PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN GREAT POWER COMPETITION Péter Klemensits After his presidential election victory in May 2016, Rodrigo Duterte started to form his new, admittedly “independent” Philippine foreign policy. In spite of his campaign promises, he totally redefined the country’s foreign and security policy strategy, the most striking aspect of which is a tendency to turn from the United States and to open towards China. Since the Philippines traditionally counts as the most important Southeast Asian ally of the US, Duterte’s political turn could have critical impacts on not only the future of the narrower region but also the American–Chinese geostrategic rivalry in the Asia-Pacific. Following the Philippines’ independence of the United States in June 1946, the country and the US remained close allies and “partners.” By virtue of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States guarantees the protection of the country, while the 1947 Military Base Agreement allows the United States to use facilities such as the Naval Base Subic Bay. Therefore, by the end of the Cold War, the country’s political, military, and economic relations were determined by its dependency on the USA. In 1991, however, the Philippine Senate refused to extend the American military presence and to conclude another agreement on a military base with regard to their right to pursue a sovereign foreign policy. However, this event had only minor effects on the political and economic relations between the two countries. The Philippine government began to see China’s emergence and its South China Sea expansion more and more as a threat, and, therefore, at the beginning of the 2000s, simultaneously with the global war on terror, it again became interested in strengthening the alliance. Besides Vietnam, the Philippines represented the strongest position against China in the South
China Sea conflict among all ASEAN countries, worsening the relationship with the Asian giant while also contributing to the organisation’s division over the issue. During the Presidency of Benigno Aquino (2010–2016), the country welcomed the announcement of the American concept of “rebalancing,” in exchange for military and political support; therefore, it became one of the most important pillars of the concept to Washington. The Obama administration openly supported the Philippines in its South China Sea dispute, and, in 2011, it declared that the two countries were historical allies and “strategic partners.” In April 2014, with the signing of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the partnership deepened further, allowing the return of the US forces on a rotational basis. Aquino began to treat the protection of the country’s South China Sea interests as a key national geostrategic issue, and, in order to protect them, he was even willing to engage in conflicts with China when he petitioned for the case at the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 2013. Taking the economic development of the country into account, he considered the deterioration of the existing political and economic relations with China acceptable; therefore, he tried to rely more on his ASEAN partners, the USA, and its allies, Japan and South Korea. Aquino committed his country to the USA even more than before in his foreign policy, and he also supported its efforts aiming to encircle China. DUTERTE’S “INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY” AND HIS “OPENING TO CHINA” POLICY From the beginning, the new administration highlighted the importance of following an ASEAN PERSPECTIVES
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