The BattleWeb by chacr_camberley

A PARADIGM SHIFT FOR THE UK STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW

THE BATTLEWEB: SUCCEEDING IN SYSTEMS CONFRONTATION THROUGH DATA AS A WEAPON SYSTEM

AUTHOR: Alan Mears MSc

The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this Occasional Paper are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence or British Army. The aim of the paper is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper presents a transformative approach to defence in the context of the UK Strategic Defence Review, emphasising the integration of data as a primary weapon in modern warfare and introducing the "BattleWeb" as the critical enabler for operational superiority.

Amid the convergence of technological advancements, geopolitical shifts, and strategic defence constraints, the BattleWeb concept envisions a paradigm shift from traditional linear systems to a resilient, adaptive and integrated data-centric framework. Unlike past models that treated data as a support function, this approach redeﬁnes data as a fundamental, multi-domain asset pivotal to decision-making, interoperability and real-time operations. The BattleWeb aims to fuse vast data resources across allied and national assets to enhance understanding, situational awareness, rapid target identiﬁcation and response capabilities, thereby providing UK forces with a decisive advantage over adversaries.

The BattleWeb approach is grounded in some key principles of data-centric warfare, where the fusion of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities generates an interconnected system that can scale and adapt to dynamic threats. Leveraging AI and machine learning, this system facilitates rapid data processing, predictive threat analysis and algorithmic warfare; this will enable an optimised "kill web" with any sensor capable of activating any weapon system in near-real-time. This design recognises initiatives such as the US’s JADC2, DARPA’s Mosaic Warfare and the Israeli application of AI in programmes such as Lavender and The Gospel, and emphasises multi-domain operations and data superiority across military and civilian domains.

The integration of autonomous systems, secure interoperability and a robust governance framework within the BattleWeb ensures not only combat efficiency but adherence to ethical and legal concepts and standards, such as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the ethical application of AI. By operationalising data as a weapon, the BattleWeb strengthens the UK’s defence posture, providing adaptable, secure and scalable responses to contemporary security challenges, thereby reshaping the future battlefield through data-driven dominance.

1 INTRODUCTION

Imperative for change

A new Labour Government has instigated a far-reaching Strategic Defence Review which will deliver its recommendations in February 2025. This review takes place at a critical tipping point in terms of a convergence of transformative technologies, renewed geopolitical divergence and confrontation, and a growing mismatch across many NATO nations beyond just the UK between the funding available for defence and the outcomes that are expected to be delivered. Worryingly, the Government’s International Relations and Defence Committee recently reported that it had “found that the UK’s Armed Forces lack the mass, resilience, and internal coherence necessary to maintain a deterrent effect and respond effectively to prolonged and high-intensity warfare”.1 This convergence however, provides opportunities in terms of potential operational and cost beneﬁts from the adoption of new technologies and challenges both in terms of the ability to transform and adopt at a pace. On the positive side these have the potential to enable UK forces to win in the modern Operating Environment (OE) On the negative side, the complexity and breadth of the challenge is increasing as adversaries apply similar technologies in ways that are less constrained by post 1945 western inﬂuenced global norms of behaviour. Identifying, prioritising and energising the critical battle winning capabilities required of today’s modern and rapidly changing OE must be a focus of this SDR.

Historical echoes

When Labour was last elected to Government in 1997, Lord Robertson was the Secretary of State for Defence, at the time the MOD was in the process of formalising its approach to a concept labelled Network Enabled Capability (NEC). By today’s standards, the world appeared benign with a single global power, the US, and no real pacing rivals; the Defence and Security focus was very much on reaping the rewards of the peace dividend following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989/90.

Despite this, a planning exercise at the Joint Services Defence Course in May 1997 – attended by Lord Robertson, his Defence team, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and the Service Chiefs – highlighted the difﬁculty in reconciling lingering global Empire based ambition against the realities of a declining budget and spiralling costs.2 The evidence of the exercise pointed to the need for a change of

approach from salami slicing towards a need to focus on key capabilities framed by a revised Defence Strategy.

In the formal military operational planning process a key element of any future planning is an honest appraisal of Lessons Identiﬁed (LIs) from previous operations; in this context several key aspirations and initiatives were in play in 1997 which will resonate with, and should inform, the ambitions of the current SDR:

• NATO was highlighted as the “bedrock of our future and the bedrock of our security”3

• The UK plan to deliver Network Enabled Capability (NEC) was outlined in an MOD paper titled A Concept for the Digitisation of the Whole Battlespace (DWB)4 , the aim of which was to enable “the integration of weapons, platforms, Command/Control/ Information (C2I), sensors and Information Technology (I2) to enable the inter-operation of the separate services and those of the allies”. A key element of the programme was the emphasis placed on international integration, with the US Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Advanced Warﬁghting Experimentation (AWE) programmes.5

• Central to the UK digitisation programme was the Joint Command Systems Initiative (JCSI) which would provide the backbone linking all MOD services and HQs through the Battlegroup Digitisation Capability Development Programme (BCCP)6. This strategy was aimed at the coherent linking of sensors, deciders and effectors using the emerging technologies anticipated at the time. This outlined a three-stage programme with Stage 2 scheduled for 2008 which would see the integration of legacy systems such as BATES (the Battleﬁeld Artillery Target Engagement System) within a broader programme at the centre of which was BOWMAN.

Whilst it is not the intention of this paper to analyse in detail the past 27 years, it should be noted that as Defence looks at its current predicament in terms of a new competitive environment accentuated by the expansion and acceleration in data relevance and technology, it should be honest about and address the cultural and leadership issues that have signiﬁcantly limited the outcomes that were invested in over this period; these were paid for largely through signiﬁcant and probably irreversible reductions in units, tanks, infantry, artillery, logistics and the industrial base. It must also recognise the institutional failures in the acquisition system, particularly in the relation to emerging technologies which Christian Brose describes as “a system that has been optimized for risk aversion and cost accounting, not rapid technology development at scale; a defense

industry that has become increasingly consolidated and closed to new entrants; a breakdown in the relationship between the national security and technology communities; and a broader failure of imagination about America’s rapidly diminishing military dominance”.7

A cautionary tale

The UK is not alone in facing the challenges of decades of underfunding and distraction; a Canadian White Paper in 1994 on Defence called for the Canadian Armed Forces to maintain a multipurpose combat-capable force in order to “manage a full spectrum of conflict” and make a “genuine contribution” to security”.8 This ambition has remained unaltered to date committing it to a broad range of capabilities and is unaffordable even if Canada uplifts its spend to NATO guidelines. They have characterised the issues as a need to address a problem where “years of underfunding and delayed modernizations have now left the Canadian military facing a severe capability deficit… this has led Canada to a crossroads where it should either accept the continued decline of its military capabilities into a largely token force, or consider radical alternatives to preserve its relevance on the battlefield and in international relations.”9

An alternative strategy

The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) has committed heavily to optimising innovation and the use of AI to accelerate their “kill webs”; these are very much evident in their application over the past few years in the Middle East and come with both benefits and challenges. The integration of an AI based programme that links a number of AI capabilities, such as The Gospel and Lavender, is at the heart of this approach. The programme accelerates, orchestrates and outputs targeting decisions based on the assessment , correlation, synthesis and analysis of multiple data inputs, reducing decision making from hours to minutes in line with “man in the loop” policies, recommendations and constraints. The approach is reflective of an idea outlined by Brigadier General YS of “FAST” (Foundations, Acceleration, and Singularity Time) as a guiding concept of how to lead nations and organisations to a successful merger of human intelligence and artificial intelligence. 10 The FAST concept is founded on the notion that the future belongs to the nations and organisations that will build the relevant foundations that enable the AI revolution. He identifies these foundations as: a campaign to acquire more and more data, both classified and unclassified, as much and as varied as possible; the ability to store and tag all the data based on cloud technology; a closed-open-closed network that deals with the classified data

and unclassified data in the same system and on the same network; and to build strong, broad computer power (specifically, to build the foundations with enough GPU servers to deal with a great amount of data). He also points to a plan of action that needs to be organised with three main efforts: “First is the “data effort,” to acquire more and more data and organise it. Second, a “cloud effort,” to effectively use and maximise all the potentials of cloud technology. Third, the “acceleration effort,” to choose specific missions that can be accelerated by AI and update organisations to accomplish these missions.” However, it is also important to understand this approach against the wider global narrative that surrounds the application of such capabilities as is evident in the Middle East today.

2 DATA IN THE CURRENT AND EMERGING BATTLESPACE

Recognising that data-centricity and digital agility are increasingly important elements of our deterrence posture, we will reshape policy, structures and skills to exploit the beneﬁts of rapid digital change. This represents a fundamental shift in thinking, whereby data and digital technologies are no longer just ‘enablers’ but the cornerstone of our approach to deterrence.11

In recent decades the amount of information produced by sensors, the speed and ubiquity of communications and the magnitude of tactical advantage possible from processing that information, and making decisions faster than one’s adversary – what some have called “informationized”12 – warfare, is transforming the modern operating environment. In this “new way of war,” advantage accrues to those that can see farther and clearer and act faster and at greater range, and deny the other side the ability to do the same”.13

Image 1: Source: Ryan Chase 6point6 Accenture

Operations in the Ukraine have provided the US, UK and NATO the opportunity to experience at first hand the dynamics of change across the modern battlespace; they are driving a reshaping of the narrative from conceptual to a focus on urgent transformation with impact. “We have witnessed how communications infrastructure, digitisation of data, and increasing automation and autonomy are vital for data security, information operations, communications, targeting, interoperability, and lethality . ”14

In addressing the opportunities and governance of data in defence, the Data Strategy for Defence15 sets out a Defence Data rules set which directs how the MOD will treat data to become a connected enterprise. All programmes and activity are required to demonstrate compliance with these rules and will be assured against them. The six Data Rules that Defence must apply:

• Exercise sovereignty over data, including accountability and ownership

• Standardise data across the Defence landscape

• Exploit data at the most effective and relevant point in the value chain

• Secure digital data at creation, curation, when handling, storing and transmitting

• Curate data, ensuring it is assured, discoverable and interoperable

• Endure data as an asset beyond individual projects

These rules are broadly consistent with other national Defence rule sets, as well as those of industry, and are perceived as enabling rather than constraining conditions in this paper.

In describing the context of How We Fight 202616, Commander Field Army (CFA) identiﬁed three key trends in the modern battlespace:

• We can see further and with more detail

• It is more difﬁcult to hide

• We can strike more targets and at increasing range.

Critically this modern OE stretches into space and cyber, extending the battlespace to one that is global and almost instantaneous. Adversaries are already exploiting new capabilities enabled through these newer domains of warfare which are increasingly pivotal to enabling and exploiting the explosion of new technologies.

To address these challenges, and as part of a coherent and integrated force across Defence, Government and broader partners and alliances, the Army must deliver an advanced, secure, and interoperable date centric BattleWeb capability that effectively supports the complex demands of the modern battleﬁeld. This requires design and build capabilities that are functional, scalable, sustainable and secure. Delivered capabilities must be user friendly and adaptable to the speed of warfare. The ability to share near real-time data across alliance partners in this extended battlespace is critical: it enables a swift and decisive response to any crisis, from any location, in any environment and during any threat condition.17

Data, not robotics or lethal autonomy, has been identiﬁed across a growing number of Governments and Defence institutions as the critical enabler for Defence in the coming decade. Data exploited through AI has the potential to improve military intelligence and understanding; there is already ample evidence of this transformation in the Ukraine. Data will allow commanders to target across the battlespace to a hitherto unachievable depth, speed, and resolution. Because it can be transmitted so quickly and in such quantity, data will improve interconnections between the services so that the armed forces will be able to cooperate more closely with each other. In each case, data will allow the military to acquire targets and prosecute them more effectively.18

3 APPROACH

This paper is focused on Land operations, including the littoral, within the context of Multi Domain Integration (MDI) and Multi Domain Operations (MDO). As such, whilst the focus is the Army, the core tenets of this paper relate to and are interdependent with the need to integrate with other domains, government, the public and industry; critical to this is understanding and enabling interoperability. This paper is inﬂuenced by some of the key aspirations of the IoPC, LOC and How We Fight 2026, notably:

• Winning DEEP through dislocation will be the presiding decisive activity in the land battle. Overwhelming sensors, disorientating decision makers, neutralising effectors, dismantling and overloading their network and severing their life support will drive land force activity.

• A focus on the dislocation of adversary offensive or defensive system and rapid exploitation of the opportunities created

• Land forces will coordinate, or deliver organically, overwhelming lethality. Cueing such ﬁrepower will be achieved through the product of data-centric warfare; the fusing of vast datasets into actionable targeting information, whilst leveraging privileged tear-line access to Five Eyes and NATO intelligence alongside Space and Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) based ISR.

• The Army must be more effective in the deep battle, more ferocious and lethal when the close battle is joined, and more adept at ensuring that the Army shield those elements of its ﬁghting system that need to be protected.

• There is a need to establish a ‘deep effects systems architecture’. This will leverage the extant land intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance programme to create a network into which the Army will seek

to connect national, cross-domain, and Army intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to achieve multi-billion data point input; intelligence fusion and analysis facilities with maximum automation; and robust targeting prioritisation processes.

• The Army must harness a UK based command and control network to maximum effect. How We Fight 2026 describes the need to tighten connectivity between the community of rear-based command and control capabilities and develop the mechanisms to do much more of the dataprocessing that hitherto would have been done by large headquarters much further forward in the battlespace. More processing of data, more planning, and more targeting will be conducted by this UK-based network in direct support of commanders forward, with data moving forward and back through the deep effects systems architecture.

• Under this integrated data architecture, and supported by a leaner, faster, approach to command and control, the Army will seek to enhance the lethality of its combat elements and to sustain them in battle.

At the core of this proposition is a need to understand that unless there is a transformation in culture, and a corresponding investment in the enabling skills, the reality of data as a weapon which is central to a data led weapon system will be unfulfilled; data will continue to be treated as a second order service as opposed to the prima-inter pares decisive “combat weapon system” on the battlefield. To contextualise this, this paper will consider five core thematic issues:

• A need for honest reﬂection to understand and transform from a legacy organisation to one equipped to ﬁght a modern war.

• A need to recognise the OE as a complex ecosystem of systems which must be competed for at all levels.

• An understanding of the BattleWeb as the primary weapon system to deliver the ambition of the LOC and the Fight 2026 as well as MDO in the round.

• Achieving enhanced readiness through assured interoperability.

• Data Centric Capability Development (CAPDEV) and Capability Delivery (CAPDEL) as a Service.

• Mainstreaming and winning the CEMA and algorithmic battle.

4 HONEST REFLECTION

“You do not rise to the level of your goals. You fall to the level of your systems ”19

The period since 1997 has seen a steady hollowing out of a well developed and tested large-scale warfighting capability that had its origins in the industrial mobilisation of the UK in 1914; this was shaped and reshaped over peace and war over the rest of the 20th century up to the point of the cessation of the USSR. The UK is not alone in this dilemma which is reflected widely across NATO, including the US, and there are several key factors that should be reflected upon in any consideration of setting aspirations for a future Defence capability under SDR:

• The increased blurring of the boundaries between Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) levers of power may undermine the global institutions and frameworks intended to prevent escalation into conﬂict.20

• The post 1990 peace dividend coincided with a shift to limited scale “wars of choice” which placed less emphasis on campaigning and sustainment at scale: the unexpected DESERT STORM in 1991 demonstrated starkly the growing inadequacy of Divisional organic logistics and the broader joint enablers behind it.

• Given the state of public finances, and the perceived lack of any existential threat among the broader public, there will be a mismatch between the current threat environment being considered by Defence and the Army, and the capacity to pay. As such the SDR will need to focus on the UK’s critical requirement using something like a German model: this will require an initial “surge of investment” in addition to a sustained 3 per cent spend of gross domestic product to deliver clearly defined outcomes “to fill in the things that you can fill in quickly. Get the complex weapon pipeline churning at volume again. Buy more spares. Buy more platforms that you can do quickly to make your forces bigger. Revitalise training. Strengthen the reserve”.21 This surge must then be supported by a focused but persistent investment in prioritised capabilities.22

• An entire generation of Army training and leadership has been built around light forces, a come as you are ﬁght, and a western way of war based on technological and air superiority over smaller and less well-trained adversaries and with no pacing or existential threat. This has disrupted the Army’s body of knowledge developed over 100 years of global large-scale warﬁghting and deterrence. Ensuring the SDR is shaped by the “what will be needed” as opposed to the “what we have been doing” over the past 25 years will be a challenge that should not be underestimated.

• There has been a shift away from capabilities such as massed ﬁres and a resilient industrial supply chain. Against the aspiration of the LOC and How We Fight 2026, which places Deep Strike and targeting at the centre of its future capability, this is a gap that will be challenging to address.

• There is inconsistency in the approach to a NATO ﬁrst policy and the Army’s relationship with the US. This has had a profound impact on interoperability with both NATO and with the US; LI’s from WARFIGHTER and NATO NRF exercises provide ample evidence of the issues which are further compounded by the overclassiﬁcation and protection of data that is needed at the operational edge.

• Despite an emphasis placed on the exploitation of information and the acceleration of related technologies for many years, the Army is in considerable technical debt and lacks the expertise and insights required to contextualise, architect and exploit the potential of data and information. A persistent focus on networks as opposed to data has accentuated a divide between the commercial sector and Defence. The industrial age systems that are currently in place are no match for the agility of the new threat actors who pay lip service to international norms of behaviour. These malign actors exploit the opportunities of the Web to outpace traditional military organisations; in so doing they are able seize and maintain the initiative. A ﬁxation on defence-wide digital backbones within defence communities is arguably expanding on an approach that has an “abysmal track record of success”; a more bounded approach that prioritises mission outcomes and recognises the centrality of data that can be passed over an increasing range of terrestrial and non-terrestrial ad-hoc “networks of convenience” will be increasingly important.23

Image 2: A UK Ops Room Helmand.

Source Alan Mears

5 COMPLEXITY AND SYSTEMS THINKING – COMPETING FOR THE SYSTEM

5.1 Context

The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 (IRR2023)24 reaffirmed the need for the UK’s overarching national security and international strategy to bring together defence, security, resilience, diplomacy, development and trade, as well as elements of economic, and science and technology (S&T) policy25. A key focus for IR2023 was the need to respond to the intensification of systemic competition, which is now the dominant geopolitical trend and the main driver of the deteriorating security environment; it is seeking to respond to the way systemic competition is playing out across overlapping ‘strategic arenas’, in which there is constant and dynamic competition above and below the threshold of armed conflict. IR2023 highlights that the need for a systems approach is of particular importance in this arena, and proposes to work with industry and international partners to balance and shape across issues including AI, digital standards, and internet and data governance. This should build on the work done since IR2021 through the G7, the UK-hosted Future Tech Forum, UK AI Standards Hub. It should also be conducted in partnership with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) through the Global Forum on Technology and the Global Partnership for AI.

5.2 Systems confrontation and system destruction warfare

For Defence and the Army, it is critical to understand that it is engaged in a persistent and global contest against complex systems using its own complex systems; it should recognise the implications of this in order that it can organise to address the ambition on IRR2023 and a future SDR. In doing so it should also reﬂect on the approach adopted by its key pacing adversary China, as well as that of Russia.

In the military context, having studied two decades of US and NATO post-Cold War operations, a Chinese theory of Unrestricted Warfare emerged that suggested that recent advances in technology, the rise of globalism, the diffusion of power beyond the nation-state, coupled with increased capabilities of modern weapons, have all combined to create a new context for conflict.26 China has since placed considerable emphasis on the concept of Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare. This concept suggests that the actual battlefield has grown to a size of thousands or tens of thousands of kilometres from only dozens in previous periods. Weapons platforms now attack across broad distances and are often deployed from high altitudes and underwater. Furthermore, established notions of front and rear in the battlespace have lost much of their distinction.27 Targets at the front can be struck simultaneously with targets in the strategic rear. The battlefield itself has become, “nonlinear” with most Iraqi targets struck by coalition forces in the rear. As a result of their studies, the PLA now views as critical the “informatization” of a range of operational and strategic systems that represent a core requirement for ISR operations, long-range precision strike capabilities, multidomain offense and defence, long-range mobility and manoeuvre and enhanced logistics and support.28 This conclusion has many similarities but is more far reaching to that of the Russian Reconnaissance Strike Complex.29 In order to contest and win in this emergent OE it is necessary to understand how the UK’s adversaries are addressing a similar challenge.

A Chinese perspective: Systems confrontation

China characterises and understands modern warfare as a confrontation between opposing operational systems rather than merely opposing armies.30 Under this theory, warfare is no longer centred on the annihilation of enemy forces on the battleﬁeld; rather, it is won by the belligerent that can disrupt, paralyse, or destroy the operational capability of the enemy’s operational system.31 This can be achieved through kinetic and non-kinetic strikes against key points and nodes while simultaneously employing a more robust, capable, and adaptable operational system of its own.32 Systems confrontation is waged not

Image 3: Source Edward Jones 6point6 Accenture

only in the traditional physical domains of land, sea, and air, but also in outer space, non-physical cyberspace, electromagnetic and even psychological domains. It is understood that the Chinese view of the operational system comprises five main component systems: the command system, the firepower strike system, the information confrontation system, the reconnaissance intelligence system and the support system. Importantly, under the PLA’s system-of-systems construct, various operational systems will be constituted and then employed under the broader strategic level war system construct during times of crisis.33 The PLA’s guiding concept that links systems warfare and informatisation entails “collective operations, asymmetric strikes, and paralyzing the enemy’s system”. The Chinese suggest this can be done through a combination of military, political, diplomatic, and economic actions designed to target an enemy’s strategic and operational systems using coordinated “front and rear units in every domain” to strike the enemy operational system’s critical nodes and weak links, rapidly winning victory and energetically subduing the enemy, rapidly paralysing the enemy’s whole operational system, effectively overawing the enemy and reducing his will to fight, and achieving operational objectives.34

Image 4: Source Ryan Chase 6point6 Accenture

5.3 Russian Reconnaissance Strike Complex

The Russian perspective captured in its Reconnaissance Strike Complex has some similarities to that of the Chinese, but is less far reaching; a crucial element of this is its assessment that modern warfare will be a series of fast-moving strike-manoeuvre fights with open flanks secured by fires, strong points and counter-attack forces.35 The Ukraine war is highlighting some key challenges in this “manoeuvreist” approach; after its initial failures the Russians have looked increasingly to a First World War doctrine: elastic defence. The guiding principle of elastic defence is an acceptance that it is no longer possible to place enough strength on the front lines to defeat a determined enemy attack, and doing so would lead to unacceptable casualties from artillery. Instead, the focus is on a doctrine that though defensive in appearance is in fact offensive in nature, relying on depth and counterattacks to defeat the enemy.36 The Ukrainians have adopted a similar doctrine. The Ukrainian military is facing an enemy that impedes manoeuvre and as a result the Ukrainian army is pursuing an attritional approach appropriate for the context of its fight based around a concept of “destruction-oriented warfare”.37 Destruction-oriented approaches are directed toward obtaining and maintaining material superiority, while depriving a hostile combatant of the means that they need for continued resistance.38 Amos Fox contends that the U.S. military and its Western partners can fight and win large-scale industrial wars in which destruction-oriented combat is the central component. The destruction of armies or the push toward destroying armies is the most effective and historically supportable way in which to drive policy makers to the negotiation table.39

5.4 Implications for the UK and its allies

As part of the NATO coalition, the UK’s role is essentially one of deterrence and defence; the Ukrainian war is highlighting some key characteristics, in particular the concept of, and capacity to, undertake, “destruction-orientated warfare”. Key to this concept will be the ability to seize and maintain an advantage through decisive kinetic and non-kinetic ﬁres delivered across resilient and adaptive BattleWebs. The targets will be determined through a detailed understanding of

Image 5: From a captured German document in June 1917, this diagram displays the organisation of a regimental sector. Joseph Mosser. US Army Military Review. Oct 2024

the inter-dependencies of the systems they are part of, and their particular signiﬁcance at any point in an operation or campaign. Building the winning capabilities necessary to understand, interdict and support these complex systems as part of a coherent cross government DIME construct that will separate Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare must be a core focus for the SDR.

6 SHIFTING THE PARADIGM – THE BATTLEWEB AS A WEAPON SYSTEM

6.1 Introduction

Since the mid 90s, data and its exploitation and the networking required to support battlespace Situational Awareness (SA), decision making and Joint Fires has largely been under the stewardship of the G6 communications community; culturally the capability has been approached as a set of services provided to end users as part of an IT and communications function, and capabilities have been developed largely at arm’s length from the user. This is not an appropriate model for the future which must be outcome driven, not services orientated.

Success in warfare comes down to a military’s ability to create decisive combat effects in the battlespace. These effects may be kinetic, such as destroying an enemy missile launcher using a laser-guided bomb, or non-kinetic, for example electronically jamming an adversary’s radars. To create these effects, military forces must find targets, fix their position or track them if targets are moving, target and engage them with precision, and finally determine if their attacks have succeeded. Completing this process is called “closing” kill chains.40

In his often-quoted book, The Kill Chain, Christian Brose outlined the need for militaries to shift from “small numbers of expensive, exquisite and complex large platforms” to large numbers of cheap, unmanned and attritable platforms linked through an agile, AI enabled kill chain. In the realm of modern warfare, the

Image 6: Source Ryan Chase 6point6 Accenture

traditional concept of the kill chain has long been a cornerstone of targeting and engagement strategies. However, as the landscape of conﬂict evolves with the integration of advanced technologies and AI, there is a growing recognition of the limitations of the linear kill chain methodology to achieve this.41

A report into the US 18 Corps experience in the development of the MAVERN SMART SYSTEM (MSS) capability reflects this.42 Using MSS, the 18th Airborne has demonstrated an ability to match the performance of the time-critical targeting cell in Operation Iraqi Freedom, a targeting cell that is widely viewed as the most efficient in U.S. military history. Whilst it is worrying that it has taken up to now to return to a capability reflective of that deployed over 20 years ago, albeit with a range of additional potential benefits in terms of manpower savings and agility, the report provides some validatory insights to key themes echoing experiences from other studies and activities, namely: senior military and/or civilian leaders willing to champion the programme; the need for flexibility in contracting, funding, and risk management; visionary front-line leaders; direct access to the operational environment with ongoing feedback; and generally relying on the implementation of mature (rather than developmental) technology.43

In addition, the Ukraine has highlighted a trend to the “democratisation” of access to elements of the C2 networks and the kill chain, and the concept of meshed civilian-military intelligence. Networks and systems previously owned and operated by the military and commanders and their staffs are now expanded through combinations of meshed military and civilian networks and actors; any soldier with access to a smart device is easily connected permitting a broader range of information to be exploited over an ever-expanding BattleWeb ecosystem. The possession and effective exploitation of such systems will be delivering a decisive edge to those organisations that best exploit their potential.44 Allied to this will be the speed of adaption and integration of new capabilities into the battlespace; as evidenced by the Ukrainian ability to adapt the Patriot system by adding and integrating additional sensors and effectors with new operating procedures.45

6.2 Deﬁning the BattleWeb

Traditionally, a kill chain is an almost linear series of sequential steps needed to deliver a deﬁned effect. Doctrinally this kill chain is a combination of a deliberate targeting process, D3EA (Decide, Detect, Deliver, Execute, Assess) which is expanded to the F3EA (Find, Fix, Finish, Execute, Assess) or F2T2EA (Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess) processes used for the prosecution of mobile or emerging targets. This has largely required an architecture that is fairly static and

fragile that connects a fairly well-deﬁned community of actors across deﬁned capabilities, often globally dispersed.

In the future, enabling force elements to collaborate at the speed of need throughout the OE across a contested Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS), right to the edge, will be the key to identifying, composing, and managing disaggregated kill chains at the speed and scale required for success in peer-to-peer conﬂict. This will necessitate a transfer from the fragility and rigidity of traditional linear kill chains which are difﬁcult to scale and easy to target towards a more resilient, agile and adaptive Kill Web concept as illustrated at Image 7: these offer redundant and multiple paths through compatible and functional nodes, thus increasing the quantity and resiliency of potential kill chains.

The transformation of communications, computer and data technologies can enable the transition from this fairly static environment into one that can enable any sensor-any decider-any effector in near real time, globally and across a constantly changing community of actors and capabilities. US concepts such as the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) are focused on developing the BattleWeb capability at pace. Related to this was DARPA’s work on the concept of Mosaic Warfare that examined how to turn complexity into a powerful new asymmetric weapon via rapidly composable networks of low-cost sensors, multi-domain command and control nodes, and cooperative manned and unmanned systems.47

JADC2 provides some key insights into both the advantages of such an approach and the challenges, a critical one being the need to bound and shape the ambition so that it can be understood and integrated in a coherent way. One suggested model describes a potential BattleWeb framework into ﬁve functional

Image 7: Comparison of linear kill chain and kill web46

elements; within each a combination of people, processes and tools (i.e., technology) govern how the element works and the capabilities it can provide in the overall battle network48 :

• Sensor element: The functional purpose of the sensor element is to collect data on what is happening in the battlespace.

• Communications element: The communications element of battle networks often receives the most attention because it provides the data links that pass information among systems and operators. The information transmitted can include voice, video, one-way data broadcasts, or two-way data links.

• Processing element: One of the most overlooked but critically important functional elements of a battle network is the processing element. The processing element is used to analyse, aggregate, and synthesise data from a variety of sensor sources to inform decisions.

• Decision element: The decision element is perhaps the most important part of the battle network because it is where information is translated into action. Where the decision occurs, how it is made, and who is involved depends on what types of actions are being considered.

• Effects element: This is where information is turned into effects in the battlespace. These effects include both kinetic ﬁres, which physically damage or destroy adversary forces, and non-kinetic ﬁres, such as electronic warfare, directed energy weapons, or cyberattacks. A key part of joint operations is the ability to coordinate these effects across domains in time and location to generate the desired effects against an adversary at minimal risk to friendly forces and noncombatants.

Image 8: Illustrative BattleWeb Construct49

The communications and data processing elements of this BattleWeb represent the critical elements that enable the others; AI and ML algorithms require timely and assured access to large volumes of sensor data and the ability to communicate the products and analysis to the point of need. A robust, adaptive and resilient BattleWeb that uses AI/ML algorithms can speed decision making and automate processes to enable algorithmic warfare at the tactical and operational level. In peacetime competition, these same networks and algorithms can greatly improve indications and warnings to prevent an adversary from avoiding detection and ultimately enhance deterrence.

A modern BattleWeb architecture does not need to connect “everything to everything” that it operates in the battlespace or share all data with every platform and operator to be effective. A ground moving target common operating picture does not necessarily need to be shared with an operator launching an air-to-air missile, for example. The location of distant threats does not need to be shared with assets that will remain well out of range of those threats. Instead, a focus should be placed on understanding which nodes are relevant to what missions and what data must be shared across kill chain nodes to achieve the required scale of kill chain operations without excessive redundancy and wasted effort. The use of Mission Threads and related use cases is key to developing and maintaining a pragmatic outcome focused understanding of these relationships. The example at Figure 3 below shows a highly simpliﬁed, notional example of how the identiﬁcation decomposition of mission threads can identify assets that could be capable and available to contribute to other mission thread kill chains. In this case, the aircraft conducting the strikes and the related enablers do not need to dedicate themselves to a single kill chain throughout its duration.

Image 9: The relationship between Mission Threads and activities50

6.3 Data as the weapon: Fuelling the BattleWeb

At the heart of the BattleWeb concept lies data, the new weapon of modern warfare. Data has become the oxygen of modern-day operations, enabling rapid decision-making, enhanced situational awareness and precise effects delivery. The centrality of data in BattleWebs cannot be overstated. In this interconnected system, every action is informed by data, from intelligence processing through the identiﬁcation of targets to the deployment of weapons. The ability to process and analyse this data in real-time allows the BattleWeb to operate with the speed and agility required in modern warfare.

The BattleWeb must leverage a wide range of diverse military and civilian data from multiple sources and across national boundaries and multiple security domains, creating an unprecedented and comprehensive view of the battlespace. Advanced analytics and AI are already enabling rapid processing of vast datasets, extracting actionable intelligence in near real-time that can enable us to outpace adversaries in decision-making. The Ukrainian development of the Delta system, for example, uses AI to exploit and leverage commercial capabilities such as Maxar Technologies and Planet labs together with other social media feeds and facial recognition developing “neural networks that provide faster intelligence analysis and assessment to produce strategic and tactical intelligence advantage”.51 Similarly the Ukrainian GIS Arta system enables a dynamic Community of Interest (CoI) using a wide variety of commercially available PED devices to input and action targeting opportunities into an encrypted network in near real time, dramatically shortening engagement times and accuracy.52

By integrating multi-source data, a holistic operational picture emerges, revealing patterns and connections that might otherwise go unnoticed. Meanwhile, machine learning algorithms identify patterns and predict potential threats, enabling proactive operations and enhancing battle strategy by anticipating enemy tactics that in turn enable autonomous, AI powered systems to verify targets and determine threats with minimal human intervention, dramatically reducing the time from sensor to ﬁre. This integration of multi-source data collection, real-time processing, data fusion, predictive analytics, and

Image 10: Source Ryan Chase 6point6 Accenture

autonomous systems forms the backbone of the BattleWeb, already revolutionising modern warfare capabilities.

6.4 Understanding and enabling data centricity – creating the capability

Data Centric Warfare (DCW) is a relatively new term which has evolved from the US concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). It is now 25 years since NCW emerged and was reﬁned by the UK as Network Enabled Capability (NEC). The exponential increase in data generation, collation and speed of analysis since then creates the foundation for DCW. Where NCW and NEC focused on the connectivity of the ﬁghting force, DCW puts data and the use of data at the heart of battlespace planning and operation.

The term DCW has emerged to encompass the opportunities offered to an information enabled force. However, the term is ambiguous and understood by different people to mean different things.

To be data driven means to make strategic decisions based upon available data. It is without question better to be data driven than not. It is an important step towards achieving data centricity. Being data driven sees organisations develop cultures where data is vitally important but where the practice of data management and science may be immature. Large volumes of data might be absorbed but they can be analysed inconsistently and may not be capable of dynamic, real-time analysis and interrogation. Such an organisation will use the data it possesses to inform its strategy and execution but may move too slowly and make ill-informed decisions too frequently. 53

Data centricity on the other hand puts data at the heart of organisational design and decision-making. It results in an organisation that builds its data structures, decision making and operational execution on common language, optimised for information exploitation. The culture works towards the eradication of data ownership and data silos, to the creation of a centralised asset which transforms operational effectiveness and speed of execution. All of this is held together by agreed governance of processes and data that facilitate successful strategy and tactical actions.

To fully understand how data centricity requires an organisation to change, there are some key underlying characteristics that are present in organisations that have successfully made the transition. Whilst all organisations are different and the outcomes sought after differ further still, these characteristics are found in all data centric organisations. These characteristics compound and multiply when applied together.54

• Strategy and governance. Data ceases to be something which is “used” and becomes an asset of integral importance and value. Strategic thought and planning as to how it will be used is central to preparation and governs its capture, storage, analysis, and presentation.

• People. There is a strong commitment to the development of people and their understanding of how to collect and manage data effectively. The opinions of data scientists, data analysts and data engineers are highly valued. People with expertise in these ﬁelds are “in the room” for strategic discussion and tactical decision making.

• Stability and adaptability. Infrastructure is resilient, robust, and secure. Storage and transmission of data is taken seriously and underpins strategy and governance. The infrastructure can handle massive amounts of storage, real time processing and model creation whilst also allowing rapid analysis.

• Agility and innovation. Change is recognised as constant and the only way to respond to it is to continually learn and demonstrate agility as operational conditions evolve. Whilst strategy and governance provide the guidelines to navigate by and parameters to operate within, continual learning must be derived from situational realities. Continual learning is taken from each new campaign or data deployment and feedback loops ensure that knowledge and insight are shared to enable continuous improvement in future execution.

6.5 The need for a coherent and trusted weapon system

Within a data centric approach, it is not enough for the traditional kill chain to evolve only as far as to operate faster, in the same linear fashion. It is necessary to transform our understanding of data and to elevate its importance from enabler of weapons deployment to the primary weapon of war. This is where the concept of the "BattleWeb" originates. The evolution from kill chain to BattleWeb is particularly signiﬁcant in the context of Land operations and MDO. In this environment, the ability to converge assets and data from multiple domains is crucial for gaining and maintaining operational advantage.

Image 11: Source Edward Jones 6point6 Accenture

The conventional kill chain model, with its sequential process of target identiﬁcation, decision-making and engagement, has served its purpose in the past. However, in today's rapidly changing operational environments, the linear nature of the kill chain can lead to delays and inefﬁciencies in decision-making. To address the challenges posed by modern warfare scenarios, there is a pressing need to adopt a more adaptive and collaborative approach across agile meshed “networks of convenience” embodied by the BattleWeb system. Treating the BattleWeb as a coherent weapon system, like the governance of missile systems, is crucial to ensuring accountability, mitigating risks of failures, and addressing concerns of collateral damage impacts.

However, any Kill Chain or BattleWeb construct, at its heart, links a community of interest to the delivery of a range of lethal and non-lethal effects. Critical to the accurate and timely delivery of these effects is the need to operate within the National Laws, International Laws, the Geneva Conventions and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). LOAC in particular places responsibilities on commanders for the alignment of effects to the principles of necessity, proportionality, humanity and distinction. Addressing these challenges is a key component of NATO warfighting; the ability to optimise potential kill chains using AI will increase challenges to the assurance of decision making and the ethics of using AI. This is not new, but as data and its exploitation through automation and ML, for example, become more prevalent , it will become increasingly important to make sure the “system” has an integral and auditable design and performance baseline that at any given stage provides confidence that the system will “perform as designed”. This is no different from the US Air Force approach to the delivery of its own weapons; the USAF have taken this approach for many years and any changes or additions to the “kill chain architecture” are tested accordingly.

6.6 Deep effects systems architecture in BattleWebs

The successful integration of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) programmes into the BattleWeb framework represents a pivotal advancement in the Deep Effects Systems Architecture. In a BattleWeb, ISTAR capabilities are distributed across a network of sensors, platforms, and decision-makers, allowing for real-time data sharing and coordination.

The integration of ISTAR programmes into BattleWebs will enhance the effectiveness of military operations by providing a more comprehensive and accurate picture of the battlespace. This integration dramatically enhances the lethality and effectiveness of our military operations by providing a near universal, real-time picture.

12: Source Ryan Chase 6point6 Accenture

Linking ISTAR assets into a networked system, BattleWebs enable the continuous, adaptive and resilient flow of information between different elements of the battlefield, from ground troops and aerial platforms to command centres and decision-makers. This real-time information flow allows for better understanding, faster decision-making and more precise targeting of lethal and nonlethal effects, improving the effectiveness of military operations. This is particularly relevant as the Army extends its battlespace into the deep where the complexity of the battlefield often makes it difficult to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. The ability to find, understand, predict, prioritise, strike and assess in a timely fashion and with precision is critical. This accelerated operational tempo delivered through an adaptive BattleWeb will provide a distinct tactical advantage enabling, outmanoeuvring and outpacing the adversary.

6.7 Enabling adaptive integration of autonomous systems. A key imperative for operations today and into the future is the need to accelerate and improve the employment of autonomous systems. The conﬂict in the Ukraine provides a powerful insight into the future: every 4 to 8 weeks the Ukrainians are modernising their drones to counter a similar response cycle in terms of counter measures from the Russians in a cycle of “innovation, design, production, delivery and reinvention that is unthinkable”.55 These capabilities will undertake a broadening range of tasks ranging from “armoured wingmen” through one-way drones to logistics. Autonomous systems will improve persistence, create efﬁciencies through reducing manpower requirements and require less logistic support than their human counterparts.56 Additionally, automated systems will allow the acceleration of combat operations using AI that could potentially outpace human decision-making cycles. Harnessing the unique power of these systems will enable commanders to make decisions and facilitate these systems to accomplish the mission at a rapid pace.57 The construct of a ubiquitous data centric BattleWeb will be a critical enabler to this foundational capability; it will provide the glue that integrates SENSE, DECIDE, EFFECT at tempo and with the required degrees of accuracy, agility and adaptability.

Image

6.8 Governance and assurance: Building trust

Establishing a robust governance framework is essential for effectively managing the BattleWeb and building trust in data-driven military operations; it is also critical for maintaining public trust.

Implementing clear policies and enforced procedures for data collection, storage, dissemination and ethical use is crucial. These guidelines must ensure data integrity while enabling efﬁcient information ﬂow across the BattleWeb Transparency, accountability and human oversight are the essential pillars of an effective AI governance framework. Creating independent ethical review boards to assess the moral implications of new technologies and operational concepts will ensure adherence to ethical expectations and standards as Defence employs data and AI. Collaborating with allies and partners to develop common standards and best practices for data-driven warfare will improve interoperability and shape global norms for the ethical use of data in military operations.

To realise this governance vision, it will be necessary to appoint senior leaders to champion data and AI governance across our defence environment. Empowered with the necessary authority and resources, these leaders will drive responsible innovation aligned to agreed mission outcomes. Agility and adaptability must be integral to these governance structures. Rigorous testing, validation and scenario planning will deﬁne the AI development and deployment process whilst strict standards and evaluation criteria will ensure the operational effectiveness and ethical integrity of Defence’s data-driven systems.

7 ENHANCED READINESS THROUGH ASSURED INTEROPERABILITY

“NATO must ‘win up front but be ready to win long’ in modern warfare”

General Christopher Cavoli SACEUR May 2024

A common narrative of the past decade, enhanced by the increasing impact of CEMA, has been a tendency to push back on a reliance on technology on the basis that such infrastructures, services and capabilities will be rapidly destroyed and less capable reversionary modes will be required. An implication of this approach is that NATO would never truly exploit the technological advantages it can leverage to their true potential, increasing the likelihood of a rapid decline into the types of attritional siege warfare as seen in the Ukraine. General Cavoli points to another paradigm which is that a focus on winning “up front” creates a more credible deterrent posture, and at the same time creates the opportunity to deliver a decisive culminating point before this decline; thus, a high state of

complex but assured force readiness will be critical. This does not detract from the need to be able to extend into a long war, but it does point to tools, techniques, services and enablers that are practised and understood, and which are adaptive to a rapidly changing operational environment enabling force elements to innovate and survive.

In this context, an interoperable BattleWeb that will enable the connection of any sensor to any effector to enable MDO/MDI across UK force elements as well as NATO partners must address readiness, and the key challenges across people, process, technology data stewardship and a new approach to exercising and testing readiness

7.1 People

People provide the start point and the critical last mile in terms of context, decision making and execution in any BattleWeb; rather like Mission Command this is something that will require the identification, development and retention of an increasing number of individuals with the necessary technical expertise, aptitude and motivation. This can only be developed through rigorous and realistic training and exercising beyond that which exists today. Without exposing individuals within the BattleWeb to the complexities and dilemmas such an environment will generate, the confidence and intuition required to execute the scale and complexity of the tasks required, at the pace required, will be unachievable.

Crucial to this transformation will be a rebalance away from the more established military skill sets towards a need to develop and maintain a broad range of software and data skills that can be deployed and integrated throughout the BattleWeb ecosystem all the way to the edge of the battlespace. An ability to adapt and innovate at any point in the process will be required to maintain the tactical edge over an adversary. This challenge puts the Army and Defence in competition for an already limited resource pool, and will require imagination, prioritisation and almost certainly the support of industry if the necessary capability and capacity are to be achieved.

Image 13: Source Edward Jones 6point6 Accenture

7.2 Process

Process in all its form will be pivotal to the successful realisation of the BattleWeb which will increasingly develop into a human-machine team with machines increasingly undertaking those functions that will release humans to provide context and decision making as a “human on the loop”. Whilst doctrine and national policies will frame national processes, and with a policy of NATO First , the UK and its partners have a NATO framework within which to develop and reﬁne key processes and Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs); this will enable effective and timely decision making and actions across multiple communities and nations. It will be key that these processes frame how technology is adopted and adapted to support the tempo and precision of operations required, and to understand how these capabilities can be measured against expectations in performance and effectiveness.

The adoption of the NATO Mission Thread methodology should provide the glue that links the definition of military capability and outcomes to the processes and TTPs that users will develop and adapt to execute their respective activities and missions. As well as defining the “use cases” that frame the design of the system across People Process and Technology, these Mission Threads and processes define the training needs that the individuals and communities must develop and be trained and exercised against. However, given that the OE is constantly evolving, these processes must not hardwire either the activities of the individual or that of the technology. The development of people with the right skills and confidence, and the appropriate disaggregation of decision making and trust , will enable the adaptability and agility required at the tempo and point of need. Mission Command in this context will enable trusted processes and capabilities to be adapted and adopted at pace and within a framework of understanding that recognises the interdependencies and cascading effects such changes will generate. Creating the environment to develop, hone and test these processes will require an increased emphasis on realistic data rich simulation which can recreate the expected operational dilemmas that decision makers will need to adapt to deliver mission success.

7.3 Technology and integration

A critical requirement for a future BattleWeb is the separation of data from applications. Industrial age C4ISTAR systems focused largely on the integration of systems; this approach is still common but results in proprietary standards, and signiﬁcant challenges for the MOD in swapping out old for new at a pace required without signiﬁcant cost or IP implications. There is a need to recognise that data

Today, Allied Defence Ministers have agreed a new NATO initiative on standardisation. Standards are critical to our ability to ﬁght together, and more robust standards will help reduce defence costs.

As part of this initiative, we will be speeding up the development of NATO standards, enhancing their implementation rate, and expanding their scope to include new innovative military capabilities.

We must make the most of our unique ability to act together, all 32 of us, because that is what gives our Alliance strength beyond the sum of its parts.

interoperability extends to the very edge including for example the fusing of ammunition; the ability to share scarce ammunition resource in a denied logistics environment is increasingly critical and interoperability is no longer just a matter of calibre.58 A focus on UK/national sovereign data layers that conform with directed taxonomies and standards, which largely exist today, provide an alternative agile and cost effective future.

Critically, the BattleWeb approach is dependent on the adoption of common standards, taxonomies, processes and data sharing practices across the NATO partners if a vision of any sensor-any effector is to be realised. This ambition is enabled by a range of recognised commercial standards, NATO STANAGS, and other conventions such as Artillery System Cooperation Activities (ASCA); however the evidence of multiple exercises and experiments such as the US Army-led Project Convergence Capstone series and NATO CWIX highlight the fact that whilst the range of agreed standards provide a cohering framework, their adoption and application are generally inconsistent across communities and rarely work “on ﬁrst contact”. A coherent approach to design and implementation should be outcome driven, based on a portfolio of agreed Mission Threads which as well as guiding design also facilitate the planning and execution of joint and multinational testing and exercises across all Defence Lines of Development.

7.4 Data stewardship and its role in interoperability

“So, why aren't we as interoperable as we'd want to be? The answer then becomes, ‘well, having a standard is one thing, meeting a standard is something altogether different’.”

Vice Adm. Guy Robinson, Chief of Staff to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Jul 2023

The effective operation of a winning BattleWeb is reliant on the quality and consistency of data, often referred to as "clean data" and the adherence to speciﬁed rules and standards relating to interoperability. Clean data is data that

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, 18 October 2024

is accurate, consistent, and free of errors or discrepancies that could lead to misinterpretations or operational failures. In a BattleWeb, where decisions may need to be made in fractions of a second, the importance of clean data cannot be overstated. US Army experience has demonstrated that a persistent and wellresourced data stewardship capability is required to maintain both the data quality, and alignment to the prescribed interoperability standards. The reality of “real world” activities generated the constant inclusion of new data from sources that do not understand or align to any common standards, and standards themselves being adapted in the light of operational needs. Key factors include:

• Ensuring clean data through:

o Data validation: All data entering the BattleWeb must be validated to ensure it meets predeﬁned standards for accuracy and consistency. This involves checking data against known benchmarks or expected values and ﬂagging any anomalies for further investigation.

o Data standardisation: data must be standardised across all systems and platforms to ensure that it is compatible and can be easily integrated. This includes standardising data formats, units of measurement and metadata.

o Data cleansing: regular data cleansing processes should be implemented to remove any outdated, irrelevant, or incorrect data from the system. This helps to maintain the integrity of the data and ensures that decisions are based on the most current and accurate information available.

o Real-time data synchronisation: to maintain interoperability, data must be synchronised across all nodes in the BattleWeb in real-time. This ensures that all components of the BattleWeb are operating with the same information and can make coordinated decisions.

• Beyond clean data, interoperability in a BattleWeb also depends on the adoption of agreed-upon standards for data exchange and communication protocols. These standards are essential for ensuring that different systems and platforms, often developed by different countries or contractors, can work together seamlessly. Agreed standards help in:

o Data integration: standards enable the smooth integration of data from various sources, ensuring that it can be combined and analysed without compatibility issues.

o System compatibility: by adhering to common standards, different systems can communicate and share data more effectively, reducing the risk of operational disconnects.

o Scalability: standards make it easier to scale the BattleWeb by adding new systems or upgrading existing ones without disrupting operations.

o Security: agreed standards often include protocols for data security and encryption, ensuring that sensitive information is protected as it moves through the BattleWeb.

The US Army employs a team of approximately 100 people full time to address this critical role. Seen as non-discretionary, without a constant and rigorous effort focused on data cleansing and interoperability, the aspirations of a modern BattleWeb are unsustainable and would very rapidly lose both trust and function.

7.5 Training and exercises

Train hard and ﬁght easy is a well-trodden but well proven maxim; it has been yet another casualty of Defence cuts in the UK and across NATO. Exercises not only provide the mechanism to develop and validate various levels of team and collaborative effectiveness; they also serve as powerful indicators of capability and readiness to potential adversaries. As such, the more these events reﬂect real operational challenges and place enable training audiences in environments to develop and display real prowess across the complexities of the OE, the more they will serve both purposes.

On Thursday 17 October 2024, NATO launched ﬁve initiatives designed to address some of the most critical areas for Allied deterrence and defence. These new multinational High Visibility Projects will involve a total of 26 Allies and will help deliver critical capabilities that will enhance interoperability among NATO forces.

The Distributed Synthetic Training Environment project aims to respond to the ever-growing demand for virtual training at the multinational level. It establishes a network of advanced and immersive multinational training opportunities for militaries. Eighteen NATO nations have joined the project: Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, United Kingdom and the United States. By leveraging national simulated training capabilities for multinational purposes, the project will bring immense operational beneﬁts and economies of scale.

Whilst at the tactical level the facilities and budgets still largely exist to create realistic training at a scale relevant to the readiness requirements of prioritised units, at the brigade levels and above there is a lack of investment in the data centric training and exercising capabilities that will stress and test units that must increasingly exploit large and complex data sets. These data sets must be designed to replicate the competing versions of reality and truth that multi-national alliance must interact with and understand at a tempo that will enable a decisive edge. This is a signiﬁcant investment in terms of scale and relevance without which there will be no transformation.

Whilst there has been an increased uplift in the scale, frequency and participation in exercises and training pitched at this higher tactical and operational level, US WARFIGHTER and NATO’s STEADFAST DEFENDER demonstrate different perspectives of such an ambition; they can lead to false assumptions and do not reflect a genuine estimation of readiness for the type of conflict the UK and NATO must now prepare for. An additional complication is that fear of political embarrassment colludes to create activities that represent political flag waving as opposed to genuine capability.

The Army, within the broader alliance framework, must have the courage to use realistic training environments to create the anvil upon which genuine transformation can be hardened and measured. Such an example was the US development and use of the National Training Centre in Fort Irwin to drive a fundamental shift from a 1970s backwards looking force into the Air-Land capable force that emerged for DESERT STRORM in 1991 and beyond. For those watching the change in US culture and capability from the outside, the transformation was extraordinary; for those inside it was brutal. Whilst the US has maintained its capability at the NTC to train and test up to divisional level, sacking ofﬁcers, SNCOS and ORs as necessary, there is no such equivalent elsewhere in NATO; the nearest such facility available to the UK in BATUS is no longer operational.

To address this critical need, the Army and Defence must develop an imaginative and representative combination of synthetic and real environments that will both develop and test formations in immersive data intensive environments that are as close as possible to the operational challenges that must be overcome. Rigour in setting appropriate training objectives with the relevant MoE and MoP will be required, and there should be consequences associated with under performance.

7.6 Data Centric Capability Development (CAPDEV) and Capability Delivery (CAPDEL) as a Service

Increasing the pace of innovation across the battlespace is not just about systems and processes; it is also about mindset. Part of this is about

Image 14: Source Edward Jones 6point Accenture

underscoring that capability is never “done”; it must constantly adapt to the changing environment in which we operate. Instead of deﬁning the exact force structure we want, or the precise capabilities we need, we need instead to build our ability to adapt rapidly. We will reform our acquisition paradigm from one focused on specifying exact requirements to one that acknowledges the importance of iterative development.59

7.7 Acquisition challenges for a data led capability

Software drives improved outcomes and effectiveness in the Army’s missions and operations; the ability to rapidly, deliver and adapt resilient software is critical to achieving a competitive advantage over adversaries. However, current institutional acquisition processes in the UK, US and broader NATO are largely designed to deliver hardware-based capabilities and do not enable the ﬂexibility and agility required by modern software development practices.60

In the past, governments, working with the defence industry, were the catalysts for innovation that then crossed over to commercial use. Today, this situation has reversed. As the defence industry seeks to leverage new technologies that are increasingly dual use61 , the concept of adoption or adaptation of commercial off the shelf (COTS) is accelerating innovation.62 Nations who exploit the opportunities of military-civil fusion because of the strong control their governments exert over industries and the tactics deployed outside national borders currently have the advantage.63 Existing procurement processes will require a transformation in culture, organisation and imagination if the UK and its allies are to contest the modern capability space by delivering advanced platforms and information systems.64 The digital force of the future will require a transformed acquisition system. A ‘digital trinity’ of digital engineering and management, agile software, and open architecture will be core to this transformation.65

The ecosystem of the defence, security and commercial sectors, including small and medium enterprises, requires the ability to develop and collaborate securely and in near real time, through digital platforms and models; the tech-stack. This connected ecosystem will enable and utilise innovation ‘at the edge’ through a DevSecOps approach, where technological prowess is viewed and rewarded as a

Image 15: NITEworks Indirect Fires Integration (IFI) Experimentation with 3(UK) Div 2004.

Source Alan Mears

badge of honour, changes are minor and more frequent, and a culture of ‘fail small, fail fast’ is an essential requirement in the competition to seek and maintain advantage.

Most importantly of all, the defence industry will need to identify and recruit or access, retain and develop people with the aptitudes and skills required.66 It requires personnel who can create, adapt and adopt with an understanding and appetite to exploit and manage the beneﬁts and risks that must be considered at all stages to win. Prowess and courage in technological innovation and its application must be encouraged and rewarded on a par with physical valour.

7.8 Establishing a persistent software centre of excellence

To enable the successful implementation of the BattleWeb concept, the UK MOD must establish a persistent, if federated, Battlelab-like capability that fosters rapid development and integration of new technologies and capabilities. It should balance the imperatives to develop and deploy rapidly new and modiﬁed user led capabilities against the need to address the prerequisites of security and interoperability.

A UK MOD exemplar of such a facility was the Command and Control Battlelab (C2BL) established to support operations in Afghanistan in Shrivenham from 2007-2011 which worked alongside the LSRC in Blandford and spun out the NATO Coalition Interoperability Assurance capability to address NATO interoperability.

A user led, agile innovation and CAPDEV capability, the C2BL was credited with transforming the Army’s digital capability “in contact” and was the driver for the development of OVERTASK and NATO’s Afghan Mission Network (AMN), which is now instantiated as the NATO Federated Mission Network (FMN). This DevSecOps approach promotes a culture of continuous innovation and experimentation, allowing for quick adaptation to evolving threats and operational requirements all within a Continuous Authority to Operate (CATO) environment. By incorporating Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) with technical and commercial expertise together with fostering collaboration with industry partners, the UK MOD can drive user led innovation, adaption and adoption, and ensure the longterm operational edge and viability of the BattleWeb system. Key elements of this approach would include:

Image 16: UK MOD Command and Control Battlelab (C2BL) 2009

Source: Alan Mears

• A single pane of glass. The complexity of matching diverse operational activities and processes is compounded by the rapid acceleration of technology; helping combinations of commanders, operators, engineers, acquisition professional and industry understand operational challenges and what good looks like is a serious challenge to capability development. PowerPoint and complex architectural tools will not address this challenge. A one-stop shop that enables shared understanding across users, engineers, acquisition and industry of current status and future capability requirements against a Mission Thread orientated “digital twin” environment is essential. Such a facility provides an opportunity to understand options between buy or adapt related to operational outcomes that can be demonstrated and measured. Without such an “anvil” upon which to focus effort, the Army will continue to chase conjecture, assumption and chimera in equal measure.

• Tailoring of processes to mission needs. A key tenet of modern software development is the ability to quickly adapt software solutions to respond to emerging threats, opportunities and needs.67 A persistent user/development teaming environment to deliver Mission Thread oriented outcomes and value ensures that software solutions are developed in line with user needs and priorities, and any consequent risks can be understood and accepted or mitigated by the user. Reﬂecting software development best practice this approach will support the relationship between user led Mission Threads and use cases and the rapid iteration of TEPIDOIL and engineering and test artifacts.

• AI pipeline as a service. The current narrative around AI is frenzied, diverse and on most occasions poorly informed. Tactical discussions around speciﬁc operational use cases ignore the broader technical and cost implications of AI adoption and exploitation. The opportunity to generate compounding errors through Machine Learning, for example, will deliver logical outcomes that are out of context and potentially dangerous. In addition, as the demand for AI increases exponentially, the potential diversity of solution development and deployment will have an accelerating impact on the costs and challenges

Image 17: Screenshot of Scarlet Dragon System.

Source: US Army Dragon Innovation Newsletter

of supporting AI computing requirements across all the Army deployed and home-based capabilities. The US experience in developing capabilities such as Project MAVERN have highlighted these issues and identiﬁed the need to put in place a centralised capability that focuses the expertise required to develop AI related use cases together with the necessary acquisition approaches to support. Project LINCHPIN has been set up by the US to address this and provides a good exemplar for a UK capability. By decoupling AI from software, the development and delivery process for AI can be responsibly managed. AI developers, engineers, testers, and security teams can be integrated into workﬂows that are governed by the MOD and Army standards for performance, security, and explainability. The end-to-end development and deployment process allows cyber security measures to be built in up front, while creating mechanisms to monitor, check and troubleshoot activities, all without exposing government data or AI and machine learning attributes to adversaries.68

• Establishment of an Army Software Management and Response Team (SMART) to assist army organisations 69 Whilst the Army has made some investment in areas such as the Int Corps, this initiative addresses a requirement to build capacity and capability in a critical skill set; creates a capability to adapt , resolve, and potentially build capabilities at the point of need, and reinforces the relationship between system design and operational outcomes. Like the provision of 1st/2nd line logistics support this capability will be increasingly critical to support the cultural and technical transformation towards a resilient data centric BattleWeb.70

• Establish a digital capabilities contracting centre of excellence to improve and streamline contracting for software. As part of the move toward data centricity is the need to transform the software acquisition process which is recognised as failing today. Currently software projects and programmes are developed in stovepipes, requirements heavy and poorly understood by the MOD or the industry. A range of challenges across commercial stipulations, IP constraints as well as process and governance result in an industrial age acquisition pathway like that of buying capital equipment. As a result there is a failure to optimise the opportunities available for coherency, efﬁciency, collaboration with industry and an over emphasis on risk and accountability.71 A US 18 Corps report into the development of the MAVERN SMART SYSTEM highlighted the pivotal role of a “lead” defence contractor in transforming this dynamic; this contractor acted as a systems integrator by leveraging warﬁghter and programme feedback to help identify and rapidly onboard the

best possible developers. This allowed the company, on behalf of the DoD, to successfully onboard (and, at various times, offboard) a variety of companies leading in AI services at pace. This was supported by adapted acquisition tools and policies to support this process. 72 A Centre of Excellence (CoE) approach that links a skilled software acquisition process to user led clearly deﬁned agile software will address this critical enabler for the Army.

7.9 The role of Defence Digital and STRATCOM

The new Integration Design Authority will work with allies and across the defence industrial sector to create open standards for our operating systems and protocols, as we have already demonstrated with the Land CEMA architecture and Pyramid Open Avionics architecture. Defence Equipment & Support and Strategic Command will take responsibility for ensuring industry contracts deliver against these standards and that integration into the defence ‘system of systems’ is demonstrated before completion of delivery into service 73

There is an ongoing tension between the expectations of “the centre” to direct, co-ordinate and govern and the tactical needs of the single services. Often this is manifested in over-complex and dictatorial process and approvals at one end, and the application of a Nelsonian blind eye at the other. The reorganisation of Defence into largely separated fiefdoms under the Levine reforms has exacerbated this. Today this challenge is often reflected in a perception that investment in an application that supports a particular warfighting capability, for example IRM&CM, must be replicated in each service and at each level of commend to serve its purpose; this is based on a legacy focus on system-tosystem integration.

A focus on a BattleWeb approach, with data at its heart, changes this paradigm. What is pivotal here is the need for a laser-like focus on data standards and data curation, and the optimisation of shared resources such as cloud and computing power and costs. This paradigm shift allows the Centre to operate more easily as an “ambidextrous organisation”74; on the one hand setting the strategic direction and providing governance of the critical data centric enablers, whilst on the other hand developing and deploying its own applications alongside those of the single services, as opposed to through them, to serve the speciﬁc roles and functions required to deliver enabling services such as intelligence and logistics as well as its responsibilities as a Joint HQ. The recent instantiation of the Design Authority framework provides a signiﬁcant opportunity in this respect; however, its focus should be functional on inter-operability through processes and standards rather than applications.

7.10 Mission focused capability through Mission Threads

It will be critical to move from a current engineering led overly speciﬁed “industrial age” developmental approach to one that is focused on the operational need and expectations of operators. The NATO Mission Thread

interoperability, a portfolio of agreed exploit and integrate with the broader portfolio of Mission Threads and related products developed for example under the NATO Federated Mission Networking (FMN) initiative. From a data and process interoperability perspective, such a foundational approach will transform the speed, effectiveness and assurance of the UK’s ability to integrate both internally and with alliances. Beneﬁts of focusing on a Mission Thread approach include:

• Enabling ‘day zero’ interoperability through clearly identiﬁed interoperability requirements and constraints.

• Providing capability planners, capability developers and mission planners a consistent context for developing or assessing solutions.

• Providing a structured way to capture and share information, enabling reuse and improved coherence between activities.

• Minimising time and resources to rework projects.

Image 18: NATO Mission Thread Development Guide 10 March 2017

• An objective mechanism to assess Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) and Measures of Performance (MoP).

7.11 A focus on DevSecOps

To develop and operate secure and resilient new capabilities at pace, a persistent user led DevSecOps approach is essential. This approach aligns the “tactical” and rapid development of new software centric capabilities as “sprints” and “epics” aligned to mission outcomes deﬁned under agreed Mission Threads. This approach would be enhanced by developing these capabilities on a Platform as a Service Environment (PaaS) which replicates the critical data, transport and security rules that such capabilities must work alongside. Such an approach will create a seamless and continuous evolution that supports a concept of Continuous Authority to Operate (CATO) which will become an increasingly critical feature of software development security and deployment.

7.12 Moving from innovation to adaption and adoption

Within the BattleWeb space there has been an explosion in the nature and diversity of MOD funded “innovation” that seeks to accelerate the exploration and exploitation of new technologies. This has created a cacophony of noise and a wide diversity of MOD and industry investment; the operational beneﬁts of this energy is less obvious. Dr Nina Kollars has highlighted the challenge of turning good ideas into tangible outcomes pointing out that “there is no innovation without adoption”. In the unstructured and legacy landscape of the MOD today CAPDEV and acquisition processes reﬂect this challenge and struggle to achieve capability deployment at the scale and pace required.76 There are several key challenges that such an unstructured approach generates some of which are illustrated below:

• The ability of contractors, especially SMEs, to understand the priority operational problems that need to be solved

• The costs SMEs in particular face in accessing and developing platforms to support their product

• Access to relevant data and an understanding of the security and operating constraints they must work to.

• The long timelines of development for Defence as opposed to industry where capitalisation can be more rapid.

• Perceptions of false promises in terms of potential revenues.

• The disconnects in defence circles between S&T and the programme space

The US AFWERX and Kessel Run environments are pointers to a more collaborative approach that has now developed signiﬁcantly. By creating a dynamic and collaborative platform where key innovators, and in particular nontraditional SMEs from outside defence, can engage at minimal cost and with access to the data environment and operational context they need, the USAF provided a low burden “come and play” environment. Under Dr Will Roper77, they also looked at ways of encouraging the “Silicon Valley” sector to go early to defence who provided early investment to develop capabilities which these organisations could then take subsequently to the commercial sector. The “dual use” nature of this approach brought beneﬁts to Defence, industry and investors.78

Through a combination of imaginative commercial incentives, and the adaption and federation of established capabilities such as the Digital Foundry and the LSRC, UK Defence and the Army can transform its success in this area. But to be successful this approach will need a coherent approach across the areas of incentivisation, orchestration and enablers; these must be focused on priority outcomes and opportunities shaped through the Mission Threads and driven by a need to constantly evolve and optimise the capabilities of the BattleWeb environment within an integrated DevSecOps environment.

8 CONTESTING THE CEMA AND ALGORITHMIC BATTLESPACE

The BattleWeb must operate in the most highly contested battlespace in terms of complexity, visibility, governance, reach and impact. Data and its exploitation represent critical vulnerabilities and opportunities across the full spectrum of cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare and algorithmic warfare. Building a capability based around the BattleWeb, whilst critical to the success of UK and NATO operations must understand and integrate the need for resilience and an ability to set the conditions for success by proactively shaping and contesting the space across which data is accessed, communicated and transformed. This requires a fundamental shift away from extant and largely passive measures of,

Image 19: Source Edward Jones 6point6 Accenture

for example, cyber security to proactively engaging in those operations required to enable assured access to data and its contribution in line with operational priorities throughout the full cycle. As part of this approach there are three complimentary concepts: ﬁrstly the acceptance that the adversary will always be able to access our networks and capabilities; the second is that by understanding our architectures and operational priorities, it is possible to maintain the required Freedom of Action required through targeted activities across People, Process and Technology: and third, by integrating these actions as part of our planning process we can identify kinetic and non-kinetic measures to degrade adversary Freedom of Action to the beneﬁt of our own. To achieve this outcome, amongst a wide range of actions, four themes should be addressed to enable a battle winning BattleWeb:

• A resilient “secure by design” data architecture.

• CEMA operations within the construct of MDO.

• The development a resilient and assured counter algorithmic warfare capability.

• Preparing for quantum computing

8.1 A resilient “secure by design” data architecture

Modern BattleWebs require an ability to integrate at pace people, process and technologies and across civil, governmental, military and alliance boundaries. This however ampliﬁes the opportunities for adversaries providing multiple vectors of approach and attack all the way from the inclusion of compromise in microprocessors in manufacture through to dynamic CEMA operations in the tactical battlespace. To address this, it is essential to design and ﬁt for a Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA).

Zero Trust (ZT) is the term for an evolving set of cybersecurity paradigms that move defences from static, network-based perimeters to focus on users, assets, and resources. Zero Trust assumes there is no implicit trust granted to assets or user accounts based solely on their physical or network location (i.e., local area networks versus the Internet) or based on asset ownership (enterprise or personally owned).79 Zero Trust requires designing a consolidated and more secure architecture without impeding operations or compromising security. The classic perimeter/defence-in-depth cyber security strategy repeatedly is shown to have limited value against well-resourced adversaries and is an ineffective approach to address insider threats.80

Whilst this is a complex undertaking and in its early stages of realisation, the “design for” principle should guide the design and integration of capabilities that will deliver the BattleWeb of today and tomorrow. The approach is consistent with UK, NATO and US defence aspirations and direction, and is aligned to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-160 Rev A and ZT principles described in NIST SP 800-207; these are foundational frameworks across NATO and their adoption will underpin the future interoperability and resilience of the BattleWeb. This approach will contribute to two key outcomes for the warﬁghter community81 :

• Integrated deterrence. To improve cyberspace survivability and deter malicious actors, the MOD must invest in the modernisation of key capabilities. Adoption of a ZTA that integrates visibility, analytics, data protection, and other advanced security techniques will reduce complexity and enable automation and orchestration of cyber response actions.

• Building enduring advantages. The current procurement process was built to acquire specific systems rather than to solve operational problems. As the MOD moves toward rapid experimentation and fielding emerging technology and capability, the intent is better alignment of requirements to resources and acquisition. Adoption of a Mission Thread driven ZTA which delivers interoperability of legacy systems with modern systems will deliver advanced capabilities to the warfighter more efficiently and effectively.

8.2 CEMA operations within the construct of MDO

Adversaries are aggressively exploiting policy and decision-making frictions and boundaries of the US and its allies.82 While this condition of constant competition falls short of overt conflict, it is all about understanding, shaping and outmanoeuvring opponents. It is therefore essential that the UK and its partners adapt their strategies and policies to both deter adversaries but also to seize and retain the initiative; this should be approached as an active and not reactive strategy.83 Not to do so, or to do so too late, risks ceding the initiative entirely, as the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has pointed out.84 The 2018 DoD strategy seeks to address this operational imperative through a concept of “Forward Defense” and has directed the Department to defend forward, shape the

Image 20: Source Ryan Chase 6point6 Accenture

day-to-day competition and prepare for war by building a more lethal force, expanding alliances and partnerships, reforming the Department and nation, cultivating talent, while at the same time actively competing against and deterring competitors.85

More speciﬁcally in Pam 3-13 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA), the US Army Cyberspace asserts that cyberspace and the EMS are critical for success in today’s operational environment (OE); achieving relative superiority in cyberspace and the EMS gives commanders an advantage over adversaries and enemies.86 By conducting cyberspace operations and EW, commanders can limit adversaries’ available courses of action, diminish their ability to gain momentum, degrade their command and control, and degrade their ability to operate effectively in the other domains. It identiﬁes the need for commanders to leverage cyberspace and EW capabilities using a combined arms approach to seize, retain, and exploit the operational initiative. Image 19 below illustrates how cyberspace operations and EW contribute to US Army operations

Figure 21: Cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare logic chart87

From a BattleWeb perspective, a rapid and thorough transformation in the applicability of CEMA in terms of ISTAR, offensive operations and defensive operations is overdue. This is required not only to mainstream the delivery of effects in the OCO space, but also to assure the performance of our own BattleWeb as adversaries increasingly place this ﬁrmly in their crosshairs as Key Terrain. Joint Concept Note 2/18, Information Advantage, reinforces the notion that central to emerging strategic contests are “information battles” in which information is “weaponised” and where the UK and its allies increasingly lack the initiative 88 These require UK Defence, as part of a national and allied effort, to become a potent and resilient strategic actor postured for constant competition both at home and away.

As with any military operation, actions along a single line of effort rarely accomplish the commander’s scheme of manoeuvre, and the same holds true in cyberspace. To provide freedom of manoeuvre across CEMA, we must optimise the employment of forces across network operations, defensive and offensive actions designed to maintain FoA across our own data ecosystem, and offensive Cyberspace CEMA actions planned and delivered as part of our targeting process.89

However, CEMA operations remain disconnected across the range of ISTAR, defensive and offensive activities in terms of operational planning and effects; without a signiﬁcant re-evaluation of the associated capabilities and their employment, the UK will be unable to achieve the outcomes required to maintain its own Freedom of Action, let alone threaten that of the adversary.

A key constraint in this space is the distancing of capabilities and their use from the commanders and their staffs largely based on organisational tensions, and a desire for protecting sensitive intelligence and equity. This is compounded by a G6 ownership of DCO which is effectively approached as information assurance as opposed to the need to shift towards a doctrine of Mission Assurance (MA) as advocated by NATO90 and the US concept of Defend Forward91; information assurance emphasises the security and defensive posture related to the protection of information and systems, while MA includes the operational impact of activities in or through cyberspace. These issues cannot be ignored. For too long they have prevented an understanding of the opportunities and threats these capabilities provide to commanders as well as adversaries. Therefore, the ability to optimise ISTAR, defensive and offensive operations across the battlespace alongside the full integration of CEMA remains an aspiration rather than a reality. Unless users practise with, and can quantify and trust the potential

outcomes of current and constantly emerging CEMA capabilities, these expensive capabilities will remain on the shelf. In addition, the integration of AI into CEMA tooling, and the potential of quantum computing are already accelerating the depth, breadth and effectiveness of CEMA capabilities and will rapidly widen the gap between those who are actively contesting this space and those who are not.

Operations in the Ukraine are already signposting this transition in the use of CEMA across the battlespace; at the strategic level, for example, the movement of Ukrainian critical capabilities into the cloud prior to the Russian invasion minimised effects of the Russian cyber pre-ﬁres that precluded the invasion. There is also a well-documented and increasing trend throughout the battlespace to leverage and integrate CEMA and kinetic ﬁres to create conditions for a wide range of operational and tactical effects.

Critically the threats and opportunities realisable through CEMA were identiﬁed at least a decade ago, but despite signiﬁcant investments these remain largely unaddressed with only a limited number of “tactical” gains as far as deployed Land operations are concerned. Unless there is an organisational and cultural transformation that places these tools into the hands of those who must plan for their use as part of a holistic MDO approach our data will be vulnerable to adversary effects, and we will miss the ability to create an asymmetric dilemma to our adversaries.

8.3 Development of a resilient and assured counter algorithmic warfare capability

In a world of the data centric BattleWeb that will be exponentially leveraged through AI tools, the co-development of a resilient and assured counter algorithmic warfare capability is critical for MDO/MDI.92 As the adversary increasingly begins to view any key algorithms as key terrain with multiple “algorithm” High Pay Off Targets (HPTs) such a capability is essential to protect the integrity of decision-making processes, enhance resilience against adversarial actions, and maintains operational tempo across multiple domains. As warfare becomes increasingly dependent on data and algorithms, and like CEMA, the ability to counter algorithmic threats is increasingly

Image 22: Source Edward Jones 6point6 Accenture

fundamental to maintaining an operational edge over the adversary. The need for such capabilities will only grow as adversaries continue to develop more sophisticated means of exploiting algorithmic vulnerabilities, making it a strategic imperative for modern militaries to invest in robust counter algorithmic warfare capabilities

Algorithmic warfare involves the use of advanced algorithms and artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) for tasks such as data analysis, decision-making, and autonomous operation of weapons systems. Algorithms underpin many technologies critical to MDO, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; electronic warfare systems; and cyber operations. In this context, adversarial algorithms are designed to deceive, disrupt, or degrade these systems, often through methods like data poisoning, adversarial attacks on machine learning models, or cyber intrusions.

Given the potential of algorithms to manipulate or degrade key capabilities, the development of a counter algorithmic warfare capability becomes vital. Without it, the effectiveness of MDO could be severely compromised. For instance, an adversary could employ AI-driven cyber-attacks to disrupt communication networks, manipulate ISR data to obscure their movements, or hack into autonomous systems, turning assets meant for defence into liabilities. A robust counter-algorithmic capability ensures that friendly forces can identify, neutralise, and adapt to such threats in real-time

The primary advantage of a resilient and assured counter algorithmic warfare capability is decision superiority; decision superiority is the ability to make faster, more accurate decisions than the adversary. In MDO, where the pace of operations is rapid and the battlespace is complex, decision superiority will increasingly be the determining factor between success and failure. By effectively countering adversarial algorithms, friendly forces can ensure that their decision-making processes are based on accurate, reliable data while degrading the adversary's ability to do the same.

Furthermore, the development of such capabilities enhances operational advantage by enabling the integration of capabilities across multiple domains. For instance, a counter algorithmic capability could allow forces to operate seamlessly in a denied or degraded communications environment, leveraging alternate data sources and decision-making frameworks to maintain operational tempo.

8.4 Preparing for quantum computing

What is increasingly evident in today’s transformative OE is that technologies that are parked on a distant horizon have an increasing tendency to accelerate forwards in time; the period between the recognition of a new transformative technology and the early manifestations of capability are being reduced. As a result, it is increasingly important to combine horizon scanning and experimentation with pragmatic measures to exploit or mitigate the potential effects of such capabilities. Quantum is such a capability.

Quantum technology is poised to revolutionise the future battlespace, promising unprecedented capabilities in computing, communications, and sensing that could decisively shift the balance of power. As warfare becomes increasingly data-centric, the potential of quantum technology to enhance processing speed, data security, and situational awareness makes it a critical asset for military forces. The Army must begin preparing now to integrate quantum capabilities into its operations, leveraging this technology to maintain an edge over adversaries in an evolving global security environment.

To effectively integrate quantum technologies, start by fostering a culture of innovation and investment in quantum research and development. This preparation involves several key steps:

• Developing quantum talent: Establishing specialised training programmes and partnerships with academic and private sector leaders in quantum research to build a workforce skilled in quantum science and its military applications.

• Investing in infrastructure: Modernising existing data infrastructure to handle the unique requirements of quantum technologies, including quantumsecure communication networks and data centres optimised for quantum computing workloads.

• Collaborating with allies: Strengthening alliances and partnerships to share research, standards, and best practices, ensuring interoperability and the rapid adoption of quantum technologies within joint operations.

• Establishing ethical and secure Frameworks: formulating policies and guidelines for the ethical use of quantum technologies, as well as developing countermeasures to protect against adversarial quantum capabilities.

Similarly to the transformative impacts the Army is undergoing today as it wrestles with AI, quantum is poised to compound these challenges and opportunities at an exponential rate and scale. It will be critical to be on the front

foot in developing quantum capabilities to avoid the consequences of being second to the party.

9 CONCLUSION

Defence is at a tipping point as a newly elected Government undertakes yet another Strategic Defence Review. In recent decades the amount of information produced by sensors, the speed and ubiquity of communications, and the magnitude of tactical advantage possible from processing that information and making decisions faster than one’s adversary, what some have called “informationized”, warfare, is transforming the modern operating environment. Operations in the Ukraine have provided the US, UK and NATO the opportunity to experience at ﬁrst hand the dynamics of change across the modern battlespace; it is driving a reshaping of the narrative from conceptual to a focus on urgent transformation with impact.

To address these challenges, China placed considerable emphasis on the concept of Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare; the PLA now views as critical the “informatisation” of a range of operational and strategic systems that represent a core requirement for ISR operations, long-range precision strike capabilities, multidomain offense and defence, long-range mobility and manoeuvre and enhanced logistics and support. This conclusion has many similarities, but is more far reaching, to that of the Russian Reconnaissance Strike Complex which has at its roots a concept of manoeuvre like that of the UK and its allies.

However, the Ukraine war is highlighting some key challenges in this “maneuverist” approach; after its initial failures the Russians have looked increasingly to a First World War doctrine: elastic defence. This is based around an attritional approach appropriate for the context of its ﬁght based around a concept of “destructionoriented warfare”; the Ukrainians are adopting a similar doctrine.

As part of the NATO coalition, the UK’s role is essentially one of deterrence and defence; the Ukrainian war is highlighting some key characteristics, in particular the concept of, and capacity to, undertake Systems Destruction Warfare through a doctrine of “destruction-orientated warfare”. Key to this concept will be the ability to seize and maintain advantage through decisive kinetic and non-kinetic ﬁres delivered across resilient and adaptive BattleWebs. The targets will be determined through a detailed understanding of the inter-dependencies of the systems they are part of, and their particular signiﬁcance at any point in an

operation or campaign. Building the winning capabilities necessary to understand, interdict and support these complex systems as part of a coherent cross government DIME construct will separate the Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare must be a core focus for the SDR.

To contest and win in this modern OE, at the heart of the BattleWeb concept lies data, the new weapon of modern warfare, the UK and its allies must move from concepts of linear and largely static kill chains to one of agile, adaptive and ubiquitous BattleWebs. Data has become the oxygen of our operations, enabling rapid decision-making The BattleWeb must leverage a wide range of diverse military and civilian data from multiple sources and across national boundaries and multiple security domains, creating an unprecedented and comprehensive view of the battlespace. Advanced analytics and AI are already enabling rapid processing of vast datasets, extracting actionable intelligence in near real-time that can enable us to outpace adversaries in decision-making.

If the BattleWeb is the weapon system, data is the weapon. The centrality of data in BattleWebs cannot be overstated. In this interconnected system, every action is informed by data, from intelligence processing through the identiﬁcation of targets to the deployment of weapons. The ability to process and analyse this data reliably and in real-time allows the BattleWeb to operate with the speed and agility required in modern warfare.

Underpinning this entire ambition is the need to achieve, assess and assure the levels of interoperability needed to achieve and maintain readiness. SACEUR’s ambition to win “up front” creates a more credible deterrent posture; this demands trusted and effective MDO and broader NATO/US interoperability across the battlespace “out of the box”. This has implications for the skills and capabilities of the “people” dimension, for the process dimension in terms of evidenced process integration across all of the key combat functions, and the technology dimension which must enable the trusted and adaptive movement of data across the ecosystem. In addition there is a need to recognise that cyberspace, algorithmic warfare, and the EMS represent key terrain for the

Figure 23: Source Ryan Chase 6point6 Accenture

modern OE; there is a need to change a posture of service led cyber security to one where these capabilities are mainstream and contested as a coherent part of MDO planning and execution Critical to readiness will be the ability to create realistic training and exercising environments across the UK and NATO that will enable the cost effective and continuous test, validation and assurance of these key processes between partners to a level of conﬁdence that can be measured and demonstrated.

There are no second chances in warfare, nor prizes for coming second.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views, opinions, or official policy of my employer or any affiliated organisation. This content is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute endorsement or official position by my employer.

Alan Mears has more than 40 years’ service as a Regular and Reserve ofﬁcer in the British Army and is a Director in the Accenture UK Defence team. He is currently working on a range of UK MOD and NATO projects related to AI, data, targeting and ISTAR. In 2007 he set up the groundbreaking UK C2 Battlelab in Shrivenham where, working closely with deploying brigades, he led efforts to “digitise” UK and NATO efforts into Afghanistan between 2007 and 2011. He was mobilised as SO1 Targets to IMEF for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, and again in 2006 to set up ISAF’s Joint Fires and Targeting capability with HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Alan has an MSc in Cyberspace Operations from Cranﬁeld University.

1 International Relations and Defence Committee Ukraine: a wake-up call. 1st Report of Session 2023-24 - published 26 September 2024 - HL Paper 10. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5901/ldselect/ldintrel/10/1002.htm

2 The author was a student at JDSC and syndicate leader for the activity

3 UK Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7c87cfed915d6969f4585e/2800.pdf

4 D/DOR (LandCIS)/166 dated 29 Nov 1996

5 MOD D/DFD/5/2/4 dated 12 Jun 96

6 D/DOR (LandCIS)/166 dated 29 Nov 1996

7 "The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare" by Christian Brose (2022)

8 1994 White Paper on Defence . Available at https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dnnd/D3-6-1994- eng.pdf

9. August 28 2024

10 The Human Machine Team. How to create synergy between Human & Artificial Intelligence that will revolutionize our world. Brigadier General YS. Available at: https://alkhanadeq.org.lb/static/media/uploads/files/the-human-machine-team-how-to - create-synergybetween-human-amp -artificial-intelligence-that-will.pdf

11 UK Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world. 18 Jul 2023

12 The Heritage Foundation. Getting to Where the PLA Needs to Be. Testimony before U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission June 20, 2019. Dean Cheng. Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center. Available at: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/Cheng_USCC%20Testimony_FINAL.pdf

13 CSIS Briefs. Battle Networks and the Future Force Part 1: A Framework for Debate https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-networks-and-future-force

14 ibid

15 Data strategy for Defence Published 27 September 2021

16 The British Army Review 183. Wow will we ﬁght? Summer 2023

17 FULCRUM: The US DoD Information Technology Advancement Strategy.

18 Targeting: Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Data, and Military Intelligence. Anthony King. University of Exeter. Journal of Global Security Studies, 9(2), 2024

19 James Clear. Atomic Habits

20 UK MoD Global Strategic Trends Out to 2050. Seventh Edition. 2024

21 General (retd) Sir Richard Barrons evidence to the Defence Committee: US, UK and NATO & RussiaUkraine Crisis, HC 608/167 Tue 19 Apr 2022

22 ibid

23 The Arms of the Future. Technology and close combat in the twenty-ﬁrst century. Jack Watling. Bloomsbury.

24 Integrated Review Refresh 2023 – Responding to a more contested and volatile world

25 2021 Integrated Review, Global Britain in a Competitive Age

26 Unrestricted Warfare: A Chinese doctrine for future warfare? Major John A. Van Messel, USMC. 2005

27 Gaining Victory in Systems Warfare. Rand Research Report. Mar 2023

28 ibid

29 The Russian Reconnaissance Fire Complex Comes of Age. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles. Oxford Changing Character of War Centre. May 2018

30 Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare. Rand Research Report. Feb 2018

31 ibid

32 ibid

33 ibid

34 Gaining Victory in Systems Warfare. Rand Research Report. Mar 2023

35 The Russian Reconnaissance Fire Complex Comes of Age. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles. Oxford Changing Character of War Centre. May 2018

36 First World War Doctrine and the Modern War of Positions. Joseph Mosser. US Army Military Review. Oct 2024

37 On Attrition - An Ontology for Warfare. Lt. Col. Amos C. Fox, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired. Military Review. Sep -Oct 2024

38 ibid

39 ibid

40 Scale, Scope, Speed & Survivability: Winning the Kill Chain Competition. Heather R. Penney. Mitchell Institute Policy Paper. Vol. 40, May 2023

41 "The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare" by Christian Brose (2022)

42 Center for security and emerging technology. Building the Tech Coalition. How Project MAVERN and the US 18 Corps operationalized software and Artiﬁcial Intelligence for the Department of Defense. August 2024. Available at: https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/building-the-tech- coalition/

43 The Human Machine Team. How to create synergy between Human & Artificial Intelligence that will revolutionize our world. Brigadier General YS. Available at: https://alkhanadeq.org.lb/static/media/uploads/files/the-human-machine-team-how-to - create-synergybetween-human-amp -artificial-intelligence-that-will.pdf

44 The War for Ukraine: Strategy and adaptation under ﬁre. Mick Ryan

45 ibid

46 Scale, Scope, Speed & Survivability: Winning the Kill Chain Competition. Heather R. Penney. Mitchell Institute Policy Paper. Vol. 40, May 2023

47 DARPA Tiles Together a Vision of Mosaic Warfare. Banking on cost- elective complexity to overwhelm adversaries. Available at: https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/darpa-tiles-together-a-vision- of-mosiacwarfare

48 CSIS Brief. Battle Networks and the Future Force Part 1: A Framework for Debate. Todd Harrison. August 2021

49 CSIS Brief. Battle Networks and the Future Force Part 1: A Framework for Debate. Todd Harrison. August 2021

50 Scale, Scope, Speed & Survivability: Winning the Kill Chain Competition. Heather R. Penney. Mitchell Institute Policy Paper. Vol. 40, May 2023

51Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center. Russia Matters. Roles and implications of AI in the RussianUkrainian conﬂict. Sam Bendett https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/roles-and-implications-airussian-ukrainian- conﬂict

52 ibid

53 A model for assessing the coherence of data- centric capabilities in Defence. Professor Allan Cook,

54 ibid,

55 The Times Saturday October 19 2024

56 Adriana Gibson, Brandon D. Vigneron, and Andrew J. Merchant, “Autonomous Systems in the Combat Environment: The Key or the Curse to the U.S.,” The Strategy Bridge (The Strategy Bridge, October 8, 2020), https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/10/8/autonomoussystems-inthe- combat- environment-the-key- or-the- curse-to -the-us

57 Future Kill Chains: Harnessing Emerging Technology to Improve Marine Corps Warﬁghting. Maj Jesse T Knoght

58 The Arms of the Future. Technology and close combat in the twenty-ﬁrst century. Jack Watling. Bloomsbury.

59 Command paper

60 US Army Directive 2024-02 Enabling Modern Software Development and Acquisition Practices) dated 11 Mar 2024

61 UK DE&S 2025. Delivering the Edge through people, technology and innovation

62 By the Seat of Their Pants: Military Technological Adaptation in War. Dr Nina Kollars 2012

63 Techno -nationalism and the US-China tech innovation race. Alex Capri. Hinrich Foundation. Aug 2020

64 Failures of Imagination: The Military’s Biggest Acquisition Challenge. Jarrett Lane and Michelle Johnson. War on the Rocks. Apr 2018

65 There is No Spoon. The New Digital Acquisition Reality. Will Roper. US Department of the Airforce

66 Modernizing military acquisition and sustainment for the 21st century. McKinsey & Company. Sep 2020.

67 US Army Directive 2024-02 Enabling Modern Software Development and acquisition practices. 11 March 2024

68 War on the Rocks. PIPELINE AS A PRODUCT: HOW PROJECT LINCHPIN PLANS TO DELIVER ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR THE ARMY. Nick Bono and Bharat Patel

69 US Army Directive 2024-02 Enabling Modern Software Development and acquisition practices. 11 March 2024

70 US Army Directive 2024-02 Enabling Modern Software Development and acquisition practices. 11 March 2024

71 ibid

72 18 Corps report

73 ibid

74 Charles A. O’Reilly III and Michael L. Tushman, “Innovation: The Ambidextrous Organization,” Harvard Business Review (April 2004): https://hbr.org/2004/04/the-ambidextrous- organization

75 NATO CONSULTATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL BOARD (C3B) ARCHITECTURE CAPABILITY TEAM (ACAT) MISSION THREAD GUIDANCE. 12 May 2022

76 Innovation is an illusion. Dr Nina Kollars. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UpAl0rmQ7o

77 Dr Will Roper was the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 2018 to 2021

78 There is No Spoon: _The New Digital Acquisition Reality. Will Roper, October 7, 2020

79 NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture, August 2020

80 Department of Defense (DoD) Zero Trust Reference Architecture Version 2.0 July 2022

81 Department of Defense (DoD) Cybersecurity Reference Architecture Version 5.0 January 30, 2023

82 Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment, P4, June 2016.

83 The Temporal Dimension of Defending Forward: A UK perspective on how to organize and innovate to achieve US Cyber Command’s new vision. Alan Mears, Joe Mariani The Cyber Defense Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, International Conference on Cyber Conﬂict (CyCon U.S.) November 18-20, 2019

84 General P. Nakasone, A Cyber Force for Persistent Operations, JFQ 92 January 2019, available at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/ Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-92/jfq-92_10-14_Nakasone.pdf.

85 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defence Strategy of the United States of America. Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, available at: https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

86 US FM 3-13 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA). Aug 2021.

87 ibid

88 UK MOD Joint Concept Note 2/18, Information Advantage

89 The Joint Force Commander’s Guide to Cyberspace Operations. Brett T. Williams. JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014. Available at: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/6379791/National-SecurityArchive-Maj-Gen-Brett-T.pdf

90 Allied Joint Publication-3.20 Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations

91 US DoD 2023 Cyber Strategy. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Sep/12/2003299076/-1/1/1/2023_DOD_Cyber_Strategy_Summary.PDF

92 Operationalizing Artiﬁcial Intelligence for Algorithmic Warfare. Courtney Crosby PHD Military Review. July-August 2020