CHACRDIGEST
The views expressed in this Digest are not those of the British Army or UK Government. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. chacr.org.uk
ISRAEL / GAZA
A week, according to Harold Wilson, is a long time in [geo] politics so the prospect of compiling a monthly digest signposting the most insightful articles from across the world is always going to be a difficult task. Whilst the word ‘unprecedented’ is regularly misused and often reflects a poor grasp of history (‘unfamiliar’ is perhaps more fitting), a week has been a very long time in the global events of September 2024.
On the 18th September Israel, according to Hezbollah’s late leader Nasrallah, crossed red lines and made a declaration of war. Israel’s audacious series of attacks on pagers and walkie talkies, seemingly 15 years in the planning, killed at least 37 people and injured thousands of Hezbollah members. The escalation was widely covered. Bronwen Maddox at Chatham House stressed that whilst Israel’s intelligence agencies may have sought to repair their reputation after the failure of the Hamas attack on the 7th October and deter Hezbollah, in reality their actions will not enable Binyamin Netanyahu to “return the residents of the north safely to their homes”. Ultimately, she concluded, Israel risks regional escalation without a strategy for peace. It is also notable that Israel seems to have ignored the concerns of US and regional neighbours, evidenced perhaps by the timing of the attacks only a day after the US diplomatic envy, Amos Hochstein, visited Israel to discourage escalation. In addition to American powerlessness, commentators – including Urban Coningham for RUSI – have emphasised that Israel has demonstrated Iran’s weakness in protecting their proxy Hezbollah. In effect “Hezbollah’s military arsenal is virtually paralysed” according to Lina Khatib (Chatham House) whilst Emile Hokayem at IISS noted ‘Hizbullah’ has been outgunned and outwitted and now faces its greatest test to date. Notably RUSI identified wider implications around increased global scrutiny on supply-chain sabotage and, at the time of writing, the most intense strikes on southern Lebanon in over a year suggest an impending ground offensive to inflict on Hezbollah “an increasing price”.
RUSSIA / UKRAINE
President Putin, speaking to the Russian Security Council on the 25th September, revised Russian nuclear doctrine and warned Western countries of “war” if they allowed Ukraine to strike targets in Russia using NATO provided weapons. This follows what the IISS called the US and UK’s clumsy indecision on lifting restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western precision missiles.
President Biden and Prime Minister Starmer expressed “deep concern” about Iran and North Korea supplying weapons to Russia and POLITICO quoted US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s statement that Russia had received Iranian ballistic missiles and will likely use them in Ukraine within weeks to “threaten wider European security”. Of even greater escalatory concern is a Reuters article, citing a European intelligence agency, that reports a long range attack UAV weapons programme has been established in China for use by Russia. Meanwhile, the US have increased security assistance to Ukraine (more armoured fighting vehicles, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and ammunition for the HIMARS rocket systems) and US industrial capacity (from 14,000 155mm shells a month in February 2022 to 40,000 now and a projection of 100,000 a month by the end of 2025).
Nevertheless, Keir Giles, writing in The National Interest, argues the Ukrainian Kursk offensive has demonstrated Moscow’s unwillingness to escalate the conflict vertically (or horizontally towards NATO) following the crossing of multiple red lines. However, rather than emboldening NATO, this leads Giles to conclude the US and Germany have decided it is not in their broader strategic interest for Russia to be defeated and Ukraine will need to continue to pursue bold moves to delay a “surrender to Putin”. This view
is echoed by Giles’ Chatham House colleague James Sherr, writing for the Estonian Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) think tank, who argues Ukraine’s Kursk operation has failed to change the narrative outside Ukraine. As a result, Putin remains convinced that time is on his side as Ukraine is fully dependent on the west and there will be no change of policy in Washington. What victory looks like for Ukraine is covered in detail by academics including Mark Galeotti and former UK Defence Attache to Kyiv and Moscow, John Foreman.
Giles’ point about the lack of an effective Russian response to NATO actions to aid Ukraine was supported, in part, by Sir Richard Moore, Chief of MI6 and Bill Burns, Director of the CIA, at a Financial Times event on the 7th September with the former claiming “the fact that Russia is relying on criminals to carry out covert operations is a sign of desperation”. However, the threat of Russian sabotage, long identified by The Economist, is explored in the RUSI Journal. The report suggests Russian sabotage operations have now reached unprecedented levels as they aim to increase the costs of support for Ukraine and slow the delivery of military supplies. This is combined with a significant global disinformation campaign (including by Russian intelligence services across West Africa and the Sahel) that is detailed in a recent RAND report and accompanying webinar and identifies lessons to counter future Russian campaigns, including by pre-bunking disinformation. This pre-eminent part of global competition is also highlighted by Yuval Harari in The Economist, with Russia identified as the most active foreign adversary trying to influence the US presidential election and China focused on influencing other actors across the world. What is clear, as Chatham House suggests by analysis of the arrest and scapegoating of Russian defence leaders, is that President Putin and the Kremlin continue to prepare for a long war
CHINA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
Despite reports about a potential escalation in Chinese support to Russia, International Affairs suggests China is increasingly adopting a softer diplomatic tone to avoid further isolation. This is assessed to be the result of internal economic challenges and the need for global economic stability to sustain growth. However, as Yuval Harari suggests, aggressive Chinese influence campaigns in Africa have been hugely successful, supported by the visit of 50 African leaders to the ChinaAfrica summit in Beijing and a $50 billion pledge by Xi Jinping to boost China-Africa ties and renewable energy.
This is in contrast to China’s weakening grip on Myanmar’s most powerful armed groups, highlighted by three days of live-fire exercises along the border by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army last month.
At the end of August, attacks by an increasingly sophisticated Baloch Liberation Army killed more than 70 people across Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan. This has prompted concerns over damage to Balochistan infrastructure projects such as the development of Gwadar port and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the risk of a recurrence of violence with Iran. The Pakistani government have blamed Pakistan’s enemies, although – as Chatham House point out – the escalating violence reflects Pakistan’s abject failure to provide meaningful representation to, and address the grievances of, the Baloch people. The result of a poorly conceived militarised security approach may yet have regional and global implications.
UNITED KINGDOM
As the UK Ministry of Defence and Government undertakes its most recent defence review, RUSI has highlighted a previous iteration’s goal to become a technology superpower. This will require high performing industrial policy and an innovation ecosystem, investment in higher education and commercial research and, perhaps most critically, resilience against the multiple adversaries intent to steal UK intellectual property and disrupt progress. As the UK government conducts its current review, RUSI points out ensuring security and resilience without stifling innovation is an epochal challenge.
From the cutting edge to the now, old hat, RUSI has also extolled the virtue of UK nuclear modernisation to the UKUS relationship; both as the only nation that had pledged its nuclear deterrent to NATO and as part of supporting the US to confront a ‘two peer problem’ of simultaneously deterring both Russia and China. Whilst a move away from a nuclear capability is unthinkable, only time will tell if the UK increases nuclear weapon investment when so many other UK land, air and maritime capabilities are in dire need of updating.
Kashim Shettima, Vice President of Nigeria, has demanded a permanent seat for African countries and the power to veto, during the United Nations 79th General Assembly in New York. This comes after a US proposal, by United States Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, to allocate two permanent seats (but not the power to veto) to African nations on the UN Security Council. The proposal was no doubt raised in the context of US hopes for African support ahead of the UN Summit of the Future and as a counter to Russian and Chinese influence. Whilst potentially transformational, it could also deepen divisions among African nations (such as the growing conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia over the latter’s Grand Renaissance Dam and Egypt’s consequent military alliance with Somalia), weaken collective African interests and exacerbate existing power imbalances.
Meanwhile US and western focus on ensuring access to Algerian oil and natural gas, in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, means they have barely raised any concerns over the re-election of the 78-year-old incumbent, Abdlemadjid Tebboune. He won the recent election with 94 per cent of the vote amid widespread criticism for disqualifying all but two of the 34 candidates and claims of election fraud. Western nations are also keen to minimise criticism for African nations for fear of exacerbating current trends. Africa continues to be a theatre of active operations for Russia, most notably in the Sahel and Sudan where increased Russian and Chinese influence is in stark contrast to the dramatic drop in US, UK and French influence and demonstrates Africa’s evolving geostrategic place in a multipolar era. Meanwhile, the horrors of the war in Sudan threaten to have global repercussions.
AMERICAS
And as if that wasn’t enough to worry about, President Javier Milei’s promise of increased Argentine defence spending (from 0.5 per cent of gross domestic product to two per cent over the next decade) – despite nearly one in five Argentines living in extreme poverty – raises the prospect of an increased threat to the Falkland Islands. The move seems all the more bizarre in the context of slumped consumer spending and the removal of entire government departments – including the Culture Ministry. Whilst the move could demonstrate an intent to combat internal organised crime, recent Argentine history suggests the population would be rightly suspicious about a return to a policing role for the military. As The Spectator points out, with all the other priorities at hand, increased defence spending doesn’t seem to make sense.
OUT NOW...
l “It is clear to me that we face a convergence of threats. And that time is not on our side. Russia, rearming and restocking, will continue to contest Euro-Atlantic security. Within a few years the Chinese could seek to realise their ambitions militarily over Taiwan. Iran, with deepening investment in nuclear weapons, conventional weaponry and its axis of resistance, will continue to divide its region. And North Korea’s leader shows an undiminished appetite to sustain the militarisation of the Korean peninsula. All are dangerous individually, but as they converge at pace and scale, they could present an acute strategic threat from as early as 2027. This demands that we accelerate modernisation to meet a sharper timeline.” – General Sir Roly Walker, Chief of the General Staff – writing in the latest edition of The British Army Review – on the Service’s ‘need for speed’. chacr.org.uk/media/british-army-review
