India’s Act East Engagement: From Southeast Asia to the Indo-Pacific

Rahul Mishra

The Act East Policy, launched in 2014, has been lauded as one of the most successful foreign policy initiatives of the Narendra Modi government. It has bolstered India’s eastward engagement and facilitated its comprehensive institutional engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its several multilateral mechanisms. Its contributions to strengthening India’s diplomatic footwork in the region have been numerous—both at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

Over the past six years of the Modi government, India’s eastward engagement has acquired a new dimension. A critically important aspect of the expansion of the Act East Policy has been the drafting of the vision for the IndoPacific order, which places the ASEAN at its core. India’s eastward engagement is characterised by an exchange of high-level visits, the elevation of relations, the signing of agreements, engaging in dialogue on issues of mutual interest, and shared concerns with likeminded countries. The emerging Indo-Pacific construct has given an opportunity to India and its friends to cooperate in the Southeast Asian region and beyond for maintaining the strategic equilibrium and preserving a rules-based order. In this context, this paper attempts to explore the central tenets of India’s eastward engagement in the emerging Indo-Pacific order, manifested in the Act East Policy.

UPGRADATION OF THE ACT EAST POLICY

In 2014, the Look East Policy was revised and upgraded to become the Act East Policy. When the Modi government assumed power, the first official announcement in this regard was by former External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj during her visit to Vietnam in August 2014. She stated, “Now it is time to not just look but act. Under the [Narendra] Modi government, we will have an Act East policy.”1 Modi spoke of the Act East Policy during his participation in the ninth EAS held in Naypyidaw, Myanmar, in 2014. He stated, “Since entering office six months ago my government has moved with a great sense of priority and speed to turn our ‘Look East policy’ into ‘Act East policy.’”2 When Modi came to power in 2014, he announced the Neighbourhood First policy to reset ties in the neighbourhood and prioritise relations with countries in the South Asian region.

The transition from the Look East to the Act East Policy was also about reinvigorating ties with the ASEAN region and beyond. The Act East Policy’s focus has certainly been on the ASEAN countries, but another important dimension has also been added. Not just the ASEAN economies but also countries in the wider Indo-Pacific region have come under the ambit of the Act East Policy. Southeast Asia, East Asia, Oceania, and the Pacific Island countries comprise the geographical canvass of the Act East Policy today, while the Indo-Pacific approach is wider in scope, including even the United States as a part of its vision. The areas of cooperation now include political, economic, defence, security, cultural, people-to-people, and other linkages. The key aspect of the Act East Policy is that India is projecting itself as a major and responsible stakeholder in shaping the Indo-Pacific regional order. Rising bonhomie with the US, Japan, and Australia is an essential element of this vision.

Highlighting key aspects of the Act East Policy, India’s Ministry of External Affairs states, “[t]he key principles and objectives of ‘Act East Policy’ is [sic!] to promote economic cooperation, cultural ties and develop a strategic relationship with countries in the Asia-Pacific region through

Narendra Modi, prime minister of India (middle, in white) and ASEAN heads of state and government at the Rashtrapati Bhavan in New Delhi in 2018 (from left: Aung San Suu Kyi, state counsellor of Myanmar [Burma], Rodrigo Roa Duterte, president of the Philippines, Prayuth Chan-ocha, prime minister of Thailand, Nguyen Phuc, prime minister of Vietnam, Lee Hsien Loong, prime minister of Singapore, Hassanal Bolkiah, sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan of Brunei, Hun Sen, prime minister of Cambodia, Joko Widodo, president of Indonesia, Thongloun Sisoulith, prime minister of Laos, and Najib Razak, prime minister of Malaysia)

continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels thereby providing enhanced connectivity to the States of North Eastern Region with other countries in our neighbourhood.”3 The Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ description of the key objectives of the Act East Policy showcases three elements. First, strengthening and exploring different aspects of bilateral relations with the countries of the region. Second, enhancing multilateral subregional and regional cooperation efforts with ASEAN—this is not only pivotal to steer ties with ASEAN but also with other dialogue partners and participants through other ASEANdriven mechanisms and meetings. Finally, the third component has strong domestic underpinnings. Building infrastructure and connectivity within the eight North Eastern states of India and linking them with the ASEAN region is a key aspect of the Act East Policy.

In 2018, the late Sushma Swaraj, the former External Affairs Minister of India, held a meeting with the Chief Ministers of the North Eastern provinces of India to emphasise the importance of the region in the Act East Policy. She stated, “[g]reater connectivity and economic integration of India’s northeast with its eastern neighbours was considered a key focus area for growth and development of the region. … Continued development of relevant infrastructure both within the state and at international borders was also discussed with a view to enhancing trade, investment, tourism and people-topeople ties.”4

Connectivity has become an important objective of India’s regional engagement and is considered a key component of Modi’s foreign policy. This is also important in the context of the China-initiated Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of which India is not a partner. One of the key

additions in the Act East Policy was the additional emphasis on ensuring intraregional connectivity within India’s North Eastern states and linking them with the ASEAN region. Today, some of the remote state capitals in the North Eastern region of India have direct flights to the Southeast Asian capitals such as Bangkok.

RELEVANCE OF THE ACT EAST POLICY

The Look East/Act East Policy is one of India’s most successful foreign policy initiatives. Although India factors China in its eastward engagement, it has been cautious not to make it a policy which revolves around China. It has more to do with India’s aspirations to establish stronger ties with regional countries. Actually, India has never been far behind China in the region and occupied an important place there on its own merit. While China has ethnic affinities with some of the Southeast Asian countries, India also shares strong age-old cultural and civilisational linkages with them. Under the Act East Policy, it tried to further revive those linkages.

India supports and facilitates the growth of the lesser developed countries in the region through its capacity-building programmes. It has provided lines of credit and has been involved in quick-impact projects. Capacity-building is done through its ITEC programmes, as well.

INDIA AND THE EMERGING INDO-PACIFIC ORDER

India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific is anchored to its Act East Policy, as it is through this policy that India has been able to reach out to countries that are part of the Indo-Pacific landscape.

In 2018, Modi delivered a keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue—the annual flagship conference of the International Institute of Strategic Studies—where he illustrated India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific. It was the first time that India’s approach had been officially disclosed. The choice of place for the announcement is noteworthy here. Singapore has been important for both India’s Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific vision. India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific is inclusive, open, rules-based, and not directed against any country. Modi chose Singapore to articulate his government’s policy and reassure Singapore and other ASEAN countries that ASEAN is and will always remain at the core of India’s Act East Policy and its vision and actions for the realisation of the IndoPacific order. He remarked: “The ten countries of South East Asia connect the two great oceans in both the geographical and civilizational sense. Inclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality and unity, therefore, lie at the heart of the new Indo-Pacific. India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. . . . [India’s vision for the IndoPacific region] stands for a free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity. It includes all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have a stake in it. Southeast Asia is at its centre. And, ASEAN has been and will be central to its future. That is the vision that will always guide India, as we seek to cooperate for an architecture for peace and security in this region.”5

Clearly, inclusivity, openness, and adherence to a rules-based order are the key foundational pillars of India’s Indo-Pacific vision. These are points that do not only distinguish its approach from the US’ but also find support in the Southeast Asian capitals. As a major maritime neighbour, India has been mindful of the concerns that its Southeast Asian neighbours have vis-à-vis the changing dynamics of the international and regional order. It is important to mention here that, contrary to popular belief, India has more maritime Southeast Asian neighbours than territorial ones—the latter category actually comprises only Myanmar. Indonesia, which is less than ninety miles away from India’s southernmost tip, is often missed when a list of India’s neighbours is made. Likewise, Thailand and Myanmar are also India’s maritime neighbours, and, yet, they have not been able to find their due place in the official discourse on India’s immediate neighbours. The Bay of Bengal is the natural geographic space that houses India and its three Southeast Asian neighbours—Indonesia, Thailand and

Myanmar—in addition to its Southern Asian neighbours—Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)—a subregional initiative that includes the abovementioned countries (except Indonesia), along with Bhutan and Nepal—aims to harness the collective potential of the Bay of Bengal subregion.

To ensure greater maritime connectivity for trade and commerce, India has been working with Myanmar to develop the Sittwe port in the latter country. The Kaladan multimodal project is also an important component of India’s maritime connectivity efforts. Finally, the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) project, launched by Modi in 2015, is yet another ambitious project under which India is working with its neighbours and friends in the Indian Ocean region to create better maritime trade linkages and connectivity.

INDIA AND ASEAN’S INDO-PACIFIC APPROACHES

After countries such as Japan, Australia, and India had disclosed their Indo-Pacific approaches, the ten-membered ASEAN also came up with its vision by issuing its outlook on the region. With emphasis on ASEAN centrality, it mentioned: “This Outlook is not aimed at creating new mechanisms or replacing existing ones; rather, it is an Outlook intended to enhance ASEAN’s Community building process and to strengthen and give new momentum for existing ASEAN-led mechanisms to better face challenges and seize opportunities arising from the current and future regional and global environments. Moreover, the Outlook is intended to be inclusive in terms of ideas and proposals. ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific envisages ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, with ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), as platforms for dialogue and implementation of the Indo-Pacific cooperation, while preserving their formats. Furthermore, ASEAN may also seek to develop, where appropriate, cooperation with other

India’s maritime borders

PAKISTAN INDIA BANGLADESH

MYANMAR (BURMA)

THAILAND

SRI LANKA

MALDIVES

British Indian Ocean Territory INDONESIA

International waters

regional and sub-regional mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions on specific areas of common interests to complement the relevant initiatives.”6

The ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific has remarkable elements of commonality with India’s (and Japan’s) vision. Unlike the US, both India and ASEAN highlight the “inclusive” nature of their conceptions of the region. It is also underscored that their policies are not aimed at any third country to make sure that China do not get the impression that India and ASEAN are ganging up against it. The ASEAN document highlights it as follows: “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is based on the principles of strengthening ASEAN Centrality, openness, transparency, inclusivity, a rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, complementarity with existing cooperation frameworks, equality, mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual benefit and respect for international law, such as UN Charter, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,

Indian ships in the Bay of Bengal during the 2017 Malabar naval exercise

and other relevant UN treaties and conventions, the ASEAN Charter and various ASEAN treaties and agreements and the EAS Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations (2011).”7

Both India and ASEAN have shown their inclination to include as many stakeholders as possible in ensuring a peaceful and stable IndoPacific order and that they do not want to have a coalition against any country including China. India’s attempts to convince Russia about the virtues of the Indo-Pacific construct and to motivate it to endorse the same are driven by that objective. The Indo-Pacific construct is still evolving and is making steady progress. With ASEAN’s embracing the concept, the IndoPacific will likely acquire a concrete shape sooner rather than later. However, whether China would show inclination to be an active contributor to the Indo-Pacific is still not clear. From statements coming from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the Chinese media, it seems that, so far, China has been cautious about this construct and perceives it as an anti-China stratagem of the US and its allies and friends. Nevertheless, ASEAN and countries such as Japan, India, and the US have shown requisite rationality to shape the common aspects of their Indo-Pacific visions as per their own perceptions of emerging challenges and opportunities at regional and international levels.

China’s rising assertiveness, especially at the South China Sea and the Seas of East Asia, is increasingly putting the regional security equilibrium in danger, leading only to the increased military presence of the US. China’s recent border stand-off with India and its growing disputes with Japan and countries of Southeast Asia have pushed these countries closer to the US to effectively deal with the China challenge.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE ROAD AHEAD

Despite hampering trade, people-to-people linkages, and tourist movements, the COVID19’s impact on India’s Act East Policy has so far been positive, helping the country’s cooperation with Southeast Asia. This was particularly true in the case of India’s ties with Malaysia. In the past four months, Prime Minister Modi has spoken to

the leaders of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. In April, India also approved to sell hydroxychloroquine tablets to Malaysia for use in the treatment of COVID-19 patients.8 Temasek Foundation Singapore donated 30,000 COVID-19 test kits to India.9

India got its people back from Southeast Asia under the Vande Bharat Mission during which seamless connectivity between India and Southeast Asia got manifested. The sheer number of people stranded in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines tells us how strong the people-to-people linkages have become over the past three decades. In the case of Malaysia, the “Government of India has, from 9 May till date, operated 27 flights under Vande Bharat Mission from Kuala Lumpur to various destinations in India to enable stranded Indians to return to India, and 4,679 Indians have returned to India on Vande Bharat flights so far.”10

Under Phase 4 of the Vande Bharat Mission,11 a total of 1,083 flights (849 international flights and 234 feeder flights) have been scheduled so far. These flights are operated by the Air India Group, IndiGo, SpiceJet, and GoAir from twenty-nine countries to thirty-one airports in India. More than 5,878,000 Indian nationals returned until 29 July 2020. India has already announced Phase 5 of the Vande Bharat Mission which started on 1 August 2020. A total of 792 flights (692 international and 100 domestic feeders) have been scheduled to repatriate Indians from twenty-three countries, viz., the GCC countries, the USA, Canada, the UK, Germany, France, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, China, Israel, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. The flights would arrive at twenty-one different airports across India and repatriate an estimated 130,000 Indians stranded abroad.

China has become more assertive and aggressive during the COVID-19 pandemic. This has led to further cooperation between India and the Indo-Pacific countries. The attempts to revive the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is increasingly giving this forum a China angle. The quadrilateral dialogue was revived amid China’s rising assertiveness. In 2017, the Doklam stand-off took place, and, at that point, India’s approach was firm enough. One of India’s first steps was to show interest in the Quad. This move caused uneasiness in China, and it agreed to launch a new bilateral mechanism—the “informal summit.” Till now, two “informal summits” have taken place. The first was the Wuhan Summit in April 2018, while the second summit was organised in Mamallapuram, India, in October 2019. India agreed to have these informal summits, and its somewhat conciliatory approach towards China shows that it wants to coexist peacefully and resolve differences.

Over the years, India’s eastward engagement has also been shaped by factors such as the US rebalancing to Asia, the Indo-Pacific strategies, and China’s Belt and Road initiative. Under Xi Jinping, China has become more assertive, and India–China relations have reached their all-time low in recent years especially amidst the ongoing border stand-off between the two countries. A huge trade imbalance, China’s opposition to India’s membership of the Nuclear Supplier Group, as well as frequent border stand-offs and recent violent clashes, and, of course, China’s equation with Pakistan are major reasons for India to revive its interest in the quadrilateral mechanism.

The year 2020 has been unprecedented in several ways. One of the important developments has been the recent violent face-off between Indian and Chinese soldiers. That had been the first time in forty-five years that events took a violent turn. Twenty Indian soldiers lost their lives in the conflict, which led to intensified tensions between India and China. Since a full-fledged conflict is not an option for the two countries, India is resorting to other measures. The next logical step is to ramp up ties with like-minded countries by seeking closer cooperation to tackle the China challenge. Japan, Australia, and the US are key partners in that regard. The February 2020 visit of President Donald Trump to India was also a significant move to deepen the two countries’ partnership in the Indo-Pacific

region. The visit resulted in the deal that India would purchase USD 3 billion worth of military helicopters for its navy and additional Apaches from the US.

India and Australia held a virtual summit on 4 June 2020. During the virtual summit, India–Australia bilateral relations were upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The two parties also issued the Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, where they advocated for a “free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region.”12 In a bid to revive the quad and form a coalition against China, India is mulling over the possibility of inviting Australia to the Malabar exercise which already has Japan and the US as core participants. Earlier, India was reluctant to include Australia in the exercise primarily to avoid turning it into an anti-China operation. Moreover, almost a decade ago, Australia had turned down India’s offer to be a part of this joint exercise. However, the 2020 stand-off in the Galwan valley has pushed India closer to the US and its allies. Australia’s inclusion should not just be seen as a move to irk China by having Australia as an important defence partner to India, for this move will further deepen the two countries’ partnership and bolster India’s IndoPacific engagement.

Over the past six years, India’s Act East Policy has contributed to furthering India’s engagement with the countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Island countries, as well as other countries such as Taiwan, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, and the US. A sharper focus on strategic dimensions and efforts to realise a rules-based and inclusive Indo-Pacific order has given additional impetus to the Act East Policy. That said, the Act East Policy still has a lot of scopes to improve both in terms of conceptualisation and working towards meeting short- and long-term objectives.

Prime Minister’s Remarks at the 9th East Asia Summit, Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 13 November 2014. <https://bit.ly/30pBZch >

3

Question No. 3121 Look East and Act East Policy. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 16 March 2016. <https://bit.ly/2XD0HUP >

4

Northeastern States Active Stakeholders in India’s Act East Policy, says Sushma Swaraj. The Indian Express. 5 May 2018. <https://bit.ly/31cPr2f >

5

Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri-La Dialogue (June 01, 2018). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 1 June 2018. <https://bit.ly/39SDjYb >

6

“ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 22 June 2019. <https://bit. ly/33pHMQP >

7 8

“ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”

Neha Arora–Krishan S. Das: Exclusive: India Agrees to Sell Hydroxychloroquine to Malaysia to Help Fight COVID-19. Reuters. 15 April 2020. <https://reut.rs/2Xlaezs >

9

Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury: Singapore, South Korea, Key Suppliers of Covid-19 Gear. The Economic Times. 1 April 2020. <https://bit.ly/2DhGj4v > 10 Deportation of Indians Held in Malaysian Immigration Detention Centres. New Strait Times. 11 July 2020. <https:// bit.ly/33rYdwd > 11 The statements of the following paragraph are based on the author’s conversation with Dr Varun Jeph, an Indian diplomat currently posted in Malaysia, and the statement of the spokesperson for India’s Ministry of External Affairs. 12 Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Between the Republic of India and the Government of Australia. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 4 June 2020. <https://bit. ly/31d3J31 >

ENDNOTES

1

Time for ‘Act East Policy’ and Not Just ‘Look East’: Swara. Business Standard. 24 August 2014. <https://bit. ly/2ELgYQP >