The Claremont Journal of International Relations | Fall 2020

CLAREMONT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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VOL. 6, ISSUE 1 | FALL 2020

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Claremont Journal of LAREMONT OURNAL OF International Relations

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I NTERNATIONAL R ELATIONS Volume IV | Issue 2 | Spring 2018 May 2019 - Claremont, CA

VOLUME | ISSUE | FALL 2020 Volume V |VIIssue 2 |I Summer 2020

DECEMBER 2020 - CLAREMONT June 2020 - Claremont

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MASTHEAD VOLUME VI | ISSUE I | FALL 2020

EDITOR IN CHIEF SELINA HO, SCRIPPS COLLEGE ’21 MANAGING EDITOR KARI SIEGENTHALER, POMONA COLLEGE '22 EDITORIAL BOARD ELIZABETH HOWELL-EGAN, SCRIPPS COLLEGE ’22 A M E L I A H U C H L E Y, S C R I P P S C O L L E G E ’ 2 3 N E J R A K R AV I C , S C R I P P S C O L L E G E ’ 2 1 OLIVIA TRUESDALE, SCRIPPS COLLEGE ’21 WRITERS B E R N A D E T T E G O S T E L O W, M A X I M I L I A N L I M , C O L U M B I A C O L L E G E K AY L I N K I M , P O M O N A C O L L E G E ‘ 2 4 J A N N A R A M A D A N , H A R VA R D C O L L E G E C A R O LY N T U N G , C L A R E M O N T M C K E N N A C O L L E G E ‘ 2 4

Articles in the Claremont Journal of International Relations reflect the opinion of the authors and do not represent the Claremont Journal of International Relations, its editors, other staff members or the Claremont Colleges. _________________________________________________________________________

Claremont Journal of International Relations Volume VI, Issue 1, Fall 2020 Published in 2021 by Selina Ho and the editorial board of the Claremont Journal of International Relations.

Faculty Advisor(s): Professor Geoffrey Herrera, Pitzer College Journal e-mail: claremontjir@gmail.com Web: www.claremontjir.wordpress.com Twitter: @ClaremontJIR Cover: Soy Production In Brazil, Source: SentinelHub under CC 4

CONTENTS

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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR SELINA HO

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RESPONSES TO MASS SHOOTINGS: GUN CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES AND NEW ZEALAND JANNA RAMADAN

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FROM NATIONALISM TO COMMERCIALIZATION: THE EVOLUTION OF THE HANFU MOVEMENT CAROLYN TUNG

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ADDRESSING THE DOKDO/TAKESHIMA TERRITORIAL DISPUTE TO IMPROVE SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS KAYLIN KIM PULLING BACK THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE: THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF THE US-CHINA TRADE WAR ON BRAZILIAN SOY PRODUCTION BERNADETTE GOSTELOW, MAXIMILIAN LIM

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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

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A question I've been considering quite often during this unprecedented time is how do we sustain the communities we have built and how do we create new ones to meet the crises we currently face? We are witnessing how acutely and deeply our interdependence shapes our lives, from the mammoth challenges in our global supply chain to the door-to-door efforts of mutual aid and community solidarity happening in the neighborhoods around us. On a personal level, millions of people are dealing with the extended isolation of staying inside and social distancing, unable to gather with and hold their friends, family, and loved ones.

Through the work at CJIR, I've been able to glean new perspectives on these questions and in this issue, we hope to provide on these related issues. For example, the Hanfu movement, explored in depth in Carolyn Tung's article, has been built primarily through an online community of Chinese netizens, providing a space for a younger generation to explore and assert their cultural histories and identities. In Gostelow and Lim's article, we zoom in on one agricultural community in Brazil to explain the effects of the United State's trade policy, specifically the trade war under the Trump administration, and domestic agricultural policy on the increased deforestation of the Amazon and the inequities big agribusinesses and smallholder farmers.

The making of this issue was a collective effort of the incredible women on our editorial board and the help of our managing editor. The feedback for and discussion on the submissions received, the mentorship and support for staff writers, and countless rounds of editing were invaluable.

As Arundhati Roy has told us: "The pandemic is a portal. . . We can choose to walk through it, dragging the carcasses of our prejudice and hatred, our avarice, our data banks and dead ideas, our dead rivers and smoky skies behind us. Or we can walk through lightly, with little luggage, ready to imagine another world. And ready to fight for it." We can imagine the embraces of our loved ones with a newfound desire to more deeply cultivate and express care for one another and we can continue to broaden our existing communities, boldly envisioning a world that gurantees the dignity of all people, through meaningful reflection, discussion, and action.

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Janna Ramadan

RESPONSES TO MASS SHOOTINGS: GUN CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES AND NEW ZEALAND

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March For Our Lives student protest for gun control, Source: Fibonacci Blue on Wikimedia Commons under CC

I. Introduction On March 15, 2019, New Zealand experienced its first mass shooting in almost 30 years at two mosques in Christchurch (Kennedy). In the immediate aftermath, New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and Parliament passed legislation to ban semi-automatic grade weapons and implemented a buyback program to purchase the now-illegal weapons from citizens (Greenfield). In addition to the passed legislation, Prime Minister Ardern was purposeful in the rhetoric used to react to the massacre, treating it as a national tragedy (Manhire). In contrast, the United States experienced 417 mass shootings in 2019 (Silverstein). In response, legislation has been proposed at the federal level, but without legislation passing, the response is opposite of New Zealand’s. Assessing the differing state attributes, I argue that New Zealand’s cultural attitude towards guns, the absence of a gun lobby, and the legitimized use of coercion by law enforcement and the judicial system enabled the New Zealand government to create legislative change and a buyback program in response to Christchurch (Kelly and McCammon). In comparison, the United States’ lack of such attributes has prevented a legislative response to the multitude of mass shootings in the United States.

II. Civilian Gun Culture Civilian gun culture has a direct impact on the state capacity to legislatively respond to mass shootings. New Zealand civilian culture largely views guns as objects used mainly for recreational activities, limiting the possibility of symbolizing guns beyond utility for hobbies (Kelly and McCammon). As a result, although some New Zealand citizens view themselves as responsible, law-abiding gun owners, they are willing to follow state legislation on gun ownership in response to Christchurch, putting national benefit before individual interests (Kelly and McCammon).

In stark contrast, in the United States guns are symbolically representative of American individual rights and identity. In 2017, the Pew Research Center found that 74% of gun owners perceive the right to own guns as essential to their personal sense of freedom (Pew Research Center, 6-7). This perceived sense of freedom alludes to the American value of freedom of expression as a protected right. Of those same gun owners, half say that being a gun owner is either somewhat or very important to their overall identity.

Sampling national public opinion, it is evident that American gun owners elevate guns from mere tools to

a mechanism of enacting their freedom and of personal identification.

The gravity of cultural perspective on guns as a personal matter can be understood through Seymour Martin Lipset’s perception of America as ideologically grounded and individualistic, a modernist take on its establishment as a nation. Lipset argues that being American is an “ideological commitment” and that those who reject or deviate from adherence to American values are effectively un-American (Lipset 19). A nationally ascribed value is the perception of a right to personal freedoms. In the case of the United States, one such personal freedom is gun ownership.

Committing guns to a symbol of the American value of personal freedom makes it such that threats to gun ownership in America amount to deviations from this national set of values and can be called a threat to American freedom. Being in favor of gun legislation reform becomes un-American. Likewise, American individualism prevents action on a broad scale by prioritizing individual rights. Lipset argues that the American Creed is made up of anti-statism, individualism, populism, and egalitarianism (Lipset 26). The concept of individualism impacts American gun culture as it prioritizes individual access to and ownership of guns over national interests. Despite the tragedy of mass shootings, the individual right and freedom to gun ownership remains paramount, preventing legislative action.

It is in this way that the national gun culture in New Zealand and the United States directly impacts the ability of the government to respond to mass shootings with legislation. While New Zealand culture was amenable to legislative action because the national view on guns was limited to use for recreational activities, the American citizens’ elevation of the role of guns to a representation of individual freedoms and identity created barriers to legislative action. However, it is overly simplistic to attribute the attitudes of American gun-owners to the entire population and to extrapolate that to result in the entire blocking of gun reform legislation. Gun owners only make up 30% of U.S. adults . Of non-gun-owners, only 35% associate their right to own guns with their personal sense of freedom (Pew Research Center 6-7). Thus, with respect to the total American population, those viewing gun ownership as a proxy for personal freedom are a fraction of the population. Findings from an August 2019 Fox News poll of registered voters found that 90% of respondents favored universal background checks and 67% favored banning assault weapons, indicating that 9

a majority of Americans favor some form of gun reform legislation (Blanton). Yet due to American gun lobby, the symbolic value of guns permeates the national dialogue on gun legislation (Gilens and Page, 564-581).

III. Gun Lobbies and Federal Influence Beyond the impact of gun culture on attempts at legislative gun reform, gun lobbies, as a special interest group, are in position to further direct the conversation and resulting legislation. As an example of John Gaventa’s Faces of Power theory, lobbies, as a Third Face of Power, can utilize their position to impact the government such that the government acts contrary to its interest (Gaventa). In New Zealand, the gun lobbies take form as pro-gun rights organizations akin to outdoor clubs. New Zealand gun lobbies consist of hunting and rifle associations working to protect the recreational use of guns, catering to an activity-based interest group (Kelly and McCammon). As a result, they cater to a smaller audience and are unable to connect their interests with a broader identification category, such as economic class. The New Zealand gun lobby industry also lacks substantial financial power (Kelly and McCammon). As a result of the specific arena of gun ownership retention promoted and the lack of financial influence, New Zealand gun lobbies do not exert significant influence on New Zealand’s legislative government. Thus, the government is able to make decisions on gun reform, approaching the gun lobby as a constituency rather than a dictating voice.

The American gun lobby is treated in an entirely different manner, as lobbies are essentially given authority and legitimacy resulting in the power to block legislation. Lobbies in the United States are characterized by their significant financial power and their capacity to utilize those finances to both dictate the conversations and legislation seen in government. Whereas gun culture reflects the role of guns in the American daily life, lobbies reflect the priorities of the business and corporation interest groups. They are responsible for gaining benefits in the form of regulations and legislation for the constituency they represent. William Domhoff explains that their influential power “is based on a great amount of personal contact, but its most important ingredients are the information and financial support that lobbyists have to offer,” (Domhoff, 176). Unlike New Zealand, American lobbies hold substantial wealth that is distributed according to how the lobby throws its weight. Thus, despite the niche status of interest groups lobbying legislators, the groups’ financial influence empowers them to manipulate their social and political networks for their benefit.

The American gun lobby operates exactly in this capacity. It amplifies the gun culture of gun-owners, a minority population in the U.S., to create a perception of a national culture that views guns as a means of freedom. Using its financial power, the gun lobby contributes to the campaigns of incumbents or challengers sympathetic to their views. Catering to the public and aiming to sway public opinion, the gun lobby also pays for pro-gun and Constitution-focused advertisements. Additionally, the lobby contributes to advocacy against legislation that negatively impacts gun manufacturers and the commercial gun industry by engaging with members of congressional subcommittees and providing generous donations to members of Congress (Musa, 4). High-spending lobbies, such as the gun lobby, generally succeed in their efforts, as policy outcomes have a modest tendency of reflecting the side with greater expenditures (Gilens and Page, 574-575).

In reflecting the interests of economic beneficiaries of the Students protesting for gun control legislation, Source: Fibonacci Blue on Wikimedia Commons under CC 10

Interfaith Vigil for the Christchurch Shooting Victims, Source: Tim Dennell on Wikimedia Commons under CC

commercial gun industry as expressed through the gun lobby, the government’s actions digress from the displayed public opinion of the majority of Americans (Block, 18-19). Despite a climbing increase in gun violence, the U.S. government does not display an active effort to ensure the safety of Americans through gun legislation (“Gun Deaths Are on the Rise Nationally”). Thus, the American gun lobby’s exercise of power presents a greater obstacle to enacting restrictive gun reform legislation compared to New Zealand, where the gun lobby did not inhibit gun reform legislation from being presented and passed.

IV. Legitimate Use of Coercive Powers of The State Further allowing or preventing concrete government action following mass shootings are differing levels of legitimacy of law enforcement and the judicial system as they exercise their coercive powers.

Following the Christchurch shooting, the New Zealand government passed legislation to ban many semi-automatic weapons and set up a gun buyback program with overwhelming support of legislators, a display of the legitimacy of the use of coercion by law enforcement and the judicial system. Six weeks after the implementation of New Zealand’s semi-automatic weapon buyback program, over 15,000 weapons and 64,000 parts and accessories had been purchased from New Zealanders by the State (Perry). In an incredible display of the legitimacy of state coercive power, New Zealanders on the whole trust the government’s use of violence so much so that they returned their weapons to the government. Part of this national trust in State coercive apparatuses, such as the police, is New Zealand’s history of policing with limited firearms. New Zealand’s policing system does have a history of patrolling brown communities, specifically the indigenous Maori and Pacific people of New Zealand. However, the unequal patrolling of brown communities is not coupled with violence towards those communities, as, through a recently continued pilot program, officers are not routinely armed. If police have weapons they are kept in the police car, rather than on the physical body of the police officer (Warner and Antolini). Such state systems provide an elite cue that security is not equivalent to the holding of firearms and provides a basis for trust that the state will not abuse returned weapons.

Should the United States be able to work against gun culture and the weight of the gun lobby to pass gun reform legislation, it would remain unable to

create a similar concrete program due to the illegitimacy of the use of violence by law enforcement in the United States. The history of law enforcement and the manipulation of the judicial system to target and disenfranchise minority communities has reduced trust in the State’s coercive power. In their writing on racial and legal exclusion in the United States, Mary Waters and Philip Kasinitz argue that although the United States has granted minorities U.S. citizenship as a way to grant them equality in the eyes of the State, “the designation has not served as a meaningful guarantee of civil or social rights in practice,” (Waters and Kasinitz, 130). Such designation did not protect African Americans and their right to vote during the Jim Crow era. This designation did not prevent the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, nor did this designation protect Arabs, South Asians, Muslims, and Sikhs from acts of prejudice following the September 11th Attacks (Waters and Kasinitz, 130). As a result, public trust and buy-in to the judicial system has been breached. Likewise, legitimacy of the United States’ coercive mechanism, law enforcement, has been crippled following the War on Drugs. Routine incarceration of the Black population was not a result of rising crime rates but rather a political act in response to changing race relations in the United States (Western, 4). In utilizing crime control the United States turned the use of its law enforcement from a neutral body meant to locate violators of the law to a mechanism of a carceral state, choosing to incarcerate minorities rather than provide support to such minorities through welfare (Waters and Kasinitz, 121). This occurred under both Democratic and Republican administrations, extending the impact across all of American government rather than associating it with a single administration. As a result, the United

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2nd Amendment Rally in Virginia, Source: Anthony Crider on Wikimedia Commons under CC

States has delegitimized its law enforcement and judicial system through historical targeting of minority communities.

Weak public trust in coercive state mechanisms on gun legislation limits the range of action the United States may take following gun violence and mass shootings. In the case of New Zealand, guns are seen as an element of public safety allowing legislators to pass both a law banning the semi-automatic weapons used during the Christchurch shooting and establish a buy-back program. The historical and present use of guns as part of U.S. state violence, largely harming minority communities, establishes guns as harmful to public safety. As a result, the U.S. is incapable of establishing a buyback program similar to that of New Zealand because of the lack of public trust in the State’s use of armed forces. To make progress to that end, the United States must take action to explicitly address the concern that the government will not abuse the weaponry it acquires through a buyback program.

V. Conclusion On the whole, New Zealand and the United States respond to mass shootings from two very different standpoints. Where New Zealand has a gun culture that views guns as tools, American gun culture elevates the view of guns from tools to a proxy for freedom and individual rights. Where New Zealand’s gun lobby lacks the financial capacity to influence the government, its American counterpart is financially backed and maintains personal connections allowing it to prevent gun reform legislation. Where New Zealanders trust state use of arms, the United States has yet to reckon with its historical and present state violence against minorities. The contextual diffe-

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rences between the U.S. and New Zealand halt attempts to graft New Zealand’s successful responses to gun violence in the United States. The American gun lobby’s financial influence makes gun control legislation more difficult to pass, but there remains potential in an American buyback program.

Regaining trust in state institutions through reconciliation and recognition of historical malpractice may have a positive effect on passing buyback legislation. Further research is needed on the potential feasibility, but the value of such a reconciliation expands beyond the scope of responses to gun violence alone. Although the exact responses to gun violence that proved effective in New Zealand may not translate to the U.S. directly, the New Zealand example of trust in state mechanisms and the buyback program offers energizing new prospects for ways the United States may consider reacting to gun violence beyond solely a debate on gun control legislation.

References Blanton, Dana “Fox News Poll: Most back gun restrictions after shootings, Trump ratings down.” Fox News. August 14, 2019.

Block, Fred. “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State.” Socialist Revolution, vol. 7, no. 3, 1977, pp. 18-19.

Domhoff, G. William. “How the Power Elite Dominated Government.” Who Rules America? The Triumph of the Corporate Rich, 5th Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. 176.

Gaventa, John. “Power and Participation,” Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence & Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley. University of Illinois Press, 1980.

Gilens, Martin, and Page, Benjamin I. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens.” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 12, no. 3, 2014, pp. 564–581.

Greenfield, Charlotte. “NZ launches gun ‘buy-back’ scheme for weapons banned after Christchurch mosque attacks.” Reuters. June 19, 2019.

“Gun Deaths Are on the Rise Nationally.” Giffords. https://giffords.org/gun-violence-statistics/#national-anchor.

Kelly, Mary Louise and Belinda McCammon. “How New Zealand Has Moved Forward Since The Christchurch Shootings.” National Public Radio. August 15, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/08/15/751538469/

how-new-zealand-has-moved-forward-since-the-christchurch-shootings.

Kennedy, Merrit. “In New Zealand, Mass Shootings Are Very Rare.” National Public Radio. March 15, 2019.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. “The American Ideology.”

Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada. New York: Routledge, 1989, pp 19-26.

Manhire, Toby. “Jacinda Ardern: ‘Very little of what I have done has been deliberate. It’s intuitive’.” The Guardian. April 6, 2019.

Musa, Sam. “The Impact of NRA on the American Policy.” Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs, vol. 4, no. 4, 2016, pp. Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs, 2016, Vol.4 (4).

Perry, Nick. “How New Zealand’s Gun Buyback Program Is Faring 6 Weeks In.” PBS. September 3, 2019. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ how-new-zealands-gun-buyback-program-is-faring-6-weeks-in.

Pew Research Center. “America’s Complex Relationship With Guns.” June 2017, pp. 6-7.

Silverstein, Jason. “There were more mass shootings than days in 2019.” CBS News. January 2, 2020.

Warner, Gregory and Antolini, Tina. “As New Zealand Police Pledge To Stay Unarmed, Maori Activists Credit U.S. Protests.” NPR. June 11, 2020. https:// www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/06/11/874851593/as-new-zealand-police-pledge-to-stay-unarmed-maori-activists-credit-u-s-protests.

Waters, Mary and Philip Kasinitz. “The War on Crime and the War on Immigrants: Racial and Legal Exclusion in the Twenty-First-Century United States.”

Fear, Anxiety, and National Identity. New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 2015, pp. 121-130.

Western, Bruce. Punishment and Inequality in America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007, pp. 4.

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Carolyn Tung

FROM NATIONALISM TO COMMERCIALIZATION: THE EVOLUTION OF THE HANFU MOVEMENT

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Hanfu, Source: bdrc on Wikimedia Commons under CC

A recent fashion trend has swept both China and areas abroad in which young Chinese men and women transform themselves into figures of ancient regality and grace by wearing the Hanfu. These modern-day time travelers represent the Hanfu Movement, a twenty-first century social movement that aims to restore the ancient dress of the Han Chinese people. While the origins of the Hanfu Movement are inextricably linked to Chinese nationalism and Han ethnocentrism, the commercialization of Hanfu has contributed to its evolution into a symbol of self-expression, cultural pride, and strong personal and cultural identity. While the sociopolitical implications of Hanfu have been suspect in the academic space in the past decade, it is important to consider the changing dynamics of the Hanfu Movement with more recent evidence and analysis. Today, the majority of consumers place higher value on Hanfu for its aesthetics and cultivation of personal discovery and healthy national consciousness, rather than solely as an instrument of Han chauvinism. The loud minority of conservative Han supremacists from 20032012 should not detract from the majority of Hanfu enthusiasts from 2012 onward, who enjoy the pursuit of traditional Chinese culture in the midst of a rapidly globalizing country with a wavering sense of identity.

Hanfu is the traditional costume of the Han Chinese, the ethnic majority group in China, and has surged in popularity in the past two decades. However, many scholars disagree on the exact dynasty of its origin, which reflects the lack of historical knowledge about the clothing itself. Scholastic material on the Hanfu is mainly comprised of secondary sources, such as literature, relics, museum documents, and reports from archaeological discoveries (Xu 20). Much of Hanfu’s craftsmanship process has been lost as well, and its historical visual representations— for instance, paintings and pottery figurines—are vague (21). It is also important to note that what is referred to as “Hanfu'” is more so an umbrella term that describes all clothing of the Han Chinese throughout history, rather than a specific type of dress, such as the cheongsam of the Qing Dynasty (Lee and Yeung).

Up until recently, there was little discourse over the Hanfu in both academic and non-academic spaces. Traditional Chinese clothing was largely associated with the cheongsam. It was the traditional dress of the Chinese people leading up to the Mao era, during which the general population favored Western-style clothing, reserving traditional dress for ceremonial events (Xiaode et al. 506).

However, as China’s economy is now driven by globalization, moving further away from the era of tradition, the role of clothing has become increasingly important.

Long before the Hanfu became mainstream, the

debate over China’s national costume posed a challenge to the nation’s leaders. In 2001, China hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Summit. As per the convention’s tradition of its participants wearing the cultural clothing of the host country, former Chinese president Jiang Zemin presented the “outfit of the Tang” for prominent world leaders to wear (Carrico). These Mandarin collar button-down jackets were an ambiguous blending of ‘traditional Chinese’ and Western designs, chosen after much deliberation on other kinds of traditional Chinese clothing. Such alternatives had contentious political connotations, were old-fashioned (in this case, the Hanfu), or simply unsuitable for a leadership summit (Zhao 71-75). According to one of the designers of the Chinese costume presented at APEC, “Many countries in the world have their own national dress. When you think of Japan, you think of kimono; when you think of Korea, you think of hanbok. What do we have? Nothing. The Western suit is not ours, and the qipao [cheongsam] is only for women. When we were designing the APEC jacket, we were thinking we had to design a garb of our own culture that could be worn at formal occasions” (Zhao 73).

As a result, Zemin presented a modified version of Chinese culture to the world to appeal to the modern China that is both Chinese and Western. While the everyday citizen could not identify that this “outfit of the Tang” was inauthentic, there were a small number of people who could.

When photos of these leaders donning the inaccurate clothing spread on the Internet like wildfire, some outraged Chinese netizens were quick to point out that the photographed traditional dress did not belong to the Tang Dynasty. In fact, it was closer to resembling the magua of the Qing Dynasty, which was an imperial period ruled by the Manchus, an ethnic minority in China. Some netizens could not reconcile the fact that China was representing itself with the clothing of an ‘inferior, barbarian’ people and its former conquerors (Carrico).

This group of extreme activists consider the Qing Dynasty to be China’s darkest period (Chew and Wang 6). They believe that the Manchus had oppressed the Han Chinese by erasing their culture which had thrived for thousands of years, forcing Manchu traditions and clothing onto them, and committing merciless massacres. They found it incomprehensible that the Chinese would continue to wear Manchu clothing even after the end of Manchu imperial rule in 1912 when the Han Chinese regained control of the government. Worst of all, they believed that because China had suffered under this Manchu oppression, their weak state had allowed 15

the West to subject China to even further colonialism and external rule (Leibold 547). They exerted their misplaced frustration and anger onto the Chinese government, who they blamed for advancing China’s economy at the expense of utter Westernization (Chew and Wang 4). If not for the Manchu invasion leading up to the Qing Dynasty, they believed China surely would have prospered over the West (Chew and Wang 4). Harboring these bitter sentiments, this minority of Han supremacists began to advocate for the revival of Han culture with the goal of achieving Han purity.

In a forum post criticizing the clothing choice of the 2001 APEC summit, some netizens proposed that the traditional dress of the Han should have been chosen for wear (Carrico). It is important to note that “Hanfu” was not an actual term before the events following APEC, so many Chinese people did not have the vocabulary or image recognition to identify the Hanfu as the traditional clothing of the Han Chinese. Rather, the elegant, loose-fitting robes of past dynasties in television renditions of classics, such as Dream of the Red Chamber, were nameless or at least not well-known to the ordinary citizen (Jiang). When some netizens uploaded their own sketches of what they referred to as “Hanfu,” a community of people who were enamored with the idea that the Han Chinese had their own traditional dress began forming (Carrico). A wave of exhilaration enveloped these budding Hanfu enthusiasts, who began sharing ideas and pictures of handmade Hanfu designs that were built on their vision of what ancient clothing looked like based on media portrayals.

This community of Hanfu enthusiasts set up websites and forums dedicated to the revival of Han culture, which garnered a large online following. What started out as root seeking transformed into a fervent duty to “awaken the sleeping national culture” (Xiaode et al. 506). In the early twenty-first century, with China becoming a central force on the world stage, much of its national identity was fragile because so much of Chinese society was now reflective of the Western world (Chew and Wang 4). Many Chinese people worried that China’s traditional values and cultural practices, such as various rituals and ceremonies, had been lost to modernization. It was especially difficult having an superficial connection to their cultural identity when comparing China to its neighbors, Korea and Japan, whose people thrived in their traditional clothing (Xiaode et al. 506). This period of vulnerability and weakened identity primed China for a cultural shift. On November 22, 2003, a man named Wang Letian appeared in public in a handsewn Hanfu he had designed himself. With this dramatic entrance, the Hanfu Movement was born. Kevin Carrico, an expert in Chinese nationalism and critic of the Hanfu, describes the movement’s goal as recentering the ‘real China’ around the Han Chinese (Carrico). However, the constitution of an infamous Hanfu supremacist website, Hanwang, lists the promotion of Hanfu as its last goal (Leibold 549). It seemed that the Hanfu had become the face of the larger Han supremacist movement, but it was more accurately a vehicle used to push a narrative of Han purity.

As Hanfu was still uncommon and unknown to the general public at the time, many of the early members of the Hanfu Movement were given strange looks and were subject to public judgment. In fact, many Chinese people confused the Hanfu for traditional Japanese clothing, a testament to how left behind the Hanfu was for modern day China. Even after the establishment of the movement, the average Chinese person still considered the fashion of the Qing Dynasty to be the mainstream choice for traditional dress. According to the Beijing Review, the Hanfu Movement had not yet gained enough traction to be well-known during the 2006 Winter Olympics. Many overseas Chinese felt shame and embarrassment at the sight of Chinese athletes donning Western suits while many other countries boasted their unique traditional clothing (“Should Example of Hanfu clothing, Source: bdrc on Wikimedia Commons China Adopt the Hanfu as Its National Costume?”). However, under CC 16

Woman dressed in Hanfu clothing playing the dizi, Source: bdrc on Wikimedia Commons under CC

this early period of the Hanfu Movement publicized the Hanfu and began gathering a community of followers.

From 2007 to 2012, the Hanfu became increasingly known to the public in a time of identity-seeking for the Chinese people, particularly the younger generation.

Those who were 30 years old and below had not experienced Tiananmen, Long March, the Cultural Revolution, or the government of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping (Leibold 550). As said by scholar Yan Zhang of Peking University, “The Chinese are becoming better off economically, but although they live more comfortably in the materialistic sense, they find that spiritually they feel more ‘empty’” (230). In a largely irreligious country, the younger Chinese generation differs from their parents and grandparents considerably in their views of the world and lived experiences. As a result, many of them have resorted to exploring their cultural heritage to discover the meaning of what it is to be Chinese.

To them, being Han seems more of an exclusionary marker of what they are not—an ethnic minority in China—rather than a concrete definition of what they are.

On one hand, James Leibold, an expert on ethnic relations in China at La Trobe University, argues that Han Chinese culture had become so ingrained in Chinese society that the Han feel they are the “silent majority” that is “often looked at but not seen” (544-545). However, Yan Zhang of Peking University suggests that this concept of “empty Han” resulted from the inability to recognize what of true Chinese society remained after such major shifts towards modernization, which was really Westernization (228).

Both analyses have merit, but the latter is more relevant to the greater Chinese population, whereas the former is more specific to the early proponents of the Hanfu Movement. Either way, the existence of Hanfu sparked curiosity and hope: could being Han Chinese be more than ticking off a box for ethnicity (Leibold 547)? The craving for a profound sense of identity mobilized early support for the Hanfu Movement.

Eventually, the Hanfu Movement garnered enough attention for a member of a committee to propose that the Hanfu be worn as the national costume of China during the 2008 Olympics, but this was ultimately rejected. With 56 ethnic minorities making up China’s population, it was impossible for the Hanfu to represent the inherent cultural fusion and diversity of China’s national identity.

Furthermore, a Beijing Review interview of Han Haoyue of Sohu, the company that hosted the 2008 Beijing Olympics website, emphasized that the Hanfu was anyhow not mainstream enough: “[w]hen most Chinese do not even have a clear idea of Hanfu, it's unwise to present this

costume to the world…” (“Should China Adopt Hanfu as its National Costume?”). In the same Beijing Review article, some critics of the Hanfu believed that the clothing was a “superficial part of the traditional culture. For them, it is only the prized ancient arts of literature and philosophy that represent the true essence of Chinese traditional culture." Most of all, these critics believed that the Hanfu risked Han chauvinism and narrow-minded nationalism and that choosing it for the Olympics would unleash dark consequences. However, eventually the Hanfu Movement began to deviate from its nationalistic origins.

In the backdrop of the controversy of Hanfu, the clothing style undeniably became a fashion choice that nurtured self-expression. There is a certain romanticism and transformative aspect to wearing ancient robes, as Hanfu is closely associated with the classical literature and art of ancient China, as well as traditional instruments such as the guzheng, guqin, and erhu. Especially due to the attraction of Japanese cosplay and kimono culture among the younger generation, which did not inherit a grudge towards China’s neighbors, wearing Hanfu became an expressive form of cultural and national pride.

These Hanfu enthusiasts could finally show the world that they, too, had their own beautiful traditional clothing.

Unlike the more modern, 1920s-esque cheongsam which is more retro than ancient, the Hanfu gives enthusiasts the opportunity to project an ethereal and fairy-like impression that channels their inner Chinese spirit. Common designs include dramatic draping sleeves, shimmering translucent layers of fabric, flowing skirts, intricate embroidery of flowers, and diversity in color palettes.

The photoshoot often takes place near traditional architecture or among nature, highlighting the historical and fantasy-like elements of the clothing. Women wear traditional hairstyles and elaborate hair pins, hair sticks, or hair combs. They often pose for photos using Chinese opera

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hand gestures, possibly emulating women in traditional Chinese art. They might use props as well, such as a fan, instrument, or parasol while men might hold a fan, instrument, a wine gourd, or scrolls. However, with the advantage of contemporary creative freedom, photoshoots are largely up to the photographer and are not limited to strict historical boundaries.

Additionally, the Hanfu allows Han Chinese males to explore masculinity through a Han Chinese lens in modeling the image of a swordsman. According to scholar Jiaxuan Xu, “Contrary to the characteristics of modern Western fashion, which emphasizes gender and the body’s shape, Hanfu did not conform to the Western norm of beauty.

Instead, Hanfu commoditized grace and inner strength, with the body completely covered by a voluminous robe creating a sense of implicit and restrained beauty” (Xu 17).

Unlike the female cheongsam and male changshan and Tang/Mao suits, the long robes of the Hanfu are largely similar in shape for both men and women. Hence, there are many unisex styles, and blurring gender lines was quite common in history and in the present, though more so for women than men. As masculinity in ancient China was associated with long hair and long robes, a return to these elements of traditional culture represents a subtle protest of contemporary Western fashion, especially for those who wear Hanfu daily. It may also reflect younger generations that posit gender as something more dynamic than the ancient world’s interpretation of it. For example, it is more common for young Chinese men to wear makeup and earrings, and the rise in androgynous Chinese women in mainstream entertainment, such as Acrush and Liu Yuxin and Lu Keran of THE9, signal that the Chinese youth are challenging gender norms more directly so than previous generations.

The commercialization of the Hanfu as a fashion choice not for political purposes but for self-expression has changed the tide of the Hanfu Movement. The movement is now straying away from the fears of academics who warned against its nationalistic undertones, which can be seen in the diversity of Hanfu enthusiasts. There are still Han supremacists who reflect the Hanfu Movement’s original intentions to revive Han culture and to maintain the purity of the Hanfu by adhering to historical accuracy as much as possible. However, this group is becoming outnumbered by those who treat Hanfu as a mere fashion style rather than a politicized tool of nationalism. Many Hanfu enthusiasts do not mind or even embrace changes in traditional Hanfu designs to adapt the clothing to modern life. Hanfu enthusiasts vary from

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supporting slight changes in design to having no regard for historical accuracy whatsoever, focusing solely on the aesthetics. Additionally, many Hanfu retailers draw inspiration from subcultures such as anime, Lolita fashion, swordsmen costumes, and cosplay, while some do not reference history at all (Xu 37). In particular, the two-chest piece Hanfu is a popular style of Hanfu that is inspired by the Japanese Hakama and has no historical support for its design (22). As the influential Weibo blogger Meixuewuming explains, “The reason for its popularity is because the dress can be spread in 360 degrees without any vent, which is good for taking photos” (Jiang). The outright use of Japanese clothing designs and the production and consumption of inaccurate Hanfu for photoshoots demonstrate that many consumers today do not wear Hanfu with a nationalistic agenda but rather for personal satisfaction, self-expression, and entertainment purposes.

The majority of Hanfu consumers are young Chinese women, meaning they belong to the generation that is grappling with both personal and national identities (Xu 16). According to a paper published by Atlantis Press, “[a] performer who finds his own cultural orientation in the multi culture and recognizes it in the form of symbols is a renaissance in the cultural sense” (Xiaode et al. 505). While the beginnings of the Hanfu Movement had darker undertones, pop culture and mass media influences have co-opted the movement’s original intentions. In fact, the inspiration from Japanese fashion and pop culture suggests that the movement has fused into a reflection of China’s natural cultural blending, as opposed to the narrow-minded nationalism that posed a fear to so many.

Besides the potency of subculture influences, another reason for the Hanfu’s surge in popularity is due to the new era of Chinese fantasy (xianxia) dramas (Vogue Business, “Decoding China’s Hanfu Revival”). Unlike the influence of previous television dramas, the 2017 xianxia drama Ten Miles of Peach Blossom in particular caused a sensation among the Chinese and is currently the most viewed television series in China at 50 billion views (Xiao biao ge ai yele ). A scenic and tumultuous love story of immortals in ancient China, the characters wear exquisite Hanfu robes, and it is incredibly likely that the poetic romanticization of ancient China has contributed to the popularity of Hanfu among ordinary youth.

Given its large viewership, it may have even introduced the Hanfu to a sizable portion of its audience. Only from 2017 to 2018, there was a 92% increase in the number of Hanfu buyers on Taobao, a Chinese e-commerce site (Jiang). Additionally, many Hanfu products are marketed as “fairy clothing” (xian nv yi fu) on Taobao. Xian nv

is a term that is used to describe the elegant, refined, and dignified women of Chinese mythology, many of which are high-ranking immortals, and it is also used to describe Ten Miles of Peach Blossom (Baidu, xian nv).

Many of the Chinese youth have taken to social media platforms to showcase videos of them wearing Hanfu, emulating the grace and beauty of the xian nv or gallant swordsmen in xianxia dramas. The “Hanfu” tag on the international version of the Chinese video streaming app Douyin has over 60 million views and is full of reuploaded clips of Chinese adolescents and young adults who participate in trends involving Hanfu. The background music of such videos is made up of traditional Chinese instruments with lyrics that resemble ancient Chinese poetry, a genre dubbed “ancient music” (gu dai yin yu ). In essence, the Hanfu has become a trendy article of clothing that allows the Chinese youth to ‘time travel’ back to ancient China. By transforming Hanfu into a cosplay trend, the youth has found a deeper interest in elements of traditional culture, such as ancient Chinese folktales, mythology, or teachings. For example, in a Douyin video, they might try to emulate the aura of ‘one of the beauties of the ancient world’ through Chinese opera hand gestures, which are associated with beauty. Perhaps they might instead roleplay as an immortal trained in Daoist cultivation. These archetypes are all common in xianxia dramas and traditional Chinese literature and history. As 24-year-old Hanfu enthusiast Dafan says, “Through [H]anfu, another side—the classical and composed side—of me is presented unconsciously” (Jiang). It is the lyricism of ancient Chinese literature and the propriety of Confucian ritual that paint this palette of envisioned elegance; while some wish for traditional Chinese values to resurge in their Westernized society, Hanfu cosplay culture itself does not represent a direct desire to revive the more archaic morals of the ancient world due to its great diversity in the community. On a fundamental level, it is simply the imagining of oneself in a romanticized realm of uniquely Chinese fantasy.

Furthermore, there is statistical evidence that the attitude towards Hanfu is shifting towards a positive and more mild direction. In 2018, the Hanfu Information Platform surveyed official members of Hanfu associations, who call themselves ‘Robes’ (Xu 29). The survey showed that 87.14% of the respondents were a Robe due to “a preference for traditional fashion,” 63.37% for “a preference in Hanfu fashion,” and 55.19% for national consciousness (29). As Jiaxuan Xu puts it, “Many new enthusiasts are not attracted by the nationalist character of Hanfu, but by the culture of Hanfu itself” (29). Additionally, only

50.88% of the Robes respondents wore Hanfu to revive Han culture as opposed to 77.8% in the 2014 survey. Originally, many of these Hanfu associations were comprised of members with a nationalistic agenda, but the percentage of such revivers is substantially decreasing over time.

These survey results reflect the changing national view of Hanfu from a symbol of Han chauvinism to one of aesthetics and historical consciousness.

However, clothing is a political language, and the fears of scholars Kevin Carrico and James Leibold are valid as the Hanfu Movement certainly has nationalist undercurrents. Nationalism is not out-of-character for China as the Han-majority government has caused unrest and suffering among many ethnic minority groups for a long period of time. With this in mind, it is unreasonable for the Hanfu to become China’s national costume. Unlike small countries like Korea and Japan, China is distinctive in that it is a large country composed of 56 ethnic minority groups. Inherently, an authentic Chinese national identity must represent this cultural fusion and diversity that has become so integral to Chinese history. Hanfu as a national costume ignores this. However, there is still deep value to the Hanfu as an article of traditional clothing, especially since the Hanfu fever is largely driven by aesthetic appeal rather than by Han chauvinism.

Interestingly, the fact that Hanfu is so popular yet historically inaccurate indeed supports the prevalence of ‘empty Han’—what should symbolize Han Chinese culture has embraced fashion styles from Japan and been reduced to a symbol of modern aesthetics. However, the commercialization of Hanfu has simultaneously encouraged Chinese youth to explore their roots and gain a deeper interest in their cultural identity, which is natural and perhaps necessary in a rapidly globalizing country. With xianxia dramas that portray Hanfu as the dreamy, fairy-like costumes of immortals, young audiences seek Hanfu for cosplay, photoshoots, and the embracing of one’s femininity or masculinity through a Chinese lens, uninterrupted by Western thought. The Hanfu craze also signals that China’s inherent identity as a nation is a culmination of cultural fusion, not only due to its diversity in ethnicity but now also due to cultural influences from Japan. This has naturally resulted from cultural evolution in a largely globalized world. While the founders of the Hanfu Movement aimed to curb this cultural blending by framing the Hanfu as a dress of Han purity, the majority of Hanfu enthusiasts today have co-opted the movement to be one not of pent-up anger and Han supremacism but of self-expression, personal discovery, and cultural and national pride.

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References Beijing Review. “Should China Adopt Hanfu as Its National Costume?” Beijing Review, Beijing Review, 12 July 2007, www.bjreview.com.cn/forum/txt/2007-07/10/ content_68673_2.htm.

Carrico, Kevin. “Young People in China Have Started a Fashion Movement Built around Nationalism and Racial Purity.” Quartz, Quartz, 29 Aug. 2017, qz.com/1064404/ young-people-in-china-have-started-a-fashion-movement-built-around-racial-purity/.

Chew, Matthew M., and Yi Wang. “Online Cultural Conservatism and Han Ethnicism in China.” Asian Social Science, vol. 8, 1 June 2012, doi:http://dx.doi. org/10.5539/ass.v8n7p3 .

Ethnic Dress in the United States: A Cultural Encyclopedia, edited by Annette Lynch, and Mitchell D. Strauss, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ccl.idm. oclc.org/lib/claremont/detail.action?docID=1832685.

Jiang, Qingrui. “Hanfu: The Controversies behind the New Trend.” CCGTN, CCGTN, 7 Aug. 2019, news. cgtn.com/news/2019-08-07/Hanfu-The-controversies-behind-the-new-trend-IWhcJDcH9S/index.html.

Lee, Lily and Jessie Yeung. “Wearing Pride: Centuries-Old Chinese Fashion Is Making a Comeback.” CNN, Cable News Network, 12 Oct. 2019, www.cnn.com/style/article/hanfu-rise-intl-hnk/index.html.

Leibold, James. “More Than a Category: Han Supremacism on the Chinese Internet.” The China Quarterly, no. 203, 2010, pp. 539–559. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/ stable/27917795. Accessed 1 Nov. 2020.

Pan, Xiaode, et al. “An Analysis of the Current Situation of the Chinese Clothing Craze in the Context of the Rejuvenation of Chinese Culture.” Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, vol. 466, 28 Aug. 2020, doi:https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200826.101.

Team, Vogue Business. “Decoding China's Hanfu Revival.” Vogue Business, Vogue Business, 6 Feb. 2020, www. voguebusiness.com/fashion/hanfu-china-revival-traditional-clothing.

Xiao biao ge ai yele . “‘Yangmi Zhaoyouting ‘San Sheng Sanshi’ Zong Bofang Liang Chao 500 Yi, Deng Shang Dianshiju Bofang Liang Bangshou 500 ’ [Yang Mi and Zhao Youting's ‘Three Lives III’ Has a Total Broadcast Volume of over 50 Billion, Ranking First in the TV Series Broadcast Volume].” Baidu, Baidu, 1 Aug. 2018, baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1607609832031609547.

Xu, Jiaxuan. “Exploring Hanfu.” 2016 International Congress of Entomology, 2019, doi:https://aaltodoc.

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aalto.fi/handle/123456789/40974.

Zhang, Yan. “What Is Going on in China? A Cultural Analysis on the Reappearance of Ancient Jili and Hanfu in Present-Day China .” Intercultural Communication Studies, vol. 17, Jan. 2008, doi:http://citeseerx.ist.psu. edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.617.6334&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

Zhao, Jianhua. The Chinese Fashion Industry: an Ethnographic Approach. Berg, 2013. “ .” Baidu, Baidu Encyclopedia, 5 Dec. 2019, baike. baidu.com/item/%E4%BB%99%E5%A5%B3/694323.

Kaylin Kim

ADDRESSING THE DOKDO/ TAKESHIMA TERRITORIAL DISPUTE TO IMPROVE SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS

21 Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, Source: KOREA.NET - Official page of the Republic of Korea under Wikimedia Commons under CC

I. Introduction Known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan, this group of small islets in the East Sea/Sea of Japan is currently controlled by South Korea, and the islets’ sovereignty is contested by Japan. Located 87 kilometers away from the South Korean island Uleungdo and 157 kilometers away from Japan’s Oki Island, the islets are composed of two large rocks and 33 smaller rocks with a total territory of 0.186 kilometers squared (Atanassova-Cornelis). The sea around the islets are rich with fish, methane hydrate, phosphate rocks, natural gas, and other precious mineral resources (Jung).

The Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute has been a constant source of tension between Japan and Korea since the 20th century, when Japan’s empire was broken apart at the end of World War II. It permeates into social, cultural, and political spheres of Korean and Japanese societies (Atanassova-Cornelis). Therefore, this dispute is key to understanding South Korea-Japan relations and why diplomacy between the two countries has faltered.

The status quo in South Korea-Japan relations is hostile and stagnant. For Koreans, the Dokdo/Takeshima land dispute invokes strong nationalist sentiment and resentment over the Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. This issue unites Koreans across ideological and political spectrums, as the islets have been “internalized into Korea’s cultural narrative” and are now “a part of Korea’s own identity and the mark of the emotional trauma of Japanese oppression and occupation” (Kozisek). On the other hand, Japan’s official stance is that Takeshima is “indisputably an inherent part of the territory of Japan, in light of historical facts and based on international law” (“Japan’s Consistent Position”). Nationalist sentiment and propaganda generated by the government perpetuate the claim that the islets are rightfully Japan’s (Kozisek). Both liberal and conservative governments in Japan have claimed that the islets are Japanese territory and argue that South Korea’s control of the islets constitutes an “illegal occupation” (Tasevski).

After exploring historical precedent and political and cultural manifestations of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, I will propose de-escalatory measures to be enacted by the two nations. The measures I propose encourage a mutually beneficial resolution to the dispute, facilitate productive conversations on other bilateral issues, and manage tensions between the two countries in the long term.

II. Historical Background and Status Quo South Korean claims over Dokdo/Takeshima are 22

“derived from numerous historical documents and maps repeatedly discredited by the efforts of Japanese researchers” (Kozisek). South Korea’s evidence suggests that the islets have “been a part of Korea as early as since the 6th century AD during the Three Kingdoms Period” (Kaikobad). However, in 1904, Japan incorporated the islets as terra nullius (Latin for “nobody’s land”) and went on to colonize the rest of the Korean peninsula in 1910. During the 35 years of Japanese rule, Koreans were required to take Japanese names and speak in Japanese. Additionally, Japan utilized Koreans for forced labor and, in the case of thousands of women, Japanese military brothels, which also contributes to modern-day tensions between the two countries (Tasevski).

Japan’s claim is that evidence of Japanese bamboo harvesting and sea lion hunting on and around the islets in the mid-17th century is sufficient to constitute Japanese control of the islets until their formal incorporation into the Shimane Prefecture during Japan’s occupation of Korea (Bowman). As a result, there was no prominent dialogue about the status of the islets until after World War II (Kozisek).

In the post-World War II era, the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute can be simply described as being “set off by different interpretations of Japan’s renunciation of the formally occupied territories” (Kozisek). For example, since the islets were not explicitly mentioned in both the World War II era 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, their status remained unclear (Kozisek). In 1951, the San Francisco Treaty was ratified to re-establish relations between Japan and the Allied Powers, end Japan’s occupation of other lands and Japan’s position as an imperial power, and specify details of settlement of war-related issues (Price). It also said that Korean territory that Japan gained unlawfully through colonization should be returned. Article 2 of the treaty states that Japan would renounce all right, title, and claim to Korea, including the islands Quelpart, Port Hamilton, and Dagelet (Lee). Because the Dokdo/Takeshima islets were not included in the treaty, Japan argues that the islets remained Japanese territory (Bowman). In 1951, the Korean ambassador to the United States requested that the U.S. Secretary of State amend Article 2 to include the Dokdo/Takeshima islets, but Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that the United States did not have information that showed the islets were part of Korea (Lee). Some argue that this omission implies that the victors of World War II did not intend to return the islets to Korea (Lee). However, in his 2013 article in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Garret Bowman argues that this omission

was “more likely the result of the Allies recognizing that not enough information was known at that time to establish sovereignty for either Japan or Korea” (Bowman).

In response, South Korea produced evidence supporting their sovereignty over the islets in the form of “written histories, Japanese-created maps, and Korean government publications dating back to 1454” (Bowman). For example, according to South Korea, Dokdo was recognized as Korean territory by the Japanese in 1696, after a dispute between Japanese and Korean fishermen (Genova).

Thus, they argue the islets were returned to South Korea at the end of World War II as part of the San Francisco Treaty. However, Japan and South Korea interpret the historical evidence mentioned above differently, and their conflicting interpretations and unclear evidence mean that a present-day “international tribunal is more likely to focus on Korea’s use and control [of the islets] since the 1950s” (Bowman). In order to press its sovereignty claims, South Korea built a lighthouse, helicopter landing pad, and deployed police officers to the islets in the early 1950s (Atanassova-Cornelis). Subsequently, in 1954 and 1962, Japan proposed to transfer the land dispute to the International Court of Justice. However, South Korea rejected this proposal and stated that there is no existing legal dispute in the first place. Since the 1950s, Korean government presence on and around the islets has only increased, as the Korean Coast Guard is now stationed there on a permanent basis (Atanassova-Cornelis). Currently there is a Korean military base on the eastern islet where soldiers live in rotation (Genova). Police officers patrol the islets and the ocean space around them (Kozesik).

Since the 1990s, “South Korean politicians have frequently relied on anti-Japanese sentiments for various political purposes,” therefore perpetuating the Dokdo/Takeshima conflict throughout the following decades (Kozesik). North Korea has also “strongly condemned Japan” for its claim to the islets and stated that “Tok [Dokdo] Island is [an] inalienable part of Korea both in name and reality.” The North Korean Central News Agency declared in 2019 that if “Japanese reactionaries keep going reckless for overseas territorial expansion, defying repeated protest and rejection by the DPRK and other countries around it, they will face earlier isolation and self-ruin” (Yonhap).

In 2008, Japan proposed for a second time to transfer the land dispute to the ICJ and South Korea rejected it yet again, on the same grounds that they rejected the proposal in 1954 and 1962.

South Korea’s refusal reflects the Korean government's position that “as long as they have effective jurisdiction, there’s no point taking the risk that they may lose the islands,” and allowing the case to be heard at the ICJ would potentially legitimize Japan’s claims to the islets (Park).

The sixty-eight-year status quo of South Korean sovereignty over the islets solidifies Korea’s claims, and under contemporary international law, the international community tends to agree that Korea’s claims are stronger than Japan’s (Bowman). It is ultimately history, specifically Japanese colonization of Korea in the early 20th century, that is responsible for South Korea’s fierce national pride for the islets. From Korea’s point of view, “losing ‘Dokdo’ would be akin to the post-facto legitimization of Japanese colonial rule” (Park). In Japan’s perspective, the islets were always theirs, and Japan has also used the islets to foster national pride and awareness to restore Japanese ownership of the islets.

III. Political and Cultural Manifestations of the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute provokes fierce nationalism on both sides, and is one of the main sources of tension between Japan and Korea. Today, propaganda regarding the Dokdo/ Takeshima land dispute permeates both South Korean and Japanese politics and culture.

South Korea pursues strategies to legitimize its claims to the Dokdo/Takeshima islands. For example, National Geographic photographer Tim Franco said that “every time you arrive in South Korea and take the train from the airport to the town, there are videos talking about the Dokdo saying they are the most beautiful islands in the country and that South Korea rightfully owns them” (Tasevski). In South Korea, there is a well-known children’s song, “Dokdo is Our Land,” on which the popular “Jessica jingle” in Bong Joon-ho’s Oscar-winning movie “Parasite” is based.

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Traditional Wedding Reenactment, Source: Taekwonweirdo on Wikimedia Commons under CC

South Korea also boasts several museums dedicated to the islets such as the Tokto Museum in Seoul, Tokto Museum on Ulleung Island, and the Tokto Research Institute (Palmer). The museum on Ulleung Island draws more than 125,000 visitors each year (Palmer).

The islets are a popular tourist spot for South Korean citizens (Kozesik). Tourist visits are brief, around 20 minutes and are often seen as a “patriotic duty” (Hancocks). Dokdo’s prominence in Korean culture goes as far as having businesses commercialize and profit off of representations of the islets. Advertisements, Dokdo related knick-knacks, souvenirs, gifts such as “spoons, notebooks, socks, hats, and shirts,” and even food such as shrimp and squid, bear the name Dokdo (Palmer).

Shrimp and squid fished in Dokdo waters are “said to be the tastiest in all of Korea.” Conservative media in Japan disapproved of South Korea’s decision to serve ‘Dokdo shrimp’ at South Korea’s state banquet for U.S. President Donald Trump in 2017 (McCurry). Dokdo has also been featured in the cuisine at inter-Korean summits; at a 2018 summit dinner South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un were served “mango mousse…with a chocolate map of the peninsula with a Dokdo-shaped dot” (Genova).

Japan currently has a number of programs to educate the public about its claims to Dokdo/ Takeshima. In 2005, the Shimane Prefecture of Japan declared an annual prefectural memorial “Takeshima Day” designated on February 22, the day the islets were declared Japanese territory in 1905. On Takeshima Day the Japanese government encourages citizens to learn about the land dispute and Japan’s ownership of the islets. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration was criticized for sending high-ranking officials to said Takeshima Day celebrations. In response to the announcement of Takeshima Day in 2005, two Korean protesters each sliced off one of their fingers outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul to protest, and in 2012, a Korean man rammed his truck against the gate of the Japanese embassy to protest Japan’s claim to the islands (Tasevski). In 2008, Japan’s Ministry of Education encouraged teachers to instruct their students that the islets were a part of Japan, and issued a manual to Japanese textbook publishers. In response, South Korea recalled its ambassador from Tokyo. Japan recalled its ambassador to Korea from Seoul in 2012 after South Korean President Lee Myong-Bak became the first South Korean president to set foot on the islets (Tasevski).

In both nations, the number of people directly affected by historical issues in the past century is slowly dimi-

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nishing. Therefore, issues like the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, which in part stems from controversies in the 20th century, “remain stored in the nations’ discursively constructed collective memories from which they can be reactivated and utilized by younger generations, resulting in reactions stronger than ever before” (Kozisek). This results in a dangerous tendency for nationalist hatred for the other nation, and such thought patterns and emotional value are attached to this land dispute in order to incentivize society to produce evidence supporting their side (Kozisek).

IV. A Solution Pacific Forum researchers Dong-Joon Park and Danielle Chubb argue it is important to “understand the strong emotional significance of the islands and the role national identity plays” in both nations, but especially in South Korea. As Park and Chubb point out, any South Korean concessions on the Dokdo issue would be “akin to political suicide,” while meanwhile it is highly unlikely Japan will hand over sovereignty.” Park and Chubb conclude “for as long as the two countries remain unable to even begin public conversation over the matter, diplomatic relations will improve only very slowly, if at all” (Park).

Some scholars argue that full demilitarization and neutralization of Dokdo and joint management of the natural and marine resources on and around the islets is the best solution to the land dispute (Kim). However, I agree with Sungbae Kim, a writer for The Journal of East Asian Affairs, that a joint management solution “overlooks the complexity and gravity” of the Dokdo-Takeshima dispute and that this conflict is not a “typical territorial dispute” (Kim). A joint management solution is naive because it ignores the emotional and sensitive nuances weaved into this unique land dispute, and fails

to address the root of the problem.

Therefore, in order to solve the dispute in the context of both South Korea and Japan’s negotiation limitations, both nations should take more comprehensive measures to address the dispute and commit to a gradual, long-term, and sustained process of bilateral reconciliation based on reduction of harmful and hateful nationalistic rhetoric and antipathy. De-escalatory measures must be taken in order to foster the environment needed for a peaceful and conclusive resolution to this land dispute and create the right set of conditions to positively impact bilateral relationships on other issues and manage tensions in the long term.

To realize these measures, three steps must be taken: harmful national rhetoric must be lessened on both sides, Japan should acknowledge Korean sovereignty, and South Korea needs to collaborate actively with Japan. A symbiotic relationship can only be achieved by reducing harsh nationalist rhetoric on both sides and lessening antipathy toward each other. Early sacrifices need to be made on both sides in order to reap the immense benefits from a strong South Korea-Japan relationship in the long-term.

First, both countries, especially South Korea, need to acknowledge how historical prejudice and fierce nationalism over the islets are tainting South Korea-Japan relations and seek to lessen animosity towards each other. The reason why many South Koreans are protective of Dokdo/Takeshima is because South Korea’s ownership of the islets strengthens the legitimacy of South Korea as a state: it symbolizes overcoming Japanese colonization. Thus, cooperation and attempts at rapprochement will not be successful, as long as Japan is still perceived as a threat to Korean autonomy in South Korean society. Fierce nationalism prohibits citizens from transcending nationalist animosity for the other and prevents them from realizing that a peaceful solution can be reached. Propaganda must be halted and if Korea and Japan allow this status quo to intensify, hatred for the other will become more and more internalized in national identity and will only worsen relations.

Second, to achieve a win-win solution for both sides, Japan should make a strategic sacrifice by accepting Korean sovereignty of the islets and acknowledge that Korea’s claims are directly linked to South Korean resentment due to Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula. Making concessions to Korea would likely hurt the popularity of Japanese policymakers due to the nationalistic fervor surrounding the dispute, and perceived concessions would also hurt South Korean politi-

cians for the same reasons. However, accepting Korean sovereignty will strengthen unstable South Korea-Japan relations, lessen animosity in future trade and political disputes or discussions, and provide an opportunity for Japan to take the initiative in promoting regional stability. As Bowman suggests, “Japanese leaders do not have to completely renounce national pride in order to resolve the issue and focus on the future.” Additionally, if Japan is not willing to engage in a military clash over the islets, “its attempts to make it a disputed territory will be futile,” and the more “Japan problematizes this issue,” the more the Korean government will “stiffen its resolve” (Kim). A pragmatic compromise in which Japan recognizes Korean sovereignty over the islets does not undermine Japanese national identity but rather fortifies it. Japan will be taking a bold step forward in setting a precedent “by endorsing recent territorial control as the territorial control as the decisive factor in island disputes,” and this will allow Japan to “better legally and politically protect islands it already controls in any disputes against China” (Park). It is understandable that Japan is not willing to give up on the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute because they believe this may “hinder Japanese claims against China over the Senkaku Islands” (Bowman).

However, it is strategically wiser for Japan to strengthen its ties with Korea if they wish to maintain a strong front in the face of China’s claims. Since Japan’s historical claims are weaker than South Korea’s and the international community will most likely favor South Korean sovereignty of the islets in a legal battle because of the status quo, it is in Japan’s best interest to acknowledge Korean sovereignty. Rather than view this as a defeat, Japan should use this as an opportunity to decrease tension in its relationship with Korea and the region as a whole. Additionally, by resolving the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, Japan could apply the status-quo framework a to its land dispute with China over the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands. Thus, by acknowledging Korean sovereignty, Japan would establish a precedent that could bolster its position in the Senkaku Islands (Bowman).

Third, South Korea must recognize that Japanese claims to the islets are not vain attempts to simply aggravate the Korean Peninsula. South Korea needs to lend a listening ear and a willingness to improve South Korea-Japan relations for the sake of their nation, its future, and regional stability. It would also require South Korea to accept Japan’s actions to rectify relations instead of relitigating past settlements regarding Japan’s past actions and condemning allegedly insincere apologies.

South Korea should stop dismissing Japan’s Dokdo/

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Takeshima claims and accept a proposal to bring the issue to the ICJ. The South Korean government needs to demonstrate to its citizens that “Japan isn't ignoring the link between their claims to the islands and the 20th-century colonization of the country” (Park). This will help shift domestic conversation and lessen animosity towards Japan in order for cooperation and productive conversations to take place.

If Japan does not want to simply concede the islets, South Korea should accept their proposal to take this case to the ICJ. Japan has little to gain by submitting this issue to the ICJ, but if they still want to propose sending this case to the ICJ, South Korea should know that they do not have much to lose. Not only are Japan’s historical and legal claims over Dokdo/Takeshima substantially weaker than Korea’s, but under modern customary international law, “territory belongs to the country that can make a showing of effective control” (Bowman).

Due to the “contested and inconsistent use of Dokdo/ Takeshima before the 20th century,” the ICJ will most likely focus on South Korea’s “use and control since the 1950s” (Bowman). Moreover, the “international community tends to agree that Korea’s claims are stronger than contemporary international law” and that South Korea’s constant and strong presence on the islets is “determinative of effective control” (Bowman). Therefore, “given the inherent harm in disrupting a sixty-year status quo,” ICJ’s decision would “most likely be found in Korea’s favor” (Bowman).

Taking this case to the ICJ will only strengthen the legitimacy of South Korean control of the islets and the benefits of taking this case to the ICJ and receiving international support outweigh any domestic political risks or losses. South Korea may need to make compromises or sacrifices, but if the islets are rightfully Korea’s, then there should be no hesitation in wanting to further prove their sovereignty through the ICJ. This will ultimately help put an end to the land dispute and allow South Korea and Japan to actively listen to each other’s claims, and hopefully, allow both nations to develop beyond this issue and work on strengthening their relations. The islets will continue under South Korean sovereignty and Japan will be strengthening regional stability by encouraging multilateral collaboration, which will help address current security affairs, such as the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

It should be understood that fostering

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stronger relations between South Korea and Japan will be a prolonged process, and not limited to a sole administration. Especially because of the sensitive nuances of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and its social and political implications, Japan and South Korea must take strengthening relations in their own hands, as they understand the situation best. Prioritizing increased cultural, economic, political partnership between South Korea and Japan is vital and may help change hostile stereotypical images between the two nations. In a broader perspective, the two nations share strategic interests and goals in the East Asia region. They both hope to protect their respective territories and strengthen their presence against the rising power of the People’s Republic of China and the unpredictable Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and collaborations on those issues can occur with a fortified bilateral relationship (Emmers).

Furthermore, South Korea would be more willing to settle on issues of resource rights and economic boundaries. In 2004, South Korea imported over $46 billion from Japan while exporting $21 billion, and these numbers have increased nearly every year since the 1960s (Bowman). In order to preserve, grow, and benefit from this positive economic relationship, Japan should not forsake its beneficial economic relationship with South Korea in favor of the islets. This would allow Japan to make priorities in the right areas and support Japan’s broader interest in regional stability.

V. Conclusion South Korea and Japan are natural strategic allies when given the current geopolitical environment in East Asia, especially with China’s rising dominance. Therefore, a resolution of the Dokdo/Takeshima sovereignty dispute through the de-escalatory measures proposed

Terriitory pole of Takeshima, Shimane-pref, Source: DokdoTakeshima on Wikimedia Commons under CC

above would not only strengthen South Korea-Japan relations but also their presence in East Asian political issues.

Japan should take the initiative in promoting regional stability by acknowledging Korean sovereignty, because their claims are unlikely to gain legal recognition and doing so is in their best interest in terms of regional security. South Korea should pursue reconciliation with Japan and both countries need to reduce harmful nationalistic rhetoric to realize that strengthening relations with each other will only be beneficial for economic, political, and cultural prosperity. The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute provides a unique opportunity for reconciliation, political power, and cultural and social growth for both nations.

In the context of historical prejudice and fierce nationalism in the Japan-South Korea relationship, one misstep in the resolution process could cause a dangerous conflict.

As such, my proposed solution of first lessening nationalist hate before moving toward reconciliation on the territorial issue seeks to help improve relations between the two nations. Dialogue is always more important than an uneasy and disputed consensus, and reducing hateful rhetoric is the first step forward in reaching a compromise that benefits parties. The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute is the first step in the process to improve South Korea-Japan relations, and any growth may help decrease tensions on other bilateral issues and facilitate multilateral cooperation on other geopolitical issues in East Asia such as North Koran missile testing and countering the rise of China.

References Atanassova-Cornelis, Elena, et al. ISLANDS, BORDERS AND CLAIMS. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2015, pp. 8–24, Pride and Prejudice: Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07082.5.

Bowman, Garret. “Why Now Is the Time to Resolve the Dokdo/ Takeshima Dispute.” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol. 46, no. 1, 2013, p. 31, https://scholarlycommons. law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=jil.

Bukh, Alexander. “Takeshima and the Northern Territories in Japan’s Nationalism.” New Zealand International Review, vol.

40, no. 3, 2015, pp. 9–10. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/48551732.

Emmers, Ralf. “Japan-Korea Relations and the Tokdo/Takeshima Dispute: The Interplay of Nationalism and Natural Resources.”

RSIS Working Paper, no. 212, 2010, p. 27, https://www.rsis.edu. sg/rsis-publication/idss/212-wp212-japan-korea-relations/#.

X6KCklNKjUo. Genova, Alexandra. “Two nations disputed these small islands for 300 years.” National Geographic, 14 November 2018, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/destinations/ asia/south-korea/history-dispute-photos-dodko-rocks-islands/#close.

Hancocks, Paula. “A trip to the center of a diplomatic spat.” CNN,

4 October 2012, https://www.cnn.com/2012/10/04/world/ asia/asia-dokdo-takeshima-hancocks/index.html.

“Japan’s Consistent Position on the Territorial Sovereignty over Takeshima.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 23 April 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ region/asia-paci/takeshima/index.html.

Jung, Ha-won. “Why are the Dokdo islets so vital for Korea, Japan?”

Korea JoongAng Daily, 28 July 2008, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2008/07/28/etc/Why-are-the-Dokdo-islets-so-vital-for-Korea-Japan/2892904.html#:~:text=According%20to%20 the%20Korea%20Ocean,a%20very%20precious%20mineral%20 commodity.

Kim, Sungbae. “Understanding The Dokdo Issue: A Critical Review Of The Liberalist Approach.” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 24, no. 2, 2010, pp. 1–27. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/ stable/23258212.

Kozisek, David. “Us and Them: Constructing South Korean National Identity through the Liancourt Rocks Dispute.” Culture Mandala: Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 2016, p. 18, https://cm.scholasticahq. com/article/5923-us-and-them-constructing-south-korean-national-identity-through-the-liancourt-rocks-dispute.

Lee, Seokwoo. “Dokdo: The San Francisco Peace Treaty, International Law on Territorial Disputes, and Historical Criticism.” Asian Perspective, vol. 35, no. 3, 2011, p. 20. JSTOR, https://www.jstor. org/stable/42704761?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents.

McCurry, Justin. “Japan anger over South Korea's shrimp surprise for Donald Trump.” The Guardian [Osaka], 9 November 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/10/japan-anger-south-koreas-shrimp-surprise-menu-donald-trump-sex-slave.

Palmer, Brandon, and Laura Whitefleet-Smith. “Assimilating Dokdo: The Islets in Korean Everyday Life.” ASIANetwork Exchange: A Journal for Asian Studies in the Liberal Arts, vol. 23, no. 1, 2016, p. 20. ASIANetwork Exchange, https://www.asianetworkexchange.org/articles/10.16995/ane.111/.

Park, Dong-Joon, and Danielle Chubb. “Why Dokdo Matters to Korea.” The Diplomat, 17 August 2011, https://thediplomat. com/2011/08/why-dokdo-matters-to-korea/.

Price, John. “Cold War Relic: The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty And The Politics Of Memory.” Asian Perspective, vol. 25, no. 3, 2001, p. 30. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704324.

“Takeshima Day” commemorative ceremony, The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, 22 February 2015, https://www.jimin.jp/ english/news/127385.html.

Tasevski, Olivia. “Islands of ire: The South Korea–Japan dispute.”

The Interpreter, 27 April 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/ the-interpreter/islands-ire-south-korea-japan-dispute.

Yonhap. “N. Korea blasts Japan over claim to S. Korean island of Dokdo.” The Korea Herald, 11 February 2019, http://www. koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190211000930.

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Bernadette Gostelow, Maximilian Lim

PULLING BACK THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE: THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF THE US-CHINA TRADE WAR ON BRAZILIAN SOY PRODUCTION

"Central-eastern Brazil" by europeanspaceagency is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 28

1. China’s increasing demand of Brazilian soy Soy meal is used as a high-protein ingredient in animal feed for livestock and as an ingredient to be further processed into food for human consumption, such as tofu and soy milk, or is extracted as oil (Purcell et al., 1). As of 2018, China is the world’s largest importer of soy, both in weight (23%) and value of imports (18%) (Chatham House). Hence, China’s decision to impose a 25% retaliatory tariff on US soy in July 2018 (Schoen) had a profound impact on the source composition of Chinese imports. While the value of the US global export of soy remained the same as the value of US soy exports decreased from close to $13.2 billion in 2017 to $5.2 billion in 2018, the total value of US export of soy decreased minimally from $27.8 billion in 2017 to $25.6 billion in 2018, the percentage of US export of soy to China decreased from 47.5% to 20.5% (Chatham House).

1.1 Effects on land use and carbon emissions Concomitantly, China has increasingly plugged this supply gap by importing soy from Brazil. The value of Brazilian soy exports to China increased by 35.6% from 2017 to 2018, and the weight of exports increased by 28.5% in the same period (Chatham House). Furthermore, the continued drop in Brazilian soy price from $555 per tonne in 2014 to $419 per tonne in 2018 suggests that this percentage will increase soon (Chatham House).

As a caveat,the Chinese government’s decision in 2019 to waive the 30% tariff on some American exporters may shift the composition of Chinese import of soy in the near future. Nevertheless, in actuality, Brazil’s supply of soy to China increased from 47.0% in 2014 to 77.6% in 2018.

Concurrently, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) database FAOSTAT, 86,760,520ha of land was dedicated to soy cultivation in Brazil in 2014. In 2018 this number increased to 97,464,936ha, representing a 12.3% increase (FAOSTAT) .

Referring to Figure 1 (all figures are in the Annex), given short term trends, Brazil will likely increase its total land use for soy cultivation by 61.5 million hectares by 2020. Assuming that soy has a yield rate of 3.25 metric tonnes per hectare and an additional 15.7 million tonnes of soy demanded from China, Chinese soy demand would account for the 4.83 million hectare increase or approximately 45.1% of the predicted increase in amazon land usage. Referring to Figure 2, given long term trends, Brazil will likely increase its total land use for soy cultivation by 7.5 million hectares by 2020. Assuming that soy has a yield rate of 3.25 metric tons per hectare and an additional 6.06 million tonnes of soy demanded from China, Chinese soy demand would account for the 1.86 million hectares increase or approximately, 17.4% of the

predicted increase in amazon land usage.

Assuming that 1 hectare of Amazonian rainforest captures 6.4 tonnes of carbon dioxide annually (sfmcanada, 1). The actual 10.7 million hectare clearing of rainforest between 2014 to 2018, partially made to cater to Chinese demand, has indirectly caused a release of 68.48 million tonnes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere annually. If predictions are accurate, future Chinese demand from 2018 to 2020 would indirectly release a further 11.90 to 30.91 million tonnes of carbon dioxide annually.

The pivot in Chinese demand towards Brazilian soy is particularly damaging, considering that at 3.25 metric tonnes per hectare (Alves), it has a relatively lower yield rate than American soy, with the US yield rate of 3.75 metric tonnes per hectare (Reuters). This rate suggests that to satisfy a similar 100 metric tonne increase in demand Brazilian production would require 4 more hectares of land than the US. Given trends, the additional 15.7 million tonnes and 6.06 million tonnes increased in Chinese demand could be met with 640,000 fewer hectares of land (13.2% fewer) and 250,000 fewer hectares, respectively (13.4% fewer). Brazilian soy farmers furthermore use the most amount of fertilizer per hectare at 169kg/ha compared to the US (62kg/ha), Russia (26kg/ha), and Argentina (16kg/ha). This data suggests that Brazilian soy cultivation is relatively environmentally inefficient (FAOSTAT).

1.2 Long-term economic costs to Brazil The ‘ecosystem value’ of a hectare of forest (Constanza, 258), i.e. its effect on climate stabilisation via the carbon sequestration effect and contribution to the rainfall cycle,., was valued at $1784/ha/year in 1997.

Accounting for inflation, this valuation increases to $2091.44 in 2019. Considering short-term trends, the ‘ecosystem value’ loss due to the increased Chinese demand for Brazilian soy from 2017 to the present valued (in 2019 only) at $10.1 billion and considering long-term trends, at $3.9 billion. These costs are distributed globally because climate stabilization is a global public good rather than a national good for Brazil. It is worth highlighting that these costs are annual, suggesting that with increased carbon emissions, the global cost will increase at a compound and exponential rate.

Furthermore, the increased carbon emissions resulting from the loss of the carbon sink can be measured by the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) (EPA) that quantifies the economic cost of non-market effects such as its effect on human health and the environment. Unlike the ecosystem value, the SCC measure is seen as national value, measuring domestic costs precisely. However, it must be 29

caveated that because both the ecosystem value and the SCC quantify the economic cost of the loss of carbon sequestration, the two measures should not be combined as that would ‘double count’ the economic cost. The current SCC is valued at $42 per metric tonne (EPA). Following short-term trends, this amounts to $202.86 million and long-term trends, $78.12 million. This amount would be $26.88 million (13.3% less) and $10.6 million (13.6% less) less if US soy production met increased Chinese demand for soy. Hence the Chinese tariff on US soy has directly contributed to the inefficient increase in deforestation globally and a deadweight cost that ranges from $10.6 to 26.88 million.

The deforestation associated with soy production has direct economic costs in the form of loss of traditional incomes. For example, before the rise of soy production in the 1990s, the Amazon biome was the center of nut production and sustainable timber production. These are valued at $40/hectare for nuts and $200/hectare for sustainable timber (Mongabay, Ecosystem Services).

According to the USDA, in 2014, approximately 36.8% of soy production occurs in the Amazon biome (USDA, crop explorer).

According to short-term trends, 1.78 million hectares of the Amazon and 0.68 million hectares according to long-term trends were deforested due to the increase in Chinese demand for soy.

Assuming that both nut and sustainable timber production co-existed throughout the Amazon, this represents an economic cost of $427.3 million and $163.2 million respectively. Instead of these traditional activities, nut farmers and loggers will either be displaced or become salaried workers for big agribusinesses. This shifts the value and profits of economic activity away from the people to corporations.

As a qualification, these projections are likely to be underestimations given that it does not account for illegal and unaccounted for deforestation. In the 1990s, it is estimated that 80% of the deforestation in the Amazon to have been illegal (WWF) . Although the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Natural Renewable Resource has taken measures in the past 30 years to stamp out illegal practices, illegal deforestation still poses a huge threat to the Amazon as the practice increased by up to 60% in 2018. Furthermore, despite an economic turndown leading to a fall in electricity consumption, Brazil’s carbon emissions rose by 9% in 2016, plausibly driven by spikes in illegal deforestation (Carbon Brief). The problem of illegal deforestation in Brazil will likely increase as soy becomes more profitable as a result of the US-China trade war.

2. Case Study: Disruption of Cerrado and Amazonian ecosystems in Mato Grosso In Figures 3&4, across Brazil, soy is concentrated in the western and southwestern states of Mato Grosso, Goias, Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul. Scientifically speaking, the acidity of the soil in these states is unsuited for soy. However, as a result of artificial government intervention in the 1990s (Santana et al, ix), the production of soy in the southwestern states has dramatically increased, as Mato Grosso alone accounts for approximately 33% of Brazil’s soy production in 2019 (USDA, soybeans). On top of the short-term trend of increased Chinese demand, long-term trends of government intervention, including the Uniform National Price Support strategy that protected the industry from pricing competition from imports and a national pricing strategy that uniformly and artificially set prices to shore up production in these states until February 1995 (Schnepf, 37) have contributed to this concentration. Hence, an increase in Chinese demand for Brazilian soy will be concentrated in these regions.

2.1 Monopolised and undertaxed: how a few agribusinesses control soy production in Mato Grosso Seven agricultural firms, Bunge, Cargill, ADM, COFCO, Louis Dreyfus, and Amaggi, dominate soy production in Brazil, capturing 57% of the total market share (Trase). Amaggi Group dominates production in Mato Grosso, having solidified its position in agribusiness through vertical integration in the production, processing, and the export of soy and sub-products such as oil and meal (Mongabay, Blairo Maggi). While the domination of the market is not necessarily harmful to Brazil’s public interest, coupled with massive government subsidies soy is effectively overvalued

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due to market distortions. In 2019, the government released a new subsidy plan: for every 120 hectares of soy insured by farms, the government will fully subsidise 20 hectares (Vieira).

Assuming that soy has a yield rate of 3.25 metric tonnes per hectare and that the price of Brazilian soy is $419 per tonne, in 2019 soy revenue would amount to approximately $66.0 billion according to long term trends and $100.0 billion according to short term trends.

However, because a sixth of the production is subsidised, the government has effectively paid up to$16.7 billion to these agribusiness giants.

Furthermore, most of the big agricultural firms have offshore accounts that are possible tax havens. For example, according to the ICIJ, Amaggi Group’s beneficial ownership is linked to Appleby Trust Ltd and Reid Services Ltd in the Cayman Islands. Blasio Maggi, the owner of Amaggi Group and former governor of the state of Mato Grosso, was publicly questioned about his ownership of these companies in the 2017 Brazilian Paradise Papers (Hermesauto). Similarly, Louis Dreyfus is also allegedly linked to Appleby (ICIJ). Whilst there are legitimate business reasons for having offshore accounts, the trend suggests that there is a strong possibility that these firms have been evading Brazilian corporate taxes.

Given that agribusiness has become an important bastion of both the Brazilian economy and its politics, the corruption in soy and agribusiness in general is particularly rampant and concerning. The bancada ruralista controls over half of Brazil’s congress, allowing pro-agribusiness policies like subsidies and the privatisation of infrastructure projects to be passed easily (Branford).

Therefore, these socioeconomic and distributional inequalities were further cemented and exacerbated through the unequal distribution and implementation of technologies developed by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA)—a public agricultural research agency linked to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Supply. This inequality highlights the systemic public-private partnership between Brazilian government agencies and big Brazilian agricultural producers. This growing public-private partnership between the Brazilian government and agricultural producers is unsurprising, especially given the importance of agriculture in the Brazilian economy, which has concentrated the political power of wealthy landowners.

2.2 Effects of greenhouse gas emissions on air pollution and the integrity of food chains Agricultural cultivation in the Amazon biome has been linked to higher nitrous oxides (NOX) atmosphe-

ric emissions. NOX has a dramatically larger per-unit impact on global warming and climate destabilisation than carbon dioxide (Nelson). Whilst the EPA estimates that the SCC is valued at approximately $39 per metric tonne in 2019, the social cost of nitrous oxides (SCNO) is valued at approximately $14,000 per metric tonne in 2019, approximately 350 times more (EPA). For example, referring to Figure 5 in the Amazon biome, though the rainforest has been documented to emit a baseline of NOX (1.9 kg/ha/year), the replacement of the rainforest with pasture has increased the NOX emissions by more than 3 fold.

Because of the acidity of the soil in the Cerrado and Amazonian biomes, a significantly higher amount of fertiliser is required for soy cultivation. However, referring to Figure 6, due to advances in inoculation and rhizobia that allow soy to fix nitrogen directly from the atmosphere, soy seeds require relatively little nitrogen based fertiliser but significantly higher amounts of phosphorus and potassium.

In soy fields, while atmospheric emissions of NOX is high, the nutrient runoff of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium into water bodies has been theorised to be low as the soil fixes and stores phosphates and nitrates.

Nevertheless, with projects such as BR-163 (explained below) that facilitate the proposed expansion of soyfields to the floodplain near Santarém, there is a high risk that marine life becomes contaminated. Particularly during the low tide period, floodplains commonly shrink and dry up, concentrating fish in a single area. When this happens, fertilisers from soy fields will also concentrate on the dried-up plain with the fish.

Infrastructure that supports soy production is likely to accelerate given robust Chinese demand for soy and the Chinese investment in Brazilian infrastructure (Watts). The building of more waterway and dams would be an ecological disaster as dams obstruct water flow, blocking the flow of nutrients and sediments downstream, potentially having devastating effects for aquatic life. This blocked flow will also increase the concentration of methyl mercury in the reservoirs that would be ingested by fishes. The process of bioaccumulation could pose a health hazard to Brazilians who rely on seafood from these rivers as their primary food source.

2.3 Acceleration of infrastructure-driven deforestation in the Amazon The construction BR-163 started in the 1970s as part of the government’s development plan. Initially, BR-163 was conceived to be a 1,770km-long highway that connects Satarém to Cuiabá in Mato Grosso (WWF). In

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response to pressure from big agricultural conglomerates to build better infrastructure in Mato Grosso to transport goods the government has been leveraging private partnerships to plug the infrastructure gap.

As early as 2013, the Brazilian government has auctioned off the continuation of the project and management of parts of the highway to private companies.

The Brazilian construction giant, Odebrecht, won the government concession at R$0.026km (USD). Nevertheless, international commenters have doubted the legitimacy of the bidding process, pointing to Odebrecht’s highly politically entrenched status as it has bankrolled multiple politicians’ campaigns (Estradas). Odebrecht has since been formally indicted for corruption and the contract has since been annulled due to its failure to meet contractual KPIs. Instead, the government employed the army to complete the BR-163 (Gallas).

Chinese demand for Brazilian soy will drive an acceleration of deforestation for the construction of soy fields and related infrastructure. Big agribusiness firms and the Brazilian government have long wanted to build a trans-Brazilian railway that will provide an alternative route for soy to the Panama Canal, which is viewed to be US-controlled.

However, neither the government nor businesses have been willing or able to fund such a project. China’s increased import dependence on Brazil has made a trans-Brazilian railway (Mongabay, Amazon Rail Network) a plausible project for China’s broader Belt and Road strategy. China has already bought a Brazilian port at São Luís do Maranhão and is in negotiations with the Brazilian government to build new rail lines such as FICO in Brazil’s centrewest that will cut through Mato Grosso (Mongabay, Amazon Rail Network). China’s aggressive expansion accelerates the deforestation of the Amazon.

2.4 Acceleration of the destruction of the Cerrado biome Whilst the destruction of the Amazon has received much international attention, little attention has been paid to Cerrado lands. Referring to Figure 7, in 2016, it was estimated that more than 3.5 times more Cerrado land was cleared than Amazon land by big agribusinesses like Bunge and Cargill. They purportedly view Cerrado lands as a less controversial biome to clear than the Amazon. Though almost half of the Cerrado has already been converted to agriculture, only 7.5% lies in protected areas. Much belong to private landowners who may clear 65% to 80% of each property. In contrast, 50% of the Brazilian Amazon lies within protected areas (Ermgassen et al., 3).

There are legitimate concerns about bio-conserva-

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tion that this paper does not have the scope to explore.

Beyond such concerns, local geraizeiros populations have farmed the Cerrado land since the 19th century and are being displaced and exploited. The issue is beyond economics as violent private security contractors have allegedly been employed by agribusinesses to terrorise locals into allowing agribusinesses to acquire their land.

Geraizeiros continue to be harassed by private security contractors despite the fact the Brazilian state courts have affirmed the rights of 62 geraizeiros families to 42,000 hectares of Cerrado land (Mongabay, Green Land Grabbing). In 2019, arguably partly due to high Chinese soy demand, private security contractors have continued to harass geraizeiros and several were shot for attempting to graze their cattle on Cerrado land (Mongabay, Cerrado farmer shot). This harassment stems from the fact that whilst geraizeiros have been affirmed of their right to their land, the Cerrado land is not considered a protected area. This reflects a deeper trend of the marginalisation of traditional communities.

Whilst private companies and some government officials have justified these policies by stating that modern agriculture would offer a path out of poverty for rural populations, rural populations are often exploited. Particularly because soy is a capital-intensive enterprise, the profits from soy farming rarely get distributed to workers. In 2005, Fazenda Australia, which operates soy farms, was found guilty of illegal hiring of workers via gato (labour intermediary) of workers.

Workers were housed in appalling conditions— housing made of zinc sheets, plastic canvases, and cardboards—with no access to water, electricity and basic sanitation (Reimberg). As mentioned earlier, the deforestation of Brazilian land at the cost of traditional livelihoods is not only a cultural issue but also an economic one as the promised value and progress for modern agriculture rarely reaches workers. Without social protections, exploitation will continue as external demand for soy continues..

3. Brazilian government’s exacerbation of structural inefficiencies in soy production Agriculture gained significance in Brazilian politics from 1986 to 2007, with production increasing by 77% during the period. This boost was driven by improvements in productivity, as growth in an average farm total factor productivity (TFP) increased 2.55% per year between 1985 and 2006 (Rada et al., iii). Commodity research centres operated by the state-led EMBRAPA45 were the primary drivers of this TFP increase (Rada et al.,

iv). However, decomposing these figures, the productivity growth of crop farms (2.9%/annum) during the period was much lower and lags behind the productivity growth of livestock farms (7.1%/annum) (Rada et al., 18). This widening productivity gap was primarily caused by the different levels of influence EMBRAPA research had on farms with varying levels of efficiency, where EMBRAPA research influenced the most efficient farms.

Moreover, while crop farm productivity has improved across the board, improvements in productivity were not equally distributed. There has been a growing productivity gap between farms that were more efficient in 1985 and those that were producing at average efficiency levels during the same period. Farms that were producing at average efficiency levels in 1985 had technical efficiency levels fall from 93% in 1985 to 84% in 1995 to 64% in 2006 (Rada et al., 19) .

Similarly, despite moderate levels of technical inefficiency, strong allocative inefficiency has exacerbated this divergence in TFP. Particularly, the over-utilisation of land and labour and insufficient educational infrastructure in rural areas exacerbated allocative inefficiency.

Similarly, poor climate, soil conditions, and irrigation use exacerbated productive inefficiency (Vicente, 208).

Mato Grosso has had one of the highest levels of technical efficiency, which highlights how farmers in the state managed to quickly modernise and use technically efficient production methods (Vicente, 212). However, this conceals deeper historical and institutional factors that reveal how large agribusinesses have traditionally dominated the region. Further decomposition of input utilisation underscores the over-utilisation of land, fuel, fertilisers, herbicides, and seeds in Mato Grosso (Vicente, 214)—in tandem with our earlier analysis of soy cultivation in Mato Grosso.

3.1 Structural inefficiencies inhibit technological adoption A growing gap in operating scale aggravates these divergences in efficiency levels. Big agribusinesses utilise more than 75% of Brazilian agricultural land, making up 62% of the country’s agricultural output and contributing to 23.5% of the Brazilian GDP in 2017 (Gross). This is significantly greater than the operating scale of smallholder farmers, who despite making up 84% of the country’s number of farms—a staggering 4.4 million farms in comparison to big agribusiness’ 800,000 farms—occupy less than 25% of the country’s agricultural land (Gross).

The rate of technological adoption in Brazil is 3 times slower than that of the United States despite a

flattening of agricultural yield curves in agricultural production (Lowry et al.). The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has suggested that over-farming and overuse of agricultural inputs such as herbicides and fertilisers that inadvertently drive climate change and degrade soil are the key culprits.

Poor soil-conservation practices, such as mono-cropping and inefficient herbicide, lead to low resilience agricultural systems vulnerable to disease and worsen the problem (USDA). Despite slowing growth in crop yields, inertia remains among Brazilian farmers, slowing their adoption of agri-tech. Technological adoption seems to also follow this same bifurcation, where big agribusinesses can afford to and profit from adopting technology; whereas smallholders lack economic incentives since they neither have sufficient knowledge nor reached production stages where technological adoption will significantly improve TFP. This bifurcation in access to resources between large agribusinesses that run larger higher productivity farms and smallholders running smaller rural farms has led to different barriers towards technological adoption. The former do not adopt the technology due to utility maximisation. Specifically, large agribusinesses are incentivised to clear the forest and repurpose pasture for crops to increase growing scale, instead of improving efficiency on existing plantation land because of the lack of enforceable constraints and the relative cost of technology.

The latter sees itself inhibited from adopting technology due to the innovation-diffusion paradigm.

For smallholders, insufficient primary and secondary school infrastructure under-equips Brazilians with the knowledge required to both identify climate change as a problem that affects production yields and to undertake corollary strategies to mitigate the effects of climate change and improve crop yields (Rada et al.). This innovation-diffusion problem does not only hold for the adoption of novel technologies and strategies such as switching away from tillage, but also prevents the implementation of stepwise changes in farming methods.

Even switching herbicides or fertilisers would require farmers to spend time and resources to track, report, and comply with environmental regulations, many of whom do not have the required knowledge to do so.

Beyond the lack of educational infrastructure in many Brazilian federal units confounded by significant income inequality across Brazil, there is a unique structural format where many of inefficient smallholder farmers are led by older farmers. In Brazil, the average farmer’s age is 47 (da Silva). Studies in Burkina Faso (Sidibé) and

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South Africa (Baiyegunhi) highlight how older farmers are less likely to adopt irrigation and water harvesting practices. This suggests that younger farmers are more positively correlated to adopting new technologies.

Studies show that structural elements inherent to the smaller scale of smallholder farming may exacerbate their lower propensity to adopt new technologies, ceteris paribus, in the absence of government intervention.

Particularly, farm size has a significant negative correlation with soil conservation practices (Israel) due to the cost of implementing soil conservation practices increasing with farm size. Similarly, land ownership is negatively correlated with the implementation of irrigation and water harvesting technologies (Israel), which is alarming when considering that most farmers in Brazil own their land.

The primarily food-related crop configuration of smallholders dampens technological adoption, especially when compared to the non-food cash crops produced by large producers. Beyond the lower market value of these food-related crops, production by smallholders for commercial intentions has a significant negative correlation with the lowered probability of technological adoption in soil and water conservation practices (Israel). This is primarily because smallholders seek to make an immediate profit before focusing on household consumption and increasing long-term yield.

3.2 Exacerbation of inequities between big agribusinesses and smallholder farmers Brazil emerged as one of the world’s global agricultural producers by the 21st century. Agriculture has remained a robust segment of Brazil’s economy, accounting for 46% of Brazil’s exports in 2016. Agriculture was even one of the few sectors to continue reporting growth during the 2017 Brazilian recession (Agriculture Abroad). Yet, there are significant inequalities in efficiency levels and productivity between smallholder farms and farms operated by large agribusinesses.

As a caveat, both smallholder and large agribusiness efficiency levels in Brazil are still markedly lower than farmers in other countries, like the United States (Filho et al). In the following sections, notions of efficiency and productivity refer to a relative comparison between the agricultural efficiency levels between smallholders and large agribusinesses within Brazil.

It is important to note that discrepancies in efficiency are also grounded in structural reasons arising from different agricultural configurations. Smallholder farmers tend to grow food-related crops due to easy access to inputs and markets to sell crops. Smallholders

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form the backbone of Brazil’s food source, producing 70% of Brazil’s consumed food (Gross). On the other hand, large agribusinesses tend to focus on cash crops such as soy because they command access to export markets abroad. This bifurcation in agricultural configuration also leads to a divergence in agricultural productivity, which tends to be calculated as a function of output value divided by input value. Clearly, cash crops are more profitable than food-related crops such as nuts and cassava.

However, these disparities cannot be solely explained by productive efficiency factors such as farm size,cost savings from economies of scale, and agricultural configurations. This distributional inequality is caused by public-private practices that have entrenched the position of large agribusinesses in Brazil. This entrenchment has caused varying levels of technology implementation and access to markets. Today, the top 1.5% of agricultural landowners in Brazil own 53% of all agricultural land (Gross). Furthermore, 84% of Brazil’s farms only contribute 38% of the gross value of Brazil’s agricultural production (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations). These deep divergences will accelerate with the US-China Trade War, as big agribusinesses are the ones that predominantly benefit from increased Chinese demand and the associated profits. With more profits, agribusiness giants have yet more capital to plough back to purchase technologies.

3.3 Existing Brazilian governmental policy serves the interests of large inefficient agribusinesses, entrenching their economic and political positions We have argued that the growing discrepancy between smallholder farms and large agribusinesses are largely the result of so-called governmental policy between agribusiness giants and the government. This needs to be addressed should Brazil aim to limit environmental degradation caused by land-use changes, deforestation, and unsustainable agriculture. Soy cultivation is highly capital-intensive, requiring expensive fertilisers, high yield seeds, herbicides, and equipment for land clearing (Global Forest Atlas). Furthermore, soy is almost wholly sold in exclusive export markets and soy sales require farmers to have access to secondary processors that extract meal and oil (Brown-Lima et al.).

As such, smallholders do not have the means to afford these high fixed costs, nor do they have the scale to sell their products in export markets.

However, although soy production by big agribusinesses is more efficient vis-a-vis the nuts that smallholders produce, soy production in Brazil is inefficient

in comparison to other countries like the US, as explored above. Nevertheless, because soy production is the ‘gold standard’ of efficiency within Brazil, big agribusinesses have little incentive to use more efficient practices to increase their yield. Yield growth is hence focused on acquiring new land through which to plant more seeds.

Instead, these businesses merely price and displace smallholders out of their land. The US-China trade war would further exacerbate this issue as increased Chinese demand incentivises agribusinesses to expand their soy fields whilst not increasing their efficiency.

3.4 Insufficient government aid to smallholders In settings with relatively equal socioeconomic distributions, the roles of rural credit and transportation infrastructure have been significant in improving agricultural productivity (Israel). Yet, studies on rural agriculture in Brazil have shown that inequities between smallholders and large agribusinesses are so stark that educational investment is the most appropriate and impactful mechanism in closing the productivity gap.

Particularly primary school infrastructural investments have historically worked best to close agricultural productivity gaps in Brazil (Rada et al.). However, the Brazilian government seems focused on policies that disproportionately benefit large agribusinesses, possibly due to the domination of the rural caucus in politics.

These policies such as the Policy of Guaranteed Minimum Prices (PGPM), technological adoption assistance provided by EMBRAPA, and the infrastructural development of the BR-163 do not specifically aim to improve the productivity of smallholders.

3.5 Lack of sustainable lending and green finance Current government-led agricultural risk management tools are not as useful for smallholders as they are crafted for big agribusinesses (Assunção et al.).

Current price-risk mitigation policies insulate against price volatility caused by climate export shocks, which large agribusinesses are more exposed to than smallholders. Moreover, existing risk mitigation policies do not provide incentives nor sufficient predictability to smallholders for them to plan for or to adopt the technology (Assunção et al.). Instead, current policies result in low income for poor farmers and restricts their ability to raise credit (Assunção et al.).

Brazilian price risk mitigation in the form of the Policy of Guaranteed Minimum Prices (PGPM) have not been wide-ranging and not cost-effective enough, with a deficit of BRL$1.4B (USD$0.27B) in 2013 (Assunção et al.). Smallholders do not benefit from this policy because minimum prices protect against price risk crea-

ted by unstable export markets and oversupply shocks.

Smallholders are instead more vulnerable to weather risks caused by drought and seasonal weather patterns (Braun), which would be better insulated by insurance policies.

Globally, agricultural buyout policies have decreased in scale, yet this trend has not been observed in Brazil (Assunção et al.). Credit supply has been a strategy through which to promote sustainable agriculture practices, seen through the Low Carbon Agriculture Programme (Assunção et al.). Yet, credit access predicated on switching to more sustainable and environmentally-friendly agriculture practices is still not fully-developed for large agricultural producers, who form the largest contributors to deforestation and emissions in Brazil (Assunção et al.). Smallholders are not incentivised to take risks or adopt technology without sufficient risk mitigation strategies (Assunção et al.). Taken together, this means that increased soy demand caused by the US-China trade war will not create growth opportunities for smallholders, but will instead entrench the positions of big agribusinesses and widen the inequities between the two groups.

3.6 Brazil’s superficial environmental targets obfuscates the lack of robust progress Both the Brazilian government and large agribusinesses have been complicit in using zero deforestation commitment (ZDR) and climate pledges as covers to continue degrading the environment. For example, according to Figure 8, both Amaggi and Louis Dreyfus have made pledges to set up soy infrastructure in 2009 and have largely fulfilled their pledges. Their joint-venture, ALZ Grãos, has invested in soy storage, wholesale facilities and a port terminal in at-risk areas, increasing deforestation risk in 2017 by 5-fold and 10fold in comparison to Amaggi and Louis Dreyfus respectively (Zu Ermgassen et al).

Furthermore, the Brazilian government’s 2015 COP21 pledge was a political manoeuvre meant to obfuscate Brazil’s environmental commitments. In 2015, the pledge was set at a 37% cut by 2025 with 2005 as the base year (Timperley). However, Brazil not only committed to an absolute carbon emission reduction but also, analysing 2012 emissions data, it is clear that Brazil was already close to fulfilling its pledge in 2012 (Timperley).

This low bar gives Brazil leeway to increase emissions and still meet its 2025 target, a commitment that Climate Action Tracker has called out as “insufficient”(Timperley). It is hence unsurprising that IEA has projected that Brazil’s emissions will increase through 2040, and

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indeed Brazil’s GHG emissions increased 9% in 2016 as reported by Carbon Brief and the Observatório do Clima as a result of increased deforestation (Timperley).

Moreover, the continued role of EMBRAPA and the Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) in leading agricultural research through the Agricultural Risk and Vulnerability Monitoring and Simulation System and the Centre for Climatic intelligence for agriculture continues to benefit large agribusinesses at the expense of smallholders.

These centres seek to augment already existing regulatory, planning, and implementation methods that have traditionally worked in the interests of large agribusinesses, and have only increased the scale of pollution and deforestation (Timperley).

With the increased Chinese demand for Brazilian soy, these superficial safeguards will continue to act as a cover for unsustainable and inequitable soy practices. Without robust institutional reform in both the political and economic spheres to make participative and representational institutions more inclusive, any new programmes and reforms proposed by the Brazilian government will only be disingenuous re-creations of structures that seek to further entrench the positions of the agricultural elite.

4 Recommendations 4.1 Environmental social credit rating system We acknowledge that given entrenched political interests in Brazil, it would be unrealistic to expect the Brazilian government to cut all soy subsidies. Instead, it would be more realistic to peg soy subsidies, including the minimum price buyout and ⅙ production subsidy, to environmental protection KPIs. In particular, we propose a points system that would help track negative and positive practices. For example, negative points would be levied per hectare on farms that acquire additional land without first improving their technology, such as high yield seeds. Additionally, high demerits alongside fines will be levied for illegal deforestation or harassment of people from protected areas. In contrast, positive points will be accorded to farmers who employ sustainable practices such as no-till farming, the use of nitrification inhibitors, and the planting of cattails.

Because smallholders do not have the political capital to risk the current fines imposed if caught illegally falling trees and are unlikely to fall trees at the scale that large agribusinesses do, we argue that this model is equitable as negative points generally target large agribusinesses.

4.2 Special Taskforce To administer this environmental social credit rating

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system; as well as to investigate and determine penalties for environmental violations, we propose the creation of a Special Taskforce.

As mentioned, the Brazilian government and companies have devised superficial policies that target deforestation risk and equity issues. Further, the regulatory and investigative bodies that do exist have monitoring and enforcement issues. For example, the Amazon Council that was established in 2019 is headed by Vice President Mourão who is a supporter of Amazon mining (Mongabay Environmental News). The Council was also created in conjunction with President Bolsonaro’s decision to cut 25% of Brazil’s environmental enforcement agency’s (IBAMA) budget (Mongabay Environmental News). As such, these policies are largely disingenuous reactions to pressure from investors who are worried about environmental issues. We argue that given the entrenchment of agribusiness political interests, the existence of this task force, sanctioned from the very political establishment that is the source of the problem, does more harm than good as it gives the illusion that progress is being made.

We recommend that actors that have a stake in Brazilian soy and in the Brazilian government as a whole, like importers of Brazilian soy and investors in Brazilian infrastructure, should use their leverage to pressure the Brazilian government to set up an independent taskforce. This task force would initially be headed and monitored by intergovernmental experts who would subsequently train up a group of local experts from Brazilian universities and the civil service. As illegal deforestation and harassment of local landowners continue to pose huge risks to Brazil, the presence of an independent taskforce would be crucial in the reporting of and penalising of violations.

4.3 Strict land-use zoning with high fines for defection To ameliorate the effect of soy’s high NOX emissions, we recommend the implementation of specific crop zoning that would mix soy production with other low-NOX emitting crops (explained below). Furthermore, we recommend the planting of several trees in soy fields that soak up fertiliser, to mitigate problems of nutrient runoff. In addition to the aforementioned negative points for land acquisition, we suggest that the stamp duty for private and public land acquisition should be increased. Because private land acquisition is predominantly executed by smallholders whilst public land acquisition is predominantly executed by agribusinesses who fall more trees to expand production, private land acquisition stamp duties should be increased less

than public land acquisition stamp duties for equitable reasons.

4.4 Educational infrastructure As mentioned before a key source of inefficiency in smallholder farms is due to lack of education. As such, revenues from the stamp duties, fines, and cut in machinery subsidies should be put towards crafting education programmes for smallholders. These programmes would have a curriculum on no-till agriculture, the importance of planting cattails and trees in fields, etc.

This curriculum would be largely deployed by consultants engaged from intergovernmental agencies and local universities. The dissemination of this curriculum will be done via cooperatives. When possible, consultants who devise this curriculum should live in the cooperatives to properly observe practices and offer bespoke advice.

4.5 Cooperatives Vulnerable indigenous people in the Cerrado and Amazon regions are predominantly under threat from private security contractors hired by large agribusinesses. As such, we argue that a solution would involve incentivising large agribusinesses to protect indigenous populations through tax deductions. Therefore, when agreed, cooperatives should be set up where agribusinesses would be incentivised to not infringe on traditional lands in exchange for tax-deductible benefits. If indigenous populations choose to grow soy, big agribusinesses will be given the option to purchase the soy produced at an equitable rate for export.

4.6 Promotion of a unique crop configuration and rotation system To promote permaculture, a specific configuration of crops consisting of both subsistence crops (corn, nuts, bananas, cassava) can be mixed with cash crops. This could be promoted as the unique standardised Brazilian crop configuration, that would have the most ideal economic and environmental impact given the average size of cultivable farmland. To return nutrients to the soil, this crop configuration would come as a set of three crop cycles such that the sets can be rotated after harvesting. This crop rotation system would ensure that a good succession of grain crops are followed by grass crops and then cultivated crops. In effect these considerations will form specific configurations specific to what crops grow well in different Brazilian regions. The exact configuration should be decided by agricultural experts in Brazil rather than political leaders, so that the choice of crops cannot be politically charged with certain agribusiness interests. This configuration, while not enforcea-

ble, should be promoted by government agencies and consultants especially those involved in the taskforce and cooperative.

4.7 Policies related to agricultural credit and risk mitigation Private capital markets are the best candidate for the implementation of agricultural price mitigation strategies (Assunção et al.). Yet, Brazilian risk mitigation strategies have not ventured into market-based instruments such as insurance and sell options. Soybean remains the only crop in Brazil still not covered by specific crop insurance (Vieira).

Brazil can work with the International Bank For Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and FAO to develop more comprehensive risk mitigation schemes in the form of index-based, region-specific, and crop revenue-related insurance policies. Lastly, government interventions have been subsidy-heavy in Brazilian agriculture, which have dampened incentives towards efficiency and technological adoption. Brazil can curtail this by attaching requirements of technological adoption to qualify for government aid or pairing policies together, such as through subsidising certain seeds whilst requiring farmers to purchase more environmentally friendly fertilisers.

4.8 Green finance Sustainability conditions should be encouraged through foreign investment in Brazil. Brazil received $109m between 2013 and 2016 from multilateral climate funds both privately managed and run by multilateral platforms such as the IBRD (Timperley). This is still quite a low number compared to total FDI inflows, and while Brazil can better promote its more sustainable projects, more should be done to induce local investment projects to move towards more environmentally sustainable production strategies as they source for foreign investment. Tax breaks and waivers on foreign investment could be extended to projects that commit to sustainable environmental standards, to environment reporting to the government, and to ensuring that these standards are met during the length of the project. Export licenses and special preferential investment licenses can also be granted to companies, depending on their history of committing to sustainable projects.

4.9 Public-private partnerships, with attention to BR-163 As seen from the example of BR-163, the Brazilian government needs to ensure transparency and equal opportunity during the tender and auctioning processes of government contracts. Particular attention should be paid not just to the price points of the submitted tenders,

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but also to the performance history of companies and if they can ensure the provision of agreed deliverables.

Whilst we agree with the current policy that passes on the cost of building BR-163 to farmers, via tolls. We argue that tolls should not charge a simple flat rate dependent on distance (Estradas), but rather a fee based on ability to pay. Hence, we recommend different toll rates based on the maximum tonnage of vehicles using the expressway, where large vehicles carrying large quantities of cash crops to the ports meant for the export market should be charged more than smaller vehicles operated by smallholder farmers travelling to local markets.

With particular attention to operating BR-163, we advise against the government’s plans to yet again privatise the expressway (BNamericas), but instead propose a contractual limited-time auction of the management of the road under a usufruct system. This would be similar to the Singaporean government’s auctioning of critical bus and subway lines (Land Transport Guru). Under such a system, the operator of the road needs to guarantee minimum services and performance standards as dictated by the Brazilian government whilst paying the auctioned yearly sum to the government, in exchange for revenues obtained from the tolls. These services and standards can take the form of a number of road maintenance work done per year, a cap on the number of accidents, or the number of trees felled per year, amongst others.

4.10 Others The Brazilian government should make it unacceptable for large agribusinesses to use prophylactic sprays across whole fields, given the contaminating effect it has on the soil. Instead, targeted agrochemical applications should be encouraged based on individual plant health.

Improvements in technology have made it increasingly viable to deploy remote-sensing techniques that automatically detect and recognise pest and disease damage on fields in real-time. This is especially crucial with larger field sizes, and these technologies can be deployed such that detection can occur before symptoms are first visible to farmers. This makes large-scale prophylactic sprays redundant and relatively less cost-efficient. More relevant to farmers, these technologies can also predict crop yields and losses at critical junctures in the farming cycle with these technologies. This strategy helps with early detection, mitigation, and crop estimation that is crucial for farmers’ interests. The Brazilian government should hence encourage the adoption of said remote-sensing technologies amongst big agribusinesses who can afford

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to do so.

Machinery subsidies have been shown to promote tilling practices. Tillage is a traditional practice that has been shown to have poor effects on soil health and to consume more man-hours (Mafongoya et al), and has limited agricultural benefits. Cutting machinery subsidies, in tandem with encouraging partial and no-till practices will make it more unsuitable for farmers to practice tillage.

Annex

Figure 1: Long-term trends

Figure 2: Short-term trends

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Figure 3: Maps showing regional soy production hotspots in Brazil (United States Department of Agriculture)

Figure 4: Maps showing regional soy production hotspots in Brazil (Martinelli et al.)

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Figure 5: NOX emissions in Brazil per region (Davidson et al)

Figure 6: Fertiliser usage by biome in Brazil (Garrett et al.)

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Figure 7: Trends in deforestation in the Amazon and Cerrado biomes (zu Ermgassen et al)

Figure 8: ZDC effects on Amaggi, Louis Dreyfus and ALZ Grãos (Zu Ermgassen et al.)

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