Iran case file oct 2017

OCT.2017

Issued By The Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies www.arabiangcis.org

CONTENTS Executive Summary...........................................................................................................................4 » Internal Affairs..................................................................................................................................7 Political File..........................................................................................................................................7 Economic File.................................................................................................................................... 13 Military File........................................................................................................................................ 23 » Arab Affairs..................................................................................................................................... 27 First: Abadi’s visit to Saudi Arabia thwarts Iranian power balance................................ 28 Second: Review of Zarif’s visit to the Sultanate of Oman and Qatar............................. 32 Third: Successive Iranian arm shipments to the Houthis.................................................. 33 Fourth: Developments of Iranian incursions in Syria:........................................................ 33 Fifth: Evidence of the Revolutionary Guards engagement in seizing back Kirkuk... 36 Iranian interactions in the Arab world..................................................................................... 38 » International Affairs.................................................................................................................... 41 The Nuclear Deal Dilemma and the Need for a New Strategy........................................ 42 Features of the new Strategy and Available Options......................................................... 46 The United States Strategy on Iran........................................................................................... 46 Russia-Iran Relations...................................................................................................................... 54 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................... 60

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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his report raises and analyzes the most prominent issues on the Iranian arena during October 2017, presenting a precise analysis to the readers interested in keeping up to date with the Iranian affairs along with monitoring and analyzing the sequence of events in the period during which the report is prepared. The report is divided into three main sections. The first one focuses on the internal affairs, while the second one centers on Iran’s interactions with the Arab affair. For the third section, it brings to the limelight the Iranian movements on the international arena within the framework of Tehran’s relations with the world’s superpowers.

5 As to the internal affairs: the report broached four issues. The first focuses on the political file.

Here we discuss two main issues: First, the new restrictions imposed on Khatami, and attempts to give an answer to the question: Is the Iranian regime imposing a house arrest on the former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami? The second centered on suspending the Zoroastrian Parliament member Sepanta Niknam who criticised the rights of minorities in Iran.

The military file discusses the conflict between the various Iranian intelligence services, the most important of which was the dispute between the IRGC intelligence service and the Iranian intelligence service. The security file highlights the accusation on the daughter of the head of the judiciary, Sadeq Larijani, of espionage in favor of Britain, and the ensuing conflict between the presidency and the judiciary and the position of the Iranian security services in this conflict. The fourth axis raises the economic issue through two main issues: the impact on the Iranian economy in the event of President Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement or the listing of the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization and the economic relations between Iran and Iraq considering Iraq’s attempt to get out of the Iranian economic hegemony.

On the Arab arena, the report of October 2017 focuses on five main axes: First, the repercussions of the visit of the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider alAbadi to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia concerning the Iranian role in Iraq. The visit resulted in the launch of the Saudi-Iraqi Coordinating Council, the opening of the Saudi Products Exhibition in Iraq, and opening land and air points of entry. The second is a reading of Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Jawad Zarif’s visit to Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman, and its impact on the Gulf crisis. The third is the Iranian arms shipments to the Houthis so that the Iranian plan in Yemen is implemented through them and subsequently harm Saudi security. And the fourth sheds light on the Iranian meddling in Syria via the visit of the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Baqri. And the fifth discusses the relevant indicators that point to the participation of the Revolutionary Guards in the offensive to control Kirkuk and the rest of the disputed areas with the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

As to the international affairs, this section is divided into two main points. The first is the dilemma of the nuclear agreement and the new US strategy on Iran.

President Trump’s announcement of the new US strategy toward Iran on October 13, 2017 marked an important shift in relations between the two countries at the current stage. The new strategy is aimed at tackling the regime’s behavior in general, which poses a threat to American interests and the interests of its allies in the region, contrary to what was expected after the signing of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the 5 + 1 group in mid-2015. The new plan is aimed to

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deprive the Iranian regime from the tools leading to the possession of a nuclear weapon.

It is also aimed at forging a regional and international coalition to force Iran to modify its behavior, confronting its acts that are destabilizing security and regional stability, facing the threat posed by its ballistic missile program, and clamping down on the Revolutionary Guards and the Iranian-backed militias.

The second axis focuses on the Iranian-Russian relations and includes two main issues.

First of which is the Iranian perspectives concerning the visit of King Salman’s to Russia in terms of it aims, activities and expected results, the scope of Russia’s reciprocation when it comes to cooperating with Saudi Arabia, and its impact on the Russian-Iranian ties. The second issue is the naval cooperation between Russia and Iran in the Caspian Sea. It also considers the core objectives of Iran’s strategy of intensifying naval military cooperation with Russia and conducting joint maneuvers and exchanges of visits between the two countries’ vessels in 2017.

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Political File New retractions on Khatami: IS THE REGIME PLANNING TO PLACE HIM UNDER HOUSE ARREST

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Iranian authorities have not clarified whether these restrictions imply a house arrest or a temporary detention, raising the fears of supporters of the reformist movement regarding the situation of Khatami and the leaders of the Green Revolution, who have been under house arrest for nearly eight years.

This comes on the heels of a preceding move, through which Khatami was banned from travelling abroad and speaking to the media. Also, a ban has been put in place in relation to mentioning his name in the audio-visual and print media as he voiced support for the Green Revolution wherein the Iranians held massive rallies nationwide, accusing the regime of rigging the 2009 presidential election.

After the presidential elections, Khatami did not criticize the security or the judicial institutions. But his speech addressed to the supreme leader Ali Khamenei, where he called on him to release the leaders of the Green Revolution was construed by the hawks within the regime as exceeding the red lines, as it is being, the first public call that was addressed to the head of the regime.

At a Shiite religious occasion, the speaker of the parliament Ali Larijani sat down and chatted with the former reformist president Mohammed Khatami. The Iranians welcomed the move, which they hoped would help ease tensions between the reformists and conservatives, since Khatami is popular with a great portion of the Iranian people.

However, the recent restrictions exposed the true intention of Khamenei and the fundamentalists against the reformist movement and its supporters. This intention was reflected in imposing further restrictions on the leaders of the movement. The regime also wanted to assert that the demands to release Mir Hossein Mousavi, his wife Zahra Rahnavard and Mehdi Karroubi, which were among Rouhani’s promises for the second presidential term, will not be met. Furthermore, the situation will worsen. And reformist leaders such as Khatami will be put under house arrest.

Announcing the new security measures against Khatami came only a few days after the Revolutionary Court sentenced seven of Khatami’s close associates to one to two years’ in prison on charges of spreading propaganda against the regime and inciting citizens to participate in the protests that followed the 2009 presidential elections. Those figures included the former president’s younger brother Mohammad Reza Khatami, Ali Shakouri Rad, Mohsen Safaei Farahani, Mohamed Naimey Bur, Hussein Kashfi, and the former deputy Ather Mansouri.

The seven reformists were members of the Central Committee of the reformist “Participation Front” party dissolved by the authorities after the incidents that followed the 2009 elections. In 2015, they established the “People’s Unity” party led by Ali Shakouri Rad. The party contributed to Rouhani’s winning of the second presidential term.

Although the procedures included a new bunch of restrictions imposed for the first time

9 on Khatami, the spokesman for the judiciary Mohsen Ejei denied that the judiciary imposed such restrictions. The prosecutor at the Clerical Court also claimed that no new measures were taken against Khatami, asserting such measures are old ones which were extended from time to time.

The lawyer of Mohammad Khatami, refuted all these allegations and confirmed that Khatami had received a letter from a judicial official. The letter included a series of orders and restrictions calling for Khatami not to participate in public life whether political, cultural and propaganda events for three months.

»»INDICATIONS OF THE NEW RESTRICTIONS As the conservatives control most of the institutions of the regime, the remarks and calls made by figures like Khatami and the late Rafsanjani, whom were previously part of the regime, resound with a considerable part of the Iranian society, let alone the reformists themselves.

Mohammad Khatami’s growing popularity and his ability to convince reformists and influence their attitudes are factors that have raised the fears of the hardliners in the Iranian regime and led to additional restrictions on him to silence him and keep him away from media platforms, events and gatherings. He called on the head of the Hope Bloc within the Iranian parliament Mohammad Reza Aref to withdraw from the presidential race in favor of Rouhani and helped rally all the reformist movement behind the latter for the 2013 presidential elections. Khatami’s influence on the reformists continued during the 2013 presidential elections held on May 19, 2017. He urged the Iranians to participate heavily and vote for Rouhani and warned that his defeat meant a possible return to international isolation and sanctions against Iran. The result of the election was in line with Mohammad Khatami’s aspirations. Rouhani defeated the candidate of the hardliners Ibrahim Raisi, who heads the court which issued the latest measures against Khatami-the Clerical Court, in addition to his presiding over al-Quds Foundation located in Mashhad.

Aside from the aforesaid reasons, there are other factors which dared the hardliners to impose more restraints on the movements, comments and public appearances of Khatami, which could be detailed as follows:

· ·· ·

The fundamentalists’ fear of influence that could shift the balance of powers and be detrimental to the regime, especially when it comes to choosing Khamenei’s successor.

Curbing the rising political influence of Khatami which cuts across the Iranian society.

Limiting his activities which escalated in recent times.

Sending a message to the grassroots of the reformists that the conservatives are still able to control things in the country and curb the influence of the reformists.

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Position of Rouhani and the reformist movement on the new measures

Restrictions slapped on Khatami provoked an angry response from President Rouhani and the backers of the reformist movement.

President Hassan Rouhani blasted the restrictions imposed by the Clerical Court on Mohammad Khatami. In a speech at Tehran University, he spoke about Khatami’s influence on public opinion and his role in rallying his supporters to participate in the elections. “If someone (about Khatami) called on people to partake in elections, should he be punished?

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“He also expressed his discontent with what he called rewarding a trend, after the elections, and punishing another.

The Hope Bloc in the Iranian parliament issued a statement reiterating that the restrictions imposed on the participation of former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami in cultural, social and political events run counter to the letter and spirit of the Iranian constitution. Some 85 members of the parliament sent a letter to Rouhani asking him to lift the restrictions and put an end to the measures taken against the leaders of the reformist movement.

The head of the Hope Bloc in the Iranian parliament Mohammad Reza Aref stressed that the restrictions imposed on Mohammad Khatami would undermine the public’s trust in the regime and pose a threat to civil liberties and rights. Mahmoud Sadiqi, a leading figure in the reformist movement, considered the restrictions to be “political” and contrary to the law and the rights of citizenship, and that they would not affect Khatami’s popularity, but would lead it to surge.

Suspending membership of Sepanta Niknam, a Zoroastrian member of the Yazd city council: Continued abuse of rights of minorities enshrined in the constitution.

Suspending the membership of Sepanta Niknam, a member of the Yazd city council, due to his Zoroastrian religion under the guise that non-Muslims have no legal capacity to hold such posts in the cities where there is a majority Muslim population, has put the Guardian Council of the Constitution under fire, sparking a debate on the rights of religious minorities in Iran.

The Iranian constitution recognizes a small number of religious minorities - Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians - but these recognized minorities have been subjected to persecution and discrimination for years. The recent decision by the Guardian Council was a new development in the series of violations against minorities and their rights and freedoms.

The Guardian Council, which is dominated by hardliners and is constantly working to expand its powers, once again acts with determination to deprive the freedoms enshrined in the Iranian constitution.

Suspicion of Sepanta Niknam preoccupied the public opinion in Iran. The implications of the decision continue until this very day since the decision goes against the core provisions of the Iranian constitution. But what is shocking is that Sepanta was a member of the previous council and he won 22,000 votes in the latest elections. But the fundamentalist candidate Ali Asghar Bagheri filed a complaint with the Guardian Council against the admission of Sepanta’s membership to the council. He was supported by a member of the Guardian Council, Ahmed Jannati, who stressed that non-Muslims cannot be members of city councils that are predominantly Muslim. Mohammed Yazdi announced that the decision to revoke the membership of Sepanta Nickenam in the Yazd city council is irreversible because its membership was illegal under the law, and warned that the violation of this decision and standing against it would be an open defiance to the Iranian regime.

What makes it hard for the crisis to be settled soon is that the decision had been issued by the Guardian Council of the constitution, which is one of the most important legal and legislative institutions in Iran. The Guardian Council is composed of six theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists nominated by the judiciary. According to Article 91

11 of the Iranian constitution, this council is assigned to ascertain whether what is approved by the parliament is in line with the provisions of Islamic Sharia and the constitution. In other words, this institution oversees issuing and revoking others deemed incompatible with the principles of the Iranian regime and the teachings of Shiism. But the functions and missions of this council are not only confined to overseeing laws and regulations issued by the parliament. It is entitled to overseeing all elections in Iran, including elections to choose the membership of the Council of Expert, parliamentary and presidential elections as well as endorsing candidates and approving and ratifying results of these elections.

The vast powers of the Guardian Council, backed by Khamenei and the hardliners of the Iranian regime, have enabled it to disqualify many candidates, including the former deceased Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, for refusing to participate in the 2013 presidential elections. It also disqualified former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who was a nominee in the last presidential election on May 19, 2017.

Suspending Sepanta Nickenam’s membership in the local council of Yazd angered religious and sectarian minorities in Iran. It also opened the door to the public opinion to assess the situation when it comes to rights of minorities. It also raised an important question: Sepanta has been a member of the city council for four years. Why did not they discover that such a membership ran against the constitution during that period? How could they let him register as a candidate? And how did the state apparatuses endorse his candidacy and not bar him from running for the post?

Here an important question arises: in case the Guardian Council presses on with the decision to dismiss Sepanta, how can people believe the claims promoted by the regime in Iran on giving rights and freedoms for religious minorities?

This “religious discrimination” has taken place clearly and explicitly at the time when the regime is trying to improve its image vis-à-vis religious and sectarian minorities within Iran and to reduce international criticism and reports of widespread abuses of ethnic and religious minorities in the ironclad theocracy. Among these attempts is the letter sent by the supreme leader Khamenei to Maulavi Abdul Hamid, one of the most prominent Sunni scholars in Iran, he said: “Iran witnesses religious tolerance, and all the apparatuses of the Iranian regime is committed to enforcing the provisions of the constitution and adhering to the teachings of Islam, rejecting discrimination against any ethnicities or cults.”

But the dismissal of Sepanta discloses that there is no such tolerance of which Khamenei spoke in the aforesaid letter.

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The jurisprudential foundation of the Guardian Council, which stipulates “Preventing religious minorities from being members of local councils in Shia-majority areas,” has proved that the interpretation and explanations of the jurisprudential views of the founder of the Iranian regime Khomeini overrides the Iranian constitution and can overrule the letter and spirit of any article in the event of any possible conflict.

The supreme leader of Iran has yet to comment on the issue. His silence is likely to be construed as a tacit support for the decision of the Guardian Council, which means he and members of the council pay no heed to the constitution neither do they believe in this constitution, since they just care about the articles four and five. Article four stipulates:” All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and the jurists of the Guardian Council are judges in this matter. As to the fifth article, it stipulates:” During the Occultation of the ‘Jurist of our Time’ (may God hasten his reappearance), the leadership of the nation devolve upon the just and pious Jurist, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possesses administrative ability, will assume the responsibilities of this office in accordance with Article 107.

In case Khamenei’s opinion opposes that of the council, the jurists there will be in an unenviable position. If Khamenei refuses to suspend Sepanta’s membership, it will mark a severe blow to the clout of this council within the hierarchy of the regime in Iran.

»»REACTION REJECTING THE DECISION This decision sparked a big deal of controversy within society. Citizens and officials are angry at the decision. Those opposing the decision and call it a ‘religious discrimination’ cite the provisions of the 14th article of the constitution that stipulates:” the government of Iran and all Muslims are duty-bound to treat non-Muslims in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human rights. This principle applies to all who refrain from engaging in conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

Liberals believe the decision is a dangerous sign. According to them, it is aimed to fully control the fate of citizens and deprive them of the very basic principles of democracy Sepanta’s membership suspension sparked a protest by some officials, in a move considered strange. The first critic of the decision was Iran’s parliament speaker Ali Larijani, who spoke of a divergence of views on the Sepanta Niknam case, but stressed that the presence of a Zoroastrianism minority citizen in local councils does not defy the Constitution and Iranian law Larijani, who said that the Guardian Council based its resolution on religious the texts related to previous laws, threatened to follow up the issue through the Council to settle the matter, in case the Guardian Council does not retract the decision.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, despite his long silence, recently joined the ranks of those who rejected the decision of the Guardian Council. He had sent a letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei confirming that the decision to suspend Niknam in the Yazd City Council goes against the law and the public interest, expressing hope to render this problem solved.

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Economic File represented in choosing their representatives in local councils. They also say the decision of the Guardians of the Constitution’s council not only violates the rights of Sepanta, but also it deprives electors from their right to choose their representative in the local council.

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The judicial authority had an opinion on this issue, despite its formal approval of the Council’s decision and affirming its right to express opinion on both old and new issues. The Deputy Head of the judicial authority Hadi Sadiqi said raising this issue at this time is not in the interest of Iran. He also called for speaking to the jurists of the Guardian Council of the Constitution and persuade them to revoke the suspension. But he reiterated in case the jurists on the council persist, we have nothing to do but to obey the decision.

In order to end the crisis, the executive and legislative branches represented in the presidency and parliament have proposed that Sepanta be allowed to return to the local council of Yazd until enacting a new law on local councils and how religious minorities could attain membership. But after the Administrative Court of Justice announced that the decision to suspend Niknam was irreversible, it was clear that the Guardian Council was still cling to its position, so that Khamenei would have the final say to end the debate on this issue.

»»THE ROW BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE IRGC AND THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE The structure of the Iranian state depends on parallel apparatuses, a parallel government to the regular one. The term parallel government does not require necessarily that a state forms a bunch of organizations and institutions whose structures resemble the regular ones of the state or its method of administration. Those parallel bodies are not considered an integral part of the legitimate state or government. But in the Iranian case, Khomeini established these bodies to maintain the massive powers granted to clerics for them to wrest full control over the state. To achieve this end, he ordered the establishment of several parallel services, though they are outwardly working under the auspices of the Iranian state.

»»HOW MANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES DOES IRAN HAVE? At the outset, when the Iranian republic was still emerging, every branch of the armed forces had its own intelligence service. There was the intelligence of the Revolutionary Guards, the military intelligence, the civil intelligence service and the intelligence of the Council of Ministers, each of them had worked respectively.

In 1983, in conjunction with the establishment of the ministry of intelligence, a coordinating council among all these services had been declared. It was assigned to providing the ministry of intelligence of information it attains from other intelligence services.

Multiplicity in the intelligence apparatuses generates many crises for the Iranian regime, the most recent was in October 2017 when a conflict emerged between the Ministry of Intelligence, the intelligence service of the Revolutionary Guard and the intelligence of the judiciary. The conflict was triggered after the verdict issued against the nuclear negotiator Abdel-

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Rasool Dari Isfahani who attended the nuclear deal deliberations.

The Intelligence service of the IRGC arrested Isfahani and brought him to trial. He was sentenced to five years over espionage for the UK intelligence. He bears dual nationality of Iran and Canada. The Iranian ministry of intelligence declared that he is an agent not a spy. In the wake of these conflicting statements between two sovereign bodies in Iran, the public opinion engaged discussions on several issues, such as the limits of the powers of the various intelligence services in Iran, who is responsible for including Isfahani in the nuclear negotiators’ delegation and whether it was accidental that he was responsible for the financial and economic files in the negotiations.

Mohsen Ejei, the spokesman of the judiciary, was embroiled in the conflict between the Iranian intelligence services. He criticized the Ministry of Intelligence and said it was not the only party in Iran that had the right to judicial police. He declared decisively that the judiciary had the right to interfere in counter-espionage issues directly without recourse to the Ministry of Intelligence.

This was rejected by Mahmoud Alawi, the Iranian intelligence minister, who clung to this right, insisting counter-intelligence is an independent service, and it has authority over all the other services when it comes to such issues. In the same manner, Hussein Taib, head of the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence service, defended his right to arrest spies and bring them to trial.

As to the one who included Dari Isfahani to the nuclear negotiators’ delegation, fingers are pointed at Siros Nasseri, one of the close allies of Hussein Fereydon, the brother of Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, and his special aide, who faces multiple graft charges.

Dari Isfahani is accused of receiving funds from the US and British institutions in exchange for divulging important financial information about the Iranian Republic. He also received £ 7,500 monthly. He also held several financial and banking posts including the deputy governor of the Iranian central bank.

Arresting Dari Isfahani from a jet while on board was foreign minister Jawad Zarif who was on his way to Turkey, has turned the conflict among these government agencies to a

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bitter rivalry. Dari was planning to flee to Canada as the jet touched down in Turkey.

Iranian political analysts considered the presence of Dari Isfahani in the Iranian negotiating delegation a big mistake made by the Iranian government and its security services, and that the government of Rouhani was wrong not to carry out security queries about the members of the delegation. This crisis, along with its security aspects, has overshadowed all the institutions of the IRGC, triggering a bitter conflict with the presidency amid accusations leveled at Rouhani ranging from negligence, and espionage against the regime, and being infiltrated by foreign intelligence agencies, given the remarks made by the reformists that the regime has no legal right to try the dual nationals on the Iranian soil without consulting with the nations where they bear their citizenships.

»»ESPIONAGE CHARGES TOPPLE DAUGHTER OF JUDICIARY’S HEAD The issue of accusing Zahra Larijani, the daughter of the head of the judiciary, of espionage for Britain has aroused great controversy within the Iranian regime and society, and its ramifications and developments continue to this day.

The issue was first raised by Amadnews, a site close to the Green Revolution leaders, bringing forward documents proving that the daughter of Ali Larijani, chief of the judiciary, was engaged in espionage for the UK intelligence. Wahid Haqanian the executive affairs assistant in the Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader, and Hussein Taib, the head of IRGC intelligence service, confirmed they grilled Zahra Larijani, and she admitted that most of the meetings with the British security officials at the British embassy in Tehran took place in the city of Tabriz in northeastern Iran. She also admitted providing the British security officials with information on Iran’s purchase of four nuclear warheads from India. In recent years, the judiciary has arrested many Iranian citizens, dual nationals, many journalists and political activists, and charged them with spying for hostile countries. They were grilled while languishing in solitary confinement. Some of them were subject to secret trials. During the period that followed Zahra Larijani’s charge of espionage, the Radio and Television Corporation attempted to cover the issue by broadcasting programs and reports on charges against political and social activists, critics, dissidents and dual-nationals. It published photographs of seven reformist activists against whom verdicts have been issued for espionage charges, including Reza Khatami, the brother of former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami, who served as the sixth speaker of parliament.

The most important fact about speaking publicly of the espionage case of Zahra Larijani is that it exposes the reality of her father who issued prison sentences against 300 people over espionage charges. They were locked up in solitary confinement for a long time, where they were subject to severe torture aimed at soliciting confessions.

As the news related to accusing Zahra Larijani of espionage for the UK broke, several

17 officials within the regime came forward to deny the reports. Preachers nationwide, head of the IRGC intelligence, and the chief of judiciary’s intelligence denied the daughter of Larijani had committed such a crime.

Iranian intelligence minister Mahmoud Alawi denied the charges against the daughter of the head of the judiciary, Sadeq Larijani, and stressed that what was published in this regard is a lie, nothing but illusions, aimed to undermine the citizens’ confidence in the state officials.

The head of the IRGC intelligence, Hussein Taib, also defended the Larijani family. “It is natural that our response to the elements associated with the US and British intelligence in Iran makes these countries attempt to settle the score, but we are vigilant and all attempts by enemies will fail,” he said.

Although officials in the judiciary deny the news of the indictment of Zahra Larijani, one of the reasons the Iranian street does not rule out the truthfulness of the reports is that judiciary and intelligence are trying to cover for it. The other reasons are that the judiciary lacks the required transparency, and is know to level accusations at political activists and spying charges against all foes of the regime.

After the espionage issue has been exposed, the General Directorate of CounterIntelligence at the Ministry of Intelligence sent a file of Zahra to Iran’s Prosecutor General Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, but he did not issue a court order for a specialized investigation into the case, others think Larijani issued directives to experts at the ministry of intelligence to keep the matter within the realm of secrecy. The agency responsible for investigating the matter is the Counter-Espionage Department of the Ministry of Intelligence. But at the meeting of the Coordination Committee of the Iranian intelligence institutions, the intelligence of the Revolutionary Guard and the intelligence of the judiciary were asked to hide this file, which angered the officials of the anti-espionage unit at the Ministry of Security and Intelligence. At the same meeting, an official within the same intelligence service said the espionage files of the relatives of the Iranian regime’s officials are in no way different than the other espionage files.

After handing over this file to the IRGC, several officials of the Ministry of Security and Intelligence and members of the Supreme National Security Council accused Iranian President Hassan Rouhani of incompetence.

Harsh criticism has been leveled at the supreme leader Ali Khamenei and Wahid Haqqanian as critics thought the IRGC will not proceed with measures in the case to achieve justice or fairness, and justice will not be served.

Khamenei was accused of double dealing over previous espionage charges against Mahdi Hashemi, the son of the late Hashemi Rafsanjani. Who faced fake and untrue charges of espionage, and he was then turned in to the IRGC intelligence. He was grilled for months.

But the IRGC intelligence did not bring forward any proofs that may render him condemned of espionage operations. When Khamenei was tipped off about the scandal, the head of the judiciary started to bear the pressure. A meeting held at Khamenei’s house, where some important decisions were taken, including launching a hush-hush inquiry into the case of Zahra Larijani. Also, Larijani was ordered to give a detailed report, every 6 months on his 63 bank accounts .

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In this respect, the Coordinating Council among intelligence services took the first step to bar the leakage of information to western countries through Sadiq Larijani’s family. The committee started to send second and third-degree information to the head of the judiciary, after it used to send a copy of top secret information, which angered Larijani.

There is no doubt that accusing Zahra Larijani is linked to the charges leveled at Dari Isfahani, the Iranian negotiator in the nuclear agreement talks, of spying for Britain. Are these files used by the two parties, Rouhani and Larijani, against each other as it was the case when the reformists were accused of receiving colossal salaries? The reformists responded, revealing the bank accounts of the head of the judiciary whose money was estimated to be in the millions of dollars. Are Iranian politicians and their relatives engaged in espionage for foreign nations? Or are these charges being leveled within the ongoing rivalry? The repeated scandals covered up under Rouhani, which included the house of the supreme leader, where Said Imami committed heinous crimes against children, reveal that the Iranian regime is in a deep quagmire.

The implications that could affect the Iranian economy in case Trump pulls out of the nuclear deal or lists the IRGC as a terrorist organization. It is no secret that the US rhetoric against Iran has been escalating since Trump took office.

This animosity reached its peak in October when Trump declared a new strategy towards Iran on October 13th. The new strategy included the US administration’s decertification of Iran’s compliance with the nuclear deal, which gives the Congress the right to decide within 60 days if the US will stay or pull out of the deal and resume sanctions. Also, president Trump gave directives to the Department of Treasury to sanction the Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) over terrorsponsoring activities. Dozens of Iranian officials, institutions and their associates were targeted by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Many Iranian personalities and entities are already targeted by OFAC. This step is expected to be a prelude to the official listing of the IRGC as a terrorist organization, and the matter seems not to be confined to targeting some figures or entities. The Iranian economy and the IRGC benefited a lot from the nuclear agreement. In case Congress decides that the US will pull out from the deal or list the IRGC as a terror organization, several sectors of the Iranian economy will be impacted. These impacts will vary depending on whether the Iranians may have alternatives. We will briefly discuss the Iranian gains from the nuclear deal in the economic sectors including energy, aviation, industry, trade and others. Then we will speak of the

19 impacts on these sectors in case the US walks away from the nuclear deal. Finally, we will detail the possible impacts in case the IRGC is listed as a terror organization.

»»ENERGY SECTOR The Iranian economy’s energy sector has benefited the most from the nuclear deal. Crude oil exports nearly doubled in 2016 after the nuclear deal reached more than 2.2 million bpd in 2017, after exports were limited to 1 million barrels per day.

Furthermore, the investments of major energy companies in the world returned to Iran again after its flight on the heels of slapping sanctions on Iran in 2012, and signed multi-billion-dollar agreements with European companies such as Shell, Total and others to search for oil. If the United States withdraws from the nuclear deal, Iran’s exports of crude oil may not be affected much. If it happens, it will be on specific terms. But foreign investment will fall in the sector and Iran will face more difficulties in remittances of exports’ revenues. Iran sends 60 percent of its exports to Asia and 40 percent to Europe. In this aspect, it has no ties to the US sanctions.

However, the scope of influence will hinge on the response of some European and Asian countries close to the United States to US pressure, such as Japan and South Korea. In case these countries yield to US pressures, Iran may rely more on increasing exports to China and India, the most important importers, even before the signing of the nuclear deal, or it may channel the exports to eastern European countries or some countries in western Europe, especially those having differences with the US when it comes to walking away from the nuclear deal such as France.

The sector is likely to be affected by the lack of European investment in the energy sector due to the response of the major European oil companies to pressure from their governments or from the United States and may amount to financial sanctions on European companies dealing with Iranian energy companies. The Americans make up about 40% of the stakeholders of one of the largest European and global companies such as British Petroleum (BP) and about 30% of the company’s employees are Americans, including the CEO of the company. European companies such as Total, following Trump’s instructions not to ratify the extension of the nuclear deal with Iran, have said they are waiting for what the US Congress will decide on Iran and that withdrawing its investment from Iran is possible if there is legal justification for it. Iran’s energy sector will be affected by the lack of investment by European companies responding to the US. In this case, Iran may make up for this shortage by

20

IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017

attracting more investments from Russia, China and other countries close to it. Iran will have to find an alternative to dollar transfers after the US puts restraints hindering the Iranian transactions in this respect. The alternatives to Iran are other international currencies such as the Chinese yuan or the European euro, especially given that China is Iran’s first trading partner, or trade agreements in local currency or oil for goods as it did with Russia. However, Iran will face a sharp shortage of dollar cash reserves, as well as a major problem in paying for imported goods in dollars.

»»TRADE AND INDUSTRY This is the second sector to benefit the most from the nuclear deal after the energy sector.

The nuclear deal allowed the Iranian industry to import raw materials, industry inputs and spare parts from abroad after years of denial. Iran’s auto industry was the biggest beneficiary of the nuclear deal after European partners such as Renault and Peugeot decided to resume production, let alone petrochemical, steel industries and industrial investments in energy. If the United States withdraws from the nuclear deal, the industry will be adversely affected, even if European countries did not withdraw from the agreement.

The withdrawal of the United States, the world’s largest industrialized country with industrial-commercial relations with the world’s largest industrial companies, affects the confidence of industrial investors in the Iranian economy. In other words, the move will dent their confidence in industrial investment or trade with Iran without being sanctioned, due to being in partnership with firms run by the IRGC in case the US lists it as a terror organization. Confidence in the stability of any economy is a very important factor in attracting or expelling foreign investments that fear losing their investment in a state that has tense ties with the world’s largest industrialized nation.

Europe is the largest industrial investor in Iran after inking the nuclear agreement. And its desire to make economic gains is the biggest motive behind the opposition to cancelling the nuclear agreement led by France, as the latter has large industrial and oil investments in Iran. Paris wants to maintain and benefit from its investments to push the wheel of the French economy. Europe was among the first of those who entered the Iranian market after removing sanctions. It managed to dominate the market and supply most of its industrial needs whether through international trade or direct investments with Iran. But if the United States manages to isolate Iran, US pressure could persuade Europe to pull out of the nuclear deal. In this case, Iran’s industrial sector will receive a shock blow that could bring it back to the years of sanctions (2012-2015).

Even though Europe is expected to defend its industrial interests in Iran, surely industry in Iran will be impacted, especially in terms of confidence as we indicated in the lines above.

The companies that mull entering the market as well as the existing ones will be cautious when they ponder expanding their investments. This means odds are high for industrial products to see sharp declines, which pushes the government to import these items to plug the expected gap.

21 In the field of aviation, the nuclear deal enabled Iran to sign contracts to purchase hundreds of European and American civil aircraft (Airbus and Boeing). The Iranian government received a very few number of these jets due to the US pressures, but it inked contracts, which were never on the cards before signing the nuclear deal. The Iranian government resorted to some European countries, Japan and South Korea to fulfill its needs, buying smaller jets.

If the United States withdraws from the nuclear deal, Iran will not be able to receive more than 80 aircraft from the US’s Boeing, in addition to the possibility of suspending the supply of more than 100 aircraft from the European Airbus under pressure from the United States, which manufactures parts of the company’s European aircraft. Boeing needs the approval of the US Department of Treasury to be able to sell the jets to Iran. Tehran will not be able to modernize its fleet of civilian aircraft through buying top-notch jets, and it will be obliged to look for alternatives, with fewer capabilities in terms of flying long distances and the size of the planes.

»»REMIT TANCES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES IN DOLLAR The withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear agreement will affect the size of the foreign exchange reserve in dollar in Iran. The United States will impose further restrictions on Iran’s international transfers to the US dollar for commercial purposes to the point where it is difficult to obtain export earnings in US currency, leading Tehran to resort to other currencies such as the Chinese yuan, the European euro or others.

It is theoretically possible for Iran to maintain a cash reserve from international currencies such as the euro and yuan, but the dollar is the most traded and popular currency in world trade. Dollar is the currency that makes up the greatest part of foreign exchange reserves in any country. It stands as a key component of the currencies’ basket. Also, it preserves the stability of the foreign exchange reserve’s value in case the values of other currencies such as yuan, the euro, the Japanese yen or the sterling pound fall. Therefore, the dollar, as a main element in the basket of currencies of the foreign exchange reserve, is important for preserving the value of the foreign exchange reserves.

»»WHAT WILL BE THE SITUATION FOR THE IRANIAN ECONOMY IN CASE THE IRGC IS LISTED AS A TERROR ORGANIZATION? Maybe it is better for the Iranian economy that the US withdraws from the nuclear deal than listing the IRGC as a terror organization. It goes without saying the IRGC has a foothold in each of the aspects of the Iranian economy. It is engaged in industry in all its forms, internal and external trade, and energy including oil, electricity, petrochemicals, transportation, contracting and other sectors, with an empire worth ten of billions of dollars, which make up about 20 to 40 percent of the Iranian Gross Domestic Production (GDP). Some put the figure at $ 400 billion. The IRGC launches its own investments or it may partner with local and foreign firms through ‘facades’ to dodge the US sanctions. Legal and financial obstacles will face the European and even Asian firms when they seek joint ventures with the major firms in Iran since the IRGC has stakes therein. These fields include energy and oil , which are the mainstay of the Iranian economy, as well an industry, where the IRGC possesses plants for car manufacturing, petrochemicals, telecommunications and others. It needs to import raw materials, production requirements and spare parts from abroad.

22

IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017

If we know that the IRGC has a strong presence in Iran’s foreign trade, manages and distributes 57% of the country’s imports and 30% of its non-oil exports, and listing it as a terrorist organization will put financial and legal sanctions on international companies with whom they have transactions. This will lead to sharp decline in the imports of Iran in terms of customer and capital goods, triggering hikes in prices at home. It will also impact the non-oil exports, which will shake the stability of the Iranian currency as the process will take a heavy toll on the foreign exchange reserve. Despite the serious economic consequences of the listing the IRGC as a terrorist organization, it may find a way to ease the burden of the international embargo. It may increase trade with its allies in neighboring countries such as Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, speed up smuggling and money laundering, and with companies that are secretly owned by it.

»»INTERACTION OF EVENTS AT HOME The Political File The Director of president Rouhani’s office Mahmoud Vaezi said, about remarks made by US President Donald J. Trump on the IRGC, the Revolutionary Guards, the army and the Basij are all key parts of the Iranian regime, and the government does not consider itself separate from all of them. He said:” “We do not want to strike deals with anyone, and when it comes to providing the national security and national interests of the state in the face of enemies and foreigners, the government performs its duty towards it,” adding that it is one of the functions of the government to defend the IRGC, stressing that this was not the first-time in which the president defended the IRGC.

23

Military File Zarif said the missile tests were not a violation in the spirit of the nuclear deal, and Iran and Oman discussed the development of military cooperation. The Iranian defense minister said that attacking the Revolutionary Guards was a blow to the entire regime. The general commander of the Iranian army, General Abdul Rahim Mousavi, sponsored the ceremony to unveil the 155-mm Ashura portable gun. Aladdin Boroujerdi, head of Iran’s national security committee, said the Iranian missile capabilities were not negotiable.

24

IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017

Security File: Some authorities disclosed two secret documents for the first time on the espionage of Zahra Larijani for Britain. The police chief, Major General Hussein Ashtri, explained that Iran has more than 10 thousand police headquarters working permanently across the country, the greater the capabilities are, the faster services are accomplished. He added the appropriations allocated for construction works are very limited, explaining that the security forces need two thousand police stations and outposts, and that this requires more financial assistance.

ECONOMIC FILE The statistics showed the proportion of revenues resulting from taxes during the same period which amounted to the equivalent of 10.02 billion dollars, posting a growth over the same period last year by 3.2%. According to recent statistics published by the Central Bank of Iran, cash liquidity grew at the end of August by 24.3% compared to the same period last year. The statistics also indicate that the cash flow in Iran exceeded the barrier of $ 72 billion. According to some foreign trade statistics in Iran in the last six months, imports rose by 15%, while exports decreased by 3%, and the balance of trade recorded a negative value of 4 billion dollars. In the same period, there were imports of 17 million tons of goods worth 23.6 billion dollars, which in the same period last year were 15.9 million tons worth 20.4 billion dollars. More than 58,000 tons of goods were exported worth $ 20.5 billion, while in the same period last year more than 61 million tons worth $ 21.2 billion were exported.

‫‪25‬‬ ‫‪Endnotes‬‬ ‫(‪ )١‬يورو نيوز‪ ،‬اعمال محدودیتهای جدید علیه محمد خاتمی‪http://cutt.us/2ZCL1 ،7/10/2017 ،‬‬ ‫(‪ )٢‬بهار‪ ،‬پیام همنشینی الریجانی با خاتمی چیست؟ ص‪ 3 ،3‬مهر ‪http://soo.gd/S223 ،1396‬‬ ‫(‪ )٣‬صداي مردم‪ ،‬محکومیت هفت فعال اصالح طلب به حبس‪ 7 ،‬مهر ‪http://cutt.us/172Wy ،1396‬‬ ‫(‪ )٤‬الحكم بالسجن على سبعة من قادة اإلصالحيين في إيران‪ 3 ،‬أكتوبر ‪http://cutt.us/EQw0J ،2017‬‬ ‫(‪ )٥‬فارس‪ ،‬القضاء اإليراني‪ :‬لم يتم فرض قيود جديدة على الرئيس األسبق محمد خاتمي‪ 8 ،‬أكتوبر ‪http://cutt.us/yVRKj ،2017‬‬ ‫(‪ )٦‬شهروند‪ ،‬ممنوعیت حضور خاتمی در مراسمهای عمومی به مدت ‪ ۳‬ماه‪ ،‬ص‪ 16 ،2:‬مهر ماه ‪http://cutt.us/bTr1W ،1396‬‬ ‫(‪ )٧‬محمد كاظميان‪ ،‬راست افراطی علیه خاتمی؛ چرا؟ ‪ 9‬أكتوبر ‪http://cutt.us/X4eb ،2017‬‬ ‫(‪ )٨‬خبر اونالين‪ ،‬تذکر ‪ ۸۶‬نماینده به رئیس جمهور در مورد محدودیت‌های جدید رئیس دولت إصالحات‪ 16 ،‬مهر‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/9FWbE ،1396‬‬ ‫(‪ )٩‬عتماد‪ ،‬عارف‪ :‬محدوديت‌هاي خاتمي موجب خدشه‌دار شدن اعتماد عمومي مي‌شود‪ 16 ،‬مهر ‪http://soo.gd/BrxL ،1396‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٠‬دویچه وله فارسی‪ ،‬ادامه محدودیت‌های خاتمی؛ طرح سوال از وزیر اطالعات‪ 9 ،‬أكتوبر ‪http://cutt.us/W84xB ،2017‬‬ ‫(‪« )١١‬مجلس صيانة الدستور» اإليراني يقمع الحريات الدينية‪ 28 ،‬أكتوبر ‪http://cutt.us/B9hc5 ،2017‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٢‬پیک ایران‪ ،‬تعلیق عضویت سپنتا نیکنام در شورای شهر یزد؛ تصویر عریان آپارتاید مذهبی‪ 20 ،‬مهر ‪،1396‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/XiYQc‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٣‬هيومن رايتس ووتش‪ :‬مجلس صيانة الدستور اإليراني يقمع الحريات الدينية‪ 28 ،‬أكتوبر ‪http://cutt.us/JIuG5 ،2017‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٤‬الریجانی‪ :‬لغو عضویت سپنتانیکنام قانونی نیست‪ 26 ،‬مهر ‪http://cutt.us/UhEel ،1396‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٥‬دنياي اقتصاد‪ ،‬واکنش رئیس‌جمهوری به لغو عضویت سپنتا نیکنام از شورای شهر یزد‪ 21 ،‬ابان ‪،1396‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/hVVwR‬‬ ‫(‪ (1(1‬ايران‪ ،‬نظر شورای نگهبان درباره سپنتا به مصلحت نبود‪ 10 ،‬ابان ‪http://cutt.us/hn5qd ،1396‬‬ ‫(‪ (1(1‬توافق مجلس وقوه قضائیه» دربارهٔ ادامه کار نیکنام در شورای شهر یزد‪ 17 ،‬ابان ‪http://cutt.us/uNwom ،1396‬‬ ‫(‪ (1(1‬مشرق‪ :‬دستگاه‌های اطالعاتی ایران چگونه «هماهنگ» می‌شوند؟‪ /‬چند نهاد امنیتی در کشور فعالند؟‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/07fDl‬‬ ‫(‪ (1(1‬بي بي سي فارسي‪ :‬اختالف اطالعات سپاه و وزارت اطالعات تا کجا پیش می‌رود؟‪http://cutt.us/4QCS4 ،‬‬ ‫(‪ (2(2‬امد نيوز‪ :‬وزیر اطالعات‪« :‬دری اصفهانی» با معاونت ضدجاسوسی ما همکاری داشت‪http://cutt.us/Z8wSY ،‬‬ ‫(‪ (2(2‬خبرگزاری مهر‪ :‬عبدالرسول دری اصفهانی دوتابعیتی بود‪ /‬تایید ‪۵‬سال حبس به جرم جاسوسی‪http://cutt.us/Y2zAJ ،‬‬ ‫(‪ (2(2‬بي بي سي فارسي‪ :‬اختالف اطالعات سپاه و وزارت اطالعات تا کجا پیش می‌رود؟‪http://cutt.us/4QCS4 ،‬‬ ‫(‪ (2(2‬نسيم‪ :‬چه کسی دری‌اصفهانی را وارد تیم مذاکره‌کننده کرد؟‪http://cutt.us/VGjak ،‬‬ ‫(‪ (2(2‬زهرا الریجانی به اتهام جاسوسی برای بریتانیا بازداشت شد‪ /‬خطر معامله سپاه با صادق الریجانی‪ 9 ،‬مهر‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/vLRJD 1396‬‬ ‫(‪ (2(2‬رئيس مخابرات الحرس الثوري يدافع عن عائلة الريجاني المتهمة بالتجسس‪ 6 ،‬أكتوبر ‪http://cutt.us/bDeoL ،2017‬‬ ‫(‪ (2(2‬اعتقال ابنة رئيس القضاء بتهمة التجسس لصالح بريطانيا‪ 3 ،‬أكتوبر ‪http://cutt.us/lVOAN ،2017‬‬ ‫(‪ (2(2‬غوغای اتهام جاسوسی دختر الریجانی واسرار افشاء شده‪ 6 ،‬اكتبر ‪http://cutt.us/WO2Wn ،2017‬‬ ‫(‪ (2(2‬آمد نیوز‪ ،‬زهرا الریجانی به اتهام جاسوسی برای بریتانیا بازداشت شد‪ /‬خطر معامله سپاه با صادق الریجانی‪،‬‬ ‫‪ 9‬مهر ‪http://cutt.us/5XuoH ،1396‬‬ ‫(‪ (2(2‬اعتقال ابنة رئيس القضاء بتهمة التجسس لصالح بريطانيا‪ 3 ،‬أكتوبر ‪http://cutt.us/7Wu4f ،2017‬‬ ‫(‪ (3(3‬غوغای اتهام جاسوسی دختر الریجانی واسرار افشاء شده‪ 6 ،‬أكتوبر ‪http://cutt.us/VIhC6 ،2017‬‬

27

In

October, the visit of the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was pivotal in shrinking the role of Iran in Iraq and returning Iraq to the Arab sphere. It was hoped that this visit will initiate intensive dialogue between both sides within the framework of the SaudiIraqi Coordination Council. However, Iran did not forego the opportunity to exploit the Gulf crisis by extending support to Qatar’s position in dismissing the demands of the three Gulf States and Egypt. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, visited Qatar and Oman to confirm the support of Iran and its decision-makers for Qatar’s position as it faces increasing pressure from its neighboring Gulf states. This Iranian support can be visualized as a pragmatic policy to work towards undermining the Gulf and hindering its unity.

ARAB AFFAIR

28

IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017

During the same month, Iranian arm shipments were seized while heading to the Houthis, this came at a time when the Houthis were facing territorial regression after the Yemeni government had recovered more than 80-85% of the Yemeni territory. On the Syrian level, the Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Major General Mohammad Baqeri, visited Syria to coordinate and plan with the Syrian government for the post-ISIS period and to expand Iranian influence.

On the Iraqi side, the Revolutionary Guards participated in retaking the disputed areas between the central government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, not for the utility of Baghdad’s government, as claimed by Iran, but to expand Tehran’s influence in those recovered areas and for her to be situated close to the areas near the Kurdistan Region to tighten the blockade.

FIRST: ABADI’S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA THWARTS IRANIAN POWER BALANCE After a series of visits between the two sides during the previous months that were designed to restrain Iran’s power grip on Iraq, the moves by Saudi were strongly supported

by Arab partners to reclaim Iraq back into the Arab sphere and to stand up to Iranian expansion and power projection in the region, particularly in Iraq. The visit of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Haidar al-Abadi, to Saudi Arabia on 21/10/2017, during which he met King Salman bin Abdul Aziz, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, the Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and the Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, commenced a highly significant stage between the two states. Along with the aim to contain Iran, the significance of the visit can be visualized via the inauguration of the Saudi-Iraqi Coordination Council, the opening of the Saudi Products Exhibition in Iraq, and the opening of land and air crossings.

1- THE OUTCOMES SAUDI ARABIA ACHIEVED FROM THE VISIT: A. Inauguration of the Saudi-Iraqi Coordination Council

INAUGURATION OF THE SAUDI-IRAQI COORDINATION COUNCIL DATE

22/10/2017

TASKS AND OBJECTIVES

-Deepen mutual political trust between the two countries, - consult, coordinate and strengthen strategic communication, - Encourage the exchange of economic, technical and scientific expertise between the two countries -Enhance joint cooperation between the two sides in regional and international affairs, - Develop partnerships amongst the private sectors between the two countries, - Provide access to trade and investment opportunities.

29

OUTCOMES OF THE FIRST MEETING

-Opening border ports, developing ports, roads and border areas, revising the customs cooperation agreement between the two countries, studying a trade exchange zone, -Possibility of cooperation in the maintenance and rehabilitation of “Gemayma-Samawah” road, completing the implementation of the pilgrimage road in the Anbar province of Iraq, studying the technical-economic feasibility of the Saudi-Iraqi electrical connection project.

-Re-operating airlines from Riyadh to Baghdad.

-opening a Saudi consulate, office of TAQA, reopening SABI C’s office in Iraq.

- Having a Saudi company “Salik” obtain a license to invest in Iraq in the agricultural field, in addition to benefiting Saudi Arabia from the economic cities available in Iraq to achieve food security for both countries.

OUTCOMES OF THE SECOND MEETING

scheduled to be held in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, with the presence of a number of ministers and senior officials from the two countries (Date has not been specified yet)

Saudi Arabia and Iraq launched the Coordination Council on 22/10/2017, with the inauguration attended by King Salman, his Crown Prince, the Prime Minister of Iraq, an Iraqi delegation of 70 officials including the ministers of economy, investment, industry and trade, and the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.

This council represents a new era of increased relations (i.e. political, security, economic, commercial and cultural) between the two neighboring countries, reflecting the Iraqi realization of the critical phase the region is going through and its need to connect with Arab states. This is while, Iran is facing international isolation and regional blockade resulting from its interference in the internal affairs of the Arab countries. There is no country that Iran has intervened in that has progressed economically and stabilized politically; all countries intervened by Iran have been torn apart, dismembered and suffered endless conflicts. In turn, the Iraqi leadership recognizes the Saudi ambition to aid its revival so that it can face the tremendous turmoil that it has seen over the years, and is fully appreciative of Saudi efforts to return Iraq to the Arab fold because of the mutual bond of blood and the inclusive history and future that they share.

30

IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017

B. Saudi Products Exhibition in Iraq Sixty Saudi companies participated, of various industrial and service fields, in the 44th Baghdad International Fair at the Saudi pavilion to showcase their high quality national products. Saudi companies, in the industrial and service sectors have been able to hold many initial deals and have conducted many negotiations to invest inside Iraq; enabling them to communicate and cooperate with Iraqi companies, investors and businessmen, and to present their products, services and facilities.

In this respect, the Director General of Marketing and Corporate Communication, and the Spokesperson of the Saudi Export Development Authority, Engineer Mazen al-Jasser, stated that with all the variant competitive products of high quality and low cost, the Saudi products have been greatly welcomed by Iraqis for similar high quality and reasonable cost.

He added that the authority is seeking through this participation to discover marketing opportunities for Saudi products in Iraq as a promising market, and to facilitate export procedures to Iraq in cooperation with the authorities.

The participation in the Baghdad International Fair this year under the slogan “Industries Surpassing Boundaries and Approaching peoples,” is one of the most important participations contributing in building trade and economic relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Iraq.

C. Opening of Land and Air crossings: With air travel and road/port networks frozen between Saudi Arabia and Iraq since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in1990- the Iraqi and Saudi officials reached an agreement to reopen the “New Arar” port officially in September 2017, that was affirmed during the first meeting for the Coordination Council, on 22/10/2017. The port was exclusively used for pilgrims over the past years; which recently had 1175 Iraqi pilgrims perform Hajj, in 2017. It is expected to open another new port in Samawah province.

The Saudi Airlines announced resuming its flights to Iraq; the first flight was on 30/10/2017- two flights per day. Saleh N. al-Jasser, Director General Saudi Arabian Airlines, said “Flights between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iraq will take off October 30, having two flights per day… the expansion in the Iraqi market will happen in the next stage with new destinations.”

The announcement made a qualitative leap in the Saudi-Iraqi relationship, especially after recent political developments and economic openness between the two countries, serving investors.

2- IRANIAN REACTIONS Iran is concerned about the growing Saudi moves to reclaim Iraq back to the Arab sphere, though the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, tried to look calm and hide his concern by arguing that the Coordination Council is an Iraqi issue with its neighboring countries. “Iraqi consensus and cooperation with Arab neighboring states is not harmful to Iran, but actually we consider it to be in our interests,” he added. The remarks of Hashmatullah Bishah, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in the Iranian parliament, that the Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement will not practically develop; in addition to the statement of Yahya al-Ishaq, President of the Iran-Iraq Joint Chamber, that there is Saudi-American pact against the Iranian market and activities in Iraq, pointing

31 to the Saudi endeavors to take Iran out of Iraq through utilizing the economy, are fatal evidences in that Iran is quite concerned of the growing Saudi-Iraqi relationship.

3 - Table of the most prominent Saudi-Iraqi mutual visits during 2017 Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubair had made visits in February 2017 before Abadi’s visit, that were aimed to coordinate at all levels and to start a new chapter of relations between the two countries, in the light of the fact that both countries need each other.

Notably the visits came, after the significant developments which were undertaken to eliminate ISIS, and the regional and international endeavors to blockade Iran.

The most prominent Saudi-Iraqi mutual visits, during 2017, were:

THE MOST PROMINENT SAUDI - IRAQI MUTUAL VISITS, DURING 2017 OFFICIAL

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubair

King Salman

DATE

February 2017

March 2017

PLACE

CONTENT

Baghdad

He discussed with Abadi Counterterrorism files, and restoring Saudi-Iraqi relations to the right track, appointing a new ambassador to Iraq.

Jordan

He met with Abadi on the sidelines of the Arab summit in Jordan and discussed the victories achieved by security forces against ISIS, in Mosul.

Abadi

June 2017

Jeddah

Setting an agreement to establish a coordination council to develop relations between both countries.

Iraqi Interior Minister Qassem al-Araji

July 2017

Jeddah

Discussing a number of topics of common interest.

The Sadrist Movement Moqtada al-Sadr

July 2017

Jeddah

reviewing Saudi-Iraqi relations and many issues of common interest.

Baghdad

enhancing bilateral relations in the economic, trade, agricultural and investment fields.

Saudi Minister of Trade and Investment Majed al-Qasabi

August 2017

32

IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017

Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al Falih

October 1, 2017

Baghdad

Participating in the inauguration of the 44th Baghdad International Fair

Haider al-Abadi

21 October, 2017

Riyadh

Launching the Saudi-Iraqi Coordination Council

SECOND: REVIEW OF ZARIF’S VISIT TO THE SULTANATE OF OMAN AND QATAR The Qatar crisis with its Gulf neighbors (Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain) and Egypt, has been reaching a boiling point with Qatar’s stubbornness in dismissing regional demands; 1- reject terrorism, 2- stop support to terrorist organizations 3- cutting its relations with Iran. This has been fueling the crisis for sixth months in a row blocking the way to reach a solution. The first visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Jawad Zarif, to two Gulf states, Oman and Qatar for two days 2-3/20/ 2017 since the start of the crisis, June 2017, emphasized the fact that Iran is prepared to exploit the division between the Gulf states, and with accusations of meddling in GCC affairs is eager to send a message to the world that it has good positive relations with the GCC states, this incidentally has led to more coverage of Tehran’s foreign policy with the GCC. According to the Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Bahram Qasimi, the reason behind the meeting, with his Omani counterpart, Yousef bin Alawi, and the Qatari counterpart, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Al Thani, was to discuss bilateral relations, regional and international issues, develop relations between Iran and both countries, and finally increase the Iranian cooperation with Qatar and Oman.

The Iranian political analyst, Faridoun Majlisi, gave an interesting point of view regarding the significance of the visit and its objectives, which we see as being unrealistic. He argued that the regional tours and discussions with neighboring countries are of great importance to Iran’s foreign policy, and that they can have a positive impact on Iran’s situation in the region and in the world, also he believes that Muscat is always trying to be a communication channel suitable for Iran in attracting friendship and fending off enmity; therefore, Iran must always give priority in its regional relations to Oman.

Also, he believes that Zarif was not seeking to exploit the crisis, as he emphasized, during the talks, the importance of tightening the bilateral relations between Qatar and Iran, and that the official bodies of both countries should provide the required facilities to boost further relations and benefit economic opportunities. He also stressed that none of the crises in the region can be solved via military means, and all parties must commit to dialogue and peaceful solutions.

While Qatar has opened the door for Iranian interference in the Gulf, dismissing the point that the Doha’ crisis cannot be solved but within the Gulf remit. Thus, food shipments from Iran, will not end the Doha’ crisis, which needs social, economic and political depth of the Gulf, whereas involvement of a third party like Iran will only lead to a temporary solution, which can be converted into blackmail (political/financial) as Iran is known to exploit such situations for national interests. Any Iranian generosity will only have a bundle of fake promises; considering the economic difficulties and low standard of living in Iran.

33 Moreover, this visit along with the Qatari-Iranian rapprochement will cause more harm to Qatar than benefit her, as it will deepen the division between Qatar and the GCC. Qatar must realize the dangerous Iranian plot, as it is aiming to weaken the GCC and manipulate this division and rattle the pillars of Gulf unity through the Qatari door- and Doha is helping them to do that.

THIRD: SUCCESSIVE IRANIAN ARM SHIPMENTS TO THE HOUTHIS While the Legitimate Forces in the Yemeni towns were advancing forward and recovering more than 80% of the territory of Yemen conquered by the Houthis, their allies, and the former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, along with the American and regional moves to blockade Iran after having ISIS terminated in Syria and Iraq, the smuggling of weapons from Iran to the Houthis was detected: First Weapon Detection was on 1/ 10/ 2017: The Saudi-led Coalition to Support Yemen announced intercepting an Iranian vessel in the Arabian Sea, which was 150 miles southeast of Salalah, with 14 Iranians on board, carrying more than 100 pieces of missiles and anti-tank missiles along with missile guidance systems, and launch platforms, pointing out that the ship was checked by the Ports and Customs Organization in the Sistan-Baluchistan province which granted them a license to sail in a fishing area. The Coalition leadership stated that the ship was carrying 18 antitank Konkurs, missiles, 54 BGM-17 anti-tank missiles, 15 missile-battery packs, 5 binoculars batteries, 3 launch-pads, and 3 batteries.

Yemeni presidential adviser Yasin Makkawi stated that the seizure of an Iranian vessel carrying weapons and military equipment for the Houthis affirms the Iranian policy which seeks to spread terror and destruction over the whole Arab world. Iran tries through using such tactics to penetrate these states to get them tied under the Iranian umbrella. “The endeavors carried out by the coalition states, led by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and the rest of coalition states, will confront all these attempts,” Makkawi added.

Second Weapon Detection Iranian armament was seized by the Yemeni government on 21/10/2017, which was carrying 29 sailors after entering the territorial water of Yemen reaching west of Socotra Island coast, in the Indian Ocean.

FOURTH: DEVELOPMENTS OF IRANIAN INCURSIONS IN SYRIA: Iran is seeking to impose its influence over Syria in this critical stage where Syria is suffering division of influence via the agreement of four safe zones along with the American moves to blockade Iran; along with the Turkish military interventions in Idlib, through important visits by senior officials to manage military coordination on the ground for the new phase.

1- Indications and significance of Baqeri’s visit to Syria The visit of the Chief of General Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, Mohammad Baqeri, and his accompanying delegation to Syria on 17/10/2017 is the first one done by a senior Iranian

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IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017

military official after more than 6 years of sending military and non-military fighters to Syria, and the second visit after the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani visited Damascus in January 2017.

The importance of this visit is due to several reasons, which is illustrated in the table below: TIMING

PARTICIPATED LEADERS

DISCUSSIONS

The issues raised in the The meeting was The visit was carried out with rising speculations of dividing attended by Mohammed meeting superficially aimed at strengthening SyrianBaqeri, as head of areas of influence through safe Iranian military relations, a senior military zones that resulted from the but it was not a regular visit. delegation from all Astana talks; while all relevant The main aim was: branches, with his regional and international -Planning joint operations: Syrian counterpart, partners were clashing to to enhance and protect General Ali Abdullah control the restored areas Ayoub, in the presence Iranian spheres of influence, from ISIS in Syria. After the and to have an active role of the Syrian Minister US President, Donald Trump, in planning policies for the of Defense. The Chief announced his new strategy post-ISIS period, in Syria. of General Staff is toward Iran and its regional -Strengthening the pillars the highest and most interference in Syria, Iraq and of Iranian militias to ensure important authority in Yemen. Following, the Turkish their continuity in the future, directing land, naval military moved troops on the to maintain their influence and air forces of the Turkish-Syrian boarders, which in the hotbeds of conflicts. army. reached Idlib.

2-Iranian causalities in Syria The Iranian causalities have been variant since the beginning of the Syrian crisis till October 2017. The economic loss has been immense with the burden on the shoulder of the Iranian citizen, along with the loss of lives amongst senior officers and advisers of the Revolutionary Guards forces, military bodies and military militias.

The table below illustrates the death toll in October 2017, and the total death toll since the beginning of the crisis, 2011:

TOTAL DEATH TOLL 2011- OCTOBER 2017

DEATH TOLL IN OCTOBER 2017

It ranges from 2400-2700 (according to Iranian con.)flicting announcements )according to international media sources( 3600 deaths are from Zainab, Fatimah and Haider 60% militias in Syria deaths are from clerics and Sharia studies stuďż˝ 900 )dents (estimation

11

35 The death toll in October 2017: eleven Iranian Revolutionary Guard troops have been killed in Syria, according to the Iranian Press Agency (DEFA press) (7 members of the Afghan Fatimiyoun Division militias, which includes about 14,000 fighters) including senior officers of the Revolutionary Guard and clerics: · Abdullah Khasyoori: The military commander of the Fateheen brigade for defending holy shrines in Syria, (added to the list of senior officers killed in Syria) · Hussein Akadadi: Member of the 40th Division of Engineering Corps in IRGC. · Ahmed Qunbori: A cleric It is estimated that more than 90 clerics and students of sharia studies were killed, including, Mohammed Ali Qalizadeh, who was the deputy of the Jurist Leader in the Army of Qum. Total death toll from 2011-October 2017: More than 2400 killed since 2011 (60% deaths are from Iranian Zainab, Fatimah and Haider militias in Syria), according to the Iranian Press Agency (DEFA press). This number is not accurate compared to the number published by international media sources, which state that 3600 military and non-military fighters have been killed. In addition, the Iranian newspaper, Kayhan, which is close to the decision-making circles in Tehran, stated that 2700 were killed, so how is it possible that the number decreased in 2017; despite the increase in the death rate during the final months of the presidency, of the former US President, Barack Obama. Iran, Syria and Russia intensified the number of their battles before a new American president came to office.

MAPPING THE DEATH OF TOP IRANIAN OFFICERS IN SYRIA Killed officers

Army Corps

Year-Location

The General Hassan Shateri

The Quds Force-IRGC

Rif Dimashq 2013-

Abdullah Eskandari

The Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans- IRGC

2014-Hama countryside

General Jabbar Dresawi

The Basij- IRGC

Aleppo countryside 2014

General Mohammed Ali Dadi

Ghadir Brigade- IRGC

Quneitra countryside 2015-

General Abbas abd Elahi

The Military Operations Commander in South Syria-IRGC

2015-Daraa countryside

General

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IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017

General Mohammed Karam Ardakani

Commander of Resistance Area- IGRC

2015-Daraa countryside

General Karim Ghwabesh

Advisor of IRGC

2015-Rif Dimashq

General Hussien Hamdani

Co-founder of IRGC

2015-Hama countryside

General Fershad Hasoni Zadah

Sabreen Brigade- IRGC

2015-Rif Dimashq

General Muslim Khezab

Commander of Zahra Brigade

2015-Hama countryside

General Mortada Ata’ey

Commander of Incursion Squad at Brigade Afghan Fatimiyoun Division

not specified 2016-

General Abdullah Khasyoori

Commander of Fateheen Brigade

Homs countryside 2017-

2- Iran recruiting children to fight in Syria: A report by the Human Rights Watch (an international non-governmental organization dedicated to defending human rights) calls for an open probe targeting IRGC recruitment of children under the age of 14 to fight under the Fatimiyoun Division and pulling them into the midst of war in Syria. The Human Rights Watch organization asked the international community and the United Nations to lead a probe on the issue and add Iran to the annual list of perpetrators of grave violations against children. The Report is based on: • Photographs of eight children graves, with their tombstone inscriptions clearly indicating that they were under the age of 18 when they died.

• Documenting three children cases; two of them were under 17 years of age and one was under 15 years of age. They were buried in Barz, Tehran and Isfahan.

• There are, according to the Iranian Ministry of Interior, more than 2.5 million Afghans in Iran -most of them without residence permits- that are exploited in conflicts hoping to amend their family legal resident status.

FIFTH: EVIDENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS ENGAGEMENT IN SEIZING BACK KIRKUK After the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional independence referendum on 25/9/2017, Iran denied that it had any role in restoring the disputed territories (Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmato, Sinjar, Khanqin and Daqouq). Ali Akbar Velayati, senior advisor for foreign affairs to Iran’s Supreme

37 Leader stated, “Iran has no role in restoring the disputed territories.” A statement was a reply to the allegation that the IRGC received instructions from the Peshmerga forces that they direct the movements of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Kirkuk. The Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council, Mohsen Rezai, claimed that Tehran did not participate in regaining control over Kirkuk, and that the Iraqi Army and PMF exerted all efforts needed without the participation of any external forces.

However, multiple lines of evidence converge to inform that the IRGC was involved in interfering in the disputed area between the Federal Iraqi government and Kurdistan Region. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards participated in restoring these territories exploiting the crisis to strengthen their influence over the disputed territories. This participation explains Iran’s behavior in Iraq, desiring to spread permanently its influence without intending to withdraw- at all.

These several lines of evidence can be seen in the following: -The Monitor’s report affirms the Iranian participation with Iraqi forces in restoring Kirkuk through the IRGC commander, Ali Eqbalpour, who is the representative of Qassem Suleimani in Kirkuk, so that Iran can gain the upper hand over Kirkuk. After seizing back Kirkuk and curtailing the Kurds’ power in the region, Iran has had a stronger grip over the Shiite Kurds, but having the Sunni Kurds allied to Turkey, on the other side, this will fire new conflicts in Kirkuk.

- On October 18, two days after the loss of Kirkuk city by Peshmerga forces, the official Facebook page of a unit under the PMF published photos of number of PMF commanders in Kirkuk. The 2nd battalion commander of Peshmerga forces in Kirkuk, Shwan Shadmani, said that the Iraqi forces and PMF will not be alone while invading the province; the Iranian Revolutionary Guards will join them.

- The Successive Iranian moves in refusing the separation can be observed in the visit of Qassem Suleimani to the Kurdistan Region after the referendum, to negotiate and dissuade the Kurds from separation. Iran deployed tanks at its border with Iraq’s Kurdish region, a Kurdish official said to Reuters.

- The Successive Iranian statements refusing separation; The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei during a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his visit to Iran, expressed his opposition to the Kurdish separation claiming that: “These are ambitions to form a state (a new Israel state), the proactive step is the separation; therefore, Iran is committed with its alliance with Turkey, to take necessary action to deal with the current situation and to prevent separation.”

Also, the Iranian Minister of Defense, Amir Hatimi stated that Tehran insists to keep ‘Iraq unified’ and strongly opposes separation of any part of Iraq. He added that the American government instead of solving its own strategic problems, it insists on supporting separation and plotting to impose sanctions against the Iranian nation, which will not be effective, affirming that separation of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is only to protect the Israeli security.

Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Parliamentary Director General for International Affairs and Assistant to the Speaker of Parliament, stated that the separation will cause instability for the region and regression in counterterrorism. Also, the member of the Iranian parliament,

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IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017

Gholam Ja’far Zadeh, said that when studying the separation of the Kurdistan Region, they find that the ‘Zionist entity’ agrees on the separation inside the Iraqi territories, aspiring to invade neighboring countries, which he named as: “the spirit of hypocrisy and Zionist plots in the region.”

Ali Akbar Velayati, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, said that the conspiracy of Masood Barzani carried out against the security of the region was thwarted after the defeat of the Kurds in Kirkuk. He claimed that Barzani aimed to seize Kirkuk’s oilfields to serve Israeli interest. This was apparent by raising the Israeli flag in the region, pointing out to the redrawing of Israeli borders, which is very critical.

The spokesman for Iran’s armed forces, Brigadier General Massoud Jazairi, affirmed his country’s stance against the separation in Iraq, adding that it was decided to conduct a military maneuver “Takdar” between the Iranian armed forces and units of the Iraqi army, which will include border areas in the “Palace of Shirin” up to Pervez khan and the borders of Bashmak in the city of Marivan and the border region of Tamrjeen (areas bordering the Kurdistan Region).

IRANIAN INTERACTIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD Saudi Arabia and the Gulf The Iranian Foreign Minister visited Muscat and Doha. Tehran and Muscat discussed ways to enhance economic corporation; the Iranian trade delegation met with the Deputy Chairman of Economic Affairs and the Branches of the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Ayman bin Abdullah Hasani in the headquarter in Muscat. Oman granted Iran exclusive use of the port of Suwaiq. The Iranian Consulate General in Dubai, Ali Reza Bahrami, said that the Consulate is ready to provide support to Iranian investors and merchants residing in the UAE within the framework of economic diplomacy.

Syria The Commander of the Fatimiyoun Division said that he doesn’t force Afghans to fight in Syria they voluntarily go to defend the Ahl Al Bait. The Shiite Afghans supported the Iranian Revolutions and its objectives, and Syria and Iran have signed a Memorandum of Understanding. The Chief of General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Major General Baqeri, visited Syria, where he met the Syrian president and his minister of defense and a number of security leaders. Bashar Assad met Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the head of the National Security Council of the Iranian parliament, stating that Syria will never forget Iran’s sacrifices. The acting Syrian ambassador to Jordan, Ayman Alloush, stated that the Gulf crisis has forced Jordanian authorities to change the stance they had against the Syrian crisis; Amman has started rapprochement with Damascus.

Iraq The Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council, Mohsen Rezai, said what Barzani did has turned back the clock of Kurdistan by ten years. Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the Parliamentary Director General for International Affairs and Assistant to the Speaker of Parliament, said on his official account on Twitter that the central government of Iraq will return Erbil to the unified Iraq easier than Kirkuk. The Prime Minister of Iraq visited Tehran and met several Iranian officials after he had visited Riyadh and Ankara.

39 Iran has aspired to increase the economic corporation with Iraq up to 20 billion a year.

Also, it has endeavored to overcome financial barriers hindering exporting gas to Iraq –in fact- approximately 10 million cubic meters per day is being delivered through a pipeline to Baghdad. The reports pointed out that exporting gas to Iraq through the border area of Shalamcheh, southwestern Iran, is just around the corner. According to the plan 7 million cubic meters of gas can be exported daily to Basra across the region; especially after The National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) has developed an export terminal and facilities in Basra- there is no problem in exporting to the southern provinces of Iraq. Iran signed a memorandum of understanding with Iraq in 2009, which turned into a final agreement after two years, and by which Iran undertakes to export 20-25 million cubic meters of gas per day to feed Mansour and Sadr electrical stations in Baghdad. Furthermore, Iran signed another export contract with Iraq supplying 25-40 million cubic meters of gas per day to feed Shatt Basra power station, in 2015.

Yemen: The deposed president Ali Abdullah Saleh denied Iranian support for him and for the Houthi militias, “Give me one Iranian killed in Yemen,” he said. Nonetheless, the disagreement between the deposed president and Houthis militias is reportedly increasing.

‫‪IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017‬‬

‫‪Endnotes‬‬ ‫(‪ )١‬العربية نت‪ ،‬العبادي في الرياض اليوم وتوقيع التفاقية مجلس التنسيق (‪.)http://cutt.us/Fx2gZ‬‬ ‫(‪ )٢‬روسيا اليوم‪ ،‬مجلس التنسيق السعودي العراقي ينطلق اليوم بآفاق واعدة تشمل المنطقة بأسرها‬ ‫(‪.)http://cutt.us/7u703‬‬ ‫(‪ )٣‬الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬العبادي في الرياض لحضور مجلس التنسيق السعودي‪-‬العراقي (‪.)http://cutt.us/J0O45‬‬ ‫(‪ )٤‬العربية نت‪ ،‬جودة المنتجات السعودية ستنافس بقوة بسوق العراق (‪.)http://cutt.us/8woJm‬‬ ‫(‪ )٥‬العربية نت‪ ،‬أولى قوافل حجاج العراق تعبر للسعودية من منفذ عرعر (‪.)http://cutt.us/2invy‬‬ ‫(‪ )٦‬نامه‪ ،‬خیز اقتصادی بلند سعودی ها در عراق‪ /‬حساب ویژه عربستان روی بازار عراق (‪.)http://cutt.us/U2XBk‬‬ ‫تحدد موعد انطالق الرحالت بين المملكة والعراق (‪.)http://cutt.us/WY1Wi‬‬ ‫(‪ )٧‬العالم‪ ،‬الخطوط الجوية السعودية ِّ‬ ‫(‪ )٨‬جام جم‪ ،‬واکنش ظریف به تشکیل شورای هماهنگی روابط عراق وعربستان (‪.)http://cutt.us/sayZq‬‬ ‫(‪ )٩‬جام جم‪ ،‬سعودیها در عراق نفرت کاشتند‪ /‬همگرایی بغداد ـ ریاض غیرممکن است (‪.)http://cutt.us/7459Z‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٠‬جوان‪ ،‬رئيس اتاق مشترك ايران و عراق خبر داد‪ :‬توطئه اقتصادي امريكا و عربستان عليه ايران در بازار عراق‬ ‫(‪.)http://cutt.us/qW1Wg‬‬ ‫(‪ )١١‬إبراهيم العبيدي‪ ،‬زيارة ظريف لقطر‪ ..‬عمالء الدوحة يدفعون بالماللي لشق مجلس التعاون الخليجي‪ ،‬بغداد بوست‬ ‫(‪.)http://cutt.us/m5pdN‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٢‬فارس‪ ،‬قاسمی‪ :‬سفر ظریف به مسقط و دوحه (‪.)https://goo.gl/hujJpr‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٣‬الوفاق‪ ،‬إيران وعمان تبحثان القضايا اإلقليمية‪ ..‬وتطور كبير في عالقاتهما االقتصادية (‪.)https://goo.gl/kCQt5q‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٤‬ارمان آمروز‪ ،‬چرا سفر به عمان و قطر؟ فریدون مجلسی (‪.)https://goo.gl/ysKmBp‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٥‬جمهوري إسالمي‪ ،‬دكتر ظريف در ديدار با امير قطر‪ :‬هيچیک از بحران های منطقه راه حل نطامی ندارد‬ ‫(‪.)http://cutt.us/mYijm‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٦‬الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬التحالف يعترض سفينة إيرانية في طريقها إلى الحوثيين محملة بالصواريخ (‪.)https://goo.gl/RjH7PC‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٧‬المرجع السابق‪.‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٨‬المرجع السابق‪.‬‬ ‫(‪ )١٩‬فارس‪ ،‬الرئيس األسد يتسلم رسالة من المرشد اإليراني (‪.)https://goo.gl/Rv89XE‬‬ ‫(‪ )٢٠‬ميزان‪ ،‬سرلشکر باقری با وزیر دفاع سوریه دیدار کرد‪ /‬همکاری‌های نظامی تهران‪-‬دمشق تقویت می‌شود‬ ‫(‪.)https://goo.gl/eViBMp‬‬ ‫(‪ )٢١‬أورينت‪.‬نت‪ ،‬صحيفة إيرانية تكشف للمرة األولى أعداد قتلى الميليشيات الشيعية في سوريا (‪.)http://cutt.us/F9I7w‬‬ ‫(‪ )٢٢‬تابناك‪ ،‬فرمانده گردان فاتحین در سوریه شهید شد (‪.)https://goo.gl/GTV7be‬‬ ‫(‪ )٢٣‬آناتولي‪ ،‬یکی از اعضای سپاه پاسداران ایران در سوریه کشته شد (‪.)https://goo.gl/H5kdQ7‬‬ ‫(‪ )٢٤‬العربية نت‪ ،‬تشييع أطفال أفغان جندتهم إيران لحرب سوريا (‪.)http://cutt.us/KMUk9‬‬ ‫(‪ )٢٥‬كيهان‪ ،‬رضائي‪ :‬ما قام به بارزاني أعاد اإلقليم ‪ 10‬سنوات إلى الوراء (‪.)https://goo.gl/55PuUi‬‬ ‫(‪ )٢٦‬فارس‪ ،‬محسن رضائي‪ :‬ال دور إليران في تحرير كركوك (‪.)https://goo.gl/k3dETx‬‬ ‫(‪ )٢٧‬صافي الياسري‪ ،‬الدور اإلجرامي اإليراني في كركوك (‪.)http://cutt.us/vVV05‬‬ ‫(‪ )٢٨‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬نیروهای سپاه برای مقابله با پیشمرگه‌ های کرد «در نزدیکی کرکوک حضور دارند»‬ ‫(‪.)https://goo.gl/eW5wkK‬‬ ‫(‪ )٢٩‬شهروند‪ ،‬مذاکره سردار در اقلیم کردستان (‪.)https://goo.gl/9wc4zy‬‬ ‫(‪ )٣٠‬ارمان امروز‪ ،‬استقرار تانک‌های ایران در مرز اقلیم (‪.)https://goo.gl/Bs3T65‬‬ ‫(‪ )٣١‬برترين ها‪ ،‬رهبر انقالب‪ :‬ضرت‌ برگزاری همه‌پرسی در کردستان عراق خیانت به منطقه است‬ ‫(‪.)https://goo.gl/XUD7MH‬‬ ‫(‪ )٣٢‬ارمان امروز‪ ،‬باجدايى هر قسمتي از خاک عراق مخالفيم (‪.)http://cutt.us/LhvnK‬‬ ‫(‪ )٣٣‬تسنيم‪ ،‬امیر عبداللهیان‪ :‬استقال ‌ل خواهی بارزانی یعنی تقویت داعش وتل آویو (‪.)https://goo.gl/mziSnf‬‬ ‫(‪ )٣٤‬شعار سال‪ ،‬رژیم صهیونیستی بخشی از یهودیان را به اقلیم کردستان منتقل می‌کند (‪.)https://goo.gl/vNjSA5‬‬ ‫(‪ )٣٥‬جام جم‪ ،‬والیتی‪ :‬شکست در کرکوک توطئه بارزانی را خنثی کرد (‪.)http://cutt.us/yUU0J‬‬ ‫(‪ )٣٦‬قانون ديلي‪ ،‬تأکید مجدد غیر قانونی بودن همه‌ پرسی استقالل در عراق (‪.)https://goo.gl/t4dDnt‬‬

‫‪40‬‬

41

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIR

In

Iran-US Relations

parallel with the announcement of the new US strategy on Iran on October13, 2017, the US President Donald Trump released two central decisions: he decertified the Iran nuclear deal and Tehran’s commitment to the JCPOA signed with the P5+1 group, giving Congress sixty days to decide whether to reimpose sanctions or to continue with sanctions relief on Tehran. Also, Trump ordered the US Department of Treasury to classify IRGC as a terrorist organization in compliance with CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) section 105 ratified by President Trump on August 2, 2017.

The Dilemma of the Nuclear Deal and the new US Strategy on Iran

42

IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017

This section requires the imposition of sanctions on the IRGC and foreign persons (officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC) pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13224 that was passed by former president George W. Bush in 2001 on global terrorism and it included the names of organizations, entities, and persons supporting terrorism. According to the US Treasury Department, it took up Trump’s orders and included the IRGC within the EO 13224, but did not classify it as a terrorist organization. However, this decision extended sanctions to include the leadership, persons, and organizations cooperating or affiliated to the IRGC within the framework of the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the US Treasury Department.

Indeed, there is a big shift in the US position toward escalation against Tehran, which means that Iran will be facing a difficult situation in the upcoming period. The problem for Iran is that this escalation emerged while the Iranian officials were ruling out any review or amendments to the terms of the nuclear deal and JCPOA, relying on effective bargaining chips like the positions of some key EU countries that participated in negotiating the deal and the Russian and Chinese positions that oppose cancelation or even review of the agreement. In addition, Iran misinterpreted the US institutions and President Trump’s positions on the nuclear deal, describing Trump’s position as propaganda to please his supporters. Nevertheless, the situation seems to be more complicated than that. The constant escalation trend accompanied by threats of re-imposition of sanctions and pressures since Trump’s succession to the US presidency has ended up with the US adopting a somewhat new strategy against Tehran.

This strategy has resolved all discrepancies between the frequent statements and contradictory positions inside the new US administration. All in all, this strategy has unified the new US administration. It was the bottom line of discussions between the US National Security team and Congress in consultation with the United States allies. It is comprehensive and not only tackled the differences over the nuclear deal, but also included Iran’s regional and international notorious behavior. Hence, the future will witness more pressures on Iran- especially the regime’s armed wings and regional proxy militias, in coordination with regional and international powers, which was evident when President Trump said, “Our strategy starts with imposition of tough sanctions on the IRGC.” THE NUCLEAR DEAL DILEMMA AND THE NEED FOR A NEW STRATEGY Some people thought the JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1 group was a turning point in the hostile and tense relations between the United States and Iran that emerged by the end of the 1970s. The agreement came to

43 light in 2015 under international approval through the Security Council resolution 2231 that was the foundation for building a solid ground to tackle the major points of disagreement between both sides. Conversely, the major problem was that Iran had limited the whole pact in the nuclear issues, while the United States believed the agreement was a comprehensive political framework to curb Iran’s behaviors and prepare Tehran to engage in the openness and good intentions provided by the accord.

Based on those assumptions, Iran tried to use the nuclear deal as a settlement for all its problems with the United States and the international community, including sanctions relief and ending its isolation without linking the agreement to the other points of disagreementespecially Tehran’s foreign policy, regional role, missile program, threatening regional and international peace and security, supporting terrorism, spreading violence, and so on. Being in a lenient environment of negotiations, Iran succeeded in excluding any obligations in the JCPOA concerning its regional policy and defense capabilities. It limited the nuclear deal in tackling the technical issues in its nuclear file that stood as the main concern for the American and European negotiators. Perhaps, the United States and the other members of the P5+1 group- especially the European countries- relied on openness as a solution for all outstanding issues. However, Iran used the environment of understanding with the United States and the P5+1 group to lessen the international pressures on Tehran, sanctions relief, and release hundreds of billions of USDs that had been frozen abroad. This détente and easing of the situation opened the door wide for the Iranian regime to maintain its legitimacy inside the country and its policies and ambitions abroad, which was reflected on the expansion of Iran’s role, troubling the American calculations in the region, development of Iran’s military capabilities- especially missile capabilities- and building political, military, and economic partnerships with the US rival countries.

On the other hand, Trump adopted different tendencies from his precedent’s policies- former president Obama that allowed Iran to use the nuclear deal to implement its projects. In addition to curbing any non-civilian nuclear activities, Trump insisted on linking survival of the Iran nuclear deal to its general behavior and positions toward the other points of disagreement.

Hence, in addition to the demands of giving the international AEA inspectors access to some military posts due to some doubts about Iran’s commitment to its nuclear obligations, the United States extended sanctions related to the Iranian regime’s behavior for violating the spirit of the nuclear deal, which was considered by Iran defiance of the agreement.

This, in addition to the Iranian pragmatic and opportunistic behavior, widened the gap and

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mistrust and severed the crisis between both sides despite all the fuss that accompanied the nuclear deal. In return, the United States restored the policy of escalation and pressure to oblige Iran to change its behavior and stop its hostile activities by threatening the reimposition of sanctions and isolation. However, this policy did not work with the Iranian government- especially in regard to Iran’s regional role and ballistic missile program. In fact, Tehran did not want to lose what it considered legitimate military and regional investments to protect its national security and preserve the state and political regime. As a result, the United States needed a shift in its policy toward this country.

ON OCTOBER13, 2017, TRUMP ANNOUNCED HIS NEW STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE THE FOLLOWING GOALS: 1. Eliminate hostilities of the Iranian regime: The Trump administration had several reservations on the Iranian regime as an extension of the tensions and disagreements that have characterized the relations between the two countries for decades. The most prominent US accusations to Iran are; its hostile nature, its role in spreading the revolutionary ideology by force, promoting violence, sponsorship of terrorism, and the regime’s oppression and tyranny.

The slogan, “Anti-America” is still dominating the Iranian political medium on all levels; officially and publically.

One of the Obama administration’s goals of adopting an open policy on Iran was to break the ideological nature of the regime and incur internal movements to urge this regime to incline towards more openness and change. On the other hand, the Trump administration adopted the same goal but in a different way, which was the restoration of pressures and the sanctions policy on Tehran.

2. Confronting the Iranian expanding regional role: As a result of the Obama administration’s withdrawal from the region, vulnerability of the regional protection umbrella, diminishing role of the active regional players, and emergence of ISIS, the door was open for Iran to expand and gain legitimacy and acceptance- especially in Syria and Iraq. No doubt, the Iranian influence threatened regional security and impacted the American interests and its allies’ security in the region. Indeed, following the signing of the nuclear deal, Iran became more aggressive toward its neighbors than before and as never punished for these practices.

Nevertheless, when Trump adopted a new US policy on the region, Iran considered this shift as a threat to its interests. The US confronted the Iranian influence and role in Syria and Iraq through building coalitions and carrying out military operations against the Iranianbacked militias, which was frankly stated in the new US strategy and considered as one of the United States top priorities against Iran.

3. Curbing the IRGC and the Iranian-backed militias’ threats: The IRGC is the regime’s tool to carry out Tehran’s military interference outside its borders. Recently, it has played a major role in a number of conflicts in the region, knowing that the IRGC is in control of a big share of the Iranian economy and the resources required for implementing the regime’s agenda.

Since the beginning of 2017, the Trump administration targeted the IRGC and imposed several sanctions on this institution through CAATSA that was passed on June 25, 2017.

After that, the IRGC was included in the executive order 13224 as an entity sponsoring terrorism on Trump’s orders followed by the US Treasury Department decision on October 31, 2017 that imposed sanctions on forty one Iranian personalities and companies dealing with

45 the IRGC, including the IRGC Air Force. These procedures reflected the awaited confrontation against the IRGC activities and its regional role within the new US strategy that aimed at curbing the IRGC role and facing its arms inside and outside the country. This tendency was evident through the statement of the US secretary of State Rex Tillerson when he said, “After the end of war on ISIS, Iran’s militias in Iraq have to go back to where they came from.”

No doubt, the new US strategy confused Iran’s calculations and would diminish its regional role, which made Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mohammed Javad Zarif respond to these statements saying, “Had Iran not fought ISIS, this organization would have controlled Damascus, Baghdad, and Erbil.” All in all, because of the new US strategy, the expected confrontation between the United States and the IRGC has taken shape.

The drivers of the new strategy were not confined to limiting the role of the IRGC; they included the Iranian-backed regional arms and proxy militias like Hezbollah.

On October 26, 2017 the US House of Representatives approved three procedures against the Lebanese Hezbollah imposing sanctions on any entities that support this organization; financially or militarily. The second procedure imposed sanctions on Iran and Hezbollah “for using civilians as human shields,” while the last procedure approved by the US House was calling the EU to classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Another practice of Hezbollah that lied within the new US strategy was its major role in the resignation of the Lebanese Prime Minister, Saad Hariri and his cabinet.

4. Curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the obligation to abide by the spirit of the agreement: The US administration believed the Iranian regime’s activities had prevented any positive initiative in the regional and international peace/security that the JCPOA aimed at achieving. Even in regard to the JCPOA, the Iranian regime showed a disturbing behavior in order to use the loopholes in the agreement for its own interests. The JCPOA stated, “Some technical constrains phase out starting from 2025”, which was considered by the United States as an escape that would allow Iran, by this date, to restore its nuclear program at any time. The US fears increased with the Iranian rejection to respond to the US demands to give access to the international AEA inspectors to some military posts- especially with the American doubts on Iran’s intentions about its nuclear program. Indeed, the new US strategy targeted, in one of its terms, preventing Iran from achieving its nuclear ambitions.

Based on these assumptions, two American Senators, Bob Corker and Tom Cotton introduced a draft law to the Senate to support Trump. The draft law suggested to review the Iran nuclear deal signed in 2015 and stated, “Every ninety days, the US president announces whether Iran is in compliance with the deal and if continuity of the agreement is in line with the US national interests or not,” knowing that President Trump had approved the extension of sanctions two times before, in April and July 2017. This amendment will add new tougher terms to the nuclear deal like re-imposition of sanctions in case Iran conducts any ballistic missile tests or denies access of the international inspectors to any posts within sixty days after Trump had decertified the Iran nuclear deal.

5. Bringing an end to Iran’s missile program: Despite the international condemnations to Iran’s long-range missile program, it insisted on proceeding on in its missile tests every so often considering these tests as legitimate defense rights. The point of disagreement with the United States and the West concerning ballistic missiles was that Iran claimed that the nuclear deal did not include its ballistic missiles and that this program was one

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of its legitimate and sovereign rights. The Iranian consistency in developing its ballistic missile program was one of the reasons behind the United States accusations to Iran that it had violated the spirit of the nuclear deal. As a result, the United States imposed several sanctions on Iran due to its missile tests and attempts to have missiles capable of carrying nuclear heads. In fact, the new US strategy aimed at exerting more pressure on Tehran to stop such programs and prevent it from threatening the regional and international security and, most importantly, threatening the US military presence in the region.

FEATURES OF THE NEW STRATEGY AND AVAILABLE OPTIONS The new US strategy was based on the belief that, “The Obama administration was short-sighted when it separated the nuclear issue from the other hostile activities of Iran because this allowed it to expand its influence in the region to its highest levels. During the past decade and a half, the United States disregarded the long-term threat of the Iranianbacked armed activities, while it concentrated most of its efforts on tackling the Sunni extremist groups. Hence, the United States had ignored Iran’s growing expansion through its proxy militias and terrorist networks that aimed at maintaining its neighbors’ weakness and instability to expand its influence at their expense in an unprecedented way. Recently, the Iranian regime provided these networks with destructive weapons by building a bridge from Iran to Lebanon.

Conversely, the Trump administration took the necessary measures to tackle Iran’s threats and activities and build the new US strategy on Iran based on the following points: 1. End Iran’s destabilizing influence and eliminate its hostilities- especially sponsorship of terrorism and support to militants.

2. Revive the traditional alliances and regional partnerships as shields against Iran’s sabotage practices and restore the significant balance of power in the region.

3. Deprive the Iranian regime- especially IRGC- from financing its destructive activities and decline the IRGC activities that divert the Iranian people’s wealth.

4. Counter the Iranian ballistic missiles and the other similar weapons directed against the United States and its allies.

5. Mobilize the international community to condemn the IRGC human rights violations and detention of US and other countries’ citizens on false accusations.

6. Prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGY ON IRAN No doubt, this strategy reflects Trump’s success in unifying his administration’s position on Iran after months of contradictory statements. This was reflected in the statement of the US Department of State when it said, “President Trump, in consultation with National the Security team and Congress, approved the new strategy on Iran,” describing the new strategy as, “Culmination of nine months of negotiations with Congress and our allies on how to best protect the American national security.”

The new strategy set out a comprehensive view that reflected an American escalation towards Tehran in the upcoming period. It also completely ended the grace period the United States had given to Iran to demonstrate good will after signing the nuclear deal and the beginning of a new period of escalation that had already started.

47

However, it is noted that the new US strategy will not rely on unilateral moves by the United States. The US administration is keen to move within a unanimous position with its European and regional allies and within the resolutions of the Riyadh summit in May 2017 to exert more pressure on Iran to guarantee success of the procedures it intends to take against this country. On the international level, there is still disagreement on the new US position toward continuity of the nuclear deal and Iran. Nevertheless, the United States is exerting pressure on its partners to align their positions with its views with constant hints of the dangers of unilateral moves. Based on those assumptions, the US Secretary of State warned the European companies from making business with Iran and pressured them to stop their trade and economic relations with this regime due to the new sanctions imposed on the IRGC. During his visit to Saudi Arabia, the US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson said, “All sides, either European or global companies, that have trade relations with IRGC and its partners are taking a big risk.”

In essence, the new US strategy draws a link between Iran’s behavior and the nuclear deal, which means that the future of the agreement, at least from the United States side, has become more related to tackling Iran’s hostile behavior in the region. Basically, the United States, through its new strategy, is delivering the following message, “Iran has to make a balance between its interests in preserving the nuclear deal and its regional role, ballistic missile program, sponsorship of terrorism, supporting the armed militias in the region, spreading violence, and regional interference; otherwise, it will be in an open confrontation with the Trump administration.”

The announcement of the new strategy put an end to the confusion and contradictions that dominated the US department’s positions since Trump’s announcement of reviewing the terms of the nuclear deal. This strategy expresses an acceptable limit of the agreed upon terms between these departments in countering Iran. Hence, it was normal when Trump decertified the Iran nuclear deal, the US Department of Treasury imposed new sanctions on the IRGC for sponsorship of terrorism, and Congress, on Trump’s demands, discussed reviewing the terms of the deal and there-imposition of sanctions. Whatever policy is to be adopted after discussions inside the US departments in compliance with the new US strategy, it reflects Trump’s success in shifting the US position toward exerting more pressure on Tehran that had never felt any responsibility for its annoying policy in the post-nuclear deal period. It also reflects the success of some regional powers- especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that played a major role in impacting the Trump administration and the US strategy on Iran.

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The new US strategy troubled the Iranian politicians. This was evident in the statements of some Iranian officials like Ahmed Hakimi Bor, Secretary General of the People’s Will Party who said, “We should not use Trump’s statements as a score-settling.” A Member of the Expediency Discernment Council, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri criticized the positions of the persons who praised Trump in Iran, asking them to reconsider their analysis and views according to the latest developments.

It was clear that there was disagreement on the nuclear deal in Iran. Some favored preserving the agreement even if the United States canceled it and re-imposed sanctions like the Chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi who said during his visit to Italy and Switzerland, “Everybody has to be committed to the nuclear deal.” The other view called for a withdrawal from the nuclear deal and to put the ball in the other countries’ court by giving them two options: to lift sanctions or withdraw. This view was supported by the statement of the Chief of the Strategic Council for Foreign Relations, Kamal Kharrazi who said, “You tried once and saw how they broke their commitments; our minds oblige us to not go this way again.”

Finally, Trump’s decertification of the Iran nuclear deal was the turning point in the US position on the agreement and has given the United States two options, the first is to withdraw from the deal and go back to square one before signing the pact. This option has some obstacles: the broad current inside the United States that is adverse to the idea of withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal or contributing to its repeal- see table (1) that explains the variant reactions on the new US strategy inside and outside the United States, alternatives of withdrawal from the deal and its consequences, and how successful the policy of escalation against Tehran will be after it had escaped a lot of pressures and opened several areas of cooperation with the key international powers after the pact. Furthermore, it is hard to convince the P5+1 group to repeal the agreement- especially China, Russia, and the European Union that have different views from the American ones on Iran.

This option will impose additional burdens on the Unites States like building a new coalition that aligns with its policy concentrated on exerting more pressure and isolation on Tehran and a possible direct or indirect confrontation with this country. Furthermore, this option clashes with the reports of the international AEA that confirmed- in eight reports since signing the nuclear deal- that Iran is in compliance with the terms of the deal and is committed to its obligations toward the agreement in addition to the United Statesitself- confirmation that Iran complies with the technical issues of the accord. Finally, this option will impact the American credibility and prevent other countries from hammering out similar agreements for fears of being exposed to the same situation of Iran like North Korea for example. The second option the United States can adopt is to preserve the Iran nuclear deal by Congress, while imposing more sanctions and pressures to force Iran to modify its behavior and tackle some outstanding issues. This option can be adopted within a long-term policy to oblige Iran to modify its behavior or go back to square one and face sanctions and isolation. In addition, this option was supported by the US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson when he told journalists, “Trump has decided to decertify the Iran nuclear deal.

However, he will not withdraw from it or re-impose sanctions, but he will say the agreement is not in the US national security interests.”

This option is also supported by procedures the Trump administration took against the

49 IRGC. It, openly, classified the IRGC as a terrorist organization, practically, this administration targeted the IRGC arms and partners of persons, institutions, and entities as sponsors of terrorism- as mentioned in previous sections of this report- when Trump granted the US Treasury Department wide powers to target this Iranian organization. In addition, Trump did not announce withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, he referred the matter to Congress to toughen sanctions on Iran and escape the terms of the deal by confirming Iran’s noncompliance with the terms of the agreement.

As for the impact of the international positions on the American strategy, the Iranians themselves have doubts about the steadfastness of the European Positions supporting continuity of the nuclear deal without reviewing its terms- especially in case the United States decides to go back to square one before signing the pact with Iran and re-impose sanctions and isolation. Based on that assumption, the Speaker of Iran’s National Security Committee, Hussein Naqavi said, “The Europeans will not take any steps concerning the nuclear deal in favor of Iran away from the United States.”

As for Iran, despite raising the ceiling of its political speech against the new US position, it might- because of heavy pressures- resort to negotiations to resolve the crisis- especially if it feels its big political investments over the past years will be at risk. Tillerson said that he discussed with his Iranian counterpart, Mohammed Javad Zarif the possibility of hammering out a new agreement to include Iran’s ballistic missile program and to be added to the first deal signed in 2015. This means that Iran has two options on the table; either extension of sanctions, isolation and losing the gains of the nuclear deal or enter a new phase of understanding and involvement. In case the Iranians fear the big cost of confrontation with the United States, they are most likely to resort to understanding and negotiations rather than confrontation and sanctions.

Nevertheless, the idea of withdrawal from the nuclear deal is still a point of dispute between the Republicans and the Democrats in the United States despite their agreement on exerting more pressures on Iran. This was evident through the wide support to the Congress decision to re-impose sanctions on Iran in 2016, which enhanced the US option of exerting more pressures on Tehran and using the nuclear deal rather than withdrawal from the accord.

The Most Important Reactions to the New US Strategy (Figure 1) THE MOST IMPORTANT REACTIONS INSIDE THE US Reaction

Position

Name

Called the United States to preserve the Iran nuclear deal and implement its terms strictly

Head of the Foreign Relations Committee in the US House

Ed Royce

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Said that the threats of canceling the nuclear deal is a historic mistake that threatens the US national security in a very critical period

The Democrats leader in the US House

Nancy Pelosi

Said that Trump’s decertification of the Iran nuclear deal is the last episode of the irresponsible attitudes that threaten the security of Americans. He also said that the ball is in the court of the Congress that has to listen to the US intelligence agencies who confirmed that the nuclear deal is going fine and called Congress to move to stop what he called, “The United States serious sliding toward war.”

Senator

Bernie Sanders

Said that canceling the nuclear deal harms the American national security and isolates the United States from its close allies, describing Trump’s speech on Iran as a hysteric dangerous one.

The Former US Secretary of State

Madeline Albright

Made a statement at which he strongly condemned the new strategy of the Trump administration on Tehran, saying that Trump is immature and does not make sense

The Former US Secretary of State

John Kerrey

Criticized Trump’s speech, saying it had questioned the United States credibility in the world and provided a distinguished service to hardliners in Iran

The Top advisor of Former President Barack Obama

Benjamin Ben Rhodes

Said that withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal does not isolate the Iranian regime, but isolates the United States

The Vice President of former US president Barak Obama

John Biden

Said that the nuclear deal secures the United States and added, “Do not take this reality from me; ask Trump’s Secretary of Defense”

Current Senator and a former vice-president candidate

Tim Kaine

51 Said that there was a possibility for the Senate to approve new amendments to the Iran nuclear deal

Republican Senator

Marco Rubio

Said that only during Trump’s era the United States has become- rather than its enemies- a country that does not respect its commitments in the world

Senator

Adam Schiff

Tweeted on the reactions on his speech saying that most of these reactions supported his speech, but added that the other participants in the nuclear deal are making big money from their trade deals with Iran.

The President of the Unites States

Donald Trump

THE MOST IMPORTANT REACTIONS IN IRAN Said that America is the agent of Zionism in the world

The Iranian Supreme Leader

Ali Khamenei

Said that the nuclear deal was not bilateral and that the United States does not have the right to be in control of it since it had been signed between Iran and the P5+1 group, asserting that the Iranian people would not surrender to any dictator or power.

The Iranian President

Hassan Rouhani

Said that if the United States withdrew from the nuclear deal, this would terminate it.

The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament

Ali Larijani

Said that the American people and the world would recognize how much the United States had lost due to its incorrect view.

Iran’s Foreign Minister

Mohammed Javad Zarif

Said, “We will not allow America to come back. All Iranian officials and people agree that America is our enemy and we are ready to move to confront America.”

Member of the Judicial and Legislative Committee in the Iranian Parliament

Mohammed Ali Bor Mukhtar

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Said that the nuclear deal is stronger than to be countered by the United States.

Iran’s Ambassador in London

Hameed Ba’idi

Said that the United States wants Iran as it is now; a weak and deficient regime and red-handed in all countries of the region, which means that the United States has no interest in changing the Iranian regime.

Former President of the Iranian Republic

Abu Hassan Bani Sadr

Said, “Had the United States and its puppets succeeded over the past forty years, to harm Iran, they would not have hesitated to do so.” He added that America only understands the language of power and Americans have to know that their projects like the “New Middle East” and “Normalizing Relations with Israel” would be absolutely defeated.

General Commander of IRGC

Major General Mohammed Ja’fari

Said, “We cannot negotiate with the Great Satan, America.” He added, “Our everlasting enemy will remain an enemy but not a friend. Satan is our number one enemy and America is the Great Satan that we cannot negotiate with.”

President of the Iranian Higher University for National Defense

Ahmed Vahidi

On renegotiating the Iran nuclear deal, he said that there would be no new negotiations with the United States.

Secretary General of Expediency Discernment Council

Mohsen Rezai

Said that everybody had to be committed to the nuclear deal

Chief of Iran’s AEA

Ali Akbar Salehi

Said that Trump’s speech is full of deficiency and failure, adding that this speech is unlike the previous one; that never mentioned the military option because the US president is taking Iran’s power into consideration.

Deputy General Commander of IRGC

General Hussein Salami

53 Said that Iran is ready to negotiate with all oil companies, including the American ones to carry out Iran’s oil and gas projects.

Iran’s Minister of Oil

Bijan Zanganeh

Said that the nuclear deal would not be renegotiated and there would be no additional negotiations, adding that the P5+1 group had to stick to their commitments.

Advisor of the Iranian Supreme Leader for International Affairs

Ali Akbar Velayati

THE MOST IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS ON THE US STRATEGY The leaders of France, Germany, and Britain warned the United States in a joint statement from taking any steps that might impact the nuclear deal like re-imposition of sanctions on Tehran. The leaders added that they shared the United States fears concerning Iran’s ballistic missile program and its destabilizing activities in the region and asserted that they were ready to work with Washington to dispel these fears.

BritishGermanFrench joint statement

Reaffirmed its commitment to the Iran nuclear deal, asking all sides to be committed to the accord. It also asserted that the use of the language of threats in international relations was unacceptable, that belonged to the past, and did not align with the modern negotiation principles between nations

Russia’s Foreign Ministry

Said that no country in the world can terminate the Iran nuclear deal, calling for preserving this agreement by all sides.

Said that Iran was in compliance with its nuclear deal commitments, adding that the agreement is subject to the highest level of monitoring.

the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs

Federica Mogherini The International Atomic Energy Agency

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Said that Britain would work with its allies to preserve the nuclear deal

British Foreign Minister

Boris Johnson

Said that if the United States repealed the nuclear deal or re-imposed sanctions on Tehran, this would drive Iran to develop nuclear weapons and increase the likelihood of war near to Europe.

German Foreign Minister

Sigmar Gabriel

THE MOST IMPORTANT REGIONAL REACTIONS Said that sanctions relief enabled Iran from developing its ballistic missile program and increasing its support to the extremist groups.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Said that it completely supported the US new strategy on Iran and reassured its commitment to work with Washington to confront Tehran’s sponsorship of extremism.

The UAE

Praised what it described as the US policy shift on Iran due to its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and sponsorship of the extremist groups in the Middle East.

Bahrain

IRAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS The visit of Saudi Arabia’ King to Russia in October 2017 impacted on the Iran-Russia relations through the agreements concluded during the visit and the building of SaudiRussia understanding regarding the future of Syria and interactions in the Middle East.

During the same month, the military naval cooperation between Iran and Russia increased; a new Iranian strategy was adopted in dealing with the issues of the Caspian Sea, both on the economic security levels.

Iranian perspective towards King Salman’s visit to Russia: The visit of Saudi Arabia’s King to Russia received wide attention from Iran; especially given that the Kingdom has been in a dispute with Iran since the storming of its diplomatic headquarters in Iran in 2016. Consequently, Saudi Arabia executed the policy of isolating Iran politically from the Arab and Islamic world after the international condemnation from the Arab League in January 2016 and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in April 2016. It was not only about condemning the storming of the diplomatic headquarters, but also about Iran’s interference in neighboring countries and its extraterritorial military presence.

55 This was followed by the undoing of diplomatic relations with Iran by many Islamic and Arab states and its prime ally Russia which has cooperative ties with Iran on multiple levels (i.e. economic, political and military). Also, the visit impacted the Iran-Russia relations and their corporation files.

Objectives of the visits from the Iranian perspective: The Iranian perceptions of the Saudi Kings visit and its objectives varied from Riyadh wanting to get close to Russia and to take a separate approach from the United States of America, to Riyadh’s dissatisfaction with Washington’s position regarding the developments in the region; including the Qatar’s crisis, as the United State is perceived by Riyadh as not providing the adequate support to Saudi Arabia in this regard.

These perceptions emerge from the underlying assumption that the Saudi Arabian diplomatic moves are completely tied to the Saudi-U.S. relations. This is not accurate as Saudi Arabia has its own foreign policy that it pursues for its interests such as the diplomatic blockade of Iran and providing substitutes to Russia in exchange for continuing its cooperation with Iran. This especially important, given Iran’s constant fear that Russia would give up its support in return for improving its relations with Europe and the United States as it was before the Ukrainian crisis.

On the other hand, some believe that Russia will not sacrifice its strategic relations with Iran and Syria for an interim relation with Saudi Arabia, which can be dissolved under American pressure.

Iran’s concerns The Iranian concerns, expressed in the opinions of Iranian analysts, were full of paranoia as they were not aligned with the objectives of the visit, as they included points that can be listed under Saudi Arabia’s interests and away from American policy- particularly, in the areas of oil cooperation and arms deals between Russia and Saudi Arabia.

There was a series of gradual concerns, the topmost being Russia completely abandoning its alliance with Iran and three other concerns evolved around the situation in Syria, arms and oil agreements.

In the Syrian conflict, the Saudi demand- which was a significant source of concern to Iran- was capping the Iranian military presence in Syria -if not eliminating it; Also demands for the departure of Hezbollah and Shiite militias from Syrian territory raised concern.

Russia has not refused this Saudi demand rather it has delayed implementing it for what is visualizes as some strategic benefits from their existence in the short term. Otherwise, there is a Russian-Saudi agreement to preserve the territorial integrity of Syria.

Iran has expressed concern over Saudi Arabia’s agreement with Russia to buy the

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missile defense system “S-400” because Iran depends in its military strategy on threating neighboring countries with its missile arsenal and also because it could not get, from Russia, other than the older defense missile system “S-300”. The Iranians have insisted for many years to have this new missile system, but the Russian have delayed its sale by invoking the international sanctions imposed on Iran.

The Iranians hoped that Russia will not implement its agreement with Saudi Arabia to sell the missile defense system “S-400”, believing it to be a Russian maneuver and that the agreement will remain a dead letter, with Saudi Arabia not receiving the missile defense system as like the previous Russia-Saudi arms deals. The Iranian head of parliament’s national security and foreign affairs commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, said the S-400 missile defense system deal is a success for Russia as it cuts into the arms deals that America makes with Saudi Arabia. However, he dismissed the impact of Saudi Arabia possessing a defense missile system on the balance of power in the Arab Gulf region. He confirmed the Iranian reaction, in this regard, is to rely more on domestic arms production along with the defense missile system S-300.

In contrast to the arms agreements and the Syrian crisis, oil cooperation between Russia and Saudi Arabia remains in the interest of Iran. The rapprochement of Russia and Saudi Arabia, the two largest oil exporters in the world, ensures extending the output cap agreement — November 2016. One of its results was rising the oil price up to 15% excluding Iran from the capping quota; consequently, Iran’s oil production rose to 3.8 million barrels per day, and Brent crude oil rose up to $60 per barrel. Such an agreement cannot be achieved without the Russian-Saudi agreement on the OPEC members quotas in the global oil market.

However, Iran seeks to raise its crude output to the pre-sanction levels of 4 million bpd.

Also, it announced the implementation of huge investments to reach an output of 7 million barrel per day.

Over all, the Saudi visit was to unblock the Russian stalemate, to negotiate common points, and to remove the Near East and Gulf region from the cold war atmosphere between the great powers, which Iran seeks to exploit in the region and divide the international community into two camps; one supported by Russia, to an extent China, and Europe as a supporter for the nuclear agreement, and the United States of America as a supporter of Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Arab and Islamic world. However, this visit reflected reality, that Iran is alone with a group of multinational Shiite militias to trigger unrest in neighboring countries and to form a geopolitical Shiite zone serving its political regime to confront countries in the region. The topmost country on the Iranian agenda is Saudi Arabia which has strong and natural ties with all international powers including Russia, which is an ally of Iran -yet in some aspect’s, it is an interim alliance.

On the Iranian side, there is no doubt that the outcomes of the visit will affect somehow the Iranian-Russian cooperation -after the visit of the Russian president to Iran in November 2017- whether through Iran raising the ceiling of demands of buying Russian weapons, or clarifying the future Russian position on the presence of the Lebanese Hezbollah forces along with the Iranian ones in Syria.

57 IRANIAN - RUSSIAN NAVAL COOPERATION IN THE CASPIAN SEA Iranian attempt to preserve what remains The Iranian Navy follows, in the naval deployment, the advanced defense strategy and forward operations, because the biggest threat to Iran, at the present, comes from the sea.

In addition, it enhances Iran’s capacity to intercept and confront large pieces of ships with small ships and rocket boats, which is applied by Iran in the Arabian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, relying mainly on the naval forces of the Revolutionary Guards, whose armament is compatible with that mission.

However, in the closed Caspian Sea, Iran follows another strategy in naval diplomacy and factors of coastal security strategy are merged. This strategy is controlled by economic and military factors and international alliances. The Iranian naval fleet visited Makhachkala port in Russia, for the second time in one year. The first visit was in March 2017 followed

by Iranian naval exercise in July under the name of “Sustainable Security and Maritime Mobility”. At the end of the five-day exercise, Russian naval vessels joined the Iranian fleet and held a joint naval exercise in July 2017. Later in the same month, the Russian Navy visited Bandar-e Anzali port in Iran. Lastly, the Iranian fleet visited- for the second timeMakhachkala port in October 2017.

This relentless move by the Iranian and Russian navies in the Caspian Sea undoubtedly carries certain messages to the countries bordering the sea, and to the major powers conflicting over gas and oil revenues of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. In addition to, the major countries that are struggling to pass oil and gas pipelines from these countries, and their desire to obtain contracts to explore and extract black gold from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

The international interactions with Iran Iran had many interactions on the international scene in October 2017. One of the most significant developments Iran had with the major powers on the international scene are the following: The United States of America: The nuclear agreement dominated the relations between the two countries after President Trump announced his refusal to extend the certification of Iran’s nuclear deal and his new strategy towards Iran. The US position provoked widespread reactions.

Iranian supreme leader Khamenei reacted to the American refusal to certify the nuclear deal by saying that America is the deputy of Zionism in the world and will be defeated by the people of Iran.

According to the economic relations between the two countries, the latest statistics published by the US Department of Statistics confirmed that the trade volume with Iran during the first eight months of this year declined to 25%, and the two-way trade between the two countries during the first eight months of this year amounted to 125.6 million dollars while it was $ 167.3 million during the same period, last year.

Russia: The Russian Foreign Ministry rejected the new US policy towards the Iranian nuclear agreement. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stressed that the continuation of negotiations between Iran and Russia is necessary. They witnessed the US “irresponsible behavior” (toward the deal), he added. Also, he praised the fact that the an

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Iranian delegation attended the international meeting of nuclear disarmament in Moscow.

Moreover, the Russian Foreign Ministry stressed in an announcement that it will not support the U.S. in listing the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist group. Also, it declared that the U.S. project of listing IRGC as a terrorism group is a step towards canceling the nuclear agreement. The announcement firmly stressed that Russia does not consider IRGC a terrorist group, and it will not support the U.S. in this regard.

The Kremlin announced an expected visit of President Putin to Iran that will be at the end of this year, where he will be meeting his Iranian and Azeri counterparts.

On the economic side, Iran’s largest trade center, ‘Iranians’ Trade House’, was opened, in Astrakhan Russian, in the presence of the Iranian Ambassador to Moscow Mehdi Sanai.

With the inauguration of the trade center, fourteen chambers of commerce from various provinces of Iran have officially launched their trade and commercial activities in Astrakhan.

The center was opened after a long time since the former Iranian commercial center, in Astrakhan, had stopped working. The memorandum of understanding was signed between the Central Bank of Iran and Russian Agency for Export Credit and Investment Insurance (EXIAR). Also, an Iranian parliamentary delegation held a meeting with the head of Russia’s Parliamentary Energy Committee.

The European Union: Iran’s Foreign Ministry called for the adherence to the rule of law in Spain and implicitly refused the separation of Catalonia because of its concerns about the referendum of the Kurdistan Region. According to Iran’s nuclear deal, the European Union defended it and criticized Trump’s strategy towards it.

On the economic side, the EU-Iran’s economic relations have noticeably progressed; probably this is the reason behind the EU defense of the nuclear deal. A delegation of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce went to Austria to enhance trade exchange between the two countries, and another trade delegation of 40 people from Tehran’s Chamber headed by the Chairman visited Switzerland to discuss the conditions of development of bilateral relations between Tehran and Geneva and, to re-strengthen EU-Iran’s trade relations and reflect an appropriate image of the Iranian economy; however, the Iranian businessmen still face obstacles in trade and foreign-exchange transactions.

An Iranian delegation visited London to sign a memorandum of understanding to enhance UK-Iran’s trade relations and develop commerce chambers in both countries. The British ambassador to Tehran stated that all European banks will cooperate with Iran.

Turkey: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that his country is cooperating with Iran and Baghdad to find a solution regarding the referendum of the Kurdistan Region. Also, the Turkish Chief of Staff visited Tehran to pursue security and military discussions with the Iranian leadership Regarding the economic relations, the Turkish exports to Iran increased to 200,000 tons.

The Iranian exports to Turkey, during the first eight months of the current year, exceeded up to 5 billion dollars, with an increase of about 74% compared to the same period last year.

Iran aims to increase the two-way trade to 30 billion a year. The two central banks of both countries agreed upon paving the way to use local currency instead of the U.S. dollar; besides, the Turkish exports to Qatar, through Iran, has increased as well.

‫‪59‬‬ ‫‪Endnotes‬‬

‫‪(1) The White House Office of the Press Secretary: President Donald J. Trump’s New Strategy on Iran, 13‬‬ ‫‪October 2017. http://cutt.us/L05WT‬‬ ‫‪(2) Tillerson warnt Europäer vor Geschäften mit Teheran. https://goo.gl/y7sHSy‬‬ ‫((( خبر آنالين‪ :‬تهدیدات ترامپ را فرصتی برای تسویه حساب سیاسی نکنیم‪ 25 ،‬مهر ‪http://cutt.us/W6XVM .1396‬‬ ‫((( روزنامه شرق‪ :‬ناطق نوري‪ :‬عده اي داخل كشور با ترامپ هم جبهه شدند‪.26/7/96 ،‬‬ ‫‪http://www.magiran.com/npview.asp?ID=3646936‬‬ ‫((( خبر كازاري تسنيم‪ :‬صالحی‪ :‬بهتر است به برجام متعهد باشیم‪ ۲۸ ،‬مهر ‪http://cutt.us/ZbaaI .۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫((( جام جم آنالین‪ :‬خرازی‪ :‬یک بار برجام را تجربه کردیم کافی است‪ 28 ،‬مهر ‪http://cutt.us/eauKV .1396‬‬ ‫((( وكالة إرنا‪ :‬روحاني‪ :‬ننتظر اعتذار ترامب من الشعب اإليراني‪ 21 ،‬سبتمبر ‪.2017‬‬ ‫‪http://www.irna.ir/ar/News/82671890‬‬ ‫((( خبر كازارى تسنيم‪ :‬شمخانی‪ :‬درک ترامپ از توافقات بین‌المللی ضعیف است‪ ۲۹ ،‬شهريور ‪.۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪http://tn.ai/1524734‬‬ ‫((( محمد عباس ناجي‪ :‬أزمة تفتيش المنشآت العسكرية اإليرانية حلقة مفرغة من التصعيد‪ ،‬العرب‪ ،‬لندن‪ :‬دار النشر‬ ‫العربي‪ ،‬العدد‪ ،10738 :‬ص‪http://cutt.us/bmrLg .7‬‬ ‫تخل‪ 13 ،‬أكتوبر ‪http://cutt.us/h7Ki3 .2017‬‬ ‫نصف‬ ‫(‪ ((1‬العربي الجديد‪ :‬ترامب واالتفاق النووي اإليراني‪:‬‬ ‫ٍّ‬ ‫(‪ ((1‬فانوس‪ :‬تذکر کمیسیون امنیت ملی به وزارت خارجه درباره نقض برجام‪ ۲ ،‬آبان ‪http://cutt.us/fadsj .۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫(‪ ((1‬الحياة‪ :‬إدانة عربية جماعية لالعتداءات اإليرانية‪ ..‬ولجنة لمواجهة التدخالت‪http://cutt.us/eCzre ،‬‬ ‫(‪ ((1‬العربية‪ :‬إدانة إسالمية صريحة إليران وحزب اهلل‪http://cutt.us/817I6 ،‬‬ ‫(‪ ((1‬سياست روز‪ :‬مسکو روابط راهبردی با تهران را فدای منافع مقطعی نمی‌کند‪http://cutt.us/TbKOU ،‬‬ ‫(‪ ((1‬الكتائب‪ :‬صفقة روسية أميركية إلخراج حزب اهلل من سوريا‪http://cutt.us/CDEGc ،‬‬ ‫(‪ ((1‬فردا‪ :‬پیشنهاد موشکی روسیه به ایران‪ /‬عکس‪http://cutt.us/uxTKK ،‬‬ ‫(‪ ((1‬سياست روز‪ :‬مرجع سابق‪http://cutt.us/TbKOU ،‬‬ ‫(‪ ((1‬خبرگزاری ایسنا ‪ :‬بروجردی‪ :‬سیاست ما اتکا به توانمندی ملی است‪http://cutt.us/ja34O ،‬‬ ‫تجدد «أوبك» اتفاق تخفيض اإلنتاج مع روسيا بعد مارس؟ ‪http://cutt.us/0nHt1‬‬ ‫(‪ ((1‬الشرق األوسط‪ :‬هل ِّ‬ ‫(‪ ((2‬شبكه اطالع رساني نفت وانرزی شانا‪ :‬تولید روزانه نفت ایران تا پایان فروردین به ‪ ۴‬میلیون بشکه می‪‎‬رسد‪.‬‬ ‫(‪ ((2‬مايكل آيزنشتات وألون باز‪ :‬الوجود البحري المتطور إليران‪ ،‬معهد واشنطن لسياسات الشرق األدنى‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/RkjS4‬‬ ‫(‪ ((2‬باشگاه خبرنگاران جوان‪ :‬چرا "ناوهای جنگی" روسیه به بندر انزلی آمدند؟ ‪http://cutt.us/MNN1I‬‬ ‫(‪ ((2‬باشگاه خبرنگاران جوان‪ :‬ناوگروه ایرانی وارد پایگاه دریایی روسیه در «ماخاچ قلعه» شد‪http://cutt.us/NvdZd ،‬‬ ‫(‪ ((2‬سبوتنيك‪:‬کشتی جنگی ناوگان خزر نیروی دریای روسیه در بندر انزلی‪http://cutt.us/HTzNT ،‬‬

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IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017

Conclusion and Summary INTERNAL AFFAIR

»»

The Iranian regime still fears Khatami’s return to Iran’s political life as he has become a charismatic figure amongst reformers, and his popularity rose to the ranks of Iran’s historical heroes such as Mohammad Mosaddegh.

»»

The Iranian regime insists, especially Ali Khamenei, on keeping the leaders of the Green Movements; Mahdi Karroubi, Mir Hussein Mousavi, and Zahra Rahnavard, under home detention, and preventing the reformists a cause to get united around while the fundamentalists are still captivated in political intransigence, regarding this case, which harms their internal and external interests.

»»

Imposing a home detention order on Mohammed Khatami, which made the former Iranian president incapable of fulfilling his promises or protecting people in his circle. That was because of successive blows from the Judiciary which he could confront previously via the bank balances scandal in which the Head of the judiciary was involved. However, all his strength diminished when his brother was convicted of embezzlement; and Dari Isfahani, a member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team, was sentenced to prison; then the Iranian judiciary refused to release the leaders of the Green Movement; and finally imposed restrictions on Mohammad Khatami.

»»

The dominance of The Guardian Council in the Constitution- as an appointed council by the Supreme Leader- over the Iranian Parliament led to President Rouhani dismissing the deputy mayor of the Yazd Zoroastrian city, Sepanta Niknam, from the city council, because of his religion; based upon an old Fatwah of Khomeini which states that a non-Muslim is not allowed to handle Muslims’ affairs.

»»

Iran’s parliament was unable to dissuade the Guardian Council from its decision, despite having non-Muslim members in the Parliament, which is a legislative council higher than the local ones.

61 »»

The victory of the Guardian Council over the parliament and the Iranian president is actually another new victory of the councils appointed by the Supreme Leader over the councils elected by the Iranian people.

»»

The elusiveness of the various Iranian intelligence agencies threatens the stability of the Iranian regime, and opens the door to the IRGC terror towards the Iranian officials themselves.

»»

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ accusations against the Rouhani government are highly credible and threaten the position of reformers in the Iranian community. After it was confirmed that one of the members of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team had been granted Canadian citizenship. Far from being sure whether or not he is ‘charged with espionage, this imposes a real challenge to the national reformers, or at least it confirms their carelessness and extreme negligence.

»»

On the economic level, if the U.S. withdraws from the nuclear deal, oil and civil aviation sectors will be varyingly affected. Probably, oil output will not be strongly affected as most of it is exported to Asia and Europe, unless Europe and Asia respond to the U.S. pressures.

However, the European oil investments might be affected before Iran finds alternatives, also Iran will also face difficulties in remittances for its oil exports.

»»

The U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal will have dangerous impact on Iranian industries- even if EU will not withdraw. Investors will lose confidence in Iran’s economy and the risk of investing in the Iranian industry will rise accordingly, especially given that the sector is dominated by the IRGC which might be listed as a terrorist group, along with the dangerous legal and financial consequences that will be imposed over those who have ‘commercial’ deals with the IRGC.

»»

The aviation sector will not be able to update its fleet with the latest American aircrafts, nor with the Europe ones. Thus, it will have older aircrafts that are less capable and having shorter flight distances. Moreover, more sanctions will be imposed against Iran’s dollar transfers, so the dollar will be reduced in the currency reserve basket, which will - somehowaffect the stability of Iran’s cash reserves if the values of the rest of foreign currencies decline.

»»

The U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal is more bearable to Iran’s economy than listing the IRGC as a terrorist organization. The first option offers more alternatives to the Iranian economy like keeping its partnerships with the Europeans, whereas the second option will tighten the stranglehold on the IRGC, and consequently Iran’s economy will suffer serious external and internal pressures.

»»

If the IRGC is classified as a terrorist organization, it will try to circumvent the imposed economic blockade through increasing inter-regional trade with its allies, smuggling and money-laundering, and importing its basic needs through establishing secretly-owned companies.

»»

Enhancing Iran’s economy in Iraq does not only depend on economists but also on the desire of the top Iranian political leaders, as well the Iranian support being backed by the highest political levels in Iraq.

»»

The volume of bilateral trade is completely in Iran’s interest. Iraq’s exports to Iran are very few, with a value not exceeding $100 million while Iraq is the second largest export

62

IRAN CASE FILE, OCT.2017

destination for Iran. The bilateral trade volume reached about 6.5 billion dollars in 2016, and recorded more than three billion and 277 million dollars during the first six months of the current Iranian year (from April to September 2017).

»»

Despite the increasing bilateral relations, external and technical obstacles hinder this growth such as: insufficient funding, low-quality of goods with high prices, and the competitive Turkish goods of high quality.

»»

Iranian officials see post-ISIS Iraq as a golden opportunity, so it is expected that the Iranian companies will play an integral role in the reconstruction of Mosul and the destroyed cities, whether in infrastructure, contracting or health investments. Yet the Gulf companies, operating in the same field, can seize the opportunity of reconstructing Iraqi cities to confront Iran’s greed which seeks to dominate over Iraq’s economy.

ARAB AFFAIR

»»

Abadi’s visit to Saudi Arabia was within the Iraqi leadership’s realization of the significance of rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, which endeavors to embrace Iraq back to the Arab sphere away from the Iranian greed and guardianship. Tehran is moving to expand more influence over post-ISIS Iraq to confront the Saudi arrangements and U.S. efforts to impose a blockade against Iran. The visit, which launched the Saudi-Iraqi Coordination Council, reflects that the bilateral relations will be closer in the future

»»

The visit of Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, to Oman and Qatar is a continuation of Iran exploiting the Gulf crisis to send a message expressing its good relations with the GCC states, and to send a regional/international message putting a spotlight on the Iranian ties with Qatar and Oman while Saudi Arabia and the U.S. are moving to impose a blockade against Iran and its militias.

»»

Iran successively provided military support to the Houthis after they have lost huge parts of Yemeni territories restored by the Legitimate Forces. Two ships carrying weapons (shells, anti-tank missiles, missile guidance systems, launch pads and rocket batteries) were seizedIran wants to keep its arms in Yemen to fight Legitimate Forces and the Arab Collation.

»»

The visit of the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Ali Shamkhani, to Damascus is highly significant because it reflects Iran’s high military endeavors to coordinate for the post-ISIS stage- At the same time, the areas of influence in Syria are expected to be divided through the safe zones, and Saudi Arabia and the U.S. are arranging to impose a blockade against Iran.

»»

Several lines of evidence confirmed the engagement of Iran’s militias in the disputed areas, (Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmatu, Sinjar, Khanaqin, Daquq) between the central government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. It was not for Iraq’s interests but only for expanding Tehran’s influence over the restored territories and getting situated near Kurdistan Region to tighten the blockade against it.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

»»

The most prominent outcome of the new U.S. strategy towards Iran is the unified stance of the American institutions as they agreed upon a general policy towards Iran.

»»President Trump has undertaken many procedures and executive decisions towards Iran,

63 which means moving to impose further pressure on Tehran.

»»Tense Iranian reactions and confusion have arisen to confront this new challenge. »»Variant international reactions towards this strategy have emerged which may eventually

lead to a re-consideration of the nuclear deal as a whole.

»»

Expected tense relations and escalation may occur in the upcoming phase, especially with Iran insisting on escalating its position with giving no room for negotiating what it assumes an inherent sovereign right or legitimate regional investments to protect its security and existence.

»»

According to the Iranian-Russian relations, the visit of King Salman to Russia triggered the fears of Iranians that Russia may alter its alliance with Iran or make some changes in the Russian-Iranian military corporation, risking the survival of its loyal militias and its presence in Syria.

»»

The visit succeeded in the signing of the Russian-Saudi arms deal which will raise the Iranian demand for Russian weapons, though Russia abstained from providing Iran with many of the offensive weapons Iran had previously requested

»»

Iran undertakes a naval diplomatic strategy to secure the coasts of the Caspian Sea while adopting the strategy of frontline defense and maritime exclusion in the Arabian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.

»»

Iran has failed in achieving the economic targets in the Caspian Sea because of the bilateral border demarcation Russia conducted with all states of the Caspian Sea- leaving Iran alone repeating its historical demand for 20 percent of Caspian wealth.

»»

Iran currently is seeking to seize what remains in the Caspian Sea relying on its Russian military dependence in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Also, it is trying to take the rest of gas transmission lines projects after 27 years of failure to implement trade transit projects from the oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia through its territories.

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IRAN CASE FILE OCT 2017