IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // #23 // FEBRUARY 22
THE STATE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM IN 2022 AUTHOR Dr. Colin P. Clarke is the director of research at The Soufan Group, a global intelligence and security consultancy. He is also a senior research fellow at The Soufan Center, an associate fellow at the International Centre for Counterterrorism (ICCT) – The Hague and serves on the editorial board of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Terrorism & Political Violence, and Perspectives on Terrorism.
CHACR The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR or the British Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
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S THE WORLD’S attention remains focused on Russia and Ukraine, it is clear that the return of great power politics is here to stay. Yet as much as policymakers would like to put twenty years of counterterrorism in the past, it’s not simply something to move on from. In many ways, counterterrorism has become a second-tier priority, seemingly overnight. The truth is, great power competition and counterterrorism are not incompatible – just the opposite. Each can serve as a complement to the other, an important recognition, particularly for countries with leaner budgets and more limited force structures that want to avoid becoming overstretched and under-resourced. There is little question that terrorism in 2022 looks much different than it did even just a decade ago. This essay will lay out several important trends in terrorism worldwide, while also providing a roadmap for where things could be headed next. It will conclude with an assessment of factors that will impact current trends, highlighting signposts for counterterrorism practitioners seeking to stay ahead of the curve. The most important trends in terrorism are the decentralization of the global jihadist movement; the rise of transnational far-right extremism; violent non-state actors leveraging emerging
“ALL OF THE CHALLENGES OF TERRORISM ARE EXACERBATED, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, BY THE ONGOING COVID-19 PANDEMIC.” technologies toward nefarious ends; and the diversion of resources from counterterrorism toward priorities and objectives related to great power competition. All of these challenges are exacerbated, in one way or another, by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. DECENTRALIZATION OF THE GLOBAL JIHADIST MOVEMENT The two behemoths of the global jihadist movement – al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) – have been significantly weakened from Western counterterrorism efforts. Still, these organizations have not been defeated, their affiliates, franchises, and branches forming a global network of terror hubs that ebb and flow in strength. Sub-Saharan Africa has become an epicentre of jihadist groups, stretching from the Sahel in West Africa to the Horn in East Africa and all the way down the coast to Mozambique. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP),
Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa alMuslimin (JNIM), and Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS) have destabilized West Africa.1 AlShabaab in Somalia and Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), with branches in both Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), have each conducted cross-border attacks, demonstrating regional capabilities and the potential for spill over violence.2 During the course of 2021, there was an increase in jihadist attacks in Somalia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Mozambique, Niger, Mali, and Kenya, a trend expected to continue into the foreseeable future. Other countries in Africa previously spared jihadist violence, are now at risk, including Togo, Benin, Ghana, and Senegal. Both Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire are faced with a growing problem and the former recently experienced a coup that could further imperil its counterterrorism efforts. The Taliban takeover of >>
Jacob Zenn and Colin P. Clarke, “Al Qaeda and ISIS Had a Truce – Until They Didn’t,” Foreign Policy, May 26, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/26/al-qaeda-isis-west-africa-sahel-stability-jihadi-groups 1
Brenda Mugeci Githing’u and Tore Refslund Hamming, “‘The Arc of Jihad’: The Ecosystem of Militancy in East, Central, and Southern Africa,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), 2021, https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/ICSR-ReportThe-Arc-of-Jihad-The-Ecosystem-of-Militancy-in-East-Central-and-Southern-Africa.pdf 2
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IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // THE STATE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2022 >> Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 has been a major morale boost for the global jihadist movement and will inevitably lead to the rejuvenation of terrorist networks throughout South Asia.3 In particular, al-Qaeda will be a significant beneficiary, since its close relationship with both the Taliban and the Haqqani network will provide al-Qaeda’s leaders with an opportunity to use Afghanistan as a sanctuary.4 According to the United Nations, this is already happening, as alQaeda and other jihadist groups in Afghanistan now “enjoy greater freedom there than at any time in recent history.”5 The result is not necessarily that al-Qaeda will immediately begin planning attacks on the West; after all, it behoves the Taliban to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a staging ground once again for transnational terrorist attacks. But preventing al-Qaeda from regrouping is a matter of both will and capability and many analysts question whether the Taliban will have the bandwidth to deal with this issue, especially as it contends with a growing insurgency waged by Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), the Islamic State’s Afghan province.6 For its part, the United States and its Western allies will seek to monitor developments
Credit: Cpl Scott Robertson, Crown Copyright
“THE DRAWBACKS TO RELYING ON DRONE STRIKES FOR COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS WAS EVIDENT IN THE LATE AUGUST STRIKE... [WHICH] KILLED TEN CIVILIANS AND WILL LIKELY MAKE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MORE CIRCUMSPECT ABOUT ATTACKING TARGETS.” in Afghanistan and rely on what U.S. President Biden has labelled an ‘over-the-horizon’ counterterrorism capability.7 There are a number of challenges with this approach, including a paucity of human intelligence now that U.S. troops have been completely withdrawn from the country.8 The drawbacks to relying on drone strikes for counterterrorism operations was evident in the late August strike, intended to retaliate against ISK terrorists responsible for the suicide bombing at Karzai International Airport that killed 182 people, including thirteen
U.S. troops.9 Instead, the strike killed ten civilians, including seven children, and will likely make the Department of Defense more circumspect about attacking targets.10 Moreover, decapitation strikes have been fundamentally flawed in the respect that they have been treated as a strategy instead of a tactic.11 Due in large part to the success of its branches and provinces worldwide, there has been less focus on the Islamic State’s activities in Iraq and Syria, its traditional heartland and base of operations. But as the late
January prison break in Hasakah, Syria has proven, IS is far from defeated and although it may no longer control large swaths of territory, it remains viable as an insurgency, capable of launching attacks with impunity across long distances throughout the Levant.12 In early February, U.S. Special Operations Forces raided a compound in north western Syria that led to the Islamic State’s leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi detonating an explosive vest, killing himself and his family in the process. With alQurayshi dead and IS undergoing a leadership transition, it could cause a disruption in commandand-control, leading regional branches to focus more on local issues than the global jihad. Another possibility is that Islamic State’s next leader prioritizes external operations, seeking to attack the West to demonstrate potency and rally supporters. Throughout the Middle East and North Africa, there are a number of remaining hotspots where jihadist groups affiliated with either IS or al-Qaeda could rebound, including Libya, Yemen, or any number of other weak states riven by civil war, in some cases stoked by external regional powers and virulent sectarianism. To this end, Iran continues to be the archetypical state sponsor of terrorism, training and >>
Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware, “The Afghanistan Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover Mean the Terror Threat is Back,” NBC News, August 19, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/think/ opinion/afghanistan-withdrawal-taliban-takeover-mean-terror-threat-back-ncna1276807 3
Colin P. Clarke, “Al Qaeda is Thrilled That the Taliban Control Afghanistan –But Not for the Reason You Think,” Politico, September 7, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/09/07/al-qaeda-taliban-complex-relationship-509519 4
Edith M. Lederer, “UN Experts: ‘Terrorist Groups’ Enjoy Freedom in Afghanistan,” AP, February 9, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/islamic-state-group-afghanistan-asia-united-nations-syria-55a15d0a370f657aa60ccc1282b603c6 6 Colin Clarke and Jonathan Schroden, “Brutally Ineffective: How the Taliban Are Failing in Their new Role as Counter-Insurgents,” War on the Rocks, November 29, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/brutally-ineffective-how-the-taliban-are-failing-in-their-new-role-as-counter-insurgents/ 5
Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware, “Biden’s Syria Strike is an Important Win – but Underscores the Folly of Leaving Afghanistan,” The Hill, February 8, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/ national-security/593347-bidens-syria-strike-is-an-important-win-but-underscores-the-folly 7
Tore Hamming and Colin P. Clarke, “Over-the-Horizon is Far Below Standard,” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/05/over-the-horizon-biden-afghanistan-counter-terrorism 8
For more on the evolution of the ISK threat, see Amira Jadoon, Abdul Sayed, and Andrew Mines, “The Islamic State Threat in Taliban Afghanistan: Tracing the Resurgence of Islamic State Khorasan,” CTC Sentinel, Vol.15, Iss.1, January 2022, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan 9
Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt, Azmat Khan, Evan Hill, and Christoph Koettl, “Newly Declassified Video Shows U.S. Killing of 10 Civilians in Drone Strike,” New York Times, January 19, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/19/us/politics/afghanistan-drone-strike-video.html 10
Stephen Tankel et al., “Book Review Roundtable: Leadership Targeting,” Texas National Security Review, October 12, 2021, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/book-review-roundtable-leadership-targeting
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Ben Hubbard, “ISIS, Thriving in Unstable Places, Proves It’s Still a Threat,” New York Times, January 31, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/29/world/middleeast/isis-syria-iraq.html
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RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISM Jihadist terrorism is not the only transnational threat, even as it has been the most prolific and lethal in the contemporary era. The past decade has also witnessed the steady growth of transnational far-right extremism, a broad term that encompasses white supremacy, neo-Nazism, and anti-government extremism. In some cases, the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the trajectory of far-right extremism, as anti-lockdown protesters and individuals opposed to vaccinations (so-called antivaxxers) and vaccine mandates have infused the movement with new life, a phenomenon taking place from the U.S. to Europe to Australia.13 From Norway to New Zealand, racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists have committed high-profile terrorist attacks against civilians. Groups like
Credit: Ivan Radic
>> equipping violent non-state actors and armed militias in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Bahrain. With Iranian assistance and close oversight provided by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF), groups like Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Shia militias in Iraq continue to refine their capabilities and master the use of high-end weaponry. Iran has also provided funding and support for Sunni terrorist groups, including Palestinian Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
the Atomwaffen Division (AWD), The Base, the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), and the Nordic Resistance Movement have each established transnational networks. If the current tensions between Ukraine and Russia intensify and move toward more kinetic action, there could be an influx of foreign fighters to the region, with far-right extremists joining both sides of the conflict, as has occurred in the past.14 To date, the United Kingdom has proscribed numerous far-right extremist groups, including The Base, National Action (NA), Feuerkrieg Division (FKD), Sonnenkrieg Division (SKD), and AWD.15 Canada has proscribed The Base, the Proud Boys, AWD,
National Socialist Order (NSO), Blood and Honour, Combat 18, and RIM. In the UK in particular, far-right extremists have been young – in 2020, nearly 60 percent of those arrested in connection with far-right extremism have been 24 years old or younger.16 2020 was not an anomaly, but rather, the continuation of a trend. Between 2016 and 2020, the number of referrals to the UK’s counterextremism strategy PREVENT in England and Wales doubled for individuals under 20-years-old.17 Given that young people have been spending inordinate amounts of time online during the pandemic, this could very well morph into a generational challenge, with the average age of people getting involved in extremist circles
continuing to decrease over the next several years. Transnational far-right extremism is even more decentralized than the global jihadist movement. Lone wolves remain a primary concern, as evidenced by the attacks of Anders Breivik, Brenton Tarrant, Patrick Crusius, Robert Bowers, and other notorious farright extremists. But there are also institutional concerns, particularly as this ideology has gained traction in Western militaries. Germany in particular has struggled with this challenge.18 However, no country is immune from the threat posed by the radicalization of highly trained and well-disciplined members of law enforcement, military, or intelligence services. >>
Colin P. Clarke, “The Newest Variant of Violent Extremism? Using Paranoia About the Pandemic as a Recruiting Tool,” Los Angeles Times, January 9, 2022, https://www.latimes.com/ opinion/story/2022-01-09/covid-vaccines-paranoia-recruiting-extremists-terrorism14Colin Clarke and Jonathan Schroden, “Brutally Ineffective: How the Taliban Are Failing in Their new Role as Counter-Insurgents,” War on the Rocks, November 29, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/brutally-ineffective-how-the-taliban-are-failing-in-their-new-role-as-counter-insurgents 13
Christopher Miller, “Ukraine’s Far-Right Forces See An Opportunity in Russia’s Invasion Threat to Grow Their Violent Movement,” BuzzFeed News, January 31, 2022, https://www. buzzfeednews.com/article/christopherm51/ukraine-russia-invasion-far-right-training 14
Several other groups are designated under a synonym or umbrella group or by affiliation, including Scottish Dawn, National Socialist Anti-Capitalist Action (NS131), System Resistance Network (SRN), and National Socialist Order (NSO). 15
Lizzie Dearden, “Three-Quarters of Children Arrested on Suspicion of Terror Offences Are Far-Right Extremists,” The Independent, July 6, 2021, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ uk/home-news/child-terrorists-uk-far-right-b1878535.html 16
“UK to Proscribe Neo-Nazi Group The Base in Continued Crackdown on Far-Right Extremism,” The Soufan Center IntelBrief, July 15, 2021, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-july-15 17
Katrina Benhold, “As Neo-Nazis Seed Military Ranks, Germany Confronts ‘an Enemy Within,” New York Times, July 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/world/europe/ germany-military-neo-nazis-ksk.html; Florian Fade, “The Insider Threat: Far-Right Extremism in the German Military and Police,” CTC Sentinel, Vol.14, Iss.5, June 2021, https://ctc.usma.edu/ the-insider-threat-far-right-extremism-in-the-german-military-and-police 18
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IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // THE STATE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2022 OTHER FORMS OF TERRORISM There are, of course, other forms of terrorism to be concerned about, especially in attempting to peer around the corner to see what threats could metastasize, or others that could be resuscitated. To be sure, while ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism was more prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s, more recent iterations of these groups remain a concern. In Northern Ireland, Brexit has led to an increase in sectarian violence, with dissident IRA groups and a new generation of paramilitaries to contend with. In Ethiopia, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has conducted terrorist attacks as it pursues secessionist objectives. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and People’s Protection Forces (YPG) remain active in Turkey and Syria, respectively, and motivated by ethnonationalism and leftist ideology. To be sure, there could be an uptick in left-wing terrorism in the near future.19 The YPG has attracted foreign fighters, including many from the United States and Europe who self-identify as anarchists and anti-fascists (Antifa). These fighters even organized their own English-speaking platoon known as the “Antifa International Tabur” which helped the YPG in its fight against ISIS.20 Militant anarchists and anti-fascists have also travelled to Ukraine and, like neo-Nazis and other far-right extremists, have fought on both sides of the conflict.21 Credit: fabrikasimf / www.freepik.com
There are other issues that could catalyse more incidents of left-wing violence. As climate change becomes widely accepted as an existential threat, more young people feel that their governments are not doing enough to deal with the challenge. As such, as occurred at various points in the 1990s with groups like Earth Liberation Front (ELF), eco-terrorist groups could turn to violence in order to call greater attention to their cause.22 It is not out of the question that in the future, we could once again see terrorist groups similar to the Red Army Faction (also known as the Baader Meinhoff Gang), which targeted wealthy industrialists and other symbols of capitalism. Wall Street and Silicon Valley have generated backlash among younger generations, who blame the corporate world for growing socio-economic inequality. There are also other nontraditional types of terrorism that have manifested, including attacks from an internet subculture of violent misogynists known as ‘Incels,’ or involuntarily celibate, and so-called technophobes or neo-Luddites, which is a growing demographic of individuals who have destroyed property and infrastructure to push back against what they see as encroachment of technology, the advent of 5G and artificial intelligence, and robotics and automation. Similar themes once motivated Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber. Finally, there is the growing prevalence of ideological convergence, or ‘salad bar ideologies,’ which is a
“ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES, 3-D PRINTING, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ALL ENABLE INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL GROUPS TO PUNCH FAR ABOVE THEIR WEIGHT.” phenomenon where terrorists and extremists select discrete components of various ideologies across the spectrum.23 WHICH FACTORS WILL IMPACT CURRENT TRENDS? There are several factors and exogenous variables that will inevitably impact the trajectory of current trends. Unfortunately, most of these work in favour of terrorists and against the fortunes of counterterrorism forces and security agencies. Three factors in particular will present obstacles to nation-states: the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic; terrorists’ continued experimentation with emerging technologies; and the diversion of resources away from counterterrorism and toward great power competition. Governments and nation-states, more than terrorist groups, have been overwhelmed by the pandemic, struggling to respond to a number of contingencies. This means thinking about how to reallocate resources, whether funding, emergency personnel, or equipment, to address the whole-of-society challenge posed by COVID-19. Meanwhile, terrorist groups have used the pandemic as a propaganda boost, crafting narratives that resonate with vulnerable populations.24 Far-right extremists in particular have benefited from the
pandemic, rallying supporters against COVID-related lockdowns, vaccines mandates, and other public health measures, painting them as tyrannical and motivated by a desire by governments to control their populations. Oftentimes, far-right propaganda is aided by mis, dis, and mal-information (MDM) and inextricably linked with conspiracies. While emerging technology can serve as a force multiplier for counterterrorism forces, as advances in biometrics have demonstrated, recent advances still favour terrorists. Encrypted communications, virtual currencies, unmanned aerial vehicles, 3-D printing, and artificial intelligence all enable individuals and small groups to punch far above their respective weight.25 Time and again, terrorists and other violent non-state actors have proven an ability to learn from failure, adapting and evolving to innovate and master new technologies.26 Spurred by the vast disruption caused by the pandemic, some terrorists may be newly motivated to acquire biological or chemical weapons. There is growing concern that terrorists may seek to capitalize upon ‘do-it-yourself ’ (DIY) communities of online learning to hone expertise on gene >>
Colin P. Clarke, “Trends in Terrorism: What’s on the Horizon in 2022?” Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), December 8, 2021, https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/12/ trends-in-terrorism-whats-on-the-horizon-in-2022 19
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Samuel Hodgson, Austin Blair, “Behind the Black Bloc: An Overview of Militant Anarchism and Anti-Fascism,” Foundation of Defense for Democracies, June 14, 2021, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/06/14/behind-the-black-bloc 20
Sara Meger, “War Junkies: Why Foreign Fighters are Flocking to Ukraine,” ABC News AU, May 3, 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-04/ukraine-foreign-fightersmeger/11054728 21
Colin Clarke and Rasha al-Aqeedi, “What Terrorism Will Look Like in the Near Future,” Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, June 29, 2021, https://newlinesinstitute.org/ nonstate-actors/what-terrorism-will-look-like-in-the-near-future 22
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Credit: senivpetro / www.freepik.com
>> editing tools and technologies like Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats, or CRISPR, to create viruses or other lethal byproducts that could be unleashed on civilian populations.27 With many Western countries, including the United States, shifting resources from counterterrorism to great power competition, there will be myriad parts of the globe that inevitably experience a resurgence in terrorism, insurgency, and extremist violence. Areas throughout the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and fragile states in vulnerable regions will be left to contend with a growing terror threat while the U.S., France, the UK and other Western militaries reorient force posture toward
state-based challenges. Building partner capacity and security cooperation programs will become even more important, as host nation forces are tasked with counterterrorism, border security, and peacekeeping missions. Still, Western countries must remain sober in their assessment of host nation capabilities and modest about how much can be achieved through train and equip programs, as evidenced by the rapid collapse of the Afghan National Security and Defense Forces over the course of several weeks in August 2021.28 CONCLUSION The misnomer ‘Global War on Terrorism’ gave the false impression that terrorism was something to be defeated. But terrorism is a tactic. More
precisely, it is politically or ideologically motivated violence. This means that terrorism has always been with us – and will continue to be. The key for government officials and intelligence agencies is to understand how and why terrorism is evolving, and as such, to allocate the resources necessary to combat this scourge. Getting this right is not just an academic exercise. We should avoid, at all costs, the false paradigm of great power competition or counterterrorism. Western countries can and indeed must do both and there are valuable lessons to be learned from two decades of cooperation and intelligence sharing among allies and partners. Similar firewalls between domestic and international terrorism also merit reconsideration in many Western countries.
While finishing research for a paper published by The Soufan Center in October 2021 and sponsored by the Airey Neave Trust in the UK, researchers conducted interviews with a range of intelligence officials and policymakers. In describing the current threat landscape, one quote stood out, in particular, from a retired senior UK intelligence official: “nothing ever falls off the plate.”29 In other words, while past threats from ethno-nationalist groups and jihadist organizations persist, new threats have manifested, especially from the far-right. Policymakers need to update their understanding of the threat, which is growing more complex and diverse than at any point in recent memory, just resources are being diverted elsewhere.
Statement of Dr. Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “The Dynamic Landscape and What it Means for America,” Congressional Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, February 2, 2022, https://homeland.house.gov/imo/media/doc/miller-idriss_testimony_full_020222.pdf; The Soufan Center, “IntelBrief: The Counterterrorism Challenge of ‘Salad Bar’ Ideologies,” March 29, 2021, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-march-29/; Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware, “The Terrorist Threat from the Fractured Far Right,” Lawfare, November 1, 2020, https:// www.lawfareblog.com/terrorist-threat-fractured-far-right 23
Colin P. Clarke, “Yesterday’s Terrorists are Today’s Public Health Providers,” Foreign Policy, April 8, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/08/terrorists-nonstate-ungoverned-health-providers-coronavirus-pandemic 24
Audrey Kurth Cronin, Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
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Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Colin P. Clarke, “Terrorists and Technological Innovation,” Lawfare, February 2, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/terrorists-and-technological-innovation
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Antonio Regalado, “Top U.S. Intelligence Official Calls Gene Editing a WMD Threat,” MIT Technology Review, February 9, 2016, https://www.technologyreview. com/2016/02/09/71575/top-us-intelligence-official-calls-gene-editing-a-wmd-threat 27
Jonathan Schroden, “Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces,” CTC Sentinel, Vol.14, Iss.8, October 2021, https://ctc.usma.edu/lessons-from-the-collapse-of-afghanistans-security-forces 28
The Soufan Center, “A Perfect Storm: Insurrection, Incitement, and the Violent Far-Right Movement,” October 4, 2021, https://thesoufancenter.org/research/a-perfect-storm-insurrection-incitementand-the-violent-far-right-movement 29
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