The Claremont Journal of International Relations | Spring 2020

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Claremont Journal of laremont ournal of International Relations

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I nternational R elations Volume IV | Issue 2 | Spring 2018 May 2019 - Claremont, CA

Volume V | Issue 2 | Summer 2020 June 2020 - Claremont

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Masthead Volume V | Issue 2 | Summer 2020 EDITOR IN CHIEF HELENA GABRIELLE ONG, POMONA COLLEGE '20 MANAGING EDITOR KARI SIEGENTHALER, POMONA COLLEGE '22 EDITORIAL BOARD SELINA HO, SCRIPPS COLLEGE '21 T I F FA N Y C H A R V E T, C L A R E M O N T M C K E N N A C O L L E G E ' 2 2 A M E L I A H U T C H L E Y, S C R I P P S C O L L E G E ' 2 3 A N A H I TA FA R I S H TA , P O M O N A C O L L E G E ' 2 3 WRITERS M A L A K A FA N E H , P O M O N A C O L L EG E ' 2 1 KELSEY CLARKE, CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE '21 E VA N N AC H T R I E B , P I T Z E R CO L L EG E ' 2 2 K AT R I N A C A S S E L L , S C R I P P S C O L L E G E ' 2 3 H A N N A H M A RT I N E Z , H A RVA R D CO L L EG E (CO N T R I B U T I N G )

Articles in the Claremont Journal of International Relations reflects the opinion of the author and do not represent the Claremont Journal of International Relations, its editors, other staff members or the Claremont Colleges.

Claremont Journal of International Relations

Claremont Journal of Volume V, Issue 2, Spring/Summer 2020 nternational Relations Published in 2020

by Selina Ho and the editorial board of the Claremont Journal of International Relations.

Volume IV | Issue 2 | Spring 2018 Geoffrey Herrera, Pitzer College Faculty Advisor(s): Professor Journal e-mail: claremontjir@gmail.com May 2019 - Claremont, CA Web: www.claremontjir.wordpress.com Twitter: @ClaremontJIR Cover, image courtesy of GDJ (pixabay.com)

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Contents 7

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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR HELENA GABRIELLE ONG

FROM RAP TO REVOLUTION: THE INTERSECTIONS OF MOROCCAN MUSIC AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM MALAK AFANEH

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THE 1967 SIX-DAY WAR: A WIN FOR ISRAEL AND EGYPTIAN ISLAMISM KATRINA CASSELL

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CHINA'S BRI: A WIN-WIN ECONOMIC POLICY OR A BID AT WORLD HEGEMONY? KELSEY CLARKE

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BEYOND THE WITCH: FEMALE POWER IN 21ST AFRICAN WITCHCRAFT HANNAH MARTINEZ

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THE CASE FOR INPUT LEGITIMACY IN PEACEKEEPING EVAN NACHTRIEB

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Letter from the Editor As a transfer, I've always felt that I had one foot outside of Claremont.

Now, graduating off-campus during a pandemic only reinforced that feeling. But this experience has forced me to look beyond the Claremont community and also seek more deeply within.

In building CJIR, I’ve sought to create a platform that recognizes student research and engages with international affairs despite being in a small, suburban, liberal arts community. But wur work doesn’t end in the Claremont Colleges; it goes beyond our campus borders and feeds into a broader conversation. And that goes both ways. It’s impossible to talk about global affairs without recognizing the insecurities and inequalities in our own communities. Hatred, racism, and abuses of power persist. We see it in the xenophobia of COVID-19, the murder of George Floyd, Hong Kong’s security law, the Philippine’s terrorism law, and constitutional changes in Russia.

It has been my belief that there is a power in naming a thing and reckoning with these problems. I hope that CJIR promotes students to do that same work in research and academia: call out a problem, educate, and get behind a solution for a better world.

On that last point: solutions and policy suggestions dominate conversations that CJIR has for submissions. Upon facing the problem, we must also fight it. Solutions are rarely obvious or easy. It takes imagination to consider a different future. I've been told that protest doesn’t accomplish anything, and that it's impossible to divest or abolish police systems, and we cannot hold policy and politicians accountable.

And yet, today, we see those norms proven wrong again and again. The Overton window shifts with discourse and imagination.

I’m grateful for the work of the writers in this issue, the editorial team of CJIR, and the unflagging commitment of our managing editor Kari Siegenthaler. I believe that their work reckons with the world we face, and helps to imagine and create a better one. Through their work, I'm reminded of my senior politics seminar which ended with a conversation with Eddie S. Glaude—professor at Princeton University and author of Begin Again: James Baldwin’s America and Its Urgent Lessons for Our Own. He told us: “The imagination is the battleground.” Make no mistake, the battle is here and now.

Helena Gabrielle Ong, Pomona College '20

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

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Malak Afaneh

FROM RAP TO REVOLUTION: THE INTERSECTIONS OF MOROCCAN MUSIC AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM

Morocco's capital, Rabat. Source: Visions of Domino on Wikimedia Commons under CC 8



ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the utilization of Moroccan hip hop and rap as a form of political expression following the events of the Arab Spring and the February 20th movement. Known for its diverse collection of beats, auditory patterns, and harmonious sound intervals, the hip hop scene in the global community and in the nation state of Morocco has allowed youth the space to express political dissent and calls for governmental reform. In consideration of King Mohammad IV’s rule to power within the last two decades, expressions of hip hop and rap represent one of the few channels of communication between the monarchy and society and is continuously evolving to more accurately represent the community’s diverse socio political needs. Through further examination of prior academic works and conducting interviews with two Moroccan hip hop artists and rappers from Rabat and Essouira, this research reveals a steady decrease in the composition of blatantly political and nuanced music. However, I argue these findings do not indicate a decrease in youth’s political engagement, but a shift to a more “bottom up,” grassroots approach. Furthermore, through mirroring the concept of sumud, Moroccan artists are prioritizing the well-being and entertainment of themselves and their community by creating music that is not dependent on the political climate of the region, but of their own ideas, and hence, resisting by existing.

INTRODUCTION Since its emergence in the 1970s in America, the musical genre of hip hop has continued to lyrically and auditorily serve as a form of political self-expression and a creative outlet for commentary surrounding restrictions on freedoms, continuing economic instability, and state sanctioned prejudices. According to Kamau Rashid, hip hop originated in “African American neighborhoods in New York, when in the 1970s, youths started the genre by rapping over drumbeats” (2016). Through patterns of rapid globalization and migration, hip hop became popularly utilized as an outlet for feelings of anger and desperation under societal oppression and an opportunity to possess some form of political power. The widespread composition of mainstream hip hop and rap since the 1990s in Morocco has shaped perceptions of the monarchy’s political decision making and raised awareness about the implications of social, economic, and political policies within the region.

Due to the simultaneous occurrence of King Mohammad IV’s ascension to the throne and the increasing exposure of Western media, the composition of hip hop has evolved significantly. By understanding the youth’s positionality in influencing the political atmosphere of the country through various artistic mediums, this research answers the following questions: post Arab Spring, how have youth in Morocco utilized hip hop and rap to gain political power and agency? In relation to the Makhzen, and the symbol of the Moroccan monarch, how does the production of rap and hip hop offer novel spaces to share social and cultural ideologies? How can expressing political dissent and call for reform through music amplify and uphold the voices of marginalized identities across Morocco, despite Western and bureaucratic opposition?

My investigation of the contemporary hip hop scene will examine varying political sentiment and renewal of creative mediums within the historical context of the post Arab Spring and Feb. 20th movement. By offering an in-depth understanding of the origin and evolution of hip hop in Morocco, I will utilize my analysis of academic works and my conversations with various Moroccan youth and artists to highlight the intersections of hip hop’s popularity with the political climate. Furthermore, I will explain my research’s findings through a parallel to the Palestinian concept of sumud. Translated from the Arabic language to mean ‘steadfastness,’ scholars such as Lena Meari have described sumud as “a form of subjectivity and politics that embodies the possibility of escaping hegemonic configurations of colonial liberal politics” (2014). By engaging in 'normal' day-to-day actions, like going to school or engaging in artistic hobbies, the act of living becomes a direct resistance to any attempt of colonial interference and a challenge to the processes of cultural and physical erasing at hand. Similarly, my research reveals complementary patterns of practices of sumud within the context of the Moroccan hip hop scene, as young artists view their music expression and creation of artistic spaces a form of direct resistance to the monarchy’s restrictions on speech and free movement, regardless of the blatancy of the political significance in the lyrics.

BACKGROUND Artistic mediums offer a genuine, humane way of capturing the community’s sentiments regarding the nature of the political climate, while additio-

From Rapto Revolution:The Intersections ofMoroccan Musicand PoliticalActivism

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nally offering individuals the agency to decide the best direction and solutions for their own future. Within Moroccan society, the expression of political sentiment through music has long been practiced by the nation state’s citizens and has recently taken the form of hip hop and rap.

The mainstream emergence of hip hop in Morocco in the 1990s public sphere sparked the widespread interest of young people across the country. Due to rapid globalization and the West’s stronghold on pop culture, hip hop formed by “African American, Caribbean, and Latino youths in the South Bronx section of New York City” was stylistically reflected in the music composed by top Moroccan artists (Rashid 2016). While sentiments of Arab nationalism were incredibly high across the Middle East and North Africa region, the decline in Pan Arabism during the 1970s resulted in the introduction of new politicized, leftist hip hop groups, such as the Nass El Ghiwane in Morocco. According to Dr. Cristina Almeida, “this group, whose members came from the poor neighborhood of Hay Mohammadi in Casablanca, embodied a new generation of politically engaged youth, influenced by the Vietnam War, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Argentine revolutionary Che Guevara, and the Arab-Israel War in 1967” (2016). Through utilizing national instruments and styles, the group raised awareness about the human rights violations and restrictive policies of the rule under King Hassan II. Moreover, the group’s positionality as members of the poor, working class inspired their bold commentary on the socioeconomic disparities present in the nation and highlighted the harmful irony of post-colonial Morocco; despite gaining independence, the same oppressive dynamics under the French colonial rule were being replayed between the monarchy and its constituents. Influenced by the beliefs of socialism and communism, the proposal for equitable distribution of wealth in a capitalist society by the music group radically adjusted the nation’s perception of political discourse as taboo and inspired increasing youth engagement. This is reflected in Nass El Ghiwane’s lyrics: “Oh, you jailers! Open the doors of the prisons. . . Oh you rulers! Cease your barbarity.”

(Excerpt from Nass El Ghiwane: “Al-Samta," 2013) The transition of monarchs in 1998 influenced the political atmosphere of the region and the consequential evolution of the hip-hop scene. King Mohammad VI’s ascension to the throne resulted in the surprising encouragement of hip hop and rap festivals by the government. Hoping to portray Morocco as a modern, open society, King Mohammad VI believed in allowing youth the space to express their creativity and artistic visions while simultaneously possessing the power to oversee music festivals and concerts. One festival, the Mawazine, is regarded as the ‘granddaddy’ of all festivals in Morocco and invites local and internationally recognized performers, including Tony Allen, Najwa Karam, and Shakira. Although the Mawazine is hosted by the Association Maroc Cultures, a private institution, the “Mawazine is perceived as the ‘king’s festival’ because the Association is headed by Munir Majidi, a close confidant of Mohammad VI. The royal imprimatur lends the festival management the political and financial clout needed to bring in musical icons” (Boum 2012). Despite the government’s alleged appreciation for artistic and musical expression, its economic and political authority on the occurrence of King of Morocco Mohammed VI. Source: UN Climate Change on Wikimedia Commons under CC 10

such events limits Moroccan artists from showcasing their talents without the support of the government.

Essentially, the value and projection of success for artists is directly correlated with the government’s approval of the artistic medium as not harmful or critical of the King. Yet for artists that produce their work as an emotional outlet for processing oppression and inspiring progressive reform, the government’s censorship is a direct obstacle to presenting one’s authentic, genuine self with the community.

LITERATURE REVIEW Culture of Rap and Hip Hop The political decision-making process in Morocco includes the political opinions of King Mohammad VI, Prime Minister Saadeddine Othmani, and the Makhzen, or the governing coalition consisting of royal figures, military officers, and well-connected civil servants. Each of these sects of society directly influence the tone of the hip hop scene in Morocco, as well as dictate foreign perceptions of the political atmosphere of the region. Morocco is often described as the 'Moroccan exception,' “whereby Morocco is globally marketed as a religiously moderate country without religious terrorism and guided by a monarchy in charge of securing the country’s future by pushing for democracy and political stability” (Almeida 2016). The country’s image as an oasis of democracy in the MENA region encourages the appeasement of such rhetoric by international superpowers and directly impacts the propaganda and messages used by hip hop artists. For example, the composition of patriotic rap and hip hop dramatically increased in 2003, despite recent terrorist attacks in Casablanca (Almeida 2016). By encouraging artists to write optimistic and positive lyrics to receive support from the King, the monarchy could ensure that Morocco’s image as a stable, peaceful nation would remain intact. This romantic theme of Morocco as a secure homeland for its peoples, void of conflict, is witnessed in the lyrics by distinguished rapper Fnaire: “Don’t touch my land, My land and the land of my grandfathers, My land and the land of my grandchildren.” (Maktich Bladi, Don’t Touch My Country, by Fnaire, 2006) According to scholar Almeida, “the groups Fnaire and H-Kayne echoed the narrative of optimism

L7a9ed, also known as El Haqed. Source: Wikimedia Commons under CC

for the country’s future and democratic change under the leadership of the king” (2016). Through inclusion of motifs surrounding homeland, belonging, and the unity of a nation and community, patriotic hip hop encouraged a political atmosphere that respected the authority of the monarch. As such, critical discourse regarding existing socioeconomic disparities and restrictions on freedoms was perceived as a direct attack on the well-being of the country and resulted in an ostracization of individuals impacted by such abuses. This othering of individuals contributed to a further divide in the hip hop scene and hindered the success and exposure of artists producing music critical of the existing systems in Morocco.

The surveillance of artists’ music by the Makhzen and the monarchy directly impacts the effectiveness of youth efforts to inspire concrete modes of community organizing. Although government-sponsored festivals offer a venue for upcoming artists, they simultaneously exclude others, on the premise of their loyalty to the government. Furthermore, a number of artists have been arrested for their music and sentenced with punishments. Rapper El Haqed (L7a9d) “was arrested and jailed in March for insulting government officials with tracks like ‘Dogs of the State” (Boum 2012). The twenty-four-year-old rapper from Casablanca has been a prominent leader in the Feb. 20th movement and continuously speaks about the King’s oppressive policies and blatant lack of concern for the financial and social well-being of the citizens of Morocco: “You are paid to protect the citizens, not to steal their money. Did your commander order you to take money from the poor?” (Klab Dawla, El Haqed, 2012)

From Rapto Revolution:The Intersections ofMoroccan Musicand PoliticalActivism

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2011 Moroccan protests organized by the Feb. 20th Movement. Source: Magharebia on Wikimedia Commons under CC

Although El Haqed is banned from producing and performing music in Morocco, his challenging of the police and royal authority has inspired an increase in youth political engagement and encouraged rappers to include more open, critical discourse in their lyrics.

The hip hop scene is indicative of the complex dynamics between artists and the state, as well as questioning the authenticity of the Moroccan government’s support of the music scene. If the music at hand is only valued for its approval and positive diction surrounding the monarchy, then can the Moroccan government claim true respect for the arts? If hip hop festivals and artists are regulated to favor the state, then are these spaces genuinely safe, inclusive spaces for individuals hoping to express their creative opinions?

THE FEB. 20TH MOVEMENT AND THE ‘MOROCCAN SPRING’ The Feb. 20th movement symbolized the disruption of the illusion of the “Moroccan exception,” and raised local and international awareness about the severity of unemployment, worker conditions, secure housing, and more. Calls for economic equality were made across Morocco, echoing the large-scale demands of participants in the Arab Spring.

Similarly, hip hop artists within Morocco quickly utilized their platform to engage with youth and initiate political discourse about the reform necessary for the future of the country. Within weeks of the protests, Western and international media outlets quickly reported on the impressive and radical mobilization of youth to engage in the political movement and viewed the utilization of hip hop as groundbreaking for the region. Yet while the cove-

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rage of the Arab Spring was necessary for international awareness, the fetishization of the political hip hop scene ironically silenced the intended messages of Moroccan artists. In categorizing hip hop artists such as El Haqed or Fnaire in the same group, media outlets did not actually demonstrate the political perspectives of each rapper or artist but grossly tokenized the existence of Moroccan hip hop artists as a revolutionary phenomenon for the more conservative, traditional society of Morocco. According to Almeida, “The media has taken advantage of this rap’s ‘coolness’ in the context of the MENA uprisings to depict the image of the revolution of the youth. On many occasions, in its attempt to talk about the youth of the region, it has overlooked the different nuances and contradictions that follow these kinds of discourses” (2014). Furthermore, the homogeneous perception of Moroccan hip hop artists during these movements only strips individuals of their humanity and ability to create art for art’s sake. As such, the value and importance of music composed is portrayed as dependent on its inclusion of blatantly political or critical lyrics. This perspective ignores the creativity and artistic expression of other individuals and negates the ability to partake in resistance outside of explicit political rap and hip hop. As exemplified through the concept of sumud, Moroccan hip hop artists’ ability to create music according to their creative visions and opinions, and not the outside world, is in itself a political statement. A number of existing academic scholarship discusses the influence of hip hop on these movements, and vice versa, yet often partakes in viewing Moroccan hip hop artists as a static monolith. My research aims to continue to examine the positionality of hip hop within the political sphere, while emphasizing the local, individualized voices of artists. As a student observing the social and political effects of the Feb. 20th Movement and the Arab Spring almost nine years after their occurrence, I aim to add to current research on the subject, while offering my own understanding of the relationship between art and activism.

METHODOLOGY In researching the influence of Moroccan hip hop and rap on political activism, as well as its consequent dynamics with the youth, the Makh-

zen, and King Mohammad VI, this study employed three main sources: 1) two structured interviews with Moroccan rappers and hip hop artists, 2) qualitative data gathered from personal fieldwork and notes through attendance of festivals and concerts, and 3) current, existing academic scholarship and literature. Through a holistic analysis of these three sources, I was able to further support and explain the findings of my research.

In an attempt to interview individuals from diverse geographic locations across Morocco, my intention at the beginning of my research was to conduct at least six interviews, one for each of the following cities I had visited on excursions: Marrakech, Fez, Tangier, Casablanca, Chefchaoune, and Rabat. However, due to the limited time constraint of the Independent Study Project, I was unable to conduct travel to all my desired locations and form relationships with artists involved in the hip hop scene. Furthermore, the majority of hip hop artists I did engage with were busy college students or young professionals who were unable to coordinate their schedules to meet for an interview. In an economic sense as well, traveling from city to city was not financially feasible for my expenses as a student myself. As a result, I talked to artists I met through my attendance at music festivals and concerts and was connected to individuals in various cities by the Moroccan friends I made during my homestay in Rabat. Through following a semi-structured interview style, in which I did not restrict my respondents to a formal set of questions, I was able to allow for more open ended inquiry and fluid discussion.

By incorporating these interviews and my personal fieldwork observations, I was able to examine the dynamics of the hip hop scene with both the artists and the audience.

My interviews with two Moroccan rappers and hip hop artists offered diverse perspectives regarding the influence of their music on society, the utilization of political rhetoric in their lyrics, and the intended missions of their music. As young people directly involved in the hip hop scene and production of music, their insight further expanded on the regional differences in the intersections of political activism and music. Moreover, I attended open mic nights in Rabat every Monday since the second week of my arrival in Morocco, and

the community of hip hop artists, rappers, poets, and singers inspired my ability to witness the influence of music in building community and fostering safe spaces for expression. My additional attendance at the Visa for Music Festival in Rabat allowed me to watch the performances of famous rappers such as Anys, Kouz1, Qaayel, and more. By conducting interviews, gathering research, and attending music festivals, I was able to develop a multi-faceted understanding of the expression of various Moroccan identities through hip hop and rap.

In an attempt to ensure that my interviews possessed diversity, I did not discriminate based on factors of geographic location, age, and gender, and was open to individuals from all backgrounds.

Consequently, my first interview was with BRIMO OFFICIAL, a 20-year-old, male hip hop artist and rapper from the port city of Essaouira. My second interview was with STORMY, a 21-year-old male, hip hop artist and rapper from the city of Rabat. Unfortunately, both of my respondents were unavailable to meet in person. I conducted both of these informal interviews over the messaging app of WhatsApp, in which I informed the interviewees of the mission and goals of my research, received written consent, and sent my five research questions to them. Although the topic of my research did not include interaction with at risk populations, I proceeded to offer each respondent an interview form and obtain written consent in order to follow all ethical standards.

My position as a 20-year-old, Arab American, Muslim woman and college student has definitely impacted my perception and understanding of my research and interviews. Although I possess a fluency in Arabic, my little understanding of Darija

The city of Rabat. Source: Elooas on Wikimedia Commons under CC

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did affect the level of comprehension of my two interviews. Furthermore, the majority of the rappers’ music was in Darija, and the translation to English lyrics may have resulted in the loss of word play and figurative language that could only be understood in the native tongue of the Moroccan artists. In addition, my role as a Muslim woman who wears a hijab did influence the level of comfort and openness in discussingsuch topics surrounding identity, music, and politics, as gender-based dynamics specific to Moroccan culture may have played out. I had hoped to interview female rappers as well but was unable to create the appropriate connections to have the opportunity to interview female artists. On one hand, my connection to this research as an Arab allowed me to possess prior understanding of the cultural concepts and themes that are enacted in Muslim majority, Arab societies. Contrastingly, my experience growing up in the United States did enforce a lens of Western thought and understandings that are not present in Moroccan communities. Overall, my limited sample size and my time, linguistic, and financial constraints is not representative of the general Moroccan hip hop scene. My research, while indicative of the lived experiences of my interviewees and my attendance in Morocco, cannot speak to the perspectives of the general community of hip hop artists and rappers. Below are details regarding my research questions and my interviewees: Interviews with Rappers/Hip Hop Artists: Interview 1: BRIMO OFFICIAL; Age: 20, City: Essaouira; semi structured interview Interview 2: STORMY; Age: 21; City: Rabat; semi structured interview Research Questions: • How/Why did you start making your own music?

• What type of music do you make and perform?

• Does your music speak about the Moroccan government or systems? If not, why?

• Do/How do you express your political opinions through your music?

• How can music make a political change in Morocco?

Findings and Analysis Bottom Up Community Organizing According to my findings, the production of political hip hop and rap in Morocco post Feb. 20th movement and the Arab Spring has significantly declined. However, I argue this is not due to a decline in political youth engagement or in the utilization of political hip hop for social change but a shift to a more community based, local approach to activism. While traditional modes of organizing perceive reform as accessible only through the King, this new, more 'grassroots' approach believes in the unity of the community and the prioritization of its well-being in order to be effective in achieving change.

BRIMO OFFICIAL, a 20-year-old rapper from Essaouira, spoke about his reasoning for shying away from explicitly political music: “I try to make music that has a voice in the artistic community...All the songs that I write will be about my life and the way of life I live and send messages in a street way to understand the target segment.

Because the problem is not in the state alone, society must change itself for the good in order to be a change in general. Society must reform its ideas Essaouira, BRIMO OFFICIAL's hometown. Source: björn hornemann, licensed under CC BY 2.0 14

Rabat, BRIMO OFFICIAL's hometown. Source: Pline on Wikimedia Commons under CC

and beliefs because it is responsible for his [the King’s] views and actions…” (BRIMO OFFICIAL, personal communication, November 26, 2019).

While BRIMO OFFICIAL acknowledges the King’s positionality in influencing political change, he views individualistic reform and the general healing of the community as an even more powerful mode of activism. Referred to as a more 'bottom-up' approach, the hip hop scene in Morocco currently inspires a community of youth collecting for the purpose of artistically expressing their sentiments and supporting individuals that share the same talents. According to scholar Biswambhar Panda, “The bottom-up approach emphasise community participation, grassroots movements, and local decision making. . . It argues that community participation and grassroots initiatives such as creating sustained community groups. . . youth clubs, and self-help groups, which promote participatory decision making local self-reliance ultimately pay dividends” (2007). As such, some artists in the Moroccan hip hop scene recognize the need of their community to express their genuine musical expression and be surrounded by a network of like-minded, supportive individuals. Furthermore, while more traditional modes of activism often focus solely on the power of the collective and the direct opposition of the government, this ‘grassroots’ approach appreciates the labor of the individual. By offering a sense of agency and responsibility in addressing the care of the community, hip hop artists are able to possess a sense of empowerment in uplifting the voices of individuals and their own lived experiences through musical mediums.

SUMUD Capitalist societies often ignore the validity of the arts as a worthy field of practice and instead prioritize actions that are deemed as useful for economic mobility. Witnessed in American communities’ portrayal of the 'starving artist,' those that joyfully partake in the arts are ridiculed for their predicted lack of success and ineffectiveness to contribute something tangible for society. This portrayal often negates the power of individual expression in inspiring change and unity in community. This categorization of other forms of labor as superior “does not encourage sufficient intellectual or cultural development since it prioritizes materialistic over humanis-

tic pursuits. It may also be knowing that knowing how to promote and publicize their artistic efforts becomes more important to their success or failure than the act of artistic creation itself” (Moore 2006).

Intrinsically, this capitalist mindset values the production of overly politicized rap and hip hop as useful in achieving change or efficiency, while the creation of music for enjoyment is seen as a waste of time, energy, and resources. This model regards the mental health and emotional healing of the community as inconsequential. STORMY, a 21-year-old rapper from Rabat, states “I used to create political music in the beginning but then I realized that music is made to reduce stress and to have fun” (STORMY, personal communication, November 27, 2019).

STORMY’s utilization of visually engaging graphics, fashion design, and dance moves in his music videos are important characteristics of his artistic expression and are all diverse forms of entertainment for his personal well-being. By prioritizing his mental health and creating music intended for the community’s leisure, STORMY is able to engage in political acts. Through the framework of sumud, existing is resisting. In a society that faces ongoing restrictions and censorship of expression, the ability of these hip hop artists to continue producing music that reflects their individuality is powerful in itself. This mode of activism is both nonviolent and allows individuals to prioritize their happiness and well-being in their day to day lives. In discussing the effectiveness of sumud, scholar Mohammad Marie writes, “A new conception of resilience has been taking root, one that is not based on an ascetic denial of frivolity, joy, or entertainment, but rather renders the very pursuit of happiness, a manifestation of resilience and of resistance at the same time” (Marie, Hannigan, & Jones 2017).

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2011 Morrocan protests. Source: Magharebia on Wikimedia Commons under CC.

This renewal of dignity and integration of unique identities in the community that may not have been unified previously due to the government’s control on collective organizing is incredibly powerful for both the individual and the society. Additionally, the adaptability of Moroccan hip hop artists and rappers through their mirrored practice of sumud allows for the production of music regardless of the political climate. In this sense, it is not the King, governmental systems, or the political setting that dictates the emotional well-being of the artists but the artists themselves that reclaim their artistic expressions and capability to feel joy. By creating spaces for emotional and artistic outlets that emphasize appreciation for individual creativity, the youth are practicing the healing and unity needed to engage in communities as fully appreciated, empowered individuals.

Viewing Resistance in a New Light The events of the February 20th Movement and the Arab Spring witnessed the increasing production of politicized hip hop and bipartisan rhetoric. Through the critical discourse initiated by rappers like El Haqed, or the patriotic rap of Fnaire and others, the hip hop and rap scene significantly influenced the political messaging offered to youth and the public at large. Yet while other countries witnessed the downfall of previous leaders during the Arab Spring, the illusion of the permanence of the King was only solidified in the eye of Moroccan society. Although King Mohammed VI did submit to local and international pressure through the implementation of specific reforms in the 2011 constitution, “implementation on the ground has been delayed several times. While some signs point to a greater formal scope for more participative governance, others rather show the persistence of centra-

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lized structures and modes of governance” (Houdret 2019). The lack of accountability in demonstrating the effectiveness of these reforms only encourages a political approach that values slow, democratic change with the King, instead of rapid revolution. Despite critical discourse surrounding the governmental system at large, the King and the Makhzen are still very much in power. As demonstrated in my interviews and research, the shift to a more 'bottom-up' grassroots mode of organizing is perceived as more effective, especially after the remaining support of the King post Arab Spring and February 20, 2011. As hip hop artists and rappers satisfy the needs of their individual desires for expression and healing, they are simultaneously building a support network of other youth interested in changing their communities through addressing their emotional well-being and entertainment.

RECOMMENDATIONS Despite the limited time constraint and capacity of the Independent Study Period, my research clearly indicates the political tension exhibited in dynamics between artists, the King, the Makhzen, and international powers. As artists engage in production of music that satisfies their emotional well-being, despite changes in their society, their capability to share political opinions and engage with the community becomes stronger. I believe that this practice is incredibly powerful, as it allows local networks the agency to determine community-based solutions that benefit them, while still applying these concepts to larger society. The King’s positionality as the supreme royal authority is one that does not allow for a complete overturn in the political and legislative reform desired, and I believe that grassroots organizing among youth is especially effective in achieving their socioeconomic and political demands. A continued analysis of scholarship post 2011 is needed to understand the social implications of hip hop and rap on politics, as well as further diversified interviews with artists from variant backgrounds, ages, genders, geographic locations, religions, races, et cetera. The analysis of artists and their music across the region of Morocco would present a novel, riveting understanding of the intersections of hip hop, rap, and political youth activism.

REFERENCES Almeida, C. M. (2014). “‘Arab Spring’ and Hip Hop ‘Cool.’” In Said Graiouid and Taieb Belghazi (eds), Migration, Human Rights and the Politics of Identity in a Globalized World, Rabat: Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines de Rabat, pp. 223-237.

Almeida, C. M. (2016). “Imagining the Enemy: The Role of Patriotic Rap Songs in Curbing Critical Voices in Morocco.” In Mokhtari (ed), Otherness Unbound: Spaces of Identity in the Postcolonial MENA Region.

Boum, A. (2012). Festivalizing Dissent in Morocco.

Retrieved November 13, 2019, from https:// www.academia.edu/1803569/Festivalizing_ Dissent_in_Morocco.

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From Rapto Revolution:The Intersections ofMoroccan Musicand PoliticalActivism

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Katrina Cassell

THE 1967 SIX-DAY WAR: A WIN FOR ISRAEL AND EGYPTIAN ISLAMISM

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The 1967 war between Israel and the United Arab Republic (now Egypt), Jordan and Syria was defined by the swift, shocking effect it had on Egypt and the world, and became referred to as the Six-Day War. While the war itself may have been short, its impacts were formidable and are still apparent in Egypt today. The 1967 Six-Day War solidified the decline of both Nasserism and Arab nationalism, as well as their replacement with Islamism as the central political ideology. The Islamic explanations credited with the Arab defeat, the devastating impact the war had on demonstrating the failure of Arab nationalism, the heightened religiosity among Jews, Christians, and Arabs in the war’s aftermath, and the war’s role in securing Sadat’s Islamic regime were contributing factors in the lasting effect this war had on the Middle East..

This paper seeks to evaluate the effects of the 1967 War on prevailing ideology in Egypt by examining Nasser’s leadership before the war, the realities of the war itself, and Egypt under Sadat after 1967. First, I will dissect the ideological implications of Nasser’s governing strategy in Egypt before the war. I will analyze the controversial historiography over what caused the war’s initial onset. Then, I will evaluate varying views about the significance of the Six-Day War in taking down the Nasserist regime and Arab nationalist ideology, the demise of which some argue was inevitable prior to the war’s onset. I will discuss the symbolic impact of the war and the implications of widespread Arab belief in the “military-success link.” Lastly, I will scrutinize the long-term impacts of the war, referencing evidence for the decline of Arab nationalism and the rise of Islamism during and after Sadat’s leadership.

In order to understand the impact of the Six-Day war in 1967, it is necessary to first examine the realities of Nasser’s leadership and its ideological implications before the war.

Nasserism represents a legacy of political leadership and guidance, rather than a concrete ideological framework. It is difficult to assert that Nasser’s time as leader of Egypt was altogether defined by singular ideology. He believed in pan-Arabism, and the theoretical notion that Egypt would eventually join a larger Arab entity and cease to be its own state. However “he was obliged by international law and by economic dependency to keep working with the colonially created nation-state he ruled” (Al-Barghouti 191). Nasser was committed to the struggle against the colonial powers of Israel and Britain, but was also a realist, and therefore trapped by the “very structure of Egypt,” which was inherently, “hostage to the will of the Superpowers'' (Al-Barghouti 191). While these views prevented Nasser from definitively embodying the Arab nationalist cause as much as some nationalists would have liked, his leanings were far more nationalist than Islamist. Nasser’s realist views preven-

ted him from seeing political Islam as a feasible governing strategy. The main obstacle preventing Nasser from embracing Islamism was his alliance with the Soviet Union, whose government disapproved strongly of religious governing.

The historian and political scientist Tamim Al-Barghouti explained the conflict in his work on Arab nationalism, The Umma and the Dawla: “As a political religious force it would have directly collided with the Soviet Union; given Nasser’s anti-imperialist programme, the Soviet Union was not an ally to lose.”

(Al-Barghouti 192) Al-Barghouti described Nasser’s political identity as “statist modern Arab nationalist.” (Al-Barghouti 192).

The insignificance granted to Islamism in Nasser’s agenda was reflected in the criticism he received from the Muslim Brotherhood, who argued that Nasser was “too modern and not Islamic enough” (Al-Barghouti 194). However, Nasser was largely a popular leader with the criticism he received coming in response to the 1967 War. The immediate cause of the 1967 War is the subject of significant controversy. Many historians assert Israel’s initial strike was both preemptive and critical to its self-defense.

These historians cite evidence of increased military tensions between Israel and other Arab nations, such as the raids

by Syrian-backed Palestinian groups in early April of 1967 and Nasser having moved Egyptian troops into the highly contested Sinai territory on May 14th, 1967 (Sela 90). According to Israeli historian Avrasham Sela, Nasser initiated the crisis through “rapid escalation to the brink of war and beyond, culminating in a total Arab-Israeli confrontation” (Sela 90). Another Israeli historian Michael Oren credited the war’s initial onset with an atmosphere prone to “a process of unbridled escalation, a chain reaction of dare and counterdare, gamble and miscalculation, all leading inexorably to war” (Oren 32). Other historians have refuted this narrative, arguing that the Israeli decision to strike was neither inadvertent nor the inevitable result of a tense military atmosphere, but rather the result of genuine Israeli interest in creating conflict (Popp 281). Evidence for this perspective is solidified by historical archives that include US communication with Israel in which President Lyndon Johnson made clear to Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol that, based on US intelligence community assessment, a military attack on Israel was not imminent. Johnson went on to warn that “Israel should not make itself the guilty party by starting a war, and that it was inconceivable the Cabinet would take such a fateful decision” (US Department of State). The United States’ vocal position that an attack by the UAR was not imminent and Israel should not preemptively strike refutes the narrative that Israel genuinely believed it was in danger. Furthermore, historian Roland Popp argued that Nasser’s militari-

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zation of the Sinai Peninsula was not an aggressive move as Sela suggested, but rather a return to “the status quo ante 1956,” referencing the norms established before the Arab-Israeli War in 1956 (Popp 305).

The decision by Israeli leadership to strike despite US advice is evidence that the 1967 War was a war of choice. Just as historiography over what caused the Six-Day War is the source of considerable controversy, so are conclusions about whether the war was a singular catalyst or a final straw in the shift towards Arab nationalism’s downfall.

Historians agree that Egypt’s defeat in the Six-Day War represented a significant moment in the shift in dominance from Arab nationalist to Islamist ideology. However, while some historians see 1967 as the certain and consequential factor in the decline of Arab nationalism, others consider it as only one event within a larger historical context of events contributing to the decline of Nasser and Arab nationalism. Historian Fawaz Gerges represents the latter view, asserting that the defeat in 1967 was “all the more damaging insofar as it came at a moment when the Nasserist state was already reeling” (Gerges 293). Gerges criticizes historians who are too quick to identify the war as a singular explanation. The view that Nasserism did not face significant threats before 1967, and that the war was solely responsible for its downfall, ignores many of the existing losses and setbacks to Nasser’s authority. As Gerges puts forth in his critique of interpretations that overemphasize the war’s effect, “specialists too often assume that it was a straightforward tipping point, swiftly bringing about the end of Arab nationalism or pan-Arab nationalism as espoused by Nasser” (Gerges 284). Historians who share Gerges’ assessment put forth that the Nasserist state was already dealing with a formidable set of challenges and losses by the time they entered war with Israel. Among the losses included the unsuccessful attempt to unite with Syria and the destructive actions of the Nasserist military in Yemen. The Syrian secession from the UAR in 1961 was considered a major failure for both Nasser and the Arab nationalist movement. The short-lived union between Egypt and Syria was a reflection of the nationalist desire for an Arab empire and its fall was a reflection of that movement’s decline. American Secretary of State Robert Mcnamara wrote that, “with the exception of the Six Day War, the fall of the UAR was undoubtedly the greatest political setback of Nasser’s political career” (Mcnamara 165). Mcnamara also suggested that Nasser’s failure to achieve long term unity with Syria was a key reason for his intervention with Yemen, which was a similarly unsuccessful foreign policy decision. In Yemen, Nasser “lost more than 10,000 men, squandered billions of dollars, and painted himself into a diplomatic corner from which the only way out was through war with Israel” over the course of a five-year war between 1962 and 1967 (Ferris). Nasser’s attempt in Yemen to promote the revolutionary cause of a greater pan-Arab identity was widely considered a failure by the time of the Six-Day War in June of 1967, the bankruptcy from which later required him to pull out of Yemen. Yemen was a failure not only for Nasser, but also for the broader pan-Arab nationalist movement which had incited the conflict with King Saud of Saudi Arabia in the first place. Egypt was also experiencing significant social fragmentation, and skepticism related to Nasser’s commitment to the pan-Arab cause had provoked prominent divisions within the nationalist movement. Other historians argue that the 1967 War was, in fact, the “central concern” and defining loss for Nasser and Arab nationalism. Israel represented everything Arab nationalists were fighting against, making conflict between Israel and Palestine all the more important. The historian Adeed Dawisha explained that, “the radicals of the 1950s, mainly young modernizing national military officers who embodied the aspirations of the Arab nationalist generation, miserably failed to deliver on that most central of Arab nationalist concerns, the Palestine issue” (Dawisha 12).

Gamal Abdel Nasser in Mansoura, 1960 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nasser_in_Mansoura,_1960.jpg

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While the practical implications of the 1967 War were severe, the defeat was as impactful symbolically as it was physically. It was “widely regarded as being not only a military setback but a kind of moral judgement” from God, invalidating the Arab belief in their nationalist destiny (Hourani 442). Having received inflated descriptions of their military strength from politicians and leaders, many Arab citizens had only ever considered they would emerge victorious, making the UAR’s swift and total defeat all the more destabilizing. Tawfiq al-Hakim, a prominent Egyptian writer, explained that for years, “the regime emphasized the army’s prowess and showed us, whenever there was a revolutionary celebration, military parades which included the newest models of tanks” (Hakim 40). The shocking, traumatic reversal in Egyptians’ perceptions of the strength of their country provoked societal depression and a deep loss of confidence in Arab culture, government, and order. Nizar Qabbani, a pan-Arab nationalist poet who had once supported Nasser conveyed the agony felt by Egyptians in 1967 when he wrote, “The old word is dead. / The old books are dead. / Our speech with holes like worn-out shoes is dead. / Dead is the mind that led to defeat” (Qabbani). In winning the Six-Day War, the Israelis dealt a devastating blow not just to Nasser and his military but to the ideology he espoused, that of Arab nationalism. The state’s endorsement and espousal of Arab nationalism meant that in the 1950s and 1960s, when Nasser as a leader and Egypt as a state were thriving, so was the ideology. However, conversely, as stated by foreign policy expert Shadi Hamid, “when Nasser, and by extension Egypt, lost, there was relatively little left to say.

The starting premise of Arab nationalism had been fatally undermined, 15 years after the 1952 revolution” (Hamid).

Similar sentiment is reflected in the words of Al Shobaky, a former member of the Egyptian parliament who said that “before the 1967 war, we were looking at an entire political model, an entire ideology based on socialism. It wasn’t just Egypt, a country that lost the war, but the political ideas upon which the country was based” (Al Jazeera).

Military success among Arabs had long been tied to the belief in God’s support, so the defeat in 1967 demonstrated superior godliness on the part of the Israelis. Islamist writer Muhammad Galal Kishk argued that this religious fervor led to the Israelis winning and the Arabs losing. Fouad Ajami, a scholar of Middle Eastern history, wrote of Kishk’s account of the war that “there is grudging admiration for the clarity with which the Israelis saw the war, for the fact that young Israeli soldiers prayed behind their rabbis at the Wailing Wall after their capture of Jerusalem” (Ajami 64).

Israel did not actually have an especially religious society in 1967, but Kishk’s observation is nevertheless signifi-

cant. According to the scholar Shadi Hamid, the defeat was particularly shocking because unlike Christian and Jewish writings and history, in which hardship and loss are recognized as demonstrative of God’s love and related testing of his people, Islamic thought only considered military defeat a sign of disappearing righteousness. The “religiosity-success link” was clear: the Arabs had lost because of a lack of religion, and the answer was more of it (Hamid). As Salah al-Din al-Munajid explained in “The Pillars of the Disaster,” the Arabs had lost the war because they “forfeited their faith in God, so He gave up on them” (al Munajid 17).

This is not to say that the Islamist explanation was the only one presented following the Arabs’ defeat. Liberals and secularists asserted that the Arabs had lost because of backwardness and a lack of modernization, democratization, and Westernization. Socialists directly opposed the Islamist explanation, citing the compromise of true Arab socialism in the name of Islamism as the reason the Israelis had won (Haddad 267). Additionally, the Nasserist state was extremely hostile to those Islamists who connected the military defeat to religious reasons. However, despite the state’s hostility and existence of other explanations, evidence suggests that the Islamist argument prevailed, if not with the immediate defeat than in the events thereafter. Historian Yvonne Haddad cites the historical aftermath of the war as solidifying Islamic ideology and the notion that Arab nationalism had failed: “The failure of the international order to bring about what Arabs considered a just solution to the conflict, the

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Hussein Al Shafei https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hussein_Al_Shafei.JPG

strengthening of Israel at the expense of the Arab states, the dynamics of the Cold War, and the increasing perception that Israel was a state based on religious identification enhanced the role of those who called for empowerment through Islam” (Haddad 267).

When the ideology of Arab nationalism died in the 1967 War, so did Nasser’s ability to win over the Egyptian people with nationalist rhetoric. Nasser’s own change in behavior reflected the first signal of Islamism’s heightened sway.

In 1969 he joined the Organization of Islamic Conference, which was essentially the “Islamic Pact” he had previously expressed harsh opposition to. This demonstrated Nasser’s recognition of his need to obtain support from other Islamic countries (Haddad 268). There is no evidence that Nasser was genuinely interested in Islamic governing, and so the “religious maneuvering” that he employed after 1967 is a reflection of the Islamic shift in what the public was interested in seeing from their political leaders (Ghalyoun 198).

Another example of this tactic--using religiosity to garner public support--is Nasser’s institution of imams (interpreters of Islamic texts) to units in the military, and his nationalization of the ulama, religious scholars who decipher and explain Islamic doctrine and law. The shift in Nasser’s political strategy during his final years in power illustrates the rise of Islamism and decline of Arab nationalism, beginning in 1967, before Nasser’s death and Sadat’s regime.

The Israeli’s win in 1967 greatly intensified religious fervor among American Jews, Israeli Jews, and Christian fundamentalists. This also resulted in an Islamic response of similarly intensified religiosity. Jewish extremist groups like the Gush Emunim, committed to establishing settlements in the West Bank, Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip, grew in popularity. A far-right American organization called the

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Jewish Defense Fund was founded in 1968, whose founder, Rabbi Meir Kahane, asserted that the gentiles (non-Jews) of Palestine were a cancer that needed to be surgically removed (Haddad 272). Among Christian fundamentalists, the 1967 War was seen as a defining victory, and in 1979 the American Moral Majority group was founded to further a conservative religious agenda that included Zionist interests. Christian Fundamentalist groups like the Temple Mount Foundation propagated messages about destroying the al-Aqsa mosque-known as the third holiest site in Islam-so that a Jewish temple could be built in its place and the second coming of Christ could take place. In 1969, an Australian fundamentalist Christian set fire to the al-Aqsa Mosque. All of these advancements hardened perceptions among Arabs that Jews and Christians sought to destroy Islam and Islamic holy places (Haddad 272). Islamists responded to the extremism of Jews and Christians with the Islamic awakening- a movement committed to “Islamize modernity rather than modernize Islam” (Haddad 273). These new Islamic revivalists saw the 1967 War and demonstrations of hostility towards Islam that followed as a test from God, imploring the Arab nation and Muslim people to return to the “true path.” This view was vocalized when, in reaction to the Christian fundamentalist’s attempt to burn down the al-Aqsa, the Egyptian vice president Hussein al-Shafi’I said, “He wanted to afflict us, to help us see the reality of our situation… He taught us with this severe test that we may reform our doctrines, that He may reform our lives and our future” (al-Shafi’I 26).

In 1970 Nasser died of a heart attack and his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, “made a fundamental decision to wrap himself with religious garb and shed the Nasserist legacy” (Gerges 314). Sadat became gradually more public about his disapproval of his predecessor’s leadership, and this played a role in shifting public opinion towards approval of political Islam. Sadat built key alliances with Islamist leaders that Nasser had isolated in order to broaden his influence and power. Millions of Egyptians and Arabs returned to Egypt from having gained massive wealth in the Saudi oil industry.

They returned “not only with money and consumer habits but also with ultraconservative religious values” (Gerges 315). This new partnership between Egypt and Saudi Arabia was critical in shifting the ideological landscape and religiosity of Egypt, as were Sadat’s own efforts to purge Egyptian society of Nasserist and nationalist ideology. Sadat came to power as a member of the Free Officers, a group that ousted the monarchy by kicking out and often jailing the political figures who had supported the Nasserist state and replacing them with their own (Gerges 315). Nasser’s chief of staff, Sami Sharaf, who served time in prison as a result of

Sadat’s purging of Nasserist influence, said in an interview that Sadat’s actions toward remnants of the Nasserist legacy were borne out of irrationality: “We had underestimated Sadat’s blind ambition and length to which he would go to rid Egypt of the Nasserist inheritance. He was willing to go to bed with the devil [the Islamists] to do so” (Gerges 316).

Sadat also reoriented the country’s economy in Islamist terms, adopting an “open door” policy geared toward making Egypt more consumer-oriented and catering to the interests of business men who were capitalists and Islamists, or “men of money and religion” (Gerges 318). The state began to encourage and sponsor Islamic activities like Islamic summer camps and pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia, as Sadat began to gradually talk less about an “Arab nation” and more negatively about Nasser (Rabi 81). Sadat released hundreds of Ikhwan prisoners, giving the Islamist movement a “new lease on life” (Hana). The Ikhwan, now freed and given the ability to organize, began to dominate social clubs, trade unions, and NGOs (Gerges 322). In 1971, Article 2 of Egypt’s constitution solidified the ideological shift that the Sadat regime had instituted when it read that “the principles of Shari’a are the main source of legislation” (Egyptian Constitution, 1971). Article 2 has prevailed over forty years and has endured numerous attempts by secular activists to remove it, evidence of the lasting impact of Sadat’s Islamist legacy on Egyptian politics and society.

The 1967 Six-Day War forever changed Egypt’s political landscape. It represented the beginning of the end for Nasser, once a widely popular and acclaimed leader.

The war’s outcome also indicated the death of pan-Arab Nationalism, due to the widely held belief that the ideology’s exclusion of religiosity caused the military downfall.

Most importantly, 1967 marked the birth of Islamism as the presiding political ideology. Its impacts remain as relevant today as they were during the war’s immediate aftermath.

Israel continues to occupy the West Bank and Gaza Strip while many Palestinians in these areas stayed, becoming a growing Arab minority within Israel. Some analysts credit the 1967 War as having caused the birth of international terrorism, as both sides became more extreme. The 1967 War also had a significant impact on Saudi Arabia, as its relationship with the US became more conflictual because of its leadership in pressing for Palestinian rights. Saudi Arabia cut oil exports to the U.K. and the US during the Six-Day War, and this became a precursor for the infamous 1973 oil embargo (Riedel). Perhaps most influential was the 1967 War’s impact in ending Egypt’s leadership within the region and dealing a blow to the Arab political system, from which the Arab world would never fully recuperate.

REFERENCES Al-Shafi'i, Hussein. Al-Tariq ila al-Masjid al-Aqsa (Cairo Kitab al-Jumhuriyya al-Dini, 1972), p. 26.

“77. Memorandum of Conversation.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 26 May 1967, history. state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d77.

Ajami, Fouad. Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought & Practice since 1967. Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Al Jazeera. “1967 And the Rise of Extremism.” Egypt News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 13 July 2009.

“Arab Nationalism.” The Umma and the Dawla: the Nation State and the Arab Middle East, by Tamim Al-Barghouti, Pluto Press, 2008, pp. 150–199.

“The Collapse of Summitry and the Road to War.” The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order, by Avraham Sela, State University of New York Press, 1998, pp. 75–100.

Byman, Daniel L. “The 1967 War and the Birth of International Terrorism.” Brookings, 31 May 2017.

The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1971.

Dawisha, A. I. The Arab Radicals. Council on Foreign Relations, 1986.

Ferris, Jesse. “Egypt's Vietnam.” Foreign Policy, 3 Apr. 2015, foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/03/egypts-vietnam-yemen-nasser-sisi/.

Gerges, Fawaz A. Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash That Shaped the Middle East. Princeton University Press, 2019.

Ghalyoun, Ightiyal al-‘Aql Mihnat al-Thaqafat al-‘Arabiyya Bayna al-Salayyat wa al-Taba’iyya (Cairo: Maktabat Madbouli, 1990) .

Haddad, Yvonne. “Islamists and the 'Problem of Israel': The 1967 Awakening.” Middle East Journal, vol. 46, 1992, pp. 266–285.

Hamid, Shadi. “The End of Nasserism: How the 1967 War Opened New Space for Islamism in the Arab World.”

Brookings, 4 June 2017.

Hana, Al-Din wa-l-thawra misr, 1952–1981: Al-usuliyya al-islamiyya [Reli- gion and the revolution in Egypt, 1952–1981: Islamic fundamentalism] (Cairo: Mak- tabat Madbouli, 1989), pp. 62–68.

Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. Faber and Faber, 2013.

Makovsky, David. “Consequences of the 1967 War.” Consequences of the 1967 War - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004.

McNamara, Robert. Britain, Nasser & the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952-1967. Routledge, 2015.

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Kelsey Clarke

CHINA’S BRI: A WIN-WIN ECONOMIC POLICY OR A BID AT WORLD HEGEMONY?

Morocco's capital, Rabat. Source: Visions of Domino on Wikimedia Commons under CC 24

INTRODUCTION Announced by China’s President Xi Jinping in 2013 as an undertaking that will create “mutually beneficial economic cooperation,” the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an expansive China-led investment program which aims to consolidate economic ties and improve regional connectivity between 65 countries and 4.4 billion people. This re-imagining of the Silk Road aims to create a web of infrastructure, such as roads, ports, railways, and pipelines that will improve economic interconnectivity and facilitate development. Xi has committed almost $1 trillion towards the initiative, and has stated that he will invest a cumulative total of $4 trillion. In order to grasp the financial magnitude of this undertaking, it should be considered that the US’s Marshall Plan in World War II only spent an inflation-adjusted $130 billion.

China has created various financial vehicles to help fund this immense operation. In 2016, it created its own multilateral development bank known as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As of 2018, the AIIB boasted 86 members, including some of the US’s closest allies such as Canada, the UK, Israel, and South Korea. However, despite these apparent multilateral efforts, the majority of funding to date has come from China’s state-owned investment banks such as the China Development Bank which announced it would invest $890 billion dollars in over 900 projects.

To what extent is the BRI a win-win policy of investment and trade cooperation? There are two main perspectives regarding the utility of the BRI as an economic policy to bring prosperity and development to Asia, Africa, and Latin America - liberals who embrace its potential and realists who do not. The realist perspective frames China’s intentions for the BRI as being a multifaceted strategy intended to increase China’s geopolitical influence and protect its national interests at the expense of other nations.

On the other hand, while liberals concede that China does have self-interested motivations in undertaking the initiative, they believe China’s intentions are primarily economically motivated and that the initiative displays great potential for all countries to mutually benefit. This research paper will evaluate both perspectives to demonstrate that the BRI is indeed a realist policy intended to utilize China’s economic power and increase the nation’s geopolitical influence and protect its national security interests.

LITERATURE REVIEW Literature on this topic can be categorized into three broad groups: the debate between realist and liberal paradigms in the field of international relations, peer-reviewed research on the BRI, and public statements regarding the

BRI published by the PRC. A. Defining Realism and Liberalism Realism views the world as an anarchic system in which rational and self-interested actors vie for power in a zero-sum game. It depicts international affairs as an endless struggle for power between states and believes that all states are primarily interested in keeping, increasing, or demonstrating power. Stephen Walt asserts that the system naturally produces an “enduring propensity for conflict between states” due to the prioritization of survival and growth. This emphasizes the importance of relative gains over absolute gains, stressing that asymmetric gains are important because states are ultimately concerned about the balance of power and their position in the international order. Realism can be divided into two principal tenets. Offensive realists, such as John Mearsheimer, believe that great powers are in constant competition to maximize power and attain hegemony. Defensive realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, agree that the anarchic system produces a power struggle between states, but argues that states seek primarily to “maintain their position in the system” because security concerns triumph over power-seeking tendencies. In order to argue that China’s BRI fits a realist agenda, the BRI must demonstrate that its primary intentions fall under the tenets of defensive or offensive realism.

In regards to offensive realism, China’s current actions and attitude towards the BRI must show that the initiative's primary intent is to increase China’s geopolitical influence and aid China in attaining regional hegemony. In regards to defensive realism, the BRI must demonstrate that it is intended to protect China’s national security interests. This essay will ultimately argue that the BRI is a fusion of both defensive and offensive realist intentions.

While realists believe in a zero-sum game, liberals de-emphasize the importance of relative power, and believe there can be variable-sum solutions and absolute gains that lead to better outcomes for everyone. While liberalism consists of several interrelated concepts, two primary aspects of the liberal paradigm that will be focused on that best relate to the BRI are interdependence and the role of international institutions. Firstly, liberal institutionalists such as Joseph Nye and Robert O. Keohane assert that interdependence through increased economic relations can ensure that states cooperate to reach results that maximize the interests of both parties. Furthermore, while realism believes that states will always seek to further and maximize their national interests, liberalism highlights the role of international institutions in influencing state behavior by regulating transnational and interstate relations. In order to prove that the BRI falls under a liberal paradigm, China must demonstrate a commitment to engage inter-

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national institutions and promote a win-win environment of economic cooperation and connectivity.

Furthermore, the BRI must not hold a revisionist agenda in which China seeks to improve its relative power position in the international system at the expense of other nations.

B. China’s Motivations for BRI through a Liberal Paradigm Liberal scholars, such as M. Taylor Fravel, concede that China does have self-interested desires, but argue that China’s motivation to promote a win-win initiative stems from the interdependency that binds China to the interests of its regional community. Consequently, they believe that economic development in Asia would invariably also lead to increased prosperity for China. Furthermore, liberal institutionalists such as John Ikenberry and Thomas Moore acknowledge China’s commitment towards utilizing global institutions and argue that regional institutions will ensure that China’s motivations develop within the framework of the region’s interests and norms. Thomas Moore points to the creation of the AIIB as proof that China has demonstrated a commitment to engage international governmental organizations and seeks to cooperate within the current norms of the international system to promote cooperation and multilateral growth. He asserts that, “China’s pursuit of institutionalized cooperation signifies a growing commitment to a rules-based, norm-driven international order.”

C. China’s Motivations for BRI through a Realist Paradigm A majority of contemporary realist literature does not engage deeply with the concrete methods and tactics that China is currently employing to aid its goal of regional hegemony. Rather, the primary focus is often discussing the issues and implications that China’s inevitable rise poses on US hegemony and the current international system. As proclaimed by the great historian Thucydides, “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.” In his book, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap?, Graham Allison examines the implications for the changing international order through the notion of the “Thucydides Trap,” and attempts to both predict and discuss how to mitigate the likely outcome of China’s imminent rise. As Allison asserts, “This is not a book about China. It is about the impact of a rising China on the US and the global order.” While Allison’s primary focus is whether China’s imminent rise will eventually lead to an inevitable war with the US, he does encapsulate the key realist arguments regarding China’s current foreign policy. Allison argues that China seeks to recover “its historic sphere of influence along its borders and adjacent seas,” command “the respect of great powers in the councils of the world,” and undermine US hegemony.

Similar to Allison’s Destined for War, Anja Manuel’s This Brave New World: India, China, and the United States, and Jeff Smith’s Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century primarily discuss the relations between China, India in regards to China’s impending rise and how the US can extend their leadership by incorporating China and India into the current international system. This research paper differs from a majority of realist BRI literature in that instead of discussing the implications of a changing international order, it seeks to analyze how China’s use of the BRI is aiding their rise, undermining US hegemony, and advancing their revisionist agenda.

D. The Chinese Perspective Xi, in conjunction with the PRC, has released official documents, travelled to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, and held international forums to discuss and outline China’s intentions and desires for the BRI. All official publications and announcements regarding the BRI issued by Beijing reiterate that the BRI is a win-win system of mutual economic benefit. The principal document released by the PRC in regards to the BRI is the “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.”

Released by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in March 2015, it outlines the principles, framework, priorities, and cooperation mechanisms that China has for the BRI. President Xi Jinping. Source: Palácio do Planalto on Wikimedia Commons under CC 26

Southern Xinjiang railway. Source: Quatro Valvole on Wikimedia Commons under CC.

The document goes to great lengths to champion the “Silk Road Spirit” which is defined as being “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit.” It also stresses that Beijing merely seeks to reform the current international system, and does not intend to challenge it. Similar to the rhetoric of mutuality and prosperity that the document proclaims, Xi’s speech at the Kazakhstan Nazarbayev University that introduced the initiative to the world promised that China would never “intervene in internal affairs of Central Asian countries, seek leadership in regional affairs, or operate a sphere of influence.”

CHINA’S OBJECTIVES FOR THE BRI Since the BRI’s inception in 2013, Xi has gone to great lengths to emphasize the cooperative nature of the initiative by framing it as a win-win economic policy that represents a “new future for Asia.” Yet, behind the rhetoric of cooperation and inclusiveness, it is evident that China did not commit $4 trillion of its foreign reserves towards an initiative solely intended to “help friends from around the world seize opportunities.” Before discussing how China’s intentions behind the BRI are primarily geopolitical in nature, it is also important to acknowledge that the BRI does have various economic interests.

Firstly, Minxin Pei believes that the BRI represents a pragmatic economic investment for China’s $4 trillion in foreign currency reserves. Instead of investing even more of the nation’s reserves into US treasury bonds, which yielded a mere 2% return value, infrastructure investment represented a potentially high-returning alternative. Pei contends that, “it seemed a brilliant idea to use some of the foreign exchanges to invest in infrastructure.” Furthermore, he believes that China’s technological know-how and domestic conditions added to the appeal of the initiative. Having built more infrastructure than any other country, China has enormous technological capabilities and a competitive advantage in building infrastructure such as telecommunications, railways, and ports. Moreover, as China’s internal demand for infrastructure declined, the initiative also represented a solution to the overcapacity of China’s steel, cement and construction industries. In this regard, the BRI aids Chinese industry by starting new projects abroad to stoke China’s own cooling domestic economy.

Another motivation behind China’s BRI is that it operates in conjunction with Beijing’s Western Development Strategy, a domestic policy intended to promote economic growth in China’s underdeveloped western regions and provinces. By building infrastructure that would essentially lead back to China, the BRI was an opportunity to create

economic corridors between underdeveloped regions such as Xinjiang and the rest of the world, thereby stimulating development and reviving the sluggish economy of China’s western regions. Finally, with China’s demand for resources such as oil expected to increase by 60% in the next 15 years, building economic corridors through the Indian Ocean Region (IOG) and investing heavily in OPEC nations through the initiative can also be seen as a direct response to China’s increasing need for natural resources. As Pei summarized, “China will not build infrastructure without thinking about what this infrastructure will do for China.”

ANALYSIS The key disagreement between the liberal and realist argument is whether China is seeking to establish a regional hegemony or whether it primarily desires economic gains through the BRI. This section will investigate and analyze China’s overall attitude and approach towards the initiative, where it is currently investing, and the success of current investment projects. While economic gains are desired, they are sought within the broader intent of aiding China’s political aims as China’s unparalleled financial largesse is its chief means of expanding its geopolitical influence.

A. Diplomatic Alliances Firstly, China uses the BRI to create new diplomatic alliances, thereby undermining US dominance in the region and beyond. Andrew Small, author of The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, argues that China has a “genius for befriending those in need of options” even if it means “bad credit risks.” China is the largest investor in Zimbabwe, Niger, Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Myanmar - countries unable to secure IMF or World Bank loans because they are authoritarian governments or have poor track records with corruption and human rights violations. Furthermore, Chinese banks have signed more than $40 billion worth of deals with Iran, Venezuela, and

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President Yuweri Museveni of Uganda. Source: Russell Watkins/Department for International Development on Wikimedia Commons under CC

North Korea. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni asserted that Chinese investments are so attractive to questionable regimes because, “The Chinese don’t ask too many questions, and they come with a sense of solidarity.” Many Western scholars argue that China is taking on real financial risks by lending and investing huge sums of money to unstable political regimes where the West is “reluctant to tread.” China’s propensity towards precarious investments highlights that Xi’s intentions with the BRI lies more in building diplomatic alliances more than in creating a sustainable investment strategy. It could even be argued, to use Randall Schweller’s description of states in the international system, that China is a wolf seeking to befriend jackals to bandwagon with its revisionist agenda. Clionadh Raleigh argues in his report Chinese Aid and Africa’s Pariah States that China has been able to induce recipient nations to align with Chinese interests in the UNSC and WTO in return for its “non-interference policy” that does not call for anti-corruption measures or democracy promotion. In the UNSC, China has defeated Taiwan’s fourteen attempts to re-enter the UN due to support from its African trading partners.

Thus, China’s willingness to lend to pariah nations that the West refuses to invest in for political reasons enables Beijing to create diplomatic alliances, thereby improving China’s relative power position in the anarchic international system.

B. Carrot Diplomacy Another way to analyze the BRI’s intention to facilitate and aid China’s political interests is by considering China’s ability to engage in “carrot diplomacy.” Akin to the idiom “carrot and stick,” carrot diplomacy in this case refers to China’s use of the BRI as a means to secure political gains

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through indirect economic bribery. The South China Sea issue offers a good example of how the BRI has aided China’s political agenda. Despite strong opposition from Beijing, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) issued a ruling against China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and in favor of US-backed Philippines in July 2016. However, the US’s Asian and European allies with close economic ties with China refused to endorse the PCA ruling. In Europe, Greece, and Budapest blocked an EU statement criticizing China. In Asia, ASEAN also failed to issue a statement acknowledging the PCA as the countries were deeply divided.

While Laos and Cambodia opposed the ruling, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Singapore maintained a neutral position. Even more interesting is how BRI loans have successfully managed to aid China in easing tensions with the Philippines themselves in regards to the dispute. In response to Chinese loans and investments, the Philippines has drastically shifted its foreign policy stance from one of uncompromising resolve to one that is open to negotiation and reconciliation. Furthermore, President Duterte decided to suspend the PCA ruling and has even gone as far to claim that the Philippines has separated from the USA and adopted its own independent foreign policy. Anja Manuel encapsulates the situation perfectly when he asserts that the loans and investments given through the BRI will invariably lead to increased political power and influence for China as, “many developing countries feel grateful and beholden to China for its generosity and thus are more likely to side with China in international disputes.” Considering the favorable political outcomes that China is currently experiencing due to support from their economic alliances, there is good reason to believe that China fully intends this to be the case.

C. Soft Power The BRI can also be seen as a soft power strategy intended to foster China’s legitimacy as a rising power. Unlike sharp power or hard power which uses manipulative diplomatic policies such as threats, coercion, and exploitation, soft power is the use of international prestige to attract other political actors towards supporting a nation’s interests. Joseph Nye believes that the BRI is just one example of the PRC’s recent attempts to develop top-down strategies to cultivate a positive international image of China. He asserts that, “China realizes that it isn’t enough to have economic and military power, it’s more effective if you combine that with soft power.” In this case, flaunting its economic might through granting ludicrous? amounts of aid and investments is the primary method that China seeks to promote

its soft power. As evidenced through the official BRI document that proclaims China’s intention to fulfill its “responsibilities and obligations” towards the international community and make “greater contributions to the peace and development of mankind,” President Xi hopes the initiative will increase China’s international prestige as a benevolent and responsible power. Not only does the BRI aid in fostering China’s global image, but it also helps to persuade other nations to accept and acknowledge its rising power status. Thus, as Xi acknowledged at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs in November 2014, China intends to use the BRI to “increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s message to the world.”

D. Economic Exploitation Despite the evident geopolitical ambitions of the BRI, even the economic nature of the initiative itself can also be explained through a realist paradigm. Jonathan Holslag argues that hegemony is a cost-effective alternative to standard imperialism as “hegemonic powers champion economic openness and make major contributions to the development of common goods because they expect that their superior economy will allow them to accumulate wealth faster than others.” While it may appear that the BRI fosters mutual economic development, China is primarily concerned with ensuring this development remains asymmetric at best and exploitative at worst. This imbalance allows them to increase their relative power position and foster asymmetric economic interdependence. Such asymmetry is desired as it enables China to translate its economic power into political power. Firstly, China’s BRI partners are countries that are significantly weaker economically. For example, as countries such as Zimbabwe and North Korea receive a minimal amount of foreign investment, even a negligible investment allows China to become a dominant partner in these countries. The following graph illustrates the imbalance between China’s GDP and the GDP of eighteen BRI countries.

This economic imbalance also can be seen by comparing foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. In 2017, China’s outward FDI amounted to $111 billion, whereas inward FDI flows were less than $40 billion. Not only is it unsettling in itself that this asymmetric relationship creates the potential for economic dependency, China’s current actions demonstrate that it fully intends to act on these asymmetric economic relationships to increase its geopolitical influence in the region.

Firstly, Chinese investment loans entail

hidden conditionalities that render recipient nations dependent on the Chinese economy. For example, Ecuador’s deal with China required that Ecuador had to use Chinese labor and resources. It is estimated that 70% of BRI projects are directly connected to Chinese firms. Furthermore, the threat of investment withdrawal due to economic dependency increases China’s potential for political leverage and influence. This can be seen when China halted energy development funds in Indonesia due to Indonesia’s refusal to purchase Chinese aircraft, or when China demanded that Sri Lanka share intelligence about all traffic that went through the Hambantota Port in return for their investment. Graham Allison argues that China is ready to use the “carrots and sticks of its economic power” - bribing, sanctioning and threatening as needed until nations “fall into line.” Thus, the BRI fosters asymmetric economic interdependence, thereby allowing China to translate its economic power into political power by leveraging its economic influence for political concessions.

Forging asymmetric relationships and fostering economic dependency is not the only way that China has used its BRI to wield political influence. A nation’s failure to return Chinese loans has also created potential for political leverage. This can be seen when Beijing seized a 99-year lease on a Sri Lankan port in exchange for granting Sri Lanka debt relief. Critics of China’s BRI go as far as to argue that Xi is following a policy of “debt trap diplomacy” by deliberately loaning countries more money than they can repay in hope that these debts will eventually be traded for equity. In Ecuador, to repay the $19 billion debt to China, the government has given up 80% of its petroleum exports to China. While liberals such as Michael Swaine have argued that China should not be responsible for a country’s failure to successfully propel its FDI and investments towards sustainable development, a common trend of these investment projects is that they are developed largely with China’s self-interests in mind and often at the expense of borrower coun-

China in red, members of the AIIB in orange, and the 6 proposed corridors. Source: Lommes on Wikimedia Commons under CC

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tries. Furthermore, the government officials overseeing the approval of such projects are often embroiled in corruption and bribery scandals afterwards. As a result, successful debt repayment is unlikely as these projects were not sustainable or wise investments for the BRI countries to begin with. For example, many Western economists argue that Myanmar’s Kyaukphyu Port is economically impractical as it is a significant distance away from the country’s commercial capital, Yangon. In this case, the investment seems to solely benefit China as it grants them a port in a strategic location for their Western provinces.

Moreover, China’s BRI will not create the economic interdependency and adherence towards global institutions that liberal scholars envisage as China’s multilateral organizations do not foster genuine checks-and-balances that can impede and counterbalance Chinese attempts at economic exploitation.

Despite China’s creation of the AIIB, which liberals institutionalists contend demonstrates a commitment towards international norms and global institutions, China still controls 26% of the votes. This significant percentage in voting power allows China to maintain control over the selection of projects and dictate the use of funds, thereby suggesting that the AIIB is merely a tool for China to exert its economic dominance under the guise of “a liberal order.” Thus, while liberal institutionalists such as Robert O. Keohane believe that institutions can shape state behavior by imposing binding constraints on their actions, this does not seem to be the case for China’s AIIB. Another flaw in the liberal argument is that it is generally assumed that any proof of economic gains made by BRI countries through Chinese investments and loans indicate that the initiative is a win-win policy of economic connectivity and cooperation. In this case, the mere existence of short-term economic gains made by borrower countries does little to prove that the BRI is not intended in the long-term to propel the region towards a Sinocentric order where all roads literally lead back to China. David Vines asserts that, “The BRI might conceivably become no more than a gigantic instrument of supply-chain management for China, creating the kind of jobs that drive an enormous Chinese production machine.”

It can be conceded that BRI investments do sometimes result in building sustainable critical infrastructure, strengthening the economy of the BRI country, and improving economic connectivity. However, China’s primary intent is rooted in their desire to generate a new thriving market for their industry as well as build infrastructure that will eventually facilitate this imbalanced trade. In doing so, China hopes to flood foreign markets with cheap goods and allow Chinese firms to begin offshoring their manufacturing at relatively low costs. In the long run, this will be detrimental for the economies of BRI countries as local industry cannot compete with cheap Chinese exports. Furthermore, it breeds economic dependency, as Chinese goods will increasingly comprise a significant percentage of a nation’s imports.

Graham Allison argues that nations that have become dependent on China’s supply of imports or on China as the dominant market for their exports are “particularly vulnerable” because when disagreements arise, China simply delays the nation’s imports and halts their exports. For example, China halted its rare metal exports to Japan to coerce Japan into returning several Chinese fishermen that had been detained. It also abruptly ceased purchasing salmon from Norway to express dissatisfaction for the Nobel Peace Prize’s selection of Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. China once even deliberately prolonged the inspection of banana exports from the Philippines, resulting in the fruit rotting on the docks, to “punish” the Filipino government for the dispute over the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. It should be re-emphasized at this point that the economic power gained by ensuring asymmetric economic gains, creating a trade imbalance, and securing a stable demand for Chinese goods is geopolitically crucial because economic clout is the primary way that China has been able to expand its influence and foster its global image as a rising hegemon thus far. Consequently, China is primarily concerned with Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. Source: Dinesh De Alwis on Wikimedia Commons, licensed under CC BY 4.0 30

Strait of Malacca. Source: Dronepicr on Wikimedia Commons under CC 2.0

the economic potential of the BRI insofar as it aids Xi’s political agenda.

E. Malacca Dilemma In all previous sections, it has been demonstrated that China’s actions within the BRI can be explained through the offensive realist paradigm that a state desires to maximize power, increase its geopolitical influence, and attain hegemony. However, China’s BRI can also be seen as a direct response towards aggressive US foreign policy in the region. In this case, China’s motivations for the BRI can be explained through the defensive realist paradigm that a state desires to protect its national security and maintain its position in the system.

One motivation of the BRI beyond expanding China’s geopolitical influence is to protect its security interests in the Malacca Strait. The Strait of Malacca is one of the most vital sea routes in the world with more than 30% of the world’s seaborne trade passing through it. China is reliant on this narrow 500 mile long stretch of water as over 80% of Beijing’s oil and other natural resources currently pass through the Malacca Strait. The “Malacca Dilemma” refers to China’s overdependence on the Malacca Straits, leading to the security dilemma that whoever controls the straits also indirectly wields power over China’s energy import market. In particular, a legitimate concern for China would be that the US and its allies could blockade the strait if relations become hostile. A desire to diversify its energy routes to ensure long-term energy security can be seen through the projects that China has been investing in through the BRI. Recognizing the need to create and maintain access to maritime hubs around the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), China has financed maritime ports in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. In the instance of the Hambantota Port, state-owned Chinese banks loaned Sri Lanka more than 95% of the costs, thereby gaining operating rights to four berths. In Myanmar, China gained the rights to run the port for half a century in return for its investment. Additionally, many of these ports are connected directly back to China with Chinese-built roads and railway systems. China’s primary motivation in building these new corridors is geopolitical rather than economic as research has proven that maritime trade through the Strait of Malacca is a much more cost-effective and efficient system for transporting crude oil than new and unfamiliar alternatives. For example, it is estimated that the shipping costs for transporting one barrel of oil in a 2 million barrel cargo through the Strait of Malacca to Shanghai costs US$0.90. Alternatively, transporting crude oil through the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor, which entails a sea route from Ras al-Tanura to Gwadar and a railway from Gwadar to Chongqing, would surge shipping

costs to anywhere between US$8.00 to US$12.40 per barrel.

Thus, one way to demonstrate that the BRI is a defensive realist policy would be to analyze the motivations behind China’s attempt to diversify the maritime routes that transport its essential energy imports.

F. Response to Washington’s “Pivot to Asia” The BRI can also be seen as a direct response to increasingly aggressive US foreign policy in Asia. Soft balancing theorists such as Stephen G. Brooks argue that secondary powers may abandon hard balancing strategies to counter perceived threats in favor of a softer approach due to the high costs and risks of the traditional method. In this case, the “soft approach” chosen by China is the initiation of regional multilateral efforts such as the AIIB and BRI. Threatened by China’s growing economic and military power, Washington announced a “Pivot to Asia” strategy intended to contain China’s rising influence and reaffirm its strategic interests in the region. Furthermore, Washington also attempted to counter China’s rising economic power by creating and excluding China from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In doing so, Washington intended to “choke” China’s economic growth and undermine its ability to expand its influence. Furthermore, Randall Schweller contends that a secondary power that does not possess the military capabilities to directly challenge the hegemon seeks to create a new international order by initiating a “revisionist counter-hegemonic coalition” intended to delegitimize the hegemon’s global authority. The creation of the AIIB, an integral part of the BRI, can be seen as China’s “counter-hegemonic coalition” that attempts to reshape the global governance system, thereby undermining the Western-dominated Bretton Wood institutions and creating a new international order. In this regard, China has been astonishingly successful. Despite Washington’s heavy lobbying to prevent its allies from joining the AIIB, the bank

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managed to garner 57 founding members in January 2016, and has now expanded its membership to 86 nations. These members include the US’s closest allies such as Canada, the UK, Germany, France, Australia, Israel, and South Korea.

Not only does the AIIB provide a challenge and alternative to established multilateral institutions, it has also enabled China to leverage its newfound power and push for reform in the IMF and World Bank. Weifeng Zhou argues that the AIIB is a catalyst for shaping a new global financial order and will boost China’s role from “rule-taker to rule-maker.”

Having failed for five years at passing quota reforms in the IMF to give China and other emerging economies voting power that accurately reflects their global economic position, the US Congress finally approved China’s proposed IMF quota reform in December 2015. This resulted in China’s voting power in the IMF to increase from 2.98% to 6.11% and the Renminbi being added as the fifth currency in the Special Drawing Rights Basket. China’s voting power in the World Bank also increased to 4.64%, resulting in China having the third highest voting power in both institutions after the US and Japan. Thus, the BRI and AIIB present a pragmatic method for China to undermine Washington’s containment policy and Western-led multilateral organizations, thereby strategically eluding the US’s attempted exclusion, and strengthening its own global leadership role in the process.

CONCLUSION Realist and liberal scholars have contrasting views about China’s primary intentions for the BRI. The liberal perspective frames China’s intent as primarily economic in nature as it seeks to promote and spearhead mutual economic development and success, whereas realists contend that China is primarily concerned with increasing its geopolitical influence and securing its national interests. While the BRI does represent Chinese economic interests, China’s current approach and attitude towards the BRI demonstrates that it views the BRI primarily as a vital diplomatic tool for advancing its geopolitical agenda. First, the BRI enables Xi to create diplomatic alliances by offering alternative investment opportunities to pariah nations that are unable to receive IMF or World Bank funding. Second, the BRI attempts to increase China’s bargaining power in political issues by engaging in carrot diplomacy. Third, the BRI increases China’s soft power by enhancing its global leadership role, thereby fostering its legitimacy as a rising hegemon. Fourth, the BRI creates asymmetric economic interdependence, thus enabling China to translate its economic power into political power. Fifth, the BRI secures and protects China’s national security interests by alleviating

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the Malacca Dilemma. Finally, the BRI and subsequent creation of the AIIB creates a bargaining coalition intended to undermine Washington’s containment policy and Western-led multilateral organizations such as the IMF and World Bank. In all cases, the BRI points towards a realist policy intended to win friends, build power, and expand influence.

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“Voting Powers,” World Bank, July 1, 2016. Accessed May 12, 2019. http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/votingpowers Walt, Stephen M. “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, No. 110 (Spring 1998).

Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1979.

Watt, Louise. “Recent developments surrounding the South China Sea,” Washington Post, August 7, 2017.

Wijedasa, Namini. “China Gets Controlling Stake at Hambantota Port.” Sunday Times, October 19, 2014.

Xuefung, Sun. “Conditionality in China’s Aid Model” Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, January 10, 2012.

Zhou, Weifeng and Esteban, Mario. “ Beyond Balancing: China’s approach towards the Belt and Road Initiative,” Journal of Contemporary China 27, No. 112 (March 12, 2018): 487-501.

C h i n a’ s B R i : a W i n - W i n E C o n o m i C P o l i C y o R a B i d at W o R l d h E g E m o n y ?

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Hannah Martinez

BEYOND THE WITCH: FEMALE POWER IN 20TH CENTURY AFRICAN WITCHCRAFT

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Witchcraft, in Western conceptions, is a phenomenon which often leaves women as its primary victim. The Salem witch trials are known for the torture, imprisonment, and death of young women under the hands of powerful male clergy leaders and false accusations. In matters of witchcraft, women are not seen as having much power at all; instead, they are the accused and condemned. However, witchcraft in South Africa sheds light on how women were not always the victim. A decade-long commission on witchcraft violence and ritual murder exposes how women, despite facing possibly victimization by witchcraft accusations, also played powerful key roles in South African witchcraft culture.

In the confusion surrounding the collapse of the apartheid era in South Africa, witch-hunts, ritual murders, and violence relating to the occult increased sharply. In the former Northern Province (now known as Limpopo) “the death toll ran into the thousands,” and often the victims of these horrific crimes were female (Kohnert). As international outrage concerning modern day witch-hunts mounted, a commission was drawn together to identify the causes of witchcraft hysteria and propose solutions. Dr. Victor Ralushai, a South African professor renowned for his work in anthropology and the successful campaign to declare Mapungubwe a UNESCO World Heritage, led the commission (Victor). Together with other South African officials, the commission set out to pore over court case records regarding witchcraft spanning from 1985 to 1996, focusing on cases in the Northern Province (Ralushai). The commission also asked the population questions regarding witchcraft beliefs and conducted fieldwork to understand the general view of witches and ritual murders; they also interviewed displaced people accused of witchcraft at police stations, as well as traditional healers and witch-doctors (Ralushai).

Established in 1995 by the Executive Council of the Northern Province, the commission faced several challenges to its conduct of the investigation. When the Council invited Ralushai and several South African officials to meet for the first time in anticipation of the commission, Ralushai was the only one to attend; while eventually, the commission would gather as a whole, this first meeting did not cast a good shadow for the future (Ralushai). The commission also suffered from a severe lack of accuracy and availability in statistics obtained (Ralushai). People asked to verify statistics were often reluctant to participate; in one region, locals claimed that only 52 persons had

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died due to witchcraft-related causes when the official statistic hovered closer to 300 (Ralushai). Police stations in rural areas tended to be understaffed and unqualified to process the paperwork required to help the commission effectively (Ralushai). Three incidents, in particular, left the commission with the distinct impression that they were not welcome. On 20 November 1995, the commission’s combi, which held a copy of Ralushai’s thesis, five hundred police dockets, a summary of court cases, and fieldwork notes, was broken into the parking lot of a Holiday Inn; all the information was stolen and never retrieved (Ralushai). Less than a month later, commission member Mikael Ndou’s car radio was stolen after thieves broke into his car, and six days later another member of the commission saw his car robbed and his briefcase of fieldwork notes destroyed (Ralushai).

There was, however, some support for the commission and its goal of helping bring down rates of witchcraft assaults and ritual murders in the Northern Province. Participants in a radio program in Lebowa and Thohoyandou hailed support for the work of the commission, and international and national media organizations also praised its efforts.

The Zionist Christian organizations of the Northern Province were so impressed that they established their own commission, reaffirming their condemnation of witchcraft-related violence and ritual murders.

Members of the commission, including Ralushai and Ndou, appeared on television and radio and aroused positive public perception and garnered interest in the work and findings of the commission (Ralushai).

At the commission’s conclusion in 1996, the members had traveled extensively throughout the Northern Province and gathered substantial data despite the challenges posed to them. The commission made major strides in the collection of information regarding witchcraft violence, and their work has allowed for a new focus on the shifting roles of women in South African witchcraft. One important finding was the gender ratio of accused witches, who were called moloi by the general populace. Moloi could be male or female, but almost always manifested in elderly women (Ralushai). It was no surprise to the commission that when witchcraft cases were brought to South African courts, seventy-eight percent of accused witches were women. It is worth noting that only a small fraction of witch-hunts are estimated to have been reported to courts, so the percentage of female accused witches may be higher (Ralushai). The

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fate of accused witches was often a torturous death.

In the Mavambe village of Gandlanani, a group of youth convened on 27 February 1990, determined that there were two witches among them, and decided to kill them both. The group attacked the kraals of Margaret Baloyi and Nwa-Muchochwani, declaring that they were moloi and trapping them inside their huts before setting them on fire (Ralushai). Women were targeted because it was “generally believed [that witchcraft is] acquired from the maternal side”; in the Northern Province, the Venda tribe sang a song declaring “women are witches” (Ralushai).

As diseases swept across rural communities, traditional healers found themselves in positions of power. In rural South African culture, disease has traditionally been seen as a “supernatural phenomenon” caused by an intersectional hierarchy of factors, which can include deities, ancestral and animal spirits, and living persons (Kale). Traditional healers were believed to be vital in bringing good fortune and health. It was estimated that 70 to 80 percent of the population would meet with a traditional healer at least once in their lifetime (Rautenbach). Despite misconceptions that traditional healers are male, most are female (Rautenbach). Female healers could charge exorbitant rates for their prized services (WITCH). In one case, a man eager to rid a tumor from his young son’s face “paid three cows, four goats, and five assegais, as medical fees...to native doctors” (WITCH).

Traditional healing was a way for women to establish themselves and set up careers, and it also allowed for generational career opportunities. For example, 62 percent of female traditional healers in the Northern

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Province reported that they received their healing abilities from parents or grandparents (Semenya). In the modern-day, traditional healing is a lucrative practice. Full-time traditional healers had an average income of 38,491 rands per month in 2009 (Mander), compared to the national average of just 8,000 rands (South Africa). Women play a key role in the planting and harvesting of traditional plants, an industry that is estimated to be worth 2.9 billion rands or just under 200 million dollars (Mander).

They make up three-fourths of the trade roles associated with traditional healing, and the trade serves as “an important livelihood option” for rural South African females in the current day (Mander).

There is a much more insidious aspect to traditional healers, however. Muti, or medicine, can be derived from human body parts (Ralushai). A traditional healer admitted to the commission that “the bone of a person killed by a vehicle could be used to join broken or fractured bones of a patient,” and the need for body parts led to an increase in ritual murders in the post-apartheid era (Ralushai). Eyes were valued as muti to cure myopia, blood gave livelihood, and genitals and breasts--especially those of women--were in high demand for their supposed fertility (Ralushai). A schoolgirl by the name of Sharon Mashige was ritually murdered after visiting her boyfriend, and her head, left arm, left leg, and genitals were cut off for use in traditional healing. Her murderer, a traditional healer, had already ground up her left fingers as herbal medicines when police arrested him (Ralushai).

Female traditional healers and other women were heavily involved in ritual murders. In June 1994 in Mukula, a man named Edward Nkhumeleni and his wife came to his mother’s aunt Tshavhungwe Munzhelele, a renowned witch doctor. Nkhumeleni and his wife were in dire financial straits, and he desired to become a witch doctor. Munzhelele told him that to become a successful healer, he had to possess human bones; she then suggested that he find a living person from whom to extract body parts. Nkhumeleni’s friend, Thivhaisali, recommended Nthatheni Negota as a candidate, as she “appeared neglected by her parents” (Ralushai). Nkhumeleni, his wife, and Tshavhungwe went out and invited Negota to a tradi-

tional dance, and while walking, Nkhumeleni asked her to have sexual intercourse with him. Tshavhungwe convinced her to relent by citing Nkhumeleni’s wife’s pregnancy, and as Negota and Nkhumeleni went into the bush, Tshavhungwe and Nkhumeleni murdered her. They severed her head, breasts, both hands, genitals, and legs; Nkhumeleni’s wife was at the ready with a plastic ‘mealie’ bag to collect the body parts (Ralushai). In this instance, women served in turn as instigator, executioner, victim, and accomplice. While Tshavhungwe and Nkhumeleni were caught and imprisoned for their crime, the murder exemplifies the extent to which women are interwoven in ritual murders as both healers and victims.

Traditional healers were aided in witch hunts and ritual murders by pointing out potential victims, but also played an integral role in witchcraft violence by the brewing of potions and muti (Ralushai).

These magic potions were another way by which traditional healers exerted influence over the communities they resided in. Some healers used fermented roots or leaves on clients; the fermentation had an intoxicating effect on the client, who then went into a state of hallucination. During the client’s hallucination, the healer would direct the client into a darkened room with white cloth pasted to a wall. On the cloth, the client would hallucinate various images of their life, including living and deceased persons. The healer would tell the client that the persons seen have bewitched them, collect their wages, and send the client on their way (Ralushai). Witch doctors were also sought out for their potions and medicines to cure bewitched people. One young man claiming to have been turned into a zombie by four elderly female witches was taken to a witch doctor. Upon receiving medicine from the witch doctor, the man stated he felt better and had been restored to his pre-zombie state (Ralushai). Potions and medicines were frequently used by traditional healers and extended their role in witchcraft to both identifying cases of bewitchment and curing the bewitched. These potions and brews, however, linked traditional healers and witch doctors to the occult in ways that did not always end favorably for them. In one case, the death of a former patient led the patient’s family to accuse a local witch-doctor of being a witch and deliberating poisoning the patient’s food with muti (Ralushai).

Women were not confined to the roles of

traditional healers; they were also recruited extensively as diviners. As isangomas, or diviners, women held a powerful role in witchcraft allegations, as ninety percent of isangomas were female (Rajendra).

Divination, like traditional healing, was also an ancestral practice; women claimed that they were called to the practice, citing strange dreams and physical pains accompanied by a need to perform divination (Redding). In becoming a diviner, women established themselves into positions of power as potential witch-finders and set up career paths for their daughters, as divination was a lucrative business (Redding). Not all diviners used this power for good, however. Diviners were, according to the commission, “involved in pointing out witches and hence connected to the practice of eliminating witches” (Ralushai), and their practices, such as the use of human knucklebones to make their divinations, contributed to the rise of ritual murders in the post-apartheid era (Ralushai). Because of their involvement in witchcraft violence, female diviners were prosecuted extensively under the 1957 Witch Suppression Act, which stated that any person who accused another of being a witch or indicated the presence of bewitching would be guilty of committing a crime and subject to fines or imprisonment (Witchcraft). They were also subject to the whims of the rural communities which they served, who could turn on them if they suspected the isangomas of being a witch or if the diviner refused to give a name in a witch-hunt (Ralushai).

Isangomas were frequent targets of legal challenges and magistrates. The commission identified diviners as key culprits in outbreaks of witchcraft violence (Ralushai), and South African courts in the apartheid era viewed diviners as “dangerous charlatans who

Figure 2

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needed to be punished publicly� (Redding). Magistrates empathized with accused witches, whom they saw as innocents condemned by a wicked diviner, but also recognized the threat that female diviners posed to the state: they worked with impunity and wielded large amounts of power in the rural communities in which they resided (Redding). Isangomas were quick, however, to counter these legal challenges. Some took to employing white lawyers, who were much more costly but also much more likely to garner a victory for the diviner; their employment of white lawyers suggests that diviners not only earned enough to hire such lawyers but earned enough to risk such an investment to protect their occupation (Redding).

Diviners found themselves in the precarious position of being at the mercy of bloodthirsty crowds eager to kill anyone, not necessarily a witch. When interviewed, a female diviner explained that diviners were forced to give a name when consulted for witch hunts, insinuating that failure to do so would result in death; the commission found that there were many instances in which the witch-hunters forced or intimidated diviners into naming a witch (Ralushai). Despite their role in naming witches, isangomas were also at risk of witchcraft accusations because of public perception that they were especially close to the occult. Even relations of diviners were suspect. In a Venda elementary school, a thirteen-year-old girl found black powder in her food; she reported the incident to her teacher, who searched the class and made them empty their pockets. The teacher then made the students laugh, but one girl, Mavis Mashudu Ralidzhivha, did not laugh like her classmates. Immediately the other students began whispering she was a witch who put the powder in the girl’s food, citing the fact that her mother was a traditional diviner. The students formed a mob around the girl and attacked her outside the school; she narrowly avoided serious injury due to the intervention of teachers. She was then taken to the police station for her safety (Ralushai).

In spite of backlash from locals and legal challenges, female isangomas had much monetary success and held tight to power in South Africa, thriving especially in the Northern Province. Historically, women diviners existed long before the apartheid era. In 1908, a case was brought to the attention of the South African courts concerning a female witch diviner who was being tried under the Witchcraft Ordinance, which outlawed witch doctors (Redding). The diviner had been consulted by a villager and determined that his

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two wives were attempting to murder him through magical means, insinuating that they were witches; the two wives immediately fled the village (Redding).

In 1990, a diviner condemned a young woman as a witch who had bewitched a child with an illness. A crowd two hundred strong came to the woman’s kraal and began removing her property, telling the woman she had until sunset to vacate the property; she fled as well (Ralushai). Female diviners wielded power in their divinations and naming of witches. They held in their rituals the might to force people out of kraals and districts and in extreme cases, to precipitate their deaths.

Diviners knew the power their words held, but isangomas rarely used their influence to stop the deaths of witches. One afternoon in March 1994, an elderly woman in the community of Dibeng was struck by lightning and killed. The villagers summoned a group of eight diviners to come and discover who summoned the fatal lightning, and one of the diviners, an isangoma called Kgosiyaka Mohlake, claimed her diving bones said one of the diviners present was a witch. She laid her accusation on Johannes Mpai.

The villagers surrounded the man and stoned him to death before setting him on fire (Ralushai). In another instance, a young girl killed by lightning prompted members of the Mokganyaka village to seek diviners and discover the culprit of such witchcraft. The isangomas summoned were from different locations and independently identified two elderly women, Caroline Thamago and Lettie Kgare, as the witches behind the fatal lightning storm. A crowd grabbed the two women and doused them with petrol before attacking them with various weapons and finally setting them alight; the women survived the initial attacks but succumbed to first-degree burns in the hospital (Ralushai). Throughout the twentieth century, isangomas played vital roles in the deaths of many men and women, who suffered brutal and agonizing deaths as a result of their accusations.

Yet one did not have to be an isangoma nor a revered diviner to influence who lived and who died.

Females in the Northern Province made up forty-nine percent of witchcraft accusers over the decade studied by the commission (Ralushai). Oftentimes, allegations of witchcraft were a source of power for women, as they could use the threat of accusations to leverage power in interpersonal relationships as well as workplace relationships. Jealousy played a key role in accusations as well. Overall, female accusers were

Shona witch doctor (Zimbabwe) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Shona_witch_doctor_(Zimbabwe).jpg

motivated by a variety of reasons and played an integral part in the naming of witches, even if they were not diviners themselves.

Souring interpersonal relationships were a primary factor in accusations of witchcraft.

One young woman who shared a room with a female friend accused her roommate of being a witch because that her friend had allegedly stolen a receipt from her (Ralushai). In another incident, a woman arrived at the door of her friend with a knife in hand, declaring her friend was a witch who obtained her financial success through witchcraft and that the friend had killed her own mother. The commission commented that there seemed to be an argument between the two women (Ralushai). A quarrel between neighbors led to yet another witchcraft accusation, with the accuser standing outside the kraal of the alleged witch and shouting that she was a witch with a red vagina who killed the accuser’s child (Ralushai). Even fights between children could be the source of witchcraft allegations.

When two children from a rural village began quarreling, the mother of one of the children reached out to the other child’s mother to discuss the matter; the other woman claimed she would not talk to the first woman because she was a witch who was cursing her gate (Ralushai). Workplace relations did not remain unaffected by witchcraft; accusations ran rampant in the workplace as well. When drinking tea with her employer, a female employee accused her employer of being a witch and of trying to poison her. The commission was left with the impression that “embittered labour relations” could be the cause of such an accusation (Ralushai). Thus, friendships, interpersonal relationships, and workplace dynamics all played a significant role in how female accusers chose their victims.

Jealousy also spurred witchcraft allegations. In one court case, a woman accused her neighbor of witchcraft and threatened to hit her neighbor with her car and burn her with tyres because she was a witch.

The commission, when looking at the file, noted that the accuser believed her neighbor was having an affair with her husband and wanted to extract retribution (Ralushai). Infidelity was the root cause of another accusation: a woman was accused of setting a young woman’s kraal on fire with lightning and of being a witch, and it was well-known in the community that the woman was having an affair with the accuser’s boyfriend (Ralushai). In another incident, a

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young woman refused to let another girl talk to her boyfriend alone. The girl would later go on to label the young woman a witch who had bewitched a book, no doubt compelled to lay such charges because of jealousy (Ralushai). Envious neighbors accused young women of being witches sent to destroy their family: one neighbor alleged her younger, more beautiful neighbor was in love with her husband and was trying to seduce him. The commission noted that “it was obvious jealousy was the cause” of such accusations (Ralushai). Jealousy was a crucial factor in female accusations of witchcraft.

On rare occasions, witchcraft accusations became a family affair. When one Elizabeth Mpoloboshu accused another woman of being a witch who took her money and was bewitching the male members of her family, she was accompanied by her three children.

She and the children--aged fifteen, twelve, and nine--began throwing stones at the accused. The commission found this case especially alarming because of the young ages of the accusers (Ralushai). Female accusers were unafraid of using their children as resources to help them harass their chosen victims.

Traditionally, witchcraft is thought of as a patriarchal system in which women are helplessly subject to the whims of male accusers. However, the findings of the 1996 commission prove that, contrary to previous thought, witchcraft practices in South Africa lend women much power. Women find niches of political

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and economic power by acting as traditional healers, a position that is revered and respected by the rural communities surrounding them. While the majority of witchcraft violence and ritual murder victims are women, it would be a mistake to suggest that women themselves do not take part in the naming and execution of alleged witches. As diviners, women fulfilled the crucial role in the naming of witches, and some females as young as nine years old have partaken in attempts to murder accused witches. Female traditional healers encouraged the ritual murder of young women to bolster the human body parts trade they relied on, even going so far as to suggest possible victims and aid in the murder themselves. Accusers, of which women comprised forty-nine percent, are equally integral to the continuation of witchcraft violence. In fact, witchcraft accusations represented a form of social power. Operating on a variety of agendas, including souring interpersonal relations, workplace quarrels, and jealousy, women did not hesitate to name former friends, neighbors, and employers of being witches.

Thus, women in the Northern Province defied Western expectations by playing roles in witchcraft violence that gave them political, economic, and social power.

The commission’s report details much more than the shifting roles of women in witchcraft violence and ritual murder. Most troubling, the report covers how, despite the advance of modernity and the approach of the twenty-first century, witchcraft violence and ritual murder were still potent problems in rural communities. Despite much legal action and attempts by the government to put an end to such violence, the commission found that attorneys neglected to prosecute sixteen percent of cases, and only a third of cases led to convictions (Ralushai). In one region, witchcraft-related cases were rising, not falling (Ralushai). The commission found gaps in South African legislature, weaknesses in law enforcement, and a general lack of education among the populace which led to widespread belief and fear of witchcraft with little resources to combat this belief and put a stop to the violence. These weaknesses were addressed by the commission, which gave its suggestions to its readers for how to dispel beliefs of witchcraft and strengthen law enforcement and legislature so witchcraft accusers could be successfully prosecuted and convicted.

These suggestions covered improvements in education, changes in the roles of chiefs and churches, advice on traditional healers, solutions involving the law and police, and emphasized the importance of research and statistics. The commission advised that the government work to educate the populace about the harm surrounding witchcraft belief in a bid to prevent them from participating in witchcraft violence. They recommended workshops, radio programs, and films geared to teach about the futility of witch hunts and purges (Ralushai). Concerning the role of chiefs and churches, the commission stressed that chiefs and churches should renounce witchcraft beliefs and condemn ritual killings. An investigation into the democratization of chiefs was also advised, and the commission cautioned that the South African government take care when conducting investigations on chiefs (Ralushai). The commission called for traditional healers and diviners “be made to taste the bitterness of their medicine” and subjected to the full force of the law when they name a witch or advocate for ritual murder. They advocated for healers to be apolitical and cease the practice of naming witches entirely, as well as ending the trend of claiming to be able to cure AIDS or Ebola. Commission members also wanted traditional healers to stop adopting the title of ‘Dr’ and instead register themselves as a Registered Traditional Medical Practitioner (Ralushai). In regards to the law, the commission recognized the divide between African and European concepts of justice regarding witchcraft, and admitted to the absence of a “clear-cut solution.” However, the commission advised that witch-finders, traditional healers, and diviners be prosecuted in cases, as they believed they were the source of witchcraft allegations and violence. The commission also acknowledged the effectiveness of capital punishment in decreasing rates of witchcraft violence and ritual murder, despite the abolishment of the death penalty in South Africa (Ralushai). With the police, the commission had a variety of suggestions. They emphasized that more investigations into witchcra-

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ft-related cases be opened; advised the government to set up more police stations in rural areas; suggested reminding police officers who believe in witchcraft that their duty is to the public, not to witch-finders; and recommended that witness statements be taken by police proficient in English to limit distortion of facts (Ralushai). Finally, the commission stated that the available statistics they researched left much to be desired, and commented that experts should be brought in to study witchcraft violence and ritual murder.

They advised that these experts teach witchcraft believers the causes of lightning, as lightning was a prime force behind witchcraft allegations (Ralushai).

While witchcraft-related violence rates in some parts of the Northern Province fell following the publication of the commission’s report, it is still a large problem in South Africa (Ralushai). As recent as 2013, there was a mob murder of a woman accused of being a witch in the former Northern Province (Joseph).

While South Africa is politically stable, economic inequality has fostered a need to find scapegoats; impoverished crowds often take out their frustrations on alleged witches (Joseph). In her visit to Limpopo following the brutal murder of alleged witch, South African police commissioner General Riah Phiyega stated that despite great strides in curbing witchcraft violence, it was clear more had to be done (Joseph).

Without a change in mindset from centuries-old belief in witchcraft, however, ritual murders and horrific cases of witchcraft-related violence will continue well into the modern-day.

South African witchcraft culture differs greatly from Western notions of the Salem witchcraft trials.

The whole of the country had women who participated in witchcraft culture as traditional healers, as diviners, and as accusers themselves. Despite the constant portrayal of women as helpless victims, the commission conducted by Dr. Ralushi turns this stereotype on its head and presents women with agency who would even murder another for profits. This is a far-fetched cry from the meek, pious woman in Western conceptions of witchcraft trials; in South Africa, accused witches were active defendants in their trials and used many tools to achieve an acquittal. Females held power in South African witchcraft culture, and their power was not one to be ignored.

REFERENCES Christa Rautenbach, "Some Comments on a New Legislative Framework for Female Traditional

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Healers in South Africa ," Emory International Law Review 22, no. 1 (2008): 113-132.

Joseph, N. (2014). Critical role: How South African justice deals with witchcraft claims. Index on Censorship, 43(4), 47-50.

Kale, Rajendra. "South Africa's Health: Traditional healers in South Africa: a parallel health care system." BMJ 310, no. 6988 (1995): 1182-1185.

Kohnert, Dirk. "Witchcraft and Transnational Social Spaces: Witchcraft Violence, Reconciliation and Development in South Africa's Transition Process." The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 2 (2003): 217-45.

Mander, Myles, Lungile Ntuli, Nicci Diederichs, and Khulile Mavundla. "Economics of the traditional medicine trade in South Africa: health care delivery." South African health review 2007, no. 1 (2007): 189-196.

"Map of South Africa." Map of Northern Province. http://www.map-of-south-africa.co.uk/map-of-northern-province.htm.

Ralushai, N. V. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders to His Excellency the Honourable Member of the Executive Council for Safety and Security, Northern Province, Advocate Seth Nthai.

Publisher Not Identified, 1996.

Redding, Sean. "WOMEN AS DIVINERS AND AS CHRISTIAN CONVERTS IN RURAL SOUTH AFRICA, C. 1880–1963." The Journal of African History 57, no. 3 (2016): 367-89.

Semenya, Sebua S., and Martin J. Potgieter. "Bapedi traditional healers in the Limpopo Province, South Africa: their socio-cultural profile and traditional healing practice." Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine 10, no. 1 (2014): 4.

"South Africa Average Monthly Gross Wage." South Africa Average Monthly Gross Wage | 2019 | Data | Chart | Calendar. https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/wages WITCH DOCTORS OF SOUTH AFRICA., The Lancet, Volume 80, Issue 2041, (October 11, 1862).

Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1957. South African Congress. 19 February 1957. http://www.justice. gov.za/legislation/acts/1957-003.pdf "Victor Ralushai (1935 - ): The Presidency." Victor Ralushai (1935 - ) | The Presidency. http://www. thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/ victor-ralushai-1935

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Evan Nachtrieb

THE CASE FOR INPUT LEGITIMACY IN PEACEKEEPING

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United Nations peacekeeping is facing a legitimacy crisis. In Beni, Democratic Republic Of Congo, protesters smashed through the gates of a United Nations Peacekeeper compound, burning buildings, looting offices, and tearing down barbed wire. Civil society organizations, such as Lutte Pour Le Changement (Fight for Change), and university students demanded that the UN mission protect civilians or leave. At least seven people were killed in the protests, one possibly by a peacekeeper’s bullet (Kivu Security Blog). In response, the World Health Organization evacuated a third of their staff from the city, staff who were working on containing the second largest Ebola outbreak in history.

The protests were triggered by a series of massacres committed by an armed group in the vicinity of Beni, massacres that protesters claimed the UN did not do enough to stop. The UN cited a lack of resources, the vastness of the terrain, and an insufficient mandate as for why it was unable to perform. None of these excuses satisfied the protesters, and deep distrust between the mission and the population remains.

The lack of legitimacy of the mission in the eyes of the local population hurt the ability of the UN to operate, both in its support efforts against Ebola and its primary mission to protect civilians. The Beni case, which occurred in late November (2019), is an extreme, but not uncommon, case of a UN peacekeeping mission that has become illegitimate in the eyes of those it is supposed to protect. The current approach toward local legitimacy is not working, which begs the question, what can be done?

There are thirteen United Nations peacekeeping missions currently active as of February 2020 (United Nations Peacekeeping). More and more of these missions are deployed where there is no peace to keep. These missions are tasked with “stabilization” of the situation through the reconstruction (or construction) of the state. In order to accomplish the broad range of activities that stabilization through state building entails, the United Nations has increased deployments of “multidimensional” missions, that incorporate both military and civilian tasks. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic is an example of one such mission (the additional “integrated” signifies an effort toward cooperation between UN agencies). The objectives of these missions include facilitating peace talks, demobilizing combatants, organizing elections, and a variety of state building activities. The focus has been increasingly on restoring states. These missions’ mandates cite Chapter VII of the United Nations charter, the 'anti-Munich' chap-

ter, which allows for the use of military force to ensure peace against aggressors.

Increasingly, in the kind of complex wars that these missions are deployed in, the politics of violence have become decentralized. The decision to mobilize for combat is often not made by a centralized government, but by local civilians. Séverine Autesserre and David Kilcullen have argued that these local actors are often fighting for local reasons, and although these local actors may fight on behalf of and with the assistance of larger national, regional, or international actors, peace (or victory) cannot be achieved without diving into local politics.

Once we realize that the local political arena is as important, if not more important, than the national or international one, a crucial problem emerges. The legitimacy of a UN mission comes from the international legitimacy of the United Nations and from the three basic principles of UN peacekeeping: consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force. In the modern multidimensional stabilization mission, Chapter VII peacekeeping and a state building mandate result in frequent use of force, perceived partiality on the side of the incumbent state, lack of consent of overlooked local actors, and a general apathy on the ground toward the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) authority.

In other words, all of the UN’s big picture methods of gaining legitimacy are increasingly outdated in new missions, like that in Mali, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Unfortunately, legitimacy at the local level is essential to tackle decentralized conflicts. It is imperative that peacekeepers develop new sources of legitimacy.

In this article, legitimacy will be defined, its role in peacekeeping explored, and its known sources classified. UN missions can incorporate untapped sources of legitimacy in a pragmatic way that complements existing initiatives, and takes inspiration from other actors that suffer from the same legitimacy without accountability challenge as peacekeepers. Benefits and methods of combining the different sources will be also addressed.

Implementation of theory into reality is often fraught with challenges. This writing concludes by predicting some of these problems and possible solutions.

Locals instrumentalizing the mission to their own ends is obviously of major concern, as is maintaining impartiality. Integrating the political functions with the military components of the mission can be a useful strategy to prevent legitimacy from being contained to a separate political arm of the mission.

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DEFINING LEGITIMACY Legitimacy, according to Birte Julia Gippert, is “a process of internalisation in which the compliance demand becomes part of the actor’s motivational system.” The interests of the actor conform to the interests of the legitimate actor, which means forcing someone to comply against their will becomes redundant. Legitimacy makes exercising authority easier in all contexts. For a resource-limited UN mission, relying on legitimacy is especially necessary, because other forms of exerting power are too expensive to be used alone. In order for a mission to shape a situation, it must project legitimacy.

Conventionally, legitimacy on the local level is seen as important for peacekeeping because it improves local intelligence, and prevents a community from mobilizing against the mission (Kassem). These are good reasons within themselves, but a crucial and overlooked aspect of peace is trust. In Louisa Lombard’s 2016 book on the Central African Republic, she shows how distrust between actors is a major dynamic of systemic conflict. Distrust persists between combatants, individuals, communities, and interveners, both within and between the different groups. How can weapons be laid down unless you trust the other party not to kill you? Trust between local populations and a peacekeeping mission is an essential aid to any UN effort toward peacebuilding, mediation, or demobilization efforts. The individual's “internalization” of the interests of the legitimate entity entrusts the entity with protection of those interests.

In traditional peacekeeping missions, where the object is to monitor an agreement between two international actors, local legitimacy is a huge asset but is not the essential factor it is in other contexts because the warring parties respond to conventional international mechanisms of legitimacy. In a decentralized conflict, local actors are the relevant actors, and if they do not think the mission is legitimate, the mission is certain to fail. Trust needs to be fostered between actors, and mission legitimacy (which is linked to trust in the mission) is necessary to contribute to trust building between potential or active combatants.

There are many potential sources of legitimacy. Max Weber gives three: tradition (“the eternal yesterday”), charisma, and legal legitimacy (legitimacy of a rational bureaucracy ). Of these, the UN can only lay claim to the third and must take care to operate with the consent of the first.

Charisma is too much of an individual tool to be incorporated into a policy recommendation for an agency that does not train its own leaders. Gippert presents a framework of three methods for obtaining legitimacy, developed from the work of Fritz Scharpf and Vivien A. Schmidt: procedural legitimacy, output legitimacy, and input legitimacy.

Procedural legitimacy, similar to Weber's “legitimacy of a rational bureaucracy”, encompasses the everyday activities of peacekeepers and the functioning of their bureaucracy. Acting responsibly, timely, and with transparency are commonly stressed in military texts such as those by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (Raymond). The presence of a UN peacekeeper Code of Conduct is another example of the form of recognition this method has. The effects that sexual abuses committed by peacekeepers have on public opinion are the most visible and obvious example of how responsible conduct is necessary for legitimacy. Autesserre takes this idea a step farther when she looks at the everyday behaviors that undermine legitimacy, such as UN security practices that isolate the intervener from the population. The UN’s international legitimacy is derived through procedural or legal legitimacy, by

Flag of the United Nations. Source: StefdeVries is licensed under CC BY-ND 2.0.

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Flag of China. Source:"Chinese flag" by Philip Jägenstedt is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

being approved by the UNSC. However, the UN struggles with procedural-based legitimacy, partially due to resource issues. For example, inadequate quality and quantity of troops and equipment make timely response impossible. The UN has been struggling to manage allegations of peacekeeper abuses as well, due to the lack of politically feasible accountability mechanisms. The UN has also earned a reputation as an inefficient, bureaucratic behemoth, undermining procedural legitimacy.

Output-based, or 'provisional,' legitimacy is based on the outputs of the entity. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is often said to rely on this form, which takes the form of economic growth. The issue with output-based legitimacy is its fragility: if the entity is unable to provide due to external factors, even temporarily, the entity’s legitimacy is at risk. This is the primary method that the UN attempts to use to gain local legitimacy. In UN training material, local legitimacy is addressed through the dual practices of accomplishing the mandate to the best of the mission's ability and simultaneously managing local civilian expectations (which are framed as frequently unrealistic). However, the official mandate in these multidimensional missions frequently places Protection of Civilians (PoC) as the primary objective of the mission. The population’s expectations are not unreasonable; they are the same expectations that the UNSC expressed in the mission mandate. At the same time, these missions do not have the resources or capacity to fulfill the reasonable expectations that emerge from their mandate, and this gap undermines output-based legitimacy. More effective intervention is desirable within itself, but, as a tool of legitimacy, is inadequate. It can result in a snowball effect, because failure makes more failures more likely, and breaking the cycle is difficult. Reliance on output as a primary method of obtaining legitimacy is a bad idea.

Input-based legitimacy is based on giving the population a voice in their own governance. Elections are the classical example of this, and they are the primary source of legitimacy for democracies. Traditionally, input legitimacy’s role is to hold those in power accountable. In UN missions, accountability is not considered feasible. Gippert claims that “international operations are not democratically elected and cannot be held accountable by the local population as the mission personnel enjoy functional immunities.” However, this is a narrow conception of input-based legitimacy, as can be demonstrated by the multitude of actors that lack true accountability and yet have developed input-based

legitimacy.

Take for example the People’s Republic of China (PRC), an openly undemocratic state that is not directly accountable to its citizens by default of being authoritarian. Despite association of China with output-based legitimacy, the PRC has a number of input-legitimacy mechanisms that Columbia professor Andrew Nathan credits with China’s remarkably long authoritarian career. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) establishes feedback mechanisms that encourage participation in local governments, allowing citizens to lodge complaints (the government legally must reply to the complaint) and sue government agencies for violating government policy (with cases successful 27-40% of the time). All these mechanisms are careful to direct input toward the local governance level, keeping the CCP unaccountable. That being said, the CCP uses these mechanisms to gauge public opinion and to align themselves with it whenever possible. While a United Nations peacekeeping mission may not like to admit the similarities between authoritarianism and peacekeeping, they both have to address the similar challenge of seeking legitimacy without accountability.

Input-based legitimacy should be added into the UN peacekeeping toolbox. Existing procedural and output-based legitimacy strategies need to be integrated consciously with input-based legitimacy efforts. Being conscious of the importance of legitimacy, a new element is introduced: salience. These efforts must be visible and salient to contribute to legitimacy. This is largely recognized in output-based legitimacy methods. An example would be patrolling deliberately done with high degree of visibility, in the day, on main roads. This in order to give the impression of safety and control, even if such patrols are negligibly effective at intercepting combatants (compared to less visible, smaller, offroad, night-

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time foot patrols). The same principle should be applied to input-based methods of legitimacy, and care should be taken to not make the mistake of valuing visibility over action. To use the previous output-based method as an example, solely patrolling on main roads during the day undermines legitimacy because by both being visible (so civilians are aware of peacekeepers) and not having an impact (intercepting combatants), confidence in the mission's competence is rightfully undermined. Doing the same with input-based methods would also lead the population to consider the mission more concerned with their image then the task. Legitimacy is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself.

IMPLEMENTATION Any solution must be politically feasible as well as physically possible. The many different critiques of the UN’s state-building view have not had much traction among practitioners, in part because professionals do not see a viable alternative and are not willing to make a revolutionary shift. However, a new approach to mission legitimacy can be built off of existing efforts such as the current drive for more local ownership and modification of current outcome-based legitimacy methods. This assumes 'true' accountability to the local population may not be politically feasible, but some degree of input legitimacy is still possible. This requires a shift in thinking in terms of “public relations” with local civilians. The mission needs to focus less on trying to align the local people with the mission and instead make an effort to align the mission with the local people.

The Input-Procedural Nexus It is possible to combine input with what is considered a typical dimension of procedural legitimacy. The UN should be pursuing mission capacity to deal with complaints. This is a difficult task. There are serious structural issues in the international system that make true accountability very difficult. First, the UN needs countries to volunteer troops and fears that countries will cease providing soldiers if troops are held accountable. Secondly (and partially for this reason), there are no international legal mechanisms to prosecute troops.

Thirdly, peacekeepers are not accountable to local law, largely to prevent harassment by the host government (almost always a party to conflict). The desperate need for troops that occurs when a mission is trying to deploy as quickly as possible to an active emergency causes additional problems, exemplified by the situation faced

by MINUSMA (Mali) and MINUSCA (Central African Republic) in their early stages of deployment. Both Mali

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and the Central African Republic (CAR) were in extremely fragile positions, with some NGOs calling the situation in the CAR to be escalating to genocide. Fast intervention was needed to save lives. Desperate for armed, warm bodies, the Department of Peace Operations “re-hatted” African Union peacekeepers into the UN missions, regardless of verified complaints of abuses committed by these troops. As a result, the re-hatted troops (who made up around 50% of the missions) were responsible for 80% of all reported abuses and 77% of sexual abuse allegations (United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services 2018). These abuses are not worth the increase in capacity. The damage they do to the legitimacy of the mission is simply too great (this view is also shared by the UN internal audit of the incident).

As previously mentioned, the People’s Republic of China remains on the whole unaccountable, but has set up avenues where accountability can be pursued.

Two mechanisms previously mentioned were the ability of citizens to lodge complaints (which the government must reply to) and the ability to sue government agencies for violating government policy (with citizen victory 27-40% of the time). Currently, United Nations missions do not have a clear system for lodging complaints. Developing a clear system for complaints and feedback that is accessible is important. Feedback is useful and could be used to hold Local Development Communities accountable and can be used as a way to make people feel like they are being heard. More sensitive complaints, such as those surrounding sexual abuse allegations, need to be handled with the greatest consistency and care. Some scholars have tried to point at the relative rarity of sexual abuse allegations to downplay the issue as a threat to peacekeeping as a practice, but this ignores the damage that poorly handled sexual abuse does to legitimacy (Autesserre). The rarity of cases is less important than the perception of these cases, because perception, regardless of reality, is what matters to legitimacy. A population that perceives it is being abused by a mission (that says it is there to protect them) will lack confidence in everything the mission says or does. If the mission is perceived to not have the population's best interests in mind, legitimacy is impossible. Sexual abuse by peacekeepers receives a lot of attention, notably by the NGO AIDS-Free World’s Code Blue campaign, which proposes a number of solutions, including the creation of an independent special court mechanism that could investigate criminal activity committed by UN personnel. While sexual abuse

is especially horrible for legitimacy, any abusive behavior is a threat. Establishing as much accountability as possible and creating accessible avenues for lodging complaints are both ways in which input-based legitimacy can be harnessed.

Modifying an existing mechanism: QIPs and Local Development Communities A second approach is to integrate input in provision by giving civilians a voice in the planning process.

Modification of existing Quick Impact Projects can create an avenue for input legitimacy that is integrated with outcome-based legitimacy efforts. This integration is crucial to preserve scarce resources and make sure that the effort is not interpreted as solely a superficial measure. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), according to the UN Department of Peace Operations (formerly the Department of Peacekeeping Operations), are “small-scale, low cost projects, funded by our missions, that are planned and implemented within a short timeframe. QIPs aim to build confidence in the mission, the mandate or the peace process (Kassem). They are one of the main functions of a mission's Civil Affairs department (along with conflict resolution and management and engagement with the local population.) Common examples of QIPs include building wells, inoculating livestock, and (re)construction of basic infrastructure (roads, courthouses, jails, small electric grids, etc.)

Currently this practice solidly lands in the conventional outcome-based method of obtaining legitimacy. The idea of “winning hearts and minds” by giving people stuff is not unique to peacekeeping and mirrors similar efforts in counterterrorism (Voice of America). The legitimacy mechanism is presumed to lay in the result of the project, and although constructing QIPs is supposed to facilitate communication between the population and the mission, the relationship is a one sided exchange of the intervener giving to a community.

The current purpose of QIPs is to align the local population’s interests with those of the mission. An input-based legitimacy approach, in contrast, tries to align the mission as much as possible with the local population’s interests. It does this by allowing formal methods of participation in aspects of mission planning.

To see how QIPs could be modified to become an input mechanism, we can look at an unlikely source of inspiration- transnational mining corporations operating in

the mineral rich and conflict prone eastern Congo.

Mining companies operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are more similar to United Nations Peacekeepers than they appear at first glance. They both desire legitimacy and lack accountability. The DRC is a region home to both many profitable mining sites and a plurality of armed groups. Rejection by local communities has similar consequences for mining operations as it does for UN missions. Attacks, both criminal and political, are frequently aimed at mining companies. To better secure themselves, some mining companies have utilized projects that are very similar to QIPs but encompass input-based methods of obtaining legitimacy. Canada based Anvil Mining partnered with the NGO PACT to create 'Local Development Communities’ (Hönke).

Local Development Communities were formed out of members of communities near the mine and tasked with representing those communities. They were given funds earmarked for QIP-like projects and allowed to choose what to spend it on. Unlike a UN QIP program, these Local Development Communities functioned as liaisons to the company, allowing the company to learn how to accommodate the communities' interests. QIPs are often formed after consulting community members, but they do not create a social, salient, and permanent input instrument. The UN peacekeeping can learn from this and QIPs are already a great framework to build up a similar effort.

Scaling the Local Development Community Concept While direct military action often necessitates excluding community input in planning, many mission functions can be modified to incorporate community input, such as local peacebuilding, Countering Violent Extremism, and DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration). Not only would this help establish

Soldiers were trying out their new UN peacekeeping uniforms prior to deploying to the Central African Republic. Source: Tsidoti on Wikimedia Commons under CC

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legitimacy, but also this kind of input is beneficial for the output aspects of the mission (actual successes). Autesserre (2015) argues convincingly that listening to locals capitalizes on the specialized insider knowledge that locals have and Yi Dionne (2018) illustrated that if projects were not aligned to match the interests of locals, implementation would be bogged down when interveners delegated tasks to local agents who had different priorities. Although it is now a buzzword, true “local ownership” has a host of studies that point to why it is desirable. In this sense, the practice of input legitimacy is already accepted as a good idea, but the connection just hasn’t been explicitly made between “local ownership” and input legitimacy.

A crucial objective here is to align the mission with the populace within the constraints of the mandate. The intelligence gathered on public opinion is important. Just as an intelligent authoritarian regime maintains power by being responsive to public demands, a UN mission should try to be responsive as possible to maintain legitimacy.

CONCERNS, CHALLENGES, AND LIMITATIONS IN PRACTICE There are challenges and limitations that arise when contemplating what these efforts would look like in practice. First, diving into local politics is necessary, but local actors often have differing objectives and may be parties to the conflict. The mission has two assets that separates it from local actors: the mission’s potential impartiality and military capacity over local actors. Getting involved in local politics is necessary, but impartiality is also necessary in order to work with all the parties. The mission needs to acknowledge that local actors have differing goals and are not equipped to solve problems themselves. If they were, the UN mission would be redundant. There is also a risk of local actors using the mission for their own ends. Keeping this in mind is important when trying to give locals more say in operations.

Care must also be taken to avoid containing legitimacy to Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Cooperation units that are tasked with outreach and not spilling over into the larger military components of a mission. Populations do not view peacekeepers as monolithic entities, even among the military components. In Alindao, Central African Republic, for example, Burundi peacekeepers had much more local legitimacy than their Mauritanian counterparts (Amnesty International).

The concern that legitimacy will not spread outside of the programs that people directly have input in is supported by the current structure of UN missions. Currently, there is a Civil Affairs section separate from the military arm of the mission that is the main driver of QIPs, who then work with UN battalion Headquarters that contain a single Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) officer. Extensive civilian cooperation would likely result in Civil Affairs being the main actor involved (over CIMIC officers). Integrating the political responsibilities traditionally belonging to civil affairs into the military component of the mission in the form of either an expansion of CIMIC activities or the embedding of Civil Affairs personnel in military deployments would ensure that military components are associated with the input-legitimacy mechanisms. This also serves to make sure that input is happening on a truly local (as opposed to national) scale. This is the decentralization of the political functions of the mission down to the lowest military unit deployed independently, the infantry platoon.

UN Blue helmet. Source: Daniel Košinár on Wikimedia Commons licensed under public domain 48

CONCLUSION UN peacekeeping missions, authoritarian regimes, revolutionary guerrillas, and mining corporations have more in common than any of them would like to admit.

Namely they all desire legitimacy and lack accountability.

By looking at the strategies that each pursue, we can get a fuller idea of how legitimacy without accountability can be pursued. One of the most significant findings is that input-based legitimacy, which is popularly thought to require accountability, is pursued by various actors who lack accountability, because input-based legitimacy is more durable then other forms of legitimacy.

Procedural-based legitimacy is meaningful.

Progress should be made on improving UN procedures to maximize visibility and contact with civilians.

However, this effort is currently limited by structural unaccountability and is thus best when linked to input-based accountability mechanisms. Outcome-based legitimacy is desirable but fragile. Outside resource constraints undermine capabilities and failure can lead to a snowball effect that leads to more failure. However, if output-based legitimacy is tied to input-based legitimacy, the population then has a degree of ownership over failure and success, making legitimacy more durable. It also makes successful output more likely, as locals know local context in a way that benefits success of mission programs. Across the board, input-based legitimacy shores up the limitations of the other two methods of gaining legitimacy. Input legitimacy is also valuable as a contribution to legitimacy in its own right. Input drives the shift from trying to align the population with the mission to aligning the mission with the population.

This results in shared interests and thus acceptance by a local population.

Overall, input legitimacy is a tool that needs to be recognized and utilized as part of a wider effort to produce truly successful missions. This needs to be done alongside the many efforts that can better a mission’s legitimacy that fall under output and procedural legitimacy. These must be pursued and incorporated with input methods. A conscious effort toward gaining local legitimacy must incorporate input mechanisms. These mechanisms (such as variations of “local ownership” and accountability for peacekeepers) are already recognized as good ideas in their own right. The opportunity to consciously incorporate input mechanisms within these reforms should not be lost.

Local legitimacy is crucial to the success (or failure) of the modern United Nations peacekeeping operations. So far the battle has been uphill, and the methods indirect and inefficient. The incorporation of input-based legitimacy has the potential to help change that for the better. Millions of lives hang in the balance.

“Where We Operate Peacekeeping.” United Nations Peacekeeping, United Nations, peacekeeping. un.org/en/where-we-operate.

“Can MONUSCO Really Withdraw From the DRC?” Kivu Security Blog, 12 Dec. 2019, blog.kivusecurity. org/can-monusco-really-withdraw-from-the-drc/.

Raymond, Dwight. Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), United States Army War College, 2018.

Gippert, Birte Julia. Local Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Pathways to Local Compliance with International Police Reform. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018.

Hönke, Jana. “Business and the uses of ‘Civil society’: Governing Congolese mining areas” Critical Perspectives on African Politics: Liberal Interventions, State-Building and Civil Society. London: Routledge, 2016 Kassem, Susann. “Peacekeeping, Development, and Counterinsurgency.” Land of Blue Helmets, 2016.

Lombard, Louisa. State of Rebellion: Violence and Intervention in the Central African Republic. Zed Books, Limited, 2016.

Autesserre, Séverine. Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. 2015 Nathan, Andrew J. “Authoritarian Resilience.” Journal of Democracy 14.1. 2003.

Dionne, Kim Yi. Doomed Interventions: The Failure of Global Responses to AIDS in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2018.

“US Troops in Djibouti Dig Wells, Build Schools.” Voice of America. Accessed November 22, 2019. https:// www.voanews.com/archive/us-troops-djibouti-dig-wells-build-schools.

Amnesty International.“EVERYTHING WAS IN FLAMES” THE ATTACK ON A DISPLACED PERSONS CAMP IN ALINDAO. London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2018 United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services.

Evaluation of re-hatting in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) Assignment No. IED-18-002 (12 February 2018).

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