In-Depth Briefing: Understanding Multi-Domain Operations by chacr_camberley

MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS UNDERSTANDING

MULTI-Domain

Operations

The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence, British Army or US Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk

(MDO) is a term that, despite its ubiquity in the contemporary debate on warfare literature and increasing prevalence in doctrine, remains ambiguous and contested. In both military and academic communities of interest, the term elicits reactions ranging from uncertainty about what it is, to scepticism about whether it will ever be fully realised, to confusion between MDO as an exercise in technology versus a full-scale transformation in the military instrument of power.1

Nevertheless, MDO-influenced operational concepts, doctrines and technologies are likely to continue to inform force developments not only in NATO and its members but also in our adversaries over the coming decades.2 MDO, in essence, is not going away and militaries and their components will need to adapt to this reality.

This is part one of a two-part series on MDO and explores the basic ideas common to MDOinfluenced concepts, highlights why militaries are pursuing them and some of the key challenges militaries face when they are

implemented. The second part will be an in-depth examination of the MDO-related forcedevelopment efforts in the United States and NATO.

WHAT ARE MDO?

Defining MDO is a difficult task. The veritable word salad of acronyms and phrases that dominate the debate cause significant levels of misunderstanding for those who do not follow operating concepts and doctrinal development closely – and even for some who do. Further, although similarities exist between all MDOinfluenced operating concepts and force development efforts, the reality is that there are important divergences between countries and organisations in technologies, developmental status and ultimate intent.

Indeed, as part two of this series will show, in the United States, the country which is the furthest ahead when it comes to implementing the core tenants of MDO, each service branch has its version of what MDO means for them and somewhat confusingly only the US Army uses MDO as a doctrinal term describing a new way of operating.3 With the rest of the services and the US as a joint force using a range of other

acronyms. Consequently, we should not assume, for example, that just because they use similar names, MDO-influenced force development initiatives in the United States are aligned or are being replicated in NATO’s ongoing effort to become, in their parlance, an MDO-enabled alliance.4 This problem is likely to be magnified as each alliance member implements their version of MDO and therefore we require some clarity and a common understanding if militaries are to move the debate forward regarding both the pros and cons of MDO.

SOME COMMONALITIES

Despite these disparities there are some general ideas that are

1Davis Ellison and Tim Sweijs, “Empty Promises? A Year Inside the World of MultiDomain Operations,” War on the Rocks (January 22, 2024).

2China has also begun working on a concept called Multi-Domain Precision Warfare. See: US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2023), 40-41.

3In 2022, the US Army updated its operations doctrine FM 3-0 to include MDO. See: Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations (Washington D.C: Department of the Army, 2022).

4NATO ACT, Multi-Domain Operations in NATO – Explained (October 05, 2023).

common across all MDO-related concepts. At their most basic but ideal form, MDO are about maximising fighting power through the merging of current and future technology, updated doctrine and the operational art of the commander and their staff. However, reaching this ideal form will be extremely challenging and as this piece points out there are legitimate questions regarding the viability and resilience of both the technologies and concepts that inform MDO and states’ ability to fully operationalise them in terms of organisational transformation, cost and logistical depth.

Despite the divergence in national and alliance approaches to MDO, there are some identifiable common principles and concepts. First, by their very name, MDO-influenced force development efforts focus on better integrating both the domains of space and cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum into warfighting. This entails empowering commanders and their staffs to utilise these domains in the same way that effectors in the other domains are used.

This leads to the concept of

convergence which is commonly associated with MDO-related concepts. Convergence implies that instead of components synchronising and de-conflicting their effects during planning and targeting cycles as commonly occurs now during joint operations, effects from all domains will be integrated and synchronised.5 This will allow commanders to simultaneously and, if necessary, continuously engage targets or sets of targets with a variety of kinetic and nonkinetic effectors.

While to some this may seem self-evident as a common-sense application of capabilities, in reality this requires pulling these often stove-piped capabilities, that are normally held at the strategic level, down to the operational and likely, in the future, tactical levels. This is therefore not only a technical exercise in integrating these capabilities into existing and future planning and command and control systems. It is also an organisational one which will require new ways of sharing data internally between services and internationally between allies and providing commanders and their staffs with the knowledge,

expertise, doctrine and organisational structures to use these capabilities effectively.

Second, all MDO efforts emphasise leveraging the now vast amounts of available data to generate faster and more efficient effects across the battlefield. This boils down to rapidly integrating the data inputs from multiple sources including, satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, aircraft, groundbased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance nodes and even open sources such as social media to not only build a more comprehensive and accessible red-blue operating picture but also to enable rapid and effective targeting and execution.

By necessity, this requires connecting a diverse array of systems into one command and control (C2) architecture. This is the primary reason that discussions of MDO are so closely linked with artificial intelligence and machine learning as it is needed to process and analyse much of this data thereby requiring the introduction of human-machine teaming across the planning and execution processes.

Connecting these two principles is the idea that militaries and, in particular, commanders will need to change their mindset when it comes to planning and execution. Instead of viewing the area of operations through the lens of each service, it should be understood as a set of interconnected domains that can be influenced by a range of effectors no matter the origin.

As an example, the 2020 US Air Force Doctrine Note 1-20 argues that under the US concept of Joint All Domain Operations: Commanders should consider all domains from the beginning of the planning process and be empowered to coordinate dynamic all-domain re-tasking throughout execution. This requires a planning and execution paradigm shift. Regardless of service or domain affiliation, commanders should effectively leverage forces and capabilities from all domains.6

“MDO-INFLUENCED FORCE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS FOCUS ON BETTER INTEGRATING BOTH THE DOMAINS OF SPACE AND CYBERSPACE AND THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM INTO WARFIGHTING.”

Despite a number of ongoing efforts, the implications of this for militaries, as traditionally hierarchical organisations, have yet to be fully explored, but as MDO-influenced concepts become embedded as doctrine, changes in C2 structures and lines of authority and delegation are likely to occur. For example, one common thread that can be found across MDO concepts is an emphasis on mission command or the delegation of authority lower down the chain of command. This is due to the understanding that the operating environment is likely to be characterised by disrupted C2 networks reducing

5Rebecca Segal, “Who ‘does’ MDO? What Multi-Domain Operations Will Mean for – And Require of – The Army’s Tactical Units,” Modern War Institute (October 03, 2023); Curtis E. Lemay Center, “Fires,” Air Force Doctrinal Publication (AFDP) 3-99 Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), (October 08, 2020), 1-2.

6Curtis E. LeMay Center, Air Force Doctrine Note 1-20, USAF Role in Joint AllDomain Operations (March 05, 2020), 3.

the ability of tactical-level units to communicate with higher echelons and that speed in execution will require greater delegation. For example, the US Marines when discussing their, still in development, MDO-influenced Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept write: Planning for EABO avoids a high degree of scripting and top-down direction, which usually aims to minimize uncertainties; rather it must lead to understanding the mission, intent and broad guidance, creating freedom of action and maximising opportunities for subordinates.7

Related to this is the seeming emphasis on moving toward a more dynamic and systemoriented line of C2, tailored to the specific operational theatre and away from the linear, hierarchical lines that exist today. For example, lower-level tactical units could access targeting data from numerous sources directly without the need to be fed such data through the hierarchy of the force they are attached to.8

Finally, a further commonality and sometimes source of confusion is where MDO will occur or where

“MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS ARE ULTIMATELY A REACTION TO THE RAPID, ALMOST EXPONENTIAL DEVELOPMENT IN EMERGING DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES INCLUDING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ROBOTICS AND AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS, BIG DATA ANALYTICS AND THE PROLIFERATION OF PRECISE LONG-RANGE STAND-OFF

WEAPONS AND EFFECTORS.”

the capabilities for MDO will be held. It is now apparent that in most (but not all) iterations of MDO, most capabilities will be held or controlled at the highertactical or operational level. For example, in a US Army context MDO-related capabilities such as cyber effects or long-range precision fires will likely be held at the corps level or above.9 This does not mean that the tactical level will not experience MDO.10 Tactical units of all services will act as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance nodes in their area of operations while also dealing with the realities of the modern battlefield such as unmanned systems and operating under conditions of persistent surveillance. Tactical-level commanders may also benefit from the effects MDO-enabled operations will produce. However, in the current iterations of MDO

for most (but not all) personnel operating at the tactical levels, training and operations will for now not fundamentally change.11

WHAT PROBLEM IS IT MEANT TO SOLVE?

Another way to grasp what MDO are, is to ask what problem are they meant to solve. This question results in four broad answers, none of which are correct in isolation but have explanatory power when taken as a set of interconnected factors that inform the trajectory of MDO development. The first is MDO-related concepts, and particularly those coming out of the United States, are primarily a response to the capabilities of China and to a far lesser extent Russia. China, now declared the pacing threat by the US military, has developed a set of capabilities which could deny

the US freedom of manoeuvre in operational areas proximate to the Chinese littoral and maybe even beyond. It is likely that China has now gained superiority over the United States in certain war-fighting areas and therefore US force development is now aimed at rectifying this through exploiting what it perceives as its inherent technological and human advantage.

The second is that MDO are ultimately a reaction to the rapid, almost exponential

7Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations 2nd Edition (May 2023), 2-5.

8Ibid, 7-9.

9Congressional Research Service, Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), (January 02, 2024). https://sgp. fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11409.pdf

10For some excellent work on MDO at the tactical level see: Jesse L. Skates, “MultiDomain Operations at Division and Below,” Military Review (January-Februaru 2021): 68-75; Steve Maquire, “Multi Domain Operations Below the Division,” The Wavell Room (September 03, 2021); Rebecca Segal, “Who ‘does’ MDO? What MultiDomain Operations Will Mean for – And Require of – The Army’s Tactical Units.”

11It is important to point out that the tactical level units of each service will contribute to and experience MDO in a different way.

development in emerging disruptive technologies including artificial intelligence, robotics and autonomous systems, big data analytics and the proliferation of precise long-range standoff weapons and effectors. The logic of this argument is that militaries can gain significant advantages from utilising these developments, particularly if they face a shortfall in quantitative measures of military power such as platform numbers. Relatedly, the argument follows that if militaries do not respond now to these developments, they will either be left behind by adversaries who could use them in a future war or could be left trying to innovate and introduce systems responsively during the heat of high-intensity warfare.

The third explanation is that MDO is just an extension of what came before it. Instead of being revolutionary, it is an evolutionary development of joint operations, built upon previous conceptual iterations of exploiting technology for operational gains such as network-centric warfare. In this sense, MDO should not be viewed as an effort to reform how the military operates, but rather as the next natural stage of a force development movement that has been in play since the Cold War. Thus, an MDO-enabled force is not an aim-point but rather just a conceptualisation of the next step in warfighting development which emphasises the leveraging of connectivity, data and precision.

The fourth explanation, and this better applies to countries other than the United States, is that the pursuit of MDO is an emulative process. There has been a historical tendency for NATO

12See: Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “Military Transformation in NATO: A Framework for Analysis,” in Theo Farrell, Terry Terriff & Frans Osinga (eds.), A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change (California: Stanford University Press, 2010): 1-13.

“FEW PEOPLE FULLY UNDERSTAND WHAT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CAN DO NOW OR WILL BE ABLE TO DO IN THE FUTURE, LET ALONE WHAT IS REQUIRED TO EXPLOIT ITS FULL POTENTIAL.”

and members of the alliance to allow the US to shape and drive force transformation.12 In part, this is an effort to maintain interoperability and in part, it likely represents a desire to keep pace with what is viewed as the pre-eminent world military despite the lack of requisite technological, financial and human resources. This is also true for US adversaries. China also is now seeking to implement its version of MDO. This does not mean that these emulative efforts have no value, nor are they exercises in pure replication. Instead, what the United States military is doing will likely have a significant long-term influence on others and hence is worthy of significant attention.

CHALLENGES

It is vital to also highlight that the entirety of MDO implementation efforts face formidable challenges to their full implementation. Foremost is the technological challenge with many of these operational

concepts relying on technologies that are either in their developmental or conceptual stages. Long experience with failed procurement processes or technologies that do not live up to their billing should and do provide militaries with pause as to their ultimate ability to deliver what has been promised.

Indeed, just taking artificial intelligence as an example, few people fully understand (including this author) what artificial intelligence can do now or will be able to do in the future, let alone what is required to exploit its full potential in terms of data needs, organisational changes, legal concerns, alliance management issues and security. It is certainly true that such technologies will likely have great utility on both contemporary and future battlefields, but they may not be the silver bullets that many companies and analysts claim.

Experiences from the United States, the best-resourced, and

probably the world’s foremost military at conducting joint operations, demonstrate the difficulties of overcoming institutional stove-pipes and bureaucratic preferences when it comes to effective operations between services. All MDOrelated concepts require even greater cooperation between the service branches and organisations such as intelligence agencies that are used to closeholding capabilities and data. It is fair to have scepticism regarding the ability of these various organisations and institutions to share data and even control assets to the extent needed for the successful implementation of MDO. International or combined operations will probably be even more complex with national, let alone institutional, barriers being even more difficult to overcome. For example, the desire or capability of even close allies to share the information and possibly C2 to an unprecedented degree as is needed for combined MDO can and should be called into question.

Relatedly, in terms of combined operations, the ability to work with other states in an MDO-enabled environment is particularly complex. In a NATO context, aligning 32 states many with vastly different military capabilities, under one overarching C2 architecture is a formidable challenge. Capabilities under development such as the NATO Federated Mission Network show some promise in enabling some of the ideas inherent to MDO, but nevertheless, the alliance itself will need to find new ways of enabling coherent and integrated combined, joint operations if its vision is to be realised. This will need to include new agreements on data-sharing, revised criteria for the NATO Defence Planning Process and the acceptance that the divergence in capabilities between alliance members is likely to get even bigger.

Finally, it is always worth considering the adversary. It is evident from the US National Security Strategy and statements from senior US military leaders that China and in particular overcoming Chinese anti-access/ area denial capabilities is one of the major shapers for how US MDO-related concepts will be developed. In one way, this makes it easier to translate operational concepts into sustainable forcedevelopment initiatives as, at least there should be, concrete objectives and commanders’ requirements to inform them. However, technologically advanced states such as China have the capacity to react and evolve operationally, and are targeting the very technological foundations that MDO require. The key question of the resilience and utility of many of these systems when in contact has yet to be answered.

WHAT SHOULD BE TAKEN AWAY?

This In-Depth Briefing has attempted to elicit some of the

“TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED STATES SUCH AS CHINA HAVE THE CAPACITY TO REACT AND EVOLVE OPERATIONALLY, AND ARE TARGETING THE VERY TECHNOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS THAT MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS REQUIRE.”

core tenets of all MDO-related concepts and the key problems with their implementation. No matter the level of scepticism many have towards them, it is highly unlikely that the ideas behind MDO will go away or that Western militaries will not seek to take advantage of the potential benefits that contemporary and future technologies provide.

It is up to force planners, doctrine writers, wargamers and military educators to ensure that these ideas, many of which are still aspirational, are integrated in a way that makes militaries more effective and that staffs will not be forced to make such systems work in an ad hoc fashion during combat. Moreover, experimentation is also of paramount importance, something that is already happening in multiple forms.13 This is particularly important in a combined setting. States in NATO and outside of it need to realise that the United

States is moving ahead and that maintaining specific levels of interoperability will be vital. In a war with a peer adversary, it is unlikely that militaries will be afforded much time to do this.

It is also important that we avoid the temptation of believing that MDO-related concepts are a solution to attrition or a way of avoiding the costly procurement of platforms, and in particular weapon systems and the maintenance of a force manned with sufficient qualified personnel. The MDO-related concepts that are in development, particularly those in the United States, are aimed at a peer or near-peer adversary and hence substantial depth in resources will still be needed. This may be an obvious point to many but is worth repeating, as the war in Ukraine has shown, AI and other advanced technologies may be useful warfighting tools particularly when integrated into doctrine but are highly unlikely

to win a war on their own.

Finally, it is vital to understand that the integration of MDOrelated concepts will be an iterative process. Militaries and alliances will not suddenly transform, rather it is more likely and arguably vital that MDO will be gradually implemented as specific technologies are introduced and doctrinal and organisational changes are applied to maximise their effect. Hence, continuing to assess and reassess the reality of what the introduction of MDO-related concepts means for each service, state and alliance, rather than just accepting the views of the naysayers or the advocates, is of vital importance.

13See: William Wells, “A Battlegroup Commander’s Perspective on Battlegroup Operations,” The Wavell Room (May 17, 2023); US Indo-Pacific Command, Allies Come Together in the Indo-Pacific: Valiant Shield 24 (June 05, 2024); NATO, The JWC’s Multi-Domain Scenario Support for NATO Exercise Steadfast Defender 2024, (February 06, 2024).