CHACRDIGEST
November 2024 witnessed the re-election of Donald J Trump as President of the United States – a result that could have consequential ramifications for specific countries and regions around the world, as extensively covered by Chatham House. The month also saw – amongst other events – a G20 summit, UN climate talks in Azerbaijan, a tentative Israel/Hizbollah ceasefire, an escalation in US permissions to Ukraine and a Russia-North Korea defence treaty that, according to one commentator, marks the beginning of “a global war, the goal of which is to destroy the existing international system”.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Chatham House highlighted unpredictability and inconsistency as hallmarks of Trump’s first presidency, a term initially considered an aberration. The US’s allies now fear he might sacrifice Western values and accelerate a new (but equally unpredictable) transactional world order in his second presidency. The approach of European leaders is split: some are seeking to develop strategic autonomy by ‘Trump-proofing’ whilst others are seeking the best bilateral they can, a factor that may impact European defence industrial cooperation. Nevertheless, say the commentators, considering Trump an aberration won’t work anymore, countries need to adapt to the new international order.
Bronwen Maddox at Chatham House highlighted the most likely immediate global impact to be tariffs on Chinese goods with a potential economic blow to European growth, especially if China dump overproduction in Europe, causing Europe to compete with an influx of cheaper Chinese goods.
In foreign policy terms, negotiations over Ukraine, normalisation of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia (including Israeli commitment to a Palestinian state) and withdrawal from global climate talks are likely to dominate. Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy will likely result in varying degrees of withdrawal from international organisations; creating a vacuum that China, who’s sovereignty based alternative to Western-led universal human rights is gaining traction, will exploit. Equally, China’s influence in the UN and on international climate cooperation will allow them to increasingly shape emerging global norms. In sum, world events will be less affected by US-China relations than on each country’s increasing (or decreasing) relationship with the rest of the world. RUSI’s article on Türkiye balancing relations in order to develop their own place in a global technology/ artificial intelligence race builds on this concept. As does the Chatham House article on Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet, which emphasises the employment of Cold War-esque tactics of diversification and counterbalancing.
In ‘special relationship’ terms, Maddox is clear significant current and historic barriers will prevent a close personal relationship between Trump and the Starmer Government.
MIDDLE EAST
In the Gulf region, Trump’s response to the attack on Saudi oilfields in September 2019 shattered US protection expectations of longtime partners’ interests and provoked self-reliance policies and greater cooperation across the Gulf. This pragmatic solution is likely to endure, hedging and de-risking a predictably unpredictable Trump presidency. However, for Jordan, they have three reasons to be concerned. Jordan’s place as a moderate security partner and unique actor status is under pressure from the potential re-emergence of the Trump-sponsored Abraham Accords, and an increase in the UAE’s value. Meanwhile, normalisation between Saudi Arabia and Israel could further reduce Jordan’s importance to Washington. Equally, if the US enabled Israel’s annexation of the West Bank and forced a humanitarian crisis, international pressure for Jordan to accept an unpalatable number of Palestinian refugees could grow drastically.
Whilst President Joe Biden brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hizbollah on the 27th November, albeit a fragile one, what is unclear is what the Trump Presidency’s reaction will be to the issuing of arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court on the 22nd November for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. The warrants, issued on charges that Israel targeted civilians and used starvation as a method of war, means all 124 member states are obliged by the court’s founding statute to arrest and extradite the suspects for trial in The Hague. Israel, however, is not a signatory member state, nor is the US.
RUSSIA / UKRAINE
What is also unclear is what Trump’s actions regarding Ukraine will be. Trump appears ambivalent to Ukraine’s plight, beyond preventing any increase to the $175 billion of economic and military aid, as detailed in this Council on Foreign Affairs article.
As a result, President Zelensky fears Trump might force unpalatable terms in the context of US reports that Ukraine only has enough soldiers for six to 12 months of fighting before facing shortages. Plus, the emergence of more than 11,000 North Korean soldiers in Ukraine and a strategic agreement between Russia and North Korea to “immediately provide military and other assistance” builds pressure on Kyiv and has wide ranging ramifications including reducing Korean reliance on China and increased threat to South Korea. RUSI’s article suggests it has irreversibly changed the dynamics of the war, reduced Putin’s domestic political risks and costs, and made it a global conflict. The article notes, alarmingly, that “despite the reluctance of Western leaders and societies to recognise it, a global war, the goal of which is to destroy the existing international system and build a new one, is already underway”.
Meanwhile, an International Institute of Strategic Studies article details how Russia is expanding its solid-propellant motor-production facilities in what US officials have described as the ‘most ambitious expansion in military manufacturing since the Soviet era’. The article, based on commercially available Maxar satellite imagery and declassified CIA reports, highlights substantial investment since 2023 and suggests that whilst short-range ballistic missile production is currently insufficient, the facility could enable Russia to update its existing capabilities.
In this context the recent Gallup poll is noteworthy, as it indicates Ukrainians are less hopeful about the future with 52 per cent in support for negotiating an end to the war as soon as possible, even with territorial concessions. A year ago it was only 27 per cent whilst the percentage determined to fight ‘until victory’ has dropped from 63 per cent in 2023 to 38 per cent. However, Ukrainian capability and morale were given a boost in perhaps one of the final acts of the Biden White House. Jack Watling at RUSI questions how Ukraine, with its increasing paucity of combat troops, will be able to meaningfully (and strategically) exploit the advantage created by permission to use ATACMS inside Russia, noting there are more operational targets inside Ukraine already than the number of available missiles. If not optimised, he fears they “might affect the timeline of events without actually altering the trajectory”. Targeting economic and industrial targets would have maximum effect in subsequent negotiations although Watling suggests it’s unlikely the Biden administration’s decision is based on close strategic cooperation with Trump-led negotiations.
In terms of the incoming President, Chatham House have identified that Trump is not incentivised to allow a bad deal for Ukraine. He’ll not want the world to think President Putin outsmarted him, both for personal vanity reasons and to maintain the potential for China, Iran and others to fear him in his second term.
On Russia, Mark Galeotti’s In Moscow’s Shadows podcast provides a fascinating insight into Russian strategic culture (which was the basis for a presentation he recently gave to the Advanced Command and Staff Course in the UK Defence Academy). Galeotti frames Russian strategic culture as a result of Russia’s size, vulnerability to attack and traditionally inefficient agricultural economy that forced the Tsar (or latterly the General Secretary of the Communist Party) to impose crippling taxation. This led to what Galeotti refers to as the “three As” of Russian strategic culture. Authoritarian centralism to maintain order; aggressive defensiveness, borne from a lack of natural barriers and characterised by Catherine the Great when she said “I have no way to defend my borders but to expand them” and by President Putin when he advocated ‘throwing the first punch’. Both of which lead to asymmetric assumptions –unconventional methods to counterbalance more powerful adversaries.
Strategic culture is also discussed in depth by Dr Lawrence A. Kuznar in this US Army War College podcast and his Strategic Culture paper. He identifies that historical context and four key variables (identity, values, norms and perceptions) shape strategic culture, and then influence strategic behaviour. To use Russia as an example, he highlights Russian values of nationalism and militarism and a “greater Russia” national identity, which then shapes Russian perceptions and perceived vulnerabilities.
Following the UK granting permission for the use of Storm Shadow missiles alongside ATACMS from the US (see above), Andrei Kelin, the Russian Ambassador to the UK, declared in a media interview that Britain was “directly involved” in the Ukraine war – echoing President Putin’s statement that Russia “have the right to use our weapons against military facilities of the countries that allow to use their weapons against our facilities”, which was followed shortly afterwards by the use of novel intermediate range ‘hypersonic’ missiles.
This places the upcoming Strategic Defence Review in a potentially new and challenging context. The Council on Geostrategy advocates powerfully for the centrality of sea power to the national effort and, consequently, recommends the new government to place sea power at the heart of its agenda. RUSI Associate Fellow Dr Andrew Curtis proposed a radical reform to UK defence management, reorganising senior management and improving organisational resilience and agility.
More broadly, across Europe, the imperative to focus on defence continues at pace with 18 EU member states demonstrating their intent to increase cooperation and share development costs of air and missile defence systems. Anticipating a reduction in US investment in Europe, Elizabeth Braw, writing for Engelsberg Ideas, advocates building regional defence groupings. Meanwhile, Lithuania’s defence spending target has increased to 3.5 per cent whilst Poland’s is set to rise to 4.7 per cent of gross domestic product next year. This emergence of Poland as a strategic actor is covered in more depth by the Danish Institute for International Studies. The policy paper argues that as Poland is established as a central hub for NATO’s defence strategy in the region it has
CHINA AND INDO-PACIFIC REGION
Whilst the introduction of Korean soldiers has been covered by European based commentators, it is also discussed by Feng Yujun in Sinification. He considers that North Korea and Russia had no alternative but to forge closer ties as they strive to restore Cold War-era blocs and draw in China. Feng, however, is clear China doesn’t want to establish military alliances with Russia and North Korea or slide into a new Cold War. Equally, there are significant drawbacks of temporary alliances that lack genuinely shared strategic interests and values.
Closer to home for China, the Center for Strategic and International Studies examined China’s options short of invading Taiwan, including the growing possibility that China could quarantine or blockade the island. Helpfully they defined the two terms; quarantine being a law enforcement-led operation to control maritime or air traffic whereas blockade is a military-led act of war. Either would severely impact the $2.5 trillion annual trade that flows through the Taiwan Strait and which constitutes more than 20 per cent of global maritime shipping.
As a parting note, this month Sweden sent out the booklet In case of crisis or war across the country. The information, issued five times since the Second World War, details how to prepare personally for the effects of war, natural disasters and cyber or terror attacks.
After all the articles read this month, the author is reminded of a line in the film Spy Game when Robert Redford’s character asks the question “when did Noah build the Ark?”, before providing the answer, “before the flood… before the flood”.