MITIGATING THE MILITARY CHALLENGES OF MEGACITIES
AUTHOR
Major
Thomas Kinson Student ICSC(L) Course, Land Command and Staff College
CThe Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence, British Army or US Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
ITIES develop because the ground they occupy has some form of economic, geographic or cultural significance. Because of this, they have long had a strategic importance in warfare. One of the earliest recorded battles in 15th century BCE was fought over the control of the city of Megiddo due to its strategic location monitoring trade routes through the Levent.1 Ever since cities have been vital ground in conflict; from Carthage to Stalingrad, battles over cities have been turning points in war. However, the importance of cities in war is increasing, and most importantly how they have been fought over has changed. Historically battles for cities would be conducted in the form of a siege or – due to their relatively small size – they could often be isolated and bypassed. However, with growing scale, urbanisation and connectivity this has become increasingly difficult, forcing militaries to fight in cities – something that presents a set of unique challenges to contemporary commanders at all levels.
This In-Depth Briefing will argue that the world has seen a
significant change in the urban environment. The growth of megacities has created increasingly large and densely populated urban environments, with cities becoming more connected and significant drivers for economic growth. This has in turn increased their military significance. This development in the urban environment has also led to new and unique challenges for contemporary commanders in the form of command and control, the information environment and logistics. These challenges can, however, see a degree of mitigation by improved mission command, training and the employment of developing technologies and intelligence. Whilst many of the challenges and mitigation will be focused on the operational and tactical level of command2 they will also touch on command at the strategic and even political level – because as will be demonstrated, urban warfare has the effect of significantly shrinking the gaps between the various levels of command.
FROM CITY TO MEGACITY
In 1950 only 30 per cent of the world’s population lived in urban areas, however, by 2018 55 per cent of the global population was urbanised; this is predicted to rise to 66 per cent by 2050.3
This has coincided with the rise in the size of cities; in 1990 there were 10 megacities,4 by 2018 this had risen to 33, with a prediction there will be 43 by 2030.5
The size of cities has not been the only transformation –urbanisation has been driven by the increasing economic importance of cities. As noted by Grübler and Fisk, 80 per cent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is now generated in cities.6 Since 1978 and the period of ‘reform and opening’ the percentage of GDP generated in China from agriculture, forestry and fishing – predominantly rural economic sectors – has dropped
1André Geraque Kiffer, Battle of Megiddo, April 1479 BC (Clube de Autores, 2019), p.10.
2Divisional command and below.
3United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision,” Population and Development Review, 2019, 1–103, doi.org/10.2307/2808041, p.9.
4Defined by the United Nations as a city of 10 million or more.
5United Nations, “World Urbanization”, p.58.
6Arnulf Grubler and David Fisk, Energizing Sustainable Cities, Routledge EBooks (Informa, 2012), doi. org/10.4324/9780203110126
Photo
“WHILST MOST DRONES ARE EQUIPPED WITH FULL MOTION VIDEO, FEW HAVE CAPABILITIES TO ‘SEE THROUGH WALLS’.”
from 27.7 per cent to 7 per cent.7 At the same time the service sector – an economic sector mostly concentrated in urban environments – has risen from 22.3 per cent to 53.3 per cent of GDP. This change in GDP makeup was accompanied by the population in China living in cities growing from 18 per cent in 1978 to 59 per cent in 2018.8 China is not unique in this regard. As countries seek to grow from low to high-income economies, the focus of their economies moves up the value chain. Their economies develop from being dominated by agriculture and resource extraction towards low and high-end manufacturing and service delivery. These industries benefit in having human capital concentrated in a smaller geographic area.
However, the growth in economic output of cities and the associated increase in urbanisation has led to them becoming incredibly complex and diverse systems. As has been argued by Felix and Wong, megacities are deeply interconnected both internally and at a regional and international level. They have a complex network of physical, virtual and social structures that cut across the air, maritime, land and cyber domains –they resemble something that is “comparable to a living organism”.9 The population
density and economic output is also not distributed evenly within megacities. Some areas may be wealthy and less densely populated – they may have reliable municipal services and strong, reliable infrastructure. However, many megacities also have densely populated slums where there are little to no municipal services and infrastructure can be extremely fragile. As has been highlighted by the US Army Strategic Studies group, megacities can range from highly top-down formal structures with regulated flow capacity to highly decentralised informal systems of governance with poor ad-hoc infrastructure.10 This has led to the idea of a ‘feral city’ – one where social services are non-existent, there is no social safety net and human security is almost exclusively the responsibility of the individual –whilst at the same time the city remains highly connected to the outside world.11
The fact that cities represent an increasing concentration of economic and human capital mean militaries can no longer simply isolate and bypass them, they represent vital ground12 and as such must be controlled. Whilst some authors such as Betz and Standford-Tuck argue that 21st century cities pose no greater challenge for militaries than other environments,13 the
issues highlighted suggest that urban environments do represent a unique military test. As Spencer has highlighted, the complex and shifting environments within cities – and the partisan nature of civilian populations – mean they are unlike any other environment militaries operate in,14 meaning cities are a unique challenge to contemporary commanders. Whilst the challenges are numerous, those highlighted below represent the key issues.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
To have effective command and control over a force a commander must first have a basic level of situational awareness. However, the three-dimensional makeup of cities, with sub-terranean and super-terranean infrastructure such as underground car parks and high-rise buildings –features even more prominent in megacities – creates an environment where it is challenging to even situate your own forces. Whilst in a rural setting a basic map should provide the detail required to plan operations, in a city a map would need to be accompanied with blueprints of buildings and city plans – items not always readily available. Even if these are accessible, the use of fires during urban operations fundamentally changes the environment due to the destruction of urban infrastructure, further degrading
the fidelity of mapping. Additionally, assets used for situational awareness such as blue force trackers and current inservice unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor troop movements are also degraded in urban environments. Signals from blue force trackers can be blocked by physical infrastructure, and whilst most drones are equipped with full motion video, few have capabilities to ‘see through walls’. Thermal imaging is not a viable solution when objects are behind concrete, and whilst synthetic
7The World Bank, “Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (% of GDP) ,” data.worldbank.org, 2022.
8The World Bank, “Urban Population (% of Total Population) ,” data.worldbank. org, 2018.
9Kevin M. Felix and Frederick D. Wong, “The Case for Megacities,” Parameters 45, no. 1 (2015): 19–32.
10Marc Harris et al., “Megacities and the United States Army Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future” (Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group, 2014).
11Richard Norton, “Feral Cities,” Naval War College Review 56, no. 4 (April 6, 2018): 1–11.
12Ground (physical or conceptual) that must be controlled in order to achieve mission success.
13David Betz and Hugo Stanford-Tuck, “The City Is Neutral: On Urban Warfare in the 21st Century,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 4 (August 1, 2019): 60–87.
14John Spencer, “The City Is Not Neutral: Why Urban Warfare Is so Hard,” Modern War Institute, March 4, 2020.
aperture radar may have some fidelity15 its utility is more suited to intelligence gathering in slow time than real-time battle tracking. It is also a capability unlikely to be found below the divisional level. This challenge in establishing and maintaining situational awareness severely degrades a commander’s ability to exercise effective command and control over their forces.
The challenge of command and control is further exacerbated by the nature of urban combat. As has been highlighted by Watling, urban warfare is made up of a series of highly tactical engagements. The nature of fighting in confined spaces often limits engagements to between one and four combatants on either side, with multiple engagements taking place across a unit’s frontage.16 This was highlighted in the battle for Donetsk Airport in Ukraine in 2022 when despite 242 days of fighting, rarely more than 60 personnel were committed to the fight at any one time.17 However, this means that commanders up to divisional level may be directing or making decisions based on action taking place at the platoon level. The
15Behzad Yektakhah and Kamal Sarabandi, “A Method for Detection of Flat Walls in Through-The-Wall SAR Imaging,” IEEE Geoscience and Remote Sensing Letters 18, no. 12 (December 1, 2021): 2102–6.
16Jack Watling, The Arms of the Future (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2023), Ch. 9.
17Ibid, p. 247.
18Joint Chiefs of Staff, “JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations,” Jcs.mil, 2013, p. IV-4.
19Rory McCarthy and Peter Beaumont, “Civilian Cost of Battle for Falluja Emerges,” The Guardian, November 14, 2004.
20Alice Hills, Future War in Cities Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma (London Routledge, 2004).
21Joseph H. Felter and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Limiting Civilian Casualties as Part of a Winning Strategy: The Case of Courageous Restraint,” Daedalus 146, no. 1 (2017): 44–58.
urban environment shrinks the command chain by physically putting larger formations into smaller areas. This creates a demand from higher formations for a fidelity of situational awareness greater than normal at a time when it is more difficult to achieve.
Both issues are also underpinned by the fact that the urban environment degrades technical communications methods.
Concrete buildings, a lack of line of sight and interference from existing electronic infrastructure all compound to disrupt military communications equipment.18 Even at the lowest tactical level a platoon commander may struggle to gain communication with their section commanders. Orders and reports may have to be passed by a ‘runner’ or through a physical chain linking a commander to their forward units. This difficulty in establishing communication causes a further reduction in situational awareness and reduces a commander’s ability to direct their forces even if they have situational awareness.
Finally, command and control in the urban environment is complicated by greater oversight
from higher levels of command, not just due to the compressed command chain caused by the concentration of forces but by greater political interest. As will be discussed next, the presence of civilians means an increased potential for civilian casualties and the filming of forces conducting operations. The potential political problems this creates can see high-level military and political interference in forces conducting urban warfare in an environment where, due to the constrained ability to establish situational awareness and communicate with subordinate units, mission command is most critical.
CONTROLLING THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Fighting in urban areas means fighting in the presence of civilians. Even when a force warns a population to evacuate, and gives time for this to happen, there will inevitably be civilians left within the combat area. This was the case in Fallujah in 2004 when despite US warnings for civilians to leave – and an estimated 90 per cent of them doing so – there were still up to 50,000 civilians present during
the fighting.19 This presents a problem, particularly for militaries from liberal countries, who see civilian casualties as a particular issue and expect commanders to take necessary steps to avoid them, even at the expense of implementing the most effective military strategy.20 A commander could be acting within the law of armed conflict when civilians are killed, however, in doing so create a strategic backlash greater than the tactical or operational advantage they were trying to achieve.
This can significantly reduce a commander’s freedom of action and ability to bestow mission command on their subordinates. Even if strategically and morally necessary, constraining the use of force to reduce civilian casualties can still create a challenge for commanders. It can limit their ability to both effectively target an enemy force and maintain their troops’ morale, who may be taking casualties whilst limiting their own use of force – as was seen with “courageous restraint” in Afghanistan.21
One of the main reasons that civilian casualties have become an increasing issue is the
“URBAN WARFARE IS MADE UP OF A SERIES OF HIGHLY TACTICAL ENGAGEMENTS. THE NATURE OF FIGHTING IN CONFINED SPACES OFTEN LIMITS ENGAGEMENTS TO BETWEEN ONE AND FOUR COMBATANTS ON EITHER SIDE.”
Picture: UK MOD © Crown copyright 2023
combination of new forms of media and the ease of access that those in conflict zones have to cameras and connectivity to the outside world. The prevalence of mobile phones and access to the internet – even in conflict zones – means tactical actions involving civilians can be filmed, edited and uploaded to social media sites, picked up by major news outlets, and dominate news cycles before militaries have had a chance to contextualise the issue. Patrikarakos has described this phenomenon as ‘Homo digitalis’, where individuals can shape the information environment through their mobile phone and access to social media.22 Patrikarakos highlights how during Operation Protective Edge in 2014 a battle over the narrative of the conflict took place on social media between the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) spokesperson’s unit and Palestinian civilians. The IDF was usually on the back foot, both trying to counter the narrative that it was intentionally targeting civilians and releasing footage from operations to pre-emptively counter the same accusations.23
Whilst this is always a problem for commanders it is especially pertinent in urban operations given the number of civilians and connectivity of cities. As urban warfare becomes more prevalent in cities with larger populations and greater connectivity, commanders will increasingly have to sway their tactical decision making to account for the impact it may have on the strategic narrative.
LOGISTICS
Whilst always an important factor in military operations, the urban environment presents unique challenges for commanders when considering logistical planning. Firstly, and most significantly, regarding the number of personnel required. Whilst Watling has highlighted that engagements
“THE PREVALENCE OF MOBILE PHONES AND ACCESS TO THE INTERNET – EVEN IN CONFLICT ZONES – MEANS TACTICAL ACTIONS INVOLVING CIVILIANS CAN BE FILMED, EDITED AND UPLOADED TO SOCIAL MEDIA SITES, PICKED UP BY MAJOR NEWS OUTLETS, AND DOMINATE NEWS CYCLES BEFORE MILITARIES HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO CONTEXTUALISE THE ISSUE.”
in the urban environment tend to take place between small numbers of troops24 it is also widely accepted that operations in cities – particularly when conducting offensive action – requires significantly more troops compared to other environments.25 This is due to the difficulty in clearing and holding complex terrain, the comparatively high number of casualties experienced in the urban environment, and the requirement to rotate troops out of the intense combat seen in cities. This places a significant planning burden on the commander and increases the complexity of the operation. It also presents a leadership challenge to commanders who will be required to deal with troops that have experienced intense and traumatic fighting and units with high rates of casualties.
Commanders must also consider the requirement for specialist support in the urban environment, potentially employing assets they are unfamiliar with or in unconventional ways. Watling has highlighted that fighting in cities effectively requires the employment of a different type of force compared to other
particularly at the operational level, where they must ensure liaison and integration of civilian authorities and expertise. Given the lack of formal authorities in some urban environments, particularly megacities, this may also require liaison with unconventional forces and gangs who understand the physical and social dynamics of the city the force is fighting in. This will be required to ensure that services such as water, power, security and communications are restored to the local population, and may have to be done when combat operations are still ongoing nearby given the slow-moving nature of urban combat.
MITIGATION
environments, with tactical units requiring at a minimum two assaulters, a grenadier, a machine gunner and a breacher.26 This is along with significant engineering support which has been shown to be vital in Ukraine where Russian engineering assets have been a significant obstacle to Ukrainian forces in both the rural and urban environments.27 This means that a commander at the tactical level, particularly when faced with the transition to the urban environment, faces the difficulty of changing the task organisation of their force, and commanders at higher levels must see that their tactical units are adequately resourced with equipment and engineering assets.
Whilst the presence of a civilian population presents a challenge to the commander when it comes to controlling the information environment, it also poses a logistical challenge. Both legally and to gain local support, a force must consider ensuring that critical infrastructure and services in the urban environment are both protected and restored as soon as is reasonably possible once fighting has ended. This presents a challenge in both planning and execution for the commander,
Whilst the urban environment –and by extension the fact fighting in it will become more prevalent – presents significant challenges to commanders, there are mitigation measures that can be taken. The first and perhaps most significant of these is a genuine embrace of mission command within the urban environment. Whilst mission command remains a central tenet of UK command doctrine, the extent to which it is implemented has been criticised. This is particularly pertinent in an information age when senior commanders or political leaders can use a ‘long handled screwdriver’ to influence tactical actions28 – something already highlighted as an issue in the urban environment.
22David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters : How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2017), Ch. Introduction.
23Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters, Ch. 2.
24Watling, Arms of the Future, p. 242
25Spencer, “The City Is Not Neutral”
26Watling, Arms of the Future, p. 248
27Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine Special Report,” 2023.
However, an embrace of mission command, and a trust in allowing subordinates the ability to operate within an intent and boundaries, can significantly reduce issues of command and control in an environment when communication is restricted. It can also help tackle issues relating to personnel shortage as it should allow for a more efficient employment of combat power, allowing small tactical units to exploit success.
Training can also help mitigate the issues presented in the urban environment. Firstly, by demonstrating the challenges of the urban environment it can help reinforce the importance of mission command whilst conducting urban operations. It can allow trust to be built between commanders and subordinates, develop operational procedures and reinforce what is expected of them from higher commands. Training can also mitigate some of the issues highlighted by Watling around force makeup. Whilst ideally specialist urban units would be employed when in the urban environment, personnel and recruitment issues often make this unrealistic. However, a greater emphasis on urban training over traditional rural environments can allow regular forces to more easily transition into a force more suited to the urban environment. To this end militaries should ensure units such as infantry and engineers spend at least 50 per cent of their time training in urban environments.
However, for the training to be effective, as highlighted by Betz and Standford-Tuck it must be realistic, at scale and deliver recoverable lessons.29 NATO nations have made some progress in trying to achieve this, with training areas such as the French CENZUB setting the standard. Despite this it is acknowledged that NATO needs to expand its urban training facilities.30 Given the trend towards megacities,
“GIVEN A LACK OF REAL ESTATE, SYNTHETIC ENVIRONMENTS MAY BE A WAY OF PROVIDING TRAINING TO BOTH LARGER UNITS AND TO SIMULATE LARGER BUILDINGS.”
whilst training in smaller urban areas with units up to company or battlegroup in size does aid in tactical proficiency, larger formations such as brigades and divisions also need to be exercised. Urban training centres also need to provide the ability to train in high-rise buildings as well as in extensive subterranean networks. Given a lack of real estate, synthetic environments may be a way of providing training to both larger units and to simulate larger buildings.31
Advances in technology can also be a significant aid for contemporary commanders, particularly around command and control. The growing ubiquity of small and microunmanned aerial vehicles can be used to aid a commander’s situational awareness, particularly at the tactical level. Small drones could be flown outside high-rise structures to provide full motion video of activities inside whilst remaining within the communications bubble. Unmanned aerial vehicles could also be used as relay stations for communications –programmed to move to ensure there is always a relay available between units. At a higher operational level, operational unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites with ground penetrating radar, teamed with artificial intelligence-powered software, can be used to help develop an understanding of the terrain as
it changes, conducting realtime topographical studies to understand how fires have impacted the environment. All of this will greatly improve a commander’s situational awareness, from the tactical to the operational level, aiding decision making that can also help reduce civilian casualties.
Finally, as proposed by Felix and Wong,32 militaries should establish centres dedicated to understanding megacities. These should combine experts in city planning and engineering with intelligence personnel. This should enable the development of human intelligence networks within complex urban environments and establish human and physical terrain baselines. If the trend is towards combat in megacities, then just as there are specialists related to specific countries, regions or capabilities, it is reasonable to develop specialists in specific cities.33 Having this detailed knowledge available to a commander will greatly improve their understanding and planning capability prior to and during an engagement. This will both help overall situational awareness but also aid in an understanding of the information environment and human terrain, arming commanders with the knowledge to fight the information battle and control the narrative.
CONCLUSION
Cities have already forced a change
in the way militaries fight – from features that could be bypassed, they are increasingly becoming the most important aspects of physical terrain on the battlefield. The increase in their size, population and economic impact is only going to increase their strategic importance in conflict. They are also unique military challenges. They condense time, space and freedom of movement. They place commanders in positions whereby they struggle to gain situational awareness at a time when it is most important, and they restrict their ability to exercise command even when they have the information needed to make a decision. This exercise of command and control is likely the greatest challenge to a contemporary commander in the urban environment. However, command and control is irrelevant at the operational level if the strategic battle is lost due to an inability to control information flows, or the inability to properly equip and structure the force.
Improved mission command, training and employment of new technologies and preparatory intelligence can all aid a commander in the urban environment. However, for the effective employment of any mitigation, militaries must embrace the idea that urban warfare will be of increasing importance in future combat operations.
28Jim Storr, “A Command Philosophy for the Information Age: The Continuing Relevance of Mission Command,” Defence Studies 3, no. 3 (September 2003): 119–29, p. 123.
29Betz and Stanford-Tuck, “The City Is Neutral”.
30Philippe Michel-Kleisbauer and France Rapporteur, “Sub-Committee on Technological Trends and Security: Urban Warfare Report,” November 20, 2020.
31Rob Taylor, Synthetic Training Environments and the Future of Urban Warfare, interview by John Spencer, Modern War Institute, June 9, 2023.
32-33Felix and Wong, “The Case for Megacities”, p. 31.
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