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from a Singaporean Perspective
GREAT POWER COMPETITION FROM A SINGAPOREAN PERSPECTIVE
Nicholas Fang
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The global environment today is complex and complicated and is becoming increasingly so. Even before the coronavirus pandemic hit, there had been forces at play that threatened to reshape the global geostrategic pecking order. Among these, there was a move away from multilateralism and globalisation towards a more inward-looking, nationalistic view of the world on the part of major powers and smaller nations alike. The trade war between the US and China, China’s growing assertiveness in East Asia and around the world, and the constant spectre of Russian influence, coupled with an unpredictable nuclear threat from North Korea, were high on the list of global geopolitical risks. The impact of the COVID-19 outbreak seemed to cast some of these issues aside, but some have already been making a comeback, partly thanks to the American president’s actions as he grapples with his own domestic challenges and his campaign for the upcoming presidential election in November 2020.
These global trends have a significant impact on a nation state like Singapore. This republic is a small and open economy, and its relations with the rest of the world are an important aspect of its survival and growth strategy. As such, the growing uncertainty the global community is facing is likely to pose particular challenges to Singapore in the months and years ahead.
A HISTORY OF CENTRALITY AND VULNERABILITY
To paraphrase Macbeth, history can be a bloody business, and Singapore’s past is illustrative of its need to manage and adapt to competition between great powers in order to succeed in the world. When the British landed on Singapore in 1819 and set up a trading outpost in what was then viewed as the “Far East,” the major maritime and trading powers of the world certainly saw things clearly through the lens of self-interest and competition. Sir Stamford Raffles, credited with founding modern Singapore and British Malaya, was focussing on securing critical advantage for British traders. This was juxtaposed against the Dutch interest in ensuring freedom of the seas for their own benefit. Even in those early days, it is interesting to note that Singapore leveraged this competitive dynamic to succeed. Experts have pointed out that Britain’s arrival led to the displacement of the Dutch in the region, just as the Dutch had displaced the Portuguese before them. They also emphasise that Singapore has always survived in a contested geopolitical space.
The city state was once a naval base of Melaka in Malaysia, a gatekeeper to towns along the Johor River. It was also a rendezvous point for Portuguese and Spanish armadas in the 1500s and 1600s. Since Singapore gained
Chart 1: Ethnic groups in Singapore (2018 est.)
9.0% 3.3%
13.4%
74.3%
China 14.7%
Export
Malaysia 10.8% US 6.6% Japan 6.3%
Import
South Korea 5.0% China 13.9%
Indonesia 5.8% South Korea 4.6%
Hong Kong 12.6% Japan 4.7% Thailand 4.0%
independence in 1965, the focus of the government—largely stable with a single party in power throughout its history—has been on ensuring that a small country with no natural resources to speak of, and surrounded by larger neighbours with whom it has had shifting relationships, would be able to survive and grow.
Due to geographical proximity, Singapore considers its relations with Malaysia and Indonesia as being of high priority. Historical baggage, including the traumatic separation from Malaysia and the Konfrontasi conflict with Indonesia, has meant that these ties dominate the attention of government leaders in Singapore. Looking at Singapore today, it is hard to imagine that, approximately fifty-five years ago, the country was struggling for recognition and legitimacy on the global stage.
The city state’s geostrategic location, as it is on the maritime trade routes linking the West with China and the rest of North Asia, meant that it could build on its status as a leading entrepôt port despite not having a significant hinterland of its own to drive trade. Over the years, this seaborne significance was broadened to include air travel, and Singapore is now largely recognised as a global transport hub with world-class air and seaports, as well as technological and physical infrastructure that attracts partners and
US 10.7% Malaysia 12.0%
stakeholders from all over the world. It has also become an economic and financial hub, with an efficiently operating system that has come to be known for its transparency and governance. This has enabled Singapore to be seen as an attractive place for global companies and organisations to do business and to base their regional and international headquarters there.
In just five short decades, the country has transformed itself from Third World to First, to borrow a phrase from the founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. A key aspect of this remarkable growth has been Singapore’s ability to maintain good relations with all stakeholders around the world. Singapore maintains diplomatic relations with 189 countries, although it does not necessarily have a high commission or embassy in all of them. It is a member of multilateral institutions like the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Non-Aligned Movement. Singapore supports the concept of Southeast Asian regionalism and plays an active role in ASEAN of which it is a founding member. Singapore is also a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which has its secretariat in Singapore. As part of its role in the United Nations, Singapore held a rotational seat on the UN Security Council from 2001 to 2002. It
has participated in UN peacekeeping and observer missions in Kuwait, Angola, Kenya, Cambodia, and Timor Leste. The country also bears good relations with the United Kingdom which shares ties in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) along with Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand.
These multilateral and bilateral ties in diverse fields ranging from economic, security, and diplomatic relations are critical in allowing a small nation like Singapore to remain relevant to the world and to have a share of voice in international conversations. Singapore is cognisant that the philosophy of “might is right,” or the proverbial law of the jungle means that it will be constantly at a disadvantage. While some countries still choose to hold that world view, Singapore has been working to ensure that it does not become a victim of its size.
THE US—AN OLD FRIEND
Among the key relationships that Singapore has with other countries, its ties with the United States stand out as being significant for a number of reasons. The US first opened a consulate in Singapore in 1836, some years after the island became part of the Straits Settlements of the British Empire. Singapore and the US have maintained formal diplomatic relations since the former gained independence. For more than half a century, the US and Singapore have forged an expansive and enduring relationship based on mutual economic interests, robust security and defence cooperation, and enduring people-topeople ties. The two countries have worked as close partners in support of a rules-based economic and security order in the Asia-Pacific and have consistently partnered up to address global threats and challenges including terrorism, transnational crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A free trade agreement between the US and Singapore entered into force in 2004 and supports 215,000 American jobs. The US enjoys a USD 20 billion trade surplus in goods and services annually and is Singapore’s largest foreign investor.
On the security front, the US and Singapore work together in various aspects, including
Table 1: The top 15 foreign direct investors in Singapore, 2014–2018 (in billion USD)
United States Cayman Islands British Virgin Islands Netherlands Japan Luxembourg United Kingdom Bermuda Switzerland Hong Kong Mainland China Malaysia India Mauritius Germany
2014
192.31 80.91 105.90 70.06 110.10 42.59 62.18 40.51 44.34 50.21 16.00 32.51 25.75 19.48 17.75
2015
243.06 98.39 109.94 99.82 115.24 48.71 60.14 51.42 48.40 48.71 22.68 32.39 23.90 22.06 18.59
2016
279.67 106.90 117.26 102.18 91.70 65.53 66.85 56.78 40.07 56.01 23.80 35.16 18.45 25.12 17.43
2017
336.51 145.20 125.04 115.22 97.74 68.68 84.89 65.09 38.68 61.28 39.69 37.62 22.18 24.47 21.60
2018
289.03 214.07 128.83 122.06 114.91 104.57 95.57 77.11 60.66 60.57 40.91 39.46 26.65 25.54 23.42
traditional military security cooperation involving training exchanges and the mutual use of facilities, as well as joint efforts to address nontraditional security threats such as cyberattacks and terrorism. Despite some bumps along the way and the fact that the position of US ambassador to Singapore has been vacant following the 2016 American presidential elections, the two countries continue to enjoy a close relationship. Singapore’s efforts to maintain economic growth and political stability and its support for regional cooperation harmonise with the US policy in the region and form a solid basis for amicable relations between the two countries. Strategic advantages persist for both sides as the US–Singapore relationship today allows the US to maintain a presence in Asia, which could become increasingly important considering the rise of China.
CHINA—A ROLLER-COASTER RELATIONSHIP
China–Singapore relations officially started in 1990, and diplomatic missions were established in the early 1990s. This initial relationship was marked by a focus on trade and the warming of ties between ASEAN as a whole and mainland China. Singapore and China have since maintained a long-standing and close relationship, partly due to the latter’s growth and rising influence in the Asia-Pacific region; and the Singaporean leadership said that the country’s common interest with China was far greater than any differences. Economically, Singapore is the largest foreign investor in China, and Singapore is China’s largest investment destination in Asia. This symbiotic relationship has done much to strengthen ties between the two countries.
Singapore, having a majority ethnic Chinese population, has been viewed with a certain degree of familiarity and warmth by China. However, this can also be a source of tension when it transitions to expectations of alignment and support for all positions and policies taken by Beijing. Regardless, Singapore has positioned itself as a strong supporter of what it hopes will be China’s constructive engagement and peaceful development in the region. It has encouraged cooperation with other ASEAN members and China to strengthen regional security and to fight terrorism, while recently participating in the organisation’s first maritime exercise with the latter. Although a strong relationship between Singapore and China has endured over the years, there have been ups and downs. Differences were experienced during numerous high-profile events, among others, on Singapore’s position on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, on its support for the US military presence and its alliance system in Asia, and on the seizing of Singapore Armed Forces vehicles by Hong Kong authorities in November 2016. These disputes were often spurred by unhappiness from Beijing over a perceived lack of support from Singapore and a binary view that “if you are not with me, you must be against me.”
Despite the disagreements, Singapore and Beijing have consistently affirmed their unwavering close relations and bilateral ties, deepening their cooperation in numerous areas, including defence, economy, culture, and education, as well as on China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The relationship is smooth at the time of this writing, but there is no guarantee that it will always be so. Singaporean leaders have learned to be ready for any situation coming up.
US VERSUS CHINA—WHEN ELEPHANTS FIGHT
Under the Trump presidency, the US has taken China to task in a manner that has been more direct and aggressive than in previous administrations. Rhetoric and sanctions have been deployed more freely than before, and observers have pointed out that the narrative, which has gotten ever more strident under the Trump administration, is that China is seeking to overturn the global order and even displace the US.
The outbreak of the novel coronavirus and the ensuing global pandemic somewhat quelled the rhetoric, but, as Trump seeks to make his toughness on China a cornerstone of his reelection campaign, we can expect a resurgence in US–China animosity in the months leading up to November 2020. As such, it has become commonplace for leaders in the Indo-Pacific
Singapore has always been an important transportation hub throughout history—and it continues to do so
region to voice anxiety as the US and China appear to spiral towards open-ended economic and strategic confrontation. Speaking from the perspective of a small state caught between the two powers, both geographically and strategically, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said previously that “when the elephants fight, the grass gets trampled.” PM Lee maintained in the past that Singapore would strive to maintain a neutral position, along with the rest of ASEAN, when it comes to competition between the great powers. However, he also admits that there may come a day when sides will have to be chosen and that that day may not be too far off on the horizon. Former leading Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan pointed out that there was no assured “sweet spot” for Singapore, although it had assiduously sought to navigate a profitable path between the US and China.
Similar anxieties are voiced elsewhere in Southeast Asia on an almost daily basis. Smaller countries are bemoaning their constricted room for manoeuvre as US–China tensions ramp up. And there is concern that the open and inclusive regional architecture that has so far prevailed in Asia will start to look more like rival encampments. However, there is a view amongst some experts that, while that angst is genuine, those smaller states are not as helpless as they may seem at first. China’s strategic revisionism and America’s desire to disrupt the economic status quo under Trump have certainly undermined accepted norms and certitudes. Still, smaller nations may have some options available to them. For example, while they are unable to directly influence the strategic decisions of major powers, they may be able to band together to increase their joint influence at a multilateral level.
Singapore has long been championing multilateral fora as an avenue to encourage a rules-based international order where all sovereign states enjoy largely equal rights and share of voice. However, this can be undermined if some members seek to sell their loyalty to the highest or most influential bidder. There are also states seeking to benefit from the competition between the US and China by maximising their own gains as long as the jostling does not boil over into armed conflict to actually delineate along economic enclosures according to the sides picked. Many are actively petitioning both sides for economic and security benefits, and it should come as no surprise to observers of geopolitics that smaller states would seek to exploit their transactional value in the marketplace of international relations. For example, Vietnam is experiencing a significant economic upside from the competition between Washington and Beijing and is reaping the benefits as international commerce seeks to circumvent US tariffs targeting China. Ironically, this phenomenon could create confusion among the major powers, as they deal not only with each other but other stakeholders and partners who may be playing a side game to ensure their own interests are taken care of.
WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
Given what we know now, regional fears of collateral damage from great power competition could indeed be well-founded. However, the situation may not be adequately reflected by publicly expressed concerns, which do not always capture the complex push-pull interplay among the US, China, and smaller states. Simply put, there is an opportunity, as well as there are also threats, for countries caught up in the intensifying regional great power rivalry. Singapore has so far been lauded for being able to adapt to and position itself in a changing world and to reap the benefits. There are a number of factors which can affect a country’s attempt to achieve that outcome, especially given the increasing complexity in global geopolitics in general, and the US–China relationship in particular.
Firstly, there is a need to ensure a deep understanding of international relations, geopolitics, and diplomacy on the part of policymakers, civil servants, and diplomats. This is even more essential given the fast-paced environment we face today, the increasing complexity of the web of relations between global powers, and the use of technology (such as social media) by leaders like Trump to conduct foreign policy and other efforts. These trends have influenced and continue to influence the world, and it is in the best interest of any country to be flexible and to understand what is truly going on when it comes to developing a coherent strategy.
Secondly, to achieve that first outcome, it is important to constantly engage stakeholders just like partners in the region and around the world in order to maintain past relations and develop necessary new ones. The trend towards a more insular, nationalistic world should be resisted as much as possible, especially by small and open economies like Singapore, which are heavily dependent on freedom of trade and a globalised international system. This will not be easy to achieve, given the tendency among politicians to play on the emotive and rallying psychological effects of nationalism in a bid to garner support from their electorates. However, it is not an option for Singapore to abandon the fight for a more open and interlinked world, as this is essential for its survival and success. Instead, it will continue to invest heavily in building ties and urging for stronger and closer relations among all the nations of the world, just as it has thus far done. This will be done bilaterally, but also through multilateral platforms such as ASEAN. Despite having been criticised as ineffective or just a “talk shop,” ASEAN has a critical role to play for countries in Southeast Asia. Since its formation in 1967, in which Singapore was a key player, the grouping has been recognised as a way for a diverse region to be able to develop in order to adopt a neutral approach to great power competition and to find a way to prosper when the world is demanding that sides be taken.
Thirdly, in order to remain relevant without compromising what it stands for, Singapore should always remain true to its principles. On the international stage, its leaders have been recognised for being honest brokers, saying what they mean and meaning what they say. This reputation has allowed the country to play outsized roles in the past, hosting significant international meetings such as the historic summit between US and North Korean leaders, and to act as an intermediary to facilitate deeper understanding between major powers like the US and China. This is a small way in which a country like Singapore can contribute to the smooth running of the international system, but it creates an important niche role to go along with its economic and geostrategic attributes.
Looking back on its short history as an independent sovereign state, and the longer one as a strategically located port and transportation hub, it is clear that Singapore may have started out as a small settlement but has undergone a series of reinventions and reincarnations that have allowed it to play different key roles and functions on the global stage. Given what we know about the uncertain and complicated future likely facing the world in the years ahead, it seems clear that Singapore will need to continue that process of reinvention, driven by a coherent and strategic world view, to survive and thrive.