Arctic Yearbook 2019 - Redefining Arctic Security

Arctic Yearbook 2019 Heininen, L., H. Exner-Pirot, & J. Barnes (eds.). (2019). Redefining Arctic Security: Arctic Yearbook 2019. Akureyri, Iceland: Arctic Portal. Available from https://www.arcticyearbook.com ISSN 2298–2418 This is an open access volume distributed in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY NC-4.0) license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is properly cited and the use is non-commercial.

Cover Image Credit Fanney Sigrún Ingvadóttir

Editor Lassi Heininen| lassi.heininen@ulapland.fi Managing Editor Heather Exner-Pirot | exnerpirot@gmail.com Assistant Editor Justin Barnes | justinbarnes@trentu.ca Editorial Board Chair Dr. Lawson Brigham (Distinguished Professor of Geography & Arctic Policy, University of Alaska Fairbanks; Senior Fellow, Institute of the North, United States of America) Dr. Gail Fondahl (Professor of Geography, University of Northern British Columbia, Canada) Dr. Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson (Former President of the Republic of Iceland, Chair of the Arctic Circle Assembly) Ambassador Hannu Halinen (former SAO, Finland; Special Advisor to the IIASA Director General and Chief Executive Officer Exploratory and Special Projects) Dr. Steven E. Miller (Director of the International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief of International Security, Harvard University, United States) Dr. Alexander Pelyasov (Russian Academy of Sciences; Director of the Center of Northern and Arctic Economics; Ministry of Economic Development & Trade, Russian Federation)

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About Arctic Yearbook The Arctic Yearbook is the outcome of the Northern Research Forum (NRF) and UArctic joint Thematic Network (TN) on Geopolitics and Security. The TN also organizes the annual Calotte Academy.

The Arctic Yearbook seeks to be the preeminent repository of critical analysis on the Arctic region, with a mandate to inform observers about the state of Arctic politics, governance and security. It is an international and interdisciplinary peer-reviewed publication, published online at [https://arcticyearbook.com] to ensure wide distribution and accessibility to a variety of stakeholders and observers.

Arctic Yearbook material is obtained through a combination of invited contributions and an open call for papers. For more information on contributing to the Arctic Yearbook, or participating in the TN on Geopolitics and Security, contact the Editor, Lassi Heininen.

Acknowledgments The Arctic Yearbook would like to acknowledge the Arctic Portal [https://arcticportal.org] for their generous technical and design support; our colleagues who provided peer review for the scholarly articles in this volume; as well as the organizers of the Rovaniemi Arctic Spirit conference for hosting our launch.

Arctic Yearbook 2019 Table of Contents I.

Introduction

Introduction – Redefining Arctic Security……………………………………………………….7 Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot & Justin Barnes The Arctic in 2019 – Timeline of Events……………………………………………………….15 Justin Barnes

II.

Traditional security in the Arctic

Precarious existence or staying the course? The foundations and future of Arctic stability………19 Adam MacDonald From Bilateral to Trilateral Agreement: The Case of Thule Air Base…………………………….33 Maria Ackrén Autonomy and military bases: USAF Thule base in Greenland as the study case……………….43 Minori Takahashi, Shinji Kawana, Kousuke Saitou, Yu Koizumi, Shino Hateruma & Ayae Shimizu Debating Arctic security through a media lens – The case of NATO’s Trident Juncture operation………………………………………………………………………………………58 Mathieu Landriault and Adam MacDonald Briefing Notes & Commentaries Between militarization and disarmament: Constructing peace in the Arctic…………………….72 Heather Exner-Pirot A new Cold War in the Arctic?! The old one never ended! …………………………………….75 Rob Huebert What a shipyard can tell us about Arctic safety…………………………………………………79 Ilker K. Basaran Why we need to talk about military activity in the Arctic: Towards an Arctic Military Code of Conduct………………………………………………………………………………………..83 Duncan Depledge, Mathieu Boulègue, Andrew Foxall & Dmitriy Tulupov The forgotten spirit of Gorbachev……………………………………………………………..87 Benjamin Schaller

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Human security in the Arctic

Human security – An alien concept for the Russian Arctic?…………………………………….90 Maria Goes Human security in the era of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): The case of Sweden, Norway and Finland…………………………………………………………………………..107 Alexandra Middleton Towards human security in the Arctic: Lessons learned from Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers……………………………………………………………………………..129 Magali Vullierme Combining critical security studies in the Barents Region……………………………………...142 Matthaios Melas Arctic break up: Climate change, geopolitics and the fragmenting Arctic security region………156 Wilfrid Greaves Free and open source software as a contribution to digital security in the Arctic………………173 Gerald Zojer Briefing Notes & Commentaries Energy security in the Arctic: Policies and technologies for integration of renewable energy….189 Magnus de Witt, Hlynur Stefánsson & Ágúst Valfells Sustainable development and notions of security……………………………………………....197 Justin Barnes The main directions of securing geocryological safety of economic activity in the Arctic region………………………………………………………………………………………....210 Alina Voytenko, Dmitry Sergeev & Irina Chesnokova

IV.

Theorizing about security in the Arctic

“Arctic Exceptionalism” or “comprehensive security”? Understanding security in the Arctic….218 Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv & Kara K. Hodgson Incompatible futures: Frontier nostalgia and southern discourses of the Arctic………………..231 Ellen A. Ahlness Narratives of the North: Contested geographic imaginaries and the case of Izembek National Wildlife Refuge……………………………………………………………………………….250 Erin Willahan Security of Indigenous peoples in Russia’s Arctic policy: Exposing the oxymoron of statedetermined self-determination………………………………………………………………...270 Agne Cepinskyte

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The desecuritization of Greenland’s security? How the Greenlandic self-government envision postindependence national defense and security policy…………………………………………….287 Rasmus Kjærgaard Rasmussen The ongoing formation of Russia’s Arctic policy: A new stage?……………………………….305 Eduard Galimullin & Yury Ivanovich Matveenko Briefing Notes & Commentaries Canada’s Arctic & Northern Policy Framework: A roadmap for the future?……………………322 Peter Kikkert and P. Whitney Lackenbauer The Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Co-operation: Legal and practical consequences…………………………………………………………………………………332 Emily Tsui Model Arctic Council at secondary school…………………………………………………….340 Anthony Speca Innovative policy dialogue on oil and gas drilling in Arctic seas versus environmental protection…………………………………………………………………………………….365 Tuuli Kuusama The Arctic Super Week in May 2019: From Rovaniemi to Shanghai…………………………..370 Lassi Heininen

V.

Non-Arctic states and security in the Arctic

Germany: A new (non-)Arctic power?………………………………………………………...379 Davina Basse The UK and the Arctic: Forward defence……………………………………………………..396 Duncan Depledge, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe & James Rogers What is ‘Arctic’ about ‘Arctic security’? ……………………………………………………….405 Pauline Pic and Frédéric Lasserre China-Russia collaboration in shipping and marine engineering as one of the key factors of secure navigation along the NSR……………………………………………………………………..421 Gao Tianming & Vasilii Erokhin Intensifying U.S.-China security dilemma dynamics play out in the Arctic – Implications for China’s Arctic strategy………………………………………………………………………………...442 Camilla Sørensen Briefing Notes & Commentaries Arctic connections - Mapping an Arctic policy framework for the Scottish government………457 Tahseen Jafry, Michael Mikulewicz & Sennan Mattar

Table of Contents

Introduction

Redefining Arctic security: Military, environmental, human or societal? Cooperation or conflict?

Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot & Justin Barnes

The Arctic Yearbook is an initiative of the UArctic Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security.

Yet since our first publication launched in 2012, we have never elected to produce a volume on the theme of security itself, focusing instead on topics such as human capital, innovation, regional governance, development, and the Arctic Council.

In one respect that has been because, as security thinkers, we see all of the above issues and more as inherently addressing security. If security is everywhere and always, then it does not need its own volume.

And yet, in the past two decades, conceptions about Arctic security have shifted. What attracts many of us in the Thematic Network to the study of the Arctic region is its unique model of defining and seeking security. Famously, while traditional security issues are alive and well, the region has uniquely accepted and embraced discourses on environmental and human security issues including environmental protection, Indigenous self-determination, safety, interregional cooperation, development, and the rule of law.

This volume seeks to articulate how security has been redefined in the Arctic region. As a field of study, Arctic security studies exhibit many – dare we use the term – exceptional characteristics that can help inform how security may be redefined across the globe as environmental issues and local challenges become more pertinent vis à vis traditional state security issues across the globe. It can also show how environmental and societal challenges are increasingly becoming ‘traditional’ security issues in and of themselves.

“An arena of global power and competition”?

The first question asked by media, immediately after the provocative speech by US State Secretary Michael R. Pompeo on 6 May 2019 in Rovaniemi in which he called the Arctic “an arena of global power and competition”, was if his words would cause damage, not only to the work of the Arctic Lassi Heininen is the Editor, Heather Exner-Pirot is the Managing Editor and Justin Barnes is the Assistant Editor of the Arctic Yearbook.

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Council (which resulted for the first time in no joint declaration), but also to international Arctic cooperation generally, by increasing political tensions. Some similarly wondered whether Pompeo’s speech, which was given on the day before the Arctic Council Ministerial meeting, would mark a turning point in Arctic governance: would the turbulence & uncertainties in international politics, and increasing great power rivalry, overtake the Arctic and its high geopolitical stability and inclusive cooperation? Others asked if this would instead be remembered as an odd episode, and if the constructive cooperation in the Arctic Council was more likely to continue?

However, the speech, as no single speech or event ever proves anything, has not resulted in a dramatic impact, yet. But the critical question remains as to what extent these kinds of generalizations, stereotypes and tropes influence Arctic discourses. Internal and external images, visions and perceptions, for example reinforce the region as an ‘Eldorado’, a ‘sink for pollutants’, a ‘tipping point for the Earth system’, a ‘race for resources’, a ‘Global Arctic’, or a ‘Homeland’.

Many security narratives also prevail, such as ‘high latitudes - low tension’, ‘emerging conflicts’, ‘great power rivalry’, ‘Zone of Peace’ and ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ or a ‘new Cold War’. From all of these, the two main narratives, or discourses, which dominate and compete with each other, are: ‘high latitudes - low tension/Zone of Peace’ representing the reality of relevant Arctic stakeholders and being a resilient narrative of Arctic geopolitics, versus the more hypothetical narrative of ‘race of resources with emerging conflicts’ often pushed by the media.

Theory: Discourses, Premises, Paradigms...

Theoretical discussions about security, including security threats, concepts of security, categories of military presence, and confidence-building measures, are needed, even required, when evaluating and analyzing the current globalized and international political system with its turbulences, growing uncertainties and wicked problems. What is security all about what? Who is security for?

Securitas (Latin) means a lack of something, whereby someone feels (mostly unconsciously) to be ‘unsecured’. That is to say that out there is a danger or threat, whether materialized or not. Thus, a threat is based on its credibility, and is often self-created and reflexive; unlike a risk, which is based on a probability calculation.

If security appeals to basic human instincts and is interpreted to be a “legitimated search for almost everything” (Westing, 1989) - like oxygen - then ‘securitization’ is interpreted to mean that everything could be or become a security issue, as the ‘Copenhagen School’ interprets it (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998).

All this means that there are many ways to understand, define and interpret, or simply feel, security.

Further, security is always paired with discourses, premises and paradigm(s), as well as with actors.

Consequently, the most critical question to ask is: whose security = security for whom?

Indeed, the unified states system has taught us to think that there is (only) one real ‘actor’ of security: a/the State. This national security officially means the nation/people of a State, though in practice, it means the elites of a nation, as they have the power to define the national security of a state.

However, in reality there are several actors or subjects of security: individuals/citizens, (civil) societies, and the international community, or simply humankind.

Different concepts of security Heininen, Exner-Pirot & Barnes

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As mentioned earlier there are several concepts of security, beginning with the idea of national security as guaranteeing state sovereignty. Behind this is the idea that “security through its history had a connection towards a state” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998). For this traditional, weaponsoriented security the state is the main subject of security, which usual means national security, and the only legitimized user of violence.

This “unilateral competitive national military security” (Newcombe, 1986) includes all categories of military presence and war, as well as preparation for a war. Most of them have been, and still are, present, and have been further developed in the Arctic since the end of the 2nd World War, especially after the militarization of the Cold War: naval bases, airports, ICBM bases, other infrastructure; radar stations (e.g. DEW Line), sonar detectors (e.g. GIUK-gap), nuclear submarines including SSBNs & SSNs; submarine & anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and the ‘Cat and Mouse’ game; air patrolling (e.g. long-range bombers); military exercises, weapons and strategy testing; nuclear tests; and radioactive leaks & accidents.

Confidence-building measures, such as arms control (e.g. SALT 1 & 2, START), disarmament (e.g.

Enmod, INF Treaty), denuclearisation (e.g. nuclear-weapon-free-zones), and demilitarization (e.g.

Svalbard, the Antarctic) are meant to protect national security and increase peoples’ security. As the issues with, as well as negotiations on, arms control and disarmament are between states/governments, mostly nuclear weapon powers, there is no room for non-state actors, not even for actors within the United Nations, though peace movements such as the movement against Euro-missiles, CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), used to forget this every now and then, and act against nuclear weapons and arms race, or militarization in general.

Among other main concepts of security are first, environmental/ecological security, with a focus on the role of the environment, and includes access to (renewable) natural resources, quality of resources, and human population growth (Dwivedi, 2011). It emphasizes environmental, societal and human aspects of security, which are in danger due to hazardous environments, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, resource-based conflicts, all leading to environmental ‘insecurity’.

Sustainable development, as an example of environmental & comprehensive security, relies on mechanisms which also draw on culture & civil society, economics, democracy, international cooperation and global governance. This security concept became relevant in the Arctic in 1980s and 1990s due to pollution, in particular radioactivity.

Second is human security, which focuses on human beings as individuals (e.g. UN Report, 1994).

It is a loose and vague definition, but means ‘everyday security’ of people beyond the military - e.g. from the growing (economic) inequality between elites and the masses, and the physical impacts and related uncertainty of (rapid) climate change. In the Arctic region, this is threatened by sources of insecurity, as Indigenous peoples have experienced (see e.g. Cepinskyte in this volume). The fact that human security, i.e. people, are the first victim of pollution and climate change manifests an importance to redefine people as subjects of security, instead of the abstract ‘state’. Following from this, security may become less mystified, when people for example face climate change related uncertainty every day, as many Arctic residents do. This kind of ‘civil security’ means that citizens have both rights and duties (Griffiths, 1993) such as the international community’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’.

Both environmental and human security concepts are part of the concept of comprehensive security, which started to challenge the traditional military based security discourse and its paradigm Introduction

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in 1980s. Instead, it was understood, much due to radioactivity, chemicals, long-range pollution and the ozone hole, that there are keen interrelations between security, the environment, development, and peace, as well as between the environment and security, including the military (e.g. Galtung, 1992). As Kalliojärvi (2019) writes “Security is no longer primarily about geographical society-based threats…but increasingly characterized by a borderless society-based narrative of vulnerability and the stabilization of technical and societal systems.”

Phases of the Arctic security nexus In the Arctic context, the same processes can be found when evaluating and analyzing different phases of Arctic security, since WWII, based on different security concepts, as well as changes in security discourses and premises (Heininen, 2019).

The Cold War’s security nexus (1950s-1980s) meant a shift for the Arctic from being a ‘military vacuum’ to a ‘military flank’, and further to a ‘military front’. This phase was dominated by traditional (national, military) security and the military, in particular the strategic importance of nuclear weapon systems (as the most advanced military technology). This led to a militarization of the Arctic, including viewing the northern seas as a military ‘theatre’. It further introduced the threat of nuclear accidents and other environmental degradations from military activities. Behind this was the hegemonic competition and arms race between the Soviet Union and the USA. The transition period’s security nexus (1980s-1990s) brought on the one hand, arms control & disarmament between the Soviet Union and the USA (a ‘thaw’), in particular between Soviet president Gorbachev and US president Reagan (for example through the Reykjavik Summit in 1986). On the other hand, new kinds of security threats and the consequences of new discourses (based on risk society theory & constructivism) were obvious due to the growing concern of nuclear accidents and radioactive wastes. This led to functional cooperation on environmental protection and nuclear safety - for example the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) between Norway, Russia and the USA -, and thus the application of ‘environmental security’ to the Arctic region.

Finally, the Post-Cold War’s security nexus (since the 2000s) saw geopolitical stability balance out military presence, new security premises and searching for paradigm shifts (e.g. Heininen and Exner-Pirot 2019), and also the question of NATO in the Arctic. This phase has been dominated by the commitment of the Arctic states “to maintain peace, stability and constructive cooperation in the Arctic” (e.g. Rovaniemi Statement by the Chair of 2019), the state sovereignty/national security of the Arctic (littoral) states, and human security (e.g. climate change, self-determination and economic development). This has led to geopolitical stability despite or because of the heavy military (nuclear weapons) structures (global deterrence), impacts of climate change, better access to exploitation of the region’s resources (known as the ‘Arctic paradox’), as well as the rise of human security as an important security concept (see e.g. Goes and Greaves in this volume).

Indeed, the main categories of the military are still going to be present in the region through the 2020s, as, we expect, will be the absence of disarmament discussions. Neither arms control (e.g. demilitarization) nor disarmament (e.g. denuclearization or nuclear-weapon-free-zones) are gaining momentum, but rather manifesting a new Arctic dilemma: we are somewhere between militarization and disarmament (see Exner-Pirot in this volume, also 2019). There are new nuclear submarines, aircrafts, vessels, more efficient radar stations (see e.g. Ackren, and Takahashi et al. in

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this volume), missile defense systems, and better quality & efficiency through modernization of weapon systems in operating these. There are also bigger, more international, military exercises (e.g. Trident Juncture, Vostok-2018) (see Landriault and MacDonald in this volume). But most of these are concomitant with the growing activities in and accessibility of the region, in particular due to a reduction in sea ice.

Furthermore, according to the current policies and strategies of the Arctic states (see Heininen, Everett, Padrtova & Reissell, forthcoming), on the one hand, security per se is emphasized by Canada, Iceland and the USA; Canada and Finland discuss security most comprehensively; sovereignty is covered by Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway and Finland (though marginally for the latter); armed forces are mentioned by Canada, Finland, the Kingdom Denmark, Norway and Russia (plus Germany and the UK of the AC observer states); and NATO is explicitly mentioned by Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark and Norway (plus Germany and the UK). On the other hand, stability-building is emphasized by Canada, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and the USA, as well as high geopolitical stability supported by all Arctic states; maritime security & the Coast Guard is emphasized by Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland and Sweden; and environmental protection is emphasized by all. Thus, security is top of mind, but is exhibited in all of its variety and complexities.

A ‘Regional Security Complex’?

As the Arctic states have reconstructed their realities in the post-Cold War geopolitics, they have gone beyond traditional power & hegemony games by redefining environmental protection as an ultimate aim, implementing the discursive devolution of power (based on knowledge) and soft-law, and applying the interplay between science, politics and business into a dialogue across sectors (Heininen, 2018). This narrative seems to be resilient, as it has been repeated in the declarations of all Arctic Council Ministerials since Nuuk 2011, even after the annexation of Crimea (see Rovaniemi Statement by the Chair of 2019). It is even described by some as an exceptional success story. Behind this are the common interests amongst the Arctic states “to decrease military tension and increase political stability” as an ultimate aim for transboundary cooperation, functional cooperation on environmental protection and scientific research, and region-building & circumpolar cooperation (Heininen, 2018). Based on this, the Arctic can be interpreted, if not as a ‘Security Community’, then as a ‘Regional Security Complex’ (see Exner-Pirot, 2013; Greaves and Melas in this volume). At the same time the above-mentioned Arctic dilemma or challenge remains: we are between militarization and disarmament.

Thus, in the globalized Arctic of the 21st century there is less military tension, fewer alarming situations (e.g. Able Archer 83 by NATO in the Cold War), and more political stability, as well as better recognition of the mutual benefits of sharing and promoting common interests. As well, there are the direct & indirect impacts of pollution and climate changes, as well as the related uncertainty of rapid climate change, such as impacts on food security. According to the Inuit Circumpolar Council Arctic policy, “For true Arctic security to be achieved, there must be greater global security. New concepts of common security are urgently needed that incorporate environmental, health, social, cultural, and economic aspects” (ICC, 2010: 16). The goal of this must be the attainment by “general and complete disarmament under effective international control… [here it] is essential that the concept of an Arctic zone of peace be formally accepted by Arctic states and others as an explicit and political objective” (ICC, 2010: 18).

Introduction

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Searching for alternative approaches and a paradigm shift It is necessary to emphasise environmental, societal and human aspects of security, as well as a comprehensive, holistic approach, when (re)defining security in the world with wicked problems and new non-military threats and risks. In this global context, security problems, such as nuclear proliferation and international terrorism, are listed as universal problems along with overpopulation, scarcity of natural resources, pollution and climate change, refugees and human right problems, and diseases (e.g. Hakovirta, 2005). Furthermore, this requires a bigger role for non-state actors, and more room for alternative thinking on security, as well as changes in security premises and paradigms.

All of these global problems, also defined as security problems, are already present in the Arctic (Heininen, 2010). It is no wonder then that there are already alternative discourses, unorthodox thinking and searching for a paradigm shift (see e.g. Heininen & Exner-Pirot, 2019). For example, the concept of ‘societal security & uncertainty’ and its related integration processes are essentially a novel, ambitious and holistic narrative for developing the Arctic region under growing uncertainty and opportunities (see FutArcSoc 2019). The term is not, however, yet used in the national policies of Arctic states or in those of the AC observer states.

The above analysis does not mean there has been a turning point in Arctic geopolitics or that governance will turn inevitably toward rivalry. The high geopolitical stability based on constructive cooperation between the Arctic states has shown its benefits and its resilience. At the same time, there is an ‘ambivalence of Arctic development’, a concurrent seeking of environmental protection and climate change mitigation alongside new economic activities (see Heininen, Everett, Padrtova & Reissell, forthcoming). This phenomenon, as well as a lack of arms control and disarmament, is much due to a political inertia, even political ‘inability’, amongst the Arctic states. There is stability in the Arctic, yes; but not much progress in achieving security, or rather, achieving desecuritization in the region.

Arctic Yearbook 2019 Such fundamental issues are addressed in full in this volume on redefining Arctic security. The sections are organized around assessments of traditional Arctic security; evaluations of Arctic human security challenges and manifestations; theoretical approaches to thinking about Arctic security; and the role of non-Arctic actors in regional security as a manifestation of the globalized nature of the region. Taken together, this Arctic Yearbook provides excellent insight into the state of the field of Arctic security at what may, or may not, be an important juncture in the region’s history.

As always, the Arctic Yearbook is a product of the efforts our authors and reviewers, whom we would like to acknowledge and express our gratitude. Importantly, this open access volume would not be possible without the support of Arctic Portal, which provides web hosting and cover image design. In particular we would like to thank Ævar Karl Karlsson, Fanney Sigrún Ingvadóttir and Halldór Jóhannsson.

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Finally, we are pleased to bring Justin Barnes on as the new assistant editor of the Arctic Yearbook.

He helps fill the gap left by Joël Plouffe, who has gone on to work at the Arctic Council Secretariat.

Joël was a co-founder of the Arctic Yearbook and worked tirelessly in the first years of this publication to ensure its success and recognition. He remains a dear friend.

References Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Dwivedi, O.P., Kyba, P., Stoett, P., Tiessen, R. (2011). Sustainable Development and Canada: National & International Perspectives. Ottawa: Oxford Unversity Press.

Exner-Pirot, H. (2013). What is the Arctic a case of? The Arctic as a regional environmental security complex and the implications for policy. The Polar Journal, 3(1), 120-135.

Exner-Pirot, H. (2019). Between Militarization and Disarmament: Challenges for Arctic Security in the Twenty-First Century. In Climate Change and Arctic Security (pp. 91-106). Palgrave Pivot, Cham.

Fairbanks Declaration (2017). Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in May 2017 in Fairbanks, Alaska. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/94/EDOCS-1200v4-All_Arctic_Council_Declarations_19962017_Searchable.PDF?sequence=7&isAllowed=y FutArcSoc (2019). Future Arctic Societies, FutArcSoc: Project on Feedbacks & System Understanding of, Scenarios & Innovation Insights for, Futire Development of Arctic Societies. Research Plan by an international consortium coordinated by INAR at University of Helsinki. (unpublished) Griffiths, F. (1993). Defense, Security and Civity in the Arctic Region. In Arctic Challenges. Report from the Nordic Council's Parliamentary Conference in Reykjavik, August (pp. 16-17).

Hakovirta, H. (2005). Muutama suositus ihmiskunnan uudelleenkoulutukseen. Globaaliongelmat ja globaalipolitiikka: koeporauksia. Kosmopolis 35(4):30-35.

Heininen, L. (2010). “Globalization and Security in the Circumpolar North.” Globalization and the Circumpolar North. Eds. by Lassi Heininen and Chris Southcott. University of Alaska Press, Fairbanks 2010. p. 221-264 Heininen, L. (2018). Arctic Geopolitics from Classical to Critical Approach – Importance of Immaterial Factors. Geography, Environment, Sustainability, Vol. 11, No. 1 - 2018, 171-186.

PEEX Special Issue. Ed. by S. Chalov. DOI-10.24057/2071-9388-2018-11-1-1771-186.

Heininen, L. (2019). “Before Climate Change, ‘Nuclear Safety’ Was There – A Retrospective Study and Lessons-Learned of Changing Security Premises in the Arctic.” In Climate Change and Arctic Security (pp. 107-129). Palgrave Pivot, Cham.

Heininen, L. and Exner-Pirot, H. (2019) Climate Change and Arctic Security: Searching for a Paradigm Shift. Springer.

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Heininen, L., Everett, K., Padrtova, B., & Reissell, A., (forthcoming, 2019). Arctic Policies and Strategies – Analysis, Synthesis, and Trends. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) & Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.

ICC (2010). Inuit Arctic Policy. Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC). https://iccalaska.org/wpicc/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Inuit-Arctic-Policy-June02_FINAL.pdf Kalliojärvi, S., (2019). Age of Changes: Threat of Climate Change and its Meaning for Security.

In Climate Change and Arctic Security (pp. 9-32). Palgrave Pivot, Cham.

Newcombe, H. (1986). Collective Security, Common Security and Alternative Security: A Conceptual Comparison. Peace Research Reviw 10(3):1-8, 95-99.

Rovaniemi Statement by the Chair 2019. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Timo Soini. On the Occasion of the Eleventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, Rovaniemi 6-7 May 2019. https://arctic-council.org/images/PDF_attachments/Rovaniemi-Statementfrom-the-chair_FINAL_840AM-7MAY.pdf Westing, A. (1989). The Environmental Component of Comprehensive Security. Bulletin of Peace Proposals 20:2, 129-134.

Heininen, Exner-Pirot & Barnes

AY 2019 Year in Review Justin Barnes

December

November

2018 The third Senior Arctic Official’s meeting of Finland’s Arctic Council Chairmanship is held. Iceland presents elements of their upcoming Chairmanship program (20192021).

AY 2018 is launched at the final session of the 2018 Model Arctic Council in Rovaniemi, Finland, held on the sidelines of the Arctic Council SAO meeting.

The Arctic Council’s Task Force on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic takes place in Reykjavik, Iceland. This was the fourth and final meeting of the taskforce.

February

January

2019 The Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law (NIEM) at the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland co-organizes a high-level advanced research workshop on Governance for Cyber Security and Resilience in the Arctic.

A pattern of high-altitude winds in the Arctic, better known as the polar vortex, weakens, sweeping frigid air over North America and Europe in the second half of the month causing record low temperatures.

The Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development Working Group releases its report Project CREATeS: Circumpolar Resilience, Engagement, and Action Through Story. The report highlights its initiative to support community and youth engagement in reducing suicide and to foster mental wellness.

March

The fourth and final plenary meeting of the Senior Arctic Officials during the Chairmanship of Finland takes place in Ruka, Finland from 13-14 March. This meeting would be the last SAO plenary meeting before the conclusion of the Chairmanship in May 2019.

Canada releases its federal budget, committing $700 million over the next decade to programs specific to Canada’s North. The budget includes a number of Inuit-specific investments and a commitment to establish the first Arctic Council-related permanent secretariat in Canada for the Sustainable Development Working Group.

Iceland and the United Kingdom sign a Memorandum of Understanding by UK Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt and Iceland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Gudlaugur Thor Thordarson. The agreement covers areas including search and rescue, counter-terrorism, cyber security, and risk and crisis management.

Trent University hosts the 2019 UArctic Rectors' Forum on its Symon's Campus, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada from 19-22 August.

Justin Barnes is Assistant Editor at the Arctic Yearbook and a Fellow at Polar Research and Policy Initiative

April

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Russian President Vladimir Putin orders the Russian government to encourage foreign investment through government tax relief plans to help build Northern Sea Route hubs in Murmansk and Kamchatka.

The United States Coast Guard releases its document Arctic Strategic Outlook, highlighting the United States’ renewed strategic outlook of the region.

The Territory of Dialogue Arctic Forum, including the Northern Forum Meeting of Governors, takes place in St. Petersburg from 9-10 April.

The 11th Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting takes place in Rovaniemi, Finland. For the first time ever, the Council fails to produce a formal Declaration due to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s lack of support for any mention of climate change.

Instead, a one-page ministerial statement is signed by all ministers.

May

The Arctic Council’s Task Force on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic presents its final report at the Rovaniemi Ministerial meeting on May 7, 2019.

The Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane releases their report Summary of Progress and Recommendations 2019.

The Arctic Circle China Forum is convened in Shanghai, China from 10 – 11 May. This is the first time the Arctic Circle Forum has been to China. The aim of the forum is to create a network of international dialogue and cooperation on the future of the Arctic.

Arctic Science Summit Week 2019 takes place in Arkhangelsk, Russia from 22 – 28 May, 2019.

Russia’s newest Nuclear-powered icebreaker, Ural, is launched in St. Petersburg as part of a many-step plan step to ensure year-round navigability of the Northern Sea Route.

June

On 18-19 June, Arctic Council delegates gather in Reykjanesbær, Iceland, for the first Senior Arctic Officials’ executive meeting during the Chairmanship of Iceland (20192021).

The United States’ Department of Defense releases its updated Arctic Strategy. The document describes “US national security interests in the Arctic in an era of strategic competition”. The strategy outlines three strategic objectives: building Arctic awareness, enhancing Arctic operations, and strengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic.

July

The One Arctic – One Health report is released by the Arctic Council and the

Finnish Food Authority. The report covers all activities of the Arctic Council’s One Health project (2017-2019) led by Finland, US, and Canada.

Russia’s largest oil company, Rosneft, announces more offshore Arctic drilling off the Taymyr Peninsula is to begin in summer 2020.

Alaska records its warmest month ever.

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Reports are released highlighting US President Donald Trump’s interest in purchasing

August

Greenland from Denmark. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen suggests the idea is “absurd”, prompting the US President to cancel a state visit scheduled for September.

Germany releases its new Arctic policy guidelines. For a deeper analysis, see Davina Basse’s article Germany: A new (non-)Arctic power?

The Canadian High Arctic Research Station in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut opens its doors.

A floating nuclear power plant, the Akademik Lomonsov, sets sail to the eastern Arctic town of Pevek in Chukotka, about 86 kilometres from Alaska. The vessel is the world’s only floating nuclear power plant.

Canada releases its long-awaited Arctic and Northern Policy Framework. For a complete analysis, see Kikkert and Lackenbauer’s briefing note Canada’s Arctic & Northern Policy Framework: A roadmap for the future?

September

Scotland releases its Arctic Policy Framework. Jafry, Mikulewicz and Mattar describe the policy development process in their briefing note Arctic connections - Mapping an Arctic policy for the Scottish government US Vice President Mike Pence visits Iceland in recognition of the growing strategic importance of the Arctic to the United States to discuss NATO efforts and trade and investment opportunities. This visit marks the first time a US Vice President has visited Iceland since George H. W. Bush in 1983.

The Northern Sustainable Development Forum, the permanent international expert platform, is held 24-28 September.

The Council of UArctic meeting takes place at Stockholm University and KTH Royal Institute of Technology from 18-20 September. Over 130 participants from UArctic's member institutions attended the meeting, from 14 countries both in the Circumpolar North and from outside the region.

A new IPCC report, the Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, is released and details sweeping changes to oceans, ice and the global impacts of Arctic melt

October

The VII International Meeting of Member States of the Arctic Council, Observer States of the AC and Foreign Scientific Community meet from 30 September – 2 October in St. Petersburg and the Valaam islands The Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council hold their first joint meeting in Reykjavik on 9 October. The meeting brings together government representatives of the eight Arctic States, business representatives, as well as representatives of the indigenous Permanent Participants, and the Councils’ respective Working Groups.

The 7th annual Arctic Circle Assembly takes place from 10-13 October in Reykjavik, Iceland. Former Icelandic President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson presents former US Secretary of State John Kerry with the Arctic Circle Award.

Northern Mayors from 13 cities in the Arctic formally inaugurate the Arctic Mayors Forum at a special event in Akureryi, Iceland.

Year in Review

II. Traditional security in the Arctic

Precarious existence or staying the course?

The foundations and future of Arctic stability Adam P. MacDonald

The Arctic is one the world’s most stable regions, but whether this trajectory will continue is a source of growing debate as the region becomes more connected within an international landscape increasingly defined by great power competition, specifically between the United States, China and Russia. Many Realist-based analyses argue stability has largely been a function of the Arctic being a strategically unimportant space, but its opening economic and military potential will increasingly attract great power interest and result in contestation between them over shaping the regional landscape to their advantage: a process the region is poorly equipped to mitigate against. Conversely, many Institutionalist and Constructivist-based analyses argue a thickening institutional network of organizations, practices, and identities, based on and in conjunction with durable common interests, has and will continue to foster cooperation, involvement in and support for the current Arctic regional order by these great powers despite increasing tensions between them elsewhere. Both accounts have strengths and weaknesses, but in general this debate creates the impression that Arctic stability is predicated on whether great power competition is/will become a major influence in regional politics (unstable situation) or not (stable situation). Alternatively, this paper proposes that regional stability can remain even amongst augmenting levels of great power competition. This is so for the Arctic strategic landscape as it is premised on a Latent Balance of Power- defined by the region’s geographic division of authority, strategic alignments, and state coherence – that has ensured stability and the emergence of a decentralized but robust regional order. Great power competition is and will increasingly become part of Arctic politics, but this specific balance of power configuration is well positioned in attenuating it. This does not guarantee the maintenance of the status-quo, however, for beyond the popular portrayals of the region as either on the brink of debilitating contestation or maintaining its ‘exceptionalism’ is a third possibility: sub-regionalization into continentally anchored configurations of power based on exclusionary logics employed by great powers to deny each other position and influence in certain parts of the Arctic. Determination of the region’s continued coherence, however, is not solely the purview of great powers but the ways in which regional states work through and adjust to great power competition manifesting in the Arctic.

Introduction The Arctic is one of the world’s most stable regions, defined by the absence of military confrontation or conflict as well as an expanding institutionalized and inclusive network of organizations and processes focused on cooperation on common interests and challenges. The Adam P. MacDonald is a PhD student in Political Science and the Deputy-Director of the Centre for the Study of Security and Development (CSSD) at Dalhousie University.

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return of great power competition as a central feature of international life (Brands, 2017), specifically between the United States, Russia and China, has led to renewed debates about the future of regional stability given all three powers are increasingly interested in and active there.

Many Realist-based assessments believe great power competition will be a centrifugal force ultimately undermining the existing regional political order which is poorly equipped to handle such tensions, whereas more Institutionalist and Constructivist-based analyses argue Arctic stability is predicated on robust centripetal forces, specifically organized cooperation on common interests, tying these great powers into the current order despite increasing tensions amongst themselves elsewhere. Both accounts have strengths and weaknesses, but in general this debate creates the impression that Arctic stability is predicated on whether great power competition is/will become a major influence in regional politics (unstable situation) or not (stable situation).

Alternatively, this paper proposes that Arctic stability can remain even amongst augmenting levels of great power competition regionally. This is so for the Arctic strategic landscape as it is premised on a Latent Balance of Power – defined by the region’s geographic division of authority, strategic alignments, and state coherence – that has ensured territorial security, neutralized contests over hegemony, and facilitated the emergence of a decentralized but robust regional order. Such a constellation of factors well positions the region in absorbing and attenuating the most detrimental effects of great power competition. This does not, however, guarantee the maintenance of the status-quo for beyond the popular and binary portrayal of the region as either on the brink of intense rivalry or maintaining its ‘exceptionalism’ (Rowe, 2013). There is also a third possibility: sub-regionalization outwards toward continentally anchored configurations of power with great powers trying to assert their own, and deny each other, influence in specific areas of the Arctic.

Determination of the region’s trajectory, however, is not solely the function of great powers’ relations but the ways in which regional states, the leaders in creating various Arctic specific organizations since the late 1980s, work through and adjust to great power competition.

Great Power Competition (GPC) and its migration North Great Power Competition (GPC) is once again becoming an increasingly central feature in international life, principally defined by great powers attempting to gain relative advantage over one another in order to shape international environments via the accumulation and employment (and/or denial to others) of instruments of power and influence (Mazarr et al, 2018). Great powers, unlike other tiered powers, act to shape regional realities not just in and of themselves but in the service of influencing system-level dynamics. In the modern world, contemporary great powers are not pursuing revolutionary overthrow but rather attempting to carve greater degrees of freedom to reconstitute major components of it, specifically the distribution of power, ordering principles and norms, and status levels (Brands, 2017). Great powers, furthermore, are motivated to deny the influence of each other in their home regions but work to ensure their own access and influence into other regions. The Arctic is of growing importance to the three great powers explored in this paper – the United States, Russia and China – but the reasons why and the centrality the region has in their grand strategies varies.

Of all three powers, the Arctic is of most importance to Russia. Russia is a heavily armed regional power with limited global influence, but an important player given its dominant position within Eurasia (straddling Europe, the Arctic and Asia), and is actively promoting the establishment of multipolar continental arrangements, with themselves a key pole and the United States having

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decreasing influence over the supercontinent (Trenin, 2019). The Arctic furthers this grand strategy in several ways. The promotion of the Northern Sea Route, which Russia does not formally claim as Internal Waters in its entirety but nonetheless seeks to fully regulate (Fahey, 2018), as an international shipping route connecting East Asia and Europe and developing of various natural resources within their northern territories (most prominently the Yamal LNG project) furthers economic benefits to Moscow as well as situates them as de facto partner with whoever wants to participate in/use these resources (Mehdiyeva, 2018). Russia, furthermore, has increasingly worked with China in the Arctic as part of a broadening relationship between the two (Rolland, 2019), specifically since the degradation of relations with the West since its annexation of Crimea, in developing these resources and trade routes. There is some speculation that Russia may host Chinese forces in their Arctic territories as part of exercises and possible joint operations (Scott 2018, Goldstein, 2019). Greater Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation is an area of increasing interest for Western security communities as Moscow seems to have withdrawn its reservations about greater Chinese (and non-Arctic states in general) presence there. This has led to sensational but vague accounts of the two teaming up to ‘take over’ the North Pole (Spohr, 2018) as well as an underreporting of the many issues within this relationship which question how coordinated and committed each side is to the others’ Arctic goals (Sørensen & Klimenko, 2017; Sun, 2018). Moving forward, the Arctic will increase in importance as an economically and strategically vital region, particularly for Russia as it is hoping to capitalize on increasing resource development, being an economic hub connecting the two sides of Eurasia, and furthering its standing and status as an Arctic great power to both domestic and international audiences (Rotnem, 2018).

Most concerning to Western security communities, however, is Russia’s continuing largescale and widespread military developments along its Arctic coastline (Tamnes, 2018). These may be a defensive, precautionary measure, developing a defence in depth posture in reconstituting its bastion strategy to protect its nuclear and naval forces (which are primarily based in the Arctic) as well as unquestioned control over the use of the Northern Sea Route, particularly as the United States believes the waterway to be an International Strait subject to Transit Rights which Moscow rejects (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2014; Parnemo 2019). The development of theatre warfare capabilities, though, has led to speculation that these efforts are not simply defensive but potentially more pre-emptive in nature, either in projecting power further into the Arctic Ocean and/or threatening NATO states, specifically Norway (Gouré, 2017; Wither, 2018). To be clear, Russia remains a cooperative member in regional forums, has not sought to change the institutional statusquo and has not used its military power there aggressively, but the rationale for stationing combat forces in a region with very little military threat posed by the other Arctic states remains uncertain.

The degradation of relations with the West, though, has had an impact on security relations in the Arctic, specifically the eviction of Russia from the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, and Moscow has augmented the declaratory importance of the Arctic as a defence security interest with NATO, and its expansion, listed as the greatest threat to the Federation (Mehdiyeva, 2018).

China, a long-time promoter of a more multi-polar, less Western dominated world, has employed primarily economic and diplomatic instruments of power (though its military power continues to augment as well but largely within a regional context), specifically via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to reconfigure trade and investment networks throughout Eurasia and beyond, conferring economic and strategic benefit to Beijing (Dobbins, Shatz & Wyne, 2018). Whether China, however, sees a multi-polar world as an end-state (as Russia does) or a transitional phase towards

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something more hierarchical with itself as the top remains unclear (Pieper, 2018; Rolland, 2019).

Nevertheless, China is becoming more active and engaged throughout the world, and not only through existing, Western based institutions but also in parallel within its BRI network based on bilateralism wherein China can wield disproportionate influence over its smaller partners, altering economic, political and possibly strategic realities towards its advantage (Thorne & Spevack, 2018).

The Arctic is of increasing importance to China as it continues to expand its reach globally, but the region remains of second-tier importance to others closer to home.

China, a self-proclaimed ‘Near Arctic state’, emphasises its right to be involved in the region, possesses declaratory interests, positions and polar activities (captured within their 2018 Arctic policy) that are broadly supportive and reflective of the regional status-quo. China, furthermore, promotes itself as a beneficial partner for the region, particularly with respect to economic development, scientific research and efforts to address climate change (Hong, 2014). The willingness to develop Polar Silk Roads and extensive resources investments - with some estimates that China has invested over one trillion dollars into Arctic states’ economies over the past decade (Rosen & Thuringer, 2017) - signals rhetorical and practical steps towards incorporating the Arctic into its own BRI project. China, furthermore, is increasingly emphasizing its managerial role in the Arctic, specifically as a great power sitting on the UN Security Council, constructing a narrative that it has a role to play in maintaining regional stability (Bennett, 2015; Lanteigne 2017). China continues to operate within and abide by the rules and relations underpinning the current Arctic regional order, but some have voiced concern that the targeting of smaller Arctic states, like Greenland and Iceland, may turn them into strategic vassals through debt-trap diplomacy and building domestic allies, pressuring governments to develop ever more favorable relations with Beijing (Robinson, 2013, T.C. Wright, 2013, Berbick & Pincus 2018). The Arctic, as well, may become a growing military interest as part of a growing maritime force with an ever-expanding global reach, with implications for North American and European continental security (Brady, 2017; Rodman, 2018; Huebert, 2019). These issues, furthermore, are increasingly being openly discussed within mainstream (but still unofficial) Chinese media and academic circles. The issues being discussed are about the Arctic becoming a more contested space where China must be prepared to be involved (D.C. Wright, 2018). Finally, though not formal allies, the bilateral strategic partnership between China and Russia continues to deepen, including significant investment in resource projects, though the worry of their desire to challenge or undermine existing regional structures and processes is unsubstantiated at this juncture (Lackenbauer et al., 2018).

The United States is a declining yet still powerful superpower with global reach, listing both China and Russia as revisionist powers that they are determined to counterbalance to maintain favourable balances of power in core regions (specifically in Europe and the Indo-Pacific regions) that are seen as vital in retaining their hegemonic position (National Security Strategy, 2017). Since the end of the Cold War, the Arctic has remained a low defence and foreign policy priority (except for nuclear deterrence and missile defence) but the last decade has seen augmenting interest and priority there. Specifically, the last year has seen a growing narrative from the Trump Administration that while the Arctic remains peaceful, it may become an increasingly contested geopolitical space requiring a greater military presence there, particularly to balance against Russian Arctic military developments and Chinese economic activities (DOD, 2019). There are growing American assertions, as well, that Freedom of Navigation is threatened in the region which necessitates the reintroduction of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) there. This could

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cause tensions with Russia (and Canada) over disagreements pertaining to certain water space designations along their shores (Pincus, 2019). The economic investments of China are also raising concerns in American national security circles of altering the strategic landscape, particularly in Greenland which is a key area for continental defence and the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine (Sengupta, 2019). Such forewarnings of Beijing’s growing footprint in the Arctic is reminiscent of the framing of Chinese economic and investment activities in Central and South America as part of a larger threat to American supremacy (Gramer & Johnson, 2018). The most recent Arctic defence policy characterizes the Arctic as a ‘strategic corridor’ connecting Europe and the IndoPacific region, the two main foreign defence foci of Washington, in which the growing power projection and influence by Russia and China must be balanced against to uphold the ‘rules-based order’ in conjunction with its Arctic allies, including within the confines of NATO (DOD, 2019: 5).

The foundations of Arctic stability The near universal consensus of the description of the Arctic as stable since the end of the Cold War is marked by disagreement over the explanation for such a condition and whether it will continue moving forward. Stability here is conceived as having both a thin level – the absence of violence, military confrontation, coercion or intense rivalry – and a thick level – the existence of an institutional network of organizations, relations, and norms enhancing inclusion and coordination on numerous issue areas between and within Arctic states and others active in the region. The exact ways in which these two levels interact, and the forces which act upon them, remains debated and heavily influences interpretations of what accounts for Arctic stability and its future.

Many Realist-based/informed assessments of the Arctic argue stability has largely been the product of the region being strategically unimportant since the termination of the superpower rivalry with the end of the Cold War, especially given Russia’s diminished power following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the United States being focused elsewhere globally as the sole remaining superpower (Blunden, 2009). The region’s continued opening economic and strategic potential, however, combined with the resurgence of Russian power, is and will continue to renew interest and involvement there by these powers (Howard, 2010), as well as for extra-regional ones with China top of mind (Huebert, 2019). They are expected to compete with one another within this increasingly accessible maritime realm. This is a situation the region is poorly equipped to handle given the lack of such strategic pressures influencing the construction of the current regional order, which has avoided dealing with traditional security issues (Gupta, 2007; Huebert, 2010). The region’s shipping and resource potential, unresolved maritime boundaries, and strategic importance (connecting three continents) are commonly cited as drivers of the competition between great powers (Blunden, 2009; Spohr, 2018). The process is accelerated by a warming climate and changing technologies that are enabling greater access into the region as well as further connecting it into the larger international realm.

As a result, the realpolitik of a new ‘great game’ is becoming the dominant thinking amongst major powers (in the context of their global relations becoming more competitive in general) with smaller regional states having to cope with greater rivalry and tensions there (Borgerson, 2008). While many of these analyses do not argue war is inevitable, or likely, the main point is that competing for relative advantage between great powers, who are increasingly motivated to act in ways which further their own power and influence but by also denying it to others, will undermine many of the

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inclusive and cooperative mechanisms currently defining Arctic governance. Military build-ups, specifically by Russia (Wezeman, 2016), are commonly referenced as evidence of this more contested Arctic environment (Holmes, 2019; Wallace, 2019), though greater attention is also being paid to economic developments (specifically by China) as a process to influence regional dynamics and possibly introduce new ordering principles (Robinson, 2013; Berbick & Pincus 2018). Arctic stability since the end of the Cold War, thus, is largely a product of the absence of centrifugal forces. Forces which are increasingly becoming present and driving great powers to compete over regional influence, position and power with connections to and impact on the wider international landscape increasingly defined by GPC. Alternatively, there are a growing number of Institutionalist and Constructivist analyses which argue Arctic stability is a function of and furthered by durable common interests, identities and relations which have produced an institutionalized network of organizations and processes unique to the region and not beholden to geopolitical tensions elsewhere amongst its membership. A process led by the smaller Arctic states, during a period of strategic opportunity with the easing of tensions in the region following Gorbachev’s 1987 Murmansk Speech, moved towards constructing forums to promote joint research on the altering region. Over the past decade it began establishing decision-making agreements at both a regional (such as for Search and Rescue and pollution control) and global (such as the Polar Code within the International Maritime Organization) level by creating regimes in order to produce an organized domain governing the ever-accessible region (Young, 2005; Bailes, 2011; Käpylä & Mikkola, 2015, Nilson & Koivurova, 2016). In explaining this level of cooperation, the Arctic is argued to be a site of ‘complex interdependence’ defined by the inability to employ military force to achieve one’s objectives, growing contacts and connections between people beyond a strictly government level, and a host of common interests which require a cooperative approach to manage and resolve (Byers, 2017).

Along with functionalist pressures to work together, some argue the Arctic is an International Society, as defined by the English School (Exner-Pirot & Murray, 2015), wherein its members are united behind common norms, rules and institutions to govern their relations, specifically environment and ocean management issues connecting regional members together (Exner-Pirot, 2013). Many of these assessments do not deny the existence of geopolitical tensions, but argue these are attenuated by the unique characteristics of the region. These include not only material factors but ideational and relational ones as well, which account for not only the continuation of Arctic stability but its enhancement and expansion over the years to tackle a growing assortment of common interests within inclusive structures (including with non-state actors and external states) by sustaining the region’s cooperative and peaceful nature. Arctic stability, therefore, is a product of the existence and furthering of a host of mutually reinforcing centripetal forces, and not simply the absence of centrifugal ones as many Realist-based analyses assert.

Both accounts have strengths and weaknesses with respect to explaining Arctic stability. Realistbased assessments are correct in highlighting the influence of strategic matters on great power thinking, but have been unable to account for the maintenance of Arctic stability over the past number of decades which have been populated by a number of periods of heightened tensions that did not result in the overall degradation of the regional order. Critics, as well, are justified in pointing out the inability of many Realist assessments to explain exactly what conflict and contestation will look like in the Arctic (Exner-Pirot, 2015; Bartelet & Dubois, 2018). Much of these analyses, furthermore, are futurist about the expected nature of relations between great

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powers and its impact on the Arctic, thus leaving underexplored and analyzed the apparent robustness of Arctic stability despite its often portrayal as being underpinned by weak foundations.

Furthermore, there needs to be more differentiation between detrimental impacts to the Arctic region in particular via specific behaviours and strategies employed there which are motivated by GPC and the grand strategic ramifications at a global level of great powers securing greater position and influence in the Arctic, which may not be detrimental to regional stability.

Assessments of the robustness of Arctic stability, on the other hand, are correct in referring to the vast empirical record which shows the growing coordination and institutionalization of many aspects of Arctic relations, despite tensions between its members elsewhere and the further inclusion and activities of a host of external actors. Within this literature, however, there sometimes is the false impression that the region is fully buffeted against external shocks which can impact Arctic relations, including detrimentally, such as Russia’s removal from the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable in 2014 (the only hard security forum) and its increasing reliance on China for Arctic economic development. The focus, as well, on norms and institutions sometimes blurs the unique geographical setting of the Arctic which could also be a factor accounting for the stability of the region. Arctic stability, finally, should not be solely an investigation of whether GPC will impact the region, but rather an examination of how great powers pursue their strategic interests there, which is dependent on regional characteristics that Institutionalist and Constructivist assessments emphasize.

Instead, this paper proposes that regional stability can remain even amongst augmenting levels of GPC as the current regional order is based on a Latent Balance of Power (BOP) that remains relatively undisturbed despite significant changes to the region, and the larger international system, over the past three decades. The Latent BOP is comprised of three components: 1) the division of sovereign authority; 2) strategic alignments; and 3) the internal coherence of regional states. Such a configuration has been vital in maintaining stability since the end of the Cold War, ensuring Arctic states’ territorial security in the region without the need for overt military balancing against one another there or hegemonic rivalries for regional supremacy to secure great powers’ strategic interests. From this foundation, and with the extinguishing of superpower competition governing regional relations with the United States and Russia acting as detached powers afterwards (Pyrs, 2010), several smaller regional powers in the late 1980s and 1990s took the lead in constructing several regional organizations and processes creating additional institutional layers to capture region-wide involvement and support into these established arrangements versus a series of more exclusive localized collectives. The result has been a co-operative non-hierarchical order, comprised of a web of institutions supporting inclusive collaboration on areas of common interests while guaranteeing large degrees of autonomy for regional actors in other more contentious realms including economic development and traditional security (Nolte, 2016).

The components comprising the Latent BOP have formed the foundation underpinning the development of a well-organized region which is forward looking on pragmatic, largely nontraditional security issues stemming from the region’s increasing accessibility caused by climate change. Throughout this development the Latent BOP has remained a durable but background factor, ensuring little intense rivalry despite the region possessing the material and structural antecedents (according to many Realists) conducive towards intense, perhaps antagonistic competition and possibly military conflict. The characteristics of and effect on regional stability of each component is as follows: The foundations and future of Arctic stability

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1) Division of Authority – The geographic distribution of authority in the Arctic is stable and almost universally accepted. There are no historical tensions over territories and besides Hans Island, no territorial disputes to speak of. Maritime boundary issues are with respect to categorization affecting the balance of sovereign rights of coastal states versus user states’ rights, not over sovereign control (Byers, 2009). Economic, specifically shipping and resource, prospects, as well, are almost all within recognized Arctic states’ jurisdictions (Claes & Moe, 2014). The implementation of rules and institutions formalizing these divisions (such as those located within UNCLOS) have been important, strengthening elements but the a priori political geographic setting of the region has made it an ideal candidate for such rules to take effect and be recognized and respected without much contestation and intense competition.

2) Strategic Alignments – The Arctic is defined by an exclusive binary strategic alignment between Russia and the other Arctic coastal states being NATO allies while Finland and Sweden are close western partners. Such a division, with both sides possessing nuclear weapons, seriously undermines any efforts to militarily attack one another. These alignments are stable as there are no swing states to compete over. While NATO members do train and operate in the Arctic, this is limited and there are no large-scale NATO balancing missions there against Russia as opposed to other, more contested regions comprised of non-aligned states such as Eastern Europe. Greenland, however, may become a strategic swing state as it is in the process of becoming independent from Denmark.

3) State Coherence – All Arctic states, as well, are stable, well-functioning entities with sovereign control over their territories. There is an absence of civil wars, societal unrest or violent independence movements which could be taken advantage of by others. This does not mean each Arctic state has the same level of constabulary and military control over their northern territories, but there is no dispute over sovereign ownership.

The Latent BOP’s erosion is not a foregone conclusion due to the increasing accessibility of the region as its tripartite configuration is hard to overturn, along with a non-hierarchical regional order offering portals of access and influence for great powers to further their interests. Arctic stability, furthermore, is not dependent on the absence of and complete harmony of strategic interests within and between regional states and great powers. In many ways the current regional arrangement suits all three major powers’ strategic interests. For Russia, a stable Arctic with a relatively benign strategic environment allows and enables Moscow to secure its military and economic interests in the region. Concerns of Russia trying to carve greater degrees and areas of control in the maritime realm (Holmes, 2019), largely based on its military build-up and increasing domestic control over the Northern Sea Route, are speculative at best, and usually neglect the fact that any such move would likely unite not only all Arctic states, including the US, but external actors, especially China, against them and severely undermine their own extensive legal maritime interests. For China, the Arctic is an ideal region as a stable, non-hegemonic space to expand into as there exist many international and regional legalized means and rights of entry and involvement in terms of investments (in an area searching for more capital) and expanding its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS) without directly competing with a regional hegemon or alliance of hostile regional powers. While it is entirely reasonable to assume Chinese warships and submarines one day will sail throughout the Arctic, along with other non-Arctic navies, China is a promoter of user rights at sea in the region and thus is not expected to behave as it is in waters in its home region where they are promoting exaggerated rights as a coastal state. As for the US, with the Arctic MacDonald

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populated largely by longstanding and close allies who have taken the lead in structuring the organizational make-up of the region, they have been able to focus elsewhere in the world in reconsolidating their power, such as the 2011 Rebalance Strategy to the Asia-Pacific region.

The Latent BOP has facilitated the persistence of non-exclusive alignments within and between great powers and regional states across various issues such as: user right emphasis at sea (China and the US) versus coastal state emphasis (Russia and Canada); Arctic states pre-eminence (Canada and Russia) versus growing role for external actors in regional affairs (China, Nordic Arctic states); those supporting (Nordic Arctic states) and weary/opposing (Canada, Russia) a permanent presence for NATO in the Arctic (though in Canada there appears to be growing declaratory comfortability of NATO interest there (Charron, 2017)). Rather than being an unstable and volatile arrangement, such divisions have inhibited the bifurcation of the region along exclusive strategic lines between the Western Arctic states and Russia and China and the creation of a more bipolar environment which would erode region-wide engagements.

In modern times, the Arctic has always been influenced and affected by larger international events and changing balances of power amongst great powers. Such a relationship is deepening and becoming more multi-vectored given the increasing connections and linkages at various levels to the international environment and the growing types and number of actors interested and involved in the ever-more accessible region. Amongst such changes the Latent BOP is assessed to be a durable condition, but one whose existence and continuation is dependent in part on global factors – such as the maintenance of the NATO alliance, respect for sovereign boundaries, and abiding by UNCLOS – any of whose violation, undermining, and/or termination would have far reaching consequences beyond just the Arctic. GPC in the Arctic will most likely be geo-economic rather than geopolitical: it will be about who is employing economic instruments and influencing the structures and processes governing rules and regulations for development of the region, more so than aggressive attempts to militarily alter the political environment. GPC poses challenges to regional states, but there is a risk of reducing them to purely or primarily military matters. The Latent BOP is a robust but not deterministic condition, and thus ensuring GPC does not derail efforts in addressing emerging governance issues by eroding the coherence of the region requires the smaller regional states to continue to support and facilitate region-wide engagements.

Navigating within an increasingly GPC influenced Arctic Rather than completely eroding the Arctic regional order, the more realistic possibility is that GPC may fracture regional coherence into more sub-regionalized localities based on economic and strategic developments which are tethered into and oriented towards larger continental networks of power (Bennett, 2014). Such an outcome is a third possibility – more overt spheres of influence within the Arctic based on major powers attempting to exclude each other from specific areas, not just militarily but economically and possibly politically as well – besides the popular binary portrayal of the future of region as either remaining a zone of peace or transforming into a zone of contestation (Rowe, 2013). This does not imply that regional coherence cannot exist amidst overlapping layers of regional organizations and processes, but rather exclusionary logics may become more pronounced, as great powers try to deny one another influence and power in certain areas of and forums in the Arctic which could result in alternative structures being constructed that exclude one another.

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The Latent BOP acts a bulwark against major power aggression in the region but in and of itself cannot maintain the region-wide momentum of working together. This requires the smaller regional states to think innovatively in ensuring GPC does not erode such processes, finding pathways for continued engagement and cooperation while also understanding the need to further prepare for a more strategically important region. The Arctic does not require a radically reordering in order to adjust to GPC, but rather needs to be proactive in constructing structures and processes dealing with issues the region has largely avoided in a collective setting with the smaller Arctic States retaining their roles as important political actors. Two issues in particular that require a more institutionalized setting to address in order to avoid excessive great power unilateralism within them are Freedom of Navigation and regional economic development.

For the Western Arctic States, there are legitimate concerns pertaining to the ultimate intentions behind Russian military and Chinese economic developments in the Arctic, but these must be balanced with and placed within the context of the larger global phenomenon of GPC, wherein the position and actions of the United States may exacerbate such tensions in the Arctic as well.

Furthermore, there is, and will continue to be increased, military presence in the region by the smaller Arctic states, both individually and within the context of NATO. These are legitimate moves both for national and alliance interests, but in so doing the deployments and posturing of such forces should consider the possible negative effects of unnecessarily creating security dilemma dynamics, specifically with Russia (Ă…tland, 2014). Strategically, as well, American moves may bring China and Russia further into alignment, both within the region and beyond, mitigating their mutual suspicions and allowing for a more coordinated approach to working together in an embedded and deep way to push back against American and Western power (Korollev & Portyakov, 2019). Furthermore, moves towards an overt balance of power based on military forces risks undermining and obscuring efforts in addressing emerging governance challenges which require inclusive engagement and a ‘regional’ approach of inclusive membership within multilateral contexts. One area where there is a dearth of such regional forums and organizations is traditional security matters, specifically issues pertaining to Freedom of Navigation (especially with respect to military vessels and aircraft) within the increasingly accessible Arctic maritime realm.

While a difficult issue-area, especially for Canada (MacDonald, 2019), this is an area where the smaller Arctic states should be coordinating to create forums and processes of exchange to engage with such issues early and often before they become more present and possibly intractable between the great powers. In this vein, there should be the reconstitution of a regional wide traditional security forum including Russian participation as they are a vital partner in the region, and avoiding Arctic specific organization which does not include all eight Arctic states (Flake, 2017).

There is the possibility, as well, of the region becoming fragmented politically, especially as these smaller Arctic states are feeling pressure to more overtly align with the US in all respects against China and Russia. It is clear which side the western Arctic states are militarily and politically, but as US-China tensions augment, epitomized by the trade dispute, there may be increased pressure

by Washington for its allies to limit Chinese investments, specifically in industries seen as vital to national security such as emerging technologies and transportation infrastructure (Gramer, 2019).

Such pressures are already evident in Chinese investment desires in Greenland where Washington and Copenhagen intervened to deny infrastructure contracts being awarded to Chinse companies (Hinshaw & Page, 2019). While there are legitimate concerns about smaller Arctic states potentially becoming overly dependent on Chinese investment, the fact of the matter is that there is a distinct

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lack of sources of long-term capital required to develop the Arctic. Therefore, the Arctic states should be working with the US, Russia and China in creating regional development funds which would allow for the inclusion of external actors but protect Arctic states by having them be key figures in the structuring of these organizations (Rosen & Thuringer, 2017). Such a process would help diversify investment partners and avoid entirely characterising Asian/Chinese involvement as solely and perhaps increasingly an unacceptable security threat. The reaction to China’s ‘vision’ for the Arctic as an extension of the BRI, producing ‘win-win’ results for all should not be dismissal, blind acceptance or outright rejection. Instead, it should be spurring discussion about regional economic development, at all levels, and how to achieve these in an increasingly interconnected region within itself and with the larger international landscape.

GPC will increasingly become part of the landscape in the Arctic but given the Latent BOP which exists, the region may be one of the best positioned in absorbing and attenuating its most detrimental effects. It is important, as well, to emphasize that working with these great powers is an inescapable part of global and increasingly Arctic life, and thus any moves to block one another’s involvement from the North would not only be futile but dangerous. They are necessary partners with legitimate rights and interests there, and in the case of China and other external actors eager to invest and be active there, possibly being beneficial and cooperative partners in ensuring Arctic states’ development interests. The Arctic states, as well, have been successful in being a forwardthinking region in constructing forums, rules and processes to manage and adapt to a warming and more accessible region including in the areas of search and rescue, pollution response, fisheries management and shipping regulations, usually working within international contexts involving external actors. Such efforts should be emphasized and continued, maintaining the coherence of the region to socialize, specifically amongst all the Arctic States themselves, engage and act collectively. Such efforts will be difficult and challenging within this new era of global GPC, but not doing so will result in abdication of the smaller Arctic states position of regional leadership and most likely be replaced by a more contested and exclusionary politics led by the great powers.

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Berbrick, W. & Picnus, R. (2018, October 24). Gray zones in a blue Arctic: Grappling with China’s growing influence. War on the Rocks.

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Dobbins, J., Shatz, H.J. & Wyne, A. (2018, October). Russia is a rogue, not a peer; China is a peer, not a rogue: Different challenges, different responses (RAND Corporation perspective paper).

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Fahey, S. (2018). Access control: Freedom of the Seas in the Arctic and the Russian Northern Sea Route Regime. Harvard National Security Journal 9, 154-200.

Flake, Lincoln E. (2017). Contextualizing and disarming Russia’s Arctic security posture. The Journal of Military and Slavic Military Studies, 30 (1), 17-29.

Goldstein, L. (2019, June 01). Chinese nuclear-armed submarines in Russian Arctic ports? It could happen. The National Interest.

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Gramer, R. & Johnson, K. (2018, February 02). Tillerson praises Monroe Doctrine, warns Latin America of ‘imperial’ Chinese ambitions. Foreign Policy.

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Hinshaw, D. & Page, J. (2019, February 10). How the Pentagon countered China’s designs on Greenland. The Wall Street Journal.

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Hong, N. (2014). Emerging interests of non-Arctic countries in the Arctic: a Chinese perspective.

The Polar Journal, 4 (2), 271-286 Howard, R. (2010). Russia’s new front line. Survival, 52 (2), 141-156.

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Huebert, R. (2010, March) The newly emerging Arctic security environment. Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.

Käpylä, J. & Mikkola, H. (2015, April). On Arctic Exceptionalism (Working Paper 85). The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Konyshev, V. & Sergunin, A. (2014). Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic? Defense and Security Analysis, 30, 323-335.

Korollev A. & Portyakov, V. (2019). Reluctant Allies: System-unit dynamics and China-Russia relations. International Relations, 33 (1), 40-66.

Lackenbauer, P.W., Lajeunesse, A., Manicom J. & Lasserre, F. (2018). China’s Arctic ambitions and what they mean for Canada. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

Lanteigne, M. Have you entered the storehouses of the snow?’ China as a norm entrepreneur in the Arctic. Polar Record, 53:2(2017):117-130.

MacDonald, A.P. (2019, May 27). Canada’s emerging Freedom of Navigation conundrum. The Hill Times.

Mazarr, M.J., J.S. Blake, A. Casey, T. McDonald, S. Pezard & M. Spirtas (2019). Understanding the emerging era of international competition: Theoretical and historical perspectives (RAND Corporation research report).

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Robinson Jr, R. W. (2013, September). China’s “Long Con” in the Arctic. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

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Rosen, M. & Thuringer, C.B. (2017, November). Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment: An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security (Occasional Paper). Center for Naval Analyses.

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Rowe, E.W. A dangerous space? Unpacking state and media discourses on the Arctic. Polar Geography 36:3(2013): 232-244.

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From bilateral to trilateral agreement: The case of Thule Air Base Maria Ackrén

Pituffik or Thule in Greenland has always been controversial within foreign and security policy between three parties: Denmark, Greenland and the USA. The Thule-base in Greenland has had an important role during the Cold War as part of the US military sphere in the North. The role of the base has changed over time to become a radar station, but it is still part of the overall US defense system. Recent tensions around the base regarding the contract and subcontractor’s role have intensified discussions about the existence of the base and who actually has power over the base. The Greenlandic government has had a wish to be more influential on what is going on in the far north, but things have been held secret from the public and local politicians. This has resulted in some skepticism between Greenland and Denmark on the one hand, but also between Greenland and the USA on the other. This paper will shed light on the development from the bilateral to the trilateral relationship outplayed between the three major actors and how this relates to foreign and security policy within the Kingdom of Denmark and the relationship towards the USA.

Introduction Pituffik or the Thule base in the far north of Greenland has been a controversial matter from the start. During the Second World War, Greenland became under the US protection and the Danish ambassador in Washington D.C. (Henrik Kauffmann) acted as the link between the US and Greenland at the time. The defense agreement from 1941 became a step towards more American involvement in Greenland. Navy bases and land based military bases were established around Greenland. US Coast Guard vessels were patrolling the Greenlandic waters (Archer, 2003; Ackrén & Jakobsen, 2015). Greenland became a focal point for North America because of its strategic location for any potential hostile power coming from the East and as a transit point between North America and Europe. Greenland also provided important meteorological information, and the mineral wealth of cryolite was of value for the aircraft industry in the US and Canada (Archer, 2003).

Greenland’s long-term negotiations and concerns with replacement of the defense agreement in 1951 and a further revision in 2004 is linked to the Thule base. Before the construction of the Maria Ackrén is an Associate Professor in Political Science at the Department of Social Sciences at Ilisimatusarfik/University of Greenland.

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Thule base, 27 Inughuit families had to be relocated further north in 1953. Another negative impact was the radioactive pollution caused by a crash in 1968 of an American B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs (Loukacheva, 2004). The Thule Air Base was constructed during the years of 1951-55. In its heyday, over 6000 American soldiers were stationed here (Gilberg, 1976; Taagholt, 2002: 67).

Already back in 1946, Greenland was on the US Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (JCS’s) shortlist of six essential bases, three of which (Greenland, Iceland and the Azores) were declared as of utmost importance (Petersen, 2011: 92).

The negotiations back in 1951 were in a formal sense set by NATO, when the secretaries of the Atlantic Planning Group in January 1951 asked Denmark and the United States to initiate discussions to fulfill the military requirements of the adopted NATO Medium Term Plan (Petersen, 1998). The outcome of the negotiations was the agreement referred to as “the Defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area” (Petersen, 1998). The Americans’ wishes were fulfilled to freely operate bases in Greenland and have full access to the Greenlandic airspace.

With the establishment of the Thule base, joint Danish-American defense areas could be established and operated and be used by NATO countries in a war situation. The US Air Force officially took over Thule from the US Corps of Engineers 1 November 1952. In this way Greenland became an integrated part of the US nuclear strategy (Taagholt, 2002: 46-47). The Thule Air Base was possible to include six functions: an emergency landing strip, a weather station, a navigational aids station, an advanced radar station, a search and rescue station, and a base for sledge dog patrol units (Petersen, 2011: 98).

Denmark has always played the ‘Greenlandic card’ in its relations towards the USA. In the past the ‘Greenlandic card’ meant that Denmark was giving the USA free access in Greenland in order to have a more favorable position within NATO (Bjørnsson, 2017). But in recent years it is not only Copenhagen that uses this card in its negotiations with the superpower. Greenland is also using the ‘Greenlandic card’ for its own purposes. This has been seen in the recent negotiations between all three players (Denmark, Greenland and the USA). On the one hand, Denmark is forced to maintain good relationships with the self-government of Greenland, but the Danish government is also keen to keep the good relationship with the USA at the same time (Søby Kristensen, 2004).

The Thule Air Base is still the most important American asset in Greenland. From a Danish point of view the strategy is to keep a presence in the Arctic region and to maintain sovereignty over the region (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2014).

On 18 December 2002, the then US Secretary of State Colin Powell made a public request to upgrade the radar at Thule Air Base, stating that it could be integrated into the radar structure on which the missile defense system depends (Søby Kristensen, 2004). This was again an example where Denmark and Greenland had a dispute on how to proceed. Denmark is still the sovereign power when it comes to foreign and security policy within the Danish Realm, but Greenland has reached some important steps towards a more independent stance in security matters. The results of the negotiations regarding the upgrade of the Thule radar station led to what has been called the “Igaliku Agreement”. On 24 May 2004, the agreement came into place. An amendment of the 1951 Agreement was signed that gave Greenlanders increased influence on matters concerning the Thule Air Base, and Greenland is acting as a cosignatory on the amendment. Furthermore, an agreement on economic and technical cooperation between Greenland and the USA was signed (Søby Kristensen, 2004; Dragsdahl, 2005). The ceremony in Igaliku was held after years of consultations, debate and negotiations starting 1999 when the Clinton administration had plans for National Missile Defense (NMD) architecture (Dragsdahl, 2005).

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For American administrations, the use of the Thule Air Base has been seen as a key component in recent Missile Defense (MD) plans. Parliamentary foreign policy committees in both Greenland and Denmark were informed during the summer of 1999 of an upcoming upgrade of the Thule Base, but was under strict conditions of confidentiality (Dragsdahl, 2005).

This article will shed light on the complex relationships between Greenland, Denmark and the USA in relation to the Thule base and in the context of foreign and security policy addressed in the three countries. This will be highlighted through the two-level or even three level game outplayed between the three major players in relation to the Thule base.

From bilateral to trilateral relationship According to Putnam (1988) there is a two-level game analysis of negotiations taking place both on the international (level one) and national level (level two) at the same time. At level one national governments seek to maximize their own ability to enhance their stance internationally, to stand the pressure from the domestic politics, while minimizing any potential foreign attack. At level two domestic groups try to pursue their interests in order to pressure the national government to adopt favorable policies (Putnam, 1988; Archer, 2003). In the Greenlandic case we have the two-level game played out between the USA and Denmark on the international level and the negotiations between Denmark and Greenland at the national level, however, a third level occurs between the USA, Denmark and Greenland simultaneously, where we have a combination of the international, national and local level.

Historically, a level-two game has been played out, since negotiations have taken place between the USA and the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland). Greenland was a colony until 1953 and became an integral part of Denmark until Home Rule was implemented in 1979. After Home Rule was established Greenland became more active in international relations, and since the end of 1990s and onwards Greenland has been taking a stance in international issues on its own.

The various games that are played out between the three different levels might all have diverse objectives and strategies. For Denmark it is essential to have good relations with its ally, the USA, on the international level. It is also equally relevant for Denmark to have a good relationship with Greenland on the national level, since this is the gateway to Arctic relations. The third level with all three parties participating is also to show good will from the Danish side to include Greenland as a co-partner and at the same time live up to the legislative relationship that the Kingdom of Denmark stands for. According to the Greenlandic Self-Government Act from 2009, for instance, it is stated that Greenland and Denmark constitute equal partners (see Lov om Grønlands Selvstyre).

The Itilleq declaration gives Greenland a position within foreign policy, especially in matters which are directly linked to the island. This was a national agreement between Greenland and Denmark and it is therefore linked to the level two game. The Igaliku agreement of 2004 amends and supplements the 1951 treaty between the USA, Denmark and Greenland and in this case include the voice of the Greenlandic government (Bjørnsson, 2017). This is an example of a level three game.

The Thule Air Base In the beginning Thule’s strategic role was linked to the first generation of US jet bombers, the B36 and B-47. In mid-1954, Thule was declared fully operational and its base was upgraded to wing status. By now Thule had a 10,000-foot by 200-foot runway, 29 hardstands for heavy bombers, and six hangars for heavy bombers. Furthermore, a special program called Sea Weed was created for the prepositioning of supplies, and the scheduled staging of 21 B-36s in wartime was completed From bilateral to trilateral agreement: The case of Thule Air Base

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(Petersen, 2011: 100-101). There is evidence that strategic reconnaissance flights from Thule were occasionally made in the period from early 1956 to mid-1959 (Petersen, 2011: 110). In March 1958 the Danish government approved the extension of the Canadian Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) against bomb attacks across southern Greenland, but the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radar built at Thule in 1960 was far more important. BMEWS consisted of three radars based in Alaska, United Kingdom and Thule. These radars gave a precious fifteen-minute warning of a missile attack (Petersen, 2011: 111).

Thule Air Base represented a conundrum between an American defense strategy based on nuclear weapons and a ban on nuclear weapons on Danish soil in peacetime, but Greenland was not part of the Danish ban against nuclear weapons and no one claimed anything about that either (Bjørnsson, 2017).

The US foreign and security policy Greenland was of the utmost importance for the US defense during the Cold War. First, Greenland had an important strategic position between North America and Europe. The US military invested deeply in northern Greenland, building the Thule Air Base, the under-the-ice nuclear-powered city called Camp Century, and a handful of separate research installations on the ice cap (Doel et al, 2016). Second, Greenland was seen as a laboratory for earth sciences or geophysics for the Pentagon and in this sense a lot of new knowledge was obtained, especially about climate change, geological features and atmospheric patterns. Finally, Greenland illustrated an example of small state politics by Denmark as the faithful US ally (Doel et al, 2016).

Greenland was two times considered for purchase by the Pentagon leaders and the White House officials in the first decade of the Cold War, however, this was never realized. Greenland was part of Danish sovereignty and therefore the island was not for sale (Doel, 2016: 26). During the Second World War Greenland had been of particular significance for US military leaders. The island was a midway point for bombers, troop transport, and cargo aircraft flying between bases in northeast North America to England (Doel, 2016).

The interest in Greenland and the Arctic was also an effort to learn more about the physical characteristics of this part of the world. This was coordinated through the Pentagon’s Research and Development Board (RDB). The RDB was created in 1946 and gathered civilian scientists and military scientists to discuss major unsolved problems whose solution would benefit national security, including the North American continental defense (Doel, 2016). The research of the ice cap meant that civil and military scientists enhanced their understanding of the properties of the ice cap and how it could be used in eventual warfare (Doel, 2016). The early Cold War years were certainly a golden age for the earth sciences. It culminated in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58. This was the largest international scientific undertaking at the time (Doel, 2016).

The interest in Greenland diminished at the end of the 1960s. This was due to new military technology. Polaris missiles were successfully deployed from US Navy submarines, making it possible to launch nuclear weapons at the Soviet Union from even closer proximity than Greenland (Doel, 2016: 40).

The US Arctic policy has been fluctuating over the decades from interest during the Cold War to non-interest after the Cold War. The relationship towards the Arctic has been uncertain. The US thinking after the Cold War was to focus on the role of the USA as being the world’s sole superpower. President George H.W. Bush’s “New World Order” did not take the Arctic into account (Corgan, 2014). With President Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama Arctic strategies came into place. The first Arctic strategy came under the Clinton administration in 1994, but it was Ackrén

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after September 11, 2001, that the real attention towards homeland security came on the table, including the Arctic region (Corgan, 2014). The National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD66, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-25 and Arctic Regional Policy came under the George W. Bush administration. Within the Arctic Regional Policy document, it is stated that the USA is an Arctic nation and that focus is on national policies on homeland security defense.

Other themes are climate change, the Arctic Council, the fragility of the region and its potential for resource extraction (Corgan, 2014).

In May 2011, the US Department of Defense released a report regarding Arctic operations and the Northwest Passage. In this report it is also stated that the US should involve Indigenous communities in decisions that affect them. A footnote also states that the US should operate in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), even though the US has not ratified the Convention (Corgan, 2014).

During the Obama Administration a new Arctic strategy came about in 2013, called the ‘National Strategy for the Arctic Region’. Here wordings such as peaceful, stable and free of conflict in relation to the Arctic region are emphasized. Another phrasing is in connection to Alaska, where Alaska is seen as a partner with the international community. Three major aims are stated in the document: enhancement of US interests in the region, pursuing a responsible Arctic region stewardship, and strengthening international cooperation (Corgan, 2014).

The current Trump administration is reopening a representation in Nuuk and has already appointed an ambassador for the job, Sung Choi. It has been over 60 years since the last American representation was in place in Nuuk (Sermitsiaq, 2019). A new report from the US Coast Guard called “Arctic Strategic Outlook”, which was released in April 2019, reveals that the US Coast Guard will partner with other Arctic nations, as well as with allies and other stakeholders having Arctic interests in order to keep the Arctic as a conflict-free zone. Furthermore, it is mentioned that the US Coast Guard and the Russian Border Guard should continue with their cooperation as they have done so far (Arctic Strategic Outlook, April 2019).

The current use of the Thule Air Base in Greenland from an American point of view is to focus on space defense. The US Air Force Space Command’s 21st Space Wing, headquartered at the Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, US, uses the military base in Greenland to house its suite of space sensors. This system is a global network of US and foreign radars that provide information on various defense activities. For this purpose, the Thule Air Base is strategically valuable to locate any space threats in the Arctic region (Husseini, 2019). Furthermore, it is the mission of the 821st Air Base Group to enable force projection, space superiority and scientific research in the Arctic region for the US but also for the US’ allies (Canada, Denmark, Greenland). The group operates and maintains Thule Air Base in support of missile warning and space surveillance and satellite command and control operations missions (Peterson Air Force Base).

For the US it is of vital importance to have good relationships with Greenland and hence Denmark in order to utilize the space for its own defense system. The strategy has been to give Denmark some favorable position within the NATO system in order to have free access to the Greenlandic soil in the North.

Danish foreign and security policy During the 1950s, it was considered that foreign aid was a tool to improve poorer countries and societies and this was also integrated into Cold War foreign policy. Denmark had large projects to improve the infrastructure, living conditions, housing and health as part of keeping Greenland as

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an integrated part of the Kingdom (Nielsen, 2016). These schemes were later called G-50 and G60 (see e.g. Skydsbjerg, 1999).

In 1957, Prime Minister H.C. Hansen had solved the nuclear issue by sending an informal note to the US Ambassador to Denmark Val Paterson, allowing the Americans to deploy nuclear weapons in Greenland, while simultaneously officially stating that Denmark would not accept nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime (Nielsen, 2016). This double-edged politics continued for a long time in Danish foreign and security politics. From 1982 to 1988, Denmark used a “footnote” policy within the NATO framework, making reservations involving the build-up and deployment of nuclear weapons. This “footnote” policy influenced the relationship between Denmark and the USA (Nielsen, 2016).

In recent decades, Denmark has been using activism in their foreign and security policy. It started back in the end of the 1980s, when the Baltic countries were about to become independent from the Soviet Union and continued during the 1990s with China’s violation of human rights (Olesen, 2017). During the recent 25 years, Denmark has been active in military operations in several countries in the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East, especially Afghanistan and Iraq with or without the UN mandate (Olesen, 2017).

The relationships with USA have been rather direct with Danish foreign ministers contacting their US counterpart directly to solve problems. One example is the contract issue in relation to the Thule Air Base, where the American company, Exelis, won the lucrative service contract, which had been reserved for Danish and Greenlandic companies in the past (Olesen, 2017). Denmark has used a pro-US orientation on the strategic level and this reflects the fact that Denmark is a small state searching for security and influence through the strong bilateral relationship that the state has with the superpower (Dragsdahl, 2005).

President Trump has critiqued Denmark’s share of support for NATO, which was 1.2 per cent of GDP back in 2016. NATO has a goal of 2 per cent of GDP for every member. USA’s support lies at 3.6 per cent of GDP. The current Danish government has been promising that the defense budget will increase in the years to come (Olesen, 2017).

As already mentioned, Greenland is seen as an important region for the Danish Arctic strategy to keep on the one hand a foot in Arctic cooperation, and on the other keeping the Kingdom of Denmark intact in relation to the sovereignty issue.

The Thule Air Base has always been used as a brick in the two-level game between NATO and Denmark. There are some who suggest that Denmark is paying less in return for having the American base present in Greenland.

Greenland in foreign and security policy In the period before the second World War Greenland was kept as a Danish trading colony and every major decision was made in Copenhagen. The Greenlandic society was kept away from international affairs (Heinrich, 2018). During the Second World War Greenland was under US protection due to the German occupation of Denmark. This also meant that the two governors in Greenland were given de jure authority over Greenland’s foreign policy (Heinrich, 2018).

In 1995, a permanent Danish/Greenlandic official group was established in order to discuss all foreign and security matters that were related to Greenland. An agreement between the Greenlandic Home Rule and the Danish Foreign Minister was signed to have annual meetings regarding these issues (Taagholt, 2002: 87).

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The Home Rule Government presented its initial position regarding the upgrade of the Thule Air Base on 19 November 1999. Greenland stated that an approval would not happen if the Agreement from 1951 was to be transgressed or if the Americans were to act unilaterally. Furthermore, the Home Rule Government wanted direct access in the discussions and that the upgrade would not lead to a negative impact on the existing world peace (Dragsdahl, 2005).

During the period from 2002 to 2004 Thule was being seen as less of a strategic problem and more as a strategic resource. The background being the occurrence of 9/11 and the change of government in Denmark in late 2001 (Dragsdahl, 2005). The two main parties in Denmark in power: the Liberals and the Conservatives were more sympathetic towards US requests (Archer, 2003). In 2003, Greenland and Denmark signed a joint declaration in Itilleq regarding the Greenlandic involvement in international affairs. Greenland was now given influence within foreign and security policy of significance for the island (Ackrén & Jakobsen, 2015). Another significant step was the signing of the Act Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements Under International Law by the government of Greenland (the so called Authorisation Act). This piece of legislation gives the government of Greenland the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, which relates to the competences held by the authorities of Greenland (Loukacheva, 2007).

Local politicians and the Government of Greenland are welcoming the establishment of the reopening of an American representation in Nuuk, since this will give Greenland a more direct link to the USA. Greenland is waiting to see if this will further stimulate trade and investments with the North American continent and whether it will lead to possible flights between Greenland and the USA in the future, when the new extended runways are in place in Nuuk and Ilulissat. Shipping between Nuuk and the port in Portland Maine will already be a starting point during 2019 (Naalakkersuisut, 2019).

Recently, the Greenlandic Minister for Education, Culture, Church and Foreign Affairs, Ane Lone Bagger, met with high-level officials and politicians in Washington D.C. where she argued that it would be best if Greenland had the opportunity to get back the service contract for the Thule Air Base (Sermitsiaq, 2019). This has a symbolic value for local firms and people involved in logistics, cleaning and food transport.

Some future perspectives The future of the Thule Air Base seems to be withheld by the US. At the time being it is very much an American affair, since all contracts have been going to US firms, so in a sense the US has a strong hold on the base. The two-level and three-level games will probably continue between the three major players: the USA, Denmark and Greenland. However, with Greenland’s aim to become independent in the future the positions in the games might change. Greenland might then have to play the two-level game directly with the US, and Denmark’s role might be diminished in relation to the Thule Air Base. It is, though, doubtful if Greenland ever will have its own military and therefore the most likely scenario would be that Greenland takes shelter directly underneath the USA or NATO. This is usually a very common strategy amongst small states with Iceland as one prime example (Thorallsson & Steinsson, 2019).

Conclusion Historically, Thule Air Base has been of utmost importance during the Second World War and the Cold War as a transit point and strategic placed base between the American and European continent. In the past with the Defense Agreement from 1941 and then a renewed Agreement From bilateral to trilateral agreement: The case of Thule Air Base

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from 1951 we see a level one game played out between the Kingdom of Denmark and the USA. With the Greenlandic development from a colony towards self-government we see that the island receives more power and competences and since 2004 with the Igaliku Agreement a three-level game has come into play. During the time of development also two-level games have been played out between the USA and the Kingdom of Denmark on the one hand, and between Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other hand. The issue regarding Thule Air Base will still puzzle the Greenlandic Government and local politicians for years to come and it is also hard to detect what happens between the Danish and American Foreign Ministers at the state level. With more interest in Greenland and the upcoming renewed American representation in Nuuk maybe a clearer picture of what the US purposes are will come into the forefront.

Foreign and security policy usually contains a level of uncertainty with “top secret” documents and confidentiality between partners and therefore it is not always possible to receive all information about the exact relationships and what is going on behind the scenes.

Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Klaus Brummer who acted as a discussant for the poster presentation at the ISA-2019 in Toronto, Canada and gave helpful and constructive comments on a very first draft of this article, as well as, the two anonymous reviewers for the Arctic Yearbook, who gave constructive comments on the first draft of the article.

References Ackrén, Maria and Uffe Jakobsen (2015). Greenland as a self-governing, sub-national territory in international relations: past, current and future perspectives, Polar Record, 51(4), 404-412.

Archer, Clive (2003). Greenland, US Bases and Missile Defence: New Two-Level Negotiations?, Cooperation and Conflict, 38(2), 125-147.

Arctic Strategic Outlook, April 2019. Washington, D.C.: United States Coast Guard. Available at: www.uscg.mil Bjørnsson, Iben (2017). The air base: Just in time, The Arctic Journal, Saturday, April 15, 2017.

Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20170415092849/http://arcticjournal.com/culture/3091 /air-base-just-time Corgan, Michael T. (2014). The USA in the Arctic: Superpower or Spectator?, In Lassi Heininen (Ed.): Security and Sovereignty in the North Atlantic. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 62-79.

Doel, Ronald E., Kristine C. Harper, and Matthias Heymann. (2016). Introduction: Exploring Greenland’s Secrets: Science, Technology, Diplomacy, and Cold War Planning in Global Contexts, In Ronald E. Doel, et.al. (Eds.): Exploring Greenland – Cold War Science and Technology on Ice. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1-22.

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Doel, Ronald E. (2016). Defending the North American Continent: Why the Physical Environmental Sciences Mattered in Cold War Greenland’ in Ronald E. Doel, et.al.

(Eds.): Exploring Greenland – Cold War Science and Technology on Ice. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 25-46.

Dragsdahl, Jørgen (2005). A Few Dilemmas Bypassed in Denmark and Greenland, Article for Peace and Research Institute in Frankfurt, Germany. Available at: https://www.dragsdahl.dk/A20050814.htm Gilberg, Rolf (1976). Thule, Arctic, 29(2), 83-86.

Heinrich, Jens (2018). Independence through international affairs: How foreign relations shaped Greenlandic identity before 1979, In Kristian Søby Kristensen and Jon RahbekClemmensen (Eds.): Greenland and the International Politics of a Changing Arctic – Postcolonial Paradiplomacy Between High and Low Politics. London and New York: Routledge, 28-37.

Husseini, Talal (2019). Thule Air Base: inside the US’ northernmost military base in Greenland, Air Force Technology, 5 June 2019. Available at: https://www.airforcetechnology.com/features/thule-military-base-in-greenland/ (visited 16.09.2019).

Loukacheva, Natalia (2004). Security challenges and legal capacity of Greenland and Nunavut jurisdictions, paper proceedings. Available at: https://www.rha.is/static/files/NRF/OpenAssemblies/Yellowknife 2004/ Loukacheva, Natalia (2007). The Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland and Nunavut.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Lov om Grønlands Selvstyre. Available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=125052 Naalakkersuisut, 09.05.2019. Available at: https://naalakkersuisut.gl/da/Naalakkersuisut/Nyheder/2019/05/0905_genoprettelse (visited 16.05.2019).

Nielsen, Kristian H. (2016). Small State Preoccupations: Science and Technology in the Pursuit of Modernization, Security, and Sovereignty in Greenland, In Ronald E. Doel, et.al.

(Eds.): Exploring Greenland – Cold War Science and Technology on Ice. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 47-71.

Nielsen, Henry and Kristian H. Nielsen (2016). Camp Century – Cold War City Under the Ice, In Ronald E. Doel, et.al. (Eds.): Exploring Greenland – Cold War Science and Technology on Ice. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 195-216.

Olesen, Mikkel Runge (2017). Det dansk-amerikanske forhold efter den kolde krig i lyset af valget af Trump, Internasjonal Politikk, 75(1), 28-35. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/ip.v75.694.

Petersen, Nikolaj (1998). Negotiating the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement: Theoretical and Empirical Aspects, Scandinavian Political Studies, 21(1), 1-28.

Petersen, Nikolaj (2011). SAC at Thule – Greenland in the U.S. Polar Strategy, Journal of Cold War Studies, 13(2), spring 2011, 90-115.

Peterson Air Force Base. Available at: https://www.peterson.af.mil/Units/821st-Air-Base-Group/ (visited 16.09.2019).

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Putnam, Robert D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, International Organization, 42(3) (Summer 1988), 427-460.

Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon (2014). “Arctic-vism” in Practice: The Challenges Facing Denmark’s Political-Military Strategy in the High North, In Lassi Heininen (Ed.): Arctic Yearbook 2014. Available at: https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2014/Scholarly_Papers/21.Rahbek.pdf Sermitsiaq, tirsdag 14. maj 2019. Available at: https://sermitsiaq.ag/usas-diplomat-i-nuukpraesenteret Sermitsiaq, lørdag 14. september 2019. ”Vi skal have servicekontrakten tilbage”. Available at: https://sermitsiaq.ag/servicekontrakten-tilbage Skydsbjerg, Henrik (1999). Grønland 20 år med hjemmestyre. Nuuk: Forlaget Atuagkat.

Søby Kristensen, Kristian (2004). Greenland, Denmark and the debate on missile defense: A window of opportunity for increased autonomy, DIIS Working Paper, No. 2004:14.

Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84548 Taagholt, Jørgen (2002). Thule Air Base, Tidsskriftet Grønland, 42-112.

Thorhallsson, Baldur and Sverrir Steinsson (2019). Iceland’s shelter options in the new millennium, In Baldur Thorhallsson (Ed.): Small States and Shelter Theory: Iceland’s External Affairs. London and New York: Routledge, 171-204.

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Autonomy and military bases: USAF Thule Base in Greenland as the study case Minori Takahashi, Shinji Kawana, Kousuke Saitou, Yu Koizumi, Shino Hateruma & Ayae Shimizu

In this paper, in order to shed light on some of the factors behind the change in the security environment in the Arctic region, we examine the history and the points of dispute concerning military bases, by taking up the US military base in Greenland (Thule Air Base) as the case study. We incorporate as explanatory variables the politics of the host country, i.e., the relationship between the local political actor of Greenland and the Danish central government, and the politics of the base provider (the United States) and Russia, which is intensifying its military activities in the Arctic region. Concretely, we first clarify the scope of the paper by pointing to the bargaining between central governments and local political actors about military bases - to the elements that constitute the vulnerability of central governments (the substitutability, urgency and specificity of bases), the form of bargaining that brings it under control (integration, institutionalization, distribution), and its balance with the effect of hold-up by local political actors wishing to reverse the asymmetrical power relationship. We then examine the validity of that approach through an actual case: the bargaining regarding the inclusion of Thule Air Base into the US missile defense shield.

Foreword The objective of this paper is to make visible the quality of the influence of local political actors (or sub-state actors: here the term refers to local political entities encompassed by a sovereign state) on national security and identify its extent. Movements in which local political subjects are trying, with certain intentions, to get involved in international relations as a whole have been explained in the past in terms of paradiplomacy and second-track diplomacy (Heininen, 2014). However, from these past discussions it is impossible to deduce, particularly in the field of national security, to what extent local political entities are able to independently regulate their own behavior and express their intentions through concrete actions. This has to do with the fact that local political actors have been regarded as entities that have a secondary role, that is, that do not participate in Minori Takahashi is Assistant Professor at Hokkaido University, Japan. Shinji Kawana is Associate Professor at Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan. Kousuke Saitou is Associate Professor at Yokohama National University, Japan. Yu Koizumi is Assistant Professor at The University of Tokyo, Japan. Shino Hateruma is a PhD Candidate at Waseda University, Japan. Ayae Shimizu is a Researcher at the Institute of International Affairs, Japan.

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international negotiations between states (governments) but only ask questions about the level at which agreements concluded through international negotiations should (or should not) be accepted (Putnam, 1988). In particular, the sphere of national security has been perceived as an exclusive prerogative of the state, and a tendency has existed to reduce issues regarding the exercising of influence on that sphere to the logic focusing on state leadership, in which the master-servant relationship between the centre and periphery easily emerges and local actors are subordinated to the internal code of the state.

For example, the case of the tripartite council for talks between Okinawa, Tokyo and Washington about US bases on the island of Okinawa, which was held periodically during the term of the governor of Okinawa Prefecture Masahide Ota in the 1990s, illustrates this point clearly. Okinawa, which is a Japanese local political entity, hoped to have its voice heard at these tripartite talks and to use the venue as a political leverage for having that voice incorporated in Japanese diplomatic policy. However, in practice, the venue could only function as a receptacle of the Special Action Committee with Okinawa (SACO), which was established by the Japanese and American governments in 1995 with the purpose of discussing various issues concerning the US military installations and zones in Okinawa.

What the case of Okinawa shows is that the influence of the local political subject was perceived as having the nature of something that should be exercised within the state, and that the internal constituent was not expected to influence (while maintaining its own position) the domain of interstate relations as a negotiator. At least not at the level of actual international negotiations, that is, in what belongs to the sphere of external autonomy. This is in line with the common interpretation, according to which the local political actor’s power of influence in an assumed situation in which it is wielded outside of the state, would resemble the right to self-determination in foreign affairs (i.e., the right to independence). This is because in the study of international relations there has been a silent premise that when a certain phenomenon is being discussed, the questions asked are first and foremost about the problem of the state.

However, as can be seen from the discussions on the relative decrease in the supremacy of the state in relation to global financial systems, in problems concerning the Earth’s environment and the failure of humanism (the global increase of inequality) (Brown, 2003), and as shown in the way that the perception of a decrease in the substance of the supremacy of the state is being shared as a self-evident fact, the assessment that the state has the capability to solve a shared problem solely on its own is sub-optimal. Within such developments, it is appropriate that the role carried out by actors other than the state should be taken up as the subject of theoretical and empirical discussions of state security. However, as is the case with past arguments regarding paradiplomacy, debates have often been limited to the level of, so to speak, “soft paradiplomacy equals low politics”, which is why it cannot be said that arguments with sufficient theoretical and empirical grounds have been made. In contrast with such past tendencies to sharply separate areas of policy, in this paper, while examining the power of influence of local political actors in high politics, we would like to, as a case study, focus on US military bases deployed abroad, especially on the politics surrounding the US air base in Greenland. We will also attempt to present arguments that are in opposition with previous theories by building a bridge between the inductive and deductive approaches.

First, we will theoretically extrapolate how the policy choice of local political actors can influence their negotiations with central governments. While doing so, we will endeavor to shed light on the

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environment which generates the differences between those local political actors who have influence on the government and those who do not, and through that, try to assess the extent of the local political actors’ influence. Second, we will examine the validity of the explanatory framework of this paper developed through the above procedure against the case of the United States military (air force) base in Thule, in Denmark’s territory of Greenland, which is treated as the main case study of this paper. The reason we chose Thule is that it is, strategically, an extremely important US military base that has a multifaceted role, not only as a radar post in the American missile defense shield, but also as a part of the air force network for satellite control, as a scientific outpost and a part of the infrastructure for the US space program. At the same time, the local political actor, Greenland, is an entity which has the power to express its stance regarding the operation of the base on the international stage on an equal footing with Denmark. Moreover, we will include as explanatory variables the national security strategies of the United States, the provider of the base, and Russia, which has been intensifying its military activities in the Arctic region, and also examine the preconditions that make possible the formation of the above analytical perspective.

The explanatory framework Transactions regarding military bases come into existence thanks to bilateral agreements between the governments of the country establishing the base and the country hosting it. But what sets bargaining regarding military bases apart from other political fields is that they are not confined only to those two sides. Rather, they are open for a trilateral relationship that may potentially include relations between the country establishing the base (in this case the US) and the local political actor belonging to the sub-national level who is actually hosting the base. Of course, the way in which a transaction is “opened” will especially depend on the relationship between the country establishing the base, the US (the highest-ranking entity), and the local political actor hosting the base (the lowest-ranking entity). The important thing here is whether a direct communication exists between the two. In case there are direct contacts between the two, in comparison with the situation in which there are not, the possibility that the influence of the lowestranking entity will become more effective, especially on the mid-ranking entity (the central government of the host country), will increase. This is because fluctuations in the power relations between actors occur more easily in trilateral than in bilateral relationships.

How can the security environment that creates the difference between local political actors that have influence on the state, and those that cannot, be identified, and how does it inform the ability of local political actors to influence national security? As representative past studies dealing with this problem, we may bring up the work of Alexander Cooley (2008) and Kent E. Calder (2007).

They address these questions by focusing on the influence of the political system of the host country on the stability of military bases and, in particular, on the affinity between bases and democracy. Cooley advocates the idea that if the host country is a mature democracy, then the credibility of the base contract will be high, and the base will be politically stable. In contrast, Calder argues that it is exactly because of democracy that a plurality of voices can be heard, and the base will on every occasion be affected by different internal factors and prone to instability. These two hypotheses, while mutually conflicting, are rich in suggestions. Nonetheless, the former does not allow us to differentiate between Japan and South Korea, which have both adopted the democratic system and rely on the US for their national security. On the other hand, the latter does not clearly

USAF Thule Base in Greenland as the study case

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specify when and under what conditions the internal factors Calder brings up as independent variables influence the stability of bases. Moreover, as with Robert Putnam’s two-level game, the greatest insufficiency of both of those arguments can be found in that they depict local political actors simply as (level 2) entities which question at what level agreements concluded in international negotiations (level 1) should be accepted or not accepted.

Therefore, in this paper, with the above problems in previous studies in mind, we examine the conditions in which a local political actor can exert influence on the central government in base politics conducted in times of peace in democratic countries. What is important is that in the bargaining regarding military bases, at least three political factors participate including the country using the base, the amount of political resources which the three sides possess constitutes the dynamics of base politics, and the host country’s government needs to obtain the consent of the local political entity regarding the existence of the base both in form and substance. Of course, it does not necessarily mean that the voice of such a local political actor will be effective in the context of base politics. For example, even if a local entity wishes to remove a military base, achieving that with its political resources alone is not easy. Particularly in countries where the consensus within the government regarding the security relationship with the US is strong, it is difficult for the words and actions of local political actors to influence the government’s decisions. However, even if it does not have a direct influence (i.e. does not participate in the actual negotiations about the base as one of the players), such a local actor can send negative signals to the US by obstructing the functioning of the base and by opting for various forms of political nonfeasance. In such conditions, the central government (the mid-ranking entity) may be forced to address its relationship with the local political actor (the low-ranking entity) with more care than before so as not to offend the US. The concept of vulnerability may be useful for understanding such a relationship between the host country government and the local political actor. What is referred to as “vulnerability” here is the cost suffered for effectively adapting to the changing environment. Below are the three elements that affect the measure of vulnerability of the host country’s government in relation to military bases. The three are not mutually exclusive and should be understood as variables that influence each other.

•

Substitutability: whether or not a possibility exists for the central government to, in case the bargaining regarding a military base has been discontinued, procure as a replacement another military base of equal value elsewhere in the country.

•

Urgency: is the base in question regarded as indispensable for the survival and prosperity of the host country and is it highly valued for its strategic importance by the country which establishes it?

•

Specificity: is the base a specific asset with a distinctive character, whereby its value becomes extremely high in a particular situation or due to a certain relationship, or not?

For example, this means that the higher the cost that actor B must sustain in order to adapt to the newly created environment after actor A has taken a certain action, the higher the vulnerability of actor B to actor A. If there is a difference in the relative size of vulnerability between two actors, that means that between them exists an asymmetric relationship. In that sense, in essence, the question is not about whether it is the central government or the local political actor who is weaker,

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but, rather, who is the side with the greater vulnerability, since that side is in a weaker position. If we assume the existence of a military base with low substitutability and high urgency and specificity, then the local political subject hosting it becomes actor A, and consequently, the vulnerability of the central government, actor B, becomes overall high. And, if the local political actor taking part in the politics regarding the base is a rational subject trying to secure better benefits than it had in the past through the acceptance of the base, then the central government will find itself in a relationship with the local political actor that correlates with the size of the risk of hold-up (the risk that the local actor may reverse its asymmetrical relationship with the central government).

But what is the hold-up we just mentioned? The term denotes the situation in which the side with lesser vulnerability is demanding the change of the conditions of the initial contract for the purpose of increasing own gains. For example, if a host country is given security guarantees by the US in return for offering a base, and if it cannot ensure its own security without the US, then the host country is dependent not only on the US, but also on the local political entity that has accepted the base. In such a case, the local political actor has a higher potential for holding up the central government in various situations during the internal political process concerning the base. In other words, the vulnerability of the government in a democracy is informed by the asymmetry in the degree of dependence that stems from the process of bargaining with local political actors about military bases.

Of course, the central government can predict such opportunistic behaviour by the local political actor. Thus, it can come up with forms of bargaining regarding the base that make the control of such behaviour possible - that is, it can conduct an integration of transactions, institutionalization, or take measures for distribution in order to limit its vulnerability. Here is what we mean by these terms: •

Integration is a means for reducing (the government’s) own vulnerability by stripping the other side (the local political actor) of its residual control rights.

•

Institutionalization means building with a local political actor a recurring exchange relationship that brings mutual benefit. Grants and subsidies given to the local actor, the establishment of special economic zones, preferential tax treatment, etc., all fall into this category.

•

Distribution refers to the option that the government has in case the internal bargaining regarding a military base has broken off to transfer the bargaining onto some other local government.

Greenland and US military bases So, to what extent can the perspective that looks at the mutual relationship between vulnerability and hold up explain the actual politics of a host country? In this section we would like to trace back the process of internal negotiations between Denmark and Greenland regsarding the American military base in Greenland (Thule Air Force Base), while looking at political and military trends in the United States.

First, we need to note that Greenland’s security for a long time correlated with the degree of United States’ interest in the island. The origins of this interest can be found in the American policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal political affairs from the first half of the 19th century

USAF Thule Base in Greenland as the study case

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as represented by the Monroe doctrine, when, based on it, Greenland was only placed within the sphere of American influence. However, when it comes to direct intervention in Greenland by the US, the first occasion for that was the Second World War, when American bases and meteorological stations were built throughout the island. At that time Greenland was a Danish colony (The island had that status from 1721 to 1953). Denmark, which chose to build a security relationship with the US, (or more precisely, the Danish Plenipotentiary Ambassador to the US Henrik Kauffman) concluded the “Agreement relating to the Defense of Greenland / Agreement between the Secretary of State, acting on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and the Danish Minister, Henrik de Kauffmann, acting on behalf of His Majesty the King of Denmark in his capacity as sovereign of Greenland (9 April 1941)”. The political atmosphere was such that the premise of the agreement was the defense of Greenland, so military bases were constructed in a way that did not involve the capability for attack. From around 1950 in Thule, which until then only had a meteorological station, the construction of the largest air force base in the Arctic region took place. For the purpose of building (maintaining and continuing) a base for the NATO military, on 27 April 1951, “Defense of Greenland: Agreement Between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark” was signed (which came into effect on 8 June of the same year), and from that point the construction work began in full swing (the construction of the air base had actually started in March of 1951, before the agreement was concluded).

From the second half of the 1950s, the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line) was established with the intention of securing early detection of bombers flying from the Soviet Union, and the Ballistic Early Warning System (BMEWS) was introduced to counter the strengthening of the Soviet ICBM force. These two have been an important part of the military value of the Thule base until the present (Petersen, 2011). Thule today, as already mentioned, is a very strategically important base with multiple roles since it functions as a US missile defense shield hub, as part of the air force network for operating satellites, as infrastructure for the US space program, and also for scientific research (The White House, 2010; Department of Defense, 2011).

Now we wish to, in line with the focus of this paper, turn attention to the fact that around the end of the Cold War, thanks to journalistic reporting and the disclosure of secret documents, various incidents and accidents that had occurred during the Cold War era in the vicinity of Thule Air Base were brought to light. For details, we would like to refer the reader to Takahashi (2019), but to summarize the events that came to light - from the forced resettlement of local inhabitants due to the base construction in 1953, the 1957 Danish non-nuclear policy and the deployment of nuclear weapons in violation of it during the 1950s and 60s, to the crash of an American military aircraft carrying hydrogen bombs in 1968, the aggravation of the plutonium contamination (that has not necessarily been admitted on the state and international levels) and the problem of the exposure to radiation of the workers sent to do the clean-up in the aftermath of the accident (Project Crested Ice) - have all influenced Greenland to a significant extent. It was in particular in the 1980s, when studies by researchers and journalists made headway, and in the 1990s, when the disclosure of secret documents gained momentum, that the above chain of events became known under the overall term “the Thule problem” (or “Thule-sagen”), and became a critical issue in the internal politics of Denmark. Therein emerged the tendency to focus on the subordinacy of Greenland, shaped by the trilateral power relationship between the US, Denmark and the island.

On the other hand, after the Cold War, the Thule Air Base became an important element in the new US defense concept when in 1998-99 the application of the National Missile Defense (NMD) Takahashi, Kawana, Saitou, Koizumi, Hateruma & Shimizu

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plan was laid out during the Clinton administration. In Greenland at that time, in light of the aforementioned Thule problem and with an eye on the then course of events, possible ways in which Greenlanders could influence the sphere of security was discussed in its parliament and elsewhere. For example, on 18 November 1999 a proposal was put forward in the Greenlandic parliament to approach Denmark and ask that Greenland be given an opportunity to directly participate in the negotiations if the US request for the inclusion of Thule in the missile defense shield was accepted by Copenhagen (Inatsisartut, 2002, 2003). The official request by the US regarding the inclusion of the base in the missile defense shield was made in December 2002, and from that point onwards, debates were conducted in the Greenlandic parliament and elsewhere on how the island should deal with the request and in what way it should be involved in the missile defense.

What is of interest to us is the 2003 joint declaration of the Danish government and the HomeRule Government of Greenland regarding the participation of Greenland in the fields of diplomacy and national security, known widely as the Itilleq Declaration. That document was the result of a series of debates and sought to guarantee anew (reaffirm), de jure, the commitment of Greenland to Danish national security. We say, “guarantee anew”, because Greenland had already had the experience of involvement in matters of national security (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000). Namely, opinions have been put forth that Greenland at the beginning of the 1990s managed to exercise influence on the decision processes regarding the agreements for the use of the Sondrestrom Aviation Facility (Søndre Strømfjords Luftfartsanlæg) and Kulusuk airfield (Kulusuk flyveplads) that concluded on 3 March 1991.

The 2003 declaration is seen as a precondition for the negotiations regarding the inclusion of Thule in the missile defense shield. In the declaration, Greenland is referred to as an actor that can “demand international negotiations” “regarding issues of special importance to it” and can “participate” in them, and “influence” them “on an equal footing” (Folketinget, 2004). This meant that it became possible for Greenland to exercise a certain influence on the international negotiations regarding the Thule military base.

Of course, Greenland is an autonomous territory of the Danish state, and as such, according to Article 19 of the Danish constitution, does not have the right to make decisions concerning foreign affairs. Thus, we have to bear in mind that whether Greenland can actually exercise the rights mentioned in the above declaration depends on the political situation and Denmark’s judgement.

On the other hand, based on the assumption that the declaration was formulated with a view to negotiations about the inclusion into the missile defense shield, the influence Greenland acquired was judged relatively positively (Folketinget, 2003a). That being said, in light of the example of SACO and the trilateral talks mentioned in the opening section of the paper, it is necessary to examine whether that influence can actually be realized in practice. Nonetheless, even if it cannot be involved in the outcome, it is possible to think that the very existence of the option to influence the political process has given Greenland an increased possibility to get involved in national security, a domain that is a prerogative of the state, as a subject who has its own will and can express it through concrete action and not just as a constituent of the state that simply repeatedly accepts or rejects its decisions. In fact, in August of the following year (2004), Greenland managed to conclude a complex agreement known as the “Igaliku Agreement” with the US and Denmark.

An inductive understanding of substitutability, urgency and specificity USAF Thule Base in Greenland as the study case

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So, why was the autonomous territory of Greenland, which was acquiring a certain amount of influence in the sphere of national security, able to occupy a position from which it can influence it? In this paper, while attempting to understand the Itilleq Declaration and the Igaliku Agreement, with a focus on the dynamics of base politics, we will examine their nature from the aforementioned perspective, which looks at the mutual relationship between vulnerability and hold-up.

For a start, we want to assess the extent of Denmark’s vulnerability by grasping the basic character of Thule Air Base. First, if we follow the provisions of the 1951 defense agreement that guaranteed the existence of US military bases in Greenland from the time the base was established, as well as its successor the Igaliku Agreement of 2004 (officially: “The Agreement to Amend and Supplement the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland”, Article 1: “Defense Areas”), we can see that the areas of the Danish state in which deal making regarding US military bases is possible are limited to Greenland. In other words, under the present framework, there is no option for transferring deal making regarding military bases to Denmark. In that sense we may say that the substitutability of military bases in the Danish state is low, as they can be established only in Greenland (strictly speaking, under the current framework, the possibility that a base can be transferred to Denmark in the future is zero).

Regarding this, in the case of American bases in Okinawa substitutability was, in theory, secured.

In the case of Okinawa, in the status agreement with the US (in its Article 3), no limits are specified regarding the geographical scope of base areas, so in terms of the legal system, an option exists that other bases of equal value may be acquired elsewhere in Japan as replacements if the current transactions regarding the bases in Okinawa are discontinued. Of course, what becomes clear when one consults the case of Okinawa is that, when the distinctive character of the base in question, that is, its quality as a specific asset is taken take into account, the existence of the option of procuring other bases of the same value and the degree of the possibility that the transactions regarding the base will be transferred onto other actors cannot be automatically connected.

Second, for Denmark, which sees itself as a “small country”, the maintenance and strengthening of the relationship with the United States, which guarantees Denmark’s security in a stable manner, has been a political choice of extremely high priority consistently from the Cold War era until today. Denmark’s understanding has been that using Thule as a bargaining piece with the US, and by extension Greenland, as a diplomatic card, contributes to the stabilization of security for the entire Danish state. It can be even said that Greenland is perceived as indispensable for the survival and prosperity of the host country’s government, i.e., Denmark itself. In that sense, we may evaluate the urgency of the base in Thule as high.

Third, since the base in Thule is literally just that, a military base, it possesses specificity as a facility.

However, at the same time, with the changes in the environment brought about by the melting of ice sheet in Greenland in recent years, the possibilities for the exploitation of resources and the commercial use of sea lanes in the Arctic are growing. Because of that, it is expected that various facilities capable of dealing with extreme cold which exist in and around the Thule base, such as the port, tanks and oil storage facilities, factories, hospitals and accommodation facilities, could serve as a hub or a platform for intensifying economic cooperation in the region (Udenrigsministeriet et al, 2011: 53). After the end of the Cold War, due to climate change, the specificity of Thule Air Base has become subject to variability. That is, the incentives to limit the role of the base only to military purposes are weakening and at the same time its value is

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diversifying, so its specificity is fluctuating, although at high levels. This is also clearly stated in the Danish national strategy towards the Arctic formulated in 2011.

Thus, the security of the Danish Realm cannot be discussed without referring to the presence of Thule, i.e., Greenland. To go even further, for Denmark, Thule is almost the only asset that it can offer to the US or NATO (an asset2 that can be exchanged for membership in NATO). If we look back at the past in which Denmark obtained qualifications for an early membership in NATO in exchange for providing Thule (Duke, 1989), we can even say that Denmark, in terms of national security, depends on Greenland. This does sound paradoxical if we assume a clear power relationship between the ruler (the central government) and the subordinate (local political actor), where the former receives much larger benefits than the latter (and is exploiting it). But what it means is that a dependence of the ruler on the subordinate has been created and that the phenomenon of power reversal may occur between Denmark and Greenland. Denmark’s vulnerability towards Greenland is overall high, and that, at least from a theoretical viewpoint, points to Greenland as an entity that holds up (or can hold up) Denmark in various situations. This perspective which looks at the correlation between vulnerability and hold-up, we believe, is a highly effective explanatory framework also in the sense that it does not just provide a snapshot of Thule, but through a historical observation sheds light on the motivation of both sides concerning the stable operation of the base and also makes possible a quantitative operationalization of the base’s value.

An inductive understanding of integration, institutionalization and distribution Well, how can Denmark counter the hold-up risk by Greenland, generated as described above? A choice that would be effective for the Danish government, which is trying to achieve a stable functioning of the base, would be to limit the relationship with Greenland to a certain scope, so as to, in advance, avoid getting held up. In the present paper, such rational behavior by the host country will be explained in terms of integration, institutionalization and distribution. This means that from hereon we will be thinking about the actions of the mid-ranking actor (Denmark), who is, in the context of base politics latently premised on a trilateral relationship, trying to control the low-ranking actor while at the same time being conscious of the high-ranking actor.

As stated above, Denmark’s vulnerability towards Greenland is high. This means that the extent to which it can be held up by Greenland is comparatively high. That is why Denmark needs to design the transactions regarding Thule Air Base in such a way that it can limit the instability to a certain scope (i.e., reduce the room for opportunistic behavior of the local political actor). We may conclude that that is why, after World War II, at the time the base construction was being expanded and the base was starting to operate, Denmark integrated Greenland into its territory and conferred on it limited autonomy rights. That is, from our theoretical viewpoint, we may offer the interpretation that Denmark integrated Greenland, which had until then been a colony, to limit as much as possible its own vulnerability with regard to the military base problem, i.e., to limit the cost it had to pay for effectively adapting to the change in the political environment. In a package with that went the grants and subsidies donated by Denmark to Greenland, as well as the implementation of side payments and positive sanctions, such as financial support by the government, including block grants. It may be said that carrying out integration in package with such measures of institutionalization is, as a policy for invalidating the voice of a local political actor, even more effective. When we look back at events like that from a deductive point of view,

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it seems that a framework for limiting the extent of Denmark’s vulnerability and for restricting Greenland’s opportunistic behavior has been established and that it works.

However, when we endeavor to understand the bargaining between Denmark (mid-rank actor) and Greenland (low-rank actor) inductively, we encounter the significant possibility that the outcomes suggested by the three variables that serve to curb the vulnerability of a government (integration, institutionalization and distribution) may be in discord with the above theoretical prediction. For example, theoretically (or deductively), an interpretation is possible that Denmark, in order to limit or deprive Greenland of the residual control rights regarding the base, simultaneously with the conclusion of defense agreements with the US during and after the war, institutionalized side payment measures such as block grants, and thus dealt with its vulnerability. However, if we address the negotiation process inductively, we can see that Denmark, in the circumstances where it had the option of integration and institutionalization, chose the options of flexibility, compromise, consideration and talks, and from the 1970s onwards, granting autonomy rights (Folketinget, 2003b; Broholt, n.d.). Not only did it not deprive Greenland of its residual control rights, but it worked out a plan for their substantial enhancement, which is why it is clear that one-sided integration and institutionalization were not Denmark’s political choice.

Just what logic was behind such a choice? A part of the explanation can be found, as the project “Democracy and Power” (Winther, 2003) demonstrated, in Denmark’s “culture of democracy”, developed through the trial and error regarding what strategy to take within a strained relationship between the ideal and reality. Of course, this was not simply a revival of an old perception, of the old layer of democratic culture in Scandinavia, which went from value nihilism to an understanding that transcends ideology. Rather, we should take the view that bargaining regarding the military base in Thule functioned as the venue for rebuilding and expressing Denmark’s culture of democracy. That culture emerged as a consequence of a plurality of democracies: political democracy by political parties (the consensus type of democracy), social democracy as the foundation of the society, and civil democracy in the relationship between the state and civil society.

Of course, the above inductive understanding does not suggest that the deductively derived explanatory framework of the paper is invalid. The problem is that we cannot pinpoint in advance the scope of actors’ interests and the character of the judgement criteria necessary for the construction of a framework for explaining the politics of military bases. That, however, does not mean that constructing a deductive theory is inappropriate for these types of issues. It is exactly because we have a theory as a base with elements which seem irregular, such as the culture of democracy, the consideration for the other side and compromise, stand out. Needless to point out, if we are to empirically examine the subtleties of the dynamics of internal politics of Denmark, then we need to include as variables the points of argument peculiar to the host state (the government) and the host region (the local political actor), as well as the local idiosyncrasies and political variations. That the presence of a political culture unique to the area, which cannot be grasped sufficiently using only a rationalist approach, is an important element constituting the dynamics of the politics of military bases, has already been pointed out by researchers who are trying to understand the security environment in Denmark and Greenland from within. That is why in the “Project for Comparative Analysis of US Military Bases”, which has already started as the successor of this paper (and the book which is its parent body), we, for the purpose of shedding light on the mechanism of politics surrounding US overseas bases, aim to grasp the developmental

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path of each individual base, their relationships with the US, as well as the distinctive features of the cultural and religious background in which they were established.

The US and Russian factors relating to Thule Incidentally, if we are to shed light on the substance of the negotiations between the host country’s government and the local political actor using the explanatory framework of vulnerability and holdup, we cannot holistically elucidate the political dynamics if we limit our investigation only to the bargaining regarding the base between Denmark and Greenland. This is because there would have been no bargaining between the host country government and the local entity at all if the US, the country which established the base, had not continued to see certain value in Greenland (and Thule Air Base). For, if we assume that the base has effectively functioned as a bargaining asset within the hold-up structure, the prerequisite for that had to be a continued interest for it and Greenland by the side that established it - the US. It is this broader view that includes the US that is, as we have noted in the introductory part, the very precondition that makes possible the explanatory framework of this paper.

Thule was expected to serve not only as a post in the missile defense shield but also as a scientific hub in the polar region. Also worth noting is that Thule was suffering from restrictions imposed by the times. For example, during the Cold War era, Thule was caught in the interstice at the frontline, where the nuclear strategies of the US and Soviet Union interlocked. As different from that, after the end of the Cold War when the Soviet threat receded, the base found itself in a situation where the US financial strain was strongly felt, and where the withdrawal of the US military from Thule was discussed in the US Arctic Research Commission in the context of the rationalization of base operations (U.S. Arctic Research Commission, 1990: 10). However, since the mid-1990s, as the common perception of the concerned countries such as North Korea and Iran regarding missile development became clearer and the construction of the missile defense shield became a determined policy line through research development and legislature, the importance of the base increased again, although in a different way from the Cold War era. Namely, according to the 2011 Pentagon report to Congress, Thule Air Base, aside from the role in the missile defense shield, has also come to play a part in the Air Force Satellite Control Network and bears an important role in space missions (Department of Defense, 2011).

However, it should be noted that the US is not the only one that determines the value of Greenland and Thule. Russia has repeatedly protested against the American missile defense shield and has especially strongly criticized US activities concerning it in Europe. Official explanations of the deployment of the missile defense shield refer to possible attacks from the Middle East, but in the committee report by the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, which was one of the factors that accelerated the deployment, the threat by missiles launched from Russia was clearly mentioned (United States Congress, 1998). Whatever America’s intent, the deployment of the missile defense shield, from the standpoint of capability, to say the least, may have a large impact on Russia’s strategy, so Russia’s negative response is not without reason. Within the US too there are voices that, in consideration of Russia’s reaction, are emphasizing the importance of transparency and predictability of the missile defense shield. The friction between the US and Russia brought about by the missile defense shield may affect the political position of Greenland, which is caught between them, so constant attention should be paid to Russia’s activities as one of the environmental factors.

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In fact, in mid-2000s Russia defined the Arctic region as a key area in terms of strategic resources and has since discovered national interests in the strengthening of its presence in it (The Russian Government, 2009). This led to a rise in Russia’s perception of the threat concerning the Arctic.

Of course, the threat is not limited to the sphere of security but stretches to various other fields, such as access to the natural resources market or the control over important transport routes.

Factors shaping Russia’s threat perception in this period were NATO and the US. The inclusion of Thule into the US missile defense shield was one of the factors stimulating Russia’s wariness. In a simulation by the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, ballistic missiles fired from central Russia are first detected by US missile warning satellites and then also tracked by early warning radars deployed in the North Atlantic and Greenland’s Thule (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2012). Russia continues to maintain a critical stance on the operational functioning of the base in Thule, including its inclusion in the missile defense shield.

Furthermore, in the waters of the Arctic Ocean in recent years, military activities, such as the dispatch and deployment of submarines and the establishment of naval bases by Russia, are intensifying. In what seems as a response to that, reshuffling and increases in the US military budget have also been observed. That is, the budget intended for guaranteeing Europe’s security (the European Reassurance Initiative/European Deterrence Initiative) has been reorganized and expanded (Department of Defense, 2018), and activities aimed at strengthening the cooperation between the United States and Europe, i.e., the unity of the North Atlantic alliance, are visible. Of course, it is hard to think that such activities by Russia and the U.S. will instantly lead to an armed conflict. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that in the Arctic waters of today, due to the fears of militarization, a “security dilemma” can be seen, embodied in the race by the two sides to strengthen their military assets and defense capabilities. This security environment developing right before our eyes, it seems, has a Cold War like appearance. Such a reality not only generates tensions, such as the aforementioned security dilemma, but, as the locals become increasingly aware of it, also functions to problematize the security in the Arctic, or in other words, leads to securitization.

The United States continues to recognize a certain value in Thule. However, at the same time, in the inclusion of Thule in the American missile defense shield there is an element that functions as a driving factor that exacerbates activities such as the boosting of military preparedness and defense capability by the US and Russia. That is also something we should take note of.

Closing words The purpose of this paper was to make visible the substance of the influence of local political actors on national security and, upon demonstrating the mutual relationship between vulnerability and hold-up, which informs the politics of military bases in democratic states, to theoretically and empirically examine the validity of that explanatory framework using the case of Thule Air Base.

American military bases in Greenland, and in particular the Thule Air Base, consistently had a high strategic value throughout the Cold War era. The base was almost the only security asset that the Danish government could offer to the US and NATO. This was an important factor that increased Denmark’s vulnerability to Greenland. This is because Denmark practically earned the qualifications for early membership in NATO in exchange for offering the base. Denmark has since then depended on Greenland for its security. In addition, the fact that the relationship between Greenland and Denmark has changed, from Greenland’s being a colony (up to 1953) and an administrative region (from 1953 to 1979), to its being a territory with broad autonomy rights Takahashi, Kawana, Saitou, Koizumi, Hateruma & Shimizu

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(from 1979 onwards and from 2009 onwards), has, theoretically, increased Greenland’s residual rights. Needless to say, that expansion of Greenland’s rights was also a choice that increased the risk of hold up for the Danish government. Furthermore, in terms of the legal system, Denmark did not have at its disposal the option to turn over transactions regarding military bases to local political actors other than Greenland. In other words, the defense agreements of 1951 and 2004 made the control of Denmark’s vulnerability difficult since they allowed for the deployment of bases only within designated areas in Greenland. While attention should be paid to the usefulness of the institutionalization (measures for financial support given by the government of Denmark to the government of Greenland, such as block grants), used alone, without a combination with integration and distribution, it was bound to have a limited effect.

On the other hand, through the mutual relationship between vulnerability and hold-up, although this is paradoxical, it has become clear that understanding the developmental path and the relationship with the US of each military base, as well as the cultural idiosyncrasies lying in the background of the establishment of bases, is important. That is, thanks to implementing an inductive approach, we have seen that it is necessary to grasp micro problems in each country or region, that is, achieve an understanding of the local base issues, by, for example, paying attention to regions’ distinctive characteristics and the political variation. Individual factors accumulated through the inductive approach need to be understood parallel with power politics, the specialty of the conventional theory of national security. That is, they need to be digested through a discipline of thought that is not limited solely to the theory of state.

The very motive for writing this paper lies in the author’s slight uneasiness with the discipline of thought in the field of international relations which could not free itself from thinking about the state and local political actors in terms of a vertical relationship, despite the fact that we were already beginning to witness a situation in which activities known as paradiplomacy were much talked about. Paradiplomacy has been understood as international activities of local political actors that unfold parallel with diplomacy but are not visible from the viewpoint of diplomacy, which strongly tends to be confined to mutual relationships between states. On the other hand, such activities by local political actors have been often interpreted as a result of the policy attitude of the state, which strives to, by creating an atmosphere of cooperation with sub-state entities, lower the political costs and achieve a soft landing in longstanding problems. In opposition to such a state-centric view, in this paper we have not taken for granted the landscape painted by the center, but have cut into it and, relying on the explanatory framework of the mutual relationship between vulnerability and hold-up, prepared, as a first step, the grounds for shedding light from the level of national security, not on the bargaining between states, but on the policy choices of local political actors.

Of course, that does not necessarily imply a preferential treatment for local political actors. What we have been trying to elucidate in this paper is not a zero-sum world in which perceiving a local political actor as superior means that the state (central government) is viewed as inferior. Rather, the significance of our endeavor was in exploring a new discipline of thought in which both entities exist parallel as subjects of equal value. Therefore, the meaning of our effort lies in pointing to a mutual relationship between the local political actor and the state that is not based on the old logic of inclusion and exclusion in which the state is the nucleus.

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Notes 1. This paper is based on discussions in the chapters of Takahashi (2019) and has been composed by rearranging the discussions into a single, new paper. For a more detailed argument, please consult the book.

2. “Asset” here means property and does not refer to human resources.

References Archer, C. (2003). Greenland, US Bases and Missile Defense: New Two-Level Negotiations?

Cooperation and Conflict, 38(2), 125-147.

Broholt, M. (n.d.). Den danske debat om Missilforsvaret og Thule-basen. IIS Research-brief, 21, 110.

Brown, C. (2003). A World Gone Wrong? In Held, D. and McGrew A. (eds.). The Global Transformations Reader, 2nd edition, 564-576.

Calder, K. E. (2007). Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cooley, A. A. (2008). Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Department of Defense (2011). Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage.

Department of Defense (2018). European Deterrence Initiative Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. Retrieved June 15, 2019, from https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2019/fy2019_EDI _JBook.pdf Duke, S. (1989). United States military forces and installations in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 37.

Folketinget (2003a). Forespørgsel nr.F29, Kl.18:20, April 29.

Folketinget (2003b). Forespørgsel nr.F29, Kl.18:35, April 29.

Folketinget (2004). Forespørgsel nr.F60, Kl.9.20, May 26.

Heininen, L. ed. (2014). Security and Sovereignty in the North Atlantic. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Inatsisartut (2002). Inatsisartuts samlinger Efterårssamling 2002. 1. mødedag, fredag den 20. september 2002, Dagsordenspunkt 1 Åbningstale.

Inatsisartut (2003). Inatsisartuts samlinger Forårssamling 2003. 22. mødedag, onsdag den 9. april 2003, Dagsordenspunkt 13-1 (kl.13:59-).

Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (2012). В.В. Герасимов, Оценка глобального потенциала ПРО часть 3, 2012.5.5. Retrieved June 13, 2019, from http://mil.ru/files/morf/2-2_m2%20centr.wmv

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Petersen, N. (2011). Greenland in the U.S. Polar Strategy. Journal of Cold War Studies, 13(2), 90115.

Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.

International Organization, 42(3), 427-460.

Simmel, G. (1908). Soziologie Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

Takahashi, M. (ed.) (2019). The Influence of Sub-state Actors on National Security: Using Military Bases to Forge Autonomy (Springer Polar Sciences). New York: Springer.

The Russian Government (2009). Russian Arctic Strategy Until 2020 CEP20090324330001 Scrf.gov.ru in Russian 24 Mar 09. [Unattributed article entitled "Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Until 2020 and Future Perspectives"]. Retrieved June 15, 2019, from https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/upload/29%20Russian% 20Arctic%20Strategy%20Until%202020%20BW.pdf The White House (2010). National Security Strategy, 50.

Udenrigsministeriet (2000). Grønland og udenrigspolitikken.

Udenrigsministeriet. et al. (2011). Danmark, Grønland & Færøerne: Kongeriget Danmarks Strategi for Arktis 2011-2020. 53.

United States Congress (1998, July). Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.

U.S. Arctic Research Commission (1990). Logistic Support of United States Research in Greenland: Current Situation and Prospects. 10.

Winther, G. (ed.) (2003). Demokrati og Magt i Grønland. Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag.

USAF Thule Base in Greenland as the study case

Debating Arctic security through a media lens – The case of NATO’s Trident Juncture operation Mathieu Landriault & Adam MacDonald

This article’s purpose is to analyze media portrayals of Arctic security through an empirical analysis of the media coverage of NATO’s Trident Juncture (TJ) military exercise. News outlets are influential as they promote specific representations of reality and have the potential to alter people’s perceptions. For the purpose of this study, the media coverage of Trident Juncture, spanning 10 media sources and totalizing 31 journalistic articles, was analyzed to assess how NATO’s initiatives in the Arctic region were portrayed in the North American and Western European media. Overall, we found that NATO’s presence in the region was presented positively, downplaying the risks of accidents, miscalculations or escalation. Right-wing publications were typically more likely to present Russia as an existential threat while specialized news outlets provided more detailed coverage and in-depth reporting and analysis.

Introduction The concept of security is in itself a contested one. Specific security initiatives could translate as reinforcing security and providing insurance to actors or as contributing to a security dilemma creating insecurity in neighbors and rivals.

Arctic security, of course, is not immune to these divergent evaluations. For example, the merits of greater involvement by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Arctic is actively debated among security experts, presenting a plethora of opinions on threat assessments, strategies, and effects on regional stability. On one side of the debate are those who argue a revanchist Russia with growing regional military capabilities increasingly constitutes a legitimate threat to alliance members in the region, requiring a more robust and permanent NATO presence in and strategy for the Arctic (Gouré, 2017; Wither, 2018; Tamnes. 2018). China’s Arctic activities are also becoming more scrutinized within a security lens (‘NATO and security in the Arctic’, 2017). On the other side, there are assessments that position Russia’s military developments as largely Mathieu Landriault is the Director of l’observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l’Arctique (OPSA) at CIRRICQ, Quebec, and an occasional contributor to Radio Canada’s Eye on the Arctic. Adam McDonald is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science and Deputy Director of the Centre for the Study of Security and Development at Dalhousie University.

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defensive in nature. Thus, the Alliance should be mindful of and restrain from behaviours and strategies which undermine working relations with Russia, an indispensable Arctic power, to prevent jeopardizing regional stability (Byers, 2017; Flake, 2017). This diversity of views and opinions provokes reflections and debates in academic and policy-making circles. However, this article will not focus on this dimension and will not try to assess which security assessment is right and which one is wrong.

Rather, this paper will evaluate if NATO’s involvement in the Arctic region was presented in news outlets as a positive or negative force for Arctic security. NATO’s military exercise, Trident Juncture (TJ), organized in October/November 2018 in Norway, will serve as a case study to answer this question.

The media act as an intermediary for the population, informing its audience and representing events that people will not have a first-hand experience about. The manner in which they portray NATO and its actions in the Arctic region will have an impact on the perceptions people share about the utility of the organization in the circumpolar world.

The remainder of this article will be divided in 4 sections. First, we will draw the contours of the debate regarding an increased role of NATO in the Arctic region. Next, the purposes and functions served by military exercises in general will be discussed, particularly Trident Juncture (TJ). The article will then present the empirical findings and provide analytical insights as to what TJ’s media coverage teaches us about interpreting Arctic security.

NATO in the Arctic debate The Arctic was a central strategic concern for NATO throughout the Cold War. This was due to the role the region played with respect to: 1) the nuclear deterrence relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, being the shortest route for nuclear attack against each other; and 2) the deployment of Soviet naval forces, specifically submarines, from their Arctic bases to the North Atlantic, which threatened the maritime approaches to a number of member states, particularly through the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap (Ollivant, 1984; Østreng, 1987). NATO strategic interests in the Arctic, however, began to erode in the lead up to and conclusion of the Cold War.1 This was punctuated by the demise of the Soviet Union and her allies, a diminished Russia left in her wake, and the United States as the world’s sole remaining superpower.

In this new era, smaller Arctic States took the lead throughout the 1990s by creating a web of inclusive organizations and processes to address non-military issues, which included Russian participation. Despite arguments that the region’s increasing accessibility would turn it into a competitive space between Russia and the Western Arctic States (all but two of whom are NATO members, with Finland and Sweden close defence partners), regional cooperation and low tensions continued leading to questions of whether NATO should play any role in this ‘Zone of Peace’ (Haftendorn, 2011). At a global level, American unipolarity, attempts to reset relations with Russia, and the rise of non-traditional security challenges (specifically the September 11th 2001 attacks and the subsequently declared ‘War on Terror’) reoriented the purpose and missions of NATO towards non-European security matters. Evidence of this can be found in the priorities listed in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept. Changes globally and in the Arctic, however, over the past decade have re-ignited debate about the future of the international and regional strategic landscapes and NATO’s role within them.

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Most important of all, there is widespread acceptance in the West that great power competition has re-emerged as a central feature of international life. For example, NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Declaration signals a shift in focus back towards state-based threats, specifically from Russia, noting the degradation in relations since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 which is presenting a renewed challenge to the Alliance in Europe (Giegerich, 2016; Foggo & Fritz, 2018). With respect to the Arctic, there are concerns that a great power competition is migrating into the region, presenting challenges to NATO regarding the deterrence of possible Russian (and to a lesser degree Chinese) revisionist predilections to unilaterally alter the status-quo to the detriment of her Arctic member states (‘NATO and Security in the Arctic’, 2017).

Russia Moscow has undertaken a large-scale military build-up along its Arctic coastline with combat capable forces stationed within several refurbished installations. All Arctic states are augmenting their regional military forces, but Russian efforts are larger with significant warfighting capabilities (Coffey & Kochis, 2016; Tamnes, 2018). Such developments have generated debate about the intention and strategy underpinning them, specifically whether this is primarily a precautionary/defensive measure (Byers, 2017; Flake, 2017) or a more pre-emptive posturing which could be signalling greater Russian assertiveness (Gouré, 2017; Wither, 2018). This debate largely bifurcates on interpretations of how Russia will achieve its strategic objectives in the region, specifically by securing and developing natural resource endowments; increasing promotion of the Northern Sea Route as an international shipping route under its exclusive control; by preserving strategic power projection (production?) at a nuclear and conventional level; and by maintaining its status as a great power in general and an Arctic power in particular (Mehdiyeva, 2018).

Russia is currently abiding by international and regional rules and processes, which is unsurprising given that they benefit immensely from them with respect to economic ownership of resources within its maritime zones. Some warn, though, that the augmentation of Arctic forces could indicate a move towards a more abrasive style of behaviour in the years ahead, both to achieve specific regional aims as well as further its larger strategy of stressing and undermining NATO solidarity (Howard, 2010; Wither, 2018). According to this reasoning, NATO involvement in the Arctic is needed to deter any Russian attempt to employ force to carve out larger maritime zones under its exclusive control, denying freedom of navigation and possibly infringing on the maritime sovereignty and rights of NATO members who have competing continental shelf claims with Moscow. A more overt display of NATO power in the region, therefore, is an important stabilizing element in ensuring regional peace (Gouré, 2017). Another important Alliance priority is the reinvestment in regional maritime forces, specifically anti-submarine defence along the GIUK Gap in order to detect and react to increasing Russian deployments into the North Atlantic and to shore up NATO’s northern flank in Europe via increased presence and training operations there (Tamnes, 2018).

On the reverse side, there are arguments that Russian regional military developments are not offensive but rather defensive in orientation, through the re-establishment of its bastion strategy meant to protect its long northern coastline as well as its sea-based nuclear deterrent stationed in the Arctic (Flake, 2017; Parnemo, 2019). Russian interests heavily overlap those of the other Arctic states and there is no indication that Moscow is overly unhappy with the current regional state of affairs, which allows Russia to achieve many of its economic and strategic objectives in a relatively

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benign environment. NATO, therefore, must be prudent that its deployments and activities in the Arctic do not undermine these mutual and overlapping interests, especially by furthering Russian perceptions that they are being contained by NATO and the West in order to inhibit its reemergence as a great power. Such prudence requires a degree of understanding of the security vulnerabilities Moscow faces with an ever-exposed northern coastline that is vital for her economic and strategic security (Byers, 2017). Even if Russia becomes more assertive, some critics warn it would be unwise for NATO to try to catch up to their regional military capabilities but rather focus on leveraging other capabilities deployed in other regions to deter any Arctic revisionism (Regehr, 2018). Moscow’s moves to consolidate control of waters closer to home, also, may not solely be directed militarily against NATO and the West but could be part of a bulwark against China which is increasingly becoming economically active and interested in the region (Sun, 2018).

China China is increasingly becoming a player in the Arctic, specifically in terms of scientific research and economic investment. While China continues to abide by and operate within existing regional regimes and networks, there are concerns regarding Beijing’s ultimate strategic goals with respect to the Arctic. These include Chinese efforts to gain greater influence over the economic future of the region, tethering it within its expanded Belt and Road Initiative via the development of Polar Silk Roads, and possibly augmenting military interest in projecting power in the region via its growing blue-water navy (Brady, 2017; Wright, 2018). Furthermore, concerns are growing about closer relations between China and Russia in the Arctic, possibly in order to challenge and obstruct existing Arctic networks and processes. NATO does not have a history of focusing on China, though there is growing notice of Beijing’s actions in the Arctic as well as American pressure on the Alliance to look at their relationship with the emerging great power, specifically with respect to cyber, investments and emerging technologies (‘NATO and Security in the Arctic’, 2017: 8; Gramer, 2019). Concerns of China in the Arctic at this juncture are largely geo-economical, specifically regarding investments in infrastructure and resource development which may turn smaller Arctic entities such as Greenland and Iceland into strategic vassals, both of which are NATO members.2 It is unclear, however, if counter-balancing against China-Russia cooperation in the Arctic is required and/or desired for any NATO presence directed against either or both in the region as it could simply motivate them to work closer together than would normally be the case (Sørensen & Klimenko, 2017).

Despite heightened interests and discussions, there remains no NATO Arctic policy. This absence is most likely due to ongoing debates within the Alliance (specifically its Arctic members) about whether the Arctic is a growing arena of military tension (rather than being a launchpad into other regions), and if so how the Alliance should position itself and act to protect its members there (Østhaghen et al., 2019). Recently, however, there does appear to be an emerging consensus that NATO should be involved in the Arctic in some capacity. This is most evident in the policy language shift of Canada, the NATO state most wary of the organization becoming more active in the Arctic, within its current defence policy highlighting greater information sharing with and exercises of NATO forces in the region (‘Strong, Secure, Engaged’, 2017: 79-80). As well, the United States, which has seen the region as a low security priority since the end of the Cold War,3 is increasingly articulating a vision of the Arctic as a contested geopolitical domain. In particular, the Trump Administration has accused Russia and China of threatening the regional ‘rules-based’ order, requiring greater Western coordination to oppose (Washington Post, 2019). What the best Debating Arctic security through a media lens

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way forward for NATO is remains unclear, with a host of possibilities available. An overarching NATO strategy and capability to become more present in the region could emerge, similar to those in other waters around Europe via Standing NATO Maritime Groups (Tamnes, 2018).

Alternatively, there could be the construction of alternative security venues to maintain regional relations by avoiding a NATO vs Russia binary forming, with the aim of reopening military channels with Moscow that have been dormant since 2014 (Flake, 2018).

Any moves towards a more overt and regular presence of NATO does risk eroding cooperative relations with Russia in the Arctic, which despite tensions elsewhere in the world have remained largely intact. The uncertainty, however, around how Russia will employ its growing Arctic-based military forces in the region leads to arguments that measures to defend against any worst-case scenario must be taken, including a conventional attack on a member state (Wither, 2018). It is a careful balancing act, however, to signal the Alliance’s resolve to defend itself while reassuring Russia that such efforts are defensive in support of the status quo and are not meant to threaten Moscow’s current position and power. Failure to convince Moscow (and others) of such intentions, amidst continued augmentations and training of NATO forces in the Arctic, risks turning the region into a security dilemma with mistrust and uncertainty fuelling greater antagonisms and reciprocal military buildups (Åtland, 2014). In achieving this balance, military exercises in general and in the Arctic, play a vital role.

Military exercises and Trident Juncture Inter-operability (both between services of a single state and/or within multilateral contexts), logistics, command and control and coordination are some of the most commonly cited reasons for conducting military exercises (Hughes, 2019). Tactical and operational efficiency and effectiveness are important goals, but all too often the political effects of military exercises are underexplored and undervalued (Heuser & Simpson, 2017). Specifically, military exercises can serve as a deterrent against another party, demonstrating not just the capability but resolve of a state or alliance to defend itself. These processes further socialize a common identity amongst participating members and a collective view of the major state and non-state threats facing them (Frazier & Hutto, 2017). Such signalling, however, can cause confusion and misinterpretation within their intended recipient state(s), which may see exercises as threatening and possibly a prelude to attack (Clem, 2018).

Such concerns were prevalent between the West and the Soviet bloc throughout the history of the Cold War, leading to the construction of a number of Confidence Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in order to introduce a certain degree of transparency about each others’ military exercises, creating a common understanding of the purpose, location and scope of them (Clem, 2018). Two key components were 1) prior notice before exercises commenced and 2) observation of them by the other actor, should exercises cross a mutually agreed upon size based on the number of participating soldiers (Hughes, 2019). With both NATO and Russian military exercises increasing in frequency and scale over the past number of years, these two components – prior notification and observation – were reconfirmed in the 2011 Vienna Document between the two parties, with the exercise size threshold requiring observation set at 13,000 soldiers (Overview of Vienna Document, 2011). Recently it appears Russia has violated key CSBMs, specifically underreporting the size of participating troops to deny NATO observation during Exercise Zapad 17 (Zapad 2017 and Euro-Atlantic Security 2017) and alleged GPS jamming in Finland during

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Trident Juncture 18 (O’Dwyer, 2018). Despite these infractions, there are arguments that NATO should continue to abide by CSBMs to ensure such actions by Moscow are not seen as acceptable.

Given the augmenting size and location of NATO exercises over the past few years, as well, it remains critical to be unambiguous on their purpose (Hughes, 2019).

Given the deterioration of relations between the West and Russia, over the past half-decade NATO has conducted a number of large-scale military exercises on the European continent, specifically Trident Juncture 15 and Trident Juncture 18. Trident Juncture 15 involved over 36,000 soldiers throughout Spain, Portugal and Italy. While the planning for the exercise began well before Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the exercise scenario was based on a hypothetical state which had invaded a neighbouring state and was threatening to attack another with global ramifications to energy security and freedom of navigation. It is interesting, as well, to note that the official rationales for the exercise were to train NATO to adapt and respond to perceived emerging security challenges to the east and south of Europe (‘Exercise Trident Juncture 2015: Fact Sheet’, 2015).

Three years later NATO conducted Trident Juncture 18, the largest training exercise since the end of the Cold War, involving 50,000 troops from all 29 NATO members plus Finland and Sweden, 250 aircraft and 60 naval vessels operating throughout Norway (‘Exercise Trident Juncture 2018: Fact Sheet’, 2018). Besides its size, the exercise was significant for two important reasons. First, unlike Trident Juncture 15 this exercise was specifically designed to demonstrate NATO capability and resolve to defend a member state against foreign attack. Second, the exercise took place in Norway, which of all the Arctic NATO states has been the most vocal of an increased role and presence of the Alliance in the region. Taking place in the European Arctic, also, was far closer to Russia than Trident Juncture 15, though the exercise areas were not in the high Norwegian Arctic near the Russian border. Nevertheless, the significant logistical, coordination and operational challenges associated with working in northern latitudes demonstrates a high degree of commitment by NATO to defend Arctic member states. Whether such large-scale exercises will continue in other parts of the Arctic, however, remain uncertain.

Media coverage – NATO in the Arctic region The media coverage under scrutiny originates from different news outlets, both in terms of geographical locations and editorial lines. The media outlets were first selected to offer a diversity of viewpoints and national origins. In total, ten media sources were selected and the timeline was extended from three weeks before the start of the operation to three weeks after the end of Trident Juncture, covering from October 4 to November 28, 2018. Then, we searched these 10 sources with the keyword “Trident Juncture”4. In total, 31 journalistic articles focused on the TJ operation.5 Out of these ten sources, eight were generalist outlets while two were specialized media focusing solely on the Arctic region (Eye on the Arctic and Independent Barents Observer). Out of the eight generalist outlets, four had a more rightist editorial line (Washington Post, National Post, The Daily Telegraph and Le Figaro) while four others were more left-wing or closer to the center of the ideological spectrum (New York Times, Globe and Mail, The Guardian, Le Monde).

The generalist media outlets’ attention devoted to NATO’s involvement in the Arctic region before TJ was rather slim. Global geopolitical developments have brought the issue to the fore, especially the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. Specific military exercises have drawn considerable media attention while others did not. For example, the 2016 Norwegian exercise, Cold Response in

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Northern Norway, only generated two news reports from our sample of generalist media outlets, even though numerous NATO member countries participated in the 2016 exercise.

On the other hand, large-scale military exercises led by great powers in recent years have contributed to a sustained interest in this policy issue. The Russian war games codenamed Zapad (September 14-20, 2017) in the Western part of the country and Vostok (September 11-18, 2018) in the Eastern part both drew significant media coverage in the news outlets under scrutiny. The same could be said about Operation Trident Juncture, organized by NATO members in Norway from October 25 to November 7, 2018.

In all three cases, more interest towards these events was expressed by media sources with a rightwing editorial line. In total, journalistic reports published by these three media sources accounted for 65% of articles published on these military exercises in our overall generalist sample. This proportion increased to 70% for the TJ operation (see table 1).6 News outlets

Zapad 2017 (Russia)

Vostok 2018 (Russia)

Total

3 6 1 2

Trident Juncture 2018 (NATO) 2 2 7 4

Washington Post Le Figaro National Post The Daily Telegraph The Guardian Le Monde New York Times The Globe and Mail Total

12 7 2 4 7 1 5 1

2 5 1 1

1 3 1 1

10 9 7 3

39

21

21

78

17 15 10 10

Table 1: number of articles on the Zapad, Vostok and Trident Juncture military exercises published by eight generalist news outlets.

Hence, specific news outlets focused more intensely on military exercises led by great powers, according to the substantial coverage of these developments. The Zapad operation drew more attention as it marked a precedent, being the first large-scale exercise deploying near the territory of significant European powers.

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Figure 1: number of articles published in the generalist news outlets studied at different times in relation with three military exercises.

The Trident Juncture exercise attracted more attention in the aftermath, as analyses were published to weigh in on the consequences of the military drill. On the other hand, the Zapad operation received little post-operation attention while the media coverage was more substantial in anticipation of the actual deployment.

NATO in the Arctic: security or insecurity contribution?

Other than the timing of these articles, our main question centered on how NATO’s involvement was described or portrayed in the media. As was previously presented, an increased Arctic presence for the organization was encouraged and framed positively as a security pledge by some commentators and experts; others, however, emphasized the risk of creating an Arctic security dilemma and contributing to an escalation with Russia. Were both sides equally represented in journalistic articles?

Overall, Trident Juncture was very positively represented as very little space was dedicated to pointing out the risk of escalation of such deployment. For the most part, military and governmental officials managed to get their voices heard in these news outlets (see table 2).

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National government officials National military officials Regional organizations officials (NATO) Others (experts, academics, companies representatives, etc.)

66

Number of individuals quoted or Number of words paraphrased 31 2113 22

1495

9

1144

9

606

Table 2: presence of different types of external contributors quoted or paraphrased in journalistic articles.

While privates were interviewed to give a human touch to the operation and explain the concrete reality of soldiers partaking in the exercise, political representatives (mostly ministers or their spokespersons) were relied upon to provide a more general understanding of the functions fulfilled

by Trident Juncture. As such, Nordic defence and diplomacy ministers as well as NATO’s secretary general occupied a central role in the media framing of these exercises. Reporters quoted these officials to explain the purposes behind the operation and provide official accounts of events that transpired during TJ. These officials framed TJ as fulfilling a defensive purpose and acting as a deterrent to offensive military actions by other states. This explains why 14 out of 31 articles (45% of all articles) explicitly stated the perceived defensive nature of TJ. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s secretary general, played a central role, casting TJ as a preventive action rather than a provocation and as an exercise to defend allies rather than a confrontation.

This framing also came to color the reporter’s description of the purposes behind Trident Juncture.

While the pragmatic reasons for TJ were frequently mentioned (military training, interoperability in 15 articles), the operation was also portrayed as fulfilling political goals. For example, the military exercise was presented as “demonstrating solidarity” (Sevunts, October 25 2018), “sending a clear message to allies” (Le Figaro, October 25 2018), “delivering a powerful political message” (Guibert, November 2018: 4), “serving a political purpose” (National Post, November 22 2018) or “ensuring the continued freedom and liberty” of allies (Cooper, November 1 2018: A6).

The other often-repeated political purpose was to act as a deterrent vis-à-vis Russia. Here, the lexicon used conveyed images of strength rather than cooperation and unity: “display of muscle”, “strongest deterrent”, “display of capability” (Le Figaro, October 25 2018; Cooper, November 1 2018; National Post, November 12 2018). In total, political purposes were mentioned in 13 articles, very close to the 15 mentions of military purposes.

In both cases, TJ is presented in a positive fashion as contributing to Arctic security by strengthening the Western alliance, and expressing solidarity while acting as a display of force to discourage Russia of offensive actions in the European Arctic. NATO contributed to Arctic security by reassuring allies that the Alliance was able to operate in a Northern environment.

The other side of the debate was not awarded equal amount of attention. While the risk of miscalculations or misperceptions had been mentioned four times during the Zapad exercise, the possibility was not raised once in the media articles covering TJ. The difficult balancing act required from NATO was rarely explained; only a few reporters dared to allude to the delicate balance Landriault & MacDonald

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required. Reporter Nathalie Guibert in the newspaper Le Monde represented such an exception: “The question is to know if the message is well calibrated, between a defensive NATO posture and a credible affirmation of strength”7 (Guibert, November 3 2018: 4). The journalist referred again to the “difficult balancing act to which NATO is confronted to” and the dilemma of reinsuring allies while avoiding provoking Russia.8 The article was also one of only three (out of 31, 10% of the sample) which relied on academics or experts not tied to a national military or government.

Instead, the counter-narrative was offered by Russian officials, whether from the Defence or Foreign Affairs ministries, or the Kremlin. Russian officials were alternatively quoted portraying Trident Juncture as “saber-rattling”, “irresponsible actions” (National Post, October 25 2018), creating a “real risk of a deterioration in the regional situation” (Staalesen, October 26 2018) and preparing “for a large-scale armed conflict in regions bordering with the Russian Federation” (Cooper, November 1 2018: A6). This type of description typically used more extreme language and contrasted sharply with the reassuring and balanced tone displayed by Western leaders. The views of Russian officials did not occupy a significant portion of the texts analyzed, constituting only 5% of the overall text under scrutiny. By contrast, Western officials totaled 25% of the overall text, with passages quoting or paraphrasing NATO’s secretary general alone amounting to 7% of the overall text.

The idea that TJ might contribute to a militarization of the Arctic region was not portrayed as problematic. Hence, the NATO military exercise was framed as “returning the favor” (National Post, October 25 2018; Noack, October 25 2018), and issuing a “warning for Putin” (Luhn, October 26 2018: 16) as NATO was “forced to respond” (National Post, November 22 2018).9 TJ was then portrayed as a reaction to prior Russian aggressiveness.

TJ was inserted in the global West-Russia struggle rather than in an Arctic context. This is illustrated by the fact that articles pointing out Russian military drills usually focused on the most recent exercises rather than the ones specific to the region at hand.10 For example, the Zapad operation, deployed in Russia’s Northwest and hence closer to TJ’s theater of operation, was only acknowledged by three reporters while the Vostok exercise was brought up by nine journalists, even though the Vostok drill was concentrated in Russia’s Far East.

More importantly, Russian actions to disrupt TJ were not widely reported in the sampled publications. Russia test-launched rockets near the Norwegian coast in the last days of TJ while Russian bombers flew over the Barents and Norwegian Seas (Nilsen, November 1 2018). Reporting on such incidents would have highlighted the possible consequences linked to these military exercises, with inherent risks of escalation and miscalculations. Less than one out of four articles reported on such development; such poor coverage limited the public’s understanding about the tit-for-tat logic at play in West-Russia confrontation in the Arctic region.

Specialized news outlets managed to bring a more refined and detailed picture of these regional dynamics and this, on two fronts. First, specialized media such as The Independent Barents Observer provided thorough reporting of Russian disruptive actions during TJ, including the rocket test-launch, the bomber reconnaissance mission and the GPS jamming. In terms of the latter, the Observer first reported on the matter, publishing three lengthy articles while generalist publications largely ignored the incident or published brief articles on it.

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Specialized news outlets also offered quality analysis and on the ground reporting to readers.

Although outside of our sampled timeline,11 Eye on the Arctic reporter Levon Sevunts published a series of in-depth articles, mixing participants’ testimonies, interviews with local stakeholders and analysis. These media sources complement the same type of reporting performed by generalist outlets. Such in-depth journalism was only performed once in three generalist news outlets in our sample: Le Monde, The New York Times and the National Post. Hence, specialized publications complement quality journalism performed by world-level publications.

Debating Arctic security: empirical observations from Trident Juncture As observed through the empirical analysis, there was not much debating about Arctic security in the media coverage of Trident Juncture. Reporters relied mostly on official accounts and statements, leaving little place for analysis or a presentation of both sides of the NATO in the Arctic debate. Such observation connects with other analysis studying the early 2000s period (Landriault, 2019). Military exercises have a cloak of secrecy around them, with operational and technical details known to military authorities but partially hidden to the general public.

NATO’s role as a deterrence force was the dominant frame employed by journalists to describe the event. NATO’s increased involvement in the Arctic was thus presented as positive for allies and benign for adversaries or rivals. On the other hand, the risk of provoking Russia and leading to a further Russian military buildup in the region was rarely evoked. Throughout the description of TJ, emphasis was put on presenting the exercise as a reactive measure that took precaution to not further antagonize Russia.

Further, Trident Juncture was framed as part of the global West-Russia confrontation rather than a separate exercise with regional implications. Regional governance and cooperation between Russia and other Arctic states have not been widespread in reporting on TJ. Only one article mentioned the strong cooperative ties between Arctic states in issues of common interests at the Arctic Council and the Barents Council. This comment was made by NATO’s secretary general, and although the secretary general was quoted in seven articles, this specific comment about Arctic cooperation was only included in one publication (Eye on the Arctic). TJ was perceived by media outlets as another occurrence of the global West-Russia antagonism. The Arctic frame, on the other hand, would have required a more complex description of the regional security and multilateral landscape. Such coverage would also entail presenting Arctic institutions (the Arctic Council for example) that were not directly related to the exercise. With limited space and a predisposition to see Arctic geopolitics in terms of competition and race between powers (Landriault, 2019), journalists were not keen on tackling the Arctic cooperation narrative.

Furthermore, recent Russian foreign interventions, especially in the 2016 U.S. elections and in the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in the United Kingdom, have probably significantly altered Western perceptions of Russia. Russian antagonism towards Western countries is taken as a given and Russia has been on the offensive even when facing little direct provocation from the West. In this context, the risk of further provoking Russia in the Arctic appears as a vein enterprise. Trident Juncture was also deployed after massive Russian military exercises, one of which was carried out in close proximity to Nordic countries, which suggests that Western countries reacted to Russian activism rather than provoking it.

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However, there is a case to be made about casting military exercises in the Arctic region in their proper regional context rather than in a global outlook. West-Russia interactions in the circumpolar region do not match their interactions in other regions or on other files; the Arctic is not Syria, Venezuela or Ukraine. Media coverage must adjust to seize more accurately the complexity of regional interactions.

Notes 1. The reduction of strategic tensions in the Arctic were not solely the function of the demise of the Soviet Union but also efforts by Mikhail Gorbachev, outlined in his 1987 Murmansk Speech, to reset relations with the West by turning the Arctic into a ‘Zone of Peace’ via the focusing on issues of mutual interest regionally.

2. Greenland, while under self-rule, does not control its foreign and defence affairs which remain the purview of Denmark, a NATO member.

3. The Arctic, however, has always remained a strategic priority in terms of nuclear deterrence and missile-defence with many assets residing within the region, but with an extra-regional mission set. The Arctic in and of itself as a contested domain is a new development in official American positions about regional security.

4. This keyword proved to be the most reliable as it generated very few false positives. The keyword was also used in both English and French newspapers.

5. These news outlets include: The New York Times, Washington Post, Globe and Mail, National Post, Le Figaro, Le Monde, The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, Eyes on the Arctic and Independent Barents Observer. Articles included in the printed version and online platforms of generalist outlets were considered, with duplicates counted as one document.

6. The same timeline was used for all three exercises, limiting our analysis to three weeks before the exercise to three weeks after the operation.

7. Translations from French sources were done by Landriault.

8. Eyes on the Arctic reporter Levon Sevunts was the only one to also present this dilemma through a series of reports. However, his reports were published online after our sampled timeline, on December 3 2018.

9. Such logic of force was more prevalent in right-wing dailies such as the Washington Post and National Post than in more centrist counterparts.

10. It is also worthwhile observing that no mention was made of previous Russian military exercises in 45% of the articles.

11. The series was put online on December 3 and is accessible at the following: http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic-special-reports/norway-nato-trident-junctureexercise-arctic-kirkenes-russia-military-defence-tensions/

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Wright, David Curtis. (2018, September). The dragon and great power rivalry at the top of the world: China’s hawkish, revisionist voices within mainstream discourse on Arctic affairs. Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

Zapad 2017 and Euro-Atlantic security. (2017, December 14). NATO Review.

Debating Arctic security through a media lens

Commentary

Between militarization and disarmament: Constructing peace in the Arctic Heather Exner-Pirot

Since 2007 there has been ongoing debate as to the prospects for conflict in the Arctic. Realists contend that great power competition, buoyed by newly accessible resources and shipping routes, makes the Arctic region vulnerable to conflict. Liberals on the other hand argue that the Arctic states share economic and environmental interests in the region that require a stable and rulesbased order in the Arctic. As such, they believe conflict is unlikely.

After more than a decade of debating the likelihood of conflict, it is time to devote our efforts towards steps that ensure the Arctic region remains peaceful. What would that look like?

Zone of peace It’s easy to forget that the origins of modern regional Arctic cooperation were based on disarmament efforts. There were intermittent efforts by academics, NGOs and politicians beginning in the 1960s, focused specifically on nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ). But it was the now famous Murmansk speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, calling for the Arctic to become a “Zone of Peace”, that most shaped the region’s post-Cold War order. Gorbachev called for a “radical lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region” including the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe, and suggested potential limitations on Soviet activities in the region, such as removing submarines equipped with ballistic missiles from the Soviet Baltic Fleet; restricting naval activity in the Baltic, Northern, Norwegian and Greenland seas; extending confidence-building measures such as observing military exercises; and eliminating nuclear testing in Novaya Zemlya.

In the same year, Canada released a Defence Review that called for the acquisition of 10-12 nuclear attack submarines to patrol the waters of the Arctic (it was later cancelled). This sparked immediate Heather Exner-Pirot is the Managing Editor of the Arctic Yearbook and a Research Associate at the Observatory on Politics and Security in the Arctic (OPSA, cirricq.org). This article first appeared in Radio Canada’s Eye on the Arctic.

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opposition from northern Indigenous leaders, including Mary Simon, the president of the Inuit Circumpolar Council at the time, as well as environmental groups. Moscow and Washington DC were not enthused with the proposal either. Gorbachev’s speech provided extra impetus for those groups to formally advocate for a zone of peace through regional disarmament in the Arctic, first within Canada and then more broadly amongst the Arctic states.

It was this domestic interest in Arctic disarmament that eventually led to Canadian advocacy for the establishment of an Arctic Council, which persisted across Governments and parties. But American unwillingness to discuss security, regional disarmament or demilitarization meant that initial Canadian aspirations for the Arctic Council evolved towards simply beefing up the technically-oriented Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. Far from a disarmament body, the Arctic Council became a political forum that addressed sustainable development and environmental issues.

Scramble for the Arctic Since 2007, the Arctic has been characterized as being at risk of a ‘new Cold War’, with the Russian flag-planting at the North Pole often pointed to as a turning point. Despite demonstrable efforts of the Arctic states to maintain peace and stability in the region, a narrative persists that the region is being militarized. Representations of Arctic politics in the mainstream media have convinced the general public that there is a scramble for the Arctic, and many civic leaders have used the spectre of conflict for political ends.

And so it turns to the adults in the room to create conditions that both reduce tensions and mistrust, and provide a counter narrative to ‘polar peril’ scenarios. What efforts should they pursue?

The dream of denuclearisation in the Arctic is almost impossible politically. Russia has a stockpile of nuclear weapons located in the Kola Peninsula which are core to Russia’s global nuclear deterrence strategy. Because it is weaker than the United States and the NATO alliance in terms of conventional military force, its nuclear assets are critical to its security, as well as its status as a great power. Denuclearisation would also be counter to President Vladimir Putin’s political brand of leading a resurgent, strong Russia.

Neither would the United States, the only other nuclear power in the Arctic region, be interested in constraining its nuclear forces range, with its air base in Fairbanks, radar station in Thule, and ballistic missile submarines.

In the medium term, demilitarization, disarmament and denuclearization are unlikely to be achieved, let alone initiated by the Arctic states. But there is another option which would reduce the prospect of actual conflict in the region: neutralization, or the removal of the Arctic from the field of possible war.

Neutralization is a concept that arose in popularity in the 19th century, with Switzerland for example having been declared a neutral state during the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Panama Canal has also been declared neutral. Austria, Finland and Sweden are formally neutral states.

More relevant to the Arctic region, the International Space Station and Antarctica are areas where the United States, Russia and others have interests but have been excluded as theatres of potential conflict.

For the Arctic, a formal declaration of neutralization of the Central Arctic Ocean on behalf of the Arctic Five – an Ilulissat 2.0 – would simply make explicit what is already the practice. All of the Between militarization and disarmament

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Arctic states, in their respective strategies and in public declaration by their leaders, have asserted that they neither expect, nor would they initiate, military conflict over Arctic territory.

Neutralization does not require the removal of defensive and constabulary capabilities; only a commitment to maintain the peace and stability that exists in the region. It is not a perfect solution – a region is only neutral until it is not – but it would go a long way towards formalizing what the Arctic states have already articulated, and help move the dial on the dominant media narrative of an Arctic on the verge of conflict, which has the dangerous potential of becoming self-fulfilling.

The second suggestion would be to reconvene the Arctic Chief of Defense Staff meetings, which took place twice before being suspended in 2014 after the Crimean invasion. Certainly Russia deserves consequences for its aggression, and joint exercises may require some more time. But meeting again at the rank of Chiefs of Staff would enhance the Arctic states’ mutual trust and ability to communicate at multiple levels in the event of an incident that would escalate regional tensions.

Issues of demilitarization have fallen far off the Arctic states’ political agenda, but they were once at the top under more difficult political circumstances. We are overdue to start having these conversations again.

Exner-Pirot

Commentary

A new Cold War in the Arctic?! The old one never ended!

Rob Huebert

There is a growing discussion over whether or not the security environment of the Arctic is reentering a “new” Cold War. The crux of the argument is that the era of Arctic exceptionalism is coming to an end. This era has been understood as a period in which the Arctic region was one in which great power rivalries ceased to exist and created an environment in which cooperation and peaceful relations were the core norms. Since the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, there have been growing questions as to whether or not this cooperative environment will be preserved or if the growing tensions between Russia and the West will result in a “new” Cold War in the Arctic. The reality is that there is no new Cold War. Likewise Arctic exceptionalism never really meant the underlying security requirements of the two sides ever really dissipated. Instead what is happening is a renewal of the Cold War with the Arctic as a core location of competition.

At the heart of the problem is a geographical proximity of the Soviet/Russian and American location connected by the Arctic region. This is combined with the existing weapon systems that place a premium on the Arctic as the best staging location for strikes against each other. These two key variables are the reason the Arctic became a region of overwhelming strategic importance when the United States and USSR/Russia began to challenge each other’s interest in the international system. It is not about conflict over the Arctic but rather the use of military force from the Arctic which has given the region its geopolitical importance. What now complicates the most recent version of the strategic environment of the Arctic is the entry of China as a growing peer competitor to the United States and in the longer term to Russia. While the tensions between Russia/USSR and the United States have a long history, the arrival of China as a “near-Arctic state,” and its determination to challenge the United States’ position as the global hegemon means that there will soon be a three-way balance of power in the Arctic region replacing the historical bi-polar system making the region even more important and dangerous.

Rob Huebert is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Calgary.

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Both the USSR/Russia and the United States are required by geography and existing weapon technologies to place their most important and powerful weapons in or near the Arctic region.

Specifically the Russian nuclear deterrent is predominantly located in the Arctic. This has been based on their long-range bombers and submarine forces. In order to protect these forces, the Soviet/Russian leadership have also been required to develop additional forces that are then needed to protect the original forces. Over time, the Soviet missile forces needed to be placed in northern locations. At the same time, the Americans also developed long-range bombers to be able to fly directly against Soviet targets by flying over the Arctic. They too placed their developing ICBMs to fire over the Arctic. Both sides also developed very extensive surveillance systems that would allow them to have warnings of attacks by the other side. Thus throughout the Cold War, the Arctic became one of the most militarized regions of the world.

With the end of the Cold War, many observers concluded that the end of tensions between the USSR and the United States would end the strategic importance of the Arctic. There were important efforts to reduce many of the nuclear strategic forces and a considerable reduction of the deployment of conventional military forces in the region not only by the USSR/Russia and the United States but also by most of the northern NATO allies such as Canada, Norway and Denmark.

The closest to which the United States and Russia were able to eliminate the central importance of nuclear weapons came in the 1990s under a number of nuclear weapon reduction agreements. Two of the most important were the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) (and the negotiations for the proposed START II and III) and the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) agreement. START I saw the significant reduction of number of nuclear strategic and tactical weapons. At the same time, AMEC was a combined agreement between Russia, the US, Norway (and later the UK) to decommission a large number of former Soviet nuclear-powered submarines.

But while these programmes were successful in reducing the number of nuclear weapons and their launch vehicles from the Arctic, they did not void the commitment that both the United States and Russia had to their core security policy based on their nuclear deterrent. The Russians’ economic collapse meant that most of their Northern Fleet and connected air assets fell into a serious state of disrepair. But at no point did the Russians seriously consider a policy of de-nuclearization or the elimination of their submarine-based nuclear deterrent.

Likewise, the Americans also reduced much of the forces based in Alaska and followed the reduction of their nuclear forces required by START. They also willingly contributed to the significant costs required by AMEC to assist the Russians in the decommissioning of their older nuclear-powered submarines. The Americans also became very distracted by a series of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq following the terrorist attacks on their soil in 2001. But at no point did the Americans ever move to renounce or diminish their core dependence on nuclear deterrence as their ultimate security policy.

What this meant is that throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, the Russian state was too weak to challenge the Americans, and the Americans became focused elsewhere, but the Arctic remained the core region of their ultimate security defence policy for the deployment of their nuclear weapon deterrent. The logic of nuclear deterrence (or illogic) is that as long as all potential adversaries were aware of this, they would not threaten either the US or Russia. Following the 9/11 attacks a debate

Huebert

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arose by which some suggested that deterrence was not effective against non-state actors, but the consensus remained that it was the ultimate defence against state actors.

As long as the Russian state remained weak and did not challenge American interests and actions, it appeared that the core logic of deterrence no longer formed the basis of the American-Russian security relationship. This seemed to be validated by the ability of the two countries to cooperate in the Arctic region. AMEC was only the first official sign of this new relationship. It was followed by the cooperation between the two states in a growing number of multilateral agreements and bodies such as the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), Arctic Council and so on – to name but the best known ones. It was the cooperation and peaceful relations within this seemingly new security environment that caused many to suggest that the arctic was entering a period of exceptional cooperation – i.e. the era of Arctic Exceptionalism.

However, while there were important positive steps in the Russian-American relationship, the fundamental security relationship did not change. The United States, along with the rest of the NATO membership, were surprised to find that at the end of the Cold War most of the former Warsaw Pact members and former members of the USSR such as all three Baltic States wanted to join the alliance. For some, this was the means of reintegrating into Europe and was seen as a means into the European Union. For others, such as Latvia who had suffered grievously under the occupation by first Nazi Germany and then the USSR, entry into the alliance was an obvious means of addressing their historic weakness against stronger powers. But the Russian reaction was to view the ongoing expansion as a threat to their security. Both the Yelstin and Putin Administrations saw this as a threat to Russian security. This shows that the old concerns about western actions were not changed by the end of the Cold War. While Yeltsin did not act on these concerns, the drastic rise of oil prices at the beginning of the Putin administration allowed his government to begin rebuilding the Russian military.

This is where the logic of geopolitical environment leads back to the Arctic. Putin specifically declared at the 2007 Munich Security Conference that the West and specifically the US had taken advantage of Russian weakness to attack Russian interests. He declared that this would no longer be tolerated. This was then followed by a period of extensive Russian military rebuilding and modernization. The most important of these efforts was the rebuilding of the Russian nuclear deterrent. This included the resumption of long-range strategic bombers over the Arctic and the modernization and rebuilding of the Russian nuclear-powered submarine fleet within the Northern Fleet. Given the level of disrepair Russian forces had fallen, this process took some time to implement. As a result most western observers tended to view the statements coming from Putin about the return to great power status with some skepticism.

The United States also allowed much of its surface capability in the Arctic to shrink throughout the 1990s and 2000s. However, it remained committed to ensuring that its submarine forces retained their Arctic capability and demonstrated this to the world by “lending” their attack submarines (along with the British) to undertake scientific research in the high Arctic. The Americans also continued to upgrade their defences in the North against ballistic missiles. They continued to improve the capabilities of their anti-ballistic missile base at Fort Greeley and their radar system in Thule, Greenland. This occurred as they allowed almost all bases in Alaska to either be closed or downsized.

A new Cold War in the Arctic?!

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As the Russian efforts to rebuild its military continued to gain momentum, the Russian government became more assertive and more willing to use the forces that it developed in the Arctic region for purposes of power projection. When Russia used military power to seize territory in the Ukraine, relations with the West deteriorated substantially. The Russians then began to use the forces that they built in the Arctic as a means of projecting powers against the West. Thus Norway, Demark, the Baltics and the UK as well as the two neutral powers – Finland and Sweden – have all experienced increases in instances of maritime and aerial incursions and interference by Russian forces. As a response, the Americans and their NATO allies have begun to increase their military activity in the region. The US has stood up the second fleets and have begun to operate north of the Arctic Circle. Thus, the logic of the ongoing security dilemma is renewed and accelerated.

Therefore in 2019, the two sides have both been strengthening and expanding their forces centred on their deterrent forces and those forces designed to respond to the other side’s forces. Given that the two sides were quick to return to their Cold War position of antagonisms, it is clear that the hope of the Arctic exceptionalism period never really was based on an improvement of the core difference between the two, but was only the result of Russia exhaustion. Thus, the Arctic never really stopped being the core security geographic location for the two.

In 2015 it became apparent that this newest phase of the new strategic environment will be different in that the Chinese will become increasingly important in the region. Already a selfproclaimed “near-Arctic nation,” China began to deploy surface naval forces in northern waters in 2015 in both the Bering Sea and northern European waters. If and when Chinese nuclear-powered submarines enter ice-covered waters the positions of both Russia and the United States will become much more complicated. While Russia and China are on good relations in the Arctic currently, there is no guarantee that this will continue into the future. Regardless, for Russia and for the United States the arrival of submarines from the world’s second most powerful navy will provide for even more complications in this critically strategic location.

Thus it should be clear that the Arctic became one of the most important strategic locations as soon as the US and USSR/Russia became dominant in the international system. The development of weapons and their delivery systems that favored the Arctic means that this location will always be one of the most important and dangerous locations. Temporary decreases of the power of either the US or Russia may have the impact of making the region appear less significant. But unless there is some event that mitigates against the differences in core interests between the two states or if there is a technological breakthrough that renders the current strategic weapons system impotent, the Arctic will remain a critical point of competition. Thus it is not about an appearance of a new Cold War, it is simply the resurfacing of the “old” Cold War.

Huebert

Briefing Note

What a shipyard can tell us about Arctic safety Ilker K. Basaran

In mid-July, I noticed a twitter feed coming from an Industry and Technology minister of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Varank. He was attending the launch event of a state-of-the-art fishing vessel, Calvert, built by Tersan Shipyard, one of the biggest in Turkey, for Ocean Choice International, a Canadian fishing company. In this event, Mr. Varank was proudly standing by the vessel and promoting its capacity along with the Turkey’s centuries old shipbuilding tradition and how it would meet today’s niche Arctic market demand.

Watching this launch event, I wondered if there was a potential role for the shipbuilding and repair industry, and the companies that were ordering vessels or requesting repairs, in the protection and safety of the Arctic marine environment, particularly for biodiversity and ecosystem services relied upon by Indigenous people. The next day, I called the Tersan and talked to Mr. Mehmet Gazioglu, general manager of the company. I asked him if they had other orders coming from the Arctic region and what he can tell me about them in general. I was surprised to learn that since 2010, they have actually received 45 orders from the five Arctic Coastal States (the US, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Greenland/Denmark). Most of them are Launch Event for “Calvert” delivered, but there are still a few in the building process. Additionally, he stated that they have noticed a significant increase in the number of orders coming from the Arctic since 2015, and even though they are capable of building all kinds of vessels and offshore structures, the orders were mostly for fishing vessels, offshore support vessels (prior to the 2015 drop in oil prices), and passenger vessels, such as ferries, though not ice strengthened.

I think the information provided above is significant in the context of international maritime law, Arctic policy, environmental law, and maritime economics.

Ilker K. Basran (Ph.D. IMO-IMLI) is a Lecturer at Bahcesehir University Faculty of Law.

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First of all, the recent increase in Arctic vessel orders can be explained by two factors. These include the decline in permanent sea ice and certainty in regulatory infrastructure of the Arctic Ocean.

At least for the last 30 years, we have been talking about the decline in the sea ice and potential economic advantages that the Arctic navigation may provide, such as transit transportation of goods, Arctic fishing, eco-tourism, and intra-Arctic shipping, particularly carrying resources from offshore installations to the refineries or southern markets. However, just recently, a decade ago, perhaps after the release of Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) Report, we have started to observe an ice-free Arctic Ocean. For example, computer models from a recent study published

by J.A. Screen and C. Decer in early 2019 suggest that the Arctic Ocean is expected to become ice free in the summer as early as 2030. This is a very important incentive for companies to invest in their fleets in the region.

The other reason for the increase in vessel orders in the Arctic is the legal certainty. Legal certainty is about the predictability of the possible legal outcome of the actions. Companies do not only make economic calculations when they make an investment decision, they make legal calculations as well. For example, if they do not know all the risks and possible outcomes or cannot calculate them, they would not invest in any kind of Arctic project, including ordering vessels for Arctic marine operations. There is still a great deal of legal uncertainty in the Arctic Ocean, and I will shortly touch upon this topic. However, there has also been a significant improvement in the development of the legal infrastructure of the Arctic Ocean in recent years. The most important improvement is the establishment of the IMO-Polar Code. Since the beginning of 2017, we have had a mandatory set of rules for the environmental protection and safety of the marine transportation in the polar regions. The Polar Code specifically allows only certain types of vessels to enter into the polar region. Therefore, companies either strengthen the capacity of their vessels or order new ones in line with the Code’s requirements. Similarly, in 2018, Arctic Coastal States together with China, the European Union (EU), Iceland, Japan, and South Korea signed an Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAOF or CAOFA) in Ilulissat, Greenland. Additionally, we know that with the leadership of the Arctic Council, there are several regional agreements signed for the environmental protection and safety of the Arctic Ocean, such as the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, signed in 2013; and the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, signed in 2011. These recent legal developments create an environment for companies to confidently invest in the Arctic region.

The second issue is about the type of vessel orders. Orders are being made mostly for fishing vessels, not for the containerships, bulk carriers or offshore installations which would be described as mobile and fixed structures including facilities which are intended for exploration, drilling, production, processing, and storage of hydrocarbons. The reason for receiving more fishing vessel orders is that despite recent developments, legal uncertainty is still quite high in the Arctic. First of all, the legal regime for the Arctic, except for the Polar Code, is made up of “soft law” that has no means of enforcement. There is no possibility that private sector actors, such as oil companies and shipbuilders will follow or consider soft law norms. Even though most of the hydrocarbon reserves is found in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the Arctic Coastal states, border disputes, unresolved overlapping continental shelf claims, and political tensions between States prevent private companies to invest this region. For example, the Canada-US border dispute in the Beaufort Sea is the main reason for oil companies not to invest in there. The problem is not only the border disputes. There are also other legal issues that most of us are unaware of. For example, we don’t have an international or regional legal liability regime to deal with the transboundary oil pollution

Basaran

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from offshore installations in the Arctic Ocean. Simply put, if there is oil pollution caused by offshore installations due to problems, such as a wellhead blow out (similar to the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico), fire, and hit by storm, we don’t know how to deal with the compensation and damages issues related to this oil pollution. Some Arctic States such as the US and Norway have fairly strong domestic legal regimes to deal with the problem, but there is an apparent lack in international law in this aspect. Additionally, in terms of maritime economics, harsh weather, a 4 to 5 months operational window, draft restrictions, long project lead times, lack of infrastructure, lack of maps, drop in oil prices, and volatility in global trade in general have affected investment decisions. As a result of this legal and economic uncertainty, investors are reluctant to invest in marine transportation and hydrocarbon development projects and place orders for containerships, bulk carriers, offshore installations, and support vessels for the Arctic region. In other words, commercial fishing is a relatively risk-free business model in the Arctic and investments in new fishing vessels are the proof of this fact.

The third issue that I want to raise is about the responsible investment. Responsible investment implies that investors value more than mere financial returns as they are not only investors but also customers, workers and citizens, and in those other roles they might be hurt by social and environmental harm caused by their investments. This concept essentially means passing on to future generations undiminished environmental/natural capital, such as clean water, predictable climate, an intact ozone layer, productive soils and ample biodiversity. Industry leaders and global companies in the maritime sector, such as Lloyds of London and BP, can exert influence on other industry players that are involved in Arctic operations. This would be, for example, to dissuade a company from initiating a project that is environmentally harmful, to make modest adjustments to its operations or even to encourage a business to take positive measures to improve its sustainability performance. Accordingly, smaller companies can also make responsible investments. For example, fishing vessels are not included in the Polar Code, therefore, commercial fishing vessels are not required to obtain a Polar Water Operational Manual to approve vessel’s operational capabilities and limitations, or Polar Water Certification to ensure the quality of the crew in the Arctic. However, I think commercial fishing companies should take responsible investment concept into account when increasing their fleets and operating their vessels. They can simply order fishing vessels that are compatible with the Polar Code requirements and hire experienced and certified crew members because vessels have approximately 30 years of life-span and the expectation is that the Polar Code will soon, through amendments, include commercial fishing vessels anyway. Additionally, heavy fuel oil, complete stoppage of sewage, and minimization or even complete prevention of introduction of alien species are some of the other areas that can be taken into account.

Shipbuilding and repair companies also have responsibilities. Shipyards in general generate large quantities of wastes. For example, steel and other metals, paints, solvents, and grinding and sandblast residues are strongly related to the raw materials used by the shipbuilding and repairing industry. A large variety of chemicals for the preparation and finishing of surfaces are in use, such as de-greasing solvents, acid and alkaline cleaning agents, and metal covering solutions. Thus, managing this pollution is very important for marine environmental protection. Additionally, low freight rates and declining new building prices have a detrimental effect on maritime safety and the protection of the marine environment. Therefore, a more transparent, uniform, efficient and independent system of technical surveys of vessels has to be promoted. A quality assessment scheme for shipyards at a world-wide level should be developed, covering newbuilding and repair.

Maintaining and strengthening shipbuilding and repair capabilities is important to ensure a high level of transport safety and environmental protection. And in order to cope with all these What a shipyard can tell us about the Arctic safety

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problems and meet the future demands coming from niche markets, such as the Arctic, shipbuilding and repair companies have to invest in research, development and innovation efforts.

Lastly, shipbuilding is of strategic importance in many respects. It develops advanced technologies that offer considerable spin-offs to other sectors and it provides essential means of transport for international trade. Therefore, I think a larger research regarding shipbuilding and repair industry and Arctic operational safety and environmental protection can be done to get a clearer global view. I did not get into the topic of eco-tourism in this paper, however, eco-tourism is also on the rise in the Arctic Ocean. Additionally, there remains a few critical questions for the future research.

For example, what are the advanced technologies and innovations shipbuilding companies can offer today and what are the possible future coopetations they might establish with startup companies to solve some of the well-known safety and environmental problems, such as oil spills in the Arctic Ocean (and all the other oceans in general).

Basaran

Briefing Note

Why we need to talk about military activity in the Arctic: Towards an Arctic Military Code of Conduct Duncan Depledge, Mathieu Boulègue, Andrew Foxall & Dmitriy Tulupov

Introduction Shortly before the 2019 Arctic Council Ministerial in Rovaniemi, the United States sharpened its rhetoric about the potential for strategic competition with China and Russia in the Arctic, prompting renewed concern for the possibility of armed conflict in the region.

The world has been here before. During the Cold War, Western and Soviet defence planners identified the strategic importance of transpolar routes for airborne nuclear warfare, and, later, intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. At sea, the development of nuclear submarines that could remain for long periods under Arctic ice provided a potent first- and secondstrike capability. On land, NATO’s northernmost member, Norway, and the Soviet Union shared an Arctic border. Both NATO and the Soviet Union undertook initiatives aimed at preventing the balance of power on the Northern Front/Flank from tipping in favour of the other.

During a visit to the Kola Peninsula in October 1987, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called for the de-escalation of military tensions in the Arctic and the transformation of the region into a ‘zone of peace’. Finland seized the moment, launching the ‘Rovaniemi Process’ (1989). That resulted in the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (1991), a cooperative framework for the eight Arctic states to address shared environmental challenges, which was the forerunner to the Arctic Council (1996). With the end of the Cold War and the demise of Russia’s Northern Fleet, the Arctic had indeed become a zone of peace.

Russia’s Arctic resurgence Throughout the 1990s, faced with major structural economic problems, the Post-Soviet leadership was unable to capitalise on the peace dividend in the Arctic. It was not until the early 2000s that _________________________________________________________________________________________ Duncan Depledge, Politics & International Studies Fellow, Loughborough University, UK; Mathieu Boulègue, Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, UK; Andrew Foxall, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Studies Centre, Henry Jackson Society, UK; Dmitriy Tulupov, School of International Relations, SaintPetersburg State University, Russia [participation in the research provided by the Russian Science Foundation’s grant No. 17-18-01110, “The EU resilience concept: its articulation and consequences for Russia”].

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the Arctic started to be prioritised by the Kremlin as military security concerns and national economic interests converged. The Northern Fleet was in dire need of modernisation and the Kremlin was uneasy about NATO’s enlargement in 2004 and the US’ announcement that it would deploy anti-ballistic missile defence systems in Eastern Europe.

In the Arctic, the effects on West-Russia relations were not immediately discernible. In spite of speculation in the media about the potential for armed conflict in the Arctic, military competition in the region still felt like a distant prospect. NATO’s interest in the region was greatly diminished as it refocused on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Ilulissat Declaration (2008) promised an orderly settlement of outstanding disputes between the Arctic states. A short period of “perezgruzka” in US-Russia relations (2009-2012) was marked, inter alia, by sensible progress on Arctic military cooperation, most notably around joint search and rescue operations. This arguably reached its zenith between 2011 and 2012 as new forums, such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and the Northern Chiefs of Defence Conference (NCDC) for the first time created formal spaces for military chiefs to build trust and confidence.

However, from the highs of 2012 it took fewer than two years for Arctic military cooperation to collapse. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the subsequent outbreak of hostilities in eastern Ukraine led to the suspension of virtually all military cooperation between the West and Russia in the Arctic. That included the termination of joint exercises and the nascent NCDC, as well as Russia’s withdrawal from the ASFR. Tensions with Russia across a range of issues has heightened Western perceptions that the country should be viewed through a competitive rather than cooperative lens. Under this atmosphere of ever-growing mistrust and confrontation, all major military exercises in the Arctic, conducted either by Russia (“Sever”, “Tsentr”) or the West (“Cold Response”, “ICEX”, “Trident Juncture”), are adding to tensions. The West has become increasingly critical of Russia for conducting unannounced ‘snap’ exercises, violating the national waters and airspaces of Nordic countries, simulating bombing attacks against NATO military installations, bases and exercise areas, and carrying out GPS signal jamming operations that pose a danger to civilian aircraft and sea navigation. Russia, in turn, has challenged the West over its manoeuvres in the Barents Sea Region and rebuked the US for announcing that it intended to carry out freedom of navigation operations in and around the Northern Sea Route.

A new era of strategic competition Without a significant shift in the attitudes of both Washington and Moscow, the risk of heightened military competition (and, consequently, unintended armed conflict), is here to stay. The security situation in the Arctic cannot be considered in isolation because it is largely determined by developments in adjacent regions, as well as the broader dynamics of global military competition.

In this regard, a major point of concern is the deterioration of the arms control regime, which is likely to also impact the Arctic. Meanwhile, the growing presence in the northern high latitudes of armed forces from non-Arctic states – that may also soon include China – could exacerbate tensions still further. The apparent uneasiness of many Arctic policymakers, experts, communities and other stakeholders show towards even entertaining discussions about military activity in the Arctic only heightens the risk of poor decision-making, and increases the risk of miscalculation and tactical error.

A common response to growing military activity in the Arctic has been to suggest that the time has come for the Arctic Council to expand its mandate to cover military matters. However, as others Depledge, Boulègue, Foxall & Tulupov

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have pointed out, there are very good reasons why that should not happen. The Arctic Council has proven its resilience in the face of deteriorating NATO-Russia relations in large part because it has focussed its effort on issues where circumpolar consensus can still be found. There is little reason to think that the Arctic Council could have remained immune to the fallout from the Ukraine crisis if military matters had been within its purview. Equally, NATO-Russia relations are such that we are unlikely to see the restoration of the NCDC or the return of Russia to the ASFR. Nevertheless, the emergence of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACFG) amid the worsening geopolitical climate does provide a glimmer of hope. This forum provides Russia and the United States with an opportunity to maintain at least some dialogue on issues such as freedom of navigation along the Northern Sea Route. However, on its own, the ACFG is unlikely to be sufficient for insulating the Arctic from outside shocks.

Towards an Arctic Military Code of Conduct With one eye on Russia’s upcoming chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2021-23), we propose that another modest gain might be achievable: an Arctic Military Code of Conduct (AMCC). The purpose of such a document would be for all states with armed forces capable of operating in the Arctic to define, collectively, the red lines of military activities in the northern high latitudes, while also creating a dialogue mechanism that would promote greater transparency and lay the ground for a less conflict-prone relationship between NATO and Russia in the region.

The AMCC would not seek to prevent military activity in the Arctic, or even limit its growth. As defence and security scholars, we recognise that there is a wide array of defence and security needs that must be met in the Arctic, ranging from the protection of the state, to the exercising of sovereign jurisdiction, the securing of commercial assets, and support for local communities.

Moreover, the logistical difficulty and expense of operating in the Arctic is such that there is an even greater need for armed forces to provide ‘soft’ security services in the region than elsewhere.

Rather, the scope of the AMCC would be limited to defining what constitutes acceptable and legitimate military practice in the Arctic, with a view to reducing irresponsible military activity and brinkmanship, whilst preserving a ‘low tension’ Arctic environment.

We also recognise, however, that in the current geopolitical climate, it may not be possible to reach agreement on what constitutes acceptable and legitimate military practice in the Arctic, not least because the interests of states operating military forces in the Arctic vary widely in terms of goals, capabilities and geographical extent. Therefore, in the first instance, the principle task should be to define what constitutes unacceptable and illegitimate military practice. Here, policymakers might look for agreement that dangerous manoeuvres, simulated attacks, turning off transponders, jamming communications, surprise exercises, and the endangering of innocent civilians cannot be tolerated.

Such an initiative would likely be of interest to Russia, given that its posture in the Arctic is defensive and oriented towards preventing military conflict and deterring aggression. The Kremlin has repeatedly called for military confidence-building measures with foreign states in the Arctic; a sign, perhaps, that it appreciates the need to cooperate with the West to preserve regional stability and security. Showing willingness to moderate its military activity in the Arctic ahead of its Arctic Council chairmanship might further benefit Russia by prompting something of a rapprochement with its Arctic neighbours. The negotiation of the AMCC could also be used as a mechanism for engaging China in a ‘litmus test’ of Beijing’s willingness to abstain from uncontrolled military

Towards an Arctic Military Code of Conduct

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activity in the Arctic. The involvement of China might also help dispel the notion that the AMCC was positioning Russia alone against the rest.

The negotiations that produced a fisheries agreement covering the high seas portion of the Central Arctic Ocean could serve as a model of how Arctic and non-Arctic states might proceed with the negotiation of the AMCC. The 5+5 format gave seats at the table to the five Arctic Ocean littoral states (‘A5’) and those countries with ocean-going fishing fleets capable of operating in the Arctic (as well as the European Union). A similar approach could be applied with regard to the AMCC, where the A5 would be joined by those non-Arctic countries capable of conducting significant military operations in the Arctic, namely China, France, and the United Kingdom in an A5+3 format. Once the AMCC is agreed, all states actively involved in or considering military operations of whatever size in the Arctic would then be encouraged by the existing signatories to abide by the AMCC. *** Popular refrains such as ‘High North Low Tension’ and ‘Territory of Dialogue’, which have been used to inculcate a spirit of cooperation between the Arctic states, are insufficient on their own. It is not enough to simply believe that armed conflict in the Arctic is impossible because of some notion that the region should be defined solely in terms of common or shared interests. The creation of the NCDC and ASFR in response to growing military activity in the Arctic tells us as much. Wherever it happens, increasing military activity, even for peaceful and cooperative purposes, is certain to bring about an element of risk in the form of a security dilemma, which needs to be managed carefully. That counts double when harder security interests are at stake.

Depledge, Boulègue, Foxall & Tulupov

Commentary

The Forgotten Spirit of Gorbachev Benjamin Schaller

The Arctic, representing the shortest flight distance for strategic bombers and intercontinental missiles between the Soviet Union and North America, and with strategic nuclear submarines (SSBN) hiding deep below the Arctic ice, had been a central arena in the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Arctic was not only home to strategic bombers, missile systems and nuclear submarines, but also to highly advanced early warning radar and air defence systems, making the Arctic for many years one of the most heavily militarized regions in the world.

In a period of political détente, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the East and West engaged in a number of initiatives of rapprochement. With the signing of important treaties, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) in 1987, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe as well as the Charter of Paris in 1990 or the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in 1991, a foundation for a more cooperative and stable post-Cold War security order was laid. In 1987, during a trip to the Kola Peninsula, Mikhail Gorbachev, at the time General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, proposed to transform the Arctic into a ‘zone of peace’, in what later became known as the ‘Murmansk Initiative’. While his proposals for increased regional cooperation and cross-border people-to-people contacts found their realization in the establishment of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in 1993 and the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996, his initiatives in the military security sphere, such as the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) or of restrictions on naval activities in the Arctic, never succeeded.

Today, thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the symbolical end of an ideological and geopolitical confrontation that had divided Europe and the world for more than forty years, we unfortunately see the return of great power politics to Europe and the Arctic region.

The fundamentally opposing views of NATO and Russia regarding the past, present and future of the post-Cold War security order have become blatantly obvious on a number of occasions over Benjamin Schaller is a PhD-candidate and research fellow at the Centre for Peace Studies at the Arctic University of Norway in Tromsø. His research focuses on military security, arms control and NATO-Russia relations in the High North.

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the last couple of years. Be it through Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, in which he fiercely criticized the hegemonic dominance and unilateral actions of the United States in world affairs and NATO’s expansion to the East, in the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, in connection with the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine or through the decay of the nuclear and conventional arms control architecture that had ensured peace and stability in the world for so many years. In short, the idea of cooperative security has widely disappeared and deterrence and the risk of a looming arms race have returned to the top of the security agenda.

These renewed tensions between East and West have also not failed to leave their mark on the otherwise rather cooperative Arctic security environment. While usually united by common economic interests and cooperation on addressing the numerous non-military security challenges of the region, for example, climate change, search and rescue or environmental protection, we today observe a growing military activity in the region, a more assertive force posture of Arctic states and an increasing suspicion regarding Russia’s considerable military presence in the region.

Earlier this year, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo openly attacked Russia for its military activities in the High North, including Russia’s reopening of Cold War military bases as well as the deployment of military troops and hardware as “part of a pattern of aggressive Russian behaviour [that is] already leaving snow prints in the form of army boots” and stressed that the United States will not allow the Arctic to become “a place of lawlessness”. These developments underline the growing risk of fundamental disagreements between Russia and the West in other parts of the world spoiling the so far rather cooperative security environment in the High North. The increasing threat to the idea of the Arctic as ‘a zone of peace’ does not – as some have previously suggested – derive from a scramble over natural resources or territorial disputes, but is clearly the result of the overall deterioration in NATO-Russia relations as Russia is increasingly challenging the existing post-Cold War security order.

A stop or reversal of this trend seems not in sight. The conventional arms control in Europe has been in a deadlock for more than ten years. The INF Treaty lies in ruins as Russia and the United States abandoned this for security and stability, meaning the important nuclear arms control treaty and Russia and the West have openly returned to the deterrence logics that dominated the security agenda throughout the heights of the Cold War. Amid the increasing confrontational attitudes between the East and West, one might wonder if we have forgotten the spirit of Gorbachev and the idea that security can be more than a simple zero-sum game?

In his 2018 documentary portrait ‘Meeting Gorbachev’, German film director Werner Herzog asks Gorbachev, who understands that his legacy of détente and nuclear disarmament is severely at risk, what he would wish to be written on his gravestone. Gorbachev, after briefly reflecting, simply replies: ‘We tried’ (‘Мы старались’). Let us make sure that his legacy in the sphere of conventional and nuclear arms control as well as his vision of the Arctic as a ‘zone of peace’ do not sink into oblivion.

Schaller

III. Human security in the Arctic

Human security – An alien concept for the Russian Arctic?

Maria Goes

The discovery of oil and gas deposits in the Arctic placed the Arctic region high on the national agenda in Russia. As a result, in official documents and political statements, the Russian Arctic is mainly framed in terms of national, economic and military security as the Arctic is positioned as a strategic source for national development. A connection between security and development remains unproblematised in the main discourse. The Russian economy in general depends on incomes from petroleum revenues.

Some of Russian regions prosper due to oil and gas extraction sites located on their territory. At the same time, the Russian Arctic for decades has been a place with difficult socio-economic situations due to an incoherent state policy towards the region.

This brings a lot of insecurities and instabilities in daily life for people living in the Russian Arctic. Nonetheless, these insecurities are not visible in the official narrative of security and development. Therefore, this article will be demonstrate how security and development are interconnected. Another question it will address is whether human security has a place in the Russian security landscape at all? These questions will be answered in several steps. First, I discuss connections articulated in the literature on development and security. With the help of a framing approach, I explore how the Russian state approaches development and security in the Arctic. Third, using the case of the Murmansk region, I expose a regional understanding of development and security. In the end, I will compare and discuss regional and national perspectives.

Introduction As temperatures increase and the ice retreats, extractive industries have the possibility to enter new and previously unavailable Arctic areas. Issues of power, security, international regimes and cooperation have become topical. Russian Arctic policies have acquired s special interest since Russia is geographically the largest Arctic state and has the longest coastline. At the same time, Russia remains “the least known Arctic player, but the most determined” (Laruelle, 2013: xx).

Russian Arctic policies are subjects of discussions and can be characterized as complex and contradictory (see, for example, Wilson Rowe, 2009; Laruelle, 2013; Foxal, 2014; Klimenko, 2016; Baev, 2018). By analysing Russian Arctic policy transformation between the 1990s and 2000s, Laruelle (2013) concludes that Russia has sent mixed messages to the international community in relation to the Arctic and its policies. But what kind of messages do the Russian Arctic regions get?

Maria Goes is a research affiliate at The Barents Institute, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway.

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There are ongoing discussions related to drivers underlying Russian Arctic policy. Two factors can be selected as affecting both Arctic policy and security in Russia. First, Arctic policy can be characterized as centralized (Laruelle, 2013). The Russian governance structure presupposes strict subordination of regional and local authorities to the federal one. It brings uncertainty to the regions since issues of regional development, Indigenous peoples, and social concerns “are not ignored, but instead must find a place within the grand design constructed by the Kremlin” (Laruelle, 2013: 6). The regions cannot decide upon oil and gas revenues since all offshore fields are defined as being of federal significance (Moe & Wilson Rowe, 2009). Security architecture is also very centralized with the President on top with other subordinate structures such as the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the government, federal authorities, authorities of the entities of the Russian Federation and local governments below the President. This architecture is the result of developments in Russian security policy between 1992 and 2010. As it has been discussed elsewhere (see Goes, 2017), a transformation in security construction – from the triad of equal partners “individual, society and state” in 1992 to the “state only” perspective of 2010 - took place. Second, several Arctic policies coexist, they are often poorly coordinated and depend on interests of particular groups or persons (Wilson Rowe, 2009; Laruelle, 2013; Baev, 2018). As Baev (2018: 411) summarizes: “Russia’s interests in the Arctic are far from coherent or even complementary, and the lobby groups that pursue them - from the Northern Fleet command to oil companies and the Russian Geographical Society - are often at odds with one another, making the Kremlin the ultimate arbiter.” In this situation regions are struggling to articulate their needs and concerns on the federal level (Goes, 2017). The existence of several policies is also detected by researchers discussing Russian strategy in the Arctic, where two contradictory approaches are implemented simultaneously: “security first” and “cooperation first” (Laruelle, 2013; Foxal, 2014; Hønneland, 2016; Heininen, 2016). The existence of two approaches is confusing and it is not always obvious what Russia wants in relation to international cooperation and regional development. At the same time Russian Arctic policies are underpinned by several interests, which according to Baev (2018), can be collected into four main groups: nuclear/strategic, geopolitical, economic/energy-related, and symbolic. This division is nominal since the interests “interact in many disharmonious combinations” (Baev, 2018: 410). In relation to these interests, several crisscrossing security issues are in focus: military, energy, economic and environmental. Military capabilities are probably the most discussed issue of Russian Arctic policies (see Baev, 2009; Konyshev & Sergunin, 2014; Klimenko, 2016). Economic/energy security is discussed by Godzimirski (2014), Mitrova (2014), and Khrushcheva (2016). Environmental security is discussed

by Pursiainen (2005), Foxal (2014), and Hønneland (2016). While several security issues are discussed, the focus is still placed on the state and inter-state relations rather than on other security actors. The issue of geopolitics remains dominating while other security approaches like, for example, human security, are less explored. In addition, Hønneland (2016: 16) points out that in general the literature on the politics in the Arctic has been empirically oriented for several decades and therefore less attention is given to development of analytical approaches and theoretical frameworks.

This article addresses some gaps discussed above and has two research questions in focus. The first question is how security and development are interconnected in general and what kind of meaning these concepts have in the context of the Russian Arctic. Another question is whether human security has a place in the Russian Arctic security landscape at all? Findings of this article contribute to the field of development studies as well as critical security studies. In both fields there is a demand for contextualization (regional, historical, political, institutional) of the concept (CurrieAlder et al, 2014; Hossain et al, 2016). This examination will help to clarify the meaning of the Human security – an alien concept for the Russian Arctic?

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concept of development in the Russian Arctic in order to reveal the gaps between goals of public policy and achievements in practice. When it comes to the concept of human security, in comparison with a number of writings on the Russian Arctic in general, the number of publications on Arctic security, and human security in particular, is relatively small. I use sources published in both English and Russian in order to create a broader picture and introduce materials unknown to both sides. First, I will discuss connections articulated in the literature on development and security in order to create some analytical perspective. Then with the help of a framing approach I will explore how development and security are interpreted in the official federal documents on the Arctic in order to reveal how the Russian state approaches these two concepts. Third, I will explore a regional understanding of development in security. In the end, I will compare and discuss regional and national perspectives. This will contribute to a better understanding of the peculiarities of governance in Russia and ongoing processes related to security and development.

Selecting the case of the Murmansk region: security and development My interest in to the connection between security and development was generated by work on my PhD thesis within the framework of a research project focused on security in the Arctic (for more on the project see Hoogensen Gjørv et al, 2016). By 2007 the Arctic had become a territory of great research and political attention both in terms of economic, security and environment interests of nation-states as well as in terms of geopolitical issues. The country of my particular interest was Russia as the largest Arctic state which in the 1990s “disappeared from the Arctic security landscape” due to economic and political challenges and re-emerged in the 2000s in “all Arctic debates” (Laruelle, 2013: xxi). What is more interesting, on the national level, within a decade (between 1997 and 2008)1, the Russian Arctic was transformed from a subsidized client to the source of the social and economic development of the country, and became essential for national security in Russia.

The challenge was how to talk about security in a country where people were not used to talking about it, since the security sphere is “something in which ordinary citizens should not meddle” (Medvedev, 1998: 80, cited in Aatland, 2009: 8). Being Russian myself, I was aware of the general attitude to this word. It happened historically that the term “security” became connected to the term “state security”, which first appeared in 1934 with the creation of a special department for state security within the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). The NKVD existed in 1934-1946 and was responsible for maintaining public order and combating crime. This organization became known as an example of the state structure violating the law and abusing its power of political control. The term “state security” came into use in Soviet legal literature in 1936 when a new constitution (known as “Stalin’s constitution”) replaced the first Soviet constitution from 1924. Though the term “security” was used without any particular clarification (Constitution 1936, chapter 2, section 14, paragraph 1), its origin in the NKVD and “Stalin’s constitution” played a significant role in the term’s further application. Due to defence preparedness in light of the Cold War, the term was so highly militarized and securitized during the next several decades, it became difficult to talk about security in everyday life. The term “security” became equated with “state security” and, in turn, “state security” became almost synonymous with the term “military security” in the Russian context (Sergunin, 2012). This semantic confusion was inherited by contemporary Russia. It resulted in a situation where it is difficult to demarcate the line between different security issues (Sergunin, 2012). My first round of phone calls to potential interviewees in Russia confirmed my concerns: the word “security” was frightening people – and they were trying to find excuses why they could not discuss this topic.

Goes

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The Murmansk region in the years 2007-2012 was an interesting case. It borders on Norway and Finland and is viewed by the Russian state as a geo-strategically important area because of the icefree sea. A large nuclear fleet is located in the ports of the Murmansk region, including icebreakers and submarines. At the same time, the Murmansk region hosts one of the biggest gas deposits – the Shtokman gas and condensate field (Government of Murmansk, n.d.), which is located on the shelf of the Barents Sea, approximately 550km away from the shore. Therefore, the Murmansk region was a territory where new trends – oil and gas development in the Russian Arctic shelf – meet traditional military-strategic requirements. But how do these trends affect the region? What do these changes mean for people?

Prior to my fieldwork in 2008-2009 in the Murmansk region, I was reviewing the literature on human security and I questioned whether human security was at all applicable in the Russian context. There is no adequate translation of “human security” into the Russian language, though there have been attempts to translate the term “human security” and to extract the main thoughts from existing literature in English (see, for example, Noyanzina, 2010; Borisov, 2011; Bokeriya, 2017). The human security agenda was launched in 1994 as part of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with the aim of focusing on people and their lives, not just on states. The Human Development Report (HDR, 1994: 24-25) outlined the necessity for protection from a variety of threats to human safety and welfare including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security issues. It did not provide readers with a clear definition of human security, but stressed that people should be able to exercise their choices freely and safely (HDR, 1994: 23). A nexus between “human security - human development human rights” as articulated in the HDR (1994) is defined by some researchers as a weak point: the concept of human security loses its anchoring and becomes everything and nothing (Chandler, 2008). In my case, this weak point became a strength. If human security can provide “a more comprehensive emphasis on human development, human rights and the role of non-state actors” (Hudson, 2005: 165), why cannot these other concepts, in turn, provide more information about human security? I decided to use the word “development” as an entrance to my interviews. By the time I was doing my fieldwork in the Murmansk region there were a lot of discussions in terms of “development”. These discussions were related to debates around the Shtokman gas field: how to develop it and what development would bring to the region. I decided that the word “development” would be familiar to my interviewees and could be a safe starting point for our conversations. The word “development” helped to create a sort of comfortable atmosphere for interviewees, which allowed us to move smoothly to the field of security – initially perceived by the majority of interviewees as dangerous or unwanted. Thus, my fieldwork revealed connections between security and development, but these connections should be better examined in order to answer a question: what does it mean for the Russian Arctic in general and for the Murmansk region in particular?

Oil and gas of the Russian Arctic In 2000, the U.S. Geological Survey presented an assessment of worldwide undiscovered oil and gas resources (Glomsrød & Aslaksen, 2006). Though the survey had limited data and didn’t include estimates of undiscovered resources from all basin areas north of the Arctic Circle, the results of it strongly affected various communities – scientific, political, business and the general public. The cause was the statement that “25% of undiscovered petroleum resources” were located in the Arctic (Bailey, 2007). By 2002, Arctic Russia was estimated to have 45 - 55% of the total volume of the undiscovered oil and gas resources in the Arctic (Glomsrød & Aslaksen, 2006: 29). An assessment from 2008 showed that more that 70% of promising or undiscovered deposits of Human security – an alien concept for the Russian Arctic?

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natural gas were located in three provinces: the West Siberian Basin, the East Barents Basin, and Arctic Alaska. It was also estimated that approximately 84% of undiscovered oil and gas was to be found offshore (CARA, 2008). The interest in the Arctic was growing. This was despite Arctic energy resources being characterized as “undiscovered” and “unproven” (Arctic Council SDWG, 2007: 7).

In 2001, Russia made a submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to establish a new border of the continental shelf and claimed that the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges were an extension of the Eurasian continent, allowing Russia to extend its Arctic maritime jurisdiction. In 2002 The CLCS replied that Russia had to submit additional scientific evidence. Among the tasks of the polar expedition Arktika-2007, which consisted of several stages, was to find justifications for this territorial claim. The expedition proved that the Lomonosov Ridge was linked to Russian territory and claimed that, potentially, the territory contained 10 billion tonnes of gas and oil deposits (Harding, 2007). The expedition received extensive media coverage both in Russia and abroad. Three members of the expedition were awarded the highest honorary title in Russia – “Hero of the Russian Federation”. One member was awarded the order, “For the merit of the fatherland” (third class). These awards demonstrated the significance of the expedition and its discoveries for the Russian state. In September 2008, the Basics of the State Policy in the Arctic (BRFA-2020) were adopted.

Heininen (2016) points out that the increasing role of energy security is a global trend. Moreover, energy security becomes increasingly important in oil and gas dependent countries like Norway, USA or Russia, since access to energy resources is related to power and geopolitical influence (Heininen, 2016: 19, 22). The first economic crisis of the years 1992-1995 in Russia demonstrated the power of economic security. The threat of economic insecurity forced the state to search for new sources of economic sustainability. The oil and gas sector was one of the few sectors of the Russian economy which was slightly affected during the first crisis and demonstrated a fast recovery when compared to other Russian industries like machine building or metallurgy (Zubarevich, 2016). The price for oil and gas was relatively stable in the 1990s and the export of petroleum provided a stable income, in particular for regions where the oil and gas was produced.

That is why it is not surprising that the oil and gas sector became viewed by the state as a cure for economic insecurity. Kryukov (2009) points out that the decision to develop the Russian Arctic shelf was mainly based on the reason of economic security rather than energy. The Shtokman project was initiated to support the military-industrial complex of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions in a critical economic situation in the 1990s (Kryukov, 2009: 37). Thus, the oil and gas sector represents an important trend in economic development and is viewed by the Russian state as a source of economic stability in the country.

According to the Energy strategy (ES-2030, 2009: 39), the Russian energy complex plays an important role in the economic development of the country, and oil and gas revenues contribute to national economic growth and independence. The structure of natural gas reserves in Russia is more favourable than the structure of oil reserves because of accessibility (ES-2030, 2009: 39).

Nevertheless, the number of complex and hard to extract resources has also increased just as in the oil sector (ES-2030, 2009: 39). Thus, the expectations and prognosis of the ES-2030 (2009) relies on a high level of gas extraction and high prices in the world market, which would allow the country to expand the export of gas to new markets and continue internal gasification of the country. The Energy Strategy (ES-2030, 2009) was formulated in 2008 under very favourable conditions for oil and gas prices on the world market (compared to 2000).2 However, in 2009, the Russian energy industry was seriously affected by the global financial crisis of 2007 - 2008 and

Goes

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suffered from the decline in price and demand (Mitrova, 2014: 58). Compared to 2008, gas production was 12% lower in 2009 (Mitrova, 2014: 58). The document was created with a hope that the crisis situation on the world market would change soon. Meanwhile Russia would manage to modernize and to regain its strength. Some recovery in the industry was registered by the year 2011. Oil production was 0.8% higher and gas production increased by 2.9% in 2011 compared to 2010 (Godzimirski, 2014: 1). However, this recovery occurred while the price of petroleum started to fall. The Russian energy sector has since had to cope with lower profits, a loss of external investors and shrunken demand for Russian gas (Mitrova, 2014: 59). Despite the changing situation of the market, oil and gas remain a highly valued commodity for the Russian state in terms of economic and national security. That is why the connections between development and security should be better explored. Below I will discuss some theoretical approaches.

Articulating cross points between security and development Fierke (2007: 150) claims that the concept of human security can be considered a result of the convergence of security and development studies, which reflects their joint concern about the wellbeing of individuals in a particular context. Though it appeared on the international political scene in the 1990s, the concept of human security is not new, and some scholars note that it is possible to trace the intellectual origin of human security back to the 1940s (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006; Inglehart & Norris, 2012). Indeed, Rothschild (1995) brings us back to the middle of the 17th century and shows the transformation of the concept through various epochs. Rothschild (1995) and Hoogensen (2005) also point out that, in the 17th and 18th centuries, security was viewed as essential for establishing the relationship between the state and the individual, and therefore the two concepts of state and human security were interconnected. The concept of development was developed in the eighteenth century and initially was related to questions of poverty, equality and justice, and, lately, to economic growth (Currie-Alder, 2016). Thus, initially both concepts were related to the state and were oriented towards improving conditions for human well-being.

Harriss (2014: 35) points out that, at least in the English language, the word development has several meanings. Among those are “growth” (including “economic growth”), “change”, and “progress”. These applications of the word “development” were criticized as the field of development studies became broader and the distribution of wealth among a population within a nation-state and across the globe was discussed in relation to such variables as education, gender, health, and environment. Nonetheless, the main line, as Harriss (2014) argues, lies in discussions between proponents of the state and those who prioritise the roles of the market in the economy.

Those discussions brought to light the need for contextualization of economic changes and the role these changes have in improving human well-being. A significant contribution into the field of development studies was done by Amartya Sen who suggested a capability approach. Sen (2003: 5) argued that economic prosperity should be considered as one of the means to enriching people’s lives. The capability approach puts personal freedom and personal experience in the centre of development. At the same time, the capability approach helps evaluate the meaning of commodities or material values differently since commodities “are only of value to us in terms of what they allow us actually to do” (Harriss, 2014: 36). The issue of personal experience and the ability of an individual to be an agent of change is a matter of discussion within security studies as well.

A human security approach claimed that personal experience and the ability to articulate one’s own insecurities are important to understanding security in the contemporary world. In relation to individual experience, the issue of state and non-state actors becomes important. Traditionally, states are considered main security actors, defining the agenda of security in the international arena.

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But as Hoogensen et al (2009: 2) claim, “[t]here is no particular logic that supports the claim that security can only be the purview of the state, and we must not forget that individuals and communities will always have a significant role to play in the provision of security.” It means that various actors identify insecurities differently, but it is up to the state to recognize those insecurities or to focus only on its own concerns (Hoogensen et al, 2009). Though the capability approach puts personal freedom and personal experience in the centre of development, it is possible to extrapolate its core point on any actor, from individuals to states. The capability approach underscores options and possibilities which the economy provides for a person, group of people, or state. By learning what actors value most and thus what they want to ensure survival of in the future, we can better understand why some statements or actions take place (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2017: 38). Values create an important connection between development and security since they are an important part of choice making: “The focus here is on the freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that things that he or she may value doing or being” (Sen, 2009: 231 as cited in Harriss, 2014: 36). Thus, actors make a choice based on their values or visions of what is important for them. Values become a bridge connecting human security and development. But while development is about what we want to change, security is about what we want to preserve.

Hoogensen Gjørv (2012: 837) argues that while examining security, it is necessary to take into consideration the practice of security (how), the context (where) and values (why). These questions will help to explore the nexus between development (a change) and security (a preservation). I will explore the practice of security and development on two levels: federal and regional. In my analysis, I will focus on the Russian Federation and the Murmansk region as main actors with their own perspectives on security and development (answering the question “who?” and “where?”).

Nonetheless, the focus of my analysis is on the question “why”: Why does Russia need transformations? I will approach values as certain landmarks helping to clarify positions of proponents and to explore meaning attached to the concepts of security and development in the context of oil and gas development in the Russian Arctic. In the next section I will discuss how to reveal values.

Framing approach and the scope of study: methodological note There are different levels of analysis: statements, policies and actions. In this article, the analysis will be conducted on the level of statements in order to obtain a more nuanced understanding of security and development in Russia. This analysis creates a background for future discussions, for example, of differences between statements and actions.

This study is based on an examination of documents published at the national (federal) and regional levels. The work with official documents provides access to how development and security were thought of from a federal as well as regional perspective and thus to what kind of values are behind these thoughts. The Murmansk region is selected as a case study. The differences between the Arctic regions in Russia are enormous in terms of climatic zones, density of population, economic conditions and social stability. Therefore, it is important to examine how state policy is viewed from the regions and to identify alternative interpretations of development and security. Four documents are identified as key documents in relation to activity in the Arctic at the official website of the government of the Russian Federation (http://government.ru/docs/). As the main source of information, I selected the “Strategy of Development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security until 2020” from 2014 (further the Strategy of Development or SDAZ-2020). This document defines the main objectives, priorities and mechanisms for implementation of the state policy in the Arctic. The SDAZ appeared as the

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follow-up to the “Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and for a further perspective” issued in 2008 (further the Basics or BRFA-2020). Additionally, two documents on security are selected for the analysis. The BRFA-2020 is related to the “Strategy of National Security” (further the Security strategy or SNS-2020) of 2009. This document clarifies the terminology used in the Federal Law “On Security” (2010). At the regional level, I analyze the “Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of the Murmansk region until 2025” (2010), henceforth the Murmansk Strategy or SSEMD-2025. This document is fundamental for the regional system of governance and provides main guidelines for the management of development in the region. This document is unique since few Russian regions created their own strategy. In these conditions, when the regions are lacking control over their political and economic situation and have limited possibilities to articulate their perspectives, this document is especially valuable.

I apply framing as an approach to this study. There are diverse theoretical and conceptual approaches to framing in different disciplines and fields of study (for more on it see Reese et al, 2008; Borah, 2011). The theory is actively developed in relation to an analysis of mass-media, though Wilson Rowe (2018: 38) traces origins of framing in the literature on the social construction of space and applies framing to the analysis of Arctic politics in order to discover possible political actions in the region. Frames are related to the process of interpretation and their analyses help to reveal the way issues are defined and presented to a broader public. Following Gamson and Modigliani (1989: 3), I define frames as a “central organizing idea”. A focus on a frame creates an analytical perspective, which allows exploring interpretations of development and security in various documents. Gamson and Modigliani (1989: 3) identify such tools as metaphors, examples, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images. However, these linguistic marks are hard to find in official documents. Entman (1993: 54) states that the process of framing involves selection and salience as main steps as well as omissions of potential definitions or explanations. I will discuss the federal and regional documents in a separate section. In each section, I will elaborate on the function of the document and its goal. I will discuss framings in terms of word’s selection, repetitions and exclusions.

There are some linguistic difficulties related to this analysis. The problem with demarcation between security, military security and state security in the Russian language was discussed earlier in this article. In addition to that, the terms “security” and “safety” are both translated into Russian as “security” and this semantic issue can be a subject of a separate study. Russian border guards, the coastguard and emergency response forces in the Arctic have a complicated structure and are divided between civil and military entities (see Klimenko, 2016). These forces are responsible for “safety”. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, mentions related to “safety” and “emergency response” will be allocated under the rubric “national security”.

Framing of development and security in official documents The Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013) defines the main objectives, priorities and mechanisms for implementation of the state policy in the Arctic. The document offers mechanism of implementations, suggests variables for evaluation and ways of measurement of social and economic development. Development and security are already linked in the title of the document.

The goal of the Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013, Section II, Item 6) is the implementation of the national interest as well as the achievement of main goals defined in the Basics (BRFA-2020, 2008). Social and economic development is identified through risks and threats in such spheres as social, economic, science and technology, environmental management and environmental protection. The words “risks”, “threats” and “strategic” dominate in the

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document, which in combination with the abundance of terms such as “national security”, “national interest” and “national priorities” makes it difficult to separate security and development.

Notions of “national security”, “national interest”, “threats to national security”, and “strategic national priorities” are not explained in the document but they are all introduced in the Security Strategy (SNS-2020, 2009, Section I, item 6). “National security” is defined as “protection of individuals, society and the state from internal and external threats, which allows for the provision of constitutional rights, freedoms, decent quality and standard of life of citizens, sovereignty, territorial integrity and sustainable development of the Russian Federation, the defence and security of the state” (SNS-2020, 2009, Section I, item 6). In this definition there are two important messages. First, “national security” protects the needs of the individual, society and the state. But in general, as I discussed elsewhere (see Goes, 2017), the document strongly emphasizes the role of the state as a security provider and prioritizes traditional state values such as national defence and border protection. Second, security becomes a necessary condition for sustainable development of the country.

The concept of “national interest” is defined as a “set of internal and external needs of the state in ensuring the security and sustainable development of the individual, society and the state.” SNS2020, 2009, Section I, item 6). Thus, security is assigned to the state, whereas sustainable development concerns “individual, society and the state”. This set is further clarified in the document. National interests are identified as the development of democracy and civil society; improving the competitiveness of the national economy; in ensuring the inviolability of the constitutional order, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian Federation; and in turning the Russian Federation into a world power whose activity is aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnerships in a multipolar world (SNS-2020, 2009, Section III, Item 21).

National interests in the Arctic are specified in the Basics (BRFA-2020, 2008, Section II, item I): the Arctic as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation; the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation; preservation of unique ecological systems of the Arctic; and usage of the Northern Sea Route.

The term “strategic national priorities” identifies “the most important areas of national security” (SNS-2020, 2009, Section I, item 6). According to the Security strategy, these are the most important areas of security that affect three spheres: constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens; sustainable socio-economic development; and sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, the concept of development is articulated as a part of the national security concept. But the connection between socio-economic development and security is exposed differently in the Basics. Thus, the goals and priorities of social and economic development are defined as the enlargement of the resource base to provide Russia with oil and gas resources, water resources and other strategic sources (BRFA-2020, 2008, Section III, item 6a). Meanwhile in the security sphere, development should be done in the direction of military, environmental, informational, science and technology, and international cooperation. It means that security and development are not the same and have different spheres and priorities.

Priorities of development are identified in three documents: the Security strategy (SNS-2020, 2009, Section III, item 24), the Basics (BRFA-2020, 2008, Section III, item 7) and the Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013, Section III, item 7). In the Security strategy (SNS-2020, 2009), priorities are identified in terms of “living standards”, “personal security”, “human capital”, and “balanced consumption”. In the Basics (BRFA-2020, 2008) priorities are identified in terms of “strategic resources”, “national security”, “defence”, “knowledge”, and “technology”. The Strategy

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of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013) operates by such terms as “economic development”, “social and economic development”, “sustainable development of fuel and energy complex”, “sustainable social and economic development”, “complex development”, “complex social and economic development”, and “sustainable innovative social and economic development”. Nonetheless, their application is very loose and no explanation is given as to what they mean and what the differences are between them. The document claims that implementation of the strategy will provide a “comprehensive build-up of competitive advantages of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation in order to reinforce the position of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, strengthen international security, maintain peace and stability, as well as enhance international cooperation” (SDAZ-2020, 2013, Section V, item 32). Thus, changes are needed for improving Russia’s image in the international arena and the state is the main value. In total, it is possible to conclude that the Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013) is framed in terms of security with articulated connections to the state, military preparedness and border protection.

Framing of the Murmansk strategy The Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) is a product of collective work of different experts – scientists, business representatives, public officials, and NGOs. It was published in 2010 and thus it does not refer to the Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013). Nonetheless, it takes into consideration other federal documents which were in power by that time. The Murmansk strategy identifies ways and mechanisms for working with challenges, which are defined as existing risks and opportunities (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 33). The document operates by such words as “risks”, “opportunities”, and “possibilities”. In several cases, headlines are accompanied by subheadings which clarify the content of chapter. For example, a headline: “7. Mission (goals) and purposes of the authorities and vision of the Murmansk region” is complemented by a subheading “The region, how we see it, want it and can create it” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 40). Another headline states: “8.

Main directions of social and economic development of the Murmansk region”. A subheading clarifies: “Our action programme” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 46). This application of pronouns and possessive pronouns demonstrates existence of the collective “we” or actors of development.

Those actors are named as the state, society, business, science and regional authorities, and the need for cooperation between them is emphasized (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 40).

Words like “human capital”, “human potential”, “mission”, and “capabilities” are actively used in the text. The word “development” is applied in many occasions, including “sustainable development”, “spatial development”, “human potential development”, “social and economic development”, “urban development”, “complex development”, “social and cultural development”, and “social development”. Clarification of the term “sustainable development” is given in relation to environment: “sustainable, that is not leading to irreparable environmental consequences and not creating threats to the well-being of the next generations” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 40). Principles of sustainable development such as the preservation of the environment, efficient usage of resources, a sustainable settlement system, population preservation and cultural development are thought as main principles of development of the region (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 46). The word “priority” is also used in the Murmansk strategy, but less intensively than in the federal documents.

It was used in relation to the state, like “priorities of national interests” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 25) or “priorities, plans and positions of federal authorities” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 40). Mainly it is applied in relation to environmental problems in the region. Once it was used in the document to define regional priorities. The Murmansk strategy prioritises “social stability, development and discovery of human potential (society and economy of capabilities) and modernization of the economy and society on the basis of innovation and knowledge” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 46).

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Economic terms like “index”, “trends”, “market”, and “micro-region” are widely applied in the document. The document also refers to the federal document “Concept of long-term social and economic development of the Russian Federation” (2008) which puts among its goals: a high standard of human welfare, social well-being and consensus, economics of leadership and innovations, balance of spatial development, a globally competitive economy, economic freedom and justice, and security of citizens and society (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 30-31). These goals would allow Russian economics to move from raw materials to an innovative, socially oriented type of development.

The word “security” is carefully used in the Murmansk strategy and is not dominating. Mainly the term “environmental security” is applied. In relation to this, it is necessary to point out that the word “environment”, “ecology” and “ecosystem” frequently appear in the document. References are made to the “Strategic action plan on environmental protection of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” (2009) and to the “Climate doctrine of the Russian Federation” (2009). Several times the word “security” is applied in the meaning of “safety”, especially in relation to transport and logistics, and emergency response. Mainly, the reference to state security is done through an articulation of the geographic location of the Murmansk region and its role in border protection.

The term public security is also used in the document. The document also refers to the “Food security doctrine of the Russian Federation” (2010).

To sum up, the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) is written in the language of economics and environment with a focus on human development and capabilities. Mostly the document maps existing risk and identifies challenges, difficulties, opportunities and perspectives for the region.

Discussion In the two previous sections, I analysed the framing of “security” and “development” in official documents on the federal and regional levels. The application of three main variables – word selection, salience and silence – helped to demonstrate specifics of the documents as well as differences in framing.

The central organizing idea (or value) of the federal documents is the state and its power and security. There is a difference between the documents written in 2008 (BRFA-2020) and in 2013 (SDAZ-2020). The framing of the document in 2008 does not have strong markers of security language, while the document from 2013 is written in terms of threats and risks, and the main place belongs to national security. Even the Security strategy (SNS-2020) from 2009, which was written with the aim of clarifying security terms and complements the law on security, has a balance between the language of security and development. It puts development for citizens on the agenda along with the state.

The Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013) does not refer to the “Concept of a long-term social and economic development of the Russian Federation” (2008). The concept was created as a guideline for new documents, plans and indicators generated by the authorities in the field of development. The analysis of the SDAZ-2020 (2013) allows us to conclude that the strategy was written with the aim of framing the Arctic as an essential part of national security and to promote the state as the main security actor and beneficiary of development. The concept of development is presented as a part of the concept of national security. The needs and demands of other actors, which are involved in the process of development, are not articulated. Due to the definition of national security, it is assumed that the state represents individuals and society and thus is capable

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of recognizing the range of other demands not only in the sphere of security, but development as well.

This framing reveals two difficulties. The first one is related to the role of the state in economy and security. As studies show (see Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012; Currie-Alder et al., 2014), the state on its own is not capable of meeting the needs of different actors. For example, the Shtokman project was expected to start production in 2012, but due to economic and technical challenges, it was slowed down in 2012 and put on ice in 2015. Thus, despite all promises given to the Murmansk region in relation to investments and economic growth, the Shtokman project never moved forward from the planning phase. The Shtokman Development AG, the company that was established in order to develop Shtokman, was abolished by Gazprom in July 2019, which put the full stop to the project (Staalesen, 2019). The talks about this giant state-controlled project created various expectations in the region and demonstrated differences in approaches. Some of the regional actors did not trust the promises given by the federal authorities and did not consider petroleum revenues as desirable for regional development (see Goes, 2017). Thus, if for the state Shtokman was a source of economic stability and national security, for some regional actors it was a source of insecurity and instability because it was state controlled.

The second difficulty is methodological in its nature. Framing development in the language of security creates some complications in extracting what is about to be changed and what values are important. The key documents on the Arctic have many connections with other legal acts, which makes it difficult to navigate between security and development. The concept of development expressed in security terms becomes superficial and less articulated because it is difficult to describe social and economic issues in the language of security.

The analysis of the Murmansk strategy (SSDEM-2025, 2010) reveals another framing. The central organizing idea is around the human being and human capabilities. The document frames human beings as actors, who can and want to do something in the region. Human capital is presented as an object and subject of development. SSDEM-2025 (2010) is written in economic and development terms and has a direct reference to the “Concept of a long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation” as well as to the Basics (BRFA-2020, 2008). Even though the term “development” has strong connections to the field of environment, together with the language of economics applied in the document, it creates a nexus between a place where people live and where changes take place. Thus, the issue of responsibility appears on the agenda of the document. A direct reference to “national security” is omitted, nonetheless the document provides a more nuanced picture of security. In particular, the focus on “human capital” and “human resources” places regional interpretations of development closer to Sen’s capability approach. As a result, the document reveals a human security perspective without an application of the term “human security”. People are articulated as a main value and changes are needed in order to make the region attractive for people to live in. This is particularly important in the situation when the Murmansk region has been struggling to attract a young labour force and to keep the specialists already working there. A process of out-migration started in the 1990s and this tendency has remained a factor in the 21st century. The population has steadily declined from 1,164,600 in 1989 to 748,100 in 2019 (Murmanskstat, 2019). Overall, it is possible to conclude that the document reflects a general trend – language of security belongs to the state and can be applied by federal authorities only. Nonetheless, the document provides an insight into how development and its related issues in the Arctic are framed. This analysis shows that development can be discussed in

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terms other than the language of security and that security approaches cannot be reduced to state security only.

Conclusions In this article I demonstrated connections between security and development in the context of the Russian Arctic. I discussed connections between these two concepts in the literature and concluded that values can be viewed as a bridge between these two concepts. With the application of a framing approach, I analysed the federal document “Strategy of development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and security provision until 2020” (SDAZ-2025, 2013) and the regional “Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of the Murmansk region until 2025” (SSEMD-2025, 2010). The analysis revealed that the connection between development and security exists and is even manifested in the name of the federal document. Nonetheless, this connection has some specific characteristics. The regional document is avoiding usage of security language, meanwhile the federal document is using security language to frame development in the Arctic.

Analysis of the connection between development and security in the Russian Arctic helps to reveal what is valued on the regional and federal level and to demonstrate the variety of visions. On the federal level, the answer to the question “why do we need development” and “what do we want to protect” is the state. At the same time, on the regional level, the answer is human resources. The Murmansk strategy makes people the main actors and beneficiaries of development, meanwhile acknowledging the state as the main security actor.

Overall, it is possible to conclude that there are different approaches to development and security in the Russian Arctic. Analysis of the documents issued on various levels gives a better understanding of what is going on in Russia. Regional approaches might differ from the one articulated on the federal level. Thus, human security may not be articulated on the national agenda, but plays an important role at the regional level.

Notes 1. The “Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation” (CNS 1997, Section 4) defined the Arctic as a crisis region in need for special state support. Meanwhile the “Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and for a further perspective”( BRFA-2020, 2008, Section II, item 4a) defines the Russian Arctic as a “strategic resource base” which provides the means for the socio-economic development of the country.

2. In 2008 one barrel cost 94 dollars. In 2000, it was 27 dollars per barrel (ES-2030, 2009: 3).

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[Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation until 2020].

SSEDM-2025 (2010). Strategija sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitija Murmanskoi oblasti do 2025 goda. [Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of the Murmansk region until 2025].

Staalesen, A. (2019). No more Shtokman development. The Barents Observer. Retrieved from https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2019/06/no-more-shtokmandevelopment September 4, 2019.

Wilson Rowe, E. (2018). Arctic Governance: Power in Cross-Border Cooperation. Manchester University Press, Manchester.

Wilson Rowe, E. (ed.). (2009). Policy aims and political realities in the Russian North. Russia and the North. University of Ottawa press, Ottawa: 1-15.

Zubarevich, N. (2016). Kak vyzhivajut rossyiskie region v krisis. [How Russian regions survive during crisis]. Retrieved from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/11/18/70588-kakvyzhivayut-rossiyskie-regiony-v-krizis-lektsiya-natali-zubarevich June 12, 2019.

Goes

Arctic human security in the era of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): The case of Sweden, Norway and Finland Alexandra Middleton

Sweden, Norway and Finland are the countries with advanced economic development and social security systems that are actively implementing UN Agenda 2030. In this study I investigate Arctic human security in the northern regions of Sweden, Norway and Finland. Human security is constructed as “proclaimed” or stated in the official documents and as “experienced” by people.

I study proclaimed human security in the Arctic reflected in national human security agendas and human security coverage in the national Arctic strategies. Experienced human security construct incorporates objective measures of economic, health and personal security. Economic security is measured as disposable income and poverty risk. Health human security is measured as tertiary education attainment and hospital beds available per 1000 people. Personal human security is proxied by crime rates by type of criminal offences (e.g. traffic, sexual). The results of the study indicate that human security is presented strongly in national and foreign policy agendas, but rather weakly in the Arctic strategies. People who live in the Arctic regions have substantially lower levels of disposable income on average and are at higher poverty risk especially compared with the capital regions of the same countries. Tertiary education attainment data demonstrates risk in human security for the male population.

Crime statistics indicate higher risks of traffic offences in northern Finland and higher sexual offences risks in the northern Norway regions. The study identifies the risks and discusses disconnectedness between national human security agendas, SDGs and Arctic strategies. Human security lenses can be useful for identifying most imminent risks in human security and tailoring SDGs to the Arctic-specific context.

Introduction Human security received a new boost after the launch of the UN Agenda 2030 in 2015. The Nordic countries of Sweden, Norway and Finland perform extremely well in international assessments such as quality of life, happiness index, etc. At the same time northern, Arctic regions of these countries experience negative population dynamics with decreasing populations of youth and young adults, and disparities in tertiary education attainment (Business Index North 2018). The objective of this article is to identify human security risks in the Arctic regions of Sweden, Norway and Finland. The scope of the study is limited to this area in order to compare neighboring regions that share many similar challenges, e.g. ageing population, long distances to major markets and capital cities. The similarities of the northern regions of Sweden, Norway and Finland is recognized Alexandra Middleton is an Assistant Professor at the Oulu Business School, University of Oulu.

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by the Interreg Nord (EU-funded) programme aimed at strengthening of economic and social development and cross-border cooperation.

Human security is constructed as “proclaimed” or stated in the official documents and as “experienced” by people. I study proclaimed human security first by addressing national policies, and secondly by reviewing Arctic national strategies. Experienced human security is measured by an array of indicators addressing economic, health and personal security. The results of the study indicate that while human security is presented strongly on the national and foreign policy agendas of the aforementioned countries, it fails to materialize for the people living in the North where the risks are high in economic, health and personal components of human security. Arctic national strategies address several components of human security, but lack targets and action plans to support human security in the North. The study contributes to the findings of Hoogensen Gjørv (2012), Greaves (2011), Emmerson and Lahn (2012) all pointing to the insufficient role of Arctic human security on the national agenda by empirically studying proclaimed and experienced facets of human security in Sweden, Norway and Finland. Moreover, the study investigates Arctic human security in the light of SDGs and provides some examples on linking these concepts.

The article proceeds as follows: section 1 discusses human security construct from a historical point of view, provides different definitions and highlights current trends in human security. Section 2 provides an overview of previous research on human security in the Arctic. Section 3 presents methods and data. Results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the article.

Human security construct Human security is a multilayered concept that is understood through an interplay of global players such as UNESCO, governments, NGOs and academia. The incipience of the term “human security” can be traced back to the 1990s emerging from the UN Development Program (UNDP).

Human security was long understood to be a part of foreign policy but since 1994 a shift from the sovereign states and their national interests to the well-being of the people happened as a result of the UNDP (Greaves, 2016.) This shift broadened the scope of security analysis and policy from territorial security to the security of people (Gomes & Gasper, 2015).

The UNDP defined human security as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” (UN Human Development report, 1994). Building on the UN Human Development report (1994) human security comprising seven pillars economic, health, food, environmental, personal, community and political was consequently adopted by more than 170 head of states (Lautensach, 2013).

Over the past years, “human security” has entered international discourse on par with the “sustainability” concept (Hunter & McIntosh, 2010). On the semantic level securitization assumes that an object of security is threatened by some issue, event or circumstance (Buzan et al, 1998).

What separates human security from other types of security, is that it must be about humanity at every level, on every scale: individuals, (small) groups, and the global population (Wilde & Boer, 2008). By making the individual the centre of analysis, human security focuses the attention of all actors on addressing the root causes of insecurities and looks for solutions that build on local capacities (Jolly & Ray 2006). Human security can be regarded as a foundational value, from which

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flow other individual and social values. Quite often human security is compromised not by risks of being attacked by terrorists or weapons of mass destructions, but by so-called soft threats economic insecurity, hunger, lack of safe drinking water and sanitation and endemic diseases (Hunter & McIntosh, 2010).) The challenge in defining human security stems from the existence of overlapping concepts such as in human security, human rights and economic development (Greaves, 2011).

It is understood that the state remains to be the main provider of security. The provision of security to individuals by the state is a social contract in which the state gains its legitimacy (Krause, 2007).

By placing the individual at the centre of analysis, human security poses new questions relevant to the ‘problem’ of security: “Security for whom? Security from what? Security by which means?”

(Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007: 13). Furthermore, security can be constructed by understanding what constitutes insecurity, or fear of human existence (Erickson, 2010). Apart from a conceptual understanding of human security, it should have mechanisms in place that govern human security.

In 2015, human security received a new set of lenses with the introduction of UN Agenda 2030 comprising the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDGs include 17 universal goals (applicable to all countries) targeting sustainable peace, poverty reduction, gender equality and inclusive societies, etc. The implementation of SDGs rests on countries’ own sustainable development policies, plans and programmes. Altogether, 244 indicators were introduced to monitor the progress towards SDGs achievement, with possibility to introduce new indicators if needed.

In addressing interrelatedness of human security and SDGs, the UN provides the following comment: “the application of human security does not add additional layers to the work of the United Nations. Rather, it builds on and strengthens existing frameworks by closing potential gaps; combining existing tools to accelerate delivery” and goes on to add that “human security serves as both an analytical lens and a programming framework that complements and enriches mechanisms to attain the SDGs” (Human Security and Agenda 2030 report, 2017: 2). During a high-level event on ‘Human Security at 25: Building on its Contributions to Achieve the SDGs’, Achim Steiner, UNDP Administrator, commented that “human security has maintained its relevance in the context of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, and called for the UN development community to keep it as a reference point for bringing together different domains of development”. However, the practical application of human security in the context of SDGs remains unclear and needs to be further addressed. When dealing with human security what set of lenses should prevail? How are we to combine these two frameworks? In the methodological part of the article I elaborate on this further.

Human security in the Arctic context Human security should be built upon context, values and practices (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012). The context determines the parameters, values inform security and practice denote mechanisms and actors in place for ensuring the process of securitization or achieving a secure state. Therefore, human security should be understood in the Arctic context, I further review previous research on human security in the Arctic.

The Arctic Council was established in 1996 as an intergovernmental high-level forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states. The

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Arctic Council does not address security issues, nor does it utilize “human security” in its lexicon.

It, however, addresses human security by its work on environmental impacts, sustainability and protection of local communities, mainly by producing documentation of these impacts. During its history, Arctic Council work initiated three international agreements: the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011), the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013) and the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017).

The challenges of human security in the Arctic regions receive attention from scholars and data driven reports. Arctic countries with their capitals far from the North historically adopted centerperiphery relationships with the northern regions (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012). Greaves (2016) denounced Arctic human security as pathological due to the prevailing emphasis on control, extraction and consumption of hydrocarbon resources, while arguing that Arctic security shall be based on the critical understanding of human-caused environmental change. Analyzing Canadian Arctic policies Greaves (2011: 231) concludes that “links between people and security are absent from current Arctic policy”, while sovereignty is prioritized over all other policy areas. Similarly, Emmerson & Lahn (2012) find that the Arctic states place the emphasis on economic opportunities exploitation while downplaying social and ecological consequences. Lukovich and McBean (2009) found that the human security of people in the Canadian Arctic was threatened by environmental, social and economic conditions. The intricacies of environment, identity of peoples, supply of traditional foods, community health, economic opportunities, political stability and Indigenous peoples’ human security in the Arctic are examined in Hoogensen Gjørv (2013). Heininen (2016) and Hossain & Cambou (2018) discuss approaches to human security in the Arctic incorporating multiple dimensions such as environmental, economic, health, food, water, energy, communities, political and digital security.

Several Arctic reports produced either by the Arctic Council Working Groups or other authors indirectly touch upon components of human security. The Arctic Human Development Report in its two editions (2004, 2011) addresses among other economic systems, human health and wellbeing, community viability and adaptation. The Arctic Resilience Report (2016) assumes human capacity for agency and calls for engaging in deliberate action, while the call for action for the Arctic states remains unclear. Economy of the North (2008, 2015) and Business Index North reports (2017, 2018, 2019) provide a wealth of comparable socio-economic indicators across Arctic regions but do not directly elaborate on the human security construct. What is missing from these studies and reports is connectedness to the larger human security context and human security goals of the Arctic countries.

Methods and data In this study I approach human security in the Arctic as “proclaimed” or stated in the official documents and as “experienced” by people (see Figure 1). In order to access these two human security facets, qualitative and quantitative data analyses are employed. For studying “proclaimed” human security I apply qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2004) of documents most relevant to human security in the Arctic. Content analysis of documents related to human security is used due to its ability to reconstruct perceptions and beliefs of documents’ authors (Pfeffer, 1981), and ability to discern values and concerns expressed in the documents (Sackmann, 1992, Donleavy, 2012).

“Experienced” security in its turn is accessed by analysis of objective statistical indicators that

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correspond to certain dimensions of human security. Experienced security provides an objective gauge of human security by only using quantitative data due to unavailability of qualitative indicators across countries.

Figure 1 Research approach to human security

In order to access “proclaimed” human security, I use a range of documents, including Agenda 2030 related documents at the national and Arctic-specific context (see Table 1 for data sources).

I analyze documents at the national context (such as human rights policy guidelines) and the Arctic strategies of Sweden, Norway and Finland by exploring whether they address human security and if so, elaborate on the elements that are deemed important in the national Arctic strategies pertinent to human and security aspects. All data are publicly available. For the analysis of the human security themes of the national Arctic strategies, I utilized NVivo software.

Table 1 Documents used in the analysis of human security discourses

Context

Sweden

Norway

Finland

National

Human rights, democracy and the principles of the rule of law in Swedish foreign policy (2016)

Human Security Network

Finland’s international human rights policy

Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017–2022 (2017)

Human rights policy guidelines (2013)

Internal Security Strategy, A Safe and Secure Life (2017)

Sweden’s implementation briefs covering UN agenda 2030

Documents related to Documents related to implementation of implementation of UN agenda 2030 UN agenda 2030

Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (2011)

Norway’s Arctic Strategy (2017)

Arcticspecific

Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (2013)

Note: The list of the documents may be not all-encompassing, only main policies were considered.

In “experienced” human security facets I concentrate on three dimensions of human security, namely economic, health and personal security. The choice of these three dimensions is driven by a focus on physiological and safety needs. Maslow’s (1970) hierarchy of needs presented as a pyramid proposes that for human development and motivation, fundamental physiological and Arctic human security in the era of SDGs

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safety needs must be met first in order to progress to higher levels. In the analysis I concentrate on three dimensions, namely economic, health and personal security due to their primal importance and due to the availability of robustly comparable data that is up-to-date.

Indicators of “experienced� human security are used for monitoring how well countries and their corresponding regions are performing in achieving SDGs. The link between human security dimension, corresponding indicators and their relatedness to SDGS is presented in Table 2. See Appendix I for details on how these indicators are linked to monitoring SDGs. Data are obtained from Eurostat, Statistics Norway, Oulu and Lapland Police Offices. Data are available on Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) 2 level1 for economic and health indicators. Personal security indicators are available on NUTS 3 level for Norway and custom calculations are applied for Finland. Throughout the analysis, for all indicators, I use national country average and data for capital regions when available (e.g. Helsinki-Uusimaa in Finland) to address the center-periphery divide. When necessary, I construct comparable indicators, e.g. number of beds per 1000 or criminal offences rate per 1000 people.

Table 2 Human security indicators and correspondence with UN SDGs (see Appendix I for more detailed description)

Human security dimension

Indicator

Description

Economic security

At poverty risk

% of people at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living in households with very low work intensity

Disposable income per inhabitant

Health security

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Relatedness to UN SDGs

SDG 1 No Poverty Disposable income SDG 10 Reduced expresses the Inequality financial resources available for spending (or saving) and determines ownership of (or access to) material goods and services

Disposable income in Purchasing power standard (PPS) per inhabitant

Same as disposable income but adjusted for PPS

Population aged 2564 by educational attainment level, sex and NUTS 2 regions (%)

% of population with tertiary education attainment by sex

SDG 3 Good health and wellbeing SDG 4 Quality Education

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Number of hospital bed per thousand inhabitants

Indicator for availability of services for acute and complex conditions at hospital

SDG 10 Reduced Inequality

Registered criminal offences per 1 000 population (drug, traffic and sexual offences)

Prevalence of criminal offences per 1 000 population

SDG 3 Good health and wellbeing SDG 5 Gender equality

The economic domain of human security relates to the economic stability and is measured by three indicators: disposable income per inhabitant, disposable income in purchasing power standard (PPS) per inhabitant and at poverty risk as a percentage of population. These indicators collectively help to understand how Arctic regions are performing in meeting SDG 10 on reducing inequality within and among countries, and SDG 1 on ending poverty in all its forms everywhere, here specifically looking at local levels of poverty.

The health component of human security is measured as population aged 25-64 with tertiary education attainment level and number of hospital bed per thousand inhabitants. Tertiary education attainment is used as predictor of future earnings, health and life expectancy (Lahelma, 2001, Ross & Wu, 1995). The number of hospital beds per inhabitant measures health infrastructure available and represents health support system. Collectively, these indicators provide a view on how Arctic regions perform in achieving SDGs 3, 4 and 10. These indicators can be used to complement the monitoring of SDG 5 (Gender Equality).

The personal security component encompasses threats to human life in the form of crimes committed in the region. It corresponds with the notion of “feeling safe on the streets� (Kaldor et al, 2007). The indicators do not address issues with domestic abuse and violence in homes due to data unavailability. The data on personal human security is collected by crime rates by major type of criminal offences (drug and alcohol, traffic offences and sexual offences) to address the personal risk the Arctic communities in the European Arctic are facing. Analysis of these indicators helps to understand meeting SDG 3 (Healthy life and wellbeing).

Results and discussion The content analysis of documents listed in Table 1 provides understanding of proclaimed human security. Further, I present the findings of experienced human security constructs as composed of economic, health and personal security indicators.

Proclaimed human security in a national context

Sweden Sweden’s approach to human security is linked to its work on human rights. Sweden promotes areas of human rights where it believes itself to be strong at home. Human rights, democracy and the principles of the rule of law in Swedish foreign policy (2016) communication to the government

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does not use the expression ‘human security’ but instead lists as priorities inclusive and democratic societies, equal rights for all, security, justice and accountability and integrated approach.

Additionally, Sweden’s Strategy for Sustainable Peace (2017) focuses on the prevention of armed conflict, effective conflict resolution, sustainable peacebuilding and state-building, increased human security in fragile and conflict-affected states, and empowerment of women as well as of youth, children and other excluded groups in these situations. The Swedish approach is international in nature whereby “the aim of Swedish international development cooperation is to create preconditions for better living conditions for people living in poverty and under oppression” (Strategy for Sustainable peace 2017: 2).

Sweden is in the processes of adopting Agenda 2030. In 2018 it published five implementation briefs covering the following SDGs: 6 - Clean water and sanitation; 7 - Affordable and clean energy; 11 - Sustainable cities and communities; 12 - Responsible consumption and production and 15 Life on land. Remarkably, none of SDGs (1-5) addressing poverty, health, education and equality received a separate briefing.

Norway Norway is one of the lead players in the ‘Human Security Network’ which was formed in 1999 consisting of several states and NGOs that endorsed the concept of human security. The aim of the network is to promote the concept of human security as a feature of national and international policies. The focus of the network is primarily on promoting human rights.

As part of its foreign policy Norway provides human rights guidelines on specific topics that it deems important. Guidelines are available on sexual orientation and gender identity, efforts to support human rights defenders, promoting the abolition of the death penalty, protection and promotion of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to religious minorities and the rights of Indigenous peoples. These documents do not feature human security per se but communicate Norway’s position in human rights priorities.

Norway embarked on adopting UN Agenda 2030 and provides elaborately planned actions for each of the SDGs, but the implementation is hampered by perceived challenges such as sustainable consumption and production, health and education, equality, employment, and migration. The Government prioritizes quality education and employment, especially for young people and those at risk of marginalization.3

Finland Finland’s international human rights policy prioritizes women’s rights, the rights of persons with disabilities, the rights of sexual and gender minorities, the rights of Indigenous peoples, economic, social and cultural rights (The Government of Finland human rights report, 2014).

Analysis of Finnish human security policies demonstrates that Finland applies human security concepts to internal policy. In 2017, Finland published Internal Security Strategy, A Safe and Secure Life that provides a road map for ensuring that Finland will be the safest country in the world, as envisaged in the Government Programme. The strategy recognizes human security risks as youth unemployment (especially for 20-24-year-old males), mental health problems, deprivation and social exclusion. The strategy mentions risks associated with migration, internal group conflicts, crimes and ethical conflicts inside Finland.

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In the implementation of Agenda 2030, Finland focuses on establishing governance structures and in the period 2016-20 put an emphasis on: 1) Rights of women and girls; 2) Reinforcing developing countries’ economies to generate more jobs, improve livelihoods and enhance wellbeing; 3) Democratic and well-functioning societies, including taxation capacity; 4) Food security, access to water and energy, and the sustainable use of natural resource.

Overall, Norway, Sweden and Finland are strong players in the field of human security and human rights, mainly using the means of foreign policy. Notably, Finland is one of the countries that apply human security concept in its internal strategy. All countries embarked on adopting Agenda 2030 and some have prioritized SDGs they are going to pursue. Human security is not utilized as concept in SDGs context.

Proclaimed human security in national Arctic strategies and policies The national Arctic strategies define priorities and demonstrate countries’ values and commitments. I first search whether the national Arctic strategies of Sweden, Norway and Finland contain a reference to “human security”. The term per se is used in neither of documents, but there are some surrogates that try to capture the concept of human security. I continue by searching of mentioning of “human”, “people” and “security” separately to understand in what context these words are used and what meaning they convey. Table 3 summarizes the frequency of words occurrences in the documents.

Table 3 Frequencies of words occurrences in the national Arctic strategies

Strategy document

“Human/s” “People” “Security”

Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (2011)

11

19

28

Norway’s Arctic Strategy (2017)

4

22

10

Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (2013)

6

23

55

Next few examples demonstrate how “human/s”, “people” and “security” are contextualized in each of the strategies.

Human In the Norwegian Arctic strategy “human” is understood in the context of growth: A sustainable region is one that has a balanced population structure and is one where human and natural resources are managed in a way that promotes development and growth (Norway’s Arctic Strategy 2017: 9).

Further growth will have to be based on an even better utilisation of the region’s natural and human resources (Norway’s Arctic Strategy 2017: 23).

The Finnish strategy supports the claim of climate change caused by “human action”. Sweden’s strategy has a whole subchapter dedicated to the “human dimension” addressing amongst others “negative health and social effects of climate change, hazardous substances and the anticipated increase in the use of Arctic natural resources” (Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2011: 41).

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People Norwegian Strategy acknowledges that North Norway “has an ageing population and the proportion of people of working age is decreasing, especially in rural areas (Norway’s Arctic Strategy, 2017: 10)”. However, there are several instances attributable to the future wish, not the current demographic situation in the North whereby: We will build local communities that can attract people of different ages and genders, and with different skills and expertise (Norway’s Arctic Strategy, 2017: 3).

We want even more young people to choose to build their future in the north (Norway’s Arctic Strategy, 2017: 10).

Swedish strategy focuses on sustainable livelihoods for the people: The basic prerequisites for the people living in the Arctic are: a long-term optimism; opportunities for them to earn a livelihood; good communications and social care. In order not to undermine the social or natural environment for people living in the region, its economic developments must be sustainable in the long term. (Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2011: 30) Finnish strategy underlines the need for: increased attention to actions to mitigate climate change; conserve and protect the natural environment; promote the well-being of the local population; and secure the viability of the traditional cultures of the Indigenous people (Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2013: 8).

At the same time Finland’s Arctic strategy emphasizes that “the necessary prerequisites for the welfare of the people living in Finland’s northern parts must be secured. Welfare encompasses mental and material well-being, access to work, efficient basic services, equality, security and education (Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2013: 11)”. This description comes as close to the meaning of human security as possible.

Security Security appears to be a widely used word in all strategies. In Swedish and Norwegian strategies security is tightly linked to foreign policy. Sweden states that “The current security policy challenges in the Arctic are not of a military nature” (Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region: 14), however, the document dates to 2011. Norway’s strategy emphasizes international cooperation for maintaining peace and security. Finland uses the word security in more diverse contexts addressing it from a foreign policy perspective: “Finland promotes stability and security in the region in line with its foreign and security policies (Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2013: 14)”. Finland introduces a notion of a “comprehensive concept of security, which consists of securing the vital functions of society through close cooperation between the authorities, industry, NGOs and citizens” (Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2013: 43).

Finally, Finland has a whole section addressing internal security where it warns of potential security threats in the future: While the Arctic region is of no special concern in terms of crime prevention for the time being, it is important to watch the developments in the area and give due

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consideration to potential future security threats (Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2013: 42).

Overall, Arctic strategy documents do not prioritize human security. People and the human dimension are portrayed with the forward-looking lenses, e.g. Norwegian strategy for the Arctic aspires that young people will choose to build their future in the North but fails to explain how to achieve this goal. Moreover, the Arctic strategies do not explicate how to address human security risks in the Arctic. There is a disconnectedness between state policies and Arctic strategies on the question of human security. The results are in line with Hoogensen Gjørv (2012) that finds that human security values are strongly articulated on the level of international policy, but somewhat disconnected from other actors. Results support the findings of Greaves (2011), Emmerson & Lahn (2012), whereby human security is not considered as an essential part of the Arctic strategies.

Experienced human security in the Arctic

Economic security Economic indicators of human security are presented in Figures 1 and 2. All Arctic regions demonstrate a disadvantaged economic situation for its inhabitants. Smaller disposable income limits human security in terms of access to food, quality living conditions, and leisure activities.

Figure 1 Disposable income per inhabitant in EUR and in Purchasing Power Standard (PPS), 2016

Disposable income, 2016 Oslo and Akershus Norway Stockholm North Norway Helsinki-Uusimaa Sweden Finland North Sweden North and East Finland 0

5,000

10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000

Disposable income in PPS per inhabitant

Disposable income per inhabitant, EUR

Note: see Appendix I and II for data sources

Figure 1 illustrates big differences in disposable income per inhabitant, whereby disposable income in the capital regions is on average 7000 EUR higher if compared to the country-wide averaged income in Sweden, Norway and Finland. People in the northern regions may expect to have on average 4000 EUR less than the corresponding country’s average. The similar result appears when looking at disposable income adjusted by purchasing power standards (PPS) of the actual individual

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consumption of households and by the total resident population. For instance, people in the north of Norway are expected to have at their disposal 10,000 EUR less if compared to the capital region of Oslo and Akershus and over 3500 EUR less than the country average (income in PPS per inhabitant). This finding illustrates a threat to economic security, it creates a negative image of the region and damages attractiveness for newcomers. The growing elderly population that is economically inactive contributes to lower levels of disposable income, coupled with low levels of tertiary education attainment amongst male populations (Business Index North report 2018).

Figure 2 demonstrates that all Arctic regions have poverty risk, which is higher compared to country averages and disproportionately high compared to capital regions. This divide actualizes real problems of material deprivations. North of Sweden has an at poverty risk rate exceeding 16%, meaning that every sixth person is at risk of poverty. Big differences of at poverty risk are observed between capital and northern regions, compare Helsinki-Uusimaa 7% rate to 14% in North and East Finland. Nelson (2013) documents diseases of poverty amongst Arctic Indigenous peoples and Duhaime & Édouard (2015) observe monetary poverty in Inuit Nunangat in Canada.

Economic security indicators used in this study indicate a threat to all Arctic populations including local and Indigenous peoples in Sweden, Norway and Finland.

Figure 2 At poverty risk rate as % of population, 2017

At poverty risk rate as % of population, 2017 North Sweden Sweden North and East Finland North Norway Stockholm Norway Oslo and Akershus Finland Helsinki-Uusimaa 0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

Note: Data from Eurostat

Health security Figure 3 shows that males in the northern regions have considerably lower levels of tertiary education attainment in the range of 20 percentage points when compared to the capital regions and subsequent country’s averages.

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Figure 3 Tertiary education attainment as % of population, by sex, 2018

Tertiary education attaintment as % of population, by sex, 2018 60 50 40 30 20 10

Female

St oc kh Os ol m lo an dA ke rs hu He s lsi nk i-U us im aa

lan d Fin

No rth

an d

Sw ed en

an d

Ea st

Fin l

No rw ay

No rw ay

No rth

No rth

Sw ed en

0

Male

Figure 4 illustrates how basic health needs are met at the hospitals. All countries under analysis have fewer number of beds per 1000 than the EU-28 average of 5.1. North and East Finland, North Norway and North Sweden have a slightly higher number of beds than their country’s averages. This can be attributed to a growing elderly population in the North. The negative trend over the years 2013-2016 demonstrated the worsening of health security. The number of beds in hospitals just shows availability of planned and emergency health care. What is more needed is an understanding of preventive medicine needs and risks in the Arctic.

Figure 4 Number of hospital beds per 1000 people, 2016

Number of hospital beds per 1 000 people, 2016 EU-28 North and East Finland North Norway Finland Oslo and Akershus Norway Helsinki-Uusimaa Upper Norrland Sweden Stockholm 0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

For instance, obesity is much more common in northern Finland where every fourth person (25.9%) aged 24-65 is obese (BMI>30), compared to the national average of 19%.4 Comparable

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measures of health security are needed on the Arctic level. Hartley (2004) suggests that interventions for combating rural-centre disparities should include three key elements—activated patients, prepared practitioners, and community resources.

Personal security The comparison results of crime statistics shall be treated with caution because each country has different methods of registering offences and hence results should be only compared within the country (see Figures 5, 6 and 7).. Figures 5 illustrates crime offence rates in Norway. The northern regions of Finnmark, Troms and Norland exhibit much higher rates than the total of Norway and especially the capital region of Oslo. The most staggering divide is observed in traffic offences between the Finnmark and Oslo region with a rate of 11.8 in Finnmark which is 5.8percentage points higher than in Oslo. Sexual offences are more prevalent in the north of Norway (see Figure 5). Finnmark had the highest rate of 2.7, ahead of Norway’s average of 1.6. Oulu police district had a much higher traffic offences rate than country’s average In Finland sexual offences rate is a bit higher in Oulu police district1.2 compared to Finland’s average of 0.7. Despite rather a low rate of sexual offence in Oulu police district, the city of Oulu image suffered due to several underage rape offences largely covered by the national and international media (Reuters, 2019). The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention reported that sparsely populated regions recorded an increase of reported crimes over the last decade (BRÅ database, 2007). Figure 7 illustrates that in Sweden the biggest difference between the North and Stockholm region is in traffic offences that were 1.9 percentage points higher in the Region Nord. At the same time there are no big regional differences in sexual offences and violations against Narcotics Drug Act. Figure 5 Criminal offences by type in Norway, per 1000 people, 2018.

Criminal offences by type in Norway, per 1 000 people, 2018 Finnmark Troms Nordland Norway total Oslo 0

2

Traffic offences

Source: SSB Norway

Middleton

4

6

Drug and alcohol offences

8

10 Sexual offences

12

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Figure 6 Criminal offences by type in Finland, per 1000 people, 2018

Criminal offences by type in Finland per 1000 people, 2018 Oulu police office Finland total Helsinki police office Lapland police office 0

10

Traffic offences

20

30

Drug and alcohol offences

40

50

Sexual offences

Source: Data from Statistics Finland, custom calculations.

Figure 7 Criminal offences by type in Sweden, per 1000 people, 2018

Criminal offences by type in Sweden, per 1000 people, 2018 Region Nord Region Stockhom Sweden total 0

2

4

Violations of the Traffic Crimes Act

6

8

10

12

Violations against Narcotic Drug Act

Sexual offences

Source: Data from BRÅ (The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention) Region Nord includes: Jämtland, Norrbottens Västerbotten and Västernorrland regions.

Crime offences are closely linked to indicators of economic deprivation (Burton et al, 1994) and negatively affect communities’ social cohesion (Hirschfield & Bowers, 1997). The literature indicates that crime may result from increasing poverty and exclusion in rural areas (Petee & Kowalski, 1993). The risk of any offence is highest in areas with a large proportion of young males (Ceccato & Dolmen, 2011). This can be one of the explanatory factors for higher criminal offences rate in the North since many remote Arctic municipalities have a very high male to female ratio (Middleton, 2019).

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Conclusions The analysis of proclaimed human security in Sweden, Norway and Finland reveals that the countries have a sophisticated understating of human security embodied in the foreign policy.

Domestically human security is put forward through the implementation of Agenda 2030. The Arctic strategies lack human security per se while elaborating on some components of human security such as the wellbeing of the people, improved education and economic growth. These components, however lack concrete targets and action plans.

The results of experienced human security demonstrate that Sweden, Norway and Finland are not performing well in mitigating human security threats in the Arctic. In meeting SDG 1 and 10 (reducing poverty and inequality), especially stark differences exist within the regions of the countries themselves, whereby capital regions have considerable favorable economic security.

Moreover, people in the Arctic regions are almost twice as likely to be at poverty risk, which might come as a surprise to the rest of the world having a picture of Nordic countries as the safest in terms of human security. Hence the achievement of SDG 1 ending poverty is especially relevant for the Arctic regions. Analysis of data on the health components of human security reveal that SDG 4 (Education) and 5 (Gender equality) need to be addressed for the male population, which is disproportionately lower educated resulting in shorter life expectancy and poorer health overall (SDG 3). Gender equality needs to be addressed for providing opportunities for males to receive education and for females to have a diversified job market. Moreover, external health provisions such as beds per population are weakening in the Arctic regions. More information is needed on the roots of health insecurity, such as access to primary care and preventive medicine. Regarding personal security, traffic offences are much higher in the northern regions of Finland than in the country in general and in Sweden North when compared to the capital region. In Norway, sexual offences and drug and alcohol offences are more prevalent in the North than compared to the country average.

These results demonstrate the existence of two different universes inside the countries where the divide between capital and the Arctic regions is especially big. Human security in the Arctic lacks the “people”5 component. To address the challenges of the Arctic regions, a human security approach is useful for mapping human security threats and adds value as an operational tool to ask questions about the roots of insecurity (Human Security Handbook, 2017).

There is no magic to fix challenges in human security overnight, but the approach shall be context specific and inclusive of preventive measures like support for the people that are at the brink of poverty in the Arctic, are subject to sexual abuse or have limited opportunities to participate in quality education. Based on the human security approach mapping a set of specific SDGs (especially addressing poverty) with achievable targets can be adopted in the Arctic. A discussed construct of human security is not all-encompassing since there are many components of human security like environmental ones that were out of the scope of this paper but need to be addressed in further studies. At the same time, it is good to start by tackling the most acute societal problems through a coherent approach, e.g. an Arctic specific set of SDGs, and put an effective monitoring mechanism in place. Furthermore, Arctic strategies can be designed as living documents that act as an interface between “proclaimed” and “experienced” human security through targets, actions and accountability.

Middleton

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Notes 1. See Appendix II for definitions.

2. Available at https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/follow-up-sdg2/id2507259/ 3. Data from Statistical information on welfare and health in Finland (sotkanet.com) 4. See discussion about people-centered approach in Tadjbakhsh (2014).

References Arctic Council. (2016). Arctic resilience report. Stockholm Environment Institute and Stockholm Resilience Centre.

Business Index North (2018). Available at: www.busisnessindexnorth.com BRÅ, 2007. BRÅ – Brottsförebyggande rådet (The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention). Brottsutveckling i Sverige fram till år 2007. Available at: https://www.bra.se/publikationer/arkiv/publikationer/2008-11-21-brottsutvecklingen-isverige-fram-till-ar-2007.html Buzan, B., Wæver, O., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). Security: a new framework for analysis.

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Ceccato, V., & Dolmen, L. (2011). Crime in rural Sweden. Applied Geography, 31(1), 119-135.

Donleavy, G. (2012). Proclaimed graduate attributes of Australian universities: patterns, problems and prospects. Quality Assurance in Education, 20(4), 341-356.

Emmerson, C., & Lahn, G. (2012). Arctic opening: Opportunity and risk in the high north.

Arctic Portal. http://library.arcticportal.org/1671/ Erickson, C. (2010). The Poetics of Fear: A Human Response to Human Security. New York: Continuum.

Finland’s international human rights policy. Available at: https://um.fi/finland-s-internationalhuman-rights-policy Finland’s Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017–2022 https://www.government.se/490051/globalassets/government/block/fakta-ochgenvagsblock/utrikesdepartementet/sanktioner/strategi-hallbar-fred-eng-slutlig.pdf Gasper, D., & Gómez, O. A. (2015). Human security thinking in practice: ‘personal security’,‘citizen security’ and comprehensive mappings. Contemporary Politics, 21(1), 100-116.

Glomsrød, S., & Aslaksen, I. (2008). The economy of the north 2008.

Greaves, W. (2012). For whom, from what? Canada’s Arctic policy and the narrowing of human security. International Journal, 67(1), 219-240.

Hartley, D. (2004). Rural health disparities, population health, and rural culture. American Journal of Public Health, 94(10), 1675-1678.

Heininen, L. (Ed.). (2016). Future security of the global Arctic: State policy, economic security and climate. Springer.

Hirschfield, A., & Bowers, K. J. (1997). The effect of social cohesion on levels of recorded crime in disadvantaged areas. Urban Studies, 34(8), 1275-1295.

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Hoogensen Gjørv, G. (2012). Security by any other name: negative security, positive security, and a multi-actor security approach. Review of international Studies, 38(4), 835-859.

Hoogensen Gjørv, G., Bazely, D., Goloviznina, M. and Tanentzap, A. eds., 2013. Environmental and human security in the Arctic. Routledge.

Hossain, K., & Cambou, D. (Eds.). (2018). Society, Environment and Human Security in the Arctic Barents Region. Routledge. https://www.government.se/49550b/contentassets/f864bf87a5d64f11b033f32e6e1fed3f/huma n-rights-democracy-and-the-principles-of-the-rule-of-law-in-swedish-foreign-policy.pdf https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/follow-up-sdg2/id2507259/ Human Development report 1994. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pd f Human rights, democracy and the principles of the rule of law in Swedish foreign policy (2016) Human Security Handbook (2017). An integrated approach for the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals and the priority areas of the international community and the United Nations system. Available at: https://www.un.org/humansecurity/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/h2.pdf Hunter, A., & McIntosh, M. (2010). New Perspectives on Human Security. Sheffield: Routledge.

Jolly, R., & Basu Ray, D. (2006). National human development reports and the human security framework: A review of analysis and experience. In National human development reports and the human security framework: a review of analysis and experience. Institute of Development Studies.

Kaldor, M., Martin, M., & Selchow, S. (2007). Human security: a new strategic narrative for Europe. International affairs, 83(2), 273-288.

Krause, K. (2007). Towards a practical human security agenda. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

Lahelma, E., Manderbacka, K., Rahkonen, O., & Karisto, A. (1994). Comparisons of inequalities in health: evidence from national surveys in Finland, Norway and Sweden. Social science & medicine, 38(4), 517-524.

Larsen, J. N., & Fondahl, G. (Eds.). (2015). Arctic human development report: Regional processes and global linkages. Nordic Council of Ministers.

Lautensach, A. K. (Ed.). (2013). Human security in world affairs: Problems and opportunities.

CaesarPress.

Lukovich, J. V., & McBean, G. A. (2009). Addressing human security in the Arctic in the context of climate change through science and technology. Mitigation and adaptation strategies for global change, 14(8), 697.

Maslow, A. H. (1970). Motivation and Personality (2nd ed.). New York: Harper & Row Mayring, P. (2004). Qualitative content analysis. A companion to qualitative research, 1, 159-176.

Middleton, A. (2019). Is the future of the European Arctic socially sustainable? Arctic Institute: Articles. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/future-european-arctic-socially-sustainable/ National report on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Finland

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https://kestavakehitys.fi/documents/2167391/2186383/VNK_J1016_National_report_ net.pdf/48be3fcf-d40c-407a-8115-e59b2c0683ee Norway’s human rights guidelines. Available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreignaffairs/human-rights/innsikt/humanrights_guidelines/id737663/ Nyhlén, S., Giritli Nygren, K., Olofsson, A., & Bergström, J. (2018). Human Security, Risk and Sustainability in the Swedish Policy for the Arctic. In Human and Societal Security in the Circumpolar Arctic : Local and Indigenous Communities (pp. 76–99). https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004363045_005 Paris, R. (2001). Human security: paradigm shift or hot air?. International security, 26(2), 87-102.

Petee, T. A., & Kowalski, G. S. (1993). Modeling rural violent crime rates: A test of social disorganization theory. Sociological Focus, 26(1), 87-89.

Pfeffer, J. (1981). Management as symbolic action: the creation and maintenance of organizational paradigm. Research in organizational behavior, 3, 1-52.

Reuters (2019). Sex abuse cases color immigration debate before Finnish election https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-politics-crimes/sex-abuse-cases-colorimmigration-debate-before-finnish-election-idUSKCN1P70OE Ross, C. E., & Wu, C. L. (1995). The links between education and health. American sociological review, 719-745.

Sackmann, S. A. (1992). Culture and subcultures: An analysis of organizational knowledge. Administrative science quarterly, 37(1), 140-61.

Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017–2022. https://www.government.se/490051/globalassets/government/block/fakta-ochgenvagsblock/utrikesdepartementet/sanktioner/strategi-hallbar-fred-eng-slutlig.pdf Sweden and human rights. https://sweden.se/society/sweden-and-human-rights/) Sweden and the transformation towards sustainable and resilient societies https://www.government.se/government-policy/the-global-goals-and-the-2030-Agendafor-sustainable-development/ Tadjbakhsh, S. (2014). Human security twenty years on. NOREF. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center. Available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/181368/540cb240aa84ac7133bce008adcde01f.pdf Tadjbakhsh, S., & Chenoy, A. (2007). Human security: Concepts and implications. Routledge.

The Government of Finland human rights report 2014. Available at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/FIN/INT_CER D_ADR_FIN_22739_E.pdf The Internal Security Strategy, A Safe and Secure Life, is a road map for ensuring that Finland will be the safest country in the world, as envisaged in the Government Programme. (https://intermin.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/sisaisen-turvallisuuden-strategiarakentaa-maailman-turvallisinta-maata) The Local (2017). Swedish midwives launch course on giving birth in cars. https://www.thelocal.se/20170116/swedish-midwives-launch-course-on-giving-birth-incars Wilde, J. de, & Boer, M. den. (2008). The Viability of Human Security. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

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Appendix I Data used for measuring Arctic human security Domain

Indicator

Description

Data Source

Economic

Disposable income per inhabitant

The disposable income of private households is the balance of primary income (operating surplus/mixed income plus compensation of employees plus property income received minus property income paid) and the redistribution of income in cash. These transactions comprise social contributions paid, social benefits in cash received, current taxes on income and wealth paid, as well as other current transfers. Disposable income does not include social transfers in kind coming from public administrations or nonprofit institutions serving households.

Eurostat

The indicator is part of the EU Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) indicator set. It is used to monitor progress towards SDG 10 on reducing inequality within and among countries and SDG 1 on ending poverty in all its forms everywhere.

Middleton

Disposable income in Purchasing power standard (PPS) per inhabitant

The adjusted gross disposable income of Eurostat households per capita in PPS is calculated as the adjusted gross disposable income of households and non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH) divided by the purchasing power standards (PPS) of the actual individual consumption of households and by the total resident population. It is used to monitor progress towards SDG 10.

At risk of poverty rate

This indicator corresponds to the sum of persons who are: at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living in households with very low work intensity. Persons are only counted once even if they are present in several sub-indicators. At risk-of-poverty are persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). Material deprivation covers indicators relating to economic strain and durables. Severely materially deprived persons have living conditions severely constrained by

Eurostat, SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions)

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a lack of resources, they experience at least 4 out of 9 following deprivations items: cannot afford i) to pay rent or utility bills, ii) keep home adequately warm, iii) face unexpected expenses, iv) eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day, v) a week holiday away from home, vi) a car, vii) a washing machine, viii) a colour TV, or ix) a telephone.

People living in households with very low work intensity are those aged 0-59 living in households where the adults (aged 18-59) work 20% or less of their total work potential during the past year. It is used to monitor progress towards SDG 10.

Health

Population aged 25-64 by educational attainment level, sex and NUTS 2 regions (%)

The indicator “Tertiary educational attainment” is defined as the percentage of the population aged 23–64 who have successfully completed tertiary studies (e.g. university, higher technical institution, etc.).

This educational attainment refers to ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) 2011 level 5-8 for data from 2014 onwards and to ISCED 1997 level 5-6 for data up to 2013

Eurostat

It is used to monitor SDG 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. The indicator can also be used to complement the monitoring of SDG 5 (Gender Equality).

Number of hospital bed per thousand inhabitants

Hospitals complement and amplify the effectiveness of many other parts of the health system, providing continuous availability of services for acute and complex conditions. Hospitals concentrate scarce resources within well-planned referral networks to respond efficiently to population health needs. They are an essential element of Universal Health Coverage and are critical to meeting SDG 3 (Good health and wellbeing)

Eurostat

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Registered criminal offences per 1 000 population

Drug and alcohol offences Addressing drug and alcohol offences will help meeting SDG 3, Target 3.5 Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse.

SSB Norway;

Traffic offences Addressing Traffic offences will help meeting SDG’s (3), Target 3.6. By 2020, halve the number of global deaths and injuries from road traffic accidents.

The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention

Sexual offences Addressing sexual offences would lead to meeting SGD 5 (especially Measures to prevent violence against women)

Statistics Finland )

Appendix II NUTS 2 level description according to Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics /NUTS 2016/EU-28 Region NUTS 2

Name used in the article

Composition

FI1D Pohjois- ja North and East Itä-Suomi Finland

Etelä-Savo, Pohjois-Savo, Pohjois-Karjala, KeskiPohjanmaa, Lappi, Kainuu, Pohjois-Pohjanmaa

SE3 Norra Sverige

North Sweden

Norra Mellansverige, Mellersta Norrland, Övre Norrland

NO07 NordNorge

North Norway

Norland, Troms, Finnmark

Middleton

Towards human security in the Arctic: Lessons learned from Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers Magali Vullierme

This research aims at identifying elements that might create an enabling environment for the protection of human security in Canada’s Arctic communities. Human security aims at protecting individual(s) against physical or non-physical, violent or non-violent threats (environment, health, development or well-being). In order to assess the current human security in Canadian Arctic, this research analyses the relational dynamics within Canadian Rangers patrols, which are composed of Indigenous people under the responsibility of non-Indigenous instructors. It focuses on Nunavik, where communities suffer from many risks related to the concept of human security, and analyses a corpus of 21 qualitative interviews and field observations conducted in 2016 and 2017. Data interpretation reveals that the Canadian government indirectly strengthens human security of its Arctic communities through Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers patrols - Canadian Rangers’ youth counterpart. This strengthening of human security in Canadian Arctic communities results from a three-step process based on balanced and respectful relationship dynamics between Inuit Rangers and non-Inuit instructors, allowing Canadian Rangers patrols and Junior Canadian Rangers patrols to act as a source and a guarantee of human security.

Introduction Developed by scholars in the early 1990s, the concept of human security aims at protecting individual(s) against physical or non-physical, violent or non-violent threats. Apart from threats linked to armed conflicts, it includes non-traditional threats to environment, health, development or well-being, for instance (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998; Colard, 2001; David & Roche, 2002; Alkire, 2010; Battistella, Petiteville, Smouts & Vennesson, 2012).

The scope of human security generates many debates that fall outside the scope of this article (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Gore, 2000; King & Murray, 2001; Krause, 2001; Rioux, 2001; Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, 2006; Fukuda-Parr & Messineo, 2012). For the purpose of this article, I focus on the broad definition of human security, given by the 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) (United Nations, 1994). This definition classifies threats to human security into seven categories: community security (threatened by tensions between ethnic groups, loss of traditional Magali Vullierme is a postdoctoral Researcher Fellow at the University of Versailles-Saint-Quentin (CEARC, France) and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, France), and Associate Researcher at the Observatory of Artic Politics and Security (OPSA, QC, Canada).

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culture etc.), economic security (threatened by unemployment, poverty, loss of home etc.), environmental security (threatened by pollution, desertification, salinization etc.), food security (threatened by hunger, deficiencies etc.), health security (threatened by injuries, diseases, malnutrition etc.), personal security (threatened by torture, domestic violence, rape, suicide etc.) and, finally, political security (threatened by political repressions, control of information etc.).

As a strong supporter1 of human security, Canada largely mobilized this concept in its foreign approach within peacekeeping operations and protection of human rights. However, “although human security is a people-centred approach to foreign policy, it can also be viewed as an approach to domestic policy” (Slowey, 2013: 190).2 This domestic approach seems particularly relevant in a context where Indigenous peoples suffer from risks partly originating from federal policies of assimilation applied in residential schools and of forced settlement, as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) underlined it in 1996 (Government of Canada, 1996)3 while criticizing Canada’s contradictory attitude: We believe firmly that the time has come to resolve a fundamental contradiction at the heart of Canada: that while we assume the role of defender of human rights in the international community, we retain, in our conception of Canada’s origins and make-up, the remnants of colonial attitudes of cultural superiority that do violence to the Aboriginal peoples to whom they are directed (Government of Canada, 1996: 15).

In addition, several academics have already advocated the analyses of contemporary Arctic security through human security lenses (Owen, 2008; Hoogensen Gjorv, Bazely, Christensen, Tanentzap & Bojko, 2009; Hoogensen Gjorv, Bazely, Goloviznina & Tanentzap, 2013; Exner-Pirot, 2012; Greaves, 2016; Hossain & Petrétei, 2016). As Owen (2008) explains, regions of developed countries suffer from the most severe threats to human security, particularly “many northern Indigenous communities” (Owen, 2008: 447). As an answer, successive Canadian northern policies referred to vocabulary related to the concept of human security, such as “well-being”, “development”, “unemployment”, or “fight against suicide” (Government of Canada, 2009 & 2017; Exner-Pirot, 2012; Landriault, 2013; Lackenbauer & Dean, 2016). But how is human security applied in practice?

How does it work at the operational level? This article assesses the current mobilisation of human security in the Arctic at the Canadian domestic level.

To determine whether this concept is currently mobilised in the Arctic, this research analyses relational dynamics within Canadian Ranger patrols and Junior Canadian Rangers patrols in Quebec. Even though they work closely together on a daily basis, Canadian Ranger patrols and Junior Canadian Rangers patrols depend on different administrations. The former is a subcomponent of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the latter is a youth development program. Located in remote, sparsely inhabited and isolated areas of Canada, Canadian Ranger patrols are mainly composed of Indigenous men and women under the responsibility of nonIndigenous instructors (2 CRPG, 2016a, 2016b; Lackenbauer, 2006, 2007 & 2013; Kikkert & Stern, 2017). Part of the Rangers’ core mission is to demonstrate Canadian sovereignty, although they also train with Regular and Primary Reserve forces, conduct search and rescue (SAR) operations and are responsible for Junior Canadian Rangers patrols (Defence Administrative Orders and Directives, 2015). Intended for Indigenous youth aged 12 to 18, the Junior Canadian Rangers program was officially launched in 1996 to fight suicides. The program develops traditional skills, life skills, and Rangers skills (National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman, 2016) and is

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focused on the Prevention of Harassment and Abuse through Awareness and Education (PHASE) program. As a “culturally and geographically-sensitive program”, PHASE “teaches Junior Canadian Rangers about different forms of harassment (personal, racial, sexual, emotional), abuse (physical, sexual, neglect), and appropriate forms of discipline. PHASE also deals with substance, solvent and alcohol abuse, and teenage suicide” (Junior Canadian Rangers, 2018).

This inductive and exploratory research focuses on Canadian Ranger patrols and Junior Canadian Rangers patrols from Nunavik, a region located in Northern Quebec. It interprets a corpus of 21 interviews and field observations conducted in 2016 and 2017 in Aupaluk (Nunavik, Quebec, Canada) 4 and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu (Quebec, Canada). I interviewed members of the 2 Canadian Rangers Patrol Group (2 CRPG), which is responsible for Nunavik – ten Rangers (R-1 to R-10) and eleven instructors or other ranked officers (M-1 to M-11). I analysed this corpus applying an inductive approach resulting in a threefold codification conducted with the software Atlas.ti.

Data interpretation revealed that Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers patrols strengthen human security of Nunavik communities – although this interpretation has potential broader applicability across Canadian Arctic.5 This strengthening results from a three-step process: (i) as a first step, my results reveal balanced relationships between Rangers and instructors of a same patrol. This balance derives from the adaptation of Canadian Armed Forces and of their trainings to Indigenous cultures. It also results from instructors’ willingness to work with Indigenous culture, from their open-mindedness and their humility; (ii) then, as a second step, I identify a respectful approach to Indigenous culture. Indeed, according to data, balanced relationships in those patrols seem not to be detrimental to Indigenous culture. On the contrary, illustration of instructors’ assimilation – albeit limited – were identified in the data analysis (especially the relationship to time). In addition, data reveals numerous elements reinforcing Inuit agency, which explains communities’ active support towards this unique military subcomponent; (iii) finally, the third and last step relates more directly to human security. Thanks to these balanced relationships and this respectful approach, those patrols act as a source and a guarantee of human security, strengthening several categories of human security in Arctic communities.

We will examine further the details of these three steps.

First step: Necessary balanced relationships According to my first result, balanced relationships exist between Rangers and instructors of a same patrol. This first necessary step derives from a structural adaptation of the patrols and from a personal adaptation of their members.

Balanced relationships through structural adaptation According to data interpretation, the current balanced relations between Inuit and instructors result from three elements related to the structural adaptation of Canadian Rangers patrols.

First, patrols result today from decades of adjustment carried out by the Canadian Armed Forces.

Rangers’ structure and trainings were adjusted to take into account the specific communities’ livelihood (Lackenbauer, 2013; Kikkert & Stern, 2017). For example, the strict military style was partially abandoned, especially the training schedules, to better take into account the cultural dimension. As R-10 said: “At first, they were doing the way they were supposed to do in the Army but sometimes, that does not work, sometimes we have to tell them how we do it in the North.”

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Another example is linked to the strict hierarchical military decision-making process, as R-4 explained: “Rangers did not appreciate how strict it was or how... sometimes the military from the South were overbearing and they didn’t take the advice of the elders.”

Second, according to both parties, many similarities between the Inuit world and the military world exist. Most of the time, participants mentioned “family”, “courage”, “respect”, “team work”, and “integrity” as shared values. According to M-1, “When communities see that ‘I respect you, I listen to you, I hear you, and we share our knowledge instead of asserting it’, there is no conflict… On a military base, everyone works together; everyone helps each other (…). You have to listen and share. Life on the Arctic field, under a Ranger tent, is the same. You have to build, to be autonomous, to use field resources, and to adapt.” This value of helping and listening to each other appears crucial to develop balanced relationships.

Third, patrols function currently thanks to the regular inclusion and consultation of members.

Decisions are taken by consensus, particularly after asking the elders. For instance, they are systematically consulted to discuss the best itinerary or the best way to perform an exercise; similarly, as observed on the field, the whole patrol is also included when it comes to order new equipment. This decision-making process differs completely from the hierarchy military model and appears central for the patrols. Thanks to these regular consultations, patrols seem to structurally work with mutual exchange, hence enabling balanced relations.

Balanced relationships through personal adaptation These current balanced relationships between Inuit and instructors depend also on two elements linked to personal adaptation of one part of their members: Ranger Instructors. Indeed, data show that the proper operation of the patrols seems closely linked to the adaptation of the instructors to Inuit culture – and even more to their ‘assimilation’, as illustrated in the second step – rather than to the adaptation of the Inuit to military culture.

The first element relates to instructors’ ability to adapt and “not to judge”, and many participants reiterated that the Rangers were “not for everyone.” At 2 CRPG, “if you stay more than 10 months [or between 6 and 18 months according to M-5], the standard is that you’ll stay forever” (M-10).

To sum up, “we volunteer twice6: when we arrive and when we leave, because to date, nobody got fired. And we become quite experts with Indigenous culture in the long run.” In addition, all participants emphasized that Ranger Instructors must be “open minded”, “able to adapt”, and “humble” (M-5, M-7). This is especially important since a 2 CRPG instructor may be required to work with different Indigenous people (Inuit, Innu, Cree, etc.), requiring even more personal adaptation.

The second element derives from instructors’ motivations to join 2 CRPG. Along with the fact that 2 CRPG reservists benefit from full-time assignments, instructors explain that they join the Rangers to “challenge” themselves and to “go out of their comfort zone” by working with civilians, furthermore Indigenous civilians. For others, working with Indigenous people is clearly the reason they joined: some wanted to try traditional ways-of-doing; others to learn from another culture.

These motivations show instructors’ willingness to personally adapt to Indigenous culture, and more specifically, Inuit culture.

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Conclusion As illustrated by my data, patrols function thanks to balanced relationships resulting from two specific adaptations.

The historic evolution of patrols structures has allowed for a better understanding between instructors and Rangers. Participants’ remarks highlight that the ‘classic’ military style did not seem to work within patrols. This balance also results from similarities between these two groups. In addition, regular inclusion and consultation of Inuit members in decision-making processes is central. Only with time and consideration of cultural and human differences in patrols structure did the patrols find their balance.

Data showed that cooperation within the Canadian Rangers also requires personal adaptation of instructors. Participants indicated several capacities necessary to understand and accept cultural differences within this military sub-element (adaptability, humility, open-mindedness). In addition, the discovery of new cultures is one of the most frequently cited reasons by instructors to come to work at 2 CRPG. To conclude, a first necessary step to strengthen human security is balanced relationships.

However, how are working those balanced relationships on a daily basis? Are those patrols also respectful to Inuit culture? Are they a modern tool to assimilate Inuit further?

Second step: Respectful approach to Inuit culture According to my second result, balanced relationships within patrols are not detrimental to Indigenous culture (see also Vullierme, 2018). This second step follows the mobilisation of two important concepts: assimilation and agency.

In my data, even though I identified discourses linked to assimilation, those data relate to the (limited) assimilation of non-Indigenous Ranger Instructors rather than of Inuit Ranger(s). Before going further, one must not forget the painful history of forced assimilation endured by Indigenous peoples through much of Canadian history (evangelization, residential schools, and forced resettlement). That being (very briefly!) reminded, many cultural differences still exist and when someone goes “up North”, s/he has to adapt to a different culture. In the past, this led to the adaptation of Canadian Ranger patrols (see step one); today, this leads to a limited assimilation of Ranger Instructors. However, this limited assimilation obviously results from a completely different process than the one endured by Indigenous peoples. In this case study, assimilation refers to a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups develop memories, feelings and attitudes towards other persons or groups; and, by sharing their experience and their history, they build a common cultural life. Since assimilation reveals this sharing of tradition, this intimate participation to common experiences, it is a central phenomenon in historical and cultural process. (…) Imitation and suggestion lead to a progressive and unconscious modification of attitudes and feelings of group members. The resulting unity is not necessarily univocal; it results more from a set of experiences and orientation allowing the development of common goals and actions (Park, 1924. Quoted in Schnapper, 1998: 194).

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By witnessing Inuit experience, history and tradition, instructors modify progressively and (un)consciously their memories, attitudes and feelings towards Inuit people, allowing the development of a common cultural life with goals and actions as a Rangers patrol.

Apart from this limited assimilation, participants’ interviews also reveal how patrols strengthen Inuit agency. Briefly said, agency is the human capacity to intentionally influence the course of one’s life and actions, as well as to influence others, collective action systems, or the social and natural space (Bandura, 1989, 1994, 2001). Inuit agency reinforcement also explains their active support towards this unique military subcomponent.

Respectful approach through instructors’ ‘assimilation’ Data analysis revealed three elements of Ranger Instructors ‘assimilation’ to Inuit culture.

First, working within the Canadian Rangers allows Ranger Instructors to better understand differences between Indigenous peoples. During interviews, several instructors admitted mingling Canadian Indigenous peoples (i.e. Inuit, First Nations, and Métis). For instance, before joining 2 CRPG, several instructors were unaware of the differences of life in Inuit communities and life in First Nation reserves. As M-5 underlined: “At the beginning, like almost everyone, we believed: ‛we know, Indigenous peoples do not pay taxes’ and everything. (...). People will sometimes criticize, they will judge those people but most of the time, they just don’t know.”

Then, patrols show the high capabilities of Inuit Rangers. According to Ranger Instructors and to outsiders, patrols’ abilities are remarkable. A huge part of the Rangers’ strength (both individually and collectively) derives from their everyday “skills and expert local knowledge” (Lackenbauer, 2013: 14). My data confirm this, since several instructors communicated strong admiration towards “their” Rangers.

Finally, by spending time with Inuit Rangers and getting to know them, instructors develop a very close relationship with their Rangers, which leads to the ‘assimilation’ of parts of Inuit culture. I predominately detected Ranger Instructors’ ‘assimilation’ to Inuit culture with the relationship to time – an essential component of Inuit culture. For instance, as M-9 said: “In the North, you cannot ask them to hurry up, to run, it is not normal. They will do it if it is a matter of life or death, if someone is injured, in that case, they will hurry up. Otherwise, why hurry up? We will do things slowly and we will do things right. It is a different world when it comes to that.” This relationship to time, already identified by previous scholars (Lackenbauer, 2007; Kikkert & Stern, 2017) has been a persistent theme during the Canadian Rangers’ seventy-year history, and the organization has adapted to this cultural reality as already underlined in step one (see also Lackenbauer, 2013).

Some instructors also assimilated Inuit styles of education, especially M-7 who explained how he “brings back home” educational tools that he discovered while working with his patrols: “Learning by experience. So they will watch and do. I brought that back home and I am happy about that. I have a good mix, I think.”

Respectful approach through Inuit agency Patrols strongly reinforce Inuit agency, since Canadian Ranger patrols are closely linked to Indigenous person’s will, as shown by the three following elements: First, agency is illustrated either when Inuit join a patrol, when they participate in training exercises, and/or when they choose to leave the organization. Indeed, volunteering to serve as a Ranger

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derives from a personal choice; consequently, a Ranger could quit training or operations or leave a patrol in case of disagreement. This has happened in the past when conflicts occurred (Lackenbauer, 2006).

Then, according to Inuit participants, the main reason why they join a patrol is to help their families and communities. As highlighted by R-5, Ranger training allows them to save lives: “personally, for me, it is to gain knowledge on survival or rescuing, helping people, to get trained, to protect... just in case something happens to [my] family and [my] friends.” R-3 also talks about the important role of Rangers: “I just want people to be safe and normal… Sometimes they are hurt and they cannot walk. They are hurt because we get very cold very fast... It is very special because everybody has to be OK… until we find them... very special people... we have to search.” Accordingly, while Rangers interviewed are very proud to be part of the military, their answers emphasised more the central role played by patrols in SAR operations and in the protection of their community with the Juniors.

Finally, Rangers’ agency is also revealed by the Junior Canadian Rangers programme. As R-4 shares, this programme was launched at the instigation of Inuit leaders since it started in 1995 as an unofficial programme financed by Kativik, the regional government in Nunavik (see also Lackenbauer, 2013: 365). Launched in 1996, the Junior Rangers have expanded since, numbering 4421 youth in 141 patrols across Canada as of 2016 (National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman, 2016). This expansion also reflects Indigenous peoples’ agency since the implementation of a Junior Rangers patrol in a community derives from individual initiatives, as explained by R-7.

Conclusion As illustrated by my data, patrols apply a respectful approach to Inuit culture thanks to two mechanisms.

Data highlight limited assimilation of Ranger Instructors. This assimilation results from a better understanding of Canadian Indigenous peoples. Patrols also reveal the remarkable capabilities of Rangers patrols. Finally, instructors develop a very close relationship with their patrols, allowing them to assimilate parts of Inuit culture, namely the relationships to time and educational tools.

This respectful approach also results from the active contributions of Inuit, as active agents, in Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers patrols. Indeed, Inuit join Canadian Rangers patrols, participate in training and exercises for Search and Rescue, or create and support a Junior Canadian Rangers patrol to be better trained, to save local lives, and to help youth in their communities.

This second step is necessary to create balanced relationships based on respect for Inuit culture.

But do these balanced relationships and respectful approach also strengthen human security?

Third step: Strengthening of human security categories According to my third and final result, these balanced relationships and this respectful approach within patrols helps to strengthen several categories of human security in Arctic communities. This third and last step reveals how Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers act as a source and a guarantee of human security, thanks to the concept of self-efficacy deriving from Bandura’s agency theory (Bandura, 1989 & 2001). Self-efficacy is the belief in one’s ability – or group ability

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– to influence events; this belief affects that person’s life and control over his or her experiences.

“A strong sense of efficacy enhances human accomplishment and personal well-being in many ways. People with high assurance in their capabilities approach difficult tasks as challenges to be mastered rather than as threats to be avoided” (Bandura, 1994: 71). Hence, self-efficacy, like human security in its broad sense, is related to the well-being and to the fulfilment of each individual (personal self-efficacy) or of a group (collective self-efficacy). However, if self-efficacy is a source of well-being, the concept of human security guarantees it. Hence, self-efficacy seems needed to strengthen human security, as demonstrated below.

Patrols as a source of human security According to my data, patrols are a source of human security thanks to the deepening of personal and collective self-efficacy beliefs within Junior Canadian Rangers patrols and Canadian Rangers patrols, as detailed below.

Canadian Junior Rangers reinforce personal and collective self-efficacy of Juniors and of the community as a whole. Three elements illustrate this in my data. First, qualified as a ‘safe place’ by participants, Junior patrols play a key role for the youth since they are frequently the only entertainment facility available in the communities. Then, Junior patrols work particularly on youth personal development and fulfilment. For example, leadership and public speaking exercises organised during summer camps help them feel confident, thus reinforcing their personal selfefficacy. Finally, Junior patrols lead to a positive spin-off for communities, since the program shows communities’ abilities as a group to mobilize the necessary motivation, resources and behaviours to develop in the best ways, contributing indirectly to collective self-efficacy.

Canadian Rangers also play a role in personal and collective self-efficacy reinforcement, as shown by two elements. First, this role seems closely linked to SAR training. For instance, R-1 joined the Rangers “to have more knowledge about search and rescue. It is really important. This situation can happen again sooner or later. It is really important not to lose someone during a search and rescue”. Ranger Instructors also underlined the “positive impact [of Rangers]. Yes, because, when they are called in for a SAR, we know we can count on them” (M-7) – either when they are called in as local ground SAR team, or when the Rangers patrol is activated for long SAR operations.

Then, several data also refer to the importance of resources (GPS, maps, compass) and their technical apprenticeship. According to Inuit respondents, this apprenticeship allows the enhancement of their “tool box” thanks to the interaction between “modernity” and local knowledge. Rangers add technical knowledge learned during trainings to field, orientation and survival knowledge learned in family. In my corpus, these two sets of knowledge, far from being opposite, complete each other and are used simultaneously depending on the weather. As R-10 sums up, “It is working very well. The training that we received and the local knowledge... when you put together the two cultures, the military culture and the Inuit culture, you sort of mix them together and you find unity.” Witnessing their important abilities during SAR operations, patrols enhance personal and collective self-efficacy of the Rangers.

Trainings and resources received by the Rangers allow them to be more efficient and to be seen as trustworthy persons able to save more lives. This directly impacts their personal (as Ranger) and their collective (as patrol) self-efficacy.

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Patrols as a guarantee of human security Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers patrols also guarantee human security, since they directly or indirectly protect several 1994 HDR human security categories.

Data highlights how patrols directly guarantee personal security. Briefly said, personal security could be threatened by domestic violence, abuse, rapes or suicide. In this research, participants’ vocabulary can be directly linked to personal security, particularly while speaking about youth suicides and the Prevention of Harassment and Abuse through Awareness and Education (PHASE) program. Indeed, youth suicide was largely mentioned by participants, as highlighted by M-8: If we give up Junior program, it would be a disaster! Because‌ Go up north, check on the other kids... At the end of the day, according to me but also to the others, we make a difference up there... In the Junior program, in Quebec, suicide rate is less than 1%. So, it is important, right? I only heard about two or three suicides‌ Implemented as an answer to this issue, the PHASE program remains a key tool to combat suicides, abuse and harassment, and accordingly, to strengthen personal security.

Patrols also play a direct role in strengthening community security. As already underlined in the introduction, community security is threatened, for example, by the loss of traditional culture and loss of intergenerational bonds. Two interdependent dynamics arise from my data. First, and even though Rangers and Juniors are administratively separate, close ties exist between those patrols: Rangers are responsible for Junior Rangers weekly meetings; some Rangers used to be Juniors; others launched the Junior Rangers patrol of their community; finally, Ranger Instructors are responsible for the Junior Rangers during specific events (summer camps, recruitments of new Juniors). As a corollary, these close ties help transmit culture and rebuild intergenerational bonds broken by the Canadian government in Indigenous residential schools. Apart from the crucial preservation of Inuit culture, keeping the knowledge is a key point for Canadian Rangers patrols, especially for SAR operations (field and survival knowledge) (M-1). According to the data, this rebuilding is partly possible through the organisation of activities and summer camps, and through meetings with adults and elders. Working closely together, Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers are rebuilding intergenerational bonds within communities. This rebuilding reduces the risk to community security by transmitting and preserving traditional culture.

Finally, patrols indirectly secure three other categories: economic, food and health security.

Primary, Junior Rangers program could reduce threats to economic security by encouraging youth to attend school (M-5) and university (M-11). This encouragement to stay at school and to attend university might impact on the long run on the economic security of Juniors and of communities as a whole. Indeed, economic security is, for instance, threatened by unemployment, which is a reality in most Canadian Arctic communities. That being said, having diplomas does not guarantee employment if there are no jobs available in communities. Secondly, some of my data can be linked to food and health securities. As a reminder, food security is the access to healthy food at a reasonable price and can be threatened by hunger or deficiencies. Access to food at an affordable price is not an option in Inuit communities. Transported by planes or by boats, products are three to four times more expensive than in the South. The most affordable food in the cooperative (the local grocer) is mainly crisps, which impacts the health security of Inuit (increase of high blood

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pressure, malnutrition) (Fergurson, 2011; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014; Greaves, 2016). One of the main domains of the Junior program deals with land skills (“Rangers skills”). Junior Rangers summer camps are built upon several outdoors activities, one of them being fishing tours – an instructor even explains that he witnessed the first catch of a Junior during a summer camp. Within Ranger patrols, part of the training is devoted to hunting and fishing, since those activities are closely linked to survival skills in the tundra. As a result, Junior and Ranger patrols could reduce food and health insecurity of Inuit communities in the long run.

Conclusion As demonstrated, patrols strengthen human security categories thanks to two dynamics.

Patrols are a source of human security for Arctic communities. The Junior Canadian Rangers program works on personal and collective self-efficacy of the youth and the community, in particular by working on personal development. The Canadian Rangers also strengthen personal and collective self-efficacy by showing the abilities, the values and the accomplishments of the Rangers, but also the importance of preserving Inuit knowledge and culture.

Patrols are also a guarantee of human security for Arctic communities, since patrols help reduce several risks to human security. Some of these risks are directly mentioned in the data (personal security, community security); while others are indirectly identified (economic security, food security).

Overall conclusion: Strengthening of human security through a three-step process Through an inductive and exploratory analysis of relationship dynamics between Inuit Rangers and non-Inuit instructors, this article illustrates the current human security of Canadian Arctic communities. This domestic approach of human security shows that the strengthening of human security results from a three-step process based on balanced and respectful relationship dynamics between Inuit Rangers and non-Inuit instructors, allowing Canadian Rangers patrols and Junior Canadian Rangers patrols to act as a source and a guarantee of human security. This strengthening is a consequence of these patrols, without being their official mandate. Indeed – and even though there are many references to community well-being in official documents about the Arctic – this strengthening does not originate from a federal policy focused on human security. According to this exploratory research, the Canadian government thus indirectly strengthens human security of its Arctic community through its Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers patrols.

Beyond the Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers patrols, this study identifies several elements that create an environment conducive to cooperation between populations of different cultures. Thus, for such cooperation to work in the long term, it is necessary to build the relationships on structural and personal adaptation leading to mutual respect, balanced sharing of knowledge and inclusion of both cultures and of both parties in decision-making processes. As shown in my research, this implies, for instance, that each individual must be open-minded and able to adapt or, even more, be ready to assimilate into part of the culture of his or her counterpart, when living in or visiting the environment of the other party.

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Notes 1. Mainly promoted by Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 2000.

2. See also: Tadjbakhsh, 2005; Kaldor, 2006.

3. See also: Robelin, 2003; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015.

4. Aupaluk, located in Ungava Bay, is the smallest community of Nunavik with about 200 inhabitants.

5. To consult similar conclusions within Rangers patrol from Nunavut (1 CRPG), see Lackenbauer (2007) and Kikkert & Stern (2017).

6. Ranger Instructors from 2 CRPG are reservists, which is not the case for other CRPG. For instance, Ranger Instructors from 1 CRPG are part of the Regular Forces and, as a result, are posted in Nunavut communities.

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Lessons learned from Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers

Combining critical security studies in the Barents Region Matthaios Melas

As the 2006-2012 Arctic hype has settled and we are now heading towards the second decade of the 21st century, a sober approach to Arctic security is needed. Traditional military security may never disappear from the Barents, a region that includes a border between Russia and NATO. However, environmental and societal security could keep traditional security aspects in the background, as contemporary critical security aspects are becoming more important for the prosperity of the region. By deepening and widening the security agenda, it is easier to identify who is threatened, whose security we are concerned about and who would be responsible to provide security in the Barents Region. So, in what ways could critical security studies contribute towards a holistic approach to the Barents Region, concerning the environment and local population? Redefining the security of the Barents is imperative in order to pursue solutions for actual security problems instead of hunting ghosts from the past.

Environmental and societal security are inherently connected in the Barents Region and a thorough analysis of their interdependence is essential. Chain reactions that could be triggered through a potential damage to the environment could have severe impacts on population that depends heavily on traditional ways of living like fishing, gathering and herding. Moreover, environmental concerns exist within geopolitical agendas as environmental disasters could lead to turmoil and migration.

Nevertheless, international and bilateral cooperation in the area, concerning environmental protection and human prosperity, is favouring the endeavours for a better future of the Barents Region.

Introduction While examining a harsh and fragile area like the Barents Sea, which is a part of the Arctic Ocean, from a geographical perspective, it is very important to consider the environmental issues of the area. Additionally, this environment is the home of Indigenous and other local populations whose prosperity is inherently connected with the welfare of the land and the sea of the region. Critical security studies provide a useful toolbox of analysis of those aspects, by focusing on different referent objects like the environment and people. The environmental security of the Arctic has a twofold application. The first one concerns the protection of the region from potential endogenous sources of environmental harm like an oil spill from an extraction platform or shipping, nuclear waste, plastic waste, biodiversity loss, overfishing and degradation of herding lands. The second one deals with the exogenous effects of the global climate change in the Barents Region. The rising Matthaios Melas is a PhD candidate at Aberystwyth University UK.

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temperatures, which lead to the shrinking of the sea ice extent and the thawing of the permafrost, should be tackled on the global scale and not in the region under examination per se. The burning of fossil fuels does contribute negatively to climate security issues, while the impacts are often geographically displaced and diverse.

Environmental security in the Barents Region The environment became part of the security concerns of Norway in the early 2000s. As Hossain et al point out, “While traditional security issues, like war and conflict, may not be a source of tension in the region, non-traditional security issues – transcending national jurisdictions – often pose significant challenges for northern communities” (2017: 3). Even during the first decade of the new millennium, a prevailing concern for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was nuclear waste in northwest Russia. As the Ministry argued, There exists in our immediate vicinity nuclear energy along with a great number of demobilised nuclear submarines, large stocks of spent reactor fuel and radioactive waste in solid and liquid form. There are hundreds of lighthouses along the coast of the Kola Peninsula run by inadequately secured and highly radioactive sources. We are confronted by a threat to the environment and security; it is obviously in our interests therefore to help solve the problems (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004).

Nuclear contamination or an oil spill in the Barents Sea could ruin its rich fishing waters and severely harm the economies of both Norway and Russia.

It is not just the physical environment that is changing but also the ecosystem. Global warming has caused several fish species in the Barents Sea to move further northeast at a considerable pace. It is imperative to monitor what is happening north of Svalbard. 2018 was the second-warmest year, after 2017, in the Arctic since 1900. A continuous, rapid increase in temperature has been seen in the region, greater than increases in the rest of the world (Markusson, 2018; Renner, et al, 2018).

There are concerns about pollution in the fragile environment of the Svalbard archipelago, as even the smallest leak of diesel is enough to kill sea birds. Furthermore, it is very difficult to take action in the event of an oil spill in the area because of the harsh environmental conditions. If the oil reaches the sea, the damage is done (Berglund, 2013).

The Arctic will continue to change until 2050, even if we manage to stabilise the increasing temperature below the 2˚C threshold agreed in the Paris Agreement. Melting sea ice, plastic waste and loss of biodiversity are the major environmental issues in the Arctic and are a significant burden for marine, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems. The summer sea ice volume has already been reduced by 75% from the 1970s, and by 2040 it is very likely that the Arctic Ocean will be ice-free during summer (Kroglund, 2018). Along with the shrinking of sea ice, the habitats of sea-icedependent species are shrinking as well, with crucial effects on walruses, seals and polar bears.

Recent changes in rain and snow patterns are also allowing ice to cover the vegetation (moss and lichens) and, as a result, reindeers and caribous cannot reach their food (Kroglund, 2018). For people who make a living from harvesting, fishing, herding and agriculture, these changes will have devastating effects. Sadly, significant quantities of marine litter have been found in the Arctic, including microplastics. Some of them come from the Arctic, but the majority reaches the Arctic through sea currents from all around the world. More research is needed to understand the true hazards of microplastics, as they are being absorbed by filter feeding microorganisms that form the Combining critical security studies at the Barents Region

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very base of the food chain (Gillman, 2018). As the Arctic sea ice retreats, more human activity, such as shipping, fishing and exploration for fossil fuels, is taking place within pristine habitats, increasing the possibility of a disastrous accident that pushes the Arctic region to the brink of a natural catastrophe.

The rate of warming in the Arctic is much faster than that for the rest of the planet, and unusual weather patterns are already developing, such as the “Beast from the East� in the UK in late February 2018 (Gabbatiss, 2018). Recent research has confirmed that temperatures in the Arctic are increasing approximately three times faster than the global average. One of the main reasons is the loss of sea ice in the Region. As Arctic sea ice melts, energy from the sun that would have been reflected is instead absorbed by the ocean. In combination with weather systems, this warming has global effects on climate. A polar vortex, a low-pressure weather system in the stratosphere over the Arctic, creates strong west-to-east winds that encircle the North Pole.

Boundary winds between this polar vortex and another in the troposphere create the jet stream winds, and the position and strength of the jet stream have a big impact on mid-latitude weather.

When the jet stream is strong, its fast-flowing winds provide a barrier between the cold air over the Arctic and the milder air further south. When it weakens, the jet stream slows and can develop kinks. This allows the cold Arctic air to spill out into the mid-latitudes and for warmer air to spill in the Arctic Region (McSweeney, 2018).

Figure 1: Schematic of stratospheric (blue) and tropospheric (red) polar vortices.

(Waugh, Sobel, & Polvani, 2017: 38)

If the updated Paris agreement target of limiting the global rise in temperature to 1.5oC is not achieved, important fish species, such as the Atlantic cod and its Arctic relative, the Polar cod,

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would have less chance of survival. Moreover, their habitats could move further north, as many of these species can spawn only in very cold waters. For example, Atlantic cod currently spawn near the Lofoten archipelago, northwest of Norway. The currents take the floating eggs, and later the larvae, northwards to their ideal living conditions in the Barents Sea (Ryan, 2019). Rising temperatures are not the only problem for the fish. Increased acidification of the oceans and seas has also been observed because as more CO2 builds up in the atmosphere, more dissolves in the ocean. Carbon dioxide reacts with water to form carbonic acid, which acidifies the ocean. As a result, the traditional habitats of Atlantic and Polar cod around the coasts of Norway and Iceland are becoming warmer and more acidic. Consequent losses for the fishing industry could be severe, as £2 billion-worth of cod (800,000 tonnes) are caught in this area every year.

Societal security in the Barents Region According to the Copenhagen School of thought, societal security is “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Wæver et al, 1993: 23). Societal security considers the issues that affect the identity of a society, because if a society loses its identity, it could cease to exist. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998) argue that when the existence of a society or a societal identity is threatened, resulting in the possible loss of a communal feeling, protection of the society’s survival and sustainability call for extraordinary measures. Giddens (1991) has argued that societal security is rooted in political sociology – it is about a relationship between community and security. The Aberystwyth School of thought has contributed to the deepening of the security agenda from the state towards community and individuals. In the Barents Region, the Indigenous communities could be the most valuable actor and contribute the most to the welfare of the Indigenous population. As has been argued by Booth, security of the state does not always mean the security of the individual.

Human security can adequately promote societal security for the populations of the Barents Region by protecting their identities and the existence of their distinct communities. “Human security, as a concept and theoretical platform, can support different voices and perspectives” (Hoogensen, 2014: 70). The understanding of human security overlaps with the concept of societal security, as “the ability of a society to persist under changing conditions and possible and actual threats. More specifically … the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom” (Hosain et al, 2017: 61). Placing the individual and the societies where they belong as referent objects, the key aspect of societal security becomes the security of every individual.

According to the regional security complex theory of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, “since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters – security complexes” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 4).

Within a security complex, states and other actors are strongly related such that their securities are entangled and inseparable. In the Arctic region, this idea applies to the environment and the Indigenous populations, who are spread across national borders. The work of the Arctic Council – from the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (ACIA) and Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) to the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) (2009) and Search and Rescue agreement (2011) – follows the principles of a regional security complex.

Security complexes are particularly remarkable in the Arctic, as they address traditional security issues even though the primary basis for the interdependence of security issues is human security Combining critical security studies at the Barents Region

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(Exner-Pirot, 2012). Sven-Roald Nystø, former president of the Norwegian Sámi Parliament, argued that the renewed securitisation of the Norwegian Arctic through the government’s High North Initiative (Jensen & Skedsmo, 2010; Jensen, 2012) has produced a dynamic, with negative implications for Sámi: We are talking on environmental security, society security, energy security, and so on and so on. And that in itself puts much more light on the high political issues in the Arctic and excludes a lot of stakeholders in the discussion on how to put forward civility in the Arctic debate. I think we have taken a couple of steps back in the desecuritization on the Arctic, and where it ends I’m not quite sure, but one of the losers in that process are, of course, Indigenous peoples” (Greaves, 2016: 473).

When an issue or a complex set of issues is moved into high-level politics or onto the security agenda, the voices of the weaker stakeholders, who are still concerned about these issues, are usually excluded from the new policies or strategies. In the Barents Region, where human, environmental, energy and economic security are interconnected, the voices of the Indigenous population must be seriously considered. Climate change is integrated with environmental security and has many different implications. The ongoing climate change and its effects have to be controlled, while at the same time populations have to adapt, to the already observed impacts at societal level, as it pressures Indigenous communities into certain ways of living. Consequently, climate change is a major threat to the “wellbeing of Arctic residents and their communities” (Althingi, 2011).

Life-changing threats of societal and human security in the Barents Region are related with widespread economic development, environmental protection, culture and identity. By using human security as an analytical tool, factors that threaten the societal security of Arctic populations can be identified. In this way, human security can be used as a tool to voice the concerns, perceptions, and desires of Arctic populations. It can also be used by policy-makers and local stakeholders to decide on matters that will benefit both local Arctic populations and the region at large (Hossain, Martín, & Petrétei, 2018, p. 391).

The industry of fossil fuel exploration and exploitation is associated with unethical activity that has caused environmental and human insecurities, mostly in the global South, with the support of authoritarian or repressive regimes (Moody, 2007). In 2006, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights and TNCs (transnational corporations), John Ruggie, claimed that the extractive sector – oil, gas, and mining – utterly dominates this sample of reported abuses, with two-thirds of the total … The extractive industries also account for most allegations of the worst abuses, up to and including complicity in crimes against humanity, typically for acts committed by public and private security forces protecting 15 company assets and property; large-scale corruption; violations of labour rights; and a broad array of abuses in relation to local communities, especially Indigenous people (UNCHR, 2006: 25).

It has been argued that the extracting industry is one of the greatest threats for Arctic Indigenous communities, as they depend on land and natural resources. Membership of an Indigenous

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community depends on certain Indigenous practices. For example, reindeer herding is an important symbol of Sámi identity and it is an exclusive right of the Sámi in Norway and Sweden. “When extractive industries hinder such traditional ways of living, the unity and societal cohesion of the Indigenous community is threatened, which in turn threatens their community security, which is the source of a unique identity” (Petrétei, 2016: 158).

An interviewed Canadian academic expert on Indigenous Arctic populations has confirmed that in Russia, Indigenous populations are viewed completely differently from how they are viewed in Scandinavia or Canada. “They [the Russians] do not have the same ethos of protecting indigenous [people]. In Russia, to be considered indigenous, your ethnic group has to have less than 40,000 people. So, for example Yakuts and Komi are not considered indigenous. They don’t speak Russian but still they are not indigenous for the Russian government. They have some protection through the federal system but not through the Indigenous system and that is very different from Canada or Norway. Everything is more centralised, to Russia” (Canadian academic expert, 2017). However, a Russian affairs expert that I interviewed commented on the fact that there are Russian Indigenous communities with special rights in the vast Russian Arctic lands, and that their permission is needed in order to explore for gas or oil. Nevertheless, there is corruption because these communities are vulnerable. “It is easy to treat them in a nasty way. You can bribe them, they are vulnerable to alcohol, and you can find ways to make an agreement that will dis-benefit them” (Senior lecturer of human geography, 2017). This statement aligns with the report of UNCHR (United Nations Commission on Human Rights), which showed that the Indigenous population of North-Eastern Russia have been mistreated for the benefit of the extractive industry.

At the same time, it has been argued that the new Russian Arctic discourse does not depict the North as a remote and hostile region that should be ‘conquered’, but instead indicates that the Russian state and society treat the Arctic region as a natural and integral part of the country that should be taken care of. A more positive and attractive image of the Arctic has been developed, as it is now related with ideas of growth, prosperity and innovation. Additionally, as Sergunin argues, Russia recognises the Arctic as a region of peace and stability, where different identities can be reconciled and harmonized (Sergunin, 2018: 54).

The concepts of human security and sustainable development have now been established within the Russian Arctic municipalities. Nevertheless, most Russian Arctic cities are not aware of the human security and sustainable development strategic documents, and the economic, ecological and social dimensions are often not harmonized with one another. The major difficulty is how to translate the words into actions, as many planned human security and sustainable development projects have not materialised. A lack of transparency in the policy planning process and a lack of co-operation within civil society institutions are the major weak points of the urban development strategies. Unfortunately, “to a large extent, the policy planning and implementation process is still of the top-down rather than bottom-up nature” (Sergunin, 2018: 69). Better co-ordination of human security and sustainable development strategies is, therefore, imperative. Yet, as Sergunin argues, “despite the problems and shortcomings, the total ‘balance sheet’ of the Arctic cities’ human security and sustainable development strategies and general dynamics is rather positive. The AZRF municipalities are serious about solving numerous socio-economic and environmental problems and making these urban areas better and more comfortable places to live in” (Sergunin, 2018: 70).

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It could be argued that, although Russia is behind other Arctic regions in relation to human and societal security in the Barents Region, it is trying to enhance the economic prosperity of its Arctic populations while taking into account the environmental and social dimensions of sustainable development. An important element of this process is the participation of the local communities in decision-making and the implementation of these decisions.

Growing awareness of the importance of environmental security, access to health and education, food security and Indigenous governance within the Barents Region is shaping future resource extraction. For that reason, these topics have become higher on the agendas of northern governments and peoples even from 2007 (Heininen & Nicol, 2007). The authors elaborated more on how climate, food, health and education are forming new security aspects. “The real tension is in reconciling how our understanding of how environmental conditions, like climate stability or access to resources, food and health and education services, are de facto ‘human rights’ issues and should be calculated into any consideration of the meaning of security” (Nicol & Heininen, 2013: 80). So, it is clear that critical security studies, even indirectly, are gaining more recognition among the security agenda. Environmental protection aspects, access to resources, food, health and education are now among the major security elements of the Barents’ populations.

In Norway, the costs and benefits of Arctic development have been intensively discussed, especially in relation to the Lofoten Islands. “Unlike in Canada and Greenland, in Norway there is not about Indigenous versus non-Indigenous populations but a discordance among fishermen and oil executives, green parties and other political institutions, corporate interests, such as Equinor, and regional and local governments” (Finnish Professor on Arctic politics, 2017). Deep-water oil and gas drilling have been postponed in the Lofoten–Vesterålen region because of their potential impact on cod fisheries and sensitive spawning grounds, yet the oil industry has significant licensed areas for exploration and active offshore drilling operations in the Barents Sea. The Canadian expert on the Arctic’s Indigenous people that was interviewed pointed out a significant differentiation between the North American Arctic and the Barents Arctic. “The Sámi are so few compared with the populations in Canada and have been integrated for hundreds of years in their Scandinavian countries’ life. They are richer, better educated and more integrated but they have less power. It is the opposite for the Canadian and Alaskan Indigenous people” (Canadian academic expert, 2017). Similarly, a senior researcher from the Arctic Institute argued that the Sámi people are very well integrated within Norwegian society. “In general, they live sideby-side with the non-natives. There are some minor problems in their societies but no major problems in general. Some who live more traditionally face some problems concerning herding fields and mining, and there are key cases of dumping mining materials in northern Norway. There are no Indigenous concerns on the oil and gas debate” (Senior researcher at the Arctic Institute, 2017).

Aili Keskitalo, President of the Sámi Parliament of Norway, has stated: “The degradation of the environment in Inuit and Saami traditional territories caused by pollution, non-sustainable natural resource extraction and climate change constitute a great threat to their traditional lifestyles and culture” (Keskitalo, 2006). It is clear that Sámi in Norway see the natural environment and its link to Indigenous cultural practices as being at the centre of what insecurity means in their Arctic homeland (Greaves, 2016). The ongoing expansion of fossil fuel exploitation in the Barents Region is a worrying concern to the coastal Sámi, as it could have negative effects on the fishing sector

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(Kristoffersen & Dale, 2014).

Norway tried to eliminate the Sámi cultural and religious distinctiveness through state policies of ‘Norwegianization’ until the mid-20th century (Minde, 2005), but in the past 30 years, Sámi institutions have promoted linguistic and cultural communities throughout Norway, and language has become one of the most important markers of Sámi self-determination (Greaves, 2016: 471).

During the Cold War, and the securitisation of the Norway–Russia border, Sámi’s rights on land use were hampered as the states took security and defence decisions without considering Sámi interests, “so Sámi deliberately avoided the language of security in order to keep open their options or possibilities for resolving their struggle for political good will” (Greaves, 2016: 473).

The two major issues for the Sámi are conflicts about land use, which affect their reindeer herding areas, and the preservation of Sámi language and culture. Their security is defined by protecting the environment, indigenous identity and cultural practices, and autonomy and self-determination.

The establishment of institutions of self-determination in northern Norway prevents the political rights of the Sámi from being endangered. Even climate change is not a security issue per se, and it relates only to reindeer herding and other food sources. In general, Sámi do not use securitising language to describe hazards for their interests, and they do not want to securitise social and environmental issues, even though they use security language occasionally (Greaves, 2016).

One more crucial reason that Sámi are not keen to securitise their interests is that security in Norway is still seen as a discourse within the authority of the state, mostly because the existing threats – including military conflict – are from Russia. Fear of the ‘Russian Other’ has always been present in Norway and Russia affects many contemporary security policies of Norway (Åtland & Pedersen, 2008; Pedersen, 2009; Jensen & Skedsmo, 2010). As Jensen argues, Everything that smacks of ‘security’ acquires a very particular status in Norwegian discourses on the High North. Discourses are wrapped in history, and here in the north, close to Russia, discursive fragments from the Cold War continue to ring like echoes from the past … There is no more obvious place for prolonging a sense of paranoia and general insecurity than in relation to the High North, where Norway’s national identity as a tiny, vulnerable land and the image of massive Russia (‘the Russian bear’) as ‘the radical other’ are clear and easily resuscitated in the ‘collective Norwegian mind’ (Jensen, 2012: 90, 94).

Sámi have not outlined their security concerns as security threats. Firstly, changing climate patterns do not present an existential threat to the Sámi community. Secondly, Sámi are integrated into Norwegian society and have the full benefits of citizenship in the only social democratic petrostate1 of the world, and there are no claims of insecurity of the Sámi from the Norwegian state. Thirdly, the importance of Russia in Norwegian security policy means that other security issues are mostly overshadowed. Also, as a researcher from the Fridtjof Nansen Institute added, “most of the Indigenous live in the Finnmark region of Norway, where they use the territory and are not marginalised. The Hammerfest’s offshore oil field [Goliat] is a very important investment, creating many jobs. The oil field [is] a regional issue as well, as it is a development for the whole population.

Unlike in Russia or Alaska, there are no onshore activities, which can create conflicts with the Indigenous populations” (Senior researcher at FNI, 2017).

Last but not least, the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has also commented on the

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populations of northern Norway: Sustainable development activities rendered enormous opportunities for employment.

Local communities have made themselves relevant to these activities by supplying goods and services to oil and gas activities. So, the activities are not a threat to the population, but an opportunity for employment. Activities are bases for supplies, growing population and families. Instead of asking for challenges, ask for opportunities. Bases were built for suppling the oil and gas industry, which led to population growth and indirect employment. As a result, there are more taxi drivers, restaurants, many other jobs and, consequently, more families in the northern Norway.

Before an area becomes open for oil and gas licensing/activities, the government produces impact assessments. And it is important that it is not just a certain environmental impact assessment, but it is a total impact assessment, as it also deals with socioeconomic challenges but also opportunities of activities. This is part of the thinking that was mentioned before – instead of asking for challenges, ask for opportunities (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2017).

The Indigenous communities had to deal with abuses and injustice from the states in the past, but through international recognition, they are now more capable of securing their rights and pointing out their security concerns, which are mainly environmental and human security issues. The Norwegian side of the Barents Region has many differences from the Russian side that create different issues in relation to Indigenous populations. In Norway, the main disputes onshore concern mining activities and installation of infrastructure for renewable energy rather than the oil and gas sector, which is the main source of disputes on the Russian side. By contrast, in the Norwegian Barents Sea there is much more exploration and exploitation than on the Russian side.

In both countries, Indigenous populations face the effects of climate change on herding and fishing activities, and the communities that depend heavily on these activities are at considerable risk.

In order to achieve greater Indigenous participation in Arctic discourse, the agenda could be broadened to acknowledge and include the concerns of the Indigenous populations that relate to contemporary Arctic geopolitics. In that respect, power would be counterbalanced by knowledge, physical space would be replaced by identity and resilience, and people would be the referent object rather than states. For this to be achieved, organisations that represent Indigenous populations should be included in the A52 conferences and discussions and enhance their involvement in the A83. Furthermore, the eight Arctic states should prioritise activities that would improve cooperation on Arctic aspects. For example, arguing that exploitation of fossil fuels should be done under stricter environmental standards is less reasonable than investing in and favouring the renewable energy sector, which would suggest an honest attempt at sustainable development.

Moreover, scientific knowledge on climate change and its impacts on local, regional and global scales could be enhanced by the local, traditional environmental knowledge of the Indigenous Arctic populations. In this way, regional institutions – both state and non-state actors – are very important and should be included in the discussions. Institutions such as the Arctic Council promote co-operation at the regional level on climate change, sustainable development and quality of life, highlighting that the most important elements of analysis are within the field of development rather than geopolitics. Conversant, critical and broadened discussion of northern human security is essential for the Arctic and, as a consequence, for the Barents Region (Nicol & Heininen, 2013: 84).

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It is widely accepted that the current most significant changes in the Barents Region are environmental, such as disrupted and unpredictable seasonal patterns, thinner sea ice each year and thawing permafrost (ACIA, 2004; ACIA, 2005). These environmental changes pose a risk to those who depend on nature (fishing and herding) for their livelihoods. Besides the impacts of climate change, global and local polluters, such as plastic and nuclear waste, are threatening the region and its inhabitants. In addition, food and health insecurity and high rates of alcoholism, suicide and domestic violence reduce the quality of life and wellbeing of Arctic inhabitants. Hundreds of years of interactions between humans and nature have made the Arctic what it is today and preserving this environment and ecosystem for the future generations is invaluable. It is obligatory and urgent to balance economic activities with environmental preservation if we want to provide social and human security to the next generations, as the exploitation of fossil fuels is not only the major source of pollution and a challenge to traditional uses of land, but also the main source of jobs and revenue in many Arctic regions. Though the region is connected historically with fossil fuel exploration and exploitation, more and bigger future developments of this kind could impede the security of other local communities, groups or individuals. It is vital to scrutinise the predominant societal and human security challenges of the Barents Region to obtain substantial support towards the development and implementation of targeted policies (Hossain, Martín, & Petrétei, 2018).

Avoiding a securitised sustainable development Global climate strikes held on March 15th, 2019 by more than 1 million students and young people were a call for politicians to act fast on climate change. In April 2019, climate protests in London lasted for more than a week with the aim of pushing the British government towards a more aggressive climate target than the existing target of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2025. It could be argued that these actions are pushing the issues of climate change and sustainable development into high politics and even onto the security agenda. In this situation, the audience is convinced by scientists and researchers that the referent objects – the Earth’s climate and development that could allow the system of the plant to continue indefinitely into the future – have to be placed further up the political agenda. Consequently, the audience is trying to convince politicians to push for stricter policies on sustainable development and climate change.

Besides environmental issues, sustainable development also refers to economic and social issues.

As it has been argued in the past, sustainable development does not mean environmental preservation. Development incorporates the aspects of economic improvement that are imperative for the preservation and functionality of human societies. The concept of national security has been transformed in the age of globalisation, and the military security within a territorial area has been interwoven with human, economic and environmental aspects. Nevertheless, any attempt to achieve sustainability in a few countries is quite inadequate if other countries are using unsustainable practices, as the environment is global and its protection needs global agreements (Dresner, 2002). In addition, it is very difficult to prove that sustainability has been achieved. Even if we could minimise or eliminate all known unsustainable activities, it is ambitious to try to deal with activities that are only suspected to be unsustainable, and it is impossible to remove all present and future cradles of unsustainability. But ultimately, “The alternative to the pursuit of sustainability is to continue along the present path of unsustainability, leading to disaster” (Dresner, 2002: 173).

A highly politicised sustainable development could mean that the principles of sustainability – the Combining critical security studies at the Barents Region

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environment, human societies and their economic prosperity – could be placed high in the political agenda and scrutinised as a system rather than independently. However, the problems and potential solutions must be developed and introduced into the political agenda by the societies that face the difficulties, thereby combining local and scientific knowledge to create a bottom-up policy approach. If the combination of sustainability awareness in high politics and inclusion of local societies could be achieved, the possibility of sustainability would be increased.

Environmental protection must remain on the political agenda, as securitisation of sustainability issues could have adverse effects not only for the population but also the environment. A securitised sustainable development would not include local knowledge and scientific consultation would be limited. Using pretexts that something is contributing to or impeding sustainable development, governments could use the securitised sustainable development speech to justify an action, undermining local communities and neglecting the environmental needs of a region.

Conclusion The Barents Region is not a homogenous region. Nevertheless, there are common elements that create a common, distinct societal identity. Such elements include the geography and the traditional communities with specific norms, customs and traditional livelihoods that are based on herding and fishing. The most important issue for Indigenous societies in the Barents Region is sustainability, as sustainability is the only way that they could continue to practice their traditional way of living and preserve their society. At the same time, they are enduring the challenges of climate change and economic globalisation.

The Copenhagen School of thought is useful for bringing the environmental and societal insecurity of populations in the Barents Region onto the political agenda, by broadening that agenda from military security to other forms of insecurity without securitising acts for those issues. Inclusion of the Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations in the formal decision-making institutions could be very helpful for balancing the interests of every actor in the region. Accordingly, the Aberystwyth School of thought has a substantial effect on the analysis of the region by deepening the agenda from the state level to the community and individual level, which helps to examine the societal challenges in the Indigenous communities. It becomes clear now that the combination “…of the two schools into a larger approach paves the way for a more critical engagement with security on part of the security analyst, allowing for normative – but denying infinite – conceptualisations of security” (Floyd, 2007: 336).

In this article I outlined the contemporary environmental and societal issues within the Barents Sea and the Barents Region of Norway and Russia, and how they are inherently connected. In a region with a historically important border between NATO (Norway) and Russia, securitising moves towards environment or societal issues are not going to materialise because traditional security aspects would continue to exist, even in the background. Nevertheless, international and bilateral co-operation in relation to environmental protection and human prosperity in the area favours a better future for the Barents Region.

Acknowledgement This research has been funded by ESRC Wales DTP.

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Notes 1. Petrostate: A state whose wealth stems from the sale of fossil fuels, mainly oil.

2. A5: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Norway, Russia, and the United States.

3. A8: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States.

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Markusson, H. M. (2018, December 05). Declining sea ice is making the Arctic ocean warmer. Retrieved from http://sciencenordic.com/declining-sea-ice-making-arctic-ocean-warmer McSweeney, R. (2018, January 03). Carbon Brief. Retrieved from https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-polar-vortex-climate-change-and-beast-from-theeast Minde, H. (2005). Assimilation of the Sámi – Implementation and Consequences. Gáldu Čála: Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights, 3, 1-33.

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Combining critical security studies at the Barents Region

Arctic break up: Climate change, geopolitics, and the fragmenting Arctic security region Wilfrid Greaves

Climate change is ushering in a new era across the circumpolar region, affecting all aspects of Arctic life, including conditions of security across the circumpolar Arctic. This article argues that the intersection of human-caused climate change, particularly the warming of the Arctic Ocean, and renewed great power competition are causing the Arctic regional security complex (RSC) that emerged in the post-Cold War period to fragment into distinct sub-regions. Rather than a single region characterized by common environmental and human security challenges, security in the Arctic is increasingly shaped by geopolitical factors related to the North American, European, and Eurasian regions, respectively. The result is the end of the Arctic as a holistic security region and the emergence of distinct sub-regional security challenges across different parts of the circumpolar world. This variation in conditions of security will contribute to the erosion of the circumpolar Arctic as a single, coherent region over the course of this century, and will strain the region’s governance architecture. The result is a circumpolar region that will be less distinctly ‘Arctic’ than in the past, as the cooperative nature of recent Arctic politics is replaced by adjacent security sub-regions characterized by great power competition and differing geopolitical and ecological considerations.

Introduction This article examines the transformation of the Arctic as a security region or regional security complex (RSC), namely an area in which relations of security between state and non-state actors are determined. Despite the enthusiasm for new institutions and inter-state cooperation that has surrounded the Arctic since the end of the Cold War, I argue that the circumpolar Arctic is undergoing the second fundamental change in its security dynamics in 30 years. The first was the change away from Cold War hostility towards a peaceful region of dynamic inter-state cooperation.

The second is the current change away from an integrated security region towards a fragmented Arctic comprising three distinct sub-regions in which conditions of security are principally shaped by geopolitical factors related to North America, Europe, and Eurasia, respectively. While the postCold War period was defined by Arctic actors coming together to improve their security, the question now is whether the Arctic security region is breaking up. I argue it is, and identify the catalysts for the fragmenting Arctic security region as climate change, specifically the warming of

Wilfrid Greaves is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Victoria.

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the Arctic Ocean, and resurgent geopolitical competition, including a reassertive Russia, newly assertive China, and, importantly, divided Western powers.

First, this article discusses the emergence of the Arctic as a security region in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and outlines the theory of regional security complexes. It presents the argument that the Arctic has become a ‘zone of peace’ in which states are committed to institution-building and peaceful settlement of disputes. Second, I explain how the Arctic RSC is fragmenting as a result of climate change and geopolitics, resulting in the emergence of North American, European, and Eurasian sub-regions characterized by different sets of actors and diverse security issues. In the third section, I offer reflections on what this fragmentation may mean for the future of the circumpolar Arctic, and the people, societies, and states that comprise it.

Security and the Arctic It was only quite recently that the Arctic became an integrated geopolitical region. During the Cold War, the Arctic was at the geographic centre of strategic competition and nuclear deterrence between the United States and Soviet Union, which resulted in dichotomous processes of overmilitarization and under-politicization. Superpower rivalry transformed the Arctic “first into a military flank, then a military front or even a ‘military theatre’” (AHDR, 2004: 218), and restricted the emergence of political institutions that included all states with territory in the region, divided as these were between different Cold War blocs. As a result, the Arctic suffered from a lack of political institution-building from which it has still only partly emerged (Keskitalo, 2007: 194).

Though scholars have detailed how shifts in global politics and increased cooperation among circumpolar states caused the emergence of a transnational Arctic identity from the 1970s onwards (Keskitalo, 2007; Young, 2005, 2009), only as relations between the superpowers became less hostile was it possible for a single Arctic region to emerge.

Indeed, the impending collapse of the Soviet Union opened space to normalize inter-state relations in the circumpolar region. In 1987, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s famous Murmansk speech called for the Arctic to become a “zone of peace” characterized by a nuclear weapons-free zone in northern Europe, restricting military activity and conventional armaments, and implementing confidence-building measures (Åtland, 2008: 294). Notably, northern environmental challenges were the focus of early efforts by Soviet officials to engage their Western counterparts on initiatives to improve scientific and environmental cooperation and establish new political institutions such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, and, a few years later, the Arctic Council (Eriksson, 1995; Hønneland, 2010). The Murmansk speech set in motion a new normative structure for the post-Cold War Arctic in which states and Indigenous peoples committed to a cooperative and rules-based regional order organized through consensus-based institutions.

The rapid transformation of the Arctic from a space of conflictual to cooperative political behaviour led to excited assessments of the circumpolar region as geopolitically unique. Building on its long history as an area distinct from the southern metropoles from which it was governed, the concept of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ emerged to characterize “a unique region detached, and encapsulated, from global political dynamics, and thus characterized primarily as an apolitical space of regional governance, functional cooperation, and peaceful co-existence” (Käpylä & Mikkola, 2015: 4). While still peripheral, the Arctic is seen by many as a region that can offer lessons in interstate cooperation, non-violent dispute resolution, and consensus-based decision-making to other

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parts of the world (Exner-Pirot & Murray, 2017; Storey, 2013). This assessment rested upon the view that the Arctic had become an integrated and coherent region of global politics, and was reinforced by a flurry of Arctic foreign and security policies and practices recently released by states and other actors that articulated their common ‘Arctic-ness’ in terms of the geopolitically coherent and distinct nature of the region (Heininen, 2012). Though the Arctic has never ceased to be characterized by sovereign states and the pursuit of their interests, the dominant political discourse in the Arctic since the end of the Cold War has emphasized cooperation, common interests, and the fundamental connectedness of the circumpolar region, exemplified by, inter alia, the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration by the five Arctic coastal states or the vision of the region as ‘One Arctic’ that animated the recent American chairmanship of the Arctic Council (Lackenbauer et al, 2017).

The Arctic Regional Security Complex (RSC) Building on discussions of the Arctic as a distinct geopolitical region, some scholars have examined the Arctic as a distinct security region (Chater & Greaves, 2014; Chater, Greaves & Sarson, 2020; Exner-Pirot, 2013). According to Buzan and Wæver (2003), regions are the most generally relevant level of security analysis because interstate interactions – ranging from alliance, cooperation, rivalry, hostility and war – have typically been determined by geographic proximity. That is to say, for most people and states around the world, conditions of security and insecurity have been determined far more by one’s neighbours than by global factors. The unit within which most states’ security is determined is the regional security complex (RSC), defined as “a group of states or other entities [that] must possess a degree of security interdependence sufficient both to establish them as a linked set and to differentiate them from surrounding security regions” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 47-48). The Arctic has historically not formed its own RSC but was either an “unstructured security region” or an “insulator” between separate North American, European, and Soviet and post-Soviet RSCs (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 41, 62). The Cold War prevented an Arctic RSC from emerging because regional security relations were secondary to the global strategic considerations of the USA and the Soviet Union; so long as its security relations primarily reflected broader Cold War dynamics, the Arctic could not comprise a regional security complex of its own.

The Arctic RSC emerged as a result of the desecuritization of superpower relations in the late 1980s, and from the unique opportunities and challenges afforded circumpolar states as a result of the Arctic environment. As Heather Exner-Pirot notes, the Arctic RSC was centered around its historically frozen ocean; political and institutional underdevelopment related to territorial boundaries, sovereignty claims, and economic activity; and incorporation of Indigenous peoples into regional governance. However, “the Arctic is exceptional in that the environmental sector dominates circumpolar relations,” making it, in effect, a regional environmental security complex (Exner-Pirot, 2013: 121-122). This means that security for Arctic states and peoples have been linked, both positively and negatively, through factors related to the natural environment.

Environmental issues such as transnational pollution, marine risks and ocean management, and climate change have been widely recognized as relevant to Arctic politics and security. Less discussed is how environmental factors have mediated the emergence and severity of other security issues, including in the military and political sectors. For instance, Arctic environments provided unique natural systems that supported human subsistence and flourishing across the region, producing conditions of human security that have been disrupted by climate change (Greaves, 2016a, 2016b; Hossain et al., 2018; Hossain & Petrétei, 2016). The Arctic’s inaccessible terrain, vast

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distances, cold weather, and sea ice also helped deter military aggression and prevent some interstate conflicts, such as allaying concerns of a Soviet ground invasion of northern Canada during the Cold War (Coates et al, 2008: 55). The deterrent effect of the harsh northern climate remains relevant to national security, with the chief of Canada’s defence staff citing it as recently as 2010 as part of his lack of concern over the need for conventional defence in the Arctic.

While many observers have noted how issues such as environmental monitoring, wildlife protection, ecosystem conservation, and the decommissioning of Soviet/Russian nuclear reactors have influenced regional cooperation and produced new regional security issues, most view the need for environmental cooperation as driving closer political integration within the region (Åtland, 2008; Exner-Pirot, 2013; Keskitalo, 2007; Young, 2009). Whereas some argue that climate change will lead to a ‘polar Mediterranean’, will facilitate Arctic integration through economic activity and political normalization, or even lead to a political renaissance akin to the political revolutions in post-communist Eastern Europe (Zellen 2013, 343), by contrast, I suggest the transformation of the Arctic environment due to climate change is undermining the material basis for assessing security in the Arctic at the pan-regional level. If the natural environment provided a shared foundation for Arctic security in the post-Cold War period, it follows that as the environment changes so, too, will the conditions and dynamics of regional security.

Climate change and the fragmenting Arctic RSC The Arctic RSC is fragmenting into three distinct security sub-regions. The primary catalyst for this change in Arctic security politics is human-caused climate change, most specifically the warming of the Arctic Ocean that has increased maritime navigability and opened new opportunities to profit from non-renewable resource extraction. Numerous studies document the environmental changes occurring in the Arctic (ACIA, 2004; Larsen et al., 2014). Sea ice declined by 9-13% per decade between 1979-2012, reaching an historic low nearly 50% below the average 1979-2000 extent in the summer of 2012. As of June 2019, sea ice extent for the year was already below the 2012 record (NSIDC, 2019). Climate records continue to be broken, and dramatic changes include more extreme seasonal variation, reduced sea ice, receding glaciers, diminished snow cover, thawing permafrost, changing terrestrial water systems, invasive species, temperatures increasing at twice the global average, and other stressors on plant and animal populations.

Numerous Arctic locales have recorded record high temperatures in the last two years, reflecting the accelerated pace of global warming and likely climate feedback loops in the region related to loss of sea ice albedo, warming ocean temperatures, and permafrost thawing (Samenow, 2019).

The Arctic, a region characterized by its frigid climate and the frozen ocean that forms its core, is predicted to be free of summer sea ice by the middle of this century (Wang & Overland, 2009), marking a radical alteration to the defining physical feature of the northern polar region.

The most geopolitically significant of these climate impacts is the increasing navigability and accessibility of historically ice-covered Arctic waters. When the Arctic Ocean was frozen for most of the year, states had little incentive to quarrel over disagreements such as maritime boundary disputes. Arctic boundaries had little effect on their core national interests, and states were unwilling to risk the global strategic balance or their diplomatic relations over trivial Arctic issues.

Moreover, the inaccessibility of the Arctic made its natural resources largely moot. But as sea ice has receded, states have paid greater attention to their Arctic boundaries and expressed greater interest in settling outstanding disputes. In addition to the symbolic value and popular attachment

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to particularly Arctic geographies, notably the North Pole, states’ interest in asserting their Arctic sovereignty is informed by their desire for the greatest economic benefits from Arctic resources (Mazo, 2014). At stake are shipping lanes, fisheries, minerals, and an estimated 13-30% of global undiscovered hydrocarbons (Gautier et al, 2009). This has coincided with the need to submit claims to their extended continental shelves within ten years of ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). There is also greater interest by non-Arctic states, notably China, in circumpolar governance, as discussed below. Overall, global warming has changed the conditions of possibility for human activity in the region in ways that invite involvement by a wider range of actors with distinct, sometimes conflicting, interests. The critical point is that climate change has facilitated a resurgence of geopolitical competition as Arctic and non-Arctic states have sought to maximize their own interests in the region through the deployment of both military and civilian assets and resources (Huebert et al., 2012).

Climate researchers describe the physical effects of climate change on the Arctic Ocean as ‘Atlantification’ and ‘Pacification’, referring to the northward intrusion of warm water, nutrients, and fauna from the Arctic’s neighbouring oceans (Katz, 2018). Numerous fish and animal species have been sighted at higher latitudes than ever before, taking advantage of milder conditions caused by the large volumes of warm water flowing into the Arctic from further south. While researchers are struggling to keep up with the pace of climate change in the region, it is clear that “the Atlantification and Pacification of the Arctic Ocean will only intensify in the coming decades as the world continues to warm and the Arctic becomes increasingly ice-free” (Katz, 2018). The circumpolar Arctic, long perceived as distinct from the rest of the world due to its unique environment, appears certain to increasingly resemble other ecosystems.

I argue that this ecological phenomenon is also occurring geopolitically as Arctic security dynamics transform due to climate change. Atlantification and Pacification thus serve as appropriate descriptions for the fragmentation of the Arctic from a single regional security complex into distinct security sub-regions, or regional security subcomplexes. As Buzan and Wæver (2003: 51) describe: “Subcomplexes [are] a ‘half-level’ within the regional one […] Subcomplexes have essentially the same definition as RSCs, the difference being that a subcomplex is firmly embedded within a larger RSC. Subcomplexes represent distinctive patterns of security interdependence that are nonetheless caught up in a wider pattern that defines the RSC as a whole.” As such, while I argue that the pan-Arctic RSC is fragmenting into distinct North American, European, and Eurasian sub-regions, this does not mean that these sub-regions or the actors within them have nothing to do with each other, or that conditions of security in each region are entirely distinct.

Rather, it means that the practices and relations of amity and enmity that produce RSCs as either cooperative or conflictual spaces are principally occurring at the sub-regional level involving subregional actors. In time, though sooner than many might expect, security within these three subregions is likely to be determined by their incorporation into the security dynamics of the broader North American, European, and Eurasian RSCs or super-RSCs (see Buzan & Wæver, 2003: xxvi), meaning the end of the Arctic as its own security region. Given that the Arctic RSC was premised on the ecological holism that unified all regional actors around a particular set of security concerns, the physical Atlantification and Pacification of the Arctic Ocean are similarly resulting in Atlantification and Pacification of Arctic geopolitics and the fragmentation of the pan-Arctic RSC.

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Atlantification Geopolitically, the Atlantification of the Arctic RSC is somewhat misleading as it actually refers to its fragmentation into two sub-regions that reflect distinct North American and northern European security subcomplexes. These sub-regions possess distinct ecological and socio-economic conditions, but also different relationships to the neighbouring Eurasian sub-region. Two political dynamics account for the emergence of separate European and North American Arctic subregions: first, is renewed tensions since 2007 between Russia and the other Arctic states; second, is their different relationships towards both Russia and climate change. Both dynamics demonstrate the extent to which Arctic politics and security are affected by non-Arctic events and the decisions of Arctic actors based on their non-Arctic interests.

The deterioration of Western-Russian relations began in 2007, when a Russian parliamentarian planted a Russian flag on the Arctic Ocean floor at the geographic North Pole. While not legally meaningful, the flag planting launched a period of “finger pointing” in which many actors portrayed Russia’s efforts to determine the limit of its extended continental shelf under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as part of a strategy of post-Cold War revanchism (Dodds, 2010). Subsequently, circumpolar states have vied over conflicting claims to their extended continental shelves, and engaged in a substantial remilitarization of their Arctic policies and practices. Circumpolar states have: reinvested in Arctic military capabilities and infrastructure to support military operations; renewed Cold War era military activities, such as long range bomber patrols and ‘buzzing’ of neighbours’ airspace; and sought to deter the influence of non-Arctic states in the region (Åtland, 2014; Chater & Greaves, 2014). While actual spending has often fallen short of commitments, military investments have contributed to a dominant narrative of a militarized race for Arctic territory and resources (Landriault, 2016).

The diplomatic relationship between Russia and its Arctic neighbours has been even more strained since 2014, when Russia illegally annexed the Ukrainian region of Crimea after the overthrow of a pro-Russian Ukrainian president in a U.S.-backed popular revolution (Burke & RahbekClemmensen, 2017). Russia then launched an unconventional armed conflict in eastern Ukraine that has claimed more than 13,000 lives, including 298 people killed when Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 was shot done by Russian forces in July 2014. Ever since, relations between Russia and the Arctic members of NATO (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the U.S.) have been their worst since the Cold War, with Western states imposing sanctions on Russian individuals, companies, and officials, and Russia retaliating. Russia, NATO, and the European Union all subsequently increased their military activities in northern Europe, and the five Nordic countries began unprecedented military cooperation with each other and the nearby Baltic states. Norway’s military reinvigorated its moribund northern defence apparatus, while Sweden, which was neutral during the Cold War, has considered seeking NATO membership, and in 2018 the government issued a manual to every household in the country with guidelines for how citizens should respond in a national crisis, including war (Chater, Greaves & Sarson, 2020). In October 2018, NATO held Exercise Trident Juncture, its largest military exercise in decades. The two week exercise to defend against a ‘fictitious aggressor’ in the region between the Baltic Sea and Iceland comprised more than 50,000 troops from 31 NATO members and partner countries, and included land, air, sea, and cyber military assets.

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The rise of military tensions and activity in northern Europe suggests the distinctive features of the European Arctic security subcomplex. First, the European Arctic holds the largest number of state actors and the densest web of regional governance (Chater & Greaves, 2014: 126-131). It encompasses the Barents region, an area of longstanding security interaction between Russia and Europe (Eriksson, 1995; Greaves, 2018; Hossain et al., 2017), with distinct regional institutions such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. In addition to six circumpolar states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Russia), the subcomplex includes non-Arctic states with polar proximity, interests, or identities, such as the United Kingdom and Scotland (Depledge & Dodds, 2017), neighbours such as the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (also NATO members), and self-governing, non-sovereign polities such as Greenland, the Faroe Islands, the Sámi parliaments, and the European Union (Adler-Nissen & Gad, 2014). NATO itself is a key actor in the European Arctic in a way that the military alliance is not in the North American context, and which also implicates the United States in the sub-region’s security (Østhagen, Sharp & Hilde, 2018).

Second, the European Arctic is, in effect, simply the northern zone of the broader European RSC. Unlike most of the circumpolar Arctic, Northern Europe has a relatively large, urbanized population, and is tightly integrated with proximate southern regions. In this respect, the European Arctic most closely resembles non-Arctic regions in terms of its levels of economic development and social well-being (Larsen & Fondahl, 2014), and, notwithstanding the rise in political tensions and military activity, is a region that prioritizes ‘business as usual’. As such, states in the sub-region have worked to: resolve outstanding issues, such as the negotiated bilateral agreement between Norway and Russia in 2010 to resolve their disputed maritime boundary in the Barents Sea; promote investment and further economic development, including the continued extraction of oil and gas in the North Sea and Barents Sea; and facilitate technical, scientific, and other forms of cooperation across various policy domains, including the adjudication of their extended continental shelf claims under UNCLOS. Overall, regional actors strive to balance continued engagement between the West and Russia – considered essential for regional peace and stability – with firm, but measured, collective responses to state-sanctioned wrongdoing. Relations between Russia and the other circumpolar states remain strained, but Russia has exercised some restraint with respect to responding to Western sanctions and the fallout from the Ukrainian crisis, seeking to insulate Arctic cooperation from other political disputes (see Burke & Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017; Konyshev, Sergunin & Subbotin, 2017).

By contrast, the North American Arctic security subcomplex differs significantly from its European counterpart. Whereas northern Europe is perceived as part of the larger European community, the North American Arctic remain fundamentally peripheral to mainstream politics and society, and reflects unique challenges. The North American sub-region is characterized by three factors: the central role of sub-state actors, including self-governing Indigenous peoples; severe socioeconomic and ecological challenges that create chronic and acute human insecurity; and a politics of exceptionalism that politicizes and complicates public policymaking.

First, the North American Arctic – roughly defined as the area north of 60˚N, though with some variation and significant exceptions (see Bennett et al., 2016) – principally consists of territory governed by sub-national governments: the state of Alaska; the Canadian territories of Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut; the four self-governing Inuit regions of Canada (Inuvialuit, Nunavut, Nunavik, and Nunatsiavut); and Greenland. While dependent in various ways on the Greaves

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national governments of Canada, Denmark, and the United States, particularly in the area of foreign and defence policy, these sub-state actors exercise considerable devolved and symbolic authority as legitimate governmental representatives of ‘the Arctic’ within their national polities. They are critical actors for Arctic policymaking, and play an important, though complex role, in shaping the conditions of amity and enmity that make up a security region (see Chater & Greaves, 2014; Dubreuil, 2010; Loukacheva, 2007).

Second, geographic, ecological, and socioeconomic factors have produced communities that are typically small, isolated, and heavily dependent on fiscal support from southern governments.

Notable exceptions to this are the cities of Anchorage and Fairbanks, Alaska, which comprise 55% of the state’s population. Even then, however, Alaska is only connected by road to the continental United States via Canada, and the rest of its population, much like that of northern Canada and Greenland, is spread across many small communities, most of which are only accessible by water or air. Life for residents of these communities can be challenging, with high levels of poverty, ill health, chronic social issues, culture and language loss, political and social alienation, exposure to pollution, and the rapidly advancing effects of climate change causing both short term acute harms and producing conditions of chronic poor well-being (see Larsen & Fondahl, 2014). Together, this has led some analysts to discuss the North American Arctic as a region experiencing pronounced human insecurity (Chater & Greaves, 2014; Exner-Pirot, 2012; Greaves, 2016a; Hoogensen Gjørv et al., 2014; Nickels, 2013). This contrasts with the European Arctic, whose population does not experience worse wellbeing or human security than the rest of their societies (Greaves, 2016a; Rautio, Poppel & Young, 2014).

Third, the North American Arctic is characterized by a politics of exceptionalism that politicizes and complicates public policymaking, in contrast to the European Arctic where politics are mostly treated as a northern extension of normal domestic policymaking. In this respect, the North American Arctic is prone to having decisions over contentious issues such as land use and nonrenewable resource extraction being determined by southern political institutions, with sometimes limited local input, on the basis of southern political or ideological considerations. Sometimes characterized as an ongoing form of colonialism (Canadian Press, 2017; Gritsenko, 2018) this is demonstrated most clearly by the politics of climate change and fossil fuel extraction in the region, which can have particularly strong impacts on human security (Bazely et al., 2014; Slowey, 2014).

Numerous projects – including the Mackenzie Valley pipeline project, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and drilling off the Alaska, Canadian, and Greenlandic coasts – have become intensely politicized and securitized as either essential for the economic security and wellbeing of northern residents and national economies, or as devastating to the environmental or social security of affected communities and ecosystems (for examples see Greaves, 2016a; Nickels, 2013; Schlosser, 2006; Wilson, 2017). These competing securitizations also mean that public policy decisions in the North are prone to reversal when elected governments change, such as the Canada-U.S. joint moratorium on Arctic oil and gas drilling, signed by President Obama and Prime Minister Trudeau, which was reversed by President Trump and remains mired in litigation (Associated Press, 2019; Greaves, 2017: 113-116).

The fact that climate and energy security in the North American Arctic are more contentious than in northern Europe is driven, in part, by the fact that climate change is having greater impacts in the former, raising the stakes of fossil fuel extraction that will worsen global warming. For instance, mean annual temperatures in northern Scandinavia have risen by about 1 degree Celsius since the Arctic break up

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1950s, and average winter temperatures by about 2 degrees. By contrast, mean annual temperatures in the North American Arctic have increased by nearly 2 degrees Celsius over the same period, with winter temperatures increasing by as much as 3-5 degrees (Larsen et al,, 2014: 1579). With northern North America experiencing more than twice the warming of Northern Europe, the effects on seasonal sea ice coverage, flora and fauna, permafrost thawing, and weather unpredictability are more acute. The ecological differences between the two Atlantic Arctic subregions demonstrate the relationship between environmental change and changing conditions of security (Greaves, 2016a: 474-475), with the warming Arctic Ocean resulting in the fragmentation of the Arctic into distinct sub-regions, in part, on the basis of their ecological differences and the corresponding impacts of the physical environment on state interests and human wellbeing.

What I describe as the penchant for exceptionalism in the North American Arctic applies not only to the securitization of unconventional security issues, such as energy and the environment, but also the relationship with Russia. In contrast with the European Arctic, where Russia poses a very proximate source of insecurity, and is thus treated seriously as a potential military threat, North America has little to fear from Russia. It thus has greater leeway to portray it as threatening (see Greaves, 2016a: 476-477; Ă˜sthagen, Sharp & Hilde, 2018). Multiple studies have demonstrated the construction of Russia as a threatening Arctic Other within public discourse, government policy, and the media in Canada and the United States (Lackenbauer, 2010; Landriault, 2016; Padrtova, 2019). Because there is little practical reason to fear Russia, the costs to politicians of invoking Russia as a security threat are low, particularly in the context of poor relations since 2014. The spectre of Russian aggression has proven effective at crafting a popular image of the Arctic as threatened or at risk, even if the most serious disputes in the North American Arctic are actually between its own states: Canada and the United States disagree over their maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea and over the legal status of the Northwest Passage, while Canada and Denmark disagree over the sovereignty of Hans Island (Byers, 2009).

The security issues in the North American Arctic differ significantly from those in the European Arctic, as do the actors involved. The sub-regions remain linked in important ways, not least of which is the overlap between some state actors, the role of the United States as lead actor in NATO, and the fact that perceptions of Russian behaviour are relevant to both security subcomplexes. But the social and political contexts for each region are distinct, and their different experiences of climate change means that security in the North American and European Arctics will continue to diverge, as the highly developed and geographically proximate European Arctic is incorporated more thoroughly into European political institutions, while the geographically vast but socially isolated North American Arctic becomes even more peripheral to mainstream North American politics.

Pacification The Pacification of the Arctic RSC refers to the emergence of a distinct sub-region centred on Eurasia, incorporating the long Russian coastline along the Northern Sea Route, the bulk of Russia’s Far North and Far Eastern territory, and the emergence of Asian actors pursuing circumpolar interests. Russia is pivotal to the Eurasian Arctic sub-region; indeed, some analysts have described it as the most significant actor in the region (Charron et al., 2012; Konyshev et al., 2017), and as the sole circumpolar state with territory in Asia it is uniquely central to that security subcomplex relative to other Arctic actors. As the previous section describes, Russia is relevant to

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security throughout the Arctic, making it critical for the relations of amity and enmity that determine conditions of security within the region. Despite the domestic and economic focus of its Arctic strategy and the belligerent rhetoric by some other Arctic states (Lackenbauer, 2010; Sergunin & Konyshev, 2018), Russia has often been characterized as aggressive by its Arctic neighbours, though its behaviour has sometimes fuelled these suspicions. For instance, weeks prior to NATO’s Exercise Trident Juncture in fall 2018, Russia held its own military exercise called Vostok 2018, which involved more than 300,000 personnel deployed across the Far North and Far East, reportedly the largest Russian military exercise since 1981 (BBC News, 2018).

It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) to the Russian economy or its national security interests. The AZRF contains 95% of Russian oil and 70% of Russian natural gas reserves, and 50-90% of Russian mineral deposits. 11-20% of Russia’s GDP and 22% of its exports are produced north of the Arctic Circle, and in 2015 the Northern Sea Route experienced the same volume of marine cargo – approximately 7 million tons of cargo per year – as it had in 1987 before the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced it to approximately 1.5 million tons in the 1990s (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2018: 135-137). The vital contributions of the Arctic to its economy has led Russia to insist on its peaceful intentions and desired cooperation with its polar neighbours, since large-scale conflict that would disrupt Russia’s capacity to extract and export its Arctic resources would be devastating for its national economy, causing far more harm than the relatively small portion of economic activity the other Arctic states experience in their northern regions.

The Eurasian Arctic sub-region is also structured around the growing role of Asian states, most importantly China. Whereas Russia has been an Arctic power for centuries, China only recently signalled its commitment to developing Arctic capabilities in order to pursue its Arctic interests.

The Chinese government has made significant investments in Arctic science, research, cooperation, resource extraction, and tourism, and China’s Arctic Policy, released in 2018, declares it a “near Arctic state”. China has built a cutting edge ice breaker (Xuelong 2) to go with its original, repurposed heavy ice breaker; established a climate research station on Svalbard; provided financial support for various Arctic meetings and activities; and wooed support from smaller Arctic states, such as Iceland (Koivurova et al., 2019). China has become one of several Asian states to receive Observer status at the Arctic Council, giving it a direct window into multilateral Arctic negotiations as well as improved access to the Arctic Council’s Members and Permanent Participants. Other Asian states such as Japan, India, South Korea, and Singapore have also become Observers of the Arctic Council and invested in natural resource extraction in the Russian Far North (Lunde et al., 2015), deepening the political and economic connections between the Russian Arctic and the Asia-Pacific region. Overall, however, it is China’s Arctic aspirations that have attracted scholarly and policymaking attention as it has established itself as the foremost non-Arctic state active in the circumpolar region (see Brady, 2017; Byers & Lodge, 2019; Kopra, 2013; Lackenbauer et al., 2018), with potentially global significance for Chinese-American great power competition (Durfee & Johnstone, 2019, 97).

Whatever its own capabilities, China’s current influence on Arctic security is closely related to its relationship with Russia (Bertelsen & Gallucci, 2016). As the two most powerful states in Eurasia, global powers, and the foremost non-democratic countries in the world, China and Russia have forged a mutually beneficial partnership in the Arctic. The cornerstone is the $27 billion project to ship liquified natural gas from Russia’s Yamal Peninsula to China via the Northern Sea Route. The Arctic break up

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foreign investment in Russia from this deal has been critical in mitigating the damage to Russia’s economy caused by the Western sanctions imposed over Crimea, particularly with respect to oil and gas extraction that has been severely hampered due to an inability to partner with major, Western-based energy companies. The need for refueling, surveillance, and search and rescue infrastructure to support increased traffic along the Northern Sea Route has also provided the justification for Russian investments in military infrastructure along its northern coastline. This reinvestment has, in turn, been part of the evidence cited for the ‘remilitarization’ of the Arctic.

Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation is not limited to the economic, energy, and environmental security dimensions of major fossil fuel projects, however. More than 3200 Chinese soldiers, as well as artillery and aircraft, participated in Russia’s Vostok 2018 exercise, marking a significant deepening in their military cooperation and reflecting the pragmatic partnership between the two foremost non-Western global powers.

The rise of Chinese influence in the Arctic has been met by concern by the other circumpolar states, reflecting a desire to limit China’s power to the Eurasian sub-region. The Canadian government has intervened to prevent Chinese companies from acquiring private corporations on the basis of national security, even though Chinese investment could help fund sorely needed infrastructure and natural resource projects. In 2019, Denmark prevented Chinese companies from winning the contract to construct three new airports on Greenland, citing national security. But, in other contexts, Chinese interests are heavily involved in providing Arctic infrastructure projects that are in high demand from many northern governments. Chinese engagement in the Arctic highlights this tension between local and regional infrastructure demands and state-level security concerns (see Chater, Greaves & Sarson, 2020), a dynamic playing out across the region. Again, the significance of these developments lies in the fact that security in the Arctic is difficult to analyze at the pan-regional level, but varies across the different sub-regions where security and insecurity are produced according to the actions of primarily regional actors.

Conclusion The central argument in this article is that climate change and ensuing geopolitical competition is undermining the holism of the Arctic and producing three distinct security sub-regions across the circumpolar world. This process is analogous to the Atlantification and Pacification of the Arctic Ocean due to global warming, in the sense that the distinctiveness that previously characterized the Arctic relative to adjacent parts of the world is being replaced by the incorporation of the Arctic into the political and security dynamics of neighbouring security regions. This sub-regionalization of Arctic politics marks the end of the post-Cold War period of Arctic exceptionalism in which the circumpolar world was seen as separate from the competition and great power manoeuvring that characterize global politics. As the Arctic Ocean warms and Arctic ecosystems lose their distinctiveness to resemble zones at lower latitudes, so Arctic politics and security are increasingly becoming a northward extension of the forces that dominate further south.

The fragmentation of the Arctic RSC does not mean that inter-state conflict is inevitable, or even more likely to occur. All eight Arctic states, as well as increasingly important non-Arctic states like China, have repeatedly affirmed their commitments to a peaceful and rule-governed Arctic order based on international law and the peaceful negotiation of disputes, and their Arctic policies state that there is no prospective military threat in or to the region (Heininen, 2012). While the Arctic’s vast natural resource wealth has often been identified as a potential source of conflict, the majority

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are believed to lie in undisputed sovereign territory relatively close to shore, and doubts remain over the viability of developing these resources, making major conflicts over them an unlikely gamble (Keil, 2014). Moreover, given the priority that Arctic actors place on the economic benefits of natural resource development – particularly the importance of Arctic resources to the Russian economy – it is unlikely that they would pursue violent conflict that would disrupt their capacity to operate as usual and export commodities to the global market. While some observers have expressed worries over an emerging Arctic security dilemma (Åtland, 2014), it remains the case that conflict in the Arctic is more likely to be caused by outside effects spilling into the circumpolar region than overt competition within the Arctic itself.

But the fragmentation of the Arctic RSC will likely affect current patterns and structures of Arctic regional governance and cooperation. Pan-Arctic governance may weaken as issues are negotiated bilaterally, and as Arctic sub-regions become incorporated into adjacent blocs of regional politics with their own intergovernmental institutions. This will likely reinforce the growing “Westphalianization”, i.e. state-centrism, within Arctic politics at the expense of sub-state governments, local decision-making, and self-governing Indigenous institutions (Shadian, 2010).

Fragmentation will also occur in terms of what ‘security’ is understood to mean across the region, as the different subcomplexes experience distinct political, economic, social, and ecological conditions. This variation in security will further drive the erosion of the Arctic as a single, coherent region over the course of this century, and may strain the region’s governance architecture as states with different interests and priorities pursue their distinct conceptions of Arctic security. The result will be a circumpolar region that is less distinctly ‘Arctic’ than in the past, as the exceptional and cooperative nature of recent Arctic politics is replaced by adjacent security sub-regions characterized by different combinations of great power influence, economic nationalism and investment, environmental change, and ongoing human insecurity. Security in the Arctic, always highly contested, will become a reflection of the specific factors within the adjacent political areas, less distinctly Arctic and more global, as climate change renders the Arctic a region of the world that is distant from the centres of political influence, but no longer one that is especially distinct.

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Free and open source software as a contribution to digital security in the Arctic Gerald Zojer

Digital technologies have become an integral part of everyday life for most inhabitants of the Arctic, diffusing so deep into society that even traditional activities are becoming digitised. All Arctic states have endorsed cybersecurity strategies, highlighting the significance that is attributed to digitalisation in today’s societies. Yet, these strategies reproduce a state-centric traditional security approach. Since digitalisation affects all spheres of human security, cybersecurity needs to be redefined in a more comprehensive way to be inclusive to challenges on the individual and community level. This paper discusses a digital security approach. Acknowledging the importance of software in contemporary information societies, this paper looks at how private and public software property regimes are related to digital security in an Arctic specific context. Following approaches from science and technology studies, with special attention to innovation research, this paper discusses the interrelations of proprietary software, open source software (OSS), and free and open source software (FOSS) approaches with digitalisation, considering the peculiarities of Arctic societies. The paper argues that FOSS provides advantages for the often small user base and niche markets of region specific applications, and thus utilising a FOSS approach promotes digital security in the Arctic.

Introduction The motivation for this paper emerged in summer 2018 during a reindeer calf marking event in Sápmi, the Sámi homeland. During this event, reindeer were gathered in a fence system. First the calves were tagged by giving them a numbered collar. Then calves and adult female reindeer were left together in another fenced area so that the mother animal and the calf could find one another again. Reindeer herders could identify their calves by reading the adults’ earmark. The reporting led sometimes to overlapping claims and extended the time the usually free roaming reindeer had to be fenced in. One of the reindeer herders explained how helpful it would be if the process of claiming the calves could be done through an app on a mobile phone or a tablet. Double claims would immediately be recognised and the process could be sped up to release reindeer sooner, thus decreasing the time they are held in captivity. However, since not every herding district uses the same method for the calf marking, such an innovation would be very specific and hiring a programmer would be expensive. Also, the programmer would need to be familiar with the process Gerald Zojer is a Researcher and PhD-Candidate at the Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland.

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and particularities of the event, because otherwise there is a risk that the digital service might not be suitable and would be rejected (personal communication, July 1, 2018). This discussion revealed some of the challenges of digitalisation in the Arctic and motivated the need to think about possible ways of how digital innovations can contribute to societal well-being; and in this particular case, even to animal welfare.

Today, digital technologies are widespread and are used for many purposes in Arctic everyday life (e.g. GPS trackers, GPS navigation, drones, smartphones, etc.). Mobile devices can especially be used in multiple ways. Smartphones, for instance, usually contain several technologies or components, such as a camera, a gyroscope, a GPS chip, or a modem. They are thus powerful devices and can be used for numerous different tasks depending on the software. In early 2019, the Google Play store contained over 2.6 million entries (AppBrain, 2019), illustrating the vast number of applications available. Few of these have been developed to suit the needs of Arctic inhabitants. For instance, in northern Finland the app Porokello warns drivers of reindeer on roads, aiming at reducing traffic accidents (“Porokello,” n.d.); in Norway, the free software app Reinmerker makes the database of reindeer ear marks (offline) accessible on mobile devices (“Reinmerker,” 2012); and in Yakutia, civil society uses smartphones to report industrial pollution to authorities (personal communication, February 18, 2016).

New innovations usually do not emerge “from flashes of disembodied inspiration” (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985a: 10) but from gradual changes of existing technologies. Software can be seen as such a gradual innovation that may change the use and purpose of a device significantly. Software itself is often built upon previous code and rarely written from scratch. Yet, every technology affects society, its socio-economic structure, its culture, and the environment. Thus, the diffusion of new innovations has repercussions on societal well-being. In governmental digital agendas, digitalisation is often portrayed in a positivist light, but it may also be perceived as challenging societal integrity (e.g. in Salminen & Hossain, 2018; Sheehan & Gulbrandsen, forthcoming; Young, 2019; Zojer, 2019). However, whether or not digitalisation is perceived as beneficial or challenging is out of the scope of this paper. This paper acknowledges that inhabitants of the Arctic use and develop digital technologies and software, and furthermore, that learning computer or programming skills became part of education programs in parts of the Arctic, also within Indigenous communities (e.g. Hirshberg & Petrov, 2014: 387; Sogsakk, n.d.). This paper focuses on how different property regimes of software are related to human well-being, in search for a software regime that most contributes to digital security in an Arctic specific context. It assumes that digitalisation is an ongoing process with increasing societal significance, while considering that Arctic communities may have specific technological needs related to their particular (economic) activities and the often relatively small community size. The paper discuses digitalisation from a human-centred security approach, and elaborates on how different property regimes of software relate to Arctic digital security.

Digital security in the Arctic The process of digitalisation progresses rapidly, including in the Arctic region. Information and communications technologies (ICTs), and especially the internet, are of increasing importance for societal functioning, affecting social, economic, and political life. In 2017, in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, more than 90% of all households had access to computers and internet from home. While in Canada (86% computer access and 84% internet access in 2013), in

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the US (72% computer access and 74% internet access in 2013) (OECD, 2019b, 2019a), and in Russia (with an internet penetration rate of 71% in 2016 (Internet Live Stats, n.d.) these numbers were a bit lower, they still show that digital services and ICTs are widespread. Finland, Sweden, and Denmark are furthermore amongst the highest scoring EU countries in the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) (European Commission, 2019). Access to computers or internet is crucial for the functionality of most contemporary digital devices. For instance, in 2017, in the Nordic countries, citizens on average used 3 connected IoT (internet of things) devices, such as cars or smart home devices, a number that is expected to double by 2021 (Dahlberg et al., 2017). Also, for electronic governance, telemedicine, or banking, a properly operating cyberspace1 is critical.

Cybersecurity The significance of cyberspace for modern societies is also reflected in states’ policy responses by endorsing cybersecurity strategies. The Committee on National Security Systems defines cybersecurity as “Prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communications services, wire communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation” (CNSS, 2015: 40). In literature related to International Relations, cybersecurity usually focuses on threats to economic and military assets on the national level. It references threats originating from cybercrime, cyberwarfare, hacktivism, or espionage, and is concerned with securing critical infrastructure and thus the defence of cyberspace from cyber-attacks (e.g. Brooks et al, 2018; Kostopoulos, 2013; Singer & Friedman, 2014). Also, the cybersecurity policies of the Arctic states follow such a mainstream approach (Ministry of Justice, 2017; Ministry of the Interior, 2015; Public Safety Canada, 2018; Secretariat of the Security Committee, 2013; The Danish Government, 2018; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016; The Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs, 2013; The White House, 2018). Human individuals are rather treated as “threats”, “weakest links”, “victims”, or are reduced to users that pose a potential risk to cybersecurity (Dunn Cavelty, 2014; Salminen & Hossain, 2018). Mainstream approaches to cybersecurity can thus be placed within a rather traditional and state-centric security framework, where governmental bodies are the securitising actors.

Such a state centric cybersecurity approach, however, runs danger of falling short of addressing security issues on the sub-state level. The complex and multifaceted realities of digitalisation require a widened and deepened cybersecurity understanding, which should treat individuals and communities as securitising actors, and concentrate on facilitating human development (see also Salminen & Hossain, 2018). A human-centred cybersecurity approach enables individuals and communities to address the fears and to vocalise the concerns they perceive. This also empowers them to include issues that originate from a state’s actions that might be detrimental to individual security (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012), as states’ measures to combat cyber-attacks may in fact even hamper information security on the individual level (Dunn Cavelty, 2014). Utilising a human security approach for the cyber domain does not neglect the security challenges that states already address, but rather supplements them with the challenges people experience from digitalisation in everyday life (Zojer, 2019). Such a human-centred cybersecurity approach can thus be seen as very similar to the broadening of the security discourse in the academic field of International Relations since the emergence of critical security studies and the human security concept.

Free and open source software as a contribution to digital security in the Arctic

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Digitalisation and human security Therefore, it seems suitable to build such a broadened approach of cybersecurity on the human security concept, which aims at promoting human well-being. When looking at the Arctic, the focal shift seems legit, as there are no inter-state conflicts over Arctic territories. The Arctic is considered to be a region of peace and stability, and conflicts can rather be observed between different societal or economic actors within states than between states (e.g. Heininen, 2013; Hossain et al, 2017; Nicol & Heininen, 2014; Tamnes & Offerdal, 2014). While there is no universally satisfying definition for human security, many have built theirs on the seven key areas pointed out in the 1994 HDR, which are economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (UNDP, 1994). Instead of focusing on a state’s survival, the human security framework focuses on people’s “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” Human security “sits on interstices of human rights, human development, and security discourses” (Martin & Owen, 2014: 1). Within a human security discourse, not only physical integrity but also culture, identity, or human progress should be safeguarded. The positive as well as negative forms of security can be compared to positive and negative forms of human rights, where the “wants” are not less important than people’s “fears” (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012; Roe, 2008). The Commission on Human Security describes the goal of human security as “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment,” and thus to protect “freedoms that are the essence of life” (2003: 4).

Through digitalisation, including the wide diffusion of personal computers (PCs) and the internet, ICTs have become one of the most significant areas of technological progress and have significant interdependence with societal development (c.f. Häußling, 2014: 97). Thus, ICTs can play an important role in safeguarding human security “since they are among the major sources of strengths in improving the quality of living across the world” (Sen, 2014: 24). The UN Human Rights Council identifies the intentional disruption or the prevention of dissemination or access of information from the internet as a violation of human rights (Human Rights Council, 2016).

However, digital technologies may also bring new challenges to individual and community security, and have different implications in regional or situational contexts. Zojer (2019) points out that all seven key areas of human security are affected by digitalisation, in both positive and negative ways.

On the case study of the European Arctic, Zojer highlights the region-specific implications on human security. For instance, telemedicine may bring basic services to remote places contributing to health, while at the same time reducing the need to travel to far away doctors or hospitals, thereby also reducing the ecological footprint for transportation. A field study in the European Arctic conducted by Sheehan and Gulbrandsen (forthcoming) found that not everyone desires increased digitalisation of health services nor see it as beneficial. It may also be perceived as a result of underfunding of welfare services, as well as generating a lack of physical contact with health professionals. Increasing utilisation of digital technologies also comes with the promise of increasing business opportunities by enabling local enterprises to access global markets, whereas online shopping also challenges established retailers and may lead to a loss of job opportunities (Zojer, 2019). There is indeed a fear that digitalisation and related automation may globally cost up to two billion jobs by 2030, although various economic sectors are affected to different degrees (World Economic Forum, 2016). According to the 2015 HDR, economists historically reject the argument that productivity gains reduce employment in the long run. Yet, the digital revolution may particularly challenge less skilled labour tasks, contributing to increased inequality (UNDP,

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2015), and shifting jobs to other regions. For example, in the United States, most jobs created by e-commerce are concentrated around only a handful of metropolitan areas (Gebeloff & Russell, 2017).

Digital security As discussed above, security literature and policies in regard to digitalisation are focusing on technology, such as infrastructure, as a referent object and mainly follow a state-centric approach.

Not being much of a concern in public discourse at the time, digitalisation was not mentioned and also ICTs remained a side note in the 1994 HDR definition of human security. Given the significance of ICTs and digital technologies in people’s everyday life today, it seems, however, appropriate to scrutinise cybersecurity through a human-centred lens. A broadened approach to cybersecurity should shift the focus from technology towards the implications of digitalisation for human well-being and be responsive to region-specific contexts. Salminen suggests introducing the term digital security to highlight the interconnection between digitalisation and human security, and to draw a distinction from the prevailing cybersecurity discourse. Such a comprehensive approach “recognises individuals and communities as actors who actively impact (in)security and (un)trustworthiness of the digital environment and, thus, the everyday life of themselves and others” (Salminen, 2018: 188). Although digital security has frequently been used synonymously for information security or cybersecurity, with a similar focus on the protection of technology, it is less biased as a policy tool and receives little attention in International Relations. For example, searching the UN website for “digital security” showed zero results at the time of writing. Yet, as digitalisation refers to digital transformation, it seems appropriate to highlight this dimension when scrutinising the prevailing cybersecurity discourse.

Free and open source software The fundamental components of cyberspace and ICTs are computers, whether as end user devices (PCs, smartphones, IoT devices, etc.) or for running the underlying cyber-infrastructure (servers, routers, etc.). Computers consist of the hardware, the physical artifact, and programs, containing libraries, data, and software. Computer programs are a set of instructions telling the hardware what to do. Software is written in a programming language in human readable code (source code) that has to be compiled into object code for the hardware to be able to understand it. Object code usually only consists of zeros of ones (binary code) and is difficult to read or to reverse engineer by humans; or in case of longer programs, almost impossible.

At the beginning of the computer era, computers were only available at some state-owned facilities or research facilities. Software was considered part of academic knowledge; It underwent a peer review process and was made public. Only in the 1980s, when PCs became more popular, software got unbundled from hardware and was turned into a commodity (Ceruzzi, 1999; Dobusch & Huber, 2007; Holtgrewe & Werle, 2001). In order to protect their research and development efforts, software companies first decided to only sell the object code before implementing legal means to secure their proprietary software through Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) (de Laat, 2005; Holtgrewe & Werle, 2001). IPRs are also tools for creating an artificial shortage of (digital) goods.

This is necessary to increase profits, since shortage is a precondition of capitalist commodification while software can be reproduced at will with almost zero costs (Nuss, 2010). Richard Stallman was one of the first to publicly voice his concerns against this development which he considered a privatisation of public knowledge. In 1985 he founded the Free Software Foundation to promote Free and open source software as a contribution to digital security in the Arctic

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the idea of free software, whereas the term free refers to freedom not price, “so think of it as ‘free speech,’ not ‘free beer’” (Stallman, 2019). For this purpose, he developed the GNU2 General Public License (GPL)3, which is a copyleft license that utilises copyright conditions to secure public access to the source code. Thus also for free software IPRs play a role, even though in an unorthodox way: authors of free software do claim copyright, but allow others free use, repairing, modifying, or updating the source code (de Laat, 2005; Dobusch & Huber, 2007; Haff, 2018; Raymond, 2002).

Public vs. private software regimes In the business world, however, free software received little attention. Critics suggested that the free software principle was too much focused on philosophical and political concerns. In order to bypass this bias and to push for wider acceptance of software with publicly accessible code, in the 1990s the Open Source Initiative was established and suggested to rather use the term open source software (OSS) (Open Source Initiative, 2018). This approach remains contested by free and open source software (FOSS) proponents up to the present. Supporters of the free software movement perceive this distinction as downplaying the importance of the inherent philosophy behind free software (Dobusch & Huber, 2007): The terms “free software” and “open source” stand for almost the same range of programs. However, they say deeply different things about those programs, based on different values. The free software movement campaigns for freedom for the users of computing; it is a movement for freedom and justice. By contrast, the open source idea values mainly practical advantage and does not campaign for principles. This is why we do not agree with open source, and do not use that term (Stallman, 2019).

FOSS and OSS projects both publish the source code, and both allow copying and distributing the code; free software, however, also requires that the code is allowed to be modified which is not necessarily the case with all OSS licenses, which can be weaker. FOSS thus always qualifies as OSS, but OSS does not necessarily meet FOSS criteria. While the open source movement is convinced about the greater efficiency of the open source model, it explicitly welcomes commercialisation of software (Nuss, 2010). The free software movement argues, however, that free software is not only a practical approach on how to develop software projects, but that ethical values are fundamental to it. FOSS is thus seen as a social movement that aims at promoting social solidarity through sharing and cooperation in a society where culture and life activities become increasingly digitised (Stallman, 2019). Yet, OSS and FOSS have much in common. In fact OSS and FOSS developers often work together in software projects and identify proprietary software as a common adversary.

De Laat distinguishes between the public (FOSS/OSS) and private (proprietary) software regimes by “whether knowledge is pursued in order to increase the public stock of knowledge, or to generate rents from its private exploitation” (2005: 1511).

Motivation and economic considerations FOSS/OSS development does not mean, however, that only private persons contribute code in their free time. For instance, from 2005 to 2017, 15,637 developers from a minimum of 1,513 companies contributed to the code of the Linux4 kernel. In 2017, among the top contributing companies were Intel, Red Hat, IBM, Samsung, or Google (Corbet & Kroah-Hartman, 2017). Yet, also independent or volunteering programmers contribute and especially many smaller and specific software solutions are user innovations or (co-)developed by independent actors. Among the

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motivations of volunteers are factors such as intellectual stimulus, improving programming skills, empowerment, the felt need for a particular software solution, the desire to support the case of FOSS/OSS, or the joy of working in a team (David & Shapiro, 2008; Ke & Zhang, 2011; Li, Tan, & Teo, 2012; Raymond, 2002). FOSS/OSS communities are thus heterogeneous, consisting of individuals or firms, or a mix of both, and their projects may have diverse hierarchical and leadership structures.

Although usually being cheaper solutions than proprietary, FOSS/OSS projects can nonetheless

generate profits. Revenues can be made from writing code, providing service, maintenance and support, bug fixing, education and training, or by creating documentation (Dobusch & Huber, 2007; Haff, 2018; Nuss & Heinrich, 2002). For instance, Red Hat, a developer of Linux operating systems, reported a net income of US $434 Million in 2018 (Red Hat, n.d.). In 2018 IBM announced its intent to buy Red Hat for US $34 Billion to diversify its portfolio (Baker & Roumeliotis, 2018). While former Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer called Linux – due to its licensing regime – a cancer (Greene, 2001) and accused its users to be communists (Lea, 2000), today also Microsoft increasingly integrates Linux into its proprietary Windows operating system. Moreover, in 2018 Microsoft acquired Github, the world’s largest open source code sharing platform for US $7.5 Billion, in order to support the empowerment of software developers (Nadella, 2018). Thus, despite the early aversion of the business sector toward free software, today FOSS/OSS solutions are deeply embedded in the commercial IT market and are often mixed with proprietary software solutions.

Discussion Arctic people(s) have been highly innovative throughout history. The rich diversity of Arctic technologies, including traditional knowledge(s); techniques and tools used for hunting or the herding of livestock; or their craftsmanship are living proof. Due to interaction with the South, there are also many technologies developed outside the region that diffused into Arctic communities, including most digital technologies. Technologies are, however, not confined to physical artifacts, but also refer to the human activities related to it in a twofold manner: in the practice of creating a technology, as well as in the usage, that is, what people know as well as what they do with it. For instance, a “computer without programs and programmers is simply a useless collection of bits of metal, plastic and silicon” (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985a, p. 3). Consequently, software also needs to be considered a technology, albeit not being a physical object. While manufacturing goods in traditional industries require heavy and expensive machinery due to the computerisation of individuals, the means of production in a digital society are no longer exclusive property of large corporations (Nuss & Heinrich, 2002). Instead, individuals can participate in the production of new innovations. This is particularly relevant in an Arctic context as it allows local residents to become (co-)producers of digital technologies despite living in remote places with a limited financing base.

Innovation stakeholders One critique on the current cybersecurity policies is that they tend to be techno-determinist; they tend to assume that technological advancements will automatically benefit society (Salminen & Hossain, 2018; Zojer, 2019). Yet, since the 1980s science and technology studies scrutinise this faith in technology by arguing that technologies are not neutral objects but embed culture and politics and are thus socially constructed. Moreover, technologies also affect the direction of Free and open source software as a contribution to digital security in the Arctic

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societal development (e.g. Bijker, Hughes & Pinch, 2012; Latour, 2004; MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985b; Winner, 1980). Most technologies, especially those developed in recent decades, are not isolated devices, but are part of large technological systems (LTS). Such systems include physical artifacts that require each other to function; organisations, such as investors or manufacturers; scientific components, since engineers and designers utilise scientific knowledge for their problem solving; regulatory laws; or system artifacts, such as natural resources that are used to build the hardware (Hughes, 2012). These heterogeneous and interacting network components constitute a “seamless web,” in which technological and societal development are tightly interlinked (Hughes, 1986). The LTS approach, however, also illustrates the importance of different actors in the innovation process, such as states’ policies or funding regimes.

Small markets and niche products Software firms in a traditional manufacturer structure might be suitable actors to design software for new applications, as firms have specialised knowledge about what they produce. However, this specialisation does not necessarily overlap with user’s interests, especially if they look for specific applications. Moreover, firms tend to develop products aimed for a large user base in order to maximise their profits, while providing solutions for specific niches are often unprofitable. Buying custom-tailored solutions usually is too expensive for end users (von Hippel, 2005). These findings coincide with the experiences and concerns of the reindeer herder discussed above. The small markets and specific niches in the Arctic will, however, often require unique solutions for a small user base. Such particularities are not only confined to technical aspects, but the Arctic is also rich of different language groups, of which many are small. For instance, the Skolt Sámi museum in Neiden developed its own font “Helveticaskolt” for its main exhibition (Skolt Sámi Museum, 2017) in order to express the Skolt Sámi language in written form. Skolt is only used by 300 people and is considered “severely endangered” by the UNESCO (Moseley, 2010). Regarding software, FOSS has proven useful for being adaptive and addressing small language groups (Benjamin, 2012).

Economic considerations When a new technology is being designed and reaches a bottleneck, such as not meeting the users’ needs or being too expensive, its dispersion may remain unsuccessful. Hughes called such bottlenecks “reverse salients.” To overcome reverse salients, designers or engineers need to involve the users to identify and understand a bottleneck (Hughes, 2012). User innovations, such as FOSS, can reduce this obstacle, as the users are usually the experts on how a new technology need to be designed (Bijker, 2010; von Hippel, 2005). A reflexive innovation policy benefits from democratising and opening innovation networks, and from including heterogeneous actors with their numerous expertise and knowledges (Rammert, 1997; see also Windeler, 2018). Takeishi and Lee (2005) have furthermore shown, on the example of the mobile music business, that also strict IPR regimes can become reverse salients and hinder innovations.

Most software firms operate in a capitalist mode of production. Maximising profits is of essence when designing a new technology. However, economic laws and economic calculations are specific to different forms of society and to how a society is organised (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985a: 17). User innovations are better suited to reflect the social organisation of the community where a new technology is used. Moreover, FOSS/OSS challenges the idea that the individual appropriability of the revenues of an innovation is essential for an economically prosperous society, because such “commodification may even be regarded as a threat to the wealth of a nation Zojer

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because it jeopardises long-term innovation by limiting access to knowledge and technology” (Holtgrewe & Werle, 2001: 61). There is also empirical evidence that user-based innovation likely increases social welfare (von Hippel, 2005).

Sustainability and empowerment Beside cost factors, flexibility and adaptability of FOSS/OSS projects are one of their strengths.

FOSS/OSS projects are the most used solutions on infrastructure devices (servers) and on mobile devices (Schrape, 2016). For clients with big number of devices, such as public administrations or large corporations, the use of FOSS/OSS can be advantageous from a pecuniary standpoint as well as to avoid lock-in effects, which create dependencies on a single manufacturer. The possibility to avoid lock-ins makes FOSS/OSS popular in developing and emerging economies (Dobusch & Huber, 2007; Sowe, Parayil & Sunami, 2012). User-centred innovations that are freely revealed can substitute or supplant manufacturer product development, making communities more independent (von Hippel, 2005).

Free software is furthermore concerned about sharing and cooperation. Making code publicly available allows other users or developers to build on the previous work of each other. Such “free riding” is explicitly welcome in FOSS communities. Sometimes only small changes of code are necessary to adapt the software to other use cases. Copyleft licenses provide guarantee that subsequent contributions of software remain a public affair, as also derivates of the original software need to follow the same license conditions. Note, that this is not the case with some OSS licenses, which may allow derivates of the original work to be placed under a more restrictive license (de Laat, 2005; Schrape, 2016). Moreover, when a FOSS/OSS project is discontinued, the code remains accessible so that others can continue to work on the project. Both, repairability and continuity contribute to the sustainability of FOSS/OSS (Sowe, 2012). In search for a suitable design of digital database and information systems for Sámi traditional knowledge, also Petterson highlights that “open source code and local ownership allow for reuse and development of other’s applications” (2011: 187).

Mainstream cybersecurity considerations While not being specifically related to an Arctic context, there are differences between public and private software regimes also from a traditional cybersecurity perspective. FOSS/OSS advocates argue that the more eyes are on the code, the more likely and faster bugs (software errors) can be fixed, while proponents of proprietary software argue for “security through obscurity” (Dobusch & Huber, 2007; Raymond, 2002). Yet, research suggests that the quality and software security between public or private regimes is more or less equal (Clarke, Dorwin, & Nash, n.d.; Haff, 2018: 36–40; Kairala, Koskinen, & Turpeinen, 2015). However, while proprietary software may contain malicious contents, free software published under the GPL imposes political restrictions to avoid that, as the GPL prohibits software to be used to violate human rights, to contain destructive viruses, or code for surveillance purposes (de Laat, 2005). Because the source code of proprietary software is a black box, some end users do not trust them. When China decided to use the open source operating system (Neo)Kylin for public administration and in the military, the step was perceived as being an attempt to block attacks from foreign governments (Heath, 2013). In 2019, the Russian military also announced readiness to shift their computers to open source operating systems (Cimpanu, 2019).

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Conclusions With increasing digitalisation, information, and no longer work or energy, is the most important factor of production. Touraine (1971) coined this as the characteristic of a post-industrial society.

In response to the acknowledgement of the significance of ICTs for the functioning of contemporary societies, the Arctic states (like most others) have endorsed cybersecurity policies.

Cybersecurity is related to safeguarding critical cyber-infrastructure and can be compared to a traditional, state-centric security approach. Mainstream cybersecurity policies tend to assume somewhat homogenous societies within national borders and treat individuals as possible risks to cyber-infrastructure. Such an approach runs danger of neglecting the regional particularities and context-specific challenges of digitalisation to communities and individuals. The concept of digital security has been used in this paper to highlight a human-centred security approach to digitalisation, including both “hard” and “soft” security concerns. Consequently, the differentiation between digital security and cybersecurity can be compared to the broadening of human security in relation to a traditional security understanding. Since the securitisation of an issue is a politically powerful act that may direct attention or drastic measures to an issue, it is important to scrutinise the mainstream cybersecurity approach in order to assure that a) policies are sensitive to the regional particularities and needs; b) listen to concerns and challenges of individuals and communities; c) policies are concerned about human well-being, because the purpose of technologies is to improve quality of life after all.

Computers have become integral parts of economic, political, and everyday life and strongly affect the course of action and mindset of people (cf. Rammert, 2016: 246). Yet, computerisation also provides people with a powerful tool to develop new software-based innovations locally and independently from traditional manufacturer models. This paper discussed how the different software regimes of proprietary software, open source software (OSS) and free and open source software (FOSS) are related to digital security in an Arctic context, which includes a) small niche markets and small user bases; b) small people with cultural particularities and small language groups; c) particular local or traditional knowledge for which technologies should be inclusive.

Following constructivist approaches from science and technology studies, technologies are not seen as neutral but they embed culture and politics. User based innovations increase inclusiveness of local culture and knowledge (von Hippel, 2005). Both proprietary and free and open source software models can provide economic benefits. A FOSS/OSS approach, furthermore, decreases dependence on outside actors and allow to repair, modify, or adapt software to local needs. FOSS moreover increases sustainability, as copyleft licenses guarantee openness and availability of code, as well as – under the GPL – prohibit violation of human rights. The paper thus concludes that when developing software innovations in the Arctic, utilising a FOSS approach contributes to digital security.

Notes 1. Cyberspace is used here as the virtual space in which digital technologies are interconnected to each other.

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2. GNU is the project name for a free Unix clone Richard Stallman developed in an attempt to keep the popular operating system available to the public. GNU is an acronym and stands for “GNU’s Not Unix.”

3. Today there are numerous free software licenses existing, however, the GPL remains the most popular one (Schrape, 2016: 26).

4. Linux is one of the most successful free and open source projects. Linux operating systems are software bundles powering numerous devices, such as servers, PCs, or smartphones (e.g. Android or Sailfish OS are based on the Linux kernel).

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Briefing Note

Energy security in the Arctic: Policies and technologies for integration of renewable energy Magnus de Witt, Hlynur Stefánsson & Ágúst Valfells

Remote Arctic communities depend 80% on diesel as the primary energy source. Besides the negative climate impact, the use of diesel has a negative impact on mid-term energy security. The mid-term energy security impact is due to the transportation of fuel to the communities. Harsh Arctic weather conditions restrict the transportation period and within a relatively short time window the annual consumed fuel needs to be shipped to the communities. Local energy sources can help to get independence from imported fuels. The use of local energy sources will increase the upstream energy security, which is affected by fuel price changes, oil exploration and oil production/delivery insecurity. Renewable energy technologies adopted to Arctic conditions exist but come with a significantly higher price than the same technologies in tempered areas. Policy can help to lower the barrier to entry and support a secure and sustainable energy supply in the Arctic. This paper discusses the special implication of energy security for Arctic communities and how policy can help to strengthen energy security and concurrently reduce CO2 emissions.

Energy policy incorporates three different dimensions: energy security, affordability of energy and environmental soundness. The analysis described in this paper reviews the strengths and weaknesses of different available energy technologies and policies with a focus on energy security in remote Arctic areas.

Arctic energy systems The Arctic can be defined by the Arctic Circle (66°33’), the tree line or the line of 10°C isotherm temperature in the summer (AMAP, 2010). This area faces harsh weather conditions with a long winter and short vegetation growth period. Around 4 million people inhabit the Arctic. Energy is an essential element for the survival of the population in the Arctic.

Currently diesel dominates electricity generation in the Arctic. It can be seen that more than 80% of the communities exclusively depend on diesel. The diesel fuel has to be imported. The import can happen in several ways: on sea by barges during the summer time or by truck over frozen rivers during winter times. In just a few exceptional cases or in case of emergency, fuel has to be flown in. This makes the fuel transportation a critical point for electricity generation and adds a high cost to it.

Magnus de Witt is a PhD Candidate, Hlynur Stefánsson is Associate Professor and Ágúst Valfells is Professor at Reykjavik University Department of Engineering, Iceland.

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In addition to the aforementioned transportation issues of diesel, other negative issues are associated with the use of diesel. A global problem of burning diesel is the greenhouse gas emission with the well known effect on the climate. Besides greenhouse gases, black carbon is emitted, which has a special role in the Artic environment. Black carbon lowers the albedo effect locally. The albedo effect describes the reflection of solar radiation from a white surface, which protects the snow and ice from melting. The small black carbon particles absorb solar radiation and the snow and ice thaw faster.

In the harsh Arctic conditions a secure and reliable energy supply is an essential need of the population. Over the last decades diesel has proven a very reliable energy source for electricity generation. Arctic diesel is a diesel with an additive, so that it can withstand temperatures up to 44°C and diesel engines need just a few minutes for a cold start (1 – 5 min) (Neste, 2019).

Furthermore, the engines can adjust the output to the demand of the electricity grid. The regulation of the voltage and frequency can be operated by the diesel generator.

With the aforementioned advantages and disadvantages of diesel it can be seen that a movement towards a transition to renewable energy resources has started among Arctic communities. Some technologies have been adapted, but it is crucial to reinforce the momentum, which has started during the past peak in oil prices. The number of communities which are utilizing renewables is growing. Furthermore, on the political side a movement towards renewables has happened as result of the climate conferences (Paris, Marrakesh etc.). Alaska announced the aim to increase the share of renewables up to 50% by 2025 (Allen, Brutkoski, Farnsworth, & Larsen, 2016). The Greenlandic aim is formulated quite vaguely: “By 2030, the goal is that the public energy supply must be, to the fullest extent possible, delivered from renewable energy sources” (Naalakkersuisut, 2018). Canada has set a different aim that does not include the amount of renewables. Canada aims rather for greenhouse gas reductions of 30% compared to the 2005 level, which was 738 Mt CO2 equivalent (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2018).

The article is mainly based on a literature review which provides an overview of already existing research, and some information used in this article has been collected during visits for case studies in the Arctic region. The article aims to give an introductory overview on energy security in the Arctic. The focus lies on the political viewpoint, how can the energy security be improved by using technologies which are currently available on a mature level. First an overview on available technologies will be given, followed by a description of the energy policies of the different Arctic countries.

Technologies to harness renewable sources for electricity generation Several renewable energy sources can be found in the Arctic. The following section focuses on sources which are widely separated over the Arctic and where the technology has reached maturity already. The renewable energy sources identified are; wind, solar, hydro, geothermal and current / tidal power. A closer look shows that geothermal power is primarily distributed around the ring of fire – Russian and Alaskan costal area at the Pacific – and on Iceland. Current and tidal power is not mature yet and in Arctic regions as there can be a risk of ice and icebergs expected.

Hydropower Hydropower is currently the energy source with the highest generation of electricity after diesel; the share accounts for 40% of electricity generation in the Arctic. The number of hydropower

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plants is relatively small, just a few relatively large hydro plants can be found in remote Arctic communities, mostly in larger communities. That is because the investment cost of hydropower plants is high and the cost per kilowatt increases with reduction of the power plant size (Tester et al, 2012). On the other hand, hydropower plants have a long lifetime from 50 to 100 years and a low operation cost (Tester et al, 2012). The energy output of such a dispatchable energy source is simple to regulate and the voltage and frequency is stable, which gives the electricity grid stability (Tester et al, 2012). Depending on the type of Hydropower plant the environmental impact can be severe, in particular if a large storage lake is needed (Kumar et al, 2012). In cases where a bypass to a river is enough, the impact is less severe (Kumar et al, 2012). In any case a powerhouse is needed, wich results in land use.

Wind power Wind power has good availability in the Arctic, with high potentials in coastal areas (Lombardi et al, 2016; Alaska Energy Authority, 2016). The general technology of wind turbines have to be adapted to the harsh Arctic conditions. Materials need to withstand temperatures below -40°C, which leads to significant changes in material properties (Lacroix & Manwell, 2000). Icing on the blades lead to significant problems which have to be addressed, for example with the use of black blades which are heated by solar radiation or heated blades (Holdmann, 205; Lacroix & Manwell, 2000). The cold climate has a positive effect since it was observed by the US Department of Energy that wind turbines in cold regions have a 20% increase in maximum power output at around -37°C (Muhando, Keith, & Holdmann, 2010). As in most construction related projects in the Arctic the cost is higher than in temperate areas. For a wind turbine it would be 2 - 3 times more expensive (Baring-Gould & Corbus, 2007). The generation cost of electricity is reduced to operation and maintenance after the payback period: no costs for fuel are needed (Tester et al, 2012). The feasible lifetime of a wind turbine is around 20 years (Wiser & Yang, 2012). From a technical point of view, it can be even longer if the operation and maintenance costs are at an acceptable level. The environmental impact of wind turbines is related to the land use and the possible interference with wildlife, in particular bird migration (Tester et al, 2012) (Wiser & Yang, 2012).

Solar PV Several photovoltaic solar systems are installed in the Arctic, mainly small scale for residential use or small businesses up to a 30 kW peak. The production of electricity is seasonal, according to the availability of sunlight. During the spring time it has been observed that the snow reflects the solar radiation and increases the electricity output of the solar cells (Boström & Godtliebsen, 2014).

Furthermore, the low temperatures increase the efficiency as well (Boström & Godtliebsen, 2014).

The solar cells have a lifetime of around 25 years (Tester et al, 2012). The environmental impact of installing solar panels is very low. In most cases they are mounted on buildings, so that no land is used. In the case of solar farms, the land use has to be accounted for.

Current policies for renewable energy in the Arctic The following section discusses the different political aims for energy among the Arctic countries, which have communities without any connection to a continental electricity grid. This puts the focus on Alaska, Canada and Greenland. Furthermore, those strategies introduced to reach the aims are discussed as well.

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Energy policy of Alaska The Alaska State Legislator setup a Renewable Energy Fund (REF) in 2008 with annual contributions of 50 million USD (Alaska Energy Authority, 2018). The year 2008 was the peak year of oil prices (NASDAQ, 2018). First the fund was planned for five years, but in 2012 the fund was extended for ten more years (Alaska Energy Authority, 2018). The fund is managed by the Alaska Energy Authority, which is an independent, public corporation responsible for assisting energy projects development, operation and financing in the state of Alaska. The mission is to reduce the cost of energy and increase energy security. Other programs such as the ‘Rural Power System Upgrades’ programme helps rural communities with less than 2000 inhabitants to increase the efficiency of their generators (Alaska Energy Authority, 2019). Nearly 100 million USD has been leveraged since the introduction of that program in the year 2000 (Alaska Energy Authority, 2019).

Since the introduction of the Renewable Energy Fund (REF) in Alaska over 280 grants for projects have been assessed and over 250 million USD have been allocated to projects. The fund helped 73 projects which are now in operation. With the executed projects it is possible to save a lot of diesel.

The total financial savings from displaced diesel are annually over 70 million USD. In 2018 a number of the 56 projects supported by the REF have been under progress (Alaska Energy Authority, 2019).

Another program very specific to remote communities is the Rural power System Upgrade (RPSU) programme, which has successfully completed 86 projects among small remote communities. The average increase of efficiency is around 15% but peaks sometimes even above 30% (Alaska Energy Authority, 2019). The increase in efficiency is due to a more efficient use of the diesel. For example, less diesel is used to provide the needed amount of energy – that would result in lower energy generation costs. Another example would be to recover heat from a generator and use it for heating purposes. This would not directly decrease the cost of generation, but the new product heat can be sold, which reduces the cost indirectly.

An observation shows that modern technology can be a problem in small remote communities.

For example, clean and technically more complicated diesel engines according to the tier 4 standard are not very common. For such a technically complicated engine it is hard to find a skilled workforce in many remote places.

Alaska has a long experience with islanded microgrids. A lot of research and development has been done, on a scientific level e.g. at the Alaska Centre for Power and Energy or by private companies and utility companies. For this achievement, dedicated funds have been very important, from the state, region etc. Alaska is, with 25 – 30% renewables in the electricity mix, more than halfway towards its target of 50% renewables in 2025. It will be ambitious to achieve the remaining half in the next six years.

Energy policy of Canada Canada’s energy transition pathway is based on four pillars: first wasting less energy, second switching to clean power, third using more renewable fuels and fourth producing cleaner oil and gas (Smith & Coady, 2018). These parameters are in alliance with the three general parameters for energy policy: affordability, reliability and cleanness (Röpke, 2013). A problem of introducing renewables are the high upfront costs on the investment side, which makes it important to have a strategy to support renewable projects. To increase the attractiveness of such projects the

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‘generation energy council report’ recommends the introduction of capital cost depreciation, strategic initiatives and other tax treatments (Smith & Coady, 2018). Moreover, existing funds and investment programs should be streamlined and the access to them should be extended (Smith & Coady, 2018). To support the transition, subsidies for the use of fossil fuels in an inefficient way for electricity generation will phase out in 2025 (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017).

The Canadian government’s aim is to reduce the 2005 CO2 by 30% until the year 2030, which would entail a maximum CO2 emission of 500 Mt CO2. The long-term goal is even more ambitious with a reduction of 80% compared to 2005 by the year 2050. The CO2 emission of 2017 was 716 Mt CO2, a reduction of 2.9% compared to the 738 MT CO2 in 2005. In other terms it means that approximately 8% of the aimed reduction of 220 Mt CO2 was reached after 2 years. To reach this aim Canada has introduced several programmes to support renewable projects. The ‘Energy Innovation Program’ has allocated 49 million USD in over three years. The program is set up to support innovations for clean energy. The ‘Canadian Renewable and Conservation Expenses’ program is more consumer orientated, with the target group of industry. The program allows the write-off of equipment associated with producing clean energy with 30 – 50% per year. The common depreciation rate without the program would be 4 – 20 % per year for such equipment.

The ‘Green Infrastructure Program’ has a sub-category, which focuses on ‘Clean Energy for Rural and remote Communities’. The goal is to reduce dependency on diesel and establish local and clean sources such as wind, solar, biomass and hydropower.

Canada has just done a little step towards the aimed CO2 reduction in the first years. But it has to be considered that the supporting programs have to be first set up and introduced, and such projects take time before they show some effect. There are eleven more years to reach the aim.

The funding options are relatively new, and they seem to be a mix aiming for research and development and for integration of renewables.

Energy policy of Greenland The aim of the Greenlandic government is very vague, but the large communities are powered by hydropower. This makes the renewable portion of the total energy mix very strong with around 70% (WWF, 2017). In 2016 the first solar test side was opened and in 2018 the first wind turbine was erected in Greenland. Private consumers have been much more open to solar power. Several small-scale solar systems can be found on residential buildings.

Comparison of energy policies among the Arctic countries A comparison of the hydropower electricity generation in the different countries shows on a first look that Greenland produces more than 70% of its electricity by using renewables (WWF, 2017).

In Canada it is around 66% renewables (Natural Resources Canada, 2018). USA is far behind with 25 – 30% renewables, but these numbers are on a country level (EIA, 2019). A breakdown on just remote areas draws a different picture. In Greenland all communities are remote, so nothing changes. But a look on Canadian remote communities shows that just 25% of all remote communities can supplement the diesel electricity generation with renewables. In Alaska 15% of all remote communities harvest a portion of the electricity from renewables. The lower use of renewables in remote places can be associated with the high investment cost for renewable power projects.

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It can be seen that renewables are a viable option to support electricity generation and lower the carbon footprint of society. The introduction of renewables has a positive effect on electricity prices. It is among the Arctic communities that the highest electricity prices around the world can be found. For example, in Alaska prices can be 2 – 5 times higher compared to the lower 48.

Conclusion At the current stage there is mature technology available to power entire Arctic communities by renewables like hydropower, or at least to supplement the electricity mix with renewable energy such as wind and solar. It is important to assess the local circumstances, which natural resources are available and which amount can be harnessed. Moreover, it has to be analysed if renewable energy can be harnessed in an economically viable way and cost-effective policies introduced to facilitate the transition. Alaska and Greenland have already implemented policies to support directly the use of renewable energy resources. Canada is however focusing directly on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, which will lead to an increase of low carbon technologies such as renewables. To reach these goal’s several initiatives have been started by the governments, reaching from a country wide approach up to specific programs just for rural Arctic communities.

Overall it can however be seen that the share of renewable energy in the Arctic is still very low.

Sustainable energy technologies are at a point of development where the integration in to Arctic electricity systems is feasible. The use of local energy sources can increase the energy security in communities and lower the cost of energy. For the small communities such projects are often very complicated to execute because of the high upfront investment cost. Since many sustainable systems are modular it is however possible for the communities to adjust the output in accordance to the demand, if the population growth or businesses require more energy. The policies that have already been introduced are helpful and the launched funding programmes are very important for supporting the implementation of renewable energy in the Arctic. However, more funding is needed to stimulate the transition, and smaller communities also need expert assistance for evaluating resource and technological potentials and with applying for funding.

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de Witt, Stefánsson & Valfells

Briefing Note

Sustainable development and notions of security Justin Barnes

Introduction Climate change is putting unique ecosystems and cultures at risk of severe consequences (IPCC, 2014: 12). Canada’s communities in the Far North are typically more vulnerable to environmental pollutants and the impacts of climate change than their counterparts living in southern Canada (Stoddart & Smith, 2016). Climate change in the Canadian Arctic thus poses a challenging problem for policy makers and their constituents. Significant environmental changes in the Arctic region create new social issues, economic opportunities and challenges for all Arctic nations and their peoples. The creation of an ‘Arctic Paradox’ – the combined fear of climate change and the anticipation of resource development – raises questions about how the various levels of Canadian society will respond to the need for socially responsible policies that help northern communities adapt to the consequences of environmental changes as well as manage their new economic interests in the Arctic. This briefing note identifies and examines interlinkages between climate change and sustainable development, environmental security, and adaptive capacity through a case study in two communities in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR): Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk. The ISR is located in Canada’s western Arctic and includes significant portions of the Beaufort Sea coastline (Figure 1). It was established in 1984, following the Inuvialuit Final Agreement between the Inuvialuit and the Government of Canada. Inuvik, the largest community in the ISR, is located on the East Channel of the Mackenzie Delta. It is considered an administrative center in the region that is home to Indigenous, local, regional, territorial, and federal government offices. Tuktoyaktuk is a second, smaller Inuvialuit community located on the coastline of the Beaufort Sea (see Figure 1).

Both communities have experienced significant changes to the local climate and landscape. These changes have resulted in a variety of impacts on the people and ecosystems in the region. In

Justin Barnes is the Assistant Editor of the Arctic Yearbook and a Fellow at Polar Research and Policy Initiative.

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addition to the challenges posed by climate change, both communities are also struggling with a number of other social problems including mental health challenges and food insecurity.

Moreover, the region is expected to contain large oil and gas deposits both onshore, and under the Beaufort Sea. Both communities have experienced the economic boost oil and gas companies have provided during times of exploration and testing but the abandoned work camps on the outskirts of town are testament to the unstable nature of the resource economy in northern Canada.

Figure 1: Map of The Inuvialuit Settlement Region This article provides an overview of Source: Government of Canada, 2011 - https://www.rcaancthe primary findings of a study that cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1427987089269/1543249556315 sought to understand how the communities of Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk perceive climate change and define sustainable development in relation to oil and gas development. Key-informant interviews were held with leaders in both towns to discuss these issues during September and October of 2019. The primary question discussed in this paper is: how do the two communities hope to address the inevitable changes brought about by both the environmental challenges they are experiencing, and the economic demands of a growing Canadian political economy which is turning its attention to the resources of the North?

Sustainable development and environmental security Policy approaches concerning development have been refocused by the rise of ‘sustainable development’ as a legitimate response to environmental and social concerns on the international and domestic level. Sustainable development has been deemed by many experts as a multifaceted approach to balancing the environmental concerns of human activities and the socio-political concerns regarding human development issues. While sustainable development has become a globally recognized term for ‘responsible growth’, opinion about what sustainable development means, and how it should be measured, remains diverse and often complex.

Dalby (2013) has acknowledged the link between sustainable development and environmental security and recognized the parallel international discussions surrounding resource management, environmental degradation, and development that led to the institutionalization of sustainable development in the United Nations’ World Commission on Environment and Development report Our Common Future (1987). The World Bank (1995) once tied the concept of environmental security to the concepts of intergenerational and intragenerational equity by arguing that environmental sustainability is closely connected with both these generational concepts of equity. According to the World Bank (1995), when the wealthy consume more resources overall, the poor tend to rely on the direct exploitation of natural resources and may have no choice but to engage in unsustainable uses of environmental resources.

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As Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) have noted from a security perspective, the concept of sustainability is the ultimate form of environmental security, as it stages environmental and social issues as existential, and which are presented by some actors as issues of supreme priority to society’s survival. This can be seen in the fact that the term sustainability is often used in reference to the future. The definitions of sustainability and sustainable development lead to only two outcomes: that either society changes to a system that provides current and future generations with the ability to survive, or that human society as we know it will be impaired by its destructive actions to the point of no return. By combining multiple existential threats and focusing on minimal future outcomes, whether or not society can shift to become more sustainable could be perceived as an existential issue in the environmental sector.

Climate change is having a noticeable impact on the Arctic environment and its communities.

Various stakeholders in the region are working to overcome the challenges being presented to them by climate change by increasing their capacity to adapt to changes to both the Arctic’s natural environment and contemporary global environmental politics. Both the impacts of climate change and the recognition of it as a global issue (see Dalby, 2013) have not only altered the opportunities and threats to communities in the Arctic, they have also changed global and domestic environmental politics (see the UN SDGs and Paris Agreement on climate change). According to the findings of Huebert et al (2012), many policy statements by Arctic states in the past have underlined the need to “maintain environmental security and sustainable development” with both Canada and the United States making it clear that “the sustainable development of the region within their national control” was a priority (17).

Sustainable development and environmental security are twin pillars of concern in a number of more recent policy and strategy documents orienting the Canadian government’s approach to the Arctic. These documents include the federal government’s former 2009 Northern Strategy, the more recent Arctic & Northern Policy Framework, and the Department of National Defence’s (DND) defence policy: Strong, Secure, Engaged. These documents have addressed the various ways in which the federal government has viewed security in the Canadian Arctic. Security in the human context is what underlines these policies. Canada’s 2009 Arctic policy - Northern Strategy, positioned sustainable development as the basis for all decision-making, while economic development in the North is framed in relation to promoting Canadian sovereignty, and the environment is positioned as factor influencing national security. The more recent Arctic & Northern Policy Framework underlined the need for sustainable development, but took a step further, recognizing the importance of the environment in traditional lifestyles in the North, framing its protection as existentially important, and identifying the threats climate change poses for northern communities.

From another perspective, the DND’s policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, approached environmental security by analyzing the threats that climate change poses for Canada’s national security in the region in relation to its allies, partners, and Canada’s northern communities.

Issues may begin to arise, however, when understandings of what sustainable development means differs across distinctive geopolitical regions and between levels of society. This has the potential to create significant issues for Arctic communities because experiences of climate change in the Arctic and what constitutes ‘sustainable development’ may vary at the local, regional and state levels of governance. As Dalby (2013) notes, framing environmental issues as a security issue that legitimates the use of emergency measures “may be completely counterproductive in dealing with rebuilding economies in a sustainable way or expanding citizenship rights and effective Barnes

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participation in the necessary decision making” (Dalby, 2013: 164). By placing potential environmental degradation and climate change as issues above normal politics and as a matter of environmental security, it is possible that the ability of local Indigenous communities to adapt to climate change in their own way and sustainably develop their communities in the way that they perceive ‘sustainability’ could be interfered with by climate change policies and strategies taking place on the state level. As Happaerts (2012) identifies, challenges arise when attempting to implement sustainable development policies across multiple levels of governance in Canada. A coordinated effort across all levels of governance is needed in order to for sustainable development policies to be successful (Happaerts, 2012). Thus, problems may emerge when understandings of what constitutes a threat and what sustainable development means differs across distinctive geopolitical regions and between levels of society.

Local perspectives of threat in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region The key-informant interviews identified that climate change is having an observable impact on Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk in a variety of ways, including changes in migratory patterns, permafrost melt, and coastal erosion. The towns have also, however, experienced significant societal and economic changes throughout their history which have proven to be significantly challenging.

Adaptation has been necessary to respond to these other changes as well, including political adaptation to a changing relationship with the South in order to establish the Inuvialuit Final Agreement. The need for adaptation has also influenced a change in perspective regarding the value of the region’s resources in the context of growing integration with the Canadian political and economic system.

These adaptations matter because they contribute to the communities’ general responses to climate change. As the interviews with local community leaders demonstrated, in Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk, climate change was viewed as both a threat by some leaders and as a practical issue by others. The ways in which climate change issues were characterized as threats were often related to the ability of the community to respond to the issue. But this raised questions about whether climate change itself should be considered a threat to the community or if the threat exists due to the inhibited ability to adapt to the issues produced by climate change. Various participants pointed to underlying concerns, such as their community’s inhibited ability to participate in the Canadian economy and the high costs of adaptation. These types of perspectives, related to community perceptions about capacity and threat, are important because they effectively shift the focus onto the other societal and economic changes currently being experienced. In other words, they broaden the discussion from its singular focus on the environment.

For some leaders, the recognition that climate change is something they have always been dealing with in the Arctic is the basis for the argument that the overarching challenge is the way communities are currently experiencing climate change in the context of other economic and societal changes. While climate change may ‘threaten’ certain aspects of life in the North, it is possible that a changing relationship with the land is prompting a different perception of what constitutes a threat to the community. For example, the protection and growth of a permanent community is relatively new in Inuvialuit history and brings additional demands, including that of economic growth, in order to finance adaptation costs, to the forefront of adapting to climate change.

Therefore, as many leaders noted in their comments on the issue of adapting to climate change

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and sustainability, a pragmatic response is needed – one that helps to increase the adaptive capacity of the communities and that is also framed by the demands of Canada’s political economy.

Local perspectives on sustainable development The general definitions put forward by leaders in Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk fall in line with that of the Brundtland Commission’s definition: sustainable development is considered by leaders in Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk to be a balance between environmental protection and economic growth that promotes community prosperity and ensures a future for the next generation. Notably, for them, key to that prosperity is economic growth, as it is believed that it is needed to address the socio-economic challenges the communities are experiencing and to help finance adaptation to a changing climate.

The general consensus on economic growth as a solution to the various issues facing Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk emphasizes the limited options available to the communities. While the communities are working hard to diversify their economic opportunities, resource development remains a significant factor in planning for the future. As previously discussed, the region is expected to have large oil and gas reserves that could provide useful energy to the communities in the form of natural gas as well as large profits that could be put towards resolving socio-economic issues and climate change adaptation. This expectation is clearly seen in the text of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, which provides the Inuvialuit with specific surface and subsurface rights within their region and a promise to negotiate future rights over marine areas, including the Beaufort Sea. A number of contradictions inherent in accessing these resources were discussed with the participants, such as the risk oil and gas extraction poses to the natural environment that many community members rely on. Nonetheless, developing an economic base is seen as necessary for sustaining the community while also adapting to change. As a former mayor of Inuvik noted, “that’s the future for the next generation, I mean they need something to look forward to or keep the generation in the North.” This desire for economic growth reflects a corresponding desire to increase the capacity of communities to adapt. In the context of the Canadian political economy, however, it focuses the options available to the communities for adaptation on undertaking potentially risky resource extraction. Although this type of activity may be considered part of a sustainable development plan for the communities, the nature of the activity and its potential impact on the environment of the Arctic make it more than just a local concern.

Different perspectives within a geopolitical region Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk have an added challenge as coastal communities in the Arctic: the economic desires of the community do not necessarily align with a current geopolitical narrative that often presents the region as a pristine environment in need of heightened environmental protection. The frustration that many of the participants expressed is a result of a lack of support from the federal government as well as the constraints that have been imposed by other levels of governance. ‘Outside’ perspectives are seen to have had a significant influence on the communities and the region in general by the leaders interviewed. Local communities, such as Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk, not only have to contend with subnational and national governments, but with the circumpolar community as a whole, due to the interdependence that exists between Arctic states and stakeholders. Recent actions at other levels of governance, particularly by the federal government, indicate the high levels of interdependence that exist both within Canada and within

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the circumpolar community. This interdependence has an influence on communities and how competing notions of environmental security and sustainable development are impacting the adaptive capacity of Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk.

Competing notions of security Competing notions of security can also be seen to be contributing to the opportunities and constraints for communities within the geopolitical region. According to Starr (2013), geopolitical factors in regions generate a structure of opportunities and constraints and this structure has an influence on the decisions and behaviours of actors. This is important because it shapes the opportunities and constraints within a region and can fundamentally change what the physical environment means to decision-makers in terms of risks, threats, and opportunities (Starr, 2013).

If the Arctic is understood as a regional security complex (Exner-Pirot, 2013), it can be seen how geopolitical opportunities and constraints shape what the Arctic’s natural environment means for decision-makers, informing their choices, strategies, and decisions in all aspects of Arctic sustainable development policy.

It also points to the impacts of environmental securitization on the global level and the dichotomy that exists between concepts of environmental security and human security. Like sustainable development, environmental security is a complex concept that has emerged in response to global environmental issues and their current and future impacts on human society. By observing the Arctic as a geopolitical region influenced by the security interdependence characteristics of a regional security complex, it can be seen that the natural environment has been a primary factor in influencing the overall security paradigm, and therefore, the political environment of the Arctic (Exner-Pirot, 2013). We have already discussed the different perspectives concerning environmental security and sustainable development advanced by the Canadian government’s suite of Arctic policy documents. It is possible to better understand the resulting disconnect on a more specific level, however, using the Canadian federal government’s oil and gas moratorium as a prominent example of one level of government unilaterally framing an issue to be existentially threatening and shaping policy around it that may not consider related socioeconomic concerns on the local level.

Actions including the Beaufort Sea oil and gas moratorium point to the different perspectives of the issues facing the North and their influence on policy. The moratorium, which will be discussed further, is an example of a constraint on local communities that arises from competing notions of sustainable development and environmental security. These different perspectives and perceptions of the region maintained by the South have been in contrast to the views of those who live in the North. It has been a point of frustration that was raised by many leaders interviewed, including a current Inuvik Town Councillor: I think we need to dispel the romantic myth of the North. It drives you crazy after a while. It’s not that romantic. It’s usually quite cold… no place in the world stays stagnant and static so don’t expect the North to do it either. Don’t expect people to just stop and we always get the question you get in the South: why don’t they just move everybody out of the North and move them down South? Well, guess what? People living here are key to Canada having sovereignty in the Arctic and the resources in the Arctic are immense. Whether it’s oil and gas or minerals.

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People don’t realize this is the last place on the planet where they haven’t gone and extracted them.

Much like the tensions that exist on the international level in environmental and climate debates between developed and developing countries, the idea that everyone else has been able to grow their economies with these types of activities raises the question: why can’t we?

The influence of environmental security on local concepts of sustainable development The key-informant interview process illustrated the general perspectives of some local leaders in the region on a variety of challenges including climate, societal, economic change, and notions of sustainable development. The interviews suggested that while climate change is considered a threat to the communities, a pragmatic response that recognizes the larger context of change in northern society is needed: one that also addresses the societal, economic, and political changes the communities have been experiencing. Climate change is not considered to be the only challenge the communities are facing and a multi-faceted approach is needed. In relation to this, the concept of sustainable development was defined as a balance between environmental protection and economic growth that promotes community prosperity and ensures a future for the next generation. This definition is important because it frames how issues related to climate change and other societal changes are approached and, ultimately, how ‘sustainable development’ as a globally emerging concept fits into northern society. On the other hand, framing climate change or environmental damage as a security threat has the potential to limit the ability of communities to sustain themselves within the demands of a growth-driven and increasingly neoliberal society and that this may be having an impact on the adaptive capacity of Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk. It identified the constraints placed upon communities that prevent them from benefitting to the full extent from emerging economic opportunities and addressing other societal concerns, due to a positioning of sustainable development in opposition to environmental security at different levels of governance. Thus, these constraints inhibit these communities from benefitting from emerging opportunities because of competing notions of sustainable development and environmental security.

Environmental security dynamics on the state and local levels: The Beaufort Sea oil and gas moratorium The relationships and agreements made between and amongst Arctic states can be seen in the variety of environmental policies that have emerged in Canada. While it is contradictory to the actions of the federal government regarding oil and gas production elsewhere in Canada, the Beaufort Sea oil and gas moratorium is an example of the Canadian government leading by example under the narrative being encouraged within the environmental agenda in the Arctic region. The Beaufort Sea oil and gas moratorium was established in partnership with the United States and was outlined in the United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders Statement on December 20, 2016 and states: In March, the United States (U.S.) and Canada committed that commercial activities will occur only if the highest safety and environmental standards are met, and if they are consistent with national and global climate and environmental goals. Today – due to the important, irreplaceable values of its Arctic waters for

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Indigenous, Alaska Native and local communities’ subsistence and cultures, wildlife and wildlife habitat, and scientific research; the vulnerability of these ecosystems to an oil spill; and the unique logistical, operational, safety, and scientific challenges and risks of oil extraction and spill response in Arctic waters – the U.S. is designating the vast majority of U.S. waters in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas as indefinitely off limits to offshore oil and gas leasing, and Canada is designating all Arctic Canadian waters as indefinitely off limits to future offshore Arctic oil and gas licensing, to be reviewed every 5 years through a climate and marine sciencebased life-cycle assessment.

The statement links global climate and environmental goals with the values of local communities, attempting to cross many levels of society and address multi-level issues. For the federal government, the management of its territorial seas is an international issue in the Arctic. Prevention of an environmental disaster brought on by an oil spill is an obligation the federal government has to the environmental epistemic community of the Arctic Council, but also to the world, through its commitment to other international frameworks regarding pollution mitigation. Therefore, the causes of environmental securitization in relation to the oil and gas moratorium can be seen at the global level. The political environment at the global level has had an influence on this policy and the reasons for it, including ecosystem and climate concerns. While an oil spill would have both local and international consequences, the consequences would be experienced differently.

The conflict that has arisen around the oil and gas moratorium between the local and federal level is a result of wider contexts involving environmental protection and economic development.

Although there is local opposition to the moratorium due to its socioeconomic impacts, there is support for these types of actions that can be found at the national and global levels. The fear of negative effects on the circumpolar and global level has motivated the moratorium but the local level is the main level of implementation and, therefore, conflict. The issues are localized due to the fact that many of the effects of a possible environmental disaster would take place at the local level but also because limiting oil and gas development is seen as limiting economic development, and therefore, sustainable development.

While the oil and gas moratorium may be a small part of a larger environmental (and political) context, securitization of the Arctic environment, from the perspective of local leaders, is seen to be having a negative effect on the sociopolitical-economic life of Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk. On the local level, this move is not being perceived as a way to preserve achieved levels of civilization. The key-informant interviews suggest that it is being perceived as an action that is denying the local communities the ability to sustain and develop their communities. Additionally, although many local groups may or may not agree with the reasoning behind the moratorium, much of the opposition lies with the fact that the communities were not consulted beforehand and that their potential economic growth is being limited by outside perceptions of “the greater good.”

Although the federal government has framed the well-being of Arctic communities and their environment as referent objects that are existentially threatened in the Joint Arctic Leaders Statement, it highlights the issues that arise for communities attempting to adapt and respond to complex changes to their climate and socioeconomic structures in the context of Canada’s political economy. As can be seen in this case study, it is impossible to not have an impact on local communities. Although issues such as a lack of infrastructure and an inhibited ability to respond

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to an environmental disaster are primary concerns of the federal government, it is also a discussion about risk and whose risk it is to take. Ultimately, the decision to put the moratorium in place was a state level decision that has had local consequences and underlines the argument that security is experienced differently at the local and state levels.

Securitization on the local level?

While Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) might consider the federal government’s actions to be characteristic of environmental regime formation in the international system and not considered to be securitization at the international level, it could in fact be perceived as a securitizing move at the local level. This scenario effectively highlights the fact that there are differences as to what constitutes a threat between the local and the global level. These differences frame both the reactions and the policy approaches of groups on both levels of governance. The federal government has effectively framed oil and gas extraction as existentially threatening to both the fragile environment of the Arctic and to the local communities who call the region home. In the context of the environmental epistemic community that is formalized by the Arctic Council, the bilateral actions of the United States and Canada frame the federal government as a veto actor at the domestic level. The declaration that the federal government must take measures in order to protect the well-being of vulnerable communities, even if the communities do not recognize it as being in their best interest, has been perceived to be extreme by the local leaders who were interviewed. The federal government, however, clearly determined that at some level the nature of the threat demanded this response.

While it is difficult to do so on the international level according to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), two factors characterize this action as a security move on the local level: (1) multiple participants suggested during the interviews that there was no immediate threat to Canada’s portion of the Beaufort Sea due to the limited amount of exploration and extraction taking place in the region and (2) according to various participants, the federal government went beyond the appropriate spectrum of response by violating the spirit of domestic federal-Indigenous agreements and co-management procedures. While the federal government has jurisdiction over Canada’s internal waters of the Beaufort Sea, the political constellation of mutual security concerns is different, or at least viewed differently, by the local and global level of governance in the Arctic.

The differences in environmental security concerns at the two levels can be seen in the way leaders in Inuvik and Tuktoyakuk discuss oil and gas activities in their region. Although all of the community leaders interviewed acknowledged the deep importance of the environment to their communities, as discussed, they also noted that economic stimulus from oil and gas activities could help address various socioeconomic issues. While the possible impacts of an oil spill or environmental disaster on socioeconomic aspects of their communities are known, they were generally discussed in relation to their land claim agreement and their right to lay out the rules and procedures for companies operating in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region. This may explain why many of those interviewed reconcile the inherent risks in oil and gas extraction by pointing to socioeconomic challenges their communities face. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998: 86) provide some insight when they note, “securitization always involves political choice; thus, actors might choose to ignore major causes for political and pragmatic reasons and therefore may form a security constellation that is different from what one would expect based on one’s knowledge of effects and causes.”

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Issues such as climate change adaptation are seen to require a pragmatic response that recognize the other changes the communities are experiencing. The demands of society require economic development to sustain their communities and these demands (and desires) play a part in reconciling the risk on the local level.

Impacts on adaptive capacity By placing potential environmental degradation and climate change as issues above normal politics and as a matter of environmental security, policies and strategies taking place on the state level are impacting their adaptive capacity. While it may be in line with the current geopolitical narrative in the Arctic, from the community’s perspective, the federal government’s moratorium is consequently preventing the communities from implementing their understanding of sustainable development. It prevents them from accessing what many leaders in the community see as a possible way to sustain the communities by providing jobs, infrastructure, and the financial capacity to respond to climate change and other challenges. Therefore, framing issues as security issues, or issues that require emergency measures, is impacting the adaptive capacity of Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk because (1) the communities have undergone significant societal, economic and political changes in the last century; (2) integration with the Canadian political economy presents the demand for economic growth; (3) economic growth is seen as critical for financing adaptation measures and sustaining northern communities; and (4) due to the fact that oil and gas extraction is one of only a small number of options for economic growth in the region, the moratorium is removing a significant option for economic growth.

This article has thus presented flaws in the concept of sustainable development as well as our neoliberal paradigm in general: economic growth is seen as a fundamental pillar for success. This raises the question: but at what cost? The risks surrounding oil and gas development are immense and while many priorities and practices have changed in the communities over the last century, traditional practices are still important aspects of their culture, the protection of the environment is critical for global society as a whole, and the continued extraction and usage of fossil fuels presents one of the single greatest threats to humanity. But still, economic growth is needed and in places such as Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk where potentially damaging practices are seen as almost the only option, the risk is worth the reward for many leaders who want to be able to provide a ‘better’ life for their people.

Conclusion Sustainable development has been described by some as the rallying cry for environmental security – that if the development is not sustainable, then it is not secure. But if sustainable development is a human-centric concept, how consistent are the concepts of sustainable development and environmental security with one another? The environment may be securitized by an actor for a number of reasons. This could include preventing some kind of action that would push society past the carrying capacity of a regional environment, thus having an impact on the sustainability of society. It could also, however, include actions by an actor that frames the environment as something that is being existentially threatened by human activity, thus limiting a region to develop a resource to sustain their community. Both concepts are being applied subjectively and this makes it difficult to employ them consistently across a range of situations. Different perceptions at different levels of society play a role in how these actions may be experienced. Therefore, securitizing the environment could serve the greater good and preserve the livability of our world.

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It might also, though, have implications for implementing sustainable development, a humancentric concept, at the community level. The federal government’s oil and gas moratorium on the Beaufort Sea is an example of such a case and while the logic surrounding environmental protection is clear, it raises issues for community-specific sustainable development and therefore, their adaptive capacity and ability to sustain themselves in the region.

This article has shown ways in which competing notions of sustainable development and environmental security can place constraints on local communities because they mean different things at different levels of society through time and space. The local desire for oil and gas extraction as part of a sustainable development plan juxtaposed with the federal government’s oil and gas moratorium is an example of how policy approaches that may not acknowledge what sustainability means to other levels of governance could have potentially negative impacts on local communities and create conflict. In the context of the societal and economic issues the communities are facing, the moratorium has potentially impacted the adaptive capacity and thus, from the perspectives of the leaders interviewed, the sustainability of the communities. While it addresses the risk for environmental disaster, it has an impact on the ability of local communities to meet their other societal and economic needs.

Environmental or human security?

Ultimately, the level of interdependence that exists between Arctic stakeholders is influencing sustainable development on the domestic level. By understanding the role of the natural environment within the integrated field of security studies, a deeper understanding of what sustainable development means can be uncovered. The security constellation that exists in the region makes it impossible to consider issues on a sector by sector basis because when viewing security from a local level and human-centric perspective, it is impossible to separate environmental issues from that of societal and economic aspects of northern life (particularly when considering the underlying context of Canada’s political economy). As Buzan ,Waever and de Wilde (1998) note, one sector cannot be addressed in separation from the others and “the environmental sector provides a lens that enables us to highlight root causes of existential threats that become manifest in other sectors” (84).

Although the environmental sector has been used as a perceptual lens to observe and understand how the natural environment influences decision-makers’ perceptions and decisions in the region, it is clear that the environment is only one aspect of security on the ground. As evidenced by the findings in Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk, the issues they face are interconnected and are not solvable independently of one another. Therefore, when discussing security from a local perspective, a more encapsulating and wholistic approach, human security, more appropriately acknowledges the interconnectedness of the issues that communities face, particularly in the Arctic. The concepts of sustainable development and environmental security are inherently tied, but because they are both human-centric concepts, a human security lens is important for understanding the constraints that might be arising for local communities.

Human security Many leaders described protecting the environment as a matter of human security based on their important ties to the land and sea. The survival of the community still very much depends on the natural resources that provide food for their tables and satisfy the cultural desires of the

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community. From this perspective, environmental security is inextricably part of a larger understanding of human security. Because discussions of security are inherently political, prioritization of certain issues on one level of society can begin to overshadow concerns at other levels. It seems that when one type of security becomes too dominant, it over-shadows the other types of security, or what other groups would consider to be existentially threatened, which exist within a constellation of security issues.

Speaking about security also immediately brings us to a discussion of power and politics. Those with the ability to shape the security discourse and prioritize certain perspectives and values hold the power to securitize and desecuritize issues. As was seen with the Beaufort Sea moratorium, it can be argued that the federal government effectively securitized the local environment and communities of the region, reminding the world of its sovereignty in the region as well as its ability to promote its jurisdictional authority in the region. While it was representing the geopolitical narrative being promoted in the Arctic Council and Canada’s commitments to international environmental and climate agreements, the moratorium had a large impact on local communities, even if it was only symbolic. It’s a reminder that the needs of the greater good are more than that of a single group. This does not, however, lessen the influence it has had on ‘security’ in the region and on the human security of the people of Tuktoyaktuk and Inuvik. In the context of Canada’s political economy, the moratorium impacts the adaptive capacity of the communities to respond to the changes they are experiencing because it continues to limit the economic options available to them. There is an underlying expectation that if the people in these communities need to find jobs or are supposed to be able to live like the rest of Canadians, then they are going to need opportunities like the rest of Canadians. This is important because in the current political economic paradigm, it is perceived that these communities need an economic base to adapt, survive and flourish.

The intersection of sustainable development and security is thus an expression of a society’s, and more specifically, a government’s world view and goals for the future. The ways in which we describe security and discuss issues in relation to security point to the values that we hold. It points to the ideals that we want to protect. The fact that there is not just one ‘right’ way of doing something complicates the matter, but the fact that different values exist on multiple levels of society makes issues regarding economic development and environmental protection in the name of sustainable development, and therefore human security, difficult to balance and realize in real life.

Acknowledgement The author would like to recognize and thank the participants of this study from Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk. The leaders interviewed in this study provided invaluable insights and this research would not have been possible without them.

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References Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Ltd. Dalby, S. (2013). Global Environmental Security. In R. Falkner (Eds.), The Handbook of Global Climate and Environmental Policy. Somerset, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Exner-Pirot, H. (2013). What is the Arctic a case of? The Arctic as a regional environmental security complex and the implications for policy. The Polar Journal, 3(1), 120 – 135.

Happaerts, S. (2012). Does Autonomy Matter? Subnational Governments and the Challenge of Vertical Policy Integration for Sustainable Development: A Comparative Analysis of Quebec, Flanders, North Rhine-Westphalia and North Holland. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, 45(1), 141-161 Huebert, R., Exner-Pirot, H., Lajeunesse, A., & Gulledge, J. (2012). Climate Change & International Security: The Arctic as a Bellwether. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions.

International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2014). Summary for policymakers. In C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L.White (Eds.), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1-32 Starr, H. (2013). On Geopolitics: Spaces and Places. International Studies Quarterly, 57, 433–439.

Stoddart, M. and Smith, J. (2016). “The Endangered Arctic, the Arctic as Resource Frontier: Canadian News Media Narratives of Climate Change and the North”. Canadian Review Of Sociology/Revue Canadienne De Sociologie, 53(3), 316-336 United Nations. (1987). Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future. Retrieved on 02/02/2018 from: https://www.are.admin.ch/dam/are/en/dokumente/nachhaltige_entwicklung/dokume nte/bericht/our_common_futurebrundtlandreport1987.pdf.download.pdf/our_commo n_futurebrundtlandreport1987.pdf World Bank. (1995). Monitoring environmental progress: a report on work in progress (English). ESSD Environmentally & Socially Sustainable Development Work in Progress. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

Barnes

Briefing Note

The main directions of securing geocryological safety of economic activity in the Arctic region Alina Voytenko, Dmitry Sergeev & Irina Chesnokova

In this work, the attentions focused on the securing geocryological safety of the economic activity in the Arctic region. The security is a prerequisite for the development, prosperity and well-being of the arctic communities, to ensure sustainable economic activity in the region. This new article addresses the risks in the arctic, which may pose a threat to human life and health, the environment, economic objects, as well as ways to prevent these risks. We pay special attention to geocryological safety. The authors consider that the geocryological safety means protect ability from a complex of negative consequences, associated with the condition of permafrost rocks. Geocryological security should be evaluated and ensured along various algorithms for stages of construction and exploitation of engineering projects and aspects of nature management.

Introduction The Russian Arctic is a region of special geostrategic and long-term interests for Russia, primarily from the point of view of the development and rational use of natural resources, ensuring global ecological balance and the preservation of economic infrastructure facilities.

The national security strategy of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on December 31, 2015, calls natural disasters, accidents and catastrophes, including those associated with global climate change, a deterioration in the technical condition of infrastructure, among the main threats to state and public security. Security is a prerequisite for the development, prosperity and well-being of Arctic communities, to ensure sustainable economic activity in the region. This new topic addresses the risks in the Arctic, which may pose a threat to human life and health, the environment, economic objects, as well as ways to prevent these risks.

We pay special attention to geocryological safety.

The authors consider that geocryological safety means protection from a complex of negative consequences associated with the condition of permafrost rocks. Geocryological security should be evaluated and ensured along various algorithms for stages of construction and exploitation of engineering projects and aspects of nature management. The Chara-China railway route and the Arctic section of the Northern Railway are considered in our work.

Alina Voytenko and Dmitry Sergeev are researchers with the Sergeev Institute of Environmental Geoscience, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (IEG RAS),. Irina Chesnokova is a researcher at the Water Problems Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (WPI RAS).

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Techniques and materials Our investigations were carried out on two roads. The first one is the Pecets-Khanovey, situated beyond the Polar Circle (approximately 67.2o N, 63.5o E) in Bolshezemelsk Tundra, at the extreme north-east of the Komi Republic, in the Vorkuta district. The second one was built, but not operated: the Chara-China Road (Kolarsk district, Transbaikal Region).

In 2014-2018 a complex of field activities were carried out: drilling work, definition of thermophysical properties of soils, definition of temperature regime of the surface, geophysical investigations (electrical survey), studying the temperature regime of permafrost rocks and the seasonal thawing layer, landscape microzoning of the locality, studying upheavals, thermokarst, definition of radiation balance, temperature regime of the stream, etc.

Our task was to study the sustainability of the railway in the Arctic (areas of cryolitozone development). This is the priority objective for designers and specialists in operation. There are many methodological recommendations, but our task is to check the effectiveness of administrative measures for deformed zones of roads.

The effectiveness of administrative measures in such difficult conditions cannot be considered without regarding the geocryological state of the environment, the engineering methods which were used for the railway construction, and the economic evaluation of the decisions taken or engineering protection.

Railway construction in the Arctic zone leads to heat transfer changes between the ground surface and the atmosphere. There are known factors affecting heat transfer. Among them: 1) removal of vegetation cover; 2) disturbance of the surface run off; 3) increasing snow cover; and 4) reflections of sun rays from the surface. All these factors directly influence permafrost grounds, which develop hazardous geocryological processes directly affecting the state of the railway stability (Isakov, 2016). Analyzing literature and research materials, we can assert that when the railway is in operation, the appearance of deformations is inevitable. Deformation zones are either technogenic or natural. The latter are of scientific interest to us, as they appear as a result of geocryological processes (Fig. 1 - 6).

In order to choose effะตctive administrative measures for development and construction in the Arctic region, it is necessary to foresee the economic factors, or more precisely, economic effectivity. Economic efficiency is a value that manifests itself in costs (rubles, dollars) for the maintenance of transport facility. Attention to this property helps to avoid unforeseen costs for engineering protection or maintenance of the road in the working condition (Voytenko, 2017).

Figure 1. Pecets-Khanovey Road (archival photo).

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Figure 2. Disturbances in the zone of Chara-China Road due to the development of dangerous geocryological processes (photo by I. Chesnokova, 2016).

Figure 3. Disturbances in the zone of Chara-China Road due to the development of dangerous geocryological processes (photo by D. Sergeev, 2016).

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Figure 4. Disturbances in the zone of Chara-China Road due to the development of dangerous geocryological processes (photo by I. Chesnokova, 2016).

Figure 5. Disturbances in the zone of Chara-China Road due to the development of dangerous geocryological processes (photo by I. Chesnokova, 2016).

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Figure 6. Disturbances in the zone of Chara-China Road due to the development of dangerous geocryological processes (photo by D. Sergeev, 2016).

Results and discussion As a result, terrains were specified which helped to reveal the regularities of space distribution of geocryological phenomena and processes. The landscape typification of the area provided the basis for preparing the original map-scheme of the locality, which allows us: • •

• •

to divide areas into conditionally disturbed or undisturbed; to demonstrate schematically the development of the area during changing geocryological conditions and to identify the leading factors associated with development of hazardous processes; to compare the data on changing geocryological conditions to present a concept on stage development of geocryological processes and phenomena; and to identify localities suitable for the organization of monitoring of geocryological processes.

Damaged areas on the track were analyzed to assess the damage (Fig. 7). It is known that during the repair (when the structure on the way back to the design framework restored roadbed and drainage structures), the cost of 1 meter (km) road is N rubles. Therefore, with the data presented in the Fig. 7, we can estimate the value of damage (in rubles). And it can be done for different conditions - simple, medium and complex.

The authors conducted an analysis of the economic damage to the main geomorphological areas across which passes the Chara-China track. Results are given in table 1 below.

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Table 1. Values of the economic damage from dangerous geocryologic processes in the Chara-China track (taking into account the geomorphologic location of zones)

Relief type

Significance of economic damage (rubles. n prices of 2009) Min. Medium Max.

Chara River Valley 3,230,800 Piedmont tails 16,390,400 Sortan moraine 5,299,300 Highland area 4,363,550 Intermontane zone 24,239,950

5,264,400 26,707,200 8,634,900 7,110,150 39,595,350

6,736,630 34,176,060 11,049,710 9,099,560 50,668,480

Figure 7. The economic damage caused by geocryological processes along the railway track Chara-China.

Conclusions The concept of “Stable development in the Arctic zone� is considered in this article as an economic planning term, supporting linear objectives (in our case, roads) in working condition. These are complicated problems, and there are still no sufficient materials to secure stable development of linear objects in the cryolite zone (Sergeev, 2014; 2016). As an indicator of sustainable development, the authors consider the ratio of planned cost to the value of maximum possible cost. On the other hand, the ratio of the cost for construction repairs to the cost of the engineering protection can be used as a criterion for making decisions.

Based on identified localities and the character of deformations of the railway embankment, the map-scheme was drawn up for the linear zoning of the route.

Thus, some indicators, among them, were used to evaluate the sustainable development: unclarified geocryological hazards; costs of protection measures; unclear development of geocryological

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processes; losses due to changes in the surrounding landscape; and uncertain localities and the depth of occurrence of high ice rocks.

One of the ways to ensure sustainable development is optimization of the engineering protection of Arctic objects. Such work is an interdisciplinary challenge, which aims to unite geological specialists in geocryology and engineering (designers and specialists in operation) and specialists in economics.

Acknowledgments This work was fulfilled as part of basic research funded by the Ministry of Science of Higher Education of the Russian Federation № AAAA-A19-119021190077-6 and № AAAA-A19119040990079-3.

References Isakov, V. A. (2016). Influence of cryogenic processes on the stability of roads and Railways: autoref. dis. on competition of a scientific degree. scientist. tap dance. kand. geographic locations. Sciences (25.00.31) / Moscow state University.- Moscow, 24.

Sergeev, D. O. & Chesnokovaа I. V. (2014). Problems of assessing the sustainable development of the territory in the cryolitozone. Geoecology. Engineering Geology, Hydrogeology, Geocryology, 2, 127-130 Sergeev, D.O.; Chesnokova, I.V.; Morozova, A.V. & Voytenko, A.S. (2016). Cartographic analysis of the damage, associated with geocryological processes // XI ICOP. 20-24.06., Potsdam, Germany. Book of Abstracts. Edited by Frank Günter and Anne Morgenstern, Alfred Wegener Institute Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research, International Permafrost Association. P.398.

Voytenko A. S., Grishakina E. A., Isaev V. S., Koshurnikov A.V., Pogorelov A. A., Podchasov O. V., Sergeev D. O. (2017). The Importance of changes in geocryological conditions for the operation of infrastructure and environmental protection (by the example of the site of detailed studies in the lower reaches of the Vorkuta river) // Arctic: ecology and Economics, 2(26). - p. 53-61.

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IV. Theorizing about security in the Arctic

“Arctic Exceptionalism” or “comprehensive security”? Understanding security in the Arctic Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv & Kara K. Hodgson

Since Mikhail Gorbachev’s icebreaking Murmansk speech in 1987, the Arctic has been considered to be an “exceptional” region of peace and cooperation in security studies. While acknowledging the relevance of this narrative, this article nevertheless argues the “Arctic exceptionalism” narrative is insufficient for understanding the complex security situation in the region. The lens of comprehensive security allows for an analysis of power that reveals which security narratives dominate, why, and who decides. After a brief description of the key elements associated with “Arctic Exceptionalism” and clarification of the terms “Arctic,” “security,” and “comprehensive security,” this article offers four core arguments against the dominance of the Arctic Exceptionalism narrative, and concludes that the comprehensive security approach provides a more nuanced and dynamic way of capturing the dynamic cooperative and competitive narratives of Arctic security today.

Introduction The concept of Arctic exceptionalism has become an increasingly popular expression for describing the amenable security conditions in the Arctic, commencing with the well-known 1987 “zone of peace” speech made by then-General Secretary of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev (Gorbachev, 1987). Although many leading scholars have supported and promoted the narrative of Arctic exceptionalism (AE), others have been more skeptical. In the following article, we acknowledge the relevance of this narrative, but nevertheless argue that it is not sufficient when attempting to understand security in the Arctic. This is because the narrative reifies a static security perception that relies on a narrow, exclusive, and depoliticised approach to security in the interest of perpetuating an exceptional image of cooperation in the region. Comprehensive security (CS) on the other hand, neither rejects processes of cooperation, nor denies areas of tension that foster increased perceptions of insecurity. Instead, it provides an analytical tool that exposes the ways in which security narratives in the region are complementary, or in competition, at a given time.

Rather than fronting a condition of constant and virtually perpetual cooperation that depolitises the power dynamics between differing security narratives, CS allows for an analysis of power that reveals which security narratives dominate, why, and who decides. Whereas AE is a narrative that

Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv is a Professor and Kara K. Hodgson is a PhD candidate at the Center for Peace Studies, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway.

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describes a selective condition of security, CS is an analytical approach to help better understand security perceptions in the Arctic, and how these are dynamic over time.

In this article, we first briefly describe key elements associated with AE as a security narrative. We then unpack some of the assumptions of AE by clarifying what we mean by “Arctic,” “security,” and “comprehensive security.” This follows with a discussion about “Arctic security” and if it is best understood through Arctic Exceptionalism or comprehensive security. We present four core arguments against the dominance of the AE term, and conclude that CS provides far more insights into the dynamics of Arctic security today.

Arctic Exceptionalism Arctic Exceptionalism is a narrative which attempts to define how one can speak about security in the region. Although the states that make up the Arctic region have all been periodically engaged in violent conflict both within their own territories (for example, World War II) or in out-of-area operations, (most recently in Afghanistan)1, since WWII direct conflict has not touched this region.

This condition of peace is considered striking because two of the Arctic states - the United States and Russia (formerly, the USSR) – had been characterised as diametrically opposed global superpowers for almost half a century. These two Arctic states were central to the animosities of the Cold War and its various proxy conflicts that took place outside of their own state territories, namely within Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Fink, 2017). In the Arctic, however, they maintained a “negative peace”, (absence of violent conflict) whereby the region was a buffer zone between the superpowers during the Cold War. Thus, it was not difficult to foster cooperation in the region when tensions thawed at the end of the Cold War. This state of relations has garnered the region many pacific monikers, including Gorbachev’s landmark proclamation that the Arctic be a “zone of peace” (Gorbachev, 1987), as well as its more recent label by Russia as a “territory of dialogue” (Tass, 2014), while in Norway it has been popularly characterised under the slogan, “High North, low tension” (Thune, 2013). Most poignantly, it has been branded as “exceptional.” The notion of “exceptional” describes the security condition as being in contrast to conditions in other parts of the world and/or in contrast to what is assumed as the normal state of international politics – violent conflict. To a degree it might also be extrapolated that the claim of exceptionality is a claim of superiority in this regard and that other countries or regions have something to learn from the Arctic (Heininen, 2019).

The framing of this state of affairs as “exceptional”, though, owes much to the timing and the context under which Arctic regional relations were institutionalized. The advances made in Arctic cooperation took place in the 1990s, when global optimism about peace in general was high. At this time, UN member states reevaluated narrow security definitions, proposing to widen and deepen our understanding with the now-familiar concept of human security (UNDP, 1994; Hoogensen Gjørv, 2017). In general, therefore, there was a political willingness to consider alternative conceptions of security that encouraged more cooperation.

The basic elements of AE maintain that the region is “detached from global political dynamics and thus characterized primarily as...an apolitical space of regional governance, functional co-operation, and peaceful co-existence” (Käpylä & Mikkola, 2015: 5). Cooperation has been based on common interests “in areas of low politics” (Heininen, 2019: 221), such as environmental protection, the promotion of Indigenous governance and knowledge, increasing connectivity across the region, scientific research, and economic development. Exner-Pirot and Murray (2017) contend that relations are exceptional because they were deliberately negotiated to be so, through the cooperative framework of institutions, through which states “have endeavored, implicitly, to “Arctic Exceptionalism” or “comprehensive security”? Understanding security in the Arctic

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compartmentalize relations there” (51). The term ‘compartmentalization’ is significant here because it reveals that the AE narrative comes with a caveat - Arctic actors discuss only those issues of common interest at the regional level. Actors, dominanted by state-actors, can talk about everything except contentious issues, not least military security. Unlike AE, a comprehensive security approach brings the contentious back in, and allows the analyst to weigh the power of different security narratives in relation to each other within the regional context.

Unpacking the “Arctic” The term itself, Arctic exceptionalism, makes two assumptions – that the “Arctic” can be considered a cohesive region about which general conclusions about security can be made, and that one such general conclusion is that this entire region is exceptional from other regions. As a security narrative, AE requires that we unpack what we mean by security, as well as how it might be understood in the Arctic context.

To understand an exceptional security status of a particular region necessitates understanding what this region is, or supposed to be. “There is nothing intuitively obvious about the idea of treating the Arctic as a distinct region” (Young & Einarsson, 2004: 17). The region has been defined in a variety of ways, including the well-known geographic boundary of the Arctic Circle at 66˚ 33’ north of the equator. However, there are also biophysical (i.e., treeline extent), climatological, (i.e., locations experiencing “Arctic-like” conditions), and functional (i.e., military planning) definitions (Tamnes & Offerdal, 2014). Within international relations and security theories the region does not conform to standard definitions, since ‘regions’ are traditionally bounded by the contiguous borders of states (Buzan &Wæver, 2003; Hoogensen, 2005). Geographically, the “Arctic” contains the northernmost parts of of eight sovereign states, all of which have their capitals located outside of what is considered Arctic.2 Only five of these states share their northern coasts with the Arctic Ocean.

The region is thus less one that is geographically contiguous, than one that is awkwardly connected by relative proximity to the geographical North Pole, generally colder temperatures (which nevertheless vary significantly), combined with, until recently, a historical marginalisation of their northern extremities (including peoples) by their southern capitals. If not for the evolving postCold War politicial will, it should hardly be called a region at all (Rovaniemi Declaration, 1991; Arctic Council, 1996). That political will is reflected in the “social/political” definition of the region as provided by the 2004 Arctic Human Development Report. It illustrates both the human as well as geographical diversity across the region, and encompasses many of the important human and environmental challenges relevant to, and still shared by, the northernmost part of the globe. Thus, the Arctic is: “all of Alaska, Canada North of 60°N together with northern Quebec and Labrador, all of Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland, and the northernmost counties of Norway, Sweden and Finland... [and in Russia,] the Murmansk Oblast, the Nenets, YamaloNenets, Taimyr, and Chukotka autonomus okrugs, Vorkuta City in the Komi Republic, Norilsk and Igsrka in Krasnoyarsky Kray, and those parts of the Sakha Republic whose boundaries lie closest to the Arctic Circle” (Young & Einarsson, 2004: 17-18).

This definition illustrates how the “Arctic” region is divided by borders, languages, ethnicities, and political systems across eight states, all of which impact security perceptions (Hoogensen, 2005; Padrtová, 2017). Distinguishing an “Arctic security” as the collective or combined security of a collection of parts of states becomes difficult. The centres of power, (capital cities and/or centres Hoogensen Gjørv & Hodgson

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of government) are located in the non-Arctic parts of these states. Furthermore, in many cases the states’ “Arctic” identity is not dominant or a primary policy issue area. As such, it is difficult to distinguish “Arctic” security from the general national interests of the states in question. For example, the increasing deployment of military capabilities in the Russian North may have less to do with the Arctic than with a general interest to protect national security as a whole. How do we then conceptualise “Arctic security,” exceptional or otherwise?

Unpacking security The concept of security has a long history, during much of which it focused on the individual (Rothschild, 1995). Security, or securitas, was positively oriented; it described a state of calm - free of fear, anxiety, or anger. It invoked “feelings of safety and stability, routines or rather, security of expectations, whereby we can count on certain things for our future, that which we most value, upon which we can build capacity” (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012: 842). The development of the security concept has involved multiple actors, ranging from individuals and, eventually, to the state (state and non-state actors). It simultaneously embodies values, (that which is to be secure), ranging from the material (physical well-being) to the immaterial (identity), and employs practices or methods in which security is created (Wolfers, 1952; Rothschild, 1995). In general, the values relevant to security are those values that are relevant to our survival over time. Mere day-to-day survival is not the equivalent of security; it could even indicate the opposite of security as either individual or state is in a constant, precarious, insecure condition. However, “survival” in combination with “actors”, “values”, “practices” and “time” (future) – gives insights into how “freedom from worry” is acheived (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2017). Together, they inform the role of actors and what they are able to do or affect in a given context, while they pursue approaches and opportunities to ensure security.

Though the above describes security in general terms, “classic” or “traditonal” security employs a more narrow understanding of the term. From the time of the Napoleonic Wars until the end of the Cold War, a more restrictive, ahistorical conception of security dominated – state security. In this invocation, the scope was transferred from individuals or communities to the security of the state as both the sole object of security (that which should be securitised) as well as securitising actor (Walt, 1991). The state’s (actor) highest priority is protecting its own existence (value) through the use of military force (practice). This narrow conception of security formed the backbone of security studies as a discipline after the Second World War and was preeminent during the Cold War. However, its domination was increasingly contested prior to the end of the Cold War, particularly by arguments for environmental security (Heininen, 2014; Greaves, 2016).

The end of the Cold War allowed more room for those conceptual contestations to manoeuver, including attempts to understand regional security as Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) (Lake & Morgan, 1997; Buzan & Wæver, 2003: Padrtová, 2020). This approach is heavily state-centric however, and does not adequately address deterritorialised security perceptions such as environmental or economic security (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 75) This approach also struggled to acknowledge the Arctic as a region (Hoogensen, 2005), though this was subsequently addressed in later works by other scholars (Padrtová, 2017). Thus an increasing number of security scholars argued for a broader approach to security, which more explicitly included multiple actors and multiple contexts and in which the relationships between survival, values, practices, and time could be better understood. This zeitgeist gave rise to multiple conceptions, notably environmental, energy, economic, societal (community/identity) and human security. In these conceptions of security the actors, values, and practices often differ and the long-term survival of one, at times, may be perceived to contradict the survival of another (for example state and human security, or “Arctic Exceptionalism” or “comprehensive security”? Understanding security in the Arctic

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environmental and economic security) (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2017). When seen as a combination of overlapping security processes, it is possible to understand security as a comprehensive and dynamic process where security conceptions may build upon and strengthen each other or expose competing priorities.

Comprehensive security Comprehensive security is a theoretical approach that takes into consideration the perspectives 1) of multiple actors (state and non-state), 2) at multiple levels (local, national, regional, and global), and 3) across the spectrum of security topics including, among others, traditional state/military, economic, environmental, societal, and human security issues. By examining these multiple perspectives simultaneously, it is possible for the analyst to assess how security perspectives are articulated for the region, by whom, and why.

Unlike “Arctic Exceptionalism”, comprehensive security is, in and of itself, not particularly “Arctic”. Rather than aligning itself to a particular region, it is a theoretical approach that attempts to reveal the dynamic processes and tensions around security perceptions within a given context.

In this sense, the Arctic provides a context that illustrates well how comprehensive security (CS) can be understood. The Arctic experience with negotiating multiple and, at times, competing security perspectives is useful for both regional as well as global security analyses. In this section we briefly explore the origins of CS, then how it has been defined and employed in non-Arctic contexts. In the next section on Arctic security we build further upon some more recent works that have focused on CS in the Arctic (Heininen, 2014; Hoogensen Gjørv, 2020).

Discussions about CS commenced with the widening debates about the complexity of security by the early 1990s. Although its origin has been popularly linked to the Copenhagen School (Heininen, 2014), David Dewitt locates the advent of comprehensive, or “overall,” security in Japan, where it was created as an alternative to the militarily dominated concept of national security (Dewitt, 1994).

For its part, the Copenhagen School acknowledged the relevance of a comprehensive security analysis, “requiring that one take particular care to investigate how the regional level mediates the interplay between states and the international system as a whole” (Buzan, 1991: 158). It also acknowledged the Japanese approach – credited with the coining of the CS term – “to influence positively the overall international environment, to cope unilaterally with threats, and to act in solidarity with ‘countries sharing the same ideals and interests’” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 173).

CS did not replace militarized security perspectives in Japan. Rather, it “was meant to give a new and wider basis for Japan’s international role and to rationalise its defence effort” (Dewitt, 1994: 2). The CS approach included multiple levels from the domestic and bilateral to the regional and global (ibid: 3), reflecting the relevance of multiple state and non-state actors to understanding security. Japan’s neighbouring states – part of the ASEAN region – defined CS as an inwardlooking understanding of security that minimised a focus on military aspects of security and emphasised the importance of “economic and social development, political stability and a sense of nationalism” (ibid). Indeed, the CS perspective considered stability and prosperity as crucial to the overall resilience of a society and to the ASEAN region itself, since each “part” (or state) in the region strengthened itself internally, which contributed to the strength of the greater whole of the region.

Drawing from the Balkan context, Dritëro Arifi argued that CS operates “from the state aspect to local context” (Arifi, 2011: 21). Threats can be local as well as transnational, transcending the boundaries of traditional national security approaches and emphasising the relevance of multiple

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actors. The focus on political stability, economic growth and prosperity, and social harmony promoted an approach to security that found its roots within society, from the bottom-up. CS is an inclusive, but difficult concept to grasp, particularly with respect to a region, as each “part” may operationalize and balance the different factors (actors, values, practices, survival, time) relevant to security in different ways. How do these converge to provide an overall security perspective? Do these perspectives always converge or is there conflict between perspectives?

The CS approach “recognises the continuing problems associated with military conflict, but argues that other factors also increasingly threaten the survivability and coherence of the state, but not only the state” (Dewitt, 1994: 9). It is simultaneously more than a state-based, national security with a regional and global applicability, but emanating from and/or relevant to the local community (Arifi, 2011). However, while recognizing the interlinkages between different security perspectives, CS does not claim the ability to reconcile multiple security perspectives. As seen below, CS has been further developed drawing from the Arctic context, including a stronger emphasis on human security, and reflective of the relevance of multiple, non-state actor security perspectives.

Arctic Exceptionalism = Arctic security?

The term Arctic security has been utilized primarily as a shorthand for state security or geopolitics in the Arctic region. It has traditionally been linked to the state security of the individual states with Arctic territory. Although the Arctic has experienced little violent conflict, it played a strategic geopolitical role during the Cold War era “because of its position between the hostile superpowers and its potential wartime role as a corridor for a nuclear strategic exchange” (Tamnes & Offerdal, 2014: 13). After the Cold War, it became important for Arctic states to ensure that this area remained conflict-free even if, as “global” states, they experienced conflict with each other in other regions of the world.

Evidencing this priority, in 1991 the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was signed by representatives of the governments of the eight Arctic states at the First Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi Declaration, 1991). This was soon followed by the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996, when “institutionalized, intergovernmental Arctic cooperation began” (Heininen, 2019: 221). It was designed as “[a] high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants” (Arctic Council, 1996), primarily in matters of environmental protection and sustainable development. But it also explicitly committed to “not deal with matters related to military security” (ibid). Thus far this commitment continues, albeit it not completely unchallenged in the background of deliberations in the Arctic Council (Hoogensen Gjørv, Lanteigne & Sam-Aggrey, 2020). Military security is explicitly excluded from entering into discussions at the Arctic Council, although military experts have been included on discussions of search and rescue issues (Bailes, 2013). Extractive industries such as petroleum industries – reflecting economic and energy security perspectives of Arctic states – are, if not specifically excluded, very carefully addressed so as to not contravene energy and economic security interests of the Arctic states (which at the same time challenges environmental security).

Comprehensive security in the Arctic region Security in the Arctic region is complex, involving human-made and earth-made boundaries (Tamnes & Offerdal, 2014). For our purposes, we combine the CS concept as articulated by Lassi Heininen (2014) with an increased emphasis on the human security dimension (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014; 2016; 2020). In Heininen’s definition of comprehensive Arctic security, “…military security “Arctic Exceptionalism” or “comprehensive security”? Understanding security in the Arctic

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is still very relevant, as is regional security due to impacts of climate change, energy security meaning both access to, and import and export of, oil and natural gas, and also environmental security due to oil transportation, nuclear accidents and impacts of climate change” (Heininen, 2014: 47). These varying security perspectives can, but do not always, complement each other. Heininen (2014) argued for the application of CS to the Arctic region “so as to include the perspectives of human beings, societies and regions, rather than just states” (38). He takes the concept further than the Japanese iteration by explicitly noting the significant role of both human and environmental security perspectives in an Arctic CS constellation: “Implementation of comprehensive security requires consideration of practical issues pertaining to an individual’s life, such as ensuring shelter, good health, social and economic well-being, as well as life in peace without conflict, war and violence. In addition however, comprehensive security also includes more immaterial values like political freedom, democracy, human rights and freedom from a range of threats and risks, such as disasters, pollution and other environmental problems, hunger and starvation, diseases or other illness and terrorism. It can also be interpreted to include cultural survival, freedom of expression and security of communication….this extended definition and comprehensive interpretation of security is based on the idea that there are a vast number of threats and risks to national security, besides traditional military threats, trans-border crime and international terrorism” (ibid: 40-41).

Hoogensen Gjørv (2014) notes, however, that the tensions that follow the human security concept in the Arctic depend on who has the power to define human insecurity in a particular context.

Human security has been operationalised through the lens of state security, focusing on perceived threats by individuals or communities to the state. State efforts to improve human security have been understood as “virtuous imperialism” whereby the state dictates who is insecure and by which means this will be addressed, for the purposes of state security (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014).

Hoogensen Gjørv et al. (2016) note that a more inclusive, participatory approach to security has also developed in the Arctic context, and can be understood as being “achieved when individuals and/or multiple actors have the freedom to identify risks and threats to their well-being and values, the opportunity to articulate these threats to other actors, and the capacity to determine ways to end, mitigate or adapt to those risks and threats either individually or in concert with other actors.”

(Hoogensen Gjørv et al., 2016: 186). Human security, in this sense, emphasises a bottom-up approach that includes individual and community perspectives. This does not, however, always coalesce with other security perspectives.

Challenging Arctic Exceptionalism The potential tensions between security perceptions are less clear when filtered through the AE narrative. CS, on the other hand, makes space for analysing the interactions between security perceptions in the Arctic. Here, we present four arguments contesting the dominance of the AE term: 1) Not exceptional: A CS approach allows for analytical comparison between regions, where each has its own distinct features but is not necessarily exceptional. Insofar as the Arctic can be claimed to be an “exceptional political space,” with qualities of peace and security that could potentially be exported to the rest of the world, it is necessary to have comparative tools that demonstrate how regions can be assessed as having inferior or superior approaches to security in relation to one another. Rather than claiming a static “exceptionality,” CS helps us understand how multiple security constellations (from state to human security) operate in

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relation to one another, exposing both processes of cooperation as well as potential conflict or tension. How does the Arctic therefore compare to other regions? As Heininen (2019) notes, there are other regions that share common interests and cooperate between major powers that, in other instances, behave more belligerently towards each other. In this light, the Arctic is just one of many political contexts in which such cooperation in common interests exist.

2) Narrow security perspective: The highlighted feature of the AE narrative is the fact that strong cooperation has resulted from “common interests…to decrease military tension and increase political stability” (Heininen, 2019: 220). Claims to success and a cooperative spirit are easier to maintain when the parameters are so narrowly defined and vigorously compartmentalized as they are in the AE discourse. Only in this way can the AE narrative claim that the region is exceptional and insulated from conflicts elsewhere in the world. However, not discussing matters of “high politics” that affect these same states elsewhere does not make them disappear. Käpylä and Mikkola (2019) note the impacts of the post-2014 Ukraine crisis, resulting in: initial disruptions to political cooperation in the Arctic Council (hold on EU observer status and US/Canada boycott of black carbon working group meeting in 2014); increased distrust of Russia’s rhetoric versus its actions especially in regards to Russia’s military; suspension of regional military cooperation; reaffirmation of Arctic NATO countries’ commitment to the alliance; and sanctions by the West imposed on Russia after its annexation of Crimea. These sanctions have resulted in the cessation of joint Western-Russian offshore hydrocarbon development in Arctic waters and the stimulation of closer Sino-Russian politicaleconomic ties, which can be seen, for example, in the addition of Chinese investment to the Yamal LNG project (Lanteigne & Shi, 2018). Though the Ukraine and Crimea crises are not rooted in Arctic issues, they nevertheless have affected defence posturing in the region (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018).

3) Not static: AE provides a static understanding of security. The Arctic’s “exceptional” (negative) peace is in part due to its inaccessibility and the difficulty of realistically engaging in violent conflict in the region itself. Greaves (2016) notes that, “states were unwilling to risk destabilising the global strategic balance or their diplomatic relations over trivial Arctic issues.

The inaccessibility of many Arctic resources made them geopolitically insignificant” (664).

However, security in the region is dynamic and in flux, especially as it is becoming an increasingly viable pathway to other parts of the world and an expanded source of markets itself. Russia, in particular, has been actively pursuing the development of its vast Northern Sea Route as well as of its exploitable natural resources. More potential activity in the region impacts state, environmental, energy, economic, and human perceptions of security, which need to be weighed in relation to each other to identify which perspectives, and by whom, perculate to the highest priorities in the region.

4) AE disguises insecurity. Issues of national interest have, and will continue to, take precedence in international relations and with regard to domestic issues. Despite the rhetoric, precious little has been done to protect the environmental and human security of the Arctic region. Indeed, the unfortunate lack of initiatives from Arctic states to curtail their own contributions to carbon emissions, not least in the extraction of fossil fuels that are either burned within these states or sold outside, has in itself contributed to the detrimental effects of climate changes occurring in the region, thereby exacerbating environmental insecurity. In particular, Norway and Russia

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continue to focus on their Arctic regions (and Canada on its sub-Arctic) as a source of economic resources, including fossil fuels (Beaumont, 2019; Staalesen, 2019).

Within the region, the vulnerabilities of Arctic residents and communities to the consequences of state policies as well as larger global processes are well-documented (Hoogensen Gjørv et al, 2014; Cone, 2005; Greaves, 2016). Arctic states have frequently prioritized their state interests at the expense of human and environmental security, both in and beyond the Arctic. Though much of the Arctic Council’s work is rooted in environmental concerns, it is also restricted by the interests of the Arctic states to continue fossil fuel production. Environmental security perspectives take on a dominant state-centric orientation, whereby protection of the environment is performed through energy security practices of extracting fossil fuels in an environmentally friendly manner (Hornmoen, 2018), which further caters to narratives wherein economic security is dependent upon fossil fuels. These claims can be further strengthened when linked regionally, across states that share similar economic and energy security perspectives (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2017; Dale et al, 2018).

When it comes to environmental security, it may be difficult to argue that “security” is attained, when a core source of climate change - the extraction and subsequent burning of fossil fuels continues to be a central economic foundation for the vast majority of Arctic states (Beaumont, 2019; Staalesen, 2019), ironically contributing to environmental insecurity instead. Zojer (2018) notes the contradiction between environmental protection rhetoric on the international level with brown habits at the national level. It can be argued that the focus on the environment was predominantly tokenism and, even when efforts were sincere, the tensions between environmental, economic, and energy security were too strong for the environment to triumph (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2017). For example, all of the Arctic states signed the AEPS, which considers oil to be a pollutant that must be eliminated. However, Norway, the United States, and Russia have all declared the exploitation of their Arctic (and non-Arctic) hydrocarbon resources is a matter of national interest, which they are prepared to protect by military means, if necessary. Furthermore, “while some regions may be affected positively, the Arctic region and population at large will likely not benefit from hydrocarbon development” (Zojer, 2018: 212) because the “revenue will drain toward the economic and political centers in the south” (ibid: 213). Economic security has therefore been “bought” at the costs of the environment due to limited controls on fossil fuel extraction (Dale & Kristoffersen, 2018; Dale et al, 2018).

CS is a tool that can be used to expose these geopolitical and human security tensions and discuss them plainly as challenges to security in the Arctic, while at the same time acknowledging how other security perspectives, such as environmental security, potentially play a role to unite the region. CS exposes this interplay of security perspectives, providing an overarching understanding of security perspectives across actors, values, and practices, revealing both synergies as well as tensions.

Conclusion Heininen (2019) claims that the Arctic not only reflects discourses of classic geopolitics (including questions of military confrontation and resource races), but also of critical geopolitics where environmental challenges (pollution, climate change) and the engagement of multiple state and non-state actors (including Indigenous peoples, NGOs, research) are significant for and within the discourses about the region. Therefore, he advocates a “holistic geopolitical” approach applied to Arctic issues and politics, including a “comprehensive coverage of factors and identities of both the Arctic’s Cold War legacy and the contemporary, broad, and new approaches to geopolitics”

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(ibid: 218). This affords broader consideration of issue areas (i.e., environmental protection) and actors (i.e., Indigenous groups) vis-à-vis military structures and priorities, in regional institutions.

He further emphasizes the close linkages between Indigenous cultures and ways of living, and environmental protection, and how the combination of these informs Arctic policies.

To view Arctic security from such a CS perspective would afford Arctic actors and communities a louder voice in matters that have a direct impact on their lives. It would give greater legitimacy to their human and environmental security needs, beyond the state level, where they might become swallowed by national interests. Such an approach would still acknowledge and provide a place for military security concerns to be addressed. For all of these reasons, comprehensive security serves as a more holistic and realistic perspective for Arctic security.

Notes 1. All Arctic states were involved and/or contributed to the 2001-2014 intervention in Afghanistan, including both NATO (Norway, Canada, USA, Denmark, Iceland) and nonNATO (Finland, Sweden) states, including Russia which facilitated logistical support early in the operation. Russia engaged in its own intervention in the country – the Soviet-Afghan War - from 1979-1989. Currently 39 NATO partners and allies contribute to the Resolute Support operation, including the following Arctic states: US, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden and Finland.

2. Iceland is located just south of the Arctic Circle aside from where the Arctic Circle passes through its most northern island, Grimsey Island. Iceland is also below the treeline which has also been considered a defining feature distinguishing Arctic from non-Arctic.

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Incompatible futures: Frontier nostalgia and southern discourses of the Arctic Ellen A. Ahlness

It is tempting for southern actors to imagine an Arctic that is separate from the challenges that define the rest of the world.

From geopolitics to pollution, militarization to a loss of biodiversity, the complex events that span the globe highlight the desirability of identifying a region isolated from broader struggles. However, the very concept of an isolated or untouched region is a production, one of multiple human imaginaries of the region. While the Far North was, for long chapters in history, largely inaccessible to the majority of humanity, it has never fully been isolated or protected from the events and processes happening to its south. Arctic images created by and for southerners fundamentally shaped early—and inaccurate— imaginaries of the North. As societies and states move forward from 1909 to 2007 (both symbolic years in encountering the North Pole) and beyond, we find that social attitudes toward the Arctic are shaped by nostalgia. However, actors hold different nostalgia narratives which have been shaped by timelines emphasizing different key social, technological, and geophysical events. Three groups of Arctic actors are identified (policymakers, researchers, and extractionists) whose understandings and nostalgia of the Arctic are shaped by emphasis on different events within these timelines. Each category of actor utilizes their varying timelines in their policy rhetoric; however, each discourse has origins in the settler-colonialism frontiersmanship of the 19th and 20th centuries. Ultimately, divergent temporalities and imaginaries mobilize actors to pursue different socio-economic policies in the North.

Introduction The Arctic elicits a pristine imagery in the global imagination; it is separate from the geopolitical and human struggles that define the remainder of the globe. The region has previously proved treacherous to interlopers: tumultuous oceans, poor weather, and unfamiliar environmental conditions made exploration by southern individuals dangerous and success unpredictable. This closed-off portrayal made surmounting the elements and gaining (and surviving) access to the North points of national pride for states (Bravo, 2019). Accessing the North required technological innovation and adaptability. Notwithstanding the Indigenous peoples of the North, who factored into Western thoughts only so far as they were sociocultural curiosities (and later, in the era of Social Darwinism, racial ‘objects’) and enablers of explorers and settler colonialism, in the Western

Ellen A. Ahlness is a Fellow of the International Security Colloquium at the University of Washington.

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imaginary, the Far North was untouched. Even in the mid-20th century, Western militarism in the Arctic was conducted under the assumption that an Arctic presence would not necessarily lead to an environmental or social impact (an assumption since proven thoroughly incorrect, see Herzberg, Kehrt, & Torma, 2018). Yet since the 1990s, southern political-economic intrigue sharply rose with increased access to the region brought about by environmental changes and technological developments. States and industries now look to the Far North with anticipation for its potential resources and opening waterways.

Contributing to the romantic appeal to the North during the 19th and 20th centuries was the sense of separateness that the Arctic held for southern societies whose political and social identities aligned more with Western Europe. This separateness was furthered by the total disconnect from southern societies that interlopers experienced when traversing the North (Nurminen & Lainema, 2010), the relatively small spatial impact of pre-industrial human activities, and the largely uncharted Arctic Ocean (Marshall, 2016). Today, the tenants that developed this romanticism no longer hold; however, the cognitive and socially constitutive effects of the romanticism persist and colour political and economic behavior of actors in the 21st century. It is a romanticism of the North that has shaped a contemporary reluctance to address its geophysical reality: it is experiencing irreversible changes. Nevertheless, Arctic politics are heavily influenced by nostalgia, the content of which varies based on historical timelines recognized by varying groups of actors originating from the South. Notably, while actors may vary in their state of origin and industry-academic backgrounds, they share commonalities in the way they view the Arctic largely based on their fit within different actor categories.

Three groups of southern Arctic actors—policymakers, researchers, and extractionists—reference divergent Arctic timelines, each differing in their recognition of human activity in the north, resource availability, and geophysical changes resulting from human activity. Nostalgia manifests in varied senses of urgency in each timeline, shaping Arctic futures. These categories are not comprehensive or fully inclusive of all Arctic actors; however, they do encompass vocal groups appearing in Arctic scholarship, policy, and economics which have colonial roots. Most noticeably, Indigenous communities and political actors do not fit neatly into these categories. The three categories that constitute the focus of this article are groups whose nostalgias and imaginaries of the Arctic are fundamentally shaped by their position as southern residents and organizations: those who fall on the ‘here’ in the dichotomy between the ‘here versus up there’ that has historically dominated southern conversations about the Arctic. From a discussion of the pristine imaginaries and eco-philosophies that shape contemporary nostalgia, I move into a discussion on three dominant categories of southern Arctic actors, then into a presentation of their Arctic timelines, which provide reference points for their behavior in, images of, and perceived spatial footprints of the Far North. This transitions into a discussion of how timeline variations and their nostalgia roots result in different senses and understandings of ‘urgency’ among the actors. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of imaginaries, nostalgia, and Arctic timelines on Arctic politics and security, and how an understanding of these classes of actors can help us resist the further domination of inherently colonial Western southern narratives in conversations on the Arctic.

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Shaping reality: Why imaginaries matter In stark opposition to 19th century European static, unyielding visions of the Arctic, is a social ecology approach, which examines how natural and cultural histories are objectively entangled.

Unique experiences and ideas surrounding the Far North became incorporated into social relations in southern societies, contributing to the regional flavours of Arctic imaginaries and social relations.

In other words, by co-constructing social and physical environments, natural environments shape the attitudes, discourses, and practices of people who live in a region as well as those who live outside the region and “look in” (Berkes, 2017; Cruikshank, 2005). Imaginaries have a long history of describing a group’s collective understanding of how the world works (Cidell, 2017). Imaginaries emerge when societies project their own needs and desires onto a landscape. They are a characterization of a geographical, ecological, and racial region. Imaginaries need not represent the real world, though they may influence discussions, problem-solving, and behavior in a way that is, for all intents and purposes, just a real as geophysical materialities. How a society understands the causes and fuel of forest fires (irresponsibility, climate change, or a consequence of complex social factors and management) will cause actors to respond with different emotion-driven reactions, policy suggestions and behavioral modifications (Jasanoff, 2009).

Imaginaries are more than narratives of what is or what should be; they are sources of and for framings, problems, identities, affects and emotional regimes, and solutions. Solutions are created based on what is believed, felt and known. When the Arctic is imagined as an isolated wilderness, policies that govern human behavior in the region will be structured based in this assumption, regardless of the reality. Wilderness derives from the notion of wildness, that which is not controlled by humans (though in an interconnected world, can anything truly be wilderness?) This challenges the nature of the pristine wildness imaginary, which carries with it two philosophical assumptions: 1) Earth landscapes are divided into a binary: separate from human actions or integrated and influenced with and by human activities (Nash, 2001). This binary is rooted in baselines that compare a before state of nature to an after. This comparison is moral in nature, not scientific.

2) Untouched nature is superior to human-shaped landscapes. Eco-philosophers critique this “romantic notion of untrammeled wilderness” as failing to recognize the more nuanced notion of ecosystems. This argument maintains that there is little scientific support for the ideology that pristine nature is “better” than alternatives (Marris, 2013).

Each assumption imagines ‘good’ nature as requiring separation from humans. Yet this implication disregards humankind-nature relationships and feedbacks. While Western political and philosophical thought often situates humans as superior to the natural world, humans, as living beings intertwined in Earth and its systems, cannot be separated from the natural order.

Additionally, these assumptions marginalize the experiences and ontologies of Indigenous peoples, who historically have had more responsible, holistic relationships with their ecological communities (Whyte, 2017). Eco-philosophical underpinnings of regional imaginaries thus color discussions on the construction of pristine imaginaries.

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The myth of an untouched Arctic The most historically dominant imaginary of the Arctic among settler colonial communities is that it is a pristine and untouched land. This image has evolved over time through its encounters in art, exploration, and environmental policy spaces. Arctic imaginaries have an established presence in the images of Northern explorers and residents, writers, and artists, which prompted myth building and nostalgia-forming images. Early attempts to map the Arctic relied just as much on stories as fact to chart the Far North. The Mercator map envisioned a giant, magnetic pole, four land segments of the Arctic stretching out, and a land of pygmies.

Figure 1. Mercator Map of the Arctic, Septentrionalium Terrarum, 1595

As naval technology and cartography developed over the next three centuries, explorers also sought to document their expeditions and experiences. As a result, explorers chronicled the sights they saw, thought they saw, or fictions they sought to convince others of from their journeys.

Figure 2. Polar night in the spring, 1897 by Aleksander Borisov

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Art through the 19th and early 20th century tended to focus on the Arctic’s vast landscapes and dispersed fauna (Peck, 2012). These images held no pretense of being scientific reference materials or authorities of northern landscapes, yet they equally acted to shape the images of the Arctic held by societies living in the South.

Unable to traverse the seas and ice themselves, laypeople relied on images developed by those who had travelled north to inform their own images of the Arctic. Such images depicted landscapes and excluded Indigenous communities from the works that shaped its era’s understandings of the North. Landscapes sans Northern communities were fodder for colonial impulses to settle the supposedly empty lands. Moreover, this created a generation of inaccurate visual reference materials that inform today’s ideas of what the Arctic “used to be”—an untouched wildness rife with first-flag opportunities— shaping nostalgia towards an Arctic that did not exist (McCannon, 2012).

In art and expedition reports, southerners tended towards one of two conclusions that drew from a pristine frontier mentality: some viewed it as a serene, untouched hinterland (Steinberg, Tasch, Gerhardt, Keul, & Nyman, 2015), while others took it to mean the North was a wild region that needed to be tamed (Lewis-Jones, 2013). Both views are volatile and inaccurate imaginaries. The Arctic has become home to some of the harshest climate change and pollution consequences, which affects residents, wildlife, and visitors while also shaping its geophysical features.

Contemporary environmental politics discourse does not maintain that the Arctic is separate and pristine in its current state, but suggests that has been “corrupted” by human activity both injected into the region and originating in the South (Schindler & Smol, 2006). This view is born from the very tenets of an Anthropocentric perspective: the Earth’s systems create a complicated system of feedback and growth wherein the consequences of human activity in one area spread and affect areas seemingly remote from the original site of behavior (Slaughter, 2012). One could argue that the only isolation the Arctic experiences today is in the vein of regional exceptionalism’s geopolitical assertions: that events in the Arctic are only relatively insulated only from global tensions (and indeed, so long as the Arctic’s great powers are dedicated to this separation-- a reasonable assumption in Heininen, 2016; and Melas, 2016).

Political, military, and economic development through the 20th century led to key events that have further demonstrated the Arctic’s vulnerability to external events, accidents and trans-national flows of pollutants. In addition to Chernobyl, Russian nuclear submarine sinkings during and after the Cold War illustrated how susceptible the Arctic environment was to human pollution. Building tensions between Canada and Denmark, as well as Norway and Russia, over ownership of seabeds, bodies of water, and land demonstrated that human activity was becoming an undeniable part of the Arctic landscape. As these human-based events entered the body of nostalgia, they maintained varying levels of importance for different categories of actors based on their rhetorical function in maintaining each group’s Arctic imaginary (Krebs & Jackson, 2007).

Ideological roles of nostalgia Nostalgia performs various affective, ideological, and sentimental roles based on the kind experienced. Nostalgia is regularly depicted as an emotional appeal—a flawed political argument— though recent studies have sought to nuance it as a ‘normal’ political discourse with positive and negative forms (Kenny, 2017). Reactionary nostalgia prompts social distrust and distaste for

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political ‘others’ and outgroups in response to perceived challenges or disruptions to a privileged group’s status quo (Cheung, Sedikides, Wildschut, Tausch, & Ayanian, 2017). Such nostalgia rhetoric exacerbates issues of social inequality and epistemological inclusion while catering to social pessimism, disadvantaging ethnic and cultural minorities.

Meanwhile, positive forms of nostalgia include productive (or “mobile”) nostalgia, which uses a ‘continuity through change’ argument to assert that change—rather than staticism—link the past and present, legitimizing newly empowered groups. Such nostalgia for the future has been chronicled among Jewish, Islamic, and Indigenous peoples, as well as labor groups, and is defined by a “positive, spirited, and receptive” nature, rather than negative discourse (Smith & Campbell, 2017: 612). Rather than protesting the present, it calls for returns to cultural or spiritual heydays, which may prompt societies to support particular politics as a progressive force. Such nostalgia draws from the past to mold emotional or moral commitments to such ideals as development or social justice.

Each form of nostalgia serves a different social function and has different ideological and real-life implications for policies (particularly the framing and implication of ‘progressive’ policies). Yet regardless of form, nostalgia remains a highly specific form of political-social discourse that emerges from—and appeals to—specific cultural-ethnic contexts. As such, sociologists and political scientists have found themselves increasingly concerned with the power of nostalgia (Wheeler, 2017) as well as other politico-emotive forces like historical trauma and inherited memories (Turbine, 2018) despite the challenges they pose for conceptualization and generalization. The nostalgia that European populations experience as southern Arctic communities are formed, experienced, and transferred in ways that are inattentive to the lived experiences of Indigenous peoples and other northern residents.

Arctic nostalgia: Creating points of reference Arctic nostalgia, developed through art and exploration and refined through the eras, has shaped contemporary understandings and imaginaries of the Arctic, affecting narratives that guide Arctic policy and images of desirable futures. Based on the way actors view the significance of particular historical events and processes, they will utilize specific Arctic timelines in their policy and development rhetoric. Three dominant groups of narratives are proposed based on a survey of Arctic politics literature offering scholar-driven classifications of Arctic actors (2010 to 2018).

These works are largely informed by 21st century Nordic Arctic scholarship and propose a variety of classification frameworks by which Arctic actors and discourses may be grouped. These three timelines build upon influential categories across Arctic typology scholarship to propose another frame by which we may better understand the rhetoric and motivations of these groups. Each timeline examines the historical events that comprise and maintain group nostalgia. Combined, these timelines shape how actors create and use historical reference points, with security implications.

The three categories of focus from Arctic typology scholarship are policymakers, researchers, and extractionists. These are not exhaustive, but are representative of overarching conversations in deliberative spaces. Their discourses and rhetoric can be identified explicitly and implicitly (Ahlness, 2018; Wang & Overland, 2009). These titles, drawn from the survey, describe the Arctic imagination dominant in each body of narratives. It is important to note that the three groups of actors are heavily influenced by Western political philosophy and terminology. By proposing Ahlness

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timelines of pivotal processes, we gain a greater understanding of the formulative events each group references to develop their narratives on the Arctic. Consequently, while the timelines are not comprehensive of all events formulative to understandings of the Arctic today, they do reference defining, pivotal, and rhetorically referenced events in focused scholarship and politicalorganizational rhetoric.

Timelines, spatial co-ordinates, and discussions Each group’s timeline is presented with brief discussions on framing efforts surrounding specific events and the following questions within the context of the reference timelines: 1) how do the timelines characterize the temporal and spatial scope of human activity, and 2) how do the timelines understand resource availability and claims legitimacy? Is human activity in the Arctic understood as events unto themselves, or is there a feedback process between humans and nature?

Policymaker Narratives

Table 1. Policymaker timeline of formulative events

The policymaker timeline is dominated by the passing of—and compliance to—frameworks that set behavioral standards and norms among state actors. These frameworks take for granted a Westphalian structure, embracing a state-centric paradigm and applying it to a changing Arctic with vocal non-state actors. Landmark events reference state-centric paradigms either through setting up organizational structures that have states submit to the ruling of other states (e.g. CLCS, Ottawa Declaration), or through internalizing challenges to the order (Russia’s symbolic North Pole seabed flag). The timeline notes the foundry of agreements that respect behavioral baselines, internal waters versus international waters, and procedure ratification.

Indigenous rights, consultation, and participation gains appear in the timeline; however, the events of the timeline are overwhelmingly state-centric, creating an image of the Arctic as a political stage just as much as a geophysical domain. Moreover, in this imaginary, non-Arctic states do not feature Incompatible futures: Frontier nostalgia and southern discourses of the Arctic

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as actors worthy of garnering much recognition or influence. Ultimately, the policymaker imaginary depicts a short history of the Arctic—while it has been the historical home of northern residents and a realm of exploration for those from the south, it is only since it has become a realm of geopolitical intrigue in the later years of the Cold War that the Arctic has become of serious interest to the states that border it. Therefore, it is only after interest is captured that political frameworks can be imposed to govern the region in progressive (and essential) steps.

Researcher Timeline

Table 2. Researcher timeline of formulative events

The researcher timeline recognizes a long Arctic timeline marked by a valued Indigenous presence and the (continuing) impact by global industrial activity. This imaginary is broadly, yet fundamentally shaped by the Arctic’s character as a region far from many human societies, yet inextricably intertwined with these societies through intertwined ecosystems. Therefore, the point at which the Anthropocene starts—when humans become an influencing force on shaping Earth systems—becomes a key part of the researcher’s Arctic timeline. Anthropocene scholars argue several periods that define Earth’s entrance into the Anthropocene: when humanity shifted from hunting-gathering to a stationary lifestyle, which altered its interactions with other life forms (Chernilo, 2017); in the Industrial Revolution when large-scale coal burning launched a long-term rise in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gasses (Steffen et al., 2007); or with the nuclear age, where fallout marks the irreversible and definitive shift into an age marked by human activity (Waters et al., 2015). The early Anthropocene dates demonstrate a long Arctic timeline—southern societies have been actively shaping the Arctic even before the first explorers set foot in the region.

Similarly, the full scope of consequences from current human activity are yet to be seen. While the date of entry into the Anthropocene is contested, its acknowledgement that fate of the Arctic is interconnected with all southern regions is foundational to the researcher’s Arctic narrative.

Meaningful events referenced in the researcher narrative center on acknowledgements or reports on global interconnection, shared responsibility, and scientific documentation of environmental or climate feedback loops. Moreover, it recognizes the increase in non-Arctic and non-state actors claiming stakeholder status in climate consequences, and even upcoming generations from humanities and natural sciences (highlighted in the International Polar Year 2007). The expansion of interested actors matters in this dialogue, shaping which problems become points of focus, and Ahlness

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which solutions decision-makers find most viable (Kilduff & Krackhardt, 2017), as well as which new technologies and investigations will be supported.

Extractionist Timeline

Table 3. Extractionist timeline of formulative events

The extractionist timeline is tied together by events denoting access: the successes of first movers shape the narrative alongside the passage of processes for states to claim ownership over a territory.

A 2008 United States Geological Survey estimates that 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may remain in the Arctic, with up to 84 percent of the resources expected to be located in offshore areas (Bird et al., 2008).

Figure 3. Petroleum Potential of Assessment Units and Provinces in the Circum-Arctic. USGS Face Sheet 2008-3049. U.S. Department of the Interior.

Large-scale capital accumulation for global markets is a relatively recent development in the Arctic.

Consequently, extractionists treat the region’s economic activity as a phenomenon injected from southern actors, regardless of its long-lived local economies. Because extractionists’ narratives Incompatible futures: Frontier nostalgia and southern discourses of the Arctic

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heavily reference economic activity, their timeline presents a relatively short Arctic timeline, with developed nations only recently becoming regional actors. Glorified historical exploration of the hinterlands colour contemporary resource extraction; it is the state’s prerogative to pursue northern interests.

The entry into force of UNCLOS in 1994 is just as meaningful in the extractionist timeline as it is to policymakers. States and industries are prohibited from exploring or establishing extraction activities in disputed areas. Submitting contested situations to CLCS for recommendations may mean having to follow the guidance of the international community and following less-thanefficient procedures but doing so legitimizes economic activity through a compliance with existing frameworks. Oil and gas titans express faith in geological survey reports of resource availability.

While attaining such independence is a fraught process as actors seek to gain first-mover advantages through initiative and legal frameworks, independence is understood as an assurance of fewer future threats. However, such assurance can only be attained by actors who were successful in the first-movers game.

Urgency in the Arctic With a greater understanding of the how nostalgia and narratives produce ‘events’, we move forward to ask how these narratives shape actors’ senses of urgency. Certainly, it is when actors feel under pressure and time constraints that conflicts become more likely to occur: urgency means less time to deliberate, a failure to critically evaluate options, think through consequences, and communicate between parties (Jervis, 1976; Levy, 2003). All of these high-risk behaviors are antithetical to the transparency and predictability that existing Arctic governance frameworks seek to encourage (Kankaanpää & Young, 2012; Nord, 2015; Stokke & Hønneland, 2007). Combined, actor belief that they must act quickly poses a threat to the security of all Arctic actors. In each narrative body, acting without deliberation has the potential for negative consequences on the Arctic’s social and physical environment. Within the context of each narrative, I ask how each timeline imagines a sense of urgency surrounding the Arctic as a viable and engageable region?

While the term urgency carries its own terminological and emotional connotations, I look at how each narrative construct time frames to achieve its Far North goals.

Policymaker behavior is influenced by environmental changes to the Arctic (positive or negative); however, urgency develops from the perceived need to negotiate understandings, agreements, and standards of conduct to govern behavior between now and “then” (though the environmental state of then remains undefined). These actors are primarily concerned about the threats inherent in a free-for-all Arctic where underdeveloped rules to govern passage through internal waters, claim territory, and extract resources can be undermined by unilateral behavior. Knowing that decisionmaking and implementation can be slow in the time-consuming practices of democratic decisionmaking, urgency pushes against a geophysical timeline that is constantly shortening (Zahariadis, 2015). If the Arctic ice is on a path to have ice-free summers by 2050 there is a concrete deadline by which states must have a framework for governing and monitoring activity to reduce the likelihood of conflict (Wang & Overland, 2009).

Researchers, whether natural scientists, social scientists, or Anthropocentrists, recognize a timeline set by the geophysical qualities of the Arctic, with a focus on sea ice levels and common pollutant levels (Braune et al., 2005). Of the three narrative groups, the researcher imaginary puts the greatest emphasis on the need to stem warming-contributive behavior in the immediate future. With a Ahlness

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timeline riddled with geophysical points of no return, the concept of time and temporality is most severely felt in this imaginary. In Western and colonial narratives, the concept of deadlines and ‘points of no return’ most often emerge in relation to war, and the points in which conflict becomes inevitable (e.g. Cold War’s MAD). Consequently, the element of time, while not new to politics, has received scarce and selective attention (Pollitt, 2008). Researchers take the concepts of timeliness and urgency and apply them in an era of climate change, where they have real and unprecedented meaning for human activity. Urgency is not limited only to Arctic actors, as the activity of all southern societies have implications for the Far North. Urgency is thus felt more severely and is universal in its compellation. If one does not act in time, the past that is so keenly desired becomes no longer attainable.

Figure 4. Arctic Ocean Map. Uwe Dedering, 2010

Contrasting with the previous narratives, extractionists look with anticipation to geophysical changes that allow for greater access (Borgerson, 2013; Ho, 2010). Material and environmental barriers that previously proved treacherous are disappearing, allowing greater access to seabeds and waterways. Both sectors have tremendous economic potential; surveys estimate that 22% of the world’s oil and natural gas could be located beneath the Arctic, and the opening of northern sea routes could cut transit distances in half (“Strategic Importance of the Arctic in U.S. Policy,” 2009).

Nostalgia that prompts assertions of normative claims, first-mover economic behavior, and opportunistic policies serve as a critical resource. Extractionists aim to be the most prepared so that they can be a first mover in oil, gas, shipping, and other resource industries and gain the resulting economic advantages (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Urgency is a matter of encountering what was only previously imagined. With an Arctic nostalgia colored with the glory of first movers (adventurers and technological marvels alike), changes that create possibilities of further interaction with the Far North are a source of eagerness rather than wariness.

Implications for Arctic politics In international relations, knowledge groups and deliberation forums serve several vital functions.

They provide spaces for parties with similar interests to gather together, affirm mutual commitments, and create a common body of knowledge upon which they can draw as they problem-solve (Davis Cross, 2013). The lattermost function is affected by the narratives, discourse, and imaginaries of members. Imaginaries and nostalgia shape what actors believe is the history, reality, and desired makeup of a space, consequently shaping problem solving by influencing what

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actors prioritize, what they identify as threats, and what actions they deem feasible to address challenges (Druckman, 2004). This poses a challenge to deliberations on security issues. Variations in the reference points groups use to understand what constitutes a threat results in different prioritizations, resulting in inefficiencies and conflict among problem-solving bodies.

A divergence in threat prioritization can be seen in Western responses to Russia’s amphibious assault trainings in late 2018. In September 2018, Russian military forces conducted the first amphibious assault training in the Arctic. This activity is part of a longer trend of Russian militarization and constitutes a threat in each group; however, the nature of this threat depends on how it is contextualized by their timelines. Policymakers reference Russia’s past bolstering in the Arctic (e.g. the titanium flag in the North Pole seabed). While remaining committed to the existing governance framework, Russia’s actions reinforce the framework’s inability to address noncompliance from great states (Escudé, 2016; Lasserre & Têtu, 2016). For researchers, a history of military waste, pollution, and sunk vessels define the threat. Not only does militarization require the further development of Northern infrastructure, but it creates barriers for international research teams to access sites of interest in conducting research in the Russian Arctic (Ananyeva, 2019; Hunter, 2018). Extractionists view Russia’s actions through their implications: expanding its sphere of influence to secure spaces for its own oil and gas industries. Russia has the grounds for vast territory claims that would limit the seabed available to its liberal competitors. The role of state is then to protect economic interests against others, and threats manifest when state impede the ability of competitors to gain first-mover advantages, rather than through environmental-feedback loops (Bouffard, 2017). Failures in inter-state diplomacy are seen as threats, but not for the same reasons policymakers view the complications; an agreement failure or noncompliance may set back trust or cooperation between states, but also discourages the safe spread of non-state industries into the Northern theater.

Conclusion Art and inaccurate depictions of the North were fodder for settler-colonial discourses among southern societies: frontier nostalgia was the bedrock upon which late 20th and 21st century Arctic frames developed, whether they went on to perpetuate the notion of southern society-injected value or critique its colonial underpinnings. The futures imagined by various bodies in the Arctic are predated by the same historical events, however, each group varies in the significance they place on given events and processes.

Nostalgia is a powerful force that colors the ongoing processes of imaginary-building. Its contextspecificity means that southern societies develop varied Arctic imaginaries to fit their cultural needs and desires. Such space-making processes are emotionally and socially charged. Nostalgia plays affective and sentimental roles in prompting social behavior. Simultaneously, imaginaries are more than narratives of what is. They are sources of framings developed from emotional regimes. The result is policy action towards desired futures that are not so much logically constructed as negotiated across repeated interpretations. As a result of their context-specific origins, these suggested futures proceed to emphasize various historical events in their own timelines as they continue to add to their nostalgia narratives. This prompts further competition between increasingly disparate—yet all southern-in-origin—futures.

The imaginaries that guide actors shape their rhetoric as they interact with other Arctic actors and negotiate futures. The imaginaries developed and held by southern Arctic actors are inextricably Ahlness

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shaped through their historical encounters with the Arctic, even as the tenants upon which they are founded cease to match contemporary realities. The persistence of nostalgia in this Far North rhetoric continues to engineer the marginalization of vulnerable, northern, and Indigenous voices.

Frontier nostalgia is in itself a perpetuated form of settler-colonialism. If we as scholars are to legitimize through discussion any of the Arctic futures suggested by southern actors, we must challenge nostalgia’s passage from Arctic imaginaries to reality.

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https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2925514 Zahariadis, N. (2015). Plato’s Receptacle: Deadlines, Ambiguity, and Temporal Sorting in Public Policy. In H. Strassheim & T. Ulbricht (Eds.), Die Zeit der Politik: Democratisches Regieren in einer Beschlungten Welt. Broschiert: Leviathan Sonderband, 113–131.

Appendix 1: Notes on literature survey and proposed actor typologies Scholar-proposed category classifications of Arctic actors included in the following table capture only proposed groupings for non-Indigenous, non-northern resident actors. Many works (Krayazhkov 2013, Graczyk & Koivurova 2014, and Lackenbauer 2014, among others) contained classifications specific to Indigenous and northern resident groups. These were not included in the survey or coding given their non-applicability to southern actors and southern-originating organizations.

Code

Sub-Code

Scholarship

(proposed narratives and actor classifications) Policymakers

Arctic States

Avango, Nilsson & Roberts 2013 Borgerson 2013 Charter 2016 Ford et al. 2016 Ingimundarson 2014 Gample 2015 Graczyk & Koivurova 2014 Kryazhkov 2013 Kuersten 2016 Molenaar 2012 Nord 2010 Ronson 2011 Sorensen 2013 Wilson 2016 Young 2012

“Deep South” (non-Arctic) States

Burke, Teale & Bondaroff 2018 Charter 2016 Graczyk & Koivurova 2014

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Knecht 2017 Kuersten 2016 Lackenbauer 2014 Ronson 2011 Sorensen 2013 Extractionists

Maritime-based Oil and Gas Industries

Bouffard 2017 Chater 2016 Huebert 2011 Ingimundarson 2014 Knecht 2017 Lackenbauer 2014 Molenaar 2012 Shindler & Smol 2006 Sorensen 2013 Wilson 2016

Land-based Industries

Dodds 2013 Huebert 2011 Knecht 2017

Fishers and Fisheries

Ronson 2011 Molenaar 2012 Sorensen 2013 Wilson 2016

Researchers

Natural Scientists

Dodds 2013 Ford et al. 2016 Ronson 2011 Smith & Sharp 2012 Young 2012

Social Scientists

Avango, Nilsson & Roberts 2013 Dodds 2013 Ingimundarson 2014 Koivurova 2010 Smith & Sharp 2012

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Young 2012 Environmentalists

Avango, Nilsson & Roberts 2013 Gamble 2015 Griffiths 2012 Huebert 2011 Nord 2010 Shindler & Smol 2006 Smith & Sharp 2012

Anthropocenists

Griffiths 2012 Gamble 2015 Huebert 2011 Nord 2010

Table 1. Author-proposed Arctic actor classification categories

Works Cited Avango, D., Nilsson, A., & Roberts, P. (2013). “Assessing Arctic Futures: Voices, Resource, and Governance.” The Polar Journal 3(2), 431-446.

Borgerson, S. (2013). The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up. Foreign Affairs, 92.

Bouffard, T. J. (2017). Managing the Barents Sea: Comparing Norwegian and Russian Offshore Oil-Spill Prevention Policies. Arctic Yearbook 2017, 1.

Charter, A. (2016). “Explaining Non-Arctic States in the Arctic Council.” Strategic Analysis 40(3): 173-184.

Burke, D.C., Teale N., & Bondaroff, P. (2018). “Becoming an Arctic Council NGO Observer.”

Polar Record (54)6, 349-59.

Dodds, K. (2013). “Anticipating the Arctic and the Arctic Council: Pre-Emption, Precaution, and Preparedness. Polar Record 49(2), 193-203.

Ford et al. (2016). “Including Indigenous Knowledge and Experience in IPCC Assessment Reports.” Nature Climate Change 6(1): 349-353.

Gamble, J. (2015). “The Arctic Council Permanent Participants: Capacity and Support- Past, Present, and Future.” Arctic Yearbook 2015, 385-388.

Graczyk, P., & Koivurova, T. (2014). A new era in the Arctic Council’s external relations?

Broader consequences of the Nuuk observer rules for Arctic governance. Polar Record, 50(3), 225-236.

Ahlness

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Griffiths, F. (2012). “Stewardship as Concept and Practice in an Arctic Context,” Cyberdialogue, University of Toronto.

Huebert, R. (2011). “New Directions in Circumpolar Cooperation: Canada, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, and the Arctic Council. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 5(2), 37-57.

Knecht, S. (2017) "The Politics of Arctic International Cooperation: Introducing a Dataset on Stakeholder Participation in Arctic Council Meetings, 1998–2015.” Cooperation and Conflict 52.2, 203-23.

Koivurova, T. (2010). Sovereign states and self-determining peoples: Carving out place for transnational indigenous peoples in world of sovereign states. International Community Law Review, 12(2), 191-212.

Kryazhkov, V. (2013). Development of Russian legislation on northern Indigenous peoples.

Arctic Review of Law and Politics, 4(2), 140–155.

Kuersten, A. (2016). “The Arctic Five versus the Arctic Council.” Arctic Yearbook 2016, 389-395.

Lackenbauer, W. (2014). “Canada and the Asian Observers to the Arctic Council: Anxiety and Opportunity.” National Bureau of Asian Research, 18(1), 22-29.

Molenaar, EJ (2012). “Current and prospective roles of the Arctic Council system within the context of the law of the sea.” International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 27(4), 553595.

Nord, D. (2010). “The Shape of the Table, the Shape of the Arctic.” International Journal, 65(4), 825-836.

Ronson, A. (2011). “Political Climate Change: The Evolving Role of the Arctic Council.” The Northern Review, 33(1).

Schindler, D. W., & Smol, J. P. (2006). “Cumulative Effects of Climate Warming and Other Human Activities on Freshwaters of Arctic and Subarctic North America.” AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment, 35(4), 160–168.

Smith, H. & Sharp, K. (2012). “Indigenous Climate Knowledges.” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 3(5), 467-476.

Sorensen, A. (2013). “From International Governance to Region Building in the Arctic?” New Global Studies, 7(2), 155-181.

Strauss, H. & Mazzullo, N. (2014). “Narratives, Bureaucracies and Indigenous Legal Orders: Resource Governance in Finnish Lapland.” Polar Geopolitics? Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes, 295-312.

Wilson, P. (2016). “Society, Steward or Security Actor? Three Visions of the Arctic Council.”

Cooperation and Conflict, 51(1), 55-74.

Young, O. (2012). “Arctic Politics in an Era of Global Change.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 19(1), 165-178.

Incompatible futures: Frontier nostalgia and southern discourses of the Arctic

Narratives of the North: Contested geographic imaginaries and the case of Izembek National Wildlife Refuge Erin Willahan

This chapter explores the concept of ‘wilderness’ in Alaska, as a Northern locale. Using the controversy over permitting an access road through legally protected wilderness in Alaska’s Izembek National Wildlife Refuge (NWR) as a case study, the research seeks to untangle the ways in which mainstream environmentalist discourse, and the epistemological concepts through which it operates, is implicated in the erasure of Indigenous presence and the ongoing dispossession of Indigenous lands and rights. Grounded in theories from Settler Colonial studies and Indigenous studies, the research deductively applies a Critical Discourse Analysis to public comments made on the Izembek NWR Land Exchange/Access Road Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) to offer a discussion on the ways in which the North’s geographic imaginaries are constructed and contested within the wider frameworks of environmental conservation, economic development, and decolonization.

“Imagination is one of the spoils of colonization, which in many ways is claiming who gets to imagine the future for a given geography.”

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adrienne marie brown, Emergent Strategy

Introduction Perceptions of land, or geographic imaginaries, are both socially constructed and construct the social (Howie & Lewis, 2014: 4). Indeed, while the historical underpinnings of Northern geographic imaginaries are often taken for granted in dominant discourse, “historical perceptibility is used…to claim, to define capacities for self-rule, to apportion social and political possibilities, to, in effect, empower and disempower Indigenous peoples in the present” (Simpson, 2007: 69). If our geographic imaginaries are, therefore, concepts with “teeth that bite through time” (ibid), it follows that discourse about land both reflects and reifies power dynamics to shape material realities. In this way, policies of dispossession are made possible through colonial representations and constructions of space, such as those which contain and anachronize Indigenous peoples’ presence Erin Willahan is a research fellow with Polar Research and Policy Initiative (PRPI) and a recent graduate of the Erasmus Mundus Human Rights Policy and Practice Master’s program.

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on their lands. Thus in acknowledging that, “space is produced and productive...we unbury the generative roots of spatial colonization and lay bare its concealed systems” (Goeman, 2009: 171).

It is important to recognize that in the North and elsewhere there are many Indigenous Peoples and organizations whose pursuit of self-determination, justice, and safety for their communities in the face of ongoing colonization includes advocating for meaningful environmental protections, as well as strategic partnerships with environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO) allies.

That said, though existing literature often highlights the pertinent connection between development projects and enduring spatial colonization, there is less research into the ways ENGOs, and the epistemological concepts through which they operate, also perpetuate harmful colonial legacies, both historically and today. Within progressive circles, ENGO-led battles for environmental protection are often taken for granted as exclusively benevolent, liberal projects wherein “good” environmentalists clash with “bad” states and resource extraction companies. And yet, some ENGO campaigns “that might be assumed to benefit Indigenous peoples can in fact disempower them” (Fondahl, Filippova & Mack, 2015: 14), particularly insofar as they constrain Indigenous Peoples’ self-determination over their traditional lands and territories.

Fondahl, Filippova and Mack (2015) briefly highlight the controversy over whether or not to permit a road through Izembek National Wildlife Refuge (NWR) in Alaska as exemplary of how, “the fact that Indigenous northerners have used, thrived in and actively managed these environments for 1000s of years is problematic to the common, romanticized view of northern nature as ‘pristine’ and ‘untouched’ ” (14). However, the ways in which this dissonance specifically plays out through discourse is a salient gap in the literature. Observing this gap, my research offers a deductive Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of public comments on the Land Exchange/Road Corridor Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). It asks, what are the key contestations between actors advocating for and against the land exchange/access road? The objective of asking this question is to identify, chart, and contextualize the contestations present in this case. In doing so, I attempt to unbury some of the ways in which discourse around land management is constructed to reproduce, negotiate, and subvert wider structures of settler colonialism.

Theoretical approach Settler colonialism Contrary to hegemonic discourse positioning the U.S. as a postcolonial state, colonialism in the United States did not end when Britain left the continent, and to suggest it did is to deny the existence, resistance, and persistence of American Indian and Alaska Native peoples (Kēhaulani Kauanui, 2016: 3). Under settler colonialism, “invasion is a structure not an event” (Wolfe, 2006: 7) because after colonizers arrived, they never left. Settler colonialism operates through both external and internal colonialism1 because the spatial boundary between the metropole and the colony in settler colonial states is nonexistent and, therefore, requires a “total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments” (Tuck & Yang, 2012: 5).

As an ongoing project, the processes of settler colonialism attempt to dispossess Indigenous lands through the erasure of their original inhabitants, materially and discursively, and then ‘indigenize’ settlers in ‘replacement.’ Indeed, territoriality, is the primary motivation for the elimination of Indigenous peoples and “settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element” (Wolfe, 2006: 388).

Every part of the settler state’s social and political institutions, from how maps are drawn to how Willahan

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science is qualified underlies the settler states’ justification for the dispossession of Indigenous lands and discursive erasure of Indigenous sovereignty (Simpson, 2007: 70).

Wilderness imaginaries and the colonial project Considered a milestone for progressive environmental preservation, the 1964 Wilderness Act created a formal mechanism for wilderness designations and legally defined “wilderness” as “an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain” [emphasis added].

As the above language indicates, the Act itself is premised on an intractable boundary between the natural and human worlds, inherited from colonial European imaginaries of wilderness as a state of nature, untouched and ‘untrammeled’ by human culture (yet always in grave danger of ‘contamination’ by ‘modernity’). Thus, the removal of Indigenous peoples and dispossession from their lands was constructed for much of the history of settler environmentalism as a sad but necessary trade-off for environmental protection (Zaitchik, 2018). Settler notions of wilderness and the environmental policies born out of them often disavow pre-existing Indigenous polities on those lands while enclosing both wilderness and Indigenous peoples within mythically anachronistic wilderness areas, such as National Wildlife Refuges (NWRs).

At the turn of the twentieth century, quests for ever-more wilderness opportunities by the Romantic back-to-nature movement provided the intellectual justifications for Westward expansion over even more Indigenous territories in the Far North (Kollin, 2001: 96). Because wilderness designations are rooted in the notion of ‘peopleless landscapes’ there lies a tension within environmentalism “between the rights of native peoples to be masters of their own cultural evolution on the one hand, and the desires of preservationists to retain the ‘primitive’ feeling of Alaska’s pristine wilderness on the other” (Higgins, 2017: 291). Meanwhile, social constructions of “Wilderness” are safeguarded through North America’s environmental institutions wherein ENGOs and the superintendents of the national parks system serve, in many ways, as “curators and policemen, protectors of valuable commodities” (Byerly, 1996: 57).

Admittedly, the 1970’s Wilderness movement in Alaska, which culminated in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA)2, made unprecedented concessions to the notion of an “inhabited wilderness” by retaining rural resident’s rights to subsistence hunting and fishing within national parks (Kantor, 2007: 61). However, this shift did not afford Alaska Natives collective rights to subsistence use of public lands. Rather, it subsumed their rights under rural use, equating settler homesteaders with Indigenous peoples before the law (ibid) and dispossessing urban Indigenous peoples of these same subsistence rights. Furthermore, as this chapter will show, persisting colonial imaginaries of a peopleless landscape found in some environmentalist rhetoric continues to problematically disavow Alaska’s Indigenous communities, and work against their self-determination, sovereignty, and safety.

Case Study – Izembek National Wildlife Refuge Izembek NWR straddles the Bering Sea and the Gulf of Alaska on the Alaska Peninsula. The smallest of Alaska’s NWRs, it includes a narrow isthmus of land between the Izembek and Kinzarof lagoons. This isthmus is the only land connection between the fishing community of King Cove (population 938; 2010 U.S. Census) and Cold Bay (population 108; 2010 U.S. Census), which houses the region’s only commercial airport.3 The community of King Cove is predominantly Narratives of the North

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Unangax̂/Aleut4 and members of the Agdaagux Tribe of King Cove. Unangax̂ have been living on the Alaska Peninsula for at least 5,000-10,000 years (Aleutians Pribilof Islands Association) and, for all intents and purposes, are the Indigenous First Peoples of the region since time immemorial.

Though it is possible to travel to and from King Cove by boat or small plane, extreme weather conditions routinely make the journey difficult, if not impossible. Residents often wait days for travel conditions to improve. The residents of King Cove believe that a land route to Cold Bay would improve their access to a safe, reliable, and affordable form of transportation for both medical emergencies and quality of life.

As part of a wider national conservation movement, the area around Izembek Lagoon was first established as the Izembek Range in 1960. Then, in 1980, Izembek was re-designated as an NWR under the ANILCA and 300,000 of the refuge’s 315,000 acres were federally designated as ‘Wilderness.’ Transportation corridors are not legally permitted in designated Wilderness.

However, under ANILCA, it is possible to allow a reversal of Wilderness designations on Federal lands through the exchange of land of equal or greater value with an Alaska Native tribal corporation.5 In 2009, the U.S. Congress passed the Omnibus Public Lands Management Act (OPLMA), approving the exchange of a little over 200 acres of federally-held land within Izembek NWR for more than 56,000 acres of land owned by the State of Alaska (SOA) and King Cove Corporation (KCC), for the purpose of building a single lane gravel road connecting the communities of King Cove and Cold Bay. Pending approval by then Department of the Interior (DOI) Secretary, Sally Jewell, the road would bisect the narrow isthmus running between the two lagoons and traverse seven miles of designated Wilderness (see Fig. 1). As per law and to inform the Secretary’s decision, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to evaluate the potential impacts of the land exchange and subsequent road.

Figure 1. Brief timeline of events related to the Izembek NWR Land Exchange/Access Road Proposal analyzed here.

The debate around the land swap, as mediated through the EIS process, marks one flashpoint in the now decades-long debate the mostly Indigenous Unangan of King Cove, Figure 1 Brief timeline of events relatedbetween to the Izembek NWR Land Exchange/Access Roadresidents Proposal analyzed here. who want to build a road through Izembek to gain access to the airport at Cold Bay, and ENGOs who are fighting to protect the unique flora and fauna present in the refuge.6 Input was received Willahan

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from a range of national conservation groups and their Alaska chapters including The Wilderness Society (TWS), Defenders of Wildlife (DOW), the Sierra Club, Audubon Alaska, and the National Wildlife Refuge Association (NWRA). Of the 71,960 public comments received by FWS on the Draft EIS (DEIS), 70,110 were form letters from supporters of these organizations, highlighting their level of visibility and national support.

In their comments on the DEIS, ENGOs exclusively advocate for a denial of the land exchange and maintenance of current land management plans. ENGOs express concern about the impacts of a road on “wilderness values” and the degradation of habitats used by wildlife in the area. Of particular concern to ENGOs is Pacific Black Brant and Steller’s Eider, nearly the entire global populations of which use Izembek’s narrow isthmus as a seasonal habitat. They also express concern over cost to taxpayers and the danger of setting a precedent for de-designating other protected wilderness areas via land exchange, such as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR).

Methodology Guided by my theoretical framework, I deductively applied Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to select public comments to delve into the relationship between the discourse and material realities.

CDA is “an interdisciplinary approach to textual study that aims to explicate abuses of power promoted by those texts, by analyzing linguistic/semiotic details in light of the larger social and political contexts in which those texts circulate” (Huckin, Andrus & Clary-Lemon 2012: 107). It follows that my methods are interdisciplinary, wholly qualitative, and use a close reading of textual evidence to develop a logical chain of argumentation, similar to a literary analysis.

Correspondingly, under feminist standpoint theory, knowledge that emerges out of the politicization of one’s own personal experience with injustice bridges theory and practice. In this sense, proximity and personal investment are not hindrances to good research, but rather allow for a more complete analysis. With this in mind, my research gives more weight to analysis offered via testimony and public comment by those most proximal to the debate, the Unangan people of King Cove. Meanwhile it should be noted that their criticisms against ENGOs often corroborate the theoretical frameworks offered in existing literature critical of environmentalism (see WillemsBraun, 1997; Voyles, 2015; Zaitchik, 2018; Higgins, 2017; Kantor, 2007; Kollin, 2001). In other words, this research in many ways re-iterates issues that Indigenous Northerners have been problematizing and theorizing on in their everyday contestations over land since the moment of colonization.

Secondly, rejecting the positivist idea that knowledge can be ‘objective’, this research gives me the opportunity to reflexively examine an issue I am intimately entwined with at many points. I was born and raised on Dena’ina Ełnena (Dena’ina Lands) in Anchorage, Alaska’s largest city. As a non-Indigenous resident, my position in the geographic and political space of my homeland is as a settler. Hence, it is impossible for me to extricate myself wholly, if at all, from the problematics of my own very materially implicated positionality within the contestations over Alaska’s social, political, and geographic landscape. It is equally impossible for me to remove myself from the implications of my work as a scholar within the system of academia, wherein colonial power is still located and reproduced. It follows that my research is not neutral. Rather, it is purposefully designed to problematize the constructions of settler space, discourse, and identities within institutions I am either directly a part of or indirectly benefit from.

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Some approaches to reflexivity and positionality can paralyze research by placing too much emphasis on identity as the locus of legitimacy and by reinforcing the importance of oppressive categorizations even as it seeks to dismantle them (Nagar, 2014: 84). As Smith (2012) writes in Decolonizing Methodologies, “Writing can be dangerous because we reinforce and maintain a style of discourse which is never innocent” (37). Even as I problematize enduring coloniality and settler narratives within the debate over Izembek, I risk re-inscribing them or otherwise reifying the myth that the process of colonization is a ‘done deal’. My research inevitably reinforces an Indigenoussettler binary that risks “treating settler colonialism as a meta-structure, thus erasing both its contingency and the dynamics that co-constitute racist, patriarchal, homonationalist, ableist, and capitalist settler colonialism” (Snelgrove, Dhamoon & Corntassel, 2014: 9).

Identifying and disrupting the discursive concepts which continue to bite through our temporal and spatial imaginaries is a necessary first step in transforming present and future material conditions. But, Kauanui (2016) suggests shifting focus away from enduring colonialism, and towards ‘enduring Indigeneity’, thereby re-centering the experiences and narratives of Indigenous peoples, as opposed to settler anxieties and whiteness. In this way, she and other Indigenous theorists refute the underlying notion that colonization is a finished project. And, though I do seek primarily to highlight instances where coloniality is reproduced within discourses that have been unattended to, I simultaneously hope to center the premise that firstly, Indigenous peoples “exist, resist, and persist; and second, that settler colonialism is a structure that endures Indigeneity, as it holds out against it” (Kauanui, 2016).

Data collection As part of the EIS process, a large volume of public comments (71,960) were submitted during the 2012 public comment period. The FWS itself reviewed, sorted, and synthesized public comments and testimony according to a rigorous methodology and collated them as Appendix G of the FEIS, Comment Analysis and Response Report. The FWS coded and categorized substantive comments into 32 issue categories and grouped them into 369 unique Statements of Concern. As evidence of these comment submissions, Appendix G includes letters it received from key actors, such as tribal organizations, politicians, King Cove residents, and ENGOs. Appendix G also includes transcripts from all five public hearings held across the state, which offer a more candid, informal discourse to complement formal letters. As such, Appendix G offers a convenient and thorough content analysis upon which to build my own qualitative study.

It would be near impossible to conduct a close reading of all 71,960 submitted comments. But, in building off of FWS’ well executed quantitative content analysis of the DEIS comment submissions, I was able to conduct a qualitative CDA of these texts that enjoys both the depth of my own close reading and the breadth of the content analysis previously conducted by the FWS. While the statements of concern identified in the EIS provided me with a methodologically-sound thematic foundation through which to guide my close reading of the texts, the texts themselves (letters and transcripts together) offer a comprehensive representation of stakeholders’ discourse.

Method of analysis - Close reading In my own analysis of sample letters and hearing transcripts, I conducted a close reading of texts (see Appendix A) from 22 ENGOs, 11 Alaska Native organizations, the City of King Cove, two U.S. Congressmembers, and 93 individuals representing organizations and/or themselves.

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Unlike a quantitative analysis, the excavation of texts through close reading, while susceptible to variable subjectivity, can situate what is not explicitly stated in a text within a wider context. Close reading, as a means of textual analysis, is well-suited to CDA as a methodology. Kuttainen (2009), for example, uses close readings of texts from ‘settler’ literatures in Australia to uncover the underlying anxieties, historical revisions, and erasures present in the settler-colonial state.

In my own study, I identified themes in the narratives that actors employed to argue for their positions. For example, I collated comments spanning the five public hearings in Anchorage, King Cove, Cold Bay, Sand Point, and Nelson Lagoon/False Pass and identified my own discursive themes based on observed dissonances that emerged between different actors’ narratives, such as historical scope and the language used to describe the land. After the initial reading, I then charted specific dissonances and contestations within the observed themes.

My textual analysis allowed me to holistically map how the narratives interacted; for example, with regards to shifts in the stated reasons for road construction and the strategies employed to authenticate each group’s narrative and discredit others. The third phase of my CDA was loosely based around Dunn’s (2008) historical representations method (Ch. 6) and historicized and contextualized the discourse in wider theoretical frameworks of settler colonialism, enduring Indigenous resistance, and self-determination.

The large amount of text I sought to analyze, and the myriad of actors involved, were a challenge.

Though I eventually limited my scope to primarily focus on ENGOs and Unangan actors to better categorize my research in a legible way, I greatly risk flattening or otherwise essentializing the actors’ positions. Further, in relying on the comments submitted to the FWS, my findings are wholly reliant on the objectivity of the FWS’ comment analysis in selecting which comments to include in full. My findings are also limited in that they only take into account actors who have knowledge of and access to the EIS process.

Results and discussion Sites of contestation often belie larger structural dissonances. In the following sections I will discuss some key findings from the conducted study that indicate the role of ENGOs in perpetuating structures of settler colonialism and the ways in which the boundaries of the debate itself encroach on possibilities for self-determination and sovereignty.

Producing wilderness A close reading of the texts shows that in its value as an aesthetic and symbolic commodity, Izembek is constructed to maintain an illusion of wilderness, by and for the consumption of the settler state. ENGOs consistently bind Izembek NWR in language of purity, wholeness, and fragility. Words like “pristine”, “untrammeled”, “untouched”, “fragile”, “unspoiled”, “sensitive”, “vulnerable”, and “unfragmented” are some of the most common qualifiers used to discuss both the wetlands and the wildlife. This discourse connotes an ENGO imaginary of a peopleless landscape, with Unangan presence invisibilized. As a markedly “man-made feature”, the FEIS similarly finds that “Constructing a road would have a major effect on the untrammeled, natural, and undeveloped qualities of the Izembek Wilderness and the Kinzarof Lagoon parcel and would also affect solitude or primitive and unconfined recreation” (USFWS, 4-255). In other words, roads are incompatible with “wilderness” values because they disrupt the Romantic imaginary of a peopleless landscape, far removed from the contaminating effects of ‘modernity’.

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The reliance on these ideals in contemporary debates like Izembek evidence that they are concepts “with teeth that bite through time.” And yet, ‘wilderness’ is not ‘wild and free’ so much as a cultural production designed by humans and clearly beholden to specific and restrictive protocols governing what is acceptable and what is not within its boundaries (Kollin, 2001: 37). The creation of national parks in Alaska, in general, was greatly influenced by the imaginations of a wider U.S. public (many of whom would never set foot in Alaska) wherein Alaska symbolized the “last best chance for wilderness” (Higgins, 2017: 292). Fittingly, the ENGO coalition letter describes Izembek NWR as “one of the few remaining wild places in our country not lost to development” (D.13). Current anxieties over the very real threats of the climate crisis, and the urgent action it demands, may exacerbate the buoyancy of this elegiac narrative; fueling a preservationist rhetoric perpetually rooted in revisionist ‘nostalgia’ for a ‘pre-historic’ time before ‘man destroyed Nature’.7 Inciting a sense of urgency to save “one of the few remaining wild places” through elegiac narratives is a logical campaign mobilization tactic. And, in trying to convey this urgency to faraway supporters, ENGO campaigns may understandably collapse the complexities of the debate over Izembek into a simple binary of “nature spoiled, or nature saved” (Willems-Braun, 1997: 24).

However, ENGOs themselves also seem to financially benefit from upholding geographic imaginaries of a peopleless landscape. For example, TWS and other environmental groups criticize the DEIS’ cost analysis for not adequately considering the loss of an estimated $1 million USD in passive use values should Izembek’s “pristine” wilderness be converted into a roadway. TWS identifies passive use values as the willingness of people who may never actually visit an NWR to pay for the protection of its land and wildlife (D.4:8). It states, “With respect to wildlife, people are clearly willing to pay to protect species – some of them halfway around the world – that they may never even view. Contributions to international wildlife organizations are an example of how that willingness to pay is manifested” (D.4:8).

In referencing the loss of passive use revenue in the form of contributions to ENGOs, TWS may also implicate how ENGOs themselves benefit from launching high profile campaigns to protect “Wilderness”. Given ENGOs opposition to the loss of passive-use values, I argue that the propagation of a narrative of a Wilderness, pure and pristine, but in grave and urgent danger of human contamination, financially sustains ENGOs, individually and as an institution. Similar critiques have been levied against other ENGOs. In the past, Greenpeace relied on a tactic of generating widespread outcry over Canadian sealing to bring in revenue for other campaigns, despite the fact that seal populations were not endangered and the campaign itself was deeply harmful to Inuit communities (Angry Inuk, 2016). Alongside the Greenpeace case, Izembek, in particular, may offer an example wherein ENGOs maintain a hardline discourse of environmental crisis even where the actual environmental impact is less severe than the impact to human safety, as will be discussed later.

In many ways, wild animals are central to the national imaginary of Alaska as a Last Frontier and an anachronistic space (Kollin, 2001: 156) and there still exists a tendency in contemporary ENGO campaigns to minimize the presence of Indigenous peoples, instead centering landscapes and animals. For example, ‘Save the Arctic’ campaigns typically feature a polar bear to evoke sympathy from the metropole in a purely aesthetically consumptive way - without attention to their relationality to humans (Boyer, 2017: 103). That said, thanks in large part to the persistent resistance to erasure by Indigenous peoples themselves, some prominent ENGOs are now making a concerted effort to re-center Indigenous communities and environmental justice in their advocacy Willahan

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overall. However, in the case of Izembek, the data analyzed here show it is concern over birds, not King Cove residents, which catalyzed the nation to pay attention and contribute to campaigns against a road through Izembek NWR. Relationality Whereas ENGOs frame markers of ‘modernity’, such as roads, as an unnatural occurrence which negatively infringe on the ‘pure’ qualities of ‘wilderness’, King Cove residents’ assertions of their relationship with the land reads as a refusal to be enclosed into this imposed binary. Ontologically, Unangan discourse consistently places humans in relationship with the environment, affording other animals and entities agency and allowing for a human role in a balanced ecosystem. The Belkofski Tribal Council President remarks, “We have ties to all of the wildlife that lives in the Izembek Refuge. This wildlife is part of who we are” (C.5). Another testifier at the Sand Point hearing states, “Yes, refuges are beautiful. To look at a swan is wonderful...But we don’t look at them like that. We look at them as food. And we know how to take care of them” (E.2).

In direct opposition to environmentalist discourse positioning human culture as incompatible with wilderness values, land, animals, and humans are “We the native people of this region are more framed in the discourse as co-dependent, dynamic, familiar with the migrating patterns and evolving, and adaptive; rather than “vulnerable” behaviors of the animals here than anyone else. and in need of saving, being spoken for, or We are also more vested in insuring these resources preserved in an anachronistic fiction. An example thrive as our people have been relying on them for of this is found in the claim, mirrored by many thousands of years for our own survival” King Cove residents, that birds and other wildlife “are very adaptable and resourceful”, and not “as Box 1 Excerpt from FEIS Appendix G, Comments submitted by Tribes and Alaska Native Corporations Box 1 Excerpt from FEIS Appendix G, fragile as some uneducated people believe” (C.7).

Comments submitted by Tribes and Alaska

Indeed, refuting the inherent authority of knowledge derived from outsider scientific studies, much Native Corporations“We theBay. native people Figure 2 Aerial view of the runway at Cold Public domain image. of the discourse asserts the authority of local and Indigenous Knowledge (IK) and reiterates local of this region are more familiar with the (US Fish and Wildlife Service, 2007)Box 1 Excerpt from FEIS investment in continuing to practice sustainable landAppendix management.

Asserting the and generations G, Comments submitted

by Tribes Alaska migrating patterns and behaviors ofNative theof Corporations knowledge behind Indigenous land management andanimals stewardship tactically the here than anyonecasts else.doubt We areon also purportedly “devastating” impact of the road and declares compatibility of both use and morethe vested in insuring theseland resources land protection under Indigenous polities, refuting attempts on both the debate thrive by as settlers our people havesides beenofrelying on to create a false dichotomy between the two. them for thousands of years for our own survival”

In contrast, the road itself is described by ENGOs and their supporters in visceral and violent language. They make repeated references to the ways in which the road would “cut”, “slice”, “punch”, and “devastate” the NWR, which is subsequently personified as the “ecological heart” of the area. And, while cautious of slipping into essentializing Indigeneity under “ecologically noble savage” tropes (Anglás-Grande, 1999), it bears noting that the “ontological turn” occurring in the field of ecology toward a more interconnected understanding of ecosystems is one which has been largely appropriated from Indigenous cosmologies and knowledge systems in the first place (Todd, 2016). This often occurs, as in these texts, without attention to ongoing Indigenous struggles over land rights, much less citational credit given to actual Indigenous peoples as originators of these ontologies (ibid). Indeed, Kollin (2001) finds that the appropriation and co-optation of Indigenous terminologies and subject-position was the mechanism through which Robert Marshall, founder of TWS, could “imagine himself as one of the region’s first real explorers” (73).

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Self-determination and the ideal victim – Debating the purpose of a road Similarly, the dissonance between the road as a lifesaving, unobtrusive necessity and the road as a violent, invasive frivolity is a key contestation in the debate. However, it problematically de-centers the discussion, moving the focus away from sovereignty and self-determination and into a debate over the believability of King Cove’s performance of ideal victimhood. In advocating for the road, King Cove residents consistently characterize their “critical” need for transportation that is “safe”, “reliable”, and “affordable”. The majority of comments testify to personal experiences with unreliable transportation options during medical emergencies. Others reference how a road would improve quality of life by allowing easier mobility to and from King Cove, in turn permitting elders to stay in the community, greater connectivity to friends and family in the rest of Alaska, and even the opportunity to visit people in Cold Bay on a more regular basis.

The prohibition of commercial use of the road was an explicit condition of the Congressional act that authorized the land exchange. Despite this, potential for commercial use is consistently brought up by environmental groups and is a vehicle through which ENGOs frame King Cove as untrustworthy. While King Cove’s argument for why a road should be constructed oscillates between medical necessity and “quality of life”, ENGO proponents repeatedly characterize the land exchange as “a solution in search of a problem” alongside assertions that the true purpose of the road is for recreational and commercial purposes, not health and safety as claimed by King Cove residents. ENGOs strategically frame King Cove’s continued insistence on the necessity of the road as an unreliable, and even fraudulent narrative. Attempts are made to discredit and delegitimize the necessity of the road for health and safety and King Cove residents are called “shameless” and accused of “flouting the law”, while motives behind the land exchange are dismissed as “some perceived need” and “overt but suspect.”

The claim that King Cove’s need for the road is false may fit into expectations that King Cove perform their victimhood in order to be ‘deserving’ of the road. For example, commenters against the land exchange speculate on whether health and safety is a genuine reason for the road, or if it is perhaps for personal travel, access to the NWR, or commercial use, and therefore unwarranted.

In one letter, ENGOs conclude that “the true purpose of the road appears to be the transportation of fish industry employees and commercial fish products rather than health and safety” (D.13:32).

In many ways, then, the strategy found in the majority of ENGO arguments is to interrogate King Cove’s performance as a “perfect victim.” The boundaries of the debate are limited to whether or not King Cove residents are credibly in need of rescue, maintaining settler’s sovereignty over who to “save” or “not to save.” The authenticity of King Cove’s medical necessity is further situated in competition with the vulnerability of an Otherized natural world that is constructed as in grave danger.

Policing of Indigeneity The settler state’s preoccupation with defining Indigeneity can be a trap wherein Indigenous people are ‘managed’ by reductive definitions imposed and policed by a colonial system (Snelgrove et al, 2014:13). In Alaska, for example, legal definitions of Indigeneity based on colonial blood quantum rules still dictate access to lands, resources, and rights (Fondahl, Filippova and Mack, 2015:10). As Tuck and Yang (2012) note, “Indigenous identity and tribal membership are questions that Indigenous communities alone have the right to struggle over and define, not DNA tests, heritage

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websites, and certainly not the settler state” (13). A list to which I would add settler environmentalists.

Yet, within the frame of ‘wilderness’, with its strictly policed dichotomies of nature/culture, traditional/modern, the only actors “authorized to ‘speak for’ nature” are ‘disinterested’ ecologists and ‘traditional’ Indigenous peoples, whose identity is imposed on them and who are often ‘spoken for’ (Willems-Braun, 1997: 23). Similarly, the commentary from a conservationist supporter and Anchorage resident in Box 2 regurgitates the idea that authentic Indigeneity must fit neatly into the settler imaginary of being recognizable to settlers as “ecologically noble” and exemplifies Johnson’s (2011) claim that settlers problematically define Indigenous Peoples by a lack of culture and an inherent vulnerability to white settlement (196).

This passage, though clearly more blatantly racist than letters sent as official ENGO statements, highlights the white fragility and the policing of Indigeneity present in the debate. Box 2 moreover, exhibits what Goldstein (2008), describes as the tendency in antisovereignty discourse to use acknowledgement of a past genocide and dispossession, “as evidence of the necessarily diminished capacity of tribal nations to make present-day claims” to selfdetermination (836).

The Box 2 Excerpt from FEIS Appendix G, Examples of comments vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples submitted by citizens and non-governmental organizations to a contaminating encroachment, as narrated by some environmentalists, starkly resembles the ways in which the nation’s last frontiers of wilderness are constructed as inherently vulnerable, to the “expanding settlement” of the settler colonial nation. In this paradigm, nature is constructed as “the absence of culture” wherein Indigenous presence must “not exceed the bounds of the traditional” (Willems-Braun, 2001: 22).

“Out came the old canards of guilt that the white man took Native lands and hauled the Aleuts off to camps in Southeast Alaska as if they had anything to do with building a road. Another regurgitated theme is that the Aleuts have thousands of years of history of living in the area and have respect for the land.

Notwithstanding that Alaska’s indigenous peoples have lost most of their cultural roots, the notion that they are magically conservationists echoes Ralph Waldo Emerson’s observation that ‘the louder he talked of his honor, the faster we counted our spoons’.

This was a myth started by naïve environmentalists in the 1960’s who were casting around for historical icons that has become gospel within the Native community not based on fact. The overwhelming evidence is to the contrary. Some of the ‘Aleuts’ testifying clearly had no factual sense of their own history.”

This particular letter relies on an inversion the “ecologically noble savage” trope to deny the validity of Indigenous sovereignty over Indigenous lands. Similarly, environmentalist rhetoric often polices Indigeneity by ascribing the “ecologically noble savage” trope to some Indigenous groups while refuting it for others who do not neatly fit their narrative (Anglás-Grande, 1999: 307). This tendency overlooks the fact that while Indigenous peoples demand free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) over projects in their territories, they are not necessarily anti-development (Fondahl, Filippova & Mack, 2015). Further, discrediting the Indigeneity of Unangax̂ advocating for the construction of a road, with the claim they have “lost most of their cultural roots”, is a stark example of how settler logic vanishes Indigenous Peoples as a tactic of dispossession. Often the lost purity for which settlers pine includes not only the construct of a wilderness, but also encloses Indigenous Peoples into this ‘always-disappearing’ geography. In its puritanical insistence on a

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natural world ‘untainted’ by ‘unnatural’ human culture, conservationism perpetuates the trope of Indigenous Peoples as always vanishing, conveniently making room for settlers.

Historic scope and the right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) For ENGOs, a land exchange would “erode the original and historic boundary of the refuge” (D.13), placing their focus on “precedent” squarely within a shallow temporal scope. The historical context offered in environmentalist discourse is limited to jurisprudence and legislation such as Izembek’s 1960 designation as a Wildlife Range. ENGO actors often refer back to the initial moment of designation as the presumed starting point of humanity’s recognition of Izembek as a special place. One conservation supporter frames the designation as “exemplary of how long its unique natural values have been widely recognized” (D.11). ENGOs further argue that the land exchange should be denied because “Izembek Refuge is an essential part of America’s wild legacy protected generations ago by individuals with the foresight to know that this area has national and international conservation significance” (D.13:33).

Even on the USFWS website’s Izembek NWR page, the sole mention of Unangan people is found in a lonely sentence under the “History of the Refuge” section: “The earliest people of the area were the Paleo-Aleuts who migrated from interior Alaska” (USFWS, 2013). This situates Indigenous presence squarely in a long-ago past and employs a trope of Indigenous peoples as settlers themselves, an inversion designed to justify colonization. These narratives distinctly erase the sovereignty and stewardship over that land by Unangan peoples, perpetuating the myth of the moment of ‘discovery’ as when the first white man experiences a geography, thereby disavowing existing Indigenous sovereignty (Voyles, 2015: 46).

Unangan discourse, in contrast, “This road will traverse Izembek National Wildlife Refuge, a huge situates the debate in their swath of land in our backyard that was designated “wilderness.” This millennia of sovereignty and decision, made decades ago, severely restricted our use and access to the stewardship over the area and land. Residents of King Cove were largely excluded from this land-use actively contests the enclosure decision - just one in a long string of failures by our federal government of Izembek’s “historic to solicit and value the input of indigenous people on the use of their boundary” within a temporal ancestral lands. Sad to say that the first that many of us knew about imaginary conditioned on the this government action was when we found our subsistence cabins burned settler experience. Additionally, to the ground in the 1970’s” many testimonials reference the right to FPIC, the exclusion of Box 3 Excerpt from FEIS Appendix G, Examples of comments submitted Unangan people in designating by citizens and non-governmental organizations the land as “wilderness” in the first place, and the systematic burning of pre-existing hunting cabins by the federal government after the land was designated as a wildlife range. In testifying to these historical injustices, road proponents re-frame the current debate within the history of settler colonialism, the dispossession of Indigenous lands, and the denial of meaningful FPIC. Nevertheless, the conversation within the DEIS remains largely bounded within the confines of colonial wilderness legislation. Though Indigenous Peoples often utilize competition between state and federal governments to carve out redress and rights in the U.S. legal system, “the tortuous articulation of juridical reason and multiscalar distribution of political and legal authority reinforce

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colonial rule even when appearing to challenge it” (Goldstein, 2008: 842). Thus, even when nimbly manipulated, law is always in the interest of the settler colonial project.

Indeed, the land exchange is positioned by ENGOs and their supporters as “undermining” the purpose of the refuge as delineated in the 1964 Wilderness Act. And perhaps it is. Yet, it seems there exists an inherent incommensurability between sovereignty for Indigenous peoples and the legal framework of Wilderness designations, entangled as it is with European binaries of Nature vs. Man and, more insidiously, with the colonial project itself. The abnegation by conservation groups of Indigenous histories on the land that is now Izembek NWR cannot be taken for granted as naïveté. Rather, “the negation of [I]ndigenous views of history was a critical part of asserting colonial ideology” (Smith, 2012: 30). In this case, admitting to the existence and sovereignty of Unangan polities prior to the moment of settler recognition would jeopardize the concept of “public ownership” over land that was stolen, and threatens the very underpinnings of U.S. fantasies of sovereignty8, including its legal authority to regulate wilderness.

Conclusions By focusing in particular on how ENGOs frame the debate my research highlights the ways actors who may be taken for granted as benevolent in the realm of liberal justice projects can reproduce and feed colonial power structures. ENGO discourse is clearly situated within prevailing colonial imaginaries of wilderness as an anachronistic space, perpetually at risk of total destruction. From this epistemology, ENGOs locate the impact of a road across a broad, international geographic space, but enclose it in a shallow historical context premised on the “first white man experience”.

Meanwhile, ENGO arguments against the road tactically disavow King Cove residents’ Indigeneity, historical context, and credibility within the confines of ideal victimhood. In their concern over “passive use” values, ENGO discourse also may evidence how maintaining problematic imaginaries of wilderness financially benefits ENGOs themselves.

In continuing to operate from colonial imaginaries, ENGOs may also hamper their own cause and leave little room for imagining alternative futurities outside of a polarizing paradigm of environmental protection vs. economic development, which remains firmly rooted in colonial ontologies about land. The ways in which approval of the road9 is readily translated to other projects on Indigenous lands, such as the opening of ANWR to oil drilling or the approval of the Pebble Mine project is certainly concerning. But, the fact that construction of a needed road could catalyze such a domino effect may also be an unfortunate symptom of the untenable legal landscape of environmental protections; founded as they were on Indigenous dispossession and colonial epistemologies of a fictive, peopleless space.

Haycox (2016) writes, “forging a false history inflates and distorts identity; it occludes a realistic and usable vision of the future” (p.16). Indeed, ignoring yesterday’s ‘inconvenient’ histories ensures the perpetual creation of exponentially more inconvenient futures. ENGO disavowals of history read as an attempt to construct Alaska as a ‘postcolonial’ space and as a move to innocence (Tuck & Yang, 2012). Further, in simultaneously appropriating Indigenous cosmologies and fighting to retain Federal control of stolen land, ENGOs help to sediment the sovereignty of the settler state.

Colonial epistemologies, though perhaps buried under layers of ostensible progressive values and environmental consciousness, will continue to reproduce harm, especially if actors are not willing to address that the teeth of colonialism continue to bite through their contemporary ideologies. In failing to challenge the epistemological boundaries of an “untrammeled” wild, nor to bring Narratives of the North

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legislation regulating wilderness in line with Indigenous self-determination, ENGOs are complicit in settler colonialism.

Opposition to the land exchange may indicate how ENGOs can, and often do, perform a version of conditional solidarity with Indigenous peoples when it aligns with their own goals, but not necessarily in the interest of Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination. Of course, ENGOs are not necessarily obligated to advocate for decolonization at all costs. But neither are we obligated to take for granted the inherent progressiveness of environmentalism. The selective picking and choosing of when an Indigenous group’s Indigeneity is used to legitimate environmental causes and when it is simply ignored or discredited because it does not fit conservationist narratives drives farther the wedge between settler environmentalism and Indigenous communities. Disrupting the false binary of nature spoiled or nature saved also means relinquishing control over decision making.

And, more importantly, it means respecting sovereignty, FPIC, and self-determination in solidarity with Indigenous peoples, even in cases where those rights are incompatible with ENGOs’ imaginaries of what environmental protection looks like.

Izembek certainly offers one instance of the ways in which the settler colonial project continues to infringe on Indigenous sovereignty over their traditional lands. However, while ENGOs appear to sediment the concreteness of the land as “wilderness” in fact, Unangan actors challenge the fixity of a space that is socially constructed in the imaginations of conservationists and their supporters, subverting the imposition of dispossessive narratives even as they tactically re-appropriate narratives of Indigeneity and victimhood as a strategy for achieving material outcomes. King Cove residents further localize their narratives within the boundaries of Unangan homelands and situate the debate in a much broader historical context than their ENGO counterparts. Discourse in support of the road repeatedly challenges the legitimacy of the legal-juridical landscape of Wilderness designations as an operational framework. Indeed, the narratives deployed by Unangax̂ in general exemplify sites of enduring Indigeneity, re-assertions of self-determination and sovereignty, and refusals of attempts to enclose their narratives in settler binaries.

Finally, insofar as it involves the repatriation of Unangan lands to Unangan people for their use, enjoyment, health, and connectivity to other lands, the battle over Izembek certainly can be recognized as a movement for self-determination. Just as Alaska Native peoples continue to successfully carve out self-determination from the insufficient confines of ANCSA (Case and Dorough, 2006), so too are Unangan people of King Cove engaging in an act of survivance10 and refusal of colonial enclosures in the fighting to secure a road. However, as mentioned by some King Cove residents (see E.5, for example), the lands KCC would give up in exchange means the legal fabric on which the proposed land exchange is occurring unavoidably perpetuates the settler colonial project. Through the lens of self-determination, a land exchange should not depend on whether or not the road is viable year-round, proven to be medically necessary, nor even whether it is intended for commercial purposes. To go a step farther, a lens of decolonization would problematize the concept that lands need be exchanged and given to the Federal government at all.

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Notes 1. While external colonialism refers to the extraction of Indigenous resources to serve the metropole, often through military force, internal colonialism refers to the domestic, often institutionalized, management of lands, people, and environments within the borders of the imperial nation state (Tuck & Yang, 2012:4).

2. ANILCA added over 100 million acres of land in Alaska to new or existing conservation systems. It doubled the size of the National Parks System and was the single greatest expansion of protected lands in U.S. history. It also uniquely allowed for rural subsistence hunting and fishing on protected lands, in some ways redefining the concept of wilderness as unpeopled. (Haycox, 2016, ch.5) 3. After Japan invaded the Aleutian Islands during WWII, the U.S. military occupied much of southwest Alaska8 and constructed a strategic air base on what is now Cold Bay. Notably, the airport, along with some roads and buildings within what is now the refuge, were originally built by the U.S. military as part of the Aleutian campaign during WWII. 4. ‘Aleut’ was the name applied to the Unangax̂ people by Russian colonizers in the mid1700s, the Unangam tunuu word is Unangan or Unangax̂ (plural). Though often used interchangeably, this dissertation will use Unangan/Unangax̂ to refer to the Indigenous people of King Cove.

5. Corporations were established following the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) in 1973. Under ANCSA, Alaska Native tribes’ aboriginal land claims were “extinguished” in exchange for a comprehensive settlement package which included the distribution of $962.5 million and 44 million acres of land. King Cove Corporation is the village corporation formed under ANCSA to represent the interests of the Agdaagux Tribe of King Cove. The regional entity is The Aleut Corporation. For a comprehensive explanation of ANCSA’s history and complex statutes please see Paul Ongtooguk’s The Annotated ANCSA available at http://www.alaskool.org/projects/ancsa/annancsa.htm 6. As intermediaries and decisionmakers, the SOA and the federal government are also key actors.

7. However, the “implicit fatalism” of apocalyptic environmentalist rhetoric elegizing Alaska as the nation’s “last best chance” may actually counterproductively imply the futility of efforts to mitigate the climate crisis, incentivize greater human impacts, preclude alternatives to an assumed ‘inevitable’ destruction and, in the long run, imperil Alaska’s futurities (See Elliott, 2017).

8. The fantasy of sovereignty was rooted in the myth of European 'discovery' of lands that were already inhabited and governed by sovereign Indigenous nations. Indeed, the discursive practice of claiming a land as terra nullius, 'uninhabited', or 'empty wilderness' preempted any actual logistic ability of colonial states to enact control over Indigenous territory; “discovery claims were made credible only after they could be actualized by settlers on the ground, at which point these claims could then be retroactively projected onto the past” (Gaudry, 2016: 49). In other words, it was not law that transformed settler

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fantasies of sovereignty over Indigenous polities into material realities, but discourse sedementing it as common sense, which first “erases Indigenous political authority in theory without accounting for its presence in fact” (ibid: 68).

9. Ultimately, Secretary Jewell selected Alternative 1: No Action, siding with environmental groups against the land-swap that would have enabled the building of the King Cove-Cold Bay road. The Record of Decision (ROD) claimed that “the large number of species that are dependent on the isthmus would be irreversibly and irretrievably changed by the presence of the road.” (ROD, 2013).

10. Anishinaabe scholar Gerald Vizenor’s (1999) term survivance is helpful here. He defines survivance as, “an active sense of presence, the continuance of native stories, not a mere reaction, or a survivable name. Native survivance stories are renunciations of dominance, tragedy, and victimry. Survivance means the right of succession or reversion of an estate, and in that sense, the estate of native survivancy” (1).

References Aleutian Pribilof Islands Association, 2019. History. [online] Retrieved 23 May 2019 from: https://www.apiai.org/departments/cultural-heritage-department/culturehistory/history/ Anglás Grande, S.M., 1999. Beyond the ecologically noble savage: Deconstructing the white man’s Indian. Environmental Ethics, 21(3), pp.307–320.

Angry Inuk, 2016. [film] Directed by Alethea Arnaquq-Baril. Canada: National Film Board. Retrieved from: www.nfb.ca Boyer, K., 2017. Saving the Polar Bear and Other Objects. In: S. Ray, K. Meier (eds.)

2017. Critical Norths: Space, Nature, Theory .Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press. Ch.5 brown, a.m., 2016. Emergent Strategy. Emergent Strategy: Shaping Change, Changing Worlds. AK Press.

Byerly, A., 1996. The Uses of Landscape. In: C. Glotfelty, and H. Fromm (eds.) The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology. Athens: University of Georgia Press, pp.52–68.

Case, B. D. and Dorough, D. S., 2006. Tribes and Self-Determination in Alaska. Human Rights, 1, pp.13–14.

Dunn, K., 2008. Historical Representations. In: A. Klotz, D. Prakash, (eds.) Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide. London: Palgrave Macmillan Limited. Ch.6.

Elliott, W., 2017. Ravens’ World: Ecoelegy and Beyond in a Changing North. In: S. Ray, K. Meier (eds.) 2017. Critical Norths: Space, Nature, Theory. Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press.

Ch.2

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Fondahl, G., Filippova, V., and Mack, L., 2015. Indigenous Peoples in the New Arctic.

In: Evengård, B. et al (eds.) The New Arctic. Springer International Publishing, pp.7– 22. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-17602-4.

Gaudry, A., 2016. Fantasies of Sovereignty: Deconstructing British and Canadian Claims to Ownership of the Historic North-West. Native American and Indigenous Studies, 3(1):46. doi: 10.5749/natiindistudj.3.1.0046.

Goeman, M. R., 2009. Notes toward a Native Feminism’s Spatial Practice, Wicazo Sa Review, 24(2), pp.169–187. doi: 10.1353/wic.0.0040.

Goldstein, A., 2008. Where the Nation Takes Place: Proprietary Regimes, Antistatism, and U.S. Settler Colonialism. South Atlantic Quarterly, 107(4), pp.833–861. doi: 10.1215/003828762008-019.

Haycox, S., 2016. Battleground Alaska: Fighting Federal Power in America's Last Wilderness. University Press of Kansas.

Higgins, M., 2017. Prospecting for Buried Narratives in Wrangell-St. Elias National Park and Preserve. In: S. Ray, K. Meier (eds.) 2017. Critical Norths: Space, Nature, Theory. Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press. Ch.14 Howie, B., Lewis, N., 2014. Geographical Imaginaries: Articulating the Values of Geography.

New Zealand Geographer, 70(2): 131-39.

Huckin, T., Andrus, J., and Clary-Lemon, J., 2012. Critical Discourse Analysis and Rhetoric and Composition. College Composition and Communication, 64(1): 107–29.

Johnson, M., 2011. Reconciliation, Indigeneity, and postcolonial nationhood in settler states. Postcolonial Studies, 14(2), pp.187–201. doi: 10.1080/13688790.2011.563457.

Kantor, I., 2007. Ethnic Cleansing and America’s Creation of National Parks. Public Land and Resources Law Review, 28, pp.41–64. Retrieved from: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr Kauanui, K., 2016. ‘A structure, not an event’: Settler Colonialism and Enduring Indigeneity. Lateral 5.1. [online] Retrieved 20 May 2019 from: http://csalateral.org/issue/5-1/forum-alt-humanities-settler-colonialism-enduringindigeneity-kauanui/ Kollin, S., 2001. Nature's State, Imagining Alaska as the Last Frontier. The University of North Carolina Press.

Nagar, R., 2014. Representation, Accountability, and Collaborative Border Crossings: Moving Beyond Positionality. In: Muddying the Waters : Coauthoring Feminisms Across Scholarship and Activism. University of Illinois Press, pp.105–123. Retrieved from: https://muse.jhu.edu/book/35542 Simpson, A., 2007. On Ethnographic Refusal: Indigeneity, “Voice” and Colonial Citizenship.Junctures, pp.67–80.

Smith, L., 2012. Decolonizing Methodologies. 2nd ed. London: Zed Books Ltd. Narratives of the North

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Snelgrove, C., Dhamoon, R. K. and Corntassel, J., 2014. Unsettling Settler Colonialism: The discourse and politics of settlers, and solidarity with Indigenous nations. Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 3(2), pp.1–32. doi: .1037//0033-2909.I26.1.78.

Todd, Z., 2016. An Indigenous Feminist’s Take On The Ontological Turn: “Ontology” Is Just Another Word For Colonialism. Journal of Historical Sociology, 29(1), pp.4–22. doi: 10.1111/johs.12124.

Tuck, E. and Yang, K. W., 2012. Decolonization is not a Metaphor. Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 1(1), pp.1–40.

U.S. Congress (U.S.C.), 1964. The Wilderness Act, Public Law 88-577 (16 U.S. C. 11311136) Retrieved from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1131 United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), 2013. Final Environmental Impact Statement: Izembek National Wildlife Refuge Land Exchange/Road Corridor. Appendix G Comment Analysis and Response Report. U.S. Dept. of the Interior. Retrieved from: https://www.fws.gov/uploadedFiles/Region_7/NWRS/Zone_1/Izembek/PDF/17%20 Appendix%20G%20Comment%20Analysis%20Response%20Report.pdf United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), 2013. Record of Decision, Izembek National Wildlife Refuge Land Exchange/Road Corridor Final Environmental Impact Statement. Retrieved from: www.fws.gov/uploadedFiles/Region_7/NWRS/Zone_1/Izembek/PDF/rod_sign ed.pdf United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), last updated 2013. Izembek National Wildlife Refuge: History of the Refuge. [online] Retrieved 23 May 2019 from: https://www.fws.gov/nwrs/threecolumn.aspx?id=2147524942 Vizenor, G., 1999. Preface. Manifest Manners: Narratives on Postindian Survivance. First Bison Books Printing.

Voyles, T. B., 2015. Wastelanding: Legacies of Uranium Mining in Navajo Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Willems-Braun, B. 1997. Buried Epistemologies: The Politics of Nature in (Post) colonial British Columbia. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 87(1), pp.3–31. doi: 10.4324/9781315256351-15.

Wolfe, P. 2006. Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native. Journal of Genocide Research, 8:4, 387-409, DOI:10.1080/14623520601056240 Zaitchik, A., 2018. How Conservation Became Colonialism. Foreign Policy, 16 July. Retrieved 20 February 2019 from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/16/how-conservation-becamecolonialism-environment-indigenous-people-ecuador-mining/

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Appendix A Documents analyzed were taken from Appendix G: Comment Analysis and Response Report. A part of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) on the Izembek National Wildlife Refuge Land Exchange/Road Corridor. All comments were submitted in 2012.

A. Transcripts of the five public meetings with testimony by many individuals A.1 Anchorage Public Meeting (May 3, 2012) A.2 Sand Point Public Meeting (May 7, 2012) A.3 Cold Bay Public Meeting (May 8, 2012) A.4 False Pass and Nelson Lagoon Public Meeting (May 9, 2012) A.5 King Cove Public Meeting (May 10, 2012) B. Comments submitted by cooperating agencies B.1 King Cove Group (Agdaagux Tribe of King Cove, Belkofski Tribal Council, King Cove Corporation, Aleutians East Borough, City of King Cove) Letter to Secretary Salazar B.2 King Cove Group Consolidated Comments B.3 History of King Cove's Need for a Road to the Cold Bay Airport B.4 State of Alaska Comments on Draft EIS Letter C. Comments submitted by Tribes and Alaska Native Corporations C.1 Alaska Native Health Board C.2 Agdaagux Tribal Council of King Cove C.3 Aleutian Pribilof Islands Association C.4 Belkofski Corporation C.5 Belkofski Tribal Council C.6 King Cove Native Corporation C.7 Nelson Lagoon Tribal Council C.8 Old Harbor Native Corporation C.9 Qagan Tayagungin Tribe D. Examples of comments submitted by citizens and non-governmental organizations (citizens’ names redacted to protect privacy) D.1 U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski D.2 U.S. Representative Don Young D.3 Della T. D.4 The Wilderness Society D.5 Dan R. D.6 Lawrence and Viola Y. D.7 Californians for Western Wilderness D.8 Peter M. D.9 Rebecca B. D.10 Tanna L. D.11 Allen E.S. D.12 David M. D.13 Coalition of Non-Governmental Organizations (Alaska Center for the Environment, Alaska Wilderness League, American Birding Association, American Rivers, Audubon Alaska, Blue Goose Alliance, Center for Biological

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Diversity, ConservAmerica, Cook Inletkeeper, Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Alaska National Wildlife Refuges, League of Conservation Voters, National Wildlife Refuge Association, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northern Alaska Environmental Center, Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society, The Wildlife Society, Western Lands Project, Wilderness Watch, Wildlands CPR, World Wildlife Fund) E. Examples from organized form letter campaigns E.1 The Sierra Club E.2 Defenders of Wildlife E.3 National Wildlife Refuge Association E.4 Wilderness Watch

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Security of Indigenous peoples in Russia’s Arctic policy: Exposing the oxymoron of state-determined self-determination Agne Cepinskyte

Since the late 1980s, international law as well as academic scholarship have been devoting increasing attention to the security of Indigenous peoples. The international community has accepted Indigenous peoples as collective actors with distinct rights under international law. Similarly, academic scholarship has recognised them as both referent objects of security and, to an extent, security actors. Post-Cold War transformations in the Arctic exemplify the special role of Indigenous peoples in the field of security. However, their security still largely depends on the policy of states under whose jurisdiction they live. Russia’s domestic policy developments, particularly amid the increased suppression of civil society since 2011, have deviated from the course of international law and scholarship. While policy-makers have persistently referred to the protection of Indigenous peoples as one of the primary objectives of Russia’s Arctic policy, human rights bodies have repeatedly noted the government’s violations of Indigenous rights, especially in the context of the ‘foreign agent’ legislation and gas infrastructure development in the Yamal peninsula. Instead of treating this discordance as merely a case of dishonest political rhetoric, this article aims to explain it by exposing the government’s paternalistic relation to society, which underlies Russia’s policy. It thereby reveals a paradox of state-determined self-determination – a rejection of this right as inherent in peoples. The article concludes that Russia’s denial of this right compromises Indigenous security, because the government alone cannot ensure its protection. Such findings could facilitate a critical assessment of the protection of Indigenous security in states whose regimes dominate society.

Introduction Since the late 1980s, both international law and academic scholarship have been devoting increasing attention to Indigenous peoples and their security. International legal documents, most notably the 1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO 169) and the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), enshrine a body of Indigenous rights and impose on state governments the responsibility to guarantee the free enjoyment of these rights. UNDRIP explicitly recognises the collective right of Indigenous peoples to live in freedom, peace and security (Articles 7, 20). Even though over 160 states have not ratified the ILO 169 Convention, and UNDRIP is a legally non-binding resolution of the UN General Assembly, the core provisions of

Agne Cepinskyte is an International Security Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs/ Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP).

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these documents reflect customary international law, with which states are required to comply (ILA, 2010: 6, 43; ILA, 2012: 28).

In 2010, the International Law Association (ILA) concluded that ‘the international community has come to a consensus that Indigenous peoples are a concern of international law’, and customary rules on Indigenous rights constitute a part of the contemporary international legal order. The crystallisation of the fundamental norms concerning Indigenous peoples as customary international law signifies the development of state practice (both at the domestic and international, jurisdictional and legislative levels) and affirms the responsibility of states to ensure the protection of the fundamental rights and security of Indigenous communities (ILA, 2010: 43-52). Even those states that initially voted against the UNDRIP, namely Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, have subsequently changed their position and endorsed the declaration.1 Thus, the international community has come to accept Indigenous peoples as collective actors with distinct rights and status under international law.

Similarly, academic scholarship has recognised Indigenous peoples as both referent objects of security and, to an extent, security actors. Following the end of the Cold War, scholars have challenged the traditional state-centric military-focused view of security and redefined it as a concept, encompassing multiple dimensions and engaging various actors, including Indigenous peoples. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies has introduced the notion of societal security as one of the five sectors of security. Societal security concerns threats to the collective identity of ‘large, self-sustaining identity groups’, such as Indigenous peoples, and refers to sustainability of their ‘traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom’ (Buzan, 2007: 112, Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 119-121). Security of Indigenous peoples is also linked to human security – a concept, which derives from the 1994 UN Human Development Report and aims to protect the survival, livelihood and dignity of people.

Post-Cold War transformations in the Arctic provide an example by which to explain the increased international legal and scholarly attention to the security of Indigenous peoples. Even though some Arctic Indigenous peoples, such as the Nordic Sámi and the Canadian Inuit, began mobilising decades before the end of the Cold War, their engagement in Arctic security matters has increased since the 1990s, as the dominance of nuclear and military deterrence faded from the Arctic policy of the circumpolar states. In 1994, under the auspices of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), the Arctic states assigned three organisations representing the Arctic Indigenous peoples (the Inuit Circumpolar Council, ICC, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, RAIPON, and the Saami Council) the special status of Permanent Participants (PP).

As the AEPS evolved into the Arctic Council in 1996, the three organisations retained their PP status, which allowed them to participate and be consulted in the intergovernmental decisionmaking processes. Within the next few years, the Arctic Council granted three other Indigenous peoples’ organisations (the Aleut International Association, AIA, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, AAC, and the Gwich’in International Council, GIC) the PP status. The three organisations joined ICC, RAIPON and the Saami Council at the Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples Secretariat.

Furthermore, three groups of Indigenous peoples in the Barents region – Sámi, Nenets and Veps – take part in the Barents Regional Council, which was set up in 1993.

These regional political institutions have integrated Indigenous peoples within the framework of the Arctic transnational political structure, allowing them to contribute to countering security Exposing the oxymoron of state-determined self-determination

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threats posed to their collective identity by socio-cultural, environmental and other transformations in the region (Hossain, 2016: 420). However, even though the Arctic Indigenous peoples engage in political consultations within such bodies as the Arctic Council and the Barents Regional Council, they do not have international legal standing to defend their collective rights and identity on their own. Consequently, the security of Indigenous peoples largely depends on the national policy of states under whose jurisdiction they live.

In most Arctic states, Indigenous peoples have made significant progress toward achieving a greater recognition of their rights through engagement in domestic political processes. The Sámi people in Finland, Norway and Sweden represent themselves in the Sámi parliaments, which provide an avenue for Indigenous participation in political decision-making (Josefsen, 2010). In Canada, the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), a national representational organisation, advocates the rights and promotes unified interests of the Inuit people. Even though challenges for the Nordic Sámi and the Inuit in preserving their identity and traditional ways of life still persist, overall, Canada, Finland, Norway and Sweden have made positive steps forward in accommodating Indigenous rights (Anaya, 2011; Anaya, 2014; Carstens, 2016; Wilson & Selle, 2019).

By contrast, Russia’s domestic policy concerning Indigenous rights has been regressive. It has deviated from the course of international law and scholarship that, as observed above, demonstrates an attempt to overcome the state-centric view of security by strengthening the agency of Indigenous peoples. The Russian government, particularly amid the increased suppression of civil society since 2011, has been restricting the exercise of Indigenous rights. While Russia’s policymakers have embellished political discourse with references to the protection of Indigenous peoples as one of the primary objectives of the state’s Arctic policy, domestic and international non-governmental organisations as well as supervisory bodies of human rights treaties have repeatedly drawn attention to the Russian government’s violations of Indigenous rights.

Instead of treating this discordance as merely a case of dishonest political rhetoric, the present article aims to explain it by exposing the state’s relation to society, which underlies and rationalises Russia’s policy towards Indigenous peoples in the Arctic. Relying on Barry Buzan’s arguments concerning the socio-political origins of a state’s national security policy, it proposes that the government’s policy towards the Arctic Indigenous peoples and their security is constructed on the backbone of the idea of the state, which underscores the conceptual link between the Russian state and the nation (i.e. between the governing institutions and society). This article thereby questions the possibility of a universal definition of Indigenous security in the Arctic. It suggests that the understanding of it and consequently its protection ultimately depend on the socio-political strands of the state in question.

The article begins by revealing the socio-political underpinnings of Russia’s policy towards Indigenous peoples and their security. It then discusses the policy concerning the protection of Indigenous peoples in the context of Russia’s ‘foreign agent’ legislation and gas infrastructure development in the Yamal peninsula. The article concludes by exposing the paradoxical phenomenon of state-determined self-determination, which stems from the socio-political relation between the Russian government and society and underlies the policy towards Indigenous peoples, and considers the implications for Indigenous security.

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The socio-political underpinnings of Indigenous security policy There is no universally accepted definition of Indigenous security. However, it concerns security of communities and as such is closely related to the concept of human security. The concept complements the traditional state-centric view of security by centring on individuals as well as communities and by acknowledging interdependencies between human rights and national security.

The empowerment of individuals and communities to withstand and counter non-military threats is a crucial part of the human security framework (CHS, 2003, UNGA 64/701). In the case of Indigenous peoples, international law guarantees such empowerment through the right to selfdetermination, which entitles them to ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ (ICCPR; ICESCR, Article 1.1; UNDRIP, Article 3).

The right to self-determination inherently belongs to Indigenous peoples. While the right is not granted by the state, the exercise of it cannot jeopardise the territorial integrity or political unity of states, i.e. it cannot violate state sovereignty (UNDRIP, Article 46(1)). However, the human security approach suggests that human rights and state sovereignty complement rather than compete with one another. The empowerment of individuals and communities in protecting their rights and ensuring security does not undermine state sovereignty but enhances it, because human and national security are inseparable (UNGA 64/701: 6). Such an argument is based on the assumption that sovereignty derives from the nation and thus the protection of state sovereignty, which is at the core of national security policy, fails if people are insecure. Nonetheless, in some states, such as those with non-democratic regimes, sovereignty rests with the government rather than people. Consequently, national security policy of these states is likely to be based on the statecentric instead of the human rights approach.

This article argues that a state’s Indigenous security policy has socio-political underpinnings. It derives from the conceptual relation between the government and society. This argument relies on Barry Buzan’s reasoning that national security fundamentally concerns the relation between nation and state, which is captured in the ‘idea of the state’ (Buzan, 2007: 70-83). The article distinguishes between two ideas of the state: a nation-state where the nation legitimises the state and a statenation where the government dominates the nation. It proposes that that national policy concerning groups of people, such as Indigenous communities, reflects the relationship between the government and society: the more the government dominates society, the more its security policy is shaped by state interests and vice versa. Accordingly, state-nations are unlikely to adopt the human rights-based approach to security, especially if that conflicts with the perceived interests of the state.

Mostafa Rejai and Cynthia Enloe, who introduced the state-nation concept in 1969, differentiated between states where chronologically the nation preceded the formation of political institutions (nation-states) and those where the state played an active role in mobilising and creating the nation (state-nations). In the former case, the national identity usually developed upward and towards certain common goals, whilst in the latter case, it was often officially sponsored, generated at the top and then filtered downward. In state-nations, political authorities usually suppress bottom-up identities, because the government perceives them as potentially undermining rather than consolidating the state’s authority (Rejai & Enloe, 1969: 144, 152-153).

Thus, in state-nations, the government’s relation to society is constructed from above and the source of sovereignty is the government rather than the nation. According to Barry Buzan, stateExposing the oxymoron of state-determined self-determination

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nations often incorporate a multitude of nationalities as well as Indigenous communities. However, even in such cases, state-nations tend to absorb or subordinate Indigenous peoples by either obliterating their identities or adding a new layer of collective identity (Buzan, 2007: 76-77). In this sense, Buzan agrees with Rejai and Enloe’s argument that state-nations seek to prevent the empowerment of bottom-up identities, particularly if they could potentially compromise the government’s authority.

Putin’s Russia fits the definition of a state-nation: it is a strong authoritative political structure, where the government is envisioned as the sole protector of its people’s rights and liberties. In post-Soviet Russia, the communist ideology, the one common denominator that society had known for decades, was abruptly discarded. There was no uniform and uniting idea of the Russian state in the 1990s. Russia’s imperial tradition of a strong monarch, reinforced by the immediate necessity to uphold a strong indivisible state authority to prevent the fragmentation of the nation and of the government itself, determined that post-communist Russia would ultimately derive its legitimacy from the sovereign. Boris Yeltsin’s policies were leading up to this idea of the state in an intermittent manner, but it has been consolidated during Putin’s rule.

The Putin government’s idea of the state has been developed around the narrative of a strong central government and a subordinate civil society, which would be protected by the authoritative state – an idea consistent with that of a state-nation. Such an idea of the state is meant to strengthen people’s attachment to the state and the government rather than encourage the growth of a selfdependent nation. Just before Yeltsin stepped down, Putin published the so-called ‘Millennium Manifesto’. A great part of this document was devoted to explaining what state Putin aspired to create and how the nation should be unified. He continued Yeltsin’s approach by making it clear that Russia needed a ‘strong state power’. Putin indicated state centredness (gosudarstvennichestvo) as one of the traditional Russian values and advocated the creation of a great power state with centralised authority and a submissive society. In his first annual address to the Federal Assembly, the new president declared: But our position is very clear: only a strong, or effective if someone dislikes the word ‘strong’, an effective state and a democratic state is capable of protecting civil, political and economic freedoms, capable of creating conditions for people to lead happy lives and for our country to flourish … (Putin, 2000).

Over the last two decades, the Russian government has strengthened its authoritative power and curtailed the freedom of civil society. Already in 2005, Freedom House re-categorised Russia from ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’, noting ‘an increase in state power over civil society’, and this has remained to be the case to date. The idea of a strong centralised state that is the sole guarantor and protector of the rights and security of its people underlies Russia’s policy towards Indigenous peoples. Such an idea conflicts with the right to self-determination, which seeks to strengthen the agency of Indigenous peoples by empowering them to freely determine their political status and pursue economic, social and cultural development. The next section demonstrates how this conflict manifests itself in two case studies: the enforcement of Russia’s ‘foreign agent’ legislation against Indigenous peoples and the implications of gas infrastructure development in the Yamal peninsula for the security of the Nenets Indigenous community.

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Foreign agents, gas and protection of Indigenous peoples Indigenous peoples of the North in post-Soviet Russia Indigenous peoples of (Soviet) Russia began mobilising in the late 1980s. In 1990, they held their first congress and established the Association of Small Peoples of the Soviet North (the predecessor of RAIPON).2 Around the same time, a number of regional Indigenous organisations, most of them based on the principle of territorial representation, emerged and eventually started functioning as RAIPON’s regional branches. Following the appointment of Sergey Kharyuchi, an experienced politician from Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (district), in 1997, RAIPON started acting as an active advocate for Indigenous rights both domestically and internationally (IWGIA, 2014: 23-25).

Between 1999 and 2001, largely due to the successful advocacy of RAIPON, Russian legislators passed three laws (‘On Guarantees of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, ‘On Territories of Traditional Nature Use’ and ‘On General Principles of the Organisation of Obshchinas [village communes]’), which aimed to create a legal framework, consistent with international legal standards, for protecting the rights of Indigenous peoples. Despite subsequent challenges in their implementation, the mere adoption of these laws was a milestone achievement for Russia’s Indigenous peoples. The three documents specified the state’s commitment, enshrined in the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation, to ‘guarantee the rights of Indigenous small peoples in accordance with the universally-recognised principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation’ (Article 69).

However, from the early 2000s, the government started to limit the political space for Indigenous activism by constraining foreign support for civil society organisations. It also weakened legislative restrictions protecting Indigenous rights to land, forests and waters (IWGIA, 2014: 26).

Fundamentally, this policy was a result of Vladimir Putin’s government’s determination to centralise political power and prevent a potential disintegration of the state (Gosart, 2017: 203204). During his first two presidential terms, Putin strengthened the central government’s authority and, in his own words, built ‘an effective state system’ (Putin, 2005). Maria Lipman (2006: 7) has described Putin’s ‘effective state system’ as ‘the growing centralization of government and the weakening of all centers, branches and institutions of power except for the president and his administration’.

Despite the deteriorating protection of indigenous rights, the government’s document on the ‘Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period until 2020 and beyond’, adopted in 2008, stated that the ‘improvement of quality of life of the Indigenous population and social conditions of economic activities in the Arctic’ was one of the state’s strategic priorities (Provision III.7.h). A year later, the government elaborated a plan for the achievement of this goal in the ‘Concept of Sustainable Development of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation’. The concept affirmed a number of tasks and measures aimed at strengthening the ‘socio-economic potential while preserving the original habitat, traditional lifestyle and cultural values’ of Indigenous peoples in the North (Section I).

Two months after the Concept’s adoption, RAIPON published a resolution in which it outlined numerous unresolved problems in the government’s policy towards Indigenous peoples. They

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included the ineffective management of sustainable development, the failure to involve Indigenous peoples in decision-making processes, the absence of legislation necessary to guarantee Indigenous rights and the lack of opportunities to use land and natural resources for the preservation and maintenance of traditional lifestyle and industries (Yarovoy, Sergunin & Heininen, 2014: 84).

The government reiterated its responsibilities towards Indigenous peoples in the 2013 Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone. President Putin has also continuously declared the state’s ‘special responsibility’ to improve the quality of life for Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, and to protect their interests, environment, culture and tradition (Putin, 2014a; Putin, 2014b; Putin 2017a; Putin, 2017b). However, international human rights bodies have repeatedly expressed concerns over Russia’s regressive legislation and ineffective policy concerning the protection of the rights and security of indigenous populations (CERD, 2013b: 5-6; CERD, 2017b: 2-3, 6-8; IWGIA, 2014; IWGIA & INFOE, 2015: 14-15, 19-22; IWGIA et al, 2017: 3). The remainder of this section discusses the discrepancy between the Russian government’s proclaimed policy on the protection of Indigenous peoples in the North and its practical implementation (or the lack thereof) in the context of Russia’s legislative and infrastructural developments.

Indigenous peoples as ‘foreign agents’ In 2012, following protests by NGOs against an alleged voter fraud in the presidential election, the Russian State Duma adopted a federal law ‘On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the Regulation of the Activities of Non-Commercial Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent’, commonly referred to as the ‘foreign agent’ law.

The law requires that all civil society organisations, which a) receive funding from abroad and b) are engaged in political activity in Russia, register as ‘foreign agents’ (Article 1.1). Both of these points are interpreted extremely broadly: no difference is made between financial support from foreign state budgets, international organisations, scientific foundations or private persons, while political activity can be anything aimed at influencing state policies or public opinion (Vedomosti, 2012: 3). The controversial term ‘foreign agent’ (inostranniy agent), which in the Soviet Union was associated with a ‘foreign spy’ and a ‘traitor’, has a connotation of stigma or ostracism (CommDH, 2013: 16). It implies allegiance to foreign government(s) and thereby refutes the independence of civil society organisations.

Following the law’s adoption, RAIPON warned that the Russian government would likely consider the protection and promotion of Indigenous rights as ‘political activity’. Thus, such organisations would have to either lose their international funding or register as ‘foreign agents’. Being labelled a ‘foreign agent’ would stigmatise them and compromise their relationship with regional authorities and other partners. In RAIPON’s view, the ‘foreign agent’ law violates the freedom of association and the internationally-recognised Indigenous right to have access to financial and technical assistance from states and through international cooperation (ICCPR, Article 22; UNDRIP, Article 39; RAIPON et al 2013: 15-16; IWGIA & INFOE, 2015: 14-15).

Less than a half year after the adoption of the ‘foreign agent’ law, Russia’s Justice Ministry suspended RAIPON’s activities, citing inconsistency between the organisation’s statutes and federal laws (Digges, 2012). Following the required revision of RAIPON’s statutes and the mounting international pressure against such government’s actions, Russian authorities allowed the organisation to reopen in 2013. Nonetheless, shortly afterwards, the government exerted pressure on Indigenous representatives at the RAIPON Congress to elect the government’s favoured Cepinskyte

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candidate, Gregory Ledkov, a member of Putin’s United Russia Party and the State Duma, as a new president of RAIPON. Pavel Sulyandziga, an ardent activist of Indigenous rights in Russia and a long-time vice president of RAIPON, who won the first two rounds of the election with clear majorities, was forced to step down (IWGIA, 2013). In 2016, the Ministry of Justice declared the Indigenous organisation that Sulyandziga chaired, the Batani foundation, as a ‘foreign agent’ and liquidated it a year later (Berezhkov & Sulyandziga, 2019).

The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has repeatedly expressed concerns over the ‘foreign agent’ law and urged the Russian government to review it in order to ensure that the work of Indigenous peoples and ethnic minority NGOs is not unduly interfered with or subjected to onerous obligations (CERD, 2013b: 5-6; CERD, 2017b: 2-3). Yet despite CERD’s recommendations, defenders of Indigenous rights in Russia have continued to face harassment. Their political activity has been severely limited by such means as increased surveillance, seizure of passports, threats of imprisonment and the preclusion of Indigenous activists from participating in international forums (IWGIA et al, 2017: 3, 6-8; Berezhkov & Sulyandziga, 2019). Multiple Indigenous organisations have been declared as ‘foreign agents’. They have received fines or have been forced to cease their activities (Pettersen, 2015; Pettersen, 2016a; Pettersen 2016b; YLE, 2015).

In 2015, the legislators adopted a follow-up law, ‘On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation’, also referred to as the ‘undesirable organisations’ law. It granted prosecutors the right to extra-judicially categorise a foreign or international NGO as ‘undesirable’ and close it down. Freedom House has stated that ‘[t]his designation, in combination with Russia’s “foreign agents” legislation, continues a pattern in which the Russian state is attacking the very institutions it needs in order to be a modern, democratic society. Using the “undesirable” label … reveals the Russian government’s disregard for the broader interests of its people’ (Freedom House, 2019). Meanwhile, Russian authorities have explained the restrictions imposed on civil society organisations, including the organisations of indigenous peoples, by the ‘foreign agent’ and ‘undesirable organisations’ laws as a necessary measure to increase transparency of non-profit organisations in order to prevent foreign states from interfering with Russia’s domestic affairs by using financial resources (CERD, 2013a: 5; CERD, 2017a: 9, Putin, 2014c; Putin, 2015; Russian Federation, 2016: 31-32).

The Nenets and gas in the Yamal peninsula The first indigenous peoples’ organisation that was declared a ‘foreign agent’ in the Barents region was Yasavey Manzara, an NGO representing the Nenets indigenous people (Pettersen, 2015). The Nenets comprise around 70 per cent of the population in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

The district contains some 20 per cent of the world’s known natural gas. It is Russia’s main gas reserve, accounting for approximatelly 80 per cent of the state’s total natural gas production. At least half of around 10,000 Nenets practice nomadic reindeer herding, which makes them the largest fully nomadic reindeer herding community in the world. Reindeer herding is also a cornerstone of the Nenets culture. Climate change and rapid industrial development of the region have already disrupted indigenous migration routes, reduced the grazing land and interfered with traditional Nenets economies, culture and way of life.

The multi-billion Yamal liquefied natural gas project (Yamal LNG), which was launched at the end of 2017 and is operated by Russia’s second-largest gas producer, Novatek, in cooperation with Exposing the oxymoron of state-determined self-determination

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French and Chinese companies, is particularly concerning in this respect. According to international NGOs, the locals in the Yamal region have reported that development and shipping activity associated with the Yamal LNG project have severely reduced fish stocks in the rivers and lakes and destroyed the swathes of dry elevated land, which the Nenets had previously used for pasture and migration. As fishing and reindeer herding are vital sources of food and income for the Nenets, such damage has gravely affected their way of life by, for instance, forcing them to abandon their nomadic lifestyle – a change which has had a considerable negative impact on their lives (IWGIA et al, 2016: 11; IWGIA et al, 2017: 12; Cultural Survival, 2017: 5; IFIP, 2018: 7).

Furthermore, despite Yamal LNG’s claims that it has obtained the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of the indigenous people, a number of international NGOs have referred to their local sources and raised concerns that the Nenets have not been adequately consulted on the project, nor have they granted their FPIC (IWGIA et al, 2016: 3-4, 11-12; IWGIA et al, 2017: 3-4, 12-13; IFIP, 2018: 7). It is virtually impossible to verify whether good-faith consultations have indeed taken place and whether the consent to the project has been informed and obtained free from any external pressure, as Yamal LNG has not provided the minutes of the meetings or any other evidence to support its statements. It is also noteworthy that the Russian government has categorised the region as a border zone. Consequently, civic oversight is not permitted in the Yamal peninsula: non-residents cannot access the region without a permission of governmental security services (IWGIA et al, 2016: 11; IWGIA et al, 2017: 12; Cultural Survival, 2017: 5).

International concerns about potential violations of indigenous rights in the Yamal peninsula are at odds with persistent assurances regarding the protection of indigenous peoples provided in Russia’s political discourse. President Putin has underlined on multiple occasions that the wellbeing and stable development of indigenous peoples in the North are among Russia’s fundamental socio-economic tasks in the region, and the protection of the interests and traditional indigenous lifestyles is a key priority. Putin has noted Russia’s ‘special responsibility’ in the Arctic territory to create a modern infrastructure, develop natural resources and strengthen the industrial potential, but to do so in a sustainable way while aiming to improve the quality of life of indigenous peoples.

The president did, however, imply that the state’s interests would take precedence over indigenous concerns when he referred to the latter as ‘an additional burden’ and declared that major national projects would proceed even if they contradicted indigenous interests, although in such cases compensation and substitution measures would be provided (Putin, 2013; Putin, 2014a; Putin, 2014b; Putin, 2017a; Putin, 2017b; Putin, 2017c; Putin, 2019).

Thus, much as in the case of the ‘foreign agent’ legislation, the Russian government has presented infrastructural developments in the North as serving rather than undermining the rights of indigenous peoples. The following section aims to explain the Russian government’s approach to the protection of indigenous rights in further detail and considers the implications of it for indigenous security.

State-determined self-determination and Indigenous security The two cases discussed in the previous section highlight the incongruity between the Russian government’s reassurances about the protection of Indigenous peoples, on the one hand, and the concerns of Indigenous peoples and human rights organisations about the violations of Indigenous rights, on the other. While in the view of Indigenous activists and organisations Russia’s ‘foreign agent’ law has unduly restricted their freedom, policy-makers have justified the law as ensuring Cepinskyte

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transparency and protecting civil society organisations from being taken advantage of by foreign actors (CERD, 2013a: 5; Putin, 2014c; Putin, 2015; Russian Federation, 2016: 31-32; CERD, 2017a: 9). Similarly, gas infrastructure development in the Yamal peninsula has reportedly disrupted the traditional way of life and culture of the Nenets, but the government has claimed that it has raised the quality of life and improved the economic progress of the Indigenous people (Putin, 2017a).

Fundamentally, the discordance between the Russian government and human rights organisations as concerns the perception of Indigenous security stems from the disagreement about the source of Indigenous rights, primarily the right to self-determination. Human rights organisations consider indigenous self-determination as an inalienable right, which inherently belongs to Indigenous peoples: it is ‘the right to have rights, in particular collective rights, as opposed to being granted rights by an all-powerful state’ (IWGIA, 2014: 16). By contrast, the Russian government perceives the protection of people, including Indigenous peoples, as its exclusive domain: the rights are determined and safeguarded by the state. As the ‘foreign agent’ and the Yamal LNG cases demonstrate, the Russian government has continued to single-handedly define what the protection of Indigenous security entails, showing little if any regard to the concerns of Indigenous peoples and human rights organisations.

As argued in the first section of this article, this policy is rooted in the understanding of the state as the sole guarantor of its people’s rights and security, which is characteristic of states whose governments dominate society (state-nations). It is consistent with Russia’s ‘idea of the state’ as an authoritative political structure responsible for the protection of its subordinate society’s security and well-being. Such a top-down approach leads to the oxymoron of state-determined selfdetermination of Indigenous peoples – a denial of this right as inherent in peoples. As the two notions contradict one another, the Russian government does not recognise the Indigenous right to self-determination altogether: the word does not appear in Russian political discourse and legislation. State authorities associate the concept of self-determination with separatism and extremism and consider it as a potential threat to state sovereignty (IWGIA, 2014: 16; Vladimirova, 2015). By rejecting the Indigenous right to self-determination the government suppresses the bottom-up developments in society, thereby depriving Indigenous peoples of the ability to freely determine their political, social and economic affairs and compelling them to entirely depend on the state (IWGIA, 2014: 16; Gosart, 2017: 200).

Russia’s paternalistic approach to the protection of Indigenous rights compromises the human security of Indigenous peoples. According to the Commission on Human Security (CHS), threats to human security cannot be countered solely through the conventional top-down state protective mechanism. Instead, the human security framework rests on two pillars: state protection and empowerment of people. Protection strategies (norms, institutions and processes) are established by states as well as international and non-governmental organisations and private sector actors to shield individuals and communities from threats. Protection implies a top-down approach.

Meanwhile, empowerment strategies are a bottom-up process: they seek ‘to develop the capabilities of individuals and communities to make informed choices and to act on their own behalf’ in order to build resilience to conditions that challenge their security. The CHS has concluded that protection and empowerment are mutually reinforcing and both ‘are required in nearly all situations of human insecurity’ (CHS, 2003).

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The right to self-determination of Indigenous peoples is precisely aimed at empowering Indigenous communities by entitling them to freely maintain and protect their identities, culture and way of life. The state’s protective mechanism is supposed to facilitate and complement this bottom-up process rather than constrain it. However, the Russian government restricts bottom-up processes in order to preserve the indivisible state authority. For that reason, it denies the right to selfdetermination for Indigenous peoples and by virtue of that obliterates the empowerment part of the human security framework. Thus, despite the reassurances in political discourse about the protection of Indigenous interests and security, the socio-political relationship between the state and society, in which the former dominates the latter, precludes the Russian government from ensuring the protection of the (human) security of Indigenous peoples.

Conclusion Failing a universally accepted definition of Indigenous security, the human security framework, which comprises both the top-down protection of human rights and the bottom-up empowerment of individuals and communities, is useful for understanding it. The right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination legitimises the empowerment of Indigenous communities. Therefore, the recognition of this right is essential for ensuring the protection of Indigenous security. However, the empowerment of people contradicts the idea of a state-nation, in which the government aims to preserve its indivisible authority and dominates society.

Such an idea of the state, which underscores the government’s paternalistic relationship to society, underlies and rationalises the Russian government’s policy concerning the security of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic. The government has reserved itself an exclusive responsibility for the protection of Indigenous peoples and has thus denied the Indigenous right to self-determination.

It has thereby restricted the agency of Indigenous peoples and, by doing so, has failed to ensure human security, because it cannot be protected solely through the state’s top-down protective mechanism. In addition to drawing attention to the case of Russia, such findings could contribute to further research concerning the critical assessment of the protection of Indigenous security in states whose regimes dominate society.

Notes 1. Russia, along with ten other states, abstained during the vote on the UNDRIP. 2. In Russia’s legislation and political discourse, Indigenous peoples are referred to as ‘Indigenous small-numbered (malochislennye) peoples’. The government does not recognise Indigenous communities with a population exceeding 50,000 as Indigenous peoples. By contrast, the UN working definition of Indigenous peoples does not contain any numerical threshold (Martinéz Cobo, 1986: para. 379).

References Anaya, J. (2011). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People. The Situation of the Sami people in the Cepinskyte

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International Law Association (ILA) (2012). Sofia Conference: Rights of Indigenous Peoples. https://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId=1243&StorageFileG uid=401ee841-8ad2-4e35-8aaf-beebd9b3aa4e IWGIA (2013). Staged RAIPON Election Taints 7th Congress. https://www.iwgia.org/en/russia/1832-staged-raipon-election-taints-7th-congress IWGIA (2014). Report: Indigenous Peoples in the Russian Federation. https://www.iwgia.org/images/publications//0695_HumanRights_report_18_Russia. pdf IWGIA and INFOE (2015). Parallel information: Civil and political rights of indigenous minority peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation.

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Martinéz Cobo, J. R. (1986). Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Final report: Study of the problem of discrimination against Indigenous populations. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4. https://undocs.org/en/E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 Pettersen, T. (2015). First Indigenous Foreign Agents in Barents. The Barents Observer. https://barentsobserver.com/en/society/2015/09/first-indigenous-foreign-agentsbarents-24-09 Pettersen, T. (2016a). Indigenous Peoples’ Organization Declared as Foreign Agents.

The Barents Observer. https://thebarentsobserver.com/cn/node/376 Pettersen, T. (2016b). One More Indigenous Organization Declared Foreign Agent. The Barents Observer. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/society/2016/03/one-more-indigenousorganization-declared-foreign-agent

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Russian Federation (2000). Federal’nii zakon ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii obshchin korennykh malochislennykh narodov severa, Sibiri i dal’nego vostoka Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Federal Law on General Principles of the Organisation of Obshchinas of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the Russian Federation (‘On General Principles of the Organisation of Obshchinas’)] http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&firstDoc=1&lastDoc=1&nd=102066839 Russian Federation (2001). Federal’nii zakon o territoriakh traditsionnogo prirodopol’zovanoya korennikh malochislennikh narodov severa, Sibiri, i dal’nego vostoka Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Federal Law on Territories of Traditional Use of Natural Habitat of SmallNumbered Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and Far East of the Russian Federation (‘On Territories of Traditional Nature Use’)]. http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docview&page=1&print=1&infostr=xO7q8+zl7fIg7vL u4fDg5uDl8vH/IO3lIOIg7+7x6+Xk7eXpIPDl5ODq9ujo&nd=102070941&rdk=4&& empire Russian Federation (2008). Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period until 2020 and beyond. http://www.arctissearch.com/Russian+Federation+Policy+for+the+Arctic+to+2020 Russian Federation (2009). Kontseptsiya ustoychivogo razvitiya korennykh malochislennykh narodov severa, Sibiri i dal’nego vostoka Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Concept of Sustainable Development of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation]. http://gov.garant.ru/document?id=94908&byPara=1&sub=6 Russian Federation (2012). Federal’nii yakon o vnesenii izmeneniy v otdel’nyye zakonodatel’nyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii v chasti regulirovaniya deyatel'nosti nekommercheskikh organizatsiy, vypolnyayushchikh funktsii inostrannogo agenta [Federal Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the Regulation of the Activities of Non-Commercial Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent]. No. 121-FZ. http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_132900/ Russian Federation (2013) Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone. http://www.research.kobeu.ac.jp/gsicspcrc/sympo/20160728/documents/Keynote/Russian%20Arctic%20strategy%202013. pdf Russian Federation (2015). Federal’nii zakon o vnesenii izmeneniy v otdel’nyye zakonodatel’nyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii [On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation]. No. 129-FZ. http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_179979/ Russian Federation (2016). Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 9 of the Convention. Twenty-third to twenty-fourth periodic reports of States parties due in 2016. Submitted by the Russian Federation to CERD. https://www.refworld.org/publisher,CERD,,RUS,5978856a4,0.html

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The desecuritization of Greenland’s security? How the Greenlandic self-government envision postindependence national defense and security policy Rasmus Kjærgaard Rasmussen

President Trump’s “offer” to purchase Greenland has placed the country at the heart of world affairs and great power rivalry in the Arctic. Greenland is currently enjoying considerable interest from both the U.S. and China while Russia is increasing its military capabilities in the region. Traditionally, Greenlandic politicians have not been interested in defense and military spending without civilian purpose. And as security policy is constitutionally outside the self-government’s authority the issue has not been high on the agenda. However, as Greenland is actively seeking independence from Denmark, the future of Greenlandic defense has become crucial to understanding its independence aspirations. This article examines how the Greenlandic selfgovernment and the political parties envision the future of Greenland’s security framework through close readings of government coalition agreements, political statements and media texts. Based on The Copenhagen School of Securitization Studies, the main argument is that Greenlandic defense and foreign policy is characterized by desecuritization. That is, a tendency towards downplaying the security and defense aspects of independence while instead highlighting i.e. economic aspects. The article analyzes this logic in Greenland’s recent foreign policy aspirations and in debates on defense. Analytically, desecuritization is linked to two underlying narratives which Greenlandic politicians use to rhetorically downplay security aspects of defense and foreign policy by referring to either economic self-sufficiency or identity politics of the Inuit.

Introduction: Greenland in the era of increased geopolitical competition When the U.S. president in mid-August 2019 dramatically offered to “purchase” Greenland, as reported by the Wall Street Journal (Salama et al, 2019) and confirmed by the President himself on various occasions thereafter, it was the culmination of a renewed and intense U.S. strategic interest in the Arctic country. Greenland has in recent years become an arena for increased geopolitical and economic competition with China and the U.S. as the most active players. China has been investing strategically in mineral extraction and satellite systems in Greenland (see Brady, 2017) while the U.S. has reopened its diplomatic representation in Nuuk and signed an MOU on mineral exploration (Naalakkersuisut, 2019).

This development underscores that the entire Arctic region is currently experiencing a rapid transformation in its security framework from a path of diplomatic cooperation to intensified Rasmus Kjærgaard Rasmussen is Associate Professor at the Department of Communication and Arts, Roskilde University, Denmark.

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economic and military competition between the three global great powers. In this race, Russia is building up military and SAR capabilities in the region (Devyatkin, 2018) while China is furthering its polar ambitions by defining itself as a “near-Arctic state” (Chinese Government, 2018). In response, the U.S. has considerably sharpened the rhetoric towards China and Russia, culminating with U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo’s critique directed at both countries at the Arctic Council’s latest meeting in Finland, May 2019: “We want cooperation to continue. But we can’t have one side cooperate, and the other side derogate its duties” (US Department of State, 2019).

Moreover, the U.S. Department of Defense in its new Arctic Strategy states that the entire region is in an “era of strategic competition” (DoD, 2019), a shift from previous statements on the Arctic.

There is a growing concern amongst observers and policy-makers of an actual militarization (DoD, 2019: 4) and risk of a “new cold war” in the Arctic (Jacobsen & Herrmann, 2017; see also Cohen, Szaszdi & Dolbow, 2008).

Still one particular development with implications for the balance of the entire Arctic security system stands out: the case of possible Greenlandic independence. Currently, Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark and as such allied with the U.S. and a member of NATO. As Greenland actively pushes to become a sovereign (micro) nation-state, however, this raises the question of what will happen to the defense obligations of this vast territory in the case of full economic and political independence from Denmark? A question that has been intensely debated after president Donald Trump’s offer to “purchase” Greenland (see e.g. Hansen, 2019; Veirum, 2019). Regardless of the recent spat between Denmark-Greenland and the U.S., most observers and scholars assume that Greenland will stay allied with the U.S. in some form (see Breitenbauch, 2019; Gad, 2019), affirming past consensus on the subject (see Turnowsky, 2018a; Breum 2018).

However, the diplomatic row also served to make it clear that parts of the political independence movement are mainly focused on the economic preconditions for independence. Thus, former Greenlandic premier, Aleqa Hammond (Nunatta Qitornai), stated shortly after Trumps proposal that the U.S. should instead “begin by paying for the presence at Pituffik-airbase” (Hansen, 2019).

And Greenlandic MP, Pele Broberg, (Partii Naleraq) said that the U.S. offer should be taken seriously as a way of crowding out the current Danish block-grant (Veirum, 2019). Greenlandic politicians appear to have a habit of taking security out of defense and security policy, focusing instead on economic considerations.

Analyzing the absence of security and threats in Greenlandic politics In this article I examine how the Greenlandic self-government and the political parties envision the future of Greenland’s security framework through close readings of government coalition agreements as well as media texts with official statements made by Greenland politicians on future defense policy. My main argument is that Greenlandic defense and foreign policy is characterized by desecuritization. That is, a propensity towards downplaying the security and defense aspects of Greenlandic independence and instead highlighting economic aspects.

This tendency to downplay security as a mode of governance is underscored by the fact that defense and security issues traditionally have not played a central part of Greenlandic politics. Jacobsen and Gad notes that “[w]hen Greenlandic politicians make (rare) demands for military investments in Greenland, arguments mostly relate to services provided for civil purposes (fisheries control, search and rescue, oil spill response, etc.)” (Jacobsen & Gad, 2017: 17). Additionally, the authors observe a lack of adversarial thinking in Greenlandic foreign policy marked by i.e. “the near-total absence Rasmussen

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of Russia in Greenlandic foreign policy narratives” (ibid). Both the focus on the civilian aspects of defense policy and the absence of adversarial thinking emphasizes this drift towards desecuritization.

The article begins by briefly introducing the theoretical concept of desecuritization and the framework of the Copenhagen School of Securitization Theory. This is followed by an analytical section in two parts. In the first part, I unpack the self-government’s complex constitutional-legal relationship with Denmark. Here, I introduce the idea of understanding this as a ‘sovereignty game’ (Gad, 2016) with Denmark, in which Greenland attempts to desecuritize policy areas in order to gain more control over areas that help secure the path towards independence. I substantiate my argument by analyzing how desecuritization has been applied by the self-government to tone down the security implications of Greenlandic independence ambitions in its foreign policy efforts and in the recent controversy over Chinese investments. In the second analytical part, I investigate the narratives underlying the desecuritization moves made by the Greenlandic politicians. This is done by analyzing the 2017 public and parliamentary debate on the future of defense and the ensuring coalition agreement from 2018. Here I identify two main narratives which underpins the rhetoric of desecuritization: the “identity politics narrative of the Inuit” (Jacobsen & Gad, 2017) and “the self-sustaining economy”-narrative where independence is framed as economic and fiscal independence from Denmark (see Naalakkersuisut, 2012 and Self-Government Commission 2001). In a concluding section I discuss the strategy of desecuritization and its implications for independence and a potential partnership with the U.S. Analytical framework: securitization and desecuritization as political and rhetorical strategies In a frequently quoted definition, the process of securitization is described as “when a securitizing actor uses the rhetoric of an existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is ‘normal politics,’ we have a case of securitization” (Buzan et al, 1998: 24-25). Equally, the process of desecuritization is defined as the opposite of this dynamic: “a limitation to the use of the security speech act” (Wæver, 1995: 9) whereby an issue is brought back to the realm of normal politics. The purpose of desecuritizing moves is thus “to take security out of security, to move it back to normal politics” (Roe, 2004: 285). The key to understanding the theory of securitization and desecuritization is thus to view it as a model of politics that explains how threat issues are both created and dismantled in discourse. Nevertheless, most analytical and empirical attention has been given to securitization, while the centrality of desecuritization has been debated (Roe, 2004; Aradau, 2004. See Wæver, 2011 for a discussion).

Desecuritization has traditionally been found in cases where the securitization of a referent object has already been established. According to Buzan and Wæver (2003) desecuritization can follow two strategies where the political community either “downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to the valued referent object” (489). The history of nuclear weapons is a good example of the first desecuritization strategy where a threat issue is being downgraded. During the cold war, nuclear arms and their inherent ‘mutual assured destruction’ was deemed an existential threat by both U.S. and soviet leaders. Accordingly, nuclear armament was the epitome of national security in both superpowers. After the end of the cold war, however, nuclear weapons ceased to be considered an existential threat by these political communities and was downgraded to the level of other societal risks and handled within the realm of ‘normal politics’.

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The latter strategy, where a political community stops treating an issue as an existential threat to the valued referent object, can be found in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration with its absence of references to Arctic militarization. The Declaration was signed by the five Arctic coastal states and emphasizes the Arctic as a low-tension region where disputes are resolved peacefully building on “mutual trust and transparency” rather than “a new comprehensive international legal regime” (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). The clear aim of the declaration is to avoid militarization and conflict in the Arctic even though militarization and great power rivalry is never mentioned by the text itself.

In terms of methodology, securitization theory is focused empirically on securitizing actors (leaders, governments, bureaucracies) and the rhetoric by which these make securitizing or desecuritizing moves.

The theory hence suggests that we use discourse analysis “since we are interested in when and how something is established by whom as a threat. The defining criterion of security is textual: a specific rhetorical structure that has to be located in discourse” (Buzan et al, 1998: 76). This of course is also valid for the rhetorical structure of desecuritizing moves. Securitization theory further urges us to read “central texts” in which major instances of securitization take places (ibid) – this can be official statements by securitizing actors or central political debates.

I find these recommendations compatible with the present article’s analytical preference for narratives and rhetoric found in empirical texts such as speeches by heads of state, media texts, policy documents and interviews with key political actors (see Rasmussen & Merkelsen, 2017 for details on narratological security analysis. See also Greimas, 1971). Moreover, since desecuritization implies rhetorically downgrading or ignoring issues, it is crucial to have analytical sensibility to what is not mentioned directly in the text but alluded to. An example is the aforementioned where the text of the Ilulissat Declaration never mentions militarization – by some considered the chief threat to Arctic security. Another example is the abovementioned statement by Aleqa Hammond which frames the U.S.-Greenlandic relation in economic terms – thereby downplaying the crucial issue of security policy (alliances, bases etc.). With securitization theory as analytical lens we can see that Hammond is actually trying “to take security out of security”.

Greenland’s limited self-government and foreign policy: desecuritization as strategy and the controversies with Denmark The constitutional-legal arrangement between Denmark and Greenland is complex, and can be hard to grasp for outsiders. The Kingdom of Denmark, a constitutional monarchy, consists of Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland forming what is known as the Realm. The Faroe Islands and Greenland are autonomous territories with Home Rule (attained in 1948 and 1979, respectively) by which these two (micro) nations have had authority over their domestic policy. Yet Denmark and the government in Copenhagen controls foreign, security and defense policy for the entire Realm.

Since 2009, though, Greenland has had self-government which created a new division of jurisdiction between Nuuk and Copenhagen (Danish Government, 2009). This further extended Greenland’s authority over policy areas to include health services, education, fiscal policy, and, perhaps most importantly, from 2010 authority over its vast mineral resources and concurrent legal control over this area, including mining licenses. The Self-Government Act also stipulates that Greenland can legally take over responsibility for other areas which are currently under Danish

Rasmussen

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authority. This list presently includes 31 policy areas, including police and courts (Danish Government, 2019).

However, responsibility for conducting foreign policy for the whole Realm according to the Danish constitution still falls under the authority of the Danish Government. This means that Denmark controls Greenland’s foreign policy as well as security and defense issues pertinent to it. (see Kristensen & Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017). This part of the constitutional-legal set-up has on several occasions spurred controversy. This is because there is no clear dividing line between what constitutes foreign policy and what constitutes economic or trade policy with international implications – issues which according to the Self-Government Act would be under Greenlandic authority. Nonetheless, the two countries have had quite different perceptions and interpretations of when economic, trade and investment issues entail foreign policy and/or security aspects. This has been painfully evident in the uranium dispute from 2009 to 2016 (Rasmussen & Merkelsen, 2017; Vestergaard & Thomasen, 2015) and in the recent quarrel over airport financing from 2017 to present (Bislev et al, 2018). Furthermore, Greenland has challenged the framework by striving for more direct bureaucratic and political control over the foreign policy field (see Kleist, 2019).

This constitutional-legal framework has thus resulted in a ‘sovereignty game’ (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2008; see also Gad, 2016) between Greenland and Denmark where the ultimate aim for Greenland is independence. Using securitization theory to understand this game makes it clear that independence is the valued referent object for Greenland and that Denmark to a certain extend can be seen as a threat to this goal.1 Or as Gad and colleagues note on this perception: “Denmark stands in the way of Greenlandic independence” (Gad et al, 2018: 3). Moreover, we can analyze the recent controversies over what constitutes foreign policy in the constitutional arrangement as a manifestation of this underlying game. In this game, I argue that securitization and desecuritization moves are used as strategies for independence. And by applying the securitization model we can elucidate the narrative through which the Greenlandic government understands independence: Greenland’s securitization narrative Referent object:

“Existential” threat:

Independence from Denmark

ß Danish securitization of economic issues (export, investments)

Own foreign policy

ß

Danish securitization of foreign policy issues par se.

Seen in isolation, Greenland is clearly making a securitizing move, rendering independence the valued referent object. Seen in relation to the sovereignty game with Denmark, however, the Greenlandic strategy – by the logic of this game – is to desecuritize pertinent policy areas in order to either gain more control or to keep the status quo. In effect Greenland has pushed for more foreign political autonomy in order to secure its economic interests regarding fishery and foreign investments by delineating these areas from security policy (see Kleist, 2019 and Bianco, 2019).

In the following analytical section, I substantiate the argument that foreign and defense policy issues are being purposefully desecuritized by two examples of this strategy in practice. First, I introduce Nuuk’s continuous bureaucratic and diplomatic ambitions to conduct foreign policy.

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Secondly, I analyze how desecuritization was used by Greenland’s government in the recent controversy over airport funding. I conclude this analysis by drawing attention to the outcome of this vis-à-vis Greenland’s relationship to the U.S. and China. This can in turn explain the sudden shift in current Greenlandic foreign political outlook and strategies for obtaining foreign investments – and economic support.

A Room of One’s Own: Greenland’s diplomatic ambitions and the de-securitization of foreign policy Control over foreign affairs is a notable point of contention and at the heart of constitutional-legal controversies with Denmark. For Greenland, foreign policy has implications for economic policy with international ramifications such as exports and foreign investments. Additionally, this policy field holds a particularly important symbolic value as proof of the coming independence. As minister of finance, Vittus Qujaukitsoq said in a recent speech held in Nuuk, May 2019 at the Future Greenland conference: “The ultimate political goal must be that Greenland takes over as much responsibility within these fields as possible” (Qujaukitsoq, 2019). Further corroborating this, is that fact that foreign policy (i.e. international relations and trade policy) is mentioned by all coalition agreements2 since 2014.

However, within the current constitutional-legal set-up this is not possible and so far the selfgovernment’s strategy has e.g. been to engage in forms of para-diplomacy with representation in UN’s forums of Indigenous people via membership of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (Jacobsen & Gad, 2017). It has also established (quasi)diplomatic representations in Iceland, Denmark, the U.S. (Washington) and the in European Union under the existing legal framework (Kleist, 2019). And in the 2018 coalition agreement between Siumut, Partii Naleraq, Attasut and Nunatta Qitornai there were even plans for representations in Canada and China (Naalakkersuisut, 2018a: 22).

Moreover, the self-government has confidently renamed the department responsible for its foreign relations “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs” to its international stakeholders while keeping the less pretentious “Department of Foreign Relations” in its Danish language communication (Naalakkersuisut, 2019; Kleist, 2019).

It would seem that such display of symbols associated with a real sovereign state would violate the constitutional red line that stipulates that Greenland’s foreign policy falls under Denmark’s authority. However, Denmark has had no specific interest in curtailing Greenlandic efforts to secure i.e. foreign investments and trade and no official Danish criticism has been made of the name change. This follows the overall policy of the Danish Government established in the 2003Itilleq Agreement which specifies that the Greenlandic Home Rule must be part of decisions involving foreign and security matters (Danish Government 2003, see also Naalakkersuisut, 2019).3 This probably dampens the Danish urge to securitize international matters with no clear defense or security aspect seen from the Danish perspective.

Additionally, the self-government in practice seems conscious in toning down defense and security policy aspects while emphasizing trade and economic aspects. In the most recent coalition agreement, it is stated that the foreign policy goal of Greenland is to work for “world peace, welfare and prosperity” and “how we as international citizens can participate in the global competition on trade and research” (Naalakkersuisut, 2018a). The unequivocal rhetoric of international trade and peace is a desecuritization move aimed at securing foreign political autonomy and maneuvering room with the current constitutional set-up.

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While Greenlandic aspirations in international matters without clear security implications for the entire Realm have been consciously ignored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office, these actors have in other instances intensely contested Greenlandic authority over domestic policy with security implications and foreign policy ramifications. This has indeed been the case with uranium exports, the Chinese airport investments, and a planned Chinese purchase of the abandoned naval base Grønnedal (Breum, 2016).

So, although the Itilleq accord stipulates that all foreign and defense policy pertinent to Greenland must involve the self-government, the realities are that the Danish Government has felt compelled to invoke a rigorous interpretation of the legal-constitutional framework when the considerations to allies or international regimes outweighed the internal relations within the Realm. This dynamic is the main reason of the ongoing security controversy between the two countries.

The airport ‘game’: the loss of the Chinese dream and revival of the U.S. as sponsor One of the most recent instances of the sovereignty game emerged in late-2017 around the plans to build three new Atlantic airports in Nuuk, Illulisat, Quarqurtoq (see Danish Government, Naalakkersuisut, 2016). What began as a triumph for Greenlandic-Chinese para-diplomacy ended in an impending security controversy with Denmark and the U.S. The row began when Greenlandic prime minister Kim Kielsen ventured on a controversial ‘official’ diplomatic visit to Beijing in October 2017. Purportedly, Chinese banks during these meetings showed interest in financing the airports on the premise that the building was made by a Chinese company (Hinshaw and Page 2019: 18). Later, media reported that China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) had indeed made a bid on airstrip development in Nuuk. According to the Wall Street Journal, U.S. officials were alarmed to find out that China was about to get a military foothold so close to the American homeland. Allegedly the Danish government was contacted: “Beijing must not be allowed to militarize this stretch of the Arctic, Mr. Mattis told his Danish counterpart Claus Frederiksen at a meeting in Washington in May 2018, officials close to the discussion said” (Hinshaw & Page, 2019).

During the summer the Danish government concocted a plan to crowd out Chinese state investments by offering Nuuk cheap development loans through a Danish state fund while stressing the grave security implications. In a joint statement, the Danish government rhetorically made it clear that it – and the U.S. – considered the airports a matter of foreign and security policy: “I agree with the considerations behind the desire for an improved infrastructure in Greenland. It is on competitiveness, business development and better growth conditions for tourism. The current airport project can have foreign and security policy perspectives that range beyond Greenland, and for a number of years it will seize large resources in Greenland’s economy.

I am therefore pleased that the chairman of the Greenland Government Kim Kielsen and I have today agreed that we initiate the joint investigation work. At the same time, a joint development fund could strengthen the opportunities for growth and development in Greenland” (Joint statement, quoted in Turnowsky, 2018b. Emphasis added).

In theoretical terms, the statement is a move towards securitizing Chinese investment in airports as an ‘existential threat’ to the Kingdom’s alliances. In effect Kielsen’s arm was twisted by both

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threatening him with risk of jeopardizing Danish-U.S.-relations and offering Greenland funding for the first time since 2009. This strategy was a success and, in the joint statement, Kielsen and the Greenlandic government accepted the Danish securitization move: I am very pleased with the openness and positive attitude I have met from the Prime Minister's side in our discussions on this topic. I am glad that the Prime Minister shares my opinion the importance of infrastructure for growth. Our discussions on cooperation on the airport projects are based on the current division of competencies between the Greenlandic and the Danish authorities and the wish for equal cooperation. On that basis, Naalakkersuisut will take a positive view of the cooperation with the Government on the possibilities for that Denmark can contribute with the financing of parts of the airport projects. This contains some exciting perspectives, both for the airport project’s realization; but also, for the development in our mutual cooperation” (Joint statement, quoted in Turnowsky, 2018b).

Kielsen’s decision to cave in to Danish demands was, however, not without political cost as the independence party, Partii Naleraq, left the coalition in protest, resulting in a governmental crisis (Lihn 2018). There are clear signs that the Danish-U.S. intervention (securitization move) has deterred China from investing further in the projects and the CCCC, which was named as a main bidder for the contract, has now officially pulled its bid. Additionally, a high-ranking Chinese general, Li Quan, in a recent news report, states that “China has a one-Denmark policy” (Turnowsky, 2019) probably signifying that Beijing respects Danish supremacy over Greenland’s foreign policy in a broad sense.

In conclusion, the new game is hence more explicitly about security – rendering economic goals (‘China’) less important than security (‘U.S.’). This is opposed to the narrative structure of the uranium game where Denmark, from the Greenlandic point of view, played the role as opponent trying to hinder China from being helper. In Greimas’ narrative terms, the actantial positions (i.e. roles) have now changed as China in the new game has gone from helper to opponent while the U.S. has taken over the function as helper in Greenland’s narrative (Greimas, 1971). Curiously enough, the U.S. is thus part of both Greenland and Denmark’s stories as a ‘helper’, albeit sustaining almost opposite foreign political aspirations.

Figure 3 – The ‘new’ game. Reversing the roles from helper to opponent (based on Rasmussen & Merkelsen 2017: 96).

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That is, if the U.S. increases its role as more of an economic sponsor for Greenland, it risks entering the role as an opponent in Denmark’s ambition of staying a “major Arctic power” (Danish Government, 2016: 13) – see figure 1 above for an overview of actors and aspirations.

I will argue that Greenland’s abandonment of its desecuritization of Chinese investments has rearranged the tectonic plates of U.S.-Dano-Greenlandic relations, shaking China’s position as a viable investor while bringing the U.S. to the fore as a new sponsor and not just a security provider (see U.S. Government 2004). The closure of this game underscores the U.S. strategic interest in Greenland. And it can in turn explain the current shift in Greenlandic foreign political outlook towards North America in its strategies for acquiring foreign investments. The Greenlandic Government’s desecuritizations of China and foreign policy have thus had the concrete aim of securing very specific investments while avoiding Danish interference. While these strategic desecuritizations are carried out at the level of the government’s foreign policy bureaucracy we also find desecuritization moves made by Greenlandic politicians in the political debate – the focus of the second analytical section.

The narrative sources of the desecuritized defense: the self-sustaining economy and the peaceful Inuit As mentioned in the introduction, Greenlandic politicians have not traditionally highlighted defense investments or that there is an absence of adversarial thinking in Greenlandic foreign policy discourse (Jacobsen & Gad, 2017). Greenlandic politician’s statements on defense policy is therefore an important place to examine the political elite’s tendency to “take security out of security.” In this final section I therefore turn to examples from the 2017 political discussions on defense policy in order to investigate the underlying narratives of desecuritization.

Desecuritizations of defense and security made by Greenlandic politicians and parties are mainly framed rhetorically within two discourses which I term the “self-sustaining economy”-narrative (e.g. Naalakkersuisut, 2018b) and the “Inuit identity politics”-narrative (Jacobsen & Gad, 2017). In the following I’ll tentatively link these two narratives with desecuritization statements on Greenlandic defense. The most recent installment in debate on the future of Greenland’s defense began when Minister of Finance, Vittus Qujaukitsoq, drew the subject into the independence debate in a seminal speech at Ilisimatusarfik, the University of Greenland in early 2017 (Breum, 2018). From here the issue made its way to the official political agenda as part of the parliamentary debates in June 2017 on the mandate of the Constitutional Commission and the subsequent discussions on what kind of sovereign nation Greenland shall be.

The speech by Qujaukitsoq contained a number of desecuritizations, building on the “selfsustaining economy”- narrative. The core of this narrative is, that independence is only possible when Greenland can free itself from the annual $576m block grant provided by the Danish state (Naalakkersuisut, 2019: 8). The phrase “self-sustaining economy” entered the independence discourse around the year 2000 in documents by the Committee on Self-Rule Government (e.g.

Self-Government Commission 2001) and has since been used extensively by the self-government to frame the economy of independence e.g. in relation to the need for mining revenues and investments (Naalakkersuisut, 2012). As Gad and colleagues note, the size of the block grant has been taken as a sign of dependence by the Greenlandic politicians (Gad et al, 2018: 7). Expenses to Greenlandic defense is currently approximately $150 million annually (Rasmussen, 2019), and

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this cost is not part of the block grant but paid by the Danish government via its defense expenditures. This additionally provides Greenlandic self-government and policy elites an incentive for keeping these costs out of independence deliberations.

This economic logic in the narrative was at stake when Qujaukitsoq downgraded Denmark as insurer of the territorial defense of Greenland: “The Danish defense today is not the actual defense of Greenland. Should there arise a real threat to our country from hostile powers, it is defended by the United States. It is the reality all know but nobody discusses” (cf. Breum, 2018). Notice how the U.S. entered the Greenlandic security narrative as the ‘true’ helper, pointing to the aforementioned role reversal in the new sovereignty game. However, the real consequence of his claim of the Kingdom’s ineptitude in the defense of Greenland is that it downgraded the perceived need for defense of the island as such. This in turn would render an independent Greenland’s economic obligations to defense smaller than the status quo – a clear sign of the “self-sustaining economy”-narrative’s logic. By undermining Denmark’s role as security provider, he is thus downplaying the significance of defense in the future autonomy from Denmark.

Qujaukitsoq further linked the desecuritization of defense with the foundation of independence, stating that “Greenland is just one of the world’s last colonies, which has not yet become independent. So, what does it mean for the defense of a future Greenland? The short answer is: not so much” (ibid). This is an apparent desecuritization move of the ‘downgrading’ type where the threat issue is ignored. And it possibly even represents an attempt to “pre-emptively” desecuritize Greenlandic defense (see Strandsbjerg & Jacobsen 2017: 25) and the threat from Russia. In this way, his speech also counters the numerous recent Danish securitizations of Russia in policy papers on Arctic security by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS, 2016, 2015).

The idea Qujaukitsoq promoted is that Denmark has no reason to further securitize the defense of Greenland because any real military threat would be impossible to counter by the Danish Defence, anyway.

Similarly, the link between the “self-sustaining economy”-narrative and political elites’ desecuritizing of defense is also visible in the 2018 coalition agreement between the four parties, Siumut, Atassut, Partii Naleraq and Nunatta Qitornai (Naalakkersuisut 2018a). Under the heading “Security and defense policy” the coalition agreement stated: “The parties in the coalition acknowledge that our geopolitical position holds great significance for defense policy” and the agreement stipulated the following: 341. The coalition parties stand firm, our country as an independent state must be a member of NATO. (…)

343. The conditions of the service contracts in the civilian area of Pituffik, Thule Air Base, and most recently around the base supply agreements, the coalition parties will pave the way for Naalakkersuisut to enter into an agreement with the US to ensure that our country gains more from the US military presence.

344. The coalition parties will continue to work to ensure that our country's defense is based on its own people and under our own flag. We must engage our young people and adults who would like to work for and can participate in our country's defense. E.g. in fishing inspection and in The Sirius sledge patrol.

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345. The coalition parties will therefore also work to ensure that programs are also initiated aimed at controlling our own borders.

346. The objective of the coalition parties is to ensure that, when inspecting our fishing territory, there are always two ships, which together carry out the necessary inspection.

This will then happen in East Greenland and on the West Coast. This requirement will be addressed with the Danish government as soon as possible.” (The Coalition Agreement of 2018 between Siumut, Atassut, Partii Naleraq (ibid, 38-39)) Economic aspects of defense are emphasized throughout the text. Most articulated in the reference are to missing income from the US military presence and the loss of the infamous “service contract” on the Thule Airbase in 2013 to an American contractor. This issue has been a source of grave frustration for the self-government. Furthermore, the inclination to focus on fishery inspection, upholding of sovereignty and border control while leaving out the cost of the NATOmembership (item 341) and military capabilities is consistent with the general desecuritizations examined in this article. Even though the wish to increase the number of naval vessels (item 346) indeed amounts to ‘real’ defense policy, I would deem that this mentioning is aimed at the current arrangement with Denmark. Note also how more civilian investments in fishery inspection is framed as defense policy by rhetorically associating it with border patrol (item 344). In conclusion, the 2018 Coalition Agreement illustrates how the “self-sustaining economy”-narrative is active when the political parties and the self-government frames non-defense as part of security and defense policy. The aim of the text seems to be getting as much symbolic defense (border patrol and upholding of sovereignty) as possible without having to accept expensive securitizations of i.e.

Russian build-up of air force capabilities.

While the “self-sustaining economy”-narrative is thus prevalent both in the agenda-setting and policy-making around defense, the more ideological “identity politics narrative of the Inuit” was active when defense policy was discussed in parliamentary debate on independence in the summer of 2017. The basis of this narrative, as Jacobson and Gad note, is an understanding, that “we, the Inuit, are peaceful; war and military affairs are not our affairs; at most it is a problem imposed upon us from outside” (Jacobsen & Gad 2017: 16). Evidence of this can be found in the discussion between MPs Ane Hansen (Inuit Ataqatigiit) and Justus Hansen on the role of Greenlandic defense. Justus Hansen introduced the idea that Greenlandic soldiers should take part in international operations. Allegedly, he was alone in these ambitions for Greenlandic activism. MP Ane Hansen said in reply: “We have always been a peaceful nation, and our role in the world community should be to spread the message of peace. We must not participate in wars” (Turnowsky, 2017). Again, desecuritization is the preferred strategy in matters of defense: the message of peace over international activism. Furthermore, the debate quite revealingly focused on ‘soft’ defense areas such as SAR and border patrol which were discussed above ‘hard’ military capabilities (ibid).

In the parliamentary debate the narrative of Greenlandic identity politics is clearly employed as an argument. This identity-based narrative on Greenlandic security in turn refers to a larger narrative of the Arctic as a unique area of intercultural and diplomatic cooperation with a special place in international affairs. This foreign policy discourse has been termed ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ as “states that comprise Arctic international society have intentionally negotiated a regional order predicated on a more cooperative framework than they pursue with each other elsewhere, and have

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endeavored, implicitly, to compartmentalize relations there” (Exner-Pirot & Murray 2017: 51). This e.g. entails the idea that the Arctic must be a nuclear free-zone and the necessity of widened cooperation in environmental matters. Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg (2017) also connects Arctic exceptionalism to desecuritization as a governance strategy. For the authors this begins with Gorbachev’s famous 1987 Murmansk speech. I would add, that in a Greenlandic context, this strategy can be found in former premier Kuupik Kleist’s 2012 statement that the entire North Pole area in the spirit of world peace should be laid out as a “global commons” (Breum, 2019).4

Conclusion Currently outside the self-government’s legal jurisdiction, both Greenlandic foreign policy and defense policy play an important symbolic role in the independence debate. The Greenlandic government and political parties have treated foreign and defense policy as a valued referent object which must be desecuritized. I found that this strategy is concurrent with the logic of the sovereignty game with Denmark where Greenland desecuritizes crucial policy areas in order to either gain control or keep the status quo.

The analysis shows that for the Greenlandic political elite, ‘defense’ is a referent object only insofar as it is linked to sovereignty and independence. For Greenland, defense is considered a threat to independence because defense is expensive and currently not factored into the financial cost of independence by the self-government. The reason for this strategy is twofold. Firstly, if defense is securitized it is harder for Greenland to move it (back) into the realm of normal politics. Secondly, when Denmark securitizes defense, it additionally bears a risk of a future cost for Greenland in military expenses. This is probably why the topic of NATO membership in all statements is only mentioned briefly and without any reference to cost.

The Greenlandic elites’ drift towards desecuritizing can thus be seen both as strategy in the sovereignty controversy with Denmark and as political mode thinking based on the self-sustaining economy-narrative. Furthermore, the propensity to descuritize defense can also be seen on the backdrop of a deep-rooted romantic vision of a peaceful High North which ties in with the narrative of the peace-loving Inuit nation. In this, it is a national obligation to counter militarization and war – and desecuritization of defense is the perfect response to this call. The resultant political thinking of this, clearly has implications for the ongoing considerations in Nuuk regarding the U.S. as an alternative to Denmark as sponsor. Based on the findings in this article I deem it very likely that Greenland will base its strategy for independence on economic rather than geopolitical considerations. Time will show the virtues of this strategy but there is no doubt that that the gravity of security and defense in Greenlandic independence will be downplayed rhetorically by the selfgovernment in the coming deliberations.

Notes 1. It can be discussed whether the securitization theory term “existential threat” is applicable for a non-sovereign nation. However, the term is, in this case of an aspiring nation-state, illustrative of the status independence holds as the ‘valued referent object’ for the Greenlandic political elite.

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2. Coalition agreements in the Greenlandic parliamentary system equals a program for official government policy.

3. This agreement was amended in 2005 with an administrative accord which specifies a cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen and the Department of Foreign Relations in Nuuk.

4. The Foreign Ministry in Copenhagen were furious, and Kleist was forced to state that his idea did not reflect the official policy of the Kingdom. However, in a recent interview Kleist reiterated the idea, asserting that the North Pole is “an important symbol” (see Breum, 2019).

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Jacobsen, M., & Herrmann, V. (1). Introduction: Arctic International Relations in a Widened Security Perspective. Politik, 20(3). https://doi.org/10.7146/politik.v20i3.97174 Jacobsen, M. and Strandsbjerg, J. (2017). Desecuritisation as Displacement of Controversy: geopolitics, law and sovereign rights in the Arctic. Politik, vol. 20(3), pp. 15-30.

Kleist, M. (2019). Grønlands udenrigspolitik og internationale relationer: Nuværende rammer og mulig udvikling i et selvstændighedsperspektiv. [Greenland's foreign policy and international relations: Current framework and possible development in an independence perspective]. Politik, 22(1). pp. 84-101. https://doi.org/10.7146/politik.v22i1.114842 The desecuritization of Greenland’s security?

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Kristensen, K.S. and Rahbek-Clemmensen, J. (2017). ‘Greenlandic Sovereignty in Practice: Uranium, Independence, and Foreign Relations in Greenland between Three Logics of Security’. In: K.S. Kristensen and J. Rahbek-Clemmensen (eds.). Greenland and the International Politics of a Changing Arctic. London: Routledge.

Lihn, A. G. (2018). Partii Naleraq har forladt koalitionen. KNR (Greenlandic Broadcasting Corporation), September 9 2018. https://knr.gl/da/nyheder/partii-naleraq-har-forladtkoalitionen Naalakkersuisut (2012). Forslag til Inatsisartutlov om bygge- og anlægsarbejder ved storskalaprojekter, oral presentation by Minister for Business and Raw Materials, EM2012/110, October 17, Naalakkersuisut (2018a). The Coalition Agreement of 2018 between Siumut, Atassut, Partii Naleraq Naalakkersuisut (2018b). Økonomisk redegørelse 2018. [Economic Report 2018]. Departementet for Finanser. Ministry of Finance. https://naalakkersuisut.gl/da/Naalakkersuisut/Nyheder/2018/08/1508_oekonomisk_re degoelse Naalakkersuisut (2019). Forslag til Finanslov for 2019. Udarbejdet af Grønlands Selvstyre [The Self-Government’s budget proposal for 2019] https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Finans/DK/Fina nslov/2019/FFL2019%20%20med%20sidetal%20og%20linket%20indholdsfortegnelse%20-%20DK%20-2308.pdf Qujaukitsoq, V. (2019). An independent Greenland – the vision and the tasks of the constitutional commission. Speech held at the 2019 Future Greenland Conference, May 14, 2019.

Rasmussen, J. B. (2019). “What are the tasks of the Joint Artic Command?” Presentation given at the Future Greenland Conference by Captain (naval) and Deputy Head, John Boye Rasmussen, May 14 2019.

Rasmussen, R. K., & Merkelsen, H. (2017). Post-colonial governance through securitization? a narratological analysis of a securitization controversy in contemporary Danish and Greenlandic uranium policy. Politik, 20(3), 83-103.

Roe, P. (2004). Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization. Security Dialogue, 35(3), pp. 279-294.

Salama, V., Ballhaus, R., Restuccia A. and Bender, M. C. (2019). President Trump Eyes a New Real-Estate Purchase: Greenland. In conversations with aides, the president has—with varying degrees of seriousness—floated the idea of the U.S. buying the autonomous Danish territory. Wall Street Joiurnal, August 16 2019.

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https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-eyes-a-new-real-estate-purchase-greenland11565904223 Self-Government Commission (2001). Selvbærende økonomi. Artikel af Jakob Janussen, formand for Selvstyrekommissionen. [A self-sustaining economy. A policy brief by chairman Jakob Janussen]. Nuuk August 2001. https://naalakkersuisut.gl/da/Naalakkersuisut/Selvstyre/Selvstyrekommissionen/Konfe rencer/Midtvejskonference-september-2001/Selvbaerende-oekonomi Turnowsky, W. (2017) Debat: Skal grønlandske soldater i krig? [Debate: Must Greenlandic soldiers be allowed to go to war?]. Sermitsiq/AG, June 2, 2017. https://sermitsiaq.ag/node/197411 [Accessed 15.06.2019] Turnowsky, W. (2018a). “Set fra Island: Grønland må acceptere de geopolitiske realiteter” Sermitsiaq AG, April 24. https://sermitsiaq.ag/node/205292 [Accessed 01.03.2019] Turnowsky, W. (2018b). Dokumentation: Her er erklæringen om Lufthavne [Joint statement on the airport projects]. Sermitsiq/AG June 13, 2018. https://sermitsiaq.ag/dokumentationerklaeringen-lufthavne [Accessed 15.06.2019] Turnowsky, W. (2019). Ingen kinesisk støtte til selvstændighed. Kina fører en 'et-Danmarkpolitik', fastslår en kinesisk general. [No Chinese support for independence. China has a ’one-Denmark policy’]. Sermitsiq/AG June 12 2019. https://sermitsiaq.ag/node/214173 [Accessed 08.09.2019] U.S. Department of State (2019). Diplomacy in Action. “Looking North: Sharpening America's Arctic Focus” Remarks by Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State given in Rovaniemi, Finland May 6, 2019.

U.S. Government (2004). “Agreement between the Government of the united States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Home Rule Government of Greenland, to amend and supplement the Agreement of 27 April 1951 pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark concerning the defense of Greenland (Defense Agreement) including relevant subsequent agreements related thereto” (signed August 6 2004, Igaliku).

Veirum, T. M. (2019) ”Naleraq: Forhandlinger med USA skal undersøges” KNR (Greenlandic Broadcasting Corporation), September 2, 2019. https://knr.gl/da/nyheder/naleraqforhandlinger-med-usa-skal-unders%C3%B8ges Vestergaard, C. and Thomasen, G. (2015). Governing Uranium in the Danish Realm. DIIS Report vol. 2015(17).

Wæver, O. (1995). Securitization and Desecurization. In: R. D. Lipschutz (ed.). On Security. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 46-86.

The desecuritization of Greenland’s security?

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The ongoing formation of Russia’s Arctic policy: a new stage?

Eduard Galimullin & Yuri Matveenko

This paper provides an overview of Russia’s Arctic policy with a focus on recent changes in the spatial development and legislative/institutional frameworks. It briefly explains the definition of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) and examines its basic consolidation mechanism, as well as socio-economic challenges to its development and some legislative gaps. The paper identifies the roles of various actors and institutions in decision-making processes. In doing so, it also investigates how both Western sanctions and oil prices affected the realization of the Arctic policy’s main objectives. It argues that Russia will continue to promote the benefits of using the NSR and to attract all interested parties in the exploitation of the AZRF’s natural resources, but there is a need to revise some strategies in order to do it effectively, considering new circumstances.

Introduction The changes taking place in the Arctic, the main drivers of which are the climate agenda and globalization (Stephen, 2018), contribute to broadening the spectrum of political actors and create a state of “complex interdependence” (Byers, 2017: 375) in the sphere of international relations.

The role of the state as the dominant political institution is declining, as more and more nongovernmental players become involved in the development of the region. Issues of conservation of the Arctic’s natural ecosystems, ensuring its sustainable development and preventing climate change, are becoming increasingly important. All Arctic states are forced to adopt the goals and objectives of their policy to the changing rules of the game.

For Russia, one of the major stakeholders in the Arctic, overcoming the separated isolated action and transition to the unity of economic, legal and institutional decisions (Pilyasov et al, 2015: 19) is the main objective of modern Arctic policy. We argue that although the paradigm of resource extraction is still prevailing, the changes that have occurred during the last 3-5 years are crucial and need to be systematized and redefined. The understanding of its possible outcomes is extremely important, especially in light of Russia’s future 2021-2023 Chairmanship of the Arctic Council.

Eduard Galimullin is a PhD candidate and Yuri Matveenko is a Professor at the Russian Academy of National Economic and Public Administration, Moscow.

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Moscow has a long-term vision of the Arctic which can be summed up briefly in three words: to extract hydrocarbons, to transport them and to protect sovereignty over them. This is straightforward in principle but given the exceptional importance of the region for Russia’s national interests, it is not surprising that Russia’s Arctic policy quite often becomes a result of various bureaucratic “corridor wars” (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2019: 3) and clashes between influential players. It contributes to the insufficiently effective state management of the Arctic, which requires optimization based on geopolitical and geo-economic changes of recent years, as well as a critical understanding of Russian and foreign experience in the development of the Arctic.

In our work, we reviewed and examined the transformations in the Russian Arctic policy in three areas: spatial development, legislative framework and institution-building. Investigating spatial development includes determining an object of state policy in a geographical sense, figuring out how it forms, what it consists of and what the main challenges and issues present in its development are. The overview of the legislative framework is important for identifying the main gaps and possible solutions for filling them. Finally, institution-building refers to the examination of the institutional framework, through which government policy is implemented.

Our paper utilizes a doctrinal analysis of the law and policy documents on the Russian Arctic, as well as an overview of relevant studies. We start from the definition of Arctic Russia, and considering the substantive consolidation mechanisms, then proceed to assess how domestic law regulates Arctic development. We finish by explaining how the current institutional framework of Russian Arctic policy is shaped.

Spatial development The object of Russian Arctic policy is the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF). It includes, either fully or partially, the territories of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions, the Nenets, Chukotka and Yamal-Nenets autonomous districts, Karelia, Komi and Sakha (Yakutia) republics, the Krasnoyarsk Krai and the islands and lands specified in the Decree: On the Proclamation of Lands and Islands Located in The Arctic Ocean as Territory of the USSR (Putin, 2014). However, the boundary of AZRF is not defined once and for all. Since 2014, there have been inclusions of several territories of the Karelia and Sakha (Yakutia) republics (Arctic.ru, 2017a; Arctic.ru, 2019a).

According to our estimates, the land area of the territories of AZRF is 4,969,391 million km2, which is about 29% of the entire territory of the Russian Federation. The Russian Arctic is home to about 2.4 million people – about half the population of the entire Circumpolar region (Gassiy, 2018: 1).

Significant hydrocarbon deposits, rich stores of mineral ores, rare earth metals and gems are located in the Russian Arctic (Bird, 2008), accounting for more than 11% of the Russian GDP (Konyshev et al, 2017: 6). Additionally, if the UN Commission on the Continental Shelf approves the subcommission’s positive decision, the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges will become part of the Russian Arctic by the summer of 2020 (Financial Times, 2019) and increase Russia’s exclusive economic zone by 1.2 million square kilometers.

The concept of the AZRF was established in 1989 (The Western Arctic Seas Encyclopedia, 2017).

Previously referred to as the Arctic “Extreme North”, the term was traditionally associated with a system of state subsidies and benefits that stimulate the economy in special conditions (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2011: 15). However, after the collapse of the USSR, considering cardinal socioeconomic, political and financial challenges of the transition period, it became clear that the Arctic

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needed to be developed as a separate entity. Some external and internal reasons contribute to the gradual emergence of the Russian Arctic as a political term (Krivorotov & Finger, 2018: 46).

Among the latter: the high concentration of strategic interests and the need for the elimination of infrastructure restrictions on the growth of mineral production in the Russian Arctic (Konovalov, 2011: 124), as well as the need for a conceptual interconnection of implemented program activities (Ivanter, Leksin & Porfiriev, 2014: 15).

The main tasks of the Russian Arctic spatial development policy is therefore the integration of available production capacities and facilities and connecting the mainland and port infrastructure into a single logistics system (Orlov, 2018). Oil and gas extraction in the Arctic will help to compensate for the depletion of the country’s mature fields (Kontorovich, 2015: 217). It is noteworthy that early Soviet discourse empowered ideas of acquisition of the North and made it indistinguishable from the rest of the country, but costly exploitation coupled with slowing economic growth led to a paradigm inherited in the post-Soviet times focused on resource exploitation (Petrov, 2018: 7).

There is an opinion that the Northern Sea Route (NSR), being a solely domestic route for a long time, served as a major consolidation mechanism (Pilyasov et al, 2015: 21) of the Russian Arctic. The national legislator has noted the particular importance of having access to the seas of the Arctic Ocean when specifying the composition of the AZRF (Katorin, 2018; Konovalov, 2014). Moscow defines the NSR as a historical national unified transport line of communication (State Duma, 1998). In one of his speeches, Putin called the NSR “the key to the development of Russian Arctic and Far East” (The Barents Observer, 2018). It is widely known that diminishing sea ice can turn the NSR into a full-fledged international route, thus significantly reducing the distance between Asian and European markets. Traffic along the route increases almost every year and 20 million tonnes of cargo passed through the NSR in 2018, twice as much as the year before (Pigni, 2019).

The Asian states, primarily China, Japan, and South Korea, are actively interested in the possibilities of the route. Cargo ships from China have repeatedly made passes through the NSR (The Northern Sea Route Administration, 2019), and the country’s authorities recently published a White paper on the Arctic, demonstrating that commercial interest is not the only reason for that (Drewniak et al, 2018). The Russian government thus seeks to take advantage of joining the Northern Sea Route with China’s maritime Silk Road and opening it to international trade. The ambitious goal of reaching 80 million tons of shipping tonnage along the NSR by 2024 was set in 2018, although researchers are cautious in assessing such potential (Benedyk & Peeta, 2018; Kiiski et al, 2018; Yumashev et al, 2017).

The developing of the NSR also implies the installation of military and intelligence infrastructure throughout the whole region. Today, military facilities are already located on almost all major islands and archipelagos from the Kola Peninsula to Chukotka (Galimullin, 2017). The perception of increasing Russian military presence and large-scale exercises after the Ukrainian crisis was transformed from the interpretation of all of this as a legitimate behavior to protect the state border and strategic resource reserves, into fear of aggressive behavior in a potential conflict situation (Mikkola & Käpylä, 2019: 157). Meanwhile, some authors argued that the Arctic is not remilitarized now because it was never demilitarized (Keupp, 2015: 24), and that Russia is still a long way from reestablishing the level of military capability it had in the Arctic during the Cold War (RAND, 2017: 14), undertaking just limited modernization (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2019: 192). Considering the The ongoing formation of Russia’s Arctic policy: a new stage?

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importance of stability in the Arctic for Russia, its military activity is indeed more likely aimed at protecting an economic interest in the North and does not threaten existing cooperation.

The next consolidation mechanism is the building of large integrated transportation networks aimed at improving land accessibility of the region, since today there are practically no railways or paved roads in the Arctic (Volgin et al, 2018: 37). The Strategy for the Development of Railway Transport until 2030 (2008) indicated a few grand railway initiatives, such as the “Northern Latitudinal Passage”, “Bovanenkovo-Sabetta”, “Belkomur” and others. Russia is seeking to attract a total of €143 billion of private investments to implement these projects (Staalesen, 2019a), having a successful Yamal LNG example based on public-private partnership. However, implementation of some promising projects at the regional level is hampered by Western sanctions, which limit the possibilities of exploration and production of natural resources in hard-to-reach regions (Shirov et al, 2015: 321). The Nenets Autonomous District has faced this problem most acutely (APEC, 2018: 14).

A new version of the state program Socioeconomic Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (2017) introduced a new concept/consolidation mechanism called core development zones. The goals of its establishment are creating favorable conditions for the rapid socioeconomic development of the Arctic zone and fostering interaction between resource corporations, communities, civil society institutions and regional authorities (Government, 2017).

It should be remembered that Russia already has such tools, like Special Economic Zones or SEZs (existing since 2005), operating in its European part and The Advanced Special Economic Zones or ASEZs (since 2014) in the Far East. But unlike both previous zones, the eight core Arctic zones (Kola, Arkhangelsk, Nenets, Vorkuta, Yamal-Nenetsky, Taymyr-Turukhanskaya, Chukotka, and North-Yakutian) are interconnected projects for complex development of not just separate areas, but the whole region (Arctic.ru, 2017b). It is expected to be based on concession agreements and agreements on public-private partnership (Lagutina, 2019: 36). Creating a strong interlinkage between different entities is crucial, since some researchers noted a lack of representation of Arctic zone interest as a single development entity (Glinskiy et al, 2017: 309), that is fueled by leadership struggles between some entities (Nazukina, 2013).

Among the main socio-economic challenges to the spatial development of the Russian Arctic are out-migration (Table 1) and related lack of manpower (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2011). Heleniak (2009) noted that the way the USSR developed the resources of the region, based on large permanent populations, has become unsustainable in Russia’s new market economy (55). It has thus led to a decrease in wage benefits (Volgin et al, 2018: 38) and the lack of jobs and opportunities for continuing education (Ivanova & Klyukina, 2017: 195). Although the government promotes the financial attractiveness of life in northern regions and supports educational institutes, forums and other initiatives, the expectations of the young population today seem incompatible with the actual economic possibilities (Nikulina et al, 2019). The outflow of population has even led to the idea of promoting temporary, rather than permanent, residence in the High North and encouraging companies not to invest in social infrastructure (Shchitinsky & Minina, 2018: 81).

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Table 1. Population changes in the Russian Arctic

Subject

Arkhangelsk Krasnoyarsk Murmansk Nenets Karelia Komi Sakha (Yakutia) Chukotka Yamal-Nenets

Year 2010

2014

2016

2017

2018

664 465 229 392 795 409 42 090 51 634 95 854 28 325 50 526 522 904

656 624 228 493 771 058 43 025 47 432 84 707 26 488 50 555 539 671

652 867 227 546 762 173 43 838 45 070 81 442 26 147 50 157 534 104

650 755 227 220 757 621 43 937 44 301 80 061 26 210 49 822 536 049

646 899 227 972 753 557 43 997 42 799 77 314 26 063 49 348 538 547

Overall (20102018) -17 566 (-2,64%) -1 420 (-0,62%) -41 852 (-5,26) 1 907 (4,53%) -8 835 (-17,11%) -18 540 (-19,34%) -2 262 (-7,99%) -1 178 (-2,33%) 15 643 (2,99%)

Besides that, there is a significant disparity within the northern regions, have only grown following the reduction of government services in the already disadvantaged regions (Duhaime, 2010: 53).

Merging is one of the tips for reducing such an inter-regional disparity (Vityazeva & Kotyrlo, 2007: 64), undertaken by combining large regions with national autonomous districts of the North. This practice has affected the Krasnoyarsk Territory (merged in 2007 with its constituent Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets) and Evenki autonomous districts). Possible projects for the merger of the oilrich Nenets Autonomous district with the poorer Arkhangelsk Region were also discussed for a long time (Harzl & Protsyk, 2013). In addition to it, two Arctic regions - Chukotka and Yakutia participate in the Far Eastern hectare program (MINVR, 2016), which aims to attract people for the commercial or personal use of empty land.

Environmental pollution, especially a number of nuclear hotspots, is also a big concern of Arctic spatial development. Although the Russian government takes measures for cleanup in the Arctic (TASS, 2019), melting ice could trigger the release of accumulated harmful substances and thus poses a risk to human health (Bock, 2013: 49). The greatest difficulty is presented by solid household waste, for the disposal of which the Russian authorities are planning to apply plasma gasification technology. The resulting heat will be used to get what the Arctic lacks: heat and energy (The Arctic, 2019a). Additionally, there is the problem of air pollution that transcends national boundaries and has already provoked some international cross-border incidents (Nilsen, 2019).

Legislative framework The current legislative framework of the Russian Arctic policy is represented by three documents: • • •

Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period up to 2020 and Beyond (2008); Strategy for Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and the National Security up to 2020 (2013); State programme Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Arctic Zone up to 2025 (2017).

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The Fundamentals of the State Policy document (2008) lists the features of the Russian Arctic that distinguish the macro-region as a separate object of state policy, determining the national interests, goals, objectives and strategic priorities of Russia in the Arctic. The Strategy for Development document (2013) indicates the main mechanisms, methods and means of achieving goals and realizing national interests. The tasks of coordinating the activities of state authorities and all other stakeholders in the implementation of Arctic state policy, as well as conducting socio-economic development of the Russian Arctic, are assigned to the State programme document (2017). Its implementation deadlines have been extended up to 2025 in 2017 (Staalesen, 2017). In one of his speeches, Dmitry Medvedev noted the “rather analytical nature” of the previous version of the document and highlighted the lack of funding as the main problem (Medvedev, 2017). In the new version three subprograms have been introduced, target indicators have been updated and the amount of budget allocations has been specified – 190,451,982 million rubles (Government of the Russian Federation, 2017). It is worth noting that the program approach to public administration in Russia has gained popularity and is used everywhere to solve the problems of socio-economic development and national security (Leksin & Porfiryev, 2016: 418).

Among other documents defining the modern Russian state policy in the Arctic, we can highlight: • • • • • • • •

Development Strategy of the Railway Transport till 2030 (2008); The Concept of Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (2009); Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030 (2009); Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2015); The Russian Federation's National Security Strategy (2015); The Strategy of Ecological Security of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025 (2017); Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period until 2030 (2017); Decree No. 296 of the President of the Russian Federation dated 2 May 2014 “On the Land Territories of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (last modified – May 13, 2019).

However, the Arctic legislative framework is incomplete without the Federal law on the Russian Arctic (Zhuravel, 2016: 6). Attempts to adopt such a document have been made since 1998 when its first version was presented, but all of them remained unsuccessful. Among the causes for the failures is a lack of detailed knowledge of the problem and abstraction from the previous experience of each new team (Zhukov & Krainov, 2008: 4), as well as the lack of ideological basis for the basic law (Pilyasov et al, 2015: 15). It is expected that this law should prescribe the status of the macro-region as a special object of state regulation (Konovalov, 2012: 22) and introduce a system of preferences and benefits for investors (Lukin, 2016).

Currently, there is no generally accepted methodology for the inclusion of territories in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (Bezrukov, 2015: 358). Existing legislation provides the possibility of clarifying its borders “in accordance with the regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation and the norms of international treaties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is a party” (Government, 2008). Some experts note that the inclusion of certain territories into the Russian Arctic is determined not only by physical and geographical characteristics, but also by priorities of state regulation and management (Konovalov, 2012: 22), as well as by the mismatch of interests of various ministries, the Federal centre and the Arctic regions (Pilyasov, 2016: 233). In addition, the

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draft law on privileges for Arctic investment, which should set tax rates for development projects, was not submitted to the government before June 10 as originally planned (Arctic.ru, 2019b).

Institution-building and decision-making The discussions on the way the Russian government should run the vast northern areas have continued since the collapse of the USSR. Several attempts to create a single body responsible for Arctic development have been taken but none of them can be described as successful. Having won over regional elites in the early 2000s (Pilyasov, 1998) and dissolving the State Committee for the North (GOSKOMSEVER), Moscow had started actively searching for a new institutional framework of its Arctic policy. Founded in 2004, the Ministry of Regional Development was responsible for implementing state policy regarding socio-economic development of regions, including the Arctic. However, even though the Ministry has been appointed as an executor of the state program Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Arctic Zone, it was abolished (PortNews, 2014) in the same year in which the program had been adopted. The establishment of specialized ministries for North Caucasus, Crimea and the Far East has made the Regional Development Ministry superfluous (The Barents Observer, 2014).

But there was still no separate Ministry for the Arctic region. The Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation was the one that has become responsible for it. However, considering the limited, primarily socio-economic, scope of its activity and the significantly increasing number of governmental bodies engaged in Arctic issues (Table 1), The State Commission for Arctic Development was founded in 2015. Its main function was coordination for the work of federal and regional authorities. Rothem (2016) claims that the appointment of a former representative of the national patriotic movement, Dmitry Rogozin, as its head was a signal of Russia’s irritation with the West’s unwillingness to recognize its status as an Arctic superpower (Rotnem, 2016: 10). Nonetheless, as a purely coordinating body it did not have the authority to address the problems. And in the absence of a well-designed institutional framework, there was no coordination.

Table 2. The governmental bodies responsible for Arctic policy Program

The executor of the program

Co-executor

Participants of the program

State program Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Arctic Zone up to 2020 (2014)

Ministry of Regional Development

-

- Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East; - Ministry of Transport; - Ministry of Industry and Trade; - Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The new version of state program Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Arctic Zone up to 2025 (2017)

Ministry of Economic Development

Ministry of Industry and Trade

- Ministry of Transport - Ministry of Emergency Situations - Ministry of Construction Industry, Housing and Utilities Sector - Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment - Ministry of Defence - Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring - Federal Service for Supervision of Natural Resources - National Guard of Russia - Federal Biomedical Agency - National Research Center «Kurchatov Institute»

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It speeded up the search for a unified center of accountability for the implementation of Arctic policy. As Putin said, it should be not a burdensome bureaucratic body, but a flexible, fast-working structure (The Moscow Times, 2014). But first, in 2018 the State Commission’s lineup was renewed in order to make it more compact and “business-like” (The Arctic, 2018). The Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District, Yury Trutnev, was appointed as a head of the revised body and the next year the additional authorities were given to the Ministry of the Russian Federation for the Development of the Far East, which is now the Ministry of the Russian Federation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic. The choice has been made not in favor of establishing a separate ministry of the Arctic because, according to Prime Minister Medvedev, it would be too costly both in terms of financial and administrative resources (Staalesen, 2019b).

The reformed Ministry is now responsible for the establishment of a proper labour division between different state agencies, which could be clustered depending on the area they managed (Table 4). The Ministry of Transport (MT) along with the Russian State Corporation on Atomic Energy (Rosatom) developed the NSR on the principle of “two keys”: the MT is responsible for statutory regulation and Rosatom is responsible for commerce and economy (Rosatom, 2019). The Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring provides authorities and ships with meteorological information and forecasts. The Ministry of Defence, Federal Security Service (including Coast Guard) and the Ministry for Emergencies are charged with building military presence in the Arctic and with border security. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and its agencies oversee natural resource management and monitors environmental protection, while state-owned corporations and private oil and gas companies are engaged in hydrocarbon production. The Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) and Arctic governors have responsibility for socio-economic development, with MIT’s particular obligation being the implementation of large industrial projects. This framework seems balanced and there is no obvious overlap of authorities which should provide harmonization of the decision-making process.

Table 3. Russia’s Arctic state policy main authorities: the executive branch President / Presidential Administration

Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic

State Commission for Arctic Development

Main body

- Ministry of Defence - Federal Security Service - Ministry for Emergencies Border security

Coordinating body

- The Ministry of Economic Development - Governors - Ministry of Industry and Trade Socio-economic development

- Rosatom (from 2018) - Ministry of Transport - The Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring Northern Sea Route Galimullin & Matveenko

- Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment - State-owned/private companies Natural resources

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There are also some specific sub-national Arctic institutes, like Polar Commission (2015) in Krasnoyarskiy Krai and The Ministry of Development of the Arctic and the peoples of the North (2018) in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). The main challenge, however, is still the reduced potential of northern regions to have an independent solution for socio-economic problems. Arctic policymaking is a highly centralized process (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2019: 4) and the Kremlin remains a key player. All Arctic governors are closely linked with the ruling party “United Russia” and therefore must usually wait for an order from Moscow for action. But the absence of strong opposition is not the only problem – it is mainly the changing distribution of tax payments from natural resources (Pilyasov et al, 2015: 19) which have resulted in undermining the regional initiative. There are various proposals for increasing financial activities of economic entities of the AZRF, such as establishing a special “Arctic” bank (Tatarkin et al, 2017: 21) and earlier mentioned core zones, which is intended to put into practice the mediating role of the state. But given that 6 out of 9 Arctic governors began their current five-year terms in 2018 and 2019, the question here is whether the Federal authorities will be able to get them to work effectively.

It is worth noting that the Russian Parliament, though possessing significantly less potential for participating in decision-making (not even in the Arctic, but in general), has its own institutional framework for conducting Arctic policy (Table 4). It has some voice in the budgeting process and is able to cut/increase appropriations for executive agencies (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2019: 9) Table 4. Russia’s Artic state policy main authorities: legislative branch Parliament (Federal Assembly) State Duma (lower house)

Council of Federation (upper house) Federation Council Committee on Federal Structure, Regional Policy, Local Government and Northern Affairs

State Duma Committee on Regional Policy and Problems of North and Far East State Duma Expert Council on legislative support for the development of the Far North

Federation Council Arctic and Antarctic Expert Advisory Board

The presence of national security objectives a priori narrows the scope for participation of nongovernmental organizations, although they have obtained much more influence in the post-Soviet era. But instead of using the resources of these players in a creative way, Moscow tries to control them, thus making them passive, both domestically and internationally (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2018: 140). For example, RAIPON, The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, operates under tight state control (IWGIA, 2019: 44).

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Overview Russia’s Arctic policy, much like the late Soviet policy in the High North, has resource extraction as its cornerstone. However, the Arctic Zone of Russian Federation is a relatively new political phenomenon, which has arisen over the past several decades and mostly implies issues of national and energy security. Not least, the growing accessibility of the Northern Sea Route, though still remaining a subject of many debates, contributed to the allocation of AZRF as a separate object of state policy.

Although the main goals of Russia’s Arctic policy have been outlined, it isn’t yet clear how to achieve them. Is it necessary to prevent out-migration and attract new citizens, or focus on using predominantly temporary-basis manpower in order to exploit the Arctic’s natural resources? Is it a better option to break-up the monopoly of state-owned Rosneft and Gazprom and allow the private oil and gas firms to explore Russia’s Arctic shelf or is it too risky? These and other questions remain unanswered, while 2 of 3 Arctic laws (2008 Fundamentals and 2013 Strategy) expire in 2020 and therefore need to be updated as soon as possible, and the adoption of Basic Arctic law has been repeatedly postponed.

Western sanctions and low oil prices are hampering the realization of Russia’s interests in mostly the resource geography dimension (Aalto & Forsberg, 2016: 223) which has resulted in delaying production for such giants as the Kruzenshternskoye and Shtokmanovskoye fields. It created further confusion among the governing elite, provoking the need to re-assess the oil and natural gas development prospects from the long-term perspective (Morgunova & Telegina, 2019: 481).

Both sets of sanctions (US and EU) target, among other things, the offshore petroleum industry and have forced Russian authorities to create more favorable tax conditions to encourage the development of Arctic resources. On the other hand, economic restrictions have contributed to the emergence of additional motivation for the development and implementation of domestic innovations, which is mainly manifested in the policy of import substitution (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2018: 140). Given these two different aftermaths, it remains unchanged that the hydrocarbon-driven economy of Russia is highly dependent on the exploitation of new production fields.

Is there a new stage to Russia’s Arctic development? To sum up, the establishment of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic, though finalizing its reform will still take some time, is a great step toward the coordination of various activities and allocation of the Arctic as a separate, integrated object of the state policy. Along with the new role of the state company Rosatom, it definitely enhances Russian management systems in the Arctic, though tensions remain. However, there are still no specific mechanisms of public-private partnership in the Arctic on the state level, without which it will not be possible to significantly increase investments. The concept of sustainable development has also not been adapted to the Russian Arctic, maintaining an apparent imbalance in favour of economic development (Maximova, 2018: 12).

Concluding remarks It seems that a contradiction of modern Russia’s Arctic policy is the fact that the region of strategic importance could not be effectively developed without cooperation with the international community. The modern Arctic strategy of Russia is a mixture of expansionist/revisionist and soft power/status quo policies (Heininen et al, 2014: 89). Thus, it depends on how Moscow will

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continue to pursue its dual-track strategy. The extremely powerful Russian military has a strong skepticism toward the West, but it is not even economic weakness and a lack of technology that creates a need for cooperation and foreign investment. There are at least four other Arctic littoral states in the same room, and considering the fragile ecosystem with associated risks, it is crucial to take into account their interests.

What are the main outcomes? We think that Russia will continue to promote the benefits of using the NSR and to attract all interested parties in the development of Arctic resources. While the estimates of the U.S. Geological Survey may be proven incorrect, Russia has an inadequate institutional environment (Kryukov & Moe, 2018: 49) for the profitable production of unconventional oil as a fallback too. Moreover, it is more than just a rational-action approach already. It has symbolic value under sanctions, demonstrating the dignity of Russians and their adherence to the commitments that have been undertaken. Additionally, calling the idea of an inevitable competition for Arctic resources into question means risking one’s reputation (Trenin & Baev, 2010: 21). Thus, considering that sanctions have strengthened the elite’s consolidation and have boosted patriotism in the country, all proposals like liberalization of the continental shelf (Neftegaz, 2019) will be made cautiously. But from the other side, the main players must act quickly because hesitation could fail the “May Decrees” in 2024, which would probably be an even greater threat to political reputation.

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Konovalov, A. M. (2012). Sistema gosudarstvennogo strategicheskogo planirovaniya i upravleniya razvitiem Arkticheskoj zony Rossijskoj Federacii [System of state strategic planning and management of development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation]. Nacional'nye Interesy: Prioritety i Bezopasnost', 34(175), 20–32.

Konovalov, A. M. (2014). Prostranstvennoe razvitie Arkticheskoj zony Rossijskoj Federacii na osnove modernizacii ekonomiki Rossii [Spatial development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation on the basis of modernization of the Russian economy]. Sovremennye proizvoditel'nye sily, 1, 51–64.

Kontorovich, A.E. (2015). Ways of developing oil and gas resources in the Russian sector of the Arctic. Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 85, 213. https://doi.org/10.1134/S1019331615030120 Konyshev, V. N., & Sergunin, A. A. (2011). Arktika v mezhdunarodnoj politike: sotrudnichestvo ili sopernichestvo? [The Arctic in international politics: cooperation or competition?]

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Konyshev V., Sergunin A. & Subbotin S. (2017): Russia’s Arctic strategies in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, The Polar Journal, DOI: 10.1080/2154896X.2017.1335107 Konyshev V., Sergunin A. (2019) The Changing Role of Military Power in the Arctic. In Finger M., & Heininen L. (Eds.), The GlobalArctic Handbook. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91995-9_11 Krivorotov A., Finger M. (2019) State-Owned Enterprises in the Arctic. In Finger M., & Heininen L. (Eds.), The GlobalArctic Handbook. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91995-9_4

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Kryukov, V. & Moe, A. (2018). Does Russian unconventional oil have a future? Energy Policy. 119, 41-50. 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.021.

Lagutina, M. (2019). Russia's Arctic Policy in the Twenty-First Century: National and International Dimensions. Rowman & Littlefield.

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Maximova, D. (2018). Sustainable Development of the Russian Arctic Zone: Challenges & Opportunities. In L. Heininen & H. Exner-Pirot, Arctic Yearbook 2018.

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The Barents Observer. Retrieved May 27, 2019, from https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/ecology/2019/01/norways-enviro-minister-bringscross-border-pollution-moscow Neftegaz (2019). Russia could allow private oil firms to explore Arctic shelf. Retrieved September 05, 2019, from https://neftegaz.ru/en/news/russia/484492-russia-could-allow-privateoil-firms-to-explore-arctic-shelf/ Orlov, D. (2018). Razvitie Arkticheskoj zony Rossii i osnovnye vyzovy dlya ee osvoeniya [Development of the Arctic zone of Russia and the main challenges for its development].

Retrieved April 27, 2019, from https://regnum.ru/news/2407690.html

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Petrov, A. (2018). Re-Tracing Development Paths: Exploring the Origins and Nature of the 20th Century’s Northern Development Paradigms in Russia and Canada. In L. Heininen & H. Exner-Pirot, Arctic Yearbook 2018 Pigni, G. (2019). Moscow’s Arctic ambitions give Washington the chills. Retrieved June 5, 2019, from https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/05/article/moscows-arctic-ambitions-givewashington-the-chills/ Pilyasov, A. (2016). Russia’s Arctic frontier: Paradoxes of development. Regional Research of Russia, 6(3), 227–239. https://doi.org/10.1134/s2079970516030060 Pilyasov, A., Kuleshov, V., & Seliverstov, V. (2015). Arctic Policy in an Era of Global Instability: Experience and Lessons for Russia. Regional Research of Russia, 5(1), 10–22. https://doi.org/10.1134/S2079970515010086 Pilyasov, A. N. (1998). Ot paternalizma k partnerstvu: Stroitel'stvo novyh otnoshenij narodov Severa i gosudarstva [From paternalism to partnership: Building new relations between the peoples of the North and the state]. A. N. Pilyasov, (Ed.). Magadan: SVKNII DVO RAN PortNews (2014). Vladimir Putin signs executive order abolishing Russian Federation Regional Development Ministry. Retrieved June 5, 2019, from http://portnews.ru/news/186684/ Putin, V. (2014). Presidential Executive Order No 296 of 2 May 2014, On the Land Territories of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, Moscow.

RAND (2017). Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia: Planning for Regional Change in the Far North. https://doi.org/10.7249/rr1731 Rosatom (2019). Head of ROSATOM Alexey Likhachev took part in the panel section “The Northern Sea Route – The Key to the Development of the Russian Arctic” of the Forum “The Arctic – Territory of Dialogue”. Retrieved May 6, 2019, from https://www.rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/head-of-rosatom-alexei-likhachev-tookpart-in-the-panel-section-the-northern-sea-route-the-key-to-th/ Rotnem, T. (2016): Putin’s Arctic Strategy: Collaboration or Conflict after Ukraine. Problems of Post-Communism, 65(1), 1 – 17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2016.1222869 Sergunin A., Konyshev V. (2018) Russia’s Arctic Strategy. In: Studin I. (Eds.) Russia. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56671-3_13 Sergunin, A & Konyshev, V. (2019). Forging Russia’s Arctic strategy: actors and decision-making.

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Shchitinskij, V. A., & Minina, M. V. (2018). Problemy upravleniya social'no-ekonomicheskim razvitiem Arkticheskoj zony Rossijskoj Federacii [Problems of Management of Social and Economic Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation]. Upravlencheskoe Konsul'tirovanie, (6), 77–87. https://doi.org/10.22394/1726-1139-2018-5-77-87 Shirov, A. A., Yantovskii, A. A., & Potapenko, V. V. (2015). Evaluation of the Potential Effect of Sanctions on the Economic Development of Russia and the European Union. Studies on Russian Economic Development, 26(4), 317–326. https://doi.org/10.1134/S1075700715040103 The ongoing formation of Russia’s Arctic policy: a new stage?

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Staalesen, A. (2017). Little cash for Russia’s new Arctic development program. The Barents Observer. Retrieved May 12, 2019, from https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2017/08/zero-cash-russias-new-arcticdevelopment-program Staalesen, A. (2019a). Russia is building a new Arctic. With private money. The Barents Observer.

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Stephen, K. (2018). Societal Impacts of a Rapidly Changing Arctic. Current Climate Change Reports, 4(3): 223 - 237. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40641-018-0106-1 TASS (2019). Putin vows Arctic pollution cleanup will continue. Retrieved June 6, 2019, from https://tass.com/politics/1052907 Tatarkin, A. I., Loginov, V. G., & Zakharchuk, E. A. (2017). Socioeconomic problems in development of the Russian Arctic zone. Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 87(1), 12– 21. https://doi.org/10.1134/s101933161701004x The Arctic (2019a). Kobylkin: Waste reform is most difficult in the Arctic. Retrieved June 6, 2019, from https://arctic.ru/forumarctica/20190410/845621.html The Arctic (2018). Trutnev to head State Commission for Arctic Development. Retrieved June 1, 2019, from https://arctic.ru/news/20181212/816496.html The Barents Observer (2014). Moscow kicks regional development out of ministry. Retrieved June 1, 2019, from, https://barentsobserver.com/en/politics/2014/09/moscow-kicksregional-development-out-ministry-11-09 The Barents Observer (2018). It’s an order from the Kremlin: shipping on Northern Sea Route to reach 80 million tons by 2024. Retrieved July 2, 2019, from, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2018/05/its-order-kremlin-shippingnorthern-sea-route-increase-80-million-tons-2024 The Moscow Times (2014). Report: Russia Considers Opening Arctic Ministry. Retrieved June 10, 2019, from, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2014/11/20/report-russiaconsiders-opening-arctic-ministry-a41583

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The Northern Sea Route Administration (2019). Permissions for navigation in the water area of the Northern sea route. Retrieved May 10, 2019, from, http://www.nsra.ru/en/rassmotrenie_zayavleniy/razresheniya.html The Western Arctic Seas Encyclopedia (2017). Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation. In I. S. Zonn, A. G. Kostianoy, & A. V Semenov (Eds.), The Western Arctic Seas Encyclopedia (p.

26). Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-255828_10050 Trenin, D., & P. Baev. (2010) The Arctic: A View from Moscow. Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Centre Vityazeva, V., & Kotyrlo, Е. (2007). Social'no - ekonomicheskoe razvitie Rossijskogo i zarubezhnogo Severa [Socio-economic development of the Russian and foreign North].

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Briefing Note

Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: A roadmap for the future?

Peter Kikkert & P. Whitney Lackenbauer

Introduction On 10 September 2019, Canada’s Liberal government quietly released its long-awaited Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF). After four years of development, the document appeared on the Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs website. It included no photos, maps, or even a downloadable pdf – just a wave of words, over 17,000 in the main chapter alone. The single infographic that accompanied the framework’s release captured its main “highlights”: that a “whole-of-government, co-development” process that created the framework involved the three territorial governments, over 25 Indigenous organizations, as well as three provincial governments.1 This collaborative process represents the “profound change of direction” that the Government of Canada highlights in the opening sentence of the ANPF.3 Iqaluit Mayor Madeleine Redfern noted how “the framework speaks to the fact that we need to be more collaborative, more strategic. It’s not a strategy per se, other than to say we need to actually be working together.”2 The government’s emphasis on collaborative governance recognizes that when Ottawa has defined problems facing the North incorrectly or has set the wrong priorities, with little consultation from Northerners, policy responses have been shortsighted and ineffective. While critics have lauded the process involved in co-developing the framework, they have questioned the hasty release of what seems to be a partially-developed document, coming just a day before the federal government announced Canada’s 2019 federal election. The ANPF appeared with no budget, timelines, or clear plan to address the wide array of challenges and issues identified. Critics have labelled the framework a “half-baked” and “chaotic mess”4 that simply lists well-known issues and gives “lip service to addressing the problems,”5 while providing no “concrete” plan for action.6 Peter Kikkert is the Irving Shipbuilding Chair in Arctic Policy at the Brian Mulroney Institute of Government at St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada., P. Whitney Lackenbauer is Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North at Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada, and lead of the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) funded by the Department of National Defence Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program.

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The ANPF highlights many well-known issues that Northerners have identified for years, including climate change impacts, food insecurity, poverty, health inequalities, and housing shortages. It is useful in reinforcing common understandings of these problems with those most affected, reiterating the importance of these issues to the general Canadian public, and setting priorities for federal policy. The framework also points out that the government and its Indigenous and territorial partners have already acted on some of the challenges and opportunities identified during the long co-development process – particularly through innovative and unique community-based initiatives. The ANPF’s expressed objective, however, is to provide a “roadmap” to achieve the “shared vision” co-developed by the groups involved in the process. If this is a roadmap, it is one with few clear directions – a map that identifies hazards, problems, and opportunities, but does little to illuminate how the federal government will work practically with its partners to navigate the complex terrain around myriad Arctic policy priorities and seemingly intractable political dilemmas.

“Consultation was not enough:” Background of the ANPF Liberal leader Justin Trudeau spent little time talking about the Arctic during the 2015 federal election campaign. His emphasis on the environment and reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, however, indicated how his government would approach northern issues. “No relationship is more important to me and to Canada than the one with Indigenous Peoples,” Trudeau highlighted in his publicly-released mandate letter to each of his Cabinet ministers in November 2015. “It is time for a renewed, nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous Peoples, based on recognition of rights, respect, co-operation, and partnership.”7 In May 2016, the Government of Canada announced its unqualified support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), stressing that “meaningful engagement with Indigenous Peoples aims to secure their free, prior and informed consent when Canada proposes to take actions which impact them and their rights.”8 Trudeau’s focus on reconciliation framed the Joint Statement on Environment, Climate Change, and Arctic Leadership that he and President Obama released in March 2016. The two leaders articulated a shared vision for the Arctic that included close bilateral cooperation, working in partnership with Indigenous Peoples and Northerners, and science-based decision-making in conservation and economic development.9 The US-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement issued that December prioritized “soft security” and safety issues, environmental protection and conservation, the incorporation of Indigenous science and traditional knowledge into decisionmaking, supporting strong communities, and building a sustainable Arctic economy. The leaders also announced a moratorium on Arctic offshore oil and gas activity. (The Liberal government failed to consult with the territorial governments or Northern Indigenous organizations about the moratorium, causing much indignation, particularly in the Northwest Territories).10 Prime Minister Trudeau also used the Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement to announce his plan to “codevelop a new Arctic Policy Framework, with Northerners, Territorial and Provincial governments, and First Nations, Inuit, and Métis People” that would replace his Conservative predecessor Stephen Harper’s Northern Strategy. The Liberal government promised that a collaborative approach would ensure that the views and priorities of Arctic residents and governments would be at the “forefront of policy decisions affecting the future of the Canadian Arctic and Canada’s role in the circumpolar Arctic.” Through the framework’s co-development process Ottawa promised

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that it would “reorganize and reprioritize federal activities in the Arctic” and “link existing federal government initiatives.”11 Trudeau announced that his new framework would include an “Inuit-specific component, created in partnership with Inuit, as Inuit Nunangat [the Inuit homeland comprised of the Inuvialuit settlement region in the Northwest Territories, the entirety of Nunavut, the Nunavik region of Quebec, and the Nunatsiavut region of Newfoundland and Labrador] comprises over a third of Canada’s land mass and over half of Canada’s coast line, and as Inuit modern treaties govern the entirety of this jurisdictional space.”12 The government’s focus on Inuit Nunangat throughout the process represented a significant departure from the approach utilized in Harper’s Northern Strategy, which did not view the Inuit homeland as a cohesive space for policymaking and tended to examine priorities and interventions through the lens of Canada’s three northern territories. The new process reflected the Trudeau government’s distinctions-based approach that “respects the unique rights, interests and circumstances of Inuit, First Nations and Métis peoples” as well as the Inuit Nunangat Declaration on Inuit-Crown Partnership – a “bilateral partnership” to act on shared priorities.13 The adoption of Inuit Nunangat as a central policy framework also reflects the vision articulated a half-century ago by Inuit leaders at the July 1970 Coppermine Conference and by Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (now Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami) when it was created in 1971.14 In August 2016, the federal government appointed longstanding Inuit leader Mary Simon as special representative to Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Carolyn Bennett, reflecting an important step in the Trudeau government’s commitment to co-develop its Northern policy with Indigenous peoples. Simon’s 2016 Interim Report on the Shared Arctic Leadership Model highlighted that a “long history of visions, action plans, strategies and initiatives being devised ‘for the North’ and not ‘with the North’.” She explained that closing the basic gaps between what exists in the Arctic and what other Canadians take for granted should form the core of the government’s new policy.15 The Pan-Territorial Vision, released by the territorial governments in 2017, reiterated these governments’ priorities and stressed the importance of resource development, economic diversification, innovation, and infrastructure to build stronger regional economies.16 The long co-development phase of the ANPF adopted a whole-of-government approach involving a wide array of departments and agencies in the region, the territorial governments, Quebec, Manitoba, and Newfoundland and Labrador. Regional roundtables, public submissions, and other face-to-face engagement initiatives solicited the input of Indigenous groups and other stakeholders.

This new approach to policymaking stressed that “consultation was not enough” and strived to involve stakeholders “in the drafting of the document” to place “the future into the hands of the people who live there.”17

“A Shared Vision”: The framework The main chapter of the ANPF lays out the issues, challenges, and opportunities facing Canada’s Arctic and northern regions and indicates the federal government’s primary goals and objectives.

It details the impacts of climate change, particularly as it affects social and cultural norms, ways of knowing, and on-the-land activities. It also highlights the broad spectrum of socio-economic challenges facing the North, ranging from lack of economic opportunity, to mental health challenges, to food insecurity, and gaps in infrastructure, health care, education, skills development, and income equality across the region. The framework notes the opportunities and challenges that stem from the North’s youthful population, particularly in Nunavut where the median age is just Kikkert & Lackenbauer

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over 26. In its effort to link existing federal initiatives to the ANPF, examples of how the government is already addressing some of these issues in collaboration with its Indigenous and territorial partners are scattered throughout the document.

The ANPF’s first and primary goal is to create conditions so that “Canadian Arctic and northern Indigenous peoples are resilient and healthy.” This priority animates the entire document. To achieve this, the ANPF pledges to end poverty, eradicate hunger, reduce suicides, close the gap on education outcomes, provide greater access to skills developments, adopt culturally appropriate approaches to justice issues, and eliminate the housing crisis in the North. As examples of action already taken, the document notes the government’s ongoing efforts to “support better, more relevant and accessible education,” funding and skills training for community-led food production projects, updates to Nutrition North, and its investment in new addictions treatment facilities in Nunavut and Nunavik. This patchwork of government initiatives has not impressed critics who lament that the framework fails to elucidate a coherent strategy or to establish clear metrics to address the dismal socio-economic and health indicators related to Canada’s North. The document even fails to expand on relatively low-hanging fruit, such as the Harvesters Support Grant (an update to the Nutrition North program that the federal government announced in late 2018). The framework could have answered how this grant will be implemented – details that the government has promised to release for months.18 Despite few details about how the government actually plans to accomplish its overarching goal of “resilient and healthy” northern peoples and communities, this broad vision resonates with its strong commitment to reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, captured in the eighth goal: the promise of a future that “supports self-determination and nurtures mutually respectful relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples.”

Between these two pillars are a broad range of challenges, opportunities, and promises that form a tangled web of underdeveloped priorities. The second goal is strengthened infrastructure, including broadband connectivity, multi-modal transportation infrastructure, multipurpose communications, energy, and transportation corridors, energy security and sustainability at the community-level, and social infrastructure. The ANPF points out that the government has already provided over $190 million in funding for improvements and expansion of existing local air and marine infrastructure.

While these community-focused initiatives are essential to the resilience and well-being of Northerners, the challenge remains how to justify the exorbitant costs associated with much larger “transformative investments in infrastructure.” For example, the policy framework cites the federal government’s investment of $71.7 million through the National Trade Corridors Fund for four Nunavut transportation projects. This funding included $21.5 million for preparatory work to the $500-million Grays Bay Port and Road Project, which, if completed, would create the first road connecting Nunavut to the rest of Canada. The ANPF mentions the project once and provides no detail on how the government plans to support this massive endeavor moving forward.

Furthermore, it is silent on how decision-makers will approach opponents of the project who argue that the road will threaten the Bathurst caribou herd. More generally, how will the government decide which infrastructure projects get what funding when the ANPF and partner documents reiterate that so much investment is required across the North?

The framework highlights the need for “strong, sustainable, diversified, and inclusive local and regional economies,” particularly through increased Indigenous ownership and participation, the reduction of income inequality, the optimization of resource development, economic diversification (including land-based, traditional economic activities), and the enhancement of trade Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: A roadmap for the future?

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and investment opportunities. It cites existing federal efforts such as the Jobs and Tourism Initiative and Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency’s Inclusive Diversification and Economic Advancement in the North (IDEANorth) program, which “makes foundational investments in economic infrastructure, sector development and capacity building.”19 The framework also highlights the idea of a “conservation economy” (which makes conservation an important part of local economies) that the federal government is slowly growing in the Arctic in collaboration with northern Indigenous stakeholders. For instance, the creation of Tallurutiup Imanga Marine Conservation Area, co-developed with the Qikiqtani Inuit Association, has involved the establishment of the Guardians program in Arctic Bay and funding to improve small craft harbours in the adjacent communities. Beyond these measures, however, the framework provides no action plan or economic model for how to grow and diversify the northern economy.

How will the government approach the debate between those who want to heavily regulate resource development and those who believe regulations are strangling the northern economy — a conflict that the framework explicitly acknowledges? The consultations highlighted “comanagement of renewable resources … as a venue for collaborative management that can help integrate different viewpoints,” but the ANPF does not indicate how this will work in practice.

The framework’s fourth goal is to ensure that both Indigenous and scientific knowledge and understanding guide decision-making, and that Arctic and Northern peoples are included in the knowledge-creation process. While the government points to the funding it has already provided for Polar Continental Shelf Program and the Eureka Weather Station, the framework includes no specifics on how it will support and fund its proposed expansion of domestic and international northern research. The same lack of detail on funding and execution is also reflected in discussion of the government’s fifth goal, which focuses on ensuring healthy, resilient Arctic and northern ecosystems and promises action on a wide array of major objectives, ranging from mitigation and adaptation measures to climate change, to sustainable use of the ecosystems and species, and safe and environmentally-responsible shipping.

The sixth and seventh goals highlight measures to strengthen the rules-based international order in the Arctic. Emphasizing that the region is “well known for its high level of international cooperation on a broad range of issues,” and “despite increased interest in the region from both Arctic and non-Arctic states,” the ANPF commits to continued multilateral and bilateral cooperation in the Arctic. It confirms the Arctic Council as the “pre-eminent forum for Arctic cooperation” complemented by the “extensive international legal framework [that] applies to the Arctic Ocean.” There is muscular language proclaiming how Canada “is firmly asserting its presence in the North” and pledges to “more clearly define Canada’s Arctic boundaries” – a surprising statement given that Canada filed its Arctic continental shelf submission in May 2019, and one that seems to deviate from Canada’s longstanding insistence that “Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is longstanding, well-established and based on historic title, founded in part on the presence of Inuit and other Aboriginal peoples since time immemorial” (as written in Conservatives’ Northern Strategy). There are also peculiar statements, such as the need to “regularize a bilateral dialogue with the United States on Arctic issues,” with no clear explanation of where the bilateral relationship is deficient or what this means.20 The overall tenor, however, is generally optimistic and unabashedly projects Canada’s domestic priorities into the international sphere, emphasizing the desire for regional peace and stability so that “Arctic and northern peoples thrive economically, socially and environmentally.” Innovative Kikkert & Lackenbauer

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elements include promises to “champion the integration of diversity and gender considerations into projects and initiatives, guided by Canada’s feminist foreign policy,” and increasing youth engagement in the circumpolar dialogue. Unfortunately, concrete examples of opportunities or new mechanisms to do so are not provided. Similarly, promises to help Arctic and northern businesses to pursue international opportunities “that are aligned with local interests and values” are welcome but vague, and the Trudeau government’s vision for the Arctic Economic Council (AEC) is unclear.

Well-established priorities, such as food security, improving health care services, and suicide prevention, are presented with no reference whatsoever to what has been done to forward these agendas internationally. There are some discernable policy changes, however. NATO is presented as a “key multilateral forum” in the Arctic – a clear shift from the reticence of previous governments who feared unnecessarily antagonizing Russia by having the alliance articulate an Arctic focus. Concurrently, the policy commits to “restart a regular bilateral dialogue on Arctic issues with Russia in key areas related to Indigenous issues, scientific cooperation, environmental protection, shipping and search and rescue” – a welcome acknowledgment that, despite resurgent strategic competition and divergent interests elsewhere in the world, both countries have many common interests in the Arctic.21 Furthermore, Canada commits to “enhance the reputation and participation of Arctic and northern Canadians, especially Indigenous peoples, in relevant international forums and negotiations,” and to promote the “full inclusion of Indigenous knowledge” in polar science and decision making. Specific examples relating to the marine environment, particularly the visionary work of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission, point to the benefits of this approach.

The priorities in the standalone Safety, Security, and Defence chapter include Canada’s continued demonstration of sovereignty, the enhancement of the military presence in the region, the defence of North America, improved domain awareness, strengthened whole-of-society emergency management, and continued engagement with local communities, Indigenous groups, and international partners.22 Much of the discussion reiterates policy elements in Canada’s 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged. It also points to the work around marine safety already accomplished by the Oceans Protection Plan, which has expanded the Coast Guard Auxiliary in the North, created the Indigenous Community Boat Volunteer Pilot Program, extended the Coast Guard’s icebreaking season, and launched an Inshore Rescue Boat Station in Rankin Inlet.23 Given the governmental action already taken through SSE and the OPP, this section of the ANPF provides the most detail on how the government aims to accomplish its objectives.

Moving forward: An unclear roadmap While reiterating many complex challenges and opportunities facing the Arctic, and setting laudable goals such as ending poverty, eradicating hunger, and eliminating the housing crisis in the North, Canada’s “new” Arctic and Northern Policy Framework offers few substantive approaches or mechanisms to meet them. Nunavut Premier Joe Savikataaq called the policy a good beginning but noted, “We will be a lot happier when there is more tangible stuff that comes out.”24 The ANPF concludes with a promise that the government will have ten years to “translate its goals and objectives into reality” and advises that federal-territorial-provincial and Indigenous partners will co-develop solutions and new governance mechanisms. As Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Carolyn Bennett noted after the ANPF’s release, “you begin with the policy and then you work toward implementation … It’s a matter of us now, as we move

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through each budget cycle of each government, having a road map for closing these gaps.”25 With the Liberals securing a minority government in Canada’s October federal election, however, several key questions about this road map will need to be addressed:

How will the government implement the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework?

The absence of a coherent strategy embedded in the ANPF speaks to the complicated process of co-developing policies across a wide and disparate region. Many different voices need to be taken into account. The framework admits that the federal government and its partners could not reach consensus on various issues (undisclosed, of course). Will the federal government be able to codevelop initiatives in the face of differing opinions and priorities, especially around controversial issues such as resource and infrastructure development? How will the government balance its focus on a conservation economy with the desire of groups, such as the Kitikmeot Inuit Association or the Government of the Northwest Territories, for more non-renewable resource development?

More generally, how will the federal government steer this extensive network of stakeholders as it works toward implementation over the next ten years? Will it be able to overcome disagreements and navigate lack of consensus in its efforts to move forward on the ANPF’s goals and objectives?

How do the partner chapters fit into the overall framework?

The inability to reach “unanimous agreement” on issues identified in the ANPF also explains one of the most confusing parts of the entire framework: the Inuit Nunangat, NWT, Nunavut and PanTerritorial chapters that are included as appendices representing “the visions, aspirations and priorities of our co-development partners.” At the beginning of the document, the government asserts that these partner chapters were “crucial” to the co-development process, that they “map out areas of present and future” collaboration between the Government of Canada and its partners, and that they will “provide guidance” on its implementation. At the tail end of the document, however, a caveat notes that these perspectives “do not necessarily reflect the views of either the federal government, or of the other partners.” There is little indication throughout the framework on how exactly these chapters will inform federal policy-making, particularly in areas of disagreement. How will the framework reconcile some of the key differences in the partner chapters, particularly the NWT’s call for a “lifting of the Beaufort Sea Moratorium” and the creation of a co-management agreement for the “responsible and sustainable development” of the region’s offshore resources?26 In April 2019, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami president Natan Obed shed some light on the government’s continued struggle to truly co-develop policies with Northerners.

“After four years, this government is still not necessarily understanding how to transform the working relationship,” he told a reporter. “… How the public service acts and the advice that it gives to any particular minister of the day has been entrenched for so long that we end up fighting that more than we fight the good intentions of ministers.”27 Will the government be able to overcome its own centralizing tendencies to truly co-develop implementation measures that reflect the goals of their partners?

Where will the government’s focus on Inuit Nunangat lead?

Throughout the co-development of the ANPF, Trudeau emphasized its “Inuit-specific component, created in partnership with Inuit” that would take Inuit Nunangat as the primary lens through which to view policies focused on Inuit. In April, Obed was asked whether the long-term goal for Inuit Nunangat was “a contiguous political space with similar jurisdiction to the provinces

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in the south. He replied: “Well, we’ll see where our self-determination takes us.”28 In the end, the ANFP included an Inuit Nunangat chapter as an appendix, which may or may not reflect the views of the federal government. How will Ottawa operationalize its focus on Inuit Nunangat moving forward? Will it support the re-drawing of Canada’s political boundaries if self-determining Inuit decide that this is what they want? How will Inuit Nunangat, as a political jurisdiction, interact with the current roles and responsibilities of public territorial and provincial governments?

Notes 1. See https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-CIRNAC-RCAANC/DAMNTHAFF/STAGING/texte-text/nthanpf_highlights_infograph_pdf_1567701943197_eng.pdf.

2. Alex Brockman, “Ottawa’s new Arctic policy has lofty goals, but few details on how to reach them, critics say,” CBC News, 11 September 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/arctic-policy-framework-short-on-details1.5278433 3. Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs, Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, Government of Canada, 10 September 2019, https://www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/eng/1560523306861/1560523330587.

4. Heather Exner-Pirot, “Canada’s new Arctic policy doesn’t stick the landing,” RCI Eye on the Arctic, 12 September 2019, https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-thearctic/2019/09/12/canada-arctic-northern-policy-trudeau-analysis/.

5. Darrell Greer, “Arctic framework same old, same old,” Kivalliq News, 18 September 2019, https://nunavutnews.com/nunavut-news/arctic-framework-same-old-same-old/ 6. Bob Weber, “New federal Arctic policy focuses on human health, environment, infrastructure,” National Post, 11 September 2019.

7. Prime Minister of Canada, “Ministerial Mandate Letters,” http://pm.gc.ca/eng/ministerial-mandate-letters.

8. Brandi Morin, “Where does Canada sit 10 years after the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples?” CBC News, 13 September 2017.

9. Government of Canada, “U.S.-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic Leadership,” 10 March 2016, https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2016/03/10/uscanada-joint-statement-climate-energy-and-arctic-leadership 10. Government of Canada, “United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement, 20 December 2016,” Government of Canada, https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2016/12/20/united-states-canada-joint-arcticleaders-statement 11. Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, Toward a new Arctic Policy Framework, Government of Canada, https://www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/eng/1499951681722/1537884604444.

12. Government of Canada, “United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement, 20 December 2016,” Government of Canada,

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https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2016/12/20/united-states-canada-joint-arcticleaders-statement 13. Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, “Overview of a Recognition and Implementation of Indigenous Rights Framework,” Government of Canada, https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1536350959665/1539959903708?wbdisable=true; Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, Inuit Nunangat Declaration on Inuit-Crown Partnership, Government of Canada, https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2017/02/09/inuit-nunangat-declaration-inuitcrown-partnership 14. Sarah Bonesteel, “Canada’s Relationship with Inuit: A History of Policy and Program Development,” June 2006, https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100016900/1100100016908.

15. Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, “Shared Arctic Leadership Model Engagement, 2016-2017,” Government of Canada, https://www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/eng/1469120834151/1537886350215 16. Governments of Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon, Pan-Territorial Vision for Sustainable Development, August 2017.

17. Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, “Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework,” https://www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/eng/1560523306861/1560523330587 18. Elaine Anselmi, “Federal government promises more info on harvesters grant this winter,” Nunatsiaq News, 23 August 2019, https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/federalgovernment-promises-more-info-on-harvesters-grant-this-winter/.

19. Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency, Inclusive Diversification and Economic Advancement in the North (IDEANorth), Government of Canada, https://www.cannor.gc.ca/eng/1385477070180/1385477215760.

20. Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, Arctic and Northern Policy Framework International chapter, https://www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/eng/1562867415721/1562867459588; and Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2009), 9.

21. See P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Canada’s Emerging Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: Confirming a Longstanding Northern Strategy,” in Breaking the Ice Curtain?

Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World, eds. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Suzanne Lalonde (Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2019), 1342.

22. Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: Safety, Security, and Defence Chapter, https://www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/eng/1562939617400/1562939658000 23. See Transport Canada, Oceans Protection Plan Initiatives Map, Government of Canada, https://www.tc.gc.ca/en/campaigns/oceans-protection-plan-initiatives-map.html.

24. Siri Gulliksen Tømmerbakke, “Why the Canadians are Provoked by the New and Ambitious Arctic Policy Document,” High North News, 12 September 2019, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/why-canadians-are-provoked-new-and-ambitiousarctic-policy-document.

25. Brockman, “Ottawa’s new Arctic policy has lofty goals.”

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26. Government of the Northwest Territories, Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, https://www.eia.gov.nt.ca/sites/eia/files/arcticnorthernpolicyframework_-_finalweb.pdf 27. Paul Wells, “Inuit leader Natan Obed on working with the Liberals—and his vision for the future,” Maclean’s, 3 April 2019, https://www.macleans.ca/politics/natan-obed-inuitsnc-lavalin-tuberculosis/.

28. Wells, “Inuit leader Natan Obed.”

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Briefing Note

A Commentary on the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Co-operation: Legal and Practical Consequences Emily Tsui

International scientific co-operation in the Arctic is important to the region, and its importance is reflected in existing robust cooperation. In 2018, the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Co-operation (Science Agreement) came into effect. This Agreement aimed to improve access for scientists to the Arctic region and to promote scientific co-operation. On one hand, this Agreement was ground-breaking, as it was the first agreement ascribing legal obligations onto states to promote scientific co-operation in the entirety of the Arctic region. On the other hand, the text of the Agreement gives significant deference to states to implement their policies. Preliminary efforts at implementing the Agreement reflects a diversity of ambition. As a result, the potential of the Agreement to enhance international scientific co-operation is uncertain as the Agreement depends substantially on individual states’ interest.

Introduction Arctic scientific research is crucial for policy makers and the public to understand the causes and the scope of ongoing climatic changes in the region. International collaboration is vital to this research due to the global nature of climate change. The scale of financial, logistical and expert resources required also exceeds the capacities of any individual state (Smieszek, 2017: 440). For the research to be timely and relevant to policy makers, scientific research needs to keep pace with the rapid climatic changes. One of the main challenges that scientists face is access to geographical areas under different jurisdictions and transporting scientific equipment to collect data, conduct experiments, attend conferences, and more (Farrell, 2018: 17).

In 2017, members of the Arctic Council, the pre-eminent intergovernmental forum discussing Arctic matters comprised of the eight Arctic states, adopted the legally binding Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Co-operation (“Science Agreement” or “Agreement”) to tackle the challenge of access. The Agreement’s purpose is to “enhance cooperation in Scientific Activities in order to increase effectiveness and efficiency in the development of scientific knowledge about __________________________________________________________________________________________ Emily Tsui is a Juris Doctor/Master of Global Affairs candidate at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law and Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy.

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the Arctic” (Arctic Council, 2017: art. 2). It is the first instance of a legally binding agreement to promote Arctic scientific research across the entirety of the Arctic region (Smieszek, 2017: 444).

This briefing note examines the legal implications of the Science Agreement for states and the Agreement’s potential to fulfill its objective of enhancing international co-operation on Arctic scientific research. The Science Agreement creates new obligations for states to improve access for scientists. The legal nature of these obligations may be enough to entice states to invest greater political and financial capital on the subject matter of the agreement (Wood-Donnelly, 2013: 300), and empower bureaucrats to overcome domestic political obstacles (Takei, 2014: 367; Nowlan, 2011: 58; Shaffer and Pollack, 2011: 1162). The text of the Agreement gives states much flexibility in interpreting their obligations on implementation. This flexibility permits states with ambitious plans to make robust changes, but it also allows states that are ambivalent about the Agreement’s provisions to act with complacency. This paper concludes that the potential of this Agreement to enhance international scientific co-operation is uncertain as the Agreement depends substantially on individual states’ interest.

Background to the Science Agreement Co-operation is the dominant theme in international relations in the Arctic region. In 1996, Russia, United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland, the eight states with territories in the Arctic Region, established the Arctic Council through the Ottawa Declaration. The mandate of the Arctic Council is to provide a forum for states to collaborate on protecting the Arctic ecosystem, tackling transboundary pollution challenges, and promoting sustainable development in the region (English, 2013: 203-217; Nowlan, 2001: 9). In the last decade, the Arctic Council facilitated the negotiation and the adoption of the three legally binding agreements by the eight Arctic states: the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, and the 2017 Science Agreement. These agreements provide a framework to deepen co-operation on certain issues among the states.

The stable political environment in the Arctic has allowed for collaboration in scientific research to flourish. Networks of scientists established through the Arctic Council, the International Arctic Science Committee (“IASC”), the Arctic Science Partnership, and the University of the Arctic (Rhemann, 2012: 34) have harmonized scientific activities, diffused best practices, and shared costs in conducting research. This international collaboration has produced remarkable results, as seen in two examples that involved hundreds of scientists from across Arctic and non-Arctic states.

First, one of the Arctic Council’s working groups published the 1997 State of the Arctic Environment Report (Arctic Council, 1997: v) and 1998 Assessment Report on Arctic Pollution Issues (Arctic Council, 1998: v). These reports influenced the adoption of the 2004 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Kankaanpää, 2012: 66). Second, Arctic Council working groups and IASC collaborated to produce the 2005 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, a blockbuster report which made the Arctic the “bellwether for global climate change” (Nilsson, 2009: 192). International collaboration on these reports allowed scientists to share best practices in research, and reduced the financial burden on individual states, which would have been considerable given the region’s remoteness and lack of infrastructure.1 The Science Agreement was negotiated with this backdrop of robust co-operation. In 2013, the Arctic Council established the Task Force for Enhancing Scientific Cooperation in the Arctic to Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Co-operation: Legal and Practical Consequences

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improve scientific research cooperation among the eight Arctic states, co-chaired by Russia and the United States (European Commission, 2018). Initially, the Council considered non-legally binding instruments to improve international co-operation in scientific research in the Arctic (Shibata and Raita, 2016: 136). However, Russia then opined that a legally binding agreement would be preferable because the legal status could give the Russian Ministry of Education and Science, the responsible authority for facilitating international scientific co-operation, greater power to mobilize political attention and various sources of government funding. As a result of these discussions, in 2015, the members of the Task Force decided to instead pursue a legally binding arrangement to facilitate international scientific co-operation (Smieszek, 2017: 443). After a total of nine meetings since 2013, the eight Arctic states signed a legally binding agreement comprised of twenty provisions on May 11, 2017 and the Science Agreement entered into force on May 23, 2018 (Arctic Council Secretariat, 2018).

Legal Environment for Arctic scientific research A summary of relevant laws governing Arctic scientific research reveals that an international agreement is needed to facilitate access for scientists (Weidemann, 2014: 140). National laws of countries govern the entry and exit of researchers, scientific equipment, instruments, data, and samples, within their sovereign jurisdictions. Within a country, sub-national governments may impose different and additional regulations on the required permits for scientists. Internationally, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) governs access for scientists conducting marine scientific research; the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears calls on contracting Parties to facilitate access for scientists conducting research on the polar bear species; and the 1920 Svalbard Treaty calls on its contracting Parties to promote conditions conducive to scientific investigations in the Norwegian Spitsbergen archipelago. These agreements do not cover the entire geographic region in the Arctic nor all thematic areas of scientific research.

For Arctic scientists conducting work in different jurisdictions, identifying all the relevant laws and procedures to follow can be difficult.2 These existing arrangements regulate scientific research and encourage scientific co-operation to varying degrees. For example, article 246(3) of UNCLOS calls on coastal states, in normal circumstances, “to grant their consent for marine scientific research projects…[and] to establish rules and procedures ensuring that such consent will not be delayed or denied unreasonably.” A scientist wishing to conduct non-marine scientific research on land does not have the backing of an international legal agreement to file legal challenges against states that delay or obstruct their research. Indeed, since Arctic scientific co-operation is extensive, for a potential agreement to be useful, it would have to focus on overcoming the main barriers that scientists face in terms of access: movements through the region,3 research infrastructure, equipment when moving across borders,4 and the relevant data (Grabowski, Rizzo & Graig, 2016: 77).

A few examples illustrate why a Science Agreement addressing access problems is needed. In one, Chinese students invited by researchers at the University of Alaska to participate in a workshop activity had their visa applications rejected without explanation.5 In another instance, Russian officials delayed an American-operated scientific research cruise for four days upon docking at Murmansk. Despite having prior approval, the Russian officials confiscated the American scientists’ equipment, which disrupted the cruise and damaged confidence in conducting research in Russia (Hinzman, 2018: 13). As well, researchers at the University of Copenhagen reported that

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Russian officials had confiscated their instruments and samples.6 These actions generate uncertainty in conducting scientific research, increase the cost of research, and reduce the timeliness of reporting results. A legally binding agreement could address some of these issues.

Legal implications of the Science Agreement This paper focuses on the provisions of the Science Agreement that are related to access.

Provisions covering intellectual property (art. 3), opportunities for emerging scientists (art. 8), and local and traditional knowledge (art. 9) are beyond the scope of this paper. Other provisions discuss amendments (art. 18), provisional application, entry into force, and withdrawal (art. 19), and depositary (art. 20) are not discussed further. The following section analyses the clauses that have legal implications for the Parties (the Arctic states) or alter the existing environment for cooperation in scientific research in the Arctic.

Article 1 defines “facilitates” as pursuing all necessary procedures, including giving timely consideration and making decisions as expeditiously as possible. The scope of “all necessary procedures,” “timely,” and “as possible” are not defined in detail and are left to the interpretation of the Parties.

Article 4 addresses the movement of persons, equipment, and material across borders. This provision calls on Parties to use their best efforts to facilitate entry to, and exit from, its territory of persons, research platforms, materials, samples, data, and equipment of the Participants. No other existing multilateral legal agreement relating to Arctic scientific research creates this obligation. “Best efforts” is not clarified in this provision nor in subsequent ones.

Article 5 covers access to research infrastructure and facilities. This provision calls on Parties to use their best efforts to facilitate access for participants to national civilian research infrastructure, facilitates, and logistical services. This is a broader legal obligation than the one ascribed in articles 4 and 5 of the Svalbard Treaty, which allows the Treaty’s contracting Parties to use wireless telegraphy stations on Svalbard. The Science Agreement’s Article 5 covers more research stations in different areas and types.

Article 6 provides more details about access to research areas. Article 6(1) states that the Parties shall facilitate access to terrestrial, coastal, atmospheric, and marine areas to conduct research. This article is like Articles 239 and 255 of UNCLOS, which calls on states to “promote…marine scientific research.” In the context of the Arctic, the Science Agreement covers a relatively larger geographic area than UNCLOS to conduct research, since UNCLOS only covers marine areas.

Article 6(2) of the Science Agreement states that Parties shall facilitate the processing of applications to conduct marine scientific research consistent with UNCLOS. Article 6(3) calls on Parties to facilitate joint Scientific Activities that require airborne scientific data collection in the Identified Geographic Areas of the Agreement. Articles 6(2) and 6(3) are more precise obligations as they identify a certain research theme (maritime and airborne). Overall, Article 6 also does not prescribe a specific set of actions for states to undertake.

Article 7 addresses access to data. Article 7(1) states that Parties shall facilitate access to scientific information in connection to Scientific Activities. Article 7(2) calls on Parties to support full and open access to scientific metadata, encourage open access to scientific data, data products and published results with minimum time delay, preferably online and free of charge at no more than the cost of reproduction and delivery. Article 7(3) calls on Parties to facilitate distribution and Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Co-operation: Legal and Practical Consequences

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sharing of scientific data and metadata. Networks such as IASC and the Arctic Data Committee (Arctic Data Committee, n.d.) already work substantially in this area, and states have been involved in this work by funding data sharing projects and sharing data it collects (Rogne & Rachold, 2015: 57-58). This Agreement makes it a legal obligation for states to facilitate access to data, but leaves it up to the state to decide how they would like to do so.

Article 10 notes that the Agreement does not alter international, national, and subnational laws, procedures, and regulations. Activities and obligations conducted pursuant to the Agreement must respect those arrangements. If states wish to change their domestic laws and regulations to enhance scientific co-operation, they may do so, but the Agreement does not impose that obligation.

Under Article 11, Parties bear their own costs from implementing the Agreement, and implementation is subject to the availability of relevant resources. This is consistent with the Arctic Council’s work, as all activities conducted by the Council are funded on a voluntary basis from contributions of states. There is no prescribed minimum that Parties should commit to in implementing the Agreement.

Article 12 states that there shall be a meeting to review this Agreement no later than a year after its entry into force to discuss the status of implementation. This meeting occurred on 11 March 2019.7 As per the Agreement, Parties can choose when to hold future meetings, and it is likely that it will be held in 2020 in conjunction with the Arctic Science Summit Week in Iceland.8 Asides from the initial meeting, there is no legal obligation in the Agreement for a periodic review of the states’ undertakings to implement the Agreement. Unlike the two other legally binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, there is no working group to support or monitor the Agreement’s implementation. The other two legally binding agreements were the product of a working group, which is a permanent body of the Arctic Council. The Science Agreement was the result of a Task Force, which disbands after the Task Force’s work is complete.

The Task Force’s job was to work on an arrangement to promote scientific co-operation. Its result was the agreement, so it disbanded.

Article 13 calls on states to designate a competent national authority as the responsible point of contact responsible for the Agreement’s implementation, which is listed in Annex II. These designated authorities are located within a state’s agency conducting and funding scientific research (such as Polar Knowledge Canada, the US Arctic Research Commission, or the Research Council of Norway), ministry of education and culture (such as in Finland), ministry of foreign affairs, or a combination of these. The lists of competent authorities outlined in Annex II help stakeholders identify the starting point for dialogue, which enhances the efficiency of their interactions. Annex II of the Agreement lists general contact points (for example in Canada, the email address provided was info@polar.gc.ca rather than a specific person), but subsequent correspondences between Parties resulted in a more detailed list.

Article 15 calls on states to settle disputes through direct negotiations. This is identical to the dispute resolution provision in other two legally binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council (art. 17 of the SAR Agreement and art. 18 of the MOPPR Agreement), which calls for states to engage in direct consultations. Arctic states that are parties to UNCLOS are still entitled to use the dispute resolution mechanism (for example, arbitration or judicial settlement) for disputes on marine scientific research covered by part XV of UNCLOS.

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Article 17 states that Parties may continue to enhance and facilitate co-operation with non-Parties for Arctic scientific research and this provision to co-operate with non-Parties is not legally binding on Parties. This is important because Arctic science is global and has always been conducted between Arctic and non-Arctic states.9 This provision has been criticized in other scholarly works, such as the ones by Shibata and Raita (158-162), and Liu (55), for potentially creating a two-tier system in the Arctic. This could hinder rather than promote international co-operation on science.

Potential of the Science Agreement The effectiveness of an Agreement to enhance scientific co-operation is assessed by how likely it is to encourage states to act to reduce barriers of access. An effective Agreement means that states are likely to take concrete steps at an international and national level to reduce barriers of access for scientists. An ineffective Agreement means that states are unlikely to act, and the Agreement does not do much to change the status quo.

Several features of the Agreement suggest that it has a high potential to encourage states to reduce barriers to access. First, the Agreement helps to co-ordinate national efforts to facilitate access by identifying four areas of improvement: entry and exit of persons, research infrastructure, research areas, and data. It provides a framework for states to fill in the gaps left in pre-existing legal arrangements. Second, the designated contact list of implementing authorities may help to overcome scientists’ access problems at an international level. Scientists experiencing challenges in travelling or moving equipment across the Arctic are able to more easily resolve their issue, as they can identify an individual in each of the governments of the Arctic states whose job is to implement this Agreement and facilitate access.10 Third, as the Russian delegation noted, the Agreement’s legal status may be sufficient to incentivize states to act. A legally binding instrument can hold states accountable to their commitments (Bodansky, 2015: 162), entice states to commit greater political and financial capital on the subject matter of the agreement (Wood-Donnelly, 2013: 300), raise the political profile of an issue (Nowlan, 2001: 58) and empower bureaucrats to overcome domestic political obstacles (Takei, 2014: 367; Nowlan, 2001: 58; Shaffer & Pollack, 2011: 1162).

At the same time, examining the text of the Agreement reveals that there is a lot of flexibility for states to act, which increases the unpredictability of the Agreement’s potential to facilitate access.

As described above, this flexibility is seen in the varying possible ways to interpret the definition of “facilitate” or “best efforts,” the voluntary nature of funding, and minimal obligations for states to report their activities to the other Parties. This flexibility, if aligned with a national government that embraces the Science Agreement, could lead that state to ambitiously implement the Agreement. The state could change national laws that would make it easier for scientists to enter and exit their jurisdiction, access research infrastructure and research areas, and data. However, since the provisions do not prescribe a minimum standard of involvement, the flexibility of the Agreement’s provisions could also mean that the state does nothing to implement the Agreement.11 Overall, this flexibility suggests that implementation of the Science Agreement will vary between states.

The Agreement’s early days of implementation provides some indication as to direction of the Science Agreement. At the 11 March 2019 meeting to review the implementation of the Agreement, each state presented their position to the rest of the Parties.12 Polar Knowledge Canada reported that it is developing “resource checklists” that scientists can use to make sure they have all the relevant permits in the jurisdiction they are entering, given the fragmented nature of the Canadian Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Co-operation: Legal and Practical Consequences

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laws governing scientific research.13 The US Arctic Research Commission is working with the State Department to draft a letter that international scientists can attach to their visa application to enter the United States, with reference specifically to the Science Agreement.14 These efforts by Canada and the US are examples of concrete action, though modest, that states have taken to facilitate access for scientists in light of the Agreement. On the other hand, even though Russia was influential in shaping the nature of the Agreement, it did not present any deliverables in the form of a new initiative or program at the meeting.15 It is possible that the states’ initiatives would have occurred in the absence of a Science Agreement (Smieszek, 2017: 445). However, from limited conversations with implementing authorities, it appears that at least some of these initiatives began because the Agreement focused states’ attention to the challenges of scientific co-operation. One can only speculate whether a legally binding agreement was necessary for the creation of these initiatives, or if a memorandum of understanding would have been enough. Nonetheless, the Agreement appears to have successfully mobilized some bureaucrats to undertake new initiatives to enhance co-operation in their capacities as implementing authorities. At the time of writing, no states reported invoking the legal status of the Agreement to compel an immigration or border official to allow for speedier visa processing times or easier entry and exit procedure for Arctic scientific researchers. It is unknown whether scientists have mentioned the Science Agreement to a permitting or immigration official as a basis for their entry, and if they did, whether that mention changed the position of the official.

Conclusion The Science Agreement is a legally binding instrument with a purpose to enhance scientific cooperation in the Arctic, where co-operation has historically been robust. Based on the text, it appeared that its potential to achieve its purpose is unclear. In implementing the Agreement, states have worked to improve communications between the incoming scientist and the state, or within a state’s ministries and agencies, on entry and permitting procedures or informing them of the existence of the Agreement.

International scientific co-operation serves the common interests of many states. The Science Agreement sheds light on what role a legally binding instrument can play to enhance this cooperation. This assessment of the Agreement suggests that a legally binding instrument can have a role, but its success depends on states’ ambitions. Given the number of climatic changes that are currently ongoing in the Arctic and globally, examining the potential of a legally binding agreement can be helpful to see how this instrument can help states understand these changes.

Notes 1. G. Song, personal communication, 11 March 2019. Gloria Song is a senior policy analyst at Polar Knowledge Canada.

2. G. Song, personal communication, 11 March 2019.

3. J. Farrell, personal communication, 28 February 2019. John Farrell is Executive Director of the US Arctic Research Commission. He has attended the meetings for the negotiation and implementation of the Science Agreement.

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4. F. Dichmann, personal communication, 26 February 2019. Frej Dichmann is a senior advisor at the Danish Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation. He has attended the meetings for the negotiation and implementation of the Science Agreement.

5. J. Farrell, personal communication, 17 March 2019.

6. F. Dichmann, personal communication 26 February 2019.

7. V. Rachold, personal communication, 27 February 2019. Volker Rachold is head of the German Arctic Office. He has attended as part of the German delegation, which is an observer to the Arctic Council, at meetings regarding scientific co-operation. He previously served as Executive Secretary of IASC during the negotiation of the Science Agreement and attended meetings of the Scientific Co-operation Task Force.

8. V. Rachold, personal communication, 25 March 2019.

9. G. Song, personal communication, 11 March 2019.

10. J. Farrell, personal communication, 17 March 2019.

11. F. Dichmann, personal communication, 22 March 2019.

12. A. Pope, personal communication, 8 February 2019. Allen Pope is Executive Secretary of IASC. He has been present, in IASC’s capacity as an observer state to the Arctic Council, during discussions of the Arctic states about scientific co-operation.

13. G. Song, personal communication, 11 March 2019.

14. J. Farrell, personal communication, 17 March 2019.

15. J. Farrell, personal communication, 17 March 2019. F. Dichmann, personal communication, 22 March 2019.

Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Co-operation: Legal and Practical Consequences

Briefing Note

Model Arctic Council at secondary school Anthony Speca

Growing interest in the Arctic Council amongst scholars and educators has recently stimulated a number of Model Arctic Councils (MACs). MACs are pedagogical simulations in which participants play the role of delegate to a cycle of Arctic Council meetings. MACs are normally aimed at university students, particularly postgraduates and advanced undergraduates, but since 2016 I have developed and launched two MACs at secondary schools in the UK and Spain: Norwich MAC (NORMAC) and MAC Bilbao. In this paper, I describe how these MACs work, and I discuss challenges to running secondary-school MACs, including attracting participants, assisting with preparatory research and consensus building, balancing realism with creative learning, and sustaining interest in the Arctic. I highlight differences with university MACs, as well as deviations from actual Arctic Council procedures designed to accommodate secondary-school pupils. I also evaluate data from surveys of delegates to four MAC conferences over two years: NORMAC 2018 and 2019, and MAC Bilbao 2018 and 2019. These data show that both MACs are meeting their educational objectives of raising awareness and understanding of the Arctic amongst secondary-school pupils; inspiring them to learn more about the region, its peoples and its challenges; and helping develop their skills in public speaking, negotiation and consensus building. I conclude with a brief discussion of future plans for secondary-school MACs.

Introduction The Arctic Council will celebrate its twenty-fifth anniversary in 2021 at the end of the current Icelandic chairmanship. As the Arctic Council’s profile as the premier high-level forum for international Arctic cooperation has grown, so too has specialist interest in its structure, procedures and effectiveness (see for instance Axworthy, Koivurova & Hasanat, 2012; Heininen, Exner-Pirot & Plouffe, 2016; Nord, 2016; Lackenbauer, Nicol & Greaves, 2017). Amongst some educators concerned with the Arctic, this interest has also stimulated a small but increasing number of Model Arctic Councils (MACs). MACs are experiential learning exercises at which pupils or students, playing the roles of civil servants and diplomats attending a simulated cycle of Arctic Council meetings, discuss salient issues facing the region and try to build consensus around solutions.

Anthony Speca is Managing Principal at Polar Aspect; Adjunct Professor in the School for the Study of Canada, Trent University; and a secondary school teacher at Norwich School.

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Perhaps the most notable MAC to date is the biennial conference developed by the University of the Arctic (UArctic), a consortium of universities concerned with Arctic-related education and research, and which itself was originally an Arctic Council initiative (Ehrlander & Boylan, 2017).

After a successful pilot in 2014 at the Northern Arctic Federal University in Arkhangelsk, Russia, the UArctic MAC was officially launched in 2016 at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, during the US chairmanship of the Arctic Council. It has now convened a second time in 2018, at the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi, Finland, during the Finnish chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Having focused on education as one of the thematic priorities of their chairmanship, the Government of Finland highlighted the UArctic MAC as a significant deliverable of their programme, and they provided financial support to the Rovaniemi UArctic MAC (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2017; UArctic MAC Thematic Network, 2018).

As a secondary-school teacher, as well as a university educator and a former policy official with the Government of Nunavut in the Canadian Arctic, I take a special interest in the MAC concept. But very few MACs advertised to date have been organised for secondary-school pupils rather than university students (see Table 1). Indeed, many participants in the Fairbanks UArctic MAC were not undergraduates but postgraduates, and the Rovaniemi UArctic MAC was explicitly advertised to postgraduates and advanced undergraduates. Such senior students have the specialised academic backgrounds to understand the often highly technical work of the Arctic Council (Ehrlander & Boylan, 2017; UArctic MAC Thematic Network, 2018).

However, similar experiential learning simulations have been organised for secondary-school pupils for many decades. Model United Nations (MUN) is the best known, but Model International Court of Justice, European Youth Parliament and others are regular events. My own experience introducing MUN at Norwich School convinced me of the potential educational value of secondary-school MACs. Inspired to share with pupils my own experience of and enthusiasm for the Arctic, I developed and launched the Norwich Model Arctic Council (NORMAC) at Norwich School in the UK in 2016.

The educational objectives of NORMAC are to raise awareness and understanding of the Arctic amongst secondary-school pupils; to inspire them to learn more about the region, its peoples and its challenges; and to help develop their skills in public speaking, negotiation and consensusbuilding. Now entering its fifth year, NORMAC has also generated a second MAC series at Colegio Ayalde in Bilbao, Spain, which is convened in conjunction with that school’s annual MUN conference. Inaugurated in 2018, ‘MAC Bilbao’ is now entering its third year, and it shares the same objectives as its sister conference.

Compared with simulations of large and well-known organisations such as the UN, MACs offer a more specialised and ‘niche’ learning experience, whether at university or secondary school. Yet with the Arctic looming ever larger in public consciousness thanks to climate change, MACs fill an educational gap. Especially at secondary school, pupils learn very little about the Arctic, and the general public tend to conceive of it either as an endangered and pristine wilderness to be protected at all costs, or a newly accessible global resource frontier over which the Arctic States and other powers are ‘scrambling’ to stake their claims (Pincus & Ali, 2016). By exposing pupils to the complexities of Arctic governance, MACs help develop an early and more nuanced understanding of an increasingly important global region, as well as the people who call it home.

Model Arctic Council at secondary school

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To my knowledge, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao are the only secondary-school MACs in the world today. Indeed, perhaps only two other MACs have ever been convened specifically at this level— both in 2010, and both apparently as special, one-off events (see Table 1). For secondary-school pupils familiar with global issues and the UN, but not with Arctic issues or the Arctic Council, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao represent an exciting new format of model diplomacy. For educators, policymakers and others concerned with the Arctic, they represent a useful new channel through which to promote interest in the region amongst youth.

With such promotion in mind, I shall explain in this paper how NORMAC and MAC Bilbao work, and I shall discuss a few of the challenges involved in running MACs at the secondary-school level.

I shall also present survey evidence suggesting that NORMAC and MAC Bilbao have had considerable positive educational impact on participating pupils—or ‘delegates’ as they are known.

Finally, in the hope that this paper sparks interest in supporting or attending NORMAC or MAC Bilbao, I shall provide information on future events and plans.

How NORMAC and MAC Bilbao work Interested readers can find full details of NORMAC online, including detailed delegate materials for download (see Table 2). MAC Bilbao lacks a dedicated website distinct from that of MUN Bilbao, but basic information and some delegate materials can be found online (see Table 2). Rather than rehearse publicly available information here, I shall instead offer a general overview of NORMAC and MAC Bilbao procedures, noting particularly certain deviations from Arctic Council procedures (Arctic Council, 1996 & 2012; Arctic Council Secretariat, 2013). I have adopted these deviations purposefully to allow for the still-maturing capacities of secondary-school pupils, as I explain in the following section.

Both NORMAC and MAC Bilbao work in very much the same fashion. Delegates from participating schools gather at the host school, which provides meeting rooms, materials, catering, social activities, and a team of pupils to help with conference administration. Registration fees defray some of the associated costs, but the host school covers any excess, including any reduced fees or other such assistance for deserving schools. NORMAC 2017 and NORMAC 2018 also benefitted from additional funding from host-school benefactors, and MAC Bilbao 2018 and 2019 benefitted from additional private sponsorship of the MUN alongside which it ran. Delegates and their schools are themselves responsible for registration fees, and for the costs of any travel or accommodation.

Over the course of the event—two days in the case of NORMAC 2018 and three days in the case of NORMAC 2019, MAC Bilbao 2018 and MAC Bilbao 2019—delegates then simulate a cycle of Arctic Council meetings. Just as the Arctic Council does, but in a vastly compressed timescale, they begin in Working Groups, proceed through a meeting of Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) and end with a Ministerial meeting. The number of Working Groups simulated depends on logistical issues such as delegate numbers and room space. Working Groups simulated at past NORMAC and MAC Bilbao conferences include the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) and the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).

Like Arctic Council Working Groups, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao Working Groups operate cooperatively. They pass the results of their work to SAOs, who base their recommendations to

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Ministers upon them. However, unlike at the Arctic Council, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao Working Groups immediately begin to draft formal ‘declarations’ on the issues on the conference agenda.

SAOs and Ministers then consider and amend these declarations and Ministers ultimately decide them. If time permits, Ministers may also consider special political issues determined to be inappropriate for the more technical Working Groups. At the end of each conference, all declarations passed at the Ministerial are collected into a ‘Norwich Declaration’ or ‘Bilbao Declaration’, imitating the Arctic Council’s own toponymous declarations.

Delegates to NORMAC and MAC Bilbao consider issues that range widely over current questions facing the Arctic as a region (see Table 3). These issues reflect the actual thematic priorities set by the country concurrently holding the Arctic Council chairmanship. However, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao delegates may also consider issues normally excluded from Arctic Council meetings, such as commercial fishing (Molenaar, 2015), and issues typically reserved for other international bodies, such as whaling. Nonetheless, at both conferences the Arctic Council’s constitutional rule against discussing military security matters remains in force.

The Arctic Council is well known for its collegial atmosphere, even at times of tension between members elsewhere in the world (Heininen, Exner-Pirot & Plouffe, 2015). NORMAC and MAC Bilbao rules are designed to encourage common effort amongst delegates, particularly during Working Group meetings, when delegates draft declarations jointly. In keeping with clause 7 of the Ottawa Declaration which established the Arctic Council, all decisions at NORMAC and MAC Bilbao must be taken by full consensus of delegates from the Arctic States. However, unlike at the Arctic Council, delegates from Indigenous Permanent Participant (PP) organisations also have a vote, even though their votes can be overridden by countervailing unanimity amongst Arctic-State delegates, in line with Arctic Council rules.

Like the Arctic Council, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao employ a ‘Secretariat’. However, the NORMAC and MAC Bilbao Secretariats exercise much wider functions than the Arctic Council Secretariat. Consisting of myself and colleagues and pupils from the host school, these Secretariats not only take responsibility for conference administration, but also monitor compliance with the rules of procedure imposed especially at SAO and Ministerial meetings. Members of the Secretariat also chair all meetings as a neutral party, unlike at the Arctic Council where one of the Arctic States holds the rotating chair. Finally, drawing on my own Arctic policy experience, I personally conduct special briefings for delegates ahead of the Ministerial, offering advice on the issues to be decided.

Like all model diplomacy, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao are games of persuasion and influence. I encourage delegates not to think of their conference as a competition, but rather to seek mutually agreeable solutions to difficult and often controversial political, social and environmental problems.

At the same time, I remind them that they should not reach consensus by sacrificing the interests of the Arctic State or PP organisation that they fictively represent. As an incentive, delegates are eligible to receive commendations at the end of the conference based on how effectively they drove consensus, how well they researched and prepared their positions, and how credibly they acted their assigned roles.

Finally, like real diplomatic gatherings, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao are multi-day affairs involving shared meals and social events alongside the rounds of meetings. At MAC Bilbao these activities are subsumed under the wider MUN Bilbao agenda, but at NORMAC they provide a further opportunity to spotlight the Arctic. For example, the keynote speaker at the NORMAC 2017 Model Arctic Council at secondary school

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welcome dinner was the recently appointed head of the UK’s observer delegation to the Arctic Council. At NORMAC 2018, delegates engaged in a question-and-answer session with the filmmakers behind Village at the End of the World, a documentary film about contemporary life in the remote village of Niaqornat, Greenland, and they later gathered for a private screening of the film. Delegates may also be exposed to wider issues that have bearing on the Arctic or Arctic governance. For instance, at NORMAC 2019, the keynote speaker was an expert on evidencebased policy-making, an issue of critical significance to the Arctic Council, considering the scientific foundation of its work (Kankaanpää & Young, 2012; Exner-Pirot et al., 2019).

Challenges to running a secondary-school MAC I have written briefly in a previous issue of this publication about a few of the early challenges involved in launching NORMAC (Speca, 2016). I shall revisit those challenges here, in the context of making MACs accessible to secondary-school pupils, and I shall discuss other challenges as well.

I shall also make some comparisons with university MACs, drawing in part on observations from a ‘NORMAC University’ for junior undergraduates that I convened in June 2019 in collaboration with Trent University and the University of East Anglia, as well as from a panel discussion on MACs that I co-convened in July 2017 at the Ninth International Congress of Arctic Social Sciences, together with Jeff Kormos, a delegate to the Fairbanks UArctic MAC. Five challenges involved in running a secondary-school MAC stand out for discussion: • • • • •

What would attract pupils to a MAC, instead of a MUN or some other model diplomacy conference?

How can pupils be assisted with MAC research and preparation, especially assuming no prior exposure to the Arctic?

How can pupils be encouraged through the process of building consensus, which is difficult even for adult professionals?

What balance should a secondary-school MAC strike between strict realism on the one hand, and creative learning on the other?

How can pupils’ newfound interest in the Arctic be sustained after the MAC ends?

I shall tackle each question in turn, with reference to practices I have instituted at NORMAC and MAC Bilbao.

MACs vs MUNs The first question is particularly important at the secondary-school level, since pupils have not normally conceived any special interest in the Arctic, nor even necessarily in a particular field of study. In contrast to the university curriculum, the secondary-school curriculum is mostly fixed, and it does not easily accommodate Arctic- or MAC-related teaching and learning. Most of the postgraduate and advanced undergraduate delegates to the Fairbanks UArctic MAC, by contrast, had prior interest in the Arctic or had studied the region academically, and some even had personal experience of life in the circumpolar North. A few of the junior undergraduate delegates to NORMAC University had studied the Arctic as well, and the majority who had not had nevertheless embarked on specialised degree programmes in international relations, geography, environmental science and the like.

Secondary-school pupils also tend to have far fewer unscheduled academic hours for MAC research and preparation than university students do, as well as numerous other organised extracurricular

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options on which to spend their limited free time. These competing options include other model diplomacy conferences, such as MUNs, which are already well embedded in the secondary-school context and which tend to attract the same internationally-minded set of pupils. Yet unlike MUNs, which are geographically and thematically diffuse, MACs offer pupils the chance to explore more deeply a region of the world that is now attracting great interest. Moreover, as a UK-based MUN consultant put it to me, MACs can offer an antidote to ‘MUN fatigue’—that is, they represent a novel alternative for pupils who have attended perhaps too many MUNs throughout their secondary-school careers (A. Payne, personal communication, 2016).

There is indeed a very large number of secondary-school MUNs that pupils can attend, especially in Europe and North America. At least in part to attract delegates, some MUN convenors offer alternative simulations alongside their conferences. Robert Stern’s Model International Court of Justice, developed in conjunction with The Hague International MUN (THIMUN), and now offered alongside many THIMUN-affiliated MUNs globally, is a well-known example within secondary-school MUN circles. MAC Bilbao, offered alongside MUN Bilbao, is itself also an example of this trend.

To differentiate NORMAC and MAC Bilbao from the many available MUN conferences, I emphasise two unusual features of the Arctic Council that distinguish it from the UN and other intergovernmental fora—the category of Indigenous PP, and the rule of consensus (Brigham, Exner-Pirot, Heininen & Plouffe, 2016; Nord, 2016). At most MUNs, delegates typically play representatives from UN Member States only. At MACs, by contrast, delegates play representatives from PPs as well as Arctic States, and all MAC delegates must grapple with the ideas of indigeneity and Indigenous rights. Many pupils in their teenage years are very sensitive to issues of fairness and justice, and in my experience they are motivated by the challenges that Arctic Indigenous peoples face, and by the idea of the Arctic as an Indigenous homeland.

Similarly, at most MUNs delegates pass motions or declarations by simple majority vote. At MUNs employing THIMUN rules of procedure—which include most secondary-school MUNs outside North America—delegates may also pass more than one competing declaration on each issue discussed. By contrast, MAC delegates must build real consensus in order to influence proceedings.

At NORMAC and MAC Bilbao, delegates may not take any decisions except by unanimous vote, and they may ultimately pass no more than one jointly drafted and negotiated declaration on each issue. Just as at the Arctic Council, unanimity need only involve the Arctic States, and not necessarily PPs. But even this rule encourages delegates to consider carefully the relationships between Arctic States and their Indigenous peoples, and to aim for the Arctic Council ideal of full PP agreement.

All the same, most secondary-school pupils have little or no exposure to the Arctic, and they are only just beginning to develop mature interpersonal skills. They require support from their teachers to profit from their exposure to a nuanced picture of the Arctic, and from the discipline of a rule of consensus. Yet secondary-school pupils are not alone in needing teacherly help to benefit fully from their MACs. The conveners of the Fairbanks UArctic MAC, for instance, assigned preparatory reading and writing to their undergraduate and postgraduate delegates. Reflecting after the conference on the obstacles to delegate agreement, the convenors also suggested that delegates to future UArctic MACs should undergo training in effective communication and cultural sensitivity (Ehrlander & Boylan, 2017).

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Assistance with preparation As I mentioned above, the fixed secondary-school curriculum does not easily accommodate teaching and learning about the Arctic. For this reason, secondary-school pupils cannot be expected to achieve the sort of facility with Arctic issues that university students might do, and the material content of a secondary-school MAC cannot be as technical and rigorous as that of a university MAC. But in my experience, if preparatory work is properly signposted and support from teachers is in place, most delegates can gain enough basic knowledge of the Arctic to learn effectively from their MACs. As one teacher preparing delegates for NORMAC 2018 wrote to me, ‘I first considered the questions [i.e. issues on the conference agenda] too difficult, but the students proved me wrong’ (K. Vackova, personal communication, 2018).

In order to aid delegates and their teachers with pre-conference research and preparation, I provide a number of resources. First, with the support of the Arctic Portal, I have established a small online ‘MAC Research Library’, featuring not only specialised documents and publications on specific Arctic issues, but also general introductory and educational materials about the Arctic and the Arctic Council (see Table 2). Second, I circulate short ‘research briefs’ on the issues to be discussed at the conference, which include open-ended questions to stimulate further thinking. Third, I provide some research links and tips both on the NORMAC website and in materials circulated to delegates ahead of the conference. Finally, at the conference itself, I conduct personalised briefings with delegates ahead of the simulated Ministerial, at which I play the role of a policy advisor interpreting SAO recommendations, and presenting options as appropriate to the tone and path of proceedings.

The depth and quality of delegate preparation for NORMAC and MAC Bilbao varies, just as it does at university MACs and other diplomatic simulations (Hazelton & Mahurin, 1986; Haack, 2008; Ehrlander & Boylan, 2017). As model diplomacy is an extracurricular activity at most schools, delegates and their teachers must find time to prepare outside of the usual school day, typically in the context of an after-school club. Delegate registration closes at least two months ahead of the conference, at which point delegates are assigned roles and the ‘research briefs’ noted above, allowing them time to research their particular Arctic State or PP, and to strategise their approach to negotiating the issues on the conference agenda. Ideally, delegates would also have conducted more general reading about the Arctic even before knowing roles and issues.

Some delegates take their preparatory research very seriously. Delegates assigned to play Denmark at NORMAC 2017, for example, contacted the SAO at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enquire after details of actual Danish policies on the issues on the conference agenda. They met with an informative reply (N. Dignum, personal communication, 2017).

Encouragement toward consensus Even after thorough preparation, achieving consensus on contentious issues in the course of a few days is a formidable task for secondary-school pupils. Most NORMAC and MAC Bilbao delegates are senior pupils of 15 to 17 years of age, mature enough to recognise that MACs necessitate collaboration, but inexperienced at finding the bridging solutions to facilitate it. For this reason, I have found it useful to take a number of steps to assist delegates with consensus building, most of which entail deviating from actual Arctic Council procedure.

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As noted, actual Arctic Council Working Groups are purely expert bodies pursuing specific technical programmes or projects. Their scientific assessments of issues facing the Arctic are at the core of the Arctic Council’s work, and they serve to shape the policy agenda (Kankaanpää & Young, 2012; Exner-Pirot et al., 2019). At the Fairbanks UArctic MAC, the postgraduate and advanced undergraduate delegates simulated this technical work in their Working Groups, including for example actual SDWG projects on water quality and suicide prevention (Ehrlander & Boylan, 2017). Similarly, at NORMAC University, junior undergraduate delegates collaborated to draft an ‘issue report’ in their Working Group, which served as a jointly-agreed base of evidence for the subsequent development of a political declaration at SAO and Ministerial levels.

At NORMAC and MAC Bilbao, by contrast, Working Groups are more like issue-driven committees than task-based expert bodies. After brief introductory speeches, delegates begin straightaway to draft formal ‘declarations’ for consideration by SAOs, and ultimately decision by Ministers. Whilst delegates need not agree on every item submitted upwards to SAOs and Ministers, achieving consensus on multiple issues in a short timeframe becomes impracticable for youthful non-experts without this early common effort to hammer out mutually acceptable wording for the Norwich and Bilbao Declarations.

At the same time, to remain as true as possible to the collaborative nature of Arctic Council Working Groups, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao Working Groups are structured as round-table discussions rather than oppositional debates, with the chair acting more as facilitator than adjudicator. In order to support collaboration further, I also require delegates to prepare brief ‘discussion papers’ detailing their Arctic State or PP’s perspective on the issue to be considered.

Discussion papers are due one or two weeks before the conference begins, and I circulate them to all delegates in good time for them to familiarise themselves with their counterparts’ views.

Sustaining an atmosphere in which consensus can be built also requires delegates to feel that their MAC is run transparently, and that each of them has a fair chance to participate fully. For this reason, at NORMAC and MAC Bilbao I apply formal rules of procedure at the SAO and Ministerial meetings, which dictate the order in which delegates may speak, and how they may introduce, discuss and decide matters. Based loosely on the actual procedures of the UN General Assembly, these rules are not wholly in keeping with the Arctic Council’s own less formal and more collegiate approach, and there were no similarly formal rules governing the UArctic Fairbanks MAC. But they do provide secondary-school delegates with a clear framework for achieving as fair a consensus as possible in limited time, especially as delegates begin officially to accept, amend or reject the draft declarations they have jointly composed in Working Groups.

In a further departure from Arctic Council procedure, I also invite PP delegates at NORMAC and MAC Bilbao to vote together with Arctic-State delegates. I inform PP delegates that, for the sake of realism, the rule of consensus officially extends to Arctic States only. But this deviation from actual practice enables PP delegates to make their positions as clear as possible in limited time, as well as openly to challenge the credibility of Arctic-State delegates who fail to live up to their domestic or international commitments to Indigenous peoples and Indigenous rights.

Finally, Arctic Council meetings are chaired by one of the Arctic States, a practice copied at the Fairbanks UArctic MAC (B. Boylan & S. Gilbert, personal communication, 2018). By contrast, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao meetings are chaired either by host-school pupils with experience of MAC or MUN, or by me personally with support from host-school pupils. Third-party chairing Model Arctic Council at secondary school

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clears a patch of neutral ground on which a large and disparate group of delegates can seek consensus more freely. Turning meetings over to delegates from one of the Arctic States merely for the sake of realism would invite scepticism from their young peers about the fairness of proceedings. It would also deprive me of a significant opportunity to guide proceedings in a teacherly but unobtrusive way—an expedient that also proved necessary to ‘nudge’ even the junior undergraduate delegates to NORMAC University toward consensus in the face of one or two particularly challenging impasses.

Indeed, at NORMAC and MAC Bilbao, consensus is achieved on most issues only in the Ministerial, often after intense discussion and sometimes even the near-collapse of previous apparent agreement. For this reason, I have tended nearly always to reserve the chair of the Ministerial for myself, so that by clarifying impasses, inviting relevant proposals, and correcting any errors of fact, I can gently encourage delegates toward consensus without imposing solutions. The pre-Ministerial briefing mentioned above also serves as another opportunity for teacherly guidance towards consensus. And where consensus is achieved too easily—for example, if delegates have overzealously adopted some proposal without accounting for serious policy problems or clashes of interest—the pre-Ministerial briefing allows me to re-inject ‘friction’ between the SAO meeting and the Ministerial.

Ultimately, however, the primary factor determining consensus must be the delegates’ own collaborative skills. The possibility of insurmountable disagreement must be real, lest the educational value of the exercise be compromised. Delegates to NORMAC 2018 fell short of consensus by a mere single vote on three of the four issues considered, and delegates to MAC Bilbao 2019 failed to reach consensus on any issue. Even at NORMAC and MAC Bilbao conferences that have ended in consensus on all issues discussed in Working Groups, the prolonged task of forging it precluded discussion of the special issue reserved for the Ministerial (see Table 3).

Realism vs creativity A secondary-school MAC is an experiential learning exercise, not a diplomatic scenario analysis, and I have already noted a number of ways in which NORMAC and MAC Bilbao procedures deviate from actual Arctic Council procedures for educational purposes. By contrast, the UArctic MAC is intended to prepare university students for leadership roles in the circumpolar North by inducting them into the complexities of Arctic governance (Ehrlander & Boylan, 2017; UArctic MAC Thematic Network, 2018). Delegates to the Fairbanks UArctic MAC formally presented their ‘Fairbanks Declaration’ to an audience of SAOs and other Arctic Council officials in the hope that it would inform future Arctic Council proceedings. Some Fairbanks delegates, together with delegates from another university MAC, have even argued that their MACs served as an alternative form of real diplomacy (Sarson et al., 2019).

For obvious reasons, the objectives of NORMAC and MAC Bilbao focus more squarely on creative teaching and learning alone. Experience with MAC may well motivate some delegates to study the Arctic as part of a broader undergraduate programme, such as in anthropology, geography or international relations. But secondary-school pupils have many possible academic and professional paths ahead, and it would be inconsonant to expect a secondary-school MAC to inspire them except in a more general way.

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With this in mind, delegates to NORMAC or MAC Bilbao are afforded considerable licence to propose, discuss and pass a ‘Norwich Declaration’ or ‘Bilbao Declaration’ that does not meet Arctic Council standards, and which may not even be politically practicable. Most secondary-school pupils are only beginning to learn how their own governments work, let alone the intricacies of international diplomacy involving both state and non-state actors. In my experience, they are prone to overestimate the power and resources that public bodies actually have, perhaps because of the pervasive role authority plays in their still-young lives.

At the same time, preparatory materials for NORMAC and MAC Bilbao stress that the Arctic Council is a ‘policy-shaping’ rather than a policy-making body, and that the Arctic Council is an international forum without the legal status of an organisation such as the UN (Brigham et al., 2016; Nord, 2016). Delegates are advised to craft realistic declarations that call for or sketch out a common approach to a problem, rather than declarations mandating compliance with rules that could not be enforced. However, the quality of declarations varies with the individual delegates most closely involved with drafting them, and with the quality of their own pre-conference research and preparation. The process of learning creatively and autonomously, not only about the Arctic itself, but also about how public bodies work and how consensus can develop, ultimately must take precedence over the political plausibility of the final declaration.

Additionally, delegates to NORMAC or MAC Bilbao may tackle some issues not found on the Arctic Council agenda. For instance, at NORMAC 2017 the PAME Working Group debated the issue of commercial fishing in the international waters of the central Arctic Ocean. In reality, the ‘Arctic Five’ coastal states controversially decided to take this issue forward outside the Arctic Council, possibly the better to control negotiated outcomes (Molenaar, 2015). Similarly, at NORMAC 2019 the CAFF Working Group debated the regulation of whaling in Arctic waters, an issue normally reserved for the International Whaling Commission. But NORMAC and MAC Bilbao are expressly intended to raise awareness and understanding of the Arctic amongst delegates, and it would seem counterproductive to bar them from discussing issues relevant to the Arctic simply because political factors have removed them from Arctic Council auspices.

That said, realism is still an explicit aim of NORMAC and MAC Bilbao. As I described in the section above on how NORMAC and MAC Bilbao work, the Arctic Council’s constitutional rule against discussing military security matters is maintained, most issues on the conference agendas reflect the thematic priorities of the current Arctic Council chairmanship programme, and delegates are eligible for commendations based partly on how well they researched those issues and acted their assigned roles. I also use the pre-Ministerial briefing to attempt to steer delegates back towards actual Arctic-State or PP positions if they have drifted too far from reality, even after allowing for creative licence.

Sustaining interest Like all model diplomacy conferences, secondary-school MACs involve considerable preparation on the part of delegates. Ideally, delegates would conduct this research together in an existing model diplomacy club, or perhaps even at a new MAC or Arctic club that could continue after the MAC itself. Where appropriate, this research could be woven into existing curricula—for instance, a coldclimate topic in a geography course, or an international relations topic in a politics course. However, the opportunity that university faculty have to offer a special, timetabled module on Arctic

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international relations, Arctic regional governance, or the Arctic Council itself, in order to prepare students for a MAC, is simply unavailable to secondary-school teachers.

Although MAC preparation may not overlap with the school curriculum except indirectly, delegates from schools in the UK offering an Extended Project Qualification at A-Level have the opportunity to transform their NORMAC or MAC Bilbao research into a nationally recognised certificate. Delegates from schools around the world offering the International Baccalaureate, with its Extended Essay requirement, or from schools offering credit for some sort of independent study project, could do the same. In this way, the most enthusiastic delegates can extend their engagement with the Arctic well beyond the conference.

Participating schools could also consider integrating MAC preparation with other co-curricular activities, such as visits to universities with Arctic-related programmes, or youth campaigns for Indigenous rights through clubs such as Amnesty. School trips to the Arctic are also possible. At certain UK schools, trips to Iceland or Norway are already popular.

There have now been a total of six separate NORMAC and MAC Bilbao conferences, with three further secondary-school conferences scheduled for 2020. Many of the same schools, and a few of the same delegates, have attended more than one conference (see Table 4), and the NORMAC Secretariat in particular is evolving into an office handed down between pupil year-groups at Norwich School. Repeat attendance as a MAC delegate, or sequential years of service on a MAC Secretariat, helps to build and sustain interest in the Arctic. It is my intention to continue running NORMAC, MAC Bilbao and possibly other secondary-school MACs on an annual basis, which will allow for more repeat attendance and service, and even for some pupils to become MAC veterans.

Evidence of educational outcomes NORMAC and MAC Bilbao are intended to raise awareness and understanding of the Arctic amongst secondary-school pupils; to inspire them to learn more about the region, its peoples and its challenges; and to help develop their skills in public speaking, negotiation and consensusbuilding. Survey data obtained from delegates to four NORMAC and MAC Bilbao conferences in 2018 and 2019 show that both MACs are meeting these objectives, and that they have had considerable positive educational impact. An analysis relating the survey data to each of the three objectives follows, after a brief general discussion of the survey method and the characteristics of the respondents.

Method and respondents Delegates to the four most recent NORMAC and MAC Bilbao conferences—the inaugural MAC Bilbao conference of January 2018, the third NORMAC conference of February 2018, the second MAC Bilbao conference of January 2019, and the fourth NORMAC conference of February 2019—were requested to complete two surveys. In the first survey, taken ahead of the conference, delegates were asked to provide a few basic details about themselves, including any past participation in NORMAC or MAC Bilbao, and any first-hand experience of the Arctic. They were also asked to rate on a five-point scale their expertise with model diplomacy, as well as their general knowledge of the Arctic and Indigenous peoples’ issues before beginning preparatory research.

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In the second survey, taken just after the conference ended, delegates were again asked to rate on a five-point scale their knowledge of the Arctic and Indigenous peoples’ issues, as well as their agreement with statements describing what they might have learned from NORMAC or MAC Bilbao. Qualitative data were collected in the form of two open-ended questions. In the preconference survey, delegates were asked what excited or interested delegates most about participating in NORMAC or MAC Bilbao. In the post-conference survey, they were asked what they had learned the most from their participation.

Response rates to both surveys were very high. Of a total of 142 possible respondents, 141 completed the pre-conference survey fully and one partially, and 131 completed the postconference survey fully and five partially. All respondents, apart from the five who partially completed the post-conference survey, answered all quantitative questions. Many respondents answered the qualitative questions as well, with 135 of 142 respondents answering the qualitative question in the pre-conference survey, and 113 of 138 respondents answering the qualitative question in the post-conference survey.

Like most secondary-school model diplomacy conferences, the four recent NORMAC and MAC Bilbao conferences attracted older pupils. The average age of delegates to the four conferences was 16.2 years, with 86% of delegates between 15 and 17 years of age. The youngest delegates were two pupils of 13 years of age, and the oldest delegates three pupils of 20 years of age.

On the face of it, the four recent NORMAC and MAC Bilbao conferences seemed to prove particularly appealing to girls. Sixty-three percent of delegates were female, and girls outnumbered boys at all four conferences. It is worth noting, however, that all four conferences involved a comparatively large number of delegates from girls’ schools, totalling 27% of all delegates.

Considering only delegates from coeducational schools, the genders were equally balanced.

Many delegates had previously attended MUN or similar conferences. Taken as a group, delegates rated their experience of model diplomacy at a mean of 2.3 points on a five-point scale. Relative newcomers significantly outnumbered veterans, however, with 63% rating their experience at one or two points, and only 15% at four or five points.

As might be expected, only 10 of 136 individual delegates had attended a previous MAC, all of them an earlier NORMAC or MAC Bilbao conference, and none had previously attended more than one. Three individual delegates attended both NORMAC and MAC Bilbao, two of them just one month apart in 2018. Moreover, of 24 individual schools sending delegates to at least one of the four conferences, 10 sent delegates to two or more MACs, including NORMAC 2017 (see Table 4).

Delegates who answered the pre-conference qualitative question expressed a variety of opinions about what features of NORMAC or MAC Bilbao interested or excited them the most, with many pointing to the opportunity to meet new people, and to learn how to communicate effectively in public. Taken together, however, 51% of respondents mentioned some unique or novel aspect of the MAC format. Of these respondents, 54% mentioned the thematic focus on the Arctic or the Arctic Council, 21% the chance to represent or learn about Indigenous peoples, and 19% the emphasis on collaboration and the rule of consensus. Seventeen percent also explicitly drew a general contrast with MUNs, perhaps lending some credence to the idea of ‘MUN fatigue’ mentioned above.

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Few delegates to any of the conferences reported noteworthy first-hand experience of the Arctic.

Two delegates two had visited Iceland on a school trip, one had visited northern Sweden briefly on a school exchange, one had visited northern Norway, and one had visited Alaska. However, one delegate to NORMAC 2019 had circumnavigated Svalbard twice, and he explained that he had chosen to participate in the conference because of a fascination with and love of the Arctic.

Most delegates hailed from non-Arctic countries, particularly the United Kingdom and Spain where NORMAC and MAC Bilbao are located. However, a significant number of delegates to both conferences were enrolled at international schools, and as a group delegates represented 27 home countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and North America (see Table 5). A small number of delegates came from or had lived in Denmark, Russia or the United States of America, but none of them reported having visited or lived in the Arctic territories of those countries.

Raising awareness and understanding of the Arctic Since delegates to the four recent NORMAC and MAC Bilbao conferences had had little previous exposure to the Arctic, it is especially encouraging that they valued both conferences extremely highly as learning experiences (see Table 6). Depending on the topic, between 87% and 92% of delegates agreed or strongly agreed that NORMAC or MAC Bilbao had taught them about the Arctic as a region, about the issues and challenges facing the Arctic, about the workings of the Arctic Council, and about the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic. Taken individually, 97% of delegates agreed or strongly agreed that NORMAC or MAC Bilbao had taught them about at least two of these topics, 88% at least three topics, and 70% all four topics.

Not only were delegates certain that they had learned something from NORMAC and MAC Bilbao, but also that they had learned much. Ahead of each conference, and before any preparatory research, delegates rated their knowledge of the Arctic and of Indigenous peoples at means of 1.9 and 1.7 respectively on a five-point scale. After participating in NORMAC or MAC Bilbao, they rated their knowledge markedly higher, at means of 3.8 and 3.9 respectively on a five-point scale.

Whilst these subjective ratings are only directionally meaningful indicators of knowledge possessed or gained—delegates certainly did not become Arctic experts!—they at least demonstrate that delegates had no doubts that they learned a significant amount from their MAC experiences.

Indeed, delegates thought highly of the educational value of NORMAC and MAC Bilbao in general. Eighty-two percent of delegates agreed or strongly agreed that, by playing a delegate to the Arctic Council, they had learned more about the Arctic than they would have done simply by reading about the subject, and 93% of delegates agreed or strongly agreed that they had learned more about the point of view of the Arctic State or PP that they fictively represented. Moreover, 96% of delegates also agreed or strongly agreed that diplomatic simulations such as NORMAC or MAC Bilbao are a good way to learn. These figures echo similar results obtained from surveys of delegates to the Fairbanks UArctic MAC (Ehrlander & Boylan, 2017).

The only exception to these uniformly high results is the 69% of delegates who agreed or strongly agreed that NORMAC or MAC Bilbao had taught them about the concept of Indigenous rights specifically. This result contrasts with the 87% who agreed or strongly agreed that their conference had taught them about Indigenous peoples of the Arctic more generally, and with delegates’ selfreported improvement in knowledge of Indigenous issues. These results suggest that an

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opportunity exists to teach delegates more about the legal and political context of Indigenous participation in the Arctic Council. I shall return to this opportunity below.

At the same time, the fact that over two-thirds of delegates agreed that their MAC experience taught them about Indigenous rights represents significant learning. It is also worth noting that delegates who represented PPs were 21 percentage points more likely than delegates representing Arctic States to agree or strongly agree that they had learned about Indigenous rights, at 83% to 62%. Furthermore, no delegate who represented a PP was amongst the 4% of delegates who disagreed or strongly disagreed that NORMAC or MAC Bilbao had taught them about this particular topic.

It seems clear from the results above that NORMAC and MAC Bilbao are meeting their objective of raising awareness and understanding of the Arctic amongst secondary-school pupils. Qualitative data reinforce this conclusion, and they suggest further that NORMAC and MAC Bilbao instilled a newfound appreciation for the Arctic and the Indigenous peoples living there. Of the delegates who answered the post-conference qualitative question about what they had learned the most from their conference, 51% pointed specifically to learning about the Arctic or Indigenous peoples, including learning about the Arctic Council and the specific Arctic issues on the conference agenda.

Indeed, just as many delegates pointed specifically to learning about Arctic Indigenous peoples as those who pointed to learning about the Arctic in general. One delegate commented that he had ‘debunked many misconceptions I previously had about Indigenous people’, and another wrote ‘MAC Bilbao opened my eyes to new struggles’.

Other delegates were particularly impressed by the unexpected complexities of the Arctic. One delegate commented about the improvement in her knowledge of the Arctic after the conference that ‘it’s far more complicated than I thought!’. Similarly, another delegate summed up the postconference comments of a number of his peers, writing that he had ‘learned a lot, but there is still a lot to learn’.

Inspiring further learning about the Arctic In contrast to the emphasis that some delegates placed on how much remains to learn about the Arctic, it may seem somewhat surprising that no more than 62% of delegates agreed or strongly agreed that NORMAC or MAC Bilbao had in fact inspired them to learn more in future (see Table 6). Despite this result, 91% of delegates indicated that they would like to attend a future NORMAC or MAC Bilbao conference. Given the preparatory research necessary to participate in a MAC, this figure strongly suggests a continued interest in further learning about the Arctic. It is possible that the 62% figure reflects some exhaustion amongst delegates after an intense few days of model diplomacy, and after having committed to some weeks of preparatory research in addition to their usual schoolwork.

This interpretation must remain speculative pending more probing survey questions accompanying future rounds of MAC conferences. As I mentioned above, many delegates reported that they wished to participate in NORMAC or MAC Bilbao for reasons not specifically related to the Arctic, such as meeting new people and learning how to communicate effectively in public. Whilst these reasons are not incompatible with a desire to learn about the Arctic, they may have been more important to some delegates than the topical content of the MAC itself.

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All the same, only 7% of delegates disagreed or strongly disagreed that NORMAC or MAC Bilbao had inspired them to learn more about the Arctic. It may well be that up to 93% of delegates were either inspired by their MAC experience in a more active sense, or felt open to further learning in a more passive sense—especially experiential and interactive learning that would also introduce them to new people and facilitate the development of their interpersonal skills. This figure tallies closely with the 91% of respondents who would participate in NORMAC or MAC Bilbao again.

Interpreted in this way—and considering that nearly two-thirds of delegates were in fact inspired to learn more about the Arctic—the survey results tend to support the conclusion that the two MACs are meeting this objective.

Improving interpersonal skills As I mentioned above, many delegates participated in NORMAC or MAC Bilbao with the desire to improve their abilities to communicate and collaborate with others. It is an explicit objective of both MACs that delegates do so. In keeping with Arctic Council practice, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao delegates must take all decisions by consensus of the Arctic States, and ideally including PPs as well. In this way, the two conferences offer a dynamic and challenging setting in which delegates can build skills in public speaking, negotiation and consensus building.

Delegates are not alone in their desire to build such skills. Speaking from my own experience, as well as from conversations with colleagues, teachers do not merely hope that model diplomacy will help our pupils to become more politically aware. We especially hope that it will help them to become more confident in themselves and more adept at collaborating with others. As one teacher remarked after his school’s third NORMAC conference, ‘It is the need for consensus (not just a majority) which makes it truly special—in a world of hyper-partisanship and populism, an event that identifies the things that unite and compromise is just the tonic for the youth of today’ (J. Kempton, personal communication, 2019).

Survey results show that 72% of delegates to NORMAC and MAC Bilbao agreed or strongly agreed that their MAC had helped them develop skills in public speaking, negotiation and consensus building (see Table 6). Nearly three-quarters of delegates represent a substantial majority, and it suggests considerable learning. However, despite its significance, the figure may seem relatively low in comparison to the very large proportion of delegates who agreed that NORMAC or MAC Bilbao had raised their awareness and understanding of the Arctic.

It may be worth noting in this context that a number of delegates to NORMAC and MAC Bilbao had previous experience of model diplomacy, particularly MUN. They may have considered their interpersonal skills already well developed. One delegate, who gave the maximum rating to his own MUN experience, explained that his rating indicating neither agreement nor disagreement with interpersonal skills development was not meant critically, but only to say that ‘nothing much [was] added or improved’. By contrast, another delegate who was a newcomer to model diplomacy, wrote in a rating of ‘10’ to demonstrate his enthusiastic agreement with the statement that his MAC had helped him develop interpersonal skills, rather than simply circle the maximum rating of five printed on the survey sheet.

Even so, the data show no correlation between agreement that NORMAC or MAC Bilbao had helped improve interpersonal skills, and self-declared experience with model diplomacy. It appears that some veterans and some newcomers alike benefitted greatly from the conference in this way,

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and some less so. In my experience, teachers familiar with model diplomacy believe that pupils ‘get out what they put into it’. It is also my experience that delegates vary enormously in their willingness to speak and interact with other delegates at conferences, with some dominating discussions, others saying virtually nothing, and many in between. It may well be that those delegates who participated more eagerly saw more improvement in their interpersonal skills than delegates who did not.

As with the question of inspiration above, however, this interpretation must also remain speculative pending more detailed surveys after future conferences. Nonetheless, with nearly three-quarters of delegates reporting that they had improved their interpersonal skills at NORMAC or MAC Bilbao, it seems fair to conclude that the two MACs are also meeting this objective.

Future plans Survey data clearly indicate that NORMAC and MAC Bilbao have had a strong and positive educational impact. They also suggest some ways in which that impact could be strengthened further. In addition, I continue to experiment with NORMAC and MAC Bilbao procedures to meet the challenges of assisting delegates with preparation, encouraging them toward consensus, and balancing realism with creativity. In this section, I shall briefly remark upon four ways in which I intend to try to extend and improve NORMAC and MAC Bilbao further in the near to mediumterm future.

First, as I indicated above, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao have attracted a handful of delegates hailing from some of the Arctic States. However, they have not yet involved delegates from any schools in the Arctic itself, especially Indigenous delegates. The involvement of delegates with experience of the Arctic, especially those who could bring to bear personal experience of indigeneity and Indigenous rights, would in my view tremendously increase the educational value of NORMAC and MAC Bilbao for all delegates.

Funding for travel to Norwich or Bilbao is the main obstacle. I would be keen to hear directly from any Arctic State governments, PPs or charitable bodies that may be interested to assist delegates from an Arctic school defray all or some of the costs of attending NORMAC or MAC Bilbao. This initial contact could also lead to a more permanent school-to-school relationship, which could involve other educational benefits such as future pupil exchanges.

Second, whilst it would be welcome to host pupils from Arctic schools at future NORMAC and MAC Bilbao conferences, it also seems desirable that there exists one or more secondary-school MACs in one or more Arctic States, ideally hosted by an Arctic school. Unlike MUNs, which can be very large given the number of UN Member States, MACs are necessarily much smaller affairs.

One way to increase secondary-school interest in MACs is to establish more of them, either as stand-alone conferences or alongside the many MUNs already running around the world. I would welcome expressions of interest from any school or organisation interested to host or help fund a MAC, most especially from schools or organisations located in, or concerned with, the Arctic region.

Third, even amongst non-Arctic schools, the costs of participating in model diplomacy conferences—including registration fees, travel and accommodation—can be prohibitive. Hosting a model diplomacy conference is also expensive, especially the costs of catering meals for visiting pupils and their teachers, and of hiring external venues if school premises cannot accommodate the conference due to size or other clashing activities. In the UK, for instance, MUN is to a large Model Arctic Council at secondary school

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extent the preserve of private schools, and even here parents are sometimes asked to help defray expenses for travelling pupils. State schools with limited budgets can find model diplomacy simply unaffordable.

NORMAC and MAC Bilbao are not exempt from this problem. Of the 25 schools participating to date, 17 have been private schools. Considering the educational benefits of MAC discussed above, as well as the educational and career advantages that private-school pupils already enjoy relative to their state-school peers, it would seem valuable to make MAC more accessible. I have already opened discussions with interested organisations about launching a MAC aimed specifically at state schools, particularly schools from communities whose pupils have not historically applied for or been accepted to university. I would be grateful to hear directly from any organisation interested in supporting such a project.

Finally, the secondary-school MAC format that I have developed for NORMAC and MAC Bilbao is by no means fixed. I continue to seek ways to develop it to heighten interest in the Arctic amongst secondary-school pupils, and to augment its educational value. Three selected possibilities under consideration include eliminating the formal rules of procedure, simulating Arctic Council Observer delegations, and adding teaching sessions to the conference timetable.

As I discussed above, the formal NORMAC and MAC Bilbao rules of procedure at the SAO and Ministerial level are designed to provide secondary-school pupils, whose interpersonal skills are nascent, with a supportive framework for effective consensus building in limited time. Yet they do not well reflect Arctic Council practice. Where host-school logistics make it possible to convene a longer conference, I intend to experiment with facilitated or moderated discussion at all levels of the conference, rather than merely at Working Group level.

I may also experiment with inviting pupils to play delegates from Arctic Council Observers, an option available at the Fairbanks UArctic MAC and other university MACs. Observers include influential non-governmental organisations, such as the World Wildlife Fund, as well as powerful non-Arctic states, such as China. However, according to Arctic Council rules, Observer delegations participate primarily in Working Groups, with some limited possibilities for participation at SAO and Ministerial meetings. Secondary-school pupils without specialised interest in a particular Observer may find it undesirable to be assigned a role that constrains their participation in the conference relative to their peers. If Observers are to be a part of NORMAC and MAC Bilbao, delegate expectations will need to be balanced against realism.

Finally, as I indicated above, an opportunity exists for delegates to learn even more about the broader context of Indigenous participation in the Arctic Council, and in particular about Indigenous rights. There may also exist an opportunity for delegates to learn more about other fundamental concepts at play in Arctic governance as well. Where time permits, I may experiment with a ‘teaching morning’ on the first day of the conference, designed to supplement delegates’ own preparatory research on the Arctic, the Arctic Council and the issues to be discussed at the conference that year. In addition, I intend also develop a ‘MAC Handbook’ explaining such concepts in simple terms, which delegates can consult before and during the conference.

Indeed, pedagogical studies of university-level model diplomacy suggest that quality of preparatory research, and familiarity with international governance structures and challenges, are major factors determining the educational value of the simulation for participants (Duchatelet, Gijbels, Bursens,

Speca

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Donche & Spooren, 2019; Haack, 2008; Hazelton & Mahurin, 1986). Where secondary-school delegates are motivated, a teaching morning and MAC Handbook could similarly help them and their teachers realise the full educational benefit of NORMAC and MAC Bilbao.

Concluding remarks NORMAC and MAC Bilbao are the only secondary-school MACs in the world today. The discussion above shows that participating pupils and schools have found them educationally beneficial to a very high degree. By their very nature, they are smaller and more intimate than typical MUN conferences—with only 14 possible delegations rather than 193, and a rule of unanimity rather than of majority, they offer a correspondingly greater opportunity for pupils to learn about international diplomacy, develop collaborative interpersonal skills, and to grow in confidence.

NORMAC and MAC Bilbao also offer pupils a powerful corrective to the today’s prevailing Arctic ‘imaginaries’. Exposure to the complexities of Arctic governance, and especially to the existence and values of Arctic Indigenous peoples, explodes preconceived notions of the Arctic as simply an uninhabited and fragile wilderness to be protected from any human influence, or an unclaimed resource frontier to be annexed and defended against others. At the same time, the challenges of building consensus on controversial political, social and environmental issues impresses upon pupils that the Arctic and its peoples are subject to the competing interests of powerful states and other groups that may be extremely difficult to reconcile.

These lessons are valuable. But one need not subscribe to ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ to wish not only that today’s youth develop a more nuanced understanding of the region, but also that they conceive of the Arctic as a place of co-operative dialogue, and as an ancient homeland for Indigenous peoples. By bringing pupils together with a mandate to build consensus according to the Arctic Council ideal of full agreement between states and Indigenous peoples, NORMAC and MAC Bilbao explicitly advance this goal. They should find much favour with educators, policy-makers and Arctic specialists concerned with the wellbeing of the Arctic and its peoples—and indeed with the Arctic Council itself.

The third MAC Bilbao and fifth NORMAC conferences are already scheduled for January and March 2020 respectively. I also plan to launch a new secondary-school MAC series in January 2020 at Wycombe Abbey in the UK. Like MAC Bilbao, ‘WYCOMAC’ is inspired by NORMAC, and it will share the same educational objectives. At present, I intend to continue all three conferences on an annual basis, and to develop new conferences wherever possible. Full details of future conferences are available online, including contact information for any schools, organisations or individuals interested in supporting or attending them.

References Arctic Council. (1996). Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council [Ottawa Declaration].

Ottawa, Canada.

Arctic Council. (2012). Terms of Reference of the Arctic Council Secretariat. Stockholm, Sweden.

Arctic Council Secretariat. (2013). Arctic Council Rules of Procedure (revised). Tromsø, Norway.

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Axworthy, T., Koivurova, T. & Hasanat, W. (Eds.). (2012). The Arctic Council: Its place in the future of Arctic governance. Toronto, Canada: Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation.

Brigham, L., Exner-Pirot, H., Heininen, L. & Plouffe, J. (2016). The Arctic Council: Twenty years of policy shaping. In Heininen, L., Exner-Pirot, H. & Plouffe, J. (Eds.), Arctic Yearbook 2016, 152-154. Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum. https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2016/2016-preface.

Duchatelet, D., Gijbels, D., Bursens, P., Donche, V. & Spooren, P. (2019). Looking at role-play simulations of political decision-making in higher education through a contextual lens: A state-of-the-art. Educational Research Review 27, 126-139. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.edurev.2019.03.002 Ehrlander, M.F. & Boylan, B.M. (2017). The Model Arctic Council: Educating postsecondary students on Arctic issues and governance through simulation. International Studies Perspectives. https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekx005.

Exner-Pirot, H., Ackrén, M., Loukacheva, N., Nicol, H., Nilsson, A.E & Spence, J. (2019). Form and function: The future of the Arctic Council. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/formfunction-future-arctic-council.

Haack, K. (2008). UN Studies and the Curriculum as Active Learning Tool. International Studies Perspectives 9(4), 395-410. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2008.00344.x Hazelton, W. & Mahurin, R. (1986). External simulations as teaching devices: The Model United Nations. Simulation & Games 17(2), 149-171. https://doi.org/10.1177/0037550086172002.

Heininen, L., Exner-Pirot, H. & Plouffe, J. (2015). Governance and governing in the Arctic: An introduction to the Arctic Yearbook 2015. In Heininen, L., Exner-Pirot, H. & Plouffe, J. (Eds.), Arctic Yearbook 2015, 13-25. Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum. https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2015/12-yearbook/2015-arctic-governanceand-governing/121-governance-governance-in-the-arctic-an-introduction-to-arcticyearbook-2015.

Heininen, L., Exner-Pirot, H. & Plouffe, J. (Eds.). (2016). Arctic Yearbook 2016: “The Arctic Council: 20 Years of Regional Cooperation and Policy-Shaping. Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum. https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2016.

Kankaanpää, P. & Young, O. (2012). The effectiveness of the Arctic Council. Polar Research 31(1). https://doi.org/10.3402/polar.v31i0.17176.

Lackenbauer, P.W., Nicol, H. & Greaves, W. (Eds.). (2017). One Arctic: The Arctic Council and Circumpolar Governance. Ottawa & Waterloo, Canada: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee & Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism. http://carc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/One-Arctic-2017.pdf.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. (2017). Exploring Common Solutions: Finland’s Chairmanship Program for the Arctic Council 2017-2019. Helsinki, Finland.

Molenaar, E.J. (2015). The Oslo Declaration on high seas fishing in the central Arctic Ocean. In Heininen, L., Exner-Pirot, H. & Plouffe, J. (Eds.), Arctic Yearbook 2015, 427-431. Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum. https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-

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yearbook/2015/2015-briefing-notes/159-the-oslo-declaration-on-high-seas-fishing-in-thecentral-arctic-ocean.

Nord, D.C. (2016). The Arctic Council: Governance within the Far North. London: Routledge.

Pincus, R. & Ali, S.H. (2016). Have you been to ‘the Arctic’? Frame theory and the role of media coverage in shaping Arctic discourse. Polar Geography 39(2), 83-97. https://doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2016.1184722.

Sarson, L., Muzik, V., Ray, B., Gambrell, G., Yona, L. & Comeau, R. The Model Arctic Council: Simulated negotiations as pedagogy and embodied diplomacy. American Review of Canadian Studies 49(1), 105-122. https://doi.org/10.1080/02722011.2019.1570955.

Speca, A.N. (2016). Launching the Norwich Model Arctic Council. In Heininen, L., Exner-Pirot, H. & Plouffe, J. (Eds.), Arctic Yearbook 2016, 152-154. Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum. https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2016/2016commentaries/184-launching-the-norwich-model-arctic-council.

UArctic MAC Thematic Network. (2018). Model Arctic Council 2018: Call for participation.

Rovaniemi, Finland.

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Table 1: MAC conferences Date August 2010

Host Students on Ice

Location (shipboard)

Remarks Held during youth Arctic expedition

Bødø, Norway Bødø, Norway Bødø, Norway Tromsø, Norway

Level Secondary school Secondary school University University University University

October 2010

UN Association in Canada

Whitehorse, Canada

March 2011 March 2012 March 2013 December 2013

Nord University Nord University Nord University University of Tromsø

February 2014 March 2014 March 2015 April 2015

Northern Arctic Federal University Nord University Nord University Moscow State Institute for International Relations Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Norway; University of Tromsø Northeastern Federal University

Arkhangelsk, Russia Bødø, Norway Bødø, Norway Moscow, Russia

University University University University

UArctic MAC (pilot)

Tromsø, Norway

University

Yakutsk, Russia

University

Paris, France

University

Moscow, Russia

University

February 2016 March 2016 July 2016

French Polar Cluster; Kallander & Associates LLC Moscow State Institute for International Relations University of Oslo University of Alaska Fairbanks Polar Aspect; Norwich School

Oslo, Norway Fairbanks, USA Norwich, UK

Jointly with Oslo MUN UArctic MAC NORMAC (pilot)

September 2016

Northern Arctic Federal University

Arkhangelsk, Russia

University University Secondary school University

April 2017

Polar Aspect; Norwich School

Norwich, UK

NORMAC

May 2017

Rome, Italy Hanover, USA Nuuk, Greenland

University University

January 2018

Italian Society for International Organisation Dartmouth College Inuit Ataqatigiit Folketiingmi; University of Greenland Polar Aspect; Colegio Ayalde

Secondary school University

Bilbao, Spain

February 2018

Polar Aspect; Norwich School

Norwich, UK

MAC Bilbao; jointly with MUN Bilbao NORMAC

October 2018 January 2019

University of Lapland Polar Aspect; Colegio Ayalde

Rovaniemi, Finland Bilbao, Spain

February 2019

Polar Aspect; Norwich School

Norwich, UK

June 2019

Polar Aspect; Trent University; University of East Anglia Polar Aspect; Wycombe Abbey

Norwich, UK

Secondary school Secondary school University Secondary school Secondary school University

Polar Aspect; Colegio Ayalde

Bilbao, Spain

Polar Aspect; Norwich School

Norwich, UK

WYCOMAC; jointly with WASAMUN MAC Bilbao; jointly with MUN Bilbao NORMAC

University of Akureyri

Akureyri, Iceland

Secondary school Secondary school Secondary school University

Polar Aspect; Trent University; University of East Anglia

Norwich, UK

University

NORMAC University

October 2015 November 2015 December 2015 February 2016

June 2017 September 2017

January 2020 (in preparation) January 2020 (in preparation) March 2020 (in preparation) March 2020 (in preparation) June 2020 (in preparation)

Note: Source:

Speca

High Wycombe, UK

Held during UNFCCC COP 21

Some secondary-school delegates

Some secondary-school delegates

UArctic MAC MAC Bilbao; jointly with MUN Bilbao NORMAC NORMAC University (pilot)

UArctic MAC

This list is not necessarily exhaustive, and the author would be grateful for any additions or corrections Polar Aspect

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Table 2: Websites for Polar Aspect secondary-school MACs MAC NORMAC MAC Bilbao WYCOMAC MAC Research Library (for all MACs) Source:

Website http://www.normac.org/ http://www.mun-bilbao.com/en/preparation/arctic-council.html and http://www.mun-bilbao.com/en/conference/comittees-topics/arctic.html https://mun.wycombeabbey.com/wycomac-arctic-council/ http://vlt.is/course/index.php?categoryid=4

Polar Aspect

Table 3: Issues on the agenda of NORMAC and MAC Bilbao Session NORMAC 2016 PAME SDWG Ministerial NORMAC 2017 AMAP PAME SDWG Ministerial MAC Bilbao 2018 AMAP SDWG Ministerial NORMAC 2018 AMAP PAME SDWG Ministerial MAC Bilbao 2019 PAME SDWG Ministerial NORMAC 2019 AMAP CAFF PAME Ministerial Note:

Source:

Issue Marine protected areas in the Arctic Suicide in Arctic communities The EU as an Arctic Council observer (not discussed) Arctic wetlands and climate change Commercial fishing in the Arctic Ocean Educational opportunity for Arctic children The EU as an Arctic Council observer (not discussed) Arctic wetlands and climate change Educational opportunity for Arctic children The EU as an Arctic Council observer (not discussed) Methane hydrates and climate change (no consensus reached) Seismic exploration for oil and gas in the Arctic offshore (no consensus reached) Broadband connectivity in Arctic communities The EU as an Arctic Council observer (no consensus reached) Seismic exploration for oil and gas in the Arctic offshore (no consensus reached) Broadband connectivity in Arctic communities (no consensus reached) The EU as an Arctic Council observer (not discussed) Meteorological cooperation in the Arctic Whaling in Arctic waters Growth of Arctic shipping The EU as an Arctic Council observer (not discussed)

The ‘special political’ issue on the Ministerial agenda serves as a backup in case pupils either reach or fail to reach consensus on the other issues with time remaining before the conference ends, or if pupils wish to discuss it in preference to continuing with the issues discussed in Working Groups Polar Aspect

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Table 4: Schools sending delegates to NORMAC or MAC Bilbao School NORMAC 2016 (14 delegates) Norwich School NORMAC 2017 (35 delegates) Colegio Ayalde Ibstock Place School Langley School Norwich School Notre Dame High School Wymondham High School MAC Bilbao 2018 (28 delegates) Bishop Thomas Grant School Cívico Liceo Lingüístico Alessandro Manzoni Colegio Ayalde Colegio Munabe Dhahran High School King’s College Madrid Rijnlands Lyceum Sassenheim NORMAC 2018 (46 delegates) CATS College Cambridge CATS College Canterbury Colegio Ayalde Gresham’s School Ibstock Place School Langley School Notre Dame High School Wycombe Abbey MAC Bilbao 2019 (26 delegates) Colegio Alarcón Colegio Munabe Vrije ASO-School De Bron Gymnasium Schwerstraße Solingen Heidelberger Privatschulcentrum Institut Saint-Dominique King’s College Madrid Lycée François Magendie Ransom Everglades School Runnymede College Wycombe Abbey NORMAC 2019 (42 delegates) CATS College Canterbury Colegio Ayalde Gresham’s School Langley School Norwich High School for Girls Norwich School Source:

Speca

Polar Aspect

Country

Delegates

United Kingdom

14

Spain United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom

6 7 9 4 3 6

United Kingdom Italy Spain Spain Saudi Arabia Spain Netherlands

2 2 8 2 4 8 2

United Kingdom United Kingdom Spain United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom

3 11 6 3 9 2 6 6

Spain Spain Belgium Germany Germany France Spain France United States of America Spain United Kingdom United Kingdom Spain United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom

2 2 2 1 4 2 3 2 2 4 2 4 12 6 12 5 3

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Table 5: Home countries of delegates to NORMAC and MAC Bilbao Country MAC Bilbao 2018 (28 delegates) Spain Saudi Arabia United Kingdom Italy Netherlands Indonesia Iraq Turkey NORMAC 2018 (46 delegates) United Kingdom Spain Nigeria Germany Malaysia United States of America Bahrain China Denmark India Indonesia Ireland Japan Kazakhstan Russia Thailand MAC Bilbao 2019 (26 delegates) Spain France Germany Belgium United Kingdom United States of America China Turkey NORMAC 2019 (42 delegates) United Kingdom Spain Albania China India Iran Qatar Russia Slovakia Source:

Delegates 15 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 21 6 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 22 13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Polar Aspect

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Table 6: Survey responses from delegates to NORMAC 2018 and 2019, and MAC Bilbao 2018 and 2019 Question or Statement

Pre-conference knowledge (1=worst, 5=best) Please rate your level of knowledge of the Arctic Please rate your level of knowledge of Indigenous peoples’ issues Post-conference knowledge (1=worst, 5=best) Please rate your level of knowledge of the Arctic Please rate your level of knowledge of Indigenous peoples’ issues Quality of learning experience (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) ‘I learned about the Arctic as a region through MAC Bilbao/NORMAC’ ‘I learned about the issues and challenges facing the Arctic through MAC Bilbao/NORMAC’ ‘I learned about the workings of the Arctic Council through MAC Bilbao/NORMAC’ ‘I learned about the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic through MAC Bilbao/NORMAC’ ‘I learned about Indigenous rights through MAC Bilbao/NORMAC’ ‘I learned more about the Arctic through participating in MAC Bilbao/NORMAC than I think I would have if I had only read a book about the Arctic’ ‘Playing the role of a Delegate from an Arctic State or Indigenous Permanent Participant helped me better to understand that group’s point of view more than I think I would have if I had only read about it’ ‘MAC Bilbao/NORMAC has inspired me to continue to learn more about the Arctic’ ‘MAC Bilbao/NORMAC has helped to improve my skills in public speaking, negotiating or collaborating with others’ I believe that simulations like MAC Bilbao/NORMAC are a good way to learn’

% Agree or Strongly Agree

% Disagree or Strongly Disagree

Average Rating out of 5 1.9 1.7 3.8 3.9

90

1

4.4

92

0

4.4

92

1

4.5

87

2

4.3

69*

4

3.9

82

3

4.3

93

2

4.5

62

7

3.8

72

7

4.1

96

1

4.7

* 83% amongst delegates who represented Indigenous Permanent Participant organisations rather than Arctic States.

Source: Polar Aspect

Speca

Briefing Note

Innovative policy dialogue on oil and gas drilling in Arctic seas versus environmental protection Tuuli Kuusama

The University of Lapland Model Arctic Council was held from 29 October to 2 November 2018 in Rovaniemi, Finland, during the second rotating Finnish Arctic Council Chairmanship. Fiftyone students from 13 countries and 32 universities took part in this international Arctic Council simulation. The MAC was hosted by the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi and led by Professor Lassi Heininen. The simulation was an official activity of the Finnish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2017−2019 run by the Finnish Foreign Ministry. The event was financially supported by the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture. It was a collaborative effort continuing the work of the Thematic Network on Model Arctic Council led by Professors Mary Ehrlander and Brandon Boylan of the University of Alaska, Fairbanks (UArctic, n.d.).

The Arctic Council structure provided the overall framework for the simulation. The Arctic Council is the primary forum for international cooperation, environmental protection and advocacy work in the Arctic. It is a policy-shaping forum, and indicative for its consensusbuilding role in the current context has been the binding Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013). The Arctic Council and its Working Groups have provided a significant amount of information about the Arctic environment and contributed greatly to global understanding and discussion of the effects of climate change.

The Model Arctic Council is described as an experiential learning exercise (UArctic, n.d.). The main aim of the MAC 2018 was to simulate an international negotiation regarding Arctic offshore oil and gas drilling in the context of the Arctic Council structure. The goal of the simulation was to reproduce the mechanisms of international negotiations between member states and other stakeholders. However, the participants were encouraged “to go beyond” the Arctic Council Tuuli Kuusama recently earned a M. Soc. Sci from the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lapland, Finland, and was a participant and organizer of the University of Lapland Model Arctic Council.

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framework, as underlined by Professor Lassi Heininen. Thus, the participants were inspired to explore innovative common solutions1 – slightly reformulating the motto of the Finnish Chairmanship – which were still compatible with their assigned roles.

Participants were carefully chosen among advanced undergraduate, Masters and PhD students.

Delegates were first asked to provide a wish list of their preferred roles for the simulation among States, Permanent Participants, Working Groups, Observers, international environmental nongovernmental organizations, oil companies and other stakeholders. However, nobody was allowed to represent their own country of origin. The simulation provided an action-oriented learning arrangement. Assigned tasks and a comprehensive reading list prepared students to their roles. Everyone was required to write a position paper on the topic from one’s assigned perspective in advance. Participants’ growth within their roles was evident throughout the week.

The simulation had its starting point in a real-world Arctic problem complex of the beginning of 21st century. The participants needed to understand the interplay between science, politics and economics in order to successfully manage the diplomatic and negotiation processes at hand. The question of natural resource utilization versus environmental protection revealed the “Arctic entwinements of energy, climate and politics” (Rovaniemi Arctic Spirit).2 The question of oil and gas drilling was chosen for the simulation because natural resource utilization is rarely discussed in the Arctic Council. It is still worth remembering, however, that oil pollution is one of the original priorities of Arctic environmental protection (Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 1991).

Offshore oil and gas drilling in the Arctic presents both opportunities and challenges. The oil and gas industry is a key economic driver across the Arctic (AMAP, 2007: 1). Sustainable economic development is desirable, but the energy sector may not have unacceptable cultural or ecological impacts. The Arctic Council Working Groups see hydrocarbon extraction as a climatic and contaminant issue as well as a challenge to biodiversity and marine safety. In the oil and gas industry pollution cannot be completely eliminated, so a risk of adverse environmental effects remains even with the best available technology. In the meantime, global warming has made Arctic waters generally more accessible for modern industries. In a world increasingly aware of climate change, the energy sector produces a lion’s share of global carbon dioxide emissions.

After introductory lectures given by Professors on Monday, the Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) Chair Aleksi Härkönen welcomed the junior delegates to the Model Arctic Council. In his speech Ambassador Härkönen underlined the need for more science-policy interplay because energy and climate change are transforming the future. There is strong scientific evidence about the tremendous and rapid transformation of the Arctic region. The valuable discussion and exchange of experience between students and senior Arctic experts was enabled by an opportune timing with other official Arctic Council activities. The MAC was organized back-to-back with a SAO meeting in the same venue. Later the week, both the students and attendees of the Senior Arctic Officials’ meeting and the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) meeting were gathered to a reception at Rovaniemi City Hall. It prepared an inspired and energized atmosphere where the participants invited their real-life counterparts to follow the Ministerial Summit on Thursday afternoon. The simultaneous events provided combined benefits and enriched the MAC participants’ experiences.

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In terms of the MAC exercise itself, the week was comprised of simulations of the Working Groups, SAO meetings and a final Ministerial Summit with a follow-up discussion. It was surprising how the process was developed step-by-step, even though the participants did not receive any ready-made script. Professor Lassi Heininen acted as a facilitator of the event.

Professors Mary Ehrlander, Brandon Boylan and Heather Exner-Pirot served as coaches.

Nonetheless, the participants made the decisions and reacted to each other’s actions.

The crowning moment of the simulation was a Special Ministerial Summit on Arctic Energy Horizons. The participants presented their final speeches in front of senior Arctic experts. The audience was briefed that the students will negotiate as if they were alone in the auditorium. The atmosphere was as innovative as it was thrilled when the students agreed on establishment of a new Working Group, Working towards Arctic Visionary Energy Solutions (WAVES) and launched a Declaration (Arctic Energy Horizons: A Vision for Sustainable Arctic Solutions, 2018). The senior Arctic experts welcomed the result with a standing ovation. The Model Arctic Council had reached a consensus in an innovative and sustainable energy future in the Arctic.

The mandate of the new Working Group would “be to support collaborative research on, and to identify and develop best practices for Arctic-specific challenges in energy production, diversification, and technology” (Arctic Energy Horizons: A Vision for Sustainable Arctic Solutions, 2018). The prioritization of human development and Indigenous perspectives was an integral part of the Declaration. Permanent Participants’ Joint Statement on Indigenous Issues in Arctic Council Discussions was included in the Declaration (ibid). In addition, the Declaration encouraged “the expansion of commitment to and enhanced coordination of rapid response for rescue and disaster clean-up in Arctic waters” recognizing harsh operation conditions (ibid). The Declaration went even further by presenting “a legally binding agreement on oil pollution prevention with stricter minimum standards” (ibid). Even more innovative approaches to renewable energy throughout the Arctic region were supported. This is to say that technological energy development and improving energy development standards have a major role in the Arctic, while the ongoing hydrocarbon utilization should be balanced with health effects and socio-economic aspects.

The week full of intense negotiating was rounded out by some extra-curricular activities. A visit to the science centre Arktikum satisfied a need to get to know Arctic nature and Indigenous Sámi culture. A visit in Rovaniemi would not have been complete without crossing the Arctic Circle and meeting Santa Claus in his official hometown.

An obvious goal of the experiential learning experience was to gain knowledge about the main topics and train argumentation skills. The simulation allowed for the examination of a multifaceted problem of natural resource utilization versus environmental protection that is not often subject to direct experimentation. The experience provided the participants with confidence to manage similar challenges and decision-making situations in real life. It was fruitful for non-native English speakers to sharpen their oral and written English skills, but it was as necessary to patiently practice active listening which allows dialogue. When the time came to formulate the final speeches for every delegation, native English speakers helped with style and phrasing. The MAC broke the glass ceiling by nominating a female Chair for the Ministerial Summit, and also encouraged non-native speakers of English to give the final speech in front of a

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full auditorium of high-ranking Arctic diplomats. The learning curve was above ordinary for the entirety of the simulation.

The opportunities for learning reached far beyond just the field of diplomacy. It was enlightening for local participants to share some responsibility of the arrangements. It was eye-opening to see that it is the smallest details, hospitality and a local contact point which mean so much to conference guests. In a best case scenario they do not even notice the little hassles behind the scenes. Thus, some organizing and anticipation skills were also acquired.

Networks and intercultural exchange in the Arctic setting should be mentioned as an added value of the MAC. It was an exciting privilege to have face-to-face interaction with Working Group representatives, Senior Arctic Officials and Permanent Participant representatives to discuss their experiences about leadership skills. We made new Arctic friends who will hopefully one day become our colleagues and Arctic leaders. As I summed up in my farewell speech: “from the north, for the world”.

Notes 1. The topic of the Finnish Chairmanship in the Arctic Council 2017−2019 was Exploring Common Solutions (Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland, 2017).

2. “Arctic entwinements of energy, climate and politics” is a subtheme of the Rovaniemi Arctic Spirit 2019 conference which will be held in Rovaniemi, Finland on November 1213, 2019.

References Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.

(2013, May 15). Retrieved from https://oaarchive.arcticcouncil.org/handle/11374/529 AMAP. (2007). Arctic Oil and Gas 2007. Retrieved from https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/arctic-oil-and-gas-2007/71 Arctic Energy Horizons: A Vision for Sustainable Arctic Solutions. (2018, November 1).

Retrieved from https://www.uarctic.org/media/1598997/final-mac- declaration.pdf Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. (1991, June 14). Declaration on the Protection of Arctic Environment. Retrieved from http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic_environment.pdf Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland. (2017, February 24). Exploring Common Solutions – Finland’s Chairmanship Program for the Arctic Council 2017−2019. Retrieved from https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1981 Kuusama

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Rovaniemi Arctic Spirit. Call for Abstracts. Retrieved from https://www.rovaniemiarcticspirit.fi/EN/Call-for-Abstracts UArctic. Thematic Network on Model Arctic Council. Retrieved from https://www.uarctic.org/organization/thematic-networks/model-arctic-council/

Innovative policy dialogue

Briefing Note

The Arctic Super Week in May 2019: from Rovaniemi to Shanghai Lassi Heininen

May 2019 witnessed a ‘super week’ in the Arctic. I name it a super week on Arctic affairs (or the Arctic Super Week) due to the intensity of several international meetings and gatherings on the Arctic in Finland and China, and big interest towards the Arctic, in particular the Arctic Council, by international media, which was revealed during the week. It started by the Welcome Reception on the occasion of the 11th Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting (hosted by Minister for Foreign Affairs Timo Soini and the Mayor of the City of Rovaniemi Mr. Esko Lotvonen) at 6 pm on 6 May 2019 at Lappia Hall in Rovaniemi, Finland; or, actually two hours before the speech of US State Secretary Michael R. Pompeo in Rovaniemi. The Arctic Super Week ended by the Closing Plenary Session at Arctic Circle China Forum at 6 pm on 11 May in Shanghai, China. In between, there were the 11th Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting on 7 May in Rovaniemi, and two international conferences on the Arctic in Shanghai: 7th China – Nordic Arctic Cooperation Symposium (7-9 May) and the Arctic Circle China Forum (10-11 May).

For me the week was busy, even hectic, due to my original plan to be present and give contributions in each of these events. In order to implement the plan, as I did, I had first, to have an access to these events - as a (keynote) speaker in the two scientific conferences, and an observer (member of the “Chairmanship” delegation) at the Ministerial and the US State Secretary Speech; and second, to design a travelling schedule making it possible, as I did, from Helsinki to Rovaniemi and back to Helsinki, and further to Shanghai, and again back to Helsinki.

The week, due to the fact that no joint ministerial declaration of the Arctic Council, together with the speech by US State Secretary, raised the question, if international politics with turbulence & uncertainties, even “Great power rivalry”, has overtaken Arctic geopolitics with high geopolitical stability and Arctic governance with constructive (inclusive) cooperation. On the other hand, the Lassi Heininen is the Editor of the Arctic Yearbook, Lead of the Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security, and Research Director at the Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research (INAR), University of Helsinki.

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events in the rest of week showed, that it is not necessarily the case, or at least it is too early to know, and that the situation too vague to reply.

Instead, I would like to describe and analyze these events as I experienced, and interpret, them by using participatory research as a method to put emphasis on personal experiences and findings, such as attitude of events, chats during breaks, and body-language, behavior, tone. This, together and supported by simulation, has been my method, which I much recommend, when trying to draw up a holistic picture on grand challenges (e.g. the combination of pollution and fast climate change), and in particular when implementing the interplay between science, politics (incl. civil society) and business. The success is, of course, depending on if you manage to have an access into Ministerial or other high-level political meetings. This was also my challenge here - though being an observer, as a part of the Chairmanship delegation, in each SAO Plenary meetings during Finland’s chairmanship - and I had to work hard to get an invitation to the Ministerial (already tried a few other options).

Speech by US State Secretary The speech by US State Secretary Michael R. Pompeo on 6 May 2019 at Lappi Areena in Rovaniemi was titled “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus” (see US State Department website). It was neither long nor a masterpiece, but mostly hawkish ‘Great power rivalry’ rhetoric on China and Russia, for example, “China’s pattern of aggressive behavior elsewhere in the – excuse me – aggressive behavior elsewhere should inform what we do and how it might treat the Arctic”, and “These provocative actions are part of a pattern of aggressive Russian behavior here in the Arctic”. Partly an effort to convince that “America is the world’s leader in caring for the environment”, by facts which deal with climate change, without mentioning the term/words – ‘climate change’. And finally, praising with a bit unclear example that “Courage and partnership is what the region [The Arctic] depends on” referring to the heroic exploration period of the Arctic.

After finishing his speech the US State Secretary almost escaped from the podium, and US Ambassador to Finland Robert Pence, who had the opening words, did not show-up. By contrast, the audience did stay for a while, partly being confused by the tone and contents of the speech, and partly due to many questions and requests of several (foreign and Finnish) journalists in the room (for example, I was interviewed by four media from Canada, Nordic counties, USA in my way from the Lappi Areena to my hotel). The first question, which was raised immediately after the speech, if this will cause a damage to Arctic cooperation and the work of Arctic Council, and if this will mean a turning point in Arctic geopolitics and governance. Or, if this will be remembered as an odd episode, and the constructive cooperation in the Arctic Council will be continued and high geopolitical stability maintained. As a Finnish citizen I had another question: Why did the Finnish foreign ministry allow a hawkish US State Secretary to take the floor and have such a “major address outside of those formal proceedings”, as State Secretary Pompeo said in his speech, just a day before the Ministerial, which ended Finland’s chairmanship of Arctic Council? Neither the speech nor the request was nice but rude and provocative toward the hosting country, in diplomacy this would be interpreted as a hostile action.

I admit that this context and the content of the speech managed to provoke me - probably a few others too in the audience – to examine more carefully if there is increasing high military tension, or even “Great power rivalry”, in the Arctic region, as journalists too often assume and some scholars try to argue. Or, if this is sort of déja-vu from the Cold War period, when the Arctic Arctic Super Week in May 2019

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continues to be exceptional in world politics and IR due to common interests between the Arctic states, as several of us (e.g. Heininen 2018) have argued and the first preamble of the latest AC Ministerial Declarations show (as well as that of the Rovaniemi Joint Ministerial Statement 2019).

I already started my examination, or mission if you wish, a couple days later in my presentations in Shanghai, and will continue here.

11th Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting & Finland’s Chairmanship The original event and context was the 11th Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, scheduled (at 10:30 am – 12:30 pm) in 7 May 2019. The meeting and its documents were well prepared in SAO Plenary meetings in March 2019 and October 2018 of Finland’s chairmanship, which I was able to experience as an observer in the four SAO Plenary meetings1.1 The Finnish AC (civil servant) chair and Finnish team, as well as AC working groups & secretariat, worked hard, were pragmatic and efficient, and had support of Permanent Participants representatives and the rest of SAOs. Though there were no expectations of any breakthrough of the chairmanship, and that it would be challenging to agree on everything, it was mainly thought and hoped that there would be a productive meeting with a joint declaration. In particular, since the meeting attracted (for only the second time) the foreign ministers of each eight Arctic state to attend.

After the US State Secretary’s speech, we in the audience however started to hesitate and speculate if there among the Arctic states would be political will and agreement enough for a joint declaration mentioning exclusively climate change; it was well known and remembered, how hard it was to agree two years earlier, when the Fairbanks Declaration at the 10th AC Ministerial was drafted. The speech, if not a game changer, clearly and strongly indicated the Trump Administration’s unwillingness to recognize and admit climate change as a reality and existing wicked problem in the Arctic region. The final outcome was that there was no compromise on a joint declaration: the USA did not accept to mention climate change, and the ministers of the other seven Arctic states did not accept a declaration excluding climate change. Though, a big majority voted for, and only one against, no joint declaration, since the Arctic Council is a consensus-based body.

By doing this, the USA was left alone, or actually it isolated itself. This was clearly experienced, felt, and even seen, in the Ministerial meeting itself. After the chair, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Timo Soini informed a change in agenda item – that instead of a Rovaniemi joint Ministerial Declaration there will be a Rovaniemi joint Ministerial Statement - there in the venue became a bit strange atmosphere (like there would be an ‘elephant’, an unpleasant thing which the others don’t want to talk/point to, in the room, and everybody knows what that is). Followed from this, the addresses by most of the AC member-states and Permanent Participants (six minutes each) mentioned or emphasized climate change as a real thing in the Arctic region. Some representatives strongly stated that they do not understand those who deny rapid climate change caused by human activities. Several representatives also required immediate action against impacts of climate change, and all, except the USA, accepted and supported the Statement by the Chair including “Environment and Climate” as the first and rich topic.

Following from this, it is logical to state that Finland’s chairmanship of Arctic Council (2017-2019) was no success, but more a failure. Yes, it was a disappointment, when it comes to the final and most visible outcome: No joint ministerial declaration, first time in the history of the Arctic Council, and instead two statements: a joint Ministerial Statement and Statement by the Chair. The former is a short with the signatures of the eight foreign ministers, and the latter one long with the Heininen

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same structure as the joint Ministerial Declarations used to be.2 Furthermore, no breakthrough with an Arctic Summit, which idea President Niinistö had mentioned a few times in different international gatherings, such as the international Arctic Forum, “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue” in 2017 and 2019. Instead, an International Arctic Forum in April 2019 in St. Petersburg included a plenary session, a sort of mini-Summit if you wish, hosted by President Putin, where heads of five Arctic states – the presidents of Finland, Iceland and Russia, and prime ministers of Norway and Sweden – had an intensive, mostly constructive, discussion of almost three hours.

There were, however, important achievements, and concrete and pragmatic outcomes at and by Finland’s AC chairmanship: The most important (immaterial) achievement was that the eight Arctic states, including the USA, reaffirmed their “commitment to maintain peace, stability and constructive cooperation in the Arctic”, as the first preamble of the Rovaniemi joint Ministerial Statement 2019 put it, instead of promoting the exclusive club of the Arctic Five. Among concrete and pragmatic outcomes, the chairmanship’s priorities – environmental protection, connectivity, meteorological cooperation and education – managed to connect with each other. For example, connectivity with meteorological cooperation on climate change to develop satellite technology and strengthen expertise. As a new, concrete thing, an award of new innovation on how to decrease black carbon was launched. Even though the slogan “Exploring common solutions” was not clearly materialized, it was brought onto the agenda of a global Arctic with an ambitious aim to search for a balance between economic activities and environmental protection bound with political stability.

Finally, the most successful concrete and pragmatic, as well as highly supportive, achievement was an implementation of a sustainable meeting model, meaning no printed papers, no plastic water bottles and coffee cups, water from the tap, local food, etc... This model will also be implemented in Finland’s EU Presidency in the 2nd half of 2019. As a conclusion, Finland’s AC chairmanship was a combination of continuity of maintaining peace, stability and constructive cooperation and practical, functional action, i.e. keep cooperation going! This was much according to Nordic principles and pragmatism, which is a good foundation for Iceland to continue, the 12 years’ period of the Nordic (plus, Russian) chairmanship of the Arctic Council.

7th China – Nordic Arctic Cooperation Symposium The theme of the 7th CNARC Symposium, Shanghai Ocean University and Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) as co-conveners, was “Arctic Fisheries, Polar Silk Road, and Sustainable Development Practices” (see CNARC website). The theme was discussed by several presentations in two plenary sessions and nine breakout sessions by scholars from China and the Nordic countries (the biggest delegation from Iceland and less from other Nordics). A general feature in most of the sessions was a lack of allocated time for open discussion. It becomes a problem in academia, when listeners cannot ask a single question, let alone have an opportunity for constructive dialogue.

In spite of this, the China – Nordic Arctic Cooperation Symposium (CNARC) is an emerging highlight of China-Nordic Cooperation as an important platform to jointly discuss Arctic development and promote pragmatic cooperation. Arctic cooperation is an area, where China and the Nordics have their in-depth cooperation at bilateral levels, or actually more hybrid (bilateral based on multilateral). Sino-Nordic Arctic cooperation is defined as a new kind of multilateral cooperation & partnership strengthening good relations between the Peoples’ Republic of China and the Nordic countries; the Nordics were among the first Western countries to recognize the Arctic Super Week in May 2019

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PRC in 1950s. At the multilateral level, taking the Nordic region as a unifying actor, China will greatly enhance the efficiency & effectiveness of dialogue with the Nordic states. All parties demonstrate great prospects to cooperate in entrepreneurship, business & investment, sustainable development, research & education, civil exchange & social welfare.

It was natural for the Nordics to have joint action and take a lead in environmental protection (biodiversity, climate change, green technology), as well as increase societal security based on knowledge. The Nordic cooperation & stability can be interpreted to be one of the foundations, if not the one, for modern international Arctic cooperation, as I analysed in my presentation. The Nordic Region (Norden) - as a political construction for multilateral, regional and functional cooperation, and modern region-building - is academically interesting and politically attractive, even favorable, in the globalized world. Behind is the deep cooperation and integration based on several ‘Nordic models’, which refer to several terms of cooperation & integration, among others that of governance, democracy, peace as well as welfare state and strong civil society. By virtue of their legacy, the Nordics and their cooperation & models are valuable outcomes and learned lessons in globalized world. Further, by creating potential win-win situations they have a unique potential to play a proactive role in world politics, in particular, in confidence- and peace-building, and be influential in the global Arctic.

No wonder that the first concrete outcome of the CNARC cooperation is a book (translated & published in Mandarin) about the Nordic Region, cooperation and models in world politics, the Nordic Arctic in a global context, and Sino-Nordic cooperation in the Arctic.3 The mission of the book, which is well taken among Chinese readers, are to tell the ‘Nordic story’ to a Chinese audience, show how experts from different countries/cultures/political & economic systems work successfully together, and carry on fruitful Sino-Nordic cooperation across borders in the Arctic and under global governance.

Here CNARC could act as an important platform to jointly brainstorm future cooperation and new models of global – Arctic governance, has even potential to become a model for cooperation, as the idea and innovative format of the cooperation indicates.

Arctic Circle China Forum As the latest country forum of the Arctic Circle Assembly, the China Forum with the title “China and the Arctic” was hosted by the Ministry of Natural Resources of PRC and sponsored by China Oceanic Development Foundation. It was organized by the Arctic Circle Assembly in cooperation with the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC), Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS) and Chinese Society of Oceanography in 10-11 May at Shanghai Science and Technology Museum in Shanghai.

The sub-themes, “Polar Silk Roads – Science and Innovation”, “Transport and Investment – Sustainable Development” and “Oceans – Energy – Governance”, were discussed in five plenary sessions and 19 (parallel) breakout sessions (see ArcticCircleChina website). It is a big achievement, and a result of hard work, to be able to organize such a political & academic expert meeting in China, and having a Chinese ministry as an organizer. It was a pity that there was imbalance between the session speakers, as most of the speakers of the plenary sessions were policy-makers & authorities (civil servants, administrators, and US Senator Lisa Murkowski) and business-people (directors, CEOs), and most of the speakers of the breakout sessions were scholars and scientists.

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A common feature between the two kinds of sessions was the same, as in the previous CNARC conference: no time open discussion, except in few sessions where there was time for questions and comments. The reason for this is, as well as a solution would be, very simple: (too) long a list of speakers (e.g. in the 2nd day’s three plenaries lasting for five hours, including one break, there were 18 speakers), and no strict timeframe for speakers (by session chairs). Though this is not a new but general, even universal, feature in political and academic gatherings, it should not be acceptable due to a few reasons: first, even if presentations are, as in this case a few ones were, interesting including new ideas and inspirations, it is too much to digest even if you try to listen and follow; experimentally I tried to listen to the entire above-mentioned marathon plenary session, and found it hard to follow after the first two hours, in-spite of the fact that there were new information and good ideas for me (next time most probably I will not waste my time). Second, this means (too often) a missed opportunity for the interplay between science, politics & business (in particular since most of the policy-makers & business people do not attend the breakout sessions and listen to researchers’ presentations), as well as that new findings would not be discussed and developed, when they are fresh, and syntheses are not done. Third, this traditional format does not cause a shift, not even aim, in the top-down power structures, and thus, again, there is a missed opportunity, when trying to gather all possible expertise to facilitate and support policy-shaping, enhance processes of empowerment, and find solutions for big challenges & wicked problems. I am emphasizing this, because the social relevance of science requires us in Academia try to do that.

I was invited to present my paper, “‘Another’ in Arctic politics & Governance – from Russia to China, what about USA?” in the “Arctic Governance and Ocean Cooperation” breakout session organized by China Institute for Marine Affairs and Ocean Policy Research Institute of Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan. Here ‘another’ is someone who is coming from outside, representing something strange, does neither believe in ‘win-win’ nor share common goals, and the point of my presentation was who is ‘another’ in the globalized Arctic. Behind are different interpretations on motives and accusations to blame Russia and China as ‘another’ in the Arctic/Arctic affairs, such as inward-looking in protecting its legitimate interests, expansionist & revisionist to resist Western ‘encroachments’ (on Russia); or inward-looking in protecting its foreign investments & national interests; expansionist due to hunger for resources; mildly revisionist power with ‘legitimate interests’ in & ‘emerging policies’ for.

At the same time, there are the following interpretations: comparative, almost the same, with other Arctic littoral states (e.g. ‘sovereignty’, regional development) (on Russia); and responsible major country on the basis of “respect, cooperation, win-win result and sustainability”, doing Arctic research and promoting peace (on China). All this is much based on what is your perspective and/or discourse, as well as the general, much trendy, narratives and perceptions on the Arctic: e.g.

‘Homeland’ (for Indigenous peoples), ‘Eldorado’ (for a race for resources), ‘Zone of Peace’ (based on high geopolitical stability and constructive cooperation), ‘Tipping point for the entire Earth System’ (due to faster speed of warming), or ‘Global Arctic’ (due to growing interest towards and increasing importance in world politics).

For me it matters more, what are the criteria - for example if the main criteria is ratification of UNCLOS or climate change – to interpret someone as ‘another’ based on the deeds, not only rhetoric. When evaluating and compering these three major powers - Russia, China, USA - globally we have for example the following findings: They are among the major nuclear weapon powers Arctic Super Week in May 2019

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(Arctic Ocean as sanctuary), biggest producers of pollution and GHGs emissions, have signed the Paris Agreement on climate change, have Indigenous peoples within their country, as well as are among major supporters of research, including Arctic research. Russia and USA are amongst the biggest producers of hydrocarbons, and USA and China the two biggest economies, etc. When evaluating and comparing them in the context of the global Arctic we have for example the following ones: all are involved in the Arctic Council, either as a member-state or observer country; are parties of UNCLOS (Russia, China) or follow the rules (USA); interested and involved in the utilization of hydrocarbons in the Arctic; supporters of Arctic research. Russia and China have common interests, and are users, in northern sea routes (Russia as the gatekeeper), recently in particular due to Yamal LNG. I left the final decision on “who is ‘another’ in Arctic politics & governance?” to the audience. Instead, I had the conclusion that Russia, USA (as Arctic states) and China (as observer) could play a more active and constructive role in the global Arctic, but have been reluctant to apply the recent and fast changes. In addition, USA has not ratified UNCLOS, as the most important binding international agreement on the Arctic, and has denied climate change and aims to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.

As a conclusion, the broad participation from all over the northern hemisphere (mostly from East Asia, North Europe and USA) and rich variety of titles of the presentations strongly show that the Arctic is globalized, as theTN on Geopolitics and Security had analysed when the GlobalArctic Project was launched in 2014 (see GlobalArctic.com). This state will be strengthened, and the project followed, by the GlobalArctic Mission Council at the Arctic Circle Assembly4, launched by Chairman of the Arctic Circle Olafur Grimsson (the former president of Iceland) in the closing session of the China Forum.

All in all, the Arctic Super Week showed the growing international interest towards the Arctic – as the parameter of global warming, and international platform for high geopolitical stability & competition and potential tension between ‘great power rivals’ – and towards the Arctic Council, as most of international media was not accredited to the Ministerial due to the speech by US State Secretary (its content was not known before), but the Ministerial meeting itself. Furthermore, these gatherings and their sessions and presentations, as well as lively chats and connections made during coffee & tea breaks, in Rovaniemi and Shanghai, showed, even manifested, that, indeed, the Arctic is globalized, and that there are experts and actors (individuals, organizations, movements, countries) from the Arctic and from outside the region, who are interested in and motivated to be involved in Arctic cooperation and affairs. This does not, however, necessarily mean a turning point in Arctic geopolitics and governance toward rivalry, since the high geopolitical stability based on constructive cooperation between the Arctic states has shown its benefits and is resilient.

Notes 1. SAO Plenary meetings during Finland’s chairmanship of Arctic Council: October 2017 in Oulu, March 2018 in Levi, November 2018 in Rovaniemi (included the Model Arctic Council 2018 which I led), and March 2019 in Ruka.

2. These two documents, and most of the addresses at the Ministerial are found at https://oaarchieve.arctic-council.org.

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3. “Sino-Nordic Arctic Cooperation: Objectives and Approaches� (in English) by 21 Nordic and Chinese authors and edited by Lassi Heininen and Yang Jian.

4. Aiming to become an international platform and network of expertise on the Arctic and global affairs for clear-thinking across disciplines and sectors, as well as beyond national borders.

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V. Non-Arctic states and security in the Arctic

Germany: A new (non-)Arctic power?

Davina Basse

Through an in-depth analysis of the 2013 document Leitlinien deutscher Arktispolitik, along with other policy documents published by the German government over the past decade, this paper assesses Germany’s perceived national interest behind developing into a non-Arctic state with an Arctic policy and which priorities led up to the publication of Germany’s revised Arktispolitik in 2019. This paper provides an analysis of various industries and interests, such as shipping, tourism, scientific research, and energy security, to understand Germany’s economic and geostrategic background that has fueled and influenced the creation of its Arktispolitik. The concluding analysis forwards the argument that Germany recently published its Arctic policy to legitimize its claim of having a stake in the Arctic to further its economic interests, such as shipbuilding and tourism, as well as strengthen its existing political and strategic alliances, most namely NATO and the Arctic Council.

Introduction Even though Hamburg, Germany’s northernmost major city, is located 1,446 kilometres south of the Arctic Circle, Germany has been showing a growing interest in Arctic relations. In September 2013, Germany published the document Leitlinien deutscher Arktispolitik: Verantwortung übernehmen, Chancen nutzen (Guidelines of the German Arctic policy) and became yet another non-Arctic state with a clear Arctic policy (Distance between Hamburg, Germany and the Arctic Circle, n.d.). The document outlines Germany’s intention to make the Arctic a central focal point of its foreign policy, specifically focusing on the effects of the Arctic on the German and European economies, global climate change, and specialized research and technology (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 1).

Furthermore, the Arktispolitik announced Germany’s position on the issue of freedom of navigation through the Arctic, supporting the growing group of states which support straits, such as the Northwest Passage, to be legally considered international straits (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 1).

Moreover, the document discusses Germany’s position on the right to self-determination of Indigenous populations in the Arctic and Germany’s support of bilateral and multilateral partnerships to maintain the security in the Arctic region (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 1). Even though the document proceeds to underline the importance of multilateral cooperation and recognizes the importance of the Arctic Council, Germany takes a clear, geostrategic stance that has an implicit effect on the sovereignty and internal politics of Arctic States (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 2).

Davina Basse is an MA candidate at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada.

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Six years later, in 2019, Germany published its updated and more extensive Arktispolitik, which encompasses a more thorough assessment of Germany’s position on Arctic matters. Nevertheless, the 2013 Arctic policy introduced Germany onto the Arctic stage with its first official Arktispolitik and presented Germany’s official Arctic policy positions. The publication of the first Arktispolitik and subsequent policy developments are important to consider in order to understand the origins of Germany’s Arctic interests and consequent policy positions. As such, this paper will focus on the 2013 Arktispolitik and answer the question: Why did Germany, a non-Arctic state, create an Arctic policy?

To answer this question, this paper conducts a qualitative policy analysis of the 2013 document Leitlinien deutscher Arktispolitik to assess the main strategic principles that derive possible motivations behind this publication. Since Germany is one of the biggest exporters globally and is heavily involved in the shipping industry, access to shorter shipping lanes crossing through the Arctic would significantly benefit Germany’s shipping sector.1 Furthermore, Germany prides itself with being a leader in scientific research, as demonstrated through the scientific research establishment, the Alfred-Wegener-Institute (AWI), and its research ice breaker the RV Polarstern (Research ice breaker, n.d.; Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 8-9). Moreover, action against climate change and the preservation of the fragile Arctic environment through stringent environmental guidelines for both shipping and research has become a focal point of Germany’s Arktispolitik (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 8-9). Consequently, the Arktispolitik highlights an active role within Arctic governance to enable Germany to continue to champion its leadership in Arctic scientific research and environmental protection (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 1-2). Energy security and strategic considerations underline the Arktispolitik, as Germany closely works with Norway, Canada, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in securing access to the Arctic region (Bundespräsidialamt, 2014). Finally, the paper will analyze the international political environment that existed in 2013, a year when numerous Asian and some European non-Arctic states became politically involved in the Arctic (Sun, 2013; India and the Arctic, 2013; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013; Jin, Seo, & Lee, 2017; Storey, 2014: 66-72).2 This paper will proceed as follows. It will first present a summary of the specific statements and implications made within the Arktispolitik. The paper will then focus on factors that influenced and were affected by the Arktispolitik, including shipping routes and economic opportunities in the Arctic, securing access to energy sources and mineral resources, Germany’s involvement with scientific and climate change research in the Arctic, and recent NATO activities and bilateral partnership agreements with Arctic states. The next section discusses policy implications for Arctic states, specifically Canada. This section compares and contrasts Canadian and German policies pertaining to climate change and environmental protection, Indigenous self-determination, the legal status of the Northwest Passage, and possible security ramifications. This paper provides a discussion of the origins and motivations behind the creation of the Arktispolitik and why the creation of an Arctic policy by a non-Arctic state is important to recognize for the future governance of the Arctic.

Summary of Leitlinien deutscher Arktispolitik The document Leitlinien deutscher Arktispolitik is a detailed document that concisely and unambiguously presents Germany’s stance on various Arctic issues. Beginning on the first two pages of the document, eleven bullet points state Germany’s stances on climate change, economic

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implications, the freedom of research, and peaceful use of the Arctic (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 12). Following this executive summary, the Arktispolitik is divided into three main sections; the first one discussing the Arctic as a region undergoing significant changes, the second focusing on the chances and risks in the Arctic from a German perspective, and the third presenting the German Arctic policy (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 3).

From the beginning of the document, Germany recognizes that the retreating ice has caused an increasing geopolitical and geo-economic (geoökonomisch) interest and importance in the region (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 4).3 The section highlights aspects specifically important to Germany, such as the global implications of a warming Arctic, the difficulty shaping an appropriate legal framework, and economic opportunities, such as fishing, shipping routes, and tourism (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 4-6). Moreover, Germany underlines its interest and concern in the changing Arctic climate as changing ocean currents influence the climate in northern Europe, including Germany (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 5). Finally, Germany highlights its support of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Arctic by listing the three conferences pertaining to the Arctic it hosted in Berlin in 2009, 2011, and 2013, as well as indicating its permanent observer status in the Arctic Council and membership to the Svalbard Treaty (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 5-6).4 The second section discusses the Arctic from a German perspective by analyzing potential opportunities and risks. The first opportunity discussed is the economic potential following a warming Arctic and the retreat of multi-year ice (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 7). Ensuring the continued supply of natural resources, such as oil and gas, but also of copper, nickel, and zinc, dominates the discussion (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 7). Norway and Russia are specifically mentioned in supplying Germany with needed oil and gas, both of which extract these resources in the Arctic region (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 7). Even though the Arktispolitik was published before the cooling relations between Russia and the West that began in 2014, Germany continues to buy oil and gas from Russian companies (Crooks & Foy, 2017). While Germany recognizes in its Arktispolitik that the extraction of natural resources will predominantly be accomplished by Arctic states, it underlines Germany’s cutting-edge technologies and research in the areas of maritime transportation and oil, gas, and mineral extraction capabilities (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 7). The 2011 Nationaler Masterplan Maritime Technologien (National Masterplan Maritime Technologies) (NMMT) was created as a platform to maximize economic potential for German companies involved in the research, development, and production of maritime technologies (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2011: 2). The NMMT specifically presents “Eis- und Polartechnik” (ice and polar technologies) as a pillar, highlighting Germany’s prevalence in constructing ice breakers and other ice-capable vessels, offshore structures designed for the Arctic region, and expertise in Arctic shipping (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2011: 15-16).

Through the NMMT, in combination with the statements made in the Arktispolitik, Germany creates a position as stakeholder in the economic development of the Arctic by providing technological expertise to Arctic states.

Despite Germany’s recognition of the economic potential, the protection of the environment is a needed overarching regulator (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 8-9). Moreover, Germany proposes that not only the extraction of natural resources but also shipping should follow strict environmental guidelines to limit the dissemination of black carbon, prevent oil spills, and avoid other disasters related to shipping in the Arctic (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 8). Nevertheless, the Arktispolitik recognizes Germany’s stake in cross-Arctic shipping, as it has the world’s third largest merchant Basse

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fleet and largest fleet of cargo ships, and is the seventh largest exporter of containerized cargo (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 9; About the Industry, n.d.; United Nations Conference on Development and Trade, 2016: 37). As a result, Germany plays a considerable role in protecting both ships and the environment in the Arctic. Regarding straits such as the Northwest and Northeast Passages, the German government supports free, secure, and peaceful passage (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 10).5 Moreover, Germany proposes solving any legal issues through bilateral and multilateral cooperation in line with international conventions and agreements, such as the Polar Code (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 9-10).

The delimitation of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves not only changes the landscape for the determination of international straits. Instead, the Arktispolitik highlights the consequent reduction of freely accessible space in the Arctic to conduct scientific research (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 10). Through AWI, the International Arctic Science Committee, and other governmental and private actors, the Arktispolitik underlines the importance for Germany and its actors to maintain a freely accessible Arctic for the purpose of scientific research (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 10-11). This aspect of the Arktispolitik is also connected back to the overarching theme of the changing climate in the Arctic with an appeal to unbiased collaborative research in the region (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 11). Germany’s ability to provide world-class research is a factor that not only ties into climate change, but also promotes multilateral cooperation throughout the Arctic region.

The final point of the Arktispolitik’s second section pertains to security and stability in the Arctic.

While Germany supports a multilateral and cooperative environment to secure and maintain stability in the region, the Arktispolitik nevertheless recognizes that the changing Arctic may result in unexpected political changes (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 11-12). As the Arctic region is a dynamic environment, policies and actions change frequently and unexpectedly. One such event was the 2017 announcement that Russia would nationalize the Northeast Passage, also commonly known as the Northern Sea Route, and only allow Russian flagged vessels to transit that route (Staalesen, 2017b). Correspondingly, the 2013 Arktispolitik’s foresight continues to hold true.

The third and final section of the Arktispolitik describes how Germany’s Arctic policy focuses on Europe and the international community. One indicator that points toward this intention is the fact that the English language version of the Arktispolitik was published two months prior to the German language one.6 Continuing from the first two sections, the third section first highlights the important effects a changing climate will have on the region, and underlines the significance of Indigenous groups and their rights (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 13). Following these initial clarifications, Germany reiterates its support for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 13-16).

Furthermore, the document highlights Germany’s continued support and involvement with the Arctic Council, in which it has held permanent observer status since 1998 and is recognized for its Arctic scientific and technological expertise (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 15; Observers, n.d.).

Additionally, the Arktispolitik underlines the importance of Germany’s membership in the European Union (EU) and its bilateral relations with all Arctic states and China (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 17-19; High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016). The last aspect the Arktispolitik underlines is Germany’s relationship with NATO and its recognition of NATO as an important actor within the Arctic (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 19). In highlighting Germany: A new (Non-)Arctic power?

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Germany’s recognition of the importance of cooperation in the Arctic, the Arktispolitik presents Germany’s stance on economic, climate, and security facets of the region.

Major factors influencing and affected by the Arktispolitik Within the Arktispolitik, there are three major factors summarizing Germany’s concerns and motivations: shipping and other economic opportunities, scientific research and climate change, and security and strategic implications. In the context of this article, all three of these factors are considered domestic and international context factors because they fall between the intersection of national interest and international priorities.

Shipping routes and economic opportunities Germany’s connection to shipping and the ship building industry comes from a long history of maritime trade through the Hanseatic League (Hansebüro der HANSE). The Hanseatic League connected Northern and Northeastern Europe through land and sea trade routes beginning in the Middle Ages (Hansebüro der HANSE). The influence of this trade system in Germany is evident to this day, as numerous cities still bear the official title “Hansestadt” (Hanseatic City) (Freie Hansestadt Bremen, n.d.; Stadtporträt, n.d.; Hansestadt Rostock mit dem Seebad Warnemünde, n.d.; Kurzüberblick, n.d.). Specifically Hamburg, as the second largest port in Europe and one of the top ten biggest ports in the world, holds a significant stake in the shipping industry (Hamburg’s Port, 2007). Already in 2005, Germany’s largest maritime trading partner was China (Hamburg’s Port, 2007). Since then, China’s shipping sector has grown dramatically, with China owning the third largest shipping fleet globally and holding eight out of the top 20 largest cargo ports (United Nations Conference on Development and Trade, 2016: 21, 65). Moreover, 15 out of the 20 ports with the largest cargo volume are located in East Asia, while the ports of Hamburg and Rotterdam are the only two European ports handling comparable volumes (United Nations Conference on Development and Trade, 16: 65). Consequently, finding the shortest and most cost-effective route between Northern Europe and East Asia is a crucial aspect of the German shipping industry.

The opening of Arctic waters and the increasing accessibility of Arctic shipping routes, such as the Northern Sea Route along the northern Russian coast, would enable German shipping companies to reduce shipping times to East Asia by up to 30 per cent in good weather conditions (Verny & Grigentin, 2009: 112). Nevertheless, Jerome Verny and Christophe Grigentin highlight potential technical difficulties ships may encounter en route, such as floating ice sheets and the probable need for strengthened hulls to weather the ice (Verny & Grigentin, 2009: 111). While these technical challenges may pose barriers to the current shipping sector, German shipyards, such as the Meyer Werft and Lürssen Norderwerft, have adapted and now offer to build container ships fitted to withstand multiyear ice cover (Containerschiffe, n.d.; Das Unternehmen, n.d.).

Another significant economic opportunity is the potential for resource extraction in the Arctic. For Germany, the interest in the extraction of natural resources in Arctic waters is threefold – its desire to secure a steady and reliable energy supply, which is an aspect specifically highlighted in the Arktispolitik; its engineering and innovative industries, which design and produce parts crucial to offshore oil and gas extraction; and its economic interest in extracting and exporting minerals and metals (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 7; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2011: 5-7).

The NMMT further highlights Germany’s stake in the maritime security technologies, linking these to resource extraction and achieving energy security (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und

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Technologie, 2011: 12-13). Various German industries ranging from ship building to resource extraction, claim a stake in a wide range of Arctic endeavours, which are present in the Arktispolitik and thus represent one side of German Arctic interests.

Scientific research and climate change Another facet of German Arctic interest concerns climate change and scientific research conducted

by German institutes, such as the AWI. In 2015, the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research published a strategic paper titled Schnelle Veränderungen in der Arktis: Polarforschung in globaler Verantwortung (Rapid Climate Change in the Arctic: Polar Research as a Global Responsibility). The paper discusses topics important to the German public pertaining to changes in the Arctic, including the future of climate change in the Arctic, the effects of the melting Greenlandic ice sheet, the impact on the climatic feedback loop of melting sea ice, the effects of gas hydrates and retreating permafrost on the global climate, the possibility of Arctic organisms adapting to a changing climate, and opportunities and risks of commercial exploitation of a melting Arctic (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2015: 3).

Moreover, Schnelle Veränderungen in der Arktis highlights the importance of thorough research in the Arctic to overcome scientific and legal barriers that can arise through a melting Arctic combined with growing economic sectors in the region (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2015: 11). Aside from research for economic purposes, German researchers, primarily through AWI and the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe), conduct research surrounding climate change and the impact these changes have on the Arctic environment (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2015: 1415).7 Finally, Schnelle Veränderungen in der Arktis presents its four main objectives for German research in the Arctic; sustainability research, knowledge transfer to society at large, technology transfer, and the involvement of the next generation of scientists (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2015: 18-22).

Through the Arktispolitik, the above-discussed strategic paper, and extensive reports of recent expeditions and research published on the AWI website, Germany not only highlights climate change and the need for thorough research in international fora but also succeeds in producing quality research. As such, Germany’s claim to have a stake in the Arctic due to climate change reaches beyond the argument that changing wind patterns and ocean currents may affect Germany’s climate (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 5). Consequently, bilateral and multilateral cooperation is not only presented as a crucial political approach in the Arktispolitik, but it is also practiced through collaboration on research projects among Arctic and non-Arctic states.

Security and strategic implications The third pillar of Germany’s Arktispolitik pertains to maintaining a secure Arctic and fulfilling all strategic needs, both bilaterally and through organizations like NATO. Throughout the Arktispolitik, Germany highlights its support and engagement to maintain a peaceful Arctic (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 1). As such, the Arktispolitik recognizes that political and strategic developments in the Arctic are “schwer kalkulierbar” and thus underlines the importance of multilateral cooperation to prevent conflict (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 11-12).8 The two main multilateral organizations closely connected to the Arctic are the Arctic Council and NATO. The Arctic Council is the only international body that includes all Arctic states, yet its

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mandate precludes security considerations (Humrich, 2015: 144-145; Arctic Council, 1996).

Nevertheless, Christoph Humrich (2015: 144-145) argues that the Arctic Council politically rose out of Arctic security concerns. Humrich (2015: 145) points toward Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk at the end of the Cold War as the inherently securitized spark and influence for the predecessor of the Arctic Council and highlights that constabulary duties, such as search and rescue, fall under the umbrella of the Arctic Council. As such, the Arctic Council’s mandate includes, although implicitly, those security concerns that pertain to the safety of the region and its people.

Other than the Arctic Council, NATO could also play a role. Out of the five Arctic littoral states, which are Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark, and Russia, all but Russia are members of NATO (Bartsch, 2015: 139). While the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) provides Germany with a forum for military cooperation with all Arctic states (except Russia) and key nonArctic allies, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France, Germany is only an observer in the ASFR. Moreover, the ASFR is not a multilateral organization but a “structured multilateral forum” intended “to enhance dialogue, cooperation and regional understanding” (Ellis, 2018; Ellis, 2014).

Since the annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014, however, relations between NATO members and Russia have cooled considerably, raising the question of discussing security concerns in the Arctic Council once again (Ministerial Meeting, 2015). Keeping this relationship in mind, Russia published its newest Arctic strategy half a year before Germany published its Arktispolitik (Haftendorn, 2016: 102). Nationalist sentiments and protective attitudes toward the Arctic were present throughout Russia’s strategy (Haftendorn, 2016: 102). Consequently, Germany’s continuous focus on the importance of multilateralism and collaboration can be seen in a new light when comparing it to Russia’s Arctic strategy. As such, Germany’s allegiance continues to lie with NATO if the question of Arctic relations were to be framed militarily.

Despite Germany’s support of existing alliances and their extended influence into the Arctic region, Arctic exceptionalism and the belief that the region is a sanctuary are frequently used as counterarguments to NATO’s involvement in the Arctic (Bartsch, 2015: 139). The concept of Arctic exceptionalism is the notion that alliances and international affairs that influence events and actions in the rest of the world are irrelevant in the Arctic (Käpylä & Mikkola, 2015: 5). This ties into the understanding that the Arctic is a sanctuary in the sense that historically, the region has been peaceful, and no fighting has spilt over into the Arctic (Käpylä & Mikkola, 2015: 5). While these two notions are frequently brought up and are said to promote cooperation in the Arctic, the Arktispolitik instead recognizes that existing alliances, of which Arctic states are members, extend into the Arctic (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 19; Griffiths, 2011: 190).

Germany’s Arktispolitik is constructed on the three pillars of economic opportunities, climate change and scientific research, and security and strategic implications. This foundation can be traced back to bilateral and multilateral agreements and organizations with which Germany is involved and continues to support. Furthermore, through specializing on certain technologies and Arctic research, Germany claims a stake in the Arctic and a seat at the table. Through these actions, Germany has created a niche for itself as a non-Arctic state wanting to be involved in the Arctic.

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Policy implications for Arctic states While Germany maintains relations with all Arctic states, this section considers the implications of the Arktispolitik on Canada and the Canadian Arctic. Canada is chosen for this comparison because it is not as explicitly mentioned in the Arktispolitik as European Arctic states, yet is a German ally and makes up a large geographic area of the Arctic. The section will explore four aspects that were mentioned in the Arktispolitik and could be considered contentious: guidelines and conceptualizations of environmental protection and guidelines, the rights of Indigenous peoples, the legal status of the Northwest Passage, and possible security ramifications.

Climate change and environmental protection Through unilateral initiatives and multilateral institutions (the EU), Germany has been championing environmental protections and action against climate change (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 8-9, 16-19). Throughout the Arktispolitik, Germany continuously highlights the drastic effects of climate change on the Arctic. The Arktispolitik’s statements concerning the effects and extent of climate change in the Arctic are representative of documents such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment published in 2004 (Hassol, 2004: 22-25). Consequently, collaboration between Germany and Canada, as well as other Arctic states, would facilitate the implementation of effective environmental guidelines.

The impact of climate change on the Arctic has been described as a force multiplier that requires multilateral collaboration to tame its consequences (Lackenbauer, 2011: 141-142). Especially for Canada, an international approach is crucial since “Canada’s weak record on climate change is a serious blow to [its] self-image as good international citizens” (Lackenbauer, 2011: 141-142). While Lackenbauer recognizes American climate leadership under President Barack Obama as the new way forward, the new administration in the United States has reversed this leadership by threatening to withdraw from international climate agreements and lifting domestic restrictions intended to mitigate climate change (Shear, 2017). The alternative to American leadership that is presented by Lackenbauer is heavier involvement of the EU (Lackenbauer, 2011: 143).

However, Germany also discusses the potential for extracting natural resources as Arctic ice retreats, granting easier access to both land and oceans (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 19). The notion of achieving energy security becomes an underlying theme in the majority of Germany’s Arctic policies. As a result, Germany’s stance toward exploiting fishing grounds and extracting oil and gas in Arctic waters may be different from that of Canada. Nevertheless, Germany’s interest in protecting the Arctic environment and combating climate change becomes further obvious when comparing the specificity with which the Arktispolitik approaches these issues to that of Indigenous rights and its support of the Indigenous right to self-determination.

Indigenous rights and self-determination The Arktispolitik recognizes the special standing of Indigenous populations living in the Arctic, with one of its eleven points recognizing Arctic Indigenous populations’ right to self-determination (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 1). More specifically, the Arktispolitik states that “their rights to selfdetermination and freedom within their habitat must be maintained” (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 13).9 Even though Germany states the right to self-determination various times in the Arktispolitik, there is no elaboration as to how this self-determination should look like. This vague mentioning of Indigenous rights could be attributed to Germany’s adherence to the United Nations Declaration on Germany: A new (Non-)Arctic power?

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the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Alternatively, the Arktispolitik may refer to the creation of new independent Arctic states, which is highly unlikely. Alternatively, the mention of self-determination may point into the direction of granting Indigenous populations rights and protections regarding their cultures and languages.

In the case for Canada, Germany’s support for Indigenous self-determination could be understood as support for the creation of self-government and increased autonomy through land claims agreements, such as the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement of 1975, which resulted in a form of self-government (Rodon & Grey, 2009: 317). While there are numerous agreements across Canada’s North that set up various types of self-government, the three territories (Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut) are still heavily influenced and governed by the Canadian federal government in Ottawa (White, 2009: 291-292). Consequently, one could argue that Germany supports increasing autonomy granted to the territories and to groups that have settled land claims agreements, such as the Nunatsiavut and Nunavik in the provinces of Labrador and Newfoundland and Quebec respectively (Rodon & Grey, 2009: 317-318). Alternatively, Germany could be supporting the creation of a separate governing entity, such as in the case of Nunavut, where a land claims agreement was settled in 1993 and the region became its own territory in 1999 (White, 2009: 284). Nevertheless, it is unclear what exactly Germany supports when it mentions the Indigenous right to self-determination.

Legal status of the Northwest Passage Autonomy and claims to sovereignty also affect straits crossing through the Arctic that have seen an increasing amount of traffic. Germany’s support of freie Schifffahrt (free or unrestricted shipping) is one of the main sections within its Arktispolitik (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 9-10). As the policy states, “[T]he federal government supports a free, safe, and peaceful passage through Arctic passages under observance of strict environmental protection and regulations” (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 10).10 Nonetheless, Germany highlights the importance to settle political, legal, and environmental challenges pertaining to Arctic passages through organizations such as the IMO (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 9). While these two positions underline Germany’s appreciation of a liberal international system, it has also utilized the IMO to register complaints and dissensions.

As such, when Canada made its NORDREG system mandatory for ships sailing between Canadian islands in the Arctic, including through the Northwest Passage, Germany was one of the states that expressed concern (Solski, 2017: 202). NORDREG encompasses the Arctic Canada Traffic Zone and as of 2010 requires all ships passing through this zone to inform Canada of the ship’s intended route, the ship’s ice capabilities, and the period of time the ship will be within the Arctic Canada Traffic Zone, among other information to facilitate the enforcement of environmental guidelines and to provide ships with ice and weather information (Transport Canada, 1998). Although Germany does not explicitly state that it rejects any claims to sovereignty over the Northwest Passage in its Arktispolitik, it nonetheless highlights the importance of freedom of navigation and an international approach to shipping in the Arctic (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 9-10). Moreover, Germany supports an international approach to search and rescue capabilities in the Arctic region (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 10). While international cooperation for search and rescue missions is important, this constabulary capability of Arctic states continues to be a gauge for control over a certain territory (Staalesen, 2017a).11 Therefore, although Germany’s statements in the Arktispolitik may solely support international cooperation and finding agreeable compromises, the underlying

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message is one that, if not outright rejects, highly criticizes Canada’s claim to sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.

Security ramifications While the effects of climate change and overlapping claims to sovereignty may pose security threats, the focus for security ramifications is on NATO and the western relationship with Russia. Although the Arctic Council is the predominant international organization in the Arctic, constabulary alliances, such as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum “Arctic Guardian,” also exist, picking up the security aspects that are excluded from the Arctic Council (Canadian Coast Guard, 2017).

Nevertheless, NATO is the main security alliance that can claim jurisdiction in the Arctic, albeit explicit NATO action has been limited in the Arctic. While in 2009, NATO and the Icelandic government organized a conference titled “Security Prospects in the High North,” little beyond air patrols had been committed to the Arctic when Germany published its Arktispolitik in late 2013 (Smith-Windsor, 2013: 1-3). Since then, NATO has conducted some exercises in the Arctic, with Trident Juncture in Norway taking place in 2018 as the most recent one (Charron, 2017: 1).

Germany’s strategic involvement with Canada in the Arctic outside of NATO is limited. Even when the Arktispolitik lists its bilateral Arctic security partners, Finland, Norway, Iceland, and Sweden are mentioned as the primary partners, and Denmark is explicitly listed as Germany’s primary strategic partner (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 18-19). Though the EU recognizes Canada, along with the United States, Russia, and China, as “strategic partners,” they are only considered to be “other important actors” in Germany’s Arktispolitik (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 18)12 This leads back to Germany’s assertion that NATO is an appropriate forum to discuss any security issues pertaining to the Arctic (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 19). Although Canada has been less supportive of Germany concerning NATO’s involvement in the Arctic, a German delegation visited the Canadian Arctic in 2017, organized through two NATO committees for research and technology as well as economic relations (Charron, 2017: 2). As a result, bilateral security ramifications for the Arctic between Germany and Canada continue to be largely channeled through NATO.

Discussion Origins and motivations When Germany published its Arktispolitik in late 2013, it was the first European country to do so that year. Although various Asian countries published Arctic policies that year and also obtained observer status with the Arctic Council, Germany’s actions were unique for a number of reasons.

Unlike Asian states that published their Arctic policies in 2013 and acquired permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, Germany already had close ties with all Arctic states, and held permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. As a result, Germany’s level of integration among the Arctic community was higher when the Arktispolitik was published. Moreover, Germany has provided research capability to the international and Arctic communities through institutions such as AWI and the ice breaker RV Polarstern (An Icon of German Polar Research, 2017).

Consequently, one of Germany’s major motivations for creating and publishing its Arktispolitik was to solidify Germany’s seat at the Arctic table.

Another factor contributing to Germany’s claim to have a stake in the Arctic is not only presented in the Arktispolitik, but also by Franklin Griffiths (2011: 201-202) when he discusses the possibility of non-Arctic members in the Arctic Council being granted more speaking rights and opportunities Germany: A new (Non-)Arctic power?

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to get involved with Arctic stewardship. Griffiths (2011: 201) further highlights the stake that nonArctic states and actors have in Arctic relations through matters like climate change. These themes are found again in the Arktispolitik, where one of the pillars is climate change and scientific research.

A further pillar pertains to Germany’s interest in economic opportunities and a growing Arctic shipping sector. While they are relevant factors worth considering, they can be categorized into what Griffiths (2011: 201) calls “future considerations.” This is to say that, even though achieving energy security through accessing Arctic oil and gas resources and maintaining a competitive edge within its shipping sector, economic considerations for Germany’s Arktispolitik were also a relevant motivation. Nonetheless, it was likely not as pressing as having a seat at the Arctic table to further scientific research and fighting the effects of climate change. Moreover, current threats and opportunities were more influential in contributing to and motivating the creation of the Arktispolitik than the future potential of the Arctic.

The third theme that was discussed in relation to the Arktispolitik encompasses security and strategic considerations. While Germany’s policy highlights bilateral and multilateral cooperation, Germany suggests NATO to be the appropriate platform for security concerns in the Arctic (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013: 19). When combining these statements with Germany’s vague indication that the Arctic is an unpredictable playing field, one can infer that the growing distrust among NATO members toward Russia is an underlying motivator for Germany’s Arktispolitik. As such, Germany’s main motivations for creating its Arktispolitik can be summarized as Germany’s attempt to legitimize its claim to have a stake in the Arctic and therefore maintain and expand its role within Arctic governance.

Importance of non-Arctic states in Arctic governance Over the course of the past ten years, various non-Arctic states have developed national Arctic policies and applied for permanent observer status with the Arctic Council.13 As Griffiths (2011: 201) discusses, the rising interest in the Arctic by non-Arctic states can be attributed to “future considerations.” Thus, a growing number of actors have taken interest in the Arctic because of new opportunities, such as easier shipping and tourism (Dawson, Stewart, Johnston, & Lemieux, 2016: 1425-1426; Blunden, 2012: 115). Although Griffiths acknowledges the fact that, and also why, non-Arctic states have become interested in the region, Griffiths (2011: 189-190) also argues that disputes and conflicts from other global regions seeping into the Arctic would cause cooperation in the Arctic to “unravel.” As such, too much international influence and the extension of interests from other regions in the world have a potentially detrimental effect on Arctic cooperation.

Following Griffiths’ arguments, Arctic states ought to be prudent when admitting non-Arctic states to the Arctic Council. While the dilution of Arctic voices could be a legitimate concern, numerous Arctic states themselves have the majority of their populations living in southern regions and most have never been to their country’s Arctic region.14 Therefore, when considering Arctic states’ policies, it is inevitable to separate Arctic affairs with the remainder of the world. Accordingly, while Arctic isolationism may be welcomed by some, it is difficult to achieve.

Conclusion In September 2013, Germany published the document Leitlinien deutscher Arktispolitik: Verantwortung übernehmen, Chancen nutzen (Guidelines of the German Arctic policy) and became yet another non-Arctic Basse

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state with a detailed Arctic policy. In the Arktispolitik, Germany took clear stances on the freedom of navigation, free access to the Arctic to conduct research, the rights and right to selfdetermination of Arctic Indigenous populations, and its confidence in international organizations to act as the primary enabler and enforcer of Arctic governance. Through these assertions, Germany aimed to make the Arctic a central focal point of German politics and foreign affairs.

To answer the question of why Germany, a non-Arctic state, created an Arctic policy, this paper approached the question through three steps. The first step involved an analysis of the Arktispolitik to understand what Germany’s 2013 Arctic policy said and how its assertions could be interpreted.

The resulting analysis highlighted two major aspects. The first one pertained to the rhetoric used in the policy, which self-assuredly announced Germany’s stakes and consequent involvement in the Arctic, notwithstanding the fact that Germany is clearly a non-Arctic state. The second aspect highlighted the three pillars upon which the Arktispolitik was built, which were shipping routes and economic opportunities, scientific research and climate change, and security and strategic implications.

These three pillars were discussed in detail as the second step of this analysis. Even though the Arktispolitik emphasized the German shipping and ship building sectors, as well as German energy security, international cooperation and consensus became the dominant theme. The second pillar, pertaining to scientific research and climate change, followed a similar pattern. The Arktispolitik highlighted the work that had been done by German scientists and institutions, which was supported by the document Schnelle Veränderungen in der Arktis: Polarforschung in globaler Verantwortung (Rapid Climate Change in the Arctic: Polar Research as a Global Responsibility). The third pillar, which discussed security and strategic implications, was the most explicit in relying on international organizations.

The third step in analyzing Germany’s Arktispolitik involved an analysis of possible effects of Germany’s policy on an Arctic state. Canada was chosen for this comparison, as it was not explicitly highlighted as a close Arctic partner for Germany yet is an Arctic coastal state. Guidelines and conceptualizations of environmental protection, the rights of Indigenous peoples, the legal status of the Northwest Passage, and possible security ramifications were considered. Germany’s track record of climate change policies and environmental protection is extensive, and although Germany has been looking to the Arctic for a secure supply of energy, its environmental concerns and action to combat climate change have trumped other considerations. A more convoluted aspect of the Arktispolitik was the continuous emphasis on the Indigenous right to selfdetermination. Throughout the document, there was no elaboration on what the right to selfdetermination for Indigenous peoples in the Arctic would entail. Consequently, there could be two interpretations to Germany’s statement. The first one would be to support the secession of Indigenous groups from Arctic states, which would fragment Arctic relations even more. This result would prove to be unfavourable to German interests. Therefore, the second alternative is more plausible. This option would entail support for land claims agreements and the granting of self-government such as Nunavut, Nunatsiavut, and Nunavik in Northeastern Canada.

Similarly ambiguous as the Indigenous right to self-determination was Germany’s stance on Canada’s claim to sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. The Arktispolitik underlined Germany’s support for the freedom of navigation and legal regulation of straits. Nevertheless, the Arktispolitik also asserted that any differences of opinion regarding the regulation of straits through the Arctic

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should be resolved through international platforms so that all points of view and political stances could be represented appropriately. At the same time, however, Germany had voiced its concern when the Canadian government proceeded to make its NORDREG program mandatory for all ships crossing through the Canadian Arctic, including the Northwest Passage. The conclusion to this analysis was that even though Germany may not outright reject Canada’s claim to sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, it had and continues to highly criticize Canada’s actions.

The final potentially impactful aspect were possible security ramifications of Germany’s Arktispolitik. However, while Germany mentioned security and strategic considerations a number of times in its Arctic policy, the main focus was on the role of NATO and its effectiveness in the Arctic due to most Arctic states being members of NATO. Consequently, the Arktispolitik changed little to nothing pertaining to the strategic relationship between Canada and Germany, other than Germany reassuring Arctic states that it was interested in the Arctic and was willing to support its allies.

The concluding discussion of this paper pertained to the motivations behind the creation of Germany’s Arktispolitik. Through this paper’s analysis, it could be concluded that while security concerns and the prospect of economic opportunities contributed to the creation of the Arktispolitik, the main motivator was Germany’s support for multilateralism and to legitimize its claim to have a stake in the Arctic. As a non-Arctic state, Germany has highlighted its research capabilities and climate leadership to present itself as a crucial element to cooperative Arctic governance. Through this framework, Germany presented its aspirations and concerns while solving most issues through multilateral channels. As a result, Germany enforced the argument that it deserves a seat at the Arctic table through its publication of the Arktispolitik in 2013.

Nevertheless, the publication of Germany’s updated Arktispolitik in 2019 will show whether the foundation that was established through the 2013 document will enable Germany to remain a nonArctic Arctic power.

Notes 1. According to the World Shipping Council, Germany is the seventh largest exporter of containerized cargo, and according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Germany possesses the fourth largest ownership of the world fleet (About the Industry; United Nations Conference on Development and Trade, 2016: 37).

2. Even though Japan did not publish an official Arctic policy until October 2015, the Japanese government began to explicitly mention the Arctic (ocean) in its Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, an Arctic ambassador was appointed, and Japan became a permanent observer in the Arctic Council in 2013 (Tonami, 2014; The Headquarters for Ocean Policy, 2015).

3. “Im Zuge des mit der Klimaerwärmung der letzten Jahrzehnte einhergehenden Rückgangs des arktischen Polareises wächst die geopolitische und geoökonomische Bedeutung der Arktis für Deutschland, die Europäische Union und die internationale Gemeinschaft insgesamt.”

4. The Svalbard Treaty recognizes Norway’s sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard, or Spitsbergen, and came into force in 1925 (The Svalbard Treaty).

5. “Die Bundesregierung setzt sich für eine freie, sichere und friedliche Durchfahrt durch arktische Schiffspassagen […] ein.”

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6. The English language version was published in September 2013 and the German language one in November 2013 (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013; Federal Foreign Office; 2013).

7. Research by German institutes is predominantly conducted at the joint research station with France named AWIPEV (the name is the merger of the German AWI and the French Institut polaire française Paul Émile Victor, or short IPEV) in Ny Ålesund, Svalbard and through the German-Russian research project “Laptev Sea System.” Further research is also conducted in conjunction in the European, Greenlandic, and Canadian Arctic regions.

8. “Schwer kalkulierbar” translates to “difficult to calculate or predict.”

9. “Ihre Rechte auf Selbstbestimmung und Freiheit in ihrem Lebensraum müssen gewahrt werden.”

10. “Die Bundesregierung setzt sich für eine freie, sichere und friedliche Durchfahrt durch arktische Schiffspassagen unter Berücksichtigung strikter umweltrechtlicher Vorgaben ein.”

11. Even recently, Russia’s attempt to create its own search and rescue base on Svalbard left Norway reassuring all stakeholders of the archipelago that Norwegian forces were very capable of handling all search and rescue missions in and around Svalbard.

12. “…sowie anderen wichtigen Akteuren wie den USA, Kanada, Russland und China…”

13. In 2013 alone, Japan, China, India, South Korea, and Singapore received permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. Both France and the United Kingdom have since also published their Arctic policy documents (Stokke, 2014: 770-773; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013; Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et du Développement International, 2016).

14. The United States, Canada, and Russia are predominantly southern countries with Canada and the United States having limited to no road or railway access to the North.

References About the Industry: Trade Statistics. (n.d.). World Shipping Council. Retrieved from http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/trade-statistics An Icon of German Polar Research. (2017, September 4). Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum für Polar- und Meeresforschung. Retrieved from https://www.awi.de/en/expedition/ships/polarstern/the-symbol-of-german-polarresearch.html Arctic Council. (1996, September 19). Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council: Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.

Ottawa, Canada.

Auswärtiges Amt, Referat für Arktispolitik, Referat für wirtschafts-, umwelt- und forschungspolitische Aspekte des Arktischen Ozeans. (2013). Leitlinien deutscher Arktispolitik: Verantwortung übernehmen, Chancen nutzen. Berlin, DE: Auswärtiges Amt. Bartsch, G. M. (2015). Zwischen Soft Security und Show of Force: Zur Streitkräftepräsenz der Anrainerstaaten in der Arktis. Sicherheit und Frieden, 33(3), 139-142.

Blunden, M. (2012). Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route. International Affairs, 88(1), 115-129.

Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Referat System Erde. (2015). Schnelle Veränderungen in der Arktis: Polarforschung in globaler Verantwortung. Berlin, DE: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung.

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Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit. (2011). Nationaler Masterplan Maritime Technologien (NMMT): Deutschland, Hochtechnologie-Standort für maritime Technologien zur nachhaltigen Nutzung der Meere. Berlin, DE: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie.

Bundespräsidialamt. (2014, June 12). Ansprache beim Mittagessen der norwegischen Regierung.

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Canadian Coast Guard. (2017, September 7). Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Government of Canada.

Retrieved from http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/ccg-gcc-collaboration/arctic-arctique-forumeng.html Charron, A. (2017, September). NATO, Canada and the Arctic. NATO Series, Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Retrieved from https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/1793/attachments/original/15057 84594/NATO_Canada_and_the_Arctic.pdf?1505784594.

Containerschiffe. (n.d.). Meyer Werft. Retrieved from http://www.meyerwerft.de/de/meyerwerft_de/schiffe/containerschiffe/containerschiffe .jsp Crooks, E. & Foy, H. (2017, June 19). US oil groups feel Russian sanctions freeze more than Europeans. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/ Das Unternehmen: Vergangenheit & Gegenwart: 100 Jahre Erfahrung und Qualität. (n.d.).

Lürssen Norderwerft. Retrieved from http://www.norderwerft.de/de/start/dasunternehmen/vergangenheit-gegenwart.php Dawson, J., Stewart, E. J., Johnston, M. E., & Lemieux, C J. (2016). Identifying and evaluating adaptation strategies for cruise tourism in Arctic Canada. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 24(10), 1425-1441.

Distance between Hamburg, Germany and the Arctic Circle. (n.d.). dateandtime.info. Retrieved from http://dateandtime.info/distancearcticcircle.php?id=2911298 Ellis, L. (2014, September 18). Bringing northern issues to the table. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Government of Canada. Retrieved from http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=bringing-northern-issues-to-thetable/hzvlshxh Ellis, L. (2018, May 10). Partners in the north: Canada hosts the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable in Halifax. The Maple Leaf – Defence Stories, Government of Canada. Retrieved from https://ml-fd.caf-fac.ca/en/2018/05/13032 Federal Foreign Office, Arctic policy division, Arctic ocean-related Economic, Environmental and Research Policy division. (2013). Guidelines of the German Arctic policy: Assume responsibility, seize opportunities. Berlin, DE: Auswärtiges Amt. Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Division System Earth. (2015). Rapid Climate Change in the Arctic: Polar Research as a Global Responsibility. Berlin, DE: Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Polar Regions Department. (2013). Adapting to Change: UK policy towards the Arctic. London, UK: Information Policy Team, The National Archives.

Freie Hansestadt Bremen. (n.d.). bremen.online. Retrieved from https://www.bremen.de/freiehansestadt-bremen.

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Griffiths, F. (2011). Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy. In F. Griffiths, R. Huebert, & P. W. Lackenbauer (eds.), Canada and the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and Stewardship (181226). Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Haftendorn, H. (2016). Wettrüsten im Ewigen Eis – Eine Gefahr für die internationale Stabilität?.

Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 9(1), 102.

Hamburg’s Port: Germany’s Hub to the World. (2007). German Business Review, 7-7, 3, 2.

Hansebüro der HANSE. (n.d.). The history of the Hanseatic League. Städtebund der Hanse.

Retrieved from http://www.hanse.org/en/hanse-historic/the-history-of-the-hanseaticleague/ Hansestadt Rostock mit dem Seebad Warnemünde. (n.d.). Die Geschichte der Hansestadt Rostock. Rostock.de. Retrieved from https://www.rostock.de/kultur-sport/maritimetradition/geschichte-der-hansestadt.html Hassol, S. J. (2004). Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2016). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic (JOIN(2016) 21 final). Brussels, BE: European Commission.

Humrich, C. (2015). Sicherheitspolitik im Arktischen Rat? Lieber nicht! Sicherheit und Frieden, 33(3), 143-149.

India and the Arctic. (2013, June 10). Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs. Retrieved from http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?21812/India+and+the+Arctic Jin, D., Seo, W., & Lee, S. (2017). Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea. Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, 22(1).

Käpylä, J.& Mikkola, H. (2015, April). On Arctic Exceptionalism: Critical Reflections in the Light of the Arctic Sunrise Case and the Crisis in Ukraine. FIIA Working Paper, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189844/wp85.pdf Kurzüberblick: Hamburgs Geschichte. (n.d.). hamburg.de. Retrieved from http://www.hamburg.de/geschichte/1776880/hamburgs-geschichte/ Lackenbauer, P. W. (2011). From Polar Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the Circumpolar World. In F. Griffiths, R. Huebert, & P. W. Lackenbauer (Eds.), Canada and the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and Stewardship (69-180). Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et du Développement International. (2016). The Great Challenge of the Arctic: National Roadmap for the Arctic. Paris, FR: Press and Communications Directorate/Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et du Développement International.

Ministerial Meeting. (2015, May 13). Joint statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_119425.htm Observers. (n.d.). Arctic Council. Retrieved from http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers Research ice breaker Polarstern. (n.d.). Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum für Polar- und Meeresforschung. Retrieved fromhttps://www.awi.de/en/expedition/ships/polarstern.html

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Rodon, T. & Grey, M. (2009). The Long and Winding Road to Self-Government: The Nunavik and Nunatsiavut Experiences. In F. Abele, T. Courchene, F. L. Seidle, & F. St. Hillaire (Eds.), The Art of the State IV: Northern Exposures: Peoples, Powers and Prospects in Canada’s North (317-343). Montreal, QC: Institute for Research on Public Policy.

Shear, M. D. (2017, June 1). Trump Will Withdraw From U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement.

The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html Smith-Windsor, B. A. (2013, July). Putting the ‘N’ back in NATO: A High North policy framework for the Atlantic Alliance?. Research Division, NATO Defense College.

Solski, J. J. (2017). Rights, Interests, Positions and Practice of Arctic Coastal States: Russia. C Beckman, T. Henriksen, K. D. Kraabel, E. J. Molenaar, & J. A. Roach (Eds.), Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States (173-216). Leiden, NL: BRILL. Staalesen, A. (2017a, October 27). Helicopter crash might add power to Russia’s push for new base on Svalbard. The Independent Barents Observer. Retrieved from https://thebarentsobserver.com/ Staalesen, A. (2017b, November 17). Putin nationalizes Arctic petroleum shipments. The Independent Barents Observer. Retrieved from https://thebarentsobserver.com/ Stadtporträt: Hansestadt Lübeck – Weltkulturerbe und Tor zur Ostsee. (n.d.). Lübeck. Retrieved from http://www.luebeck.de/bewohner/stadtportraet/index.html Stokke, O. S. (2014). Asian Stakes and Arctic Governance. Strategic Analysis, 38(6), 770-783.

Storey, I. (2014). The Arctic Novice: Singapore and the High North. Asia Policy, 18(2), 66-72.

Sun, K. (2013). East Asia Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Politics: China and the Arctic: China’s Interests and Participation in the Region. Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation.

The Headquarters for Ocean Policy. (2015). Japan’s Arctic Policy. Tokyo, JP: The Headquarters for Ocean Policy.

The Svalbard Treaty. (n.d.). University of Oslo Faculty of Law. Retrieved from http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-11/svalbard-treaty.xml Tonami, A. (2014). Who Gets a Voice and Why it Matters: Arctic Policies of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Polar Initiative Policy Brief Series: Arctic 2014, Wilson Center.

Transport Canada, Marine Safety Directorate. (1998). User Assistance Package for the Implementation of Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System – AIRSS (TP 12819 E). Ottawa, Canada.

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Verny, J. & Grigentin, C. (2009). Container Shipping on the Northern Sea Route. International Journal of Production Economics, 122, 107-117.

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Montreal, QC: Institute for Research on Public Policy.

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The UK and the Arctic: Forward defence Duncan Depledge, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe & James Rogers

The United Kingdom (UK) is not an Arctic state, but over the past decade its policies towards the region have developed in significant ways. Since 2013 the British Government has published two Arctic Policy Frameworks, setting out commitments to working cooperatively with the Arctic states and other stakeholders to ensure that as climate change occurs the region remains peaceful. In 2019, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) committed to publishing an Arctic Defence Strategy, that would “put the Arctic and the High North central to the security of the United Kingdom”. This article examines the evolution of UK defence interests in the Arctic, whilst also highlighting the emergence of a significant Scottish dimension in UK Arctic affairs.

Introduction The United Kingdom (UK) is not an Arctic state, but over the past decade its policies towards the region have evolved considerably. Where previously the UK was hesitant to say too much about its interests in the region, since 2013 the Government has published two Arctic Policy Frameworks, setting out its commitment to working cooperatively with the Arctic states and all other interested stakeholders to ensure the region remains stable and peaceful (Depledge, 2012; Depledge, 2018).

More recently still, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) committed to publishing an Arctic Defence Strategy in 2019, that would, in response to recent environmental change-related developments,, “put the Arctic and the High North central to the security of the United Kingdom” (Ministry of Defence, 2018).

As we set out in this paper, that commitment has been driven by concerns about Russian ambitions in the region, climate change and commercial competition, and despite domestic chaos over how to implement the result of the 2016 referendum which determined that the UK should leave the European Union. On defence, the UK has been emphasising its role not just in NATO but also its own strategic concerns in what it increasingly terms the ‘High North’.1 That is a marked shift away Duncan Depledge is a Politics and International Studies Fellow at Loughborough University, UK. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe is a Professor at Loughborough University, UK, and James Rogers is an Assistant Professor at the University of Southern Denmark.

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from the earlier tendency to downplay the defence dimension of UK Arctic policy and the uptick in what might be termed ‘Wider North’ defence cooperation with the US and Northern Europe (Depledge and Rogers, 2016).2 We begin by considering the evolution of UK defence and security in the Arctic. We then consider more recent developments with regard to growing concerns about Russian and Chinese ambitions in the northern high latitudes. We argue that this strategic reassessment has prompted an increase in the UK’s military bootprint in the Arctic since 2018.

Looking to the future, in the last part of the chapter we consider the ramifications of ‘Brexit’ and Scotland’s increasingly independent approach to Arctic policy for the UK’s approach to defence in the High North.

The United Kingdom as a non-Arctic state As early as 2007, the MOD anticipated that the impacts of climate change on the Arctic would be disruptive to UK defence and security (DCDC, 2007; Depledge et al, 2019). Little more than a decade later, the UK continues to stress that “the change in the natural environment in the Arctic and High North is driving a change in the security environment and, as the region becomes more accessible, there has been an increase in military activity” (Ministry of Defence, 2018). As with many other countries, concern among British defence officials has focussed on the implications of Arctic resources and trade routes becoming more accessible. While this could, in a long-term perspective, relieve pressure on other geopolitical choke points such as Suez, it would also result in a significant increase in traffic to and across the Arctic. That is likely to bring new opportunities, but also new threats as multiple stakeholders (state and non-state) move in to explore the potential of new trade routes and resource prospects.

In the years since 2007, the MOD has continued to assess potential threats to UK defence and security from the north. Declining output from the North Sea and rising oil prices in the wake of the Second Gulf War resulted initially in greater national security attention to energy issues. With the UK increasingly dependent on Norway for energy supplies, upon becoming Secretary of State for Defence in 2010, Liam Fox immediately singled out Norway as one of the UK’s key defence partners and visited Oslo. He also established the Northern Group of Defence Ministers (a forum consisting of the Nordic and Baltic states, Germany, Poland, the UK, and later the Netherlands), which was tasked with discussing and promoting northern European cooperation on defence and security matters. The Arctic was included within the group’s remit, implying that neglected regional concerns were part of a broader set of challenges facing northern Europe as tensions between the West and Russia rose (Depledge et al, 2019). This appears to have formed the basis for the widening of the British narrative about the High North, and, in particular, the idea that Arctic security and defence matters no longer existed in isolation.

Since Fox’s tenure, the UK’s concerns about energy security have receded, in part because of the shock collapse in oil prices from 2014 to 2016, but also because confidence in the potential of Arctic oil and gas to make a significant contribution to world markets has diminished in recent years (Gulas et al, 2017). However, in the wake of the Ukraine/Crimea crisis in 2014, military incidents and diplomatic stand-offs, the Russia ‘question’ has re-emerged in full, touching, arguably, all aspects of UK defence and security policy, including in the High North. American concerns about the possibility of future Chinese military activity in the Arctic are also being raised in the UK, although London has not gone as far as to use the same kind of confrontational language coming out of Washington.

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The Russia-China axis in the Arctic As far back as 2010, there were suggestions in the British press that Russian submarines had revived an old Cold War tactic of trying to record the acoustic signatures of the UK’s Vanguard class nuclear submarines – the carriers of the Trident nuclear deterrent – as they entered and left Scottish waters, which, if successfully executed, would make these vessels easier to detect and track (Harding, 2010).

More recently, British Defence Chiefs went public about their concerns about Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic, particularly in the so-called Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap, that posed a potential and escalating threat to undersea communication lines between Europe and North America(BBC News, 2017). Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic is directly linked to the Arctic because of the location of the Northern Fleet’s bases on the Kola Peninsula.

At the same time, London appears to be increasingly concerned about the potential for Russia to disrupt the UK’s ability to benefit commercially from new opportunities arising as the Arctic becomes more accessible. Part of what drives British interest in the Arctic, alongside commercial interest in resource extraction and shipping-related activities, is an awareness of howtechnological developments and innovation is creating new knowledges and new opportunities in the Arctic. For example, only some 15% of the Arctic Ocean has been mapped, but this is likely to increase in the coming years with greater use of unmanned vehicles. Furthermore, satellites capable of covering the High North will enable not just mapping but monitoring of the region, potentially improving safety of navigation and creating new systems for the surveillance of ecosystems, pollution and suspected illicit activity. UK interest in such opportunities also reinforces the Government’s commitment to supporting good governance in the Arctic.

Recent moves by the Kremlin to assert Russia’s ‘rights’ over the NSR raises the potential for an abrogation of the freedom to navigate through opening seas (The Maritime Executive, 2019). The UK’s concerns appear to have been augmented by Russia’s expansion of military activity in the Arctic even though that has taken place against the constraints of the Russian economy and what is an old and aging naval fleet. Russian investment in Arctic military projects also draws in resources from other critical socio-economic projects, calling into question the long-term sustainability of Russia’s Arctic military and commercial presence in the Arctic. Nevertheless, Moscow appears adamant that Russia must retain control over access to the NSR and its approaches.

The Kremlin’s assertion of legal, military and commercial primacy over the NSR has been accompanied by robust rhetoric from the Russian Defence Ministry directed towards NATO as well as Sweden and Finland. Simulated attacks against military installations, bases and exercise areas in the European High North have also been reported (Nilsen, 2019; Staalesen, 2019a). Most recently, Russia’s large-scale military drills during Tsentr 2019 featured a substantial NSR component, which included the staging of an exercise involving more than 500 soldiers on Bolshevik island between the Kara and Laptev seas (Staalesen, 2019b).

The UK is of course not alone in worrying about Russia. Many Western states have over the last decade grown wary of Moscow’s intent. Cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007, the 2008 RussiaGeorgia war, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and most recently, the worrying development of Russia applying ‘pressure’ through cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns on Finland, Sweden and Norway all combine to increase suspicions of Moscow’s agenda and what the endpoint of such organised disruption might be. While Finland and Sweden are not members of NATO,

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their geopolitical position and democratic cultures mean that ‘probing’ or so called ‘hybrid warfare tactics’ against them raises anxiety levels in partners such as the UK. In the Far East, Beijing’s decision to enunciate its own Arctic policy in 2018 raised the real prospect of future Chinese expansion and ambition in the region, which appears to be increasingly symbolised by the idea of a ‘Polar Silk Road’ (State Council, 2018). China is commonly referred to by its officials and commentators as a ‘near Arctic’ state and Arctic ‘stakeholder’. Chinese investment in scientific research, commercial projects and icebreakers, the related accumulation of experience, knowledge and from experimental voyages in Arctic waters, and Beijing’s warming relationship with Moscow, has prompted significant debate about Chinese ambitions (Pezard, 2018).

While Chinese military activity (as opposed to Beijing’s commercial agenda) in the region remains somewhat unclear, since a group of naval vessels was sent within 12 nautical miles of the US Aleutian Islands in 2015 (coinciding with a presidential visit by Barack Obama to Alaska), there has been considerable speculation about the prospects of Chinese warships or submarines crossing the Arctic Circle in the near future3. Earlier this year the Pentagon went further still, warning that China’s expanding submarine fleet was moving closer to a deployment capability for the Arctic (Department of Defense, 2019a; 2019b). Meanwhile, speculation that the Chinese military would participate in Russia’s Tsentr 2019 drills was confirmed in September (Buchanan & Boulégue, 2019). Although there is no open source evidence that the Chinese military was directly involved in the Arctic component of Tsentr 2019, it is likely that it was monitoring the exercise carefully.

The UK’s growing Arctic bootprint since 2018 As recently as 2017, there was a real possibility that the UK’s military presence in the Arctic would be substantially reduced in response to domestic budgetary pressures (Defence Committee, 2018).

The Government actually cancelled Arctic warfare training for the Royal Marines in early 2018 in to plug a hole in the Royal Navy’s operating budget. Around the same time, the Government entertained a serious debate about whether to scale-back the UK’s amphibious warfare capability, including the Royal Marines. Even before 2018, the size of Royal Marine’s annual deployment in the Arctic had fallen from c. 2,000-4,000 personnel at the end of the Cold War to c. 200-300.

However, critics of that decision, which included the House of Commons Defence Committee, appear to have precipitated a shift in mindset that has actually led to an amplification of public messaging by the MOD around the UK military presence in the Arctic, which in turn strengthens the case for expenditure on critical assets for that region such as the Royal Marines.

Over the past year or so, the emerging narrative has started to consolidate the UK’s military activities in the Arctic and project a single strategic picture of the need to respond to new threats to the UK and its allies from the High North. That includes, for example, the renewal of the UK’s under-ice submarine capability: in March 2018, HMS Trenchant (one of the UK’s remaining Trafalgar-class nuclear-powered submarines) surfaced through the Arctic ice cap, becoming the first Royal Navy submarine to do so since 2007. The expectation is that the Royal Navy is now working towards ensuring that the newer Astute-class nuclear-powered submarine will be similarly capable of under-ice missions. Last Autumn, the MOD also announced that the UK would deploy around 800 Royal Marines for Arctic warfare training in Northern Norway in early 2019. However, this move was significant not just because it more than doubled the number of Royal Marines being deployed to Norway, but because this time it was to be part of a decade-long commitment to train The UK and the Arctic: Forward defence

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with Norwegian armed forces on an annual basis. Historically, the Royal Marine deployments to Norway had only been planned a year or two ahead (which is what made it easier to cancel the deployment in 2018). Moreover, surges are expected to occur every other year when personnel numbers will swell to around 1,400. In addition to working with Norway, the Royal Marines will also continue providing valuable cold weather training to the US Marine Corps (as they have done since 2016). A third aspect to the emerging narrative relates to the anticipated arrival next year of new Boeing P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft, which will be based in RAF Lossiemouth in northeast Scotland. In 2018, the MOD confirmed that it planned to use the aircraft to monitor Russian submarine activity in the High North. Fourth, before the end of this year, the UK will conduct air policing over Iceland for the first time.

The UK has also been acting in concert with a wider set of allies. In October, NATO undertook ‘Exercise Trident Juncture’ (EXTJ) its largest military exercise since the 1980s. EXTJ was centred on Norway but also involved air and naval operations in adjacent areas of the Arctic and North Atlantic (NATO Review, 2018). American involvement in the exercise witnessed the deployment of a carrier strike group north of the Arctic Circle for the first time in nearly thirty years. However, NATO is still essentially divided over how to respond to Russia’s military ambitions in the Arctic.

While some members are simply unable to focus on the region because of competing priorities in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, NATO is also mindful of Norwegian and Canadian concerns about the possibility of an enhanced alliance presence exacerbating rather than reducing tensions.

While the UK would like to see greater alliance unity with regard to the High North, its more immediate focus has been on enhancing its defence partnerships with northern European nations and the United States. HMS Trenchant’s recent deployment to the Arctic was part of joint UK-US cooperation on under-ice submarine operations. As already set out, the UK is also working more closely with Norway and the United States to enhance interoperability between the Royal Marines, US Marine Corps and Norwegian armed forces. That cooperation has extended to the air, with the three countries agreeing to work together on maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare over the North Atlantic and High North. The UK and US have further strengthened their commitments to military training exercises in northern Norway, Finland and Sweden. In 2019, Sweden invited the UK’s Royal Marines to participate in ‘Exercise Northern Wind’, together with Finland, Norway and the United States. The Defence and Security Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2018 between Iceland and the UK also indicates the importance of that country to the UK’s emerging defence strategy in the High North. Meanwhile there is still potential for UK-Denmark cooperation to be expanded, including in relation to Greenland. The UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), which includes many Arctic nations, has meanwhile been conducting maritime exercises in the neighbouring Baltic region. However, British defence officials are talking increasingly about the possibility of directing the JEF towards the High North as well in the future. Combined with the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia (part of NATO’s enhanced forward presence that was a direct response to Russian actions against Ukraine), a chain of military cooperation stretching from North America to the Baltic is emerging, encompassing not just the High North, but the Wider North.

Post-Brexit Britain and the Arctic All of the above needs to be set against the turmoil that has been caused in the UK by the 2016 referendum which called on the British Government to end the UK’s membership of the European

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Union. Three years on it is still unclear what the final outcome will be. Nevertheless, the enormity of the decision to leave was reflected in the UK’s 2018 Arctic Policy Framework, which stated that “perhaps the biggest change to the UK’s Arctic position since 2013 was the decision by the people of the UK to leave the European Union” (HM Government 2018). However, until a final agreement with the EU has been reached, there is little that can be said with any degree of certainty about how Brexit will impact upon the UK’s Arctic interests (Depledge et al, 2019). As of October 2019, there is still uncertainty over the timetable and terms on which the UK will leave the EU, if at all. However, whilst Westminster politics remains uncertain, the commercial, scientific and defence communities continue to call for an enhanced UK presence in the High North.

The position of the UK has also been complicated by the fact that Scotland has been increasingly assertive in pushing and defining its own Arctic credentials. Expressions of Scottish ‘Arctic-ness’ have grown over the past decade, particularly since the Scottish National Party began articulating a distinctly northern (if not ‘Nordic’) identity narrative that separated Scotland from the rest of the UK in the run-up to the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum (Depledge & Dodds, 2017).

Following several prominent appearances by SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon at the annual Arctic Assembly in Reykjavik, Iceland, in September 2019 Holyrood launched its own Arctic Policy Framework.

The Scottish Arctic Policy Framework rests primarily on claims of a shared cultural and historical experience with northern neighbours but also interestingly points to shared experiences of the ‘peoples’ of Scotland and the Arctic. Not least the framework emphasises the challenges of sustainable economic development in rural and isolated areas and in a side swipe against London points to the fuel poverty of some Scottish communities highlighting the the fact that Scottish citizens pay 7-9% more on their fuel bills than the average British person. No mention though was made of the growing presence of Norwegian commercial and energy interests in Scotland itself (Middleton, 2019). Synergy with Arctic communities and Indigenous peoples as well as a role as a ‘gateway’ to business has been highlighted by the establishment of an Arctic Unit within the Scottish Government’s Directorate for External Affairs. While at the moment the claim to be geographically the Arctic’s nearest non-Arctic neighbour does not appear to have ruffled too many feathers further south, a second referendum on Scottish independence could yet undermine the coherence and claims of the UK Government, not least in the realm of defence given the ongoing basing of key UK military assets in Scotland.

Conclusion The UK is faced with a series of challenges in redefining its foreign and defence strategies whilst in a period of deciding and trying to leave the EU. Part of the Government’s response has been to reiterate its military and defence interests in the Arctic and High North. A decade or so ago, there was far greater emphasis on climate change and energy security, followed by economic opportunities, and now strategic and defence re-assessment. Rooted in a firm commitment to NATO and Northern allies, the UK’s emerging defence policy now rests on resisting both Russian expansionism and mischief making, while also looking to counter new players in the Arctic such as China.

The 2019 launch of an Arctic defence strategy by the MOD is also fully mindful of the reality that the UK still needs European partners, drawn both from NATO and EU as well as from nonNATO and non-EU friends and allies. The UK strategic re-engagement with the North Atlantic The UK and the Arctic: Forward defence

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and the Arctic should therefore also be regarded as part of a concerted attempt to strengthen relations with non-EU states such as Norway, Iceland and the US. This could be seen as a compensatory move designed, in part, to mitigate a change in relations with the EU.

Notes 1. It is important to note that the UK definition of the High North is distinct from that of other states, most notably Norway, in that it encompasses the Arctic as well as the northern reaches of the Atlantic.

2. Defence is hardly touched upon in the two Arctic Policy Framework documents despite the British Government making the maintenance of peace and stability in the region its foremost priority.

3. After all, Chinese military in the Arctic is not new. It can be traced back to the 1950s, when nuclear submarines were developed for the purpose of great power deterrence. During the Cold War, however, China’s aspirations were hamstrung by technical difficulties associated with operating undetected in Arctic waters (Brady, 2017).

References BBC News. (2017, December 15). Russia a ‘risk’ to undersea cables, defence chief warns.

Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42362500, 30 May 2019.

Brady, A-M. (2017). China as a Polar Great Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buchanan, E. and Boulégue, M. (2019, May 20). Russia’s military exercises in the Arctic have more bark than bite. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/20/russias-military-exercises-in-the-arctic-havemore-bark-than-bite/, 30 September 2019.

DCDC. (2007). The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme: 2007-2036. Third Edition.

Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence.

Defence Committee. (2018). On Thin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic. HC 388. Retrieved from: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmdfence/388/388.pdf, 30 May 2019.

Department of Defence. (2019a). Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense. Retrieved from: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf, 30 May 2019.

Department of Defense. (2019b). Report to Congress: Department of Defence Arctic Strategy.

Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy. Retrieved from: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTICSTRATEGY.PDF, 7 June 2019.

Depledge, D. (2012). The United Kingdom and the Arctic in the 21st Century. Arctic Yearbook 2012. Retrieved from: https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2012/2012scholarly-papers/13-the-united-kingdom-and-the-arctic-in-the-21st-century, 7 June 2019.

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Depledge, D. (2018). Britain and the Arctic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Depledge, D. and Dodds, K. (2017). The United Kingdom, Scotland and the Arctic. The Arctic Institute, 5 December. Retrieved from: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/unitedkingdom-scotland-arctic/., 30 September, 2019 Depledge, D, Dodds, K. and Kennedy-Pipe, C. (2019). The UK’s Defence Arctic Strategy: Negotiating the slippery geopolitics of the UK and the Arctic. The RUSI Journal 164(1): 28-39.

Depledge, D. and Rogers, J. (2016). Securing the Wider North. RUSI Newsbrief 36(2): 19-20.

Gulas, S., Downton, M., D’Souza, K., Hayden, K. and Walker, T. R. (2017). Declining Arctic ocean oil and gas developments: Opportunities to improve governance and environmental pollution control. Marine Policy 75: 53-61.

Harding, T. (2010, August 27). Russian subs stalk Trident in echo of Cold War. The Telegraph.

Retrieved from: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/7969017/Russiansubs-stalk-Trident-in-echo-of-Cold-War.html, 30 May 2019.

HM Government. (2018). Beyond the Ice: UK policy towards the Arctic. London: Polar Regions Department.

The Maritime Executive. (2019, March 8). ‘Russia tightens control over Northern Sea Route’.

Retrieved from: https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/russia-tightens-controlover-northern-sea-route, 30 September 2019.

Middleton, A. (2019, September 27) Constructing Arctic Identity: Analysis of Scotland’s Arctic Policy. High North News. Retrieved from: https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/whatremains-not-so-evident-what-scotland-wants-arctic-return, 30 September 2019.

Ministry of Defence. (2018). Defence Secretary announces new Defence Arctic Strategy.

GOV.UK, 30 September. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-announces-new-defencearctic-strategy, 30 September 2019.

NATO Review. (2018, October 19). A credible transatlantic bond: Trident Juncture and NATO capabilities. Retrieved from: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/acredible-transatlantic-bond-trident-juncture-and-nato-capabilities-militaryexercise/EN/index.htm, 30 May 2019.

Nilsen, T. (2019, February 12). 11 Russian fighter jets made mock attack on Norwegian Arctic radar. The Barents Observer. Retrieved from: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/02/11-russian-fighter-jets-mademock-attack-norwegian-arctic-radar, 30 September 2019.

Pezard, S. (2018, November 26). The New Geopolitics of the Arctic: Russia’s and China’s Evolving Role in the Region. Testimony presented before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development of the Canadian House of Commons.

Retrieved from: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT500/RAND_C T500.pdf, 7 June 2019.

Staalesen, A. (2019a, May 21). Russia says its radio-electronic shield now covers the Arctic. The Barents Observer. Retrieved from: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arcticsecurity/2019/05/russia-says-its-radio-electronic-shield-now-covers-arctic, 30 May 2019.

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Staalensen, A. (2019b, September 16) Arctic Troops advance on Bolshevik Island. The Barents Observer. Retrieved from: https://thebarentsobserver.com>revanchist-forces-advancebolshevik-island, 17 September 2019.

State Council. (2018). China’s Arctic Policy. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Retrieved from: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_2814760266603 36.htm, 30 September, 2019.

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What is ‘Arctic’ about ‘Arctic security’?

Pauline Pic & Frédéric Lasserre

This work focuses on the governance of the Arctic, through the prism of security, by analyzing arctic strategies and security policies from coastal countries around the Arctic Ocean in order to understand how they apprehend the changing Arctic. A series of interviews conducted in Norway and Canada in the Winter and Spring of 2019 complete this discourse analysis. In this exploratory work part of an ongoing research, we explore the Arctic dimension of Arctic security discourses. Since 2007, the label of Arctic security is more and more used, as a symptom that global geopolitics have reached the Arctic and that the age of exceptionalism is over. We want to question processes behind this label, trying to identify what could be specifically Arctic about Arctic security, in the changing contemporary context. This paper broadly delineates the security system at play in the Arctic today (1) through an analysis of the actor network at play and the definitions of security put forward in Arctic strategies, with a focus on the coastal states around the Arctic Ocean. It then questions current developments within this system (2), to question the scale of ‘Arctic Security’ and how it faces external powers getting more and more interested in the region.

Introduction In February 2019, the Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters (COECSW) organized a side-event at the Munich Security Conference titled “In from the cold: The end of Arctic Exceptionalism”. The premise was that “So far, the Arctic has been discussed under the frame of being a zone of exceptionalism, where cooperation and not confrontation is the fundament for problem solving” (COECSW, 2019) and that we were now “entering a new era of great power competition” (idem). Then later on, in the beginning of May of the same year, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a vehement speech on the eve of the ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council. During the meeting per se, he refused to include Climate Change in the declaration, which meant that for the first time in the history of the Arctic Council, a ministerial meeting did not end up in a joint declaration. As it is a consensus-based organisation, this is saying a lot.

Pauline Pic is a PhD Candidate, and Frédéric Lasserre is a Professor, in Geography at Laval University, Quebec, Canada.

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At the end of the Cold War, the Arctic slowly emerged as a distinct region in international society (Young, 2000). The 1987 Soviet proposal that the Arctic could be a “zone of peace” (Gorbachev, quoted in Åtland, 2008; Taubman, 1987), a “Territory of dialogue”1, or even a “mosaic of cooperation” (Young, 2005) became dominant. It would then be understood as a “unique region detached from global political dynamics” meaning an “apolitical space of regional governance” based on functional cooperation and peaceful coexistence (Käpylä & Mikkola, 2015: 5). In this context, the Arctic Council embodies this will of peaceful cooperation. The Ottawa Declaration, the founding agreement of the Arctic Council, explicitly states that this high level forum will allow cooperation and discussion on common Arctic issues – excluding military security (Arctic Council, 1996). Those ministerial meetings have thus made a point of excluding global geopolitical issues and power competition, even in the midst of crises like in 2014, after Russia invaded Crimea and faced international sanctions (Byers, 2017; Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017). The idea of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, meaning a region somewhat insulated from politico-strategic dynamics, was then used to describe Arctic governance. The change of tone in Pompeo’s speech, emphasizing a ‘new era of competition’ (Pompeo, 2019), coupled with an increasing number of discourses about Arctic security would then contribute to the idea of a crumbling exceptionalism.

But if this speech emphasizes the rise of new powers which might constitute a threat to the unipolar world as we knew it since the end of the Cold War, it was not the first time that this idea emerged (See for example Lasserre & Plouffe, 2013; Murray, 2012): in that sense, this speech was not disruptive whatsoever. Substantially, there was indeed nothing new, but the form was different: what changed was the framing of power practice and security issues in the Arctic region. This, therefore, questions discourses about security in the region. Many discourses tackle the issue of what is labelled “Arctic security”, but there isn’t really any consensus about a definition of what it would be. Under this label, we can read haphazardly about human security, environmental security (Gjørv, Bazely, Goloviznina, & Tanentzap, 2013), securitization, or desecuritization (Jensen & Hønneland, 2015), militarization of the Arctic, or rather now, about remilitarization (Lamothe, 2018). There isn’t even, really, any consensus about what the Arctic is, and we could argue, as Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv puts it, that the mere act of talking about “Arctic security” is political (Center for Peace Studies, 2019). We aim here to question this political stance: what would be ‘Arctic’ about “Arctic security”? How have framings of ‘Arctic security’ evolved and why?

Definitions & literature review Framing the Arctic The map below shows several lines can be used to define the Arctic region: from the Arctic Circle to the treeline or the discontinuous permafrost, many defining features can be highlighted – depending on the context and the discipline. Framing the region according to a definition or another may also already be a political choice, as Elana Wilson Rowe underlines it: “the idea of ‘what’ or ‘where’ the Arctic is has been fascinatingly fluid and contested, depending on the political context and constellation of actors at hand” (Wilson Rowe, 2018: 6). Many examples can illustrate this, beginning with the definition of Arctic states. Founders of the Arctic Council count eight countries, including Iceland even though its coastline is predominantly under the Polar Circle.

When the Arctic coastal states met in Ilulissat in 2008 on the other hand, Iceland, Sweden and Finland were not invited. The meeting had as an objective the signing of a declaration stating that coastal countries in the region would claim extended continental shelves according to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UN, 1994). This has been analyzed as a political move to re-

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territorialize the ocean and insist on the fact that the Arctic was not a terra nullius to be grabbed (Dodds, 2013; Steinberg et al, 2015).

Map 1 – The limits of the Arctic according to various definitions (CAFF, 2001)

The framing of the region was therefore very specifically centered around the Ocean as a core territory of definition, with the de facto exclusion of Iceland, Finland and Sweden from the treaty.

After the Russian flag planting episode of 2007 and the claims that there was going to be a race for the Arctic, and to address talk coming especially from the EU to neutralize the Arctic via a treaty inspired from the 1991 Madrid Antarctic Treaty (Lasserre, 2010a; Offerdal, 2011), states chose a more restrictive framing of the Arctic region, “collectively and individually reinforcing their sovereign rights and jurisdiction from their coastlines seaward” (Berkman & Young, 2009).

Depending on the framing, we then have two distinct definitions of Arctic countries: the “A8”, meaning the eight member countries of the Arctic Council, and the “A5”, referring to the 5 signatory countries of the Ilulissat declaration. When China describes itself as a ‘near-Arctic State’ (The People’s Republic of China, 2018) – just like the UK (HM Government, 2018)2, but drawing far more media coverage than the British narrative – the framing is geographically much wider.

Depending on the context and the set of actors at play, framing the region has a political significance, but it also has practical consequences in the way the concrete policy debate is shaped (Wilson Rowe, 2018).

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For the purpose of this paper, we chose a definition of the Arctic centered around the Arctic Ocean, considering coastal states or the A5 as the center of interest. However, considering both the strategic position of Iceland and the fact that it can be considered a coastal state, it will be included in our territory of definition. The figure on the left shows two different definitions of the Arctic Ocean. The one circled by the black line corresponds to the definition of the International Hydrologic Organisation. The deep blue one corresponds to the definition used by the CIA in its World Factbook (Grataloup, 2015) and highlights the inclusion of Iceland. As we want to investigate the Arctic Map 2 - Delimitations of the Arctic ocean dimension of Arctic security, we chose to focus on the (extracted from Grataloup, 2015) more restrictive geographical framing of the region to be able to draw comparisons in further work later on.

Security as a complex issue It is easier to define what security is not, rather than what it actually is. Definitions are usually quite vague: “Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (Wolfers, 1952: 485) and there can be no agreed upon definition as long as those try to be more precise. Balzacq then talks about an “essentially contested concept” (2003: 3): there can be no consensus over the definition of security because of an intrinsic ideological dimension in the concept (Balzacq, 2003; Little, 1981).

In sum, he argues that there can be no neutral definition of security because security is linked with power. This draws upon Emma Rothschild’s work on the definition of security in which

she argues that one of the four purposes – or definitions – of security is to “influence directly the distribution of money and power” (Rothschild, 1995: 59). This takes us back to the notion of framing which we alluded to when defining the territory of study: framing a definition of security implies a purpose and comes with political means.

In the Arctic, while security was largely understood in the military sense during the Cold War (Tamnes & Holtsmark, 2014), the shift towards a larger understanding of the issue happened even before the end of the conflict, the Murmansk speech of 1987 being a famous turning point in this respect (Åtland, 2008). Now it seems security is omnipresent in discourses about the region, whether we are talking about human, environmental or economic security. This is why we will frame our working definition on the state and use a state centric definition – what is usually referred to as ‘military security’ (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998) or ‘state security’ (Tamnes & Offerdal, 2014).

However, we do not want to have a sectoral approach isolating one sector from the others.3 We consider that those sectors are interconnected and that state security issues can have a – direct or indirect – impact on human security issues, as well as on other sectors, much like in a system. We investigate here through policy documents, how states consider these overlapping sectors, or definitions, in their own definition of security in the region. In that sense, we consider security as a “complex issue’, that is to say one that can be seen from multiple perspectives, one that is constantly evolving and which has no linear solution or way to address it, but rather multiple, sometimes competing perspectives (Horst & Webber, 1973).

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To try and take into account this complexity, this paper will use a systemic approach to study the Arctic subsystem within the global system. Broadly defined, a system is a set of units, linked together by a set of interrelations, so much that when there is a change in one unit or in one interrelation, it has effects on the other units and interrelations (Battistella et al, 2012). Then the entire system has to exhibit properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts (Jervis, 1997). We therefore consider the Arctic Ocean system, through the prism of geopolitics, with a focal on security.

Cooperation and security in the Arctic Cooperation is a very strong component of Arctic governance, and it serves the interest of every national actors that it remains so (Deng, 2016; Lackenbauer & Lalonde, 2019; Lasserre, 2010b; Scopelliti & Conde Pérez, 2016; Tamnes & Offerdal, 2014; Zagorsky, 2010).

However, even though cooperation is a driving force in the region, a lot has been written on a changing Arctic security environment, associated with different key drivers for change, such as climate change and the melting of sea ice (See for example: Anderson, 2009; Borgerson, 2008; Heininen & Exner-Pirot, 2019; Kraska, 2011; LeMiere, 2017; Zellen, 2009). This opening up of the region is often accompanied by discourses about a race or a scramble for the Arctic (see for example: Byers, 2010; Dodds & Nuttall, 2016; Howard, 2010; Sale & Potapov, 2009). The Arctic is changing, and this would have consequences on regional security and cooperation. Talking about Arctic security also requires one to think about scale: the Arctic as a geographical but also political space is so diverse that we would agree with Østhagen et al. (2018) saying that it would be more relevant to talk about local security configurations – or local subsystems, rather than talking at the regional scale about one generic and almost void ‘Arctic security’ (Østhagen, Sharp & Hilde, 2018) – and this questions the framing of the issue as well, as talking about ‘Arctic security’ seems to imply a regional scale.

So what exactly is ‘Arctic’ about security in the region? Are the discussed changes shaping a specific meaning of the concept in the region? Is it just a political label or can we actually outline ‘Arctic specific’ issues in the security system in the region? Safety wise, the ice environment makes some safety issues stand out. Security wise however, the picture seems much less clear when it comes to distinguish what would be specifically Arctic.

Data collection and methods This article is based on an analysis of Arctic strategies of the selected states (see annex 1). We focused during the first step on Arctic policy frameworks established by the relevant states, to establish a discursive framework of Arctic governance. The idea was to outline the general discursive framework of Arctic governance and apparent priorities, to consider where security fits.

This then drew upon previous work, either comparative (Heininen, 2012), or analyzing Arctic strategies by country (See for example Dodds, 2011; Hønneland, 2014; Plouffe, 2017; Zysk, 2010).

Recurring concepts have then been outlined, which allowed us afterwards to proceed to an analytical coding, based on the main themes which emerged (Hay, 2016), in order to compare discourses about security around the Ocean, and try to identify the main drivers of definition for ‘Arctic’ security. After this step, we conducted some semi-structured interviews in Norway and during conferences in the first quarter of 2019 with diplomats and politicians from around the Arctic, to add some perspective to the analyzed data. We then supplemented this analysis with references to newer texts and policies, often with a narrower scope or relevant for one set of actors

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(i.e., the Coast Guards). As this is an ongoing research project, the following results and discussion are mainly exploratory, setting the framework for the project.

Results & discussion Defining security We started with an analysis of the basic discursive framework of Arctic countries. We then processed overarching policy frameworks (see annex 1) to highlight the main themes.

Figure 4 - Discursive framework for Arctic governance This word cloud is based on policy frameworks for the Arctic. The idea is to visualize the most recurring themes in order to understand how what is labeled as Arctic security fits in this general framework. As we want to outline the general discursive framework for Arctic governance, we deliberately excluded from this figure the word “arctic” and country names, in order to focus on the most common and recurring themes. A few terms stand out: “international”, “cooperation”, “region”, “resources”, “Indigenous” … This tends to fit with the idea of “exceptionalism”, meaning that geopolitics in the Arctic are driven by a number of special features (Heininen, 2012, 2018b; Lackenbauer & Lalonde, 2019; Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016).

As this is an Arctic specific framework, we then want to understand how security definitions integrate those issues, and if the stated priorities fit the ones outlined there. The second step is then to analyze those definitions to see how they fit in this discursive framework.

Of course, security is always associated with defense issues and the question of the military. It is however only explicitly linked to national security concerns in the Russian and US strategies, as the overarching goal: “the United States is establishing an overarching national approach to advance national security interests, pursue responsible stewardship of this precious and unique region, and serve as a basis for cooperation with other Arctic states and the international community as a whole to advance common interests” (US Government, 2013: 4). For the Russian Federation, national security also appears as a main objective, in both 2009 and 2013. In the primary goal section, we can thus read that one of them is “to create a complex safety system for protection of the territories, What is ‘Arctic’ about ‘Arctic security’?

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population and objects of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation which are crucial for the national security of the Russian Federation” (Russian Federation, 2009). It remains relatively similar in the 2013 version of the strategy: “The strategy defines the basic mechanisms, ways and means to achieve the strategic goals and priorities for the sustainable development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and the national security” (Russian Federation, 2013). In other countries considered, national security is not put forward as an overarching goal, but rather as a priority among others. In the Norwegian strategy then, security policy corresponds to a subparagraph, and presents security in the Arctic through a more collaborative approach, especially through NATO4: “Membership of NATO and the transatlantic security community is the cornerstone of Norway’s security policy” (Norwegian Government, 2017: 18). But security is referred to in many more sections. It is not considered only through the prism of state security, but rather as a multidimensional problem. The newly released Canadian Arctic policy framework devotes an entire chapter to security and addresses several referent objects, from national security (objective 2): “The Government of Canada is already taking steps to increase its Arctic and northern footprint in support of regional safety and security. This effort is anchored in Canada's defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, which recognizes that the Arctic region is of critical importance to the national security and defence of Canada and of North America” (Government of Canada, 2019), to human security (objective 6). In every definition considered however, a broad security spectrum is considered, which fits what Heininen coins as the “Post-Cold War’s security nexus”, i.e. where geopolitical stability balances military presence in a global space, and what dominates is the joint “commitment to maintain peace, stability and constructive cooperation in the Arctic” (Heininen, 2019: 124). Security is not limited to the state and encompasses many more dimensions, more actors and more factors are considered in its definition, starting with climate and the environment which are standing out in fig. 1, and could constitute a specific feature of Arctic security (idem: 125). But does this translate into actual political action, which would then lead to a specific definition of security in the Arctic, or ‘Arctic security’?

Back to the basics?

In this section, we added to our analysis policy documents which are focused on the Arctic region and represent a specific actor in the field of security in the region. This mainly includes departments of defense and national coast guards. We saw that premises for security showed some specific features in the Arctic and we now want to see if/how this translates into political action. According to Heininen’s periodization (Heininen, 2019), if we analyze the “Post-Cold War period” – which follows a transition period and starts in the 2000s – can we find evidence that would convey a new definition for security that would be Arctic specific?

In the latest documents available, we can read somewhat of a change in tone. The shift from a common understanding of security and a cooperative framework for security is especially apparent in the US Coast Guard strategy, released in May 2019. We can find all the vocabulary identified above (cooperation, stability…). But the tone is much more direct, especially in the second part: “Today’s realities” (US Coast Guard, 2019). The analysis of the geostrategic change takes no detour when it comes to China and its presence in the Arctic: “China, a non-Arctic state, continues to expand its influence and seeks to gain strategic advantage around the world […] China’s pattern of behavior in the Indo-Pacific region and its disregard for international law are cause for concern as its economic and scientific presence in the Arctic grows” (US Coast Guard, 2019: 10). It is also singularly direct about Russia: “Russia has demonstrated a willingness to use its power globally to coerce other nations around the world in an effort to expand its sphere of influence” (idem: 10).

In the Canadian defense strategy Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017: 79), the question of external actors is Pic & Lasserre

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explicitly mentioned, though the tone is much less aggressive: “The Arctic is also becoming more relevant to the international community […] Arctic and non-Arctic states alike are looking to benefit from the potential economic opportunities associated with new resource development and transportation routes”. The safety and security chapter of the new policy framework sums it up: “While the Canadian Arctic has historically been — and continues to be — a region of stability and peace, growing competition and increased access brings safety and security challenges to which Canada must be ready to respond” (Government of Canada, 2019). Interviewees on the other hand almost unanimously insist on the important discursive emphasis that is put on these actors.

The Arctic Strategic Outlook for the US Navy, which is the new document of reference, superseding the 2014 Roadmap, describes the region as having a “low risk of conflict, because nations have demonstrated their ability to resolve differences peacefully” (US Navy, 2019: 5). The document seems to convey a low interest for the military in the region, and it is interesting to compare it with the US Coast Guard’s newly released strategy which is much more detailed and provides an in-depth analysis of global developments in the region. In practical terms, this would suggest that soft security issues and actors remain the priority in the region. It would then be an oversimplification to say that we are ‘back to the basics’ of global geopolitics as it can sometimes be read (see for example Lamothe, 2018; Shea, 2019): the tone might have changed, but a classic realist security approach is not more relevant today to understand security dynamics in the region.

They have to be understood in their context and their complexity.

From a “High North, Low tension” paradigm to a “High North, Underlying tensions” one?

Three main types of systems can be outlined: closed systems, which have no relations with others, open systems, which have relations of interdependence with others and, finally, autonomous systems, which are open on their environment, but able to counter or filter system effects such as feedback or retroactive loops (Thibault, 2003). The post-Cold War Arctic is based on institutional international cooperation, which is supported by Arctic non-state actors such as Arctic Indigenous peoples or NGOs (Heininen, 2018a). The issue of security is taken out of the equation as the region remains – in discourses – a zone of peace. The only panarctic institution – the Arctic Council – excluded issues of military security. Cooperation is the main governance mechanism, leaning on a wide set of actors, governmental and not. The system is essentially built on environmental cooperation (Exner-Pirot, 2013), as attested in the 1991 Helsinki Declaration and the 1996 Ottawa Declaration. In systemic terms, that means that connections with the global system are mainly considered on the environmental side of things, for example addressing issues of long-range pollution. Hard security issues are filtered out, and their retroactive loops are actively kept out of the debates.

Interviews conducted are almost unanimous on one point: in 2014, the annexation of Crimea changed how the system behaved. Cooperation was built on the respect of international law and this episode set a precedent which had an unexpected feedback effect on the Arctic governance system. Yet, the system only partially broke down. Michael Byers (2017), argues that cooperation prevailed even in times of crisis because of mechanisms of “complex interdependence”. Building his argument on the Ukraine crisis of 2014, he demonstrates that those mechanisms helped contain the crisis – even though they were severely affected (Byers, 2017). He argues that the Arctic meets the criteria for complex interdependence, namely transgovernmental and transnational channels of contact and the near irrelevance of military force. This implies that in case of a crisis, if some channels are dismissed, others will act as a safety net because dialogue between two parties does What is ‘Arctic’ about ‘Arctic security’?

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not rely only on one set of issues but on several sets of multifaceted ones. In the Arctic then, cooperation remains a driving dynamic in the governance of the region, but “it should not be taken for granted” (idem: 395). We saw in Arctic strategies that security was associated with a set of issues which laid the basis for peace and cooperation. The annexation had practical consequences on this security system and several avenues of dialogue were suspended. For example, military cooperation was suspended with Russia but cooperation between Coast Guards remained effective (Østhagen, 2016). It can be argued then that this episode thus contributed to opening this Arctic system: security issues could not be completely filtered out and had consequences on other nodes of the system. Two interviewees explained for example that cooperation on a scientific level within a working group of the Arctic Council got affected. This “negative effect” as per Jervis’s typology (Jervis, 1997) would support the idea that the system is opening up and becoming less impervious to outside issues. Some actors took it even further affirming that a conflict emerging within the Arctic would be quite unlikely or even “completely irrational” (Norwegian officer, closed conference with Emerging Leaders participants, 2019), but that there is an effective risk of a spillover effect. Tensions are not out in the open, they are underlying and mainly emanating from outside of the Arctic. We could thus say that we moved from a “High North, Low tension” paradigm to a “High North, Underlying tensions” one.

Framing Arctic security: A matter of scale and context Scale and context are two very important variables when it comes to the identification of what could be Arctic about Arctic security. Recent developments show that there is a perceived growing interest in the region from non-Arctic actors, Scotland being the latest non-Arctic actor to launch its Arctic policy framework (Vidal, 2019) For the A5 and the A8, it resulted in a stronger affirmation of themselves as Arctic nations (Steinberg et al, 2015; Wilson Rowe, 2018). Iceland is an interesting case study in this respect, asserting in its Arctic strategy that “it is of great importance that consensus is reached across the political spectrum on an Arctic policy which aims at positioning Iceland among those countries that have the greatest influence on future development in the region” (Government of Iceland, 2011: 4). Coastal state status has grown in significance (Dodds & Ingimundarson, 2012) and looking at the US’ newly released documents, it looks like the trend is getting stronger. This was clearly stated in the Coast Guard Strategy (2019) and is also quite apparent in the strategy released by the Department of Defense last June: “The United States does not recognize any other claims to Arctic status by any State other than these eight nations [the A8]” (US Department of Defense, 2019: 3). The new strategy also insists on the fact that the Arctic is a “part of the U.S. Homeland”. One of the three main points of the DoD strategic approach is to “build Arctic awareness”. This would suggest that the Arctic is now being framed as a national matter in a move to assert the country’s legitimacy in the region, in opposition to non-Arctic states.

Non-Arctic states use of a different, wider frame, considering their connection to a ‘global Arctic’ (Wilson Rowe, 2018), suggests the importance of scale – both geographical and reticular, in the definition and framing of Arctic security.

Conclusion It thus seems that discourses have changed in scale. Before 2014, results show that discourses about the Arctic were very Arctic-centered and focused on a consensual set of issues (cooperation, stability, the environment…). They were rarely put into global perspective, thus conveying the idea of an autonomous system. The annexation of Crimea and the unexpected feedback effect it had on cooperation in the region questioned the system and Arctic relations had to be considered also in regard to relations outside of the Arctic. The Kerch Strait incident of 20185 revived this crisis,

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emphasizing the importance of global geopolitics on cooperation in the region and the regional security system (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016). With the rise of growing interests of new external actors, discourses now envision the Arctic at the global scale, and seem to be less and less Arcticonly centered. Two main framings seem to be competing: a regional one, especially favoured by Arctic countries, and notably the A5, a reticular one. This questions tensions between national and international scales in the framing of security stakes: are they defined in the Arctic or are they integrated into broader security schemes that reflect them?

This analysis questions the Arctic dimension of what is labelled ‘Arctic security’. It appears that apart from a definition of security based on soft security stakes, it is hard to isolate Arctic specific stakes or dynamics that would allow one to talk about Arctic security as being something other than a discursive construction or a political stance – for now.

Acknowledgements This ongoing research is supported by the Sentinel North program of Université Laval, made possible, in part, thanks to funding from the Canada First Research Excellence Fund. Part of the research conducted in Norway was made possible thanks to funding from Mitacs Globalink programme. This research has also been made possible thanks to UiT (Norway) where Pauline Pic was able to stay for three months. Special thank goes to Professor Rasmus Bertelsen who supervised her work during her stay at UiT.

Notes 1. This is the name of an international forum about Arctic politics held in Russia since 2010. (https://forumarctica.ru/en/) 2. The official British Arctic policy says Britain is not an Arctic state, but is its “nearest neighbour.”

3. In Security, a New Framework for Analysis, authors divide security into five main sectors: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental (Buzan et al, 1998).

4. See (Østhagen et al, 2018) for details about Norway and NATO in the Arctic 5. On 25 November 2018, an incident occurred between the Russian and Ukrainian Navy.

Three Ukrainian Navy vessels attempting to pass from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait on their way to the port of Mariupol (Ukraine) were captured. Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia claims the Kerch Strait is internal waters that are not subject to innocent passage rights.

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Annex – List of Arctic policy documents considered Canada -

Canada’s Northern Strategy Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, 2009

-

Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad, 2010

-

Strong, Secure, Engaged. Canada’s Defence Policy. 2017

-

Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, 2019

Denmark -

Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020

Iceland -

A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, 2011

Norway -

Norway’s Arctic Policy, 2014

-

Norway’s Arctic Strategy, Between geopolitics and social development, 2017

Russia -

Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period Till 2020 and for a further perspective, 2009

-

The Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, 2013

The United States -

NSPD 66 / HSPD 25: Arctic Region policy, 2009

-

National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2013

-

Implementation Plan for National Strategy for Arctic Region, 2014

-

Executive Order --- Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic, 2015

-

US Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook, 2019

-

The US Navy Strategic Outlook for the Arctic, 2019

-

Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, 2019

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What is ‘Arctic’ about ‘Arctic security’?

China-Russia collaboration in shipping and marine engineering as one of the key factors of secure navigation along the NSR Gao Tianming & Vasilii Erokhin

Currently, about 80% of globally traded cargo is carried by maritime transport, including increasingly along the routes in the North, which have not been secured previously due to heavy ice conditions and extreme temperatures. In recent decades, however, climate change has been affecting the reduction of ice coverage in the Arctic Ocean and thus providing opportunities for the development of commercial navigation. Many countries are becoming increasingly interested in the exploration of opening maritime routes. With the incorporation of the Polar Silk Road into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) network, China has rapidly emerged as the major non-Arctic actor in the region. Contributing to the development of commercial shipping in the North, China aims at the diversification of its trade routes and linking itself with Arctic countries by a network of maritime corridors. Implementation of the Polar Silk Road initiative requires first and foremost improvement of navigation safety and passability of northern routes, primarily through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The existing network of operable routes along the Russian coastline of the Arctic Ocean allows commercial shipping during summer and autumn only. Due to the prevailing shallow depths, the operation of icebreakers is limited. Extension of the secured navigation window is hindered by the lack of icebreaking and supporting fleet and underdeveloped navigational infrastructure in Russia. In this paper, the authors discuss how China may collaborate with Russia to ensure the development of secure navigable routes by determining the areas suitable for the development of deep-water shipping and allowing the operation of large-tonnage tankers and icebreakers. The paper presents an analysis of water areas in the NSR suitable for the development of deep-water routes and operation of largetonnage vessels with high categories of ice reinforcements. The authors provide an overview of the current condition of the shipbuilding industry in Russia in relation to the construction of vessels and marine equipment for the Arctic in such segments as icebreaking, transport, port, and dredging fleet. In the conclusion, the existing obstacles and opportunities for China and Russia are summarized in light of the establishment of more secure and stable navigation along the NSR.

Introduction During the past fifteen years, there has been a substantial decrease in ice coverage in the Arctic Ocean during the summer-autumn navigation window (by 14-20% of total ice cover, on average).

In winter, the ice situation has become lighter (Dumanskaya, 2016). Due to warming, the ice-free

Gao Tianming is an Associate Professor at the School of Economics and Management, and Director and Chief Expert at the Arctic Blue Economy Research Center, Harbin Engineering University, China. Vasilii Erokhin is an Associate Professor at the School of Economics and Management, and a Researcher at the Arctic Blue Economy Research Center, Harbin Engineering University, China.

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water area in the summer has increased. It allows for extending the navigation window and expanding the zones of potential transport routes which have been previously covered by ice.

By 2050, owing to climate change, the character of navigation in the Arctic Ocean will undergo a fundamental change. The temperature increase affects the processes of formation, growth, and movement of ice. Associated processes have been emerging and influencing the conditions of ice cover in a non-linear manner. Ice melting increases the area of open water which has a lower solar reflectance coefficient compared to ice. As a consequence, absorption of the sun’s warmth in the zones of open water increases and the temperature of surface water rises which results in the cyclical process of ice melting (Parkinson, 2014). Such an effect is observed in both seasonal and long-term perspectives: warming up of surface layers of seawater causes a delay of ice freezing in autumn and thus shortens the period of ice growth. As a result, next year, sea ice is thinner, spongy, and more exposed to earlier fracture. According to Mokhov and Khon (2015), by 2025, with less than 15% of water area covered by ice during summer, the average duration of the navigation period may increase up to 3-4 months; by 2050 up to 4-5 months; and by 2100 to 5.5 months.

The melting of ice in the Arctic has opened up opportunities for transporting through the northern passages. Among non-Arctic countries, the one which is concerned the most about the effects of climate change and ice melting on navigation is China. China has formalized its involvement in the development and exploration of the Arctic by its inclusion of northern maritime routes into a network of blue maritime passages of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Zhang, 2018). A fundamental part of the future Polar Silk Road is the Northern Sea Route (NSR) which runs along Russia’s Arctic coast and provides easier access for cross-continental shipping in polar waters. By potential integration of the NSR into the BRI economic and transport corridors, China is attempting to take an active role in the development of the northern transport routes and is becoming more comfortable with being forthcoming about its interests in Arctic shipping and engineering rather than solely emphasizing science and climate change (Bennett, 2017; Erokhin & Gao, 2018).

The development of stable and secure navigation along the NSR is also one of Russia’s core interests in the Arctic (Zysk, 2010). The persistence of risk and uncertainty during sailing along the NSR includes the scarcity of port facilities and navigation aids, the inaccuracy of nautical charts, and isolation (Lasserre, 2018). Among the priorities in the sphere of transportation along the NSR are the construction of new icebreakers and support vessels, development of coastal infrastructure for sustainable all-year-round cargo shipping, and the establishment of a system for monitoring the safety of navigation and transport flow management in the areas of intense traffic (Østreng, 2010).

To ensure secure navigation and meet the requirements of increased economic activity along the NSR, Russia recognizes the need to modernize its Arctic fleet and therefore supports China’s growing involvement in shipping along the NSR. In its turn, China is willing to assist Russia in the development of the NSR by the modernization of the fleet and provision of advanced marine engineering technologies.

From the Chinese side, there have been many studies related to China’s emerging activities in the Arctic. Most of them have addressed the growing interests of China in the Arctic in various bilateral and multilateral formats and thus examined the nature of China’s interests and motivations in wanting to maintain its involvement and presence in the region (Li, 2009; Hong, 2018; Zhang, 2018; Gao, 2018). Many scholars like, for example, Sun (2014), Liu (2017), Hong (2018), Xiao Gao & Erokhin

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(2012), Guo and Guan (2009), Li and Tian (2009), and Wang and Shou (2013) advocated the idea that maritime routes in the Arctic had a strategic importance for China and would generate strong traffic due to a shorter distance and lower transportation costs. However, while discussing China’s interests in potential Arctic routes, no critical analysis of the feasibility or security of navigation along such routes has been considered (Huang et al, 2015), except by Shyu and Ding (2016) and Li et al (2018), who demonstrated that navigation safety and navigation information were the most important aspects affecting the building of Arctic shipping routes for China.

There is a branch of studies which underline the need to assess the navigability and feasibility of Arctic shipping and therefore focus on navigation conditions and commercial features, as well as examine the necessary conditions and requirements for trans-Arctic shipping routes to be viable (Xu, 2013; Huang et al, 2015; Meng et al, 2017; Zhang et al, 2013, Tillman et al, 2018). Mao et al (2011), Zhang et al (2006), Liu et al (2016), Kelmelis (2011), and Hong (2012) studied the effects of climate change on the security of navigation in polar waters and China’s maritime transport.

Chinese publications, however, barely tackle the issue with an assessment of difficulties linked with Arctic shipping, infrastructure development, and engineering, leaving all those technical issues at the mercy of collaboration with Arctic countries. Specifically, since the early 2010s, China has been reportedly interested in collaboration with Russia on all those “technical” issues, but few studies have investigated the possible convergence of Chinese initiatives with Russia’s current needs in the NSR, specifically those related to practical issues of infrastructure development, shipping, navigation, and marine technologies.

This study attempts to add to the discussion of the prospective directions of China-Russia collaboration in the spheres of shipbuilding and marine engineering to ensure the development of secure navigable routes in polar waters. In section 1, the authors present the major navigable paths in the Russian sector of the Arctic which may be used for transit shipping and discusses the major threats and risks to secure navigation along the high latitude and littoral routes in the NSR. The authors summarize safety requirements to navigation on the following parameters: (1) type of a vessel; (2) ice navigation mode; (3) parts of the NSR; (4) navigation window. In Section 2, the authors discuss how China’s vision of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Arctic matches Russia’s current interests and needs in shipping and engineering. Section 3 includes an overview of the current conditions of Russia’s shipbuilding industry in relation to the construction of vessels and marine equipment for the Arctic in such segments as icebreaking, transport, port, and dredging fleet. The authors determine the areas suitable for the development of deep-water shipping and the operation of large-tonnage tankers and icebreakers. In the conclusion, the existing technological, engineering, and economic obstacles and opportunities for the two countries are summarized in light of the establishment of more secure and stable navigation along the NSR.

Safety of navigation along the NSR The NSR passes along the northern coast of Russia in the Arctic Ocean (Barents Sea, Kara Sea, East Siberian Sea, Chukchi Sea, and Bering Sea). It connects seaports in the European and far eastern parts of Russia and navigable rivers of Siberia into an integrated transport network. The length of the route varies from 2,700 nautical miles (high latitude paths) to 3,500 nautical miles (littoral paths) depending on the particular route, ice situation, weather conditions, and other factors. In the west, the NSR starts in the Kara Gate, in the north – in Zhelaniya Cape in the Kara Sea. The distance between Murmansk and the Kara Gate is 528 nautical miles and between China-Russia collaboration in shipping and marine engineering

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Murmansk and Zhelaniya Cape it is 758 nautical miles. In the east, the NSR is accessed through Dezhnev Strait. The distance between Murmansk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky is 1,037 nautical miles. The lengths of the littoral paths are 4,640km (Kara Sea), 5,590km (Laptev Sea), 1,745km (East Siberian Sea), 1,890 km (Chukchi Sea), and 1,450km (straits along the NSR).

In the context of navigation, the NSR may be divided into three climatic zones: Atlantic, Siberian, and Pacific. The Atlantic zone includes the Barents Sea, western part of the Kara Sea, and a part of the water area of the Arctic Ocean northward of those seas. There are frequent storms in winter and fog and rainfall in summer. In the Barents Sea, the mean temperature in summer does not exceed 7°C, while in winter falls down to -20°C. Wave height is 7m. At the coast of the Kara Sea, mean temperature in summer does not exceed 6°C, and in winter it falls down to -28°C. The Siberian zone includes the eastern part of the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, and the western part of the East-Siberian Sea. In winter, the temperature is lower compared to that in other zones, while in summer, it is higher along the coast. In the northern parts of the zone, it is cold even in summer.

In the northern part of the Laptev Sea, the mean temperature in July is 1°C, while in winter, it reaches -34°C. Pacific zone includes the eastern part of the East-Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea. In winter, the climate of the zone is affected by the Pacific Ocean, which results in a higher mean temperature, stronger winds, and more precipitation compared to other zones. The average monthly temperature in the East Siberian Sea is +7°C in summer and -33°C in winter. In summer, there are frequent storms and heavy fogs because of the substantial oscillation of air temperature (Erokhin et al, 2018).

The depths vary substantially. Littoral routes pass through the shallow water areas of the Arctic seas. In terms of the water depth, the most insecure areas are Severnaya Zemlya Archipelago, Novosibirsk Islands, Dmitry Laptev Strait, Vilkitski Strait, and Skokalsky Strait.

Figure 1. Straits in high latitude and littoral paths of the NSR Source: ABS (2016)

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Depending on the particular path, the route passes through one or more straits with the lowest depths in Dmitry Laptev Strait (8-9m), Yugorsky Shar Strait (13m), and Sannikov Strait (13-15m) (Figure 1). Seaports along the NSR are predominantly shallow-water with the limiting depths of 1.6m in Amderma, 12.0 m in the seaports in the Gulf of Ob, 8.0m in Dikson, 11.8m in Dudinka, 4.2m in Khatanga, 3.9m in Tiksi, and 9.0m in Pevek.

There is no universal optimal way to pass the NSR but rather a scheme of indicative optimal shipping routes (Figure 2).

Figure 2. The scheme of indicative optimal shipping routes in the NSR Source: Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (n.d.)

For transit vessels, the optimal path usually varies depending on the season (Figure 3). In OctoberMay, shore ice spreads along the coastline of the Arctic Ocean and accumulates in the main navigation straits (except the Kara Gate, Long Strait, and Bering Strait). Most commonly, an optimal path passes through coastal flow leads which are formed alongside shore ice under the influence of atmospheric circulation and under-ice currents.

Figure 3. The scheme of transit paths in the NSR Source: Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (n.d.)

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According to the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (n.d.), during the entire period of regular ice monitoring, there have been registered singular events (5-10% frequency) when the optimal path passed from Zhelaniya Cape directly to West Coastal Flow in Severnaya Zemlya Archipelago, then through Vilkitsky Strait to West Novosibirsk Coastal Flow, and then to the north of Wrangel Island. In June-September, during summer navigation, the location of the most optimal path for the entire NSR route is determined by the condition of shore ice (before its fracturing) and the position of ice massifs.

In the most western part of the NSR, in June and July, the optimal transit route usually passes through the Kara Gate and Yugorsky Shar straits, while in September and October it passes around Zhelaniya Cape (55-80% frequency). In August, the usage of the two routes is equally probable.

Further to the east, the most optimal route passes through Vilkitsky Strait (95-100% frequency).

In the Laptev Sea and in the realm of Novosibirsk Islands, the location of the optimal route varies seasonally. Prior to the period of intensive ice erosion in Taimyr ice massif, the route passes alongside the southern border of the massif (55-90% frequency), while in August-October it passes through the massif (65-90% frequency). In July, the usage of the two routes is equally probable. In the water area around Novosibirsk Islands, prior the fracture of shore ice (June and July), the optimal route passes northward of the islands, while in August-October it passes through Sannikov Strait (50-85% frequency). In the eastern part of the NSR, transit passage of the East-Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea most commonly passes along the border of shore ice, while after the shore ice fracture it passes along the coast of the Chukchi Peninsula (65-90% frequency).

Due to the low sea depth in the straits, littoral paths are only accessible for low-tonnage vessels.

Large-capacity vessels (up to 15m draw) have to use high latitude routes. The variants of high latitude routes for transit navigation were approved in 2009-2010 with due account of the length of the route segments, limiting depths, passability for the large-capacity vessels, and ice conditions (Figure 4).

Figure 4. High latitude paths in the NSR Source: Afonin et al (2019)

The A-B-C-D-E route passes from Zhelaniya Cape to Dezhnev Cape. The A-B section limits the part of the route in the Kara Sea, sections B-C and B-D in the Laptev Sea, and D-E section in the Gao & Erokhin

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East Siberian Sea. In the Chukchi Sea, the route continues from E point to Dezhnev Strait. The total length of the A-B-C-D-E route is 2,200 nautical miles. The A-B-D-E route is shorter by 100 nautical miles. The B-D section is used in case of the deviation of ice cover front to the north.

When the ice situation is easier, navigation is carried out along the conventional route through C point. The F-B-C-D-E route passes from the Kara Gate to Dezhnev Cape. The F-B section limits the part of the route in the Kara Sea, sections B-C and B-D in the Laptev Sea, and the D-E section in the East Siberian Sea. The total length of the route from the Kara Gate to Dezhnev Cape is 2,500 nautical miles.

The NSR is used seasonally during the summer navigation window (typically, July-November) and winter navigation window (the remaining part of the year). During the summer navigation window, the positioning of particular paths is determined by the location of ice massifs, distribution and characteristics of floating ice, and ice-free water areas. In winter and spring, when the coast and the islands are blocked by ice, the positioning of the paths depends on the ice situation and the capacities of icebreaker assistance.

After November, all the seas along the NSR (except the southern part of the Chukchi Sea) are covered by ice. When the ice situation is heavy, the seas are covered by pack ice even in summer.

Commonly, ice melting begins in mid-June and ice freezing begins in mid-September (northern parts of the Kara Sea, the Chukchi Sea, and the Laptev Sea). By the end of October, ice sheet thickness typically reaches 25-30cm and by December it reaches 70-90cm. Ice sheet thickness reaches its maximum (140-210cm) by May prior to the opening of the navigation window. In the northern parts of the transit zone, multi-year ice may exceed 3m.

In winter, the water areas along the NSR are affected by anticyclonic circulation of air masses. In summer, atmosphere circulation is opposite to that in winter, but its influence on climate is not that big. Navigation directly depends on the direction, speed, and continuity of winds and currents.

Along the entire NSR, the currents are predominantly cold. There are relatively warm currents in the western parts of the NSR (Barents Sea) and in the far east at the exit from the Chukchi Sea to the Pacific Ocean.

Due to the unstable ice situation and rapid transfer of ice by the currents and winds, navigation along the NSR requires the usage of not only icebreaker assistance but also transport and cargo vessels of Arctic class. Under icebreaker assistance, the average speed of a vessel is 13-14 knots. A nuclear icebreaker forms a channel in the ice appropriate for a passage of a cargo vessel of 75,000 tons deadweight. Two icebreakers are able to lead large-capacity vessels of up to 150,000 tons deadweight (similar to the tankers which are projected to be employed for the transportation of liquefied natural gas from the Yamal LNG site). Water depths along the NSR allow routing the vessels of 12.7m draw through Sannikov Strait and the routing of vessels of over 18.0m draw northward of Novosibirsk Islands. The Kara Gate located between Vaigach Island and Novaya Zemlya Island is the hardest for navigation because of the ice exchange with the Kara Sea. There is predominantly first-year pack ice with thickness that reaches 0.12-0.14m by end of the winter.

Ice fields in the Kara Gate are frequently compressed and hummocking which tremendously aggravates icebreaking. In that region, ice flows periodically drift with high speed which may disable even nuclear icebreakers (Mayorova et al, 2013).

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The most serious obstacles to secure navigation are (1) Novozemelsky, (2) North Kara, (3) Severozemelsky, (4) Taimyr, (5) Yansky, (6) Novosibirsk, and (7) Ayonsky ice massifs (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Littoral and high latitude paths in the NSR and the location of major ice massifs Source: Afonin and Tezikov (2017)

The apparent alleviation of the ice situation in the Arctic should not be categorically associated with the improvement of navigation conditions. Dynamic forces which affect the ice, as well as icebergs detached from an ice shelf, pose severe risks for navigation. Thus, in some of the parts of the Arctic Ocean, deformed first-year ice may reach 5-7m in thickness (Landy et al, 2016), which aggravates or almost blocks the passage of sea vessels, specifically in narrow straits where the currents press the ice and in such a way increase its thickness. Drifting ice is another danger to navigation. Because of the decreasing thickness of ice cover and the area of the ice shelf, ice becomes more mobile, drift velocity increases, and the behavior of ice becomes more dynamic and less predictable. Owing to the changes in climate and sea ice regime in the Arctic, wind and cyclonic regimes in the atmosphere, as well as sea disturbance and icebergs’ activity in the water area of the Arctic Ocean will also change. Specifically, wavelength will grow and surface winds will become stronger. The increase in sea disturbance will cause the emergence of coastal erosion.

From the beginning of monitoring in the 1980s by the end of 1997, annual average reduction of ice cover was 26,000Âą3,600 km2, or 2.1% per decade (compared to the period average). From 1998 to 2006, the tendency changed and the annual average reduction reached 114,800Âą8,800 km2, or increased up to 10% per decade. During 2007-2017, a variability of sea ice in the Arctic was observed while the annual average reduction of ice cover peaked up to 40,200 km2 (Shalina & Bobylev, 2017). From 1979-2016, September minimums of ice extent decreased by 87.2 km2, or 13.3%, per decade (National Snow and Ice Data Center, 2016). The record minimum in September 2012 was 3.41 million km2, or only 54% of the average minimum from 1981-2010 (Liu, Q. et al., 2016). Apart from the reduction of ice cover, there has been registered growth of the share of thin and young ice in the overall structure of the ice cover.

Microwave satellite monitoring allows for the assessment of change in the duration of the ice season. This parameter has been changing in various degrees in different parts of the Arctic, but in Gao & Erokhin

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general, it has decreased in most of the Arctic Ocean. The area where the duration of ice season decreased at the rate of minimum five days per decade was 12.4 million km2. The area where the duration of ice season increased at a similar rate was 1.1 million km2. On the one hand, the basic parameters of ice cover (coverage of the central part of the Arctic Ocean by ice during the entire year and ice-free water area to the north-east of Scandinavia) persist. On the other hand, substantial transformations have been observed. Specifically, the area of year-round distribution of ice has decreased, the part of the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk has become free of ice during the entire year, while the ice season in the Russian Arctic has extended. In most of the Arctic seas, the duration of the ice season has been decreasing at a rate above five days per decade. In the northeast part of the Barents Sea, the rate of decrease was over 60 days per decade (Parkinson, 2014).

The gradual decrease of ice which undergoes summer melting has determined the change in the percentage ratio of first-year and multiyear ice. Currently, first-year ice dominates in the Arctic with up to 78% of the ice cover. The area of ice older than five years decreased from 16% in the mid1980s down to 1.2% in 2016-2017. First-year ice is thinner than multi-year ice, which is why it melts faster. In spring, ice melting starts earlier and in autumn, ice freezing starts later than several decades ago. The change in ice dynamics in the Arctic Ocean is also associated with the thinning of ice. Thinner ice is more mobile and more vulnerable due to destruction under the influence of winds and waves. The speed of ice drift in the Arctic has grown substantially after the 2000s.

According to Friedlander (2018), during the past decade, the rate of loss of ice in the Arctic has doubled in comparison with the previous 60 years. Ice massifs have been decreasing in both area and height. From 1953 until 2020, the average annual rate of melting of ice massifs was 18 cm.

From 2011 until 2015, the rate increased up to 32 per year. The ice melts irregularly – in northern Canada, the massifs are decreasing faster than in the Russian Arctic. Because of warming, a displacement of ice fields by open water may happen (Lind et al, 2018). In the eastern sector of the Russian Arctic, meteorological and ice conditions have deteriorated compared to those in 20132017.

In hard ice conditions in littoral areas, the vessels are forced to deviate from the recommended paths in both non-escorted voyages and under icebreaker assistance shipping. During winter navigation, vessel speed is limited by a speed of the escorting icebreaker. In summer, a vessel is able to sail independently in ice-free water areas with required speed, but it has to have certain ice class to pass particular paths (Table 1).

To operate in the Kara Sea during summer and autumn, a vessel must be at least of Arc5 class.

Arc4 class vessels are allowed independent navigation under easy and moderate ice conditions.

During winter and spring – Arc8. Independent operation of Arc5 and Arc6 class vessels are permitted under easy ice conditions only and Arc7 is permitted under easy and moderate ice conditions.

In the Laptev Sea during summer and autumn – at least Arc6. Arc5 class vessels are allowed independent navigation under moderate ice conditions. During winter and spring – Arc9.

Independent operation of Arc6 and Arc7 class vessels are permitted under easy ice conditions only and Arc8 is permitted under easy and moderate ice conditions.

In the East-Siberian Sea during summer and autumn you need at least Arc6. Arc4 class vessels are allowed independent navigation under easy ice conditions and Arc 5 class vessels are permitted China-Russia collaboration in shipping and marine engineering

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under moderate ice conditions. During winter and spring you need Arc8. Independent operation of Arc6 and Arc7 class vessels is permitted under easy ice conditions only.

Table 1. Safety requirements to the vessels in the NSR Kara Sea Ice class

Operation mode

Laptev Sea

East Siberian Sea Chukchi Sea

Summer SW

NE

Winter SW

NE

Summer SW

NE

Winter SW

NE

Nо assistance N/S

Summer SW

NE

Winter SW

NE

Summer

Winter

-

Icebreaker assistance Nо assistance

Ice1

L Icebreaker assistance

L

Nо assistance Ice2

Icebreaker assistance

Icebreaker assistance Nо assistance

Arc4

-

-

L

M/L L H/M/L M/L M/L

Icebreaker assistance

M/L

Nо assistance Arc5

L

Nо assistance Ice3

-

Icebreaker assistance

M/L

L L H/M/L

L

L

Nо assistance Arc6

Icebreaker assistance

M/L

Nо assistance Arc7

Icebreaker assistance

Icebreaker assistance

H/M/L

M/L

H/M/L

M/L

H/M/L H/M/L

Nо assistance Arc8

H/M/L

H/M/L

H/M/L

M/L

M/L

H/M/L

H/M/L

H/M/L

H/M/L

H/M/L

Nо assistance Arc9

Icebreaker assistance

H/M/L

Note: N/S – non-strengthened vessel; SW – south-west; NE – north-east; H – hard ice conditions; M – moderate ice conditions; L – light ice conditions Source: Authors’ development based on ABS (2016)

In the Chukchi Sea during summer and autumn you need at least Arc6. Arc4 class vessels are allowed independent navigation under easy or moderate ice conditions. During winter and spring you need Arc8. Independent operation of Arc6 class vessels is permitted under easy ice condition only and Arc7 class vessels are permitted under easy or moderate ice conditions.

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During winter navigation (January-June) and in the period from November 16 until December 31, operation of conventional non-strengthened vessels along the NSR is not allowed. Nonstrengthened oil and gas tankers of over 10,000 tons displacement are permitted to sail in ice-free water areas under icebreaker assistance in the period from July to November 15.

The NSR and Polar Silk Road: China’s vision of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in Arctic shipping and engineering So far, the NSR has been first and foremost a transportation route for Russia’s domestic shipments.

The passage has been used by major Russian companies, namely, Gazprom, Lukoil, and Rosneft, among others, for the transportation of extracted oil and gas, as well as machinery and people between their production sites in the Russian Arctic (Erokhin & Gao, 2018).

By the Federal Law of the Russian Federation “About Internal Sea Waters, Territorial Sea, and Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation” (Government of the Russian Federation, 1998), the NSR is recognized as a historical national transport route of Russia in the Arctic. Russia’s recent ambitious plan declared by President Putin is to increase the volume of cargo transported via the NSR up to 80 million tons by 2024. However, due to technological, economic, and political reasons, Russia is not able to increase the constriction of ships and marine equipment to such an extent as to support the growing volume of cargo transportation in the Arctic. Here is an opportunity for China to contribute its technologies and investment and to benefit from collaboration with Russia in this sphere.

In January 2018, China issued its Arctic policy and in such a way articulated the perception of its role in the region. According to Liu (2016), China wants to contribute to shaping Arctic governance and believes that the changing environment and resources of the Arctic have a direct impact on China’s climate, environment, agriculture, shipping, and trade as well as its social and economic development. China’s position is that the management of Arctic shipping routes should be conducted in accordance with international law and that the freedom of navigation enjoyed by all countries in accordance with the law and their rights to use the Arctic shipping routes should be ensured. China also wants to coordinate development strategies with Nordic countries and encourage joint efforts to build secure navigable routes in the Arctic (Gao, 2019).

China’s perspective vision of its role in the Arctic is not only about opening and securing new trade routes. The overarching goal is to facilitate Asia-Europe connectivity and to bridge the gap between traditional industries in the Arctic and China’s market. Within such a vision, China’s BRI network was supplemented by its Polar Silk Road branch in an attempt to expand the existing bilateral formats to a multilateral cooperation with all stakeholders concerned. The extension of the BRI to the Arctic means that China wants to work with Arctic and non-Arctic countries to establish the Polar Silk Road through the development of shipping routes. In the format of the Polar Silk Road, China expects its involvement in the navigation of cargo vessels in polar waters, as well as in marine and ice engineering to pave the way for Chinese commercial, exploration, transport, and logistics operations in the Arctic. China also attaches great importance to navigation security in the prospect maritime routes of the Polar Silk Road, particularly along the NSR in the seas of the Arctic Ocean controlled by Russia.

Despite the fact that shipping was mentioned first among the economic sectors of interest in China’s Arctic policy, collaboration with Russia in shipping and engineering in the NSR was not China-Russia collaboration in shipping and marine engineering

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specifically outlined. From the Chinese perspective, it may be seen as a reluctance to view the Polar Silk Road as an appendix to Russia’s plans in the Arctic (Moe & Stokke, 2019). There is, though, a Russian perspective as well since Russia seems rather reluctant to support a possible emergence of China’s role in the Arctic (Ananyeva, 2019). In 2015, on the wave of Russia’s “turn to the East” after the imposition of Western sanctions against Russia, the Russian officials explicitly linked the NSR to the BRI and proposed the creation of a “Cold Silk Road” or “Ice Silk Road” (Lenta.ru, 2015; RIA News, 2015; Xinhua, 2017). Since 2016-2017, however, Russian rhetoric has been toned down and the terms “Cold Silk Road” and “Ice Silk Road” have been dropped out of speeches while the use of “Polar Silk Road”, the term officially recognized by China, has been avoided by Russia in official documents, even those concluded bilaterally with China. During the Belt and Road Summit in April 2019, President Putin announced the plan to connect Arctic shipping through the NSR to the BRI but still did not use the “Polar Silk Road” term (Ehret, 2019). He emphasized that Russia gave major attention to the development of the NSR and connection between the NSR and the BRI, not substitution.

Russia claims to control the navigation and resources along the NSR and China’s Arctic policy actually supports persevering with the existing rules of the Law of the Sea (Górski, 2019).

Specifically, China stipulates that (1) the management of the Arctic shipping routes should be conducted in accordance with treaties including the UNCLOS and general international law and that the freedom of navigation enjoyed by all countries in accordance with the law and their rights to use the Arctic shipping routes should be ensured; (2) China hopes to work with all parties to build the Polar Silk Road through developing the Arctic shipping routes; (3) China respects the sovereign rights of Arctic States over oil, gas and mineral resources in the areas subject to their jurisdiction in accordance with international law, and respects the interests and concerns of residents in the region (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2018).

Nevertheless, in defiance of the formal compliance of China’s approach with Russia’s stance on the status of the NSR, continuing expressions of interest in Arctic shipping from Chinese government and major actors, as well as declarations of and statements on various formats of collaboration announced during big forums (the most recent ones made by Russian and Chinese authorities at the International Arctic Forum in Moscow on April 2019 and the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok on September 2019), China’s activities in the NSR have remained modest.

Since the early 2010s, when the NSR was actually opened and promoted by Russian authorities for international transit sailings, China has increasingly encouraged its enterprises to participate in the infrastructure construction in the Arctic and declared its interest in commercial trial voyages along the NSR in accordance with the law to pave the way for regular commercial operations (Hong, 2018). In 2015, three years before the articulation of China’s Arctic policy, COSCO announced that “the group was actively studying the feasibility of operating regular services on the northern route” (Paris & Chiu, 2015). But since that time, few vessels under Chinese flag have transited the whole NSR (one in 2015, two in 2016, five in 2017), while the annual number of full NSR transits never exceeded fifteen.

As noted by Moe and Stokke (2019), one of the reasons for China’s very modest use of the NSR for transit is weak development of international transit infrastructure. Aside from state-backed COSCO, most Chinese shipping companies balk at the risks of navigation in polar waters and the high investment costs required for the construction or purchase of ice-strengthened ships (Huang et al, 2015). Cost-sharing mechanisms of collaboration with Russia, the sole operator of the NSR, Gao & Erokhin

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in shipbuilding, marine engineering, and navigation safety would appear commercially advantageous for Chinese companies to be increasingly involved in more intense shipping in the North. One of the mechanisms was actually established in 2018 with a $9.5 billion credit line from China, aimed at joint integration processes on the area of the Eurasian Economic Union and the BRI, with the NSR mentioned as a priority (Moe & Stokke, 2019). Currently, China-Russia collaboration in polar shipping and engineering is still in its embryonic stage, but Russia remains the main area of interest for China’s Arctic joint investment (Blaxekjaer et al, 2018).

Towards secure shipping and navigation: Prospective areas for China and Russia to collaborate in the NSR Russia operates a certain number of vessels that are capable of handling current traffic demands (Drewniak et al., 2018), but not the expected future increase. Most of the vessels, including icebreakers, were built in Soviet times almost three decades ago. The useful life of the four lead icebreakers expires in 2024 which, first, jeopardizes China’s ambitious plans to explore trading routes in the North, and second, poses a threat to secure navigation in the NSR. For China, the lack of icebreaking and shipping capabilities is somewhat disconcerting given the attention the country pays to the promotion of the Polar Silk Road. Major cargo shipped along the NSR are liquefied natural gas, oil, petroleum products, coal, mineral fertilizers, construction materials, and industrial equipment. Types of cargo vary which requires the development of a multi-purpose fleet including icebreakers, tankers, and support vessels.

Russia’s icebreaking fleet consists of 38 vessels, including nuclear-powered, diesel-electric, and diesel icebreakers. Among the nuclear-powered icebreakers, there are two icebreakers with doublereactor nuclear power facility (power capacity – 75,000 horsepower, or 55 MWT), two icebreakers with one-reactor power facility (power capacity – 50,000 horsepower), one nuclear lighter aboard container ship (power capacity – 40,000 horsepower), and five maintenance vessels. In 2015-2016, Russia launched three diesel icebreakers (power capacity – 16 MWT each). Eight icebreakers of different power capacity from 6.8 MWT up to 60 MWT are being constructed, including three nuclear-powered icebreakers: “Arctic”, “Siberia”, and “Ural”. The construction is scheduled to be completed in 2019, 2021, and 2022. One linear diesel-electric icebreaker is under construction too but its launch has been postponed several times due to technical problems.

Both nuclear-powered icebreakers in operation and those under construction may be operated year-round in the western parts of the NSR only, in the Kara Sea and the Barents Sea. In the eastern sections of the NSR, they may be operated during summer navigation. In other seasons, their operation makes no economic sense because of the low speed in difficult ice conditions. That is why, in addition to the three nuclear-powered icebreakers which are under construction, “Rosatomflot”, a Russian operator of a nuclear-powered fleet, plans to launch two universal nuclear-powered icebreakers (power capacity 60 MW), four LNG-powered icebreakers (power capacity 40 MW), and three nuclear-powered icebreakers of Leader type. There is a necessity in tug vessels of high ice classes and of different size and capacity to ensure ice routing in the frozen water areas at the seaports. Mining companies require specialized vessels and marine equipment for the exploration of the continental shelf. By 2035, they will need about 140 units of various equipment, including large-capacity transport vessels, tankers, and oil-and-gas carriers (up to 40 vessels), Aframax and Shuttle tankers (7 vessels), maintenance ships of ice and non-ice class, as well as rescue vessels. Also, there is a need for new research vessels – up to 90 by 2035, including China-Russia collaboration in shipping and marine engineering

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various types of research vessels for the Russian Academy of Science, Ministry of Environment, Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of Russia, and Federal Agency for Fishing.

The average age of port and support vessels is 27 years, but the fleet is now under modernization, particularly in relation to tugboats. Russia’s primary need in this sphere is shallow-draught and lowcapacity icebreakers. Currently, to ensure ice-routing in the ports, Russia uses icebreakers produced in Finland in the 1970-1980s. A new port icebreaker is under construction to the order of Rosmorport, a Russian operator of river and seaports. Its launch is scheduled for 2021. “Atomflot”, a national operator of nuclear-powered icebreakers, ordered two ice-class tugboats (power capacity 5 MWT), two ice-strengthened tugboats (power capacity 7 MWT), and one port icebreaker (power capacity 12 MWT). “Gazproneft”, one of Russia’s leading oil and gas companies, is constructing two icebreakers for the use at the Arctic terminal of Novoportovskoe oil deposit.

Russia’s mixed river-sea fleet is decreasing, particularly bulk carriers of mixed and middle-water operation. By 2020, the number of river-sea vessels is expected to drop down to 623, by 2025 – to 276 vessels constructed before the year of 2000, or only 32% of the current number of vessels. To keep the volume of dry cargo on the current level, by 2022, Russia needs at least 130 new bulk carriers, 60 dry cargo lighters, and 20 push towboats. 28 bulk carriers of mixed river-sea type are now under construction at the Russian shipyards, including ten multipurpose bulk carriers (deadweight – 7500 tons), eight bulkers (deadweight – 8000 tons), and 18 vessels of lower capacity.

In the sphere of construction and assembling, the major needs are large-size section assembly of ships and vessels; real-size production of hull structures and elements in a unified system of fits and tolerances; usage of electro-optical computer-aided instrumentation systems; automation in shipbuilding and robotic application; 3D modelling in marine engineering; additive technologies for assembling of machinery and equipment aboard a ship; naval mechanical engineering (power installations, ship propulsors, active control units); and shipbuilding materials and coatings (highly corrosion-resistant and low-alloy steel, resistant and antifriction materials for use in saltwater).

Fifteen liquefied gas carriers for Yamal LNG are being constructed at DMSE shipyards in the Republic of Korea. Currently, Yamal LNG is served by seven gas tankers, but only one of them sails under the Russian flag. The remaining six are owned by Canadian Teekay, Greek Dynagas, and Japanese Mitsui. Three more LNG carriers will be launched in 2019, five more will be launched in 2020. However, that is not enough. Accelerated expansion of the Yamal LNG project along with the construction of new LNG facilities in the North require more gas tankers. Since January 2019, the Russian government requires that all new vessels operated by Russian companies in the Russian Arctic have to be constructed at Russian shipyards. In 2016, Russia launched a new shipyard near Vladivostok. Novatek company, the one that owns and operates Yamal LNG facilities, has already placed an order for the construction of fifteen LNG carriers to be launched in 2022, 2024, and 2025. Sovkomflot, one of the leading shipping companies in Russia, also ordered three product carrier tankers (deadweight 51,000 tons, MR type) for the carriage of petroleum products and gas condensates and two crude oil tankers of Aframax type.

In the sphere of science, technology, and engineering, prospective areas for collaboration between China and Russia include engineering projects of marine vessels and technical equipment (robotic engineering for the exploration of continental shelf, marine platforms and terminals, subsea production units and systems) and digital technologies (augmented reality technologies, 3D Gao & Erokhin

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modeling, application of industrial robots with the use of the Internet of Things, swarm intelligence technologies for ship underwater surveys) (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Prospective directions of China’s participation in shipping and marine engineering in the Arctic Source: Authors’ development

Among Russia’s seaports on the Arctic Ocean coast, only Dudinka can receive vessels all yearround. All ports need dredging to be able to receive modern large-capacity vessels. The dredging fleet operated in the Russian Arctic consists of only six vessels, including five self-propelled and one non-propelled dredger. Their average age is over 40 years. Because of the small number of available vessels and their obsolescence, Russia engages foreign dredgers primarily from the Netherlands and Belgium. The most demanded ones are trailing suction hopper dredgers, cutterdredgers, and mud scows. Russia tries to localize the construction of dredgers but it lacks China-Russia collaboration in shipping and marine engineering

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technologies required for the engineering and construction of trailing suction hopper dredgers.

Several shipyards are trying to start production of bucket dredgers, universal dredgers of Watermaster and Amfibex types, as well as various support equipment.

Due to the insufficient exploration of the sea bottom along the NSR and harsh climate and ice conditions, Russia needs advanced technologies and equipment for seabed exploration. This is one of the most crucial issues today in the Russian Arctic in terms of improvement of navigability of the NSR, prospecting of oil and gas deposits in the continental shelf, as well as the replacement of western companies which left joint exploration projects in the Russian Arctic because of sanctions.

Russia is heavily dependent on foreign technologies and equipment for subsea exploration. One of the most problematic areas is seismic exploration. Annually, Russia needs up to 250km of towed streamers. Also, there is a need for 3D wade-patch survey, technologies for protection of towed streamers against damage in the iced water, and seismic source points to improve the accuracy of streamers’ positioning. For Chinese companies, there is another prospective area of collaboration with Russia in subsea exploration in the North which is the engineering of automated unmanned equipment. Russia needs advanced technologies of handling and control of under-ice automated equipment; under-ice navigation and anti-collision systems; and equipment (multichannel highcapacity telemeters for recording of geophysical data with high sampling frequency, geophysical equipment constructed with the use of superconducting quantum interference devices).

Use of unmanned aerial vehicles for various purposes, including ice monitoring, navigation, geophysical and meteorological surveys, and delivery of cargo to remote areas is a developing sector in the Arctic. In the last decades, emergency preparedness resources in the Arctic have been significantly strengthened through the addition of available vessels and helicopters. However, the response time may still be long and the capacity limited if major incidents occur (Marchenko et al, 2018). China is one of the leading countries worldwide in terms of unmanned aerial solutions but Russia lacks such technologies. Specifically, Russia needs the technologies of engineering and construction of heavy long-range unmanned aerial vehicles which are required for the monitoring of long-distance high-latitude routes of the NSR. Also, there is a demand for mid-range unmanned vehicles with internal combustion engines and short-range onboard robot aircraft for quick operational surveys of the ice situation.

Chinese companies may also participate in the (1) development of unmanned navigation technologies which have started in Russia recently, including computer vision, automatic navigation, technical verification and data recording; (2) replacement of the US and European radar equipment on the Russian market (meteorological buoys, small low-altitude space crafts for monitoring of climate, ice conditions, and navigation); and (3) intellectual geographical information services for data analysis and visualization of navigational charts.

Conclusion In the Russian sector of the Arctic Ocean, an increase in commercial shipping activities requires substantial investment in the development of infrastructure for cargo shipping, icebreaking assistance, safer navigation and rescue, and the creation of new materials and technologies to construct enforced vessels that are able to operate in polar waters. For China, an acceleration of collaboration with Russia in the spheres of Arctic shipbuilding and marine engineering to cover the current gap in icebreakers’ assistance and navigation and support services is clearly a high priority. Both countries need each other to clear the existing economic, technological, and even Gao & Erokhin

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climate thresholds in the way of potential convergence of the NSR and Polar Silk Road initiative and the establishment of secure navigable maritime routes in the North. Meanwhile, China’s activities in the NSR need to be well balanced with Russia’s interests in the region, current and future technological needs, as well as special regulatory rights under the current international legal regimes, recognizing special conditions of navigation risks.

Unpredictable ice, wave, and wind conditions, varying routes, high environmental risks, and lack of qualified and experienced staff to facilitate safe sailing in polar waters are just a few securityrelated challenges to the intensification of commercial shipping in the NSR (Erokhin et al, 2018; Fisenko, 2014). In light of the establishment of more secure and stable navigation along the NSR, the identification of water areas suitable for the development of deep-water shipping and the operation of large-tonnage tankers and icebreakers should be supplemented by investigation of major technological, engineering, and economic factors affecting China-Russia collaboration.

China has both expertise and money to offer to Russia, which is currently nearly fenced off from formerly used western technologies due to the sanctions. The adoption of Chinese technologies and engineering solutions, however, first requires Russia’s openness to accept them and thereby tolerate China’s rising presence in the Russian sector of the Arctic, and second, substantial changes to the Russian less-than-perfect import-substitution policy, as well as custom, tax, and financial legislation. Ultimately, the intensification of shipping and securitization of the NSR for international transit largely depends on Russia’s willingness to modernize national legislation and create favorable conditions for collaboration with China and other partners in the spheres of maritime engineering, shipbuilding, ice and weather monitoring, and navigation services.

Acknowledgment The study is supported by the National Social Sciences Fund of China (grant no. 18BGJ004).

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Intensifying U.S.-China security dilemma dynamics play out in the Arctic: Implications for China’s Arctic strategy Camilla T. N. Sørensen

The U.S., Russia and China are all assigning higher strategic priority to the Arctic and are strengthening their diplomatic and military presence and activities in the region. For the U.S. and Russia, it links up with the growing security tension in the surrounding regions, e.g. the North Atlantic Ocean and the Baltic Sea region. However, the deepening great power competition with China also increasingly drives Washington’s diplomatic and military offensive in the region. For China, it is a question about ensuring access to Arctic sea routes and resources, e.g. energy, minerals and fisheries, and making sure that China gets a say in Arctic governance. The so-called “Arctic exceptionalism” – i.e. the Arctic as a low-tension region, where the great powers, despite conflicts in other regions, continue to cooperate and refrain from political and military coercion to get their way – is under pressure. This article analyzes how Arctic politics and security are increasingly intertwined with global security developments that are dominated by intensifying U.S.-China security dilemma dynamics. It further discusses the implications for China’s Arctic strategy pointing to how recent developments make it even more difficult for China as the only great power without Arctic territory to ensure its access to and influence in the region. Seen from the perspective of numerous Chinese Arctic scholars, this underlines the growing importance of strengthening China’s economic and strategic cooperation with Russia in the region.

Introduction: Arctic politics and security through a prism of “great power competition” [The Arctic] “has become a region for power and competition” “We are entering a new age of strategic engagement in the Arctic” 1 The above excerpts from the U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo’s speech to the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Finland in early May of 2019 give a clear indication of how the Trump Administration increasingly views the Arctic as yet another arena for great power rivalry outlined as the overall frame for U.S. security policies in the National Security Strategy from December, 2017 (White House, 2017). In recent months, the U.S. has strengthened its focus on the Arctic,

Camilla T. N. Sørensen is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Strategy of the Royal Danish Defence College.

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both diplomatically and militarily. The June 2019 updated Arctic strategy from the U.S. Department of Defense is presented as a strategy for the Arctic region “in an era of strategic competition” (DoD, 2019b: 2). That is, Washington increasingly sees Arctic politics and security through a prism of “great power competition,” and it is China, in particular, that Washington points to as the main great power competitor. The strategy warns about creeping Chinese attempts to use investments and other economic leverage points to gradually increase China’s role and influence in the Arctic, which is threatening regional stability. As stated in the strategy “China is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its predatory economic behaviour globally may be repeated in the Arctic” (DoD, 2019b: 6). The annual report on China’s military power from the U.S. Department of Defence to Congress, published in early 2019, also for the first time includes a special section on “China in the Arctic” which warns “Civilian research could support a strengthened Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, which could include deploying submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks (DoD, 2019a: 114).

These recent official U.S. statements and documents combined with the ongoing “securitisation” in Washington of almost all dimensions of the bilateral U.S.-China relationship, from student exchanges and cultural programs to trade and joint business and research projects, decrease the room of manoeuvre for China in the Arctic. The U.S. is concerned about the Russian military buildup in the Arctic, which in itself arguably would have led to an increasing U.S. military presence in the region. However, it is the growing Chinese presence and interests in the region that have led to the comprehensive upgrading of the U.S. diplomatic approach to the Arctic, which is illustrated by the significant increase of high-level visits to the region in recent months and the reopening of a permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in Greenland, announced in early June 2019 (GoG, 2019).

The rising U.S. worries come on the background of the development of a more confident, proactive and sophisticated Chinese diplomacy in the Arctic over the recent decade. The region has moved up the Chinese leaders’ foreign and security policy agenda and is assigned increasing strategic importance. The key here is that in Beijing’s perspective, the Arctic has become more closely linked with its ability to realize China’s economic reform agenda and great power ambitions.

This article analyzes how Arctic politics and security are increasingly intertwined with global security developments that are dominated by intensifying U.S.-China security dilemma dynamics.

It further discusses the implications for China’s Arctic strategy, pointing to how recent developments make it even more difficult for China as the only great power without Arctic territory to ensure its access to and influence in the region.

In terms of theory and analytical approach, the analysis draws on defensive neorealism with its focus on states as the main actors in an anarchic international system (Waltz, 1979). The structure of the international system, i.e. the distribution of relative power capabilities among the great powers, combined with geostrategic conditions, set the overall room of manoeuvre for states. All states seek to maximize their security by strengthening their relative economic and military power and enter alliances. The security dilemma as coined by John Herz (1951: 3-4) is the central analytical concept. It catches a situation, where a state’s attempt to increase its own security has the effect of decreasing the security of other states. More specifically, the security dilemma refers to vigorous action-reaction dynamics between two states, where the steps by one state to increase its security, e.g. by building up its military, creates similar responses by another state, setting off another response by the first state, and then again by the second and so on. This stimulates a “negative

Sørensen

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spiral” of deteriorating relations with growing security tension, power competition, escalating arms races, and potentially conflict and war (e.g. Jervis, 1976). The ultimate sources of the security dilemma are anarchy – i.e. the lack of a higher authority in international politics – and states’ uncertainty and fears about each other’s intentions under anarchy.

The key is that such security dilemma dynamics are playing out in the Arctic. They are visible in all bilateral relations among the three great powers, but with the most consequential dynamics being found in relations between the U.S. and China, which strongly link up with the deepening great power competition between the two states. Russia is increasingly positioning itself with Beijing even though Moscow still has strong concerns about the implications of a stronger and more ambitious China. As argued below, this is a result of not only the Western sanctions against Russia since the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014, but also an awareness among Chinese leaders of the potential for adverse security dilemma dynamics and the need for countering “China threat” perceptions and reassuring Russia and other Arctic states (Hsiung, 2018). It reflects how Beijing continuously seeks to strike a balance between assertiveness and reassurance in its Arctic diplomacy. Thus, there are multifaceted and crosscutting security dilemma dynamics currently at play in the Arctic, where some are linked to the deepening U.S.-China great power competition and others have certain regional origins. The other Arctic states are to different degrees and in different ways caught between the U.S. as a close ally and traditional security guarantor, China as prospective economic partner, and Russia as an important Arctic neighbor that they need to cooperate with to address the many complex challenges evolving in the region as the ice melts.

The article presents its analysis in three steps. The first section analyzes China’s Arctic strategy, the drivers behind and how Beijing seeks to implement the strategy (i.e. China’s evolving Arctic diplomacy). Seen from Washington, China’s entrance into the Arctic and the development of a more confident, proactive and sophisticated Chinese diplomacy in the region has begun to threaten regional stability. This activates and further fuels the U.S.-China security dilemma dynamics in an Arctic political and security context. Specifying such dynamics, the second section takes a closer look at the U.S. response and what it prescribes regarding how the Arctic states should deal with China in the Arctic. The third and last section discusses the implications for China’s Arctic strategy, also including analyses and debates on this from Chinese Arctic scholars. Several of these Chinese Arctic scholars underline the growing importance of strengthening China’s economic and strategic cooperation with Russia in the region as a way for Beijing to respond to what they increasingly assess as a more threatening U.S.2

China has entered the Arctic as a great power In late January 2018, China released its first and long-awaited Arctic Policy White Paper (State Council, 2018). It represents the culmination thus far of the development of a more confident, proactive and sophisticated Chinese diplomacy in the region.

The Chinese Arctic strategy – the Arctic is a stronger strategic priority The Arctic Policy White Paper starts out by underlining that China, due to its status, size and proximity to the Arctic, has legitimate interests in the region and therefore should be respected and included as an important stakeholder. Beijing in the paper assures that China will respect the territorial sovereignty and rights of the Arctic states as well as international law and regulations, e.g. the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but it also emphasises that the Arctic

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should not be regarded as a demarcated region. The main Chinese argument is that climate changes in the Arctic have global implications and international impacts, and therefore it is not up to the Arctic states to solely establish the rules and norms for the future development of and access to the region and its resources. Non-Arctic states like China have a role to play and legal rights to engage in Arctic research, navigation, overflight and a series of economic activities such as resource extraction, fishing, and laying cables and pipelines. Making this argument, it refers specifically to China’s legal rights as a signatory to the Spitsbergen Treaty and the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (State Council, 2018).

These are new directions. Previous official Chinese speeches and documents on the Arctic have taken a more modest and reluctant stance and underplayed China’s ambitions in the region. This played an important role in reducing the concern among the Arctic states and in 2013 paving the way for China’s access to the Arctic Council as an observer state. However, among Chinese Arctic scholars, the framing of the Arctic as a “common good” has long been prevalent (Brady, 2017: 3334; Wright, 2011). The Chinese President Xi Jinping also already in 2014 openly characterized China as a “polar great power” and directly linked the country’s ambitions in the polar regions (i.e. the Arctic and Antarctica) with China’s goal of becoming a maritime great power (Brady, 2017: 3) In his speech at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, President Xi Jinping further underlined Beijing’s goal to obtain world-class military might by 2050, including a Chinese navy capable of operating globally (Xi, 2017). The release of China’s first Arctic White Paper should be seen in light of these developments. It underlines how Beijing assigns stronger strategic priority to the Arctic.

The drivers – why is the Arctic a stronger strategic priority for China?

Overall, there are three main drivers. Firstly, China aims to build solid Arctic (polar) research capacity, focusing especially on climate changes in the Arctic, which have direct impacts in Asia and China that are causing extreme weather patterns and are negatively affecting China’s agriculture and economy. However, setting up Chinese research stations in the Arctic is also essential for the rollout of China’s civil-military “BeiDou-2” [ -2] satellite navigational system, China’s space science program and more accurate weather forecasting systems. These programs and systems have so-called “dual use” character – i.e. both civilian and military use (Brady, 2017: 60, 107-100).

In recent years, the Chinese research activities in the Arctic – and in the Antarctic – have been further strengthened by launching more expeditions and intensifying efforts to build research networks and research stations. Since 2004, Beijing has had a research station, the Yellow River Station (Huanghe Zhan, ) on Svalbard, has recently opened the Aurora Observatory in Iceland, and has presented plans for opening a Chinese research station and satellite receiver station in Greenland (e.g. Sørensen, 2018).

China, like other non-Arctic states, is taking an active role in the general science diplomacy in the region by using their research activities to legitimize and strengthen their overall growing presence and influence in the region. Furthermore, the research activities help strengthen China’s relations with individual Arctic states and stakeholders such as universities, cities, regions, and provinces through focused and concrete research cooperation and networks. This includes the “China Nordic Arctic Research Center” (CNARC) established in 2013 and led by the Polar Research Institute China (PRIC) (Bertelsen, Li & Gregersen, 2016).

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Secondly, China works to ensure access to the energy and mineral resources that the Arctic holds, thereby helping to secure and diversify China’s energy supply. This is also a question about ensuring China a frontrunner position within new technologies and knowledge. Together with the deep seabed and the outer space, the polar regions are identified in Chinese strategic considerations and plans as the “new strategic frontiers” [zhanlue xin jiangyu, ], where the great powers in the coming years will compete (e.g. Xinhua, 2015). These new strategic frontiers are characterized as the most challenging areas to operate in and extract resources from. Therefore, the expectation is that the great power who manages this first – first develops and masters the necessary new technologies and knowledge – stands to gain crucial strategic advantages ensuring it the dominate position in the great power competition in the 21st century.

Beijing’s determined aim is to ensure that China gets to be first and be superior in these new strategic frontiers. This links up with the ongoing restructuring of the Chinese economy, where Chinese-driven innovation is at the top of the agenda. The Chinese “Made in China 2025” strategy identifies key sectors or industries such as robotics, space technology, artificial intelligence, the next generation of communication and information technology such as 5G networks, and maritime technology and capabilities in which China, through targeted investments, acquisitions and research and development, wants to take the lead in developing new technologies and knowledge and in setting global standards (e.g. Kania, 2019).

The restructuring of the Chinese economy and the “Made in China 2025” strategy provide the context for the expansion of Chinese investments in and acquisition of foreign companies especially within robotics and artificial intelligence in recent years. Furthermore, it is also one of the main drivers behind the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) that since June 2017 has also included the Arctic (NDRC/SOA, 2017). Since then, Beijing has prioritised promoting BRI-cooperation with the Arctic states and stakeholders. This has been formalised and further elaborated on in the Arctic Policy White Paper under the heading of “Polar Silk Road” (State Council, 2018).

This relates to the third driver, which is China seeking to develop and get access to the Arctic sea routes, which present an attractive alternative to the longer and strategically vulnerable routes in use now. For China, the Arctic sea routes are approximately 30 percent shorter than travelling through the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal, but it is not necessarily quicker or cheaper. The level of ice varies from year to year and the weather conditions in general are very changeable in the region. The general assessment is that there will still be many years before the Arctic sea routes will be commercially viable, but the Chinese, in particular the Chinese state-owned shipping company COSCO, seem to hold a more optimistic assessment. In 2016, COSCO announced plans to launch regular service through the Arctic to Europe by the way of the Northeast Passage and is busy testing the Arctic sea routes and designing and building new ships that are better suited. The growing Chinese focus on the Arctic sea routes is underlined in China’s Arctic Policy White Paper, which encourages Chinese companies to assign priority to participating in the construction of infrastructure linked with the Arctic sea routes (State Council, 2018). The fact that the “Polar Silk Road” is tied to the realisation of the BRI likely means that the involved Chinese companies have better chances of obtaining financial and political support.

As mentioned above, the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s coast has gradually been incorporated into the “Polar Silk Road” and China has been generally strengthening its cooperation with Russia recently regarding infrastructure in the Russian Arctic by constructing ports, rail ways, and other

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infrastructure that especially link up with the large Russian-Chinese natural gas project (LNG) on the Yamal Peninsula. However, the “Polar Silk Road” is not only coming to Russia. In relation to Iceland and Finland, China has also intensified “Polar Silk Road” efforts. Iceland is especially interested and is trying to promote itself as a logistical hub on the “Polar Silk Road” (Conley, 2018: 8-9). In Finland, preliminary negotiations are currently taking place on the establishment of a 10,500kilometre cable through the Arctic, which according to plan will be able to secure the fastest data connection between Europe and China as early as 2020 (SCMP, 2017). Finland and Norway have initiated cooperation on the so-called “Arctic Corridor” – a railway line from Rovaniemi in Finland to Kirkenes in Norway – which is positioned as the possible end station of the “Polar Silk Road” (BT, 2018; Tsuruoka, 2017). Sweden is also experiencing growing Chinese interest for example in Lysekil on the west coast, north of Gothenburg, where Chinese companies seek to invest in the expansion of the port as well as in the necessary surrounding infrastructure with roads, railroads and bridges (Olsson, 2017).

China has direct tangible interests in Arctic energy resources, raw materials, fisheries and sea routes.

However, the point here is that the Arctic for the Chinese leadership also links up with their focus on ensuring continued growth, prosperity, and political stability and further plays into China’s broader and long-term geo-economic and geo-strategic ambitions and plans outlined in the “new strategic frontiers”, the “Made in China 2025,” and the BRI. Therefore, Beijing seeks to ensure that it is Chinese companies and researchers that most effectively seize the new opportunities opening up in the Arctic as the ice melts and take the lead in developing and mastering the necessary new technologies and knowledge for building research stations, satellite receiver stations, off-shore platforms, cables and pipelines and deep-sea ports under polar conditions.

It is also a question about making sure that China gets a say in Arctic governance. In China, the Arctic governance regime is generally seen as preliminary with opportunities for non-Arctic great powers such as China to shape its further development and the institutionalization of rules and regulations in the region (e.g. Zhang, 2019; Pan, 2019).

Chinese Arctic diplomacy – striking a balance between assertiveness and reassurance How do Chinese leaders seek to implement the Arctic Policy White Paper and ensure the range of Chinese interests in the region? It is a difficult balance between assertiveness and reassurance.

Beijing has since the early 1990s been very aware of the security dilemma dynamics resulting from its stronger economic and military power and has invested many resources in reassurance policies (Goldstein, 2005: 118-135; Hsiung, 2018: 9-17). On the other hand, China has an expanding sphere of interests and develops stronger incentives to push for its own positions now also having more powerful economic, diplomatic and military instruments to put in play. Furthermore, under the current Chinese President, Xi Jinping, there has been a general development in Chinese foreign and security policy away from Deng Xiaoping’s “keeping a low profile” guideline (e.g. Sørensen, 2015). Xi Jinping has promoted a more ambitious, self-confident and proactive line within his overall argument of a “new era” for China as a great power (Xi, 2017). Such a complex mix of ambitious assertiveness and careful reassurance is also reflected in China’s Arctic diplomacy.

Beijing has generally been very careful not to provoke mistrust and resistance among the Arctic states by promoting “legitimate” Chinese research interests in the region and repeatedly providing assurances to the Arctic states that China respects their territorial sovereignty and rights as well as international law and regulations (e.g. State Council, 2018). Beijing has also taken great efforts in Sørensen

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highlighting how China is to contribute to the Arctic in a “win-win” manner on a number of areas from handling climate change, managing sustainable extraction of Arctic resources, to the establishment of regulations and institutions to ensure continued stability and security in the region (e.g. Zhang, 2018). An important Chinese concern is to avoid generating fear of an overly ambitious and assertive China and further fuel the security dilemma dynamics already evolving in the region.

The Chinese leaders are keenly aware that China is the only great power that does not have Arctic territory and therefore depends on the Arctic states seeing a benefit in having China involved.

Therefore, the key focus behind China’s enhanced diplomatic and economic activities in the region is to establish strong and comprehensive relationships with all the Arctic states and stakeholders and gradually increase China’s presence and influence in Arctic governance institutions. China seeks to propose many benefits to the Arctic states and stakeholders, because if it succeeds in binding China into the region – on multiple levels – through “win-win” agreements on research, resource extraction, infrastructure development etc., China is better positioned to manage unforeseen developments and future attempts to marginalise China in the Arctic. It simply aims to make sure that the Arctic states and stakeholders have strong interests in keeping China involved in the region.

Such efforts are especially focused on the smaller Arctic states that could then work as a counterbalance if the Arctic great powers, the U.S. and Russia, want to push China out (e.g. Hong, 2018).

However, it is getting more difficult for China to strike the balance between assertiveness and reassurance in its Arctic diplomacy – the room of manoeuvre for China is decreasing as Washington increasingly sees China’s diplomatic and economic activities in the region as a threat to regional stability. This activates and further fuels the U.S.-China security dilemma dynamics in an Arctic political and security context. There is a growing debate among Chinese Arctic scholars on how to deal with such a situation, which I will return to below after detailing the U.S. diplomatic and military response and countermeasures.

U.S. response – diplomatic and military offensive As argued in the introduction, the Trump Administration increasingly views the Arctic as yet another arena for great power rivalry and has in recent months generally strengthened its focus on the Arctic, both diplomatically and militarily. The vigorous action-reaction dynamics following intensifying U.S.-China security dilemma dynamics are increasingly playing out in the Arctic as the U.S. fears growing Chinese assertiveness, is uncertain about the Chinese intentions, does not trust Chinese reassurance efforts and is taking its own countermeasures. Countering China as a strategic competitor in the Arctic is, therefore, increasingly the focus of the U.S. Arctic strategy.

Whereas the previous U.S. Arctic strategy from 2016 only acknowledged China as one of the dozen Arctic Council observer states, the new strategy from June 2019 includes over 20 direct references to China’s activities and growing influence in the Arctic (DoD, 2019b). The U.S. has been rather slow to realize and react to the rising Chinese role in the Arctic. It is reacting now and outright categorizes China as a great power rival and destabilizing force in the Arctic.

However, as discussed further below, China has now in many ways established itself as a de facto Arctic stakeholder, which makes it difficult for the U.S., especially in light of the evolving SinoRussian economic and strategic cooperation in the region.

The U.S. concern is that China is gradually changing the realities on the ground by slowly binding itself into the region through research cooperation and networks, investments and other activities Implications for China’s Arctic strategy

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(e.g. Pincus, 2019: 11-13). Therefore, Washington has started warning the other Arctic states and stakeholders with reference directly to a – seen from Washington – similar Chinese strategic approach in the South China Sea, asking: “Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims? Do we want the fragile Arctic environment exposed to the same ecological devastation caused by China’s fishing fleet in the seas off its coast, or unregulated industrial activity in its own country?” (State Department, 2019b) The key U.S. argument is that there is not much to be gained from a stronger Chinese presence in the Arctic – there is no “win-win” as Beijing holds – rather there are many risks as highlighted by U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo, when he describes the Chinese behavior in the Arctic: “This is part of a very familiar pattern. Beijing attempts to develop critical infrastructure using Chinese money, Chinese companies, and Chinese workers – in some cases, to establish a permanent Chinese security presence” (State Department, 2019b).

It is clear that the U.S. on the military front is driven by what Washington assesses as a more aggressive Russian posture and a Russian military build-up in the Arctic, referring especially to Russia’s new Arctic units and their efforts to reopen old military bases along the Russian coastline and establish new ones (DoD, 2019b: 4; Pincus, 2019: 19). The U.S. military response outlined in the strategy is investing more in U.S. Arctic military capabilities and to further develop NORAD with Canada while simultaneously strengthening the U.S. role in the European Arctic security cooperation through NATO exercises and direct military cooperation and exercises. This cooperation is for example with Norway and Denmark as well as non-Arctic states such as the UK, which are important for securing the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap. This clearly has a strong focus on countering Russian military activities in the region. However, the U.S. diplomatic offensive in the Arctic is not driven by Russia, but by the growing Chinese presence and their activities in the region that take a different form. That is, Russia stands as a tangible current military threat that is primarily related to the Arctic and the surrounding regions, whereas China stands as a long-term comprehensive challenge both in the Arctic and on a global scale.

However, there also seems to be a growing U.S. concern regarding the potential political and security implications of the strengthening economic and strategic cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic. This has led to discussion in Washington of whether the U.S. should seek to lure Moscow away from Beijing by offering Russia alternatives to Chinese dependence (e.g. Pincus, 2019: 2).

Recent months have seen a significant increase in visits by U.S. high-level civilian and military officials to the Arctic as an effort to counter what is seen as a reinforced Chinese influence-seeking strategy vis-a-vis the smaller Arctic states – as formulated by Professor Pincus (2019: 14) from the U.S. Naval War College, the aim should be “to build a common consensus and dialogue on China in the Arctic.” There are also strengthened U.S. efforts to present alternatives to the Chinese offers of investments and economic opportunities to the smaller Arctic states. When the U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo visited Iceland in mid-February, he announced the creation of the U.S.-Iceland Economic Dialogue in order to increase trade and investment between the U.S. and Iceland (State Department, 2019a). Such initiative comes as an American response to the stronger diplomatic and economic presence of China in Iceland. Following his participation in the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Finland in early May, Pompeo was supposed to visit Greenland, only to be cancelled at the last minute. Immediately following, the U.S. announced the reopening of a permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in Greenland and has called for increased U.S. investments into Greenland, in particular into Greenlandic airports. In November 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Sørensen

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Copenhagen released a statement notifying that the U.S. Department of Defense “intends to analyse and, where appropriate, strategically invest in projects related to the airport infrastructure in Greenland” (e.g.

Turnowsky, 2018). U.S. concerns about Russia’s strengthened military presence in the Arctic and increasing vulnerability of the U.S. military in the region (e.g. at the Thule Air base) is also behind this offer. The U.S. needs more flexibility and operational choices in Greenland. However, the U.S. is also driven by concerns that Greenland could be an easy target for Chinese science and commercial diplomacy and that China could gradually gain a foothold on the island (Lanteigne & Shi, 2019).

The U.S. has increased its diplomatic and military focus on Greenland in recent months, and it seems highly unlikely that the different Chinese proposals and initiatives, such as the establishment of a research station and a satellite receiver station in Greenland, are to materialise. Such prediction is supported by the U.S. handling of the potential involvement of the Chinese state-owned construction company, China Communication Construction Company Ltd., in the construction of airports in Greenland. Here, the then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis, in May 2018 told his Danish counterpart at the time, Claus Hjort Frederiksen, that Denmark needed to stop this in order to avoid a Chinese militarization in the Arctic, and he further warned that it could be the first step in establishing a Chinese military presence on the island (e.g. WSJ, 2019; Sørensen, 2018).

Following, the Danish government took a growing interest in the airport project, and in midSeptember 2018, the then Danish Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, went to Nuuk and presented a detailed plan for how Denmark would invest 700 million Danish kroner in the airport project and provide credit worth 450 million Danish kroner as well as state guarantee for another 450 million Danish kroner from the Nordic Investment Bank. In return, the Danish government was ensured influence on the selection of the construction company. However, in June 2019, before the end of the bidding round, the Chinese state-owned construction company, China Communication Construction Company Ltd., announced that it was withdrawing its bid, referring to practical difficulties with obtaining visas and residence and work permits for the company’s employees and concerns about unfair treatment should they get the contract (e.g. KNR, 2019; Sermitsiaq, 2019). The intriguing point is that visas and residence and work permits to Greenland are processed in Copenhagen.

The U.S. focus and concern about Greenland also relate to the uncertainties about the island’s future and the fact that Denmark and Greenland often have different expectations and assessments regarding the opportunities and challenges that China presents for Greenland (Pincus, 2019: 12-13; Sørensen, 2018). Copenhagen confronts increased U.S. pressure on Denmark’s approach and policy towards China and more specifically on Danish control of – and limitation of – what the Chinese are doing in Greenland. This U.S. pressure will only increase further as the U.S.-China security dilemma dynamics intensify.

Implications of intensifying U.S.-China security dilemma dynamics for China’s Arctic strategy As highlighted above, the Arctic has become more closely linked with Beijing’s ability to realize China’s economic reform agenda and great power ambitions, and therefore, it is seen as important to ensure room for Chinese presence and activities in the Arctic. However, the way Arctic politics and security are increasingly intertwined with global security developments that are dominated by intensifying U.S.-China security dilemma dynamics makes it even more difficult for China as the only great power without Arctic territory to ensure its access to and influence in the region.

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Among Chinese Arctic scholars there is a long-standing fear of an Arctic region dominated by strategic mistrust and competition between the great powers leading to what is often referred to as a “melon effect” [tiangua xiaoying, ], where sovereignty disputes come to play a stronger role and where the Arctic will be divided as a melon only between the Arctic states marginalizing and excluding non-Arctic states. Such fear has only increased recently with the U.S. launching “a new polar version of the China threat theory” (Deng, 2019). The debate on how to handle this is ongoing in China (e.g. Zhang, 2019; Deng 2019; Pan, 2019).

Several Chinese Arctic scholars highlight the importance of Russia and argue that Beijing should prioritise even more strengthening economic and strategic cooperation and security coordination with Russia in the Arctic in order to counter the U.S. diplomatic and military offensive. There are suggestions from Chinese Arctic scholars along the lines of developing the “Polar Silk Road” with Russia into a platform for alternative Arctic cooperation (e.g. Pan, 2019). The recent U.S. offensive and stronger diplomatic criticism of Sino-Russian Arctic collaboration risks having the opposite effect of pushing the two closer together, maybe even with stronger support from other Arctic states.

Another group of Chinese Arctic scholars are more sceptical, arguing that such a strengthened priority of Russia will only further provoke the U.S. and also risk pushing the other Arctic states over in the U.S. camp as most of these have security concerns about Russia related to the Russian military and hybrid activities in the Baltic states and Ukraine. However, in the Arctic, most Arctic states still see benefits of cooperation with Russia, and it is in the Chinese interest to keep it that way. The point here is that a stable Arctic governance system is the best option for China to further develop its presence and activities in the region – China should work to strengthen Arctic governance rules and regulations and of course China’s own role in this; not risk undermining it by focusing on strengthening its own bilateral relations with especially Russia but also other Arctic states (e.g. Zhang, 2018; Zhang 2019). There are indications that Beijing is following this course and proactively seeks to mitigate the evolving security dilemma dynamics – it has signed on to recent initiatives such as the Polar Code and the Central Arctic fishing moratorium and has not challenged the Arctic Council. Also the Chinese official response to U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo’s speech at the 2019 Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting keeps the focus on presenting China as “a responsible Arctic stakeholder” (Pan, 2019). Spokesman Geng Shuang from the Chinese Foreign Ministry hence highlighted how Pompeo’s comments “run counter to the general trend of peaceful cooperation in the Arctic,” and that China “has always had an open, positive, win-win attitude towards matters in the Arctic. When it comes to Arctic issues, we continue to be a leader in scientific research, advocate environmental protection, and make reasonable use of governing conduct according to law and international cooperation” (Yang & Zheng, 2019). That is, even though several Chinese Arctic scholars have raised their concerns about the exclusivity of the current Arctic governance system, the general assessment now is that despite the restrictions it poses for China, it does provide room for China to promote its presence and activities in the region.

It is likely that the growing U.S. opposition to China’s presence and activities in the Arctic, including the U.S. efforts to mobilize the other Arctic states, causes Chinese diplomats, businesses and researchers to reassess the situation and return to a more low-profile approach in the region.

It would not be a long-term Chinese retrenchment from the Arctic, but rather a tactical restraint.

The key is that the strategic importance of the Arctic seen from Beijing diminishes in the light of

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the current overall situation facing Beijing such as the trade war with the U.S., rising tensions in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and Hong Kong, and general growing Western criticisms and perceptions of China as an aggressive revisionist state. In the Chinese strategic cost-benefit assessment, there are growing strategic costs of pushing for Chinese activities in the Arctic. It does not serve China’s interests. It hurts China’s international image and plays into the U.S.-led “China threat” campaign, which generally weakens Beijing in securing more important interests. Even though there are clear indications of China assigning stronger strategic priority to the Arctic and the Arctic is increasingly connected with highly prioritized strategic initiatives such as the “Made in China 2025” strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), currently the region is still not at the top of the Chinese foreign and security policy agenda. There are signs of such Chinese tactical restraint in Greenland for example with the withdrawal in June 2019 from the Chinese state-owned construction company, China Communication Construction Company Ltd. (CCCC), of their bid for the construction of airports in Greenland, as mentioned above.

Another scenario, where Beijing is likely to decrease – at least temporarily – the strategic priority of the Arctic is if the security tension in East Asia, including in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait, continues to increase with the U.S. Navy further strengthening its presence in the region. Under such conditions, Beijing will likely direct focus even more to East Asia, where Beijing has so-called “core interests” [hexin liyi, ] at stake.

How the intensifying U.S.-China security dilemma dynamics will influence specific Chinese policies in the Arctic in the years to come is difficult to assess. Many developments are likely to come into play, not least the development in relations between China and the other Arctic states and here in particular Russia, which increasingly stands as a stepping-stone for Beijing to ensure and promote its presence and activities in the region. China will most likely take a more careful diplomatic approach but will still seek to further strengthen relations with all Arctic states and stakeholders. A key question is also how determined the Trump Administration is to counter Chinese diplomatic and especially economic activities in the Arctic, and hence, present the other Arctic states with attractive and credible alternatives. It requires a long-term U.S. commitment and comprehensive resources. As it stands now, the other Arctic states do not fully share the U.S. analysis of the challenges posed by a stronger Chinese presence and activities in the region and are not keen on backing the U.S “great power competition” strategy in the region.

As the intensifying U.S.-China security dilemma dynamics spread into the Arctic, it questions the continuation of the so-called “Arctic exceptionalism” – i.e. the Arctic as a low-tension region where the great powers, despite conflicts in other regions, continue to cooperate and refrain from political and military coercion to get their way. This gives cause for growing concerns that the era of high political stability and strong intergovernmental cooperation of the Arctic is ending. Mitigating the evolving security dilemma dynamics is no easy job. Creative and proactive strategic thinking and action also from the other Arctic states will be in strong demand in the years to come.

Notes 1. Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus. Speech given by U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo in Rovaniemi, Finland, ahead of the 19th Arctic Council Ministerial

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Meeting, May 6, 2019. Available at: https://www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpeningamericas-arctic-focus/ 2.

For the last section, the article draws on meetings held in May 2019 between the author and Chinese Arctic scholars from the Shanghai Institute of International Studies and the Ocean University of China as well as material and data gathered through the author’s participation in the “China-Nordic Arctic Research Center” (CNARC) conference held May 8-9, 2019, in Shanghai and the “Arctic Circle, China Forum” held May 10-11, 2019, also in Shanghai.

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Briefing Note

Arctic connections - Mapping an Arctic policy framework for the Scottish government Tahseen Jafry, Michael Mikulewicz & Sennan Mattar

Overview Historically, Scotland and the Arctic have been connected by social and cultural ties. More recently, mainly through trade and tourism, economic links have flourished. Some of this is underpinned by the expanding number of scientific and academic partnerships that have developed between Scotland and its Arctic neighbours. Scotland is also excelling in technological innovation to tackle climate change and in environmental protection. There is no doubt that Scotland has considerable expertise across many sectors and is well placed as a valuable partner in Arctic matters. The development of Arctic Connections - Scottish Government’s Arctic Policy Framework is demonstration of the significance placed on Scottish-Arctic issues in Scotland. This briefing note provides an insight into the mapping exercise carried out for the purposes of the Scottish Government’s Arctic Policy Framework, highlighting key Scottish Arctic relationships, pointing to Scottish strengths across sectors and exploring avenues for even closer cooperation.

Mapping Scotland’s existing links with the Arctic region While Scotland is not located within the Arctic Circle, it is among the region’s closest neighbours and shares with Arctic countries a number of features, outlooks and challenges. In light of these similarities and opportunities for mutual cooperation, the Scottish Government has developed its own Arctic Policy Framework. This policy decision emerged from the Scottish Government’s extensive involvement in Arctic fora, including the First Minister’s participation in the Arctic Circle Assembly in 2016 and 2017. It also came in recognition of the mutual policy agendas in the face of climate change and social and economic challenges affecting rural and remote northern communities.

__________________________________________________________________________________________ Tahseen Jafry is Director, Michael Mikulewicz is Research Fellow and Sennan Mattar is Researcher at the Centre for Climate Justice, Glasgow Caledonian University, Scotland, UK.

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In this context, the design and development of the Scottish Arctic Policy Framework could be considered as a formalisation of, as well as, a vehicle for fostering closer ties between Scotland and its northern neighbours.

In order to help shape the future Arctic Policy Framework, the Scottish Government commissioned Glasgow Caledonian University’s Centre for Climate Justice to work in partnership with the University of the Highlands and Island’s Environmental Research Institute to produce a mapping report which provides a thorough overview of Scotland’s existing links with the Arctic region across 5 themes: governance, society and culture, economy, environment and climate change, and academia and to explore avenues for further collaboration.

Figure 1: Arctic Definitions - Hugo Ahlenius, UNEP/GRID-Arendal. Source: Rekacewicz 2005.

A two-pronged approach was used to conduct the mapping report; a desk-based review of literature and stakeholder engagement workshops. The feedback from representatives of Scottish business, academia and civil society provided additional insight into the breadth and depth of existing links between Scotland and the Arctic and highlighted the opportunities for future collaborations and partnerships during two stakeholder engagement workshops held in Glasgow and Inverness in 2018.

The study set out to answer the following set of questions: •

What links exist between Scotland and the Arctic Region in the context of governance, socio-cultural issues, the economy, environment and climate change and academic-research and education?

•

How can critical thinking, insight and feedback by key and wider stakeholders be mobilized for the development and roll out of the Arctic Policy Framework?

•

What are the gaps and opportunities for furthering the development of a Scottish Arctic Policy Framework?

Governance links The Arctic falls within the legal jurisdiction of eight nations; Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States (Bajrektarevic, 2010). At the regional level, it is governed through a number of international institutional initiatives such as the Arctic Council, the Northern Forum, the North Atlantic Cooperation (NORA) and the West Nordic Council (WNC). However, non-Arctic states are taking a growing interest in the region due to its growing scientific, economic and strategic importance. The Arctic Council, the most significant governance structure in the region, puts strong emphasis on the human dimension of regional governance, with indigenous and social issues high on its agenda. In contrast, while the UK strategy for the Arctic aims to “protect people and the environment” (HM Government ,2018: 15), there appears to be little emphasis by the UK and other non-Arctic states on social and

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economic inequalities (including those rooted in environmental issues such as climate change) that are affecting the region’s indigenous and northern communities.

Thus Scotland shares similar challenges to many Arctic nations in the context of supporting its rural and remote communities and protecting its geographical landscapes. Scotland’s policy focus on just transition and climate justice are closely aligned to the Arctic Council’s own focus on addressing human dimensions and so provides a platform and an opportunity to work in partnership to identify and develop solutions to address these issues and achieve sustainable economic development. This could be through strengthening trade and investment links in sectors such as shipping, fisheries and aqua-culture.

Scottish-Arctic social and cultural similarities Scotland has many social and cultural links and similarities with the Arctic Region and Arctic States.

There are numerous geographical, historical, cultural, and linguistic ties, in particular between the Highlands and Islands and the Arctic, which are considered to be stronger than those in the rest of the UK (Johnstone, 2012). Much of the shared historical and cultural links come through, for example, ‘Viking’ connections, Scottish emigrant populations in Canada, and 19th and 20th century polar explorers John Rae and Thomas Abernethy (Mikkola, 2014). Nova Scotia in Canada received large numbers of Scottish emigrants, and these links are still maintained through the celebration of the Canadian Highland Games annually (Menezes et al, 2016). Visitors from the Scottish diaspora, and in particular Canada, are a valuable part of the tourism industry in Scotland. Moreover, Scotland is reliant on the marine environment for social integrity much like the Nordic nations, with which it is closely connected through the ongoing climate, economic and social changes in the Arctic.

Linguistically, Shetlandic and Orcadian dialects are replete with Norse words, and Scottish town names like Wick and Tinwald have their origin in a language once shared with other Nordic Arctic states (Menezes et al, 2016). These linguistic similarities can again be traced back to the Viking influence. Until 1472, Shetland and Orkney belonged to Norway and Denmark until they were pawned as a wedding dowry.

Geographically, Northern Scotland faces similar issues experienced by Arctic and near-Arctic countries in terms of its sparse population, remoteness, inaccessibility, and a harsh climate (Mikkola, 2014). These issues have been explored over the past 20 years, through Scotland’s cooperation within the framework of EU mechanisms and largely through the Northern Periphery and Arctic INTERREG Programme (and its predecessors). Through cooperation within the framework of the EU, the Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme 2014-2020 and Horizon 2020 have been invaluable financially to supporting the development of community-based programmes in the Scottish Highlands and Islands. The programmes have facilitated collaboration between regions to find practical solutions to common problems as well as exchange networks.

Economic ties The economic links between Scotland and the Arctic are mainly found in the energy, fishing and tourism industries. There are notable Scottish companies operating in the Arctic region, which have achieved commercial success. However, the most significant economic links are found in investment by companies and institutions based in Arctic Council member states into Scottish

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commercial operations and research development. A notable example of this is investment from Norwegian companies into the Scottish salmon industry (Shepherd et al, 2017).

Arctic-based companies seek also to benefit from Scottish expertise in offshore engineering and supply chains (Scottish Government, 2017). For example, the Aberdeen-based company, Tritech, supply sensors and underwater cameras for Arctic rigs and icebreaker ships. A number of Arcticbased companies have been developing and testing wave and tidal projects at the European Marine Energy Centre (EMEC) based in Orkney; the EUR €5.5 million Project Wello Oy to build and test a prototype wave energy converter (Wello Oy, 2015).

There is significant cooperation between tourist agencies based in Scotland and the Arctic region.

For example, VisitScotland and the Icelandic Tourist Board signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to cooperate on best practice and knowledge exchange in areas such as sustainable tourism (VisitScotland, 2016). VisitScoltand is also developing relationships with the West Sweden Tourist Board, Innovation Norway, VisitDenmark, Visit Faroe Islands and Finnair.

Scotland’s cruise and ferry industries have a well-established tourist link between Scotland and many of the Arctic nations. Currently, the world’s first hydrogen-powered car and passenger ferry is being design and constructed by the European Marine Energy Centre (EMEC) based in Orkney (EMEC, 2018). This project is promoting hydrogen fuel cell technology in transportation and showcasing Scotland as both an innovator in renewable technologies and a promoter of green tourism across the Arctic region.

Environment and climate change links Scotland is the Arctic’s closest non-Arctic neighbour and a valuable partner in tackling climate change. Temperatures in the region are rising faster than the global average posing serious risks to daily life, livelihoods, food production and bio-diversity (IPCC, 2018). Yet, while climate change will bring unexpected challenges, Scotland is determined to tackle this global challenge through its expertise and developing closer collaboration with its closest neighbours to ensure sustainable development.

Scotland has well-established research connections with the Arctic region working on environmental issues and climate change through collaborative research and programs spanning over 25 years. Large projects include the EU-funded Horizon 2020 project Arctic Cluster and the UN Conventions and Scientific Associations project EU-PolarNet (2016). Scottish scientists are at the fore front of scientific and technical advances in oceanographic and ecological data collection, remote sensing and the development of small satellite systems in the Arctic region (Boehme et al, 2009; EMODnet, 2014; Changing Arctic Ocean, 2018). Scottish universities host Europe’s largest glaciology research group and contribute to the Marine Climate Change Impacts Report, the Arctic Council Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program and the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR, 2018) on marine spatial planning.

The interconnected nature of the environment, wildlife, and human health in the Arctic has long been recognized, and climate change is rapidly threatening both the local communities and their environments (AMAP, 2018). In this context, a number of Scottish organisations contribute to the Multidisciplinary Drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate (MOSAiC) which aims to improve understanding of the Arctic in terms of its atmosphere, ocean, sea ice, and ecosystem. In

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addition, the Scottish Association of Marine Science (SAMS) are also involved in long term monitoring of the environment and climate in the Arctic region as an associated institution of the University of the United Nations (UNU).

Academic partnerships Scottish universities and research centres have a long tradition of conducting world-class research on the Arctic. Most of the Scottish Universities have links to the Arctic either through participation in research programs or as partners in transnational collaboration projects. Currently, two Scottish higher education institutions – the University of Aberdeen and the University of the Highlands and Islands – have a particular relationship with the Arctic and the region’s academic institutions as members of the University of Arctic (UArctic) with opportunities for more to join. Despite this level of engagement, there is no institutional centre for Arctic research in Scotland comparable to the UK’s Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge but there is considerable drive to create one.

External to academia, examples of Scottish Arctic educational partnerships include the West Lothian-based Polar Academy (The Polar Academy, 2018), an organisation that specialises in organising polar expeditions to eastern Greenland for 14-17 year-olds and the Scottish Arctic Club which is a group of enthusiasts with a common interest in the Arctic (Scottish Arctic Club, 2018).

Academic collaboration is dependent on research funding mainly from the EU. It is unclear what impact Brexit will have on the availability of EU finding for Arctic research. In the worst-case scenario, Scottish research bodies will lose access to the likely successor of Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme 2014-2020 and Horizon 2020, creating a funding gap in the Scottish research landscape. Arctic research heavily depends on strong regional networks which EU funding has facilitated. It is unclear if and to what extent UK funding for Arctic research would compensate the loss of available funds in a hard-Brexit scenario.

Reflections for furthering Scottish-Arctic collaborations There is no doubt that Scotland has much to offer to the Arctic region in terms of knowledge, skills, expertise, technology and business opportunities and these findings have informed the development of Arctic Connections – Scottish Government’s Arctic Policy Framework which was launched in Orkney on the 23rd September 2019. With that in mind, we offer some reflections for furthering Scottish-Arctic collaboration and the development of future partnerships.

Scottish participation in Arctic governance: From indirect representation to public diplomacy Scotland

could consider greater participation in international bodies such as the Northern Forum, the North Atlantic Cooperation (NORA), and the West Nordic Council (WNC) to grow Scotland’s presence among Arctic nations. A dedicated Scottish Arctic office could be of interest to coordinate Scotland’s involvement in Arctic governance at the international level. A strong European presence in the Arctic will benefit Scotland due to the allocation of EU research funding and economic initiatives that support and promote Scottish institutions and businesses. Moreover, the establishment of a national academic forum, involving Scottish councils and municipalities, could be considered to coordinate Scottish contributions to Arctic governance at the national level.

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Building on Scottish-Nordic socio-cultural connections By promoting cultural legacy projects, Scotland could build upon its socio-cultural connections with its Arctic neighbours. A programme of cultural outreach would complement a wider strategy of Scotland positioning and identifying itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’.

Opportunities for growing the economy The forging of partnerships between Scottish and Arctic-based businesses in renewable energy, fisheries and tourism is evidence that Scotland is an attractive global destination for foreign investment. Building on this platform technology-innovation conferences, research and development workshops, business expos, and knowledge exchange platforms are the types of events that Scotland could host in collaboration with its Nordic neighbours to encourage and foster new collaborations.

The transition from oil and gas to renewable energy, green tourism, and bringing the voices of rural and remote communities to shape a new vision for sustainable economic development is an opportunity where Scotland could show leadership in Just Transition.

Scotland’s approach to environmental protection and climate change The Arctic is undergoing rapid environmental change, but there are undoubtedly opportunities for Scotland to contribute knowledge and expertise to further understand the impacts of climate change and support vulnerable communities in mitigating and adapting to them. Multi-disciplinary research to understand the scale of climate change impacts and to assess how climate change will affect rural and remote communities could be achieved through the development of a new Arctic Research Cluster which spans all sectors of interest. The Arctic Research Cluster could build on Scotland’s globally unique Climate Justice Innovation Fund, placing a strong emphasis on protecting the poorest and most vulnerable people.

Scotland could take a leadership role in the development of new educational links with the Arctic region. Expanding partnerships with the University of the Arctic (n.d.) through distance learning, joint courses and placements, could create opportunities for Scotland to help nurture future generations of engineers and scientists to respond to climate change.

Academic excellence Given the current nature and extent of existing research, outreach, and teaching and learning partnerships, Scottish academic institutions could be positioned as an avenue to the Arctic and Europe. At the international level, the Scottish government could contribute to Arctic governance through active participation of Scottish research institutions in regional scientific bodies, such as the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), and by facilitating partnerships with nonArctic states research initiatives.

Concluding remarks The mapping report provided an overview of existing links between Scotland and the Arctic. The evidence speaks for itself. The breadth and depth of collaborations, partnerships and mutual understanding is extensive. There is opportunity in Scotland to galvanise, consolidate and coordinate our strengths in Arctic expertise. There is no doubt that the development of Arctic

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Connections - the Scottish Government’s Arctic Policy Framework is a clear indication of Scotland as a valuable partner to the Arctic Region.

Full details of the mapping report can be found at: http://researchonline.gcu.ac.uk/portal/files/27282329/Arctic_Mapping_Report_Final_June_20 19.pdf

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