MARITIME COMPETITION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC— THE ROLE OF ASEAN NATIONS Béla Háda From an East and Southeast Asian perspective, the importance of maritime trade and security increased dramatically at the beginning of the 21st century. This phenomenon was not independent of the impressive economic development and growing great power competition in the Asia-Pacific region. Contemporary Southeast Asia is at the epicentre of these processes. The region, and primarily Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, is a crossroads for key trade flows between East Asia and the Western areas (i.e., Africa, Europe, and the Middle East). Its unique geostrategic position has generated increased interest from the world’s leading powers. The uncertain sovereignty over both the Asia-Pacific and the Southeast Asian regions as well as the needs of fast-growing economies stimulate the intensive development of maritime security capabilities against not only conventional military challenges but piracy, too. Because of the extensive archipelago, the shallow sea areas, the high-level sea freight transport across the so-called maritime choke points (e.g., the Strait of Malacca1 or the Lombok Strait), and the nautical experiences of the population in the islands and coastal areas, Southeast Asia has become the primary area of activity of pirate groups. The strategic importance of maritime lines of communication resulted in the great powers’ increased presence in the region. Chinese, American, Indian, and Japanese naval exercises take place in the South China Sea and the nearby Indian Ocean regularly. In the light of the Southeast Asian nations’ historical experiences, this process seems detrimental to their security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. The current maritime competition has been the result of these fears. This article aims to summarise the Southeast Asian nations’ answers to the great powers’ regional maritime ambitions. 126
REGIONAL ISSUES
IN THE SHADOW OF GIANTS—A SHORT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN MARITIME SECURITY SITUATION After decolonisation in the middle of the 20th century, the newly independent Southeast Asian countries faced the strategic environment of the Cold War world. Although colonisers had withdrawn from the region, new external powers—the Soviet Union and the United States of America—formulated their ambitions for the East Asian strategic sphere. Besides them, the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the new Beijing regime’s ideological views on the processes of modern history and the future of Chinese power position raised the risk that the historical tributary system would be restored in the nearby areas, primarily in continental Southeast Asia. From a wider historical perspective, it was not an unknown situation. Different external great powers appeared in Southeast Asia’s history, and, leaning on their past experiences, the newly independent states started to create their selfdefence capabilities—primarily in partnership with a stronger actor. At the beginning of the Cold War, the naval capabilities of these potential external allies were different. Only the United States had a real blue-water navy, while the other two powers could only project their power into closed waters. In later decades, this situation gradually changed. The rapid build-up of the Soviet Fleet under the direction of Admiral Sergey Gorshkov brought a change to the maritime balance of power by the late 1970s. While the US Navy maintained its bases in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the Soviet Union established a naval base in the Vietnamese Cam Ranh Bay in 1979. It was the largest Soviet naval
