The Weapons' Reputation

The Weapons' Reputation

An Investigation into the Geopolitics of Arms Trade

The Weapons' Reputation An Investigation into the Geopolitics of Arms Trade

Cinzia Bongino

07 Abstract 13

Preliminary Investigation — Introduction

17

Background Information — Conventional Weapons

25

Crime Scene — The Yemeni Civil War

33

Allegations and Legal Framework — Self Defense vs. National Interest

37

Crimes Reconstruction — Investigations

39

Investigation #1 — GBU-12 Paveway II Laser Guided Bomb

51

Investigation #2 — Eurofighter Typhoon Combat Aircraft

63

Investigation #3 — Quds-1 Cruise Missile

73 Follow-Up

— The Collateral Damage

of the Arms Trade 77

Final Report — Conclusion

84

Endnotes and Sources

Table of Contents

6

The thesis questions the integrity of arms trade as a legal transfer of conventional weapons among countries. The Arms Trade Treaty prohibits the sale of arms to nations involved in a civil war and in which the equipment risks to be used against civilians or diverted. Although every conventional weapon is produced and sold with a license, there is an enormous lack of responsibility among the people involved in the defense industry, often exchanged in favor of political consensus and economic partnerships: despite its dangerousness, the arms trade is not a commerce enough tracked.

It is from the debris of weapons that survived to the impact with their target that it is possible to investigate not only who "pulled the trigger" but also who designed, produced, acquired and transferred it. As a case study, the Yemeni crisis is narrated through the perspective of three arms used in the conflict: by tracing their route, from the countries of origin to the end-users, it is possible to outline the dynamics of warfare, and which nations have a political and economic interest to feed it.

Abstract

7

8

'All warfare is based on deception' Sun Tzu, The Art of War

9

• Tucson

10

Warton • • Samlesbury

• Manching

• Caselle Torinese • Getafe • Sevilla • Teheran

• Abqaiq Riyadh • • Khurais

• Sana'a

11

12 12

Preliminary Investigation

Introduction

13 13

1

2

3

[ 1 ] GBU-12 Paveway II guidance unit fin fragment (31/01/2017) [ 2 ] Twitter: Benjamin Strick (8/05/2019) [ 3 ] Remnant of a misfired Iranian displayed during a press conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (18/09/ 2019)

Preliminary Investigation

14

The images aside show debris of weapons found in Yemen (or linked to): + Picture [ 1 ] displays one of the four fins of the Guidance Control Unit of an American GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bomb + Picture [ 2 ] shows a European Combat Aircraft known as Eurofighter Typhoon being refueled by a European A3330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport flying over the Saudi southern border with Yemen + Picture [ 3 ] depicts the remnant of an alleged Iranian cruise missile, exhibited during a Saudi press conference Why are these items connected to a nation in which there is an active arms embargo against local armed groups and weapons are used against civilians, if the manufacturing countries have ratified the Arms Trade Treaty or, as part of the United Nations, should respect the humanitarian law? To what degree is the business of arms trade influencing foreign relations and subsequently fueling conflicts? And how can the military, economic and political role of weapons be highlighted in current events?Even if war context in the Middle East could be perceived as distant from a European perspective, it is, in fact, much closer than we imagine, due to the globalized world of Arms Trade: the question is then not who takes part in a conflict, but who can affirm to not have any connection with it.

In the form of an investigation, this research enquires into who currently controls which arms and consequently influences international political and economic alliances. The thesis examines the countries linked to the Yemeni crisis through the type of weaponry employed, the real tangible evidence of any direct (or non-direct) participation of a nation in a specific conflict. Starting from their design, through to the manufacturing process, to their military use and misuse, this is an attempt to visualise the hidden relationships among the countries in terms of money flow, companies, service infrastructure, deals, and banks involved.

Introduction

15

16 16

Background Information

Conventional Weapons

17 17

A weapon, an arm or armament is any device that is used with intent to inflict damage or harm. Weapons can be divided into three main categories: cyber, nuclear and conventional weapons. The items collected in this document belong to the last category.

Conventional Weapons are ‘essential to national security and tools of national politics with the legitimate military, police, and civilian use’ (Stohl, 2009: pp. 2): armaments manufactured and traded among countries, meant to be used by armed forces of states and civilians. Labeled as “conventional” because fitted with conventional explosives (i.e. do not use nuclear, biological or chemical ordnance), the definition includes “heavy” weapons such as battle tanks, artillery systems, munition, armored combat vehicles, combat helicopters, fighter aircraft or warships, but also small arms and light weapons, like handguns or light and heavy machine guns that can be used independently by one or several persons. Any technological or digital equipment used to make them work is also considered part of it.1 Conventional weapons are also profitable goods: due to the correlation between the political sphere and industrial power, significant profits can be made through arms deals. Every transaction is linked to multi-million dollar deals usually signed during diplomatic state visits, which enable military and economic partnerships among countries. Since most states in the world own a national army and often need to replace/ update their inventory, the arms business is a quite flourishing market. The biggest manufacturers are located in the most powerful countries, which own an extended net of foreign relations: commissioning the construction of a jet, for instance, requires many legal steps and approvals from both supplier and recipient countries, with no common regulation.

Background Information

18

AMMUNITION Bombs

Dumb Bomb

Laser-Guided Bomb

Joint Standoff Bomb (Flight control)

Joint Direct Attack Bomb (GPS + Laser)

Grenades

Bullets

Smart Bullet

Soft-Point Bullet

Cartridge Rifle

Shotgun Shell

Hand Grenade

High Explosive Grenade

Smoke Grenade

Missiles

Anti-Ship Missile

Anti-Tank Missile

Air-to-Air Missile

Air-to-Surface Missile

Conventional Weapons

Anti-Tank Missile Launcher

Cruise Missile

19 19

COMBAT AIRCRAFTS Fighter Aircrafts

Multirole Fighter Aicraft

Fighter Jet

Interceptor Aircraft

Bomber Aicraft

Surveillance Aircrafts

Military Transport Aircrafts

UAVs Maritime Patrol Aircraft

COMBAT HELICOPTERS

Attack Helicopter

Transport Helicopter

Background Information

Maritime Helicopter

Observation Helicopter

Utility Helicopter

20 20

ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES Armoured Vehicles

Main Battle Tank

Armored Personnel Carrier

Amphibious vehicles

Armored Cars

Reconnaissance vehicle

Self-propelled artillery

Cruise Missile Launcher

Multiple Rocket Launcher

Howitzer

Conventional Weapons

Mortar Carrier

Self-propelled artillery

21 21

WARSHIPS

Aircraft Carrier

Helicopter Carrier

Destroyer

Patrol Boat

Corvette

Frigate

Submarine

Background Information

Amphibious Assalt Ship

22 22

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS Guns

Submachine gun

Handgun

Shotgun

General-purpose machine gun

Light machine gun

Carbine

Rifles

Rifle

Sniper Rifle

Recoilless Rifle

Anti-material rifles

Designated Marksman Rifles

Grenade and missiles launchers

Rocket-Propelled Grenade Launcher

Grenade launcher

Conventional Weapons

Portable anti-tank missile

Mortar

23 23

4

[ 4 ] Before and after an airstrike in Bab-al-Yemen, Old Town of Sana'a Yemen. (12/06/2015)

24 24

Crime Scene

The Yemeni Civil War

25 25

5

6

8

7

[ 5 ] Arab spring rally in Sana’a (2011) [ 6 ] Yemen's former president Ali Abdullah Saleh (21/05/2014) [ 7 ] Yemen President Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi (30/07/ 2013) [ 8 ] Yemen's Houthi rebels made gains against government troops north and east of the capital Sana'a (28/01/2020)

Crime Scene

26

'Like dancing on the heads of snakes' – former President Ali Abdullah Saleh on governing Yemen The war in Yemen has been acknowledged as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis: over 24 million people (about 80% of the population) need assistance and protection, as confirmed by the UN Human Rights Council.2 But who is fighting against who?

The Yemeni conflict has its roots in the Arab Spring of March 2011. Inspired by the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia and similar protests in Egypt, the pro-democracy Yemeni citizens [ 5 ] erupted against three decades of the authoritarian regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh [ 6 ]: corruption, human rights abuse and his double-dealing tactics between America and Al Qaeda were no longer tolerated. After several months of negotiations and protests, Saleh agreed to step down in favor of his former vice-president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi [ 7 ], in exchange for immunity from prosecution. Hadi took office on February 27th, 2012: the agreement was achieved thanks to the intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the political union formed by Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. This can be seen as a tactical move from Saudi Arabia in order to enforce its control over Yemen and limit the spread of Shia and Jihadist groups; as a matter of fact, Al Qaeda is also present in Yemen since 2009, known as AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula), and even benefited from the support of Saleh.3 Under the Hadi’s government, the situation did not change: Yemen continued to suffer from unemployment, food insecurity, corruption, and any initiatives of constitutional and budget reforms that were always brokered by the GCC. The Houthis [ 8 ] (a small branch of Shia Muslims known as Zaydis) took advantage of the new president’s weakness and increased their command over the northern Saada province and neighboring areas: many Yemenis – including Sunnis – joined the rebellion. Even Saleh allied with the movement (since they were both side-lined by the GCC plans), and with him also tribesmen, political forces and approximately 60% of the Yemeni army still loyal to Saleh, united together to fight Hadi and the Saudi-led coalition. The Houthis gradually extended their control to the north-west area of the country and entered into clashes with AQAP. In September 2014 they were able to occupy the capital Sana’a and force President Hadi to flee to the southern port city of Aden, in January 2015. This event caused the military intervention of Saudi Arabia and its allied countries (Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, plus the American private military company Academi, formerly known as Blackwater), alarmed by the consolidation of their power: since March 2015, a never-ending series of relentless airstrikes [ 4 ] and ground attacks were organized to restore Hadi’s government.

Nevertheless, the alliance between Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthis did not last for too long: the politician switched side and sought peace with Saudi Arabia, broadcasting his statement on television, on December 2nd, 2017. Saleh encouraged ‘all the districts and neighborhood to take a united stand to defend the revolution and the Republic against this group, who have been irresponsibly playing with the Yemeni people for the past three years.4 Two days later the Houthis fighters assaulted his house in Sana’a and killed him. Since then the conflict has led to a military stalemate with none of the parties capable of winning the war, and to large-scale civilian casualties and major humanitarian crises for the population caught in the middle of this conflict.

Yemeni Civil War

27

SAUDI ARABIA

Sa'dah Al Jawf

Hajjah

Hamir

Al Mahwit

• SANA'A

Re

ah ayd

Hud

Al-

Ma'rib

ea dS

Shabwah Raymah

Dhamar Al Bayda' Ibb

ER

IT

R

Ad Dali' Abyan

EA

Ta'izz Lahji Aden

ETHIOPIA

DJ

Crime Scene

U IBO

TI

d of A Gulf

en

28

OMAN

Hadhramaut

Al Mahrah

Houthi control Official Yemeni Government supported by the Saudi-led coalition 100 km

Ansar al Sharia / AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) source: yemen.liveuamap.com | March 2020

Yemeni Civil War

29

9

[ 9 ] Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (L), Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi (UAE), meeting with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman near the holy city of Mecca (12/07/2019)

Crime Scene

30

Yemen is like a very precarious war playground for bigger powers, which do not fully take into account the consequences of their decisions. The United Nations consider the situation as ‘non-international armed conflict between the armed forces of the Government of Yemen and the Houthis, with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council as co-belligerents on the side of the Yemeni forces’.5 These operations are legally covered through a request for military intervention by the Hadi government: although not really in chief, he remains the internationally recognized President of Yemen.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates [ 9 ] are the main players of the coalition: the Royal Saudi Air Force leads the air campaign, while the UAE coordinates the naval offenses. Both are very active on the land war: UAE covers the seaside areas, while the Saudi army is mostly present along its border with Yemen and the northern coastal region towards Midi. Other coalition countries and mercenaries support the conflict as well: United States offered logistic support to Saudi Arabia during the attacks; not only to target Houthis but to counteract the presence of Al Qaeda too. US drones have been targeting suspects since 9/11, both in Yemen and Pakistan.

The Obama and Trump administration have exported billions of weaponry in multiple deals, regardless of how they were deployed: President Trump continues to use his veto power to prevent Congress from withdrawing the sales with Saudi Arabia. It is always a matter of oil.

But how have the Houthis been able to respond to their attack for such a long time, being numerically inferior? Who does supply them? Their strength is estimated around 180,000-200,000 armed men,6 with access to tanks, combat vehicles, longrange and anti-tank guided missiles. Experts and weapons analysts point to Iran as the main source of armaments for Houthi: Iran denies the accuses, although it shares the same ideals and religious beliefs. Even if no direct financial or military link has been found, there are claims that missiles and small arms with Iranian technology have been shipped through Oman (which is the only Middle Eastern Monarchy not taking part in the coalition).7

Yemeni Civil War

31

10

[ 10 ] Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 8, Art. 51, Repertory, Suppl. 1, vol. I (1954-1955)

32 32

Allegations and Legal Framework

Self-Defense vs. National Interest

33 33

The main function of weapons is to harm: designers and engineers are commissioned to create machines programmed to protect national security. But how to deal with the concept and design of armaments? Is there an ethical approach to manufacture, sell and use them?

The Ethics of Arms Trade hides behind the common right of self-defense, as stated in the Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter Article 51: [ 10 ] ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of collective or individual self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’.

The acceptable use of weapons is governed by the Geneva Conventions, even if not all countries signed the agreements. There have been established treaties to ban the use of specific armaments, such as landmines (Ottawa Treaty, 1997), cluster munitions (Convention on Cluster Munition, effective since 2010), nuclear weapons (published in 2017, but not yet in force because not been ratified by at least 50 countries).

Western governments reacted to globalized terrorism by producing more weapons, instead of studying a collective political vision to resolve conflicts. This happens because arms are used as a tool of foreign diplomacy: trading arms for influence over another nation’s foreign and domestic policies. So where does self-defense end and national interest begin?

Arms have always been used as a physical representation of power by governments, even if today military software and immaterial infrastructures could be considered more dangerous than the “traditional” weapons. The nation with the biggest number of aircraft, warships, drones or military bases is perceived as an enemy to be feared, or as a partner to team-up with in exchange of protection. Weapons, like other manufactured goods traded all over the world, are the outcome of the symbiotic relationship between politics, power, economic and technology (Grillot, Stohl 2009: pp. 6). Not only to establish a bilateral help in case of attack, to protect national and economic borders but also to enable international collaborations for technological development. Governments promote the Defense Industry as a way to increase job placement, technological districts of R&D projects, that can potentially lead to commercial spin-offs. Exactly like any other type of business, the defense industry consists of research and development, engineering, production, commercial and marketing sectors to sell weaponry: as a matter of fact, many military districts are built close to the industrial districts, taking advantage of the already working facilities.

But weapons destroy, they do not build; they might protect or help, but they are meant to fight, and therefore to be feared. Civilians perceive them as dangerous objects, as something very bad for the society; but weapons are needed in case of physical attack: depending on the side in which they are used, they can turn into a form of protection. Because of this dual perception, and because they embody power, they are able to emanate attraction and fear at the same time.

Allegations and Legal Framework

34

The international attention on Yemen is focused mainly on the airstrikes and bombings, but many other small clashes are happening among non-State armed groups affiliated with the main parties. The country has an active Arms Embargo on non-state armed groups imposed by the United Nations Security Council in April 2015, meaning that all UN Member States must adopt measures to avoid any ‘acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen may also include the violations of the arms embargo (‌) obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Yemen’, as stated in paragraph 19 of the Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015). Only Russia (one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council) abstained from voting the decision.

Additionally, European countries must follow Common Foreign and Security policies to prevent conflict or to respond to emerging crises: the EU Sanctions Map adopts the UN Security Council Resolution too, enforcing limitations on the arms export, inspections on cargo and travel restrictions on persons (and frozen any assets/funds available to them) entering in Yemen.

The trade of Conventional Weapons, as much as any other legal trade among countries, is commerce ruled by law: the Arms Trade Treaty has been established to define the wrong or correct use of weaponry and to limit the illicit flow. It is a multilateral agreement adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2013 and it defines common standards for regulating the international trade in conventional weapons and ammunition, which all States Parties are legally bound to apply: the treaty is supposed to ensure that the armaments transferred by the State parties do not end up in the hands of those who may be expected to use them to commit crimes. So far, out of 195 countries in the world, 105 States ratified the document and 33 are signatories: Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have not joined yet.

Despite its dangerousness, the Arms Trade is not a commerce enough tracked.

Each year all UN member states are requested to report, on a voluntary basis, information on their annual exports and imports of major arms to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), but very few countries produce a complete yearly report, complicating the correct monitoring of the flow. The United Nations8 and European Union9 charge specific sanctions to those who do not respect the current arms embargoes: EU states must not supply unfree countries, those involved in a (civil) war, with a high risk of corruption in military procurement. Furthermore, it is imperative to assess the possible risk that the military equipment could be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported. This is essential data to consider for assessing the implementation and effects of national arms export laws and security policy-making.

These evaluations are not usually public, but they can contribute to mapping relations between actors in conflicts and their external supporters since the actual policies are not able to limit the smuggling.

Self-Defense vs. National Interest

35

CRIMES RECONSTRUCTION

Investigation #1 GBU-12 Paveway II Laser Guided Bomb

36 36

Investigation #2 Eurofighter Typhoon Combat Aircraft

Investigation #3 Quds-1 Cruise Missile

37 37

38

Investigation #1 From Tucson to Sana'a

GBU-12 Paveway II Laser Guided Bomb

39

11

12

[ 11 ] Sana'a, Yemen (2013) Zoom Earth [ 12 ] Sana'a, Yemen (2018) Apple Maps

Investigation #1

From Tucson to Sana'a

40

On Saturday afternoon of October 8th, 2016, a funeral is being held at the Al-Kubra Hall, [ 11 ] located in south-west Sanaa, the capital city of Yemen. Approximately 1500 people are gathered together for the last goodbye to Ali al-Rawishan, the father of Houthi-Saleh Interior Minister Galal al-Rawishan.

At 15:20 (UTC +3) a bomb hits the community hall, during the time the funeral is expected to receive the highest number of mourners; ten minutes later a second munition drops into the building [ 12 ] after passers-by and first responders have already entered the place to rescue the injured. This is what is called “double-tap strike�: two shots fired towards the same target with a few minutes of difference. 137 people died and 695 remained injured.

GBU-12 Paveway II Laser Guided Bomb

41

13

Lenght: 3.27 m | Width: 27 cm | Circular Error Probable: 9 m | Range: 14 km | Unit Cost (2003): $19,000 14

15

16

17

[ 13 ] 3d Model of a GBU-12 Paveway II (2016) [ 14 ] Guidance and Control Unit: 3d Model of a MAU-169 Laser Homing Guidance and GPS system (2016) [ 15 ] Warhead: 3d model of a MK-82 500lb (237kg) Bomb - Body Explosive: Tritonal, PBXN-109 (192lb) (2016) [ 16 ] Tale Unit: 3d Model of a MXU-650 Airfoil Group (2016) [ 17 ] GBU-12 Paveway II guidance unit fin fragments (2016)

Investigation #1

From Tucson to Sana'a

42

The bomb dropped in Sana’a, like in Al Mahala, al-‘Eram, Al Hdaydah, Bani al-Harith, Farah and the other 23 identified cities and villages of Yemen, was a GBU-12 Paveway II Laser-Guided Bomb [ 13 ] manufactured in the United States. The Paveway kits convert standard Mk 80 free-fall (dumb) bombs [ 15 ] into laser-guided weapons.

Each guidance kit consists of a Computer Control Group Guidance system [ 14 ] with a laser seeker and an Air Foil Group [ 16 ] on the back end that provides lift and stability.

A Targeting Pod is placed under the combat aircraft and it points to the designated target; the laser seeker of the kit guides the bomb towards the light signature; once a target is designated, the laser guidance is more accurate than GPS, but it can be foiled by weather conditions. The performance of a laser-guided bomb is much more accurate than a dumb one (the Circular Error Probability is only 9 meters of radius, in comparison with 100 meters of an unguided munition). There exist 12 versions of Paveway kits to be used on the Mk 80 family bombs (with warheads from 500 to 2000lb.), which are produced by several manufacturers in the world (like General Dynamics in Garland, Texas, or the RWM S.p.a. in Domusnovas, Sardinia, the Italian division of Rheinmetall).10 The GBU-12 Paveway II kit is specifically designed for Mk 82 bomb of 500 lb (227kg).

The Paveway kits are manufactured by only two US Defense Contractors: Raytheon Company and Lockheed Martin Corporation. The remnant found in the Al-Kubra Hall belong to Paveway kits manufactured by Raytheon, as it can be proved by the code on the Guidance Unit. [ 17 ] 96214 is the CAGE11 code of Raytheon Company, specifically the Missile division located in Tucson, Arizona, while the numeric sequence 837760-4 refers to the Stock Keeping Unit: the online repository of military components Part Target (www.parttarget.com) gives the following 1325-01-062-8064, which is the National Stock Number of the Paveway II Tail Fin group. [ 18 ] The United States exports the Paveway kits to more than 30 countries in the world 12 but Saudi Arabia and UAE (part of the coalition Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen) are its first costumers: Saudi Arabia ordered 3100 Paveway kits in 2011, delivered between 2016 and 2018, and other 8120 kits in 2015, as part of a $1.29 billion deal [ 19 ] signed in November 2015,13 agreed during the state visit of Saudi Arabia’s King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud with former President Barack Obama on September 4th, 2015. [ 23 ] Salman became the new King of Saudi Arabia on 23 January 2015 following the death of his half-brother, King Abdulla. Since then he has strengthened the relationship with the White House.

US EXPORTS OF PAVEWAY KITS 2000-2018 (Source: SIPRI) Saudi Arabia

United Arab Emirates

2011 — 100 GBU-10, GBU-12 delivered 2016 — 1100 GBU-24 Paveway III, 2000 GBU Dual Mode Paveway 2017 — 8120 GBU Paveway Serie

2004 — 1673 GBU-10 and GBU-12 Paveway II, GBU-24 Paveway III 2005 — 500 GBU-24 PavewayIII 2013 — 450 GBU-24 Paveway III, 448 GBU-12 Paveway II 2018 — 3000 Dh2.5 b. deal

Australia, Afghanistan, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, United Kingdom

GBU-12 Paveway II Laser Guided Bomb

43

18

[ 18 ] Part Target Manufacturer (2020) [ 19 ] Defense Security Cooperation Agency News Relaese: The Government of Saudi Arabia Air-to-Ground Munitions (16/11/2015)

Investigation #1

From Tucson to Sana'a

44

19

GBU-12 Paveway II Laser Guided Bomb

45

Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) platforms suitable to carry the paveway kits 20

21

72 EUROFIGHTER TYPHOON Manufacturer: Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH (IT, UK, DE, ES)

Saudi Air Bases

•7

22

193 F-15 EAGLE Manufacturer: McDonnell Douglas (US)

81 PANAVIA TORNADO Manufacturer: Panavia Aircraft GmbH (UK, DE, IT)

Airstrikes in the territory occupied by the Houthis

•3

• Sa'dah ( 2 )( 21 )

2• 1• • RIYADH •6 •4 •8

( 13 )

( 6 )( 17 )

•5 • SANA'A

• al Jawf

• Hajjah

( 12 )( 14 )( 24 ) • SANA'A ( 10 )(16 )( 19 ) ( 20 ) (3)

1 • Al Kharj/Prince Sultan Air Base 2 • Dhahran/King Abdullah Aziz Air Base RSAF 3 Wing: (13sq) F-15C, F-15D; (92sq) F-15S; (44sq) Bell 412EP | RSAF 11 Wing: (7sq) Tornado IDS 3 • Hafr, Al Batin/King Saud Air Base

( 11 )(17)

Al Hudaydah • ( 5 ) (4)

4 • Jeddah/Prince Abdullah Air Base 5 • Khamis Mushayt/King Khalid Air Base RSAF 5 Wing: (6sq) F-15S; (55sq) F-15S; (99sq) AS532M (14sq) AB212, Bell 412EP 6 • Riyadh/King Salman Air Base 7 • Tabuk/King Faisal Air Base RSAF 7 Wing: (2sq) F-15C, F-15D (21sq) Hawk Mk65 (37sq) Hawk Mk65 (79sq) Hawk Mk65A (88s) Hawk Mk65, Hawk Mk65A 8 • Taif/King Fahd Air Base RSAF 2 Wing: (3sq) Typhoon F2, Typhoon T3; (5sq) F-15C, F-15D; (10sq) Typhoon F2, Typhoon T3; (14sq) AB212 ll 412EP (34sq) F-15C, F-15D; (12sq) AB212

• Ibb ( 15 ) • Ta'izz ( 22 ) (8) (7) Lahij • ( 1 )( 9 ) Aden •

source: www.scramble.nl (2017) [ 20 ] RAF Eurofighter Typhoon (2010) [ 21 ] Panavia Tornado GR4 (12/10/2012) [ 22 ] McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle (7/10/2007)

Investigation #1

From Tucson to Sana'a

46

Documented airstrikes with fragments of the GBU-12 Paveway II bombs

( 1 ) 30.04.2015 Home in Dar Sa’ad District, - 1 deaths, 6 injured

( 2 ) 03.06.2015 Village of al-‘Eram, Beni Ma’ath, Sahar - 30 deaths, 8 houses destroyed

( 3 ) 14.09.2015 Wa’lan Agricultural Complex, Bilad Ar Rus - 8 deaths, 12 injured, facilities destroyed

( 4 ) 31.12.2015 Al Kuhlani Cosmetics Factory, Kilo 16 - facilities destroyed

( 5 ) 06.01.2016 Car Factory in Hodeidah, Kilo 7 - no casualties

( 6 ) 15.03.2016 al-Khamis Market, Mastaba district - 116 deaths, 40 injured

( 7 ) 25.05.2016 Water-Bottling Factory, Al Mahala, - 2 injured, building destroyed

( 8 ) 25.05.2016 Civilian houses in Al Mahala, - building destroyed

( 9 ) 15.07.2016 Neighborhood in al-Basateen, Dar Sa’ad district - unknown casualties

( 10 ) 15.08.2016 MSF hospital, Abs - 19 deaths, 24 injured, building damaged

( 11 ) 10.09.2016 Arhab water drilling site, Sana’a - 31 deaths, 42 injured

( 12 ) 13.09.2016 Al-Snaydar factory complex, Bani al-Harith, Sana’a - facility damaged

( 13 ) 20.09.2016 Car hit in Al-Matmmah district, Al Jawf - 15 deaths

( 14 ) 22.09.2016 Al-Snaydar complex, Sana’a - Faciliy destroyed

( 15 ) 24.09.2016 ( 16 ) 09.06.2017 Residential complex in Mafraq, Sana’a Residential building Jiblah - 9 deaths, 7 injured - 4 deaths, 8 injured

( 17 ) 23.08.2017 Arhab Motel - 33 deaths, 25 injured

( 18 ) 02.09.2017 al-Maqadhi house in Farah, Washhah - 3 deaths, 13 injured

( 19 ) 08.10.2016 Al-Kubra Hall, Sana’a - 132 deaths, 695 injured

( 20 ) 01.11.2017 al Layl Market, Sahar district, Saa’da - 31 deaths, 26 injured

( 21 ) 10.11.2017 Residential building in Sa’dah - 4 deaths, 4 injured

( 22 ) 14.11.2017 Ta’izz - 3 deaths, 5 injured

( 23 ) 22.04.2018 Wedding, Bani Qais Al-Toor, Hajjah - 21 deaths, 90 injured

(24 ) 09.08.2018 Schoolbus, Dahyan, Sana’a - 43 deaths, 63 injured

All the photos of remnants of laser guided bombs are extracted from the UN Security Council Reports redacted by the Panel of Experts in Yemen 2015-2019

GBU-12 Paveway II Laser Guided Bomb

47

23

24

25

[ 23 ] Former US President Barack Obama meets with King Salman of Saudi Arabia in the Oval Office of the White House, Washington (4/09/2015) [ 24 ] Former US President Barack Obama meets with Saudi King Salman at Erga Palace in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (20/04/2016) [ 25 ] King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud during a bilateral meeting with US president Donald Trump in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (20/05/2017)

Investigation #1

From Tucson to Sana'a

48

The Paveway kits exported to the air forces of the Saudi-led coalition can be carried on the following platforms (combat aircrafts): Mirage 2000, Air Tractor AT-802U, F-16 Fighting Falcon, F-15 Eagle, Eurofighter Typhoon, Panavia Tornado, Dassault Rafale, Northrop F-5. Since Saudi Arabia is the most active country of the coalition and the leader of the air campaign, it is very much likely that the GBU-12 Paveway II bombs that hit the funeral hall were carried by a Royal Saudi Air Force aircraft. The Panavia Tornado [ 20 ] (manufactured by the German company Panavia Aircraft GmbH, with Italy, and UK as partner nations), the F-15 Eagle [ 21 ] (realized by the American defense contractor McDonnel Douglas) and the Eurofighter Typhoon [ 22 ] (a multi-role combat aircraft produced by Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH, a consortium of Italy, Germany, Spain and UK) are the three suitable platforms currently operated by the RSAF squadrons, located in four of the eight Saudi airbases. And it’s probably from the King Fahd Air Base in Taif or the King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushayt, the two closest to the Yemeni border, that the aircraft carrying the Laser Guided Bombs took off.

The funeral strike was probably planned to eliminate former President Saleh, that was supposed to attend the ceremony. Due to the enormous number of civilians that lost their lives in the attack, the public debate understood the seriousness of the situation and pressed obstructing any US involvement in the conflict: this helped to stop the $115 billion deal signed with Saudi Arabia during the summit meeting of Barack Obama in April 20th, 2016, [ 24 ] which included everything from small arms and ammunition to tanks, attack helicopters, missiles, warships, maintenance and training to Saudi security forces. Nevertheless, a few months later President Trump was able to bypass the stop and to close new multi-million dollar deals in May 20th, 2017, [ 25 ] during his first visit to Riyadh. Consequently, Raytheon Company and the Saudi Arabia Military Industries Company established a closer cooperation on defense-related projects and agreements for the petroleum industry: this move lead to open a new Raytheon division in Riyadh in August 2018, which focuses ‘on implementing programs to create defense, aerospace and security capabilities in the Kingdom,14 giving the ability to Raytheon Saudi Arabia to assemble autonomously the Paveway kits.

GBU-12 Paveway II Laser Guided Bomb

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Investigation #2 From Warton to Abyan

Eurofighter Typhoon Combat Aircraft

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26

27

[ 26 ] Mountains of Al Wade'a district, Yemen (2018) Apple Maps [ 27 ] Twitter: Harry Boone (17/11/2017)

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On September 13th, 2017, 19:30 (UTC+3) a Saudi jet crashed on a mountain in the Al Wade'a District [ 26 ], Abyan governorate, southern Yemen: the pilot Muhanna bin Saad Al-Baiz lost his life in the crash. According to the Saudi Press Agency,15 he was a Lieutenant Colonel of the Royal Saudi Air Force involved in an operational task against AQAP. The day after, the wreckage of a Eurofighter Typhoon Combat Aircraft was found close to the village of Al Kashmim in Hajin, Lawdar district.16 The flight was part of the Operation Restoring Hope, the second stage of the air campaign organized by the Saudi-led coalition to counteract the advancement of the Houthis. Up today, approximately 20,656 air raids17 have been carried out since the beginning of the conflict, [ 39 ] and it does not look like they are going to stop.

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28

WEAPON SYSTEM

SRAAM A Short Range Air-to-Air Missile is a manoeuvrable infrared homing (“heatseeking”) missile.

29

BVRAAM A Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air missile is capable of hitting targets at ranges of 37 km or beyond thanks to rocket motors.

LASER DESIGNATED POD It’s a “laser spot tracker” that locates laser light from a designated target: it enables the aircraft’s targeting system to direct precision-guided munitions.

Lenght: 15.96 m | Wingspan: 10.95 m | Weight: 16 tons | Max Speed: 2,495 km/h | Fire range: 1,389 km SWING ROLE: WEAPONS CONFIGURATION (Source: www.eurofighter.com) Air-To-Ground + 4 Laser/GPS Guided Bombs + 4 BVRAAM + 2 SRAAM + 27mm Mauser + 2 Fuel Tanks (1000L) + Laser Designator Pod

Air-To-Air + 6 BVRAAM + 2 SRAAM + 3 Fuel Tanks (1000L) + 27mm Mauser

Destruction Of Air Defences + 2 Laser/GPS Guided Bombs + 2 ARM + 3 BVRAAM + 2 SRAAM + 27mm Mauser + 1 LDP + 3 Fuel Tanks (1000L)

Interdiction/Strike + 4 Laser/GPS Guided Bombs + 3 BVRAAM + 2 SRAAM + 27mm Mauser + 1 Fuel Tank (1000L) + Laser Designator Pod

Maritime Attack + 2 Anti-Ship Missiles + 4 BVRAAM + 4 SRAAM + 27mm Mauser + 1 Fuel Tank (1000L)

Strategic Attack + 2 Stand-Off Missiles + 4 BVRAAM + 4 SRAAM + 27mm Mauser + 1 Fuel Tank (1000L)

STANDOFF MISSILES Standoff weapons are missiles used against landand sea-based targets: they can be launched at a distance sufficient to evade defensive fire from the target area.

MAUSER A Mauser BK 27 is a caliber revolver cannon manufactured by Mauser (Rheinmetall).

[ 28 ] Eurofighter Typhoon (November 2017) [ 29 ] Instrumented Production Aircraft One (IPA1) on flight trials with 6 Paveway II, 2 shortrange air-to-air missiles and 1,000l external fuel tank, Warton, UK (April 2016) | All the pictures of the weapon system are collected from Wikipedia

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The Eurofighter Typhoon [ 28 ] is a twin-engine, canard–delta wing, multirole fighter: it can switch from Air-to-Air (firing missiles from the aircraft to destroy another) into the Air-to-Ground role (to attack ground targets) and back within the same mission.

It has also very enhanced weapon system, [ 29 ] with a capacity of up to 12 missiles/ bombs, with sufficient processing power to simultaneously support in-flight missile updates and bomb targeting. It was considered to be the world’s most advanced swing-role combat aircraft in the past few years.The Typhoon is promoted as a great example of cooperation among European countries. It is, in fact, the powerful outcome of a joint program divided between the following aerospace and defense companies: Airbus Defence and Space (with branches Spain and Germany), BAE Systems Military and Information (United Kingdom), and Leonardo (Italy).

The project began in the last decade of the Cold War when the European air forces wanted to keep pace with the fastest American and Soviet jets: the multinational consortium Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH, based in Hallbergmoos, Germany, has been created in 1986 for managing the development of a new “European Fighter Aircraft”. The construction began in 1989 and it was agreed that each of the four parent nations would host the production line and final assembly of the aircraft for the components it was responsible for: Warton for BAE Systems, Manching for EADS Germany (now Airbus), Caselle-Turin for Alenia Finmeccanica (now Leonardo) and Getafe for EADS CASA (now Airbus Spain) were the designated factories. This means that each country is in charge of one or more main pieces, then to be delivered to each partnering country, where the final aircraft can be employed in the national army or sold to third recipient states. The supply chain extends through all Europe: [ 30-34 ] the components are not in-house but designed by local manufactures, organized under sub-companies. Eurofighter GmbH’s customer is the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA), operating on behalf of the partner nations.

TheTyphoons are enrolled among the English, Italian, Spanish and German air forces, and they have been sold to Austria, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar. In December 2019 the production of 28 fighter jets ordered by the Kuwait Air Force was concluded in the plant of Leonardo Aircraft Division based in Caselle, Turin, Italy. Kuwait is part of the Saudi-led coalition and contributes to the conflict with 12 fighter jets.18

Eurofighter Typhoon Combat Aircraft

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Eurofighter Typhoon Workshare a The Eeuropean consortium Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH (Hallbergmoos, Germany) coordinates the design, production and upgrade of the aircraft.

( 1 )( 2 )

d

NATO / NETMA (NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency) manages the project and is the prime customer.

(5) c

e

(6)

f (4)

b P = Production / A = Final Assembly

(3)

UNITED KINGDOM (33%) BAE Systems is a British multinational defence, security, and aerospace company. The company is the largest defence contractor in Europe and among the world’s largest defence companies.

BAE manufactures the helmet, the suit, the a) Rear and b) Front Fuselage, c) Canopy (the transparent enclosure over the cockpit) and the Windscreen.

( 1 ) BAE - Samlesbury, UK / P

( 2 ) BAE - Warton, UK / A

( 3 ) Airbus - Sevilla, Spain / P

( 3 ) Airbus - Getafe, Spain / A

( 5 ) Airbus - Manching, DE / P+A

( 6 ) Leonardo - Caselle, Italy / P+A

GERMANY (33%) SPAIN (13%) Airbus Defense and Space is a European aerospace and defense company (the world’s biggest corporation after Boeing). Registered in the Netherlands, its shares are traded among Germany, France and Spain. The Spanish division develops the d) Right Wing of the Typhoon while the German one works on the e) Center Fuselage.

ITALY (21%) Leonardo S.p.A. is an Italian multinational aerospace, defence and security company.

It is partially owned by the Italian government through the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which is its largest shareholder (30.2%).

Leonardo manufactures the f) Left Wing of the Typhoon, in a parallel production with Airbus Spain.

30

SUB-COMPANIES The components of the Typhoon are not in-house designed but by partnering manufactures. The supply chain extends through all Europe.

31

32

Eurojet EJ200 Engine Motor EUROJET GMBH Rolls Royce (UK) + ITP Aero link (ES) + MTU Aereo Engine (DE) + Avio Aereo (IT)

Pirate Infra-Red Search & Track EUROFIRST CONSORTIUM Thales Land and Joint System (UK) + TECNOBIT (ES) + Leonardo (IT)

33

34

Captor E-Radar EURORADAR CONSORTIUM Indra, Airbus (ES) + Airbus (DE) + Leonardo (IT)

Praetorian Defensive Aids Sub System EURODASS CONSORTIUM Indra (ES) + Hensoldt (DE) + Leonardo (IT) + Elettronica (IT)

[ 30 ] Eurofighter Typhoon supply chain (2019) [ 31 ] EJ200 Engine (2015) [ 32 ] Pirate System (2007) [ 33 ] Captor E-Scan Radar System installed aboard BAE's IPA5 development aircraft (2014) [ 34 ] Typhoon’s Praetorian DASS (2019)

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Eurofighter Typhoon Production and Delivery 1998

Tranche 1 / 2008

2004

148 aircrafts AU = 15 | DE = 33 | IT = 28 ES = 19 | UK = 53 - High-End Multi/Swingrole weapon system, with integration of Paveway IV

Tranche 2 / 2011

299 aircrafts DE = 79 | IT = 47 | ES = 34 UK = 67 | SA = 72 - Deep Attack Stand-off targeting of high value assets through the integration of Storm Shadow - Beyond Visual Range Missiles: BVR air superiority against a variety of targets from jets to small UAV and cruise missiles.

The Typhoon has three Tranche of production, which do not imply an incremental increase in every tranche but a selected features. Tranches were further divided up into production standard/capability blocks and funding/procurement batches, though these did not coincide, and are not the same thing. source: www.eurofighter.com

2009

Tranche 3A / 2015

112 aircrafts DE = 31 | IT = 21 | ES = 20 UK = 40 - Fast Moving Targets Integration of Brimstone II with fast-moving Air-toSurface precision effect.

- Advanced Sensor Delivery of E-Scan Radar with full Air-to-Air and Airto-Surface radar modes.

2011

Tranche 3B / 2022

64 aircrafts QA = 24 | KW = 28 | OM = 12 EF Typhoon carrying four Meteor BVR Air-to-Air missiles, two Brimstone II low collateral precision strike weapons, two ASRAAM missiles and two Paveway IV laser guided precision weapons.

In February 2019 Germany has ordered 33 further Typhoons to replace ageaing Tranche 1 Aircrafts. In the beginning of 2020 the Typhoon Consortium offered to Finland the chance to join in an updated proposal to the HX fighter acquisition programme to replace the Finnish Air Force's F-18 Hornet aircraft.

EUROFIGHTER TYPHOONS OPERATORS

LUFTSTREITKRÄFTE Austria 15 EF Typhoon Block 5/T2 delivered in 20072009 from Germany

ROYAL AIR FORCE United Kingdom 117 EF Typhoon 05 in order Assembled in UK

AERONAUTICA MILITARE Italy 88 EF Typhoon 05 in order Assembled in Italy

EJERCITO DEL AIRE Spain 64 EF Typhoon 2000 04 in order Assembled in Spain

LUFTWAFFE Germany 122 EF Typhoon 04 in order Assembled in Germany

ROYAL SAUDI AIR FORCE Saudi Arabia 72 EF Typhoon (24/ T3A delivered in 20152017; 48/T2 delivered in 2009-2015) from UK

ROYAL AIR FORCE OF OMAN Oman 09 EF Typhoon Block-30N/T3, delivered in 2012 from UK

QATAR AIR FORCE Qatar 24 EF Typhoon Block-20 to be delivered in 2022, from UK

KUWAIT AIR FORCE Kuwait 28 EF Typhoon Block-20 to be delivered in 20202023, from Italy

Eurofighter Typhoon Combat Aircraft

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35

38

36

37

[ 35 ] Margareth Thatcher with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (1985) [ 36 ] Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair with the Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal (July 2005) [ 37 ] Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s meets the Queen Elizabeth II (7/03/2018) [ 38 ] Al Yamamah Deal Documents (26/09/1985)

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The 72 Typhoons owned by the Royal Saudi Air Force have been produced by the United Kingdom in the factory of Samlesbury, assembled in Warton, and delivered between 2015 and 2017. The order was part of the famous al-Yamamah deal agreed between King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1985, [ 35 ] which lobbied on behalf of British industry. Prince Bandar bin Sultan (Saudi Ambassador to USA 1983-2005) and then defence secretary Michael Heseltine signed officially the deal 1988: [ 38 ] Britain agreed to sell 72 Tornado planes, 30 Hawk trainer jets and 30 other trainer planes to Saudi Arabia, paid for by the delivery of up to 600,000 barrels (95,000 m3) of crude oil per day to the UK government, enriching BAE Systems with £43 billion in twenty years.19 In July 2005 the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair flew to Riyadh to meet the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, [ 36 ] to promote a new military cooperation among the two countries. This meeting led to a third tranche of the Al Yamamah deal, the Al-Salam contract. On 21 December 2005 the British and Saudi Arabian Governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding to “establish a greater partnership in modernising the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces”: it was agreed that the Saudi will buy a new fleet of 72 Eurofighter Typhoons (instead of the 48 Tornadoes), including training, spares, ground support equipment, technical and manpower for £4.43 billion: as part of the deal, BAE Systems invested in Saudi Arabian companies, provide training and transfer military technology.20 The sale of the Typhoons, which was signed in August 2006, was obstructed by the UK Serious Fraud Office due to slush fund used to bribe senior Saudi officials in the contract, specifically Prince Bandar bin Sultan, which orchestrated the arrangement:21 thanks to political pressure from the Saudi and British governments the investigation was cancelled and the deal finalised. BAE Systems was subject to no legal consequences (except for a £400 million fine) in the UK in relation to Al Yamamah, nor was any individual ever prosecuted in the UK, Saudi Arabia, or elsewhere.

Al YAMAMAH DEAL (Source: CAAT - Campaing Against the Arms Trade) 1985 - Al Yamamah I 30 Hawks (1985); 48 Tornado IDS (1986); 102 Sea Eagle anti-ship missiles (1986); 24 Tornado ADV (1986); 560 Skyflash BVRAAM missiles for Tornados (1986); 2 Jetstream light transport (1986); 3 Sandown Minehunter ships (1988); 6 Hawker-800 VIP jets (1988); 250 alarm missiles (1991);

1993 - Al Yamamah II 48 Tornado IDS, including 6 recognissance versions (1993); 20 Hawk 60s (1993); 2007 - Al Salam 24 Typhoon block 20 (2007); Modernization of 84 Tornados (2007); 48 Typhoon block 8 (2008); 350 Storm Shadow missiles for modernized Tornados; 22 Hawk-100 (2012); 22 more Hawk-100s in 2015. + Ongoing support services in Saudi Arabia.

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Saudi Air Raids (20,656 since March 2015) 39

40

42

• [ 43 ] King Khalid Air Base Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia • [ 40 ] • [ 41 ]

[ 42 ] • Al Wade'a district

41

43

[ 39 ] Air raids timeline per month (2020) [ 40 ] RSAF Typhoon refueled by a tanker aircraft (2018) [ 41 ] Screenshot by CivMilAir showing a Saudi Airbus MRTT flying over Yemen (2018) [ 42 ] Air raids conducted by the military coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, since March 26, 2015 (2020) [ 43 ] Typhoons at the King Khalid Air Base, Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia (21/11/2018)

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The crash of the fighter jet happened in Yemen was confirmed on Arab and international websites but there is no trace of any pictures of the wreckage online; nonetheless, there have been registered other 13 air raids in the territories controlled by the Houthis between the 13th and 14th of September [ 42 ] (data published on the website Yemen Data Project). To confirm the RSAF daily sorties, there is only one evidence that depicts one Eurofighter Typhoon flying over the Saudi southern border with Yemen, [ 40 ] that has been geolocalised and documented online: it shows one of the Saudi Typhoon being refuelled by an Airbus A330 MRTT tanker aircraft belonging to the 24th Squadron of RSAF, which operates from the Saudi Arabian base at Al Kharji / Prince Sultan Air Base. The same tanker aircraft has been captured by the Flight Tracking Platform @CivMilAir, and published on December 4th, 2018, [ 41 ] so it can be assumed that it often refuels Saudi aircrafts also on the Yemeni airspace.

A Memorandum of Intent was signed on March 9th, 2018 between the Saudi crown prince Mohammad bin Salman and the UK Defense Secretary Gavin Williamson, [ 37 ] for the production of new 48 Eurofighter Typhoon as part of a ÂŁ5bn-plus package. After the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Kashoggi on October 2nd, 2018, Germany established a ban to stop the selling of weapons to Saudi Arabia: this ban, extended until March 2020, affected the production of the Typhoon jets (Germany produces the Center Fuselage of the aircraft). The British government, however, refused to say how a ban could affect the deal with Riyadh.

Eurofighter Typhoon Combat Aircraft

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Investigation #3 From Velká Bíteš to Khurais

Quds-1 Cruise Missile

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45

[ 44 ] Damage at Saudi Aramco's Abqaiq oil processing facility, Saudi Arabia (15/09/2019) [ 45 ] Damage at Saudi Aramco's Khurais oil field in Khurais, Saudi Arabia (15/09/2019)

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At 4.00 a.m. (UTC+3) of September 14th, 2019, two state-owned Saudi Aramco oil facilities [ 44-45 ] have been attacked with missiles and drones. The Abqaiq processing center and the Khurais oilfield, located in eastern Saudi Arabia, have been raged by fires for hours before being contained. The production was immediately shut down: as a result, 5 million barrels a day of crude oil had been impacted for the following weeks, close to the 5% of the global supply.22 Saudi Arabia is the world largest oil exporter, with 12 million barrels of oil per day sent to China, Japan, India, South Korea, and United States, to name a few: attacking the facility was presented as an attack to the big economies of the rest of the world.

Iran-aligned Houthi group claimed the responsibility for the intervention, as a response of the Saudi involvement in the Yemeni Civil War; the debris of UAVs and cruise missiles have been instead identified by the Saudi as of Iranian manufacture. Teheran denies any involvement.

Quds-1 Cruise Missile

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46

47

48

[ 46 ] Journalists film what Saudi military spokesman said was evidence of Iranian weaponry used in the attack targeted Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais, during a press conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (18/09/2019) [ 47 ] Remnants of a misfired LACM on display during the press conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (18/09/2019) [ 48 ] Youtube: Drones, missiles and other flying objects displayed at the Martyr President Alsammad Houthi Military Exhibition (7/07/2019)

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What you see in the picture is a remnant of a missile, identified as “Misfired LACM (Land-Attack Cruise Missile)” [ 47 ] by the officials of the Saudi Arabia Ministry of Defense. A cruise missile is a guided missile used against terrestrial targets, that remains in the atmosphere.

Designed to deliver a large warhead over long distances with high precision, it is self-navigating and capable of traveling at extremely low-altitude. Displayed at a press conference held on September 18th, 2019 [ 46 ] a few days after the attacks, the wreckage is one of the 25 drones and missiles launched against the two Aramco facilities. The gas-oil stabilization of Abqaiq has been targeted with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) while the oil field of Khurais was shot by 7 cruise missiles, of which 3 fell short. The spokesman of the Ministry of Defense presented the debris as an Iranian Ya-Ali cruise missile, a medium-range missile (700km), alleged to have been used also in a previous attack against the Abbha Airport on June 12th, 2019. But, as analysts have pointed out, parts of the wreckage were more similar to the Quds-1, [ 49 ] a Houthi-made small ground-launched cruise missile. The Quds-1 was unveiled for the first time on July 7th, 2019, during a Houthi military exhibition [ 48 ] in memory of Saleh Ali al-Sammad, the former president of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council, which was killed by a drone strike in April 2018.

It is interesting to notice how the name Quds-1 recalls the Quds Force, a special unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), branch of the Iranian Armed Forces. Born during the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, it is specialized in extraterritorial operations and military support to non-state armed groups in many countries (including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Shia militias in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, and the Yemeni Houthis). As the name affirms (al-Quds, “Jerusalem Force” in English), the special unit has the mission of protecting Iran from western influence, reporting directly to the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran. Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian general [ 56 ] killed due to a drone strike ordered by Donald Trump on January 3rd, 2020, was the Iranian Major General in the IRGC and, from 1998 until his death in 2020, commander of its Quds Force.

According to experts, the Quds-1 could be a copy of the Iranian Soumar missile [ 51 ] or the Russian KH-55. The Soumar is Iran’s attempt at reverse-engineering the Soviet-designed KH-55 cruise missile, [ 52 ] several of which the country illegally imported between 1999 and 2000 from Russia.23 Differences between the Quds-1 and the Soumar include the size (much smaller), the wing position, the shape of the nose cone and the fuselage, the position of the stabilizers and its shorter range, due to having less room aboard for fuel, and due to being a ground-launched rather than an air-launched cruise missile. Both the KH-55 and the Soumar use fuel-efficient turbofan engines, while the Quds-1 is powered by a TJ100 Turbo Jet engine suitable for UAVs and missiles: the apparatus seems to be an unlicensed copy of the one manufactured by the PBS Velká Bíteš, a Czech hi-tech manufacturer of power units and other equipment in the field of aerospace, although the company denies any involvement.24 Exactly because of its short range, it is much unlikely that the cruise missiles have been fired from northern Yemen since it is situated more than 1200 km away. [ 53 ] Also, by taking a closer sight of the satellite images, [ 54-55 ] it is clear to see how the damages to the facilities are positioned in such a way that they cannot have been fired from the South. A report published by the UN Security Council in December 2019 assessed that before hitting its targets, one of the drones traversed a location approximately 200 km to the northwest of the attack site; considering that the assessed 900km maximum range of the UAV, indicates with high likelihood that the attack originated north of Abqaiq, therefore from some Iranian or Iraqi military bases.25

Quds-1 Cruise Missile

67

Cruise Missiles The Soumar, Ya-Ali, and (alleged) Quds-1, are Iran’s attempts at reverse-engineering the Soviet designed KH-55 cruise missile.

49

PBS Velká Bíteš TJ100 Turbojet engine

QUDS-1 (Yemen) Range: 700 km | Lenght: ~5.4 m | Width: 0.50 m | Launch: Ground | Engine: TJ100 Turbojet 50

YA-ALI (Iran) Range: 400 km | Lenght: ~4.9 m | Width: 0.35 m | Launch: Air | Engine: TJ100 Turbojet 51

SOUMAR (Iran) Range: 1350 km | Lenght: ~7 m | Width: 0.5 m | Launch: Air/Ground | Engine: Turbofan 52

SOVIET KH-55 (Russia) Range: 3000 km | Lenght: 7,5 m | Width: 0,5 m | Launch: Air/Ground | Engine: R95-300 Turbofan [ 49 ] Missiles and drone aircrafts on display at the Martyr President Alsammad Houthi Military Exhibition, unidentified location, Yemen (17/09/2019 [ 50 ] The Ya Ali cruise missile as part of a display of new military equipment put on by the IRGC in May 2014 (26/06/2019) [ 51 ] Iran long-range cruise missile ‘Soumar’, IRGC (13/01/2019) [ 52 ] Raduga Kh-55 in the Ukrainian Air Force museum (8/05/2008)

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Range Estimation 53

N 1) YA-ALI Range: 400 km Abqaiq [ 53 ] Khurais [ 54 ]

(1)

(2)

(3)

2) QUDS-1 Range: 700 km

3) SOUMAR Range: 1350 km Considering that the assessed 900km maximum range of the UAV, indicates with high likelihood that the attack originated north of Abqaiq, therefore from some Iranian or Iraqi military bases.

UN Security Council, December 2019 54

N

N

55

Iranian Military Structure 56

Iranian National Army The Iranian Armed Forces comprise the Army, the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Law Enforcement Force (Police) of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranian Army defends borders and maintains internal order, according to the Iranian constitution.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps The IRGC is a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces, founded after the Iranian Revolution on 22 April 1979.

The Revolutionary Guard is intended to protect the country’s Islamic republic political system and preventing foreign interference; it answers to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Quds Force The Quds is a unit specializing in unconventional warfare and military intelligence operations. Analysts estimate that has 10,000–20,000 members. Although it’s a highly specialized department, it is controlled by the military hierarchy of the IRGC, and therefore by the highest levels of the administration in Iran.

Qasem Soleimani Iranian Major General in the IRGC and, from 1998 until his death in 2020, commander of its Quds Force. The IRGC is a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces, founded after the Iranian Revolution by order of former Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, intended to defends Iranian borders and prevent foreign interference.

[ 53 ] Middle East (2020) Graphic visualization made with Google Earth Pro [satellite] [ 54 ] A satellite image showing damage to Saudi Aramco infrastructure at Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia (15/09/2019 [ 55 ] Damage to Oil Saudi Aramco facility in Khurais, Saudi Arabia (15/09/2019) [ 56 ] Qasem Soleimani with the Order of Zolfaghar military uniform (11/03/2019)

Quds-1 Cruise Missile

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57

H

S

• SANA'A

S

S

S

S

S

S S S S

S

Food insecurity (Feb. 2020) Emergency Level Crisis Level H - Houthi control (2019) S - Saudi-led Coalition troop and naval presence

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[ 57 ] Yemen Food Insecurity Map (2020) [ 58 ] Vladimir Putin meets Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran, Iran (05/11/2017)

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It has been reported that Saudi Arabia has at least one American MIM-104 Patriot missile defense system in place at Abqaiq. The Patriot is designed to mitigate threats from “high flying targets”, while the UAVs and cruise missiles fly at an altitude too low to be detected by conventional radar systems, so that’s why the defense system did not work properly.26 Furthermore, the analysis of the weapons debris did not reveal the origin of the manufacturers: assuming the limited industrial capacity and technology of the Houthis, it is highly probable that the Quds-1 and all the other weaponry have an Iranian origin and its components have been specifically modified to not show any link with Iran. The government of Teheran has been repeatedly accused of providing an increasingly potent arsenal of anti-ship and ballistic missiles, deadly sea mines and even explosive boats that have attacked allied ships in the Red Sea or Saudi territory across Yemen’s northern border.

The United States, the Yemeni government and its allies in the region have recaptured some Houthi-held coastal areas to stop threats to international shipping and block any further smuggling of weapons. This lead to the actual sea, land and air blockade on Yemen which started with the positioning of Saudi Arabian warships in Yemeni waters in 2015 (and enforced with US support since October 2016). [ 57 ] Restrictions and controls over the incoming ships and trucks have resulted in delays and the consequent shortage of food, water, and medical supplies. Furthermore, by bombing hospitals, schools, water infrastructures, and facilities it makes almost impossible for the citizens to receive healthcare and medicines against the epidemic of cholera, to the extent that children are at risk of disease due to lack of drinkable water. Approximately 80% of the population (24 million people) requires humanitarian assistance, including 14.3 million who are in acute need.27 There is no doubt about how these events are causing the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

Iran did not sign the Arms Trade Treaty but it received an embargo on arms export in 2007 by the UN, due to concerns over its nuclear program. In addition, following the human rights situation in Iran, the EU imposed an embargo on transfers to Iran of conventional weapons and equipment that might be used for internal. The removal of the UN arms embargo within five years (October 2020) was part of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, which the U.S. withdrew from last year, imposing new sanctions; the five other parties to the agreement — Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany — still support it. On the other hand, Russia [ 58 ] is looking forward to this deadline in order to tie closer relationships with Iran, planning to trade hardware, fighter jets, submarines, and air-defense systems.28

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[ 59 ] Airstrike on the Cholera Treatment Center in Abs, Yemen (11/06/2018) Google Earth

72 72

Follow-Up

The Collateral Damage of Arms Trade

73 73

The conflict has contributed to deteriorating the Yemeni economic situation, having a significant impact on the citizens. The Saudi-led coalition, together with the national military forces loyal to President Hadi, claimed to have been targeting the enemy, but many villages and civilian sites like hospitals [ 59 ] and schools were bombed during the air campaign, regardless of the people involved.

Air, land and naval blockades impede the transfer of aid and food supply (the country imports 90% of the food and 100% of the drugs).29 Deliveries into areas controlled by Houthis must follow specific controls imposed by the Gulf Cooperation Council and NATO, to inspect possible weapons smuggled among the goods: food and aids can consequently be stored at ports for months and deteriorate. Furthermore, the health system is close to collapse: up until today, only a few hospitals are still operating and a high percentage of the population is suffering from cholera, due to the lack of access to clean water for drinking and irrigation. Additionally, a fuel shortage is deepening the crisis: fuel is not needed just for cars and ambulances but also for water pumps, hospital generators and transport of goods.

The full scope of human suffering in Yemen is not clear today: partly because it is difficult to obtain precise information regarding the death toll and partly due to outdated UN figures, on which Western news rely on. If we compare the number of civilians killed (6,872) and wounded (10,798)30 reported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) with the figures published by the non-profit organization Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), there is a difference of over 100,000 reported fatalities since the beginning of the conflict.31 Despite several attempts of UN and Saudi-backed peace talks between President Hadi and the Southern Transitional Council, formed in 2017 to represent the southern governorates of Yemen opposed to the Houthis escalation in the North, the conflict continues to rage on. Saudi Arabia has vowed to continue supporting the internationally recognized government of Hadi while Houthi rebels have demanded the formation of a unity government to move forward on a political solution. A peace deal, however, remains elusive.

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‘If we don’t sell it, someone else will’ is the usual excuse released by the companies’ spokesperson: it’s like saying that there will always be a conflict, somewhere, therefore there will always be the demand of armaments. The problem is that the consequences of their use are not fully calculated in the final cost. When an attack does not reach a specific target, the civilians and buildings involved are classified as “collateral damage”, comparable to something that was not possible to estimate. But buying ‘a $19,000 smart bomb to load on to a $90,000,000 combat aircraft so that it can fly at the cost of $18,000 per hour32 to kill some people in Yemen who live on less than $4 a dayʼ 33 is without a doubt a studied choice, just very unbalanced. Transfers of weapons occur simultaneously at an individual, national and global scale and require simultaneous responses at various levels.

The arms trade counted for at least $95 billion in 2017, approximately 2,2% of the global GDP, according to the calculation of SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), based on the states’ arms exports.34 USA, Russia, France, Germany, China, UK, Spain, Israel, Italy, and The Netherlands are, in order, the 10 world’s largest arms suppliers. Saudi Arabia, India, Egypt, Australia, Algeria, China, UAE, Iraq, South Korea, and Vietnam are instead the 10 main importers of the previous countries.

According to the latest report published by SIPRI, the volume of international transfer of major weapons rose by 10% in the past 10 years, reaching the highest level since the end of the Cold War35 (the latest evaluation corresponds to at least $88.4 billion, based on the published figures of the arms-exporting countries in 2016).

However, the true number is likely to be higher since many transfers are not reported. Let’s have a look at the global military expenditure: it has increased 75% over the past 20 years but stands at around $1.7 trillion annually since 2009.36 This 2,2% can look small if compared with other types of trades, but the arms business is missing the right public attention: the news highlight the deaths and buildings destroyed, and in only very few cases move to the end of the sentence the armaments used. This “missing information” occurs because civilians have always been kept distant from matters related to the army: classified documents, international cooperation among the intelligence groups, military service must be separated from everyday life, but the defense industry is funded by the states themselves and therefore maintained by the citizens, the taxpayers.

The Collateral Damage of Arms Trade

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Final Report

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60

[ 60 ] Case report: ‘Made in Europe, bombed in Yemen: How the ICC could tackle the responsibility of arms exporters and government officials’ Page 1 (11/12/2019)

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Conflict situations are complex, the arms trade is not transparent, corruption spreads everywhere, arms lobbies condition governments and markets: what to do, then? How to inform citizens about this intricate system? And how to force governments to make the data more available? The situation has recently begun to become clearer in the past two years, thanks to the many fact-based reports, documentaries, and articles that counter-attack post-truth politics.

To name a few actors of this movement: Bellingcat, the investigative journalism website specialized in fact-checking and open-source intelligence technique, leads the route thanks to its active community; Lighthouse Reports, a Dutch independent media non-profit organization, supports the research with the project #EUArms, where journalists, analysts, and students are involved to track and find out where the Europeans weapons really end up; Forensic Architecture, a multidisciplinary research group based at the University of London that uses architectural techniques and technologies to investigate cases of state violence and violations of human rights around the world. NGOs like Amnesty International and ACLED collaborate with first-hand data; then international newspapers elaborate and present the information gathered to the larger audience.

But a stronger action has been taken recently. In December 2019, a joint force of international organizations has filed a case [ 60 ] against European arms companies that supply the Saudi-led coalition: Raytheon Systems Ltd. (UK), MBDA France S.A.S. (France), MBDA UK Ltd. (UK), Rheinmetall AG (Germany) through its subsidiary RWM Italia S.p.A. (Italy), and Thales (France) are in the sight of the International Criminal Court, based in The Hague, Netherlands. 'Corporate executives present themselves and the interest of the companies they work for as politically and legally neutral, but selling arms, even if authorized by a license, is not a neutral business transaction. Through arms trade, company officers and government officials can fuel armed conflicts and even be complicit in war crimes.37

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[ 61 ] Le armi italiane in Yemen | La 7 (6/05/2019) [ 62 ] El expresidente Saleh ofrece a Arabia SaudĂ­ una salida a la guerra | El PaĂ­s (2/12/2017) [ 63 ] Investigation uncovers arms trade in Yemen war | DW News (12/12/2018) [ 64 ] Yemen conflict: Battle for Sanaa - BBC News (4/12/2017) [ 65 ] UN alleges war crimes in Yemen | Euronews (28/08/2018) [ 66 ] Exclusive look inside war-torn Yemen | CNN (28/03/2019) [ 67 ] Yemen's Houthi forces kill Saudi soldiers in combat | Al Jazeera English (17/02/2019) [ 68 ] To UAE: If you want your glass towers to be safe, leave Yemen alone | Yemen Wrath (20/09/2019)

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There’s an enormous lack of accountability among those that produce, sell, transport and use weapons: to who point at the finger, if there are so many variables in conflicts and foreign relations that is impossible to quantify who is in the fault of what. Selling tools of warfare to nations’ armies do not free company officials to assess the risk of the arms delivered to be used in the commission of international crimes: by aiding countries that deal with internal insurgency or attacks, supplying countries are abetting a situation of crisis too. Therefore, an export license offers the opportunity to export, but leaves the possibility not to export: this implication is not yet fully understood by policy-makers and producers, as much as for any other type of trade.

It is time that every actor related to a conflict faces its part of social responsibility.

And it can start by giving a glimpse of the hidden infrastructure of an arms trade. By reconstructing the stories of selected weapons it is possible to outline the dynamics of conflict: referencing Yemen as a case study, the design project will sum up the research into a visual storytelling that combines technical data, military language, 2d/3d reconstruction with the news media repository. The goal of the project is to arm the viewers with data and resources to identify events in which the arms trade has played an important role.

Design is not only a tool to improve living conditions but also to offer an alternative perspective on current issues. If the overload of daily information is only grasped through a tailored newsfeed or aggressive breaking-news video, it is quite difficult to keep the pace of what’s going on in the world. Maintaining ourselves informed is like doing sport regularly: if practiced correctly and balanced then it can lead to long-term benefits. In some cases, indeed, it is very difficult to understand complex matters that cannot be fully explained in 1000 words or 3 minutes [ 61-68 ] of news.

The fragmentation of information is a very urgent issue not yet considered by the larger audience; it is exactly by taking advantage of momentary information-peaks that geopolitical manoeuvres and intricate deals can happen unconcerned. As for weapons, information can be traded in exchange of economic or political advantages, or used against competitors: targeting a specific event force to avoid the rest. This is the void where investigative/narrative journalism can play a role, and present a closer version of the truth for slow-readers. The next question is then if the formats of representation of information are still valid for the current viewers/readers. The information contained in official reports or investigations is usually targeted to selected audiences; when it is meant to the general public is usually translated into less complex forms, which visually sum-up or present only the main facts. But which way is actually more effective? Or is there a third way?

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ENDNOTES 1 Conventional Weapons.

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and Pacific (2019) http://unrcpd.org/conventional-weapons/ (Accessed 16 October 2019) 2 Yemen: Collective failure, collective responsibility. Human Rights Council (3 September 2019) https://www. ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=24937&LangID=E (Accessed 15 November 2019 3 Jordan, W. (2015) ‘Informant says Yemen’s Saleh helped direct al-Qaeda.’ In: Al Jazeera [online] At: https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2015/06/informant-yemen-saleh-helped-direct-al-qaeda-150604073415522.html (Accessed 15 November 2019) 4 Yemen: Conflict intensifies between former rebel allies (2017) Al Jazeera English, December 3, 2017. At: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=X11lC8BDI44&lc=z22ojlzyepngupa04acdp433zvtxdtdhhktlzvwbsr1w03c010c.1512423183560266 (Accessed on 18 November 2019) 5 Report of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts as submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights - Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014, A/HRC/42/17, par. 9 (Accessed 9 August 2019) 6 Mansour, R. and Salisbury, P. (2019) Between Order and Chaos - A New Approach to Stalled State Transformations in Iraq and Yemen - September 2019. [online] at: https:// www.chathamhouse.org/sites/ default/files/2019-09-17-StateTransformationsIraqYemen. pdf: Page 37 (Accessed 15 November 2019) 7 Bayoumy, Y., Stewart, P. (20/10/2016) ‘Exclusive: Iran steps up weapons supply to Yemen's Houthis via Oman – officials’ In: Reuters [online] At: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-iran/ exclusive-iran-steps-up-weapons-supply-to-yemens-houthis-via-oman-officials-idUSK-

CN12K0CX (Accessed 27 January 2020) 8 UN Sanctions. United Nations Security Council 2019. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information (Accessed 16 October 2019) 9 EU Sanctions Map. Estonian Presidency of the Council of the EU, 2017 https:// sanctionsmap.eu (Accessed 16 October 2019) 10 Sasso, M. and Tizian, G. (23/08/2016) ‘The business of death’ In: L’Espresso [online] At: http://espresso.repubblica. it/internazionale/2016/08/23/ news/the-business-ofdeath-1.280860 (Accessed 16 October 2019) 11 CAGE (Commercial and Government Entity Code) = numeric identifier assigned to suppliers, government and defense agencies. Part of the NATO Codification System.

12 (Australia, Afghanistan, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, United Kingdom) SIPRI Trade Register [online] At: http://armstrade. sipri.org/armstrade/page/ trade_register.php (Accessed 20/10/2019) 13 Shalal, A. ‘U.S. approves $1.29 billion sale of smart bombs to Saudi Arabia’ (16/11/2015) In: Reuters [online] At:https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-saudi-usa-armsidUSKCN0T51NC20151116 (Accessed 23 November 2019) 14 ‘Raytheon, Saudi Arabia Military Industries in strategic partnership’ (2017) In: Arab News [online] At: https://www. arabnews.com/node/1102651/ saudi-arabia (Accessed 23 November 2019) 15 ‘Coalition Command announces martyrdom of pilot during an operation against Al-Qaeda in Yemen’ (2017)In: Saudi Press Agency [online] At: https://www.spa.gov. sa/1666045 (Accessed 21 November 2019) 16

‘The wreckage of the

Endnotes and Sources

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t-used-in-saudi-arabia-attack/30173643.html (Accessed 07/03/2020) 25 Pamuk, H. (19/12/2019) ‘Exclusive: U.S. probe of Saudi oil attack shows it came from north - report’ In: Reuters [online] At: https://www.reuters. com/article/us-saudi-aramco-attacks-iran-exclusive/ exclusive-u-s-probe-of-saudi-oil-attack-shows-it-camefrom-north-report-idUSKBN1YN299 (Accessed on 27/01/2020) 26 Safi, M. and Borger, J. (19/09/2019) ‘How did oil attack breach Saudi defences and what will happen next?’

In: The Guardian [online] At:https://www.theguardian. com/world/2019/sep/19/howdid-attack-breach-saudi-defences-and-what-will-happennext (Accessed 07/03/2020) 27 OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ‘Crisis Overview’ [online] At: https://www.unocha.org/ yemen/about-ocha-yemen (Accessed on 27/01/2020) 28 Meyer, H. (27/12/2019) ‘Russia Rejects Extending Iran Arms Embargo, Defying U.S.’ In: Bloomberg [online] At: https://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2019-12-27/ russia-rejects-extendingiran-arms-embargo-defiesu-s-pressure (Accessed on 27/01/2019) 29 Health system in Yemen close to collapse.

Bulletin of the World Health Organization [online] At: http:// www10.who.int/bulletin/volumes/93/10/15-021015/en/ (Accessed 15 November 2019) 30 World Report 2019 – Yemen Events of 2018.

Human Rights Watch [online] At: https://www.hrw.org/ world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen (Accessed 20 November 2019) 31 ‘Press Release: Over 100,000 Reported Killed In Yemen War’ (31 October 2019) – ACLED https://www. acleddata.com/2019/10/31/ press-release-over-100000reported-killed-in-yemen-war/ (Accessed 23 November 2019) 32 Defense Issues - Military and general security. Military

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Aircraft Cost (2012) https://defenseissues.net/tag/eurofighter-typhoon-cost/ (Accessed 21 November 2019) 33 YEMEN: Cost of Food Nearly Doubles, Putting Thousands of Lives at Risk – Save The Children (2018) https://www.savethechildren. org/us/about-us/media-andnews/2018-press-releases/ yeme-cost-of-food-nearlydoubles (Accessed 21 November 2019) 34 Financial value of the global arms trade. SIPRI https://www.sipri.org/databases/financial-value-global-arms-trade (Accessed 16 October 2019) 35 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2018) SIPRI Yearbook 2018 Summary Oxford University Press, UK - May 2018. [online] https:// www.sipri.org/sites/default/ files/2018-11/yb_18_summary_en.pdf (Accessed on 19 May 2019) 36 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. SIPRI https:// www.sipri.org/databases/milex (Accessed 16 October 2019) 37 ECCHR (2019) ‘Case report: Made in Europe, bombed in Yemen� - The Hague Humanity Hub, Netherlands, 11 December 2019.

IMAGES [ 1 ] Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (2017) GBU-12 Paveway II guidance unit fin fragment. At: http:// images.wellcome.ac.uk/ (Accessed on 24 June 2009) [ 2 ] Benjamin Strick (2019) Eurofighter Typhoon flying over the Saudi border with Yemen [Twitter; Screenshot] At: https://twitter.com/bendobrown/status/11260133830425 84577?lang=en (Accessed on 10 January 2020) [ 3 ] Amr Nabil / AP (2019) Remnant of a misfired Iranian cruise missile [Photograph] At: https://www.ctvnews.ca/ mobile/world/u-s-says-attackon-saudi-oil-site-was-an-iranian-act-of-war-1.4598347?cache=%3FclipId%3D104066 (Accessed on 10 January 2020) [ 4 ] Mohammed Huwais/ AFP/Getty Images (12/06/2015) Before and after an airstrike

in Bab-al-Yemen, Old Town of Sana'a, Yemen. (12/06/2015) [Photograph] At: https:// www.theguardian.com/ world/gallery/2015/jun/12/ old-town-of-sanaa-after-airstrikes-and-before-in-pictures + http://wikimapia.org/402279 (Accessed 8 March 2020) [ 5 ] Arab spring rally in Sana’a (2011) [Photograph] At: http://guides. library.illinois.edu/c. php?g=348276&p=2346879 (Accessed on 27 February 2020) [ 6 ] Khaled Abdullah/Reuters (21/05/2014) Yemen's former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, pauses during an interview with Reuters in Sanaa [Photograph] At: https://www. pri.org/stories/2015-04-02/ man-accused-stealing-60billion-yemen-still-there-andwielding-power (Accessed on 27 February 2020) [ 7 ] Fawcett, G. Department of Defence (Released) (30/07/2013) Sitting down for a meeting, Yemen President Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi listens as Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel welcomes him to the. [Photograph] At: https://www.flickr.com/photos/secdef/9401413723/in/ photostream/ (Accessed on 27/02/2020) [ 8 ] AFP (28/01/2020) Yemen's Houthi rebels made gains against government troops north and east of the capital Sana'a [online] At: https:// www.middleeasteye.net/news/ yemens-houthi-rebels-seizekey-route-deadly-clashesaround-capital (Accessed on 27/02/2020) [ 9 ] AFP (12/72019) Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (L), Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, meeting with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman near the holy city of Mecca [online] At: https:// www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/When-the-Saudis-andEmiratis-fall-out (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 10 ] Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 8, Art. 51, Repertory, Suppl. 1, vol. I (1954-1955) [online] At: https:// legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ repertory/art51/english/rep_ supp1_vol1_art51.pdf&lang=EF (Accessed on 27/02/2020)

Endnotes and Sources

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Corporal Mike Jones/

MOD (12/10/2012) Panavia Tornado GR4 [online] At: https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panavia_ Tornado#/media/File:RAF_Tornado_GR4_MOD_45155233.jpg (Accessed 05 March 2020) [ 22 ] Sgt. Samuel Rogers (7/10/2017) McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle [online] At: https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_F-15_Eagle#/ media/File:F-15,_71st_Fighter_Squadron,_in_flight.JPG (Accessed 05 March 2020) [ 23 ] AP (4/09/2015) President Barack Obama meets with King Salman of Saudi Arabia in the Oval Office of the White House, Washington [online] At:https://www.voanews.com/ usa/obama-meet-saudi-kingamid-rising-tensions (Accessed 20 October 2019) [ 24 ] Defense, Security Cooperation Agency (16/11/2015) The Government of Saudi Arabia - Air-to-Ground Munitions [online] At: https://www. dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/ government-saudi-arabia-air-ground-munitions (Accessed 11 November 2019) [ 25 ] REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque (20/04/2016) President Barack Obama meets with Saudi King Salman at Erga Palace in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. [online] At: https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-usa-obama-gulf/ obama-saudi-king-discuss-strained-alliance-middle-east-conflicts-idUSKCN0XH11Y (Accessed 05 March 2020) [ 26 ] Mountains of Al Wade'a district, Yemen (2018) [satellite] Apple Maps (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 27 ] Harry Boone (17/11/2017) Wreckage of a Saudi aircraft [online] At: https://twitter.com/towersight/ status/931517759309123585 (Accessed 3 March 2020) [ 28 ] Unknown Author (November 2017) Eurofighter Typhoon [online] At: https://www. eurofighter.com/news-andevents/2017/11/2017-roundthe-clock-operations-for-eurofighter-typhoon (Accessed 3 March 2020) [ 29 ] Chris Ryding (April 2006) BAE Systems Instrumented Production Aircraft

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One with heavy weapon load [online] At: https://www. eurofighter.com/multimedia/ details/bae-systems-ipa1with-heavy-weapon-load-590 (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 30 ] Vredesactie (2019) Eurofighter Typhoon Supply Chain [online] At: https://yemen. armstradewatch.eu/air.html (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 31 ] Unknown Author (2015) E200 Engine [online] At: https://ukdefencejournal. org.uk/eurojet-continue-typhoon-engine-support/ (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 32 ] Unknown Author (2007) [Pirate System [online] At: https://defense-update. com/20070801_italian-airforce-typhoons.html (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 33 ] BAE Systems (2014) Captor E-Scan radar system installed aboard BAE's IPA5 development aircraft [online] At:https://newatlas. com/bae-systems-radar-eurofighter-typhoon-captor-e-scan/34930/ (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 34 ] Unknown Author (2019) The EuroDASS consortium is studying how the Typhoon’s Praetorian DASS could be improved to safeguard the aircraft against emerging threats [online] At: https://armadainternational.com/2019/10/deepdive-on-the-dass/ (Accessed 5 March 2020) [ 35 ] Unknown Author (1985) Margareth Thatcher with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia [online] At: https://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/2016/08/23/ margaret-thatcher-stoppedal-yamamah-arms-deal-going-to-french-w/ (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 36 ] Stephen Hird/REUTERS (July 2005) Tony Blair with the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal [online] At: https://www.theguardian. com/commentisfree/2019/ nov/18/attorney-general-geoffrey-cox-gpt-arms-deal-corruption (Accessed 5 March 2020) [ 37 ] Lipinski, D. WPA Pool/Getty (7/03/2018) Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s meets the Queen Elizabeth II [online] At: https:// www.businessinsider.com/

saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-meetsqueen-state-visit-2018-3?international=true&r=US&IR=T (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 38 ] Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) (26/09/1985) Al Yamamah Deal Document: Memorandum of Understanding between Britain and Saudi Arabia [online] At https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/countries/saudi-arabia/al-yamamah (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 39 ] Yemen Data Project (February 2020) Air raids timeline per month [online] At: https://www.yemendataproject.org (Accessed 8 March 2020) [ 40 ] EUArms (2018) RSAF Typhoon refueled by a tanker aircraft (May 2019) [screenshot, online] At: https://euarms.com/ news/2WHJZ7WI1yjIyFktBk7Nzz (Accessed 3 March 2020) [ 41 ] @CivMilAir (2018) Screenshot by CivMilAir showing a Saudi Airbus MRTT flying over Yemen [online] At: https:// euarms.com/news/2WHJZ7WI1yjIyFktBk7Nzz (Accessed 3 March 2020) [ 42 ] Yemen Data Project (2020) Air raids conducted by the military coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, since March 26, 2015. [online] At: https://www. yemendataproject.org/data. html (Accessed 3 March 2020) [ 43 ] Typhoons at the King Khalid Air Base, Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia (21/11/2018) [satellite] Google Earth (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 44 ] U.S. government/Digital Globe via AP (15/09/2019) Damage at Saudi Aramco's Abqaia oil processing facility, Saudi Arabia. [online] At: https://www.npr. org/2019/09/16/761118726/ oil-prices-jump-followingdrone-attack-on-saudi-oilfacility?t=1584468203089 (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 45 ] U.S. government/Digital Globe via AP (15/09/2019) Satellite images show two significant hits to two towers, with scorch marks visible on the ground from a significant fire. [online] At: https://www.

Endnotes and Sources

bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-49718975 (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 46 ] Amr Nabil/AP (18/9/2019) Journalists film what Saudi military spokesman Col. Turki al-Malki said was evidence of Iranian weaponry used in the attack targeted Saudi Aramco's facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais, during a press conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. [online] At: https://www.militarytimes. com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/09/18/saudi-arabia-says-iran-missiles-dronesattacked-oil-sites/ (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 47 ] Amr Nabil/AP (18/9/2019) Remnants of a misfired LACM on display during the press conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia [online] At: https://www.abc.net.au/ news/2019-09-19/saudi-arabia-says-iranian-sponsorship-of-oil-attack-undeniable/11526328 (Accessed 8 March 2020) [ 48 ] YemenWrath (07/07/2019) Drones, missiles and other flying objects displayed at the Martyr President Alsammad Military Exhibition [Youtube still] https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=fJtCav4oCxA&list=PLyGa4xM4Klzl-3ESUELmhfCma7RvaDedg&index=2&t=0s (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 49 ] Houthi Media Office/ Handout via REUTERS. (17/09/2019) Missiles and drone aircraft are seen on display at an exhibition at an unidentified location in Yemen in this undated handout photo released by the Houthi Media Office. [online] At: https:// www.reuters.com/article/ us-saudi-aramco-houthis/ yemen-houthi-drones-missiles-defy-years-of-saudiair-strikes-idUSKBN1W22F4 (Accessed 8 March 2020) [ 50 ] Source: leader.ir (26/06/2019) The Ya Ali cruise missile (in red on the right) is seen as part of a display of new military equipment put on by the IRGC in May 2014 [online] At: https://www. janes.com/article/89521/ saudi-led-coalition-identifies-iranian-cruise-missile-used-against-airport (Accessed 4 March 2020)

[ 51 ] General Qassem Taqizadeh (13/01/2019) Iran long-range cruise missile ‘Soumar’, IRGC [online] At: https://theiranproject. com/blog/2019/01/13/iranian-cruise-missile-to-be-delivered-to-irgc-deputy-defense-minister/ (Accessed 8 March 2020) [ 52 ] Chernilevsky, G. (8/05/2008) Raduga Kh-55 (NATO code:AS-15 "Kent") in the Ukrainian Air Force museum [online] At: https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kh-55#/ media/File:H-55_AS-15_ Kent_2008_G1.jpg (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 53 ] Middle East (2020) Graphic visualization made with Google Earth Pro [satellite] [ 54 ] US Government / REUTERS (15/09/2019) A satellite image showing damage to oil/ gas Saudi Aramco infrastructure at Abqaiq, in Saudi Arabia [online] At: https://www.bbc. com/news/world-middleeast-49718975 (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 55 ] US Government / REUTERS (15/09/2019) Damage to Oil Saudi Aramco facility in Khurais, Saudi Arabia [online] At: https://www.bbc. com/news/world-middleeast-49718975 (Accessed 7 March 2020) [ 56 ] Unknown Author (11/03/2019) Qasem Soleimani with Order of Zolfaghar [online] At: http://farsi.khamenei.ir/ photo-album?id=41944#i (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 57 ] Yemen Food Insecurity Map | Sources: World Food Programm [online] At: https://docs.wfp.org/api/ documents/0779e0c79cfb41178180357568a18128/ download/?_ ga= 2.134418353.

1745891009.1584791260988303718.1584791260 + European Council on Foreign relations https://www.ecfr. eu/mena/yemen (Accessed 4 March 2020) [ 58 ] Vladimir Putin meets with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran, Iran (05/11/2017) [online] At: http://english. khamenei.ir/news/5257/3 -outcomes-of-Mr-Putin-meeting-with-Ayatollah-Khamenei (Accessed 1 March 2020) [ 59 ]

Air Strike on the Chol-

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era Treatment Center in Abs, Yemen (11/06/2018) [satellite] Google Earth (Accessed 10 March 2020) [ 60 ] ECCHR (11/12/2019) t, Page 1 [online] At: https://www. ecchr.eu/en/case/made-ineurope-bombed-in-yemen/ (Accessed 29 January 2020) [ 61 ] Le armi italiane in Yemen | La 7 (6/05/2019) [Youtube still] At: https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=D7t61oQn-kE (Accessed 10 March 2020) [ 62 ] El expresidente Saleh ofrece a Arabia Saudí una salida a la guerra | El País (2/12/2017) [Youtube still] At: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=4B3D1ySMKf0 (Accessed 10 March 2020) [ 63 ] Investigation uncovers arms trade in Yemen war | DW News (12/12/2018) [Youtube still] At: https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=ptmRqZMjDmY (Accessed 10 March 2020) [ 64 ] Yemen conflict: Battle for Sanaa - BBC News (4/12/2017) [Youtube still] At: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=VFwibQcqYPE (Accessed 10 March 2020) [ 65 ] UN alleges war crimes in Yemen | Euronews (28/08/2018) [Youtube still] At: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=-cL2NmauBeI (Accessed 10 March 2020) [ 66 ] Exclusive look inside wartorn Yemen | CNN (28/03/2019) [Youtube still] At: https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=R7MOp1wUp_U (Accessed 10 March 2020)

DATABASES

arms.com/ weapon

REPORTS AND PAPERS

+ Amnesty International Yemen War: No End in Sight (2019) - https://www.amnesty. org/en/latest/news/2015/09/ yemen-the-forgotten-war/

+ Mwatana for Human Rights - https://mwatana.org/en/

+ Department of Defense Directive 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems (2012) United States. Department of Defense.

+ ACLED - Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project - https://www.acleddata.com/ tag/yemen/ + Arms Trade Treaty Monitor (2018) ATT State Positions - https:// attmonitor.org/en/ arms-trade-treaty/state-positions/ + Armed Banks - http:// www.bancaarmada.org/en/ campaign/what-are-thearmed-banks + Bellingcat (2019) Yemen Project - https://yemen.bellingcat.com + Conflict Security Intelligence - https://t-intell.com + CORRUPTION WATCH https://www.cw-uk.org/projects-and-publications + Council of Foreign Relations (2019) Global Conflict Tracker - https://www.cfr. org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/?category=us + Disclose - Made in France (2019) - https://made-infrance.disclose.ngo/en/ + Designation-Systems - http://www.designation-systems.net + Defense Security Cooperation Agency - www.dsca.mil

[ 67 ] Yemen's Houthi forces kill Saudi soldiers in combat | Al Jazeera English (17/02/2019) [Youtube still] At: https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=k5zw5Hw9WmU (Accessed 10 March 2020)

+ FAS – Federation of American Scientists - https://fas. org/asmp/profiles/world.html

[ 68 ] To UAE: If you want your glass towers to be safe, leave Yemen alone | Yemen Wrath (20/09/2019) [Youtube still] At: https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=Qx8oV5hQWII (Accessed 10 March 2020)

+ Global Security - www. globalsecurity.org

+ GAO - US Government Accountability Office - www. gao.gov

+ NISAT – Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer - http://nisat.prio.org/Publications/ + PRIO - Peace Research Institute Oslo - https://www. prio.org/ Publications/Publications/ + PART TARGET - https:// www.parttarget.com + Scramble: Military database - https://www.scramble. nl + SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - https://www.sipri.org/publications + UN Security Council, (2019) UN Sanctions - https:// www.un.org/securitycouncil/ sanctions/information + UNRCPD (2017) Conventional Weapons - http://unrcpd. org/conventional-weapons/ + UNROCA – United Nations Register of Conventional Arms - https://www.unroca.org/ participation + UNODA - United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs - https:// www.un.org/disarmament/publications/ + UN – United Nations https://www.un.org/disarmament/education/publications. html + UNRCPD - United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific - http://unrcpd.org/ publications/resources/ + US Department of Defense - https://www.defense.gov

+ Human Rights Watch (2019) - https://www.hrw. org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen

+ Vredesactie - War in Yemen, Made in Europe (2019) - https://yemen. armstradewatch.eu/?fbclid=IwAR04jR__3yavrCyVBXglFcIJ8oYRTX2Dg7pvjxltwT3EIfhi5OxUjerTraA

+ Global Security - https:// www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ world/iran/sumar.htm

+ Worldwide Armed Banks (2018) - http://www.centredelas.org/bancaarmada/en/

+ Lighthouse Reports (2019) EU Arms Project - https://eu-

Endnotes and Sources

+ ICRC, 2016. Understanding the Arms Trade Treaty. + Smith, D., (2018). Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Yearbook).

SIPRI, Stockholm. + Wezeman, P.D., Fleurant, A., Kuimova, A., Tian, N., Wezeman, S.T., (2019) Trends in international arms transfers (2018) SIPRI Fact Sheet. SIPRI, Stockholm. + Raud-Sudreau B. L., Holtom P., (2013) International Transfers of Surplus Weapons as a Consequence of Defence Reform in Europe. SIPRI, Stockholm + Mwatana for Human Rights, University Network for Human Rights (2018) Day of Judgement – The Role of the US and Europe in Civilian Death, Destruction, and Trauma in Yemen + Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat (2018) Wassenaar List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munition List + CAR - Conflicts Armament Research (2019) Diversion Digest - An analysis of information relating to the transfer of conventional weapons and ammunition. CAR, London + CAR - Conflicts Armament Research (2018) Conventional Ammunition Diversion - A supply chain security approach to international control measures.

CAR, London + CAR - Conflicts Armament Research (2018) Mines and IEDs employed by Houthis Forces on Yemen’s west coast.

CAR, London + Human Rights Council (September 2019) Annual report of the UN: Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014 + Flight Global (2019) World Air Forces 2020. DVV Media International Ltd.

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BOOKS + Grillot R. S., Stohl R. (2009) The International Arms Trade.

Oxford, United Kingdom; Polity Press. + Fenster A. (2011) The Shadow World. London, United Kingdom; Penguin Books Ltd. + Erickson L. J. (2015) Dangerous Trade: Arms Exports, Human Rights, and International Reputation. New York, USA; Columbia University Press + Tzu S., (2000) The Art of War. Leicester, England; Allandale Online Publishing + Headquarters Department of the US Army (2010) The Operation Process. Washington DC, USA

The Weapons' Reputation An Investigation into the Geopolitics of Arms Trade This publication resulted from research conducted as part of the individual thesis project in the Master Department Information Design at Design Academy Eindhoven, The Netherlands.

Edition: March 2020 printing and binding

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typeface

Sequel Sans Roman tutors

Maurits de Bruin, Simon Davies, Joost Grootens, Toon Koehorst, Gert Staal, Irene Stracuzzi, Jannetje in ’t Veld, Alice Wong. special thanks

Bellingcat (Benjamin Strick), EU Arms Project (Ludo Hekman, Klaas van Dijken), Bart Bakerman, Leone Hadavi, the ID Department '18-'20.

+ Weizman E. (2017) Forensic Architecture – Violence at the threshold of detectability. New York, USA; Zone Books NEWS SOURCES + Al Jazeera + Arab News + CNBC + Middle East Eye + Military and Aerospace Electronics + Liveuamap Yemen + Jane's Defense and Security + Reuters + The Defense Post + The Guardian + The New York Times + The Washington Post + Wikileaks (Yemen Files) ARMS MANUFACTURERS + + + + + + + + + +

Airbus BAE Systems Boeing Company Eurofighter Typhoon Gmbh General Dynamics Leonardo S. p. a Lockheed Martin PBS Aerospace Rheinmetall Group Raytheon Company

Endnotes and Sources

Colophon

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In the form of an investigation, the research enquires into who currently controls which weapon, and consequently influences international political and economic alliances. The countries linked to the Yemeni civil war are here examined through the type of weaponry employed, the real tangible evidence of any direct (or nondirect) participation of a nation in the conflict. Starting from the design, through the manufacturing process, to the military use and misuse, this is an attempt to visualize the hidden connections in terms of money flow, service infrastructure, political figures, and companies involved in the arms trade.