Arctic Yearbook 2024 - Arctic Relations: Tranformations, Legacies and Futures

Arctic Relations:

Transformations, Legacies and Futures

ISSN 2298-2418

Lassi Heininen, Justin Barnes and Heather Exner-Pirot, Eds.

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Arctic Yearbook 2024 Heininen, L., J. Barnes & H. Exner-Pirot, (eds.). (2024). Arctic Yearbook 2024 - Arctic Relations: Transformations, Legacies and Futures. Akureyri, Iceland: Arctic Portal. Available from https://arcticyearbook.com ISSN 2298–2418 This is an open access volume distributed in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY NC-4.0) license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is properly cited and the use is non-commercial.

Editor Lassi Heininen| lassi.heininen@ulapland.fi Managing Editors Justin Barnes | jbarnes@balsillieschool.ca Heather Exner-Pirot | exnerpirot@gmail.com Communications Manager Tiia Manninen Editorial Board Dr. Daria Burnasheva (Senior Lecturer at Arctic State Institute of Culture and Arts, Sakha Republic) Dr. Miya Christensen (Professor at University of Stockholm, Sweden) Halldór Johannsson (Executive Director, Arctic Portal, Iceland) Dr. Alexander Pelyasov (Russian Academy of Sciences; Director of the Center of Northern and Arctic Economics, Russia) Dr. Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson (Former President of the Republic of Iceland, Chair of the Arctic Circle Assembly) James Ross, (Gwich’in leader, Northwest Territories, Canada)

About Arctic Yearbook

The Arctic Yearbook is the outcome of the Northern Research Forum (NRF) and UArctic joint Thematic Network (TN) on Geopolitics and Security. The TN also organizes the annual Calotte Academy.

The Arctic Yearbook seeks to be the preeminent repository of critical analysis on the Arctic region, with a mandate to inform observers about the state of Arctic politics, governance and security. It is an international and interdisciplinary peer-reviewed publication, published online at [https://arcticyearbook.com] to ensure wide distribution and accessibility to a variety of stakeholders and observers.

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Arctic Yearbook material is obtained through a combination of invited contributions and an open call for papers. For more information on contributing to the Arctic Yearbook, or participating in the TN on Geopolitics and Security, contact the Editor, Lassi Heininen.

Acknowledgments The Arctic Yearbook would like to acknowledge the Arctic Portal [https://arcticportal.org] for their generous technical and design support, especially Ævar Karl Karlsson. We would also like to thank our colleagues who provided peer review for the scholarly articles in this volume.

The Arctic Yearbook would like to acknowledge the Nordic Arctic Programme (NAPA) for the invaluable grant for “Promoting Arctic Knowledge and Understanding through the Arctic Yearbook”

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Table of Contents Introduction Arctic Relations: Transformations, Legacies and Futures.......................................................................1 Lassi Heininen, Justin Barnes, & Heather Exner-Pirot Year in Review...............................................................................................................................................8 Tiia Manninen

The View from Europe Emergent regions? A historical perspective on ArctiC-EUrope relations (1970s-2008) ................12 Emilie Canova International Talent for the Arctic: Strategies and Challenges.............................................................40 Alexandra Middleton & Elena Zhurova Sæther Industrial Ecosystem Collaboration in Critical Materials Value Chains: the Case of Kokkola Industrial Park..............................................................................................................................................64 Nuppu Mielonen & Hanna Lehtimäki European Union-Indigenous Relations in Arctic Governance: The inclusion and articulation of Indigenous realities in policy papers since 2008.....................................................................................78 Niall J. Janssen

Russia and China Looking Beyond China: Non-Western Actors in the Russian Arctic after February 2022.............94 Sergey Sukhakin & P. Whitney Lackenbauer Revisiting the Arctic Region’s Cooperative Network: The Role of China.......................................122 Maria Lagutina, Yana Leksyutina, Alexander Sergunin Bypassing NATO Enlargement: Explaining Russian Naval Power Projection through the Arctic...........................................................................................................................................................142 Mihai Giboi Briefing Note Russian media coverage of Arctic issues: changes since the invasion of Ukraine..........................159 Mathieu Landriault

Science, Diplomacy, and Governance Non-state observers in the Arctic Council – Exploring participation patterns in the PAME Working Group........................................................................................................................................167 Natia Tsaritova

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Advancing the Understanding and Quantification of Arctic Climate Feedbacks to Improve Climate Models and Inform Decision-Making: Insights from the AASCO Project (2020–2022)................................................................................................................................................186 Hanna K. Lappalainen, Timo Vihma, Eija Asmi, Alexander Baklanov, Peter Bauer, Paul Arthur Berkman, Federico Bianchi, Nicole Biebow, Jaana Bäck, Torben Røjle Christensen, Richard Davy, Igor Esauj, Ekaterina Ezhova, Huadong Guo, Torill Hamre, Angelika Humbert, Veli-Matti Kerminen, Lukas Kohl, Lars Kullerud, Kirsty Langley, Jan Rene Larsen, Heikki Lihavainen, Lisa Loseto, Risto Makkonen, Cecilie Mauritzen, Outi Meinander, Geir Ottersen, Peter Pulsifer, Yubao Qiu, Arja Rautio, Stein Sandven, Britta K. Sannel, Sandy Starkweather, Mikko Strahlendorff, Lise Lotte Sørensen, Jennie L. Thomas, Michael Tjernström, Petteri Uotila, Manfred Wendisch, Markku Kulmala and Tuukka Petäjä

Briefing Notes Exploring the Past, Present, and Future of USAPECS: Lessons from a Decade of Supporting Early Career Research Across National and International Polar Networks....................................230 Susan B. Vanek, Zachary M. Labe, Olga Lauter, Kevin Shionalyn, Mohammad Afzal Shadab, Elena Adasheva, Annika Margevich, Meghan N. Schaberg, Lavanya Ashokkumar & Jonathan N. Naoukin Rashtriya Raksha University Steering Global Sustainability: India's First International Workshop on Polar Region Policy - A Commitment towards the Global Partnerships and Sustainable Approaches as it’s “Our Planet, Our Responsibility”........................................................................244 Manish Kumar Singh The 33rd Year of the Calotte Academy: Unstoppable Arctic Discourse........................................248 Zhanna Anshukova, Tom Gabriel Royer, and Adam Kočí Commentaries The Arctic Council: a path forward for geoengineering engagement and governance.................254 Burgess Power Langshaw & Samuel Geisterfer Incorporating North American Arctic Indigenous peoples and northern residents into regional security.......................................................................................................................................................257 Robert P. Wheelersburg Research on the Euro-Arctic Borderland under pressure: a case and some reflections...............268 Urban Wråkberg Freedom of science will be taken by geopolitical tensions if universities do not resist pressure from outside and implement academic freedom.................................................................................274 Lassi Heininen Securitization Narrative in the West and its Restrictive Impact on Research on Russia and China..........................................................................................................................................................282 Matti Nojonen

Strategies and Policies Ireland looks North: Arctic Strategy for Ireland as an Arctic-facing State.....................................287 Elena Kavanagh

v A Menu of Arctic Specific Confidence Building and Arms Control Measures..............................305 Alexander MacDonald Towards a Sustainable Integrated Arctic Shipping Strategy...............................................................320 Ana Teresa Cardoso Briefing Notes “Nothing about us without us”: What can we learn from Greenland’s new Arctic Strategy 20242033?...........................................................................................................................................................337 Rasmus Leander Nielsen & Jeppe Strandsbjerg “The most urgent and important task we face”: Framing the Arctic focus in Canada’s April 2024 defence policy update..............................................................................................................................351 P. Whitney Lackenbauer

Culture Discursive Frameworks of Arctic Art...................................................................................................359 Johanna Ruotsalainen Indigenous lessons on how to harvest a polar bear: Exploring sustainability and sense-making in a post-growth economy...........................................................................................................................373 Benedikte Brincker Co-creating Arctic Futures: Perspectives from Emerging Leaders on Youth Leadership and Inclusive Governance..............................................................................................................................385 Pouya Dabiran-Zohoory, Anastasiya Henk, Sterre Koops, Shannon E. Moore, Ugo Nanni, Leah Palmer, Sophie Roher, Conor Savage, Polina Smirnova & Haliehana Stepetin Briefing Note Western Hudson Bay Belugas: the junction between humans, nature and law..............................406 Monim Benaissa

Introduction

Arctic Relations: Transformations, Legacies and Futures Lassi Heininen, Justin Barnes and Heather Exner-Pirot

One of the first lessons in IR is that “Nothing is forever, except change.” The same is seen in nature. This makes resilience a key feature, and more relevant than conservation per se. It is time to ask: is the Arctic better off embracing change, or resisting it?

The theme of this Arctic Yearbook 2024 is “Arctic Relations: Transformations, Legacies and Futures”. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has dramatically shifted the geopolitical context of the Arctic. The subsequent “pause” of the Arctic Council, instigated by the other seven Arctic states, placed decades of collaboration among state officials, Indigenous peoples, scientists, and other experts in this unique forum on hold. The growing tension within this geopolitical context has also placed tremendous strain on other important forums, institutions, and networks that engage with issues related to the Arctic.

Although we have seen a dramatic change in Arctic geopolitics and cooperation, we do not yet know if it will lead to structural change in Arctic geopolitics and governance. “Transformation” here (in the Arctic Yearbook title) means a structural change as a process, where parts and their interrelations and meanings, as well as methods and premises of involving actors, are changing.

It has been said that the Arctic region is “in constant transformation, (geo)politically, economically, culturally and indeed environmentally and geologically” (Arctic Yearbook, 2017). Furthermore, that “these rapid transformations... are affecting the entire Earth system” (Toyama Conference Statement, 2015). The many transformations the Arctic region has experienced since the end of the Cold War include (a) the shift from military tension to trans-boundary cooperation on environmental protection and science; (b) a recognition of the Arctic as a distinctive, cooperative region with shared interests and high geopolitical stability supported by shared region-building and knowledge-building activities; (c) a transfer from state-centrism towards circumpolar cooperation and self-governing by Indigenous peoples, devolution by subnational entities, and globalism by non-Arctic states; (d) an increasing awareness of the implications of the climate crisis and Lassi Heininen, Justin Barnes, and Heather Exner-Pirot are the Editors of the Arctic Yearbook

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globalization; and (e) the broadening of the debate among Arctic states’ and other non-state actors including Indigenous Peoples about the balance of environmental protection and economic activities.

All in all, the Arctic states together with Arctic Indigenous peoples, supported by peoples and civil societies of the region, reconstructed their geopolitical reality. This has been accomplished by first starting cross-border cooperation in certain fields, such as environmental protection, environmental remediation, search-and-rescue, and science. And second, consciously seeking stability by defining a “decrease in military tension and increase in political stability” as the ultimate aim. Confidence-building has been the preferred approach to deal with rivals in the region. This marked a significant change, a real transformation, from the Cold War’s military tension to the high geopolitical stability of the cooperative Arctic Council era.

When analyzing the transformations the Arctic has undergone, one conclusion is that this would not been possible without two elements: first, that certain geopolitical, security and governance features such as global nuclear deterrence as the original nature of Arctic militarization, a high degree of international legal certainty created by suitable conditions for cross-border cooperation; and second, that the Arctic states share several similar interests, common interests, such as the goal of addressing long-range pollution.

This cooperative attitude, which privileges geopolitical stability - the “Arctic model” - is threatened by another change, even an emerging transformation, due to a two-fold pressure and emerging crisis. Firstly, by dramatic impacts of climate change and loss of biodiversity; and secondly, by new uncertainties emerging due to the resurgence of great power rivalries, marked by an arms race and new East-West tension, a tit-for-tat approach to retaliation, and the (temporary) pause of panArctic cooperation. If the former threat picture is global and unavoidable, with a possible outcome of an “irreversible collapse” of some ecosystems; the latter one is very much regional and between two blocs, with so far minimal fallout in the Arctic region itself, limited to sanctions against Russia and pressure towards, and punishments of, Western researchers contacting Russians and travelling in Russia.

Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine has dramatically shifted the state of Arctic geopolitics and cooperation, it will not necessarily lead to a structural change in Arctic geopolitics and governance. Such a transformation would be possible if, for example, Russia, together with China and India, broadened the BRICS+ cooperation to include Arctic research by creating a parallel governance structure to the Arctic Council. We are not yet there, but this possibility, though damaging to the Arctic states’ shared interests, has been speculated and discussed, and has potential from the point of view of a Russia punished by Western sanctions.

Nonetheless, we do not know how this will end. That is a logical reason for patience to wait and evaluate, on the one hand, what we are observing; and to analyse, on the other, what changes and responses are necessary and desirable. Both require academic skills and capabilities. Experience is also an asset, as is academic freedom, in exploring all possible options.

In this evolving landscape, many questions have been raised about what future cooperation will look like among the many different types of actors that contribute to Arctic governance, as well as the diverse issue areas they contribute to. It is now more important than ever to take stock of the successful aspects of circumpolar governance and cooperation: how it emerged in the wake of the

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Cold War, how it has evolved over the past three decades, and how and whether to engage with an adversarial Russia.

We must analyze deeply and critically the last transformation, from the military tension of the Cold War into political stability: its legacies, including analyses related to the emergence, growth, decline of state and non-state cooperation; and lessons learned from the transformation of the Cold War to post-Cold War, including functional cooperation, back-channel diplomacy, and rapprochement.

The desire to use the lessons of the past three decades as we confront the next one was one of the primary motives we, at The Arctic Yearbook, had when we decided upon the theme of this year’s volume and put out our call for abstracts. Of course, the call is a list of wishes, meant to curate what we as editors thought would be academically and theoretically interesting. They include challenging, politically important, and sometimes sensitive issues, which we do not shy away from.

The reality often differs from the wishes, but in our case the collection of articles submitted has satisfied our expectations. The Arctic Yearbook 2024 consists of a rich variety of thoughtful analyses, descriptions and commentaries on Arctic relations, transformations and their legacies, and the future of the region.

As academics and commentators, we have the privilege of evaluating the hard work and critiquing the tradeoffs made by diplomats, politicians and Indigenous leaders, without ever having to make them ourselves. In return we are expected to be honest, curious, and even skeptical. We are called to think of scenarios and strategies unconstrained by political expediency.

The Arctic Yearbook is a tool and a platform to conduct this important work. We do not demand, nor we do desire, adherence to more or less acceptable views. We seek instead to provide a fulsome accounting from a multiplicity of perspectives and experiences. A transformation is an opportunity, after all. Let us not waste it.

Arctic Yearbook 2024 This year’s volume explores a variety of topics relevant to the constantly changing geopolitical and environmental context of the Arctic. The authors of Arctic Yearbook 2024 explore issues facing the Arctic from a European perspective; Russia’s challenges following its invasion of Ukraine including its desire for new non-Arctic partners in the region; contributions related to science, diplomacy, and governance opportunities and challenges; emerging strategies and policies, including Greenland’s new foreign policy and Canada’s updated defence policy; and cultural dynamics of the Arctic.

The View from Europe Emilie Canova argues that although the EU-Arctic relationship has experienced increasing scrutiny from media and researchers since 2008, the scarce amount of literature on this relationship from pre-2008 has consequences on how it is understood in today’s policy context. By analyzing key speeches, Arctic Council documents, and the EU’s Northern Dimension documents, Canova highlights how the EU and Arctic have interacted as “macro-regions” and traces shifting power relations within the key evolving geographical and political entities.

In the context of significant demographic challenges in the Arctic, characterized primarily by population decline and youth outmigration, Alexandra Middleton and Elana Zhurova Sæther discuss examples of national higher education strategies, employment support mechanisms, and Arctic Relations: Transformations, Legacies and Futures

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the strategies employed by several prominent Arctic universities. By analyzing university strategies, government policies, and regional demographic statistics, Middleton and Sæther identify important tensions between university-led retention strategies and national-level policies and explore the role universities can play in helping to solve the Arctic’s demographic challenges.

Nuppu Mielonen & Hanna Lehtimäki argue that as the EU works towards a green transition, material value chains for the development of EV batteries have local and global connections with implications for the Arctic. Mielonen and Lehtimäki highlight how the Arctic region has critical materials essential for the EU’s transition, and through a qualitative case study of the Kokkola Industrial Park in Finland, identify key actors and collaborative practices of this “industrial ecosystem” as well as the possibility for environmental, social, and economic value creation that can emerge from related processes.

While Canova has analyzed the pre-2008 period of EU relations with the Arctic, Niall J. Janssen analyzes EU policy positions regarding the Arctic and communications within them involving Indigenous-specific issues between 2008-2021. While arguing that the EU has failed to gain Observer status at the Arctic Council due to its poor policy positions and communications about Indigenous issues, Janssen suggests that the results of their qualitative analysis opens up possible avenues for future research to assess EU-Indigenous relations in the Arctic.

Russia and China Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to its isolation from Western partners in the Arctic. Sergey Sukhakin and P. Whitney Lackenbauer discuss how this isolation has pushed Russia to look for alternative partnerships, and while China occupies a special place, Beijing’s economic and military ambitions preclude China from being Moscow’s only partner in the Arctic. Sukhakin and Lackenbauer highlight how Russia is actively trying to engage partners from BRICS and G-20 platforms including India, Brazil, South Korea, and Singapore, but also how these new partnerships cannot replace what Russia has lost. The authors also argue that comprehensive cooperation with these many of these new partners would be limited due to the economic and geopolitical risks of Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine.

Maria Lagutina, Yana Leksyutina, and Alexander Sergunin approach the issue of Arctic cooperation in the context of Russia’s isolation from a Russian perspective, and highlight the necessity to search out non-Arctic partners to continue “established relations of the Arctic states and sectors of the Arctic economy.” Lagutina, Leksyutina and Sergunin discuss the evolution of China’s key interests and activities in the Arctic as well as the shifting bi-lateral relationships between China and each of the Arctic states within the current geopolitical context. The authors indicate their perspective that due to increasing tension in many of these relationships, bi-lateral cooperation with Russia is becoming an increasingly attractive option for China.

Mihai Giboi engages with the ongoing debate about Russia’s regional interests by observing how the Arctic fits within Russia’s wider geopolitical conditions. Through an analysis of Russian strategic documents and relevant literature, Giboi argues that Russia’s core interests are not vested in the Arctic but the region provides significant geostrategic value for its great power ambitions by providing Russia and its Navy the ability to bypass what it sees as increasing encirclement due to NATO enlargement.

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Mathieu Landriault’s briefing note provides an update on the Observatory on Politics and Security in the Arctic’s (OPSA) key findings from its analysis of how the Arctic has been described by Russian press agencies, highlighting how Russian media coverage of Arctic issues has substantially changed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 2022. Landriault notes three key changes in how Russian press agencies portray the Arctic: Russia is now more inward-looking and refers less to other countries, the Arctic is framed as a region of competition and struggle, and that Russian press agencies have shifted in their coverage on Svalbard by rarely referring to Norwegian presence or control of the territory.

Science, Diplomacy, and Governance Natia Tsaritova explores the how observers of the Arctic Council contribute to its work through a case study of the PAME working group. Through an analysis of participation data, observer reports and reviews, and other official Arctic Council documents, Tsaritova highlight the key roles observers can have at the Arctic Council but also the role they play in embedding Arctic issues in the broader global context.

Hanna K. Lappalainen and co-authors argue that a better understanding of land-atmosphere-ocean feedbacks and interactions is crucial for developing effective sustainable development strategies and improving mitigation and adaptation plans for all Arctic stakeholders. The authors provide an overview of key topics related to ongoing atmospheric, oceanic, and cryospheric research in the Arctic and synthesizes insights from the Arena for the Gap Analysis of Existing Arctic Science Co-Operations (AASCO-1) project (2020–2022). The authors call for the development of integrated observations systems that draw from diverse sources and extend beyond traditional scientific boundaries.

Susan Vanek and co-authors provide an in-depth discussion on the work of the United States Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (USAPECS) over its 10 years of operation, highlighting important ways in which it has brought together early career researchers from across disciplines, regions, and historically underrepresented groups while advancing the principles of Inclusion, Diversity, Equity, and Accessibility (IDEA). The authors describe key collaborations with other agencies and organizations, and discusses key challenges and lessons learned over its decade of existence.

In the context of climate change and the struggle for most countries to meaningfully meet emissions reduction targets, Burgess Langshaw Power and Samuel Geisterfer discuss how the deployment of geoengineering techniques could become increasingly likely. Power and Geisterfer argue that geoengineering technologies pose potential risks, but more research is needed to understand their nature and likelihood. At the same time, governance mechanisms are needed to engage the public on this debate. As the Arctic region is experiencing the impacts of climate change more quickly than other regions, it is crucial that Arctic stakeholders have a say. The authors argue that the Arctic Council, with its eight member states and six Permanent Participant organizations representing Arctic Indigenous Peoples, is uniquely positioned to consult with stakeholders on geoengineering technologies in a new and meaningful way.

Manish Kumar Singh provides an overview of the key perspective shared at an international workshop titled “India’s Polar Region Policy Towards Building Partnership with Sustainable Approach” hosted by Rashtriya Raksha University in India. Under the theme “Our Planet, Our

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Responsibility,” the workshop was a collaborative effort of India’s Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES), National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR), and the University of the Arctic (UArctic) Network.

Robert P. Wheelersburg provides historical and current examples of how Arctic peoples have contributed to regional security at the domestic level. Through their discussion of the various programs that have supported these contributions in different Arctic states, Wheelersburg argues that improvements can be made to ensure North American Arctic grey-zone security, particularly in Alaska, and that increasing the engagement of Indigenous Peoples in this could expand Indigenous influence over stability and confidence-building measures.

Strategies and Policies Elena Kavanagh discusses the implications of climate change, emerging economic opportunities, and geopolitical dynamics in the Arctic on Ireland due to the country’s regional proximity and presence in the North Atlantic. As a result, Kavanagh argues that Ireland’s self-proclaimed experience as a proactive “global actor and bridge builder,” its polar traditions and strong research base, and the upcoming expiry of the “Global Ireland multi-year Strategy to 2025” present a timely opportunity for Ireland to clarify its position on the Arctic. Kavanagh provides an initial step towards a comprehensive policy analysis of Ireland’s role in the Arctic, and highlights the need for an Arctic strategy to proactively engage with the evolving Arctic political landscape.

Alex MacDonald explores the historical proposals to denuclearize the Arctic region between 1964 and 2012, and argues that key gaps in these proposals have led to the failure to present a series of viable confidence building measures and arms control measures needed to precede denuclearization. Through their use of historic and modern work, MacDonald offers a framework to advance the goal of achieving an Arctic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

Shipping activities in the Arctic are expected to increase as climate change advances. Ana Teresa Cardoso engages with this topic by discussing the implications of increased shipping on Arctic ecosystems and proposes that an integrated strategy for navigation in the Arctic – based on existing international programs and agreements – could improve the region’s sustainability.

Rasmus Leander Nielsen and Jeppe Strandsbjerg provide an in-depth look at Greenland’s new foreign policy strategy Greenland in the World - Nothing about us without us. Greenland’s Foreign, Security and Defense Policy 2024-2033 – an Arctic Strategy. Nielsen and Strandsbjerg outline the historical and geopolitical context of the strategy, and provide an analysis that highlights how certain issues have been emphasized over others including Greenland’s relationship with North America over the EU and Denmark. The authors identify the key implications of the strategy’s priorities for Greenland’s geopolitical aspirations and diplomatic relations.

Following the release of Canada’s 2024 defence policy update, P. Whitney Lackenbauer describes the policy context from which it has emerged and highlights its key focus on the Arctic.

Lackenbauer discusses how the defence policy update places an unprecedented focus on the Canadian Arctic and notes that “never before has Arctic sovereignty and security factored so prominently in a Canadian defence statement.” Lackenbauer provides the key points and approaches the Government of Canada has committed to, and provides a reflection on its place in the emerging global political and security context Canada is finding itself in.

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Culture Johanna Routsalainen reflects on the impact of colonization on the exchange of thoughts and artistic and aesthetic practices between the central and peripheral regions of Europe. Through this reflection, Routsalainen provides a discussion on the definition of “Arctic art” and its distinction from “Northern art,” and through a review of literature on Arctic art from the past two decades, engages in the debate about how art is defined differently depending on geographical, cultural, political, and environmental discourses.

Benedikte Brincker explores Indigenous sense-making of nature by analyzing Indigenous traditions of hunting and harvesting polar bears. Brincker identifies three principles that guide this practice: one relating to governance, another to rewards, and finally one that pertains to insurance. Their article considers these three principles and evaluates their ability to contribute to our understanding of sustainability and a post-growth economy.

Pouya Dabiran-Zohoory and co-authors share the perspectives offered by 29 emerging leaders who gathered ahead of the 2024 Arctic Frontiers Conference that are advocating for change across a spectrum of issues related to the Arctic. The authors discuss the concept of “youthwashing” and offer a critique, as well as actionable recommendations, for fostering inclusive decision-making. As the Arctic is undergoing significant change, the authors suggest that framework respectful of all generations that is rooted in justice for all Arctic peoples is needed.

In their commentary looking at the connections between humans, nature, and law, Monim Benaissa discusses the importance of beluga whales to Inuit society. Benaissa argues that in addition to maintaining traditional Inuit values, protecting marine mammals and maintaining a sustainable tourist attraction in Hudson Bay requires the involvement of local stakeholders as well as policy makers in implementing the provisions of international and national environmental law.

Arctic Relations: Transformations, Legacies and Futures

Arctic Yearbook 2024 Year in Review Tiia Manninen

2024

February

January

The Ice Innovation Festival in Kirkenes, Norway, highlights technological solutions in addressing Arctic challenges.

Arctic Frontiers 2024 takes place in Tromsø, bringing together over 1,000 participants from 30 countries to discuss sustainable development priorities in the Arctic.

In Brussels, an EPB policy briefing is held at the European Parliament, examining the findings of OCEAN:ICE and Arctic PASSION. On 31st January, the Arctic Council’s Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) publishes a report showing a 37 % increase in Arctic shipping over the past decade, based on the Arctic Ship Traffic Data (ASTD) System.

The Jokkmokks Market in Sweden celebrates Sámi culture, aligning with Sámi National Day on 6 February.

In Toronto, the Arctic360 Annual Conference explores Arctic development opportunities from the North American perspective by focusing on supporting sustainable economic growth.

The Polar Symposium in Monaco showcases the increasing international interest in Arctic affairs, with discussions on the region’s environmental and economic issues.

At the end of the month, Finland hosts Polar Bear Pitching, an event that connects Arcticbased startups with international investors.

On 7 March, Sweden formally becomes NATO’s 32nd member.

March

Between 20 and 22 March, the 16th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region takes place in Kiruna, Sweden.

The Arctic Science Summit Week in Edinburgh brings together scientists worldwide to present new research on Arctic climate impacts.

The month concludes with the Sámi Easter Festival in Kautokeino, Norway, which celebrates Sámi cultural heritage and resilience through performances and traditions.

Tiia Manninen serves as Communications Manager at the Arctic Yearbook.

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The Arctic Encounter symposium takes place in Anchorage, and the Arctic Security Conference is in Copenhagen.

April

Environmental concerns are addressed at the 3rd International Conference on Ecosystem Approach to Management in Tromsø.

In an effort to strengthen regional cooperation, Russia and China’s PLA navies signed a MoU on naval search and rescue. Additionally, Russia invites BRICS countries to participate in Arctic exercises in 2025 to test equipment suitable for extreme environments.

The Arctic Council’s Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) publishes its fifth Arctic Shipping Status Report, based on data from the Arctic Ship Traffic Data (ASTD) System. The report reveals that over 1,660 unique vessels operated in the Arctic since 2022, with fishing vessels making up the largest share (44 %).

May

The Arctic Circle Berlin Forum expands Arctic discussions to Central Europe. At the same time, the EU Arctic Forum and Indigenous Peoples' Dialogue in Brussels reinforce cooperation frameworks focused on sustainable development and regional security.

In Bodø, the Arctic Congress and Assembly 2024 foster academic collaboration on Arctic research, while the High North Dialogue emphasises sustainable economic development.

On 23 May, the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) comes into force to secure essential raw materials critical to the EU’s climate goals and technological advancements. This legislation seeks to strengthen the EU’s autonomy in sourcing, processing, and recycling critical materials.

June

Early in June, China hosts the inaugural session of the Third Pole Climate Forum (TPCF), the first regional climate forum for high mountain regions. The TPCF issues a seasonal climate outlook for June to September 2024 to inform regional decision-making and address knowledge gaps in climate impacts.

The UArctic Assembly in Bodø focuses on strengthening networks in Arctic higher education, supporting collaborative research, and capacity-building initiatives across northern institutions.

July

The Arctic Development Expo in Inuvik showcases economic opportunities in the North, highlighting resource development and infrastructure projects.

The Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) ban in Arctic waters officially takes effect on 1st July. While the ban marks a step toward reducing environmental risks, there are concerns that alternative fuels introduced due to this regulation could pose a higher environmental risk in the event of spills, potentially impacting Arctic ecosystems.

Canada, Finland, and the United States form the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact), recognizing their joint priority of upholding safety and security in the Arctic.

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July

On July 22, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) released its updated 2024 DOD Arctic Strategy, the first revision since 2019. The strategy outlines the DOD's approach to ensuring a secure and stable Arctic, in alignment with the 2022 National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

On July 24, China and Russia held the 11th meeting of the China-Russia Investment Cooperation Committee in Moscow, where both countries agreed to deepen cooperation in investment and energy sectors, strengthening their strategic partnership in Arctic development.

September

August

On 27 July, a Ukrainian drone hits a Tu-22M3 bomber at Olenya airfield on the Kola Peninsula.

August 2024 marks a record-breaking summer on Svalbard, with temperatures reaching new highs. At Svalbard Airport, the average summer temperature reaches 8.5 °C, making it the third consecutive year of record-breaking summer temperatures in Svalbard.

Arctic sea ice retreats to near-historic lows, with the minimum extent likely reached on September 11, 2024, as reported by NASA and the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC).

The European Polar Science Week in Copenhagen and the 17th Polar Law Symposium in Östersund convene to address this issue, combining scientific and legal perspectives.

On 24 September, Michael Sfraga is confirmed by the Senate as Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs as the inaugural U.S. Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs.

October

On October 10, two United Nations committees find that Finland violated Sámi Indigenous rights by granting mineral exploration permits on their territory without an impact assessment or adequate participation process.

Joint Russian and Chinese military activities in the Arctic Ocean area emerge. Moscow and Beijing begin joint naval and aerial patrols in the region, prompting the U.S. to monitor the interactions between the two countries closely.

The Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik focuses on pressing regional challenges, while the 9th China-Nordic Arctic Cooperation Symposium highlights growing Asian engagement in Arctic affairs.

November

On November 8, the Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee meets in Ottawa to advance shared priorities for a more prosperous Inuit Nunangat.

The Calotte Academy 2024 takes place from 11 to 17 November in the European Arctic and Sapmi, with sessions and excursions in Rovaniemi, Luleå, Hetta, Kautokeino, Inari, and Sodankylä.

November records a milestone as global sea ice extent reaches a historic low of 23.15 million km².

In Kiruna, the Forum for the Arctic and Antarctic promotes cooperation across both polar regions

Manninen

I.

The View from Europe

Emergent regions? A historical perspective on ArctiCEUrope relations (1970s-2008) Emilie Canova

Since European Union (EU)-Arctic relations have been increasingly under scrutiny both by the media and researchers since 2008. Yet, because there was no EU policy documents dedicated to the Arctic region before 2008, the literature is scarce on their relations pre-2008. This has consequences for how post-2008 relations have been framed and understood as EuropeArctic and even EU-Arctic relations predate 2008. A historical perspective adding nuances and context is thus lacking in our current understanding of the relations between the Arctic and its governance (the ArctiC) and EU/Europe (EUrope).

This paper fills in missing links and knowledge gaps by examining how EUrope and the ArctiC interacted as ‘macro-regions’ through a close historical analysis of their relations from the 1970s to 2008. Documents from Arctic and European institutions’ digital archives have been studied using critical geopolitics and region building approaches. Three periods with key documents are analysed. Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech in 1987 and Stoltenberg’s Rovaniemi speech in 1992 are first scrutinized. It then moves on to describe how Arctic Council SAO meeting minutes and EU’s Northern Dimension documents respond to each other from 2000 to 2007. Finally, it focuses on the emergence of the proposition by the European Parliament of an Arctic treaty (2005-2009) as being part of a longer trend of geopolitical reconceptualization of the ArctiC and EUrope. The paper highlights the dynamic interactions between the evolving geographical and political entities that EUrope and the ArctiC have been and traces shifts in power relations.

Introduction European Union (EU)-Arctic relations have been increasingly under scrutiny both by the media and researchers since 2008. Yet, because there were no EU policy documents dedicated to the Arctic region before 2008, the literature is scarce on their pre-2008 relations. This has consequences for how post-2008 relations have been framed and understood. A historical perspective adding nuances and context is thus lacking in our current understanding of these relations. Having a better knowledge of pre-2008 relations is important not only for the sake of it but because they shaped later relations and therefore are key to the understanding of the EU’s difficulties in becoming recognized as a legitimate actor in the Arctic after 2008.

One of the difficulties for researchers comes from the evolution in time of the entities under scrutiny in terms of political institutions, geographical extent, and actors involved. Indeed, the Arctic starts to emerge as an international region in the 1990s, and especially after 1996 with the creation of the Arctic Council (Keskitalo, 2004). The European institutions have also undergone drastic changes over the period both in terms of deepening political integration and geographical extent. The conceptualization of a European geopolitical unity, created by political and economic Emilie Canova is a PhD candidate at the Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge

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integration, really developed after 1992 and the Maastricht Treaty (Bachmann, 2021). However, European encounters with the Arctic go back to commercial whaling and the exploration and colonisation age, from the first expeditions in the sixteenth to the twentieth century (e.g.

Loukacheva, 2007; Salvadori, 2021). During the Cold War parenthesis of bloc confrontation in the Arctic, the European Communities (EC)1 did not have a direct relationship with the Arctic despite the adhesion of the Kingdom of Denmark to the EC in 1973. Indeed, Greenland left the EC in 1985 following a referendum and has since held the status of an Oversea Country and Territory (OCT). The accession of Sweden and Finland to the EU in 1995 meant that the EU formally extended above the Arctic Circle. Finland proposed the creation of EU’s Northern Dimension policy that includes part of the Arctic under its geographical scope (Heininen & Käkönen, 1998).

Despite the mention of the Arctic, no EU policy documents define the Arctic before 2008.

There is a strong scholarship on the Northern Dimension or the Barents region (e.g. Heininen & Käkönen, 1998; Browning, 2003; Heininen & Nicol, 2007; Archer & Etzold, 2008; Zimmerbauer, 2013; Elenius et al., 2015; Bailes & Ólafsson, 2017). However, links between earlier EU engagement in the North through these programmes and its subsequent Arctic policy need further investigations (Airoldi, 2008; Heininen & Nicol, 2007; Powell, 2011, 2013; Wegge, 2011).

Moreover, the EU’s interactions with the Arctic and its governance during the 1990s and early 2000s have been studied through EU documents only (Airoldi, 2008; Jacquot, 2019; Maurer, 2010; Raspotnik, 2018). Therefore, this period needs more investigation from the sources directly, especially on the Arctic side. It was also necessary to complicate the main narrative of a single political entity (the EU) engaging itself in a geographical area (the Arctic).

This paper fills in missing links and knowledge gaps by reconceptualising how EU/Europe (EUrope) and the Arctic and its governance (ArctiC) interacted as ‘macro-regions’ (Mareï & Richard, 2020; Väätänen, 2020), and through a close historical analysis of EUrope-ArctiC relations from the 1970s to 2008. The aim is to understand the scalar and inter-regional links between EUrope and the ArctiC over time. Three key aspects and moments are taken from the period 1970s-2008 and explored to highlight these evolutions and inter-actions at different scales and involving different actors and geographical and geopolitical imaginaries. I first examine Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech in 1987 and Stoltenberg’s Rovaniemi speech in 1992. I then move on to describe how AC Senior Arctic Officials’ (SAO) meeting minutes and EU’s Northern Dimension documents respond to each other from 2000 to 2007. Finally, I focus on the emergence of the proposition by the European Parliament of an Arctic treaty (2005-2009) as being part of a longer trend of geopolitical reconceptualization of the ArctiC and EUrope.

By exploring the documents with a critical geopolitics approach on region-building and interregionalism (Börzel & Risse-Kappen, 2016; Hänggi, 2005; Paasi, 1991; Toal, 2003) and focusing on the geographical representations, I shed light on the dynamic interactions between the evolving geographical and political entities that EUrope and the ArctiC have been. The paper highlights the dynamism and fluidity of the concepts we are used to in international relations but also contextualizes and unearths continuity and ruptures in power relations.

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Geostrategic interdependence of two emergent regions Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech in 1987: peace in Europe through peace in the Arctic The end of the 1980s saw the emergence of the Arctic as an international region, as documented by many scholars (e.g. Lackenbauer & Dean, 2021; Osherenko & Young, 1989). One key moment in these developments was the speech given by the former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in Murmansk on 1st October 1987. Scholars have stressed the importance of considering the speech in the longer-term perspective, highlighting a gradual shift from the start of circumpolar cooperation to ultimately the conceptualization of the Arctic as an international region (e.g.

Escudé-Joffres, 2020; Keskitalo, 2004; Powell & Dodds, 2014; Steinberg et al., 2015; Young, 2005).

Reading it through the lenses of the history of ArctiC-EUrope relations reveals the interconnectedness from a geostrategic point of view of Europe and the Arctic, understood as world regions, although they did not yet include the current regional political and institutional framework (inexistant in the Arctic and only covering West-Europe).

Gorbachev geographically positions himself “in Murmansk, the capital of the Soviet Polar Region” (Gorbachev, 1987). This point of view allows him to give a new definition of the Arctic.

Pic (2022a) stresses that “beyond the political turning point this speech represented, it also marked an important geographical shift regarding the discursive production of a coherent Arctic space, that will eventually lead to the emergence of an Arctic scale”. By defining the Arctic as lands and seas above the Arctic Circle, Gorbachev enlarged the traditional Soviet definition of the Arctic which designated the High Arctic/Arctic Ocean (Olsen, 2020), and extended for the first time the “Arctic regional scale” beyond the ocean basin (Pic, 2022b). By doing so he also revisited the Polar Mediterranean imaginary promoted by the Canadian-American anthropologist Vilhjalmur Stefansson (Stefansson, 1921; Steinberg, 2016; Steinberg et al., 2015). The idea is developed in two different aspects in the speech. The first one is the economic and social development of the area, the idea that “the potential of contemporary civilization could permit us to make the Arctic habitable” (Gorbachev, 1987). This draws on the idea of the Mediterranean pictured as the “cradle of the European civilization” (Tsoukalis, 2022). This imaginary discursively describes the Arctic not only in terms of similarity with a key geographical part of Europe, but also in terms of commonality with the European project as a “civilian” project of economic development (Bachmann & Sidaway, 2009; Déclaration Schuman, 1950). The second one is the geographical similarity with the Mediterranean as a sea/ocean surrounded by land and a crossroad of different cultures: “It is the place where the Euroasian, North American and Asian Pacific regions meet, where the frontiers come close to one another and the interests of states belonging to mutually opposed military blocs and nonaligned ones cross.”2 The various geographical imaginaries and knowledge displayed in the speech highlight a specific vision of the world and link Arctic and Europe in a security ordering of the world. In this context, cooperation in the Arctic is needed not only for its own sake, but primarily “for the benefit of the national economies and other human interests of the circumpolar Arctic states, for Europe and the entire international community”3. The three concentric geographical circles are linked through the security architecture. Policy moves to make the Arctic “a zone of peace” belong to the aim to mitigate the soviet-US nuclear rivalry and to create a “Common European home”4 . The Arctic is thus important for Europe as part of the security architecture and their construction as secure regions is not possible in isolation. The varied geographical scope of the initiatives proposed by

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Gorbachev in his speech are to be understood from this perspective. Not all are directly linked to security, but for the USSR they all had security policy implications (Åtland, 2008). Out of eight initiatives, three were related to the military sector and had the European Arctic as geographical scope, two economic initiatives also had Northern European geographical focus, and the last three in environmental and socio/cultural exchange had a wider circumpolar Arctic geographical scope.

The Arctic and Europe were conceptually constructed in relation to one another. An Arctic cooperation could only be envisaged as such because Europe would become a “common home” and vice-versa, and (the demilitarization of) the European Arctic was the enabler. As the aim of the initiatives was to go beyond the division of the world into two political and military blocs, Europe and the Arctic can be conceived as independent regions made of states having commonality.

Whilst security links between the Arctic and Europe were emphasized by the USSR at the beginning to justify the necessity for an Arctic cooperation, the geopolitical transformations triggered by the collapse of the USSR lead to circumpolar cooperation being decoupled from European security perspectives to focus on the Arctic only. The political implementation of Gorbachev’s speech, in the form of Arctic cooperation, has been made from a different geographical (and security) perspective, and in a different geopolitical and historical context than the one in which the speech was made. The security aspects of Arctic cooperation and its link with Europe were abandoned (notably under the impulsion of the US) and replaced by the will of some (such as Canada, Inuit leaders and Finland) to create a circumpolar vision (English, 2013; Keskitalo, 2004; Lackenbauer & Dean, 2021; Tennberg, 1998). Actors reinterpreted Gorbachev’s speech through an Arctic perspective and selected only some propositions. The connection between the environment and security, and between the Arctic and Europe was, however, still present in the Norwegian initiative to establish the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC).

Stoltenberg’s Rovaniemi speech in 1992: the Barents region and the Europeanisation of the North The Kirkenes Declaration that established the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) in 1993 directly linked the security situation in Europe with cooperation in the Arctic. Notwithstanding the (current) Arctic dimension of the BEAC, the study of the documents reveals that the creation of the Barents region was seen at the time as part of the Europeanisation process5 and of the recomposition of the geopolitical landscape in the European North with the application of Finland, Norway, and Sweden to the EC/EU. The European Commission was a founding member of the BEAC. One key document to understand the Norwegian mindset is the speech given by the then Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thorvald Stoltenberg, pronounced in the framework of the conference “From North calotte to Great calotte” in Rovaniemi in October 1992. This followed a conference in September 1992 in Kirkenes at the initiative of the Norwegian government to launch a Barents cooperation. The analysis of this speech shows the evolution of the ideas of regions and interconnectedness between the Arctic and Europe with the emergence of the Barents sub-regional scale to EUrope-ArctiC relations in the early 1990s, and the potential development of institutional links.

The 18-page long speech focuses on the “place and role of a Barents region in the new Europe” (Stoltenberg, 1992). It provides a historical account of the importance of the region for Norway as a transnational region that traditionally spanned over the Nordic countries and North-West Russia. The presence of the Sami people and their role in building a transnational region is Canova

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emphasized. The Norwegian initiative to create a Euro-Arctic region took place in the double context of the end of the Cold War and of the debate in the Nordic countries about EU accession, with the widespread idea of “Europeanising the North” (Elenius et al., 2015; Stokke et al., 1994).

Stoltenberg highlighted the fact that on top of the traditional East dimension of economic and people-to-people cooperation in the region between Nordic countries and West Russia, the initiative would now look South to Europe as well. By doing so, he was positioning the Barents region as Russia’s new way to Europe. The characteristics of the region are very close to the one that are still highlighted nowadays (resource rich, strategic importance of the North-East…). He mentioned the Rovaniemi process on environmental protection but clearly separates the Arctic Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS) launched in 1991 as an “Arctic question” (“arktiske spørsmål”) from the process taking place in the Barents region. The use in Norwegian of the word “arctic” and not “high north” («Nordområdene») also signals that Norway saw the AEPS as having a different geographical scope and interest from the traditional understanding of the Arctic, but as clearly circumpolar in nature (Medby, 2017). He situated the Barents initiative in the context of the Nordic countries striving to Europe and EU-membership seen as “the key to full-fledged cooperation in the North”: “For the Russians, co-operation in the North is also interesting because it is a window to cooperation with Western Europe. It is my impression that the Russians would find a Barents region more interesting if it were linked to the EC, because they are interested in the widest possible window. […] the Nordic Region can become a link between EC co-operation and NorthWest Russia. Such ties exist today with the Danish membership of the EC, and ties will be strengthened if other Nordic countries join the EC. […] It is not inconceivable that the EC will be expanded by just one or two new Nordic members. This could mean that a new border line will cut across the North Calotte at a time when we are keen to demolish or minimise divisions. […] it may mean that the North Calotte will be divided in the sense that part of the North Calotte will orientate itself in one direction towards one set of institutions, while the rest of the North Calotte will orientate itself in another direction and towards other institutions. […] There are also aspects of the current EC regulations that are unsuitable for the North Calotte. […]

It is therefore important to develop a separate set of regulations for the Arctic EC.” (Stoltenberg, 1992)6 Stoltenberg foresaw the situation as it is now, with North Europe divided over EU membership, which has consequences on the EU’s place and role in the Arctic (Canova, 2023). Later in the speech, Stoltenberg also pointed to the risk of centre-periphery divide with EU decisions made far away from the North, on “the continent.” To prevent that, he stressed the need for reciprocal relationships and the need for the EU to develop a strategy with regards to the North, both for internal questions (such as agriculture) and external ones to balance out the centre of gravity of Europe that was still in the South at the time. This was also the idea behind the Finnish proposition of a “Northern Dimension for the EU policies” (European Council, 1997; Finnish government, 2006).

In the Kirkenes Declaration, the Barents region is depicted as an Arctic region in terms of natural, geophysical and social characteristics, with the same vocabulary that is used in the AEPS documents (AEPS, 1991, 1993; Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1993). However, there is a clear discrepancy between the introduction of the declaration and the rest of the document where the BEAC region is described as belonging to Europe in terms of security and political architecture.

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Cooperation on the Arctic environment is presented as a need for European security and in the Barents region in order to create closer ties between Northern Europe and the rest of the European continent. This echoes the Murmansk speech propositions, but the main difference is that cooperation with Russia is conditioned to reforms: “support for the ongoing process of reform in Russia which aims inter alia at strengthening democracy, market reforms, and local institutions, and which is therefore important for closer regional cooperation in the Barents EuroArctic Region” (Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1993).

The period from the end of the 1980s to 1996 was a time of rapid changes. It witnessed various political actors, from states’ representatives to Indigenous peoples, trying to put forward their interests and create or integrate regional (Arctic or European) political institutions accordingly.

Institutional and political contacts between actors in Europe and the Arctic existed, however, they were not yet framed as EU-Arctic relations. Relations with the US and Canada were seen as transatlantic, relations with Russia were framed as East/West confrontation, relations with the Nordic countries were framed as part of the process of Europeanisation and enlargement of the EEC/EU. In the Soviet view, Europe and the Arctic were linked from a security and strategic perspective and framed as geostrategic/confrontation theatres. Yet, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the post-Cold War dynamics changed the context in which development towards regionalisation in the Arctic had begun. Their interpretation and subsequent development in the 1990s, therefore, shifted from the initial impetus and allowed for certain actors (such as Finland or Canada) to position themselves in a changing international order. On the other side, the political integration in Europe and the notion of a common space in geographical terms really took off in 1992, and especially with Schengen in 1995 (Foucher, 2000). Russia was already integrated in the negotiations of Arctic cooperation programmes in the 1980s-90s, but from a European perspective, the end of the Cold war meant that the EU could extend its influence and “civilise” Russia by integrating it with wider Europe. European integration deepened and expanded through advancing Europeanisation in the North. The security link between environmental cooperation in the Arctic and Europe was thus reduced to a sub-regional level – the Barents region – whilst cooperation in the Arctic continued for its own sake, with specific features due to the push back from the Americans on security issues and legally binding regional institutions during Arctic Council negotiations. There is continuity between IASC, AEPS and the AC in the way the Arctic region is characterized and represented, mainly with a fragile environment in need of scientific knowledge, economic development and political protection.

As a result, different region-building dynamics occurred in each of the regions. The Arctic was being referred to through physical and biological attributes and primarily for states (and other entities, including later the EU) to take care of. Europe was being referred to through political institutions. These institutions encompassed Europe incompletely, but nevertheless the EU gradually became the metonymy of Europe after Maastricht.

The attempt to create an inter-institutional dialogue between the Arctic Council and the European Union in the 2000s In January 1995, Finland, and Sweden (and Austria) officially joined the EU. The enlargement of the EU to the North formally linked the EU to the Arctic region where the Arctic Council (AC) was formally established in September 1996. The creation of the AC broadened Arctic cooperation, and gave it more political weight, despite the exclusion of military issues (Arctic Canova

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Council, 1996). In December 1997, Finland proposed the Northern Dimension (ND) to the EU policies and that entered into force in 2000. The ND policy included part of the Arctic in its geographical scope. These events changed the dynamics between the regions but also continued previous trends.

The creation of the AC and the development of the ND policy meant that documentation is more abundant with minutes of SAO meetings, internal reports and policy documents being accessible online. It allows the construction of a detailed chronology of the relationships between entities and study of their mutual influences on each other. Even though there were no AC documents dedicated to the EU, the minutes of the AC SAO meetings disclose that cooperation with the EU was discussed in every single meeting from 2000 to 2007. Ministerial declarations also mention possible forms of cooperation with the EU through the ND. They reveal interactions between the EU and the AC at a technical level, especially through the representatives of the European Commission sent to the SAO meetings. The table (see table 1) shows how AC SAO meeting minutes and EU’s Northern Dimension documents responded to each other from 2000 to 2007 with the EU and the AC commenting on the work of each other, contradicting the idea that the EU “discovered” the Arctic in 2008.

Table 1. Table of documents mentioning EUrope/the ArctiC (1997-2004) Arctic Council documents and events

EU institutions documents and events Finnish proposal of a “Northern Dimension” to the EU policies to the Council in Dec 1997 (European Council, 1997) Nov 1998 Commission communication on “A Northern Dimension for the policies of the Union”: adds an external relations component to the Finnish proposition (Commission of the European Communities, 1998) April 1999 European Parliament (EP) (Resolution A40073/99 on a new strategy for agriculture in arctic regions, 1999) April 1999 EP report on the ND (European Parliament, 1999): Finnish rapporteurs; Urges the Commission to participate in the work of the AC. ND ministerial conference in Helsinki in Nov. 1999: Commission to draft an action plan for 20002003: Greenlandic Prime Minister Motzfeldt launched the idea of an “Arctic Window” in the ND; links AC working groups-ND: representatives from PAME and AMAP participated in the conference

SAO meeting in Washington in November 1999 (Arctic Council, 1999): Finnish SAO presented a document on the “Environmental aspects of the Northern dimension” and updated the SAOs about the ND ministerial; Russian SAO suggested that the AC could be “the EU’s window on to the Arctic” and to formalise a cooperation with the ND

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Fairbanks SAO meeting in April 2000 (Arctic Council, 2000a): Finnish SAO reported on developments in the BEAC and in the ND The Northern Dimension Action plan for 20002003 was endorsed by the Council in June 2000 (Council (general affairs), 2000; Council of the European Union, 2000): The AC (not listed in the first ND documents) is now listed among the institutions for cooperation; Greenland is not included in the geographical scope of the plan; no mention of the circumpolar Arctic EU Commission President Romano Prodi visited Greenland in July 2000 supported the idea of the “Arctic Window” AC ministerial meeting in Barrow in October 2000 and declaration (Arctic Council, 2000b) the EU was invited and attended for the first time Finland Chairship programme (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2001): aim to “make the European Union an Arctic co-operation partner”; proposition that “the Commission becomes a permanent Observer in the Council” SAO meeting in June 2001 in Rovaniemi (Arctic Council, 2001): DG RELEX, presented the “Arctic policies and activities of the EU”; mentioned the Greenlandic Arctic Window initiative SAO meeting in May 2002 in Oulu (Arctic Council, 2002a): Denmark had the presidency of the EU; announced the organisation of a ND conference in Greenland in August 2002 ND Ministerial Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland on Aug. 2002, with report written by Greenlandic government (Parliament of Greenland, 2003): the concept of the Arctic Window was further developed and included in the conference conclusions SAO report to the ministers for the Ministerial meeting in Inari in October 2002 + Inari declaration (Arctic Council, 2002c, 2002b): Canada was pushing for more Arctic to be incorporated in the next ND action plan; section dedicated to “Cooperation with European Commission” Oct 2002 3rd ministerial conference of the ND with Presidency conclusions and guidelines for a new action plan for 2004-2006 (Third ministerial conference on the Northern Dimension, 2002): Inclusion of a section on the Arctic Nov 2002 annual progress report (internal document) on the implementation of the ND action plan (Commission of the European Communities,

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Icelandic Chairship programme (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland, 2002): strengthening of cooperation with the EU was inscribed Jan 2003 EP resolution on the ND (Resolution P5_TA(2003)0521 on the Northern dimension, 2003): mentions the AC ministerial meeting in 2002; highlights the need to improve coordination between the EU, the AC, BEAC, and other forums involved “in arctic and regional matters”.

SAO meeting in April 2003 in Reykjavik (Arctic Council, 2003b): EU Commission representative updated the SAOs on the development of the New ND plan to be endorsed end of 2003 The Icelandic chair sent two letters to the SAOs ahead of the SAO meeting in October 2003 (Arctic Council, 2003c): aiming to build on the momentum and concretely implement the synergy between the AC and the ND The Chair also sent two letters to the Commission (Arctic Council, 2003a): AC’s input into the development of the ND action plan with a detailed list of AC activities that could be developed as ND projects; asked for concrete cooperation mechanisms.

In October 2003, the new ND action plan was presented (European Commission, 2003): apparition of a section dedicated to the Arctic region; Greenland is included in the geographical scope.

EP resolution November 2003 (Resolution P5_TA(2003)0020 on the Northern dimension New action plan 2004-2006, 2003): tabled in by Finnish MEPs; has a much stronger Arctic dimension; points out that the Arctic Window is not developed enough and that cooperation with the US and Canada are not mentioned in the new action plan Selfoss SAO meeting in May 2004 (Arctic Council, 2004a): listed the projects of the AC for “possible cooperation between the AC and the Commission on Arctic issues”; list was sent to the EUropean Commission in preparation for the workshop in Brussels planned for the Summer 2004.

AC-ND workshop took place in July 2004 in Brussels EP resolution on Arctic agriculture (Resolution P5_TA(2004)0014 on Arctic agriculture, 2004)

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Reykjavik SAO meeting in November 2004 and Reykjavik Declaration in 2004, (Arctic Council, 2004c, 2004b): the EU ND is still mentioned; show the disappointment of some Arctic stakeholders for the lack of follow-up by the EU on the July workshop; For the first time since the Barrow meeting in 2000, the EU did not send a representative. But this meeting had also the lowest attendance from observers ever.

I analysed the documents from a triple perspective: representations of the regions in the documents; tracing the actors involved, and the geographical scope/scale linked with the narrative/aims of cooperation.

From 1996 to 2004, the relationship was driven by Arctic actors, especially by the AC at a time when the forum sought international recognition and to position itself as the “voice” of the Arctic (Arctic Council, 2003a). The EU was one of the key partners identified, as it was developing its own programme that partially encompassed the geographical remit of the Arctic. In this context, the AC attempted to create real coordination and partnership with the EU through the ND. The word “window” was a recurring term that is used by at least three different actors, starting with Stoltenberg in his 1992 speech. It was then used by the Greenlandic Premier calling for an “Arctic window in the Northern Dimension” in 1999, notably to include Greenland in the policy. Finally, the Russian SAO also described the AC as a possible window for the EU into the Arctic. This is an interesting metaphor in the aftermath of the Cold War, characterized by the famous metaphor of an “iron curtain” (Churchill, 1946). Windows can be associated with transparency, which leads to trust from both sides but also opportunity. However, in the end, someone must open it for the opportunity to be seized and real cooperation to happen, and exploring this period reveals missed opportunities that disrupted momentum.

In EU documents, the Arctic region was framed through the lenses of regional development and had a fluctuating geographic scope, illustrating the influence of Arctic actors but also the indecisiveness of the EU. Some political entities played a key role and had leeway to shape the relationships between the AC and the EU. 2002 was particularly dense in exchanges during the preparation of the new ND action plan, in which the AC (especially the Finnish and Icelandic chairships7) and Greenland played a key role in trying to further engage the EU in the Arctic.

Despite a few political events, these exchanges remained primarily at the technical level between the SAOs and a few people from the Commission. The attempt to influence the second action plan to introduce a circumpolar scale and to widen the scope to Greenland was only superficially successful. In the second action plan, a section on the Arctic was added and Greenland was incorporated in the scope of the programme, but the focus remained very much on the North/East and Russia in the context of preparing the 2004 enlargement, a process that would see ten new Eastern European Member States joining the EU. The lack of concrete follow-up on the AC initiatives disappointed the SAOs (see table 1). The attempts to establish a real institutional dialogue and cooperation mechanism stumbled due to two interlinked problems. The first one was institutional. The EU Commission refused to participate formally in the AC and did not ask for observer status. The second one is more of a political nature. Both regional institutions had

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different aims and reasons for cooperating with the other despite common goals for themselves, such as sustainable development.

Indeed, the analysis also shows that the EU and the AC had two different geographical scopes in the Arctic. The AC was trying to build a truly circumpolar vision and international recognition as a primary cooperation body for the region, whilst the EU was focused on deepening EUropean integration and preparing for geographical enlargement. In this context the EU was interested in Europeanising the European Arctic. From that perspective, the ND and BEAC areas were of interest for the EU. The EU envisioned the Arctic as a neighbourhood and thus as part of the Europeanisation process as well as as part of its policy towards Russia. On the Arctic side, the geographical representations were quite different. The AC wanted cooperation with the EU because the EU had a policy that partly covers the Arctic, and shared normative goals (sustainable development, peace, etc.). As such, the EU was seen as a natural institutional partner. That was very much encouraged by Finland, which positioned itself as a liaison between the institutions. The discursive framings of the EU and of the Arctic have obscured the interdependence between the Arctic and Europe, and between environment and security. During this period, the geostrategic and security dimension of Europe-Arctic relations was clearly absent. The Arctic was portrayed in terms of environment protection and sustainable development, and progressively climate change as well. The security dimension remained centred in the ND and the Barents region, but the solution was Europeanisation to bring Russia closer to European values and economic growth.

Two separate political regions thus continued to be discursively (re)produced.

During this period, the Arctic was progressively and consistently associated with themes that shaped how external actors perceived of the Arctic region. We saw the evolution of the Arctic being associated with purely environmental degradation and protection to being associated with climate change concerns and its role in the global climate system (Arctic Council, 2004c). In the EU’s documents, the Arctic region is systematically associated with the environment, research and increasingly climate change. In the Inari Declaration, for the first time, a whole section is dedicated to climate change (that was previously merged with environmental concerns), and the warming of the Arctic is mentioned (Arctic Council, 2002b). Additionally, we can see the insertion of Arcticspecific themes in international discussions and the implementation of international agreements

by Arctic states that concern the Arctic. During the Icelandic chairship, SAOs discussed the idea of integrating the findings from the Arctic Climate Change Assessment (ACIA) in the IPCC report of 2002 (Arctic Council, 2002b). It goes hand in hand with the fact that the AC is also developing an international profile that shapes the Arctic region even more prominently with specific concerns. Its relations with external entities, such as the EU, played a role in pushing the forum to gain an international Arctic identity while also speaking for a region that it was simultaneously shaping by its association with certain topics. The goal of the AC, which was to develop knowledge about the region, was solidified by the publication in 2004 of two ground-breaking reports: the Arctic Climate Change Assessment (ACIA) and the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR).

Despite these achievements, the drop in attention from Observers started during the 2002-2004 Icelandic chairship, and continued during the 2004-2006 Russian chairship (Knecht, 2017).

2004 was a pivotal year for both the EU and the AC. Around 2004, the (re)-emergence of power relations between the ArctiC and EUrope through geographical and geopolitical framings at different interrelated scales can be observed. Two sets of representations of the Arctic emerged

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in the EU documents. On the one hand, the Arctic is described in positive terms of peace and cooperation, but also in terms of an endangered pristine environment to be protected, which reproduced the description of the region found in the AC documents. On the other hand, the European Arctic is described as a challenging region to be developed and democratised on the Russian side. In both cases, the EU is positioning itself as a “helper” and provider of solutions which create unequal power dynamics. The security environment of the EU was cause for concern and “The European security strategy” was published in December 2003. For the first time, a joint threat assessment at the European scale was conducted and clear objectives for advancing the EU’s security interests were outlined. However, the Arctic is not mentioned in this document. In this context, one of the reasons for the drop in interest from the Observers to the AC during this period could be that the Arctic was seen as a peaceful region which did not require strategic attention compared to other EU neighbourhoods (the Balkans or the Middle East, for instance).

However, precisely when security became a EUropean concern, references to European integration and security stopped in the BEAC documents. From 2003 onwards, the emphasis was put on cooperation with other structures, such as the AC or the ND. The declarations have become more technical. The declaration for the 10th anniversary of the Kirkenes declaration is key in that regard (BEAC, 2003). It marked the shift from considerations on security to sustainable development, and by doing so, from considering the Barents region as part of the European process of regionalisation to considering it primarily as an Arctic sub-region. It is thus important to note that although both are not mutually exclusive and that the Barents region had a double nature and regional identity from the beginning, this shift in its regional “belonging”, going from a strong European anchor to stressing more and more its Arctic identity, is far from innocent and plays out at different intertwined scales. Regional developments at the Arctic or European scales influence the way the Barents sub-region is characterised, and on the other hand, the characterization of the Barents region as either predominantly Arctic or European has consequences at the regional scale, as it changes the limits of EUrope or the Arctic and contributes to blurring the political limits of the regions.

The years from 2004 to 2008 are key to understand the 2007-2008 shift in the Arctic, in Europe, and globally, with the development of crucial trends. This period has been studied slightly more (Airoldi, 2008; Maurer, 2010; Raspotnik, 2018), but it is also very dense and is a turning point in the relationship. Therefore, it needs careful attention to trace the actors involved and the shifts/evolutions in geographical representations (Powell, 2011). The EU started to develop as a geopolitical subject, but the Arctic region was not (yet) represented as a geopolitical theatre. Within a few years, this changed, and new actors emerged as drivers of these relations.

Moreover, another set of political actors start to show interest in the Arctic Ocean and become interested in the governance of the region. The number of questions concerning the Arctic and the Northern Dimension asked by MEPs illustrate this inversion dynamic (see Figure 1). There was a growing concern with climate change globally and especially in the Arctic.

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Evolution of the number of MEP questions concerning the Arctic and the Northern Dimension per legislative period 50 40 30 20 10 0 Before 1994 1994-1999

1999-2004

2004-2009

2009-2014

2014-2019

2019-2024

Number of questions on the Arctic Number of questions on the Northern Dimension

Figure 1. Data source: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

In the EU, the internal political debate about the nature of the EU and the future Constitutional Treaty,8 as well as its enlargement, changed the nature of the EU. The EU transformed both in its institutional and political nature and in its geographical extent with its enlargement to ten new Member States (MS) between May 2004 and 2007. The internal political consolidation and debate on the nature of the EU goes hand in hand with the evolution of the role of the EU on the international stage as a unitary actor (Habermas, 2011). Moreover, scholars point out that the “reconfiguration of the political space is at the heart of the project of European integration” (Bialasiewicz et al., 2005). The enlargement to the East also meant that the EU would have new neighbours, and thus a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was implemented in 2004 with two different areas: the South/Mediterranean area and Eastern Europe/Caucasus area9. This initiated the process of giving an institutional and legal shape to values that also have geographical dimensions: the question of where Europe is and what the EU’s purpose is. These values were redebated between an opposing free-market vision (British vision) and a more geopolitical vision for Europe as a new international subject (Bialasiewicz, 2011; Bialasiewicz et al., 2005). At the same time, Russia’s behaviour on the international stage became more and more assertive, as illustrated by the Munich speech in 2007 and the war in Georgia in 2008 (Devyatkin, 2023; Laruelle, 2018).

In this context, the ND was not included in the European Neighbourhood Policy framework but there were clear commonalities in the objectives, as both aimed at the dissemination of values and democracy and economic prosperity beyond EU’s borders as well as the use of the same instruments as the ENP (partnership with Russia, Interreg, accession instruments, structural funds). After a year with almost no EU documents dedicated to the ND or the Arctic, 2005 saw a return of interest from both the Commission and the Parliament.

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Table 2. Table of documents mentioning EUrope/the ArctiC (2005-2009) Arctic Council documents and events

EU institutions documents and events May 2005 a non-paper10 by the Commission called “ND options beyond 2005” was drafted and distributed to the MS, Norway, Iceland and Russia in order to start negotiations in view of the November ministerial meeting (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a) Sept. 2005 a plenary debate on the ND was organised + resolution on the future of the ND (Resolution P6_TA(2005)0430 on the future of the Northern dimension, 2005): called for the first time for a “charter for the Arctic governance”

Yakutsk SAO meeting in April 2005 (Arctic Council, 2005a): for the first time the topic of cooperation with the EU was not at the agenda SAO meeting in Khanty-Mansyisk in October 2005 (Arctic Council, 2005b): representative of the EU Commission in Moscow attended; mentioned the ND ministerial meeting that would take place in Brussels in Nov. 2005; presented the EU priorities in view of the new ND in 2006.

ND ministerial took place in Brussels and political declaration Nov. 2005: participation of Sergey Lavrov; guidelines for a new ND political declaration were adopted. Turning point in the ND policy: from the end of 2006, it would shift from being an EU policy to being a Common policy of four partners SAO meeting held in Syktyvkar in April 2006 (Arctic Council, 2006a): the EU was not at the agenda for the second time June 2006 report on the ND for 2005 (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a) June 2006, Commission green paper “towards a future maritime policy for the Union: A European vision for the oceans and seas”. (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b): the Arctic was mentioned for the first time in another document than a ND document or an EP resolution.

Salekhard ministerial declaration signed in October 2006 (Arctic Council, 2006b): still mentioned the EU and the ND Feb. 2007 ND parliamentary conference in Brussels: Charter for the Arctic mentioned but not criticized by Arctic representatives present (European Parliament, 2007) April 2007 SAO meeting minutes in Tromsø: EU ambassador to Norway presented the new ND and

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the new articulation with the AC (Arctic Council, 2007a) June 2007 President of the Commission Barroso visits Greenland Oct. 2007 Commission “Integrated Maritime policy for the EU”: mentions the Arctic Ocean and geopolitical implications of climate change and ask for a strategic report on the Arctic Ocean (Commission of the European Communities, 2007) Narvik SAO meeting, November 2007 (Arctic Council, 2007b) ND not at the agenda for the 3rd time but Finnish SAO requested that it is next time; EEA statement on work with AMAP; observers wanting more prominent role May 2008 Ilulissat declaration Arctic 5 coastal states reaffirming their roles, the Arctic Ocean governance and legal framework Oct. 2008 EP (Resolution P6_TA(2008)0474 on Arctic governance, 2008): Treaty proposition Nov. 2008 Commission communication (The European Union and the Arctic region, 2008): asked for observer status for next Ministerial conference in 2009 SAO report and Tromsø Ministerial meeting 2009 (Arctic Council, 2009a, 2009b): EU/ND not mentioned anymore in AC SAO meetings minutes but Observer status debate in April 2009; postponed decision on Observer applications

In May 2005, a new political framework for the ND was discussed. The new geopolitical situation created by the EU enlargement required the change of the ND legal and political framework. The new ND, based on the political declaration, would be of a permanent nature. It still exists today and does not encompass the circumpolar Arctic. The change in the ND framework also affected the dynamic with the AC, which was not considered as the forum to implement the ND programmes anymore (Airoldi, 2008; Archer & Etzold, 2008; Zimmerbauer, 2013). In this context, within the European Parliament (EP), some MEPs started to take interest in the ND and the Arctic more seriously, leading to yet another resolution on the future of the ND calling for a “charter for the Arctic” for the first time (see Table 2) with many follow-up questions from Diana Wallis, a British MEP. However, the answer by the Commissioner for external relations shows that the EU was not yet planning to apply as an Observer.11 Precisely when we observe a rise in the EUropean geopolitical interest for the ArctiC, there is a decrease in the AC’s interest for cooperation with the EU, fuelled by disappointment in the lack of EU’s follow-up, but also by shifting representations and reactions to the geopolitical context.

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The construction of two types of regions: the Arctic as geopolitical theatre and the EU as a geopolitical actor In October 2008, the EP passed a resolution on “Arctic governance.” This resolution and the ban on seal products that was proposed in July 2008 (COM(2008) 469 proposal for a regulation of the EP and Council concerning trade in seal products) and implemented in 2009 (Regulation 1007/2009 seal products banned from internal market) have been widely criticised by Arctic actors for ignoring the reality of the Arctic Indigenous peoples (Raspotnik, 2018; Sellheim, 2015). These two events crystallised resentment against the EU and a narrative about the EU’s insensitivities which hindered its legitimacy in the region for a long time. A lot has been said about these two events and their long-lasting impact on EUrope-ArctiC relations. I focus on the EP resolution12 and show how a recontextualization in the longer term also help explain why it had such deep consequences.

In the resolution, the proposition of an Arctic Treaty was not well received by Arctic actors who feared EUropean interference. This resolution is certainly contradictory. Whilst it mentions UNCLOS, the Arctic Council and the Ilulissat Declaration signed in May 2008, it also says that the Arctic “is currently not governed by any specifically formulated multilateral norms and regulations” and deplores the “lack of proper governance”. It has been brandished as showing the ignorance of the EU on the realities of the Arctic because it proposes a Treaty similar to the Antarctic one. It is certain that the MEPs who drafted the resolution were not experts on the Arctic and had little understanding of the complexity of the area. Nevertheless, the proposition of the Treaty is accompanied by a comment limiting the scope of the Treaty to the Central Arctic Ocean that shows that they knew the difference between the Arctic and the Antarctic: having as its inspiration the Antarctic Treaty, as supplemented by the Madrid Protocol signed in 1991, but respecting the fundamental difference represented by the populated nature of the Arctic and the consequent rights and needs of the peoples and nations of the Arctic region; believes, however, that as a minimum starting-point such a treaty could at least cover the unpopulated and unclaimed area at the centre of the Arctic Ocean (Resolution P6_TA(2008)0474 on Arctic governance, 2008).

Notwithstanding, it triggered reactions from the Arctic States accusing the EU of a lack of knowledge, but also of interference in their backyard (Kobza, 2015; Raspotnik, 2018). Another aspect of the EP proposition that has been under-emphasized in previous works is the influence of French and British MEPs on the early EU stance towards the Arctic (Plouffe, 2012; Powell, 2011). Michel Rocard, former Prime Minister instrumental in the Antarctic Madrid Protocol and Ambassador to the Poles from 2009 to 2016, and Diana Wallis, Vice president of the European parliament, pushed forward the 2008 EP resolution and the idea of a Treaty for the Arctic Ocean.

The proposition of a Charter or Treaty had been made before and in the presence of Arctic representatives without causing as much stir (see figure 3). Moreover, a draft Treaty published by a French NGO, the Cercle polaire in September 2008, managed to go unnoticed despite the direct link it has with the EP resolution13 and the fact that it goes further than merely a proposition (Groupe d’études sur l’Arctique (GEA) du Cercle Polaire, 2008).

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These two events can be looked at as “storms in a teacup”, that is events that symbolise that geopolitical framings and the power relations they define are at stakes (Wilson Rowe, 2018). We therefore need to look for underlying trends in the documents that crystalised in a changing context and reactivated geopolitical representations in both regions, and look at the reactions from specific actors to counter these.

In 2007, internal and external events in each region impacted and shaped EUrope-ArctiC relations.

The International Polar Year (IPY) gave momentum and attracted the attention of a wider public to the poles. In the ArctiC, the work of the AC on climate change, but also the publication of the report on hydrocarbon resources and the planting of the Russian flag at the bottom of the sea at the North pole, politicized the debates and triggered external attention, projecting geopolitical lenses to the region (Bruun & Medby, 2014; Dittmer et al., 2011; Dodds, 2010; Powell, 2008; Powell & Dodds, 2014). In EUrope, the Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007, and Russia was reassessed as a threat to the stability of the neighbourhood. Thus, the link between the Arctic and security in EUrope was revived. The changes in the Arctic (climate change) and to the perception of the Arctic, and in Europe and to the EU itself (Lisbon Treaty), fundamentally changed the situation.

With the EU seeking to integrate the European periphery with its core, its borders were shifting following enlargements and the inclusion of new Member States. Moreover, political geographers also highlighted that by doing so the EU reactivated geopolitical imaginations of Europe that had specific historical genealogies. The moral responsibility of the EU to engineer “European unity” came along with neighbourhood regions constructed as specific geopolitical sites where the EU has a transformative power vis-à-vis its “outside” (Bialasiewicz et al., 2005). In the Arctic, this is also the case, but was met with resistance from some actors, and was also complicated by the fact that it is not only a “neighbourhood,” but a partly overlapping regional system of its own.

Moreover, in the EU, beyond the Commission, non-Arctic MEPs and Member States (like France and the UK) tried to draw attention to the Arctic for the first time. By the end of 2007, there were several calls for the EU to develop a document or a policy on the Arctic. However, they came from different actors, had different (geographical) angles and scope, and various interests and themes.

The political and institutional framework and the type of document that should be developed remained unclear (see Table 2).

In the Arctic, the increased geopolitical attention to the region had consequences on its governance and on the perceptions of the Arctic actors towards external ones. During the Norwegian chairship, we can see a transformation in the formatting of documents with the apparition of the AC logo and a standardisation of the minutes of the SAO meetings. Interestingly this comes with less information about the discussions being displayed in the minutes. Whilst previous minutes were almost verbatim type documents, the later ones become a summary of the discussions without any details on the position expressed by the different representatives. There is no trace, for instance, of the discussions on the Observers applications, only a reference of the decision to postpone the decision (Arctic Council, 2009b). It was also decided to create an AC Secretariat in Tromsø to ensure continuity for the Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish chairships. Moreover, a shift in the relations to external actors is also noticeable, from the AC reaching out to entities for collaboration and calling for increased attention to the Arctic, to trying to keep control and limit the number of external entities involved in the Council and debating their role (Wilson Rowe, 2018). At the same time Observer precisely started expressing their wish to have an increased role in the AC. All these changes also affected the EU in the context that we have just described. When Emergent regions? A historical perspective on ArctiC-EUrope relations (1970s-2008)

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the EU Commission finally published its Communication and applied for Observer status in 2008, it was in a very different context than the one of the early 2000s when the AC was pushing for it.

From 2009 onwards, precisely when the EU institutions started producing documents devoted to the Arctic, cooperation with the EU was no longer on the agenda of the SAO meetings and the EU was not mentioned in the minutes. Thus, when the EU finally showed political interest in the Arctic, this interest was perceived as a threat by Arctic actors for several reasons. It was not the interest that the Arctic actors in the AC had wanted, but an interest triggered by global and external changes affecting the ways in which the Arctic was perceived. This was reinforced in the EU by its own changes that reactivated geopolitical imaginaries in order for the EU to find its place and role on the international scene. The combination of these factors were crystalized by two particular events or “storms in a teacup” (Wilson Rowe, 2018) that affected the EU’s potential role in the Arctic.

These events are reflective of deeper power relations. Inter-regionalism and critical geographical analytical frameworks allow us to put emphasis on the power relations at play rather than just focus on contextually dependent factors. Power relations start to emerge that differed from the ones defining the post-Cold War period, producing new geopolitical representations, but also reusing enduring representations in a different context. Towards the end of the 2000s, the environment would again be linked to security through climate change. The Arctic region had been framed as territorially linked with environmental issues and climate change, hence the EU was able to connect climate/environment to security and the Arctic. At the same time the behaviour of Russia in the European Eastern neighbourhood as well as in the Arctic relinked both regions in terms of military security and geopolitics. Thus, when the EU self-defined itself as a geopolitical subject, it is logical from this perspective that it must play a role in the Arctic, which was being reframed at the time (and still is) as a geopolitical theatre. The logic behind the co-construction of the two regional spaces through geographical imaginaries is very visible here. Inherent to this process was the position of Russia on the international stage, both in the EU neighbourhood (Georgia in 2008) and in the Arctic, that again linked EU security directly to the Arctic. Climate change and the potential transformation of the area was perceived as a “threat multiplier” by the EU (Council of the European Union, 2003).

Conclusion This paper sought to advance knowledge on EU-Arctic relations by shedding light on three interlinked blind-spots identified in the literature. First, there was little scholarly engagement with pre-2008 EU-Arctic relations. Second, the relations had been studied only through EU policy documents, and the Arctic perspective was missing. Third, the narrative of a single political entity suddenly entering “new” a geographical area in 2008 was too simplistic. The combination of the absence of EU documents dedicated to the circumpolar Arctic region before 2008, and the Eurocentric perspective explain the lack of attention to the period before. However, when looking at Arctic documents and the dialogue instituted with the EU, this paper revealed that relations existed and were driven by Arctic political actors. This paper thus engages with broader academic debates on de-centering inter-regional relations and the making of the EU’s regional strategies by examining Europe from the outside (Acharya, 2016; Fisher-Onar & Kavalski, 2022). The ‘macroregional’ scale and critical genealogical perspective allowed us to overcome the problem of the evolution of the entities under scrutiny in terms of political institutions, geographical extent, and

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actors involved. Considering EUrope-ArctiC relations as the reciprocal ones of two ‘macroregions’ in construction helped us refine the analysis and encompass actors, spatialities and scales that were looked over. By doing so, the paper brings to light the historical co-construction of the regions and traces precisely the institutions (evolution of the EU institutions and states involved), the actors (from individuals MEP to states), the representations (Arctic and Europe as different regions with specific characteristics demanding specific political actions), and the different scales (circumpolar, Barents sub-region, etc.) involved in the process. It identifies three shifts in geographical representations: from two geo-strategically interdependent regions to two unequal institutional partners, and finally two different geopolitical regions: the Arctic as geopolitical theatre and the EU as a geopolitical actor.

These shifts do not simply have academic implications regarding the nature of regions but also have crucial consequences from an empirical and policy perspective. As the EU now faces challenges to act as a geopolitical actor in the Arctic and globally, and is aware of being too reactive and of lacking unity in times of crises (Borrell, 2022; European Commission & EEAS, 2021), looking at this period of time when the Arctic was not considered a strategic region might bear lessons for the EU. This paper shows that Arctic actors were proactive but the EU’s failure to take them seriously led to missed opportunities in the early 2000s to act and gain a more permanent role in the Arctic governance. The Eurocentric perspective considered the Arctic as a strategic space depriving it of actorness at the regional scale. The neglect of the AC as an institution and of the wish from Greenland to be included in the ND might have contributed to the mistrust towards the EU after 2008. The lack of interest towards the Arctic region during this period was not unique to the EU. However, compared to other European countries at that time, the EU was not an Observer, and the AC had more interest in cooperating with the EU given its ND programme and political weight. Thus, this disinterest had more impact on the EU’s role in the Arctic14. The “mistakes” of the EU in 2008-9 are to be considered in the longer term of shifts in geopolitics and geopolitical representations to understand fully their impact EU-Arctic relations.

A paradoxical situation appeared: the AC had wanted more political interest for the Arctic from the EU but when the EU’s political interest arrived it was perceived by the Arctic actors as potentially depriving them from their agency (Indigenous people) or form their privileged position in the Arctic region (Arctic States).

This study thus draws the attention to the importance for the EU of not being dismissive towards calls for cooperation, not clinging to its own representations of power projection onto a space where actors strive to form another form of region-building, to be more reflexive on its imperial and colonial past when reviving enduring geopolitical imaginaries such as the geostrategic narrative. It also emphasizes that “hidden actors” and individuals (MEPs, Commission representatives, SAOs…) have more impact (detrimental or positive) when dealing with areas or topics that are considered as peripheral for the EU. The presence of knowledgeable individuals and efforts towards concrete proposals that are followed-up might thus have more importance in the Arctic than other areas that have broader attention. This is exacerbated by the fact that both EUrope and the ArctiC are complex entities across different jurisdictions with complex organisations. Relying on certain texts only tells simplistic narrative: conflicting narratives need to be considered even if sometimes they cannot be fully reconciled.

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Notes 1. The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1993. It created the European Union based on three so-called “pillars”: 1. the European Communities – EC (grouping the 3 original organisations: the European Economic Community, European Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom); 2. a common foreign and security policy; and 3. cooperation between EU governments on justice and home affairs.

2. My translation: «Здесь смыкаются евроазиатский, североамериканский и азиатскотихоокеанский регионы, сходятся границы, пересекаются интересы государств как принадлежащих к противоположным военным блокам, так и не входящих в них.»

3. My translation: «[…] на благо народнохозяйственных и других человеческих интересов и приарктических государств, и Европы, и всего международного сообщества. А для этого в первую очередь надо решить накопившиеся здесь проблемы безопасности. » 4. My translation: «Мне не раз приходилось высказываться на тему об «общем европейском доме». Потенциал современной цивилизации позволяет обжить Арктику. » 5. Europeanisation is the promotion of European solutions such as free market, democracy, regional multilateralism inside and outside of the EU (Jones, 2011).

6. My translation from Norwegian.

7. In 2023, Norway introduced the term ‘chairship’ instead of ‘chairmanship’, preferring a gender-neutral term. Following this, I use this term throughout.After the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 it was replaced by the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007.

8. The two areas received later each their own strategy under the umbrella of the ENP: the Union for the Mediterranean (French initiative) was launched in 2008 and the Eastern Partnership in 2009 (Swedish-Polish initiative).

9.

“A non-paper is an informal document, usually without explicit attribution, put forward in closed negotiations within EU institutions, notably the Council of Ministers, in order to seek agreement on some contentious procedural or policy issue. Often circulated by the presidency of the Council, an individual member state or the European Commission, non-papers seek to test the reaction of other parties to possible solutions, without necessarily committing the proposer or reflecting his or her public position up to that point.” (Teasdale, 2012)

10. Resolution on Northern Dimension (Arctic Governance) 13.12.2005, WRITTEN QUESTION E-4860/05 by Diana Wallis (ALDE) to the Commission, OJ C 327, 30/12/2005 and Written Answer given by Mrs Ferrero-Waldner on behalf of the Commission, 23.8.2006, OJ C 327, 30/12/2006 11. For the seal ban issue see for instance: (CBC, 2009; Østhagen, 2013; Sellheim, 2015) 12. Michel Rocard was the Chair of the group and drafted the EP resolution: (Le Cercle Polaire - Michel Rocard, s. d.)

13. The EU still does not have the full Observer status at the AC. Canova

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International Talent for the Arctic: Strategies and Challenges Alexandra Middleton and Elena Zhurova Sæther

The Arctic region faces a significant demographic challenge, characterized by a population decline and youth outmigration projected until 2060. This phenomenon, driven by harsh climatic conditions, limited economic opportunities, and social isolation, threatens the region's future sustainability and development. Universities play a crucial role in mitigating this challenge by attracting, retaining, and integrating young talent into the Arctic workforce. This study investigates the role of institutional settings in facilitating the integration of highly skilled migrants into the Finnish and Norwegian Arctic regions. This paper explores national higher education strategies, employability support mechanisms and the strategies employed by several prominent Arctic universities, University of Oulu and University of Lapland in Finland, and Nord University in Norway, to retain graduating students and foster their engagement and employment in the corresponding Arctic regions. Employing a comparative case study approach, this study analyzes qualitative and quantitative data, including university strategies, government policies, and regional demographic statistics. Additionally, the analysis incorporates relevant sociological theories on employability and social capital, providing a deeper understanding of the factors that influence youth migration decisions. The study also explores the potential conflict between university-led retention strategies and national-level policies, such as the introduction of tuition fees for non-EU students. This policy change, while generating revenue for universities, might impede international student recruitment and contribute to regional brain drain. Finally, this study questions how universities can embed retention strategies into their core functions and foster sustainable long-term solutions to the demographic challenges of the Arctic regions. By understanding the effectiveness of various strategies and potential challenges, stakeholders can collaborate to develop comprehensive approaches to retaining young talent and creating vibrant, sustainable communities in the Arctic and beyond.

Introduction Countries worldwide, including Finland and Norway, are competing for international talent.

International talent includes skilled immigrants or returnees with international experience, expertise, and connections that generate benefits for society (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment,, 2021). In today's globalized world, countries compete fiercely for talent, highlighting the necessity of strategic policies to attract and harness the potential of international students as future skilled migrants (Hawthorne, 2018). National policies are pivotal in drawing international students, yet the multifaceted endeavour of retaining them as skilled migrants extends beyond policies involving immigration regulations, academic mobility opportunities, and the socioAlexandra Middleton is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Oulu Business School University of Oulu.

Elena Zhurova Sæther is a Researcher at Nord University

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economic climate of the host nation, which requires knowledge of the contextual factors, which in the case of this study are the Arctic regions of Norway and Finland.

Finland is experiencing a demographic shift, with an aging population, growing dependency ratios, and low fertility rates (Antolín et al. 2002; Hellstrand et al. 2020), with the Finnish Arctic regions (North Ostrobothnia, Lapland, and Kainuu) undergoing starker demographic changes compared to country averages (Middleton et al. 2018). Similar processes are observed in Norway, where the old-age dependency ratio, which measures the number of people aged 65 and older per 100 children under 15, is expected to more than double from 1975 to 2035, indicating a shift towards an "inverted pyramid" population structure (Herlofson & Hagestad. 2011). This phenomenon is even more pronounced in the Norwegian Arctic regions of Finnmark, Troms, and Nordland (Middleton et al. 2018).

To address demographic challenges, the Finnish Central Chamber of Commerce aimed to attract 30,000 individuals to work or study in Finland in 2022, with a plan to increase the target in the upcoming years and double it by the end of the decade. (Finland Chamber of Commerce, 2021).

The Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment's Occupational Barometer indicated a shortage of skilled labour in the health and social services sector and other leading occupations, such as programmers and application developers (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, 2020). International degree students are considered highly skilled migrants and are important for addressing workforce shortages in these sectors in Finland. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported that among immigrants in Norway, 36% are employed in high-skilled jobs, 44% in medium-skilled jobs, and 20% in low-skilled jobs. The projections for future labour market demand indicate an increasing demand for high-skilled workers, while the demand for low-skilled workers is expected to significantly decrease (OECD, 2024). A report from the Oslo Business Region highlighted that nearly two-thirds of the Norwegian industry lacks the competence it needs, demonstrating a great demand for highly educated talent (Oslo Business Region, 2024).

Finland and Norway are both attractive countries for international students to obtain university degrees and are ranked among the top 100 countries in the OECD talent attractiveness index (OECD, 2023). While universities are interested in internationalization and reaping the economic benefits associated with international education, there is a perceived disconnect between policies aimed at attracting and retaining talented international students (Shumilova & Cai, 2016). Labor market integration of the immigrant population has proven exceptionally difficult in Finland (Habti & Koikkalainen, 2014; Ndomo & Lillie, 2022). This study reveals that highly educated immigrants in Finland, including those with Finnish qualifications, are often placed in low-skilled, low-paying secondary sector jobs with limited advancement opportunities, even in high-demand fields such as healthcare (Ndomo et al., 2023). A similar pattern is observed in Norway, which often encounters significant barriers, including “brain waste”, where highly qualified individuals end up in unskilled jobs because of gendered deskilling processes and other complex factors (Fossland, 2013).

This study investigates the role of institutional settings in facilitating the integration of highly skilled migrants into the Finnish and Norwegian Arctic regions. It focuses on international students from two Finnish universities and a Norwegian university as case studies, analyzing how evolving institutional settings might impact their employability and social integration. Employability, encompassing both skills and social networks (Gong et al. 2023), is a key factor. This study focuses

Middleton & Zhurova Sæther

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on programs to support the employability of international degree students and their integration into the labor market, as they can also be considered a type of highly skilled migrant, defined as an individual with a tertiary degree or extensive specialized work experience, according to Iredale (2001). According to Rothwell and Arnold (2007), employability refers to the extent to which individuals possess the skills and characteristics necessary to find and retain a desired type of work.

This study uses statistical data from the Vipunen database of the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Finnish National Agency for Education, and data collected via an enquiry at a Norwegian university.

In the context of regional specifics and whether internationalization is matched with the demands of the region, this study aims to understand how the demand for high-skilled labor amidst shifting demographic profiles in Norway and Finland, particularly in the Arctic regions, is being met through the integration of international students. It seeks to uncover the dynamics between institutional settings, the role of universities, and employability programs, and assess the effectiveness of current support mechanisms and areas needing improvement.

These findings indicate that international graduates face challenges when finding employment opportunities in Finland. The two Finnish Arctic universities (University of Oulu and University of Lapland) differ in their size and degree of programme offerings. The retention level of international students in Finnish working life from these two universities has changed in the last few years towards more positive numbers. In Finland, in the 2000s, institutional support mechanisms for employability were minimal or non-existent. At the university level, employability services were offered only in 2020, and state-supported programs (Talent Boost and Talent Hub) to boost employability and integration of international students were launched in 2021. In Norway, a strong internalization agenda in higher education has been implemented at the national and university levels, as witnessed by Nord University. z A holistic approach to employability and retention of skilled migrants would include building employability solutions to meet the needs of the Arctic region.

Key message is to initiate meaningful discussion on the effectiveness of support measures adopted for the high-skilled migrants in the Arctic regions. In addition, this work intends to enhance debate on some refinement and optimization of the existing support mechanisms that will be able to create a more inclusive and sustainable environment for skilled migrants to grow and contribute to the socio-economic context of the Arctic region. Given the need to attract and retain highly skilled graduates in the Arctic, supporting cross-regional collaboration among these universities to share best practices in graduate recruitment and integration within the Arctic context could be crucial.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following sections present the theoretical underpinnings, data, and research methods used in this study. The findings on demographic shifts are then presented, followed by a discussion of the changing institutional contexts in higher education institutions. Subsequently, cases from Finland and Norway are discussed to contextualize this phenomenon. The conclusions summarize the main research findings and underline the importance of a good institutional framework.

Literature Review Studies have shown a growing interest in the socio-cultural incorporation of skilled migrants, emphasizing the importance of understanding their challenges and experiences in the host society

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(Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore, 2018; Dumnova & Mukha, 2022). Skilled migration trends within Europe have become a focal point for sociologists, economists, and migration geographers, reflecting the shift towards a "knowledge society" and prompting theoretical debates on the subject (Palczewska, 2023). Furthermore, qualitative narratives from skilled migrants were analyzed using Bourdieu's concepts to explore the impact of migration transitions on employment outcomes, emphasizing the role of social networks in securing suitable employment post-migration (Gong et al. 2023). Overall, these studies underscore the significance of sociology in examining the sociocultural integration and employment dynamics of skilled migrants in contemporary societies.

Research on migration in the Arctic Several studies have investigated migration in the Arctic regions. In a country-level analysis, Heleniak (2019) determined that numerous Arctic regions, such as Kainuu in Finland, Karelia, Komi, Arkhangel'sk, Murmansk, and Magadan in Russia, are projected to experience a population decline of over 5%. These trends represent a broader shift in Arctic demographics, including aging populations, a more balanced gender ratio, increased urbanization, and depopulation of smaller settlements. These changes are likely to have significant social and economic consequences for the affected regions. Researchers have frequently linked migratory patterns to economic factors, with the Arctic regions reliant on resource extraction being the most vulnerable (Schmidt et al. 2015).

The attractiveness of Arctic regions is not directly influenced by earnings potential, as indicated by Edwards (2007), who found that income poverty is an insufficient measure of regional well-being in Alaska. Instead, non-income place-level amenities were more closely connected to migration patterns. The substantial migration rates in Alaska imply that people relocate for reasons other than income, such as access to amenities. Correspondingly, Adams (2023) discussed that Arctic regions are appealing to young lifestyle migrants who seek authenticity, simplicity, and improved quality of life.

International students’ employability Employment is the most direct route for international graduates from Finnish and Norwegian universities to remain in the country. The European Commission emphasizes the link between higher education and the job market to develop a knowledge-based society, making employability the university's responsibility. The Bologna Process highlights universities' role in improving graduate employability and encourages multi-stakeholder collaboration in enhancing career and employment counselling services, work placements, and on-the-job learning (London Communique, 2007; Leuven Communique, 2009).

Numerous studies have explored the migration of international students to Finland, specifically in terms of their integration into the local job market upon graduation (Laine & Kujanpää, 2008; Abdulkarim, 2013; Shumilova et al., 2012; Li, 2020). Although students have the potential to enhance their employability by developing Finnish language skills, professional qualifications, and interpersonal abilities, they have no control over Finnish employers’ attitudes (Abdulkarim, 2013).

In a study by Alho (2020), the process of labor market integration for international students who graduated from Finnish universities was analyzed. The research revealed that integration into the labor market was dependent on the national, cultural, and institutional contexts of Finland. Highly skilled migrants face language barriers and undervaluation of their skills in new labor markets, leading to discrimination (Cresswell, 2006; Friedberg, 2000; Remennick, 2003).

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According to Koskela (2014), highly skilled migrants in Finland are viewed more positively than humanitarian migrants. However, despite their privileges, they often feel excluded from society.

Factors such as age, class, gender, and ethnicity affect the perception and inclusion of skilled migrants are perceived and included in Finnish society (Koskela, 2019). For instance, unemployed young Russian-speakers in Finland are labelled as low-skilled or non-waged "migrant workers."

(Kryvonos, 2019). Chinese students in Finland face exclusion not only from academic opportunities but also from the labor market and society (Li, 2020).

Fossland (2012) explored the integration of skilled migrants in the Norwegian Arctic region, where a scarcity of highly skilled professionals is prevalent. Paradoxically, skilled migrants often struggle to find qualified work in the local labor market. Immigrants with higher education from Norway and good language skills are at a greater risk of unemployment than ethnic Norwegians (Rogstad & Orupabo, 2007; Brekke, 2008; Villund, 2008). Highly skilled migrants also face challenges in language learning, adapting to sociocultural norms, and building personal contact outside work (Frykman et al. 2020). Integration involves both economic and psychological adaptation, and migrant well-being is crucial to this process (Yijälä & Luoma, 2019). A study from Finland revealed a preference for native-level Finnish language skills and "culture fit" among employers (ELY, 2020).

This echoes the research by Fossland (2012), Krivonos (2019), and Li (2020) on the employment challenges faced by highly skilled migrants. Discriminatory selection processes for international graduates have also been identified (Forrier & Sels, 2003; McQuaid & Lindsay, 2005), with cultural capital, social exclusion, and demographics impacting employability.

The conclusion is that integration into the labor market for highly skilled migrants is dependent on national, cultural, and institutional contexts. Language barriers, undervaluation of skills, and discrimination pose additional challenges. Universities play a role in improving graduate employability; however, employers’ attitudes and societal factors affect integration. The well-being of migrants is crucial to the integration process.

Data and Method In this study, an exploratory approach was used to investigate the relationship between institutional frameworks and employability prospects of highly skilled migrants in the Finnish Arctic region by employing a combination of research methodologies.

Data Collection The initial phase of data collection aimed to gather information from various sources to gain a thorough comprehension of the research context. First, demographic data from credible sources, such as Statistics Finland and Statistics Norway, were obtained to establish an understanding of population trends in the Arctic regions in Norway and Finland. Simultaneously, a review of governmental policy documents, including initiatives like the "Talent Boost" program, was carried out to illustrate the existing support mechanisms available for skilled migrants.

Second, qualitative and quantitative data were collected to elaborate on the case studies from Northern Norway and Northern Finland. The focus on Nord University in the Arctic region of Norway and Oulu and Lapland University in the Arctic regions of Finland is due to researchers’ affiliations and strong connections with these institutions, which facilitate data access and understanding of internal processes. Once the analysis model from this study is established, it can be expanded to include data from other universities that are not currently represented.

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Quantitative Analysis The quantitative analysis focused on scrutinizing demographic data derived from Statistics Finland and Statistics Norway, the Vipunen database maintained by the Ministry of Education and Culture, and the Finnish National Agency for Education. Vipunen is the education administration’s reporting portal, managed by the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Finnish National Agency for Education. It provides statistics and indicators on various educational sectors, student placement after completion, higher education research, the population’s educational structure, and students’ socio-economic backgrounds. The content is organized into sectors such as pre-primary and basic education, upper secondary education, vocational training, university education, higher education and R&D, liberal adult education, and population educational structures.

The objective of this analysis was to uncover patterns in demographics and trends in the migration of international students to Finland, as well as to evaluate their subsequent employment outcomes.

Demographic trends in Nordic Arctic regions This study focuses on Finnish regions, Lapland and North Ostrobothnia, and three regions in Northern Norway (Troms, Finnmark and Nordland). The Arctic region classification follows the classification standards of the Economy of the North (Glomsrød & Aslaksen 2008) and Business Index North reports (Middleton et al. 2018). The demographic situation in the Finnish Arctic region is characterized by an aging population and negative population trends in children (0-5-yearolds) and youth (6-16-year-olds). Changes in family values and personal preferences affect the Nordic fertility model, which incorporates fertility recuperation at a later age. Even comparatively strong institutional support for gender equality does not affect fertility decline (Hellstrand et al.

2020). Demographic data demonstrate an ongoing concern about Finland’s aging population and its weakening dependency ratio (Ruotsalainen, 2013).

Population projections up to 2040 indicate a deteriorating demographic situation in the Arctic regions of Finland. According to these projections, the population of children and adolescents aged 0–14 years is expected to decrease by 17.2% in North Ostrobothnia and by 20.3% in Lapland by 2040 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Population projections in age group 0-14 years old, 2021-2040, index 2021=100. (Source: Statistics Finland, compiled by the authors).

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Similar to Finland, the population of children and adolescents under 19 years of age is expected to decrease in Norway until 2050, but the most affected region is Nordland with a 9% decrease and Finnmark with a 5.6% decrease.

Figure 2. Population projections in age group 0-19 years olds, 2024-2050, index 2021=100. (Source: Statistics Norway, compiled by the authors).

By 2040, it is anticipated that the working-age population (15-64 years old) in North Ostrobothnia will experience a reduction of 3%, while in Lapland, this age group's population will decrease by 10.3%. Conversely, the national average for Finland will see a 2.2% decrease in the active population. (Figure 3.)

Figure 3. Population projections in age group 15-64 years old, 2021-2040, index 2021=100. (Source: Statistics Finland, compiled by the author).

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By 2050, in Norway, the projections indicate that the working-age population (20-65 years old) in the whole of Norway will grow just over 1%, in Nordland it is expected to decrease by 8.4% and in Finnmark by 7.1% (See Figure 4).

Figure 4. Population projections in age group 20-65 years old, 2024-2050, index 2024=100. (Source: Statistics Norway, compiled by the authors).

The most significant change is predicted to occur among the elderly demographic comprising individuals aged 65 years and above, with a surge of approximately 25% in North Ostrobothnia, an average increase of 17.7% in Finland, and a rise of 6.3% in Lapland (refer to Figure 5 for visual representation).

Figure 5. Population projections in age group 65+ years old, 2021-2040, index 2021=100. (Source: Statistics Finland, compiled by the authors).

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In Norway the challenge of ageing population is expected to accelerate by 2050 on both national level with over 50% increase in age group 65+, on regional level all three Arctic regions will see an increase in this age group exceeding 20%.

Figure 6. Population projections in age group 65+ years old, 2024-2050, index 2024=100. (Source: Statistics Norway, compiled by the authors).

The trend of a diminishing population of children and youth and high dependency ratios in the Arctic regions of Finland and Norway is a cause for concern regarding the future of the labor market. This situation threatens the availability of future taxpayers and employees and restricts economic growth. In order to address these trends, it is crucial for the Arctic regions of Finland to rely on highly skilled migration. The attraction of skilled migrants allows businesses to expand and invest in adjustments and stimulates innovation and growth (Bosetti et al., 2015).

National Higher Education Strategies for Internalization Finland’s higher education strategy Finnish universities have continuously attracted skilled migrants in the form of international students who come to Finland to pursue study programmes in English. International degree programmes at Finnish Universities have developed from marginal activity at the end of the 1980s to the focus of economic interest (Jokila. 2020). Tuition fees for students outside the European Union and European Economic Area were introduced at the beginning of 2016 (Kauko & Medvedeva, 2016). This policy change mirrored a trend observed in other Nordic countries, such as Denmark (2006) and Sweden (2011) (Vabø & Aamodt, 2017).

International degree programmes were envisioned to promote the internalization of host universities and to contribute to the labor availability of highly skilled professionals in Finland.

Policy papers emphasize the need for skilled labor. The policy paper by the Ministry of Education (2009), mention “non-Finnish students and researchers who choose Finnish higher education institutes are attracted by the high quality education and research, as well as by the opportunities afforded by Finnish working International Talent for the Arctic: Strategies and Challenges

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life’” (Ministry of Education, 2009: 33) and later re-iterated in the policy paper by the Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2017).

The path to this change was afforded by the New Universities Act of the Finnish Ministry of Education in 2009, which took a more market-oriented path (Cai & Marginson, 2013) giving universities nevertheless more autonomy. However, the introduction of fees has produced mixed results. In Sweden, a similar move resulted in an 80% decrease in applications, with gradual recovery over time (Nilsson & Westin, 2022). In Finland, it has also been a matter of concern as to whether there will be social inequalities between fee-paying and non-fee-paying students, thereby sidestepping Finland's traditional emphasis on equality (Plamper et al., 2022). In a press release dated May 16, 2024, the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture proposed changes to tuition fees for non-EU/EEA students in universities and universities of applied sciences. The goal is to implement full-cost tuition – meaning that the fees would cover the actual cost of education – and potentially encourage these graduates to stay in Finland after their studies. The proposed changes are expected to take effect in stages, with application fees starting on August 1, 2025, and tuition fee changes potentially coming into effect by August 1, 2026 (Finnish Government 2024). The proposal is foreseen to augment the finances of the universities. Still, perhaps it would increase graduate retention. On the other hand, the impacts of this proposal on graduate retention are highly debatable.

Institutional support for employability in Finland To attract and retain highly skilled migrants for Finnish economic growth, in 2020, the Finnish government introduced the Talent Boost program (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment in Finland, 2023). The program focuses on the immigration of highly skilled professionals, such as senior specialists, employees, students, and researchers, and promises to pay more attention to their integration and employment in Finland. It also seeks to prevent brain drain by encouraging international graduates and researchers to settle in Finland. The Talent Boost includes measures to advance the employment of international students and researchers in Finland and to create a model for international recruitment. The Talent Boost emphasizes the importance of a multi-stakeholder approach involving the state, cities, educational institutions, businesses, and other actors to attract and integrate international specialists and effectively use their skills. At least on paper, the program appears to tick the boxes and overcome the challenges of international highskilled employment in Finland, as highlighted by previous research (Alho 2020; Li 2020; Koskela 2014).

Within the Talent Boost program, the government allocated 28 million EUR for the period 20212024. The Talent Boost service promise is based on university-specific measures by which the university strengthens the integration of international students and researchers into Finnish society and the transition to the Finnish labor market. The programme identified various stakeholders (companies, entrepreneurial organizations, chambers of commerce, higher education institutions, research institutes, and international specialists) to find solutions to attract international talent to Finland. (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, 2021). Business Finland is responsible for the nationwide coordination of various business services. Regional implementation of the program will rely largely on the Talent Hub service model, bringing together various regional actors involved in the recruitment of international talent and other related service provisions. The Talent

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Boost appears to build upon international employability research that emphasizes the importance of a multi-stakeholder approach (Leuven Communique 2009; Williams et al. 2016).

The new right-wing government in Finland was elected on 2nd April 2023 (Wilson Center 2023).

This coalition government, led by the National Coalition Party and including the Finns Party, the Swedish People’s Party, and the Christian Democrats, officially took office on June 20, 2023. One of the significant changes introduced by this government is the tightening of the rules for workbased residence permits. This includes a proposal to reduce the unemployment allowance period for permit holders to three months, potentially impacting Finland’s objective of increasing workbased immigration (Loimu, 2024).

Norway’s higher education strategy The reform of higher education strategy in Norway started in the late 1950s, with university access broadened socially, regionally, and by gender; non-university institutions were also established with the aim of answering local needs and regional development requirements (Aamodt & Kyvik, 2019).

Reforms of greater magnitude, such as the Quality Reform of 2004, have made it possible for institutions to move between categories over time, more than doubling universities, showing how systemic changes are institutionally complex and incremental in nature (de Boer et al. 2017).

Norway attracts international students to its universities through a combination of strategic policies, economic incentives, and appealing societal attributes. A key factor in the deliberate policy for internationalization of higher education since the 1980s has been the emphasis on student mobility as a tool for quality enhancement in education. Norway utilized its reputation as peaceful, safe, and technologically advanced society in attracting international students. (Wiers-Jenssen, 2020). Additionally, the introduction of a performance-based funding system in 2003 incentivized institutions to attract more students, including international ones, by rewarding the number of credit points awarded (Wiers-Jenssen, 2020) Most Norwegian higher education institutions did not charge tuition fees, which was regarded as an attractive factor, especially as neighboring countries have introduced fees for non-European students (Wiers-Jenssen, 2020). For a long time, Norway remained the only Scandinavian country that offered free higher education for international students regardless of the country of origin.

However, starting in autumn 2023, Norway introduced tuition fees for international students from outside the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA) (Smith, 2023). The exact fees may vary depending on the university, but they are intended to cover the costs of education. In concrete amounts, tuition fee rates for study programs fall into several categories, from category F which constitutes 130 000 NOK per year, to category A – 500 000 NOK per year.

Compared to the average tuition fees of European universities, the rates in Norway are rather high.

The main argument from the government was the need to cut budget allocations for higher education and research. Government representatives, however, underlined that the Norwegian state has invested a lot in the quality of higher education over the past years. According to the minister for research and higher education Ola Borten Moe, “Our universities and colleges should therefore be wellequipped to recruit international students because the quality of education is good, not because it is free. I also believe that a tuition fee will give us more motivated international students.” (Press release from 06.10.2022).

The introduction of tuition fees for non-EU/EEA students in Norway has been criticized for potentially hindering the intellectual environment. Opponents argue that it could lead to a decline

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in student body diversity, thereby diminishing cross-cultural exchange and program-specific competencies ( Infanti & Sripada, 2023). Tuition fees for non-EU/EEA students in Norway risk program closures heavily reliant on international enrolment, for example, Tromso University (UiT) canceling its Bachelors in Northern Studies program, and threatens the jobs of instructors teaching in these programs (Mohammed, 2023). This also undermines efforts to attract talent to the Arctic, contradicts Arctic policy to attract people to the North and ignores demographic needs of Norwegian Arctic regions Institutional support for employability in Norway The Norwegian government introduced, among others, a series of initiatives to improve the employability and inflow of international highly skilled workers, including mentor arrangements that enable learning and development (Life in Norway, 2024a). Additionally, a jobseeker visa for skilled workers has been introduced (Life in Norway, 2024b). The government also invested in the Integration Reform, offering Norwegian language courses and cultural competency training (OECD, 2024). However, there is no program in place that would be comparable to TalentBoost in Finland.

Case studies Finland: University of Oulu and University of Lapland The Finnish Arctic regions of Lapland and North Ostrobothnia host two universities: the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi and the University of Oulu in Oulu. The University of Oulu is a large multidisciplinary university with over 15,000 students and over 20 international degree programs as of 2020, and the University of Lapland has 4,800 students offering four international programs for international students. The University of Lapland and University of Oulu received 2,961 international Master’s degree students from to 2000-2022, with 88% (2,604) of all international degree students coming to study at the University of Oulu (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. New international Master’s degree students at University of Lapland and University of Oulu, 2000-2020. (Source: Vipunen database compiled by the authors).

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University of Oulu in a newly released strategy (University of Oulu, 2024) supports internalization efforts. The University of Oulu aspires to attract international students and foster their employability in Finland. The university's strategy reflects this aim by stating, "Internships and other stakeholder cooperation will provide pathways for international students to find employment in Finland" (University of Oulu Strategy, 2024). This focus ensures that international students gain valuable academic experiences while potentially developing career prospects within Finland. By prioritizing employability alongside globally focused education, the University of Oulu positions itself as a potentially attractive destination for international students seeking post-graduation opportunities.

The University of Lapland expresses its commitment to educational development through a dedicated program. This program aligns with national priorities, as evidenced by its focus on "expanding degree education, digital service environments, continuous learning, and internationalization’ (University of Lapland Strategy,2024.). While the specific methods employed are not explicitly mentioned in the document, the program suggests the university's aspiration to enhance its educational offerings and develop collaborations within the Lapland University Consortium.

The University of Oulu aims to increase the number of foreign students employed in Finland within ten years by 75%, which represents a significant increase from the 51% rate in 2019 (Saarela 2022). The university targets both newly recruited and existing international students, researchers, start-up entrepreneurs, and specialists. The University of Oulu has increased its intake and targeted marketing to specific countries to expand its talent pool, aiming to produce 520 international graduates by 2024. The University of Oulu offers more Finnish language courses for international students and professionals, including virtual reality courses, and a 60-point minor in Finnish for working life (Saarela 2022). Actions as part of the TalentBoost program within the University of Lapland are on a smaller scale because of the smaller number of international degree graduates.

The Vipunen database also provides data on the employment of international graduates one year after graduation. The data were gathered through a survey starting in 2013, with the latest data from 2020 (see Table 1). On average, one-fourth of the students reported leaving Finland in 2013 and 2020. In 2013, 34.8% of the graduates from the University of Oulu left the country. By 2020, this number had decreased to 18.3%. In 2013, 47.8% of graduates from the University of Oulu were employed, and in 2020, this number increased to 53.7%, which is higher than that in Finland, on average (49%). Due to the small number of graduates, data from the University of Lapland were less reliable in 2013. In 2020, 33% of graduates from the University of Lapland reported employment, and 22.2% left the country.

Table 1. Employment of international degree students one year after graduation in 2013 and 2020, % (Source: Vipunen database compiled by the authors).

Full-time student

Employed

Unemployed

Other

Left the country

2020

2013

2020

2013

33.3

N/A

N/A

N/A

3.714.8

16.7 – 66.7

33.3

N/A

22.2

100 %

47.8

53.7

1.4 - 5.8

6.1

1.4 – 5.8

11,0

8.7

11.0

34.8

18.3

100 %

45.2

49

4.8

3.8

4.2

6.8

19.0

15.2

26.8

25.2

100 %

University

2013

University of Lapland

16.7 66.7

University of Oulu Total of Finland

–

2013

202 0

2013

2020

Total

202 0

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The data demonstrate that international graduates from the University of Oulu are, on average, less likely to leave the country and are more likely to be employed than international graduates from the University of Lapland. This can be explained by diversified programme offerings, including IT specializations. However, the data do not reveal the region of employment of recent graduates; therefore, it is impossible to know if these graduates obtained employment from the Finnish Arctic regions or from somewhere else.

Norway: Nord University Established in its current form in 2016, Nord University is the successor of the University of Nordland (est. 2011), Nesna University College (est. 1994), and Nord-Trøndelag University College (est. 1994). The university has 11,000 students at study locations in Northern and Central Norway, with the main campuses in Bodø, the capital of the county of Nordland, and Levanger.

Internationalization has always been a key priority for Nord University. Although the university has issued only two strategies to date, internationalization is prominent in both documents. The university’s sub-strategy on internationalization, outlined in the Strategy 2020 document, views international cooperation as "an important tool for developing new knowledge that promotes democratic development, intercultural understanding, and contributes to achieving the UN's sustainability goals for development." As such, internationalization is deemed crucial for enhancing the quality of education and research.

The 2020 internalization strategy emphasizes increasing student mobility and developing courses in English with some vision of attracting more international students and retaining young talents coming from abroad. Furthermore, Nord University’s Strategy 2030 states that “Nord as an organization is to be strengthened by increasing internationalization through the exchange of students and staff.”

All faculties have their sub-strategies aligned with Nord University’s strategy and respective activity plans. However, faculties' internalization strategies and activities may differ from each other in connection to their goals and development pathways. Student mobility is considered in light of institutional collaboration development with the main purpose of strengthening research profiles.

In practice, infrastructure for internationalization takes different forms, from a well-established international office with several employees, to international coordinators at faculties and the more informal international student union, that works to integrate international students at Nord.

The Norwegian Quota scheme programme The Norwegian Quota Scheme was a national scholarship program providing funding for higher education to students from developing countries, as well as countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This policy was implemented between 1994 and 2015-2016 at Norwegian universities and colleges. For faculties, this meant receiving grants to support international students pursuing master's or PhD degrees, funded by the Norwegian Government. Under this program, the students received a monthly stipend from the Norwegian Loan Agency and annual travel grants. The program played a significant role in fostering institutional cooperation and attracting young talent from abroad. Each year, over 1,000 places were distributed among higher education institutions in Norway through the Quota Scheme.

However, the programme was not aimed at retaining international students in Norway after graduation. In contrast, the purpose was to educate students from foreign countries (under

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development) so that they could contribute to the local economies when they are back home. The official documents formulate the purpose as follows “The objective of the scheme is to supply students with relevant competence that could benefit their home countries when they went home upon completion of their studies” (MOER 2001b:1). The practical implication for students was that those who remained in Norway had to repay 60% of their student loans, whereas those who returned to their home countries had their loans forgiven.

Since the academic year of 1999-2000 there have been 1100 quota places per year, and in the period spanning 1994- 2013 5844 individuals received Quota scholarships (Damvad, 2014). There are no statistics concerning how many quota scheme students stayed in Norway after graduation. Several evaluations were conducted during this period. According to the first evaluation in 2000, the Quota scheme program was impactful for the internalization of Norwegian universities. Still, the impact of the program on the target countries was not quite clear. Later evaluation in 2014 concluded that the Quota scheme had had significant effects on development, with only limited effects on internationalization (Damvad, 2014). In 2016, the government proposed to phase out the Quota scheme and eventually replace it with a different instrument, a partnership programme aimed at broader cooperation with higher education institutions in developing countries. As such, the Quota scheme program was discontinued. The programs that are governed by the Norwegian Directorate for Higher Education and Skills partly substituted the Quota scheme for faculties. The new model requires faculties to apply for projects, which imposes some limitations compared to the original Quota allocation system.

Best practices High North Center for Business and Governance The High North Center for Business and Governance at Nord University Business School is an international center for research, education and communication, connected to societal and business development in the Arctic. Established in 2007, the High North Center works closely together with companies, government bodies and other stakeholders to develop knowledge, competence and awareness about the potential for innovation and sustainable value creation in the Arctic.

In 2021, the Norwegian Parliament defined that the High North Center will be an internationally leading professional environment for the development of and distribution of knowledge about the High North and the business opportunities in the region. Internationalization has always been an important aspect of the Center’s work.

Key milestones in international cooperation include: ● ● ● ●

From 1995 - cooperation with Russian Universities.

From 1998 - cooperation with Ukrainian Universities.

From 2015 – cooperation with a Chinese university.

From 2018 – with North American universities.

The High North Center actively utilized the Quota Scheme, among other funding opportunities, to boost international student mobility. For example, the Center welcomed 5-7 students from Russian and Ukrainian institutions each year to participate in master’s programs at the Business School. Although the Center did not specifically focus on retaining international students after

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graduation, approximately 20% of incoming Quota students managed to find jobs independently and stayed in Norway, typically in larger cities with more diverse job markets.

Internship Program of Nord University Business School The internship program at Nord University Business School is regarded as one of the most effective initiatives in terms of retaining young talent in the local region. The program aims to foster closer collaboration with future employers in various industries, government, and other organizations, contributing to student recruitment. As a result of the program, several international students have received job offers from local employers after completing internships.

The program aligns with the university’s goal of employing at least 60% of the students locally.

However, it is designed for all students, without the specific consideration of international students, who may face different challenges, such as limited Norwegian language skills. Additionally, the program requires significant involvement from both faculty staff and local organizations to be successful.

Internationalization has been recognized as an essential strategy at both the university and faculty levels. However, the extent of related activities and efforts varies across faculties and depends on the commitment of individual departments, research groups, and even faculty members. Nord University provides solid infrastructure for those driving internationalization initiatives.

Nonetheless, this infrastructure has faced challenges in recent years due to state-level changes, including the termination of the Quota Scheme and the introduction of tuition fees for international students from outside the EU and EEA.

Discussion The demographic analysis shows a worrying trend for the Arctic regions of Norway and Finland, which is marked by the decline of youth and young adults, shrinking populations of adults, and increasing elderly demographics up to the year 2060. This, therefore, puts considerable strain on society as a whole, even to the extent of potentially undermining social security schemes. In this line of development, the attraction and retention of highly qualified university graduates already residing in these regions present itself as one of the solutions to the demographic crisis. In contrast, strategies for internationalization at the national level in Finland and Norway today are top-down and do not consider regional factors. For instance, it is factual that introducing tuition fees in Norway translates to fewer international applicants, as the case of Nord University shows.

Therefore, specific attention should be paid to regionally tailored strategies that consider the particular needs and challenges resulting from an Arctic context (Teichler, 2009).

Country-wide support mechanisms for graduate employability already exist in Finland like "Talent Boost," whose effectiveness on a regional level has to be further investigated. The same can be said about Norway, which has a support system without a clearly defined role of universities, needing, if anything, more harmonization in terms of effort. A study by Aalto et al., (2016), points out that graduate employability in Finland requires more than skill development programs by taking into detail the greater social and cultural context. However, the lack of a harmonized approach toward their long-term integration is a critical barrier. This includes the early infrastructural development of networks, promotion of social integration, and language learning opportunities (Yijälä & Luoma, 2019). Abdulkarim (2013) shows that all the efforts by students cannot overcome employers’ attitude towards international graduates and that the solution partly lies in the macro Middleton & Zhurova Sæther

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level of societal change and avoiding discriminatory practices as best as possible (Forrier & Sels, 2003; McQuaid & Lindsay, 2005).

In Finland, research has shown that employers prefer native-level Finnish language skills and "culture fit." ((ELY, 2020). This corresponds to the earlier work of Fossland (2012), Krivonos (2019), and Li (2020) on highly skilled migrants' frustration in the labor market and points to a need for increased focus on intercultural understanding and initiatives enhancing social inclusion in society.

Since universities are also responsible for the development of graduate employability (London Communique, 2007; Leuven Communique, 2009), a successful overall strategy must be developed through cooperation among universities, policymakers, regional authorities, and employers. These measures could include long-term planning, reducing language barriers, better recognition of international qualifications, promotion of more inclusive workplaces, and the well-being of international graduates. It will be possible for Finland and Norway to realize the potential of international graduates in their quest for sustainable development in their Arctic regions through a shift from top-down to more holistic and regionally sensitive strategies.

In our study, we primarily focused on institutionalized approaches that are visible through university strategies and available funding. While it is important to consider bottom-up approaches for integration, such as clubs, student union opportunities, and other support services that are already available at the university, these approaches are highly variable and depend on the resources of these organizations. Additionally, while services are available for all students at universities, they might not be tailored to the specific needs of international students. For instance, specifically tailored services for the employability of international students were introduced at the University of Oulu starting in 2021. The needs of international students are very different, including training on host country job-seeking culture and other specific support. Providing these services requires additional funding and expertise.

Conclusion This study explored the role institutional settings play in facilitating the integration processes of highly skilled migrants, specifically international students, into the Finnish and Norwegian Arctic regions. The research answers the growing sociological interest in socio-cultural incorporation, including how these evolving institutional settings bear on their employability and social integration. Drawing attention to demographic pressures underpinning the impetus for skilled migration, this research intersects with the emerging sociological interest in the socio-cultural incorporation of international skilled migrants (Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore in 2018; Dumnova & Mukha, 2022).

The findings support the body of literature on the complex interplay of factors on employability, which include language difficulties, social exclusion, and discriminatory employment processes.

This is why institutionalized support mechanisms, such as the "Talent Boost" program, are of great importance. Still, according to Alho (2020) and Shumilova et al., (2012), effective integration requires deeper changes in society. These forms of integration could be studied: health, housing, and informal networks; also, the impact of new employability measures on talent retention in the Arctic region needs to be further investigated.

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The study shows that detailed regional data on high-skilled migrant employment and successful integration in the Finnish and Norwegian Arctic regions are missing. Sociological analysis is critical for understanding the experiences of highly skilled migrants in the Arctic context. A more openminded civil society regarding international competence and transnational capital is a precondition for creating effective innovation conducive to economic growth in the Arctic region. Future research should focus on the readiness of the host environment, including organizations, to absorb and integrate international talent.

It remains to be seen how well new employability enhancement measures will be implemented, and to what degree they account for the specificities and needs of the Finnish Arctic regions. Lost opportunities to retain highly skilled migrants are visible since institutional support for employability services was introduced only in 2020. The importance of successful integration is increasing in Finland and Norway as the working-age population ages and the population with an immigrant background grows.

To assess the success of international talent retention and absorption in the Arctic regions of Norway and Finland, it is essential to systematically collect more data on their employment. This includes information on whether their employment aligns with their training, the location of their employment within these regions, and the destination countries of those who leave after completing their education.

Universities in the Arctic should be viewed as hubs for attracting talent and should adopt regionally adaptive strategies rather than following uniform country-wide strategies. Universities hold a significant position in integration and employability and should be considered key players in the context. If the retention of international talent within the host Arctic region is taken seriously, universities will need to implement specific retention strategies for international students.

Arctic universities should develop strategies that cater precisely to the needs and situation of their region, including an understanding of the local labor market, cultural context, and challenges specifically related to the Arctic that international students face. Comprehensive language immersion programs may make it easier for students to break down barriers and fit into their community. Such programs should focus on both academic and everyday language to provide students with opportunities to participate in university life and the local job market.

Universities should facilitate the integration of international students with informal integration networks of a local community group, cultural organization, or student clubs. Thus, these networks may be an important support in the processes of building social contacts for students, making them more at ease with their new home. With strong partnerships with local businesses, ways for internships, job placements, and projects involving collaboration will be opened. This would make students with international backgrounds more employable while gaining professional networks and practical experience related to the local job market.

Degree programs offered at universities must be relevant to the needs of the local economy. This ensures that graduates have the required skills and knowledge from local employers, thus enhancing their chances of securing jobs in the same region upon graduation. For education to be more accessible and appealing for international students, universities could abolish tuition fees or offer tuition fee redemption if graduates stay to work in the host region. This financial incentive can

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encourage students to stay in the Arctic after graduation, taking part in the local economy and helping demographic problems a little.

The introduction of more such concrete measures will help universities in the Arctic to be more sensitive to the special needs of international students, which would improve their retention and integration in the region. This approach would be beneficial not only to students but also for the long-term development and sustainability of Arctic regions.

This study highlights the need for regionally adaptive university strategies and provides detailed data. This study also introduces new research and policy questions. How do top-down national measures, like introducing of tuition fees affect Arctic universities attractivity and demographic needs of these regions? Do graduates from Arctic universities stay in the Arctic regions or are they absorbed by the labor market in the capital region? How can employability solutions be designed to boost high-skilled migration to Arctic regions? Moreover, more precise and comparable data on employment and integration are needed to assess the impact of measures on the retention of international talent in the Arctic regions of Finland and Norway.

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Industrial Ecosystem Collaboration in EV Battery Materials Value Chains: The Case of Kokkola Industrial Park Nuppu Mielonen and Hanna Lehtimäki

The global environmental and geopolitical situation is affecting the energy transition in business and society. The Arctic region has critical materials that are valuable for the EU in the green transition. In response to geopolitical instabilities and to secure access to energy transition materials, the EU is aiming for European and Arctic resource extraction and related value chains.

As a result, electric vehicle battery value chains will concentrate in smaller geographical areas with diverse industrial backgrounds within Europe. The purpose of this paper is to examine: What enables environmentally, socially, and economically successful regional circular industrial ecosystem collaboration? A regional industrial ecosystem with symbiotic synergies requires collaborative efforts and value creation from many actors, varying from the government to regional, business, and local actors.

We present an intensive qualitative case study on an industrial ecosystem with a long history of operations in the Nordic region: Kokkola Industrial Park (KIP) in Finland. With the current movement of the developing energy transition and of EV battery materials value chains in Europe, it is important to examine local ecosystem flows and the ways in which they connect to global value chains. The data comprises semi-structured interviews with various ecosystem actors and secondary research material, such as reports, documents, social media, and news articles. With interpretative qualitative analysis, we scrutinize and detail the actors, the collaborative practices and activities of an industrial ecosystem. We elaborate on shared interests, and analyze the environmental, social, and economic value creation of the process. The results of this study contribute to our understanding about the role and importance of ecosystem flows in value creation. The results can be utilized in planning and establishing new industrial ecosystems for energy transition and EV battery materials in the Arctic region in Europe.

Introduction Ecosystems have become a central focus in sustainability transition research and policymaking.

There is a call for research on the emergence and evolvement of circular ecosystems (AarikkaStenroos et al., 2021; Pietrulla, 2022) and industrial symbiosis (Neves et al., 2020). In more detail, what is of interest are the enablers and barriers for the emergence and evolvement of circular ecosystems (Pietrulla, 2022), their agency and governance (Kanda, 2023) as well as collaborative activities and interactions among the actors of the circular ecosystem, such as ecosystem orchestrating (Parida et al., 2019), data sharing (Serna-Guerrero, 2022) and the triple-bottom-line value creation in industrial symbiosis in regional settings (Neves et al., 2020; Uusikartano et al., Nuppu Mielonen, University of Eastern Finland, nuppu.mielonen@uef.fi Hanna Lehtimäki, University of Eastern Finland, hanna.lehtimaki@uef.fi

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2020). Sustainability transition requires a transition from the current, linear, take-make-waste extractive economic model to a circular model that seeks to reduce the use of energy and keep materials creating value for as long as possible (Lehtimäki et al., 2023). Building on systems-change theory and multilevel perspectives, researchers argue that this transition entails extensive and radical change in the prevalent societal, economic, and business systems (Creed et al., 2022; Geels & Schot, 2007; Kivimaa et al., 2021; Lehtimäki et al., 2023; McPhearson et al., 2021).

Transformation toward a sustainable market economy calls for examining ways of organizing innovation from fresh perspectives to understand how actors from different industrial sectors, public institutions, research facilities, and user, consumer, and other stakeholder communities get together and shape evolving innovations and business ecosystems. We contribute to the rising research orientation on ecosystems supporting sustainability transitions with a focus on regional industrial ecosystems of electric vehicle (EV) battery materials.

We recognize that regional industrial ecosystems of EV battery materials require attention due to three parallel reasons. First, electric mobility is a response to the demand for carbon neutrality in the quest to prevent and mitigate the effects of climate change. However, electric mobility is more metal intensive than the conventional internal combustion engine mobility (Kleijn et al., 2011; Valero et al., 2018). The demand for metallic materials increases rapidly not only because of electric mobility—but also the transition to carbon neutrality at large—increases the demand, as wind and solar power also use these materials. The limited resources of metallic materials, global industrial politics on sourcing the materials, and the increased demand for these materials in sustainable energy and material transition calls for exploring the application of the principles of the circular economy (CE) into the EV battery value chain (Lehtimäki et al, 2024).

Second, while the existing business ecosystems for the supply of critical raw materials of electric mobility have a strong global character due to their reliance on primary production, it is expected that future sustainable CE business ecosystems will have a strong regional emphasis with opportunities for new business opportunities and interwoven local value chains of secondary raw material streams, as well as new process concepts and technologies. Europe’s Arctic region plays a crucial role in the EU’s energy transition because of its renewable energy resources and reserves of critical minerals, and the increased focus of the European Union (EU) on energy security in Europe. The established and regional industrial ecosystems in the Artic region offer chances to explore ways to develop eco-innovative ways of operating, and new green energy ecosystems are being set up. Our case study provides valuable insights from a long-operating regional ecosystem of process industry in energy transition and EV materials to other ecosystems operating in the Arctic region.

Third, the CE of EV battery materials are only emerging. There are not yet enough materials to recycle; the regulation is still taking form; and there are several technological barriers—for example batteries are not always optimally designed to be recycled, labor intensity in recycling, and recyclability of battery chemicals (Rönkkö et al., 2024). What makes regional circular industrial ecosystems important is that the green energy transition requires cross-industrial, collaborative efforts that connect different actors for shared, systematic value creation (Aarikka-Stenroos & Ritala, 2017; Adner, 2017; Pietrulla, 2022).

In this study, we examine actors and the interdependencies between them in a regional circular industrial ecosystem in the northern context. We argue that to increase knowledge about the CE

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ecosystems of EV battery materials requires a close examination of regional ecosystems that seek to achieve system-level outcomes through collaboration due to spatial proximity of a variety of public and private stakeholders who pursue their interests that are not only local but also national and international. The research question is: “What enables environmentally, socially, and economically successful regional circular industrial ecosystem collaboration?” Specifically, we ask the following: (1) What actors are there in the regional circular industrial ecosystem? and (2) How do material, knowledge and value flows occur in a regional circular industrial ecosystem?

With an intensive qualitative case study (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2016), we examine the ecosystem actors and their connections and the related material, knowledge, and value flows (AarikkaStenroos et al., 2021) to increase our understanding about the impacts of ecosystem collaboration.

The research material comprises 14 in-depth interviews, a workshop, and seminars as primary material—and reports, documents, social media and news articles as secondary material.

Interpretative content analysis (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013) was used as a method of analysis.

The results of our analysis uncover actors and flows in a regional circular industrial ecosystem of EV battery materials in Central Ostrobothnia in Finland, on the Gulf of Bothnia. This study brings new knowledge about the connection between regional ecosystem collaboration and sustainable CE value creation in the global ecosystem. This study contributes to research on ecosystems in two ways. First, our elaboration on the variety of actors and the intertwinement of resource flows in the regional ecosystem brings new knowledge about the contextual factors that shape the flows and the collaborative aspects of the circular ecosystem of EV battery materials. Second, our analysis of the connection between the ecosystem collaboration and sustainable CE value creation in the ecosystem increases knowledge about the global process of systemic value creation (AarikkaStenroos et al., 2021) in the CE ecosystems of EV battery materials.

The paper is structured as follows. In the theoretical background section, we will first review the ecosystem concept and elaborate on the research gap we are addressing in this paper. In the methodology section, we describe the intensive case study method and explicate our method of data collection and analysis. In the findings section, we provide a rich description of the actors and the flows in this regional industrial ecosystem in a northern context. We conclude with a summary of the findings and a discussion on the implications of the findings for northern developments in energy transition.

Theoretical background In previous research, the concepts of industrial symbiosis, industrial ecosystems, eco-industrial parks, CE ecosystems, and circular industrial ecosystems have been used to frame ecosystems.

While the definitions have differences, they have also been used in parallel with each other. For instance, the concept of an ecosystem is often used interchangeably with concepts such as systems (Kanda, 2023), industrial symbiosis, and eco-industrial parks (Pietrulla, 2022). These concepts have roots in varied literature such as anthropology, biology, and industrial ecology (Moore, 1993; Lowe & Evans, 1995; Kanda, 2023). They all belong to the same family of concepts, as they all depict cross-sectoral collaboration and ways to advance sustainable processes and production—and they all have been used to increase understanding about systemic changes in the sustainability transition.

In this research, we follow the definition of circular ecosystem as “an aggregation of economic actors whose activities need to be coordinated to create value” (Kanda, 2023: 3) — and more specifically, as “a regional community of hierarchically independent, yet interdependent, Mielonen & Lehtimäki

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heterogeneous set of actors who sustainably produce industrial goods and services in symbiotic collaboration and resource use.” (Aarikka-Stenroos et al., 2021: 266).

In connecting ecosystem management and value creation, previous research has directed attention to the orchestrator as a focal organization that advocates an ecosystem value proposition to other actors (Thomas & Ritala, 2022), configurations of activity in the ecosystem as defined by a value proposition (Adner, 2017), and the common goal of competitive advantage as a value outcome for actors in the ecosystem (Clarysse et al., 2014). Previous literature has drawn attention to the roles of actors, such as orchestrators, complementors, users, and external actors in ecosystem interaction (Thomas & Ritala, 2022). Some of the previous research has shown that ecosystems can be managed to some extent (e.g., Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2018), while others have argued that ecosystems are self-organizing collectives (Clarysse et al., 2014; Wilhoit & Kisselburgh, 2015). Some researchers have emphasized the role of ecosystem orchestrators in coordinating and overseeing diverse interests, ensuring alignment among ecosystem partners, and enforcing the rules of the game and ensuring that other partners adhere to the rules (Parida et al., 2019).

Ecosystem theorizing builds on a notion that value is a result of ecosystem actors collaborating, coevolving and competitive support, crossing the industry and actor disciplines (Moore, 1993).

Recent research has argued that value is (co-)created in a systemic way by diverse collaborating actors who join in providing an offering (Aarikka-Stenroos & Ritala, 2017; Adner, 2017). Thus, a shared value proposition of an ecosystem is expected to stem from a combination of technological, economic, and cognitive interdependencies and the interactions between various participants (Thomas & Ritala, 2022). Participation in the ecosystem is expected to provide a competitive advantage for each actor in the ecosystem (Adner, 2017). Our research adds to this discussion by examining the ways in which ecosystem actors join in creating value at the ecosystem level and the ways in which interdependencies organize the value creation. We examine the relational dynamics in ecosystem value creation (Kujala et al., 2017; Kanda et al., 2021) and seek to increase understanding about the ways in which relational dynamics and collaboration organizes value creation.

Methodology We present an intensive qualitative case study (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2016) of a regional industrial ecosystem. This methodology was chosen because it enables a rich contextual description essential to understanding the phenomenon and theory generation (Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). Our case study, Kokkola Industrial Park (KIP) in Kokkola, Finland, is the largest inorganic chemical industry ecosystem in Northern Europe and a pioneer in the circular economy in Europe. The site was selected as it enabled a fruitful setting for studying an established regional circular industrial ecosystem.

Our primary research material consists of 14 semi-structured interviews (Brinkmann, 2014) with ecosystem actors collected between August 2022 and March 2024. The research team organized a workshop (in November 2022) where actors in the ecosystem discussed CE activities and best practices in the local ecosystem. Both interviews and group discussions from the workshop were recorded and transcribed. The research team attended local seminars (two seminars in 2022 and 2023) where the ecosystem actors presented their activities, developments, and plans to a national audience. Notes were taken by the researchers participating in these seminars. The secondary Industrial Ecosystem Collaboration in EV Battery Materials Value Chains

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research material involves reports and documents (including an innovation ecosystem agreement between the city and the Finnish government), policies, strategy documents, sustainability reports of ecosystem actors, media coverage, and social media posts.

Interpretative content analysis (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013; Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2016) was applied as the method of analysis. The analysis process was a cyclical research process that included several rounds of analysis of the empirical research material with reading theory on the topic and further analysis of the material. This allowed us to explore themes, patterns, and meanings in the text. Both authors participated in the analysis to allow for a deeper analysis of the interdependencies and co-evolvement of relations in the ecosystem. A visual mapping tool Kumu (https://kumu.io/) was used to visually illustrate the roles and connections between the actors in the ecosystem.

Findings In this section, we will first depict the actors in the ecosystem. Next, we will provide an in-depth analysis of the resource flows that include materials and energy, knowledge flows that involve education and informal knowledge sharing among the actors, and value flows that include social, environmental and economic values. The analysis of the ecosystem flows will include depictions of the actors and their roles in the ecosystem and the interdependencies between the actors. The analysis of the aforementioned aspects underlines the collaborative nature of the ecosystem.

Actors and relations in the ecosystem Our research focuses on the EV battery materials ecosystem in the area of Kokkola, Finland.

Kokkola is a city located in Central Ostrobothnia that is historically known as a trade center, due to its port and seafaring. Since the 1940s it has had industrial manufacturing facilities in the Kokkola Industrial Park (KIP), which is the industrial park where the ecosystem is sited. The KIP area was historically divided into two parts: KIP South, which used to run the Kemira chemical factories; and KIP North, where the Outokumpu metal production factories were located. An interesting point to note is that none of these original manufacturing facilities, inherited from the Finnish state-owned manufacturers Kemira and Outokumpu from the 1940s and 1960s, have been closed.

Instead, they have got new owners who have made further investments in the area. The city has good logistical connections within and outside Finland through the Port of Kokkola, as well as railways, highways and an airport. KIP boasts decades-long cooperation and maintaining an industrial symbiosis. The manufacturers in the area benefit from many levels of synergies, such as utilization of the process industry’s side streams, centralized service production, and the joint development of business culture— especially with regard to the environment and health, safety, and quality factors that have been established between companies.

Image: KIP Area (https://kip.fi/en/area/introduction-to-the-area.html)

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KIP is identified as an industrial ecosystem, which has strong and increasing focus on EV battery material production. EV battery material manufacturing and processing actors in the area include the chemical, mining and metal production industries. KIP South houses the Sibanye-Stillwater Keliber lithium project. This project, which is under construction at the time of this study, aims to develop operations to produce battery-grade lithium hydroxide—an essential component in lithium-ion batteries. The second major owner of this project is the Finnish government, through Finnish Minerals Group, with 20% ownership. The Keliber project includes a mine near Kokkola, a concentrator near the mining sites, and a lithium refinery in the KIP South area. Both the concentrator and the refinery are under construction with the aim of being fully functional in 2025 or 2026. Boliden operates their sulfuric acid plant in KIP South. In the KIP North area is the second Boliden site with their zinc plant. This zinc plant is the second largest zinc plant in Europe.

KIP North also houses Umicore, with their variety of operations—mainly around cobalt and battery precursory cathode material (pCAM) production. There is also Jervois, with the biggest cobalt refinery outside of China. The identified end customers of the manufacturers are mostly battery producers or car producers outside of Finland. Mining companies, where materials to the manufacturing companies mainly come from, are connected to the ecosystem through the manufacturers.

The KIP Registered Association (KRA) is a regional developmental organization of the KIP area, focusing on developing and improving the area. The KRA promotes collaboration between businesses and improves the operating conditions of the park’s businesses. The KRA is governed by a board of directors with 25 members from the different organizations in the park, including the city of Kokkola through Kokkolanseudun Kehitys Ltd (KOSEK). The members have volunteered and applied to be part of the association in order to have a say in the developmental activities within the industrial park. The KRA includes various active working groups on the environment, energy, safety, HR, ICT and marketing. The working groups are platforms to further enable collaboration, communication, and support of the core activities in the area. The KRA has been defined as a “soft areal developer.”

A variety of service operators were identified as part of the KIP ecosystem with the aim of supporting the core manufacturing activities. KIP Service Limited is the collaborative, multiservice organ of the industrial park. It provides environmental services, security services, and services related to real estate and infrastructure, such as maintenance, human resources services and consulting, training and development, and a variety of other supportive services such as postal services. KIP Service Limited was defined to be the active and action-oriented “practical areal developer.”

KIP Infra Limited, in turn, deals with the infrastructure of the industrial park through not only management of the land areas, buildings and roads, but also through ownership of railways, sewage, and pipe bridges in the area—all of which are required to maintain and develop the activities of the manufacturing facilities. Other services and machinery and utility providers of the KIP area include consulting companies, water and energy companies, logistics companies, and machinery, automation, and ICT providers. These ecosystem actors complement the services that KIP Service Limited provides with more detailed and directed support to the manufacturers. Some examples of these are Kokkolan Teollisuusvesi Limited, which is responsible for the water supply and management of the area; Kokkolan Energia Limited, which deals with the energy of the area; and Sweco, which supplies consulting, development, and project management-related services.

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Public sector actors were identified as integral in the KIP industrial ecosystem. These include the city of Kokkola, through its ownership of some infrastructure and memberships in associations such as KIP Services Limited and KIP Infra Limited. KOSEK is the regional development company owned by the city of Kokkola and the city of Perho with an aim to develop the business environment of the region further. KOSEK focuses on promoting collaboration between regional actors, cities, and businesses through free development and advisory services to businesses of all sizes—and they do this with in a wider regional perspective rather than focusing only on the area of Kokkola and KIP. Educational institutes such as the University of Oulu and Centria University of Applied Sciences were identified to be integral in providing a knowledgeable and well-trained workforce to the ecosystem actors of KIP area. Collaboration between companies and educational institutions spans research, development, and innovation activities. Educational institutes were stated to be currently one of the most important actors of the Finnish battery value chain.

Ecosystem reach is wider than just regional proximity, due to connection and collaboration with governmental institutions, national organizations and networks, and international partners. The actors and parties involved in this ecosystem benefit from the Innovation ecosystem agreement signed between the city of Kokkola and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland (TEM). This agreement brings the city and the KIP ecosystem financial and status-related benefits. KIP is also part of the Finnish network for eco-industrial parks, which allows for exchange of knowledge and information with other ecosystems present and emerging in Finland. KIP is the only Finnish and Nordic member of the European Chemical Site Promotion Platform focusing on European-wide collaboration and promotion of European chemical markets to possible future investors.

The ecosystem actors were also linked through diverse interdependencies. All the manufacturers were located physically close to each other with a structured and supported infrastructure. This spatial proximity allowed for physical interconnectedness which is required for industrial symbiosis.

Technological complements and business links were identifiable and integral for maintaining a wellworking ecosystem. Ecosystem governance with a leadership structure and defined responsibilities for the industrial park governance was identified to maintain coordination mechanisms among the actors, accompanied by the regional government.

Interdependencies and co-evolutionary interactions The material and energy flows, knowledge flows and value flows created interdependencies and co-evolutionary interactions among the ecosystem actors. We will describe each of these flows in the following section.

First, material and energy flows included resources mostly from outside Finland through the Port of Kokkola. Materials that the manufacturers in the KIP area utilize are mined elsewhere (e.g., Asia, Canada, the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and then transported to be further processed at the KIP plants. In some cases, the materials received include a level of recycled material, but these levels are still quite low. The geographically stipulated context of KIP enabled energy and material flows between the manufacturers of the ecosystem. Due to proximity to each other, energy and materials could be easily distributed among the various actors through pipes to be directly utilized further rather than transporting them elsewhere. The efficient resource flows between actors were stated not to be possible would the actors be more dispersed. The actors were defined to be highly connected through resource flows “in good and in bad” (interview KOF-1). This was explained to Mielonen & Lehtimäki

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mean that the actors benefit from the synergies, but if one of them fell out for any reason or their production stops, for example due to downtime, it might cause major issues elsewhere.

The resource flows were in part historically defined, partially due to the demand and supply of the actors present. In the 1960s Kemira and Outokumpu had their manufacturing facilities built so that they could benefit from each other’s side streams. Later, when new actors started to come to the area, discussions were conducted to see how and where the new entrants could benefit but also contribute to the synergies and the symbiosis. The main resource flows were specified to include sulfuric acid, hydrochloride acid, ammonia, gases, and energy. These resources flow between the actors mainly through pipes and pipe-bridges connecting the actors. When planning a new manufacturing plant for the KIP area, placing the pipes is carefully considered to ensure that not only current residents but also possible future residents are provided for. The chemicals and materials produced at KIP are mostly exported through the Port of Kokkola.

Second, the knowledge flows occurred between educational institutions, the manufacturers, and the service facilitators. On a regular basis, the educational institutions visited the KIP area to learn about the manufacturers and the service providers, and the work they did. Visiting and learning how the area and the businesses work allows collaboration regarding student work placement, project work, and possible future employment opportunities. In 2023 KIP received approximately 11,000 visitors. These visitors came from the region, elsewhere in Finland and abroad—and represented interested parties from, for example, educational institutes, companies, city governments, and developmental organizations. Also, knowledge flows involved organizational support through the KRA that was stated to be integral in maintaining the formal and informal knowledge flows within the ecosystem. The meetings—both general meetings and with the working groups—ensured that the different actors gathered to discuss important topics. Coming together as representatives of various ecosystem actors, whether in person or online, allowed for knowledge sharing through discussions that might not otherwise occur. Stakeholder magazine SERVIS, published by KIP Services Limited, was stated to be an important way to reach more of the different stakeholders of the ecosystem. This magazine was published in Finnish approximately three times a year and is available online and in printed form. Knowledge also flowed through the SSG On site app that was utilized for communication, as well as in a variety of memos to site employees and on screens in all cafeterias and on roadsides. A lot of informal knowledge sharing was said to happen in cafeterias in the KIP area, where employees from the various companies and with different functions meet for lunch and coffee breaks. Governance in the ecosystem was identified to happen mainly through the KRA and KIP Services Limited. They provide services for projects both inside and outside KIP, and thus, also “tie these different companies together better” (interview KOC-1).

Third, the value flows included social, environmental, and economic value. As dimensions of social value, we identified being a part of the area, part of the city, and part of the country as important to the ecosystem actors. Also, the industrial history of the area was mentioned as an aspect of social value in operating the industrial park It was intertwined with identity building: “We know what we are doing; we have been doing this for a long time; we are the example.”. The importance of trust, openness, contact and connection, and the acknowledgement that one is not alone but a part of a larger ensemble was highlighted. Being part of the area and the city was expressed, for example, through supporting the local sports and cultural events and organizations.

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We detected the environmental value in the discussion about raw-materials mining and transportation. The discussion involved pondering about paradox of doing good for the environment (climate) while contributing to its degradation (mining of raw materials). The CE was defined as something inherent to the processing industry, something that was built into its activities—so deeply so that the interviewees did not realize at first what was meant by CE. The efficient use of raw materials and the strengthening of the various resource flows was quoted “to be natural” (interview KOF-1) to the ecosystem. Already historically, in the 1960s, the manufacturing facilities that originated in the area were built to accommodate utilization of each other’s side streams. Innovations regarding circularity and expansion of the resource flows to a greater extent were seen as possible development points to further enable sustainable value proposition to customers, investors and collaborators nationally and internationally.

The economic value was depicted in the discussion about investments. Industrial investments were seen to require long-term commitment— “decades long long-term investments” (interview KOE1) and a lot of money. Lack of available domestic capital had led to investments mainly from international private businesses. The Finnish government was, however, participating within its abilities—as, for example, identified in the case of Keliber, where the majority owner is the South African miner Sibanye-Stillwater, with Finnish government as a partial owner (20%) through Finnish Minerals Group (FMG). Interviews showcased anticipation of the growth of the area due to increasing interest from companies wanting to establish their business in the area. Water, energy and the existing infrastructure were identified as factors of importance to possible investors to the area. Permits—and more specifically environmental permits—were seen as a possible obstacle to the further growth of the area. Also, the geopolitical situation and uncertainty related to future investments (e.g. the Inflation Reduction Act, or IRA) raised concerns. Economic value came also to the surface when interviewees talked about synergies. One responded stated “they [actors] benefit from this collaboration and synergies, even to an economically significant extent.” (interview KOF-1).

Value was seen to be created locally in the industrial park, regionally and nationally. An increase of over 1,000 employees was stated to be expected in the next coming years. A Kokkola Works advertising campaign was created to attract people to work in the area. Many of these new recruits would not be coming alone but with their spouses and families. This meant that careful planning was required in the local municipality to include the employment of spouses, schooling, daycare centers and housing.

Discussion Our study contributes, first, to the ecosystem perspective on CE by elaborating on agency and the interdependencies among the ecosystem actors. The CE in this industrial area comprises the circulation of raw materials that includes the efficient use of raw materials, side streams and water, and the reduction and use of waste materials. Resource efficiency in processes, closed-loop water use, and carbon dioxide capture and storage are also part of the circular economy in the area. The area has also various sharing platforms, product-as-a-service models and extended life-cycle services to enhance operational efficiency in the area.

The CE of energy transition and EV battery materials industry is still in its early stages in Europe.

Currently, the recycling rate of key elements of EVs is below 1 % (UNEP, 2013; EC, 2018). In addition to policy and regulatory frameworks to address recycling across the entire EV battery lifecycle—from raw-material supply to end-of-life (Lehtimäki et al., 2024)—voluntary action of Mielonen & Lehtimäki

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companies is needed to develop CE of energy transition and EV battery materials. As a contribution to developing CE ecosystems, our study shows that ecosystem interdependencies in material, knowledge and value flows support the interest of companies in engaging in CE activities.

Second, our case study contributes to the northern development in the global context by showing how the regional ecosystem collaboration provides value to the actors involved and how it supports building continuous competitive advantage in the unpredictable global market and regulatory environment. The value chains of energy transition and EV battery materials are global and face problems of material demand, trade, regulatory frameworks, and logistics (Barman et al., 2023).

There are several complexities and wickedness of interwoven sustainability tensions regarding resource sufficiency, geographical distribution of raw materials, and the global value chains, global, national, and regional regulations and policies and the emerging novel battery technologies (Lehtimäki et al., 2024). Our case study shows how a regional industrial ecosystem in the northern context is a part of the global value chains through upstream and downstream material flows, ownership structures, and investments. This regional ecosystem has little negotiation power to influence the decision making on investments by globally operating companies or the geopolitical decisions of China, the USA, or the EU. However, the well-functioning industrial symbiosis provides the benefits of optimizing the use of resources, improving energy efficiency, identifying synergies in collaboration, and fostering knowledge sharing—and thus improves the strategic resilience of the regional ecosystem. Therefore, we conclude that the regional social, environmental, and economic outcomes build resilience and sustainability for the industrial ecosystem to anticipate potential changes and risks involved in the global value chains of which they are a part.

Conclusions The results of our analysis elaborate on the interdependencies between the ecosystem actors in an industrial area in a northern context closely involved in the global energy transition. We identified infrastructural, technological, economic, cognitive, and social alignments among the actors in the industrial ecosystem as important in creating collaborative advantages needed for staying competitive in the global value chains. A regional ecosystem involves locally based knowledge flows and globally spanning material and value flows. Simultaneously, in the global ecosystem, geopolitics and protectionism in the energy transition, risks in the supply of raw materials, and competition in battery industry investments between nations and regions create strategic risks of value destruction.

Our findings show that in the regional ecosystem of energy transition and EV battery materials, the public and private sector actors join the ecosystem with their value propositions and delivery and expectations of value capture, and thus, create ecosystem level value capture without centralized control. Previous research has emphasized the role of orchestrators and centralized control of the ecosystem (Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2018; Parida et al., 2019).

This study shows that the interaction and the relational dynamics among actors both inside and outside of the regional ecosystem—i.e., national and international constituencies—are important in the governance and organizing of ecosystem-level value creation. The value network that the local actors create includes industrial actors, service providers, educational institutions, and ecosystem facilitators. It also involves an extended network of global suppliers, customers, partners, investors and collaborators. Thus, a regional ecosystem of energy transition and EV battery materials involves operational and strategic interdependencies among the network actors in

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the regional area while simultaneously cutting across several national and international value networks of which many of the regional actors are a part.

This case study indicates that a high-level coordination among the ecosystem actors is important in managing risks in the global value chains. In this regional industrial ecosystem, the strengths of relational dynamics build on long history of collaboration in the local area, trust among the actors, joint interests in value capture, and an ability to collaborate in industrial processes, knowledge sharing, and capacity building. Understanding how this complex network of regional and globally spanning activities is organized is particularly important for understanding the drivers and barriers in developing a sustainable CE value creation on EV battery materials in the global value chains of the future.

The Arctic region has critical materials that are valuable for the EU in the energy transition. In response to the geopolitical instabilities and to secure access to energy transition materials, the EU is aiming for local, European-wide, and Arctic resource extraction and related value chains. It is anticipated that electric vehicle battery value chains will concentrate in smaller geographical areas with diverse industrial backgrounds within Europe. Our study shows that a regional industrial ecosystem with symbiotic synergies builds on collaborative efforts of heterogeneous actors— including governmental and regional public sector actors, third-sector organizations, and local and global business actors. The coevolutionary processes in a regional ecosystem create mutually beneficial adaptations that support thriving in the face of economic and political changes in the global value chains.

Acknowledgements This research is part of the project GOVERMAT "Multi-level governance of critical materials for future electric mobility" which is funded by the Research Council of Finland (Grant ID 346725).

The work of the authors was further supported by Foundation for Economic Education, Finnish Cultural Foundation North Savo Regional Fund and Dr. h.c. Marcus Wallenberg’s Foundation for Research in Business Administration.

We thank the anonymous reviewers and our colleague Juha Kotilainen for their insightful feedback on the manuscript.

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Thomas, L. D. W., & Ritala, P. (2022). Ecosystem legitimacy emergence: A collective action view.

Journal of Management, 48(3), 515–541. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206320986617 UNEP (2013). Recycling Rates of Metals -A Status Report, A Report of the Working Group on the Global Metal Flows to the International Resource Panel. Graedel, TE, Allwood J, Birat J-P, Reck BK, Sibley SF, Sonnemann G, Buchert M, Hagelüken C. Uusikartano, J., Väyrynen, H., & Aarikka-Stenroos, L. (2020). Public agency in changing industrial circular economy ecosystems: Roles, modes and structures. Sustainability, 12(23), 10015. https://doi.org/10.3390/su122310015 Valero, A., Valero, A., Calvo, G., & Ortego, A. (2018). Material bottlenecks in the future development of green technologies. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 93, 178–200. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.05.041 Wilhoit, E. D., & Kisselburgh, L. G. (2015). Collective action without organization: The material constitution of bike commuters as collective. Organization Studies, 36(5), 573–592. https://doi-org /10.1177/0170840614556916

Industrial Ecosystem Collaboration in EV Battery Materials Value Chains

European Union-Indigenous Relations in Arctic Governance: The inclusion and articulation of Indigenous realities in policy papers since 2008 Niall Juval Janssen

Arctic governance is an ever-transforming and crowded field: from states with Arctic territory to those without, from vast multinational corporations mining in the region to Indigenous peoples and local communities living in the North. One of those actors, the European Union (EU), has repeatedly tried to establish its place in this packed field by inter alia becoming a permanent observer to the Arctic Council (AC). As can be taken from statements of several Arctic foreign affairs officials, the EU’s failing to gain this status is due in significant part to its relations with the Indigenous peoples of the North which have been troubled by poor policy and sometimes even poorer communication. This article seeks to examine the policy positions of the EU towards the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic as communicated in the EU’s Arctic policy papers since 2008. Therefore, it analyses six germane policy papers and communications by relevant political actors and institutions of the EU. To investigate how the inclusion and articulation of Indigenous-specific issues differs from one EU institution to another and how they have changed from 2008-2021, this article employs a quantitative N-dataset/corpus analysis supplemented with minor qualitative research methodologies. The article finds that across relevant EU institutions, the regard for Indigenous-specific issues has increased since 2008. Further, the article argues that the EU needs to improve its coherence and coordination of policies amongst the different institutions to achieve a more successful and sustainable European contribution to Arctic governance. Finally, the author elaborates on possible avenues for future research to assess EU-Indigenous relations in the Arctic.

Note from the author: Capitalisation or the absence thereof in regard to the term ‘Indigenous peoples’ shall not be considered a denial of their identity or disregard for their institutions and rights. Here, the author opted to capitalise the ‘Indigenous’ but not capitalise the ‘peoples’ to avoid confusion with the term ‘Peoples’ in the public international legal sense. The author would like to point out that ‘state’ (as in ‘nation state’) has also not been capitalised throughout this article.

Introduction The rights of Indigenous peoples1 is a theme that has been raised by multiple institutions and actors of the European Union (EU) in their communications, resolutions, and representations to external actors as well as governments of its own member states (Wuidar, 2024: 587). As is claimed by Wuidar, “the EU has moved from a relatively passive position regarding recognition of Indigenous Niall Juval Janssen, student of Polar Law (M.A.), University of Akureyri

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Peoples' rights to [a] much more active involvement in ensuring the effectiveness of these rights in its policies” (2024: 586). The EU’s regard for Indigenous-specific issues and, in taking a step further, its support for the advancement of Indigenous peoples’ rights are of significant importance to the EU as an actor in Arctic2 governance. The EU’s “ambition to contribute to enhanced governance in the Arctic suffered its greatest setback” when at the Ministerial Meeting of the AC in Tromsø in April 2009 no new permanent observers were admitted (Wegge, 2012: 20). The official reason given in the declaration was that more time was required to “continue discussing the role of observers in the Arctic Council” (Arctic Council, 2009: 9), but this was contradicted by statements of politicians and ministerial staff of multiple Arctic countries (Wegge 2012: 20). After the conclusion of the Ministerial Meeting in Tromsø, Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Lawrence Cannon, told CBC News that “[a]s long as this European Union doesn't have the required sensitivity to the needs of northerners, I see no reason why they should be […] a permanent observer on the Arctic Council” (CBC News, 2009a). A correlation between the EU’s (by then still only) anticipated seal skin ban and a denial of a permanent AC observer status was echoed by the then Premier of Nunavut Eva Aariak: “I wouldn't see the balance in European nations getting [an observership] with [the] Arctic Council while they are working very hard to counteract with our very way of life” (CBC News, 2009b). Further, Arctic Officials at the Danish and Swedish Ministries of Foreign Affairs in December 2009 explained that the EU’s application has been denied based on “the EU ‘not knowing the Arctic issues,’ as well as making decisions in Brussels without consulting those it affected in the north” (Wegge, 2012: 20).

Hence, the EU’s respect for the needs of local and Indigenous peoples is seen as important for its access to Arctic governance through the AC. The questions must be whether the EU’s move from mere “recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ rights to [a] much more active involvement” (Wuidar, 2024: 586) in Arctic Indigenous affairs is also evident in its policy communications and resolutions regarding the Arctic.

Therefore, this article seeks to answer the following question: In what ways have the inclusion and articulation of Indigenous-specific issues changed in the EU’s Arctic strategic policy papers since 2008, and how do they differ between different EU institutions?

This article will, after giving a brief overview of the actors involved in the making of Arctic policy in the EU, introduce the reader to the history of the EU as an actor in Arctic governance. In doing so, this article highlights specifically the EU’s relations with Indigenous peoples of the North.

Before seeking to answer in what ways the EU’s regard for Indigenous-specific issues in its major Arctic policy documents since 2008 has changed as an expression of EU-Indigenous relations, this article will outline the methodology for its comparison of said selected policy documents. This analysis will be divided into three policy cycles and will then turn to a comparison of these three overarching cycles. Finally, conclusions will be shared along with potential starting points for further research on the matter. Historical, political, and organisational context will be provided throughout the article to support the analysis and comparison of the EU’s Arctic policy, which goes beyond the mere text of the policy documents.

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Who is Who in EU-Arctic Relations?

“The EU is a unique and original political entity that has a sophisticated institutional and legal architecture” (Canova, 2023: para 2), which can at times be confusing. Therefore, a brief overview of actors in the EU’s Arctic policy is provided.

First, the major EU institutions involved in shaping the organisation’s political priorities are the European Commission (with executive authority), the Council of the European Union (which shares legislative authority with the Parliament and also holds some executive competencies), the European Parliament (which shares legislative authority with the Council), and the European Council (which is the high-level body representing the member states and which can define overarching priorities for the EU’s other institutions) (Treaty on European Union articles 22, 27, 28, 32, 34, 36 and Wuidar, 2024: 586). The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is a position within the EU Commission, which is assisted by the European External Action Service (TEU article 18).

As the EU is an intricate system of power-sharing between member states and its supranational institutions, policy areas are usually divided in different competencies, for example those that are exclusive to the EU, shared between both EU and member states, and those that the EU can only support the member states in coordinating across borders (Bulmer et al, 2020: 337ff.). The EU’s foreign policy does not follow these set categories as it is singled out as an area of political action by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in Title V. Further, the matter is more complicated in regard to Arctic policies because Arctic governance touches on many different policy areas such as, but not limited to external action, fisheries, biodiversity protections, and trade. Keeping in mind the constraints of this article, it shall focus on policy documents of the Commission, the Council of the EU, and the Parliament.

The EU in Arctic Governance – Policy Communications in between Cooperation and Faux Pas The EU’s role in the Arctic is a special one in that it is an international organisation which represents states with territory above the Arctic Circle and states that lie south of the Arctic.

Beyond that, the EU has extensive trade relations and association agreements with other Arctic states and territories, such as Norway, Iceland, and Greenland (López & Razauskas, 2023). Hence, the EU has territorial interests in the Arctic (member state territory above the Arctic Circle) as well as economic ones (for example in the European Economic Area (EEA)) (Raspotnik, 2018: 65f., 75f., 79). Furthermore, the EU is especially sensitive to changes to the climate and the wider environment in the Arctic, especially in regard to the Greenland ice sheet melting and ‘Arctic Amplification’ (Strahlendorff, 2014: 27). Therefore, what a policy officer at the Commission’s Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries said in an interview conducted by Andreas Raspotnik remains applicable: “The EU is a part of the Arctic, linked to the Arctic and simultaneously affects and is affected by the Arctic” (2018: 86).

With these reasons for defining a common foreign policy towards the Arctic, the EU institutions regularly publish documents, communications, and resolutions on the EU’s policy priorities in the region. As set out in Title V Chapter 1 of the TEU, the primary responsibility to draft and publish such a strategy paper on the Arctic falls to the Commission.3 Another actor that stands out in the crowded field of EU institutions in this regard is the European Parliament. With powers defined

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in Rule 118 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (2019), its plenary can make recommendations to the Commission on the issue, which it has chosen to do in every cycle of the EU’s Arctic policy so far. Since 2008, the Commission has put forward a total of three (joint) Communications to other EU institutions regarding the Arctic which were requested (2008), commented upon (2016), or accompanied (2021) by European Parliament resolutions. Therefore, this article will consider the following six documents serving as the N-dataset/corpus (see section Methodology and Comparison of these Policy Cycles below) for its analysis and towards answering its research question.4 These are in chronological order:5 Doc A) European Parliament Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance Doc B) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The European Union and the Arctic Region (2008) Doc C) Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic (2016) Doc D) European Parliament Resolution of 16 March 2017 on an integrated European Union policy for the Arctic Doc E) European Parliament Resolution of 7 October 2021 on the Arctic: opportunities, concerns and security challenges Doc F) Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic (2021).

The EU and Indigenous Peoples of the North - Indigenous Knowledge and Institutional Ignorance Generally, the EU’s affairs in the Arctic – and with Indigenous peoples in particular - are characterised by contrasts: On one side, the EU depicts itself as a strong actor in the region with significant political and economic impact (Doc A: preambulatory clause N and Doc B: 2 para 1), but, on the other side, significantly “pay[s] in terms of credibility and trustworthiness” (Raspotnik, 2018: 74) by defining priorities that show a lack of regard for the peculiarities of the Arctic. This apparent lack of understanding of Arctic realities becomes evident in the import restriction of seal products communicated by the European Parliament and the Council in 2009, the Parliament’s own demand for an Arctic treaty based on the Antarctic Treaty of 1961 in its 2008 Resolution (Doc A and Raspotnik 2018: 106) and the consequent abandonment of this demand in its later Resolution of 20 January 2011 on a sustainable EU policy for the High North. In the latter, the Parliament admitted that “the Arctic Region is not to be regarded as a legal vacuum” (European Parliament, 2011: para 42) as there is a multitude of applicable legal regimes (Raspotnik, 2018: 106).

Whereas this article already established the importance of the EU as an actor in the Arctic, the significance of sufficient regard for Indigenous-specific issues in the definition of the EU’s political objectives above the Arctic Circle still needs to be deduced. Degai et al. (2022: 2 para 3) explain that, as the traditional and historic population of the region in question, the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic and their traditional knowledge are “key to accurate interpretation of dynamics in the natural and social systems in the Arctic.” Accordingly, “Indigenous knowledge [is] central for both research and policymaking in the Arctic, now and in the future” (Degai et al, 2022: 2 para 1).

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Prior to the first unified Arctic policy communicated in Doc B, the EU mostly referred to Indigenous peoples in its Northern Dimension policy starting in 1999 (Airoldi, 2008: 21f. & 83).

The founding documents of this cooperation initiative between the EU, Norway, Iceland, Russia, and others mention “indigenous peoples issues […] together with environmental, health and social issues (sic)” (Airoldi, 2008: 83).

Whereas Chuffart, Raspotnik and Stępień argue that a focus “on implementing more robust environmental policies in Europe” (2021: 1) will guide the EU institutions towards a more comprehensive and better integrated EU Arctic policy, this author suggests that the EU institutions have to concentrate their efforts on coordinating their respective policies towards Indigenous peoples and the recognition of their rights in the Arctic, both between institutions and between the EU and its member states.

Whether the EU takes the Indigenous peoples of the North and their knowledge into account sufficiently in the formation of its policy objectives for the Arctic is beyond the scope of this article since it focusses on the final policy documents as published post-deliberation.

This article shall proceed to present the content of the six specified policy documents (Doc A-F) and analyse them regarding the representation of Indigenous-specific issues, and then compare the three policy cycles against each other. The comparison will also contain a brief juxtaposition of the approach to Indigenous-specific issues by different institutions.

Analysis of EU Arctic Policy Documents Before an in-depth comparison of the six policy documents over three distinct phases in the EU’s Arctic policy-making since 2008 (hereafter referred to as the “three policy cycles”), the policy cycles will be analysed separately first and their legislative output will then be put into wider historical context. This further supports the qualitative analysis of these policy documents as it is methodologically supported by Cardno (2018: 631 Table 2).

Policy Cycle of 2008 - Getting Started After The Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 and during the International Polar Year, the interest in Arctic relations significantly increased in the European Parliament (Raspotnik, 2018: 96). Therefore, the Parliament formulated and passed its first resolution on Arctic Governance on 09 October 2008 (Doc A) (Raspotnik 2018: 96).

Generally, Doc A recommended under European Parliament Rule 118 to the Commission to pursue measures which: - lay “the foundations for a meaningful EU Arctic policy” (p. 7) addressing the following issues: “climate change […] in the region; policy options that respect the indigenous populations and their livelihoods […]” (p. 7 (a) & (b)), - deliver “a standalone EU Arctic policy” (p. 5), - respond to the European Parliament’s concern “over the ongoing race for natural resources in the Arctic, which may lead to security threats for the EU” (p. 13), - lead to the EU “taking up ‘observer status’ on the Arctic Council” (p. 14), and - seek to open “international negotiations [on] the adoption of an international treaty for the protection of the Arctic, having as its inspiration the Antarctic Treaty” (p. 15).

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Although Doc A was perceived as following a “rather blunt ‘Arctic-in’ approach” (Raspotnik 2018: 97), it was approved by MEPs with a significant majority of 597 to 23 (against) to 41 (abstentions) (Raspotnik 2018: 98) and is seen as proof to the European Parliament’s “less constrained vision of the world” compared to other EU institutions (Airoldi, 2008: 99).

In response to the European Parliament’s Doc A, the Commission published its first stand-alone Communication on the Arctic (Doc B) on 20 November 2008. The Commission (2008) outlined proposals for action “around three main policy objectives: - Protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population - Promoting sustainable use of resources - Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance” (p. 3).

The Commission used this document as a catalyst for launching the EU’s effort to join the AC as a permanent observer (Canova, 2023: para 3).

Whereas Doc B was able to facilitate most of the Parliament’s recommendations communicated in Doc A, the Commission’s communication was widely received as “less controversial” (Raspotnik, 2008: 102) than the Parliament’s policy objectives (Airoldi, 2010: 21). This has been linked to the “far less bold and innovative” position of the Commission compared to the European Parliament (Airoldi, 2010: 21).

Although the following document is not included in the six selected EU-Arctic policy papers, it is worth taking note of European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal products with EEA relevance. While this regulation was drafted in a way as to avert negative economic effects on Indigenous and local economies (European Parliament and Council Regulation, 2009: preambulatory clause 14), “the ban had […] adverse effects on Inuit livelihoods” (Government of Nunavut, 2012: 3ff.) and led to critique from Indigenous communities (Raspotnik, 2018: 92) as well as governments of affected regions (Government of Nunavut, 2012). Concerning animal welfare regulation, the EU “continues to be at odds with the vision of Arctic populations, particularly indigenous peoples, as well as impairing their economic interests” (Airoldi, 2010: 10). In a resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU strategy for the Arctic, the European Parliament on page five “regrets the effects which the EU regulation relating to the ban on seal products has produced […] in particular for indigenous culture and livelihood”.

Policy Cycle of 2016 - EU Between In and Out Slightly behind schedule and on earlier requests by the Parliament and the Council to develop an integrated EU policy on the Arctic, the Commission and the High Representative published another major policy paper defining the EU’s approach to Arctic relations on 27 April 2016 (Raspotnik, 2018: 114). The Joint Communication (Doc C: 4) entitled “An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic” again specified recommendations for actions in the following “three priority areas: - Climate Change and Safeguarding the Arctic Environment; - Sustainable Development in and around the Arctic; - International Cooperation on Arctic Issues”.

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As Doc C was published, the EU’s admission to the Arctic Council as an observer was still in a “stalemate” (Raspotnik, 2018: 114). This fact could also explain the change of tone in Doc C compared to the more involved and assertive expressions of Doc B. In that sense, Doc C refers to “three priority areas” (2016: 4) whereas Doc B refers to them as “three main policy objectives” (2008: 3). Furthermore, the Commission and High Representative focus the suggested actions more towards the “European Arctic” (Raspotnik, 2018: 114f.) instead of the Arctic region as defined extensively in Doc B (2008: 2 footnote 1). Hence, the EU “continued to retract its broader circumpolar vision from 2008” (Raspotnik, 2018: 116). Besides that, and as is easily graspable, the main items of the Communications have not changed significantly. What has changed in the meantime, though, is that the position of EU institutions on, and understanding of, the Arctic governance framework “followed [the by then] well-practised and diplomatically framed line of argument” (Raspotnik, 2018: 115) to avoid controversy as was seen amongst several of the eight Arctic states following the passing of Doc A (Raspotnik, 2018: 115). Lastly, the measures suggested in Doc C have a strong connection to research and scientific efforts, highlighting the EU as “a global leader in science” (2016: 13).

After the Council responded to this Joint Communication on 20 June 2016 with ‘Council Conclusions on the Arctic,’ the European Parliament responded with its resolution of 16 March 2017 (Doc D). Generally, it followed the priorities of its previous resolutions on the matter: “climate and environment, sustainability and regional development” (Raspotnik, 2018: 118).

Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) did, however, elaborate on the need to establish marine protected areas in the Arctic High Seas (Doc D, 2017: 51ff.). Compared to the EU’s previous policy papers, Doc D (p. 30) takes a more tangible stance on security-related concerns, especially regarding Russia. The Parliament’s resolution on the Arctic of 2017 is widely seen as aiming to “demonstrate Arctic engagement” (Raspotnik & Stępień, 2017: 6). In contrast to both Commission and High Representative, MEPs called again for a “comprehensive [Arctic] strategy” citing a lack of coherence between the “EU’s internal and external policies as regards Arctic matters” (Doc D, 2017: 1).

Policy Cycle of 2021 - Growing Confidence Highlighting the need for a coordinated EU Arctic strategy which takes into account the rapidly changing environmental and geopolitical circumstances, the European Parliament passed its resolution on “The Arctic: opportunities, concerns and security challenges” on 07 October 2021 (Doc E, 2021: 1f. & operative clause 2). Doc E took up – not just in its title – MEPs’ heightened awareness for security in the Arctic region. While reiterating that the “comprehensive governance model of the Arctic, with international law at its core, has proven to be effective and robust” (Doc E, 2021: preambulatory clause C), Doc E stresses the growing “military importance and geopolitical strategy role” of the region (preambulatory clause E). Further, it declares in preambulatory clause N that “while the challenges to the Arctic are predominantly caused by global climate change and activities outside the Arctic region, the effects of climate change are particularly visible in the Arctic,” hence highlighting both an interest in (operative clauses 10-14) and a responsibility of actors beyond the Arctic Circle for (preambulatory clause N) sustainable development in the region. Another theme that arose under previous resolutions (Doc A & D), is the Parliament’s support for the “three founding pillars of the integrated EU policy for the Arctic […] climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment, promoting sustainable development and […]

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international cooperation” (Doc E, 2021: operative clause 2). DOC E again seeks to underline “the need for more coherence between the EU’s internal and external policies as regards Arctic matters” (operative clause 2), a demand which apparently has not been met by the Commission’s response to that same demand in Doc D. The Commission and the High Representative reacted to the Parliament’s recommendations in Doc E with the most recent Communication on EU-Arctic relations on 13 October 2021. This Doc F (2021) entitled “A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic” structures the Commission’s policy proposals around three “objectives” (Doc F, 2021: 2), which are: - “a region for peaceful cooperation in the new geopolitical setting” (p. 2), - “making the Arctic more resilient to climate change and environmental degradation” (p. 7), - “stimulating an innovative green, blue and digital transition” (pp. 11f.).

With Doc F (2021), the Commission committed the EU to an “increased engagement in and around the Arctic region” (p. 16) with a coordinated effort of all EU institutions involved. Serving as examples for these efforts and actions, the Commission proposes investment to “enhance its strategic foresight on Arctic security risks” (p. 6), “strengthen and enhance EU-Greenland cooperation” (p. 6), and to “promote research” (p. 7) in policy objective one. In objective two, the Commission plans to “promote sustainable and responsible solutions […] for extracting critical minerals” (p. 11), and, more controversially, to “push for oil, coal and gas to remain in the ground” (p. 11). In the third and last objective, the Commission suggests to “invest in Arctic research” (p.

15), especially on “health threats linked to Arctic climate change” (p. 16), and to “boost digital connectivity in Arctic regions” (p. 16).

Methodology and Comparison of these Policy Cycles Having covered the general contents and purposes of the six documents (Doc A-F), this article will now turn to a comparison of their regard for Indigenous-specific issues and how it has changed between 2008 and 2021. This article utilises the methodology outlined in the following paragraphs to seek and apply quantifiable indicators regarding Indigenous-specific issues in the EU’s policy documents since 2008.

Keeping in mind the importance of Indigenous peoples and their knowledge toward successful Arctic governance in the face of growing regional and global challenges mentioned in the previous section, but also the limited scope of this article, this section shall compare the selected policy papers with regard to two indicators: I.

the absolute and relative number of mentions of the term “indigenous”, and

II.

the regard for Indigenous rights instruments.

In its approach, this analysis and comparison will be guided by a synthesis of linguistic corpus analyses of political speeches and documents (Charteris-Black, 2018: 173f), as well as Roger’s (2023: 223f.) methodology of “large-N dataset” analyses in the study of international organisations seeking to combine both quantitative (I.) and qualitative approaches (II.) to understand better the behaviour of this specific organisation, the EU, in relation to Indigenous-specific issues. Thus, this article applies “combined quantitative and qualitative approaches to provide more compelling answers to empirical questions than either could in isolation” (Roger, 2023: 223).

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As the size of this “large-N dataset” is limited due to the extent of this article, the reader is advised to keep in mind the suggestions for future research on the issue in a later section. This essay shall proceed to present the content of the six specified policy documents (Doc A-F) and analyse them towards representation of Indigenous-specific issues, and then compare the three policy cycles against each other, as well as the approach of different EU institutions to Indigenous-specific issues.

I. Mentions of the term “indigenous” While noting that the simple act of mentioning the term “indigenous” in policy papers does not directly translate to regard for Indigenous-specific issues, it shall be noted that the complete absence of a topic in such papers would indicate a general disregard for that topic. Resolutions of the European Parliament and communications of the Commission (and High Representative) undergo significant work in their drafting. Hence, it shall be taken as a given that every word included in the limited space available in these policy documents was included, and remained included, for a purpose and shall be subject to attention in academic analysis (Mitrani & Noy, 2023: 230f.).

In keeping this comparison as objective as possible, this article shall first compare the absolute number of mentions of the term ‘indigenous’ differentiating between in-text mentions, mentions in (sub)titles, and in footnotes (fn). Then, the analysis will also consider the total word count of the documents and present the relative mentions of ‘indigenous’. Following that, the study shall point out features of that numerical comparison that stand out. Finally, the capitalisation of the terms ‘indigenous’ and ‘peoples’ will be regarded briefly.

The results of a count of the absolute mentions of the term ‘indigenous’ in the six selected EU Arctic policy documents (while taking into account the varying length of the individual documents for a relative keyword count) are presented in Table 1 and Figure 1: Table 1: Absolute and relative mentions of the term ‘indigenous’ in selected EU Arctic policy papers (in-text | (sub-)titles | fn)

total word count

relative mentions

Doc A (EP 2008)

3 (3 | 0 | 0)

1545

0.19% (1 in 515)

Doc B (Cms 2008)

12 (10 | 1 | 1)

4311

0.27% (1 in 359.25)

Doc C (Cms & HRep 2016)

9 (7 | 1 | 1)

7239

0.12% (1 in 804.33)

Doc D (EP 2017)

17 (17 | 0 | 0)

7267

0.23% (1 in 427.47)

Doc E (EP 2021)

36 (35 | 1 | 0)

11253

0.32% (1 in 312.58)

Doc F (Cms & HRep 2021) 15 (15 | 0 | 0)

8136

0.18% (1 in 542.4)

average

6625.16

0.23% (1 in 432.17)

Document

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absolute total mentions

15.33 (14.5 | 0.5 | 0.33)

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Figure 1: Relative mentions of the term ‘indigenous’ in selected EU Arctic policy papers and their trend

As is evident from Table 1, the policy papers increased in length with Doc E as an outlier being almost twice as long as the average paper. Thus, in recent years, the EU appears to have more to say on Arctic issues in general. Likewise, the term ‘indigenous’ has been mentioned more often.

Whereas roughly one in 437 words was ‘indigenous’ on average during the 2008-cycle, in the last cycle this increased to roughly one in 427. It can be seen in Figure 1 that the relative mentions in percent increased on average.

When dividing the documents not into the three cycles but into those produced by the European Parliament, and those by Commission and High Representative, a difference in institutional regard for Indigenous-specific issues (based on relative mentions) becomes evident: As the relative mentions in the Commission’s documents are on average below 0.2 per-cent, those in documents authored by the European Parliament are about a quarter per-cent. Granted that this could be interpreted as evidence for institutional bias of the European Parliament in favour of Indigenous realities, the scope of this article does not allow for a more comprehensive analysis.

To put the numbers found by this corpus analysis into perspective, here follows a brief digression to another example of highly deliberate political communication: the US Presidential State of the Union Address to Congress. Taking into account severely impactful events of September 2001, it becomes evident that the mentions of the term “terrorism” and its derivatives6 increased by around 0.9 per-cent in the address following the events in September 2001 compared to the two addresses given by WJ Clinton in the two previous year.7 This brief example shows that a national catastrophe such as the events of 9/11 led only to a short-term increase in relative mentions by less than one percent. It can be argued that an overall increase in relative mentions of the term “indigenous” in the six selected policy papers of around 0.05 percent might without an underlying wide-reaching catastrophic event to catalyse mentions might still be meaningful.

Further, it is worth noting that the documents up to the most recent Commission and High Representative communication have consistently not capitalised either ‘indigenous’ or ‘peoples’.8

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In contrast, the combination of ‘indigenous’ and ‘peoples’ has been consistently capitalised in Doc F. Though this is not legally significant, it is arguably of symbolic significance as a “sign of respect for [Indigenous] identities, governments, institutions and collective rights that have been historically considered illegitimate” (Government of British Columbia, 2023: para 1).

II. Regard for Indigenous peoples’ rights instruments As the mere mentioning of ‘indigenous’ (quantitative) by itself is not a sufficient indicator for institutional awareness for Indigenous-specific issues, this article shall also consider the substantive regard for Indigenous peoples’ rights instruments (qualitative) in the six selected policy papers.

For the purpose of this analysis, this article will consider the following rights instruments: - United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) (UNDRIP) and - International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 “Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention” (1989) (ILO C 169).

Further, it will also consider other more specific endorsements of Indigenous rights.

Table 2: Regard for Indigenous rights instruments in selected EU Arctic policy papers Document Doc A (EP 2008) Doc B (Cms 2008) Doc C (Cms & HRep 2016)

Doc D (EP 2017)

Doc E (EP 2021)

Doc F (Cms & HRep 2021)

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Regard for specific Indigenous peoples’ rights instruments (bold) & other measures (below) N/A N/A reference to European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (p. 4) N/A “to ensure that [Indigenous peoples’] rights are respected” p. 15, “annual dialogue meeting with [Indigenous peoples] in relation to […] human rights” (p. 15) ILO C 169, UNDRIP, UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples “fundamental rights of indigenous peoples must be respected and protected with more stringent safeguards” (PC R), “necessity to safeguard and promote [Indigenous peoples’] rights, cultures and languages” (OC 36) UNDRIP, ILO C 169 “preserving the rights of indigenous peoples” subtitle (OCs 44-51), “supports […] the full and effective implementation of Article 19 of the UNDRIP” (OC 44), “highlights the need for the staff of […] EU delegations to be versed in indigenous peoples’ rights” (OC 46), “reiterates its call on all the remaining Member States to ratify without delay [ILO C 169]” (OC 51) ILO C 169, UNDRIP “The [UNDRIP] is integral to the EU’s human rights policy.” (p. 14) “The EU will promote Indigenous Peoples’ rights […] in line with [ILO C 169]” (p. 14)

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As is evident from Table 2, the regard for Indigenous peoples' rights and the support for related legal instruments considered by this study has changed over time. As the two first documents (Doc A & B) did not refer to Indigenous peoples’ rights instruments at all, starting in 2016 both the Commission and European Parliament showed more consistent regard for them.

Conclusions Taken that respect for and cooperation with Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, on their terms, are imperative for successful circumpolar governance and that a more comprehensive account of Northerners’ needs might well be key to the EU’s inclusion in the Arctic’s institutional governance, Indigenous-specific issues should be central to the EU’s policy communications on Arctic affairs.

The N-dataset/corpus analysis presented in this article show that Indigenous-specific issues appear more often in more recent European Parliament resolutions and Commission communications, as well as that Indigenous people’s rights and their international legal instruments appear more consistently. Therefore, there is evidence to suggest that from 2008 to 2021 the representation of Indigenous-specific issues has increased both quantitatively and qualitatively (though not the focus of this study). Beyond that, there are first indications that the regard that both institutions (subject of this study) show for Indigenous issues and rights differs in significant ways. In comparison, the Parliament mentions Indigenous-specific issues more often than the Commission, and the former shows regard for Indigenous rights more extensively than the latter does. To conclusively answer the research questions guiding this article, the author suggests improvements and further research into the matter. For instance, future research could increase the size of the N-dataset/corpus to include communications from other EU institutions (quantitative improvement). They could also account for the length of paragraphs on Indigenous-specific issues and not just the mention of one keyword, or even take into account the words used directly before and after the terms ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Indigenous peoples’ and compare the findings across the three policy cycles and different institutions (qualitative improvements).

Notes 1. Capitalisation or the absence thereof in regard to the term ‘Indigenous peoples’ shall not be considered a denial of their identity or disregard for their institutions and rights. Here, the author opted to capitalise the ‘Indigenous’ but not capitalise the ‘peoples’ to avoid confusion with the term ‘Peoples’ in the public international legal sense. The author would like to point out that ‘state’ (as in ‘nation state’) has also not been capitalised throughout this article.

2. For the purposes of this article, any territory north of the Arctic Circle shall be considered Arctic territory. Any state with territory (and territorial waters) north of the Arctic Circle shall be considered an Arctic state.

3. see in particular articles 17 & 21 (2) TEU. 4. These six documents have been chosen out of the more than ten EU documents on the Arctic since 2008 (see Raspotnik (2018), p. 93 “Box 5.2”) respecting the limited scope of this article. For proposals towards future research on the issue see this article’s conclusions below.

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5. Hereafter, the author will apply these designations (Doc A-F) when referring to any of these six documents.

6. The derivatives of the term “terrorism” include “terror”, “terrorist”, and “terrorists”.

7. Comparison by the author based on corpus analysis of the State of the Union Addresses of 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. The former two delivered by WJ Clinton mentioned the term and its derivatives 0.08 and 0.05 per-cent, respectively. The latter two mentioned the term and its derivatives 0.93 and 0.41 per-cent. Speeches were accessed through the UC Santa Barbara’s The American Presidency Project.

8. excluding the mention in the titles of international legal texts for example in Doc D: 1f. and Doc E: 1.

References Airoldi, A. (2008) The European Union and the Arctic: Policies and Actions (Nordic Council of Ministers).

Airoldi, A. (2010) European Union and the Arctic: Main Developments July 2008–July 2010 (Nordic Council of Ministers).

Arctic Council. (2009) ‘TROMSØ DECLARATION On the occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of The Arctic Council’.

Bulmer, S. et al. (2020) Politics in the European Union, 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Canova, E. (2023) The European Union and its Member States in the Arctic: Official Complementarity but Underlying Rivalry? EU-Arctic Series 2023 (The Arctic Institute).

Retrieved from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/european-union-member-statesarctic-official-complem entarity-underlying-rivalry/.

Cardno, C. (2018) Policy Document Analysis: A Practical Educational Leadership Tool and a Qualitative Research Method, Kuram ve Uygulamada Eğitim Yönetimi. 24(4), pp. 623-640.

CBC News. (2009a) ‘Canada against EU entry to Arctic Council because of seal trade ban’, 29 April 2009. Retrieved from <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/canada-againsteu-entry-to-arctic-council-because-of-seal-trade-ban1.806188#:~:text=Canada%20opposes%20the%20 European%20Union's>, retrieved 30 September 2024.

CBC News. (2009b) ‘Nunavut premier wants EU barred from Arctic Council’, 15 April 2009.

Retrieved from <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/nunavut-premier-wants-eubarred-from-arctic-council1.775028#:~:text=Nunavut%20Premier%20Eva%20Aariak%20says% 20the>, retrieved 30 September 2024.

Charteris-Black, J. (2018) Analysing Political Speech, 2nd ed. London: Palgrave.

Chuffart, R., Raspotnik, A. & Stępień, A. (2021) Our common arctic? A more sustainable EUarctic nexus in light of the European green deal, The Polar Journal. 11(2), pp. 284-302.

Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2021.1978757.

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Council of the European Union. (2016) Council Conclusions on the Arctic (20 June 2016) 10400/16 COEST 166.

Degai, T. et al. (2022) Shaping Arctic’s Tomorrow through Indigenous Knowledge Engagement and Knowledge Co-Production, Sustainability. 14(3), pp. 1331-34. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3390/su14031331.

Durfee, M.H. & Johnstone, R.L. (2019) Arctic Governance in a Changing World. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.

European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2016) Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council ‘An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic’ JOIN(2016) 21 final.

European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2021) Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic’ JOIN(2021) 27 final.

European Commission. (2008) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council ‘The European Union and the Arctic Region’ COM(2008) 763 final.

European Parliament and Council. (2009) Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal products OJ L286/36.

European Parliament. (2008) Resolution (2010/C 9 E/07) of 09 October 2008 on Arctic Governance OJ C 9 E/41.

European Parliament. (2011) Resolution of 20 January 2011 on a sustainable EU policy for the High North (2010/2214(INI)) OJ C 199E/1.

European Parliament. (2014) Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU strategy for the Arctic (2013/2595(RSP)) P7_TA(2014)0236.

European Parliament. (2017) Resolution (2016/2228(INI)) of 16 March 2017 on an integrated European Union policy for the Arctic P8_TA(2017)0093.

European Parliament. (2019) Rules of Procedure (9th parliamentary term, 2019).

European Parliament. (2021) Resolution (2020/2112(INI)) of 07 October 2021 on the Arctic: opportunities, concerns and security challenges P9_TA(2020)0413.

Government of British Columbia. (2023) Capitalization and formatting of Indigenous Terms. Retrieved from https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-forgovernment/service-experience-digital-delivery/web-content-development-guides/webstyle-guide/writing-guide-for-indigenous-content/capitalization-and-formatting-ofindigenous-terms.

Government of Nunavut. (2012) Report on the Impacts of the European Union Seal Ban. Retrieved from https://gov.nu.ca/sites/default/files/impactssealban_web.pdf.

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López, M.Á. & Razauskas, A. (2023) The European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland and the North (Fact Sheets on the European Union, European Parliamentary Research Service).

Retrieved from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/169/theeuropean-economic-area-eea-switzerland-and-the-north.

Mitrani, M. & Noy, I. (2023) Computerized Text Analysis. In Badache, F., Kimber, L.R., & Maertens, L. (eds.) International Organizations and Research Methods. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Raspotnik, A. & Stępień, A. (2017) The European Parliament Heading Towards Icy Arctic Waters – Again. ArCticles. Retrieved from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/europeanparliament-heading-towards-icy-arctic-waters/.

Raspotnik, A. (2018) The European Union and the Geopolitics of the Arctic. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Roger, C.B. (2018) Large-N Data and Quantitative Analyses. In Badache, F., Kimber, L.R., & Maertens, L. (eds.) International Organizations and Research Methods. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Strahlendorff, M. et al. (2014) Climate Change in the Arctic. In Stępień, A., Koivurova, T. & Kankaanpää, P. (eds.) Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic: Assessment Conducted for the European Union. (pp. 19-32). Rovaniemi, Finland: Arctic Centre, University of Lapland.

UC Santa Barbara. (n.d.) ‘State of the Union Addresses’ (The American Presidency Project), accessible <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/app-categories/spokenaddresses-and-remarks/presidential/state-the-union-addresses>, accessed 21 September 2024.

Wegge, N. (2012). The EU and the Arctic: European foreign policy in the making. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 3(1), 6–29. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/48710161.

Wuidar, M. (2024) European Union Engagement with Indigenous Issues. In Mamo, E. et al. (eds.) The Indigenous World 2024. (pp. 586-91). Copenhagen, Denmark: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs.

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II. Russia and China

Looking Beyond China: Non-Western Actors in the Russian Arctic after February 2022 Sergey Sukhankin & P. Whitney Lackenbauer

This article examines Russia’s changing approach regarding the role and place of non-western actors in the Arctic. The outbreak of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has exacerbated political and economic tensions between Moscow and its Western counterparts, seriously undermining Arctic cooperation. Consequently, Russia has looked for alternatives to Western partners in the Arctic. China occupies a special place, but Beijing’s economic might and growing military ambitions preclude Moscow from considering China its only partner in the Arctic. Accordingly, Russia is actively trying to engage other partners from BRICS and G-20 platforms – such as India, Brazil, South Korea, and Singapore – who, in addition to foreign direct investment, could contribute expertise and unique competences to regional development. Yet, cooperation with these partners, while lucrative and promising in theory, cannot replace what Russia has lost by destroying its traditional ties with other Arctic nations. While some actors (such as Brazil) have only limited interest in the Arctic, others (such as India, South Korea, and Singapore) will likely abstain from comprehensive cooperation because of the economic and geopolitical risks posed by Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine and the prospect of secondary sanctions.

Introduction Over the last couple of decades, the Arctic region – once largely isolated – has become increasingly integrated into global economic, transportation, and geopolitical systems. Consequently, Arctic and non-Arctic states have elevated the region to a higher priority and integrated it into broader efforts to advance economic and security agendas. This also means that states have worked to define the Arctic in terms favourable to their interests.

Geographically, the Russian Federation is the largest Arctic state with a vast Arctic territory covering approximately 9 million square kilometers. Its Arctic coastline stretches over 24,150 kilometres, Dr. Sergey Sukhankin, Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC); Fellow at NAADSN (Canada); PhD candidate at the University of the Basque Country (Economic Integration Program) Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Professor at Trent University, School for the Study of Canada and Tier 1 Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North.

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extending more than halfway around the Circumpolar North. More than 2.5 million Russians live in the Arctic, representing nearly half of the global population living in the circumpolar North – but less than 2 percent of the Russian population resides there. Activity within the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation generates between 12–15 percent of the country’s GDP and, before the West introduced expanded economic sanctions in 2022, represented one-quarter of Russia’s total exports (Kozlov, 2019). Accordingly, sustainable development of the region is amongst Russia’s foremost national priorities, which also include “the use of the Arctic region as a strategic resource base” for socioeconomic development, the “preservation of the Arctic as an area of peace and cooperation,” protection of Arctic ecosystems, and the promotion of the Northern Sea Route as a major transportation artery (Arctic Council, 2022).

Russia has laid out a comprehensive strategic plan for the Arctic region in a series of documents released since March 2020.2 They are rooted in a Russian national perspective on the idea of Arctic exceptionalism, emphasizing specific characteristics that demand “special approaches to its socioeconomic development” in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) and to “ensure national security in the Arctic.” This lays the foundation for Russia to build its case for why the AZRF is important for socio-economic development and national security, with a deliberate emphasis on oil and gas resources (both terrestrial and on the continental shelf), expectations of heightened demand for the NSR “as a transport corridor of global importance,” climate change effects on the environment and security, the presence of Indigenous peoples, and Russia’s positioning of strategic deterrent forces in the region (President of the Russian Federation, 2020). The external-facing dimensions of Russia’s strategy articulate core objectives to foster international cooperation, as well as those intended to bolster defence, security, and border protection. Specific language promises to implement “multivector foreign policy activities aimed at preserving the Arctic as a territory of peace, stability, and mutually beneficial cooperation.” External priorities also include asserting control over foreign activities in the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and reducing the impact of foreign sanctions (Sukhankin, 2020c).

Russia’s intensifying war on Ukraine since February 2022 has forced the Kremlin to recalibrate its approach to circumpolar affairs and the partnerships that it needs to achieve its domestic and regional goals. An insightful study by Marina Lomaeva and Fujio Ohnishi (2022) on how Russian experts assessed their country’s isolation from Arctic governance fora in the domestic, government-controlled media from March-October 2022 indicates how Russian experts perceived the decision by the other seven Arctic states to “pause” their engagement with Russia through the Arctic Council as a threat to the existing Arctic governance structure and the privileged position of the Arctic states in the region.

This has generated debate about whether Russia should divert its energy to other international Arctic fora to advance its regional agenda. It has also led Russia to invite non-Arctic states, such as China and India, to partner with Russian companies to develop the AZRF (Arctic: Territory of Dialogue, 2022a).

For example, Putin’s advisor Anton Kobyakov stated in July 2022 that “Russia is interested in international cooperation and joint work within the framework of major infrastructure projects in the Arctic …, but we are faced with the unwillingness of various countries to cooperate in projects of mutual interest. In this regard, the Russian side is ready to cooperate with non-Arctic countries in

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projects of any scale. Only the joint work of all interested countries can help strengthen mutual trust and reduce security risks in the Arctic” (Arctic: Territory of Dialogue, 2022b).

This article critically examines Russia’s recent pivot to seeking partnerships with non-Western, nonArctic states to advance regional cooperation. While significant academic attention is dedicated to the Sino-Russian relationship,2 there has been less discussion about Russia’s interest in attracting other foreign actors. We begin with an overview of Russia’s strategic shift towards non-Western partners, its perception of how the Arctic might serve to break Russia’s West-imposed international isolation, and Russian concerns and constraints with respect to this pivot. We then look specifically at Russia’s interests in cooperating with four particular states: India, South Korea, Singapore, and Brazil. While some of this interest predated February 2022 (Sukhankin, 2020a, 2020b), we analyze how the War in Ukraine has served as a driver for Russia to diversify its partnerships, a cause for caution or withdrawal on the part of some prospective partners, or a catalyst for new relationships as Moscow is driven to seek new markets, new sources of investment, new scientific partners, and new legitimacy as an Arctic actor that is largely isolated from its Arctic state peers.

This article also does not discuss various other non-Western states that have demonstrated their interest in the economic, science, and research-related potential of the Russian Arctic. Given the amount of recent academic and public commentary on China and its evolving relationship with Russia, we have deliberately chosen to exclude the Sino-Russian Arctic relationship from our analysis – except where it influences relationships with other prospective non-Western partners in the region. Russia also views the Republic of South Africa as a potential partner in Arctic affairs. Although this interest is reciprocated, South Africa focuses primarily on its own (domestic) issues and has, at least for now, limited capabilities in expanding its presence or collaboration with Russia in the Arctic. The strained Russo-Japanese relationship is substantively different from Russia’s ties with the actors that fall within the scope of this article – and has profoundly worsened since February 2022. The Kremlin immediately branded Japan, alongside Ukraine and members of the Trans-Atlantic alliance, as an “unfriendly” country. For its part, Tokyo was one of the first countries to introduce anti-Russian sanctions on February 25. This voided any remaining prospect of Russo-Japanese cooperation in the Arctic.

Accordingly, we have focused on other actors who represent more interesting cases of Russian interest and partnership aspirations.

The strategic shift in Russia’s perception of cooperation in the Arctic Away from the West, toward the non-Western world Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, followed by next-to-complete collapse of ties between Moscow and its Western counterparts, marked a decisive turning point in the Kremlin’s strategic re-orientation toward the non-Western world. This turn was somewhat expected: powerful conservative politician Yevgey Primakov championed these ideas in the early 1990s, which were reflected in the Concept of the National Security of the Russian Federation adopted in 1997 (President of the Russian Federation, 1997). Over time, a pool of Russian conservative and anti-Western thinkers expanded alongside the Kremlin’s growing frustration with the West, which Russia accused of predatory foreign policies and blamed for Russia’s domestic failures. Former liberal-turned-

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conservative intellectual Sergey Karaganov exemplified the influential proponents of strategic reorientation away from West, outlining these arguments in a book published in 2001 arguing that Russia should exploit its abundant natural resources in Siberia, the Far East, and the Arctic region as a bridge to the rapidly growing economies of Asia (Leksin & Shvetsov, 2001).

In an article published in December 1999, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin supported these ideas and shared (albeit cautiously) similar thoughts. Over the next several years, Putin’s rhetoric about the need to change the vector of Russia’s economic, cultural, and “civilizational development” became more pronounced and increasingly anti-Western. Prior to the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022, Putin publicly expressed these ideas on at least six major occasions: • • • • • •

In 2005, during the thousand-year celebration of Kazan (President of the Russian Federation, 2005).

In 2007, during celebration of 450th anniversary of Bashkiria’s accession to Russia (President of the Russian Federation, 2007).

In 2012, during his inaugural address (President of the Russian Federation, 2012).

In 2013, during his speech at the Valdai discussion club (President of the Russian Federation, 2013).

In 2017, during his visit to Beijing, where he referred to “Big Eurasia” – with Russia in its heart – as a “civilizational forward-looking project” (President of the Russian Federation, 2017).

In 2018, in his telegram to the Institute of Eastern Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Science, where he emphasised the need to study history, culture, and traditions of the Orient – factors that have a special meaning for Russia “as a great Eurasian power” (President of the Russian Federation, 2018).

Accordingly, the foundations of Russia’s strategic re-orientation from the West to the non-Western world – with Russia’s North-Eastern territories serving as the key enabler – were laid well before 2022 (Paderina, 2019). Despite previous moves in this direction, however, completing and legitimizing this full turn required a powerful impetus: Russian launching its large-scale war on Ukraine and the concomitant (nearly complete) breakdown in economic, political, and diplomatic ties between Russia and its Western counterparts.

The Kremlin’s perceived role of the Arctic region since 2022 Unlike the Western sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014, those introduced in 2022 were robust and cannot be discussed as merely symbolic. Within months of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia found itself increasingly isolated by the West and its allies and partners. In its struggle to break the looming isolation, Russia could only rely on the following competitive advantages: its size (critical for transportation and logistics); its abundant natural resources (essential for economic growth and production of products in both developed and rising economies); its indispensability in certain scientific research (such as climate change); and an integrated global economy, enabled by 1990s reforms that made Russia a significant actor in international business and trade as well as an integral part of global supply chain networks.

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Russia’s ability to capitalize on all these factors simultaneously are inseparable from its plans for the Arctic region, Siberia, and the Far East, which Moscow seeks to use to overcome its international isolation. President Putin clearly articulated this intent in a 13 April 2022 speech during “consultations on the development of the Arctic Zone” (President of the Russian Federation, 2022), when he appealed to Russia’s foreign partners – which he characterized as “responsible” and “friendly countries” – to explore opportunities in the Russia Arctic and replace those who chose to abandon the country after February 2022. To break West-imposed isolation, the Kremlin intends to use the Arctic region and its resources in three main ways.

First, Russia sees the exploitation of the Arctic as a source of geoeconomic power. Aside from its vast natural resources, the NSR offers secure maritime passage from Asia to Europe. Given ongoing instability in the Middle East (Sukhankin, 2024a), Russia has been urging its foreign partners to choose the NSR as a safer, shorter, and cheaper alterative. In effect, Russia’s top-level politicians perceive the NSR as a way to redraw the transportational map of Eurasia, allowing Russia to bridge Asia and Europe and become indispensable for both (Radio Sputnik, 2024). Towards this end, Russia has adopted legislative amendments and infrastructural initiatives to attract foreign investors in the Arctic. The Federation Council (the upper house of the Federal Assembly of Russia) approved a law incorporating two municipalities of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District – Yugra into the AZRF (“Sovfed prinyal zakon” 2024), extending its administrative borders and Free Economic Zone (FEZ) preferences granted in the Arctic region (“V Sankt-Peterburge sostoyalsya XII Mezhdunarodnyy Forum”, 2022) to attract foreign investors (Ria Novosti, 2024a). To bolster the attractiveness of the region, Russia is considering refurbishing or building new intra-Arctic railroad transportation arteries within the macroregion to strengthen economic ties. One example is the “Northern Latitudinal Railway” (Severny Shorotnyii Khod) (Arctic Russia, 2023) in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District, a resource-rich region that has one of the weakest transportation networks in Russia (Ofitsyalny sayt polnomochnogo predstavitelya Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Fderatsii v Uralskom federalnom okruge, 2024).

Second, Russia promotes research and scientific activities with “friendly countries” in the Arctic region, with a specific emphasis on the BRICS (a cooperation platform for emerging economies comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). This represents a new and interesting turn in Russia’s approach to cooperation with foreign actors in the Arctic, which used to be rather China-centric. This idea was clearly emphasised by Nikolay Korchunov, the Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador at Large for International Cooperation in the Arctic and Senior Arctic Official at the Arctic Council, during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in 2023 (TASS, 2023c). Within the realm of Arctic research, climate change is particularly appealing to nearly all members of the BRICS (and G20 countries). For instance, during the BRICS Johannesburg summit in August 2023, the final declaration explicitly stated the need for BRICS+ members (including Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Ethiopia) to strengthen cooperation in sustainable development, combat climate change, and preserve biodiversity (Ministerstvo Inostrannyh Del Rossiyskoy Federatcii, 2023). Prior to this, Russian authorities had already claimed that its BRICS partners found climate change and Arctic research to be key points of interest (TASS, 2023c).

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Third, Russia envisages the Arctic region as a platform for tightening political cooperation with nonWestern countries, primarily from the BRICS and G-20 blocs. Prior to February 2022 and the seven like-minded Arctic states’ pause on Arctic Council participation, Russian political and intellectual elites adopted a reserved stance on granting more weight to non-Arctic nations in that forum. Russia’s approach has changed saliently, as the amended version of the “Foundations of the Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic for the Period up to 2035” (adopted in 2020) revealed. The amended Point 16, which discusses “main goals in the domain of the development of internation cooperation” in the Arctic, no longer includes a reference to “strengthening friendly neighbourly relations with Arctic states.” Instead, it emphasizes “the development of ties with foreign nations [no specification provided] on the grounds of bilateral ties in the framework of multilateral structures and mechanisms” (President of the Russian Federation, 2023). Russian sources clearly indicate that these primarily include BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (a Eurasian political, economic, security, and defence organization established by China and Russia in 2001) whose members “are starting to showcase much greater rate of participation” in Arctic-related problems and affairs (Matveyev, 2024).

Discussions in Russia about the possibility of either completely abandoning the Arctic Council or creating an alternative structure comprised of so-called “friendly countries,” with Russia playing a more central role, reveal how the country is seeking to use the Arctic region to advance its geopolitical objectives. While mainstream Russian intellectuals and politicians have been cautious about breaking from the status quo (Sukhankin and Lackenbauer, 2023), voices championing the idea of creating a regional organization in the Arctic “with BRICS office” (based either in Russia or on the territory of a friendly country) are becoming more audible in Russia’s intellectual discourse (Zhuravel & Medvedev, 2023).

The Arctic region and Russia’s strategic shift: concerns and constraints While the overwhelming majority of mainstream Russian intellectuals, policymakers, and politicians ardently support the idea of using the Arctic region and its resources as a means to diversify the country’s economic, cultural, and scientific ties, some prominent Russian experts caution that this approach may have serious limitations and should not be seen as a panacea. Three main factors, both external and intrinsic to Russia’s way of thinking, could seriously strain Russia’s plans to use the Arctic as a platform to strategically re-orient toward non-Western partners.

First, Russia’s growing strategic overreliance on China is a source of persistent concern. Prominent Russian experts such as Anatoly Torkunov warn about the dangers associated with this emerging reality and argue for a more balanced approach in dealing with foreign partners. To avoid imbalance, they suggest Russia should dramatically increase its profile in the “Big Eurasia” by playing a greater role in major infrastructure projects in the India-Pacific macro-region, thus becoming a strategic nexus between all parties. At the same time, they propose that Russia should increase its presence in such regional platforms, forums, and organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and ASEAN+Russia. Russian experts also urge Russian political leaders to take a more active role in forming multilateral linkages (such as Moscow-Beijing-Seoul; Moscow-Beijing-Seoul- Pyongyang; Tokyo-Moscow-Seoul; Moscow-Hanoi-

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Beijing; or Moscow-Hanoi-Delhi) which would amplify Russia’s political opportunities beyond bilaterial engagement (Streltsov & Torkunov, 2023).

Second, Russian experts worry about a lack of sustainable, long-term interest among Russia’s nonWestern partners. They observe that these partners have expressed little commitment to strategic economic projects in the Arctic given, in addition to geopolitical instability, the relatively high start up and annual operational fixed costs associated with developing Arctic-based projects. Consequently, Russia “is rarely mentioned [in strategic documents] as the key partner” (Regnum, 2023). While Russia’s Arctic resource base is immense and attractive to many countries, the actual amount of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) is extremely modest given economic sanctions, general uncertainty, and threat of secondary sanctions. This makes it inadequate to propel any major endeavours. Some Russian experts state that, while the country’s Arctic-based natural resources are extensive, there are simply not enough new export markets or investors to make many of the development opportunities economically sustainable (Nikolayev, 2024). Furthermore, despite Russia’s continuous official touting about growing Arctic scientific interest amongst Russia’s non-Western partners, foreign experts point out that Russia’s BRICS partners had not carried out a single large scientific project in the AZRF as of 2023 (Yasin, 2023).

Third, Russian thinking about the Arctic is heavily influenced by zero-sum logic and the prism of geopolitical competition. Many Russian experts, especially those with military-political backgrounds (whose profile has grown exponentially since 2022), perceive the macro-region as a theatre of expanding “hybrid confrontation” with the US and its NATO allies. For instance, Aleksandr Bartosh, the corresponding member of the Academy of Military Sciences and Experts of the League of Military Diplomats, portrays the Arctic as a sphere of confrontation between “three circles” of adversaries. The “first circle” is composed of the coastal Arctic states. The “second circle” of rivals also encompasses sub-Arctic countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Iceland. The last “circle” is composed of countries such as China, Japan, India, Singapore, South Korea, and Australia – actors that do not have direct access to the Arctic but express increasingly explicit interest in the macro-region and its resources (Bartosh, 2023).

Russia’s continuous official rhetoric about the Arctic being a “territory of peace and dialogue” is contradicted by Russian military actions and ideas generated in powerful military-political circles that construct the region as a new geopolitical playground. This means that foreign investors, including those in what Russia perceives as “friendly countries,” are unlikely to commit to large, expensive projects in an unstable, insecure region. Consequently, some experts anticipate that the local resource base and commercial transportation routes will not receive the strategic foreign investments that the Kremlin promotes in its messaging.

Russia: Looking beyond China India: a cautious Elephant in the Arctic Among all non-Western countries, India is Russia’s second most significant political and economic partner (after China). Russia is one of just five countries with which India has a 2+2 dialogue mechanism, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Putin have met twenty times since 2014. The

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India-Russia Strategic Partnership was elevated to the level of a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership in 2010 (the only Indian example of this type of partnership). On January 26, 2024, Putin stated that Russia cherishes its privileged strategic relationships with New Delhi, which chooses to conduct independent and pragmatic foreign policy (Izvestia, 2024). The Russian side also trumpets that, despite economic sanctions imposed by the West, the level of the Russo-Indian bi-lateral trade hit a record $50 billion in 2023 (Izvestia, 2023). Accordingly, Russia is receptive to India having adopted an Arctic policy titled “India and the Arctic: building a partnership for sustainable development” on March 17, 2022 (Government of India, 2022) and welcomes its growing interest in the region. Russian experts applaud the Indian document for its “neutral, politically correct [language] that avoids any confrontation such as the concept of the ‘near Arctic state’ promulgated by China” (Brodt, 2023). Specifically, the Kremlin seeks to attract India’s attention and engage its as a “friendly country” in Arctic affairs in three primary areas.

First, Russia seeks to expand its energy exports to India. Prior to 2022, Russo-Indian cooperation in the Arctic was driven primarily by import-export ties in oil, natural gas, coal, and ferrous metallurgy.

Indian corporations such as ONGC Videsh acquired shares in Sakhalin-1 and Vankorneft (Interfax, 2020), with Russian sources stating that cumulative Indian investments in Russia’s oil and gas sector stood at $15 billion in 2021 (Neftegazovaya Vertikal, 2021). The two countries reportedly worked on developing a road map to strengthen trade and partnerships under the auspices of the India Energy Office (IEO) in Moscow which opened in 2021 (INGC Videsh Ltd., 2021). Strategically, Russia anticipates that it can help India meet its rising demand for oil and natural gas owing to the growing number of vehicles users in the country (expected to reach 300 million users by 2040) (Sukhag, 2022) and India’s unhappiness with EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (Dhoot, 2023).

Second, tighter Russo-Indian transportation and logistical ties are premised on three main hopes. On the other hand, Russian commentators expect that the construction of the Vladivostok-Chennai transportation corridor, agreed on in 2019 during the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, would foster a “logistical alliance” between Russia (with its access to the Arctic resources) and India (with access to East African resources) (Kupriyanov & Korolev, 2019). All talks on the project ceased after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, although Russian sources claimed that they would be renewed in 2013 (TASS, 2023e). It appears that New Delhi is not rushing to commit to this project while secondary economic sanctions remain a factor. Conversely, Russia seeks to capitalize on the strenuous ties between India and China. Given high security risks in bilaterial relations between Beijing and New Delhi, Russian experts assume that India might be interested in investing in alternative trade and transportation routes through the Russian Arctic in case China blocks transportation through the Malacca Strait. According to this logic, intensified competition between India and China – including in Arctic projects – could benefit Russia (Kortunov, A., Saymon, T. et al., 2024), providing Moscow with additional room to politically manoeuvre and effectively transform it into a peacebreaker between two Eurasian giants. Ultimately, Russia pins growing hope on the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-kilometer-long ship, rail, and road route for moving freight between India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Central Asia. This corridor could provide the Kremlin with a means to reassert its influence over regional transit and trade by reducing the time to transport goods from Russia to India by 10–15 days compared with the Suez Canal. Although there has been meagre Looking Beyond China: Non-Western Actors in the Russian Arctic after February 2022

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development of infrastructure along the INSTC to date, Russia’s pivot from the West and its prospective integration with the Indo-Pacific region could provide Moscow with a significant competitive advantage if it can control larger parts of north-south transit routes (Sukhankin, 2024b).

Third, India has enhanced its cooperation with Russia in scientific research and development surrounding climate change, which is of existential concern to India given its reliance on agriculture to feed a rapidly growing population (Shyrgazina, 2022). Russia is interested in integrating India into its Yamal (Snowflake station) (Nilsen, 2023) and prospective Svalbard-based Arctic projects (TASS, 2023d).

While these plans appear promising on the surface, the expansion of the Russo-Ukrainian war and uncertainty posed by economic sanctions and the political isolation of Russia by the West make them less attractive for three general reasons. First is the nature of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. As Russian officials have indicated, Russo-Indian trade relations have surged since February 2022, stimulated primarily by India’s purchases of discounted Russian oil (Sukhankin, 2024a).

Nevertheless, Indian investors have not indicated any substantive interest in Russia’s major oil and natural gas projects in the Arctic: the Vostok Oil mega-project (Sukhankin, 2024c) or Arctic LNG-2 project which, after US sanctions, has lost foreign investors (Sukhankin, 2024d). Paradoxically, the sheer volume of bilaterial trade and Russia’s overwhelming trade surplus with India has become a matter of concern in Russian circles. Mikhail Zadornov, chairman of the management board of Otkritie FC Bank, noted that Russia does “not have any goods that we can import from China and especially India compared to the volumes of oil, gas and oil products destined for these countries” (RBC, 2023).

Russian experts note that the use of the Indian rupee (which has lost more than 10 percent against the US dollar and 25 percent against the ruble in value) in bilateral trade poses a major strategic challenge for Russia in terms of how it will deal with the oversupply of rupees that it receives for its raw materials, particularly given the trade imbalance (Komrakov, 2022).

In the late 2023/early 2024, Russian sources reported shifts in the trajectory of the Russo-Indian economic cooperation in the Arctic that might indicate a change in the nature of bilateral collaboration.

The Russian side claims that Indian businesses are considering opening local operations on the Kola Peninsula (MKRU Murmansk, 2023) and building an India-owned pharmaceuticals complex in Murmansk oblast by 2027 (RIA Novosti, 2023). Open-source searches did not yield any specific financial details or concrete plans regarding the realization of these plans and projects. Thus, RussoIndian economic ties remain heavily oriented toward situational trade in discounted natural resources and lack strategic coherence (Sukhankin, 2023). Furthermore, Indian Oil Corporation Limited (India’s largest oil and gas company under the ownership of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas) has stated its intent to dramatically reduce the amount of oil it purchases from Russia (ProFinance, 2024).

While similar rumours have circulated since 2022 (Yermakova, 2022), the tightening EU and US sanctions regime against Russia might encourage the Indians to follow through, thus weakening the only substantive pillar in the Russo-Indian economic partnership. According to Russian private sector experts (Moscow Times, 2024c) and public officials (such as VTB head Andrey Kostin) (Moscow Times, 2024b), US and EU sanctions have led banks from countries “friendly” to Russia to cancel payment deals with their Russian counterparts for fear of Western reprisals. Nonetheless, Russia keeps

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exporting commodities, resulting in “every fourth USD [earned through Russian exports] not reaching Russia.” This hits Russia’s oil and oil products sector particularly hard (Moscow Times, 2024a).

Second, India’s model of cooperation and system of partnerships in the Arctic is rather selective – and not always aligned with Russia’s expectations. India’s Arctic Policy strategic document, released in 2022, conveys that India has clear national interests in the Arctic and considers the macro-region to be the global heritage of humankind. Its emphasis on ecological sustainability as a key pillar of Arctic governance does not resonate with Russian interests and objectives, which prioritize commercial exploitation, re-militarization, and the idea of the region as an emerging geopolitical battleground (Staalesen, 2023). It is revealing that India decided to publish the document after the seven other Arctic states paused their participation in the Arctic Council under Russia’s chairship, effectively placing the primary multilateral regional forum on hold. Furthermore, India has never explicitly stated, or even implied, that Russia is its only partner in the Arctic region. Senior Indian officials argue that while Russia is “one big partner,” it also cooperates with other countries that Russia considers “unfriendly,” such as Norway and Iceland (Chandran & Viakhireva, 2024). Moreover, during the 2nd CII (Confederation of Indian Industries) India Nordic-Baltic Business Conclave in 2023, Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar highlighted that India is interested in strategic collaboration on innovative projects with countries in Northen Europe and the Baltic Sea region (TASS, 2023f). In developing scientific ties with Arctic players, India has devoted more attention to Norway than Russia (Zaykov & Bhagvat, 2022). This is unsurprising in light of declining Russian scientific research spending (proportional to GDP) (RBC, 2024).

Akin to Russia reacting with concern or disfavour when its partners cooperate with “unfriendly countries” in the Arctic, India’s approach reveals a similar tendency. For example, senior Indian officials and experts frequently refer to China-related geopolitical strains when referring to Arcticrelated developments (Reddy, Sah & Viakhireva, 2024). Russia’s active courting of China in the Arctic, coupled with official discourse about China representing Russia’s most critical partner, may irritate India’s political and diplomatic leadership.3 The director of Carnegie India, Raja Mohan, has noted concerns about inconsistencies in Russian policies toward other countries, and insisted that India will not be a “younger brother” or a “pawn” in Russian political games. He also suggested that Indian ruling elites are unsure about Russia’s relationship priorities when it comes to Delhi and Beijing, recalling the bitter experience of the Indian-Chinese war of 1962 and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev once calling India a “friend” and China a “brother” (Kupriyanov, 2016).

The Republic of Korea (ROK) in the Arctic: middle power diplomacy in action The ROK’s involvement in the Arctic dates to 1987, when the government created its Polar Research Center (PRC) under the umbrella of the Korea Ocean Research & Development Institute (KORDI).

The country appeared dormant in its Arctic endeavours until 2004, when the Korean Antarctic Research Program was transformed into the Korean Polar Research Program (covering both poles) that identified six priority areas: climate change in polar zones and their global consequences; biodiversity; tectonic changes in polar zones; studies of meteors and deepwater drilling; “activization of polar studies by Asian countries that are not adjacent to polar zones”; and economic activities and transportation in the polar regions (Tolstokulakov, 2015). The ROK has become a world leader in Looking Beyond China: Non-Western Actors in the Russian Arctic after February 2022

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producing Arctic-class vessels, with the first “Araon” type icebreaker built by Hanjin Heavy Industries in 2009. This expertise in enabling commercial transportation in the Arctic had made South Korea a key shipbuilding partner for Russia.

The nature of South Korea’s interest in the Arctic conforms with a “middle power” approach – that of a country acknowledging that it occupies a middle-level position in the international power spectrum (Baç, 2024). Its interests are primarily related to narrow economic and scientific research issues, and it harbors no grand ambitions and aspirations for the region akin to the so-called “great powers” (Akimova, 2021). Following a constructivist approach, the ROK’s behavior in the Arctic region might be defined as “role-oriented bridging diplomacy.” According to Korean experts, unlike issue-oriented actors (such as Canada or Australia), the ROK could be viewed as an astute intermediary bridging conflicting viewpoints on Arctic affairs (Suzuka, 2015). Some Korean intellectuals have even suggested that the country could serve a connecting function between Asian observers and member states in the Arctic Council, emulating the role that it plays in the G-20 as an intermediary between the G-7 and BRICS (Seryun, 2017).

Analysis of the ROK’s strategic documents pertaining to the Arctic region before 2022 reveals Seoul’s keen interest in developing and proliferating ties with Russia in various dimensions of Arctic cooperation (So, Pak & Chistov, 2021). For its part, Russia sees various benefits in cooperating with the ROK in the region. South Korea boasts one of the world’s most innovative and fastest growing economies, is strategically dependent on imported natural resources (Minsu & Marchenkov, 2019), and seeks new export markets. Furthermore, its lack of geopolitical ambitions in the circumpolar north means that it neither threatens nor jeopardises Russia’s standing in the macro-region. The Russians also appreciate that, unlike other non-Arctic states (such as Japan), South Korea does not involve its Ministry of Defence in Arctic-related issues. In theory, this makes it an attractive regional partner for Russia.

Nonetheless, there are visible constraints on the prospects of an expanded ROK-Russia partnership in the Arctic – some (but not all) of which relate to post-2022 developments and the Russo-Ukrainian war. One core limitation is Russia’s traditional incredulity and apprehensiveness about foreign actors operating in its self-defined areas of exclusive interest. Thus, while Russia’s stance on South Korea’s Arctic involvement has been traditionally positive, Moscow perceives Seoul’s scientific studies of the NSR as a risk. Given that Russia would consider any push to internationalize waters that the Kremlin considers falling under its control as a national security threat, one Russian commentator characterized ROK interests as “a camouflaged threat to Russia’s national security.” He recommended that Russia not “allow [Koreans] to conduct independent scientific activities in the Arctic,” and to only admit their scientists if their areas of research were not a threat – and to “constantly and meticulously monitor” them all the same (Tolstokulakov, 2018).

The cautious and reserved approach of the ROK and the private sector to committing financial resources to Arctic cooperation also inhibits the country’s relationship with Russia. Despite strong South Korean demand for natural resources (especially oil and gas), companies from that country have never gone further than reaching memorandum-type agreements on cooperation (none of which yielded concrete results) in the realm of hydrocarbons. A case in point is the agreement between

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NOVATEK and Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) signed in 2018 (Afanasiev, 2018). Instead, the ROK imports 79 percent of its LNG from five countries: Qatar, Australia, the US, Malaysia, and Oman (Leksyutina, 2021). Given growing scepticism amongst foreign investors about Russia’s major oil and natural gas projects in the Arctic (Dyatel, 2023), it is highly unlikely that South Koreans will drastically change their stance on energy cooperation in the short-to-mid-term. Although the ROK speaks of the Russian Arctic as a critical transportation artery (Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea, n.d.), South Korean businesses have not made any substantive commitments to enhance Russian seaport infrastructure in the Far East or the Arctic. Instead, the ROK is prioritizing development of its own seaports to make Busan, Ulsan, and Gwangyang its gateways to Arctic maritime routes, relegating Russian ports to a marginal position in bilateral trade and transportation (Leksyutina, 2021).

Although the ROK did not follow the lead of its Western partners in imposing a full suite of sanctions against the regime in Moscow, sanctions inhibit deeper Korean-Russia collaboration in the Arctic. For example, South Korean shipbuilding companies faced difficulties in receiving payments from Russian clients after many Russian banks were switched off the SWIFT system, leading South Korean shipyard Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (now part of Hanwha Ocean) to terminate its contract with Sovcomflot. Given that a lack of Arctic-class Arc7 tankers is seriously constraining the Arctic LNG-2 project, and that contracts for Russian-built tankers have been delayed, securing the twenty Arc7 tankers commissioned from South Korean shipyards is critical to Russian plans as it is unlikely to find sufficient numbers on the secondary market (Parshynova, 2023). Russia’s growing military cooperation with the ROK’s strategic adversary North Korea (Shin, 2024) also fosters distrust, making the prospect of deeper ROK-Russian cooperation increasingly unlikely.

Singapore: the Arctic novice with growing ambitions Singapore, a tiny city-state with a population close to six million people, is resource scarce but one of the world’s most economically and technologically advanced nations (IMD, 2024). It became an accredited observer to the Arctic Council in 2013, with its Arctic interests boiling down to three core variables: shipping, energy resources, and climate change (Singapore MFA, 2018). Like the ROK, Singapore has never articulated any geopolitical interests or agendas in the macro-region. After securing Arctic Council observer status, it “sought to make up for lost time by engaging in several areas of Arctic diplomacy, including on the Track II, sub-governmental level via various organisations and conferences,” Lanteigne (2017) explained. In forging an Arctic identity, Singapore still “had much ground to cover. The country is not yet a signatory to the 1920 Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty, has had limited exposure to Arctic scientific endeavours, and unlike Japan and South Korea has yet to publish a comprehensive Arctic governmental white paper” (Lanteigne, 2017).

Singapore has understandable interests in climate change, given that rising sea levels owing to melting ice would have disastrous consequences for the maritime city-state. According to the Third National Climate Change Study released by the Centre for Climate Research Singapore in January 2024, sea level rise would have major implications for the country’s water resources, biodiversity, public health, and food security (CCRS, 2024). Further development of the NSR also poses a potential challenge to Singapore’s role as a global shipping hub for maritime cargo from Eastern to Western markets, with 70 to 80 percent of all oil bound for China and Japan passing through the Strait of Malacca (Arctic Looking Beyond China: Non-Western Actors in the Russian Arctic after February 2022

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Institute, 2024). Accordingly, Singapore’s business sector closely observes what is happening in Arctic transportation networks. Recognizing the need to diversify both its portfolio and the geographic scope of its investments, Singapore looks at potential megaprojects around the world – and the Arctic region is no exception (Bennett, 2018).

Prior to February 2022, Russian sources identified three main directions of collaboration with Singapore in the Arctic (Yeranosyan, 2021). First, Singapore was a potential source of financing and technology to develop Russian seaport infrastructure in the Arctic and the Far East. The Russian side was particularly interested in cooperating with engineering companies Keppel Corporation and Semcorp Marine. It also looked to potential collaboration in hi-tech industries, including drilling, navigation systems, and monitoring, with Russian sources identifying up to 5,000 companies in Singapore working in these sectors. Furthermore, Singapore is a world leader in freight and cargo insurance, and Russian sources indicated that Singapore-based companies were interested in providing insurance to facilitate cargo transportation in the Arctic.

Deals between Trafigura and Norilsk Nickel in 2008 (Trader Trafigura, 2010) and between Trafigura and Russia's Rosneft in 2013 (Afanasiev, 2020) bode well for commercial cooperation between the two countries. In 2016, during a high-profile trip to Singapore, Russian delegation member Artur Chilingarov (a polar explorer, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and a Hero of the Soviet Union) communicated that Moscow eagerly sought joint projects and collaboration with Singapore in the Arctic, especially to facilitate drilling on the Russian continental shelf. He also applauded Singapore’s abstention from Arctic geopolitics and its concentration on economic and commercial opportunities (Ria Novosti, 2016). Practical achievements were limited, however.

Following Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Trafigura froze its investments in Russia (Trafigura zamorozila investicii, 2022) and later sold its 24.5 percent share in Nayara Energy Limited (an Indian oil downstream energy and petrochemicals company in which Rosneft holds a 49.13 percent indirect minority interest) (Hara Capital Sarl, 2023).

More generally, Singapore either paused or slowed down its international collaborations in the Arctic after February 2022. Its participation in the Arctic Council has been limited to modest projects, such as a Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna working group project in which Singapore’s National Parks Board tracks Arctic migratory birds that overwinter in Singapore (Begum, 2024). Russian academic experts hold out hope that Moscow will attract Singaporese involvement in various Arctic projects and initiatives, which Singapore could use to showcase its infrastructure, communication, shipbuilding, and other innovative technologies. The experts also concede that uncertainty and geopolitical risks inhibit this prospect (Kazakov & Lystsev, 2023). When Pavel Volkov, Russia’s deputy director for the development of the Far East and the Arctic, was asked about the possibility of Singaporese and other foreign non-Western investors in Russia’s Arctic projects, he deflected the question to mention unspecified Chinese and Indian projects (Saprygina, 2024). The short-term opportunity space to revitalize the Russo-Singapore Arctic relationship appears non-existent.

Brazil: to the Arctic through the Antarctic Brazil, which is projected to be the world’s ninth largest economy in 2024 (Forbes India, 2024) and is home to 203 million people (World Bank, 2024), appeared disinterested in either Arctic or Antarctic Sukhankin & Lackenbauer

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affairs until 2013 when it released “Antarctic Science for Brazil: An action plan for the 2013–2022 period.” This plan contained a small passage on the Arctic, noting that “the Antarctic scientific community is interested in deepening cooperation with researchers from the Arctic region at the moment that evidence of connections between the two polar regions accumulate, such as the deep ocean circulation, climate variability processes and the Sun - Earth interaction with the atmosphere” (SEPED, 2013).

It took Brazil another decade to mention the Arctic region in another strategic document: the “Ten Year Plan for Antarctic Science in Brazil 2023–2032” (Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação (MCTI), 2023). In this plan, the Arctic region was allocated a separate section as “a new frontier for Brazil’s polar science” (Uma nova fronteira para a ciência polar brasileira) that looked at the Arctic region as a key factor in global climate change. That year, Brazil sent its first scientific expedition to the Arctic, which Brazilian sources suggested “could initiate Brazil’s integration into [Arctic] studies considered strategic from a geopolitical point of view” (Lopes, 2023).

While Brazil’s fledgling interest in the Arctic region is primarily driven by interest in the adverse consequences of climate change for Brazil and its northern coast (Blue Amazon or A Amazônia Azul), the country is also seeking prestige. Brazilian experts note that theirs “is the only country among the 10 largest economies in the world to have no participation in issues related to the Arctic” and, “in the future, [Brazil] may also apply for an observer seat on the Arctic Council and sign the Arctic Treaty” (Rosa, 2023). There is no “Arctic Treaty,” of course, which is telling about the state of Brazil’s Arctic knowledge in its own right. Nevertheless, commentators suggest that participation in Arctic projects could enhance Brazil’s “role in BRICS and internationally” (Casella, Lagutina, & Giannattasio, 2020).

Well aware of these sentiments, Russia has indicated a strong desire to strengthen ties with Brazil in the Arctic since February 2022. While Brasilia has indicated no interest in pursuing joint economic projects, Russia has sought to pull its Brazilian counterparts into scientific cooperation. For instance, in 2023 Nikolay Korchunov noted that Russia and Brazil were planning a joint seminar on collaboration in the Arctic. His statement highlighted that Russia “took a very positive stance on Brazil’s interest in the Arctic and international cooperation in the Arctic region,” noting that the bilateral partnership on food security “already has an Arctic dimension” and that Brazil’s interest in Indigenous issues “could also become another topic of partnership” (TASS, 2023b). The extent of actual Russo-Brazilian scientific cooperation in the Arctic may exceed either Russo-Chinese or RussoIndian scientific collaboration in the region, with Brazil and Russia reported to be the most active participants in the BRICS working group “one ocean and polar studies” (Vyakhireva, 2023). Following Russo-Brazilian consultations on the polar regions held in the Republic Saha (Yakutia) in 2024, reports suggest that Russia and Brazil are planning to conduct a joint scientific expedition in the Arctic in 2025.

(Shyshlo, 2024).

Russia also sees benefits in drawing a key BRICS partner into Arctic affairs and joint projects. In effect, Brazil can offer expertise and legitimacy on climate change, sustainable agriculture and food security, drilling technologies, development of green energy, and work with Indigenous and small numbered peoples (Roscongree, 2023) from which Russia could benefit. Russia also seeks to derive geopolitical dividends from increasing Brazil’s presence in the Arctic. When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva returned as Looking Beyond China: Non-Western Actors in the Russian Arctic after February 2022

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President of Brazil in October 2022, Russian experts and policymakers rejoiced4 and hoped that Brazil would once again become Russia’s premier partner in South America. With Russia largely ostracized from Western circles after February 2022, cooperation with Brazil in the Arctic region could serve as a platform to strengthen more general political ties between Brasilia and Moscow. Helping Brazil to become an accredited Arctic Council observer could be an important step in this direction, as Brazil’s Ambassador to Russia Rodrigo de Lima Baena Soares tacitly acknowledged in 2023 (TASS, 2023a).

Conclusion Russia’s strategic shift towards non-Arctic state partners has been hastened by the pressure of growing isolation from the West after the Kremlin launched its unprovoked, full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Desperate in its search for new markets and new sources of foreign investment in the face of Western sanctions, Russia hopes that cooperation with non-Western partners can help to solve its key problem: commercializing its vast Arctic-based natural resources. Nevertheless, our study suggests that it remains unlikely that Russia’s non-Western partners will be willing to commit to expensive, strategic projects in the AZRF – particularly while the war in Ukraine is ongoing. Novatek’s announcement this year that it is downsizing its flagship Arctic LNG 2 development is a case in point, reflecting its lack of access to new icebreaking vessels (thus curtailing its ability to recapitalize and expand the tanker fleet) which are sitting in South Korean shipyards (Staalesen, 2024).

While speculation about the current and future status of the Sino-Russian relationship in the Arctic dominates a significant amount of recent academic and think tank discussion, this article has illustrated how Russia’s interests extend to other non-Western, non-Arctic states as well. Points of tension in the Sino-Russian Arctic relationship – such as Russian sovereignty and control over the NSR, scientific research as an enabler for encroachment on Russian sovereign rights, and concerns about both limited and potentially exploitative investment (Lajeunesse et al, 2023) – are also present in Russian discussions about other prospective partners. In many cases, despite handshakes and rhetorical gestures promising enhanced cooperation, there has been little actual action apart from purchasing Russian energy resources. As Russia becomes more desperate for new forms of economic and political support, we will watch with interest to see if the Kremlin is able to convert its pivot to non-Western partnerships into practical outcomes that advance its agenda in the AZRF, the broader circumpolar north, and globally.

Notes 1. In March 2020, President Putin signed the “The Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic through 2035,” which outlines key goals and Moscow's Arctic agenda. "Президент утвердил основы государственной политики в Арктике" [The President approved the Principles of State Policy in the Arctic], администрация президента России, updated 5 March 2020, http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/62947. Following this direction, the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic submitted a draft implementation strategy for the government's consideration in May 2020. "Минвостокразвития начало разработку новой госпрограммы развития Арктики," [The Sukhankin & Lackenbauer

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Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East begins the development of a new state program for the development of the Arctic], TASS, 13 May 2020, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/8464809. The third document, released on 26 October, outlines the mechanisms to realize the ‘State Policy’ and ‘Socio-Economic Development’ plans in the Arctic. Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 26.10.2020 № 645, “О Стратегии развития Арктической зоны Российской Федерации и обеспечения национальной безопасности на период до 2035 года” [“Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security until 2035”], 26 October 2020, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202010260033.

2. See, for example, Sørensen and Klimenko, 2017; Sun, 2018; Alexeeva and Lasserre, 2018; Hsiung and Røseth, 2019; Kobzeva, 2020; MacDonald, 2021; Cao, 2022; Yang and Guo, 2022; Nan and Guo, 2022; Juris, 2022, Lajeunesse et al 2023, Moe et al, 2023.

3. One might recall Russia selling of S-400 surface-to-air missile complexes to China in 2017 before it sold them India, which generated negative reactions in India (Sukhankin, 2017).

4. During da Silva’s previous tenure as president (2003-2010), he played the key role in initiating the Russo-Brazilian strategic partnership (Yakovlev, 2022).

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RIA Novosti. (2023, September 19). Indiyskaya kompaniya podbirayet uchastok dlya farmzavoda v Murmanskoy oblasti [An Indian company is selecting a site for a pharmaceutical plant in the Murmansk region]. https://ria.ru/20230919/zavod-1897307961.html?in=t .

Ria Novosti. (2024a, February 26). Komarova: vkhozhdeniye rayonov Yugry v Arkticheskuyu zonu pozvolit privlech investitsii [Komarova: the inclusion of Yugra regions in the Arctic zone will attract investment]. https://ria.ru/20240226/investitsii-1929651815.html .

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Rossiyskiye vlasti prigotovilis postavlyat gaz v Kitay so skidkoy pochti [Russian authorities are preparing to supply gas to China at a discount of almost 30%]. (2024, April 24). The Moscow Times. https://www.moscowtimes.eu/2024/04/24/rossiiskie-vlasti-prigotovilis-postavlyatgaz-v-kitai-so-skidkoi-pochti-30-a128893 .

Saprygina, Y. (2024, February 21). V Minvostokrazvitiya rasskazali chto budut delat v Arktike Singapur, Kitay I Indiya [The Ministry of Eastern Development told what Singapore, China and India will do in the Arctic]. Parlamentskaya Gazeta. https://www.pnp.ru/economics/vminvostokrazvitiya-rasskazali-chto-budut-delat-v-arktike-singapur-kitay-i-indiya.html https://www.pnp.ru/economics/v-minvostokrazvitiya-rasskazali-chto-budut-delat-varktike-singapur-kitay-i-indiya.html.

Seryun, H. (2017). Vneshnyaya politika Respubliki Koreya v Arkticheskom regione [Foreign policy of the Republic of Korea in the Arctic region]. Mirovaya politika, (1), 107-126. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/vneshnyaya-politika-respubliki-koreya-v-arkticheskomregione .

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Shyrgazina, E. (2022, October 5). Rossiysko-indiyskiye otnosheniya v Arktike: perspektivy dlya nauki I infrastruktury [Russian-Indian relations in the Arctic: prospects for science and infrastructure].

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Looking Beyond China: Non-Western Actors in the Russian Arctic after February 2022

Revisiting the Arctic Region’s Cooperative Network: The Role of China Maria Lagutina, Yana Leksyutina, and Alexander Sergunin

The Arctic governance system, which has been relatively settled over the past decades based on a fragile balance of interests and obligations of the Arctic Council member states, is now undergoing a rigorous endurance test. The short-term hang-up of the multilateral cooperation regime due to the de-facto freezing of Russia’s activities in the Arctic Council is being overlaid by longterm structural shifts in the geopolitical landscape of the macroregion. There is a growing contradiction between the responsibility of the Arctic states for the environmental situation and the sustainable development of national Arctic territories and the search of non-Arctic countries, primarily China, for bolstering their interests in the Far North in terms of intensifying their research and economic activities in the Arctic. The new normal economic and political reality requires a revision of the rigid Arctic region’s cooperative network through engaging non-Arctic stakeholders in joint searching for niches for collaboration in the already established relations of the Arctic states and sectors of the Arctic economy. Attempting to contribute to the convergence of positions of the two sides, the chapter summarizes China’s fundamental interests in the development of international cooperation in the Arctic, analyzes China’s current research, economic, and infrastructural projects in the High North, and outlines niches for China’s involvement in the advancement of the Arctic agenda. Potential areas of tensions and cooperation in China’s bilateral relations with the key Arctic players are identified.

Introduction The Arctic region is playing an increasingly significant role in international affairs due to its vast reserves of natural resources, the shift of global energy production towards the North, its transport and logistics potential, the vulnerability of its ecosystems to climate change, and its importance in the global agenda for sustainable development. The geopolitical priorities of individual Arctic nations are shifting towards enhancing their economic presence in the area, while non-Arctic nations are seeking to increase their role in governance, regulation, and development in the Arctic.

Some member countries of the Arctic Council either openly express their dissatisfaction or have concerns about the increasing economic presence of non-Arctic states in the region.

Such heterogeneous factors increase the uncertainty of interaction with the countries in the region for China. Due to the increasing importance of the Arctic in world politics, China recognizes its Maria Lagutina Ph.D., is a Professor at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia.

Yana Leksyutina, Ph.D., is a Professor at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia.

Alexander Sergunin, Ph.D., is a Professor at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia, and Nizhny Novgorod State University, Russia.

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role as a significant contributor to the development of the region (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018). China's activities in the Arctic cover all key aspects, including climate change, environmental protection, scientific research, construction of ice-class vessels, developing innovative equipment for high polar latitudes, shipping, and resource exploration.

The growing importance of the Arctic for China is evident from the increasing number of scientific publications on this issue. In general, international research on China tends to focus on macroregional geopolitical aspects rather than the geographically-focused economic and geographical dimensions of cooperation in Arctic development. Many authors, including Peng and Wegge (2015), Leksyutina (2021), and Bai and Zhu (2023), discuss aspects of China's political engagement with Arctic countries in the context of the Arctic Council as an observer state, without emphasizing economic factors that influence the interests of collaborating countries. While other scholars (Melia et al., 2017), although they acknowledge that economic motivations underlie collaboration in the Arctic, focus on the institutional policies and management of the region by a group of countries rather than on the regional aspects of development and deployment of productive forces with China's involvement. In studying Chinese companies' involvement in the development of economic and transportation corridors in the Arctic, Bertelsen and Gallucci (2016) focus on the possibilities of navigating along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), without considering the integrated development of the territories adjacent to the NSR or other potential sea routes in the Arctic Ocean and North Atlantic waters.

The geopolitical concepts behind China's current Arctic policy are discussed by Lu (2010), Bennett (2015), and Bai and Zhu (2023), among others. However, the topic is still underdeveloped and is evolving. Chinese publications focus on China's preparedness and need to take advantage of the emerging opportunities in the Arctic, and to pursue its foreign policy more actively in that direction.

At the same time, topics related to adapting cooperation mechanisms to changing conditions in the economic landscape of the Arctic are not well represented in contrast to research in political science (Wang, 2016; Lim, 2018), resource development, and transport routes (Meng et al., 2017; Deng, 2018; Zhu et al., 2018; Yang & Zhao, 2019). Additionally, ecology and climate change are important topics (Liu et al., 2016; Wang, 2023). In terms of politics, Chinese scholars focus mainly on the multilateral aspect of China's engagement with the Arctic Council (Bai and Zhu, 2023), where the realization of China's interests is often hindered by the unified stance of the member states. Such a focus underscores the relevance of studying bilateral interactions between China and Arctic states.

Despite the lack of comprehensive research on China's involvement in international cooperation in the Arctic, its interest in the region is growing and has become an integral part of its strategic discourse. China's current Arctic policy aligns with its goal of becoming a major maritime power, as outlined at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2012. At the 19th CPC National Congress in 2017, President Xi Jinping presented a multi-dimensional diplomatic approach to the development of the country, which corresponds to China's geopolitical and economic goals in the Arctic region.

Given the growing significance of the Far North for Beijing, this study summarizes China’s fundamental interests in the development of international cooperation in the Arctic, analyzes China’s current activities in the region, and outlines niches for China’s involvement in the advancement of the Arctic agenda.

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The Road to the Arctic In the international arena, China first expressed its interest in addressing Arctic issues in 1925, when it joined the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920. It granted all participating countries the right to conduct economic and scientific research on the archipelago and its waters. According to the Treaty, China has equal rights to fishing, navigation, and hunting in the waters of the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) archipelago. It also has the right to conduct any type of activity on the archipelago, including commercial and industrial activities. At the same time, due to China's geographical remoteness from the Arctic, it did not actively participate in the Arctic agenda. Thus, China’s first expedition to the North Pole only took place in 1951. In 1964, China established the State Oceanic Administration, one of whose tasks was to organize expeditions to the Arctic and Antarctic.

However, as suggested by Xu (2016) and Karandasheva (2019), before the launch of the opening up of economic policy in the 1980s, this task had not been fully implemented due to the underdevelopment of capabilities of Chinese research institutions and lack of expertise in polar issues.

Systematic studies of Arctic ecology and environment started in 1982, when China signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In 1981, China established the National Antarctic Research Committee, the first scientific research institute dedicated to coordinate polar operations and to be responsible for scientific research and logistics in polar regions (Zou, 1993). This was followed by the establishment of the Polar Research Institute of China in 1989. The institute's work is dedicated to preparing polar expeditions, as well as managing scientific laboratories, Chinese Polar Science Database, polar information network, National Polar Archives of China, as well as publishing specialized journals.

Since the late 1990s, China has been financing a program of scientific research in the Arctic region.

In 1996, it became a member of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), which led to the involvement of Chinese scientists in a variety of projects under the Arctic's Role in Global Change Program.

Significant efforts have been made to create a fleet of vessels capable of operating in polar conditions and to develop techniques for exploring and developing marine resources and habitats.

In 1994, the Xue Long icebreaker was introduced into the Chinese fleet, and in 2012, it sailed along the NSR from Qingdao, China, to Iceland in just 90 days. The Xue Long then returned through the Suez Canal and Indian Ocean to Shanghai. In 2019, a second icebreaker, the Xue Long 2, which was designed by the Finnish engineering company Aker Arctic but was built by and launched from the Chinese Jiangnan Shipyard (Shanghai).

In order to study the Arctic region and the northern trade routes in more detail, China established the Yellow River Station in the Spitsbergen Archipelago (Svalbard) in 2004.

One of the notable elements of China’s maritime policy is the goal of building China into a “maritime great power” (Sheng, 2024). It was declared for the first time at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012. As a result, various projects and programs were launched to develop new sea routes and waterways, including the Arctic Ocean. Somewhat later, the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration was established as part of the government structure, responsible for implementing various programs in polar regions. In 2009, China applied for

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observer status with the Arctic Council, and its admission as a permanent observer in 2013 was confirmed at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna, Sweden.

In 2018, the State Council of the People's Republic of China (2018) published the China’s Arctic Policy (The White Paper). This document outlines the principles of China's approach to the Arctic and its plans for implementing its policy in the region. The policy emphasizes the importance of Chinese capital, technology, and knowledge in expanding sea routes and promoting social and economic development in the Arctic region. China is also focusing on cooperation with Arctic countries to ensure environmental management and the development of renewable energy. The country is investing in research on the ecological development of biological and mineral resources, as well as management of Arctic ecosystems. China's Arctic strategy outlines a wide range of research areas that the country prioritizes in the Arctic, including geology, geography, hydrology, meteorology, biology, ecology, geophysics, marine chemistry, and the study of sea ice. It emphasizes that China respects the sovereignty of the Arctic countries over mineral resources in their territories. It also notes that China, as one of the largest trading and energy-consuming countries, can be significantly impacted by the exploration and development of Arctic energy resources. However, China is also interested in cooperating with these countries to develop environmentally friendly energy sources such as geothermal and wind power.

According to the White Paper, China's priorities in the Arctic include participation in international governance based on the principles of the UN Charter and the UNCLOS. China also supports the promotion of peace and stability in the region, as well as respect for the boundaries of international waters and their common heritage. China's stance on Arctic affairs is based on its interpretation of the UNCLOS, which it sees as the fundamental international document governing navigation issues in legal regime of the Arctic. Under this interpretation, China has no right to develop resources on the Arctic continental shelf. Instead, China emphasizes the importance of scientific research and exploration in the region as a means to strengthen its position.

In 1999, China organized its first scientific expedition to the Arctic to study climate change in the region and its impact on China. Since then, Chinese researchers have carried out several expeditions to various parts of the Arctic Ocean. Investigations focused on studying climate change in the Arctic and its impact on climate change in China, oceanography, sea ice, observations of atmospheric, marine and oceanic processes associated with extensive melting of sea ice, “waterice-steam” transformations of marine systems and accelerated change of marine environment, marine hydrology, meteorology, chemistry, biology, ocean acidification, plastic waste, formation of rocks and magma and the geomorphic features. In 2023, the 13th Chinese Arctic Expedition reached the North Pole for the first time aboard the Xue Long 2, China’s first domestically built scientific icebreaker. The expedition studied volcanic activity in the area of the Gakkel Ridge, which affects the formation of ice in the Arctic and, in turn, global climate change (CGTN, 2023).

To sum up, by now China has not only formulated its Arctic strategy, but also supported it with its practical actions in the field of economics, transport infrastructure and Arctic research.

Formats of Collaboration China has a limited set of tools for direct action in the Arctic and does not have access to decisionmaking processes like those of the Arctic Council countries. Instead, China is pursuing its goals

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and interests through multilateral and bilateral agreements, as well as by promoting the concept of the near Arctic state in order to establish its own identity in the region.

Multilateral Arctic Council Today, international cooperation in the Arctic is facilitated by regional international organizations.

Among these, the intergovernmental Arctic Council is a region-forming establishment that has been shaping the Arctic agenda since 1996. China has been a permanent observer of the Arctic Council for over a decade. The key criteria for being an observer at the Arctic Council include recognition of the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Arctic states, Indigenous peoples rights, as well as international maritime law as the basis for responsible management of Arctic resources.

Observers can participate directly in working groups and may be invited to special meetings when necessary, depending on the consensus of the eight member states. At meetings of the Arctic Council bodies, observers are allowed to make a written or oral presentation on an issue under discussion, as well as participate in the debate.

On the one hand, by joining the Arctic Council, China has gained access to participating in Arctic affairs and activities. On the other hand, the procedural conditions applied to observer members do not allow China to be an equal member of the Arctic Council along with the other Arctic countries. However, China’s importance in today's global political and economic landscape makes it difficult to ignore its opinion. As a permanent observer, China has the opportunity to share its views with the member states of the Arctic Council and, thus, take an active part in shaping and implementing the regional agenda.

Given the current "frozen" state of the Arctic Council, non-Arctic countries, including China, could partially compensate for the lack of cooperation with Russia by their activity in the working groups of this forum. Moreover, at the end of February 2024, it was decided to resume cooperation in an online format within the framework of specific projects of the Council's working groups.

China could use this opportunity to enhance its role in the Council's project activities and strengthen its reputation as a responsible Arctic player (especially in the field of Arctic science diplomacy).

However, one should not overestimate the importance of China's position in the Arctic Council or the importance of the Council itself for China. The Council was created by the Arctic countries and, above all, for the Arctic countries themselves. From their point of view, granting membership to non-Arctic countries would mean the loss of the Council's identity. Hypothetically, it is possible to imagine a higher status of China in some new organization that could be created by Russia in the event of its withdrawal from the Arctic Council and which would operate in parallel with or instead of this institution (if it were dissolved). Most member countries, especially the United States, are not interested in strengthening China's political influence in the Council and its economic influence in the Arctic in general. The Arctic Council is not a universal platform to solve all economic, social, and political issues in the region. Decisions made within the Council are advisory. Issues such as the development of natural resources, the construction of infrastructure, and the operation of shipping routes are outside the scope of the Council. Each Arctic country decides these issues independently (and/or in the frame of various international legal regimes and bodies, other than the Arctic Council). In this regard, while the permanent observer status in the

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Arctic Council is important for China from a political perspective, many practical aspects of cooperation are governed by bilateral agreements with Arctic nations.

Arctic Circle Recently, it seems that a new wave of cooperation in the Arctic is emerging. This cooperation should be characterized not as purely international, but rather transnational. Not only China, but other countries outside the traditional circle of the Arctic Council members, such as India, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, are becoming increasingly involved in shaping the agenda for the Arctic. Additionally, various non-state actors, including non-governmental organizations and commercial companies, are also playing a significant role. Given this trend, there is a clear need to formalize their cooperation within more flexible and informal associations that can act as alternatives to the Arctic Council. These associations would allow for a more inclusive and balanced approach to Arctic affairs, taking into account the diverse interests and perspectives of all stakeholders. One example of a different format of interaction is the Arctic Circle, an Arctic cooperation forum that brings together, first and foremost, non-Arctic countries as well as all interested parties to discuss current Arctic issues. The Arctic Circle provides a platform for international dialogue and collaboration in the Arctic region, involving executive authorities, organizations, companies, universities, research institutions, environmental groups, Indigenous communities, and others interested in Arctic development. For China, the Arctic Circle serves as a platform to clarify its position on current Arctic matters, complementing its participation in the Arctic Council, in which permanent observers cannot fully participate in discussions.

At the same time, it should be remembered that the Arctic Circle was created on the initiative of two Arctic countries (the then President of Iceland and representatives of the state of Alaska), its main assemblies are held in October each year in Reykjavik (that is, in the capital of the Arctic country), and it does not have any authority to make any decisions at all. This forum is a purely discussion platform, in terms of its status it can in no way be compared with the Arctic Council.

Other Multilateral Formats China is directly involved in a number of international organizations, including the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research, the Committee on Marine Meteorology, and the International Maritime Organization. As a member of these organizations, China has joined several conventions, such as the Convention on the Facilitation of Maritime Traffic, International Convention on Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation in Cases of Oil Pollution and the Polar Code which regulates Arctic shipping. In addition, China is also a member of other organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the North Pacific Marine Scientific Organization. China participates in the preparation of various UN agreements on the protection and control of large-scale interzonal migrations of fish shoals. This has been reflected in its negotiation processes with Russia, the United States, and Japan, among others, on the development and protection of fish resources in the Bering Sea, as well as the signing of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea. In 2018, China joined a multilateral agreement which introduced a ban on commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean for the 16-year period.

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The PRC pays great attention to its Arctic science diplomacy and, for this reason, actively participates in international scientific organizations such as International Arctic Science Committee, International Arctic Social Science Association, Association of Polar Early Career Scientists, etc.

The China-Nordic Research Center (CNARC), which was established in 2013, aims to provide a platform for academic cooperation with Nordic countries. The CNARC primarily focuses on three research themes: 1) Arctic climate change and its global and regional impacts; 2) Arctic natural resources, shipping and economic cooperation, and 3) Arctic policy-making and international legal regime (Nielsson, 2023).

While China has launched extensive cooperation and exchange programs in the maritime sector with dozens of countries around the world, the key partners for China in the Arctic are eight members of the Arctic Council. By prioritizing collaboration with the Arctic countries, China aims to promote sustainable development, conservation, and protection of marine resources, as well as to promote peace, stability, and cooperation in the region.

Bilateral United States Initially, the United States had a positive attitude towards China's proposal to join the Arctic Council as an observer, as China was seen as a reliable partner in the region (Karandasheva, 2019).

According to Wishnick (2017), it was expected that the interaction in the Arctic Council format could become another platform to involve China in addressing climate change issues. However, the historically difficult relationship between the United States and China in the Asia-Pacific region has had a negative impact on Arctic cooperation between the two countries. As argued by Konyshev and Kobzeva (2017), the potential hostility between China and the United States has a destabilizing effect on international relations in the Arctic.

According to the National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2022), in order to ensure the security of the country and its allies, the United States will work to contain threats to its territory and those of its allies (six Arctic Council countries, excluding Russia). This will involve strengthening the capabilities needed to protect American interests in the Arctic and coordinating with allies and partners on common security approaches. The goal is to reduce the risks of unforeseen escalation and ensure the safety of American people and territory in the region. The document states that, along with “expansionist” Russia, China is aiming to strengthen its presence in the Arctic through increased economic, diplomatic, scientific, and military activity. Over the last decade, China has significantly increased its investment, focusing on extracting critical minerals, expanding its scientific research, and using these resources to conduct dual-purpose research with applications in both exploration and military operations in the Arctic region. China has also expanded its icebreaker fleet and sent military vessels to the Arctic for the first time. As a result, in the upcoming years, the United States will strive to maintain its influence in the region and manage tensions arising from increasing strategic competition in the Arctic, which, according to the document, are fueled by China's “aggressive efforts” to establish a stronger foothold in the area (White House, 2022: 6). This doctrine provoked a fierce counter-reaction from both Russian and Chinese policymaking and expert communities (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2023).

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According to the Strategy-2022, despite the challenges that arise in Arctic cooperation, promoting international cooperation and governance remain key priorities for the United States in the Arctic.

The document states that the US is committed to supporting the institutions that facilitate cooperation in the Arctic, such as the Arctic Council. The Strategy-2022 underlines that it is crucial to ensure that these institutions have the resources and capacity to address the increasing levels of political tensions in the region and adapt to the changing circumstances. In light of the rising uncertainty, it is even more important to maintain and strengthen existing cooperation mechanisms, including at the level of states. However, by boycotting the Russian Arctic Council's chairmanship (2021-2023) the US has undermined rather than strengthened regional institutions.

Given the tense relations between some Arctic and non-Arctic countries, some regional players are now paying more attention to contact with subnational actors. As Bowman and Xu (2020) note, China's desire to directly cooperate with the State of Alaska as tensions with the US federal government remain high, especially in the area of trade.

Canada Canada-China relations in the Arctic are primarily driven by trade and economic interests (Karandasheva, 2019). Despite the challenging conditions for extracting certain resources, Canada has rich deposits of coal, gold, uranium ore, forests, and clean drinking water reserves. An important factor in developing cooperation is the experience of Chinese companies in neighboring Greenland, where the conditions and some of the natural resources are similar to those in Canada.

In the early 2010s, Chinese oil companies such as the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) invested more than $100 billion in Canada's energy sector. By 2022, at least 27 Canada’s public companies have shareholders with ties to China. Chinese firms have been involved in 89 announced acquisitions and investments in Canadian metals and mining companies in the 2010s worth of $14 billion. Many deals involved companies tied to the 31 critical minerals identified by Canada (Lorinc, 2022).

However, as noted by Peng and Wegge (2015), already by 2015, the growing presence of Chinese capital in Canada began to raise concerns among businesses and the public due to the potential loss of control over natural resources in the long run. For example, in December 2020, the PRC mining company attempted to purchase a Canadian Arctic gold mine operated by TMAC Resources Inc. The agreement was blocked by the Canadian government over Arctic security concerns. The site of the mine is located 100 kilometers from a NORAD North Warning System radar station (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2022).

According to many analysts (Dobson, 2017; Lajeunesse, 2018), Chinese initiatives in the Arctic should be welcomed, but should be approached with caution. The strategic orientation of Canadian Arctic policy is expected to shift towards a more careful approach towards Arctic Council observers and non-regional actors in the region. This shift is due to China's increasing interest in the Arctic and the need to ensure security in international relations (Viakhireva, 2019). Pressure on the Arctic NATO allies from the United States, which considers Russia and China to be serious threats to Western interests in the Far North, also plays a role in tightening Canada's position on cooperation with China in the Arctic.

There are also growing environmental concerns about Sino-Canadian energy cooperation in the Canadian society. According to some accounts, the logic of a Canada-China energy-environment

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nexus is that Canada’s energy relations with China should not be treated simply as trade to increase its market share beyond North America. Rather, the supply of Canadian oil and natural gas in the form of LNG should be linked to overall Chinese efforts in reducing the use of coal (Jiang, 2022: 28).

Denmark/Greenland Chinese business circles are showing special interest in Greenland, the Arctic autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. Chinese enterprises in Greenland are primarily involved in the extraction of minerals which are in growing demand in China, including uranium and rare earth metals. The biggest project was the exploration of Kvanefjeld site in a form of China-GreenlandAustralia partnership. Sichuan Xinhai Mining has invested in a major international mining project on the Greenland iron ore site Isua. Other Chinese companies, such as Jiangxi Zhongrun Mining and Jiangxi Union Mining, were also involved in the project. Greenland also attracted investments of Sinosteel and China Communications Construction Company, as well as Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth. Chinese energy firms are interested in investing in the onshore oil and gas exploration projects. Greenland has significant potential as a transportation and logistics hub for the sea routes connecting the markets of Asia and North America (Yang, 2017). A number of researchers (Zeuthen & Raftopoulos, 2018; Chalenko, 2022; Chen, 2022) suggest that the rapidly growing mining industry in Greenland, fueled by Chinese investment, could contribute to the territory's increased economic development and growth. However, some countries, such as the United States and the European Union, have expressed concerns about Chinese companies' involvement in the development of rare earth minerals in Greenland (Olsvig, 2022; Christiansen, 2023). They fear that this could lead to China monopolizing all stages of the supply chain for rare earth elements, which are crucial raw materials for high-tech industries and strategic industries important for national security.

As a result of security and environmental concerns most of the above projects, including Kvanefjeld uranium and Isua iron ore projects were cancelled (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2022).

Finland Over the last two decades, relations between China and Finland were intensifying in various fields, including transport, bioenergy, tourism, information, and telecommunication (Koivurova et al., 2019). There were two investment projects related to the biorefinery and biofuel production in Kemijärvi (Boreal Biorex Ltd.) and Kemi (Kaidi company). In Lapland, Chinese investors were participating in two projects related to tourism and entertainment.

In 2018, the Finnish Meteorological Institute and China signed an agreement on the joint construction of an Arctic Space Center in Sodankylä in order to develop cooperation in the field of satellite imagery and data exchange related to the cryosphere. The parties agreed to jointly use information received from satellites for climate research, environmental monitoring, and navigation in Arctic waters. However, due to China's intention to place its own satellite station in Sodankylä, the cooperation was terminated by Finnish authorities in order to ensure national security. This decision was made to protect Finland's interests and ensure that no sensitive information would be shared with a country that may pose a potential threat.

There was a discussion about the possibility of China's participation in the construction of railways to connect Finland with seaports in the Arctic, such as Kirkenes in Norway. However, in 2019, a Lagutina, Leksyutina, & Sergunin

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joint Finnish-Norwegian working group concluded that the creation of an “Arctic railway corridor” would be commercially unprofitable in the foreseeable future, and this project was postponed indefinitely (Final Report of the Joint Working Group, 2019).

China also planned to join the Arctic Connect project initiated by Finland in 2015 to link Europe and Asia through a subsea fiber optic cable on the seabed along the NSR. However, this project was put on hold because of the growing geopolitical tensions between the West and Russia (Middleton & Rønning, 2022).

Iceland One of the countries that China pays special attention in developing its Arctic diplomacy is Iceland, due to its geographical location, which makes it a promising transport hub for China-North America trade. In 2012, a number of agreements were signed between China and Iceland on container transportation, continental shelf development, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

The China-Iceland free trade agreement came into force in 2014.

In 2011, a China-based businessman sought to purchase land in Iceland to develop a golf resort – this offer was ultimately rejected in part because of fears that an airfield or deep-sea port would be developed instead (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2022).

Furthermore, the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) became the first Chinese company to develop the Arctic oil and gas shelf projects in Dreki and Gammur, owning a 60% stake in a joint venture with Icelandic and Norwegian companies. However, the exploration of Dreki – the most promising site near Iceland’s coast – was cancelled when CNOOC decided that it too expensive and too risky. The exploration of Gammur, a relatively young sediment basin of about nine million years, has been put on hold pending environmental assessments. Whether CNOOC will be involved in exploring the site is not clear (Dams et al., 2020: 24).

China and Iceland are working together to develop geothermal energy and extract ferrosilicon, which is essential for the production of solar panels (Samploon, 2021).

In 2018, they opened the China-Iceland Arctic Observatory at Karhóll in northern Iceland, making it the second largest Chinese research base in the Arctic after the Yellow River in Norway. The station provides a variety of research facilities for studying the northern lights, monitoring climate indicators, and exploring glaciers. It also allows for oceanographic, geophysical, and biological research.

For Iceland, the attraction of Chinese investment is a way to diversify its economic and trade links.

The country's own resources are rather fragile, primarily in the areas of fishing, tourism, and geothermal energy. Due to the scarcity of these resources, Iceland has embedded its activities in the context of EU policy, including the development and exploration of Arctic resources. In this regard, an alternative source of financial support could be viewed as a way for the Icelandic government to leverage its position with both the EU and the United States (Auerswald, 2019) in pursuit of its interests in the region. This could include the possibility of attracting Chinese investment, which could help to diversify the economy and create new opportunities for growth.

Norway The Nordic country with which China is seeking to develop full-scale relations, and which in turn supports China’s activities in the Arctic, is Norway. It officially supported China's quest to become Revisiting the Arctic Region’s Cooperative Network: The Role of China

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a full observer of the Arctic Council. Therefore, the Arctic-focused relations between the two countries have a relatively long history. The starting point for China's success in the Arctic was the establishment of its own research station Yellow River in the Svalbard Archipelago in 2004. At that time, China, having already been actively involved in Antarctic research, had accumulated experience and resources to establish a presence in the Arctic as well. China initially considered the station as an opportunity for international scientific collaboration with other countries in the region. It was built and operated by Norwegian partners, and currently serves as the home base for a growing number of Chinese scientists. Through participation in projects on the archipelago, China has built up a cadre of Arctic specialists and has been able to exchange scientific knowledge and technology with other nations. Various scientific institutions are involved in the implementation of projects at the station, including the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Polar Research Institute of China, and Second and Third Institutes of Oceanography. The station serves as a scientific platform for conducting geophysical, meteorological, oceanographic, and biological studies that help understanding climate change in the Arctic and the characteristics of mineral extraction. Attention is also given to studying economic, legal, and international issues related to the use of Arctic shipping routes, natural gas transport, and modeling indicators for evaluating the effectiveness of China's Arctic development (Konyshev & Kobzeva, 2016).

In the 2000s, Chinese companies focused on energy and natural resources sectors. For China, these sectors became entry points to the Norwegian market, and actually determined the access of Chinese companies to other industries, such as information technology and retail, in the 2010s (Gåsemyr & Sverdrup-Thygeson, 2017). However, the amount of investment is still relatively low compared to other Nordic countries and Russia, at about $7 billion. China primarily invests in the energy sector (Sinochem, $105 million; COSL Norwegian and CNOOC, $2.5 billion; ChemChina, $640 million). China Invest Corporation has acquired a 30% stake in Gaz de France Suez, gaining access to the development of an oil field in the Barents Sea. China and Norway have been cooperating on offshore wind energy since 2010, with Norway holding advanced offshore wind energy technology and expertise. A Memorandum of Understanding on Sino-Norwegian cooperation in the wind power sector signed between Innovation Norway and the Chinese Wind Energy Association in 2019 further promoted bilateral cooperation in the wind energy industry, particularly in the offshore wind energy sector (Wang, 2023).

There are joint projects in transportation (Grand China Logistics and HNA, nearly $380 million), chemical industry (China Bluestar and ChemChina, $2.0 billion), information technologies (Golden Brick, Qihoo, and Beijing Kunlun, $575 million), and retail (Reignwood, $105 million).

Sweden The main areas of cooperation between China and Sweden in the Arctic are education and research (Think Arctic, 2022). The KTH Royal Institute of Technology has agreements with leading Chinese universities and research centers, which aim to exchange students and share scientific expertise (Vargö, 2019). In 2016, the Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth of the Chinese Academy of Sciences established a ground-based remote sensing station in Kiruna, the northernmost city of Sweden, which significantly improved satellite data transmission efficiency and access to remote sensing data (Holz et al., 2022). China is also investing in renewable energy development in Sweden, with the China General Nuclear Power Group owning stakes in six wind energy projects in Sweden, Lagutina, Leksyutina, & Sergunin

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including a 75% share in the Markbygden Ett project that will become Europe's largest onshore wind farm (Duxbury, 2021).

Russia Bilateral cooperation between Russia and China has been developing rapidly. Due to the sanctions regime imposed on Russia, which intensified significantly after 2022, the country has shifted its Arctic policy towards the East, focusing on cooperation with China (Filippova, 2023). This shift was further reinforced by the suspension of cooperation with Russia by other Arctic states in the Arctic Council, which Russia chaired from 2021 to 2023. Russia's recent withdrawal from the Barents Euro-Arctic Council will only increase China's presence in Russia's Arctic agenda.

Since the mid-2010s, China has been investing heavily in LNG production projects in the Russian Yamal. Chinese companies own 29,9% in Novatek's Yamal LNG plant and 20% in its other Arctic LNG-2 plant. China has helped Russia create a fleet of ice-class tankers to transport LNG from Yamal to East Asia (Duran, 2020).

Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for the New Era (Xinhua, 2023), signed during President Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow in 2023, emphasizes the importance of preserving the Arctic as a region of peace, stability, and constructive cooperation. Russia and China advocate for the continued development of the Arctic region, emphasizing the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the region. Among the most significant areas of cooperation identified in the statement, President Putin highlighted the development of the NSR as a strategic priority. This includes China's commitment to work with Russia to develop the transit potential of the route, as well as Russia's willingness to establish a joint working group to promote the development of this important waterway. The development of the NSR holds significant importance for both China and Russia. For China, it represents an opportunity to diversify its trade and transportation routes, while for Russia, it is essential to modernize its infrastructure and increase cargo turnover along this route (Erokhin et al., 2022). The goal is to transform the NSR from a national transportation artery into an international multimodal transport corridor, attracting external investments and promoting economic growth in the region. At the same time, it is important for Moscow to introduce high ecological standards and reduce safety and environmental risks in the NSR water area, in other words, to follow the ‘blue economy’ model (Tianming et al., 2021). It should be noted that both countries are eager to apply this model to their marine economies and this area could become another venue for their bilateral cooperation.

Also in 2023, Russia and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding on strengthening law enforcement cooperation at sea between the Federal Security Service of Russia and the Maritime Police Department of China. For the first time, the Chinese delegation was able to participate as observers in the large-scale Arctic Patrol 2023 exercise in the Barents Sea. Most experts (Wanden, 2023; Borozna, 2024) agree that the continued boycott of cooperation with Russia by Arctic states will lead to closer cooperation with China, deepening Sino-Russian relations and increasing China's presence in the region.

Near-Arctic State or Stakeholder in Arctic Affairs?

China's efforts to develop its Arctic diplomacy, both in multilateral and bilateral formats, are driven by the country's overall strategic orientation to strengthen its foreign policy and increase the role Revisiting the Arctic Region’s Cooperative Network: The Role of China

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of one of the largest economies in the future system of international relations (Zuenko, 2024). This evolution of China's understanding of its role in global governance can be seen through the development of two key concepts put forward by China in its 2018 White paper: “near-Arctic state” and “important stakeholder in Arctic affairs”. These concepts, which describe China's position in the Arctic region, have been widely used in international scientific and public discourse since the publication of China’s Arctic Policy in 2018.

However, the “near-Arctic principle” did not become an innovation of the White Paper 2018. In the early 2010s, an alternative approach was proposed to the traditional sectoral principle for territorial delimitation in the Arctic (which benefits mainly Canada and Russia). This approach can be applied not only to Arctic countries but also to so-called near-Arctic countries (Lei, 2021).

According to a number of Chinese scholars, including Lu (2010), Liu (2012), and Ma (2019), among others, the criteria for determining a country's proximity to the Arctic region include geographical location (relative proximity to the Arctic Circle), transportation infrastructure (close and convenient maritime access to the Arctic Ocean), the impact of the Arctic on that country (its territory is subject to a direct and significant influence from the Arctic environment), and the connection between the country's economy and the Arctic economy (its economy and trade are closely tied to Arctic resources and waterways). Based on these criteria, near-Arctic states include not only China, but also its neighbors such as Japan and South Korea, as well as several European countries like the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Germany. For example, Japan uses the term “Non-Arctic Coastal State” to justify its interests in the Arctic region.

According to Lei (2021), the near-Arctic principle was proposed in order to demonstrate respect for the historically established rights of Arctic countries and to condition the participation of new players in Arctic affairs, while increasing the openness and democratic nature of Arctic governance.

The concept of a “near-Arctic state” suggests building a hierarchy, with the goal of getting closer to the “privileged” Arctic states and distancing oneself from non-Arctic countries that do not meet certain criteria (Lu, 2010). Some authors, such as Minenkov (2005) and Gong (2018), describe this approach to Arctic diplomacy as a desire to create a new collective identity that redefines China's and other near-Arctic nations' positions in the Arctic and contributes to a more open and equal international relations system in the region.

As a result, China has managed to achieve a fair degree of recognition of its near-Arctic status.

Although China is not an Arctic country, it has certain legal rights and interests in the Arctic region, including fishing in waters beyond national jurisdiction (foreign countries can fish both in the territorial sea and exclusive economic zones upon permission of a coastal state) and conducting scientific research and environmental monitoring. This recognition is based on the principle that China should have access to these areas for legitimate purposes, such as scientific research and environmental monitoring (Lei, 2021). As mentioned above, Beijing also is a party to a number of international legal regimes, including the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty, 1994 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea, 2018 agreement on commercial fishery ban in the Central Arctic Ocean, and the IMO Polar Code, which provide this country with some additional legitimacy in Arctic affairs.

However, due to its rather vague definition, the concept of a “near-Arctic country” has difficulties in establishing these standards. As a result, the concept is perceived ambiguously in international scientific and public discussions. In particular, Ruan (2016) notes that without a clear definition of

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the “near-Arctic” status, it is difficult to determine the rights of certain countries to participate in Arctic affairs. Therefore, it is essential to standardize the definition of a near-Arctic state and establish unambiguous criteria for determining a country's Arctic adjacency. Currently, a geographical location beyond the Arctic Circle is used as a clear criterion to classify eight countries as Arctic nations. Due to the lack of a clear definition of such a belongingness to the Arctic, the term “near-Arctic state” simply means that China has a strong interest in the Arctic environment and other Arctic issues, but it is unable to provide sufficient support for its rights and interests in the region based on international law.

Due to the ambiguity of the term “near-Arctic state”, Chinese political and scientific discourse has recently shifted towards a more accurate and rational perception of China's role in the Arctic as an “important stakeholder in Arctic affairs”, the concept which was also used in the 2018 White paper (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2018). The concept of stakeholders has been adopted by political science from the sphere of corporate governance, where stakeholders include consumers, business owners, shareholders, and governments, who all play a role in managing economic, social, and political processes and can be affected by their developments (Ayuso et al., 2014). Being stakeholders, these actors can protect their rights in civil and international courts, giving the term “stakeholder” a certain legal meaning. According to several Chinese scholars (Wang, 2013; Sun, 2014; Li, 2020; Lei, 2021), this term has more legal certainty than the term “nearArctic state” because it directly indicates that China has the legitimate right to be involved in Arctic affairs. In addition, the stakeholder principle provides a basis for multiple countries' participation in the Arctic agenda. Issues related to managing and developing the Arctic are of global significance (climate, ecology, biological resources, indigenous communities, transcontinental routes, and territorial development). Only by recognizing and respecting the concerns of all parties involved and working together common challenges can be addressed more effectively and shared development goals can be pursued.

As noted by Don (2017), the concept of an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs not only blurs the boundaries between Arctic and non-Arctic countries, but also levels the differences between state and non-state actors. This collective identity allows for the inclusion of international organizations, such as those with the participation of China, in the “stakeholder” group. This approach can lead to a broad international consensus on important issues on the Arctic agenda (Ruan, 2016). By implementing the stakeholder concept, China believes that it is in no way undermining the established governance structure in the Arctic. Its participation in Arctic governance is not interference in the internal affairs of Arctic countries, but rather a reflection of its concern for the Arctic as a global issue and its efforts to address these challenges. China always underlines that its involvement in the governance of the Arctic region is based on respect for the sovereignty of Arctic states, respect for the inalienable rights of Arctic Indigenous Peoples, and consideration for the interests of non-Arctic countries and the common interests of the international community. China tries to demonstrate that it supports research and understanding of the Arctic to establish an optimal regional governance system and a multilevel structure for Arctic cooperation that takes into account the interests of all parties involved.

At the same time, it should be mentioned that both concepts are based on China’s assumption that the Arctic is the humankind’s “common heritage” or “global commons” – the concepts which are not supported by the Arctic coastal states, including Beijing’s “strategic partner” Russia.

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Conclusion In its evolution, China’s Arctic diplomacy has gone through several stages, from formally expressing interest in exploring the region a century ago, to becoming an important stakeholder in the Arctic agenda, covering a wide range of political, environmental, economic, social, and cultural issues. China’s official position is that it sees the sustainable development of the Arctic as linked to the common destiny of humanity, where all countries have the right to participate. A peaceful, secure, and sustainable Arctic is in the interests of both the Arctic region and its people, as well as the wider international community. Both Chinese diplomats and academic community stress that in the face of global challenges to sustainability, achieving global prosperity cannot be achieved at the expense of any country. Instead, it is necessary for the entire world to join forces to work together. China - through different formal and informal channels - signals that it is not a direct competitor of the Arctic nations, but rather an important stakeholder and collaborator in the protection of the environment and development of Arctic regions. Beijing demonstrates that it is prepared to share opportunities, address challenges, and work with Arctic nations, non-Arctic countries, and other stakeholders to promote cooperation, enhance exchanges, and achieve shared goals in areas such as climate change, research, environmental conservation, shipping, and sustainable growth.

China's modern Arctic policy includes various measures, such as the development of an Arctic discourse and identity, the articulation of its interests as an important stakeholder in the region, the aggregation of interested actors under the concept of near-Arctic countries, participation in various international legal regimes and the lobbying of its interests on multiple international platforms.

Although there are some restrictions, such as China's role as an observer in the Arctic Council and opposition to expanding China's presence in the region by the United States, we have to admit that China is nonetheless becoming an integral part of the international system in the Arctic. China's involvement in the Arctic dialogue is creating a new political reality that is pushing regional players to work more closely together on both a bilateral and multilateral level. Hopefully, this could lead to the development of a more comprehensive and balanced approach to the management and conservation of the Arctic. In the current situation of global geopolitical turbulence, it is very important that not only China behaves in the Arctic in accordance with internationally accepted standards, but also that the Arctic states do not allow unfriendly actions against it and focus on Beijing's integration into the regional system of international relations, rather than on its exclusion or discrimination.

Acknowledgments This work was supported by the generous grant from the St. Petersburg State University (project no. 116233367).

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Bypassing NATO Enlargement: Explaining Russian Naval Power Projection through the Arctic Mihai Giboi

Since a Russian titanium flag was planted in the Arctic Ocean in 2007, Western academic circles have grown more interested in the Kremlin’s position in the circumpolar North, sparking an ongoing debate about its regional interests. Traditionally, discourse has been divided between neorealist and neoliberal paradigms that either suggest Moscow aims to militarily dominate the region, or is a cooperative actor despite behaving aggressively elsewhere, respectively. However, new perspectives have emerged that offer a middle ground, and explore Moscow’s use of its military to project power outside the Arctic, particularly towards the GIUK Gap. Despite this shift in the literature, it has not yet discussed how the North fits within Russia’s wider geopolitical ambitions, and why it is interested in projecting naval power against the West. Consequently, this paper argues that, as demonstrated by the Kremlin’s response to the mere mention of NATO enlargement, its core interests are not in the Arctic, but in maintaining its great power status, which it believes is being threatened in Europe. This does not dismiss the region’s geostrategic value, because it will play an important supporting role in bypassing the strategic encirclement if NATO-Russian tensions escalate to war. Russian strategic documents also reveal that while the literature has correctly identified the Kremlin’s intention to disrupt NATO operations by contesting control over the GIUK Gap, another likely objective is to conduct precision strikes on Western military and economic infrastructure to support ground operations in Europe.

Introduction Since a Russian titanium flag was planted in the Arctic Ocean’s seabed in 2007 (Buchanan, 2023: vii), Moscow’s activity in the circumpolar North has attracted attention in the West, which has only increased with the return of great power politics. This enduring curiosity has informed an ongoing debate about the Kremlin’s intentions in the region, which is split between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists that either insist Moscow aims to dominate the Arctic, or affirm that it is a positive regional actor that abides by international law, respectively (Sukhankin, Bouffard & Lackenbauer, 2021: 4; Buchanan, 2023: 7-8). However, new perspectives are emerging that offer a middle ground (Bouffard, Charron & Fergusson, 2019: 64), and explore the potential and actual use of the Russian military to project power outside the Arctic (Regehr, 2021; Huebert, 2021; Mikkola, 2019; Boulègue, 2019; Dean, 2023).

Mihai Giboi is an MA in Political Studies student at Queen’s University. He is also an MA Researcher at the Centre for International and Defence Policy, a Research Fellow with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, and a Junior Editor at The Commandant.

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Despite this shift, two gaps remain. First, the conflict-cooperation debate has not yet considered how the Arctic fits within Russia’s wider geopolitical ambitions, because of a regional lens applied by both paradigms, which excludes the North’s place in the international system, and leads to conclusions that either exaggerates or downplays hard security threats. Second, while the literature has acknowledged the use of the Arctic by Russia to project power elsewhere, it has not yet fully explored how its security competition with the West informs these activities. Consequently, this paper fills these gaps by addressing the following research questions: how does the circumpolar North fit within Moscow’s broader geopolitical ambitions; and why is it interested in projecting naval power from the Arctic into the GIUK Gap? By drawing from John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism and Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theory of sea power for its framework, this paper contends that Russia’s core interests are not vested in the Arctic. This is because Moscow’s top priority is maintaining its great power status, which it believes NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe is undermining. However, this does not dismiss the Arctic’s geostrategic value. Since it provides the most direct route to the North Atlantic Ocean (Mikkola, 2019: 4), it will allow Russia to bypass what it perceives as encirclement, if tensions escalate to armed conflict, and bolster land operations in Eastern Europe.

This paper is structured as follows. First, it argues in favour of a different theoretical approach for examining Arctic geopolitics that breaks from the traditional use of a regional lens, which excludes important context that informs Moscow’s activity in the Arctic and constrains neorealism’s explanatory power, since it is designed to explain how the wider international system functions.

Second, it describes Russia’s great power ambitions, along with its opposition and aggressive response to NATO enlargement, to demonstrate that it believes its core interests are being threatened in Europe. Third, it describes the Arctic’s geostrategic value that allows Russia to bypass NATO enlargement and, in wartime, disrupt NATO’s sea lines of communication, as identified by the literature (Regehr, 2021: 1, 3; Mikkola, 2019: 4; Boulègue, 2019: 10; Dean, 2023: 20), and attack ground-based Western military and economic infrastructure. Finally, it explains Russia’s geostrategic constraints that will hinder its ability to project naval power from the Arctic, and argues in favour of a proportionate response by NATO.

Literature review Traditionally, the scholarship has been split into two schools of thought. The first, described by Sergey Sukhankin, Troy Bouffard, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer as the neorealist school, attest that Russia intends to strategically dominate the Arctic, leaving little room for the West to cooperate with Moscow and must instead prevent its expanding control in the region (Sukhankin, Bouffard & Lackenbauer, 2021: 4). Academics supporting this perspective include Aurel Braun and Stephen J. Blank, who argue that the Kremlin has aggressively claimed large portions of the region, and suggest it could act unilaterally if its submitted claim over the Mendeleev and Lomonosov Ridges to the United Nations is rejected (2020: 11). Conversely, the neoliberal institutionalist school posits that the likelihood of conflict in the region because of local disputes is low, and despite Russia’s regional military buildup, it remains a positive actor. It also asserts that since the Arctic has crucial economic value, military confrontation is undesirable (Sukhankin, Bouffard & Lackenbauer, 2021: 4). A prominent proponent of this perspective is Elizabeth Buchanan, who argues that in spite of its revisionist ambitions elsewhere, Russia is a cooperative player in the region, whose Arctic

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strategy abides by international law (2023: 7-8). She also contends that because the North provides a substantial resource base for Moscow’s economy, military conflict is not in its interests (78).

This divide also impacts discourse about Russian Arctic militarization, where it is portrayed as either provocative or defensive in nature. Braun and Blank argue that Moscow’s military activities demonstrate that their “assertions of Arctic military exceptionalism are entirely false,” pointing to its 2018 mock attack on one of Norway’s radar stations, deployment of the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system in 2019, construction of military bases, and confrontations with U.S. and Canadian fighter jets near North America (2020: 10-11). Danielle Cherpako explains further that it “has often used large-scale bastion defence, anti-sub, and air denial exercises as a way of communicating displeasure with NATO activities, and demonstrating their ability to block NATO access to the Baltic, North, and Norwegian Seas” (2020: 5). In contrast, Lincoln Flake attests that Russian efforts are best viewed as a correction of the vast demilitarization that occurred during the 1990s and 2000s, arguing that deploying the S-300 anti-air system, Bastion coastal defence missiles, Rubezh anti-ship systems, MiG-31BM interceptors, and surveillance drones are protective measures (2017: 20, 21-22). Additionally, Michael Petersen and Rebecca Pincus state that Arctic military investments are intended to safeguard resource development and transportation infrastructure, and key components of their strategic nuclear force, from an American attack meant to cripple Moscow militarily and economically (2021: 490, 506-507, 504).

This theoretical divide, however, is blurring with the emergence of a middle ground that highlights the importance of circumpolar cooperation, while acknowledging the Kremlin’s revisionist foreign policy. Bouffard, Andrea Charron, and James Fergusson argue that the West should encourage positive regional actions from Russia, while defending itself against aggressive Russian behaviour (2019: 64). They also attest that Moscow’s involvement with the Arctic Council is important for engagement, since the forum’s discussions prioritize shared concerns and avoid military issues (6465). Simultaneously, considering deteriorating West-Russia relations, Bouffard, Charron, and Fergusson assert that NORAD will have an increased role in dealing with Russia’s revisionist ambitions by defending North American airspace and providing warning of maritime threats.

NATO would also play a role in guarding the North Atlantic’s maritime approaches (66).

Also appearing are considerations about the potential and actual use of the Russian military to project power outside the Arctic. In his assessment about the possible spillover effects of a conventional war in Europe into the region, Ernie Regehr suggests that Moscow would aim to protect its economic infrastructure and military forces by preventing conflict from impacting the Arctic, incentivizing the Kremlin to disrupt NATO operations in the North Atlantic. This would also grant the Russian Northern Fleet access to the GIUK Gap, which is crucial for the Alliance’s “defence and deterrence strategy” (Regehr, 2021: 1, 3). Furthermore, Rob Huebert notes how Moscow’s expanded Arctic forces allow it to project power abroad, pointing to elements of the Northern Fleet being sent to Syria, and the use of its air force and navy to posture against Western Arctic states after the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Consequently, he argues that this makes Russia a regional hegemon in the circumpolar North (Huebert, 2021: 431).

Emphasis is also being placed on Russian threats to NATO’s sea lines of communication (SLOC).

Harri Mikkola explains that the Arctic Ocean provides Moscow with the easiest route to the Atlantic Ocean, and since the North Atlantic SLOC is crucial for transporting troops from North America to Europe, Russia would be interested in disrupting it to delay or prevent reinforcements.

Giboi

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This requires that its submarines and surface vessels pass through the GIUK Gap, making it necessary for NATO to maintain control over this region (Mikkola, 2019: 4). Mathieu Boulègue also asserts that Russian operations in the Gap would negatively impact the Alliance’s SLOC, which are necessary for North American forces to reinforce and resupply Europe (2019: 10). Ryan Dean goes further by attesting that Russia intends to hold it “at risk with long-range naval, air, and missile systems deployed through the Norwegian Arctic and the GIUK Gap to the west,” and is heavily investing in new launcher platforms (2023: 20).

Addressing gaps through a new theoretical approach Despite this shift in the literature, two prominent gaps remain. The first is the conflict-cooperation debate’s lack of consideration about how the Arctic fits within Russia’s wider geopolitical ambitions. This is because both sides utilize a regional lens, largely excluding the circumpolar North’s place within the international system, which either exaggerates or severely downplays hard security threats. Suggesting that the Arctic will experience conflict over resources or boundary disputes inflates the region’s importance in the security competition between the West and Russia.

Moscow’s core interests are not in the North, but in maintaining its great power status as a guarantee of its security, which it believes is threatened by NATO enlargement in Europe. Because of geography, it is also interested in protecting its Pacific coast. This does not suggest that the Arctic has no role in achieving these aims, considering its geostrategic and economic value, but the region is not the Kremlin’s top priority, and unrealistic expectations of a resource war provide a limited understanding about how it will be dragged into great power competition (Giboi, 2024: 16-17). As Huebert explains, this is not about conflict over the region, but how it is used by great powers (2021: 463).

Downplaying the potential for conflict in favour of cooperation is equally problematic (Giboi, 2024: 17). As demonstrated by the pause in Arctic Council activities and Russia’s withdrawal from the Barents-Euro Arctic Council after its invasion of Ukraine (Lackenbauer & Dean, 2022: 3; Edvardsen, 2023), the Arctic is not insulated from external international affairs (Giboi, 2024: 16).

Contrary to Flake’s argument that the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway should disassociate Russian engagements in the region from their “overall relations with Moscow” (Flake, 2017: 18, 28), artificially isolating the circumpolar North leaves out important context for the Kremlin’s activity in the region. Flake himself demonstrates how Arctic security analyses are more nuanced when placed in a wider environment by arguing that Russia’s military buildup in the region since 2012 was the result of its 2008 military reforms, not preparations for an inevitable confrontation in the North (Flake, 2017: 20).

This lack of context leads to the second gap. Although part of the literature acknowledged Russia’s use of the Arctic to project power elsewhere, it has not fully explored its motivations for doing so.

Other than Huebert (2021: 430), assessments about Russian power projection from the Arctic have not acknowledged how NATO enlargement informs Moscow’s military activity in the region.

This has resulted in little discussion about the Arctic Ocean’s strategic value for Russia in avoiding strategic encirclement by the Alliance, especially in the currently unlikely possibility of tensions with the West escalating to war.

To fill these gaps, this paper explores how the circumpolar North fits within Russia’s broader geopolitical ambitions, and why Moscow is interested in projecting naval power from the Arctic

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into the GIUK Gap, by combining Mearsheimer’s offensive realism and Mahan’s theory of sea power for its framework. The former is a variant of neorealism, a subset of realist theory that assumes the structure of the international system – in other words the distribution of power – causes states to seek their own security (Mearsheimer, 2014: 19, 337). However, it breaks from the defensive realist argument that states want to maintain their current position (Mearsheimer, 2014: 20-21; Waltz, 2010: 126), positing instead that states, particularly great powers, are incentivized to maximize their power1 to ensure security (Mearsheimer, 2014: 5, 29). Great powers also pay attention to the balance of power, and seek opportunities to alter it at their adversaries’ expense (34). It also states that since achieving global hegemony, the domination of the international system, is virtually impossible, great powers seek to dominate their region in the world, also known as regional hegemony (40-41, 138), which is why they act aggressively when they believe their sphere of influence is being infringed upon (Mearsheimer, 2014: 82).

This approach is not a reiteration of the type of neorealism described by Sukhankin, Bouffard, and Lackenbauer, which constrains its explanatory power. Instead of accounting for the Arctic through a regional lens, offensive realism is better suited to explain how the region fits within the international system, and how states intend to use it in support of their core interests. As Kenneth Waltz demonstrates, neorealism, as a theory of international politics, is designed to describe international structures, which are defined by “the primary political units” – which are nation states in our era – “emerge from the coexistence of states,” and “are formed by” state interactions (Waltz, 2010: 91). Applying this approach to Russia illustrates that it cannot only account for its Arctic neighbours as it navigates the international system, but must instead prioritize NATO’s presence near its European borders. Consequently, examining its activities in the Arctic through only a regional context sets offensive realism up for failure.

Additionally, this paper utilizes Mahan’s theory of seapower to illustrate the Arctic’s geopolitical value. He posited that a place’s strategic importance depended on three conditions: its geographic position, military strength, and resources (Mahan, 1911: 132). This paper, however, only prioritizes the first two because emphasizing resources is more appropriate for discussing Russia’s ambitions to develop the Northern Sea Route, and offers little theoretical explanation for why Moscow uses the Arctic to project naval power. While Mahan largely emphasized a place’s position in the context of trade, pointing to narrow crossroads like the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal as highways for commerce (134-135),2 he also highlighted its military utility. By showcasing Bermuda, and, to a greater extent, Hawaii as examples, he illustrates that a region’s geographic situation provides advantages for engaging in offensive operations (135, 138). Furthermore, Mahan believed that offensive military strength depended on whether a seaport can gather and host a large force, safely launch it into open waters, and continuously support it throughout a campaign (153). When applied to the Arctic’s role in Russia’s pursuit of its core interests, it is clear that the region provides Moscow with a strategic position to avoid encirclement, especially if tensions with NATO escalate to war, and conduct offensive operations, which is in line with Russian naval strategy. Alongside offensive realism, Mahan’s insights are also useful to identify serious constraints that prevent Russia from using the Arctic to become a fully fledged maritime power.

Situating the Arctic within Russia’s aims Contrary to what the literature suggests, the Arctic does not comprise Russia’s core interests.

Instead, it is concerned about maintaining its great power status, which it believes is being Giboi

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undermined by NATO enlargement. Even though the circumpolar North has geostrategic value, Moscow has, and will continue to, prioritize its geopolitical position in Europe relative to that of the Alliance, and, to a lesser extent, in the Pacific relative to that of China. Consequently, its role, while important, will most likely be in support of the Kremlin’s goal of bypassing what it perceives as encirclement, Europe, rather than obtain gains in the region. However, Russia’s ability to project power from the Arctic into the North Atlantic will be limited because of its geographic situation.

Russia’s Core Interests The goal of attaining regional hegemony, as described by offensive realism, is characteristic of Russia’s status and ambitions. Even though it is much weaker than the U.S., Moscow is also a great power (Mearsheimer, 2014: 360). It is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, possesses the largest nuclear arsenal of approximately 4,380 warheads, is the largest state by territory (Sakwa, 2017: 74; Kristensen et al., 2024: 118), and can project power and influence abroad. This is demonstrated by its 2016 naval deployments in Syria (Bodner, 2018), military assistance to Latin American countries like Nicaragua and Venezuela (Brands & Berg, 2021: 12), growing presence in the African Sahel though Wagner and the Africa Corps (Stronski, 2023; Banchereau & Donati, 2024), and the recent arrival of Russian ships to Cuba and Venezuela for naval exercises in the Caribbean Sea (Crowther, 2024; Associated Press, 2024).

Additionally, President Vladimir Putin wants Russia’s great power status to be recognized on the international stage, and its perceived sphere of influence to be respected by other great powers (Doris & Graham, 2022: 76). Putin does not solely have these views, as explained by Andrew Doris and Thomas Graham, since Moscow’s great power assertions were also present during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency (2022: 76; Sakwa, 2017, 33). Indeed, as Suzanne Loftus identifies, during its economic decline in the 1990s, the political leadership believed that its foreign policy objective should be reversing it “to become a serious actor on the international stage” (2021: 203). They also “universally agreed to pursue economic, political, and military cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States to ensure Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’” (203). Former president Dmitry Medvedev concurred with these objectives, calling Moscow’s “near abroad” a “sphere of privileged interests” in August 2008 (Loftus, 2021: 203; Sakwa, 2023: 243).

For this reason, Russia is antagonistic to NATO and believes it is a tool of American hegemony.

Its 2023 Foreign Policy Concept implies that the Alliance is really a network of U.S satellite states, whose goal is to weaken “Russia in every possible way, including at undermining its constructive civilizational role, power, economic, and technological capabilities, limiting its sovereignty in foreign and domestic policy, [and] violating its territorial integrity” (Russian Federation, 2023: sec.

13). Additionally, Moscow’s 2021 National Security Strategy claims that the buildup of NATO military infrastructure near its borders intensifies military threats to Russia (Russian Federation 2021: 11).

The 2022 Maritime Doctrine delivers similar rhetoric, asserting that part of the main threats facing Russian national security and development at sea is the Alliance’s “expansion of military infrastructure,” and “the increase in the number of exercises conducted in the waters of the seas adjacent to the territory of the Russian Federation” (Russian Federation, 2022: 6). Finally, the 2014 Military Doctrine classifies NATO’s increasing power potential as an external military risk (Russian Federation, 2014: sec. 12a).

Consequently, Russia has explicitly expressed severe disapproval over its “near abroad” engaging with the West. Its opposition to NATO enlargement, which the Kremlin perceives as a threat Bypassing NATO Enlargement: Explaining Russian naval power projection through the Arctic

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(Russian Federation, 2014: sec. 12a), dates to the 1990s, as illustrated by former foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov’s comments that the Alliance’s incorporation of former Warsaw Pact countries would worsen the geopolitical situation and place Russia within striking distance of strategic missiles and tactical aircraft (Götz, 2016: 308-309). Despite the strong protests of Russian policymakers, however, little happened because of internal political and economic turmoil, but that changed in the 2000s after Moscow recovered (309-310).

After NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit, where it was announced that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join the Alliance (Mearsheimer, 2014: 78-79), despite not providing either country with a Membership Action Plan, Putin objected on the grounds that it directly threatened Russia’s security (Götz, 2016: 311; Karagiannis, 2013: 86-87). Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated his position, stating that Moscow would take any possible action to prevent Kyiv and Tbilisi from joining the Alliance (Götz, 2016: 311). That materialized in its 2008 war with Georgia, annexation of Crimea in 2014, after Viktor Yanukovych’s pro-Russian government was toppled, and support of Donbass separatists (Götz, 2016: 311, 314-316; Mearsheimer, 2014: 79, 80-82; Sakwa, 2017: 8889, 133, 156, 157). Finally, in February 2022, after Putin’s speech claiming “that Russia’s enemies were using Ukraine as a platform to threaten the country’s existence,” and his recognition of the breakaway states of Donetsk and Lugansk, Moscow directly invaded Kyiv to “demilitarize” and “denazify” the country (Sakwa, 2023: 263-264).

Russia’s aggressive actions after the mere suggestion of its neighbours joining the Western bloc demonstrate that its core interests are in preventing NATO from undermining its great power status. Nowhere in its objections to the Alliance’s enlargement is the Arctic mentioned. It is true that arguments to the contrary have been made that Moscow’s core security considerations are indeed in the North, since the Northern Fleet possesses much of its sea-based nuclear deterrent (Huebert, 2021: 431). Additionally, because the region accounts “for roughly 10 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 20 percent of all Russian exports,” it can hardly be called a peripheral pursuit (Buchanan, 2023: 51).

These arguments, however, have two problems. First, the need to protect its sea-based nuclear weapons is not tied to the Arctic. If its ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) were redeployed into the Sea of Okhotsk near the Pacific Ocean, Russia’s core security interests would be vested in that region instead. Its war in Ukraine also forced Moscow to redeploy its Arctic brigades, which suffered immense casualties (Wall & Wegge, 2023: 6; Staalesen, 2023; Nilsen, 2022), showcasing that its “near abroad” is a higher priority than its North. Second, Russian fears about the West using Ukraine to threaten its existence overrode the need to attract Western commercial investment for Arctic offshore projects,3 as sanctions following the invasion negatively affected their economic ambitions (Sukhankin, 2022: 5-8), demonstrating that security concerns frequently trump considerations about prosperity (Mearsheimer, 2014: 408). Instead, Russia’s use of its Arctic forces to project power elsewhere strongly indicates that their role is to support its interests in Europe.

The Arctic’s Role This does not suggest that the Arctic is entirely irrelevant. On the contrary, in accordance with Mahan’s theory, the region is strategically valuable because of its geographic position, which permits Russia to project naval power abroad in support of its core interests. Since Moscow has no powerful allies in Europe to buck-pass4 responsibility to, it will need to balance against NATO Giboi

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itself. Thus, the Arctic Ocean is crucial for Russia to avoid strategic encirclement by the Alliance, especially if tensions escalate to war.

For Moscow, the region is not merely a base for its nuclear deterrent, but also “a thoroughfare to project power” (Lackenbauer & Dean, 2021: 152). Unlike the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, which have historically faced geopolitical constraints in projecting naval power (Afonin, 2008: 575-577), the Northern Fleet in the Arctic has access to the least obstructed passage into the Atlantic Ocean (Mikkola, 2019: 4). Consequently, this geographic position allows Russia to compete with American and European navies in the Atlantic (Regehr, 2024: 26) by demonstrating NATO enlargement has not contained them, and can project naval power abroad when it pleases. As explained earlier, it has achieved this by sending Northern Fleet vessels to Syria, the GIUK Gap, and the Caribbean, likely from its headquarters in Severomorsk, located near the Barents Sea coast of the Kola Peninsula. This illustrates the Arctic’s role as a “staging area for Russia’s global strategic presence” (Regehr, 2024: 26).

The Northern Fleet also has the material capacity to attempt naval offensives. Analysts Colin Wall and Njord Wegge identify that despite losses in Ukraine (2023: 6), Russia can still threaten the West with its naval capabilities (8). Furthermore, the Northern Fleet possesses around sixteen active combat submarines, which are reportedly armed with land attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, most notably the Kalibr, a high-end long-range precision missile capable of striking targets from 1,500 to 2,500 kilometers (4). It also officially owns thirty-seven surface vessels as of 2019, which are armed with a variety of surface-to-air, anti-ship, and land attack missiles, including the Kalibr (4). Additionally, its submarines and surface vessels can be equipped with Tsirkon hypersonic anti-ship missiles (5).5 Finally, it is supported by forty-six icebreakers (Regehr, 2024: 25; Wall & Wegge, 2023: 4), which have granted it de facto strategic and operational superiority in the Arctic Ocean, considering the lack of Western icebreakers.

The potential for conducting offensive operations is also consistent with Russian naval strategy.

Official strategic documents point to the necessity of maintaining access to the World Ocean, which is considered important for maintaining Moscow’s interests in national security and sustainable development (Russian Federation, 2022: 3; Russian Federation, 2017: 2-3). According to the 2022 Maritime Doctrine, the Russian Arctic, including the Northern Sea Route (NSR), is considered one of many vital areas of national interest required to ensure Russian interests at sea (Russian Federation, 2022: 5). They are considered crucial for national defence and socioeconomic development to the point that losing control of them risks jeopardizing Russian security (5). While it is true that the Arctic’s importance stems from its economic value, considering that Russia sees the NSR as a promising shipping route (Buchanan, 2023: 56), there is also a crucial military component. Since, alongside ensuring the survivability of its SSBNs, Moscow’s goals in the Arctic also include ensuring “freedom of access to other oceans” (Kofman, 2023: 104), which suggests that Moscow also sees the North as a gateway to the Atlantic Ocean.

In the currently unlikely event that tensions with the West escalates to war, such a geographic gateway will allow Russia to engage in a strategy of active defence. As described by the Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, which envisions a pre-emptive response to national security threats, as described by (2019: 4). As Michael Kofman explains, while it has a defensive character, it also consists of offensive operations, rather than “a strategy premised on area-denial, or anti-access capabilities” (2023: 100-101). The defensive aspect comes from the expectation that

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the Kremlin’s military would conduct defensive manoeuvres and persistent counterattacks from their own territory. However, the active component consists of engagements through constant long-range conventional strikes against crucial infrastructure. Active defence also utilizes “attrition via fires” (101). As indicated by Russian strategy, the active aspect is the more likely operational conduct for Moscow’s naval forces, which will consist of contesting command over the sea, and attacking military and economic targets in Europe.

One potential objective is threatening NATO’s SLOC, which was correctly identified by the literature (Regehr, 2021: 1, 3; Mikkola, 2019: 4; Boulègue, 2019: 10; Dean, 2023: 20), and is in line with Russia’s naval tasks (Kofman, 2023: 111-112). The Maritime Doctrine states that one of its strategic goals is “improving operational (combat) capabilities of the Russian Navy to ensure the national security of the Russian Federation and defense of its national interests in the World Ocean,” which include the full employment of military force in strategic maritime locations (Russian Federation, 2022: 8, 39). The 2017 Fundamentals more explicitly lists the “control over operations within the [SLOC] on the World Ocean” as primary objectives for naval operations, as well as ensuring a “sufficient naval presence of the Russian Federation in strategically important areas of the World Ocean” (Russian Federation, 2017: 6-7, 9). In the event of war, this doctrine will inevitably set the Russian Northern Fleet against NATO’s naval forces in the Norwegian Sea. Threatening NATO’s SLOC will strategically benefit another objective: conducting long-range precision strikes against Western land-based infrastructure, for the purposes of either “warfighting or escalation management” (Kofman, 2023: 95). Contrary to Regehr’s assessment, however, Russia is more likely to attack targets in Europe with conventional weapons, compared to those in North America (2021: 1), since it is more operationally feasible, and will better support land operations in Eastern Europe. According to the 2017 Fundamentals, priority areas of naval operations include developing and maintaining the ability to attack a potential enemy’s ground targets with either conventional or nuclear weapons (Russian Federation, 2017: 11). It also explicitly states that: With the development of high-precision weapons, the Navy faces a qualitatively new objective: [the] destruction of [the] enemy’s military and economic potential by striking its vital facilities from the sea (12).

Operational plans also encompass long-range attritional strikes to prevent adversaries from attacking Russian soil. Since intercepting an incoming barrage would be cost-prohibitive at best, and impossible at the worst, the “Navy’s value is in destroying the launchers or platforms that carry long-range strike capabilities” (Kofman, 2023: 109-110). This is reinforced by Moscow’s ambitions to primarily arm its naval forces with long-range cruise missiles through 2025, and hypersonic missiles and underwater drones after 2025. It also aims to possess powerful fleets by 2030, with coastal forces and naval aviation vested with high-precision capabilities (Russian Federation, 2017: 15). These plans will provide the navy with an unprecedented ability to carry out conventional and non-strategic nuclear strikes on ground-based targets, which the Soviet fleet never had (Connolly, 2019).

Geostrategic Constraints and a Proportionate Response Upon first glance, these developments suggest that the Arctic is pushing Russia towards becoming a maritime power (Antrim, 2010: 1). However, Moscow’s naval power projection capabilities will be plagued by two geostrategic constraints. The first is that Russia is a continental state, which

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renders its self-perception as a maritime and land power (Russian Federation, 2022: 39; Russian Federation, 2017: 16) problematic. According to Mahan, nations surrounded by water have an advantage over their continental counterparts (1890: 29), but unlike the United States, Russia is not a maritime power that can only be invaded through water (see Mearsheimer, 2014: 126-127), and needs to prioritize land forces to balance against NATO’s military. As Mearsheimer explains, armies are the most important forces “in warfare because they are the main military instrument” to conquer and control land (2014: 86).

Moscow understands this, having historically experienced land invasions by the Mongols in the 13th century (Galeotti, 2020: 53-55), fought wars against Sweden and Poland during the 18th century (Galeotti, 2020: 98; Fuller, 1992: 38, 40-44), and withstood additional incursions by Napoleonic France in 1812 (Galeotti, 2020: 140-142; Fuller, 1992: 197-203; Mearsheimer, 2014: 127), and Germany during the First and Second World Wars (Galeotti, 2020: 169-170, 179-181; Mearsheimer, 2014: 127). This was exemplified in military debates between proponents of landpower and seapower during the perestroika – or tumultuous change – years from 1985 to 1991, which the former won, considering the drastic decline of the Russian Navy, with shipbuilding efforts halted, and the deterioration of naval infrastructure and readiness (Cigar, 2009: 459, 479).

Consequently, Moscow will consistently prioritize its land forces, because focusing on its navy at the expense of its army will leave it vulnerable to ground attacks, a possibility the Kremlin wants to avoid.

The second limitation comes from Russia’s coastline. Mahan also explains that a country’s “geographical position may be such as of itself to promote a concentration, or to necessitate a dispersion, of the naval forces” (1890: 29). Because Moscow has a long coastline, stretching from the Barents Sea to the Pacific Ocean, it will have to disperse its navy. Another area of importance for the Kremlin is the Pacific (Russian Federation, 2022: 16), where it must not only balance against the United States, as illustrated by its joint naval exercise with China near Alaska on August 2023 (Yang, 2023), but also Beijing. Despite their “no-limits” partnership, as further demonstrated by Putin and Xi Jinping’s proclamation of a “new era” of collaboration in opposition to the United States (Orr, Faulconbridge, Osborn, 2024), this is a transactional relationship (Lajeunesse & Choi, 2022: 1059-1060), and Russia is suspicious of China’s interest in the Arctic (Boulègue, 2022: 36).

Boulègue explains that alongside Beijing’s potential intention to turn the region into a “global commons,” which directly clashes against Russian national interests, Moscow has negative perceptions about their partner’s military interests in the North, which includes a fleet of nuclearpowered icebreakers being constructed for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) (36-37).

China could also use these vessels to support naval transit in the North, and submarines “conducting nuclear-deterrence operations” against American SSBNs (37).

Since a Chinese military presence in the Arctic would challenge Russia’s strategic position (Pincus, 2020: 57-58), Moscow will strongly object against the PLAN operating in its northern waters.

Pincus explains that the Russian military is hawkish on Beijing, and Russians in the Far East perceive Chinese influence “as a potential threat” (53). Additionally, Adam Lajeunesse and Timothy Choi state that China would strategically benefit from a military presence in the North if it was at war with Russia (2022: 1060). They explain that even one nuclear submarine in the Kara or Barents Seas could hold regional shipping hostage, and a small fleet of submarines can tie down a significant portion of the Russian navy in the Arctic Ocean, and restrict access to the Pacific.

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Chinese cruise missiles could also damage Russia’s economy by striking critical infrastructure (1060-1061). Furthermore, Chinese SSBNs in the region would enable them to threaten a nuclear strike on Russian territory from Moscow’s own waters, which would be unacceptable for the Kremlin, considering the Soviet Union’s hostile response to American nuclear weapon deployments in Turkey during the 1960s, triggering the Cuban Missile Crisis (Crandall, 2023: 143144, 146-149).

While NATO should deter Russia from attacking its SLOC and ground-based military and economic infrastructure, its response should be proportionate to Moscow’s geostrategic constraints. Operations at the level of Exercise Strikeback in 1957, for instance, which consisted of over 100 vessels operating in the Norwegian Sea (Baldwin, 1957), should currently be avoided.

As identified by Monaghan, some Russian observers suggest that Moscow’s naval strength is hampered by its need to divide resources among four fleets spread out in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, and the Baltic and Black Seas, along with a flotilla in the Caspian Sea (2023: 13-14, 3, 10, 4-5, 16, 9), rendering the Kremlin’s navy locally weaker than that of Turkey (14). This dispersion greatly diminishes the Russian Northern Fleet’s power projection capabilities, which will make a large and costly NATO naval presence unnecessary.

Instead, the Alliance should consider a more moderate approach by continuing to participate in Exercise Dynamic Mongoose, which is an annual naval exercise by NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) that focuses on anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare (NATO, 2024), and expand its mandate to address existing challenges posed by the Russian Navy. To counteract Moscow’s precision-strike capabilities, future exercises should focus on neutralizing Russian naval launch platforms, instead of intercepting incoming missiles. If priority is given to attacking the “arrows” instead of the “archers”,6 the Kremlin would eventually develop countermeasures, considering its development of hypersonic missiles to defeat ballistic missile defences (President of Russia, 2018). Another focus should be on aerial and anti-aircraft warfare. As explained earlier, Russia’s strategy includes the use of naval aviation equipped with high-precision missiles (Russian Federation, 2017: 15). Monaghan also identifies that: [Russian] officials and analysts…point to the introduction of new and upgraded naval aviation, the looming introduction of an automated command system to improve the navy’s ability to create ‘continuous zones of destruction with an area of hundreds, even thousands of kilometres’ (Monaghan, 2023: 12).

Consequently, ensuring NATO’s operational capability to neutralize Russian naval aviation capabilities with Western aircraft and anti-aircraft will be essential to prevent the Northern Fleet from striking valuable ground targets in Europe.

Conclusion As Ernie Regehr would argue, this is not an Arctic-specific issue (see Regehr, 2021: 3-4). Instead, Russian naval power projection through the region is only part of Moscow’s wider rivalry with the West. As demonstrated by its response to the mere mention of NATO enlargement into its “near abroad,” Russia’s core interests are not in the North, but in maintaining its great power status, which it believes is being threatened in Europe. This does not dismiss the region’s geostrategic value, however, because it will play an important supporting role in bypassing what Moscow perceives as containment, if tensions with the Alliance escalate to war. Its strategic documents also

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reveal that while the literature has correctly identified the Kremlin’s intention to disrupt NATO operations by contesting control over the GIUK Gap, another objective is to conduct long-range, precision strikes on Western military and economic infrastructure to support ground operations in Europe. The Arctic is indeed an important region, but not exceptionally important.

This approach illustrates the importance of examining geopolitical activity in the region through the context of the international system, which neorealism excels in explaining and fosters considerations about how the circumpolar North contributes to a great power’s core interests.

Constraining analysis to a regional lens removes this wider understanding, leading to conclusions that either exaggerate, or severely downplay, the affects of great power competition in the North.

Contrary to what the Arctic conflict paradigm suggests, Russia will unlikely start a resource war in the region, because it will draw resources away from its top priority of preventing NATO from undermining its great power status. Since it is also much weaker than the United States, the costs of sparking conflict in the North outweigh the benefits.

Simultaneously, trying to separate Russia’s behaviour in the Arctic from its actions elsewhere is equally problematic. The assumption that the region comprises its core interests, because of its economic value, does not account for why the Kremlin persists in its war against Ukraine despite Western sanctions that hinder its northern development projects (see Sukhankin, 2022: 5-8). Using a regional lens to demonstrate that Russia’s aims in the Arctic are genuinely peaceful, without considering how its economic gains would be used in its security competition against the West – such as translating it into sufficient military power to challenge NATO in Europe – also ignores how the international system grows more dangerous as it shifts to multipolarity. Any region with strategic value is subject to “the tragedy of great power politics” (Mearsheimer, 2014), and the Arctic is unfortunately no exception.

Notes 1. In the realist tradition, power is grounded on a state’s material capabilities, especially military power (Mearsheimer, 2014: 55).

2. While Mahan believed sea power depended on commerce, he also argued that military maritime control was needed to protect it (1911: 139).

3. See (Buchanan, 2023: 124-128) for Russian attempts to secure partnerships with Western energy firms.

4. Buck-passing is a strategy where a state gets another state to bear the responsibility of deterring, or fighting, an adversary (Mearsheimer, 2014: 157-158).

5. It should be mentioned, however, that despite Putin’s claims that it “has no analogs in the world” (Nilsen, 2023), Tsirkon missiles have allegedly been intercepted by Ukrainian forces (Defense Express, 2024).

6. The “arrows” refer to missiles, while “archers” refer to launch platforms (Charron & Fergusson, 2022: 107).

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North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, 1-14. https://www.naadsn.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2022/07/22jul-Sukhankin-upload.pdf.

Sukhankin, S., Bouffard, T., Lackenbauer, P. W. (2021). Strategy, Competition, and Legitimization: Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation. Arctic Yearbook, 1-26. https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2021/ScholarlyPapers/12_AY2021_Sukhankin.pdf.

Wall, C., & Wegge, N. (2023). The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War. Center for International and Strategic Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-arctic-threatconsequences-ukraine-war.

Waltz, K. (2010). Theory of International Politics (2nd ed.). Waveland Press.

Yang, M. (2023, August 6). US dispatches warships after China and Russia send naval patrol near Alaska.

Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/aug/06/us-navywarships-china-russia-naval-patrol-near-alaska.

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Briefing Note

Russian media coverage of Arctic issues: changes since the invasion of Ukraine Mathieu Landriault

Russian media coverage of Arctic issues has substantially changed since February 2022: it is now more inward-looking, referring less frequently to other countries. More importantly, the region is now predominantly framed as embroiled in both a race and a struggle, with other nations vying to steal Russian Arctic territories and access. This change occurred while Russian press agencies also operated a shift in coverage on Svalbard, by rarely referring to Norwegian presence or control over the territory. These three changes mark departures from Russian media coverage of the Arctic before the mass invasion of Ukraine.

Introduction The Arctic region has been unequivocally impacted by the Russia-Ukraine war. Relations between the West and Russia remain strained, with only a limited resumption of cooperation through the Arctic Council. As questions arise about resuming cooperation (is it desirable? If so, when, or how?), it seems relevant to look at how the Arctic region is portrayed in Russian discourses. The Observatory on Politics and Security in the Arctic (OPSA) brought together a team to analyze how the Arctic was described in Russian press agencies (Sputnik and TASS) from 2020 to the summer 2022 (Landriault et al., June 2022). This research aimed at analyzing Russian press agencies so as to gather intelligence on the types of stories and framing used in Russia to refer to the region. By focusing on English-language articles, we have gathered a sample of Arctic frames that Russia intended to promote to an international audience.

Although analyses extended to the summer of 2022, little movement was noticed in how Russia referred to the Arctic region after the invasion. This analysis was updated (albeit only looking at TASS) so as to highlight whether differences can be observed between how it was described before the invasion or in the immediate aftermath of the invasion and how it was portrayed during the first 5 months of 2024 (January 2024 to May 27 2024). Three key differences emerged, providing further empirical evidence of how Arctic relations have been impacted by global developments.

Mathieu Landriault is an adjunct professor at the École nationale d’administration publique in Canada and the director of the Observatory on Politics and Security in the Arctic (OPSA).

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Emergence of a classic: the Arctic struggle/race frame Two popular perceptions about the Arctic region have dominated headlines in popular media outlets since at least the early 2000s: the Arctic race and Arctic struggle perceptions. The former presents an unstoppable dash by both state and non-state actors to exploit Arctic resources and claim a piece of the region: this “race” is characterized by a feeling of urgency, as actors jockey for a position to hopefully seize a slice of the Arctic. This first frame is often presented alongside the second one: this is referred to as the Arctic race/struggle frame. In this view, this “race” will be dominated by competition and confrontation. The Arctic region is then presented as an arena of conflict. These pessimistic accounts were not solely observed in media outlets: they have been relayed at times by decision-makers. For example, former Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper, promoted these frames in the second half of the 2000s when he insisted that Canada should “use it or lose it”, while referring to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.

Before February 2022, mentions of the Arctic in Russian press agencies predominantly presented the Arctic region as one of peace and stability. Cooperation and partnerships dominated coverage, especially in relation to its commercial and scientific dimensions (Landriault et al., February 2022).

After February 2022, Russian officials were also quick to promote these reassuring assessments but with caveats. For example, in October 2022, the commander of Russia’s Northern Fleet, Admiral Alexander Moiseyev, asserted that there was a “relative stability and absence of real challenges and threats to regional security in the Arctic” but that “the military-political situation in the region at the present stage is characterized by growing negative trends” (TASS, October 21, 2022). At the same time (October-November 2022), Russian users and allies on social media (Telegram, Twitter) were disseminating the idea that the U.S. was backing Ukraine in a nefarious plot to defeat Russia and to grab Russian Arctic resources and sea routes.

Upon analyzing articles published during the first 5 months of 2024, the tone has emerged as much darker and less ambivalent than Moiseyev’s previous assessment: the Arctic race/struggle is front and center and presented as obvious to readers, a position usually asserted by quoting Russian experts. First, the Arctic struggle is presented as natural, intemporal by TASS: “The Arctic has always been a zone of tense confrontation between various countries” (TASS, March 14 2024). In another instance, the proverbial Arctic pie is mentioned: “the interest in the Arctic is growing, all countries are trying to set foot, not to be late, when the pie is already cut” (TASS, March 4 2024).

The Arctic race frame, as observed in other outlets, is mostly sketched as a race for resources: “Why has everyone rushed there? Arctic is a store of resources. Oil and gas, bio resources, ores, rare earth metals - lots of everything” (TASS, March 4, 2024).

In a classic victimization move, this confrontation is brought about by somebody else. Here, the United States is presented as the party responsible for this state of affairs, casting the region as a “possible future battlefield” (TASS, March 19 2024) or the “main arena for future confrontation” (TASS, March 7 2024). Giving intentions to the US dabbles in conspiracy theories as this posture is presented as solely “to benefit its defense-industrial complex” (TASS, March 19 2024) or that the war in Ukraine was just a pretext for the US to expand NATO in the North with the additions of Sweden and Finland (TASS, March 7 2024).

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The language of the “special military operation” and the Arctic The special vocabulary developed by the Kremlin as part of their war in Ukraine spilled over into how Arctic issues are addressed. Mentions of “anti-Russian” sanctions and the references to friendly and unfriendly countries were widespread in these articles.

The militarization of discourses was also commonplace as every Arctic development is explained through a military prism. In all cases, either the US or the West is presented using terms that are offensive in nature, while Russia portrays itself as a victim defending its interests against Western countries plotting to steal Arctic resources and territories. For example, the West is framed as holding a “traditional desire - to take away from everyone and divide among themselves. The Americans are all right (sic) with creativity. They have both grand conceptions to cover up their actions, and pirate-like approach: to rob everything that can be robbed” (TASS, February 15 2024).

In yet another article, TASS reporters claim that “The US and its allies are driven by the desire to embroil Russia into a geopolitical confrontation, aimed at preventing Russia from obtaining leadership positions in polar regions, and to ensure unhindered access to resources and transportation routes in the region” (TASS, May 17 2024).

Military language is predominant in these assessments. For example, Arctic geopolitics in general is described as a “war for resources, northern transport routes, territories, influence and so on” (TASS, March 7 2024). The focus on environmental threats that could emerge from the Russian Arctic is also couched as an aggression on Russia. A TASS article reacted to an article published in The Guardian: the British newspaper had reported that dangerous pathogens could surface from the Russian Arctic as a result of permafrost thaw. TASS then promptly proceeded to interview a Russian expert framing The Guardian’ article as an “attempt to interfere with this country’s internal affairs”, highlighting that this was part of a broader struggle: “From a political point of view, we are currently fighting for the Arctic shelf and the Northern Sea Route. Therefore, as part of this struggle, they come up with all sorts of stories to take control of something or to limit someone” (TASS, January 26 2024).

These articles constitute a fascinating account as to how Western sanctions actively impact the Russian Arctic. On the one hand, Russian Northern communities have faced negative consequences from these sanctions, such as importing duties slapped on Russian goods, increased costs for Russian companies to reorient to new exporting markets, reduced demand on Russian LNG, barred access to Western laboratories to study artifacts and fossils, and lower numbers of tourists travelling the Russian Arctic. On the other hand, TASS has stressed that sanctions did not yield any significant impact on Russia and sanctions were actually beneficial, forcing the country to find alternatives and generating “potential for the further growth of exports” (TASS, January 17 2024). The abstract and often general nature of the latter claims can however be contrasted with the very specific ways in which Russian Arctic communities are negatively impacted: the former seems to outweigh the latter.

The evolution of the war in Ukraine and of Arctic relations can be reflected in the countries mentioned and the topics raised in these different articles. One can observe a diversity of countries mentioned as Russia attempts to divert its Arctic relations away from Western countries. Although the United States is still the most often mentioned country in these accounts, mentions of Arctic partnerships with India and China are more numerous than before the invasion. Further, unlikely

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countries are also involved: initiatives including Mongolia, Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam are presented to readers so as to illustrate how Russia can strike collaboration agreements with new partners. In some instances, TASS went on to unveil the relevance of these new partnerships to readers: “It is obvious to us what a strong Arctic program China has got. India, in terms of the Himalayas, is interested in developing the "three poles" concept, in comprehensive studies of perennially frozen soils. Arab countries show interest in developing logistics routes” (TASS, February 13 2024). Western countries on the other hand were mostly mentioned in the context of sanctions or NATO and framed as obstacles or challenges to Russia. Overall, most stories did not reference any country other than Russia: about 66% of articles only referred to developments within Russia without mentioning the outside world. This last feature points towards Russian press agencies being more inward-looking than they were before the invasion, in the case of the Arctic anyway. However, a more problematic discursive shift can be observed on the issue of Svalbard.

A problematic discursive shift on Svalbard The full-scale invasion of Ukraine did not immediately spur a change of tone in relation to Svalbard. Instead, subsequent sanctions highlighted this turning point, especially the inspection of a Russian cargo transiting through Norway before being sent to Svalbard. This event unfolded in late June 2022 and was resolved on July 6, with Norway agreeing to let the cargo go through after inspecting it.

By analyzing articles published by TASS on Svalbard from 2019 to May 2024, a rather significant difference in how Svalbard (or Spitsbergen) is described before and after this incident can be observed. Before this episode, Norwegian sovereignty and presence in Svalbard was often mentioned and at times emphasized. The territory was referred to as “Norway’s Svalbard”, “The Norwegian polar archipelago of Spitsbergen”, and it was hinted that Svalbard “is in Norway”. In more political stories, reports emphasized that Russia never questioned Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. In total, before the June/July 2022 incident, 63% of TASS articles mentioning Svalbard acknowledged or recognized Norwegian sovereignty or presence in Svalbard. This number dropped to 53% for articles published between the 2022 inspection event and the rest of 2022, and to 21% for articles published from January 2023 to May 2024.

Figure 1. Mentions of Norwegian sovereignty when reporting on Svalbard in Russian press agencies.

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In articles published after 2023, the quasi-absence of mentions of Norwegian sovereignty or presence gave the impression that Norway was absent from the territory, with only Russia laying down plans and investing in the archipelago. At other times, articles were ambiguous about Norwegian presence, pointing that the “Spitsbergen Archipelago is located on the border between Russia and Norway” and that settlements inhabited by Russians in Svalbard are “in the Russian territory” (TASS, April 9 2024). This development must be monitored to figure out whether it is temporary or a sign of a more permanent shift in Russian rhetoric towards Norway.

Conclusion The following briefing note aimed at providing evidence as to how Arctic discourses have recently shifted in Russia. TASS coverage is markedly influenced by the war in Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions: the Arctic region is not exceptional or isolated from these developments. More importantly, the most significant shift is in the support and promotion by Russia of the Arctic race/ struggle frame. This logic of confrontation is well established in TASS and usually supported by both the press agency and experts quoted in the articles. It is not presented as a possibility but as fact, a reality: one against which Russia and Arctic states must prepare and react accordingly. It is difficult to envision cooperation between Arctic states emerging from this dark assessment of Arctic geopolitics; something to keep in mind as we assess the likelihood of reestablishing full circumpolar cooperation between the 8 Arctic states.

References Landriault, M., Savard, J-F., Caron I., Poulin-Langlois, L. and Millette, A. (June 2022). June 2022 Analysis – Russian Press Agencies and the Arctic. Available at: https://obsapa.org/wpcontent/uploads/agences-de-presse-russes_June-2022.pdf Landriault, M., Savard, J-F., Caron I., LaFortune, G. and Millette, A. (February 2022). February 2022 Analysis – Russian Press Agencies and the Arctic. Available at: https://obsapa.org/wp-content/uploads/February-2022.pdf TASS. April 9 2024. Scientists find rapid warming in Europe’s northernmost point. World Service Wire.

TASS. March 19 2024. Russian Press Review – TAS World Service. World Service Wire.

TASS. March 14 2024. Kremlin says unsurprised by reports about US plans to increase presence in Arctic. World Service Wire.

TASS. March 7 2024. NATO exercises in EU practice confrontation with Russia – Security Council’s secretary. World Service Wire.

TASS. March 4 2024. University professor: Foreign countries’ interest in Arctic will grow. World Service Wire.

TASS. February 15 2024. West’ attempts to cut off Russia from world markets completely pointless – expert. World Service Wire.

TASS. February 13 2024. International Winter School for Arctic studies features researchers from 7 countries. World Service Wire.

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TASS. January 17 2024. Russian Press Review – TASS World Service. World Service Wire.

TASS. October 21 2022. Negative trends in the Arctic grow – Northern Fleet’s commander. World Service Wire.

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III. Science, Diplomacy, and Governance

Non-state observers in the Arctic Council – Exploring participation patterns in the PAME Working Group Natia Tsaritova

Arctic Governance relies on relations between different Arctic and global actors. As the Arctic Council is a key actor within Arctic Governance, this study takes a closer look at its inter-organizational relations with its non-state observers and explores how observers actually observe. Because of the tense situation in Arctic cooperation, it is again necessary to reflect on the observers’ contribution to the Arctic Council and consequentially to Arctic Governance. This way, conclusions can be drawn about the extent to which specifically non-state observers will continue to be relevant in the future. Building on the STAPAC dataset from Knecht (2017), where stakeholder participation in Arctic Council and sub-body meetings are summarized, this study adds data of observer participation after 2017. Here, I take the PAME working group of the Arctic Council as starting point and analyse observer attendance of ministerial, SAO and working group meetings. Apart from the participation data, the basis for analysis are observers reports and reviews, and other official documents from the Arctic Council. This article aims at revealing patterns and mechanisms of observing. Drawing on the sociological neo-institutionalist perspective, observers are conceptualized as an organizational field that relates to the Arctic Council. This relational perspective allows us to gain an understanding of how non-state observers participate and what roles they can have within the Arctic Council. This study shows that non-state observers play a vital role in embedding Arctic issues in the larger global context.

Introduction Due to climate change, Arctic livelihoods, environment and biodiversity are at risk. As the climate crisis is a global problem, it affects global society. The Arctic is thus a global region of interest.

Beyond climate issues, it also triggers economic interests due to the potential for shipping routes and natural resources (Young, 2019a). Thus, there is an increase of actors that want to partake in the region beyond the Arctic states and the peoples living there. These are states, non-state and transnational actors, and local and global actors who wish to have an influence in and on the Arctic.

This is mirrored in the work of the Arctic Council (AC) and is best visible through its high number of (non-Arctic) observer states and organizations. They are allies to the AC, for example by supporting the AC’s working groups or research projects either financially or with expertise (Rottem, 2016: 157). The discussions about observers and their role in the AC are a recurring theme in and around debates about Arctic Governance. Knecht (2017b) found that“[…] the way AC Natia Tsaritova is a Doctoral Researcher at Bielefeld University.

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enlargement has been politicized in recent years is disproportionate to observers’ actual presence as a necessary condition for influencing Council proceedings” (Knecht, 2017b: 217). Building on these discussions, this study explores observer engagement by zooming in on one of the six Working Groups of the AC and how observers participate there. Through the lens of sociological neo-institutionalism, observer engagement is conceptualized as a special form of interorganizational relations, more specifically as an organizational field that relates to the AC rather than to one policy field. From this perspective, I explore how non-state observers actually observe, by analysing their participation quota, patterns and roles. Accordingly, this study traces similarities and differences amongst observers. It focuses on the PAME working group since 2016 as a case study. By zooming in on observer participation through one Working Group, the study provides a deeper understanding of what “observer” status in the AC entails and what mechanisms exist in the inter-organizational cooperation between the AC and its observers. Marine governance is highly international and demands cooperation on multiple levels. Thus, this is an important starting point to analyse inter-organizational cooperation with the AC. The second focus lies on non-state observers and can be explained from two perspectives. The first reason is the observation that from 2004 until 2017 there were no new organizational observers admitted to the AC. Between 2017 and 2019 however, a total of six organizations became observers, many of which have a marine specialization. The second perspective is derived from the fact that observer states tend to have different communication channels and opportunities to engage in Arctic affairs, making them rather distinct actors from organizations. For example, observer states can make use of their bilateral relations with Arctic states and other fora.

Observers in the Arctic Council The AC as a high-level intergovernmental forum that is associated with its scientific output for environmental protection and by a variety of actors. It stands out through its inclusion of Arctic Indigenous Peoples organizations, the permanent participants (PP) and its cooperation with various regional and global observers (Rottem, 2020a: 4f). While it is clear why the Arctic Indigenous rightsholders are part of the AC, the role of observers is somewhat contested. Although one could subsume all of the actors and categories under the umbrella of “Arctic Council membership” (Rottem, 2016: 158), this appears to be a shortcut to a highly complex structure of relations, responsibilities and rights. Debates around the AC’s need to open up more for transnational and global cooperation (Young, 2019b) relates to the idea that the Arctic is a piece of the global puzzle rather than a remote space: “[…] it is necessary and high time to understand the Arctic as a ‘globally embedded space’ that is inextricably linked to global climatic, environmental, economic and political systems and processes” (Keil & Knecht, 2017: 4).

Although observers do not have any decision-making capacities like the member states or consultative rights like the permanent participants, they are included in different organizational structures or processes, which presents the question of whether, or to what extent, observers are part of the organization or simply part of the organizational environment. I argue that observers are not directly part of the AC: the AC communicates clearly and unequivocally that membership is based on geography and sovereign territories in the Arctic. Thus, the AC differentiates poignantly between Arctic actors and others and in their semantics. Observer have to apply for their presence in the AC and meet certain expectations (Arctic Council, 2013b). Accordingly, I understand them as one specific form of inter-organizational relations that is supposed to increase exchange with actors from the AC’s complex environment. This will be explained further in the next chapter.

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The AC observers represent an especially interesting case for two reasons: First, the AC has more than 38 observers, which are almost equally divided in the three different actor types (Arctic Council, 2024), strongly outweighing the members and PPs by numbers. Secondly, observers in the AC are expected to not only acknowledge the AC’s authority and observe its processes but to contribute to the AC’s work (Arctic Council, 2013a). It’s clear that observer engagement here is not just a symbolic gesture, since even in the AC’s Strategic Plan for the decade, the AC highlights the cooperation with observers and encourages “[…] their proactive engagement in relevant activities of the Council” (Arctic Council, 2021: 7).

The process of becoming an observer and the procedures of acting as an observer are regulated (Arctic Council, o.A.; Arctic Council, 2013a). Some might even say the rules are quite detailed for an intergovernmental forum without a legal foundation (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2014: 229). The formal criteria for observer admission include the requirement to recognize authority of Arctic states and international legal frameworks, such as UNCLOS, and respect the PPs. Applicants should also demonstrate political willingness and financial ability to contribute to PPs and their work, demonstrate interest and expertise for the AC, and have demonstrated a concrete interest and ability to support the work of the AC, including through partnerships with member states and PPs. They should bring Arctic concerns to global decision-making bodies (Arctic Council, 2024).

When admitted, observers are obliged to report every two years about their contributions and to show their on-going interest and merit to the AC (Arctic Council, 2013a). Additionally, observers are reviewed every four years by the ACS. The rules for observer engagement are set in the Ottawa Declaration, but the composition of observer engagement has evolved over time. Participation in AC meetings used to be simple until the interested actors became practical problems, for example regarding the size of the venue (Shadian, 2017: 52f). Between 2011 and 2013 the AC refined its observer rules with the amendment of the rules of procedure (Arctic Council, 2013b) and the Observer manual for subsidiary bodies (Arctic Council, 2013a). Graczyk et al. (2017) understand these rules as an “attempt to socialise observer behaviour through mechanisms of conditionality” (Graczyk et al., 2017: 122). It is noticeable that the huge interest in the Arctic and the number of observers has created the urgency to make changes. Graczyk and Koivurova (2014) studied “possible effects of the new rules for AC observers when considering external actors’ inclusion within Arctic governance” (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2014: 225) and traced the evolution of observer engagement from the AEPS to the new observer rules of the AC. One possible explanation for these rules could be the fear of the PP’s of being marginalized in the face of observer enlargement (Humrich, 2017b: 91) and that powerful states would push for more influence (Graczyk et al., 2017: 122). Another way of looking at reporting and reviewing is that it can strengthen the credibility of observers and of the AC by incentivizing continuous interest and action: “[..] that observer status in the Arctic Council has a price tag, and requires sustained interest, capacity and relevant expertise to contribute to Arctic science and knowledge production” (Knecht, 2015).

This argument relates from the study by Knecht, where observer activity in the AC is categorized as “different worlds of commitment” (Knecht, 2017a: 172), varying from “late bloomer”, “regular visitor” to “overachiever”. The study finds that some observers do not make full use of their observer rights. It concludes that observer participation is not a ‘one way street’ but needs commitment from the observers and the AC equally (Knecht, 2017a: 181). This is an important point to follow up on, because if observers do not participate, then why are they thematized so Tsaritova

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much? Motivations for participating in the AC can vary “from purely scientific to economic and strategic” (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2014: 226). For states, enhancing their own status in the international community or geopolitical considerations may also be motivations (Filimonova, Obydenkova, & Rodrigues Vieira, 2023).

Studies about observer cooperation tend to put the focus on observer states, like the involvement of Asian states that gained observer status in 2013 (Hong, 2021; Stephen & Stephen, 2020) or on major IOs. One of the most frequent external IOs that is examined is the EU (Bailes & Ólafsson, 2017; Paul, 2021; Raspotnik & Stępień, 2020) or the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (Basaran, 2017; Hebbar, Schröder-Hinrichs, Mejia, Deggim, & Pristrom, 2020; Molenaar, 2014).

In her study of non-state observers and their actual influence on the AC, Wehrmann compares WWF and CCU and their roles within the EPPR and a task force (Wehrmann, 2017). She ascertains that observers have some influence on agenda-setting and policy formulation to varying degrees (Wehrmann, 2017). A broader picture on non-state observers is illustrated by Sellheim and Menezes (2022), who have integrated various papers that deal with different non-state actors and their role in the Arctic in their edited volume (Sellheim & Menezes, 2022). For example, it zooms in on the UArctic (Nicol, Beaulieu, & Hirshberg, 2022), IASC (Łuszczuk & Szkarłat, 2022) and the Nordic Council of Ministers and the West Nordic Council (Caddell, 2022). Platjouw et al. (2018) take on a another approach by showing how the cooperation between AMAP and UNEP (as an observer) has contributed to creating a legal outcome through the Minamata Convention on Mercury.

Yet, theorizations on observer engagement and the observer category are rare. This paper attempts a theoretical conceptualization of observers and underlines it with empirical findings. A concrete understanding of what observers mean to the AC could help assess future scenarios for Arctic cooperation. Considering the current state of global politics due to the Russian war against Ukraine since 2022, debates about observer engagement gain new importance. The most recent debates were held at the Arctic Frontiers conference where discussions suggested that the crisis could function as a turning point for the way in which the AC makes use of its observers. But as suggested

by Knecht’s data set on stakeholder participation in AC ministerial, SAO and working group meetings (STAPAC) (Knecht, 2016), not all types of observers exhaust the potential given through their formal role. In this study, I use that as starting point to focus on organizational observers and their participation patterns in the policy field of marine governance.

Between organization and environment: Observers as an organizational field The observers are actors of the AC’s environment. They cooperate more closely than other actors with the AC and have formalized access to the organization. Accordingly, the observers function similarly to an organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) in the organization’s environment.

As prerequisite to this concept, one must understand the sociological neo-institutionalist lens of organizations and their environments. This lens understands organizations as entities that differentiate themselves from their organizational environment but are in constant interaction with it. In spite of formal organizational boundaries, open systems are not monolithic entities (Scott, 1992: 77). In the case of the AC, which is here conceptualized as an open system, it consists of various elements that are loosely connected rather than being one collective. These differentiated elements are for instance the member states, the PPs, but also the Working Groups and the secretariats (Arctic Council Secretariat and Indigenous Peoples Secretariat).

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Organizations are faced with an environment that is coined by uncertainty and instability (Duncan & Weiss, 1979: 11f). This environment entails a high number of information, events and influences.

What the organization reacts to and perceives as important stimuli are thus constructed as their environment. This shows the interdependency between the organization and its environment, since organizational decisions can be influenced by the environment and by questions of material or ideational resources (Koch, 2008: 110). Organizations can be changed or pressured by their environment and through their reciprocal relations (Koch, 2008: 106). Adaptation to changes in the organizational environment is based on the interest to stabilize and preserve themselves as organization by external legitimization. The increased interest in the Arctic after the Arctic Council Impact Assessment (ACIA) report in 2005 created changes in the AC’s environment (Spence, 2017: 801), which the AC reacted to by admitting more observers and by expanding the rules.

This also meant the expansion of the organizational field of observers, since they have accompanied the AC from the beginning. An organizational field is defined as “a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside of the field” (Scott, 1994: 207f).

They are key actors, that share resources and a shared understanding of an institution, or a policy field (Wooten, 2015: 375). Thereby, the organizational field consists of “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute an area of institutional life” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148). Members of the organizational field remain independent, however, and follow their own interests and aims (DiMaggio, 1988), which is how they can invoke adaptation processes for the institution and the field.

Adaptation processes in an organizational field can be explained through isomorphism. Building on previous research, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have extended the understanding of isomorphism, particularly by introducing three forms of institutional isomorphism. They argue that in organizational fields organizations tend to (over time) display similar features and behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148f). Isomorphism can be induced in different ways: coercive by pressure from political authorities and legitimacy issues, mimetic when organizations react homogenously when faced with uncertainty or normative by an increase of professionalism in organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 150–156). Heucher (2019) stresses that organizational fields are about interactions amongst organizations in its field: “For its participants, the organizational field is about struggle and contestation, but it may also be about collaboration” (Heucher, 2019: 75). Although organizations can have specific features and consequently positions (peripheral or core) within an field, they are constantly faced with the flexibility of positions in an organizational field (Heucher, 2019: 76).

Another challenge organizations can face is the possible discrepancy between the formal, representative appearances and the actual working level. The former signifies the formal structures or goals that are communicated to the environment to meet external expectations. The latter, in contrast, are the day-to-day procedures that are only communicated internally and vary to what extent they meet the external expectations or if they do so at all. This process of decoupling enables the organization to accumulate resources and legitimacy without making concessions in their daily activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 356–359). As a consequence, it becomes more difficult to grasp anything beyond the representational level which in fact could mean that organizational fields that were previously considered homogenous, could vary on their practical working procedures. Meyer and Rowan (1977) conclude that decoupling is a solution to bridging frictions between internal Tsaritova

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processes and the environmental influence (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 359f). Though decoupling is often addressed in the context of one organization, this concept is included to explore mechanisms of cooperation between observers and the AC as inter-organizational decoupling.

Although observers could be subsumed simply as stakeholders, this terminology does not suffice to precisely grasp the category. Stakeholders are “actors who are either significantly affected by an institution or capable of affecting it” (Stokke, 2014: 772). However, stakeholders encompass far more actors and groups, for instance Arctic conferences, such as Arctic Circle or Arctic Frontiers (Steinveg, 2023). To add, observers cannot for the sake of simplicity be categorized as members either. They have a particular role for the AC and are simultaneously included and excluded. The category of observers signifies an overlap of the internal world and external environment. As an organizational field, observers are positioned at the AC’s organizational boundaries. Organizational “boundaries necessarily address what is outside the organization, not just what is inside” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005: 505). In the AC’s case, members and PPs being on the inside and observers at the outside. The main difference between observers and members is that observers are not core members of the organization but are an addition to it. Observers need to earn the right to participate through their application and their merit, and can also lose this right or not make use of it. This relational theoretical frame helps to explore the role of observers and offers opportunities to trace mechanisms that influence the field.

Methods: Tracing observer participation This contribution has two aims: first, on the example of the PAME Working Group, this study will supplement the data compilation from Knecht (2016) showing observer participation in the AC bodies. This first step clarifies if there are decoupling mechanisms visible through the participation quota. This traces Knecht’s assessment that observers do not fulfil their role and are not even always present at meetings (Knecht, 2017b). After revealing the participation trends of non-state observers relating to PAME, the data is discussed in the context of observer reports, observer reviews, PAME meeting protocols from 2016 until 2021, which were available in the respective online archives, and in the context of secondary literature. Reports from the project Strengthening Observer Engagement Shipping Related Activities led by PAME observers were also considered. This triangulation addresses patterns and mechanisms of observation and roles of non-state observers.

It should be mentioned that the European Union (EU) is not included as a non-state observer in this study, since its status is a special case as an ad-hoc observer or observer in principle.

Additionally, the EU’s demeanour resembles more to those of states and it is often addressed in the same way states are. Examples for this is its participation in the Warsaw format and Arctic Science Ministerial, which may not be organized by the AC itself, but shows that the EU has a different standing than other non-state observers.

This study starts with the analysis of one working group, although this could be replicated for other working groups as well. Although Marine Governance is a policy field that touches the work of more than one Working Group, the one which deals with it the most is PAME. Thus, the case at hand sets a particular focus on PAME projects and cooperation but is not limited to it. PAME is an important pillar of Arctic Marine Governance and describes itself as follows: “PAME is the focal point of the Arctic Council’s activities related to the protection and sustainable use of the Arctic marine environment and provides a unique forum for collaboration on a wide range of activities in this regard” (PAME, 2024). Marine governance enjoys particular attention in this Non-state observers in the Arctic Council

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decade, because of the UN’s sustainability agenda and the Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development 2021-2030. This initiative is supposed to strengthen scientific cooperation of various scientists and other stakeholders and encourage science-based strategies to the 2030 Agenda (UNESCO, 2024). In a similar trend, Arctic politics has furthered legal regimes on marine safety in Arctic waters. Particularly the implementation of the Polar Code (International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters 2017) and the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement show progress in marine safety (Brigham & Gamble, 2022: 173).

The increase of interest or activity in Ocean governance can also be traced by looking at the recently added observer organizations. Table 1 shows the most recent additions to the observer group in the AC, after the ministerial meeting in Kiruna in 2013. Two things are striking: Oceana is the only NGO that has gained observer status recently. In fact, the last NGO to be permitted was the Arctic Institute of North America (AINA) in the ministerial meeting in Reykjavík in 2004. For IOs, the trend was similar until the ministerial meeting in Fairbanks 2017, because in this category the last observer addition was Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO), also in 2004. The other element that stands out is that most of them have a strong focus on marine issues. Both underline that a case study of non-state observers in the Arctic marine context is relevant.

Table 1. Observer expansion since after the Kiruna expansion (Compiled by author) Year of Admission

Type

Observer

Fairbanks, 2017

IO

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)

Fairbanks, 2017

IO

OSPAR Commission

Fairbanks, 2017

IO

West Nordic Council (WNC)

Fairbanks, 2017

IO

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

Fairbanks, 2017

NGO

Oceana

Fairbanks, 2017

State

Switzerland

Rovaniemi, 2019

IO

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

To observe or to participate?

By conceptualizing observers as an organizational field, this study focuses not only on the relationship between the AC (or its working groups) with its observers, but it also includes how observers relate to the AC and to each other. This broader perspective explains how Arctic cooperation through the AC’s observer category works and what it could entail. Apart from the exchange of resources, efforts to collaborate or competitions within the field of observers are also addressed. Since the observer category is highly institutionalized and regulated, I argue that isomorphic patterns of observing are induced by the AC. The analysis should identify further patterns, mechanisms and roles of observing in the AC. Participation in PAME, SAO and ministerial meetings To start the empirical examination of observer engagement, at first, the focus lies on participation behaviour of non-state observers in PAME. Table 2 shows the participation frequencies of all the observer IOs and NGOs that were present in PAME working groups meetings since 2016. It shows a high frequency of participation to PAME meetings by both types of actors. In total 16 observer Tsaritova

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organizations (half each) were present. There were 12 meetings in total. The meeting with the highest number of non-state observer participation is the second one in September 2020, due to how the pandemic meetings were held online for the first time in September 2020 and onwards (cf. PAME II 2020, PAME I 2021 and PAME II 2021). This can be an explanation for the participation of ten observers in 2020, particularly concerning NGO observers who have smaller resources.

Table 2. Participation frequencies in the last 12 PAME meetings since 2016 (Compiled by author) I 2016

II 2016

I 2017

II 2017

I 2018

Observer

Type

ACOPS

NGO

WWF

NGO

X

X

X

X

X

CCU

NGO

X

X

X

X

Oceana

NGO

X

NF

NGO

IASC

NGO

AINA

NGO

UArctic

NGO

UNEP

IO

ICES

IO

OSPAR

IO

IMO

IO

WMO

IO

NCM

IO

NEFCO

IO

IUCN

IO

X

II 2018

X

I 2019

II 2019

O

O

X

II 2021

∑

-

X

1

X

X

-

X

11

X

X

X

X

X

-

X

10

X

X

X

X

X

-

X

7

X

X

X

X

X

-

X

6

X

X

-

X

5

X

X

-

3

-

2

X X

I 2021

X

X

X

II 2020

X

X

X

I 2020

X X

X

X

X

X X X X X

X

X

X

-

X

X

-

1

X

X

-

5-7

X

X

-

X

X

-

3

-

1

-

1

-

1

X

9

3-4

X = observer; O = invited expert Keeping in mind that most of the listed IO observer were non-observers until 2017 or 2019, the participation rate is rather remarkable. This can of course also be attributed to the fact that they are new, eager to contribute, and that this might wear off. However, especially OSPAR shows constant interest for PAME’s work, as representatives were invited as experts before OSPAR became an observer. An explanation for this could be the observer application process in 2015, where OSPAR was rejected by the AC (Knecht, 2015). Participating in PAME meetings as an invited guest and being in the good graces with specific actors in the AC or a Working Group can positively affect the application process.

Low participation from the Nordic Environment Finance Cooperation (NEFCO) and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) could be tied to the fact that these IOs are not specialized in this policy field. In contrast, UNEP presents itself as a reliable, longstanding partner to PAME from its participation frequency. Amongst the NGO observers, Oceana is quite active and present at nearly every PAME meeting since its admission. Prior to 2021, ACOPS did not participate in

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meetings. Here it is sensible to assume that ACOPS made use of the digital format of the meetings in 2021. In comparison, WWF and CCU participated (almost) regularly and WWF often so, with more than one representative. WWF has been referred to as the most active NGO observer previously by Knecht (Knecht, 2017b: 211), which this data supports. Next to these ‘overachievers,’ it should be mentioned that NF and IASC also participated in approximately half of the meetings, showing continuous interest in PAME’s work.

In order to get a broader picture of how the aforementioned observers in PAME generally engage, the participation in ministerial and SAO meetings must also be addressed. Table 3 shows the participation of the non-state observers from the aforementioned PAME meetings in ministerial meetings. This table clearly illustrates that NGO observers show a higher participation rate, but this is partly due to the later admission of some of the IO observers.

Table 3. Participation frequencies in the Ministerial meetings from 2017-2023 (Compiled by author) Observer

Type

2017

2019

2021

∑

ACOPS

NGO

WWF

NGO

X

-

X

2

X

X

X

3

CCU Oceana

NGO

X

X

X

3

NGO

-

X

X

2

NF

NGO

X

X

X

3

IASC

NGO

X

X

X

3

AINA

NGO

X

X

-

2

UArctic

NGO

X

X

X

3

UNEP

IO

X

X

X

3

ICES

IO

-

X

X

2

OSPAR

IO

-

-

X

1

IMO

IO

-

-

X

1

WMO

IO

-

X

X

2

NCM

IO

X

X

X

3

NEFCO

IO

X

X

X

3

IUCN

IO

X

-

X

2

Table 4. Participation frequencies in the SAO meetings since 2016 (Compiled by author) Observer

Type

I 2016

II 2016

I 2017

II 2017

I 2018

II 2018

I 2019

II 2019

I 2020

II202 0

I 2021

II 2021

USA

USA

USA

FIN

FIN

FIN

FIN

ICE

ICE

ICE

ICE

RUS

X

X

X

∑

ACOPS

NGO

WWF

NGO

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

12

CCU

NGO

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

12

Oceana

NGO

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

8

NF

NGO

X

X

X

X

X

9

IASC

NGO

X

X

X

X

X

X

12

AINA

NGO

X

X

X

X

9

UArctic

NGO

X

X

UNEP

IO

X

X

Tsaritova

3

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

12

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

12

X

X

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Arctic Yearbook 2024 ICES

IO

X

OSPAR

IO

IMO

IO

WMO

IO

NCM

IO

X

X

NEFCO

IO

X

X

IUCN

IO

X

1

X

2

O

X

X

X

X

5

X

X

X

X

X

7

X

X

X

X

11

X

X

X

10

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

1

X = observer; O = invited expert Capacities and roles As mentioned, the high number of observers in the AC is sometimes viewed as a point of contestation (Humrich, 2017b: 91). At first glance, it might appear confusing that to have nonArctic, global observers in the AC, whilst one of its special features is the inclusion of Indigenous voices. Especially because PPs fear that their perspectives and position in the AC would be downsized through external actors (Chater, 2019: 160). Since the category of PPs is an evolution from their observer status back in the AEPS (Cambou & Koivurova, 2020), there might be suspicions whether this could be repeated with exceptional observers in the AC. But as one criterion for observer admission is the respect and support of the PPs, one can trace not only the importance of the Indigenous standpoints, but also the observers’ necessity to try to foster relations with PPs. The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), for example, recently became an Observer NGO to the IMO, which shows that there is an interest to cooperate. Additionally, PPs are supported by various non-state observers: One might assume that funding would not fall under the NGO observers’ contributions. However, several of them fund the PPs, for example by covering travel expenses for workshops or conferences (International Arctic Science Committee, 2020: 6).

Many observers stress their intention to cooperate with the PPs: “we hope to engage more fully and directly with Arctic Council Permanent Participants in the coming years as part of our expanding role as observers” (Oceana, 2020: 6). This could be seen as a consequence of coercive isomorphism, through the observer criterion of acknowledging PPs and traditional knowledge.

However, it also falls under mimetic isomorphism, where traditional and Indigenous knowledge is all-around in Arctic Governance. Including them increases one’s own legitimacy and helps to understand the Arctic better. WWF for example, participated in a Training Workshop for Permanent Participants to improve ways of engaging with PPs (World Wide Fund for Nature Arctic Programme, 2016: 6). The latest example of an integrated approach to knowledge production could be seen at the Third EA International Conference 2024, co-organized by the Norwegian Chairship, ICES and WWF in Tromsø. This conference put a strong emphasis on Indigenous knowledge holders and the co-production of knowledge from ‘Western science’ and different Indigenous communities (Participatory Observation by the author). This way, observers strengthen the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge holders. It is, however, difficult to ascertain to what extent the engagement with PPs is incorporated in the observers’ work.

What is certain is that observers seek to strengthen their own role. In the project Strengthening Observer Engagement Shipping Related Activities (PAME, 2020a), state and non-state observers express how participation in PAME could be more effective. The suggestions include that newer observers wish to strengthen their position in the Working Group and look to experienced observers to lead

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them as possible observer coordinators. This way, they advocate for more formalized procedures and roles in PAME to increase and focus their input (PAME, 2020a). These suggestions confirm that the observer rule amendments “only defer the problem of inclusion” (Humrich, 2017a: 157), since observers still seek more integration and to exhaust their full potential as partners to working groups.

However, some NGO observers do not have the financial capacities to exhaust their roles as observers. ACOPS is one example which has requested for an increased digital meeting format, so that they might increase their presence at meetings (ACOPS, 2021: 4). This request was repeated in the draft for the aforementioned PAME project on enhancing efficiency and participation. As a project-funded entity, IUCN is also at times lacking funding, which explains its low participation rate. In one report, IUCN explains itself by sharing that at the moment of reporting, there was no project which could finance attention in AC meetings (International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2020: 6). Financial contributions can be a vital part of observing, depending on the IO’s mandate and function. Looking at the NCM, they emphasize their financial contributions (NCM, 2020). Since the NCM’s mandate does not focus too much on the marine policy field, it takes over the role of a funder for AC projects for the most part. Similarly, the Nordic NEFCO is a special case, since it contributes “[…] in its unique capacity as the Fund Manager of the Arctic Council Project Support Instrument and partly as an IFI funding environmental projects in the region” (Oberserver report - NEFCO, 2021: 4).

Since observers have different organizational aims, it also makes sense that their specific roles can differ as well. As one group of observers are NGOs, it is not surprising that advocacy is a part of observing. As a reliable and well-known partner, WWF uses its reports to stress its commitment but also to make remarks on shortcomings and to make demands towards the Arctic states. For example, it warned that Arctic states are not fulfilling their roles as the prime stewards of the region” in the Scorecard of the AC in 2019 (World Wide Fund for Nature Arctic Programme, 2020: 5). Hereby, WWF makes use of its close relations with the AC, to criticize and drive the AC towards more action in regards to environmental protection. This behaviour shows the WWF’s authenticity, in a similar way to its current condemnation of Norway’s recent decision to pursue deep sea mining (WWF, 2024).

Generally, the findings adjoin to previous literature that IO and NGO observers show similar participation patterns (Knecht, 2017b: 211), even though in this PAME case study, NGO observers show a slightly higher participation in working group, SAO and ministerial level meetings. At first glimpse, this might be surprizing since one would expect NGOs to be lacking capacities to join meetings. However, as shown before, there are mechanisms that facilitate the participation, i.e. online participation and the cooperation with other organizations. IASC emphasizes that its interorganizational cooperation with PAME has improved, since IASC’s secretariat is located in Akureyri close to the PAME secretariat (International Arctic Science Committee, 2020: 5). This shows that observer interest can be maintained or increased, if meetings and staff are easily accessed.

Collaboration and mobilization Comparing observers to an organizational field, one would assume that collaboration between observers is a natural extension of their world. There are many examples of such collaborative efforts. IO and NGO observers also co-organize or fund thematical workshops. CCU and WWF Tsaritova

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team up for various projects, as for example the Marine Protected Areas (MPA) Network Toolbox project. As both NGOs demonstrate a high frequency, one can conclude that cooperation is facilitated through these frequent meetings and exchanges. Another example of collaboration amongst the field of observers is that CCU has occasionally sent representatives from other NGOs, such as Oceana to task force meetings. This way, Oceana was involved even before it gained official observer status (Wehrmann, 2017: 197). To what extent this practice is viable and welcomed by the AC is not clear. However, it enables actors to establish themselves for Working Groups and to make an impression. However, NGOs do not only collaborate amongst themselves, as WWF and OSPAR collaborate with Canada on Underwater noise in Arctic waters (PAME, 2018: 7). The data does not provide insight, regarding patterns of competition within the field of observers. Even if there are struggles and competition amongst observers, for example to take the leading part in a project, this would be hard to trace in the official reports.

As Stokke and Hønneland (2006) stated over ten years ago: the AC has a remarkable feature of political mobilization. Certain IO and NGO observers have proven to be reliable partners for PAME, which underlines the mobilization power of the Arctic marine issues for a broad variety of actors. Matters of international marine concern are prepared, discussed and contextualized within PAME, which makes it even more important to participate for observers, as it is visible through the discussions, interpretations and calls to implement the Polar Code. Hereby, especially observer states are addressed. The IMO, however, is a good example of the reciprocal relation between PAME and its observers. In its review, the IMO does not only describe their efforts for PAME but rather encourage “[…] to indicate their interest in collaborating with the IMO in order to deliver future joint activities […]. Such collaboration could include, among others, providing expertise […], contributing financially in order to develop training material or the hosting of national and/or regional events for promoting the IMO Polar Code” (International Maritime Organization, 2022: 8).

In this context, PAME and its organizational observers rely on each other’s expertise and they exchange resources. Through this exchange, PAME and its observers maintain a network of Arctic marine expertise and keep each other up to date on important issues. This is also the case with the ICES/PICES/PAME-Working Group for Integrated Ecosystem Assessment of the Central Arctic Ocean, where reports are “shared with PAME prior to being published as a Cooperative Research Report” (PAME, 2020b: 30). In addition to this, it should be noted that the increased intercooperation of the AC Working Groups (Rottem, 2020b: 3) also expands this network. The other side of this is that organizational observers can also have a valuable role in maintaining or expanding this network on a more global scale by using their knowledge from PAME to embed it in a wider world political context. Thus, cooperating with PAME offers mutually beneficial exchange. Rather than competing, observers seek to harmonize strategies through their embeddedness in various global fora, as shown by this note by ACOPS: […] parallel work streams are on-going in other intergovernmental organisations including the IMO, the LC/LP and OSPAR. ACOPS also takes part in parallel working groups established in these other fora thereby allowing for enhanced sharing of the work across the bodies and supporting the development of an overall consistent governance framework (ACOPS, 2021: 6).

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This illustrates the relevance of normative isomorphism in the case of organizational observers in PAME, since their contributions are based on scientific expertise and the fact that these experts have similar backgrounds and education. Similarities and streamlining emerge through these cooperations that exist amongst observers beyond the AC, as Oceana, WWF and ACOPS, NAMMCO and UNEP and AMAP are observers to OSPAR to name just one example (OSPAR Commission, 2024). Thus, isomorphic patterns are mostly visible in the way observers contribute and it is not surprising due to the framework of the AC, the Arctic context, and the scientific emphasis of the AC. Generating and spreading knowledge is the underlying driver of Arctic cooperation: “The engine of Arctic governance that produces cooperation and collaboration at the circumpolar scale runs on unique knowledges that have been the ‘fuel’ of Arctic exceptionalism” (Spence, Alexander, Røvden, & Harriger, 2023: 12).

Inter-organizational decoupling Working Groups are spaces where observers can get a real peak behind the AC curtains and can take part in the actual work of the Council. In contrast, the ministerial meetings could be viewed as the representational level. The working Groups are often referred to as the engines or “the heart of the Council itself” (Rottem, 2020a: 21). They give a better understanding of what needs to be done, what can be done, and by whom. The Working Groups are where observers should aim to partake and increase their presence. It is surprising then, that participation rates in ministerial meetings are the highest. However, there is a political relevance of such meetings not only to observer states but also organizations. All in all, even non-state observers that did not have high participation rates, could at least through reporting, show if and how much interest they still have.

In this case study about PAME, there are some non-state observers that are less committed than others. However, the data had shown evidence for ambitious and continuous inter-organizational cooperation between PAME and several of its non-state observers.

Hints of decoupling mechanisms can be found in the project about Project Strengthening Observer Engagement Shipping Related Activities in PAME. Observers argue for more efficiency to enhance their ability to contribute, stating that systemic and institutional infrastructure could be adapted in some regards. Although the observer category is constructed by design, observers feel as through their contributions are restricted or underrepresented. For instance, they wish to ”increase transparency in the decision-making process to show Observers that their recommendations are being incorporated into decisions” (PAME, 2020a: 8). This underlines the reciprocal nature of the cooperation between observers and the AC. Rather than simply contributing and taking information for their own organizational aims, some observers seek to distinguish themselves through their ideas and expertise in the AC. The actual working level needs further examination beyond document analysis, to fully grasp mechanisms of inter-organizational decoupling.

Conclusion and outlook Ultimately, the “different worlds of commitment” (Knecht, 2017a) are still clear in observer engagement, but there are also certain patterns of similarity that can be observed. These emerge primarily from the normative and coercive isomorphism amongst non-state observers. The harmonized observer engagement emerges from the main driver of working groups: to produce scientific recommendations. This is the anchor of the normative isomorphism amongst the field of observers. While this process comes about rather naturally within the organizational field, the Observer rules and amendments by the AC also factor into the way observers contribute. Even Tsaritova

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though it was not regulated at this level, already during the AEPS observers were a relevant addition to tackling Arctic environmental issues (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2014: 227f). However, there is a clear asymmetry of power that is enforced through the observer rules. Although some observers still do not exhaust their full potential, the reviewing process and the biennale reporting pose higher expectations on them. With the reporting system, observers become obliged to make at least a minimum effort. It also raises the stakes of non-participation, since it could send a negative signal or even invoke sanctions. Accordingly, some observers use the reporting to explain, when they have fallen short. However, coercive isomorphism is not at the centre of the organizational field of observers. What stands out, is the high level of professionalization and expertise, similar aims and outputs, that result in similarities amongst non-state observers. This way observers assist the AC in its core efforts: “generating knowledge on the region, raising awareness of changes in the Arctic in the outside world and, in some instances, even influencing broader regulatory developments” (Smieszek, 2019: 6). This study shows that non-state observers play a vital role in this regard and in embedding Arctic issues and knowledge in the larger global context.

The way non-state observers actually observe depends on various factors, some of which are more practical (lack of funding capacities) while others relate to respective projects. As PAME is more policy-oriented than other Working groups (Rottem, 2020b: 1), it makes especially sense to participate as an observer that can shape policy outcomes further, such as the IMO with the Polar Code. It should be noted, that marine governance is a policy field that inherently is of global character. Thus, the proactive engagement of observers could be explained through this as well. A comparative analysis of different Working Groups and different policy fields would enhance the understanding of observer roles. Regarding the roles of non-state observers in PAME, the categorization of overachievers and regular visitors (Knecht, 2017a) still apply in many cases, but as this paper has shown, what this can mean can be more specific: Observers can be funders, drivers, advocates, companions, experts and learners. The increasing openness for co-production of knowledge is an important indicator of mimetic isomorphism and additionally shows the reciprocal nature of the cooperation.

The organizational field of observers to the AC is in constant flux – through expansions and rule amendments, but also through external events and processes. At this moment, observers are not able to participate to their fullest due to the current situation in the AC. Since Working Group meetings have slowly restarted, they do have access to the AC world again. Due to the current state of the AC, observers could evolve into a stronger partner with more influence. If for example, the AC might struggle to create new projects, it might be that Working Groups and Arctic states would look to long-established partnerships with observers to make progress. Non-state observers can build and foster stability through their networks in uncertain times. Alternatively, increased informality in the AC might push observers even further to the outside. Since all decisions are based on consensus, it is fair to assume that no new observers will be admitted, nor will any be ‘kicked out’ in the near future. Consequently, the current crisis might invoke observers to participate less, if there are no repercussions to be feared.

This study has shown that the inter-organizational cooperation between the AC and its observers is not just a myth or a token. To what extent the presence of observers and their respective contributions affect the AC remains unclear and should be the focus of further research. As Knecht suggested, there are different worlds of commitment, but in the case of PAME, some of these

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commitments appear quite solid and eager to participate in an even more meaningful way.

Observing thus, is multifaceted, but being present at meetings is a fundamental part of that.

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Advancing the Understanding and Quantification of Arctic Climate Feedbacks to Improve Climate Models and Inform Decision-Making: Insights from the AASCO Project (2020–2022) Hanna K. Lappalainen, Timo Vihma, Eija Asmi, Alexander Baklanov, Peter Bauer, Paul Arthur Berkman, Federico Bianchi, Nicole Biebow, Jaana Bäck, Torben Røjle Christensen, Richard Davy, Igor Esauj, Ekaterina Ezhova, Huadong Guo, Torill Hamre, Angelika Humbert, Veli-Matti Kerminen, Lukas Kohl, Lars Kullerud, Kirsty Langley, Jan Rene Larsen, Heikki Lihavainen, Lisa Loseto, Risto Makkonen, Cecilie Mauritzen, Outi Meinander, Geir Ottersen, Peter Pulsifer, Yubao Qiu, Arja Rautio, Stein Sandven, Britta K. Sannel, Sandy Starkweather, Mikko Strahlendorff, Lise Lotte Sørensen, Jennie L. Thomas, Michael Tjernström, Petteri Uotila, Manfred Wendisch, Markku Kulmala and Tuukka Petäjä1

A better understanding of land-atmosphere-ocean feedbacks and interactions is essential for developing effective strategies for sustainable development of the Arctic region. Further, this understanding is crucial for improving mitigation and adaptation plans and transforming them into actionable services for Arctic stakeholders and Indigenous communities. In this paper, we highlight key topics in Arctic research from atmospheric, oceanic, and cryospheric perspectives and offer insights into the latest research on interactions and feedback mechanisms in the Arctic region, particularly from the natural sciences perspective. Our approach synthesizes insights from the Arena for the Gap Analysis of Existing Arctic Science Co-Operations (AASCO-1) project (2020–2022), which calls for further development of integrated observation systems and the fusion of data from diverse sources, extending beyond traditional scientific boundaries.

Introduction The Arctic faces immense pressure from rapid environmental, economic and cultural changes, as the complex dynamics of globalization has positioned it as a region of high influence in global geopolitics (e.g., Hartfield et al., 2018; Ford et al., 2015; Petäjä et al., 2020; Heininen, 2018). The role of the Arctic in the global climate system, Arctic ecosystems, and the development of Arctic societies are challenged by global megatrends, including rising concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG, all acronyms defined in Appendix A-1), resource extraction, urbanization as well as local and long-range pollution (Smith 2011; Overland et al., 2019; Farré et al., 2014; Meinander et al., Corresponding author Hanna K. Lappalainen, hanna.k.lappalainen(at)helsinki.fi (author affiliations in notes section)

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2021). The changing Arctic has placed its fragile environment and its population, especially Indigenous Peoples, in a vulnerable position (e.g., Holland & Stroeve 2011; Arnold et al., 2016; Kulmala et al., 2015; Kumpula et al., 2011; Post et al., 2009 & 2019; Destouni et al., 2021; Ezhova et al., 2021).

The observed Arctic climate change is a consequence of the increased anthropogenic GHG emissions causing global warming and the local and remotely driven feedback processes amplifying warming in the Arctic (e.g., Rantanen et al. 2022). Climate change in the Arctic is affected by complex land-ocean-cryosphere-atmosphere feedback mechanisms linking higher and lower latitudes and acting on time scales from weeks to decades (however, geological and glaciological feedback mechanisms with longer time scales are beyond the scope of this paper). Due to the apparent rapid changes observed in the Arctic, there are simultaneous needs for both domainspecific scientific advances, e.g., in ecology, atmospheric, and cryosphere sciences, as well as for more in-depth integration of the research from these fields to better understand the interconnected system as a cohesive whole. A quantitative feedback analysis requires special attention so that the detailed, process-level knowledge can be elevated to a system-wide understanding of causes and effects and how actions mitigating the effects of climate change are best placed (Lappalainen et al.

2016, Kulmala et al. 2004).

There are still several critical knowledge gaps (Boy et al., 2019) in the Arctic environment. For example, ecological research on disentangling and quantifying Arctic processes and their drivers across the appropriate temporal scales is challenged by a lack of understanding of the detailed coupling within the Earth system including the relevant feedback mechanisms (e.g. Heffernan et al., 2014). Such combined system understanding is required to meet the complex environmental challenges in the Arctic. In addition to improved system understanding, the fundamental evaluation of the feedbacks and interactions will provide a foundation for necessary improvements of climate models and for required services benefiting Arctic residents and other stakeholders in the region (e.g., Starkweather et al., 2022).

The international Arctic research community has addressed the complexity of Arctic changes in several recent activities. The need for a deeper understanding was recognized by the IASC State of Arctic Science Report (2021) underlining the role of the Arctic in the global system and listed eleven relevant topics in this context, including “Improving understanding of Arctic amplification and Arctic climate feedbacks”. The NCoE-CRAICC provided several scientific legacies for deeper Arctic gap analyses and feedback interaction studies and analyzed new or improved existing feedback loops in ESMs that are crucial for accurate representation of the Arctic cryospherebiosphere-atmosphere interactions (Boy et al., 2019) (Fig. 1). Now research projects like CRiceS, PolarRES, PROTECT and the Horizon Europe GREENFEEDBACK are continuing in this direction.

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Figure. 1. The feedbacks related to the Arctic region and climate change are a key research topic of global importance. Figure adopted and modified from Boy et al. (2019) doi.org/10.5194/acp-19-2015-2019.

A general framework representing the complexity of feedbacks is not sufficient to find solutions for the critical issues, as quantification of feedbacks is needed to make progress. Comprehensive observational data with adequate geographical coverage and temporal sampling are the foundation for such a feedback analysis so that it is fit to support decision making in the Arctic. Some of the essential variables for monitoring the state of the Arctic environment are already available (e.g.

Petäjä et al., 2020; Noe et al., 2022) and the development of Arctic observational infrastructure is a critical step in this process (Uttal et al., 2016; Petäjä et al., 2020; IASC 2021; Starkweather et al., 2022). Towards this end, the strategical planning and implementation of basic research together with an integrated Arctic Research Infrastructure (RI) is underway (e.g. Starkweather et al., 2022), where different national and international activities have provided critical support (SIOS 2018- ; IASC-SAON; WMO). Also, several European Union projects e.g INTAROS 2016-2022, Arctic PASSION 2021-2025, iCUPE 2017-2021, EU-PolarNet 2, and GEM 1995- (Pirazzini et al., 2020; Noe et al., 2022) provide novel data and process management to integrate and combine Arctic data sets. However, these infrastructure projects and the modelling of Polar climate and weather largely separate activities, and gaps emerge in lieu of explicit links.

Beyond observational data collection and processing, the link between observations and models is crucial for turning process understanding into Arctic wide and for global monitoring and prediction capabilities. Here, the WMO’s PPP project, the YOPP (Jung et al., 2016; Goessling et al., 2016) and the EU funded APPLICATE project (e.g. Sandu et al., 2021) have been important milestones for creating a new methodological Artic focus covering the range from weather to climate timescales. YOPP is followed by the new the WMO project PCAPS, more strongly oriented towards development of services for societies. Also, Preparations for the International Polar Year (IPY) 2032–2033 are underway, coordinated by the International Conference on Arctic Research Planning (ICARP) with the seven Research Priority Teams (RPTs). Ultimately, science must support societal and political agreements, fostering social acceptance and active engagement. This is increasingly recognized as a fundamental asset for enabling the implementation of these plans (Berkmann et al., 2017, ARCTIC OPTIONS).

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Here we introduce the scientific contributions obtained from the “Arena gap analysis of the existing Arctic science co-operations” AASCO project (2020-2022) funded by the Prince Albert II of Monaco Foundation. AASCO complements the IASC report (2021) with a specific focus on the Arctic feedbacks and interactions framework, the related Research Infrastructures (RIs) and data needs. Further, AASCO contributes to the ICARP process for the IPY.

Methods The AASCO project spans two periods: 2020–2022 (AASCO-1, Contract No. 2858) and 2023– 2025 (AASCO-2, Contract No. 2858). It is coordinated by the Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research (INAR) at the University of Helsinki. The primary goal of AASCO-1 was to establish the AASCO collaborative process, focusing on understanding land-ocean-atmosphere feedbacks and interactions within the Arctic-boreal context. The project analyzed research gaps in Arctic-boreal studies, specifically addressing unresolved problems identified in existing research. A key method involved organizing two interactive workshops for Arctic experts in the field. Due to COVID-19, we conducted online workshops in November 2020 (over 200 participants) and December 2022 (with over 200 participants). The abstracts submitted by participants and reports generated from the discussions during AASCO-1 were utilized for this paper's overview.

First, we briefly introduce the current capacity of Arctic research infrastructure and outline future data needs. Next, we synthesize discussions on existing knowledge gaps, particularly concerning system feedbacks and process interactions. Although the societal component was not included in AASCO-1, it remains a crucial aspect for future analysis in AASCO-2.

The AASCO process contributes to Arctic research and observation planning in preparation for the International Polar Year (IPY) 2032–2033, particularly regarding the following ICARP research priorities: RPT 1 "The Role of the Arctic in the Global System," RPT 2 "Observing, Reconstructing, and Predicting Future Climate Dynamics and Ecosystem Responses," and RPT 4 "Arctic Research Cooperation & Diplomacy."

The Arctic research infrastructure and data - current and future approaches Understanding of Arctic processes and feedbacks is the key to provide a scientifically sound basis for policy making. To this end, there is need for systematic observations from different domains, such as the physical Earth system, biodiversity, ecosystem structure and functionality, and the global and regional environmental drivers changing the system. The current networks of monitoring and research are unevenly spread across the Arctic region, which largely reflects the reality of difficulties with working in remote areas, inequality of resources and limited human presence causing limited observational coverage at the Earth surface. In support of surface-based observations, the remote sensing from satellites and aircraft can provide data with a high spatial and temporal resolution, distributed with a remarkable speed and cost-effectiveness governed by internationally agreed protocols and infrastructures. The availability of harmonized data is crucial not only for monitoring changes as they occur, but also to forecast future conditions and to combine the environmental data with socio-economic data, such as health data.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marked a significant turning point for panArctic research and data collaboration. In response, the European Union and several individual countries, such as the United States, Canada, Norway, and Iceland took decisive actions, with research organizations and communities following suit by suspending cooperative efforts with Lappalainen et al.

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Russia. For example, on March 4, 2022, the Arctic Council announced that it would "temporarily pause the work of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies until further notice”. Since then, access to environmental data from Russia has become much more difficult, and in some cases, impossible. However, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) continues to collaborate with Russia, ensuring access to meteorological data from the region.

The use exisiting of data is becoming more efficient due to the fast development of artificial intelligence-based solutions. Stevens et al. (2023) introduced Artificial Intelligence-based “Earth Virtualization Engines” (EVE) which are generating novel and fundamentally improved sources of information that has the potential to catalyze changes towards a new generation of data ecosystem and services.

Global and regional re-analyses form the best available databases of physical variables in the atmosphere and ocean over the past decades because they exploit most of the existing groundbased and space-borne observations (Hersbach et al., 2020; Bromwich et al., 2018). Re-analyses combine such observations with numerical models through data assimilation methods to produce a physically consistent, three-dimensional record of the coupled atmosphere-ocean system at the highest affordable resolution. The numerical models fill observational gaps in space and time but also permit insights into processes and cause-effect relationships. However, our limited understanding of process details and feedbacks in the Arctic also requires dedicated modelling efforts that must be supported by observations and campaigns (Shupe et al., 2022).

At the moment, the observational data product streams covering the Arctic are based on numerous atmospheric, cryospheric, oceanic and terrestrial observing systems (Fig. 2). The linkages between observational RIs and data management are implemented through topical projects and programs (see Appendix A-1 for details) while the planning, implementation, and production of data in the Arctic takes place in many different communities at global, regional, national and local scales.

Figure 2. Arctic data are multidimensional and consist of atmosphere, marine, cryosphere, terrestrial ecosystem and socio-economic datasets. Observations are made as in situ and remote based measurements and by community based monitoring. The long-term goal is open data for everyone. In the best case we have the so-called "big data", which we need as a basis for science-based political decision-making.

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In situ Research Infrastructures (RIs) and thematic networks for the Arctic The European and national RIs for the observation of climate are based on physical structures and on logistics such as satellites, terrestrial stations, aircraft, ships and ocean/sea ice platforms.

European infrastructures (roadmap2018.esfri.eu/) are partly represented in Arctic areas or they plan to extend their observational capacities into the Arctic. Some are already established as legal entities, such as the ICOS-ERIC and ACTRIS-ERIC, or are public, limited companies (e.g., SIOS Svalbard AS), while others are yet in the process of establishing their legal status to ensure that the observing system has a sustainable organization. Most of the in-situ observations are funded through European or national research infrastructure programs. They provide high-quality, standardized data on GHG concentrations and fluxes (ICOS), short-lived trace gases and aerosols (ACTRIS), as well as on biodiversity and ecosystems (eLTER and EU INTERACT). Global networks relevant to the Arctic include, e.g., the GAW and the BSRN observation networks of the WMO. Some thematic observing systems (focusing on, e.g., ice sheets, snow, hydrology, permafrost, and sea ice) are not developed through formal RIs but operate as part of research projects and are organized in networks, programs or as formal organizations, such as the GCW network of the WMO. In a few cases, governmental funding is involved but most of their efforts are driven by research projects without long-term funding. In some cases, they are developed into formal RIs, such as the International Arctic Buoy Program. In addition, the locally generated data from community-based monitoring (CBM) activities provide environmental and climate data as decided by the contributors. The evolution of such local observing systems plays an increasingly important role. Many CBMs are designed to support science in addition to community needs, and sometimes are lacking community involvement in design. The AMAP marine mammal monitoring generated

by CBMs is an example how the CBM systems represent important information to the science systems (Appendix A-1).

The recent AMAP report (2021) on human health in the Arctic highlights effects of environmental contaminants on health, diets, lifestyles, and other circumstances of the Indigenious Peoples and leads to an assignment of different risk levels and health impacts between regions. Connecting the environmental data with health data is in progress, and is currently implemented in different largescale projects, such as the EU Horizon-2020 Nunataryuk project and the NordForsk Nordic Centre of Excellence CLINF on epidemics of infectious diseases (Appendix A-1).

Space and airborne Research Infrastructures (RIs) in the Arctic The global observing programs initiated under the UN, e.g., WMO and IOC, which include the polar regions, often use satellites as the backbone observing system. The European Union space program’s Earth observation component Copernicus, launched in 2014, became the largest open and free satellite data provider with seven currently operational so-called Sentinel missions (Plummer et al., 2017). The Arctic component measurements (CIMR, CRISTAL, ROSE-1), combined with Sentinel-1 instruments, can measure dry snow depths, soil moisture and vegetation characteristics. ESA now also has its own polar projects, which adds a layer of complexity when identifying the gaps. In addition to Europe and USA, Chinese satellite systems are actively developing their remote sensing capacity in the Arctic.

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The space-borne observing systems are growing and produce an increasing amount of data in the polar regions. The largest impact of this data is produced by offering free and open data access of the entire circumpolar Arctic on a weekly basis at high spatial resolution and a sub-daily basis at medium resolution. This is already achievable with European and American data, which are facilitated by the GEOSS programs (Qiu et al., 2016 & 2017). However, high-quality, long-term insitu and airborne observations, which are particularly important in the Arctic, are typically not included in such space programs. There are a number of specific airborne campaigns in the Arctic (e.g. Wendisch et al., 2024). These types of measurements help to investigate specific research questions, such as the role of clouds in the Arctic climate system.

Data sharing and international agreements A common data management and open data distribution policy is an important part of the operating principles for these programs, and data from thematic observing systems are often complementary to space-based observing systems. Data from any observational activity are broadly used by the scientific community only if the data are supplemented by transparent metadata and follows the FAIR principles (http://www.go-fair.org/fair-principles/). This is extremely important for widely shared datasets to ensure maximum value generation but also to ensure that the scientists operating in the Arctic and collecting the data are properly credited.

An integrated Arctic observing system needs to provide access to ground- and space-based data at the same time. Currently, there is a combination of data systems that are specific to the Arctic or include the Arctic as part of a global or regional system and are operated by individual research organizations, national data centres, data infrastructures, and thematical observing programs. With many data systems that have evolved largely independently, a major challenge is that they offer different access mechanisms, and support different metadata, vocabularies and data formats. This makes it hard to integrate data from multiple systems, requiring a complex technical implementation to make interoperability work in practice.

So far, the efforts to strategically improve the Arctic observing systems have been hampered by the lack of a consistent, equitable and holistic planning mechanism and direct coordination at a high level from international funding agencies. Vihma et al. (2019) presented a comprehensive overview and formulated views on a future Arctic marine and terrestrial observing system. Recently, SAON has taken an active role and delivered a ROADS roadmap for Arctic RI (Starkweather et al., 2022).

ROADS aims at improving linkages across independently funded efforts, proposes a holistic concept, building from the societal benefit-based approach of the IDA, and presents a roadmap to improve the most important Arctic observing elements accessed through interoperable data systems. The concept of SAVs is central to the ROADS and is linked to the essential harmonization of variables in broad, global networks (e.g., GCOS, GOOS, and GAW) (Starkweather et al., 2022).

A similar approach for the identification of the essential climate variables has been addressed in the frame of the R&B Initiative by China, by the EOST and by the Big Earth Data (BED). In addition to research, SAVs are serving an increasing socio-economic need, such as the Climate and Environmental Services in the Arctic (Baklanov et al., 2018; Grimmond et al., 2020). On one hand, climate variables from other parts of the World are important for understanding and predicting the changes in the Arctic (Karpechko et al., 2024). On the other hand, the High Latitude Cold Regions, especially the Arctic Ocean, and the High-Altitude Mountain Cold Regions of Asia have a profound influence on the northern hemisphere weather and climate, through which they further determine Advancing the Understanding and Quantification of Arctic Climate Feedbacks

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global changes (You et al., 2021). From the perspective of the Earth’s climate system, there is a need for continuous, long-term observations of these areas, as well as for the development of new methodologies to better characterize the evolution of the ecosystems, atmosphere, and cryosphere.

One of the major challenges is the gap between data collectors producing new datasets and data managers tasked with ensuring long-term storage and open access. A mediator role between these two communities of scientists and technical experts needs to be established, enabling competence building in FAIR data management (FAIR, 2016) and providing support in documenting and formatting datasets. For example, the Data Catalogue developed by INTAROS (https://catalogintaros.nersc.no/) is an attempt to integrate and provide access to data from different scientific disciplines (Sandven et al., 2022). In addition to the technical organization of the data products and their availability, agreements are needed to allow on international cooperation (like COPENICUS) for studies addressing complex observations, basic science, multidisciplinary analysis and predictions, social dimension and policy mechanisms. The Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (signed in 2017 www.arctic.gov/agreement-on-enhancing-internationalarctic-scientific-cooperation/) serves as an example, which aims to promote cooperation and prevent conflict with an international, interdisciplinary and inclusive implementation “for the benefit of all on Earth across generations” (Berkman et al., 2017). The agreement is also a science diplomacy asset, which improves collaboration and the dialogue between the Arctic actors (Berkmann et al., 2017; Evengård et al., 2021; Lappalainen et al., 2022).

Integrated observation system and big data An integrated observing system for the Arctic needs to be established at different levels ranging from better formalized co-operations between institutions and countries to the practical integration of sensors and platforms and the development of interoperability between data systems. We have successful examples going in these directions. The regional observing system SIOS is an example of an integrated, in-situ observing system where scientists work together by sharing observing methods, knowledge, and logistics in an interdisciplinary manner over the entire Svalbard region (van den Heuvel- Greve et al., 2020; Moreno-Ibáñez et al., 2021). Another example is the SMEAR concept, which was originally developed for the high-latitude, boreal forest environment but can now be applied to various environments and conditions from the tropics to the Arctic, from rural regions to megacities (Kulmala 2018, Hari et al. 2016). The SMEAR concept is providing big data and enabling analysis of the atmospheric feedbacks, interactions and processes in and between the atmosphere and different land surface types (Hari et al., 2016; Kulmala et al., 2004 & 2014; Lappalainen et al. 2016, Vihma et al., 2019; Kulmala et al. 2021).

As new, advanced satellite observing systems emerge based on advanced hyperspectral radiometer and active lidar-radar instruments complemented by ground-based sensor networks and the internet of things, and as numerical models reach much finer scales also integrating impact sector models, the way big data are generated, analysed and workflows managed will evolve towards socalled digital twins. Digital twins will not only allow to observe and simulate the complex Earth system more accurately, also bridging between the physical and human world, but such an information system also allows a much more interactive way to work for scientists, service providers and decision makers (Bauer et al. 2021 a, b). Particularly for the Arctic, digital twin capabilities will create new opportunities for preparing climate change adaptation measures and preparing Arctic societies for the future.

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Existing and future actions for the further development of Arctic RIs and the role of big data are not only important for the services and for the verification of the sustainable development, but also for research, e.g., feedback analysis (e.g. Kulmala 2018; Kulmala et al., 2021; Guo et al. 2018).

While the global climate modelling and numerical weather prediction communities have driven this macro-level data gathering and merging approach in the past, increased attention to the Arctic only emerged recently triggered by the decline of sea-ice, glaciers, and the Greenland ice sheet, as well as by the complex process interaction during weather regime transitions affecting mid latitudes.

Still, in the consolidation phase of YOPP and an early stage of PCAPS, both weather and climate prediction require more polar focus and a dedicated RI to fill this gap.

Different observing systems must be seen as complementary to each other. In situ observations provide validation data for models and remote sensing observations, particularly important in the data-sparse Arctic region. Without standardization of data structures, formats, access and analysis capabilities, the data will not provide sufficient understanding of the complex natural and societal interactions or improve predictions of future changes. There is an urgent need to collaborate across communities, across local and global scales and across methods of modeling and observations.

Progress in one area is impossible without progress in the others. To meet these challenges, Arctic observing programmes have been at the forefront of filling the gap over the last decades (e.g. AOS 2020 summit). However, better ways of coordinating observations are only one element of this agenda.

Arctic processes and their broader context - science-based rationale Altogether 13 key fields of research relevant to feedbacks in different Arctic main domains are introduced in Table A-2 (Appendix 2). These key areas call for comprehensive data, a multidisciplinary approach, and dedicated funding to better understand all these interconnections and feedbacks (Schuster et al., 2018).

To better predict and mitigate the rapid changes in the Arctic environment, there is a strong need to better understand numerous local and large-scale processes in the Arctic atmosphere, cryosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere, and within Arctic societies. The Arctic Amplification and understanding the atmospheric process and changes in the cryosphere in the Arctic are key issues (e.g. Pithan and Mauritsen, 2014, Wendisch et al., 2023). Practical issues in the hydrosphere include warming, salinity changes, and acidification in the Arctic Ocean and its marginal seas. Changes in the Arctic cryosphere are seen as reductions in the mass of sea ice (in particular, multi-year ice), lake ice, terrestrial snow, the Greenland ice sheet, and numerous Arctic glaciers, as well as in the thawing of terrestrial and submarine permafrost (Meredith et al., 2019). The cryospheric changes are mostly driven by the atmosphere and ocean, providing feedback to both. The sea-ice decline also allows stronger impacts of the open ocean on the coastal zone, seen above all in coastal erosion (Ogorodov et al., 2020). The above-mentioned changes both affect and are affected by the socioeconomic evolution in the terrestrial and marine Arctic. The key socio-economic issues include e.g. pollution of the environment (Schmale et al., 2018), environmental health (Evengård et al., 2021), urban climate (Esau et al., 2021a, b), as well as socio-economic effects of extreme weather and climate events (Walsh et al., 2020). Both terrestrial and marine systems are strongly dependent on atmospheric (temperature, precipitation), cryospheric (water availability, snow and ice cover, permafrost), and socio-economic trends (land cover, land use, and offshore activities).

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Considering the atmosphere, the active transport of heat, moisture, greenhouse gases, trace gases and aerosols occurs between the marine Arctic and northern continents, and the source regions are often located in mid-latitudes (Hirdman et al., 2010; Backman et al., 2021; Schmale et al., 2021).

In particular, the moisture transport is critical for the state of the Arctic climate system, as it distributes atmospheric water vapor and thereby impacts cloud formation, radiative transfer through the atmosphere, precipitation (Vihma et al., 2016), and consequently the ocean hydrography (Carmack et al., 2016) and terrestrial hydrology (Bring et al., 2016). The Arctic climate system is further modified by variable concentrations of natural and anthropogenic aerosols which directly interact with the radiation and take part in the complex dynamic processes modifying the properties and lifecycle of clouds (Schmale et al., 2021). Analogously in the ocean, heat and salt are transported poleward above all in the Atlantic sector, whereas freshwater is transported to the Arctic Ocean by rivers, the major ones having their origins in the Eurasian continent and North American mid-latitudes (Carmack et al., 2016), and by the relatively fresh oceanic flow from the Pacific and from melting ice (Solomon et al. 2021). Over recent decades, a large part of this freshwater has been accumulated in the Beaufort Gyre, but if it gets released relatively fast, as a response to large-scale atmospheric circulation, and transported to the North Atlantic, it might impact the oceanic meridional overturning circulation (Zhang et al., 2021). In addition to midlatitude effects on the Arctic, conditions in the Arctic affect mid-latitudes. Due to the strong Arctic warming, cold-air outbreaks originating from the Arctic have become less cold (Screen et al., 2015).

However, simultaneously with the warming of the marine Arctic, decadal-scale cooling trends and the increased occurrence of cold, snow-rich winters have been observed in parts of Eurasia and North America. These may represent natural climate variability or the forced response to Arctic warming, or, most likely, be a combined effect of both (Cohen et al., 2020).

Considering the Arctic cryosphere and biosphere, on the one hand, the situation is simpler in the sense that the variations and trends are controlled by local-to-regional processes in the Arctic (although the atmospheric and oceanic boundary conditions are partly remotely driven). On the other hand, the processes are very complex. The cryospheric ones involve both atmospheric and oceanic forcings, as well as thermodynamics and dynamics of sea ice, glaciers, and ice sheets, the dynamic components of glaciers and ice sheets being the least well-known ones (Meredith et al., 2019). The terrestrial biospheric processes in the Arctic are closely controlled by the availability of heat, water, and nutrients, which determine the ecosystem structure and productivity. The impacts on Arctic biodiversity are partly driven by local factors (depending on land cover and management), and partly by regional or even global ones (e.g. migrating birds and mammals).

Analogously to the atmosphere and hydrosphere, also the socio-economic component of the Arctic system is strongly externally driven, as both in large private companies as well as in the public sector in national and international levels the key decisions are made outside of the Arctic (Hanacek et al., 2022). In addition, the socio-economic interactions between the marine and terrestrial Arctic are strong (Radushinsky et al., 2017; Huskey et al., 2014), e.g. the shipping along the Northern Sea Route requires improved port infrastructure. Urbanization is accelerating globally but also in Northern high latitudes. This trend causes transformation in the geosphere, biosphere, pedosphere, atmosphere, and hydrosphere, affecting the human-environment system over both short- and longterm timescales. Cities represent a complex and highly dynamic interface between the Earth system (atmosphere, land, water, etc.) and societal factors (health, social equity, life quality, economy, etc.)

(Orttung et al., 2021). At the same time, cities are very sensitive to climate change. This vulnerability Lappalainen et al.

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is strongly pronounced in the North, especially in the Arctic, where the warming rate since 1979 has been nearly four times the global average (Rantanen et al., 2022). This has direct and indirect impacts on the local livelihoods, infrastructure, water resources, ecology and air quality (e.g. Esau et al., 2020 & 2021a, b; Varentsov et al. 2023).

When the examination is extended beyond the pure natural sciences to the living environments and the effects on people, Urban Arctic climate and environmental health is widely recognized as an important topic (e.g. Schmale et al. 2018). Arctic is home for more than 5 million people living in >100 cities (Arnold et al., 2016). Rapid Arctic warming challenges people, infrastructures, and sustainability of the Arctic settlements (Hjort et al., 2018; Ramage et al., 2021; Sharma et al., 2019; Orttung et al., 2021). Poor knowledge of urban climate anomalies, their feedbacks and implications to socio-environmental interactions impede the progress towards more resilient and sustainable Arctic settlements e.g. proper mitigation and adaptation actions (Esau et al., 2020; Esau et al 2021; Streletskiy et al., 2019). The warming causes e.g., release of mercury (Hg), infectious agents, anthrax, from permafrost (Schester et al., 2018; Revich et al., 2021; Timofeev et al., 2019; Ezhova et al., 2021). Arctic air pollution has negative health effects on Arctic residents and the environment (AMAP, 2021; Schmale et al., 2018). There are a number of nuclear risk sites located in the Arctic (Mahura et al., 2005; Baklanov et al., 2006) causing potential hazards related to unintended release of nuclear waste.

In these challenges, the contributions of the cold climate conditions, stable-stratified turbulent exchange, and intense anthropogenic fluxes of heat and pollutants need to be better understood.

High-resolution data from both ground-based and satellite observations are required for quantification of changes in the environment. Strategic plans for food and water security and living conditions influenced by thawing permafrost need to be developed in close collaboration with local stakeholders and researchers (Callaghan et al., 2020). Projects on quantifying nuclear risk sites in the Arctic are needed. Overall, a new view of One Health (World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/one-health) is needed to tackle the challenges in health of the environment, wild-life, and humans. Open and inclusive collaboration between the different disciplines and experts in research and practical work are needed to make steps forward.

Conclusions The Arctic climate is changing much faster than the global average (Hartfield et al., 2018; Meredith et al., 2019; Rantanen et al., 2022) and the permafrost and multi-year sea ice are disappearing rapidly (Onarheim et al., 2018; Kwok 2018; Ricker et al., 2017). Our existing in-situ observational networks and space-borne instruments together with strategical plans (Starkweather et al., 2022) provide us a basis to create a new Arctic focus.

Arctic research on meteorology and sea-ice physics are relatively well established because of the investments made by operational forecasting services and the associated scientific research programs, their good international collaboration, and well-coordinated development of in-situ and satellite observation networks. Increasingly, the global climate modelling community also identifies the Arctic as a key area of interest but struggles with the scales and complexity of the important processes, their interactions and their effects on the large scale. Regarding the primary scientific challenges, we have introduced 13 key topics on Arctic feedbacks and interactions (Appendix 2) and call for a new coordinated framework from multi-disciplinary perspectives to address them.

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While the observations from different systems are currently often performed in isolation, the critical global challenges call upon a multidisciplinary approach, stronger integration, improved information and data flows, and a capacity to draw science-based synthesis and predictions from the existing information through single platforms and data services. Without a coordinated, systematic observation system the science-based approach for the mitigation of environmental threats in the Arctic will be impossible to achieve, and we risk the failure of adaptation measures for Arctic societies.

Moreover, we are still missing full description of polar processes in the models. To be able to add these descriptions we need new, improved polar observations to increase the process level understanding in the Arctic environment. However, the approach has to be extended beyond the physical world with a much-enhanced data-model fusion including impact sectors relevant to societies. In-situ and remote sensing data as well as citizen science and Indigenous knowledges need to be included to form the so-called big Earth data and digital twin capabilities specifically for the Arctic. The important role of the Arctic in the global system and the acceleration of the change seen in the Arctic require these capabilities to be developed at the highest speed.

The collaboration of national and international organizations is of great importance to achieve these goals. The accelerated and amplified urban warming opens a unique opportunity for gapfilling field studies, where the analyses cover the physical, biological, and societal processes in the already warmed and altered environment. Hence, the organization of multi-disciplinary field work in and around the Arctic cities would be beneficial for the environmental protection and better climate projections alike.

For the societies affected by rapid changes and experiencing increasing threats, we urgently need new information systems with foci across basic process and feedback research and bridging between science and society. As changes are evolving fast, these information systems and their scientific input need to be as agile as possible. Based on the Analyzing Global Funding Trends project and the UArctic’s funding database, the research funding targeted to the Arctic is only 1% of all global research funding. “Earth Sciences” is the largest proportion of the Arctic research funding and is especially attributed to oceanography. This concretizes the need for enhanced resources for multi- and cross-disciplinary Arctic research (Osipov et al., 2016). AASCO calls for further actions towards achieving this goal by creating a big data framework enabling comprehensive research (program) on land – atmosphere – ocean interactions and feedbacks. This will benefit Arctic stakeholders from local to global communities to address climate change and fulfil UN SDGs in the Arctic context.

The paper has been conceptualized with a joint contribution of all the Authors.

Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no competing financial interests or personal relationships that could influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability No data was used for the research described in the article.

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Notes 1. Author Affiliations: Hanna K. Lappalainen, Associate Professor, Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research, University of Helsinki (Finland); Timo Vihma, Professor, Finnish Meteorological Institute (Finland); Eija Asmi, Head of Group, Finnish Meteorological Institute (Finland); Alexander Baklanov, Professor, Science and Innovation Department, World Meteorological Organization (Switzerland); Peter Bauer, Director of Destination Earth, European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) (UK); Paul Arthur Berkman, Professor, Science and Innovation Department, World Meteorological Organization (Switzerland); Federico Bianchi, Professor, Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research, University of Helsinki (Finland); Nicole Biebow, Head of International Cooperation Unit, Alfred-Wegener-Institut, Helmholtz-Zentrum für Polar- und Meeresforschung (Germany); Jaana Bäck, Professor, Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research, University of Helsinki (Finland); Torben Røjle Christensen, Professor, iCLIMATE Aarhus University Interdisciplinary Centre for Climate Change (Denmark); Richard Davy, Senior Researcher, Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing Center (Norway); Igor Esau, Professor, University of Tromsø (UiT), Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing Center (Norway); Ekaterina Ezhova, University Lecturer, Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research, University of Helsinki (Finland); Huadong Guo, Academician, Professor, Director General, International Research Center of Big Data for Sustainable Development Goals (CBAS) (China); Torill Hamre, Research Leader, Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing Center (Norway); Angelika Humbert, Professor, Alfred-Wegener-Institut, Helmholtz-Zentrum für Polarund Meeresforschung (Germany); Veli-Matti Kerminen, Professor, Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research, University of Helsinki (Finland); Lukas Kohl, Senior Researcher, University of Eastern Finland (Finland); Lars Kullerud, President, University of the Arctic, GRID-Arendal (Norway); Kirsty Langley, Project Leader, Asiaq Greenland Survey (Greenland); Jan Rene Larsen, Deputy Executive Secretary, SAON Secretariat, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme Secretariat (Norway); Heikki Lihavainen, Managing Director, Svalbard Integrated Arctic Earth Observing System (SIOS) (Norway); Lisa Loseto, Research Scientist, Freshwater Institute (Canada); Risto Makkonen, Research Professor, Finnish Meteorological Institute (Finland); Cecilie Mauritzen, Senior Scientist, Norwegian Meteorological Institute (Norway); Outi Meinander, Senior Research Scientist, Finnish Meteorological Institute (Finland); Geir Ottersen, Senior Research Scientist, Institute of Marine Research (Norway); Peter Pulsifer, Research Scientist, University of Colorado, Boulder (USA); Yubao Qiu, Professor, International Research Center of Big Data for Sustainable Development Goals (CBAS) (China); Arja Rautio, Professor, Director of Thule Institute, University of Oulu (Finland); Stein Sandven, Senior Scientist, Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing Center (Norway); Britta K. Sannel, Senior Lecturer, Stockholm University (Sweden); Sandy Starkweather, Scientist, NOAA Physical Science Laboratory (USA); Mikko Strahlendorff, Space Adviser, Finnish Meteorological Institute (Finland); Lise Lotte Sørensen, Professor, Aarhus University (Denmark); Jennie L. Thomas, CNRS Researcher, Institut des Géosciences de l'Environnement in Grenoble (IGE) (France); Michael Tjernström, Professor Emeritus, Stockholm University (Sweden); Petteri Uotila, Professor, Institute for

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Atmospheric and Earth System Research, University of Helsinki (Finland); Manfred Wendisch, Professor, Head of Institute for Meteorology, Leipzig University (Germany); Markku Kulmala, Academician, Professor, Director of Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research, University of Helsinki (Finland); Tuukka Petäjä, Professor, Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research, University of Helsinki (Finland)

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Appendix 1 Table A-1. Explanation of the acronyms.

Acronym

Full name

Scope

Website

AASCO

Arena gap analysis of the existing Arctic science co-operations

Prince Albert Foundation

https://www.atm.helsinki .fi/peex/index.php/aasco /

feedback research (AC)³

Arctic Amplification: Climate Relevant Atmospheric and Surface Processes, and Feedback Mechanisms

Transregional Collaborative Research Centre funded by German Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemei nschaft, DFG)

http://ac3-tr.de/

ACTRIS

Aerosol, Clouds and Trace Gases Research Infrastructure

European RI

https://www.actris.eu

Arctic Monitoring & Assessment Programme - a Working Group of the Arctic Council

Arctic Council

AMAP

atmospheric sciences

health research

AMAP Assessment 2021: Human Health in the Arctic

https://www.amap.no/d ocuments/doc/amapassessment-2021-humanhealth-in-the-arctic-preprint/3593

AOS

The Arctic Observing Summit

conference

https://arcticobservingsu mmit.org/summits/aos2020/.

APPLICATE

Advanced Prediction in Polar Region and Beyond

European Union’s Horizon 2020

https://applicateh2020.eu/

ARCTIC OPTIONS

Arctic Options / Pan-Arctic Options projects (both on Holistic Integration for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainability) – funded through ()

the Belmont Forum with Canada, China, France, Norway, Russia and the US from 2013-2022 – which evolved into the Science Diplomacy Center™

https://scidiplo.org/

Lappalainen et al.

Arctic Yearbook 2024 Arctic PASSION

219 Pan-Arctic Observing System of Systems - project

EU Horizon2020

https://arcticpassion.eu

RI

BED

Big Earth Data

BSRN-WMO

Baseline Surface Radiation Network of the World Meteorological Organization

CBM

Community-based monitoring

CIMR

The Copernicus Imaging Microwave Radiometer (CIMR) Expansion mission

EU Earth observation programme COPERNICUS

https://atpi.eventsair.co m/cimr-mission-2021/

CLINF

Climate-change effects on the epidemiology of infectious diseases and the impacts on Northern societies

Nordic Center of Excellence funded

by Nordforsk

https://clinf.org

United Nations’ organization

https://hal.archivesouvertes.fr/hal03658664/document https://mkp28.wixsite.co m/cbm-best-practice

feedback research CRAICC

Cryosphere–Atmosphere Interactions in a Changing Arctic Climate, Nordic Centre of Excellence

Nordic Center of Excellence funded

by Nordforsk

https://researchportal.hel sinki.fi/en/projects/craic c

feedback research CRiceS

Climate Relevant interactions and feedbacks: the key role of sea ice and Snow in the polar and global climate system - project

EU Horizon2020

CRISTAL

The Copernicus Polar Ice and Snow Topography Altimeter Mission in COPERNICUS, launch planned in 2027

EU Earth observation programme COPERNICUS

https://www.copernicus. eu/en

eLTER

Integrated European Long-Term Ecosystem, critical zone and socioecology Research infrastructure

European RI

https://elter-ri.eu

EOST

Earth Observation Technology

other

https://le.ac.uk/earthobservation-science

EPOS

European Plate Observing System

European RI

https://www.epos-eu.org

ERIC

European Research Infrastructure Consortium

a specific legal form that facilitates the establishment and operation of Research Infrastructures with European interest

https://ec.europa.eu/inf o/research-andinnovation/strategy/strat egy-2020-2024/ourdigital-future/europeanresearchinfrastructures/eric_en

Science

and

feedbacks research

https://www.cricesh2020.eu/

ecosystem research

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ESM

Earth System Models

other

EVE

Earth Virtualization Engines

interactive data access layer that allows simple navigation, extraction, and application of the climate simulation data

https://eve4climate.org/

EU-POLARNET

European network to co-develop and advance European Polar Research

EU Horizon2020

https://eu-polarnet.eu

European Research Infrastructure consortium for observing the Ocean

European RI

FAIR

Findability, Accessibility, Interoperability, and Reusability

other

https://www.gofair.org/fair-principles/

Gaofen

Gaofen series

a series of Chinese high-resolution Earth imaging satellites for the China Highresolution Earth Observation System (CHEOS) program

https://directory.eoportal .org/web/eoportal/satelli te-missions/g/gaofen-1

GAW-WMO

Global Atmosphere Watch of the World Meteorological Organization

United Nations organizations

GCOS

Global Climate Observing System

GCW

Global Cryospheric Watch (GCW) of the World Meteorological Organization

United Nations organizations

GEM

Greenland Ecosystem Monitoring

Other research infrastructure(s)

GEOSS

Global Earth Observation System of Systems

GHG

Greenhouse gases

other

GOOS

Global Ocean Observing System

Arctic research infrastrcture

https://www.goosocean. org/

IABP

the International Program

Other research infrastructure(s)

http://abp.apl.washingto n.edu/overview_principle s.html

IASC

International Committee

International bodies

https://iasc.info

Euro-ARGO

Lappalainen et al.

Arctic

Arctic

Buoy

Science

feedback research

ocean

https://www.euroargo.eu

https://gcos.wmo.int/en /home

https://g-e-m.dk https://earthobservations .org/geoss.php

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221 Scientific Associate of International Council for Science (ICSU)

ICOS

iCUPE

Integrated System

Carbon

Observation

European RI

https://www.icos-cp.eu

atmospheric sciences

Integrative and Comprehensive Understanding on Polar Environments – project

IDA

The International Association

IMBIE

Ice Sheet Mass Balance comparison Exercise

INTAROS

Integrated Arctic observation system

EU Horizon2020 feedbacks research

Development

Inter-

https://www.atm.helsinki .fi/icupe

https://www.worldbank. org/en/news/factsheet/ 2019/12/13/fact-sheetthe-internationaldevelopment-associationida project

https://webisardsat.vercel.app/projec t/imbie2

EU Horizon2020

https://www.intaros.eu

RIA INTERACT IOC

European project Intergovernmental Commission

Oceanic

RI

International bodies

https://euinteract.org/project/ https://ioc.unesco.org/n ode/2

UNESCO NCoE

Nordic Centre of Excellence

a NordForsk funced Nordic Centre of Excellence (NCoE) promoting Nordic cooperation between outstanding researchers and research institutions

https://www.nordforsk.o rg/nordic-centreexcellence

NUNATARYUK

Project combines permafrost research with modelling and socio-economic analysis and includes stakeholders from all over the Arctic

EU Horizon 2020

https://nunataryuk.org

feedback research

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PCAPS

Polar Coupled Analysis and Prediction for Services further developes numerical weather prediction and utilization of its results in operational services for societies.

WMO project as a follow-up of YOPP

https://www.wwrppcaps.net/

PolarRES

PolarRES studies the interactions between the atmosphere, oceans, and sea ice in the Arctic and Antarctic

PolarRES is a multi-partner project, and a member of the EU Polar Cluster.

https://polarres.eu/

PPP

Polar Prediction Project

a 10-year (2013– 2022) endeavour of the World Meteorological Organization’s (WMO) World Weather Research Programme (WWRP)

https://www.polarpredic tion.net/

R&B

Belt and Road Initiative

PROTECT

PROjecTing sEa-level rise : from iCe sheets to local implicaTions

EU Horizon 2020

RI

Research Infrastructure

large-scale, integrated, in situ observation system

-

ROADS

Roadmap for Arctic Observing and Data Systems

SAON coordinated activity

http://www.arcticobservi ng.org/news/378guidelines-forcontributing-to-saon-sroadmap-for-arcticobserving-and-datasystems-roads

SAON

Sustaining Networks

Arctic Council

www.arcticcouncil.org/projects/sao n/

Arctic

https://www.mfa.gov.cn /ce/cegv/eng/zywjyjh/t 1675564.htm

Observing

project

research network

RI

https://cordis.europa.eu/ project/id/869304

SAVs

Shared Arctic Variables

-

-

SDGs

Sustainable Development Goals

set up in 2015 by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and are

https://sdgs.un.org/goals

Lappalainen et al.

Arctic Yearbook 2024

223 intended to be achieved by 2030

SIOS

Svalbard Integrated Arctic Earth Observing System (SIOS)

Other research infrastructure(s)

https://us.sios.com

SIOS

Svalbard Integrated Arctic Earth Observing System

large-scale, integrated, in situ observation system

https://siossvalbard.org/

SMEAR

Stations for Measuring Earth surface – Atmosphere Relations (SMEAR)

research infrastructure(s) coordinated by the University Helsinki, FI

https://www.atm.helsinki .fi/SMEAR/index.php

UN

United Nations

international organization

https://www.un.org/en/ ?

YOPP

Year of Polar Prediction

other

https://www.polarpredic tion.net/

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Appendix 2 Table A-2. The list of the 13 domain based Key topics, the existing knowledge and the areas where we need a better understanding of the Arctic feedbacks and interactions. The content of the table is based on the contributions e.g. submitted abstracts to the AASCO events in 2021 and 2020.

EXISTING KNOWLEDGE

CRITICAL KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND RESEARCH NEEDS

ARCTIC AMPLIFICATION (1-2-3) feedbacks-trends-extreme events

The Arctic Amplification – The mechanisms v Behind the enhanced response of the Arctic climate system to global warming are generally referred to as Arctic amplification (Serreze and Francis 2006; Serreze and Barry, 2011; Davy et al., 2018; Davy and Outten, 2020; Dai et al., 2019; Previdi et al., 2021; Wendisch et al., 2022). Two prominent indications of Arctic amplification are the dramatic decline of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean (Olonscheck et al. 2019; Screen 2021), and the accelerated increase of the Arctic near-surface air temperature (Rantanen et al, 2022). v Clarification of the Amplification mechanisms, feedbacks and impacts in progress (Goosse et al., 2018; Duncan et al., 2020; Feldl and Merlis, 2021; Wendisch et al., 2022). v Extreme events related to numerous variables in the coupled Arctic climate system (Bullard et al., 2016; Meinander et al. 2021).

ATMOSPHERE (4) Atmospheric processes in the Arctic v v

Numerous interactive physical and chemical processes act in the Arctic atmosphere (Goosse et al., 2018; Devasthale et al., 2020).

Local processes in the Arctic atmosphere that are clearly different from those in mid latitudes include atmospheric boundary layer (ABL) physics and Arctic clouds (Davy et al., 2017; Chernokulsky and Esau, 2019).

ü Atmosphere-cryosphere interactions are important for the arctic

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ü Synthesis of the AA studies are needed to identify and describe multi-scale and multi-process contributions to the phenomenon. Developing this solid background, future projections and implications of the Arctic Amplifications can be prospected and attributed. reanalysis. ü In the case of extremes, such drought, flooding and cyclones, the future changes are not well known. High priority for: enhancement of observation systems to detect extreme events; application of high-resolution models; more research on the impacts of climate extremes on ecosystems ü

and humans (Walsh et al., 2020; Ezhova et al., 2021).

Extreme events may also provide positive feedback to climate change, if critical thresholds or tipping points are passed due extreme events

ü Understanding of interactions and feedbacks between processes and their presentation in numerical weather prediction and climate models are needed (Vihma et al., 2014, Petäjä et al. 2020). ü Processes controlling low level clouds formation are unclear. Improved descriptions of aerosol precursor emissions and their influence on the polar aerosol lifecycle,

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radiative balance due to highly reflecting surfaces (Boy et al., 2019; Petäjä et al. 2020)

including parameterizations of biologically driven sea-ice DMS production and emission, physical and biogeochemical drivers of NH3 emissions, and controls on organic aerosol emissions and formation, with a focus on Ncontaining organic aerosols, are needed. ü Cloud microphysical processes in mix-phased and ice clouds are poorly understood ü More insights and improved parametrizations on absorbing aerosol impact on snow albedo and melting (Svensson et al, 2018)

ATMOSPHERE (5) Atmospheric circulation and transports between the Arctic and mid latitudes v

v

Atmospheric circulation is of critical importance for climate in the circumpolar Arctic. A vast majority of the energy transport to the Arctic is carried out in the atmosphere. Transport across the Arctic Circle, the role of the atmosphere is 5 to 6 times larger than that of the ocean (Trenberth and Fasullo, 2017).

Key physical processes related to atmospheric circulation and transport between the Arctic and mid-latitudes include: on planetary scale, the stratospheric Polar Vortex and the upper-tropospheric Polar front jet stream have a major role in controlling the cyclone tracks (Kidston et al, 2015). In the lower troposphere, warm-air intrusions are characterized by complex interactions of heat and moisture advection, subsidence, cloud and fog formation, turbulence in the atmospheric boundary-layer and clouds, radiative transfer, as well as sea ice thermodynamics and dynamics (Pithan et al., 2018).

Need for a better understanding: ü

ü

ü

ü

ü

Impact of the Arctic amplification on the properties of the jet stream (Cohen et al., 2020), and related changes in the occurrence and strength of warm-air intrusions and cold-air outbreaks Relative importance of warm-air intrusions and local arctic processes on the Arctic amplification in the past and future Compensating effects of a warmer Arctic (resulting in higher temperatures during cold-air outbreaks) and conditions that possibly favor increasing occurrence of cold-air outbreaks from the Arctic Modelling capabilities of air-mass transformation and related interactive processes during warm-air intrusions and cold-air outbreaks Measurement campaigns are needed to provide appropriate data to construct test cases, which may help to evaluate and improve models (Wendisch et al. 2019)

MARINE (6) Arctic Ocean and its ice cover v

An important phenomenon of the regulation is the deep-water formation in the vicinity of sea ice (Bindoff et al., 2019).

v

Oceanic heat transport to the Arctic Ocean from the Atlantic is increasing due to increasing ocean temperatures and changing circulation (Tsubouchi et al., 2021; Trenberth et al., 2019; Oldenburg et al., 2018).

v

Volume transport from the Pacific through the Bering Strait, river runoff and melting ice and snow have increased the fresh water in the Arctic Ocean thus strengthening its stratification, in particular in the Beaufort Gyre. This trend is also affecting the dynamic sea-level and circulation patterns (Couldrey et al., 2021). In some regions such as the Eurasian basin, the reduced sea-ice cover may promote oceanic convection and the eradication of the halocline.

v

There is an increased risk of relatively sudden discharge of the Arctic freshwater reservoir to the North Atlantic with impacts on the oceanic meridional circulation (Zhang et al., 2021).

v

Global hydrodynamic models, prognostically reproducing the transports and hydrography of the ocean – sea-ice system, rely on parameterization of meso- and small-scale phenomena, such as ocean eddies, tides and air-sea interaction, due to their insufficient resolution (Fox-Kemper et al., 2019).

ü

To resolve the volume transports, e.g. from the Pacific, is to resolve currents through the narrow and shallow Arctic passages, e.g. Bering Strait, which require accurate resolution, typically not yet implemented in standard CMIP category ocean climate models.

ü

Global ocean – sea-ice models cannot be expected to resolve all relevant scales, such as the sub-mesoscale, due to the issues related to oceanic predictions before the availability of quantum computers. The increasing resolution may also require updating the atmosphereocean coupling due to stronger oceanic impacts (Small et al., 2019). However, processes such as sea-level rise and hydrological cycle, could already be addressed probabilistically by deploying model ensemble hierarchies that include, in addition to global models, ocean reanalyses and high-resolution regional models, and emulators (Lambert et al., 2018; Uotila et al., 2019).

ü

Knowledge about status and process understanding of the Arctic sea-ice system is key for assessing impacts quantitatively, and for improved projections of future scenarios. Since the current observation system still has crucial gaps when it comes to spatial and temporal coverage of the Arctic sea-ice system (e.g. Gerland et al., 2019),

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Arctic sea ice regime (SROCC, 2019; Perovich et al., 2020) with different sea ice properties, ice types, thermodynamical and dynamical conditions (Spreen et al., 2020), and changes in snow cover (Webster et al., 2018), may lead to new processes and feedbacks (Graham et al., 2019).

226 improved observations systems (e.g. Lee et al., 2019) and more (international) coordination and collaboration across disciplines and working groups are necessary. ü

Representing relevant sea ice and snow cover features in numerical models is further challenged because of the limited ability to include increased complexity and sub-grid scale processes (e.g. ice type, leads and melt ponds) in large scale climate models. Further research improvements require utilization of existing and emerging satellite and insitu observations of sea ice, including sea ice age, thickness, leads, melt ponds, ridges, and ice type, and under ice radiation (driving biological activity). These will provide improved data sets for validation of models and serve as the basis for improved understanding of the processes that govern sea ice.

ü

Ongoing shift of sea ice age and type from multi-year ice to first-year ice in the Arctic results in changes of properties of the ice pack. The processes that control sea ice and its interaction with atmosphere and ocean have unresolved critical gaps and uncertainties

ü

Urgent need to improve sea-ice biogeochemistry models in both hemispheres, focusing on the nutrient buffering role of sea ice and its effect on primary production and carbon export.

ü

Understanding the climate change driven risks to food provision through fisheries, transport and access to non-renewable resources are of great importance.

Adding to uncertainty in human choice related to climate change is the interaction of climate with other forces for change, such as globalization and land and sea-use change.

These interactions necessitate that responses to climate change consider cumulative effects and context-specific pathways for building resilience (ARR, 2016; Meredith et al., 2019).

MARINE (7) Ocean environment and socio-economic feedbacks v

v

v

Arctic net primary production increased in ice-free waters, spring phytoplankton blooms occurring earlier in the year in response to sea ice change and nutrient availability with spatially variable consequences for marine ecosystems (IPCC, 2019).

Boreal zooplankton and fish are expanding into more Arctic areas (Dalpadado et al., 2016; Frainer et al., 2017) and Arctic fish are under pressure (Christiansen, 2017; Meredith et al., 2019).

Increasing stratification and decreasing nutrients will likely dominate in the Arctic environment, but land derived inputs may have already sustained primary production.

MARINE (8) Ocean Acidification & Arctic marine freshening v

Terhaar et al. (2020) estimated an increase of regional anthropogenic carbon storage and ocean acidification. Furthermore they predict increasing probability for undersaturation to calcite of the mesopelagic Arctic Ocean by the end of the century. This increased rate of Arctic Ocean acidification together with changing physical and biogeochemical Arctic conditions deepens climate change impact on Arctic marine ecosystems (Terhaar et al. 2020).

v Arctic marine freshening as an important process: warming and freshening of the surface waters in the coastal and polar regions due to increasing freshwater input (e.g., melting of sea ice and glaciers, river discharge, lateral transport of biogeochemical variables, including carbon) will change the chemistry of the surface waters affecting the GHG uptake/release (Woosley and Millero, 2020),

ü The main challenge for the ocean acidification reseach is to assimilate the knowledge of different research branches into an integrated assessment. The assement shound inlcude short and long-term responses to multiple drivers and their underlying mechanisms at the different scales: organisms, populations, communities and ecosystems. (Riebesell and Gattuso, 2015, see also Pörtner et al., 2019) ü A need for generalized pan-Arctic representation of the impacts of freshwater on the upper Arctic Ocean. Many biological and geochemical interactions occur in this part.

Knowledege on the regional and seasonal variability is addressed to gain a pan-Arctic perspective on the physicalgeochemical-biological state of the upper Arctic Ocean (Brown et al. 2020)

CRYOSPHERE (9) Greenland Ice Sheet mass loss and its impact v Greenland Ice Sheet mass loss is an urgent topic, given that even ü To understand the processed of ice sheet hydrology and by reaching the Paris Agreement goals, Greenland is experiencing 3running coupled simulations of ice flow and hydrology. For 4°C warming (Rückamp et al., 2019). Satellite observations provide increasing the process understanding, modelling and satellite

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essential information to quantify the current contribution of the ice sheet to sea level change (e.g. Helm et al., 2014; IMBIE2 team 2020). v About half of the mass loss is due to accelerating glaciers, while the other half a consequence of changes in surface mass balance. Surface melt water is either transported via surface rivers into supraglacial lakes, or direct surface run-off. Another fraction of it is penetrating ü into the firn and may either refreeze (Machguth et al., 2016), releasing latent heat, or may form subsurface aquifers (Miller et al., 2020). v Calving of tidewater glaciers in Greenland is linked to subglacial water discharge (Slater et al., 2019). This demonstrates the feedback between glacier dynamics and ice sheet hydrology. Projections ü are underestimating the mass loss of the Greenland Ice Sheet massively – only about 1/3 of the observed mass loss is represented in simulations (Rückamp et al., 2019) - and this is mainly due to underestimating glacier acceleration.

remote sensing informed in-situ observations are required (Petäjä et al., 2020; Humbert et al., 2020). This comprises a wide range of different type of observations, radar observations, GPS stations close to supraglacial lakes, pumping tests in firn and model experiments.

Coupled ice-ocean models with boundary conditions accounting for physical processes in the boundary layer at the ice-ocean interface (including, e.g., subglacial discharge, Straneo and Cenedese, 2015), improved melting parameterizations.

Run-off in crevasse zones and supraglacial lake drainage (e.g.

Schröder et al., 2020) are then delivering water to the base of the outlet glaciers, leading to seasonal acceleration (e.g. Neckel et al., 2020) and freshwater discharge into the ocean. All those processes are contributing to the ice sheet hydrology, and they are poorly constrained at the moment. ü Interdisciplinary approaches are needed to boost process understanding. It is important to attract scientists with continuum mechanical background, researchers from hydromechanics, applied mathematicians and computer scientists, to jointly to derive mathematical models and incorporate the missing processes into exascale-ready simulation codes. (Box et al., 2019; AMAP SWIPA update report 2021 in press). ü Better projections are needed for the mass loss of the Greenland Ice Sheet (Rückamp et al., 2019). ü New logistic hubs, supporting operation of monitoring networks on the ice sheet, are crucial. Support of autonomously operating instruments and sample retrieval, will highly benefit from such hubs.

CRYOSPHERE (10) Interactions of the Arctic permafrost, active layer, and atmosphere v v

v

v v

The northern circumpolar permafrost region stores large amounts of soil organic carbon (SOC), ~1300 Pg C (Hugelius et al., 2014).

Carbon based feedbacks connecting Arctic land-atmosphere interactions to thawing permafrost: permafrost thaw makes previously immobile carbon available for microbial decomposition, depending on the oxygen availability, CH4 or CO2 is formed and released from the soil; emitted GHGs can amplify warming and further enhance permafrost thawing (Schuur et al,. 2015).

Abrupt thaw resulting in ground collapse (thermokarst), a process contributing to extensive carbon losses both in lowland and upland terrain (Olefeldt et al., 2016; Turetsky et al., 2020).

Future carbon emissions have been estimated under different climate scenarios (McGuire et al., 2018).

Increased emissions of nitrous oxide have been observed from thawing Arctic permafrost peatlands, acting as a non-carbon climate feedback (Voigt et al., 2017).

ü Better process understanding of the complex interactions between climate, permafrost and hydrology is needed for accurate projections of future GHG exchange. ü More field and satellite based data on soil organic carbon content, vegetation, landforms and GHG emissions in the permafrost region required for better upscaling and incorporation in models. ü Extent and rate of abrupt permafrost thaw (thermokarst) needs to be better understood and included in ESMs projecting future carbon exchange. ü Better quantification of CH4 storage and future carbon lability and release from subsea permafrost. ü Assessment of the impact of considerable volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions from the thawing permafrost on atmospheric chemistry, aerosol formation or terrestrial biosphere – atmosphere interactions (Li et al., 2020). ü Need to relate reanalysis model data sets with high resolution optical and radar satellite observations. This information would also provide necessary constraints on modelling results. ü Modelling results for vegetation response (NPP and respiration) to climatic scenarios with strong increasing temperature trends are poorly constrained. Challenges in representing vegetation in the Arctic zone (Birch et al., 2021).

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ü Knowledge gaps: landscape dynamics and changes as a result of permafrost thaw; interactions between plants, soils and microbes under changing climatic conditions; integrated analysis of carbon and nitrogen compounds released from the permafrost and their net impacts on the feedback

ü Effects of permafrost thaw on forests (Baltzer et al. 2014), soil microfauna and hydrology (Walvoord and Kurylyk, 2016).

TERRESTRIAL (11)

v Increased nutrient transport via rivers, primary production in the

v

ü

Mechanical and thermal erosion of the coast results in permafrost thaw/ground collapse and removal of the nolonger frozen sediments by water (Lantuit et al., 2012) favoring large-scale release of CO2, methane, and other volatile substances from thawing permafrost (Overduin et al., 2016). Quantitative data on these important processes is limited. The average rate of erosion along the Arctic coastline is 0.5 m year−1. Spatial variations are, however, large both in local and regional scales with peak values exceeding 3 m year−1 in the Laptev, East Siberian, and Beaufort Seas (Lantuit et al., 2012). Knowledge gaps remain on submarine permafrost distribution, its thermal state, and release rates of greenhouse gases (Ping et al., 2011).

Better knowledge of biogeochemical processes combined with improved model representations of ocean–land interactions are essential to accurately predict the development of arctic ecosystems and associated climate feedbacks.

Arctic coastal oceans is expected to increase. The river discharge is a component of the carbon cycle and also affects storm surges and coastal erosion (Wicks and Atkinson, 2017; Shakhova and Semiletov 2007).

Valuable datasets on riverine transports are available from the Lena, Ob, and Amur rivers (Savenko, 2006; Bagard et al., 2011; Pokrovsky et al., 2015), but also these datasets suffer from sampling infrequency and uncertainties resulting to underestimation of fluxes (Chalov et al., 2018).

ü

TERRESTRIAL (12) v Human activities (wild fires) have an impact on the Arctic environment by increasing quantities: o pollutants: plastic, heavy metals and other trace elements (Barbante et al., 2001) / radioactive nuclides (Ezerinkis et al., 2014) / synthesized organic compounds (Hermanson et al,.

2010; Xie et al,. 2007) / artificial light at night (Hölker et al., 2010) / black carbon, carbon-containing compounds (CO, CO2) trace gases and greenhouse gases (Garrett and Zhao, 2006; Hienola et al., 2013) With the global climate changes of recent decades, strong regional temperature, circulation, and hydrological anomalies are manifested. They cause, among other things, extensive fires (Bondur et al., 2020).

TERRESTRIAL (13)

ü Knowledge on the source contribution of pollution to settle mitigation strategies (Law et al., 2014) ü more measurement of short-lived climate pollutants, and their precursors for evaluating the impacts of natural resource extraction and shipping in Arctic environments (Dekhtyareva et al., 2016).

v

ü

Arctic is home to more than 21,000 known species of highly coldadapted mammals, birds, fish, invertebrates, plants and fungi and microbe species (ACIA, 2005). v Long-term warming and its most dramatic effects and changes in Arctic ecosystems through local extreme events relating to temperature, precipitation and snow (Christensen et al., 2021) v Arctic terrestrial ecosystems possess feedbacks and critical tipping points: o wildfires turning the permafrost tundra to bushland or forest with different functioning. (Köster et al., 2018; Sizov et al., 2021) o local nutrient availability effecting carbon flux magnitudes between otherwise comparable ecosystems (López-Blanco et al., 2020)

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Knowledge gaps: landscape dynamics and changes as a result of permafrost thaw o interactions between plants, soils and microbes under changing climatic conditions o integrated analysis of carbon and nitrogen compounds released from the thawing permafrost and their net impacts on the feedback mechanisms. ü More ground based and remote GHG observations needed on the local and regional levels to improve understanding on land-atmosphere feedbacks, the knowledge on the rate of GHG emissions and contribution from different soils and landforms. o

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herbivory changing the overall carbon balance via changes on plant composition, energy balance, nutrient availability (Väisänen et al., 2014; Metcalfe and Olofsson, 2015; Stark and Ylanne, 2015).

ü

More data on the dynamics of thermal structure and thickness of the seasonally thawed layer of permafrost determinating the intensity of geomorphological processes and the physical and mechanical properties of soils. (assessment of the geocryological consequences)

Advancing the Understanding and Quantification of Arctic Climate Feedbacks

Briefing Note

Exploring the Past, Present, and Future of USAPECS:

Lessons from a Decade of Supporting Early Career Research Across National and International Polar Networks Susan B. Vanek, Zachary M. Labe, Olga Lauter, Kevin Shionalyn, Mohammad Afzal Shadab, Elena Adasheva, Annika Margevich, Meghan N. Schaberg, Lavanya Ashokkumar & Jonathan N. Naoukin

Navigating the multitude of organizations and institutions involved in Arctic research can be daunting for those just beginning their careers, from outside traditional academic circles, or from historically excluded communities. These difficulties are exacerbated by the rapid changes unfolding across the Arctic environment, highlighting the interconnectedness of the region and the need for evermore cooperative research that transcends geopolitical and disciplinary boundaries. It is the goal of the United States Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (USAPECS) to foster such connections and encourage the inclusion of underrepresented groups within the broader Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine research community while advancing the principles of Inclusion, Diversity, Equity, and Accessibility (IDEA). Led by a board composed of volunteers, USAPECS has engaged in a variety of collaborative activities and partnerships with U.S. and international institutions over its 10 years of operation in order to bring together early career researchers from across disciplines, regions, and from historically underrepresented groups and to support and showcase their work. This has included collaborations with Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee, Polar Science Early Career Community Office, Association of Polar Early Career Scientists International, and Arctic Research Consortium of the United States and the production of an annual blog series, online webinars and roundtables, conference presentations and events, and the international Polar Film Festival. Drawing on feedback from past and current members, participants, and partners, this briefing note provides an overview of the past and current work of USAPECS and its collaborative activities. It focuses on the challenges faced and lessons learned over USAPECS’s decade of existence as a means to highlight the value of such volunteer organizations.

Susan B. Vanek, PhD Candidate at Department of Anthropology at Binghamton University (State University of New York), Zachary M. Labe is Associate Research Scholar at Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences Program at Princeton University, NJ, USA. Olga Lauter is Assistant Professor of Instruction at University of Texas at El Paso, TX, USA Kevin Shionalyn is PhD Candidate at University of Texas at Austin, TX, USA. Mohammad Afzal Shadab is Postdoctoral Research Associate at Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Princeton University, NJ, USA. Elena Adasheva is PhD Candidate at Sociocultural Anthropology and Environmental Humanities at Yale University, CT, USA. Annika Margevich is PhD Candidate at Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Yale University, CT, USA. Meghan N. Schaberg is Post Doctoral Fellow at Atmospheric Sciences Department at Colorado State University, CO, USA. Lavanya Ashokkumar is Lecturer at Department of Atmospheric and Earth science at University of Alabama in Huntsville, AL, USA. Jonathan N. Naoukin is TEX-E Fellow at University of Texas at Austin, TX, USA.

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Introduction Addressing the rapid environmental changes unfolding across the Arctic requires partnerships from across both disciplinary and geopolitical boundaries. While such cooperation has been a hallmark of both Arctic governance and scientific research over the past four decades, work is still needed to ensure the future of collaborations between the next generation of Polar researchers, Arctic communities and Indigenous Peoples, and the broader public. One such organization working to encourage continued collaborative research in the Arctic is the United States Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (USAPECS), the national committee representing the U.S.-based members of the international Association of Polar Early Career Scientists. Like its parent organization, USAPECS aims to bolster the work of early career researchers, educators, and others with interests in the Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine regions and the wider cryosphere. This article explores the work of USAPECS over its decade of existence with a focus on its efforts to support early career researchers, its advocacy for more inclusive practices in Polar and Alpine research, and its engagement with nation and international collaborative networks. Drawing on surveys and interviews of past members and collaborators, USAPECS archival documents and event histories, and the experiences of the current board, it provides a brief history of the organization and an overview of its composition and network of collaborators. It then offers a glimpse into some of USAPECS’s activities and events that aim to encourage collaboration, cross/trans-disciplinary interconnections, and knowledge sharing across national and international spaces. Finally, this article concludes with a discussion of the challenges faced and lessons learned over USAPECS’s first decade of existence as well as plans for its future in an Arctic experiencing rapid climate change. It is our hope that this briefing note will both highlight the value of groups like USAPECS and provide information to others interested in participating in and supporting allvolunteer organizations.

Growing an Organization to Support Early Career Researchers in the U.S.A. The 1980s marked the beginning of what Osherenko and Young have termed “the Age of the Arctic'' (1989: 4-5). Driven by a combination of interconnected environmental concerns, possibilities for increased resource extraction and expanded transportation networks, social and Indigenous rights movements, and renewed geostrategic importance, the once-peripheral Arctic was quickly becoming the focus of growing international attention and activity (Grant, 2010; Keskitalo, 2004). In the U.S., part of this interest centered on supporting research and education in and about the region. The Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee, for instance, was formed as part of the Arctic Research and Policy Act in 1984 and was followed by the universitydriven Arctic Research Consortium of the United States in 1988 (Rich et al., 2015; Arctic Research Policy Act, 1984). The thawing of political relations in the post-Cold War years also saw a surge in international cooperation in the region with the establishment of organizations, such as the International Arctic Science Committee in 1990, which included 23 countries conducting research in the Arctic (Smieszek, 2015). This was followed by the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991 and the Ottawa Declaration and the formation of the Arctic Council in 1996, the primary intergovernmental forum supporting coordination, interaction, and cooperation between Arctic states, Indigenous organizations, and non-Arctic observer nations (Arctic Council, 2024; Heininen et al. 2020; Ottawa Declaration, 1996). This push toward collaboration in the region continued into the 2000s with events, such as the 4th International Polar Year in 2007-2008 led by the

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International Arctic Science Committee and the Year of Polar Prediction. These efforts opened spaces for new international organizations, such as the Northern Forum and Association of Polar Early Career Scientists and the national committees that took shape within it, like USAPECS (Goessling et al., 2016; Heininen et al., 2020; Heininen, 2023; Hindshaw et al., 2018).

USAPECS is a volunteer organization founded in 2014 through the unification of several regional groups in the United States as a means of overcoming the challenges of maintaining engagement at a regional level and to encourage greater inclusion and collaboration in Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine research. During its first years, USAPECS faced a number of challenges, including the difficulty of integrating its regional precursor organizations into one entity, maintaining and growing its membership within a largely online space, and charting its own identity under the broader Association of Polar Early Career Scientists International umbrella. However, by navigating these initial hurdles, USAPECS began to take on its current shape; forming working groups, growing its network of collaborators, and setting the foundations for what would become its annual events and activities.

USAPECS’s membership today is primarily composed of early career researchers from inside and outside of academia with an interest in the Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine regions. It is led by an executive board of early career researchers from various institutions across the U.S. that serve for a 1-year period with the option of term renewal. All board members participate in at least two of USAPECS’s eight task groups which focus on specific events or activities. These include Website, Polar Film Fest, Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee, Social Media, Conferences, Blog, IDEA (inclusion, diversity, equity, accessibility), and Webinar teams with new task groups formed as necessary to address specific needs or handle particular activities or events. These groups meet at least once a month online while general board meetings are held twice monthly to accommodate members’ differing schedules. Meeting minutes and other related documents are compiled and held online in a common file with additional ongoing discussions between the entire board and individual task groups taking place over the Slack communication platform. This flexibility in the open flow of information and in USAPECS’s overall structure has proved essential for maintaining an active and engaged volunteer membership that is often juggling educational, employment, and personal obligations and is located across multiple time zones.

The overall goals of USAPECS, from its inception, have been to stimulate inclusive, interdisciplinary, and international research collaborations and develop effective future leaders in Polar and Alpine research, education, and outreach in the United States and beyond. To further these aims, USAPECS is supported by informal and formal connections with a number of Polar and Alpine focused networks and organizations. These include the advertisement and amplification of USAPECS events and activities through listservs, websites, and institutional networks, such as Cryolist, UArctic, and the International Arctic Social Science Association, although there is no formal relationship with these groups. Official collaborations are maintained with several U.S.based organizations and the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists International. USAPECS’s official network of collaborators includes: ● Association of Polar Early Career Scientists International: USAPECS’s parent organization, which is responsible for the overall functioning of the organization and the code of conduct which guides both USAPECS and its events.

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● Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee: a U.S. governmental organization focused on addressing research needs and objectives in the Arctic. ● Polar Science Early Career Community Office: a community-building and communitysupport organization for polar early career scientists, funded by U.S. National Science Foundation Office of Polar Programs, Award #2135176 (Dryak, et al., 2022). ● Arctic Research Consortium of the United States: a nonprofit organization consisting of institutions organized and operated for educational, professional, or scientific purposes to advance Arctic research and education.

In addition, USAPECS also partners with: ● United States Permafrost Association: an organization that shares knowledge and data related to permafrost. ● Center for Oldest Ice Exploration (COLDEX): a U.S. National Science Foundation science and technology center focused on exploring Antarctica's oldest ice cores to understand the earth’s past climate. ● PolarSTEAM: a newly formed U.S. National Science Foundation program that connects polar educators and scientists with writers and artists in Antarctica.

As USAPECS is not a funded organization, it relies upon this network of collaborators for both monetary and logistical support. Recently, for instance, Polar Science Early Career Community Office has provided for the further development of USAPECS’s online presence through the financial support of USAPEC’s website and its Slack communication channel. In addition, Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee provides the online platform for many USAPECS webinars and other online events. Without the aid of these organizations, USAPECS’s activities to advance early career researchers’ voices in Polar and Alpine sciences as well as its broader outreach efforts would not be possible.

All of the work of USAPECS, including its collaborative activities, are guided by Inclusion, Diversity, Equity and Accessibility (IDEA) principles (Kasprowicz et al., 2023; Sukhai & Mohler, 2016). While these principles have been foundational to USAPECS since its inception, a plan to form a task group specifically focused on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion was not formulated until 2018 following feedback received from a correspondent panel at the American Geophysical Union Fall Meeting 2018. The IDEA task group grew from these discussions surrounding diversity, equity, and inclusion and was officially launched in 2020 as a response to the political and social turmoil in the United States, as well as the lack of diversity in Polar Science (Bernard and Cooperdock, 2018; Gewin and Wongpan, 2019; Gewin, 2019). Initial aims of the IDEA task group included the development of a concise mission statement for the implementation of IDEA principles, the outline of short- and long-term IDEA-related goals, and the integration of these principles into the work of all the other task groups. The IDEA team relied on various resources, such as Association of Polar Early Career Scientists International’s diversity, equity, and inclusion principles as well as support from Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee, to develop an official strategy guide for organizing its efforts. This document now serves as a roadmap for the application of IDEA principles throughout USAPECS’s organizational structure and in its events

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and activities. However, it remains a living text; flexible and adaptable enough to meet both expected and unexpected challenges while being open to updates and revisions when necessary.

One of the early applications of this guide was in the development of a land acknowledgments policy for USAPECS. Land acknowledgments are generally formal statements by organizations that reflect a recognition and respect for the Indigenous Peoples, cultures, histories, and rights that relate to an institution’s physical location (Native Governance Center, 2024).1 However, given that USAPECS is composed of volunteers, based online, and not tied to any one institution, formulating a land acknowledgment policy proved more challenging than expected. After discussions between the IDEA task group and the wider USAPECS board, it was decided that any land acknowledgment policy for USAPECS needed to be broad enough to encompass the variety of different geographical regions on which its members lived and worked. Thus, the final iteration of the land acknowledgment, which appears prominently as a popup on the USAPECS homepage, specifically notes that all of the institutions in which Arctic researchers work are situated on Indigenous lands.

In addition, individual board members have the option of adding specific land acknowledgments related to their location and their pronouns to their personal biographies on the USAPECS website.

This is part of USAPECS’s broader effort to encourage a more respectful and open forum for Polar and Alpine research in which all identities are heard, seen, and supported. In 2022-2023, these efforts were furthered in a code of conduct designed by the IDEA task group to enhance diversity and inclusion in USAPECS events. It initially included guidelines for events directed at both participants and organizers but eventually led to the development of a new code of conduct for all board members which took effect at the start of the 2023-24 board cycle. This document builds upon the code of conduct provided by Association of Polar Early Career Scientists International and includes event-specific rules and guidelines for members along with recommendations for action to be taken to address violations.

Finally, a new core objective of the IDEA task group has been to design a series of training sessions on IDEA-related issues for the board. Topics were first chosen based on the results of an anonymous board member survey, in which respondents were asked to identify subjects connected to inclusion, diversity, equity, and accessibility that were unfamiliar or that they would like to learn about in greater detail. After topics were selected, board members volunteered to research their chosen subject, provide a short 30-minute interactive presentation, and moderate a group discussion related to their topic. A list of materials and resources for further reading was also prepared. To date, these training sessions have included subjects such as colonialism in science, coproduction of knowledge, gender identity, best practices for collecting demographic data, and improving accessibility in online spaces. This activity has proven beneficial, providing a safe forum for USAPECS board members to engage with a multitude of perspectives and ask questions about topics that can sometimes be difficult to discuss. Expanding upon this work, the IDEA team plans to develop training modules that can be uploaded to YouTube, making such information available to the wider Polar and Alpine research community and to the public. Overall, these new initiatives, combined with living strategy documents and guidelines designed by the IDEA task group, represent USAPECS’s ongoing efforts to foster a more open and inclusive Polar and Alpine research community while also encouraging outreach and engagement with the public. The IDEA 1

Additional resources related to land acknowledgments are available from Edmonds College Library: https://edcc.libguides.com/land

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task group works to ensure that these IDEA principles are evident throughout all aspects of the organization.

Activities and Events for the Polar and Alpine Research Community and Beyond USAPECS activities and events are crafted to encourage collaboration, cross-/trans-disciplinary interconnections, and sharing among Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine early career researchers, established researchers, community members, Indigenous Peoples, and others interested in the region. While many of these efforts are held annually and led by dedicated task groups, others are one-time events designed to meet specific needs or foster early career researchers’ professional development, such as networking opportunities and mentorships. These events and activities rely on previous years’ efforts and the work of past board members to carry skills and knowledge forward even as USAPECS’s membership changes. Yet, these efforts are also designed to be responsive to the current and future needs of the early career research community. Both the direction of USAPECS activities, as well as their chosen themes, are selected annually in order to meet changing interests and in response to feedback from members and participants. In recent years, USAPECS has also begun to encourage synergies between some of its annual activities, bringing together the skills and experiences of members from various task groups to expand events and outreach. This section briefly explores the development of some of USAPECS’s activities and events with a focus on how such efforts support the broader goals of the organization. It also highlights some of the challenges that have been faced during this work, the opportunities they have presented for learning and growth, and how they continue to be shaped and reshaped to address the shifting needs of the Polar and Alpine early career researcher community.

Annual Blog Series USAPECS’s blog task group was developed in 2018 to expand the organization’s mediums of communication and to facilitate greater collaboration within the Polar and Alpine research community. The annual blog series is the primary focus of this group and is designed as a space for a diverse group of Early- to Mid-Career scientists and educators to share their personal insights and experiences in Polar science. These blogs are meant to communicate valuable advice and learning opportunities for early career researchers through first-hand accounts. They also reflect a shared passion for Polar research and education in order to foster a community of informed and interconnected Polar scientists. Themes for the blog series are chosen yearly after which an open call is sent out through social media, across various listservs, and through other networks to solicit submissions. Themes have included “Communicating Your Science,” “Navigating Your Early Career and Beyond,” “Science Policy at the Poles,” “Becoming a Polar Scientist,” and our current theme of “Exploring Polar Science Across Disciplines.” Since 2018, USAPECS has published thirty-six blog posts.

The annual blog series is a reflection of USAPECS’s goal of encouraging the open exchange of knowledge and experiences from across disciplines as well as perspectives from outside of academia as a means to support the next generation of Polar and Alpine early career researchers.

To this end, individual blog authors are selected from a variety of disciplines, career stages, backgrounds, and more. Each contributor offers valuable advice aimed at early career researchers, drawing from their own journeys and challenges within their specialized communities of

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knowledge. The strength of these blog posts lies in their conveyance of lived experience; the authors provide first-hand accounts that not only narrate their individual histories but also illuminate broader aspects of Polar research and its impact. These personal stories also serve as important learning tools. They allow readers, especially those just beginning their careers, to gain practical knowledge and inspiration, helping them navigate both the expected and unexpected, and glimpse the complexities of Polar science. Moreover, each author contributes a shared enthusiasm for both Polar and Alpine research and the importance of education in their respective fields. This collective passion enriches the blog series content, making it a vital resource for fostering a community of informed, motivated, and interconnected early career researchers.

The main challenges the annual blog series has faced in recent years relate to ensuring a diversity of disciplines and perspectives are reflected in its content. Most notably, the social sciences, the humanities, and art-based research are largely absent from the blog. Additionally, most blog authors to date are from academic and research-related backgrounds which limits the exchange of experiences and viewpoints from outside those realms. Indigenous researchers and authors are also absent from the blog series. To address these gaps in representation, USAPECS plans to make a concerted effort to broaden its outreach and better amplify the multitude of voices and experiences reflective of the Polar community.

Annual Webinar Series In addition to providing early career researchers with the opportunity to highlight their voices and gain knowledge from more established researchers in written blog form, USAPECS also hosts an annual webinar series with approximately 2 to 3 events held per year. These webinars are free and open to both the early career researcher community and the public and are managed by a dedicated webinar task group. The goal of USAPECS’s webinar series, much like that of the blog, is to elevate a diverse set of voices and convey new ideas and information to both the Polar and Alpine research communities and others interested in learning more about the region. These webinars have been a staple activity of USAPECS from its early years with the first held in conjunction with Association of Polar Early Career Scientists International. At that time, they typically focused on themes related to best practices for scientific communication or specific research questions, such as on the stability of the Thwaites Glacier. The focus of webinars expanded in 2019 with the “Polar Science 101” theme which provided a general overview of several Polar and Alpine related topics, such as running and analyzing fully-coupled global climate models or writing policy briefs on environmental and social issues in the Arctic region. There were also several Association of Polar Early Career Scientists International/USAPECS collaborative webinars related to the theme of the best practices for conducting trans-disciplinary work in a region like the Arctic where an understanding of both physical and social science perspectives is crucial for addressing current and future climate change. More recently, with the support of Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee, USAPECS has broadened the focus of its webinars further to include issues related to early career skills and capacity building. These webinars have included a panel discussion with established researchers on creating an online science persona through social media and professional websites and a webinar training session on the inclusion of alt text for enhancing the accessibility

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of online spaces. All of USAPECS’s webinars produced over the last three years are publicly available through the USAPECS YouTube channel.2 One of the biggest hurdles faced by USAPECS’s webinar task group in recent years has been growing participation and viewership of the webinar series. As in so many other aspects of work and life, the COVID-19 pandemic heavily impacted the activities of USAPECS with the number of annual webinars and their attendance sharply declining. In the years that have followed, many researchers and the general public have increasingly shifted to virtual platforms for employment, meetings, conferences, and other interactions, hence contributing to a fatigue in relation to these virtual spaces (Wooston, 2020; Tao et al., 2021). While active interest and participation in online events has always been challenging for outreach organizations, such as USAPECS, it has become even more difficult to draw attention to traditional research-style webinars. To address this issue and better assess the needs of USAPECS membership and webinar participants, the webinar team has recently launched an anonymous reflection poll. It is hoped the qualitative feedback received will aid the webinar team in better gearing the webinars to meet the interests of early career researchers and improving the overall event coordination. The webinar team also recently applied for a small education and outreach grant through Polar Science Early Career Community Office to provide honorariums for webinar speakers and panelists. Although this was a one-time source of funding, the webinar team is actively looking into a long-term solution for providing speaker honorariums. This is a crucial component of improving inclusivity and equitability for early career researchers, but unfortunately there are a number of challenges in implementing this type of system for a volunteer organization like USAPECS, which has no direct institutional home. Over the next few years, the webinar team aims to continue providing a platform for early career researchers to share their research via online webinars, but also hopes to continue expanding webinar topics through skill training, surveys of different career pathways, including more speakers from the social sciences and humanities, and increasing outreach about the importance of polar science to the public (e.g., Guímaro et al., 2024).

The International Polar Film Festival The international Polar Film Festival is USAPECS’s largest event, held annually in conjunction with Association of Polar Early Career Scientists International’s Polar Week every September.

Begun in 2016, the Polar Film Festival was designed as an online showcase of recent short films about the Polar and Alpine regions produced by researchers, community members, Indigenous Peoples, organizations, and institutions from around the world. It is also meant to provide a resource for teachers and others interested in finding up-to-date information about the region for use in education. The Polar Film Festival strives to include content that highlights ongoing issues related to the Polar and Alpine regions and communicate such material to as wide an audience as possible in order to facilitate education and give a platform to those interested in sharing their experiences and knowledge of the region from around the globe. The 2023 Polar Film Festival, for instance, included films submitted from Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Chile, Russia, Alaska U.S.A., Turkey, New Zealand, and Finland. The Polar Film Festival is organized by a dedicated USAPECS task group but also works with the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists’ Polar Week team. A call for films is generally released in May with additional calls in July

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and August. Film submissions are due by the end of August with final film reviews, letters of acceptance, and preparations taking place at the start of September. The Polar Film Festival is hosted on USAPECS’s website which provides links and information about the films and filmmakers. A selection of films is advertised daily on USAPECS’s social media over the September International Polar Week with in-person screenings being held by interested individuals at institutions within and outside of the U.S. In recent years, the Polar Film Festival has grown to become USAPECS’s most synergistic event, linking together the work of several task groups. Beginning in 2023, the webinar team along with the Polar Film Festival task group held a live online filmmaker roundtable during which filmmakers discussed their work and interacted with the public. The success of this event has encouraged its continuation in 2024, as well as the addition of a new filmmaker mini-blog series. Currently being organized in conjunction with the blog team, the new mini-blogs will allow filmmakers to further discuss their unique stories, motivations, and filmmaking techniques and, it is hoped, inspire others to share their experiences and viewpoints through visual media. These new additions to the Polar Film Festival are designed to highlight perspectives, activities, and organizations that may receive less attention in traditionally published academic circles and to include a window into the Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine that is accessible to a wider audience.

The Polar Film Festival has also faced a number of struggles since its inception, including the upheaval caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and managing the intensity of labor involved in running the event. The global pandemic put a halt to the Polar Film Festival with no film festival occurring in 2021. Afterwards, the Polar Film Festival struggled back in 2022, but received fewer submissions than in previous years with only the 2023 Polar Film Festival beginning to reach the level of attention as pre-COVID-19 events. The short burst of intensive labor involved in running the Polar Film Festival has also been daunting at times. As many filmmakers are also Arctic researchers that conduct fieldwork during summer months, the film submission deadline is set for August when many are returning. However, this leaves a very short window for films to be reviewed and the Polar Film Festival to be organized. USAPECS’s Polar Film Festival task group has endeavored to distribute the labor involved in organizing the event and relies on the aid of the entire board to ensure no volunteers are overwhelmed in the lead-up to the Polar Film Festival.

Conferences and In-Person Events While many of USAPECS’s activities take place in virtual spaces, the organization also participates in several in-person conferences and organizes periodic social events and workshops. These activities generally focus on increasing awareness of USAPECS and its activities, providing opportunities for early career researchers to interact, build skills, network, and engage in discussions in formal and informal settings, and to increase awareness and support dialogues focusing on IDEA-related topics. Larger events have included a three-day Polar Science Communication Workshop held in 2017 in Boulder, Colorado and supported by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. National Science Foundation (Bliss et al., 2018). Smaller, less formal activities for early career researchers have included social gatherings, such as events co-sponsored with the Polar Science Early Career Community Office and Polar Impact during the American Geophysical Union Fall 2023 meeting and an online event held during American Geophysical Union Fall 2022 meeting for virtual attendees.

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USAPECS has maintained a presence at all in-person American Geophysical Union Fall Meetings since 2018 with the goal of bringing together early career researchers in Polar science and discussing issues related to academia. At the 2018 American Geophysical Union Fall Meeting, for example, USAPECS hosted a panel together with Permafrost Young Researchers Network: North American titled “Diversity and Inclusivity in Polar Sciences”. The panel session discussed current challenges faced by minority groups and women in the Polar and Alpine research and related disciplines along with possible avenues for addressing these issues head-on in academia and in scientific organizations. It also included strategies for promoting diversity, equity, and inclusion. During the American Geophysical Union Fall 2022 and 2023 meetings, USAPECS members presented “Advancing Inclusion, Diversity, Equity, and Accessibility (IDEA) in the Polar Sciences by USAPECS,” given in both years to discuss the activities the organization has taken on over the course of its lifetime (Ashokkumar et al., 2022 & Ashokkumar et al., 2023). In addition, USAPECS also participated in the International Congress of Arctic Social Sciences during the larger Arctic Congress in 2024. Members organized and chaired a session together with APECS Norway, entitled “Cross/Trans-Disciplinary Collaborations and Advancing Community, Equity, and Inclusion in Arctic Research'' that included presentations related to diversity, equity, and inclusion principles and the challenges and opportunities of cross/trans/interdisciplinary collaborations (Arctic Congress, 2024). USAPECS members also presented a paper on the history of USAPECS, its activities, and its plans for the future during the session entitled “Building & Sustaining Strategic linkages for Network-to-Network Arctic Research Collaboration” (Ashokkumar et al., 2024).

Conclusion: Lessons Learned and the Future As USAPECS has grown and taken shape over the past decade, it has faced a number of difficulties.

While some have been overcome, others persist, and it is the goal of the organization to continue the process of addressing these issues. The concluding section of this paper will discuss some of these challenges, the lessons that have been gleaned by confronting and seeking to address them, and how they contribute to ongoing plans for USAPECS’s future. While some of these issues have been discussed already, it is hoped that bringing them together here will contribute to a better understanding of USAPECS and its activities and aid other organizations that are confronting similar issues. They represent steps in USAPECS’s development as an organization built to support early career researchers and the wider Polar and Alpine community while also increasing inclusivity, diversity, equity, and accessibility in research - a process that is never complete. Continuing to carefully identify these challenges remains key for expanding trans-disciplinary understanding, education, and research across the rapidly changing Polar and Alpine regions (Gaffey et al. 2024).

For all organizations, but particularly a voluntary one, continuity of information and maintaining an active and engaged membership can be daunting. This is especially difficult when the organization is composed mainly of early career researchers that are balancing education, employment, and personal obligations. Flexibility in requirements and meeting schedules have proven essential as has a dedicated system for maintaining the flow of information.

Communication platforms, such as Slack, as well as shared files for documents and other materials are essential for allowing members to interact at differing times and to catch up on missed information (Perkel, 2017). These channels have also aided in stemming the loss of institutional knowledge as board members leave the organization for other pursuits. Schedules of events, turnover documents, past meeting minutes, and other materials allow for past activities and events

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to be built upon in the future. However, maintenance of these systems is paramount and requires both oversight and attention.

Maintaining such systems, as well as the variety of annual events and activities run by USAPECS, also requires support from other organizations in the form of money, time, and logistics. While USAPECS is a voluntary organization with no dedicated funding source, its website, Slack channel, conference participation and social events, speaker honorariums, and other efforts require funding.

USAPECS relies heavily on its network of collaborators to provide this financial support as well as other periodic funding sources. However, money is only one aspect of the aid USAPECS receives from these organizations. The Association of Polar Early Career Scientists International, Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee, Polar Science Early Career Community Office and Arctic Research Consortium of the United States all contribute time to aid in USAPECS activities, use of their platforms to hold events, share their skills and experiences to bolster the work of USAPECS, and help the board and its members grow their skills and knowledge. This strong network of collaborators has allowed USAPECS to grow over the past decade, rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic, and expand. But this requires transparent goals, open channels of communication, and clearly defined roles and expectations.

Finally, organizations like USAPECS need flexibility in order to grow and meet the shifting needs and interests of its membership (Bohleber et al., 2020). Polar and Alpine research, much like the regions themselves, is dynamic. It encompasses multiple disciplines, perspectives, peoples, cultures, and ideas. As an organization that represents the next generation of early career researchers and strives to advance diversity, equity, and inclusion principles, USAPECS must be able to adapt to these changing needs and challenges, approach and openly discuss difficult issues, and find new avenues to bring support to those that have been excluded (Rauser et al., 2017; Moraru et al., 2024).

There is no end point in addressing these subjects, just an ongoing and iterative process. Thus, USAPECS’s organization, as well as its events and activities, must be flexible enough to meet these changing needs and goals. With these lessons in mind, USAPECS plans to continue to grow through increasingly synergistic activities which bring together a variety of task groups, like the Polar Film Festival. The organization also plans to work to maintain relationships with alumni members, find new ways to reach out to groups and disciplines that have not been represented, and increase engagement with the public. These efforts, as well as the Polar and Alpine networks that have been built since the 1980s, are essential to maintain a cooperative and collaborative research community in a rapidly changing Arctic landscape.

Acknowledgement The authors would like to express their gratitude to USAPECS’s past and current board members, its membership, the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists International (APECS), Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC), Polar Science Early Career Community Office (PSECCO), Arctic Research Consortium of the United States (ARCUS) and other partners, participants in USAPECS activities and events, and the Social Media and Website task groups that supports all our work. The statements, conclusions, and recommendations expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of any specific organization.

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Guímaro, H. R., Fragão, J., Abreu, J., Rettinger, C., & Queirós, J. P. (2024). Empowering ECRs: Bridging the educational gap for polar regions. PLOS Climate, 3(2), e0000353.

Heininen, L. (2023). “Pioneering Models for an Open Discussion and Northern KnowledgeBuilding – The Case Studies of Calotte Academy and Northern Research Forum.” Arctic Yearbook 2023. https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2023/Briefing_Notes/4BN_Heininen _AY2023.pdf Heininen, L., K. Everett, B. Padrtova, and A. Reissell (2020). Arctic Policies and Strategies - Analysis, Synthesis, and Trends. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/16175/1/ArticReport_WEB_new.pdf Hindshaw, R. S., Mariash, H., Vick-Majors, T. J., Thornton, A. E., Pope, A., Zaika, Y., Lenz, J., Nielsen, H., & Fugmann, G. (2018). “A decade of shaping the futures of polar early career researchers: A legacy of the International Polar Year.” Polar Record, 54(5-6): 312323.

Kasprowicz, V. O., Waddilove, K. D., Chopera, D., Khumalo, S., Harilall, S., Wong, E. B., Karita, E., Sanders, E.J., Kilembe W., Gaseitsiwe S., Ndung’u, T. (2023). “Developing a diversity, equity and inclusion compass to guide scientific capacity strengthening efforts in Africa.” PLOS Global Public Health, 3(12): e0002339.

Keskitalo, E.C.H. (2004). Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region. Routledge.

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Exploring the Past, Present, and Future of USAPECS

Briefing Note

Rashtriya Raksha University Steering Global Sustainability: India's First International Workshop on Polar Region Policy - A Commitment towards the Global Partnerships and Sustainable Approaches as it’s “Our Planet, Our Responsibility” Manish Kumar Singh

Rashtriya Raksha University, an institution of national importance under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, took a significant step towards fostering global partnerships and sustainable approaches by hosting India’s first International Workshop on “India’s Polar Region Policy Towards Building Partnership with Sustainable Approach” on March 12th – 13th, 2024. This event was a collaborative effort with the Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES), National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR), and the University of the Arctic (UArctic) Network. The workshop was a testament to India’s commitment to engaging with polar region policies, focusing on sustainable approaches and global partnerships, all under the theme “Our Planet, Our Responsibility.”

Keynote Addresses Prof. (Dr.) Bimal N. Patel shed light on the recent strategic developments such as the signing of a Free Trade Agreement with the European Free Trade Association. He delved into the details of India’s enhanced engagement in the polar regions, stressing upon the importance of environmental protection and scientific research. He further highlighted the legal policy framework, such as “The Indian Antarctic Act, 2022” and “The India’s Arctic Policy, 2021.” In his concluding remarks, he called out like-minded states towards global cooperation for dedicating the region to science and betterment of humankind, maintaining peace and stability in the polar regions.

Rear Admiral TVN Prasanna praised the initiative taken by RRU in the field of maritime and polar law and governance. He emphasized the significance of recent policy formulations including

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the Antarctic Act and Arctic Policy. Furthermore, pointing out the key development, 46th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) to be held in Kochi, India.

Amb Pankaj Saran commended the Indian government’s efforts in establishing a national security-oriented university and discussed India’s longstanding connection with the polar regions.

He highlighted the global interconnectedness that climate change and economic growth entail, advocating for a robust polar law and governance framework for enhanced capacity development for the future generations.

Thematic Discussions I) Polar Science Dr. Rasik Ravindra emphasized the interconnected role of science in India's Arctic and Antarctic policies. Further emphasizing its importance in strategic planning and environmental protection in the polar region. He noted that India's commitment to the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid Protocol, is clearly reflected in the Indian Antarctic Act (2022) and the Arctic Policy. Questioning whether science or geopolitical manoeuvring drives nations' actions in Antarctica.

Dr. Naresh Chandra Pant highlighted India's Arctic connection and a need for strategic preparation due to climate change and geopolitical shifts. He emphasized upon bridging the scientific research and policy formation, noting the challenges in understanding Earth's system. He highlighted the importance of research on Antarctica's ice to study historical greenhouse gas levels and the complexity of Antarctic governance.

Dr. Rahul Mohan elaborately discussed Antarctica's role in international cooperation among states and climate change research, its history and territorial claims. He highlighted India's interest in the continent, the Antarctic Treaty System, and India's Antarctic Scientific Programme. He also mentioned “The Indian Antarctic Act, 2022”, which addresses environmental emergencies.

II) Polar Security Ms. Cecilia Ines Silberberg underscored Argentina's commitment to the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), its operation of 13 Antarctic bases, and the challenges it faces, including climate change and expanding fishing activities. She mentioned Argentina's leadership in Antarctic tourism and environmental protection negotiations, and potential Argentina-India cooperation in Antarctic research.

Prof. Lassi Heininen discussed 'security' and 'functional cooperation' in the Arctic, emphasizing the 'Arctic Model' as a zone of peace and cooperation. He highlighted the role of 'sustainable development' in cross-border cooperation and the importance of knowledge transfer. He noted the Arctic's militarization, the need for legal certainty, and the potential gains from continued cooperation.

Dr. Irina Strelnikova and Dr. Ekaterina Serova explored India's strategic interests in the Arctic, particularly in partnership with Russia, highlighting the importance of environmental protection and research.

Prof. Rasmus Gjedsso Bertelsen discussed the impact of historical international affairs on Arctic law and world order, noting the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar order post-Cold War. They highlighted the influence of Russia's transformation and organizations like the WTO, EU, and

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NATO. They contrasted the GDP in the Arctic with China's BRICS++ pursuits and emphasized the strategic implications of USA-Russia, China-Russia, and China-USA relationships. Despite US advocacy for a rule-based order, Arctic tensions persist.

III) Polar Law and Governance H.E. Mr. Juan Angulo highlighted Chile’s active role in the Antarctic Treaty System, its national policy prioritizing Antarctic research, and its contribution to the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research. He highlighted Chile’s extensive Antarctic research, historical claim, and joint proposal for a Marine Protected Area. He also mentioned the Chilean International Antarctic Centre, emphasizing the balance between conservation and economic interests.

Mrs. Kanagavalli Suryanarayana discussed the Arctic region's complex governance, home to approx. 500,000 Indigenous people, and the need to recognize diverse stakeholders. Highlighting the history of cooperation among Arctic states, the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, and the Arctic Council. She further discussed India's observer role in the Arctic Council, its active contribution towards climate change studies, and collaborations with the member/observer states.

Prof. Brooks Alexandra Kaiser highlighted the significant impact of climate change on the Snow Crabs in the Antarctic and shifts in the fishing practices due to their presence. Svalbard became a key harvesting location, with Norway and Russia designating the snow crab as a secondary species.

Further discussing the challenges, the methods of conservation and sustainable harvesting, prioritizing the need for global efforts in balancing the economic and ecological principles.

Mr. Manish Singh highlighted India's Arctic enforcement mechanisms, emphasizing maritime law and sovereignty. He highlighted India's cooperative relations with polar states and commitment to environmental protection. He mentioned India's domestic maritime laws and the Indian Antarctic Act, 2022, reflecting India's commitment to polar law. He emphasized the importance of policy shaping and soft law frameworks in Arctic governance.

IV) Polar Trade, Geopolitics, and Indigenous People Rights H.E. Mr. Kimmo Lähdevirta discussed the repercussions of rapid climate change in the Arctic, noting new maritime routes and their strategic challenges, along with the shifted security landscape influenced by geopolitical dynamics. He underscored Finland’s dedication to sustainable Arctic development, and highlighted the Arctic Council's role in fostering inclusive governance to maintain a peaceful, stable, and sustainable region.

Capt. Anurag Bisen highlighted the strategic interests of the USA, Russia, and China in the Arctic, emphasizing the legal and strategic challenges in enhancing scientific cooperation despite the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. He noted each nation's distinct Arctic policies and investments.

Dr. Romain Chuffart and Cmde. Debesh Lahiri focused on the environmental strategies and challenges in Arctic governance, emphasizing the importance of integrating Indigenous rights and addressing logistical difficulties.

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Conclusion: Forging a Path Forward in Polar Region Policy The workshop successfully fostered dialogue among key stakeholders from various sectors, contributing significantly to the discourse on polar region policies. The discussions highlighted the complexity of challenges in the polar regions, from environmental to geopolitical, and underscored the need for integrated international cooperation in the polar regions. India's proactive approach in these discussions not only reinforces its commitment to global sustainability but also positions it as a strategic leader in fostering global partnerships. This event has set a precedent for future international cooperation, aiming to ensure the stability, peace, and sustainable development of the polar regions.

Rashtriya Raksha University Steering Global Sustainability

Briefing Note

The 33rd Year of the Calotte Academy: Unstoppable Arctic Discourse Zhanna Anshukova, Tom Gabriel Royer, and Adam Kočí

A field report from the Calotte Academy in the European Arctic and Sápmi, 11—17 November 2024

The Calotte Academy, an international travelling symposium and school of Arctic dialogue, took place in the European Arctic and Sápmi from the 11th to the 17th of November 2024. This year’s Academy brought together seventeen early-career researchers and seven professors from thirteen countries, attending sessions and excursions in Rovaniemi, Luleå, Hetta, Kautokeino, Inari, and Sodankylä. The event was organised by the Northern Policy Society in cooperation with the Sámi Education Institute (SAKK), the International Reindeer Husbandry Centre (EALÁT), the Department of Media Studies at Stockholm University, Launch Pad Finland, and UArctic’s Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security.

The theme of the Academy, “Environmental Security vs. Military Security,” reflects the growing global crises and their impact on the Arctic. First of all, the environmental damage caused by resource overuse and the political inability to address the ecological catastrophe. Secondly, the intensifying great power rivalries, arms races, and conflicts in regions like Ukraine, the Middle East, and Africa. The theme underscored the growing tension between environmental and military priorities in societies, politics, transnational relations, and media.

Participants met informally in Rovaniemi in the evening before the official program began. The “warm-up” meeting took place in the common room of a DAS dormitory, located near the University of Lapland campus. In a friendly atmosphere, accompanied by snacks and drinks, initial connections were made as participants eagerly discussed their expectations for the upcoming week.

The first session, held on Monday, the 11th of November at the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi, began with opening remarks by Lassi Heininen, who emphasized the resilience of the Calotte Academy amid this year’s organizational challenges. The Academy, established in 1991, is the oldest event of its kind in the Arctic – preceding even the first meeting of the Arctic Eight Zhanna Anshukova, PhD Candidate, University of Lapland.

Tom Gabriel Royer, PhD Candidate, University of Lapland.

Adam Kočí, Assistant Professor, University of Ostrava.

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countries. Professor Heininen stressed the importance of engaging in meaningful discussions after each presentation, which is central to the unique format of the Academy. He also highlighted that the first session coincided with the opening day of COP29 in Baku, underscoring the environmental focus of this year’s theme.

The session’s theme, “Securitizing Science and Society – Re-militarizing the Arctic?” addressed one of the topical issues of the Arctic. The first speaker, Professor Matti Nojonen, presented on the topic of “Emerging Securitization Narratives and Academic Freedom,” focusing particularly on Chinese studies. Matti emphasized the need for critical voices in the media, noting that the trend of securitization raises important ethical, legal, and practical questions about the limits of academic freedom. The next speaker, Professor Miyase Christensen, introduced the theme of “Arctic geopolitics and the role of (mis)information in a polarised communication ecology”. The presentation highlighted the role of media in shaping both global and regional perceptions, especially in the case of security and national interests in the Arctic. The third presentation, “Securitizing the High North: A New Priority for NATO,” was given by Marco Dordoni. After that, Professor Laura Junka-Aikio gave a presentation with the title “There’s plenty of space, and it doesn’t bother the civilians”, a quote that reflects the military’s attitude to the consequences of militarisation in the Arctic.

After the lunch break, the first session concluded in the afternoon with a presentation by Lassi Heininen on the topic of "The Military in the Arctic - the Arctic for the Military." The professor’s slideshow featured maps illustrating conflict dynamics in the Arctic. Lassi pointed out that we have not witnessed any conflict in the Arctic since the Second World War. Still, the Arctic Ocean is probably the world’s most significant region for nuclear deterrence, ensured especially by submarines operating in deep waters. Thus, the so-called GIUK gap is crucial as a gateway to the Arctic and a potential meeting point for U.S. and Russian submarines.

After a full day of discussions, participants headed to the Santa Claus Village on the outskirts of Rovaniemi. The first excursion in the Academy program was not only a pleasant experience that put everyone in the Christmas spirit, but also an opportunity to discuss the business prospects in the Lapland region and the impact of mass tourism on residents and the traditional livelihoods of Indigenous Sámi people.

After the Santa Claus Village, the Calotte Academy headed to Sweden. By evening, the group crossed the border and arrived at a campsite near Luleå, where they spent the night in charming, red-painted Swedish houses on the Bothnian Bay coast.

On Tuesday, the 12th of November, starting at Luleå Technical University (LTU), the session focused on “Alternative Approaches to (Arctic) Security”. The group was welcomed by Prof.

Athanasios Migdala from the Department of Business Administration, Technology and Social Sciences (ETS). The first presentation was by Rea Fraser, who spoke about the role of the military as a landowner, using Punta Vigía as a case study. Next, Zhanna Anshukova presented a unique perspective, exploring how sexuality can be perceived as a security threat. Caterina Monni followed with an analysis of Arctic security, focusing on the balance between hybrid strategies and nuclear challenges. Finally, Lassi Heininen concluded the session with a presentation on environmental security as a necessary priority, proposing it as a replacement for traditional military security approaches.

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After lunch at LTU, some participants visited LTU’s Science Centre, where they saw, among other exhibits, a Nike Orion rocket and exercised their creativity with Legos. This was followed by a cultural visit to Gammelstad Church Village (UNESCO World Heritage Site).

After that, the Calotte Academy travelled to Hetta, Finland to stay at the comfy wooden chalets of Hetan Kota.

The next day, Wednesday, the 13th of November, the participants attended the session of “The Arctic Yearbook Presents” at the new building of Čoarvemátta – Sámi National Theatre Beaivváš, the Sámi High School, and the Reindeer Herding School, highlighting Indigenous perspectives on Arctic politics and self-governance, food security, extractivist narratives, paradiplomacy, and exclusion. It began with Anders Oskal, who introduced the NOMAD Indigenous Food Lab, an initiative highlighting the importance of traditional food systems in Arctic Indigenous communities. Next, Mirkka Ollila discussed power dynamics in contested extractivist narratives on the Kola Peninsula, offering insights into the tension between development and Indigenous rights.

Adam Kočí explored Greenland’s paradiplomatic relations in a postcolonial context, examining how self-governance is shaping its external relations. Finally, Eleni Kavvatha analyzed the EU Critical Raw Materials Act. The session highlighted the growing influence of Indigenous voices in Arctic politics, while addressing the challenges they continue to face in asserting their rights and roles.

This was followed by a traditional Sámi lunch: roast reindeer with mashed potatoes and cranberries.

After this delicacy, the participants listened to the welcoming joik of the musical artist Inger Marie Nilut. The Academy visited the school’s various handicraft study rooms, where students have the opportunity to learn a range of skills, including sewing traditional clothing, knife carving, reindeer slaughtering… and e-sports!

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After this, the Calotte Academy visited the International Sámi Film Institute; the group had a lively discussion with film commissioner Liisa Holmberg about the Sámi film industry. The participants had a chance to see iconic Sámi film posters (Sámi Blood, Let The River Flow, Pathfinder, …) and to take a look inside the studios.

On the 14th of November, the Calotte Academy travelled to Enontekiö for a session which took place at the Town Hall. It focused on the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) and its evolving dynamics under current geopolitical challenges. Professor Urban Wråkberg opened the session with a presentation on research conducted in the Euro-Arctic borderland, addressing how shifting political landscapes are reshaping cross-border cooperation. Next, Gerald Zojer explored the connection between digitalization and environmental security, discussing the tangible impacts of cloud computing on Arctic regions. His presentation highlighted the hidden environmental costs of digital infrastructure and its implications for security in the Arctic.

After the session, the participants travelled to Ivalo. During the trip, Tatiana Petrova held the workshop “Save the Calotte Academy!” giving participants a chance to exchange ideas on “funding for new Arctic adventures with the Calotte Academy”, “broadening horizons: friends of the Calotte Academy and global connections for greater impact”, and “bringing the methodology of the Calotte Academy to your local community (Don’t copy but apply)”.

In Ivalo, the participants visited UTAC’s winter testing facility. The group had a chance to visit indoor testing environments, including test tracks. After the excursion, the Academy participants learned more about the firm’s activities and testing grounds from the presentation. At the end of the day, the Calotte Academy travelled to Inari.

Friday, the 15th of November began with a peaceful walk along the Juutua Trail, ending at the Jäniskoski Rapids. Participants enjoyed the beauty of northern nature and learned how to start a fire outdoors. Some participants spotted lingonberries still growing in the wild in November —a first-time experience for many nonArctic researchers.

Next, the group visited the Siida Sámi Museum and Nature Center, where they learned more about the rich culture of the Sámi people and northern nature. The museum provided a deeper understanding of life in the Arctic, both past and present.

After lunch, the group gathered at Lassinkota, a modern Sámi-style hut at the Sámi Education Institute.

There was a session titled “Two Mediterraneans: the Southern vis-avis the Northern One.” The session explored the Arctic’s maritime and environmental challenges. Céline Rodrigues spoke about the connection between the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, focusing on Portugal’s role in Arctic

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security. After that, Marco Ghisetti introduced the idea of the “Nordic Mediterranean” as a new way to think about Arctic cooperation. The next presentation was given by Marlene Payva, who discussed how global crises affect the ocean environment and the role of UNCLOS in Arctic governance. The last presenter was Christine Gawinski, who shared insights on how small sea creatures called copepods are adapting to changes in the ice-free Barents Sea. The session ended with lively discussions that brought together ideas from different fields and viewpoints, highlighting the Academy’s focus on meaningful dialogue.

On Saturday, the 16th of November, the day started with a session titled “Arctic Cooperation and Militarization vis-a-vis De-securitization: Russian Perspectives.” Held at Lassinkota, the session combined in-person and online participants. Yulia Zaika spoke about the role of science diplomacy in disaster response and asked whether peace is still possible in a time of growing political tensions in the Arctic.

After lunch, the next session, “The Arctic Yearbook Presents: Global & Planetary Approaches to the Arctic,” explored big global issues through the lens of the Arctic. The first speaker was Tom Royer, who discussed balancing environmental and military security, focusing on commercial spaceports in Northern Europe. Next, Raymond Ruhaak talked about how humans’ disconnection from nature fuels unsustainable resource use.

The final presentation was given by Michaela Louise Coote, who looked at how environmental protection and development can go hand-in-hand in Arctic cooperation. The session ended with the mini-launch of the Arctic Yearbook 2024, celebrating this publication’s role in advancing Arctic research and discussions.

On the final day, Sunday, the 17th of November, the Calotte Academy travelled from Inari to Sodankylä. At the Sodankylä Town Hall, the group met with Stéphanie Lefrère, a sustainability expert. She explained the efforts to tackle environmental challenges, including waste recycling, managing the effects of mining and climate change, and the ambitious Sodankylä Climate Roadmap 2035, which aims to create a greener future. This visit offered a great example of how Arctic communities are addressing global issues with local solutions, showing leadership in sustainability.

The journey ended with a drive back to Rovaniemi. By the time participants arrived at the airport, the train station and the city centre, they reflected on the experiences and ideas shared over the past few days. It was a fitting end to a meaningful exploration of the Arctic’s landscapes, cultures, and challenges.

The 2024 Calotte Academy was, as always, a remarkable journey through the European Arctic and Sápmi, fostering dialogue, collaboration, and learning among early-career researchers. Participants explored diverse themes under “Environmental Security vs. Military Security”. From insightful sessions on geopolitics, Indigenous governance, and environmental challenges, to excursions that Anshukova, Royer, & Kočí

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immersed participants in Sámi culture, sustainability initiatives, and Arctic innovation, the Academy provided a meaningful mix of academic discussions and hands-on experiences. The Academy underscored the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration and local engagement in tackling the Arctic’s pressing issues, leaving participants inspired to apply these lessons within their own research and communities.

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Commentary

The Arctic Council: A Path Forward for Geoengineering Engagement and Governance?

Burgess Langshaw Power and Samuel Geisterfer

The Arctic is in dire circumstances. New research suggests that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) could shut down within decades, it rains at the summit of the Greenland Ice Sheet, and the summer Arctic Sea Ice is predicted to be gone by 2030. The implications of these outcomes are concerning – they include changes to ocean temperatures around the United Kingdom and Scandinavia, and loss of key habitat for Arctic species.

Additionally, Northern Europe is anticipated to experience less precipitation and may become less habitable resulting from cooler annual temperatures. These changes are likely to be felt across Northern Europe and have impacts on and reductions to Arctic ice. For the Inuit and other peoples Indigenous to the Arctic, reductions in ice signify decreased transportation and hunting access.

This situation requires action to maintain the integrity of the Arctic. While the EU has made significant achievements in emissions reductions, most countries (like Canada) are struggling to meaningfully reduce their emissions. Most countries will not meet their own emissions reduction targets. It is also increasingly unlikely for the world to meet the 2-degree Paris climate target, while meeting the 1.5-degree target is beyond any realistically achievable scenario. Failure to meet climate targets almost certainly spells the end of the Arctic as we know it. What, then, can be done to maintain the Arctic?

There are two conceivable paths to maintaining environmental and ecological integrity in the Arctic. First, as has been proposed in numerous venues, is the radical and transformative reconstruction of human society – eliminating the majority of fossil fuel use, removal of most meat products from human diets, implementation of strict population controls, and degrowth of major world economies. While theoretically feasible, this path is not viable for many reasons including a lack of political will. Therefore, we must consider the second pathway: research and possible deployment of geoengineering techniques.

Burgess Langshaw Power, PhD Candidate - Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo Samuel Geisterfer, Lawyer, BC; JD/JID

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What is geoengineering? Geoengineering is a series of technological interventions in global climate systems which would serve to mask the effects of climate change. Few geoengineering techniques currently proposed rectify the problems of buildup of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere, but rather act to temporarily lower global temperatures. The premise of most geoengineering is to increase the reflectivity of different parts of the planet (ranging from the stratosphere, to clouds, to ice) and thereby reflect light and heat back into space – known as albedo modification or albedo enhancement.

The various technologies known as geoengineering are nascent, under-researched, and often poorly understood outside computer modeling. As a result, each carries its own social, economic, environmental, and ethical risks and consequences. Some are notably more scalable, or utilize more readily available technology, but the common trend across these techniques is their ability to invoke disagreement over whether they should be researched further.

The Arctic is no stranger to this disagreement. Harvard University formerly ran the Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment (SCoPEx) but the experiment was cancelled as a result of controversy. An early experiment to test project equipment over Sweden (notable in that it did not in fact intend to cause any change to albedo) was cancelled after the Saami Council issued an open letter objecting to the experiment, claiming that some of the unknown risks of geoengineering entail ‘catastrophic consequences’ and that, ‘There are therefore no acceptable reasons for allowing the SCoPEx project to be conducted either in Sweden or elsewhere.’ The SCoPEx project provides a clear example of the controversy that follows when experiments are conducted with insufficient prior consultation.

While it is true that various geoengineering technologies do hold potential risks, current research has not established the likelihood or extent of such risks. Research is required to ascertain to what extent these concerns are justified, and whether the probability can be reduced, or the consequences mitigated. Conversely, failure to research geoengineering is all but certain to lock us into a future where the environmental and ecological integrity of the Arctic is destroyed – likely irrevocably.

Prior to engaging in such research, we must determine who should be responsible for it. Most geoengineering technology’s research has been conducted by academics disengaged from the realities of Arctic living. Decision-making for geoengineering research should not lie solely in the hands of technocrats. Who else should be considered? Some public advocacy groups have proposed moratoria and bans on geoengineering research (including one supported by academics).

While these movements are well intentioned, they do not account for the practicalities facing the world of geoengineering: Many proposed technologies for geoengineering are relatively simple and inexpensive, so it is possible for private actors or nefarious agents to engage in geoengineering research (and possibly deployment) programs without public oversight or transparency. Given this reality, a ban would only succeed in driving research into covert, private and military spaces, reducing accountability and the ability for democratic oversight of the research.

The path forward in geoengineering must be an open and transparent one. Governments must begin immediate public engagement and consultation programs to ensure that concerns around these technologies are appropriately studied and addressed. With a properly funded research program, the precise nature of the risks and consequences of these technologies can be

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determined; and then, if the risks indeed outweigh the benefits, appropriate governance mechanisms can be implemented.

The critical consideration here is where, who, and how to engage in consultation. In the Canadian Arctic context, the word consultation invokes constitutional overtones. Canadian Inuit groups are owed a constitutional duty to consult for impacts to their rights. The impacts to those rights resulting from geoengineering technologies will, of course, be project specific. However, the existence of this recognized legal duty should encourage governments to involve Indigenous groups at the earliest stage possible. There remains a question regarding which Indigenous groups should be consulted for broader governance decisions and how their voices fit into broader decision-making structures for geoengineering research.

International norms also work to support the inclusion of Indigenous voices while determining the future of geoengineering research. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) provides guidance on ensuring that states properly account for the voices of Indigenous groups. While there is ongoing debate regarding the precise legal effects that flow from UNDRIP, it provides a framework for government decisions that have profound impacts on the territories of Indigenous groups.

The issue of consultation regarding geoengineering technology is complicated by the fact that climate change is a trans-boundary issue. Nation-states have historically been held responsible for legal consultation requirements, but they may not be the best positioned to address the impacts of climate change in the Arctic. Geoengineering technologies and their impacts, like climate change, do not begin or end at the jurisdiction of nation-states. This fact suggests that a new model of consultation may be required for consultation on geoengineering technologies.

The Arctic Council is uniquely positioned to test out a new model of consultation in the geoengineering context. It represents eight nation-states and includes six Indigenous Peoples organizations as Permanent Participants (including the Saami Council). While the SCoPEx project stands as a prime example of how not to proceed, the dire circumstances in the Arctic suggest that now is the time to act. The Arctic Council has an opportunity to consult on geoengineering technologies in a new and meaningful way, emphasizing those whose lives and livelihoods are most directly at stake in the fight against climate change.

It is entirely plausible that the outcome will be to reject geoengineering technologies on account of their ethical implications, or that it is simply too dangerous. However, it should not be up to biased technocrats, nor governments lacking sufficient data. Therefore, engagement with the people at most risk – both of climate change and the effects of geoengineering – must be considered first and foremost, and a strong path forward through a combined institution such as The Arctic Council presents an excellent opportunity. Success in this venue could then be a model for future such deliberation, for geoengineering or other emerging technologies, and for not just Indigenous peoples, but for participatory decision making at the global scale.

Power & Geisterfer

Briefing Note

Incorporating North American Arctic Indigenous peoples and northern residents into regional security Robert P. Wheelersburg

Introduction It is clear in late 2024 that the so-called Peace Dividend proclaimed by Prime Minister Thatcher and President Bush following the breakup of the Soviet Union failed to materialize (Hoagl, 1990).

Worse for the northern regions, although controversial, the oft-mentioned concept of Arctic exceptionalism, wherein peaceful and cooperative relations between circumpolar nations are facilitated by the Arctic Council (Gjørv & Hodgson, 2019), also has not come to fruition.

Following two decades of trying to cash in on the Peace Dividend and Arctic Exceptionalism, several of the Nordic countries are today unable to defend themselves after they decreased defense budgets, eliminated universal conscription, and reduced armed forces. The lack of Nordic security preparedness after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led Denmark, Iceland, and Norway to increase defense spending and caused Finland and Sweden to join NATO. In response to the Russian threat and the emergence of China in the Circumpolar Region, the U.S. reactivated the 11th Airborne Division and established an Arctic defense center, both based in Alaska. Russia is building or reoccupying Arctic bases, creating new units, and establishing an Arctic strategic command. Arctic strategic bipolarity exists again like the Cold War. Yet, the situation is different now since the melting ice will soon allow grey-zone security threats (Atlantic Council, 2022) such as rogue (i.e., out of area) states, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups to operate in the region.

Since the Arctic Council excluded defense in its charter, making competition in the north for emerging territorial claims and natural resource acquisition a matter of conflict not cooperation, there is effectively no method for dealing with grey-zone threats such as border disputes (e.g., Lomonosov Ridge) or international criminal/terrorist activity except with military or police forces.

That inability has contributed to decreased stability in the Arctic just when it is opening to anyone who wants to operate there. To reduce grey-zone threats without resorting to a NATO Article 5 response requiring all members to come to the aid of a beleaguered comrade, some mechanism Robert P. Wheelersburg, a retired professor of anthropology and Arctic Studies, is also a retired U.S. Army officer who was assigned for ten years to the Icelandic Defense Force and the Icelandic Civil Defense Office.

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should be put into place to allow Arctic nations to retain their sovereignty and protect their populations in grey-zone threat situations. This paper argues that North American Arctic Council nations should assist their Permanent Participants, through their respective organizations like the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), in creating security structures that increase Indigenous peoples’ contributions to confidence and stability-building in the north. For the purposes of this paper, the term Indigenous will be used, but the recommendation also covers traditional northern residents.

Utilizing Arctic Indigenous peoples’ capabilities to perform their traditional tasks adapted to security such as surveillance, communication, transportation, and survival, combined with training and support from their countries in limited security functions, could reduce dependence on militaries to protect the Arctic, increasing regional stability.

Lack of United States’ North American Arctic Security Leadership The newly published Department of Defense Arctic Strategy illustrates that the U.S. government views the region as a strategic theatre linked to the defense of the homeland and other global-level operations such as freedom of navigation in international waters. The strategy outlines U.S. Arctic security as a “monitor-and-respond” capability that focuses on intelligence, allied cooperation, and global assets to protect the country’s security (DoD 2024: 1). With it being a strategic and global asset, U.S. Arctic security operations exist to counter the People’s Republic of China and Russia in the Arctic, with virtually no consideration to grey-zone security threats in Alaska. The exception is the U.S. Coast Guard, which does not have the ability to counter ground-based security threats.

That strategy means the U.S. has no leadership role in North American Arctic grey-zone security, leaving Indigenous peoples and northern residents to deal with those threats on their own.

As further proof of its strategic orientation, in 2022 U.S. Army Headquarters Alaska was redesignated as the 11th Airborne Division (Arctic). Despite activation of the division, according to inaugural commander General Eifler, during the past several decades, Alaskan-based troops lost their cold-weather capabilities as they trained to fight in, and deployed to, Middle Eastern deserts rather than preparing for cold-weather combat (Panella 2024). Regardless of assurances by the commanding general that the division was focused on the Arctic, activating the 11th Airborne Division was greatest diversionary tactic since General Patton took command of the fictional First US Army Group to convince the Germans that Operation Overlord (i.e., D-Day) would come at Calais instead of Normandy. Yes, the 11th’s so-called “Arctic Angels” are making a great show of training in the Arctic by participating in NATO and Nordic exercises in Norway and other northern locations. However, if someone believes that the division is more likely to make a combat jump into Barrow, Iqaluit, or Longyearbyen instead of Taipei, Seoul, or Manila, then he or she ignores military history. The 11th was formed originally in 1943, moved to New Guinea to complete training, and then engaged in major Pacific combat operations in the Philippines, headed up Japanese occupation forces, fought in Korea, and was deactivated in 1968 as a strictly Pacific combat asset. As of this writing, a combat infantry company from the 11th Airborne Division just landed on Shemya Island in the Aleutians, which was described by the current commanding general as “show of force following recent Russian and Chinese military activity in the Arctic” (Warner, 2024). With U.S. defense policy focused on Chinese and Russian advances in the Pacific Area of Operations, it is easy to see that the real mission of the 11th Airborne Division is strategic-level deterrence there!

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The absence of U.S. Arctic security leadership is perhaps fortuitous due to the abysmal historical record of U.S. Arctic military operations. Despite the boldly (and erroneously) titled publication, Regaining Arctic Dominance – the U.S. Army in the Arctic (2019), the U.S. Army has never had Arctic dominance, shown by the service’s failure to staff, equip, and train units for Arctic combat (or even survival) during WWII. For example, American unpreparedness for Arctic operations was evident in 1941 as U.S. Marines took over from British forces that occupied Iceland to prevent a German invasion. The War Department sent Marines destined for the Caribbean to Iceland without cold weather uniforms, equipment, or training for Arctic operations. They were relieved by untrained and poorly equipped Army troops, who spent the war fighting to stay warm and survive the rigors of the Arctic winter. In Alaska, the 1943 attempt to retake the Aleutian Island of Attu was nothing short of a military disaster due to the U.S. Army’s unpreparedness for Arctic operations. The 7th Infantry Division, which led the counterattack against 500 Japanese troops occupying the island, was untrained and poorly equipped for the frigid Arctic weather. While they retook Attu eventually, the Americans suffered more non-battle casualties attributed to weather, disease, and vehicle accidents than to combat. Although there was no combat when allied forces later reoccupied abandoned Kiska Island using elements of the American mountain division, the Army forces still suffered high casualties from accidents, disease, and weather. Five years after WWII, the Battle of Chosin Reservoir in Korea took place in frigid arctic conditions, which resulted in the virtual annihilation the Army’s 7th Division in what some call the worst defeat in American military history.

Thus, as seen through its Arctic security strategy, doctrine, and military history, the U.S. has no real leadership position among its North American Arctic partner nations in grey-zone operations (i.e., Canada, Denmark, and Iceland). That means all four countries must create structures utilizing Indigenous arctic peoples and northern residents as a first step to ensure grey-zone security in their own territories and in the Arctic region generally.

Indigenous Arctic peoples in previous North American security operations Although there are historical examples of Indigenous peoples serving in strategic-level military operations and fighting in convention warfare battles, for example the Saami and Nenets during WWII (e.g., Turunen et. Al. 2018; Dudeck 2018), that is not the type of security participation recommended here. Rather, the recommendation is that North American Arctic Indigenous peoples and northern residents possessing traditional knowledge and skills for survival, perhaps with military training as part of their national service, participate on a voluntary basis in grey-zone security activities supported by their host nations. The Alaskan Territorial Guard (ATG) during WWII (Figure 1; Heurlin n.d.) provides a suitable example of a security operation by Indigenous peoples and northern residents. Ranging in age from 12 to 80 years old, several thousand native Alaskans were recruited to become members of the ATG organized by two active-duty Army officers. After the 1942 invasion of Attu and Kiska, these militia members provided patrolling and surveillance for Alaskan frontier security, performing other tasks like deception operations and establishing remote supply depots. ATG troops received minimal Army training near their villages including weapons familiarization and communication procedures to enhance their Indigenous arctic survival and mobility skills (Kimmons, 2017; Eifler & Hardy, 2023).

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Figure 1. Recruiting poster for the Alaska Territorial Guard. Heurlin, n.d. Used with permission from the University of Alaska Museum of the North.

Although the ATG was disbanded in 1947, later the Alaskan legislature authorized creation of the Eskimo Scouts as a militia associated with the Alaskan National Guard (a federal entity), but without pay or formal training. In 1951 the scouts received their first formal field training at Fort Richardson. Although paid minimally for part-time service, the scouts and their families were so dedicated that villages held charity events to supplement their pay. Some scouts eventually received training at Fort Bragg (now called Fort Liberty) from Army Special Forces (i.e., Green Berets) troops in basic soldering skills like map reading, but also in guerilla tactics behind enemy lines. At the same time, since Special Forces soldiers must be prepared to operate in any climatic conditions, the Eskimo Scouts provided cold-weather survival and mobility training to the Green Berets. Many Indigenous family members continue the legacy of the scouts today by serving in the Alaskan National Guard, where they receive individual training and are prepared to enlist if the Eskimo Scouts are ever reactivated (Kimmons, 2017).

Like Canada today (as described below), Alaska had its own federal rangers, when a Ranger Company consisting of Active Component troops was stationed at Fort Richardson from August 1970 until September 1972. Company O, 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger) was created by the commander of U.S. Army Alaska using experienced officers from Ranger units that formed Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LLRP) in Vietnam. Many of the Ranger units stood up during the latter stages of the conflict in Indochina were being disbanded or returned to the states and there was Department of the Army discussion about what type of Ranger units should exist in the future and how they should be utilized (Harrison, 2024).

Based on recommendations by officers assigned to Alaska, and supported by general officers at the Pentagon, the Army used both ranger-qualified and newly recruited personnel to form the new

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unit, informally referred to as “The Arctic Rangers.” The Arctic Rangers’ mission was to perform long range reconnaissance patrols in the sparsely populated Alaskan north during the Cold War to protect the nation from strategic threats, especially a ground attack by Russia. Subordinate tasks included protecting the Alaskan Pipeline, performing search and rescue duties especially to recover downed aircrews, and showing the flag to ensure the sovereignty of the decade-old Alaskan state.

Importantly the Arctic Rangers trained with former Eskimo Scouts members who continued to perform their previously assigned duties voluntarily without compensation. The Alaskan Rangers, numbering approximately 336 troops, created training and tested equipment for Arctic conditions, and was just beginning to establish itself as an elite unit when it was disbanded. That began a pattern of relative neglect of security in America’s Arctic region that continued for the next half century (Harrison, 2024).

North American Arctic security in Canada, Denmark (Greenland), and Iceland World War II made Canada a strategic military power, allowing it to build one of the world’s largest militaries composed of an army, navy, and air force, with over a million troops under arms (Veterans Affairs Canada, 2020). Yet it was decided that military troops were not enough to ensure complete defense and security for the Canadian Arctic; rather, a combination of mobile force and frontier scouts was necessary to retain sovereignty over their northern territories. This resulted in a security force involving both regular army paratrooper units called the Mobile Striking Force and a type of reserve home guard named the Canadian Rangers. The Canadian Rangers are northern residents (mostly Inuit) who live in the arctic countryside, survive its hardships, provide reconnaissance, and protect themselves if necessary (Coates et al., 2008).

The key to understanding Canada’s use of Indigenous peoples in security operations is contained in its Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy (Government of Canada, 2010). The policy requires increased government monitoring and security in the country’s Arctic region, consisting of Nunavut, the Northwest Territories and Yukon. The sparsely populated area comprises 40% of Canada’s land mass, 75% of its coastline, and includes 36,000 islands, presenting a challenge to monitor given that it is without roads or railroads. The immense mission of ensuring Canadian sovereignty requires not only meeting strategic security threats, but includes grey-zone threats like terrorists, criminals, and others who might use violence to achieve their goals. Those threats would be countered by the civil authorities, law enforcement, and the armed forces. Importantly, the country’s security posture includes the Canadian Rangers made up primarily of native and northern residents (Government of Canada 2010).

Today’s Canadian Rangers began their history as the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR) formed in 1942 amid invasion worries following Japan’s occupation of the Aleutian Islands. The militia members were unable to perform regular military service due to age or essential-occupation status.

In the PCMR they received training, a rifle, and a uniform, but were required to be self-sustaining.

The main PCMR tasks were to use their local members’ knowledge of terrain, settlement locations, and subsistence activities to report to their higher headquarters any events like suspicious maritime act or overland travel by strangers. While the PCMR disbanded in 1945, today’s Canadian Rangers owe their ancestry to them (Lackenbauer, 2013).

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The Canadian Rangers were created in 1947 and their approximately 5,000 members are part of the nation’s Army Reserve forces. Although many are Indigenous peoples, the rangers have a mixed ethnic makeup depending upon their locations, and non-native northern residents can take part. The rangers receive annual military training and are stationed near their local communities.

Members are issued a rifle, clothing (e.g., red sweatshirts that identity them), and other equipment, but are expected to use their own transportation means for which they are reimbursed. The members are paid for performing duty and training according to their rank and status as Reservists, although some rangers at headquarters have active-duty positions. Rangers are organized into five patrol groups (CRPG), assigned to an active or reserve Army division, and responsible for patrolling their unique regions. Each CRPG consists of a headquarters unit commanded by a lieutenant colonel, patrol companies headed by a captain, and patrol groups of thirty members led by a sergeant. Patrol groups are assigned a specific area with members coming from local villages (Government of Canada, 2011).

Canadian Rangers conduct surveillance operations by patrolling North Warning sites in their area of responsibility, observing strangers, and reporting suspicious activity. When so tasked, ranger units provide training to regular military troops in Arctic survival and mobility skills. During arctic emergencies or exercises performed by southern-based troops, Canadian Rangers act as guides or advisors to civilian and military responders, and participate in search and rescue operations.

Rangers also generally “show the flag” in their local communities by providing instruction and mentoring to the Junior Canadian Rangers and by supporting important national and local holidays.

Except for personal protection measures, the Canadian Rangers would not engage in direct combat with enemy troops or other grey-zone threats. Therefore, CRPGs do not possess automatic or anti-armor weapons (Government of Canada, 2011). Still, the rangers’ structure, organization, and primary missions represent a current example for North American grey-zone security forces. At the other end of the spectrum of native Arctic militia groups is the elite, active-duty Danish naval unit called the Sirius Sled Patrol (Slædepatruljen Sirius) that operates in uninhabited northern and eastern Greenland. As an important part of the Danish Kingdom’s sovereignty mission in the North Atlantic, the Sirius Sled Patrol is fully capable of operating for months without direct support, relying on pre-positioned supply depots and shelter in the remote Arctic landscape. The entire unit consists of twelve volunteers who have undergone extreme testing and training to survive and navigate in the Arctic, with six first-year members joining six second-year veterans annually. All sled patrol members spend most of their two-year tour patrolling mostly in the Northeast Greenland National Park. Each patrol team consists of two sailors accompanied by as many as fourteen sled dogs. The patrols perform military surveillance, policing, game and fish warden duties, support research expeditions and cruise ships, take climatic observations (i.e., ice thickness), and assist in search and rescue (Forsvaret 2024). Like the U.S. Navy’s Underwater Demolition Teams (i.e., SEALS) without the scuba diving capability, Sirius Sled Patrol teams are fully capable of engaging threats militarily using direct action (i.e., conventional combat). They are heavily armed with personal weapons and capable of attacking small-scale threats or even providing support to regular armed forces during larger conflicts.

Unlike the Sled Patrol, direct action missions against Arctic grey-zone threats are not suitable for Indigenous militias or security patrols, for which they are not trained or equipped. Recently, however, many native Greenlanders have received military training by serving conscription periods with Danish armed forces, and those former service members could provide the basis for an Inuit Wheelersburg

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security patrol unit. Additionally, two recent changes to the Greenlandic self-governing responsibilities related to increasing autonomy could provide the legal basis for forming a security force comprised of Indigenous peoples. First, following a referendum on self-determination in 2008, an agreement was signed with Denmark to allow the Greenlandic government to take a larger role in foreign affairs and defense (originally retained by Denmark along with currency and postage). That larger defense role involved Greenland taking control of the coast guard there and assuming a command role in policing operations including the patrol boat crews that are trained and equipped to support Arctic military operations (Statsministeriet n.d.). Second, in 2024, the first cohort of 22 members enlisted in the Arctic Basic Education course offered by the Joint Arctic Command in Nuuk. The course will be held in Greenland, with classes covering Indigenous Arctic knowledge mostly taught in Greenlandic, that when combined with Danish military subjects, will prepare the new soldiers to perform their duty in Greenland. According to the Arctic command, the new opportunity has generated much interest among young Inuit for serving in the military, which had fallen to a low-level following Denmark’s 2019 elimination of the conscription of Greenlanders. Although the intent is for Greenlanders receiving the Arctic Basic Education to support and serve with Danish armed forces for training or in an emergency, the capability will soon exist for a Greenlandic Ranger organization to be formed to conduct grey-zone security tasks while performing their day-today activities in the self-governing, autonomous region (Ellekrog 2024).

Because much of Iceland is located on the North American Continent, I include the country in this discussion. However, there are no Indigenous peoples in Iceland, so the northern residents must take control of their own security, which they have not yet accomplished. I have declared elsewhere that I believe Iceland’s failure to provide for its own security against grey-zone threats should result in the country’s removal from NATO (Wheelersburg 2022). If Iceland is to remain in NATO, it must establish its own security force and use the programs available to alliance members that help countries by providing training, equipment, and weapons. While the politicians, especially those from the anti-military parties like the Left-Green and Socialist Parties, have controlled much of the country’s foreign policy recently, Iceland’s citizens traditionally supported an anti-military stance. A 2016 survey revealed that nearly 45% of Iceland’s population did not know they were in a military alliance (the number was 50% for those respondents under 30; Ómarsdóttir 2018). But after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Figure 2), a 2022 survey revealed nearly three-quarters of respondents were in favor of the country remaining in NATO although there was some variation based on political party. Regardless of the differences, nearly half of Left-Green and Socialist Party members responded in the 2022 survey that they wanted to remain in NATO (Ledbetter, 2022).

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Figure 2. Goodbye Arctic Exceptionalism! Russian Ambassador’s Residence in Reykjavik splattered with red paint following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, October 2022. Photography by Robert Wheelersburg.

Without legitimate security forces, the country has continued the process of militarizing its police (much to the consternation of its citizens) by arming them with automatic weapons and assigning them inappropriate missions like anti-terrorism operations or diplomatic security. Such inappropriate missions are plain to see. While attending Arctic Circle in 2022, to which most Icelanders pay scant attention, I watched Crown Prince Haakon of Norway being surrounded by a dozen Icelandic motorcycle cops leaving Harpa Concert Hall, with crowds of Icelanders gawking at the scene not knowing who was being protected. Recently, Icelandic Police pepper sprayed proPalestinian demonstrators who were supposedly blocking government ministers from meeting; however, that claim is disputed (Fontaine, 2024). The 2024 G-7 summit in Reykjavik marked a significant change in Icelandic security policy. In time for the summit two days later, a June 22, 2024 amendment to the Icelandic Police Act No. 95/2024 allowed foreign police to carry weapons to provide security for international events or as bodyguards for foreign leaders (Alþing 2024).

Regardless of the militarization of the police and allowing foreign police to be armed, Iceland is woefully unprepared to provide for its own security. For example, the coast guard’s only longdistance surveillance airplane, SF-TIF (a Saab 340a), is currently grounded indefinitely to repair its engines, leaving the country without sufficient advance threat warning using its own capabilities (Pomrenke 2024a). Since to date NATO member countries have provided approximately $50 billion to Ukraine to fight against Russian aggression, Iceland could certainly request that the treaty organization provide it with two C-130 Hercules aircraft and fund their maintenance.

Iceland took the first step toward achieving its own security when Prime Minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir resigned and was subsequently defeated in the 2024 presidential campaign. In 2018, Jakobsdóttir refused to tour an American aircraft carrier visiting Iceland, despite other ministers doing so, citing her party’s stance that Iceland should withdraw from NATO (Kyzer 2018; Gibson 2022). As a member of the anti-military Left-Greens Party that held only a few seats, Jakobsdóttir had no legitimate claim to be the leader of her country. Recent polling suggests that the Left Greens may lose their seats in the Alþing, which would benefit

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Iceland’s future security posture (Pomrenke 2024b). Today most Icelanders want to be a member of NATO and there is no real political opposition toward doing so. It is time for the country to assume its own security instead of using hired guns like the Americans or Canadians who have provided past grey-zone security. If Iceland does not want to “join” NATO as a full member able to defend itself, the alliance can find another airfield or just pay rent for the one the U.S. built originally at Keflavik. I have outlined a plan to create such a security force using existing search and rescue capabilities and adding a volunteer reserve component (Wheelersburg 2022).

Conclusion Northern American Arctic grey-zone security is in its formative stages, using militias and reserve forces comprised of Indigenous peoples and northern residents. Currently, only Canada possesses the capability to adequately protect its population and retain its sovereignty in its Arctic from such grey-zone threats using non-military forces. Denmark is taking steps to support the Greenlandic government’s efforts to protect its own territory against rogue states, terrorists, and criminals.

Using its Inuit people, perhaps with the Sirius Patrol providing training and logistical support, Greenland could achieve its own grey-zone securityy. Iceland has no security above the police and coast guard. NATO members should require the country to create a security force using trained and armed reservists, perhaps recruited from the existing search and rescue units. The U.S. is also unprepared to deal with grey-zone security threats in its Arctic region despite the presence of the 11th Airborne Division there. America should create a new Alaskan Rangers that is comprised of Indigenous peoples and northern residents. If the Northern American Arctic countries develop grey-zone security forces in autonomous regions like Nunavut or Greenland and in sovereign territories in America and Iceland, the Arctic Council’s Permanent Observers could begin to influence stability and confidence building in the Circumpolar region without relying on military forces or NATO’s Article 5. Such a security situation could limit the circumstances that lead to actual combat or all-out warfare in the North American Arctic.

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Accessed August 20, 2024, https://www.althingi.is/altext/154/s/2125.html Atlantic Council (2022) Today’s wars are fought in the ‘grey zone.’ Here’s everything you need to know about it. Hybrid Conflict Project, Forward Defense Experts, February 23, 2022.

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Dudeck, Stephan Johannes (2018) Reindeer Returning from Combat: War Stories among the Nenets of European Russia. Arctic Anthropology, 55(1), pp. 73 – 90. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Eifler, Brian S. and Natalie M. Hardy (2023) Building Readiness through Alaska Native Partnerships. Journal of Arctic & Climate Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2023), pp. 33 – 40.

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Accessed June 14, 2024, https://www.forsvaret.dk/da/organisation/sokom/Sirius/omos-sirius/ Gibson, Megan (2022) Iceland’s prime minister: “My opposition to Nato has not changed” Gjørv, Gunhild Hoogensen and Karen K. Hodgson (2019) ”Arctic Exceptionalism” or “comprehensive security”? Understanding security in the Arctic. In Heininen, Lassi, Heather Enxer-Pirot and Justin Barnes (eds) Redefining Arctic Security, Arctic Yearbook 2019, pp. 218-230. Akureyri, Iceland: Arctic Portal. Accessed on May 11, 2024, https://issuu.com/arcticportal/docs/ay2019 Government of Canada (2011) Canadian Rangers. Canada. National Defense. Ottawa: Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces. June 27, 2011. Accessed May 23, 2024, http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/cr-rc/index-eng.asp Harrison, Suzanne (2024) The Forgotten Ranger Company. The Story of the “Arctic Rangers” of Company O, 75th Ranger Regiment. April 2024. Fort Liberty: U.S. Army Special Operations History Office.

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2024, https://www.canadashistory.ca/explore/first-nations-inuit-metis/sentinels-ofsovereignty Ledbetter, Emma (2022) Most Voters Support Iceland’s NATO Membership, Survey Finds.

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Commentary

Research on the Euro-Arctic Borderland under pressure: a case and some reflections Urban Wråkberg

Are field excursions, participant observations and face-to-face interviews during visits to an area of study a prerequisite for claiming profound knowledge on it, or is freedom of travel just some kind of ingrained privilege for academic researchers? This commentary for the Arctic Yearbook will explore the present dilemmas of doing research in social sciences and the humanities on the Norwegian, Finnish and Russian High North borderland as we face sanctions and rapid change in national and university policies towards Russia.

While belief has recently all but evaporated in the media and among North-European governments, in the Barents Euroarctic Region 1993-2022 cross-border program, modelled on EU neighborhood policies, faith was high for some decades in the institutional cross-border partnerships it facilitated, governed by top-down funding and political promotion. Among the components of this were cross-border interaction on regional level by "people-to-people" relationships. After Russia’s military attack on Ukraine in 2022 this peace-work is now seen as highly problematic, stamped in hindsight by many as naïve and counter to the real security interests of the Nordic countries.1 Is this maneuvering the necessary flip-side of a responsible top-down monitoring of northern regional activities including university borderland research, Russian studies and cross-border education?

Most Scandinavian scholars seem to say yes to that today, esp. those who didn’t engage more than opportunistically in the Barents Euroarctic policy in the first place. Somehow lost in the present new-old “security from above” concern are people still residing under the pressure of outmigration in the Euroarctic, and those who take seriously the Euroarctic collective memory – dating far back to similar times of conflict that were brought north from the south.

This commentary will briefly relate a journey made by a group of Norwegian citizens, including the present author, to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk in June 2024 and the storm of dislike it caused in Norway a few weeks later when information about it was planted on the national media scene.

Public condemnation and deep concern were expressed to response-fishing journalists by domestic commentators, importantly the leader of the Arctic University of Norway in Tromsø (UiT) who

Urban Wråkberg, Professor of Northern Studies, UiT The Arctic University of Norway

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reacted immediately to journalists against two of the travelers who were former and present professors of the UiT. The “successful” journalist initiation and piloting of this affair through a week of overblown agitation will be reflected on, along with the widely spread lack of awareness of the principles of freedom of speech and research that are stipulated in Norwegian law. Attention will be drawn to how different academics, the public, journalists and university leaders understand and apply the Western sanction-policy against Russia which Norway follows. I will go on to present what I see as the main “take-aways” of this affair, and what may be the continuing challenges for scholarly research on Russia that it demonstrates.

A Norwegian-Russian cross-border trip – its features and consequences So what was this all about? It was vacation, based on travels in Russia made in full accordance with UiT IT security regulation. Thus the two UiT employees participating operated no job computer, cell phone or soft-ware provided or serviced by UiT inside Russia, no on-line connection were opened there with UiT E-mail systems. The recommendations against travelling in Russia issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) were known to all, and obviously Russian Visa were applied for and bought privately as was travel insurance valid in Russia. The main goal of the trip was to attend the White June cultural festival in Arkhangelsk where my colleague at the UiT professor emeritus Ivar Bjørklund did two excellent presentations on literary topics while I did none. Others in the group were musicians and performed elsewhere in the many parallel shows of this great festival. Returning with a stop-over in Murmansk we did museum visits and met members of the Russian-Norwegian language club, several of its members now being out of a job after being fired from Norwegian and other international enterprises that have cancelled their business in Russia.

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From the extensive web program of the White June festival anyone able to read Russian, or taking the trouble to translate its contents, could with some effort find the names of a few Norwegians performing there – we were the only foreigners present. One organizer of a private dinner in Murmansk put pictures of the event on Facebook; those were also found by the media-tipper and handed to journalists of the National Norwegian Televisions Cooperation (NRK).

Having been involved in job partnerships in Russia the group naturally met with people we had worked with on various Barents cross-border endeavors now all closed. Regarding UiT this typically included book publishing, conferences, and in my case internationally open on-line courses in Northern Studies, offered in institutional alliance with several Russian universities. In the days all of this was run fully transparent to the NMFA, in-line with Barents policies and endorsed as UiT academic undertakings.3 Some former colleagues in Russia refrained from meeting us due I guess to personal risk evaluation. Nowhere were we pursuing such contacts because this was vacation. However, given my experience of Russian society and that of all fellow travelers, field-research based on participant observation was part of the trip.

We don’t know who tipped the NRK about our trip, but we can guess. What we know is that Western legislation on journalism means that its sources are protected from disclosure. Indicative of the intellectual level of the media witch-hunt against the undersigned and Ivar Bjørklund were interview questions repeatedly phrased like, how is it even possible for a professor at a Norwegian university to travel in Russia these days? One academic colleague at a domestically highly ranked research institute informed us via the media that he would not have undertaken that trip, considering in hindsight, I guess, the bad publicity it created for us. As part of the media defamation Research on the Euro-Arctic Borderland under pressure

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campaign I was mentioned on national news web-sites by name with full affiliation and big highresolution portrait photos. Television outlets propagated it further in the echo-chamber of national and district news. I am today recognized by any Norwegian familiar with the affair, this includes most academic people.4 I received hate mail describing cancellation measure planned against me and my family from individuals including some in doubtful mental health.

After responding to an internal UiT request from the faculty leadership for rapid/brief information I received feedback from the academic union, and some relevant high-level UiT functionaries.

While being unsupportive of the trip, they advised me to let the thing blow-over and avoid any hasty statements in the media. This was largely OK, but most of those in touch with me regarded it as obvious that the trip was one big embarrassing mistake. UiT legal advisors and academics in the faculty of jurisprudence were missing in this and continued to be so until the affair was over.

At the peak of summer vacations advisors were perhaps also missing around UiT’s then acting leader prorector Jan-Gunnar Winter who rashly told some journalist asking for comments that I, being the only full UiT employee among the travelers would be facing an UiT internal investigation and charged with disciplinary measures (personalsak). This is the strongest kind of reaction against an employee available at a Norwegian state institution and includes the option of the accused being fired. For the media this was the “best possible” UiT reaction and allowed further inflating the drama and building a burgeoning readership.

Twenty-four hours later the threat of a disciplinary investigation was withdrawn by the prorector in a 180-degree turn; the affair was called off as far as the UiT was concerned. Later he explained to me that the whole thing resulted from mistaken use of terminology on his behalf, and the matter was and is – I hope – laid to rest on the top-level of the university.5 In the outpour of anti-academic sentiments there were clarifying comments rapidly made which proved crucial for how the affair progressed. Those came from experienced legal experts and are of a general interest. In this category fall statements made by practicians of law and experts on the principles of freedom of speech in Norwegian and international legislation, Anine Kierulf, Benedikte Moltumyr Høgberg and Mads Andenæs, all at Oslo University (UiO).

Benedikte Moltumyr Høgberg, professor of law, stated in a public post on her Facebook profile that she regarded the entire case as problematic for academic freedom of expression and deemed the UiT management’s reaction against Bjørklund and Wråkberg as disproportionate.

“If academics face reactions [like these], it will work as an attempt to control research and academic freedom. Shame on any research dean at UiT or elsewhere who does not stand up for true freedom, democracy and academic autonomy.” “This case is a grotesque example of how Norwegian academics are attempted to be controlled, duped and hung out in public if they do not behave as the Norwegian authorities, the university management, the press or the PR agencies want.”6 Mads Andenæs, professor of jurisprudence at UiO stated to NRK “Regardless of what the internal [university] guidelines say, the principle of academic freedom of expression is weighty and must take precedence.” He “agreed” that there ought to be a disciplinary case opened at UiT but not against the present author but against Prorector Winter.7 Formerly at the Dep. of Mathematics and Statistics of UiT, Professor emeritus Kristoffer Rypdal stated to the media:

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“The problem in this case is that UiT is acting as a surveillance authority and interfering with our fundamental freedoms in a way that feeds the Russian propaganda machine, since they can rightly claim that the fundamental freedoms we fight for in Ukraine are not worth much when it comes to ourselves.”8 What are the take-aways from this?

Contemporary Scandinavian institutions suffer from media scare. Few things if any are as abhorred as bad publicity. No matter if the organization seems to be involved in committing anything right or wrong, and if leaders of the institution are unable to decide this, there is a nervousness when journalists call and ask for comments. The result is that journalism sets the agenda for much of the public conversations in society and that any employee causing bad publicity tends to be regarded not part of the problem but the problem. To quickly join the journalist’s accusations against such a person is a temping way out of the institutional guilt-dilemma. This distrust-reaction against staff of your own organization seems many places to be part of the company culture. It should be tested more often to start negative media encounters with a standard response from the top that we will clarify and investigate matters before stating much more than as a rule our employees don’t make big mistakes.

Nordic media are free to present news involving the smearing of named individuals and institutions.

The way to plant information useful for such media sensationalism follows a well-tested procedure.

There is little or no efficient legislation in place against libel caused by what is found to be unfounded accusations and mistaken ideas on laws and regulation. The lack of proof of any wrongdoing of anyone exposed by journalists is manageable. This invites fraudulent information to be handed to journalists under the cover of anonymity against the public, that are motivated by malicious intent by the tipper against individuals, groups or institutions of his or her dislike.

International networking and field excursions are not academic privileges but something necessary to gain and hold credibility in expertise. It should be the duty of every scholar to leave the interior academic comfort zone regularly to test ideas and encounter extramural phenomena and values.

To shut the door on interaction with a problematic region or country leads to poor research that will be prone to miss new trends and developments. In contrast the news reporters’ risky trips to dangerous locations are adamantly swallowed by most Western minds, not only as a journalistic privilege, but a valued component in the cliche of the heroic correspondent.

Enduring challenges Certain groups of professionals in contemporary Scandinavia are held in low esteem by most journalists and many politicians. Unpopular academics, esp. scholars and social scientist, are suitable targets for journalistic attacks and entertaining media defamation. A set of stereotypical confrontation models can be found by which academic persons are typically dragged/lured into the public scene for “critical” studio interviews. Such interviews are typically kept short to the detriment of profound analysis, are full of interruptions and opposition from the expert-acting journalist or studio chairperson. Thus, scholars on less than national celebrity level, are reluctant to accept invitations to broadcasted debates and to give interviews. This is characteristic of Scandinavia media and stands in contrasts to journalistic practices in national news in other countries. I’m familiar with news outlets in Poland, Israel, Germany and the US. Here instead interviews of various professionals provides ample time for the respondent to answer which

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enables the public to receive and evaluate for themselves experience- or research-based knowledge on various matters.

In the Swedish state funded SVT news channel it is since long established a system in which real experts have been replaced by former SVT reporters and journalist who have been handed a position as news channel inhouse expert commentators on matters like macro economy and domestic politics. In Norway an undecided top-down dispute rolls on regarding who or what a researcher represents when stating anything in public media.

Turning to the standard reactions I have had from the average academic colleague, the most common one regarding field research or travelling in sanctioned countries like Russia is negative. I have had simplistic feedback, like: “How could you!?” “Going there to appear in anything in public you were of course used in Russian propaganda!” without the contender being able to give concrete examples and present the logic of the propaganda.

In other personal communication I have been lectured more interestingly by Russian academic colleagues living in Western diaspora. Their advice to me in conclusion is to leave Russian studies to them, as they would know Russia best. Non-Russians do well to stay out of there as they risk being lured into espionage or thrown in jail to be used for exchanges with Russian criminals imprisoned abroad. Nevertheless, we see mostly journalists committing crimes of informationgathering in Russia that get them into prison there. All Russian academics living in the West I know have strong bonds to family members still living in Russia. From what I have seen over time they tend to be careful not to undertake research on subjects that may irritate authorities at home. It could affect badly the life-quality of their Russian relatives as well as their own future permissions to undertake travels in and out of Russia. Pressure on loved ones in your home-country is a wellknown practice internationally to control and extort citizens abroad into illegal activity in their land of residence. These are not only factors hampering free enquiry by those victimized by such state attention, but also of course something that may cause individuals in diaspora to become security risks wherever they are.

Admittedly, moving further with such reasoning may lead astray. The Western sanction regime against Russia has been appropriated by activists also in Norway. The improved career opportunities that positive publicity entails have tempted some academics, despite lacking diplomatic experience as well as military special training and professional title in jurisprudence, to sense a call to help the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) to discipline credulous fellow countrymen, esp. amateur historians, from cross-border networking with Russians. Russianoriented local circles and named individuals living in the Russian-Norwegian borderland have been stamped repeatedly in chronicles and in videos on the Internet as politically naïve security risks.

This deepens distrust in the borderland for central authorities and for anyone from the university sector.9 Good scholarship needs historical perspectives and often geopolitical contextualization. Repressive regimes are found in many military hot regions globally and instructive to study before jumping to conclusions on domestic affairs. The truly naïve idea to my mind is that if we only think away our “problematic” neighbor and forbid cross-border interaction and research, we can sleep-walk through the bad times without the risk of being overwhelmed when we are forced to open our eyes again sometime in the future.

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Notes 1. The foresighted scholar Geir Hønneland declared Barents Euroarctic regional collaboration dead already in 2017. Geir Hønneland (2017). Arctic Euphoria and International High North Politics. Singapore: Springer Nature. Cf. Astri Edvardsen (2022). “Border Seminar 2022: ‘We Must Check for Both Pessimism and Illusions in Our Perception of Russia’”. High North News October 22.

2. https://whitejune.ru/program/ Visited November 3, 2024.

3. Peter Haugseth & Urban Wråkberg (2021). “Experiences of Norwegian-Russian Cooperation in the Field of Education at the UiT Arctic University of Norway Campus Alta and Kirkenes”. In: N.A. Shevchenko & Yu. O. Shestova (eds). Dialogue of Cultures: History and Modernity of Russian-Norwegian Cultural Cooperation, Murmansk: Murmansk Arctic State University, pp. 117–122.

4. https://www.nordnorskdebatt.no/grenselost-naivt/o/5-124-317437 Visited November 3, 2024.

5. https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/uit-forskere-fikk-kritikk-etter-russland-reise-_jusekspert-langer-ut-mot-universitetet-1.16961170 Visited November 3, 2024; Ivar Bjørklund (2024). “Russland Er Et Farlig Sted [Russia is a Dangerous Place]”. Khrono July 10. https://www.khrono.no/russland-er-et-farlig-sted/888723 Visited November 3, 2024.

6. Quoted from an E-mail by journalist Oscar Henrik Biti Næss to the author July 10, 2024.

«Hvis akademikere møter reaksjoner for dette, er dette et forsøk på å styre forskning og akademisk frihet. Skamme seg den forskningsdekan ved UiT eller andre steder som ikke står opp for ekte frihet, demokrati og akademisk frihet»; «Denne saken er et grotesk eksempel på hvordan norske akademikere forsøkes styrt, dupert og hengt ut hvis de ikke oppfører seg slik norske myndigheter, universitetsledelsen, pressen eller pr-byråene ønsker.»

7. https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/uit-forskere-fikk-kritikk-etter-russland-reise-_jusekspert-langer-ut-mot-universitetet-1.16961170 Visited November 3, 2024.

8. “Det problematiske i denne saken er at UiT opptrer som overvåkingsmyndighet og griper inn i våre grunnleggende friheter på en måte som gir det russiske propagandamaskineriet vann på mølla, siden de med rette kan hevde at de grunnleggende frihetene vi kjemper for i Ukraina ikke er så mye verd når det kommer til oss selv.” https://www.nordnorskdebatt.no/uit-skal-ikke-vare-psts-forlengede-arm/o/5-124317981 Visited November 3, 2024.

9. Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv (2024). Security and Geopolitics in the Arctic: The Increase of Hybrid Threat Activities in the Norwegian High North, Hybrid CoE Working Paper 30. Helsinki: The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, pp. 16–18; Einar Sørensen (2024), “Uten Nordnorske Journalister Ville Vår Nære Historie Aldri Blitt Allemannseie”.

ND Nordnorsk debatt, November 2. https://www.nordnorskdebatt.no/uten-nordnorskejournalister-ville-var-nare-historie-aldri-blitt-allemannseie/o/5-124-332178 Visited November 3, 2024.

Research on the Euro-Arctic Borderland under pressure

Commentary

Freedom of science will be taken by geopolitical tensions if universities do not resist pressure from outside and implement academic freedom...

Lassi Heininen

Freedom of science is stated as belonging to the core of Nordic/European values in speeches (e.g. the 55th anniversary of Finnish Union of University Professors in October 2024), communiques and declarations (e.g. the European Higher Education Area Ministerial Meeting in May 2024) and academic gatherings (e.g. the Helsinki Collegium event on academic freedom in November 2024; the Nordic Meeting in May 2018) as a leading principle in Academia. Recently, based on a substantial report Nordic academic trade unions stated that academic freedom is “under pressure from a range of factors... [when] challenges such as managerialism, external funding dependence, undue political interference,... threaten the core principles of academic freedom”, as they united their commitment to protect it (Nordic Academic Trade Unions 2024). So far, so good.

The real value and importance of an independent scientific community, however, is measured by if the freedom is implemented in a real life. This is particularly relevant when there is a ‘storm’ of turbulent times in world politics either due to geopolitical tensions or wars; or severe natural disasters or man-made environmental catastrophes indicating that the “‘Anthropocene’ is already at play” (Finger 2016) and is threatening the entire planet.

There is now a perfect storm with multiple crises consisting of great power rivalry, including a trade war between China and USA; New East-West tension with related tit-for-tat responses, an arms race and frozen arms control between Russia and USA; a hot/proxy war in Ukraine with propaganda, war-mongering and supplies of military hardware, from ammunitions to strategic long-range missiles, between Russia and NATO member states; constant occupations, armed conflicts and civil wars in the Middle East, in particular between Israel and Palestine, and in Africa with massive bombardments and ongoing genocides.

At the same time, the entire world is thoroughly affected by the climate crisis, together with a loss of biodiversity and the mass-scale utilization of resources as well as the political inability of states

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to mitigate climate change, as seen at the latest COP-29 summit. Permafrost thaw is an important consequence of global warming and is representative of the rapid warming of the Arctic climate at 3-4 times the rate of the rest of the Planet: it destroys infrastructure (roads, airfields, factories, pipelines), causes accidents and pollution, releases carbon dioxide and methane (possibly old frozen viruses), makes Indigenous peoples’ and other residents’ everyday life more vulnerable, and is having direct and indirect consequences by accelerating global warming around the world.

On the one hand, all this requires the political ability and willingness to recognize the environment as the “material basis for human existence” (Haila 2001) and put it as the first priority because it serves “as a signifier for everything which is gone wrong in society” (Albrow 1996, 71). On the other, it is largely recognized that better scientific and interdisciplinary research are required and advanced technologies need to be applied in addition to more scientific cooperation across borders, including the sharing of scientific results and data globally.

On the contrary, since early-2020s, under the pressure of great power rivalries and geopolitical tensions due to the rise of China, the strengthening of the BRICS+ integration, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a fear rather than courage ”dominates among Western leaders” (Wieslander 2023). This fear plays a significant role in world politics, though cooperation is still a motivating factor in the longer run (e.g. Heininen 2024). This has made Western governments pause scientific cooperation, including cooperation in monitoring and information- and data-sharing between the West and Russia, and now with China.

In difficult times, if not always, it would be good for the geopolitical situation to be analyzed holistically and thoroughly by experts and debated honestly among policymakers, and for academic freedom to be properly implemented. It would also be good to remind ourselves about lessons learned from the past when formulating and implementing new policies and restrictions, and to take into consideration their consequences. This commentary - as a part of the volume on transformations, legacies and futures, and a sort of continuity of the discussions at the 2022 Arctic Yearbook “The Russian Arctic: Economics, politics & peoples” (e.g. Introduction, Heininen, Wheelersburg, Paul, Knyshev, Devyatkin, Enomoto, Parlato et al) - discusses the consequences of securitizing open science and restricting scientific cooperation in democratic societies, raises ethical questions of undermining academic freedom, and finally, provides a reminder about the importance of cooperation in Arctic research and its benefits for maintaining peace and stability in the region.

Securitizing science and restricting scientific cooperation Regardless of the existing reality of environmental catastrophe, including the risk of an “irreversible collapse” of the industrial civilisation and the entire global system (e.g. Ahmed 2014), great power rivalries and geopolitical tensions are being allowed to securitize open science, undermine academic integrity, and violate freedom of science in Western democratic states.

Consequently, this securitization process has led governments of most EU and NATO member states “to impose direct and indirect restrictions on research concerning Russia and China” as Nojonen writes in this volume.

First, members of the scientific community who have continued cooperation between individuals, across the NATO-Russian / Chinese borders are been punished or threatened with punishment (e.g. Wråkberg in this volume). Similarly, those academic networks and platforms, with open

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discussion and excursions as main methods which are keeping connections functioning across a new ‘Iron Curtain’ are facing unprecedented challenges. It seems to be that mainstream academic institutions put these activities into a margin by terminating funding, cancelling agreed visits, undermining academic qualifications, and attractiveness among young researchers towards cooperation across different borders.

Damage is already seen in Arctic research, for example, where cross-border, pan-Arctic cooperation, knowledge-building and transdisciplinarity (e.g. Arctic Yearbook 2023, Introduction) has been flourishing for decades. Due to a pause in monitoring and data-sharing, we do not know enough about the recent impacts of climate change. As the Russian Federation covers half of the Circumpolar Arctic and its rimlands and around 50% of the world’s permafrost is located there (mostly in Siberia), it is not scientifically credible and politically wise to neglect that half by excluding it from scientific cooperation and diplomacy (e.g. Konyshev 2023). In addition, several Western researchers and research institutions, having done research in the Russian Arctic and / or among Indigenous peoples, as well as cooperating with Russian colleagues, have benefitted professionally and from fundraising by leaning on Russian data and assisted by Russians (Zaika 2024).

There is peripheral damage (though critical) to the scientific community as it is losing its independence – i.e. the right to decide the goals, objectives and methods of research – to policymakers, secret services and media. This has already been seen in critical fields of science, such as climate and environmental sciences, security and strategic studies, and IR. Universities are allowing media, including yellow press, to influence research by politicizing it. Consequently, scientific cooperation across Western-Russian / Western-Sino borders is becoming an increasingly sensitive issue within Western research communities, including those with academic freedom in their constitution.

The fact that new policies and restrictions – often formulated quickly and accepted without assessment and detailed guidelines on how they should be implemented – are not necessarily thoroughly thought-out or logical, and this does not help here. For example, the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture (2022) declared in March 2022 that universities and higher education institutions are recommended to restrain “from all cooperation with Russian partner organisations in higher education and science... new projects should not be initiated and existing cooperation between organisations should be suspended”. Yet in a statement regarding institutional cooperation, there is nothing about cooperation between individual researchers or how to implement the policies.

The UArctic Board, on the other hand, stated in April 2022 that “collaboration between individual researchers in Thematic Networks and educational activities for students shall continue where possible.” Similarly, the Human Rights committee of the Council of Finnish Academies recommended in August 2022 that sanctions targeted to states and institutions should not be extended to scientific cooperation between individual researchers.

The results so far: two Finnish universities contradictorily implemented the new policies in the case of the same person: one punished by terminating an emeritus contract, unlike the other that decided to continue a visiting researcher contract. University leaders in Norway threatened publicly to punish a staff and emeritus faculty member, yet after a strong public response by the scientific community, the move was withdrawn. After an outcry and pressure from a loud group of staff Securitization Narrative in the West and Its Restrictive Impact on Research on Russia and China

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members and universities leaders in Estonia, a decision was made to terminate an emeritus contract.

University leaders of another Finnish university withdrew an already promised honorary doctoral degree from a former minister who is currently an individual researcher.

In each of these cases, and there are a few more, a citizen of these countries paid a visit to Russia as an individual researcher.

Ethical questions of undermining freedom of science All this raises at least three ethical questions: Firstly, although juristically universities have a right to terminate contracts, ethically it is very problematic to claim that a fact-finding trip of an individual researcher, or contacts between individuals, would be against the values of science and the commitments of universities if contacts are related to discussions on fundamental and timely issues, such as nuclear weapon systems, the climate crisis and other related risks. It is also artificial and hypocritical to argue that information-sharing and discussion between Western and nonWestern experts on scientific research, methods, monitoring and data-sharing would threaten national security of EU / NATO member-states and support the Russian war in Ukraine.

Secondly, when it comes to freedom of science and the independence of the scientific community, there is concern about a growing influence of media over academia and universities. Research and higher education should keep their neutrality from any influence or pressure from outside the science community and be independent (see Laakso 2024). Hence, it cannot be so that universities make important decisions on research based on the media, or a single news report in yellow press, as has happened in Finland.

Yet, what would be a motive of universities (rectors, deans, heads of administration) to overreact or press a panic button and implement new policies and forget freedom of science? To please a ministry / government when hoping for more financial support, perhaps. Or, simply to play by the book, when trying to interpret how new policies should be implemented. Or, to punish certain individuals, who are being vocal either in public by asking critical questions (e.g. concerning Western double-standards) or critical within a university / faculty.

Thirdly, as wicked global problems cause severe, actually the severest, security threats to people and societies on the Planet, they should be debated publicly and discussed between researchers and other experts - through interdisciplinary research and internationally - all the time and without (self)censorship. We academics are educated and trained either to reveal a problem or find a new approach / angle to a known phenomenon, and then analyze it critically as well as submit our findings and conclusions, after a peer-review process, to be published without a fear of censorship or authoritarianism, or to be silenced under the pressure of geopolitical tensions. Yet, decisionmakers will make the final decisions based on that.

As science is universal, new approaches, analyses and findings should be shared among members of the international scientific community. Or, this used to be the normative scientific environment, and would be useful and beneficial to all parties in the future, too.

In a such stormy situation, when hegemonic competition and geopolitical tensions accelerate rivalries between major nuclear weapon powers, and when the last arms control agreement expires next year, scientific cooperation, as a field of low-politics, has the capability on the one hand to give insights into societies and implemented policies beyond the closed borders. On the other hand, it has the ability to provide a common ground for dialogue. A dialogue between researchers and Freedom of Science

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other experts is, or could also be used for, confidence-building by indicating the social relevance of science.

This, also called ‘science diplomacy’, is an emerging topic in recent international policy-oriented gatherings on the Arctic; yet it is important to remember that researchers are not diplomats, and according to the division of labour, diplomats should be allowed to do their work where they are the best experts.

The thinking behind this goes that if cooperation between authorities and institutions is not possible, members of the scientific community (for example, emeritus / emerita and other retired experts) can, and should be allowed, to use other channels to continue cooperation. Though, not much discussed in this hostile atmosphere to highlight the importance of national security, researchers are more citizens of the international scientific community than those of a certain state (Saarikivi 2024). Similarly, ethics says that to emphasize national interests over moral points of view, such as human rights, is neither always allowed (Sihvola 2006), nor beneficial for humankind, even that very nation, in the longer run. This is also one of the features of Globalism, which requires that states would do things globally what they were doing earlier nationally (Albrow 1996).

Finally, even in this very situation, universities have responsibilities to defend their researchers and their academic credentials, and certainty not to violate their academic freedom.

Importance of cooperation in Arctic research Arctic research - either by researchers of Arctic states and Indigenous peoples, or beyond - has been mutually beneficial and is one of the main indicators of common interests between the eight Arctic states and Indigenous peoples. This has been demonstrated by international scientific organizations, such as International Arctic Science Committee; higher education institutions, such as University of the Arctic; academic journals, such as Arctic Yearbook; and international research networks and fora – annual or ad-hoc – like for example, Calotte Academy, Arctic Frontiers, and the Arctic Circle Assembly.

This international approach to Arctic research was approved, and is supported, by the scientific cooperation agreement (2017) between the Arctic states. It is legally-binding and (still) in force and does not “provide an explicit provision for its termination, withdrawal or suspension because of armed conflict or heightened political tensions” (Konyshev 2023). The approach is also supported by the new guidelines for the Arctic Council Working Groups, agreed to in 2023 and implemented since early-2024 under the Norwegian chairmanship.

Based on its social relevance, Arctic scientific research could also be used for confidence- and peace-building, as a few learned lessons from the Cold War period indicate. Interestingly, in the 1970s new cooperative agreements on environmental protection and arms control were signed across the Iron Curtain multi- and bilaterally: The 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears between the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean is mentioned. Less so bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the USA, such as the 1972 US-Soviet Cooperation Agreement aiming to solve “the most important aspects of the problems of the environment” (Rosen 2023), the Agreement of the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, from the same year (Lynn-Jones 1988). Hence, scientific cooperation “eventually paved the way for the normalisation of state relations” in the Arctic, as Exner-Pirot (2024) writes (see, also Arctic Yearbook 2022).

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Concerning learned lessons from the Cold War period – in these days these stories would be told more by those of us who were there – I cannot avoid a temptation to look back to the beginning of my research career and compare the current situation to that of the turn of 1980s-1990s with the pioneering of cross-border and pan-Arctic cooperation on research. Based on scientific curiosity and mutual respect between Nordic, North American, Russian, and Indigenous researchers and other experts, the first research projects on the Arctic had in-person seminars, including dialogues between researchers and civil servants (many experts on arms control), and publications were launched (e.g. TAPRI). Additionally, the first academic institutions on Arctic issues were established, among them the International Arctic Science Committee and Calotte Academy which still function (e.g. Report on Calotte Academy 2024 in this volume).

Despite several uncertainties and poor communication lines, there was much enthusiasm and an open-minded attitude towards cooperation across state and bloc borders. There was also a readiness to share experiences, information and data, and to implement the interplay between science, politics and business (e.g. Heininen 2021). It was a “moment of hope,” as Evangelista (1990) describes the first arms control negotiations in the 1950s between the Soviet Union and the USA. Prior to the transformation “from military tension into geopolitical stability,” the Arctic states, together with Indigenous peoples and supported by the region’s civil societies, reconstructed their geopolitical reality by putting cross-border cooperation regarding environmental protection as the first main shared interest, as President Mikhail Gorbachev (1987) noted in his famous Murmansk speech in October 1987. Including initiatives for Soviet-Nordic cooperation on both military and civilian issues, some Western politicians took the speech, as well as the speeches by Soviet prime minister Nikolai Ryzhkov (1988) three months later in Sweden and Norway, very cautiously at first, even sceptically, calling it hypocritical or a Trojan Horse (for more details see Archer 1989).

Nonetheless, after substantial political discussions and debates, and many speculations, the Nordics, as well as Canada and the USA, were ready to differentiate the proposals and pick that of cooperation on environmental protection, including science, “as an important opening in approaching security and co-operation problems in the Arctic and Nordic areas” (Torstila 1988).

The rest is a part of the history of successful Arctic cooperation.

Conversely, in the 2020s, the Western Arctic states have paused official scientific cooperation with Russia, though the Arctic Council’s WGs are functioning on a limited basis. One Arctic state has closed its embassy in Moscow. Another closed all crossing points on the Russian border, unlike another that is keeping its only one open. The last two non-aligned Arctic states have joined NATO, Russia is in a war against Ukraine, and the rest seven are involved in sanctions and a proxy war against Russia. In short, it does not look good – it looks bad – as this kind of total pause between these states did not even happen during the Cold War period; hopefully, the USA is keeping its diplomatic channels open with Moscow.

At the same time, scientific cooperation and cooperation on climate change mitigation is more needed than ever due to the pressure of the ongoing environmental catastrophe. Permafrost thaw, as an effective way to measure a state of the rapid warming of Arctic climate, has made Indigenous peoples and other residents in the Russian Arctic, as well as Russian researchers and authorities, concerned about the situation and eager to share data and cooperate with foreign experts.

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If the previous procedures are applied to the current situation: Scientific cooperation and cooperation on climate change mitigation and glaciology, which play a crucial role for the future of the region and that of the entire humankind, could be excluded as targets of the Western sanctions and restrictions. This could be done by differentiating foreign and security policies of Arctic states so that cooperation in these fields could be continued, and flows of research data and knowledge-sharing restarted (Heininen 2024).

As 30-35 years ago things were not expected to go as they did, further processes can go in other directions as well: Arctic cooperation between the eight Arctic states would become fragmented, and Russia would prefer the BRICS+ cooperation also in Arctic research, as we discuss in the introduction (of this volume) (also Zaika 2024). Fresh indicators of this were discussed at the Calotte Academy 2024, in November, when researchers of the Kola Science Center (located in the Western most part of the Russian Arctic) reported on increasing cooperation with Asian partners, namely from China and India, due to a pause of collaboration with Western partners.

Whatever the future options there will be (in Arctic research), an important precondition for science is that academic freedom, as well as the integrity of the scientific community, is being respected - universally, nationally, regionally, locally - among policy-makers, and that all members of the scientific community implement this freedom.

References Agreement on Enhancing International Scientific Cooperation, 11 May 2017, Fairbanks, United States. (mimeo) Ahmed, Nafeez (2014). “Nasa-funded study: industrial civilisation headed for ‘irreversible collapse’?” The Guardian 14 March 2014.

Albrow, Martin (1996). The Global Age. State and Society Beyond Modernity. Polity PressBodmin, Cornwall.

Archer, Clive (1989). ”Western Responses to the Murmanks Initiative.” Centre Piece 14, Spring 1989.

Centre for Defence Studies, Aberdeen, Scotland.

Evangelsta, Matthew (1990). ”Cooperation theory and disarmament negotiations in the 1950s.”

World Politics, A Quarterly Journal of International Relations, Volume XLII, Number 4 – July 1990, 502-528.

Exner-Pirot, Heather (2024). “Termination of Lapland professor puts a chill on Arctic research.”

The Barents Observer – 12/06/2024, 11:08.

Finger, Matthias (2016). “The Arctic, Laboratory and the Anthropocene.” Future Security of the Global Arctic. State Policy, Economic Security and Climate. Ed. By L. Heininen. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave Pivot, 121-137.

Heininen, Lassi (2024). ”Geopolitical Features, Common Interests and the Climate Crisis: The Case of the Arctic.” Geneva Paper 35/24. GCSP. Online: www.gcsp.ch Heininen, Lassi (2021). “From Scholars’ Journey to the North into a School of Dialogue – History of Calotte Academy.” Selected Articles of Calotte Academy – A travelling northern symposium on science and politics. Eds. by L. Heininen and J. Huotari. TN on Geopolitics and Security, 4-55.

Online: https://www.arcticpolitics.com Securitization Narrative in the West and Its Restrictive Impact on Research on Russia and China

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Konyshev, Valery (2023). Arctic Science Diplomacy: With or without Russia?” GCSP Strategic Security Analysis, Septrember 2023 – Issue 32.

Laakso, Liisa (2024). ”Akateeminen vapaus ja sota”, a personal e-mail 13/05/2024, 14:20.

Lynn-Jones, Sean (1988). “A Quiet Success for Arms Control. Preventing Incidents at Sea” Naval Strategy and National Security. Eds, by Steven Miller and Stephen Van Evera. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 359-389.

Ministry of Education and Culture (2022). ”Finland freezes higher education and research cooperation with Russia – Support for Ukrainian students in Finland.” Press release 9.3.2022 13:38.

Nordic Academic Trade Unions (2024). Academic Freedom in the Nordics: Legislation, Practice, Challenges.

A report from Nordic academic trade unions 2024. https://sulf.se/app/uploads/2024/10/Report_Academic_freedom_in_the_Nordics_202 4.pdf Rosen, Y. (2023). “Despite Russia’s Post-Invasion Isolation, Some Narrow Openings for Arctic Cooperation Remain.” 5 April 2023.

Ryzhkov, Nikolai (1988). Neuvostoliiton ministerineuvoston puheenjohtajan Nikolai Ryzhkovin puhe pääministeri Ingvar Carlssonin Ruotsin ulkoministeriössä tarjoamilla päivällisillä 11. tammikuuta 1988. APN (mimeo) Saarikivi, Janne (2024). “Mitä Immanuel Kant sanoisi Venäjästä, ydinsodan uhasta ja konferenssimatkailusta?” Helsingin Sanomat nettipainos 19.5.2024.

Sihvola J. (2006). Suomen ulkopolitiikan etiikka. Tieteessä tapahtuu 3/2006, 5-14.

Torstila, P. (1988). Security and Co-operation in the Arctic Region: Finnish viewpoints. Remarks at Nordic Security in 2000: Seminar in Kuhmo, July 21, 1988. (mimeo) Wieslander, A. (2023). “Is This Any Way to run a War?” Discussion by Tällberg Foundatuion, 5 April 2023. Online: https://www.tallbergfoundation.org Zaika, Yulia (2024). “Omnia Mea Mecum Porto: Science Diplomacy Realm of The Russian Arctic.”

Paradigma Vol./Issue: 13/Special Issue.

Online: https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/paradigmaiiad

Freedom of Science

Commentary

Securitization Narrative in the West and its Restrictive Impact on Research on Russia and China Matti Nojonen

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the rise of China have catalyzed a powerful "securitization" narrative in the West, which has, in turn, influenced academic freedom and intellectual discourse, especially in subjects concerning Russia and China studies, security (policy) studies, and international relations. The narrowing of academic freedom is partly driven by political, public and diplomatic pressure on universities to align with government stances against Russia and China. This overwhelming securitization environment can and has not only stifled research critical of Western strategies (incl NATO's role) in the region but has forbidden working together with Russian academics and limited academic collaboration with China. Consequently, we are losing insights into the trajectories of Russian and Chinese societies. We in the academic community face a paradox: while universities should do critical work on our own societies and policies and advocate for freedom of speech and critique authoritarianism abroad, we are facing a new normative environment where open domestic discourse are threatened to be silenced under the pressure of securitization discourse.

Rising Tide of Securitization Narrative In this article we utilize securitization framework as a process in which academic work with Russia and China are treated as security threats and therefore should be banned or restricted and align with government policies.

We can pinpoint certain moments and processes that have triggered and are feeding into securitization framing processes in our Western societies. It was since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the continuation of Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine that began in February in 2022 and China’s fast technological advancements and becoming a genuine economic super-power challenging the position of US, when Western nations have increasingly labelled Russia and China as security threats. This rising tide of a securitization narrative has become the dominating line in policy-making, news media, public perception, labeling both Russia and China Matti Nojonen Professor of Chinese Culture and Society Faculty of Law, University of Lapland matti.nojonen@ulapland.fi

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as challenging and threatening our Western security, economic rights and order, and even fundamental values and practices.

Restrictions on and consequences of Russian and Chinese Research The securitization process has led Western governments to impose direct and indirect restrictions on research concerning Russia and China. Following the Russian war on Ukraine, the European Union Commission decided to suspend cooperation with Russian entities in research, science and innovation. A great majority of the EU member states (with the exception of Hungary), Norway and Great Britain gave national level ministry level bans forbidding universities and research institutes collaborating with their Russian counterparts.1 The collaboration and partnerships with Chinese research institutes, enrolling Chinese researchers and academic work on China has also been subjected to restrictions. This process began during Trump’s first presidential term as a part of his China containment policies. Trump famously stated in August 2018 that “[A]lmost every student that comes over to this country [from China] is a spy.”2 As a part of this policy the Department of Justice launched their “China Initiative” campaign that carried out detailed investigations on US university researchers affiliated with China or being of Chinese origin. Despite the campaign directed at finding Chinese spies on US campuses the result was embarrassing – no one was convicted or even charged with spying in any China Initiative case. The Initiative reportedly largely targeted individuals based on any connection to China or scientists of Chinese heritage, and increasingly targeted “research integrity” issues and was accused of racist practices rather than economic espionage and hacking3 These policies also reached Europe where nation states and security authorities restricted and warned universities of China related collaboration.

The Russian war on Ukraine in 2022 and Beijing’s open reluctance to condemn the illegal war of aggression created a situation where all China-related research and collaboration are seen as a security risk. The securitization pressure on academia is even broader. For instance, US embassies are contacting university leaders and funding agencies behind the curtains asking universities to align with Western policies against China and domestic security apparatus are warning of perceived risks involved in China collaboration.

Consequences of securitization measures and narrative The silencing force of the securitization narrative and measures are legally questionable as these measures can be seen as hindering the freedom of academic research and freedom of expression guaranteed by laws and constitutions in Western liberal democracies. This silencing is not conducted under Martial Laws of these countries, but merely as ministry level stipulations or EU Commission decisions.

Furthermore, different universities in given countries are interpreting these ministry-level orders differently. The most famous case being the treatment of Emeritus Professor Lassi Heininen of University of Lapland and Visiting Researcher at Aleksanteri Institute of Helsinki University.

Heininen participated in an international conference arranged in Moscow together with a number of other Western scholars. Consequently, the University of Lapland stripped him of his Emeritus Professor contract whilst Helsinki University did not punish Heininen for participating in this conference4. Notably, no other Western participant was punished by their home universities. This kind of treatment questions the principle of equality in and between respective countries.

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The securitization narrative is most visible in the news media and how news media selects the specialists for interviews. When news is solely produced through a security lens, not only policymakers receive a limited perspective but the wide public gets a skewed and negative stigmatizing understanding of these countries. This limited perspective reinforces a cycle in which perceived threats are amplified, and the danger of denouncing all Chinese and Russian people as potential threats becomes “a truth”.

Funds for research critical of securitization policies are increasingly limited, pushing scholars toward self-censorship or pro-securitization narratives. Consequently, researchers fearing repercussions may avoid controversial topics or choose an approach that aligns with prevailing securitization narrative. This self-censorship can also spill over to publications, where editors may be reluctant to publish work that could be seen as challenging the dominating Western views on Russia or China.

Furthermore, the securitization cloak limits our possibilities to discuss with liberal and critical Chinese or Russian researchers who have deep personal knowledge of their domestic societal moods and potential policy trajectories. By keeping in contact with these researchers we can also express our support for them.

These chilling consequences have implications for fact-based policy making due to limited access to Chinese or Russian liberal voices. One-sided news broadcasts combined with self-censorship omit insights to potentially alternative trajectories of these societies. When certain narratives or interpretations are prioritized over others, and others are silenced, the actual hard-core security and other policy making becomes one-sided due to a lack of diversity in perspectives.

The Dangerous Paradox The securitization narrative restricts academic freedom, drives self-censorship, and narrows the scope of scholarly inquiry related to Russia and China. It will cast a long shadow over research related to these countries. By emphasizing security over a broader and open approach to these countries, we miss opportunities for gaining understanding of potential alternative societal trajectories of these countries and are not able to have constructive engagement that could have significant global implications.

The prevailing securitization trend raises ethical, legal and practical questions about the boundaries of academic freedom. Maybe the most alarming is that the securitization narrative and practices harm the actual democratic values we cherish. This paradox has not gone unnoticed in China and Russia and is, as a matter of fact, providing powerful propaganda tools for autocratic rulers boosting their political legitimacy. By displaying this paradox Chinese and Russian state-lead media expose our Western “double speak” – how we speak of freedom of speech whilst we readily silence domestic critical voices.

There is a danger that we have entered a securitization dominated world where only very few brave academics voice their concerns. This is reminiscent of the Communist Party governed Poland that reminded “a room where people unanimously maintain a conspiracy of silence, one word of truth sounds like a pistol shot,” in the words of Polish Nobel laurate of literature (1980) Czesław Miłosz5.

It is notable that the Nobel Committee recognized him for his writing in dissident silencing Poland of the 1980s, which "with uncompromising clear-sightedness voices man’s exposed condition in a world of severe conflicts”.6

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Notes 1. https://okm.fi/-/suomi-jaadyttaa-korkeakoulu-ja-tutkimusyhteistyon-venajan-kanssasuomessa-olevia-ukrainalaisopiskelijoita-tuetaan; https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1544 2. https://asamnews.com/2018/08/10/chinese-students-are-spies-president-donald-trumpreportedly-told-u-s-business-leaders/ 3. https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1593&context=crsj 4. https://yle.fi/a/74-20087766 5. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1980/milosz/lecture/#:~:text=In%20a% 20room%20where%20people,to%20think%20of%20anything%20else.

6. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1980/milosz/lecture/#:~:text=In%20a% 20room%20where%20people,to%20think%20of%20anything%20else.

Nojonen

IV. Strategies and Policies

Ireland’s Arctic Strategy: Building Bridges to the North Elena Kavanagh

The Arctic region is of global importance due to the escalating impact of climate change, emerging economic opportunities and geopolitical dynamics. These changes in the Arctic affect Ireland because of its proximity to the region and its location in the North Atlantic. Despite being on a Northern periphery, Ireland lacks a transparent model for its involvement in Arctic governance. Irish interest in the Arctic is growing due to the country's rich polar tradition and strong research base on oceanography, biodiversity, and climate change impact. There is a clear “gap in Ireland’s engagement in the Arctic, and successful stewarding of the Arctic is in Ireland’s best interest” (Cronin, 2021). Therefore, two research questions arise. Firstly, given Ireland’s experience as a proactive “global actor and bridge builder” (Government of Ireland, 2020) in the international arena, what role could it play, and what can it contribute to the Arctic? Secondly, as the Global Ireland multi-year Strategy to 2025 (Government of Ireland, 2023) comes to an end, should Ireland develop its Arctic regional Strategy? The main strategic Arctic themes for Ireland are ripe for exploration. The political landscape of the Arctic region is rapidly changing and being reimagined (Koivurova et al., 2022). It is, therefore, important to review Ireland’s position in this context. This paper serves as an initial step towards a more comprehensive policy analysis of Ireland’s role in the Arctic. The main findings of the paper highlight the growing significance of the Arctic region due to climate change and geopolitical dynamics, emphasising Ireland's strategic interest in the area. The paper also underscores the need for Ireland to eliminate the current fragmented approach to Arctic policy and formulate a comprehensive Arctic Strategy to proactively engage with the evolving Arctic political landscape, environmental protection and economic opportunities.

Introduction The Arctic region is experiencing significant and rapid transformations, driven by rapid climate change, economic activities, and shifting geopolitical dynamics. These include a rate of climate warming that is four times faster than the global average (Rantanen et al., 2022) so that the extent of Arctic sea ice is declining and thinning (IPCC, 2019). In recent years, the effects of abrupt climate change have become increasingly apparent, profoundly affecting Arctic residents and dramatically altering marine and land ecosystems (Jansen et al., 2020). The diminishing ice cover in the Arctic Ocean has heightened economic activities in the Arctic (Alvarez et al., 2020).

Elena Kavanagh, Ph.D. in Law, School of Law, University College Cork, Ireland.

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For the Republic of Ireland, the consequences of Arctic changes are becoming increasingly significant. The country is located at the same latitudes as Hudson Bay in Canada, the Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia, and southern Alaska in the US. The potential weakening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) throughout the 21st century is expected to bring cooler temperatures to Ireland, which could edge the country even closer to the Arctic region (Noone et al., 2023). This scientific concern, combined with the need for preparedness and response, highlights Ireland’s strategic interest in the region.

Moreover, as the Arctic is slowly losing its status as a “region of peace” (Gorbachev, 1987) and Arctic exceptionalism is being increasingly challenged (Spence et al., 2023; Shvets and Hossain, 2022; Devyatkin, 2023; Jensen, 2024), Ireland needs to develop a comprehensive approach to address the emerging geopolitical risks and opportunities. With its experience as a proactive “global actor and bridge builder,” Ireland could play a crucial role in facilitating international cooperation and dialogue in the Arctic.

At the Arctic regional level, the Arctic Council, which serves as the principal platform for Arctic cooperation, is currently facing challenges in maintaining its normal operations. Russia’s limited involvement in recent years (Koivurova & Shibata, 2023; Kavanagh, 2024) has complicated multilateral cooperation. Efforts to establish a formal Arctic treaty, akin to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, have been unsuccessful due to national sovereignty issues, economic interests, and geopolitical strategies among the eight Arctic states (Koivurova, 2015). Additionally, there is a growing call for Ireland to sign the Antarctic Treaty (Hughes & Hughes, 2024), which underscores the importance of international cooperation in polar regions and highlights the contract between the established governance of Antarctica and the current fragmented approach to Arctic governance. However, a soft-law framework continues to govern the Arctic region, which emphasises the need for external actors, such as Ireland, to formulate their own strategies. The lack of binding rules in soft-law frameworks in the Arctic requires Ireland to proactively craft its own approach, ensuring it can adapt to legal uncertainties.

Given these shifts, Ireland’s response must be proactive. While it already has an existing Strategy for the Nordic Region to 2025 (Government of Ireland, 2021) and a separate Strategy for the US and Canada to 2025 (Government of Ireland, 2019), the approaching expiration of these policies calls for the formulation of a more focused Arctic Strategy. Ireland’s rich history of polar exploration, combined with its scientific engagement in Arctic research, further validates the search for such a Strategy. Drawing inspiration from Scotland's approaches (Johnstone, 2012) and discussions around the UK’s Arctic potential (Depledge & Dodds, 2011), Ireland now finds itself at a critical juncture. This is the time to formulate a comprehensive Strategy that addresses its unique interests and capacities in the Arctic, while also aligning with the approaches of the Observer states in the Arctic Council.

By crafting a proactive, ethical, and comprehensive dedicated Arctic Strategy, Ireland can position itself to address both the environmental and geopolitical challenges in the region. By demonstrating the historical connection with the Arctic region, dependency on the state of the Arctic environment, and scientific involvement in the Arctic region, this article aims to map the future Arctic Strategy for Ireland. It is probable that Ireland’s Strategy will share some similarities with the strategies of similar-sized countries or the Observers in the Arctic Council; therefore, the role of non-Arctic states in the Arctic should be examined in this context. Despite this alignment,

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Ireland's approach should have its own unique elements tailored to its specific interests and capabilities.

This paper adopts a multidisciplinary qualitative research approach, focusing on policy analysis and comparative case studies to explore Ireland’s potential role in the Arctic and the development of its Arctic Strategy. The methodology begins with a historical analysis of Irish Arctic engagement.

Next, a comparative case study approach examines how non-Arctic states have engaged with Arctic affairs. This allows for the identification of successful strategies that Ireland can adapt, particularly in terms of environmental, geopolitical, and economic interests. Special attention is given to Scotland’s Arctic engagement, given its proximity and similar historical connections to polar regions.

Throughout the research, the Heininen’s thematic analysis (Heininen et al., 2020) is applied to identify key themes for the Arctic strategy. The methodology also considers ethical research principles, ensuring that Ireland’s potential Arctic Strategy respects Indigenous communities and avoids exploitative practices. Ireland's Arctic Strategy should include ethical considerations for research and collaboration with Indigenous groups, as some research has been harmful or unwelcome in the past (Doering at al., 2022).

Indigenous Peoples are distinct actors in Arctic international relations. Based on their right to selfdetermination, they have established unique relationships with the Arctic states, participating in the Arctic Council meetings around the same table as nation-states. Recognising and adhering to Indigenous protocols for ethical research can help Ireland avoid the pitfalls of a "white saviour" mentality, ensuring that any contributions by Irish universities and scholars are collaborative, respectful, and guided by the needs and desires of Arctic Indigenous communities (O’Brien et al., 2024).

Historical Underpinnings and Ireland’s Current Arctic Engagement Historically, Ireland has experienced both sides of colonialism. On one hand, the historical colonisation of Ireland has shared experiences with Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic. On the other hand, Ireland has also made great advancements in polar exploration (Smith, 2010; McCannon, 2013). The Irish explorer Robert McClure was the first European explorer to discover the Arctic Northwest Passage (Cavell, 2018). The distinguished history of polar science is marked by contributions from many notable individuals. Ernest Shackleton, from County Kildare, remains one of the most celebrated polar explorers, known for his leadership during the Imperial TransAntarctic Expedition (Larson, 2011; Alexander, 1998). His contemporary, Tom Crean from County Kerry, also earned renown through his pivotal roles in three major Antarctic expeditions, including Shackleton's Endurance expedition (Smith, 2019).

Another key figure is Francis Crozier from County Down, a major contributor to Arctic and Antarctic voyages in the 19th century (Lloyd-Jones, 2005). Crozier was a captain of Terror in the Franklin Expedition, which aimed to traverse the last section of the Northwest Passage unnavigated by European explorers (Smith, 2021; Nugent, 2003). His efforts significantly advanced the Western geographical and scientific knowledge of the polar regions during his time.

In modern times, the Network of Arctic Researchers in Ireland (NARI, 2019) plays a leading role in developing Ireland's scientific connection with the Arctic. It has been active at previous Arctic Circle events, organising sessions with the other Arctic networks. It is being involved in setting up Ireland’s Arctic Strategy: Building Bridges to the North

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an Irish branch of the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS, 2024), which is due to be launched in the near future.

Since 2018, the Embassy of Ireland in Oslo and the Marine Institute have been sponsoring early career researchers to attend the Arctic Frontiers Emerging Leaders programme (Embassy of Ireland, 2024). Ireland's contributions to Arctic research are signified by numerous established scientists, including Dr Audrey Morley, an expert in marine geology who focuses on paleoceanography and understanding climate change, having conducted Arctic research aboard the Irish vessel, RV Celtic Explorer, a certified polar research vessel. Among other prominent Arctic scholars is Dr Mark Jessopp, a leading marine biologist from University College Cork.

Their work, along with that of many other dedicated Irish researchers, including scholars from social sciences and humanities such as Dr Tracey Skillington, Dr Elena Kavanagh, Michaela Louise-Coote and others, is critical for understanding the Peoples and communities of the Arctic (Skillington, 2023; Kavanagh, 2024; Coote, 2023) and global climate patterns and the impacts of climate change on Arctic ice and ecosystems (Afloat, 2020).

The importance of this research grows because the Arctic has emerged as a focal point of geopolitical interest and tension for both Arctic and non-Arctic states, partly due to environmental shifts and ongoing global conflicts. Therefore, while the Arctic requires Ireland’s contributions, Ireland also has a moral imperative to develop a strong Arctic Strategy to engage with this critical region.

Non-Arctic States This section explores the policy approaches adopted by other non-Arctic states as their involvement in the Arctic has increased due to a combination of environmental, economic, and strategic factors (Steinveg et al, 2024). The policies of non-Arctic states usually have a somewhat different context and purpose that distinguishes them from those of the Arctic states who take their Arctic legitimacy for granted (Canova, 2023).

Non-Arctic states are keen to understand the processes behind climate change (Coates & Holroyd, 2017). As the fastest warming region on Earth, the Arctic region must affect the rate of sea level rise, biodiversity, and weather patterns worldwide. The wide economic opportunities for nonArctic states are hard to underestimate. As the ice melts, untapped natural resources become more accessible, drawing interest from non-Arctic countries and multinational corporations which has led to increased geopolitical competition (Kieval, 2022: 46; Auersward, 2020).

Another opportunity for non-Arctic states, especially in Asia, is the opening of the Northern Sea Route (Lanteigne, 2022). As a strategically important route for international trade, this is planned to be the main artery for trade between Russia and China while excluding Europe due to geopolitical difficulties (Mikhailova & Tabata, 2024). Overall, apart from the obvious focus on geopolitics and general political anxiety about the future of Arctic cooperation, the main political trends among Arctic Council Observer States are self-identification of non-Arctic states as Arctic stakeholders; emphasis on biodiversity conservation and mapping the protected areas (Barry et al., 2023); focus on science (Heininen et al., 2020: 253); and more currently, focus on security (Varik, 2023).

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By engaging with three “key players in the Arctic”, such as the Arctic Council, Arctic Circle Assembly, and Arctic Frontiers, non-Arctic states are able to ensure that their strategic and economic interests are represented (Steinveg, 2024). However, the Arctic Council, the main Arctic forum for cooperation, has suffered a long pause in its operation starting March 3, 2022. Since then, the working groups have resumed their functions, but not to their full capacity (Arctic Council, 2024). Various Arctic symposiums and conferences are going ahead and becoming the main forums of cooperation at present. Ireland is primarily represented by Claire Buckley, the Ambassador of Ireland to Norway and Iceland, along with NARI, and Irish academic institutions.

Ireland's historical ties, close proximity to Arctic waters, scientific capabilities, and growing interest in Arctic affairs resulted in Ireland applying for Observer status to the Arctic Council back in 2020, highlighting Ireland’s dedication to establishing credibility in the Arctic region (Government of Ireland, 2020). This move aimed to secure a seat at the table in Arctic affairs, reflecting its commitment to addressing global climate challenges. Ireland has been seeking Observer status in the Arctic Council to enhance its role in Arctic regional environmental governance and align with its “scientific capacity, expertise and commitment” (Government of Ireland, 2020: 3).

However, considering current geopolitical difficulties, the next ministerial meeting where Ireland’s application could be approved is not expected to take place any time soon (Arctic Council, 2024).

Ambassador Clair Buckley has stated that Ireland, as “an aspirant Observer”, is interested in participating in projects under the working groups of the Arctic Council (Buckley, 2024). In this regard, Ireland can still engage in the activities of the Arctic Council’s working groups due to its EU membership, even without Observer status. Therefore, the absence of this status is not an issue that should stop Ireland from intensifying cooperation and involvement in the work of the Arctic Council.

The Role of Ireland in the Arctic Contributing to environmental stewardship, scientific research and sustainable economic development, while fostering international cooperation and security, Ireland could play a multifaceted role in the Arctic. This includes collaborating with both nation-states and Indigenous Peoples. As Minister Simon Coveney, in his keynote address, put it: “We are an island nation at the edge of Europe in the North Atlantic, and we have a culture, heritage and identity intrinsically linked to the seas that surround us” (OCSI, 2020). This deep connection to the maritime world underpins Ireland's willingness to engage with the Arctic region, exemplified by its application for Observer status in the Arctic Council. Additionally, Ireland plays an active role in the European Union, which has a comprehensive Arctic policy (European Parliament, 2022).

The EU recognises the importance of this policy in promoting peace, sustainable development, and prosperity in the Arctic region (European Commission, 2021). The EU's Arctic policy aims to ensure a stable, safe, and sustainable Arctic region, while also promoting responsible resource use and protecting the environment. The EU's primary focus in the Arctic is on climate change, environmental protection, and research; furthermore, EU ratification of the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement manifests the EU's focus on Arctic region fisheries (Council Decision (EU), 2019). As a key partner in this endeavour, Ireland is well-positioned to contribute meaningfully to the EU's Arctic policy objectives, especially the Green Deal and the EU Maritime Security Strategy.

Interestingly, Ireland's application for Observer status in the Arctic Council does not mention its

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EU membership, while Estonia used EU membership as an argument in its application (Canova, 2023).

Under the aegis of the EU's multiple engagements with youth initiatives and its efforts to empower them to influence policies, the new project “Youth Together for Arctic Futures” was launched in January 2024 (Youth Together for Arctic Futures, 2024). This provides opportunity for European youth, including Irish youth, to work together with Arctic youth towards implementing good climate and nature policies for the Arctic. As the Director of WWF Global Arctic Programme, Vicki Lee Wallgren, stated, “We are excited to work together with Arctic and European youth and with our partner organisations,” reiterating the power of togetherness and cooperation for “sustainable, resilient and peaceful Arctic and European Future” (Youth Together for Arctic Futures, 2024).

Additionally, Ireland is the only non-Arctic State that is included among the seven partner countries-contributors to the EU-Interreg Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme that supports “cooperation between remote and sparsely populated communities in the northernmost part of Europe on matters of shared interest” (Interreg, 2024). The inclusion of Ireland in this program demonstrates the acknowledgement that Ireland, particularly the western parts, shares similarities with many areas of Arctic countries.

Regionally, established cooperation ties with Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Norway are already being built through the “Global Ireland. A Strategy for the Nordic Region to 2025” (Government of Ireland, 2021). The strategic objectives announced in this Nordic Strategy could be applied to the entire Arctic region. These objectives include: (1) Advancing and Sharing Ireland’s Arctic interests in the region, (2) Deepening trade, tourism and knowledge exchange, (3) Strengthening people-to-people links and links to the Global Irish community, (4) Growing Ireland’s reputation through enhanced promotion of culture, heritage and linkages, (5) Strengthening the team Ireland approach in the region. Moreover, deepening these existing connections and expanding cooperation with the United States and Canada, as outlined in Ireland’s Strategy for the US and Canada to 2025 (Government of Ireland, 2019), provides an ideal pathway for Ireland’s involvement in Arctic affairs. This integrated approach underscores how Ireland can play a significant role in Arctic cooperation.

While these strategies lay a solid foundation, a consolidated Arctic Strategy would offer a more comprehensive and long-term approach. This is particularly important because the Arctic is a unique and complex region, requiring specialised attention and solutions.

Indicators for the shared interests in the Arctic To develop a comprehensive Arctic Strategy, Ireland must first identify key benchmark themes that align with the broader vision of the Arctic and other non-Arctic states. Identifying shared interests is the first step to securing future cooperation. The Arctic region is a region full of challenges and opportunities that “require cooperation not only within the Arctic Council, but also through other competent bodies and other countries,” such as the UN, the EU and the OSPAR Convention (Cronin, 2021). By acknowledging shared interests, stakeholders can work together to develop solutions that benefit all parties involved.

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participation within the Arctic Council. The report identified fourteen main indicators, or themes, reflecting shared Arctic interests. These themes are (re)defining and (re)mapping the Arctic, human dimensions, governance, international cooperation and international treaties, environmental protection, pollution, climate change, security, safety and search and rescue, economy, tourism, infrastructure, science and education, and implementation (Heininen et al., 2020: 25). These fourteen themes identified for Arctic cooperation are crucial for Ireland as a non-Arctic state as they may represent areas of shared interests. Challenges like climate change, biodiversity conservation and pollution originating from or affecting these regions almost inevitably mandate non-Arctic involvement.

Drawing inspiration from successful models like Scotland's Arctic Connections initiative, Ireland should pursue a community-centred approach in these discussions (Scottish Government, 2023).

Practical implementations of the Arctic Strategy include knowledge sharing among Indigenous, local and coastal communities on rural repopulation, advancing circular economic practices, improving rural healthcare and connectivity, supporting Indigenous languages and strengthening climate resilience. Having mastered decolonising methodologies, Ireland has a wealth of knowledge in revitalising the Irish language and culture allowing them to thrive.

Consolidating strategic objectives from different policies, such as a Strategy for the Nordic Region to 2025, Ireland’s Strategy for the US and Canada to 2025, and the EU’s new Arctic policy, while taking inspiration from the Scotland’s Arctic Policy Framework (Scottish Government, 2019), will help determine the objectives for the Arctic Strategy for Ireland. Additionally, analysis of different indicators elicited by scientific reports such as “Arctic Policies and Strategies – Analysis, Synthesis and Trends” (Heininen et al., 2020), and Arctic Strategies Round-up 2017 (Schulze, 2017) will support the objective-setting process.

To effectively address the complexities of the Arctic, Ireland’s Arctic Strategy should build on and enhance both Nordic and North American strategies while incorporating Heininen's fourteen-part thematic analysis. This approach will ensure a comprehensive Arctic Strategy that avoids fragmentation into separate regional strategies. In the following subsection, we will explore the most urgent needs for Ireland’s Arctic cooperation, namely environmental concerns, the pressing need for scientific collaboration, and economic engagement in the Arctic.

Environmental Concerns, Science Diplomacy and Economic Opportunities Ireland’s geographical position and scientific achievements in oceanography and climate research uniquely position it to take on a leadership role in Arctic environmental and scientific initiatives, especially in the area of renewable energies and decarbonisation as per the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development (Amendment) Act 2021 (ISB, 2021). However, Ireland itself is on the frontline of climate change consequences (Nolan at al., 2023). Therefore, combating climate change should be one of the most important elements in Ireland’s Arctic Strategy.

Collaboration is essential in meeting the ambitious climate goals set forth by the United Nations.

Implementing the targets set by the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework is an important focus for Ireland as demonstrated in Ireland’s 4th National Biodiversity Action Plan 2023-2030 (NBAP) (Government of Ireland, 2023a). Objective 2 (Meet Urgent Conservation and Restoration Needs), Objective 4 (Enhance the Evidence Base for Action on Biodiversity) and Objective 5 (Strengthen Ireland’s Contribution to International Biodiversity Initiatives) of the

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NBAP are directly related to cooperation with the neighbouring Arctic region. Joint research and shared technology initiatives can enhance capabilities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and promote sustainable practices through scientific-based diplomacy by Ireland as a stability-building and neutral state.

Increasing storm frequency and intensity, along with erosion and flooding on Ireland's west coast, underscore the urgency of focusing on the Arctic amplification of climate change (Babila and Morley, 2020; Previdi et al., 2021). These changes, driven by rapid Arctic ice melt, demand a robust scientific response from Ireland, given the potentially profound impact on its climate system and coastal infrastructure.

Moreover, the anticipated shifts in atmospheric circulation patterns are expected to influence oceanic currents and change ocean properties significantly (Henderson et al, 2021). These shifts could alter the subpolar gyre circulation which “plays a crucial role in determining the regional ocean surface temperature” (Ghosh et al., 2023). Recent decades have seen a cooling trend linked to a decline of AMOC (McCarthy et al., 2023: 5). The ecological consequences of these changes are substantial as “temperature and salinity are key quantities for fisheries and benthic ecosystems” affecting the productivity of economically important fisheries (McCarthy et al., 2023: 7) and resulting in other severe ecological repercussions. Regarding human security, one of the most drastic consequences of climate change could be human displacement, which Ireland is currently unprepared to handle (Cubie, 2024: 2).

Recognising these environmental challenges, it is strategically imperative for Ireland to enhance its capacity to evaluate and forecast the climatic impacts stemming from the Arctic's rapid changes.

This goes beyond environmental protection, touching on socio-economic development and national security. Ireland's initial steps in increasing cooperation with Nordic states represent a positive development in this direction. Nevertheless, to fully address these challenges, it is critical for Ireland to deepen engagements with other Arctic nations through the “web of relations” (Hansen-Magnusson, 2019: 132) of the Arctic Governance system. Enhanced cooperation through different forms of science diplomacy is essential to effectively address and adapt to the evolving Arctic environmental dynamics.

A key area of focus for this strategic partnership should be the prevention of biodiversity loss.

Ireland and the Arctic countries can work together on conservation efforts that protect Arctic flora and fauna, supporting initiatives that combat the adverse effects of climate change and human activity on Arctic biodiversity (Cronin, 2021). This particularly relates, firstly, to the shared migratory bird flyways as the seabird colonies extend from Ireland’s Skelligs up to the Arctic and “birds are very responsive to changes in the environment, being dependent for feeding on fish stocks which are in turn being affected by plankton and changing ocean temperatures” (MaRei, 2024) and, secondly, fish migratory pathways in the Arctic where Irish salmon migrates every year (Rikardsen et al., 2021).

Furthermore, the impact of climate change on the oceans is most significant for Ireland as an island nation (Nolan at al., 2023). Sharing concerns about ocean acidification, rising sea level temperatures, pollution, marine litter, and melting Arctic ice with all Arctic states is a reason for Ireland to develop cooperative research and action plans with Arctic states. Through its chairmanship of the OSPAR (Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic) Commission in 2018-2022 and active participation in conducting the Kavanagh

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OSPAR’s Quality Status Report 2023 (OSPAR, 2023), Ireland has expertise in the areas of marine biodiversity, pollution and climate change that continue to affect the Arctic part of the North-East Atlantic. This includes the Arctic waters of Iceland and Norway as OSPAR's mandate covers parts of the North-East Atlantic that extend into the Arctic Circle, making OSPAR essential for Arctic marine protection. Ireland and Finland are co-conveners of the OSPAR Arctic Outcomes Working Group which focuses their work on the protection of the Arctic marine environment in the OSPAR Maritime Area. The Arctic region is particularly sensitive to changes in the marine environment, making OSPAR's role and Irish expertise crucial in mitigating these impacts.

As new Arctic sea routes open for trade and economic activities and the Arctic Ocean ice recedes, there are major opportunities for Ireland to develop more economic interests in the Arctic. There are various investment prospects in sectors such as green technology, fisheries, and shipping.

Regarding the ‘blue economy’, by fostering sustainable maritime industries via implementing the National Marine Planning Framework and Maritime Area Planning Act 2021, both Ireland and the Arctic States can mutually benefit economically while ensuring environmental protection.

Another area of economic opportunity is the development of marine cables. Leveraging its existing infrastructure, Ireland is a potential “Gateway to Europe” location that is attractive for further development of the Far North Fiber project with Cinia Oy (Finland), ARTERIA Networks (Japan), Far North Digital (US), in cooperation with Alcatel Submarine Networks, fully owned by Nokia (Finland) (Murray, 2024). However, the raised security concerns need to be addressed prior to going ahead with such developments (Shvets, 2023).

Ireland and the Arctic countries would benefit from further collaboration on improving navigational safety measures, search and rescue operations, and emergency response strategies, especially considering that Ireland is not a NATO member. The current Far North Cable project is making Ireland the first point of reach in Europe. It requires additional safety measures and cooperation with all the countries of the Arctic region, as the system will comprise 15,000 km of cable running from Japan via the Northwest Passage to Europe with a landing in Alaska and with European landings in Norway adjacent to Finland and Ireland. The Irish Government has backed up the project by welcoming the Far North Fibre to land in Galway, the “the ideal landing spot” (Murray, 2024). Although policy-level measures are underway to strengthen maritime security capabilities in relation to the new underwater cable, further research and investment are needed to understand the various types of maritime security threats Ireland faces and how these might evolve in the future (McCabe et al., 2023).

Lessons from Scotland’s Arctic Connections initiative are examined in the next subsection highlighting the importance of community-centred approaches, which Ireland can adapt to strengthen ties with Arctic stakeholders and promote sustainable development.

Learning from the Scottish-Arctic Collaboration Different non-Arctic states have different visions of the Arctic, from positioning themselves as a leading polar nation to having a more limited approach and less ambitious Arctic Strategy.

Scotland, even though it is not an independent state, is the most appropriate example for comparing Ireland with similar-sized states or Observers in the Arctic Council to identify best practices and strategies. The Scottish Government adopted Scotland’s first Arctic policy

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framework in 2019 (Scottish Government, 2019). The main emphasis of the policy framework is a strong focus on cooperation, sharing knowledge and community focus.

Among the approaches that could be applied in Ireland is the Scottish focus on offering and sharing rather than simply taking from the Arctic: “Scotland’s offer to the Arctic” (Scottish Government, 2019). For example, the expertise in Irish language protection and revitalisation is a valuable input for Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic as most Indigenous languages in the Arctic are endangered. Close cooperation with the Saami Council on language revitalisation and promotion of Indigenous languages has already been a priority in the Action plan of Ireland’s Strategy for the Nordic Region (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2021).

As the world embarks on UNESCO’s International Decade of Indigenous Languages 2022-2032, Ireland will have an opportunity to engage in collaborative projects with Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic. This presents a valuable chance to contribute to the revitalisation and preservation of Indigenous languages while supporting the cultural resilience and self-determination of Arctic Indigenous communities.

Other issues that reflect the rural way of life, especially in the West of Scotland and Gaeltacht in Ireland, are being shared with the Arctic rural and coastal communities. The past North Atlantic Forum 2024 in Connemara, Ireland, demonstrated the scope of the themes relevant to the rural communities in the West of Ireland (North Atlantic Forum, 2024). Following the Scottish example (Scottish Rural Network, 2020), shared concerns of rural mental health challenges and rural repopulation could be possible future projects of knowledge sharing projects between Ireland and the Arctic States.

Scotland is active in the network of Arctic universities – UArctic. For Ireland, membership of institutions of higher education in the UArctic network can have funding implications.

Membership comes with a yearly fee but gives access to various supports for students, such as the North2North exchange programme and other research cooperation opportunities, such as an array of Thematic Networks (UArctic, 2024). Inclusion of the membership fee in the Strategy could encourage smaller research centres in Ireland to join UArctic. At present, there are three UArctic members in Ireland: (1) the Trinity Centre for the Environment (TCE), a teaching and research centre within the School of Natural Sciences, Trinity College Dublin (UArctic, 2024a); (2) the Halpin research Centre, a research entity for the National Maritime College of Ireland (UArctic, 2024b); and (3) the NARI (UArctic 2024c).

The strongest comparison between Scotland and Ireland lies within the academic sphere. Ireland and Scotland have networks (NARI, 2024; ScAN, 2024) of Arctic researchers bringing together scholars with expertise in the Arctic. The Scottish Arctic Network (ScaN) is a UArctic Regional Centre for Scotland, composed of UArctic members – higher education institutions in Scotland.

With more Irish universities joining the UArctic network, new research cooperation opportunities will open up for Irish scholars, thus helping to attract more scholars to research Arctic topics.

Building on this academic foundation, it is reasonable to suggest that Ireland should establish a dedicated Arctic unit within the Department of Foreign Affairs, similar to the proposal made for Scotland (Johnstone, 2012). This unit would bring together expertise and resources and help Ireland take advantage of opportunities while managing the environmental, economic, and geopolitical challenges that come with Arctic engagement. By aligning national interests with the

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broader goals of Arctic stewardship and cooperation, such a unit would help create a coherent Strategy.

Summary Ireland's role as a proactive “global actor and bridge builder,” combined with its experience as a post-colonial society, positions it as a unique contributor to Arctic governance, possibly being a contributor to promoting cooperation in the region. Moreover, Ireland understands the complexities of historical and cultural legacies, which can be valuable in addressing similar issues concerning Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic region. Additionally, Ireland's strong research base on Arctic studies equips it to contribute valuable insights and expertise to the international Arctic community. This combination of historical perspective and scientific input makes Ireland a potential key player in promoting sustainable development and governance in the Arctic.

Ireland, despite facing the Arctic, has not fully incorporated Arctic considerations into its political agenda. However, it is crucial to recognise that a combination of environmental and geopolitical challenges emphasises the need to broaden the focus beyond specific Arctic areas, such as the Nordic region and North America. A fragmented Strategy for the Arctic is not an optimal solution for Ireland. As one of the last countries in North-Western Europe without a clear Arctic policy, Ireland should prioritise developing a comprehensive approach to the region.

Ireland's recent application for Observer State status within the Arctic Council represents a strategic shift and advancement in its international relations, particularly with the Arctic nationstates. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that this status will be approved any time soon due to geopolitical tensions and a pause in the Official Arctic Council Meetings. This makes it even more relevant to adopt an Arctic Strategy for Ireland, thus making a stronger statement of Ireland’s Arctic connection and commitment, particularly as the absence of Observer status is not a significant obstacle to continuing scientific and research cooperation in the Arctic region with Indigenous Peoples, Arctic nation-states and non-Arctic nation-states. Even without the official status of Observer, Ireland remains an Arctic-facing state enhanced by Ireland's existing diplomatic and economic ties with Nordic states, US and Canada. The continuation and intensification of these partnerships are essential, particularly in addressing global challenges such as climate change, maritime security, and sustainable development which are significant in the Arctic region.

Ireland’s role as a critical “Gateway to Europe,” exemplified by initiatives such as the Far North Fiber project, is becoming more evident. It should be further strengthened by a clear Arctic Strategy.

The debate on Ireland’s Arctic Strategy must be pursued with urgency and in ethical cooperation with Arctic stakeholders, such as Arctic States, Indigenous Peoples, local communities and industries. As climate change increasingly impacts Arctic geopolitics and economics, the window for establishing a significant and beneficial role for Ireland is narrowing. Timely action is required to ensure that Ireland does not miss the opportunity to contribute to and benefit from the evolving dynamics of the Arctic.

In the near term, it is essential to undertake comprehensive research on the discourses and public perceptions of the Arctic as presented across various media platforms in Ireland. To ensure the future Arctic Strategy for Ireland is well-received by the public, it should be in harmony with broader discourses surrounding this topic. Furthermore, effectively communicating scientific Ireland’s Arctic Strategy: Building Bridges to the North

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information and research related to the Arctic is of utmost importance. The national audiences and decision-makers should stay informed about the Arctic's relevance to Ireland, particularly in terms of geopolitical, economic, and environmental considerations.The goal of this article is to initiate a debate on Ireland's involvement in the Arctic. It is important that policymakers, academics, and stakeholders expand upon this discussion, developing an Arctic Strategy that reflects Ireland’s strategic position, diplomatic capabilities, and commitment to international cooperation while being mindful of the colonial past of the Indigenous Peoples in the region. The future of Ireland's engagement in the Arctic holds promising prospects for national growth, economic development and international collaboration.

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A Menu of Arctic Specific Confidence Building and Arms Control Measures Alexander MacDonald

Proposals to denuclearize the Arctic region span a time frame of 1964 to 2012, yet no substantial progress has been made towards denuclearizing the region. This is partly due to the proposals’ consistent failure to present a series of viable confidence building measures (CBMs) and arms control measures to precede denuclearization. This paper seeks to fill the strategic gap of Arctic denuclearization proposals by presenting a menu of Arctic specific arms control and CBMs which seek to address the strategic and political gaps of previous Arctic denuclearization proposals, using both historic and modern works and ultimately offering a framework to advance the goal of an Arctic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (ANWFZ). The formulation of this menu was guided by the key contention that the foundation of confidence is communication and information sharing. That is, arms control measures, to even be negotiated, must first be preceded by confidence building measures. Arms control measures require trust both in the negotiation and execution phase which can be provided for through established dialogue forums and confidence building measures. This menu for Arctic arms control and CBMs has been in development for several decades, starting with Franklyn Griffiths’ 1979 partial Arctic demilitarization proposal, and has enjoyed an increasing amount of academic commentary, especially in the wake of the 2014 collapse of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and Arctic Chief of Defense Staff (ACDS) meetings. These measures, however, have never been assembled into a comprehensive menu for consideration. Efforts towards comprehensive Arctic denuclearization can immensely benefit from this work if it is harnessed, harmonized and orientated towards denuclearizing the Arctic region. Doing so would begin charting the course of strategic stability leading towards cooperation and arms reduction which is absolutely crucial for any serious consideration of Arctic denuclearization.

Introduction The idea of establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Arctic is not a new one, with proposals for one having been made since the late 1950s (Armstrong, 1965). Some of these proposals were aimed at denuclearizing parts of the Arctic, like those made for a Nordic NWFZ by several Nordic governments in an effort to ensure low-tensions and shield the area from the arms race in central Europe (Atland, 2008). These proposals were taken up by academics and elaborated in academic circles, allowing over time, for the comprehensive formulation of an Arctic NWFZ (ANWFZ) (Rich and Vinograndov, 1964, Newcombe, 1981, Wilkes, 1984, and Axworthy, Alexander MacDonald is a graduate of the Master's in Strategic Studies at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies (CMSS) at the University of Calgary. Expert Advisor to the Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the United Nations on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

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2012). These proposals have also been adopted by Indigenous organizations, regional and international peace and disarmament groups, academic and Arctic specialists. Nonetheless, such a zone has yet to come to fruition.

In 1981 Robert Reford, an intelligence officer turned journalist and arms control advocate, published a piece in the International Journal entitled “Our Seat at the Table: A Canadian Menu for Arms Control,” in which he outlined an arms control agenda for Canada to pursue across a range of fields including the Arctic, submarines, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and chemical weapons (Reford, 1981). Reford sought to reinvigorate and reimagine the contributions that Canada could uniquely make to global disarmament and arms control initiatives. This paper takes inspiration from Reford in both its title and approach. Herein a ‘menu for Arctic arms control and confidence building measures (CBMs)’ will be offered, which seeks to address the strategic and political gaps of previous Arctic denuclearization proposals, using both historic and modern works and ultimately offering a framework to advance the ultimate goal of an ANWFZ. Four confidence building measures will be outlined in addition to two Arctic specific arms control measures. None of these measures are novel, for they have all been proposed in the last four decades. What is novel, however, is presenting these together as a suite of measures in the context of achieving the necessary strategic environment to realistically pursue Arctic denuclearization. The absence of such a suite is the key reason for why the numerous proposals for an ANWFZ have failed. This is an attempt to begin filling that strategic void. It will become clearer through the analysis of each measure why this particular grouping of measures is being proposed. The guiding assumptions, however, are that the foundation of confidence is communication and information sharing and that arms control measures must be preceded by confidence building measures to even be negotiated in the first place, but also to act as the foundation for successful arms control. Arms control measures require trust, both in the negotiation and execution phase, established dialogue forums and confidence building measures provide for that. These then are the assumptions upon which this novel suite of measures is built.

Arctic Confidence-Building Measures: 1. Renew the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) 2. Renew the Arctic Chief of Defence Staff Meetings (ACDS) 3. Establish an Arctic Security Cooperation Forum (ASCF) 4. Negotiate an Arctic Code of Military Conduct (AMCC) Arctic Arms Control Measures: 1. Partial De-militarization of the Central Arctic Ocean 2. Arctic specific SSBN Sanctuaries / Arctic ASW Free-Zone

Strategic Confidence Building Measures It is first worthwhile to establish why confidence building and arms control measures are necessary steps in an Arctic denuclearization program. The short answer is because serious arms reductions, whether conventional or nuclear, will not be possible in a strategic environment where there is an emerging security dilemma. Lars Saunes, former Chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy commented in early 2021 that “[t]he way it is today, deterrence and military posturing are more or less the only MacDonald

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signaling that takes place in the Arctic. That may lead to an accelerating security policy challenge in the future. Right now, there is a security dilemma in the Arctic. The Arctic states are increasingly acknowledging this” (Sauner, 2021).

Arctic security expert Rob Huebert has argued that “[i]n a changing international system, the primary security requirements of the three most powerful states [the US, Russia and China] are now overlapping in the Arctic region, producing new challenges and threats” (Huebert, 2019: 75).

Strategic state interests have grown and converged in the Arctic, while at the same time that Arctic coastal states have begun to systematically address “soft-security” threats through the development of constabulary forces. This, Huebert points out, makes it difficult “to separate the expansion and enhancement of military capabilities that can be used for offensive strategic purposes from those intended to defend local resources, shipping routes, and the Arctic environment” (Huebert, 2019: 76). In the context of increasing strategic interest, growing military presence, ambiguity between offensive and defensive postures, and now defunct security dialogue mechanisms, Arctic states are in the midst of an emerging security dilemma where “deterrence and military posturing are more or less the only signaling that takes place in the Arctic.” The antidote to this situation lies in a mixture of information sharing, verification, and harmonization of expectations to reduce opportunities for provocation, miscalculation and escalation – precisely what CBMs have historically offered.

The Arctic region is not totally bereft of inter-state cooperation. In fact, there has been substantial cooperation on environmental, shipping and soft-security issues. While this cooperative spirit has yet to “spill-over” into hard-security matters, there are indirect benefits to harness from such cooperative interactions. Heather Exner-Pirot has remarked that “It’s easy to forget that the origins of modern regional Arctic cooperation were based on disarmament efforts. There were intermittent efforts by academics, NGOs and politicians beginning in the 1960s, focusing specifically on the nuclear weapon free zones” (Exner-Pirot, 2019). And further that, “it was domestic interest in Arctic disarmament that eventually led to Canadian advocacy for the establishment of an Arctic Council, which persisted across Governments and parties” (ExnerPirot, 2019). Historically, linkages have been drawn between the Murmansk Speech of 1987, the commencing of the Rovaniemi Process in 1989, the signing of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991, and the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996 (Depledge et al., 2019) The initial spark was aspirations for a ‘zone of peace’ so as to address Arctic militarization, the outcome was a cooperative forum, which although excluding hard security issues, has engendered an inter-governmental web of Arctic cooperation.

To this myriad of foundational cooperative initiatives can be added the 1996 Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) Program, which sought to address the management of spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned Soviet submarines. AMEC was an astounding moment in postCold War Arctic relations, as the US along with its allies and the USSR transitioned from nuclear confrontation to nuclear cooperation. The AMEC forum sought to address the cross-border nature of nuclear related environmental problems resulting from Cold War activity, including nuclear submarines. AMEC was eventually merged with the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program which pivoted AMECs orientation from environmental concerns to national security concerns. That is, AMEC became a forum through which the US and its allies could pursue and protect their national security interests vis-à-vis Russia’s nuclear capabilities.

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The Arctic region’s inter-governmental cooperative history, especially in the 21st century, has been focused primarily on ‘soft security’ issues like the environment, shipping and search and rescue.

Such cooperation, however, was not bereft of hard-security interests as exemplified by AMEC, and the impetus to address ‘soft-security’ issue in the Arctic was actually engendered by state interest in Arctic disarmament. Thus, to begin serious consideration of hard-security cooperation in the Arctic is to bring the cooperative history of the Arctic full circle.

Why Military-to-Military Dialogue is Essential The main objective of military-to-military dialogue in the Arctic is to preserve, or restore if necessary, a ‘low tension’ strategic environment via increased levels of communication and information sharing so as to avoid or curtail the eruption of an Arctic based security dilemma (i.e., unnecessary action-reaction cycles).

The US Navy’s 2020 strategic blueprint “A Blue Arctic” notes that “unintended military accidents and conflict, and spill-over of major power competition in the Arctic all have the potential to threaten US interests and prosperity,” and thus insists that “US Naval forces must operate more assertively across the Arctic Region to prevail in day-to-day competition” (The United States Department of the Navy, 2021). The irony is that in the US Navy formally recognizing that a spillover into the Arctic is possible, and by making preparations for such a scenario, it is making it all the more likely. Arctic spill-over is poised to become a self-fulfilling prophecy if Arctic capable states continue to militarily build up in anticipation for it. Communication, information sharing, and harmonizing expectations can stunt the action-reaction cycle by clarifying intentions and actions.

Military activity will continue in the Arctic for the foreseeable future, this is especially true because of the constabulary and safety responsibilities that Arctic state militaries have been entrusted with.

Military-to-military dialogue should thus be understood as a sort of pressure release valve, intended to reduce, if not eliminate, adversarial perceptions related to military activity in the Arctic region.

It is to contextualize all the necessary military activity in the Arctic region in cooperative and transparent tones rather than competitive and adversarial ones. It is essential that Arctic specific mechanisms of military-to-military dialogue be developed as the “military efforts of regional states to protect their interests in the region, fueled by fear and mutual lack of trust, may create ‘actionreaction’ dynamics as well as risk creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of militarization and escalation” (The United States Department of the Navy, 2021).

Expanding the Arctic Council’s mandate to allow for the inclusion of hard security issues and topics has been floated as a possible way to begin seriously addressing hard security in the Arctic.

Indeed, the former Prime Ministers of Iceland and Finland both endorsed considering whether the Arctic Council’s mandate should be expanded to include hard security (Tømmerbakke, 2019). Most Arctic experts who have opined on the matter have warned against expanding the Council’s mandate, primarily out of fear that this could paralyze the work of the Council and undermine the now well-established cooperative relations regarding soft security and their potential for further growth (Groenning, 2016).

This analysis heeds the warnings of potential Arctic Council paralysis and instead suggests the formulation of a parallel defence diplomacy track to compliment and exploit the soft security cooperation achievements of the Council while not threatening their vitality or future potential.

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This dual-track approach would seek to exploit the spirit of inter-governmental cooperation on Arctic soft security matters, not by including hard security matters into already existing cooperative forums, but by creating a parallel institutional track. This would ensure that soft security cooperation is insulated from the more contentious hard security cooperative efforts while at the same time opening up hard security cooperative avenues.

Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and Arctic Chief of Defence Staff (ACDS) While the end of the Cold War calmed military activity in the Arctic and led to several cooperative ventures, like the AMEC, military interest and activity returned to the Arctic in the mid-2000s.

Arctic states recognized that in such a context dialogue is required to avoid misperception and miscalculation. Thus, the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and Arctic Chief of Defence Staff (ACDS) were initiated in 2011 and 2012, respectively. Both forums suffered significant setbacks, however, in the wake of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Western Arctic States, in solidarity with Ukraine, chose to cease engaging with Russia at the military-to-military level in the Arctic context, and Russia withdrew from the ASFR. Some Western commentators have voiced a discomfort with reinvigorating these two forums out of concern that doing so would tacitly condone Russia’s position in Ukraine (Boulegue, Depledge, 2021: 2). Other commentators have stressed that good behavior need not be a pre-condition for talks, or that Artic cooperation opportunities ought to be approached in a “compartmentalized” fashion (Exner-Pirot, 2020: 102). The negotiation of a NWFZ, or any arms control measure, in the Arctic entails delicate deliberations regarding strategic stability and wider security concerns, for such discussions to be fruitful. Many point to the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine as a spark point of deteriorating diplomatic relations in the Arctic. While it is true, and evident, that it has reduced levels of cooperation and good-will in Arctic governance forums and even caused splitter meetings, such events need not totally dictate the much broader negotiations and cooperation prospects. One can look South for evidence that diplomatic breakthroughs are still possible through international fora where Russia and NATO member states are involved. An October 2016 meeting of the Convention of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) Commission, which Russia chaired, produced a breakthrough in the form of an agreement to designate the Ross Sea as a marine protected area (Conley, Melino, 2016: 3). These negotiations included Russia, China, the United States and several other NATO member states.

It has been previously reported that Russia is interested in resuming the annual ACDS meetings, with Russia’s Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic stating that “Russia supports resuming the annual meetings of the Chiefs of the Armed Forces in the Arctic states in order to prevent deterioration of the military policy situation in the Arctic. This would be an effective measure to build trust and security in the region” (Danilov, 2021). Russia is not alone in suggesting resumption of these meetings. The US International Security Advisory Board recommended in 2016 that the US resume military-to-military dialogue with Russia through the ASFR and ACDS particularly noting that “U.S. interests would be served by resuming military-to-military engagement with Russia in the Arctic on the basis of a determination that the advantages of doing so would outweigh the impact (if any) on U.S. policy with respect to maintaining, along with other nations, pressure on Russia to resolve Ukraine/Crimea issues on satisfactory terms” (International Security Advisory Board, 2016). Notably, it can be assumed that the calculations of these assessments have changed due the fluid geopolitical dynamic of US – Russia relations since 2016.

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While opinions abound on how, when, and where Arctic hard security dialogue should be orchestrated, it is nonetheless agreed that “the establishment of a military-security dialogue among the Arctic states would be a crucial step in building security architecture into the region” (Cepinskyte, Paul, 2021). A first step would be to re-engage Russia through the already existing Arctic military-to-military forums, which would bring things back to the pre-2014 status quo. Of course, should the establishment of such a forum be achievable without the reinvigoration of the ASFR and ACDS it would be welcome and a significant step towards Arctic military-to-military dialogue. The goal, and necessity, is to reinvigorate/re-establish military-to-military dialogue, how it happens, under what format or name, is secondary as long as the parties are satisfied.

Arctic Security Cooperation Forum (ASCF) An Arctic Security Cooperation Forum, whether it be a complimentary mechanism to the ASFR and ACDS, or a parent body with ASFR and ACDS as subsidiary organs would serve not only to address present security concerns but also be positioned to handle security disputes on the horizon.

At its core, such a forum would “encompass talks on military stability and conflict prevention measures in the Arctic region,” and such a forum could “be called the Arctic Security Cooperation Forum (ASCF)” (Zandee et al., 2020: 48). This forum would formalize and make predictable the desired military-to-military dialogue and provide the framework to address emerging issues.

Issues on the horizon that could be addressed by such a form include: the outstanding boundary disputes in the Arctic region and the deployment of cruise missile capabilities in the Arctic. Russia has been developing and expanding such capabilities in recent years which has prompted the US to state its intention of outfitting future Arctic Coast Guard icebreakers with cruise missiles (Makichuk, 2021). More broadly, discussions could be considered on Arctic nuclear deterrent postures of the US and Russia, which could be an important forerunner to discussions on SSBN sanctuaries or ASW free zones.

Such a forum for dialogue and information sharing would be valuable in and of itself, but such discussions naturally lead to discerning what sort of military action is acceptable to the parties involved, whether this be made explicit via assertions within formal discussions, or implicit by the reactions of parties within such dialogues. Therefore, an Arctic Military Code of Conduct could be the hallmark agreement to rationalize, solidify and guide the work of the ASCF, for dialogue and information sharing can naturally lead to engagement and the harmonization of principles. It would then become the natural forum for negotiation of further cooperative agreements or arms control measures like the extension of the current bilateral Incidents at Seas Agreements (INCSEA) to the Arctic region, or should a more Arctic specific agreement be desired; proposals have also been made for an “Arctic Code for Unplanned Encounters at Seas (CUES)” (Berbick, Saunes, 2020).

Arctic Military Code of Conduct (AMCC) While it is true that Russia has recently made disproportionate investments in its Arctic military capabilities and infrastructure, Russia’s geographic, demographic and economic context must be kept it mind – it has the largest Arctic based population, the largest littoral frontage, immense natural resources extraction activities and perhaps the most promising Arctic shipping sea-route within its EEZ territory. This may partially justify Russia’s infrastructural build up, for military capabilities are often used in the Arctic region for constabulary and search and rescue purposes.

The provocative shows of force, however, are less justifiable, but need not be pinned solely on

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Russia for “[o]n one hand Russia has become more aggressive since 2008 but it is also reacting to new weapons systems introduced by the U.S., Russia isn’t acting on their own but in an effort to contain NATO and reacting to posturing of the U.S.” (Huebert, 2021).

The point here is that the mere presence of militaries in the Arctic is not inherently problematic, nor is military build-up per se, but the ongoing and increasing occurrence of provocative shows of force made possible by those presences is concerning and should be addressed by the regional states. This is because in the absence of dialogue mechanisms, information sharing tools, or established norms of conduct, the margin for misinterpretation and ensuing escalation is high.

Peace and stability are heavily degraded by provocative, mischievous and/or surprise military activities. Ernie Regehr has observed that “the most basic characteristic of a security zone that has matured into a cooperative security community… is that there exists a reliable expectation that states within that regional community will not resort to war to prosecute their disputes” (Regehr, 2019: 285). While this may be what the Arctic regional states formally proclaim in their policies, and even within relevant agreements like the Ilulissat Declaration, these words can be fundamentally undermined by action, like that of competitive military build-ups or arm races. It is therefore imperative in the Arctic region to discern whether ‘remilitarization’ efforts are militarily competitive in nature, which would erode expectations of cooperation, or if such build ups actually facilitate public safety and regional security. Such discernment is possible through programs of dialogue, information sharing, transparency and mutual verification. Current Arctic governance forums, however, are currently inadequate to facilitate the type of dialogue and information sharing needed to reduce tensions and prevent misunderstanding.

An Arctic Military Code of Conduct (AMCC) would seek to “define, collectively, the red lines of military activities in the northern high latitudes, while also creating a dialogue mechanism that would promote greater transparency and lay the ground for a less conflict prone relationship between NATO and Russia in the region” (Depledge et al., 2019) Commentators have rightly suggested that such a Code would not be easy to negotiate and that the most prudent entry point to negotiations will be to mutually determine what behaviour is not acceptable within the region and to then build outwards (Regehr, 2019). This could include, for example: dangerous maneuvers, surprise exercises, simulated attack drills, communications jamming, turning off of transponders, and guidelines on live testing. Thus, the goal of an AMCC would be to reduce irresponsible, flagrant or provocative military actions, and brinkmanship, all aimed at enhancing transparency, norm cultivation and preserving/guaranteeing a ‘low tension’ political-military Arctic environment.

Indeed, just the negotiation of such an agreement would be an important first step for dialogue and confidence building.

It has been noted that there are several applicable precedents or existing agreements that could be expanded to include activities in the Arctic region within the context of negotiating an AMCC. Among these are: the Open Skies Treaty; The Incidents At Sea Agreement (INCSEA); the Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities; and the Vienna Document 2011 (on confidence and security building measures) (Goodman, Kertysova, 2020). INCSEA and the Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities are two US- Russian bi-lateral agreements signed in 1972 and 1989, respectively. They both sought to reduce tensions between the two nuclear superpowers by establishing mutually agreed upon expectations for their forces and mechanisms to address concerns. The Vienna Document 2011 is a regime of confidence and security-building measures designed to enhance transparency concerning military activity A Menu of Arctic Specific Confidence Building and Arms Control Measures

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conducted within the OSCE’s zone of application, which includes all land, air and sea areas of all European and central Asian participating states (this includes Russia from its Western border to the Ural Mountains). It includes provisions for such things as: annual exchange of military information; defence planning information exchanges; consultation and cooperation mechanisms; prior notification for certain military activities; observation of certain military activities; and constraining provisions for large scale military activities. Seeing that all Arctic regional states are party to at least one of these CBM agreements it is reasonable to expect that they could act as frameworks for developing an AMCC, relevant provisions from each could be adapted to the Arctic context and included in the AMCC agreement.

The negotiation and execution of an AMCC may also be an ideal way to engage China on hard security issues in the Arctic region. This is becoming more imperative with the release of China’s Arctic Policy in 2018 and its developments and deployment of icebreakers in the Arctic region (People’s Republic of China, 2018). The US Coast Guard has openly declared China as a threat to American interests in the Arctic region, noting that it fully expects China to replicate its current provocative actions in the South China Sea in the Arctic region once it develops sufficient Arctic military capabilities (United States Coast Guard, 2019). Thus, any serious attempt to develop a comprehensive AMCC will not only include current and active Arctic military capable states but those who will be so in the near future. Such a strategy also has the niche benefit of not singling out Russia as the sole hostile actor and creating a West versus Russia dynamic in the negotiations (Depledge et al., 2019).

Two Arctic Arms Control Measures The end goal of Arctic specific CBMs is to bolster a degree of confidence amongst Arctic states so that arms control measures for the region may be negotiated which tend towards disarmament and eventual denuclearization. Two such arms control measures are worthy of consideration and ought to be addressed in future ANWFZ proposals for they promise to preserve and enhance strategic stability in the region and would therefore enhance denuclearization prospects.

ASW Exclusion Zones / SSBN Sanctuary Agreement The Arctic emerged as an ideal forward positioning location for SSBNs during the Cold War, as the mutual geographic proximity of each of the superpowers allowed for a credible first strike threat, whether by cruise or inter-continental ballistic missiles. As missile technology progressed it became possible for the then Soviets to threaten the American homeland from Soviet home waters, but as Adam Lajeunesse notes, “a launch from waters within the Arctic Archipelago, or even as far north as the Lincoln Sea, off of the tip of Greenland would cut SLBM flight time in half (from thirty to fifteen minutes), while lower flight trajectory would hinder detection” (Lajeunesse, 2016: 229). While the Americans could position themselves in the vast expanses of either the Atlantic or Pacific oceans to credibly threaten the Soviets, the Soviets with the bulk of their sea-based nuclear deterrent in the Kola Peninsula had to transit the well-guarded GIUK gap to achieve commensurate freedom of operation. These geographic realities prompted the Soviets to position their SSBNs in Arctic waters. To these rationales could be added the natural protection that was offered by sea ice in the Arctic Ocean, which provided near invulnerability to SSBNs and SSNs (Lajeunesse, 2016: 229).

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The best way to approach theorizing about and developing a practical elaboration of SSBN sanctuaries is through a strategic analysis, to see whether in fact such sanctuaries carry sufficient strategic value to forego other deployment options. As noted, the strategic value of the sea-based deterrent is its degree of invulnerability and thus credible second-strike capability. Russian SSBNs can pose a sufficient threat from their home bastions, that is, they need not enter the Arctic Ocean region to enter into credible range to threaten North American targets. Forward deployment is thus not a strategic necessity, it is a provocative political/military gesture. Further, entering the Arctic Ocean region would cause unnecessary threat exposure to Russian SSBNs. The Russians have developed SSBN sanctuaries/bastions close to home ports so that Russian surface vessels, aircraft and SSN attack submarines can protect Russian SSBNs from enemy ASW activity.

Therefore, forward positioning provides little or no strategic value in terms of deterrence and actually exposes Russian capabilities to unnecessary threat levels (Purver, 1987: 17).

What is the incentive then for Russian submarines, whether SSBN, SSGN or SSN subs, to leave their sanctuaries? A priority incentive would be to blunt/thwart American SSN forays into or towards Russian sanctuaries through interception missions which may push Russian subs close to Canadian and American coastal waters. Another strategic incentive would be for Russia to forward position its SSBNs in Canadian waters for a decapitation/precursor strategy. To do so in peacetime, or at least, outside the context of hostile and escalating relations, would be unnecessarily provocative and of little strategic value. It is also hard to justify Arctic deployment, and all of its attendant risks, when the same net outcome can be achieved from either Atlantic or Pacific stationings. Arctic stationing, however, does promise greater stealth and invulnerability due to current ice coverage – the ability to pass from ice coverage to open waters with ease to stymie detection is perhaps the greatest strategic interest in Arctic forward deployments. Nonetheless, climate change has begun to show that strategic ice coverage will not be a perennial feature of the Arctic region, the prospect of which should move the US and Russia to consider more seriously the need for at least a bi-lateral agreement to guarantee a sufficient degree of SSBN invulnerability to preserve and bolster deterrent stability (Huebert, 2011: 383-400).

An agreement aimed at reducing submarine-based warfare in Arctic waters while also enhancing and preserving strategic stability in the region would be best achieved through a SSBN Sanctuary Agreement or ASW Free-Zone Agreement. Proposals for such a zone date back to the 1980s but have received relatively little attention or updating until very recently, and even than in very small ways (Regehr, 2019). Ronald Purver, writing in 1983 suggested that a “type of strategic ASW control measure would be the creation of SSBN sanctuaries or ASW-free zones, from which adversary ASW forces and installations would be barred (and which would also, incidentally, make initial acquisition of trail more difficult.) Verification would appear to be quite feasible by the use of the defending party’s own sonar detection systems” (Purver, 1983: 427). Specifically, sanctuary zones were proposed on the Russian side in the Barents Sea, Sea of Okhotsk and on the American side in the Gulf of Alaska (Purver, 1983). Other than the suggestion that these sanctuaries extend “a specified distance from a state’s coast (in the order of several hundreds of miles)” no concrete zonal boundaries or mapping of these proposals has been done (Purver, 1987: 19). Based off of this imprecise suggestion however, the EEZs of both states in the suggested areas could be considered as a starting point for negotiations.

The possible provisions of such an agreement are neatly captured in the definition of an SSBN sanctuary offered by Willy Østreng as “a geographically defined sea area which is declared out of A Menu of Arctic Specific Confidence Building and Arms Control Measures

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bounds to antisubmarine weapons. In an area of this nature the superpowers pledge themselves not to use or to deploy antisubmarine weapons. This is an area in which strategic submarines possess no ‘natural’ enemies (attack submarines) and where their survival is guaranteed” (Østreng, 1982: 107).

Ernie Regehr has observed that “the stability of the global strategic environment would be significantly bolstered by a US and Russian agreement not to deploy their SSBNs close to each other’s territories and not to track and thus threaten each other’s SSBN’s with attack submarines in agreed locations” (Regehr, 2020: 208). SSBN sanctuaries would provide through a bilateral agreement what both sides have been trying to achieve through more provocative and destabilizing offensive tactics – credible and lasting retaliatory sea-based deterrent capabilities.

An additional measure, whether it be agreed to in initial negotiations or be pursued as a follow up measure would be to establish upper limits on the number of ASW capabilities, particularly hunterkiller SSNs seeing that they are truly the most threatening and thus destabilizing element in this equation. Ronald Purver specifically suggested that “limiting the number to less than two or three times the number of the opponent’s SSBNs would be an effective measure of control” since it would restrict each side from tracking and or targeting all of each other’s SSBNs at a given time (Purver, 1983: 427).It is unclear, however, how this measure would account for the strategic deterrence considerations of other rivals with ASW capabilities, like China.

De-militarization of the Central Arctic Ocean In his 1979 piece “A Northern Foreign Policy” Arctic expert Franklyn Griffiths proposed “a regime of limited demilitarization” for the Polar Basin Area which he defined as “the Arctic Ocean lying to the seaward of the line demarcating the offshore exclusive economic zone of the littoral states” (Griffiths, 1979: 60-61). Within this zone, Griffiths proposed that the surface waters and ice be demilitarized. His proposal explicitly ignored the sub-surface waters which, at the time, were suspected to be used by SSBNs. This arms control proposal was echoed by numerous Arctic security commentators through the 1980s and even in more recent commentaries from 2013 onwards (Regehr, 2019, Exner Pirot 2019). The proposal has largely remained untouched in its composition except for Ronald Purver suggesting it be expanded to include all waters of the Arctic Ocean including those within the EEZs of the littoral states (Purver, 1981: 130).

It is essential to note that Griffiths and those commenting on his proposal in the 80s and 90s all justified this proposal through one key premise: “to freeze the level of military activity at current levels, and if possible, to reduce it” (Griffiths, 1979: 60). That is, such proposals were attempting to formalize the then non-militarized status of the surface waters and ice of the Arctic Ocean, to preserve what was in reality already the status quo. This was the case because of the climate, geography and technological limitations of the day. Climate change, however, is altering the historically formidable ice of the Arctic Ocean, making travel through the area, whether commercial or military, more accessible in the years to come. In response, states have expressed their interest in weaponizing icebreakers and plans for ice-capable surface vessels, both of which forecast weaponized surface patrols in the Arctic Ocean in the near future (Regehr, 2020: 207).

This prospect is perhaps one of the most serious problems that proposals for demilitarizing the Arctic Ocean would have to contend with.

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Thus, the reality of military activity, or the prospect thereof, on the surface of the Arctic Ocean is radically different today, which makes this measure all the more necessary. Imminent militarization cuts both ways, for while it makes an Arctic Ocean de-militarization agreement more urgent as an arms control measure it would also have to be negotiated in a context where state interests are more intensified and the necessary strategic sacrifices more serious. Geography and climate no longer have total control over what is militarily possible on the surface waters of the Arctic Ocean, it is now up to the states to decide whether or when the Arctic Ocean will be legitimately used as a military theatre or not. It is clear that preserving, or at least limiting, the extent to which the Arctic Ocean is used as a military theatre enhances the prospect of more comprehensive Arctic denuclearization proposals.

Such an agreement would have various benefits for efforts towards Arctic denuclearization. It would create a military buffer zone between Arctic nations, specifically the US and Russia, and thus act as a disengagement and deconfliction mechanism (Wilkes, 1984). It would reduce the incentives and justifications for developing Arctic military capabilities or the build-up thereof and thus act to suppress the Arctic security dilemma (Huebert, 2021: 89). In conjunction with an ASW free-zone, or on its own, such an agreement would decrease the vulnerability of SSBNs by curtailing options for surface based ASW in the area, which would stabilize US and Russian nuclear deterrent postures.

In the context of increasing ‘soft security’ cooperation in the Arctic, through the Search and Rescue Agreement for example, it is important to clarify that such a demilitarization agreement would not totally prohibit military presence on the surface waters of the Arctic Ocean. Rather, such an agreement could follow the precedent and structure of the Antarctic Treaty which, although demilitarizing the Antarctic, allows for military personnel and equipment to be used towards scientific and peaceful ends. Emulating this is crucial, seeing that Arctic state military’s have increasingly taken on constabulary and scientific support functions which ought to be facilitated.

In fact, such a demilitarization agreement would enhance and protect these cooperative achievements by increasing transparency and norms of conduct.

Both of these Arctic specific arms control measures would tend towards larger Arctic disarmament and denuclearization efforts by reducing the legitimate military scope and use of the Arctic and by building further confidence and military transparency in the region. Moreover, these measures are specifically aimed at enhancing strategic stability in the region through assuring deterrent invulnerability by reducing the need and incentive for provocative offensive moves like ASW tracking or weaponized icebreakers. These measures are thus worthy of consideration by ANWFZ proponents since they would improve the strategic environment and thus work to create the environment in which grander denuclearization negotiations could be considered.

Conclusion The steps outlined here are a program of actions for filling the strategic gap of historic ANWFZ proposals and would work to create the conditions necessary for negotiation of a zone to be considered. There are numerous starting points, for some commentators have suggested even more preliminary steps ahead of formal military-military dialogue resumption like academic cooperation and Arctic inclusive research groups like the Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative. The ‘menu’ offered here, while laid out in a format and progression which the author believes to be ideal, remains but a ‘menu’ that future scholars or policy advocates may wish to pick and choose, even to re-order.

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The crucial point is to commence dialogue, build confidence, reduce arms, preserve and enhance strategic stability.

In separating hard and soft security discussions, or military specific and non-military discussions, a two-track method of cooperation is developed, one in which two tracks are running in parallel to each other, to the benefit of each other, while remaining mutually insulated from each other to preserve one another’s efficacy should crises or diplomatic impasses emerge. This has also been referred as an “interdependent continuum.” (Boulege & Depledge, 2021).

This ‘menu’ for Arctic arms control and CBMs has been in development for several decades now, starting with Franklyn Griffiths 1979 proposal, and has enjoyed an increasing amount of academic commentary, especially in the wake of the 2014 collapse of the ASFR and ACDS meetings. The ANWFZ concept can immensely benefit from this work if it is harnessed, harmonized and orientated towards denuclearizing the Arctic region. There is undoubtedly still much work to be done, but the pieces are being assembled. While there has been little hard security cooperation between Arctic capable states as of yet, pursuing this ‘menu’ for arctic arms control and CBMs is the natural maturation of the Ilulissat Declaration and the first step in the formation of a comprehensive security architecture for the Arctic region.

Some of these measures, however, are susceptible to the identified shortcomings of ANWFZ proposals – to never break free from NGO advocacy circles and to be seriously considered by governments. It is fair to ask whether any of these suggested measures are capable of making that transition from the policy advocacy realm to the government policy formation realm. Arctic specific CBMs and arms control measures are beginning to receive attention from Governments, but their future remains uncertain especially given the heighted geo-political tensions associated with the war in Ukraine. These measures, and the way in which they have been framed, attempt to bridge the strategic void of historic ANWFZ proposals. The proposed measures are more attune to the strategic realities of the Arctic region. The proposed arms control measures are intentionally preceded by proposals for formalized military dialogue and CBMs, and the contingency of arms control on dialogue and confidence is fully realized.

References Armstrong, T. (1965). Arms Control in The Arctic. Nature, 206, 865–866.

Atland, K. (2008). Mikhail Gorbachev, the Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization of Interstate Relations in the Arctic. Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, 43(3), 289–311.

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Berbrick, W., Gosnell, R., Saunes, L., & Thompson-Jones, M. (2021, March 8). Preventing Conflict in the Arctic with Russia Starts with Dialogue. The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/preventing-conflict-arctic-russia-starts-dialogue179593 Boulègue, M., & Depledge, D. (2021, March 10). Arctic Hard Security Taskforce: Summary of the 10 December expert workshop. North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network MacDonald

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(NAADSN). https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Activity-ReportArctic-Hard-Security-Taskforce.pdf Cepinskyte, A. & Paul, M. (2021, February 11). Arctic Security Environment in Flux: Mitigating Geopolitical Competition through a Military-Security Dialogue. The Arctic Institute. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-security-environment-flux-mitigatinggeopolitical-competition-military-security-dialogue/?cn-reloaded=1 Conley, H. & Melino, M. (2016). An Arctic Redesign: recommendations to rejuvenate the Arctic Council. Center For Strategic & International Studies. http://csiswebsiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/160302_Conley_Ar cticRedesign_Web.pdf Danilov, P. (2021, January 19). Russia Wants to Resume Meetings Between Arctic Defense Chiefs. High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-wants-resume-meetingsbetween-arctic-defense-chiefs Depledge, D., Boulègue, F., & Tulupov, D. (2019). Why we need to talk about military activity in the Arctic: Towards an Arctic Military Code of Conduct. Arctic Yearbook 2019.

Exner-Pirot, H. (2019). Between Militarization and disarmament: constructing peace in the Arctic. Arctic Yearbook 2019.

Exner-Pirot, H. (2020) Between Militarization and Disarmament: Challenges for Arctic Security in the Twenty-First Century. In Heininen, L. & Exner-Pirot, H. (Eds.), Climate Change and Arctic Security. Palgrave MacMillan.

Griffiths, F. (1979). A Northern Foreign Policy. Wellesley Papers 7. Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

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Huebert, R. (2021, January 13). Russia Elevates Importance of Northern Fleet Upgrading it to Military District Status. High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-elevatesimportance-northern-fleet-upgrading-it-military-district-status Huebert, R. (2011). Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage. In Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security: Historical Perspectives (pp 383-400). Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies.

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Makichuk, D. (2021, March 12). Russia’s Kalibr Missile puts US on the back-heel. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2021/03/russias-kalibr-missile-puts-us-on-the-back-heel/ Newcombe, H. (1981). A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Arctic: A Proposal.. Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 12(3), 251-258. Østreng, W. (1982). Strategic Developments in the Norwegian and Polar Seas: Problems of Denuclearization. Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 13(2), 101-112.

Sauner, L. quoted in: Hilde-Gunn, B. (2021, January 26). Russia Should be Invited Back to Arctic Security Forums, New Report Suggests, High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-should-be-invited-back-arctic-securityforums-new-report-suggests Tømmerbakke, S. (2019, October 22). This is why Finland and Iceland want Security Politics in the Arctic Council. High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/why-finland-andiceland-want-security-politics-arctic-council Purver, R. (1987). Arms Control Options in the Arctic. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Issue Brief No. 7.

Purver, R. (1983). The Control of Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare. International Journal, 38, 409431.

Purver, R. (1981). Arms Control in the North. Queen’s University Center for International Relations.

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Regehr, E. (2020). Military Infrastructure and Strategic Capabilities: Russia’s Arctic Defence Posture. In Spohr, K. & Hamilton, D. (Eds.), The Arctic and World Order, Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins University.

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Wilkes, O. (1984). A Proposal for a Demilitarized Zone in the Arctic, Project Ploughshares, Working Paper 84(4).

Zandee, D., Kriuijver, K., & Stoetman, A. (2020). The Future of Arctic Security - the Geopolitical Pressure Cooker and the Consequences for the Netherlands. The Clingendael Institute. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/202004/Report_The_future_of_Arctic_security_April2020.pdf The United States Department of the Navy. (2021, January 5). A Blue Arctic, A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic. https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/05/2002560338/-1/1/0/ARCTIC%20BLUEPRINT%202021%20FINAL.PDF/ARCTIC%20BLUEPRI NT%202021%20FINAL.PDF

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Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative. (2020). Conflict Prevention and Security Cooperation in the Arctic Region: Frameworks of the Future. https://www.divaportal.org/smash/get/diva2:1508235/FULLTEXT01.pdf The State Council of The People’s Republic of China. (2018, January 26). China’s Arctic Policy. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_28147602666 0336.htm United States Coast Guard. (2019). United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_2019.pd f International Security Advisory Board (2016). Report on Arctic Policy. https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/262585.pdf

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Towards a Sustainable Integrated Arctic Shipping Strategy Ana Teresa Cardoso

Shipping activities in the Arctic region pose a wide range of pressures on its marine environment, including underwater noise, light disturbance, ship strikes with marine mammals, pollution from operations and accidents, and socioeconomic impacts on coastal communities. The IMO has adopted the Polar Code to manage shipping in the Arctic Ocean. Protecting the Arctic marine environment from shipping impacts is essential for all stakeholders, including seafarers. Shipping, including cruise tourism, serves societal drivers such as trade, commerce, and recreation, and global shipping is expected to increase, particularly if climate change continues to result in sea ice losses, potentially opening up new trade routes. Increases in shipping activity in the Arctic region have already been observed, raising concerns about potential impacts on sensitive Arctic marine ecosystems, particularly on marine mammals reliant on sound for communication and navigation. Climate change increases navigational risks in the Arctic due to mobile sea ice and limited hydrographic charting in newly opened areas. The WMO and IMO provide seafarers with weather, wave, and ice warnings and forecasts to mitigate these risks, extending the global maritime distress safety system. HFO has been identified as the most significant pressure exerted by ships in the Arctic, with fishing vessels, general cargo vessels, and service vessels being the top emitters of black carbon. The Arctic states should develop a integrated strategy for navigation in the Arctic to improve this region's sustainability and to guide the non-Arctic states.

Introduction The exploration and potential utilisation of Arctic shipping routes have emerged as a focal point of global interest, driven by the prospect of shorter transit times, reduced costs, and expanded economic opportunities. The retreat of Arctic sea ice, a consequence of climate change, has opened up new maritime pathways, sparking a surge in maritime activity and heightened attention from nations with Arctic interests (Huntington et al., 2023). Accordig Dawson et al. (2020: 19) “Ship traffic has nearly tripled in the Canadian Arctic over the past decade and additional growth is expected as climate change continues to increase navigability in the region. In response, the Canadian Government is developing Low Impact Shipping Corridors as an adaptation strategy that supports safety and sustainability under rapidly changing environmental conditions.” As the allure of these routes grows, so too do the complexities and challenges they present, necessitating comprehensive consideration and global cooperation.

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From an environmental perspective, the impact of shipping activities on the delicate Arctic ecosystem is profound and far-reaching. Concerns about pollution, habitat disruption, and disturbance to marine life loom large as vessels navigate these icy waters. Efforts to mitigate these risks include reducing emissions, minimising noise pollution, and preventing ship strikes with marine mammals (IMO, 2023a; Rojano-Doñate et al., 2023). Moreover, there is a growing consensus on transitioning from heavy fuel oil (HFO) towards cleaner alternatives to safeguard the Arctic environment (Comer et al., 2020; Dalaklis et al., 2023).

International conventions such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provide a legal framework for addressing these issues, emphasising cooperation, environmental protection, and Indigenous rights (Singh et al., 2020).

Arctic shipping has significantly increased over the past decade, according to the Arctic Council.

The council's Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) released a report detailing the trends in Arctic shipping from 2013 to 2023. The report revealed a 37% rise in the number of unique ships entering the Arctic Polar Code area, with around 500 more ships compared to previous years. September recorded the highest influx, with 1,122 ships entering the area (Arctic Council, 2024).

The distance travelled by ships in the Arctic Polar Code Area also increased by 111%, from 6.1 million to 12.9 million nautical miles during the same period. Fishing vessels accounted for over one-third of all ships, making them the most common type, closely followed by general cargo ships.

These developments in Arctic shipping can be attributed to changes in the marine environment, particularly the reduction in sea ice extent. Longer navigation seasons and access to previously inaccessible areas have resulted. The rise is also driven by increased natural resource extraction projects like the Mary River Mine and Yamal Gas (Arctic Council, 2024).

As shipping traffic increases, so do the risks of accidents and collisions, posing threats to human safety and environmental integrity (Huntington et al., 2023). To address these challenges, the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and International Maritime Organization (IMO) have implemented various safety measures, including improved ice forecasting, satellite navigation systems, and enhanced training for seafarers.

This paper examines the environmental concerns arising from Arctic shipping and explores the importance of developing an integrated Arctic shipping strategy. A qualitative method based on documentary analysis of scientific articles and institutional websites of organisations relevant to maritime transport in the Arctic, with a focus on environmental concerns, was used.

Arctic Shipping Routes The Northwest Passage, Northern Sea Route (the Northeast Passage), and Transpolar Sea Route (Figure 1) represent key Arctic shipping routes that have garnered increasing attention and exploration in recent years (IPCC, 2019). These routes offer potential shortcuts for maritime transportation between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, presenting opportunities for reduced transit times and costs and potential economic benefits (Huntington et al., 2023). However, they also pose significant challenges due to the harsh Arctic environment and geopolitical complexities.

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Figure 1. Arctic shipping routes: Northwest Passage, Transpolar Route, Northern Sea Route.

(Source: Yercan &. Sogut, 2023)

The Northwest Passage (NWP) traverses the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, offering a potential route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the Canadian Arctic waters. Historically, ice conditions have made this route largely impassable for much of the year. However, with the retreat of Arctic sea ice due to climate change, the NWP has become increasingly navigable during the summer months, attracting interest from shipping companies and governments (Huntington et al., 2023).

The Northeast Passage (NEP), which is also called the Northern Sea Route (NSR) because it encompasses the NSR, extends from northern Norway across Russia to the Bering Strait. Russia defines the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as the waters within its exclusive economic zone between Cape Zhelanie (68◦35′E) and the Kara Gates in the west and Cape Dezhnev (168◦58′37′′ W) in the east (Huntington et al., 2023).

Like the Northwest Passage, the Northeast Passage has experienced increased shipping activity in recent years, particularly during the summer when ice coverage is reduced. Russia has been actively promoting the Northern Sea Route as a viable alternative for global shipping, investing in infrastructure and icebreaker fleets to facilitate navigation (Huntington et al., 2023).

The Transpolar Sea Route represents a potential route directly over the North Pole across the central Arctic Ocean. While this route has historically been impractical due to thick ice cover, climate change-induced Arctic ice melt has led to speculation about the future feasibility of a navigable Transpolar Sea Route. However, significant challenges remain, including unpredictable ice conditions and the lack of infrastructure along the route (Bennett et al., 2020; Huntington et al., 2023).

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Despite the opportunities presented by these Arctic shipping routes, there are also significant challenges and concerns. Melting sea ice contributes to environmental changes in the region, impacting marine ecosystems and Indigenous communities that rely on the Arctic environment for their livelihoods.

As Arctic ice continues to diminish, the region's shipping future remains uncertain. While Arctic routes offer potential benefits in terms of efficiency and cost savings, they also pose environmental and geopolitical challenges that require careful management and cooperation among states.

Environmental Concerns Shipping activities in the Arctic region have garnered increasing attention in recent years due to the changing climate and the opening of new maritime routes. While this presents economic opportunities, it also raises concerns about the environmental impacts on the Arctic ecosystem.

Underwater Noise Underwater noise from shipping activities in the Arctic can significantly impact marine life, particularly marine mammals that rely on sound for communication, navigation, and foraging. The noise from ships can disrupt essential behaviours such as mating, feeding, and migration, leading to habitat displacement and population declines (Erbe et al., 2019).

Light Disturbance Light pollution from ships, particularly from artificial lighting used for navigation and operations, can disrupt natural light cycles and adversely affect Arctic wildlife, including seabirds, marine mammals, and fish. Light disturbance can disorient animals, interfere with their feeding and breeding behaviours, and contribute to habitat fragmentation (Qi et al., 2024).

Ship Strikes with Marine Mammals The increase in shipping traffic in the Arctic raises the risk of ship strikes with marine mammals, including whales, seals, and walruses. Collisions can result in injury or mortality for these animals, impacting their populations and ecological roles in Arctic ecosystems. Implementing speed restrictions in known whale habitats, establishing whale avoidance zones, and using acoustic monitoring systems to detect marine mammals can help reduce the risk of ship strikes and protect vulnerable species (Vincent et al., 2023).

Cleaner Fuels and Scrubber Ban Among the foremost environmental hazards associated with Arctic shipping is the pollution stemming from the combustion of HFO. HFO, a residual fuel derived from crude oil refining processes, is extensively utilised as a primary fuel source for marine vessels owing to its costeffectiveness compared to cleaner alternatives like marine gas oil (MGO) or liquefied natural gas (LNG) (Comer et al., 2020). However, the incineration of HFO emits substantial quantities of pollutants, including sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate matter (PM), and black carbon (BC), which contribute to air pollution, acid rain, and climate change (Comer et al., 2017).

The use of scrubbers in Arctic shipping has raised concerns due to their potential environmental harm, prompting calls for their prohibition in the region. Scrubbers discharge pollutants directly into Arctic waters, threatening marine life and ecosystem health (Clean Arctic Alliance, 2024a).

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Transitioning to cleaner fuels, such as low-sulphur marine diesel or LNG, offers a more sustainable alternative, reducing emissions and minimising environmental impact (Al-Enazi et al., 2021).

Furthermore, recent studies have emphasised the environmental benefits of alternative fuels, such as biofuels and hydrogen, in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and air pollutants (Islam Rony et al., 2023). These fuels present promising alternatives for Arctic shipping, offering lower carbon footprints and fewer environmental repercussions.

Creation of Emission Control Areas (ECAs) Emission Control Areas (ECAs) regulate shipping emissions and protect marine environments.

Establishing an ECA in the Arctic would require stringent fuel sulphur content and emissions regulations, promoting cleaner and more sustainable shipping practices (Kontovas, 2020).

Collaborative efforts among Arctic states and international organisations are essential for effectively implementing and enforcing ECA regulations.

Recent research has highlighted the positive impact of ECAs on air quality and human health, demonstrating their effectiveness in reducing emissions of sulphur oxides (SOx) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) (Merico et al., 2021; Clean Arctic Alliance, 2023a, 2023b). Additionally, addressing black carbon emissions within ECAs is critical, as black carbon deposition on snow and ice accelerates melting and contributes to climate change (Clean Arctic Alliance, 2024b).

Addressing Black Carbon Emissions Black carbon emissions from shipping in the Arctic significantly contribute to climate change and ecosystem disruption. Black carbon, primarily emitted from the combustion of fossil fuels, has a warming effect on the climate and contributes to the accelerated melting of Arctic ice (EUA-BCA, 2021; Qi et al., 2024). Implementing measures to reduce black carbon emissions, such as using cleaner fuels and improving engine efficiency, is essential for mitigating its impact on the Arctic environment (Clean Arctic Alliance, 2024b).

Recent studies have underscored the urgency of addressing black carbon emissions in the Arctic, highlighting its detrimental effects on local communities, wildlife, and the global climate system (Zhang et al., 2024).

The Arctic Council’s Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) has highlighted the significance of close-to and within Arctic sources of BC, concluding BC emissions above 60 degrees North were more significant than those at lower latitudes and mitigating measures should recognise this (IMO, 2013).

AMAP defined the Arctic as all regions north of 60 degrees North. It has previously been proposed that at a minimum the geographic scope of measures cover the maritime waters of the Arctic Human Development Report area or those defined by AMAP, or alternatively, all waters above 60 degrees North (excluding the Baltic Sea) may be a simpler definition for navigational purposes (IMO, 2023b).

The International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) has conducted four studies on CO emissions from ships in the Arctic region (2015, 2017, 2019, and 2021). In 2021, the study focussed on the Arctic area, defined in Annexes I, II, IV, and V of SOLAS and MARPOL, and referred to as IMO Arctic waters in Figure 2, as well as the wider geographical area of the Arctic, which covers all waters north of 78.95oN (excluding the Baltic Sea) (IMO, 2023b).

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Figure 2. Arctic intensity of ship BC emissions (north of 78.95ºN) based on 2021 data (IMO, 2023b)

According to the ICCT on the IMO (2023b: 3-4): Several findings bear directly on the question of geographic scope of BC emission control measures. A comparison of 2021 BC emission data with 2015 data shows that in six years BC emissions from ships operating within IMO Arctic waters have doubled from 193t to 413t. The analysis of BC emission data also compared the numbers of ships operating in the IMO Arctic waters area with the number of ships operating north of 78.95oN (excluding the Baltic Sea) in 2021. This analysis shows that 8,577 vessels operated in Arctic sea areas north of 78.95oN and were responsible for emitting 1,500 tonnes of BC in 2021, while only 1,866 vessels operated in the IMO Arctic waters area emitting 413 tonnes of BC. The numbers of ships operating in the IMO Arctic waters represented 22% of ships operating throughout the wider Arctic and they were responsible for only 27% of the total of BC emitted in the Arctic. The analysis also shows that the volume of residual fuel used throughout the wider Arctic area is less than a quarter of that needing to be replaced to comply with the recently adopted Mediterranean Sea SOx ECA. The blue boundary marks the delineation of Arctic waters as used for purposes of the IMO's Polar Code, the green boundary the delineation of the Arctic Human Development Report and the red boundary the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme boundary.

Measures to reduce BC emissions must applied to all ships emitting this pollutant, which impacts the Arctic. A definition of ‘Arctic’ is needed in MARPOL Annex VI. The geographical scope of measures to reduce the effects of BC emissions from ships in the Arctic should cover, as a minimum, the maritime waters of the AHDR area or the AMAP area (see Figure 2) or a more feasible definition of the Arctic for shipping purposes could include all waters, for example, North of 60 degrees North (excluding the Baltic Sea) (IMO, 2023b).

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Sustainable Practices and Environmental Stewardship Adopting sustainable practices is imperative for minimising the environmental footprint of Arctic shipping. Preventing oil spills, managing waste responsibly, and reducing underwater noise pollution contribute to preserving Arctic ecosystems (Pavlov, 2023). Indigenous communities play a vital role in environmental stewardship, offering traditional ecological knowledge that informs conservation efforts and sustainable resource management (Huntington et al., 2023).

Unique Challenges Posed by Arctic Shipping Arctic shipping presents distinctive challenges that exacerbate its environmental impact and complicate risk mitigation efforts. The extreme cold, harsh weather conditions, and sea ice pose significant operational hurdles for vessels navigating Arctic waters, heightening the risk of accidents, spills, and pollution incidents (Albrechtsen et al., 2021; Uryupova, 2024). Moreover, the remoteness of Arctic regions and the dearth of infrastructure and emergency response capabilities further compound the challenges associated with Arctic shipping (Brigham, 2018).

One of the most notable environmental risks associated with Arctic shipping is the potential for oil spills in remote and environmentally sensitive areas. Unlike spills in more temperate regions, where swift response and clean-up efforts are feasible, Arctic oil spills present unique challenges due to ice cover, limited daylight, and restricted access to affected areas. The slow pace of natural remediation in cold Arctic waters further complicates clean-up efforts and extends the ecological impacts of spills (Qi et al., 2024).

Furthermore, the melting of Arctic ice and the opening of new shipping routes have led to increased vessel traffic in previously pristine and ecologically sensitive areas, raising concerns about noise pollution, disturbance to marine wildlife, and the potential for ship strikes and habitat degradation (Tiller et al., 2022). Arctic ecosystems, already under pressure from climate change and other anthropogenic stressors, are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of increased shipping activity, underscoring the need for comprehensive risk assessments and mitigation measures to safeguard sensitive habitats and species (Arrigo et al., 2020).

Regulatory Efforts to Address Environmental Concerns Navigating the complex and ever-changing Arctic region requires a deep understanding of its environmental challenges and the legal frameworks governing maritime activities. As the effects of climate change continue to transform the Arctic landscape, including the melting of sea ice and the opening of new maritime routes, the need for clear and comprehensive regulations to ensure the safety, security, and sustainability of navigation in the region becomes increasingly critical.

UNCLOS provides the primary legal framework for governing maritime affairs, including navigation, environmental protection, and resource management. UNCLOS is often called the "constitution of the oceans" due to its comprehensive scope and its role in establishing the rights and responsibilities of states about the world's oceans and seas.

At the heart of UNCLOS is the principle of freedom of navigation, enshrined in Article 87 of the convention. This principle affirms the right of all states to navigate freely on the high seas, subject only to certain limited exceptions provided for in the convention. The high seas, which encompass the vast majority of the world's oceans, including the Arctic Ocean, are considered international waters where all states enjoy equal rights and freedoms (United Nations, 1982).

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The principle of freedom of navigation takes on added significance in the Arctic, where the effects of climate change are most pronounced. As sea ice retreats, previously inaccessible areas are becoming navigable, opening up new opportunities and challenges for maritime activities in the region. UNCLOS provides the legal framework necessary to ensure that navigation in the Arctic is conducted safely, responsibly, and under international law.

One of the key provisions of UNCLOS relevant to Arctic navigation is Article 234, which addresses navigation rights through ice-covered areas. In the Arctic, where ice cover can be extensive for much of the year, navigating through ice-covered waters presents unique challenges and risks.

Article 234 ensures that ships, including icebreakers, enjoy the right of innocent passage through ice-covered areas, subject to certain safety measures and regulations established by the coastal state to prevent accidents and environmental damage (United Nations, 1982).

In addition to ensuring freedom of navigation, UNCLOS also imposes obligations on states to protect and preserve the marine environment. Articles 192 to 195 of the convention outline these obligations, emphasising the duty of states to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment from various sources, including ships, land-based activities, and exploration and exploitation of marine resources (United Nations, 1982).

In the Arctic, where the impacts of climate change are most pronounced, these environmental obligations take on added significance. The melting of sea ice and the opening of new shipping routes bring opportunities for economic development but also raise concerns about potential environmental degradation. UNCLOS requires states to conduct environmental impact assessments for proposed activities that may have significant adverse effects on the marine environment, ensuring that the environmental risks associated with Arctic navigation are carefully considered and mitigated.

Moreover, UNCLOS establishes principles of international cooperation in addressing marine environmental issues. Article 197 underscores the importance of states cooperating on a global and regional level to protect and preserve the marine environment, including through the exchange of scientific and technical information, capacity-building, and the promotion of international agreements and measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution (United Nations, 1982).

Cooperation is essential for effective environmental protection in the Arctic region, where multiple states share common environmental concerns. UNCLOS provides a framework for states to work together in addressing shared challenges, such as oil spills, shipping pollution, and habitat degradation. The convention encourages states to develop and implement joint initiatives and regional agreements to protect and preserve the Arctic marine environment (United Nations, 1982). Note that UNCLOS provisions apply during peacetime. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 jeopardised the cooperation with this Arctic state.

At the international level, UNCLOS provides a legal framework for addressing these issues, emphasising cooperation, environmental protection, and Indigenous rights (Singh et al., 2020).

Additionally, the IMO's International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), which came into force in 2017, establishes rigorous standards for vessel design, equipment, and operational practices to ensure the safety and sustainability of Arctic shipping. The code encompasses provisions for pollution prevention, emergency preparedness, and environmental risk assessment, striving to minimise the ecological footprint of shipping activities in polar regions.

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Polar Code mandates that ships operating in polar waters develop and implement environmental management plans, conduct regular environmental audits, and adhere to stringent discharge limits for pollutants such as oil, sewage, and garbage (Deggim, 2018; IMO, 2024a).

Although the Polar Code is mandatory under both the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), both Conventions allow flag States to authorise exemptions and waivers for ships flying their flag. The Arctic Ocean cannot wait for these regulations to become mandatory without exemptions and waivers.

In April 2018, the IMO committed to reducing the risks associated with HFO. Canada and the Marshall Islands submitted a proposal to assess economic and other impacts on Arctic communities as a result of a ban on HFO use and carriage in the Arctic because Canadian Arctic communities rely on shipping to bring in essential goods, including fuel, and rely on HFO as a source of energy on land. Approved in 2022, the ban on the use and carriage of by ships of HFO in the Arctic begins in July 2024, although allowed exemptions and waivers (Lloyd’s Register Group Limited, 2023) mean that a full ban on HFO for ships in the Arctic will not be enforced until 2029 (Transport Canada, 2021).

IMO’s agreement on reducing underwater noise pollution from shipping stops short of prioritising mandatory measures (Humpert, 2023; Clean Arctic Alliance, 2024c; IMO, 2024b). Dr. Sian Prior criticised its failure to make progress toward mandatory rules that would decrease the impact of shipping on Arctic wildlife (Clean Arctic Alliance, 2024c).

The ECAs proposed by Canada and Norway and approved by IMO member states will provide additional protection from air emissions in Canadian Arctic waters and the Norwegian Sea by reducing emissions of sulphur oxides (SOx), particulate matter and nitrogen oxides (NOx) from international shipping (Clean Arctic Alliance, 2024d; IMO, 2024b).

The Canadian Arctic ECA includes Arctic waters under Canadian sovereignty, from the 137º meridian west in the Beaufort Sea to the existing North American ECA boundary in the east (IMO, 2023a). Meanwhile, the Norwegian Sea ECA covers the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone north of 62 degrees latitude and includes Norwegian fjords and coastal waters (IMO, 2023b).

During the 82nd session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), IMO has adopted significant amendments to MARPOL Annex VI, establishing those new ECAs. These ECAs will also reduce black carbon emissions, encouraging maritime transport operators to switch to cleaner fuels (Clean Arctic Alliance, 2024e).

According, Sian Prior (2024e) “With the IMO finally looking set to regulate black carbon emissions from black carbon – which will greatly lower the impact of the shipping sector on Arctic sea and glaciers – member states must now agree on which fuels are appropriate for use in the Arctic, so that robust rules can be put in place.”

In addition to international instruments, the Arctic States developed and agreed treaties in the 21st century. Among these, two are very relevant for the sustainability of Arctic shipping: the Arctic SAR Treaty and the Arctic Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Treaty.

The Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement or SAR) is an international agreement on search and rescue

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cooperation in the Arctic, signed by all 8 Arctic States in Nuuk, Greenland, on 12 May 2011, and came into force in January 2013. It is the first ever legally binding document elaborated under the auspices of the Arctic Council and the first multilateral Arctic legal document (Arctic Portal, 2024a).

The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, also signed by all 8 Arctic States in Kiruna, Sweden, on 15 May 2013, has “the objective to strengthen cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance among the Parties on oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic in order to protect the marine environment from pollution by oil (art. 1).” Clearly, “each Party shall maintain a national system for responding promptly and effectively to oil pollution incidents. This system shall take into account particular activities and locales most likely to give rise to or suffer an oil pollution incident and anticipated risks to areas of special ecological significance and shall include at a minimum a national contingency plan or plans for preparedness and response to oil pollution incidents. Such contingency plan or plans shall include the organisational relationship of the various bodies involved, whether public or private, taking into account guidelines developed pursuant to this Agreement and other relevant international agreements (art.4.1)” (Arctic Portal, 2024b).

The Arctic states have a relevant and dynamic role in protecting the Arctic Ocean from maritime traffic. An example is the Arctic Maritime Transport Assessment (AMSA) report conducted by the Council for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group. This report, with 17 recommendations, was approved by the Arctic Ministers at the 2009 Ministerial meeting in Tromsø. PAME issued four reports (2011, 2013, 2015, 2017) to document and track progress in implementing all recommendations. However, due to the progress and developments, the recommendations had to be updated (2021). These reports present a comprehensive framework and strategy for the Arctic, strengthening maritime safety and environmental protection (PAME, 2024).

PAME's shipping work has evolved into a more project-based approach in recent years. It operates a Shipping Expert Group that collaborates regularly with experts from Arctic States, Permanent Participants, and Observers. PAME focuses on environmental protection and sustainable development, distinct from the regulatory role of the IMO. PAME's role includes data collection, analysis, and policy recommendations to support safe and environmentally sustainable Arctic shipping. This work has influenced decision-making within Arctic States and the IMO, fostering better coordination and cooperation. The strong partnership between IMO and PAME reflects PAME's expertise in providing valuable input to shape maritime actions in the Arctic (PAME, 2024). It can inferred that Arctic states are concerned about the sustainability of Arctic shipping.

Strengthening Arctic Governance Through Integrated Shipping Strategy Considering the dynamic environmental conditions and the increase in maritime traffic in the Arctic Ocean, the Arctic states should develop an integrated shipping strategy promoting the adoption of regulations without exemptions, among others. This strategy should be the guiding principle for non-Arctic states to develop national strategies for flag vessels operating in the Arctic Ocean.

Ensuring Safe and Secure Navigation Safety and security are paramount in Arctic navigation, given the challenging environmental factors, including sea ice, extreme weather, and limited infrastructure. (Arctic Council, 2020). An integrated strategy would prioritise the establishment of standardised procedures for navigation safety, Towards a Sustainable Integrated Arctic Shipping Strategy

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encompassing vessel routing measures, icebreaking assistance, and coordinated search and rescue operations.

Protecting the Marine Environment The Arctic marine ecosystem is susceptible to pollution, habitat degradation, and biodiversity loss due to shipping activities. (Arctic Council, 2020). An integrated shipping strategy should include measures to minimise environmental impacts, such as emission reduction initiatives, ballast water management protocols, and stringent oil spill prevention measures By promoting sustainable shipping practices, for example, banning the use of HFO and transport for use of HFO and banning scrubbers, Arctic and non-Arctic states are contributing to the Arctic preservation ecosystem and people's health in this region.

Promoting Sustainable Development Arctic navigation presents economic opportunities for trade and tourism, benefiting Arctic and non-Arctic states (Arctic Economic Council, 2022). An integrated strategy would facilitate the sustainable development of Arctic shipping, infrastructure, and services while ensuring a balance between economic growth, environmental preservation, and community well-being. Howevwer, this strategy would have developed with respect to the Arctic state's jurisdiction and sovereignty.

Strengthening Governance Frameworks Effective, sustainable governance of shipping requires solid legal and institutional frameworks. An integrated strategy would be the common thread for non-Arctic states developing their Arctic shipping strategies. If the Arctic Council had regulatory status focused on environmental protection and sustainable development, it would reinforce the legal value of this strategy.

Engaging Indigenous Communities Indigenous communities in the Arctic possess invaluable knowledge, rights, and perspectives that must be integrated into navigation governance processes (Skripnikova et al., 2023). Arctic Shipping Best Practice Information Forum, led by PAME, showcases successful public-private partnerships and is an example of engaging Indigenous Peoples in shaping maritime transport in the Arctic.

(Arctic Council, 2020). Another example is the AMSA reports mentioned above, which also involve the relevant participation of Indigenous communities (PAME, 2024). Indigenous knowledge from Arctic communities is so fundamental that the Arctic Corridors and Northern Voices (ACNV) project was created to include this knowledge in the Government of Canada's development of lowimpact navigation corridors. Thirteen Canadian Arctic communities in Inuit Nunangat (Inuit homeland) participated in this project, six from the Inuvialuit Settlement region (ISR); Aklavik, Inuvik, Paulatuk, Sachs Harbour, Tuktoyaktuk, and Ulukhaktok; seven from Nunavut (which consists of three different regions – Kivalliq, Kitikmeot, Qikiqtaaluk): Arviat, Cambridge Bay, Coral Harbour, Gjoa Haven, Iqaluit (not finalised at time of submission), Pond Inlet, and Resolute; and one from Nunavik: Salluit (Dawson et al., 2020).

An integrated strategy should prioritise meaningful engagement with Indigenous Peoples, respecting their traditional knowledge, cultural practices, and territorial rights.

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Conclusions In conclusion, the exploration of Arctic shipping routes and their potential utilisation represent a pivotal juncture in global maritime affairs, characterised by promise and peril. The opening of these routes, facilitated by the retreat of Arctic sea ice driven by climate change, offers tantalising prospects of shorter transit times, reduced costs, and expanded economic opportunities. However, the allure of Arctic shipping is counterbalanced by a host of environmental, geopolitical, and socioeconomic challenges that demand an integrated strategy.

From an environmental perspective, shipping activities' impact on the Arctic ecosystem is profound and far-reaching. Concerns about pollution, habitat disruption, and disturbance to marine life loom large as vessels navigate these icy waters. Efforts to mitigate these risks include reducing emissions, minimising noise pollution, preventing ship strikes with marine mammals, and transitioning away from heavy fuel oil towards cleaner alternatives. However, the unique environmental sensitivity of the Arctic amplifies these challenges, necessitating stringent regulatory measures and proactive environmental stewardship.

Moreover, regulatory efforts at both the international and national levels are crucial for addressing environmental concerns and ensuring compliance with best practices. The IMO’s Polar Code establishes rigorous standards for vessel design, equipment, and operational practices to ensure the safety and sustainability of Arctic shipping. Additionally, flag states should not authorise exemptions and derogations for ships flying their flags and operating in the Arctic.

Furthermore, strategic route planning and speed management can help reduce underwater noise pollution and minimise disturbance to marine mammals and other wildlife. Joint work with researchers, Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations, and Indigenous communities will enhance understanding of Arctic ecosystems and their preservation.

Sustainable Arctic shipping requires an approach that integrates technological innovation, regulatory frameworks, and research-based decision-making. By adopting sustainable practices, stakeholders can minimise environmental impact, ensure the safety of Arctic shipping operations, and preserve the region's unique ecological and cultural heritage for future generations.

Arctic shipping needs concerted efforts across multiple sectors and stakeholders. By prioritising sustainable development that balances economic interests with environmental protection, policymakers can navigate the complexities of Arctic shipping that promote long-term prosperity and resilience for the region and its inhabitants. Achieving sustainable shipping in the Arctic requires an integrated strategy that includes shipping sustainable practices and engaging with Indigenous communities.

The fundamental components of such a strategy may include: •

Environmental Regulations: continuously update and strengthen regulatory frameworks to address emerging environmental challenges, including emissions reduction targets (creation of ECAs and increase the geographical scope), pollution prevention measures (ban scrubbers), and habitat conservation.

•

Infrastructures: upgrade port facilities to ensure that port operations are carried out as quickly and safely as possible. Raise port fees for non-Arctic flag states vessel. Ensure sufficient port reception facilities for the discharge of ship-generated waste and others.

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Indigenous Engagement: is essential for ensuring that shipping activities in the Arctic region are not only environmentally sustainable but also culturally sensitive, socially responsible, and economically beneficial to local residents. Given the Arctic's unique environment and the rich cultural heritage of Indigenous Peoples, meaningful community engagement is a cornerstone of sustainable development in the region. The Arctic is home to diverse Indigenous groups, including the Inuit, Sami, and various other Indigenous communities. For these groups, the Arctic is more than a landscape; it is central to their way of life, identity, and traditions. Shipping activities, often driven by economic and geopolitical interests, can disrupt these ways of life if not managed thoughtfully. Cultural sensitivity in shipping operations involves respecting and understanding the historical and spiritual significance of the land and sea to Indigenous populations. This requires: o involving Indigenous communities in decision-making processes from the very beginning, before key shipping routes or infrastructure projects are finalized. o incorporating Indigenous knowledge systems, such as centuries-old navigation and ecological practices, alongside Western scientific approaches. This fosters a more holistic understanding of the Arctic environment and promotes more informed, effective decision-making. o shipping activities should be mindful of sacred sites, hunting grounds, and seasonal migration patterns that are essential to Indigenous livelihoods. Any disturbance to these activities can have devastating effects on food security and community wellbeing.

•

Technological Innovation: joint research initiatives focused on green shipping technologies, ice navigation, and satellite monitoring can enhance the resilience of Arctic shipping routes while minimizing environmental harm.

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Rojano-Doñate, L., Lamoni, L., Tougaard, J., & Findlay, C. (2023). Effect of Vessel Noise on Marine Mammals and Measures to Reduce Impact. In: Popper, A.N., Sisneros, J., Hawkins, A.D., Thomsen, F. (eds) The Effects of Noise on Aquatic Life. Springer, Cham. pp 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10417-6_138-1.

Safety4Sea (2024 October 4). IMO designates Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea as ECAs. https://safety4sea.com/imo-designates-canadian-arctic-and-norwegian-sea-as-ecas/.

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Singh, P.A., Ort, M. (2020). Law and Policy Dimensions of Ocean Governance. In: Jungblut, S., Liebich, V., Bode-Dalby, M. (eds) YOUMARES 9 - The Oceans: Our Research, Our Future.

Springer, Cham. pp 45–56.

Skripnikova, N., Nagabhatla, N., & Doubleday, N. (2023). Filling the Void’: Engaging Indigenous Peoples in Arctic Environmental Governance.

2(7). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/368024079.

Tiller, S. J., Rhindress, A. P., Oguntola, I. O., Ülkü, M. A., Williams, K. A., & Sundararajan, B. (2022). Exploring the Impact of Climate Change on Arctic Shipping through the Lenses of Quadruple Bottom Line and Sustainable Development Goals. Sustainability, 14(4), 2193. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14042193.

United

Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

Uryupova, E. (2024, April 30). Climate Change and Challenges of Navigation in the Arctic: How Safe are We? The Arctic Institute. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/climate-changechallenges-navigation-arctic-how-safe-are-we/.

Van Roy, W., Merveille, J. B., Scheldeman, K., Van Nieuwenhove, A., Schallier, R., Van Roozendael, B., & Maes, F. (2023). Assessment of the Effect of International Maritime Regulations on Air Quality in the Southern North Sea. Atmosphere. 14(6), 969. https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos14060969.

Vincent, W. F., Lovejoy, C., & Bartenstein, K. (2023). Shipping in Arctic Marine Ecosystems under Stress: Recognizing and Mitigating the Threats. Chapter 3. In: Shipping in Inuit Nunangat. 37-57.

WMO.

(2023). Arctic Shipping Routes Weather and Ice Forecasting System. https://community.wmo.int/en/activity-areas/Marine/WMO-Support-for-Shippingpolar-waters.

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Zhang, Z., Libo, Z., & Meigen, Z. (2024). A progress review of black carbon deposition on Arctic snow and ice and its impact on climate change. Advances in Polar Science. 35(2). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380186326.

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Briefing Note

“Nothing about us without us”: What we can learn from Greenland’s new ‘Arctic Strategy’ 2024-2033 Rasmus Leander Nielsen and Jeppe Strandsbjerg

In February 2024, Greenland published a strategy on foreign, security, and defense policy. The strategy had been eagerly awaited for several years. The novel strategy aims to secure a stable foreign policy direction for Greenland for a decade and signal intents to multiple audiences. The Kingdom of Denmark had to delay their common strategy (or, policy) for the entire realm until the Greenlandic strategy was published, while other Arctic states have been curious on the priorities of the strategy. In this briefing note, we outline the historical and (geo)political context of the strategy. We then move on to discuss some of the main items of the strategy by emphasizing the relative of weight of certain areas over others (US and North American Arctic over EU and Denmark), security and defense policy, and climate policy, and, thirdly, sketch out the implications of these priorities for Greenland’s (geo)political aspirations and diplomatic relations.

Introduction In February 2024, Greenland published its foreign policy strategy titled Greenland in the World Nothing about us without us. Greenland’s Foreign, Security and Defense Policy 2024-2033 – an Arctic Strategy.1 Within a Greenlandic context, the strategy marks an important milestone. Since the formation of the first Greenlandic political parties in the late 1970’s, Greenlandic politics has frequently been articulated in opposition to Denmark and been evolving around a twin process of getting more control over domestic policies and room for maneuver in international and Arctic regional affairs.

Moreover, even though Greenland also published a foreign policy strategy in 2011, with the new strategy, we see, for the first time, a comprehensive strategic description of Greenland’s aspiration within the domain of security and defense policy.

On the one hand, the strategy had been eagerly awaited by multiple audiences, and on the other, the strategy should be read as a signal to these multiple audiences, i.e. domestically, within the Kingdom of Denmark (KoD), and abroad. The strategy aims to secure a stable foreign policy direction of Greenland, and to this end, the government has secured a broad parliamentary backing.

All political parties but one (Naleraq) have put their signature to the strategy and thus, in principle, Rasmus Leander Nielsen is Associate Professor at Ilisimatusarfik (University of Greenland) and Head of Nasiffik – Centre for Foreign and Security Policy Jeppe Strandsbjerg is Associate Professor at the Royal Danish Defense College and Nasiffik – Centre for Foreign and Security Policy at Ilisimatusarfik (University of Greenland)

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declared themselves in consensus. That is, frontloading the future if, for example, the incumbent government coalition over time should change. Within the Greenlandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the strategy should aid the small number of civil servants to handle foreign and defence policy issues on a day-to-day basis without prior political consultation. From outside, the increasing number of actors interested in the Arctic have likewise been eager to get to know the priorities and aspirations of Greenland. And finally Denmark, where there is a strong wish to renew the KoD’s Arctic Strategy, which expired in 2020, and set the course for a common Arctic policy.

The key message of the strategy is in the title ‘Nothing about us without us’. This has in recent years become established as the key term of Greenland’s engagement with the outside world, including Denmark and within the KoD.2 This motto stresses how discussions and decisions made about Greenlandic and Arctic affairs can no longer be ventured without prior consultation with Nuuk, i.e. that Greenland is insisting on a seat at the negotiation table. This motto is written as the guiding principle for 11 policy areas outlined in the strategy.

In addition, the strategy signals a credible commitment to be part of and contribute to international agreements and negotiations. This is expressed as a willingness to take international responsibility and be party to international commitments like the Paris Agreement. In a larger picture, the strategy follows a slow-motion evolution for half a century of becoming an international and regional actor in its own right, and, thus, sets the tone for an ever more outwards looking Greenland and a stronger international commitment.3 In this briefing note, we present key dimensions of the Arctic Strategy and provide historical and (geo)political contextualization in order to provide a guide for understanding the wider ramifications, as well as limitations of the strategy. While much of the strategy is in line with (geo)political signals emanating from Nuuk over the last decade, there are at least three issue areas deserving more attention that emerge from such a reading: First, the apparent importance ascribed to the EU and North America respectively, where the prioritization of North America flies in the face of the historically economic significance of the EU. Second, we highlight a fairly substantial shift in the political attitudes towards military presence and Greenlandic engagement within defense policy, although dual-use aspects of potential investments and developments to include economic and civilian benefits to the Greenlandic society and local actors is stressed. Third, as alluded to above, there is a stronger willingness to take on international responsibility, especially in regional Arctic fora and in the context of climate policies despite the complexities of Greenlandic infrastructure and development potential.

In what follows, we discuss the context, content, and implications of the novel Greenlandic strategy. We begin with an outline of the historical and political context of the strategy, including both domestic and KoD dynamics. We then move on to discuss the content of the strategy by primarily zooming in on the abovementioned three items, and finally, discuss some key aspects of the strategy in more detail and sketch out the implications of these priorities for Greenland’s (geo)political aspirations and diplomatic relations. In our choice of highlighting certain aspects of the strategy over others, we compare the prioritization of space given to various sections in the strategy with both the political and economic importance of certain foreign relations over others as well as the current political debates in Greenland.

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Context Even though the new Arctic strategy has been described by some pundits as Greenland’s first foreign policy strategy,4 there is prior work to this end which is worth mentioning. Even if largely unknown, Greenland published a foreign policy strategy and explanatory statement memorandum in 2011, which also makes it possible to make temporal comparisons between the content and priorities over time.5 It described visions for how Greenland should evolve towards 2050 but was intended ‘just’ to be a ten-year strategy. The 2011 strategy came in furtherance of several official documents since the late 1990’s and committees’ work paving the way for chapter 4 concerning foreign affairs in the Self-Rule Act of 2009.6 The point of departure of the current strategy was, then, partially that the former strategy of 2011 had reached its expiry date.

The initial drafting of the new strategy started in early 2020, after an internal MFA-seminar in 2019.

While Covid19 at that time was very disruptive for Greenlandic diplomacy, including the projected strategy work, it also served as a point of departure for the drafting of the strategy in the early phase – later, also because of lengthy quarantines in e.g. the new Greenlandic representation in Beijing, China – as it freed up time. Afterwards, it primarily swapped hands between a few diplomats in Nuuk and at the Greenlandic representations abroad, and was also transferred to some deliberative phases between the government and the political parties.7 From early on, the strategy was thus intended to not just be a civil servant document of the MFA in Nuuk, but have broad political legitimacy in Inatsisartut, the Greenlandic parliament, and it thus went back and forth in the drafting period between the MFA and the political parties. The strategy was delayed several times, and this had ramifications on several levels (e.g. domestically and within the KoD), but to a large extent follows earlier signals from Greenland where, for example, a westwards looking focus has emerged as a key component, i.e. the US and Canada, as well as fellow Inuit in the North American Arctic.

Quite a few times, at least from spring 2022, the Premier or the Minster of Foreign Affairs were quoted in the media that the strategy was almost ready to be published. The reason for the iterative delays and stop-‘n’-go process is not mono-causal. For one, the coalition of the government changed in April 2022, seeing a noteworthy coalition of the two largest political parties: The social democratic Siumut and the slightly more left-leaning Inuit Ataqatigiit. Henceforth the designated Minister of Foreign Affairs was chosen from the former main opposition party, Siumut.

This change in government meant some time to align on the process and content and came at a time when Ministers of Foreign Affairs had changed quite often in the years preceding the call for and drafting of the strategy. Likewise, a shuffle of the top diplomats in May 2021 between the MFA in Nuuk and the different representations abroad, akin to small embassies, had similar minor effects.

Second, while political settlements are utilized in Greenlandic politics, rather than discussed mainly in a committee or drafted within a closed circle in the ministry, there is not a strong political tradition for this way of deliberating a strategy of this sort. Here, the party leaders (or, in a few cases, main spokespersons) were consulted over time. And there was strong insistence in Inatsisartut that they should be involved in the process. Outside parliamentary sessions in the assembly in Nuuk, it can be difficult to gather politicians who live far away from the capital, and this prolonged the process.

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Third and arguably far more significantly, the MFA was often short on staff during the 4-year process or other important issues were being prioritized, although it is at times difficult to decipher if temporal delays were mainly for bureaucratic or political reasons, etc.

In contrast to the abovementioned strategy from 2011, security and/or defense was mentioned by Greenlandic diplomats from early in the writing phase of the new strategy, as it was expected to be added to the foreign policy aspects of the former strategy. In the end, the title includes them all, even though security and defense policy are formally the prerogative of Denmark, as will be elaborated below. Discussions whether it should be coined an Arctic Strategy or if Greenland should draft one in general had been floating for several years, with some arguing that Greenland should have its own Arctic Strategy whereas others arguing that it is redundant as all politics in Greenland per definition is Arctic, or that Greenland inherently is an Arctic nation.

In the foreword to the strategy, Naalakkersuisoq (Minister) of Foreign Affairs, Vivian Motzfeldt, muses about the middle-of-the-road solution, that it “addresses the needs and concerns of an Arctic nation and an Arctic people. Not surprisingly, these issues are crosscutting for us in Greenland, which means that this can also be called an Arctic strategy.” Hence, it’s partially an Arctic Strategy, but also not just that.

As such, the strategy provides key insights to the long-term political goals of Greenland, as well as the current dynamics within the Kingdom of Denmark and Arctic governance in general. There is a very strong desire in Greenlandic foreign relations to be treated as an equal, but this desire sometimes – or quite often – fly in the face of the legal constitutional framework that posit Greenland as a subordinate part of the Kingdom. Next, we therefore devote a subsection to a brief run through of the formal framework vis-à-vis practical developments in regard to foreign policy within the KoD. The Kingdom of Denmark The fact that Greenland, and the Faroe Islands as well, issue their own Arctic Strategies could appear at a first glance to be incompatible with the formal constitutional framework of the KoD where foreign policy remains the prerogative of Denmark, as stipulated by §19 of the Danish constitution of 1953 (see below). However, the development of independent Faroese and Greenlandic strategies falls in line with the political practice of the last decades within the kingdom.

The insistence on “nothing about us…” should, of course, also be read within a history of Danish foreign and security policy decisions being taken and implemented – often under the auspices of US security concerns and interests – without prior and proper involvement of Greenland. In the efforts to challenge and gain influence over the Arctic voice of Danish foreign policy, Greenland has insisted that the Arctic-ness of the KoD solely rests with Greenland. Bluntly put by previous Greenlandic Minister of Foreign Affairs (2014-2017) Vittus Qujaukitsoq: “Several countries and states have come up with arctic strategies, which is a typical characteristic of non-Arctic countries […] For an Arctic country like Greenland, our Foreign Policy Strategy is an Arctic strategy. We are the Arctic. We are the epitome of the Arctic.”8 This policy of monopolising the Arctic-ness of the Kingdom, has been successful to the extent that Denmark now accepts not to make any public decisions on the Arctic or Greenland without Greenland. In effect, the KoD had to delay the ambition of a common strategy for the entire realm after the previous Arctic Strategy from 2011-20 expired until Greenland published its own strategy.

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A key disagreement in the foreign policy tango between Denmark and Greenland revolves around the status of §19 of the Danish constitution, which states that “the king acts on behalf of the kingdom in international affairs.” In practice, this means that the Danish government takes care of foreign policy for the entire kingdom, and thus there can be only one external voice of the unitary Kingdom. Greenland became part of the KoD in 1953 in a process whose legitimacy is now much disputed.9 The Greenlandic push for a stronger independent voice in international relations was kindled by the European Communities (EC) membership in 1973 where Greenland became part of it despite a huge majority against membership at home. This led to Greenland’s departure of the EC (now European Union) in 1985.

Fast forward to 2005, Greenland (and the Faroe Islands) obtained the formal right to conduct foreign policy through the so-called “authorization arrangement.” This arrangement gives Greenland the right to conduct foreign policy and enter agreements on behalf of the Kingdom on matters of exclusive concerns to Greenland. These powers shall not, however, “limit the Danish authorities’ constitutional responsibility and powers in international affairs, as foreign and security policy matters are affairs of the Realm.”10 In short, the Danish constitution is often seen as a straitjacket limiting Greenland’s desire to act independently to the extent that the Greenlandic permanent secretary Mininnguaq Kleist – in a public debate with then Danish Arctic Ambassador, Thomas Winkler, during the large business conference Future Greenland in Nuuk in May 2022 – openly said that: "I will always challenge the constitution. Always. […] We are pushing the framework of the constitution. This is how we make progress. I am not creating a crisis in the community of the realm (Rigsfællesskabet). I create development together with my colleagues.”11 In this light, we should not be surprised that the Arctic Strategy devotes very little space to the KoD. Within the KoD, Denmark proper had to wait to negotiate and polish a common Arctic strategy, even if that writing process before and during the early phase of Covid19 had produced a somewhat lengthy draft that was in hearing among different institutions, but the KoD Arctic strategy is to this day still on hold. Moreover, as mentioned, it took substantially longer than initially expected for the Greenlandic strategy to materialize.12 In sum, the strategy should be read as Greenland’s desire to perform an own voice alluding more independent international agency than what can be derived from the legal and constitutional framework of the KoD. Having discussed some contextual aspects, we now turn our attention to the content of the new strategy, zooming in primarily on three items laid out in the introduction and elaborated below.

Content The English version, which came out a few weeks later than the Greenlandic and Danish versions, is 48 pages including pictures and graphics, and consists of a foreword, an introduction, some closing remarks and 11 sections in between on key topics including the Arctic Council, the climate and the ocean, relations with neighboring countries (the United States, Iceland and Canada), trade, connectivity, East Asia, multilateral cooperation, and security and defense policy. It is based on values that underpin Greenland’s approach to relations with other countries, which are: • •

Democracy and human rights are at the core of all relations.

Greenland and the Arctic is an area of low tension.

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Improving the lives and livelihoods of the Greenlandic people is of key importance.

All relations are based on the premise that Greenland and the Greenlandic people constitute an independent people and nation.

All relations must be solution oriented.

[Greenland] stand[s] in solidarity and work hand in hand with other Arctic communities.

The first section after the foreword and introduction is devoted to the Arctic Council, which testifies that this is a key priority, and despite the current “difficult times, there is still a need to look ahead to the long-term development of the Arctic Council.” The phrase ‘difficult times’ is not elaborated and Russia is not explicitly mentioned, but early on after the (re-)invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Greenland both backed the pause of the Council and its working groups and argued that in the long term some cooperation with all member state, implicitly including Russia, must be resumed: “The role of the Arctic Council must be safeguarded with long-term participation of the entire Arctic region, and its mandate should continue to exclude matters related to hard security.”13 In the short term, there is a strong focus on the upcoming chairship of the Arctic Council, which KoD will convene from spring 2025 to 2027, and Greenland is adamant that it will play a key role during the chairship.

Overall, the strategy follows political priorities established over the last decades in Greenland’s foreign policy. This includes focus on iteratively highlighting the governance aspect of being a regional Arctic actor, expanding trade, a strong focus on Indigenous peoples of the Arctic, including Indigenous and local knowledge, and the re-affirmation that Greenland envisions a cooperative and low-tension Arctic.

However, there are also a number of issues that are worth paying attention to because of their novelty and/or the attention they are given in the strategy or the wording in which they are depicted.14 Subsequently, we will go through three specific items: first, the emphasis on connectivity and the positioning of North America vis-à-vis the European Union; second, the weights ascribed to security and defence policies; and third, the strong commitment to international climate politics.

Connectivity, North America & the EU The first passage that we wish to highlight is one that has not drawn a lot of attention, but nevertheless is interesting. This is the section on “connectivity” (Attaveqaateqarneq in Greenlandic).

While this is not a typical term in political strategic parlance, it is interesting because it draws our attention towards questions of Greenland’s broader connections to the outside world. It should be understood as trade policy, transport links, representative relations, communication, infrastructure and so on.

At the same time, connectivity is about increasing opportunities, minimizing vulnerability (e.g. diversifying supply chains) to the benefit of Greenland’s society. Yet, at the same this should also reduce its dependence on Denmark. In this light, it is interesting to note the desire to be at the head of a new Arctic North American forum.15 It is supposed to strengthen cooperation between Greenland and the North American states and territories that are home to the Arctic Indigenous peoples – on a substate level.

More concretely, the wish is to establish cooperation between governments and parliaments in Alaska (USA), Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Nunavik (Canada) and Greenland. While Nielsen & Strandsbjerg

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this part of the strategy is less tangible in terms of how it may be implemented compared to most of the other sections, this relates to the general focus on the North American Arctic and enhanced cooperation with fellow Inuit. In this context, it is important to remember that Nunavut and Greenland signed an MoU in August 2022 in recognition of the “interest and aspiration to bolster cooperation” between the two.16 Not only can North America be seen as a westward and Inuit-oriented alternative to Scandinavian cooperation in, for example, the Nordic Council which Greenland has recently been highly critical about for not being inclusive of the semi-autonomous polities (Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and Aaland), it would also provide a transnational forum where Greenland could play a leading and agenda-setting role.17 Compared to North America, the EU appears as a surprisingly low priority in the strategy.18 First, the description of the EU does not take up nearly as much space as the USA or Canada, respectively. Secondly, the description of the EU partnership has a somewhat distanced character.

The recent opening of the EU Commission’s office in Nuuk as of spring 2024, for example, is described as something that the EU needs and not something that arose from a mutual desire: "the EU now also needs a presence in Greenland."19 This is surprising in light of how important the EU is, and has been for half a century, for Greenland – at least in financial terms. Under the fisheries and partnership agreements, Greenland has duty-free access to the European market and educational cooperation. Greenland also receives far more EU funding in Danish kroner per capita than any other Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT). Historically, cooperation with the EC/EU were in many respects a catalyst for Greenlandic foreign policy thinking and learning the craft of diplomacy, and since the beginning of the 1990’s, Greenland has had a representation in Brussels where most Greenlandic diplomats have had shorter or longer working periods. A recent third pillar of cooperation was added related to green energy, including potential mining and hydropower, and the European Commission finally opened an office in Nuuk in spring 2024 which had been in the pipeline for roughly five years.

So why does the EU now occupy so little space in the strategy? A friendly reading might be that most things actually work well, and fits within the continuation of decades-old negotiating frameworks. By implication, there is thus no significant reason to reinvent the wheel when EU cooperation is mostly running on rails. A more critical reading would suggest that the otherwise economically important partnership with Europe would appear as a barrier to the North American agenda; the importance of the EU could be seen as a somewhat inconvenient obstacle to the wish of putting more weight and resources behind further integration with North America.

On top of this, the EU has traditionally been seen as a large and distant bureaucratic apparatus, especially by the general population who do not work with fisheries or education agreements with the EU on a daily basis, let alone notice the financial contributions to the national treasury. In terms of actual trade and economic structural funding, one should arguably assume the EU to have a more prominent role in the strategy than building trade from almost scratch with the US, whereas the westward lean makes more sense in a cultural and (geo)political exchange with North America.

Compared to the abovementioned Greenlandic 2011 strategy, the focus on the US and the EU has swapped places in terms of how much they are prioritized.

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Regardless of how one interprets the description of Nordic and EU cooperation, there is a very clear line in the strategy seeking to diversify Greenland’s trade, cultural, administrative and economic relations with North America over those of Europe and the Nordic countries. These priorities could be seen to reflect both a colonial legacy tying Greenland to the KoD and Europe while there is a strong sense of also being a North American people seeking kinship across the Baffin Bay and Davis Strait.

Defense and Security An area that had been foreseen with great anticipation is defense and security policies for at least two reasons. First, it has long remained a central political field of contention between Greenland and Denmark – often with the United States’ security interests and presence adding to secrecy and complexity in the unfolding of these policies. Second, it is an area where the Government of Greenland has made significant changes to its position over a very short period of time.

Greenlandic policy on security has traditionally followed a fairly pacifist line emphasizing the need for cooperation and a general belief that disarmament and the absence of military capabilities would provide the best recipe for peace. The 2011-strategy did mention security concerns, but only in relation to how détente was best safeguarded through the work of the Arctic Council and the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008. This also corresponds in broad terms with earlier statements by the Inuit Circumpolar Council on a peaceful Arctic since the 1970’s.20 And to the extent there is military activity and presence, this should benefit Greenland beyond security concerns. That is, tax money, education, local societal developments in settlements in proximity to military activity and bases, etc.

Aligned with this tradition, the 2021 coalition agreement emphasized that Greenland was against any increase in military presence, even causing some translation confusion about whether this meant demilitarizing or simply a stance against further militarization of the Arctic. This position came under much scrutiny when the Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced its so-called Arctic Capability package in early 2021, where they announced significant investments especially in surveillance capacity in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The problem was that the MoD had not secured the approval of either the Faroese or Greenlandic governments. As a result, the initial initiative was rejected in both places (cf. also the next section on the ‘filibuster’-strategy).

These disagreements were overtaken by the Russian (re-)invasion of Ukraine and a new security rhetoric in Europe and North America. Greenland was surprisingly quick and staunch in their support of sanctions and condemnation of Russia despite its losses on the fish export.

Disagreements on defence policy might have been a factor leading to a new coalition government in 2022, as mentioned above. Whether this is true or not, the Greenlandic government has seemingly followed a more defense accommodating line since then. In Summer 2022, a new agreement for the implementation of the Arctic Capability package was signed by the Danish Minister of Defence and the Greenlandic minister Vivian Motzfeldt. In early 2023 she told the public: “So, yes, Greenland must be prepared to host further military activity.”21 What is new in the strategy in this regard is first an explicit commitment to the Western security architecture and that “Greenland will continue to cooperate with the defense authorities of Denmark and the United States, partially in the most beneficial way to maintain a military presence and installations in Greenland.”22 That is, also, to continue the focus on how to make military

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presence benefit Greenlandic society. Second, and this is new, an explicit wish and ambition to play a larger role in the sovereignty enforcement in Greenland. This wish is articulated on many levels: 1) In 2023, a Greenlandic diplomat was sent to the NATO headquarters in Brussels within the Danish permanent representation; formally, a part of the Danish diplomatic delegation, but seconded and partially funded by Naalakkersuisut; 2) an expressed desire to have a liaison, or administrative, unit at Pituffik Space Base (formerly known as Thule Air Base); and 3) on a more practical or operational level, wishes to explore possibilities of establishing a military or civilian national service in Greenland.

More concrete suggestions are to ‘civilize’ and take over the Coast Guard (today these are ‘grey’ ships run by the Danish Defense), have a closer and mutual learning interaction with the Joint Arctic Command, seek active involvement in the Sirius patrol of Northeastern Greenland, and eventually contribute the surveillance of the GIUK gap; the latter a key priority for the North Atlantic members of NATO. While the latter ambition seems far off at a time where Denmark has very little to chip in to the GIUK gap surveillance, the tone of the strategy follows the general pattern of being more involved and taking greater responsibility.

Climate Change While it is no surprise to include climate change in a foreign policy strategy, this one represents and signals a noteworthy change on Greenland’s position on international climate policy. In Chapter 3, The Climate and the Ocean – second in order only to the abovementioned Arctic Council priority – the strategy highlights the impact of climate change on the Arctic region and the potential hazards for Greenland in terms of biodiversity and changing ecosystems possibly affecting hunting and fishing. The fishing industry remains the single most important economic sector. The section then moves on to affirm that: “We all have a responsibility to take action.” 23 This responsibility is then differentiated based on the premise that emissions mainly have come from the industrialized countries – among which Greenland has not traditionally considered itself within these debates.

This has meant that Greenland has sought to stay clear of international commitments to combat climate change with reference to its need to develop economically and the special infrastructural and demographic situation, as mentioned in the Greenlandic foreign policy strategy of 2011, which makes green solutions complicated to say the least. Arguments like these had also been put forward as a reason why Greenland should not be part to the Paris Treaty – that is, opt for a territorial exception from Denmark’s participation. This notion that Greenland was not yet in a position to take responsibility for climate change changed with the election in 2021 where Inuit Ataqatigiit became the government forming party. They declared already in 2021 that they would abandon its territorial exception.

With a new coalition in 2022, implying power sharing with traditional power holder Siumut, the process of acceding was delayed because Siumut demanded a proper impact assessment of the consequences. They have traditionally been against this for the reasons outlined above. In light of a compromise between the traditionally two biggest parties in Greenlandic politics, the strategy is surprisingly firm in stating Greenland’s commitment to shared responsibility, especially the ambition to play a central role for the development in the Arctic, even if this is done with “due consideration for Greenland’s economic development needs.”

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With Self-Rule in 2009, Greenland also obtained ownership of the underground and mineral resources. At the height of the Arctic hype, there was much hope (and some controversy) tied up with offshore oil and gas deposits. This oil adventure, however, never materialized and in part to bolster their green profile, the 2021 government made the decision to suspend oil and gas exploration and in turn seek economic advances within the green and renewable energy. In this process, the government owned company Nunaoil was re-defined and re-named as NunaGreen, now seeking to expand a green economy. There is a real hope that the abundance of critical minerals for the green transition, alongside large hydropower potential, will turn Greenland towards being a contributor to the global green transition while also benefitting economically from being green.

Implications and concluding remarks Having zoomed in on three important items, we close this briefing note with a discussion on some of the implications and some analytically interesting aspects of the Greenlandic strategy. Most of the items of the strategy are well-known priorities developed over time, whereas others are less developed and tangible. For example, the abovementioned Arctic North American Forum is merely an idea to perhaps be implemented in the future, which is also the case in relation to a suggestion to establish a Peace Center, with inspiration especially from Japan.

One could argue that publishing an intended decade long strategy is cumbersome in a period of a volatile, more conflictual geopolitical Arctic for the better part of the decade so far, but the strategy can be updated as needed and is “essentially an expression of a Greenland that, in cooperation with others, is progressing toward more or eventually full independence”24 in line with the preamble of the Self Rule Act from 2009 regarding the right to self-determination.

Equally important, the strategy should be read in line with the long-term evolution of Greenland enhancing its role as an international actor, currently with a strong focus on the North American Arctic, which is why we highlighted connectivity in our discussion of the strategy. Connectivity is conceptually related to network theories highlighting the importance of the connections between things, organizations and peoples rather than these entities by themselves. Connectivity is almost an intuitive concept, but sometimes we forget that a specific location does not mean anything in and by itself without understanding its connections – in terms of infrastructure, transport, supply chains, communication, trade and political connections. Hence, connectivity should both draw attention to the fact that Greenland’s geostrategic significance is not static, but rather a result of how Greenland is connected to the outside world.

Moreover, as alluded to in the introduction, it is worth stressing that it has multiple designated audiences and playing fields. Arctic strategies are frequently being drafted and updated by numerous actors. Some of the comparative scholarly work on Arctic strategies shows that, in general, they habitually have an internal and external audience: “Towards the outside world [Arctic strategies] offer transparency, signals of determination and possibly more specific promises, inspirations or warnings,” whereas internally, a strategy aligns priorities as well as “mobilize, steer, and coordinate the national or multi-state communities that they cover.”25 Hence, a strategy conveys the government’s awareness and resolve designed to promote consensus and to mobilize actors for specific ends. Internally, in the Greenlandic strategy under scrutiny, having made an effort to achieve domestic political legitimacy, as described above, the expectation is that the strategy does not become a dead-letter document when/if the government changes over

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time. It makes it easier for civil servants to navigate their work in a coordinated manner, especially in the MFA but also in other departments/ministries.

Externally, it helps Greenlandic diplomats explaining to foreign counterparts how much leeway they actually have in terms of international relations and showcases what the near- and longer-term priorities are. Before, the Self-Rule act was often brought to meetings with actors who were not experts on Greenland, or the often confusing quasi-federal and historical complicated dynamics of KoD, to show the status of Greenlandic foreign policy possibilities. Now, a more comprehensive document can be forwarded in advance of meetings, deliberations and negotiations. However, this also has a lock-in effect of the priorities of, say, North American Arctic over Denmark, the EU, and Nordic (Scandinavian) cooperation, which can cause issues in the longer run when negotiating the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF).

Domestically, a future Greenlandic Naalakkersuisut (government) might have other preferences in terms of preferred international partners, or in regard to ratifying specific agreements. For example, no later than spring 2025, there will be an impending parliamentary election in Greenland. The stance on climate policy could be an interesting test case for the solidity of the broad parliamentary backing of the strategy. Will Greenland remain within the Paris agreement if another coalition gains power? A new climate strategy is currently being drafted by Naalakkersuisut, but is still at an early stage.

Other Greenlandic political actors might question the resources designated to foreign affairs and whether it is wise to spend the resources required to live up the strategy at a time where the social, educational, and energy supply sector are all under immense pressure for funding and maintenance.

Moreover, it is not set in stone how several items of the policies addressed in the strategy are going to be implemented, let alone funded.

Another vital audience is within the KoD, where the strategy can iteratively be revisited if the Danish counterparts deviate from what are now explicitly stated Greenlandic preferences.

Specifically in relation to the KoD strategy, the Greenlandic strategy signals that a common Arctic policy (not a strategy) can be supported, but would be a more scaled downed document. This can be seen as a bargaining chip in line with earlier signals regarding the KoD strategy, namely that Greenland is not just ratifying any common Arctic strategy, by arguing that the KoD strategy from 2011 in many ways actually made Greenland worse off than prior to its publication. Not least because a common strategy could be seen as giving Denmark a carte blanche to take policy initiatives on areas that Greenland wishes to maintain a firm grip on.

It is also, and more likely, however, a signal that a KoD Arctic policy, regarded as less comprehensive than a strategy, is what Greenland is willing to coordinate for now. Although this semantic change is arguably symbolic, it should be understood in the context of other somewhat similar, sometime heated, iterative discussions between Nuuk and Copenhagen, such as issues regarding the Arctic Ambassador title, SAO, and the upcoming chairship of the Arctic Council in spring 2025.

While the strategy took longer than initially expected to prepare, it was generally received as a coherent and well-designed strategy by most pundits, the other political parties bar one, and the Danish government, although Danish politicians were less vocal about the content but seemed rather relieved that it was finally published.

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As mentioned, KoD had to delay the common strategy for the entire realm after the previous Arctic Strategy from 2011-20 expired because of Greenland using the drafting of its own strategy as a ‘filibuster’ vis-à-vis the KoD strategy. A filibuster is commonly known in US politics as a means to delay decisions and laws; in this case, it refers to Greenland’s early signal that it would not negotiate with Copenhagen until Greenland’s own was published, and, thus, could iteratively postpone the KoD strategy.26 Another example of a filibuster is how Greenland delayed an Arctic capacity package of Danish 1.5 billion Danish kroner in funding for upgrading, inter alia, surveillance in the North Atlantic and especially in and around Greenland. Whereas, formally, the prerogative of foreign and security policy de jure rest in Copenhagen, this showcases that Greenland also has an emerging de facto say in security and defense policy.

In sum, the Greenlandic strategy published earlier this year provides an interesting insight into the priorities of Greenlandic foreign policy anno 2024 with the publication of Greenland in the World Nothing about us without us. Greenland’s Foreign, Security and Defense Policy 2024-2033 – an Arctic Strategy.

The title of the document in itself is interesting, as it stipulates the (geo)political tensions and possibilities in several policy dimensions and spaces, including security and defense, a willingness to partake in solving the climate and Arctic governance crises, and the content and how the chapters are weighted respectively shows the main priorities of Greenland for the next decade.

We have highlighted the context of the strategy, including how it came about and the political and constitutional dynamics of its raison d'être, then zoomed in on connectivity and especially the strong focus on North America, security and defense policy, and the signal to fight climate change in international governance fora. There are many other aspects of the strategy, which we have briefly touch upon or not discussed, at all (e.g. China and East Asia).

Hence, future research could, and arguably should, unfold other aspects of comparative inquiries, trade relations and supply chains, or revisit the implementation and practical use of the strategy over time. Whether the strategy under scrutiny in this briefing note will be mostly forgotten in 2033 when it expires, like the previous strategy from 2011 arguably was, only time will tell.

Notes 1.

1

2.

2

The strategy is available in Greenlandic, Danish, and English at: https://naalakkersuisut.gl/Departementer/Dep_for_Udenrigsanliggender_Selvstaendigh ed/Publikationer?sc_lang=kl-GL. A direct link to the English version is available here: https://paartoq.gl/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Greenlands_Foreign_Security_and_Defense_Policy_2024_2033.pdf It was even written into the coalition agreement of the current Danish government: “The government's guideline will be that nothing about the Faroe Islands and Greenland must be decided without the Faroe Islands and Greenland” (our translation from Regeringen (2022). Ansvar for Danmark Det politiske grundlag for Danmarks regering. København, p. 53. The ‘nothing about us without us’ phrase is hardly a specific Greenlandic motto but can be detected e.g. across Inuit communities in Canada and Alaska as a principle of participation and inclusion, as well.

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Cf. Nielsen, R. L. (2021). Global Greenlanders: Evolutionen af en grønlandsk udenrigspolitik i et foranderligt Arktis. In Rydstrøm-Poulsen, A., Reimer G. A. & Lauritsen (red), Tro og samfund i 300-året for Hans Egedes ankomst til Grønland (315-330). Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag.

For example, by long time observer of Greenlandic and Arctic Affairs, journalist Martin Breum; see Breum M. (2024). Greenland’s first security strategy looks west as the Arctic heats up, Arctic Today, 27 February 2024 https://www.arctictoday.com/greenland-lookswest-as-the-arctic-heats-up/ (also available at: https://www.martinbreum.dk/greenlandsfirst-security-strategy-looks-west-as-the-arctic-heats-up/).

The 2011 strategy can be consulted here: https://ina.gl/media/szqh2hb1/pkt14_em2011_udenrigspolitisk_strategi_rg_gr.pdf (in Greenlandic); https://ina.gl/media/q5rp2zqt/pkt14_em2011_udenrigspolitisk_strategi_rg_dk.pdf (in Danish) E.g. the Anorak-report from 1999 was a critical juncture in terms of defining a scope for Greenlandic foreign policy. The Home Rule Act of 1979 was rather vague in this sense, and several documents through the 2000’s addressed this in writing. In 2011, an Arctic strategy for the KoD was also published, which should not be conflicted with the Greenlandic foreign policy strategy of 2011; see e.g. Nielsen, R. L. (2021) up cite end note 3.

This assessment and several other arguments in the article are partially based on interviews and informal talks with Greenlandic diplomats and politicians over several years. Being locally based researchers in Nuuk provides some comparative advantages to understand some of the contextual developments, but any flaws in these readings of the process remains ours.

Cited by Jacobsen, M. (2020). Greenland’s Arctic advantage: Articulations, acts and appearances of sovereignty games. Cooperation and Conflict, 55(2), 170-192. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836719882476 See e.g. Gad, U. P. (2020). Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and Denmark: Unity or Community? In P. M. Christiansen, J. Elklit & P. Nedergaard (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of Danish politics.

Oxford University Press, 28–45.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198833598.013.3.

10. 10An English version of the Self Rule Act of 2009 https://english.stm.dk/media/10522/gl-selvstyrelov-uk.pdf

is

available

here:

11. 11Cited in Andreas Krogh (2022). Grønlandsk topembedsmand: Vi presser grundlovens grænser.

Altinget, 19 May 2022. https://www.altinget.dk/embedsvaerk/artikel/groenlandsk-topembedsmand-vi-pressergrundlovens-graenser.

12. 12See e.g. https://www.ft.dk/ripdf/samling/20222/redegoerelse/R5/20222_R5.pdf (in Danish). The sentiment that Denmark could not do anything but patiently wait was clear from several interviews and informal talks, we have had over several years with Danish What we can learn from Greenland’s new ‘Arctic Strategy’ 2024-2033

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diplomats and SAOs. One of this article’s authors, Rasmus Leander Nielsen, was part of the hearing process on behalf of Ilisimatusarfik (University of Greenland) of the halted KoD draft of a common Arctic strategy.

13. 13Both citations about the Arctic Council are quoted from page 13 of the strategy, up cite endnote 1 14. 14On top of several media outlets articles after the publication of the strategy, a few scholarly commentaries have discussed the strategy from e.g. KoD and Canadian perspectives, see respectively Jacobsen, M. & Rahbek-Clemmensen, J. (2024). Greenland stakes a Course within Defense and Diplomacy. The Arctic Institute, 27 February 2024, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/greenland-stakes-course-defense-diplomacy/ (Danish perspective) and Lanteigne M. (2024). Greenland’s Widening Arctic Strategies How Canada Can Respond, North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network - NAADSN Quick Impact Brief: https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/24jun7-greenlandFP-ML.pdf (Canadian Perspective). From a Greenlandic perspective, the senior diplomat Kenneth Høegh has discussed the strategy in a historical perspective in Høegh, K. (2024).

‘Greenland's Foreign Policy, Past and Present: From the Merchants' Message to Bilateral Agreements’, Ocean & Coastal Law Journal, Vol. 29, No 2, pp. 181-196; see also his interview with the Wilson Center focusing primarily on an US angle: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/microsite/7/node/118894 15. 15Høegh, K. (2024). ‘Greenland's Foreign Policy, Past and Present: From the Merchants' Message to Bilateral Agreements’, Ocean & Coastal Law Journal, Vol. 29, No 2, pp. 181-196.

16. 16Cf. the press release from the Government of Nunavut: https://www.premier.gov.nu.ca/en/new-greenland-nunavut-agreement-signed 17. 17In regard to the Nordic Council, see https://www.wilsoncenter.org/microsite/7/node/118894. In relation to the Arctic Council, see Nielsen, Rasmus Leander (forthcoming, spring 2025) in Internasjonal Politikk 18. 18This argument has earlier been forwarded by the authors in Strandsbjerg J. & Nielsen R. L. (2024). ‘Det kan undre, at EU ikke fylder mere i grønlandsk politik – og omvendt’, Altinget Arktis, 15 March 2024, https://www.altinget.dk/eu/artikel/lektorer-det-eregentlig-underligt-at-von-der-leyen-foerst-besoeger-nuuk-i-dag (in Danish) 19. 19There is a noteworthy variation in language between the English and Danish version. The English version just talks about presence whereas the Danish texts specifically mentions that the EU needs an office (p. 39 and 35 respectively).

20. 20See for example, Inuit Circumpolar Counil (no date). Inuit Arctic Policy, pp. 16-20.

21. 21Cited in Altinget Arktis: https://www.altinget.dk/forsvar/artikel/forskere-ruslandsinvasion-har-gjort-det-vigtigste-samarbejdsorgan-for-groenland-impotent 22. 22See page page 43 of the strategy, up cite end note 1 23. 23For all quotes from the chapter 3 on climate in this subsection, see page 15 of the strategy, up cite end note 1 24. 24See page 47 of the strategy; cf. Høegh, Kenneth (2024) up cite end note 1 and 15.

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25. 25Quotes from Bailes, A. J. K. (2009). Does a small state need a strategy? Occasional Paper 22009, Centre For Small State Studies, University of Iceland, p. 9: https://rafhladan.is/bitstream/handle/10802/5099/Bailes_Final%20wh.pdf?sequence=1 (externally) and Bailes, A. J. K. & Heininen L. (2012). Strategy Papers on the Arctic or High North: A comparative study and analysis. Centre for Small State Studies Institute of International Affairs, University of Iceland, p.

21: https://www.rha.is/static/files/NRF/Publications/arcticstrats.pdf (internally).

26. 26The third polity of KoD, the Faroe Islands, also had to finish its own renewed Arctic strategy, but that was concluded in fall 2022; the Faroe Islands has twice produced Arctic strategies.

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Briefing Note

“The most urgent and important task we face”: Framing the Arctic focus in Canada’s April 2024 defence policy update P. Whitney Lackenbauer

The most urgent and important task we face is asserting Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic and northern regions, where the changing physical and geopolitical landscapes have created new threats and vulnerabilities to Canada and Canadians. …

Defending the Arctic is asserting Canadian sovereignty. To do so, we must take a new approach that improves and modernizes our defences in the region. This means establishing greater presence, reach, mobility, and responsiveness in the Arctic and North to deal with disasters, threats, and challenges to our sovereignty.

Department of National Defence, Our North, Strong and Free (April 2024)

Arctic geopolitics and security continue to rise in profile on the Canadian political agenda. The Conservative government of Stephen Harper, which held office from 2006-15, supplemented its initial, narrow “use it or lose it” sovereignty agenda with a comprehensive Northern Strategy in which national defence was only one component (Lackenbauer, 2021b). When Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government came to office in 2015, it initially avoided language around sovereignty and security, believing that the Conservatives had managed to “brand” this language in a partisan sense (Lackenbauer, 2017). During public and political consultations, however, Northern Canadians insisted that any Canadian Arctic strategy had to incorporate both components. The Liberal defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged, published in 2017, followed by the safety, security, and defence chapter of the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF) released two years later, returned to national defence as a key part of Canada’s “commitment to a safe, secure, and welldefended Arctic and North, and as a continued expression of Canada's enduring sovereignty over our lands and waters” (CIRNAC, 2019).

The ANPF stated that “while Canada sees no immediate threat in the Arctic and the North, as the region’s physical environment changes, the circumpolar North is becoming an area of strategic international importance, with both Arctic and non-Arctic states expressing a variety of economic and military interests in the region,” thus necessitating “effective safety and security frameworks, P. Whitney Lackenbauer is a Professor at Trent University, School for the Study of Canada and Tier 1 Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North.

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national defence, and deterrence” (CIRNAC, 2019). Then Russia’s brutal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 rocked the international order, with heightened geopolitical competition spilling over into Arctic regional affairs. What some commentators called the age of “Arctic exceptionalism,” marked by peaceful regional relations since the end of the Cold War, abruptly ended (although many of us question whether it ever existed at all – see, for example, Exner-Pirot and Murray, 2017; Dean and Lackenbauer, 2020; Smith, 2022). Consequently, much of the expert debate about the Arctic geopolitical environment has shifted from a conflict-or-cooperation binary to analyzing a continuum of competition involving the seven like-minded Arctic states (all of which are now NATO members), Russia, China, and other non-Arctic state and non-state actors.

Canada’s April 2024 defence policy update Our North, Strong and Free (ONSF) places an unprecedented focus on the Arctic – and particularly on Canada’s Arctic (DND 2024). Never before has Arctic sovereignty and security factored so prominently in a Canadian defence statement.

Even Defence in the ’70s, which shared the overarching idea that the top priority of the Canadian Armed Forces is the defence of Canada and Canadians, did not confer on the Arctic the idea that it was “the most urgent and important task” for the Canadian military. Neither did the 1987 White Paper on defence, with its three polar projection maps and its emphasis on a new Arctic defence imperative to deter the Soviet Union (DND, 1987). Like these previous iterations of intensified Arctic security attention, however, the Department of National Defence has again produced a vision that conflates sovereignty, security, and the need for an expanded and enhanced military presence.

Canada’s 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, described the Arctic as “an important international crossroads where issues of climate change, international trade, and global security meet.” Reiterating longstanding narratives about the Arctic as a region undergoing massive change in an unpredictable and complex security environment, the federal government committed to “increase [the military’s] presence in the Arctic over the long-term and work cooperatively with Arctic partners.” Rather than promoting a storyline of inherent competition or impending conflict, however, the policy emphasized that “Arctic states have long cooperated on economic, environmental, and safety issues, particularly through the Arctic Council, the premier body for cooperation in the region. All Arctic states have an enduring interest in continuing this productive collaboration” (DND, 2017).

Seven years later, Minister of National Defence Bill Blair painted a more alarming picture of a region that adversaries are openly contesting: In our North, we need to confront the reality of climate change. Our Arctic is warming at four times the global average, opening the region to the world, which was previously protected by the Polar Ice Cap year-round. By 2050, the Arctic Ocean could become the most efficient shipping route between Europe and East Asia. We are seeing greater Russian activity in our air approaches, and a growing number of Chinese vessels and surveillance platforms are mapping and collecting data about the region. Meanwhile, states are rapidly building up their military capabilities in ways that impact our security in the Arctic—including submarines, long-range aircraft and hypersonic missiles that move faster and are harder to detect. As the Arctic becomes more accessible to foreign actors, we need

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to ensure our military has the tools to assert our sovereignty and protect Canada's interests. (DND, 2024a) The statement evokes a sense of urgency, alleging that environmental changes have increased regional accessibility and thus open new threat vectors for competitors to exploit. “Canada must meet these new and emerging threats with resolve,” Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly added in her opening message in the policy statement. “Vigorous assertion of our sovereignty, particularly in the Canadian Arctic, is a fundamental priority” (DND, 2024a).

Most Canadian sovereignty and security discourse emphasizes how emerging drivers of change create unprecedented challenge and uncertainty. Our North, Strong and Free highlights three “powerful, connected trends” that are reshaping global geopolitics: climate change, autocracies and disruptive states (particularly China and Russia) challenging the international order, and new and disruptive technologies that “are rapidly redefining conflict and what it takes to be safe and secure.”

In highlighting the Arctic as the region of particular concern and priority, the Liberal government has chosen once again to securitize ideas around Arctic sovereignty, requiring extraordinary military action beyond the realm of normal politics (Dean, 2022).

Critically discussing the role of the Canadian Armed Forces in demonstrating or asserting sovereignty is nothing new. While grandiloquent proclamations about the precarity of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty are a staple in national discourse, these are often grounded in superficial understandings of the legal basis for Canada’s sovereignty and the nature of what is being contested.

Furthermore, they are often ambiguous about why the armed forces should be the preferred method of addressing emergent challenges in sectors of security (political, economic, environmental, and societal) that typically fall outside of the conventional military threat envelope.

What is the nature of the threats facing Canada that imperil our sovereignty and security in the Arctic? Is the military the best instrument to mitigate and counter these threats? In ONSF, the Government of Canada insists that “Canada's Northwest Passage and the broader Arctic region are already more accessible, and competitors are not waiting to take advantage—seeking access, transportation routes, natural resources, critical minerals, and energy sources through more frequent and regular presence and activity.” Does this heightened maritime activity in Canada’s Arctic waters include foreign navies? Which pernicious actors are “exploring Arctic waters and the sea floor, probing our infrastructure and collecting intelligence”? Are these primarily military challenges, or illegal activities that should be countered and prosecuted using law enforcement and diplomatic tools? Because Canada has not updated its national security strategy since 2004 (PCO, 2004), it remains difficult to situate Canadian defence in a whole-of-government security context.

Our North, Strong and Free states that the Government of Canada is “seeing more Russian activity in our air approaches, and a growing number of Chinese dual-purpose research vessels and surveillance platforms collecting data about the Canadian North that is, by Chinese law, made available to China’s military” (DND, 2024a). Russian bomber flights that are routinely intercepted

by NORAD do not transgress Canadian sovereign airspace (e.g. NORAD, 2023) and, while they may fly more aggressive patterns than before, climate change does not make northern air approaches more accessible to competitors. Furthermore, Chinese researchers, icebreakers, buoys, and balloons may serve dual-use agendas, but they do not represent conventional kinetic threats.

Why characterize the Canadian Arctic as a region facing new, acute military pressures rather than

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more general national security ones inviting more deliberate coordination of the military instrument with other instruments of national power?

The Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept, released in fall 2023, recognizes that “the CAF is currently configured to counter overt military actions in the traditional domains of land, sea, and air by recognizable force elements of an adversary’s armed forces” (DND, 2023: 9). By contrast, Canada’s adversaries are more effective in integrating various instruments of national power and employing them effectively. To compete in this context, increasing the military’s “presence, reach, mobility and responsiveness across the country, particularly in our changing Arctic and North,” can contribute to whole-of-government and whole-of-society preparedness and responses. ONSF declares that: Our military must be capable of undertaking a wide range of missions, including asserting Canadian sovereignty, conducting search and rescue, and assisting civil authorities when required. The Canadian Armed Forces also needs increased capacity to monitor our vast land mass, airspace and maritime areas, defend against threats to Canada as they arise, and be able to deploy quickly and efficiently across the country, especially in remote environments like our Arctic and North, or to assist Canadians facing wildfires, floods, or other climate-related disasters.

To address new threats through, to and in the Arctic and North, we will prioritize detecting and understanding threats across all military domains, increasing our military's presence, mobility and responsiveness in the Arctic, and robustly responding to threats when and where they materialize. This will also help address challenges to the safety and security of Indigenous and northern communities.

We will make investments to ensure that Canada remains well-defended.

Collectively, these capabilities will address our biggest challenges in the Arctic and North—they will provide a broader footprint and prepositioned supplies and equipment in the region, much better eyes and ears in space, in the air, on the ground and underwater, striking power to deter threats far from our shores, and the ability to get to and deal with incidents faster.

We will broaden our ability to monitor our approaches and detect and deter threats before they reach Canada, and to share that information securely with our allies.

(DND, 2024a) To address this blend of missions and requirements, which include a diverse array of threats through, to, and in the Arctic (Lackenbauer, 2021a), the Government of Canada proposes various material solutions. It commits to “explore options” for “renewing and expanding” the Royal Canadian Navy’s submarine fleet to enable it to “project a persistent deterrent on all three coasts.”

It will improve CAF mobility and presence on the land in the Arctic and North by acquiring new all-terrain vehicles “adapted to ice, snow and tundra” that “will allow the military to maintain awareness in remote regions and along Canada's entire coastline, and better respond to unauthorized activity.” Furthermore, promises to acquire specialized maritime sensors to monitor Canada’s approaches, build a new satellite ground station in the Arctic, and establish northern operational support hubs and other infrastructure. Even if this ambitious plan is funded and realized, synchronizing these instruments in a pan-domain campaigning approach and then

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coordinating them with whole-of-government efforts will require lucidity and innovation (DND 2023).

Canada’s 2017 defence policy noted that “NATO has…increased its attention to Russia’s ability to project force from its Arctic territory into the North Atlantic, and its potential to challenge NATO’s collective defence posture” (DND, 2017). Since that time, NATO exercises off the coast of Norway and the stand up of new commands in support of Alliance efforts have reinvigorated attentiveness to NATO’s Northern Flank. The sea lines of communication linking North America to Europe are central to this concept, with the North Atlantic linking the defence of Canada and the Arctic with NATO. While Strong, Secure, Engaged specifically framed the North Atlantic as a geostrategic centre of gravity, this is largely missing from ONSF. The policy update is rife with concern about “asserting,” “defending,” “protecting,” and “securing” Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, but neither the integrity nor security of the European Arctic nor the larger concept of NATO’s Northern Flank are emphasized in detail (Dean and Lackenbauer, 2024). This sets up the expectation that Canadians’ defence priority should be to protect their own Arctic sovereignty. Does this mean at the expense of their commitments elsewhere, particularly in the European Arctic? As the size of Canada’s armed forces contracts (Higgins, 2024), should its international commitments follow a similar trajectory in favour of basic national security needs such as protecting Arctic sovereignty? Fortunately, reported discussions between Canada, Germany, and Norway about a possible trilateral defence and security partnership covering the North Atlantic and the Arctic point in the other direction (Brewster, 2024b).

ONSF received significant criticism for projecting Canada’s defence spending that failed to meet the 2% GDP spending threshold to which NATO members – including Canada – have committed.

Various NATO Allies expressed concern about promised spending increases spread out over a twenty-year period which, according to the policy update, would reach a projected 1.76% of GDP (Reuters, 2024; Brewster, 2024a; McLeary, 2024). In the face of this pressure, Minister Blair’s announced at the Washington NATO Summit on 10 July 2024 that Canada is launching a formal process to procure a fleet of up to twelve conventionally-powered, under-ice capable submarines – a purchase that will push Canada over the 2% threshold (DND, 2024b). The long timelines for major capital procurement programs in Canada means that this will be a protracted process.

ONSF also states that “defending this vast and challenging region, with coastlines and territory larger than the entirety of most other Arctic nations, a harsh climate, and limited physical and communications infrastructure, requires full community engagement and rethinking how we approach the defence of our country” (DND, 2024a). This promise to adopt a new approach – and particularly the focus on collaborating with Northern Indigenous partners and community stakeholders – should invite deliberate reflections on fundamental ideas and assumptions about “sovereignty,” “security,” and “presence.” An “inclusive approach to national defence” that places Arctic rightsholders at the forefront and engages with them more substantively is likely to reveal that Indigenous Peoples envisage these concepts in broader and deeper ways than the Department of National Defence (Greaves and Lackenbauer, 2021).

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References Brewster, M. (2024a, June 20). Canada, Germany and Norway discussing a security pact to cover the North Atlantic and Arctic. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadagermany-norway-nato-submarines-1.7240569.

Brewster, M. (2024b, July 8). Trudeau heads for the hotseat at NATO summit as allies question Canada's defence commitments. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeaunato-defence-spending-summit-1.7256027.

Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC). (2019). Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: Safety, Security, and Defence Chapter. https://www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/eng/1562939617400/1562939658000.

Dean, R. (2022). (De) Securitizing the Arctic? Functional Actors and the Shaping of Canadian Arctic Security Policy. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Calgary.

Dean, R., and P.W. Lackenbauer. (2020). Arctic Exceptionalisms. In The Arctic and World Order: The Question of Future Regimes to Manage Change, eds. K. Spohr and D.S. Hamilton, 327-355.

Washington: Johns Hopkins University for Brookings University Press.

Dean, R., and P.W. Lackenbauer. (2024, July). The Defence Policy Update and NATO’s Northern Flank: Insights from Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s 1947 Gray Lecture. North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) Strategic Perspectives. https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/StrategicPerspective-DeanLackenbauer-DPU-NATO-Gray-Lecture.pdf.

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Framing the Arctic focus in Canada’s April 2024 defence policy update

V.

Strategies and Policies

Discursive Frameworks of Arctic Art Johanna Ruotsalainen

The historical colonialist approach has stigmatized the exchange of thoughts and artistic and aesthetic practices between the Central-European and the peripheral regions of Europe. In recent years, cultural operators and decision-making have identified and recognized this tradition of exotification and cultural appropriation in the Arctic. A discussion on the definition of Arctic art is needed to differentiate the concept from, for example, Northern art, which only refers to context to orientation or location.

Arctic art as a term should illustrate the methods and the goals of art and art-related practices specific to Arctic areas, the actions aimed at increasing well-being and competitiveness in Arctic areas, and the international character of practices defining it across national borders, to connect the phenomenon with Arctic discourse in other fields. This article examines the possible frameworks for Arctic art by reviewing the scientific discourse around the theme. The research exposed six most significant discourses on the concept of Arctic art in the peer-reviewed articles from the past two decades. They were further analyzed around ten arguments, that embody various meanings and are partly interlinked and overlapping. This article aims to stimulate the discussion on whether art should be reviewed more in relation to the context where it was created, when for example assessed in cultural politics or for curatorial and art critical processes. The concept of Arctic art does not have an established and unambiguous meaning, and various cultural communities and interest groups define the term differently. In geographical, political, and environmental discourse, some of the terms are well enough defined, but when transferred into cultural or ecosocial discourse without further research, terms reveal an overlap of definitions that both intersect themselves with and distinguish themselves from each other and are sometimes used without discernment.

Introduction This article focuses on the concept and terminology of Arctic art: the concept of art does not have an established and unambiguous meaning, and various cultural communities and interest groups define the term differently (i.e. Chartier, 2019). The Arctic itself is a politicized term and in the discourse, the term Arctic always contains an agenda. In this article, I use the term Arctic art – yet without more articulated definition – to refer to multicultural artistic and art-like practices of cultural Arctic in Northern Scandinavia, Scotland, Northern Canada, Alaska, Greenland, Faroe Islands, Northern Russia, and Northern Iceland, including both Indigenous and other-thanIndigenous traditions. Arctic areas mentioned are connected through similar topical geographicspecific environmental and sociocultural challenges such as severe effects of climate change, long

Johanna Ruotsalainen is a Doctoral Researcher at the University of Lapland.

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distances, ageing populations, isolation and peripherality, effects of colonialization, unemployment, and population drift (Kuure et al. 2017).

My article is a continuation to previous research done in the University of Lapland’s Northern Art, Community and Environment Research Group (NACER) led by professors Timo Jokela, Mirja Hiltunen, Maria Huhmarniemi and Glen Coutts, and my research rests essentially on the knowledge on the Arctic art previously produced by the NACER Research Group. The starting point of my article is the defining of the term Arctic design, by Jokela and Tahkokallio in 2015. Jokela and Tahkokallio (2015) defined Arctic design as understanding the uniqueness of Arctic circumstances, custom, livelihood, culture, and megatrends, and applying expertise to solve challenges specific to Northern areas following the principles of ecologically, economically, socially, and culturally sustainable development (Jokela & Tahkokallio, 2015). A similar discussion on the definition of Arctic art is needed to differentiate the concept from, for example, Northern art, which only refers to context to orientation or location. Arctic art as a term should illustrate the methods and the goals of art and art-related practices specific to Arctic area, the actions aimed at increasing well-being and competitiveness in Arctic areas, the international character of practices defining it across national borders, and to recognize the multi-ethnicity of art professionals working in the Arctic, to connect the phenomenon with Arctic discourse in other fields (i.e. Jokela & Tahkokallio, 2015; Beaulé & Evans, 2020).

Different discourses define Northern and Arctic differently according to the context. Both terms are often understood in relation to perspective and can overlap in meaning. In this article I adopt the discursive differentiation from the University of Lapland’s NACER research group’s perspective, where Northern is understood as a geographical orientation within the Arctic region. This perspective is characteristic to Scandinavia, where the North-South-axis is understood in relation to the Arctic. Southern as an adjective in this article thus refers to the perspective of Arctic administrative capitals, and Northern as the peripheral and identity-related perspective of the Arctic North. This differentiation is indicative rather than comprehensive, and within the Arctic region the definitions of Northern and Arctic vary according to perspective and agenda. Analyzing these differences in definitions could benefit from further research.

The data for this research consists of peer-reviewed scientific articles. The challenge with the chosen data is that research articles analyzed may continue to reproduce unintended colonialization of Indigenous knowledge in this article, as in the academic context western methodologies are preconceptions of the nature of knowledge. The majority of the articles studied were written from an other-than-Indigenous position and perspective. Coming from Finnish Lapland, my experience of Arctic is a shared Northern culture, and this atheoretical praxis positions me in a certain way as a researcher. I acknowledge that there are also agendas advocating the view that the definition of Arctic should inclusively translate as Indigenous cultures of the North. In this research, terms Northern and Arctic refer to a shared Northern culture, including both Indigenous and other-thanIndigenous traditions. This article is the first in a collection of research articles, which seek to open and explain the concept of Arctic art, and the experienced and real quality criteria used in evaluative processes concerning art in the Circumpolar Arctic.

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Method and data A thematic literature review was used as the research method to sketch the outlines of the definition of the term Arctic Art, to assess the current state of knowledge on a topic and to inform the directions of my future research on assessment of evaluative processes concerning art in the Circumpolar Arctic. The aim is to describe the concept of Arctic art through a discursive approach.

It is not analyzed as a separate linguistic phenomenon but in relation to the context in which it was produced.

The data for this analysis consists of peer-reviewed scientific articles, and for this study focuses on scientific discourse, not policy discourse. A preliminary review of the data was conducted in 2021.

The core material of the data are the publications of the Relate North Publication Series from years 2015 to 2020 and complemented with other research articles acquired via a more thorough literature search conducted at the University of Lapland based upon electronic science databases in the fall of 2023. The literature review began by searching five databases (finna.fi, arcticportal.org, Ebsco, ProQuest and Scopus). The search query was adapted to the specific syntactical requirements of each search engine and was restricted to Title and Keywords to ensure the return of the most relevant papers. This search returned over 700 records, which were then screened in two stages. The first stage removed duplicate entries and articles in a language other than Finnish or English. The titles and abstracts were then assessed for relevance based on the following criteria: The articles chosen as the final data for the research were restricted to articles written during the last two decades. The articles that focused only on historical or archeological phenomena were also omitted, as this article researched Arctic art as a contemporary practice. The restriction was made also to exclude articles concerning art educational aspects alone, without a connection to the profession as an artist. The final analysis comprised of 88 articles published during the years 2003– 2023. The concept of Arctic art was used in the data articles in different ways. In most articles, it was not mentioned in this particular term, or as a defined concept. Most articles didn’t discuss it more thoroughly or aim to define it. In addition, authors who used the term Northern art without any attempt to make a distinction between the idea of Arctic art as a complex collection of discourses and Northern as mere context to orientation were excluded from exploring how Arctic art as a concept is constructed independently of the context of orientation.

In the first phase of the analysis, the data were organized according to the terminology used.

Original expressions were collected from the articles, which dealt with Arctic art, the operating environments of Arctic artists, the identities and roles of artists in the Arctic regions, and the goals and aspirations of artistic activity from the perspective of the well-being of the Arctic. The original expressions were reduced and listed according to their similarities and differences. The contexts that most of the terminology could be hierarchically located into after reduction were ethnicity, cultural heritage, place-specificity, materiality, activism, and dialogicity. The found discourses were further analyzed around ten arguments, that embody various meanings, and are partly interlinked and overlapping: (1) Indigenous – Other-than-Indigenous Knowledge and Tradition; (2) Heritage as Speaking for a People – Independence of Authorship; (3) Counter-narrative: New Northern Paradigm – Arctic Art as a Laboratory for Global Futures; (4) Crafts as Arts – Crafts as Medium and Method; (5) Artivism – Participatory Art Methods; (6) Exotification – Cultural Pride, Cultural Rights, and Northern Knowledge; (7) Place-making: Place-research – Spatial Knowledge; (8) Dialogicity – Art as Communication; (9) Appropriation – Cultural Sustainability as Living Heritage;

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and (10) Process-based art – Object-based art. In this article, I will address in more detail the five most topical discourses which are central when informing the directions of future research on defining the term of Arctic art.

Indigenous – Other-than-Indigenous knowledge and tradition The concept of hybrid culture is an ambiguous and yet determining discourse in the context of Arctic studies. Hybrid culture refers to heterogenous, multicultural, and multiethnic co-existence of Indigenous and other locals, long-term residents, and newcomers, residing in Arctic areas (Usenyuk-Kravchuk, 2020). The predominant discourse in the context of hybrid culture concerns the inclusion of other-than-Indigenous art in the definition of Arctic art. Discourse in the Indigenous and other-than-Indigenous art in the North focuses on the question of if a knowledge system in the context of art in the Arctic, common for both Indigenous and other-than-Indigenous locals, exists. In the data, there are discourses advocating the view that the definition of Arctic art should include both practices and discourses advocating the term of Arctic art, which is translated inclusively as Indigenous art of the Arctic. As globalization has become the dominant context in today’s Arctic also, alongside hybrid culture hybrid identities have become default positions, especially among the younger generations in the area (Burnett, 2017). Pluralistic and assimilated culture and cultural heritage change the generational traditions and historical identities of new generations’ mental landscape (Ivey, 2017). Arntzen (2021) suggests that there has been a postcolonial need to create new identities in the Arctic, which has resulted in shared Northern culture becoming a premise for decolonization (Arntzen, 2021). Is it the traditional Indigenous knowledge that impacts the ethnic canonization of artists in the Arctic, or is it shared Northern knowledge mutual to both Indigenous and other-than-Indigenous local artists alike, that sets the foundation for defining Arctic art? Northern knowledge is understood in this article as thinking systems, vocabularies, intercultural know-how, arts and humanities sensibilities, expressions of opinions, and applications in territorial, political, and economic fields, that forms in situated learning in relation to local ecocultures (Huhmarniemi & Jokela, 2020).

At least two arguments can be found from the data supporting more clear distinction between Indigenous and other-than-Indigenous art practices in the Arctic: (1) The question of emphasis on the spiritual in the context of Northern knowledge, and (2) the question of language as principal device for transmission of Northern traditions and knowledge. According to academic Gunvor Guttorm (2015), the distinction between traditional local knowledge and traditional Indigenous knowledge is a question of emphasis on the spiritual knowledge in Indigenous tradition (Guttorm, 2015: 64). In most Indigenous worldviews the presence of the spiritual, such as ancestral recognition, elemental relationships and fostering connections with the natural world, is inseparable from everyday life. Indigenous contemporary artists realize the spiritual in ceremonial practices such as site-specific ritualism and repetition (Gismondi, 2022). Meaning-making through storytelling and ritualistic processes of grounding and creating form the body of Indigenous knowledge and practice to transmit tradition. The challenges with addressing Indigenous knowledge with Western methodologies as described by Tuhiwai Smith (2010) are preconceptions of the nature of knowledge: in contrast to Western understanding of discipline, Indigenous knowledge doesn’t necessarily combine into a coherent whole, form a universal history with one chronology working towards modernization and development or adapt into a binary manner of classification.

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The importance of understanding language as culture and culture as language is fundamental for transmission of tradition according to Ivey (2017). They find the renewal of culture being dependent on learning in a social context and the process of reconnecting with one’s socio-cultural identity: exclusion of language and social contextual particularities related to language maintain and reproduce colonization of culture. When not having parallels in one’s own cultural experience, assumptions about values, expressions, and aesthetics should not be made. If we lack the cultural and linguistic knowledge necessary to appreciate another culture’s symbolic, metaphoric, and religious imports, we cannot make assumptions on their significance or values they hold (Ivey, 2017; Davies, 2016). Junka-Aikio (2018) suggests that pictorial messages alike address audiences very differently depending on their cultural literacy and background knowledge. Although most images can be read in more general terms, certain interpretations suggest themselves only to those who understand particular languages and share strong local knowledge with cultural and political backgrounds. Emphasizing language as the transmitter of traditions and cultural knowledge results in embracing parallel knowledge systems existing in the Arctic.

According to Burnett’s (2017) research on the adopted definitions of ‘Scottish art’, identity should be interrogated more fully as something ‘made, not born’. They criticize choosing any canons of artists as an act of ethnicity, but rather see the cultural expressions of community identity as the place being a constellation of processes, not all participating required to answer to a certain (ethnic) identity. They recognize however, that even this perspective does not eliminate the risk of exclusion of marginal voices; who speaks for margins and how remains a valid question even when canonization of art is broadened beyond ethnicity. It also poses a risk of forming a new hegemonic iconography of art-making within a margin, that leads to exclusion of some less fashionable practices (Burnett, 2017). Huhmarniemi and Jokela (2020) point out that even without taking a stand to various conflicting ways of defining who counts as Indigenous in the Arctic, there are still other cultural minorities with relevant heritages in the Arctic in addition to Indigenous tradition.

Huhmarniemi and Jokela suggest the emphasis of the discourse on Indigenous and other-thanIndigenous traditions should be shifted towards the two-way integration of cultures and focus on collaboration to promote joint interests in Arctic sustainability (Huhmarniemi & Jokela, 2020: 8).

While the difficulties of Indigenous cultures are different from those of other-than-Indigenous cultures in the Arctic, multicultural and intercultural communities in the area are also connected via common challenges. Huhmarniemi and Jokela (2020) promote the concept of Arctic pride as tool for empowering culturally diverse communities in the Arctic. The concept of Arctic pride stresses the shared Northern knowledge mutual to Indigenous and other-than-Indigenous local artists as a framework for Arctic art. Phillips (2022) points out that in the Arctic, the shared legacies are inhabited together by all locals of today alike, and the only way to transfer power is co-create the representational modes of the new era.

Heritage as speaking for a People – Independence of authorship Artists working in the periphery adopt a mentality where they become a participant observer amongst the marginalized community speaking for the people rather than an individuality-driven artist speaking for oneself alone. Blair (2018) describes this in their research article about the art of Will Maclean with the concept of hybridity or heteroglossia: the presence of more than one viewpoint in an artistic work. For Maclean this meant the presence of marginal voices of his Scottish Highland fishing community heritage that were not embraced in the ‘grand narrative’

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when addressing the canonization of British anthropological history (Blair, 2018). Artistry, as a profession in the sense of how it is understood in the Western world, is relatively new in the Arctic.

In Northern and Arctic cultures, art is impossible to separate from social. A key to understanding Arctic cultures is that they are holistic in the sense that culture cannot be separated from human social life or the organization of the universe (Ryynänen, 2020: 54). During the 19th century, European artists began to establish their independence, and leading to a cult of authorship, as opposed to anonymous works. It emphasized originality, and artist’s inspiration and creativity different to crafts-maker’s (Davies, 2016). This centrality of innovation and authorship to artistic production translates into tradition being a constraining factor in contemporary mainstream art, whereas artists from Arctic areas understand tradition as an enabling attribute. Blair (2018) describes this as an anthropological perspective.

Building a collaborative body of place-based knowledge is characteristic for artists working in small communities in the North; Working together with the locals shifts the single-author role of the artist towards an idea of distributed authorship (Ross-Smith & Walker, 2019: 177). Unruh (2015) concludes that the concept of artist-as-genius should be surrendered and replaced with roles of facilitator and collaborator. In the Arctic, artworks reflect more than perceptions of an individual (Blair, 2018; Beaulé & De Conick, 2018). Within Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, a collection of principles guiding Inuit ontologies and social relations, collective decision-making, focus on benefitting the community before an individual and working together for the common good are emphasized.

Success and leadership in Inuit communities are translated as contributions for the community and sharing with others rather than highlighting individual achievements (Igloliorte, 2017: 103).

When speaking for a People, artists working in the Arctic should pay attention to selfrepresentation-rights of Indigenous communities. In efforts to de-colonize the Arctic, it is vital to ensure that Indigenous communities have the ability to speak for themselves rather than be spoken for (Unruh, 2015).

Counter-narrative: New Northern paradigm – Arctic Art as a laboratory for global futures Globalization increases the pressure to standardize culture, and challenges defining the locality (Härkönen & Vuontisjärvi, 2018). In a globalized context, the Northern is still defined against something; the Northern paradigm is in constant fight with the Southern paradigm. This fosters the idea of Southern as ‘normal’ and Northern as deviation from normal (Beaulé & De Conick, 2018: 13). In Arctic art, a need for a paradigm shift is recognized; when taking local context into account, it should translate into a deeper understanding than just global comprising the Northern specificities like climate, environment, and the cultural framework. North as a context extends also to complex entities such as values, well-being, ethics, social responsibility, and decision-making (Beaulé & De Conick, 2018; Häkkilä & Johansson, 2018). Challenging the western Eurocentric mindset and reconfiguring our historical ontologies requires dismantling of administrative, cultural, linguistic, and psychological colonialism, and shedding the realm of otherness (Blair, 2018; Jokela & Coutts, 2018; Burnett, 2017). According to Beaulé and De Conick (2018) it is possible to have conflicting paradigms within the same community (2018: 17). ‘South’ as the frame of reference that is presumed to be the norm has produced a need for a counter-narrative among Arctic communities. The grand narrative is the idea of a universal presentation of a culture, where the dominant ideology of the regime is to control knowledge. Socially constructed reality means

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that we produce the structures and shape the world’s perception as we interact with others. These structures often are subordinate to the grand narrative created by the mainstream majority culture.

Thus, it can neglect the cultural values or climate particularities of an area or create products, services, infrastructures etc., that are contextually inappropriate for the marginal people in the community. Counter-narrative is told from the perspective of the dispossessed and provides a presentation of local culture as a complex phenomenon and distinct. In the Arctic, artworks reflect more than perceptions of an individual and can thus be seen as telling the counter-narrative (Blair, 2018; Beaulé & De Conick, 2018).

Jokela and Coutts (2018) propose a new perspective to Arctic art as a laboratory for designing more sustainable methods for the environmentally, socially, economically, and culturally challenged global futures. The Arctic region is sparsely populated, culturally diverse, of socioeconomically differing conditions, of long distances, and suffering from urbanization-borne migration, which makes sustainable development and resilience-building inherent in Arctic communities. Global warming, together with environmental stress, brings another threat to the Arctic as interest towards the area increases as a potential resource for new oil and gas deposits, the building of new shipping routes, the building of new undersea telecommunications constructions, and the military interests arising from frontier thinking. The melting of the permafrost will seriously affect human-assisted systems. The Northern areas have good experiences on how contemporary art methods and techniques can act as an intercultural platform where artists explore their multi-ethnic backgrounds and environmental knowledge in the benefit of building more environmentally and culturally sustainable future. Similarly, also in other aspects of society, the North as a context could function as a laboratory where a new kind of sustainabilitythinking would be developed and tested (Jokela & Coutts, 2018). Usenyuk-Kravchuck et al. (2018) propose that a new paradigm transition in the Arctic strategy from conquest mentality into developing the ways of living within Arctic regions should transpire: the Arctic cannot be seen as an abnormality, but a completely different and independent phenomenon (Usenyuk-Kravchuk et al. 2018: 57). Arctic in this framework can illustrate the global future in the miniature – a natural laboratory and a real testing ground with an appropriate toolkit for developing new sustainable solutions (Usenyuk-Kravchuk et al., 2020). As climate change has made the Arctic trendy again, even the scientific gaze and an interest to study the perceived periphery for the global good might lead to a new colonization; Decker (2020) uses the metaphor of today’s canary, when describing the North as an image for what may come to other (Southern) places in the future (2020: 640). As Arctic cultures’ technologies pose relevant questions and solutions for today’s visionaries and futurists, values, attitudes towards sustainability, and critical awareness rooted in Northern cultures should also be taken in consideration when adopting knowledge from the Arctic. ‘The Arctic laboratory’ should be less about what, and more about how.

Exotification – Cultural pride, cultural rights and Northern knowledge As cultural operators and decision-makers have begun to identify and to recognize the tradition of exotification and cultural appropriation in the Arctic, the positive impact on the collaboration between the local professionals in the Northern areas and operators from the outside of the culture has been established. However, Arctic, and other non-Western cultures or peripheral areas are still seen as something that is outside. It continues the tradition, where people who are insiders in the legitimate system, in some sense, still think they are on a higher plane (Ryynänen, 2020: 6). The

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Arctic and its environmental challenges – especially since the struggle against climate change has become a global problem – have become a trendy subject and an interesting theme for many international artists as well. This raises another relevant question for decision-making: is all art done in the Arctic area Arctic art? When international artists from outside of the culture create a community art project with the locals in the Northern or peripheral areas, the tradition of one-way cultural exchange is a topical problem. The risk is that the Arctic community will be viewed degradingly: The high-art community from outside of the culture will teach locals what art is, and in the community art project the aim is to ‘fix’ or ‘school’ the broken and uneducated community.

This could be seen as a modern exotification of the Arctic areas. Ryynänen (2020) hopes that community artists will be so well-educated from a post-colonial perspective, that presentations with the feeling of “white savior attitude” no longer dominate the visits to the Arctic. Present community artists should be aware of their own position when approaching ‘the others’.

Karlsson Häikiö (2018) describes how the images featured in the media have made locals look at their home region from a tourist perspective; in the imagery by the schoolchildren in Northern Finland elements foreign to the local culture, such as mountains, were repeated (Karlsson Häikiö, 2018: 63). The need for a more versatile and updated view on the Arctic has been recognized by artists working in the area. The depiction of the Arctic is still dominated by the romantic imagery of remoteness and wildness belonging to former generations when lived experience is of pivotal and conflicted ‘next North’ (Manninen & Hiltunen, 2017; Burnett, 2017; Lehtimäki et al., 2021).

The tradition of seeing the Arctic through a conquering gaze stigmatized the North as terra nullius, an empty waste land separate from civilization, free to be harnessed in service of well-being industry and tourism (Newman, 2019). Outsider views as the author and extracted knowledge advocate a centuries-old tradition in the exchange of thoughts in the Arctic; the local vernacular is not perceived as possessing authorship, but knowledge is somehow applied from the outside (Decker, 2020). Although the most visible disadvantage of exotification is the peripheralization of people living in Arctic regions, the romanticizing gaze should be recognized first and foremost as a political narrative, whose goal is to maintain the inequity of land ownership. Who represents marginals to themselves and to others remains a key debate (Burnett, 2017). Authentic representations of the Arctic depict neither hardship nor voyeurism, but reciprocal realism with the environment, popular culture and multicultural everyday. Northern knowledge is understood as the tacit knowledge of the locality and their ability to find fluid and sustainable co-existence with the challenging and harsh Arctic environment.

Appropriation – Cultural sustainability as living heritage The common challenges in building knowledge within or connected to the marginal, for example within the Indigenous paradigm, are the questions of ownership and power (Guttorm, 2015). In the Northern areas a tradition of exploitation is still a topical issue, especially in the tourism industry, where stereotypical representations and exotification of Indigenous cultures for promotion and consumption purposes prosper. The challenge is to adopt existing local knowledge and develop from it, while respecting the intellectual properties of Indigenous people in particular (Usenyuk-Kravchuk et al., 2020). The discourse of appropriation in the data revolves around the questions of (1) artistic intertextuality and salvation as cultural appropriation and (2) cultural sustainability as a promotor for living heritage.

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Postmodernist intertextuality in this context can appear as appropriation or even sabotage when it turns into parody or pastiche. In the multicultural Arctic, appropriation is usually seen more as an act of salvage, where traditional elements are creatively re-interpreted to show the individuality of the artist (Blair, 2018; Zemtsova & Sharapov, 2017). Protecting, preserving, and salvaging the past is too narrow a perspective as cultural sustainability. Cultural heritage is a continual process of remaking, constructed in social interaction. Understanding how identities and social relationships are built is central. The discourse of sabotage and salvage emphasizes the interpretation of heritage as something static that fixates on the historical. This also raises the question of appropriation and authorship; who determines what should be salvaged? Cultural sustainability builds on the idea of local communities themselves determining their heritage values (Jokela & Coutts, 2018; Härkönen & Vuontisjärvi, 2018). Genuine collaboration between operators from different cultural and linguistic communities is still a difficult question: how to encounter otherness in art without succumbing to stereotypes or desiring exotics?

Juuso (2021) suggests, that even if it is – due to deficiencies in culturally-dependent knowledge – impossible to interpret and appreciate the artworks of other cultures to perfection, mainstream operators should strive to increase inclusion through wider collaboration. Fear of being misunderstood and stigmatized as racist and the burden of colonialist history curbs the willingness of the mainstream Western artworld to co-operate with artists from the Arctic areas. Lack of collaboration leads to making false assumptions on how Arctic art should be encountered.

Compartmentalizing something as marginal art is harmful prejudice, if it is done without collaboration, from outside. Compartmentalization produces otherness and exclusion, and nonWestern artists should own their integrity to decide how their art is to be labelled, if at all (Juuso, 2021).

Stöckell (2015) suggests that artistic action should create a new language to challenge the prevailing discourses, to enable the development of narratives that renew and transmit more sustainable cultural heritage (Stöckell, 2015: 53). Guttorm (2015) also describes the Indigenous knowledge of duodji as a living culture; according to them, tradition should be regarded as a standpoint and basis for conceptual expression, where individual experiences and influences are equally crucial.

Usenuyk-Kravchuk et al. (2020) introduced the term context-sensitivity as a practical framework for cultural heritages and questions of appropriation within a hybrid culture. Context-sensitivity emphasizes the protection of not just the historical cultural resources, but also those generated in today’s hybrid communities. Ethically equally relevant as to how, it is to examine why something is borrowed from another culture. (Usenuyk-Kravchuk et al., 2020: 25–26.) Decker (2017) proposes a shift from preserving objects to preserving narratives and perspectives.

Discussions and results Globalization as the dominant context, pluralism and assimilation in the Arctic will inevitably result in shared Northern culture (Burnett, 2017; Arntzen, 2021). While it is apparent that Arctic as heterogenous, multicultural, and multiethnic co-existence of Indigenous and other locals, longterm residents, and visitors alike is not without challenges, especially due to the historical colonialist burden the area holds, the two-way integration of cultures and focus on collaboration to promote joint interests on Arctic sustainability should be actively and consciously chosen as the practice on pursuing the new shared Northern culture (Huhmarniemi & Jokela, 2020). Even the context of the art itself is not without problems; the art system – having its centennial historical Discursive Frameworks of Arctic Art

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strength and with the aid of its strong institutional presence – affects our thinking, making it hard to achieve artistic or aesthetic democracy, even when it is consciously pursued (Ryynänen, 2020).

A wider definition of what qualifies as art might have the potential to bridge the divide between marginal and mainstream and include those narratives that are currently absent in the global discourse – within the institutional artworld and within global geopolitics alike.

The term Arctic art fails to serve as an unambiguous definition but appears rather a complex phenomenon requiring a combination of discourses to gather the components that together succeed in outlining the concept. The research indicates that several arguments appear through which Arctic art is represented in scientific literature, indicating that it is at an evolutive stage in its conceptualization. To identify and to recognize that art can have regional idiosyncrasies challenges the definition of art perceived as universal. This article aims to stimulate the discussion on whether art should be reviewed more in relation to the context where it was created, when for example assessed in cultural politics or curatorial and art critical processes. It is topical to identify and recognize the unique features of the art in the Arctic: expanding the institutional art world’s definition of art to include the methods, practices and contexts that are relevant for the art of the Arctic region is crucial in the current geopolitical situation, where artists of the region can be a significant actor when better communication is needed between different interest groups and locals to build more sustainable futures.

Jokela et al. (2021) have introduced a concept of new genre Arctic art to differentiate the phenomenon from all regional art from the North and from the Nordic style concerning only the aesthetic (Jokela et al., 2021). New genre Arctic art actively connects artistic practice with land, local community, and tradition to promote Arctic cultural continuity, Northern pride, and revitalization of Northern knowledge. Jokela et al. (2021) have recognized the coherence with Suzanne Lacy’s (1995) concept of new genre public art with chosen terminology, but this research is consistent with the concept itself of new genre Arctic art. The terminological positioning of the results of this research in relation to previous research on Arctic art by Jokela et al. (2021) is visually outlined in Figure 3.

Figure 1. Visual demonstration of the construction of the term ‘new genre Arctic art’.

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Figure 2. Visual demonstration of the ten discursive frameworks of Arctic art according to this research.

Figure 3. The terminological positioning of the results of this research in relation to previous research on Arctic art.

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Conclusions This article researched the possible frameworks for Arctic art by analyzing the scientific discourse around the theme. The research exposed the ten most significant discourses on the concept of Arctic art in the scientific peer-reviewed articles from the past two decades, that illustrate the distinctive characteristics of art from the Arctic. The five most topical discourses were discussed in more detail, for they are central when informing the directions of future research on defining the term Arctic art: the roles and relationship between Indigenous and other-than-Indigenous knowledge and tradition in the context of Arctic art; heritage understood as speaking for a people versus the independence of authorship; the presence of new Northern paradigm as counternarrative, and Arctic art as a laboratory for global futures; cultural pride, cultural rights and Northern knowledge as objection to exotification of the Arctic; and cultural sustainability as living heritage to protest appropriation.

As all the peer-reviewed articles on Arctic art are not included in this study, I recognize that another type of search would have yielded different data. Therefore, the data should be seen as a sample of the whole population of scientific articles on ‘Arctic art’. This research is thus not defining the concept of Arctic art as a definitive and unambiguous term, but rather making visible the international discourses sketching the outlines of the phenomenon in question. As illustrated in Figure 3., the discursive frameworks of Arctic art discussed in this research are consistent with previous research by Jokela et al. (2021). As the term Arctic art continues to fail to serve as an unequivocal definition and is still in an evolutive stage in its conceptualization, I find that the concept of new genre Arctic art can serve the future discourse and research as a less ambiguous term to describe the particularities and characteristics of Arctic art as analyzed in this article, and to distinguish the phenomenon as separate from all regional art from the Circumpolar Arctic and from the Nordic style concerning only the aesthetic.

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Indigenous lessons on how to harvest a polar bear: Exploring sustainability and sense-making in a postgrowth economy Benedikte Brincker

This paper applies Karl Wieck’s notion of sense-making to an Indigenous setting — the Indigenous Inuit population of East Greenland. The paper explores Indigenous sense-making of nature by analyzing Indigenous traditions of hunting and harvesting polar bears. The paper identifies three principles that guide this practice: one relating to governance, another to rewards, and finally one that pertains to insurance. The paper considers these three principles and evaluates their ability to contribute to our understanding of sustainability and a post-growth economy.

Introduction This paper explores Indigenous sense-making of nature and analyses how it offers insights into a post-growth economy. In doing this, it employs Karl Weick’s theory of sense-making to an Indigenous setting – the Indigenous Inuit population of East Greenland – and takes its methodological inspiration from Barbara Czarniawska’s method of shadowing.

There are several studies that link studies of growth including a critique thereof, with studies into Indigenous peoples. This is clearly evident in for instance the research done on entrepreneurship.

These studies explore the promise that entrepreneurship holds for rebuilding Indigenous communities both culturally, socially and economically, contributing to the emerging research agenda on Indigenous entrepreneurship. The notion of Indigenous entrepreneurship captures a distinct form of entrepreneurship that is fundamentally different from others - entrepreneurship that is community-based as opposed to one based on a single (heroic) individual or a family (Cummings & Jesse, 2022; Peredo et. al. 2004; Peredo & McLean, 2010).

Studies into Indigenous entrepreneurship unfold the interplay between Indigenous culture and identity on one hand and an entrepreneurial market economy on the other. Deliberations on Indigenous entrepreneurship are, in turn, closely associated with the analysis of enterprise communities, such as Ana Maria Peredo’s research conducted with Indigenous peoples in three

Benedikte Brincker is Professor at the Department of Sociology at the University of Copenhagen.

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Andean countries. Her research unfolds how communities can be actively corporate as both entrepreneurs and enterprises in the pursuit of the common good (Peredo, 2003).

This paper takes its inspiration from and contributes to the Indigenous entrepreneurship research agenda. Drawing on the works of Barbara Czarniawska and Karl Wieck, the paper follows the action instead of the actor, thus advocating an action-focused and process-oriented approach (Czarniawska, 2004; Weick, 1995; see also Lichterman, 2020). Against this background, the paper engages with the hunting and sharing of the catch of polar bears in East Greenland and analyses it using Karl Weick’’s theory of sense-making. The paper employs the term ‘harvesting’ to capture the cultural, social and economic aspects of how to share the catch, i.e. the polar bear. It does so with the aim to explore how Indigenous lessons on how to harvest a polar bear offer insight into sense-making in a post-growth economy.

In recent years, alternatives to growth have received growing scholarly attention. These alternatives cover but are not limited to the notions of green growth, de-growth and post-growth. They have in common a critical perspective on economic growth linking it to environmental degradation under capitalism. However, they differ in other aspects. Green growth seeks to decouple environmental degradation from economic growth by improving the efficiency of production through technological and market innovations (Sandberg, et. al. 2019; Bauhardt, 2014). So, green growth offers a catalogue of potential improvements to capitalism rather than a critique of it. In contrast, de-growth calls for a substantial reduction in growth especially in the western part of the world, while post-growth invites us to reflect on the growth imperative completely.

These debates open up a critique that is not limited to capitalism, production and consumption under capitalism, or the organisation of capitalist society (Baker, 2019, Chandler, 2018). In this perspective, it makes little difference what is heralded as the causal drivers of environmental degradation. Regardless of where scholars position themselves and highlight capitalism, colonialism, imperialism, mass consumerism, modernity or enlightenment, as a primary cause, the conclusion is common across them (Chandler, 2019; Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2017). There is no longer a separation between humans, nature, and culture (Chandler, 2019; Baker, 2019, Colebrooke, 2014).

The present paper engages with growth and a critique thereof from a profoundly empirical point of departure. Following Czarniawska method of shadowing and furthermore her engagement with the work of Weick, this is an invitation to reflect ‘on your feet’ (Czarniawska, 2005b). This implies that one needs to engage with Indigenous people and their practices, not as examples of alternative futures, but as a way of life that exists. While this approach sees Indigenous peoples as embedded in nature, it does not in any way include portraying Indigenous people as having a unique bond to nature or being guardians of nature. The latter constitutes an approach that may easily involve the kind of romanticism that tends to prevail in colonial and some post-colonial accounts of indigeneity (Sejersen, 2004). In contrast, the present analysis of Indigenous sense-making of nature taps into the collapse in the separation between man and nature and the insights that this offer into a postgrowth economy (Brincker, 2017; Böhme, 1989).

First, the paper presents the theoretical framework by drawing upon the scholarship of Karl Weick focusing especially on Weick’s notion of sense-making. The paper then turns to the case and briefly introduces the reader to the setting and context, and furthermore to shadowing as a method. This brings us to the analysis, which focuses on two key elements of sense-making in the process of hunting and harvesting a polar bear: identity construction seen as a social and on-going process Brincker

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and the enactment of sensible environments. The paper concludes by evaluating the potential of the study to contribute to our understanding of a post-growth economy.

The theoretical framework: Karl Wieck’s theory of sense-making The notion of sense-making is part of Weick’s broader theoretical contribution to the study of organisations which hinges on three central concepts: enactment, sense-making, and heedfulness (often referred to as mindfulness). The enactment theory states that when humans act, they bring structures and events into existence and set them in action. This forms the basis of a socialconstructivist perspective on organisations. It offers a view that directs attention away from the organisation seen as an entity towards the continual processes through which organisations are brought into life. It is an approach where the analytical gaze of the observer shifts from the organisation to organising. The notion of sense-making is central to our understanding of organising, because it allows us to understand the process through which meaning is ascribed to experience. In doing so, it offers insights into what enables action.

Weick sees sense-making as a process that is: grounded in identity construction, retrospective, enactive of sensible environment, social, on-going, focused on and by extracted cues, and finally driven by plausibility rather than accuracy (Wieck, 1995: 17). These seven elements collectively shed light on the relationship between the individual and the environment. A key insight from Weick’s work on sense-making is that shared meaning is not what is crucial in collective action.

What is crucial is the experience of shared action. It follows that Weick does not work with a distinction between an individual mind and the collective mind. The collective mind precedes the individual mind. Hence, there can be no individual or single sense-maker (Weick & Roberts, 1993: 360). What a situation means is defined by who we become while dealing with the situation and, what or who we represent. This leads us to understand the individual as a person who is completely and fully embedded in the social i.e. there is no individuality before social life.

In recent years, the notion of sense-making has seen a revival and it has been applied to studies that engage with organising under extreme conditions and circumstances — such as extreme weather and natural disasters (Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). Acknowledging that sense-making of ecological conditions is not a dominant concern within mainstream organisation literature, Whiteman and Cooper stress the need to embrace the power of materiality (Orlikowsky, 2007; Suchman, 2005). They recognise that local inter-generational knowledge of ecosystems often enables people to make sense of and respond effectively to ecological change and surprise.

However, ecological sense-making is not straightforward. The ability to make sense of nature, often in the spur of the moment, and respond sensibly requires that people are ‘ecologically embedded’.

According to the authors, people who possess the quality of being ecologically embedded are those ‘who are deeply rooted in “the land” in a physical and cultural way’ (Whiteman & Cooper, 2011: 890). Those who do not have this characteristic are likely to suffer from its absence when they need to respond quickly and heedfully/mindfully to changes in the natural world. As a result, those who are not ecologically embedded and do not have ecological sense-making abilities become highly vulnerable when confronted with surprises that originate from the local ecology (Whiteman & Cooper, 2011:891). With this in mind, the authors call for more research into acts and instances of sense-making of an ecologically material world.

Case and Context

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Colony and County Greenland is the largest island in the world with its 2,166.000 km2. It is inhabited by approximately 55,000 people, who live along the coastline with a predominance of settlements on the central west coast. Greenland is often considered to be both North American and European. Geographically, it is part of the North American continent. However, given that Greenland was a Danish colony for more than 200 years (1721-1953), a Danish county for more than 20 years (1953-1979), and is part of the Danish Realm (Rigsfællesskabet), Greenland is also considered part of the Nordic countries, constituting the Arctic dimension. In recent years, the relationship between Greenland and Denmark and especially the colonial history has received a lot of attention among scholars and lay people alike. A consensus seems to be emerging that Danish colonial policies have been guided by ideas of protective paternalism and that these ideas have been facilitated by a unique bond between mission and trade. The policies effectively sealed off Greenland from the outside world and endorsed parts of traditional Inuit lifestyles that were seen fit, while replacing elements that were regarded unfit (Rud, 2014; Thisted, 2005, 2009, 2014).

Under pressure from the United Nations, to allow the introduction of popular sovereignty, in 1953 Greenland’s status was changed and the island went from being a Danish colony to being a Danish county. In doing this, Greenland took a road very different from most other colonies that became independent. With the change in status from Danish colony to Danish county, it became a key priority for Denmark to assimilate Greenland into the Danish welfare state which was created during the same period. The new policies had pronounced implications for the social structures in Greenland as the country went through a rapid modernisation process in areas such as health, housing, and education (Rud, 2014).

In 1979, as a response to a national and ethno-political movement that emerged in the 1960s, Greenland acquired Home Rule. Its autonomy was further increased in 2009 with the SelfGovernment Act (Selvstyre). The Self-Government Act stands out by granting the government of Greenland the right to declare the country independent. It thus recognises the people of Greenland as a people with a right to self-determination. Furthermore, the Act allows the government of Greenland the right to assume legislative power over major policy areas. However, there are exceptions to this rule, most notably foreign and security policy.

East Greenland is the most sparsely populated area of Greenland with only 3,000 inhabitants.

Tasiilaq is, by Greenlandic standards, the only large town in this vast geographical area and has approximately 2000 people living there. East Greenlanders speak a distinct dialect that qualifies as a language unique to the region. However, it does not have the status of a minority language. In addition to differing from West Greenland in terms of language, East Greenland also has a different cultural and a shorter colonial history. East Greenland was colonised in the late 1880s while the rest of the country was colonised much earlier in 1721. This left East Greenland relatively more isolated than West Greenland. Also, the county years, i.e. 1953-1979, were experienced differently in East Greenland compared to the western region. Denmark’s attempt to modernise Greenland and assimilate Greenland into the Danish welfare state focused primarily on West Greenland. As a result, Indigenous practices in hunting and fishing are relatively more prevalent and dominant in East Greenland. This extends to practices for hunting and harvesting polar bears.

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Indigeneity and Isolation Greenland belongs to the Inuit people, who are recognised as an Indigenous People. In contrast to many Indigenous Peoples, Greenlandic Inuit constitutes the majority population of Greenland, and the majority of the population speaks the Inuit language, Greenlandic.

For many years, the Greenlandic Inuit have expressed hopes to be fully independent from Denmark one day, thus leaving the Danish Realm. A main obstacle to achieve this end derives from the fact that Greenland is economically dependent on Denmark. The Danish annual block grant constitutes about 50 per cent of the country’s national budget. The hope to declare itself independent and to become the first Inuit nation state taps into the concept of Indigenous People and how to define ‘Indigenous People’. Several attempts to offer a definition have been presented and they share the emphasis on Indigenous Peoples’ non-dominant position being vital to our understanding of this particular group of people (Mortensen & Barten, 2016).

As Greenland gradually gains more autonomy and detaches itself from its former colonial ruler Denmark, a question emerges: Do the people of Greenland continue to be non-dominant and qualify as an Indigenous People? Furthermore, given the vast regional differences in Greenland that involve both culture, language and socio-economics, it is possible that some parts of the Greenlandic population are non-dominant (and thus Indigenous) whereas as others are not.

Domination/non-domination are fundamental to our understanding of indigeneity. If the former colonial ruler, i.e. Denmark, is taken out of the equation, and with relations of domination/nondomination playing out internally in Greenland, are the people of Greenland still an Indigenous People? Or may it be that when judged by the token of dominance / non-dominance, only parts of the population constitute an Indigenous People?

These questions are by no means just academic. In the early 2000s, the people living in Thule, i.e. the population in the northern part of the country, took legal action to be recognised as an Indigenous People distinct from the people of Greenland (Hastrup, 2007, 2009). The Danish Supreme Court ruled that the people of Greenland constitute one people, specifically one Indigenous People. However, the hope continues to linger, spurred on by the movement towards independence, and it is not limited to the Thule population. It is also present in East Greenland.

The question therefore remains - at what point does the balance tip from being non-dominant to being dominant. Furthermore, when it tips, does it do so for the entire population of Greenland or does Greenland contain several peoples, some being Indigenous in the sense of being nondominant, while others are not (Mortensen & Barten, 2016)? In the present context, it is vital to recall that in contrast to ‘a people’ or ‘a minority’, Indigenous Peoples have certain rights relating to self-determination and to living and non-living natural resources (Mortensen & Barten, 2016).

These include the rights of Indigenous Peoples to hunt, for instance, seals and polar bears.

Methods: Shadowing in East Greenland The motivation for carrying out research in one of the most remote and isolated parts of Greenland stems from a research project that the author conducted into Indigenous entrepreneurship and education in East Greenland (2016-2018).

The study took a point of departure in Barbara Czarniawska’s method of shadowing. However, the researchers used it in a diluted form as we did not spend extensive periods of time (6-12 months) in the field. Instead, we had regular shorter stays. Shadowing was reported in field notes and Indigenous lessons on how to harvest a polar bear

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narratives. Albeit, we used shadowing in a diluted form, Czarniawska’s approach remained the central source of inspiration throughout the research.

The notion of mobility lies at the core of Barbara Czarniawska’s work on shadowing as a method to study “the work and life of mobile people” (Czarniawska, 2007: 17). Czarniawska calls for a mobile ethnography of people who move often and quickly. Consequently, she advocates not to follow the actor but to engage with action nets of actors that are under constant change (Charniawska, 2004; Latour, 2007). Charniawska makes a point of the fact that shadowing is more than a technique. It is a mindset that offers different insights. Shadowing requires that the researcher takes a step back in order to observe. Ironically, in order to take this step back, the researcher has to step into the field and become part of it. Only then, according to Charniawska, does observation in the true manner of shadowing become possible (Charniawska, 2007: 9).

This raises the question of how the observed responds to the more or less constant presence of the observer. Based on the experience derived from the present study, the observed generally tend to ignore the observer after a very short period of time. While being ignored as an observer might be very attractive in the context of shadowing, this should not be considered an indication of, or invitation to ‘going native’. Stepping into the field and going native are two very different things.

The former allows the researcher to observe and capture that, which escapes the eye of the observed. The latter signifies the point at which the researcher has spent so much time in the field that he/she begins to take things, events and comments for granted (Charniawska, 2007: 27-28).

The above considerations are particularly relevant in the context of research on/with Indigenous peoples, especially given the context of colonisation. The author of this paper is a Danish national and thus, in the eyes of the local community associated with Denmark, the former colonial ruler (Smith, 2012). It raises the question of whether non-Indigenous researchers in general and nationals from the former colonial power in particular can be involved in accurate Indigenous research (Crothers, 2014). For this study, the attempt was to avoid two pitfalls: one was the risk of producing research that ascribes a particularly privileged position to an underprivileged group, calling for a mobilisation for and protection of the group’s interests, i.e. so-called ‘standpoint theorists’ (Crothers, 2014). The other was not to engage in research that could potentially endanger the cultural particularity of the Indigenous group in question by intruding in the community. With this in mind, shadowing lends itself as a highly conducive method because it allows the researcher to balance stepping into the field and remain distant from it at the same time.

How to harvest a polar bear The population of polar bears is not evenly distributed in Greenland. The vast majority can be found in the northern and eastern parts of Greenland. During the summer, polar bears follow their prey such as seals through the East coast of Greenland. Summer is, in other words, the season for hunting polar bears.

The Inuit people in the northern and eastern parts of Greenland have hunted polar bears for centuries. In addition to seal and fish, polar bears constitute part of the Inuit diet. To this particular group, hunting and harvesting polar bears is embedded in their Indigenous way of life and world view.

There are specific traditions connected to hunting and harvesting polar bears. For instance, the person who spots the bear first has the right to the animal’s skin. This is fixed. So, if a child, an Brincker

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elderly person, or a woman spot the bear first the skin is theirs, even though they do not participate in hunting the polar bear. Typically, however, it is a hunter that spots the bear first — as polar bears rarely come near villages or towns.

Sharing the bear’s meat is guided by tradition and hunters try to observe these traditions even today.

Typically, the hunter who spots the bear first also shoots it. Apart from the skin, which is the reward he may claim for having spotted the bear first, he gets the head, meat from the chest bone, and meat from the central part of the bear which is measured as the piece from the fifth rib from the top to the rib fifth from the bottom. If the bear is killed as part of a hunting expedition, the bear’s limbs are divided equally among the remaining hunters. The intestines, which are considered a delicacy and an important source of nutrition, are divided among all the participating hunters (Møller, 2007).

Interestingly, if hunters who have not participated in the hunt happen to pass by, they also get their share of meat. They may claim the meat from the hip and the tail. Sometimes this piece of meat is also taken back to the village or town and offered to an old hunter who is no longer able to participate in hunting expeditions. This is considered a sign of respect (Møller, 2007).

The rule that the meat is shared both among participating hunters and passer-by hunters is not limited to the polar bear. It applies to all the types of large prey. For instance, in the case of narwhales, the tradition is that boats that happen to pass by the hunting scene may toss a stone or a cartridge on to the buoy that holds the whale afloat and thus claim a piece of meat from the belly of the whale. So, the traditions that guide the sharing of prey are not limited to polar bears. They are also not limited to East Greenland. Similar traditions exist in Northern Greenland, albeit with local variations.

Sense-making and how to harvest a polar bear The first insight to be derived from Indigenous lessons on how to hunt and harvest a polar bear pertains to the interaction between the individual and the collective mind. In this context, the understanding that there can be no individual sense-maker is vital. The collective mind precedes the individual mind. What a situation means is defined by who we become while dealing with the situation — such as the person who first spotted the bear or the former hunter who can no longer hunt. This process of identity construction is social and on-going.

Against this backdrop, Indigenous practices connected to harvesting a polar bear involve an element of governance. Key to this governance is preventing conflicts arising among hunters over dividing and sharing scarce resources. For this reason, they clarify who gets the skin and the head of the bear, the two most-precious parts of the animal, and who is entitled to what portion of meat.

Governance also pertains to external relations i.e. to passers-by, because it clarifies that they have a right to claim a piece from the less attractive part of the animal, the hip.

When engaging with Indigenous practices as movement and patterning of social form rather than as system or structure, these social practices are linked to questions of organising, and processes of sense-making that give meaning to organising. Hence, they allow us to understand the significance of these elements of governance in the context of a post-growth economy. The aim of governance is to prevent conflict arising over scarce resources.

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The social and on-going process of identity construction is clearly expressed in the granting of rewards. Indigenous lessons on how to harvest a polar bear include insights into rewards that relate to the risk associated with spotting and shooting a polar bear. For example, the hunter who does so gets the skin and head — parts of the animal that are considered most attractive — as well as a significant portion of the meat. However, rewards extend to the entire group and to by-passers as well. Hence, while they are granted to particular individuals, they do not cater to an underlying understanding of individuality. Instead, these lessons are embedded in identity construction that acknowledges and seeks to promote actions, and rewards risk taking in the context of human survival not as individuals but as species living along with other species in a space that is social and where resources are scarce.

The system of rewards extends to former hunters who no longer have the capacity to hunt. At first glance, this may appear to be a social welfare scheme. However, the scheme is limited to retired hunters; it does not cover all elderly people in the group. So instead of envisioning this as a welfare scheme, it is more apt to perceive this particular reward system as an old-age insurance scheme targeted towards former hunters.

The distinction between social welfare and an insurance scheme is very important in the present context, as it taps into the rationale that informs this system. In the case of social welfare, the system is informed by rights and duties that are assigned to particular individuals. In the case of an insurance scheme, the rationale that underpins the system can be described as an act that motivates a particular type of behaviour over time. And so, the hunters who bring meat back to the old hunter do so anticipating that young hunters will, in the future, do the same for them when they are too old to go hunting. The act involves an expectation of reciprocity (Elster, 1992).

The distinction between a social welfare regime and an insurance scheme is significant for the discussion on individuality and its place - or lack thereof - in Indigenous lessons on how to harvest a polar bear. When exploring the act of bringing part of the prey back to former hunters, it becomes clear that this particular act relies on neither altruism nor self-interest. Instead, it is an act that spans and links the past, the present, and the future and is grounded in the social and on-going process of identity construction.

Another insight to be derived from Indigenous practices connected to the hunting and harvesting of polar bears relates to the environment, specifically, in Weick’s notion of sense-making in relation to the material world: the enactment of sensible environments. The enactment of sensible environments implies that, following Weick, people produce the environment that they face. There is no fixed environment according to Weick. People are part of their own environments, which they produce by acting in it (Weick, 1995: 31). In saying this, Weick is not implying that there is no material world outside our cognition. Only that when we focus on it, we enact it and construct it socially. In doing so, we construct sensible environments. This extends to the enactment of the natural environment which Whiteman and Cooper seek to capture with the notion of ecological sense-making. In the particular case of Indigenous lessons on how to harvest a polar bear, sensemaking of the natural environment or ecological sense-making means that the polar bear is enacted as prey i.e. an animal to be hunted and harvested in order to get food. It also means that other enactments are possible. One such example is from West Greenland, where the polar bear is enacted as a sacred animal and a national symbol. This is clearly expressed in the fact that a roaring polar bear is the symbol of the government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut). Another is in the

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context of the wider world where images of starving polar bears are typically enacted as symbols of environment degradation stemming from the economic growth of the western world.

The above-mentioned three enactments of the polar bear as prey, sacred animal and national symbol, and finally a symbol of environmental degradation, are part of cognition that involves sustainability. However, in the context of Indigenous practices, it would be a mistake to conceptualise sustainability as the polar bear’s sustainability as a species. Among the Indigenous Inuit population in East Greenland, sustainability pertains to humans. It pertains to the Indigenous people living there. In recent decades, this group has seen the effects of climate change first hand.

They have seen bears that earlier would not come near towns or villages now wander through these places in search of food as they have been deprived of their prey such as seals. Illorqortormiut, the northernmost town in East Greenland has been especially bothered by the continuing appearance of groups of polar bears.

Among the Indigenous people living in East Greenland, sustainability is the sustainability of humans placed in a nature that is socially constructed in the ways that the livelihood of living resources such as the polar bear is fundamental for the sustainability of humans. This is in the sense that the enactment of sensible environments involves the sustainability of humans as a species as opposed to the sustainability and self-preservation of sovereign individuals.

Discussion and Conclusion This paper set out to explore how Indigenous lessons on how to harvest a polar bear offer insight into sense-making in a post-growth economy. Taking its inspiration in Czarniawska’s method of shadowing, her call for a mobile ethnography and the concomitant point to follow the action rather than the actor, the paper integrated research conducted into entrepreneurship and education at state school in East Greenland with an analysis of the social practices involved in the hunting and harvesting of polar bears in that region. In exploring and unfolding these practices, the paper has drawn on Karl Weick’s theory of sense-making, in particular the process of identity construction and the enactment of sensible environments.

The paper has identified elements of governance and compensation that underpin how the meat and the skin of the bear is divided both internally within the group of hunters and in relation to passers-by. It has discussed the rationale that informs rewards, unfolding how they seek to motivate particular actions such as risk taking. Rewards are not limited to the present moment but extend to former hunters and also to the future; they involve an expectation of reciprocation and are firmly embedded in the collective mind.

The question that remains to be addressed is how Indigenous lessons on how to harvest a polar bear offer insight into sense-making in a post-growth economy and how these insights may contribute to the emerging research agenda on Indigenous entrepreneurship. The paper argues that Indigenous practices can facilitate such insights by enabling us to envision commons that are profoundly social in their conceptualisation. Relationality is key to this understanding. When engaging with Indigenous practices as movement and patterning of social form rather than as system or structure, these social practices are linked to questions of organising, and processes of sense-making that give meaning to organising. At the heart of this is the recognition that the collective mind precedes the individual mind.

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Weick’s works are dedicated to analysing processes of sense-making, including how people enact their own environment — both social and natural. To the extent that it makes sense to speak of sustainability in relation to this collective, it pertains to humans as a species, and not to sovereign individuals. The question is one of not becoming extinct as a species as opposed to selfpreservation of the individual.

Acknowledgement I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. Especially, the comments on the term i.e. harvesting in the context of Inuit traditions and the sharing of the catch, i.e. polar bears have been helpful not only the context of the present paper but in the context of my research at large.

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Co-creating Arctic Futures: Perspectives from Emerging Leaders on Youth Leadership and Inclusive Governance Pouya Dabiran-Zohoory, Anastasiya Henk, Sterre Koops, Shannon E. Moore, Ugo Nanni, Leah Palmer, Sophie Roher, Conor Savage, Polina Smirnova & Haliehana Stepetin

As the Arctic undergoes unprecedented environmental and climate transformations, an urgent call for inclusive governance and intergenerational leadership echoes across the circumpolar region. In January 2024, 29 Emerging Leaders from the Circumpolar Arctic and Subarctic gathered in Northern Norway ahead of the 2024 Arctic Frontiers Conference. This diverse group, with global identities and multi-disciplinary backgrounds spanning science, policy, business, geopolitics, and law, brought together experiences that inspired this paper. We highlight the unique perspectives offered by younger generations and leaders to advocate for changes across a spectrum of critical Arctic issues. Our voices must be present in the decision-making which shapes our future, yet we observe some politicians, diplomats, legal, and business officials engaging in protracted discourse overlooking the urgent realities faced by those most directly impacted.

We address the concept of “youthwashing” and offer a critique, as well as actionable recommendations, for fostering inclusive decision-making. We explore the role of youth leadership in Arctic governance across various disciplines and how diverse perspectives are required to better shape Arctic futures. Our concerns encompass the sustainable management of the Arctic’s natural resources, respect and protection of Indigenous rights and Traditional Knowledge, and developing solutions rooted in sustainability, survivance, and justice. As Emerging Leaders, we aspire to create liveable futures for generations to come, challenging the present trajectory set by current senior leadership. In turn, we ensure that while the Arctic is undergoing significant change, it develops in a framework respectful of all generations, ultimately rooted in justice for all Arctic peoples.

Pouya Dabiran-Zohoory, Lawyer and LLM Candidate at the University of Cambridge. Anastasiya Henk, PhD, Associate Professor at Nord University Business School, Norway. Sterre Koops, PhD candidate at the Arctic Centre, University of Groningen; Research Centre for Built Environment NoorderRuimte, Hanze University of Applied Sciences; Netherlands. Shannon E. Moore, PhD candidate at the Norwegian College of Fishery Science, UiT - The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway. Ugo Nanni, PhD, Department of Geosciences, University of Oslo, Norway. Leah Palmer, PhD candidate - College of Arts, Social Sciences, and Celtic Studies, University of Galway, Ireland. Sophie Roher, PhD, Institute for Circumpolar Health Research, Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, Canada. Conor Savage, UK Polar Network and Early Career Ocean Professionals Programme, United Kingdom. Polina Smirnova, PhD candidate, School of Business and Economics, UiT - The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway. Haliehana Stepetin, PhD, Assistant Professor - Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies.

All authors contributed equally to the conception, design, research, and writing of this work. The order of authorship is determined solely by alphabetical order of last names and does not reflect any hierarchy or level of contribution.

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Introduction The Arctic is experiencing some of the most rapid environmental changes on the planet (AMAP, 2022). These transformations have direct implications for the lives and livelihoods of the Peoples who have called the Arctic home for thousands of years. These changes also impact the global climate system and the livelihoods of communities well beyond the Arctic’s boundaries (Vincent, 2019). Given the significant and swift environmental shifts occurring in the Arctic, there is an urgent need for innovative governance approaches that are both inclusive and forward-thinking.

Incorporating intergenerational leadership is essential to ensure that the voices of those living in the Arctic, particularly younger generations, are meaningfully included in policy discussions and decision-making processes. While the lives and futures of young people are often topics of discussion, their actual inclusion in decision-making spaces tends to remain superficial (Carabelli & Lyon, 2016; Macauley et al., 2022).

In January 2024, a diverse group of 29 Emerging Leaders from the Circumpolar Arctic and Subarctic, all working on Arctic and pole-related issues, convened in Northern Norway ahead of the Arctic Frontiers conference (Arctic Frontiers, 2024). This group, composed of individuals with multidisciplinary expertise in science, policy, business, geopolitics, and law, inspired the development of this article. The aim of this article is to highlight the unique perspectives and contributions of younger generations to Arctic governance. The insights and leadership of these younger generations are crucial for fostering just and sustainable solutions to the critical issues affecting the Arctic, both for the current population and for future generations. We believe that the accelerating impact of climate change emphasises the urgent need for inclusive decisionmaking processes that reflect the needs and aspirations of younger generations, who serve as a more accurate conduit for the voices of future generations than today’s senior leadership.

Figure 1. Sharing our expertises and learning from our peers was at the heart of the Emerging Leaders Programme. Credits: Alexandru Mitu, all rights reserved.

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Addressing critical Arctic issues The Arctic is a region of complex challenges, where environmental, economic, and geopolitical interests converge. It is currently facing a myriad of critical issues that demand immediate attention and innovative solutions. While our paper does not aim to provide an exhaustive account of all the challenges and opportunities facing the Arctic, it focuses on some of the most pressing concerns. By emphasising these concerns, the necessity for immediate and collaborative action becomes evident as it is essential to mitigate and prevent further environmental degradation, while at the same time ensuring the resilience of the natural world and humanity’s existence and prosperity within it.

The Arctic and sub-Arctic hold some of the world’s major commercial fishery grounds, including pollock, cod, herring, halibut, and salmon (Fauchald et al., 2021; Gritsenko, 2018; Norris & McKinley, 2017). These species tend to be more vulnerable to climate change and anthropogenic activities because of their long lifespans and delayed sexual maturity (Norris & McKinley, 2017).

As Arctic waters continue to warm, many of these commercially important species are migrating further north into the Arctic (Dubay, 2021; Fauchald et al., 2021; Jørgensen et al., 2020; Norris & McKinley, 2017). The combination of this northward shift and the remote nature of these waters makes illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing a large concern for the sustainability of these stocks. Various international agreements aim to define a state’s right to fish, manage stocks, and prevent unregulated fishing, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), and the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (CAOFA) (Dubay, 2021; Fauchald et al., 2021; Norris & McKinley, 2017). The Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (2018) specifically outlines a 16-year moratorium on commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean to allow scientists time to study the ecosystem (Dubay, 2021). However, the effectiveness of these agreements is limited as they only apply to signees and not all states with fishing fleets are signatories, thereby making enforcement challenging (Dubay, 2021). Without appropriate regulations in place, many of the commercial stocks in the Arctic region could be at risk of collapse from overfishing, as commercial fisheries are driven by economic profit (Norris & McKinley, 2017).

Additionally, the Arctic has a long history of fossil fuel extraction, which developed into a large commercial-scale industry as many countries began using hydrocarbons and coal as energy sources in the 19th century (Gritsenko, 2018; Sörlin, 2021). Commercial interest in oil and gas in the Arctic intensified following the oil crises of the 1970s, leading to significant discoveries of stores in the Norwegian and Russian Arctic waters (Gritsenko, 2018; Morgunova, 2020). Geopolitical instability remains a powerful driver for oil and gas exploration in the Arctic, as nations cope with the need to ensure energy security (Morgunova, 2020). Today, the Arctic provides about 10% of the world’s commercial oil, and 25% of its commercial natural gas (WWF Global Arctic Programme, n.d.).

Russia, Norway, and the United States of America currently produce oil and gas in the Arctic, with Norway, notably, acting as the world’s 3rd largest supplier of natural gas and providing 25% of the European Union (EU)’s demand (Morgunova, 2020). Canada announced a ban on issuing new offshore oil and gas licences in Canadian Arctic waters in 2016, and in 2019, it prohibited all oil and gas work in these waters due to environmental considerations (Zhang et al., 2024).

Beyond oil and gas, mining has also proven to be a prevalent extractive practice in the Arctic.

Recently, it has been touted as pivotal for the transition from fossil fuels to “green” and “clean” Co-creating Arctic Futures

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technologies (Henriques & Böhm, 2022). Even though mining in the Arctic was believed to be primarily post-contact, it can actually be traced back to before the arrival of Europeans and ensuing colonies with Indigenous communities mining copper prior to contact (Cooper et al., 2020). Arctic mining encompasses both traditional resources (e.g., copper, lead, iron, manganese, silver, uranium, and coal), precious minerals (e.g., diamonds and gold), and critical minerals (e.g., cobalt, cryolite, graphite, nickel, palladium, and platinum) (Bjørst, 2017; Cassotta & Goodsite, 2024; Gritsenko, 2018; Mazurier et al., 2020; Sörlin, 2021). Many of these minerals are essential for the production of batteries, smartphones, wind turbines, and electric cars (Henriques & Böhm, 2022). In particular, one of the most contentious mining projects can be found in Greenland.

Greenland was a Danish colony from 1721 until the Greenland Self-Government Act of 2009 (Bjørst, 2017; Henriques & Böhm, 2022). Despite expanding autonomy through the Act, Greenland is still seeking ways to establish economic independence, namely through mining, whilst also bearing in mind the environmental impacts. Indigenous Greenlandic Inuit make up almost 90% of the country’s population (Bianco, 2024). The Greenlandic Inuit have rights and obligations of self-government under the Self-Government Act, even though Greenland is still a part of Danish territory (Ackrén, 2019). Under the Self-Government Act, Greenlanders’ right to selfdetermination is recognized. (Jakobsen & Larsen, 2024) The Greenland Inuit’s collective and regional territorial rights in Greenland have paved the way for significant decision-making over mining exploration projects, and ultimate decision-making over mining project approvals in certain areas in the Greenlandic Arctic. There are two prevailing political views in Greenland: (1) the “mining friendly”, who desire to establish an independent and sustainable economy for Greenland, and (2) the political view, which is fearful of the environmental impacts of increased CO2 emissions and radioactive waste (Henriques & Böhm, 2022). The Kvanefjeld mining project in Greenland highlights the tension between the desires for economic development and environmental preservation. It is notably led by an Australian company and backed by Chinese investors and has one of the largest rare earth mineral deposits in the world (Henriques & Böhm, 2022).

Finally, deep-sea mining in Arctic waters has recently emerged as a critical issue. Mining in the seabed is recognised as being able to provide the mineral resources important for decarbonization and clean energy transition strategies (Cassotta & Goodsite, 2024; Henriques & Böhm, 2022).

However, deep-sea mining faces uncertainties regarding its potentially catastrophic environmental impacts and ambiguous legal framework (Cassotta & Goodsite, 2024). In particular, there is uncertainty concerning the intersection of governance over the Area (i.e. the seabed beyond the national continental shelf), within which a significant amount of deep-sea mining would take place, and the new Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (United Nations, 2023). This uncertainty exists given the intersection of governance over waters beyond national jurisdiction through the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement (United Nations, 2023, Articles 2-3), and the governance over the Area by the International Seabed Authority (United Nations, 1982, Article 137). While the above environmental, legal, and ethical concerns persist with respect to deep sea mining, the race for critical and valuable minerals globally, and in particular in the Arctic, is already well underway. For example, in January of 2024, Norway approved deep-sea mining exploration with the intent to

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establish a commercial deep-sea mining industry throughout the Norwegian continental shelf – the first declaration of its kind in the Arctic region (Gilbert, 2024).

Given that the Arctic is one of the fastest-changing regions globally (Rantanen et al., 2022), the decisions made today with regard to these critical and uniquely Arctic issues will have a greater impact on the Peoples of the Arctic, not only in the present but also in the future. In this context, young generations today, as well as future generations of tomorrow, will have a shorter time than generations of the past to influence their own lives and well-being through high-level political, legal, and business decision-making. In order to address this urgent reality, it is now vital to integrate young people from the Arctic into knowledge co-production and executive, high-level decision-making processes, ensuring their perspectives are central to the region’s governance.

Our Emerging Leaders cohort included individuals selected from diverse fields such as resource management industries, Arctic business, subsistence and industrial fishing, governance, emergency response, scientific research, and law. During the Emerging Leaders Programme, before joining the Arctic Frontiers Conference, we engaged in productive debates on current Arctic issues, such as urban development and governance of deep-sea resources. Building on the progress from Emerging Leaders, at the 2024 EU Arctic Forum Arctic Youth Dialogues event (European Commission, 2024), young people from across the Arctic proposed policy initiatives for youthinclusive planning, economic incentives for nature protection and conservation, management of Arctic oceans, and climate adaptation in the Arctic. These contributions underscore that every critical Arctic issue today has the potential for youth-driven innovative solutions. Every Arctic issue, therefore, is also a critical youth issue that demands their active participation.

Youth involvement in Arctic decision-making In response to the growing interest in the Arctic (Heininen, 2012; Steinveg, 2021), numerous conferences such as the Arctic Encounter Symposium, Arctic Frontiers, Arctic Spirit, Arctic Congress, and the Arctic Circle Assembly have been established. These gatherings often emphasise emerging economic opportunities in the Arctic due to climate change, including the potential for increased extraction of critical minerals and oil and gas, as well as the opening of new maritime traffic routes (Stouwe, 2017). At the same time, various risks and threats related to climate change, geopolitics and outmigration associated with the Arctic region are also discussed.

However, in our experience, these conferences often shy away from addressing the fundamental causes of climate change, such as carbon emissions and environmental destruction tied to historical colonialism and imperialism (Mercer & Simpson, 2023; Greenpeace & Runnymede Trust, 2022).

Furthermore, these discussions tend to omit critical examinations of the interplays between capitalism and sustainability transitions (Clark et al., 2022; Feola, 2020). Yet, there are smaller workshops and conferences that consider these issues. For instance, the Annual Meeting of the Native American & Indigenous Studies Association (NAISA) includes discussions on the protection of land rights, cultural identity, and the sustainability of Indigenous cultural landscapes as well as the role of Indigenous humanities in challenging colonial narratives (NAISA, 2024).

Another recent example is the “Patterns of Environment-making” workshop held in July 2024 at UiT - The Arctic University of Tromsø, which explored the historical contributions of dominant society to the climate crisis and highlighted Indigenous responses and resistances to Western colonialism and capitalist systems, emphasising the importance of including Indigenous

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perspectives in environmental debates and policy-making (University of Tromsø, 2024).

Nevertheless, such events usually exist outside of the big political conferences and attract less public attention. This avoidance, likely aimed at evading controversy or tensions among nationstates and diverse political views, presents significant challenges. By sidestepping critical issues, the important impact these changes have on current youth and future generations is overlooked. The legacies of historic injustices are not consigned to the past, but are alive in the present, and shape our futures (Mercer, 2022).

Notably, there are existing initiatives aimed at facilitating youth inclusion. Programs like Arctic Frontiers Emerging Leaders and High North Dialogue Academy foster networks that facilitate future collaborations between motivated young people, while providing opportunities for mutual meaningful engagement and advancement. Other initiatives, events, and networks seek to engage Arctic Indigenous youth such as the Permanent Participants Youth Network of the Arctic Council and the Arctic Leaders’ Youth Summit. More recent events include the 2023 launch of the EU project Youth Together for Arctic Futures and Tromsø’s upcoming status as the first Arctic city to hold European Youth Capital status in 2026 (Edvardsen and Martinussen, 2023). Even though these efforts are crucial in ensuring that the voices of Arctic youth are heard and considered in the formulation of policies that will inevitably affect their lives and the sustainability of their environment, youth engagement often falls into tokenism - a symbolic inclusion which lacks meaningful participation in the decision-making process. For instance, while youth participation is ostensibly one of the central components of the Arctic Frontiers conference (Steinveg, 2023), programmes like Emerging Leaders and the Student Forum unfortunately remain marginally integrated into the main conference proceedings. Notably, during the 2024 Big Picture sessions the most significant panel discussions which featured representatives from the Norwegian government and other authorities - youth participation was limited to pre-recorded videos, without providing a forum for active involvement with these representatives. This level of participation can be considered as mere formality rather than meaningful engagement of young people, exemplifying what we refer to as youthwashing.

Young people’s awareness and action against tokenistic youth engagement initiatives long predate the term youthwashing; but it nonetheless serves as a useful shorthand for the issues explored in this paper. The term ‘youthwashing’ was likely coined by Eilidh Robb (2019) through blog posts and tweets for the United Kingdom Youth Climate Coalition (UKYCC). Initially associated with fossil fuel companies using young people to improve their public image by suggesting alignment with youth-led climate justice movements (Robb, 2019; Youthwashing, 2019), it has since evolved to describe any tokenistic youth involvement in climate industry and policy spaces. The antiyouthwashing movement, led by young activists and leaders frustrated with their treatment in the climate industry and policy spaces, is an international one, with youth activists from across the globe and Indigenous youth activists at its centre (see, for instance, Youth4Climate, 2021; Indigenous Climate Action, 2020).

Since 2021, discussions of youthwashing have greatly proliferated, especially regarding tokenistic youth involvement in Congress of Parties spaces (Frost, 2021). In these fora, the faces of youth are often used as symbols of progressivity and diversity; whereas in reality, the contributions and priorities of youth are often sidelined. Within the Arctic Council, for instance, only the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group has an explicit youth involvement policy

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(CAFF, 2021). Yet, young people in the Arctic are as affected as any age group by issues of other Working Groups, such as Arctic contaminants and pollutants, and emergency preparedness and response. Arguably, given the expected intensification of climate change impacts, and rising shipping activities, broader extractive industry operations, and more external presence in the Arctic that will follow, youth are likely to be more deeply affected by these intersecting issues throughout their lives than older generations. In this context, tokenistic involvement can to a greater extent harm the well-being and mental health of young activists and leaders (Young, 2021).

At the same time, young people in the Arctic are uniquely positioned to offer innovative solutions for sustainable development and resource management. As Naja-Theresia Høegh, EU Special Advisor on Youth to European Commissioner Urpilainen, states: ‘Youth are key stakeholders in forming policies concerning the Arctic region, including climate change, Indigenous and local communities, research, security, sustainability, and much more.’

(European Commission, 2024) Building on these discussions, progress has been made in addressing youthwashing and moving towards non-tokenistic youth involvement in Arctic policy, planning, and research spaces. In the academic field, Northern Research Forum (2000-2015) and Calotte Academy (1991-ongoing) are good examples of scientific fora facilitating interdisciplinary dialogue between early-career researchers and senior experts (Heininen, 2023; Calotte Academy, n.d.). Importantly, youth inclusion in these spaces is not meant to displace other voices, but to enhance decision-making by incorporating a broader range of perspectives, including those of younger generations. In the political sphere, organisations and programmes such as the Arctic Youth Network (AYN) and the Barents Regional Youth Council (BRYC) exist to foster youth leadership, engage them in northern politics, and facilitate collaboration across borders and cultures (Arctic Youth Network, n.d.). A youth-led and youth-focused organisation, AYN provides space for young people from across the Arctic to network, learn, and develop as leaders, and to engage directly with Arctic organisations to give young people a seat at the table. Through the AYN, youth voices have been amplified in organisations such as the University of the Arctic (UArctic), the Arctic Circle Assembly, and the Arctic Council Sustainable Development Working Group (AYN, n.d.). At the 2024 EU Arctic Forum and Indigenous Peoples’ Dialogue, groundbreaking youth panels organised by young Arctic leaders tackled issues related to youth participation in Arctic spaces and youthwashing head-on (European Commission, 2024). Many youth-centred initiatives provide financial support to cover participation costs, ensuring that individuals from diverse economic backgrounds have the opportunity to be included and benefit from these programs.

Nevertheless, youthwashing and tokenistic youth involvement remain salient issues in Arctic industry, policy, and research. Youth are increasingly organising to create their own networks, collaborate internationally, and ensure their voices are present. However, how effectively their voices are heard remains an issue. While young leaders should be acknowledged for their determination in self-organising, the issue of youthwashing remains a significant concern in Arctic youth spaces and must be addressed through both critical reflection and meaningful action. There is a compelling need to confront these issues head-on, challenging the polite expressions of uniformity that have perpetuated ongoing problems with a lack of inclusivity. By doing so, today’s

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young leaders aim to surpass past efforts and address the pressing issues that threaten the futures of all inhabitants, human and non-human, in the Arctic.

Politics of the future In decision-making, both the past and future are influential since individuals as well as collective actors participate, and ‘anticipate’ the future when deciding how to act in the present (Beckert 2016, Vervoort & Gupta 2018, Nanni et al., 2024). The future serves as a guiding beacon for action, and images of the future provide both direction and shape to societies and policies (Oomen et al., 2022). It is, therefore, important to keep in mind the ‘politics of the future’; specifically, ‘those social processes and practices that allow particular “imagined futures” to become socially performative’ (Oomen et al., 2022).

Future imaginaries In exploring the politics of the future, it is essential to understand the concept of future imaginaries.

Future imaginaries can be defined as ‘collectively held, institutionally stabilised, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures’ (Jasanoff, 2015: 2). These imaginaries are not merely speculative; they are narratives that hold statements about expected or desired futures and possess a guiding nature. They direct actions in the present towards the expected or desired future (Oomen et al., 2022). Imaginaries extend beyond what exists or what is envisioned to exist; they form the cornerstone of framing the point on the horizon we strive to reach, driven by beliefs, emotions, and knowledge. If, for instance, these imaginaries depict the Arctic as a remote wilderness, it is this perception that will shape policies governing human conduct in the Arctic, regardless of the region’s actual circumstances (Ahlness, 2019). The importance of future imaginaries in decisionmaking highlights the need for active involvement from all social groups, including youth, to create inclusive imaginaries of the future that resonate with the entire population. Meaningful change is hindered without these inclusive imaginaries (Oomen et al., 2022).

Superficial involvement of youth in Arctic decision-making restricts their ability to influence the development of future imaginaries, reflecting the unequally distributed agency among people to shape and alter these imaginaries, and ultimately significantly impact outcomes (Oomen et al., 2022). The formulation of imaginaries for desirable futures must actively involve those who will inhabit these envisioned futures. Therefore, youth participation in present discussions must go beyond mere token gestures and youthwashing to safeguard the rights of current and future generations. The imaginaries we hold for the future directly influence the rights and well-being of those who will live in it. The narratives we craft and the policies we enact based on these future imaginaries not only shape our current actions but also determine the legacy we leave behind.

Ensuring that youth and other marginalised groups have a meaningful role in shaping these imaginaries is crucial, as their perspectives and interests are vital for creating equitable and sustainable futures. By actively involving diverse voices in the formulation of future imaginaries, we pave the way for policies that respect and protect the rights of those who will inherit the consequences of our decisions, particularly in the rapidly changing Arctic region.

The rights of future generations The question of what rights, if any, are owed, and by whom, to future generations is a topical subject in domestic and international legal circles. There are various lenses through which we can

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view the rights of future generations intersecting with the decisions we make today about the Arctic through international actors such as states, corporations, civil society, and international government organisations.

Climate change is one of the primary concerns for the Arctic and intergenerational rights. The changes in the Arctic caused by climate change are, arguably for the first time, evident in a single generational time frame, if not shorter. The changes are complex, bringing both positive and negative impacts. Positively, climate change in the Arctic brings new economic opportunities, such as through new shipping routes, regional trade, and resource development (Stouwe 2017, 195; Dabiran-Zohoory, 2024). However, these opportunities are not inherently beneficial; without careful governance and the involvement of Indigenous Arctic communities, they could exacerbate existing issues. Improperly managed, they risk significant harm to human health and livelihoods (Dabiran-Zohoory, 2018). Ultimately, due to the global and systemic nature of Arctic climate feedbacks, the resulting costs may offset and potentially exceed the (economic) benefits in the long run (Alvarez et al., 2020).

Intergenerational rights refer to the concept that the present generation is obligated toward future generations in ensuring their needs and interests are protected. These rights are grounded in the idea that the actions and decisions made today can significantly and detrimentally affect the opportunities and quality of life of those in the future. This involves, for example, ensuring a safe living environment for future generations, but also mitigating climate change impacts and promoting adaptation strategies (Hiskes, 2017). Contrary to intergenerational welfare, intergenerational rights explore the obligations of present generations to future generations as a legal obligation.

Currently, there are several court cases around the world, both domestic and international, exploring the rights of future generations, as well as state obligations concerning climate change.

Some examples include Mathur v. His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, Environnement Jeunesse (Canada), L’Affaire du Siècle (France), Demanda Generaciones Futuras (Colombia), The People’s Climate Case (EU), Pandey (India), Do-Hyun Kim et al (Korea), and Union of Swiss Senior Women for Climate Protection (Switzerland) (Neumann, 2022, 28), among others. Further, the very first international treaty decision by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea explored the link between climate change obligations of states and UNCLOS, which found that greenhouse gas pollution is a form of marine pollution (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 2024, para 173). There are other international climate change cases making their way through international courts and tribunals currently, including a notable request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligations of States with respect to climate change (United Nations General Assembly, 2023).

These examples are only some of the many cases around the world which demand stronger climate protection policies, public and private liability for environmental damages, and a more proactive political approach to climate change and sustainability. A key component of a number of these cases is the question of state obligations with respect to younger and future generations (Mathur v.

His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, 2023; United Nations General Assembly, 2023). What is common and true with respect to these cases is that international and domestic courts are increasingly becoming aware of the existence of potential procedural and substantive rights of

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future generations, owed by States, in the context of climate change (Mathur v. His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, 2023; United Nations General Assembly, 2023).

Arctic peoples and states hold a significant legal and political opportunity in clarifying what obligations and rights states hold with respect to future generations in the context of climate change due to the unique confluence of scientific, jurisdictional, and rapid environmental change experienced by Arctic peoples. Even though future generations do not yet exist, Arctic states are reliant on their presence to continue their assertions of sovereignty in the Arctic. Claims of territory in more remote areas of the Arctic are dependent on historical use and custom (Dabiran-Zohoory, 2024). Therefore, Arctic states have a strong legal and geopolitical interest in maintaining a true link between historical practices and future practices in the Arctic by fostering the voices of both younger and future generations in senior-level decision-making. The interests of the sovereign territory of Arctic states are dependent on taking on this active role, ahead of the incoming decisions by international and domestic courts on the specific content of the rights of future generations.

In conclusion, the politics of the future is crucial for shaping commercial, social, environmental, and legal landscapes today, particularly in the Arctic. Future imaginaries influence present-day policies and actions, underscoring the need for inclusive and representative involvement when drafting these imaginaries from all social groups, especially the youth. By empowering young people and marginalised groups to meaningfully contribute to the shaping of these imaginaries, we not only create more equitable and sustainable futures but also uphold our ethical responsibilities to those who will inherit the outcomes of today’s decisions. Especially in the Arctic, the urgency of intergenerational justice is most profound. As we move forward, it is imperative that our policies and actions reflect a commitment to these principles, beyond the minimum legal obligations, ensuring that the voices of all generations are heard and respected in the crafting of our shared future.

Figure 2. Working together for our futures. Credits: Alexandru Mitu, all rights reserved.

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Youth leadership and aspiring for livable futures Youth leadership is crucial for advocating for the rights of future generations and steering the Arctic towards sustainable and inclusive futures. As Emerging Leaders 2024 of Arctic Frontiers, representing diverse disciplines and regions, we recognise the unique contributions of Arctic youth leadership in shaping livable futures and have identified shared characteristics of Arctic youth leadership.

In the dynamic context of Arctic research and operations, the perspectives of young leaders reveal both commonalities and contextual peculiarities that shape their influence in their respective fields.

Across disciplines, there is a shared recognition among Emerging Leaders of the vital contributions younger professionals can make, particularly in leveraging digital tools for grassroots advocacy and challenging traditional paradigms with innovative solutions. This is particularly evident in climate change adaptation and academia, where youth employ new methods, such as ‘ClimateCafés,’ to foster interdisciplinary knowledge exchange and develop context-specific solutions (Boogaard & De Jong, 2020). From an Arctic Indigenous perspective, young Indigenous leaders significantly highlight the inequities faced by Arctic Indigenous Peoples, emphasising the importance of equitable climate change discourse.

Despite these strengths, young leaders face contextual challenges unique to their fields. In Arctic maritime operations, for example, they must manage teams with older, more experienced members, requiring adaptability and strategic thinking. In climate research, the gap between grassroots advocacy and policy influence remains a barrier to meaningful engagement with established governmental structures. Furthermore, academia’s hierarchical nature also limits the impact of young experts, even as they contribute significantly to advancing research.

Calls to action: Including youth voices in Arctic decision-making The authors of this article recognise that ensuring the meaningful inclusion of youth in Arctic decision-making requires systemic change and action-oriented approaches. As Emerging Arctic Leaders, we advocate for the following actions for both young and senior leaders to ensure youth voices become integral in shaping the Arctic’s future.

Calls to action for young leaders 1. Be bold and proactive Young leaders cannot afford to become part of the system that excludes future generations and created the crisis into which we have emerged. Young leaders must not fall into patterns of exclusion but must assertively use their voices to critique, support, and question existing systems.

By being solutions-focused, young leaders can drive significant change for present and future generations.

2. Foster collaboration and community Young people should actively build partnerships with governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), businesses, and Indigenous communities. By respecting and addressing the diverse needs of different Arctic communities and co-creating knowledge, they can form enduring strategic alliances and strengthen connections across sectors. Building strategic partnerships with diverse stakeholders can amplify youth voices beyond dedicated youth spaces. These

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collaborations will strengthen connections among youth leaders in industry, academia, and communities, fostering joint solutions and reducing conflicts. By promoting and championing radical collaboration, young people can reshape today’s competitive world into one of inclusivity and cooperation.

3. Seek and provide mentorship Young leaders should actively seek mentorship from current leaders, while also making commitments to mentor their peers and future generations. This dual role bridges gaps between senior and younger generations, enhancing the impact of youth in Arctic affairs.

4. Embrace leadership opportunities When leadership or mentoring roles arise, young leaders should seize these opportunities, even if they seem daunting. By doing so, they can challenge the tokenistic involvement of youth and pave the way for genuine systemic change. Indeed, the tokenistic involvement of young voices mainly rests on the idea that young people cannot make any significant contributions. Only by not believing in the false ideas underlying the systemic exclusion of young voices can young leaders make systemic change, and eliminate youthwashing in the Arctic both today and for future generations.

5. Commit to lifelong learning With these leadership roles comes more responsibility. Young leaders of today have to take responsibility for the actions which influence the Arctic’s rapid development both today, and in the coming decades. Continual education and integration of diverse knowledge are therefore crucial. Doing so will guide young leaders into making informed decisions for current young generations, as well as future generations, facing issues within and beyond the Arctic.

Calls to action for current senior Arctic leaders 1. Promote Diversity and Inclusion The Arctic is a diverse place, and those working on Arctic issues are even more diverse. Senior leaders must integrate youth voices into their structures by actively considering a diversity of factors like age, culture, gender, and socioeconomic background. This work will facilitate the change needed to reflect the perspectives and experiences of all youth continuously. There must be a focus on creating inclusive spaces where youth with dissenting opinions and different kinds of experiences can effectively engage with senior generations and their own diverse leaders. In turn, current young generations and future generations of the Arctic will be influentially engaged.

2. Redefine qualifications Senior leaders must tailor application processes further towards youth, and effectively target youth who are affected by Arctic affairs but not already engaged in decision-making processes.

Traditional metrics like “years of experience” should not dominate the selection processes.

3. Recognise youth as fellow leaders Recognise the unique perspectives and skills of youth, allowing them to express opinions independently and participate as co-leaders in decision-making processes. Youth should be allowed to express opinions independently and have decision-making power, with senior leaders regarding Dabiran-Zohoory et al.

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them not just as individuals offering suggestions, but as co-leaders in the decision-making process.

Youth must not only work on projects decided by non-youth; youth priorities must help guide decision-making on matters impacting the future of the Arctic.

4. Support Indigenous youth The Arctic is the homeland of many Indigenous Peoples. Without recognising the importance of Indigenous youth in decision-making, Arctic youth engagement is rendered meaningless. Senior leaders must prioritise the inclusion of Indigenous youth in decision-making, supporting initiatives that preserve and develop Indigenous languages, Traditional Knowledge, and cultural practices.

Tailored resources are essential for fostering leadership in Indigenous and Arctic communities while bearing in mind that the resources needed may look different in every community.

5. Provide resources and opportunities Young leaders struggle with insecure employment and financial barriers to participation. Ensure youth have access to financial resources, mentorship, and participation opportunities. Recognise that significant decisions often happen outside formal settings tied to financial status and family heritage and facilitate youth inclusion in these influential spaces. It is therefore not sufficient to only start a programme for youth inclusion; there also must be financial resources, opportunities, and skilled mentors to facilitate this work. Where there is funding already available for Arctic projects, it is imperative to include in the funding conditions that recipients must have a youth element to their project to ensure current funding is funnelled towards supporting the generations of today and tomorrow.

6. Invest in education and networks Young leaders are the leaders of today, not only the leaders of tomorrow. This does not negate the importance of mentorship, learning, and upskilling to young leaders. Establish mentorship networks and learning opportunities that cater to youth from diverse backgrounds. Approaches like peer-to-peer mentorship, experiential learning, and critical discussions are vital for preparing youth for leadership roles. In a youth context, ‘learning’, ‘experiencing’, ‘doing’, and ‘making change’ may all happen simultaneously at a time of rapid change.

7. Integrate youth beyond youth-centric fora The Arctic Frontiers Emerging Leaders who contributed to this paper agree on the importance of youth-centric fora. Dedicated spaces for young people allow them to network, take on leadership roles, and develop their voices in a supportive environment. However, while youth-centric spaces are valuable, youth should not be solely confined to them. Meaningful integration throughout a broader decision-making network is essential. Youth priorities must help guide decision-making on matters impacting the future of the Arctic. Including youth in non-traditional spaces, such as main stages at the conferences, policy roundtables, and high-level advisory boards fosters intergenerational dialogue and collaboration. The broader inclusion will help to fight tokenism and youthwashing and ensure that young people have a substantial role in shaping decisions that impact their futures.

In conclusion, these calls to action aim to transform youth participation from symbolic gestures to substantial contributions to inclusive Arctic governance. By embedding youth voices across decision-making processes, we can create a resilient and equitable Arctic future that respects and Co-creating Arctic Futures

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incorporates the perspectives of all generations. It is often stated today that the future of the Arctic now rests on the shoulders of young people, or, as Carabelly and Lyon (2016) stated, “young people are positioned in linear intergenerational relationships as the bearers of the future hopes”.

Integrating the diversity of youth in senior decision-making by providing secure resources, acting on the different needs of different communities, and facilitating peer-to-peer and intergenerational dialogue ensures that decisions impacting the Arctic are influenced by the youth who will be most influenced by those decisions. It is of utmost importance that, when these initiatives begin, they have the goal of supporting the inclusion of the youth from the Arctic and facilitating genuine youth involvement in decision-making processes. These initiatives cannot be just another tool to showcase young people’s participation; youth’s contributions must meaningfully impact the decisions made.

Conclusion The Arctic faces urgent and complex challenges that require governance that is both inclusive and forward-thinking. In this context, the active participation of young and local leaders is not just an ethical imperative, but a practical necessity. Young people, facing both environmental and economic challenges, are advocating for policies that promote intergenerational fairness—policies that do not sacrifice long-term climate resilience for short-term economic gains. Integrating youth perspectives into decision-making processes ensures that policies are equitable, sustainable, just, and attuned to the rapidly changing environmental and socio-political landscape of the Arctic.

Despite the growing recognition of youth involvement in areas such as climate activism, youth participation often remains superficial. Too often, young people are used as tokens rather than being empowered as genuine stakeholders. This tokenistic involvement — whether confined to activist roles or restricted to specific issues — undermines their potential contributions across the spectrum of Arctic governance. The transformative power of youth leadership lies in their ability to challenge classical approaches, leverage digital tools for advocacy, and foster intergenerational dialogue. Their contributions are particularly crucial in addressing climate change and other pressing Arctic issues where innovative and urgent solutions are required. Youth involvement in decision-making is essential for crafting future imaginaries that are inclusive and reflective of their aspirations. However, systemic barriers, including hierarchical structures and limited access to resources, often diminish their impact.

To move forward effectively, we must create inclusive spaces where diverse youth and Indigenous perspectives can meaningfully influence decisions at all levels. This involves providing secure resources, development opportunities, and ensuring that youth are integrated into broader networks rather than relegated to token roles. Initiatives such as mentorship, tailored education, and capacity-building are critical for enabling young leaders to participate effectively and exert real influence. Addressing these challenges and enhancing the role of youth leadership is vital for ensuring that the perspectives and needs of future generations are integral to decision-making in the Arctic. The future of the Arctic depends on the meaningful inclusion of young and diverse voices in its governance. Young people play a crucial role in steering the Arctic towards a sustainable and equitable future. Empowering youth today is crucial for fostering resilient and just societies, ensuring the Arctic remains a liveable and thriving region for generations to come. This commitment to intergenerational justice recognises that young leaders are not merely the future; they are essential actors and leaders in shaping the present.

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Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank fellow Emerging Arctic Leaders Edson Silva, Alex Hamel, Bogdan Løw-Hansen, Oda Sofie Bye Wilhelmsen, Kristian Liland, Ingrid Rekkavik, , for contributing with their perspectives of leadership in the Arctic.

The authors also wish to acknowledge all the organisers, lecturers, and participants of the Emerging Leaders 2024 program, as well as institutions that funded the participation of the authors in the Emerging Leaders programme: Ugo Nanni, Shannon E. Moore, and Polina Smirnova - the Research Council of Norway; Anastasiya Henk - Nord University Business School; Pouya Dabiran-Zohoory and Sophie Roher - Global Arctic Leadership Initiative by Global Affairs Canada Scholarship; Leah Palmer - The Embassy of Ireland, Norway, and the Irish Marine Institute; Sterre Koops - Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Willem Barentsz Foundation; Conor Savage - Early Career Ocean Professionals Programme, and the UK Polar Network.

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Briefing Note

Western Hudson Bay Belugas: the junction between humans, nature and law Monim Benaissa

Over time, belugas have been an important part of the identity and daily life of Arctic Indigenous peoples. In the ChurchillHudson Bay region, these mammals are not only a source of food, but also a component of the local economy, attracting hundreds of tourists and scientific observers each year. Unfortunately, these belugas are facing not only the effects of climate change, but also human disturbance and noise pollution, factors that negatively affect their natural habitat and population growth. This article argues that in addition to maintaining traditional Inuit values, protecting marine mammals and maintaining a sustainable tourist attraction in Hudson Bay requires the involvement of local stakeholders as well as policy makers in implementing the provisions of international and national environmental law.

Introduction The latest news from the world of marine mammals indicates that Hvaldimir, a young male whale beluga, was found dead on the Norwegian coast on Saturday August 30, 2024. This marine mammal is reputed to be used by Russia for espionage purposes (Olsen, 2023). It should be remembered that during the Cold War, the CIA, US Navy, Soviet KGB and now the Russian Navy often trained marine mammals for military espionage (Colin, 2015: 11-21). They used sea lions, dolphins, sharks, but also belugas (Roth, 2009. Hvaldimir arrived from Russian Arctic waters and was first seen in Norwegian Arctic waters in April 2019. Norwegian marine biologists noted that he had been a trained whale accustomed to interacting with humans. Hvaldimir served as a therapy whale in Russia (Associated Press, Sunday 01 September 2024). So, since his arrival on Norwegian shores, he has attracted the curiosity of thousands of visitors in what can best be described as an unregulated tourist attraction. The human presence has put it in a dangerous situation.

Whales are divided into two main groups: baleen whales (Mysticeti) and toothed whales (Odontoceti)(Breton-Honeyman, 2021). Baleen whales are called so because their mouths contain baleen plates made of keratin that filter plankton from the water. This type of whale is distinguished by having two blowholes on top of its head, while toothed whales have teeth instead of plates, feed

Monim Benaissa, Ph.D., is a part-time Law Professor at University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law.

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on fish and squid, and are distinguished by their ability to identify their surroundings using biosonar (echolocation) (Gruen, 2014: 22-33).

One of the most famous species of toothed whales are the beluga whales (Delphinapterus leucas). The length of the beluga whale ranges between 3.96 and 4.88 m, and its weight reaches 1590.91 kg (Bors 2021: 1263-73). Those mammals are among the most vocal whales in the world. Scientifically known as Delphinapterus leucas, it is also called the sea canary because of the distinctive sounds it makes. These sounds are used as echolocation to communicate with other whales and are similar to whistles, screams, or short intermittent sounds (Worden et al., 2020: 229-46).

In Canada, each summer in the second half of July and first half of August, thousands of beluga whales return to the Churchill River estuary on Western Hudson Bay, attracting tourists and scientists from around the World. But long before these captivating creatures became a global draw, the Indigenous communities in the Arctic circle and around Churchill had a deep, centuries-old interconnection with the belugas (churchillscience.ca/about/the-churchill-area/beluga-whales/).

In this context, what are the international and national legal provisions that make it possible to protect these marine mammals both against disturbance of human origin and against global warming and marine pollution?

Social ties between Canadian Inuit and Belugas The connection between the Indigenous communities and the belugas of this region goes back several centuries, where these marine mammals having cultural and spiritual significance (Teichroeh, 2024). Belugas have always been a source of food for the Inuit. The whale oil obtained from the blubber is used for heating, lighting and preserving food. The skin is also transformed into sled dog food, and the meat into muktuk, a traditional Inuit food source (O’Crry Crowe, 2018: 1-32). The beluga is also a popular symbol of Inuit communities' attachment to the Arctic region, and the assertion of hunting rights, a practice that has continued for centuries if not since immemorial time (NAMMCO, 2018). For these communities, beluga hunting is an important part of their Arctic Inuit identity. Despite the development of hunting and fishing techniques in the rest of the world, the Inuit of Canada continue to hunt belugas using traditional, sustainable and humane methods (Tyrell, 2008: 322-32).

In recent decades, ecotourism has attracted an increasing number of tourists to Churchill to observe the belugas. This tourist activity has had an impact on the local economy, but also effects on marine biodiversity. For example, the noise pollution produced by the use of motorized vehicles disturbs the communication between these marine mammals (Halliday, 2020: 438-48).

It has become essential to think about a vision for the future, particularly by ensuring that belugas continue to live in Hudson Bay without being threatened by human presence, tourist activities, and marine pollution. Moreover, initiatives have taken place in this direction, such as a new project sponsored by Oceans North which is working to preserve this invaluable knowledge (Teichroeh, 2024). According to Ocean North, this project brings together stories and perspectives from Churchill’s Inuit, Dene, Cree and Métis residents, reflecting their long-standing relationship with the belugas. This collective knowledge will be used to contemplate the past and a guide to managing the future, in a context marked by global warming and increasing human activities that continue to impact marine biodiversity (Honeyman, 2021: 1-13).

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Although the hunting and fishing practices of Aboriginal peoples vary from one Arctic country to another, and have changed over time, the fundamental principles of protecting marine mammals and sharing the harvest have remained constant (Vongraven, 2017: 149-73). Clearly, beluga whale hunting is a tradition in many of Canadian Arctic regions that share a similar history of discreet beluga hunting by groups in kayaks, without the use of shotguns (Michaud, 2007). These are Nunatsiavut, Nunavik, Nunavut and Inuvialuit (Luijk, 2022: 3-15).

The impact of human activities on Belugas and other marine mammals Marine mammals can be categorically affected by human activities. These include the degradation and disturbance of their habitats, and the reduction of food resources. For example, heavy fishing pressure sometimes means that the biological resting period of fish is not respected, which can be detrimental to the diet of marine mammals. In addition, the use and abandonment of non-selective fishing gear and accidental catches are dangers for these marine mammals (Nama & Prusty, 2021: 34-36).

Noise pollution is also an issue for all fish species, from small invertebrates to large marine mammals. This man-made noise interferes with fish species and marine mammals, disrupting their communication and changing their migration paths. Marine mammals use sound waves to move, avoid shock, recognize each other and create social cohesion, as well as to locate and identify prey (Erbe et al., 2019: 277-309).

This is not physical pollution (industrial waste, plastics, petrochemicals), but underwater noise. It is caused by a combination of sources known as anthropogenic noise, due to the increase in maritime traffic, the development of the merchant navy, the organization of military activities, and the multiplication of tourist expeditions. Other sources include seismic and hydrographic surveys, hydrocarbon and mineral extraction, dredging, and the construction of oil, gas and port platforms.

Anthropogenic noise can have indirect effects by interfering with the sounds emitted by marine mammals, reducing their ability to perceive their environment, locate prey, communicate, or detect conspecifics. Over the past two decades, marine noise pollution has become increasingly prevalent in Arctic waters, constituting a major environmental issue of concern to environmentalists. This problem has become one of the main subjects of international oceanographic research for the protection of marine mammals (Merchant et al 2014, at 85-95).

There is no doubt that human activities are the main source of marine noise pollution in the seas and oceans, exposing marine species and marine mammals to harmful consequences. These include merchant shipping, the navy, submarine sonar whose emissions are spread throughout the high seas frequented by large marine mammals, the construction of platforms for oil and gas exploration in increasingly deep waters, sonar used during fishing operations mainly inshore and in the EEZ, and the use of acoustic sounds to scare off marine mammals during fishing. Finally, we can add to this list the installation of wind farms at sea, which emit sounds that are as unbearable for marine mammals as they are for humans (Barfuss, 2021: 2-12).

Legal provisions relating to the protection of marine mammals The protection of marine biodiversity is covered by several international and regional legal instruments. This reflects the interconnection between environmental law and the law of the sea.

In return, the international community has become increasingly aware of the need for a more

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effective legal arsenal to protect marine mammals. Among the most important legal instruments are the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity; the United Nations Environment Programme's Global Plan of Action for the Conservation; Management and Utilization of Marine Mammals, adopted in 1984; the Barcelona Convention and its Protocol on Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity; The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals; the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, commonly known as the Bern Convention; the Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea; Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS); and the initiatives of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (Selheim, 2020: 21-124).

The aim of these conventions is the conservation of migratory species belonging to the wild fauna, due to the fact that cetaceans are an integral part of the marine ecosystem which must be conserved for the benefit of present and future generations; the integration between conservation actions for cetaceans and activities relating to the socio-economic development of the parties concerned by these agreements, takes place with respect for marine activities such as fishing and the free movement of ships in accordance with the provisions of the law of the sea (UNCLOS). These international legal instruments foresee the need to promote and facilitate collaboration between States, regional economic integration organizations, intergovernmental organizations and the nongovernmental sector for the protection of cetaceans.

Additionally, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, adopted in 1946, established the International Whaling Commission (IWC) to regulate whaling. Today, this organization has 89 member states. Although the IWC's historic role was to regulate whaling, it is now concerned with other threats to cetaceans, such as noise pollution. The IWC also plays a major role in scientific research, setting up working groups and drafting recommendations on conservation issues. The IWC currently manages 13 major cetacean species. That said, the IWC is also active in the protection of smaller cetaceans such as dolphins and belugas (Wold, 2024: 271333).

At the national level, the protection of marine mammals such as orcas (killer whales), whales, walruses, seals and belugas fall under Canadian federal jurisdiction. Federal institutions specializing in the protection of the marine environment, notably Fisheries and Oceans Canada and Parks Canada, oversee the implementation of the Species at Risk Act (Species at Risk Act (S.C. 2002, c. 29), and the Marine Mammal Regulations (SOR/93-56). Thus, under the Marine Mammal Regulations (SOR/93-56, it is forbidden to disturb a marine mammal) (Marine Mammal Regulations (SOR/93-56).

That said, an agreement has been signed between the federal minister and those of the provinces and territories responsible for wildlife species to implement a national approach to the protection of species at risk. The aim is to ensure that animal species are protected from human activities (Accord for the Protection of Species at Risk (1996)).

In regard to the fight against noise pollution, international commitments have been multiplied at scientific, political and legislative levels, and associated directives have been drawn up in several countries, notably the United States and Europe, in order to tackle this environmental challenge (US Government, 2008). The efforts currently being made by all concerned are aimed at eliminating the risk of injury resulting from exposure of marine mammals to intensive man-made noise.

Although these risk-reduction measures have not achieved their objectives, awareness among public and private players remains significant.

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The Canadian government is still working on strategies to reduce noise in the oceans, including the Department of Defense. It should be noted that military maneuvers by the Canadian armed forces in maritime waters affect marine mammals, which are protected under the Species at Risk Act (SARA) (Species at Risk Act (S.C. 2002, c. 29). Among the immediate actions taken, the Ministry of Defense temporarily suspended military exercises in 2019 in a 330-kilometer zone in the Strait of Juan de Fuca (British Columbia). This area is known for its killer whale populations (Cox, 2024: 27).

In addition, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans remains the competent authority under the Species at Risk Act (S.C. 2002, c. 29) for the St. Lawrence Estuary population of the belugas, the Northwest Atlantic population of the blue whale, the Atlantic population of the fin whale, and the North Atlantic right whale. This department also adopted an Action Plan, in accordance with section 47 of SARA, to address a common threat identified in the recovery strategies for these species. Under this Action Plan, the Minister took into account the Government of Canada's commitment to conserve biological diversity, including marine mammals, in accordance with section 38 of SARA (Species at Risk Act (S.C. 2002, c. 29). This Action Plan, in accordance with subsection 48(1) of SARA, has been prepared in cooperation with other stakeholders, including: Parks Canada, representatives of the shipping industry and marine mammal-watching excursionists.

The Action Plan aims to reduce the impact of noise on marine mammals at risk in the St. Lawrence Estuary and in the Saguenay River fjord, an area regularly visited by beluga whales during the summer season (Pêches et Océans, 2020).

Concluding Remarks In conclusion, the multiple pressures exerted by human beings on the marine environment have resulted in an ecological imbalance that is adversely affecting the survival of marine mammals, particularly belugas. As a result, these mammals require special attention. On the whole, most of the opportunities for state commitments to counteract the dangers to marine biodiversity lie in increasingly sustainable management. As mentioned above, there are already relevant legal instruments that can help achieve some of these goals, such as the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity. These legal texts deal with the conservation of marine biodiversity.

Moreover, compliance with these legal agreements by public and private players can help to achieve the objectives of sustainable exploitation of the marine environment, through the possibility of adopting an advanced conservation strategy, using various preventive actions, or implementing measures that contribute to multiplying the marine mammal population.

Finally, intra-community collaboration in the hunting, processing and use of belugas, and rapid environmental change in the Arctic region have underlined the importance of inter-regional engagement and cooperation between policymakers and Indigenous communities to maintain beluga populations and their cultural and nutritional roles in sustainable development. In short, the upholding of traditional values, the implementation of collaborative management efforts, the sustainable inclusion of Aboriginal knowledge and meaningful collaboration between hunters, researchers and managers are essential not only to the conservation of belugas, but also to the continued well-being of the communities that live with them.

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