THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY AND ASEAN Thomas Daniel and Puteri Nor Ariane Yasmin INTRODUCTION This article aims to provide a compressive overview of the dynamics between the IndoPacific Strategy (IPS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). To achieve this in a structured manner, the article will be organised into four main components. First, it will explore ASEAN’s mechanisms in engaging with external and major powers, including the evolution of ASEAN’s relations with the United States and China. Second, it will explore the various iterations of the Indo-Pacific strategies and initiatives by various stakeholders and what they could mean for ASEAN. A contextual understanding of both is important to help readers, especially those from outside the region, understand the background from which ASEAN and its member states view and employ the IPS. A key development in ASEAN’s engagement with the IPS has been the release of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The document, which caused a stir when it came out, will be the third component to be addressed in this paper. The AOIP indicates both the thinking of ASEAN as an organisation on the IPS and, also, how ASEAN might choose to engage with it. Lastly, this article will conclude with potential opportunities and challenges for ASEAN in its engagement with the IPS. ASEAN IN THE MIDDLE OF MAJOR POWER ENGAGEMENT ASEAN’s multilateral mechanisms The founding members of ASEAN knew that, while there was no way to avoid major power influence in the region, they stood a better chance of navigating the great game of the Cold War by having a common grouping. One of the ways that ASEAN sought to retain its strategic autonomy was to draw in all regional
powers and engage them comprehensively as a regional grouping.1 Ten key external partners and stakeholders were recognised as Dialogue Partners (Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, New Zealand, and the US) and four as Sectoral Dialogue Partners (Pakistan, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey).2 ASEAN also worked to promote and grow various multilateral regional initiatives and mechanisms that were inclusive in nature and involved all major powers. The key element in all these was an ASEAN that was put at the centre, in the “driving seat.” These initiatives and mechanisms include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Forum (EAF). The former, established in 1994, plays a key role in convening officials, academics, think-tankers, and other security and diplomatic practitioners for frank discussions on both longstanding and emerging security issues across the Asia-Pacific.3 The latter, first convened in 2005, is one of the few leaders-led dialogues which brings top leaders and policymakers together from across the Asia-Pacific to discuss broad strategic issues, focussing on the evolving regional architecture. Other important mechanisms include the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea) and ASEAN Closer Economic Relations (ASEAN plus Australia and New Zealand). The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ASEAN plus eight of its Dialogue Partners except Canada and the EU) is the only active high-level regional military multilateral mechanism. It aims to strengthen security and defence cooperation for peace, stability, and development in the wider Asia-Pacific region. In a post–Cold War Asia-Pacific, having ASEAN in the “driving seat” of such regional mechanisms was beneficial to both the US REGIONAL ISSUES
133
