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Arctic Yearbook 2023 Heininen, L., J. Barnes & H. Exner-Pirot, (eds.). (2023). Arctic Yearbook 2023: Arctic Indigenous Peoples: Climate, Science, Knowledge and Governance. Akureyri, Iceland: Arctic Portal. Available from https://arcticyearbook.com ISSN 2298–2418 This is an open access volume distributed in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY NC-4.0) license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is properly cited and the use is non-commercial.

Cover Image Credit Henrik Saxgren Qumangaapik, 16 years. Ikerraaq, Northwest Greenland 2015 Editor Lassi Heininen| lassi.heininen@ulapland.fi Managing Editor Justin Barnes | jbarnes@balsillieschool.ca Managing Editor Heather Exner-Pirot | exnerpirot@gmail.com Communications Manager Tiia Manninen Editorial Board Dr. Daria Burnasheva (Senior Lecturer at Arctic State Institute of Culture and Arts, Sakha Republic) Dr. Miya Christensen (Professor at University of Stockholm, Sweden) Halldór Johannsson (Executive Director, Arctic Portal, Iceland) Dr. Kirsi Latola (Research Coordinator, UArctic Vice-President Networks, Finland) Dr. Alexander Pelyasov (Russian Academy of Sciences; Director of the Center of Northern and Arctic Economics, Russia) Dr. Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson (Former President of the Republic of Iceland, Chair of the Arctic Circle Assembly) James Ross, (Gwich’in leader, Northwest Territories, Canada)

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About Arctic Yearbook

The Arctic Yearbook is the outcome of the Northern Research Forum (NRF) and UArctic joint Thematic Network (TN) on Geopolitics and Security. The TN also organizes the annual Calotte Academy.

The Arctic Yearbook seeks to be the preeminent repository of critical analysis on the Arctic region, with a mandate to inform observers about the state of Arctic politics, governance and security. It is an international and interdisciplinary peer-reviewed publication, published online at [https://arcticyearbook.com] to ensure wide distribution and accessibility to a variety of stakeholders and observers.

Arctic Yearbook material is obtained through a combination of invited contributions and an open call for papers. For more information on contributing to the Arctic Yearbook, or participating in the TN on Geopolitics and Security, contact the Editor, Lassi Heininen.

Acknowledgments The Arctic Yearbook would like to acknowledge the Arctic Portal [https://arcticportal.org] for their generous technical and design support, especially Ævar Karl Karlsson; Sara Olsvig for her guidance and collaboration on this volume; and our colleagues who provided peer review for the scholarly articles in this volume.

Table of Contents – Arctic Yearbook 2023 Introduction Arctic Indigenous peoples: Climate, science, knowledge and governance.............................................1 Lassi Heininen, Sara Olsvig, Justin Barnes & Heather Exner-Pirot

Section I: Climate change and the green transition Arctic infrastructure: Considerations in the green transition.................................................................17 Lill Rastad Bjørst, Sigríður Kristjánsdóttir, Christopher Clarke-McQueen, Jaime DeSimone, Andrea Kraj & Anna Krook-Riekkola No land, no health: Exploration of the impact of historical environment on Inuit qanuinngitsiarutiksait in the context of climate change..........................................................................41 Jeevan Toor, Tagaaq Evaluardjuk-Palmer, & Josée Lavoie Just Like Alta? A Comparative Study of the Alta and Fosen Cases as Critical Junctures for Sámi Rights in Norway.........................................................................................................................................63 Luke Laframboise Existence and Survival: A Dimension of Indigenous Self-Determination in the Context of Climate Change Impacts...........................................................................................................................................79 Dave-Inder Comar Rethinking the relationship between humans and nature in law: An Indigenous Peoples’ perspective....................................................................................................................................................98 Marlene A. Payva Almonte Briefing Notes & Commentaries The role of China within Arctic climate governance.............................................................................111 Chuan Chen The Arctic Academy for Sustainability...................................................................................................113 Giuseppe Amatulli & Jamie Jenkins

Section II: Food, health and labour Occupational Safety and Health in Greenland – a chapter to be written?..........................................126 Anne Lise Kappel, Peter Hasle, Søren Voxted & Katharina Jeschke Conditions for positive contact and a positive organization: A case study of Chinese workers in Maniitsoq fish factory...............................................................................................................................144 Fang Fang

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The Food (In)Security Issue Across Indigenous Communities in the Russian Arctic: Economic, Social, and Environmental Aspects.........................................................................................................161 Gao Tianming & Vasilii Erokhin Briefing Notes & Commentaries The Ainu language and Indigenous psychological well-being in Hokkaido, northern Japan..........194 Seira Duncan

Section III: Governance and economy Inuit Myth and the Remaking of Greenland's Postcolonial Governance...........................................199 Rikke Østergaard & Javier L. Arnaut Embracing Indigenous Knowledge in Arctic Economic Development: A Pathway towards ESG and Indigenous Sustainable Finance Integration...................................................................................216 Alexandra Middleton Satellite dependency in Nunavut: a barrier to the territory’s political realization..............................236 Célestine Rabouam Working with and for Arctic communities on resilience enhancement..............................................251 Anna Karlsdóttir, Jean-Michel Huctin, Jeanne-Marie Gherardi, Tanguy Sandré & Jean-Paul Vanderlinden Community-based co-creation for sustainability as an academic fourth mission: An exploration of Sustainability Practices of the Smallest Institutions of Higher Learning in the Arctic......................270 Martin Mohr Olsen Briefing Notes & Commentaries How Expert Communities Contribute to the Arctic Governance Systems as and beyond Knowledge Holders..................................................................................................................................282 Yang Jian

Section IV: Knowledge and science Cooperation by Design: Exploring the Dynamic of Trust in an Arctic Collaborative Project........295 Caoimhe Isha Beaulé & Pierre De Coninck The Contribution of Interdisciplinary Research to Sound Environmental Decision-Shaping in Arctic Matters.............................................................................................................................................318 Michaela Louise Coote Art and co-research with Sámi reindeer herders - in the spirit of decolonisation unfolding cultural knowledge...................................................................................................................................................333 Korinna Korsström-Magga

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Briefing Notes & Commentaries The social lives of Arctic expertise, or how to do transnational networks.........................................349 Merje Kuus Building pioneering models for an open discussion and northern knowledge-building – The case studies of Calotte Academy and Northern Research Forum...............................................................361 Lassi Heininen Arctic Expert-to-Expert Initiative for Continuous Scientific and Indigenous Knowledge Exchange in the Arctic................................................................................................................................................378 Alexandra Middleton, Andrey Mineev, Paul Arthur Berkman, Anton Vasiliev, Halldór Jóhannsson, Ekaterina Uryupova & Lassi Heininen 32nd Year of the Calotte Academy............................................................................................................381 Zhanna Anshukova & Tom Gabriel Royer

Section V: Cooperation and conflict What makes the Arctic exceptional? Stories of geopolitics, environments and homelands............387 Jennifer Spence, Edward Alexander, Rolf Rødven & Sara Harriger Indigenous peoples of Russia during the war time................................................................................404 Ekaterina Zmyvalova High seas triggering Arctic security? An analysis of Chinese domestic discourse on the Central Arctic Ocean...............................................................................................................................................424 Marco Volpe Briefing Notes & Commentaries Diplomatic deadlock in the Arctic: Science as an entry point to renewed dialogue.......................452 Paul Dziatkowiec North Pacific Arctic Community Meeting (NPARC): A platform to develop Asian perspectives of the Arctic by a variety of experts in China, Japan and Korea...............................................................457 Natsuhiko Otsuka, Yuji Kodama, Minsu Kim & Yang Jian Discussing Arctic Geopolitics in Bosphorus.........................................................................................463 Eda Ayaydin The China-Nordic Arctic Research Center: One decade in................................................................466 Egill Nilsson

Table of Contents

Introduction

Arctic Yearbook 2023 Arctic Indigenous Peoples: Climate, Science, Knowledge and Governance

Lassi Heininen, Sara Olsvig, Justin Barnes, & Heather Exner-Pirot

As an interdisciplinary journal focused on issues of Arctic governance, economics, environment and society, the Arctic Yearbook has always sought and included contributions by Indigenous Peoples experts and on topics relevant to Indigenous communities. Since our first issue in 2012, we have never dedicated a volume to it; rather Indigenous perspectives, topics and authors were intrinsic to our work.

This year's theme on "Arctic Indigenous Peoples: Climate, Science, Knowledge and Governance", however, centers Indigenous Peoples and issues. Rather than occasionally addressing issues of politics, economic and society that relate to Indigenous Peoples, this volume starts with an Indigenous focus and assesses Indigenous experiences, challenges and perspectives through the lens of climate, science, knowledge and governance.

Arctic Indigenous Peoples The Arctic is currently home to over 4 million people, many of whom are Indigenous and have lived in the region since time immemorial. Building on inherent Indigenous Knowledge systems, Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic contribute throughout science and diplomacy in responding to various challenges and crises. As many northerners and Indigenous leaders from across the Circumpolar Arctic have articulated, Arctic residents and Indigenous Peoples are at the front lines of the climate crisis, of a changing geopolitical environment, and of shifts in international natural resource interests towards the Arctic region. At the same time, Arctic Indigenous Peoples continue to respond to a wide variety of important challenges related to colonial legacies, environmental degradation, and other interrelated socioeconomic challenges in the Arctic, while calling for inclusive and integrated knowledge systems to inform solutions and decision-making.

Lassi Heininen, Justin Barnes, & Heather Exner-Pirot are the editors of the Arctic Yearbook Sara Olsvig is the International Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council

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At the 2020s, Arctic research and academia are at a turning point. More important, in the long run, than temporary pause in scientific cooperation, debates on decolonization are pushing and reforming our collective views on the role of academia and research in a region where Indigenous Peoples have lived for millennia, and where only a few hundred years’ interference have changed the landscape of knowledge immensely. Looking back at the role of science and research in colonization, there is no doubt that an unequal relationship between the colonizer and the colonized has existed, and continues to exist, and that knowledge as a means for gaining power has been a tool predominantly used by southern settler and colonizer powers.

While questions remain about the future of international Arctic science cooperation and the entire pan-Arctic cooperation, particularly at the Arctic Council, the evolving processes that have been increasing the involvement of Indigenous Peoples in Arctic governance at the national and international level, since the 1970s, have had important influences on regional and international politics. Bolstered more recently by increasing international recognition of Indigenous human rights frameworks, including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007, and of the many challenges Indigenous Peoples are managing, there is a need to better understand and articulate the central role of Indigenous Peoples in Arctic governance frameworks, policies, knowledge production and programs. Today, Indigenous Peoples demand equal recognition of Indigenous Knowledge, of worldviews and ways of life to be respected, and for science and research to be done by and with them, not only about them. This sparks epistemological debates on how to know and how to approach science, and changes are emerging. Therefore, an Arctic Yearbook edition specifically shedding light on epistemological discussions on ways of knowing, and on the recognition of Indigenous Knowledge as equal to all other knowledge systems, is timely and needed.

While the Arctic Yearbook has generally focused on timely issues and events, an Indigenousfocused volume must be thoughtful with regards to process. The traditional approach to academic writing – the peer review process, a reliance on the established literature, its particular writing style – can be alienating to some Indigenous authors. It may also be a poor fit for describing and sharing Indigenous worldviews and experiences, while ways of ethically and equitably including Indigenous Knowledge, with correct citation and permissions from the knowledge holders, continue to be a challenge to many non-Indigenous scholars. To be conducted in good faith, such an undertaking demands a bridging of conventional scholarly processes and Indigenous ways of knowing. Our Special Issue on Arctic Pandemics, released in July this year, was a successful test of these principles. A special editorial board was set up for that volume, including a number of Indigenous members, and peer review was determined to not necessarily require a PhD review depending on the subject. The Arctic Yearbook has always encouraged non-peer reviewed contributions from decision makers and practitioners in the form of commentaries and briefing notes, and this proved a good option for some Indigenous authors as well. Following from that, we have been pleased and encouraged to approach this year’s volume with the guidance of Sara Olsvig, current International Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC).

Region-building with states as the major actors within the current Westphalian unified state system, and circumpolar inter-regional cooperation with Indigenous Peoples as transnational actors, were the major trends in early post-Cold War Arctic International Relations and geopolitics (Heininen, 2004). Although state sovereignty is still firm, the global Arctic is a new trend whereby pan-Arctic

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cooperation, including knowledge-building with Indigenous Peoples, together with an epistemic community made up of a variety of other non-state actors, is becoming more important due to a political and practical need to assist decision-making processes. The turbulence of world politics today, with constant great power rivalry, enemy pictures and warfare influencing ongoing discursive battles about the Arctic, requires a balance with the other influential realities that have shaped – and continue to shape – the Arctic.

The idea behind selecting such a multi-dimensional and multi-layered theme - “Arctic Indigenous Peoples: Climate, Science, Knowledge, and Governance” – for this year’s Arctic Yearbook was both to have a holistic approach and emphasize the rich variety of dynamics related to Arctic governance, and to acknowledge the important experiences, knowledge, and roles of Arctic Indigenous Peoples, as well as to provide an opportunity to discuss and analyze their future role in Northern knowledge- and expertise-building. This is particularly important when building on inherent Indigenous Knowledge systems, and when calling for inclusive expertise and integrated knowledge systems in order to find solutions for the climate crisis and other wicked problems.

Governance The Arctic region, a former geopolitical margin of the northernmost geographical periphery, seems to be in a state of constant transformation, as we discussed at the 2017 Arctic Yearbook. Yet the traditions, practices and knowledge of Arctic peoples have carried on for centuries. Among recent significant changes to the region are, on the one hand, increased globalization due to the impacts of climate change, global economics, and increasing scientific interests worldwide; and on the other, the pause of multilateral (pan-Arctic) cooperation at the Arctic Council due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, although, despite policy-makers and mainstream scholars often argue about it, there have been no armed conflicts in the Arctic between states since the Cod Wars in the 1970s.

Nevertheless, two other recent transformations are important to consider: Firstly, the increasing self-determination of Arctic Indigenous Peoples in North America and the European Arctic based on devolution, Indigenous Knowledge and circumpolar cooperation by Indigenous Peoples. In particular, the introduction of self-determination arrangements such as the 2009 Act on SelfGovernment in Greenland marked a turning point in Arctic governance. Secondly, a global ‘environmental awakening’ about the importance of the Arctic’s climate and environment and increased international followed the decades of advocacy by Indigenous Peoples, engaging civil societies and NGOs. Governance mechanisms in the Arctic have been a unique space for Indigenous Peoples and Indigenous Knowledge to influence programs and policies, particularly in regards to sustainable development and building resilience at the local, regional, and global levels. Through domestic and international reforms, including the devolution of governance processes in the Arctic with selfdetermination and self-government as key themes, Arctic peoples have become more connected to the political processes responsible for environmental and economic decision-making. Concerns about environmental degradation, and its potential to create conflicts, requires Arctic stakeholders – including state and regional governments, and Indigenous Peoples– to determine how the Arctic’s land and waters should be used or preserved as well as for what and by whom, and in this, recognize that Indigenous Peoples are rights holders. Although these types of international and regional debates have historically been dominated by states and their various agencies, Arctic Indigenous Peoples have been breaking through colonial barriers and have become crucial players in environmental Arctic Indigenous Peoples: Climate, Science, Knowledge and Governance

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politics and economic debates at national and international levels regarding the Arctic since the 1970's (Kleivan, 1992; English, 2013).

Here, Arctic Indigenous Peoples, together with environmental NGOs and members of the scientific community, have shown their willingness and ability to push the Arctic states’ governments to cooperate on environmental protection (Heininen, 2013). A growing environmental awareness about the impacts of long-range pollution from lower latitudes of Europe, North America and Asia, particularly Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), heavy metals, and radioactivity, on the Arctic’s ecosystems and the human health of the people, as well as their interrelationship with climate change (AMAP, 2002). This increased understanding about the susceptibility of the Arctic environment and its global interconnections also raised concerns about how human inhabitants of the Arctic, and their food security and food sovereignty, were particularly vulnerable to global pollutants (Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1988; Paci et al., 2004). It was becoming clearer that once these pollutants enter the food cycle, dangerous concentrations can accumulate in the human body, having harmful consequences for northern populations who rely on country foods gathered through hunting and fishing (Huebert, 1997).

These important issues, as well as strong international advocacy by Arctic Indigenous Peoples, helped push the eight Arctic states to develop and sign the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) (Rovaniemi Declaration, 1991), the beginning of circumpolar cooperation and the foundation for the Arctic Council's establishment in 1996.

While the eight Arctic states are often referred to as the founding members of the Arctic Council, it was International Indigenous Peoples organizations from the Arctic that played a crucial role in kickstarting circumpolar cooperation among the Arctic states and other Arctic stakeholders (see Dean & Lackenbauer, 2021). The work of the ICC, for example, brought significant attention to the issues facing Indigenous Peoples in the region, positioning their interests as a primary feature of the Arctic agenda (English, 2013). With national offices located in Anchorage, Ottawa, and Nuuk (with continues push to include Soviet Inuit in conferences), the ICC was active in establishing guiding principles for activity in the Arctic in a variety of fields that included research and resource development (Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1988). While the first Arctic Peoples’ Conference was held in Copenhagen in November 1973 had not been attended by Russian and Alaskan Indigenous leaders (Kleivan, 1992), the June 1991“First Arctic Indigenous Leaders' Summit” included Indigenous leaders representing the ICC, Nordic Saami Council, and the USSR Association of Northern Small Peoples, as they gathered in Denmark again to discuss shared priorities, and concluded with the signing of a declaration focused on environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic (Rothwell, 1996). The ICC, with the greatest capacity to operate internationally at the time, would first play an important role in advocating for Indigenous participation in the AEPS and its work before becoming one of the primary organizational forces of the Arctic Council (English, 2013; Dean & Lackenbauer, 2021).

In addition to the ICC, the Nordic Saami Council and the Association of Aboriginal Peoples of Northern Russia acted as the main representatives of Indigenous peoples during AEPS negotiations and discussions (Mullen, 1994). This early Indigenous activism helped to establish the structure, norms, and practices of state and non-state relations in the Arctic – a legacy evident in the current structure of the Arctic Council and the influential role the Permanent Participants have in Arctic governance more broadly today.

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The founding of the AEPS and Arctic Council launched a new era of science diplomacy focused on circumpolar issues and formalized Indigenous Peoples' central role in Arctic governance processes. Arctic Indigenous Peoples co-founded the Arctic Council and from the outset pushed for their equal participation, resulting in the unique structure of the Arctic Council as a governance body inclusive of Indigenous Peoples. Here, Indigenous peoples responded, and continue to respond, to a wide variety of challenges related to colonial legacies, environmental degradation, and other interrelated socioeconomic challenges in the Arctic, and have been included in, and influenced, the decision-making of the Arctic states.

All in all, Indigenous peoples have always been living in the Arctic region, and thus they, more than anyone else, are rights holders. As representatives of five Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations stated in the Statement of the 2023 Arctic Peoples’ Conference, which was a commemorative conference celebrating fifty years of Arctic cooperation, Arctic Indigenous Peoples have “survived, and thrived, through hundreds of years of colonization, and emphasize that many challenges and colonial systems remain to be dismantled”. The conference participants furthermore emphasized “the rights of Arctic Indigenous Peoples, [their] unique relationship to the Arctic, and [their] commitments to cross-border and people-topeople cooperation in the region” (ICC, 2023).

Climate changes and Actors As the Arctic Council, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and other international bodies have acknowledged, climate change has become a key issue at every level of politics both within and outside the Arctic. According to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report and other renowned climate reports the Arctic is warming 3-4 times faster than the rest of the globe (Constable et al., 2022; Rantanen, 2022). The high speed at which the climate is warming in the Arctic is a major cause of concern for both local communities and global planetary processes. The cliché that “what happens in the Arctic does not stay there” is true when considering the severe impacts and consequences of thawing sea ice, glaciers and permafrost on the global climate. Small island states of the Indian and Pacific Oceans face dramatic, and in some cases existential, ramifications due to climate change and the possibility that they might totally lose their land, and therefore their legitimacy as a sovereign state, due to rising sea levels. In the Arctic, rising sea levels are causing coastlines and communities in the region to erode away from increasingly extreme weather events. The melting of sea ice, permafrost and ice capes is literally changing the cultural landscape of Indigenous Peoples.

The more obviously the world faces the global climate crisis and the ecological catastrophe, the clearer it is that states lack the ability to manage efficiently global environmental problems on their own, and this has placed more responsibilities on non-state actors (here is a problem in terminology, when being dependent on the term of a ‘state’). This raises questions, such as: Who are legitimized and have the power, but are hesitating to make the hard decisions? Who are legitimized and reasonable actors, and willing to find ways to ‘save the planet’, but do not have the power? And, who are knowledgeable and reasonable actors, and willing to act? In general, what are the factors and drivers of a change, and who are the actors behind a change, and what are their premises?

According to classical geopolitics, as well as political realism, the list of (relevant) factors and actors in international affairs are short: meaningful factors are physical space (including resources) and power based on force, with states as the main actors interacting in a world of international anarchy.

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Critical geopolitics, which includes constructivism, acknowledges several other important factors and actors: these factors include identity and identities, knowledge and the power of ideas, the environment, political norms, and the politicization of physical space. In terms of actors, critical geopolitics includes people and civil society, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Transnational Corporations (TNCs) alongside states. Acknowledging and taking into consideration the longer list of factors and actors there are other important contexts to consider, such as environmental or human security, human rights, and more pressure for a paradigm shift to address a broader set of threats and challenges. This was the key issue in the Alta Dam conflict in the 1980s between the Sami and the state of Norway, with parallels taking place in the Fosen case today concerning Sami rights (see Laframboise as well as Payva in this volume). These types of debates in International Relations show that a discursive battle on perceptions and interpretations continues. A fascinating part of this is to analyze how premises - of geopolitics, security or governance - have been changed, and if there has been a paradigm shift (e.g. Heininen and ExnerPirot 2020; Olsvig, 2022).

States used to change their premises via economic and/or political integration or devolution, as well as by increasing their tolerance of self-determination and self-governing. The devolution of power by the Nordic countries has led to a noticeable change in premises and become a new Arctic governance model. The ‘environmental awakening’ changed the Arctic states’ premises dramatically, after environmental protection cooperation became a trigger for them to reconstruct their geopolitical reality, and by combining western science and Indigenous Knowledge – all this is been materialized by shared interests between the Arctic states, and between them and Arctic Indigenous Peoples (Heininen, 2013). This has not, however, yet meant a paradigm shift, though it has been important to maintain the mutually beneficial high stability in the Arctic, in particular in turbulent times of great power rivalries, regional wars, constant warfare, and arms races. Here again Indigenous Peoples have played an important role.

This kind of more tolerant model of governance which leans on a variety of factors and actors is most probably the best, if not the only, way to tackle the multiple issues related to the climate crisis and ecological destruction globally and particularly for the Arctic. As the climate crisis is global with several local impacts and ramifications, it requires a motivation and firm legitimacy, as well as a holistic approach and capability to be solved. Who are more motivated and legitimized than Indigenous Peoples and civil societies, particularly if they are being acknowledged as equal actors in decision-making and in action?

This is also a part of a long-range global tendency of the breaking of the unified state system, with states as the major, even only, actors in world politics. This is much indicated by the abovementioned finding that states seem to be unable to efficiently manage global environmental problems, and if so, we have to lean on people(s) and civil societies to take the lead. Nevertheless, what was done nationally in Modernism, is done internationally, even globally, in the Age of Globalism. Here, Arctic Indigenous Peoples, having increasing recognition of Indigenous and human rights frameworks, such as UNDRIP, are playing an important role. Transdisciplinarity is discussed and applied more often, and Western science leans on Indigenous knowledge. The role might become bigger and the application of transdisciplinarity may be accelerated, especially if the Arctic states and governments are neither capable nor willing to differentiate their policy on sanctions against the Russian Federation by allowing joint pan-Arctic scientific projects, including

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Russians, to be continued or restarted. Alternative ways and procedures based on individuals, which is already happening (see, Arctic Yearbook 2022), would include Indigenous Knowledge and its methods.

Indigenous Knowledge and Western Science Science, together with technology, has been seen as the most efficient means for development and progress – the combination has been the motor behind “western” modernization. Before "western" science, which, excluding Philosophy as a rather young phenomenon, there was traditional and Indigenous Knowledge by, and for, Indigenous Peoples. It has, since time immemorial, been mutually beneficial, and often the way to survive and thrive for peoples and societies. In the same way, science is a part of the common heritage of humankind, and at the same time it is about people: for those who do research, and for those whom research is done for, western science has had a social relevance as well. Equally important is the freedom of (western) science and the independence of the scientific community whereby policy-makers do not have repressive control over science or the scientific community. It is important to encourage new innovations, or solutions for the problems that society faces today (see the Knowledge and Science section in this volume).

Under the pressure of ecological catastrophe, Indigenous Knowledge is becoming increasingly recognized for its ability to help tackle climate change and biodiversity loss. Western science is often handicapped due to gaps in knowledge and data on climate and other ecosystems. Indigenous Knowledge, however, can lean on traditions, practices, spirituality and human memories, as well as narratives and stories held and shared by elders. As a concrete example, the Calotte Academy organized a town hall meeting, “Understanding the impacts of global changes in the Barents region”, in June 1998 in Inari. Saami fishermen, hunters and reindeer herders were invited to share their experiences and knowledge on environmental changes in the region within the last 50 years or so. The meeting brought new data and information for scientists of an international research project on global changes, who were running out of proper data, though scientists did not have patience enough to listen carefully to all the experiences.

Indigenous Knowledge and methodologies have been shifting the goals and priorities of Arctic related research, as well as how research is initiated, and this is bringing diverse worldviews together to help solve issues that have both local and global consequences. Bridging western and Indigenous knowledge has the ability to generate various decolonial-colonial tensions that are important to work through (Kovach, 2009), and centering Indigenous knowledges, experiences, and perspectives is critical for 'flipping the script' on framings of Arctic peoples as victims, or as peripheral factors for consideration in Arctic-related research.

Over the twenty-seven years of its existence, there have been many debates and decisions on the full inclusion of Indigenous Knowledge in the work of the Arctic Council. Since its establishment by the Ottawa Declaration (1996), the Council recognized Indigenous Peoples traditional knowledge, later refined to be called Indigenous Knowledge, and of “its importance and that of Arctic science and research to the collective understanding of the circumpolar Arctic”. The Arctic Council further committed itself to this through in 2015 with its adoption of the Sustainable Development Working Group’s “Recommendations for the Integration of Traditional and Local Knowledge into the Work of the Arctic Council”. The Arctic Council’s Permanent Participant

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organizations also jointly created the “Ottawa Traditional Knowledge Principles” which provides guidance for the use of Indigenous Peoples’ Knowledge.

In 2022, the ICC addressed the inequity in Arctic knowledge production when publishing the Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement. The protocols call for scientists and academia to ensure engagement with Indigenous Peoples, to recognize Indigenous Knowledge in its own right, to practice good governance and comply with i.a., the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, principles that are founded in internationally recognized principles built through negotiations with and by Indigenous Peoples. The protocols call for communicating with intent and exercising accountability, including in the use and sharing of data, addressing ownership and permissions in relations to knowledge production and re-production.

Finally, the protocols offer a definition of Indigenous Knowledge, closely based on the definition accepted by the Arctic Council: “Indigenous Knowledge is a systematic way of thinking applied to phenomena across biological, physical, cultural, and spiritual systems. It includes insights based on evidence and acquired through direct and long- term experiences and extensive and multigenerational observation, lessons, and skills. It has developed over millennia and is still developing in a living process, including knowledge acquired today and in the future, and it is passed on from generation to generation.”

Development like this forges new thinking in Arctic academia, among members of the scientific community and other professionals worldwide, as well as Indigenous researchers and experts. It also requires deliberateness from research institutions and publicists to create and support Indigenous Knowledge holders and researchers to be fully and equally represented in academia and publications. By applying transdisciplinarity and recognizing Indigenous Knowledge equally to western science and defining the Arctic as a global environmental linchpin and workshop for climate and environmental sciences, as well as building bridges that connect Indigenous Knowledge, local knowledge and interdisciplinarity (of science), a new role of Arctic knowledge has been emerging in policy-shaping and -making.

All in all, there is much at stake in the Arctic, and much to lose if we cannot continue pan-Arctic cooperation, in particular on environmental protection and climate change mitigation. Specifically, this is true in relation to scientific research needed to study, monitor and assess a state of Arctic ecosystems, that of well-being of Northern inhabitants, and resilience of their cultures and societies, as well as a changing state of governance, geopolitics and security. Finally, and even more importantly, we should continue knowledge-building, though transdisciplinarity by Indigenous Knowledge and western science, in the circumpolar North and deepen our understanding of needed local, regional and global governance mechanisms, procedures and methods.

Arctic Yearbook 2023 The 2023 edition of the Arctic Yearbook consists of 19 peer-reviewed articles and 12 commentaries and briefing notes across five thematic sections: (1) Climate change and the green transition; (2) Food, health, and labour; (3) Governance and economy; (4) Knowledge and science; and (5) Cooperation and conflict.

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Section I: Climate change and the green transition Lill Rastad Bjørst, Sigríður Kristjánsdóttir, Christopher Clarke-McQueen, Jaime DeSimone, Andrea Kraj & Anna Krook-Riekkola highlight key tensions between climate change, the need for a green transition to renewable energy technologies, and the extraction of resources needed to develop these emerging technologies. They point out that many of these resources may be found in the Arctic, and this could have a deep influence on Arctic communities. The authors argue that the voices of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and others living in the North need to be prioritized, and provide five key findings of their research related to this.

Jeevan Toor and Tagaaq Evaluardjuk-Palmer discuss the impacts that colonialism has had on Inuit social and cultural fabric within the context of climate change. Toor and Evaluardjuk-Palmer approach this issue through lenses of anthropology, geography and Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (Inuit knowledge), and argue a holistic approach to health in the Arctic is required. The authors explore the Canadian government’s approach, and argue that future research related to climate change and health needs to be located in qanuinngitsiarutiksait, Inuit knowledge, Inuit methodologies and be Inuit-led.

Luke Laframboise engages with the events that led to protests in Oslo over Norway’s Supreme Court rulings regarding the Fosen wind farm project. Lafromboise compares this case to the Alta conflict in the 1970’s and early 1980’s – a period of significance in recent Sámi-state relations in Norway – and argues that while the material conditions are different between the Fosen and Alta cases, both are potentially important pivot points in Norway’s political and legal history. According to Laframboise, the ongoing Fosen case highlights the growing conflict between a well-established Indigenous rights regime and green energy policies in Norway.

In relation to climate change and the threats it poses to the existence and survival of Arctic Indigenous Peoples, Dave-Inder Comar makes the argument for an “existence and survival” dimension of the self-determination of Indigenous Peoples in international law. Comar argues that this dimension is supported by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as international and regional human rights law. Through an analysis on the selfdetermination of Indigenous Peoples under international law, Comar underlines the obligations Arctic and non-Arctic states have to address the causes of climate change and its impacts on Indigenous Peoples.

Marlene Payva Almonte argues that in the context of global climate change, it is crucial that we consider our most basic notions of nature and the relationship humanity has with the natural world, particularly in terms of how they are represented in Western law. Payva Almonte discusses the tensions between Western legal systems and the responses needed to address our current climate and ecological crises, and argues that the colonial legacies of Western legal systems do not provide the ontological framework for dealing with these challenges. Payva Almonte makes this argument through a case study of the legal dispute regarding the Fosen windfarm in Norway and the conflicting perspectives of Sámi Indigenous Peoples, state authorities and companies regarding the use of lands related to the case.

The section is concluded by a commentary by Chuan Chen focused on the role of China within Arctic climate governance and a briefing note by Giuseppe Amatulli and Jamie Jenkins that provides highlights of the 2022 and 2023 editions of the Arctic Academy for Sustainability.

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Section II: Food, Health and Labour Anne Lise Kappel, Peter Hasle, Søren Voxted, and Katharina Jeschke discuss the various changes Greenland’s labour market has experienced and current legislation related to occupational safety and health. The authors presents the findings of a cross-sectoral survey of private Greenlandic companies and highlight the difficult challenges Greenlandic companies have in meeting the basic requirements related to work environment legislation.

Fang Fang provides a different perspective on the labour environment in Greenland through their case study of the experiences of Chinese workers in the Maniitsoq fish factory. Labour shortages in Greenland has led to an increase in foreign immigration in recent years, and this article provides the perspectives of Chinese workers in relation to “positive organization factors”, and highlight the positive factors as well as the challenges related to multicultural interactions in these labour spaces.

Gao Tianming and Vasilii Erokhin provide an in-depth overview regarding the food security of Indigenous communities in the Russian Arctic and the policy environment influencing it. Tianming and Erokhin discuss the context of nine territories in the Russian Arctic and conceptualize an approach to assessing the level of food and nutritional security by considering the different environmental, economic, and social factors that affect Indigenous communities in the region.

They conclude by providing a series of recommendations, including how to mitigate adverse effects of food insecurity on public health, boost self-sufficiency in food, and promote the use of traditional foods and related products in diets.

In their commentary on the Ainu language and Indigenous psychological well-being in Hokkaido in northern Japan, Seira Duncan provides an interesting case regarding the importance of supporting, maintaining, and practicing Indigenous languages for, and by, Indigenous communities.

Section III: Governance and economy Rikke Østergaard and Javier L. Arnaut argue through a decoloniality perspective that the Inuit myth and its related alternative view of sovereignty has had important implications on the nation-building process in Greenland due to its departure from Western notions of state formation. Østergaard and Arnaut analyze the legacy of colonialism in Greenland and the role of the Inuit Circumpolar Council in promoting an alternative model of political legitimacy against the conventional approach of nation-building, and argue that state formation must be revised to incorporate the historical experiences and knowledge of Indigenous Peoples.

Alexandra Middleton discusses the potential for integrating Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles with Indigenous Sustainable Finance principles to shape Arctic economic development. Middleton argues that a paradigm shift is needed that provides space for the collaboration of diverse perspectives for sustainable solutions, and where Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ Knowledges are a core element of economic development.

Célestine Rabouam discusses the challenges that Nunvaut, Canada’s largest and northernmost territory, has faced in developing its telecommunications infrastructure and the implications of this for the territory’s 25 communities. Rabouam examines previous and current approaches to connecting these communities, and presents new policy complications related to emerging options such as Starlink’s low earth orbit satellite constellations.

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Anna Karlsdóttir, Jean-Michel Huctin, Jeanne Gherardi & Tanguy Sandré share experiences from the Belmont Arctic II program’s project “Sense Making, Place attachment, and Extended networks, as sources of Resilience in the Arctic” (SeMPER-Arctic, 2019-2023), and share the development of a narrative-centred, locally rooted, and place-based understanding of resilience. The authors consider the impacts of their research, the importance of reflexivity and relationship building, important ethical considerations, and their reflections on decolonizing research in the Arctic.

Martin Mohr Olsen shares the findings of their research investigating how smaller Arctic institutions of higher learning employ sustainability in their operations. The article pursues the question how smaller higher education institutions in the Arctic implement sustainability, and discusses the complexity of the concept of sustainability in this context.

In their briefing note that concludes the section, Yang Jian discusses their perspective on the role that expert communities play in Arctic governance, and highlights how different types of expertise can influence different phases of Arctic Governance.

Section IV: Knowledge and science Caoimhe Isha Beaulé and Pierre De Coninck consider the successful elements that emerge in research projects when Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples come together to address issues related to Arctic communities. Beaulé and Coninck argue that trust is a crucial part of any collaborative project, and present their findings related the two-year Dialogues and Encounters in the Arctic (DEA) project that took place in an Indigenous Sámi context. The authors share what influenced the trust dynamic in the context of their research, and how this weaved itself into the fabric of the project.

Michaela Louise Coote provides a historical and conceptual analysis of interdisciplinary environmental decision-shaping research in the Arctic context. Coote argues that while interdisciplinary research has had a variety of important influences in the Arctic, its use is impacted by geopolitical factors, past and present practices, and epistemologies and ontologies including power hierarchies and colonialism.

Korinna Korsström-Magga highlights their approach to a research project that is using an art-based action research strategy. Korsström-Magga describes how their research is implementing a Photovoice-method as a means to collect data and bring forward the daily life of Five Sámi reindeer herder families from the region around Lake Inari in northern Finland. The author argues that artbased actions can emphasize the decolonial potency of participative action research and coresearch, and shares their unique experience as an art-educator-researcher that is also directly involved in reindeer herding herself.

Section four concludes with four briefing notes and commentaries that discuss the networks and events that have contributed to Arctic knowledge and science production in recent years, and includes a special section of “Knowledge for governance and diplomacy: Expertise & Dialogue” based on presentations at Arctic Circle Japan Forum on March 4-6, 2023, in Tokyo, co-organized by the Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security, and the Arctic Yearbook. Merje Kuus provides a two-pronged argument about Arctic networks and their participants: that these networks benefit from in-person interaction and that these networks bridge scientific, diplomatic, business, and civil society realms, and are the medium of Arctic expertise. Lassi Heininen provides their reflections on the development of the Calotte Academy and the Northern Research Forum, Arctic Indigenous Peoples: Climate, Science, Knowledge and Governance

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and the important influences they have had on Arctic researchers and Arctic dialogues. Alexandra Middleton, Andrey Mineev, Paul Arthur Berkman, Anton Vasiliev, Halldór Jóhannsson, Ekaterina Uryupova and Lassi Heininen discuss the recently launched “Arctic Expert-to-Expert” initiative, and the challenges it seeks to address in terms of scientific and Indigenous Knowledge exchange in the current Arctic political context. Zhanna Anshukova and Tom Gabriel Royer conclude the section by providing a report on Calotte Academy 2023, which convened 30 travelling participants and local guest lecturers at each location, and share the key themes discussed in the Academy’s 32nd year.

Section V: Cooperation and conflict Jennifer Spence, Edward Alexander, Rolf Rødven and Sara Harriger challenge the conventional narrative of Arctic Exceptionalism by ultimately going beyond it. The authors consider a broader range of characteristics and features that make the Arctic unique, and consider how this expanded view alters perceptions of the region’s governance. The authors share three stories of the Arctic as defined through geopolitics, environment, and Gwitch’in homelands, and highlight the key insights these perspectives provide about the past, present and future of the Arctic and Arctic governance.

Ekaterina Zmyvalova considers the experiences of Indigenous Peoples in Russia in the current context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Zmyvalova explores the legal changes which have been taking place in Russia since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022, and discusses the impact of these changes on the human rights of Indigenous Peoples in Russia.

Marco Volpe explores the evolution of domestic debate in China regarding its role in the Arctic, and the influence of this debate on domestic-decision making. Volpe sheds light on how the Chinese domestic academic debate between 2014-2021 addressed the Central Arctic Ocean, and offers a reflection on future actions that Chinese leadership might consider.

This section is concluded by four briefing notes and commentaries. Paul Dziatkowiec discusses in their commentary the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Arctic science and the purpose of the Switzerland-based Geneva Centre for Security Policy’s launch of a discreet dialogue process (the ‘High North Talks’) to address some of the gaps that have emerged. Natsuhiko Otsuka, Yuji Kodama, Minsu Kim and Yang Jian’s commentary presents a concise history of the North Pacific Arctic Community (NPARC), an initiative born out of the growing interest in Arctic affairs among non-Arctic nations, particularly those from Asian three countries namely, China, Japan, and Korea. Egill Thor Nielsson provides an overview of the China-Nordic Arctic Research Center and an update on its work after a decade of operation. Finally, Eda Ayaydin provides a report on the launch of their book Uluslararası İlişkilerde Arktik (The Arctic in International Relations), and discusses key perspectives of Turkish academic discourse about the Arctic.

References AMAP (2002). Arctic Pollution 2002. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme: Oslo.

Arctic Peoples’ Conference Statement (2023). Accessible from: Ahttps://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/news/statement-of-the-arctic-peoples-conference2023-inuiaat-issittormiut-ataatsimeersuarnerat-2023/

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Canadian Institute of International Affairs (1988). The Arctic environment and Canada's international relations: the report of a working group of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Ottawa: Canadian Institute of International Affairs. National Capital Branch.

Constable, A.J., S. Harper, J. Dawson, K. Holsman, T. Mustonen, D. Piepenburg, and B. Rost, 2022: Cross-Chapter Paper 6: Polar Regions. In: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, pp. 2319–2368, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.023.

English, J. (2013). Ice and Water: Politics, Peoples, and the Arctic Council. Toronto: Penguin Canada Books Inc. Heininen, Lassi (2013). “’Politicization’ of the Environment: Environmental Politics and Security in the Circumpolar North.” The Fast-Changing Arctic: Rethinking Arctic Security for a warmer World. Edited by Barry Scott Zellen. University of Calgary Press: Calgary 2013, pp. 35-55.

Heininen, Lassi (2004). Circumpolar International Relations and Geopolitics. AHDR (Arctic Human Development Report) 2004. Stefansson Arctic Institute: Akureyri, Iceland, pp. 207-225.

Heininen, Lassi & Exner-Pirot, Heather, eds. (2020). Climate Change and Arctic Security. Searching for a Paradigm Shift. Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave Pivot: Cham, Switzerland.

Huebert, R. (1997). The Canadian Arctic and the International Environmental Regime. In J. Oakes and R. Riewe (Eds.). Issues in the North, volume 2. Edmonton: Canadian Circumpolar Institute.

ICC (2022). The Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement.

ICC (2023). Statement of the Arctic Peoples’ Conference 2023 Kleivan, I. (1992). The Arctic Peoples' Conference in Copenhagen, November 22-25, 1973. Études/Inuit/Studies, 16(1/2), 227-236.

Lackenbauer, P . W. & Dean, R. (2021). Canada and the Origins of the Arctic Council: Key Documents, 1988-1998. Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary Mullen, P. (1994). State Interests and the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (Master’s thesis, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa).

Olsvig, S. (2022): Greenland’s ambiguous action space: testing internal and external limitations between US and Danish Arctic interests, The Polar Journal, DOI: 10.1080/2154896X.2022.2137085 Ottawa Declaration (1996). Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council. At the Ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council, Ottawa, Canada, 19th day of September 1996.

Paci, James, C. Dickson, S. Nikels, L. Chan, and C. Furgal (2004). Food Security of Northern Indigenous Peoples in a Time of Uncertainty. Position Paper for the 3rd NRF Open Meeting. Yellowknife, NWT, Canada.

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Rothwell, D. R. (1996). The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and International Environmental Cooperation in the Far North, Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 6(1), 65-105 Rantanen, M., Karpechko, A.Y., Lipponen, A. et al. The Arctic has warmed nearly four times faster than the globe since 1979. Commun Earth Environ 3, 168 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-022-00498-3 Rovaniemi Declaration (1991). The Rovaniemi Declaration, signed by the Eight Arctic Nations, June 4, 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland.

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Section I: Climate change and the green transition

Arctic Infrastructure: Considerations in the Green Transition Position paper written by scholars from Fulbright Arctic Initiative III

Lill Rastad Bjørst, Sigríður Kristjánsdóttir, Christopher Clarke-McQueen, Jaime DeSimone, Andrea Kraj & Anna Krook-Riekkola

The global green transition has put a new focus on the Arctic region and its resources (eg.energy, minerals, and access to land) at the same time as Arctic communities are looking for development, self-determination, and growth. Arctic infrastructural “fingerprints” will exemplify key considerations within the green transition in a changing arctic climate, with competing visions and framings of what the green transition is about, and the rationale for its need. Global green transition involves resources that may be found in the Arctic. The argument of this paper is built around the position that it is of particular importance to hear, value, integrate, and prioritizes the voices of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and others living in the North. Findings from fieldwork and observations conclude that: 1. The Arctic has a new strategic role because of the green transition, 2. Arctic communities lack physical as well as policy infrastructure for a successful transition, 3. Green transition is not “a one size fits all” in the Arctic. Different communities have different opportunities as well as requirements when it comes to green transition, 4. There is a knowledge gap both in terms of what arctic communities need from a transition and how these needs best could be met, and 5. Green transition can become an important driver of change in the Arctic.

Lill Rastad Bjørst, PhD and Associate Professor, Dept. of Culture & Learning, Aalborg University (Denmark) Sigríður Kristjánsdóttir, Ph.D in Environmental Sciences (Iceland) Christopher Clarke-McQueen, Architect and PhD fellow at McGill University (Canada) Jaime DeSimone, Curator of Contemporary Art (USA) Anna Krook-Riekkola, Associate Professor, Energy Engineering, Luleå University of Technology (Sweden) Andrea Kraj, PhD and Microgrid & Energy Transition Advisor (Canada)

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Figure. 1. Nuuk, Greenland. Photograph by Lill Rastad Bjørst, Greenland August 2022

Background Climate change impact is a living global reality. Over the last 49 years, the Arctic has warmed three times faster than the world as a whole (AMAP, 2021: 4). The thawing permafrost, wildfires, extreme and rising temperatures, and sea-level rise are changing the landscape and living reality for the people of this ecologically vulnerable region. To reduce the climate impact, a green transition agenda is pushed forward by heads of states and industry. An agenda which has been even more accelerated with world events such as the war in the Ukraine, global economic recession, and extreme climatic events. This position paper demonstrates that the green transition presented in international politics, and how it plays out locally in the Arctic, differ. At the same time, there are Bjørst, Kristjánsdóttir, Clarke-McQueen, DeSimone, Kraj & Krook-Riekkola

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goal conflicts between international and national decisions. The ramifications and when it is to be implemented in a regional and local context can be illustrated by the discussion at the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC (COP-meetings) and the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Degai & Petrov, 2021).

The Arctic has a new strategic role because of the green transition The green transition agenda is at the center of attention for governments, organizations, businesses, and academia (Stokes, 2022). The goal with the European Green Deal is, for instance, to reach climate neutrality by 2050, and to support the transformation of the EU into a fair and prosperous society with a modern and competitive economy (European Council, 2023). Currently, the environment, security, and economy go hand-in-hand for many countries. The war in Ukraine and dependencies on Russian gas have made the European countries speed up the transition to renewables. In “The EU in the Arctic” policy paper from 2021, the overall focus is on “a stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable, and prosperous Arctic.” In the text it is specified that “The EU’s full engagement in Arctic matters is a geopolitical necessity” (EU, 2021: 2). In the same vein, the US National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2022) (launched after the war in Ukraine) has “Security” as its first pillar and “environment” (Climate Change and Environmental Protection) as its second, with pillar three being “Sustainable Economic Development,” and pillar four as, “International Cooperation and Governance”. Recently, the relationship between environment, security, and economy has been translated into green transition, such as in the US Inflation Reduction Act (2023). In our Fulbright Arctic Initiative (FAI) III endeavor, we have observed that the Arctic policies currently being formulated have begun to echo these green transition agendas (from Europe and the US) as well, which are closely connected to local dilemmas.

In discussing Arctic infrastructure in our FAI III cohort, we became attentive to the new infrastructure facilitated by the global green transition. A large expansion of wind power, PV, batteries, and electric vehicles are seen by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2021) as being critical to reach climate neutrality, while still meeting the future needs for the benefits that energy services provide. If greenhouse gases are not reduced fast enough, there will be a need for carbon offsetting, including carbon storage (IPCC SP1.5, 2018). The Arctic could be an important provider of both material and energy resources, as well as the carbon storage needed for the global transition, thus taking up a new strategic role due to the green transition. Our focus is on Arctic communities, while being attentive to these communities’ (and countries’) relationship to the rest of the world.

Without seeking to theorize too much as an interdisciplinary group of scholars, we have a dynamic approach to studying infrastructures that goes beyond the built environment (Larkin, 2013). This paper is based on many field trips to various Arctic locations that the authors took alone or together during the FAI III where we consulted with professionals and locals. As of today, the Arctic lacks physical as well as institutional policy infrastructure (Bennett & Bouffard, 2022) for a successful engagement in the green transition. Melting permafrost, extreme weather events, and lack of connectivity in many of the Arctic regions makes it expensive and challenging to build physical infrastructure such as roads, power lines, wind power plants, and airstrips. In parallel, the lack of inclusive processes, knowledge and resources supporting, and speaking to local needs slows down the green transition locally (see Fulbright Arctic Initiative III Policy Brief 2023 in DeSimone et al, 2023). A small disclaimer for not overestimating comparisons within the Arctic is that remote and rural characteristics, and seasonal and year round access are highly impactful on the ease and cost

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of building infrastructure in the Arctic. The argument of this paper is built around the position that it is of particular importance to hear, value, integrate, and prioritize the voices of Arctic Indigenous peoples and others living in the North. This paper addresses the research question: What are the key considerations and significant fingerprints of Arctic infrastructure in the green transition?

Many Arctic regions have a delicate history of land grabbing, land claims, nation building, and selfdetermination. Several Arctic nations have unresolved land and resource issues with Indigenous peoples. These issues become prevalent in green transition projects as well. For example, the Southern Sámi living within Norwegian borders experience what they call “Green colonialism” because of the wind energy development in their region (Normann, 2021). The examples from NWT illustrate how new Arctic infrastructure and green transition is also about understanding the needs of Indigenous peoples in regard to the Arctic and to create the right relationships, as in any decolonising project. The example from Greenland highlights how the Government of Greenland has the right to land and resources, and looks for ways to become an exporter of energy and minerals so as to “live up to the name, Greenland”'. Meanwhile, policy infrastructure and commitments are lacking (i.e. a national climate strategy and Nationally Determined Contributions speaking to the goals of the Paris Agreement) and the dilemmas about local impact and benefits from the development are still unresolved. Many Arctic nations search for ways to be more selfsustaining when it comes to resources, minerals, and energy; a process where Iceland comes out as a forerunner.

With the global resource pressure from Russia tailored to oil and natural gas exports, enhanced with the war in Ukraine, a tendency to resource nationalism has reappeared in international politics where governments position themselves around their access to potential resource wealth, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development (2021: 5-6). The US Inflation Reduction Act (2022) intends to support a green transition but could also cause friction between the EU and the US. It should not be underestimated that some areas of the Arctic are dependent on the use of fossil fuels and have national interest in local security of the supply for development not to be remotely controlled by others.

Relevance: Arctic fingerprints in green transition In political debates, “green transition” is often mentioned as self-evident, but without pointing toward any specific object. This makes the concept politically powerful. Being so unclearly defined enables green transition to appear in surprising sectors and contexts (Bjørst, 2022; Karlsson & Hovelsrud, 2021). The ambiguity of ‘greening’ is not a new tendency in environmental discourses.

This form of “green speak” is closely connected to globalization, speaking to the idea of a “global green consciousness” (Harré et al., 1999). An idea that was articulated in the work of the Brundtland Commission (Brundtland 1987), which promised a “common future” that at the time gave some comfort to its belief in the possibility of “Managing the Commons” (ibid, 1987: 261).

Recently the philosopher, Bruno Latour, evaluated this idea. He concluded that: “The absence of a common world we can share is driving us crazy” (2018: 2). The relationship between global problems and local affairs are altered with the green transition, whereas Arctic resources and energy production are increasingly developed to accommodate globalization. Scholars like McCauley & Heffron (2018) have advocated for more fairness and equity as part of the transition away from fossil fuels – with a green transition in the Arctic it could be difficult to live up to those ideals.

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Today, branding your country as “green” or as part of a “green transition” can be a powerful new way of presenting a country as modern and progressive (i.e. at UN COP meetings, or in the European Parliament). Bjørst (2022) writes about the differences between sustainability and the green transition, presented as part of a political discourse: “Whereas ‘sustainability’ is about sustaining something (i.e. environment, Indigenous communities, the economy) - green transition is about transforming something and not having the ambition to sustain (not to change) to the same extent. In other words, green transition can be rather transformational for Arctic communities in the years to come. Something must go as part of this transformation (e.g., oil, gas, imported food)” (Bjørst, 2022: 4). The community will be expected to change and build new infrastructure and energy systems as part of this process.

As part of the FAI III (2021-2023), we have been discussing green transition processes with a focus on Arctic infrastructure. Utilizing our regional expert knowledge from Iceland, the Canadian Northwest Territories (NWT), Greenland, Norway, Sweden, and the US. Arctic infrastructural “fingerprints” will exemplify key considerations within the green transition in a changing arctic climate, with competing visions and framings of what the green transition is about, and the rationale for its need in an era where many Arctic communities are looking for development, selfdetermination, and growth. This is a multidisciplinary position paper dealing with a pressing matter of concern. With the help of the FAI III, we were inspired to use a collaborative, multidisciplinary approach to enquire about the green transition in the Arctic. To work across academic disciplines (Architecture, Energy Engineering, Planning and Design, Computational Engineering, Art, Anthropology, and Arctic Studies) takes dedication and time as “science cannot race ahead in isolation but must learn instead to slow down” (Stengers, 2018). This position paper and a policy brief as presented at the Wilson Center in Washington DC in April 2023 (DeSimone et al, 2023) is the fruit of our endeavors.

In this paper, light will be shed on the different status in the Arctic by highlighting fingerprints from various places (Iceland, Greenland, NWT and Norway). Certainly, the diversity of the region that is considered the Arctic is great. Therefore, it can be difficult to compare different regions, but nevertheless, they can learn from each other. The four cases are selected based on both relevance for a discussion about green transition, and where we as a group had expertise.

Unfortunately, the authors did not have the time nor funding to visit all the Arctic countries however these fingerprints show the variety of statuses across the Arctic.

The fingerprint (regional examples) from Iceland proves that large-scale transformation can occur within countries in a short period of time based on cooperation. Greenland’s fingerprint illustrates a recent political paradigm shift towards a green transition agenda with the ambition to utilize its hydropower potential, in addition to extracting mineral resources relevant for green technologies.

The fingerprint from Indigenous communities in the Northwest Territories (NWT) illustrates how some communities are attempting to break free of their petrol dependency, planning alternative local renewable energy solutions, and the way this relates to the need for decolonization. Finally, the fingerprint from Norway reminds us about how green transition can be governed - but also how it can be experienced as harmful to specific Indigenous groups’ livelihoods.

Fingerprint: Iceland Iceland lies over a volcanic hotspot on the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. Ever since the Viking Age, Icelanders have used natural hot springs for washing and bathing. Uniquely, the island also Arctic Infrastructure: Considerations in the Green Transition

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possesses underground water reservoirs continually replenished by rain (Mims, 2022). Magma underneath the island heats these reservoirs to hundreds of degrees, making natural conditions in Iceland favorable for geothermal power production. Almost all heating and electricity generation is provided for by renewables – both hydro and geothermal energy.

Figure 2. The Carbfix provides a natural and permanent storage solution by turning CO2 into stone underground in less than two years. Iceland proves that big transformation can happen within countries in a short period of time based on cooperation. That is a lesson that can be useful to everyone to fight the climate crises today.

Photograph Lill Rastad Bjørst, Hellisheiðarvirkjun, Iceland June 2022

Icelanders have gone through an energy transition twice The first was when they started to produce electricity with hydropower and the second when oil was replaced by geothermal heat to heat houses. It is estimated that in Iceland, the first electric light bulb was switched on in 1899, and in 1904, electricity production began in Hafnarfjörður.

When the oil crisis struck in the early 1970s, the world market price for crude oil rose by 70%. At the same time, heat from oil served over 50% of the population in Iceland. The oil crises caused Iceland to change its energy policy, reducing oil use and increasing domestic energy resources, such as hydropower and geothermal. This policy meant exploring new geothermal resources and building new heating utilities across the country. Due to the urgency and constructive cooperation, it took only 12 years to decrease oil for heating from 50% 1973, to 5% 1985. This involved converting household heating systems from oil to geothermal heat, based on constructive cooperation between the state, cities, municipalities, and private citizens. Now more than 90% of houses in Iceland are heated by a system based on the direct use of geothermal heat. There are also

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several gas-fired heating plants in operation, where electricity is most often used as a source of energy. As such, almost all domestic heating in Iceland is based on renewable energy sources, primarily geothermal energy.

In the following years, each municipality established an electricity utility, and the electricity was either produced with oil or hydropower. After the Second World War, the use of electricity became common in the country’s urban areas. Electricity was then used to power various machines in industry and business. After the 1960’s, larger hydropower plants were built throughout the country. The development had been quite fast and now the electricity production in the country is one of the most environmentally friendly in the world. The initiative for electrification came from enterprising individuals, then moved mostly to the municipalities, and finally to the state level.

Iceland faces a green transition in the form of a third energy exchange: replacing fossil fuels in transport with green, domestic energy sources. According to a study by UI and UR for Samorka (Government of Iceland, 2023a), energy exchange in transport is economically viable and a great benefit for the environment. Energy transition in transport is one of the biggest opportunities for the Government of Iceland to meet international climate agreements. The Government of Iceland aims to achieve carbon neutrality before 2040 and to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2030 under the Paris Agreement (2015) (Government of Iceland, 2023b). Iceland has great potential for carbon uptake from the atmosphere by afforestation, revegetation, and to curb emissions from soils by reclaiming drained wetlands. The biggest sources of emissions (outside land use) are industrial processes, road transport, agriculture, fisheries, and waste management.

More wind energy in Iceland can be the way forward With the implementation of the EU framework, the energy landscape has changed rapidly. The clearest manifestation is the 34 wind energy projects that have been put on the table of the fourth phase of the framework plan. There is a serious lack of framework for this issue, but a bill is expected soon. Wind quality is high in Iceland, and wind energy can, in many ways, fit well with the country’s energy system. The wind blows, for example, more in the winter when there is less water in the reservoirs, but slows down in the summer when the reservoir situation improves.

Iceland has a wide range of renewable energy resources and therefore has greater utilization potential compared with most other countries. At the same time, it faces a greater challenge regarding the management of unique natural qualities. The value of nature grows in times of climate change and the effect of utilizing geothermal, hydropower, and wind is different when looking at the structure of structures as well as the different nature of the resources as energy sources (Logadóttir 2002a). The National Energy Authorities, Orkustofnun, confirmed that a lot of lessons can be learned from building wind power in steps and that it is necessary to look at wind power at sea, as well as on land, when choosing locations for the future (Logadóttir, 2022b). It is also necessary to work out how dividends from energy sources are returned to the nation and local communities, since most energy projects are now carried out by private actors and not by state owned companies like in the past.

Furthermore, there has never been so much fermentation in the field of energy and climate issues.

One of the biggest achievements of the year 2021 was probably the milestone of scientists in the United States in the field of nuclear fusion, a technology that could transform energy issues in the coming decades. In Iceland, many climate-related companies have developed These include Alor (which works on a new type of battery), Carbfix (which has technology to turn CO2 into stone Arctic Infrastructure: Considerations in the Green Transition

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(figure 2)) (Kristjánsdóttir & Kristjánsdóttir 2021), Laka (which works to improve the safety of systems), Sidewind (which uses wind energy on cargo ships and Transition Labs, which has invested in the growth of green solutions.) Innovation and technological development could work for Iceland when it comes to creating the greatest benefit in all utilization for society, so progress is closely monitored.

Summary - fingerprint from Iceland Today, the entire transportation system in Iceland depends on the nations that produce oil. By replacing oil with domestically produced green energy, society can become self-sufficient in the energy it needs. Icelandic society will not be affected by external factors that may affect the supply or price of oil, for example, due to war.

Iceland could become the first Arctic country to use only green, renewable energy. The Icelandic population uses about a million tons of oil a year and pays 100 billion ISK for it. If Iceland manages to stop this, the benefit could be cleaner air and a sustainable standard of living in Iceland along the way.

Fingerprint: Greenland

Figure 3. Kangia, Ilulissat Icefjord. Photograph by Lill Rastad Bjørst. Greenland August 2021.

Kalaallit Nunaat (Greenland), is self-governing sub-national territory within the Kingdom of Denmark (Ackrén & Jakobsen 2015) and the world’s biggest island. A unique feature of Greenland is that 81% of the land is covered by ice and the total population is just about 57,000 (Statistics Greenland 2022). The Self-government Act of 2009 gives, among other things, Greenland full Bjørst, Kristjánsdóttir, Clarke-McQueen, DeSimone, Kraj & Krook-Riekkola

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responsibility regarding its own natural resources. The citizens of Greenland share common property rights. In 2021, the Government of Greenland changed the political discourse from being focusing on the extractive future of Greenland with no commitment to global binding climate deals - to focus and plan for a “green transition,” become an exporter of renewable energy, and potentially ratifying the Paris Agreement (Bjørst 2022). Therefore, the new focus for the Government of Greenland is on developing more hydropower, establishing PtX installations, and planning extraction of minerals which would be important for new green technology. Despite this new ambition, Greenland lacks physical as well as policy infrastructure. Physical infrastructure, meaning a lack of roads between towns, international airports, along with runways1 long enough for bigger cargo, modern seaports, connectivity and high-speed internet (Abildgaard et al., 2022; Sejersen, 2015), and a larger STEM educated workforce is just some of it. The lack of policy infrastructure speaks to the fact that Greenland, has for a decade, not been part of international climate agreements such as Copenhagen Accord (2009), the Rio Convention, (2012) or the Paris Agreement (2015). At the time of writing, the Government of Greenland just signed the Paris Agreement by the UNFCCC. This signifies a turning point for the climate action and Greenland’s commitment to bring down greenhouse gas emissions. “We join in acknowledgment that we are an Indigenous people with the right to self-determination. We are responsible for our climate policy, and we join the Paris Agreement on these terms,” Greenlandic Minister, Kalistat Lund, stated in a press release (UN, 2023). Now follows the work, with a formal climate strategy for the country, setting the nationally determined contributions (NDC) for Greenland, and explaining the potential implications and possibilities to civil society (Berthelsen, 2023).

Despite being mentioned often in the climate change debate, the discussions about climate politics in Greenland is a relatively new thing (Bjørst, 2019). Nevertheless, Greenland has a unique potential in green transition if managed accordingly, the authors would argue. It is the Greenlanders who have the right to the subsurface, resources, and the hydropower installation that are managed by the Government of Greenland. In other words, when it comes to mining rights and title to land, ownership to the land cannot be obtained in Greenland. However, local people, institutions, or companies may apply to obtain a right to use a piece of land for a defined purpose. In effect, Greenland has no major unresolved problems with land rights - but lately controversies about landuse and extractive projects have appeared and a civil society resistance has evolved, especially around the mining of Greenland’s uranium (Bjørst, Sejersen & Thisted, 2023; Hansen & Johnstone 2019). So far, development of hydropower plants has not sparked the same resistance in the public.

The same goes for wind and solar energy.

Greenland ice cap = an energy island?

The Greenland ice cap is called the “world’s biggest battery” by the national energy company, Nukissiorfiit (figure 3). The CEO Kasper Mondrup, in an interview with the Danish newspaper, Berlingske, said about the capacity of the meltwater from the Greenland ice cap: “It can produce energy for the next eight hundred years if it continues to melt at the current rate.” He sees a big potential for Greenland as “The world's hydropower potential is about to be fully exploited.

Greenland is one of the places in the world where there is a lot of unused hydropower” (Østergaard 2022: 7). The unused energy from Greenland are currently inspiring politicians to think about possibilities for energy exports and use the presumably cheap renewable energy as a pull factor to attract more private business to Greenland from the rest of the world (data centers, PtX converters,

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factories ect.). Today, hydroelectric generators produce far less carbon dioxide than power plants that burn fossil fuels and it is considered an alternative to coal, natural gas, and oil. As good as it sounds, hydroelectric development can also produce a broad range of environmental impacts and changes to the land and biodiversity (Winemiller et al., 2016). To boost the energy production in Greenland and attract new industries, might not in the first instance lead to less emissions of CO2 in total as Greenland (except the fishing industry) does not have bigger industrial complexes at the moment (like aluminum smelters or large-scale extractive industries like mining, oil, and gas extraction). This is also part of the reason why the political party Siumut has been reluctant towards committing to the Paris Agreement (2015). They fear it will impact Greenland’s competitiveness when planning for new industrial development (Larsen & Kristensen, 2023). Future fishing, shipping, aviation, and energy consumption in cities and towns without access to hydropower might be unable to transition fast enough in the years to come.

With access to cheap renewable energy, a green industrial revolution might be set in motion.

Despite the possibilities for renewable energy in Greenland, diesel will for a long time be part of the energy mix for industries in remote sites in Greenland such as the remote mining activities in northeast Greenland. However, domestic energy use is dominated by renewable energy - especially from hydropower. At a side event at COP26 (01.11.2021), the Greenlandic Prime Minister, Múte B. Egede, described the ambition for a green transition like this: Naalakkersuisut (the Government of Greenland) believes that we who call the Arctic home must do what we can to lead by example by aiming to reduce CO2 emissions and to promote a sustainable, green transition in Greenland and beyond.

Sustainable green energy solutions are the future, and we have a lot to gain by this transition. Greenland has an abundance of hydropower resources, which surmounts our domestic energy needs. We are right now in the process of opening up to investors, who can help develop these areas, so that Greenland can fuel cheap and sustainable energy for data centers or as an input into storing of energy in hydrogen via PtX processes for example (Múte B. Egede at COP26 2021, as quoted in Bjørst 2022).

At COP26, Greenland was inspired by examples from the energy transition projects in Iceland and Norway and used the politics of comparison to argue for Greenland’s role in the global green transition (Bjørst, 2022). What Greenland’s Prime Minister described was a landscape of intensification (Jones, 2014) to give the green transition momentum (a lot to gain) and placed it within the discourse of national leadership (“lead by example”). Greenland’s minerals were not mentioned by the MPs at COP26, but visiting Greenland’s plans for industrial development reveal that mining is still part of the portfolio. Greenland’s mineral deposits and mineralization profile show great diversity and quantities (GEUS, 2013; Kalvig, 2021). Greenland commands resources that could be important for green technology, which has raised the interest in Greenland from a geopolitical point of view (Rahbek-Clemmensen & Nielsen, 2020).

Over the past 10 years, the total consumption of Rare Earth Elements (REE) has grown by about 50% and with the current use of REE for new technologies the world may face a supply challenge by 2030 (Kalvig, 2021:23). REE in the South Greenland (Kuannersuit/ Kvanefjeld and Killavaat Alannguat /Kringlerne) has raised public attention (Bjørst, 2016; Thisted, 2020, Vestergaard, 2015).

However, the Kvanefjeld project is quite close (6-8 km) to the local community, sparking concerns

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over health, local environment, and the many long-term impacts (Bjørst, Sejersen & Thisted, 2023; Hansen & Johnstone, 2019; Thisted, 2020). REEs in the Kvanefjeld project also include the mining of uranium and thorium – meaning that waste and tailings can potentially contaminate the local environment. In general, there is a significant climate impact in the production of REE and the recycling rate of REE is very limited (Kalvig, 2021). Still, the mining companies promote themselves as green. In a video produced by Greenland Minerals A/S to inform the public about the Kvanefjeld mining project, they describe how Kvanefjeld would “make the world greener,” (Greenland Minerals A/S, 2021) indirectly imagining the end product of the production and how this would impact “the world”. The mining company TANBREEZ (planning for mining in Killavaat Alannguat /Kringlerne in South Greenland) echo a similar storyline with the slogan “Mining for Green Technologies” (http://tanbreez.com). The Australian company operating in Greenland, formerly known as “Greenland Minerals Ltd,” recently changed their name to “Energy Transition Minerals Ltd'', rebranding themselves from being a mining company now being an energy transition company. Another example is the Hudson Resources, with an open Pit Mine located 80 km SW from Kangerlussuaq known for their mining of Greenland’s anorthosite (calcium feldspar). On their webpage they copy a recent humoristic Carlsberg beer commercial2 and writing “Possibly the Greenest Mine in the World” (https://hudsonresourcesinc.com/), describe how it is “an operating mine producing green product”3. These two cases illustrate the general tendency in mining projects where the “green” is mostly related to the product itself and less to the local impacts or what the locals will get out of this transition.

Will Greenland be more green?

In the dominant political discourse in Greenland, a green transition and the future and identity of the nation are linked. As Naaja Nathanielsen, Greenlandic Naalakkersuisoq (Minister) for Housing, Infrastructure, Justice, Minerals, and Gender Equality said in her keynote at the 2021 Arctic Circle Assembly: “We want to be known for our commitment to renewable resources and live up to our name, Greenland.” At the time of writing, Greenland has some way to go in international climate change policy-making (Bjørst, 2018: 22). Thus, the Government of Greenland is still discussing its climate policy and potentially, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to implement the Paris Agreement (Veirum, 2023). Following the political climate change debate in Greenland the last 20 years underpins a shift in the discourse with the introduction of the concept “green transition” in the conversation about climate change and Greenland’s development (Bjørst, 2022).

The concept “green transition” is not fixed and pops up in the conversation. It offers a “promise,” about being green and transformative. One that is not articulated and therefore seldom binding, by offering the mining companies a stage to perform as green if they mine for REE or contribute to the global production of green technology. It is an empty signifier and under constant revision, but at the same time unifying with a lot of political effects (Bjørst, 2022). The versions of the green transition that Greenland is planning for contain the paradox that it comes with a new form of industrialization, which invites industrial projects and businesses to come to Greenland and make use of the abundance of hydropower. An industrialization that may increase the CO2 locally when adding activity, while decreasing the CO2 globally (from products being produced with fossil free electricity). More activity also requires better infrastructure such as harbors, runways, roads, buildings, energy systems, cables, and more. At the same time Greenland could be more dominant as a business partner and as a country offering green solutions.

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Summary - fingerprint from Greenland To return to the key considerations and significant fingerprints of Greenlandic infrastructure in the green transition it is important to remember that the Greenland ice cap might be melting - but Greenland has never been more solid when it comes to governance and right to land and resources (eg. Self-Government Act of 2009). Greenland is a self-declared welfare society (Arnfjord, 2022) like Denmark, which means that green transition in Greenlandic politics is expected to support and sustain the welfare model. However, as this paper shows, the political green transition agenda might call for considerations when it comes to physical, institutional as well as policy infrastructures to support the Greenlandic society. This fingerprint from Greenland mostly focused on the paradigm shift in the political agenda around green transition in Greenland. At the time of writing, these discussions have, so far, not surfaced in civil society discussions. Some of the missing links are: First, what does the local community need from this transition and how can local towns benefit?

Second, what will be Greenland’s national climate strategy and NDC to fully commit to the Paris Agreement? Third, the local impact of exploring the hydropower resources to accommodate new industrial complexes and potentially become an energy exporter is not articulated. Fourth, the fact that green transition as a concept is not fixed paves the way for green open claims. One of the effects is that the local dilemmas and social-environmental impacts can be easily overlooked when an initiative speaks to green transition on a global scale.

Fingerprint: Northwest Territories (NWT), Canada

Figure 4. Photography by Lill Rastad Bjørst, NWT, close to Yellowknife, September 2022.

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Indigenous peoples, especially in North America, populate a large portion of the Arctic region.

Currently in the case of Canada, 170 of 292 remote communities are Indigenous, with the majority relying heavily on a microgrid of energy generation using fossil fuels (Hussein & Musilek, 2021).

Due to their inextricable interconnectivity to the land and environment, the green transition is of particular importance to the continuation and proliferation of Indigenous cultures. This is even more true in our rapidly changing environment, in which Arctic temperatures are increasing at a much higher rate than those to the south (Rantanen, Karpechko, Lipponen et al., 2022). With the continuation of temperature increases and climate change, the ability for Indigenous peoples to continue, let alone reclaim, their respective ways of life will become increasingly tenuous. Thus, the need to advance and move beyond the green transition becomes a human rights issue, especially as Indigenous communities attempt to recover from the long lasting as well as devastating effects of colonialism (Cameron, 2015). Nevertheless, Indigenous people have the human right to continue cultural practices, and at the core of those practices is the connection with the environment (Anaya, 2000). As Kraj indicates, “Regeneration of the land is critical to the sustainability of the place. Development that occurs on the given land must not exceed what the land can hold and replenish by itself”, and so the pathway to development must be reciprocal as well as sustainable (Kraj, 2023).

Although the ideals of Indigeneity and environmentalism are generally well aligned, so too can they be at odds with one another. Conservation of species, the sustainable use of resources and energy, and the elimination of climate change are issues generally agreed upon. Nevertheless, Indigenous peoples can oppose movements of environmentalists as well, especially when it comes to Indigenous rights to harvest fish and animals for food and fur for clothing (Wenzel, 1991). Despite this, the majority of the threat to both the environment and the continuation of an Indigenous way of life in the Arctic come from the massive amounts of carbon produced in the world south of the region. Regardless of the relatively minute contribution of climate changing actions occurring in Arctic regions, the global consequences of melting glacial and periglacial (permafrost) bodies releasing eons of trapped greenhouse gasses such as methane and carbon dioxide, may prove immense (Ravasio, Riise & Sveen, 2020). Thus, regional influences of pollution require Arctic infrastructure to lead by example and quickly transition to those exemplifying the green transition.

To break free of petroleum dependency Of those 292 remote Canadian communities, 257 rely on individual, independent, and highly carbon producing diesel energy generation microgrids (Hussein & Musilek, 2021). Energy production, too, may be even more essential in Arctic regions due to the need for heating in the severe cold and for light in long dark winters. Some communities do not have sunlight at all for weeks or months on end. Nevertheless, many communities are trying to break free of this petroleum dependency, and to a larger extent colonialism through the installation of alternative energy solutions, such as photovoltaics (PV). Although this source is essential to a microgrid of sustainable energy generation, other sources must also be included since solar is most abundant during long and bright Arctic summers, but lowest in the cold dark winters when it is most needed.

Ground sink heat sources would also be a very complicated or impossible option, especially in permafrost rich areas, which would cause a thaw and create other ecological devastations. In Inuvik, a community in Canada’s Northwest Territories near the coast of the Arctic Ocean, the

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Gwich’in Tribal Council is currently constructing a windmill to further reduce their reliance on diesel. The latter of which is extremely costly due to the shipping of the fuel and energy production monopolies. If effective, this will demonstrate the potential of wind energy for that region, as well as in frigid temperatures throughout the circumpolar North.

This energy transition is essential in remote Indigenous communities, but must be done with the engagement and incorporation of Indigenous peoples’ participation (Hussein & Musilek, 2021).

Furthermore, although there has been a long history of exclusion of Indigenous peoples from participating in the determination of infrastructure affecting them, many are reclaiming the right for self-determination, and pushing forward the agenda of the green transition. One such Arctic Indigenous community is the Łutsel K’e Dene First Nation4, whose members initiated, planned, and implemented a National Park upon their ancestral lands; the Thaidene Nene National Park Reserve. For decades, their traditional homeland, the Akaitcho Territory, has been the location of various diamond mines and other developments (figure 4). Additionally, this community has experienced a devastating loss in historic numbers of caribou; a herd of animals they have been following, living with, and depended upon for thousands of years until present. After years of negotiation with federal and territorial governments, for the survival of the land, animals, and culture of these people, the First Nation created the wildlife reserve in 2019. On the East Arm of the Great Slave Lake in the Northwest Territories (NWT), the massive refuge consisting of 26,376 km2 (6.5 million acres) of land and protects the sensitive ecological zone transitioning from the boreal forest to the Arctic tundra (Thaidene Nene: Land of the Ancestors Website 2023). Without the determined efforts of this First Nation, a people still intimately connected with their land, this Arctic Canadian National Park Reserve would not exist, nor have moved the green transition agenda forward.

Summary: fingerprint from NWT Canada does not have a cohesive Arctic infrastructure strategy or accompanying road map (Chiang, 2023). In a recent report from Arctic360, Canada’s premier Arctic think tank, it is stated that “Canada’s strategy up to now for the North is engaging in spontaneous reactions, as it moves from one crisis to the next” (Shadian, 2022: 5). Currently, these requests are challenged with competing in the political negotiations with Canadians who are struggling with high prices, money to advance Canada’s green energy transition, and keep the country competitive (Taylor, 2023). In summary, the northern infrastructure gap and participation in the green transition needs to be addressed, and creating the right relationships with Indigenous nations is of utmost importance. Understanding the needs of Indigenous peoples, in regard to Arctic infrastructure, comes through a process of the creation of right relationships, as it is in any decolonising project (Howell et al., 2016). Thus, determining the infrastructural requirements in the region requires the consultation of the Indigenous communities that the infrastructure project is meant to serve. Additionally, it is critical to form meaningful relationships with Indigenous peoples, not only because it is right, but also for the advancement of reconciliation and Indigenous self-determination (Howell et al., 2016).

Meaningful community engagement with Indigenous Nations affected by any infrastructure project through proper protocols and with the appropriate facilitator is a part of the decolonisation objective (ibid).

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Fingerprint: Norway

Figure 5. Wind power outside Narvik, Norway. Photography by Anna Krook-Riekkola.

Norway represents an interesting paradox regarding the green transition. On the one hand, Norway is a world leader in renewable energy. With 61% of the total final energy consumption in the year 2020 (IEA 2022), 99% of the electricity generation in 2022 (Our World in Data, 2023) come from renewable energy sources. Electricity generation has historically been generated from almost 100% hydro power (normal year generating 137 TWh), while wind power has increased rapidly from 2 TWh in 2016 to 16 TWh in 2022 (Our World in Data, 2023). Nearly 80% of all new vehicle sales are electric-only vehicles, a rate which continues to grow (Statista, 2023). On the other hand, Norway remains an important global producer of oil and gas, with the European Union and the United Kingdom being its most important markets as well as Norway being an important provider of oil and gas to these countries (Lewis, 2021; Lundberg, 2021). In 2021, the export of these commodities accounted for almost 50% of Norway’s total export revenues (IEA, 2022). A large amount of these revenues are invested in the Government Pension Fund Global that was established when Norway discovered oil in the North Sea. This to make sure “that both current and future generations of Norway get to benefit from our oil wealth” (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2023). Given the war in Ukraine and the necessity for Europe to secure oil and gas from non-Russian sources, Norway’s oil and gas industry is likely to remain important for years to come. The Government Pension Fund Global is not a unique case. Norway has “a long history of schemes that provide society with a share of the revenues from industries that earn very well, thanks to access to Norwegian natural resources. This has meant that revenues from hydropower, oil and gas have benefited us all. The proposals announced by the Government are based on foundations that we already have in our tax system” (Government of Norway, 2022, as stated in a press release from the Ministry of Finance in Norway).

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Some other important dimensions to understanding Norway’s transition include: a carbon pricing system that has been in place since 1991 and part of EU emission trading scheme, a joint Norwegian-Swedish electricity certificate market aiming to increase electricity generated from renewables since 2012 (currently being phased out), policies to increase electric vehicles and ships, and efforts to decarbonize the petroleum industry through electrification of production, carbon capture, and sequestration. In June 2021, the Government of Norway released the White Paper “Putting Green Energy to Work” that outlined four long-term goals for how to create values from Norwegian energy resources: 1) more jobs in Norway, 2) further electrification to make Norway greener and better, 3) establishment of new, profitable industries/technologies, and 4) refine the oil and gas sector within the framework of the climate change goals. The White Paper was published together with a proposal for the further development of offshore wind in Norway and a road map for hydrogen (White paper Meld. St. 36 (2020–2021)).

In May 2021, the International Energy Agency (IEA) released the Net Zero by 2050 Report, the “world’s first comprehensive study of how to transition to a net zero energy system by 2050 while ensuring stable and affordable energy supplies, providing universal energy access, and enabling robust economic growth,” as was stated in the Press release (IEA, 18 May 2021). The special report was designed to inform the high-level negotiations that took place at the twenty sixth Conference of the Parties (COP26) of the United Nations Climate Change Framework Convention in Glasgow in November 2021. One of the messages in the report was that no new gas or oil field should be permitted if the world should net zero by 2050. In September 2021, there was a general election in Norway, offering a potential shift of the governing bodies and political agendas related to climate, fossil fuels, and the country’s interests moving forward. Norway’s Green Party, for example, wanted this general election to shut down the country’s multi-billion dollar oil industry (Adomaitis, 2021).5

Norway’s late venture into wind power Norway started the deployment of wind power later than many other European countries. In 2016, when Norway generated 1 TWh, Denmark (a much smaller country in size) generated 13 TWh (Our World in Data, 2023). One explanation is that Norway already had fossil free electricity production, while Denmark was phasing out its coal. The resistance against wind power has been strong in Norway. Vasstrøm and Lysgård (2021) put forward an explanation to be “the Norwegian national identity embedded in Norwegian cultural citizenship” that includes “the perception of individual rights and imagined landscape values”. Another explanation could be that – unlike with the case of revenues from hydropower, oil and gas giving back to the society – the local communities have not received any revenues even though their visible landscape has been changed.

Another conflict is the one between wind power plants and reindeer herding, the very debated wind power project on Fosen that was built between 2016 and 2022. In 2018, the Saami Council first began advocating for land rights by submitting a request to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) to suspend the construction of the power plants within the traditional territory of the Fovsen Njaarke reindeer herding communities. The UN Committee ignored this request. A year later in 2019, the power plants were completed. According to President of the Saami Council, Christina Henriksen, “irreparable damage was done to the historical winter pastures of the Sámi community and its members’ possibility to continuously pursue its ancient livelihood, traditional Sámi reindeer herding, the backbone of their cultural

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identity'” (Hætta, 2021). This case has created debate in national and international forum. After ongoing persistence by the Saami Council and people, the Government of Norway ruled in favor of Sámi rights, though it remains unclear how this will be imposed on the green energy transition of the country (Henley, 2021). Norway’s Supreme Court ruled, according to Article 27 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1949), that two wind farms in western Norway are harming reindeer herders from the Sámi people by encroaching on their pastures. Article 27 states that minority ethnic people “shall not be denied the right in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language” (UN 1949: 6). Thus, traditional Sámi reindeer herding is a form of protected cultural practice. More than 150 turbines may be torn down after licenses to operate and build them are declared null and void.

As of 27 February 2023, Sámi youth activists have been occupying the Norwegian Ministry’s Energy Office to protest illegal wind farms, also known as the Fosen Vind Project (Ahtone, 2023).

With respect to the complexities of this case, the authors have not unfolded this case further. We just would like to mention that in April 2022, the Norwegian government announced it would resume licenses for new wind farm applications in municipalities as long as specific measures were implemented such as including the involvement of Sámi interests in all stages of the process (IEA, 2022: 77). Vasstrøm and Lysgård (2021) has concluded that, “Norwegian wind power is at a crossroad. Arguments on energy security, climate mitigation, market conditions and efficiency are challenged by broad public contestations concerning environmental and nature values, local participation and transparency, and the distribution of burdens and goods” (Vasstrøm & Lysgård, 2021: 9).

Summary - fingerprint from Norway The fingerprint from Norway exemplifies how it is of particular importance to understand and respect the rights and voices of Indigenous peoples in green transition projects in the Arctic. The IEA (2021) emphasizes that wind and solar energy need to increase substantially over the next decade to not make it too difficult to reach the 1.5 degree target. Offshore wind power is one way forward for Norway. Nevertheless, onshore wind power is much cheaper. In the years to come, there is a need to better understand the societal conflicts that stick to renewable projects.

Position: Green transition as a driver of change The Arctic has the potential to play an important role in the green transition, as illustrated in the four fingerprints. Both as an important provider of resources (material and energy), and as assistance to meet the climate goals agreed upon in the 2015 Paris Agreement by making it easier to replace fossil fuels with renewables as well as providing carbon storage. Meanwhile, changes also bring opportunities and green transition can be a driver of change in the Arctic – to improve quality of life, well-being, and support the local livelihoods in Arctic communities. For the peoples of the Arctic, there is a need for both sustaining the good life while being part of a global green transition moving away from fossil fuels dependency. Green transitions, if managed well, can be of particular importance to the continuation and proliferation of Indigenous cultures, as we learned from NWT. However, other settings we have identified include how the concept can offer a “promise” about being green and transformative without being binding or committing to local needs or agendas. As FAI scholars, we would like to encourage a green transition informed by the knowledge and expertise that already exists within the local communities, also make sure to connect local Arctic Infrastructure: Considerations in the Green Transition

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communities across the Arctic regions as to be inspired by each other (instead of flying consultants up from the south). There are many good examples across the Arctics - like our fingerprints - that can be beneficial for building multipurpose and multiuser infrastructure fit for Arctic citizens.

Takeaways from our field trips, observations, and document analysis conducted in various places in the Arctic on the current position is: 1. The Arctic has a new strategic role because of the green transition, 2. Arctic communities lack physical as well as policy infrastructure for a successful transition, 3. Green transition is not “a one size fits all” in the Arctic; different communities have different opportunities as well as requirements when it comes to green transition, 4. There is a knowledge gap both in terms of what Arctic communities need from a transition, and how these needs best could be met, and 5. Green transition can become an important driver of change in the Arctic.

Notes 1.

2.

3.

4.

But two new airports are in construction and plan to open in 2024.

“Carlsberg 0.0 - Probably the best beer in the world” (https://hudsonresourcesinc.com/projects/white-mountain-anorthosite-project/) Author Chris Clarke-McQueen is a Yellowknife Chipewyan Dene, Akaitcho Territory, Treaty 8 member of the Łutsel K’e Dene First Nation.

5. Despite high support in the poll ahead of the election, the party did not get many voters.

References Abildgaard, M. S., Ren, C., Leyva-Mayorga, I., Stefanovic, C., Soret, B., & Popovski, P. (2022).

Arctic Connectivity: A frugal approach to infrastructural development. Arctic, 75(1), 72-85.

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No Land, No Health: Exploration of the impact of Historical Environment on Inuit qanuinngitsiarutiksait in the context of Climate Change

Jeevan Toor, Tagaaq Evaluardjuk-Palmer & Josée Lavoie

This study draws upon material relating to communities in Inuit Nunangat to explore the impact of the historical environment (i.e. colonialism) on Inuit qanuinngitsiarutiksait (good health and wellbeing) in the context of climate change, through lenses of anthropology, geography and Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (Inuit knowledge). The negative impact of colonialism on Inuit social and cultural fabric, resulting in diminished and intergenerational knowledge transmission has made it harder to adapt to climatic changes, with resulting impacts exacerbated by existing socioeconomic inequities. Climate change affects qanuinngitsiarutiksait causing poorer mental health, food and water insecurity, rise in diseases and respiratory illness and icerelated accidents. Adaptations to impacts of climate change are discussed, centring Inuit voices and initiatives, and a move from deficit to strength-based research. The Canadian government’s approach to this topic is explored, with recommendations from an Inuit perspective. It is argued that for maintenance of qanuinngitsiarutiksait, a holistic approach to health is required where Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit is considered in collaboration with Inuit. While finding ways to adapt to current climatic realities are notable endeavours, the aim should not be to accept the worsening of the climate, but rather to commit to mitigate, and where possible, reverse the effects of anthropogenic climate change in the Arctic. This work seeks to provide a novel contribution through basis in Inuit concepts, ‘historical environment’ and the synergy of the theoretical approaches of anthropology and geography.

Inuktitut translation: ᑖᓐᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᔪᖅ ᐱᖁᑎᓂᑦ ᐱᔾᔪᑎᓕᖕᓂᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᖕᓄᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᓄᓇᖓᑦ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᒃᑑᑎᔪᓂᑦ ᐃᒻᒪᓂᓴᕐᓂᑦ ᐊᕙᑎᖏᓐᓂ (ᓲᕐᓗ ᖃᓪᓗᓈᖑᖃᑎᒌᙱᑦᑐᑦ) ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕈᓯᖏᓐᓂᑦ (ᖃᓄᐃᙱᑦᑎᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᙱᑦᑎᐊᕐᓂᕐᓗ) ᐃᓗᓕᖏᓐᓂ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᑕ, ᑕᐅᑐᖕᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᐃᓕᖅᑯᓯᓕᕆᓂᖅ, ᓄᓇᓕᕆᓂᖅ ᐃᓄᐃᓪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᑐᖃᖏᑦ (ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᑐᖃᖏᑦ). ᐱᐅᙱᑦᑐᑦ ᐊᒃᑐᐃᔾᔪᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᓪᓗᓈᙳᖅᑎᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᐃᓄᖕᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪ ᐃᓕᖅᑯᓯᕐᒧᑦ ᐋᖅᑭᒃᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ, ᐱᑕᖃᕈᓐᓃᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᓪᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪ ᑭᖑᕚᕇᓄᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᔪᑦ ᓯᐊᒻᒪᒃᑎᑕᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᔪᑦ ᐊᔪᕐᓇᕐᓂᖅᓴᐅᕗᖅ ᓱᖏᐅᓴᒋᐊᒃᓴᖅ ᓯᓚ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᔪᒧᑦ, ᓴᖅᑭᑉᐸᓪᓕᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᖅᖢᓂ ᐊᒃᑐᐃᔾᔪᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐅᔾᔨᕐᓇᖅᓯᕚᓪᓕᖅᖢᑎᒃ ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒌᓄᑦ ᒪᑭᑕᓇᓱᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᓪᓗ ᓇᓕᒧᒌᙱᓐᓂᐅᔪᓄᑦ. ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᐊᒃᑐᐃᕙᒃᐳᖅ ᖃᓄᐃᙱᑦᑐᓕᕆᔾᔪᑎᓂᒃ ᐃᓱᒪᒃᑯᑦ ᖃᓄᐃᙱᑦᑎᐊᕈᓐᓃᖅᑎᑦᑎᕙᒃᖢᑎᒃ, ᓂᕿᓂᒃ ᐃᒪᖃᑦᑎᐊᕈᓐᓃᖅᑎᑦᑎᓪᓗᑎᒡᓗ, ᐋᓐᓂᐊᖅᑖᖅᐸᒃᖢᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪ ᐊᓂᖅᑎᕆᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᐋᓐᓂᐊᖅᑖᖅᐸᒃᖢᑎᒃ ᐊᒻᒪ ᓯᑯᒃᑯᑦ ᐱᕐᕈᓗᐊᕿᕙᒃᖢᑎᒃ. ᓱᖏᐅᔾᔨᓂᖅ ᐊᒃᑐᐃᔪᓄᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᓯᐅᔪᑦ, ᓴᖖᒋᒃᑎᒋᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᓂᐱᖏᑦ

Jeevan Toor, PhD student at University College London Tagaaq Evaluardjuk-Palmer, Inuit Elder and Knowledge Keeper Josée Lavoie, Professor, Dept. of Community Health Sciences, Director, Ongomiizwin Research, Indigenous Institute of Health and Healing, Rady Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Manitoba

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ᐱᒋᐊᖅᑕᖏᓪᓗ, ᓅᑉᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᕐᓗ ᐊᑐᓗᐊᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᓴᙱᓂᖃᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ−ᑐᙵᕕᓕᖕᒥᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᕐᒥᒃ. ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᒐᕙᒪᒃᑯᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᔾᔪᓯᖓ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᐱᔾᔪᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᔭᐅᕗᑦ, ᐊᑐᓕᖁᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᖅᑰᖅᑕᖓᓐᓂᒃ. ᐊᐃᕙᔾᔪᑕᐅᕗᖅ ᒪᑭᒪᑎᑕᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᑦ ᖃᓄᕆᒃᓴᐅᑏᑦ, ᐊᑕᖐᔪᒥᒃ ᐱᓕᕆᔾᔪᓯᕐᒥᒃ ᐋᓐᓂᐊᖃᕐᓇᙱᑦᑐᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᒪᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᑐᖃᖏᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓪᓗᑎᒃ ᐱᓕᕆᖃᑎᖃᖅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓄᖕᓂᒃ. ᓇᓂᓯᓂᖅ ᐊᑐᒐᒃᓴᓂᒃ ᓱᖏᐅᑎᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᒫᓐᓇᐅᔪᖅ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᖃᓄᐃᓐᓂᕆᒐᔪᒃᑕᖓᓄᑦ ᐅᔾᔨᕐᓇᖅᑑᓪᓗᑎᒃ ᐊᑐᕋᓲᑎᑦ, ᑐᕌᕆᔭᖅ ᐊᖏᕐᓗᓂ ᐱᐅᔪᓐᓃᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓯᓚ, ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᐱᓂᐊᕐᓂᕋᕐᓗᓂ ᐱᓗᐊᕈᓐᓃᖅᑎᑦᑎᓂᕐᒥᒃ, ᐊᔪᕐᓇᙱᑎᓪᓗᒍᓗ, ᐅᑎᖅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᒃᑑᑎᔪᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᖅᑕᖅᑐᒥ. ᑖᓐᓇ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᖅ ᕿᓂᖅᐳᖅ ᐱᑎᑦᑎᔪᒪᓪᓗᓂ ᓄᑖᒥᒃ ᑐᓐᓂᖅᑯᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᒥᒃ ᑐᙵᕕᖃᖅᑎᑕᐅᓪᓗᓂ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑕᐅᑐᒃᐸᒃᑕᖏᑎᒍᑦ, 'ᐱᖅᑯᓯᑐᖃᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᕙᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ' ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ ᐃᓕᖅᑯᓯᕆᔭᐅᕙᒃᑐᓂᒃ ᐃᓕᖅᑯᓯᕆᔭᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᒋᔭᐅᔪᒥᒡᓗ.

Introduction “Inuit culture is inseparable from the condition of their physical surroundings… environmental upheaval resulting from climate change violates Inuit’s right to practice and enjoy their culture” (Watt-Cloutier, 2018: 236) There are roughly 65,000 Inuit in Canada with many in Inuit Nunangat, the northernmost part of Canada, including 53 communities in four regions: Inuvialuit, Nunavut, Nunavik and Nunatsiavut; with an increasing population living in Southern Canada (ITK, 2018). Historically, Inuit have lived off the Land1, harbouring strong relationships with the environment, living and non-living entities which inhabit their surroundings. However, recent generations of Inuit communities have undergone swift cultural changes due to interactions with explorers and more recently from detrimental actions of the Canadian government (e.g. relocation, residential schools); historically Inuit have adapted to their environment. However, recent transitions have occurred too quickly (Kirmayer et al., 2009). For example, Inuit youth suicide rates are now ten times those of nonIndigenous counterparts (Anang et al., 2019), and while this is not solely attributed to climate change, it highlights the existence of detrimental impacts.

Exploration of Inuit knowledge (Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit) allows for an understanding of the connection which Inuit have to the environment. This will be explored further, but briefly it is related to a traditional way of life which is to live in symbiosis with the Land. Impacts of colonialism, the ‘historical environment’, directly affect qanuinngitsiarutiksait, and are now exacerbated by climate change, so these issues need to be considered together. ‘Climate change’ refers to changes in weather from mainly human actions (other factors can contribute); due to global warming the Arctic is at the forefront of these changes, with rising temperatures at rates up to triple that of the rest of the world (Little, 2022; Mena et al., 2020; Middleton et al., 2021). For Inuit, climate change has led to unpredictable weather patterns, e.g. more rain, thinner ice and warmer temperatures (Lebel et al., 2022; Ostapchuk et al., 2015). Inuit are especially concerned about the negative impacts of changing climate due to their close relationship with the environment, which is an essential protective factor for qanuinngitsiarutiksait.

Globally, there are 350 million Indigenous individuals who have strong connections to their environments, undermined by their experience of colonialism (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005; Durkalec et al., 2015). This is not to homogenise Indigenous peoples around the world, or even in Inuit Nunangat; our review reflects the literature, when it points out differences in culture, environment and impacts of climate change. This exploration is novel, through its basis in Inuit concepts and the term ‘historical environment’, paired with the anthropological and geographical theory used.

This issue has not previously been addressed from these perspectives.

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Methods This exploration is based on a review of the literature, supported by a research team working on Inuit health in Winnipeg, connected to Elders and Inuit-based organisations. Novel understandings on Inuit knowledge were provided from an Elder, Tagaaq Evaluardjuk-Palmer, who is co-author on this paper. Discussions took place via video-conferencing. We worked collaboratively to produce this paper, where I presented each draft back until we were both satisfied with the outcome. This collaborative process is outlined in Figure 1.

Data was found using Google Scholar through the search terms ‘Inuit health and climate change’, ‘Inuit environment and health’ and ‘Inuit climate change adaptions’ where 57 records were identified. These were sorted thematically by manually sorting each category by highlighting relevant information on climatic impacts and climatic adaptations (split into the themes of: mental health, food and water insecurity, disease, respiratory illness, ice-related accidents). A semiethnographic approach, adapted from traditional anthropological ethnography was used, guided by discourse analysis.

Figure 1: Collaborative working process

Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, being ‘healthy’ and the Environment “All-encompassing holistic view of an interconnected world” (Tagalik, 2018: 94) Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ) translates as “that which Inuit have known all along” encompassing Inuit worldview through stories, teachings and myths linking the past and future together (Kalluak, 2017: 41) as a ‘living’ knowledge (Tagalik, 2009). Often, IQ has been sidelined by Western research as it was not recognised as ‘scientific’ enough; instead, the focus was on biomedical approaches (Ferrazzi et al., 2019; Wilson et al., 2020) that although helpful, fail to fully engage with complex questions requiring holistic, localized and longitudinal observations, at times over multiple generations. IQ is also metaphysically different from Western knowledge, and therefore comprehension in the context of Inuit culture, history and beliefs is needed (Wilson et al., 2020).

A foundational belief of IQ rests in a profound relationship with nature and the connection it provides to their environment. For example, Elders have remarked that “when the Qallunaat2 came, muskox and whales were hunted nearly to extinction” (Karetak & Tester, 2017: 15). Due to interconnected beliefs, qanuinngitsiarutiksait cannot be understood without IQ. However, to fully conceptualise qanuinngitsiarutiksait, deeper insight into the person is needed.

Inuit notion of the person Pool and Geissler (2005) argue that personhood is understood culturally in various ways; personhood is not an artifact of the brain but is one of ‘life and experience’. Personhood is a dialogue between the projection of society onto the individual, and the individual forming their location in society. More fitting for this context is the concept ‘complex personhood’, allowing emphasis on more than the individual, e.g. family, community, the ancestors and the environment to become more prominent (ecocentrism). This allows a shift from a Western emphasis on No Land, No Health

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individuality, to understanding a more complete notion of the person (Dixon, 2017; Tuck, 2009), which arguably, is closer to Inuit philosophy.

Thus, Inuit conceptions of personhood, belonging and identity lie in their strong relationship with the environment. While connection to the Land is a key in maintaining qanuinngitsiarutiksait, and therefore Inuit personhood, other factors are also integral; for example, cultural practices such as eating specific foods, speaking one’s language and having a strong sense of community (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2013; Kirmayer et al., 2009). Gombay (2015) suggests that colonialism created ‘colonised identities’ as local norms defining aspects of personhood conflicted with coloniser’s views of being, and colonisers viewed Inuit as ‘uncivilised’, lacking the qualities and benefits of Western personhood and consequently lacking the privilege of full citizenship, to be relegated to a subordinated ‘ward of the state’ like status. Colonialism, past and present continues to disrupt Inuit personhood and consequently identity and belonging. The literature has begun to explore the disconnect between Inuit and the environment associated with climatic impacts, but does not link historical and environment aspects.

Qanuinngitsiarutiksait The use of qanuinngitsiarutiksait, visually displayed in Figure 2, pays homage to the cultural context of this exploration, and acknowledges that Inuit concepts of good health differ from biomedical concepts, and that past explorations have not embraced Inuit concepts. Qanuinngitsiarutiksait roughly translates as ‘good health and wellbeing’, referring to a holistic all-encompassing idea of health which encompasses physical and mental health, cultural connection (e.g. Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit), spiritual connection, environmental connection (e.g. wellbeing of the household and the Land); it can also refer to tools used for health e.g. eating traditional foods.

Elder Evaluardjuk-Palmer conveyed the sentiment that research needs to involve Inuit in the process, to ensure a broad understanding, rather than just investigating one issue or aspect.

Another Elder, Taamusi Qumaq, suggested that good health and wellbeing means to “live without worry, being able to move on the land with ease…hunt animals and eat the food they provide, and visiting and taking pleasure in the company of family and loved ones” (cited in Fletcher et al., 2021: 18) reinforcing that qanuinngitsiarutiksait encompasses factors of one’s larger social setting, such as family, nature and community. This approach recognises more than one way of knowing or understanding the world, integral for work aiming to situate itself in a decolonised realm, allowing production of ‘legitimate knowledge’ (Liboiron, 2021).

Figure 2: Visual explanation of qanuinngitsiarutiksait Toor, Evaluardjuk-Palmer, & Lavoie

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Environment, Avatittingnik kamatsiarniq “We lived on the land, off the land, for the land…what we took we could put back…my parents only took what they needed and lived for today” (Elder Evaluardjuk-Palmer, personal communications) Although the environment is part of ‘Inuit determinants of health’ (ITK, 2014), it is mostly disregarded in non-Indigenous contexts (Harper et al., 2015). Some anthropologists and geographers have engaged with this concept as an avenue to guide health-related research (Kurtz & Smoyer-Tomic, 2009; Martin & Pavlovskaya, 2009); with anthropologists specifically grappling with ways in which power affects interactions between humans and their environment (Cortesi, 2018). Geographers suggest that the environment “refers to the sum total of conditions which surround [hu]man at a given point in space and time” (Park, 1980: 29). The sub-discipline of health geography suggests the concept of ‘landscape’ should be used to explore health-environment interactions, as it encompasses “diverse and converging layers of history, social structure, and built environment at particular sites” (Kearns & Collins, 2010:17). These perspectives are helpful to begin to comprehend interactions between health and the environment.

Niewöhner and Lock (2018) developed ‘situated biologies’ to explain how the environment can influence ‘environment/human entanglements’; emerging from ‘local biologies’ which suggests health is impacted by the material body. Using ‘situated’ instead of ‘local’ implies that it is not just personal biological make-up that impacts the individual but also the environment. Further, the term ‘situated’ acknowledges that not only local factors impact the body, as increasingly apparent in our global world (Niewöhner & Lock, 2018). This builds upon Haraway’s (1991) ‘situating knowledges’, where social, political, historical and economic aspects structure and re-structure the body, in a constant flux allowing bodies to be in a state of ‘becoming’. This ontological caveat is wholly applicable to help to unpack relationships between qanuinngitsiarutiksait and the environment.

Perhaps more fitting is the Inuktitut concept ‘avatittingnik kamatsiarniq’, shared by Elder Evaluardjuk-Palmer who stressed importance of understanding the environment from an Inuit perspective. Avatittingnik kamatsiarniq roughly means an all-encompassing situation of someone in their surroundings, where one is aware of the habits of the Land and acts towards it with care and respect. Persons are not the most prominent feature in the Land, rather persons are part of an interconnected web of in relation to their surroundings. Elder Evaluardjuk-Palmer noted that other aspects such as policy, government and research are now part of avatittingnik kamatsiarniq, hence their inclusion later. As one is connected to and part of the cosmos, comprehension of historical context is necessary to understand issues of qanuinngitsiarutiksait.

When qanuinngitsiarutiksait is explored in context of ‘historical environment’, i.e. colonialism, the impact on avatittingnik kamatsiarniq and thus climate change becomes apparent.

Historical Environment Colonialism refers to imperialist actions based on capitalist expansionist ideals, where the dominant society utilises their power to attain benefits (Karetak & Tester, 2017). Inuit first experienced interactions with Europeans from explorers and whalers in the sixteenth century; in the twentieth century, the Canadian government introduced policies affecting Inuit way of life through sedenterization, forced relocation (some distances similar to Toronto to Miami), implementation of a monetary system, residential schools and tuberculosis control (Kirmayer et al., 2009).

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Residential schools impacted children through loss of connection to culture, language and community (Karetak & Tester, 2017); the last school closed in 1996 (Chrétien, 2013). Forced relocation ensured Inuit no longer lived their nomadic lifestyle, with families moved to overcrowded matchbox housing with few facilities; mortgages had to be paid, but monetary jobs were uncommon, thus indoctrination began into a Western way of life and a dependency on social welfare (Karetak & Tester, 2017). The Royal Canadian Mounted Police killed 1,200 sled dogs (used for hunting), officially to stop spreading disease; implicitly to “encourage” Inuit to stay is settlements, deepening their reliance on government’s handouts as then hunting for food became difficult (Watt-Cloutier, 2018). Actions have been attributed to a policy of assimilation for gain of Canadian territorial rights in the high Arctic (Stevenson, 2014; Watt-Cloutier, 2018).

Colonialism set the foundations for capitalism, an ideology based on monetary growth leading to industrialisation and consequently climate change (Connor, 2010; Torrealba, 2021; Whyte, 2017); Davis and Todd (2017) link colonial actions to broken connections between mind, body and Land.

The concept of an ‘ecological paradox’ applies, as at first mistreatment of the environment leads to economic growth, but then this growth comes at the cost of health and the environment (Mena et al., 2020). Thus, anthropogenic climate change, rooted in colonial actions, links to impacts to the avatittingnik kamatsiarniq. Recent literature found that aspects of wellness, e.g. kinship and culture, were negatively affected by welfare/settler colonialism, and that there were intersections between the effects of colonialism and aspects of coping with climate issues (Mackay, 2018; Whyte, 2017); colonialism has thus had impact Inuit’s ability to respond to climate change, in part because of anthropogenic climate change and because intergenerational knowledge transmission was interrupted and/or undermined. This process is visually outlined in Figure 3. Anthropological and geographical theory, built upon with the Inuktitut concepts, allows for a holistic understanding of qanuinngitsiarutiksait, moving away from biomedical models of health. Without interdisciplinarity that considers Inuit knowledge, we cannot fully comprehend these concepts or relationships.

Figure 3: Visual demonstration of the link between colonialism, climate change and qanuinngitsiarutiksait

Climatic impacts on qanuinngitsiarutiksait “It’s all the pieces, like dominoes, all touches each other. I mean everything you do, [our] Inuit way of life and our way of thinking is all intertwined and interconnected [to the environment]. So, something as significant as changes in the temperature, and in snow and rain and that kind of thing, it’s all going to have a ripple effect” (Harper et al., 2015: 6) The literature suggests that the main impacts of climate change on qanuinngitsiarutiksait are related to mental health, food insecurity, rise of diseases, water insecurity, respiratory illnesses and icerelated accidents. For clarity, these issues will be investigated separately, but their interconnection should be noted. Adaptations to climate change will be discussed, demonstrating resilience,

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centring Inuit voices and initiatives, and moving from deficit-orientated research. However, as many issues are relatively new, adaptations do not always exist.

Mental health Spending less time on the Land is associated with feelings of anxiety, depression, anger and frustration (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2013; Harper et al., 2015; Kipp et al., 2019; Lebel et al., 2022; Middleton et al., 2021). Changes to ice reliability which is becoming thinner or where open water remains for longer periods of time is due to warming temperatures (Ostapchuk et al., 2015), resulting in “feeling trapped” (Lebel et al., 2022: 324), or “like a caged animal” (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2013: 262). Durkalec and colleagues (2015) found interviewees saying if they could not go onto the Land they would “have no health”, “can’t breathe”, “be lost” and “their appetite and mind would go” (p.21). In Nunatsiavut, visits to the health clinic for mental health issues increased after a period of warmer weather, and when temperatures cooled visits were less frequent (Middleton et al., 2021); a health practitioner noting “when people can’t get out…we see a difference in the counselling part: people are more agitated…because they’re just not getting off on the land” (Middleton et al., 2020: 6). The literature noted that spending less time on the Land negatively impacted Inuit sense of identity through being unable to do culturally-based activities and engage with traditional knowledge (Clayton, 2020; Richards et al., 2019), impacting feelings of self-worth and productivity (Harper et al., 2015; Lebel et al., 2022; Ostapchuk et al., 2015) – exemplified by a hunter who said: “if…people can’t be going to the cabin…hunting and…going on the land, then… start to see a community shifting, not knowing what they’re supposed to be doing…not knowing what your selfworth is, not knowing what you should be doing with your time” (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2012: 544) Studies found that spending less time on the Land is associated with increased ideations of suicide, use of drugs and alcohol (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2013; Lebel et al., 2022; Ostapchuk et al., 2015).

In Rigolet, an interviewee stated “people get bored…turn to drinking and drugging” (Ostapchuk et al., 2015:17). Community cohesion has been impacted by spending less time on the Land, impacting mental wellness (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2012; Harper et al., 2015; Lebel et al., 2022; Middleton et al., 2020), with an interviewee stating “cohesiveness is usually a common denominator of outdoor-based activities…it’s sort of somewhat fragmented [because of climate change]. The cohesiveness that now bonds the community could be jeopardized because what else are you bonding on?” (Harper et al., 2015 :12).

Not spending time outside means more time at home, which some found stressful due to many people in a small space: “people felt like they were getting in each other’s way more, in a way that they previously hadn’t experienced” (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2013: 262). Lastly, studies suggested less time on the Land increased attention to historic trauma (Lebel et al., 2022): “if you are able to find some sense of worth in yourself…able to start unconsciously healing from those wounds…if for some reason you are not able to do something that makes you feel good…then those tragedies…is still there, and then they’re magnified because they come more to the surface because you’re not feeling personal strength” (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2013: 324).

However, when more time is spent on the Land, interviewees expressed feeling “more relaxed, calm and peaceful, as well as healthier and happier” (Lebel et al., 2022: 321) with an Inuk3 encapsulating benefits of spending time outside as “much a part of our life as breathing…so if we don’t get out then…it’s

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like taking part of your arm away…you’re not fulfilled…it’s just like taking medicine” (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2013: 261).

Access to mental health services in Inuit Nunangat is inconsistent, as Western-trained practitioners generally come to communities for a limited time, or people rely on telehealth, and practitioners may know little of the culture (Lebel et al., 2022). While telehealth services can be useful, e.g. in the COVID-19 pandemic, it poses issues for those without reliable internet (inaccessible to many (ITK, 2021)), or for those who feel more comfortable with in-person conversations. Solutions could include more Inuit training in healthcare programs, located in the North, that are Inuitcentric, or training practitioners extensively in the cultures in which they are working. Practitioners need to be aware of the impacts of the changing Land on mental health, which could be included in their training (Clayton, 2020). Drug and alcohol abuse require a holistic approach, addressing all facets of health (Watt-Cloutier, 2018). Land-based programming, successful in nurturing youth mental health and wellness (Hackett et al., 2016), should continue.

Food insecurity “I love that [country] food, it’s really healthy…it’s good for your body and your spirit…you feel good about going out on the Land and being able to do that” (Durkalec et al., 2015: 23) Traditional ‘country’ foods benefit Inuit economically, culturally and nutritionally; nourishing mental and spiritual health and community cohesion by hunting, harvesting together or sharing food according to prescribed rules of mutual care (Watt-Cloutier, 2018). However, climatic changes have altered vegetation growth, migration patterns and ocean acidification levels (Harper et al., 2015; Lebel et al., 2022; Torrealba, 2021); melting ice coinciding with seal births, leads to high mortality; caribou preferring areas with more snow in winter and cooler areas in summer; thinner caribou due to less vegetation; caribou drowning when crossing thinner ice; and fewer berries found with less taste (Harper et al., 2015; Panikkar & Lemmond, 2020). Changes exacerbate existing issues of food security; a 2004 survey shows food insecurity rates in the Arctic were eight to ten times higher than the rest of Canada (Schiff & Schembri, 2021), and data from 2008 showing 70% of houses in Nunavut have dealt with food security issues – the highest rate globally for an Indigenous populace in an advanced country (Newell, 2018).

In her book, Watt-Cloutier (2018: 137, 202, 254) relate Inuit’s preference for country foods: “country food connect[s] us to water, land, to the “source” of our life”, and that not eating them is a “spiritual loss”. Hunting teaches valuable skills such as “patience, boldness, tenacity, focus, courage, sound judgement and wisdom, very transferable to the modern world that has come so quickly”. Ostapchuk and colleagues (2015: 17) explained the link between food and personhood, through identity, as follows, “cultural identity is partly what you eat…part of identifying with being Inuit is eating [country foods]”. Positive health benefits from traditional food are noted through intake of essential vitamins, minerals and antioxidants, with less refined carbohydrates, saturated fat and sodium (Boulanger-Lapointe et al., 2019; Caughey et al., 2022; Rosol et al., 2016). General wellbeing through consumption of traditional foods has meant people “feel warmer, relaxes the body, causes less stress, makes them feel more full, causes less bloating” (Newell, 2018:25). Kirmayer and colleagues (1994: 54, 60) found general feelings of discontent when country foods were not eaten, such as “weakness, lassitude and tiredness…irritability, uncooperativeness…depression”, while another said, “Inuit eat mainly meat because it has blood in it and that helps…the person will be in better health…it’s visible even on the cheeks, the cheeks were redder… in the past”.

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Consumption of store-bought foods has increased due to the demand of the market economy, where the 9-5 work week, Monday to Friday interferes with harvesting activities which depend on the weather, the loss of skills associated with residential schools and weather changes also impact harvesting and hunting. In less-abundant years, reliance on store-brought foods has been noted (Statham, 2012; Gilbert et al., 2021), purchased foods are twice as expensive or more as in the rest of Canada (Hayward et al., 2020); healthy items are available, but are even more expensive, leading to higher consumption of processed foods (Panikkar & Lemmond, 2020). This dietary shift, along with spending less time on the Land, has been linked to higher non-communicable diseases e.g. diabetes, high blood pressure, obesity and cardiovascular issues (Ahmed et al., 2021; Schiff & Schembri, 2021). An interviewee stated, “people are eating processed meat and salt and additives…the rate of diabetes has jumped really high…thirty years ago…I do not think there were any diabetics in town. Now there’re lots”, with another stating “there’s a higher increase of obesity…heart disease…high blood pressure and heart attacks and strokes and I think that it is related to food” (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2012: 543).

Adaptation has been demonstrated in Arviat through the use of community greenhouses to grow fresh produce, using seaweed as fertilizer, and community freezers to store and share successful hunts (Richards et al., 2019; Schiff & Schembri, 2021). Food sharing networks between community members have been reported in Akulivik (Kishigmai, 2022). In Nunavut this has been noted as being particularly useful for vulnerable populations, such as Elders (Gilbert et al., 2021). In Kugluktuk hunters have revised their courses to reflect changes in migratory patterns, and Elderyouth mentorship initiatives have been implemented to help convey traditional knowledge of hunting practices which can then be adapted to specific climate needs (Rosol et al., 2016; Panikkar & Lemmond, 2020). Further it has been suggested that increased financial support for hunters and harvesters is needed (Gilbert et al., 2021). Overall, investment needs to be put towards resolutions, and strategies to lower costs of food.

Disease More rain, less snow and warmer temperatures have contributed to spread of disease in the Arctic (Richards et al., 2019). Studies have suggested that a parasite from the Amazon, Toxoplasma gondii (causing flu, vision issues, neurological problems, stillbirth, and passed to foetuses in vitro) may be spread either by felids travelling to the Arctic from oocysts discharged in water via north travelling currents, infecting fish and entering the Arctic aquatic food chain, or from migrating animals infected in the Amazon region. Both hypotheses are caused by climate change, as oocysts reach the Arctic from changing currents due to warming temperatures, or migratory animals have changed routes due to climate changes (Reiling & Dixon, 2019). Further, increased Arctic water levels have allowed gastrointestinal pathogens, particularly H. pylori and campylobacteriosis, to be transmitted more in recent years causing gastritis, ulcers and gastric cancer (Finlayson-Trick et al., 2021; Hayward et al., 2020). In Cambridge Bay and Kugluktuk these pathogens were found in muskox, making them inedible (Panikkar & Lemmond, 2020). Lack of infrastructure in water testing systems has led to under-reporting of these diseases, as many pathogens are transported in water (Finlayson-Trick et al., 2021). Increase of these diseases is associated with climate change, therefore testing capacities need to increase, practitioners need an up-to-date knowledge of rates, treatment and mitigation measures which are culturally appropriate. Research into modes of

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transmission and the impact these pathogens have on these communities needs further investigation.

Respiratory illness “Association between climate change and the increase in mould in homes is concerning, because usually the frost kills everything…you don’t have that now” (Harper et al., 2015: 13) Historically, mould was not, one contributor saying, “there’s a lot more mould, and you’re going to get that too in a milder climate…you’re going to have more rain, you’re going to have more mould…of course mould has a direct impact on lung health” (Harper et al., 2015: 13). The literature also reports an increase of respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), attributed to warmer temperatures and more rain (Princeton University, 2019; Schreiber, 2020). Susceptibility towards respiratory illnesses is partly due to socioeconomic factors, such as crowded homes; combined with an increase in mould in houses not being killed by frost, due to warming temperatures, these illnesses are increasing (Harper et al., 2015; Kauppi et al., 2021; Torrealba, 2021). Infants in the Arctic are five times more likely to die from respiratory illnesses than infants elsewhere in Canada, with association to mould exposure suggested to be main issue, but other factors contribute such as: overcrowding in homes, tuberculosis transmission, second hand smoke and increased susceptibility associated with marginal nutrition (Torrealba, 2021).

Access to treatment is limited due to health care system expense, e.g. RSV rates can be reduced with medication which is commonly given in Southern Canada but it is not readily available in the North. Further, infants are often airlifted to receive care due to lacking facilities in the North, which puts stress upon families who are separated from their children, often for long periods of time (Banerji et al., 2020; Kovesi et al., 2007). Care that is routine elsewhere in Canada is not routine in the Arctic; an interviewee from Schreiber’s (2020) work reporting that there is: “huge difference in the way that Indigenous and non-Indigenous people are treated…when you have Inuit babies that have at least much as risk of respiratory syncytial virus…but they’re not eligible for the same treatment…it’s part of a broader systematic issue that occurs in Canada” (no pagination) Overcrowding, lack of equitable medical care and climate-durable housing needs to be addressed, with adequate Inuit-based research and appropriate culturally-based remedies put in place.

Water insecurity “There are a lot more brooks that dried up. And there are a lot more ponds that are drying. I notice when I go out on the land…to where we used to get water maybe twenty-five years ago…the brooks there are really dried up now” (Goldhar et al., 2014: 76) Most Canadians have access to drinking water, but not in Inuit Nunangat, as not all communities receive consistent water distribution (Finlayson-Trick et al., 2021; ITK, 2020). Communities receive water via water tanks or aged piped structures from the 1950s, which leak, causing lower pressure and wasted water. Unreliability of clean water means ‘boil water advisories’ are frequent; trucked water is dependent on deliveries which are often unreliable (ITK, 2020), directly contravening United Nation’s human rights resolution on access to clean water (UN, 2023). Local governments prefer trucked water, due to low construction and maintenance costs, but running costs are high (Little, 2022).

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As with food insecurity, climatic changes exacerbate existing issues of water insecurity. In Iqaluit in 2019 water pipes froze, previously unknown, due to changes in temperature, and the city spent $33,000 to thaw pipes which took two weeks, leaving those who relied on this distribution without water (Little, 2022). Those using piped water (often coming from nearby lakes or reservoirs) find provision unreliable due to warming temperatures which melts permafrost under water sources leading to evaporation; in Hopedale in 2015 the school and health clinic closed due to low water reserves (ITK, 2020).

Preference for collecting water from the Land has been expressed, with one person saying they would collect water from brooks during Land-based activities, then take it back to the community, and another saying: “I don’t drink [tap water] unless it’s an emergency – I would drink a glass then, if I had no water here and the store was closed and I couldn’t get up to the brook. Well, then I’d sip on a little bit. Mostly if I have to use that water, I’ll boil it first” (Goldhar et al., 2014:77) Literature noted that water availability is expected to vary via season, but in recent summers it has been is harder to collect water (Goldhar et al., 2014; Harper et al., 2015; Kipp et al., 2019). One stated: “I started noticing about five years ago. Out around our cabin where we go in the summertime what used to be ponds are now mud holes” and another saying “when there is less water it’s closer to the ground so it might be boggier and dirty…if you have ample water supply you’ll get it from a running brook which will be healthier” (Goldhar et al., 2014: 76).

Due to unreliable and inaccessible water supply, attributed to infrastructure and climatic issues, many rely on buying bottled water, which is extremely expensive; some have filtered water systems but this too is becoming unaffordable. Further, rising gas prices have been identified as an issue for those who prefer to collect water from the Land (Goldhar et al., 2014). Preference for Land water must be recognised as valid, and the drying up of natural sources of water needs to be addressed. Until then, filtered and bottled water must be economically and readily accessible, with investment for better infrastructure.

Ice-related accidents “My neighbour…had fallen through the ice on a hunting trip…he pulled himself out of the water and, in soaking wet clothes, dug himself into a snowdrift for insulation…he spent nearly two days that way before he was found.

Both his legs were already frozen, so they had to be amputated” (Watt-Cloutier, 2018: 186) Ice is essential for travelling; climate change has led to thinner ice and a new problem of less predictability of which ice is safe, as traditional knowledge was normally sufficient (Wilson et al., 2020). Transmission of traditional knowledge has been negatively impacted by residential schools and of Inuit’s need to engage with a diversity of activities which competes with their time, e.g. school and wage employment. Rates of injury and death while travelling on the Land have increased, and ‘search and rescue’ incidents have increased (Segal et al., 2020; Torrealba, 2021).

Loss of ability to travel on the Land impacts mental wellness, food security, and connection to culture as well as safety.

Adaptation to this new reality has been shown by technological initiatives. For example, ‘synthetic aperture radar remote sensing’, combined with traditional knowledge, has been developed to

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identify safeness of ice; Cambridge Bay hunters have found this useful and suggest it could be developed into maps and used in schools to teach children how to go out on the Land (Segal et al., 2020). Another initiative, ‘SmartICE’, uses a similar idea and works in collaboration with Inuit to provide this service (SmartICE, 2022). Due to internet and reception issues, experienced frequently in the region, maps should be downloaded before travel and available on lower bandwidths (Segal et al., 2020).

Where do we go from here?4 Inuit have been adapting to avatittingnik kamatsiarniq since time immemorial; now with human induced climatic changes, compounded by lasting colonial impacts, the ‘historical environment’ needs to be addressed. Wider issues of government approach, policy legislation and research methodology in this sphere need to be reconsidered as systemic problems here feed into the wider discussion of climate change and qanuinngitsiarutiksait.

Government “Government practice for generations was to deny, delay, distract when it came to Indigenous issues” (WilsonRaybould, 2021:2) The first Indigenous Minster of Justice and Attorney General, Jody Wilson-Raybould (2021), noted that during her time in cabinet Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s administration had strong rhetoric with little substance; focus on keeping the party in power; lack of understanding of what decolonisation, reconciliation and a nation-to-nation relationship means in practice; lack of willpower to focus on Indigenous issues; an approach of ‘we know better’ in relation to Indigenous issues; and allowing ‘politics of exclusion to exist’. She sums up this administration as being “focused on power and partisanship and so little interested in principle…that was more image that substance”, and points out that this government can make significant changes which are enacted quickly in situations of crisis – as shown through the COVID-19 response; however, the “government does not see the dire reality that many Indigenous peoples live in as a crisis” (Wilson-Raybould, 2021: 187, 180). Often, government attention towards the Arctic is on economic development through resource extraction, even though this does not allow for sustainable maintenance of the environment, and, historically, mining projects have failed to implement maintainable economic improvement in Inuit Nunangat (Watt-Cloutier, 2018).

In the context of climate change, the ‘Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change’ (Government of Canada, 2016) and ‘A Healthy Environment and a Healthy Economy’ (Government of Canada, 2020) are reports addressing issues of health and climate change. While Indigenous people, including Inuit, were referred to throughout they were not directly involved and did not provide insight into these recommendations (Deranger, 2021). Trudeau’s visit to Nunavut was two years after he became prime minister, reflecting the lack of support this region receives (Little, 2022); now, focus is on the Arctic in relation to climate change only because melting ice makes the nation more accessible to foreign threats, mirroring an attitude which saw relocation of Inuit in the 1950s – suggesting possible military presence in the Arctic again (Connolly, 2022).

Watt-Cloutier (2018) highlights the perpetual misunderstanding in politics of the importance of climate change in the Arctic, exemplified by the Canadian delegation’s refusal to include the Arctic in discussion at Conference of the Parties in 2003, even though she was trying to highlight that the Arctic is the first place to show changes in climate, and that without action the rest of the world

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would follow. This attitude, although from a government over 20 years ago, still represents a government genuinely uninterested in a nation-to-nation relationship, and missing the urgency of understanding the climate crisis.

To fully understand problems Inuit face in this context, federal, provincial and territorial governments need to add climate change in the Arctic on their agenda, but before policy is designed and support given, they must ensure that they have an in-depth understanding of IQ, Inuit personhood and implications of the ‘colonised identity’, thus allowing a holistic approach to qanuinngitsiarutiksait. Impacts of climate change on qanuinngitsiarutiksait are interconnected and multifaceted, and it could be argued that Inuit are more vulnerable to these impacts due to historical environmental conditions driving underlying socioeconomic inequalities, e.g. high food prices, poor housing, water provision and facilities to keep up with the rise of diseases. Lack of attention to these basic provisions contribute to systemic racism and help to perpetuate settler colonialism.

Wilson-Raybould (2021) suggests the administration has taken the stance that the right to selfdetermination, and therefore self-government, is negotiable; when arguably self-determination is the first step towards decolonisation, reconciliation and a nation-to-nation relationship.

Policy “At this late date our job is to build movements, ones powerful enough to force the policy changes that give us our only hope of catching up with physics” (Watt-Cloutier, 2018: xv) To remedy issues of qanuinngitsiarutiksait in the context of climate change, policies need to be situated in a decolonised framework which centres northern context and experiences, instead of merely copying structures in Southern Canada. Policies should facilitate the revival of Inuit governance through insights from the community and collaboration between the community and those enacting policy. This approach promoted by Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK, 2019), the representative body for Inuit in Canada, who encourages collaboration between Inuit and those with access to contemporary climate data, allowing a co-ordinated response, using IQ. This approach has begun to be used e.g. SmartIce or the Arviat greenhouse initiative, but more still need to be done. Alfred and Corntassel (2005: 610) propose that for change to occur, “shifts in thinking and action” are required. ‘Shifts’ include, but are not limited to, revisiting the 1984 Canada Health Act to give space for Indigenous treatment modalities; a greater focus on IQ in research, program planning and delivery; and, given the relative small size of the Inuit community, a better use qualitative research findings for policy and program planning.

Although the 1876 Indian Act does not directly apply to Inuit, attitude of the Canadian government toward Inuit is rooted from these thoughts. In regard to treatment of Indigenous people in Canada Wilson-Raybould (2021: 142) describes the existence of this Act as “segregationist, colonial and racist” suggesting that it is because of “ignorance, fear, greed, and lack of will” that it still exists, and if it continues to exist “there will always be institutionalised, systematic racism in Canada with respect to Indigenous people”. The Canada Health Act is the bedrock of health policy, with its objective to “protect, promote and restore the physical and mental well-being of residents of Canada and to facilitate reasonable access to health services without financial or other barriers" (Government of Canada, 2022). However, federal commitments to enacting policy assisting in health and wellbeing issues of Inuit is “limited” as there are no specific requirements which define “federal obligations towards Indigenous peoples” (Lavoie et al., 2021: 385). Those in the Arctic often receive poorer standards and culturally inappropriate healthcare informed by Southern models – as seen from RSV in infants. Ultimately to achieve No Land, No Health

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equity and maintenance of qanuinngitsiarutiksait these key pieces of legislation need to be revisited where IQ and Inuit voices inform practice.

Policy appears to be driven by economic quantitative data; however, it can be difficult to quantify issues such as the emotional response to climate change and the importance of Inuit knowledge and perspective (Simon, 2021). Thus, for issues such as this attention needs to focus on qualitative data, such as ethnographic works which allow profound findings to surface, or, adaptation of quantitative measures to be wholly applicable to this context. For example, ethnographic works from Saladin D’Anglure (2018) and Stevenson (2014) give insights on Inuit life, traditions and issues that would not be evident from quantitative data. Comprehension to this threedimensionality is integral for the enactment of policy and legislation.

Researchers “Nothing about us, without us” (Morton, 2019: 4) Inuit have experienced a complicated history with researchers due to lack of consultation and consent, attributed to an approach based on colonial hierarchies (Tuck, 2009). Over the past few years research in Inuit Nunangat has become more of a partnership, e.g. links being made between academics and Inuit with projects tackling priorities in the community (ITK, 2018). Although a participatory approach has been used for research, often this is limited to ‘consultation’ and findings are not communicated back to the community (Anang et al., 2019). ITK (2018: 6) suggest five areas for productive and just research to take place: “advance Inuit governance in research; enhance ethical conduct of research; align funding with Inuit research priorities; ensure Inuit access, ownership, and control over data and information; build capacity in Inuit Nunangat research.” Further, they suggest there are issues with funding processes for Inuit-related research, as most funds are given to those in Southern Canada or outside Canada, and that Inuit are limited in the funds they can access due to measures put in place by the federal government.

Methodologically and theoretically a shift is developing is this field, which researchers should take into consideration. For example, the way Liboiron (2021) footnotes and cites Indigenous scholars and the way in which ‘Land’ is capitalised when it indicated a primary relationship (rather than being used in a general sense) should be considered, as used here, given the importance of acknowledging sources and connection to the Land. Further, a shift is needed in how topics related to Inuit are labelled and discussed, as previous literature tends to focus on what has gone wrong rather than what is going well, and the ways in which self-determination can be attained. Tuck (2009) suggests rather than thinking of Indigenous people as ‘broken’ or ‘damaged’, a fuller representation of the community should be taken into account, based on resilience, taking a strengths-based approach, allowing a shift from deficit-oriented research; an approach attempted here, although more thought is needed to adapt to climatic realities.

Conclusion “Change takes courage, including the courage to break away from the old ways of doing things that are not achieving the needed results” (Wilson-Raybould, 2021:26) Improving Inuit qanuinngitsiarutiksait requires holistic self-determination; this comes from acknowledging that colonial legacies still affect Inuit today, that approaches to research, government and policy need to be reconsidered, from a strengths-based approach, with

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acknowledgment of existing problems. This can be done by working in collaboration with Inuit; understanding Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit; recognising issues are interconnected and should not be looked in isolation; taking into consideration the importance of the Land and its associated benefits; taking a cross-disciplinary perspective; not separating the mind and body in approach; acknowledging value of qualitative approaches; and ultimately, commitment from the government to improve. Future research needs to be located in qanuinngitsiarutiksait, Inuit knowledge, Inuit methodologies and be Inuit-led; lack of attention to these facets can be seen to perpetuate ignorance and continuation of the colonial mindset. Additionally, researchers should aim to think in a cross-disciplinary manner, allowing for nuances and greater insights to come to light.

While finding ways to adapt to current climatic realities through innovative solutions is a noble endeavour, and may provide solutions to other issues too (e.g. the greenhouse initiative helping with rising costs of foods in the Arctic and SmartIce assisting with transgenerational teachings of the Land), the aim should not be to accept a worsening climate, but rather to commit to reversing anthropogenic climatic impacts so that Inuit and other Indigenous groups have the right to their culture and associated avatittingnik kamatsiarniq. Exploration has also demonstrated impacts of climate change are compounded by existing socio-economic disparities. To be clear, this is not to say that Inuit in urban settings cannot achieve qanuinngitsiarutiksait, but the scope of this study is to investigate climatic impacts in the Arctic; further research should engage with the impact of climate change on urban Inuit and how this affects them.

Overall, the issue is not just about Inuit in the Arctic, it is about recognising that impacts of climate change occur in the Arctic first; that Inuit have been impacted from climate change earlier and to a greater extent than the rest of the globe. They have served as an early warning beacon and our humanity has been lacking. Now, as citizens of an interconnected globe, acting alongside and in the interest of Inuit can redress historical environmental injustices and launch a healthier and more sustainable, equitable future for Inuit as well as co-benefits for societies beyond the Arctic.

Notes 1. Capitalised to follow Liboiron (2021)’s example as this emphasises importance of the Land in this context, not used in quotations to keep the original meaning 2. Non-Inuit, specifically those of European ancestry 3. Singular of Inuit 4. Inspired from Dr Martin Luther King Jr’s speech in Atlanta, Georgia 1967

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Mena, C., Artz, M., & Llanten, C. (2020). Climate change and global health: a medical anthropology perspective. Perspectives in Public Health, 140(4), 196-197. https://doi.org/10.1177/1757913919897943 Middleton, J., Cunsolo, A., Jones-Bitton, A., Shiwak, I., Wood, M., Pollock, N., Flowers, C., & Harper, S. L. (2020). “We're people of the snow:” Weather, climate change, and Inuit mental wellness. Social Science & Medicine, 262, 113137. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113137 Middleton, J., Cunsolo, A., Pollock, N., Jones-Bitton, A., Wood, M., Shiwak, I., Flowers, C., & Harper, S. L. (2021). Temperature and place associations with Inuit mental health in the context of climate change. Environmental Research, 198, 111166. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2021.111166 Morton, D. (2019). The Urban Indigenous Health Research Gathering. https://umanitoba.ca/research/sites/research/files/2022-02/indigenous-healthresearch.pdf Newell, S. (2018). Social, Cultural, and Ecological Systems' Influence on Community Health and Wellbeing [McMaster University]. https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/24071/2/Newell_Sarah_L_2018_09_ PhD.pdf Niewöhner, J., & Lock, M. (2018). Situating local biologies: Anthropological perspectives on environment/human entanglements. BioSocieties, 13, 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41292-017-0089-5 Ostapchuk, J., Harper, S. L., Willox, A. C., & Edge, V. L. (2015). Exploring Elders’ and Seniors’ Perceptions of How Climate Change is Impacting Health and Well-being in Rigolet, Nunatsiavut / ᕿᒥᕐᕈᓂᖅ ᐃᓐᓇᐃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓄᑐᖃᐃᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᔾᔪᓯᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᕆᒍᓚᑦ, ᓄᓇᑦᓯᐊᕗᒻᒥ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐊᑦᑐᐃᓂᖃᖅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐃᓗᓯᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᓐᖏᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ. International Journal of Indigenous Health, 9, 6-24.

Panikkar, B., & Lemmond, B. (2020). Being on Land and Sea in Troubled Times: Climate Change and Food Sovereignty in Nunavut. Land, 9(12), 508. https://www.mdpi.com/2073445X/9/12/508 Park, C. (1980). Ecology and Environmental Management: A Geographical Perspective. Routledge.

Pool, R., & Geissler, W. (2005). Medical Anthropology. Open University Press.

Princeton University. (2019). Climate change could make RSV respiratory infection outbreaks less severe, more common. Retrieved 27 June from https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/12/191216110139.htm Reiling, S. J., & Dixon, B. R. (2019). Toxoplasma gondii: How an Amazonian parasite became an Inuit health issue. Can Commun Dis Rep, 45(7-8), 183-190. https://doi.org/10.14745/ccdr.v45i78a03 Richards, G., Frehs, J., Myers, E., & Van Bibber, M. (2019). Commentary - The Climate Change and Health Adaptation Program: Indigenous Climate Leaders' Championing Adaptation

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Effort. Health Promot Chronic Dis Prev Can, 39(4), 127-130. https://doi.org/10.24095/hpcdp.39.4.03 Rosol, R., Powell-Hellyer, S., & Chan, H. M. (2016). Impacts of decline harvest of country food on nutrient intake among Inuit in Arctic Canada: impact of climate change and possible adaptation plan. Int J Circumpolar Health, 75, 31127. https://doi.org/10.3402/ijch.v75.31127 Statham, S., (2012). Inuit food security: vulnerability of the traditional food system to climatic extremes during winter 2010/2011 in Iqaluit, Nunavut. Retrieved 6 October from https://idl-bncidrc.dspacedirect.org/items/3352d39c-1a54-4886-96f5-0f24cc2bf771.

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Retrieved 27 June from https://www.arctictoday.com/coronavirus-isnt-the-only-seriousrespiratory-illness-threatening-arctic-residents/?wallit_nosession=1 Segal, R. A., Scharien, R. K., Duerden, F., & Tam, C.-L. (2020). The Best of Both Worlds Connecting Remote Sensing and Arctic Communities for Safe Sea Ice Travel. Arctic, 73(4), 461-484. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26991435 Simon, L. (2021). What can Inuit teach us about climate change and mental health? Retrieved 9 July from https://oneresilientearth.org/what-can-inuit-teach-us-on-climate-change-and-mentalhealth/ SmartICE. (2022). Enabling Resiliency in the Face of Climate Change. Retrieved 10 July from https://smartice.org Stevenson, L. (2014). Life Beside Itself: Imagining Care in the Arctic. University of California Press.

Tagalik, S. (2009). Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit: The Role of Indigenous Knowledge in Supporting Wellness in Inuit Communities in Nunavut. https://www.ccnsa-nccah.ca/docs/health/FSInuitQaujimajatuqangitWellnessNunavut-Tagalik-EN.pdf Tagalik, S. (2018). Inuit Knowledege Systems, Elders, and Determinants of Health: Harmony, Balance, and the Role of Holisitic Thinking. In M. Greenwood, S. d. Leeuw, & N. M. Lindsay (Eds.), Determinants of Indigenous Peoples' Health: Beyond the Social (Second ed., pp.

94-102). CSP Books.

Torrealba, C. (2021). From Inuit Nunangat to the Marsh: How climate change and environmental racism affect population health. Healthy Populations Journal, 1. https://doi.org/10.15273/hpj.v1i2.10663 Tuck, E. (2009). Suspending damage: A letter to communities. Harvard Educational Review, 79, 409427. https://doi.org/10.17763/haer.79.3.n0016675661t3n15 UN. (2023). About water and sanitation. Retrieved 28 April from https://www.ohchr.org/en/waterand-sanitation/about-water-and-

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sanitation#:~:text=OHCHR%20and%20the%20rights%20to%20water%20and%20sanit ation,-Overview&text=On%2028%20July%202010%2C%20the,RES%2F64%2F292).

Waddell, C. M., Robinson, R., & Crawford, A. (2017). Decolonizing Approaches to Inuit Community Wellness: Conversations with Elders in a Nunavut Community. Canadian Journal of Community Mental Health, 36(1), 1-13. https://doi.org/10.7870/cjcmh-2017-001 Watt-Cloutier, S. (2018). The Right to Be Cold. University of Minnesota Press.

Whyte, K. (2017). Indigenous Climate Change Studies: Indigenizing Futures, Decolonizing the Anthropocene. English language notes, 55. https://doi.org/10.1215/00138282-55.1-2.153 Wilson, K., & Henderson, J. (2014). The Indian Act. Retrieved 22 August from https://opentextbc.ca/indigenizationfoundations/chapter/the-indianact/#:~:text=Indian%20Act%2C%201876,and%20still%20in%20existence%20today Wilson, K. J., Bell, T., Arreak, A., Koonoo, B., Angnatsiak, D., & Ljubicic, G. J. (2020). Changing the role of non-Indigenous research partners in practice to support Inuit selfdetermination in research. Arctic Science, 6(3), 127-153. https://doi.org/10.1139/as-2019002 Wilson-Raybould, J. (2021). "Indian" in the Cabinet. HarperCollins Publishers.

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Just Like Alta? A Comparative Study of the Alta and Fosen Cases as Critical Junctures for Sámi Rights in Norway

Luke Laframboise

In February 2023, protests erupted in Olso in response to 500 days of inaction by the Norwegian state following the country's Supreme Court rulings regarding the Fosen wind farm project. Though the events of this case remain ongoing, Fosen has been compared in scope to the Alta conflict in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which is considered one of the most significant events in recent Sámi-state relations in Norway. This article takes that comparison as a baseline question and compares both cases as critical junctures, or, in the case of Fosen, the potential thereof. Making use of an adaption of Hillel David Soifer’s model of critical juncture operative conditions, the underlying factors of each case are examined to determine how such politically charged moments come about and what alternative institutional regimes were proposed during these critical pivot points. As this paper discusses, the comparisons between Alta and Fosen are apt, though the material conditions differ substantially. Rather, the ongoing Fosen case highlights the growing conflict between a well-established Indigenous rights regime and green energy policies that risk the tarnishing of the legacy that the events of Alta helped establish.

Introduction In February 2023, Sámi activists and allies descended on Oslo. After 500 days of waiting for the Norwegian government to act on the rulings regarding the Fosen wind farm project, it became clear that nothing was going to be done (Grimstad, 2023). Sámi and environmental activists, including outspoken climate agitator Greta Thunberg, staged protests across the government quarter, including the temporary occupation of the government ministry for energy and oil (Fouche, 2023). Protesters remained in place for nearly five days before being removed by police.

In response, the government has admitted, in a rare moment of contrition, that the Fosen case represented a clear violation of Indigenous human rights and more must be done (Gaino Buljo, 2023).

Though the events of this case remain ongoing, Fosen has the potential to become a pivot point in Sámi-State relations not unlike the Alta conflict of the late 1970s (Andersen & Midttun, 1985;

Luke Laframboise is a PhD Candidate at Umeå University

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Hjorthol, 2006). Alta, which began as a protest movement against the damming of the Alta River in northern Norway, resulted in the largest Sámi-led protest movement to date (Minde, 2003). More than fifty years later, Alta has become a symbol of Sámi resistance and a clear break between the old policies of assimilation and marginalisation that characterised the previous state relationship.

Yet are the current protests just like Alta? Certainly, on its face, the current protests appear to follow a similar pattern and are certainly evocative of such. However, a closer look at events reveals that much has changed concerning Sámi politics since the 1970s. Sámi rights, once a key point of contention, have repeatedly been strengthened in the decades since in Norway, though perhaps not to the extent that many Sámi might wish (O. Ravna, 2014). The Fosen case, which has been in progress for nearly a decade, was very much an extension of this paradigm, as the rights of Sámi herders were further confirmed, over and above the political will of the state (Ø. Ravna, 2023). It is this status quo that is now being challenged, however obliquely, by the current Norwegian government in allowing the Fosen wind farm to continue to operate. Whether Fosen will follow a similar trajectory to Alta remains an open question, one that may not be answered for months, if not years. Yet, by looking at the conditions under which both protests occurred, we can better understand the current state of Sámi rights in Norway and why the Fosen protests occurred when they did.

To best draw out these conditions, this paper will pull from Historical Institutionalism. This is a political science theory that is useful for understanding the formation of what are termed critical junctures, or moments in which political regimes or institutions change, often under the pressure of changing norms. This article will make use of Hillel David Soifer's model of operative conditions and Slater and Simmons’s critical antecedents (Cappoccia & Kelemen, 2007; Slater & Simmons, 2010; Soifer, 2012). As will be discussed further, this combined model provides a robust structure through which to understand the structural mechanisms that propel political action toward forming a critical juncture through which political institutions may topple or, as Alta will demonstrate, might be reconstituted.

As the outcome of the Fosen protests remains uncertain, it is difficult to compare cases as might be traditionally done in Critical Junctures literature. Instead, the focus will be on a comparison of factors that lead up to the critical moments and, in the case of Alta, what allowed them to fundamentally change the dominant political institution. From there, this comparison will be used as a jumping-off point to discuss what the current moment following the Fosen case ruling represents. Through understanding the conditions that brought these events about we can better understand how such movements turn from political protest to institutional change, and what form this potential change takes.

Background: The Sámi and the Struggle for Self-Determination Before getting into the case, I will briefly introduce the Sámi themselves, as well as provide an overview of the history of Sámi-State relations in Norway. The Sámi are a Finno-Ugric Indigenous people known for their unique history and culture based, in part, on reindeer herding and a traditionally nomadic lifestyle (John B. Henriksen, 2008, p. 27). Throughout their history they have found themselves living under the rule of a variety of different foreign rulers, creating a fractious history. The result of this came in the 19th century when the Sámi population was cut across the borders of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Northwestern Russia (Lantto, 2010).

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In this era, the Norwegian government implemented a series of policies that formed what became known as Norwegianisation (Fornorskning) (Minde, 2005). Designed to assimilate national minorities into the majority population, Sámi cultural practices and languages were heavily discouraged among other destructive practices (Sannhets- og forsoningkommisjonen, 2023). The result was a policy of marginalisation that remained in place until well after the Second World War. In 1968 the official Norwegianisation policies were repealed, however little was done afterwards to replace these policies with anything more supportive (Hjorthol, 2006; Sannhets- og forsoningkommisjonen, 2023). As such, the Alta conflict became a key flashpoint in changing this policy environment. Today, the conflict has become a cultural touchstone amongst Sámi in Norway, as the defining moment in which they fought for and won the constitutionally granted rights and protections they are entitled to today (Aanesland, 2021). It is for this reason that Fosen activists look to Alta for inspiration, as it set the stage for the current state of Sámi rights that has been both enshrined in Norwegian law and the constitution.

Theory: Historical Institutionalism Historical Institutionalism is an approach in political science that works towards explaining how past institutions and events shape current and future political outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth, 1992; Thelen, 1999). Institutions are the primary focus of the theory and are defined as “the rules, norms, and practices that organize and constitute social relations” which are, in turn, “examined for their role in creating constraints and opportunities for political action” (Fioretos, Falleti, & Sheingate, 2016, p. 7). This analytical work is done by examining institutions according to the logic of constancy and change which are conceptualised according to two concepts: path dependence and critical junctures.

Path dependence refers to the idea that once a particular path is taken, it becomes increasingly difficult to change course. This is due to the tendency wherein, as institutions become more and more embedded in society, individuals develop habits and expectations based on them (Peters, Pierre, & King, 2005). In turn, the greater the embeddedness in society, the less likely that change will occur. Should change be desired, that would mean a disruption to the status quo which other institutions and actors have come to rely upon, making change difficult. As a result, even if a more efficient or effective alternative emerges, they are unlikely to be adopted, as the costs and disruptions associated with changing established practices would be considered too high. That is, of course, unless an institution is weakened in some way.

Critical junctures, then, are moments of instability or crisis that create opportunities for institutional change and are considered the answer to the question of institutional change (Cappoccia, 2016; Thelen, 1999). They tend to occur when existing institutions are no longer able to cope with changing circumstances, be it due to changing norms, external shocks or other major moments of stress. At these moments, there is often a window of opportunity for actors to push for institutional change as the cost to do so is unusually low (Schmidt, 2010). Scholars debate to what degree critical junctures can be understood as coming from the institutions themselves or whether other factors play a part (Fioretos et al., 2016, p. 10). However, accordingly, it is in these moments of stress that an institution might “break” and, as a result, be replaced or revised to follow a different path, establishing a divergent path dependency until another such moment should occur.

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Critical Antecedents, Permissive and Productive Conditions Despite the central importance Critical Junctures play in Historical Institutionalist thinking, how they come about is relatively underdeveloped, though this is slowly changing. One such framework, proposed by Hellel David Soifer in 2012, posits that such moments come about and build momentum when certain preconditions are in place which in turn build momentum strong enough to cause institutional change (Soifer, 2012).

According to this framework, he defines two specific factors that should be considered: the permissive conditions under which institutional constraints are eased or in conflict which allow for change to occur, and the productive conditions, which represent the range of possibilities and outcomes that arise during and after the closing of a Critical juncture (Soifer, 2012, pp. 1573-1576).

Expanding on these twin conditions briefly, permissive conditions can be viewed as the factors, events or norm changes that allow for change to occur, while productive conditions represent the ideas and conceptions of how the institution should be changed should a critical juncture produce institutional change. Soifer argues that neither sort of condition is sufficient on its own to produce lasting institutional change (Soifer, 2012, p. 1575).

However, when such conditions arise alongside other factors, a critical moment may grow into something more. Soifer highlights two further factors in his work, however for brevity, I will focus on only one which is termed critical antecedents (Soifer, 2012, pp. 1576-1577). First developed by Slater and Simmons in 2010, critical antecedents, or critical causes, are defined as “factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine with causal forces during a critical juncture to produce long-term divergence in outcomes” (Slater & Simmons, 2010, p. 889). Conceptualised to build a more robust foundation to understand how critical junctures take place, Slater and Simmons further differentiated between successive causes and conditioning causes (Slater & Simmons, 2010, pp. 889-890). Successive cases can be understood as antecedents which directly cause critical junctures to occur, which are often difficult to determine, while conditioning causes are those that help determine what direction the institution will take once the critical juncture passes.

Taken alongside the conditions Soifer proposes, critical junctures are built on a series of contingent parts that form a chain of operation that, in turn, produce institutional change. Should such change be considered, but ultimately rejected, however, a distinct possibility in critical juncture literature, this is termed a “near miss”. Such near misses are defined as a period in which change is proposed, considered and ultimately rejected, resulting in the reinstatement of the previous path of institutional development, with perhaps a few minor concessions towards change (Cappoccia, 2016, p. 95) As we turn into discussions of how these movements come about, this possibility should be kept in mind, as to consider otherwise assumes a degree of determinism that minimises the agency of the actors operating during these moments.

Methodological approach: Comparative Case Study As the term suggests, Historical Institutional work is not often done on current cases. Rather it is used to research past institutional events and the development of new political paradigms.

However, the continued and sustained comparison between the ongoing Fosen case and the Alta conflict of the 1970s represents an intriguing opportunity to consider what factors go into developing a critical moment of institutional change as one is potentially emerging. In addition, as

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will be shown, the current events surrounding the Fosen case protests are directly interlinked with the institution of Sámi rights that came as a direct result of Alta. As such, the rest of this paper will focus on developing the two cases of Alta and Fosen according to an adaption of Soifer’s model using the permissive and productive conditions he discusses to form the structure of comparative analysis. This analysis will be further foregrounded using Slater & Simmons's critical antecedents, as prior political conditions and history are key factor in understanding the formation of the current state of Sámi rights in Norway. The basis for this research includes historical accounts, academic treatments and concurrent news reporting, the latter of which is particularly relevant regarding the ongoing Fosen case and subsequent protests. Using these relevant sources, each case will be constructed as a historical narrative, divided up into sections highlighting the critical antecedents and the events that propelled the critical juncture into reality or, in the case of Fosen, may constitute the formation of such.

This article will then conclude with an analysis of the events of Alta and Fosen in context with the wider green shift. As will be discussed throughout, the current state of the Fosen protests highlights a clear potential for a break between the established normative system put in place in post-Alta Norway. This has been driven, in part, by a shift in political priorities that have placed the Norwegian state in direct collision with the legally protected rights of the Sámi. Whether this will continue to its logical extreme remains unknown as of writing, but it is this potential that the rest of this article will attempt to highlight through the contrasting political factors present in the Alta and Fosen cases.

Case 1: The Alta Conflict (1968-1982) To begin, many factors led to the formation of opposition to the Alta dam project and the protests that arose in 1979. These include the wider international movement towards decolonisation, changing political norms within the Sámi communities towards radical Sámi identification well as the greater role Norway played in protecting indigenous rights across the work (Kalstad, 2013; Minde, 2003; Vik & Semb, 2013). However, there are three processes in particular that I think set the stage best: the formal end of Norwegianisation, the policy gap left by it, and the ultimate decision to dam the river itself.

Critical Antecedents of Alta In 1959, the Norwegian government officially ended the series of policies that collectively formed the Norwegianisation efforts (Hjorthol, 2006; Minde, 2003). Built on the recommendations from what had been termed the Sámi Committee (Samekomiteen) this represented the formal end to a regime that systematically worked to assimilate the Sámi into the Norwegian majority. After more than a century of direct political assimilation, the government relaxed its efforts and began work to establish a more accommodating policy environment towards the Sámi. However, despite these efforts, including the forming of a sort of proto-Sámi Parliament known as the Norwegian Sámi Council (Norsk Sameråd), little material change occurred(Minde, 2003). Attitudes in government remained little different than they had been under Norwegianisation and, as such, the tangible benefits of the formal end of Norwegianisation were few. As such, which had been attempts to build a more accommodating policy scape resulted in an environment of extreme distrust between the state and Sámi.

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The Sámi themselves had not been idle following the end of the Second World War. After a failed attempt at organising during the early 1900s and 1910s, a new generation of Sámi activists, organisers and politicians arose (Lantto, 2000). This began the second wave of Sámi mobilisation, as civil, cultural and, increasingly, political organisations arose to represent their interests. The largest of these was Norgga Sámiid Riikasearvi (Norsk Samers Riksforbund) (NRK), which was formed in 1968 and remains a key figure in Sámi politics today (Gaski, 1993; NSR, 2021, p. 124).

On the international level, the Sámi became more directly tied across borders through the formation of Nordisk Sameråddet/the Nordic Saami Council, which brought Sámi organisations from across the three Nordic borders to organise and discuss how best to promote their culture and protect their culture interests (Rantala, 2004). Through ostensibly divided borders, these crossborder connections, combined with the rise of robust and self-interested political organisations meant that Sámi built a strong foundation for greater political mobilisation. In the wider international sphere, the Nordic Saami Council connected the conditions faced by the Sámi with that of other Indigenous groups across the world (Crossen, 2017). Through this, the Sámi became not just a singular people, but one that shared a struggle with other Indigenous groups across the world. With this came a sense of solidarity that would serve them well in what was to come.

Critical Juncture: Alta It is in this context that the events that would lead to Alta began. In 1968, the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) proposed a dam across the Álttáeatnu/Alta River to power the inner Finnmark region (Andersen & Midttun, 1985, pp. 318-319). In the early plans, the construction would result in the flooding of the small village of Maze (Masi), which had been a majority Sámi settlement for centuries (Andersen & Midttun, 1985, p. 319). Initial reactions to this proposal were mixed in the Norwegian parliament and generally negative in the region affected, but particularly amongst the Sámi of the region. This was because Maze was considered a symbol of Sámi identity, which was further strengthened by the plans to inundate it. Thus, the plans to dam and submerge the settlement without any sort of consultation or discussion was seen as a confirmation that the Norwegian government held little care for the wellbeing of the Sámi people.

When government planners arrived in 1970 to inspect the site they were greeted by nearly 400 protesters armed with signs and a statement for the government that they would not move from the village until the damming was stopped (Andersen & Midttun, 1985). Perhaps due to these early protests or due to other considerations, Maze was protected from damming in the revised plans for the dam in 1973. However, this did not stop the development of the dam itself, as it was deemed far too important to shelf.

In the summer of 1979, construction was set to begin on the Alta Dam. However, the NVE ran into unexpected resistance. In the time since the ratification of construction, the villagers of Mazi and local Sámi groups had united under the banner of opposing the government through a grassroots organisation they called People’s Action against the Building of the Alta-Kainokeino Watercourse (Folkeaksjonen mot utbygging av Alta-Kautokeinovassdraget) (Hjorthol, 2006, p. 32) In short order, a standoff began between government workers and Sámi protesters, centred over the worksite of Stilla. There Sámi and environmental activists chained themselves to the gates of the worksite and stood directly in front of bulldozers, creating stalling construction (Broderstad, 2011, p. 899). As the Sámi and their allies had hoped, their actions swiftly became national news. By October demonstrations sprung up across Norway, but the largest was centred in Oslo, which is

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where the most famous images of the event spring from. Sámi in gakti marched in the streets, a lavvu was set up on the grounds of the Storting and, significantly, a group of Sámi women occupied the Prime Minister’s offices (Hjorthol, 2006).

Behind the scenes, Sámi activists pursued all manner of legal channels to get the dam development stopped. In 1980 the legality of the Alta project was brought before the Norwegian courts (Minde, 2003). Despite the criticism levelled towards the process through which the permissions were granted, it was ultimately ruled in 1981 that the development was legal. As such work began on the Alta Dam once more. In a final show of resistance, a final demonstration was held at Stilla, resulting in mass arrests through one of the largest police actions seen in Norway (Hjorthol, 2006).

Though the Norwegian government had seemingly won the conflict, it now faced a problem: how to respond to such still and sustained resistance. Their solution was a committee establishment of Samerettsutvalget (the Sámi Law Committee) with a mandate to determine potential remedies to the state of Sámi rights protection (Broderstad, 2011, p. 899; Minde, 2003). The work of the commission, which heavily involved Sámi actors, took nearly a decade but the results changed the state of Sámi rights fundamentally. In 1987 the Sámi languages were recognised as official languages through an official act of parliament with further rights enshrined in the constitution. Finally, in 1989 the Norwegian Sámi Parliament was founded, setting the stage for the modern current state of Sámi-State relations (Josefsen, Mörkenstam, & Saglie, 2014).

Permissive Conditions of Alta As the dust of Alta settled, it was hard to see that it would be the critical juncture it ultimately became. The defeat of the Alta case in the courts was viewed as the end of the hopes for institutional change. This was not the case. By looking at the conditions of Soifer’s model it becomes more clear how these events came about.

Going into the 1979 protests, the first permissive condition can be seen as the mismatch between the end of Norwegianization and the political facts on the ground. Going into the 1979 protests, the Norwegian government had done little material work to build goodwill with the Sámi. The formal end of the Norwegianisation policies had done little to change the legacy those policies had built. Nor did the government seem willing to work to correct this situation. Instead, to paraphrase Henry Minde, “The continuation of the old assimilation policy was due to a special power structure that was strengthened unintentionally by the Sámi Committee”(Minde, 2003, p. 77). As such, Sámi actors, organisations and activists had little reason to trust the motivations of NVE and, by extension, the Norwegian government. As such, the choice to build the Alta dam despite protests against its construction brought the Norwegian government's seeming contempt into clear focus.

The second permissive condition was one built by the Sámi themselves. In the years leading up to Alta the groundwork had been laid to create a parallel civil and political society built a strong foundation for political activism. However, it was through its international connections that these organisations transformed from, to quote Henry Minde again, a “pressure group for the disadvantaged to becoming a mouthpiece for international human rights”(Minde, 2003, p. 79). As such, through the protests, court battles and police actions, the Sámi brought with them the understanding that this was about more than just a dam, it was about defending their rights to their lands and their culture, a struggle that was paralleled across the world (Crossen, 2014).

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Thus, as the Alta crisis took off, it was these activists who offered up the productive condition of the conflict: an institutional shift towards the enshrinement of Sámi rights. The alternative was the continuation of a state of political hostility and potential instability that the Norwegian government, through its efforts in establishing the Sámi Committee in 1965, did not wish to continue (Minde, 2003). The Alta conflict resulted in institutional change that broke from the old institutional thinking, towards the new. It is in this environment that the current Fosen case protests take place, and it is on this basis that we consider the conditions that face the potential breakthrough.

Case 2: The Fosen Case (2010 - Present) The Flourishing of Legal Sámi Rights In the four decades following the end of the Alta conflict, the state of Sámi rights transformed. No longer the subject of assimilation and marginalisation, Sámi rights, languages and culture became strictly protected under what became Article 108 of the Norwegian constitution in 1988 (Vik & Semb, 2013). Two years later this was followed up with the adoption of the International Labour Organisation’s Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO 169), making it the first state to do so (Henriksen, 2008, p. 5). This legally binding treaty, amongst other points, further strengthened the protections for Sámi culture and language rights, which were considered fundamental Indigenous rights (ILO, 1989). More directly to this case, however, ILO 169 required free, prior and informed consent to be obtained for any development regarding Indigenous rights and territory. Taken as a whole, Article 108, ILO 169, and the ratification of the International Convent on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1999 have built a strong and seemingly unassailable right for the Sámi to live as they see fit on their own lands, using their own language (Ravna, 2020).

In 2007, Norway further added to these protections, which were already quite bespoke, by adopting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), strengthening an already robust institution of Sámi rights being at the forefront of Norwegian law (Ravna, 2020).

This is perhaps why Fosen is so surprising. After three decades of increasing rights protection for Sámi culture, language and land rights, as evidenced by the ongoing Finnmark estate, the relative silence from the government after the Fosen verdict appears, on its face, to be out of step (Ravna, 2023; Spitzer & Selle, 2019). Whether this will become a critical juncture remains to be seen, but let us now turn to look at how this current moment has developed and what conditions are in place for a shift in policy priorities.

Critical Antecedent 1: The Facts of the Fosen Case The events that ultimately resulted in the Alta case coming to the Supreme Court began in 2010.

In June of that year, NVE, the same directorate that gave the go-ahead for the construction of the Alta dam, issued licenses to build four wind farms on the Fosen peninsula, which is located in Trondelag county ("HR-2021-1975-S (Fosen)," 2021, p. 3). Of the four wind farms, two in particular became the focus of the case, the Roan and the Storheia installations. Due to reorganisation, these licenses would then fall into the hands of Fosen Vind, a state-backed energy company in 2016 ("HR-2021-1975-S (Fosen)," 2021). After these licenses were transferred, the way was made clear for construction on the peninsula. In 2019 the Roan wind farm was put into operation, with the Storheia site following in 2020 ("HR-2021-1975-S (Fosen)," 2021). With

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Storheia’s completion, the Fosen peninsula became home to the largest onshore wind power project in Europe to date.

Since the beginning, however, two siidas, the Sør-Fosen sijte and NordFosen siida, have legally pushed back against this process ("HR-2021-1975-S (Fosen)," 2021). This resistance has formed the basis for the ongoing court case that came to rest in front of the Supreme Court in 2021. The first judgement came in 2013 when the licenses were ruled legal, though minor changes to the footprint of the Storheia wind farm were required. In 2014 Fosen Wind, which was in the process of acquiring the licenses in question, demanded an appraisal of the damages that the Sámi Siidas faced from the operation of the windfarms in question ("HR-2021-1975-S (Fosen)," 2021). SørFosen sijte countered that such an appraisal should be ruled inadmissible because the licenses in question were already in violation of ICCPR, specifically article 27 which gave specific protections of culture, which set the stage for what was to come. As this case wound through the courts, four questions became core to this case: whether the Fosen peninsula was lost to the Sámi as a winter grazing area, to what degree it damaged their livelihood, what sort of compensation was warranted, if at all and, finally, whether the Article 27 rights of the Sámi were violated (Ravna, 2023). However, there was a wider context under which these questions were considered.

Critical Antecedent 2: Environmental Politics In contention more broadly was the question of whether the cultural rights of Sámi reindeer herders would be upheld over the economic and environmental interest of the Norwegian state through its partner Fosen Vind. Although the Fosen case appears to be about Sámi rights, it is part of a much political conversation ongoing with Norway (Inderberg, Rognstad, Saglie, & Gulbrandsen, 2019). Speaking in a more international context, the construction of the Fosen windfarms is part of a much wider push by nations across the world to transition from non-renewal energy sources to renewable sources, all as part of combating climate change. Norway has been at the forefront of this transition(Skjærseth & Rosendal, 2023). Its normative bono fides, favourable conditions for both hydro and wind power and wider societal and political favourability have meant that a veritable renewable boom has taken place (Anker, 2020).

However, this boom has been perceived by many Sámi, particularly reindeer herders, as a threat to their way of life and the rights they had fought hard for. One major concern is the effect wind power has on the well-being of reindeer, which have been argued to be negatively impacted by close exposure to wind turbines, resulting in a change in migration patterns (Eftestøl, Tsegaye, Flydal, & Colman, 2023; Tsegaye et al., 2017). As a result, Sámi herders and their allies have fought fiercely against such developments on traditional lands and herding pastures, as the development of such projects further limits the range of an already embattled industry (Normann, 2021). The term that has increasingly been used to refer to this conflict, is “Green colonialism”, a term with resonant connotations (Kårtveit, 2021; Singh, 2021). The Fosen case ruling, then put this conflict into sharp relief, as one of the major arguments forwarded by the Fosen wind was the “green shift” that the industry was undertaking.

The Supreme Court Ruling and Initial Reception As such, in early October the Norwegian Supreme Court made its ruling regarding the Fosen windfarms. In their view, the operating licenses had been granted in direct contravention of Sámi rights and the Norwegian government’s obligations under Article 27 were violated ("HR-2021-

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1975-S (Fosen)," 2021; NHRI, 2023; Ø. Ravna, 2023). More broadly, in their ruling, the supreme court of Norway argued that the licenses were invalid as a result of the windfarm developments being built contrary to the protection of reindeer herding activities, which had been further protected by Article 27 and in context with article 108 of the Norwegian constitution. Further, they argue that as the developments of these windfarms had changed the land completely, the result was that “the siidas' winter pastures are lost in important areas connected to reindeer husbandry and thus to the reindeer herders’ culture – in late winter ("HR-2021-1975-S (Fosen)," 2021, p. 24).

What this means for the Siidas in question was the ultimate eradication of the grazing resources available, to such an extent that alternative compensation is not possible ("HR-2021-1975-S (Fosen)," 2021, p. 25). Finally, perhaps the most significant ruling for this article is the rejection of the “green shift” as a potential justification for wind farm development. As the court noted, “Article 27 ICCPR does not allow for a balancing of interests”("HR-2021-1975-S (Fosen)," 2021, p. 25). Human rights, and by extent, Sámirights come first. How this situation would be rectified, however, was left to the Norwegian government to decide.

In the wake of this ruling, the Fosen case was hailed as a reaffirmation of Indigenous rights and a curtaining of green industry overreach during a time in which Sámi's livelihoods had been put at risk (Buli & Terje, 2021). It was expected that the offending wind farms would be torn down and the land returned to the pasture land it originated as (Buli, 2021; Ravna, 2023). However, in the year following the ruling little work has been done. The Norwegian government, through the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, has shown little willingness to comply with the verdict. Instead, the Ministry looked toward further remedies to compensate the Siidas while keeping the wind farms in operation. As Öyvind Ravna noted in his treatment of the case, “It is difficult to imagine that the wind turbines can continue to roll at Fosen, at least to a significant extent, without questions being asked about Norway’s ability and willingness to comply with its obligations to the Sámi under international law, and not least, Norway’s ability to comply with its own court decisions under national law” (Ravna, 2023: 175) In February 2023, just such questions were asked, not but outside observers, but by Sámi themselves.

Critical Juncture: the ‘500 Days’ Protests and Government Response Following five hundred days of inaction by the Ministry and the government at large, mass protests erupted in Oslo and across Norway. Activists came together in a manner not seen since Alta spearheaded by the youth wing of NSR, NSR-Nourat, and supported by various Sámi and environmental organisations (Natur og Ungdom, 2023). Marchers in gahki were once again seen on the streets, now with their traditional outfits turned inside out, something considered a striking statement of protest (Fouche, 2023). At one point activists occupied the entrance to the Ministry of Oil and Energy before being removed by police shortly afterwards (Eivind, 2023; Fouche, 2023).

Their demands were simple, respect the verdict of the Supreme Court that the licenses were deemed invalid and have the windfarms removed (Natur og Ungdom, 2023).

The initial response from the Norwegian government was contrition, as the then minister for Oil and Energy, Terje Aasland, recognised that human rights had been violated and something had to be done to rectify the situation (Gaino Buljo, 2023). However, in the weeks and months since, government response has been muted, while the windfarms continue to stand. One of the stated reasons for this is concerns over what effect the loss of energy production would have on Trondolag County (Gaino Buljo, 2023). This is a stance that has been supported in the affected

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region itself, but less so within the wider country (Eivind, 2023). Sámi activists remain wary of what will come next. Protests have continued sporadically both in Oslo and around Fosen, however in the latter case the police temporarily removed protesters, further muddying the waters (Grimstad, 2023; Utsi, 2023). What is clear, however, is that the Sámi and the Norwegian government remain at an impasse that has not been seen since Alta and that has implications for what comes next.

Analysis: The Conditions of Fosen and the Potential Tarnishing of Alta’s Legacy In 1979, the largest Sámi led protests ever seen in Norway erupted across Norway. The Alta conflict was a moment at which the rights of the Sámi to practice their culture and language and protect their traditional lands were forwarded as the alternative to the outdated and colonial policies of Norwegianisation (Minde, 2003). The Fosen case represents a clear challenge to this ongoing institution. Through the Norwegian government’s continued inaction beyond minor concessions to the violation in question, the stability of the institution has been put into question (Ryland Ørnhaug, 2023). The legacy of Alta, in essence, faces being undermined. Returning to Soifer’s model, we can see the underlying conditions that have been building to this point.

As mentioned previously, Historical Institutionalism is not usually used in ongoing cases. As such, it is difficult to determine Soifer’s conditions as easily as for the Alta case. There remain many unknowns regarding the government's response, as well as what other factors have affected the Ministry of Oil and Energy’s decision to withhold on calling for the removal of the wind farms (Grimstad, 2023). With that said, there are two potential conditions I wish to highlight which I consider proto-conditions, or conditions that may drive this situation to become a formal critical juncture. The first is the proto-permissive condition of the court’s judgement, and the second is the proto-productive condition of the wider move towards renewable energy.

The permissive condition within this case can be most clearly seen in the decision of the Supreme Court to pass off remedial action to the Norwegian government ("HR-2021-1975-S (Fosen)," 2021; Ø. Ravna, 2023). Though perhaps unintentionally, this choice has created a gap between action and implementation that has had the consequence of the Ministry of Oil and Energy proverbially dragging its heels in determining an adequate response. As such, this has meant it has meant that the wind farms on Fosen continue to operate (Lønnum Andreassen, 2023). This state of affairs puts into direct question the government’s willingness to follow through with the findings of its own legal system, which in turn has shaken the foundations on which the current institution of Sámi rights stands.

Second, there is the productive condition that is currently driving this move against this established regime, which is the ongoing green shift that has taken place over the past decade. Sámi reindeer herders are no strangers to renewable energy sources displacing their herds, but the current boom in green energy is markedly different (Fohringer, Rosqvist, Inga, & Singh, 2021; Össbo & Lantto, 2011). Spurred by the ongoing green push, the popularity of renewables in Norway has never been higher. In addition, the wider energy crisis that has swept Europe, and the wider world, has made this boom all the more acute. As such, the priorities of the Norwegian government, much like its European peers, have been fixed on building up this infrastructure and creating further sources of electricity (Skjærseth & Rosendal, 2023). As the ongoing Fosen case protests have shown, these priorities are now in conflict not just with the legal requirements handed down to the Supreme

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Court, but also with the legal rights of the Sámi to their cultural practices. The question remains whether the Norwegian government intends to pursue this conflict to its logical conclusion.

Sámi activists, organisations and allies have signalled their concern regarding this clash of priorities since the start of this green transition. It is for this reason that the term “green colonialism” has begun to take hold (Kårtveit, 2021). It is no wonder then that a wind power farm, this generation’s hydroelectric dam, would become the focal point of such a profound protest. The stakes are similar, but the scope is different. During the protests of Alta, the conditions that allowed it to come about were, in part, brought about because of the policy gap left by the official end of Norwegianisation, and the attitudes held over from that era. Today, the Fosen case represents a similar gap. Though much smaller, the approach that the Norwegian government has taken represents a potential breaking point. In essence, the Fosen case is not just like Alta, it is its mirror image. Whether it will result in the continuation of its legacy, or if this will mean a dramatic shift in policy, remains to be seen.

Looking, however briefly, towards the future outcomes it is clear that there will not be a return to the institution of the past. The Supreme Court’s ruling on Fosen makes that abundantly clear, as do the ongoing structures of governance that have arisen in past years such as the Finnmark Estate and the continued commitments expressed as a result of the findings of the Sannhets- og forsoningskommisjonen (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) (Josefsen, Søreng, & Selle, 2016; Sannhets- og forsoningkommisjonen, 2023). The more likely outcome instead will be that the Norwegian government will continue to avoid the licensing issue while attempting to find a compromise that will keep its Green credentials intact while keeping to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Supreme Court ruling. Early indications demonstrate exactly this approach (Ryland Ørnhaug, 2023). Whether this will amount to a further push towards development remains undetermined, as does much about the current actions of the Norwegian government. The fact remains, however, that the Sámi, and their allies, will be closely watching whatever happens next.

Conclusions: The Continual Defence of Sámi Rights To conclude, this article set out to discuss the comparison between the Alta conflict and the ongoing Fosen case protests from the perspective of Historical Institutional theory. The goal was to ask a simple question: how similar are the events and political conditions of Alta in the 1970s to ongoing events surrounding Fosen? To do this, I made use of Hillel David Soifer’s model of critical junctures, which introduced the concepts of permissive and productive conditions to understand how such moments of institutional rupture come about. Combined with Slater and Simmons’ concept of critical antecedents, which Soifer himself builds upon, I constructed a comparative case study to look at the two events.

Through these case studies, the major antecedents to the events and the most probable permissive and productive conditions were highlighted. In the case of Alta, it was the end of the policy of Norwegianisation collapsing without a viable alternative that allowed for a strong and sustained protest to offer up a rights-based alternative. In the case of Fosen, the ongoing events have centred around the failure of the Norwegian government to follow through with an adequate remedy regarding the now illegal wind farms. As Sámi activists have highlighted, this represents a clear threat to the ongoing institution of Sámi rights that have been in place since the 1980s.

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Whether Fosen will ultimately become a true critical juncture, or whether it shall become a near miss is not currently known and will remain unknown for some time. Returning to the initial question posed: Is Fosen just like Alta? There are certainly parallels and there are similar conditions for a rupture to happen. However, should such a critical juncture happen, it may not be to the degree of the Alta conflict, as the core institution of Sámi rights in Norway remains much stronger than the older assimilationist policies in place at the time of Alta. The threat remains, however, that it would perhaps require a much more compelling force to shift the institution. Instead, this represents a challenge towards an institution that has, so far, held strong.

Once the Fosen case protests come to whatever conclusion awaits, a further evaluation of this conclusion will be needed, as well as a further assessment of the factors involved. Until then, this piece should serve as a strong jumping-off point for further discussion. Further work is needed to better understand the effect decarbonisation efforts have on the wider struggle for greater Indigenous rights, as Fosen demonstrates such tension exists even in a state that has ostensibly striven to strike a balance between the two interests.

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Tsegaye, D., Colman, J. E., Eftestøl, S., Flydal, K., Røthe, G., & Rapp, K. (2017). Reindeer spatial use before, during and after construction of a wind farm. Applied animal behaviour science, 195, 103-111.

Utsi, J. A. (2023, 09/07/2023). Tviler på politiets maktbruk på Fosen. NRK. Vik, H. H., & Semb, A. J. (2013). Who Owns the Land? Norway, the Sami and the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 20(4), 517-550. doi:10.1163/15718115-0200400

Laframboise

Existence and Survival: A Dimension of Indigenous Self-Determination in the Context of Climate Change Impacts

Dave-Inder Comar

This article argues for an “existence and survival” dimension of the self-determination of Indigenous Peoples. This dimension is supported by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as well as international and regional human rights law. This article proposes that such an existence and survival dimension should be expressly delineated in the context of climate change impacts. This article then analyses threats to the existence and survival of Arctic Indigenous People posed by climate change impacts as alleged before a variety of international legal fora. The article concludes by discussing possible legal consequences on States for breaches of the existence and survival dimension of self-determination with respect to Arctic Indigenous Peoples.

Introduction Anthropogenic global warming is destabilising ecosystems all over the world but is having a particularly pronounced impact on the Arctic. The Arctic is warming four times faster on average than the rest of the planet (Rantanen, 2022). Recent projections suggest that the Arctic will be sea ice-free in September as early as the 2030s-2050s under any emissions scenario (Kim, 2023).

Impacts from climate change in the Arctic are now threatening loss of land and natural resources that are crucial to the subsistence lifestyles of Indigenous Peoples (Abate and Warner, 2013: 6-7).

Indigenous communities in the Arctic, including members of the Inuit and Arctic Athabaskan Indigenous Peoples as well as the Native Village of Kivalina, have sought international legal redress related to climate change impacts in the Arctic that are negatively impacting their human rights as well as their very survival. This article reviews these claims from the perspective of the right of selfdetermination of Indigenous Peoples. This article argues that an “existence and survival” dimension of self-determination should be doctrinally recognised within the context of possibly Dave-Inder Comar, PhD candidate at The Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies at Leiden University, and Executive Director of Just Atonement Inc.

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existential threats to Arctic Indigenous Peoples presented by climate change impacts, and that breaches of such a dimension may carry legal consequences for Arctic States.

The Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples under International Law The right of self-determination is “one of the essential principles of contemporary international law” (ICJ, Case Concerning East Timor, 1995: ¶ 29), and a “fundamental human right” (ICJ, Chagos Archipelago, 2019: ¶ 144) with erga omnes status (ICJ, Construction of a Wall in The OPT: ¶¶ 155-156; ICJ, Chagos Archipelago, 2019: ¶ 180), meaning that States owe an obligation to the international community as a whole with respect to the norm, and that all States have a legal interest in its protection (ILC, 2001, art 48 comments (8), (9); Saul, 2011: 631-632). After the ratification of the UN Charter, self-determination became the primary vehicle for decolonisation efforts and it is now well settled that UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) provides the legal foundation for the right of peoples in colonial territories to enter the international legal order as independent States (Chagos Archipelago, 2019: ¶ 150; Saul, 2011: 613; Drew, 2001: 658-659; Crawford, 2006: 106). The adoption of the Friendly Relations Declaration in 1970 strengthened a broadened conception of self-determination in defining additional forms of “alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” beyond that of colonialism, including foreign occupation (UNGA, 1970, Principle V; Espiell, 1980: ¶ 45; Cassese, 1995: 90; Wewerinke-Singh, 2019: 100-101; Jones, 2023: 3; UNGA, 1992: ¶ 2; ICJ, Construction of a Wall in The OPT, 2004: ¶¶ 87, 88, 115, 122, 52). Other international frameworks, including the Helsinki Final Act, have shifted the definitional focus of self-determination towards a continuing, permanent right of all peoples to determine their “internal and external political status” “when and as they wish,” in order to perfect and protect their legal, political, economic, social, and cultural sovereignty (OSCE, 1975, Principle VIII; Cassese, 1995: 285-288; see also Vienna Declaration, 1993; CERD Committee, 1996).

Common article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (“Common Article 1”), adopted in the late 1960s and both entering into force in 1976, augmented the right of selfdetermination by recognising an explicit human rights component of the norm. Common Article 1(1) of the two covenants guarantees that, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” Common Article 1(2) protects the rights of all peoples to, “for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.” Finally, Common Article 1(3) obligates States to “promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right.”

In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), representing the first “explicit and widespread” recognition by States that the right of self-determination applies to Indigenous Peoples as at least one other category of “peoples” with rights under international law (Quane, 2011: 259-260; Cambou, 2020: 2; Jones, 2021: 9; Xanthaki, 2022: 84). The UNDRIP states that Indigenous Peoples “have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms” under recognised international law (article 1), “are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals,” (article 2), and “have the right to self-determination” (article 3).

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According to the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2021: ¶ 14), “All the rights in the Declaration are indivisible, interdependent and grounded in the overarching right to self-determination.” The American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (ADRIP), adopted in June 2016 at the third plenary session of the OAS General Assembly, comprises a second international legal declaration related to the rights of Indigenous Peoples and contains similar recognition of the right of self-determination (article 3). The ADRIP arguably reflects an express recognition of the self-determination of Indigenous Peoples within the legal framework of the Inter-American system (Monteiro de Matos, 2020: 24).

There remains significant discussion in the literature regarding the scope and nature of Indigenous self-determination captured by the UNDRIP stemming in part from the language used in articles 4 and 46 (Xanthaki, 2022: 75-77). Article 4 of the UNDRIP focuses the exercise of Indigenous self-determination on a “right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to [Indigenous Peoples’] internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.” Separately, paragraph 1 of article 46 states that nothing in the UNDRIP shall be deemed as authorising or encouraging the dismemberment or impairment of the territorial integrity or political unity of States. These two articles in particular have led some scholars to conclude that Indigenous self-determination contains a more limited purview of rights than that provided by the general law of self-determination and is focused primarily on the “internal” aspects of selfdetermination (Koivurova, 2010: 203; Quane, 2011: 269, 285; Cambou, 2019: 36-37). Other scholarship argues that Indigenous Peoples comprising “peoples” under international law are equal to all other “peoples” with respect to their rights, including the possibility of a right to secession— analysis also supported by the International Law Association in a 2010 report (Dorough, 2011: 512-513; Scheinin and Åhrén, 2018: 71-73; Xantahki, 2022: 77; ILA, 2010: 10). The UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples takes a third approach, describing “internal” selfdetermination for Indigenous Peoples as consisting of the ability to freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development, whereas “external” self-determination includes the ability to maintain and develop relationships with their members across State borders and to participate in the international community with equal rights, including through participation in the international Indigenous movement and in international fora (Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2021: ¶¶ 15-17).

As further discussed below, UN human rights mechanisms such as the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) as well as the Inter-American human rights system have recognised that at least some Indigenous Peoples constitute “peoples” for purposes of Common Article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. The UNDRIP does not purport to declare or limit the full scope of the rights of Indigenous Peoples under international law, and in fact, it expressly declines such an interpretation under article 45. The principle of self-determination instructs the “equal rights” of peoples (UNGA, 1970, Principle V; Helsinki Final Act, 1975, Principle VIII), which the UNDRIP also affirms in article 2—declaring that Indigenous Peoples and individuals “are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals.” Fidelity to the principle of equal rights cautions against distinguishing subsets of “peoples,” some of whom possess a full panoply of international rights, and others with only a subset of rights. To the extent that at least some Indigenous Peoples constitute “peoples” under international law—a conclusion doctrinally supported by both HRC and Inter-American jurisprudence—the UNDRIP should not be interpreted to limit applicable

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rights, whether rooted in Common Article 1 or elsewhere, including a right to “internal” and “external” aspects of self-determination (CERD Committee, 1996: ¶ 4).

The Triadic Relationship Between Self-Determination with Cultural Integrity and with Lands, Territories, and Resources A defining characteristic of Indigenous self-determination is a triadic link between (i) selfdetermination with (ii) culture and cultural integrity and with (iii) lands, territories, and resources (Wiessner, 2012: ¶¶ 3.1, 3.2; Daes, 2005: 76-79; Åhren, 2016: ¶ 6.3.4; UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2020: ¶ 5; Voukitchevitch, 2021: 189-190; Gilbert, 2016: 239; Fuentes, 2017: 233). This connection was acknowledged as early as 1989 in article 13 of ILO Convention No. 169 and has been affirmed and strengthened in the UNDRIP and the ADRIP. The UNDRIP prohibits the forced assimilation or destruction of culture and the forcible removal of Indigenous Peoples from their lands and territories (UNDRIP, arts. 8, 10; see also ADRIP, art X). Both the UNDRIP and the ADRIP recognise the right of Indigenous Peoples to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas, and other resources (UNDRIP, art 25, ADRIP, art XXV(1)), as well the right to the lands, territories, and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired (UNDRIP art 26(1), (2); ADRIP arts XXV(2), (3)). States must also “give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources” with “due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned” (UNDRIP, art 26(3); ADRIP, art XXV(4)).

The triadic link between (i) self-determination with (ii) culture and cultural integrity and (iii) with lands, territories, and resources means that the disruption of the linkages between Indigenous Peoples with either their culture or with their lands, territories, or resources will necessarily implicate their self-determination. In the case of culture, for example, the HRC takes the position that at least some Indigenous communities are both “minorities” entitled to protection under article 27 of the ICCPR (right to minority culture), as well as “peoples” under article 1 of the ICCPR and thus beneficiaries of the right to self-determination contained therein (Scheinin, 2005: 6)—establishing a doctrinal link in international human rights law that infringements on the right to culture of Indigenous Peoples can also implicate the right of self-determination (HRC, 1990: Lubicon ¶ 32.2; HRC, 2019: Sanila-Aikio, ¶¶ 6.8-6.11; Castellino, 2005: 61). The HRC also cites to article 1 in its Concluding Observations country reports of States parties’ conduct under the ICCPR in recommending how States may better protect the rights of Indigenous Peoples (Gilbert, 2016: 236-237), including the right to dispose freely of their natural resources pursuant to the right of self-determination (Cambou, 2022: 157). For example, in its 1999 Canada country report, the HRC affirmed that “the right to self-determination requires, inter alia, that all peoples must be able to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources and that they may not be deprived of their own means of subsistence (art. 1, para. 2)” including with respect to “aboriginal peoples” in Canada (HRC, 1999, Canada: ¶¶ 7-8).

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which monitors compliance with the ICESCR, has also affirmed the triadic connection between aspects of self-determination (in this case, the right to the means of subsistence and natural resources) with culture and with lands, territories, and resources in its General Comment No. 21 (2009: ¶ 36), concluding that the “strong communal dimension of indigenous peoples’ cultural life is indispensable to [Indigenous Comar

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Peoples’] existence, well-being and full development, and includes the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired,” and must be protected by States parties in order to prevent degradation of their way of life, “including their means of subsistence, the loss of their natural resources, and ultimately, their cultural identity.”

In its General Comment No. 26 issued in 2023 related to cultural aspects of the right to land, the CESCR again affirmed aspects of this triadic link, observing that “land is also closely linked to the right to self-determination, enshrined in article 1 of the Covenant” and that, “Indigenous Peoples can freely pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development and dispose of their natural wealth and resources for their own ends only if they have land or territory in which they can exercise their self-determination” (¶ 11). The close link between land and the ability to take part in cultural life is “particularly relevant for Indigenous Peoples” on account of the “spiritual or religious significance of land to many communities” (¶ 10).

Existence and Survival in the Inter-American and African Regional Systems and before the UN Human Rights Committee In both the Inter-American and African regional human rights systems, the triadic conception of Indigenous self-determination finds doctrinal emphasis in the protection of the existence and survival of Indigenous Peoples. In the 2007 Saramaka case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights first relied on the right of self-determination, including Common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR, to interpret indigenous land and resource rights (Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R., Saramaka, 2007: ¶¶ 93-95; Shelton, 2011: 63, 75-76) and also articulated an “inextricable connection” between Indigenous Peoples with their territory and the “natural resources that lie on and within the land” which required protection under article 21 (Right to Property) of the American Convention on Human Rights (the “American Convention”) to “guarantee their very survival” (Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R., Saramaka, 2007: ¶ 122). In the 2012 Sarayaku case, the Inter-American Court reiterated that article 21 protects the close connection between Indigenous Peoples with their territory and resources, something “necessary to ensure their survival” and to “ensure that they can continue their traditional way of living, and that their distinctive cultural identity, social structure, economic system, customs, beliefs and traditions are respected, guaranteed and protected by the State” (InterAm. Ct. of H.R., Sarayaku, 2012: ¶ 146). The Inter-American Court also separately focused on cultural integrity and cultural survival as a “fundamental right” of Indigenous Peoples (¶ 217). The Inter-American Court has subsequently reaffirmed the link between lands, territories, and resources with culture and with indigenous survival in later cases, including in Garífuna Community of Triunfo de la Cruz and its Members v. Honduras (2015: ¶¶ 100-103), Xucuru Indigenous People and its Members v.

Brazil (2018: ¶ 115), and in its 2017 advisory opinion related to the right to a healthy environment (¶ 48).

In the African regional human rights system, the Endorois decision from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “African Commission”) and the Ogiek decision from the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “African Court”) have affirmed a right to existence and survival connected to cultural integrity as well as to the use of lands, territories, and resources, in part through reliance on Inter-American doctrine. In the Endorois decision involving allegations of displacement of the Endorois Indigenous community in the Lake Bogorio area of Kenya, the African Commission stressed that article 17 (protecting the right to culture) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “African Charter”) imposed a “higher duty” Existence and Survival: A Dimension of Indigenous Self-Determination in the Context of Climate Change Impacts

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on States “in terms of taking positive steps to protect groups and communities like the Endorois” to avoid “the danger of extinction” (Afr. Comm. on H.P.R., Endorois, 2010: ¶ 248; Claridge, 2019: 268). Similarly, with respect to property protections under article 14 of the African Charter, the African Commission relied in part on Saramaka to conclude that States may have an obligation to take special measures to protect the connection of Indigenous Peoples with their lands and territories and to ensure the survival of Indigenous Peoples “in accordance with their traditions and customs” (¶ 187). In discussing the protection of the resources of Indigenous Peoples under article 21 (right of peoples to free disposition of natural resources), the African Commission again cited to Saramaka for the proposition that “the cultural and economic survival of indigenous and tribal peoples and their members depends on their access and use of the natural resources in their territory that are related to their culture and are found therein,” which grants to Indigenous communities “the right to own the natural resources they have traditionally used with their territory”; without them, “the very physical and cultural survival of such peoples is at stake” (¶¶ 260-261, 267-268). In 2017, in the Ogiek decision, the African Court found breaches of these same three articles of the African Charter (among others) in reviewing allegations that Kenya had violated the rights of 30,000 members of the Ogiek Indigenous community by displacing the Ogiek from their ancestral land of the Mau Forest (Afr. Ct. H.P.R, Ogiek, 2017: ¶¶ 122-131, 176-190, 195-201).

In its 2022 reparations order, the African Court affirmed that the “protection of rights to land and natural resources remains fundamental for the survival of indigenous peoples” and that the close ties between Indigenous Peoples with their land “must be recognised and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, spiritual life, integrity and economic survival.” (Afr. Ct. H.P.R., Ogiek, 2022: ¶¶ 109, 112).

The existence and survival of Indigenous Peoples is also a concern of the HRC and has been addressed in HRC jurisprudence under article 27 of the ICCPR (right to minority culture). In the 2009 Ángela Poma Poma decision, the HRC reviewed correspondence made by an Indigenous author who alleged that the diversion of the river Uchusuma by the government of Peru had led to the deaths of thousands of head of livestock. Consequently, the “community’s only means of survival—grazing and raising llamas and alpacas—has collapsed, leaving them in poverty,” which deprived the community of their livelihood (¶¶ 2.1-2.3, 3.1). The HRC, citing its General Comment No. 23, first observed that article 27 is “directed to ensure the survival and continued development of cultural identity” of minority communities, which “may require positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them” (¶ 7.2). The diversion of water had a substantive negative impact on the author’s enjoyment of her right to enjoy the cultural life of the community to which she belonged, and neither the author nor her community had been consulted prior to the water diversion, amounting to a violation of article 27 (¶¶ 7.5, 7.7). In the 2022 Billy decision, the HRC reiterated that protection of the right to minority culture under article 27 in the context of Indigenous Peoples was “directed towards ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural identity” (¶ 8.13). The failure by Australia to implement timely adaptation measures against climate change impacts that were eroding lands and natural resources used for traditional fishing and farming and for cultural ceremonies by the Indigenous authors amounted to a violation of rights under article 27 (¶ 8.14).

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Claims Made by Arctic Indigenous Peoples Implicating the Existence and Survival Dimension of Self-Determination in the Context of Climate Change Members of Indigenous Peoples from the Inuit and Athabaskan Indigenous communities as well as from the Native Village of Kivalina have now presented claims in the Inter-American system as well as to UN Human Rights Council Special Procedures related to the existential nature of climate change impacts in the Arctic. These alleged impacts include threats to their means of subsistence, their connection to historic lands, territories, and resources, their cultural practices, their selfdetermination, and ultimately their existence and survival as peoples. One such petition was filed in 2005 by Sheila Watt-Cloutier before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the “Inter-American Commission”), arguing that the acts and omissions of the United States with respect to climate change were infringing a variety of human rights protected by the American Convention and American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (the “American Declaration”). Watt-Cloutier alleged “severe” impacts in the Arctic related to changes in weather, snow, and ice, as well as changes to biodiversity and new adverse health conditions, all of which were infringing on the rights to culture, the use and enjoy traditional lands, property, health and life, residence and movement, and the means of subsistence (Watt-Cloutier, 2005: 1-6). The petition specifically argued that deprivation of the means of subsistence amounted to a violation of the right of self-determination (Watt-Cloutier, 2005: 94.) The changes to the physical environment caused by climate change were “seriously threatening the Inuit’s continued survival as a distinct and unique society” (Watt-Cloutier, 2005: 67). “Like other indigenous peoples, the Inuit rely on the natural environment for their cultural and physical survival . . . Destruction of the delicate arctic ecosystem is therefore inconsistent with [the Inuit’s] right to be respected as … human being[s]” (Watt-Cloutier, 2005: 74). The petition was dismissed in 2006 by the InterAmerican Commission and was never reviewed on its merits (OAS 2006). However, in 2007, WattCloutier was permitted to provide testimony on these issues before the Inter-American Commission (Watt-Cloutier, 2007; CIEL, 2007).

A second petition by Arctic Indigenous Peoples before the Inter-American Commission was brought in 2013, this time by members of Arctic Athabaskan Indigenous Peoples seeking review of Canada’s alleged failure to regulate the impacts of black carbon emissions and the consequent aggravation of warming in the Arctic (Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2013). The Arctic Athabaskan petition described how, “Athabaskan traditions, food sources, and livelihoods are inextricably tied to the ecosystems of the Arctic tundra and boreal forests,” and that many Athabaskan peoples “live off the land” through a subsistence diet (Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2013: 1-2). The petition alleged that a significant cause of warming in the Arctic was “Canada’s failure to regulate emissions of black carbon” a “potent climate warming agent” on account of the fact that while in the air, it absorbs sunlight and heats the atmosphere (Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2013: 2). Arctic Athabaskans’ culture depended on a healthy Arctic environment, which is “essential to subsistence and survival” (Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2013: 2). This included the ability to pass on Arctic Athabaskan knowledge from one generation to the next, an essential aspect of cultural survival (Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2013: 3). The petition argued that the State had an obligation to protect Indigenous Peoples against environmental harms and that “the possibility of maintaining social unity, of cultural preservation and reproduction, and of surviving physically and culturally, depends on the collective, communitarian existence and maintenance of the land” (Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2013: 54 (citing to Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Awas Tingni, 2001: ¶ 39)). The petition Existence and Survival: A Dimension of Indigenous Self-Determination in the Context of Climate Change Impacts

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argued that “special measures” can sometimes be required in order to help ensure the physical and cultural survival of Indigenous Peoples, which in the case of the Arctic Athabaskan Indigenous Peoples required Canada to take measures to protect them from the environmental degradation caused by black carbon affecting rights to culture, property, health, and means of subsistence (Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2013: 57.) As of this writing, the Inter-American Commission has not responded to the petition.

A third claim by Arctic Indigenous Peoples was presented in 2020 by members of five Indigenous communities in the United States—four located in the US state of Louisiana, and one located in the Native Village of Kivalina in the US state of Alaska (the “Five Tribes”), who submitted a joint complaint to a variety of Special Procedures established by the United Nations Human Rights Council alleging human rights violations by the United States government related to climate change impacts (Five Tribes, 2020). These Five Tribes alleged that they were being “forcibly displaced from their ancestral lands” because of climate change impacts and related human-made disasters, including “rising sea levels, catastrophic storms, and unchecked extraction of oil and gas” (Five Tribes, 2020: 9). Such climate change impacts were causing them to lose their cultural traditions and ancestral lands and were infringing on their “tribal nation sovereignty and self-determination,” ultimately presenting existential risks (Five Tribes, 2020: 9). The Native Village of Kivalina alleged a connection between the “catastrophic changes to the environment” and “catastrophic land collapse” in the Arctic from increased flooding, erosion, and permafrost loss, to threats to the “lives and livelihoods of Alaska Native communities” (Five Tribes, 2020: 30-32). The Native Village of Kivalina faced “imminent threats” from rising temperatures and storm vulnerability (Five Tribes, 2020: 32). All of the Tribes expressly alleged “the endangerment of cultural traditions, heritage, health, life and livelihoods” and interference with “tribal nation sovereignty and selfdetermination” from climate change impacts. By refusing to act, the United States had “placed these Tribes at existential risk” (Five Tribes, 2020: 9).

The Five Tribes alleged several violations of human rights, including the right to life, the right to self-determination, the right to cultural heritage, the right to subsistence and food security, the right to safe drinking water, physical and mental health, and an adequate standard of living (Five Tribes, 2020: 38-48). The Five Tribes sought remedies against both the United States government as well as the Louisiana and Alaska state governments, including recognition of their “self-determination and inherent sovereignty,” involvement in relevant decision-making processes (including free, prior, and informed consent to future infrastructure projects and oil and gas exploration), and government protection and funding to support the Five Tribes’ cultural connection to their ancestral lands and their means of subsistence (Five Tribes, 2020: 10-11). They also sought funding for “adaptation measures” on account of increased sea-level rise and funding to implement the tribal-led relocation process for the Alaska Native Village of Kivalina and the Isle de Jean Charles Tribe (Five Tribes, 2020: 10-11).

On September 15, 2020, nine of the contacted Special Procedures sent a communication to the United States with respect to the Five Tribes Complaint (Human Rights Council, 2020). The communication expressed “utmost concerns” about the impacts of climate change on the Five Tribes, including to “their collective rights as indigenous peoples such as their right to selfdetermination, to their traditional lands, territories and resources, and to engage in their cultural and religious practices” (Human Rights Council, 2020: 7). The response included an international

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legal annex that dedicated several paragraphs to the particular rights of Indigenous Peoples under international law. The annex observed the “real threat of cultural extinction” of Indigenous Peoples because of climate change impacts (Human Rights Council, 2020: 12-13). The annex further observed that article 25 of the UNDRIP protected the right of Indigenous Peoples to “maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship” with historic lands, territories, waters, coastal seas, and other resources, including for purposes of upholding such responsibilities to future generations (Human Rights Council, 2020: 12). The annex also recalled the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, and specifically, provisions requiring States parties to “take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change” and to “address climate change, respect, promote and consider respective obligations on human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples” (Human Rights Council, 2020: 13-14). As of this writing, no further public communications have taken place related to the Five Tribes Complaint.

Recognising an Existence and Survival Dimension to Self-Determination in the Context of Climate Change Impacts Arctic Indigenous Peoples have now formally described and alleged threats to their existence and survival because of climate change impacts, which include threats to their self-determination and related cultural and land, territory, and resource rights. This article argues that the existential threats described by Arctic Indigenous Peoples from climate change impacts warrant recognition of an explicit “existence and survival” dimension of Indigenous self-determination. First, as discussed above, Indigenous Peoples themselves have recognised the link between alleged infringements on their self-determination from State action or inaction on climate change and the risks to their continued existence and survival, including from losses of territory, resources, culture, and their means of subsistence. Regional human rights jurisprudence already acknowledges that the cultural integrity of Indigenous Peoples and their connection to their lands, territories, and resources are integral components of Indigenous existence and survival (Summers, 2019: 5)—for example, in the Saramaka, Sarayaku, Endorois, and Ogiek decisions—and jurisprudence from the HRC has similarly tied the guarantee of the self-determination of Indigenous Peoples under Common Article 1 to article 27’s protection of cultural practices associated with historic lands, territories, resources, and ways of life (Lubicon, 1990; Sanila-Aikio, 2019). There is thus a legal foundation in regional and international human rights law for delineating an express protection of the existence and survival of Indigenous Peoples as a specific dimension of Indigenous self-determination—a dimension that needs recognition and protection in the face of climate change impacts.

Second, delineating an existence and survival dimension of Indigenous self-determination is doctrinally supported and implied, inter alia, by the UNDRIP, which according to Hohmann enshrines “a right to the protection of indigenous peoples’ continued survival and existence, both physically as individuals, and as collective entities, in accordance with levels of human dignity and well-being” in part through Articles 7(2), 8, and 43 (Hohmann, 2018: 150). An existence and survival dimension can be further inferred from the right of peoples to freely determine their political status, to freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development, and the prohibition against depriving peoples of their own means of subsistence protected by Common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR, which all imply a breach of the human right of selfdetermination in instances where peoples lose their ability to subsist or to freely determine and Existence and Survival: A Dimension of Indigenous Self-Determination in the Context of Climate Change Impacts

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pursue their development. An existence and survival dimension can be further inferred from the equal rights of peoples under international law and the positive obligation on States to support the self-determination of peoples (ICCPR, art 1(3); ICESCR, art 1(3)), which suggest that the international legal system exists in part to protect the existence and survival of peoples (Friendly Relations Declaration, Principle V; UNDRIP arts 2, 3; ADRIP arts 2, 3; ICJ, Construction of a Wall in The OPT: ¶¶ 155-156; ICJ, Chagos Archipelago, 2019: ¶ 180). Finally, a right to existence and survival can be inferred from the prohibition against genocide, which is an act that fundamentally threatens the interests of the international community (Wouters and Verhoeven, 2005: 403), and from the right of peoples to defend their self-determination through force in the context of national liberation from colonisation (Yau, 2020: 63-65). The argument in international law that peoples may lawfully use force to resist some kinds of infringements on their self-determination suggests, a fortiori, a fundamental assumption that such peoples have an underlying right to existence and survival within the international system itself.

Recognition of an existence and survival dimension of self-determination frames possibly existential climate change impacts as infringements of an arguable peremptory norm of international law (Cassese, 1994: 140; ILC, 2001, art 26, comment (5); ILC, 2022, Annex (h); compare with Park, 2021: 711) and a fundamental human right as protected by Common Article 1. Such recognition would further delineate a duty on those States carrying obligations to Indigenous Peoples to refrain from threatening their existence and survival as well as to promote and protect it. In the context of climate adaptation action, for example, a State may be under an international legal obligation to implement appropriate adaptation measures to protect the existence and survival of Indigenous Peoples in its jurisdiction. In the Billy decision from 2022, the HRC concluded that Australia’s delay in implementing relevant adaptation measures to protect the Indigenous authors from climate change impacts amounted to a breach of the positive obligations imposed by articles 17 and 27 of the ICCPR (HRC, Billy, 2022: ¶¶ 8.12, 8.14). Australia was under a subsequent obligation to protect the authors’ “continued safe existence” and to make “full reparation” for such violations of human rights (¶ 11)—remedies consistent with principles of State responsibility requiring States to cease an internationally wrongful act and to make reparation “for the injury caused” by that internationally wrongful act (ILC, 2001, art 28 comment (2); arts 30, 31; Shelton, 2012: 373-374). As detailed above, Arctic Indigenous Peoples have described how changing conditions in the Arctic are leading to territorial, resource, and cultural loss impacting their existence and survival, mirroring the allegations made by the authors in Billy. The alleged delay

by Arctic States in implementing appropriate adaptation measures to protect the existence and survival of Arctic Indigenous Peoples within their jurisdiction is not only a potential breach of the human rights obligations outlined in Billy, but also of the self-determination of such affected Arctic Indigenous Peoples, including the positive obligation to promote their self-determination.

Secondary obligations flowing from a breach of self-determination could require, among other things, adaptation measures designed to protect the means of subsistence of Arctic Indigenous Peoples from climate change impacts as well as their connection to their lands, territories, resources, and related cultural practices and lifestyles. Appropriate adaptation measures must further protect the political, economic, social, and cultural sovereignty of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and their ability to make decisions related to their internal and external status in a warming world. In light of the rapid environmental changes taking place in the Arctic, implementation of these kinds of adaptation policies, in addition to the obligation to make reparation, could involve

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significant financial costs to Arctic States or dramatic kinds of “special measures” to protect the physical and cultural survival of Indigenous Peoples in the language of regional human rights jurisprudence (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Saramaka, 2007: ¶¶ 85-86, 90-91, 96, 103, 121; Afr. Comm.

H.P.R., Endorois, 2010: ¶ 187).

Billy is also noteworthy for opening the door to legal scrutiny of the emissions-generating conduct of States, particularly high-developed, high-emitting States. The HRC concluded that Australia’s alleged actions and omissions with respect to mitigation measures could be reviewed on account of Australia being “among the countries in which large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions have been produced” and also ranking “high on world economic and human development indicators” (HRC, Billy, 2022: ¶ 7.8). While the HRC did not further opine on the Billy authors’ mitigation claims, this admissibility determination suggests that high-developed States responsible for significant amounts of greenhouse gas emissions may have certain kinds of obligations to mitigate such emissions under the ICCPR. Just like the authors in Billy, Arctic Indigenous Peoples are facing “real predicaments” from the continued burning of fossil fuels that have “already compromised their ability to maintain their livelihoods, subsistence and culture,” including “serious adverse impacts that have already occurred and are ongoing . . . more than a theoretical possibility” (HRC, Billy, 2022: ¶ 7.10). Years and years of issuing licenses for fossil fuel exploitation, exporting fossil fuels, or providing subsidies to fossil fuel enterprises, among many other State activities, could be framed as attributable State conduct (Wewerinke-Singh, 2019: 90-92) constituting a breach of the self-determination of Arctic Indigenous Peoples on account of such conduct transforming the Arctic and threatening Indigenous existence and survival, either as a direct breach of selfdetermination or perhaps a composite breach consisting of a series of actions or omissions wrongful in the aggregate (ILC, 2001, arts 12, 15; art 15 (comment 8)). Because omissions can also constitute a breach of an international obligation (Weatherall, 2020: 197-198; ILC, 2001, art 2 comment (4)), the omission or failure by high-developed, high-emitting Arctic States to dramatically reduce their emissions-generating conduct in a warming world could also constitute a failure to discharge positive obligations to promote the self-determination of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and their existence and survival. The fact that multiple States could be contributing to climate change impacts in the Arctic from the burning of fossil fuels does not prohibit or prevent the responsibility of a single State from being invoked in relation to such wrongful emissionsgenerating conduct under principles of State responsibility (ILC, 2001, art 47).

Secondary obligations associated with such a breach would require a State to cease the conduct in question and to make reparation (ILC, 2001, art 28 comment (2); arts 30, 31; Shelton, 2001: 373374). States continue to permit the burning of fossil fuels even with atmospheric carbon dioxide at approximately 420 ppm as of this writing (NASA, 2023), with current warming of approximately 1.2°C over pre-industrial temperatures, and with projected warming of up to 2.8°C by 2100 (WMO, 2021; UNEP, 2022: xvi, xxi). There is also a real possibility of triggering irreparable climate change tipping points at or over 1.5°C (McKay, 2022)—all of which would aggravate the current harms suffered by Arctic Indigenous Peoples and threaten their existence and survival. Consequently, the obligation to cease the breach of the primary rule could impose a legal obligation on duty-bearing States to, among other things, drastically curtail their emissions-generating conduct to prevent further dangerous warming in the Arctic. The obligation to make reparation “caused by” a State’s emissions-generating conduct could entail restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, to impacted peoples (ILC, 2001, art 34). Determining reparation is a “factExistence and Survival: A Dimension of Indigenous Self-Determination in the Context of Climate Change Impacts

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sensitive exercise” closely related to the question of causation (Wewerinke-Singh, 2020: 137-138; Shelton, 2013: 385).

So far, this discussion of international legal responsibility has been limited to Arctic States.

However, the obligation on all States to promote the self-determination of “all peoples” imposed

by Common Article 1 as well as the general principle of self-determination (CERD Committee, 1996, ¶ 3; Friendly Relations Declaration, 1970, Principle V; OSCE, 1975, Helsinki Final Act Principle, VIII; UNGA, Vienna Declaration, 1993) may impose duties on other high-developed, high-emitting States outside the Arctic and without Arctic Indigenous populations to also reduce their emissions-generating conduct on account of such emissions contributing to the climate degradation of the Arctic and now threatening Arctic Indigenous existence and survival. This should not be conceived of as an “extraterritorial” obligation, but rather a consequence of the fact that the burning of fossil fuels can have planetary consequences and can impact peoples in all parts of the world.

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Existence and Survival: A Dimension of Indigenous Self-Determination in the Context of Climate Change Impacts

Rethinking the relationship between humans and nature in law: An Indigenous Peoples’ perspective Marlene A. Payva Almonte

1. Introduction In today’s rapidly changing world, marked by climate and ecological crises, it is crucial to interrogate, as human species, our most basic notions of nature underpinning our relationship with the natural world reflected in our laws. Recognising how such notions rooted in our laws have traditionally guided our relationship with non-human nature and shaped our assumptions of our role vis-à-vis nature can help to understand the inability of the mainstream (Western) legal system to meaningfully contribute to tackle the climate and ecological crises. In doing so, it is important to acknowledge the historical context amply framed within colonialism, in which the prevalent legal system has been erected and matured in a way to reflect an anthropocentric approach of nature.

An anthropocentric legal approach entails a “prevailing ethic, upon which the law is based, [which] is human-based (or anthropocentric), and … has directly contributed to the environmental crisis” (Taylor, 1998: 4). While the anthropocentric legal system is not the only factor contributing to the interlinked climate and ecological crises, law has a central role in shaping collective notions of nature and defining the boundaries of human behaviour towards the non-human natural world. As Grear points out (2015: 225), “[law] is often accused of being resolutely ‘anthropocentric’, of rotating, as it were, around an anthropos (human/man) for whom all other life systems exist as objects.”

It falls beyond the scope of this article to discuss whether international law should be less anthropocentric or more ecocentric, or making a historical recount of the effects of colonialism in the development of anthropocentric notions of nature reflected in contemporary law, contributing thereby to environmental depletion (see, for e.g., Kotzé, 2019; Grear, 2017). Instead, this article seeks to reflect on foundational anthropocentric notions of nature imposed in colonised lands, which are present in the (Western) legal system and its interpretation, including in the context of ‘green’ transitional measures to address the climate and ecological crises. This article focuses on the anthropocentric notions of land embraced in the colonial context, which reverberate until today Marlene A. Payva Almonte, Senior Researcher – Arctic Centre, University of Lapland

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in the Arctic and elsewhere, inter alia, through law and its interpretation, including in courtrooms.

With the help of a case study, concerning a litigation between Sámi Indigenous Peoples, Norwegian state authorities and companies regarding the use of lands, this article seeks to investigate how anthropocentric approaches to nature manifest, for example, in the implementation of measures aimed to transit into a ‘green’ sustainable future, and how the judiciary interprets and balances opposite views on land in this context. First, this article will discuss the anthropocentric relational approach between humans and nature and its emanation through law in the colonial context; and, in the next section, how Indigenous and Western opposing views on nature have been manifested in the Arctic environment. Finally, this article will examine how such opposing views and priorities pertaining the use of land have been interpreted and balanced by Norwegian courts in the renowned Fosen case; and provide concluding remarks at the end.

2. On anthropocentrism and the colonial legacy The dominant anthropocentric notion on nature reflected in the relational approach between humans and nature has largely been linked to the Anthropocene – “a new geological era [which] is still “under review”, [where humans have been] the physical force that, like asteroids and volcanoes before, abruptly redirected the context for life’s evolution” (Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000: 1).

Anthropocentrism has been given several definitions (Mylius, 2018), such as “human chauvinism” (Routley, 1973: 207), and characterised as “attitudes, values or practices which give exclusive or preferential concern to human interests at the expense of the interests or well-being of other species or the environment” (Hayward, 1997:50). This set of manifestations of anthropocentrism reflected in the relationship between humans and nature – where these two are not considered part of each of other but separated – has amply been infused across the world through Western thought.1 Through this way of seeing the world, the environment and non-human beings are framed by a colonial legacy that is reflected, among other things, in Western(ised) law. With a central role in shaping individual and collective behaviour, mainstream law represents humans as separated from an externalised natural world and with innate authority over it2 and, consequentially, as natural holders of hierarchical power to exploit nature. Grear (2015: 227) notes that “such hierarchies implicate a systemically privileged juridical ‘human’ subject whose persistence subtends – to a significant and continuing extent – the neoliberal global juridical order as a whole, and that these hierarchical commitments also significantly undermine the ability of the international legal order to respond to climate crisis…”. Such exaltation of the human (subject) over nature (object), reflected in the prevailing neoliberal legal system, legitimises an exploitative approach to nature with catastrophic effects on the planet as a whole. This has been manifested in the global climate and ecological crises. In doing so, one (Western) anthropocentric view supresses “other’’ (Adelman, 2015) understandings of the natural world and their relationships with land.3 This anthropocentric relational approach to nature was thus projected to ‘discovered’ lands with the colonial enterprise, thereby neglecting distinct approaches to the natural world in colonised lands, such as those cultivated by Indigenous Peoples and is still present in contemporary law. As Merry points out (1991:890): Colonialism is an instance of a more general phenomenon of domination. Events that happened in the past, such as those in the period of colonial conquest and control, can provide insights into processes of domination and resistance in the present … Colonialism typically involved the large-scale transfer of laws and legal Payva Almonte

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institutions from one society to another, each of which had its own distinct sociocultural organization and legal culture.

Such was the case of Indigenous Peoples, who while not necessarily share a unique approach to nature and had different colonial experiences and implications – for which, attempting to discern a pan-Indigenous approach to nature or colonial experience would be misleading – some commonalities in the human relationship with their lands are distinguishable. For example, in describing an Andean Indigenous approach to nature, Villalba (2013: 1431) notes that: “Indigenous world-views invoke a more cosmo-centric and/or eco-centric view that includes all forms of life, as opposed to the Western anthropocentric view … viewing the world as a machine, or nature as a series of resources to be exploited”. Certainly, while a more intimate and respectful relationship with the land is core to Indigenous Peoples’ understanding of nature, for colonisers, looking for ‘new’ lands for expansion, land had a different meaning. Colonisers saw the land as an object of appropriation over which to exercise ownership and authority for exploitation as a source of wealth. This is a central point where the colonisers and Indigenous’ views of land collide (Payva Almonte, 2023).

The prevalence of one understanding of nature over the other was facilitated, among other things, by law. As Adelman (2015:14) argues: “Colonialism manifested itself primarily in physical violence and dispossession, but was also characterized by projects designed to colonise the minds of the ‘natives’ through the salvation of Christianity and the rule of law”. As a result, Indigenous Peoples’ relational approach to nature became peripheral or inexistent in colonial laws, reflecting a diametrically different relationship with land.4 This does not imply to suggest homogeneity of diverse Indigenous Peoples’ relationship with their lands disrupted through colonial law, but pointing out to the common clash of Indigenous and colonisers’ views on the relational approach between humans and nature, and the dominance of one view over the other. Indeed, on one hand, the centrality of nature is present in diverse Indigenous Peoples’ ontologies reflecting a close relationality with diverse components of the natural world. For instance, as Watson illustrates (2022: 355), “[the] natural world is referred to as ‘mother’ and features of the land are often known as places of the grandfather or grandmother. Arising from relationships to land are obligations to care for the country as one would care for oneself”. On the other hand, the coloniser’s understanding of the natural world is “one which is largely predicated upon an individualised connection to land as property and commodity”.

Such colonial approaches to nature persist today and are echoed in contemporary law, which endorses the rapacious exploitation and depletion of nature (or ‘natural resources’) in the name of a Western idea of (economic) development at all cost as an ultimate goal of every society. As Stone (1972: 463) said in his renowned article Should Trees Have Standing, “[natural] objects have traditionally been regarded by the common law, and even by all but the most recent legislation, as objects for man to conquer and master and use”. Changing this path requires rethinking our deepest notions of nature reflected in our (human) relational approach towards the natural world, which implies reconceptualising anthropocentric notions of nature inherited and expanded through colonialism and reflected in the legal system. This does not mean to deny our ineludible anthropocentric view of the world, but recognising ourselves as human nature and integral part of the natural world, which we cohabit along with other non-human natural beings as worth of respect, care and protection as humans. In this respect, Grey (199: 466) aptly contends that:

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We should certainly abandon a crude conception of human needs which equates them (roughly) with the sort of needs which are satisfied by extravagant resource use. But the problem with so-called 'shallow' views lies not in their anthropocentrism, but rather with the fact that they are characteristically shortterm, sectional, and self-regarding. A suitably enriched and enlightened anthropocentrism provides the wherewithal for a satisfactory ethic of obligation and concern for the nonhuman world.

Interrogating traditional economic growth-oriented approaches to nature reflected in our legal, policy and institutional frameworks, including those aimed to tackle the climate and ecological crises, should be a good start to ‘enlighten’ our anthropocentrism. In such a way, it incorporates an ecological awareness that corrects the exploitative approach to nature at its core. The next section will discuss how the discussed anthropocentric approach to nature has been manifested though the colonial Arctic experience.

3. Colliding approaches to nature in the Arctic The Arctic is not an exception to the traditional exploitative anthropocentric approach to nature that expanded with colonialism. The region has experienced colonial incursions that continue leaving a harmful footprint on the environment and its Indigenous Peoples. As Csonka (2022: 23) recounts: Colonization had an impact on the ways of life of indigenous peoples that still reverberates today. These Peoples were affected by contact with incomers at different times, different rhythms, and in different ways… The exploitation of nonrenewable resources of the North, such as mining, oil, and gas, and construction of hydroelectric dams increased, generally with little regard for environmental consequences or impacts on Indigenous societies…

Such impacts are present in the Arctic environment. These affect the ability of Arctic (Indigenous) Peoples to carry out their lifestyles that are closely connected with nature, and preserve their ancestral livelihoods and culture – thereby impinging their human rights. This has also been exacerbated by the effects of climate change in the fragile Arctic environment. Scientific studies have established that global warming is greater (IPCC, 2018) and “nearly four times faster in the Arctic than in the rest of the globe” (Rantanen et al., 2022). The consequences of maintaining an anthropocentric approach to the natural world, whereby nature continuous to be seen as a “storage bin of ‘natural resources’ or ‘raw materials’” (Bookchin, 2018: 21) at the service of human beings, are particularly serious in Arctic ecosystems, given the accelerating rate of global warming there.

These impacts of climate change impinge Indigenous Peoples’ ancestral livelihoods and culture strongly integrated within the Arctic landscape. For instance, for Sámi Indigenous Peoples, the connection with the land is everywhere: “Language, humans and livelihoods are tied together: livelihood helps preserve culture but both are dependent on the land and its well-being” (Inari Siida Museum, 2023). Connected to this accelerating rate in the region are the decrease of snow cover, thawing permafrost and rapidly melting sea ice, which in turn are increasing accessibility to some regions of the Arctic and their resources (minerals such as, cobalt, lithium, nickel)5 that are necessary to cover the demands of development for the ‘green’ transition.6 As a result, the interest of Arctic and non-Arctic states, as well as extractive industries in the region – notably, from China

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(Koivurova, 2020) – has grown in the last years, which will likely put under additional threat Arctic ecosystems and its inhabitants.

Development strategies that are considered necessary for a ‘green’ and sustainable transition into a carbon neutral economy often maintain an utilitarian understanding of nature, where this exists to satisfy human needs oriented to (unlimited) economic growth, which justifies the continuous exploitation of natural world and dispossession. Sustainability discourses thus risk reinforcing the depletion of nature in the name of development, and its (mis)understanding as an object for humanity’s appropriation and exploitation. In a planet confronted with climate and ecological crises, it is thus unclear how the exploitation of natural ‘resources’ in the Arctic could be done in a sustainable way. On one side, there is the view that achieving development goals through ‘sustainable’ use of natural resources is unviable. As Finger (2022: 344) clearly points out: Resources extraction is overall predatory in nature; that is, it is not sustainable in itself and it does not sustain local communities and their economies. This will not be different in the Arctic… [The] very nature of the extractive Arctic industries will not allow for sustainable development of the Arctic and its communities. In other words, the sustainable development of the Arctic thanks to resources extraction is illusionary.

On the other hand, there is the view that energy transition is only possible through further extractivism and that, for example, we must “look underground for the solutions to our challenges” (Frederiksen, 2023).7 There are certainly competing notions of sustainability and what exactly entails sustainable incursions in the Arctic. A ‘green’ transition from fossil fuels into an economy based on renewable sources of energy will have multifaceted implications. In any scenario (Indigenous or not), sustainability can only be achieved when the social and ecological implications of development projects have been thoroughly observed equality and in the context of all actors involved. As Bennett et al argue (2019: 11), “sustainability transformations cannot be considered a success without social justice… The road to environmental sustainability can be pursued in an inclusive or exclusionary manner and increase or decrease distributional justice”.

All in all, the continuous clash between states’ authorities and Indigenous Peoples’ views on the use of lands embeds fundamental discrepancies in the understanding of the relationship between humans and nature – where the state has a privileged position at the centre of decision-making power and those directly affected by development projects are at the periphery – is what might continue determining the future of the Arctic. The following section presents an illustrative case concerning a legal dispute on land use, involving Sámi Peoples, Norway state authorities and companies, which was filed before Norwegian national courts in the context of climate change and the ‘green’ shift.

4. The Fosen Case: the clash of world views As part of an energy development project to build four windfarms in the Trøndelag County, the government of Norway, through the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate office, issued licenses for the development of renewable energy infrastructure in 2010. This involved the construction of the Roan and Storheia windfarms, and two power lines from Namsos, through Roan to Storheia, involving consent for expropriation of land rights.8 Once the licenses were

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granted to companies9 and the projects were completed, the operations started between 2019 and 2020, becoming the largest windfarms in Norway, “and the largest onshore wind power project in Europe” (Fosen, para.136). Roan started in 2019, with nearly 25 square kilometres and 71 turbines and, subsequently, Storheia, started in 2020, with nearly 38 kilometres and 80 turbines (Fosen, para.

6). Both areas have traditionally been used by Sámi in the Fosen peninsula for reindeer husbandry, for which the development of wind energy infrastructures was problematic.10 While this kind of conflicts on the use of areas for reindeer husbandry and development projects have already arisen in Sámi lands in Nordic countries – for example, in “the northern region of Sweden, where the Sámi herding areas are located, has now become the cradle of the Swedish green transition” (Cambou, 2020: 315) – the Fosen case is the first in Norway involving impingement on areas for reindeer husbandry that has been grounded on the Sámi right to culture (Lingaas, 2021).

Both windfarms are located within the grazing area of the Fosen peninsula. The Roan windfarm is located within the pasture of Nord-Fosen siida,11 while Storheia windfarm is located within the pasture of Sør-Fosen sijte (Fosen, para.8). In the case at hand, the licenses and expropriation decisions in favour of the development projects were appealed, inter alia, by Nord-Fosen siida (against Roan license), and Sør-Fosen sijte (against Storheia license, and Namsos-Roan-Storheia power line) without success. This was because the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy confirmed those decisions, although with some changes (Fosen, para.9). The Ministry was of the view that: [Roan windfarm] area could “be used for reindeer husbandry also after the development, even if it [would] demand more from the reindeer herders in the form of increased work”. As concerned Storheia windfarm, the Ministry assumed that a development would “be negative” for reindeer husbandry, but that the area would not “be lost as winter pasture” (Fosen, paras.10-11).

The Ministry’s view reflects the usual acquiescence of national authorities on the use of (Sámi) lands for development projects, which, is harder to challenge when these are presented as ‘sustainable’ projects and, accordingly as, ‘green, good and necessary’ (Fjellheim, 2023: 142) to produce renewable energy for the ‘green’ transition. Cambou (2020:315) points out that there is “a growing body of research [that] has confirmed that the impact of wind energy projects on reindeer husbandry is real and can significantly affect reindeer husbandry in some cases”. In the present case, the use of lands for development projects was prioritised over reindeer husbandry, revealing the inherent anthropocentric and short-termed perspective with which development projects are usually evaluated and ultimately authorised, without actual and equal participation of Sámi reindeer herders in decision-making processes. As Fjellheim (2023: 160) argues: “As long as [Environmental Impact Assessment] processes are industry-led and solely based on environmental sciences, Saami reindeer herders will continue to lack trust in consultants and licensing processes which exclude them from being experts on their own livelihoods and culture”. Besides, the state authority’s assumption of limited ‘negative’ impact for reindeers as a result of the wind energy projects reflects a lack of interest and concern for non-human nature in resolving a non-entirely human dispute.

The case was appealed by the Sámi reindeer herders to the Court of Appeal, who found that the assumption that the reindeers would get used to the windfarms and eventually start grazing in those areas was ‘speculative’ (Fosen, para.80). In this way, the Court of Appeal somewhat acknowledged the potentially serious ecological impact of the development project upon reindeers’ feeding patterns. Yet, by ordering compensation to reindeer herders for, among other things, reindeers’

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feeding, the Court of Appeal showed its concern in reindeer husbandry as economic activity but not necessarily as an expression of Sámi traditional culture (Cambou et al., 2022). The Court of Appeal also acknowledges the irreparable damage from the Roan windfarm provoking “dramatic loss of pasture for the North Group, which in the long run will lead to a reduction of the number of reindeers” (Fosen, para.82); and goes further by acknowledging potential preventive measures by stating: “unless measures in the form of winter feeding are implemented” (ibid). Although it does not detail what kind of ‘measures’ or how these would prevent the adverse impacts of the windfarms upon reindeers’ life or number, the Court of Appeal concludes that “the building of the windfarms in Storheia and Roan will threaten the existence of reindeer husbandry on Fosen, unless remedy measures are implemented” (Fosen, para.85). Thereby, the Court of Appeal conveys an extended criterion grounded on the affection to a traditional activity to determine the viability of the development projects, even if these are primarily considered to contribute to states’ objectives in light of the ‘green’ transition. Yet, it does not expand the merely anthropocentric reasoning, thereby leaving aside the ‘non-human’ (reindeer) dimension of it. The Court of Appeal grounds its analysis of the potential disruption to reindeers’ activity (such as, reindeer feeding patterns) on the basis of the impacts for reindeers herding as economic activity, even when discussing its cultural dimension. However, the Court does not question, for example, the impacts of the development projects on the basis of the potential breach of reindeers’ life, health and ability to enjoy their natural environment in their own capacity as non-human beings, despite their centrality in reindeers’ husbandry as traditional activity of Sámi reindeer herders in Norway.12 Subsequently, after appellation, the judgement of the Supreme Court builds upon the findings of the Court of Appeal which was favourable to the Sámi reindeer herders to the extent that it found that the development of Roan and Storheia windfarms interfere with their ability to enjoy their (collective) right to culture, linked to their right to livelihood and trade. However, the Supreme Court replicates the Court of Appeal’s disregard for the reindeer as non-human being worth of respect, care and legal protection in its own capacity, as co-inhabitant of the Fosen peninsula.13 Instead, the Supreme Court focuses in an anthropocentric analysis of the cultural and correlated economic aspects of the dispute, without taking a more holistic view that also encompasses ecological considerations for the non-human. It was of the view that: (…) the starting point must be that Article 27 aims at protecting the right to cultural enjoyment. As mentioned, reindeer husbandry is a form of protected cultural practice while at the same time a way of making a living. The economy of the trade is therefore relevant in a discussion of a possible violation. The relevance must be assessed specifically in each individual case and must depend, among other things, on how the economy affects the cultural practice. In my view, the rights in Article 27 are in any case violated if a reduction of the pasture deprives the herders of the possibility to carry on a practice that may naturally be characterised as a trade (Fosen, para. 134).

Accordingly, it is on the basis of the affection to the right to culture of reindeer herders under Article 27 ICCPR that the Supreme Court finds this provision was violated. Even if the judgement could be considered (more) favourable to reindeer herders in this respect, it should be borne in mind that the Court’s reasoning was built upon a traditional anthropocentric perspective that does not include a concern for the reindeers in themselves. Rather, the Supreme Court puts humans and the threat to their rights and economy at the centre, and assesses the impact of the two

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development projects upon reindeers only insofar such projects affect the profitability of reindeer husbandry as economic activity and the exercise of the right to culture. In a context of climate and ecological crises, it is relevant to (re)consider what ‘green’ or sustainable development actually means. A truly ‘green’ and just transition should endeavour to integrate an ecological approach to nature in the legal system, which includes the non-human natural world under its scope of protection and recognises its agency in shaping reality (regardless such recognition is legally framed as ‘right’ or not). As Celermajer at al. note, “agency is a feature of human and nonhuman networks, assemblages, and (inter)relationships” (Celermajer et al., 2021: 124).

In a similar vein, the Supreme Court continues its anthropocentric approach to the case when considering the application of the right to a healthy environment in the context of the ‘green shift’ in which the development projects are framed. The Court found that ‘the ‘green shift’ and increased production of renewable energy are crucial considerations’ (Fosen, para.143). However, Article 27 ICCPR does not allow for a balancing of interests that could preclude reindeer herders’ right to culture in light, for example, of what is deemed necessary for the ‘green’ shift. This may be different in the event of conflict between different basic rights. The right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment recognised in the Norwegian constitution (Article 112) should be increasingly considered to interpret and balance claims in the context of the ‘green’ shift, and provide legal avenues to integrate non-human nature under its scope of protection.14 In the case at hand, the Supreme Court did not find a collision between basic rights and ‘[assumed] that ‘the green shift’ could also have been taken into account by choosing other – and for the reindeer herders less intrusive – development alternatives. Then, the consideration of the environment cannot be significant when assessing whether Article 27 has been violated in this case’ (Fosen, para.143). One can thus conclude that, while the Supreme Court upheld the invalidity of the licensing of the development projects, its findings reflect the prevalence of a mere anthropocentric approach to nature and assessment of rights that does not consider the non-human in its own value despite its centrality in the case at hand.

Overall, an ecological approach to nature where it is valued in itself and not on the basis of its capacity to satisfy human (economic) needs, is predominantly absent in contemporary laws, policies and their interpretation (for example, by courts), including in those aimed to generate a ‘green’ shift. In a context of the ‘green’ transition, more ecologically aware approaches to law and respect for Indigenous Peoples’ rights and knowledge of nature are needed, in order to meaningfully contribute to a ‘green’ transition that entails a truly more sustainable and harmonious relationship with nature and its non-human components.

5. Conclusion The context of colonialism in which the Western legal system is rooted presents an anthropocentric approach to the natural world that continues to reverberate today. This one-sided view of the world is reflected in law and policy frameworks that put economic human interests at the centre and disregard the inherent value of the non-human world, independently of its utilitarian value for humans, legitimising thereby environmental depletion. The Arctic is not an exception to the traditional exploitative anthropocentric approach to nature. Despite the particularly serious and fast-paced impacts of the climate and ecological crises in fragile Arctic ecosystems, (neo) colonial incursions seeking to exploit natural resources in the name of ‘sustainable’ development and the ‘green’ shift continue threatening the Arctic and its human and non-human inhabitants. The Payva Almonte

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continuous tensions between states’ authorities and Indigenous Peoples’ views on the use of lands embed a fundamental difference in the understanding of the relationship between humans and nature. The Fosen case in Norway showed how differing views and relational approaches to nature collide in the context of the ‘green shift’. In Norway, Sámi Indigenous Peoples rights are legally recognised and some advancements have been made to address the implications of sustainable development projects upon their livelihoods and culture that is traditionally connected to reindeer husbandry. However, in relation to the non-human elements of the case, despite the Sámi reindeer herders claim was to a good extent upheld, this has occurred only to the extent that it protects human entitlements (e.g. the right to culture and livelihoods), but not those of non-human beings, like reindeers in their own capacity, even if they are not legally considered ‘subjects’ of ‘rights’.

Also, it is important to note that, despite the outcome of the case in the courtroom, the implementation of the Supreme Court’s order in the Fosen case by Norwegian authorities remains to be seen two years after the judgement, generating additional questioning of the (national) legal system and protests by affected parties.15 Despite conceptual and technical challenges, Rights of Nature and Multispecies Justice can provide underexplored theoretical frameworks to protect non-human nature and recognise its agency in the context of climate and ecological crises. Its application can introduce ecological considerations in law that help humanity to depart from the traditional economic growth-oriented anthropocentric approach to nature and our human role therein. The accelerating impacts of the context of climate and ecological crises should prompt a necessary rethinking of law that considers humans and nonhuman entities as part of nature within an interconnected web of life.

Notes 1. As Adelman notes, ‘[the] strain of Western thought separating humanity from nature has been traced back as far as the emergence of Christianity, but it is widely accepted that Enlightenment rationality and the Industrial Revolution greatly accelerated the tendency’.

Adelman, 2015:11.

2. Grear argues that ‘such separation between Anthropos and its feminised ‘other/s-nature’ is fundamental to understanding the foundations of the Anthropocene crisis’. Grear, 2015:235.

3. For a detailed discussion on how the relationship of dominance of wilderness by humans has been constructed, see, for example, De Luca, K. (1999). ‘In the shadow of whiteness: The consequences of constructions of nature in environmental politics. Whiteness: The communication of social identity, 217-245.

4. For instance, in the context of colonisation of indigenous lands in Australia, Watson recounts that: ‘Aboriginal laws live under the weight of the imposed colonial legal system. … There has never been a real understanding by non-indigenous peoples of the Aboriginal laws and their intricate and holistic relationship with all aspects of the environment and humanity. The law, land and peoples are one integrated whole’. Watson, 1996:107.

5. See Watson, B. et al (2023) ‘Critical Minerals in the Arctic: Forging the Path Forward’.

Wilson Center Critical Minerals, 10 July. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/criticalminerals-arctic-forging-path-forward.

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6. At European level, see, for example, European Committee of the Regions (2022, 29 June), ‘The EU must harness the potential of the Arctic to drive the green transition’. https://cor.europa.eu/en/news/Pages/Arctic-strategy.aspx.

7. See, for example, Frederiksen, M. (2023, 12 January) ‘If we want energy transition, we must have more mining’.

Arctic Economic Council. https://arcticeconomiccouncil.com/news/if-we-want-an-energy-transition-we-musthave-more-mining/.

8. Statnett v. Sør-Fosen sijte, Nord-Fosen siida and Fosen Vind DA; Fosen Vind DA v. SørFosen sijte and Nord-Fosen siida; and Sør-Fosen sijte v. Fosen Vind DA and Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Judgement HR-2021-1975-S, (Norway. Supreme Ct. 2021). https://www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/decisions-in-english-translation/hr2021-1975-s.pdf [Hereinafter, ‘Fosen’].

9. The licenses for Roan and Storheia windfarm projects were granted to Energi AS and Statkraft Agder Energi Vind DA, respectively. Although, in the case of the Roan project, the license was later transferred to another company and subsequently to Roan Vind DA. Ibid, para. 4.

10. It should be highlighted that the development projects were also problematic for reindeers as such. Studies have shown that ‘[despite] a long domestication, reindeer within Sámi reindeer-herding systems exhibit similar patterns of large-scale avoidance of anthropogenic disturbance’. Skarin & Åhman, 2014: 1051.

11. Reindeers’ herders are traditionally organised in ‘siidas’ (in Sámi language) or ‘sijtje’ (in the South Sámi language), which are the Sámi words for a group of reindeer owners practicing reindeer husbandry jointly in specific areas. Reindeer Herding Act, Article 51.

12. In this respect, Rights of Nature provides an increasingly used theoretical framework to incorporate more than mere traditional anthropocentric approaches to address competing views on land use. See, for example, Jone, E. (2021). ‘Posthuman international law and the rights of nature’. Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, 12 Special Issue,76–102.

13. For example, in the Colombian context, the Superior Tribunal of Bogotá took an innovative approach in a family dispute by recognising for the first time a dog as a member of multispecies family. Carlos López (2023, 12 October) ‘Por primera vez en Colombia, Tribunal reconoció a un perro como miembro de una familia’. El Tiempo. htps://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/tribunal-de-bogota-reconocio-a-perrocomo-miembro-de-una-familia-multiespecie-815308.

14. For example, a municipal Court of Colombia recognised the right of a dog to medical treatment and survival of a sentient being, as constitutional ‘object’ of protection. El Tiempo. (2020, 8 July). ‘ Juez le reconoce a perro derecho a tratamiento médico para epilelpsia’. https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/servicios/juez-reconocio-derecho-de-unperro-a-la-supervivencia-y-ordeno-darle-medicamento-515776.

15. See IGWIA. (2023, 14 October). ‘Sámi Activists Demand Removal of Wind Turbines in Fosen’. https://www.iwgia.org/en/news/5278-press-fosen-oct2023.html.

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Commentary

The role of China within Arctic climate governance

Chuan Chen

The impact and consequences of climate change in the Arctic are becoming more and more catastrophic, posing a great threat to human survival and development. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a stark warning about the dangers of climate change in the Arctic in its latest sixth climate assessment report. The issue of Arctic climate change has become a common concern of both Arctic and non-Arctic countries. How to implement Arctic climate governance to solve climate change has become an important Arctic governance issue related to the future of mankind.

Climate governance involves all aspects of politics, economy, science and technology, diplomacy, and social development of various countries, and requires the cooperation of all countries.

However, the current international situation has undergone major changes, and Arctic climate governance cooperation is facing an unprecedentedly severe and complex international environment.

Since its establishment in 1996, the Arctic Council has played an important role in promoting international cooperation in the Arctic. However, affected by the Russia-Ukraine war, the other seven Arctic countries have suspended various cooperation with Russia in the Arctic, and the Arctic Council has come to a standstill. In the future, whether the Arctic Council can resume normal work still faces great uncertainty. At the same time, Finland officially joined NATO on April 4, 2023, and Sweden is also in the process of joining NATO. A situation in which NATO's seven Arctic countries confront Russia is taking shape. The geopolitical situation in the Arctic is unprecedentedly tense, and the international trust of Russia and the other seven Arctic countries has dropped to a historical low after the Cold War. This is very detrimental to the cooperation in dealing with climate change in the Arctic because climate governance cooperation requires mutual trust among countries. Without basic trust, there can be no effective international cooperation.

Chuan Chen, School of Government, Peking University, China.

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As political games and confrontations in the Arctic region become more intense, and Arctic cooperation becomes increasingly fragmented, Arctic climate governance requires the participation of non-Arctic countries more than ever. Since becoming an observer country of the Arctic Council, China has been actively participating in Arctic affairs over the years, and climate change is one of China's key concerns. Although the current Arctic climate governance is in a disadvantageous situation, it is also an opportunity for China. On the one hand, the Arctic climate issue is not only an environmental issue but also poses a huge threat to the sustainable development of the Arctic region. Participation in Arctic climate governance is an inherent requirement for China's sustainable development in the Arctic region. On the other hand, although China claims to be an important stakeholder in the Arctic region, this identity has not yet been fully recognized externally.

For China, if China can contribute to Arctic climate governance in the current difficult period of Arctic climate governance, it will not only reflect China's responsibility as a responsible Arctic stakeholder but also help expand China's influence in Arctic affairs, thereby helping China to gain wider recognition of identity in the Arctic region.

Therefore, China should seize the current opportunity, place the Arctic climate governance in a more prominent position in its Arctic strategy, and seek to lead the Arctic climate governance.

First, China needs to act as a good coordinator of Arctic climate governance. China should actively coordinate the conflicts between Russia and the seven Arctic countries in Arctic cooperation, and encourage all parties to put aside political disputes and work together on Arctic climate governance.

Second, China must be a practitioner of climate governance and take practical actions to contribute to Arctic climate governance, rather than just staying at the level of slogans. In addition, China should actively act as a pioneer in Arctic climate governance. China should take the initiative to explore the Arctic climate governance model, increase investment in scientific research on the Arctic climate, improve the training of climate governance personnel, etc., and strive to be at the forefront of climate governance. Finally, China should vigorously advocate multilateralism, actively promote the Arctic climate governance cooperation network through bilateral and multilateral negotiations, promote the joint construction of a fair, reasonable, cooperative, and win-win Arctic climate governance system, and enhance the cooperation and effectiveness of the Arctic climate governance.

Chen

Briefing Note

The Arctic Academy for Sustainability

Giuseppe Amatulli & Jamie Jenkins

Introduction: The idea behind the Arctic Academy for Sustainability https://uarcticacademy.wordpress.com/home/ The Arctic Academy for Sustainability: Creating Environmentally and Socially Responsible Sustainable Energy and Resource Development in the Arctic is a multi-year project (2022-2025) funded by the Prince Albert II of Monaco Foundation. Spanning over the European and Canadian Arctic, the Academy has four main university partners: Copenhagen Business School (Denmark), University of Helsinki (Finland), UNBC - University of Northern British Columbia (Canada), and Memorial University of Newfoundland (Canada). Originally, Tyumen State University (Russian Federation) was a partner institution; however, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the resulting inability to cooperate with Russian institutions, Memorial University has taken its place to ensure the smooth unfolding of the yearly academies in terms of logistic and administrative support.

The idea of having an Arctic Academy for Sustainability was proposed in 2020 by The UArctic Thematic Network on Arctic Sustainable Resources and Social Responsibility (TN ASRSR). The Network envisioned the Academy as the ‘venue’ to organise and host four scientific fora (including PhD training) to promote transdisciplinary research dialogue concerning the environmental, economic, and social aspects of sustainability in the Arctic focused on the identification of solutions. A socially responsible green transition, intertwined with sustainable resource management in the Arctic, is imperative for the long-term well-being of Arctic peoples and for reducing the impact resource exploitation has on the Arctic ecosystem, considering that the Arctic is rich in resources both on land and in the seas. More particularly, the lack of adequate engagement processes for addressing the competing interests of stakeholders and rightsholders involved in resource and energy development decisions generates divisions within communities, impacting how people envision the future and their lives in the Arctic. By advancing sustainability research, Giuseppe Amatulli, PhD, Postdoctoral Fellow, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada Jamie Jenkins, PhD Candidate, University of Helsinki, Finland

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the Arctic Academy will contribute to advancing knowledge on two critical areas of human decision-making processes in the Arctic: (1) how to ensure adequate rightsholder and stakeholder involvement in decision-making, and (2) how to develop comprehensive sustainable solutions to effectively address the social implications of the green transition. Eventually, the Academy has the ambition to provide some answers to the overarching issue of how Arctic societies can develop inclusive, evidence-based, culturally appropriate, and socially legitimated processes to be included in decision-making while better managing Arctic natural resources.

The Academy brings together senior researchers, early career scientists and the next generation of researchers from across the Arctic and beyond, with the scope to analyse the review processes and concepts being used in different Arctic countries – such as legal, environmental impact assessments, voluntary corporate codes, and human rights ideals such as free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) – to enable public engagement and ensure a just and sustainable transition. The inclusion of senior and junior career-stage researchers (including PhD students) is an important feature of the Academy, as this will facilitate the transfer of knowledge while ensuring scientific continuity for a significant period following the project. Moreover, the sustained interaction between scholars and non-academic stakeholders will develop networks that can sustain longerterm empirical research and promote information and knowledge-sharing, resulting in society benefitting beyond the duration of the Academy. The outcomes of the project will serve as a basis for further scientific research and networking activities with non-academic stakeholders, and they will also be a source for new projects focused on energy development, resource use, and social responsibility in the Arctic. Advancing an understanding of the societal processes necessary to achieve a just transition to renewable energy and sustainable resource management in the Arctic aligns with the Prince Albert II of Monaco Foundation’s mandate of protecting the environment and promoting sustainable development on a global scale. Focusing on a Polar region, the Arctic Academy for Sustainability is consistent with the Foundation’s intent to “limit the effects of climate change and promote renewable energy” in this region of the world. With this project, the Arctic Academy for Sustainability will therefore address critical issues identified by the Foundation.

2022 Arctic Academy - Rovaniemi, Kiruna & Piteå, Finland and Sweden The first Arctic Academy took place in Finnish and Swedish Lapland from August 29th to September 2nd, 2022. Fourteen researchers from Norway, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, and India travelled to Rovaniemi, Finland, before departing on a bus to Kiruna and Piteå, Northern Sweden, to promote discussion, facilitate learning and share knowledge on enhancing and securing a just energy transition in the Arctic region, considering the effects of climate change.

Climate change is having profound and far-reaching impacts on our planet and is especially impactful on the vulnerable and fragile Arctic environment. There is an urgent need to decarbonise our energy systems to limit and mitigate the impact of the changing climate. However, such an urgent need should not come at the expense of an environmentally and socially sustainable transition. The responsibility of business, industry, and policymakers in protecting and establishing an environmentally and socially sustainable green transition was the central and linking theme of the 2022 Arctic Academy. This theme was explored in depth during the week through excursions, presentations, lectures, discussions and writing while travelling across the Finnish and Swedish Arctic. The research backgrounds and expertise of the participants were diverse and allowed for cross-disciplinary discussions and problem-solving.

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Day one of the Academy, held at the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi, began with introductions from participants and instructors and proceeded on to introductory lectures on the energy transition in the Arctic.

The first introductory words were by Dorothee Cambou, Assistant Professor of Sustainability Science from the University of Helsinki, who introduced the Academy Figure 1: Arktikum/Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi. and the practical details for the week. Next, Kamrul Hossain, Director of the Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law and Research Professor from the University of Lapland, further introduced the themes and details of the Academy. The first academic lecture was from Professor Paul Bowles, University of Northern British Columbia, introducing the energy transition and the related issues in the Arctic context. The final lecture of the morning was from Adam Stepien, University of Lapland, elaborating further on the energy transition in the Arctic and the wider EU context.

The Academy provided the opportunity for participants to present their research and share their knowledge during participant seminars. This was a unique experience to encourage dialogue on topics the participants were deeply interested in. The seminars allowed for feedback and questions to be raised by other participants and instructors. The first round of participant seminars was held after lunch. Each seminar had three or four participants, and a round of discussion followed every presentation. The seminars were loosely organised around a common theme, and the first theme centered around international and EU policy, sustainable development, and the potential ramifications on the Arctic region. The first seminar series explored EU policy, legislation, and new technologies to promote sustainable development in the Arctic region. The next presentation focused on the town of Kiruna, the next stop in the Academy, and the interesting case study of the relationship between the nearby mine and the town. The final presentation travelled overseas to shed insights on sustainable development in the Indian context. After the final presentation, we boarded our bus and began our first journey across the Finnish-Swedish border towards Kiruna.

We stopped at a restaurant on the Finnish-Swedish border for dinner, where the discussions and ice-breaking continued. We arrived in the mining town Kiruna later in the evening and spent two nights.

Kiruna mine is the “largest and most modern” underground iron ore mine in the world. The current haulage level is at 1,365 m underground, and recently, Europe’s largest deposit of rare earth materials was discovered in the Kiruna area. The permitting and application process to begin mining this deposit is still underway, but production is expected to start later this decade. The mine has been in operation for over a hundred years already, and this new deposit, if extraction begins, will likely see the mine continue for many, many years to come. Interestingly, the town centre of The Arctic Academy for Sustainability

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Kiruna is being moved 3km away from potentially dangerous areas prone to collapse and sinking into the ground due to the mining activities. The new town centre was officially being opened with a small celebration after the closure of the old town centre. The academy was in town for the final day of the old town centre being open, although we were not able to attend the celebration and official opening of the new town centre. The second day of the Academy began, and the morning was reserved for participant seminars before an excursion to the Kiruna mine visitor centre, 540m below ground. The theme for the seminars focused on social sustainability, and local and Indigenous stakeholder engagement in the Arctic context. We explored and discussed socially just stakeholder identification, effective participation, and legislation for protecting stakeholder voices. The first academic lecture of the morning was from Pamela Lesser, University of Lapland, via Figure 1: Kiruna mine visitor centre and museum, Zoom, and focused on sustainability in the Photo by Jamie Jenkins mining sector - a hot topic of discussion during the afternoon excursion and the remainder of the Academy. Sustainable mining is an interesting concept that has slowly increased in popularity. Mining is fundamentally unsustainable - extracting minerals from the earth is often highly destructive and takes millennia to replenish and regenerate (if at all). However, there are practices, actions and methods that can be adopted to promote more sustainable mining activities. This would be better described as “responsible mining” to account for the inherent unsustainability of mining activities. This was partly explored in the morning seminar, in which socially responsible mining practices can be identified and adopted to mitigate and limit the impact on surrounding and local communities. One key aspect of socially responsible mining projects is ensuring meaningful stakeholder engagement in the entire timeline of the mining project.

During the excursion to the underground mine, LKAB, the company that owns Kiruna mine, shared with us their vision of transitioning to a “sustainable” mine over the next century. They have an ambitious plan to have their processes and products carbon-free by 2045. This means they are aiming to produce iron using biomass and hydrogen as energy in the production plants and phase out carbon-based mining equipment in favour of electric vehicles and automated equipment.

This will require massive additional inputs of electricity. The remainder of the mining tour, and into the evening and next day, included lively discussions on the consequences and implications of “sustainable mining” - is this simply greenwashing, does this promote more mining, if it’s seen as

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“sustainable”, thereby potentially damaging more areas, or is this a step in the right direction for the mining and steel industry?

The third day of the Academy continued the exploration of sustainable and responsible mining, and the responsibility of businesses and community relations in mining projects. The social licence to operate in mining projects, and corporate social responsibility were key points in the lectures given by Professor Paul Bowles (UNBC) and Professor Karin Buhmann, (Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen). The participant seminars focused on Indigenous peoples and communities as stakeholders in the green transition and sustainable development. After the final lecture in Kiruna, we boarded the bus and travelled a few hours south to Piteå. This marked a shift in theme from responsible and sustainable mining to wind power and the role it plays in the green transition and sustainable development.

Wind power is rapidly developing. Many countries have implemented ambitious plans to increase the capacity of wind power to aid in decarbonising their energy systems and transition away from fossil fuels.

Wind power is a reliable, clean, and domestic source of energy.

However, it can have significant impacts on land-use practices, local communities and surrounding biodiversity and ecosystems, particularly during the construction and decommissioning.

Identifying Figure 2: Markbygden Wind Farm. Photo by Jamie Jenkins and mitigating the social and environmental impact is crucial to ensuring the sustainable development of wind power. The fourth day and final field trip of the Academy was to the Markbygden wind park in Piteå. The field trip began at the offices of Svevind, operators of the wind park, where Svevind representatives presented information on the wind park, future plans and company activities, before moving to visit part of the wind farm. Markbygden wind park will be the largest in Europe when construction is finalised and all turbines are in operation. It boasts up to 1,101 turbines covering an area of 450 square kilometres and will provide 12TWh of Sweden’s energy needs per annum. An impressive technical and engineering feat that aids in achieving Sweden’s targets for renewable energy development and decarbonisation. However, the development of Markbygden has caused controversy for the impact on surrounding communities, particularly the impact on reindeer herders in the region.

Discussions during the day were lively and centred on the impact of the Arctic energy transition on local communities, with a focus on the impact of wind energy development on Indigenous communities, with the aim to provide answers to three important questions: how does the transition to renewable energy impact surrounding and Indigenous communities and land-use

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practices in the Arctic region? What has been the role of Indigenous communities in the development cycle? Who bears the responsibility of transitioning away from fossil fuels? There is an urgent need to decarbonise and transition away from fossil fuels to mitigate the impact of climate change, but this shouldn’t come at the expense of a just and environmentally sustainable transition.

These points were well addressed in the final academic lectures of the Academy. Prof. Dorothee Cambou gave a presentation on wind farms and the rights of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic transition. The final lecture was held via Zoom, by Per Sandstrom & Anna Skarin, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, and outlined the impact that wind energy is having on reindeer husbandry, an interesting discussion and follow-up on the many discussions had during the day.

The final day of the 2022 Academy was spent reflecting on the topics, discussions, and themes of the week in the Arctic. In the morning, participants formed groups and wrote blog posts discussing the seminar topics. After lunch, each group presented a summary of their blog posts to the main group to gain feedback and continue the reflections and discussions from the previous week. We continued the discussions into the afternoon before a final wrap-up lecture and the official end of the 2022 Arctic Academy. We boarded the bus for the final trip back to Rovaniemi. We stopped for a farewell dinner during the bus journey, where the conversation was friendly, lively, and intense. After a week spent together discussing important and difficult topics, we had formed close bonds, and the goodbyes back in Rovaniemi were tough but definitely not the last.

2023 Arctic Academy – Prince George, British Columbia, Canada The second Arctic Academy for Sustainability took place in Prince George, British Columbia, from May 22nd to May 26th, 2023. The main goal of the Academy was to provide insights on sustainability challenges in the Canadian context, intertwined with First Nations’ rights, resource exploitation and changes affecting Indigenous communities in Canada. The programme was drastically modified a few days before commencing the Academy due to the fire emergencies that dramatically impacted several communities in Northeastern British Columbia, Northwestern Alberta, and the Northwest Territories in the first half of May 2023. Skyrocketing temperatures above +30C, combined with the dry spring season, was a deadly mix and made us all reflect on the impact climate change has on Arctic and sub-Arctic regions. Fort St. John, the city that was supposed to host the second part of the Academy, was put under evacuation alert on Tuesday, May 16th, while Doig River First Nation, who was an important partner for the Academy, issued an evacuation order on Monday, May 15th and community members were evacuated in a few hours, to be sheltered in Dawson Creek. Everyone was asked to act quickly and be flexible to adapt to the uncertainties of the week, a condition that we all have learnt since the COVID-19 pandemic and with which we may learn to live to cope with other emergencies of our time, such as climate change and its unpredictable effects on the ecosystem and everyday life.

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With a substantially revised programme, the Academy kicked off in the Senate Chamber of the UNBC on Monday, May 22nd, with a welcome and territorial land acknowledgement delivered by UNBC’s Chancellor Darlene McIntosh, an Elder with the Lheidli T’enneh Nation. In her opening, she stressed the importance of conducting research on sustainability and Indigenous related issues with an open mind and positive Figure 3: Paul Bowles’ welcome speech, Senate Chamber. Photo attitude to find answers to the many challenges of the current

by Giuseppe Amatulli world. Following the opening, the morning session focused on Sustainability Research conducted at UNBC. The first presenter was Dr Daniel Sims from the Department of First Nations Studies and Academic Co-Lead for the National Collaborating Centre for Indigenous Health. In his talk, he stressed the importance of considering the impact of development on how we live, pointing out how the colonial erasure and the narrative of forgetting that was promoted for so many years has had disastrous impacts on the ability of Indigenous peoples to live in different ways. The second talk was delivered by Dr Tristan Pearce, Canada Research Chair in Cumulative Impacts of Environmental Change. Drawing on his experience with communities in the Canadian High North, his lecture focused on how sustainability is understood by Indigenous members of small and scattered communities who rely on hunting for subsistence purposes, in addition to ensuring cultural continuity. Challenging the mainstream definition of sustainability, for example, reflecting on how the Inuit of the Canadian High North have been practising subsistence harvesting of polar bears to ensure food security while securing an important source of income purposes and safeguarding cultural continuity. Dr Pearce pointed out important nuances that must be considered when defining sustainability in the Canadian Arctic, also considering its heterogeneity. The last speaker of the morning was Dr Gabrielle Daoust from the Department of Global & International Studies. Drawing on her latest co-authored book, Divided Environments, in which she focused on the links between climate change, water and security in the African context, she offered a thought-provoking approach to the way in which places are imagined based on the resources they hold. Reflecting on water management and exploitation in Africa and drawing interesting parallelism with natural resources management and usage in British Columbia, Dr Doust provided insights on the need to change the paradigm and think about how to use fewer resources while changing the exploitation narrative.

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After lunch, the day continued with a 90-minute poster presentation session. Every student attending the Academy (twelve internationals coming from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the US and the UK) and six internal UNBC students produced posters to explain their research.

By engaging informally, students received precious feedback on their work while instructors became Figure 4: Posters' presentation session at the UNBC. Photo by familiar with the topics and Giuseppe Amatulli expertise of each participant.

The first day was concluded by a keynote speech by Chief Joe Alphonse, from the Tsilhqot’in National Government, on “Indigenous worldview and Aboriginal Title”. Chief Joe was recently awarded a PhD honoris causa in Law by the University of Victoria in recognition of his fights to see the rights of his people recognised. He initiated key litigation that brought a ground-breaking verdict (2014), that recognised Aboriginal title in Canada exists and was never extinguished.

Furthermore, the Tsilhqot’in case was instrumental for Canada to fully endorse the UNDRIP at the Federal level in 2016, two years later the Tsilhqot’in verdict was issued. Towards the end of his keynote speech, a student asked what Canada could do to remedy the wrong of the past, and Chief Joe simply replied: ‘Leave. We do not need Canada; we do not need any of them to run our Government.’ This answer generated an interesting debate among students and instructors in the following days. As highlighted by Prof. Paul Bowles during the final round of reflections on the last day, Chief Alphonse statement moves the discussion on Governance in Canada. It poses important questions about Canada as a Federal state while opening the debate on the need to see Canada as a pluri-national state and how to govern such a state entity, where always more First Nations are acquiring political and economic self-determination.

Day 2 began with a keynote lecture on the green transition and Indigenous Worldviews given by Prof Heather Castleden, President’s Impact Chair in Transforming Governance for Planetary Health, University of Victoria, and Principal Investigator of the Research Project ‘A SHARED Future - Achieving Strength, Health, and Autonomy through Renewable Energy Development for the Future. The research project studies reconciliation between knowledge systems. Renewable energy was chosen as the platform for exploring reconciliation and moving towards healing the relationships with each other and the world. Prof Castleden pointed out that decolonizing energy policy in Canada is fundamental to achieving a real reconciliation while offering First Nations a way out from the financial and political dependency generated by fossil fuels. The morning continued with the presentation of Prof Marianna Muravyeva (Faculty of Law/Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki) on the topic of ‘Personal Security of Indigenous Women in the Russian North: Old Issues, New Challenges’. Focusing on Women's issues in the Russian North, Prof Muravyeva explained the situation that Russian women have been facing since the collapse of

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the Soviet Union. In addition, Prof Muravyeva referred to several examples made by Chastity Alphonse the day before, about women in British Columbia. Different in subject, but complementary to the scope of the Academy, was the talk given by Prof Brian Menounos, Canada Research Chair in Glacier Change. Explaining how the cryosphere responds to climate change, Prof Menounos made us think about how receding and melting glaciers can impact life on Earth and its meaning for human beings. He concluded his talk by pointing out that it is necessary to make a shift in the way we live if we want to be more sustainable. His concluding remarks resonated with what Dr Gabrielle Daoust explained when concluding her presentation on water and the need to use fewer resources.

After lunch, we reconvened in the Senate Chambers for the afternoon session. Titled ‘Sustainability, the Green Transition and UNDRIP: BC and Beyond’, the session was organised as a roundtable discussion among policymakers and practitioners from different First Nations, consulting firms, research institutes, and provincial and federal branches of the Government. Paul Gruner, CEO of Tahltan Development Corporation, joined us online from Yellowknife and was our first speaker. He explained the role and mission of an Indigenous Development Corporation and how it can contribute to the sustainable exploitation of natural resources. Similarly, Allan Stroet, Economic Development Manager of the Lheidli T’enneh Nation, shared his experience. A strong believer that First Nations are entering a golden age of economic development, Allan explained the difference between First Nations and Western companies when it comes to economic development, with a focus on timing and business approaches.

The need for a different approach to working with First Nations was also highlighted by Tara Bogh, Resource Manager, Ministry of Forests, Province of British Columbia. While recognising that there is so much to do, she also explained that the Government has changed perspectives and improved engagement practices in the last decade. Walsham Tenshak, Director of Economic Development and Communications of the District of Kitimat joined us by Zoom. She provided an explanation of the possibilities that Kitimat offers when it comes to business development while also addressing some of the challenges. Ananya Bhattacharya, Project Manager for the Takla First Nation, took the word after, explaining how Takla is implementing article 14 of UNDRIP on the rights that Indigenous peoples have to establish and control their educational systems. Ananya explained that at Takla, there is an on-Reserve school that hosts pupils until grade 9. In the last few years, the Nation has done extensive work to train members to become teachers and stay in Reserve, thus providing jobs and offering a real opportunity to community members to stay and live on Reserve. Other participants in the roundtable discussion were Rob van Adrichem, Director of External Relations, Community Energy Association and Carly Madge, Program Manager Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions. Rob provided a description of the Association and its mission, pointing out that one of the biggest challenges is to change the narrative about sustainability, what is sustainable and how to live more sustainably (i.e. in terms of producing and using energy in a different way). Carly explained the mission of the Institute and her role in conducting communityengaged research. After the end of the roundtable discussion, the conversation continued as we walked downtown through the UNBC connector trail system and Maple Madra Indian Restaurant.

The first two days of the Academy were over, and students were ready to get out of the University and experience something different.

The Arctic Academy for Sustainability

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On Day 3 of the Academy (Wednesday, May 25th), we visited Canfor, a Canadian company leader in forestry activities and one of the world's largest producers of pulp, lumber, and paper. For many of the students, it was their first time visiting a pulp mill, and everyone was curious to know more about CANFOR, its activities, and strategies when it comes to sustainability and relationships with Indigenous peoples. Once we entered the facility, we were welcomed by Walter Matosevic, Canfor’s chief forester, who introduced us to the session and the meeting objectives. Soon after, presentations on CANFOR and its activities started. Lindsay Sahaydak, Director of Environment & Sustainability, gave us a talk on corporate overview and sustainability strategy; Kalin Uhrich, Chief Forester, and Sara Cotter, FMS & Tenure Coordinator, spoke about forest sustainability, while Kerri Simmons, Director of Indigenous Partnerships, told us more about Aboriginal Engagement and the impacts of UNDRIP on CANFOR operation considering the 2019 approval of the BC DRIPA (the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) Act. Throughout these presentations, an interesting debate arose about CANFOR and its mission, its sustainability objectives, and the renewed commitment to building trust and relationships with First Nations considering the approval of DRIPA in British Columbia.

Figure 5: CANFOR headquarters, Prince George. Photo by Giuseppe Amatulli

The discussion on these issues continued over lunch and while we walked to the forest nursery.

We were offered a tour of the JD Little Forest Nursery, guided by Russ Martin, Director of Forest Operations, who explained the importance of the nursery to ensure forestry continuity. From the nursery, we went to the Northwood Pulp Mill, where Robert Thew, Group General Manager Kraft Pulp & Paper, gave us a 45-minute explanation on wood/pulp processing to obtain paper while isolating other products that could be used for several different purposes (such as biodiesel, alcohol, etc.). Towards the end of the explanation, we were offered a tour of the facility, thus having the opportunity to see how paper is manufactured while having a better understanding of how the facility works.

Once the visit to the pulp mill was over, we went to visit the ‘Exploration Place’: a science museum that hosts taxidermies, small living animals and a section on the history of the city of Prince George.

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The museum is in the Lheidli T'enneh Memorial Park, one of Prince George's premier parks, with stunning views of the Fraser River. Students had the opportunity to explore the park after visiting the museum, reflect on the week and engage in meaningful conversations with the instructors.

After three days, relationships started to be formed, and everyone was more at ease in engaging in relevant discussions about the week and the upcoming events of the next days.

On Thursday, we had the honour of hosting a delegation of the Doig River First Nation at the UNBC. Due to the fire emergency, we could not travel to Fort St. John and attend Doig Day, as it was initially planned.

Nevertheless, Shona Nelson (Band Manager of Doig), Garry Oker (previous Chief and current councillor) and Levi Davis (community and staff member) agreed to come to Prince George to offer us cross-cultural training and Figure 7: Drumming and smudging ceremony for the opening of updates on what Doig has the Doig Day at the UNBC. Photo by Giuseppe Amatulli achieved in the last years in terms of socio-economic development and to ensure cultural continuity. The day started outside with a smudging ceremony, some drumming by Garry and Levi, and a prayer. For many students, it was the first time to live such an experience and many questions were asked to Garry and Levi regarding the practice, its meaning according to the Indigenous worldview and its importance nowadays. The morning continued inside, with Garry and Shona speaking about Doig, the political organisation of the Band, and the work done by the Land Department and by Garry and Levi to ensure cultural continuity while transmitting the culture to future generations. Throughout the day, there was space for Garry to share examples of how he works with language revitalisation, making us sing in Dane-zaa after learning just one word! (Tsu-nayeh - Be kind). Levi shared with us his vision for the future within Doig River, after having travelled and lived in many different places around the world. As Garry remarked during the day, having a vision is the key to ensuring that there is a future for the next generations while using resources appropriately to fulfil the vision the community has.

The last day of the Academy was reserved for the final academic presentations given by Professor Karin Buhmann (CBS, Copenhagen) on ‘just and fair energy transitions and best practice for stakeholder engagement: meaningful rights-holder involvement in Arctic communities’, Dr Mette Apollo Rasmusen (Roskilde University, Denmark) on ‘The challenges of tight relations and decision-making in remote settings in Greenland’, and Elena Campbell (Washington University) on Arctic History(ies) and perception of the Arctic in the eighteenth/nineteenth century. The afternoon session was reserved for reflecting on the week’s achievement. Students were asked to work in groups, to highlight and share what they had learned throughout the week and how the The Arctic Academy for Sustainability

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lessons from the Academy could help them shape their current PhD research and future research plans. In the concluding thoughts, time as a social construct was highlighted by some of the students, while others pointed out how industry and First Nations have different truths when it comes to meaningful engagement and decision-making and this makes it difficult to implement a real reconciliation within Canada. Drawing on these reflections, the concept of a pluri-national state was mentioned by Prof. Bowels. As argued by Bowles, Canada might fall into this category, especially if a true reconciliation with the Indigenous peoples must be achieved. As a concluding remark of the discussion, Prof. Bowles mentioned the concept of the metabolic rift to explain the current ecological crisis and the rupture between humankind and nature because of the marketdriven economy. Such a closing statement is a remark that the discourse about sustainability and the current ecological crisis we are now facing must be addressed by everyone in society, this problem is not limited to Indigenous peoples. However, Indigenous ontology and worldviews can certainly offer a different perspective to look at things and a way out from the current socioeconomic and environmental crises in which we have trapped ourselves.

Amatulli & Jenkins

Section II: Food, health and labour

Occupational Safety and Health in Greenland – a chapter to be written?

Anne Lise Kappel, Peter Hasle, Søren Voxted, & Katharina Jeschke

Research knowledge on the management practice of Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) in Greenlandic companies is limited. As a first study of work environment activities in Greenlandic companies, this article presents the results of a survey of OSH management practice in the private sector (>9 employees) in Greenland.

74% of Greenlandic companies indicate that they want to have a work environment better than required by legislation. However, compliance with OSH legislation is challenged as only 45% meet the requirements for the compulsory risk assessment.

Additionally, 69% of the companies claim to have the compulsory safety organization, although only 38% have educated the safety organization as required. For small companies and the regions far away from the capital Nuuk, compliance is even lower.

The results point to the specific challenges in Greenland, such as the large distance in the country, hampering the dissemination and enforcement of work environment regulation.

The difficulties for the Greenlandic companies in meeting the basic requirements from the work environment legislation creates a severe challenge for the society. The authorities and the social partners need to develop strategies to reach out to the private sector to secure a safe and healthy work environment. A better adaptation to the specific Arctic context in Greenland is highly pertinent.

Introduction Greenland’s labour market has been through a fast transition from traditional self-employment based on hunting and fishing to ordinary salaried employment for most citizens. Following this development are safety and health risks at work. Greenland has adopted the Danish work environment legislation, and the Danish labour inspectorate is responsible for enforcing the legislation. However, Greenland’s unique geographical, occupational, social, and cultural conditions may challenge the understanding behind the Danish and European OSH legislation and Anne Lise Kappel, Department of Arctic Social Science and Economic, llisimatusarfik, University of Greenland Peter Hasle, Global Sustainable Production, University of Southern Denmark Søren Voxted, Department of Business and Management, University of Southern Denmark Katharina C.N. Jeschke, TEK innovation, University of Southern Denmark

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its implementation, and little is known about the Greenlandic companies’ management practice of occupational safety and health (OSH).

The first indications of work related safety and health risks date from a survey of the living conditions, lifestyle and health in Greenland, where Bjerregaard indicates that “a very large part of the population is exposed to nuisances in their work place that can influence the health negatively” (Bjerregaard, 1995) and he later points to the lack of knowledge: “poor work environment influences the health which is shown by a lot of surveys from many countries but no surveys have been conducted in Greenland” (Bjerregaard, 2004). Since then, only limited research is published.

A few studies of occupational diseases have been conducted, pointing out serious challenges for both employees and companies in the fishing industry (Hjort Bønløkke et al., 2012; Laustsen et al., 2022), and furthermore a few studies in arctic safety in the oil industry, maritime and mining operations identifying the special arctic challenges as remoteness, limited infrastructure and weather conditions (Albrechtsen & Indreiten, 2021). Yet, the main occupations have during a few decades shifted from self-employed hunters and fishermen to employment in all sorts of businesses – ranging from fish industry and construction to services and public employment (Lennert, 2015).

Only less than 4% of the employed population in Greenland has traditional fishing and hunting as their main income1. Management of OSH is therefore a new task for both employees and companies in Greenland, and knowledge about how private companies in Greenland manage and implement the basic legal OSH requirements is needed to develop efficient strategies to improve the work environment.

This paper contributes to this knowledge by investigating the approach to OHS, the ability to meet the regulatory OHS requirements and control measures in practice in the Greenlandic companies.

Furthermore, the survey illuminates the OSH differences related to company size and location. We contribute to the OSH literature in the Arctic region by providing a first-of-its-kind survey study of work environment activities in Greenlandic land-based companies. The results call for a more targeted adaption of OSH regulation to the unique Greenlandic context and to further studies of work environment practices in both Greenlandic companies and public institutions.

Background Greenland is marked by a harsh arctic climate and huge distances with a geography stretching 2670 km from North to South and 1050 km from East to West. The country has around 56,000 inhabitants spread out in 17 larger and 54 smaller settlements along the coastline of Greenland, and as there are no roads between settlements, transportation takes place by either boat or plane/helicopter. During winter, covering more than half the year, and spring, the weather adds more constraints because of sea ice, snow, and fog. Furthermore, the urbanization in Greenland has been remarkably high, and the capital, Nuuk, is now counting more than one-third of all the inhabitants in Greenland versus a fifth 40 years ago. In contrast, the number of people living in settlements with less than 700 inhabitants has decreased from a quarter to one-seventh (Kleemann, 2023: 6). Privately owned companies are mostly situated in the larger cities where the economic basis for business is present. Additionally, 13 government-owned joint stock companies dominate business life in every settlement (Kleemann, 2023: 20), especially within infrastructure, fishing industry, retail trade, and oil supply.

Another important layer in understanding the Greenlandic context is the fast transition from Danish colony to Greenlandic Self-government within half a century, impacting both business Occupational Safety and Health in Greenland – a chapter to be written?

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structure and democratic influence and traditions (Bianco, 2019). The transformation from a traditional society with self-employed hunters and fishermen to modernity with salaried employment has been particularly rapid in Greenland compared to other Indigenous societies in the Arctic (Karlsson, 2021). Consequently, Greenlanders may have ambiguous relations to salaried employment as self-sufficiency from hunting and fishing has been highly valued (Kruse et al., 2008).

However, cultural values and preferences of the Greenlandic labour force are changing as employment may now be seen as the means to acquire resources for needed equipment instead of having an identity as a salaried employee (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2003: 31). Furthermore, the drive for self-sufficiency may create a barrier to the traditional organisation of employment with managers directing and controlling work activities (Lau, 2005). A further related trait is acceptance of conditions as they are and avoidance of confrontations and conflicts (Lau, 2005; Wilson, 2015).

These constraints may, together with positive economic development explain a labour market characterized by full employment with vacant positions and large problems with attracting and retaining employees (Karlsson, 2021). The labour force is furthermore marked by a relatively low rate of skilled and many unskilled workers, and a language divide between Greenlandic and Danish with a large share of both only speaking one of the languages (Karlsson, 2021). Increasingly, workers from third countries, mainly from Asia, are hired without speaking Greenlandic or Danish and in many cases not even English. These labour market challenges can be expected to have a spillover effect on the companies’ possibilities to manage OSH as high labour migration and absenteeism and reluctance to speak up together may be a constraint for motivation and organisation of systematic work environment activities.

Danish, and thereby Greenlandic legislation2, follows the same principles outlined in the European framework direction from 1989 on OSH (Jensen, 2002). In Greenland, Denmark, and the EU, the employer has the full responsibility to secure safe and healthy working conditions for the employees – independent of explicit regulatory rules (Uhrenholdt Madsen & Hasle, 2017). Moreover, the employer has to make risk assessments (workplace assessment in the Danish legislation) of all possible risks and to plan how to control these risks to protect workers from all health hazards.

Employees are to be involved in OSH management through election of safety representatives and the establishment of joint safety committees. Managers in the safety groups and the safety representatives in Greenland must complete the statutory work environment education of five days duration. The education is carried out by the Danish Working Environment Authority (DWEA) and ensures basic knowledge of the work environment, the legislation, and its implementation in practice. Most courses are offered in Nuuk in either Greenlandic or Danish, according to DWEA. Little is known about the work environment in the labour market in Greenland. The number of reported accidents and occupational diseases has increased since 2009 to 619 accidents and 100 diseases in 2016. However, in 2016 Greenland Statistics stopped publishing on OSH (Grønlands Statistik, 2017), and only few studies in the fish processing industry show considerable health problems (Laustsen et al., 2022). Research and public statistics lack information about the work environment in Greenland. The public health survey from 2004 (Bjerregaard, 2004: 83-84) indicates a massive underreporting of work accidents and argues for the expected number to be around 1,500 per year. Knowledge about the work environment has decreased even further since regular studies of public health in Greenland do not compare occupation or sector with health (Larsen et al., 2019).

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In 1986, the first work environment legislation was approved in Greenland, which is a delay of decades compared to Denmark, and while the legislation in Denmark has been adjusted often, there have been very few adjustments in Greenland, with the latest in 2005, but a major revision has just passed into law and will apply from July 2023. The revision entails equality of mental and physical work environment, inclusion of sickness absence in the workplace assessment (WPA), as well as changing the designations from safety organisation to work environment organisation and a higher level of fines for infringement of the law.

In the European countries with a long history of industrialisation and subsequent OSH regulation – Denmark got the first legislation in 1873 – workers still suffer from accidents and occupational diseases, and improvements have been limited since the Millennium (Countouris N et al., 2023). A safe and healthy work environment is, therefore, not a goal, which comes automatically with industrialisation and economic development. Even rich countries in Europe are fighting to improve the work environment (Aleksynska et al., 2019: 66; Inc, 2022: 42–43).

Methodology We selected a cross-sectorial survey design with telephone interviews to create an overview of the work environment activities in private Greenlandic companies. The National Research Centre for the Working Environment has developed a questionnaire to map work environment activities in Danish companies and compare the activities with regulatory requirements (Bach, 2018). The questionnaire is based on Danish legislation, and has been validated and used repeatedly for research purposes (Madsen et al., 2022; Thorsen et al., 2017).

The Danish questionnaire contains 46 questions covering themes such as workplace assessment, a priority of work environment, safety organisation, preventive activities, risk assessments and instruction and training of employees. We adapted the questions to the Greenlandic context to make the questionnaire shorter and more relevant for the respondents. The adjustments are based on discussions in the research group with Greenlandic students and have subsequently been discussed with an advisory group consisting of representatives from Greenlandic companies, the labour market department, the Danish Working Environment Authority, employers' organizations, and trade unions.

Adaptation to Greenlandic conditions consists in the removal of irrelevant questions, e.g., questions related to recent legislation in Denmark not implemented in Greenland, while a few questions have been added such as weather conditions particularly relevant to Greenland. The Greenlandic version ended with 35 questions covering ten themes including company information, workplace assessment, priority of the work environment, physical, chemical, and psychosocial exposures, safety and accidents, management of OSH, and OSH training.

We translated the questionnaire into Greenlandic by the bilingual members of the research group, and bachelor students studying professional translation made a translation back to Danish. The translation validation showed difficulties in translating several work environment terms not usually applied in Greenlandic – a problem also identified in a study of court proceedings in Greenland (Pedersen & Lauritsen, 2018). After reconciliation, to validate the adaption to the Greenlandic context, we tested the questionnaire in six interviews – three in each language, initiating a few more adaptions.

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During data collection, we became aware of four issues of particular importance for Greenland that needed adaptation of the questionnaire. We identified a misunderstanding about fulfilling a workplace assessment and consequently added two additional questions about actions plans and follow up to indicate a full compliant workplace assessment. Due to the geography many companies appeared to have several separated locations (up to 1000 km distance) without present management but having managers responsible for the work environment located elsewhere, and managers expressed uncertainty about the management responsibility in these cases. We therefore added questions about management of more locations, and added an open answer to clarify how responsibility was handled practically. A recurring misunderstanding was how employees were counted in several physical separated workplaces. Here, some counted each workplace separately, and others assumed that only permanent staff counted, where none of the two assumptions are correct. Likewise, several companies indicated that they did not have a safety representative, and we added questions about these issues to a subsample of the respondents. We furthermore prepared a procedure for the implementation of the interviews, including details about the number of employees.

The study population The work environment law requires companies with 10 or more employees to establish a safety organisation, and we therefore limited the study population to all land-based companies having 10 or more employees, including both private owned and government owned joint stock companies with a permanent residence in Greenland. Number of employees is calculated as total number of employees independent of geographical location and covering both permanent and temporary employment as well as part time. Since 2018, Greenlandic companies have been integrated into the Danish Central Business Register. We used the register to identify the population, but the register proved they have incomplete information about physical operating places and numbers of employees. Consequently, we used supplementary data to identify companies with more than 9 employees from the social security numbers associated with a company and a payroll of more than 3 million DKK from the Labour Market Insurance company3 combined with the data from the Danish Central Business Register. We explained the interpretation of the rules in the beginning of the interview, and the interviewees accepted joining the interview, even though they stated less than ten employees. Due to the misunderstanding about counting the employees, we included the so-called small companies in the study, as we assume them to have more than 9 employees according to definition in the law.

The selection process carries the risk that there may be companies that are not included in the study, even if they are covered by the selection criteria. This can be misclassification in the Danish Central Business Register or incorrect information from the manager about the number of employees. Yet, we believe that the selections process covers most of Greenlandic businesses with 10 or more employees.

Data collection procedure 280 companies met the criteria for inclusion in the study. We started with a general telephone call to contact the companies to identify the manager responsible for OSH for the interview and for larger companies to map the number of physical units, and whether they have several managers to interview. When possible, the interviews with the OSH responsible managers were complete at this first contact, but in most cases, the interviewers had to call several times to get an appointment to Kappel, Hasle, Voxted, & Jeschke

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carry out the interview. The interviews were conducted in the language preferred (Danish or Greenlandic) by the Interviewee. All interviews were conducted by bilingual project participants who possessed both linguistic and cultural skills to conduct interviews on the respondent's terms, including handling of language ambiguities. Most of the 160 respondents had Greenlandic as mother tongue, but only 43 answered in Greenlandic, the reason is – as expressed by one interviewee “the meaning of the Greenlandic expression can be ambiguously unclear”, consequently the Danish version were preferred. A few respondents requested a digital version of the questionnaire and answered through an internet link.

Results The data sampling ended with 160 completed questionnaires corresponding to a response rate of 57%. The non-respondents were contacted up to 10 times and the most common reasons for not participating were lack of time and interest but also misunderstanding about whether the company was covered by the legislation. All the contacted companies have been interviewed in their preferred language (Greenlandic or Danish) and no one has refused with language as a reason.

The response distributed based on geography and sectors shows no tendency to important bias (Table 1 and 2).

Municipality

Response n 8 7 23

Avannaata Qeqertalik Qeqqata Sermersooq (Location of Nuuk) 113 Kujalleq 9 Total 160

Pct

Total N 47% 17 88% 8 56% 41 56% 202 75% 12 57% 280

Table 1. Responses distributed on the five Greenlandic municipalities.

In this context, it is important to bear in mind the small numbers of companies in the municipalities outside the capital, which means that we are cautious about concluding on these individually but instead use them to contrast the capital municipality.

Sector Construction Trade Industry Office and communication Agriculture and food Private Service Social and Health Transport Education and research Total

Response n 35 40 4 21 18 17 0 21 4 160

% 61% 51% 67% 54% 75% 61% 0% 57% 80% 57%

Total N 57 78 6 39 24 28 6 37 5 280

Table 2. Responses distributed on sectors.

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Data analysis The analysis focuses on the implementation of the basic regulatory requirements to the work environment activities in Greenlandic companies, and the aim is to provide an overview over the Greenlandic situation by analysing the attitude towards the work environment and the compliance level on WPA and safety organisation followed by a closer look at the challenges caused by geography and business structure.

Greenlandic companies generally indicate a high priority of the work environment – also compared to Danish companies (Bach, 2018). Two out of three Greenlandic companies indicate high priority of the work environment, and only half of the Danish companies do the same (Figure 1). The prevalence of low priority is low and almost the same.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

To a large extent

60%

63%

52% 31%

To some extent

To a little extent

4% 4%

No

3% 3% Greenland

70%

41%

Denmark

Figure 1. Does the workplace give high priority to the work environment?

In both countries approximately one out of three companies indicate that the work environment should be better than legal requirements (Figure 2).

0%

10%

20%

30%

45%

To some extent

No

50%

29% 32%

To a large extent

To a little extent

40%

49%

11%

8%

11%

14%

Greenland

Denmark

Figure 2. Does the workplace intend to have better work environment than the law requires?

Kappel, Hasle, Voxted, & Jeschke

60%

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Taken together Greenlandic companies generally indicate a high priority of the work environment at a level comparable to Danish companies.

Workplace assessment When we turn to the actual legal requirement for the companies to organise work environment activities, the picture is more nuanced and deserves a closer examination. As indicated in section 2, the EU requirement for risk assessment is in Denmark and subsequently in Greenland translated to workplace assessment. Full compliance involves the following four steps:4 1.

2.

3.

4.

Mapping of the company's work environment risks Assessment of the risks Preparation of an action plan for control risks and solve work environment problems Guidelines for follow-up of activities undertaken, including responsibility, implementation, and revision of action plan

It is mandatory that risk assessments are carried out for all major changes of work organisation and technology that may have an impact on the work environment and must in any case be carried out at least every three years. The results for compliance with workplace assessment in Greenland show that three out of four companies have carried out a workplace assessment at one moment in time and a little more than half have done it inside the three years requirement. These results are lower than the comparable Danish compliance (Error! Reference source not found.).

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

78%

WA carried out

93%

55%

Last 3 years

88%

Greenland

Denmark

Figure 3. Completed workplace assessment.

The size of the company has an influence on the inclination to comply with the legislation, and the large companies are as expected more compliant in both countries while the smallest companies have the lowest compliance (Figure 4). As in the Danish survey the company size is based on number of employees: small companies 0-9 employees, medium-sized companies 10 -34 employees and large companies are 35 and more employees, but it is important to bear in mind the register challenges in Greenland as described earlier under “The Study Population”.

The Greenlandic companies have a lower compliance rate than the Danish for each size of companies. Especially the required recurring implementation of WPA every third year constitute a challenge for the Greenlandic companies.

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45%

Small companies in Greenland

19% 76%

Small companies in Denmark

6%

53%

Medium-sized companies in Greenland

22% 92%

Medium-sized companies in Denmark

5%

75%

Large companies in Greenland

12% 98%

Large companies in Denmark 0%

10%

20%

WPA Within3 years

30%

40%

50%

1% 60%

70%

80%

90% 100%

WPA older than 3 years

Figure 4. Completed workplace assessment distributed by company size.

However, a fully legal workplace assessment requires both preparation and implementation of an action plan, and with the two additional elements less than half of all companies have full compliance with the workplace assessment requirement (table 3). Even for large companies 40% have not a compliant WPA, and for smaller companies the majority do not have a compliant WPA. Large

Small

Total

Companies

Medium-sized companies

N

Pct

N

Pct

N

Pct

N

pct

WPA mapping

48

87%

62

75%

14

64%

124

78%

WPA within 3 years

41

75%

44

53%

10

45%

95

55%

Prepared action plans

36

65%

32

39%

10

45%

78

49%

initiatives = full 33

60%

30

36%

9

41%

72

45%

Concrete implemented compliance Total

55

83

companies

22

160

Table 3. Compliance with the requirement for workplace assessment in Greenland

Distributed by geography and represented by the five municipalities of Greenland (Table 4) the results show that the compliance rate is higher in Sermersooq with the capital Nuuk. It is by far the biggest city with most of the companies and the largest ones. The number of respondents from the four other municipalities is low, but added up, the average of the compliance rate is 31% which is considerably lower than the capital municipality with a rate 50%.

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Qeqertalik

Qeqqata

N

%

N

%

N

5

63%

4

57%

WPA within 3 years 3

38%

1

Prepared action plans 3

38%

Concrete initiatives implemented = full compliance 3

38%

WPA mapping

Total

8

Sermersooq

Kujalleq

%

N

%

N

%

17

74%

93

82%

5

56%

14%

14

61%

74

65%

3

33%

1

14%

10

43%

61

54%

3

33%

1

14%

8

35%

57

50%

3

33%

7

23

113

9

Table 4. Workplace assessment distributed by municipalities.

A part of the explanation for compliance differences is differences in company size where Sermersooq has 37% large and 49% of medium size companies, while the average for the other four municipalities is 28% large and 60% medium size companies. However, even for large companies, the compliance rate outside Sermersooq is considerably lower (Table 5).

Sermersooq

Outside Sermersooq

Full compliance

Pct N Full compliance Pct N

Large companies

28

67% 42 5

38% 13

Medium-size companies

21

38% 55 9

32% 28

Small companies

8

50% 16 1

17% 6

Total

57

50% 113 15

32% 47

Table 5. Workplace assessment distributed to Sermersooq versus rest of the country.

Safety organisation A key feature in the management of the work environment is the safety organisation. Companies with 10 or more employees but less than 20 employees must establish a safety group consisting of the first line manager and an employee-elected safety representative, while companies with 20 or more employees must establish a safety5 committee chaired by a responsible management representative. Both the safety groups and the safety committee must include employee-elected safety representatives. During the interviews, many respondents expressed uncertainty about these rules, and the interviewer had to explain the rules to get an answer.

The frequency of companies is depicted in Error! Reference source not found.6. We have included small companies even though they in principle are not required to have a safety

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organisation as we expect that, according to the definition in the legislation, in practice they have had 10 or more employees.

The prevalence of safety organisations is almost level with Denmark, with the majority of large companies and two-thirds of the medium-sized companies having a safety organisation.

Large companies

Medium-sized companies

Small companies

Mean

N

Pct

N

Pct

N

Pct

N

Pct

Has a safety organization 50

91%

52

63%

9

41%

111

69%

Total

55

83

Denmark

22

93%

160

69%

Table 6. Distribution of companies with a safety organisation

Similar to workplace assessments, the capital municipality has a higher frequency with 76% coverage compared to the other four municipalities with 53% of the companies having a safety organisation.

One of the requirements for the safety organization is that the members (managers and safety representatives) receive a compulsory one-week education in a work environment. Completion of the education can be a proxy for a fully compliant safety organization. Table 6 shows the prevalence of a safety organization with all, or most managers and safety representatives educated (Error!

Reference source not found.7). Companies can be compliant even though all managers and safety representatives are not educated due to employees leaving and waiting time for enrolment at the course.

The results indicate that only a little more than one-third of the companies have a fully compliant safety organisation with a majority of educated members.

Large companies

Medium-sized companies

Small companies

Mean

n

pct

n

pct

n

pct

n

50

91%

52

63%

9

41%

111 69%

Educated Safety Organization 28

51%

25

30%

7

32%

60

Safety organization

N

55

83

22

pct

38%

160

Table 7. Educated members of the safety groups distributed in company size.

Half of the large companies have educated safety organizations while the share is remarkably lower for medium-sized and small companies. As shown in table 8 the share of educated safety organizations in Sermersooq is 42% while the average 28% for the other four municipalities is remarkably lower. Most courses are organized in Nuuk and companies in other localities have therefore significant cost for completion of the courses as they bear both course fees and travel and subsistence costs.

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Avannaata

Qeqertalik

Qeqqata

Sermersooq

Kujalleq

n

pct

n

pct

n

pct

n

pct

n

pct

Safety organization

4

50%

4

57%

15

65%

86

76%

2

22%

Educated Safety Organization

3

38%

4

57%

6

26%

47

42%

0

0%

N

8

7

23

113

9

Table 8. Educated members of the safety groups distributed geographically.

As for workplace assessment, large companies are more compliant with establishing and training the safety organization – although half of the large companies do not fully follow the rules. The geographical distance similarly plays a role for compliance with the safety organization rules.

Management of several locations It is common for Greenlandic companies to have several locations distributed on the coast, and 41% of the 123 managers who were asked this question are responsible for more than one workplace (Table 9).

Number locations responsible for:

n

Pct

Total responsible for more than 1 location 51

41%

Hereof: •

2-3 places

28

23%

•

4-6 places

12

10%

•

7 locations or more

11

9%

N

123

Table 9. Management of several locations

Some of these separated workplaces can be more than 1000 km from the manager’s residence and require several days of travelling. One fifth of the managers are even responsible for four or more locations, which is likely to be a severe constraint for an effective management of the work environment and leads to questions about the feasibility of fulfilling the responsibilities satisfactorily. With the geography of Greenland, it must be a severe constraint for the safe control of the work environment.

Just below half of the managers with several locations experience themselves that they have proper control of the work environment. More than half consider the consequences of the separation of units to be more constrained.

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n

pct

To a large extent

23

45%

To some extent

18

35%

To a little extent

6

12%

No possibility

4

8%

N

51

100%

Table 10. Possibility to manage the work environment at several locations.

For some of the companies with several units placed in the same city – particular in Nuuk, where most companies have their headquarters, the physical distance constitutes a smaller problem, but most of the companies have locations in different geographical locations where they do not come daily. In the open question, approximately one fourth indicate that they use the safety organisation and the legislative instruments such as workplace assessment to management the work environment at distant locations. It most often also involves various kinds of digital communications. Yet, a large share (approximately half of the companies) indicated that they leave local leaders and employees to take care of the work environment and that they expect them to report if there are any problems.

Discussion The Greenlandic legislation on work environment is relatively new and only few updates have been made with the latest in 2005, although a major revision come into force from 2023. The findings from this survey constitute the study of work environment activities in Greenlandic companies before this major revision. Yet, the changes in legislation are all adopted from Danish legislation without any adoption to the Greenlandic context.

We consider the response rate of 57% as a satisfactory response rate for company-based surveys (Pielsticker & Hiebl, 2020), but of course, it would have been interesting to dive more into the company size of non-respondents to clarify. However, due to the register challenges, it is not possible to verify this sufficiently. From other studies, we know that small companies tend to have a lower response rate as well as larger challenges with the work environment (Sørensen et al., 2007).

Despite this, we consider the sample to be a valid representation of companies in Greenland in our target group, as explained in the study population section.

The first important result is that Greenlandic companies have adopted the work environment as a key issue on their agenda. This result is very positive as Greenland has only had explicit work environment legislation for approximately 35 years, whereas Denmark has more than 150 years of experience with public regulation of the work environment. Despite this difference, Greenlandic companies indicate a priority of the work environment at the same level as Danish companies. In addition, the establishment of the basic safety organisation with safety groups (a manager and a safety representative) and a safety committee is on level with Danish companies.

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However, a high priority is not equal to a high level of management of the work environment in practice. Next to the short history of work environment management, Greenland companies face several other constraints, including a small population dispersed on a large geography, resulting in many small companies and often with several physical separated locations. Furthermore, the working population has a limited experience of salaried employment and may, especially for unskilled labour, consider employment as a means to acquire the necessary resources for a return to fishing and hunting (Karlsson, 2021). A low level of some of the required work environment activities is therefore not a surprise. This is particularly the case for workplace assessment, which is one of the key elements in the work environment law. A significant majority of Danish companies have carried out a workplace assessment inside the required three years, whereas only a little more than half of the Greenlandic companies have done so, and when it comes to taking tangible action to improve the work environment, less than half of the companies has done so.

These results suggest that most Greenlandic companies have knowledge of the requirement for a workplace assessment but only, to a more limited extent, initiate tangible activities.

A similar problem is having an efficient safety organisation where only a smaller part of the companies has secured that the members of the safety organisation have the compulsory work environment education. The cost of having a trained safety organization on both the manager and employee side may explain why only a minority of the respondents have a trained safety organization and thus meet the requirements of the legislation.

The share of companies with an educated safety organization is remarkably higher compared to the companies outside Nuuk. One explanation is the education costs for the companies outside Nuuk, causing companies to wait for the courses offered closer to their location. Furthermore, the course language adds another constraint, as bilingualism is more limited outside Nuuk.

These results indicate that the geography constitutes a major constraint. The compliance level in the municipality Sermersooq, dominated by the capital Nuuk, is much higher than the other four municipalities, with many smaller towns and settlements and large physical distances. The headquarters of the major companies including the ones owned by the Government of Greenland are in Nuuk, and companies in Nuuk have easier access to a higher skilled labour and education in work environment. The labour market in Nuuk is challenged by a lack of labour force and high turnover can force the companies to improve the work environment and display their achievements to potential employees. Also, the supplementary questions about management of workplaces in different locations underline the geographical challenge.

Even the relative high level of priority must be considered with reservations. It is the first time an adapted Danish questionnaire has been applied in the Greenlandic context. The interviewed managers may tend to give positive answers as they are aware of the legislative requirement and there may be quite a distance from the opinion of the responsible manager to the practice in the fish factory or the construction site. Although the same contradiction may be expected at Danish workplaces, and our survey has a satisfactory response rate above the Danish study, the nonrepliers could be expected to give a lower priority to the work environment. All in all, our results will therefore represent a group of replying companies with a better performance than non-repliers, and even for the repliers, the practice at the workplace level may be less effective than indicated by the replying companies themselves.

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Conclusion The work environment at Greenlandic workplaces is of growing importance as most Greenlanders work in salaried employment and the labour market is challenged by full-time employment, high labour turnover, and high absenteeism. The companies put a high priority on the work environment at the same level as Danish companies, and they have in most cases established a safety organisation. However, for the more tangible preventive activities such as completing a full workplace assessment cycle – including mapping, planning and implementation – only a minority of companies do so. The same is true for securing the compulsory education of the members of the safety groups. The challenges are especially found among companies outside Nuuk and in the medium-sized and smaller companies, as well as in companies with several units at physically separated locations. With a group of non-respondents and many respondents with a distance to the shopfloor level, many workplaces may even have larger problems related to implementation of the compulsory work environment activities.

Perspectives The high priority of the work environment among Greenlandic companies and the relatively low level of compliance with the basic requirement for work environment management point toward a need to develop strategies that help companies improve their work environment management practice.

A strengthened work environment policy, in cooperation between the Greenlandic authorities and the social partners, such as labour unions, business associations etc., would create possibilities to improve safety and health at the workplace. Such an effort can have a potential not only for safety and health but also for some of the labour market challenges with high labour turnover, exclusion from the labour market and high absenteeism (Karlsson, 2021).

The Greenlandic government has already initiated such a process with the amendment of the present law with the changes of the Danish work environment law passed in 2005. Yet, a process of tailoring the practical enforcement to the Greenlandic context is still pending. In planning that process, an integrated process between all involved parties with orchestration of the stakeholders’ activities would have a stronger impact (Hasle et al., 2017).

Future research This is the first study of work environment activities in Greenlandic, and to a large extent for the whole Arctic, as only very few studies of OSH and work environment have been published outside the fields of oil, gas, and mining industries. More research is needed to confirm whether the results can be found in other Arctic societies. It would also be relevant to study work environment activities in public employment, which is covering a little less than half the population.

Furthermore, during the data collection, we registered uncertainty regarding the legal requirements related to how temporary employees were to be counted related to the establishment of a safety organization, and another uncertainty addressed the range of responsibility for the managers.

Naturally, this leads to the question of how the law is implemented in the workplace in practice.

Hence, it would be of high relevance to carry out more detailed case studies of work environment practice at the shopfloor level to get an understanding of both barriers and possibilities for preventions of occupational risks. It would be particularly relevant to study the influence of the

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Greenlandic culture and possibilities for handling constraints related to geography, sector structure, and competence. Such case studies at the shop floor can be used to better understand the mechanisms hampering the full implementation of work environment activities, as well as possibilities for improvement.

Notes 1. Greenlandic Statistic: https://stat.gl/publ/da/AR/202218/pdf/2021%20Besk%C3%A6ftigelsen.pdf fig. 1.

2. https://at.gl/da/regler/love/lov-om-arbejdsmiljoe-i-groenland/. Accessed21.04.2023 3. https://www.aes.dk/english/about-labour-market-insurance 4. §11a, part 2 Order no. 1048 of the Ministry of Employment of 26 October 2005 as amended and §3, part 3 Executive Order no. 1168 of the Danish Working Environment Authority of 8 October 2007 5. §5 and §6 part 1 Order no. 1048 of the Ministry of Employment of 26 October 2005 as amended

Acknowledgment This research is funded by the National Research Centre for the Working Environment, who has been essential to realize this project.

Thankful acknowledgment to our student employees Soriina Davidsen and Bettina Søgaard, who conducted the phone interviews and contributed to all part of the research process with crucial cultural and local knowledge.

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Occupational Safety and Health in Greenland – a chapter to be written?

Conditions for positive contact and a positive organization: a case study of Chinese workers in Maniitsoq fish factory

Fang Fang

To deal with the shortage of a stable workforce, Royal Greenland has recruited Chinese workers in their fish factories. The factory encounters challenges in managing intercultural diversity, and this case study has examined Chinese workers´ perspective on positive contact conditions and crucial factors for a positive organization. The context of this case study is Chinese workers in the Maniitsoq fish factory, for its heatedness in local media and absence of workers’ voice. Ten interviews were conducted in October 2017 and four more in March 2018, and contact factors such as equal status, common goal, cooperation and management support; as well as positive organization factors such as corporate government, human resource management, work environment, conflict management, social activity, language skill, leadership strategy, and stress management are recognized.

The final part gives implication for factories to facilitate positive contact and establish a positive work environment and discusses the limitations of the study.

Background In recent years, the self-government of Greenland has demonstrated a commitment to building a more resilient economy. However, a lack of labor constrains Greenland's economic development.

Grønlands Erhverv, Greenland's primary business organization, conducts annual labor surveys, which reveal a persistent workforce shortage. Businesses across a wide range experienced a labor shortage of about 1,000 people in 2022. There is a constant shortage of skilled workers, and a high turnover rate among unskilled workers results in a 55% workforce gap throughout the year (Grønlands Erhverv, 2022).

Along with labor shortages, Greenland has also seen an increase in foreign immigration in recent years. In the year 2023, Statistics Greenlandic registered 1958 foreigners living in Greenland, of whom 1267 were of Asian origin. The percentage of foreigners has increased from 0.91% in 2000 to 3.46% in 2023. The largest group of foreigners come from the Philippines (725), Thailand (313), Fang Fang, Assistant Professor & PhD student, Department of Arctic Social Science & Economics, University of Greenland.

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Iceland (121), Poland (94) and Sri Lanka (92). Europeans work mainly in public administration and service, building, and transport sectors, while Filipinos and Thais uphold hotels and restaurants, where foreign workers consist of 20% of the total workforce (Statistics Greenland, 2023).

The fishing and fish-related businesses, which are essential drivers of Greenland's economy and export sector, have experienced severe challenges in maintaining a stable labor force. Gønland Erhver's 2022 report demonstrated a shortage of more than 500 personnel in the fishing industry.

(Grønlands Erhverv, 2022) In response to the situation, the largest corporation in Greenland, Royal Greenland A/S, began to recruit workers from a distant nation, China. 35 Chinese workers arrived in Greenland in 2017 to work in fish factories in Maniitsoq, Ilulissat, and Uummannaq, while another 27 arrived in 2018. Since then, Chinese workers are employed on a regular basis at Royal Greenland’s fish factories. In year 2022, the number of Asian workers reaches 128, constituting around 10% of Royal Greenland’s total employees. The largest group among them comes from Philippine (77), next biggest are 48 workers from China (Kristensen, 2022) Concerns regarding workplace diversity have grown in parallel with the rising number of international workers. Workplace diversity can contribute to competitive advantages in numerous domains, including cost, resource acquisition, innovation, problem-solving, and organizational flexibility. To capitalize on such competitive advantages, however, organizations must first overcome obstacles such as language barriers, cultural shock, misunderstanding, lack of trust, stereotyping, and conflicts (Cox & Blake, 1991). Organizations need to establish a positive work environment where individual differences are recognized, learned, and accepted to profit from workplace diversity. The attitude of an organization toward diversity may influence its employees' ability to gain long-term benefits from a diverse work environment (Lambert, 2016).

The effective management of workplace diversity holds significant importance within the Arctic region. The population of foreign-born individuals in the Nordic nations has increased significantly, from 1.3 million in 1990 to 3.3 million in 2018, and there is substantial potential for their engagement in the labor market (Heleniak, 2018). Incorporating a diverse range of perspectives and experiences can lead to creative approaches to resolving regional concerns such as climate change and sustainable development. Furthermore, the Arctic regions struggle to attract labor due to their distant locations and the associated excessive cost of transportation. By promoting diversity and inclusion in the workplace, Arctic regions can get access to an expanded range of skills and experience, inspire innovation, and eventually contribute to economic growth.

Chinese workers gained attention in the media before they even arrived in Greenland. In 2012, the world’s giant of aluminum, Alcoa, had considered to build a new smelting plant in Maniitsoq. Both Greenlandic and Danish media illustrated worries about thousands of underpaid Chinese workers rushing into Greenland. The arrival of Royal Greenland's Chinese employees has been closely reported, although the peak number of 80 Chinese people living in Greenland only makes them as 3rd largest among Asians in Greenland in 2022 (Statistics Greenland, 2023). Unlike Philippine or Thailand, which has a rapid growing number of people living in Greenland in recent years, Chinese people appeared to be less interested in living in Greenland for an extended period. The number of Chinese living in Greenland in 2023 drops to 68, outnumbered by Sri Lanka (92) (Statistics Greenland, 2023). And despite extensive coverage of Chinese workers in the media, their own voices are rarely heard of. Therefore, it is of great academic interest to learn from Chinese laborers

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about their experiences in Maniitsoq, the major challenges they encounter in a diverse work environment, and their perspectives on a positive work environment.

Figure 1: Main groups of Asian living in Greenland. Data source: Statistics Greenland, 2023. Population by Citizenship 1977-2023 [BEEST6].

Positive work environment Prior studies have acknowledged the significance of a positive work environment in the context of diversity management. However, more research is still needed to identify the essential elements that contribute to a positive work environment. Patrick and Kumar (2012) conducted interviews with 300 IT employees and discovered that discrimination, prejudice, and ethnocentrism were the most common barriers in a diverse workplace, with cross-cultural training, overseas assignment opportunities, and language courses being the most recommended approaches for promoting inclusiveness. To diminish cognitive workload during communication, people frequently base their responses on prejudice, which has been shown to have a negative impact on intergroup attitudes and communication efficacy (e.g., Spencer-Rodgers & McGovern, 2002). According to contact theory, positive contact between group members, such as friendship, can inspire personalization (focusing on the unique characteristics of out-group members rather than group stereotypes) and de-categorization (reducing the salience of the original group boundaries). As a result, personalization and categorization would lessen the original intergroup bias and conflict (Wilder, 1986).

Positive contact, therefore, has been defined as contact with outgroup members which reduces intergroup prejudice. Allport (1954) recognized four conditions for positive contact: equal group status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support of authorities. Meta-analysis by Pettigrew et al. (2006) found that Allport’s conditions facilitated, but were not essential to, the decrease in prejudice. The meta-analysis also showed the special importance of cross-group friendship in promoting positive contact effects, and essential mediators for the relationship between positive contact and prejudice reduce, such as increased knowledge, anxiety reduction and enhanced empathy.

Fang

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Aside from positive contact, positive organizational theory focuses on a broader range of positive events and processes that occur within organizations. PRIDE theory (Cheung 2014, 2015) identified five essential components of a positive organization: positive practices, relationship enhancement, individual attributes, deviant leadership, and emotional well-being. According to Wenstrom et al. (2018), these kinds of positive behaviors can lead to positive emotions and attitudes, which in turn create a positive atmosphere at work. Positive events and processes are also linked to energy, work engagement, and enthusiasm. This approach originated from the positive psychology movement and emphasized more on capitalizing on individual strengths rather than solely focusing on shortcomings or deficiencies (Cheung, 2014).

Research questions An intercultural workplace provides good opportunities to examine positive contact conditions.

Compared with neighborhoods, Laurence et al. (2018) indicated that workplace characteristics, such as team composition, task assignment, and the necessity of interaction with co-workers, facilitate inter-group contact. On the other hand, workplace contact could be more competitive, or involve larger status differentials, and individuals may be compelled into negative contact where other contexts would allow them to avoid it. Unlike migration from Philippines or Thailand, who normally come to Greenland through social network in their home country, Chinese workers were first recruited to Greenland by Royal Greenland’s office in Qingdao, China, and had limited knowledge about Greenland before coming. Lacking social networks and social capital in Greenland, social lives of these Chinese workers are also intricately linked with their workplace and the group of workers in the same workplace. Therefore, positive contacts in the workplace are vital for their integration into the local society. Also, their limited language ability, and as a result their lack of power in the workplace, make it more difficult to fulfill Allport’s conditions for positive contacts. With its specific features discussed in previous section, the context of Maniitsoq fish factory has provided good opportunity to study intergroup contact process between Chinese workers and local workers, and to recognize key factors that facilitate/hinder positive contact and attitude improvement.

Positive organization theory demonstrates that positive attitudes fostered by social contact may contribute to improved work performance. Fredrickson and Losada (2005) revealed that the presence of effective communication and supportive expressions among team members was a significant differentiating factor between flourishing teams and languishing teams. And Bakker et al. (2005) discovered that job demands, including work overload, emotional demands, physical demands, and work-home interference, did not lead to burnout among employees who had access to job resources such as autonomy, performance feedback, social support, or supervisor coaching.

Chinese workers in Maniitsoq were regarded as a reliable and productive workforce in general.

Chinese workers, however, also must deal with issues like limited language proficiency, opportunities for professional growth, and development programs. The lack of prospects for advancement encouraged a short-term perspective, and most Chinese laborers did not plan to stay in Greenland permanently. This case study provided an opportunity to explore the perspectives of Chinese laborers on a positive work environment and provided insights into actions that are most pertinent to developing a supportive work culture that may draw and keep Chinese laborers, thereby contributing to a more inclusive and diverse workforce in Greenland.

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The following research questions aim to investigate the factors of positive contact and positive organization in the context of Chinese workers at the Maniitsoq fish factory: 1. How do Chinese laborers perceive their contacts with their Greenlandic colleagues and supervisors at the Maniitsoq fish factory?

2. What are the key elements that contribute to a positive work environment for Chinese workers at the Maniitsoq fish factory?

Methodology A case study is defined as" an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units (Gerring, 2004: 342), and the case study design is suitable to explore complicated individual-environment interactions. A case study of Chinese workers in the Maniitsoq fish factory can provide valuable information on the specific experiences and challenges faced by Chinese laborers in Maniitsoq. Such research can acquire firsthand accounts of these workers' daily lives, interactions with locals, and cultural challenges they may experience; therefore, it can contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics between Chinese laborers and their work environment, as well as inform policies and interventions that can improve their workplace as well as their overall well-being and integration into the local community.

To guide the research on a project's complexity and uniqueness, it is required to first determine the subject of interest and the theoretical topic of interest. By doing so, we can study the theoretical topic of interest through the prism of the subject of interest. In this study, I defined my subject of interest as Chinese workers employed in the Royal Greenland fish plant in Maniitsoq, and my subject of interest as the factors that constitute a positive contact condition and a positive organization. To address the issue, a semi-structured interview guide was used. Semi-structured interviews allow participants to share in-depth insights and viewpoints. Furthermore, it enables the detection of emerging themes and patterns that were not predicted previously, boosting overall comprehension of the project in a "real-life" setting (Yousfi, 2014). Triangulation offers multiple perspectives to assess the complexity of a project. Triangulation improves the validity and reliability of the findings by combining several data sources and techniques, such as document analysis and observations. Furthermore, a more comprehensive understanding of the project makes the research findings more representative and applicable to real-world situations (Williams & Shepherd, 2016). Data collected for triangulation includes public resource data, such as news articles, academic papers, and public statistics, and informant-shared data, such as reports, marketing materials, oral descriptions, presentations, and observations. Such data enriched the context of the project and complemented the interview findings.

Research context Royal Greenland Ltd. is the largest company in Greenland, 100% owned by the self-government.

In total, the company has 38 plants along the west coast of Greenland, with around 2200 employees worldwide; among them, 1400 are employed in Greenland. In 2022, Royal Greenland A/S had a turnover of 5.757 billion DKK. Maniitsoq Fish Plant is one of the biggest plants in Royal Greenland. Its production capacity is around 80 tons per day, and the employee number ranges from 25 to 100 in low and peak seasons. The main products are fish fillets of cod in the summer and Greenland halibut in the winter. The factory is quite automatically equipped, with machines for fish sorting, freezing, transporting, and fillet processing lines.

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Maniitsoq is a town in Qeqqata Municipality, West Greenland, with around 2500 inhabitants. The area around the town is rich in fish, reindeer, minerals, and precious stones, and the most important industry is the fishing industry and other food production. Since the fishery was industrialized during the 1960s and 1970s, Maniitsoq has become a town in the center of industrialization (Dybbroe, 2008). Located about 140km north of Nuuk, Maniitsoq is easy to reach with flights from Nuuk and Kangerlussuaq and with passenger ferry and fast boat shuttle. The town has good facilities such as supermarkets, shops, banks, restaurants, museums, and football pitches.

In 2016, Royal Greenland attempted to recruit a larger number of Chinese workers through a fish plant in Qingdao, which produced fish imported from Royal Greenland. The recruiting process took a longer period than expected, and finally, in May 2017, the first group of Chinese workers arrived in Maniitsoq. Most of them were in their 30s and 40s, had middle school education, and had work experience in fish production at the Qingdao plant. Many also came as couples, leaving the kids in the care of their grandparents back home. With former work experience, they need little adjustment with fish processing tasks. Workers have come under a two-year work contract, while work permits still need to be renewed every year. The wages were time-paid every two weeks.

Chinese workers received the same paid rate as local workers; in addition, the plant provided an 8hour working day guarantee to Chinese workers. Chinese workers lived in dormitories with a relatively low rent, and their travel expenses between China and Greenland were covered.

Workers are divided into three groups: material, filling line, and packaging. The material group has 2–3 workers in charge of fish defrosting and sorting. Fillet processing and packing have a larger group of workers, and they shift between different tasks according to a work schedule published one day before. Daily routines started at 7 o’clock for production preparation and finished when the required quantity of products was achieved. In the long winter seasons workers had more leisure time, but outdoor activities were extremely limited due to wintry weather, and the main entertainment for workers was card playing and chatting. And summertime is the high season for production, as well as an enjoyable time for outdoor activities such as hunting, fishing, and berry picking.

One Chinese-born translator was hired by Royal Greenland first in 2010 as a part-time translator and later as a HR consultant. The translator spent her daily life in Aasiaat, a town 367 kilometers north of Maniitsoq, taking care of seven plants with foreign worker-related issues such as recruitment, work permit application and renewal, travel arrangements, document and meeting translation, and translation of daily life issues.

Semi-structured interviews As a Chinese coming to Greenland in the similar period as the first-coming Chinese workers, I noticed the media focus on Chinese workers, and the absence of voice from workers themselves.

To learn about Chinese workers’ expectations, opinions, and experiences, I contacted the management of Maniitsoq fish factory, and with the assistance of the factory arranged interviews with five Chinese workers. A semi-structured interview method is chosen to narrow down the discussion to the main themes of research, and to avoid the risk of ignoring interesting topics. Each interview has a length between half an hour to one hour. The guideline covered topics as follows: background and work condition; expectation; optimal contact condition; and adapting process.

Five interviews in total took place in October 2021 in the meeting room of Maniitsoq fish factory.

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After arriving in Maniitsoq, I happened to meet a group of Chinese workers in a local supermarket and learned that these workers had just started their work at the Royal Greenland fish plant for two weeks. I thought it was a good chance to do longitudinal research about their adapting process.

Five interviews were conducted in October 2021, in Chinese workers’ dormitories. These interviews followed a revised guideline to focus more on their first impressions of Maniitsoq. After about six months, four out of five participants participated in the following interviews in March 2022 to examine their experience of adaptation. Compared to the group of workers picked out by the plant management, this group of workers were recruited to Greenland through a different channel. They learned the recruitment information through a foreign worker agency, and after a simple interview and long waiting time for necessary documents and permit application processes, they took the flight to Greenland. This group of workers covered a variety of work backgrounds, such as worker agent, truck driver, cook, and assembly line worker in electronic plants. Several also had experience working abroad before coming to Greenland.

Data analysis The interviews were conducted in the Chinese language, and with the participants' consent, the interviews were comprehensively recorded. Subsequently, I undertook the task of translating and transcribing all the conducted interviews. The coding approach consisted of many practices recommended by scholars such as Gioia et al. (2013), Williams and Shepherd (2016), and Yousfi (2014) to enhance the qualitative analysis by ensuring both rigor and comprehensibility. Such approaches included (1) analyzing data from first-order codes to aggregate themes; (2) previewing important findings to provide the reader with clarity and structure; (3) displaying representative quotations; and (4) identifying overlapping stories and expressions to examine the common criteria used by interviewees to express their perspectives. Throughout the process, I reviewed and reread the data and recoded it numerous times to reflect my changing understanding.

To begin with, I gave labels to the transcripts. As there were two rounds of interviews taking place in October 2021 and March 2022 and two groups of workers coming to Maniitsoq at separate times, transcripts were first labeled to facilitate comparison between diverse groups and different rounds of interviews. For example, for label W11, the first number "1" represented the first round of interviews in that the interviewee was from the first group of five workers who came to Maniitsoq in 2017, and the interview took place in October 2021. The second number "1" registered which worker has been interviewed. For label W23, the first number "2" represented the interviewee as a "newcomer" to Maniitsoq, who arrived in 2021, and the interview took place in October 2021. The second number "3", still registered who has been interviewed. Label W33 registered for the following interview in March 2022 for the same interviewee in W23.

After labeling the transcripts, I classified and labeled the text to give initial codes. Positive contact theory and positive organization theory served as guides for the initial codes to emphasize the subjects that were most pertinent to the research questions. Initial codes covered a wide range of topics, including power status, cooperation and collaboration, communication, language skills, leadership, and so forth. Furthermore, the initial set of codes was combined and organized into broader conceptual categories. This involved an ongoing process of analyzing the data and identifying theoretical patterns until all the data were systematically categorized and no new categories emerged. An examination was also conducted to investigate the critical incidents and common expressions. I focused on the stories that the interviewees shared when offering their

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perspectives about what makes for positive contact or a positive workplace. The overlapping narratives and expressions provided clues as to key factors applied to the specific setting. In total, four positive contact factors and eight positive organization factors were identified. In the subsequent section, a more comprehensive analysis of these factors will be provided.

Findings Positive contact factors Allport (1954) proposed four conditions for positive contact: equal group status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support of authorities. In the contacts between Chinese workers and local workers in Maniitsoq fish factory, Allport’s conditions were not fully fulfilled.

Equal group status At first glance, it seems that Chinese workers and local workers have equal group status. They work under the same type of work contract, with the same tasks and the same pay level. However, the situation was much more complicated under further examination. In the first round of interviews, both groups of workers reported an equal status at work. However, the following round of interviews revealed a different picture. For example, W31 commented: [Local workers] came back and forth to stare at me. When they wanted to order me to do some tasks, they just pointed at me.

W32 also mentioned that: We couldn’t guess what they were thinking about. Locals were in the same working position as us, but they just stared at how you worked and reported to the team leaders.

W34 commented: After reporting us to the leader, they talked with us, smiling as if nothing had happened.

At first, Chinese workers got quite annoyed by the reporting behaviors, and afterwards they learned to deal with the situation and comfort themselves. W31 mentioned: I gradually learned to care less (about the reporting behavior) during the half-year period.

W34 mentioned.

I just pointed at the cap (color of the cap represented the positions in the team; a team leader had a different cap color than the common workers) and gestured that you are not my leader.

Feelings of unequal status hinder the intention of positive contact. W34 commented: We couldn’t understand their way of thinking, and don’t bother to know.

Common goal Chinese workers generally thought that they had a common goal with local workers while working, which was to finish the job with good speed and quality. However, the working styles were different. Chinese workers were more accustomed to piece-paid work in China and had a habit of focusing more on their working speed. For example, W11 mentioned that:

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The working goals are different. They (local workers) do what they want to do, and when they feel tired, they go outside to take a rest. We Chinese don’t feel that way. When we notice fish piling up in the line, we just want to do the job as fast as possible.

W12 commented: Chinese speed. When we produce the fillets, we have three people on each side. The production line has a high speed; more Chinese workers means less effort.

W31 commented: At first, we felt anxious when there were no fish on the production line and feared that the leader would scold us for laziness.

On the other hand, local workers focused more on following the instructions step-by-step and were described as "rigid". W31 mentioned: Once, I needed to change to a new knife. We have rules that one person can only hold one knife at a time. I just asked somebody to pass the knife for me, and it was reported by locals that I was holding two knives at the same time.

W14 also mentioned that: (The locals) believe in machines, not people. At a glance, we could tell the difference in weight of fish pieces—only two kinds: 200 grams and 400 grams. We could spot the difference easily. But here they require that every single piece of fish be weighed by the scale. Even though I could tell anyway, I was required to follow the procedure.

Local workers were also described as responsible. W15 commented: The locals are ready to admit their own mistakes and did not try to push the responsibility away.

Cooperation Chinese workers reported good cooperation with local workers. Although Chinese workers only spoke a few words of English, and most local workers spoke only Greenlandic, the working cooperation did not require much language ability, and the workers learned to understand each other by gestures or facial expression. W11 commented: When we get familiar, we can easily understand each other without so many gestures.

For example, I could simply point to the gloves to show that I need to change them or point to the door to show that I want to go outside for a rest.

W15 commented: It is happy to work together with local workers because they are funny and often make jokes.

However, small conflicts about joking behaviors were also reported. W11 reported: (Locals) could make fun of me, but they could not accept it when I do the same kind of thing. One day a female worker patted my butt jokingly, and she thought it was quite OK. Another day when I patted her, she got annoyed.

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Management support When there were conflicts between Chinese workers and local workers, factory management would call a meeting to solve the conflicts as soon as possible. W14 commented: Firstly, both sides should explain the situation to group leaders. But we could not explain our situations clearly, not as clearly as the locals.

Group leaders would report the situation to the factory manager, and she asked the translator then.

W11 commented: (With trivial conflicts) the manager does not interfere and is rather indulgent towards the locals.

W31 mentioned: The leaders didn’t understand (our situation) and did not try to mediate (our conflicts with the locals). Whatever the locals reported (Chinese worker’s "wrongdoings"), they believed and criticize the Chinese on personnel meetings.

The management tended to focus more on production-relevant issues. W14 mentioned: Production-related issues will be translated. If these issues are not involved, they will not explain what has happened. During meetings, we just sit there. If Chinese people are not involved, there is no translation.

Chinese workers had little clue about what had been discussed. W14 mentioned: There was an event last year which I still haven’t figured out yet. The locals were very happy about it. A list was typed out and pasted on the wall, but I don’t understand what the letters mean.

W32 mentioned the same event: When they had meetings, we were asked to do all the work in the group, and they drank coffee and had leisure time. Still, these activities counted for the same working hours as us.

Chinese workers also reported the unwillingness of management to listen to their opinions in production and management improvements. W14 commented: I can't argue with them. He is the leader, so I can't talk, even if I know better. The problems we can spot immediately, they can't spot even if they go around and around.

We can finish production at two o'clock, and when they arrange workers and allocate work, they can't finish it until four o'clock. Their management model and team are different from our domestic ones.

W33 mentioned: There are good and bad people everywhere. Chinese, Greenlandic, all the same. It’s okay, the problem is the management mode is not good.

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Positive organization factors Following positive psychology, positive organization theory emphasized strengths rather than shortcomings. The Chinese workers also gave their perspectives on a positive organization. To examine the most relevant factors for Chinese workers, I organized topics into different factor categories following the guidelines of the Positive Organizational Index (PRIDE-69) (Cheung, 2014).

Table 1: Chinese workers’ perspective on a positive organization Positive Organization Factors

Topics

Positive practices

Corporate governance

W11, W12, W13, W14, W15, W22, W23, W24, W25, W31, W32, W33, W34

We come here to earn money. (W12)

Human resources management

W14

New locals were promoted to supervise us. (W14)

Work environment

W14, W21

Back in China the factory had little rest time. (W21)

Conflict management

W11, W31, W32

It is harmful for conflicts to accumulate. (W32)

Social activity

W15

People eat cakes and drink coffee together in canteen(W15)

Individual attributes

Language skill

W14, W24, W25

When We wanted to speak, no one could help in translation (W14)

Deviant leadership

Leadership strategies

W14, W21, W25, W31, W32, W33, W34

The factory leader called me by nickname. (W25)

Emotional well- being

Stress management

W31, W32, W33, W34

The Work itself is not tiresome, but my heart feels tired.

(W31)

Relationship enhancement

Interviews Representative Quotes

No improvement over the years. The same questions continued. (W14)

Corporate governance The topic most concerned Chinese workers was corporate governance. All Chinese workers emphasized that they came to Maniitsoq to work and earn money, and most of them planned to go back to China after contract expiration. Therefore, they cared most about the workload allocation. The workers were paid by the hours, so their main concern was to work as many hours as they could. Such an intention was strong when they first arrived, and gradually they learned to live a more leisurely life. The second group of workers had experienced unsatisfaction with the overtime work arrangement in the factory and tried to suggest a "fairer" distribution of overtime working hours among Chinese workers. But they felt that they had no channel to communicate their wishes, and a lack of interest from factory management made them disappointed.

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Human resources management Chinese workers were excluded from training and promotion on the excuse of language ability.

W14 mentioned: The group leaders were promoted among local workers. Yesterday, two locals were promoted. They just started working for a few days. Now they were leaders to supervise us.

However, development issue was not mentioned that often by Chinese workers. With a short-term perspective, most workers had no intention for a longer stay in Maniitsoq. Consideration of family, especially children, is the main cause for returning. One worker showed interest in applying for permanent residence in Greenland, which requires seven years’ stay. But he also mentioned consideration of his family back in China.

Work environment In general, Chinese workers had no specific requirements for their work environment and were satisfied with what was provided to them. W21 compared the work environment at the Maniitsoq fish plant with the factory he worked before: Back in China, the factory had little rest time. Here, it is quite different.

W14 also mentioned work environment improvement: This year music was played during our work time, but we couldn’t understand the songs.

We thought it was noisy, but the locals were happy and dancing. It's fun to work here.

People cheered when they got off work, the atmosphere was quite good.

Conflict management Lack of effective conflict management was also mentioned. W31 commented: We were told that we could not compare with the locals. Locals could do whatever they wanted; we came here to work.

Although conflict management was not always satisfactory and language barriers made it difficult to communicate, Chinese workers still held a good relationship with local workers in general. W11 commented: One day we were annoyed by each other, and the following day we just forgot about it.

Social activity Although Chinese workers had participated in some social activities when they first came to Greenland, they gradually lost interest in participating. W15 mentioned: The factory has contacted a fitness center to provide us with free entrance. We tried a few times on Sundays, but shortly we went no more. The work itself is exhausting; we need no more training.

The language barrier also diminished their motivation to participate. W13 mentioned: I went to a concert once but couldn’t understand a thing.

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One key person on social networks could have a huge influence. One local worker was mentioned by several Chinese workers in the first group as being very friendly and enjoying communicating with them. He often visited their dormitory and invited them to his home for dinner and holiday celebrations. He also invited Chinese workers to go hunting and fishing with him. Unfortunately, he died of cancer at the early age of 28, and Chinese workers lost their most important local friend.

And the second group of workers loses a lot of opportunities to contact locals. Local workers also had a high turnover rate, which made social networking even more challenging.

Language skill Several works also showed an interest in improving their language skills. W33 mentioned: The locals speak Greenlandic. Some could speak a little English, others couldn’t. During leisure time I like to chat with the local people, and they teach me Greenlandic. One sentence, two sentences. Gradually I could communicate with basic words.

Although the work itself did not require many language skills, the Chinese workers were still excluded from development opportunities. And the inconvenience experienced both at work and in daily life made them motivated to learn the foreign language. Greenlandic and English were preferred, while no one showed an interest in learning Danish.

Leadership strategies The second group of workers experienced a change of perspective about leadership. When they first arrived, they were surprised by the equal status and respect shown by factory management.

W21 mentioned: The leaders stood there and introduced themselves, and we sat and listened. Afterward, we had dinner together with the factory management.

After six months, workers began to be unsatisfied with the overtime work arrangement in the factory and the lack of interest from the management in handling the issue.

W31 mentioned after six months: (We were criticized for) wasting the factory manager's time. The manager has no obligation to care whether the workers feel (the overtime allocation) is fair or not.

Stress management The lack of communication channels and unsatisfactory allocation of overtime work made some workers show signals of burnout. W31 mentioned: It is hard to adjust my mode, and I feel depressed. My children are still young back in China, and when my parents complained about taking care of children, I became very depressed.

When I worked in Japan, the work itself was tough, but the atmosphere was nice. When something happened, there was someone available to help us fix it. The work arrangement was fair.

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W34 also mentioned: We were criticized for working in a bad mode. Basically, you won’t get emotional because of work. You won’t lose your temper easily when you are not tired. People only get emotional when they are unhappy.

Discussion To summarize, the workplace at the Maniitsoq fish factory did not fully match Allport's (1954) good interaction characteristics, according to Chinese workers. On the other hand, contacts between Chinese laborers and local workers were often described as friendly. Employees also displayed a "U-curve" process of attitude transmission. Chinese workers had a favorable attitude toward their work and the local workers at first, but their attitude deteriorated with time due to a lack of positive contact variables in the workplace. They gradually learned to adapt to their surroundings over time. Management support was shown to be critical in establishing positive interactions between Chinese labor and local workers. A more inclusive and harmonious work environment developed when management actively supported and encouraged interactions and collaboration among employees from diverse backgrounds, as well as actively dealing with conflicts. This not only helped to strengthen relationships between Chinese workers and local workers but also contributed to overall job satisfaction and productivity within the organization.

The short-term perspective of Chinese workers has a significant impact on their expectations for a positive working environment. Due to their limited language skills and communication channels, it is challenging for management to understand them, and they frequently miss advancement opportunities. A short-term perspective encourages Chinese workers to prioritize immediate gratification over long-term aspirations for a positive work environment. A positive organization was more frequently associated with factors like work allocation that have a direct correlation to short-term gains. As a result, for Chinese workers, leadership and corporate governance became the primary areas of focus, while individual qualities and other areas linked to long-term perspectives were largely ignored. Consequently, Chinese workers may overlook the importance of personal growth and development, and this imbalance in priorities may hinder the overall growth and sustainability of the organization eventually.

Conflicts are difficult to avoid in a multicultural setting, and factors such as conflict management, leadership strategies, and stress management were frequently mentioned, particularly by the second group of Chinese workers. Without proper conflict resolution skills and strong leadership, the organization may face increased turnover rates and decreased productivity, ultimately impacting its long-term success. Additionally, stress management techniques can help Chinese workers cope with the challenges of working in a multicultural setting, promoting their overall well-being and job satisfaction.

Open communication and respect should be the foundations of the working relationship between management and employees. This can create a positive workplace where employees feel heard and respected. Furthermore, regular feedback methods like performance reviews can improve the relationship between employees and management by encouraging responsibility and openness.

Effective management requires acknowledging and addressing employees' concerns, addressing their needs, and treating them as equals. Furthermore, international workers need a supportive social network to help them deal with life's obstacles.

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Positive contacts and an inclusive environment can also foster the de-categorization process.

Because they were a unique group residing in a tiny town, the Chinese workers were more easily identified as "Chinese" than as individuals. and the misbehavior of a single Chinese worker could lead to a negative attitude toward the whole group of Chinese workers. By encouraging personal connections and fostering understanding between individuals from diverse groups, it becomes easier to address conflicts on an individual level rather than attributing them to the entire group.

Maniitsoq shares many characteristics with other small Arctic societies, such as Longyearbyen and Svalbard. Both are on the coast, and since there are no roads connecting them to other networks, most transportation is by air or sea. Furthermore, population sizes are constrained (de Witt et al., 2021). We can read about Filipinos and Thais who live on Svalbard (Sokolickova, 2022) or work in fish factories in Icelandic cities (Bissat, 2013; Skaptadóttir, 2010, 2019). However, there are few accounts about Chinese workers in Maniitsoq that can be compared. The findings revealed unique challenges faced by Chinese workers in terms of positive contact and positive organizational behavior, highlighting the importance of further research in understanding the dynamics of diverse work environments in isolated regions. Arctic regions are known for their harsh weather conditions and remote locations, which can pose significant challenges for such regions to attract workers from diverse cultural backgrounds. Therefore, studying Chinese workers experiences in Arctic regions like Maniitsoq can provide valuable insights into the complexities of multicultural interactions.

The study's limitations included a lack of translation and coding comparison. Due to time and resource constraints, the study was unable to involve other scholars in the translation and coding process. Although the author followed guidelines from established research and examined the translations and codes several times to reflect the highest level of accuracy possible, the absence of a second opinion may have introduced some bias or errors in the results. To improve the reliability of the study, further research could consider comparing samples from different Arctic regions and conducting longitudinal research to track the long-term effects of multicultural interactions in Arctic regions. Additionally, a broader range of data collection methods could benefit the study by allowing for a variety of analytical angles. Incorporating mixed methods, such as quantitative data or focus groups, could provide deeper insights into the experiences and perspectives of positive work environments.

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The Food (In)Security Issue Across Indigenous Communities in the Russian Arctic: Economic, Social, and Environmental Aspects

Gao Tianming & Vasilii Erokhin

The livelihoods and prosperity of Indigenous Peoples substantially depend on the quality of local ecosystems and biodiversity.

Indigenous communities are particularly vulnerable to the detrimental effects of climate change. At the same time, Indigenous Peoples have extensive historical knowledge about the possibilities of responsible and environmentally friendly use of local resources, which allows them not only live in severe conditions, but also adapt to climate change. However, as the changes in the way of living have accelerated under the influence of progressing economic exploration and development of the Arctic, the adaption is becoming increasingly harder. Establishing food security is exacerbated by the cross-influence of climatic, environmental, economic, social, and cultural transformations that Indigenous communities are experiencing. In the cases of nine territories in the Russian Arctic, the chapter conceptualizes an approach to assessing the level of food and nutritional security with the differentiation of environmental, economic, and social factors that affect the security-related parameters in Indigenous communities. The authors make recommendations on how to improve food security of Indigenous Peoples, mitigate adverse effects of food insecurity on public health, boost self-sufficiency in food, and promote the use of traditional foods and related products in diets.

Introduction Food security is an important component of the national economic security of both a country as a whole and a particular territory. In accordance with the policy documents of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (FAO, 1996, 2009, 2015, 2023), this concept is used to characterize the state of the national and global food market and it is interpreted as conditions under which people at any time have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets the needs and preferences of their diets for an active and healthy life (FAO, 2009). Food Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation (President of the Russian Federation, 2010, 2020a) recognizes food independence, physical availability, economic Gao Tianming, Ph.D., Professor, School of Economics and Management, Director and Chief Expert at the Arctic Blue Economy Research Center, Harbin Engineering University, China Vasilii Erokhin, Ph.D., Associate Professor, School of Economics and Management, Research Fellow at the Arctic Blue Economy Research Center, Harbin Engineering University, China

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accessibility, and safety of food among integral elements of food security. Achieving the food security status of a particular community implies ensuring the following conditions: •

providing people with food and agricultural products according to scientifically based standards without prejudice to the competitiveness of the domestic food market and the economic security issues;

•

protection of people from low-quality food products (both domestic and imported), provided on the basis of quality control on the set of parameters;

•

continuous improvement of nutrition standards, especially in ecologically unfavorable regions, and promotion of healthy food and agricultural products;

•

establishment of food banks and reserves of food and agricultural products for their use in case of extreme situations (natural disasters, lean years, civil tensions, or any other emergencies that disrupt food supply chains).

A set of policy documents declares the priority status of the food security agenda in Russia (President of the Russian Federation, 2020a; Government of the Russian Federation, 2020b).

Nevertheless, certain aspects of the food insecurity problem are becoming increasingly acute for Russia, especially in the context of recent COVID-19 outbreak and the international sanctions regime. Russia is self-sufficient in most of the staples, including wheat, poultry, beef, fish, vegetable oil, and sugar (Wegren & Elvestad, 2018; Ahrens & Galiev, 2021; Götz et al., 2022). Meeting Russia’s national food self-sufficiency targets in quantitative terms, domestic agricultural sector fails to secure supply of sufficient volume of qualitative foods in accordance with international standards of adequate and healthy nutrition - a situation of food insecurity (Ivanov, 2015; Erokhin, 2017; Ivanov & Ivanova, 2017).

The unevenness of the sufficiency-insecurity dilemma across Russia highlights the relevance of addressing food security dimensions not only at the federal level, but also in individual entities and territories. The going regional approach is particularly vital in the Arctic zone of Russia due to the substantial gaps in the standards of living between urban and rural dwellers and Indigenous peoples (especially, nomadic communities) (Andronov et al., 2020). The significance of this distinction is consistent with the FAO Policy on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (FAO, 2015), which reports that about 15% of Indigenous Peoples worldwide live below the poverty line. It postulates that the protection of life support systems and specialized knowledge possessed by Indigenous Peoples may both reverse the erosion of Indigenous cultures and offer new solutions to the food insecurity and malnutrition problems, as well as contribute to global efforts on fighting poverty and environmental degradation (FAO, 2015). However, the issues of the quality of life and food security across Indigenous communities in the Russian Arctic remain underexplored (Poppel, 2014).

Food security and sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples are based on the preservation of traditional types of nutrition. It is a key element of the culture and economy of Indigenous communities in the Arctic, as well as an effective means of preventing health issues and adapting to the Arctic environment (healthy benefits specific to the Arctic climate). According to Andronov et al. (2018), a traditional diet is one in which the portion of traditional foods (venison, local fresh river fish, etc.) exceeds 60%. Under-consumption of traditional animal and fish products may result in an increase in a number of health-related risks, such as the increased incidence rates of cardiovascular The Food (In)Security Issue Across Indigenous Communities in the Russian Arctic

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diseases, chronic bronchitis, and metabolic disorders; decrease in adaptive body functions; transformation and erosion of traditional lifestyle; increased dependence on imported food (marketed products, junk food); decrease in quality of life and related demographic issues in the Arctic. As evidenced by FAO (2015), the food insecurity threat to Indigenous communities could be more severe than that to non-Indigenous ones due to the lower standards of living and higher dependence of Indigenous Peoples living in remote territories on a narrower assortment of imported marketed products. Progressing climate change and related environmental transformations in the Arctic, economic and industrial development of traditional Indigenous habitats, and radical shifts in food consumption patterns and the entire way of life of Indigenous Peoples are becoming decisive factors of food insecurity (Dudarev et al., 2013; Erokhin, 2019a, 2019b; Shishaev et al., 2020; Ruiga et al., 2021). Combating the problem requires the development of a methodological approach to improving the sustainability of the traditional economy of Indigenous Peoples, its adaptation to the changing conditions of the Arctic environment, and ensuring an adequate response to the major challenges to social and economic development of the Arctic.

When developing specific approaches to addressing the food security issues across Indigenous communities in the Arctic, one should take into account its specific features, including low selfsufficiency in staples due to limited capacities of domestic agricultural production in the Arctic climate and the dependence of food supply on imports from outside (inner territories or other countries); small number of rural population and poor provision of agricultural resources; poor development of local agricultural facilities and rural infrastructure; lack of stable links with the areas of food production outside the Arctic zone; focal settlements and seasonal food delivery to remote territories (Ivanov & Ivanova, 2017).

The FAO's data on food security issues in the Russian Arctic are based mainly on the data collected at the regional level, not individual territories included in the Arctic zone of the country. Therefore, the data may not adequately reflect the real differentiation and degree of food security problems in urban and rural areas and in nomadic Indigenous communities. Regardless of particular location or way of life, diverse communities of Indigenous Peoples inhabiting the Russian Arctic region substantially depend on traditional food in their diets. Therefore, the issues of their food security and food sovereignty should be studied at the territorial level, taking into account not only economic factors of food supply, but also social, cultural, and environmental dimensions of food security. In this chapter, the authors make an attempt to systematize Russia’s approach to ensuring food security of the Indigenous Peoples at the national level, as well as to explore regional specifics of the food security agenda across nine territories of the Russian Arctic. The study conceptualizes an approach to assessing the level of food and nutritional security with the differentiation of environmental, economic, and social factors that affect the security-related parameters in Indigenous communities.

Food Security of Arctic Indigenous Communities: Background and Narratives Reindeer herding, hunting, and fishing have historically been considered crucial activities for the survival of Indigenous Peoples in the Russian Arctic. The intensification of exploration of natural resources in the Arctic zone of Russia along with the industrial exploration of vast territories in the Yamal Peninsula, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), and Chukotka and Nenets autonomous districts (including traditional Indigenous habitats) have triggered a significant increase in the population,

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mainly urban, aggravated anthropogenic pressure on the environment, and compromised food and nutrition security status of Indigenous communities (Gao & Erokhin, 2020a). The above narratives are addressed in the literature in four main directions: degradation of traditional habitats (not only those of animals, birds, and fish, but also people), contamination of food sources (pastures, water), climate change, and food-borne diseases and related public health issues in Indigenous communities (Gladun et al., 2021; Andronov et al., 2021; Stimmelmayr & Sheffield, 2022).

Until recently, most studies in the sphere of food security in the Russian Arctic focused mainly on small and geographically remote Indigenous communities, such as Nenets in the Nenets Autonomous District and Arkhangelsk Oblast (Murashko & Dallmann, 2011; Lobanova et al., 2013; Andronov et al., 2021), Selkup in Krasnoyarsk Krai (Stepanova, 2020), Khant and Mansi in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District and the Komi Republic (Ivanov & Ivanova, 2017; Bogdanova et al., 2020), Evenk and Even in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) (Robbek et al., 2015; Petrova, 2018), and Chukchi and Yupik in the Chukotka Autonomous District (Kozlov et al., 2007; Vate & Davydova, 2018; Davydova, 2019). However, approaches to assessing the level of security varied significantly due to different interpretations of food security parameters (Trotsuk et al., 2018). Thus, Gao (2017) and Ivolga (2014) focused on the sustainable development of rural areas in the High North as one of the solutions to the food insecurity problem. Ilinova and Dmitrieva (2016) and Savenkov (2018) considered environmental aspects of sustainable development of Indigenous communities and traditional economic activities. Rodnina (2022) and Ruiga et al. (2021) investigated perspectives of agricultural production across sectors and areas. Among major threats to security, Ivanov and Ivanova (2017) and Hiyama and Takakura (2018) highlighted the declining self-sufficiency of small settlements in food, growing dependence on food supplies from outside (in many cases, junk food of poor quality and nutritional value, but at high prices), as well as the degradation of water and biological resources in most of the territories within the Arctic zone of Russia. Against the background of aggravating food insecurity problems, Kondrashev et al. (2016) and Zimmermann et al. (2023) noted the urgent need to considerably improve self-sufficiency of Indigenous communities with food, preferably traditional foods (food availability and food safety parameters of food security).

Ragulina (2018) developed the concept of food deserts through the lens of the food security narrative in Indigenous communities in the Arctic. The concept emerged in the 1990s to reflect significant violations of key parameters of food security (physical availability, economic affordability, and quality of food) and correlate them with specific territorial issues (Cummins, 2014; Battersby, 2019; Jin & Lu, 2021; Sisk et al., 2023). In general, those communities that inhabit food deserts are characterized by social disadvantages manifested in underemployment and critical role of state support and food aid programs in supporting the food security status of the population (Alviola et al., 2013). Access to food (adequate volume and quality) in such territories is complicated by macroeconomic and social factors, as well as cultural patterns of traditional way of life of Indigenous communities (Lebel et al., 2016; Davies et al., 2017). Initially, food deserts were seen as inherent in urban communities across developed and developing countries, since it was assumed that the products of rural households could compensate for the lack of access to food in cities (Beulac et al., 2009). According to Lebel et al. (2016) and Ragulina (2018), peculiarities of economic transformations in the Russian Arctic along with territorial imbalances of the current economic landscape make it possible to apply the concept of a food desert to Arctic Indigenous communities.

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Economic, social, and environmental parameters of food security vary significantly across Indigenous communities in the Arctic (Russian Arctic, Alaska, Arctic Canada, Northern Europe) (Plisetskii & Plisetskii, 2019). Nevertheless, the latter have at least one thing in common, which is a lack of domestic supply of food (physical availability) and over-dependence on food supply from outside. Consequently, two categories of food sources are distinguished: traditional food (domestic) and marketed food (imported). Traditional and non-traditional foods complement each other in diets: when one category decreases, the other increases. Cyclical fluctuations in diets are adaptive, since traditional nutrition is associated with the use of local habitats (herding, hunting, fishing, gathering) and seasonal fluctuations of particular foods in diets. The products of hunting, fishing, gathering, and reindeer husbandry come as a result of the exploitation of functionally different lands within the economic area of a community. The seizure of lands in traditional Indigenous habitats or deterioration of quality of lands due to industrial development act in two ways. First, a gap that emerges in the annual food cycle is to be compensated by an increase in the portion of marketed foods in diets. Changing diets due to an increase in the proportion of nontraditional foods causes metabolic disorders and a variety of public health issues in Indigenous communities (Kuhnlein et al., 2004; Young et al., 2000). Second, not only the lands of certain categories (associated with certain types of traditional economic activities), but also management practices with utilitarian and cultural-symbolic content are withdrawn from the turnover.

According to Willows (2005), preference for traditional foods is not only the receipt of food, but also a method of production that supports social relations and distinctive cultural characteristics.

This vision corresponds with the FAO’s interpretation of sustainable food systems as those ensuring the availability and equitable access to safe and nutritious foods and providing access to diverse, culturally appropriate, and sustainably produced foods on a consistent basis (High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, 2020). The consumption of traditional foods is the end point of a number of culturally significant processes involved in the collection, processing, distribution, and preparation of food products. Food aid networks, food sharing practices, and distribution of commercial food products merge into a single complex of economic adaptation to the natural environment and contemporary economic and social circumstances. At the same time, the distance from the transport networks and the high cost of transport services compromise physical availability and economic affordability of food across remote territories in the Russian Arctic.

Indigenous Peoples in the Russian Arctic Russia’s legislation defines Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic, Siberia, and the Far East as those living in the territories of the traditional residence of their ancestors, preserving the traditional way of life, economic activities, and crafts, numbering less than fifty-thousand people, and identifying themselves as independent ethnic communities (President of the Russian Federation, 2000). The approved lists of places of traditional residence and types of traditional economic activities of Indigenous Peoples include 28 administrative entities - many more than territories of nine regions that make up the Arctic zone of Russia (Government of the Russian Federation, 2009). Thus, the territories of ancestral residence (places of traditional residence and traditional economic activity) of Indigenous Peoples go far beyond the Arctic zone of the country. The list of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of Russia includes forty positions (Government of the Russian Federation, 2006), the largest being Nenets, Evenk, and Khant (Table 1).

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Some Indigenous Peoples lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic life associated with traditional types of nature management, such as reindeer husbandry, hunting, fishing, marine hunting, and gathering.

The majority are settled residents living in urban areas or rural settlements. According to Tishkov et al. (2016) and Hossain et al. (2021), about twenty thousand people roam year-round or seasonally (about a quarter of the total number of Indigenous Peoples in the Russian Arctic). About 60% of the nomadic population in the Russian Arctic is concentrated in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District.

Table 1. Largest Indigenous communities in the Russian Arctic: territories and population, descending order Indigenous Peoples

Territories

Population, 2021 Census, people

Nenets

Arkhangelsk Oblast, Komi Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Nenets Autonomous District, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District

49,787

Evenk

Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

39,420

Khant

Komi Republic, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District

31,600

Even

Chukotka Autonomous District, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

19,975

Chukchi

Chukotka Autonomous District, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

16,228

Mansi

Komi Republic

12,308

Dolgan

Krasnoyarsk Krai, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

8,182

Koryak

Chukotka Autonomous District

7,498

Vepsians

Republic of Karelia

4,687

Selkup

Krasnoyarsk Krai, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District

3,491

Itelmen

Chukotka Autonomous District

2,622

Eskimo

Chukotka Autonomous District

1,659

Saami

Murmansk Oblast

1,550

Yukagir

Chukotka Autonomous District, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

1,183

Ket

Krasnoyarsk Krai

1,096

Chuvan

Chukotka Autonomous District

903

Nganasan

Krasnoyarsk Krai

693

Chulym

Krasnoyarsk Krai

382

Enets

Krasnoyarsk Krai

203

Kerek

Chukotka Autonomous District

23

Source: Authors’ development

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Legal Framework Federal Level Contemporary food security policies in Russia were formed in the 2000s. In 2010, Russia released its Food Security Doctrine (President of the Russian Federation, 2010). It defined food security as the state of the economy, which ensures the country's food independence, guarantees physical and economic accessibility for all of food products that meet the requirements of Russia’s legislation on technical regulation, in volumes not less than the rational norms of food intake required for an active and healthy lifestyle. Food security was differentiated from food independence, a stable domestic production of food and agricultural products in volumes not less than the established threshold shares of domestic production in the supply of corresponding food products on the domestic market.

A decade later, certain provisions of the Doctrine 2010 were revised and formalized in the Food Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020 (President of the Russian Federation, 2020a).

Four principal novelties apply: •

Food security is defined as a condition in which food independence is ensured and physical and economic availability of products for all is guaranteed in the amounts required for an active and healthy lifestyle.

•

Food independence is defined as the self-sufficiency threshold calculated as the ratio of domestic production to domestic consumption. Thus, the self-sufficiency thresholds for meat and meat products and fish and fish products are established at above 85%. The Doctrine 2010 assessed food security through the criterion of the specific weight of products in the total volume of commodity resources of the domestic market, taking into account rolling stocks.

•

The list of potential risks and threats to food security has been expanded. There are risks of reducing the fertility of agricultural lands due to their irrational use, veterinary, phytosanitary, and epidemiological risks. Social threats have also been considered, such as a falling attractiveness of the rural lifestyle.

•

Achieving self-sufficiency is postulated as a priority goal of the development of the entire food security system.

Neither the Food Security Doctrine 2020, not the Action Plan (Government of the Russian Federation, 2020b) sufficiently reflect the territorial specifics of the food security agenda. Both documents describe the general principles of achieving food self-sufficiency, food independence, and food security at the national level, without delving into the differences in approaches to ensuring FAO’s four dimensions of food security across the country's macro-regions. Similarly, national strategies for the development of the Arctic and programs to ensure economic development and security of the Arctic zone of Russia fail to pay adequate attention to food security issues in circumpolar communities, not to mention the food security specifics in Indigenous communities. The State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic till 2035 (President of the Russian Federation, 2020b) emphasizes the following tasks in the sphere of development of agricultural activities in the Arctic zone of Russia:

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•

stimulating local production of agricultural raw materials and food;

•

preservation and development of traditional economic activities and crafts that contribute to improving the employment opportunities (including self-employment) in Indigenous communities;

•

ensuring access of Indigenous Peoples to natural resources required for pursuing their traditional way of life and carrying out traditional economic activities;

•

creating conditions for increasing the efficiency of the development and exploitation of aquatic biological resources, stimulating the production of value-added fish products and the development of aquaculture.

The mechanisms for implementing the above tasks remain unclear. Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Endurance of National Security till 2035 (President of the Russian Federation, 2020c) only mentions the need to develop and implement a program of state support for traditional economic activities of Indigenous Peoples. It also notes the creation of a network of trade and logistics centers to facilitate supplies of staples and essential goods to remote settlements. State Program of Social and Economic Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (Government of the Russian Federation, 2021) does not refer to food security. It only designates goals of state policy in the Arctic, among which is improving the quality of life of Arctic residents, including Indigenous Peoples. But the State Program 2021 highlights the role of individual territories included in the Arctic zone of Russia in achieving the goals of the program and ensuring the development of a system of benefits for regional and local taxes and non-tax preferences for Arctic residents. Thus, additional powers and additional responsibilities emerge for regional administrations in the sphere of ensuring food security in local communities.

Regional Level The Arctic Zone of Russia includes nine territories (President of the Russian Federation, 2014).

Four of them are located within the zone (Murmansk Oblast and Chukotka, Nenets, and YamalNenets autonomous districts), while the remaining five are partially included in it. They are Arkhangelsk Oblast (Arctic territories include Arkhangelsk, Mezensky, Novaya Zemlya, Novodvinsk, Onezhsky, Primorsky, and Severodvinsk municipal districts), the Komi Republic (Vorkuta municipal district), Krasnoyarsk Krai (Norilsk city, Taymyr Dolgan-Nenets municipal district, and Turukhansky district), the Republic of Karelia (Belomorsky, Loukhsky, and Kemsky municipal districts), and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) (Abyisky, Allaikhovsky, Anabarsky, Bulunsky, Eveno-Bytantaisky, Momsky, Nizhnekolymsky, Oleneksky, Srednekolymsky, UstYansky, Verkhnekolymsky, Verkhoyansky, and Zhigansky districts). The total area of the Russian Arctic is 4.8 million km2 (28% of the country's territory).

Arkhangelsk Oblast The system of legislation of Arkhangelsk Oblast pays little attention to the food supply and nutrition issues in Indigenous communities. Regional Strategy of State National Policy in Arkhangelsk Oblast till 2025 addresses general aspects of the development of the public administration system in the sphere of interethnic relations without specifying the Indigenous issues (Government of Arkhangelsk Oblast, 2014). Among directions of the Regional Assistance

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Project, Strategy of Social and Economic Development of Arkhangelsk Oblast till 2035 provides for the promotion of the development of folk crafts, increasing the level of adaptation of traditional economic activities of Indigenous Peoples to contemporary economic environment, and ensuring the protection of habitat and traditional way of life in Indigenous communities (Assembly of Deputies of Arkhangelsk Oblast, 2019). Due to the high level of urbanization and the density of settlements and transport infrastructure in Arkhangelsk Oblast, the vast majority of Indigenous Peoples are deeply integrated into the regular economic system of the region. Therefore, the government sees no rationale in highlighting the Indigenous-related narratives in the economic and social development agenda.

Chukotka Autonomous District In Chukotka, the development of traditional economic activities of Indigenous Peoples is considered a strategic line of economic development (Government of Chukotka Autonomous District, 2014). The traditional branches are reindeer husbandry, which provides up to 50% of the needs of Chukotka residents in meat products, and sea hunting, which provides the needs of Indigenous Peoples in coastal territories in meat of marine animals. The development of other types of agricultural activities is restricted by climate conditions of the region. That means that apart from traditional foods, all other food and agricultural products are supplied from outside.

The Northern Delivery is a set of measures and financial mechanisms for the regular and uninterrupted supply of remote territories in the Russian Arctic with essential goods (primarily, food and petroleum products). Since the supply of local communities with food critically relies on imports, physical availability of staples and their economic accessibility are vital components of the food security status of Indigenous Peoples. According to the Strategy of Social and Economic Development of Chukotka Autonomous District till 2030 (Government of Chukotka Autonomous District, 2014), the first component of food security (physical availability) is to be improved by increasing the volume of domestic production of local foods. The district government aims to increase reindeer livestock to 153.2 thousand head of cattle by 2030, which will ensure the gain in output of meat in slaughter weight up to 411.2 tons. In the sea-hunting sector, the government prioritizes the development of processing facilities to add value to processed fish products and meat of marine animals. In terms of economic availability of staples, the Concept of Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples 2009-2025 (Government of Chukotka Autonomous District, 2009) provides for the expansion of transport and logistics services and assistance in the development of markets for traditional foods and related products; support for small and mediumsized businesses of Indigenous Peoples aimed at improving the efficiency of traditional economic activities, including financial support of entrepreneurs; establishment of portable transshipment bases for storing and distributing of food products; simplified procedure for obtaining licenses for hunting by Indigenous Peoples in places of traditional habitat and traditional economic activity; creation of workshops for primary and deep processing of reindeer meat and related products.

Komi Republic According to the Strategy of Social and Economic Development of the Komi Republic till 2035, the development of the region in the long term is considered in several contexts, including through economic development of rural areas and traditional forms of environmental management of Indigenous Peoples (Government of the Komi Republic, 2019). The Republic largely depends on food supplies from outside (the food self-insufficiency status). The share of the domestic

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production in food supply on the domestic market is 54.5% for eggs, 36.2% for meat and meat products, 25.5% for milk and dairy products, and only 19.6% for vegetables. To improve the food security status of the territory, the Strategy prioritises the increase in output in the local agricultural sector, increase in the competitiveness of domestic farmers, and ensuring the financial stability of agricultural producers. Measures to improve the level of food security of Indigenous Peoples include the preservation of reindeer husbandry as a traditional economic activity and an integral element of lifestyle and culture of Indigenous Peoples. The Plan on Implementation of the Concept of Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples 2017-2025 implies the establishment and development of intermediate bases (storage and distribution points) along the routes of reindeer herders' nomads, provision of social guarantees and compensations to reindeer herders, and provision of land plots from state or municipal ownership for free use to Indigenous Peoples for carrying out their economic activities (Government of the Komi Republic, 2017). The Strategy of Social and Economic Development specifically encourages the development of livestock breeding and commercial aquaculture. It is expected that by 2035, the level of self-sufficiency of the Komi Republic will improve up to 35.3% for milk and dairy products, 38.0% for vegetables, 47.7% for meat and meat products, 61.4% for eggs, and 100.0% for potatoes (Government of the Komi Republic, 2019).

Krasnoyarsk Krai The number of Indigenous Peoples in Krasnoyarsk Krai exceeds 16,000 people, of which about 3.5 thousand people are engaged in traditional economic activities, such as reindeer husbandry, fishing, commercial hunting, and gathering. Monitoring and recording of the reindeer livestock, pastures, and reindeer farms are conducted in order to preserve and further develop reindeer husbandry in the conditions of intensive industrial development in the North of Krasnoyarsk Krai (Government of Krasnoyarsk Krai, 2017). Commercial hunting is typical for the Taimyr DolganNenets municipal district, which is home to the world's largest population of wild reindeer (over 400.000 head of cattle). In Turukhansk district and the Evenki municipal district, Indigenous Peoples are engaged in hunting fur animals. A distinctive feature of the legislation of Krasnoyarsk Krai is a merge of the territorial, economic, and social development agendas of Indigenous communities. In February 2023, the regional government released the revised Strategy of Social and Economic Development of Northern and Arctic Territories and Support of Indigenous Peoples in Krasnoyarsk Krai till 2030 (Government of Krasnoyarsk Krai, 2023). Among priorities of agricultural development of the region are greenhouse farming, cattle breeding, reindeer husbandry, and processing of local natural and wildlife resources (fish, game, venison, wild plants) and imported raw materials (bread and bakery). Innovative approaches to increasing the volume of agricultural production include the development of infrastructure for the primary processing of agricultural products, hunting, and fishing (including the use of mobile processing complexes and mobile slaughter complexes in the reindeer sector), as well as the development of deep processing of venison and wild plants to obtain medicinal raw materials and biologically active additives.

Special attention is paid to ensuring healthy nutrition of people of all age groups, education and training of people on healthy nutrition, development and implementation of the Arctic Diet that compensates for the adverse factors of extreme climate and landscape of the Far North.

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Murmansk Oblast Among the priorities of the state agrarian policy of Murmansk Oblast, the Strategy of Social and Economic Development of Murmansk Oblast till 2020 and for the Period until 2025 highlights the supply of high-quality agricultural products and locally produced food to the market, including through the development of the reindeer sector (the self-sufficiency approach to ensuring food security) (Government of Murmansk Oblast, 2013). To improve the well-being of Indigenous communities, the Strategy provides for stimulating the production of premium products from venison. According to the Regional Program of Social and Economic Development of Murmansk Oblast, low level of development of traditional economic activities and underemployment of Indigenous Peoples hinder the prospects for economic and social development of the region (Governor of Murmansk Oblast, 2014). The Program emphasizes the necessity of creating conditions for ensuring economic accessibility and physical availability of essential food products based on rational norms of food intake for vulnerable populations. One of the measures for the development of the fisheries sector is the improvement of the organization of traditional fishing of Indigenous Peoples. The Action Plan for the Implementation of the Concept of Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples in Murmansk Oblast in 2016-2025 (Government of Murmansk Oblast, 2017) includes such measures as the provision of aquatic biological resources for fishing to Indigenous Peoples (Saami), the implementation of state support for the domestic reindeer husbandry, and the provision of subsidies to improve the material and technical base of Indigenous communities.

Nenets Autonomous District The share of agriculture in the gross regional product of the Nenets Autonomous District is only 0.5%, but the sector provides employment for 4% of population. For Indigenous Peoples, agricultural activities are currently the main source of life support. According to the Strategy of Social and Economic Development of Nenets Autonomous District till 2030, agriculture and processing of agricultural products are included in the list of priority sectors of the regional development (Assembly of Deputies of Nenets Autonomous District, 2019). Reindeer husbandry is the main economic activity across Indigenous communities, the vital source of livelihood, and the basis of food security. The development of the reindeer sector aims at the formation and maintenance of expanded reproduction of domestic reindeer, the development of a system of harvesting, processing, and sale of related products to preserve the ancestral habitat and traditional way of life of Indigenous Peoples. Such a goal is achieved by improving the quality of domestic reindeer livestock, increasing the productivity of the sector, developing deep processing of reindeer products, organizing training and retraining of specialists for reindeer husbandry, as well as providing targeted assistance aimed at developing and modernizing the infrastructure of reindeer herders, harvesters, processors, and distribution networks. Fishing is much less developed than reindeer husbandry. In this sector, the government strives to increase fishing of aquatic biological resources and the degree of processing of fishery products. Harvesting and processing of berries, mushrooms, and medicinal plants has a significant potential for generating additional income for Indigenous Peoples. Hundreds of species of edible berries, medicinal herbs, and mushrooms grow in the Nenets District. However, neither the regional government nor the municipal administrations have elaborated any mechanisms of state support for Indigenous Peoples in those sectors.

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Republic of Karelia The climate of Karelia is relatively mild compared to other territories of the Arctic zone of Russia, which makes it possible to cultivate certain crops native to the non-chernozem zone. However, since the region is located in a zone of risky agriculture, the dairy sector, meat farming, and fishing are more developed compared to crop production. Similar to the system of legislation of the neighboring Arkhangelsk Oblast, neither the Strategy of Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Karelia till 2030 (Government of the Republic of Karelia, 2018) nor the Individual Program of Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Karelia for 2020-2024 (Government of the Russian Federation, 2020a) focus on the role of Indigenous communities and traditional agricultural activities in the development of the agricultural complex and the achievement of food security. Only the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Concept of Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples in the Republic of Karelia in 2021-2025 (Government of the Republic of Karelia, 2021) details the measures in the sphere of development of Indigenous communities. Among them are the development of territories of traditional use of natural resources of local significance in Vepsian communities (Prionezhsk municipal district), enforcing the exercise of rights of Indigenous Peoples to fishing and hunting in order to ensure the conduct of a traditional lifestyle and the carrying out of traditional economic activities, as well as the provision of federal budget funds to support economic and social development of Indigenous communities.

Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) In the Arctic zone of Yakutia, 49 settlements (70% of the total number of settlements in the Republic) are classified as places of residence of Indigenous Peoples, including Evenk, Even, Dolgan, Yukagir, and Chukchi. As stated in the Strategy of Social and Economic Development of the Arctic Zone of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) till 2035 (Head of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), 2020), the ensurance of food and nutrition security of Indigenous communities is severely challenged by harsh climate conditions (the physical availability component) and lower standards of living in rural areas compared to urban territories (the economic accessibility component). Centralized food delivery (the Northern Delivery system) plays a critical role in supporting the food security status of Indigenous communities. According to the updated State Program “Development of the Arctic Zone of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and Indigenous Peoples in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)” (Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), 2022), to facilitate food supplies, the government provides subsidies for the transportation of agricultural and commercial products, raw materials, feed, and seeds. Subsidies are also provided for the delivery of essential food products by air and water. The development of the reindeer sector includes the introduction of advanced technologies for grazing; optimization of herd sizes with due account for reindeer capacity and pasture turnover; modernization of the material and technical base of reindeer husbandry (construction of corrals, fences, purchase of all-terrain and snowmobile vehicles); transition to industrial reindeer husbandry; provision of comprehensive protection in reindeer husbandry (introduction of electronic certification of reindeer herds, herd guarding and grazing monitoring in order to minimize losses of animals from predators and exclude grazing in contaminated areas, carrying out systematic health checks and veterinary support). In the fishing sector, the main tasks are to increase the volume of catch of low-value fish species and to involve remote lake areas of the Yana, Indigirka, and Kolyma river basins in economic development, as

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well as carrying out measures for the artificial reproduction of aquatic biological resources in order to restore fish stocks of the main commercial fish species. The development and implementation of state and municipal programs in the sphere of sustainable development of Indigenous Peoples is facilitated by the Concept of Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) till 2035 (Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), 2021).

Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District The district is home to over 49.000 Indigenous Peoples, including Nenets (72% of the total number of Indigenous Peoples), Khant (24%), and Selkup (4%). More than 18.000 people (5,420 families) pursue a traditional way of life. Traditional economic activities are reindeer herding, fishing, and caged-animal farming. The depletion of reindeer pastures, climate change, and industrial exploration of traditional habitats distort traditional life patterns of Indigenous communities. There emerge families with few reindeer cattle or without reindeer cattle at all. The transition to a settled lifestyle is hampered by a poor integration of Indigenous Peoples into the economic, cultural, and social environment of the district. According to the Strategy of Social and Economic Development of Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District till 2035 (Legislative Assembly of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District, 2021), the preservation and development of the traditional way of life and economic activities and crafts of Indigenous Peoples represent "an absolute priority” of the development policy in the region. At the same time, the Strategy does not detail the specifics of improving the food security status of Indigenous communities. Instead, it emphasizes the need to develop dairy and meat cattle breeding, poultry farming, and crop production by providing support to farmers (dairy, meat (cattle, pigs, horses, poultry), vegetables (open ground and greenhouses), wild plants, herbs). Thus, the Strategy is too attentive to the physical availability component of food security, while the economic accessibility of adequate diets remains undervalued. The increase in domestic agricultural output is to be achieved by the development of the reindeer sector (optimization of structure of herds in reindeer enterprises, processing of reindeer products, modernization of slaughter and refrigeration complexes and their certification) and fishing (development of new fishing areas, new tools and methods of fishing, organization and modernization of processing plants in the East of the district, releases of fish of valuable species, such as whitefish, to the Ob and Taz rivers). Indirectly, economic aspects of food security are addressed in the State Program on Preservation and Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District through improving the level of economic and social well-being of Indigenous Peoples (support for the minimum material security of families according to the regional standard, at least 4,500 families annually) (Government of the YamalNenets Autonomous District, 2021).

Food Security Dimensions In most of the interpretations, measuring food security involves employing quantitative methods of assessment and modeling. The issues related to assessing the food security and nutrition statuses of Arctic Indigenous communities can hardly be addressed without using qualitative methods.

Food sharing, food intake, procurement of traditional foods and agricultural products cover FAO’s four dimensions of food security, namely: availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability of food supply. However, in relation to Arctic Indigenous communities, the commonly applied interpretations of food security parameters need certain adjustments. As evidenced by the Inuit Circumpolar Council (2012), Duhaime and Bernard (2008), and Nuttall and Callaghan (2019), Tianming & Erokhin

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critical food security issues across Indigenous communities in the Arctic include high prices of food products, economic vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples, falling consumption of products derived from local Arctic flora and fauna, spiking energy prices, and the adverse effects of climate change on traditional habitats. Along with all those threats to the food security status of Indigenous Peoples, promoting traditional activities in the reindeer sector, fishing, hunting, and gathering is fundamentally important for both the livelihood of Indigenous communities and the preservation of their culture. According to the concept of food sovereignty, traditional food is interpreted as sacred thing and an element of connection with the nature. Thus, the system of food supply and nutrition based on local foods not only provides people with necessary nutrients, but also ensures the preservation of ecosystems and traditions of Indigenous Peoples. Such an interpretation of food security is significantly broader than the mere availability of food in a certain amount or the economic accessibility of basic foodstuffs.

This study pursues FAO’s approach to interpreting food security as physical, social, and economic access to food (FAO, 2009). Consequently, the food security parameters are divided into three groups to reflect the three dimensions, i.e., the availability of food, its economic accessibility to all Arctic residents, and the stability of food supplies (Table 2). Due to the lack of reliable data on the nutrition components of food security across Indigenous communities in the Russian Arctic, the authors omitted the FAO’s utillization pillar of food security. In country-level studies, national average data or territory-average data could be used to reflect the ability to utilize food to support human health. For the community-level studies in the Russian Arctic, however, the data on food safety and the occurrence of food-borne diseases is fragmented and inhomogeneous. This limitation of the study is further addressed in the Conclusion.

Table 2. Parameters of food security in the Russian Arctic Dimensions

Availability

Access

Stability

Parameters

Units

Intake of meat products, per capita

Scale 0

1

2

kg/year

<63

63-77

>77

Intake of dairy products, per capita

kg/year

<324

324-396

>396

Intake of vegetables, per capita

kg/year

<133

133-147

>147

Intake of bread, per capita

kg/year

<114

114-126

>126

Intake of fish and marine mammals, per capita

kg/year

<7.5

7.5-9.2

>9.2

Share of traditional food in diets

%

<50

-

>50

Share of food expenditures in total household’s expenditures

%

>34

28-34

<28

Share of population living below a minimum subsistence level

%

>13

11-13

<11

Share of households with a hunter, a herder, or a fisherman in a family

%

<50

-

>50

Number of days in a year when food delivery is disrupted due to weather conditions

days/year

>60

30-60

<30

Number of safety net programs

number

0

-

≥1

Number of food aid programs

number

0

-

≥1

Source: Authors’ development based on Erokhin (2019a, 2019b) and Gao and Erokhin (2020a)

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The scale for assessing the food security status of individual territories is based on the standards of healthy nutrition of the World Health Organization and the relevant international and national thresholds for each indicator (World Health Organization, 2023; Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation, 2016; Eganyan, 2013; Dudarev et al., 2013). The achievement of the food security threshold scores 1 (100% of the standard). A value below 90% of the threshold may signal a threat to security (0 points), while that above 110% of the threshold is considered a high level of security (2 points). The final score for each of the measurements is defined as the sum of the scores of individual parameters. In accordance with the obtained values, the food security status of a territory is determined (by food security dimension and the total) (Table 3).

Table 3. Food security scores Dimensions

Food security thresholds Extreme insecurity

Insecurity

Security

Reliable security

Availability

0.0 – 2.9

3.0 – 5.9

6.0 – 9.9

10.0 – 12.0

Access

0.0 – 0.9

1.0 – 2.9

3.0 – 4.9

5.0 – 6.0

Stability

0.0 – 1.9

2.0 – 3.9

4.0 – 5.9

6.0

Total

0.0 – 5.9

6.0 – 12.9

13.0 –20.9

21.0 – 24.0

Source: Authors’ development based on Erokhin (2019a, 2019b) and Gao and Erokhin (2020a)

This scale is applied to the territories of the Arctic zone of Russia. In order to capture the diversity of food consumption patterns, the influence of anthropogenic factors on food systems, and the environmental parameters of food production, the territories are grouped into four categories: •

Type 1: predominantly urban agglomerations with a substantial share of imported marketed foods in diets (Arkhangelsk Oblast, Komi Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Republic of Karelia).

•

Type 2: predominantly industrialized territories with high level of environmental pollution (Krasnoyarsk Krai, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District).

•

Type 3: territories with the developed reindeer sector and a substantial share of meat in traditional Indigenous diets (Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)).

•

Type 4: territories with a substantial share of fish and fish products in traditional Indigenous diets (Chukotka Autonomous District, Nenets Autonomous District).

The study demonstrates that most of the Arctic territories of Russia fail to secure the credible levels of availability, accessibility, and stability of food supply (Table 4). Only the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District demonstrates security on the accessibility and stability thresholds due to a high per capita income and a low proportion of population living below the poverty line.

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Table 4. Food security scores per territories Food security scores /thresholds Type

1

2

3

4

Territory

Availability

Accessibility

Overall food security status Stability

Score

Threshold

Score

Threshold

Score

Threshold

Score

Threshold

Arkhangelsk Oblast

2.6

Extreme insecurity

0.8

Extreme insecurity

4.0

Security

7.4

Insecurity

Komi Republic

2.4

Extreme insecurity

0.9

Extreme insecurity

2.6

Insecurity

5.9

Extreme insecurity

Murmansk Oblast

3.1

Insecurity

1.7

Insecurity

4.0

Security

8.8

Insecurity

Republic of Karelia

3.4

Insecurity

1.1

Insecurity

4.2

Security

8.7

Insecurity

Krasnoyarsk Krai

4.9

Insecurity

2.2

Insecurity

3.6

Insecurity

10.7

Insecurity

Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District

3.7

Insecurity

3.8

Security

5.8

Security

13.3

Security

Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

6.0

Security

2.2

Insecurity

2.0

Insecurity

10.2

Insecurity

Chukotka Autonomous District

4.0

Insecurity

3.5

Security

2.0

Insecurity

9.5

Insecurity

Nenets Autonomous District

3.0

Insecurity

5.3

Reliable security

4.0

Security

12.3

Insecurity

Source: Authors’ development based on Erokhin (2019a, 2019b) and Gao and Erokhin (2020a)

In Type 1 territories, diet is predominantly based on marketed foods (under-consumption of meat, dairy products, and vegetables compared to the national standards of adequate nutrition). The share of traditional foods in diet is rather low. In type 2 territories, higher pollution levels due to the industrial development of natural resources on the Yamal Peninsula and the north of Krasnoyarsk Krai exert a negative impact on the quality of traditional food sources – reindeer pastures, soil, and water resources. In such territories, improving the safety parameters of diets is inseparable from importing food products from outside. However, the economic accessibility of marketed products would be lower compared to domestic foods. With a decrease in economic accessibility of foods, diets become less diversified. Dietary patterns change by shifting from higher-nutrient products to lower-quality substances and carbohydrates (Kuhnlein et al., 2004; Lambden et al., 2006; Gao & Erokhin, 2020a). Therefore, balancing the safety and accessibility parameters of food security is of particular importance for local administrations.

In Type 3 and Type 4 territories, diets contain a large portion of traditional foods, such as venison, fish, and seafood. For the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), the intake of meat and meat products per capita is the highest among Arctic territories of Russia. The food security status of Indigenous The Food (In)Security Issue Across Indigenous Communities in the Russian Arctic

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communities, however, is threatened by the remoteness and low transport accessibility of the Arctic territories of the Republic. Diets are poorly diversified (under-consumption of vegetables, bread, dairy products). Like Yakutia, Chukotka and the Nenets District demonstrate high levels of consumption of traditional foods. In more than 80% of households in Chukotka and in 65% of households in the Nenets Autonomous District, people are engaged in hunting and fishing. Still, the problems of non-diversified diets and under-consumption of vegetables and other products are acute, especially in Chukotka. Due to the high cost of delivery, the economic availability of foods in the Chukotka Autonomous District is significantly lower compared to that in other territories of the Russian Arctic. Imported products are commonly of low quality, frozen, with a high content of preservatives and food additives to increase their shelf life.

Physical Availability Apart from the climatic conditions and low diversification of the agricultural sector (over-reliance on reindeer husbandry, fishing, and hunting), immediate threats to ensuring the resilient availability of essential foods in the Russian Arctic include the irreplaceable retirement of production funds, declining performance of agricultural and processing enterprises, degradation of soils and pastures, stagnation of the seed and breeding systems, and the low level of innovative development of the agricultural sector. The above factors radically degrade the foundations of the availability pillar of food security in Ingenious communities.

Russia’s Food Security Doctrine (President of the Russian Federation, 2020a) defines physical availability of food as the level of development of the distribution infrastructure, in which residents in all territories of the country are able to purchase food products or get meals in volumes and assortment that meet the recommended rational consumption threshold. In relation to this study, the key aspect in the above definition is that physical availability of food should not vary considerably between territories (Ivolga, 2014). Nevertheless, the inequality in the level of physical availability of essential foods between territories of the Russian Arctic is quite notable. The establishment of a reliable food supply system in the Arctic zone of Russia requires addressing a set of technical, technological, organizational, social, and economic issues, such as the optimization of locations and specializations of the agricultural sector in particular territories and rational combination of domestic production with import of food products, seeds, and feed. The State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic till 2035 emphasizes a need to create a system of state support for the delivery of food products and essential goods across the Arctic zone in order to ensure their physical accessibility for Arctic residents (President of the Russian Federation, 2020b). The development of the Northern Delivery system should be accompanied by the establishment of a system of food bases. As far as possible, they should be located near large settlements and be connected with other territories of the Arctic zone and the rest of the country by land, water, and air. Such bases would not be able to fully meet the population's need for food on a regular basis, but they can serve as temporary insurance in case of a break in supply chains due to climatic or other force majeure circumstances. Also, by linking food bases with agricultural enterprises and farms, local administrations would be able to form stocks of not only imported staples, but also vegetables, meat, and dairy products. However, stable provision of high-quality foods to Indigenous communities is impossible without developing food market infrastructure and coordinating activities of various economic entities in regional, sectoral, and institutional aspects.

The participation of the state is necessary, since the development of market infrastructure requires

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substantial investment with an exceptionally long period of return (transport infrastructure of the Northern Delivery, construction of the branch railway to Yakutsk, development of the Northern Sea Route) (Erokhin et al., 2022).

The stability of food supply chains can also be improved by establishing foreign economic and trade links (Erokhin et al., 2019). For the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and the Chukotka Autonomous District, imports from markets in Asia could be less expensive compared to supplies from Central Russia (especially in the format of special zones of border trade in Magadan and Nakhodka). Cooperation with Northeastern provinces of China (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning) is promising in not only physical supply of food, but also breeding of new varieties of crops, livestock, poultry, and fish and joint development of natural resources and lands (Gao, 2017). As China’s Arctic Policy 2018 states, “China takes part in the development and utilization of Arctic resources on the condition of respecting the traditions and cultures of the Arctic residents including Indigenous peoples, preserving their unique lifestyles and values, and respecting the efforts made by the Arctic States to empower the local citizens, foster their social and economic progress, and improve education and medical services, so that the Arctic residents, including Indigenous Peoples, will truly benefit from the development of Arctic resources” (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2018).

Economic Accessibility According to the Russia’s Food Security Doctrine 2020 (President of the Russian Federation, 2020a), economic accessibility of food is the capacity of purchasing food products of adequate quality at current prices in volumes and assortment that meet the recommended rational consumption threshold. Logistics costs increase prices of imported foods, such as potatoes, vegetables, canned foods, cheese, sausages, confectionery, etc. by at least 2.5-3 times compared to the average price level in non-Arctic territories of the country. The demand for locally produced meat and dairy products, dietary eggs, vegetables, potatoes, and other foods demonstrates the rationale for the development of local agricultural production. In terms of their nutritional parameters, local products, including traditional foods, are more suitable for Arctic residents.

Consequently, the production of food locally (with the exception of territories where it is impossible due to the climate) is a more appropriate way of improving the economic accessibility of at least certain categories of essential foods in the High North compared to importing of a wide range of food and agricultural products.

The food supply system of the Russian Arctic territories should proceed from the emerging new concept of regulating the number and structure of the population of the Far North. Along with preserving the traditional way of life and economic activities of Indigenous Peoples, it involves alleviating pressure on the domestic food market and food prices by controlling immigration to the region (particularly, workers employed in industrial projects). A law providing for an increase in the living standards, guaranteeing minimum subsistence, and providing supply of essential foods to Indigenous Peoples across territories of the Russian Arctic is particularly needed. Since the 1990s, many of traditional industries have been declining. The reindeer livestock has more than halved, while the production of fish and furs has dropped even more radically. Given the critical importance of reindeer herding and fishing for the preservation of the Indigenous way of life, developing the system of targeted state support of these sectors at both the federal level and the

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regional level in the Russian Arctic is imperative for improving economic accessibility of essential foods in Indigenous communities.

Environment and Public Health Climate change is exerting a major impact on Arctic ecosystems (Hiyama & Takakura, 2018). The increase in the average annual temperature in the Arctic is nearly four times higher than the global average (Rantanen et al., 2022). Climate-related processes have both positive and negative effects on the livelihoods and health of Indigenous peoples in the Russian Arctic, primarily on the food security status of Indigenous communities (Gao & Erokhin, 2020b). An increase in water temperature in the rivers of the Arctic zone along with an increase in the length of the off-season period may result in higher frequency of episodes of mass death of fish due to a lack of oxygen in organic-enriched water (Gao et al., 2021). As evidenced by Mozaffarian and Rimm (2006), Tong et al. (2019), and United Nations Nutrition Secretariat. (2021), sufficient consumption of fish and marine fish species contributes to reducing blood pressure, lowering cholesterol levels, and improving cardiovascular function. Fish tissues are rich in the essential elements, such as Se, Cu, and Zn and may significantly improve the nutritional intake by Indigenous Arctic people (Sobolev et al., 2019), while a decrease in the proportion of fish in diets may trigger a number of health issues in Indigenous communities (Erokhin, 2019a, 2019b; Gao & Erokhin, 2020a). The lengthening of the off-season periods and higher summer temperatures contribute to the trampling and degradation of deer pastures. More frequent extreme weather events, such as winter thaws and rains, late spring with an icy infusion, strong and prolonged heat create the threat of mass deaths of reindeer and the related lack of venison in Indigenous diets. The latter increases incidence rates in respiratory diseases, overweight, and hypertension, because meat, blood, and liver of reindeer are all irreplaceable components of Indigenous diets and elements of adaptation of Indigenous Peoples to the Arctic climate and environment. Another damaging consequence of climate change is the accumulation of persistent toxic substances in Arctic ecosystems (Nuttall & Callaghan, 2019).

Accumulation of organic toxic agents in food chains, slow destruction of toxic elements in cold Arctic climate, high concentrations of heavy metals in soil, lichens, fish, and animals lead to a high toxic load on ecosystems across the Russian Arctic.

Nutrition patterns shift to predominantly carbohydrate type of diet with a lack of animal proteins (Gao & Erokhin, 2020a). The intake of nutritionally valuable products, such as dairy products, vegetables, and fruits, has decreased across the Russian Arctic territories down to 50% of the national average (Andronov et al., 2021). A poor-quality diet has long been associated with increasing obesity, diabetes, and glucose intolerance in Indigenous communities (Murphy et al., 1995). Due to the shortages of milk and dairy products, vegetables, and fruits, there is a shift of macronutrients in diets towards carbohydrates (an abundance of sugar, confectioneries, bread, pasta, cereals) and, therefore, a lack of almost all types of vitamins, mineral nutrients, and contamination of food by pesticides, metals, antibiotics, nitrates, and biological agents.

Kuhnlein et al. (2004) and Lambden et al. (2006) considered traditional food as critical for providing essential nutrients in balanced diets in Indigenous communities. However, due to climate change and environmental pollution, traditional food is becoming a less obvious solution to public health issues in the Arctic. Concentrations of some chemicals of emerging concern are increasing in air and wildlife, indicating their potential for bioaccumulation and biomagnification, including in food webs (Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2012). Climate change acts through alteration of food

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web pathways for contaminants (McKinney et al., 2013), while pollution increases the risk of disease transfer from animals to humans as marine and terrestrial wildlife is consumed in by Indigenous Peoples, often raw and inadequately frozen (Jenssen et al., 2015).

At the same time, climate change also brings new opportunities (Panait et al., 2019), such as the development of vegetable growing, greenhouse farming, and dairy farming in areas where those types of agricultural activities were unprofitable or impossible due to the climate conditions. Local crop production and animal husbandry may largely enrich diets and make a positive contribution to health. However, the influence of climate change on the change in the fodder base for reindeer husbandry may be ambiguous. On the one hand, longer seasons without snow and higher temperatures during the growing season increase productivity of plants and crops, which improves forage supply in the reindeer sector (Tømmervik & Forbes, 2020; Kelsey et al., 2021). On the other hand, the increasing drying of vegetation communities and ecosystems as a result of higher evaporation due to higher air temperature (Sandvik & Odland, 2014) result in dehydration and trampling loss of lichen (Heggenes et al., 2020) and more frequent tundra fires (Vachula et al., 2022).

Society and Culture In addition to its availability, accessibility, and nutritional parameters, traditional food is a cultural symbol of ethnic and local identity. Social pressures from the outside, such as the Westernization of traditional diets and lifestyle and growing proportion of marketed food in Indigenous diets are factors contributing to changes in diet patterns, the transition from traditional foods to unbalanced Westernized diets (Gao & Erokhin, 2020a; Gilbert et al., 2021), and the related adverse effects on the public health and adaptive capabilities in Indigenous communities (Andronov et al., 2021). In recent decades, the cultural context of supporting the food security status of Indigenous peoples in the Russian Arctic has been deteriorating due to the degradation of channels for the transfer of traditional knowledge and skills to younger generations. Outmigration, transition to a settled lifestyle, and cultural diffusion have all resulted in loss of traditional knowledge and food production practices. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to the analysis and study of knowledge transfer channels, traditional knowledge centers, networks, programs, community centers, northern research centers, as well as organizations capable of integrating traditional and modern scientific knowledge in the sphere of food production and food security. Food security strategies should integrate short-term measures, such as the creation of food supply bases, food sharing networks, and production and purchasing cooperatives, with long-term solutions of the food insecurity problem (legislation and the federal and regional level, standards of adequate and healthy nutrition, economic and social well-being, and protection of rights of Indigenous people).

Both multilevel and interdisciplinary approaches are needed (Andronov et al., 2021). Since no single program can entirely eliminate a complexity of food insecurity issues, implementing a set of interrelated measures is required (Zimmermann et al., 2023). For example, educational programs on rational nutrition cannot compensate for the poor availability or accessibility of food.

Duhaime and Bernard (2008), Ragulina (2018), and Hossain et al. (2021), among others, suggest that the Westernization of traditional diets in Indigenous communities could be mitigated by promoting the “cultural food security” approach. This implies the ability of Indigenous Peoples to provide reliable access to food through traditional agricultural (rather, lifestyle) practices. The parameters of cultural food security include knowledge on various aspects of food , nutrition, and

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safety that have been established across Indigenous communities for centuries. The food security status of Indigenous communities in the Russian Arctic is threatened by a number of culturerelated factors, including restricted access to traditional lands and habitats, disrupted intergenerational transfer of knowledge and values, settled way of life and regular employment instead of traditional economic activities, shift of food consumption patterns towards unified diets with low portion of traditional foods, and ageing of family members who can engage in traditional Indigenous activities, such as hunting and fishing (Power, 2008).

Measures to Narrow the Food Insecurity Gaps The diversity of factors affecting the parameters of food security and adequate nutrition in the Russian Arctic should be considered when drawing up food security programs. Prospective measures should take into account radical differences between territories (types of the Russian Arctic territories emphasized above) in economic, social, environmental, and cultural specifics of food security. In addition to those, differences in diets, consumers, and food security dimensions should be considered (Table 5).

Table 5. Measures to improve the food security status per types of Russian Arctic territories Type

1

2

3

4

Dimension

Measure

Anticipated effect

Availability

Development of animal husbandry and fisheries

Increase in the proportion of meat and fish of domestic production in diets

Access

Targeted food subsidies

Increase in real incomes, purchasing power, and effective demand for food

Stabiility

Safety net programs

Higher quality of animal products and vegetables

Availability

Development of animal husbandry and vegetable production

Increase in the proportion of meat, dairy, and vegetables of domestic production in diets

Access

Increasing employment

Increase in households’ income and effective demand for food

Stabiility

Food aid programs

Providing vulnerable populations with basic foodstuffs

Availability

Protected vegetable production

Increase in the proportion of vegetables of domestic production in diets

Access

Targeted programs in reindeer herding, hunting, and fishery

Growing involvement of Indigenous Peoples living in settlements in traditional industries

Stabiility

Establishment of reserves of basic foodstuffs

Uninterrupted operation of food aid programs at the time of disruption of food supply due to weather conditions

Availability

Protected vegetable production

Increase in the proportion of vegetables of domestic production in diets

Access

Targeted food subsidies

Increase in real incomes, purchasing power, and effective demand for food

Stabiility

Establishment of reserves of basic foodstuffs

Uninterrupted operation of food aid programs at the time of disruption of food supply due to weather conditions

Source: Authors’ development

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Since an increase in the intake of basic foodstuffs per capita has a positive impact on food security in all types of territories of the Russian Arctic, appropriate measures should be aimed at ensuring both the physical availability and economic accessibility of such products on the market. In most of the territories of the Arctic zone of Russia, the level of income is rather low. Therefore, promoting food supplies from other regions would only drive food prices up thus depressing the economic accessibility of staples. One of the solutions to the availability and accessibility issues is the development of local production facilities, mainly animal husbandry, aquaculture, and protected vegetable growing. Targeted food aid programs and the establishment of food reserves can contribute to increasing the economic accessibility of essential food and the stability of food supplies. The quality of food must be improved through safe nutrition programs to mitigate adverse effects of unhealthy foods on the public health status of Indigenous communities.

The COVID-19 outbreak has sharpened the urgent food insecurity issues and demonstrated the priority of solving food insecurity problems across Indigenous communities in the Russian Arctic (Bogdanova et al., 2020). Lockdowns and related quarantine measures complicated the access of Indigenous Peoples to food, energy resources (fuel), social infrastructure facilities, and slaughter complexes. The pandemic has almost completely restricted the access of Indigenous Peoples to traditional foods, such as reindeer products. Reindeer herders were unable to share foods between neighboring communities, as well as they were restricted to share reindeer products with their relatives living in other territories. The consequences of anti-pandemic measures were aggravated by the underdeveloped food logistics infrastructure in the Russian Arctic.

However, the development of logistics infrastructure and the provision of regular food supplies cannot completely solve the food insecurity problem. The food security status of Indigenous communities is to be ensured by the development of traditional formats of food production and consumption. The development and support of traditional economic activities, such as reindeer herding and fishing face the need to overcome a set of hurdles: •

Development of the biotechnologies sector could create the demand for raw reindeer products, as well as for herbs, berries, mushrooms, and other plant raw materials.

Reindeer husbandry products include powder, extracts, hydrolysates and dry slides from antlers, blood products, tails, and tendons (Maximov, 2019). They are used as raw materials in the pharmaceutical and cosmetic industries, as well as in the production of certain food products. In addition to producing reindeer products, some of the Indigenous communities would receive an option to switch to gathering (i.e., to embed themselves in alternative value-added chains and diversify their sources of income), continuing to pursue a traditional lifestyle in the tundra.

•

Support of the conventional reindeer husbandry (production of venison) and integration into interregional and international production and supply chains through the development of the velvet antler industry.

•

Support of nomadic reindeer husbandry or transition to modern technologies of reindeer feeding and development of corral reindeer husbandry.

Short-term and long-term economic, administrative, and social measures are needed to maintain and improve the food security status of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic zone of Russia. Shortterm ones include the following:

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•

Organization of a mobile economic and legal advisory service for nomadic reindeer herders in order to support this type of traditional economic activity.

•

Encouraging cooperative forms of reindeer husbandry and introducing a new state program of subsidies to Indigenous households in order to purchase equipment for small slaughter complexes and mobile refrigerating facilities.

•

Development of veterinary services and provision of reindeer herders with medicines and other treatment substances and materials for animal care.

•

Facilitating the access of reindeer herders to energy resources and basic foodstuffs at subsidized prices.

•

Establishment of mobile slaughterhouses and points of additional feeding of animals along major routes of reindeer migration in the tundra.

•

Expanding the export potential of reindeer husbandry products such as antlers and reindeer skins, to support food sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples, while focusing public policy efforts on improving the access of Indigenous Peoples to venison as a critical source of valuable trace nutrients required for supporting healthy life in the Arctic environment.

Long-term measures in the sphere of improving the food security status of Indigenous communities in the Russian Arctic could include the following: •

Knowledge transfer and training of Indigenous Peoples in the advanced technologies of processing traditional products (venison, other reindeer products, fish, herbs, etc.) in accordance with bio-production standards and integration of Indigenous Peoples into value chains as producers, intermediaries, processors, and distributors of traditional products.

•

Subsidizing reindeer herders to purchase energy resources and medicines.

•

Development of a special preferential tax regime for Indigenous households in the reindeer sector.

•

Comprehensive annual monitoring of the health status of Indigenous communities across the Russian Arctic (examination of major health parameters of Indigenous Peoples and habitats, nutrition of people and animals, conditions of reindeer pastures, environmental safety parameters of soils, water, air, and food chains).

Addressing contemporary challenges to food security in the Arctic is a prerequisite for improving the food security status of Indigenous Peoples across diverse dimensions of food security through the use of traditional knowledge about biological resources of the Arctic. Exploring innovative ways of using biological resources may provide new income opportunities for Indigenous Peoples, create new jobs, and introduce innovations into traditional economics sectors and traditional lifestyles. A comprehensive solution to the food insecurity and nutrition issues in the Russian Arctic requires combining modern technologies and traditional practices of Indigenous Peoples, i.e., complementing gains in economic performance of traditional industries with improvements in their sustainability. Interdisciplinary studies would link adaptation mechanisms (climate,

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environment), development of functional nutrition products and biologically active additives for all Arctic residents, methods to increase the profitability of using local plant and animal raw materials, methods for obtaining products from previously unused raw materials to expand the range of raw materials procurement and providing year-round employment for Indigenous Peoples.

Conclusion In the Arctic, the food security status of Indigenous communities cannot be administered from the outside as a set of standard solutions since economic, social, ethnic, and cultural specifics of food production and food consumption vary widely across territories (even within territories). Many issues remain underexplored, such as, for example, compensatory mechanisms that help Indigenous communities mitigate the adverse impacts of disrupted availability of staples or inadequate nutritional parameters of marketed foods. A comprehensive approach focused on the convergence of the food security narratives (agricultural production, economic and social access to food, stability of supplies, safety of traditional and marketed foods, environmental parameters of food chains) that will contribute to the development of a more precise regional policy in the sphere of food security of Indigenous Peoples. Food supply of Arctic territories is an important part of the overall strategy of economic and social development of Russia. The specific features of the food security agenda in the Arctic include climatic and environmental conditions that determine a need for increased intake of high-calorie foods, restricted use of huge natural resources of the region in domestic agricultural production, and a reliance of local food chains on supplies of essential food products from other regions of Russia.

The nutrition components of food security across Indigenous communities are to be measured by the food utilization parameters omitted in this study due to the lack of data. The poor nutritional quality of many retail foods that are available in the North increases the risk of nutritional deficiencies (Little et al., 2021). Furthermore, the high cost of these foods and the breakdowns of food supply chains can impact households’ food security status, particularly when local foods are not readily available (Kenny et al., 2018). Consequently, the utilization pillar should be assessed with the implementation of food safety indicators which allow measuring the occurrence of foodborne diseases, such as nutritional and metabolic disorders and diseases of the digestive system. In the Arctic, the utilization pillar should capture not only nutrition parameters of food intake, but also a healthy physical environment, including safe drinking water and adequate sanitary facilities.

For example, the safety of water resources is a critical component of the aggregated food security score in the Arctic, since waterborne infectious diseases have been reported among Indigenous communities (Nilsson et al., 2013; Daley et al., 2018; Wright et al., 2018).

Prospective venues of the food security policy in the Russian Arctic should capture four blocks: food production in traditional sectors (reindeer husbandry, fishing, hunting); farming and animal husbandry based on the use of traditional knowledge and practices adapted to local conditions; industrialized agricultural production where possible due to the climate and the availability of lands (meat and dairy animal husbandry, protected agriculture); and the delivery of food from non-Arctic territories of Russia and from abroad.

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Acknowledgment The study is supported by the Grant of Central Universities of the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China (grant no. 3072022WK0917).

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Tianming & Erokhin

Commentary

The Ainu language and Indigenous psychological well-being in Hokkaido, northern Japan

Seira Duncan

The Indigenous Ainu who once lived in northern Japan and the Russian Far East now live primarily in Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost prefecture. Over the years, many Ainu hid their Indigenous identity both from Japanese society and in some cases their own children (see e.g., NHK News, 2023). To this day, many with Ainu ancestry are unaware of their indigeneity. Despite the existence of linguistic resources such as language courses and radio stations, there are now only two native Ainu speakers in the world(Endangered Languages Project, n.d.). The Ainu language is a language isolate (that is, it has no known genealogical link with any other language) and can be divided into Hokkaido, Sakhalin and Kuril Ainu, the latter two of which are now extinct (Dal Corso, 2022: 3).

Yet, language revitalisation is associated with a heightened sense of self-worth and community; ‘it is no surprise that people who have access to their language have improved mental health, lower suicide rates, and lower rates of substance abuse than do comparison groups in similar communities who do not use their language’ (Grenoble, 2021: 17-19).

The Ainu language traditionally has no alphabet and is often written using the Latin or Japanese alphabets (Hokkaido Government, n.d.). Primary school students in Japan learn the first two of the three Japanese alphabets – hiragana and katakana – prior to memorising a few thousand Chinese-based kanji by adulthood. In contrast to hiragana and katakana which are phonetic, a single kanji can house multiple context-dependent meanings. While close to eighty percent of place names in Hokkaido are said to be derived from Ainu, the language is a rare sight in the streets of Hokkaido; place names are usually written using kanji which often do not accurately represent their phonetics.

Ateji is a ‘phonological representation of Japanese words using kanji’ (Sato 2018: 314) and the kanji for Wakkanai (the northernmost settlement in Japan) are 稚内 (technically waka nai) which come from the Ainu words wakka (drinking water) and nai (river). In Japanese, 稚 (waka, itokena or chi) means young and 内 (nai, dai, nou, dou, uchi or i) interior, neither of which reflects the Ainu

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meanings. Similarly, 倶知安 (technically ku-chi-an) near the prefectural capital Sapporo is pronounced kutchan. In these ways, many place names in Hokkaido are learned on a case-by-case basis and are notoriously difficult to read even for native Japanese-speakers.

Language and psychological well-being Founded in 1997 by Elder Shirō Kayano, The Ainu Times is the only newspaper in Japan that publishes entirely in the Ainu language. Kayano now works as a Director at the Kayano Shigeru Nibutani Ainu Museum in Hokkaido (in the town of Nibutani, approximately seven in ten residents have Ainu ancestry). He and his late father Shigeru made significant contributions in terms of Ainu language revitalisation and, in Shirō’s mind, Ainu should be an official language in Japan (Kayano, 2023). Research shows that ‘public recognition of an ancestral language can have a very positive effect on Indigenous well-being’ (Walsh, 2018: 8) and, in addition to spoken Ainu (e.g., announcements on public transport), the potential of linguistic landscapes, or a ‘displayed language in a particular space’ (Carr, 2022) needs to be taken into account. A study on the use of languages in the Saami museum Siida in northern Finland highlighted museums’ capacity to ‘reinforce’ or ‘challenge’ linguistic hierarchies already prevalent in society (Kelly-Homes & Pietikäinen, 2016: 37).

A case in point is the size or placement of the Ainu language in relation to other displayed languages such as Japanese and English. Linguist Gorter and colleagues (2020: 179) found that, in addition to raising language awareness, ‘the languages on display in public spaces can be an important resource for language learning and teaching’. This is particularly encouraging given that the few Ainu who are interested in the language ‘are from relatively affluent backgrounds’ (Tahara, 2009).

Would such a democratisation of oral and written Ainu incentivise residents to learn the language?

As Shirō comments, residents need to see the language as necessary or beneficial to their daily lives and feel motivated to learn it (Kayano, 2023).

According to a study on whether linguistic landscapes influence one’s happiness, ‘there is indeed a connection between individuals’ sense of happiness and the presence of one’s language in their environment’ although it very much depends on ‘individuals’ own experiences, the perceived position of language groups within the society in question, and the way signs reference these experiences and social positions’ (Malloy, 2022: 101). Such observations also call into question the psychological implications of seemingly commodified uses of the Ainu language in touristic areas (especially if its employment is limited to such locations). Importantly, introducing the Ainu language to Hokkaido’s landscape may yield other benefits – for instance, research suggests that when non-Indigenous people learn an Indigenous language, there is ‘a reduction in racism’ (Walsh, 2018: 10).

Looking forward It was evident through my interview with Kayano that while exchange opportunities among Ainu and Māori communities in New Zealand exist, the Ainu and their Indigenous counterparts in other regions of the Arctic have little to no communication despite climatic and historical similarities.

Additionally, there is a paucity of research on the connections among linguistic landscapes and psychological well-being among Ainu communities. It is therefore imperative that more studies are conducted to explore the potential psychological benefits – and disadvantages – of an Ainu linguistic landscape. In the same way that increased visibility of the language may encourage Indigenous and non-Indigenous residents alike to learn Ainu, such an exposure may even motivate Ainu currently unaware of their Indigenous roots to research their ancestry and lead to a The Ainu language and Indigenous psychological well-being in Hokkaido, northern Japan

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strengthened sense of community. While it may be challenging to effectuate immediate infrastructural changes, it is worth considering the potential role of linguistic landscapes in their more mobile or local forms ranging from shopping bags to bilingual café menus and pamphlets in the short term.

Acknowledgements I would like to express my sincere gratitude towards Elder Kayano, Yu Yamamoto (Municipal Nibutani Ainu Culture Museum) and Jeff Gayman (Educational Anthropology at Hokkaido University) for their valuable input.

References Carr,

J. (2022, August 30). Linguistic landscapes.

Oxford Bibliographies. https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780199772810/obo9780199772810-0251.xml

Dal Corso, E. (2022). Materials and methods of analysis for the study of the Ainu language: southern Hokkaido and Sakhalin varieties. Venice University Press.

Endangered Languages Project (n.d.)

Ainu https://www.endangeredlanguages.com/lang/1212

(Japan).

Retrieved

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Gorter, D., Cenoz, J., & Worp, K. (2021). The linguistic landscape as a resource for language learning and raising language awareness. Journal of Spanish Language Teaching, 8(2), 161181.

Grenoble, L. (2021). Why revitalize? In J. Olko & J. Sallabank (Eds.), Revitalizing endangered languages. Cambridge University Press.

Hokkaido Government. (n.d.) アイヌ語とは [What is the Ainu language?]. Retrieved from https://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ks/ass/new_ainugo.html Kayano, S. (2023). Interview by Seira Duncan. Organised by Y. Yamamoto.

Kelly-Holmes, H. & Pietikäinen, S. (2016). Language: a challenging resource in a museum of Sámi culture. Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism, 16(1), 24-41.

Malloy, C. (2022). Does the linguistic landscape influence happiness? Linguistic Landscape, 9(1), 86-106.

NHK News (2023, February 17). Ainu work to build a sense of community in urban Japan.

Retrieved from https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/2294/ Sato, E. (2018). Socio-cultural implications of the Japanese multi-scripts. In H. Pae (Ed.), Writing systems, reading processes, and cross-linguistic influences: reflections from the Chinese, Japanese and Korean languages. John Benjamins Publishing.

Tahara, K. (2009, October). The saga of the Ainu language. The UNESCO Courier. Retrieved from https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000185911

Duncan

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Walsh, M. (2018). Language is like food: links between language revitalisation and health and wellbeing. In L. Hinton, L. Huss & G. Roche (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Language Revitalization. Routledge.

The Ainu language and Indigenous psychological well-being in Hokkaido, northern Japan

Section III: Governance and economy

Inuit Myth and the Remaking of Greenland's Postcolonial Governance

Rikke Østergaard & Javier L. Arnaut

This article examines the conceptualization of nation-building in Greenland, challenging conventional views on sovereignty and suggesting an imminent emergence of an alternate governance model in the Arctic region. Drawing on the decoloniality perspective, we explore the Inuit myth, which suggests a unique connection of the Inuit to the Arctic environment and asserts their status as natural stewards of the region with special rights based on their cultural and political identity. We argue that this understanding of sovereignty has important implications not only for its departure from conventional Western notions of state formation but also for its potential to create alternative governance structures that do not reinforce existing political hegemonies from the “West”. We further analyze how the legacy of colonialism in Greenland has impacted power and gender relations in the region and has fueled a distinctive sense of nationalism that differs from those seen in the West. The article discusses how the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) is playing a major role in promoting an alternative political legitimacy model against the conventional approach of nation-building. We note that the ICC depends on the maintenance of political myths which have evolved over time. We conclude by suggesting that conventional perspectives on state formation must be revised to incorporate the historical experiences and knowledge of Indigenous peoples, and that further exploration of alternative governance structures is needed.

1. Introduction This article examines the conceptualization of the Inuit's aspirations or lack thereof regarding state formation in Greenland (Kalaallit Nunaat, in Greenlandic). We present the prevailing perspectives on state formation, contrasting them with an alternative understanding of sovereignty in Greenland. Additionally, we employ decoloniality theoretical perspectives to analyze the Greenlandic case. Specifically, we delve into the discussions surrounding the notion of the "Inuit myth," as outlined by Shadian (2010) and the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)1, which posits a unique Inuit connection to the Arctic's natural environment, endowing them with a natural stewardship role over the entire region. Consequently, this characteristic grants them distinctive rights based on their political and cultural identity in the Arctic, thereby constructing a concept of non-state sovereignty or non-Westphalian sovereignty.

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Consequently, our analysis aims to explore the potential divergence of this perspective from conventional interpretations of state formation and sovereignty, specifically within a non-Western framework. By considering the insights offered by decolonial and gender perspectives, we endeavor to enhance our understanding of this alternative conceptualization. The historical legacies of colonialism in Greenland have been studied by various scholars (e.g., Petersen, 1995; Petterson, 2016; Rud, 2017; Arnaut, 2021; Thisted, 2022). As with most colonization experiences in other parts of the world, the extraction of valuable natural resources from the colonies aimed at making the Kingdoms or Empires richer and increase their geopolitical power. However, the Danish colonization experience in Greenland also had an impact on power and gender relations in the territory. These postcolonial impacts affected the existing notion of self-determination in Greenland and heightened a sense of nationalism in a different way than in the western world.

The conventional view used to “compensate” postcolonial Indigenous societies (from colonial injustice and material and immaterial dispossession) has been through the idea of promoting selfdetermination though the formation of a nation-state. However, according to Shadian (2010), there are non-state or state-like identities contemplating international recognition that are not based on compensation in the form of a nation-state. Instead, self-determination is accomplished through other ways of political legitimacy. She argues that there is an “Inuit myth” which is a discourse that is not based on a national movement for statehood, or the traditional statehood Westphalian framework. The active role of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (hereafter ICC) in the Arctic is an example of this alternative governance.

Shadian (2010: 504) paraphrasing Stenbaek (1985: 9) argues that after all, “the aim of the ICC from its inception according to one ICC member was not for a new country but for a new consciousness”. The ICC depends on its ability to maintain the legitimacy of the political myths which over time have evolved, adapted, and changed into the Arctic myth. Kuokkanen (2019) argues that the current notion of Indigenous self-determination in the Arctic is incomplete because it ignores the concerns and political views of Indigenous women in the Arctic who are the ones that are most vulnerable to colonialism and its legacies due to gendered violence.

The discourse on modern state formation encompasses various perspectives, yet one significant aspect, as exposed by Mignolo (2007), often remains overlooked. Mignolo suggests that comprehending the colonial history and the experiences of Indigenous peoples should go beyond a simple understanding of their lives. It necessitates a critical examination of how we perceive their historical agency and their holistic comprehension of reality within the global context. Thus far, mainstream views on state formation have failed to adequately acknowledge the profound insights that can be gathered from Indigenous perspectives. This article is structured as follows: the ensuing section provides a brief overview of key prevalent perspectives on state formation, followed by relevant key concepts in relation to the type of sovereignties in context. The notion of the Inuit myth is presented in section 4, a discussion on Indigenous sovereignty in section 5, followed by a brief analysis of the decolonial approach and its relation to Greenland. The last section concludes.

2. A brief overview of prevalent views on state formation The Inuit myth is a belief system centered around the idea of a special connection between the Inuit and the natural environment of the Arctic. Their perceived role in the Arctic may be viewed as an alternative governance framework, particularly in regions where traditional Indigenous customs and beliefs play a significant role in shaping decision-making and resource management.

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This highlights the influence of cultural and mythological narratives on governance structures and identities, which can have implications, albeit not inevitably, for state formation. Consequently, it is essential to deconstruct the origins of the concept of state formation, as it is not an inherent or universally applicable notion.

State formation is commonly used to describe “the long-term processes that led to the genesis of modern political domination in the form of the territorial sovereign state” (de Guevara and Lottholz, 2015). However, the concept itself may have different meanings given that it is believed that the idea of a state originated in Europe and spread out to other regions because of colonialism.

These different meanings arise from a stark contrast between mainstream perspectives, which usually fail to account for the historical experiences of state formation in colonized regions, and their inadequate acknowledgment of the responsibilities by colonizers. Moreover, most of those perspectives neglect to recognize the distinct trajectory pursued by colonialized regions in comparison to Western or imperial states. According to Weber’s definition, a State is “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. He argued that “a State is that human community which (successfully) lays claims to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory being another of the definition characteristics of the state” (Weber, 2004: 310-311).

Weber provided an explanation of the contemporary state as a Herrschaftsverband, which denotes an institutional association of rule. This entity has effectively established a monopoly over physical violence as a means of governing within a specific territory. To accomplish this objective, the state consolidates the material resources necessary for its operation and appropriates the authority previously held by various "estates." Consequently, the state assumes the role of the highest embodiment of power, supplanting these functionaries (Weber, 2004: 316). Weber's argument essentially suggests that the absence of violence as a tool for state enforcement would undermine societal order, potentially giving rise to a state of anarchy.

Weber and other prominent thinkers typically refer to the "early" period spanning from the 16th to the 18th century, as well as the "modern" era characterized by the proliferation of colonialism.

Charles Tilly, renowned for his seminal work Coercion, Capital, and European States (1990: 5), raises the fundamental question of elucidating the reasons behind "the significant temporal and spatial disparities in the types of states that have prevailed in Europe since AD 990, and the eventual convergence of European states into diverse variants of national states." Tilly argues that state development primarily resulted from the actions of the power elite, who imposed taxes on the common populace in order to finance warfare and territorial conquest. Consequently, he suggests that cities and countries in the 15th-16th century were primarily established as defensive entities to safeguard against the ravages of war. This development was largely motivated by the exigencies of warfare.

Tilly's work is frequently associated with the aphorism "the state makes war and war makes states."

Essentially, his primary argument asserts that the foundation of a contemporary state centers upon its capacity to impose taxation upon the populace within its jurisdiction. These fiscal resources, in turn, facilitate the state's sustained engagement in warfare, enabling the acquisition of additional territories and the lawful compulsion of greater numbers of individuals to participate in these military campaigns. Tilly suggests that international territorial competition and resource scarcity drive colonial expansion. While he considers that non-European countries may not replicate

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Europe's state formation pattern, he argues that European variations can provide insights into state formation and warfare in non-European contexts (Tilly, 1990: 16). This characterization has been utilized by scholars to understand state formation globally, but it faces criticism. For example, the British sociologist Michael Mann in The Sources of Social Power (1986) stresses the importance of social relations and ideologies in shaping state formation. For him, nation-building cannot be solely attributed to coercion and military force. He identifies four primary sources of social power that interact in complex ways in shaping state-building: ideological, economic, military, and political.

Yet, for Mann, ideological factors assume a significant role as a source of power. He argues that ideology constitutes one of the principal foundations of social power that contributes to the process of state formation. Mann insists that ideologies, such as nationalism, religious convictions, and political doctrines, serve as moral and normative frameworks that give legitimacy upon state authority while promoting collective mobilization (Mann, 1986: 307-319).

However, if ideologies are social constructions, then nations and states are not natural entities, but they are “imagined” by their members. This is what Benedict Anderson argues in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (2006). According to Anderson, print capitalism played a pivotal role in shaping modern nations and states. He argues that the development of vernacular languages, the expansion of printing press technology, and the widespread accessibility of printed materials contributed to the creation of a shared cultural space (Anderson, 2006: 46). This space allowed people to envision themselves as members of a larger community beyond their immediate social circles. Anderson also emphasizes the significance of nationalism in the process of state building. He suggests that the dissemination of print capitalism played a key role in fostering national consciousness, as people began to identify with and imagine themselves as part of a distinct nation characterized by shared symbols, myths, and narratives (Anderson, 2006: 204). This sense of belonging and collective identity, nurtured through the notion of imagined communities, facilitated the establishment of nation-states.

Yet, those “imagined communities” would not exist without changes in social organization, technology, and institutions that gave rise to the shared space that Anderson was referring to. This constitutes what Anthony Giddens identifies as the phenomenon of modernity. For him, the aforementioned changes gave rise to industrial capitalism and the Enlightenment as argued in The Nation-State and Violence (1985). Giddens emphasizes the transformative effects of modernity on various aspects of society, including the state. He argues that modernity, characterized by industrialization, urbanization, and global interconnections, has led to a fundamental reconfiguration of social and political structures, and thus the functioning of a nation-state.

However, most of these perspectives have tended to underestimate the significant influence of colonialism in shaping social identities, ideologies, institution-building, and warfare on state formation. Scholars such as Chatterjee (1993) and Bhambra (2018) present a different viewpoint that challenges the mainstream understanding of the nation-state. According to this view, the notion of a nation-state only becomes relevant in the aftermath of the emergence of colonial or imperial states. This argument posits that historically powerful nations like Germany and England, for instance, attained wealth and political power through colonization. Bhambra contends that the wealth of colonizer states was not limited to their original territories but derived from the countries they colonized. Consequently, she calls into question Weber's conceptualization of the modern state, which is based on the contemporary German state defined by its national boundaries. Yet,

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the construction of the ‘national state’ was concurrent with, and indeed constituted by, its associated imperial activities” (Bhambra, 2018: 4). It is argued that this conventional way of understanding nation state, which is also used by mainstream scholars, often disregards the fact that “the actions of the state upon populations outside its self-defined parameters and towards whom there is no relationship of emerging equality, only of domination” (Bhambra, 2018: 4).

Chatterjee (1993) and Bhambra (2018) invite for a reconsideration of the concept of the nationstate through the lenses of colonialism and imperialism looking to understand history from a much broader perspective. Bhambra in particular mentions as an example how Britain started to be regarded as a “failed state” in the mid-twentieth century because of the legislative policies making its citizens into immigrants on the basis on a racial hierarchy. Bhambra concludes by arguing that without a new way of understanding state formation, we exclude the “darker” citizens outside the world history, that in the case of Britain, it discusses citizenship without acknowledging that “England acquired colonies prior to Union and continued their colonial conquests after Union, and so they were already imperial states prior to becoming a conjoined nation-state” (Bhambra 2018: 8).

Nevertheless, in hindsight, the mainstream views on state formation, and even the post-colonial perspectives of Chatterjee (1993) and Bhambra (2018) downplay the role of diverse epistemologies, the ways of knowing, and knowledge production of former colonies and societies after the crafting of the idea of a state. The Argentinian scholar, Walter Mignolo, known for his decolonial approach, argues that coloniality (i.e., the enduring colonial power structures and systems of domination) is the result of western modernity (Mignolo, 2007). For Mignolo, the idea of a nation-state is an element that western modernity has imposed. The current idea of knowledge and science disregards other perspectives that are not western aligned. Thus, he proposes to academics and non-academics to decolonize knowledge, “delinking” it from the western notion of totality. Totality is the imposed knowledge that preconditions the way of understanding reality, and that the idea of the nation state is one of these imposed realities. Coloniality imposes a matrix of power that persuades individuals to believe that scientific truth can only be attained through specific methodologies. Mignolo contends that alternative histories and civilizations, particularly precolonial ones, offer different perspectives on reality and diverse understandings of societal organization. These non-colonized societies experienced distinct ways of comprehending the world, challenging the dominant narrative that upholds Western methodologies as the sole source of scientific truth. He proposes to delink from the western epistemology and go towards a change in the terms of conversation, and this “new” understanding will bring a change in economics, politics, philosophy, and ethics.

That is, by including other ways of thinking about the truth and reality. Overall, he argues that the idea of an imperial nation state is also a western imposition that leads to nationalism and further international inequalities and the perpetuation of the colonial matrix of power.

Undoubtedly, new scholarly perspectives on state formation should emphasize the need to move beyond a Western lens and consider the histories and perspectives of colonized countries and cultures. Failing to acknowledge non-Western history limits our understanding of the diverse processes of state formation. While the issue of colonialism is present in these key perspectives, there is a distinction in how it is addressed. The warfare perspective, imagined communities, and institutional building approaches do not sufficiently consider the experiences of colonial subjects as valuable sources of knowledge. In contrast, Bhambra's viewpoint encourages learning from the

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perspectives of the colonized. Additionally, Mignolo argues that it is insufficient to merely include colonial subjects; a decolonization of knowledge is necessary to reframe our understanding. This calls for a critical examination of the ways in which we approach and interpret colonial histories.

3. Exploring Arctic Sovereignty: Unraveling Concepts Following the brief overview of the prevalent views on state formation, it is important to begin to disentangle the concepts or ideas of sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, non-Westphalian sovereignty, Indigenous sovereignty, as well as their interplay for the context of Greenland. For this, we rely on the notion of the so-called “Inuit myth” in order to show the different understandings of Arctic sovereignty and how the decolonial perspectives are related to it. The Inuit myth is a belief system that establishes a deep connection between the Inuit people and their natural environment. This belief system has significant implications for their sovereignty because it asserts that the Inuit have a unique historical claim to the Arctic region, and therefore, a voice regarding the land, its resources, and its governance. The connection between this belief system and sovereignty implies that the Inuit should have a recognized role in shaping policies that affect their communities and territories. Conventional literature rarely draws direct connections between sovereignty and belief systems. Hence, it is of particular relevance to examine this interplay, especially within the specific context of Greenland and the Arctic.

The concept of sovereignty has evolved throughout history, and it has been adapted to political circumstances and actors. The Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War and institutionalized the concept of sovereignty in Europe (in a Westphalian way). Sovereign states were then recognized as the most important political institutions. The term “Westphalian” includes the sovereignty to act independently as a territorial statehood within a particular geopolitical arrangement (Opello and Rosow, 2004: 79). Accordingly, the state was then represented by a King or a Queen, a dictator or a democratically elected government, and the state could, without interference of other states, claim control over the affairs within its territorial boundaries. If the sovereignty of other states is respected, the state was also entitled to manage its external affairs (Bauder and Mueller, 2021).

The term sovereignty is not a rigid term, on the contrary, it has been an evolving concept that has been often contested. In political theory, sovereignty is more of a functional way to legitimize authority while in international law it is related to the ability to exert power by a state. In general, it has been commonly defined the way Werner and de Wilde (2001: 3) describe it as “the absolute and independent authority of a community or nation both internally and externally”. There are mainly two ways of conceptualizing sovereignty from which additional variants of them arise. The two ways are the so-called de jure sovereignty and de facto sovereignty. The first one (de jure) is considered when there is an articulated and institutionally recognized right to control a territory, or as Lee (1996) describes it as “the right to command”. It is also referred to as legal sovereignty. As for the de facto sovereignty is the “ability to command”, which is sometimes referred to as coercive sovereignty.

Krasner (2004), argues that sovereignty can also be divided in three ways: Domestic, International legal, and Westphalian. Regarding domestic sovereignty it refers to the institutions in which a particular state is governed, and whether this can provide security, prosperity and justice to the people that live under that state. For international legal sovereignty, Krasner refers to it as the ability to be recognized juridically by independent territorial entities. As for Westphalian, and as mentioned Inuit Myth and the Remaking of Greenland's Postcolonial Governance

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earlier in this section, Krasner (2004: 1077) states that this is the characteristic when the state has the right to independently determine its own institutions of government and there is no other authority in the state aside from the domestic sovereign and the principle of no intervention in the internal affairs of other states applies.

However, non-European societies, particularly colonized societies may have a different way to understand sovereignty, thus, many various authors and international institutions have argued that because of the struggle for recognition of the culture and language of colonized people, the term sovereignty should be re-examined. For example, the Inuit Circumpolar Council has stated in a Declaration on Sovereignty the following: “For Inuit living within the states of Russia, Canada, the USA and Denmark/Greenland, issues of sovereignty must be examined and assessed in the context of our long history of struggle to gain recognition and respect as an Arctic indigenous people having the right to exercise self-determination over our lives, territories, cultures, and languages” (ICC declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, 2009).

This is especially relevant because the regions that were occupied underwent a process of colonization aimed at altering their culture and the organizational structures of their societies. Also, there is a key element present when a country occupies and colonizes a territory: the psychological element also called animus occupandi, that is, the intention to control and occupy a territory in order to get sovereignty over it (Wallace and Martin-Ortega, 2020: 100) Therefore, it can be said that the 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) that asserted the right of self-determination of Indigenous peoples represented a step towards the emancipation from the colonial control of Westphalian sovereign states. In particular, article 5 states: “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State”.

It is then important to define the term colony in the context of state formation in occupied territories. There are various definitions of “colony” but a general definition in international law of a colony refers to a “dependent territorial entity subject to the sovereignty of an independent country, but considered part of that country for purposes of relations with third countries” (US Legal, 2022).

Colonization is an important element to understand state formation in occupied or formerly occupied societies. It is crucial to differentiate between the terms "postcoloniality" and "decoloniality" in order to gain clarity for our ensuing arguments. Postcolonialism, or postcoloniality, does not refer to the time period following colonialism; rather, it encompasses the enduring legacy of colonial rule on the subjugated populations and examines how people respond to this legacy. It primarily focuses on describing and understanding the issues stemming from colonialism within local communities that have experienced occupation. Decoloniality is the approach that seeks to challenge and dismantle the ongoing effects of colonialism and its legacies.

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is superior to Indigenous knowledge. Decoloniality is concerned with actively addressing and resolving issues such as social class and gender inequalities, that persist in postcolonial communities.

It seems then that both terms, postcoloniality and decoloniality, are addressing an issue that the reviewed concepts of sovereignty are ignoring, that is the dispossessed local communities.

Sovereignty can be quite different than previous mainstream views on state formation and the capacity of the state to exert control. This concern is expressed in a policy paper from the ICC published in 2020: “Similar to other attempts to lump Indigenous peoples into other collective terms is problematic because the term “local” does not account for Indigenous peoples who have been removed from their lands and discounts the particular circumstances of Inuit… These actions are part of an alarming trend in the behavior of States to diminish the standards in the U.N. Declaration, including actions to devalue Indigenous peoples’ status, rights and participation rather than upholding their responsibilities and uplifting the status, rights and participation of Indigenous peoples” (ICC Policy Paper, 2020: 3) The previous quoted paragraph points out that other sovereign states tend to undermine the 2007 UNDRIP. However, Kuokkanen (2019) questions the different interpretations of sovereignty in the Arctic, arguing that the concept of self-determination contained in the UNDRIP (and as indicated in article 5), it is an idea of sovereignty that is inherently Westphalian. Thus, she coined the term Indigenous Westphalian Sovereignty, which she argues is the case of Greenland.

On the other hand, Shadian (2010) argues that the creation of non-state sovereignty in the Arctic is based on a notion of Inuit nationalism relying on an entity greater than any other state achieving legitimacy via a myth that consists of seeing the Inuit as Indigenous stewards across the circumpolar region. This is a case of non-Westphalian sovereignty.

4. The Inuit Myth Inuit mythology is vast across the Arctic (for example, in Nunavut, Nunavik, Nunatsiavut, and the Inuvialuit Settlement Region) but it is especially in Greenland where storytelling plays an important role in transmitting cultural symbolism and beliefs. In these, there are repeatedly spiritual tales where nature plays a key element when describing how the Inuit view the environment that they live in.

There is a common belief that Greenlanders have lived according to the laws of nature, spiritual principles, and mythical characters such as the Greenlandic Shamans (or Angakkut in Greenlandic).

The Shamans are central figures in the mythology of Greenland, as they are said to interpret the will of the higher powers. Another emblematic figure in Greenlandic mythology is the Mother of the Sea, Sassuma Arnaa. The Mother of the Sea is an integral part of Greenlandic cultural history and today is powerful symbol of marine pollution and global warming of the ocean for the Inuit (Bach-Kreutzmann, 2018). According to the myth (of the Mother of the Sea), when the Inuit breaks a taboo in society, the hair of Sassuma Arnaa gets dirty entangling the animals and prevents the hunters and fishers from catching any food (Bach-Kreutzmann, 2018: 108). As a consequence, to untangle the animals, a Shaman has to go into the bottom of the Ocean to communicate with

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Sassuma Arnaa and find out what taboos were broken, ultimately spreading the messages and lessons back to society (Sonne, 2017: 135).

These prominent local mythologies serve as a reflection of how Greenlandic identity and ethnicity are deeply intertwined with the natural world. As exemplified by the myth of Sassuma Arnaa, the challenges faced by communities may originate from within themselves and potentially have mystical remedies, but the common denominator is the harmonic relation with the natural environment. Moreover, many Greenlanders hold the belief that they do not possess ownership over the land they inhabit; instead, they perceive themselves as temporary custodians, borrowing the land from their ancestors. This sense of responsibility compels them to treat the land with respect and assume the role of stewards (Harrop et al., 2022).

An external observer to the Arctic may perceive the connection between Arctic nature and Greenlanders’ identity as a recent phenomenon. Yet, the Inuit have inhabited the Arctic for several millennia. Historical accounts from printed media (e.g., a longstanding newspaper named Atuagagdliutit) show that, West Greenlanders had a well-defined ethnic identity from the beginning of the 1860s, where hunting and kayaking played a significant role in cultural awareness, and they constituted a unified whole as arctic peoples (Langgård, 1998).

Sara Olsvig, the current International Chair of the ICC, mentions the following in a recent speech: “As you know, Inuit live across the borders of four nation states, across our homeland, Inuit Nunaat. We were divided by these state borders, and it took our collective and hard efforts to reach the place we have been since 1992, when ICC Chukotka finally became a full member party to our organization, uniting Russian Inuit with our Alaskan, Canadian and Kalaallit family. Just like our languages, our cultures, our identity as Inuit, - our surroundings; the environment, the changing climate, our ecosystems, and biodiversity, know nothing of borders. […] As we have said many times, protecting to Arctic is to protect the planet. These days, this saying has much further reaching reality – not only being about climate and our environment, but also being about democracy”. […] We are spiritually connected to our surroundings, and we are spiritually connected across Inuit Nunaat.” (Sara Olsvig, Keynote Speech, UArctic, 2023).

In a similar fashion in relation to the deep relationship between the Inuit and their ancestral lands, the late ICC founding member, Eben Hopson in one his earliest speeches addressing the oil and gas industry, depicts the Inuit as a nation and not a nation-state: “We (the Inuit) are an international community sharing common language, culture, and a common land along the Arctic coast of Siberia, Alaska, Canada, and Greenland. Although not a nation-state, as a people, we do constitute a nation” (Eben Hopson, Official Speech, 1978.)

Shadian (2006) reflects on the ICC positions on sovereignty and argues that the aforementioned myths related to the human-natural environment have evolved into political myths and structures uncovering a type of sovereignty based on symbolic meanings and not on territory. Thus, the Inuit myth is the Inuit collective identity and cultural heritage that serves as a basis for political sovereignty. Accordingly, the Inuit myth is portrayed as a means to exercise sovereignty, which is not necessarily dependent on achieving statehood or taking part in mainstream international Østergaard & Arnaut

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organizations. Rather, the legitimacy of their political myth or the ongoing historical myth of an Inuit collective identity within the realm of global politics is what enables the Inuit to exercise their political autonomy. Although, Shadian’s notion of the Inuit myth might initially emanate from the Inuit in the Canadian Arctic, it is understood that the collective identity refers to the traditional homeland and ancestral territory of the Inuit Nunaat (Inuit land, in Greenlandic), or Inuit Nunangat (Inuit land, in Inuktitut). According to this assessment, “a new framework by which a transnational Inuit myth acquired its role as a legitimate stakeholder in Arctic development. The underlying structure of this collective myth, the idea of the Inuit as indigenous with particular rights; the natural stewards of the Arctic, would remain a dominant aspect of this new polity” (Shadian 2006: 196).

Yet, the evolving concept of stewardship, whereby Indigenous peoples assume responsibilities as stewards of the land and resources but not as its owners. This might seem like a conflicting aspect of the framework and clashes with other conceptualizations of sovereignty. According to international law, Indigenous peoples are recognized as right-holders rather than stakeholders (e.g., United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169). Still, following the Inuit myth view, the Inuit are natural stewards of the land which does not equate to landowners, but it gives them the exclusive right (thus, right-holder) to the land and key element in decision-making processes.

In this context, the concept of non-Westphalian sovereignty (also referred to as post-Westphalian sovereignty) comes into play. In the subsequent section, we delve into an examination of how this perspective diverges from the conventional understanding of sovereignty.

5. Non-Westphalian sovereignty and Indigenous Westphalian sovereignty Thus far, it is evident that mainstream perspectives on sovereignty, which rely on a clearly delineated territory and a militaristic entity, may not adequately capture the complexities of Arctic Indigenous societies' pursuit of self-determination. As mentioned in the previous section, the Inuit myth relies on a collective identity that may not focus entirely on statehood. For example, for Greenland is highly unlikely, though not entirely impossible, to employ institutionalized violence as a means of exerting control over its geographical territory. Consequently, one might argue that this case exemplifies a clear instance of non-Westphalian sovereignty. Nonetheless, there are characteristics of the Westphalian sovereignty that are taking place currently in Greenland that can be outlined as Indigenous Westphalian sovereignty. Thus, it is imperative to elucidate the distinctions between these concepts.

Shadian (2006) argues that resource development in the Arctic was fundamental to the process by which the Inuit were able to: “reframe their historical myth in a contemporary setting—Arctic indigenous stewards through a codified organization—the Inuit Circumpolar Council”. She goes on to say that the “Inuit collective political identity points to an emerging post-Westphalian reality where sovereignty is shifting from the state to new collective identities. Yet, this new political architecture needs more than a myth in order to be political; it needs to be legitimized and realized through political institutions.”

Thus, Shadian places an important characteristic in trying to define non-Westphalian (or postWestphalian) from the orthodoxy of a Westphalian sovereignty. A non-Westphalian view covers the Inuit myth or the symbolism of Inuit values (belonging to the arctic nature) which is not based

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on territoriality. Nevertheless, this needs to be legitimized by political institutions. For this, the ICC plays a role of a “supranational” political institution to legitimize Indigenous sovereignty. The conventional view of Westphalian sovereignty grants nation states controls not only of their internal but also of their external affairs. Thus, in a non-Westphalian sovereignty, external control is not necessary. This idea can be summarized in a speech from the ICC founder Eben Hopson in 1978: “An important objective of our Inuit land claims movement is the organization of local government in the Arctic. I personally feel this organization must happen within the national context and traditions of Denmark, Canada and the United States. Some may talk about separate Inuit political development, but I do not. All we need is the cooperation of our governments to enable us to make traditional North American local government work for us in the Arctic” (Hopson, 1978).

On the other hand, Kuokkanen (2019), contends this framework, contrasting this position by arguing that the 2009 Greenland Self-Government Act was a significant step towards securing exclusive subsurface rights to its territory and political independence. She claims that given that political independence requires economic self-sufficiency, Greenlanders are then advancing their own form of “Westphalian indigenous sovereignty” based on the vision of a self-sufficient state.

However, Koukkanen (2019) does not claim that this is the only prevalent view. She argues that in Greenland there are two different discourses of sovereignty. One is aligned to the ICC which is the “shared, overlapping sovereignties emerging from the global Indigenous self-determination movement” (Koukkanen, 2019: 315), and the other is the Westphalian discourse, which represented by the Greenlandic Parliament and the Self-Government, and which seeks emancipation from the Danish Kingdom as an ultimate objective as is stated in the SelfGovernment Act of 2009 in reference to political independence.

Kuokannen uses a metaphor brought by the former Greenlandic Prime Minister Aleqqa Hammond. Hammond was quoted in interview (April 11, 2013) saying that she sees Greenland like an airplane, “on the one wing lies all the traditions, the culture, language, and values. On the other wing is the global influence and interaction with various partners (Koukkanen, 2019: 315).

Determining the prevailing perspective on sovereignty in Greenland's contemporary political milieu is challenging due to the region's notable regional variations in social and economic dynamics. In Nuuk, where the majority of the population resides alongside the central public administration, prominent private enterprises, the social elite, and Danish settlers, the political outlook of the public differs from that of smaller towns and settlements. This contrast is evident in the voting outcomes of past national elections.

In general, smaller towns often exhibit a preference for political parties that espouse traditional values and claim to represent Inuit ideals, such as nationalist left-wing parties like Siumut and Naleraq. Conversely, larger towns and the capital tend to lean towards liberal or progressive-left parties like Democratiit and Inuit Ataqatigiit. Notably, Siumut-led governments have historically displayed a proactive approach towards attaining economic self-sufficiency, often through the expansion of the mining industry via the granting of mineral mining exploitation licenses. These governmental efforts can be seen as aligning with a notion of sovereignty rooted in indigenous Westphalian sovereignty. Presently, the Inuit Ataqatigiit-led government, in a coalition, expresses

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a desire for independence, although not in a hasty manner, but rather in accordance with principles rooted in climate global agenda, Indigenous self-determination, and the values upheld by the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC).

In the international sphere, Greenland is not a marginalized regional actor anymore. The current trend reveals Greenland’s empowerment as regional actor asserting its claims in the Arctic. A proof of this are the dynamics of Greenland's foreign policy and its capacity for self-determination as the country progressively assumes the role of a partner to the United States, all the while navigating its ongoing relations with Denmark. The pursuit of self-determination has influenced the trilateral dynamics with Denmark, and the United States (Olsvig, 2022). Consequently, the concept of Indigenous sovereignty in Greenland oscillates between interpretations within the framework of Westphalian sovereignty and alternative, non-Westphalian (or post-Westphalian) perspectives.

6. How does decoloniality contribute to understanding sovereignty in Greenland?

Following the conclusion of the Second World War, the United Nations exerted pressure on Denmark to acknowledge Greenland as a territory inhabited by individuals aspiring for selfdetermination. Consequently, Denmark's recognition implied an admission that Greenland retained its status as a colony, despite Denmark's attempts to present itself as a generous or "good" colonizer. Indeed, a prevailing narrative suggests that Denmark is often characterized as a relatively “mild” colonizer (Alfredsson, 1982: 307). Nevertheless, the perception of the colonialist as benign and compassionate has come under scrutiny due to documented instances of colonial injustices, such as discriminatory birthplace wage criteria from 1953 to 1991, the social experiment of relocating Greenlandic children to Denmark in the 1950s, cases involving fatherless children, and the mid-1960s contraception campaign known as the “Spiral case” when Danish authorities instructed doctors and health specialists to place thousands of intrauterine contraceptive devices (IUD) on Greenlandic girls and women without consent, among other illustrative examples of colonial or postcolonial injustice (Sermitsiaq, 2022, May 12th).

According to some authors (e.g., Rud, 2018: 6), there is a colonial social hierarchy in Greenland that sees western foreigners (mostly Danes) as the “advanced ones” with the “modern” skills while local Indigenous people are seen as primitive. This hierarchy still exists today in Greenland, but it is informal and disguised in various ways. The “soft” former colonizer within the Danish Kingdom relies on the use of non-violent methods to gain control and power over the societies of Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The former Faroe Islands’ head minister Høgni Hoydal refers to Benedict Anderson in a speech in a convention about “rethinking Nordic colonialism” called “NeoColonialism with a human face – the cozy self-colonization in Danish home rule”. Høgni Hoydal refers, in the conference, to an interview that a Danish newspaper had with Benedict Anderson. In the newspaper interview Benedict Anderson was quoted for saying “All the historians know that Denmark was once an empire, but as I understand it is not something you could learn about in school. Instead, they learn about this friendly little harmless nation and its nice people” (Høgni, 2006: 2).

In relation to this, the Greenlandic anthropologist Aviaja E. Lynge (2006), argues: “We have always been taught we were one of the best colonies in the world. No slavery, no killings. We learned it through Danish history books, and from Danish

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teachers. With the books telling us how fantastic a colony we were – books about primitive Eskimos, books written from Euro-centric, economic, or self-justifying angles – we haven’t really looked beyond this historical oppression […]. We went directly from being a colony into becoming a part of Denmark. We learned to be Danish, and we learned to be thankful. Why, then, should we have had a reason to decolonize? And why should we have a reason to ask questions about the 250 years of colonial presence?” (Lynge 2006: 1).

“The question remains if one can discuss colonization in such terms as ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Is it better to take bodies or to take souls?” (Lynge, 2006: 6) These quotes from Lynge (2006) point out in general the rhetorical question of why should Greenland have a reason to decolonize if Denmark brought Greenland within the Kingdom and as a consequence it stopped being colony? The answer that she is trying to put forward is the one given by decolonial theory. Decoloniality in a nutshell, stands for the idea that even though colonialism has ended in most parts of the world, the “coloniality of power” continues to characterize relations between the West and the “Rest”.

This phenomenon of coloniality of power is present in Greenland. As Rud (2017) has argued, Danish colonization in the nineteenth century attempted to erase Inuit social relations and establish a new governance and sovereignty different from what it already existed in Greenland. Williamson (2011), claims that Danish colonialism also changed gender relations. Before the arrival of the Danish colonial mission, Greenlandic society was genderless, that is, there was a certain indifference to gender and the absence of a hierarchy of male dominance or female subordination.

In this regard, Lugones (2007), a feminist decolonial theorist, argues that gender did not exist as a principle of power in Indigenous societies before colonization. Thus, according to her, gender is a colonial construct. Building in these ideas, Koukkanen (2019) insists that the materialization of Indigenous self-determination cannot be seen only as an end through the creation of Greenlandic Self-Government. She explains that women’s community issues in Greenland, like gendered violence, should be part of the “hard issues” (land rights and natural resources) and not framed as soft issues when building a new type of governance under an Indigenous notion of sovereignty.

This is because even though Greenlandic women historically have been at the forefront of the struggle for Indigenous self-determination, they have been subjugated and marginalized in a patriarchal system that stemmed from Danish colonialism.

To advance towards an inclusive idea of sovereignty, Mignolo (2017) proposes “decentering” and “delinking” political Indigenous structures from western knowledge. But Mignolo (2017) also warn us: “…there cannot be one and only one decolonial master plan – that would be far too modern, too Eurocentric, too provincial, too limited and still too universal.

Decoloniality operates on pluri-versality and truth and not in universality and truth.

As mentioned above, decoloniality’s first moves should be those of delinking.

Secondly, it should strive for re-existence. Re-existing is something other than resisting. If you resist, you are trapped in the rules of the game others created, specifically the narrative and promises of modernity and the necessary implementation of coloniality.”

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The case of Greenland underscores a valuable lesson derived from the decolonial discourse, elucidating that the trajectory of political developments oscillates between a non-Westphalian conception of sovereignty and an Indigenous Westphalian framework. However, it is imperative to recognize that Indigenous self-determination in the Arctic is not governed by a universal blueprint, necessitating a departure from the notion of a "one size fits all" approach. Drawing upon Mignolo's conceptualizations of decoloniality, Greenlanders are encouraged to embrace a paradigm of "re-existing" or remaking rather than mere resistance, placing Indigenous knowledge production at the forefront. This transformative process engenders a continuous emergence of novel forms of autonomous indigenous governance.

7. Conclusion The title of this article “Inuit Myth and the Remaking of Greenland's Postcolonial Governance” may be deemed somewhat farfetched, principally in regard to the term "remaking" which could be seen as a need for Greenland to reconstruct itself. However, it is important to acknowledge that Greenland does not require a rebuilding but rather an assertion of self-determination, resilience, and re-existence, as advocated by Mignolo's decolonial approach. Our article has showed that the concept of sovereignty has been a subject of considerable debate within mainstream literature (e.g., Tilly 1990, Weber 2004, and Bhambra 2018), as well as in emerging perspectives on Indigenous sovereignty, where the absence of a universally applicable model becomes evident. Greenland's historical trajectory includes triumphing over colonization and resisting Danish assimilation attempts, culminating in its transformation into an influential political actor that significantly impacts both Arctic and global governance dynamics.

We have presented Shadian's argument on the Inuit myth, which posits that the collective perception of the Inuit, depicting them as Indigenous people with distinct rights and serving as natural stewards of the Arctic, is strategically employed to politically legitimize the right of selfdetermination. This legitimization process is facilitated through the utilization of a "supranational" institution, namely the Inuit Circumpolar Council, which serves as a means to advance the pursuit of self-determination goals within the political sphere.

Our examination has revealed a contestation of the prevailing notion of non-Westphalian sovereignty, propagated through the Inuit myth, across the Arctic region. Greenland, in particular, stands out as a prominent actor challenging this established understanding of sovereignty. The enactment of the 2009 Self-Government Act in Greenland serves as a concrete manifestation of a distinct form of sovereignty, termed Indigenous Westphalian sovereignty by Koukkanen (2021).

While this variant does not align with the traditional Westphalian model due to its lack of authority over external affairs (despite provisions for potential future advancement), it asserts its influence domestically.

We briefly discussed the oscillating or alternating nature of the political landscape in Greenland, which involves a dynamic interplay between these divergent notions of sovereignty, ranging from non-Westphalian to Indigenous Westphalian perspectives. Moreover, we engaged in an exploration of the utility of decolonial approaches, such as Mignolo's (2007) framework, in facilitating openness to new local understandings of sovereignty in the Arctic context. These approaches question the adoption of imported notions regarding state-building and the establishment of predetermined paths for state formation.

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In conclusion, we align with Mignolo's perspective, emphasizing the importance of promoting an ethos of "re-existing" rather than merely "resisting." Central to this approach is the prioritization of Indigenous knowledge production, which should be situated at the forefront of discussions on sovereignty, recognizing its crucial role in shaping Arctic dynamics.

Notes 1. The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) was founded in 1977 to represent and advocate for the rights and interests of 185,000 Inuit from Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Chukotka.

It operates through a governing body known as the General Assembly, which consists of delegates from each of the Inuit regions it represents. The elected leadership works collectively to advance the interests of Inuit communities and ensure their perspectives are heard.

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Østergaard & Arnaut

Embracing Indigenous Knowledge in Arctic Economic Development: A Pathway towards ESG and Indigenous Sustainable Finance Integration

Alexandra Middleton

As industrial activities in the Arctic intensify with more players and capital prospects from international players, it is important to have rules on how to conduct business and make investments which prioritise optimal environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors or outcomes. This article focuses on voluntary sustainability and ESG compliance and reporting initiatives related to the Arctic context. In 2015, the Arctic Investment Protocol was introduced as an initial endeavour to tackle this issue by establishing a framework that promotes sustainable investment in the Arctic, in alignment with global Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles. In June 2022, the Inuit Circumpolar Council published eight protocols in the document “Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement (EEE)”. The shift appears to be in the role Indigenous Peoples take in the formation of rules for conducting business and investment in the Arctic. Protocols released by the Inuit Circumpolar Council build on holistic and collaborative co-production of knowledge and recognise that people are integral parts of the environment, prioritising the importance of Indigenous Knowledge (IK). This article aims to elaborate on the requirement for a paradigm shift that values the collaboration of diverse perspectives for sustainable solutions, where Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ knowledge is viewed as part of the solution for achieving Arctic economic development by integrating environmental, social, and governance (ESG) principles along with Indigenous Sustainable Finance. In the context of ESG investment principles and Indigenous Sustainable Finance, it has become increasingly crucial to recognise and incorporate the wisdom and traditional practices of Arctic Indigenous Peoples. This article traces the development of sustainability frameworks in the Arctic, examines the Inuit Circumpolar Council’s eight protocols, and proposes solutions for the future development of sustainability frameworks in the Arctic.

Introduction While the Arctic is portrayed as a new frontier for economic development in extractive industries, logistics, and services such as tourism (Conley, 2013), the region presents unique challenges for business development and investment flows (Larsen & Huskey, 2015; Larsen & Petrov, 2020).

Factors such as a declining population, decreased youth demographics in the Nordic Arctic (Bullvåg, 2017), and inadequate physical and digital infrastructure (Delaunay & Landriault, 2020)

Alexandra Middleton is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Oulu Business School University of Oulu.

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impact investment in the Arctic region. Additionally, the vulnerability of the Arctic to the impact of climate change further complicates the investment landscape. The Arctic region has experienced some of the most pronounced effects of climate change, including rising temperatures, melting ice, and changing ecosystems (Previdi et al. 2021). These changes not only pose significant environmental challenges but also introduce uncertainties and risks for potential investments. The geographical remoteness of Arctic areas from consumption centres results in increased transportation times and higher costs (Egorova & Delakhova, 2019), making development in the region more expensive. Moreover, Arctic investment is subject to uncertainties driven by fluctuations in commodity prices, shifting geopolitical forces, and the limited legal framework pertaining to sustainable business development and investment (Middleton, 2022). The Arctic region has sparked concerns among multiple stakeholders who seek to enhance the alignment of Arctic operations with sustainability goals, while concurrently addressing the delicate balance between defense, economic objectives, and potential environmental degradation (Trump et al.

2018).

To attract international investment, it is essential to address the gap between the need for investment and the lack of clear rules and sustainability guidelines tailored for the Arctic region.

For instance, growing economic activity in the Arctic has sparked conflicts over land use and the inclusion of Arctic Indigenous Peoples in decision-making processes (Hanaček et al.,2022; Bielawski, 2020; Cambou & Poelzer 2021). It is important to notice that in the context of Arctic development, it is notable that each of the eight Arctic states has established its own set of hard laws, which govern various aspects of business development and investment in the region. The current international investment framework in the Arctic states, comprised of hard investment laws and international treaties, is fragmented and does not adequately align with ESG and sustainability principles (Middleton, 2022a). This study explores available soft law mechanisms1 governing sustainable business development and investment in the Arctic states, with a focus on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles.

Balancing economic interests with the rights of Indigenous communities requires inclusive approaches that respect traditional knowledge, land rights, and self-determination. Involving Indigenous communities in decision making enables the preservation of the Arctic's unique social, cultural, and environmental fabric. In the Arctic, Indigenous Knowledge (IK) is of paramount importance in comprehending and addressing environmental challenges. Scholars have argued for the critical recognition of Indigenous Knowledge (IK) as a distinct knowledge system characterised by its unique methodologies, validation processes, and scope. They emphasise that IK surpasses traditional activities and embodies an adaptive process of understanding and interpreting observations and experiences. Nonetheless, integrating IK into decision-making processes presents several challenges. These include a lack of respect for or understanding IK, inequities between IK holders and other partners, and attempts to impose scientific frameworks for the validation of IK (Wheeler et al. 2020).

In scientific research, the challenges of effectively integrating Indigenous perspectives into Arctic conservation efforts have been recognised. These challenges stem from the misalignment between conventional conservation approaches and Indigenous values as well as the historical 1 Soft law refers to non-binding legal instruments or guidelines that lack enforceability through traditional legal

mechanisms

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marginalisation of Indigenous communities. Additionally, overcoming colonial pressure and recognising the obstacles faced by Indigenous communities in achieving their conservation objectives are essential (Buschman & Sudlovenick, 2022). Working with Indigenous Peoples entails challenges including trust issues, research fatigue, and communication limitations between scientists and communities. Funding constraints, limited recognition of non-academic work, and delays in scientific publishing due to community review processes are viewed as additional hurdles (Sjöberg et al. 2019).

Despite the growing importance of Indigenous perspectives in promoting sustainable economic development, a significant knowledge gap remains regarding the extent to which these perspectives have been incorporated into existing regulations and guidelines. Investment regulation in the Arctic is characterised by two distinct approaches. On the one hand, the international investment framework, encompassing national investment laws and international investment agreements, is legally binding but lacks specific provisions addressing Arctic conditions. On the other hand, guidelines and soft laws tailored for the Arctic are available; however, they operate on a voluntary basis without international enforcement or arbitrage mechanisms (Middleton, 2022). Indigenous Sustainable Finance (ISF) involves the application of Indigenous perspectives, values, and approaches to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues as well as the impact and implications for investment decision-making and asset management within Indigenous communities. The ISF incorporates Indigenous Knowledge and practices into financial decisionmaking processes to promote sustainable development and to address the unique needs and challenges of Indigenous communities (Daugaard et al. 2023). To date, the exploration of Indigenous Sustainable Finance (ISF) in the Arctic region remains limited. The Arctic region presents a unique context with distinct environmental, social, and economic factors that necessitate specific examination of the ISF. This study explores how Indigenous perspectives and IK are integrated into sustainable economic development or sustainable investment guidelines or frameworks available in the Arctic. The focus is on the Arctic Investment Protocol, Responsibility Standard for the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, and Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement. Content analysis was employed as a methodological tool to examine and analyse text data, specifically focusing on the inclusion of Indigenous People in framework development and Indigenous Knowledge in documents, providing valuable insights and enabling the quantitative and qualitative study of historical trends.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the role of Indigenous Knowledge in the context of sustainable business development in the Arctic, followed by the data and methods. Section 2 reviews the role of Indigenous Peoples’ voices in sustainable business development. Section 3 focuses on Inuit Protocols for EEE. Section 5 discusses the challenges regarding the role of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and IK in sustainable economic guidelines. Section 6 concludes.

Role of Indigenous Knowledge Indigenous knowledge (IK) should be distinguished from Indigenous Science (IS) and Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) (Snively & Corsiglia,2016). Indigenous Knowledge (IK) is the local knowledge held by Indigenous Peoples or local knowledge unique to a particular culture or society (Warren et al. 1993). IS represents scientific knowledge shaped by cultural worldviews and interests (Snively & Willimans, 2018), while TEK is a body of knowledge derived from direct experiences Middleton

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with the biophysical environment, developed by Indigenous Peoples over generations (Kim & Dionne, 2014). TEK has proven valuable for sustainable natural resource management and has contributed to ecological and evolutionary understanding (da Silva et al. 2023). Scholars such as Cajete (2000) have explored the incorporation of traditional universal concepts into Indigenous Science frameworks, emphasising self-knowledge, wholeness, reciprocity, spirituality, and interconnectedness.

The practice of science is influenced by natural and environmental resources within a specific cultural and socio-economic context. However, many textbooks worldwide tend to overlook or limit the cultural aspect of science, often presenting a predominantly Western perspective on history (Ideland, 2018). Research has highlighted the diversity of Indigenous views on nature and IK in science, which varies globally across societies and cultures. IK is rooted in a deep respect for nature, driven by Indigenous Peoples' relationships and responsibilities towards the natural world (Suzuki & Knudtson, 1992).

Despite the rich diversity and intricate nature of IK, it frequently receives neglect in knowledge production settings, often characterised by derogatory terms such as 'primitive’, ‘backward’, and 'unscientific' (Ezeanya-Esiobu, 2019: 7). The distinct knowledge and interpretations of reality generated by Indigenous communities through a complex cultural construction process are rendered invisible, marginalised, and perceived as an inferior social experience. This marginalisation occurs within a dominant epistemological model that perpetuates and legitimises a singular monoculture of knowledge (Santos, 2015).

IK enhances the sustainability of development efforts through the mutual learning, adaptation, and empowerment of local communities. Its integration contributes to the efficiency, effectiveness, and overall quality of development work. IK finds applications in diverse sectors, such as agriculture, health, education, and natural resource management. However, the utilisation of IK should be context specific, aligning with the needs and priorities of the communities involved. Involving communities to identify, validate, and adapt IK practices ensures relevance, ownership, and longterm sustainability (Gorjestani 2001). Recognising and utilising IK for development faces challenges, including a lack of recognition, validation, and misappropriation by mainstream institutions. Inadequate resources, conflicts, and rapid changes pose challenges to the contribution and relevance of IK in research, education, advocacy, and decision-making. Addressing these obstacles is vital for integrating diverse knowledge systems and fostering sustainable development (Gorjestani 2001).

Within the sustainability discourse, such as sustainability standards and sustainability reporting, emphasis has been placed on the three-pillar approach: social, economic, and environmental issues (Richardson, 2013; Purvis et al. 2019). Savelyeva (2017) asserted that the prevailing sustainability discourse in the Western context is grounded in an anthropocentric perspective, stressing the need to manage nature within the framework of ecological, economic, and societal sustainability pillars.

This perspective on the relationship between humans and nature focuses primarily on cultivating sustainable individuals. However, this discourse does not allow Indigenous perspectives to be included in guidelines.

In the Arctic context, Buschman and Sudlovenick (2022) stressed the need to incorporate Indigenous perspectives into Arctic conservation, considering their sustainable practices and addressing historical exclusion. IK and community initiatives should be valued alongside the Embracing Indigenous Knowledge in Arctic Economic Development

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recognition of sovereignty and self-determination. The integration of IK into Arctic sustainable economic development guidelines offers the potential to enhance sustainable resource management, cultural sustainability, and Indigenous Sustainable Financing.

Indigenous Sustainable Finance Indigenous Sustainable Finance (ISF) is defined as the use of indigenous perspectives, values, and approaches to address environmental, social, and governance issues (ESG) in investment decision making and asset management within Indigenous communities (Daugaard et al. 2023).

Indigenous Sustainable Finance (ISF) encompasses various approaches that enable indigenous communities to integrate their perspectives and values into their financial decision-making processes. Community-based investment models prioritise a community's specific needs and values, fostering local businesses, sustainable land management, and cultural preservation. Impact investing directs financial resources towards projects that generate positive social and environmental outcomes, alongside financial returns (Ormiston et al. 2025; Poyser et al., 2021).

The integration of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) ensures sustainable resource use and promotes environmental stewardship within the ISF (Higgins,1998). Indigenous-led financial institutions empower communities by establishing governance and management structures (Nengah et al., 2016). Lastly, socially responsible investing strategies align investments with Indigenous values, avoiding industries that harm the environment or violate human rights (Richardson, 2007; Nikolakis et al., 2014). Together, these approaches form the foundation of the ISF, allowing Indigenous communities to actively engage in sustainable development and align financial decisions with their cultural priorities.

Data and method Data were obtained from publicly available publications by the Arctic Council, Arctic Economic Council, Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council, and other materials produced by Arcticrelated organizations and stakeholders. Content analysis was employed as a methodological tool to examine and analyse qualitative data in the form of text (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This approach facilitates the identification and evaluation of specific words, themes, or concepts present within the data. Specifically, the focus is on the presence of Indigenous People in document formulation and the inclusion of Indigenous Knowledge in the documents. By quantifying and examining the prevalence, meanings, and relationships of these elements, valuable insights were gained into the subject matter. Additionally, content analysis proved to be particularly useful in studying historical materials, enabling documentation and analysis of trends that occurred over time.

Arctic Indigenous Peoples There is no universally accepted circumpolar definition of “Indigenous,” resulting in variations in the national definitions used to determine Indigenous status. Consequently, official statistics may not consistently recognise indigenous populations as separate entities. For instance, Russia and Canada have different approaches to recognising Indigenous rights. Although international law acknowledges indigenous rights, Russia and Canada have different legal frameworks. In Canada, most Arctic residents are recognised as Indigenous, whereas in Russia, only smaller populations receive legal recognition. These differences affect indigenous participation in Arctic governance, including that within the Arctic Council and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Sharapova et al. 2022).

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Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of Indigenous populations in relation to the total Arctic population. The data reveal that approximately one million individuals, constituting 9% of the Arctic's total population, are identified as indigenous. These indigenous populations encompass more than 40 distinct ethnic groups. Notably, the prevalence of the indigenous population is highest in the Canadian Arctic and Greenland, where it constitutes more than 75% of the total population. Conversely, Yukon, southern Northern Quebec, Labrador, and Newfoundland in Canada had the lowest proportions of indigenous inhabitants. In the remaining Arctic regions, indigenous peoples make up less than half of the total population, except for Sakha (Russian Federation), the Southwest Region, and Northern Region (Alaska, USA), where the indigenous population ranges from 50% to 75%. Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and Svalbard have no indigenous populations.

Figure 1. Indigenous Populations in the Arctic. Source: Nordregio (2019). Indigenous Populations in the Arctic. Cartographer/GIS Analyst: Shinan Wang and Johanna Roto

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Permanent Participants to Arctic Council The Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum addressing Arctic regional issues, involves the participation of Permanent Participants. These Permanent Participants, representing Indigenous Peoples with deep roots in the Arctic, possess a distinctive perspective on the region's challenges and opportunities (Arctic Council 2023). They provide advice and input on a wide range of issues including climate change, sustainable development, and economic cooperation. They also help ensure that the Arctic Council's work is inclusive and reflects the interests of all Arctic people.

Table 1 lists the six Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council. The table shows the territory where each Permanent Participant lives, the Indigenous Peoples they represent, and the estimated size of their population. The total population of the six Permanent Participants was over 600,000 people, with the largest group being represented by RAIPON (250,000 people) and Inuit Circumpolar Council (180,000 people).

Table 1. Permanent Participants to Arctic Council (Source: Arctic Council, compiled by the author).

Permanent Participant

Territory

Indigenous Peoples

Indigenous Population

Aleut International Association

Alaska (United States), Russian Federation, Pribilof Islands (United States) and Commander Islands (Russian Federation)

Russian and American Aleut (Unangan)

Approximately 15,000 Aleuts in the United States and 350 Aleuts in the Russian Federation

Arctic Athabaskan Council

Alaska (United States), Yukon and Northwest Territories in Canada

Athabaskan

45,000

The Gwich’in Council International

Alaska, United States and the Yukon and Northwest Territories in Canada.

The Gwich’in people

9,000

Inuit Circumpolar Council

Alaska, Canada, Greenland and Chukotka

Inuit

180,000

RAIPON Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North

Russian Federation

40 Indigenous Peoples that live in the Russian Federation

250,000

Saami Council

Finland, the Russian Federation, Norway and Sweden

Sámi

over 100,000

The definition of indigeneity differs among circumpolar nations, with Russia excluding the larger Indigenous groups of the Far North. For historical reasons, not all Indigenous Peoples are represented in the Arctic Council. It has been argued that the Arctic Council should incorporate a greater number of Indigenous groups as Permanent Participants to achieve equal representation and ensure that all Indigenous groups in the Arctic have a voice (Sidorova, 2019).

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Frameworks for sustainable Arctic development This article focuses on voluntary sustainable development frameworks in the Arctic, including the Arctic Investment Protocol (AIP), Responsibility Standard for Arctic Zone of Russian Federation (AZRF) residents, and The Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement (see Table 2). These frameworks are central to ESG investment and promoting responsible and ethical engagement in Arctic business development and investment. It is noteworthy that these frameworks do not possess the status of hard law mechanisms. Companies engaged in or planning operations within the Arctic are encouraged to adhere to these frameworks, yet they do not carry mandatory legal obligations.

Table 2. Frameworks for sustainable Arctic development.

Name

Year introduced

Issuing organization

Arctic Investment Protocol (AIP)

2015

Global Agenda Council on the Arctic (GACA) as part of World Economic Forum

Responsibility Standard for Arctic 2020 Zone of Russian Federation (AZRF) residents

Ministry of the Russian Federation for the Development of the Far East in consultation with Public Council of the Arctic Zone, Federal Agency for Nationalities, Arctic Regions, as well as the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East

The Circumpolar Inuit Protocols 2022 for Equitable and Ethical Engagement

The Inuit Circumpolar Council

Arctic Investment Protocol (AIP) The Arctic Investment Protocol (AIP) was created by the Global Agenda Council on the Arctic (GACA) as part of World Economic Forum during the 2014-2016 term and released in 2015. The composition of experts on GACA included stakeholders from academia, states, media, business, and Indigenous Peoples’ organisations. The AIP falls under the category of soft law as it is not legally binding and is advisory. The AIP is specifically designed for the Arctic region and aims to provide a framework for sustainable investment in the Arctic that can support sustainable business development. The Arctic Economic Council (AEC) actively promotes the AIP at conferences, public events, and high-level meetings with stakeholders.

The Arctic Investment Protocol provides six principles that lay the foundation for responsible Arctic development (Arctic Economic Council 2023). These principles are: 1. Building resilient societies through economic development 2. Respecting and including local communities and indigenous peoples 3. Promoting environmental responsibility and stewardship 4. Encouraging innovation and technology development 5. Ensuring responsible resource development Embracing Indigenous Knowledge in Arctic Economic Development

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6. Fostering sustainable economic growth and diversification.

The AIP represents a set of guidelines similar to the Sustainable Development Goals, and lacks some essential elements, such as a definition of Arctic investments, objectives, definitions, and the parties to whom the AIP applies. The principle that specifically mentions Indigenous Peoples is the second principle: "Respect and Include Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples." This principle emphasises the importance of respecting the rights of indigenous and local people; mitigating any adverse impacts on their traditional practices; and consulting with local authorities, Indigenous governance structures, and relevant community authorities.

During the proceedings of the Global Arctic Council Assessment (GACA) project, the representation of Arctic Indigenous Peoples was limited to the Sami Reindeer Herders' Association of Norway and the National Union of the Swedish Sami People. This situation presents challenges in terms of adequately including the voices of Arctic Indigenous Peoples as Permanent Participants to Arctic Council (refer to Table 1). It is noteworthy that certain key corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples do not mention the AIP itself or its corresponding Appendix. Furthermore, the absence of Russian representatives in the team of experts who drafted the AIP is worrisome, given Russia's abstention from voting for the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This raises concerns about whether the perspectives and rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic are adequately represented within the AIP (Middleton, 2022a). The AEC strives to encourage stakeholders to adopt the AIP voluntarily, recognising its significance in shaping responsible economic practices in the Arctic and its broader implications for global governance. The extent of the potential influence of AIP on investments by large global firms remains uncertain (Lim, 2020).

Responsibility standard for Arctic Zone of Russian Federation (AZRF) residents The Russian Arctic has been designated a Special Economic Zone that aims to foster economic growth in this region. To incentivise investment, the government has introduced initiatives such as the Arctic Hectare and Resident of the AZRF programs. These programmes offer land and tax advantages to individuals and businesses interested in Arctic development. In 2019, the Arctic zone expanded and, in 2020, the passage of Federal Law further broadened the scope of the Special Economic Zone (Middleton, 2022b).

In 2020, the Federal Law on the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation introduced a responsibility standard. This standard serves as a set of advisory principles guiding interactions between residents of the Arctic zone and Indigenous Peoples in their traditional habitats and economic endeavours.

It aims to promote sustainable development, improve the quality of life of Indigenous people, and preserve their original habitats. This standard emphasises the participation of Indigenous representatives in decision-making processes related to the development of natural resources in traditional areas. It also encourages cooperation in improving the socio-economic situation in these areas and calls for openness and transparency in the activities of Arctic zone residents. Additionally, the standard emphasises the need to minimise the negative impact of economic activities on Indigenous Peoples and the vulnerable Arctic environment.

The responsibility standard, a list of principles recommended for use by Arctic residents when interacting with Indigenous Peoples in their traditional residences and economic activities, was approved by Order of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East No. 181.

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The Responsibility standard includes the following principles.

•

Promoting the sustainable development of indigenous peoples, improving their quality of life, and preserving their original habitat.

•

Participation of representatives of indigenous peoples in decision-making on issues affecting the rights and interests of indigenous peoples in the development of natural resources in places of traditional residence and economic activity.

•

Cooperation in improving the socio-economic situation in the places of traditional residence and in the territories of traditional nature management of indigenous peoples when a resident of the Arctic zone carries out his activities.

•

Openness of the activities of a resident of the Arctic zone for indigenous peoples and their organizations, state authorities, and local self-government in all environmental and socioeconomic issues affecting the interests of indigenous small peoples;

•

Minimising the negative impact of the economic activities of residents of the Arctic zone, considering the social, environmental, and natural vulnerability of indigenous peoples and the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a whole.

An important aspect of the responsibility standard entails the engagement of AZRF residents in conducting environmental impact assessments that consider the Arctic's vulnerability and the traditional utilisation of natural resources by Indigenous Peoples (Ivanova & Litvinov, 2022).

Furthermore, the standard incorporates provisions for compensating Indigenous communities in cases where residents’ economic activities adversely affect their habitats. Additionally, the standard emphasises the active participation of indigenous peoples in decision-making processes concerning the development of natural resources in traditional residences and economic activities. This requires prior coordination between residents and indigenous communities as well as consultations before initiating industrial development projects in areas of traditional residence and economic activity (Ivanova & Litvinov, 2022).

However, criticism has been directed toward responsibility standards. Some provisions that were initially included in the draft order, such as the principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) for Indigenous Peoples, were ultimately excluded when the document was finalised. Instead, the final standard replaced the FPIC principle with the principle of Indigenous representatives’ participation in decision-making processes concerning their rights and interests in resource development (Ivanova & Litvinov, 2022). Furthermore, the draft document had unique features, including the requirement of companies (residents) to sign an agreement on compliance with the standard with the federal authority responsible for corporate social responsibility (CSR). In addition, approved methods for monitoring compliance were outlined. However, these provisions were not included in the final standard (Murashko, 2021).

Despite these shortcomings, some researchers have suggested that the responsibility standard, although advisory, can have a positive impact. This may help strike a balance between the interests of businesses involved in Arctic resource development and the aspirations of Indigenous communities to preserve their traditional habitats and improve their quality of life (Samonchik, 2022). The standard emphasises the active participation of Indigenous representatives in decisionmaking processes concerning natural resource development in their traditional areas, while also

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encouraging cooperation to enhance the socioeconomic situation in these regions and promote transparency in the activities of Arctic zone residents. However, it is important to note that the responsibility standard does not explicitly include the recognition and integration of Indigenous Knowledge, which is crucial for effectively addressing the unique perspectives and needs of Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic.

The Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement (EEE) were introduced in 2022. However, these Protocols marked long-lasting work by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, as reflected in the following analysis:

Inuit Arctic Policy 2009 The Inuit Arctic Policy was adopted by the Inuit Circumpolar Council in April 2009. The Inuit Arctic Policy was created by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, with contributions from various Inuit organisations and individuals. The goal of Inuit Arctic Policy is to establish a comprehensive policy in Inuit circumpolar regions with regard to economic, social, cultural, environmental, and political concerns. It aimed to achieve a broad consensus on the priorities, policies, and principles to be advanced in the Inuit circumpolar regions, considering the significance of the Arctic and its resources for both present and future generations of northern peoples. The policy also sought to encourage coordination of policy-making and decision-making in the international community, particularly in and among states with Arctic jurisdictions and interests. According to the Inuit Arctic Policy, economic development plays a crucial role in the future of Inuit society and culture. The lack of economic opportunities and development can have critical implications for the well-being of the Inuit communities. Therefore, the policy emphasised that Inuit should be involved in all aspects of economic development to enjoy fundamental human rights, such as the right to work and the right to an adequate standard of living. This policy also suggests that initiatives to attain economic goals and aspirations in the Inuit circumpolar homeland can be significantly enhanced through regional, national, and international cooperation (Inuit Arctic Policy 2009: 80).

Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic 2009 The Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic was adopted by the Inuit Circumpolar Council in April 2009 to affirm the rights and interests of the Inuit people in the Arctic region, including their right to self-determination, unique knowledge of the Arctic environment, and commitment to protecting their home. The declaration also calls for greater recognition of Inuit sovereignty and participation in decision-making processes related to Arctic governance (Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, 2009: 1). The declaration called for economic activity in the Arctic to be put on a sustainable footing, which could include business activities that are conducted in an environmentally responsible and socially beneficial manner, specifically: economic activity in the Arctic to be put on a sustainable footing and for harmful resource exploitation to be avoided. We emphasize the need to achieve standards of living for Inuit that meet national and international norms and minimums, while deflecting sudden and far-reaching demographic shifts that would overwhelm and marginalize indigenous peoples where they are rooted and have endured.

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Utqiaġvik Declaration 2018 The Utqiaġvik Declaration is a strategic document that outlined the shared priorities of the Inuit communities in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Chukotka. It was declared at the 13th General Assembly of the Inuit Circumpolar Council in Utqiaġvik, Alaska in 2018. This declaration is important because it provided a framework for Inuit-led action on issues such as access to healthcare and education, cultural preservation, and environmental protection. The Declaration emphasised the importance of involving every Inuk in implementing its goals. This can be achieved through community engagement and consultation, as well as by providing resources and support to Inuit-led organizations and initiatives. It outlined several specific actions that could be taken to achieve these goals. These include promoting the Inuit language and culture, improving access to healthcare and mental health services, supporting sustainable economic development in Inuit communities, advocating for the rights of Indigenous Peoples at the national and international levels, and addressing climate change through mitigation and adaptation measures (The Utqiaġvik Declaration, 2018).

The Utqiaġvik Declaration acknowledged the importance of equitable and sustainable economic development and employment as the building blocks for autonomy. It emphasises the need for a long-term, sustained, and well-funded employment training effort that must be linked to coordinated efforts with the education system, employment and training system, and employers.

This declaration also highlights the importance of supporting sustainable economic development in Inuit communities as one of the specific actions that can be taken to achieve its goals. For example: “Economic development is central to the sustainability of Inuit communities. As noted in the 2011 ICC Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Development Principles in Inuit Nunaat, healthy communities and households require a healthy environment and a healthy economy. We know economic development and social and cultural development must go hand-in-hand, resulting in self-sufficiency, which is an essential part of greater political self- determination”(Utqiaġvik Declaration, 2018: 9) “It is important to continue this work and furthermore focus on advocating for Inuit driven research and monitoring, equitable partnerships in all aspects of research, information sovereignty, and working to increase intellectual and political space for Inuit across scales”(Utqiaġvik Declaration, 2018: 6) The declaration directed the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) to facilitate the development of protocols for EEE and engage appropriate international fora, such as the Arctic Council, to provide guidance on Indigenous Knowledge. The goal of these protocols was to ensure that Indigenous Knowledge is respected, protected, and utilised in a way that benefits Inuit communities and respects their rights.

Analysis of Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement (EEE) 2022 The Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement (EEE) were developed by the ICC Workshop on EEE and attended by 35 nominated Inuit Delegates from Inuit Nunaat.

These delegates represented the Inuit communities in Alaska, Canada, Greenland and Chukotka.

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The workshops were held over the course of three months in the fall of 2021. The purpose of the workshops was to develop ICC protocols for EEE of Inuit Communities and Indigenous Knowledge. These protocols are intended to ensure that Inuit knowledge is respected and used ethically by decision makers, researchers, and others operating in the Arctic (ICC, 2021).

The workshops were organised with the goal of aiding the development of the Inuit Circumpolar Council's international protocols on the ethical and equitable engagement of Inuit communities and IK. The workshops provided a platform for participants to share their personal perspectives and experiences on these issues, with the aim of strengthening dialogue among the Inuit across their homeland. To ensure that Inuit communities and IK were respected and included in the discussions, participants emphasised the importance of focusing on Inuit voices and perspectives throughout the workshop series. They also stressed the need for active listening, open dialogue, and mutual respect among all the participants. (Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2021). The ICC EEE Drafting Team prepared, Inuit-values-grounded international engagement protocols that incorporated discussions from workshops and previous ICC initiatives: The guidance found here on the development of circumpolar protocols/guidelines is intended to transcend national borders, politics, and policies, and situate us as an Inuit in a broader world. These protocols/guidelines bring us together on the international stage, not to eliminate our differences, but to provide a united voice that captures the spirit of our people and our communities (ICC Ethical and Equitable Engagement Synthesis Report 2021; 8.

These protocols have been widely disseminated and implemented at the international level. The workshops highlighted various potential next steps, which involved developing specific protocols for engaging with Inuit communities and integrating IK into international forums, such as the Arctic Council and United Nations. The Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for EEE outline several key principles, including the importance of respecting Inuit rights and self-determination, recognizing and valuing Inuit knowledge and perspectives, engaging in meaningful consultation and collaboration with Inuit communities, ensuring equitable benefits from any activities or projects that impact Inuit lands or resources, and promoting environmental sustainability. These principles are intended to guide fair and respectful engagement between the Inuit community and others seeking work with them.

This document outlines the eight protocols for equitable and ethical engagement. These protocols are: 1. 'Nothing About Us Without Us' – Always Engage with Inuit 2. Recognize Indigenous Knowledge in its Own Right 3. Practice Good Governance 4. Communication with Intent 5. Exercising Accountability - Building Trust 6. Building Meaningful Partnerships 7. Information, Data Sharing, Ownership and Permissions 8. Equitably Fund Inuit Representation and Knowledge

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Individuals and organizations seeking to engage with the Inuit community can apply the Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for EEE by respecting cultural differences, accommodating Inuit preferred communication and decision-making styles, prioritising relationship building, including reciprocity and giving back, and working to build reciprocal relationships. They should also recognise and value Inuit knowledge and perspectives, engage in meaningful consultation and collaboration with Inuit communities, ensure equitable benefits from any activities or projects that impact Inuit lands or resources, promote environmental sustainability, and respect Inuit rights and self-determination. By following these principles, individuals and organisations can establish fair and respectful engagement with the Inuit community.

Protocol 2 of the document specifically calls for the recognition of Indigenous Knowledge in its own right and emphasises that it is directly connected to Inuit sovereignty, past, and future. It recognises that Indigenous Knowledge (IK) is a systematic way of thinking applied to phenomena across biological, physical, cultural, and spiritual systems. IK includes insights based on evidence acquired through direct and long-term experiences, and extensive and multigenerational observations, lessons, and skills. The protocols for EEE describe Indigenous Knowledge as a systematic way of thinking that goes beyond observations and ecological knowledge, offering a unique way of identifying research needs and applying it to research, monitoring, assessments, decision-making, policy, and the overall understanding of the Arctic. It also emphasises that Indigenous Knowledge cannot be separated from the identity, values, spirituality, and worldviews of Indigenous peoples.

Discussion This article examined three frameworks, namely the Arctic Investment Protocol, Responsibility Standard for AZRF residents, and Circumpolar Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement, which are all categorised as soft law. Soft law refers to non-binding legal instruments or guidelines that lack enforceability through traditional legal mechanisms such as courts. It encompasses norms, principles, and standards developed and agreed upon by states, international organisations, or other actors, but without the same legal force as treaties or domestic laws. Soft law instruments can take the form of declarations, resolutions, codes of conduct, guidelines, and recommendations (Guzman & Meyer, 2010). Although soft law does not create legally binding obligations, it can still exert significant influence and impact on the behaviour and practices of states and other actors.

The development of the Arctic Investment Protocol (AIP) engaged multiple stakeholders, including observer countries such as the UK, China, Japan, and South Korea. Nonetheless, certain countries, such as Iceland, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, were not represented in the AIP drafting process, and the participation of Permanent Participants to the Arctic Council was not fully realised. The AIP was created to address the needs of the business community in order to promote sustainable business development in the Arctic. The Arctic Economic Council (AEC), which represents business community stakeholders, took ownership of and actively promoted the AIP. The AIP aims to provide a framework for investment in the Arctic region, which suggests that it addresses the needs of businesses seeking to invest in the Arctic and navigates the unique challenges and opportunities of the region. The Arctic Investment Protocol exemplifies a streamlined and investor-friendly framework that aligns with the global Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) discourse; however, it may lack specificity related to the Arctic and does not

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have guidelines for the integration of Indigenous Knowledge and Indigenous Sustainable Finance in the Arctic.

The Russian Arctic responsibility standard was introduced into Federal Law in 2020. However, it is important to note its voluntary nature. The responsibility standard aims to promote sustainable development, enhance the well-being of Indigenous peoples, preserve their habitats, encourage their participation in decision-making processes, foster socio-economic improvement, ensure transparency, and minimise the adverse effects of economic activities on Indigenous communities and the fragile Arctic environment. While the standard emphasises sustainable development, improving Indigenous quality of life, and preserving habitat, it falls short of recognising and incorporating Indigenous Knowledge and principles of Indigenous Sustainable Finance.

The Inuit Circumpolar Council has been active in making Inuit voices heard, including their participation in the Arctic economic development. The Inuit Arctic Policy, adopted in 2009, aimed to establish a comprehensive policy for economic, social, cultural, environmental, and political matters in Inuit circumpolar regions. Economic development was highlighted as crucial for the well-being of Inuit communities, emphasising their involvement in all aspects of economic development to ensure fundamental human rights. The Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty 2009 in the Arctic affirmed Inuit rights and interests in the region, while calling for sustainable economic activity and adherence to international norms. The Utqiaġvik Declaration 2018 outlined shared priorities of Inuit communities, including sustainable economic development, employment training, and full Inuit partnership in economic ventures. It also emphasises the importance of respecting and utilising Indigenous Knowledge for the benefit of Inuit communities.

These initiatives demonstrate Inuit's commitment to economic and business development, while safeguarding their rights, culture, and environment.

The resulting Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for EEE 2022 created by rightsholders emphasise respecting Inuit rights, recognising Inuit knowledge, meaningful consultation, equitable benefits, and environmental sustainability. The protocols consist of eight principles for engagement. The Protocols highlight the importance of recognising Indigenous Knowledge as a systematic way of thinking connected to Inuit sovereignty. Indigenous Knowledge is viewed as holistic with its integral connection to the identity, values, spirituality, and worldviews of indigenous peoples. The protocols aimed to guide fair and respectful engagement with the Inuit community, while promoting Inuit self-determination. The protocols align with the principles of ESG and Indigenous Sustainable Finance Integration. However, these protocols represent Inuit-based perspective not an approach that would incorporate worldviews of both Indigenous Peoples and investors.

According to Savelyeva (2017), the dominant sustainability discourse in Western societies is centered on an anthropocentric perspective that prioritizes ecological, economic, and societal sustainability pillars for managing nature. However, this perspective does not include Indigenous perspectives in the guidelines. In the Arctic context, Buschman and Sudlovenick (2022) highlighted the importance of incorporating Indigenous perspectives in Arctic conservation efforts. This entails recognising the sustainable practices and historical exclusion experienced by Indigenous communities. It is crucial to value IK and community initiatives, while respecting sovereignty and self-determination. Additionally, integrating IK into sustainable business frameworks and guidelines presents an opportunity to promote sustainable resource utilisation. By incorporating

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Indigenous perspectives and valuing indigenous knowledge, a more comprehensive and inclusive approach to sustainability could be developed.

Of the analysed guidelines for sustainable business development, the Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement (EEE) and Arctic Investment Protocol (AIP), if combined, can be viewed as a bridge between IK and the Western perspective, addressing the existing divide. The Protocols for EEE recognise the significance of incorporating Indigenous perspectives and valuing IK in guiding decision-making processes (Cajete, 2000; Gorjestani, 2001), whereas AIP is targeted at investors in general. The progress of the Arctic economic development requires guidelines.

However, a thorough examination of existing Arctic-specific sustainable development frameworks and guidelines highlights the urgent requirement for the increased involvement of Arctic Indigenous communities in the creation of sustainable economic development and investment guidelines. Simultaneously, it is crucial to consider the needs and expectations of global investors to align the Arctic sustainable economic guidelines with global ESG requirements.

To develop effective guidelines, it is crucial to consider multiple aspects. First, these guidelines should align with the principles of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) discourse, ensuring that they meet the expectations and requirements of sustainable and responsible investment practices. Second, it is important to make these guidelines investor-friendly, taking inspiration from the Arctic Investment Protocol (AIP). Additionally, the guidelines should incorporate specificity comparable to that of the Protocols for EEE. Finally, the inclusion of Indigenous Knowledge (IK) and principles of Indigenous Sustainable Finance (ISF) is essential, recognising the unique perspectives, values, and practices of Indigenous communities and their role in promoting sustainable development. This inclusion is crucial to ensure the integration of IK, which reflects the unique worldviews and values of Indigenous Peoples and should be respected during developmental processes. Currently, it remains unclear who can undertake such an initiative, especially when the work of the Arctic Council is paused. Moreover, the level at which these guidelines should be established remains challenging. Should there be separate guidelines tailored to each Arctic Indigenous population represented by Permanent Participants to the Arctic Council or a unified protocol on a pan-Arctic scale? These are essential questions that demand answers given the growing attention paid to incorporating IK into decision-making processes.

Addressing these challenges is vital to promoting inclusive and culturally sensitive sustainable business development in the Arctic region.

Conclusion This study investigated the integration of Indigenous perspectives and Indigenous Knowledge (IK) within existing guidelines for sustainable economic development or investment in the Arctic.

Specifically, the Arctic Investment Protocol, Responsibility Standard for the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, and Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement were analysed. Using content analysis as a methodological approach, this study examined text data to quantitatively and qualitatively analyse the presence of Indigenous Peoples’ views and the incorporation of IK in these documents.

The analysis of the current guidelines reveals the necessity for greater involvement of Arctic Indigenous communities in formulating inclusive and respectful sustainable economic development and investment guidelines that integrate IK and reflect indigenous worldviews and values. Developing effective guidelines requires aligning them with ESG principles, making them Embracing Indigenous Knowledge in Arctic Economic Development

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investor-friendly; for example, inspired by the Arctic Investment Protocol. Specificity comparable to EEE Protocols is crucial, and incorporating Indigenous Knowledge and principles of Indigenous Sustainable Finance is essential for promoting sustainable development in the Arctic.

This study highlights the pressing need for increased participation of Arctic Indigenous communities in formulating sustainable economic development and investment guidelines to ensure the integration of IK and respect for indigenous worldviews and values. Establishing inclusive guidelines on either a pan-Arctic scale or tailored to individual Arctic Indigenous groups presents a significant challenge, requiring attention and resolution to promote culturally sensitive and inclusive sustainable business development in the region.

In conclusion, incorporating the best practices from the three frameworks can guide the development of a new sustainable economic development protocol that effectively integrates IK. Both the Arctic Council and Arctic Economic Council can play key roles as facilitators to ensure the meaningful participation of Indigenous Peoples in the creation of this protocol. However, the current pause in the Arctic Council’s work poses a challenge, requiring alternative mechanisms or temporary arrangements to continue progress in this regard.

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Satellite dependency in Nunavut: a barrier to the territory's political realization

Célestine Rabouam

Officially created in 1999, Nunavut is Canada's youngest, largest and northernmost territory and no road network connects the 25 communities scattered across the territory. It is also the only Canadian territory to rely entirely on satellites for its communications and this situation contributes significantly to the isolation of the population, 85% of which is Inuit, and hinders the economic development and political governance of the territory. However, the development of telecommunications in Nunavut raises a major issue for the territorial government and the nunavummiut communities. Inuit organizations have been quick to take up the issue of Internet access, but despite these initial assertions, Nunavut remains the Canadian territory with the least access to the Internet. Two cable projects are currently being studied and/or developed, but the distances between the communities will not allow all 25 communities to be terrestrially connected in the short or medium term. To mitigate this problem, operators of low earth orbit satellite constellations such as Starlink have been deploying their services in Nunavut for several months and aim to compete with the players traditionally responsible for telecommunications in this territory. While Inuit associations are at the heart of the decision-making process for the development of cables (in the Qikiqtaaluk and Kivalliq regions), Starlink's takeover of a part of this market reinforces the geographic concentration of decision-making and organizational power in the South, whereas Inuit associations aspire to relocate these skills locally.

Introduction Telecommunications in Canada are seen as essential tools for uniting the population, given the vastness of the territory and the distance between population centers (Charland, 1986). This representation is even stronger in northern territories, where the vastness of territorial entities combines with the weakness of road infrastructures, or even their absence in some communities.

Since December 21, 2016, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) has defined access to high-speed Internet without data volume limits and with a minimum speed of 50-10 Mb/s as a basic universal service to be provided to every Canadian, recognizing at the same time that the Internet is an essential tool for the economic development of a territory1.

Reinforced by the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting widespread use of distance learning and working, the CRTC's statement acknowledges that Internet access must be seen as a vector of Célestine Rabouam, PhD candidate at the French Institute of Geopolitics (University Paris 8) and at the GEODE research center (Geopolitics of the datasphere)

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social and economic equality, as well as political equality, since it enables democratic participation in debates that are increasingly held online.

This CRTC statement follows the telecommunications services review process announced by the regulator in April 2015. The review specifically aimed to identify the technical and financial challenges and difficulties in serving remote communities in northern regions through consultations with users, service providers, and aboriginal organizations. In recent years, there have been significant developments in telecommunications regulation in Canada, with an increasing focus on equal and equitable access to broadband services and the promotion of competition. The CRTC has introduced new measures to ensure affordable prime rates for telecommunications services, monitor quality of service, and require investment in infrastructure to improve connectivity, particularly in rural and remote areas. Measures have also been taken to promote competition in the telecommunications market, especially by allowing the introduction of new players, such as mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs)2.

Officially created in 1999, Nunavut is Canada's youngest, largest and northernmost territory and no road network connects the 25 communities scattered across the territory. It is also the only Canadian territory to depend entirely on satellites for communications, and this situation significantly reinforces the digital inequalities that mainly affect the Inuit, who make up 85% of Nunavut's population. Dependence on satellites also represents a challenge for the territory's economic development and political governance as all services rely on satellite operation, which is both very costly and congested due to the number of users.

The issue of access to the Internet has been part of the Nunavut Implementation Commission's (NIC) work since 1994, with a first report entitled "Footprints in New Snow", which addresses the issue of information highways by including the Internet and asserting the importance of this resource to ensure the effective decentralized governance of the territory (Delaunay, 2021:239).

The role of the NIC was fundamental in the establishment of the Territory and played a central role in the negotiation and implementation of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. In its two reports - Footprints in New Snow and Footprints 2 - the Commission recommended strong decentralization of territorial government to provide programs and services at the regional and community levels to the extent possible. The decision to decentralize government services as much as possible also reflects a desire to provide employment and training opportunities to communities while enabling them to develop their capacity and strengthen and diversify their local economies (Millenium Partners, 2002).

To achieve these objectives, the NIC reports emphasize the need for the Government of Nunavut to benefit from a solid telecommunications infrastructure. In this context, telecommunications systems are seen as political tools for economic and social integration, whose primary objective is to compensate for the geographic dispersion of economic, political and population centers across the country. However, this objective is largely hampered by the fact that satellites provide all the bandwidth available for the territory.

Despite these early goals, Nunavut remains the Canadian territory with the least access to the Internet. Two fiber-optic cable projects are currently being studied and/or developed, but the distances between the communities will not allow all 25 communities to be connected in the short or medium term. To mitigate this problem, operators of low earth orbit satellite constellations such

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as Starlink have been deploying their services in Nunavut for several months and aim to compete with the players traditionally responsible for telecommunications in this territory.

Focusing on the case study of Nunavut, the paper aims to question the impact of the arrival of LEO satellite constellations on the Arctic telecommunications market in a context of Inuit organizations' reappropriation of digital-related decisions. The objective of this paper is also to understand the role of telecommunications in Nunavut's political project and to analyze the evolution of power relations between the actors traditionally responsible for telecommunications in Nunavut, the operators of satellite constellations dedicated to broadband (Starlink - OneWeb) and the regional Inuit associations that aspire to a better understanding of the specific needs of the population in terms of access to digital resources.

Digital development in Nunavut: a complex but necessary undertaking for the territory The creation of Nunavut in 1999 was a turning point in relations between the Inuit of the Canadian Arctic and the federal government, but it also underlined the precociousness of the population's claims for digital inclusion. While access to the Internet and digital technologies has become essential to many aspects of modern life, Nunavut communities face major connectivity challenges.

As early as 1994, the issue of Internet access became part of the work of the Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC), with the first report "Our Footprints in Fresh Snow". In particular, the report emphasized the importance of information and communication technologies for effective decentralized governance of the territory (CEN, 1995:57). Two years later, in Volume 2, the importance of a modern communications network to ensure territorial governance is emphasized once again: "The rationale is quite simple: the proper functioning of a decentralized public administration in 11 localities located in one of the world's highest transportation cost regions will only be possible through an efficient telecommunication system" (CEN, 1996:71). The establishment of a decentralized system of governance is of prime importance to Nunavummiut communities, as it enables the creation of skilled jobs throughout the territory and the inclusion of communities in its governance.

To connect the remote and isolated communities of the Canadian Arctic, the federal government has always relied on geostationary satellites operated by the Telesat company, because they enable it to bypass the constraints associated with the distances between communities and the development of terrestrial digital infrastructures in rural and sparsely populated areas. However, this technological choice has left many communities dependent on an expensive system that offers only limited bandwidth. With the spread of Internet use and the progressive digitization of society, satellite telecommunications systems in geostationary orbit no longer meet the needs of the population, businesses and scientists, who have been calling for federal investment in fiber-optic cable for several years (Delaunay, 2021: 290). Today, the federal government is the only stakeholder with the resources to financially support the development of new telecommunications systems (subsea or terrestrial fiber-optic cable) in Nunavut, where each project requires a very high level of commitment, both logistically and financially.

The CRTC is responsible for regulating telecommunications in Canada, including the northern territories. The regulatory authority also supports funding programs such as the Broadband Fund, which was launched in 2019 in conjunction with a consultation on potential barriers to broadband

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deployment in underserved areas of Canada. In 2020 and again in June 2022, the CRTC also launched a series of consultations to find solutions to improve telecommunications services in the Far North3.

In terms of telecommunications, the three Arctic territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut4) share a common history of regulated monopolies granted to BCE (formerly Bell Canada) and then NorthwesTel in the Yukon, Northwest Territories (NWT) and Nunavut. Prior to the deregulation of telecommunications in 1992 and the introduction of competition in the marketplace, the government had assigned monopolies to Canada's major telecommunications companies to provide all services in the territories covered by the monopolies (Poitras, 2000). In 1992, Bell's monopoly over the Eastern Canadian Arctic ended, but its subsidiary NorthwesTel, created in 1979, obtained an extension of its monopoly in the Yukon, NWT and Nunavut until 2012 (Delaunay, 2020: 255). However, these three territories do not have access to the same technologies for their telecommunications, and this difference fuels inequalities between populations. In some communities, access to local radio is inconsistent, and many households do not have reliable Internet access because the cost of residential packages is too high. The poorest households therefore have the least access not only to digital resources but also to information in general5.

NorthwesTel is subject to regulation of its services by the CRTC due to its monopoly position in the provision of telecommunications services in the Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut.

As the main provider of telecommunications services, NorthwesTel is critical to ensuring connectivity in local communities. The regulations issued by the CRTC are designed to ensure that NorthwesTel provides affordable rates, adequate quality of service and investment in infrastructure required to meet the unique needs of these regions, while promoting competition to drive innovation and provide consumer choice. These regulations aim to balance the interests of consumers, communities and businesses while ensuring that northern residents have access to essential telecommunications services (CRTC, 2020:40).

While the Yukon's telecommunications infrastructure relies almost exclusively on terrestrial fiber optic cables operated by NorthwesTel, the NWT relies on a combination of several technologies (GEO satellites, cables and microwave tower networks) and Nunavut is totally dependent on satellite telecommunications systems (Delaunay, 2014).

In 2005, SSi Canada – formerly SSi Micro – was the first company to connect the 25 Nunavummiut communities to the Internet with its Qiniq network, but the provider quickly faced competition from NorthwesTel. The Bell subsidiary initially set up in the most populous communities before launching its Tamarmiik Nunaliit network in 2019, financed by a $49.9 million grant from the federal Broadband Fund. Both ISPs relied on Telesat's geostationary satellites until 2021, when SSi chose to partner with SES Networks to offer new GEO satellite capacity on its residential and mobile networks.

Although the Yukon and NWT are better served than Nunavut, these two territories face similar issues regarding the improvement of Internet connectivity in their most isolated and remote communities. Firstly, NorthwesTel's monopolistic position in the telecommunications market of the three territories hinders the emergence of competitive players in the telecommunications market. As a result, users have a limited choice of Internet providers, which reinforces the

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inequality of Internet access not only compared to southern populations, but also between social classes at local level.

In Nunavut, the cost of living is much higher than in the rest of Canada, and the most precarious households usually cannot afford an internet package. In addition, poverty mainly affects the territory's Indigenous peoples. The 2022 report by the National Collaborating Centre for Indigenous Health indicates that the poverty rate among Inuit in Nunavut is estimated at 62%, compared to 29% among the territory's non-aboriginal population. According to the 2017 Indigenous Peoples Survey, 68% of Inuit households in Inuit Nunangat have access to the internet at home, compared to 91% of Inuit households outside Inuit Nunangat. Of Inuit households in Inuit Nunangat that do not have internet access at home, 54.5% cite cost, 10.2% cite lack of equipment, and 2.9% cite unavailability of service as reasons for lack of access.

The federal government's preference for satellite-based systems to connect its Arctic populations subsequently had a major impact on the allocation of funding, as terrestrial infrastructure projects were considered too risky and costly compared with the satellite infrastructures already present in these territories and operated by traditional telecommunications companies. This trend can be seen above all in Nunavut, where the road network is limited and the development of terrestrial cables would require a complex layout in terms of logistics (Coelho, 2018: 141).

The low population density of the communities and the technical challenges posed by the installation of terrestrial and submarine cables in Nunavut partly explain why satellite was chosen to connect the rural populations of the Canadian Arctic. Firstly, terrestrial cables are subject to extreme climatic conditions and unstable permafrost, which complicates infrastructure layout and maintenance. The NWT government did support the installation of a terrestrial fiber-opric cable in the Mackenzie Valley to connect several communities that still relied on satellites. However, the project has taken a few twists and turns since it was announced in 2014. Costs have risen dramatically (from $81 million to $194 million), forcing the NWT government to pay an additional $28 million (Carroll, 2017). Ledcor, the company laying the cable, also faced significant geological challenges caused by permafrost along the cable route (Thurton, 2016).

And secondly, laying submarine cables in the Northwest Passage requires a major effort in terms of feasibility studies and environmental impact, as this sea passage is covered with ice for part of the year. In addition, ice masses gradually breaking away from the continent can cause damage near the coastal section of a cable if it is not adequately protected. The Quintillion cable project is a good example of the logistical and technical difficulties of laying submarine cables in the Northwest Passage. In 2016, the Alaskan company Quintillion bought the assets of the Canadian Arctic Fibre project, which would connect Asia and Europe via the Northwest Passage, because the Canadian company was unable to secure federal funding for its project. Since 2017, Quintillion has laid the first part of its cable in Alaska and plans to continue its efforts, first to Asia, then to the Canadian Arctic and finally to Europe. While the project has succeeded in its first phase, the company has also faced significant financial challenges – Quintillion's former CEO has since been put on trial for fraud within the company – as well as technical challenges in installing and protecting the cable (Delaunay, 2021: 291). During the construction of the first segments of the Quintillion cable in 2017, concrete was even laid to reinforce the installation and further protect the branch (Green et al., 2018).

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The constraints associated with the vastness of the territory, the distances between communities, the absence of a road network and the demographic distribution of the area make Nunavut a particularly challenging place to build infrastructure, where federal investment is essential.

OneWeb and Starlink satellite constellations: two contrasting models for polar connectivity Throughout Nunavut and Canada's remote Arctic communities, the choice of operators and Internet service providers is very limited, and competition is almost non-existent. This situation has led to considerable frustration among the local population, who are calling for more choice (Environics Research, 2020). Since the aim of these satellite constellations is to bring broadband to the most remote and isolated areas, their launch in the Canadian Arctic has been eagerly awaited by users. Both constellations are now available. Starlink's offer has been operational in Nunavut since November 2022 and OneWeb's services have been available to commercial entities and organizations in Nunavut since March 2023. Canadian operator Telesat has also launched its own satellite constellation project, Lightspeed, but has experienced significant delays compared with Oneweb and Starlink. The constellation was due to be operational in 2024, but Telesat announced in March 2022 that commissioning could be delayed until 2026 (De Selding, 2022). Since then, the Canadian operator has changed its plans, announcing in August 2023 that its Lightspeed constellation was now fully funded. The company announced that it had replaced Thales Alenia Space with Canadian company MDA Ltd for the construction of the 198 satellites needed for its constellation. The satellites are now scheduled to launch in mid-2026, with polar and global services launching in late 20276.

Major constellation projects bet on inter-satellite optical links because they enable data to travel at the speed of light from one satellite to another, reaching the ground station that connects to the Internet backbone and then to the user's terminal as quickly as possible. This system reduces latency and the need for ground stations, forming an interconnected mesh network that gives users access to the network wherever they are. Users' data packets travel from satellite to satellite to the nearest ground station, back up to the satellite and transit again between satellites in the constellation to reach the one closest to the user (Rodriguez-Perez et al, 2011). Currently, the second generation of Starlink satellites – including those launched into polar orbit – are the only ones equipped with this technology, enabling SpaceX to bypass the costs of building and operating ground stations in the Arctic (Foust, 2021). The use of inter-satellite optical links therefore gives the Starlink constellation an advantage in polar coverage, both in terms of operating costs and services.

To offer satellite telecommunications services in Canada, operators can adopt either a direct-tohome model – which means that the operator sells and delivers its services directly to users – or a community aggregator model, which enables the operator to aggregate traffic at a central point and redistribute it to the local network. In the latter case, operators must generally partner with local service providers to manage distribution on the local network7.

Starlink's business model enables it to bypass traditional ISPs by selling Internet access directly to users, unlike OneWeb, which in August 2021 signed a Memorandum of Understanding with NorthwesTel to extend connectivity solutions for the population, businesses, governments and mining. Initially, NorthwesTel planned to rely exclusively on the Telesat constellation, but the

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company has not ruled out OneWeb to meet its objectives as part of the "every community" project8. In May, OneWeb signed a new ground station agreement with Swedish Space Corporation (SSC) and NorthwesTel to build and manage a new OneWeb satellite network portal in Yellowknife, the capital of the Northwest Territories (Swinhoe, 2023).

Starlink's rapid deployment and uptake by northern consumers seems to have caught Internet service providers – limited in the Canadian Arctic – off guard, and they now fear losing market share. This is particularly true for NorthwesTel, which called on the CRTC even before the service became available in the Arctic, to help it counter the competitive threat posed by this new player.

In 2021, the company asked the regulator to modify the rate filing process for retail Internet services so that it could prepare for Starlink's arrival on the Arctic telecommunications market9.

Although Starlink has not yet completed its polar coverage, the constellation has been a great success in Nunavut, and has even led to an outcry against the Northview Housing Corporation, which does not allow its tenants to install Starlink antennas in their homes. A petition was launched on December 04, 2022 to force Northview to allow its tenants access to Starlink service (Cohen, 2022).

For the moment, SpaceX's direct competitors who aspire to connect the Arctic territories are acting only as wholesale satellite operators, selling their bandwidth to ISPs already present in the territory.

Oneweb and the Canadian Lightspeed project developed by Telesat have signed agreements for the Yukon and NWT with NorthwesTel, the incumbent Internet provider in the Canadian Arctic, and Pacific Dataport, a Microcom subsidiary serving part of rural Alaska10. In Alaska, Pacific Dataport strongly opposed Starlink at the FCC, and followed up its efforts with a white paper entitled "Clearing the LEO fog in Alaska", in which the Oneweb constellation is presented as the safest and fastest option for rural populations in the Arctic, while the Starlink project is accused of trying to influence regulatory agencies and of relying on populist campaigns (Pacific Dataport, 2021).

SpaceX's authorization to launch its satellites into polar orbit has thus given rise to incumbent service providers protests from the constellation's competitors in the Arctic while the service was eagerly awaited by northern residents. In particular, Amazon objected to the FCC's request to modify the orbital plans of the second-generation Starlink satellites, arguing that this modification doubled the technical effort that operators like Amazon face in examining interference and orbital debris issues vis-à-vis Starlink (Brodkin, 2021). Criticism of Starlink has also focused on the service's supposed benefits for local populations. Indeed, although Starlink's availability in remote and isolated Arctic communities allows users to choose a new, more efficient service, the company is not physically present in the territory, which raises a number of issues. For example, SpaceX doesn't participate in the economy of these territories, and unlike traditional access providers, it doesn't employ a local workforce. Furthermore, users located in remote communities have no access to a dedicated customer service to report problems.

However, it is important to note that during phase 2 of the CRTC's call for comments on telecommunications in the Far North, ISP NorthwesTel's practices in terms of customer service, local employment and monthly data overage billing were highlighted as major issues for respondents. Indigenous parties participating in the call for comments also raised concerns about the way NorthwesTel engages in dialogue with local Indigenous communities (CRTC, 2022-147).

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One of SpaceX's main arguments for launching its satellites into polar orbit is the public interest of this service for the world's least connected populations, particularly in the Arctic11. Unlike Starlink, its main competitor OneWeb completed its polar coverage several months ago, but its satellites do not integrate inter-satellite optical links, which appears to have an impact on the quality of its Arctic services. In December 2022, lobby group Alaska Telecom Association filed a document with the FCC, citing unsatisfactory connectivity levels and excessively high operating costs for a residential network aimed at rural Alaskans (Swinhoe , 2023).

Increasing involvement of Inuit organizations in telecommunications development across Nunavut Inuit claims concerning access to digital resources and infrastructures were particularly precocious and testify to the population's genuine concern that their specific needs regarding ownership and control over the organization of the networks be taken into account. An initial Broadband Task Force was set up by the Nunavut government in January 2001, and was replaced in 2002 by the Nunavut Broadband Development Corporation (NBDC), a group of members from the Government of Nunavut, Inuit organizations and SSi Canada, created to meet the requirements of Industry Canada's BRAND program to build the Qiniq network and improve telecommunications services in the territory (Mignone et al., 2008:20). The early creation of these two organizations illustrates the importance of telecommunications in the process of Nunavut's creation, but also reaffirms the central role of the federal government in their funding.

The context of reconciliation with Indigenous populations also plays an important role in the discourse around digital equity in Canada. Access to digital resources is seen not only as a universal need, but also as a political tool to meet the specific needs of Indigenous communities.

Reconciliation with Canada's Indigenous populations does indeed rely on economic and political levers. In terms of telecommunications, initiatives that are part of this reconciliation logic must enable Indigenous communities to achieve digital sovereignty by giving them the possibility of owning and deciding on the organization and management of their data and digital infrastructures.

Digital infrastructures are thus seen as tools of emancipation that communities want to seize in order to control the uses and effects of digital technologies and ensure that they meet their specific needs (McMahon, 2013).

Since 2007, the Kuhkenah Network (KO-KNET) developed in Northern Ontario has been a good example of the reconciliation approach in the field of telecommunications. KO-KNET is a nonprofit association that has adopted a self-controlled, autonomous community model for digital infrastructure and services. This initiative has connected 26 ISPs in First Nations communities, and each First Nation served by KO-KNET owns and controls its own local network infrastructure, and is its own Internet service provider. The value of this initiative is that the First Nations control and maintain the telecommunications infrastructure “according to their own politics and policies, but in dependency of non-Indigenous funding bodies and partners and in the wider context of governmental policies” (Budka, 2015:37).

In Nunavut, Inuit organizations are also actively involved in projects designed to improve access to digital resources. For example, the Inuit company CanArctic Inuit Networks has for several years been working on a project that would bring high-speed Internet via a submarine cable to the capital Iqaluit. In March 2023, the company signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Alaskan

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company Quintillion to help build a fiber-optic network from Happy Valley-Goose Bay, Labrador to Iqaluit (Wright, 2023). The Kivalliq Hydro Fibre link project also aims to bring both a new energy source and a fiber-optic connection to several communities and a mining site in the southern Kivalliq region from Manitoba. The development of the project and the active search for funding were largely managed by the Kivalliq Inuit Association, which will also own the entire infrastructure once it is built (Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency, 2021). This will be the first fiber-optic cable in Nunavut and will provide a new source of revenue for the Association, which will be able to sell wholesale bandwidth to NorthwesTel and SSi. Inuit organizations involved in fiber-optic cable projects focus on regional projects that will connect only one or a few communities. The Sednalink project is currently focused on the capital Iqaluit, and the Kivalliq Hydro Fiber Link will connect only 5 communities in southern Nunavut.

These projects will therefore not solve the problem of satellite dependency throughout the territory. They will, however, connect two major population centers, Iqaluit and Arviat, thereby freeing up bandwidth for other communities that will remain satellite-dependent. One of the main challenges in improving connectivity in Nunavut is to free up satellite bandwidth by connecting the largest population centers to fiber-optic cable12.

Cable projects are therefore at the heart of Inuit demands for access to broadband services in Nunavut, but Inuit organizations have also been interested and invested in the opportunities presented by the arrival of LEO satellite constellations in the Canadian telecommunications market. The telecommunications arm of Qikiqtaaluk Corporation – the for-profit development arm of the Qikiqtani Inuit Association (QIA) – PanArctic Communication, has seized this opportunity to create Inuknet, a company 51% owned by PanArctic and the result of a partnership with OneWeb and Galaxy Broadband (Lipscombe, 2023). Inuknet, formed in 2023, currently serves only one customer in Iqaluit, but plans to offer residential services in all Nunavut communities in the coming months. It will then be the only operational service provider in Nunavut that is Inuit-owned.

Conclusion Inuit organizations have a long-standing understanding of the technical challenges posed by the territory, by the lack of competition in the telecommunications market and by the dependence on federal investment induced by the cost of infrastructure in the North. While the first cable will not connect all 25 Nunavummiut communities to fiber optics, these initiatives will gradually free up bandwidth for satellite-dependent communities, improving the overall situation across the territory.

Similarly, the introduction of LEO satellite constellations and the availability of new networks based on new bandwidth sources will diversify digital opportunities for users while strengthening the resilience of information systems in the territory. Therefore, although new infrastructure development in Nunavut is extremely slow and costly, the complementarity of terrestrial and spacebased telecommunications infrastructures is therefore essential to achieving broadband in the territory.

Although Inuit involvement in projects dedicated to improving connectivity in Nunavut has long been a mere façade, the context of reconciliation with Indigenous populations on a national scale has made it possible in recent years to confirm the central role of Inuit players in the territory's

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digital development. While Indigenous organizations criticized NorthwesTel during recent CRTC public consultations primarily for its weak services and approach to Indigenous communities, recent federal government and regulatory public policies aimed at bridging the digital divide have primarily targeted rural Indigenous communities (McMahon, 2020). In addition, the CRTC has made clear that it seeks reconciliation in the context of telecommunications regulation in the Far North and recognizes that Indigenous voices are essential and indispensable in conversations about telecommunications services in the Far North. In the second phase of consultation, in response to complaints received in Phase 1, the CRTC took steps to allow for broader participation by Indigenous organizations (CRTC, 2022-147). Despite these efforts, no Nunavut organizations attended the CRTC hearings in Whitehorse. They argued that the discussion with the CRTC would be more meaningful if it took place in Nunavut (Tranter, 2023).

The aim of low-earth orbit constellations is to bridge the global digital divide and universalize Internet access. However, they serve governmental and private interests far removed from the concerns of communities still dependent on limited and costly Internet services. With Starlink, the amount of data consumed per month is five times greater than the volume of data allocated to the largest NorthwesTel package. Moreover, Starlink does not charge users for data overage unlike NorthwesTel. Starlink's improvements in service quality and the availability of consumable data will therefore enhance users' digital capabilities. The arrival of competitive players such as Starlink nevertheless raises certain risks, as pointed out by Inuit organizations and competitors of the American constellation in the Canadian Arctic. Firstly, SpaceX does not participate in any way in the economy of the Arctic territories, nor does it contribute to initiatives aimed at strengthening reconciliation with Indigenous populations. And secondly, by taking over part of the users in Nunavut, the Yukon and the NWT, Starlink increases the dependence of remote communities, and of Canada in general, on American telecommunications infrastructures. Starlink's capture of part of the market also has the effect of strengthening the geographical concentration of digital organizational decision-making power in the South, while Indigenous populations aspire to relocate these skills locally.

The intensification of debate on the opportunities and challenges raised by the arrival of broadband constellations in remote Arctic communities underlines the ongoing tension between the societal, economic and political vocation of digital resources and infrastructures.

Notes 1. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. (2016, December 21) « Le CRTC établit un fonds pour atteindre de nouvelles cibles en matière de service Internet haute vitesse », Communiqué de Presse du Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes (CRTC), from, https://www.canada.ca/fr/radiodiffusion-telecommunications/nouvelles/2016/12/crtcetablit-fonds-atteindre-nouvelles-cibles-matiere-service-internet-haute-vitesse.html 2. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. (2023, May 9). “CRTC takes action to ensure Canadians have more choice of cellphone services” CRTC Press Release, from, https://www.canada.ca/en/radio-television-

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telecommunications/news/2023/05/crtc-takes-action-to-ensure-canadians-have-morechoice-of-cellphone-services.html 3. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. (2022, June 8). “CRTC invites Canadians to help find solutions to improve telecommunications services in the Far North”. CRTC Press Release, from, https://www.canada.ca/en/radio-televisiontelecommunications/news/2022/06/crtc-invites-canadians-to-help-find-solutions-toimprove-telecommunications-services-in-the-far-north.html 4. The administrative boundaries of the Canadian Arctic include the Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut, but it can also be defined by the four Inuit regions known by the Inuktitut name Inuit Nunangat: Inuvialuit in the Yukon, Nunavut, Nunavik in Northern Quebec and Nunatsiavut in Labrador.

5. Nunavut Roundtable for Poverty Reduction. (2017, April 11). “The Makimaniq Plan 2017-2022, A Shared Approach to Poverty Reduction”, from, https://gov.nu.ca/sites/default/files/makimaniq_2_final.pdf 6.

(2023, August 11). “Telesat Contracts MDA as Prime Satellite Manufacturer for Its Advanced Telesat Lightspeed Low Earth Orbit Constellation” Telesat Press Release, from, https://www.telesat.com/press/press-releases/telesat-contracts-mda-as-prime-satellitemanufacturer-for-its-advanced-telesat-lightspeed-low-earth-orbit-constellation/

7. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. (2014, October).

“Satellite Inquiry”, CRTC Report, from, https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/reports/rp150409/rp150409.htm#h12_3 8. (2020, October 16). Every Community project. NorthwesTel Press Release, from, https://www.nwtel.ca/community/every-community-project 9. (2021, December 10). Northwestel tells CRTC it’s in “urgent” need of ability to respond to Starlink’s competitive threat. CARTT.CA, from, https://cartt.ca/northwestel-tellscrtc-its-in-urgent-need-of-ability-to-respond-to-starlinks-competitive-threat/ 10. (2021, August 11). OneWeb and Northwestel sign Memorandum of Understanding to expand connectivity solutions for business, governments and mining across northern Canada. Oneweb Press Release, from, https://oneweb.net/resources/oneweb-andnorthwestel-sign-memorandum-understanding-expand-connectivity-solutions 11. FCC 21-48. (2021, April 23) Space Exploration Holdings, Request for Modification of the Authorization for the SpaceX NGSO Satellite System. Federal Communications Commission, Adopted: April 23, 2021, from https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-21-48A1_Rcd.pdf 12. (2022, November 14). Telecom - Commission Letter addressed to Imran Khan (Northwestel Inc.), CRTC, from, https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2022/lt221114.htm

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Nunavut News, from, https://www.nunavutnews.com/news/canarctic-signs-mou-withalaskan-company-to-bring-fibre-to-iqaluit/ (2023, April 17). Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2022-147, Notice of Hearing in Whitehorse, Yukon, from, https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2022/2022-147.htm (2023, August 11). Telesat Contracts MDA as Prime Satellite Manufacturer for Its Advanced Telesat Lightspeed Low Earth Orbit Constellation. Telesat Press Release, from, https://www.telesat.com/press/press-releases/telesat-contracts-mda-as-prime-satellitemanufacturer-for-its-advanced-telesat-lightspeed-low-earth-orbit-constellation/ (2022, November 14). Telecom - Commission Letter addressed to Imran Khan (Northwestel Inc.), CRTC, from, https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2022/lt221114.htm (2021, January 05) CanArctic Inuit Networks’ SednaLink Fibre to eliminate Nunavut and Nunatsiavut Connectivity Crisis by November 2022. CanArctic Inuit Networks Press Release, from, https://subtelforum.com/fibre-o,ptic-network-between-iqaluit-nu-and-clarenvillenl-which-will-dramatically-improve-connectivity-in-to-inuit-nunangat-by-november2022/ (2021, August 11). OneWeb and Northwestel sign Memorandum of Understanding to expand connectivity solutions for business, governments and mining across northern Canada.

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Oneweb Press Release. from, https://oneweb.net/resources/oneweb-and-northwestel-signmemorandum-understanding-expand-connectivity-solutions (2021, December 10). Northwestel tells CRTC it’s in “urgent” need of ability to respond to Starlink’s competitive threat. CARTT.CA, from, https://cartt.ca/northwestel-tells-crtc-itsin-urgent-need-of-ability-to-respond-to-starlinks-competitive-threat/ (2020,

October 16). Every Community project” NorthwesTel https://www.nwtel.ca/community/every-community-project

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Working with and for Arctic communities on resilience enhancement

Anna Karlsdóttir, Jean-Michel Huctin, Jeanne-Marie Gherardi, Tanguy Sandré & Jean-Paul Vanderlinden

Concepts like knowledge co-production and narrative-centred approaches have become more prominent in place-based research in the Arctic. This article will share experiences from the Belmont Arctic II program’s project “Sense Making, Place attachment, and Extended networks, as sources of Resilience in the Arctic” (SeMPER-Arctic, 2019-2023). Rooting our work in the Arctic, with and for Arctic communities, we collected local stories of changes, shocks, upheavals, and their aftermaths in three communities: Uummannaq and Ittoqqortoormiit (Greenland) and Tiksi (Sakha Republic, Russia). However, this article is primarily about our research in Greenland. We investigated the interactions between the local narratives of resilience and two broad categories of external narratives: environmental science, and public policy and regional development. We developed a narrative-centered, locally rooted, place-based understanding of resilience. This calls for developing tools and strategies to increase community resilience in other communities and for sharing the lessons learned with regional planners and policymakers.

We contribute to the framing of global environmental change through respectful, non-prejudiced enquiry, deciphering what it means to be a resilient community. Therefore, the results of this analysis are meant to be translated into options for actions, at the local, regional, national and circumpolar levels. Working towards maximizing impacts or enhancing resilience from research conducted for the benefit of communities involved in the research requires reflexivity and relationship building. How did this commitment emerge in our research practices? How do we meet ethical considerations? How do we contribute to decolonizing research whose imperative is towards culturally responsive research? This article will discuss experiences, questions and tensions emerging from circumpolar fieldwork-grounded research.

Anna Karlsdóttir, Geography and Tourism Studies. Life & Environmental Sciences, SENS. University of Iceland & Nordregio, Stockholm, Sweden; ORCID ID: 0000-0001-6025-6380 Jean-Michel Huctin, CEARC, Université Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Université Paris-Saclay, Guyancourt, France; Jeanne-Marie Gherardi, LSCE, Université Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Université Paris-Saclay, Gifsur-Yvette, France; ORCID ID: 0000-0001-8985-2848 Tanguy Sandré, CEARC, Université Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Université Paris-Saclay, Guyancourt, France; ORCID ID : 0000 0002 8077 2443 Jean-Paul Vanderlinden, CEARC, Université Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Université Paris-Saclay, Guyancourt, France, and SVT, University of Bergen, Bergen Norway.

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Introduction Research in Arctic indigenous communities focusing on the effects of climate change is less than thirty years old (Folke et.al, 2002; Cruikshank, 2001, Gunn, 1994). Although natural science research on climate change is based on a tradition that goes back well over a century (Arrhenius, 1893), it is only in the last two decades that the wider world has become convinced that the Arctic is one of the regions of the world where the effects of climate change are visible to the naked eye, resulting in an unprecedented level of international interest. However, research that focuses on and works with communities has until not long ago been at the margins, especially related to knowledge co-production or transdisciplinary research (Vanderlinden et al., 2020). Grossly a decade ago, community adaptation to climate change had accelerated and concepts such as resilience and sustainability had come to the forefront (i.e., Folke et.al., 2002; Einarsson et.al., 2004; Rasmussen, 2011, Petrov et.al., 2016). Since then, a large body of literature focusing on Arctic communities has emerged.

Until recently there was little research on how co-production research works in practice and what its implications are, especially regarding how data collection and analysis can be developed to increase the quality and reliability of research. However, we currently need to foster our understanding on how Indigenous partners can be more deeply involved in other stages of research such as project design and dissemination of results, and more generally the roles that researchers themselves play in shaping research. A recent surge in this literature demonstrates co-productions’ relevance to social science research. This is especially true to sustainability issues, which are characterized by extensive uncertainty and complexity (for example Wibeck, Eliasson & Neset, 2022; Yua et.al., 2022). In addition to this experience, in many cases, new demands from public administration on registering time reduce creativity and open repeated dialogues with communities, sometimes driven by financial resource constraints. Increased demands for ethical contracts when working in Indigenous communities have arisen from bitter experience of strong exploitation practices in the past among academics and other scholars. These demands have developed in different parts of the world over the past 15 years, although they appeared later in the Arctic (see for example among Inuit Nunaat: Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2018; Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2021, Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2022).

This article presents important practical lessons drawn from the co-authors' experiences in several research projects in Inuit communities in Greenland, particularly during the SeMPER-Arctic2 project. Many articles promote the co-production of knowledge, but at the level of principle, without always proposing concrete answers to the problems faced by researchers.

The three focus communities are quite different, but they share some common challenges due to adverse conditions related to remoteness. Remoteness from regional and national political centers reduces the power of local people to make decisions about their own present and future. Some of them have problems with dilapidated housing (whether due to weathering or lack of resources for maintenance); increased uncertainty about weather forecasts and ice conditions; and changing ecosystems due to challenging climate conditions. Towns are also losing population (with the exception of the population of Uummannaq, which has stopped decreasing due to the relocation of residents from two settlements that were evacuated after their definitive closure following a tsunami in 2017). The level of development of social infrastructure is a constant challenge. While 2 Sense Making, Place attachment and Extended network as sources of Resilience in the Arctic

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hunting is still a livelihood, commercial fisheries are of greater economic importance. These three communities are emblematic of the challenges of adapting to climate, economic, political, and cultural changes. While the weather has become warmer and more erratic, sea ice has tended to decrease in thickness and extent, at least over the past two decades. These three communities are striving to find ways to remain sustainable and attractive despite their remoteness at a time when urbanization is a megatrend (Rasmussen, 2011).

Initiation of Research Project and the Inclusion Process The first challenge facing scientific projects is the search for funding, which raises the question of the possible involvement of local Indigenous partners in the preliminary co-design of projects. To avoid asking too much of them without any guarantee of success, or to avoid disappointing or fatiguing them in the event of repeated failure, it is often easier for researchers to involve them little or not at all in the writing phase of the application file intended to respond to the call for projects. However, if the application is selected, the lack of input from the local partner (or at least without validation of the project as written in the application) means that researchers run a great risk of having designed a project that is partly unfeasible, or of no real use to the community studied, or even not really wanted by the local partner. To avoid this often-unavoidable pitfall of most foreign projects, researchers need to have acquired some local knowledge and, of course, to have built up a solid relationship of trust with their partners. This is not a given for all teams of foreign researchers, especially those who are new to the field and have no previous experience of working in the community under study. In the case of our SeMPER-Arctic project, we relied on letters of support from local partners with whom we had previously discussed and agreed on the project's objectives. Our first Greenlandic partner, accustomed to working with researchers, had worked with one of us for many years, while the second partner had been met by a team member during an initial reconnaissance trip; as for the Yakut partner, we worked together into several projects (ARTisticc, Belmont Forum funding, and Nunataryuk, H2020 funding), this for now almost 10 years. Without these established professional relationships, some of which were also personal friendships, it would have been impossible to design a project that was in any way connected to the local community.

Like many other international projects focusing on the Arctic, we were funded through a large global or interregional initiative, in this case the Belmont Forum Arctic II initiative, which was supported by ten national research councils, for three years. The call aimed at bringing together researchers and other expertise across the globe to develop proposals from integrated teams of scientists and stakeholders to address key areas of Arctic resilience, from understanding to action.

This collaboration of academic and non-academic knowledge systems constituted a transdisciplinary approach that would advance not only understanding of the fundamentals of Arctic resilience but also spur action, inform decision-making, and translate into solutions for resilience (Belmont Forum, 2019). The consortia had to address at least two of seven interconnected elements of resilience as described in the Arctic Resilience Report of the Arctic Council (2016): natural, social, financial, cultural, and human capitals; infrastructure; and knowledge.

SeMPER-Arctic was one of eight proposals awarded funding, which is provided through the national research councils of partners (Belmont Forum 2020). Many of us had experience from conducting prior research within the circumpolar Arctic as human geographers, engineers, Working with and for Arctic communities on resilience enhancement

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anthropologists, economists, and climatologists, to mention few of our disciplinary backgrounds.

The integration across scientific disciplines enables us to consider multiple worldviews present in contemporary science (Mauser et.al., 2013). This interdisciplinary group was needed as the purpose of the project was to analyze how the two external narratives (environmental science and regional development policy ones) interact with local narratives of resilience to assess their impacts. The objective was to develop a narrative centered, locally rooted, place-based understanding of resilience within Arctic communities. As such resilience and narrative analysis were the central framework in SeMPER-Arctic, which was meant to contribute to the knowledge base on global environmental change through locally guided enquiry of what it means to be a resilient Arctic community in the 21st century.

As put forward in the Arctic Resilience Report synthesis (Arctic Council 2016, Arctic Council 2017), decisive action is needed to effectively navigate emerging conditions to avoid potentially negative social and ecological changes already emerging. One of the major statements not only in this report, but also echoed by various politicians and representatives in the Arctic Council, is that “responses will be most effective if they build on a well-integrated, evidence based interdisciplinary understanding of Arctic social-ecological systems and their relationships with global processes and draw on Indigenous knowledge wellgrounded in practical experience” (Arctic Council, 2017; 2).

Research evidence shows that scientific representations and interpretations have emerged as dominating worldviews (Bremer et.al., 2017). While sciences are necessary, their research objectives and measurement tools can often be too abstract, and their metrics can be very unfamiliar to human populations in general. This domination of "western" science has created a significant undervaluing of the traditional knowledge perspective, which has demonstrated its effectiveness in assessing weather, climate, and navigating natural environments for human communities. Therefore, it has to be our common enterprise as researchers and population to rediscover the places we inhabit; it is not the responsibility of the expert community alone to reinterpret our places under a changing climate (Ibid, 2017).

The Way Knowledge Co-production has been Conceptualized Many of the problems that societies around the world are currently facing need to be tackled with a different mindset from the ones that created them. Thus, there is an urgent need for new ways of thinking that go beyond dominant disciplines and paradigms, exploring contemporary issues, insights, and responses. In policy discussions as well as in research, there are increasing calls for societal transformations, which are systemic, long-term, non-linear change that spans the different sectors of societies. Formal conventional knowledge systems like those practiced by universities and research institutes may be failing humanity. Especially when the impact of the research is measured against the level of progress in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change (Fazey, 2019, Fazey et.al, 2020). This urges researchers to have an integrity when conducting research to secure their work is relevant to the communities involved.

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Expert system Knowledge Spiral

SSSystemSy

Social construction

Dialogue Practioners research

Reflexive Practitioner

Community of Practice

Action Research Praxis research

Co-generation Praxis/Research

Research and praxis take part in the same discourse

De-connected Research discourse Praxis discourse

Figure 1. Degrees of Integration: Research & Praxis (Johnson, 2013).

Ideally, knowledge co-production is a demanding approach in conducting research that involves deep collaboration between researchers and stakeholders who have different types of knowledge, expertise, and perspectives. It recognizes that multiple forms of knowledge, including scientific, local, Indigenous, experiential, and contextual knowledge, can contribute to all stages of the research process, and aims to integrate these diverse forms of knowledge to generate more relevant, robust, and actionable research outcomes (Mauser et.al., 2013).

In knowledge co-production, researchers and stakeholders work together as equal partners, engaging in a process of co-design, co-implementation, and co-interpretation of research (Wibeck, Eliason & Neset, 2022). It may involve collaborative activities such as joint problem identification, research design, data collection, analysis, and interpretation of findings. This approach emphasizes the importance of mutual respect, shared decision-making, and open communication among all participants throughout the research process. It recognizes that stakeholders, who may include community members, policymakers, practitioners, or other end-users of research, are not just passive subjects or recipients of research findings, but active contributors who bring their own insights, experiences, and expertise to the table.

It often includes iterative feedback loops, where stakeholders provide ongoing input and guidance to researchers, and researchers respond by adjusting their research questions, refining their methods and their data analysis. It also includes their participation in field work, by helping researchers access observation situations or by facilitating the collection of oral data, sometimes by carrying out the collection itself as for example during the COVID-19 period in 2020-2021 in which researchers could hardly travel. The process aims to generate research outcomes that are contextually relevant, applicable, and useful for addressing real-world problems, and that reflect the perspectives and needs of diverse stakeholders.

Given the need for co-creation, surprisingly little discussion has evolved around its implications for research practices and knowledge co-production i.e., what challenges you meet in fulfilling the promise of co-creation (Ren, Johannesson & van der Duim, 2018). As mentioned before, Working with and for Arctic communities on resilience enhancement

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unnecessarily burdening local partners, and raising the expectations of research funding during proposal design and submission can lead to disappointment and deteriorate trust with the researchers if funding is not approved.

The question then is how can researchers contribute and impact the processes of, for example, enhancing resilience? One may expect that researchers wanting to increase impacts in or for communities need to become “insiders” to a higher degree (Hjemdal & Aas, 2018). However, this is complicated when international research teams are involved. This may also mean that knowledge transfer is more complex if researchers want to contribute with impacts which would require skills far beyond their disciplines. This also implies the more or less long time to build relationships of trust and the possibility or reciprocal desire to take time together, which is not given to everyone.

A major challenge with implementing Co-Production of Knowledge is mischaracterization (i.e. referring to collaborative work as CPK). For example, a researcher may identify a problem, develop research questions, and then invite Indigenous participation in the project. The project may result in Indigenous participation through collaboration on information collection or other aspects of the research process, or there may be a capacity building aspect to the work. This theoretical type of relationship, through the lens of our framework, would not be considered co-production because involvement or equity at all stages of the process was not the aim, methodology, or the outcome.

The mischaracterization of CPK does not advance equity for Indigenous Peoples and their communities in research relationships, project outcomes and limits a fuller understanding of the world (Yua et.al., 2022).

Despite good intentions, the climate change knowledge co-production literature is a complex meeting place of several academic traditions and practices, introducing both ambiguity and creativity as scholars’ appropriate perspectives from neighboring disciplines. Scholars have thus used several ways in applying and understanding the term co-production. Of the eight ways identified by Bremer et al. (2018), our project includes perspectives to facilitate extended modes of science that integrate societal knowledge and values, building adaptive capacity in institutions and to empower traditional knowledge systems. Hence, we would ideally like the results of the work to find its way into a structured science-policy interface, but this is yet to be seen.

Ethics towards Community-Focused Research Several different approaches stress the inclusion of local communities in research development and in dealing with the rapid environmental and social changes ongoing in the Arctic. Various methods may relate to climate change research (i.e. Hansen & Larsen, 2015) and seek to assess cross-regional societal development (i.e. Karlsdóttir et.al, 2017). Participatory scenario approaches have been credited with many positive outcomes that include identifying important benefits like social learning across different stakeholder groups, promoting community-owned solutions, and facilitating the sharing of experiences in a creative and collaborative way (Oteros-Rozas et al., 2015, Nilsson et.al, 2019).

We have, as an interdisciplinary team, varied experience of working in knowledge co-creation research. One of us has worked for three years with participatory foresight analysis in 12 communities in the Nordic Arctic where collected results were shared with local communities in citizen meetings, with regional and national authority representatives and with interregional bodies in special workshops (Karlsdóttir et.al, 2017). This methodology does not enhance a co-creative

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knowledge approach and includes certain weaknesses, such as the research may lack diversity among the participants and lack follow-up on whether the process led to any action (Nilsson et.al, 2019). However, this form of action research was a collaborative process which required partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation with various actors on multiple local, regional, national, and inter-regional levels, and where results had the potential of being mobilized into policy actions.

We were challenged in the first 18 months of the three-year process due to consequences of the global pandemic and related sanitary policies and travel restrictions. For the most part, we could not visit the communities that were the focus. However, the partners doing fieldwork in Tiksi (Sakha Republic) collected instances of events that the local population found important, and gathered explanations that local people and authorities gave to these events, their origin, their management and their short- and long-term consequences (Nikulkina, Shadrova & Antonova, 2020, Nikulkina et.al., 2020). Then another shock hit us: we lost contact with our Russian partners after the war against Ukraine started in 2022. Yet we have proceeded with processing the data already collected in the Sakha republic (Doloisio, 2022), but it has truly affected reciprocity relations between the communities, and therefore knowledge co-production as well. Thus, our account in this article is primarily focusing on the Greenlandic research sites and communities.

Involved researchers and partners focusing on Greenland had to come up with alternative ways of conducting research in the first phases (luckily, we were granted an extension to 2024 due to the pandemic). This required, as all research endeavors, reflexive ways of conducting research. The consortium communicated for the first two years through TEAMS or Zoom and made a serious effort to build up collective reflexivity (Palaganas et.al., 2017) but also collected data (interviews conducted by local partners). One important point of departure was that you cannot do research only to benefit your own merit as a researcher if you engage with a community. This felt even more urgent since the focus of the project was on resilience in the wake of shocks, upheavals or incidences related to climate change driven effects.

SeMPER-Arctic works across disciplines and analytical levels in that it examines narratives driven by a natural science perspective, the political scene (manifesting in national and regional strategies and policies), and with three local communities in combination (Uummannaq, Ittoqqortoormiit and Tiksi). In all the research locations we had key local partners who proved crucial in making field research possible and without whom we would not have been able to do the work.

Acknowledging their role is an important ethical aspect of community focused research. We stress an approach that fosters wellbeing and inclusive societies in an era of climate change and uncertainty; our project is fundamentally about the process of spatialization and becoming space as we adapt “a thinking that one cannot write sufficiently in the name of an outsider” (Deleuse & Guatarri 1987, in Huijbens, 2021). Thus, researching and understanding the process of the ongoing changes in the communities reveals how manifold the community is as well as the entities in it. By revealing how entities emerge from the relations that compose them, they are not to be pulled apart but seen in connection, which involves understanding and making sense of the community while recognizing how power relations are entangled into power geometries inherent in the transformation process (Huijbens, 2021).

Environmental changes make up space for stories. Our narrative-based research requires that it is grounded in the lived experience of communities.

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Long term Relationships and Trust One major factor in enabling participatory or co-production of knowledge in practice is to build trust through long-term relationships. Relationships are crucial for co-production (Kielsen Holm, 2016; UNESCO, 2009) and Indigenous research (Smith, 2021: 137). Building trust means sustaining long-term relationships that exceeds the demarcated period of funding for a research project, both prior and post research activity (Gearheard et.al., 2006; Mahoney et.al., 2009; Mahoney et.al., 2013).

Relationships and trust are needed in encounters with the community, especially to bridge the work with the community and for the community. One of the researchers had 18 years of research experience over 26 years of traveling to the community of Uummannaq and in Greenland which secured firm relationships with the key partners who conducted part of the data collection. With their deep insights and knowledge, we were better equipped to understand and mediate what stories of upheavals, shocks and transition were more important than others. Engaging with key partners who have 37 and 30 years of experience working with young people and children on empowering them in meaningful activities intersecting nature and culture helps to enable trust. Working with children and youth has also been important (Huctin & Andreasen, 2007; Huctin, 2016; Huctin et.al, 2021; Gregersen, 2010; Karlsdóttir & Jungsberg, 2015; Karlsdóttir et.al., 2019). “A key strategy for navigating the inevitable tensions that can arise in projects where research on resilience is in focus with natives is paying continual attention to relationship building and mutual acknowledgement of the value added by all the invested members” (Wexler et.al., 2020).

The relevance of addressing and acting upon decolonizing approaches to social science research with communities is important and relevant for Greenland. A prominent and vivid discussion expressed in music and arts, in public and social media forums and among contemporary Greenlanders is focused on the ails of colonialization implications and post-colonialism. With many Greenlanders being of mixed ethnicity, the discussion becomes even more complex (Thisted, 2022). When it comes to the need for political agency, it is evident that the majority looking for self-rule are of Greenlandic origin. However, the leading positions within society are still occupied

by Danes, who thereby have a strong influence on the decision-making processes (Björklund, 2011, Grydehøj, 2016). Colonial identity forming of lived and imagined experience plays a role on many levels, but also breaking out of it, is both an important signifier and mindset for many young adult Greenlanders (i.e., Uyarakq’s “Move I’m Indigenous” provocative lyrics: “Like a fire make your demands… we manifest your tears because we are the true pioneers…” (Uyarakq, 2020). Greenlanders are well aware that they belong to a small community and self-determination is important for them, in being recognized as such and as people (Kleist in Björklund, 2011). They are proud of their heritage and have many reasons to be (Bjørst, 2018). In some cases, Greenlanders in power have struggled holding influence over the climate change debate touching Greenland in international settings.

Thus, they have blamed global discourses as too academically constructed, leaving their role as limited to acting as victims of global climate change effects (Bjørst, 2012). This starkly contradicts many Greenlanders self-perceived role, as they express certain autonomy in their relationship to nature built on centuries long heritage of coping and adapting to a harsh climate (Abelsen in Bjørst, 2012). Mastering the environment may in some cases display Greenlanders' character (Beyer Broch, 2020). One of the critiques that have been linked with research conduct is that Greenland has been seen through Danish eyes. It is claimed that they see it to a greater extent as an empty terrain than

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a populated nation when it comes to scientific research. Furthermore, that it is more important for Denmark, what they as a nation can get out of researching the ice sheet than thinking about involving the population to whom the ice belongs (Plank Sommer, 2016). This underpins the importance of recognizing multiple forms of knowledge in research conduct.

What do the Ethical Guidelines Require? Epistemologies that have Changed!

One of the papers guiding the ICC Ethical and Equitable Engagement Synthesis Report (2021) states that past inequities persist in the form of inequitable research processes and relationships across the Arctic (Yua et.al, 2022). These inequitable processes and relationships, which prioritize non-Indigenous ways of being and knowing, feed a structure of decision making that does not fully account for Indigenous Peoples’ knowledge, perspectives, or needs (Yua et. al., 2022). From our point of view, scientific conduct needs to adapt to changing epistemologies where embedded practical experience is recognized as an important element in the knowledge generation.

‘Nothing About Us Without Us’ – Always Engage with Inuit • Recognize Indigenous Knowledge in its Own Right • Prac\ce Good Governance • Communica\on with Intent • Exercising Accountability - Building Trust • Building Meaningful Partnerships • Informa\on, Data Sharing, Ownership and Permissions • Equitably Fund Inuit Representa\on and Knowledge (Inuit Circumpolar Council, Ethical and Equitable Engagement Synthesis Report, 2021)

In the EU context, one particularly important recent step towards anchoring decolonial research in the Arctic is the new Roadmap to Decolonial Arctic Research (Herrmann et.al., 2023).

ICC encourages researchers to practice the co-production of knowledge and follow Inuit guided processes to successfully bring together Indigenous knowledge and science, while ensuring that our knowledge is trusted and respected as a unique knowledge system that comes with its own evaluating and validation processes. Of paramount importance in their guidelines is that research projects should avoid that results of their work burden the people in focus (ICC, 2021). ICC stresses eight ethical protocols for research conduct that they recommend as a good pathway, which we attempted to fulfill in our research practices (see text box above: Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2021). They warn about cherry-picking their protocols, but overall, they stress reciprocity in the cooperation process with Indigenous communities. ICC stresses that their guidelines should not overshadow national guidelines and that these protocols do not replace any local, regional, or national guidance provided by Inuit (Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2021: 13).

The Greenland Research Council was established in 2013 and started to function in 2014. One of their primary roles besides allocating funding is to improve and strengthen Greenlandic research embedded in Greenland and to strengthen research relations internationally and within the commonwealth (Inatsisilorneq, 2013; Mercer et.al., 2022). They have been working on developing ethical guidelines and recently published their National Research Strategy towards 2030 (Ministry for Education, culture, sport & church, 2023). Their approach involves being open to the international scientific community while safeguarding their own interests and values (Greenland Research Council, 2020). Their view is that more than ever, there is a need for a joint research effort that can address questions related to global processes, climate change and the green transition, which contributes to sustainable development in Greenland: Working with and for Arctic communities on resilience enhancement

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Unfortunately, we see examples of Greenlandic research institutions and other stakeholders being involved far too late in foreign research projects. It undermines the possibilities for a genuine, equally dignified cooperation for the benefit of both parties. It is crucial for good cooperation that all involved parties are involved from the start of a project, where the basis for ownership is established – ownership of the knowledge that is created and influence on and participation in how it is used.

Therefore, the Greenland Research Council works purposefully to develop Greenlandic research policy and support network formation and other mechanisms through which Greenlandic and outside researchers can exchange ideas and interests, jointly develop research questions, and become familiar with institutions and infrastructure (Greenland Research Council, 2022; 4).

As described previously, we who are engaged in the SeMPER-Arctic project made the continuous effort to involve our local partners at an early stage and during the process of the work. We have also committed ourselves to the convening of discussions about emerging knowledge while we have been in the field. This has been our way of approaching equitable involvement and recognizing that people are part of the community and ecosystem. Being challenged by the pandemic made us even more reliant on our local partners who conducted part of the qualitative research.

In our case, it was pivotal to have the support, cooperation, and network of the Uummannaq Polar Institute before the work began. We also consulted experts from Ilisimatusarfik/University of Greenland researchers at early stages in the literary work phase when collecting public reports, strategies, and plans, to analyze and assess political narratives in Greenland related to climate change and resilience (Jungsberg et.al., forthcoming). At later stages, we consulted Greenland Research Council and various other stakeholders of knowledge generation in Greenland, as well as fellow researchers within social science and Circumpolar Arctic research activities. In this process it has been very important to get back and forth to our key partners in the communities to hear their opinions. In Ittoqqortoormiit, which was a new community for the project researchers, seven fieldwork trips of three to nine weeks were implemented by three of the co-authors between September 2021 to July 2023. Building strong trust was crucial for our research team, formal interviews (over 30), participant observation, and informal discussions have been sustained remotely and locally from 2020. This considerably extended the involvement of stakeholders and community members over the time, allowing to build community-based research. Even if we acknowledge the limits of the involvement of community members in the project design and in the research conduct itself, an important step towards inclusive and fair research practices has been reached. Using an inductive approach, the research team identifies central invisibility of narratives regarding the essential importance of narwhals for the community and the threat to the future of narwhals hunting. In June 2023, a 22-minute short film was coproduced in the native language (Tunumisut, Ittoqqortoormiit). Various community members have been involved at different stages (production, edition, story-making, translation/transcription, voice-over, and video caption).

A first projection was held throughout a culturally relevant event (“kaffemik” or celebration party with coffee/tea/cakes). Additionally, a diffusion throughout local Facebook page was implemented. We reached at least a third of the community (cumulation of attendance to “kaffemik” and reactions on Facebook), while opening to comment and opinion. Among the main reactions that were generated, people expressed gratefulness, desire for the film to be spread out, Karlsdóttir, Huctin, Gherardi, Sandré & Vanderlinden

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and happiness to see the story exposed. Ittoqqortoormiit’s born community members who live abroad also expressed feelings of homesickness, which strongly resonate with the expression of place-attachment we frequently encountered during our time in Ittoqqortoormiit. Important work is also carried out towards reframing sea ice changes in a salient perspective for community members (Sandré et.al., forthcoming).

The Dialogue that Nuances our Knowledge All these practices require dialogue with informants and partners in the community that in most cases is voluntary. So, we must respect their time and seasonal activities that may not correspond to our ideal needs, but we simply must adapt as researchers. Researchers who have been trained into certain terminologies and logics need to step up and widen their horizon and engage in meaningful partnerships for both parts. This can be challenging for some but liberating for others and requires skills beyond academic training. Intercultural competence in communication helps, as well as mastering the local language which in our case is only partly fulfilled (one researcher masters Greenlandic, two other master Danish, many master Norwegian and French, all including local partners communicate in English).

The knowledge co-production approach goes beyond “participatory” or collaborative research that could be limited in terms of involvement of local populations. Adopted by a small minority of researchers around the world, the knowledge coproduction approach has recently been on the increase. In addition, to be more respectful to studied people and to research partnership requirements advocated by Indigenous leaders, it would offer new sources of data and better analyses. It would also foster a deeper public awareness and hopefully inspire more effective public policies (Baztan et al., 2017).

We try to ensure that the knowledge gained is of value to the community – extending the meaning of research conduct to work with and for the communities. One aspect of that is being in contact with local and regional actors who make decisions or execute decisions and plans in the towns on behalf of the municipality in different fields.

As the project has not been completed at the time of writing this article, we still have much to do, in particular to ensure the most complete restitution of this co-produced knowledge to the communities involved who are most interested in it.

Meaningfulness for Communities - Conclusion and Discussion In the early days of research on Indigenous communities, the rapid societal changes from huntergatherer lifestyles to modernity were prominent in the perspective of social scientists. The recognition of the power of traditional knowledge to understand the complex dynamics has been slow to emerge. While vulnerability to these changes was the forefront perspective to begin with, the focus shifted to trying to understand the adaptive capacities of communities and their ability to navigate and cope under changing circumstances. Pearce et.al. (2009), for example, have identified in a comprehensive review the importance of targeted vulnerability research that collaborates closely with community members and decision makers. This included understanding the interactions between current and projected climate change, as well as the factors which determine vulnerability and influence adaptation, identifying research gaps and making recommendations for advancing adaptation.

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The commitment to work not only with the communities but also for communities in producing research-based knowledge can be seen as our small step in research based decolonialization and culturally responsive research. As proposed by Sultana (2022), we mobilised a narrative-based approach whereby lived experiences can counterbalance hegemonic framings that structures climate coloniality. Maximizing impacts or enhancing resilience is something that we promised in the research proposal.

Our good will, however, faces a dilemma. Do communities really benefit from our research?

Translating results to business concepts may not necessarily be a useful outcome for the community. We should rather strive to translate these findings into a resilience enhancement framework where people with long-term knowledge from within the community are our best allies in interpreting what can be targeted and strengthened. It may be an emergency response framework, it may be social infrastructure, it may be improving port capacity and renovation of man-made structures, it may be recycling, it may be fair and environmentally friendly tourism, or it could be all of it.

With increasing research on how co-creation research plays out in practice and what its implications are, there are still important gaps in terms of how to equitably fund a project, conduct data collection and analysis, and disseminate results in full collaboration with community partners.

These gaps must be addressed to increase the quality and reliability of the research, and to change the roles that researchers themselves play in shaping the research and its findings. We do not claim to have navigated perfectly but rather to have tried to set some examples in reciprocal encounters with the communities in question.

Our SeMPER-Arctic project comes to an end in 2024. We have therefore not reached the project completion and do not know if we will be able to translate our findings to something that can really be beneficial to communities in the long run. But we foresee that the relations with the communities will not be terminated by the formal termination date the research funders have set.

Beyond co-producing knowledge and caring for local stories that we write in the accumulating literature on climate change and the impact on communities, time will tell how we succeed.

The idea and practice of knowledge coproduction has become an important and new perspective for Arctic research as a response to the recent increase of research projects with ethical rules and participatory/collaborative approaches. Furthermore, it is required by Indigenous leaders and recommended by organizations such as the Arctic Council, UNESCO, IPCC, and others. The immensity, speed and complexity of the ongoing challenges require the best available knowledge for decision-making and there is growing recognition that this can revitalize local culture, empower the community and foster sustainability. There is a greater understanding that traditional and scientific knowledge are complementary, or rather that they can be complementary.

We would like to argue that our work so far has been characterized as collaboration towards coproduction (which means it is not full knowledge co-production but a sincere attempt to achieve fair collaboration). We are not insiders and cannot be because we are not part of the Arctic communities. But as researchers, we can collaborate with our Indigenous partners by finding the best possible form for each according to the conditions of the place and time in order to address complex issues and try to lead to innovative solutions. We have in our own work seen how it becomes easier with the development of information and digital technologies (photo, video, audio, internet, and social networks). Science can benefit from Indigenous Peoples' experience of their Karlsdóttir, Huctin, Gherardi, Sandré & Vanderlinden

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own environment and in-depth understanding of the complexity and interconnected environmental systems. The collaboration provides another source of information and data: daily observations at the local scale all year round. It provides relevant information about livelihood, community concerns, needs and values. It offers the multiplication of perspectives. Research with knowledge co-production leads to information that meets users’ needs and is considered salient, legitimate, and credible by them. Through the confidence it inspires in the communities, the coproduction approach is more likely than other forms of research to have an impact on society. But it often remains more of an ideal towards which to strive throughout the entire research process than the form required at the start of this process.

To improve the movement from collaboration to co-production, we still need to answer some questions on challenges and potential conflicts. Before the research is kicked off, researchers must reflect on how they perceive the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge in their research work, which is sometimes constrained by administrative rules, and, for their part, Indigenous partners must reflect on what scientific knowledge can support their community. What are the expectations of both parties? How can they concretely share knowledge for their mutual benefit? It also remains a question how western scientists may choose such an approach when they know so little about Indigenous knowledge. Furthermore, one may wonder how Indigenous Peoples can be interested in collaborating with researchers if they do not know them well enough, when they are not familiar with the functioning of sciences as practiced by Western researchers and when there is a distrust of their effectiveness or their desire to bring a benefit?

On the other hand, researchers can do much to improve the trust placed in them during research.

For example, what kind of relationships are needed to improve connections before and during fieldwork, as well as after? How can we connect the global scale (science knowledge and interest) with the local scale (Indigenous knowledge and needs)? We may also ask ourselves how to make sure that all partners respect all steps in the co-production process. When the research is completed, we need to ask ourselves how to involve and credit Indigenous partners in our dissemination work and what kind of knowledge should be returned to Indigenous communities. Finally, those essential questions remain food for thought to design better research in the future.

Acknowledgments This work was carried out as part of the SeMPER-Arctic (Sense Making, Place attachment and Extended Networks as sources of Resilience in the Arctic) project, funded by the Belmont Forum.

The authors would like to warmly thank their local partners Ann Andreasen (Uummannaq) and Mette Pike Barselajsen (Ittoqqortoormiit) for their invaluable contribution to this research work and of course all members of the Arctic communities involved in the project.

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Community-based co-creation for sustainability as an academic fourth mission: An exploration of Sustainability Practices of the Smallest Institutions of Higher Learning in the Arctic Martin Mohr Olsen

Prior research The following is a shortened version of a chapter recently produced for a PhD thesis. I adopted the current form to account for scope and clarity. It also builds on research previously completed on sustainability implementation in higher education within the Arctic. A 2018 study (Blaxekjær, et al. 2018) identified emerging trends in Arctic academia, including the demand for innovative skills, the establishment of a "co-creation of sustainability" mission statement, adoption of the SDGs, and increased interest in Arctic conferences and collaborations. A 2019 report (Lauritsen et al.

2019) emphasised the role of students in driving sustainable development in the Arctic. A study of the University of the Faroe Islands (Olsen, 2020) examines its historical and organisational structure and potential for improved sustainability engagement. I (Olsen, 2021) explore institutional implications of a fourth mission statement and helix-based engagement in Natcher & Jokela’s (2021) volume on Renewable Economies in the Arctic. A systematic literature review explores global SDG implementation within academia, highlighting a need for stakeholder engagement and civic involvement (Olsen and Rosati, forthcoming). The present article aims to bridge local and global perspectives within the context of a larger body of work by examining how Arctic universities integrate sustainability into their operations at the regional level.

Introduction and Methodology This article investigates how smaller Arctic institutions of higher learning employ sustainability in their operations. It initially used two surveys – one quantitative and one qualitative – to make sense of how sustainability is employed. The quantitative survey's findings were inconclusive in that they did not produce a clear enough picture of how sustainability should be understood and, therefore, Martin Mohr Olsen is a PhD-Candidate at the Technical University of Denmark and the University of the Faroe Islands. The author would like to thank all respondents and interviewees for their time and kind help.

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how institutions might better implement it. The qualitative follow-up of interviews (included herein), on the other hand, produced a much better insight into how these smaller Arctic institutions operate. They also reveal that the concept of sustainability within Arctic academia is contextual and poorly defined.

To structure the formulation and subsequent analysis, I rely on an idealised framework for academic sustainability through co-creation put forward by Trencher et al. (2014), referred to as the 4th mission. Western academic teaching has its roots in mediaeval Europe, with universities emerging from monastic schools. Initially, universities taught only subjects related to the church.

This singular focus was the first pillar or academic mission of what was to be academia as we know it today: teaching. As societies changed, new disciplines emerged. The Humboldtian Model emphasised academic autonomy and a holistic approach to education after the Napoleonic Wars– knowledge for the sake of knowledge. This addition takes on the ethos of the second pillar: research.

Vannevar Bush's 1945 idea of linking university research with business to advance economic wellbeing led to the commodification of knowledge, culminating in the rise of the Entrepreneurial University in the 1980s after the Bayh-Dole Act allowed researchers to claim ownership of federally funded advancements. This development is often called “transferral of knowledge” but generally underpins the third pillar, or the third academic mission broadly known as dissemination. These pillars support the conventional roof of present-day academic institutional mission statements and agendas: teach, research and disseminate. Trencher et al. (2014) argue that these three pillars alone cannot solve the world's complex sustainability-based problems. Their proposal for a fourth mission of co-creation for sustainability aims to create socially embedded knowledge through stakeholder collaboration (I cover this in more detail in Olsen, 2021:130-132).

Trencher et al. (2014: 4) introduce a framework containing eight emerging paradigms on display in highly co-creative universities around the world. These paradigms centre on highly active academic involvement and collaboration on sustainability issues within their communities. To gauge how small Arctic universities display parity with Trencher et al.’s paradigms for co-creation, the qualitative interviews were structured to accommodate a comparative analysis (see Table 1 in the Discussion).

As noted, preceding work has compelled me to question how smaller higher education institutions in the Arctic implement sustainability. To this end, I used a mixed-method data triangulation approach in the form of a questionnaire sent to a subset of UArctic members, with additional interviews with staff at selected universities. The nature of the surveys is such that the number of respondents is below the threshold for conventional statistical analysis. The resulting data has been deemed acceptable for the intended purpose, but additional research is still highly recommended.

What follows presents only the qualitative portion of that initial triangulation for clarity.

Additionally, I lean on Flyvbjerg’s (2011) encouragement that even singular case studies can assist in producing valuable knowledge. The paper is informed by neo-institutionalist theory (Meyer & Jepperson, 2021) and relies on Bourdieu’s (1972) practice theory. As I am interested in the intersection of how institutions create meaning and how Arctic stakeholders reinforce or alter that meaning to further their local communities, these are well-suited for such a study.

I conclude, firstly, that there is an unfortunate duality within the discourse surrounding the concept of sustainability and that smaller Arctic institutions of higher learning function as local stabilisers for the economy, culture and environment – all vital aspects of sustainability. Second, I conclude that Community-based co-creation for sustainability as an academic fourth mission

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these same institutions are in line with emerging social engagement paradigms to a surprising degree. In fact, they already follow the requirements stipulated as constituting a 4th academic mission statement (beyond teaching, researching and dissemination) as outlined by Trencher et al.

(2014) in their call for new transformative universities based on “co-creation for sustainability”.

Small Arctic institutions of higher learning: Hybrid-institutions The interviews, as are presented below, were completed as an extension of a previously completed quantitative survey that relied on institutional memberships of UArctic per January 1st 2021 (UArctic, nd) as respondents. Institutions list UArctic assembly representatives and points of contact. These contacts are rectors, academic administrators, deans or Arctic researchers with sufficient insights into local sustainability developments and similarly sufficient insights into developments at a local level.

At that time, UArctic had 134 academic members. Of those, 57 were institutions with fewer than 5000 students, mostly comparable to the University of the Faroe Islands (the focus of study for my thesis). Most of these smaller institutions are relatively young, and more than half were established between the late 80s and mid-2000s. Surveying the entire membership base of the UArctic (Figure 1), we see that institutions were established in fairly distinct groupings. In the period before the 1810s, we see old Scandinavian and Russian national universities. In the first half of the 1800s, there was a proliferation of American and Canadian national (or large) universities.

In the latter half of the 1800s and up until WW2, a number of smaller national universities (typically in second-largest cities) were established. During the war and some years following that, we mostly see an increase in highly specialised Russian technical universities. While some of the smaller institutions we will be concerning ourselves with in this article were established throughout the years presented in Figure 2, the majority came into being around the mid-60s and onward.

Figure 1: UArctic members’ establishment sorted by decade and grouped by period.

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Notably, these smaller Arctic institutions come in two distinct waves–one between 1960- and 1980, where many very local institutions on the periphery are established, especially in the far north of Russia, Canada, and Alaska. The later wave, the 1990s-2000s, consists of even smaller and more localised institutions best described as hybrid-institutions: part university, part vocational college, part indigenous or cultural institution. It bears noting that these smaller institutions of higher learning make up roughly half of the membership base of the UArctic–and half of those again were established in the 1980s or later.

Qualitative survey As noted above, the qualitative survey below is part of a larger PhD thesis. Constraints allowed for six interviews with representatives from the mentioned cohorts of smaller hybrid-institutions. The focus of these interviews was to explore further the concept of sustainability and how respondents, acting as institutional representatives, would contextually situate their institutions’ existence and operations in that regard.

Data collection Respondents have been made anonymous. They are located in the following regions of the Arctic: Norway, Greenland, Sápmi, Iceland, Northern Alaska, and Western Canada3. Interviews were conducted online, each lasting 40-60 minutes. An open-ended interview guide was produced and followed throughout. While queried institutions were very similar, there were aspects that were different enough that not all questions were equally relevant. The interview guide consisted of five different lines of questioning: ● Question on motivations and objectives behind establishing the institution in question. ● Question on challenges and barriers facing the community around the institution. ● Question on community engagement (cultural, economic, environmental). ● Question on the institutional definitions of sustainability broadly. ● Question on how sustainability might be utilised to combat challenges within the community.

Interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis by myself.

Qualitative findings While only six interviews were conducted, I would argue, based on previous work and interactions with a fair number of institutions on the initial list of prospective respondents, that these interviews broadly represent the state of smaller Arctic institutions of higher learning. Further, the institutions interviewed exhibit striking parity with my own historical overview and institutional analysis of the University of the Faroe Islands (Olsen, 2020).

Q1: Motivations and objectives behind establishing the institution Historically, the interviewed institutions exhibit striking similarities regarding the reasons behind their establishment. A few came about through mergers with similar institutions, either in terms of institutional focus or due to geographic proximity. Those resulting from an institutional merger were made up of smaller, struggling local institutions. A recurring theme for all of the institutions 3

Several attempts were made to reach out to Russian respondents. It seems that current geopolitical realities complicated matters.

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is that they were launched through grass-roots efforts by their respective local communities. Where the majority of institutions of higher learning in the Arctic established up to around the 1950s were primarily initiated through top-down governmental efforts to ensure education, the smaller institutions that came about during the two waves seen in Figure 1 came about through bottomup efforts by communities in need of local options: “It started in the mid-to-late 1980's, there was a committee that formed and [...] they were promoting this idea. There is a pretty good story behind this…they had tables at shopping malls to promote this idea of a university, and people were encourage to give [small amount] to the university fund, right…to this day I still hear from people, this is 30 years later, of how they gave their [small amount], right? It was almost as if they were buying shares in the community–so it was a grass-roots movement, and they managed to convince the government to commit resources” (Olsen, MM. 2023a).

“Historically, you look at the boarding-school era where our people had to leave the community to go to education, even [name of boarding school] had 8 or 9 years old students…even younger, so, having education here at home is something very important for our people and for our communities so they don't have to leave” (Olsen, MM. 2023b).

Due to the often immense distances within the Arctic, governmental efforts to initiate institutions of higher learning tend to be centred around highly populated areas, and regions that are geographically cut off from accessible infrastructure are often overlooked. Local solutions, then, emerge through the efforts of local elders, municipal councils, cultural enthusiasts and other firebrands.

Q2: Challenges and barriers facing the community around the institution Aware of the multitude of stigmatic social issues facing many of the remote communities within the Arctic region, I was wary of probing too far into the territory of socioeconomic maladies. All interviewees steered clear of any such discussions on their own accord. The institutions interviewed are all located geographically in areas or regions that tend to rely heavily on resource extraction: fisheries, mining, mills, farming or husbandry. For that reason, the communities they serve can be subject to economic booms and busts. For many communities, these fluctuations can severely impact social stability, an often overlooked variable that can be quite challenging for small institutions. The most general and obvious commonality for the institutions is remoteness and infrastructural challenges due to geography. All but one are located far away from urban centres, and the areas they serve tend to be isolated further, requiring air travel or lengthy trips by ship or busses. This type of isolation tends to be a challenge in attracting students and also staff interested in remaining in the community long-term. Geographic isolation tends to translate into a scarcity of resources, and bootstrapping an institution from the bottom up can often come with very practical challenges in terms of purely daily operations. A number of the institutions interviewed are not housed in conventional purpose-built campuses but have to make do with whatever local resources allow: “[O]ne main area is our physical infrastructure, we are operating out of a 1940's naval infrastructure, so we have 13 different buildings [...] and we are not connected to the main water and sewer utility from our town. It doesn't feel like a college, because it wasn't built to be a college...so our location and our facilities, we have out-grown it...it's, some of the areas are

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dilapidated, we can't work on it, because of the asbestos, so we are very much in need of new facilities” (Olsen, 2023b).

Q3: Community engagement (cultural, economic, environmental) While the initial cut-off point for inclusion in the initial survey was 5000 students or fewer, most institutions dealt with here have substantially lower numbers of students. Some as low as 150. This naturally entails limited access to facilities and restrictions on offices and teaching spaces. An interesting commonality of these institutions is their ability to increase the scope of their activities by bleeding into the surrounding community in clever ways. For some, the community is used to secure vocational internships and off-site practical training. Most seek to establish long-term partnerships with local industries. Examples such as mutually beneficial collaborations with farmers, herders and hunters to extend teaching capabilities (veterinary sciences, biology and cultural studies) are common. There was little focus on environmental sustainability during the interviews, but some interviewees offered the occasional local perspective on how it figured into academic pursuits. “[B]ecause of our geographic location, the local environment around the school…it becomes a natural extension, or an obvious tool to use in our classes–drilling for ice-cores, temperature measurements and observations of local plants and animals. It’s natural for our researchers, and I think…I think it is also simply expected by our students…that when we can open the door and step outside to have classes there…that, that is something that we do…I guess, somewhat naturally…” (Olsen, 2023c).

“Oh yeah, we do that. We purchased snow-machines and we have had people make sleds, so that our science classes are in the field, they do snow-samples, specific science studies that are related to the specific environment here, so they can utilise the land, we grow a lot of plants–medicinal plants, they are on the field and learning our local history and knowledge” (Olsen, 2023b).

In many instances, environmental and cultural aspects very much rub up against each other. To a large extent, this is also something that is very much ingrained in being Faroese (referring to myself); the environment is culture, and it can be hard to separate the two in casual conversation.

The subsistence way of life that is the norm within these communities is inextricably linked with nature and the environment. Food is the obvious example: [W]e had something called [cultural night], so having a cultural night…you cook soup and have traditional foods and you allow for staff who are new here to come be a part of the experience as well as our students, and they were such a hit that we had that responses from our students that they would like to have them once a month, and we can then bring in our cultural experts and utilise our space and opportunity to bring in our elders, so that they create a familiar atmosphere and be rooted in our cultural body…and I think that is something very different than a larger institution of education can offer (Olsen, MM. 2023b).

Q4: Definitions of sustainability.

After spending roughly an hour with each interviewee, a similar pattern of attempting to draw out definitions of sustainability emerged. In most cases, after several attempts to coax interviewees to see that generally, their answers were indeed circling types of sustainability, be it environmental, cultural, or economic, direct modes of questioning were often needed. Trying to get the point across without asking leading questions required some finagling persuasion. With the interviews Community-based co-creation for sustainability as an academic fourth mission

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completed, this fact had me puzzled. It took a while to understand that this classification of sustainable might be an apt way of conceptualising behaviour post-factum, as I will now attempt to do–but that, as it was relayed to me, these actions were likely understood by the interviewee as immediate and pragmatic solutions to very complex problems that would otherwise go underserved. Utilising the local environment and the stakeholders in the surrounding community wasn’t meant as a deliberate act of sustainability but rather as a matter-of-fact necessity. I feel this is the same reason that the topic of the environment only came up in conversations sparingly–in many ways, the culture is the environment and the environment is the culture. The environment is always assumed–not part of a sustainability equation needing solving. Soil erosion, changes in migratory patterns, warming oceans, disappearing hunting grounds– these are all lived and assumed complexities of operating a small Arctic institution of higher learning on the periphery. “[...] you can define sustainability however broadly you want to, right? I mean, often we focus on environmental sustainability. And I think that's been some, you know, somewhat of a focus [here] through our different programming. We have environmental studies, natural resources and environmental studies programs that focus a lot on that. But I think also, I mean, sustainability is about economic sustainability. It's about regional sustainability. It's about even the sustainability of the university itself. [We are] a standalone institution [...] and maintaining that independence is very important. In terms of sustainability, things like enrollment and [...] regional programming going back to those things, you know, we need to figure out those issues in order for us to be sustainable. These institutions are providing trained people who…who are often from the north. So they see their futures here and they want to give back to the communities where they live, whether that's indigenous communities or non-Indigenous communities. So, yeah, [...t]hat was one of the founding…, the reason why, [we] were created–to build that kind of capacity in the north” (Olsen, 2023a). “[We] would see it in a couple of different ways, sustainability I think of as self-sustainability of being a tribal college and of being who we are, we wanna maintain and continue who we are and being able to be a college that provides, we wanna sustain and we wanna be here with our culture.

That can mean funding and diversifying our funding [...] I would look at that as operational– then you think of the cultural part, of language preservation, cultural learning and keeping our cultural knowledge and our subsistence way of life, hunting, the land, the language and...I see it in those two different ways...as a college financially and making sure we are in compliance with our accreditation and continue to exist as a college, but then being embedded in our culture and in being tribal” (Olsen, 2023b).

Q5: How sustainability is used to combat challenges within the community Taken in aggregate, these interviews revealed an insight that I think is often overlooked, perhaps even by these institutions themselves–as one interviewee noted: “[W]hat the university does or has done is almost like act as an economic stabiliser, right? Because the university exists no matter what the resource economy is doing” (Olsen, 2023a). In regions experiencing booms and busts in the economy, a comparatively large local institution of learning absolutely can have a noticeable balancing effect on the local economy in that it not only offers salaries to the staff that re-enter the economy–but it can also readily function as an intermediary between the community and its industry. However, this stabilising effect is not limited to economic sustainability; it extends to cultural sustainability for all the interviewed institutions in many different ways. Without explicitly stating as much, all

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institutions had cultural sustainability as an inherent operational aim, focusing on language preservation, history, values and norms. For a number of institutions, this was made explicit through open-door policies that invite the community into the institution for cultural events and workshops. For some communities, these institutions provide access to facilities and larger venues able to host local gatherings and thus facilitate interactions between cultural experts, researchers and the community.

“Since this is a very small place, and we have modern facilities, a lot of the cultural activities and other community-based activities come through our buildings…and, and we spend a lot of effort on being welcoming and inviting to the surrounding community” (Olsen, 2023c).

For most institutions, operational continuation and financial survival is a key concern. This often intense focus that they have, as quoted above, on self-sustainability and perpetuation seems to be mirrored in the student body. As one source candidly revealed, as they were about to initiate a week-long workshop with students and staff on the Sustainable Development Goals, discussions concerning sustainability can sometimes complicate matters. While the world is large and its problems legion, focusing on home can often have a surprisingly large impact.

“I think that our students, these young people, they really do care and they have a burning desire to make a difference. And, I think that they are going to be the ones to carry the torch, not only because they are young and idealistic, but also–don’t get me wrong–it’s their future…it doesn’t belong to old assholes like me and you. [...B]ut I do think that there might be a challenge in working with the Sustainable Development Goals and them being this very large diffuse, global and complex thing to take on–and then translating it into something local where they as students feel can make a real difference–that bridge, I feel, is all-important” (Olsen, 2023d).

Especially one of the conversations crystalised a mismatch between what the idea of sustainability is perceived as, and how it actually fails to engage. A notion that sustainability is a concept that is defined externally and forced onto a community is a repeated sentiment in several interviews: “[We] are fed these ideas of sustainability from the media and social media…and I can get this sense of “bah!”...perhaps not fed-up with it, but at least that we as a school need to become part of making it familiar to us…to make sure that it is recognisable” (Olsen, 2023f).

As we continue this discussion, we veer into how the Saami people are and have been at the centre of a prolonged debate on the construction of windmills in Northern Norway. While this will not be dealt with here (see Nilssen. 2019), our discussion is rather in relation to the often harsh discourse directed at the Saami and how that might impact Saami youth. We end up circling back to this idea of small Arctic schools and universities catering to indigenous or culturally distinct students functioning as stabilisers–in this case, as cultural stabilisers. Talking about what would happen if this particular school were to cease operations, we come back to the meaning of sustainability: “I mean, being young [Saami] today, there has been research done on this–the harshness of the discourse against Saami. I think this school is extremely important for them to get a sense of security in order to resist such treatment. [...] If you read comments online [i.e. discussing Saami rights and politics] it is extremely offensive, it is really quite serious stuff. So, I think…that it is important that the youth here have a safe and empathetic harbour here”.

MMO: “...but, would you not call that sustainability?”

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“[laughs and pauses]...well, it probably is sustainability [laughs]. I never thought of it that way.

But, yes, it is. It is…” (Olsen, 2023f).

Discussion and Conclusion This article focuses its attention on institutions of higher learning in the Arctic, particularly smaller institutions with fewer than 5000 students. It aims to take on as pragmatic an approach as possible without veering into the varied political histories within the multitude of Arctic communities– focusing on smallness. The main reason for this is the inclusion of the present research in the context of a larger research project, but certainly also that the severity and complexities of these histories would be far beyond the scope of the article.

I am, by far, not the first to point out the complexities of defining the concept of sustainability.

Robert O. Vos, writing in 2007 (Vos, 2007: 335), already notes that definitions of sustainability number in the hundreds. Nor am I breaking new ground in terms of pointing out complexities in defining sustainability within the context of the Arctic; Gad and Strandsbjerg, in their (2018) volume on the politics of sustainability in the Arctic, do so at length. Shorty (2022) expertly deals with this from an indigenous angle, and Huhmarniemi and Jokela (2020) do so regarding culture and arts.

These definitional complexities within Arctic academia also seem very much present. Very few of the surveyed institutions have published definitions of sustainability (nor are the majority required to do so), making it difficult to zero in on any type of consensus in terms of how sustainability is defined regionally. The interviews conducted, to some degree, mirrored this lack of definition.

None of the respondents interviewed, in clear terms, offered on their own accord that their institution was sustainable. Institutional operations were, in the context of economics, culture and environment, overwhelmingly referred to in terms of having a stabilising effect but not as being sustainable. Only when pressed that these were often interchangeable did respondents agree that their institution was acting sustainably. Clear definitions of academic sustainability, however, did not form.

Based on the previous personal and professional experience, prior research (ex: Blaxekjær et al.

2018; Olsen, 2020; Olsen, 2021), the quantitative survey conducted before this qualitative study, and finally, the interview included herein – a picture is painted of smaller Arctic institutions of higher learning – often operating as hybrid-institutions, that are lacking in resources and removed from urban centres. They tend to service highly localised student bodies, often consisting of cultural minorities, and they generally function as facilitators or conduits for economic, cultural and ecological activities within their communities. Crucially, they also often connect conventional aspects of sustainability (environmental, social and economic) as a form of civic glue. The core reason the concept of sustainability is so elusive and difficult to discuss is primarily how diffuse and multi-faceted it is as a subject. The interviews presented here reveal a far more nuanced perspective on what constitutes sustainability–compared to any of the other research I have been involved in recently. Not only does it become clear that “sustainability” is so ingrained in the ethos of these smaller institutions that it is taken for granted and not necessarily considered sustainability–but, rather, a by-product of survival and continuation. Resilience, rather, would be a more fitting term to use in this context. The institutions surveyed are not sustainable because they have chosen to implement the SDGs or have produced strategic policies. They are sustainable, economically,

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culturally and environmentally because there is no other way for them to operate. The discourse on sustainability in academia is sidetracked or muddled by this duality of terms.

Elsewhere (Olsen, and Rosati, forthcoming), based on a systematic literature review of publications from around the world, we point to evidence that there is an emerging movement within academia to restructure academic institutional operations in such a way as to better work with issues of sustainability. We argue that the current conventional organisational and institutional structures fall short of solving complex issues related to sustainability that require collaboration and varied stakeholder involvement. While drivers behind this change are based on the interests of students, educators and external spheres of interest such as NGOs and industry, we see that barriers to change can overwhelmingly be blamed on inflexible and rigid academic modes of operations. The educators and academic staff referenced in our review all go beyond what is generally considered conventional academic mission statements–teaching, researching and dissemination. There, we find that globally speaking, the most successful efforts to introduce sustainability within academia are based on what can best be described as community-based co-creation that is highly in line with the framework being put forward by Trencher et al. (2014). To combat academic inertia within the field of sustainability, they (ibid) insist that institutions of higher learning embark on restructuring towards becoming transformative universities. These would be universities that systematise their approach to the three academic pillars mentioned so that it is possible to go beyond teaching, researching, and disseminating–towards an all-encompassing ethos of co-creation. They similarly track these emerging trends and find that universities that are especially focused on this idea exhibit eight different paradigms of social engagement (Table 1 below), all centred around active community and stakeholder collaborative efforts.

Paradigms for successful co-creation as listed by Trencher et al. (2014)

Survey findings: Operational activities smaller Arctic institutions of higher learning

LIVING LABORATORIES

Engagement of university research and expertise to establish, monitor and evaluate real-life experiments and social inventions. Use of urban environment as open collaboration area

Institutions tend to have small physical spaces or lack conventional campus areas. Operations spill over into the community and the surrounding urban and geographic environment.

TRANSDISCIPLINARITY

Joint problem-solving of real-world problems with multiple actors from society and academia.

Practise-oriented approach.

Local experts and elders become part of teaching or overall coursework to address local issues, often related to cultural aspects.

SERVICE LEARNING

Application of educational programmes to extra- Due to the size of communities, courses tend to focus on curricular activities for tackling localised, real- local issues dealing with environmental issues, food world problems production, social issues and the like.

COOPERATIVE EXTENSION SYSTEM

Dating back to 1914 and the land-grant system, an outreach and technology transfer portal to drive local community and rural development.

Institutions become facilitators and act as conduits for civil society and industry interaction.

PARTICIPATORY AND ACTION RESEARCH

Collaborative problem defining, a fusion of researcher and subjects, empowerment of reflective social change

Researchers and educators use the community to practise their work, bringing students into the field and engaging local experts and industry.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Alignment of university functions with regional economic development goals. University plays active role in regional governance.

Institutions are a main actor that engages with local development practically. Research projects and courses are geared towards local development.

URBAN REFORM

Targeted economic revitalisation by directing Low on monetary resources, institutions tend to opt for university financial resources to the local facilitation and playing an active role in the development community and real-estate development. of the local community.

Teaching

Research

of

Dissemination

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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

4th mission

CO-CREATION SUSTAINABILITY

FOR

Commercialisation of research results, societal contribution through economic development

Transferral of research and educational results are mainly cultural or vocational.

Internal and external collaborative co-creation on local issues concerned with cultural, economic and environmental sustainability.

Due to their size, lack of resources or geographic placement, institutions are forced to engage with aspects of sustainability through co-creation.

Table 1: Adapted and expanded upon Figure 1 “Research & Social Engagement Paradigms in Trencher et al. (2014:4). They list the following eight constituent parts as, when combined, making up the 4th mission statement.

These eight paradigms listed by Trencher et al. (2014) all centre around activities that engage the local communities served by universities and institutions of higher learning. They focus on real-life solutions that can alleviate and solve societal problems. They are activist and transformative and acknowledge that co-creation is the best way for actors to engage with complex issues. For the institutions that Trencher et al. point to in their work, these paradigms are novel, and none encompass all eight principles. The Arctic institutions featured herein reveal themselves to come exceptionally close to embracing the full gamut of the listed paradigms–not as an active pursuit of sustainability in terms of the SDGs, but rather as a pragmatic solution to survival. Just as the economy, the environment and culture often fuse and can be hard to separate for most respondent institutions–so we see a similar melding between education, research and dissemination. Whereas the economic, cultural and environmental aspects of sustainability are taken to mean stability, the overlaps between institutional operations regarding education, research and dissemination produce a similar result through community-based co-creation. Interestingly, for these very small institutions, the sustainability components (economy, culture, environment) also fuse with institutional missions (teaching, researching, dissemination) due to a need for stability and how it is engaged through co-creation.

References Blaxekjær, L., Olsen, MM. et al. (2018) The Sustainable Development Goals and Student Entrepreneurship in the Arctic. Arctic Yearbook 2018, Akureyri: Northern Research Forum and UArctic Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security.

Bourdieu, Pierre ([1972] 1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge University Press.

Flyvbjerg (2011) Case Study. Chapter 17:301-316 in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, 4th Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011.

Gad and Strandsbjerg (2018) The Politics of Sustainability in the Arctic: Reconfiguring Identity, Space, and Time. Routledge.

Huhmarniemi and Jokela (2020) Arctic Arts with Pride: Discourses on Arctic Arts, Culture and Sustainability. Sustainability 2020, 12(2), 604.

Lauritsen, S. E., Olsen, MM. et al. (2019) Educating Arctic Entrepreneurs: The next generation of sustainable pioneers. Nordregio report on entrepreneurship in the Arctic. Published by the Nordic Council of Ministers.

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Meyer, J. and Jepperson, RL. (2021) Introduction: Cultural Institutionalism (pp. 3–24), in Institutional Theory: The Cultural Construction of Organizations, States, and Identities, Meyer, J. and Jepperson, RL. (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nilssen, TR. (2019) South Saami Cultural Landscape Under Pressure. Ch. 9 in Hermanstrand, H. et al (2019) The Indigenous Identity of the South Saami: Historical and Political Perspectives on a Minority within a Minority. Springer Open; Springer International Publishing.

Olsen, MM. (2020) University of the Faroe Islands: From Nation-building to Nation-branding. Økonomi & Samfund 93(4); Special issue on the Faroe Islands, Blaxekjær, LØ (ed). Djøf Forlag: Copenhagen [published in Danish].

Olsen, MM. (2021) An Academic Lead in Developing Sustainable Arctic Communities: Co-Creation, Quintuple Helix, and Open Social Innovation. Chapter 7 in: Natcher, D. and Jokela, T.: Renewable Economies in the Arctic. Routledge.

Olsen, MM., Rosati, F., Li-Ying, J. (forthcoming) Universities as Agents for Entrepreneurship and Innovation for the Sustainable Development Goals: A Systematic Literature Review [Manuscript submitted for publication].

Olsen, MM. (2023a) Interview with a First Nations institution in Western Canada. Interview conducted March 30th, 2023. Interview conducted in English.

Olsen, MM. (2023b) Interview with an Iñupiat institution in Northern Alaska. Interview conducted October 10th, 2022. Interview conducted in English.

Olsen, MM. (2023c) Interview with an institution in Northern Norway. Interview conducted November 8th, 2022. Interview conducted in Danish and Norwegian, quotes translated.

Olsen, MM. (2023d) Interview with an Inuit institution in Greenland. Interview conducted March 20th, 2023. Interview conducted in Danish, quotes translated.

Olsen, MM. (2023e) Interview with a rural institution in Iceland. Interview conducted March 21th, 2023.

Interview conducted in English.

Olsen, MM. (2023f) Interview with a Saami institution in Norway/Sápmi. Interview conducted April 21th, 2023. Interview conducted in Danish and Norwegian, quotes translated.

Shorty, N. (2021) Sustaining Indigenous Knowledge as Renewable “Resources”. Chapter 8 in: Natcher, D. and Jokela, T.: Renewable Economies in the Arctic. Routledge.

Trencher, G. et al. (2014), Beyond the third mission: Exploring the emerging university function of co-creation for sustainability. Science and Public Policy, 41(2): 151–179.

UArctic (nd) Members. University of the Arctic website: www.uarctic.org/member-profiles.

Vos, RO. (2007) Perspective. Defining Sustainability: A Conceptual Orientation. Journal of Chemical Technology and Biotechnology, 82:334-339.

Community-based co-creation for sustainability as an academic fourth mission

Briefing Note

How Expert Communities Contribute to the Arctic Governance Systems as and beyond Knowledge Holders

Yang Jian

Introduction Arctic governance is structurally a complex mechanism, but fundamentally it is a political field that distributes social resources through some policy-option procedures. Expert communities have always played the role of innovators and guides in social development and human progress. Arctic affairs are a combination of global and local public affairs. The knowledge-based authority of experts has helped them to gain great influence in the Arctic international governance agenda. This influence is not only reflected in their contribution of knowledge but also in their role to form the rules in governance systems. The theme of the International Polar Year IPY Montreal Conference in 2012 is "from knowledge to action," which shows that expert communities are not satisfied with only publishing scientific facts and knowledge but are willing to take more active actions and inputs in influencing policy shaping and making. This article focuses on the power sources, mobilization capabilities, and institutional contributions of the expert communities in participating in the political process of global governance.

The needs for knowledge for the evolution of Arctic governance system The diffusion of knowledge is a process that moves from discovery by the few to common knowledge by the many. The dynamics of social acceptance of the diffusion of scientific knowledge are generally twofold: first, when knowledge becomes a necessity for members of society and, at the same time, an important tool for the development of productivity and international competitiveness of a country. This was evident in the early stages of industrialization. The second is when scientific knowledge reveals common challenges and crises faced by society and the public and when such crises require a concerted effort by members of society (or the international society)

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to address them. The second situation is more in line with the needs of governance in the era of globalization. The way of allocating resources by market forces or by a single national government is no longer able to solve some of the major problems that transcend national boundaries and affect the whole world, such as the environment, ecology, climate, infectious diseases, and so on. The capacity and role of Arctic expertise community in steering global governance in the era of globalization and information technology is beginning to expand.

Knowledge has decisive significance for the evolution of governance systems. The lack of knowledge accumulation will limit the depth and breadth of institutional innovation, and the increase in knowledge stock will help improve human society's ability to discover institutional imbalances and to take a move to create some changes. Human exploration and research on the Arctic are still quite insufficient, especially the accumulation of knowledge on the relationship between Arctic changes and the entire Earth system. Many reports on Arctic governance emphasize the important role of knowledge. 1One of the main contradictions faced by Arctic governance is the contradiction between the increased human activities in the Arctic and the relative lack of systems of Arctic governance. One of the real reasons for the gap in governance is the lack of knowledge. Limited knowledge will affect the speed, depth, and breadth of the formation of Arctic governance systems.

The demand for knowledge in Arctic governance is multifaceted. In summary, there are approximately four kinds of knowledge required, namely: the first kind of knowledge is about observing and the relevant facts. The second kind of knowledge is about technologies and means for ecological and environmental protection; The third kind of knowledge is about sustainable development knowledge and technology innovation; The fourth kind of knowledge is about the belief system that are helpful to form governance system. The above four kinds of knowledge are interrelated and jointly construct a knowledge-based support system for the Arctic governance system. The expert communities need to acquire these four kinds of knowledge and organize them into a social system with a professional and scientific spirit.

The first kind of knowledge is the systematic integration of information on various changes in the Arctic natural environment, such as climate change, glacier retreat, sea ice melting, and other information that affects the natural and social ecosystems of the Arctic. These scientific data obtained through observation can reveal the causal relationships behind phenomena, and scientists can make predictions and confirm certain inferences based on data. The continuous improvement and enrichment of the database have promoted the accumulation of knowledge about Arctic changes, which is conducive to improving the predictive ability of the assessment system. The series of reports of the Arctic Council's Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) play a fundamental role in ranking the urgency of the Arctic governance agenda in the formation of the Arctic governance system. 2 The second kind of knowledge is about technologies and means of ecological and environmental protection. The third kind of knowledge is about sustainable development knowledge and technology. The second kind of knowledge and the third kind of knowledge involve two aspects of the Arctic issue: one is to protect the Arctic, and the other is to pursue interests and development. The balance between the second kind of knowledge and the third kind of knowledge just reflects the sustainable concept of seeking development through effective protection. To achieve a balance between the two, knowledge-based technology applications and management

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solutions are needed. The scientific discoveries and knowledge accumulation of the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) and the Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) help establish governance in various fields of the Arctic based on accurate scientific data and ecological logic. The expert groups have proposed systematic and coordinated principles for Arctic governance regulations from the top-level framework, providing a foundation for principle-based governance. The expert groups have completed various reports on the impact of climate change on Arctic flora and fauna, Arctic fish, and local communities through research, providing a basis for determining the goals and timelines in specific-functional Arctic governance. In terms of biodiversity, scientists have conducted a series of assessments in Arctic protected areas from the perspective of ecological and social significance. Based on depicting the internal connections of the Arctic ecosystem, they have provided a well-designed protected area division and protection measures for local governments. The third kind of knowledge requirements mainly come from the response of technology applications for business. The resources and waterways of the Arctic region will be further integrated into the global market. To achieve sustainable and moderate development, it is necessary to ensure that the speed and scale of development are within the range that the Arctic ecosystem can support and to innovate green technologies and production methods. Technological innovation and knowledge reserve regarding resource utilization in fragile environments are the technological foundation for improving the Arctic governance system.

The fourth kind of knowledge is the belief system required for the social support of Arctic governance systems. Both political and economic arrangements in the system require extensive social support. Sharing the belief in knowledge, information, and governance objectives only among expert groups and decision-makers cannot enhance governance systems. Once a knowledge system is widely accepted by the public in a certain society, it will stimulate and accelerate the rearrangement of the political and economic system of that society. When the popularization of the knowledge system reaches a high level that can form a belief foundation for institutional change, it can provide a shared value and belief. Moreover, the popularization of these knowledge systems can actually reduce the cost of institutional change and promote rapid prototyping of governance institutions. Public support for Arctic governance goals largely stems from such a belief system.

The fourth kind of knowledge is crucial for international cooperation in the Arctic. Arctic governance is a global governance that includes multinational cooperation. Due to the nature of the tele-coupling of some Arctic issues, such as climate change, glacier retreat, and protection of migratory animals, Arctic governance needs to be coordinated between Arctic and non-Arctic countries. The transnational governance system aims to maintain the normal order of the international community and achieve long-term coexistence between humans and nature. The international organizations tasked with Arctic governance need scientific knowledge and the community of experts to support their authority and rationality that helps to establish new international moral and ethical standards, as well as related evaluation standards centered on fairness and impartiality. The community of experts can mobilize social capital and, make positive international commitments related to governance from various major relevant governments, and establish international principles, norms, standards, policies, agreements, etc. The Arctic Council's inclusion of China, India, South Korea, Japan, and other non-Arctic countries as observers is actually meaningful for spreading Arctic knowledge to countries outside the region. The operations of the China Nordic Arctic Research Center (CNARC)3 and the North Pacific Arctic Conference Yang

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(NPAC)4 are also a kind of practice for the expert community to coordinate international action through knowledge dissemination platforms.

Knowledge is Power: How Expert Communities Gain the Influence on Governance Systems Power is the capability of an actor to lead or to constrain other actors in the actual political process, relying on a certain strength advantage, resource advantage or institutional advantage, in order to realize certain interests or principles. Arctic governance is an action that requires a series of changes in the way that members of society behave (e.g., how they produce, how they consume, how they allocate social resources). Experts on Arctic issues do not have the advantage of political resources, but only immaterial resource ----knowledge. So the first thing they can do is to influence decisionmakers and the public by taking advantage of their independent intellectual insights and sharing knowledge. Decision makers are the groups with the ability to allocate resources, and the public are the taxpayers and voters who are able to express their support for or opposition to the policy of reallocation of resources.

According to Joseph Nye's concept, soft power is the ability to achieve a desired goal by attraction rather than coercion. 5 It can work by persuading others to conform, or by persuading them to agree to norms or institutions that produce the expected behavior. The intellectual soft power possessed by a community of experts can result in the formation of scientific ideas or cultural attractions, which in turn result in the formation of standards, institutions and values that can shape the preferences of others. If the concept of soft power is used to look at the roles of expert communities, it is clear that the systematic education of knowledge by expert communities is the use and exertion of this kind of soft power. Most of the individuals educated in this way are persuaded to follow the "laws of science" and to submit to a certain ethic based on knowledge.

An examination of the process of shaping the Arctic governance system can tell us that Arctic governance is a democratic process of public policy. What role does the community of experts play in this process? The purpose of democratic decision-making on public affairs is to allocate the responsibilities, obligations and rights of members in a society in a sensible and reasonable manner, to allocate public resources available for governance, and to resolve problems appropriately, while maintaining shared values. It is difficult to strike a balance between efficiency and fairness. Because each individual has his or her own small in-group interests, in most cases people will accept the rulings of the social system and the results of the democratic process, but are unwilling to make concessions to other groups or majority group interests. The combination of scientific procedures and democratic decision-making makes political decisions much more rational and effective. After understanding the facts and evidences of science, a consensus on the policy options can reached, and the responsibilities, interests and resources are redistributed among the members accordingly.

The professional training of scientists includes the advocation for the free flow of information and knowledge, which makes scientists relentlessly insist on their right to disseminate and interpret "facts" and "truths" globally. The exchange of information among scientists is also governed by the long-established rule of the game that one can oppose any assertion or conclusion, but not "the rationality of the free flow of information and the open debate of ideas", which is tantamount to giving scientists the morality and rationality to engage in social mobilization and political debates around the globe on international governance.

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Global governance is a public affair without a so-called world government to provide public goods.

The original intention of scientists to participate in governance and demonstrate mobilization is driven by their social responsibility in the global context. When they find that the resources for governance are not allocated as they expected, they will think about fully playing the mobilization capacity for global governance.

John G. Ruggie introduced the concept of epistemic community into the study of international organizations. 6 Epistemic communities are networks of experts and scholars in a given field who are recognized by the public for their professional authority and who use their transnational network platforms to influence or change the process and outcome of policymaking. Epistemic communities play an important role in the formation of shared values and the construction of transnational networks. The core of epistemic communities is the community of experts who hold the power of knowledge, and the authority of epistemic communities depends on the authority of experts' knowledge and information. Epistemic communities guide the rational allocation of social resources through the possession of knowledge, information and develop new modes of governance through the dissemination of new information and ideas, thus effectively achieving policy coordination and international governance. In the past half century, in the global protection of the ozone layer, the control of acid rain in Europe and the control of pollutants in the Mediterranean Sea, the epistemic communities centered on the community of experts have played a great role and promoted the development of international governance systems. Epistemic community members can institutionalize their knowledge in three ways: first, by setting development goals; second, by forming coalitions of opinion and action in support of knowledgebased policies; and third, by creating organizational entities for international governance based on their knowledge. 7 International governance activities are highly democratic, as there is no strong executive power on international governance platforms similar to that found in domestic politics within a country, and international governance activities enjoy more freedom of information dissemination with few restrictions similar to those found in domestic politics. In this context, expert communities enjoy a wider range of participation and have the opportunity to bring their modes of discussion and interaction to international governance platforms. At the level of international organizations, they are often in a position to shape the orientation and content of international law and agreements on the basis of scientific findings.

The role of experts in the negotiating process related to Arctic governance— —beyond the knowledge holders The public does not doubt the identity of expert groups as knowledge holders in Arctic governance.

Nonprofessionals consider popular scientific conclusions as the whole of science. But scientific explorers know that these conclusions constitute "science" only when they are linked to the methods used to reach them.8 Knowledge has characteristics such as the authority of truth and the complexity of the system, which can have an impact on the way human society is organized and managed. When various expert communities enter the governance process, they are not satisfied with only informing the public and decision-makers of scientific conclusions, but are willing to make institutional contributions to the effectiveness of governance. They implant the logic of science into the ideology of governance in the name of scientific popularization, the methods of

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scientific decision-making into the governance system, and the evaluation methods of scientific indicators into the governance process.

A set of institutional systems has been formed for the accumulation, acquisition and exchange of knowledge among experts. Transplanting this interactive mode of experts to the field of governance will have an impact on the negotiation of the governance system and the negotiation of governance goals. The larger the proportion of experts participating in a certain governance system, the easier it is for this system to become the mainstream system. Both scientific debate and democratic debate are a kind of discourse. The goal of a scientific debate is to reach a consensus on the "fact and truth" of some discipline. The goal of democratic debate is to reach a consensus on social public choices in a certain situation. The institutional formation process of Arctic governance is a combination of the above two consensus-building processes. They have something in common with the spirit of democratic co-governance. This commonality has a good ethical basis for the formation of corresponding institutional arrangements.

At the negotiating table for the Arctic governance for a specific regime, many players emerge. There are power holders, such as governments. Governments have the power to redistribute social resources. There are capital holders, such as corporations, who have the capital to develop various projects and industries. There are right holders, such as indigenous people. The Arctic indigenous people have important rights over the disposal of local resources while preserving their own rights to subsistence, way of life and cultural traditions. In Arctic affairs, the manifestation of such rights helps to enhance the favorable position in negotiations.

There is no doubt that, as analyzed earlier, expert communities are knowledge holders. In addition to being knowledge holders, expert communities may also play the role of right holders, competitors for policy options, pressurizers, and coordinators at the Arctic governance negotiation table.

Playing the role of right holders When the expert community talks about "sustainability", it often makes the following statement: the Earth is the only home on which human beings depend for their survival, and cherishing and caring for the Earth is the only option for human beings. Instead of developing in a destructive way, we should seek the path of sustainable development. We have to be responsible for future generations, while at the same time thinking about the present generation. Here, the community of experts has become a spokesperson for the rights of future generations. When the expert community talks about "biodiversity conservation", it actually becomes a spokesperson for the rights of other species (e.g., polar bears) by presenting data from scientific monitoring.

Playing the role of competitor and that of pressurizer The expert community can represent global interests in competing with governments on Arctic policy options. The community of experts could also propose some different governance programs with governments when the community of experts believes that the policies of certain governments are problematic.9 If governments are not willing to invest social resources in environmental protection, greenhouse gas emission reduction and environmental legislation, many governance ideas will remain on paper rather than being translated into action. Through the work of expert groups in international organizations or through the pressure of public opinion, the expert community has urged governments to enact laws, regulations and other mandatory measures to

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encourage enterprises to regulate their behavior, reduce or eliminate economic practices that do not guarantee environmental protection. Through media campaigns and international lobbying, the community of experts has led international organizations to adopt guidelines and declarations, thereby creating public pressure on Governments and enterprises.

The role of the community of experts in helping international organizations to enhance their independence and authority. The development of international organizations reflects the trend towards democratization of international relations and the characteristics of science-based decision-making. The increased role of the community of experts in international organizations is a reflection of this trend. Members of international organizations, especially the major Powers, often have a real veto or a great deal of dominant power in the activities of international organizations. In such cases, the intellectual authority of the community of experts is an effective means for international organizations to increase their independence and enhance their negotiating power with member states. In the context of sustainable development and global governance, international organizations encourage scientists to engage in science diplomacy and professional forums, which provide an intermediary link for consensus-building in the dialogue between governments.

Acting as a coordinator among multiple international governance systems The complex and overlapping layers of international organizations involved in Arctic governance create an expectation of coherent and organic linkages between the various international mechanisms. The expert community plays an important role as a coordinator. Scientists participate as experts or advisers in various fields of Arctic governance and in various international organizations. On the one hand, they can follow the track of the progress of various fields and organizations, and on the other hand, they can use their expert status to carry out coordination, promote discussion among various disciplines on important issues, and promote the consistency of goals in various governance fields. The expert community can utilize its professional strengths to organically combine various governance objectives.

Roles of expertise at different phases of the Arctic governance Arctic expert communities fit the characteristics of an epistemic community that has the ability to play a significant role in the process of Arctic governance such as setting the agenda or establishing rules and regulations. On the one hand, Arctic expert communities define the nature of Arctic issues through long-term scientific research and work to make policymakers aware of and address the challenges facing the Arctic; on the other hand, expert communities are important transnational actors who can use their transnational networks disseminate knowledge and consolidate established consensus, promoting fact-based governance policy and international cooperation.

In the first phase, the main role of the expert community is to identify and raise issues. It should be noted that the Arctic issue’s emerging in international politics is largely related to climate and environmental changes in the Arctic region. The Working Group of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme released a report "Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic" in 2011.10 The fact that the temperature in the Arctic region is increasing has been confirmed, which has greatly affected the perception of the Arctic region by the public and decision-makers. The Arctic region regulates the global climate. Against the background of global climate change, all aspects of the Arctic system have undergone the fastest changes in the past 400 years, even

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exceeding scientists' expectations. Because of this, policymakers and the public are increasingly paying attention to the Arctic. The international scientific community refers to the intricate environmental changes taking place in the Arctic as the "unaami". This term, derived from the Inuit, indigenous people in the Arctic, means "unknowable tomorrow", which expresses the worries of scientists all over the world about the unpredictable and uncontrollable future of Arctic environmental changes. The "unaami" phenomenon mainly has the following characteristics: 1.

The surface temperature of the Arctic land continues to rise. 2. Decrease in sea ice coverage in the Arctic Ocean. 3. The edge of the Greenland ice sheet is melting. 4. Continental snow cover and permafrost cover decreased, permafrost thawed, and river and lake ice decreased. 5. Increases in freshwater runoff, rainfall and snowmelt have reduced sea salinity in the Arctic Ocean, which has an impact on the cycle of the world's oceans. 6. Ocean warming. 7. A decline in sea level atmospheric pressure in the Arctic.

The experts define Unaami as the ongoing decadal, pan-arctic complex of intertwined changes in the Arctic physical system. The physical changes, in turn, alter the ecosystem and living resources and impact the human population. Thus, these biological and societal consequences may also be considered part of Unaami. The scientific community's definition of the issue of natural changes in the Arctic is related to the future of the earth and mankind, which naturally raises the attention of the Arctic in international affairs.11 The experts have developed four working hypotheses to guide research: (1) Unaami is related to the Arctic Oscillation related to temperature and ocean circulation. (2) Unaami is a component of climate change. (3) Feedback among the ocean, land, ice, and the atmosphere is critical to Unaami.

(4) The physical changes of Unaami have large impacts on the arctic ecosystems and society. The experts define their mission as follows: to find out whether the recent Unaami is tied to anthropogenic climate change or not, to describe (and ultimately attempt to predict) the ecosystem effects and societal impacts of Unaami, and to distinguish between the changes associated with the large-scale physical Unaami phenomenon and the changes due to human activities.

In the second phase, the role of the expert community is to disseminate new ideas and form a social consensus to promote "knowledge-based policy." The Arctic epistemic community has been working to bring the conclusions of scientific research into public awareness, a similar process like Townhall meetings to bridge the communication gap between the elite and the public, get every member of the society well-informed about updated facts and truths and plans. Misinformation is costly for each governance objective. In this phase, it is essential for the efficient flow of information and communication, including the feedback from the public.

Norwegian scientists hosted a three-year project called SciencePub under the initiative of the International Polar Year.12 That is to continuously improve the public's awareness of the Arctic natural environment through active publicity activities. These publicity activities include establishing an information-sharing network covering all partner institutions, training science journalists, and launching visualization and mobile exhibitions. It is worth noting that epistemic communities often collaborate with NGOs in the process of building consensus between the public and the policymakers. In fact, the most well-known role of NGOs is that of “advocacy networks,” which seek to influence policy by mobilizing public opinion to directly or indirectly put pressure on influential policy networks and groups and change policies. 12 For example, one of the important reasons why the issue of Arctic fisheries can quickly become a hot topic is the initiative of scientists

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and the lobbying of environmental NGOs. At the International Polar Year Conference held in Montreal, Canada in April 2012, The Pew Charitable Trusts of the United States distributed to the participants a letter of initiative signed by 2,000 scientists around the world, calling on governments to sign an international agreement on preventing uncontrolled commercial fishing in the central Arctic Ocean until a full scientific investigation is completed. 13 It shows that after the expert community reaches a consensus that is disseminated through the introduction of the media, enter the discourse system of decision makers and the public, a governance system begins to take its shape.

In the third phase, the expert community can provide policymakers with various policy options and their scientific basis. For example, as the most important working platform in Arctic governance, the working groups of the Arctic Council released a number of assessment reports based on scientific research at the Eighth Ministerial Conference in 2013, such as the “Arctic Biodiversity Assessment”, the "Arctic Marine Assessment Report", etc., carried out a scientific assessment of the current situation of the Arctic environment, and put forward a series of followup measures and guidance suggestions. The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA)" adopted in 2013 is the second legally binding agreement since the establishment of the Arctic Council after the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (SAR). The agreement is a precautionary measure by Arctic countries trying to curb large-scale oil and gas resource extraction in the Arctic in the future. It can also be regarded as a declaration that the Arctic Council will prioritize the protection of the environment and biodiversity in the Arctic region. Although policy choices cannot be entirely attributed to the expert community, it is clear that the highly specialized knowledge and information possessed by the expert community provide policymakers with a basis for policy choices, making it easier for policymakers to choose among existing policies to determine priority items on the agenda.

In the fourth phase, the role of the expert community is to maintain policy continuity through institutional design. The fourth phase is the deepening and institutionalization of the first three phases. Advancing international governance will inevitably involve interest calculations and power games among all parties involved. Disputes between different countries and interest groups can also shake the governance consensus that has just been established. Some countries and industries will also adopt negative policies for international cooperation in governance due to changes in the economic and political environment. Therefore, establishing a solid system is the key to ensuring policy continuity. While assisting in the construction of the governance system, the expert community must also institutionalize its own influence. Taking the governance of Arctic high seas fisheries as an example again, scientists have cooperated with NGOs to not only complete petitions, and publicize them, but also exert pressure on governments. They spent about five years in extensive discussions with governments, fisheries leaders and Indigenous leaders to seek an international agreement to protect Arctic high seas fisheries. In July 2015, under the impetus of the expert community and NGOs, the governments of the Arctic Ocean littoral countries signed a non-binding joint statement, no longer authorizing their fishing vessels to fish in the relevant waters.12 In October 2018, the five Arctic littoral countries as well as five non-littoral countries (Iceland, China, Japan, South Korea and the European Union) signed the “Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean” which initially established the order and model of fisheries governance on the high seas of the Arctic Ocean.

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In summary, the system of international governance is a regulatory system for maintaining the normal order of the international community as well as for realizing the goals of sustainable development. Modern global governance is a highly complex operation. If international organizations of all kinds are to gain more legitimacy and authority, they need to be supported by a scientific basis and governance tools, as well as a community of experts to educate the public in science and guide public opinion at the level of values and ethics. In adjusting the international system of Arctic governance, it is necessary to regulate international relations and order and to improve various international principles, norms, standards and procedures. In this process, expert communities have a remarkable ability to use their scientific knowledge to design and improve the system of Arctic governance, as well as to use their intellectual authority to mobilize social resources more broadly to achieve governance goals. Expert communities can provide Arctic governance with the scientific belief systems needed to build governance systems. New knowledge systems, once widely recognized by society, can stimulate the reorganization of societal governance systems and encourage governments to increase their investment in scientific research. By turning scientific discoveries, experiences and information into systematized knowledge, and by strengthening international learning exchanges and scientific and technological cooperation, expert communities have accelerated the accumulation of knowledge stocks as a whole and increased the momentum for change in the Arctic governance system.

Notes 1. Report of the Arctic Governance Project, Arctic Governance in an Era of Transformative Change: Critical Questions, Governance Principles, Ways Forward, 14 April 2010: 16.

2. http://www.amap.no/about/the-amap-programme/amaps-priority-issues.

3. The China-Nordic Research Center (CNARC) was established in Shanghai in 2013 by 10 Member Institutes, four Chinese and six Nordic, which all have capacities to influence and coordinate Arctic research. CNARC's purpose is to provide a platform for academic cooperation to increase awareness, understanding and knowledge of the Arctic and its global impacts, as well as to promote cooperation for sustainable development of the Nordic Arctic and coherent development of China in a global context.

4. Each year since 2011, a diverse group of Arctic specialists, researchers, practitioners, policymakers, private-sector representatives, and Indigenous Peoples and other community leaders from a variety of countries have met at the North Pacific Arctic Conference for wide-ranging discussions on Arctic issues, with a particular focus on the North Pacific region. the North Pacific Arctic Conference is Organized by East-West Center and supported by the Korea Maritime Institute.

5. Nye, J.S. (1990) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books: 31-32 6. John G. Ruggie , “International Responses to Technology : Concept s and Trends,” International Organization , Vol . 29, Issue.3, June 1975: 557-583.

7. Peter M. Hass. “Special Issue on Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization, Vol.46, No.1, 1992.

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8. John J. McDemott (eds), The Philosophy of John Dewey, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1973: 633.

9. Huang Zhixiong, ed., Non-Governmental Organizations in the Perspective of International Law: Trends, Impacts and Responses, the Press of China University of Political Science and Law, 2012: 20-24.

10. AMAP, SWIPA 2011 Executive Summary: Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic, 2011. http://www.amap.no/swipa/ 11. SEARCH SSC, SEARCH: Study of Environmental Acrctic Change, Science Plan,2001, Polar Science Center, Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington, Seattle: 3436 12. http://www.ngu.no/sciencepub/eng/ 13. Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Cornell University Press, 1998.

14. International Scientists Urge Arctic Leaders: Protect Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean. http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/projects/arctic-ocean-international/solutions/2000scientists-urge-protection.

15. Scott Highleyman, Negotiations for a Central Arctic Fisheries Accord Advance, December 15, 2016. http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2016/12/15/negotiations-for-acentral-arctic-fisheries-accord-advance.

References AMAP, SWIPA 2011 Executive Summary: Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic, 2011 Berkman, Paul Arthur. (ed), Science Diplomacy: Antarctica, Science, and the Governance of International Spaces, Washington, D.C. Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 2013, pp299-310.

Cross, Mai'a K. Davis “Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later,” Review of International Studies, Volume 39, Issue 01, January 2013.

Hardin, Russell. Collective Action, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,1982.

Hass, Peter M. “Special Issue on Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization, Vol.46, No.1, 1992.

Highleyman, Scott. Negotiations for a Central Arctic Fisheries Accord Advance, December 15, 2016 Jian, Yang. Power and Wealth in Cyberspace, Shanghai Century Publishing Group, Shanghai, 2013.

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Cornell University Press, 1998.

McDemott, John J. (eds), The Philosophy of John Dewey, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1973.

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Nye, J.S. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books,1990.

Pielke, Jr., Roger. Climate Politics. The Climate Fix: What Scientists and Politicians Won’t Tell You About Global Warming, New York: Basic Books, 2010.

Report of the Arctic Governance Project, Arctic Governance in an Era of Transformative Change: Critical Questions, Governance Principles, Ways Forward, 14 April 2010.

Ruggie, John G. “International Responses to Technology: Concept s and Trends,” International Organization , Vol . 29, Issue.3, June 1975.

SEARCH SSC, SEARCH: Study of Environmental Acrctic Change, Science Plan,2001, Polar Science Center, Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington, Seattle,2001.

Young, O. R. Governing Complex Systems: Social Capital for the Anthropocene, Massachusetts: the MIT Press, 2017.

Young, O. R. and Paul Arthur Berkman, “Governance and Environmental Change in the Arctic Ocean,” Science, Vol. 324, April17, 2009.

Zhixiong, Huang. ed., Non-Governmental Organizations in the Perspective of International Law: Trends, Impacts and Responses, the Press of China University of Political Science and Law, 2012.

How Expert Communities Contribute to the Arctic Governance Systems

Section IV: Knowledge and science

Cooperation by Design: Exploring the Dynamic of Trust in an Arctic Collaborative Project

Caoimhe Isha Beaulé & Pierre De Coninck

When Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples come together in a project to address issues relating to Arctic communities, how do fruitful collaborations come to be? Among the elements that constitute the approach for genuine cooperation and creativity in complex projects, trust is an indispensable ingredient. From a systemic and complexity paradigm and design lens, this article explores the “dynamic” of trust in collaborative projects involving Indigenous Knowledge and Peoples in the Arctic. How does the dynamic of trust within a collaborative project operate, evolve, and re-organise in action and how can we conceptualise it?

What factors influence cooperation and trust in Arctic collaborative projects? Guided by action research and project-grounded strategies in design, the research draws from the two-year Dialogues and Encounters in the Arctic (DEA) project that took place in the Indigenous Sámi context. Multiple qualitative tools were employed, including seven semi-directed interviews, two reflective journals, one workshop, and one post-project online group discussion. The research involved twelve DEA collaborators (both Indigenous Sámi and non-Indigenous). Our findings present results from a preliminary analysis, shedding light on the dynamic nature of trust in the DEA project through the example of in-person project encounters and ethical framework development, reflecting how trust weaves itself into a project's very fabric. We found that, amidst the complexities and various influences on trust dynamics (e.g., socio-political contexts, a global pandemic, or individual personalities), fostering consistent interaction between project collaborators emerges as an effective strategy to nurture a dynamic of trust. An ‘organising’ design approach is seen as being favourable to such processes.

Positionality statement As first author of this paper, I, Caoimhe Isha Beaulé, approach this research as a non-Indigenous doctoral researcher, of French-Canadian and Irish settler descent. My perspective is rooted in my role as a designer and coordinator in a collaborative project called Dialogues and Encounters in the Arctic (DEA), primarily conducted within Sápmi - the Sámi traditional homelands. This study involves both Indigenous (Sámi) and Non-Indigenous participants, all of whom were involved as collaborators in the DEA project. For clarity, Indigenous Sámi collaborators will be identified as (I), while non-Indigenous collaborators will be denoted as (NI)1. I conducted all the data collection, Caoimhe Isha Beaulé, cbeaule@ulapland.fi, Doctoral Candidate, Faculty of Art and Design, University of Lapland Pierre De Coninck, pierre.de.coninck@umontreal.ca, Full professor, École de Design, Université de Montréal

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processing, analysis, and most of the writing. The second author, Pierre De Coninck, contributed to the development of the theoretical and conceptual ideas presented in this paper and provided editing support. He is also co-supervisor of my doctoral thesis.

Introduction How do fruitful collaborations emerge when Indigenous and non-Indigenous people come together to work on significant social, cultural, and political challenges that concern Arctic2 and Northern communities, particularly in design-related initiatives? Arctic projects, including research activities, can quickly become challenging given the settings they operate in: extreme climates, fragile and changing ecosystems, remoteness, limited resources, and delicate socio-political landscapes. Given European colonial history in the Arctic and in research practices on Indigenous Peoples (Smith, 2012), developing relationships with communities is a crucial task (Doering et al., 2022) with trust-building playing a key role in the process (Gordon, 2017). As damages to relationships or trust can mean the failure of a project (Le Cardinal et al., 1997; Lillie et al., 2020), these areas require serious thought and ethical considerations when embarking on new collaborative journeys. The recent publication Comprehensive Policy-Brief to the EU Commission: Roadmap to Decolonial Arctic Research (Herman et al., 2023) mentions the need to rebuild trust between researchers and Indigenous communities. We extend this notion, arguing that fostering trust would be beneficial for all types of collaborative projects in the Arctic, especially those engaging with Indigenous Peoples and Knowledge.

Trust is ubiquitous in our daily activities and interactions, unconsciously influencing the outcomes of events and processes. Shortly, it can be defined as a “willingness to be vulnerable” (Mayer et al., 1995: 724). However, when trying to grasp the essence of trust, things are not as obvious. This is reflected in the various interpretations it has among disciplines (Rousseau et al., 1998). Trust’s role in supporting teamwork and cooperation (Avenier, 2000; Le Cardinal et al., 1997) and team creativity (Gong et al., 2012) is clearer, but the way it operates is less. Where does trust come from?

How does it emerge, maintain, or deteriorate in collaborative processes? How is it preserved beyond diverging interests or unforeseen challenges? In a study conducted by Indigenous researcher Heather Sauyaq Jean Gordon in a Greenlandic context (2017), trust arises as something that can be cultivated through action. This action entails knowing the community's history, establishing local contacts, engaging in open communication, mutual respect, adherence to Institutional Ethics, knowledge exchange, and giving back (Gordon, 2017: 243-247). Regarding researcher-Indigenous community relationships, Gordon’s study suggests that trust is nurtured through interactions or actions that occur within the broader context of a collaboration.

The potential of utilising co-creative and community-based approaches within transdisciplinary teams to address the complex problems encountered in the Arctic region has been recognised (Doering et al., 2022). Indeed, collective design practices (e.g., co-design, participatory design, cocreation, see Centazzo & Pope, 2023; Sanders & Stappers, 2008) are commonly used in projects involving multiple disciplines to address social issues and foster innovation. Though some research has addressed the notion of trust in the field of collective design practices (Clark et al., 2021; Parkinson & Warwick, 2019; Warwick, 2017), so far it has not been clearly modeled, as indicated

by Parkinson and Warwick (2019). Moreover, the ongoing discussion on the ethics and decolonisation of collective design practices, particularly ones involving Indigenous Peoples, has contributed to our understanding of the concept of ‘design’ and the way in which it is practiced Beaulé & De Coninck

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collaboratively (e.g., Akama et al., 2019; Mäkiranta & Yliotapio-Mäntylä, 2019; Shultz et al., 2018; Tunstall, 2013). Unreflective application of the frameworks, methods, and tools developed for Western contexts may perpetuate colonial legacies (Akama et al., 2019; Harrington et al., 2019; Janzer & Weinstein, 2014; Smith et al., 2020; Tunstall, 2013), for instance, when it comes to defining the ‘issue’ and its ‘solution’. Like what Gordon (2017) has highlighted in the context of researcher-community relationships in the Arctic, designers collaborating with Arctic Indigenous Peoples often lack adequate frameworks for cultivating the trusting relationships required for their work. As the outcomes of collective design aim to create practical solutions and not solely new knowledge, our article seeks to shed light onto the the ways of building a dynamic of trust in collective acts of design.

To further these reflections, we ask: How does the dynamic of trust within a collaborative project operate, evolve, and re-organise in action and how can we conceptualise it? What frameworks, processes or attitudes are favourable or detrimental to cooperation and trust? To explore these questions, we will draw from a two-year collaborative project that had Indigenous Sámi knowledge and Peoples at the centre of its activities: Dialogues and Encounters in the Arctic (DEA).

The article is structured as follows: First, we give background information on the DEA project.

Second, we define our theoretical lens by discussing the systemic and complexity paradigm and conceptualise the dynamic of trust, cooperation, and design within this framework. Third, we explain the qualitative methodology and methods employed, data collection, and subsequent analysis. The research used multiple qualitative tools to access the implicit and experiential knowledge held by DEA project collaborators. Specifically, the material collected includes seven semi-directed interviews, two reflective journals, one workshop, and one post-project online group discussion. In total, the research involved the twelve main DEA collaborators, equally divided between Indigenous Sámi and non-Indigenous participants, including the first author.

Finally, we present and discuss the findings of this preliminary phase of analysis3, which focuses on exploring the dynamic nature of trust through the DEA project and the experiences of the collaborators involved. We found that, amidst the complexities and various influences on trust dynamics (e.g., socio-political contexts, a global pandemic, and individual personalities), fostering consistent interaction among project participants emerges as an effective strategy. In sum, our study emphasises the importance of creating opportunities for engagements in all phases of collaborative work to achieve desired collaborative outcomes, which requires time and should begin as early as possible. Although further research is required to develop more knowledge of designing with Arctic communities, the research sees an “organising design project” approach (see de Blois & De Coninck, 2009) as being favourable to such processes.

The Dialogues and Encounters in the Arctic (DEA) project The ideas, empirical material and results presented in this paper stem primarily from a transdisciplinary, inter-organisational and intercultural two-year project (2020-2022) called Dialogues and Encounters in the Arctic (DEA), a collaborative effort aimed at initiating dialogue between the Arctic Indigenous Peoples and creating a network-based model for collaboration.

Although the project maintained an international outlook, the Indigenous Peoples and communities involved were Sámi as the project took place primarily within Sápmi, the traditional Sámi territory covering parts of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia4.

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Through a series of online and on-site workshops, the project intended to strengthen the ability of Indigenous Peoples to influence issues about their own culture, and document knowledge and information on Arctic Indigenous livelihoods, languages and culture, and issues affecting them.

These project activities covered three overarching themes: Indigenous food sovereignty and security, environmental observations, and Indigenous craft and design. The DEA initiative originated from and was led by the Sámi Education Institute (Sogsakk) in Finland and involved collaborative efforts with partners from the Faculty of Art and Design and Social Sciences at the University of Lapland in Finland as well as the Várdduo – Centre for Sámi Research at Umeå University in Sweden. This project united actors involved in Sámi education, Sámi handicrafts and design, Indigenous Knowledge, storytelling, and research, encompassing art and design, health, and social sciences.

The project actively engaged with Indigenous Sámi Knowledge and other ways of knowing (e.g., Indigenous, scientific, designerly). Thus, DEA provided a fruitful context to explore how different ways of knowing can have equal value, for instance local and scientific, thereby setting the grounds for a different approach to knowing and doing in the North (Valkonen, J., Valkonen, S. & Ingold, 2018). As DEA was not a research project, although it did involve some specific research activities, the strategies used by collaborators to engage, document, store, and share Indigenous Sámi Knowledge (árbediehtu - which translated to “inherited knowledge”, Jonsson, 2011) needed many ethical considerations from all collaborators involved to tailor the approach to the specific needs of the project. The general DEA ethical process was informed by Sámi collaborators involved, frameworks and recommendations from the university ethical advisors, and existing literature (e.g., Jonsson, 2011; Helander-Renvall & Markkula, 2017; Holmberg, 2020) given such guidelines are still under construction (Drugge, 2022). Collaborative approaches to data collection with Indigenous Peoples were particularly inspiring (see Basile et al., 2018).

The DEA collaboration started in early spring 2020. However, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which limited physical encounters locally and across borders, necessitated modifying the original project plan and forced the collaborators to reimagine the central ‘in-person’ workshop format. Despite the change in format, the core idea of the project remained the same. A dozen collaborators acted as the core DEA team during the project’s duration, with about 30 total participants in the various project workshops. The changes brought about by the pandemic led to unexpected results, namely, over 100 hours of documentary and educational films were created by two DEA collaborators from Sámi Education Institute (Sogsakk), which were later used in various parts of the project6.

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Image 1: Final lavvu dialogue workshop in Hetta, organised by the Sámi Education Institute (Sogsakk), photo by Jari Rantapelkonen, autumn 2021.

Image 2: Some lavvu workshop participants having lunch, Hetta, photo by Caoimhe Isha Beaulé, autumn 2021

Conceptual framework The conceptual framework of this paper is based on three core themes: Systemic and Complexity paradigm, the Dynamic of Trust in Collective Practices and Cooperation by Design.

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The Systemic and Complexity Paradigm The vision underlying this paper is part of a systemic and complexity paradigm, drawing primarily from Morin (1977; 1992a; 1992b; 2015) and Le Moigne (1999). According to these authors, we can view the world as a complex and interconnected system where the behaviour and properties of the whole emerge from the interactions and interdependencies of its parts. A system as a macro concept emerges from three core concepts: system, interaction, and organisation (Morin, 1992b). As such, the focus lies in the inseparable dynamics that take place within the system, for instance, the interactions between the parts and the whole (Morin, 1992b). Such interactions represent the interconnected web of relationships, behaviours, and responses that jointly shape a system (Morin, 1992b). Through these interactions and encounters emerges organisation which gives “constructive coherence, order, regulation, structure, etc., to the interactions” (Morin, 1992b: 376) while also creating disorder and degradation of the system and of itself (Morin, 1992b). Complex systems, or wholes, are in a state of perpetual construction and deconstruction, marked by the ongoing organisation and disorganisation that result from the interactions and encounters among their constituent elements, or parts (see Figure 1). Moreover, the coupling of complementary concepts within systems and how their cyclical interaction, for instance parts ⇄ whole are termed feedback loops (Tatchinovsky, 2018). According to Le Moigne (1999), a system operates because it changes, and it changes because it operates. In fact, following the principles of entropy, a system that does not change is a closed system and is destined to disappear.

Figure 1. Interconnection of whole, parts, organisation and interaction/ encounters.

Modification based on a model by Morin (1992b: 52)

As part of our reflection on the dynamic of trust within collaborative projects, we are particularly interested in Morin’s (1992b) idea of auto-eco-re-organisation. Based on the different concepts introduced previously, Morin views the organisation process as a process that is: auto (selforganising), eco (connected to its environment), re (continuous), organisation (creating order within emerging disorder). Thus, the process of interaction and organisation is not linear, with a clear start and end. When using the term “organising” we are referring to this auto-eco-re-organisation process, as opposed to an “organised” one, which is given and predetermined (see de Blois & De Coninck, 2009).

We can analyse a system in four levels: 1) parts, which can have different natures (tangible, intangible, actions, values, ideas, etc.); 2) the interactions between these entities; 3) the organisation

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of these interactions into subsystems; and 4) the interrelations with their environment(s) (Le Moigne, 1999).

The dynamic of trust in collective practices A widespread cross-disciplinary study on the topic of trust provides a general conceptualisation: “Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 395). Although this widely accepted definition informs us on some core aspects of trust, it does not reflect its complexity and its dynamic nature in the context of collective practices, which authors like Le Cardinal et al. (1997) and Avenier (2000) have highlighted. Trust is an essential ingredient for collaboration, serving as both a driver and as an outcome in the collaborative process (Avenier, 2000).

Thus, in collaborative processes, we theorise that trust is not just a state that should be measured in terms of scales or levels (+ or -). Rather, trust is also a process with auto-eco-re-organisation (organising) capabilities. In a non-linear and cyclical manner, trust is in constant evolution in collaborative projects: connecting (and self-connecting), maintaining (and self-maintaining), producing (and self-producing) (see Figure 2). It is shaped by the parts and whole it interacts with and in environments that are not only co-present but also co-determining as they interact with the system (ecosystem). By demonstrating the inherent complexity of trust in collaborative projects, it is easier to understand the pertinence of investigating the multiple ways in which it influences and is influenced.

Figure 2. Trust as an organising system: an infinite connecting (and self-connecting), maintaining (and self-maintaining), and producing (and self-producing) process. Adaptation from Le Moigne (1999: 75)

This presupposes a dynamic that evolves according to the development of the interactions between the entities involved (e.g., the actors of a project, laws and regulations), but also between these entities and their respective environments (e.g., historical contexts, interpersonal histories, the natural environment). Based on Morin’s (1977) systemic and complexity theory, we argue that we Cooperation by Design: Exploring the Dynamic of Trust in an Arctic Collaborative Project

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cannot isolate trust, a single system, from the network of systems within which it is nested. This is why we argue that, when examined in the context of collaborative work, trust should be conceptualised from a systemic and complex perspective, considering interconnections and nonlinear dynamics, rather than investigating it with a Cartesian, linear cause-and-effect approach (Le Moigne, 1999; Tatchinovsky, 2018).

Cooperation by design In the context of enhancing our understanding of successful collaborative work, trust is intricately linked with cooperation. Le Cardinal et al. (1997) describe cooperation5 as the outcome of effectively managing interactions within a dynamic of trust in a project. The authors highlight that cooperation should not be seen as a luxury to hope for when things go well, as the failure to achieve such a state opens the door to a multitude of negative consequences, including conflict and violent disruptions. Instead, cooperation is viewed as an essential condition for the success of complex projects, fostering creativity, enabling effective administration, and ensuring the sustainability of partnerships (Le Cardinal et al., 1997). The authors also make a distinction between genuine cooperation, characterised by a dynamic state eased by mutual trust, where creativity flourishes, and what is termed “non-non-cooperation”. In such cases, parties might be involved in a collaborative project but lack the willingness to really work together, for instance, if bound by contractual obligations. The intricate relationship between trust and cooperation holds significance not only in collaborative work but also in the domain of design processes that rely on collaborative work for the solutions they try to create.

Design has been described as an approach with organising capabilities (Alvarez & De Coninck, 2016; de Blois & De Coninck, 2009; de Blois et al., 2016). Like an auto-eco-re-organising system, design projects are characterised by their iterative nature. The outcomes of design processes and thinking are not pre-determined but emerge gradually through cycles of testing and feedback (see Brown & Katz, 2009; Cross, 2011; Dorst, 2011, 2019). The project, for example, community empowerment, is viewed as a driver within these processes (Kaine et al., 2010). Boutinet (2010) broadly defines a project as a deliberate approach aimed at achieving a specific objective (it is designed) and views a project as a response to a problematic situation or a desire for improvement.

It involves the mobilisation of resources (knowledge, skills, material means, etc.) and an anticipated process of action. The project involves two stages: the project before (conception) and the project after (completed product) (Boutinet, 2010: 77), making a clear distinction between the project (e.g., community empowerment), the designed and anticipated action, and the product, a result of project activity (e.g., the development of a sustainable and viable business model based on Indigenous livelihoods) (Kaine et al., 2016; Ninacs, 2008).

Thus, we assume that approaching project conceptualisation and planning in an organising, designorientated manner creates an environment favourable to the development of a dynamic of trust and the organising abilities of communities and collaborators.

Methodology & Methods This section presents the process behind the empirical research material collection and subsequent material analysis.

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Collecting empirical research material As discussed above, this research takes a systemic paradigm approach. We seek to understand everything that composes the system and are particularly interested in the interplay between the parts and the whole. This research is of exploratory nature and uses a cyclical abductive reasoning.

The research strategies used are based on Action research (Reason & Bradbury, 2008; Villari, 2014) and project-grounded research (Catoir-Brisson & Watkin, 2021; Findeli, 2008; 2015) approaches in design. The “project”, in this case DEA, acts as the fieldwork of the study with the project process and outcomes being part of the research (Raiche-Savoie & Déméné, 2022).

The empirical material used as part of this paper was collected in four different ways involving the main DEA project collaborators (see Table 1) following a thorough ethical process7. The material was collected both during and post-project: one workshop (drawing from focus group method, Krueger & Casey, 2002), seven semi-directed interviews (Savoie-Zajc, 2009), two reflective practice journals (method inspired by Gibbs, 1988) and one online group discussion regarding the first phase of analysis of this study on the dynamic of trust. All these activities were aimed at collecting implicit and experiential knowledge of DEA collaborators on what supports cooperation and trust in Arctic collaborative projects. Through reflective practice, the study aims at generating actionable knowledge (Schön, 1984). In all methods used, participants were invited to discuss their positive and negative project experiences and identify elements that influenced and characterised them.

These research activities created opportunities to reflect and learn from past and current projectbased experiences, including the DEA project.

Table 1. Empirical material collected via the DEA project Type of material

Focus •

Workshop In-person

Semidirected interviews In-person and online

Reflective practice journal In-person (selfcompleted)

Cooperation and trust in the context of Arctic collaborative projects with Indigenous Peoples (including DEA)

Sample

4 DEA project collaborators*

Period

Raw material produced

During DEA project: July 2021

3hrs audio recording, notes, and visual documentation (posters, photos)

*2 (I); 2 (NI)

•

Cooperation and trust in the 7 DEA project context of Arctic collaborative collaborators* projects with Indigenous *3 (I); 4 (NI) Peoples (including DEA)

During DEA project: Sept-Dec 2021

About 8hrs of audio recording, anonymised transcriptions

•

Organisation of DEA project material (activity traces including reports, videos, photos, notes) and creation of a project timeline to trigger reflections in the journals Identify 10 influential parts of the DEA project (what worked, what didn’t).

Reflecting on cooperation and trust

Post- DEA project: May 2023

25 pages of text

•

2 DEA collaborators* (project coordinators) *2 (NI), including the first author

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Group discussion Online

•

304

Discussion on first phase of the study findings (dynamic of trust)

5 DEA project collaborators* *4 (I); 1 (NI)

Post- DEA project: October 2023

90min audio recording, notes

* Legend : (I) Sami Indigenous DEA collaborator; (NI) Non-Indigenous DEA collaborator Material Analysis The analysis of the empirical material was conducted in progressive phases. The findings presented here emerged from the three first phases of the data analysis.

Phase 1: Systemic analysis code list (see Table 2). The first round of analysis aimed at supporting the conceptual development of the systemic perspective used in the research and to locate trust within this framework. The thematic coding was conducted in an exploratory manner, with the first half of the interview transcripts to identify themes. The concepts and themes that emerged were then gradually organised into four categories (system, parts, interaction, organisation) followed by identification of elements that would be included in those sub-categories. The remaining interviews, reflective journals and workshop notes were coded to complete the analysis grid. A basic structure of analysis was then developed through a dozen rounds of sensemaking, using visual mapping and note-taking, and the organisation and reorganisation of the themes.

Table 2. Organisation of themes and categories for analysis of empirical material Overarching themes 1.

Whole (Systems)

Categories

Examples from DEA

Project (e.g., to a problematic situation, desire for improvement)

Project: Sámi Indigenous Knowledge and

cultural, environmental, historical, economy).

Finland, and pre-existing work and family ties among some collaborators.

cultural sustainability; Community empowerment; Arctic cooperation.

Context: History of colonialism, tense Societal context (e.g., political, socio- political context regarding Sámi Identity in

Individual context (e.g., historical, interpersonal) 2.

Parts

Agent - Non-living (e.g., protocols,

Agent - Non-living: European GDPR

law).

regulations, Finland Ethical research guidelines

Agent - Living Non-human (e.g., virus).

Agent - Living Non-human: COVID-19.

Agents - Living (human) (Actors:

Agents - Living (human): Diverse set of

Insider; Outsider; Indigenous; Westerner; University; Community; Organisation).

actors involved and related to the project, including local, Indigenous, nonIndigenous, internationals, actors with diverse set of expertise and cultures.

Personal attributes (e.g., Beliefs; Values; Interests and Agendas; Cultural and Ethnic background;

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Resources: Financial limitations within the project frameworks, location possibilities

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Knowledge; Skills; Personality)

Resources (e.g., Human; Financial; Time; Spatial; Service; Equipment)

Outcomes and results: Project activities

Outcomes and results (e.g., Product;

(workshops, video productions, Data Management Plan (DMP))

New knowledge) 3.

Interactions

(ex. Online platforms, within Finnish borders)

Activity - visible (e.g., Action;

Activity - visible: Facilitation of a

Behaviour; Attitude)

workshop, dialogue with elders in a lavvu, editing videos, communicating consent forms.

Experience - invisible (e.g., Feeling; Emotion; Atmosphere)

Feedback loop (e.g., Projectproblem; Trust-Cooperation;)

Experience - invisible: feeling incompetent regarding a task, getting motivation after an encounter.

Feedback loop: Trust contribution to cooperation which fuels a dynamic of trust among collaborators 4.

Organisation

Relationships (e.g., Comradeship;

Relationships: family ties between

Rivalry; Social Networks) Hierarchies (e.g., Community-based; Researcher-led, Universitycommunity) State (e.g., Order/ harmony; Disorder/ chaos) Process (e.g., Driver; Obstacle)

participants and/ or collaborators, new encounters, colleagues.

Project (e.g., product, problem, object, subject)

Hierarchies: Hosted by community members for workshops, Sámi organisation as project leaders

State: Chaos after an unexpected event (pandemic, mistake by university admin, etc.)

Process: Lavvu (type of temporary dwelling) meetings helped boost synergies among collaborators, physical distance limited relational development with collaborators outside Finnish borders.

Project: The overall aims and motivations for the project don’t change, but the results and outcomes evolve during the collaboration.

Phase 2: Characteristics of desired and feared collaborative experiences (see Table 3). Through the cycles described in phase 1, codes, concepts, and themes emerged from the data. In that process, the emerging characteristics that were described by participants as supporting a dynamic of trust and cooperation (i.e. tending towards desired collaborative experiences), or those that create friction in the dynamics (i.e. tending towards the feared collaborative experiences) were compiled.

Furthermore, these characteristics were divided as either actions (activity, behaviours or attitudes) or sentiments (feelings, emotions or atmospheres).

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Table 3. Emerging characteristics of desirable or fearful dynamics in collaborative projects Characteristics of desired collaborative experiences

Characteristics of feared collaborative experiences

Sentiment

Action

Action

Sentiment

Cooperation

Flow

Opposition

Frustration

Drive

Safety

Restraint

Stress

Patience

Openness

Conventionality

Deception

Leadership

Comradeship

Betrayal

Insecurity

Confidence

Humour

Isolation

Failure

Investment

Authenticity

Judgment

Fear

Hospitality

Pleasure

Bossiness

Incomprehension

Time

Experience

Secrecy

Tension

Effort

Harmony

Misleading

Pressure

Commitment

Motivation

Resistance

Trauma

Attunement

Creativity

Top-down

Competition

Bottom-up

Empathy

Infantilisation

Difficulty

Dialogue

Fluidity

Silence

Doubt

Listening

Effervescence

Control

Ignorance

Transparency

Community

Risk

Conflict

Kindness

Rigidity

Phase 3: Conceptualising the dynamic of trust. In this phase, the material was recoded to identify examples that demonstrate the dynamic nature of trust. The data was re-analysed to further identify emerging themes, revealing stories, and descriptions. The findings presented here represent the first stage of the overall research findings, focusing primarily on exploring the dynamic of trust in ‘real life’ scenarios, further conceptualising trust, and reveal how it might take place in Arctic collaborative projects.

Preliminary findings: A dynamic of trust emerges through interaction The empirical data collected via the DEA project provided rich insights into what can influence the dynamic of trust in collaborative projects in Indigenous contexts. An assumption underlying this study is that the nurturing of a dynamic of trust occurs through interaction. For this article, we focus on theme 3 and 4 presented in Table 2: interactions (e.g., sub-themes activity, experience, feedback loops) and organisation (e.g., relationships, hierarchies, states). Importantly, we keep these aspects connected to themes 1 (parts) and 2 (wholes) because they are inherently intertwined, as shown on Figure 2. The two following examples were selected in the collected material to discuss the dynamic of trust in the DEA project.

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Fostering trust and cooperation trough in-person interaction The first few months of the projects were slow due to the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Everyone was re-organising their work but also their personal lives. During the first six months, small meetings and group activities took place remotely, for instance on Zoom and Teams.

The online meetings were highly useful as an alternative during the pandemic, for shorter meetings and planning, developing relationships amongst the main project collaborators who barely knew each other. Nonetheless, in-person meetings were essential in deepening the collaborative relationships, which led to more significant outcomes. Collaborators who found ways to meet faceto-face were more involved and could more easily continue their work.

One of the coordinators emphasised how important the physical meetings were for the project’s success, where coordinators who were located within the Finnish borders could meet in one of the Sámi collaborator’s lavvu (a type of temporary dwelling) located in their backyard. This became a common meeting place during the project, where activities were planned, ideas shared. For example, the thought of using the documentary films produced by two of the project collaborators into the DEA workshops, emerged during those meetings: It was quite essential that [the coordinator] could come, even though we had the pandemic. Then, [they] could start planning the filming with [the other collaborators] and they could work together. And [they] would help with the editing and sharing ideas. (NI collaborator) The Sámi lavvu dialogues were recurrently described with enthusiasm as having multiple positive impacts on the collaborative process. Hospitality from members of the Indigenous community was described by many as both a sign and driver of trust. Moreover, the overall experience of encounters in such settings was portrayed as mediator in the insider-outsider relations, by interacting with the materiality of the local culture and engaging with all senses: In the lavvu, there is the warmth of the fire, the smell, the freshly cooked food, and the whole experience. Fresh air from outdoors, all in a circle discussing. There was no stress, discussions took as long as they needed to take, there was a friendly and collaborative atmosphere, even if we didn't know each other a lot. This was better to me than white walls and glass windows with whiteboards.

(NI collaborator) The lavvu dialogue setting was also highlighted as an approach that could be more commonly used in projects and research involving Indigenous Peoples and Knowledge: Sitting around a fire in the lavvu is a way of dialogue that I wish we would have had more time for, because that kind of dialogue, traditional knowledge sharing, is very efficient too. You don’t look each other in the eyes and threaten one another. You look at the fire and share this view, and many people, are more comfortable to speak out when you’re not confronted with an interviewer.

(I collaborator) Physical interactions, which occurred through meetings, discussions, and activities, played an essential part in trust building between project stakeholders, project collaborators, workshop participants, and partner organisations. For one Sámi collaborators leading the project, the online gatherings could not replace in-person meetings and felt that the limit on physical encounters “took Cooperation by Design: Exploring the Dynamic of Trust in an Arctic Collaborative Project

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something off of our project”. Both most influential happenings described by this participant involved the larger in-person workshops, where more sensitive topics could be discussed: To achieve trust in Sámi community, it is necessary to interact a lot. And I see two big turning points in this project which were good and necessary. The first was the [initial in person meeting between two partner institutions in Sweden]. […]. It was very important for this project. And the second meeting we had was this [final workshop in Northern Finland], where actually researchers, educators, Indigenous Peoples, businesspeople, were involved there and we were really talking about sensitive topics, like land use and so on. (I collaborator).

Similarly, Sámi collaborators located in Swedish borders highlighted that participating in lavvu workshops virtually was simply not the same and that they missed out on that experience, given the borders were closed during the pandemic. Limitations on in-person interactions had an impact on the level of participation in DEA activities by collaborators.

Another participant had strong memories about how informal meetings and discussions with Sámi community members influenced their work in the project. When describing their first work trip ‘in the field’, they described feeling nervous in those first encounters: I remember being very nervous when meeting [Sámi community members]. I wouldn’t say anything that could potentially break trust. I was really careful with everything, and I didn’t want to take photos, etc. even though other members of the group were documenting. (NI collaborator).

After a couple of days filled with in-person encounters, listening to local people’s thoughts on social and political issues that concern them, sharing meals and daily activities together, their feelings and confidence changed immensely. This NI collaborator referred to the visit later on as “The best work trip ever”. This particular example characterised the evolving nature of trust and how it can change through involvement in project activities, those involving interpersonal connections in particular.

Mediating trust through ethical framework development and documents Given that no ethical framework was required by the funding bodies, the DEA collaborators developed their own ethical framework (Data Management Plan (DMP), consent forms, etc.) collaboratively throughout the project. It became evident that ethical guidelines would be necessary to conduct DEA activities appropriately, particularly because collaborators would be engaging with Sámi Indigenous Knowledge during the workshops.

As the project activities were unclear due to the pandemic, it made this task difficult as the project activities remained unclear for many months. Moreover, the application of complex legal frameworks developed in entirely different contexts (e.g., the EU General Data Protection Regulation - GDPR) was described as struggle by those involved.

Nonetheless, this ethical process enabled multiple interactions between collaborators, which eventually led to a framework that was viewed as one of the important project outcomes and as a basis for future projects. Approaching this complex task collectively through action supported the sentiment of trust in oneself: “As the process developed, my self-confidence increased” (NI collaborator), with another highlighting how this was the fruit of a collective effort “This taught

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me that great processes are not born alone but as a team effort” (NI collaborator). When referring to this type of work in DEA, a Sámi collaborator mentioned how clarity emerged as the project developed and their work progressed: At least in the beginning and middle of the project, I didn’t always know [how to take care of different tasks in the project], what would be the best way to work.

But I think then, towards the end of the project the picture became clear.

(I collaborator) Moreover, an outcome of the ethical process, consent forms, also played a role in mediating the trust dynamic between researchers, participants, collaborators, and organisations. If done correctly, the forms could support trust by acting as a contract between parties, alongside oral agreements.

The documents could act as mediators of such relationships as their ultimate purpose is to protect the participants from potential harm. However, if the consent forms and the actions that surround them are conducted inappropriately, this could result in a failed collaboration or project.

For instance, the way in which the documents are presented and how their contents are communicated when actors interact is influential. The context but also the people receiving the information must be considered (e.g., their age, familiarity with research or projects of this nature for example). There is a risk of the ‘receiver’ having a sentiment of infantilisation or a lack of transparency which feeds into the feared dynamic of opposition. In the ethical process, DEA collaborators often questioned the limiting formats of such documents and the inevitable hierarchies they impose. They can be viewed as symbols of colonial practices as they emerge from specific Western social and cultural practices: […] in a way, we were scared that these very administrative and legal documents would do the opposite of what was planned, and make participants feel insecure about sharing information, them needing to sign multiple documents, etc...

(NI collaborator) Such interactions can thus influence trust and cooperation in a project in both positive and negative ways, depending on a multitude of other factors. When referring to partnership agreements at the beginning of new collaborations, one Sámi collaborator mentioned that documents detailing collaborative agreements play an important role : “[…] first of all you have to have some kind of agreement, it could be orally or a written agreement, to be sure that both sides are serious about this project.”. Indeed, such documents and processes were viewed as important in the trust relationships developed with partners, collaborators, or participants. However, as described by the collaborator below, they do not replace trust. They are co-existing entities, with trust requiring continuous nurturing, unlike documents you sign off once: You can’t rely on the protocols and think that you have already built the trust. You need to have a parallel system, building trust independently of the document, and of course, follow the rules because you need to follow them. But they are giving a false feeling of security maybe because trust is nothing you can commit for long term. It is always a fresh product that can rot anytime. You have to keep it fresh.

(I collaborator) In DEA, starting without a detailed ethical framework felt chaotic, but ultimately, this allowed more space for an iterative and inclusive approach and learning in the process. Through this work, Cooperation by Design: Exploring the Dynamic of Trust in an Arctic Collaborative Project

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collaborators involved mentioned feeling more confident about these sensitive processes, using the documents created, and motivated to work with them in other projects.

Discussion: A dynamic of trust thrives in an organising process In this concluding section, we circle back to our journey through the complexities of trust dynamics within collaborative Arctic projects, adopting the systemic lens (Le Moigne, 1999; Morin, 1977, 1992a; 1992b, 2015) to reveal the multi-faceted and dynamic nature of trust. As illustrated with our example of the DEA collaborative project, trust weaves itself into a project's very fabric. When looking at trust in the context of collective work, trust is not static, it is constantly in evolution and restructuration. In collaborative projects, multiple elements influence the development and management of trust which leads to genuine cooperation (Le Cardinal et al., 1997). The examples provided in the findings section highlight how trust evolves through interaction(s) and the (re)organisation(s) of a project.

Collaboration often begins with a leap of faith, an unspoken intuition that propels project actors forward because, simply put, "it feels right." Yet, we have learned that trust is far from static; it is in a perpetual state of negotiation, an ever-evolving element that organises itself within the project and through intricate interactions involving actors and the entities they encounter.

Sustaining a dynamic of trust needs leadership that values actions and sentiments favourable to encounters and cooperation, such as hospitality, commitment, transparency, camaraderie, and creativity while cautioning against the behaviours that erode trust, like restraint and rigidity. By managing the interactions that nurture a dynamic of trust, we support the intricate relationship it maintains with cooperation (trust ⇄ cooperation) and with the project (cooperation⇄ project).

Throughout our analysis, we have witnessed the diverse elements that influence cooperation and trust, for instance, unexpected challenges like the COVID-19 pandemic, the significance of regular meetings and the value of physical encounters in community-led settings (e.g., the lavvu dialogues), and the way the development and implementation of work protocols (such as ethical processes and documents) influence this system. Hence, it is impossible to have absolute control over the trust dynamics in collaborative efforts due to the multitude of variables involved.

Nonetheless, focusing on building relationships through project activity, like the planning of workshops, can help teams re-organise when faced with important challenges and simultaneously build the trusting relationships required for the collaboration. Through these interactions, actors get to see the collaborator’s skills and knowledge in practice as well as increasing self-confidence (i.e., trust in oneself) which have both emerged in the study as a driver of trust. When focusing on specific parts of a project, and how they interact and organise within the whole project, we can truly perceive the organising capacities of collaboration. For instance, consider the collaborative creation of project protocols like ethical frameworks, achieved through encounters, discussions, experiences, and iterations, leading to continual cycles of interaction and organisation.

The disruption of the DEA project in its early stage due to the pandemic projected it into a space of unknown, chaotic, which was both destabilising, yet from a design point of view, quite familiar.

In a design process, the beginning of a project is blurry. There is no clear idea of the end product.

This takes shape through cycles of exploration, discussion and debate, decision making, testing, prototyping, implementation.

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Managing a project through an organising design approach (Alvarez & De Coninck, 2016; de Blois & De Coninck, 2009; de Blois et al., 2016) seems appropriate for complex projects like DEA. Creating an organising design project requires time and effort and a different structure than typical Arctic collaborative projects. And as highlighted by Doering et al. (2022), the limitations imposed by funding bodies makes it difficult to have the necessary resources to work in a “pre-project” area, which is seen as an important criterion to develop relationships with Indigenous communities in the Arctic. Funding bodies must also trust that communities and collaborators can organise themselves. In the post-project discussion with DEA collaborators, the project was in fact viewed as a ‘pre-project’, where a base was created for future work, with new more precise projects being developed between partners.

DEA was initiated and led by a Sámi organisation, and had a majority of Indigenous collaborators, which seemed to create favourable conditions for cooperation and a dynamic of trust. Such structures, which are more community-based, are not yet common in Arctic collaborations but are viewed as essential to building relationships and trust between Indigenous communities and researchers (Doering et al., 2022; Gordon, 2017). Viewing Indigenous communities themselves as self-organising systems was highlighted by one of the DEA collaborators: […] you just need to trust in the situation, need to know that these communities actually can organise themselves, they will organise themselves and they do organise themselves. That is part of their strengths, that no outsider can bring. (NI collaborator) As such, we decide to emphasise the potential of changing perspective regarding the way we view and understand projects and their processes. To create meaningful results (products), we must not focus on what we make (the end destination) but on how and the journey that leads there. We can collectively decide to go on a trip together (project) but change the destination along the way (product) and consider this change as a success and not a failure. As poet Antonio Machado famously said : “Traveller, your footprints are the path and nothing more; Traveller, there is no path, the path is made by walking.”.

Given the exploratory nature of this study and its project-grounded approach, the findings are not generalisable to all Arctic collaborative projects involving Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples, nor can we suggest a general theory around trust in collective design practices. However, our indepth exploration of the DEA project, which took place in a Sámi Indigenous context, can demonstrate the pertinence of exploring collaborative projects in all their complexity and based on a systemic approach.

In essence, this research provides the foundation for further inquiry into trust within collaborative work, underscoring the intricate nature of trust dynamics within Arctic collaborative projects. As we conclude, we emphasise the effectiveness of prioritising interactions within projects, fostering trust dynamics through discussions, meetings, workshops, and creative endeavours. An organising design project approach could be further developed in the context of collective design practices involving Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples in Arctic contexts.

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Conclusion In this paper, we aimed to further our understanding of trust from a systemic perspective and in collective work that requires great sensitivity, specifically collaborative projects engaging with Indigenous Knowledge and Peoples in the Arctic. We drew from the Dialogues and Encounters in the Arctic (DEA) project, which was set in the Sámi Indigenous context. The study guided by project-grounded research and action-research in design, the underlying aims of 1) creating better understandings of the topic of trust in the context of collaborative work involving designers, and 2) inform the design practice in ways in which practitioners and researchers can support cooperation through their work when engaging with Indigenous Peoples and Knowledge. We also strived to contribute to existing research that focuses on ‘how to’ build trust when involved in projects involving Indigenous Peoples, by opening a discussion that acknowledges the complexity and specificities of collaborative projects that are not research but project-led. We found that, amidst the complexities and various influences on trust dynamics (e.g., socio-political contexts, a global pandemic, or individual personalities), fostering consistent interaction among project participants emerges as the most effective strategy to nurture a dynamic of trust. In sum, our study emphasises the importance of creating opportunities for ongoing interaction at all phases of collaborative work to nurture a dynamic of trust and cooperation within complex projects.

Notes 1. The decision to maintain anonymity was made in collaboration with the research participants.

2. We use the term Arctic throughout the text in the text to make it easier to read, however, when speaking about Arctic contexts and communities, we mean the North(s) in its inclusive and complex meaning (Chartier, 2019; Hamelin, 2000).

3. The results presented in this paper are part of a doctoral dissertation investigating trust in collective design practices and processes, conducted by the first author. The results shared in this paper are from the first phase of analysis, which aimed at conceptualising the dynamic of trust from a systemic and complexity point of view. A next article (forthcoming in 2024) will present the remaining findings of the study.

4. The project initially aimed at including more Arctic Indigenous Peoples, namely from Canada, but due to lack of funding and COVID-19 limitations, the project focused on the Sámi context in Northern Europe.

5. Throughout this article, we align with authors such as Le Cardinal et al. (1997) by consistently using the term "cooperation." However, we acknowledge that terms like cooperation and collaboration encompass distinct meanings (see Schöttle et al., 2014).

These nuances are relevant as they describe various stages of collective work.

6. A previously published book chapter describes some DEA activities in detail, including the role these films played in the project (see Beaulé & Viinikainen, 2022). These will not be explicitly explored in the scope of this paper.

7. A positive statement and approval of the initiation of research was received by the first author on 01.06.2020 at the University of Lapland Beaulé & De Coninck

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Acknowledgments The Dialogues and Encounters in the Arctic project is EU funded by Interreg Nord and has received funding from Lapin Liitto (official decision no. NYPS 20203486). This work has also been supported by the Fonds de Recherches du Québec – Société et Culture (FRQSC) through the doctoral research scholarship. The first author is also thankful to all collaborators of the Dialogues and Encounters in the Arctic project who accepted to participate in the research.

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The Contribution of Interdisciplinary Research to Sound Environmental Decision-Shaping in Arctic Matters

Michaela Louise Coote

Interdisciplinary research is a popular methodological choice for informing environmental decision-shaping; however its use needs further critical evaluation to ensure that it is able to meet grand environmental challenges and societal needs. This research provides a historical and conceptual analysis of interdisciplinary environmental decision-shaping in an Arctic context. The primary methodology for the study was interviewers with experts who have been engaged with interdisciplinary environmental decision-shaping in the Arctic to answer the research questions: 1) does interdisciplinarity involve the softening of boundaries in the Arctic; 2) does interdisciplinarity promote the diffusion of ideas in the Arctic and 3) does Interdisciplinarity support scientific enquiry in the Arctic? The objective of this research was to further academic inquiry regarding the use of interdisciplinary research in Arctic environmental decision-shaping. Whilst interdisciplinary research in the Arctic was found to encompass a spirit of reinvention, critical thinking and open-mindedness; its use was found to be impacted by geopolitical factors, past and present practices, epistemologies and ontologies including power hierarchies and colonialism. Epistemological differences between actors was seen as a strength in Arctic interdisciplinary studies but required the practitioners to be respectful and willing to reevaluate their knowledge and approach.

An Introduction to Interdisciplinary Environmental Decision-Shaping Questions concerning whether scientific discovery should be disciplinary and focused or critical and rebellious make up one of the most important questions since the Enlightenment (Coote, 2023). From a Latourian perspective, both politics and science are held within a relationship that means that they exist dependently on one another (Latour, 1988). Interdisciplinarity exists as a fluid concept that straddles science and policy (Osteng, 2009). Discourses surrounding interdisciplinarity can be traced to early Western thinking and have ebbed and flowed in popularity since at least the Platonic era. Interdisciplinary studies gained pace in the twentieth century and recently, interdisciplinary scholarship is booming (Klein, 1990; Ostreng, 2009). There is a vast amount of

Michaela Louise Coote is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Lapland.

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literature concerning interdisciplinarity. However, there is a gap in research which interrogates its application, particularly in International Relations and environmental decision-shaping (Jacobs and Frickel, 2009).

The emphasis of this article is on interdisciplinarity which can be defined as: a systems perspective that spans two or more disciplines in order to create a combined methodology (Ostreng, 2009).

Disciplinarity refers to the specialisation and fragmentation of academic disciplines since the Enlightenment period (Newell and Green, 1982). Multidisciplinary is also an important concept and can be understood as a working method in which disciplines act separately to achieve a systematic outcome. Transdisciplinary approaches can be understood to integrate numerous approaches and disciplines, or as taking a meta-perspective above disciplines in order to understand concepts. Transdisciplinarity can also be understood as providing a methodology to combine different modes of knowledge (Ostreng, 2009). Different ways of knowing include philosophical knowledge, scientific knowledge, practical knowledge and mystic knowledge which can be applied through using/doing, questioning, analysing and believing (Ostreng, 2010).

There are three constitutional assumptions contained within interdisciplinarity which are interrogated within this article: 1) That interdisciplinarity involves the softening of boundaries; 2) that interdisciplinarity promotes the diffusion of ideas and; 3) interdisciplinarity supports scientific enquiry (Brewer, 1999). Barry and Born (2013) suggest three potential ways in which interdisciplinarity is practised: Mode 1) Integrative approach: the combination of two or more disciplines symmetrically; Mode 2) Subordination-service mode: one discipline occupies a subservient role to the other; Mode 3) Anti-antagonistic: interdisciplinarity is driven by an antagonistic or oppositional relationality to existing knowledge forms. Klein (1990) notes that interdisciplinarity can be practised through four interactions: borrowing, problem solving, increasing consistency of subjects or methods, and the emergence of an inter-discipline.

Interdisciplinarity has been found to present practical challenges including problems arising from epistemological differences between actors; power imbalances within political and scientific structures; and, research difficulties through lack of a fixed methodological blueprint (Jacobs and Frickel, 2009). Power imbalances can be seen through a number of factors. Firstly, some disciplines have more notoriety and funding than others, and secondly, hegemonic discourses may make novel methodology production difficult (Næss, 2010). Methods applied in interdisciplinary studies may be completely new or not following a ‘normal’ scientific method. Thus, studies have shown some risks to practitioners careers as well as general risks to the project, if the method is incompatible with the overall aim (Lacey and Lacey, 2010).

Interdisciplinarity and Environmental Decision-Shaping Sustainability science has been characterised by a problem-solving approach which entails more than the disciplines it employs (Boda and Faran, 2018). For example, to solve sustainability issues - economic, environmental, social and political situations need to be considered in unison. As Popper voices: “We are not students of some subject matter but students of problems. And problems may cut right across the borders of any subject or discipline” (Popper, 1963: 88). Trends in environmental decision-making show an international push towards methodologies that are solution-based and pluralistic (Thorén and Persson, 2013).

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Sustainability consists of an understanding that sustainable transitions are a process that includes pluralisms and complexities which rely on cross-cutting problem solving (Roe, 2012; Petrov et al., 2016). Such complexities mean that a diverse group of experts from different epistemological positions are needed to put together the complex puzzle pieces. For example, the 1987 Brundtland Report explains: “Together, we should span the globe, and pull together to formulate an interdisciplinary, integrated approach to global concerns and our common future…We needed people with wide experience, and from all political fields, not only from environment or development and political disciplines, but from all areas of vital decision-making that influence economic and social progress, nationally and internationally.” (Brundtland, 1987:6) The notion that environmental problems require complex solutions is tied in with the knowledge that the environment represents a whole rather than parts. This, to a certain extent, stems from a growth in mapping technologies, such as climate modelling, which highlighted the physical and social interrelationships involved in environmental processes, as well as a philosophical shift in academic circles that occurred during this time that highlighted the earth is comprised of a series of integrative feedbacks (see Lockelock, 1979, for example) (Cornell, 2010).

Institutions such as the United Nations integrated interdisciplinarity into their decisions and recommendations on issues of sustainability soon after this shift took place. In 1987, the Brundtland Report called attention to the need for an interdisciplinary approach when considering topics of sustainable development as: “these challenges cut across the divides of national sovereignty, of limited strategies for economic gain, and of separated disciplines of science.”

(Brundtland, 1987: 12). Agenda 21 (1992) also specifically promotes the need to increase interdisciplinary research: “In order to integrate demographic analysis into a broader social science perspective on environment and development” (UN, 1992: Chapter 5. p. 1.). The 2012 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recognise the: “need to further mainstream sustainable development at all levels, integrating economic, social and environmental aspects and recognizing their interlinkages'' (UN, 2012: 1). The above timeline highlights that in accordance with philosophical and practical trends in international environmental decision-shaping, the United Nations put forward that the environment, economics, society and peace are intrinsically connected and require a cross-cutting approach to sustainability problem-solving, which needs to move beyond disciplinary methodologies.

The Arctic presents an interesting case study regarding the use of interdisciplinary research for sound environmental decision making for a number of reasons. Firstly, knowledge concerning environmental change in the Arctic is linked with a global understanding of earth-systems and the need for an integrative approach to environmental problem solving. Secondly, the Arctic is home to a number of cooperative networks aimed at collaborative science. Thirdly, research into the inclusion of Indigenous Knowledge and Western Science in the Arctic represents a unique discussion concerning broad interdisciplinarity. Finally, environmental change in the Arctic is urgent and thus requires rapid improvements in environmental decision-shaping.

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Integrative Approaches to Environmental Challenges The environmental movement stemmed from a new understanding that industrial and development practices may have damaging repercussions to societal well-being (Haila, & Heininen, 1995). The Love Canal disaster was a key moment in the environmental movement which both highlighted how conflicting development practices could be dangerous (e.g planning a toxic landfill next to a family housing project) and highlighted that science could be the proof that enables change in collaboration with the business and political sectors (Beck, 1977). Further, the 1983 report Common Security: a Blueprint for Survival, led by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, highlights the continuing trend to synthesise the concepts of the environment, security, development and governance against a backdrop of potentially catastrophic nuclear destruction during the Cold War (The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 1983). Today, concerns surrounding climate change have again caused a normative shift calling into question knowledge use and anthropocentric practices (Bhaskar and Parker, 2010).

The Arctic has brought into popular discourse knowledge concerning cause-effect relationships relating to natural systems. For example, melting glaciers and reduced snow cover leads to the albedo effect speeding up global warming. This awareness highlighted the inefficiency of a singular approach to problem solving (Næss, 2010). The Arctic Council (AC) Strategic Plan (2021), shows a desire to integrate broad concepts contained within sustainability. It states: “All people in the Arctic will have ample pathways for sustainable social and economic development while respecting the environment. Conservation and sustainable use of natural resources in the Arctic, that respect the rights and cultures of all Arctic inhabitants, will contribute to resilient societies” (AC, 2021: 1).

The concepts of development and conservation are balanced together in a way that requires novel conceptual integration in the search for solutions.

Indigenous Knowledge & Western Science From a critical perspective, concepts can only be understood in relation to other factors, such as other concepts, past knowledge(s), interests, values, beliefs, power structures and institutions (Gad and Strandsbjerg, 2020; Apetrei et al., 2021). Such concepts are inherently linked to both past colonial activities and current activities within the extractivist paradigm (Sorlin, 2022; Herrmann et al., 2023). From an unorthodox perspective, interdisciplinarity involves “the integration of concepts, methodology, procedures, epistemology, terminology and data” (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1972) and; combining epistemological frameworks such as Indigenous Knowledge and Western Science can be seen as an advanced aspect of interdisciplinarity on the evolutionary ladder towards transdisciplinarity (Heckhausen et al., 1970; Thorén and Persson, 2013).

Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic were often forced into the Western centred education system by colonial actors. Such schools taught a disciplinary and segmented way of learning and enforced a new language upon the Indigenous Peoples who were forced to attend (Stuhl, 2019). Arctic science can still be seen to hold colonial practices including inclusion and preference towards Western actors and practices (Herrmann et al., 2023). According to Herrmann et al., (2023): “Acknowledging Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination in research goes hand-in-hand with rethinking over all ethics in both the natural and social sciences.” Part of this research reflects understanding that science represents certain hegemonic discourses which perforate scientific knowledge and scientific practices favouring certain knowledge(s) and knowledge holders above The Contribution of Interdisciplinary Research to Sound Environmental Decision-Shaping in Arctic Matters

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others. Herrmann et al., (2023) build on the work of Reid et al., (2020) to highlight the concept of two-eyed seeing. The authors write: Two-Eyed Seeing refers to “learning to see from one eye with the strengths of Indigenous ways of knowing, and to see from the other eye with the strengths of Western ways of knowing, and to use both of these eyes together, for the benefit of all” (Bartlett et al., 2012, s. 335).

Cooperation as a Seed for Interdisciplinarity Since the Cold War, interdisciplinary studies have provided the backbone of scientific cooperation in the Arctic (Ostreng, 2009; Heininen, 2023). The Murmansk speech in 1987 was the catalyst for the development of international networks and programs including the International Arctic Science Committee and the Barents Council (Kökönen, 1996) and multi-actor networks such as the International Arctic Science Committee, the Northern Forum, the Calotte Academy, Conferences of Arctic parliamentarians (Heininen, 2023). Interdisciplinarity was directly cited as a methodological tool in order to achieve shared outcomes. The International Arctic Science Committee’s founding documents, for example, state that: “There is an increasing need for scientific knowledge of the Arctic region…This need comprises many fields of science, and is often of a multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary nature” (IASC, 1990: 2).

INSROP (International Northern Sea Route Programme) commencing in 1993 was an early example of collaborative research between the Arctic states. Osteng (2009: 241) writes that, “for all those who took part in INSROP this interconnectedness became the beauty and the best of interdisciplinarity at the same time”. In 1989, Finland launched the Rovaniemi Process which called for cooperation between the Arctic states on environmental protection. During the meetings in Finland, it was decided that two cross-cutting task forces should be created: one on the Arctic environment and one on Arctic law and cooperation. There were a number of topics to be resolved within each task force, for example, within the environment task forces lay the categories of: “the marine environment, climate change and pollution, radioactivity, chemicals and oil, food chains, waste management, protecting the living resources, environmental economics, environmental health, noise pollution, population centres and indigenous peoples” highlighting the integration of interdisciplinarity in the Arctic immediately after the Cold War ended (Heikkilä, 2019).

This era was marked by an optimism of a ‘New North’ and saw the emergence of numerous networks which sought to encourage collaborative critical thinking on shared issues which naturally adopted a trans-disciplinary approach (Heininen, 2023). Osteng (2009) highlights that the joint desire by the Arctic states to facilitate cooperative mechanisms through scientific collaboration on environmental issues naturally entailed a general approach on cross-cutting issues which was both practical and economically sensible.

Methodological Reinvention in Environmental Decision-Shaping Much of the debate about interdisciplinarity stems from considerations that disciplines are repressive and inhibit creative problem solving (Barry and Bonn, 2013; Heininen 2018). Gergen (2009) gives voice to such a perspective when he writes: “If innovative scholarship is the outcome of hybridity, of impurity, or blurring the boundaries between disparate realms of reality, disciplining is its enemy. There is no thinking outside the box without risking banishment from the box.”

(Gergen, 2009: 210). On the other hand, for some, disciplines are inherently enabling methods and theories that can provide an answer with a wide tool set (Barry and Born, 2013). Another

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consideration when comparing disciplinarity to interdisciplinarity is that disciplines represent a closed space whereas, interdisciplinarity represents heterogeneity and openness (Barry and Born, 2013). Deleuze gives voice to this concept when he writes: “the individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to another, each having its own laws: first the family; then the school ("you are no longer in your family"); then the barracks ("you are no longer at school")” (Deleuze, 1992: 1). For some, interdisciplinarity is a staged process which begins in closed disciplinary practices - to multidisciplinarity - to interdisciplinarity - to transdisciplinarity (Jantsch, 1970; Thorén and Persson, 2013).

Interdisciplinarity is also a process that is undertaken through the collaboration between many individuals who hold subjective realities. Theorists such as Latour (2007) and Ingold (2012) show the relationality between the scientific practitioner, the material and immaterial world around them as well as their outputs. According to one such thinker, Haraway (1988) - knowledge is situated within complicated frameworks that are performed through practical applications. Haraway (1988) highlights that both the subject and the object should not be considered: ‘innocent and waiting outside the violations of language and culture’ (Haraway 1988: 109). For Haraway, knowledge is informed by the location and position of the knower and thus, any knowledge produced is therefore not impartial. Haraway (1988) argues that due to this, practitioners should be accountable of how they approach the world around them.

Best Practices of Interdisciplinary Projects in the Arctic Council The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) (2004) was prepared by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) in collaboration with the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) working group, and the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) in order to provide a comprehensive account of Arctic change (AMAP Secretariat, 2023). According to AMAP, “More than 250 scientists and six circumpolar Indigenous Peoples’ organisations participated in the ACIA…ACIA was the first comprehensive multidisciplinary assessment of the impacts of climate change in the Arctic. As such it represents a baseline for later work.” This was the first comprehensive report to include both the natural and social sciences on Arctic change including “environmental, human health, social, cultural, and economic impacts and consequences, including policy recommendations” (AMAP Secretariat, 2023). Chapter 17 of the ACIA in particular looks to understand the human-environmental system as a whole. For example, the authors write: “Climate change occurs amid myriad social and natural transformations.

Understanding and anticipating the consequences of climate change, therefore, requires knowledge about the interactions of climate change and other stresses and about the resilience and vulnerability of human–environment systems that experience them.” (AMAP, 2004: 946.).

The Community Based Monitoring Program (CMBP) by CAFF was created based on recommendations from the ACIA and consists of a network of governmental and nongovernmental actors including scientists, Indigenous Knowledge holders and conservation groups.

The CBMP looks to develop “coordinate and integrated” Arctic Biodiversity Monitoring Plans based around the four key areas of: marine, freshwater, terrestrial and coastal (IPBES, 2018). The CMBP can be applied across all disciplines and geographic areas (CAFF, 2010).

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Method Four interviews were undertaken with knowledge holders who have specialist knowledge on interdisciplinarity in Arctic environmental decision-shaping and science in order to understand whether 1) interdisciplinarity involves the softening of boundaries; 2) interdisciplinarity promotes the diffusion of ideas; and 3) if Interdisciplinarity supports scientific enquiry (Brewer, 1999).

Interviewees were selected due to their expertise on the topic based on publications or professional experience in Arctic environmental decision-shaping and interdisciplinarity. The interviews were semi-structured and based around five broad questions relating to the research questions (Kallio et al., 2016). Sub-questions were asked if an interviewee hit upon a core theme in the research (e.g. scientific cooperation in the Arctic vis-a-vis interdisciplinarity). The research questions were very broad; for example: what makes a good interdisciplinary project? This was to take into account that the interviewer may have potential biases when asking the question and therefore effort was taken not to force a box around the potential answer (De Wachter, 1982). The results were coded based around the topic areas of the research questions (Kallio et al., 2016). Due to the sensitivity of the Arctic research environment since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, all of the participants were kept anonymous of all distinguishing factors and results were edited to take out any specific factor that might show the interviewees identity. The interviewees were not sent the research questions beforehand but were informed that they were under no pressure to answer the questions. Due to time constraints only four interviews were conducted, however they represented a geographical spread across the Arctic and included one Indigenous expert.

Results Interdisciplinarity and the Softening of Boundaries Interviewee 3 highlighted that interdisciplinary research caused a reinvention of methodologies.

Interviewee 3 stated: “What makes a really good interdisciplinary project is actually being able to find the points of intersection. Like when you are doing interdisciplinarity often you start from one point of view and tend to work your way out, push the corners out, to incorporate this and that and I really think you have to navigate down the middle. There are really epistemological differences between disciplines and frameworks, so you have to step back and try and sort out what those are…and do it in a way that you get more than you would have done from approaching it from just one perspective… even more than a balancing act it is a reinvention”.

The idea that knowledge is situated geographically and contextually and thus methodologies need to be adapted for specific problems was highlighted by all of the interviewees. For example, Interviewee 1 stated: “if you use economic methods such as cost and benefit analysis or rational choice theory to solve environmental problems in the Arctic you can get some wrong results because most of the economic methods, they tend to ignore values and they tend to ignore humanitarian aspects because most of the economic methods they aim to the viability of the profits to get a profit or material benefits from a project but as we might know from the Arctic we should think about people living in the Arctic, not about economic effects or economic benefits”.

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All interviewees agreed that it was beneficial to get different perspectives to gain insight into a problem set, however there was a mixed understanding of the extent that interdisciplinary work needed to include an international perspective. For example, interviewee 1 stated that: “it's preferable if its international projects - that projects with different teams from different countries with different methodological approaches would participate. Of course, it’s always useful. For example, project x was about country x and at least two foreign teams participated and they brought a lot of useful approaches and methodologies. It is always very good to see a project from an external point of view. Because we are in some kind of internal country x discourse on these issues…we are locked in this discourse and of course we need some kind of fresh ideas and approaches to the problem. It is the same if country y studies region y (in country y) in order to have a more diverse…more objective point of view, it's always good to invite foreign experts with different methodologies and different perspectives on the same problems. So, I believe the international component is quite important”.

Interviewee 3, on the other hand, referenced the need to apply an international perspective to Arctic environmental decision-shaping rather than just basing science within the region itself.

Interviewee 3 stated: “There is a global level too…the little pieces of the whole can't solve the whole problem.”

Interdisciplinarity and the Diffusion of Ideas Three of the four the interviewees highlighted that good interdisciplinary research should involve the co-production of knowledge. In addition, half of the interviewees highlighted that Indigenous Knowledge (IK) provides a different framework of knowing that science cannot. Interviewee 2 stated that the most successful projects involve a co-production with IK whilst; Interviewee 1 also highlighted that a co-production of knowledge is fundamental to an interdisciplinary project but did not mention specifically that the inclusion of IK is necessary, just relevant Arctic actors.

Interviewee 4 highlighted that interdisciplinary knowledge was mostly seen as a superior methodology within the scientific paradigm which encompasses a narrow following of certain predefined ideas and concepts for reasons of self-interest and adherence to a colonial structure of governance. For interviewee 4, interdisciplinarity still reflects the narrowness of a linearly disposed academic system rather than a holistic knowledge set that can be gained from Indigenous Knowledge. Interviewee 4 evidenced issues with the prevalent education system which pushes a segmented way of learning, detached from the environment, that is disconnected from experientially based learning.

All of the interviewees highlighted that there was a personal dimension to the successful creation of an interdisciplinary project. Interviewee 2 stated: “It’s people really, I mean it doesn’t necessarily matter…you can have lots of people who are experts in let's say biology or archaeology and they are looking at some aspect but unless they are open to cooperation across things then it can be quite difficult... if people are open to new ways of thinking and new ideas then a cross-disciplinary project will work really well”.

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For interviewee 4, the issue primarily revolved around respect between different knowledge forms.

It was not important which actors were present in projects, more that the actors respected each other's ways of knowing.

Interdisciplinarity and Scientific Enquiry Three of the four interviewees brought attention to the notion that approaching topics from different perspectives can be challenging when not everyone has the same contextual reference.

All of the interviewees stated that science should be undertaken from a critical standpoint and highlighted the importance of fluid boundaries around methodological approaches. For example, Interviewee 2 stated: “You see a lot of people, they may be in similar disciplines, they may be speaking the same language but they are not necessarily understanding one another. So I think transparency, a willingness to admit when you are wrong and an openness to trying something new - they are the basic bones of ensuring (a good interdisciplinary project)”... you may see what you have spent years looking at, from a totally different light… it is an openness and a willingness to change and admit that the approach that has been tried and tested and your particular approach might not be the one that works on a greater scale… to speak a common language is the challenge”.

All interviewees to some extent discussed that science and/or decision-shaping should be relevant for those with a claim to the implications of the research. This was discussed in different ways, through speaking about knowledge ownership, ethics towards nature and societies or rights holders. All of the interviewees highlighted that there was a political dimension to interdisciplinary projects linked to funding prioritisation either for interdisciplinary projects themselves or for certain disciplines over other disciplines. For example, Interviewee 2 said: “interdisciplinary work is straddling this boundary of how science informs policy because if we look at the EU project they are increasingly requiring that you take an interdisciplinary approach”.

Interviewee 3 said that one of the key problems with interdisciplinary projects is the perceived value of science which leads to the prioritisation of certain discourses over others: “there is a hierarchy..power structures...it is about who are the powerful voices in academia, who's getting the funding, where is public perception going…what voice is valued…the problem is who has the answers and who are seen as the keepers of knowledge”.

Interviewee 4 highlighted that whilst decision-shaping can include the right statements, for example, the inclusion of IK or the co-production of knowledge…often the decision-making does not reflect that. There were mixed opinions on the extent that interdisciplinary research in the Arctic would be affected by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent decline in Arctic cooperation. Interviewee 1, highlighted that the freezing of cooperation since the Ukrainian war has been damaging for interdisciplinary studies on environmental decision-shaping in the Arctic.

Interviewee 2 stated: “it is definitely going to affect the quality in that what we will see will only be part of the picture.”

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Discussion Interdisciplinary research methodologies in Arctic environmental decision-shaping merge with a spirit of epistemological cooperation, new academic understandings of the earth as a system and international environmental decision-making that seeks to balance many different conceptual groupings. This follows the definition of Interdisciplinarity by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (1972) to understand interdisciplinarity as including “the integration of concepts, methodology, procedures, epistemology, terminology and data”. In the Arctic, interdisciplinarity was used as a political tool to maintain open-minded collaboration after the ColdWar through an integrative approach which combined disciplines towards a mutual goal (environmental protection). Following the work of Barry and Born (2013), this could place Arctic interdisciplinary decision-shaping as anti-antagonistic, which sets interdisciplinary studies as alternatives to epistemologically fixed dialogues and damaging practices of the Cold War. In the Arctic and globally, discourses concerning critical and interdisciplinary methodologies correlate with an understanding of complexities and pluralisms that go beyond a hegemonic discourse and the damaging practices associated with a discourse such as those associated with colonialism or the extractivist paradigm. Considering reflections from Klein (1990) – that interdisciplinarity can be practised through the emergence of an inter-discipline – Arctic studies may reflect an interdiscipline which contains divergent and pluralistic discourses and practices synthesising them through interdisciplinary methodologies or alternatively; environmental decision-shaping could be seen as the inter-discipline with the process of interdisciplinarity as the goal rather than the stated ambition.

A key theme also to be drawn from the research was that the interviewees felt the strength of interdisciplinary research lay in the personal experiences and viewpoints that individual researchers from different backgrounds can bring to the project, including their abilities to respectfully communicate with those from other disciplines or different knowledge sets. For example, interviewee 2 stated: “if people are open to new ways of thinking and new ideas then a crossdisciplinary project will work really well”. The interviewees highlighted that various boundaries could be broken through interdisciplinarity including: methodological, disciplinary, national, individual, historical, political and power based. However, interdisciplinarity also was not seen to be completely removed from concepts and practices surrounding disciplinarity. Thus, disciplines were found to represent depositories of situated knowledge entangled within certain predefined understandings of functions and terminologies, as well as sometimes an element of power hierarchies which reflected wider social, political or individual frameworks relating to social order.

For example, interviewee 3 stated: “there is a hierarchy... power structures... it is about who are the powerful voices in academia, who's getting the funding, where is public perception going…what voice is valued…the problem is who has the answers and who are seen as the keepers of knowledge”. Looking to Barry and Born (2013), this fits in with the understanding that interdisciplinarity can be practised by entailing an element of ‘subordination-service’ where one discipline dominates the other. This theoretical framework can be expanded to take into account the relationship between different epistemologies, methodologies or practices. Such an analysis could support the work of Herrmann et al., (2023) which argues that Science has historically and currently dominated Indigenous Knowledge in Arctic science.

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All of the interviewees considered the relationality of their knowledge and experiences to the world around them and the impact of this on interdisciplinary research. For example, interviewee 1 stated: “Because we are in some kind of internal [country x] discourse on these issues…we are locked in this discourse and of course we need some kind of fresh ideas and approaches to the problem.”

For all of the interviewees, knowledge was not seen as impartial. The interviewees all highlighted the need for open-minded and respectful dialogue and thus, returning to Haraway’s theory of Situated Knowledges (Haraway, 1988) - the interviewees highlighted a sense of responsibility for their activities in interdisciplinary science to maintain a critical and constructive dialogue. For example, interviewee 2 stated: “I think transparency, a willingness to admit when you are wrong and an openness to trying something new - they are the basic bones of ensuring (a good interdisciplinary project)”.

Based on the topics brought forward by the interviewees from the open questions asked to them, in the Arctic, interdisciplinarity is connected to wide concepts such as (Science, sustainable development, conservation, economics, security and peace) and epistemological frameworks (such as Indigenous Knowledge) rather than purely the integration of two or more disciplines. This is in line with some wider descriptions of interdisciplinarity such as by Heckhausen et al., (1970) and Thorén and Persson (2013).

Conclusions This research agrees with a broad definition of interdisciplinarity because to consider current environmental decision-shaping as transdisciplinary would be to accept that methodologies and practices have gone beyond damaging and hegemonic practices to fully explore concepts associated with these practices and, that there has been the equal consideration of different modes of knowing in Arctic science. In the Arctic, interdisciplinary research did involve a softening of boundaries (individual, conceptual, methodological and societal) across disciplinary norms, geographic boundaries and methodological practices dominant within science. Interdisciplinary research was found to correlate with a spirit of reinvention, critical thinking and open-mindedness. This was set against new understandings of complex earth systems in Western philosophy and science; the growth of the environmental movement; improved understandings of the impact of colonisation; the framework of the functionalist environmental agenda of the Arctic states after the Cold War; and internationally in the sustainable development agenda proposed by institutions such as the UN. The research also highlights the negative impact that continued hegemonic practices (e.g colonialism) and closed-minded thinking may have on novel idea generation within environmental decision-shaping. Interdisciplinarity was found to exist in relation to current geopolitics, past histories and power hierarchies, and thus, interdisciplinarity was found to support scientific inquiry only so far as institutional practices, scientific paradigms and individual motivation would allow.

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Art and co-research with Sámi reindeer herders - in the spirit of decolonisation unfolding cultural knowledge

Korinna Korsström-Magga

The world's population growth with its increasing need for resources, along with globalisation and climate change, are seriously affecting minority and Indigenous peoples’ cultures in the North. Sámi reindeer herders have to adjust their livelihood because of other stakeholders that are desiring to use the lands where the reindeer graze. This research project encourages the reindeer herders to come forward and introduce their livelihood and profession as vivid, culturally sustainable and valuable, and as a source of knowledge that is needed as the world faces climate change and other challenges while seeking environmental sustainability. The study uses an art-based action research strategy, implementing the Photovoice-method as a means to collect data and bring forward the reindeer herders’ daily life. Five Sámi reindeer herder families from the region around Lake Inari in northern Finland took snapshots of their everyday life around the year. With the photographs, they built an exhibition about their daily lives and also published an even more descriptive picture book. Art-based actions emphasise the decolonial potency of participative action research and co-research. The research was conducted by an art-educator-researcher, also involved herself in reindeer herding, which opened deeper possibilities to plan, operate and fulfil the research actions to benefit the Sámi reindeer herders and also to develop art-based action methods as a research strategy.

Introduction Sápmi (the Sámi homeland) which is the regions of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Kola Peninsula located north of the Arctic Circle, is seeing increased exploitation due to globalisation and the impacts of global interest in resources. Also, climate change is already affecting natural resourcebased livelihoods. In this light, the northern Indigenous people, their culture, and their present situation need to be acknowledged. The Sámi reindeer herders of northern Finland have long faced the demands of other inhabitants and stakeholders on the reindeer pastures. The regions of Sápmi have increased the world’s interest as a source of forestry, mining, tourism, and energy. The reindeer pastures of untouched land diminish every year. Kuokkanen (2020) characterises this as Korinna Korsström-Magga, PhD researcher, University of Lapland, Finland, Faculty of Art and Design

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the contemporary on-going northern colonialism in which the self-determination and rights of the Indigenous Sámi are being diminished through general discourses, institutions, and government structures (Kuokkanen, 2020). The collaboration between and land use by all stakeholders in these northernmost areas are based upon common interest, and the results are meant to benefit all involved parties. However, in this situation, the reindeer herders, who strive to keep nature untouched, are usually the ones who lose out. The reindeer herders often find the government and other decision-makers to be ignorant of their needs and daily lives. They confront situations where local people, media and even authorities often reckon their profession to be a type of cultural hobby rather than proper work (Pohjola & Valkonen, 2012). Clearly, more information about contemporary reindeer herders' livelihood needs to be disseminated to enable fruitful collaborations.

As a member of a Sámi reindeer herder family and an art educator and artist, I started an art-based research project together with five reindeer herder families. We all live in Finland, in the northernmost areas of the province of Lapland, that we recognise as Sápmi, in the regions of Lake Inari. Our mission was to highlight the position of reindeer herders by disseminating knowledge about their contemporary daily lives through art-based actions. We collected photographs taken by the families over one year and used them to build an exhibition and to design a book, both of which were called Boazoeallin (which means ‘reindeer life’ in northern Sámi). The exhibition and book were aimed at increasing knowledge about the reindeer herders’ contemporary lives. The photographs and narratives that the reindeer herder families disseminate, contain cultural knowledge that may be of use in other research fields. The project was realised by art-based action research (ABAR), which is a strategy that has been used to enhance a dialogical stage for communities, collaboration and to promote increased understanding in society. This study is aimed at developing and exploring the features of art-based actions combined with participatory methods that can be implemented with an art-based action research strategy supporting communities.

In ABAR, data are usually produced and collected through community art education methods (Hiltunen, 2009) in the spheres of applied art, which values place-specific art related to a community’s culture (Jokela, 2019). Art-based research actions are participatory and have qualities of co-research (Jokela et al., 2015). In research with Indigenous people, participatory research has destabilised power positions linked to traditional research settings, which supports decolonisation (Lenette, 2022). Art-based actions might develop into useful tools for communities to enhance decolonisation and showcase their culture to the majority population.

In this article, I discuss the research methods I used in my project with reindeer herder families.

Every community research project is unique and needs a special approach. In this project, the combination of art education, participatory art-based actions, and co-research is aimed at inviting the community to join the research on their own terms and to give them the opportunity to control the research data and its use. I confront the challenges of working together with a community that has been exposed to cultural colonialism for generations, which I suggest leads to a restrained manner of producing knowledge publicly. The art-based action method seeks decolonisation and an empowering strategy. My position as an insider helps greatly in building trust and acting in the project. In this project, I am deeply involved as an artist, art educator, facilitator, and researcher, and I arrange and guide the actions to serve the community to create the trust and confidence needed to reveal private knowledge publicly.

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Decolonisation brings forward cultural knowing This article adopts the theoretical concept of decolonisation arising from the postcolonial settler colonialism in Sápmi. I also present the concept of Cultural Knowledge, which grows as a visual result from the reindeer herders’ art-based actions.

Existing studies in this area have been based almost exclusively upon Western paradigms and approaches. Indigenous research paradigms might be considered as research objects but have not been accepted and respected as equals in research. Indigenous scholars (e.g., Battiste & Henderson, 2000; Smith, 2012) have criticised Eurocentric dominance since the late 20th century. To decolonize research paradigms and methodologies is to include Indigenous ways of knowing in academia and to value these as equal to Western approaches to knowing. Combining these two methodologies also challenges Western methods of reporting results. The Indigenous methods of producing data as well as their knowledge features may differ greatly from those of Western traditional science (Held, 2019). Seppälä et al. (2021) summarise decolonisation research as an approach that challenges the Eurocentric view of science and aims to center the concerns and world-views of non-Western communities. Since the beginning of the 21st century, decolonising research actions have increasingly become an academic moral starting point for conducting research with marginalised communities and Indigenous peoples. Such research aims to create alternative theories, open less Eurocentric forms of knowing, and support the perspectives of the colonised society.

Some challenges are faced in understanding decolonising Indigenous research and conducting responsible collaborative research (Smith, 2012). Seppälä et al. (2021) noted that the innocent wish to support a decolonised community may result in decolonising research becoming only a trendy buzzword within Western academia by too often serving only as a metaphor without any concrete decolonising practises. This is still a relevant discussion that Smith (2012) initiated, and has raised questions about who are (or should be) the key agents of decolonisation in research and how the collaboration should be realised with the colonised people. Power plays an important role in the relationship between the researcher and the participating community. The researcher could extend knowledge or perpetuate ignorance. The decolonial label of the research may too easily only heal Western science’s bad conscience over its racially and ethically abusive research from the past instead of genuinely supporting the community (Smith, 2012). Held (2019) describes decolonial research in collaboration with non-Indigenous scholars as at its best when it leads to mutual understanding, healing, and, ultimately, a postcolonial coexistence and collaboration.

To understand and be able to form decolonising art-based research actions with the Sámi reindeer herders, it is crucial to explore the backgrounds and contemporary situation of the on-going cultural colonisation of Sápmi. Until the middle of the 19th century, the Sámi people were usually nomads over a smaller or larger area of Sápmi, and they commonly moved two times a year between their summer and winter residences depending on seasonal fishing, hunting areas, and reindeer pastures. National borders divided Sápmi and the reindeer herders’ nomadic routes between Norway and Finland in 1852 and Sweden and Finland in 1888, thus separating families and limiting their cultural interactions (Lehtola, 2015). For the Sámi people, the ideas of borders and landowning were strange. For them, their land covered their hunting and fishing grounds as well as their reindeer pastures. Other families and relatives that lived in the same culture and talked the same language as they did lived along the northern calotte.

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The historian Enbuske (2006) implies that colonialism has never occurred in Sápmi as the area has been considered since the 17th century, also by the local people, as Crown land. Enbuske explained that people from the South made no effort to invade Lapland, and the contemporary habitation therein resulted from the Sámi people themselves changing their nomadic lifestyle and culture and settling the lands. Over time, they mixed with the Finnish population. According to Kuokkanen (2020), the Sámis in the area began farming because, by law, this was the only way they could continue their rights to their hunting and fishing lands while people from the South settled into the region. The colonialism in the North can be described as settler colonialism (Wolfe, 2006), which is realised by imposing the settlers’ culture through the power structures that direct regional functions such as religion, education, and official language. This has been going on in the Sámi regions since the Middle Ages, when the church began to Christianize the North (Lehtola, 2015).

It is a type of cultural colonialism, where the Indigenous people are being eliminated over the years, not through massacres or other brutal physical acts, but through assimilation. Ultimately, it is difficult to blame any person for being a colonial settler, as all local habitants are involved in some way (Wolfe, 2006). Today, the ancient Sámi families live in northernmost Sápmi. The majority of the habitants in the province of Lapland have mixed ethnic roots, and Sáminess today cannot be measured through ethnicity alone. A large population descending from the Sámi people has lost their culture and language, and today, they identify themselves as Finnish, Swedish, or Norwegian people in their way of living. For them, their Sámi identity is like an open and painful wound in that they are ashamed of not speaking Sámi, not knowing Sámi culture. These people are a result of settler colonialism.

Settler colonialism is ongoing. This is one reason why activism or extreme radical decolonial acts do not necessarily interest people who have raised their children in a democratic welfare society and are living peacefully in a mixed society where people are longtime friends or relatives.

Kuokkanen (2007) describes the Sámis’ silent approval of their situation as a long-term adaptation of the hegemonic power of the dominant society, which ensures that their interests are everyone’s best and has resulted in colonising the Sámis' minds. Even if many of the Sámis might agree that they are still undergoing colonialism, the democratic society discourages them from protesting.

People wish to mind their own business and live in peace. They often have an evasive attitude when it comes to expressing radical personal opinions or raising their voices.

Cultural Knowledge It is important to define the term "knowledge" in the context of Indigenous research. Knowledge is a certain outcome in research with communities, and ethical questions are raised concerning the use of data, credentials, and the benefit of spreading it. Knowledge systems such as Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK), Indigenous Knowledge (IK), Sámi Traditional Knowledge, Lokal Knowledge, Northern Knowledge, and Community Knowledge have similarities and differences from each other (Berkes, 2018; Helander-Renvall & Markkula, 2017; Jokela & Huhmarniemi, 2022; Lehtola, 2015; Riseth et al., 2010; Valkonen & Valkonen, 2019). In this research, I prefer to use Cultural Knowledge from the viewpoint of the specific knowledge that the reindeer herders share in the exhibition and design of the book. Cultural Knowledge is commonly understood as a competence to interpret different cultures, which is useful in order to understand, learn, and adapt other people's behaviours (Wang, 2011). Alternatively, and referred to in this article, Cultural Knowledge can be considered a feature, ability, quality, or attribute of a certain community. Wang

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(2011) notes that it is often difficult for individuals to be fully aware of the features of their own cultural knowing because it lies deep within their consciousness. Culture is learned by communication with those around us from the day we are born. We learn our languages; develop our worldview, values, and beliefs; and restore the data to be used in the community we live in.

This might include multiple things that we think “that we just know” (Wang, 2011). Tiili (2023) includes kinesthetic and bodily learning processes in Cultural knowledge, which are in close interaction with the environment and the community. The active receiving of impulses that a person gains from the day he/she is born, is building intuition and an awareness of our daily life that we can lean on. This kind of knowing is place- and community-specific, and is tied to hidden cultural norms, inherited wisdom, and behaviour (Tiili, 2023). The Boazoeallin exhibition and book can be seen as visual samples of the reindeer herders’ Cultural Knowledge. In this article, the concept of cultural knowing is also used. The philosopher Ryle (1946) first addressed the difference between knowing and knowledge in his essay on knowing how and knowing that. Knowledge is often considered stable and confirmed. Knowing is subjective and develops according to changing circumstances (e.g. place and time). Further, the complex explanations of knowledge and knowing have been addressed in multiple fields of science (Azzouni, 2020; Kuhn, 2001; Nagel, 2014).

Methods used in this ABAR strategy ABAR has been developed at the University of Lapland since the 1990s to respond to the needs of revitalisation of communities, regional development, and sustainable development of the environment (Jokela, 2019; Jokela & Huhmarniemi, 2020; Huhmarniemi, Jokela & Hiltunen, 2021).

Jokela and Huhmarniemi (2020) described this method as a research strategy as it usually plays a key role in combination with other fields of science. This strategy shares common features with international arts-based research and artistic research (Barone & Eisner, 2012) as well as with participatory action research (Jokela, 2018; Leavy, 2017). ABAR aims to develop methods and working approaches of the artist and art educator that in contemporary pedagogy has entered the working fields outside educational institutions (Jokela et al., 2015). Today, at a global level, this strategy involves artists and art educators as researchers working together with communities in social science for developing education, regional sustainability, and healthcare (Huhmarniemi & Jokela, 2020; Miettinen et al., 2016, Strand et al., 2022). In Sápmi, the University of Lapland has led development projects in which the challenges of peripheral villages, such as population ageing, isolation of young people, and undeveloped creative industries and cultural services, have been in the background alongside cultural sustainability in tourism (Hiltunen, 2009; Jokela et al., 2015). The art-based actions in this strategy are process-oriented and dialogical. The democratic performance enables the researcher and the community to collaborate and enhance co-research, which often encourages the community to highlight their culture. The art that is produced in the research projects are dialogical place-specific art forms, such as environmental or community art, and are produced according to the basis of community-based art education (Hiltunen, 2009).

The reindeer herder families participated in the research project as co-researchers. Participants as co-researchers are situated as contributors as well as investigators to the findings of a research project. This approach privileges the experiences of the community and positions participants as experts of their own life and, therefore, as essential co-researchers and collaborators in the process of gathering data (Boylorn, 2008). Inviting the community to participate in research as coresearchers is a way to seek to implement the principles of democracy throughout the research

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process and to destabilise the power positions linked to traditional research settings (Kulmala et al., 2023). The participatory aspect of co-research has been a natural starting point for decolonising research that has given deserved respect for Indigenous peoples’ knowledge (Smith, 2012; Seppälä et al., 2021). The participating community is not necessarily invited to the process as co-authors as it is usually not familiar or comfortable with the concept of the research work; nonetheless, it can offer its observations and expertise (Boylorn, 2008).

We used photographing as a tool to collect information and data; in research, this is known as the Photovoice method (Wang & Burris, 1997). The Photovoice method was originally used in social and healthcare research but has since been successfully adapted to community-based participatory research and research with Indigenous people in their communities (Castleden et al., 2008). This method has also helped highlight the oppressive conditions of the participants’ lives (Wang & Burris, 1997).

The visual Photovoice method is, by itself, not an art-based method. Visual data can include simple exploration or informative journalism. The action and data will turn into art when it is established in artistic spheres by designing, constructing, and valuing aesthetics or exhibiting. In this research project, the reindeer herders families collaborated with the researcher to build an exhibition in which their own photographs, taken by cellphones, were presented in combination with installations of ´taskscapes´ (Ingold, 1993) describing the reindeer herders’ daily chores (Korsström-Magga, 2019; Korsström-Magga & Jokela, 2022). Taskscape is a term introduced by Tim Ingold to refer to an environment or situation in which human actions are performed. The environment is usually strongly connected to cultural heritage and involves all senses (Ingold, 1993; Korsström-Magga & Jokela, 2022). The families designed the installations for the exhibition themselves, determining the theme and using their own working tools and equipment that formed the taskscapes. They also designed a book of their photographs that is based upon their cultural view of their working year. In this project, the Photovoice method can be considered decolonial because the outcome of the action is primarily beneficial to the participants (Seppälä, 2021).

Positionality and background My insider position in this research is related to my everyday life as a member of a reindeer herder family. This enables me to collect data as a participant observer. McKechnie (2008) defines participant observation as a qualitative research method that is especially appropriate for studying social phenomena or communities about which little is known or is visible to the public (McKechnie, 2008).

At the same time, I was born an outsider in the society as my roots are in the South of Finland. I am neither Sámi nor a reindeer herder myself. I moved to the county of Inari in Lapland as a young woman and married a Sámi reindeer herder. To learn to live in a new culture, understand the language, and adapt the visible and invisible understandings of cultural ways takes more than a lifetime, and I would be lying if I claimed to know all about it today. Nonetheless, over the years, I have learned to meet the outside world from a reindeer herder’s perspective. I have noticed how much ignorance and false information there is about Sámi reindeer herders’ contemporary lives. I have also noticed how the Sámi reindeer herders often need to convince the local people, regional government, and state about their needs and cultural rights with regard to their livelihood. My life has given me valuable knowledge about the community and as a person originally from the South who was a member of the dominant society, I can recognise the counterparts’ ignorance. My insider Art and co-research with Sámi reindeer herders

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position as well as my pre-knowledge of the research community has helped me to understand and analyse the research data and the community’s cultural behaviour.

My outsider position arises from my position as a researcher. The Indigenous people have never thought highly of researchers. Western science has abused minorities through unethical research since the Middle Ages. Therefore, Indigenous people commonly view Western science and researchers with suspicion. The five reindeer herder families did not totally welcome my idea of the research project. However, the thought of promoting their livelihood and the fact that they were familiar with me, even if I was not born into their culture, convinced them to join the project.

The following summary as shown in Figure 1 visualises the strategy and background of the research actions.

Figure 1. A summary of the strategy used in this ABAR research with Sámi reindeer herders. Note: this model is produced by the author (2023), summarising the strategy factors of the research.

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In art-based action, the researcher performs the key tasks of planning and organising the action.

The art-based action, guidance, practical knowledge, and analysis are clearly related to the art educator’s profession as well as its performance and reporting to the academic society. In this research, the action was aimed at producing knowledge about Sámi reindeer herder families’ everyday lives. The expectations of the art-based actions, combined with the participatory methods of co-research and Photovoice, sought decolonial empowering actions with the community and produced Cultural Knowledge.

Reindeer herder families producing Cultural Knowledge Through this project, I was personally interested in raising reindeer herder families’ voices and disseminating knowledge about their everyday lives. I started to plan the art-based action and visualised different scenes of how the art we were going to produce with the reindeer herders could be presented by visualising their everyday life in the most conspicuous way. As an outsider to the Sámi Indigenous community, I initially did not understand why the families were doubtful of my first suggestions and ideas of contemporary and slightly radical forms of disseminating the reindeer herders’ daily life in the exhibition (Korsström-Magga, 2019). The participant observation during this long-term research helped me to gradually understand the contemporary complex situation of colonialism in Sápmi, which explains partly the families' hesitance in expressing themselves publicly and their desire to act politely and objectively in their art actions. They clearly want to avoid conflicts and they want to give a good impression of themselves. In both the exhibition and the design of the book, they wished to present themselves as correct and decorous people.

The reindeer herder families photographed their daily lives for one year to reveal moments that are seldom seen or understood by outsiders. We exhibited nearly 1000 photographs of the families’ daily lives in the Boazoeallin exhibition in Sámi Siida Museum in Inari. At the exhibition, the photographs were built into taskscapes (Ingold, 1993) around themes of the reindeer herder’s work, such as the separation fence, contemporary use of the lávvu (a Sámi teepee), impacts of predators on reindeer herders’ livelihood, and tourism. The exhibition gained local attention, and the autumn tourist season brought foreigners who also enjoyed it. I publicised the exhibition further in several international conferences and journals, and it is central to my thesis (Korsström-Magga, 2019; Korsström-Magga & Jokela, 2022).

After our exhibition, we decided to continue our mission of disseminating information; toward this end, we started designing a book that would present the photographs along with short explanations.

The book is called Boazoeallin, like the exhibition. The research group considered the book more informative than the exhibition as it would not disappear as the exhibition would, and the members of all families could sell it in the future to disseminate information by themselves. We started to plan the book in the autumn of 2019. This time I also joined the actual art-based action together with the families. We planned and designed the edition and I added photographs from situations where my own family was working with similar tasks as the other families. This deepened my understanding of the art-based action and it also set me in the same situation as the research group, presenting and revealing my personal and private life. This helped me a great deal to analyse the other person's feelings and their efforts made for the project.

Exploring reindeer herders’ working year We decided to structure the book according to the reindeer herders’ year, which starts when the

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calves are born in early summer. The year is divided into eight seasons according to an ancient Sámi view of the year. The seasons do not change at a certain date, and they are not equally long.

Instead, they change according to climatic conditions in nature combined with chores of reindeer herder’s livelihood. The year starts in spring-summer, when the first calves are born on the melting snowfields. The summer follows when the leaves are fully grown and the mosquitoes fly. The late summer is when the cloudberries are ripe and the reindeer fur is new and shiny. The autumn starts when the first frost nights occur, leaves become colourful, and reindeer eat mushrooms. The late autumn is when the reindeer mating season starts. Winter starts when the snow falls and reindeer are separated and slaughtered. In winter, the sun does not rise. Early spring sees the coldest days of the year, during which time snow falls increasingly, the snow cover gets thicker, and the first glimpses of the sun are seen. In spring, the days get longer quickly. The nights can be very cold; however, the days are pleasant and sunny. Some warm days cause a thick and hard snow crust, and the reindeer herd spreads and eats moss that falls from the trees. The whooper swans return. Then, the snow cover starts to melt and the new reindeer calves are born and the next year is considered to start. Every season is represented in the book by a large photograph of either a landscape or special task of the season. The season is described by a short text in Finnish translated with a few lines in English.

Autumn The ground is freezing and soon snow will cover the world. We are spending our last freetime before the slaughter season by fishing, hunting elk, birds, and picking lingonberries. Then, the reindeer separation time begins. The slaughter time continues during the winter period. The male reindeer are now fighting with each other and gathering the female reindeer to larger herds, which helps us to collect the reindeer into the separation fence. At the fence we separate the slaughter animals. The reindeer that are not slaughtered are after the separation transported either by vans or by herding to the reindeer herders’ village herding areas, where they can be supported during the harsh winter period.

A couple of texts in the book are written in Inari Sámi and Northern Sámi; however, as our main audience are not Sámi, we decided to describe our everyday chores in Finnish. The texts are based upon our discussions of the photographs that gave the inspiration to talk about and compare our working systems across all seasons. A photo collage describes every season visually. Every season also has a ‘to do’ list summarising the chores in a familiar and everyday tone what one should do during this season.

We reused some of the photographs from the exhibition along with new photographs in the design.

For some of the seasonal chapters, we added short texts about a special task or event. The autumn season contains a text about hunting and fishing as these are of great importance to all Sámi reindeer herder families. The late autumn contains a chapter about slaughter, as the reindeer herders are skilled self-taught butchers. The handicraft of making shoes from reindeer skin as well as a couple of recipes for reindeer meat are also presented. All these skills are passed down from generation to generation in Sámi families. The book is planned to be sold beside the meat market for all, including tourists. Some books may be directly given to regional offices.

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Results of dialogical art-based space The research actions highlight the qualities of the ABAR strategy. As an art educator, I analyse my own actions, including the planning of the action, use of the Photovoice method, and collaboration with the participants as co-researchers. As an artist, art educator, as well as participant observer, I analyse the community’s visual art, which is a research result. These include the photographs as well as the exhibition, book, and all related actions and decisions. This requires understanding and knowledge about the culture of the reindeer herders’ community, which I have thanks to my position as an insider. My observations, notes, photographs, and unstructured interviews that I have produced as a participant observer confirm and complement the results of the visual analysis.

A strength of art-based research methods is that the action can engage communities to trust and highlight their cultural knowing, which is otherwise often non-verbal, silent, sensitive, and bodily (Jokela & Huhmarniemi, 2020; Tiili, 2023, Wang, 2011). This art-based action research presents a project in which the community participates as co-researchers and expresses itself visually through art-based actions to produce Cultural Knowledge that highlights their community in society and thereby decolonises and empowers itself.

My special position as an insider in this research project gave me enough knowledge about the community to plan the art-based research actions. My background and everyday life placed me in this research as a participant observer (McKechnie, 2008). During the research, I primarily made observations from my own daily chores with my family, and in the analysis, I compared my observations to those of other families. This helped me to fully understand the chores and situations they had photographed in their everyday lives.

Figure 2: The reindeer herders’ Cultural Knowledge is visible in the pictures. A written explanation might increase the information for those who are not familiar with the culture. Author's own photograph, 2023.

For example, in Figure 2, a man driving a snowmobile with a lávvu (Sámi traditional teepee) in the background does not necessarily reveal to the viewer that the sledge and lávvu are handmade based

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on inherited knowledge. My insider knowledge helps me to understand the photographs in a wider sense. The photograph reveals that the family herd their reindeer in the forest area of the region.

It is late spring and the family is keeping the female reindeer in a large fence while they are calving.

The sledge is used for transporting and distributing the reindeer hay, lichen and fodder as the early spring plants have not yet started to grow. The lávvu is used as a resting place, where the family eat, keep their things and occasionally also spend their nights.

My position as an insider helped me to gain trust and convince the reindeer herder families to join the project. This was not self-evident, as the community is Sámi and is aware of the abusive research that has been done on their people (Smith, 2012). They suffer from generations of settler colonialism, which is today seen in society as cultural colonialism and colonisation of the mind (Kuokkanen, 2007). I noticed that the participating persons were cautious. It was important for them to present their livelihood and daily lives in a positive light and correctly. They wanted to convince the people, who do not know their culture well, that they are honest and hardworking people. It was equally important to them that no one in their own reindeer herders’ society could blame them for bringing up false or abusive material. All insisted on acknowledging that the photographs do not represent all reindeer herders and that every family has often its own specific way of doing the chores. Settler colonialism has mixed the northern habitants together for a long time, with the result that people are socially related. In society, a subconscious knowing of proper behaviour exists which silences impulsive acts.

In this research, we used the Photovoice method (Wang & Burris, 1997) to gather information about the reindeer herders’ daily life. This method suited the study purpose well by empowering the community and building self-esteem and trust in our research. Further, it produced visual data and revealed Sámi reindeer herders’ cultural knowing (Wang, 2011). The photographs and texts in the Boazoeallin book tell a story about happy people living a good life.

Figure 3. The Sámi reindeer herders are hardworking outdoor people. From the left: Photographs 1-2, 2021 by S. Kustula, photograph 3, 2017 by K. Ukkonen and photograph 4, 2022 by E-M. Hetta.

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Figure 4. The Sámi reindeer herders' daily lives are also similar with the majority population. From the left: Author’s own photograph 1, 2023, photograph 2, 2012 by K. Ukkonen, photograph 3, 2021 by S. Kustula and photograph 4, 2016 by Sara family.

A sample of photographs from the book in Figure 3 show that the families wanted to bring forward positive features of themselves as skilled, professional, and hardworking outdoor people who are proud of their Sámi Indigenous heritage and especially proud of being reindeer herders. They also added photographs in the book that pointed out commonalities with the majority people. The photographs in Figure 4 disseminate their everyday lives also as familiar and approachable. The usual outcome of the Photovoice method, that has been used in Social Sciences and the realm of social work, has revealed misery or a minority population’s struggles (Wang & Burris, 1997). The reindeer herders’ photographs had on the contrary a positive daily character. Exploring the daily chores by photographing was clearly empowering. The photographs reveal and confirm the families’ Cultural Knowledge so that the viewer may adapt, understand, and learn. The Boazoeallin exhibition and book describe the reindeer herders’ daily life and noteworthy stories. The book contained explanations that widened the understanding of the photographs. These explanations are based on the stories and discussions of the research community. The exhibition and book are both considered as a visual-art-based result of the research.

The democratic way of producing data encouraged the community as participating co-researchers to trust the research and to be enthusiastic and inspired about presenting their livelihood. These actions are valued as decolonising in research (Smith, 2012).

Conclusion In this article, I discuss the elements of an art-based action research project that produced Cultural Knowledge of Sámi reindeer herder families in Inari, northern Finland. The aim was to create visible information and inform regional decision-makers and the majority population about contemporary reindeer herding. The research aimed for democratising and decolonising actions.

The participants acted as co-researchers and used art-based actions and the Photovoice method to collect research data about their own daily doings and their lives as reindeer herders. The reindeer herder families, with me facilitating, built an exhibition of the photographs and placed them in installations formed as taskscapes. The exhibition was called Boazoeallin (‘Reindeer life’ in English) and subsequently the families designed a book (of the same name) of these photographs. Through the photographs, the families showed themselves doing their chores and living their lives over the year, also revealing their specific cultural knowing about their profession, their environment, nature and Sámi heritage as reindeer herders. The exhibition and book should clarify and highlight Art and co-research with Sámi reindeer herders

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reindeer herders’ livelihoods to people in common and multiple stakeholders who desire to use the reindeer pasturelands in the North for other purposes. This article highlights the features of artbased action research as a strategy that produces and transmits Cultural Knowledge produced with art-based actions. The use of the Photovoice method encouraged participants to explore their own lives through a lens, which helped them to present and reflect on their own features and skills; this was empowering and supported decolonisation. The Boazoeallin book, that will remain as a result of this project, is embracing a time frame of these reindeer herder families lives in Inari, where external challenges are changing their circumstances of livelihood.

Acknowledgements I thank the reindeer herder families involved in my Art-based Action Research project research, who I also gratefully acknowledge for permission to use and reproduce their photographs in this article. A special thanks goes to Koneen Säätiö and University of Lapland for supporting my doctoral studies.

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Strand, M., Rivers, N., Baasch, R., & Snow, B. (2022). Developing arts-based participatory research for more inclusive knowledge co-production in Algoa Bay. Current Research in Environmental Sustainability, 4, 100178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsust.2022.100178 Tiili, M.-L. (2023). Kinestesiska dispositioner och kulturellt vetande: Rörelse, förändring och kontinuitet inom sjöbevakningen. [Kinestaethic dispositions and cultural knowing: Movement, change and continuity in the Coast Guard] Budkavlen, 95, 24–37. https://doi.org/10.37447/bk.129601 Valkonen, J., & Valkonen, S. (2019). On local knowledge. In E. T. Hylland, S. Valkonen & J. Valkonen (Eds.), Knowing from the Indigenous North: Sámi approaches to history, politics and belonging (pp. 12–26). Routledge.

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Wang, C. & Burris, M. A. (1997). Photovoice: Concept, methodology, and use for participatory needs assessment. Health Education & Behavior, 24(3), 369‒387.

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Briefing Note

The social lives of Arctic expertise, or how to do transnational networks

Merje Kuus

What role does in-person interaction play in the networks of Arctic governance? As virtual rather than personal interaction is gaining ground in many fields, we need to examine the value of in-person communication in Arctic networks. Especially in the Arctic, a region which inhabitants live across twenty-four time zones, the organization of interaction matters greatly. It is vitally important for the Arctic that regional networks cultivate collaboration, professional trust, and a certain esprit de corps: we thus need to consider what practices foster these qualities.

This briefing note makes a two-pronged argument about Arctic networks. First, I suggest that these networks are strengthened by the accent on in-person interaction at key networking events. Second, I foreground a transprofessional field of knowledge— the networks that bridge scientific, diplomatic, business, and civil society realms—as the medium of Arctic expertise. Arctic networks are necessarily transnational and transprofessional configurations, and that is their strength. My underlying claim is about the social lives of transnational governance. To the degree that Arctic networks have retained resilience, it is in part due to value placed on in-person contact and transprofessional connections in the Arctic. There is a lesson here for international governance more broadly.

Introduction: personal contact in Arctic networks Arctic governance accentuates the role of transnational professional networks. This happens in part because of the intensifying geopolitical and geoeconomic interest in the region by states as well as private companies and non-profit groups. Put simply, many new actors enter the scene and they all need expert knowledge to gain influence. The field of Arctic expertise is expanding rapidly and this creates a new mix of ideas and interests in that field. We thus need to examine how this expanding constellation of knowledge works.

This briefing note does so. It explores the social field of Arctic expertise—the social context that situates the actors and channels their actions—to make two points. First, I underscore the importance of socialization, as distinct from formal institutional structures, as a key medium of

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influence in Arctic networks. This is the stuff of social rather than institutional lives: of a certain milieu of informality that is an integral facet of Arctic networks. That milieu relies on in-person contact and social trust cultivated over years of continuous interaction. Second, I highlight the role of the professionals whom I tentatively call the Arcticians: Arctic experts from academic, diplomatic, business, and non-profit spheres who work in the nodal positions of Arctic governance.

They operationalize the knowledge that non-Arctic actors need but, given the specificity of Arctic matters, cannot quickly build. We should not overvalorize the Arcticians, but neither should we overlook their central role in facilitating communication and collaboration in the Arctic.

One effect of this expansion of Arctic expertise is that transnational networking events gain in importance. Such events both analyze the Arctic and make it: the Arctic as a field of connections and collaboration is created in part through networking events. Some of the inter-state competition in the Arctic is a competition for socialization cache. New players enter the Arctic conference carousel to participate in that socialization. Socialization is not an icing on the cake in Arctic networks: it is baked into the cake.

My point is not simply that networking matters: that knowledge is inseparable from the social networks through which it operates. My point is that networks in the Arctic matter more and in different ways than may first meet the eye because these networks are rapidly expanding in number, reach, and diversity. As the field expands, its core remains the filter that refracts the incoming flows of information and influence. It is therein, in the existing networks and traditions, that we can look for the possibilities of repair and renewal. When Arctic cooperation returns to something resembling pre-2022 levels, a diplomat notes ‘it will be your network’ that gives you the edge.

This is not a traditional academic book chapter: it is, rather, an invitation to appreciate the value of in-person professional interaction in transnational governance. Although I mobilize the academic study of diplomatic expertise from multiple disciplines, that work remains on the background. The foreground is given to primary empirical material from my interactions, including twenty interviews as well as conversations and participant observation at Arctic events in 2022-2023, combined with my previous fifteen years of studying diplomatic practice. My method is quasi-ethnographic: although I attempt no traditional ethnography with its detailed descriptions of the settings, I observe the scene with an ethnographer’s curiosity about how others see their world. Some interactions took the form of interviews with prepared questions and detailed notes; others were in the form of loosely planned or impromptu conversations with minimum notes taken. Either way, everything is off the record and non-attributable. I share vignettes and quotes, but only insofar as I can retain the anonymity of my interlocutors1.

The stakes in Arctic interaction go beyond the Arctic. The core difficulty in international governance is not about technical expertise but about the habits of mind that simplify the issues at hand into national and professional slices and thus inhibit the synthesis that we actually need to respond to the situation. The networks of Arctic expertise have something to teach us about the societal value of in-person interaction in transnational and transprofessional spaces.

‘The essence of my profession is meeting people’: interaction in Arctic diplomacy The social milieu of Arctic networks has traditionally been relatively informal, inter-field, international, and inter-regional. The Arctic Council and several other regional institutions trace their

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beginnings to the late Cold War and immediate post-Cold War years. They were established in the context of thawing relations between the superpowers: that atmosphere of pragmatic cooperation is reflected in their institutional set-up. Their organizational cultures bear the traces of Nordic countries, whose systems and traditions of regional development, education and research, and international dialogue are integral to the scene. Many Arctic networks were created to facilitate people-to people contacts at the time when regions in several Arctic countries pushed for more autonomy from central governments. The Arctic context on the ground, from infrastructure and ecosystems to indigenous politics, differs markedly from the latitudes of capital cities: local actors, with their long-term knowledge of the region, have always been central to the field (Keskitalo, 2004). Stereotypical narratives of geopolitical conflict—narratives that are more likely to be peddled by and for actors outside the region than in it—have encountered strong pushback as a result (see Exner-Pirot, 2018 for a pithy summary of such narratives).

The central role of diplomats, in and beyond the Arctic Council, is another central feature of Arctic networks. The Arctic is a prime example of what Constantinou, Cornago, and McConnell (2016, 2) call the ‘transprofessionalization’ of diplomacy: a process that expands diplomatic space and intensifies diplomats’ networks beyond their profession. That expanded space transforms the boundaries of diplomatic spaces within state structures and within modern societies (ibid.: 20-34).

Arctic networks thus illustrate what might be called the diplomatization of state-governing expertise: in the Arctic, all state-governing knowledge is becoming interwoven with the diplomatic profession.2 To study governance expertise in the Arctic is to study diplomatic expertise. To suggest this is not to overvalorize one profession, but to note how diplomatic culture is woven into the culture of Arctic expertise.

As the title quote of this section implies, diplomats value in-person interaction. Personal contact, another diplomat notes: ‘is not a part of diplomacy: it is diplomacy’. Pressured and tense situations make such contact more important, they continue. In diplomacy: ‘We are out for a result. We need a decision.’ In-person interaction makes getting to the decision—one that works well enough for multiple parties and thus holds in the long run—easier. This is in part because in-person interaction provides a backstage for managing friction and thereby generates trust. ‘The reason you send diplomats out to foreign capitals is to engage personally and share confidences,’ Singapore’s ambassador to the United States Ashok Mirpuri says of his field of work (Heath, 2020). It is well established that in-person sociability forms a central building block of the esprit de corps in the diplomatic profession (see also Nair, 2020; Kuus, 2023a).

In Arctic diplomacy, then, the diplomats’ preference for in-person interaction is not a matter of touchy-feely idealism or elitist indulgence: it is a pragmatic evidence-based choice for effective communication.3 That preference is discernible in the set-up of transnational Arctic meetings, such as the Arctic Circle, Arctic Frontiers, and Arctic Encounter meetings: all of them are devised to facilitate interaction. The growing constellation of such events also indicates that many actors recognize the need to bring Arctic professionals together in person. ‘Everyone wants an Arctic meeting these days’ says one regular participant: how a meeting is organized and how it facilitates interaction is of vital importance in determining who attends.4 That video platforms undercut trust-building became clear when the pandemic struck. ‘Spare a thought for the world’s diplomatic elite’, Politico implored in the thicket of the spring 2020 lockdowns: ‘they’re prowling around Zoom liked caged animals, deprived of their most potent tool

Kuus

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– personal contact –right as the world is looking to them to coordinate the response to a crippling pandemic’ (Heath, 2020). Building and acting on trust is ‘about the cues and nuances that aren’t available online’, Mirpuri commented. Austria’s ambassador in Washington Martin Weiss agreed, noting that the benefits of digital tools ‘stop when the discussions get complex’. A video platform creates a very different dynamic, he explained: ‘There isn’t the same pressure to compromise you would experience if you were in the same room. It’s easier to hide behind your own screen’ (ibid.; see also Eder 2020; Kuus, 2023a). A virtual platform, a diplomat says to me when looking back at the pandemic, is unsuitable for long-term cooperative relationships because it ‘removes the element of humanity from interpersonal communication’. To the degree that Arctic meetings worked in virtual format during the pandemic, several diplomats explain, it was because the key actors knew each other already and could rely on the trust built up before the pandemic. Moving forward, inperson contact needs to be restored and maintained.

What is less noticed and appreciated is that the central role of in-person interaction extends much beyond diplomacy in Arctic networks. Many of the stories of professional connections and initiatives are of specific ad hoc interactions, off the cuff remarks, serendipitous encounters outside one’s ‘own’ national or professional circles. The Arctic was remote not only physically but also in mainstream spatial imaginaries: it was and still is removed from most people’s field of attention.

The indifference and sometimes incompetence of outsiders goes beyond some capitals or some ministries: many Arctic professionals can tell colorful tales of the ignorance of ‘their’ national politicians and civil servants. The esprit de corps in Arctic networks is in part a response to the provincializing gaze of the capital: it is a regional and not only a professional affinity.

Arctic scientists, for example, need to regularly interact with Arctic experts much beyond science.

In part because of the growing attention to social issues in the region, from health to indigenous sovereignty, natural scientists increasingly need to grasp such issues. What is needed for professional success is not only the knowledge of one field but also the ability to navigate multiple professional fields. ‘I sometimes feel sorry for [the natural scientists]’, an interlocutor familiar with academic networks remarks: natural scientists, too, increasingly need to grasp social affairs to obtain big grants, but they are not trained for this. They now need to learn, fast. An Arctic scientist needs attend quasi-diplomatic receptions. That scientist may be skeptical at first, grumbling that diplomats are not ‘our kind of people’, an interviewee at ease in both worlds remarks. But once they attend, they see the benefits: ‘they come back like from a foreign trip’, feeling excited and energized. It is not an accident that the commentary in Science on ‘the science of schmoozing’ (Kintisch, 2015) was written about Arctic science networks. The specificity of Arctic issues necessitates and enables transprofessional connections.

It is in part because Arctic networks are highly dispersed that in-person interaction gains in importance. The Arctic in a circumpolar region across twenty-four time zones: an international meeting held virtually may well involve someone logging in at 4 a.m. their time. That someone is more likely to be an indigenous person rather than a high-ranking civil servant in a national capital.

This is why, one such civil servant notes, in-person interaction is especially important in the Arctic: if the actors involved are serious about indigenous perspectives, they need to engage with these perspectives in greater texture than is possible online. At the principal Arctic meetings, such as the Arctic Circle Assemblies, many of the indigenous participants wear their traditional clothing: that

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visual signaling is an integral part of Arctic interaction and is valued as such by the other participants.

In the aftermath of the pandemic, when many activities have been slow to move back to in-person formats, Arctic networking is a notable for its emphasis on such formats. I briefly cite two examples. The Arctic Circle Assembly of 2021 is my first example. The Assembly, a three-day conference plus its associated receptions and fieldtrips, was first held in 2013, but had become the key international gathering of Arctic expertise by the time of the pandemic. The 2020 conference was cancelled. In 2021, as the Delta variant was fueling much uncertainty about travel, the event’s organizers decided to keep that year’s meeting in person. Over 1,400 people attended from 50 countries, for an almost entirely in-person and maskless meeting (thanks to continuous testing) (Arctic Circle, 2021).5 This at a time when international travel was discouraged by many public institutions. The effect of those few days of interaction on policy processes cannot be quantified, but the effort taken, by the organizers and the attendees alike, needs to be noted. When I hear, from multiple people, that Arctic Circle meetings are ‘very special’, they mean the opportunity at these meetings to encounter people they would not meet elsewhere. They also mean a certain vibe, one in which no one country or profession dominates. At one level, the meeting is a ‘circumpolar speed-dating event’: almost crassly image-conscious and ‘North American’ in its upbeat tonality.

At another level, it is an ‘extremely useful’ place to see and be seen, hear and be heard, perceive the dots and connect them. The scene is relatively open and fluid in part thanks to the ease of inperson interaction.6 The Calotte Academy of 2022 is my second example. The Academy has long been a key venue of familiarizing annual cohorts of 20-30 professionals, often junior ones, with Arctic issues. From its origins in the 1990s, it has been a transnational and transprofessional affair, designed to connect individuals from different countries and academic fields in North Calotte region of northern Scandinavia every June. Logistically, the Academy involves the 20-30 participants spending a week together, travelling on a bus in the North Calotte region and learning about that place, other Arctic places, and each other’s research. Because place and interaction are central to its rationale, the Academy describes itself as ‘a travelling symposium’ and a ‘school of Arctic dialogue’(see Heininen and Huotari, 2021). Post-pandemic, the dilemma about format faced the organizers of that event as well: to be or not to be in-person (the Shakespearean phrasing was used by an interviewee about the Arctic Circle Assembly 2021). The Academy was held in person in June 2022: it involved one week and more than 1,700 kilometres of travel as usual. The risks of the venture were not only to the (mostly) young professionals on the bus: the risks were also to the inhabitants, often older, of the remote region. Reflecting on that choice some months later, Lassi Heininen (2023), the longterm convener of the Academy, said: ‘We go there: we see, we hear, we smell, we taste’. Some short months later, the effects of socialization were clear: the spirited network of young professionals who had met at the Academy was well in sight at the Arctic Circle Assembly in October that year.

The Academy creates knowledge about the Arctic and it also, and as importantly, socializes professionals into Arctic networks. It builds the esprit de corps on which Arctic networks rely.

These examples concern two specific events, but the ‘huge’ role of socialization in Arctic networks—the descriptor is a quote from an interview about very different settings—comes up in many of my interactions.7 Beyond any one event, the long-term value of in-person interaction lies in fostering socially textured quasi-diplomatic knowledge that fosters consensus-building and

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compromise. No neat line can be drawn from the format of meetings to policy outcomes, but neither should we assume that no causal relation exists. Context matters. It is in context that connections are made and decisions are reached: the structuring of the context is an integral part of these connections and decisions. The relatively open feel of the Arctic Circle Assembly and similar meetings—a feel that I would call transnational and transprofessional—does affect how people think and speak. The effect is observed by regular attendees and is also discernible to me.

It is not an effect that can be measured, but it can be observed. The analytical task is not about measuring outcomes but about noticing the milieu of professional trust in Arctic networks.

Diplomats rotate in and out of Arctic settings; the quasi-diplomatic and sociable atmosphere of the social field remains.

The Arcticians: the specific intellectuals of circumpolar governance The Arctic is home to about four million people in eight states. Some of these people are members of indigenous groups with centuries-old presence in the region, whereas others are relative newcomers whose family history in the region goes back decades or less. In part because of the specificity of Arctic issues, both groups have close connections to other Arctic countries. This section accentuates a group which presence in the Arctic is professional: the scientists, diplomats and other civil servants, businesspeople, and civil society actors with long-term professional ties to the region. These individuals may or may not live in the Arctic, but their professional expertise is closely linked to the Arctic.

These are the professionals whom I tentatively call Arcticians: the individuals who wield specialized expertise on Arctic socio-ecological processes. I borrow the idea though not the term from Jessica O’Reilly’s (2017) work on Antarctic science. As that continent has no permanent population, O’Reilly notes, scientists are its only people. She calls them Antarcticians and she foregrounds their key role in crafting governance regimes for the continent. A similar analytical device is useful in the Arctic. In that region, too, governance relies on specialized technical expertise that cannot be imported from more southern latitudes but requires the synthesis of specifically Arctic expertise from multiple fields. In the Arctic, an interviewee stresses, ‘it’s all about synthesis’: effectiveness requires not only the knowledge of any one field but also the capacity to synthesize claims from multiple fields. It is the expertise in synthesis that is the currency of Arctic governance. That expertise is not only technical—in science, diplomacy, business, and so on: it is also social. At an Arctic event, the discussion is not one in which scientists and policy-makers discuss matters from their own silos: it is, rather, one on which both parties leave ‘their’ silos and ‘their’ jargon (and thus their comfort zone) to communicate in a more open social space.

I recognize the risks of borrowing a term from a region with no permanent inhabitants and adapting it to one with deeply rooted local cultures. The Arcticians are professionals of the Arctic: some of them live in the region but others do not. The term has downsides, but it also has upsides: it enables us to look at a professional field without getting caught up in national and professional affiliations. To speak of Arcticians is to speak of a transnational and transprofessional social field rather than individuals.8 The Arcticians’ knowledge of the region is specialized, but this does not make it narrow. To the contrary: they have often spent considerable time in the region, including in different Arctic countries, and they know their counterparts in these countries well. Their professional identity is in part regional. It is situated at the relatively stable crossroads of national, transnational and The social lives of Arctic expertise, or how to do transnational networks

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international levels on the one hand and of political, regulatory, business, and academic spaces on the other, and it works through a certain ‘unnoticed cognitive coordination and resource-pooling’ (Vauchez, 2008, 138 emphasis added; Vauchez, 2011, 344). The interdisciplinary, inter-field or, in sociological terms, interstitial, networks of Arctic-specific scientific, legal, commercial, indigenous expertise have some autonomy from the capitals of big states (Kuus, 2023b). There is a feedback loop between a certain professional autonomy and the in-person interaction on which it rests.

In Arctic networks, one needs to wear multiple hats and interact across national and professional boundaries. Outside intergovernmental settings, too, civil society and academic networks are highly international. The first step in creating a strong academic project, an Arctic scientist notes, is not to start crafting the project but to build trust with the local communities and with scientists from other countries. It is a learning phase before the doing phase. If that learning phase is cut, the quality of the science suffers. Even in diplomacy, a profession based on building connections, practitioners comment on how extensively they need to work with people outside their ministry.

It is this interstitial character—this multiplicity of inter-field and inter-setting knowledges—that accentuates the importance of in-person interaction. Silos thrive in virtual space; it’s the synthetic and inter-field communication that requites in-person interaction.

Arcticians are the professionals whom the historian of ideas Michel Foucault might call specific intellectuals. Most intellectual work today, he says, occurs not in the modality of the universal, but within specific sectors and at the precise points where particular tasks situate the professionals charged with these tasks: the hospital, the university, or the civil service (Foucault, 1984: 68). Unlike the universal intellectual who aspires to speak for everyone, the specific intellectual intervenes in the sector of life with which they are practically involved: hospitals, research institutes, nuclear power, arms control. Their knowledge is not something they simply ‘apply’ to the problems and conflicts with which they engage at work. Rather, these problems and conflicts are conceptualized in part on the basis of their knowledge. ‘One may even say,’ Foucault writes, ‘that the role of the specific intellectual must become more and more important in proportion to the political responsibilities which he is obliged willy-nilly to accept, as a nuclear scientist, computer expert, pharmacologist, etc.’ (Foucault, 1984: 69; see also Kuus, 2021).

The Arcticians are the specific intellectuals of Arctic governance. Their influence is so pronounced in part because Arctic networks are specialized and small: individuals know each other well. Most Arctic countries are small states: even few individuals can have considerable impact there. In large countries like United States or Russia as well, Arctic regions are far from capital cities. This context facilitates and indeed requires the formation of transnational and transprofessional networks. In Arctic networks, one needs to understand the ‘micro-atmospheres’ of meetings and this involves understanding long-term professional relationships.

Conclusion: the speed of trust It was at a transnational and transprofessional Arctic event—the Arctic Circle Japan Forum in March 2023—that I heard the point that, in retrospect, seems obvious. Business in the Arctic, Mads Frederiksen, Executive Director of the Arctic Economic Council, says at a business-oriented session there, moves ‘with the speed of trust’ (Frederiksen, 2023). The effort in this briefing note is to unpack the processes through which trust is created and maintained. Understanding the social lives of Arctic expertise is necessary if we are to learn from Arctic experiences during the pandemic

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and ensure that this learning informs future analysis and action (see also Spence, Exner-Pirot, and Petrov, 2023).

For the Arctic, the social texture of Arctic expertise is an important resource. That social texture enables the kinds of multilateral and transnational regulatory processes that we ultimately need in the Arctic. The quasi-diplomatic feel of Arctic networks is maintained not only by diplomats: it is also cultivated by scientists, indigenous leaders, and businesspeople. All of them need to shift out of the center of their comfort zone and this helps them to listen better. At Arctic events, the diplomatically framed signaling from the stage—the references to common challenges, long-terms interests, or, in the case of indigenous groups, their emphasis on the ‘very long term’—is crucially enabled by interactions off stage.

I recognize the dangers of romanticizing Arctic networks. In that field, too, as in every social field, there is no shortage of national, professional, and personal rivalries and turf wars. As in every social system, proximity can enable cooperation, but it can also breed insularity. The relative openness of Arctic networks is aided by the strong influence of Nordic countries, with their high levels of social trust: it is a contingent achievement rather than a fixed outcome. In- person interaction is but one facet of Arctic interaction: my claim here is simply that it is a facet worth noticing, valuing, and studying.

The social lives of expertise deserve careful consideration especially in this time of conflict and tension, when complexity and compromise are marginalized by soundbites. Diplomacy tends to get sidelined in the world of soundbites, a diplomat noted to me some years ago, because compromise-building disrupts the national grand narrative. Compromise-building does not thrive in the space of video recordings: it thrives in the realm of human interaction. The energy of the room is not quantifiable, but this does not make it unimportant. ‘Diplomacy works best when people can get together’, another diplomat commented some short months ago. Insofar as Arctic networks have been resilient, I suggest, it is in part because of the space and time afforded to professional expertise and professional interaction at Arctic events. We have something to learn from this.

Notes 1. The twenty Arctic-focused interviews and another half-dozen scheduled conversations (the distinction is explained below) ranged from twenty minutes to more than an hour and were conducted in 2022-2023 with individuals who hail from ten different countries. All interviews and conversations were in person, off the record, and non-attributable. All persons move in transnational quasi-diplomatic circles though most were not members of any diplomatic corps at the time of the interview. They are mid-career or senior-level professionals with extensive diplomatic, policy-making, or Arctic-related experience. Most have worked in multiple professional fields. Some interviews were conducted in private offices and conference rooms whereas others took place in restaurant or conference spaces.

In general, if I did not request a formal interview and send the project description to the person in advance, I did not take formal notes and I treated the interaction as a conversation rather than an interview: I felt that reaching for a notebook in a situation in which the person had agreed to sit down with me on the basis of a coffee-break chat or a

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colleague’s recommendation an hour before would push the limits of trust. All unattributed quotes here are drawn from my notes rather than recordings and the same applies to attributed quotes derived from conference sessions: I use my notes from such sessions.

The Arctic-focused primary material rests on a longer study of diplomacy, including 170 non-attributable interviews with practitioners of diplomacy and related spheres since 2007.

Protecting anonymity in the context where people know each other’s professional histories as well as habits of speech goes beyond omitting personal names. I present all fieldwork material in ways that conceal the specific professional or national affiliations as well as other social markers of my interlocutors. This is done in part to ensure anonymity but also to avoid an overly nationality-based interpretation of the material. My object of analysis is a transnational social field and my interest is less in national views than in modes of work that transcend specifically national or professional viewpoints (see Kuus 2018 for a discussion of such methodological and ethical considerations).

2. The term ‘state-governing expertise’ is borrowed from Dezalay and Garth, 2011.

3. This does not reduce the value of Arctic Council settings. At an Arctic Council meeting, an interviewee explains, ‘you are one of eight with a veto power’. An Arctic Circle event is a more nebulous setting with multiple networks of influence: it may not be as ‘comfortable’ for a diplomat.

4. The history of Arctic conferences, especially the Arctic Circle Assembly and the Arctic Frontiers meetings, has received some scholarly attention already, and I will not review that material here. See Steinveg, 2022 for a book-length study from political science and Kuus, 2023b for a more interdisciplinary analysis of the spaces of Arctic governance expertise.

5. See also the photographs of the meeting that are available on the Arctic Circle site.

6. That the Assembly always takes place in the architecturally stunning Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre in Reykjavik is ‘genius’, a regular attendee remarks: the Assembly is now associated with that beautiful space and the association supports the event in intangible ways.

7. Broader discussion of the use of in-person vs hybrid or virtual interaction in international governance processes is beyond the scope of this paper. Studies from neuroscience to psychology to organizational sociology show that virtual meetings tend to be less creative and more susceptible to groupthink, produce cognitive overload (which is worse for women), and undercut trust (e.g. Fauville et al., 2021; Schwartz et al., 2022; The Economist, 2021a; 2022). Remote work makes collaboration more ‘static and siloed’ (The Economist, 2021b; see also Kuus, 2023a). A neuroscience paper based on experiments done before the pandemic highlights substantial attenuation of inter-brain synchrony in virtual vs in-person interactions (Schwartz et al., 2022: 11). As one author of the study puts it, even in the best of circumstances of excellent technology and relaxed conversation between two partners who know each other well, virtual interaction leads to ‘lower-quality and less authentic communication, compared to what our brain is used to (and) what it was made for’ (Guilleaume Dumas, quoted in Legault, 2023). The methodological implications of this to how scholars do fieldwork are likewise beyond the scope of this paper, but see Kuus, 2023c for a brief consideration of some such implications.

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8. Diplomats fit the category uneasily: as professional networkers, they are well connected in Arctic circles when assigned to work on the region, but they rotate to different postings every 3-5 years. However, in part because several of the Arctic states are small Nordic countries, the field of professional communication remains stable because members of the national professional class know each other. In Arctic networks, quasi-diplomatic expertise is not confined to diplomatic services.

Acknowledgements I thank the professionals who made the time in their tight schedules to sit down for interviews and conversations with me. Parts of the argument were presented at the Arctic Circle Japan Forum in March 2023 and the Arctic Circle Assembly in October 2023. The research that underlies the piece was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Any mistakes or misinterpretations are my responsibility.

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Frederiksen, M. (2023) Comments at the session ‘Securing critical minerals supply for the green revolution: The potential for Japan in the Arctic’. Arctic Circle Japan Forum, Tokyo, 5 March.

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Spence, J., H. Exner-Pirot, A. Petrov (2023) Introduction--lest we forget… Arctic Yearbook 2023 Special Issue: Arctic Pandemics: COVID-19 and Other Pandemic Experiences and Lessons Learned. https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2023-special-issue, Last accessed July 13, 2023.

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Briefing Note

Pioneering Models for an Open Discussion and Northern Knowledge-Building – The Case Studies of Calotte Academy and Northern Research Forum

Lassi Heininen

About 25 years ago, a colleague of mine who well knew ‘Action research’ claimed that my method is first to act, i.e., organize a workshop/seminar with the interplay between science and politics, and then, later, to examine and analyze the process. As to be proved (Q.E.D.), I do analyze here something that I have been doing for the last 30 years or so.

From the end of the 1980s to the early-2000s, there was an inspiring sense that we were in a “New North” in terms of ideas and innovations, cooperative initiatives for disarmament, peace, and sustainability, innovative political and academic arrangements by Indigenous peoples, regional governments and scientific society, as well as a certain idealism of a raise of an influence of civil societies and NGOs (TAPRI 1991; AHDR 2004; Heininen 2023a). As a result, new forums and networks for open discussions between different stakeholders and knowledge-building - locally, regionally, nationally, internationally – were established. All this was much motivated and accelerated by the thaw and stability-building between the Eastern bloc and the Western one, which indicated the end of the Cold War period in the Arctic region.

This inspiring sense, also called an ‘Arctic boom,’ included a social need and tentative readiness for a dialogue between scholars, Indigenous peoples, representatives of NGOs, and policy-makers, as well as across sectoral borders, with interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity. In particular, there were active interrelations, even discussion, between a state and a civil society within several single Arctic states on the one hand and on the other across national borders due to the fact that Indigenous peoples, environmental movements, and civil societies, as well as a few scholars and scientists, became concerned on a state of their environment due to long-range pollution from lower latitudes (e.g., Heininen 2013).

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Based on this, there were visions, narratives, initiatives, and discourses on the Arctic, such as a “knowledge-based region,” a new design for regionalization as a “challenge to the traditional state system” vis-a-vis region-building by nations as major actors, a potential model for functional cooperation and stability-building in world politics (e.g., Heininen et al. 1995, 16; AHDR 2004, 2226 & 236-237). In the 2010s, this was interpreted as an ‘Arctic model’ or an ‘Arctic consensus’ (e.g., Byers 2017, Zagorsky 2017). Some of the outcomes, in particular the initiatives of the Murmansk Speech by President Mikhail Gorbachev (1987), are impressive as illustrated and implemented like, for example, the International Arctic Science Committee (established in 1990) as the first academic pan-Arctic organization, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (signed in 1991) by the eight Arctic states; the Conferences of Arctic parliamentarians (since 1993), and the establishment of the Arctic Council (in 1996), including representatives of states and Indigenous peoples.

There were also experiences from the first international research projects on Arctic issues, such as the Tampere Peace Research Institute’s project on alternative security and development (in 19871993), the Calotte Academy as its public seminar organized in the European Arctic (since 1991); and the first policy-oriented academic open assemblies on Arctic issues, circulated over the circumpolar North, the Northern Research Forum (in 2000-2015).

By the 2020s, the Arctic region has become part and parcel of global multidimensional and multifunctional changes and new challenges, and the globalized Arctic has multiple implications worldwide (Heininen & Finger 2018). This maintains the Arctic as an interesting workshop for further studies – on the environment and resources, Indigenous peoples, societies and cultures, governance and international law, geoeconomics and politics, cooperation and stability(building) – on global, regional, and local levels. After February 2022, as we are facing turbulent times and great power rivalries in world politics, and when unilateral, competitive, national military security is in focus, it might, nevertheless, be challenging to recall how multiple civil societies - with growing concern on a state of their environment and security, as well as interested in open cross-border cooperation - pushed the governments of the Arctic states to act.

After February 2022, as pan-Arctic cooperation in the context of the Arctic Council has been (temporarily) paused, it seems to be obvious that these initiatives, open discussions, and new international cooperative platforms, based on the inspiring sense of a New North, were not enough. In the atmosphere of ‘talks by hawks’, conversely, it might be a proper time to study cooperation and peace and how to solve conflicts and build confidence. In particular, wicked environmental challenges and other complex problems creating a multi-dimensional crisis give even bigger reasons to go beyond the state-dominated world system and mainstream thinking and lean on high expertise, unorthodox methods, and cooperation.

This conclusion, if correct, does not indicate a need for more (state) power and control or higher technology. It indicates an “absence of an inspiring atmosphere that would motivate stakeholders to (re)think, move beyond the mainstream and do globally what states have done nationally,” as well as a need for an inclusive dialogue (Heininen 2023a). The legacy of, and experiences from, the early efforts to establish and run forums for knowledge-building, which are not controlled by states, and create new and unorthodox methods to promote a lively dialogue and expertise-sharing, where participants engage each others’ arguments, could be viewed useful, perhaps also applied, for an open discussion on a global scale. As well, they could be useful for data-sharing and confidencebuilding in the entire North when official cooperation between the eight Arctic states is paused.

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The annual Calotte Academy and the Northern Research Forum with its biennial Open Assemblies were organized in the period of a ‘New North’ with great success for regional dialogue- and knowledge-building. With serious efforts to enhance open discussion, to share knowledge and experiences with local communities, and to believe in a dialogue as a means, they deserve to be acknowledged and analyzed, their experiences studied, and their narratives heard. Hence, it is time to analyze them as case studies on how these pioneering Northern models for dialogue and knowledge-building were built in the first place and what their aims, methods, procedures, outcomes, and importance were. As well as what might be their legacy and lessons to learn for Northern expertise and knowledge-building in the future. This briefing note is part of a special section of the Arctic Yearbook 2023, which is closely related to the theme of the year.

Theoretical background ‘Science’ means to produce ‘knowledge’ for people (Östreng 2010, 3, 6-8, 12), as universal science is a part of the common heritage of humankind and goes across national and disciplinary borders.

It cannot be isolated from the rest of a single society or the global community. This means that scientists and scholars are not only members of the scientific community and citizens of their own countries but also members of their own societies. Neither are they outsiders or someones who make observations about the world, societies, and peoples’ lives. In the same way, logically, each of them is responsible to their own society and nation, as well as to the scientific community and the entire global community.

Behind is the ‘social relevance of science,’ an important criterion of science. The same could be illustrated by the notion of Osama El-Ghazali Harb (former head of the Arab Association of Political Scientists) that “Science is more than labs. It’s people, it’s the environment” (Krieger 2008). The two case studies of this piece of writing are influenced - in the beginning implicitly and later explicitly - by the social relevance of science, though it is an individual researcher’s responsibility to implement it daily. Nonetheless, in the Age of Globalism, members of the scientific community are able and should be willing, to do research internationally, i.e., to continue their work in a global context, which they did nationally in the Age of Modernism (see Albrow 1995).

Johan Galtung, a well-known peace researcher, put it more directly and impressively for a young scholar by arguing that researchers should always do good for humankind. This argument about researchers’ mission is understandable and more common in peace studies and for peace researchers; interestingly, the two co-founders of the Calotte Academy were at the time peace researchers at TAPRI doing research on the issues of peace vs / vis-a-vis war, conflict vs / vis-avis cooperation, disarmament vs / vis-a-vis arms race.

The importance of the social relevance of science is every now and then acknowledged, at least rhetorically in speeches and supported in theory. Ironically, it is less remembered when it would be badly needed. Behind is an understanding that our modern societies, with different sectors and sectorial borders as boundaries, have the benefit of having constant interplay between science, politics, and business. Even though the principle is recognized as a value per se, it is less implemented, in particular when research positions and funding are heavily competitive, as, in fact, the implementation is not always interpreted as merit.

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When the social relevance is interpreted literally and implemented, there is an inspiring atmosphere for new and fresh ideas for those who produce new scientific knowledge. Fresh ideas and innovations are much required and needed in modern societies, and not only for businesses, which are facing more rapid and multi-functional changes, and even accelerated by crises. Science has played a role in nation-building and is largely interpreted to do so in the present and the future.

Behind is thinking that science, as well as expertise in general, is required for development, prosperity, and education much through advances in technology, and in modern, technologydepending societies, this, as well as knowledge-building, is even required more.

Furthermore, taking into consideration how much science is being leaned on and required, it is expected to be useful. Fresh ideas and innovations are good to have, but implementation is what is always needed. An implementation requires being open-minded towards new ideas from the leading minds, creating and promoting a new and wider (international) platform for innovative thinking and bold new ideas, financial resources, and, more importantly, real efforts to make it; and finally, to be willing and capable to maintain your freedom, i.e., the independence of science.

Whether to call it a ‘freedom of science’ or the ‘independence’ of the scientific community, the question is about another universal principle, as well as criterion of science. The principle is parallel to ‘freedom of expression,’ which is mostly related to media. An academic freedom and freedom of expression are said to belong to the core of European values, and academic freedom was ranked as the first of the key messages by Nordic universities at Nordic University Days in September 2022.

Though the principle is universal and clear, the challenge is how and when, if not always, to implement a freedom of science. It means that an individual researcher is able and has a right to explore, (re)think, and express her/his thoughts based on outcomes from her/his research, even if they go beyond the mainstream. This principle is being threatened on the one hand, from inside by “alternative narratives for university governance and higher education… and the notion of universities as particular kinds of corporations” (Mäntysaari, 2018), and on the other from outside, when science is politicized due to for example a hot/cold/trade war, great power rivalry, other geopolitical tension, or an emergency law, authoritarian governing, a dictatorship. In these kinds of conditions, researchers easily face “the delicate balance: whether researchers could align with national policies and at the same time maintain their independence?” (Report from Expert-toExpert workshop at the High North Conference on 18 April 2023).

Following this, freedom of science is about the courage of an individual researcher to implement the principle that the scientific community should always support, in particular in turbulent times in world politics or in society. On the other hand, the independence of the scientific community is up to the cohesion of the community and, finally, up to every member.

In the post-industrial era, ‘Knowledge’ is interpreted as a new factor of ‘Power,’ or ‘Soft power’ by Joseph Nye (1990). According to post-modernism, knowledge could also be called ‘Influence,’ meaning a new kind of approach instead of traditional power, when talented experts with high knowledge have an influence on others – either ordinary people or policy-makers - by persuading them to agree to new norms, or by “friendly persuasion” arguing to go beyond their prejudice (Heininen 1999, 27-50; Risse 2000; also Yang in this volume). Knowledge is included Critical geopolitics, unlike in Classical geopolitics, as an important factor, as well as an emerging factor in

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global geopolitics and rivalries between great powers, as in Globalism, none can totally control knowledge and knowledge-building (Heininen 2018).

Should science and knowledge based on science be utilized for a society, a nation, or people, or taken as a value per se? This is a universal and complicated question. ‘Utilitarianism’ vis-a-vis ‘science as a value’ is a dilemma that is been discussed and debated for a long. If to prefer the value per se and forget the ethics of science, it easily means that whatever inventions, innovations, and new technology would be allowed to develop, even an atomic bomb, as an extreme example. Consequences of this, as well as those of the ‘Anthropocene,’ could be fatal, as we have seen when facing consequences of the destruction by an atomic bomb (in Hiroshima and Nagasaki) or extreme weather conditions caused by the climate crisis. On the other hand, if to prefer utilitarianism and require an advantage, it means that science will be controlled by policy-makers or being politicized, consequently losing its independence.

This dilemma is without a final conclusion; at least so far, there is no functional model for binary thinking. A possible metaphor for the dilemma is ‘innovation’ as a symbol of utilitarianism: Science should be useful and produce an advantage for a society/nation on the one hand, and on the other, innovation is not possible without creativity, which is based on the independence of the scientific community, i.e., policy-makers can neither command nor order to make an innovation. Here, it is possible to lean on dualism and argue that the value of science is in its benefits and advantages, which will not be materialized without ethics and respect for the freedom of science. Finally, the real importance of science is measured by its capability to produce knowledge for people.

The same principle and dilemma also concern ‘expertise,’ i.e., other experts outside the science community who have high expertise in the field. The holders of expertise can be called an ‘epistemic community,’ a community and/or network of knowledge-based experts who help decision-makers define the problems they face, identify various policy solutions, and assess the policy outcomes (Haas 1992; Gunnarsson 2023). This kind of community neither means nor supports meritocracy, which is elitist and exclusive; instead, it acknowledges transdisciplinarity as relevant and needed when facing complicated and multifunctional challenges. One idea behind the Northern Research Forum, in the beginning, was first to apply the model of an epistemic community, and after having experiences and reaching a high level of expertise, be able to establish a northern model and network of an ‘epistemic community.’

A ‘dialogue’ and an ‘open discussion’ (used here as synonyms) were the key terms for the two case studies and a focus of this briefing note when trying to define workable methods for knowledgebuilding. Gadamer (1972) interprets that in a real dialogue, the participants “approach the dialogue with an open mind,” which shows, even reveals, “the potential of dialogues.” Diderot echoes this by stating that “monologue is tyranny… a dialogue to practice freedom” (Hongisto 2013). In other words, a dialogue is a way and means, through rounds of (counter)arguments, a common language between parties, as well as between science and politics, is possible to find.

If ‘science’ is to produce ‘knowledge’ for people, a dialogue means “to overcome not only the boundaries of scientific disciplines but also those erected between academia and stakeholder expertise in society” (Östreng 2010). Here, the interplay between science (as knowledge producer for peoples) and politics (all about power) is relevant, though more is required.

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Kornprobst (2009) lists several rules, or preconditions, for an open and democratic dialogue.

Among them are that the participants “are committed to inclusivity,… engage each other's arguments, ... focus on an issue domain… [and]… embrace the open-ended nature of the dialogue”. Based on the experiences from the Calotte Academies and the NRF Open Assemblies, there is a need to add two more rules as preconditions: that the participants “have patience” and that sufficient time is allocated for open discussion, which is no battlefield but ‘inclusive’ by nature (Heininen 2021).

After these, a few technical rules, as well as mental and technical preconditions, are fulfilled, and the potential for dialogues could happen, though it is not determined. In a lively dialogue, through rounds of arguments and those of counter-arguments, the participants start to know others’ opinions and a common language is possible to find. As a result, Gadamer’s potential for dialogues could be achieved after fulfilling these preconditions and following the rules. To be successful, the implementation is not only, or mostly, a technical matter, more a mental matter that participants are willing and open-minded first, to agree on the importance of the social relevance of science; second, to respect other expertise and knowledge, and thus implement ‘transdisciplinarity’; third, patiently listen others’ arguments; and finally, that organizers allocate sufficient time, as mentioned, for an open discussion – in academic and policy-oriented meetings this is often the bottleneck which makes an open discussion not existing.

The original nature of a dialogue could be described to include several arguments by the participants being built on each other like layers. If so, then a dialogue is one of the best methods for knowledge-building and innovation, if you wish. This is much about the objective that the Calotte Academy and NRF Assembly aimed to achieve by creating an atmosphere where participants are confident, patiently listening, and actively contributing. At their best, the sessions of these events, as will be discussed later, managed to create dialogue, where the participants were committed to ‘inclusivity,’ engaged in each other’s arguments, and focused on issue domains. As an outcome, participants could find that the original nature of an open dialogue was embraced.

Interestingly, a dialogue is also for confidence-building, and correspondingly, confidence is a precondition for lasting peace and sustainability. Another applicable and more efficient means for confidence-, stability- and peace-building, according to Functionalism (e.g., Mitrany 1975), is functional cooperation in a field of low politics, such as environmental protection, science, education, and knowledge-building. In the world order divided by the (rich) global North and the (poor) global South - dominated by Sino-US great power rivalry, new East-West tension, and blocbuilding with the military as the focus - this does not seem to be so obvious. Nonetheless, cooperation is a more used and important factor in international politics than fear. The high geopolitical stability of the post-Cold War Arctic is a masterpiece of functionalism, as it is a result of constructive functional cooperation on environmental cooperation and science between the Arctic states and Indigenous peoples (e.g., Heininen 2013).

Furthermore, wicked global problems - the climate crisis, the environmental catastrophe, and the related multi-dimensional crisis - would require functional cooperation, less so bloc-building, and other bureaucracy. It is no surprise that implementing the interplay between science, politics, and business requires both words, i.e., a dialogue, and deeds, i.e., cooperation.

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The Calotte Academy – a school of dialogue The Calotte Academy is an annual international academic seminar on Northern/Arctic issues and a traveling symposium in the European Arctic and Sapmi. It is with high expertise and designed to promote interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary discourses and to discover, brainstorm, and test new methods and applications. Further, as a “school of dialogue” to foster academic and policyoriented dialogue among members of the research community and between them and a wide range of other northern stakeholders. Finally, by supervising young researchers in circumpolar Arctic and global studies and training them to implement a dialogue, the Academy is designed on the on hand, for early-career scientists (advanced MA students, PhD candidates, and post-docs) with different academic and knowledge backgrounds to present their work, and on the other, as participatory by nature to share knowledge and expertise with/by/for local communities.

The first Academy, as a public seminar based on high expertise, took place in May 1991 at Jeera (of Saami Education Institute) in Inari, Lapland. Since then, the Academy has been arranged annually in different locations in the European Arctic - Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and Sapmi – using different routes when being on the road for a week. Including the 2023 event in June 2023 - in Rovaniemi & Inari in Finland/Sapmi, Kiruna in Sweden/Sapmi, and Kautokeino, Alta & Kirkenes in Norway/Sapmi - relevant Northern/Arctic themes have been covered by hundreds of presentations, and innumerable comments and counter-arguments, questions and answers in discussions after each presentation1.

When looking chronologically at the annual events of the Calotte Academy, it is possible to identify the following phases within its first three decades2: In the first phase (in 1991-1999/2000), the Academy acted as a policy-oriented seminar for TAPRI’s international research project and a platform for public discussion on relevant issues (covering security, ecology, and sustainable development) between scholars and local and regional stakeholders, as well as for to educate MA university students and young journalists; Through the 2nd phase (in 2001-2011), it acted as an international forum for scientific and policyoriented dialogue on relevant issues – globally, regionally, and locally – among members of the research community and a wide range of other stakeholders and served as a regional sub-forum for the NRF Open Assemblies, and an inter-disciplinary seminar for international organizations and research institutes (e.g., the Barents Press, the Barents Institute in Kirkenes); The 3rd phase was started in 2012 when the Academy was mature enough to act as an annual traveling symposium and a ‘school of dialogue’ for early-career scientists from the Arctic States, Central Europe, and Asia3, as well as to serve as a forum for the UArctic Thematic Network (TN) on Geopolitics and Security’s and the Arctic Yearbook’s brainstorming.

As a unique ‘school of dialogue,’ the Academy’s main aim is to create, promote, and enhance a lively theoretical and multidimensional dialogue, with inter- and transdisciplinary approaches, on relevant contemporary Northern and Arctic issues from different - local, regional, global perceptions of, and discourses on, Arctic development, governance, geopolitics, and security.

Among attractive themes the Academy has covered are ecology and climate change, regional visa-vis sustainable development, governance vis-a-vis (from classical to critical) geopolitics, traditional, environmental, and comprehensive security, globalization, self-governing of Indigenous peoples, para diplomacy by sub-national governments and regions.

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A further aim has been to maintain an analytical and critical discussion on the future of the European Arctic and Sapmi, as well as their peoples and communities, by describing, analyzing, and debating different – cooperative, competitive, conflicting – perceptions, discourses, and trends, as well as possible and probable impacts of their interrelations/complexities in globalization.

Recently, a special focus has been on the transformations of the Arctic, particularly its European part, from confrontation to geopolitical stability based on constructive cooperation. And later, that is the unprecedented development of the region, when the pan-Arctic cooperation is (temporarily) paused by the Arctic states, as mentioned earlier. Here, participants are asked to take into consideration - in their presentations and discussions - a state of constructive (functional) cooperation across national borders, including an important role of the Saami and other non-state actors. And first of all, how to maintain the achieved geopolitical stability and continue, even deepen, the successful cooperation when the Arctic is facing multiple crises of the rapid climate change, loss of biodiversity, and the inability of the states to make the hard decision in mitigation on the one hand, and on the other great power rivalries, new East-West tension and reflections of regional wars in Europe and the Middle East.

To implement these aims, an annual event is structured so that there are academic sessions with policy orientation, including scientific presentations, expert ones, and open discussions in each location. Sessions are structured based on an ‘open dialogue,’ which is interpreted as a cumulative process with an open-ended nature and inclusivity, engagement of others' arguments, and focus on the issue domain. Further, it is recommended to apply the open-ended nature of dialogue and cross borders between disciplines, expertise, and sectors, like the route of a week crossing several national borders.

A fundamental precondition for this, and to let Gadamer’s potential of dialogues materialize, is to allocate sufficient time for open discussion – questions and answers, comments and counterarguments – as well as ask participants to have patience to listen to others’ argumentation.

As a result, according to these principles, sessions are structured so that each presentation is allocated altogether 30-40 minutes, out of which a maximum of 15 minutes is for a presentation and the rest for open discussion.

Whereas substance is the most important thing, it matters what kind of methods are used/what the procedure is - in the case of the Calotte Academy, the procedure is simple and non-bureaucratic.

This kind of unorthodox and flexible format is neither common in the scientific community nor easily taken by established academic & funding institutions. More importantly, the Academy itself has become a means, with a strong educational component (though without official duties), to implement an open and cumulative dialogue with a focus on an issue, allocated time, and mutual confidence and respect. As well as its aims, methods, and experimental nature have made it an open, democratic forum for academic and policy-oriented activities and, further, an alternative model for conventional academic gatherings, which (too) often are run by lack of time and patience for open discussion.

In addition to academic and policy-oriented sessions, in several locations in the European Arctic and Sapmi, an annual event consists of first, excursions to special places, administrations, institutions, and companies that are interesting and relevant to the theme; second, a devoted session for a research plan, project design, fund-raising and other practical issues of research; and third, a

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(possible) role-play game, as a simulation of international negotiation, on Arctic governance, geopolitics, security and ecosystems, where each participant has her / his own role.

Each annual event consists of a core group of open-minded people and talented minds who are interested in substance as well as motivated and committed to open-minded dialogue. Due to the fact that the Academy is neither an exclusive club, as participants are equal, nor there are keynote speakers. Instead, in each location, there is a local audience – consisting of educators, planners, policy-makers, journalists, and NGO people – without a request to be a registered participant to attend the Academy’s discussions (see Vogt 2011, 54).

As a participatory by nature and with a synergistic approach – neither against anyone nor anything (except maybe narrow-minded thinking and bureaucratic structures), the Academy has been taken as a welcome addition to the spectrum of existing platforms and, for used theories and methods.

Behind the combination of aims, methods, procedure, as well as that the core of participants is early-career scientists, there is a certain philosophy: firstly, the participatory nature, or inclusivity, is implemented by open discussion as a cumulative process between relevant stakeholders; secondly, critical approach across disciplines of science and expertise is implemented by the double interplay (between science, politics and business, and Western science & Indigenous knowledge); thirdly, respect towards knowledge-building and as an attitude matters, when building a process which should be cumulative and exponential; and finally, flexibility and economic efficiency are applied in organization.

All in all, though small and unorthodox, the Calotte Academy is, so far, been a surprisingly resilient and successful platform for implementing the interplay between science, politics, and business in reality; a sub-forum for international research projects and conferences, and a platform; and first of all, a school of dialogue for early-career scientists. This makes it one of the oldest still running international academic institutions on circumpolar/Northern issues and the oldest with all sessions located within the Arctic region. Born and raised in Inari and acting as Inari’s unofficial higher education component, the Academy is a perfect example of the social relevance of science and a ‘Global-Local’ interference. To have interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches, and thus implementing the social relevance of science, has in these years been attractive for practitioners, post-docs and other young researchers, and Ph.D. candidates.

Northern Research Forum – a pioneering model for an open discussion4 The Northern Research Forum (NRF) was an international and transdisciplinary platform for an open and constant dialogue on relevant Northern local-to-global issues between researchers, experts, and other Northern stakeholders. The NRF Open Assembly, which was successfully run for 15 years, was the first pan-Arctic platform concerning circumpolar North/Arctic academic spheres to implement the interplay between science, politics, and business; the Calotte Academy had been doing that in more local and regional scale.

The NRF was established in October 1999 in Reykjavik, Iceland “to provide a forum where research on northern and Arctic issues can be shared and discussed in regular meetings of a wide variety of scientists, other academics and representatives of other stakeholders” (Press Release 1999). The initiative came from President of Iceland, Olafur Ragnar Grimsson (1998), who proposed to create a “forum which... would bring together in a systematic way the wealth of academic talent… enabling young researchers and scholars to present their findings”, and was

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supported by Senior researcher Lassi Heininen as a forum for an interactive and creative discussion and debate on research between science and politics/theory and praxis, when a lack of crosssectoral communication was defined as a barrier for modern societies’ development and an obstacle for problem-solving.

The first Open meeting, North meets North, including participants – junior and senior researchers, policy-makers, and business people - from all over the circumpolar North, took place a year later in Akureyri, Iceland (see The Northern Research Forum 2001). It proved that this model of open discussion should be continued. The last Open Assembly was in October 2015, when the Arctic Circle was institutionalized and adopted this model of an open discussion. Altogether, there were eight Open Assemblies with tens of sessions, hundreds of presentations and comments, tens of position papers, and a few printed proceedings.

The NRF’s objectives and aims were first, to provide – to create and promote - an international platform for the promotion of innovative thinking and bold new ideas from the leading minds of the research community and northern experts, as well as an effective and trans-disciplinary open dialogue among researchers, and between them, policy-makers, business people, and a wide range of other northern stakeholders. Secondly, instead of an emphasis on the number of participants, the focus was to maintain and feed a constant interplay between science, politics, and business by creating an atmosphere and suitable conditions, such as sufficient time, for an open – academic, policy-oriented and intellectually attractive - discussion on relevant and critical issues based on expertise and research-findings. Thirdly, to facilitate research on contemporary issues assisting decision-makers to know and apply research findings, as well as to assess research findings relevant to the contemporary Northern and Arctic agenda, yet with global significance.

More importantly, the aim was to focus on holistic viewpoints and socially relevant issues to people and communities when they face rapid societal changes of globalization and try to respond to the climate crisis. And here, opportunities were emphasize more than problems - community viability, resilience/sustainability locally-regionally-globally, stability-building for comprehensive security – and that issues are based on research findings and expertise. This long-range goal - inspired by the social relevance of science, including people and the environment - could be interpreted as an intercultural communication process with a spirit and enthusiasm for innovative ideas.

These objectives and aims were implemented via open discussions at the biennial NRF Open Assemblies in 2000-2015. Based on inclusion and democratic nature, discussions took place in theme sessions and plenaries with a holistic approach, day-long excursions, and occasionally breakout sessions facilitated by panelists were added to have a deeper expert approach vertically.

These activities were supported by short Position Papers on the main theme(s), invited beforehand from and prepared by experts in different fields. At their best, these sessions managed to create dialogue, where the participants were committed to ‘inclusivity’, engaged in each other’s arguments, and focused on issue domains. As an outcome, when being active and patiently listening, the participants could find that the original nature of an open dialogue was embraced.

An important part of the Assemblies and the implementation of the NRF objectives was to have 10-20 NRF Young Researchers at each event. The aim was to promote early-career scholars by inviting them, based on applications, to present their research and engage them in a dialogue with other experts and policy-makers. Due to the high quality of their research - for example, to explore what new methods are required to tackle climate change when there is a gap between the 4-year Heininen

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logic of politicians and 100+ years of real impacts - they were later upgraded as panelists. In addition to junior and senior researchers and other experts, there were policy- and decision-makers from national, regional, and local governments – heads of state, chairs of Indigenous peoples’ organizations, members of parliaments, governors, ministers – and business people, who attended the Assemblies.

Among NRF activities between the Open Assemblies, there were local round-tables and subforums with lively discussions based on expert contributions by the participants organized in Europe, North America, and Russia. Among them, a series of Town Hall meetings on the findings of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and Arctic Human Development Report in Anchorage, Oulu, Inari (in 2006-2007); a special session on the Arctic Council and multilateral cooperation at the 5th Assembly in Anchorage (in 2008); and a modified workshop to identify the most important issue/problem of the globalized Arctic/for Arctic science at the ICARP III in Toyama, Japan (in 2015).

The NRF also closely cooperated with other international institutions - the University of the Arctic, the International Arctic Science Community, the Northern Forum, Arctic Parliamentarians, and the Arctic Council - to build and enhance knowledge for regional development. Similarly, as the registration fee was zero or symbolic, there was a need for external funding – that was received in the early years from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, the Nordic Arctic Research Program, and the Government of Iceland.

The NRF stage-building, which was transferred into a global scale at the 6th Open Assembly having “Our Ice Dependent World” as the theme, was meant to be a cumulative process, where the Arctic was redefined as a ‘knowledge-based region.’ Indeed, the NRF process included several phases: ‘stage-building,’ i.e. an expert platform for seeking new thinking and bold, innovative ideas from talented people across the entire North; ‘inter-disciplinarity,’ i.e., an issue orientation and inviting researchers in particular young ones, representing different disciplines; ‘dialogue-building,’ i.e., to promote human and social capital, and knowledge-building by crossing borders/boundaries between different sectors in society, and the entire globe, by maintaining a constant interplay between science, politics, and business; and finally, ‘transdisciplinary,’ i.e., to serve as a platform for researchers and experts, in particular Indigenous experts, and to train young researchers.

Comparative study The establishment of the Calotte Academy and that the Northern Research Forum was motivated by the social need and inspiring atmosphere of a New North at the turn of the 1980s-1990s, as a transition period from the Cold War Arctic into a post-Cold War one. The Academy is based on an initiative of the Summer University of Lapland and the NRF on that of President Grimsson.

The feasibility study and design for the platforms were done by the scientific community: in the case of the Academy, the team of TAPRI’s international project; and the case of the NRF, the University of Lapland expert group in the first place (see, The Northern Research Forum 1999), followed by the NRF Steering Committee. Finally, agendas for annual/biennial events were planned, designed, and developed by active researchers and other experts.

The Calotte Academy and the NRF have much the same main objective/aim: to implement the interplay between science, politics, and business through an in-person dialogue. As a result, by promoting open discussion between different stakeholders, they made the social relevance of

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science real. In the same way, the two platforms share the same method, an open discussion/dialogue between members of the scientific community and other experts on the one hand, and on the other between them and a wide range of other stakeholders, policy-makers, planners, Indigenous representatives, NGO activists, and business people.

As a real dialogue is possible only through direct personal contacts, the annual Academies and the biennial Open Assemblies were only in-person gatherings, not online, as Merje Kuus (in this volume) describes and prefers.

This makes them pioneering and innovative models for knowledge-building in the post-Cold War Arctic, as well as highlights and promotes intangible values. These, as well as peaceful coexistence with nature and neighbors, remain important in the era of globalism, too, particularly in an atmosphere of tensions and rivalries when hawkish talks are loud. Similarly, a lively dialogue with patience between experts from different fields, where you aim to build on what others say, is still interpreted as “a useful means of generating insight into an issue and of turning research into powerful innovations and knowledge” (Heininen, 2023a).

Nonetheless, the Academy and the NRF were not merely ‘stage-building’ for an open discussion between different stakeholders. They were also exercises for fact-finding and data-collecting for and promoting the next annual or biennial event through expert-based discussions - for example, by the NRF Theme Project Groups5 -, professional training, disseminating research findings, and intercultural communication for knowledge-building, such as Town Hall meetings. Each of them could be interpreted as a cumulative ‘process,’ not an organization in the ordinary sense of the term. No wonder that the two platforms and networks were, from the beginning, meant to be and further develop, first and foremost, forums and processes with an enthusiasm for fresh ideas and research findings and a spirit of continuity.

Following this, their organizing and administrative structures were lean and less bureaucratic: At the first state, the Academy was organized by the TAPRI’s project team in cooperation with regional and local academic institutions, and since the 2010s by co-organized by the Saami Education Institute (SAAK) and the University of Lapland together with UiT The Arctic University of Norway and the Kola Science Center from Russia, in cooperation with the TN on Geopolitics and Security. Correspondingly, the operation work and administration of the NRF was done by the Secretariat, located at the University of Akureyri, and by the International Steering Committee, consisting of scholars and experts from the Arctic states. For each Open Assembly, an ad-hoc -based local host organizing committee was placed in charge of contacts and practical arrangements in the location.

Instead of having formal procedures or duties, the two platforms adhered, and the Academy still adheres, to four fundamental principles: organizing and promoting a transdisciplinary dialogue; inviting senior and junior researchers and other experts to actively participate; having an issueoriented discussion concentrating on opportunities; and allocating sufficient time for to sustain an open and lively discussion. This also meant several rounds of preparations – pre- and post- of each event – such as organizing local round tables or sub-forums, recruiting young researchers, inviting background (Position) papers on the main theme, and after an event, oral reporting, or more often written final reports (Academy) and proceedings (NRF).

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Conventional wisdom says that interesting things are often cumulative, and according to the nature of an innovation wave, which is universal, anything new and innovative will easily become attractive and for this reason, been applied or copied. Not surprisingly, the Academy, taking place in the European Arctic, acted as a foundation for the NRF, which took place in the entire circumpolar Arctic and beyond. Even more, around the Academy, there was born an ’Ecosystem’ consisting of the NRF and its Open Assemblies, TN on Geopolitics and Security and its sessions at Arctic Circle, the Arctic Yearbook, and the GlobalArctic Project and its Handbook.

Correspondingly, the format/model of NRF Open Assembly was applied for the CNARC Assembly and as the most productive effort for the Arctic Circle Assembly, the both first time organized in 2013 (see also Kuus in this volume). Also some other elements and activities of the NRF were applied elsewhere like for example, the Theme Project Groups, as a new model and procedure to gather experts on a field for fact-finding, were applied for the University of the Arctic Thematic Networks; and the model of NRF Young Researchers’ grant and network acted as a foundation for the International Polar Year (IPY) Young Researchers, and the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS), as well as already earlier for the Calotte Academy.

Importance and learned lessons for Northern expertise and knowledgebuilding The importance of the Calotte Academy and its annual events for Arctic research and higher education, as well as for regional knowledge-building, could be measured by a valuable, though simple, finding as an outcome of the first phase: An authentic implementation of inter- and transdisciplinarity is doable, cumulative and applicable, and that the related dialogue can be an intellectually attractive method among early-career scientists, in particular as established universities and academic institutions are not interested to apply it. Correspondingly, the importance of the NRF and its Open Assemblies for Northern expertise and regional knowledge-building could be measured by a striking outcome: For the first time, a broader pan-Arctic stage, which became global, was built on research, expertise, and Indigenous knowledge, and succeeded in facilitating an academic and policy-oriented discussion on relevant contemporary local, regional and global issues.

Finally, the importance of the two platforms could be measured by the fact that a model for a forum, expert network, and brainstorming procedure, with inclusion and relevance for people and local communities, was created, and an open and intensive dialogue was maintained and developed further.

The design, emphasizing an open discussion based on expert presentations among researchers, experts, and policy-makers, was an efficient way to set an interesting agenda, place relevant issues and opportunities on the agenda, and have bold ideas from innovative thinkers to discuss and analyze. Interestingly, these platforms and networks provided - during the events and in their preparations - two relevant lessons: first, that though ‘substance’ is most important, a ‘procedure’ matters, and that more important than the number of participants is participants’ interests and motivation; and second, at their best, with an upper-limit number of participants, they managed to create dialogue, where the participants were committed to ‘inclusivity’, engaged each other’s arguments, and focused on issue domains. Consequently, as mentioned earlier, when the

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participants were both active and patiently listening, they could find that the original nature of an open dialogue was embraced.

Active participation of two groups of experts should be mentioned here: The first group consists of early-career scientists. The NRF started, and the Academy applied later, a pioneering way to support young researchers by giving a grant to become equal participants of and present their research at these events6. The main aim was to train them for future careers as researchers, other experts and/or practitioners.

The second group consists of policy-makers, practitioners, and other non-academic stakeholders.

After being involved in lively (in-person) discussions and brainstorming on relevant, contemporary issues, it would be easier for them to apply scientific knowledge for policy-shaping and -making.

This requires from non-academic actors to be open-minded and, from the research community, to make real efforts to implement the interplay so that all stakeholders would be treated equally. This made it possible to apply effectively new ways and address certain challenges more constructively than otherwise would have been possible.

As an open policy-oriented discussion, based on research and expertise, was transferred into a dialogue on critical issues – for example, human responses to melting of sea ice and glaciers; building resilience in, and sharing experiences for, regional development; stability vis-a-vis security in governance – it was necessary to address opportunities, which peoples and societies might have when facing societal changes and impacts of globalization. Among successful examples of this are first, the Calotte Academy Town Hall meeting on Understanding the Impacts of Global Changes in the Barents Region (in 1998 in Inari) “with a few scientists and bigger audience including Saami fishermen, hunters, and reindeer herders” (Selected Articles of Calotte Academy 2021, 712); second, the Town Hall meetings on the findings of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) and Arctic Human Development (AHDR) reports in Anchorage, Oulu and Inari (in 2005-2006); and third, the 2nd NRF Assembly, in 2002 in Vileky Novgorod, Russia (see, The Northern Research Forum 2004) and the 3rd one, in September 2004 in Yellowknife and Rae Edzo, NWT, Canada, coorganized with regional and local governments, local universities and Indigenous peoples’ organizations.

Similarly, fourth, to address constructively between experts the challenges on how climate change might impact regional planning of municipalities and regional governments at the 2008 Calotte Academy with the title Climate Change Defining Human Security, and at the 2013 NRF Open Assembly with the approach of Sharing Experiences and Exploring the Methods, and Assessing Socio-economic Impacts; and finally, as the bar was raised higher, when the scope of the stage was expanded and discussion was transferred into global agenda to integrate themes in terms of local-global context by having Our Ice Dependent World as the main theme of the 6th NRF Assembly (2011), and Water – globally and in North Calotte as that of the 2012 Calotte Academy.

Conclusions The Calotte Academy has been successfully acting as a school of dialogue for young researchers and a platform for international research projects & conferences. Correspondingly, the Northern Research Forum successfully acted from 2000-2015 as a forum to implement the interplay between science, politics, and business.

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The importance of these platforms and processes, in the longer run, is that by having a lively discussion among researchers, in particular young ones, and other experts, and between them and local/regional/national policy-makers, planners, and business people, a new way to organize an international policy-oriented meeting was tested. Indeed, in these contexts, science was more than labs; it was about people, civil societies, and the environment.

Thereby, an innovative model for a Northern dialogue with ‘inclusivity’ was implemented, and this approach was not only for an open discussion per se but dealt with ways and procedures for building knowledge locally and regionally, as well as for building and increasing confidence regionally and globally. For these reasons, it is no wonder that the Calotte Academy and the NRF Open Assembly - being transdisciplinarity by nature and having actively implemented the interplay between science, politics, and business - became an important part of an Arctic model. And an Arctic model has already been applied to other academic and policy-oriented gatherings, even in other parts of the globe, such as CNARC and the Third Pole events in the Himalayan region.

The key for their success was pioneering new methods of thinking, and that their objectives, aims and the themes were results of a careful (re)thinking and brainstorming among the members of organizing bodies, all experts on Northern fields. Further, this kind of agenda, designed by the scientific community, was brought among other experts, policy-makers, business people, and other practitioners to be openly discussed and challenged. Finally, that as open and independent entities they implemented synergy between different expertise and stakeholders, as well as between existing organizations and networks.

As the initiators, developers, and co-organizers do not have a copyright, the main means of these two platforms - the model of an open assembly and the method of a dialogue - could applied and further developed, by academic and other expert institutions, for a dialogue-, knowledge- and confidence-building, where participants engage each other’s arguments for searching new solutions, on local, regional and global scale.

Notes 1. Afterwards, a Final Report of each Academy, based on notes of each session written by the participants as rapporteurs, including main findings and highlights of a discussion, is produced and published as hard copies and digital (see https://calotte-academy.com).

Shorter reports are also published in the Arctic Yearbook.

2. As numerous outcomes of the three phases in the first 32 years, except the years of 20002001 due to the preparations of the 1st NRF Open Assembly, and 2020 due to the COVID19: 30 annual events in 20 locations in Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and Sapmi with hundreds of active participants representing more than 25 nationalities.

3. Paper presenters are annually selected based on an open call for application, and given a small grant to support traveling and accommodation.

4. More about the history of NRF and its Open Assemblies, see Heininen 2023b.

5. Among the NRF Theme Project Groups were the following themes: Legal and Political Issues, Economies in the North, Energy Issues, Northern Sea Routes, and Climate Change vis-a-vis Northern Securities.

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6. The NRF Network of Young Researchers consisted of circa 120 scholars (in 2000-2015), and that of the Calotte Academy (since 2012) consists of more than 300.

References AHDR (2004). Arctic Human Development Report 2004. Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic Institute & Arctic Council SDWG. Albrow, Martin (1995). The Global Age. State and Society Beyond Modernity. Policy Press, Cornwall, Great Britain.

Gadamer Hans-Georg (1972). “The Incapacity for Conversation” (“Die Unfähigkeit zum Gespräch”).

Gorbachev, Mihail (1987). Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev at a Formal Meeting in Murmansk on October 1, 1987. Pravda October 5, 1987.

Grimsson, Olafur Ragnar (1998). “The Northern European States: New Perspectives Call for Creative Research.” Celebratory Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the 20th Academy Year at the University of Lapland, Finland, on September 7, 1998.

Gunnarsson, Thorsteinn (2023). Personal communication by an e-mail message on July 8, 2023, at 15:24.

Haas, Peter (1992). “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination.” International Organization 1(46), 1-35.

Heininen, Lassi (2023a). “Technology has its place in innovation – but we still need the intangible assets that have always worked.” WWF Arctic Magazine 1 / 2023, Editorial.

Heininen, Lassi (2023b). “The Northern Research Forum – a Pioneering Model for an Open Discussion.” Arctic Circle Journal, published 14.09.2023.

Accessible at https://www.arcticcircle/arctic-circle-journal Heininen, Lassi (2021). “From Scholars’ Journey to the North into a School of Dialogue - 30 Years of Calotte Academy”. Selected Articles of Calotte Academy – A travelling northern symposium on science and politics. Eds. by L. Heininen & J. Huotari. The Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security. Accessible at https://arcticpolitics.com.

Heininen, Lassi (2018). “Arctic Geopolitics from Classical to Critical Approach – Importance of Immaterial Factors.” Geography, Environment, Sustainability, Vol. 11, No. 1 - 2018, 171-186.

PEEX Special Issue. Ed. by S. Chalov. DOI-10.24057/2071-9388-2018-11-1-1771-186.

Heininen, Lassi (2013). “’Politicization’ of the Environment: Environmental Politics and Security in the Circumpolar North.” The Fast-Changing Arctic: Rethinking Arctic Security for a warmer World. Edited by Barry Scott Zellen. University of Calgary Press, Calgary 2013. p. 35-55.

Heininen, Lassi (1999). Euroopan pohjoinen 1990-luvulla. Moniulotteisten ja ristiriitaisten intressien alue (The European North in the 1990s - A Region of Multifunctional and Conflicting Interests). Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 21 - Arktisen keskuksen tiedotteita/Arctic Centre Reports 30.

Rovaniemi.

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Heininen, Lassi and Finger, Matthias (2018). “The ‘Global Arctic’ as a New Geopolitical Context and Method.”

Journal of Borderlands Studies, 33:2, 199-202 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2017.1315605 (downloaded at 05:37 04 December 2017) Heininen, Lassi, Jalonen, Olli-Pekka and Käkönen, Jyrki (1995). Expanding the Northern Dimension.

Tampere Peace Research Institute. Research Report No. 61. University of Tampere, 1995.

Hongisto, Pekka (2013). “Kone, luonto ja valistuksen paradoksit – Diderot Suomessa.” Tieteessä tapahtuu 6/2013, 28-30.

Kornprobst, Markus (2009). “International Relations as Rhetorical Discipline: Toward (Re)Newing Horizons.” International Studies Review (2009) 11, 87-108.

Krieger Zvika (2008). “Ballad of the Old Cafes”. Newsweek, Aug 18 / Aug 25, 2008, 50.

Mäntysaari, Petri (2018). “Nordic Meeting 2018: Trends in Academic Freedom.” Acatiimi 5/2018, 32-34.

The Northern Research Forum (2004). Northern Veche. Proceedings of the Second NRF Open Meeting.

Veliky Novgorod, Russia, September 19-22, 2002. Eds. by J. H. Ingimundarson and A. Golovnev. Stefansson Arctic Institute & University of Akureyri: Akureyri, Iceland 2004.

The Northern Research Forum (2001). North Meets North. Proceedings of the First Northern Research Forum. Eds. by T. S. Björnsson, J. H. Ingimundarson & L. Olafsdottir. Stefansson Arctic Institute & University of Akureyri: Akureyri, Iceland 2001.

The Northern Research Forum (1998). A Feasibility Report. Prepared at the University of Lapland

by An ad hoc group composed of Lassi Heininen (Chair) et al. Publications in the University of the Arctic Process No. 8, 1999.

Nye, Joseph (1990). “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy 80, 153-171.

Press Release (1999). “Establishment of the Northern Research Forum.” Akureyri, November 19, 1999. (mimeo) Report from Expert-to-Expert workshop at the High North Conference in 18 April 2023. (mimeo) Risse, Thomas (2000). “Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics.” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Winter 2000), 1-39.

TAPRI (1991). Arctic Project, Research Plan 1991-1993. “Sustainable Development and Security in the Arctic.” Tampere Peace Research Institute. (mimeo) Vogt, Henri (2011). “Kansainvälisen politiikan käytöstä ja kutsumuksesta.” Kosmopolis, VOL 41:2 / 2011, 51-57. Östreng, Willy (2010). Science without Boundaries. Interdisciplinarity in Research, Society, and Politics. UK: University Press of America.

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Briefing Note

Arctic Expert-to-Expert Initiative for Continuous Scientific and Indigenous Knowledge Exchange in the Arctic Alexandra Middleton, Andrey Mineev, Paul Arthur Berkman, Anton Vasiliev, Halldór Jóhannsson, Ekaterina Uryupova, & Lassi Heininen

Introduction Scientific cooperation in the Arctic has witnessed an uninterrupted period of nearly 30 years of peace and mutual understanding among diverse actors, states, and international bodies. The situation changed dramatically post-February 2022, which resulted in the suspension of the work of the Arctic Council and many other fora and organizations working on the pan-Arctic scale. The pause of work of the Arctic Council can be regarded as the most significant one as it facilitated the exchange of knowledge and scientific collaboration, and included Arctic Indigenous Peoples as Permanent Participants, meaning that the Indigenous Peoples had a direct channel of communication and knowledge exchange among themselves and all other Arctic stakeholders.

Formal resumption of the Arctic Council under the Norwegian Chairship since Summer-Fall 2023 presents a tiny light of hope. Yet, by the time of writing it is still unclear how the Councils’ practical work at the project level is going to proceed.

Challenges in scientific and Indigenous knowledge exchange in the Arctic The Arctic region, characterized by its remote location and harsh climate, presents significant challenges for data collection. Interruptions in scientific collaborations have resulted in notable Alexandra Middleton, Postdoctoral researcher, Oulu Business School Andrey Mineev, Researcher, High North Center, Nord University Business School Paul Arthur Berkman, Professor, Senior Fellow, United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Anton Vasiliev, Vice-President, Russian Association of Polar Explorers, Halldór Jóhannsson, Executive Director, Arctic Portal Ekaterina Uryupova, Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute Lassi Heininen, Professor (emeritus), University of Lapland

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data gaps. The limited availability of comprehensive data hampers accurate predictions regarding the impact of climate change globally. In addition, the lack of data sharing on permafrost presents risks to the infrastructure and ecosystems in the region, as permafrost is a critical consideration.

Arctic Indigenous Peoples possess deep-rooted knowledge of the Arctic environment and its evolving nature, which can greatly inform decision-making processes. However, despite Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic holding a wealth of valuable knowledge, their insights remain underutilized in current scientific and policy practices. Regrettably, the interruption of work by the Arctic Council further exacerbated this issue, resulting in a stall in knowledge collection and exchange processes. This critical pause in the Council's activities has hindered the potential integration of Indigenous knowledge, impeding progress towards a more comprehensive understanding and effective management of the Arctic region and its complex dynamics.

Arctic Expert-to-Expert Initiative Circumpolar scientific cooperation in the Arctic has become increasingly crucial in the face of the current geopolitical situation. Recognizing this, the Arctic expert-to-expert initiative emerged in fall 2022 with the aim of fostering continued dialogue and knowledge exchange among transdisciplinary Arctic experts and Indigenous Knowledge holders from all nations. The Arctic expert-to-expert initiative is a people-to-people, non-affiliated, bottom-up approach driven by scientists that promotes collaborative dialogue and knowledge exchange on climate change, sustainability, and other pressing issues in the Arctic. The Arctic expert-to-expert initiative is created in view of Open Science with global inclusion to address global challenges, involving people, each acting in their own capacity.

Emphasizing a people-to-people format while adhering to relevant regulations, this initiative promotes cross-disciplinary discussion on topics of mutual importance. Climate change and sustainability of Arctic regions and communities have emerged as key focal points, highlighting the urgent need to address these shared challenges through collaborative efforts and expertise.

The Arctic expert-to-expert initiative has a dedicated webpage on the Arctic Portal with announcements of current and future activities. The initiative is open to all scientists, Indigenous knowledge holders, and other stakeholders, regardless of their affiliation and nationality.

Arctic Expert-to Expert Initiative’s Webinars The first Expert-to-Expert initiative’s webinar “Climate change and the Arctic: state of the art and what kind of scientific cooperation is most needed?” occurred on December 15, 2022. The webinar highlighted critical challenges faced by the Arctic scientific community, including data gaps, climate change impacts, and the importance of Indigenous knowledge. Insufficient data exchange and monitoring hinder effective management, while climate change continues to threaten the way of life for Indigenous peoples. The need for comprehensive monitoring, science diplomacy, and continued international cooperation has been emphasized for sustainable Arctic development. The webinar served as a productive platform for knowledge exchange and collaboration in addressing these pressing issues.

The second webinar "Arctic expert-to-expert cooperation for the future" event, held as part of the Nord University High North Dialogue 2023, took place on April 18th and was streamed online.

The main message of the event was to emphasize the crucial need for Arctic expert-to-expert

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cooperation in the face of the climate crisis and challenging geopolitical situations. The event aimed to highlight the responsibility of Arctic experts and scientists to foster continued dialogue and knowledge exchange among transdisciplinary experts from all nations. The focus was on addressing the impact of scientific research, identifying blind spots in Arctic scientific data, and exploring ways for the scientific community to collaborate inclusively on global questions using pan-Arctic approaches.

Ways forward The initiative aims to draw attention and create awareness through its activities, including online expert webinars, exchange of knowledge and joint publications. By covering crucial topics related to climate change, sustainable development, Indigenous knowledge, and global Arctic scenarios, the initiative seeks to engage experts and participants worldwide. Through knowledge exchange, collaboration, and dissemination of scientific findings, the initiative aims to increase understanding and raise awareness about the challenges facing the Arctic region. By involving individuals in their respective capacities and promoting Open Science principles, the initiative strives to cultivate global inclusion and encourage collective action to address these pressing issues.

The initiative is open to all scientists, Indigenous knowledge holders, and other stakeholders, regardless of their affiliation and nationality.

Middleton, Mineev, Berkman, Vasiliev, Jóhannsson, Uryupova, & Heininen

Briefing Note

32nd Year of the Calotte Academy

Zhanna Anshukova & Tom Gabriel Royer

The unique event of the Calotte Academy is known for being the longest-running Arctic symposium travelling around the region. The attendees, predominantly PhD candidates, explore the Arctic by bus to acquire a first-hand experience of its appearance, texture, and — occasionally — odour. Its primary objective is to connect researchers with the Arctic and bring together experts from around the world. The programme excels in prioritising open and meaningful conversations, including talking to local people and learning about the real issues of the region.

The Calotte Academy 2023 took place from the 11th to the 18th of June. It started in Rovaniemi and passed through Kiruna, Kautokeino, Alta, Kirkenes, and Inari. The theme for this year was “Non-state Actors and Circumpolar Regionalization”. Throughout the journey, over 30 traveling participants gave their presentations and engaged with guest lecturers at each stop, resulting in a total of 48 presentations. Additionally, daily excursions, both major and minor, were arranged.

Unfortunately, the Academy had no opportunity to include a stop in Russia. However, Russian researchers participated in an online session.

Academy attendees convened at Guesthouse Borealis in Rovaniemi, Finland, on Sunday the 11th of June, for the inaugural session, entitled “Non-state Actors & Regionalization”. The meeting started with opening words by Lassi Heininen and an introduction of participants and the program of 2023 Calotte Academy. Afterward, Heather Nicol presented on borders, mobility, and transnationalism in the circumpolar north with a North American focus. For her part, Daria Mishina shared her research findings on the topic of business in the Arctic, specifically about Arctic regional and central development.

In the evening, during the reception in the ‘Alaruokanen House’ (a semi-detached house built in the 1860s and one of the oldest buildings in Rovaniemi), mayor Ulla-Kirsikka Vainio warmly welcomed the participants of the Academy and provided a captivating overview of the city’s recent

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development. She highlighted the city’s approach to sustainable urban planning, fostering a thriving economy while preserving its natural beauty. As the evening unfolded, the dinner by Gustav Kitchen & Bar showcased a delightful fusion of traditional Lappish cuisine and modern gastronomic delights. After the dinner, participants travelled to Kiruna, Sweden.

The second session of the Academy focused on the environment and climate. It took place at the seminar room of the Malmfältens Logi & Konferens AB in Kiruna, Sweden, on the 12th of June.

Michaela Louise Coote presented on the topic of Arctic interdisciplinary research as a tool for environmental decision-making. Guglielmo Migliori’s presentation was focused on policy research.

It was titled “Leveraging the Arctic’s Frozen Assets: A Critical Path to EU Energy Security and Transition in a Changing Energy Landscape”. Virga Popovaitė gave the third presentation of the session on the topic of maps and safety in the Arctic: more-than-human interactions in a search and rescue (SAR) response. The session was closed with Tom Gabriel Royer’s presentation on “Questioning the Holisticness of Space Sustainability Law: A Critical Examination of Arctic and Scottish Commercial Spaceports”.

After the session, the participants of the Academy went on a remarkable journey at LKAB’s Visitor Centre, located 540 meters below the Earth’s surface in the world’s largest iron-ore mine, which extends 1365 meters deep in total. It was a great chance to explore the mining world, uncovering its impact on Kiruna’s displacement and the intricate link between industrial progress and urban development. A documentary on ‘green mining’ showcased LKAB’s sustainability efforts, prompting reflection on resource needs and environmental preservation. Everyone interested concluded with iron pellets as souvenirs, feeling content like satisfied crows.

Next, the Academy visited the Swedish Institute of Space Physics where Information Officer Martin Eriksson provided a comprehensive overview of the IRF, illuminating its key objectives, missions, and scientific collaborations, notably with the European Space Agency (ESA). Philipp Wittmann delved into the technical intricacies of the Jovian Plasma Dynamics and Composition Analyzer (JDC) for ESA’s JUICE Mission. He explained the innovative design and the challenges of creating a robust instrument for Jupiter’s harsh environment. Wittmann also shared insights into meticulous testing and calibration procedures, with a replica of the JUICE satellite as a visual backdrop. Uwe Raffalski then introduced ozone monitoring using the IRF’s KIMRA millimetrewave radiometer. He highlighted its advantageous polar location for studying polar stratospheric chemistry, drawing attention to a result curve that bore a resemblance to Barad-dûr, though lacking an eye.

On the 13th of June, the third session, titled “The Arctic Yearbook Presents: Indigenous Sovereignty and Sámi”, started in Kautokeino, at the Sámi University College. The session started with the opening words and introduction to EALAT by Anders Oskal, the Secretary-General of the Association of World Reindeer Herders. After that, Heidi Maarit Pietarinen and Amna Qureshi presented their project, “Life Between Art and Blood”. The third presenter of the session, Larry Ibrahim Mohammed concentrated on an analysis of the Kvalsund Wind Power Project in Northern Norway. The next presentation, given by Laura Junka-Aikio focused on military colonialism and building critical approaches to the militarization of Northern Finland in the era of NATO membership. The session was closed with Jacob van Haaften’s presentation on decolonized nature relatedness and indigenist mixed methods research design and implementation.

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Later that day, practicality and ethics were discussed during the next session. Zhanna Anshukova presented on the topic of cross-border challenges in Arctic research, talking about the differences in ethical reviews in Sweden, Norway, and Finland. The session continued with the discussion and brainstorming on how to make a research plan, project design, fund-raising and network-building.

After the session, the Calotte Academy participants travelled to Alta. There, at UiT Alta Campus, Jan Olli said a few words about the recognition of the land rights for the Indigenous people of Sámi in Finnmark. After this presentation, Aslat Heandarat Eira and Ingrid Fredriksen shared their personal account on reindeer herding in Sápmi as a part of the fifth session on the topic of smart specialisation, de-colonising tourism and Sámi governance.

The next morning, the same session continued with the opening words by Professor Urban Wråkberg from the Northern Studies Research Group of UiT Alta. This was followed by Sveinung Eikeland’s presentation on smart specialization for the achievement of SDGs in European Arctic regions. The next presentation given by Frida Marie Omma Jørgensen was focused on traditional and local ecological knowledge in nature-based tourism. The session was closed by Peter Haugseth presenting the Sámi electoral system and cultural revitalization processes and some consequences of inclusion and exclusion.

In the afternoon, session number six, focused on Marine Environment and Climate, started with Auni Haapala talking about urban (in)visibilities of global fisheries in Tromsø, Norway. The next speaker was Llucia Mascorda-Cabre presenting on the topic of offshore shellfish aquaculture sustainable and focusing on protein while enhancing marine biodiversity examining the Brexit case study and how lack of cooperation and political will can influence food security. Then, Anna Margarete Pluschke gave a presentation titled “The Arctic Council – Ready to tackle the balance between marine environmental protection and the impacts of climate change?”. The last presentation of the session was on the topic of clearing the air: Serafima Andreeva introduced the understanding of the use of knowledge on black carbon through the Arctic Council in Norway and Canada.

The initial plan to visit the stunning Alta Dam after the sixth session had an unforeseen obstacle.

As the bus was too lengthy for the road restrictions leading to the dam, the trip had to be redirected, leading to an exciting adventure at the Norwegian-Russian border. It was a stimulating occasion, where several attendees perused a picturesque gift shop filled with Russian collectables such as Matryoshka dolls, small Lada automobiles, postcards, stamps, and more!

On the 15th of June, the day started at Barents Institute in Kirkenes. The seventh session, focused on non-state actors and regionalization, started with welcoming words from Victoria Tevlina.

Then, she presented the book project “From Northeast Passage to Northern Sea Route. A history of the waterway North of Eurasia”. Jakub Wambach and Marie Crikova presented on cross-border cooperation in the North Calotte Region, observation and application of the approaches to Euroregion Neisse-Nisa-Nysa. The third speaker was Alma Karabeg, who talked about non-state actors in the Arctic and specifically about research institutes on the multi-level governance scene.

After that, Tatiana Petrova presented on the topic of bridging youth and regional development through a dialogue. The session was closed with Gleb Yarovoy’s presentation titled “When a dream does not come true. Re-interpreting regional cooperation in the Euro-Arctic Rim”.

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Between the sessions, the Academy had a chance to visit the town hall of Kirkenes. Participants were given a presentation about Sør-Varanger, in eastern Finnmark, which borders Russia, Finland, and Norway, with three border rivers and Kirkenes, its administrative center. The municipality strives to diversify its economy, notably in tourism, fishing, and services. EU sanctions and border closures have hit local businesses. The shipyard can no longer repair Russian boats, risking 200 jobs. Cross-border cooperation possibilities arise with Finland joining NATO. Challenges include an aging workforce, high expenses, energy deficits, and regional instability. However, hope hinges on tourism, education, and entrepreneurship, notably the Nothing Hill project.

The eighth session of the Academy was titled “Unveiling Truth in the Face of Censorship: (CrossBorder) Journalism in the European North”. Anna Jarovaja gave a speech on independent Russian journalism in the North, asking a rhetorical question: “is there life after death?”. Thomas Nilsen and Alte Stålesen continued the topic by focusing on cross-border journalism from Kirkenes in times of censorship. The session was closed by Georgy Chentemirov introducing the Journalist Union of [Russian] Karelia and discussing free journalism in a restrictive state.

On the evening of the 15th of June, the Calotte Academy travelled to Inari. The next morning, session number nine, “The Arctic Yearbook Presents: Indigenous Sovereignty and Sámi”, took place at Jeera. Pasi Jaakonaho introduced the ultimate tools in the Arctic – puukko, sámeniibi, and kniv. Eleni Kavvatha presented on the ability of non-state actors to influence policy related to Indigenous tourism in the European Arctic – the case of the Sámi in Norway, Sweden, and Finland.

The next presenter, Owen Harrison, discussed the role of the individual in the reconciliation between settlers and the Indigenous population in Canada. After that, Sharon Beaucage-Johnson introduced her research on the effects of colonization on Indigenous women’s relationality. The last speech, given by Marlene Payva Almonte, was about rethinking nature in the context of climate change and ‘green’ transformation from the Indigenous peoples’ perspective.

The tenth session concentrated on Arctic geopolitics, security and cooperation. Olivia Wynne Houck presented on Norway, NATO, the Soviet Union and the spectre of bases of Svalbard. After that, Soili Nystén-Haarala introduced the current geopolitical situation of the Arctic railway.

Following Soili’s presentation, Mari-Anna Suurmunne examined conflicts and geopolitical tensions highlighting challenges for global engagement of higher education institutions. Then, Lassi Heininen closed the session by introducing and discussing common interests vis-à-vis special features – (re)structuring (Arctic) geopolitics.

In the evening, the Academy travelled to the UTAC test centre in Inari, a bit north of Ivalo. Within UTAC’s traditional wooden hut, the members of the Academy attended a captivating presentation of the company’s operations. Later, as a reminder of Lapland’s chilly winters, the participants ventured onto the indoor track, which was held at a temperature of minus 7°C (19.4°F), and also had the opportunity to observe the outdoor ice tracks — which, in the summertime, resemble rectangular artificial lakes.

The morning on the 17th of June started with the online session during which Russian colleagues Alina Cherepovitsyna, Ekaterina Kuznetsova, Svetlana Tuinova, Yulia Zaika, Upasak Bose, and Alexander Sergunin focused on sustainability and alternative energy in the Russian Arctic and Western-Russian relations. As well as last year, these scientists couldn’t travel with the other researchers because of the political situation, but when they joined online, it showed how important it is for people to talk and work together sharing their perspectives, which is what the Calotte Anshukova & Royer

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Academy stands for. This continuing situation is a clear example of politics getting in the way of researchers working together across borders.

In the afternoon, the Sámi cultural performance and student engagement event in the form of the Zoom workshop for Circumpolar Studies Students was the twelfth and last session of the Calotte Academy trip. The workshop brought together circumpolar students from across the University of the Arctic to participate in an evening workshop highlighting cultural performance, traditional knowledge, and other elements of Sámi culture. First, the projects connected to Sámi education, especially distance education, were presented by Pigga Keskitalo. Then, Inker-Anni Linkola-Aikio introduced the linguistic landscape PhD project. The third project, presented by Line Reichelt Föreland, was about game-based learning. The fourth presentation was about studying yoiking from a pedagogical perspective, presented by Laila Aleksandersen-Nutti. The final presentation was on Sámi filmmaking, presented by Liisa Holmberg.

On Sunday, the 18th of June, the Academy travelled back to Rovaniemi.

The Calotte Academy 2023 journey was an enlightening exploration of the Arctic’s multifaceted dimensions. From Rovaniemi to Inari, this odyssey ventured into the heart of Arctic complexities.

It fostered meaningful connections among participants and promoted open dialogue with local communities. It showcased the spirit of cooperation and resilience that defines Arctic research – and Arctic life more generally. Sessions covered an impressive diversity of topics, from Indigenous sovereignty to cross-border journalism, through outer space, emphasizing the Arctic’s significance on the global stage. Excursions, like the memorable visit to LKAB’s iron ore mine and the unplanned Norwegian-Russian border visit, added instructive and exhilarating twists to the journey.

As the participants returned, they carried back not only knowledge, but also a deeper appreciation for the Arctic’s vast and intricate landscape. In conclusion, the Calotte Academy continues to be a vital platform for fostering Arctic understanding and collaboration, transcending borders and obstacles, and bridging different views. Finally, it is essential to express gratitude to Professor Emeritus Lassi Heininen, whose expertise, enthusiasm, and guidance made this remarkable journey possible.

32nd Year of the Calotte Academy

Section V: Cooperation and conflict

What makes the Arctic and its governance exceptional? Stories of geopolitics, environments and homelands

Jennifer Spence, Edward Alexander, Rolf Rødven & Sara Harriger

Since the end of the Cold War, the Arctic has been defined by Arctic scholars as “exceptional.” A region protected from geopolitical tensions to the south. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent pause of circumpolar cooperation have challenged this designation. The Arctic appears to be again dominated by geopolitics. This article seeks to see beyond conventional understandings of “Arctic exceptionalism,” acknowledge a broader range of characteristics and features that make the Arctic unique and consider how this expanded view alters our perceptions of the region’s governance. Constructed as a thought experiment, this article asks, “what makes the Arctic exceptional?” And, by extension, “how does this allow us to see the Arctic and its governance differently?” To answer these questions, we introduce three stories of the Arctic as defined through geopolitics, environment, and Gwitch’in homelands. What insights do these stories provide about the past, present and future of the Arctic and Arctic governance? In a time of rapid change, uncertainty about the future, and reckoning with the past, it is important to examine assumptions, challenge the status quo, and continue to foster governance innovation. This article seeks to contribute to this effort.

Introduction ‘Arctic Exceptionalism’ is a concept that has been used to describe the Arctic as a unique region that enjoys a “level of immunity to many of the world’s geopolitical problems” (Murkowski, 2021).

Therefore, it is not surprising that the freezing of Arctic cooperation following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has generated headlines announcing the death of Arctic exceptionalism (Exner-Pirot, 2023), or arguing that it never really existed (Melchiorre, 2022; J. Smith, 2022). However, Arctic experts often remind us that there are many Arctics (Dodds & Smith, 2022; Łuszczuk, 2017). In this article, we argue that Arctic scholars should be open to the Jennifer Spence, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center Arctic Initiative Edward Alexander, Co-Chair, Gwich’in Council International Rolf Rødven, Executive Secretary, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme Sara Harriger (Corresponding Author), Research Associate, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center Arctic Initiative

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idea that there are multiple features, beyond geopolitical dynamics, that have made and may continue to make this region exceptional.

During this time of rapid change, uncertainty about the future, and reckoning with the past, there is an opportunity to critically examine mainstream assumptions, challenge the status quo, and foster further governance innovation. To contribute to this effort, this article asks: “What makes the Arctic exceptional?” We, the authors, seek to challenge mainstream discourses about the Arctic and its governance. Constructed as a thought experiment, we introduce the stories of Arctic geopolitics, environment, and Gwich’in homelands to expose different narratives regarding what defines the Arctic and what makes the region and its governance exceptional. Each story examines the Arctic from a different position that draws on the expertise, knowledge, and experience of the authors.

We begin with the geopolitical story of the Arctic because this is commonly where mainstream discussions about its exceptionalism are focused. We map out the evolving narrative of how states have interacted in the region and how they have defined the Arctic as a region. We then examine the relationship between the geopolitical story of the Arctic and the conventional narrative of Arctic exceptionalism. Next, we introduce the environmental story of the Arctic. In contrast to the firm lines drawn in the region by states, this story outlines multiple, dynamic boundaries that have been used to define the Arctic. Through this story, we demonstrate that Arctic exceptionalism has characteristics that extend beyond geopolitics, emphasizing dynamic connections within and beyond the region. Finally, we present the Gwich’in story. This story shares a deep, intimate connection with place. It brings to life elements of Arctic exceptionalism that are often referenced, but perhaps still under-appreciated – how the engagement of Arctic Indigenous Peoples in the governance of this region is at the heart of Arctic exceptionalism.

Following the presentation of each story, we revisit the idea of Arctic exceptionalism. We consider how these three stories, brought together, provide an expanded and richer understanding of what makes the Arctic exceptional. We go on to consider how this expanded view may provide new insights about the form and function of Arctic governance in the face of significant geopolitical, environmental, and socio-economic changes.

The delivery of these stories may be uncomfortable for the reader. When we started, we attempted to find a common voice for the entire article. But we realized that in writing, as in practice, each story has its own language, style, and tone. We wanted to respect that. We wanted to allow the narrative of each story to be present in this article as it is in the interactions of Indigenous Peoples, policymakers, and researchers within the Arctic Council, and other institutions in the region, where widely different perspectives are shared and reconciled. We came to understand that sitting with this discomfort provides an opportunity to learn and challenge our assumptions. It is an opportunity for growth and new ways of thinking (Boudreau Morris, 2017; Natanel, 2022). We invite you to experience the value (and discomfort) of bringing these stories together and to explore their points of harmony and discord.

Geopolitical Story: The Conventional Exceptionalism Narrative In the most simplistic and classical terms, geopolitics focuses our attention on the interests and power of states combined with the strategic value and control of physical territories and space (Dodds, 2019; Heininen, 2018). In these terms, we see global affairs as the interplay of states and

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observe distinct stages in how the Arctic has been positioned in the world and how the region has been governed. In recent history, the mainstream perception of the region has evolved from that of a remote, unclaimed space of discovery and competition between colonial states, to a strategic military theater of great powers, to an exceptional space of peace and cooperation, to the contemporary reemergence of competition and tension. Each of these geopolitical realities has involved different governance architectures, but all have assumed that the primary actors are states.

Emergence of Arctic as a Region The name “Arctic” originates from the Greek arktos, or bear, because of its proximity to the constellations Ursa Major and Ursa Minor in the northern sky (Liddell & Scott, n.d.), but the idea of the Arctic as a region came into being quite recently. European exploration of the Far North began as early as the 16th century as a quest for natural resources, in particular Dutch whaling and hunting of seals and walruses. The rush of southern explorers to discover shipping routes to and across the North Pole began in earnest in the 19th and early 20th century. These celebrated expeditions to the Far North told Europeans a misleading story of the Arctic as empty, devoid of sovereign actors, and undefined in geopolitical terms: Terra Nullius, like a blank spot on the map (Labévière & Thual, 2008: 17). According to the principles of international law at that time, that blank spot was up for grabs.

As states claimed land and established boundaries, they saw these northern spaces primarily as vast resource hinterlands or a remote military theater. As early as World War I, the Far North was militarized in support of southern states and their conflicts. World War II saw major investments in military infrastructure in the North, and with the Cold War the Far North became a frontline for great power competition. The emergence of the Arctic as a region in its current form can be linked to efforts to end the Cold War. Many diverse efforts to reduce tensions and demilitarize the Far North culminated in a well-known 1987 speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in Murmansk that evoked a vision of a peaceful Arctic (Gorbachev, 1987). This created an opening for the first initiatives to establish the Arctic as a cooperative governance space: first, the International Arctic Science Committee in 1990, followed by the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991, and then in 1996 the Arctic Council (English, 2013; Koivurova, 2010; Rogne, 2015; Watt-Cloutier, 2015; Young, 2013; Huebert, 2017). Through these new institutions, the “Arctic States” were defined to include Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, and the United States (Figure 1).

Figure 1: The Eight States of the Arctic Region (Source: U.S. Arctic Research Commission).

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In the early 1990s, the establishment of the Arctic Council, with its broader mandate than previous Arctic institutions, was not a certainty. The Inuit and Sami had been championing their involvement in transboundary Arctic institutions for some time and had been frustrated by the limited success they had achieved in the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, where they were offered observer status (Axworthy & Dean, 2013; Watt-Cloutier, 2015). In negotiations to create the Arctic Council, Canada was spurred by Indigenous activists and their allies in civil society to champion establishing a more substantive role for Arctic Indigenous Peoples (Axworthy & Dean, 2013). The other Arctic states were less comfortable with this proposition, slowing efforts to launch the Arctic Council (English, 2013). After extensive negotiations, the unique category of “Permanent Participant” was “created to provide for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council” (Arctic Council, 1996).

The U.S. was staunchly opposed to the inclusion of hard security issues on the Arctic Council agenda and proposed a footnote in the Council’s founding declaration that stated: “The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security” (Arctic Council, 1996). Despite the aspirations and lobbying of peace activists, hard security issues were taken off the table (Axworthy & Dean, 2013; English, 2013).

Recognizing the Arctic as a Unit of Governance With the establishment and acceptance of several circumpolar institutions, the Arctic was legitimized as a unit of governance and the groundwork was laid to position the region as an innovative “zone of peace and cooperation” along the lines of the vision articulated by Gorbachev.

Arctic states generally handled affairs in the region as uniquely insulated from tensions to the south.

The norm was established that the primary institutions governing the region would work around hard security issues and geopolitical concerns. In this way, rather than serving as a frontline between great powers, Arctic states joined forces to protect and celebrate the Arctic as a unique and exceptional - governance space (Nord, 2016).

Supranational governance is shaped by layers of international, regional, and national laws and policies. The boundaries of the Arctic and the authority of the eight Arctic states to govern the region work within, and need to be aligned with, this complex multi-level governance regime that recognizes the Arctic states as the central decision-maker in regional affairs (Byers, 2009). Nested within this international regime, the Arctic Council emerged, or has been positioned, as the preeminent decision-making forum for the region (Arctic Council, 2016). The elevation of the Arctic Council as the stage for Arctic decision-making has served to reinforce the boundaries of the Arctic as a region and, by extension, to legitimize the Arctic states as its primary decisionmakers. This, in turn, has made the Arctic Council even more valuable to the Arctic states as a means of confirming their role in the region.

In the 1990s, the formation of the Arctic as a unit of governance and the positioning of Arctic states as the legitimate decision-makers for the region did not attract much attention from the capitals of Arctic states, let alone from actors further afield. The establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 was relatively low key and expectations were limited (English, 2013). In the first decade of its existence, the Arctic Council gained credibility for its high-quality scientific assessments and policy advice (Platjouw et al., 2018; Steindal et al., 2021), but the Council and the region remained primarily below the political radar. It was only in the late 2000s and early 2010s Spence, Alexander, Rødven & Harriger

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that the Arctic began to gain more global prominence. Scientists and activists started to sound the alarm that the Arctic was a harbinger of climate change (Watt-Cloutier, 2015), and states and business took an interest in the region as a last frontier for untapped natural resources (Dodds, 2010; Heininen, 2005) and a space for potential new shipping routes made accessible by climate change (L. C. Smith & Stephenson, 2013). This increased interest translated into new mainstream narratives of competition and a race for resources in the Arctic (Spence, 2017).

The first notable response to this increased global interest was the release of the Ilulissat Declaration by the five Arctic littoral states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, United States) in 2008, which pointed to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the appropriate framework that defines the maritime boundaries within the region, contributes to substantiating the authority of the Arctic states to govern the region, and “provides a solid foundation for responsible management by the five coastal states and other users of this Ocean” (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008: 1–2).

Efforts to reinforce this are evident revisions to the Arctic Council Rules of Procedure in 2013, which introduced new criteria for admitting observers that included: “b. recognizes Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic; c. recognizes that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea, and that this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management of this ocean" (Arctic Council, 2013: 14).

Despite these new requirements, the number of non-Arctic state Observers in the Arctic Council doubled in 2013 from six to twelve, which suggests that the Arctic as a unit of governance and the Arctic Council as a forum for the governance of the region were being recognized as legitimate and important.

A Belief in Arctic Exceptionalism As the Arctic took shape as a region, so did the narrative of the region as an exceptional governance space. Mikhail Gorbachev’s vision of the Arctic as a zone of peace is recalled regularly by Arctic scholars and officials. Since 2011, all Arctic Council declarations and statements have opened with a commitment by Arctic states to “maintain peace, stability and constructive cooperation in the Arctic.” Despite tensions between Russia and the West in other parts of the world, there appears to have been an agreed norm amongst the eight Arctic states that the Arctic could and should be protected as a space for peaceful and constructive dialogue and cooperation. This exceptionalism was put to the test with Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014. Many speculated that the Arctic as a zone of peace could not be maintained with rising tensions to the South. Instead, the ability of Arctic states to successfully sustain peaceful dialogue and cooperation in the region following the invasion of Crimea amplified the narrative of Arctic exceptionalism. In fact, the case became so compelling that the Arctic Council was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2022 (before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) for its ability to maintain peace and stability while navigating dramatic environmental and geopolitical changes in the region (Wenger, 2020; Jonassen, 2022).

Ultimately, the Arctic exceptionalism narrative was challenged by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The spillover effects were evident in the pause of many bilateral and multilateral efforts and activities that involved Russia, including under the Arctic Council. On 3 What makes the Arctic and its governance exceptional?

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March 2022, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States released a joint statement announcing they were “temporarily pausing participation” in the meetings of the Arctic Council (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Since that time, despite various efforts to emphasize the value and importance of continuing Arctic cooperation, the prospects of “business as usual” in the Arctic Council have been rejected by many officials and experts (Savage, 2023).

Because of the disruption of cooperation in the Arctic as a result of events outside of the Arctic, Arctic scholars have called into question the Arctic exceptionalism that has been celebrated for over two decades.

This story centered around the conventional definition of the Arctic as a geopolitical region, categorized as exceptional in terms of the interests and actions of states. We have mapped out the conventional Arctic exceptionalism narrative. It frames the question, can the Arctic remain exceptional - indeed, is it still the Arctic - when it is no longer governed as a cohesive unit? Can the Arctic remain the (exceptional) Arctic without the participation of Russia? The following environmental and Gwich’in stories challenge us to expand our thinking, add to our understanding of Arctic exceptionalism and, by extension, consider alternative ways to see and explore Arctic governance.

Environmental Story: Narrative of Unique Ecosystems, Unprecedented Changes, Global Repercussions We have considered in some detail the geopolitical events that led to the creation of the Arctic as a region, but the boundaries of the Arctic are generally assumed to be linked to certain physical and/or geographic parameters. In this section, we examine how the Arctic is defined environmentally, the physical and ecological traits of the region that make it exceptional, and what this means for the governance of the Arctic.

Environmental Boundaries of the Arctic While the Greeks defined the Arctic using the night sky, more precise definitions have been used since. In general, these definitions fall into two categories. The first is defined by a geographical border, for instance the geographical area north of the Arctic Circle, the southernmost latitude where the sun does not set on summer solstice and does not rise on winter solstice, currently at 66°33′49.5″ north of the Equator. An alternative geographical definition of the Arctic has been the whole or parts of the states lying north of the polar circle, as done by the Arctic Council (AMAP) (Figure 2).

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Figure 2: Physical boundaries of the Arctic (Source: AMAP)

In the second category, the Arctic is defined by physical or biological traits. One of the most common of these is the 10 degrees Celsius isotherm, the southernmost area where the average temperature for the warmest month is below 10 degrees Celsius (Daubmire, 1954: 19-136). As a consequence, the temperature sets the extent or distribution of other characteristics of the Arctic.

One such characteristic of the Arctic marine environment is the sea ice extent, where the permanent ice definition is based on the seasonal minimum extent, usually in September. The seasonal ice is defined based on the maximum in May, while the marginal ice zone is where the ice meets the open water, defined as areas between the dense drift ice and open water where the density of sea ice is between fifteen and eighty per cent (Norwegian Polar Institute, n.d.; Strong et al., 2017; National Snow and Ice Data Center, n.d.)

For land based areas, the Arctic is often defined into different bioclimatic zones (e.g. https://www.artsdatabanken.no/Pages/181902/Bioklimatiske_soner_i_Arktis). The Sub-Arctic zone is the transition zone between the tree line and the boreal forests. The tree line, usually aligned

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with the 10 degrees Celsius isotherm for July, is defined as the border between Sub-Arctic and Low Arctic, while High Arctic is distinguished from Low Arctic by having no woody shrubs of any kind.

Frozen soil called permafrost is a feature common for large parts of the Arctic. For both land and sub-sea ground, permafrost is a characteristic defined as ground (soil or rock and included ice or organic material) that remains at or below 0°C for at least two consecutive years (Osterkamp & Burn, 2002).

For most of the definitions in this second category, the Arctic has unique features. While the Arctic has similarities with the Antarctic or High Alpine areas when it comes to physical parameters like temperature or permafrost it distinguishes itself by being an ocean surrounded by continents.

Likewise, the wildlife and ecosystems are unique, where a large portion of the more than 21,000 species found are endemic to the Arctic (Arctic Council, 2013) several which have no areas for further displacement.

Arctic environmental exceptionalism The Arctic has conventionally been viewed as a pristine environment, distanced from industrial development and impacts. However, the Arctic ecosystem is not isolated from the lower latitudes and is now recognized as a hotspot for rapid changes influenced by anthropogenic emissions further south (Rødven & Wilson, 2021). Even definitions of the Arctic that are generally assumed to be static are changing: The radius of the Arctic circle currently shrinks annually by approximately 15 meters, due to the angulation of the planetary orbit (Tanner, 2023). Still, this is considered stable compared to the immense change of physical and biological parameters characterizing the Arctic.

Since 1971, the average surface temperature of the Arctic has increased by an average 3.1 degrees, which is about three times as fast as the global mean (AMAP, 2021). The precipitation has increased by 9%, but with a 24% increase as rain. This has led to dramatic changes of the Arctic; since 1979 the sea ice extent has almost halved, and land fast ice, in particular the Greenland ice sheet, has decreased dramatically. The soil temperature has increased since 1971 by 2-3 degrees Celsius, leading to thawing of permafrost. This has again led to massive shifts in ecosystems, where more southern marine, terrestrial, and avian species have moved northwards (AMAP, 2021). Arctic marine species in the Barents Sea are being replaced by Atlantic species, which again has changed ecosystem functions and stability (Kortsch, Primicerio, Fossheim, Dolgov, & Aschan, 2015; Fossheim, Primicerio, Johannesen, Ingvaldsen, Aschan, & Dolgov, 2015).

In general, physical and ecological traits and processes that dominated and defined the area known as the Arctic have been challenged, and partly replaced, by traits and processes usually defining areas at lower latitudes. Would this challenge mainstream beliefs in the exceptionalism of the Arctic environments, and where does it lead to in defining stakeholders and setting conditions for decision making?

From an environmental perspective, Arctic exceptionalism could be defined with regards to the exclusive features of the Arctic environment, like exclusive Arctic ecosystems, or the remoteness to sources of pollution and other anthropogenic influences. This has also spilled over to management regimes, where the rareness due to Arctic conditions has set the value of protection.

For instance, Arctic species are of particular importance for protection as they do not exist elsewhere and have no other potential refugia to migrate to. In other words, a value for protection by the exclusiveness or exceptionalism of species or ecosystems. However, connecting

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environmental management to such exceptional features is a two-edged sword: in a changing world the displacement of Arctic ecosystems northwards may also devalue the southern margin of such systems as they lose their exclusiveness and transform into near-Arctic ecosystems. Will the Arctic remain exceptional if its ecosystems transform?

Gwich’in Story: Narrative of Homelands and Resilience Even though almost forty years have passed, I remember vividly the first time I saw lightning in the Arctic: the forking flash igniting the blackened sky and the earth rumbling boom, the power unleashed. The sky exploded over and over in flashing light and sound and the rain pelted the ground with force. The summer darkness, the crack and boom of the flash, was so strange to all of us kids so used to the midnight sun which would roll around and around at the edge of the sky, a yellow ball kicked to the end of its tether and circling. In the dark day of the first lightning storm, we went to our elevated cache and pulled out our caribou skin sleeping rolls and wrapped them around ourselves and sat out in the pouring rain to watch the lightning and feel the rain. The Arctic was still the Arctic then, but in those flashes, and we didn’t know it at the time, a destructive future roared to life.

I grew up in Fort Yukon, Alaska, and I can still remember my father, who was the Chief of our Gwich’in community when I grew up, explaining to me that “all engines need three things to run: fuel, air, and a spark. If you’re having problems, start there in those three places first.” He showed where the motor got fuel, where it got air, and where its spark came from. He would often talk like this, not just about things or parts, but about the relationships of things, and how things thrived.

He would say "everything is alive,” “we were born into paradise right here,” “it’s not enough to do the right thing, no, we even need to think right, think right about the world, because it doesn’t, our thoughts don’t end with our skull, okay?” I remember once he had to prove that he was using some land in order to file a claim for it from the government, and the agent walked around and said, “I don’t see any sign of habitation here.” My father insisted that we used that land every spring for trapping, and finally the government agent found a tea kettle hanging in a tree and said “Ah! Evidence!” My father was so embarrassed about this evidence, proof that he had been there, but the government viewed this as critical to showing that the land was being used “correctly.” It’s interesting how two people can draw such radically different conclusions from the same tea kettle.

One day I was splitting wood in the yard, when I was about ten, the pile was long and high, about twenty-five feet long and four feet high, all of which needed to be split for the coming winter. I enjoyed it, the crack and split, knowing that a warm fire would result. An Elder, Sammy Roberts, used to tell me when he saw me, “Ah Eddie, some people they were complaining that they were getting cold, you don’t get cold eh? No, hard workers they never get cold.” As stick after stick split, a stranger walked into the yard, a white man, and it was unusual to see a white stranger in our remote fly-in only village back in those days. He came to talk with my father and as I split the wood I listened and remembered their discussion: “Hello Clarence, so I wanted to conduct an interview with you and ask you about climate change. Do you think that’s real, and have you seen any effects of it?” It was the mid 1980’s, and apparently this was controversial where the man was from, and I remember my father narrowed his eyes a little bit and looked around and said “Sure, it’s everywhere. Look around, absolutely everywhere.” The man thought he was talking to someone who was misinformed, and he said “well, I don’t see it, what do you mean?” My father pointed to one of the blocks of wood that I was chopping, “Well, what do you see?”

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“I see a block of wood.”

“No, I didn’t ask you what it was, I know it’s a block of wood, I cut it, I said what do you see?”

“I don’t know what you mean. I see a block of wood, it’s spruce I guess.”

“No, look at it, just look at it. If I tell you what I see, you’ll never see it for yourself!”

The man looked at the block of wood and said, “I see the tree rings.”

“Yes, go on, what do you see?”

“I see the tree rings getting wider and wider.”

“Yes, look at the middle of the tree, its first hundred years it grew three to four inches across, its second hundred years how far did it grow?”

“Three feet?”

“Now look around, just look at it, do I see any evidence? Do I believe that the climate is changing?

It’s always about belief with your people, I don’t need to believe, I am here, I can see.”

I cracked another block in half, and another, seeing the growing season getting longer in each, a story written in circular lines, widening, growing quietly larger.

The lightning increased year after year, but unlike the trees, it leaves a different kind of growth behind, wildland fire. Gwich’in homelands have warmed more rapidly than any place in the Arctic, but just a few degrees more than other places in the North. The Yukon Flats National Wildlife Refuge, an area about the size of Maryland, started to burn (Figure 3). Four Delawares’ worth of land has burned, over the last 60 years, immolated by an angry sky. Leaving rings of destruction.

My life is from the boreal forest, the largest forest on planet Earth. The boreal forest is the largest terrestrial source of carbon on the planet. The forest itself holds as much carbon as the atmosphere for the rest of the planet combined. Compounding the issue is the fact that the forest insulates the permafrost of the North, which contains more than twice as much carbon as the atmosphere of the entire planet. These forests are subject to rapid change, as Gwich’in can attest. Our homeland was split apart by fire, smoke, lightning from the sky. What if the world’s boreal forest were to burn? What if the permafrost just below were to melt? We’ve seen 64% of the boreal in the vast Yukon Flats burn in a period almost equal to my short life. The world cannot afford to not consider the Boreal, to not look, to not see, to not be here, and understand that the fate of the boreal and its permafrost, is the fate of the world and all of its relationships.

Words echo in my ears like the thunder of that first storm as I walk in the boreal forests now. An ‘engine needs fuel,’ as I run my hands in the dry moss and sticks on the forest floor and look at the trees dry and ready to burn. ‘An engine needs air’ as the wind billows about, more and more frequently in the North. “An engine won’t run without a spark.” In the past, in the Arctic, and in the subarctic, the landscape composed a natural engine. An engine that ran for millennia, it served to capture carbon from the air like a net, and to tuck it down into the soil where it would become frozen. The forest would rise a little higher, year after year on the newly frozen soil, rich with carbon. It would go up and up, creating a paradise for all the Gwich’in and other peoples of the circumpolar North to live upon, the Saami, the Inuit, the Dehcho and Dene, the Ket. The boreal forest is the largest engine upon Earth, the greatest piece of terrestrial, natural infrastructure the world has known, an engine that took air, fuel, and the cold as a spark to sequester vast, world-

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changing, world-preserving, stores of carbon. More than three times more carbon and world changing methane than the atmosphere, and virtually no one can see it, nor, importantly to some, believe it.

Figure 3: Wildfire has touched 64% of Yukon Flats National Wildlife Refuge from 1960-2020

The force of climate change has started to make this engine run in reverse. Gwich’in have had a front row seat to a world afire. Seeing the relationships between every creature, species of plant, and the climate itself change rapidly is the story we collectively know. Climate change doesn’t need our belief to be quite real. The smoke that choked the east coast of the U.S. and Canada recently wasn’t a fantasy, nor is it the end of the story, it’s the beginning. The boreal forest and all that it does, the natural infrastructure that allows life on Earth to exist, doesn’t need our beliefs, nor our political systems, or our systems of “governance.”

Gwich’in have long been subject to, and participants in, true ‘Arctic governance’: understanding the relationships of the natural world and our place in it. When is the Arctic not the Arctic? When we put people above all of the other relationships in the Arctic, when our thinking isn’t right or good, when we aren’t interested in taking only what we need and leaving no trace, we become blinded to the world and the meaning of our lives. This is why the Gwich’in, through Gwich’in Council International, are leading two wildland fire projects in the Arctic Council – the Arctic Wildland Fire Ecology Mapping and Monitoring Project (https://www.caff.is/arcticfire) and the Circumpolar Wildland Fire Prevention, Preparedness and Response Project (https://eppr.org/projects/circumpolar-wildland-fire-project/ ). These projects try to get the world to see that our relationships to each other are only meaningful when we do meaningful things with each other, when we see each other, when we work towards common cause to jointly solve problems that we can’t solve alone. That we cannot allow the engine of our cooperation to atrophy and rust, all while our greatest challenge lies before us.

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Arctic Exceptionalism Revisited: Fuel, Air, Spark As we acknowledged at the opening of this article, there are many Arctics. Arctic scholars who make this claim are usually referring to the different characteristics and conditions of the Russian, Nordic and North American Arctics (physical, political, economic, social, etc.). This article introduces three stories that also validate the co-existence of multiple Arctics and expand our understanding of Arctic exceptionalism. We have discussed: 1) the Arctic as a space that, until very recently, was governed by the eight Arctic states, who have served as decisionmakers and gatekeepers of a protected zone of peace and cooperation; 2) the Arctic as a space with unique physical and environmental characteristics that is important to understand, manage and protect both for their intrinsic value and because of the region’s important position within global systems that are rapidly and dramatically impacted by climate change; and 3) the Arctic as a homeland for the Gwich’in and other Arctic Indigenous Peoples that hold Indigenous Knowledge and worldviews built on millennia of direct experiences and relationships on and with these lands.

There may be discomfort in bringing these stories together, but each provides insights about what makes the Arctic exceptional and contributes to a broader understanding of the unique and innovative governance that has evolved in the region.

The Gwich’in story above discussed how an engine requires three things, existing in a specific relationship to one another to run: fuel, air, and a spark. We now extend this metaphor to consider how we can draw out elements of each of our three stories to provide a richer understanding of the engine of Arctic exceptionalism and the unique features of Arctic governance. We observe that each story contributes to the engine of Arctic exceptionalism. In the following sections we explore how the “fuel” can be seen as the incorporation of the different knowledges of these stories; the “air” as the governance environment and approach; and the “spark” as the opportunities and challenges facing the Arctic. This is not to suggest that these stories exist in harmony. There are inherent tensions between them, but they have all contributed to the region’s exceptionalism and governance in important and distinct ways.

Fuel: Knowledges The engine of Arctic governance that produces cooperation and collaboration at the circumpolar scale runs on unique knowledges that have been the “fuel” of Arctic exceptionalism. Arctic states bring knowledge of the current geopolitical picture of the Arctic: global, regional, and domestic politics, policymaking processes, and authority structures. States also proved a conduit for scientific and Indigenous knowledges to directly and indirectly shape government policies, processes, and structures. But the flow of influence is not unidirectional. If Arctic governance at the geopolitical level is deemed to be exceptional for its focus on the collaborative pursuit of scientific knowledge, it has been influenced to be so by a growing global understanding of the unique features of Arctic ecosystems, their rapid transformations, and their critical role in global environmental systems.

This Arctic exceptionalism exists at the intersection of the stories of Arctic geopolitics and environment.

Yet, the historic perspectives and knowledge of the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic dwarfs the knowledges of modern geopolitics and science. The Gwich’in have knowledge that comes from a relationship with the land that has existed for millennia. On this timescale, the Arctic is constantly changing and humanity’s connection to the land creates a sense of unique responsibility and accountability. Indigenous Knowledge creates a fundamentally different worldview that places Spence, Alexander, Rødven & Harriger

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everything in relationship. With the inclusion of Indigenous Knowledge by Arctic Indigenous Peoples in the work of the Arctic Council, and other circumpolar institutions, a distinct characteristic of how the Arctic is conceived is the inseparable relationship between nature, wildlife, and people that redefines our understanding of ecosystems and policy solutions. Over the last few decades, there has been a growing understanding and appreciation of Indigenous Knowledge in the Arctic by researchers and policymakers. The Arctic Council - thanks to the hard work and advocacy over many years by Indigenous leaders - has acknowledged the unique and important role of the region’s Indigenous Peoples. This was made possible with the creation of unique category for Indigenous Peoples organization (Permanent Participant) and, subsequently, the time and energy invested by these organizations in the Council’s discussions and decisions.

While there is still a long way to go to address the power imbalances that exist, this inclusion of Indigenous perspectives is a hallmark of what makes Arctic governance exceptional: a step toward inclusive, consensus-based cooperation and away from factional, power-based competition.

Toward emotional regulation, grounded and steady conversations, at the international level, and away from the erratic and unpredictable nature of cold and hot conflicts. The inclusion of Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic Council has been recognized globally by policymakers and experts as an important innovation and a hallmark of Arctic exceptionalism.

Air: Governance Environment and Approach To run the engine of Arctic exceptionalism requires “air”: a governance environment and approach that creates an atmosphere within which these knowledges can co-exist, interact, and shape institutional values and culture. In the context of the Arctic Council, this atmosphere was able to form, in part, by the exclusion of military security issues from the Council’s mandate, and by the low political salience of the region at the time that the Council was established. The peripherality of the Arctic allowed government officials, Indigenous leaders, and experts to talk, build relationships, share knowledges, commit to and engage in consensus-based decision-making processes, and establish meaningful cooperation to understand and solve Arctic problems. The Arctic Council became a vehicle for peace, science cooperation, and empowering Northern and Indigenous Peoples. Through relationships, these stories were intertwined, and a sense of common identity and purpose was able to form and shape the Council’s governance culture and approach.

If Arctic governance is exceptional for its inclusion of Indigenous Peoples, it has been influenced to be so by Indigenous Peoples’ expressions of their values. This exceptionalism exists at the intersection of the geopolitical and Indigenous stories and moves Arctic Peoples and environments closer to center stage. It fosters deeper knowledge of history - all of it: western/southern and Indigenous/northern. This can be built upon. However, to the extent that an understanding exists which acknowledges a deeper Arctic history embedded within Indigenous Knowledge, there remains a “belief” to be tested and debated by distant agents of power who have only heard about it - not seen it - much like the understanding of climate change evinced by the visitor in the Gwich’in story. This aspect of Arctic exceptionalism, based on values of inclusion and consensus, is in danger.

Through the involvement of Indigenous Peoples and scientific experts, Arctic governance itself has gotten closer to the Arctic. Indigenous Peoples’ organizations help to ground often abstract discussions and bring the Arctic to high level meetings. They understand the importance of relationality in Arctic governance – people-to-people, land-to-people, inside-to-outside. Similarly,

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scientific cooperation means being there and helping the world to see (rather than believe) the transformations that are taking place. While Arctic states must continue to navigate where and how the Arctic fits geopolitically in the world and scientific experts seek to understand the relationships that connect ecosystems within and beyond the Arctic, Arctic Indigenous Peoples define the Arctic as home.

The Arctic Council, and the institutions that have adopted similar governance approaches in the region, have become a place for blending different stories and knowledges, and provide a more holistic view of Arctic issues and the solutions that will fuel its future. This is not to say that it is easy. Similar to bringing together the stories in this article, the experience can be clunky and uncomfortable. There are risks. Tensions between these stories continue to exist. Power imbalances remain. The unilateral decision of Arctic states to pause the work of the Arctic Council following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine without consulting the Indigenous Peoples organizations is an important and timely case in point of how all the air can be sucked out of the combustion chamber. However, the Arctic Indigenous Peoples organizations were open in their criticism of their exclusion (Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2022; Gwich’in Council International, 2022; Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2022) and, with the transfer of the Arctic Council Chair to Norway, we have seen concrete efforts to re-engage with Permanent Participants, experts, and Observers.

Spark: Opportunities and Challenges Facing the Arctic Finally, the engine of Arctic exceptionalism needs a “spark”. In this context, it is the opportunities and challenges facing the Arctic that have ignited the collective desires of leaders, officials, and experts to take action. The dramatic changes in Arctic ecosystems are essential to the story of geopolitics and inextricably linked to the rising participation of Indigenous Peoples in the region’s governance. The urgency to act on the discovery of high levels of pollution in what was perceived to be pristine Arctic environments was such a spark to initiate the Arctic Council.

That spark still exists.

Over time, the importance and urgency of Arctic research has been increasingly realized and has been brought into international science-to-policy processes (e.g., IPCC, Minamata Convention, etc.). As a result, more and more people can see and know about the dramatic changes in the Arctic and its complex role in global systems. Initial and continuing interest in new shipping lanes is one thing; understanding that the Arctic is the world’s air conditioner, or that populations of bird species in far off countries, such as Australia, South Africa, and Chile, depend on breeding grounds in the Arctic, is another. Exclusion of non-Arctic states from Arctic governance structures becomes less and less tenable as, through science, we reach new levels of understanding about these relationships.

While no one should be excluded from this call to action, there is no question that the people that live in the Arctic have the deepest understanding of the unique opportunities and challenges facing the region, are the most impacted by the transformations currently taking place and are best positioned to identify the issues that require attention. Responding to challenges such as wildland fires, permafrost thaw, the decline of animal populations, and infrastructure deficits requires an ‘exceptional’ level of collaboration if the Arctic ecosystems and homelands are to be sustained.

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Conclusions Together, the stories of geopolitics, environment, and Gwich’in homelands in the Arctic provide a much richer sense of the engine of Arctic exceptionalism and the region’s governance. The engine of Arctic exceptionalism has run on a unique mix of knowledges (fuel), been nourished by a distinct governance environment and approach (air), and is catalyzed by real and pressing opportunities and challenges facing the Arctic (spark). The Arctic has been an exceptional space where hard security - competition and conflict - were set aside to make space for learning and for deeper understanding of underlying relationships. Its remoteness and the difficulty southerners faced in using the land, the fragility and charisma of the environment, the wisdom, strength, and grit of the Arctic Indigenous Peoples are all critical components of the engine that we call Arctic exceptionalism, manifested in the structures of governance people see and recognize as “Arctic.”

The Gwich’in have gathered to meet in council at Tł’oo Kat for a documented 15,000 or more years. So, it could be said that there have been many Arctic Councils, Arctic Councils all along throughout human history, rather than only the one that emerged in recent times. In this context, it is disheartening to see the Russian invasion of Ukraine so quickly unravel the relationships that have made the contemporary Arctic and its governance exceptional. The way we think when it comes to meeting challenges is what brings together knowledge and relationships to create action in the world. This can mean focusing on innovating for better governance, or it can mean abandoning our innovations in favor of more familiar responses to danger. In more recent months, there are some glimmers of hope that the breakdown of geopolitical exceptionalism in the Arctic does not need to result in the complete collapse of Arctic exceptionalism.

Despite its limitations and deficiencies, the Arctic Council has experience, and still holds potential, as a space where government officials, Indigenous leaders, and scientific experts can have substantive discussions, work to translate knowledges, and take on policy actions. Here we observe that exceptionalism is as much a process as it is an outcome. Taking the time to reflect on the many stories that make the Arctic exceptional is an important step in preserving and even fostering its unique and inspiring features within the region and beyond.

References Arctic Athabaskan Council. (2022, February 14). Press Release: Conflict Continues in the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine. ArcticAthabaskanCouncil.Com. https://arcticathabaskancouncil.com/conflict-in-the-crimean-peninsula/ Arctic Council. (2016). The Arctic Council: A forum for peace and cooperation. Arctic Council. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/20th-anniversary/416-20thanniversary-statement-2 Axworthy, T. S., & Dean, R. (2013). Changing the Arctic Paradigm from Cold War to cooperation: How Canada’s Indigenous leaders shaped the Arctic Council. The Yearbook of Polar Law V, 7–43.

Boudreau Morris, K. (2017). Decolonizing solidarity: cultivating relationships of discomfort.

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Byers, M. (2009). Who owns the Arctic. Douglas and McIntyre.

Dodds, K. (2010). Flag planting and finger pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the political geographies of the outer continental shelf. Political Geography, 29(2), 63–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2010.02.004 Dodds, K. (2019). Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198830764.001.0001 Dodds, K., & Smith, J. R. (2022). Against decline? The geographies and temporalities of the Arctic cryosphere. Geographical Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12481 English, J. (2013). Ice and water: Politics, peoples, and the Arctic Council. Penguin Canada Books Inc. Exner-Pirot, H. (2023, May 11). Arctic Exceptionalism is Over. Who Will Tell the Diplomats?

Eye on the Arctic. https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2023/05/11/arcticexceptionalism-is-over-who-will-tell-the-diplomats/ Gorbachev, M. (1987). Speech in Murmansk at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medel of the city of Murmansk, October 1, 1987. Barentsinfo.org. https://www.barentsinfo.fi/docs/Gorbachev_speech.pdf Gwich’in Council International. (2022, March 3). Re: Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. GwichinCouncil.Com. https://gwichincouncil.com/sites/default/files/2022%20March%203%20GCI%20Stateme nt.pdf Heininen, L. (2005). Impacts of globalization, and the circumpolar north in world politics. Polar Geography, 29(2), 91–102. https://doi.org/10.1080/789610127 Heininen, L. (2018). Arctic geopolitics from classical to critical approach – Importance of immaterial factors. Geography, Environment, Sustainability, 11(1), 171–186. https://doi.org/10.24057/2071-9388-2018-11-1-171-186 Ilulissat Declaration. (2008). Ilulissat Declaration. http://www.arcticgovernance.org/the-ilulissatdeclaration.4872424.html Inuit Circumpolar Council. (2022, March 7). Statement from the Inuit Circumpolar Council Concerning the Arctic Council. InuitCircumpolar.Com. https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/news/statement-from-the-inuit-circumpolar-councilconcerning-the-arcticcouncil/#:~:text=We%20are%20concerned%20about%20the,a%201987%20speech%20in %20Murmansk.

Koivurova, T. (2010). Limits and possibilities of the Arctic Council in a rapidly changing scene of Arctic governance. Polar Record, 46(2), 146–156. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247409008365 Łuszczuk, M. (2017). Changing foreign policy roles in the changing Arctic. In E. Conde & S. I. Sánchez (Eds.), Global Challenges in the Arctic Region (pp. 412–429). Routledge.

Melchiorre, T. (2022, June 29). The Illusion of the Arctic “Exceptionalism.” High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/illusion-arctic-exceptionalism

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Natanel, K. (2022). Affect, excess & settler colonialism in Palestine/Israel. Settler Colonial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2022.2112427 Nord, D. C. (2016). Creating an Arctic regime. In The Arctic Council: governance within the Far North (pp. 9–33). Routledge.

Platjouw, F. M., Steindal, E. H., & Borch, T. (2018). From Arctic Science to International Law: The Road towards the Minamata Convention and the Role of the Arctic Council. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 9(0), 226. https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v9.1234 Rogne, O. (2015). Development of IASC. In IASC after 25 years: Special issue of the IASC bulletin (pp. 9–20). International Arctic Science Committee. http://iasc25.iasc.info Savage, L. (2023, February 17). The Arctic ‘will not be business as usual.’ Politico. https://www.politico.com/newsletters/global-insider/2023/02/17/the-arctic-will-not-bebusiness-as-usual-00083367 Smith, J. (2022, August 19). Melting the myth of Arctic Exceptionalism. Modern War Institute At West Point. https://mwi.usma.edu/melting-the-myth-of-arctic-exceptionalism/ Smith, L. C., & Stephenson, S. R. (2013). New Trans-Arctic shipping routes navigable by midcentury. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 110(13). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1214212110 Spence, J. (2017). Is a Melting Arctic Making the Arctic Council Too Cool? Exploring the Limits to the Effectiveness of a Boundary Organization. Review of Policy Research, 34(6), 790–811. https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12257 Steindal, E. H., Karlsson, M., Hermansen, E. A. T., Borch, T., & Platjouw, F. M. (2021). From arctic science to global policy – Addressing multiple stressors under the Stockholm convention. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 12, 80–107. https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v12.2681 U.S. Department of State. (2022, March 3). Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.

Watt-Cloutier, S. (2015). The right to be cold. Penguin Canada Books Inc. Young, O. R. (2013). Governing the Arctic : From cold war theater to mosaic of cooperation.

Global Governance, 11(1), 9–15.

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Indigenous Peoples of Russia During the War Time

Ekaterina Zmyvalova

This paper explores the legal changes which have been taking place in Russia since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022. The paper also demonstrates that due to socioeconomic reasons and disinformation, the number of Indigenous combatants in the war is proportionally higher than the number of ethnic Russians. The partial mobilization was mostly carried out in the remote regions of Russia, where most of Indigenous peoples reside. Thus, a high number of Indigenous individuals have been summoned to the war. The paper demonstrates how Russia distances itself from its international commitments, and how this affects the Indigenous peoples of Russia. As a result, for example, Russian citizens, inter alia Indigenous individuals, cannot apply to the European Court of Human Rights, as Russia is not under its jurisdiction any longer. International cooperation of Indigenous peoples of Russia has significantly decreased. Changes in the national legislation have resulted in the aggravation of responsibility under criminal and administrative law. The analysis of the changes reveals the tendency of the Russian Federation’s attempts to summon as many combatants to the war as possible. This paper demonstrates the impact of these changes on the rights of Indigenous peoples. The initiatives have been undertaken to promote laws on the exemption of Indigenous individuals from the mobilization. However, without success.

Introduction According to the data of the Arctic Council, 4 million people reside in the Arctic (Arctic Council, 2023a). About half a million of them are Indigenous Peoples. A significant part of these Indigenous peoples are Russian Indigenous peoples. (Regulation N 255, 2000; Edict N 296, 2014). The rights of the Indigenous peoples of Russia were violated before the war (Anaya, 2010: para. 20; HRC, 2015: para. 24; Zmyvalova, 2020: 334–359). Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the situation with the rights of Indigenous peoples of Russia keeps getting worse (Berezhkov, 2022; Zmyvalova, 2022: 407–414; Free Idel-Ural, 2022). The challenges caused by the violations of the rights of the Indigenous peoples of Russia, including those living in the Arctic, can have a broad impact, also on the Arctic policy.

This paper explores the legal changes1 which have been taking place in Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. Furthermore, the paper explores how these legal changes have been impacting the rights of Indigenous peoples in the Russian Federation (henceforth referred to as RF).

Ekaterina Zmyvalova is a PhD student in Sámi studies at Umeå University. The work on this paper was financially supported by the Iris scholarship.

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The legal changes are taking place against the background of the following social realities.

According to Alexey Bessudnov, the number of Indigenous combatants in the war is proportionally higher than the number of ethnic Russian combatants (Bessudnov, 2022). Before the announcement of the partial mobilization (Edict N 647, 2022), there was a high ratio of Indigenous peoples choosing to participate in the war due to, inter alia, socioeconomic reasons (Zmyvalova, 2023c: 71–72). By socioeconomic reasons I mean the poorer socioeconomic status of Indigenous peoples compared to more stable socioeconomic status of ethnic Russians. James Anaya also draws attention to the fact that Indigenous peoples’ socioeconomic status on average is lower compared to ethnic Russians (Anaya, 2010: para. 59). Participation in the war is financially more attractive for Indigenous peoples. Bessudnov observes that the death rates of the residents of the poor regions with low income is higher compared to the other regions of Russia (Bessudnov, 2022: 893).

Disinformation was another reason for Indigenous peoples’ massive participation in the war. By disinformation I mean the dominance of false information in the Russian media, and the absence of access to relatively objective news coverage regarding the war in Ukraine (Zmyvalova, 2023c: 71–72). The Government of the RF confirms that there is lack of access to high-speed internet and a poor quality of communication channels in most of the places of traditional residence of Indigenous peoples (Order N 978-p, 2021).

After the announcement of the partial mobilization, there appeared another factor of Indigenous peoples’ massive participation in the war. This factor was geographical localization of the mobilization events. The partial mobilization took place primarily in remote areas where the Indigenous population mostly resides. Thus, a significant number of Indigenous individuals have been summoned to the war (Latypova, 2022; Light, 2022). According to Bessudnov, the highest mortality rates are observed with regard to the mobilized from the Buryatia and Tuva, while the lowest mortality rates are among those from Moscow and Saint Petersburg (Bessudnov, 2022: 888).

Buryatia and Tuva are the two republics in Siberia with a significant ratio of population consisting of minority groups, such as Buryats and Yakuts, who are not recognized as Ingenious peoples as they number more than 50 000 (see clarification regarding the terms ‘Indigenous peoples’ used in the international law and ‘Indigenous small-numbered peoples’ used in the Russian law below in this section) (Regulation N 255, 2000). 240 out of 100 000 men from Buryatia have died in the war.

In contrast, 3.1 out of 100 000 men from Moscow and 10.2 out of 100 000 men from Saint Petersburg have died in Ukraine (Bessudnov, 2022: 893). The nonprofit group Cultural Survival reports that almost all of the male population of the conscription age from small settlements of the Far North were summoned to the war (Cultural Survival, 2022). For example, in the Olenek Evenki National District, 39.07% of the male population were mobilized. Another example is given by the social media site Radio Svoboda. In the small village Ust’-Kabyrza of the Shor region, all men of the conscription age were mobilized during the first days of the partial mobilization. One of the inhabitants explains: “[i]t was easy to take them. All the villages were searched, and everybody who was not in the taiga at that time were taken. People in these areas are simple-minded and easy to persuade” (Sibreal, 2023).

It is noteworthy, from the very start, the mobilization was carried out chaotically. Legal breaches in connection with the recruitment of Indigenous individuals occurred (Cultural Survival, 2022).

Ivan Shamaev gives an example of such legal breaches. Even those peoples who were exempted from the mobilization for valid grounds were summoned anyway (Shamaev, 2022). Another example is suggested by the Cultural Survival, which explains that military subpoenas were handed Indigenous Peoples of Russia During the War Time

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in to the recruits between 1:00 and 2:00 AM, and people were given two to three hours to pack their things. Those who refused were threatened with imprisonment of up to five years. The next morning, the mobilized were loaded on the buses and planes to Yakutsk. In Yakutsk, the mobilized experienced a lack of equipment and accommodation (Cultural Survival, 2022).

The topic of violation of human rights of Russian Indigenous peoples during the war time was discussed on different platforms (FIDH, 2023; Indigenous Russia, 2023). However, systematic research on the issue of the legal changes in Russia and its impact on the rights of Indigenous peoples has not been carried out. This paper intends to fill in this gap.

This paper is based on the analysis of legal and statistical sources. Because of the lack of data, the analysis also relies on information from the mass media. Moreover, this paper is based on personal communication with some Indigenous individuals.

To clarify the terminology in this paper, it shall be noted that international law employs the term “Indigenous peoples”, whereas the Russian legislation uses the term “Indigenous small-numbered peoples”. Article 1 (1) of the Federal Law (henceforth referred to as FL) ‘On Guarantees’ defines Indigenous small-numbered peoples of the RF as “peoples who live in the territories traditionally inhabited by their ancestors, maintain their traditional way of life and economic activity, number fewer than 50 000, and identify themselves as separate ethnic communities”. The FL ‘On Guarantees’ applies a quantitative criterion for identifying Indigenous peoples in Russia.

Consequently, some Indigenous peoples are denied legal support because their population exceeds 50 000, and, thus, are not recognized as Indigenous peoples according to the Russian legislation.

Examples include the Sakha-Yakuts, the Komi, the Tuvans, the Altay, the Khakas, the Buryats, and the Karelians. I mostly focus on the Indigenous peoples who are recognized as small-numbered peoples in Russia. Nevertheless, I also provide examples of the communities who are not formally recognized as Indigenous small-numbered peoples because of the numerical criterion.

The paper is organized as follows. The introductory part is followed by Section 1 which describes the changes in the status of international law in Russia today, and the impact of these changes on the rights of Indigenous peoples. Moreover, it describes the current situation of international cooperation of the Russian Indigenous peoples. Section 2 describes the changes in the national legislation and their impact on the rights of Indigenous peoples. This section also presents an overview of legislative initiatives on the exemption of Indigenous peoples from participation in the war. Section 3 is devoted to concluding remarks.

1. Russia and international law 1.1. The status of international law in Russia According to Article 15 (4) of the Russian Constitution, international principles and norms are an integral part of the Russian legal system. However, Russia is distancing itself increasingly from its international commitments. The changes in Russian legal practice regarding the hierarchy of legal sources show that the Russian Constitution shall prevail over international law.

I will now demonstrate prerequisites of the changes regarding the hierarchy of legal sources with two examples which occurred before the start of the war. The first example is the Judgement of the Constitutional Court of the RF of 2015 (Judgment, 2015). According to the Judgement, the Constitution of the RF has priority over the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights

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(henceforth referred to as ECHR). In cases when the Constitutional Court of the RF finds a decision of the ECHR contradictory to the provisions of the Constitution, the decision of the ECHR does not come into effect in Russia. Olga Komshukova observes that this Judgment of the Constitutional Court has in fact enshrined Russia’s right not to enforce decisions of the ECHR in exceptional cases (Komshukova, 2019: 117–118). Furthermore, Maria Filatova claims that according to this Judgement, the Constitution has legal precedence in the territory of the RF as compared to international law (Filatova, 2016). Legal experts concurred that this decision was not legally and logically argued (Komshukova, 2019: 119). Furthermore, the legal experts agreed that this decision was aimed at the regulation of international interference into the foreign affairs of Russia (Komshukova, 2019, 119). I agree that this decision creates grounds of precedence of the national Constitution in Russia and supports Russia’s distancing from its obligations under the international law.

Another example of Russia’s increasing distancing from its international commitments is the 2020 amendments to the Constitution. Here the focus is the Amendment to Article 79. According to the Amendment, decisions of international bodies based on international treaties of the RF, which contradict the Constitution, are not subject to enforcement in the RF. Legal scholars have interpreted this amendment differently. Some of them explained this amendment as a natural change in the legislation due to the need to prioritize the Russian Constitution. Commenting on this amendment, Taliya Khabrieva and Andrey Klishas observe that this amendment manifests the continuation of the state policy to prioritize the Russian Constitution over the decisions of the international bodies (Khabrieva & Klishas, 2020: 88–92). Vlada Lukyanova explains this change similarly. According to her, the 2020 Amendments reflect “the new formula of proportionality between international (including universal) and national legal values, principles and norms.” She states that the Amendment to Article 79 is central in establishing the new formula of proportionality. Lukyanova further explains that Amendments create a solid foundation for the realization of the constitutional principles in Russia (Lukyanova, 2022: 58).

Another group of scholars with a similar opinion includes Andrey Morozov and Anna Kashirkina.

Commenting on the Amendment, they observe that the Constitution of the RF takes into account international principles and norms with respect. However, the legal provisions of the Constitution, which regulate the hierarchy of international and national law, have been modernized to protect the constitutional order of the RF, as well as the rights and freedoms of Russian citizens in the light of a changing international situation (Morozov & Kashirkina, 2022: 120).

I rather concur with the group of scientists and international bodies who are concerned about these changes because Russian law is distancing even further from international law. According to Yulia Ioffe, Russia has established its own approach to international law by the 2020 amendments and “may destroy any hope of a common language of international law and result in Russia’s further isolation” (Ioffe, 2020). International bodies have expressed their concern about the implications of 2020 amendments. For example, the Venice Commission (officially the European Commission for Democracy through Law) declared that they are “alarmed” by the “entrenchment” of the Constitutional Court’s power to put to an end to enforcement of the judgments of the ECHR. According to the Commission, this contradicts the obligations of the RF under the European Convention on Human Rights (European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2020).

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I will now demonstrate the legal changes after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with the following examples. The first example of Russia’s distancing from its international commitments is that Russia withdrew from the European Council in 2022. The European Council, in turn, canceled Russia’s membership (Resolution CM/Res(2022)2, 2022). For the first time in history, a member State was excluded from this body.

The RF withdrew from the European Convention on Human Rights and some other European Council treaties (Council of Europe, 2022; Regulation N 1155, 2022). The President of Russia signed a number of laws that the ECHR’s judgements are not to be enforced in Russia (Kremlin, 2022).

The treaty of the European Council which directly regulated minorities’, inter alia Indigenous peoples’, rights, and which Russia has denounced, is the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. This treaty was denounced by the FL N 500-FL (FL of 2023, October 19).

The deputies of the State Duma explain the document in the following way: “[c]onsidering the fact that the termination of Russia’s participation in [the European Convention on Human Rights] will permit the avoidance of a discriminatory attitude towards the RF within the framework of the monitoring mechanism of the Council of Europe, and will not violate national minorities’ rights implementation, a denunciation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is proposed” (State Duma, 2023).

Another example is the adoption of the FL N 157-FZ (FL of 2023, April 28). This Law introduced the norm legalizing the punishment of up to five years of imprisonment for supporting decisions of international organizations of which Russia is not a member of (Radio Svoboda, 2023). There are different interpretations of this norm. The prevailing opinion is that Article supports the international immunity. This Article supports inadmissibility of criminal prosecution of the officials of the public authorities of the RF (European-court-help, 2023). This means that this article attempts to discharge Russian official and military personnel from any criminal responsibility. It is claimed that this Article is an outcome after the warrant of arrest that was issued for President Putin by the International Criminal Court (International Criminal Court, 2022).

These examples illustrate just a few of the many legal changes related to Russia’s distancing from its international commitments.2 In the next subsection, I will demonstrate the impact of these changes on the Indigenous peoples of Russia.

1.2.

Russia’s distancing from its international commitments and its impact on Indigenous peoples

Priyanka Shankar claims that the RF’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe has raised concerns in the international community because the victims of the Kremlin’s abuses of their rights cannot apply for defence of their rights in the ECHR (Shankar, 2022). This also includes Indigenous individuals. Indigenous peoples of Russia applied to the ECHR earlier. This can be demonstrated by the application of the Indigenous Peoples’ Centre (henceforth referred to as CSIPN) (The Center for Support of Indigenous Peoples, 2023) to the ECHR in 2016. The reason for the application was that the CSPIN received the status of a foreign agent. According to the ECHR’s decision (Ecodefence and Others v. Russia, 2022), the CSIPN was among the organizations who “were active in civil society issues, human rights, the protection of the environment and cultural heritage, education, social security and migration” (Ecodefence and Others v. Russia, 2022: para.

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4). The mission of CSIPN was assisting the Indigenous peoples of the North of Russia (Ecodefence and Others v. Russia, 2022: para. 415). The ECHR took the side of the CSIPN and required the RF to reimburse all the procedural expenses.

One of the latest applications to the ECHR from Russian citizens concerns violation of their rights to a safe environment. A group of 20 persons, including three Indigenous individuals, applied to the ECHR in September 2023. They claim that insufficient actions of the Russian Government on the mitigation of the consequences of the climate change violate their rights, enshrined in the European Convention of the Human Rights (Kedr.media, 2023). The applicants also explain that the consequences of climate change have a negative impact especially on Indigenous peoples of the North. They clarify that the temperature in the Arctic increases faster than in the rest of the planet. It creates risks of spreading diseases earlier unknown for the Indigenous population of the Arctic and endangers their traditional way of life. The ECHR cannot consider the cases on the violations of the rights which occurred after September, 16 2022 (VSRF, 2022). However, the ECHR “remains competent to deal with applications directed against the Russian Federation in relation to acts or omissions capable of constituting a violation of the Convention provided that they occurred until 16 September 2022” (Resolution of the ECHR, 2022). The violations in this claim occurred before September, 16 2022 and, thus, this case is under consideration of the court.

Denouncement of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was disapproved by some representatives of the national minorities of Russia. According to Anvar Kurmanakaev, the termination of the participation in the Convention demonstrated an intention to completely deprive international organizations of the possibility to monitor the situation in Russia (Krasno, 2023). A similar opinion was expressed by Aslan Beshto. He observes that over the last 20 years, the rights of the national minorities in Russia have been systematically infringed.

He illustrates it with the following example: not only instruction in the native language is terminated but also teaching of the native language is limited in many territories of Russia (Krasno, 2023). He claims that the situation with minority language teaching worsened after amendments to the Constitution of 2020.3 In particular, he mentions the amendment on recognizing the Russian language as the language of the State-forming people. I support these opinions. The rights of the national minorities, inter alia Indigenous peoples, were infringed even before the denouncement of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The denouncement can result in further violations of their rights. The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities who is responsible for evaluating the implementation of the Convention carried out several monitoring cycles on the implementation of the Convention with regards to the rights of national minorities in Russia. In their opinions the Committee several times observed violations of Indigenous peoples’ rights in Russia (Advisory Committee, 2012; Advisory Committee, 2018).

1.3.

International cooperation of Russian Indigenous Peoples

Section 1 is devoted to the changes in the status of international law in Russia today, and the impact of these changes on the rights of Indigenous peoples. In addition, I describe the current situation with international cooperation of the Russian Indigenous peoples.

Since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the international cooperation of Indigenous peoples of Russia has reduced substantially. It has especially affected those Indigenous peoples who had close ties with their Indigenous sisters and brothers in other countries. One of the examples of Indigenous Peoples of Russia During the War Time

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these Indigenous peoples is the Sámi who live in the territory of Sápmi stretching through the four nation States, namely Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia.

According to Zmyvalova, Indigenous peoples had different reactions to the war (Zmyvalova, 2023a: 223). Indigenous peoples’ organizations backing the ideology of the federal center have supported the war (RAIPON, 2022). Some others have condemned the RF’s aggression. It resulted in the polarization of opinions within the Indigenous community in Russia.

One of those who actively supported Russia’s aggression is the Association of Indigenous Smallnumbered Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation (henceforth referred to as RAIPON). The RAIPON is the biggest Indigenous organization in Russia. The association unites 40 Indigenous peoples. It is also the Permanent Participant of the Arctic Council.

In the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the RAIPON appealed to the RF President with the Letter to support the war. The Letter contained 33 signatures. Two of the 33 signatures belonged to individuals. These individuals were President of the RAIPON and Vice-president of the RAIPON. The rest of the signatures belonged to different Indigenous organizations. Some other Russian Indigenous organizations who did not join the letter, also expressed their support to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine (Indigenous Russia, 2022). The reason that the RAIPON supported the war in Ukraine is that it is a pro-governmental organization. Commenting on the progovernmental orientation of the RAIPON, Pavel Sulyandziga explains that the RAIPON “is not an organization of Indigenous Peoples but part of the structure of the Russian regime” (Lackenbauer, Sidorova & Sukhankin, 2023: 1). P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Evgeniia Sidorova and Sergey Sukhankin claim that the RAIPON “has been coopted by the Kremlin and is now little more than a mouthpiece for government directives” (Lackenbauer, Sidorova & Sukhankin, 2023: 3).

One of those who openly took up the anti-war position is the Sámi activist Andrei Danilov (Zmyvalova, 2023b; Nilsen, 2022). He left Russia immediately after the start of the war. Currently, he resides in Norway. Another Sámi activist Aleksandr Slupachik is also seeking asylum in Norway (Staalesen & Chentemirov, 2023). Andrei Zhvavyi is a Russian Sámi activist who is awaiting the decision regarding asylum in Finland (Sjögren, 2023).

The Sámi Council suspended the cooperation with the Russian Sámi for an indefinite period.

(Fjellheim, 2022). Sámi Council is an organization (Saami Council, 2023a) with voluntary membership of Sámi organizations in Finland, Russia, Norway, and Sweden. According to Zmyvalova, the suspension of cooperation does not prevent the Sámi Council in their attempts to support the Russian Sámi individuals (Zmyvalova, 2023a: 224). The example of such attempts is the establishment of the memorial fund in honor of the work and life of Jevgenij Jushkov. The Fund’s main objective is to stimulate education in the Sámi languages for individuals from the Russian side of Sápmi (Saami Council, 2023b). As one of Zmyvalova’s personal contacts among the Sámi individuals explains, this is a worthy initiative. However, challenges occur for the Russian Sámi individuals in the Russian part of Sápmi because of the sanctions and aggravated legislation.

The sanctions impact monetary transfers from the Sámi Council to the private bank accounts in the RF. According to the new aggravated legislation, individuals can be recognized foreign agents in the RF if they receive a foreign financial support (see the clarification regarding the foreign agents in subsection 2.1). Russian citizens living in Russia are afraid of being recognized foreign

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agents. These challenges create obstacles for those who potentially are interested in learning the Sámi language.

Another example is the collaboration of Russia with the Arctic Council. According to Serafima Andreeva, the Arctic Council is “an intergovernmental and consensus-based forum that promotes cooperation among the Arctic states, indigenous peoples, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and non-Arctic observer states” (Andreeva, 2023: 112–113). Ida Folkestad Soltvedt informs that the Arctic Council was criticized for “the lack of legal status and, consequently, the supposedly low level of implementation among member states” (Soltvedt, 2017: 73). Further, she expresses her disagreement with this critique (Soltvedt, 2017: 73-94). Discussing its significance for Indigenous peoples, Paula Kankaanpää and Oran R. Young state that “it has become a mechanism for increasing the prominence of the concerns of the Arctic’s indigenous peoples” (Kankaanpää & Young, 2012). Besides the eight Arctic member States, six permanent participants representing Indigenous peoples of the Arctic, are part of the Arctic Council (Arctic Council, 2023a). One of these permanent participants is the RAIPON. In March 2022, all member States except Russia, decided to abstain from activities of the Arctic Council (Office of the Spokesperson of the Department of State, 2022a). In June 2022, these States decided to continue the Arctic Council’s activities partly but all the links with Russia were put on hold (Office of the Spokesperson of the Department of State, 2022b). The decision on the suspension of the Arctic Council’s activities was taken without prior consultations with the Permanent Participants. According to some scholars, this situation leads to ousting of Indigenous peoples from their stakeholder role. Barry Scott Zellen claims that the States again have become those stakeholders who take important decisions in the Arctic governance (Zellen, 2023: 148). It is impossible to predict whether and how the Arctic Council will continue its activity. According to the Russian Minister of foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov, Russia has considered its withdrawal from the Arctic Council (Ria Novosti, 2023; SeverPress, 2023).

2. Changes in Russian legislation 2.1. Criminal and administrative punishments Since the beginning of the war, numerous legislative acts of the RF have undergone substantial changes. The most substantial changes were made to the Criminal Code and the Code of the RF on Administrative Offenses. According to the Chairman of the lower house of the Russian Parliament (State Duma) Vyacheslav Volodin, 653 law drafts were considered in the State Duma in 2022 (Yurishina, 2023). According to Elena Yurishina, the changes to the Criminal Code of 2022 demonstrate that this year was ‘the most repressive’ since the adoption of the Criminal Code (Yurishina, 2023). 19 new articles were introduced. 16 of them provide for criminal responsibility for war crimes (Yurishina, 2023). In addition, some existing articles were amended (Yurishina, 2023). Characterizing these changes, media outlet Mediazona claims that the wave of military laws passed in 2022 forced all those who disagreed to be silent, or to leave the country (Mediazona, 2023).

Criminal punishments were introduced for offenses such as “fakes about the Russian authorities” (FL N 63-FZ, 2022) and “fakes about the army” (FL N 32-FZ, 2022). In addition, the criminal punishment for fakes about the Russian authorities and the punishment for disseminating of “false information” about the activity of the Russian State bodies were initiated. The administrative

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responsibility for the activity as a foreign agent has been aggravated since the start of the war (FL N 622-FZ, 2022).4 The presented legal changes are examples of the changes in the Administrative and the Criminal Code of the RF that occurred after the start of the war in Ukraine. Consequently, there were detained 19 718 individuals from 2022, February 24 up to June 2023 for their anti-war position.

There were registered 6 839 cases on discredit of the Russian army (OVD-Info, 2023a; OVD-Info, 2023b).5 Furthermore, 584 individuals were pursued for their anti-war position in accordance with the regulations of the Criminal Code 2.2. Other changes in the legislation In addition to the changes in the criminal and administrative legislation, the Russian legislation has undergone changes in other legal branches. I suggest categorizing and describing the main changes in each of the periods.

The following stages can be distinguished:6 2.1. From the start of the war to the announcement of the partial mobilization (February 2022September 2022); 2.2. From the announcement of the partial mobilization to the introduction of the legal regulations on the digital subpoenas and military digital register of military servicemen (September 2022-June 2023); 2.3. From the introduction of the legal regulations on the digital subpoenas and military digital register of military servicemen up to date. (June 2023-until now).

The first stage is characterized by the introduction of military censorship. The military censorship of this stage implies infringement of the freedom of speech, the information freedom, and the freedom of assembly (FL N 255-FZ, 2022).

The second stage is characterized continuation of the introduction of massive changes in the legislation (FL N 478-FZ, 2022) and the compulsory recruitment of military servicemen in accordance with the Edict of President of the RF September 21, 2022 (Edict N 647, 2022).

The third stage is characterized by the attempts of the State to recruit as many combatants as possible. Ekaterina Zmyvalova illustrates this tendency by referring to the amendments to the Law ‘On Military Duty and Military Service’ (Zmyvalova, 2023a: 223; FL N 127-FZ, 2023). According to these amendments, “military subpoenas on paper were to be sent alongside digital subpoenas to the private accounts on digital platforms” (Zmyvalova, 2023a: 223). If a person has not read a digital subpoena online or has not signed the subpoena in paper, the subpoena is counted as delivered anyway after seven days of its placement in the digital register. This means that an individual is obliged to come in person to the military commissariat. It is worth mentioning that the digital military register of military servicemen is still under development. The launching of the electronic military register is planned for Spring 2024. However, it was already announced by the Deputy Head of the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media, Oleg Kachanov, that meeting this deadline is impossible due to the lack of the proper infrastructure, among other things (Litoi, 2023).

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To illustrate other changes concerning the recruitment of the biggest possible number of combatants, there can be given an example of the changes in the Russian legislation on the age of the individuals to be summoned to the short-term military service. The upper limit of the age of recruitment will be increased to 30 years from 2024. Earlier, the upper limit of the age to be summoned to the military service was 27. (FL N 439-FZ, 2023). Also, from October 2023, fines for the failure to assist the military commissariats in their mobilization work when mobilization is announced are introduced (FL N 404-FZ, 2023). Furthermore, from October 2023, the penalties for those who do not comply with the obligations on the military registration are aggravated.

2.3.

The impact of the legislative changes on Indigenous peoples

In the present subsection I will present the impact of the legal changes within each of the periods presented in Subsection 2.2 on the rights of Indigenous peoples of Russia.

From the very start of the war in Ukraine, Indigenous peoples have been affected by the war. Even before the announcement of the partial mobilization, the number of Indigenous combatants was proportionally higher than the number of ethnic Russians (Bessudnov, 2022). Also, the proportion of Indigenous individuals who died at the war was higher than the number of the killed Russian combatants (Free Idel-Ural, 2022). Indigenous individuals chose to participate in the war for several reasons. Among them there were economic reasons, including their poverty and the need to receive monetary rewards for their participation in the war. Besides, the lack of reliable and objective information about the war in Ukraine has misled them and did not allow to them evaluate the situation objectively. As a result, this has increased the number of Indigenous combatants (Zmyvalova, 2023a: 221). According Loode, the Russian army is a mirror of the social and economic challenges of the State, especially in the remote territories where Indigenous peoples live.

He observes that most of the recruits come from outskirt territories where unemployment, drug addiction and criminal situations are typical. Thus, for these recruits, participation in the war becomes a life-saving opportunity (Idelreal, 2022).

From the start of the partial mobilization, the mobilization was mostly carried out in the remote territories of the RF (Latypova, 2022; Light, 2022). According to the official statement from the Ministry of Defense, only one per cent of those who could be potentially mobilized would be recruited (Vesti, 2022). The number of the mobilized in fact is unknown due to the absence of official statistics. According to Prince, from the very beginning the events of the mobilization were poorly regulated by law and, thus, the mobilization was carried out chaotically (Prince, 2022; News UN, 2022). No unified criteria existed in Russian legislation regarding the number of mobilized and the mobilization in general. This resulted in varying practices in the federal subunits. Moreover, the absence of the unified criteria has led to legal breaches. Ekaterina Zmyvalova states that the informal mobilization criteria applied at the beginning of the mobilization (Zmyvalova, 2023c: 71).

When President Putin announced partial mobilization, different subunits interpreted his order differently. In addition to the examples of the legal breaches during the partial mobilization presented in the Introduction of this paper, the following examples can be given. Nanai activist Andrei Belda says that people from his village participated in the military activities in Donbas area already from 2014. Many of them died in Ukraine. Some of the families of the dead received military subpoenas for the dead to be summoned to the war in 2022. He continues: “[e]ven the dead were called up … The military subpoenas were sent to those who died long time ago. The youth, the old -everybody went [to the war]. A little bit later those who had not fit were returned from

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Khabarovsk-these are the disabled and teachers” (Sevrinovsky, 2023). According to Belda, every fifth person from his village was mobilized rather than one per cent of the village population, as was promised by the Minister of Defense. Other Nanai individuals confirm that the military commissariat “grabbed everyone they could” (Sevrinovsky, 2023).

The introduction of the legal regulations on the digital subpoenas and military digital register of military servicemen will impact Indigenous peoples negatively. According to Uliana Vinokurova, Indigenous peoples reside in the territories of “digital inequality” (Vinokurova, 2023). The absence of technology in the territories of traditional residence of Indigenous peoples can result in the situations when those Indigenous individuals who do not have access to the internet and, thus, cannot get access to their digital military subpoenas will be punished.

2.4.

Legislative initiatives on the exemption of Indigenous peoples from participation in the war

Notably, there exist no special rules of exemption for the mobilization of Indigenous peoples to the war. This subsection gives an overview of the legislative initiatives on the exemption of Indigenous peoples from participation in the war.

One of the examples of such initiatives is the initiative of the deputy of the State Duma and former mayor of the city of Yakutsk Sardana Avksentyeva. She proposed that men belonging to Indigenous peoples officially recognized by the Order of the Government of the RF of 2006, April 17 N 536-p ‘On Approval of the List of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation’ should not be mobilized (Avksentyeva, 2022).

Another initiative was undertaken by the deputy of the State Duma from the Nenets Autonomous Okrug Sergey Kotkin. He planned to initiate a bill on the exemption of reindeer herders from the mobilization (National Accent, 2022). Governor of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug Yury Bezdudny supported this initiative. He claimed that reindeer herders could not be conscripted because they provided for the food security in the region (New Izvestiya, 2022).

Another initiative was undertaken by Head of the Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North of the Khabarovsk Region Lyubov Odzyal. She appealed to President Putin, the Prosecutor the General’s Office of the RF, and some other bodies of State power, to stop the mobilization of Indigenous individuals (Activatica, 2022).

The two latter initiatives did not result in any law drafts on either the federal or the subunits’ level.

The only legal initiative that ended in the Parliament as a law draft was initiated by Sardana Avksentyeva and Maksim Gulin (Draft of the FL, 2022). According to this law draft, Indigenous small-numbered peoples have the right to change their military service to the alternative civil service. This law draft regarded Indigenous peoples who had a traditional way of life and carried out traditional economic activities and Indigenous crafts. This draft has never become the law.

Some scholars have expressed their opinion on the exemption of Indigenous individuals from the mobilization. Vinokurova suggests two criteria for the exemption. The first criterion is living in the areas of extreme climactic conditions and working in the life-supporting sectors. The second criterion is that an individual belongs to Russia’s ethnocultural diversity (Vinokurova, 2022).

Thus, despite the initiatives, no law was adopted on the exemption of Indigenous individuals from the mobilization.

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3. Concluding remarks The legal changes in Russia which have taken place since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, demonstrate that Russia has distanced itself from its international commitments. Moreover, the changes in the punitive legislation demonstrate that the year of 2022 was the most repressive since the adoption of the Criminal Code in 1996. Also, the Code of the RF on Administrative Offenses of 2001 was changed substantially. In addition, the changes were also introduced into other legal acts. These changes concern, inter alia, the military censorship and demonstrate attempts of the State to recruit as many combatants as possible. Rapid legal changes create chaos in implementation of the new laws. Announcement of the partial mobilization is an example of such challenging implementation.

All the legislative changes have a direct impact on the Indigenous peoples in Russia. For example, from the start of the war, high numbers of Indigenous persons participated in the war due to socioeconomic reasons and disinformation. From the start of partial mobilization, a significant number of Indigenous persons were summoned from the remote areas where Indigenous peoples traditionally reside. This paper describes some legal initiatives to adopt legislation regarding the exemption of Indigenous individuals from the mobilization. However, no laws were adopted as a result of these initiatives.

The analysis also shows that international cooperation of Indigenous organizations of Russia has reduced substantially. This might have an irreversible impact on their culture, language, and rights.

Some examples were given to demonstrate that Indigenous individuals were supported internationally in their strive for their language. However, this support was hard to manage due to the sanctions and aggravation of the Russian legislation.

Notes 1. Legal changes’ is a broad term which also includes other sources of the Russian law in addition to the legislation. Examples of these additional sources are court decisions.

2. For more examples see: Katzarova, 2023.

3. For more information see Zmyvalova, 2020: 350–351.

4. A foreign agent is an individual or a legal entity who has received any foreign support or who is under a foreign influence, or both. According to Article 2 (1) of this Law, foreign influence is providing support by a foreign source or impacting a foreign agent, also by coercion, persuasion or in other ways. According to Article 2 (2) of this Law, the support is providing a foreign agent with monetary funds and (or) other property, as well as providing organizational, methodological, scientific-technical assistance, or any support in other forms.

5. Article 20.3.3 of the Code of the RF on Administrative Offenses regulates issue of discreditation.

6. I am solely responsible for the suggested categorization.

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Council of Europe. Russia ceases to be party to the European Convention on Human Rights.

2022, September 16. https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/russia-ceases-to-be-party-tothe-european-convention-on-human-rights Criminal Code of the RF (Edition 2023).

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European-court-help. (2023, April 24). The European Court and Article 243 of the Criminal Code of the RF. Will they be prosecuted for the assistance in the implementation of the decisions of the ECHR? https://european-court-help.ru/evropejskij-sud-i-st-284-3-uk-rfbudut-li-privlekat-k-ugolovnoj-otvetstvennosti-za-okazanie-sodejstvija-v-ispolneniireshenij-espch/ European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). (2020, June 18).

Russian Federation Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Constitution (As Signed by the President of the Russian Federation on 2020, March 14). Para. 64. https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDLAD(2020)009-e Fjellheim. R. (2022, December 5–6). Rights of indigenous peoples in zones of armed conflict (internal or international), including cross-boundary rights of indigenous peoples; and peace and demilitarization processes (1 and 1/2 hrs). Seminar of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The impact of militarization on the rights of Indigenous Peoples. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/indigenouspeoples/emrip /seminars/undrip/rune-fjellheim-paper-rights-indigenous-peoples.docx FIDH (2023, June 6). FIDH documents the destruction of civil society in Russia, law after law.

International Federation for Human Rights. https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-centralasia/russia/fidh-documents-the-destruction-of-civil-society-in-russia-law-after Filatova, M. (2016). Relations of legal orders and hierarchy of international and national norms: new issues and solutions in the Russian Constitutional Court’s case-law. International Justice, 3(19), 88–100.

FL of 2022, March 4 N 32-FZ ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Code of the RF and Articles 31and 151 of the Criminal Procedural Code of the RF’.

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FL of 2022, March 25 N 63-FZ ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Code of the RF and Articles 150 and 151 of the Criminal Procedural Code of the RF’.

FL of 2022, July 14 N 255-FZ ‘On Control over the Activities of Persons Being under Foreign Influence’.

FL of 2022, July 14 N 260-FZ ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Code of the RF and Criminal Procedural Code of the RF’.

FL of 2022, December 5 N 478-FZ ‘On Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection’ and Certain Legislative Acts of the RF’.

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FL of 2023, April 14 N 127-FZ ‘On Amendments to Certain Legislative acts in the RF’.

FL of 2023, April 28 N 157-FZ ‘On the Amendments to the Criminal Code of the RF and Article 151 of the Criminal Procedural Code of the RF’.

FL of 2023, July 31 N 404-FZ ‘On Amendments to the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses’.

FL of 2023, August 4 N 439-FZ ‘On Amendments to Certain Legislative acts in the RF’.

FL of 2023, October 19 N 500-FZ ‘On the Denouncement by the RF of the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities’.

Free Idel-Ural. (2022, May 1). Statement in the UN: Moscow destroys Indigenous peoples in the meat grinder of war. https://idel-ural.org/archives/syres-bolyaen-prizval-oon-obratit-vnimanie-naispolzovanie-moskvoj-korennyh-narodov-v-vojne-protivukrainy/?fbclid=IwAR2a5tkYDY6UyHKd8UGiJO4iL0DI5ZZ8F5dZoB_q5jMvEnVqo2 s1lfaJ7Lk HRC. (2015). Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the Russian Federation (CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7).

Idelreal. (2022, May 9). Special 9th of May. “It was enough for the Kremlin to anthem the glorious deeds of ancestors, now - they have to win by themselves”. https://www. idelreal.org/a/31838711.html Indigenous Russia. (2022, December 21). The Indigenous Peoples of the North support all the decisions of the Government of the RF. https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/29319 Indigenous Russia. (2023). Representatives of Indigenous Peoples who died in the war against Ukraine (the list). https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/29542 International Criminal Court. Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova. (2023, March 17). https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-againstvladimir-vladimirovich-putinand#:~:text=Today%2C%2017%20March%202023%2C%20Pre,Ms%20Maria%20Aleks eyevna%20Lvova%2DBelova Zmyvalova

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Ioffe, Y. (2020, January 29) The Amendments to the Russian Constitution: Putin's Attempt to Reinforce Russia's Isolationist Views on International Law? EJIL: Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law., https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-amendments-to-therussian-constitution-putins-attempt-to-reinforce-russias-isolationist-views-oninternational-law/ Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the RF of 2015, July 14 N 21-p.

Kankaanpää P., & Young, O.R. (2012). The effectiveness of the Arctic Council. Polar Research, 31, 1–14, https://doi.org/10.3402/polar.v31i0.17176 Katzarova, M. (2023). Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation (A/HRC/54/54). https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessionsregular/session54/advance-versions/A_HRC_54_54_AdvanceEditedVersion.docx Kedr.media. (2023, September 12). Environmental activists applied to the ECHR to question the climate policy of Russia https://kedr.media/news/ekoaktivisty-podali-isk-v-espchchtoby-osporit-klimaticheskuyu-politiku-rossii-7536 Khabrieva, T., & Klishas, A. (2020). Thematic commentary to the Law of the Russian Federation on the Amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 2020, March 14 N 1-FKZ ‘On improving the regulation of certain issues of the organization and functioning of public authorities’.

Norma: INFRA-M. Komshulova, O. (2019). Politics argumentation in the decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation: the analysis of the Judgement of 2015, July 14 N 21-p. Comparative constitutional education, 130(3), 110–126. DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2019-3-110-126 Krasno, A. (2023, October 15). The law regulated discrimination: Russia withdrew from the Convention of the protection of the national minorities. Kavkaz realii https://www.kavkazr.com/a/uzakonennaya-diskriminatsiya-rossiya-vyshla-iz-konventsiipo-zaschite-malochislennyh-narodov/32638090.html Kremlin.ru. (2022, June 11). Amendments due to recognition of the judgements of ECHR unenforceable in Russia after 2022, March 15 were introduced in the legislation. http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/68648 Kremnev, P. (2022). Sources and Legal Succession of Universally Acclaimed International Law Principles and Provisions in the Russian Legal System and Amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Constitutional and Municipal Law, 9, 15–24. DOI: 10.18572/1812-3767-2022-9-15-24.

Latypova, L. (2022, September 27). Ethnic Minorities Hit Hardest by Russia’s Mobilization, Activists Say. The Moscow Times. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/27/ethnic-minorities-hit-hardest-byrussiasmobilization-activists-say-a78879 Lackenbauer, Sidorova, E. & Sukhankin, S. (2023). RAIPON, Russian Indigenous Peoples, and the War in Ukraine: Pro-Kremlin Narratives and Voices of Dissent.

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https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/23jul-RAIPON-RussianIndigenous-PWL-ES-SS-NAADSN-policy-primer.pdf Light, F. Russia’s mobilization hits hard in poor, rural Buryatia. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poor-rural-buryatia-russias-partial-mobilisationhits-hard-2022-09-23/ Litoi, A. (2023, September 23). A long recalculation: introduction of a digital military register is being delayed. https://www.svoboda.org/a/dolgiy-pereschet-vvedenie-tsifrovogo-voinskogoreestra-zatyagivaetsya/32609488.html Lukyanova, V. (2022). A New Concept of Proportionality of Universal and National Values in Russian Legislation. Journal of Russian Law, 26(9), 53–69. DOI: 10.12737/jrl.2022.094 Mediazona. (2023, June 8). The last 50: Russian repressive laws since 2018. https://en.zona.media/article/2023/06/07/50rep_en Morozov, A. & Kashirkina, A. (2022). Constitutional Transformations in the Russian Federation and the Interaction of International and Domestic Law: Continuity and Novelty. Russian Law Journal, 26(1), 120–141. DOI: 10.12737/jrl.2022.010 National Accent. (2022, September 28), The deputy of the State Duma from the Nenets Autonomous Okrug initiates cancellation of the partial mobilization of reindeer herders. https://nazaccent.ru/content/39138-deputat-gosdumy-ot-nao-iniciiruet-otmenuchastichnoj-mobilizacii-dlya-olenevodov.html New Izvestiya. (2022, October 10). The authorities of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug ask to postpone military mobilization for reindeer herders. https://newizv.ru/news/2022-1012/vlasti-nenetskogo-ao-prosyat-ob-otsrochke-dlya-olenevodov-368524 News UN. (2022, September 27). Russia: Alarm over arrests of military mobilization protesters. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1128091 Nilsen, T. (2022). Fleeing Russia, Andrei seeks asylum in what for him still is historical homeland, Sapmi. The Barents Observer. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/life-andpublic/2022/11/forced-flee-russia-andrey-seeks-asylum-what-him-still-historicalhomeland Obyasnyaem.rf. (2022, October 15). Called up for military service: what one needs to know about the rights of mobilized. https://xn--90aivcdt6dxbc.xn-p1ai/articles/useful/prizvan_na_sluzhbu_chto_nuzhno_znat_o_pravakh_mobilizovanny kh/?sphrase_id=1139269&fbclid=IwAR3LOgC7PaSmM31idbWMEtAY97PqNJskfix0_ NtUflNsZFy_yiwXL4oujjM Office of the Spokesperson of the Department of State (2022a, March 3). Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russiasinvasion-of-ukraine/ Office of the Spokesperson of the Department of State (2022b, June 8). Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-limited-resumption-of-arctic-council-

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cooperation/#:~:text=We%20remain%20convinced%20of%20the,participation%20of% 20the%20Russian%20Federation Order of the Government of the RF N 978-p of 2021, April 15 ‘On the Approval of the Program of the Sate Support for Traditional Economic Activities of the Indigenous SmallNumbered Peoples of the RF in the Arctic Zone of the RF’.

OVD-Info (2023a). Anti-war case. Infographics on criminal prosecutions for anti-war stance. https://en.ovdinfo.org/antiwarinfographics?_gl=1*18cus9h*_ga*MTY1MDY5NzYyMi4xNjg3Mzc4OTM3*_ga_J7DH9 NKJ0R*MTY4NzgxMTY2NS4yLjEuMTY4NzgxMTY4OC4zNy4wLjA OVD-Info (2023b) Wartime Repressions Report. https://en.ovdinfo.org/wartime-repressionsreportmay?_gl=1*1p904es*_ga*MTI2NTM2NTczOC4xNjg4MDM1MTI3*_ga_J7DH9NKJ0R *MTY4ODAzNTEyNi4xLjAuMTY4ODAzNTEyNi42MC4wLjA.#10 Prince, T. (2022, October 17). Amid A Chaotic Call-Up, Some Russian Draftees Are Returning Home In Body Bags. Now Putin Says Mobilization Is Ending. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-chaotic-mobilization-deaths/32088532.html Radio Svoboda. (2023, April 28). One will be deprived of one’s citizenship for disseminating fakes. One can be imprisoned for a lifetime for treason. https://www.svoboda.org/a/zadiskreditatsiyu-armii-budut-lishatj-priobretyonnogo-grazhdanstva-rf/32383773.html RAIPON supported President of our country V. V. Putin. https://raipon.info/presstsentr/novosti/assotsiatsiya-kmnss-i-dv-rf-vystupila-v-podderzhku-prezidenta-nasheystra-ny-v-v-putina-/ Regulation of the Government of the RF N 255 of 2000, March 24 ‘On the Unified List of the Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the Russian Federation’.

Regulation of the Government of the RF N 1155 of 2022, June 28 ‘On the Termination of Participation of the RF in Partial and Extended Partial Agreements of the Council of Europe’.

Regulation of the Government of the RF N 1200 of July 24, 2023 ‘On the Amendments to the Regulations on the Conscription of the Citizens of the RF According to Mobilization who are Assigned to Military Units (Purported for Special Entities), for Military Services in Military Positions Provided by the War Time Schedule, or for Sending them to Work in the Civilian Positions of the Armed Forces of the RF, other Troops, Military Formations, Bodies and Special Entities’.

Resolution CM/Res(2022)2 on the cessation of the membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 2022, March 16 at the 1428ter meeting of the Ministers' Deputies). https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680a5da51 Resolution of the European Court of Human Rights on the consequences of the cessation of membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe in light of Article 58 of the European Convention on Human Rights. (2022, March 22).

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https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Resolution_ECHR_cessation_membershi p_Russia_CoE_ENG Ria Novosti. (2023, May 11). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not exclude Russia’s withdrawal from the Arctic Council. https://ria.ru/20230511/arktika-1871104033.html Romanova, S. (2023, May 31). “Look around. Nelmin Nos is behind you. Do not even think to retreat”. How residents of the Polar tundra explain to themselves the death of their sons and brother in the war in Ukraine. https://zona.media/article/2023/05/31/nelmin-nos?

Russian Federation. (2023). Country-specific monitoring. https://www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/russian-federation Saami Council. (2023). https://www.saamicouncil.net/en/the-saami-council Saami Council. (2023, May 16). Announcement of Jevgenij Jushkov Memorial Fund. https://www.saamicouncil.net/news-archive/2023-jevgenij-jushkov-memorial-fund Sever-Press. (2023, May 11). Sergei Lavrov: the future of the Arctic Council depends on the possibility to carry out civilized dialogue. https://sever-press.ru/news/politika/sergejlavrov-dalnejshaja-sudba-arkticheskogo-soveta-zavisit-ot-vozmozhnosti-vestitsivilizovannyj-dialog/ Sevrinovsky, V. (2023, October 14), Bitter wormwood soup. How do the Nanais live during the war? Sibreal. https://www.sibreal.org/a/gorkiy-sup-iz-polyni-kak-zhivut-nanaytsy-vovremya-voyny-/32574857.html Shankar, P. (2022, March 17). What does Russia leaving the Council of Europe mean? DW. https://www.dw.com/en/what-does-russia-leaving-the-council-of-europe-mean/a61164543 Shamaev, I. (2022, September 23). Open letter To the President of the RF, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the RF V.V. Putin Minister of Defense of the RF S.K. Shoigu, Head of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) A.S. Nikolaev, Chairman of the State Assembly (Il Tumen) Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) A.I. Eremeev. Culturalsurvival. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/sites/default/files/Open%20letter_Shamaev%20%281 %29.pdf Sibreal. (2023, 31 August). “The war does not distinguish between Shor and others”. A smallnumbered people is dying in Ukraine. https://www.sibreal.org/a/voyna-ne-razbiraetshorets-ili-net-malochislennyy-narod-gibnet-v-ukraine-/32554068.html Sjögren, P. (2023, 24 July). Flydde inom Sápmi – tvingas bo på flyktingmottagning i Norge. SVT Nyheter. https://www.svt.se/nyheter/sapmi/flydde-inom-s-pmi-tvingas-bo-paflyktingmottagning-i-norge Soltvedt, I. F. (2017). Soft Law, Solid Implementation? The Influence of Precision, Monitoring and Stakeholder Involvement on Norwegian Implementation of Arctic Council Recommendations. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 8. https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v8.639

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Staalesen, A. & Chentemirov, G. (2023, February 1). “I just want to help my people,” says exiled Sámi leader. The Barents Observer. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/indigenouspeoples/2023/02/i-just-want-help-my-people-says-exiled-sami-leader State Duma. (2023, October 10). The deputies denounced the Framework Convention of the Protection of National Minorities. http://duma.gov.ru/news/58013/ The Center for Support of Indigenous Peoples of the North /Russian Indigenous Training Center. (2023). https://www.csipn.ru/ Vesti. (2022, September 21). Shoigu informed who is subject to the partial mobilization. https://www.vesti.ru/article/2951363 Vinokurova, U. (2022, September 22). “I suggest to add to the other criteria the criterion of geoclimatic safety”. Indigenous Russia. https://indigenousrussia.com/archives/24663?fbclid=IwAR0OjV2kZfYA4AAN22RVxecO1SA3mOvN5FdiQWBTUp0yRGI5mBT97BApU Vinokurova, U. (2023, April 13). @UlianaVinokurova. https://t.me/UlianaVinokurova/4942 Yurishina, E. (2023, March 15). Unprecedented repression. 2022 marks the darkest year in the history of the Russian Criminal Code. Mediazona. https://zona.media/article/2023/03/15/kpp Zellen, B. S. (2023). As War in Ukraine Upends a Quarter Century of Enduring Arctic Cooperation, the World Needs the Whole Arctic Council Now More Than Ever. The Northern Review, 54, 137–160. https://doi.org/10.22584/nr54.2023.005 Zmyvalova, E. (2020). Human Rights of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples in Russia: Recent Developments. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 11, 34–359. https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v11.2336 Zmyvalova, E. (2022). The Impact of the War in Ukraine on the Indigenous Small-numbered Peoples’ Rights in Russia’. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 13, 407–414. https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v13.4058 Zmyvalova, E. (2023a). Nearly Two Years Since the Start of the Full-scale War in Ukraine: The Rights of Russia’s Indigenous Peoples Continue to Deteriorate. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 14, 220–227. http://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v14.6030 Zmyvalova, E. (2023b). Sápmi as a Traditional Sámi Land in Four Countries Supports Sámi Activist from Russia in Having his Asylum Case Processed in Norway. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 14, 107–111. https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v14.5454 Zmyvalova, E. (2023c). The Rights of Indigenous Peoples of Russia after Partial Military Mobilization. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 14, 70–75. https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v14.5083

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High Seas Triggering Arctic Security? An Analysis of Chinese Academic Discourse on the Central Arctic Ocean

Marco Volpe

The Central Arctic Ocean is the marine area within the Arctic Ocean beyond national jurisdiction where, according to UNCLOS, no state is allowed to advance any sovereign claims. Today, the protection of marine ecosystems, exploitation of Arctic natural resources, commercial and fishing opportunities are all drivers which attract major powers' attention. The recentlysigned Treaty on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (2023) and the Agreement to prevent unregulated fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (2018) have drastically changed the maritime regime in the Central Arctic Ocean. They both provide more room for non-Arctic stakeholders to participate in the management of the Central Arctic Ocean and they induce a profound reflection on how it will influence the strategies of Arctic and non-Arctic states.

Despite a good amount of literature in the English language that has shared skepticism over China's role in the Arctic, the limitation of China’s investment in the Arctic region has stimulated a reconsideration of China’s threatening role. However, it has mostly overlooked the evolution of the domestic debate and its potential to influence the domestic decision-making apparatus.

This paper aims to fill this gap by shedding light on how the Chinese domestic academic debate addresses the Central Arctic Ocean. Geopolitical purposes, military means, economic opportunities, environmental issues and governance are all themes that emerge from the analysis. The investigation focuses on the period 2014-2021. It draws the evolution of the topics discussed and offers a reflection on future actions the Chinese leadership might consider.

1. Introduction In the last two decades the Arctic region has been experiencing renewed attention not only from the Arctic states, but also from stakeholders located well below the Arctic Circle. Non-Arctic states have been particularly active in releasing their official Arctic strategy and engaging in Arctic affairs to improve their regional influence. Interests are multifaceted and include military and environmental security, the accessibility to Arctic natural resources and new shipping route opportunities. The United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines the Marco Volpe, PhD Candidate at the University of Lapland, Visiting Researcher at the Arctic Centre

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portion of the sea that is not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea nor the internal waters of a state, nor in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state as “High Seas” that are open to all states. The Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) is one of those areas that, in the recent past, due to its inaccessibility for the most significant part of the year, was a no-priority matter for great powers. However, the rising potential for easier access to Arctic untapped natural resources along with the opportunities to develop shipping routes in the Nordic waters are attracting major powers’ attention. It is estimated that the Arctic Ocean may experience ice-free summers before 2050 (ESA, 2020), making the CAO a precious resource for fisheries. In 2018 Canada, Norway, Russia, the United States, Iceland, China, Japan, South Korea, Denmark and the EU signed the Agreement to prevent unregulated fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO Agreement). More recently the Treaty on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ Treaty) has been adopted at the UN level. It provides holistic management measures for ocean life, to conduct environmental assessments and to establish marine protected areas on the high seas. While I acknowledge the relevance of such a Treaty in establishing a global governance approach to tackle global challenges and manage marine areas beyond national jurisdictions, the articles analyzed in this paper were published before the BBNJ Treaty’s adoption and therefore much of the discussion has a speculative nature.

Within this framework, China has worked to enhance its position within Arctic governance, and its proactivity has generated many different reactions from Western and Arctic countries. A good amount of the literature published in English language shares scepticism over China’s interest and activities in the Arctic, however most-recently published reports show how speculative rhetoric does not match reality on the ground. Here, I draw attention to the debate within Chinese academia. Among Chinese scholars, what has prevailed is the discourse of the "common good" (Brady, 2017: 33-34). Recently Kossa (2020) has noticed how, besides the traditional actors, the policy decision-making process has to some extent valued non-traditional actors, such as China's large state-owned enterprises, subnational governments and research institutions. The article aims at enlarging the debate about China’s Arctic engagement also on a domestic level in order to shed light on non-traditional Arctic actors to influence the decisions-making process and to provide insights about China’s posture in the future.

In the first part I illustrate the research question, methodology and data. The second section offers an overview of perspectives on China’s engagement in the Arctic, starting from China’s threat theory to the recent reconsideration of China’s massive presence in the region. In the third section, I first frame themes and categories I have derived from the articles analysed, and then discuss the emerging topics. The six categories that I have conceptualised are: participation in international agreements; geopolitical dimension; endorsement of Chinese leadership concepts; Arctic governance; economic opportunities and environmental dimension. In the discussion session I have grouped some of the categories because of the horizontality of discussed themes. As one of them, governance-related themes are widespread as “institutional complexity that marks polar governance follows inevitably from the enmeshment of change in polar regions in wider and often global environmental, economic, political, and legal processes” (Stokke, 2022: 251). Specifically, I have grouped participation in international agreements with Arctic governance and endorsement of Chinese leadership concepts with economic opportunities. The geopolitical and environmental dimensions are discussed independently.

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1.2 Research Questions RQ1: How do Chinese scholars frame the Central Arctic Ocean?

RQ2: How is Chinese academic debate focused on the CAO different from the one in the English language?

1.3 Data and Method In this article, I employ qualitative content analysis on journal articles extracted from the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), one of the leading academic source databases.

Alexeeva and Lasserre (2012) stated how on Arctic issues, priority was given to the natural science field. This paper aims to expand knowledge on political and international relations issues related to the CAO as a source of security, political and economic matters.

Empirical data consist of 36 Chinese language-based journal articles selected from two main disciplines: Chinese and International Politics and International Law in 2014-2021. First, I used the keyword "Central Arctic Ocean" as the primary filter. Due to the limited number of articles, I enlarged the research to the "Arctic Ocean", including articles that cover matters related to areas under national jurisdiction. Such a decision helped me work on a more consistent dataset and better correlate the academic debate with official China's Arctic policy, which looks at the Arctic as a mixture of areas under and beyond national jurisdiction. I selected this timeframe because it falls in the period between the acceptance of China as a permanent observer in the Arctic Council and before the breakout of the war in Ukraine, which profoundly changed the political assets in the Arctic, prioritizing traditional security in the academic discussion.

In the content analysis, meaning units and themes consist of inductive and deductive open coding that helped me mix previous research with new and most recent insights and enabled me to individualize an evolutionary trajectory of patterns and trends along the suggested timeframe. I have endorsed a bottom-up process in building categories starting from meaning units, framing them into main themes and grouping themes into categories (Appendix 1-2). Therefore each category includes themes that emerged from the grouping meaning units. The final discussion reflects the interconnectivity between scientific knowledge, Arctic governance and geopolitical and commercial issues.

2. Perspectives on China’s Arctic Engagement Throughout the centuries the Arctic Ocean has been an important destination for explorers, and by the end of the 19th Century the North polar region was extensively explored (World Ocean Review, 2019). However, until the Second World War, the CAO was not considered a priority to any state agenda, as it was perceived mostly as a frozen zone and potentially lifeless (Sorlin, 2018).

In the Cold War period, the Arctic region was a place of substantial military deployment by the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1958 the UN Convention on the Continental Shelf, paired with UNCLOS (1982), provided the legal framework to administrate seabed, living and non-living resources and the water column.

The thawing of the North polar ice cap has come to be a game-changer.

The new perception of the CAO as an essential living environment and the lack of scientific data, led Arctic and non-Arctic states to sign an agreement to prevent unregulated fishery in 2018 (Dodds, 2019). While Balton (2021) underlines how important it is for the states to learn more Volpe

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about the ecosystem and the obligation to create a Joint Program of Scientific Research and Monitoring for the CAO, Liu (2021) stresses that even though China's delegation presence was "under-the-radar", it marked the first time that China to sat equally with the Arctic states in the negotiation process.

As a non-Arctic state, science has offered China space for engagement in Arctic governance.

However, when looking at China's Arctic engagement, the perception of China is deeply influenced

by China's threat theory which considers China as seeking a level of hegemonic power that menaces US leadership in the Asia-Pacific region as well as globally (Broomfield, 2003). From a realist perspective, China's soft power strategy has been shadowed by a step-by-step military build-up specifically designed to improve Chinese capabilities in the Northern Sea Route (Robinson, 2013).

In the last US Arctic Strategy (The White House, 2022), concerns about China are focused on the increased investments, expanded scientific activities and the use of scientific engagements to conduct dual-use research with intelligence or military applications in the Arctic.

Many academics circumscribe the whole discourse from a geoeconomic perspective. Jakobson (2019) underlines how China's economy depends on foreign trade, and the shortage of the North East Passage might have substantial commercial implications. Lanteigne (2020) expands the interest in accessing fossil fuels and raw materials to not be singled out in the economic development led by major powers and Arctic littoral states. Pursiainen et al. (2021) also identify that geoeconomics in China's foreign policy and fostering economic growth is directly linked to strengthening domestic stability.

Lackenbauer et al. (2022: 86) highlight how Arctic commentators define Chinese investment as a “trojan horse to secure access to the Arctic, which the People Republic of China can then exploit for its strategic purposes". The authors assess how China is not even a near-peer of the Arctic states and commentators have often overstated the scale of Chinese investments in the region. A perception that two recently published reports have questioned. Pezard et al. (2022) and Stünkel (2022) share the idea about the limitation of massive Chinese presence due to the prudence shown by governments and sub-national actors in welcoming Chinese investments, as well as solid factors of resilience, geopolitical pressure and local pushbacks. An exhaustive study on Arctic policies shows how out of all the Arctic policies released by non-Arctic states, China’s has been the most discussed. China’s policy contains a strong commitment to maintaining peace and stability and endorses environmental protection. The study concludes that comparing the analysis and de facto priorities, China’s main goals for the Arctic include governance, international and global cooperation and sustainable development (Heininen et al., 2020).

Much of the skepticism related to China’s Arctic engagement is also related to the renewed cooperation with Russia in the Arctic, which is mainly built on energy-related agreements. Despite a considerable increase in imports coming from the Yamal LNG shipped through the Northern Sea Route, which enabled China to become the world largest importer of LNG surpassing Japan (Humpert, 2023), many scholars share doubts about the solidity of such a relationship. MacDonald (2021) advocates for Western countries to refrain from adopting strategies based on the assumption of a deep-aligned Sino-Russia axis and to treat China and Russia as distinct regional challenges that require specific policies. In the light of China’s role as a Russia’s strategic partner, Kobzeva and Todorov (2023: 7) clarify that within the current Arctic regime complex, China does not have an opportunity to make critical changes as it has already obtained legitimate status that allows

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participation in regional rulemaking, however “promising fields for China’s rulemaking for the Arctic are management of the shipping and fishing in high seas areas”.

3. Categories and themes that emerged from the Chinese academic discussion about the CAO In this section, I conceptualise and analyse categories and themes that emerged from the academic debate. The tables help to catch the discussion’s evolution over the years, which will be discussed in the next section.

Categories: 1 - Participation in international agreements: It refers to negotiations of recently-signed international agreements relevant to the Arctic region, such as the BBNJ Treaty and the CAO Agreement.

2 - Geopolitical dimension: It includes reference to security, national interests, military activities related to the CAO. 3 - Endorsement of Chinese leadership concepts: It complies with concepts and projects created, implemented and outspoken by the Chinese leadership in the public debate.

4 - Arctic governance: It relates to Arctic-relevant treaties, agreements and international platforms.

5 - Economic opportunities: It includes commercial and economic opportunities related to the maritime, energy and transportation sectors.

6 - Environmental dimension: It looks at protection and conservation of the natural Arctic environment.

2021

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Chinese and 2 Int. Politics

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Internationa 1 l Law

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Figure 1. Articles extracted and analyzed from the CNKI

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Figure 2. Categories and percentage of theme-related mentions in the Chinese academic discourse about the CAO. Source: Author

3. 1 Participation in international agreements Themes and mentions Themes

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US leading role in negotiating int. agreements

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China needs to have a more active role and strengthen Scientific research A5+5 mechanism as a good example of shared governance

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Source: Author Gui Jing (2021) argues that the combination of the CAO Agreement and the BBNJ Treaty will shape the future international legal order for Arctic high seas fisheries. While the BBNJ Treaty was still in the negotiation process, he acknowledges its potential to put an end to the "fragmented" 碎 片化 (suipianhua) management of the high seas and to "not undermine the existing regime" 不损 害现有机制 (bu sunhai xianyou jizhi) (Gui Jing, 2021: 75). He states that China's active involvement in negotiating both agreements represents a good point to increase engagement and negotiation practices further. Tang Yao (2020) underlines how China is a newcomer to the international law system and how the final CAO Agreement resulted from the interaction and interpretation of various actors within different platforms. Even though China joined almost all High Seas Triggering Arctic Security?

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the relevant scientific meetings, he individualises a two-fold issue: the gap between China and other states' willingness and ability to conclude the Agreement as the US emerged as a leading party; and China's failure to use the relevant international regimes, mechanisms and organisations, such as the AC and the Food Agricultural Organization (FAO). Meng Linghao (2019) is more sceptical about the potential of the CAO Agreement. He individualises gaps in the participant issues, non-party compliance issues, the sunset clause of the Agreement, and the transnational approach. He recommends China to have a more active role when negotiating the content of conservation and management measures concerning the parties' fisheries to safeguard future interests in the region.

When discussing the management of the CAO, Bai Jiayu and Li Zhuang (2017) advance the concept of shared governance. They acknowledged the cooperation progress in managing high seas fishery resources in the CAO, recognising the US initiative since 2010 to set up meetings among the Arctic five senior officials and scientists. While the US advocated for a legally binding agreement, participants advanced different needs related to the economic structure and interests.

China valued the precautionary approach as it does not mean a blanket ban and is not the same as closing fishing grounds. Their recommendations for China are to enhance international cooperation, actively participate in scientific research in marine biological resources, give a full play to its role in the AC and to uphold participation in the management of high seas fishery resources.

The need to strengthen scientific research on biological resources in the CAO can enable China to advance more specific conservation and management measures, as the extent of scientific research capacity will determine the country's voice in Arctic governance (Tang Jianye, 2016).

Bai Jiayu and Sui Jiaxin (2018) analysed the progress of the delimitation of the continental shelves and underlined how negotiation is the primary force for maritime delimitation. Authors underline how China can actively participate in global issues and put forward recommendations to improve its potential negotiation regarding sovereignty established by international law and to prevent Arctic states from arbitrarily extending the limits of the continental shelf. The US has led the discussion for the CAO Agreement and the Joint Statement, which led to the creation of A5+5 mechanism2, a landmark event in high seas fisheries governance and the first step for a broader international agreement. The Joint Statement creates room for negotiations and opportunities to cooperate open to non-Arctic countries (Zhao Ningning and Wu Leizhao, 2016, Pan Min and Xu Liling, 2016).

Zhao Long (2020) values the A5+5 mechanisms as a critical paradigmatic innovation for China to participate in Arctic governance since it allowed it to reach an intraregional consensus between the Arctic five and the other five non-Arctic littoral entities. The author not only acknowledges the leading role of the US in drafting the Agreement but also underlines that its negotiation took place outside the paradigm of the AC. 3.2 Geopolitical Dimension Themes and mentions Themes Militarization

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Source: Author When discussing the near-Arctic states concept advanced by China in its official policy, Li Zhenfu (2021) suggests the necessity to frame it on the regional scale of geo-security, with a level of analysis that perceives the Arctic as a region based on factors derived from the interconnectedness and interactivity of regional threats and threats that pertain to the military, ecological, environmental, energy, economic and trade spheres.

While the geo-security scale shows how the shift of the security dimensions from the military to the environment is also discussed among Chinese scholars, militarisation, framed in the traditional logic of deterrence, still represents a key driver of security. By expanding the concept of security to the environmental dimension and elaborating its relevance in the Arctic region can help in differentiating China's positioning in the Arctic and in the South China Sea, where China’s engagement is often discussed to sustain China's threat theory. Wang Lijiu and Xu Xiaotian (2019) underline how Russia's deployment of military is a deterrent for US-led Nato and a guarantee for the maintenance of geostrategic security. Li Jianfu (2019: 100-101) focuses on the "non-offensive" militarisation 非攻军事化 (feigong junshihua), stating that "military presence" does not create tension but "increases opportunities for comprehensive cooperation" 军事存在[…]能为建立全 面合作 (junshi cunzai[…]neng jianwei quanmian hezuo). The remilitarisation issue is strictly connected to the Ukraine crisis of 2014, which works as a boundary. While prior to the Ukraine crisis, the remilitarisation of the Arctic would have shaped an "all against all" 一切人反对一切人 (Yique ren fandui yiqie ren) scenario, after the Ukraine crisis, the focus of security was on the deteriorating relations with Russia. However, according to the author, none of the Arctic five believes that remilitarisation would have ever led to aggressiveness and expansion.

Li Anmin and Zhao Fulin (2017) discuss how militarisation is increasing and represents a threat to China's security. Russia focuses on military force as a necessary guarantee to pursue national interests; Canada's multilateral activities aimed at asserting its sovereignty will represent a threat to future shipping routes; Denmark repeatedly sent warships to assert its sovereignty on Hans Island disputed with Canada3, and Norway is also increasing its military presence. Overall the Arctic has become more hostile (Li Anmin and Zhao Fulin, 2017).

The right to continental shelf extension and access to natural resources emerges as content with high geopolitical relevance. Potential disputes arise from the many submissions claiming the extension of the continental shelf, which can make the work of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) more complicated and slower (Fang Yinxia and Yin Jie, 2020, Chen High Seas Triggering Arctic Security?

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Kunfeng et al. 2018). Fang Yinxia and Yin Jie (2020) built their analysis on the comparison with the claims in the South China Sea, explicitly referring to the cases of Vietnam and Malaysia presenting a submission to the CLCS to which China has strongly reacted, stating that it violates sovereignty rights in the area. The authors' recommendations then focus on the need to closely monitor further development to assist with future assessments violating China's rights. Bai Jiayu and Sui Jiaxin (2018) stress how bilateral negotiations have been prioritised when addressing disputes. However, they underline how national interest is the driving force when considering fisheries resources and exploiting natural resources. Moreover, the CLCS's power is limited to the approval or rejection of submissions; it is not an arbitrary body and does not have the power to mediate disputes between states (Li Xuejie et al. 2014).

Academics also focused on how the changes happening in the CAO are relevant to other stakeholders and their Arctic strategies. Wang Qian (2018) states that the shrinking of the ice of the Arctic Ocean produces benefits and weaknesses for Russia's sea power. Reduced ice might ease operation along the Northern Sea Route and communications between the Eastern and Western fleets, consistently enhancing Russia's maritime power. Conversely, it makes detection from the enemy easier, reducing the underwater nuclear deterrence capability. Moreover, Northern territories are more exposed to the threat of superior maritime power of strategic rivals. The strategic relevance of the Arctic waters for Russia is twofold: on one side, the Arctic is the base for future national transport arteries, and its waters are a permanent strategic barrier. From the 21 Century, competition between Arctic States has increased and Russia has demonstrated its value through military exercises. In its 2014 Strategy for Development and National Security of the Russian Arctic Region until 2020, the control over the NSR is pivotal and the acquisition of the continental shelf is not only framed under national development but enlarged to strengthen its geopolitical influence in the region (Lu Junyuan, 2015).

The Arctic occupies a strategic position in terms of military and national security for Arctic and non-Arctic states. As major players in the Arctic, Russia and the US retain military presence as a tool to gain power and leadership and increase chances to enhance national security. China's General National Security Law deals with traditional and non-traditional security challenges: the Arctic falls into the "New Strategic areas" for national interest, which should be preserved (He Jian and Liu Lei, 2015). The development of the Arctic might represent problems for China's national security as the domination of the Arctic sea routes will become a geopolitical target, especially in those countries that compete for hegemony (Lu Junyuan, 2014).

Zhao Long (2018) analysed Russia from a cooperative perspective. He investigates features related to the joint building of the Polar Silk Road with Russia. The author recognises that at a geopolitical level, what happens in the Arctic has an impact not only on a regional level but also on the international order. Constraints of such a collaboration derive from the problematic normalisation of US-Russian relations and claims that go over the national jurisdiction (e.g. extensions of the continental shelf). According to the author, China should avoid any sovereignty-type dispute and keep endorsing Arctic governance and promoting cooperation.

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3.3 Endorsement of Chinese leadership concepts Themes and mentions Themes

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The concept of a "community of common destiny" was first mentioned by former Chinese Communist Party's General Secretary Hu Jintao. Xi Jinping has slightly modified it into the concept of a "community of a shared future" (人类命运共同本, renlei mingyun gongtong ben) which is not only targeted to neighbouring countries but extended at a global level (Jin, 2013).

Jiang Xiumin and Chen Jian (2019) envision the concept of a community of destiny as the final and ideal destination of the community of interests, where parties share trust and consensus on each other's future and destiny. The integration of Eurasian economies through the blue economic corridors (BEC)4 will allow the building of a community of human destiny and, through maritime partnerships, will share mutual benefits and jointly overcome difficulties. Li Jianfu (2019) conceptualises the concept of the common interest of humankind by universalising the beneficial effects of Arctic development. Despite some trigger points, he argues that the current legal and institutional framework makes more room for collaboration rather than confrontation. As a common property of humankind, the Arctic development should be open to any country interested. Wu Junsong (2020: 26) extends the concept of common destiny to maritime destiny.

He proposes China as the "initiator" 发起人 (faqiren) of the Arctic Ocean Blue Economic Passage (AOBEP) project. Although the project is still in its creative phase, the concept of a common maritime destiny allows all parties to share benefits. The author calls China to adopt a series of measures to promote development and accelerate bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Arctic Ocean coastal states. Meng Linghao (2019: 84) stresses how to realise the concept of building a community of human maritime destiny 构建人类海洋命运共同体 (goujian renlei haiyang mingyun gontongti) China should closely monitor further steps related to the joint scientific research and monitoring programme within the CAO agreement. He Jian and Liu Lei (2015) perceive the integration of the three Arctic shipping lanes5 in the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road as a way to link the concept of community of destiny with the concept of common security, which is key for China as well as for Russia, US and Canada.

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Li Zhenfu (2021) endorses the concept of a community of human destiny in the context of avoiding military conflicts in the Arctic as he perceives militarisation as the greatest threat to Arctic geosecurity. Bai Jiayu and Sui Jiaxin (2018) suggest that China should use either its status as an Arctic stakeholder or act in line with the principle of community of human destiny to promptly avoid any arbitrary process on the definition of limits of the continental shelf by Arctic coastal states. The integration of the Polar Silk Road into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can positively impact the future development of regional cooperation mechanisms as it might build a cooperative cobrokering and sharing-based system of common interests (Xia Liping and Xie Xie, 2018). Before the Polar Silk Road was formally announced, the Arctic shipping lanes and the BRI were already envisioned as a common ground for China and Russia to build an Arctic shipping community (Lili Fan, 2015).

Zhao Ningning and Wu Leizhao (2016) advocate for China to take the initiative for peaceful cooperation and a multi-win solution for the sake of humanity. Wang Meili and Wu Junsong (2019: 50) advocate for a stakeholder participation model for managing and governing high seas fisheries in the CAO, as the CAO's resources belong to humankind's common heritage. The authors recognise it might represent an external threat to governance and management traditionally led by the Arctic five or the Arctic eight and suggest that China should work on building a sharing and joint construction of the Arctic community of shared future "共商、共建、共享以及共筑北极 命运共同体" 的先进理念 (gongshang, gongjian, gongxiang, yiji gong zhu beiji mingyun gongtongti de xianjin linian).

In managing the fisheries resources of the CAO from an international law perspective, China acknowledges the critical role of coastal states. However, cooperation between the Arctic five and the distant-water fishing nations is necessary for a win-win situation and the prerequisite to build a "harmonious Arctic" 和谐北极 (hexie beiji) (Zou Leilei and Huang Shou-Lin 2016: 11).

Common governance arrangement for managing fisheries in the high seas in the Arctic is linked to the status of the Arctic Ocean, which is a global common rather than a semi-enclosed sea. Such a multilevel arrangement enhances the possibility of creating win-win solutions (Bai Jiayu and Li Zhuang, 2017, Xu Hong, 2017).

3.4 Arctic Governance Themes and mentions Themes Asian Cluster

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The CAO from the periphery of global affairs, is now at the centre of the global agenda because it is the source of the global greenhouse production with knock-on effects on the ecosystem and a future prospect for natural resource exploitation (Lu Hao, 2019: 10). The author analyses Japan's Arctic policy and defines China, Japan and South Korea as 'near Arctic Ocean countries" 进北冰 洋国家 (Jin beibingyang guojia) that are geographically close to the region and have geo-economic and political interests. China's relevance within Japan's Arctic strategy lies on the increased investments that Beijing has set up for the Arctic shipping routes and the enhanced possibilities to exploit natural resources. Many academics have discussed similarities and shared interests among Asian countries: Zhao Long (2020) discusses how the AC limits Asian countries and how alternative platforms have become a relevant place to discuss Arctic issues; Jiang Xiumin and Chen Jian (2019) suggest China to enhance relations with Asian partners to build consensus over the economic opportunities linked to economy corridors; Xu Hong (2017) values the "minimultilateral" mechanism of high-level dialogue on Arctic with Japan and South Korea aiming at coordinating, exchange policies and activities on international cooperation; Xiao Yang (2015) frames common situation for Asian observers countries which look at the Arctic as an internationalized Arctic.

Most of the discussion of Chinese academics focuses on the role of the AC and China's observer status. Xia Liping and Xie Xie (2018) value the AC as a key platform in the Arctic regional cooperation mechanism and in the role it can play in the realization of the Polar Silk Road in terms of guaranteeing and promoting its construction, guaranteeing Arctic navigation, providing the legal basis for the development of oil and gas resources and facilities related to scientific cooperation.

The existing rule-based Arctic governance made up of UNCLOS, the Svalbard Treaty and the AC functions well and sufficiently ensures China's rights to freely travel in the Arctic Ocean (Xu Hong, 2017; He Jian and Liu Lei, 2015; Li Xuejie et al. 2014). However, a centrifugal tendency of Arctic observers to voice their rights through other platforms exists. China should consider interaction with other AC observer states and other stakeholders such as the UK and France (Xu Hong, 2017).

Bai Juayu and Sui Jiaxin (2018) individualize bilateral negotiations as the main guiding force for solving state disputes. Zhao Long (2020) underlines how observers are limited in their decisionmaking power in the AC. Li Anmin and Zhao Fulin (2017: 38) define the "observer" status as not only awkward, but weak 所谓的 "观察员" 在北极理事会中不仅地位尴尬而且话语苍白无力 (suowei de guanchayuan zai beiji lishi hui zhing bujin diwei ganga erqie huayu cangbai wuli). They then compare the AC to the Monroe Doctrine, as the Arctic belongs to the Arctic states, and China will never have the same decision-making power. Xiao Yang (2015) also mentions the Monroe Doctrine regarding mutual opportunities between China and Canada. Strengthening such a relationship might help Canada in lessening dependence on the US, for China could be vital to have a broader reach in the AC. Limitations for China are also extended to the system of claim for extension of continental shelf, making it difficult to be integrated into the international mechanism of the Arctic route (Li Anmin and Zhao Fulin, 2017). However, Jie Yin et al. (2020) underline how Art. 238 of UNCLOS secures all the countries to conduct marine scientific research and the CLCS should prevent the arbitrary expansion of the continental shelf.

Many academics pay attention to the governance and management of the high seas fisheries. The current cooperative mechanism for high sea fisheries governance in the Arctic Ocean is High Seas Triggering Arctic Security?

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fragmented, with global treaties based on voluntary participation and bilateral and multilateral agreements limited to specific areas. This inadequate governance might lead to the tragedy of the commons (Bai Jiayu and Li Zhuang, 2017). The necessity for a regional management system for Arctic fishery management and specific governance related to the management of the CAO (Zou Leilei et al., 2015) is compared with the efficiency of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in making a pan-Arctic shipping regulation which has facilitated a unified Arctic management system, and with the Polar Code as the key to the sustainability of fishery (Zou Leilei and Fu Yu, 2017). The negotiation of the CAO Agreement intervenes as a key point of discussion.

The Arctic five claim a leadership position in the management of high seas fisheries in the CAO (Zou Leilei and Huang Shuo-Lin, 2016, Li Fangfang, 2016, Zou Leilei et al. 2015). Tang Jianye (2016) agrees with the unique position of dominance the Arctic five have had in preventing unregulated fishing in the CAO. He focuses on the interim measure to deter possible unregulated fishing activities in the CAO and underlines that it cannot have a legally binding effect on third parties and it is inconsistent with UNCLOS. On the same line, Zou Leilei et al. (2015), refer to the principle of equity expressed in paragraph 3 of Art. 119 of UNCLOS which suggests that even if the Arctic five enjoy specific rights in the management of the CAO fishery, it does not mean that management of the high sea fisheries should be exclusively under their authority. The discrepancy of national strategies of Arctic countries was an impediment to the final CAO Agreement (Wang Meili and Wu Junsong, 2019, and Zou Leilei et al., 2015). For example, Nordic countries attached much importance to developing the potential of high sea fisheries. The authors advocate a stakeholder participation model whose legal basis is provided by UNCLOS, the Fish Stocks Agreement and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishery (FAO) (Wang Meili and Wu Junsong, 2019). Pan Min and Xu Liling (2016) explore and value the potential of cooperation between the US and China through the AC to establish solid ground for cooperation. However, they underline the need for more space for opportunities for observer states to participate and they acknowledge the creation of the A5+5 mechanism as a basis for China to better cooperate in the management and governance of high seas fisheries in the CAO. Limitations of international law are also related to the difficulty of understanding the legal status of Arctic shipping lanes (Lili Fan, 2015 and Chen Kunfeng et al., 2018).

3. 5 Economic Opportunities Themes and mentions Themes Development of the Polar Silk Road Northern Sea Route Navigate Central Arctic Passage Utilization of the North West Passage

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The core of the academic discussion about economic opportunities is centred on utilising Arctic shipping routes. They will offer a precious opportunity for China to lessen its dependence on importing oil from the Middle East and reduce the strategic vulnerability of the Malacca Strait (He Jian and Liu Lei, 2015). Li Anmin and Zhao Fulin (2017) identify the Northern West Passage (NWP) and the North East Passage and they discuss the Central Arctic Passage, that stretches from the Bering Strait directly to the Norwegian or Greenlandic Seas, as the shortest way between the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic.

Xiao Yang (2015) underlines the commercial opportunities in the framework of Sino-Canada cooperation and looks at the Arctic route as a new channel for international trade. The value of the NWP relies on its suitability for container shipping, even though it is not the shortest way. The opening of the Arctic route will change China's reliance on energy imports from unstable ports around the world and alleviate the security dilemma linked to the Malacca Strait.

The development of the Arctic shipping lanes makes the Arctic a geo-economic frontier for China's interest related to the expansion of foreign trade, facilitating East Coast regional economic development and diversifying ocean transportation routes. Due to its location, the Central Passage will be even more important for China (Lu Junyuan, 2014). Chen Kunfeng et al. (2018) highlight how the control of shipping lanes is a matter of high economic value and highlight the advantage of crossing through international waters in the Central Arctic passage rather than through the NSR, where Russia requires foreign vessels to comply with Russian domestic law.

The Arctic shipping lane represents a key point for Russian development strategy. Despite limitations related to jurisdictions, safety, lack of infrastructure and the harsh environment, the Arctic shipping lane represents an excellent opportunity for China in terms of expanding maritime trade and helping in financing needed infrastructure (Lili Fan, 2015) and for increasing polar tourism (Xiao Yang, 2014).

Russia's interest in opening the NSR is a matter of national strategy, and it collides with China's interest in offering mutual support in Arctic scientific research and opening operations along the NSR (Wang Lijiu and Xu Xiaotian, 2019). The shrinking of the ice cap offers Russia economicrelated advantages: development of the NSR; the shift of the Eurasian trade; increasing Russian population benefiting from the sea, and the ease of the harsh climate that so far has impeded the exploitation of natural resources (Wang Qian, 2018). China is envisioned as the leading partner for Russia in the Arctic for the possibility to develop the blue economy by linking the Polar Silk Road with the NSR to reconfigure the Eurasian transport pattern (Zhao Long, 2018). China's increased attention on its maritime strategy focuses on developing blue economic corridors and the one through the Arctic matches with Russia's willingness to develop the NSR (Jiang Xumin and Chen Jian, 2019).

Li Jianfu (2019: 97) shares some scepticism about the Arctic being fully navigable because of the extreme weather conditions, polar nights and lacking infrastructure. However, cooperation is emphasised over confrontation for facilitating the "gold rush" 但开发北极资源的 "淘金热" 则 重点强调合作而不是对抗与竞争 (Dan kaifa beiji ziyuan de "taojin re" ze zhnogdian qiangdiao hezuo er bu shi duikang yu jingzhen).

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Xia Liping and Xie Xie (2018) highlight how future commercial opportunities in the CAO will be incorporated into the Polar Silk Road and require China to develop large ice-class fishery vessels to conduct exploratory fisheries and cooperate with other countries to collect scientific data.

3. 6 Environmental Dimension Themes and mentions Themes

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Zhao Long (2018) stresses how the natural ecosystem in the Arctic is closely linked to the function of China’s and to the security of agricultural production. Li Anmin and Zhao Fulin (2017) state that China should study the role of the Arctic region in global climate since the Arctic is an important region for the exchange of atmospheric and oceanic material energy and an amplifier of global climate change. Lu Junyuan (2014) notices how the natural and social environment in the Arctic regime is undergoing profound changes. He individualizes three main strategic implications for China: the development of Arctic sea routes will change the world of oceanic transportation providing China with new economic opportunities for foreign trade and regional development; new economic opportunities will come also from exploitation of natural resources; the Arctic becoming a geostrategic region. Wang Meili and Wu Junsong (2019) agree in considering the role of the Arctic region in influencing the global climate, marine safety and marine biodiversity.

Foreseeing competition in fishing and its potential damage to the marine ecological environment and global biodiversity, the authors value the interdependence of development and management from the natural perspective, a reason why all countries should pay attention to the environment protection of the CAO. Narrowing down the discussion to the environment in the CAO, three main perspectives emerge: the urgency for China’s improvement of scientific research, the need to be part of the CAO’s management and governance system and how its management meets national interests.

Meng Linghao (2019) highlights China’s less attention to Arctic scientific research compared to the Antarctic and values the joint research programme in the management of the CAO as a way to further grasp the status of ecological environment in the Arctic region. Gui Jing (2021) focuses on conservation and sustainable use of biological resources and biodiversity understood through international legislation and specific management tools. He encourages China to give a full play of

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scientific research as the establishment of marine protected areas and the process of the agreement itself is strongly based on the best scientific knowledge.

Many other scholars deepen the discussion about the existing link between scientific knowledge and participation in management and governance of the CAO. Bai Jiayu and Zhuang Li (2017) analyse the shared governance of the high sea fisheries when CAO Agreement was under negotiation and underline how during the formation stage of management tools, China needed to increase efforts and expand the scope of scientific research on the Arctic Ocean environment, improving existing model of scientific enquiries. Xu Hong (2017) stresses how China is involved in global climate mechanisms such as environmental protection conventions and it shares the principle of “scientific conservation and rational utilization” of CAO fishery resources. He then encourages multi-stakeholder participation in the Arctic cooperation and pushes China to actively participate in fields of environmental protection. Li Zhenfu (2021) agrees on the potential damage that Arctic warming will bring to global ecological security and only by incorporating non-Arctic states into Arctic governance mechanisms can lead to effective solutions. Some authors underline how the management of the CAO represents a direct matter of national interest. Tang Yao (2020) calls for China’s close attention to the management of CAO as a matter of national interests. Much of the discussion looks at Arctic shipping routes. Xia Liping and Xie Xie (2018) suggest that China should participate in the rule-making of the Arctic regional cooperation mechanism to safeguard its national interests which include the realization of the Polar Silk Road and oil and gas exploitation. According to them, China should comply with conventions for ships sailing in the Arctic waters and play an active role in shaping environmental protection in the governance and development of Arctic hydrocarbon resources through soft law. Jian He and Lei Liu (2015) envision the scenario of the Arctic Ocean becoming a busy waterway that will cause environmental degradation. While they value the role that IMO plays in international maritime safety and in marine environmental protection, they conclude that China needs to mobilize military and logistic support to adapt the natural environment of the Arctic Ocean to make full use of the NSR. Some authors speak about the environmental dimension in terms of the opportunity that the blue economic corridors give to cooperation in marine protection. While Zhao Long (2018) values marine cooperation, Jiang Xiumin and Chen Jian (2019) label the environmental dimension under the development of the blue economic corridor as a “strategic value”. Wu Junsong (2020) perceives environmental protection under the realm of interdependent issues rather than domestic or international issues which call for every country to be responsible for maintaining protection of marine environment and how China can actively promote environmental protection through the implementation of the Arctic blue economic corridor. Lu Hao (2019), who focuses on Japan’s Arctic strategy, also looks at the environment of the Arctic Ocean as a strategic value for its enormous potential in terms of resources and energy.

Some authors focus on the environmental protection of other Arctic states’ strategies. Wang Lijiu and Xu Xiaotan (2019) highlight Russia's active participation in the AC in the adoption of important cooperation documents (e.g. the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement in 2011). The authors identify the role that Russia has had in providing fruitful results in the field of climate change, resource investigation and exploitation and the potential for scientific cooperation with China in the Arctic and Antarctic. Li Jianfu (2019) stresses how the Arctic legal framework provides plenty of room for cooperation in the protection of marine environment and underlines how

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Russia agreed to solve international issues and maintain close cooperation with Western countries also after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2014. From a different perspective, Lu Junyuan (2015) considers environmental requirements along with the world energy market, technical expertise and risks, one of the constraints that the development of oil and gas has to face. Xiao Yang (2015) highlights how environmental protection is highly addressed in the Canadian Arctic strategy, especially in the light of the shipping lanes’ development and its potential to environmental degradation. Canada has promoted environmental cooperation with neighbors and considers the AC the main permanent and multi-disciplinary body where they develop environmental protection strategies. According to the author, obtaining Canada’s support will enable China to have its voice heard in the AC and increase the chance to give a full play in its economic, scientific and technological sectors as both countries share common interests in scientific research and marine environmental management. The AC is also perceived by Pan Min and Xu Lilin (2016) to be the platform to further develop China and US cooperation on environmental protection.

Ma Yingjie and Ji Lei (2021) offer a deep analysis of China’s environmental rights in the Arctic.

The authors share the opinion of Arctic marine environment being a matter of global security and agree about Arctic environmental issues to be addressed jointly, both inside and outside the region as China is also vulnerable to the Arctic ecosystem. However, they underline how obligatory and non-obligatory provisions related to the marine environment do not provide extra-territorial countries, such as China, with interest and rights in relation to the environmental condition of the Arctic Ocean, but only with the legal basis for international organizations and extra-territorial countries to urge Arctic Ocean coastal countries to fulfil their obligations to the disclosure of the marine environment. The authors identify some obstacles that affect the realization of China’s environmental rights in the Arctic Ocean: the insufficient theoretical research on Arctic environmental rights and the lack of a strong support of national science and technology. Moreover the authors underline the lack of a favorable identity for participation in Arctic environmental affairs, a matter that was already discussed by Ningning Zhao and Wu Leizhao (2016). The authors then conclude that knowledge of environmental conditions depends on cooperation with Arctic countries. China should build a “Arctic environment community” and build consensus on the value of environmental governance.

4. Discussion 4.1 Participation in International Agreements & Arctic Governance The discussion among Chinese academics mainly focuses on the two most recently signed international documents about the Central Arctic Ocean: the CAO Agreement and the BBNJ Treaty. In the debate, the intersection of science and governance clearly emerged. While the recent adoption of the BBNJ Treaty still impedes catching reactions and perspectives of its adoption, it is fair to say that the negotiation phases of the CAO Agreement often collide with Chinese scholars' critical stance about China’s role in Arctic governance. Many scholars agree on the US leadership negotiating process and a strong willingness in its implementation, proven by the adoption of domestic measures oriented toward banning illegal fishing. While in the first years of negotiation emerged a heavy critique towards the leadership position of the Arctic five, the creation of the A5+5 mechanism was perceived by many scholars as an innovative paradigm and an example of a shared governance system that might enhance China's position. What is important to note is that the CAO Agreement was not negotiated under the auspices of the AC, as it was for the adoption Volpe

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of the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic in 2011, for the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic in 2013 and for the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation in 2017. Some can argue that it shows a weakening position of the AC as the main platform for discussion related to the Arctic environment. However, the creation of an alternative channel of discussion reinforces the idea of a global Arctic and it confirms the cooperative approach employed by Arctic states which is not anchored to the exclusivity concept, but it values the position and the interest of non-Arctic states. The role of the AC is widely discussed among Chinese academics. While UNCLOS’s stewardship safeguards rights in the Arctic region, opinions on the AC, widely recognized as the leading international platform to discuss Arctic issues, are only sometimes aligned. The hardest critics are related to the observer status that would not give China sufficient space to have a decisive role, not even in the future. In order to enhance such a position, academics agree on the necessity for China to strengthen its scientific research capability and participation in the framework of international agreements or in the AC working groups.

4.2 Geopolitical Dimension Chinese domestic discourse takes a more militarised and securitised approach which accepts geopolitical and geoeconomic competition due to failed governance (Parsons, 2022). My analysis shows that security and military concerns are oriented towards cooperative diplomacy to stabilize the political and relational situation. Domestically, geopolitics and security are primarily interpreted through the traditional lens, prioritizing military deployments and capabilities as regulatory elements of states’ relations. Militarisation and deterrence are framed as stabilizing tools, and military deployments are justified as necessary for civil purposes in harsh conditions. Room for shifting the security concept from the military to the environmental dimension is mainly proposed as advice to the political class to improve China's position in the Arctic governance and sustain China’s self-definition as a near-Arctic state. By framing China’s Arctic interest in relation to the geo-security dimension helps in expanding the security concept from military to environment, energy and economics, clarifying also existing differences between China’s engagement in the Arctic and the South China Sea, lessening the threat perception.

Discussion on submission for the continental shelf extension emerges as a critical issue. While authors agree on its geopolitical relevance and the impact that many submissions may have on the work of the CLCS, academics’ recommendations are oriented to enhance China’s position about legit rights, act following international law, and avoid sovereignty-type disputes. Among Arctic stakeholders, Russia emerges as a key player. Here the CAO plays a double role: on one side, it influences Russia’s maritime sea power; on the other, it provides opportunities for opening commercial exchanges mainly between China and Russia. Chinese academics deeply analyzed how the NSR is a vital issue for Russian national strategy. However, while older articles show greater attention to security issues as it might pose challenges for China’s national security, most recent articles devote attention to economic opportunities that cooperation along the NSR might bring for Russia and China’s East Coast regional development. The trend of economic value the NSR development might signify for China emerges in the economic opportunities category, and it is accompanied by a gradual assimilation to the Polar Silk Road project and a decreasing attention to the North West Passage and the Central Arctic Route. This finds its explanation in the contextual difficulty in navigating the waters of the CAO and in the alignment of Sino-Russian interests in

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developing the NSR. It also comes from a more explicit China's strategy for the Arctic, which, besides the release of the official policy in 2018, has been strengthened by the strategic agreement Russia and China signed in February 2022, in which both sides agreed on intensifying practical cooperation for the sustainable development of the Arctic and on the development and use of the Arctic routes (Official Internet Resources of President of Russia, 2022).

4.3 Endorsement of Chinese Leadership Concepts & Economic Opportunities Two main concepts of Xi Jinping’s era emerged in the discussion among Chinese academics: the community of shared destiny 人类命运共同体 (renlei mingyun gonggongti) and the win-win solution. What Parsons (2022: 13) defines as the Political Convolution (“The country seeks to destabilize governance mechanisms enough to place itself within the realm of relevant actors[...] creating new form of institutional design”) is partly echoed by the endorsement of the concept of community of shared destiny which, on one side advocates for global governance mechanisms addressing universal challenges, and on the other, proposes China as the “initiator” or as the thruster of the economic benefits. The proposition of the community of a shared future is simultaneously developed under the governance and the economic sphere. The global perception of the Arctic pushes scholars to question the leadership position of Arctic states and to strongly advocate for alternative co-governance mechanisms which involve a broader number of stakeholders. The A5+5 mechanism under the CAO Agreement represents a replicable example of cooperation between Arctic coastal and non-Arctic states. As for the geopolitical dimension and militarisation, the endorsement of the community with a shared future looks at enhancing cooperative attitudes with a stabilizing role, which does not necessarily call for destabilizing governance mechanisms, but increases China’s space to manoeuvre through economic partnerships. The concept of a win-win solution has a double role of stabilizing the political environment and enhancing economic ties. The economic-shared benefits are based on the advantages that climate change-induced phenomena may generate in the region. Namely, the possibility to develop the Arctic blue economic corridor because of the gradual melting of the Arctic ice cap. The justification for creating such a project lies in the example provided by the Belt and Road Initiative as a China-led project aimed at creating standards, shared and mutual benefits and win-win situations. Most of the debate is based on the status of the CAO in international law as a global common, which gives equal rights to any country and impedes any sovereignty claim.

4.4 Environmental Dimension The environmental dimension occupies a relevant portion of the discussion in Chinese domestic discourse. One of the most discussed points is related to the repercussions that climate change in the Arctic has on a global-scale which induce all countries, including China, to advocate an improved role in the development and management of the CAO. However, how Ma Yingjie and Ji Lei (2021) state, obligatory and non-obligatory provisions related to the marine environment do not provide extra-territorial countries with interest and rights in relation to the environmental condition of the Arctic Ocean, but only with the legal basis to urge Arctic Ocean coastal countries to fulfil their obligations to the disclosure of the marine environment. Most of the debate among Chinese academics addresses the environmental dimension of the CAO as a strategic value and it is often linked to national interest that China could obtain by participating in its governance and management. Whether this pattern captures the existing link between scientific knowledge, participation to governance, and national interest, this leading perspective can be identified as an Volpe

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area of pertinence in the articles analysed, which are more related to politics and governance. There is not a lot of discussion around the value and the necessity to endorse the precautionary approach, which is the core concept adopted in the CAO Agreement and in the BBNJ Treaty, nor is there a lot of attention on how degradation of the natural environment can affect Indigenous peoples living in the Arctic. Looking at areas to be improved, academics agree on enhancing China’s scientific research and the necessity to establish a clearer environmental-related identity which might facilitate China’s position in discussing marine and Arctic natural environments. The first issue has been already addressed in the last Chinese Communist Party Congress Report which includes an entire section dedicated to science and technology (科技 – keji). In the Report, they are both labeled as a “primary productive force” for China’s transformation into a “modern socialist country“ (Xi, 2022). It is also stated that China: “will increase investment in science and technology through diverse channels[…] We will expand science and technology exchanges and cooperation with other countries, cultivate an internationalized environment for research, and create an open and globally-competitive innovation ecosystem” (Xi, 2022). With regards to identity, perhaps being signatory parties of international treaties might not be sufficient. An active role within the mechanisms and management tools of the BBNJ Treaty, such as management of marine genetic resources, area-based management tools and environmental impact assessments provides a good opportunity for China to act in that way.

Conclusion Chinese academic debate about the CAO offers a holistic picture of China's stance in the Arctic.

The overlaps and connections between themes and categories discussed show how it nicely captures the complexities of China's engagement that range from governance, security, environment, diplomatic and economic to scientific means.

Cooperation over confrontation is a mantra that emerges from the debate. While acknowledging opportunities in terms of commercial exchanges and energy supplies (especially with Russia) and their geopolitical relevance for lessening dependence on unstable channels, the "gold rush" and the "Arctic race" narrative seems not to be as present as in the first 2000's Western literature.

Critiques of China's official policy are not absent. However, the debate shows a distinct alignment with Chinese leadership thinking and policies. Many academics strongly endorse Xi Jinping's philosophical concept of a community with a shared destiny and the win-win strategy. If the first one is oriented to justifying the Arctic region as a global space, the latter one opens the field for economic ties which, in the last years, have resulted in bilateral agreements with Arctic states.

However, as Pezard et al. (2022) and Stünkel (2022) have highlighted, the threatening rhetoric about a profound Chinese penetration in the Arctic economy does not really match the reality.

Framing security under the traditional lens of power politics and military deployments on the ground and looking at it as a stabilising tool to endorse cooperative behaviour, shows how the debate privileges investigation of how to enhance China's role in Arctic governance rather than focusing on environmental-related threats. This aspect clashes with China's advocacy for enhancing global governance based on the universal approach to transnational effects of climate change and induces reflections in light of the recent signing of the BBNJ Treaty. This is also amplified by the repeated perception of the environmental dimension as a strategic value, along with the limited attention to the core principle of the precautionary approach and to the effect of climate change on Arctic Indigenous peoples.

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While critiques of the Arctic governance range from China's limited space when negotiating relevant international agreements to the weak position as an observer state in the AC, scientific knowledge, scientific cooperation and specific expertise are often valued as the key to improving China's stance in the Arctic governance.

Suggestions and advice often appearing in the final section of the articles analysed suggest how Chinese academics might shape a bottom-up process of China's Arctic policy-making. As an enhanced global governance instrument in an area of international interest, the BBNJ Treaty might require China to keep acting in line with international law and have a more active role and propositional attitude, especially in scientific research. Due to the interconnection between scientific knowledge and China's stance in Arctic governance, I strongly encourage research investigating the role of Chinese scientists engaged in international scientific agreements and joint projects, as well as Chinese academics' influence on the decision-making process. Further research is also encouraged as the recent wars in Ukraine and in the Middle East have not only compromised the realization of ongoing projects, but have also jeopardized the cooperative framework established in the last two decades.

Notes 1. One article is in both the disciplines.

2. The mechanism includes: the Arctic five coastal states with China, Japan, South Korea, the EU and Iceland.

3. The dispute on Hans Island’s sovereignty has been recently solved with an agreement between Canada, Denmark and Greenland in 2022.

4. The Vision for Maritime Cooperation Under the Belt and Road Initiative proposed blue economic corridors, consisting of three parts, including channels: (1) connecting ChinaPakistan, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and then continuing to the Mediterranean Sea and into the Atlantic and Africa; (2) linking China, the South Pacific and then Australia; (3) starting from China to the northwest of Russia’s northern coast, and then to the Nordic region and parts of Europe through the Arctic Ocean (Song and Fabinyi, 2022).

5. The North East Passage, the North West Passage and the Transpolar Route.

Acknowledgements The realization of this article was possible thanks to the funding provided by the EDUFI grant issued by the Finnish National Agency for Education and by the Joel Toivola Foundation.

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Appendix 1

Category

Category

Category

Participation to International Agreements

Geopolitical Dimension

Endorsement of Chinese leadership Concepts

↑

↑

↑

Themes

Themes

Themes

US Leading role in the negotiating international. Agreements

Militarization

Community of a shared future

China needs to have a more active role and strengthen Scientific research

Geopolitical relevance of Continental Shelf

Win-Win solutions

A5+5 mechanism as a good example of shared governance

Russia’s maritime power

Relation with BRI

Comparative discourse to the South China Sea

Shared Maritime destiny

↑

↑

↑

Meaning Units

Meaning Units

Meaning Units

CAO Agreement, BBNJ Agreement, negotiation process.

regional security, near-arctic state status, threat, militarization, South China Sea, remilitarization, national interest, Sea Power, Maritime strategy, deterrence, nuclear deployments, claim, sovereignty, claim on extension of continental shelf.

Community of destiny, Shared future of mankind, interest of mankind, OBOR, win-win strategy, Polar Silk Road, BRI.

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Appendix 2

Category

Category

Category

Arctic Governance

Economic Opportunities

Environmental dimension

↑

↑

↑

Themes

Themes

Themes

Asian Cluster

Development of the Polar Silk Road NSR

Space/Need for cooperation

Arctic governance ensures China’s

Navigate Central Arctic Passage

Global range of Arctic environmental changes

Fragmentation - Inadequate governance

Utilization of the NWP

Scientific Research

↑

↑

↑

Meaning Units

Meaning Units

Meaning Units

Non-Arctic states involvement in Arctic governance, Asian countries, fragmented governance, Arctic policies of Asian countries, Asian Cluster, A5+5 Mechanism, Ilulissat Declaration, Oslo Declaration, EEZ, Continental Shelf, CLCS, MPAs, bilateral negotiations, CAO Agreement, US leadership, leader status of A5, the exclusivity of A5, Fish Stocks Agreement, Code of Conduct of Responsible Fisheries.

Blue economic corridors, Arctic resources, gold rush, blue economy, exploitation, development, Polar Silk Road, Yamal LNG, fisheries.

Arctic Council, BBNJ Agreement, CAO Agreement, International Maritime Organization, global warming, changing climate, global environmental security, domestic environmental legislation, international environmental legislation.

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Commentary

Diplomatic Deadlock in the Arctic: Science as an entry point to renewed dialogue Paul Dziatkowiec

The ongoing geopolitical confrontation over Russia’s war in Ukraine led to the severing of constructive diplomatic communication on many issues of multilateral relevance. The Arctic, long considered a model of international collaboration, has not avoided the consequences; on a number of pressing topics, including security, science, and the environment, there is little cooperation remaining between the West and Russia. The lack of an adequate forum for addressing the urgent threats facing the Arctic led the Switzerland-based Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) to launch a discreet dialogue process (the ‘High North Talks’) to address some of these gaps. These talks convene experts from the states most invested in the Arctic, with a view to developing creative solutions and conveying them to decision-makers for consideration. One area of attention is scientific collaboration, which has largely ceased since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Regardless of the geopolitical fallout from the war, it is imperative that an accommodation be found to jointly address the most pressing of the Arctic’s challenges, which are long-term and global in nature, and in some cases irreversible if they are left unattended.

Introduction In the decades since the end of the Cold War, science has regularly been depicted as an entry point to dialogue aimed at alleviating political conflict or diplomatic tensions. Science is after all not politics; it is a universal good, a common language, and a shared value; moreover, it is grounded in widely-agreed fact rather than opinion, which means that - at least in theory - it is less prone to ideological influence.

Even during the Cold War, science diplomacy helped to maintain threads of communication across ideological divides, and provided the vehicle and substance for dialogue (see for example Davis & Patman (eds), 2015). Thanks to science diplomacy, despite geopolitical tensions the superpowers were able to find common ground and work together where they perceived a mutual interest or a shared threat. Convergence around the language of science may have helped them to avert an even greater rupture, and perhaps more dangerous escalations.

Paul Dziatkowiec is Director of Mediation and Peace Support at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and creator and facilitator of the High North Talks.

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Regrettably today’s geopolitical climate appears to be less amenable to constructive exchange and joint, pragmatic problem-solving. Russia’s brutal attack on Ukraine triggered an enormous counterreaction that has led to the severing of West-Russia communications on multifarious international issues and in various regions, including the High North.

As such, the Arctic is fast becoming a new theatre for great power politics. The recent sharpening of geopolitical tensions introduces new unknown variables into the international security landscape, and affects a broad gamut of issues on which West-Russia coordination was once taken for granted, including science. Without constructive communication - which has almost completely ceased - there are risks that misunderstandings, miscalculations, or simple neglect may lead to an environmental disaster or a dangerous new conflagration.

In the absence of an adequate forum for addressing the urgent threats facing the Arctic, in 2022 the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) launched a discreet dialogue process, the ‘High North Talks’, which has met regularly since. The Talks offer an informal platform for discussing in a neutral setting - the threats and challenges, potential solutions, and possible areas of renewed cooperation in the Arctic. Attendees include experts from states with a stake in the region - Arctic Council members (including Russia), as well as other actors like China, the EU, Japan and India.

In the context of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the High North Talks explore how Arctic affairs could be managed more effectively in spite of the geopolitical turbulence. The Talks constitute one of the few remaining venues where representatives from the countries most invested in the Arctic can meet, in a safe and discreet environment, to discuss the future of this region.

One of the most urgent topics is the need to restore some meaningful cooperation between the West and Russia, at least on the most pressing issues like climate change monitoring. While the rationale for the West’s response to Russian aggression in Ukraine is clear and understood, it is crucial that ways be found - perhaps through policies that allow for targeted coordination in ‘exceptional’ cases - to manage ongoing problems of global significance.

The case for resuming (the most urgent) scientific cooperation There are at least three compelling arguments as to why scientific cooperation in the Arctic should be resumed, with a view to averting an environmental disaster. These arguments are based on law, principle, and scientific fact.

A legal obligation The 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, whose explicit purpose is to ‘enhance cooperation in Scientific Activities’ (Article 2), is still in force. The signatories - who are the eight Arctic states4 - recognised in their Agreement the importance of constructive cooperation and environmental protection in the Arctic (preambular paragraphs 1 and 2); reiterated the urgent need for increased actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change (preambular paragraph 3); and noted the importance of international scientific cooperation (preambular paragraph 5).

Moreover, in order to achieve said enhanced cooperation, the states parties entered into a number of commitments, including to facilitate the entry and exit of persons and equipment involved in 4 The Government of Canada, the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Government of the Republic of Finland, the

Government of Iceland, the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, and the Government of the United States of America.

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scientific activities (Article 4), as well as access to research infrastructure and facilities (Article 5), research areas (Article 6) and data (Article 7).

These commitments are legally binding. Article 18 provides for the amendment of the Agreement, and 19(3) for automatic renewal after its initial five-year validity unless a party announces its withdrawal from it. Also, any party may withdraw via written notification (Article 19(4)). However, since these provisions have not been triggered, the Agreement remains valid and binding.

Acute regional and global shocks since the signing of the Agreement have significantly altered the geopolitical landscape, and rendered various forms of collaboration untenable. However, the urgency of the problems afflicting the Arctic has not diminished in line with reduced cooperation, nor have the obligations contained in the 2017 Agreement been put on hold. The parties must be cognizant of the fact that if its provisions are not followed, not only will states be in breach of their international legal obligations, but the rest of the world will face real life repercussions.

The principle of Open Science An argument can be made that impeding science is equivalent to restricting academic freedom and free speech within science. Moreover, in a time of diplomatic tension a clear line should be drawn between trust between scientists and trust between governments; while the latter focus on matters of state, including security, scientists bear the vital responsibility of finding solutions for the longterm wellbeing of the planet. Their work requires establishing facts, which demands sustainable dialogue and cooperation, whatever the (geo)political climate. In other words, there is a greater good, even a social responsibility in ‘ringfencing’ this essential pursuit from the vagaries of politics.

In that context, science diplomacy is a valuable tool for reopening dialogue on issues of common interest, and for enabling policymakers to better understand Arctic processes, ecosystems, and environmental changes and to make informed decisions based on evidence. ‘Open science’ plays a vital role in the Arctic; it encourages knowledge sharing, collaboration, and transparency among researchers, Indigenous communities, policymakers, and other stakeholders (UNESCO, 2021).

Through open science, monitoring can occur in real time, which constitutes the basis for early warning, climate modelling, and adaptation strategies. Critically, these important functions have been discontinued over the Ukraine war, which harms not only the Arctic but also other parts of the world affected by the knock-on effects of climatic conditions in the Arctic.

Perhaps most importantly, by focusing on shared scientific goals and objectives and addressing common global challenges, scientists can transcend political differences and work together towards a common purpose. In turn, abiding by the principle of open science, scientists can pool their expertise and resources to develop sustainable and impactful solutions that transcend national boundaries. Reviving this sense of common purpose requires a political choice to decouple geopolitical tensions (as least on an exceptional basis) from the principle of open science.

The scientific imperative The Arctic is experiencing unprecedented environmental changes, including melting sea ice, permafrost thaw, and shifts in ecosystems. Temperatures in the region continue to rise at four times the global annual average (Rantanen et al. 2022). These transformations directly affect the entire globe and therefore require urgent and global responses.

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The international scientific community has not been immune to recent geopolitical tensions, with Western countries and Russia introducing reciprocal bans on joint research and scientific projects.

There are notable exceptions, including continuing cooperation on fisheries, but these are relatively few. While important scientific research continues in the Russian Arctic, this too is under threat as sanctions reduce access to Western technology.

Of course, the environmental problems of the Arctic do not recede when there is a break in international collaboration - if anything they accelerate. Accordingly, it is important to consider ways to ‘compartmentalise’ scientific/environmental issues from hot security issues. The former are urgent for the globe, not just the region, and they are sometimes irreversible.

With Russia representing almost 60 percent of the Arctic coast, there is no escaping the need for constructive engagement with this key stakeholder - at least at the level of scientists - when it comes to global concerns. Close monitoring of the Arctic is key to improving understanding of the changes that climate change will bring in the future. These are existential and global challenges.

It goes without saying that Russia’s brutality in Ukraine has profound consequences - for its millions of victims, but also well beyond Ukraine, not least for the basic norms underpinning the international normative framework. This deserves a severe and comprehensive response. At the same time, though, both in timescale and scope the urgent problems of the Arctic require joint and sustained attention if they are to be effectively mitigated, for the sake of the future of humanity.

The dangers associated with the emergence of possibly dangerous pathogens (including viruses) from the melting permafrost (Cohen, 2023), and the spread of radioactive waste (Miner et al. 2021), are just two examples of risks that will persist and potentially undermine global safety and health, whether the war in Ukraine is resolved or not. Taking the latter point further, there are thousands of radioactive objects - including spent fuel and corroding nuclear reactors inside sunken vessels that were dumped at the bottom of the Arctic seas during the Cold War. Today, political tensions and international sanctions hinder any retrieval and clean-up efforts as Russia lacks the equipment and technical expertise to extract these vessels without foreign assistance (Digges, 2022).

The severe impact that radioactive contamination can have on the environment is undeniable. It can harm plant and animal life, disrupt ecosystems, and potentially impact human health through the consumption of contaminated food and water. As such, the idea of resuming a discussion on extracting the sunken vessels and their radioactive waste constitutes one tangible and universally valuable project that could prove the worth of decoupling certain issues - even if only on an exceptional basis - from the situation of the war in Ukraine.

A way forward Geopolitical uncertainty is jeopardising years, if not decades, of trust-building efforts amongst scientists and researchers across countries, and directly impeding their work. The problems of the Arctic have a direct connection with the rest of the world, and if not addressed in a coordinated manner, may have harsh and irreversible repercussions for global health and environmental equilibrium, not to mention peace and stability.

With this in mind, the resumption of some level of communication between relevant stakeholders on all sides of the geopolitical divide is vital. There is no substitute for dialogue, though in the short term it is unlikely to resume at the Track 1 level. As a fallback, the informal High North Talks, led

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by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, may assist in developing creative policy options aimed at addressing some of urgent problems in the Arctic, and in sustaining unofficial communication links that help avoid damaging misunderstandings.

Whatever the geopolitical fallout from the war in Ukraine, it is imperative that an accommodation be found to jointly address the most pressing of the Arctic’s challenges, which are long-term and global in nature, and in some cases irreversible if left unattended.

References Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, 2017, website of International Arctic Science committee: https://iasc.info/cooperations/arctic-science-agreement Cohen, Jon (2023). Lurking in the Deep Freeze? Science, 381 (6665), 1406-1407.

Davis, L.S, & Patman, R.G. (Eds.) (2015). Science Diplomacy: New Day or False Dawn? World Scientific Publishing Company Inc. https://doi.org/10.1142/8658 Digges, Charles (2022). War puts cleanup of Russia’s radioactive wrecks on ice. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 28 November 2022, at https://thebulletin.org/2022/11/war-puts-cleanup-ofrussias-radioactive-wrecks-on-ice/ Miner, K.R., D’Andrilli, J., Mackelprang, R. et al. Emergent biogeochemical risks from Arctic permafrost degradation. Nature Climate Change. 11, 809–819 (2021).

Rantanen, M., Karpechko, A.Y., et al. The Arctic has warmed nearly four times faster than the globe since 1979.

Communications Earth & Environment 3, 168 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-022-00498-3 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNESCO Recommendation on Open Science, adopted by the 41st session of UNESCO General Conference, November 2021. See https://www.unesco.org/en/open-science and https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000381148

Dziatkowiec

Briefing Note

North Pacific Arctic Community Meeting (NPARC): a platform to develop Asian perspectives of the Arctic by a variety of experts in China, Japan and Korea

Natsuhiko Otsuka, Yuji Kodama, Minsu Kim and Yang Jian

This commentary paper presents a concise history of the North Pacific Arctic Community (NPARC), an initiative born out of the growing interest in Arctic affairs among non-Arctic nations, particularly those from Asian three countries namely, China, Japan, and Korea. Established in 2014, NPARC serves as a platform for interdisciplinary research and collaboration among China, Japan, and Korea, fostering discussions on emerging challenges and opportunities in the Arctic. Over the past decade, NPARC has grown and evolved, adapting to changing circumstances such as the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical shifts.

This paper offers an overview of the latest NPARC Meeting held in Japan 2023.

Introduction In the year 2013, the Arctic Council extended observer status to six non-Arctic nations, including five from the Asian region, notably China, Japan, and Korea. Recognizing the escalating global interest in the Arctic, the Korea Maritime Institute (KMI) proposed the establishment of a platform for discussion and knowledge exchange. This initiative sought to encourage regional interdisciplinary research on emerging challenges and opportunities in the Arctic, to communicate and share regional research outcomes for capacity building, and to enhance cooperation in various levels such as forums, seminars and joint research related to the Arctic among members.

The inaugural NPARC meeting took place in Cheju, Korea, in 2014, hosted by the KMI. Participating institutions included four Korean institutions (KMI, Korea Polar Research Institute, Natsuhiko Otsuka, Hokkaido University Arctic Research Center Yuji Kodama, Hokkaido University Arctic Research Center Minsu Kim,, Korea Maritime Institute Yang Jian, Shanghai Institute for International Studies

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Korea Research Institute of Ships and Ocean Engineering, and Korea Maritime and Ocean University), along with the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) and four Chinese institutions (Polar Research Institute of China, Ocean University of China, Dalian Maritime University, and Shanghai Jiaotong University), and the Overseas Coastal Area Development Institute from Japan. During this meeting, member institutions reached several consensuses and agreements, including the recognition of the need for collaborative efforts among academic organizations to address emerging Arctic issues, the establishment of regular seminars emphasizing voluntary participation and non-binding partnerships, and the exploration of possibilities for collaboration with other research organizations both within and outside the region, irrespective of academic affiliations.

Subsequently, NPARC meetings became an annual event, rotating between China, Japan, and Korea. The organizing committee now comprises three prominent research institutions: SIIS (China), Hokkaido University Arctic Research Center (Japan), and KMI (Korea). As of 2023, NPARC has successfully convened nine meetings, with the 2020 and 2021 meetings conducted online due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2022 meeting, originally scheduled in Japan, was postponed to 2023. These gatherings have provided a platform for discussions encompassing various disciplines, such as natural sciences, engineering, social sciences, humanities, Arctic policy, and Arctic-related activities undertaken by the three Asian nations.

Thematic Sessions of the 2023 NPARC Meeting: The 2023 NPARC meeting, coinciding with the 10th anniversary of its inception, convened in Sapporo, Japan, on August 28th. In total, 48 experts joined the session including 13 from China, 14 from Korea and 21 from Japan. This milestone event featured five thematic sessions: a. "Arctic and Asia": The opening session, led by three distinguished Arctic Ambassadors from China, Korea, and Japan, namely Mr. Gao Feng (Special Representative for Arctic Affairs, People's Republic of China), Mr. Park Chong-suk(South Korean Arctic Ambassador), and Mr. Takewaka Keizo(Japanese Ambassador for International Economic Affairs and Arctic Affairs), explored the progress and contributions of these observer states to the Arctic Council over the past decade. Key points highlighted included as follows. ü

Through 10 years of experiences as being Arctic Council’s observer states, China, Japan, and Korea has been achieving their contribution and cooperation in Arctic Council’s activities.

ü

Today, Asian nations could have the substantial impact on the Arctic issues in terms of social, economic, scientific, and environmental effects as well as international agreements, exemplified by the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement. Under the current Arctic Council’s hiatus, it could be possible for China, Japan, and Korea to achieve meaningful contribution to the Arctic issues.

ü

The Trilateral High-Level Dialogue on the Arctic by China, Japan, and Korea, which was started in 2015, was also noted as an important platform for East Asian countries to collectively address Arctic challenges.

ü

Not only the Arctic Council related activities, but also the other Arctic related events such as Arctic Circle Assembly and Arctic Circle Forum are also a good opportunity to approach the

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Arctic issues, to deliver messages to the Arctic from Asian countries, and to develop more engagement to the Arctic issues. b. "Arctic Cooperation": This session featured presentations from six experts who discussed various aspects of Arctic cooperation.

The session also emphasized the importance of Asian countries' involvement in climate change strategies and their active participation in Arctic-related events. ü

Aniya Satoru (Consular Office of Japan in Anchorage) introduced their activities in Sister Cities between Alaska and Japan, and exchange events of youth and indigenous peoples between Alaska and Japan.

ü

Lu Zhibo of Tongji University introduced China’s contributions and interests to PAME, one of the Arctic Council’s working groups. He also introduced the China’s new research vessel “Xuelong 2.”

ü

Kim Bongchul of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies talked on international laws in polar areas and the domestic laws for their polar activities of northeast Asian countires.

ü

Hide Sakaguchi of Sasakawa Peace Foundation reported on Arctic Circle Japan Forum, which was held in Tokyo in March 2023, especially on the significance of the Japan, China, and Korea Sessions. He emphasized that the involvement of Asian countries would be important for the climate change strategy by collaborative and cooperative manner.

ü

Takahashi Minori of Hokkai-Gakuen University talked on the historical soil of Greenland, and the Denmark’s colonial governance from the viewpoint of self-reliance, conservation, and denial of coevality.

ü

Xu Qingchao of University of Chinese Academy of Sciences talked on the role of international science cooperations for promoting the effectiveness of Arctic governance. She also talked on the importance of the science cooperation and science diplomacy.

c. "Arctic Science": Four experts presented their latest research in this session. Discussions underscored the significance of collaboration among the three nations in scientific research and bridging the gap between scientific knowledge and indigenous wisdom. ü

Yabuki Hironori of National Institute of Polar Research (Japan) introduced Arctic and Antarctic Data archive system, the data management platform for Japan’s polar projects, which aims to support for data-driven sciences.

ü

Jin Emilia Kyung of Korea Polar Research Institute introduced the Korea’s Arctic climate change projects, including modeling and observation, 2nd icebreaking research vessel, etc.

ü

Qu Feng of Liaocheng University talked the Traditional Ecological Knowledge of indigenous people, locality, importance and barriers, differences with scientific knowledge.

ü

Kimura Hajime of Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology introduced the Japan’s new icebreaking research vessel, which will be launched in 2026.

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d. "Sustainable Arctic": In this session, four speakers covered a range of topics, including efforts in interdisciplinary Arctic research, international law and governance, and sustainable development. The session highlighted the importance of the complex challenges of sustainability in the Arctic. ü

Kodama Yuji of Hokkaido University talked on Hokkaido University’s initiative of the Arctic research in the promotion of “Future Earth” and SDGs based on the needs for interdisciplinary integration and transdisciplinary research of global environmental science.

ü

Bai Jiayu of Nankai University talked on the implication of China’s Arctic engagement in the international law development and governance for its sustainable development at the regional level.

ü

Choi Su-Beom of Incheon National University talked on the state of the art of Russian Arctic shipping activity including LNG, container, and project cargoes.

ü

Xia Liping of Tongji University presented about topics from the sixth China-U.S. Arctic Social Science Conference, which was held June 2023 in China, as governance in the Arctic, shipping route development, natural resource export from Alaska to China, and cultural, tourism and educational cooperation.

e. "Youth Session": This session aimed to strengthen trilateral network among the youth scientists for their future collaboration. ü

Tang Yao of the Polar Research Institute of China introduced the Chinese involvement in IPY1 to 4 and activities of Arctic and Antarctic research.

ü

Zhang Yiran of Dalian Maritime University presented the status and role of the Arctic Sea Routes in the perspective of modern logistics development.

ü

Shin Euichan of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies focused on geopolitical situation of EU and the Arctic, and EU’s arctic policy.

ü

Shim Minsub of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, presented a study on the polar activities promotion act in Korea, in conjunction with the international legal basis.

ü

Yoshida Yuka of Hokkaido University introduced about her activity of the Arctic Transdisciplinary Community of Practice to improve public’s understanding of the Arctic environment, society, and multi-layered problems.

ü

Mikhailova Diana of Hokkaido University talked about Russian strategic narratives on the Northern Sea Route development strategy focusing on the emerging effects after Feb. 2022.

ü

Osawa Hisato of Hokkaido University talked about building environments in cold climates, and clarified relationship between building environment and duration of life in cold and warm regions.

Conclusion: The NPARC Meeting has evolved over the past decade, fostering a collaborative platform among China, Japan, and Korea in the context of the Arctic. As the Arctic continues to face dynamic

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challenges, NPARC has been a unique initiative for the evolving discourse on the Arctic by the three Asian countries.

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Briefing Note

Discussing Arctic Geopolitics in Bosphorus

Eda Ayaydin

The book Uluslararası İlişkilerde Arktik (The Arctic in International Relations) edited by myself, and my colleague Adnan Dal was published in Turkey and analyzes the Arctic region's significance in the context of international relations.

Given Turkey's status as a non-Arctic state and its relatively recent engagement with the region, there exists a prevalent set of stereotypes concerning the Arctic in this country. These stereotypes include assumptions such as an impending conflict in the Arctic due to the increased accessibility of hydrocarbon resources resulting from melting ice or expectations that Turkey can easily derive economic benefits from its involvement in the Svalbard Treaty1. In light of this kind of stereotypes, this book concentrates on presenting critical viewpoints and perspectives that encourage a more nuanced understanding of the Arctic in Turkey and vice versa.

Furthermore, another contribution that the book strives to make is to enrich the Turkish academic discourse. The editors have meticulously attended to the selection of appropriate Arctic scholar terminology throughout the book. For instance, contrary to the prevalent usage of "North Pole" or "Arktika" in Turkey, the editors have insisted on the term "Arktik" to align more closely with global academic conventions. Additionally, while the term "minority" is well-understood by Turkish readers, it takes on a different connotation when referring to indigenous peoples.

Consequently, the book has engaged in discussions regarding the relevant Turkish terminology for "indigenous peoples," thus enhancing the precision of language within the field. Obviously, this semantic debate has an impact on the angles of analyze and not just a discussion on words.

In terms of facilitating dialogue between scholars from Turkey and their counterparts from the Arctic region, this book offers another contribution to Turkish academic literature. Readers are provided with insights from both Turkish and regional perspectives, allowing them to comprehend diverse epistemological and ontological approaches to the Arctic. This inclusiveness ensures that readers gain access to a spectrum of viewpoints from scholars who have both insider and outsider perspectives on the region.

Eda Ayaydin, Teaching Fellow, University of London Institute in Paris

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The book launch event2 took place in Istanbul on November 9th, 2023, and was hosted at the Istanbul Policy Center, which is situated in the historic heart of the city. Following the book launch, a seminar was conducted under the theme of "Discussing Arctic Geopolitics in Bosphorus." This seminar featured the participation of Lassi Heininen from the University of Lapland and Trym Eiterjord from the University of British Columbia and The Arctic Institute.

During the seminar, Lassi Heininen delivered a presentation focusing on Arctic geopolitics and Arctic security within a holistic approach. He highlighted the pivotal role of functional cooperation in the Arctic and its associated priorities, emphasizing that this form of cooperation played a crucial role in reshaping the region immediately after the end of the Cold War. Heininen also noted that the endeavors aimed at fostering constructive cooperation in the Arctic sometimes tend to be overlooked amidst the complexities of contemporary geopolitics.

Following Heininen's presentation, Trym Eiterjord discussed China's scientific involvement in the Arctic. He mentioned how science can be strategically leveraged to establish a presence in the region, and how expertise can become a significant factor in shaping governance mechanisms.

Eiterjord expressed a keen interest in understanding how governments and research communities from outside the Arctic, such as those from Beijing or Ankara, perceive the Arctic in geopolitical terms and how they approach the region diplomatically.

During the discussion, the project involving Russia's scientific research station in collaboration with BRICS nations and Turkey was a subject of significant scrutiny. Participants considered the potential impacts of this project and how Norway would interpret the establishment of such a scientific base. Eiterjord stressed the importance of Norway's environmental regulations in Svalbard, suggesting that these regulations should be a key consideration.

A noteworthy observation made during the debate was the similarity between Turkey's recent actions in the Arctic and China's earlier engagement in the region. Eiterjord indicated that it might not be advisable diplomatically for Turkey to join a research base project with Russia in Svalbard.

Lassi Heininen added that he was not surprised by Turkey's ratification of the Svalbard Treaty.

This move could serve as a valid reason or justification for Turkey if it decides to reapply to join the Arctic Council, demonstrating its interest in and commitment to the Arctic region.

During the discussion, the topic of NATO expansion in the Arctic was critically examined. Some participants questioned the necessity of such expansion, drawing historical comparisons to the Cold War era when Finland managed to maintain its security without the need for physical barriers.

From this critical perspective, the question arose as to why such measures are being considered now and Heininen reminded the saying “Don’t try to fix something which is not a problem.”

It was noted that NATO's decision-making might not take into account the nuanced history of Finland-Russia relations. Lassi Heininen argued that the process of militarization in the Arctic did not commence with NATO membership but rather began with bilateral military agreements, particularly those involving the United States. Furthermore, it was highlighted that NATO has played a relatively small role in the Arctic region. Canada, for instance, was cited as a country that was not enthusiastic about NATO's presence in the Arctic. While there are U.S. military bases in the Arctic, NATO does not have a significant military presence there.

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Homework for Turkey Lassi Heininen's suggestion that Turkey should "do its homework first" likely implies that Turkey should thoroughly assess and establish its interests and objectives in the Arctic. This is in response to the question of why Turkey is seeking to engage in the Arctic, beyond scientific research, and what political motivations Ankara might have for its involvement.

As Eiterjord drew parallels what China did in its first engagement with the Arctic what Turkey is doing now, it appears that Turkey may be following a path of engagement through scientific collaboration, facilitated in part by cooperation with Russia. Turkey's engagement with Russian scientists and its plans for a Russian scientific research center in Svalbard suggest a growing partnership with Russia in Arctic activities. This partnership extends to economic endeavors, such as participating in electrifying drilling platforms and collaborating on icebreaker projects for Russia.

However, it's important to note that Turkey's partnership with Russia in the Arctic differs from China and Russia's partnership, primarily due to Turkey's NATO membership.

In conclusion, Turkey does not yet possess a well-defined Arctic strategy. Its engagements in the Arctic vary, but Ankara lacks comprehensive planning. Turkey applied for observer status in the Arctic Council and was subsequently rejected. Remarkably, this rejection received little (actually not at all) attention in the Turkish media. This situation underscores two key points.

Firstly, Turkey lacks a structured plan for Arctic engagement. The Foreign Ministry has not provided any explanation for the reasons behind the application to the Arctic Council. When examining the 17-page report of the National Polar Science Program (2018-2022), it becomes evident that there is only one fundamental reference to the Arctic Council, as follows: “It is known that Turkish scientists started scientific studies on the Arctic in the 2000s. The first initiative regarding the Arctic as the Republic of Turkey was made by applying to the Arctic Council in 2015, under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the support of ITU PolReC. As of December 2017, the application result has not been announced.”3 The second point highlights the limited public awareness of Arctic matters, which, in turn, results in insufficient efforts by both media and government in Ankara to address this issue. Given Turkey's Mediterranean location, it may not be expected to have a vested interest or established policy regarding the Arctic. However, the fact that Turkey submitted an application warrants a discussion on potential steps Ankara could take to enhance its position in Arctic affairs. During the seminar in Istanbul, Heininen emphasized that Turkey should first clarify its objectives for seeking Arctic Council membership, particularly considering the apparent lack of ambition regarding the Arctic in 2015.

Turkey is a member of the Paris Agreement, committing to efforts to combat climate change. It has set a target of achieving net-zero emissions by the year 2053. In alignment with these climate goals, Turkey's Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change is actively engaged in the development of climate legislation aimed at facilitating a green transition,4 substantially increasing its emissions reduction target for the year 2030. This updated commitment raises the reduction goal from the initial 21 percent set in 2015 to an ambitious target of 41 percent5, aligns with Minister Özhaseki’s reference to Turkey as a “green superpower”6. In the context of the blue economy, Turkey, as a maritime nation, has undertaken various initiatives. Within this framework,

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Turkey has the potential to develop a strategic roadmap for engagement with Arctic Council projects.

Turkey's approach can be characterized as one of "entryism," where Ankara seeks to be an active participant in various regions without necessarily having long-term, structured ambitions specific to those regions. This approach spans from space endeavors to Arctic involvement. In the case of the Arctic, Turkey's engagement has been particularly noteworthy due to its close economic and scientific partnerships with Russia. However, it's important to note that this collaboration occurs within a backdrop of increasing divisions, primarily driven currently by military (NATO) and political (Gaza) tensions with Western Arctic states. In this complex geopolitical era, Turkey, situated between a politically constructed East and West (and now North), is likely to continue its tradition of adopting a multilateral approach started in 1960s, where Ankara understood that the only American alliance cannot be sufficient to ensure its success after the very infamous “Johnson Letter” warning Turkey that NATO will not protect it in case of a Soviet attack if Ankara intervenes in Cyprus.

Notes 1.

Ayaydin Eda (2023) “Interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty in Turkey” https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/interpretation-svalbard-treaty-turkey, Accessed in November 2023.

2. The book launch was co-organised by Istanbul Policy Center and Novidies Media Culture- Art Inc. 3. National Polar Science Program (2018-2022), https://kare.mam.tubitak.gov.tr/sites/images/kare_mam/ulusal_kutup_bilim_programi. pdf, Accessed in November 2023.

4. Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change of Turkey https://csb.gov.tr/bakan-ozhaseki-iklim-degisikligi-ve-uyum-koordinasyon-kurulutoplantisina-katildi-bakanlik-faaliyetleri-39893, Accessed in November 2023.

5. UNDP https://www.undp.org/turkiye/press-releases/turkiyes-business-leadersembrace-green-transformation, Accessed in November 2023 6. Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change of Turkey ,https://csb.gov.tr/bakan-ozhaseki-iklim-degisikligi-ve-uyum-koordinasyon-kurulutoplantisina-katildi-bakanlik-faaliyetleri-39893, Accessed in November 2023.

Discussing Arctic Geopolitics in Bosphorus

Briefing Note

The China-Nordic Arctic Research Center: One decade in

Egill Thor Nielsson

The China-Nordic Research Center (CNARC) was established at an event hosted by the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) in Shanghai on the 10ᵗʰ of December 2013. CNARC has ten founding Member Institutes, four Chinese and six Nordic, which all have capacities to influence and coordinate Arctic research. They include polar institutes, research centres, research funders, universities and think tanks. The purpose of CNARC is to provide a platform for academic cooperation to increase awareness, understanding and knowledge of the Arctic and its global impacts, as well as to promote cooperation for sustainable development of the Nordic Arctic and coherent development of China in a global context. With a primary focus on three research themes: 1) Arctic climate change and its impacts, 2) Arctic resources, shipping and economic cooperation, and 3) Arctic policy-making and legislation.1 During the past decade since CNARC was established, there have been notable changes in the geopolitical landscape and the Covid-19 world pandemic has affected international cooperation significantly. The focus on this commentary will be on how the CNARC cooperation has developed under three different periods, 1) pre-Covid-19, 2) during Covid-19 restrictions, and 3) post-Covid19 restrictions. Highlighting the main activities of CNARC during the past decade and prospects for academic cooperation under the CNARC platform.

Pre-Covid-19 By the end of the year 2019, CNARC Member Institutes had grown from ten to eighteen members, and seven annual China-Nordic Arctic Cooperation symposium and economic roundtables had taken place. Additionally, 21 CNARC fellowships had been awarded and carried out by researchers between China and Nordic Countries, and two publications had been initiated by CNARC: 1) A special issue on “Arctic Policy and Sustainable Development” in Advances of Polar Science and a book, titled: “Sino Nordic Arctic Cooperation: Objectives and Approaches”.

Egill Thor Nielsson is a PhD Candidate at the University of Lapland and the University of Iceland (Double Degree) and a Senior Adviser at the Icelandic Centre for Research - Rannís (On Leave).

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During this period CNARC grew into an important platform for China-Nordic cooperation and was both highlighted in 1) a “Joint Press Release Strengthening Sino-Nordic Cooperation”, following a meeting between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and the Nordic Council of Ministers in Beijing on 25ᵗʰ of May 2017, under the theme: Science, research and education;2 and in 2) China´s Arctic Policy White Paper were CNARC was named as one of four primary international forums (outside of the Arctic Council) for promoting exchanges and cooperation among the stakeholders.3 A CNARC project was furthermore included in the Nordic Council of Ministers’ Arctic Cooperation Program. 4 CNARC provided support towards various high-level events between Nordic countries and China during this period, including a “ChinaNorway Dialogue on the Changing Arctic and International Cooperation” co-sponsored by SIIS and PRIC in Shanghai at the occasion of an official visit of then Prime Minister of Norway, Erna Solberg.5 The development of CNARC has been documented in several publications, such as the 5-year anniversary publication of CNARC, titled: “The Evolution of CNARC 2013-2018”,6 and in articles analysing the outcomes of the CNARC cooperation both from “Chinese” and “Nordic” perspectives. A “Chinese perspective” on the outcomes of the CNARC cooperation is presented in the article “Four Impacts for the China-Nordic Arctic Research Center”, by Yang Jian: After five years of development, CNARC has produced four clear results. First, knowledge about governance structures has expanded from Arctic countries to non-Arctic countries. Second, the Chinese government has adopted the concept of “governance” to apply to its Arctic cooperation.

Third, Chinese media and businesses have begun taking concrete actions to practice the concept of governance. Fourth, China’s positive role in Arctic governance is gradually being acknowledged.7 A “Nordic perspective” is presented by Egill Thor Nielsson in a publication titled: “Nordic–China: Cooperation Challenges and Opportunities”, lead by the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies and commissioned by the Nordic Council of Minsters´. The paper highlights eight lessons learned from starting a new international and cross-cultural initiative such as CNARC: •

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Cooperation through the CNARC proved to be a valuable way to build up a ‘track 2’ mechanism, in addition to the more immediate goals of establishing trust and mutual understanding on Arctic affairs by advancing both social and natural science research.

The CNARC secretariat – hosted by the Polar Research Institute of China and in close cooperation with other Chinese member institutes, including the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies – has been highly useful for implementing projects and supporting initiatives that have been of regional Nordic relevance without interfering with national priorities of each Nordic nation and its specific relations with Chinese counter partners on Arctic issues.

The CNARC model of joint Nordic collaboration has proved to be effective at focusing the attention of leading Chinese actors.

For this joint research collaboration initiative to work, CNARC has had to identify where it can add value and thereby play a role as a complementary aspect to many ongoing bilateral collaborations.

The largely informal setting and knowledge-based approach of CNARC to Arctic affairs have been assets in building a valuable China–Nordic Arctic network that still remains largely decentralized and is mainly a platform.

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Scientific findings that require a great deal of competence to generate have been shown to have great value for policymakers and businesspeople.

Arctic affairs require long-term commitments and vision in order to enhance mutual understanding of a topic of global significance that is moving towards sustainable and peaceful practices. Similarly, an initiative such as the CNARC needs time, patience and effort from all parties in order to establish a foundation for work that can be of value to all stakeholders.

From a Nordic perspective, the biggest contribution of the CNARC to date is arguably China’s increased understanding of Nordic Arctic issues, as reflected by their accommodation within China’s Arctic Policy White Paper.8

Both articles highlight the constructive aspects of the epistemological gains from the CNARC cooperation. While the researcher-to-researcher level of the China-Nordic Arctic cooperation has been seen as largely beneficial, there are geopolitical aspects that can affect a platform like CNARC. In May 2019 the 7th China-Nordic Arctic Cooperation Symposium was hosted by the Shanghai Ocean University and co-convened with PRIC and SIIS as a back-to-back event to the Arctic Circle China Forum. The local organisation of the two events took place in conjunction and the Arctic Circle China Forum is to-date the largest international event on the Arctic hosted in China. The events took place only a few days after the 2019 Ministerial in Rovaniemi at the end of Finland´s 2017-2019 Chairmanship to the Arctic Council in what Lassi Heininen dubbed as an “Arctic Super Week”. At Rovaniemi Ministerial the then US State Secretary Michael R. Pompeo delivered a speech, titled “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus” in which the tone towards China´s Arctic engagement had soured significantly,9 only six years after China had been admitted as an observer to the Arctic Council at the 2013 Kiruna Ministerial.

During Covid-19 restrictions In an article published in March 2023, titled: “An assessment of China’s participation in polar subregional organizations” in Advances in Polar Science, Shan Yanyan et al. compare China´s involvement in three different subregional polar organisations. While they argue that “CNARC is the youngest but the most vigorous organization of the three” they furthermore note that “…the CNARC is subject to the influence of future international politics. Affected by the COVID pandemic, CNARC symposia have been moved online, and business roundtables and visiting scholar projects have been postponed or stalled for the time being.”10 CNARC´s activities between 2020-2022 were limited mainly due to Covid-19 restrictions and as the Nordic countries started to loosen their policies on Covid-19 restriction, China´s zero-Covid policy meant that in-person meetings would have to be delayed. The 8th China-Nordic Arctic Cooperation Symposium that was planned to take place in May 2020 in Umeå, Sweden had to be postponed. Instead, the first CNARC online seminar took place via Zoom on 13-14 January 2022 under the theme: “Arctic Policy Development of China and Nordic Countries in the New Geopolitical Landscape”, as well as a hybrid CNARC session at the 2022 Arctic Circle Assembly on “Interactions and Development in China´s Arctic Cooperation”. The CNARC website, www.cnarc.info, was updated in 2022 by the Arctic Portal and now also includes databases for both experts at CNARC member institutes in the field of Arctic research and relevant publications.

As no Assembly of Member Institutes has been held since May 2019, which alongside the CNARC Nielsson

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roundtable are part of each China-Nordic Arctic Cooperation Symposia, no new members have joined CNARC since the 2018 Assembly.

Post-Covid-19 restrictions By 2023 in-person activities of CNARC have resumed, as China lifted its Zero-Covid policy. The first in-person CNARC event, after Covid-19 restrictions were relaxed, was a summer seminar on “Arctic Issues and China-Nordic Cooperation” hosted by the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies in August 2023. There the focus was on analysing the status and future prospects of ChinaNordic cooperation under the current geopolitical situation and practical aspects regarding the CNARC cooperation.11 It was furthermore decided that the 8th China-Nordic Arctic Cooperation Symposium will take place in Guangzhou, China in 2023 (the dates were later set for 3-6 December) and CNARC session were furthermore hosted at the 2023 Arctic Circle Assembly. The 8th ChinaNordic Arctic Cooperation Symposium will focus on “Sustainable Development of the Arctic Oriented: The Role of Sino-Nordic Cooperation” and includes an economic roundtable on “Green Solutions to Arctic Tourism” and an Assembly of Member Institutes.12 The event will be an important step towards a relaunch of “normal” CNARC activities following the period 2020-2022 period of Covid-19 restrictions.

As previously stated, the purpose of CNARC is to provide a platform for academic cooperation to increase awareness, understanding and knowledge of the Arctic and its global impacts, as well as to promote cooperation for sustainable development of the Nordic Arctic and coherent development of China in a global context. This purpose is even more important than when it was framed in 2013 and the benefits of increased understanding between different parties can be showcased in the CNARC cooperation. Geopolitical aspects can impact research cooperation severely as is visible in the state of international Arctic cooperation following Russia´s invasion of Ukraine on 24th of February 2022. The security aspect in Nordic-China relations is also more evident today than it was ten years ago and by 2023 all Nordic States are either members of NATO or applying to become members. NATO´s position on Arctic affairs was presented at the 2023 Arctic Circle Assembly by the Chair of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Rob Bauer, who underlined that “NATO does not consider China as a threat, but as a challenge”.13 Security aspects can impact China-Nordic Arctic research cooperation and it would be naïve to disregard them completely. However, when evaluating the first decade of CNARC´s activities it can be argued that it has proved to be a constructive platform for exchanges, primarily research cooperation, while there has been important participation at CNARC events from policy-makers and industry alike. The focus on understanding each other’s objectives in Arctic cooperation and communicating values related to sustainable development and joint solutions on common challenges, including climate change, and opportunities, including innovation and economic development, require international cooperation. CNARC, and similar platforms, can contribute towards constructive dialogue and play an important role in enhancing the well-being of the eight billion people living in the world today and towards improving the future.

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China-Nordic Arctic Research Center, December, 2013, https://www.cnarc.info/images/documents/CNARC_Brochure.pdf.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Press Release Strengthening Sino–Nordic Cooperation”, May 26, 2017, http://dk.chinaembassy.gov.cn/eng/zdgx/201705/t20170526_2557196.htm.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Policy,” January 26, 2018, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_2814760266603 36.htm.

Nordregio, “The China–Nordic Arctic Research Center (CNARC)”, 2018, https://nordregioprojects.org/blog/2019/10/01/the-china-nordic-arctic-researchcenter-cnarc/ Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, “H.E. Erna Solberg Visits SIIS and Delivers a Speech”, April 12, 2017, https://www.siis.org.cn/SeminarConference/9480.jhtml China-Nordic Arctic Research Center, “The Evolution of CNARC 2013-2018”, December 2018, cnarc.info/images/documents/CNARC2013-2018_final.pdf Yang, J. (2017), “Four Impacts of the China-Nordic Arctic Research Center”, In R.W. Corell et al. (eds.), The Arctic in World Affairs: A North Pacific Dialogue on Building Capacity for a Sustainable Arctic in a Changing Global Order, pp. 291-299, Korean Maritime Institute and East-West Center, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/2017arctic_0.pdf Nielsson, E.T. (2019), “China-Nordic Arctic Research Center”, In A.B. Forsby (ed.), Nordic-China Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities, NIAS Reports, No. 52, pp.

59-63, NIAS Press, https://www.fni.no/getfile.php/13115931576073459/Filer/Publikasjoner/Nordic-China_Cooperation-report.pdf Heininen, L. K. (2019). “The Arctic Super Week in May 2019: from Rovaniemi to Shanghai”, Arctic Yearbook, 370-377, https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2019/BriefingNotes/13_AY2019_BN_Heininen.pdf

10. 10 Shan Y.Y., He J.F., Guo P.Q., et al. (2023), “An assessment of China’s participation in polar subregional organizations”, Adv Polar Sci, 34(1): 56-65, doi: 10.13679/j.advps.2022.0023 11. 11 Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, “Nordic scholars visit SIIS”, August 24, 2023, https://www.siis.org.cn/Visits/15088.jhtml 12. 12 See more on CNARC website: Upcoming Symposia - China-Nordic Arctic Research Center - CNARC 13. 13 Edvardsen, A., NATO’s Military Leader: “We Must Be Prepared for Military Conflicts Arising in the Arctic”, High North News, 01 November 2023, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/natos-military-leader-we-must-be-preparedmilitary-conflicts-arising-arctic

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