CHACRDIGEST#34
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Much of the analysis around the conflict in Gaza has focused on political and strategic problems, including the lack of a ‘day after’ plan and the long-term prospects of an Israeli-Saudi normalisation deal. However, the conflict also holds important lessons for how an advanced military fights in complex urban terrain. A recent report by the Royal United Services Institute has sought to identify the transferable lessons for the British Army from the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) operations in Gaza City in autumn 2023. The report’s findings relate to several warfighting functions: mounted and dismounted close combat; combat engineering; subterranean operations; fires; information operations; and humanitarian support operations. While many of the IDF’s tactical and organisational innovations are context specific, the report highlights the decisive role played by tactical-level firepower in shaping the battlefield to the IDF’s advantage. Much of this organic firepower is based on the use of small drones operated at the platoon-level. Kerry Chávez and Ori Swed, writing for the Modern War Institute, elaborate on the use of tactical strike unmanned aircraft systems by lower echelon IDF units. These systems provide small units with greater situational awareness and the ability to conduct precision strikes in direct support of tactical manoeuvres.
ULTRA-ORTHODOX JEWS TO SERVE IN THE IDF
Last month, Israel’s Supreme Court ordered the government to start conscripting ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) men into military service, effectively ending the de facto exemptions granted to the Haredi community in 1948. The Haredi exemption has taken on increased political importance in Israel following Hamas’ attack on 7 October 2023. The IDF’s plans to extend the length of service for conscripts and reservists in February of this year generated huge backlash by highlighting the unequal burden placed on non-Haredi Jewish Israelis. The Institute for National Security Studies in Israel has highlighted the severe strains on manpower facing the IDF, arguing that plans to conscript an initial cohort of 3,000 Haredi men falls well short of requirements (the IDF currently requires another 20,000 soldiers across combat and combat support roles). While drafting Haredi men might solve some of the IDF’s manpower shortfalls, Daniel Statman, writing for The Israel Democracy Institute, draws attention to some of the practical issues facing the military. Issues such as male-only spaces for Haredi soldiers will provide a challenge for the IDF, which operates under the model of a ‘people’s army’ and has employed women in combat roles since 2000.
REVIEW OF UK DEFENCE
The Ministry of Defence recently announced a “root and branch review of UK defence” to be headed by Lord Robertson, a former secretary general of NATO. As part of the review process the new Labour government will set out its priorities for defence. Ben Barry and Nick Childs, both senior fellows at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, suggest that one of the major decisions facing the new government will be whether to sustain and resource the UK’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific. While Labour has voiced its support for the Australia-UK-United States defence agreement (AUKUS), the authors argue that the UK may be forced to scale back its ambitions in the region in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. By contrast, a report for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute urges the new government to resist the temptation of reducing the UK’s forward defence posture in the Indo-Pacific, arguing that Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security are closely linked. At an organisational-level, Matthew Savill, the director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute, argues that the defence review will need to address the issues the UK Armed Forces currently faces in generating, deploying and sustaining combat power. He suggests that this “will require hard thinking and prioritisation”.
Media reports in July claimed that US intelligence agencies had uncovered a plot by the Russian security services to assassinate Armin Papperger, the chief executive of the German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall. Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russia’s security politics and the host of In Moscow’s Shadows, argues that the reports suggest a shift in Russia’s approach. To date, Russia has focused on targeting individuals it considers ‘traitors’ – Maxim Kuzminov, for example, a Russian helicopter pilot who defected to Ukraine, was killed in Spain. Galeotti suggests that Russia’s alleged targeting of Papperger is part of a deliberate Kremlin strategy to signal Russia’s hardening resolve and to impose costs on Ukraine’s European backers. He also highlights how these sabotage attacks are often conducted by proxies such as criminal gangs, making it harder to trace specific acts back to the Russian government. A report by The Insider, Re:Baltica and Delfi highlights the recruitment of Baltic citizens – and particularly those with criminal backgrounds – to gather intelligence and conduct acts of sabotage on behalf of Russian intelligence.
RUSSIAN MILITARY MODERNISATION PLANS
Russian battlefield losses in Ukraine continue to mount. In May, UK officials claimed that 465,000 Russian troops had been killed or wounded since February 2022. The rate of Russian losses has also increased as a result of the recent new offensive near Kharkiv. Yet, the Russian Armed Forces appear to believe that they can sustain these rates of attrition; they have continued to exert consistent pressure on Ukrainian defences along much of the front line. Indeed, in parallel to its war in Ukraine, the Russian military is pursuing a series of reforms aimed at reconstituting and regenerating its fighting forces. Chatham House published a report in July aimed at assessing the Kremlin’s ability to rebuild and modernise Russia’s armed forces across the land, sea, air, space and information domains in the medium-term. The report concludes that, despite high battlefield losses, “the Russian military remains a force capable of contesting peer and near-peer competitors”.
Following the first US general election debate between President Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump on 27 June, polls in key battleground states moved against Biden. On 21 July, Biden announced that he would not be seeking re-election. These events have forced global policymakers to start planning for the prospect of a new Trump administration. In a policy brief for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Célia Belin, Majda Ruge and Jeremy Shapiro develop fictional foreign policy scenarios for Ukraine, the South China Sea, strategic industrial policy, NATO, the Middle East and closer US ties to European populists following an imagined successful 2024 Trump re-election campaign. Much will depend on which Republican foreign policy camp is most influential in a second Trump administration. However, the report highlights some of the difficult trade-offs and policy dilemmas that European leaders may face if Trump is re-elected on 5 November. For the new UK government, Luigi Scazzieri, a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform, argues that a second Trump presidency will increase the pressure for closer alignment between the UK and Europe on security and trade issues. Writing for the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, research adviser See Seng Tan claims that a second Trump term would also likely have serious implications for the US’ allies in Asia. He expects that a new Trump administration would double-down on a confrontational strategy towards China, forcing Asian powers to continue to navigate the escalating tensions between Washington and Beijing.
NEWS STORIES TO WATCH OUT FOR
With the US presidential election, tensions in the Middle East and conflict in Ukraine continuing to dominate headlines, here are some other topics to keep an eye on:
The head of Japan’s Maritime Self Defence Force, Admiral Ryo Sakai, resigned on 19 July after more than 200 military officials were punished for misconduct over their mishandling of classified information. His resignation comes one week after Japan released its annual defence white paper which focused on the threat posed by growing cooperation between China, North Korea and Russia.
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan held talks with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in Kazakhstan in July. It is the first meeting between the two leaders in nearly two years as President Erdogan seeks to cement his country’s economic ties with China.
Vietnam’s Communist Party chief, Nguyen Phu Trong, died on 19 July, raising questions about who will succeed the influential party chief. Trong spearheaded Vietnam’s push to open its economy to foreign investment and became the first party chief to visit the US when he travelled to Washington DC in 2015.
Syria held parliamentary elections on 15 July as President Bashar al-Assad seeks to project an image of strength and legitimacy to domestic and international audiences. It is the fourth series of elections in the country since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. Assad uses elections to reward regime loyalists.
Violent protests have broken out in Bangladesh over how civil service jobs are allocated by the government. Under the current system, a third of jobs are reserved for the relatives of veterans from the country’s war of independence from Pakistan in 1971.
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE US
The failed assassination attempt on former president Donald Trump at a campaign rally in Pennsylvania has refocused attention on the use of assassinations to bring about political change. Following the killing of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in July 2022, Bruce Hoffman, the senior fellow for counter-terrorism and homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations, warned about the accelerating threat of political assassinations. He argued that high-profile politicians and officials, as symbols of the state, are an attractive target for state-sponsored and lone wolf terrorists aiming to sow chaos and division. Writing for CTC Sentinel in May, Pete Simi, Gina Ligon, Seamus Hughes and Natalie Standridge claim that the US has seen a significant increase in ideologically motivated threats to public officials since 2013. While the authors are quick to underline the distinction between attacks and threats, they argue that the rise in threats of targeted violence is exerting severe pressure on the US’ systems of governance. The authors also claim that the threat landscape in the US has evolved significantly over the last decade. Of the ideologically motivated threats identified by the researchers, 43 per cent were fuelled by anti-government, anti-authority violent extremist sentiment compared to only nine per cent linked to Salafi-jihadist ideology.
GEN Z PROTESTS IN KENYA
Kenya has been mired in unrest since 18 June after protests were organised to demand that the government ditch its controversial tax reforms. On 25 June, protesters stormed Kenya’s national parliament building in Nairobi, and the protesters have since broadened their demands to include grievances such as corruption. The BBC’s The Documentary interviewed several young Kenyans about their motivations for joining the protests. All interviewees described tough economic conditions and anger at widespread youth unemployment. Meron Elias, the East and Southern Africa analyst at the International Crisis Group, explains the background to the protest movement. The report urges the government to repair its relationship with the public by ensuring that the victims of police violence receive justice – the police response has led to the deaths of at least 50 people. The report also warns that many other African countries face similar economic challenges to Kenya; and there is a risk the fallout from Kenya will spread throughout the continent.
REFORMIST CANDIDATE WINS IN IRAN
Reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian beat hardliner Saeed Jalili in the presidential run-off election in Iran on 5 July; Pezeshkian secured 54.76 per cent of the votes on a turnout of 49.68 per cent. The first round of the vote on 30 June saw voter turnout fall to 40 per cent, the lowest election turnout since 1979. The regime often touts high voter turnouts to demonstrate its legitimacy; however, voter apathy in Iran has deepened amid a worsening economic crisis and the harsh security crackdown following the 2022 protests. Pezeshkian’s victory has raised hopes that Tehran may seek to improve ties with the West. Writing for The Henry L. Stimson Center, Javad Heiran-Nia, the head of a think-tank in Tehran, argues that Pezeshkian’s foreign policy approach will be “practical and pragmatic” and neither anti-East nor anti-West. Experts at the Middle East Institute suggest that Pezeshkian’s victory may offer a small window of opportunity for Western governments interested in diplomatic engagement with Tehran; however, they also agree that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei still retains ultimate authority over the country’s national security and foreign policy approach.
