The Great Divider/Connecter—Southeast Asia’s Future: A Shatterbelt or a Gateway Region?

Zsolt Csepregi

On our planet, every place is unique in its own way, but, if we could identify “degrees of uniqueness,” an obvious candidate for the most outstanding and complex region would be Southeast Asia, without doubt. There is no other place on Earth which has such duality as this grand geographic stripe that combines a mainland territory and a chain of islands spanning more than 6,000 kilometres in length from Myanmar to the Eastern edge of Indonesia. It both separates the surrounding oceans and landmasses and connects them in the maritime realm through its navigable straits. This region is also home to hundreds of millions of people from all major religions, thousands of ethnicities and languages. Arguably, no region on the globe is more diverse than Southeast Asia. As I shall later elaborate, many experts remind us in complacent Europe that this area is poised to be the pivot of the 21st century, the century of the Indo-Pacific, a region divided and connected by Southeast Asia that largely defines the coming decades in terms of great power war or lasting peace.

A UNIQUE PLACE ON EARTH

Southeast Asia is situated at the crossroads of three geostrategic realms: the East Asian, the Asia-Pacific, and the emerging South Asian realm. These realms constitute the Indo-Pacific, which, according to geopolitical thinker Robert D. Kaplan, will become the new global demographic heartland by 2050 with its more than seven billion inhabitants—vast in riches, but also significantly contested between great powers.1 In fact, Southeast Asia not only divides but is also divided between these realms as they are the ones that constitute the surrounding Indo-Pacific. The Indochinese states belong to the East Asian realm, Myanmar partly belongs to South Asia, while the rest are firmly positioned in the Asia-Pacific. Naturally, these geostrategic units do not solely signify geographic location but certain political alignments, as well. East Asia is dominated politically and economically by the People’s Republic of China, itself being torn between its continental and maritime characteristics. The Asia-Pacific is led by the United States—although the Asian pivot of Obama did not go as planned—and is home to major regional powers such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia. South Asia is dominated by India, a rising power, with an emphasis on the “rising” nature of the colossal country. Southeast Asia is, therefore, a location where the ambitions of the three largest and, arguably, most powerful states merge and clash, while many more medium-sized powers are influencing the region. The most important takeaway is that Southeast Asia does not constitute a geostrategic realm itself, not even a coherent geopolitical unit, but a unique pivotal region standing at crossroads.

Certain similarities can be found with Europe, as both are adjunct, densely populated territories attached to, and located on, the Rimland of the dominating geographic structure of the globe, the Eurasian supercontinent. Nonetheless, digging deeper, we uncover that differences between them are more important to highlight than any similarities, as their positions and influencing geopolitical forces differ greatly. Europe, while fractured by mountains, rivers, and shaped into peninsulas, has to contend with one strong and another semi-dormant neighbouring geostrategic realm (the Eurasian Heartland, dominated by Russia, and Africa, dominated by none). On the other hand, Southeast Asia, as stated above, has to face three strong powers or a coalition of states. For

Europe, the Atlantic Ocean and the polar region serve as great barriers to the west and to the north, respectively. These are geopolitical boons Southeast Asia does not have: the “stopping power” of the surrounding Indo-Pacific is matched by its strategic value as a global highway of trade and armed conquest.2 Even though Europe’s geography favoured the consolidation of multiple political entities and the emergence of distinct cultures, communication between them was not hindered as much as to prevent the formation of a single yet diverse, dominant geopolitical unit, the European Union. Southeast Asia, due to its fractured geographic nature, favoured the survival of thousands of distinct languages, while the true consolidation of nation states is still an ongoing process (think, for example, of Indonesia divided into a wealth of islands), and, therefore, the current regional cooperation framework, ASEAN is much more flexible than the EU. Consequently, unlike Europe, which has to contend with a relative simplicity in its geopolitical outlook, Southeast Asia is a zone of convergence for three realms surrounded by much stronger powers than any of its countries, while it has much larger geographic segmentation than Europe, lacking any kind of geographic shields.

Considering the above, Southeast Asia is in grave danger of reverting to a geopolitical shatterbelt, a geopolitical entity torn by internal disunity, strife, and the meddling of outside powers, similar to the Middle East, the archexample of shatterbelts. Yet, with all the geopolitical factors stacked against it, the region today is not a shatterbelt, unlike during the first half of the Cold War, as it has become a booming trading conglomerate of states.3 Southeast Asia did have its fair share of civil wars (communist, Islamist, and separatist insurgence in most countries), interstate clashes, and full-scale invasions (Cambodia–Vietnam, Thailand–Cambodia) but also interventions of outside powers (PRC in the South China Sea and mainland Vietnam, the US during the Vietnam War). Yet, after the Cold War

ended, the previously hostile countries converged into an intergovernmental organisation, ASEAN, founded in 1967 and based in Jakarta, Indonesia, now encompassing ten member states. This group exemplifies the quest of Southeast Asian states for defying their geopolitics and continues peaceful development against all odds.

SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE TIDE OF THE “GREAT DECOUPLING”

The context of the aforementioned unique geopolitical role is the “changing world order,” an oft-quoted concept of international relations at the highest level. It usually marks three interconnected issues which all greatly affect Southeast Asia. The first is the rise of the People’s Republic of China and its potential to surpass the United States of America.4 The second is multipolarity in the world order and the future of middle power relations.5 And the third one is the future of globalisation, or the lack thereof, and the rules-based world order as we know it. Naturally, all three issues are interrelated, but, for this argument, we will use great power relations as a basis for the scenarios ASEAN states have to face in the unfolding new world order.

In recent years, we have seen the US matching China’s rise with expanding its trade war against the emerging power. Questions whether China’s eventual challenge to the US as the global hegemon will be peaceful or will lead to a war among great powers are relevant, but we are not there yet, even though this is reportedly the primary threat according to ASEAN state leaders.6 For now, we are experiencing that two technological and economic systems started to take shape, a phenomenon only vaguely resembling the Cold War competition between the Washington- and Moscow-led blocs. In our globalised world economy, no country belongs to only one bloc. The great powers, Washington and Beijing, together with other capitals, are engaged in a highly complex tug-of-war for power, profit, and influence when conducting business on a global scale. Actions by great and middle powers can

An economic pioneer of the region: Singapore

only aid or hinder these flows yet cannot stop them but at a great price (as we have seen with the debate over 5G technology). This price can hardly be paid by middle powers engulfed in cooperation and competition between great powers. What they can do is to insist on a rulesbased order, challenged selectively by each great power in security, business, and intellectual property. Members of ASEAN are even more interested in avoiding an escalating breakdown in the rules-based international order and great power competition. This competition is threatening not only because the current leader, the US, might be replaced, but also because we may be facing a “great decoupling” between the politico–economic–technological regimes in the international area and a leaderless world.7 The COVID crisis has led to mutual diplomatic attacks and scapegoating between Beijing and Washington, and the erosion of international bodies like WHO, as well, while it has also increased discussion on how to make supply chains more “resilient.” It is no surprise that highly mercantile ASEAN states are alarmed by this process and need to provide alternative solutions for these systemic challenges. As the change in the world order is reshaping old structures, some of these are breaking down, while new ones are emerging, but the question remains whether the

latter are more resilient and provide more opportunities for the ASEAN countries’ citizens or they are semi-optimal solutions. For now, ASEAN, as a community of states, seems to be constantly forming into a more optimal state; therefore, we, in Europe, should study their way to find solutions for the challenges which are to be met all around the world..

THIS IS THE ASEAN WAY

So what constitutes the secret of ASEAN countries? Can the organisation and its underlying philosophy endure the storm of great power competition? In their above-cited book titled The ASEAN Miracle, the academic Kishore Mahbubani and the veteran Singaporean diplomat Jeffery Sng explain that the intergovernmental organisation’s success is based on the distinct culture and the set of values according to which it operates. These values also provide ground for constructive diplomatic discussions between leaders and officials. According to this view, facilitating cooperation between countries as distinct as ASEAN members in a highly contested geopolitical region can only be based on consensus, and a culture of community and unity.8 Quiet, backdoor diplomacy managed to bridge the gaps between the members looking for consensus, compromise, and progress on issues of common interest, and, on the other hand, avoiding topics where agreement is distant or nearly impossible.9 ASEAN looks for the greatest common divisor solution and always makes sure to have an opportunity to save face in a disagreement. This approach is very different from the one preferred by the European Union, which prides itself on being always very principled and having a “frank” and “transparent” discussion (of course, based on the preferences of each political side). ASEAN instead opts for being pragmatic and effective and forgoes the theatrics of conflicting diplomacy. In East Asia, sovereignty and non-intervention (concepts challenged by Western academia and civil organisations) are key concepts which have to be preserved and respected, but this conservative diplomatic conduct also has an implicit military threat looming over the cordial relations.10 Unlike Europe, Southeast Asia does not have the luxury of a favourable geopolitical environment, and its geopolitical pressures necessitate a flexible approach to, and conduct of cooperation on, issues of common interests— and there is no interest more crucial than peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

It is remarkable that, in spite of the differences, in virtually all aspects that define a state (geography, ethnicity, religion, political system, economic development), ASEAN countries have a solid and aligned view on the world and a vision for the role of the Southeast Asian region in the Indo-Pacific. Unlike many official “vision documents,” the ASEAN Outlook on the IndoPacific is a short and effective strategic base to understand how the region’s capitals envision their joint role: “Southeast Asia lies in the center of these dynamic regions and is a very important conduit and portal to the same. Therefore, it is in the interest of ASEAN to lead the shaping of their economic and security architecture and ensure that such dynamics will continue to bring about peace, security, stability and prosperity for the peoples in the Southeast Asia as well as in the wider Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions or the Indo-Pacific. . . . Against this backdrop, ASEAN Leaders have agreed to further discuss an initiative that reinforces the ASEAN-centered regional architecture, namely, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”11

Southeast Asians see themselves in a central position in the coming Indo-Pacific–oriented world order. The keyword is “central” because this is the root for all the opportunities and challenges stemming from their unique position. The opportunities lie in the economic field, as Southeast Asia evaluates complementary neighbouring regions in terms of economic output. The Indo-Pacific has virtually every element of a matching economic megaunit: raw materials coming from the upstart, booming economies in (East) Africa, energy sources in the Middle East, large markets and industrial regions in China and India, technology and capital in South Korea and Japan, and the more distant but ever-present US. Challenges come

The ancient Khmer city of Angkor in Cambodia is one of the most visited places in Southeast Asia.

from the aforementioned clash of interests in Southeast Asia, primarily in and around the South China Sea, which is the pivot of security in the region and potentially in the wider IndoPacific. The South China Sea is the key to China as an ascending power just as the Aegean Sea was for Ancient Greece, the Mediterranean Sea for the Roman Empire, or the Caribbean Sea for the US.12 The country cannot become a secure great power without controlling the sea and attaining free access through the so-called first island chain that prevents China from reaching the open oceans and becoming a mature, global maritime power. Apart from the South China Sea, the straits of Southeast Asia are also potential nodes of conflict, as they are the blood veins of a significant part of the global economy and also have pivotal importance to the IndoPacific states’ economic well-being and, thus, their security. Southeast Asia has the potential to become the most armed maritime region, as Dr Háda so eloquently demonstrates in his article in the present issue of In Focus. According to classic geopolitics, Southeast Asia should be a shatterbelt, and China should move to dominate it, while other great powers should aggressively try to seek a balance in it. ASEAN has a different vision for itself, being a node of connection instead of a shatterbelt, and it has every chance to succeed.

TACKLING THE CHALLENGE, BECOMING A STABLE GATEWAY

Despite its convoluted geopolitical position, Southeast Asia has a lot of advantages. Its massive, young, and an ever more educated and productive population of more than 700 million people embracing a sweeping digitalisation is made even more dynamic by the complementary nature of capital, manpower, and raw materials that abound in regional subunits, which all make it a go-to place for anyone interested in making a profit from the global market.13 Therefore, ASEAN, while building on

its inherent strengths, also aims to defy its fate as a shatterbelt and transform itself into a massive gateway between the three geostrategic realms. Becoming a stable gateway requires internal robustness (so that the incoming forces do not “bring down” the gates themselves) and connectivity infrastructure in all domains. The exact concept of the Indo-Pacific varies according to each global player, primarily as to whether any political, economic, or security framework built on it should serve as a platform for balancing China. Although these differing approaches will become a major issue if the present developments go forward, all parties agree that everyone would benefit from enhanced connectivity opportunities in Southeast Asia.

It is worthwhile to look at Japanese views on ASEAN, as it is a major (but not a great) power geographically close to China and Southeast Asia, as well. It would gain from the successes of ASEAN and lose with more competition and deterioration of international transportation and economic environment. Japanese experts, therefore, highlight the importance of hard and soft infrastructure development in Southeast Asia, identifying it as the number-one positive factor contributing to a true win-win solution for the Indo-Pacific.14 Hard infrastructure would entail ports, train and highway systems, while soft infrastructure is closely related to the underlying digital networks in the region. Connectivity is the key to realise the opportunities inherent in the Southeast Asian region, which would bring all major players together and provide transportation corridors for their economic interactions through the challenging terrain. The goal is to create in, and through, ASEAN countries enough value for all involved parties that going into a zero-sum competition be a much-feared scenario by all sides. This balancing act relies not only on ASEAN states but also on great and middlesized powers which provide capital, technology, investment, and business opportunities. Economic interdependence is, of course, a required but not a sufficient factor because, without substantial hard power, balancing against any non-status quo power is impossible.15 Southeast Asia would still need US involvement but, arguably, only an indirect one, which does not threaten China as much to motivate it to sacrifice the above-mentioned economic opportunities.16 The future of the Indo-Pacific, and that of ASEAN itself, is not pre-written, as both alarming factors and promising opportunities spring from its geopolitical nature. The Southeast Asian region will draw competition, but it possesses the internal capabilities, position, and guiding vision to continue to manoeuvre successfully among the giants of the adjunct geostrategic realms. It proves that geography does not determine a country’s fate, it only provides a canvas which will be completed with the paint of competing and cooperating collective actions, guided by well-intentioned or toxic human will.

WHAT WE CAN LEARN IN CEE

Many experts have claimed that the Indo-Pacific is the new grand theatre of mankind’s future and Southeast Asia will be a pivotal region in the 21st century. Understanding it, therefore, is a must, but I claim, furthermore, that for Central Eastern Europe there are additional motives for developing a greater understanding of ASEAN’s modus operandi. While I have pointed out that Europe’s geopolitical situation differs greatly

Southeast Asia is home to more than 240 million Muslims—about 42% of Southeast Asians, and about 25% of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims. (In the picture: The Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah Mosque in Malaysia)

from Southeast Asia’s, the CEE region has much more in common with it, as it is (albeit on a smaller scale) locked in a similar three-way bind between Western Europe, the Eurasian Heartland dominated by Russia, and the Eastern Mediterranean hosting the slumbering great power Turkey. The two takeaways for CEE countries should be ASEAN’s emphasis on respecting sovereignty and its search for areas of cooperation where there is mutual interest, a value also reflected in the Visegrad Cooperation. Besides, connectivity must be developed in CEE, by making a denser and more capable network (in speed and volume), and also by balancing and diversifying from the one-sided Western European (mainly German) supply chain through strengthening North–South connectivity. Soft infrastructure is also an important area to develop, and CEE will not avoid controversies, as we have seen with the introduction of 5G networks. To sum up, we have to turn around the old logic of trying to export European solutions to the “rest” of the world and realise that, in many fields, Asia has already surpassed us. We must learn the lessons, both positive and negative, which stem from the geopolitical foundry of the Indo-Pacific, the Southeast Asian region, and the emerging, successful, and rightly proud ASEAN member states.

ENDNOTES

1

Robert D. Kaplan: Asia’s Cauldron. The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific. Random House, New York, 2014. 181.

2

Parag Khanna: Connectography. Mapping the Future of Global Civilization. Random House, New York, 2016. 237–241.

3

Saul B. Cohen: Geopolitics. The Geography of International Relations. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2009. 300–303.

4

Wu Baiyi: Rethinking the Driving Forces and Conditions Affecting the Evolution of the International Order. China–CEE Institute, Working Paper. 2020/17. 30 April 2020. <https://bit. ly/2zIAOK8 >

5

Laura von Daniels: Repercussions of the US–China Conflict on the Multilateral Order. SWP Research Paper 2020/RP 04. April 2020. 43–46. <10.18449/2020RP04 >

Michael J. Green: Geopolitical Scenarios for Asia after COVID-19. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 31 March 2020. <https://bit.ly/35Zr8Xs >

7

Ian Bremmer–Cliff Kupchan: Top Risks 2020: Coronavirus Edition. Eurasia Group. 9 March 2020. <https://bit. ly/3fSQQld >

8

Kishore Mahbubani–Jeffery Sng: The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace. Ridge Books, Singapore, 2017. 179–184.

9

Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First. Singapore and the Asian Economic Boom. Harper Business, New York, 2011. 331. 10 Henry Kissinger: World Order. Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History. Penguin Books, London, 2014. 178–179. 11 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 23 June 2019. <https://bit.ly/2WZoyfX > 1. 12 Robert D. Kaplan: Revenge of Geography. What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate. Random House, New York, 2013. 220. 13 Parag Khanna: South-east Asia rides fourth wave of regional growth. Financial Times. 11 May 2020. <https://on.ft. com/361Sdcu > 14 Kei Koga [et al.]: U.S.–Japan Cooperation on Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture. Asia Strategy Initiative, Policy Memorandum #3. September 2019. Sasakawa Peace Foundation. 6. <https://bit.ly/2WVk8qw > 15 John J. Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., New York, 2014. 407–411. 16 Kaplan, 225–227.