Philippine Foreign Policy in the Context of the Southeast Asian Great Power Competition

Péter Klemensits

After his presidential election victory in May 2016, Rodrigo Duterte started to form his new, admittedly “independent” Philippine foreign policy. In spite of his campaign promises, he totally redefined the country’s foreign and security policy strategy, the most striking aspect of which is a tendency to turn from the United States and to open towards China. Since the Philippines traditionally counts as the most important Southeast Asian ally of the US, Duterte’s political turn could have critical impacts on not only the future of the narrower region but also the American–Chinese geostrategic rivalry in the Asia-Pacific.

Following the Philippines’ independence of the United States in June 1946, the country and the US remained close allies and “partners.” By virtue of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States guarantees the protection of the country, while the 1947 Military Base Agreement allows the United States to use facilities such as the Naval Base Subic Bay. Therefore, by the end of the Cold War, the country’s political, military, and economic relations were determined by its dependency on the USA.

In 1991, however, the Philippine Senate refused to extend the American military presence and to conclude another agreement on a military base with regard to their right to pursue a sovereign foreign policy. However, this event had only minor effects on the political and economic relations between the two countries. The Philippine government began to see China’s emergence and its South China Sea expansion more and more as a threat, and, therefore, at the beginning of the 2000s, simultaneously with the global war on terror, it again became interested in strengthening the alliance.

Besides Vietnam, the Philippines represented the strongest position against China in the South China Sea conflict among all ASEAN countries, worsening the relationship with the Asian giant while also contributing to the organisation’s division over the issue.

During the Presidency of Benigno Aquino (2010–2016), the country welcomed the announcement of the American concept of “rebalancing,” in exchange for military and political support; therefore, it became one of the most important pillars of the concept to Washington. The Obama administration openly supported the Philippines in its South China Sea dispute, and, in 2011, it declared that the two countries were historical allies and “strategic partners.” In April 2014, with the signing of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the partnership deepened further, allowing the return of the US forces on a rotational basis.

Aquino began to treat the protection of the country’s South China Sea interests as a key national geostrategic issue, and, in order to protect them, he was even willing to engage in conflicts with China when he petitioned for the case at the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 2013. Taking the economic development of the country into account, he considered the deterioration of the existing political and economic relations with China acceptable; therefore, he tried to rely more on his ASEAN partners, the USA, and its allies, Japan and South Korea. Aquino committed his country to the USA even more than before in his foreign policy, and he also supported its efforts aiming to encircle China.

DUTERTE’S “INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY” AND HIS “OPENING TO CHINA” POLICY

From the beginning, the new administration highlighted the importance of following an

Airbases in the Philippines

CHINA

Hong Kong

Hainan

South China Sea

Taiwan

Philippine Sea

PHILIPPINES

Basa Air Base Fort Magsaysay

Manila

VIETNAM

Spratly Islands (Chinese-occupied islands shown) Antonio Bautista Air Base

MALAYSIA

Sulu Sea

Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base

Lumbia Air Base

Airbases in the Philippines the US can use as part of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement

“independent foreign policy,” the main principles of which are sovereignty, sovereign equality, non-interference, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The most apparent aspects of Duterte’s new approach are distancing its country from the United States and opening towards China and Russia. The court decision of 12 July 2016 on the South China Sea dispute basically favoured the Philippines and rejected the position of China. Despite this, Duterte sought compromises with China. During his visit to Beijing on 18–21 October 2016, the Philippine president confirmed the essential elements of his country’s “independent foreign policy,” which contained the maintenance of its security and economic ties with the US and, at the same time, a commitment to close economic cooperation with China. Hostility towards Beijing was no longer a strategy that paid off. China, realising after Duterte’s opening towards it that its non-cooperative conduct had achieved its goal—that is, it had made the Philippines seek cooperation by taking a firm stance—changed its strategy. Duterte was welcomed at the highest level during his visit to China in October 2016, meeting President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang. He was accompanied by four hundred Filipino businessmen, demonstrating the importance of economic ties. The parties signed twenty-one agreements worth USD 24 billion, of which Chinese investments accounted for USD 15 billion, complemented by a USD 9 billion credit line. The Philippines does not wish to be left out of China’s “21st-century Silk Road” project, so the majority of investments are linked to infrastructure development.

In May 2017, President Duterte visited Beijing in person again to attend the Belt and Road Forum, in which representatives of the BRI

stakeholder countries participated. Many economic and energy agreements were signed during the negotiations, while the Philippine president talked about the positive effects of Chinese investments on the island nation’s development.

Over the past three years, relations between China and the Philippines took a new path, confirmed, among others, by high-level visits and signed agreements. President Xi Jinping’s visit to Manila in November 2018 can be regarded as the culmination of the cooperative strategy, as the parties signed twenty-nine contracts on that occasion, covering economic, defence, justice, and cultural fields. The agreement to jointly explore the energy sources in the South China Sea signalled that Manila was willing to adapt to Chinese political requirements for the sake of cooperation. In April 2019, at the second BRI Forum, nineteen additional investment agreements worth over USD 12 billion were signed, proving the continuation of the cooperation.

To Duterte, it is important that he and the Chinese government share the same position on antidrug actions and human rights and, at the same time, both countries reject foreign criticism. From the perspective of real politics, close cooperation with the Chinese might trigger new favours from the US—if it wishes to maintain its former position—and the Philippines might finally profit from playing the two great powers off against each other.

According to the Duterte government, its participation in the New Maritime Silk Road initiative of the 21st century will clearly increase the country’s international competitiveness, as infrastructure improvements will reduce the cost of trade with China, as well as with Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. What is more, new markets will open up to the Philippine industry and agriculture while millions of new jobs are created.

However, despite the spectacular plans, very few projects have reached the implementation phase by 2020, which also calls into question the effectiveness of the “Opening to China” policy. Red tape, the resistance coming from military circles, caution on the Chinese side, environmental concerns, or even fear of a debt trap have slowed down the majority of investments or, in some cases, even shut them down temporarily or definitively. Proving his determination, at the end of 2019, President Duterte commissioned the China Communications Construction Company Ltd (CCCC) to build the Sangley Point International Airport worth USD 10 billion, which, however, raised questions about the transparency of investments. Duterte is trying to promote the project in every possible way, including by cutting red tape, but this does not lessen the significance of the fact that, according to the National Economic Development Authority, only twenty-one of the seventy-five planned projects can be expected to be completed by 2022, the end of Duterte’s term.

NEW DYNAMICS IN THE US–PHILIPPINES RELATIONS

After the Obama administration had criticised Duterte’s antidrug campaign in late 2016, the relationship between the two heads of state deteriorated. Duterte also objected to being subject to lectures by the US on human rights issues, and, therefore, he needed new allies such as China and Russia—the more so because Washington was not willing to provide him proper weaponry any more. During his visit to Beijing on 20 October, he spoke about separation from the US, by which he, as explained later, did not mean the termination of diplomatic, defence, and economic relations but merely an independent foreign policy reorientation. In fact, Duterte did not wish to be part of the concept of “rebalancing” announced by Barack Obama and would not like to keep fighting against China—since it was not worth at all to his country. He would rather like to focus on cooperation with the US and other countries. Duterte tries to establish good relations with both major rival powers, but—at least in his rhetoric—he is ready to take actual steps to distance his country from the US. Duterte would not like to give up US investments either, but, as these have not even been able to

meet the country’s infrastructural needs, it is clear that there is a need to look for new partners.

The Philippine political leadership eagerly awaited Donald Trump’s presidency, as, after his inauguration on 20 January 2017, the new US president spectacularly broke with the objectives and values represented by the Democrat government in his new foreign policy. Soon, it turned out that the issue of human rights was not a priority to Trump during his negotiations with the Philippine political leadership. Trump did not deny supporting the antidrug campaign of the Filipino president, let alone his other domestic and foreign political measures. Since the Trump cabinet—similarly to Obama—soon realised the strategic importance of the Philippine–US relations, it did its best to mitigate tensions and restore harmonious cooperation.

One of the decisive elements of Trump’s Asia tour in November 2017 was his meeting with the Filipino president and the opportunity to reform their bilateral relations. Following the APEC Summit organised in Vietnam, President Trump arrived in the Philippines on 12 November, where his first official meeting with the Filipino president took place.

Sources are contradictory on how much the two presidents talked about human rights during their negotiations in Manila; however, it is obvious that both Trump and Duterte blamed the Obama administration for the deterioration of their relations. The outcome of the negotiations suggests that the two countries’ relations were restored, and the basis of the compromise is that Duterte stops his outbursts against the USA, and, in return, Trump does not insist on the issue of human rights. The good relationship between the two presidents has much weight; nevertheless, the close political relations between the two countries that could be observed prior to Duterte are not likely to be restored in the near future. Trump is fully aware of the strategic importance of the Philippines, which is proved by the fact that he qualified the island country as the “most prime piece of real estate” in military terms and said that he had primarily negotiated with Duterte about the status of bilateral trade.

Obviously, the two presidents represent a more pragmatic foreign policy approach today, focussing on the acquisition of economic benefits and the enforcement of the interests of their own countries, combined with regional security policy objectives.

The new US National Security Strategy released in December confirmed Trump’s commitment to tighter bilateral relations while it stood up for respecting the principles of free navigation and overflight—as opposed to China. This document also pledged to protect the sovereignty of certain Southeast Asian countries against the increasing Chinese influence.

During Duterte’s presidency, the Philippines aims to build as close economic cooperation with China as possible, while, in terms of security, the country also relies on Russia and intends to use Japan as a counterbalance against both countries. Nevertheless, the US–Philippines alliance is still of essential importance in security policy, since the USA provides a guarantee for the defence of the country.

The National Defense Strategy, issued by the Pentagon in 2018, highlighted the necessity to strengthen alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and this is particularly true for the Philippines. At the same time, the Duterte government initiated the revision of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 at the end of the year and expected the US to take a clear stand primarily on the claims about the South China Sea islands. During his visit to Manila in March 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo finally publicly confirmed the Treaty of 1951 and guaranteed to protect Filipino interests. Of course, re-evaluating and, if necessary, amending the Treaty, which is the basis of the alliance, was not removed from the agenda, but it does not seem to be possible during President Duterte’s and President Trump’s current term because of domestic political and strategic risks. (In spring 2020, Duterte attempted to terminate the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement but was finally forced to suspend his decision for foreign and domestic policy reasons.)

OLD AND NEW ALLIES

After his visit to China, the Filipino President also visited Japan between 25 and 27 October 2016, which may be regarded as symbolic. Duterte assured his hosts that he had only discussed the strengthening of economic relations with China and the creation of a new military alliance was not a subject. At the same time, he naturally tried to encourage the extension of Japanese investments and business relations.

During his meetings with Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, Duterte insisted on strengthening the strategic partnership between the two countries and praised Japan’s defence security and development support. The parties also agreed on the purchase of additional training aircraft. Regarding territorial disputes, they confirmed that ensuring the freedom of navigation and settling disputes in line with international law is in the interest of both countries. In May 2019, Duterte travelled to Japan for the third time. During his visit, he and his hosts agreed on an investment package worth USD 6 billion, laying the foundations of the “golden age” of Philippine–Japanese relations.

The continuation of the defence cooperation with Japan is indispensable to Duterte, who increasingly intends to rely on the Eastern Asian country instead of the US. However, he wishes to do so not to the extent and in the fashion imposed by the Americans, unlike the Aquino government. The Filipino president would not like to expose his country to Chinese interests, and he views Japan as an ally which adequately counterbalances Beijing’s power.

South Korea is a less costly, geographically favourable alternative for the Philippines to modernise its military hardware; therefore, the Philippines can become a major customer of South Korea, and it is one of the guarantors of freedom of navigation in the South Chinese Sea. The possible escalation of the conflict would affect, inter alia, maritime trade in the region and, thus, in particular, South Korea. Both parties can gain from closer security cooperation: as to the Philippines, business with South Korea could mean more up-to-date assets and yet another partner beyond the United States, while, to South Korea, it means a larger market and at the same time, the country could become a

President Rodrigo Duterte with Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzō and members of the Philippine delegation during the former's visit to Japan in 2016

relevant geopolitical factor in the region and contribute to the stability of the South China Sea.

In the meeting of APEC country leaders in Lima in November 2016, Duterte showed a willingness to develop closer cooperation with Russia, besides China. He called Vladimir Putin his idol and gladly accepted the Russian president’s invitation to Moscow. He also confirmed his “independent” foreign policy ambitions and his wish to join the Chinese–Russian alliance.

After his visit to Moscow in May 2017, Duterte travelled to Russia again in the autumn of 2019. The two parties continue to strengthen economic relations, and the Philippine government pledged to extend their defence cooperation in particular. Other factors are set aside, however, since the partnership with Russia has its limits, due to the fact that the Philippine military force is not interested in reinforcing these relations, and, therefore, its outcome is doubtful.

Regarding his regional policy, Duterte stands for closer cooperation with ASEAN countries, as proven many times before. For his fight against the spread of corruption, drugs, and terrorism, Duterte won the support of his partners, and, at the same time, his moderate standpoint in the South China Sea dispute is also generally accepted. Vietnam and the Philippines even worked out a six-year action plan against transnational crime. The stimulation of bilateral trade and investments also featured on the agenda. In Malaysia, Duterte was willing to put aside the disputed issue of Sabah, and he signed agreements on the improvement of living standards and support for the Filipino communities overseas. The issues of piracy, terrorism, and more effective actions against kidnapping were also in the spotlight.

In 2017, on the 50th anniversary of ASEAN, the Philippines took over its presidency, which was another great opportunity for Manila. At the 28–29th ASEAN Summit, the Southeast Asian countries were willing to join China’s New Silk Road project and to cooperate with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Under the leadership of Duterte, China and the ASEAN countries were expected to cooperate more closely, at least on shaping of a joint Southeast Asian standpoint, which is advantageous for Beijing.

THE “BALANCE SHEET” OF THE “INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY”

In the Asia-Pacific region, the balance of power has already started to shift towards an emerging China; therefore, it is highly likely that the US will lose positions. As a consequence of the changed international balance of power, Southeast Asian states will try to capitalise on this trend and choose the most advantageous relations among rivalling great powers. In the past, the Philippines was a major US ally in political, military, and economic terms alike, but, by now, the results of this process can be questioned.

It was in this situation that Rodrigo Duterte entered, instantly realising the need for change in the Philippine foreign policy. The last four years have been hallmarked by his efforts to realise his “independent foreign policy,” and pursuing that, he has chosen the advantages of closer economic cooperation with China and of distancing from the US. We do not know yet what results the president’s new initiatives will yield and how effective his policy will be in the long term, because it will be affected by both internal and external factors. Two of the most important questions in this aspect are how long Duterte will retain the needed popularity and how much the powerful elite will support his approach to China and Russia. The army, which has been an ally of the US, and the Filipino business elite with American ancestry can guarantee that the security partnership with the US will endure, and the Philippines, just as in the past, will remain a substantial US ally in Southeast Asia. Although it is too early to talk about the failure of the “Opening to China” policy, the current administration must do everything to ensure its effectiveness. Given the long-term geopolitical consequences, Beijing cannot accept a fiasco either, as it would have a negative impact on its power relations in Asia and the Pacific.