New Zealand’s Defence and National Security Magazine
Watts: What the Australian DSR could mean for NZ naval force structure.
Ewing-Jarvie: Is there a problem with the organisational design of NZDFHQ?
Air Power: RNZAF
P-8A Poseidon fleet complete as new C-130-Js take shape.
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Kia ora and welcome to the Winter 2023 issue of Line of Defence Magazine!
There’s a little something for everyone in this 28th issue of Line of Defence. It’s a magazine of many parts, but one theme that emerges from these pages is that there’s an election coming up!
In the lead-up to this edition we contacted several political parties inviting them to articulate their defencerelated policy positions to our readers. Inside, National’s Tim van de Molen highlights that with 30% of uniformed personnel leaving over the last two years the NZDF is dangerously close to being operationally ineffective, while ACT’s Dr James McDowall argues that a 2% of GDP defence spend will serve to address soaring attrition and capability gaps in the NZDF.
The recurring theme of personnel is also explored by Dr Simon Ewing-Jarvie, who raises concerns in relation to the organisational design of NZDF Headquarters, and Ross Browne , who writes that lower than ever Defence personnel numbers will provide the Defence Policy Review with some challenging calculations.
Featured contributor Dr Wayne Mapp writes that with Pillar Two of AUKUS providing plenty of opportunities for engagement on emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and quantum computing, the AUKUS arrangement poses big questions for New Zealand’s approach to alliances and naval capability. Our role and contribution within AUKUS, he suggests, will be among the most important decisions to be made by our political leadership in the coming term of parliament.
In International Security, Associate Professor Jeremy Moses and Dr Sian Troath write that Andrew Little’s openness to considering AUKUS Pillar Two cooperation raises numerous questions over New Zealand’s position on autonomous weapons systems
Other big questions are being posed by the Australian Defence Strategic Review (DSR), writes maritime capability specialist Andrew Watts. An Australian force design oriented towards Distributed Maritime Operations is signalled in the DSR, and this has potential implications for the design of NZ’s future fleet.
In Homeland Security, I explore the twin rise of violent retail crime and retail customer-initiated violence in Aotearoa. We’re shopping more violently – and we’re shoplifting more violently – in the public squares of the 21st century, and it’s happening within a leadership vacuum.
If you haven’t already, consider subscribing to our eNewsletter THE BRIEF . And lastly, a big shout out to the seven businesses and individuals who in May were recipients of 2022 Minister of Defence Awards of Excellence for Industry.
Nicholas Dynon, Auckland.
Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Dr James McDowall MP
Tim van de Molen MP Nicholas Dynon
Dr Sian Troath General Atomics Aeronautical
CAPT Andrew Watts
Dr Simon Ewing-Jarvie
Ross Browne Fortinet
Assoc Prof Jeremy Moses
General Atomics Aeronautical
Centre for Defence and Security Studies
ASIS International New Zealand Chapter
Massey University
Security Exhibition & Conference
Fortinet
Soldier on exercise in Tekapo image courtesy NZDF.
SPRING – September 2023
Main themes: Space; Information Domain
Related events: New Zealand Aerospace Summit 2023
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Andrew Little’s openness to considering pillar two cooperation under AUKUS raises numerous questions, write Associate Professor Jeremy Moses and Dr Sian Troath of the University of Canterbury.
Defence Minister Andrew Little’s recent announcement that New Zealand would be “willing to explore” participation in military technology sharing – or “pillar two” – under the AUKUS security arrangement has already divided opinion.
Proponents have argued participation will enhance New Zealand’s security and help deter China in an increasingly contested geopolitical environment. Critics have suggested it would compromise New Zealand’s antinuclear commitment, undermine diplomacy and raise the prospect of a destabilising arms race in the Pacific region.
But missing from the debate so far is any clear analysis of how participation in pillar two of AUKUS might infringe on New Zealand’s policy approach to autonomous weapons systems (AWS).
That’s because of lack of clarity about two things: what kinds of technology sharing and development would be included under pillar two, and just what New Zealand’s policy position on AWS currently is.
When AUKUS was announced, the promise to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines naturally dominated headlines. The other focus of the partnership, however, is cooperation on “advanced capabilities”.
While little detail has been released publicly, these capabilities include a range of high-tech applications: undersea robotics and autonomous systems, quantum technologies, AI and autonomy, advanced cyber technologies, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, electronic warfare, defence innovation and information sharing.
In some ways, pillar two of AUKUS is more significant than pillar one. It is certainly more imminent than the submarine delivery. It may also be “of greater long-term value and more strategically challenging”, according to analysis by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
There are a lot of uncertainties with emerging technologies, with no way to predict how they will develop
or be adopted for military purposes. They also have more wide-reaching societal and economic implications, since much of the research and development capacity sits in civilian industries and universities.
Ultimately, of course, AUKUS is about competing militarily with China. It’s the “most consequential strategic competitor” of the US and its allies and partners, according to US Assistant Secretary of Defense Mara Karlin.
Pillar two cooperation, Karlin argues, is necessary to accelerate military innovation, enhance interoperability and integrate the “defence industrial base” across partner countries in response to the threat posed by China.
Last month, it was revealed Australia, the US and the UK had held a trial of AUKUS advanced capabilities, focused on AI and autonomy. According to the UK Ministry of Defence, the event succeeded in achieving several “world firsts”, including AI-enabled assets from the three countries successfully operating as a “swarm”.
The systems were “testing target identification capabilities”, indicating the likely lethal applications of some pillar two technologies.
While some clarity is beginning to emerge on the technologies being explored under pillar two, New Zealand’s policy approach to these types of technologies has become increasingly murky.
Following advocacy by the former minister for disarmament and arms control, Phil Twyford, cabinet committed to supporting international regulations and bans on AWS in late 2021.
When Twyford announced the policy, he declared the emergence of lethal AWS would be “abhorrent and inconsistent with New Zealand’s interests and values”, and would have “significant implications for global peace and security”.
Yet the cabinet paper itself contained significant caveats. These were aimed at allowing for maintenance of interoperability with key defence partners, and ensuring the New Zealand tech sector could continue to pursue “the
responsible development and use of AI”.
Twyford’s leadership on this policy position is important given the loss of his ministerial role following Chris Hipkins’ first cabinet reshuffle as prime minister. Whether the approach outlined in the 2021 cabinet paper survives his demotion is not yet clear.
Thus far, his successor in the disarmament and arms control role, Nanaia Mahuta, has made no statements on AWS policy.
Given these developments, Andrew Little’s openness to considering pillar two cooperation under AUKUS takes on an interesting complexion and raises numerous questions.
Some have suggested the defence minister has moderated his original comments on openness to pillar two, perhaps having faced some pushback from the prime minister and foreign minister.
Most recently, Little has emphasised the uncertainty around what New Zealand could offer under pillar two. But he has maintained there was an interest in collaboration on cybersecurity, quantum computing and artificial intelligence.
The recent tests of military AI technologies by the AUKUS partners, and the associated comments on their likely military purposes, point to the likelihood of various combinations of lethal and autonomous capabilities emerging from pillar two cooperation.
Before making any commitment to engaging in this part of the AUKUS arrangement, New Zealand’s political leaders need to carefully consider if these technologies are in keeping with the “interests and values” behind Phil Twyford’s initial push toward banning or regulating AWS. This article was originally published in The Conversation on 08 June 2023.
After four years preparing to operate and maintain the new RNZAF P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, the new capability has been formally released and the fourth and final aircraft has landed at Air Force Base Ohakea.
Chief of Air Force Air ViceMarshal Andrew Clark said the new fleet’s introduction into service marks the beginning of a new era.
“New Zealand’s maritime security is central to our wider security,” said AVM Clark. “The Poseidon is the latest in a series of aircraft going back to the early days of the RNZAF that have kept watch from the air – securing our maritime resources, defending our region against military threats, building regional resilience, preventing trans-national crime, and of course
Lockheed Martin factory in the US.
carrying out search and rescue and humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions.”
“In the Poseidon fleet, we now have the modern standard in technology to perform these crucial roles. The Poseidon has the breadth of versatility and the depth of capability required for the job in today’s complex security environment,” he said.
Achieving readiness to undertake operations was the culmination of years of hard work from a wide range of people, said Wing Commander Mark Whiteside, Commanding Officer of No. 5 Squadron which will be operating the P-8A.
“Right from the start, we knew that people would be at the heart of this generational change,” said WCMR Whiteside; “every trade in our Squadron, in the air and on the ground, and others on base with us who are involved in what we do, would be needed to put us on the mark to begin operations on time,
and so it has proved to be,” he said.
“I am extremely proud of all our aviators as we begin this new era –they have worked hard, and now they will be able to see all that effort pay off as the P-8As start work.”
No. 5 Squadron has moved from RNZAF Base Auckland at Whenuapai where the Air Force’s six P-3K2 Orions were based, to Base Ohakea in Manawatū to accommodate the new aircraft. The Orions had been operated by the RNZAF since the 1960s with the last P-3K2s retired on 31 January 2023.
In 2018 the Government announced it would be purchasing the four Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (based on the commercial Boeing 737800 fuselage) from the United States Government. The first P-8A Poseidon arrived in New Zealand on 12 December 2022.
The P-8A Poseidons will be used for a range of tasks including aerial surveillance of New Zealand’s areas
of interest such as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the South Pacific and the Southern Ocean including the Ross Dependency and Antarctica. They will support a range of Government agencies, including Ministry for Primary Industries, New Zealand Customs, New Zealand Police, and the Department of Conservation.
Hercules milestone reached
A key C-130-J project milestone was celebrated in early May, as representatives from New Zealand and Lockheed Martin senior staff gathered for a bulkhead signing ceremony at the factory in Marietta, Georgia, USA.
“The C-130J-30 is a significant investment in strategic airlift capability that delivers domestically and globally,” said Sarah Minson, Deputy Secretary Capability Delivery at the Ministry of Defence. “This aircraft is likely be the first response option for missions in our
region or further afield supporting both the NZDF and other Government agencies.”
“While we are a South Pacific nation, our ability to be part of the region, requires a capability that can get people and equipment to where they need to be, often over long distances, and always at short notice. Since 1965, the C-130H has given us this capability, and it has been used extensively. The C-130J will continue that legacy of service.”
The bulkhead signing ceremony on 11 May (US time) signified the formal commencement of New Zealand’s new C-130 fleet through production. Attendees were able to tour the factory floor and see the aircraft take shape as components of the fuselage were bought together.
Five C-130-J were purchased on 05 June 2020 the for the RNZAF to replace the current C-130 Hercules. The new aircraft are on track for delivery next year, with the full fleet operating from 2025.
The C-130J-30 has more capacity than its predecessor due to its additional 5.4 metres length and a payload capacity of 21 tonnes. With a 15 tonne payload, the new aircraft will be able to travel 2,400 nautical miles, compared to the current 1800nm.
Each of the new aircraft will be fitted with a wide bandwidth, high speed satellite communications system and an electro-optical/ infra-red camera. Imagery, video and data can be streamed in realtime and the camera allows for aerial surveillance including while undertaking transport tasks –particularly useful during search and rescue, and humanitarian and disaster relief missions.
The aircraft are being procured through the United States’ Foreign Military Sales process. Along with the new fleet, the $1.5 billion project will also deliver a full mission flight simulator and other supporting infrastructure.
On 01 May seven New Zealand businesses and individuals working with the Ministry of Defence and NZDF received a Minister of Defence Award of Excellence for Industry.
At an event at Parliament, recipients received their awards from the Secretary of Defence, Andrew Bridgman, and the Chair of the New Zealand Defence Industry Advisory Council, Greg Lowe.
Minister of Defence Andrew Little, in his comments to the recipients said this year’s winners and finalists have gone above and beyond expectations.
“They have shown a spirit of partnership with Defence that builds outstanding innovation and leadership. The range of businesses and people receiving awards shows just how varied and highly skilled the defence industry is,” said Andrew Little.
The Minister of Defence Awards of Excellence to Industry were established in 1998 to highlight and reward the contribution made by industry to Defence. The Awards are administered by the New Zealand Defence Industry Advisory Council (NZDIAC) on behalf of the Minister of Defence.
This year’s award recipients included two category award winners and five special awards winners:
Category Awards:
• The provision of service to Defence as a prime contractor – Qioptiq
• The provision of a product to Defence as a Sub-contractor or small to medium sized enterprise (SME) – Inde Technology Limited
Special Awards:
• Tū Māia (Integrity) - David Goodrich OAM – Silver Spirit Partners
• Tū Tira (Comradeship) – Lionel Ng – Auckland Regional Public Health Service
• Tū Kaha (Courage) – Mike Sheedy – Gemtech Solutions Limited
• Tū Tika (Commitment) – Patrick Power – Airbus New Zealand
• Kotahitanga (Unity) – Steven Renata – Kiwa Digital Limited
Secretary of Defence, Andrew Bridgman, said many of this year’s recipients represent small to medium sized companies from across New Zealand.
“It was a pleasure to meet with Kiwi businesses boosting defence
capability with their exceptional work. I would like to congratulate them all on their achievements and thank them for their support and enduring partnership with Defence,” said Andrew Bridgman.
The goods and services acquired by Defence range from long-term maintenance and repair services to the provision of consultancy services, and everything in between. This broad set of industries and businesses is well represented by the 2022 award finalists and winners.
Prime Contractor of the Year: Qioptic Ltd
In early 2022 Qioptiq was selected to design and deliver a new thermal inline sight for the NZDF’s Modular Assault Rifle System. This award acknowledges Qioptiq’s approach to
relationship building and delivering quality outcomes.
The company invested time and resources to develop an understanding of the NZDF and how it operates, displayed professionalism and enthusiasm in building a relationship that became essential during COVID-19 travel restrictions, and goodwill and commitment to quality by continuing to refine their product to deliver the best outcomes.
Sub-Contractor or SME of the Year: Inde Technology Ltd
Inde Technology Ltd delivered a stable system for remote desktop access, which is critical for business
continuity planning and has allowed for flexible working arrangements. Inde Technology brought specialist expertise to delivering the solution, and ensured Defence was trained and supported to maintain the system. The company’s focus on delivering value throughout the project stood out.
Tū Kaha (Courage) Award
Winner: Mike Sheedy, Gemtech Solutions Ltd
Mr Sheedy was commissioned to review Army logistics arrangements for warehousing, maintenance, repair and overhaul - known as Project Alexander. This thorough and wide-ranging review was carried out
collaboratively with the incumbent supplier, Lockheed Martin NZ, and Logistics Command Land and resulted in a number of improvements including embedding continuous improvement and benefit realisation processes.
Mr Sheedy conducted the review diligently and respectfully, and ensured that all stakeholders felt considered and valued throughout the process.
Tū Maia (Integrity) Award
Winner: David Goodrich OAM, Silver Spirit Partners
The acquisition of the Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft fleet is delivering one of the largest and most significant capablities to be introduced into service in several generations. Commercial throughlife support arrangements of this scale and type required an experience negotiator and Mr Goodrich delivered a commercially strong contract for Defence, in less than ten months and while COVID-19 travel restrictions were in place.
His expertise, knowledge of the sustainment provider, and the respect for him within the sector were critical in delivering the contract and the certainty it provides.
Tū Tika (Commitment) Award
Winner: Patrick Power, Airbus NZ
A blended workforce supports the deeper maintenance programme of the NH90 helicopter fleet. Managing this requires a strong and engaging leader and in providing that leadership Mr Power has delivered a world-leading programme that has helped to establish New Zealand as an international authority on NH90 deeper maintenance.
He has built and maintains a high-performing team and is generous in his sharing of knowledge to upskill the wider workforce. He is a trusted partner to the RNZAF, and his experience and advice is sought by members of the wider NH90 user community.
During the COVID-19 lockdown period and restrictions on travel, Mr Ng was responsible for enforcing border requirements on returning RNZN ships. He worked closely with Defence to understand implications of time impacts on isolating ships’ operations, and the reduced risk posed by the way these ships are operated.
Standard operating procedures were developed for delivery and receipt of swabs and for managing on-board cases. Mr Ng ensured Defence was kept informed on emerging policy changes and went out of his way to minimise the effects on Defence’s maritime movements.
The Ministry of Defence formed a rōpū to focus on upskilling the knowledge of te ao Māori of its people, and Kiwa was commissioned to support this by developing a mobile app. In addition to being feature-rich, this easy-to-navigate app enables phonetic sounding out of words to support learners, and inclusion of a history section for people to expand their knowledge.
Throughout the process Kiwa displayed flexibility by accommodating additional needs of the Ministry, such as translation of a number of terms that are unique to Defence.
Airbus New Zealand Ltd was nominated for the technical services it provides for NH90 deeper maintenance activities at RNZAF Base Ohakea. Their personnel operate as part of a blended workforce with RNZAF, providing a point of continuity and increased resilience.
Airbus NZ supported the upskilling of new Air Force
personnel while delivering innovative solutions such as a corrosion resistance programme. As a result, Aotearoa New Zealand has become a respected leader in the sustainment of the NH90 helicopter with a comparatively high fleet availability.
Big Mal Ltd provided outstanding, highly specialised services for maintenance and management of the NZDF’s firing ranges in the Auckland region, ensuring operations are carried out safely, efficiently, and in a way that minimises harm to the environment Electronics Navigation Ltd delivered a new maritime Damage Control Communications training simulator, providing specialised training that mirrors the conditions found on seagoing platforms.
Marops Ltd developed assessment and training requirements to support the Frigate Sustainment Communications Programme, in line with the Defence Manual of Learning.
South Pacific Scaffolding Ltd supplied complex scaffolding and shrink-wrapping services to Babcock and the Royal New Zealand Navy as they worked to maintain various seagoing vessels, including HMNZS Manawanui and frigate and Offshore Patrol Vessel projects.
A recently published Fortinet whitepaper highlights the need to protect New Zealand’s critical infrastructure from “grey zone” threats as global tensions heighten and a new Cold War sets in.
Amid conflict in Ukraine and escalating geopolitical tensions, the new reality of hybrid warfare means that geopolitics and cybersecurity are now inextricably linked. According to the authors of Fortinet whitepaper Government and Industry: Partnering on Cybersecurity to Strengthen Data Security, this leaves New Zealand’s critical services unprecedentedly vulnerable.
“While there is no single definition of hybrid warfare, the term shows that countries can advance strategic aims by military and non-military means as well as additional tools of influence, coercion, and interference,” write Glenn Maiden and Nicole Quinn.
“Attacking a country’s critical infrastructure, such as power grid, ports, airports, hospitals and communications systems can do profound damage to national resilience.”
It’s a threat highlighted in New Zealand’s Defence Assessment 2021 in terms of ‘grey zone’ activities. “By undertaking grey zone campaigns,” notes the Assessment, “states can deploy a wide range of tools of statecraft to pursue their objectives – including incrementally and/or opportunistically – while avoiding or mitigating international responses.”
Russia’s continuing invasion of Ukraine shows how cyber technology is now a central and increasingly effective component of modern warfare, state Maiden and Quinn.
“Moscow has sought to disable Ukrainian IT networks, attacked critical infrastructure, and sought to disrupt the command-and-control systems of the Ukrainian military.”
According to New Zealand’s Cyber Security Strategy 2019, state-sponsored cyber operations are increasingly frequent, with more governments openly developing offensive cyber capabilities to steal sensitive commercial information, disrupt critical systems and interfere with democratic processes.
With cyber weapons being deployed by states and organised criminal groups, enterprise security and risk cannot be managed solely by CISOs and their teams, write Maiden and Quinn. “Everyone from individual employees to top management, customers, and supply chain partners must help to contain cyber risks.”
In addition to a heavily contested South China Sea, competition for influence in the Pacific and Indian
Oceans, increasing strain on global supply chains, and the impacts of climate change, Maiden and Quinn cite ageing critical infrastructure –and ageing operational technology (OT) systems in particular – as a key exposure.
It’s an exposure highlighted by a discussion document on enhancing the resilience of New Zealand’s critical infrastructure that’s just been released by the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet.
The document, which stems from the Government’s response to Rautaki Hanganga o Aotearoa –New Zealand Infrastructure Strategy 2022-2052, identifies “a pressing need to boost the resilience of our critical infrastructure system.”
It lists the deteriorating national security environment, along with climate change, economic fragmentation, and rapid technological change, as a global megatrend heightening the risk of infrastructure failure.
“New Zealand faces a deteriorating national security environment,” states the document, “and our critical infrastructure system is an attractive target for espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks, and other types of interference.
A global cybersecurity leader with deep experience in protecting OT, Fortinet helps governments and businesses better understand and defend against cyber threats. Click here to download the whitepaper.
An Australian force design oriented towards Distributed Maritime Operations poses questions for the design of NZ’s future fleet, writes maritime capability specialist Andrew Watts.
The Australian Defence Strategic Review (DSR) published 24 April 2023 has significant implications for New Zealand’s defence investment choices. I’ll let those more qualified to comment reflect on the geopolitical issues; in this article I’ll address the potential implications of the DSR for the next generation of New Zealand naval capability.
The DSR is premised on the reality of great power competition in the Asia-Pacific, and the fact that the United States is no longer
the unipolar dominant force in the region. Australia must be able to work with the United States to deter and defeat direct great power threats to its national interests and its sovereignty; the ADF must therefore be postured such that the likely cost of great power aggression against Australian interests outweighs any possible benefits to the aggressor.
Nuclear submarines will be a major component of this posture, but the DSR signals that the Australian surface fleet will be re-structured
In an over three-decade career in the RNZN, Andrew Watts commanded HMNZ Ships Pukaki, Wellington, Resolution and Te Mana, and served as Director, Capability Development and Programme Director Network Enabled Capability, and Captain, Fleet Personnel & Training. He is Deputy Executive Director at the Australian Civil-Military Centre.
to better fit a strategy of “sea denial and localised sea control”. The main concept in play in modern naval force design is Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and the DSR reference to a larger number of smaller surface vessels suggests that DMO concepts are likely to underpin the surface fleet review that will complete later this year.
To re-cap, the naval forces of the liberal democracies are facing significant numerical overmatch in relation to potential adversaries, because the cost of modern multifunction surface combatants has reached a level where even the United States can no longer afford to acquire a numerically sufficient force of high end destroyers and frigates. DMO therefore spreads the combat power of a naval force over both high-end combatants and a large number of less capable but fully networked combatants optimised for specific functions – primarily long-range strike and anti-surface warfare.
The greater the number of platforms in a given force, the greater the adversary’s targeting problem, and thus the greater the likelihood that sufficient platforms will survive
an adversary’s pre-emptive strike to impose an unacceptable cost in retaliatory strikes against the adversary. DMO thus increases the deterrent effect of naval surface forces.
Multi-function combatants have a significant role to play in a force structured for DMO. They provide the sensor coverage, command and control and layered anti-missile defensive capabilities under which less capable platforms optimised for strike and anti-ship capability would operate. They would also probably be the only platforms capable of contributing to theatre antisubmarine operations.
They would be the “Tier 1” platforms referred to in the DSR. However, DMO requires large numbers of less capable, mission specific “Tier 2” platforms, and as indicated in previous articles, therein lies an opportunity for New Zealand in designing our next generation naval fleet. In light of the DSR, mission specific surface combatants offer a way of giving effect to our commitment to the alliance with Australia that connects directly with a key plank of Australian defence policy.
Modularity, by which a fleet consists of common platforms that can be adapted for specific missions by the installation of equipment and people modules optimised for specific roles, offers a way in which platforms useful in a force constituted for DMO could also be useful in a range of other maritime security tasks.
When required for DMO in conjunction with Australia, a modular New Zealand naval platform could be fitted with maritime strike modules complete with the necessary missiles, sensors, operators and maintainers. When required for resource and border protection operations in the Pacific (a key DSR focus area), strike modules could be replaced with Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) modules.
In this way a force could be relevant and effective across the entire spectrum of operations, noting that the DSR specifically acknowledges New Zealand’s role in the Pacific.
Modularity also offers huge advantages in relation to obsolescence management.
Capability upgrades can be carried out by upgrading or replacing the module while the platform remains available for other operations –multi-year capability gaps while a fleet of two non-modular combatants undergoes risky and expensive openheart upgrade surgery are avoided.
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly to those naval people responsible for the many different aspects of fleet availability, the platform standardisation allowed by modularity dramatically simplifies asset management by reducing the number of supply chains and training pipelines and the number of small, vulnerable to attrition work force communities trained in specific systems.
The Australian government has directed that an independent analysis of naval surface fleet capability be carried out to ensure complementarity with the forthcoming nuclear submarine fleet and consistency with the principles outlined in the DSR. This had led to a great deal of speculation amongst the defence commentariat.
A common theme is that the Hunter class frigate and Arafura
class OPV programmes are likely to be truncated in favour of the larger number of smaller platforms referred to in the DSR – potentially mission specific Tier 2 combatants capable of contributing to DMO.
Should this occur, there would appear to be an opportunity for trans-Tasman cooperation along the lines of the Anzac frigate programme, noting that New Zealand interests (and arguably Australia’s) would be best served if these platforms were based on modularity concepts. Given the time it would take to re-orient the Australian National Ship Building Strategy from current to new programs, there should be time to study this possibility in depth.
In previous articles I have discussed an alternative force structure based on 3 – 4 through deck ships of the KALAAT BEN ABBES type designed by Fincantieri. These ships, and a later version being delivered to the Qatari navy, incorporate many of the capabilities of a frigate in addition to an amphibious capability of the type identified in DCP 19.
The flexibility offered by these ships could enable meaningful contributions to a deterrence/ denial strategy while also enabling significant contributions to Pacific security. At the same time, defence disaster relief capacity in New Zealand and the Pacific would be greatly enhanced. This option is very much worthy of consideration.
If the alliance with Australia is as important as our policy rhetoric suggests, the emphasis on deterrence and denial embodied in the Australian DSR could move the value of a modular surface fleet beyond the theoretical, particularly if an industrial cooperation programme for modular Tier 2 combatants is practicable.
A force structure based on KALAAT BEN ABBES type ships would also enable a viable contribution to deterrence and denial while providing manoeuvre options in the Pacific and greatly enhanced disaster relief capability.
I assume that the outcome of the Australian surface fleet review will be monitored with great interest in Wellington.
The major regeneration and modification of two formerly decommissioned New Zealand Navy (RNZN) Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPVs) has been completed at the Devonport Dockyard ahead of the ships’ handover to the Irish Naval Service (INS).
Babcock was appointed by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) in March 2022 to undertake the maintenance and upgrade program after the IPVs were purchased by the Republic of Ireland.
According to Babcock’s Program Director in New Zealand, Mark Worsfold, incorporating a supply chain of local businesses helped Babcock achieve the successful delivery of the former New Zealand Navy ships Rotoiti and Pukaki to the INS.
“Babcock has been able to invest significantly into the New Zealand economy, partnering with nearly 30 New Zealand businesses to form an extensive and trusted supply chain,” he said.
“Our partnership with the NZDF is focussed on building long term collaborative relationships with New Zealand businesses to deliver broader economic outcomes. This regeneration project is another great demonstration on what New Zealand industry can achieve together.”
Babcock engaged Lloyds Register to provide classification and survey on work undertaken such as overhauls of main and auxiliary engines, installation of electrical and platform management systems as well as hull and propeller preservation work. Babcock also worked closely with the INS to integrate equipment
currently used across the rest of the Irish Naval fleet.
The two vessels were picked up from Auckland on Thursday 6 and Friday 7 April, heavy lift ship Happy Dynamic for their 33 day voyage to Cork, Ireland. They were delivered in May to the Irish naval base at Haulbowline in Cork Harbour where they are due to undergo a refit before being used primarily for fishery protection patrols on Ireland’s east coast
Babcock also built the Samuel Beckett class offshore patrol vessels for the INS and has since been contracted to install a variable speed drive system for the central cooling onboard.
In 2022, Rotoiti and Pukaki were purchased by Irish Department
of Defence for €26m for use by the Irish Naval Service.
Rotoiti was commissioned on 17 April 2009 (the first of her class to be commissioned in the RNZN), and arrived at the Devonport Naval Base on 24 April 2009. The third boat of this name to serve in the Royal New Zealand Navy and named after Lake Rotoiti, the vessel was decommissioned at Devonport on 17 October 2019.
Pukaki was launched in Whangarei Harbour on 6 May 2008, and was the third ship of this name to serve in the Royal New Zealand Navy (named after Lake Pukaki). The vessel was decommissioned at Devonport Naval Base on 17 October 2019.
The AUKUS arrangement poses big questions for New Zealand’s approach to alliances and naval capability. Wayne Mapp writes that the response will need leadership from the top.
The most important security issue currently facing New Zealand is working out our role with AUKUS. New Zealand’s most important security partners, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom have hugely upgraded their mutual security through the AUKUS partnership. With the procurement of up to eight nuclear powered submarines through the AUKUS partnership, Australia will have one of the most formidable navies in the world.
Although there is no prospect of New Zealand being involved in any aspect of AUKUS that involves nuclear technology, AUKUS provides other opportunities for engagement. Pillar Two of AUKUS involves emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and quantum computing. Two of these are also directly relevant to the intelligence activities of Five Eyes. Quantum computing will allow GPS level accuracy without needing a satellite signal
There is of course a prior question: to what extent does New Zealand want to upgrade its relationship with the AUKUS partners? This question could be put another way: is New Zealand
prepared to accept a progressive downgrading of its relationships with the AUKUS nations – because that is surely what will happen if New Zealand does not participate in Pillar Two of AUKUS.
The Far-Left parties in Parliament have no doubt about their answer to these questions. The Green Party and Te Pati Maori want New Zealand to withdraw from all security relationships, and in particular, from Five Eyes. This stance extends to AUKUS.
The positions of these parties is well known, and in the case of the Green Party extends back many decades. However, these two parties also represent less than 20 percent of New Zealand voters, which has also been the case for decades. In short, there is a substantial majority in Parliament, and among New Zealand voters, that our current security relationships should be maintained, and be kept in good order.
The majority position was well stated by Minister of Defence, Andrew Little, when he said in May this year that New Zealand had already picked a side decades ago. Although this statement was made with specific reference to New Zealand’s active support for Ukraine
and the rule of law, no-one could mistake the broader meaning. On matters of security, New Zealand knows who its partners are.
Security relationships require a certain level of commitment, if they are to be taken seriously. Not slavishly, as New Zealand’s stand on Iraq showed, but at a sufficient level to be seen to be making a useful contribution.
Even in a proportionate sense, New Zealand’s contribution does not match that of the AUKUS partners, and this has been the case for many decades. Nevertheless, the contribution to security partnerships has to be more than token, it must add something of real value.
I have seen the treatment of a nation who was seen as only making a token, almost derisory effort. That was Greece in the Afghanistan mission. Greece paid a deep political and economic price for offering only 12 people to the Afghanistan mission. Only now, nearly two decades later, is Greece being accorded a more respectful position within NATO.
AUKUS is not just about technology transfer. Much more importantly, it is about reinforcing fundamental security relationships. The three partner nations have held together for over a century. This is also true of the two other Five Eyes nations, Canada and New Zealand.
The five nations, with their global trading links, have had a traditional focus on maritime power, these days, both encompassing both naval and air. At various times in the past, the greatest proportion of the five nations respective military strength has been primarily vested in naval and air power.
The pinnacle of the AUKUS partnership is the investment in nuclear powered submarines. This is truly an awesome level of commitment for a state with the economy and population of Australia.
It is not just two, three or four nuclear submarines, it is eight. To put this into perspective, the eight nuclear attack submarines will be more than the seven Astute class submarines in the Royal Navy and
more than the six Barracuda nuclear attack submarines that the French Navy has ordered.
Australia is truly committed to building one of the most formidable navies in the world, surpassed only by those of the long-established nuclear powers.
The Australian naval build up is not just in the nuclear submarines, it is also reflected in the Australian Navy’s surface fleet. Australia already has three advanced air warfare destroyers. It is now replacing the eight ANZAC frigates with nine substantially larger Hunter class frigates.
At nearly 10,000 tonnes displacement, the Hunter class ships blur the traditional distinction between destroyers and frigates. Following the publication of the Defence Strategic Review earlier this year, a specific review of the surface combatant fleet was required, with a report back in September this year. Although the Hunter class project will be part of this review, a large amount of work has already been done on those ships.
There could be a reduction in numbers of the Hunter class made up by the possible acquisition of further air warfare destroyers. This would certainly bolster the combat power of the Australian Navy.
The greater focus is more likely to be on the next tier down. There have been proposals to build up to twelve corvettes or light frigates. These ships would be a very large step up from the current Armidale patrol vessels. Irrespective of the specific recommendations of the surface combatant review, one thing is certain – the Australian Navy surface fleet will be vastly more capable in 2040 than it currently is.
The level of increase in the capability of the Australian Navy will inevitably influence what New Zealand does. Will it be credible for New Zealand to simply retain a two frigate navy when there has been such a large increase in the size of the Australian Navy?
The decision to purchase two ANZAC frigates was made at a time, to use Helen Clark’s phrase, when there was a “benign strategic environment”. It is also worth
noting that when these ships were purchased, New Zealand’s population was barely over three million compared to the 5.2 million of today.
Would simply buying just two more frigates run the risk of placing New Zealand in a similar predicament to that of Greece two decades ago?
Two frigates are not a token effort, though when both are out of service for an extended period, as was the case two years ago, that charge may have been levied. Nevertheless, a two frigate navy would amount to a major reduction of the proportion of total Trans Tasman naval power compared to twenty years ago.
Back in 2000 it could be reasonably said that New Zealand supplied around 15% of the total naval effort of Australia and New Zealand. In 2040 that percentage will be well under 10% and could be as low as 5% of the total transTasman effort. At what point, will our most important security partner, Australia, think that New Zealand is not making a serious effort to keep
the security relationship in good repair?
AUKUS is a serious challenge for New Zealand. Not so much over the specifics of the commitments, but more because it sends a strong signal as to how our closest security partners think of the evolving security situation, particularly in the Asia Pacific.
New Zealand now has to seriously think of how it will maintain its core security relationships. This is not a question that can be palmed off to Defence Ministers to manage. It will require the top leadership, the Prime Minister and aspiring Prime Ministers, to have a clear view as to what is required of New Zealand.
Just as AUKUS was introduced by the President and Prime Ministers of the three nations, so will New Zealand’s response need leadership from the top. Even if this not a major election issue, New Zealand’s role and contribution within AUKUS will be among the most important decisions to be made by our political leadership in the coming term of parliament.
Defence personnel numbers are lower than they’ve ever been, writes Ross Browne, providing the Defence Policy Review with some challenging calculations.
As the Government’s Defence Policy Review slowly builds momentum, personnel numbers and the ability for NZDF to have an impactful contribution to support New Zealand’s foreign and domestic interests are topical.
The harsh reality is that Defence personnel numbers are lower than they’ve ever been relative to New Zealand’s population.
Size matters. Numbers create career opportunities, help population affinity with roles and missions, and shape the impact Defence can make supporting national objectives.
An analysis of a century of Defence personnel data shows that today, there are just two Regular personnel in the armed forces for every 1,000 civilians in the population. That’s down from about five per 1,000 in the 1950s and 1960s and between three to four per 1,000 in the 1970s and 1980s.
At its peak during World War II, Defence numbered some 150,000 and accounted for about eight percent of the total population, or 80 per 1,000 people.
Aside from a brief spike during the Korean War, Regular numbers remained relatively consistent at about 12,000 throughout the Cold War period.
The 1990s brought a steady decline in headcount, with almost 4,000 regulars (or about 30 percent of the total force) lost by the early 2000s.
Afghanistan involvement saw numbers pick up again and grow by 1,000 between 2005 and 2011, peaking at close to 10,000.
Once some 2,700 territorials and 3,000 civilian staff are included, the total size of the NZDF in 2021 was about 15,000. However, on a per capita basis the size of the defence force remains at record low levels of 1.9 per 1,000 people.
In contrast, Police has seen a strong increase in numbers in recent years, keeping pace with population growth.
In 1990 there were more than twice as many Regular Defence personnel than there were Sworn Police. Police numbers recently surpassed Defence for first time.
The 2019 Defence Capability Plan headlined Army growth to 6,000
personnel by 2035. Army Regulars haven’t exceeded 6,000 personnel since 1953. In 1953 that meant Army had 3.2 people per 1,000 of population. In 2019, the ratio was 1.3 people – roughly the same as Australia’s.
The devil is always in the detail, and commentators scrutinising the output of the upcoming review should be mindful of where headcount is applied, and what it means in a relative sense.
Today’s Defence Force undertakes a whole host of environmental, estate and facilities, and administrative IT tasks that the Cold War force didn’t. All of that reduces headcount available for the unique tasks the military is suited to. As Australia has just announced, a firm commitment to structures that deliver capability in the near term is where impact will be measured.
The NQ-9B SeaGuardian provides a new, highly cost-effective tool to meet the 21st century challenges of maritime security, resource protection and search and rescue.
The need for surveillance and reconnaissance can be a challenging and resource-intensive process, but uncrewed aircraft are helping rewrite the way it’s done.
Leading the way is the MQ-9B SeaGuardian®, which enables the most advanced navies, coast guards, and other civilian agencies to patrol longer, detect more, and complement other assets to make them much more effective.
Manufactured by San Diego-based General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., SeaGuardian has recorded several recent first-ever achievements across a range of operational and test environments around the world. Even as users prove what the system can do as it enters widespread service, they’re only scratching the surface of the ways MQ-9B will alter the way intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions are conducted.
SeaGuardian has shown it can provide timely, pervasive, and broad area ISR for both military and civilian authorities. It has supported numerous coast guard operations in Japan, prosecuted submarines, and escorted naval surface task groups, providing them with sensing, targeting, and communications capabilities. It can self-deploy over extensive distances from its home base and integrate seamlessly into normal aviation traffic.
In just two years of operation with the Indian Navy, the aircraft has recorded more than 12,000 operational hours, delivering valuable maritime, littoral, and overland ISR. Further, the Japan Coast Guard has been flying SeaGuardian since October 2022 and has logged nearly 2,000 hours of operations, including highly effective security and surveillance missions for this year’s 49th G7 Summit in Hiroshima, Japan. These operations have been enabled by General Atomics Aeronautical’s OPTIX Mission Intelligence System.
SeaGuardian was also utilized by the U.S. Navy for one of its most complex and challenging integrated exercises yet, the Integrated Battle Problem 2023 (IBP-
23) – one in which the MQ-9B joined with human-flown maritime helicopters in a major anti-submarine warfare exercise.
As part of the IBP-23 in May, an MQ-9B aircraft flown by its crew from a ground control station and operated over satellite joined with U.S. Navy helicopter squadrons to search for submarines in a range off the coast of Southern California.
The exercise focused on crewed/uncrewed teaming, showing how a remotely piloted aircraft can join traditional aircraft, such as U.S. Navy MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, in tackling complex missions. In this example, the helicopters released sonobuoys to detect submarines and conducted simulated attacks. The SeaGuardian then took over monitoring the data sent by the sonobuoys. The SeaGuardian also deployed its own sonobuoys. The MQ-9B demonstrated similar interoperability with the P-8A Poseidon during the Rim of the Pacific 2022 exercise. Overall, SeaGuardian’s considerable endurance gives military commanders increased versatility in how to tackle maritime missions.
In assessing the recent exercise, it is instructive to compare this crewed/uncrewed process with an oldfashioned anti-submarine prosecution, in which crewed aircraft might have needed to fly tens or hundreds of hours, exhausting crews, maintainers, and aircraft. The remotely piloted MQ-9B does this at a fraction of the cost and with no crew on board or even deployed.
The U.S. Navy sub-hunting exercise was one of several such exploits for SeaGuardian. Another involved the aircraft partnering with Navy carrier strike groups off the coast of Hawaii in April, working with warships, aircraft, and other units to ensure the safe passage of the surface ships.
Carriers, cruisers, and destroyers, as well as F-35 Lightning II fighters, F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, EA-18G Growlers, E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes, MH-60 Seahawks, and P-8 Poseidons were all in the mix with MQ-9B SeaGuardian, which provided them with maritime domain awareness, information dominance, targeting capability, and more.
What the aircraft did, in effect, was serve as the distant eyes and ears for naval commanders. Its onboard sensors can see all through the visual and infrared spectrum, including – with its onboard multi-mode radar – through clouds, fog, mist, or smoke. Other onboard systems can hear throughout the radio frequency spectrum, collecting intelligence that contributes to the most complete common operating picture possible.
No other large medium-altitude, long-endurance aircraft can contribute to multi-domain operations like this. And there are even more ways that SeaGuardian contributes. The aircraft’s proprietary Detect and Avoid System, invented by GA-ASI, means that it can operate in civil airspace just like any other aircraft. This eliminates the need for special arrangements or crewed escort aircraft like those that remotely piloted aircraft might have needed in the past.
Also new is SeaGuardian’s ability to self-deploy to far-flung operating areas. In each of the recent maritime exercises supported by MQ-9B, the aircraft took off from its home base in the California high desert and flew to the base where it was needed.
To participate in the Northern Edge field training exercise around Alaska in May, SeaGuardian flew more than 2,000 miles in a single hop – less than half of its operating range – highlighting its extraordinary range and endurance. Then the MQ-9B flew its missions and took part in the various exercises and, when it was finished, returned home the same way, with a single flight. Compare that to older practices in which an uncrewed aircraft might have needed to be disassembled, boxed up, loaded into a cargo aircraft, flown to its operating location, and then reassembled there for use, and the savings in workforce, time, and increased capability are evident.
Advanced onboard and supporting systems help make all this possible, including automatic takeoff and landing, artificial intelligence and machine learning, and cutting-edge networks. Satellite operations mean that MQ-9B’s crew can be located anywhere, even thousands of miles from where the aircraft is operating. During the Northern Edge exercise, for example, around Alaska, the crews flew the SeaGuardian from the Pacific Northwest area of the United States at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island.
This remote operation not only takes human crews off the aircraft and removes them from harm’s way at sea. It means the MQ-9B can cover other inhospitable areas, such as the cold, ice-covered polar regions, without burdensome hardship deployments for crews or the necessity to position other units for search and rescue in case of a mishap. Taking the people off the aircraft protects them and their support units – all while reducing cost and complexity.
The challenges of the 21st century to seafaring nations, ranging from military security to resource protection and search and rescue, aren’t simple or easy to tackle. But the good news is that authorities charged with oversight and protection in these domains now have a new, highly cost-effective tool ready to meet those challenges head-on – MQ-9B SeaGuardian.
Much can be established about any organisation from two documents – the pay scales and the internal phone directory. One tells you what is valued and the other reveals the approach to work. Together they are a road map to the culture. Job titles appearing in both documents cast more light on the norms and behaviours.
NZDF pay scales have been the subject of media coverage in relation to retention issues. However, nothing much has been said about the merits or otherwise of how NZDF organises itself and consequently spends the remuneration part of Vote: Defence Force.
It is a given that any organisation with the size and range of tasks of the NZDF will be bureaucratic, and
several formal reviews of structure have occurred. However, given the declining overall size of the force, discussion regarding the current number and size of headquarters is due.
The current situation of hollow units creates a dilemma. Should a large HQ structure be maintained in anticipation of a complete – and possibly larger – future force? Or should the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) get the HQ to an appropriate size now knowing that it is easier to upscale than vice versa in the future?
The actual size of HQ NZDF is extremely difficult to ascertain due to the data supplied under OIA being consolidated numbers reporting to Tier 3 positions. The NZDF declined to provide a detailed organisational
chart claiming that it would take substantial research and collation effort as one does not readily exist. This latter point is concerning given claims in the Briefing to the Incoming Minister this year that work was progressing well on the recommendations from the 2020 Op Burnham report regarding organisational structure, record keeping and retrieval processes. Therefore, I have made several assumptions to come up with an estimated HQ NZDF plus HQ JFNZ headcount of 4,227 which is 28% of the total force of 15,236. About 25% (1,162) of these positions are vacant. This is comprised of the major staff groups shown in the graph above.
Structurally, this represents fifty major staff elements comprising five two-stars, 17 one-stars (including two civilian equivalents), ten Colonels (equivalent) and 17 senior management grade civilians. This rank line up should also be
considered against the current total force size:
There are thirty uniformed positions of Colonel equivalent or above in the HQ which is a ratio of one for every 406 uniforms (fewer than an infantry battalion in numbers.) If civilians are added, there is one senior HQ role for every 311 people (roughly the full complement of our two frigates) in the NZDF.
Though likely misattributed to Joseph Stalin, I do not believe that “quantity has its own quality”.
What can be gleaned of the quality of the HQ structure? Quite a lot and deserving of a longer article. For example, in the NZDF there are 92 position titles with the word ‘strategy’ or ‘strategic’ in them. 39 are civilian roles. There are many more roles that have strategy as a component of the position description.
I am not setting out to criticise any individual but it is not possible to credibly argue for this many strategic
roles when defence planning forms part of a much larger national security effort. Strategies are contested. Those who write uncontested strategies are planners, not strategists. Most of these supposedly strategic jobs relate to medium to long-term planning and analysis.
As at February, the Ministry of Defence had 175 staff. It had 18 Tier Two and Three managers, which is a ratio of approximately one for every ten staff. The Ministry was able to produce a detailed organisational chart which shows that 52% are project management and procurement professionals, 29% are policy advisors and analysts and 19% are corporate staff.
Is there a problem with the organisational design of the NZDF Headquarters? Probably, but more research is urgently needed. However, leaving any Defence Force to fix this sort of thing has rarely worked in the past.
Examples abound, from the resistance to the New Zealand Joint Force HQ discussed by Colin Robinson at Wavell Room (February 2022) through to Michael Shoebridge’s 19 June article in The Australian titled “Defence can’t fix itself and that matters for our security.”
Consequently, CDF has two choices. The first is to tell politicians that there is “nothing to see here” and stick it out to the election and his retirement. That leaves the incoming CDF and potentially a new Minister to decide the next move. Alternatively, he could take the tougher path and seek external help for headquarters reform while warning the government of the significant risk this carries in an already fragile organisation.
In Defence, there are never easy choices. A long-read version of this article is available on the author’s page at Patreon.com.
There is no hiding the fact that the New Zealand Defence Force has been through an extremely tough time over the last few years, with Operation Protect being a turning point for many personnel and their families. Combine that experience with underinvestment, low pay, a lack of deployment opportunities, and miserable conditions in Defence housing, the pressures were and still are in plain sight.
The previous Minister, Hon Peeni Henare spoke frankly about these pressures, however beyond this year’s additional funding I’m not expecting a great deal more under the new Minister before the election.
ACT would ensure the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is equipped to do its part in defending New Zealand’s people, allies, and values in today’s increasingly volatile strategic environment. That means increasing defence operating and capital spending over the next four years to two per cent of GDP. This is the NATO definition of military spending and would bring New Zealand in line with its allies.
Our Defence force is full of hardworking Kiwis who want to protect and serve their country. We need to give these brave men and women the tools and resources they need. This kind of targeted spending would send a message to the rest of the world.
The Prime Minister’s recent visit to China, including a sit-down
with President Xi Jinping, may seem like the tightrope that is the China-New Zealand relationship is in a good space, compared to how our traditional allies are fairing. Delicate as that relationship is, it is not a reason to be shy about our place in the Pacific, nor to underinvest or cooperate less with the likes of Australia, the United States, and so on.
Throughout the world, liberal democracies are being directly challenged by increasingly assertive autocratic governments that reject the rules-based international order.
Russia’s appalling invasion of Ukraine and the atrocities it continues to commit have highlighted how important it is for democratic nations to stand up for human rights, liberal values, and to not take the status quo for granted; no matter how well we work our relationships in the Pacific, we must be prepared. China’s People’s Liberation Army has modernised and grown at a rapid pace, as has their reach, and at any time they can combine that show of force with economic coercion. Trade is obviously critically important, but so are our values.
The values of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law are increasingly under threat, and New Zealand needs to sharpen its position. A capable and agile defence force is essential to support other democracies internationally and help
with greater security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
While disaster relief missions and initiatives such as supporting local police are important roles for the Defence Force in the Pacific, we have found ourselves somewhat limited to such roles as a result of decades of underinvestment in our capabilities and assets. Our mission to train Ukrainian personnel is highly commendable, but ultimately we should be doing more. Over time, larger operations in conflict zones further afield may call on New Zealand to play a larger role.
In April 2022, China and the Solomon Islands signed a security pact, catching New Zealand offguard despite a decade of engagement in the Solomons. China has sought to build naval bases in Pacific Islands, and a tour of the Pacific islands by China’s foreign minister in May 2022 showed that China is seeking to deepen its presence in the Pacific. Since then, China has continued to pressure New Zealand to maintain an ‘independent foreign policy’; translation: one that is more dependent on them and not on our traditional allies.
Meanwhile, Australia is substantially increasing its defence engagement with the Pacific - it has announced a A$1.9 billion
budget package aimed at boosting Australia’s influence across the region. In Australia’s most recent defence review, New Zealand was mentioned once, and only in the context of disaster relief.
Rebuilding our alliance with Australia and other democracies Australia is our only formal defence ally, and our most important international partner overall. However, the relationship has been imbalanced for some time as New Zealand’s defence capabilities have progressively fallen behind Australia’s. Australia has reinvigorated its military alliance with the United States and is investing in increasingly sophisticated military capabilities.
New Zealand’s irrelevance was most graphically seen when Australia announced the formation of the AUKUS alliance and the purchase of nuclear submarines without bothering to inform New Zealand. Under Labour, New Zealand has gone from being an ANZAC partner to being an afterthought. When Australia and China clashed over trade issues, the Labour Government told Australia to “show respect” to China, infuriating the Australians.
In the meantime, Australia, the United States, India and
Japan are moving ahead with the Quad security partnership. While President Biden labelled President Xi a “dictator”, Xi himself described New Zealand as a “friend and partner”. We’re treading a very fine line.
The NZDF needs significantly more resources as it grapples with increasing pressures, including improving pay and conditions, replacing ageing capabilities such as the ANZAC frigates, and acquiring new technologies such as drones and precision weapons.
New Zealand’s defence spending is low by international standards at $5.3 billion (or 1.4% of GDP) depending on how you cut it, while the Australian Labor government plans to spend A$52 billion on defence (2.02% of GDP) this financial year, with much more to come over the following decade.
2% of GDP is the ‘NATO standard’, and is a signal that a nation has a commitment to common defence of themselves, their allies, and to upholding the rules-based international order. ACT believes that this is an appropriate spending target for the next four years, and will serve to address soaring attrition and capability gaps that have been emerging for some time.
I have thoroughly enjoyed holding the Defence portfolio for ACT for the duration of this term in Parliament, and being one of the many voices calling out for more funding and investment, and exposing the Government’s lack of foresight and the concerns of the fantastic men and women serving in our defence force. Combined pressure has led to better remuneration, and also the Defence Policy Review, which should shine more light on our capabilities, limitations, and one hopes the many future opportunities.
Tim van de Molen, National Party Spokesperson for Defence and Veterans outlines Nationals’ position in relation to Defence and supporting Defence personnel to enhance their potential.
National backs our Defence Force like we back the All Blacks, and we want to see them be the very best they can be. As we have all seen in recent months, the quality of the service that the NZDF gives to our great country is unparalleled, and it would only be right that we give them the support they need.
Since 2020, this government has seriously neglected the NZDF. 89% of personnel are paid at least 5% below comparable civilian rates. This lack of support has contributed to 30% of uniformed personnel leaving over the last two years and now the
NZDF is dangerously close to being operationally ineffective.
I have repeatedly called for this funding shortfall to be addressed, as well as for the improvement of other conditions of service, such as the standard of facilities and equipment. While it was encouraging to see the government announce funding for our remuneration recommendations in the budget and finally agreeing with our concerns about the depleted operational capability of the NZDF, there is still much work to be done in this space to give our NZDF the tools they need.
1. National is committed to strengthening the NZDF by addressing the unsustainably high attrition rates and bolstering recruitment.
Continued high attrition rates on a consistent basis threatens the operational effectiveness of the NZDF by limiting their capabilities. It is a priority that this comes to an end. The NZDF needs the tools to recruit more personnel and keep them for longer.
2.) National will support the recent funding announcement from the government but also want to improve the other conditions of service for our existing personnel.
Pay rates are important to NZDF staff and National will review these to ensure they are competitive and commensurate. NZDF personnel deserve better living conditions and
more variety in the types of work available. National understands these components play big roles in personnel’s decision to stay or leave the NZDF.
3. National will focus on improving our interoperability with our traditional partners given the rising geopolitical tension.
NZDF personnel need the expertise to operate a range of tools and machines, even if these are outside the usual scope of operations, so they can more readily work with allies and regional partners as escalating situations require.
National will support our NZDF personnel to undergo more training with allies and regional partners and to cooperatively share defence knowledge, vital to collaboratively navigate the geopolitical tensions growing in the Asia-Pacific region, posing threats towards democratic countries.
4. National will focus on enabling the NZDF to deliver exceptional performance in a selection of key areas that will support our own priorities and enhance joint international efforts.
New Zealand has limited resource capabilities when compared to some other countries. As we do in other sectors, the NZDF should focus on specialising as experts in niche areas, offering capabilities to allies and regional partners that they don’t necessarily have. Our unique skills will enhance our worth globally as opposed to being a similar contributor to others albeit on a smaller scale.
This approach will provide potential to earn our NZDF personnel more respect on the world stage, opening more opportunities for deserved recognition. National recognises the skill and hard work our personnel contribute and will support them to enhance their potential further.
According to a just-published UK House of Commons Committee report, the UK’s defence procurement system needs a sense of urgency, less ‘requirements creep’, and better relationships with industry.
A report released by a sub-committee established by the UK House of Commons Defence Committee to focus on Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) has slammed UK defence procurement and called for far-reaching reform.
The DE&S is a part of the Ministry of Defence responsible for purchasing and maintaining the UK’s military equipment.
In the course of that inquiry, states the Defence Committee, “it rapidly became apparent that, while there are major issues within DE&S, there are also several wider factors, across Defence as a whole, which also materially impact our ability to procure equipment successfully.”
“We believe the system is now in need of major, comprehensive reform,” states the report’s summary. “We have discovered a UK procurement system which is highly bureaucratic, overly stratified, far too ponderous, with an inconsistent approach to safety, very poor accountability and a culture which appears institutionally averse to individual responsibility.”
The inquiry report, titled It is broke – and it’s time to fix it: The UK’s defence procurement system, makes 22 specific recommendations aimed at overhauling the system, including giving Senior Responsible Owners (SROs) greater power over their
programmes and improved rights of escalation “if programmes begin to go badly wrong”.
“These changes should also materially improve accountability to Parliament, which has to vote the funding for defence programmes in the first place,” states the summary.
According to the report, the UK is in need of a defence procurement system that places a much greater value on time, “promotes a sense of urgency rather than institutional lethargy, and prevents endless ‘requirements creep’ by our own military.”
Also emphasised is the importance of improving skills within DE&S, including a professional procurement stream within the military; extending time in post for key positions to improve continuity and giving access to specialist contract lawyers for authoring more robust contracts.
“We also stress that DE&S must improve its relationships with
industry, from increasing transparency about forthcoming requirements, expanding the emphasis on exportability, better defining ‘social value’ in competitions, through to fostering critical skills, preventing skill-fade and encouraging and developing the Defence apprentices and workforce of the future.”
According to the report, these changes are made all the more necessary against the backdrop of war in Ukraine, which it characterises as a ‘game-changer’ in defence and security terms for the UK.
“Faced with a revanchist Russia, which is prepared to use high-tech weapons, from drones to cruise missiles, combined with barbaric methods, we can no longer take our national security for granted,” it stated. “In this new, more challenging environment we need a defence procurement system which can not only equip our Armed Forces to fight and to win, but also sustain them over time”.
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Texel Air, a 100% New Zealand-owned charter cargo airline, has launched its first step to increasing air freight capacity for New Zealand exporters and importers.
Starting with one Boeing 737800 Boeing Converted Freighter (B737-800BCF) aircraft servicing domestic cargo needs, the company will add two additional aircraft by the end of 2023. It plans to have 10 aircraft operating in Australasia by 2026 to service New Zealand and Australian, domestic and Trans-Tasman needs.
Texel Air works with companies in the freight and express industry, airline industry, and governments, rather than selling direct to consumers. With NZ Post and Parceline Express as foundation customers, its launching priority freight flights between Auckland, Palmerston North and Christchurch.
Texel Air Chairman and Founder, John Chisholm, says the airline will give New Zealand more cargo capacity that’s on time, and will invest to bring new technologies to the New Zealand cargo market.
“We are making significant investment in aircraft and technology to enhance connectivity, speed, and efficiency so exporters and importers can rely on our air cargo operations. The pandemic and recent weather events put New Zealand’s supply chain resilience to the test and highlighted the need for additional air freight capacity.
“We have a long partnership with Boeing because of their support, aircraft reliability and innovation. An example is that Texel Air will be one of the first companies in the world using Enhanced Vision System technology and more precise Satellite navigation across our Boeing fleet. This technology will enable our pilots to take off and land in low visibility conditions, thereby providing more fuel-efficient and reliable freight services for our customers.”
Invercargill-born Chisholm has more than four decades’ experience developing airlines, working in freight logistics and building the associated hubs overseas, predominantly in the Middle East. In 2011 he moved back to New Zealand where he has developed a number of business interests,
including a 450-acre sheep and cattle farm.
Whilst Texel Air in New Zealand will initially service the country’s domestic freight needs, the business has a clear plan to serve New Zealand’s offshore needs before the year is out.
“Texel Air is the result of my life’s work in the airline, cargo and logistics industries in the Middle East,” said Chishom. “I had previously founded several airlines including Texel Air Bahrain and the opportunity to now launch an airline in my home country makes me extremely proud.”
“Texel Bahrain has a 98% on time performance rating, meaning our customers can rely on us. We’re focused on enabling faster, more reliable, and fuel-efficient cargo operations across the Tasman and around New Zealand.”
Autonomous flight technology developer Merlin has opened a test facility at Kerikeri as it looks to edge closer to realising autonomous flight vision.
Fixed-wing autonomous flight technology developer Merlin announced on 24 May the opening of its centre for operations in Kerikeri. Housing two Cessna Caravans, the new facility will serve as a test-bed for safety-critical software and hardware while enabling freight carrier capabilities.
With the opening of this facility, Merlin is now equipped with a dedicated test environment to support further technological development and certification activities of its New Zealand-based Cessna Caravans that underpin the capability, safety, and effectiveness of its autonomous flight technology.
Merlin has also partnered with Freightways New Zealand to deliver freight to northern New Zealand, creating a multi-purpose facility that provides substantial and invaluable first-hand experience in freight carrier operations.
The testing completed in New Zealand and the corresponding learnings will guide future development decisions to be implemented worldwide and support the achievement of in-air operability and certification with the Federal Aviation Association (FAA) and Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAA).
This announcement follows Merlin’s recent achievement, Stage of
Involvement (SOI) 1, with the CAA announced on 15 May.
“Before autonomous flight can scale, we must conduct a considerable amount of prerequisite work,” said Shaun Johnson, CEO of Merlin New Zealand. “As a birthplace of aviation innovation, New Zealand has more than 100 years of history-making work. It’s exciting to have Merlin’s best-in-class capabilities here and put them to the test.”
“Our talented team is devoted to ensuring a more resilient air network continues to safely grow globally. With this new facility, we now have the infrastructure needed to modify aircraft with the Merlin Pilot while simultaneously running freight operations in support of rural New Zealand.”
The Merlin New Zealand facility in the Bay of Islands includes
an aircraft hangar, maintenance workshops, and office space.
The primary focus in New Zealand is the advanced development of Merlin technology and certification activities. When possible, this facility is also available to support broader New Zealand aerospace activities, including a recent New Zealand Defence Force parachute training school deployment to the region.
Merlin’s first test aircraft were deployed earlier in the year to assist in the regional flood relief efforts, showcasing Merlin’s commitment to supporting the community in which it works while simultaneously advancing its technical capabilities.
Founded in 2018, Merlin is headquartered in Boston and has offices in Denver, Kerikeri, and Mojave.
$187.4m contract will see delivery of world-class satellite positioning service on one of Inmarsat’s three new I-8 satellites from 2027.
With the 26 May contract signing, Southern Positioning Augmentation Network (SouthPAN) partners Geoscience Australia and Toitū Te Whenua Land Information New Zealand are one step closer to worldclass satellite positioning for the southern hemisphere.
The new SouthPAN satellite service (SouthPAN GEO Payload 01, known as SGP-01) on the Inmarsat I-8 satellite will replace the Inmarsat I 4F1 satellite, which was acquired as part of the SouthPAN test-bed trial.
SouthPAN provides accurate, reliable and instant positioning services across all of Australia and New Zealand’s land and maritime zones without the need for mobile phone or internet coverage. It will improve positioning accuracy to as little as 10 centimetres. Early Open Services have been available since September 2022.
Covering the Asia Pacific region, SouthPAN signals are expected to broadcast services over the new Inmarsat I-8 satellite navigation system for 15 years, commencing from 2027.
A second new SouthPAN satellite service is also being procured to provide redundancy and resilience in SouthPAN that will ensure continuous broadcast of SouthPAN services, enabling the development and use of critical applications relying on SouthPAN.
These satellites will also be a critical part of a safetyof-life-certified SouthPAN for aviation and other applications, scheduled for 2028. These services will be accessed or used by end users engaged in operations where life could be at risk, like landing an aircraft.
“SouthPAN represents extraordinary potential for the region,” said Todd McDonell, President, Inmarsat Global Government. “It can save lives by enabling precision safety tracking, help farmers improve productivity through automated device tracking, or even support transport management systems of the future.”
“We have a long history providing services for Governments in the moments that matter most, and we are delighted that our Inmarsat-8 satellites will continue that legacy well into the 2040s.”
The ground segment of SouthPAN including the network of ground reference stations and satellite uplink facilities is being built by Lockheed Martin Australia as part of a separate contract with Geoscience Australia and LINZ.
SouthPAN will be fully operational by 2028, and combined with other technologies the network will support innovation benefiting many sectors and industries including transport, agriculture, construction, forestry, and horticulture.
Satellite telecommunications company Inmarsat provides telephone and data services to users worldwide via fourteen geostationary telecommunications satellites. On 8 November 2021, a deal was announced between Inmarsat’s owners and Viasat, in which Viasat was to purchase Inmarsat. The acquisition was completed in May 2023.
New Zealand is providing further targeted support for Ukraine’s recovery and resilience, Prime Minister Chris Hipkins has announced.
The Prime Minister and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met on 13 July on the side lines of the NATO Leaders’ summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. The two Leaders discussed New Zealand’s unwavering support for Ukraine and its unequivocal condemnation of Russia’s ongoing aggression.
“We strongly support the underlying objective that Ukraine should determine its own future within its internationally-recognised borders,” Chris Hipkins said.
“New Zealand is providing $1.2 million to the United Nations Development Programme’s Mine Action Programme which has been the UN lead on eliminating the threat posed by land mines in Ukraine since 2016. This contribution responds to Ukraine’s Ten Point Peace Formula’s call for work to ‘prevent ecocide’, particularly through investing in de-mining.
A contribution will also be made to the maintenance of nuclear safety and security, another key pillar of the Peace Formula, with $500,000 going to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its work in Ukraine.
The Prime Minister reiterated that New Zealand remains strongly opposed to the use of nuclear weapons.
The devastation wrought by the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, which provided cooling water for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, has underscored once again
the vital importance of the IAEA’s work there to reduce the risk of a nuclear incident. New Zealand calls on Russia to end its occupation and militarisation of the nuclear power plant.
“We have also committed a further $3 million in recovery and reconstruction assistance for Ukraine. How that is best used to support peace efforts will be developed in consultation with international partners,” Chris Hipkins said.
During the past 16 months, New Zealand has responded to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine through a package of diplomatic, military and humanitarian assistance worth more than $80 million, as well as our support for Ukraine’s legal case
against Russia, sanctions targeting more than 1500 Russian and Belarusian individuals and entities, and the implementation of restrictive trade measures.
“We maintain our resolve to sanction those with a material or strategic role in the conflict. New Zealand plans to implement further sanctions against Russian and Belarusian individuals and entities next week,” Chris Hipkins said.
“These sanctions will target military and economic actors and sectors supporting the continuation of this abhorrent war, as well as avenues being used for sanctions evasion. This supports the broader efforts of our international partners, and makes it harder for Russia to continue to wage war.”
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2023 Yearbook notes the number of operational nuclear weapons is rising as countries’ long-term force modernisation and expansion plans progress.
The nine nuclear-armed states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Israel—continue to modernise their nuclear arsenals and several deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapon systems in 2022.
Of the total global inventory of an estimated 12,512 warheads in January 2023, about 9,576 were in military stockpiles for potential use—86 more than in January 2022. Of those, an estimated 3,844 warheads were deployed with missiles and aircraft, and around 2,000—nearly all of which belonged to Russia or the USA—were kept in a state of high operational alert, meaning that they were fitted to missiles or held at airbases hosting nuclear bombers.
Russia and the USA together possess almost 90 percent of all nuclear weapons. The sizes of their respective nuclear arsenals (i.e. useable warheads) seem to have remained relatively stable in 2022, although transparency regarding nuclear forces declined in both countries in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
In addition to their useable nuclear weapons, Russia and the USA each hold more than 1,000 warheads previously retired from military service, which they are gradually dismantling.
SIPRI’s estimate of the size of China’s nuclear arsenal increased from 350 warheads in January 2022 to 410 in January 2023, and it is expected to keep growing. Depending on how it decides to structure its forces, China could potentially have at least as many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as either the USA or Russia by the turn of the decade.
“China has started a significant expansion of its nuclear arsenal,” said Hans M. Kristensen, Associate Senior Fellow with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). “It is increasingly difficult to square this trend with China’s declared aim of having only the minimum nuclear forces needed to maintain its national security.”
Although the UK is not thought to have increased its nuclear weapon arsenal in 2022, the warhead stockpile is expected to grow in the future as a result of the British government’s announcement in 2021
that it was raising its limit from 225 to 260 warheads. The government also said it would no longer publicly disclose its quantities of nuclear weapons, deployed warheads or deployed missiles.
In 2022 France continued its programmes to develop a thirdgeneration nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and a new air-launched cruise missile, as well as to refurbish and upgrade existing systems.
India and Pakistan appear to be expanding their nuclear arsenals, and both countries introduced and continued to develop new types of nuclear delivery system in 2022. While Pakistan remains the main focus of India’s nuclear deterrent, India appears to be placing growing emphasis on longer-range weapons, including those capable of reaching targets across China.
North Korea continues to prioritise its military nuclear programme as a central element of its national security strategy. While North Korea conducted no nuclear test explosions in 2022, it conducted more than 90 tests of missiles. Some of these missiles, which include new ICBMs, may be capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
SIPRI estimates that the country has now assembled around 30 warheads and possesses enough fissile material for a total of 50–70 warheads, both significant increases over the estimates for January 2022.
Israel—which does not publicly acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons—is also believed to be modernising its nuclear arsenal.
“Most of the nuclear-armed states are hardening their rhetoric about the importance of nuclear weapons, and some are even issuing explicit or implicit threats about potentially using them,” said Matt Korda, Associate Researcher with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Senior Research Associate with the FAS Nuclear Information Project. “This elevated nuclear competition has dramatically increased the risk that nuclear weapons might be used in anger for the first time since World War II.”
“With billion-dollar programmes to modernise, and in some cases expand, nuclear arsenals, the five nuclear weapon states recognised
by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty seem to be moving further and further from their commitment to disarmament under the treaty,” said Wilfred Wan, Director of SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme.
Nuclear diplomacy dealt a further blow by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Nuclear arms control and disarmament diplomacy suffered major setbacks following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In the wake of the invasion, the USA suspended its bilateral strategic stability dialogue with Russia.
In February 2023 Russia announced it was suspending its participation in the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START)—the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty limiting Russian and US strategic nuclear forces. Talks about a follow-on treaty to New START,
which expires in 2026, were also suspended. Nevertheless, by SIPRI’s assessment, both countries’ deployed strategic nuclear forces remained within the New START limits as of January 2023.
Iran’s military support to Russian forces in Ukraine and the political situation in Iran also overshadowed talks on reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 agreement meant to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The JCPOA’s revival now seems increasingly unlikely.
The USA and the UK both declined to release information to the public concerning their nuclear forces in 2022, which they had done in previous years.
“In this period of high geopolitical tension and mistrust, with communication channels between nuclear-armed rivals closed or barely functioning, the risks of miscalculation, misunderstanding or accident are unacceptably high,” said Dan Smith, SIPRI Director. “There is an urgent need to restore nuclear diplomacy and strengthen international controls on nuclear arms.”
The impacts of the war in Ukraine are visible in almost every aspect of the issues connected to armaments, disarmament and international security examined in the Yearbook. Nevertheless, it was far from being the only major conflict being waged in 2022, and acute geopolitical tensions, mistrust and division had been growing long before Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbour.
‘We are drifting into one of the most dangerous periods in human history,’ says Dan Smith, SIPRI Director. ‘It is imperative that the world’s governments find ways to cooperate in order to calm geopolitical tensions, slow arms races and deal with the worsening consequences of environmental breakdown and rising world hunger.’
In this excerpt from his 02 June speech to the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue, Defence Minister Andrew Little acknowledges limits of international rules and institutions against the nuclear threat.
New Zealand’s most recent defence assessment identified climate change and geostrategic competition as the two greatest security challenges to our place in the South Pacific.
To the first issue, partners engaging and re-engaging with Pacific Island Countries are finding that climate change is a security and existential threat in our part of the world. As defence leaders we cannot view climate change as something that only others must grapple with.
But today I want to focus on that second challenge, increasing geostrategic competition in the Pacific and Indian Oceans regions. That issue poses significant risks of miscalculation – particularly when nuclear weapons are part of the calculus.
A number of issues over many years have converged to heighten tensions in our wider region. These include:
• Larger economies significantly growing their military spending and capabilities,
• Intensification of military exercising and challenges to freedoms of navigation,
• Destabilising actions in the South China and East China Seas,
• Rhetoric and actions that might disrupt the peaceable status quo across the Taiwan Strait,
• A Pacific Rim state, Russia, defying the rules-based international order with its unlawful and immoral invasion of Ukraine,
• And the development of longrange ballistic missiles by a pariah state, North Korea.
Added to that difficult environment we have the threat of nuclear weapons. We have seen:
• Rhetoric around the possible use of nuclear weapons becoming more prominent, including false categorisations of so-called tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons,
• States in the region adding to their nuclear weapons stockpiles, including North Korea,
• And growing concerns about a deficit of prudent transparency about the real size of those stockpiles.
New Zealand’s longstanding position on nuclear weapons has no ambiguity.
We believe all nuclear weapons should be verifiably and irreversibly eliminated, because there are no circumstances in which their use could be morally justified. It is not possible to confine all of the effects of the use of nuclear
weapons to a period of kinetic engagement or a zone of conflict. It necessarily follows that the use of nuclear weapons would also breach the fundamental rules of international humanitarian law. We know this because the South Pacific is where superpowers once tested their atomic weapons.
On this issue my country ‘walks the talk’. For 35 years we have had legislation absolutely prohibiting the acquisition, stationing and testing of nuclear weapons in New Zealand.
Nuclear-powered vessels have also been banned in our waters since the Cold War, and this will not change.
Like many states, New Zealand has ratified nuclear non-proliferation and test ban treaties.
An example of this is the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga which established the South Pacific nuclear free zone, and to which we are fully committed.
However it is apparent that international institutions are limited in their ability to act in cases were nuclear super-powers are in conflict.
It is also clear that the mechanisms for the management of crises are lacking, let alone the means to facilitate wider strategic dialogue.
The failure to fully implement verifiable and irreversible elimination of all nuclear weapons is what prompted New Zealand to negotiate and to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
This is the first global treaty to provide for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which would provide the only guarantee that they will never be used again.
It is not enough to cross our fingers and hope for the best. Rational analysis and cool heads are required in the present circumstances. When we see the rising geopolitical tensions and the limited effectiveness of some international institutions, then we must acknowledge that the presence of nuclear weapons, adds a risk of miscalculation that could be truly catastrophic.
For small liberal democracies like New Zealand, we do not get to avoid the real-life effects of geostrategic competition. Our way of life, including the freedoms we cherish and which are guaranteed to all peoples by the UN Charter, can never be fully safeguarded from the effects of nuclear conflict in a world that tolerates nuclear weapons.
But New Zealanders know that our views on nuclear weapons are not shared by everyone. We acknowledge that, in the end, it is for sovereign states to determine how they will ensure their national security, consistent with international law. Do not confuse my country’s moral clarity with wishful thinking.
So New Zealanders must be prepared to equip ourselves with
trained defence personnel, assets and materiel, and appropriate international relationships to protect our own national security. And we are.
We are increasing our military spending and modernising our capabilities across land, sea and air. We have our most precious assets, our people, deployed to hot spots around the world.
My country has a range of security commitments and partnerships, not only with our neighbours but also beyond our region. We value the trust our partners place in us, and we will uphold our promises to them.
And we retain our focus on strengthening multilateral and regional institutions and their role in promoting the safety and prosperity of everyone.
These efforts would be strengthened by a nuclear free region and world. Were it so we could all focus on the other pressing security issues we all face, such as climate change.
New Zealand looks with clear eyes at the world and our own security. We will stand prepared, and will maintain the military capability necessary to contribute to the rules based international order and protection of our free and democratic way of life now and in the future.
In the recently launched 17th edition of the Global Peace Index, New Zealand takes 4th place while 91 countries are now involved in some form of external conflict.
The 17th edition of the annual Global Peace Index (GPI), the world’s leading measure of peacefulness, has revealed that the average level of global peacefulness has deteriorated for the ninth consecutive year, with 84 countries recording an improvement and 79 a deterioration.
According to GPI publisher the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), deteriorations over the past year were larger than improvements, as the post-COVID rises of civil unrest and political instability remain high while regional and global conflicts have accelerated.
Iceland remains the most peaceful country, a position it has held since 2008, followed by Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand and Austria. For the sixth consecutive year, Afghanistan is the least peaceful country, followed by Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Ukraine’s overall score recorded a decline of 13%, the largest deterioration in the 2023 GPI, and is now 157th on the Index. Libya experienced the largest improvement in overall peacefulness, improving by 7% and rising 14 places to 137th.
A shift in the global distribution of conflict continued as major conflicts in the MENA region and South Asia declined, while conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and Asia-Pacific intensified. The Russia
and Eurasia region recorded the largest deterioration in peacefulness in the world.
The impact of violence on the global economy increased by $1 trillion to a record $17.5 trillion. This is equivalent to 13% of global GDP, approximately $2,200 per person, and was due to increased military expenditure owing to the Ukraine war.
The disparity in the economic impact of violence is stark: the ten countries most affected averaged 34% of GDP, compared to just 3% for the ten least affected.
“The 2023 Global Peace Index highlights the contrasting dynamics of militarisation and conflict,” said Steve Killelea, Founder & Executive Chairman of IEP. “On the one hand, the majority of countries are decreasing their reliance on the military, while on the other hand an increasing number of conflicts are becoming internationalised.
“Conflict deaths are the highest since the Rwandan genocide which had over 800,000 deaths and sparked a wave of global action,” he said.
“After the Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syrian wars and now the Ukraine war, it is obvious that the most powerful armies cannot prevail against a well-resourced local population. War has become mostly unwinnable, and an increasingly heavy economic burden. This is
highlighted by the impact of a potential economic blockade on Taiwan, which would result in a global economic recession twice as impactful as the global financial crisis of 2008.”
79 countries deteriorated in the Ongoing Conflict domain, with conflict related deaths increasing by 96% compared to the prior year. Conflict deaths are now at the highest level this century.
The Ethiopian conflict claimed the most lives in 2022 with new data finding that battlefield deaths were over 100,000, while disease and famine related deaths were conservatively estimated at over 200,000. This conflict has been largely hidden from the media because of domestic media restrictions and internet blackouts.
In sub-Saharan Africa, Mali recorded the largest deterioration with conflict-related deaths increasing by 154%, while violence against civilians rose by 570%.
Eswatini experienced the next largest drop in peacefulness in the region.
The Ukraine war has seen the total number of Ukrainians who were either refugees or internally displaced jump from 1.7% before the conflict, to over 30% and is likely to continue increasing. Recent data has found that up to 65% of
men in Ukraine aged 20 to 24 years have fled the country or died in the conflict. The report estimates 83,000 deaths are related to the conflict so far.
The global number of refugees and internally displaced people continues to rise; there are now 15 countries with over 5% of their population displaced.
While China is not currently directly involved in any external conflicts, it has become more assertive in the South China Sea and has intensified aerial operations near Taiwan. The Index indicates that if a Chinese blockade of Taiwan were to materialise, it would lead to a drop in global economic output of $2.7 trillion, or 3% of global GDP in the first year alone.
Almost 60% of this loss would occur in China and Taiwan. The Chinese economy would shrink by an estimated 7%, and Taiwan’s by almost 40%. China’s five largest trading partners are established democracies that are militarily aligned – the US, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Australia.
Although conflict is increasing, more countries are directing military expenditure toward other priorities including healthcare, education, infrastructure, and pandemic recovery. The improvements in militarisation were widespread with every region improving. However, the total military spending increased by 17% since 2008 with the largest increases coming from China ($180 billion), the US ($70 billion), and India ($40 billion).
Drones are being increasingly used in conflicts, including in Ukraine, Ethiopia, and Myanmar. The total number of drone attacks increased by 41% in 2022, with the number of different groups using drones increasing by 24%.
The largest regional improvements occurred in MENA and North America. North America’s improvement was driven by Canada, but the United States deteriorated slightly where homicide rates have risen to levels six times higher than Western Europe.
Since 2016 MENA has seen the largest improvements in peace globally, however it is still the least peaceful region. The epicentre of terrorism has shifted from the MENA region into sub-Saharan Africa, especially the Sahel.
Central America, the Caribbean and South America have recorded substantial deteriorations, falling mainly on measures of repression, violence, and conflict.
Coastal West Africa is at its most peaceful since reporting began in 2008, with countries in the region recording an average improvement of 5% in the past 14 years. The coastal region between Morocco and Ghana recorded no deaths from terrorism in 2022, in contrast to the neighbouring countries in the Sahel.
Europe is still the most peaceful region in the world, despite military expenditure and Neighbouring Country Relations deteriorating because of the Ukraine war. The region is still home to seven of the ten most peaceful countries, with the level of violent demonstrations, protests and riots remaining high. The other three most peaceful countries are in the Asia-Pacific region.
Is violent retail crime trending up in Aotearoa? Yes it is. But so is retail customer-initiated violence. We’re shopping more violently – and we’re shoplifting more violently – in the public squares of the 21st century, writes Nicholas Dynon.
I came across a word the other day that I didn’t recognise: ‘jeremiad’. For a wordsmith like me, not knowing the meaning of a word can be intolerable, so I looked it up.
A jeremiad, Wikipedia told me, is a “long literary work, usually in prose, but sometimes in verse, in which the author bitterly laments the state of society and its morals in a serious tone of sustained invective, and always contains a prophecy of society’s imminent downfall.”
I instantly liked this new word, and immediately turned my mind to the exciting – if not self-indulgent – challenge of how I might make myself look intellectual by dropping it into an upcoming article. The topic of spiralling out-of-control retail crime in New Zealand presented a possible fit.
Media and political commentators tell us that we’re being subjected to increasingly brazen and violent retail thefts – smash-andgrabs and ram-raids in particular. Crime statistics are providing metrics that justify the hysteria.
Could this proliferation of violent thefts by gangs of youths who possess a flagrant disregard for lives, livelihoods, laws and school attendance – and a penchant for posting postcoital ‘theft porn’ –
provide me with the content to justify a jeremiadic rant?
Could I denounce all of society for its wickedness and prophesise its downfall based on the hormone and inflation-fuelled acts of these young criminals alone? Surely not. What about the rest of us good folk, the law abiding consumers who are happy paying for the stuff we want?
I didn’t ruminate on that question for too long before debunking my assumption around “happy” consumers. Customerinitiated violence, aggression and anti-social behaviour is – retailers are telling us – at unprecedented levels far exceeding pre-COVID. If violent thieves stealing their goods isn’t bad enough, retail staff are being subjected daily to verbal and physical abuse by a continuous flotsam of selfrighteously aggressive customers.
The operators and staff of shopping malls, strip malls and dairies across New Zealand have become the new punching bags of an increasingly pugnacious, perfunctory and polarised society. Bruised and bloodied, they stand fast behind their counters as their fellow citizens beat a retreat from civility and descend one ram-raid, one racial slur at a time into modern-day barbarism.
It’s not just the criminals, it’s all of us.
Retail NZ, the peak body for retailers, has expressed concern for some time that criminals have become increasingly organised, brazen and violent.
On 4 May, Parliament’s Justice Select Committee heard submissions from various parties on youth crime trends, including from Retail NZ chief executive Greg Harford. According to Harford, his members are telling him that perpetrators are becoming more brazen and violent via ram raids, aggravated burglaries and shoplifting. Ram raids have increased more than 500 percent since 2018.
In mid-June, retail crime hit Parliament again when MPs received a petition on crime against retailers from the Dairy and Business Owners Group and members of the Chinese community.
In figures released by Foodstuffs on 07 June, reported cases of retail crime at their North Island supermarkets reached 3,285 between February and
April this year (an increase of nearly 40% on the same period last year). Serious offences – burglary, assault, robbery, and threatening behaviour – are up 36%, with repeat offenders responsible for around one third of all reported incidents.
“I see the reports of what our store owners and their people are dealing with on a daily basis, and it’s distressing when we have people threatening our team members with weapons and throwing punches,” said Chris Quin, Chief Executive of Foodstuffs North Island. “Every New Zealander has the right to work in a safe and secure environment and not be threatened, assaulted, spat on, yelled at, or racially abused as they go about their working day.”
“Brazen and violent” isn’t just a catchphrase being used in little old New Zealand to describe the new theft-scape. According to Matthew Shay, President and CEO, of the US National Retail Federation (NRF), “criminal groups have become more brazen and violent in their tactics”.
In its recently published report, Organized Retail Crime: An Assessment of a Persistent and Growing Threat, the NRF’s analysis of 132 Organised Retail Crime (ORC) groups found that 21 groups (16 percent) used at least one violent tactic —smash-and-grab, use of firearms or other weapons, battery, flash mob tactics or threats of violence against store employees or customers.
Fifteen of the 21 violent groups identified by the study began operations in 2021, which, according to the NRF, suggests the uptick in the use of violent tactics during theft operations is a recent development.
Eight in ten retailers that participated in the NRF’s 2022 National Retail Security Survey reported violence and aggression associated with ORC incidents increased in the past year, and a majority of the respondents to surveys conducted in 2020 and 2019 reported that ORC gangs exhibited more aggression and violence compared with the previous year.
The uptick in violent tactics such as smash-and-grab in retail theft was attributed by the study to young or inexperienced thieves, “some of whom may have mental health issues or other problems” (established professional perpetrators were generally nonviolent because they sought to avoid detection).
“Demand for ORC goods may also be sustained by a segment of youth who champion an emergent booster subculture that espouses a vague anti-capitalist ideology, states the report. “Videos tagged with terms related to shoplifting have accumulated millions of views on social media platforms such as TikTok”.
So it’s not just a New Zealand problem. Within several comparable jurisdictions internationally, violent and destructive retail crime, it seems, is being met with an abundance of instant social rewards and a paucity of long-term punitive consequences.
Customer aggression and violence isn’t a new workplace hazard, says the Australian Retailers Association, but COVID-19 saw “an increase in customer aggression and violence for some businesses in the retail sector.”
“During the early months of the pandemic, stores became tinderboxes for a society frazzled by lockdowns, protests and mask mandates,” writes Michael Corkery in the New York Times. “Many workers say that tension persists, even as pandemic tensions recede, and that they need more protections.”
Corkery notes that from 2018 to 2020, assaults reported to the FBI by law enforcement agencies overall rose 42 percent, with significantly higher rates recorded in grocery stores (63 percent) and convenience stores (75 percent). According to the FBI, more than half of active shooter attacks in 2021 occurred in places of commerce, including stores.
When Retail NZ’s Greg Harford spoke to Parliament’s Justice Select Committee just a few weeks ago on the issue of violent retail crime, it was by no means his first trip to the capital.
Back in November 2021 at a Retail NZ Summit on Violence and Anti-social behaviour in Parliament’s Grand Hall, Harford commented that rates of “aggression, violence and anti-social behaviour from members of the public have doubled over the past year, on top of significant increases over the last few years.”
“Many workers say that tension persists, even as pandemic tensions recede, and that they need more protections.”
According to ShopCare, in the year to May 2021, New Zealand retailers experienced an 11 percent increase in “serious behaviours” (aggressive or physically abusive behaviour or brandishing a weapon), and for the grocery sector, there was a 19 percent increase.
And the proliferation of crappy
behaviour doesn’t appear to have ended with COVID. According to a recent piece in The Spinoff by Chris Schulz, aggression continues to appear in the broad sweep of societal interactions, from the supermarket to the petrol pump, workplaces to traffic jams.
“Lockdowns are over, and storms and floodwaters have subsided,” he writes. “But the stresses still seems to be showing up in everyday interactions.”
According to a survey by Griffith Criminology Institute for the Profit Protection Future Forum of companies that operate more than 8,900 stores across Australia and New Zealand, incidences of theft and customer aggression are currently at far higher levels than before COVID-19.
The 2022 ANZ Retail Crime Study found that violence and abuse experienced by frontline retail staff is at record levels, with supermarkets, department and discount department stores bearing the brunt of the increased abuse.
Across the Tasman, things have gotten so dire that states have started to legislate against customer initiated violence. “We’ve seen a frightening escalation in retail crime, where it is now becoming a matter of life-ordeath for workers simply trying to do their job,” said Australian Retail Association CEO Paul Zahra in welcoming the tougher laws.
In New South Wales, changes to the Crimes Act 1900 now make it an offence to “assault, throw a missile at, stalk, harass or intimidate a retail worker in the course of the worker’s duty, even if no actual bodily harm is caused to the worker.” No bodily harm now carries a maximum penalty of 4 years’ imprisonment, actual bodily harm 6 years, and grievous bodily harm 11 years.
Various experts have offered varied explanations for the worsening state of manners at our shopfronts and showrooms. We’re suffering from post-COVID blues, we’re tired, we’re struggling to managing a confluence of financial pressures and international uncertainties, we’re in need of a break.
The explanations offered for the increasing violence of retail crime are similarly inadequate. While it may be so that an influx of young and inexperienced thieves are bringing more violent tactics to retail crime, it still begs the question of why.
I find none of the rationales either singularly or collectively convincing. They provide little meaningful explanation for the moral decline of our citizenry currently playing out in the retail spaces, the public squares, the marketplaces, the points of sale that for centuries have constituted the commercial nuclei around which our cities are built.
One might say that the security industry – much like opposition political parties and puritanical preachers – is not without self interest in calling out spikes in social disorder and violence. According to such an argument, we stand to profit from insecurity-driven increases in demand for our products and services.
But more cameras, more bars, more shutters, more barriers, more guards don’t necessarily make people feel more secure. Like the sight of heavily armed police on the streets, the sight of heavier security measures tends to make people feel that they are living in communities that are indeed less safe.
Over the past several months, New Zealand Police (Retail Crime Prevention Programme) and the Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (Fog Cannon Subsidy) have subsidised the installation by private security operators of tens of millions of dollars’ worth of enhanced security measures in vulnerable stores. But retailers remain fearful.
While the security industry can provide the often unsightly bandages and balms that may treat the symptoms of a more violent, less caring society, finding a cure is an altogether wider public policy challenge.
But to comply faithfully with the narrative intent of the jeremiad, I must not only lament our society’s descent into violence and to ponder its impending demise, but also to offer something in the way of a correction that might assist in the return of society to its ideal trajectory.
No matter the societal malaise that has led to the demise of civility in our civic squares, it appears logical to me that a society functions ideally and avoids entropy when rules of propriety and rules of law are followed – and when transgressors are called out and called to account.
In other words, it is unlikely that safety will come to our shopkeepers, sales assistants, waiters, supermarket workers and checkout operators unless our society – and those responsible for its legal and moral leadership – finds a way to ensure that bad behaviours are penalised and that crime does not go unpunished.
Robust and reliable communication enables Surf Lifesaving New Zealand Search and Rescue to conduct successful inter-agency surf and rescue operations in challenging and remote environments.
Surf Lifesaving New Zealand Search and Rescue (SLS SAR) is increasing safety and efficiency for its interagency training exercises with rugged and reliable communications from public safety and enterprise security provider Motorola Solutions.
The volunteer agency depends on Motorola Solutions’ technologies to deliver rescue and emergency services throughout New Zealand every day. This includes the agency’s support for communities impacted by Severe Tropical Cyclone Gabrielle in February 2023, one of the most damaging weather systems to strike New Zealand in decades.
To prepare for such events, SLS SAR conducts Search and Rescue Exercises (SAREX) involving multiple public safety and emergency service personnel to test operational efficiency and response in the most challenging and remote environments. In these dynamic conditions, reliable communication is essential to helping frontline teams to collaborate seamlessly and coordinate successful operations.
On a recent training exercise amidst towering peaks, waterfalls and narrow fiordlands reaching as high as 1,000 metres in Milford Sound, Motorola Solutions’ MOTOTRBO
SLR 1000 Repeater and rugged DP4000e and MOTOTRBO R7 two-way radios provided extended and interoperable coverage for all
participating agencies. As a fully deployable communications solution, it can be mobilised wherever rescue missions take place.
“By placing the repeater on a mountaintop we remained connected while performing search and rescue training exercises in the lakes 1,000 metres below,” said Max Corboy, Search and Rescue Volunteer.
“Reliability is crucial to us. We’re deploying to remote locations and we need to make sure our team has the best possible equipment supporting them to get their job done. Motorola Solutions gives us that freedom without anyone needing to worry about the communications network that’s sitting behind them,” he said.
Following the successful exercise, Motorola Solutions and NZSAR are
planning further enhancements to deployable mobile communications, including the introduction of live video streaming, body-worn video cameras and software solutions. This will further enhance incident awareness and safety for field-based responders during rescue missions.
“The importance of clear, reliable and interoperable communication cannot be underestimated for frontline responders working in the most challenging circumstances,” said Daniel Leppos, Motorola Solutions’ Director of Channel Business, for Australia and New Zealand.
“Our work to expand SLS SAR’s communication capabilities during training exercises will ultimately lead to safer and more successful rescue missions when it matters most,” he said.
Just-announced measures to combat crime include a new aggravating factor for an adult using young people to commit a crime and aggravated sentence for posting crimes online.
Requiring young offenders to attend education programmes or do community activities 78 more Police prosecutors.
On 17 July the Government announced a range of steps to crack down on an increase in brazen criminal offending. “Prevention, protection and accountability is our focus,” Prime Minister Chris Hipkins said.
“We’re told many ramraids are done for notoriety on social media and the news or petty theft, but we know there’s also a planned or organised crime element to some of them,” he said. “Using a child to commit a crime is cowardly, exploitative and destroys lives, so the consequences must be serious.”
In response, the Government is creating a new aggravating factor that would apply when an adult, whether or not connected to an organised crime group, aids, encourages or incites a person under 18 to carry out an offence.
Posting offending behaviour online will also become an aggravating factor in sentencing.
“This ‘social media amendment’ we’re introducing will apply to adults and young people and provide the courts with an additional consideration when sentencing, and it sends a strong signal that this behaviour is unacceptable,” said the Prime Minister.
Among the changes, the Family Court will be given new powers to require – not request – young offenders (from the age of 10) to undertake community activities, such as cleaning graffiti and picking up rubbish.
“The Family Court will also be able to require that an offender attend an educational, recreational or activity programme,” he said. “That’s really important to get them engaged again and back on track and builds on the work we’re doing to improve school attendance.”
Victims will be entitled to attend Care and Protection Family Group Conferences for the first time in relation to children over 10. It will force the offender to confront the victims whose lives they are harming.
“None of this is about locking up children and perpetuating the cycle of crime. It’s about accountability and consequences to help break the cycle of offending. We’ll continue the careful and intensive work we’re doing to prevent young people from undertaking crime in the first place.”
Police Minister Ginny Andersen said the Government is also backing the Police to pursue criminal offending through the courts by boosting the prosecution service with an additional $26 million to help clear the case backlog in the District Court.
“This funding will allow Police to add up to 78 full time equivalent staff to prepare their in-court work against those who’ve committed serious crimes,” Ginny Andersen said.
World Excellence Awards – the organisation that runs the Outstanding Security Performance Awards (OSPAs) – has announced that the first-ever Global OSPAs will take place in 2025
The 17 July announcement by OSPAs founder Professor Martin Gill is a key milestone in an awards programme that in the space of a decade has expanded from three countries to dozens. The new development means that category winners from each country will qualify for entry to the global awards.
The awards scheme began in 2015 with events in Norway, Australia, and Germany and since then, Benelux, Canada, France, India and South Asia, Kenya, New Zealand, Nigeria, Romania, South Africa, Southeast Asia, and USA have been added to the programme. 2023 saw the annual OSPAs being held in Aotearoa for the second time.
According to organisers, the OSPAs have been designed to be ethical, and based on values of being independent, credible, transparent, and respectable. They do not appoint the judges, they are nominated by supporting associations and interest groups; the judges mark to an ethics policy, they mark independently against published criteria.
The OSPAs are seen by many as one of the most prestigious accolades to be awarded in the security sector around the world. In New Zealand, the OSPAs awards night has since its inception in 2022 been hosted in conjunction with the
ASIS International New Zealand Chapter’s annual Certification Dinner.
“When we started the OSPAs we always envisaged and were working towards the Global OSPAs, that is why the categories are the same, the judging criteria is the same, and the judges are selected in the same way in all countries,” said founder of the OSPAs Professor Martin Gill.
“Ten years on we are ready to recognise the outstanding performers in security globally. We are excited by the prospect that everyone who enters the OSPAs in 2024 has the chance of not only winning in their country but in the world.”
Categories that are included in the Global OSPAs are:
• Outstanding In-House Security Manager/Director
• Outstanding Contract Security Manager/Director
• Outstanding Security Team
• Outstanding Security Company (Guarding)
• Outstanding Security Consultant
• Outstanding Security Training Initiative
• Outstanding Security Installer/ Integrator
• Outstanding New Security Product
• Outstanding Security Partnership
• Outstanding Security Officer
• Outstanding Female Security Professional
• Outstanding Young Security Professional
• Outstanding Equality, Diversity and Inclusion Initiative
• Outstanding Security Sustainability Award
The first OSPA global event will take place virtually at the beginning of 2025 with further details to be published on the Global OSPAs website in due course.
Friday 15th September 2023
Te Pae Christchurch Convention Centre
These awards are an opportunity for us to recognise and celebrate excellence, outstanding service and performance within the New Zealand security industry.
If you know an individual or organisation who is making a difference to our industry, please nominate them for an award.
NOMINATIONS CLOSE 5PM, FRI 11th AUGUST 2023
Join us for a celebratory evening as we announce the award winners!
Friday 15th September 2023, Te Pae Christchurch Convention Centre
Crowne Plaza Christchurch
Accor Group – Ibis Christchurch and Novotel Christchurch
Visit our website for full event information, including to make a nomination, register for the Awards evening and book discounted accommodation: www.security.org.nz/nz-security-awards-2023
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