The Claremont Journal of International Relations | Special Issue 2021

Special Issue:

A WORLD IN CRISIS

THE CLAREMONT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited By Nejra Kravic Olivia Truesdale

claremontjir.wordpress.com https://issuu.com/cjir claremontjir@gmail.com

Published November 18, 2021

Cover Photo by Olivia Truesdale

Masthead

Volume VII | Issue I | Special Edition

Editors NEJRA KRAVIC, SCRIPPS COLLEGE '21 OLIVIA TRUESDALE, SCRIPPS COLLEGE '21

Writers

JULIA KELLY, SCRIPPS COLLEGE '21 PETIE SCHILL, SCRIPPS COLLEGE '22 ERIN PUCKETT, POMONA COLLEGE '23

Claremont Journal of International Relations Volume VII, Issue I, Special Edition Published in 2021 by Nejra Kravic and Olivia Truesdale of the Claremont Journal of International Relations Journal email: claremontjir@gmail.com Web: www.claremontjir.wordpress.com Twitter: @ClaremontJIR LinkedIn: Claremont Journal of International Relations

Articles in the Claremont Journal of International Relations reflect the opinions of the authors and do not represent the Claremont Journal of International Relations, its editors, and staff members at the Claremont Colleges.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Contents Neglecting the Menstruation Needs of Refugees Must End. Period.

BY JULIA KELLY A Detrimental Definition: How the Legal Designation of Refugees Fails to Address Climate Change Displacement

BY PETIE SCHILL Effective U.S.-ROK Cooperation on South Korean Cybersecurity

BY ERIN PUCKETT Photo by Olivia Truesdale

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Introduction As managing editors of the spring 2021 semester of the Claremont Journal of International Relations (CJIR), we are pleased to be publishing some of the fantastic submissions we recieved that speak to the ongoing challenges that our world faces outside of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The first theme of this issue is the existing and emerging challenges in the refugee system: menstrual care and climate refugees, respectively. Following this, the issue shifts to cyberspace and how the United States can collaborate on cybersecurity with South Korea.

We would like to give special thanks to the writers who diligently and tirelessly worked with us to edit their papers over the course of the past several months, and to our former Editor-in-Chief Elizabeth Howell-Egan for initiating the work on this issue, though its form has shifted since its inception. We would be remiss to not acknowledge Canva for providing the template for this report, and to you, reader, for picking up a digital copy of this issue.

All in all, it has been a pleasure and a journey to produce this issue you are reading today; we hope that you find it interesting and engaging. If you have questions or are interested in submitting to a future issue of CJIR, please reach out to new Editor-in-Chief Kaylin Kim, at claremontjir@gmail.com Thank you!

Sincerely, Nejra Kravic, Scripps College '21 Olivia Truesdale, Scripps College '21

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Neglecting the Menstruation Needs of Refugees Must End. Period.

Julia Kelly

Introduction and Background For half of the world's population, menstruation is a fact of life. In many cultures, menarche signifies the transition from girlhood to womanhood, and in certain cultures, she is considered ready for marriage.

Nevertheless, menstruation itself is not celebrated. Rather, menstruation is stigmatized, and open discussion of menstruation is silenced in many cultures. In some communities, women and girls are forbidden from talking about their periods with men, and even their female friends and mothers (Hawkey 1483).

The issue of menstruation is even more fraught for female refugees.

Even without the obstacle of menstruation, female refugees are disproportionately disadvantaged in comparison to their male counterparts.

There are currently over 30 million females displaced globally–the greatest number since World War I (Schmitt 1). In conflict and disaster settings, instances of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) greatly increase. Not only is SGBV used as a weapon of war in armed conflict, but women are also more susceptible to Knobil, Mark."Refugee women in Chad." Flicker, 29 March 2005, https://www.flickr.com/photos/36448457@N00/66824893/.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Neglecting the Menstruation Needs of Refugees Must End. Period.

Julia Kelly

being victims of domestic violence from intimate partners. While SGBV can cause great mental problems, such as extreme stress, anxiety, and trauma, there can be physical issues, including injury and gynecologic problems that often go untreated (Masterson 2). In pursuit of protection and fulfilling the basic needs of their family, many women’s needs fall to the wayside. In fact, refugee women “may prioritize children, the elderly, and other family members’ needs over their own body-related needs” (Sommer, What is the scope for addressing menstrual hygiene management in complex humanitarian emergencies?” 246). Women’s needs are unlikely to be seen as important, especially in an emergency situation where suffering silently about menstruation might seem like the path of least resistance.

In rare cases, some refugee women temporarily lose their ability to menstruate due to stress and food insecurity (Masterson 6). But most women’s periods do not stop when conflict begins, and for menstruating refugees, Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) becomes a conflict of its own. After UNHCR's 2008 Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls illustrated the need for accessible menstrual supplies, and the abuse they may have to suffer to gain access to them —including women being forced to resort to exchanging sex for sanitary pads, UNICEF created an inter-agency manual that addressed menstrual hygiene called the “Immediate Response WASH and Dignity Kits and Family Hygiene” (Sommer, “Menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian emergencies,” 87). The most complete resource published in 2012 is called Menstrual Hygiene Matters by Wateraid/shaRe (Sommer, “What is the scope for addressing menstrual hygiene management in complex humanitarian emergencies?” 252). However, both of these guides and others are insufficient because even with the increasing volume of manuals, assessment tools, guides, and studies relating to menstruation, implementation of MHM measures for refugees has been underwhelming.

There are many factors that contribute to the problem concerning MHM in refugee camps. The gender data gap, the deficit in data collected about women on several topics, is a global shortcoming that oppresses and disadvantages women by neglecting to account for their needs and experiences, and the difference is even more stark for refugee women. Especially in the case of menstruation, women’s needs are very different from those of their fathers, brothers, husbands, and sons. Even though the consideration of MHM has increased in the past 15 years, the research on women-specific issues in refugee camps is greatly lacking while general observations and research on refugee camps are centered around the male experience (Sommer, “Menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian emergencies,” 83). Studies fail to answer the question of how refugee camps can create a safe and healthy environment for everyone.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Neglecting the Menstruation Needs of Refugees Must End. Period.

Julia Kelly

There are two main reasons for the lack of research conducted about MHM. First, the people in positions of power decide what is important. In the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) field, the leadership has historically been almost exclusively male (Sommer, “Menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian emergencies,” 98). These men in leadership have unintentionally overlooked the need for MHM in humanitarian situations as a result of lack of personal experience with menstruation and discomfort speaking about the subject which has subsequently disadvantaged female refugees under their care. In the “What is the scope for addressing menstrual hygiene management in complex humanitarian emergencies?” study, an NGO health advisor explained that “the reason why it [MHM] hasn’t been taken up is the lack of understanding and the lack of senior women in roles and program design. If you look at [WASH] programming, it’s male-dominated” (Sommer 251). Second, Stigma associated with menstruation results in avoidance of discussions about MHM. Not only are refugees uncomfortable speaking about it, but so are the humanitarian aid workers and emergency planners across the world in charge of providing for and researching feminine hygiene needs (Lonsdale 2). Both the reasons for the lack of gender aggregated data on refugee’s MHM and the lack of appropriate supplies for refugees has a negative impact on the women living in refugee camps and in migration.

The most difficult time for a refugee to manage her period is in transit from her home to a place of asylum. Many refugees have limited time to pack and limited available space in their bags needed to be carried on a long and perilous journey to safety. In the rush to flee from their homes, considerations such as food, water, and shelter may overshadow the need for feminine hygiene products. En route, there is “a loss of normal coping strategies, changes in socioeconomic status, experiencing changes in their physical and social environments, and a lack of access to structural and material sanitation needs can compound menstrual hygiene management (MHM) issues among refugee populations” (VanLeeuwen and Torondel 350). There is often no privacy on this journey as sometimes refugees are traveling in groups of strangers, all of whom attempt to flee undetected which sometimes means journeying through deserts, mountains, and forests with little or no infrastructure. Menstruating refugees’ best chance of privacy may be ducking behind a tree but still, clean water is rare while in transit, which increases the risk of irritation and infection. Some women reported using mattress filling, mud, leaves, and other unhygienic materials to manage their period as there is very little access to feminine hygiene products (Kunico 33). Further, the lack of toilets increases the risk of experiencing sexual violence (Sommer, “What is the scope for addressing menstrual hygiene management in complex humanitarian emergencies?” 255). Safety and privacy are almost impossible to come by on these long and perilous journeys whether that be on foot or by boat, and unfortunately, refugee women’s MHM does not improve significantly once they reach their destination: the refugee camp.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Neglecting the Menstruation Needs of Refugees Must End. Period.

Julia Kelly

Refugee Camps and Challenges to MHM It is widely understood by international emergency planners that the MHM approach should consist of five initiatives (Sommer, “Menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian emergencies” 91). The first measure consists of providing toilets that focus on privacy and safety, which includes a gender-segregated area and locks on the door to provide security for women. Second, women need to have access to enough water so that they can properly wash themselves during their period, their reusable pads, if they use them, and their clothes if they bleed through their menstrual products. Water is especially important in camps located in drought-ridden regions where water rations might be used instead for other activities. Third, the sanitary materials allotted to refugee women need to be suitable for each individual’s personal preference so that they can feel as secure as possible in their new living situation. This means understanding culturally which products are used: various cloths, reusable pads, or disposable pads. Fourth, there needs to be a consideration for the disposal or cleaning of feminine hygiene products. This includes a requirement for a proper waste management system for disposable pads and private cleaning and drying areas for reusable pads. Fifth and finally, there needs to be sufficient education for young girls before menarche so that they can better understand and manage their monthly periods (Sommer, “Menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian emergencies” 91). While these five initiatives are the current gold standard for MHM in refugee camps, their conditions are not always met. In fact, MHM is not formally defined in international emergency planner guidelines, which indicates that managing menstruation is not viewed as a top priority. Additionally, there is no international policy setting a baseline for minimum acceptable MHM resources, and therefore, many refugee camps do not make menstrual care a priority, and refugee women suffer because of it. Even camps that initially follow MHM guidelines, may not distribute feminine hygiene kits in the long-term (Sommer, “Menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian emergencies” 91).

Additionally, research shows that lack of privacy, especially privacy from men and boys, is an overarching concern for refugee women in their menstruation experiences. A refugee at a Lebanese refugee camp explained that tents do not fully shield their occupants from view, as they are “normally just blankets, plastic sheeting and transparent.” She further comments that “Someone from the outside can see you in there; if you undressed or don’t have your veil on” (Schmitt 6). A refugee in Myanmar similarly commented that the lack of space and genderseparated spaces was concerning ( Schmitt 5). As noted by the refugee in Myanmar, the absence of gender-separated latrines poses a massive problem for refugee women, especially when they are menstruating. For example, 99 percent of female refugees surveyed in the Central African

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Neglecting the Menstruation Needs of Refugees Must End. Period.

Julia Kelly

Republic and Nigeria feel unsafe at camp toilets in Cameroon (Mimche and Mbella 1). Refugee women and girls surveyed in Liberia and Guinea are fearful of rape and sexual assault at and on the way to relieving themselves (Sommer, “What is the scope for addressing menstrual hygiene management in complex humanitarian emergencies?” 255).

This fear is not imagined, as sexual and gender-based violence is heightened to a frightening degree for female refugees in bathrooms, especially at night, highlighting a major barrier to MHM, even if sanitary supplies are provided. The risk of SGBV increases when the toilets are not gender-segregated and locks are not put on the stall doors (Schmitt 6). A sector employee for UN WASH explained that "even after 10 years, we have been saying we need to segregate latrines between men and women and you go to the field, and it never happens" (Sommer, “What is the scope for addressing menstrual hygiene management in complex humanitarian emergencies?”

251). Some refugee women decrease the number of times they use the toilets by limiting food and drink consumption, and during their period these women have a greater potential for irritation and/or infections if their menstruation products are not changed regularly (Machado 3).

The lack of gender-segregated toilets has prompted refugee women to advocate for having toilets inside their lodging. A staff member working in a camp for Syrian refugees explained that many women there were more satisfied with a latrine in their living spaces because of the safety and privacy that it afforded them, despite the harsh smell (Schmitt 7), and findings from a study of women in Sierra Leone and Nepal reaffirmed that the household latrine idea for safe and accessible MHM (Sommer, “What is the scope for addressing menstrual hygiene management in complex humanitarian emergencies?” 255).

As illustrated above, toilets can be the most dangerous place for refugee women, and the simple measures that can be made to improve their experience during menstruation and their overall safety should not be ignored. When MHM access is improved, mobility for refugee women is also increased. In non-conflict situations, when women are menstruating, many daily activities are paused, including domestic and household tasks by 43.8 percent, trade by 36.3 percent, and education by 29.7 percent (Mimche and Mbella 3). This greatly affects the lives of women and their families. In Lebanon, refugees had access to local markets where they could buy menstruation products that best suit them instead of relying on the camp’s provisions (Schmitt 5). On the other hand, internally displaced women in Myanmar did not have that kind of freedom. A camp staff member in Myanmar explained that IDPs “have no livelihood so they do not have anything [menstrual materials].because of restricted movements, the Muslim IDP can’t access these materials in town or even have the money to buy it [pads]” which significantly decreases their quality of life (Schmitt 5).

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Neglecting the Menstruation Needs of Refugees Must End. Period.

Julia Kelly

It is important to state the obvious here: all refugees are not equal. Camp location, MHM program, and refugee’s customs and financial situation depend on each individual. Nevertheless, if all refugees had identical access to menstrual products provided by the camps, the mobility of all refugee women would be improved greatly.

Menstruation education is a major component of proper MHM in refugee camps, and the lack of comprehensive MHM means that many refugees have not been formally taught about this matter. The stigma of menstruation has prevented some mothers from passing important information about periods down to their daughters, and others wanted to speak to their daughters about menarche and menstruation but did not feel educated about it enough themselves or did not know the proper time to broach the subject (Metusela 840). Because of this, menstrual education is an area of which refugee camp staff could help enhance adolescents and adults’ knowledge. A staff member in a Myanmar refugee camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) said that when the refugees that they were working with were given menstrual pads, “they just thought they were tissues.” As many refugee women are more accustomed to using cloth, they needed an explanation on how to use the disposable pads (Schmitt 7). Other examples of the knowledge gap include, one woman believed that menstrual cramps and pain is due to “infection,” or that menstrual “bleeding is dirt inside our body and it’s being discharged,” both examples of how poor menstrual education further stigmatizes menstruation (VanLeeuwen and Torondel 355, Hawkey 1483). Additionally, males can serve “as supporters or as barriers” for menstruation reform (Sommer, “What is the scope for addressing menstrual hygiene management in complex humanitarian emergencies?” 258). Many refugees report negative feedback from men and boys about menstruation. One refugee told the “Experiences and Constructions of Menarche and Menstruation Among Migrant and Refugee Women” study researcher that her husband is “so disgusted and so grossed [out] by our menstruation,” and another refugee surveyed in the same study avoids her husband during this time of the month as “a type of respect to him as a man” so he does not “see something not good in me” (Hawkey 1483). Some refugee camps transitioned or are transitioning to cash assistance programs which further disadvantages women, as they are usually registered in the husband's or father’s name, meaning that the male members of the household have control over the family spending and may be likely to overlook or even ignore the need for feminine hygiene products when calculating monthly expenses. As a result, It is absolutely crucial to include men and boys in MHM education from a young age in order for them to understand the needs of the women and girls around them (Machado 2). As the Red Cross found in East Africa, “MHM is not only about distributing pads or providing education to girls” it is about the combination of the two on a regular basis (Machado 1).

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Neglecting the Menstruation Needs of Refugees Must End. Period.

Julia Kelly

Menstruation is stigmatized in every society globally, and women’s experiences with MHM are often silenced. The taboo nature of menstruation is exacerbated by religion and oppressive customs. Some Hindu, Muslim, and Jewish texts portray menstruating women as inherently unclean, and some scripture bans menstruating women from touching holy books, entering places of worship, praying, or participating in fasting, and may endorse exiling women from their communities during their week of menstruation (Hawkey 1483). A Sudanese refugee surveyed in the “Experiences and Constructions of Menarche and Menstruation Among Migrant and Refugee Women” study explained that “you can’t cook, you can’t wash dishes, you can’t clean the house for one week until you are clean” (Hawkey 1482). While some Tamil and South Sudanese refugees reported celebrations held in their honor when they reached menarche, one’s first period, this attitude towards menstruation is out of the ordinary (Hawkey 1478). One study claimed that refugee and migrant women continued to not participate in the same activities while menstruating after they arrived in a refugee camp as they did before (Hawkey 1486). A different study found the same phenomenon among refugees in Myanmar that menstrual customs and stigmas remained unwavering (Schmitt 4). However, in the same study, researchers also found that because displacement makes normal habits more difficult to maintain, refugees in a camp in Lebanon were reporting “possible diminishment of such taboos” which is a definite positive outcome for menstruating women (Schmitt 8). The menstruation taboo may also extend to emergency staff who are uncomfortable discussing the topic of menstruation, preventing menstruating refugees from getting the aid and guidance that they need (Lonsdale 2).

Menstrual Products Women all over the world have different ways of managing their periods, and this is no different when it comes to women living in refugee camps. For example, women in rural communities and economically disadvantaged women generally use swatches of cloth to cope with the bleeding.

However, in a Lebanese camp, women preferred disposable pads as that is what they had used before conflict (Schmitt 4). Many women prefer to use the MHM method that they used before migrating, but many are forced to change their preferred menstrual product in the refugee camp, mainly due to two reasons: first, because the refugee camps do not always provide much product variety, and second, because MHM products available differs by camp (Schmitt 4). According to Schmitt, refugee women must keep in mind “the ease of their ability (or not) to wash and dry reusable materials or dispose of disposable materials” while focusing on their access to privacy as well (Schmitt 4). Adapting to a new form of MHM is extremely stressful while managing symptoms of menstruation such as painful cramps and premenstrual syndrome (PMS). A caseworker from Myanmar explained this phenomenon when she noted that “at first many of the women used

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Neglecting the Menstruation Needs of Refugees Must End. Period.

Julia Kelly

cloths but now all of them use the [disposable] pads provided” because of their relative ease of accessibility (Schmitt 4). Understanding the advantages and disadvantages of various MHM methods for refugee women is essential to offer useful menstrual care services sensitive to refugees’ cultural backgrounds. Disposable pads are considered to be the superior form of MHM for refugees because of their reliability and ability to prevent the most leakage (Schmitt 4).

Being able to discreetly dispose of a pad after use with little privacy is considered a great advantage, particularly in contrast to washing and drying reusable pads with limited space and usually limited gender-segregated infrastructure (Schmitt 4). Additionally, the trust women had in the disposable pad allowed for more mobility within the camps instead of being confined to their temporary housing out of fear of bleeding on one’s clothes. Given the stigma and shame surrounding periods that was discussed in the previous section, these advantages cannot be trivialized. However, disposable pads also have the major disadvantages of cost and waste management. In terms of cost, continually having to buy new pads when each pad can only be used for a certain number of hours proves costly and will represent a significant portion of the camp’s budget. Additionally, refugee camp planners rarely take into account the amount of waste that comes from disposable pads. In Cameroon, menstruating women discarded their pads by burying them, burning them, throwing them in nearby rivers, and forcing them down camp latrines (Mimche and Mbella 1). There are rarely discreet trash bins in camp bathrooms and women are forced to find other ways to dispose of their period waste. As a result, sustainability becomes a problem and camps are not prepared to take on this extra waste (Schmitt 4). While disposable pads are widely preferred due to their superior effectiveness as compared to swatches of cloth, refugee camps rarely have the money or waste management systems to make this choice an easy one.

Reusable menstrual products have two main advantages: they are more sustainable and more cost-effective than disposable pads. Instead of disposing of pads after one use, reusable menstrual products have the potential to be used for a lifetime. This cuts down on waste and stops women from scrambling for protection when disposable pads are not available in the camps due to financial reasons. Reusable pads are more expensive at first purchase, but quickly become the less expensive option as the staff do not need to repurchase pads for female refugees each month. Also, a study of Muslim refugees found that there were no “cultural, religious, or hygienic concerns associated with hand washing and reusing this product” which is important to note in terms of its feasibility (VanLeeuwen and Torondel 357). In a Ugandan camp where reusable pads were being piloted, a study reported that 50 percent fewer girls skipped school because of menstruation. Additionally, instances of leakage dropped from 59 percent to nine percent and itching and burning while menstruating dropped from 73 percent to 24 percent (Kuncio 27). However, reusable period products have their disadvantages, namely the lack of

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Neglecting the Menstruation Needs of Refugees Must End. Period.

Julia Kelly

leak protection and privacy concerns while washing and drying them. In a study testing perceptions of reusable period underwear, which operate similarly to reusable pads, “most women felt that the product would not be sufficient for heavy menstrual bleeding and others questioned the absorbent capacity altogether,” and some women suggested pairing a reusable product with a disposable pad to ensure its leak prevention (VanLeeuwen and Torondel 357).

Because women did not feel confident with reusable pads’ leak prevention, they frequented the toilet more often to change the pad, which posed a safety concern if the latrines were not gender-segregated. If leakage does happen, it can affect a refugee’s entire day. As described by one 44-year-old refugee, "I only have one pair of clothing and when blood soaks through I have to wash it and wait in the caravan until they are dry" which stifles mobility (VanLeeuwen and Torondel 355). In addition, female refugees were concerned about washing and drying reusable products in the public eye because of the lack of gender-segregated hygiene spaces. Because of this, some women wore reusable products while they are still damp, which can lead to irritation and even infection (Machado 4). Climate can also impede the use of reusable pads, as “during the wet season, when drying times are longer, … [girls] need more [reusable] pads to manage their cycles” (Kuncio 27). In sum, reusable pads are less feasible due to the need to wash and dry the pads, which could have privacy and health repercussions, but are very cost-effective compared to disposable products.

Existing research of MHM in refugee camps primarily focuses on disposable and reusable pads, while use of tampons and reusable menstrual cups in camps has not been widely studied or at all. This is in part because they are often not distributed by humanitarian organizations because of the limited use of this type of MHM due to cultural narratives around virginity. When tampons and menstrual cups are inserted, they could break the hymen, a membrane partially sealing the entrance of the vagina, the intactness of which is equated with virginity in many cultures. Many believe that if a woman inserts one of those products inside of her body to soak up menstrual blood, her hymen may break, and she would be less likely to bleed on her wedding night from intercourse making her, therefore, less pure and chaste. The ideas of “breaking one’s hymen” and bleeding due to intercourse are problematic from a physiological perspective: the hymen will sometimes ‘stretch out’ naturally before a woman first has intercourse due to horseback riding, bicycle riding, or other activities. Additionally, not all virginal women bleed during their first time having vaginal sex. These narratives aside, tampons and menstrual cups can make a woman’s period less ‘messy’ by containing menstrual blood flow internally until the product is removed, which may make periods more manageable. They do require more knowledge than pads, however, to use safely. Without proper education on how to use a tampon, a woman runs

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Neglecting the Menstruation Needs of Refugees Must End. Period.

Julia Kelly

the risk of developing Toxic Shock Syndrome, a very rare but potentially life-threatening disease caused by bacteria growth. As such, these additional safety and cultural factors may make pads the most feasible MHM product for use in refugee camps.

Conclusion While access to proper MHM and privacy and cultural concerns serve as a major challenge to menstruating refugees, there are simple and low-cost changes that emergency and humanitarian planners can make to drastically improve a refugee’s menstruation experience. First, creating a women’s community center in each refugee camps can help to confront the stigmas that female refugees face concerning menstruation and other female-only issues, and additionally ameliorate the problems due to lack of education and shame about menstruation. This femaleonly center has not been widely recognized as a solution considered by emergency planners.

Women’s centers within refugee camps need to supply menstrual hygiene kits so that women are able to access these products in a safe and private space. Women-only centers also provide a safe space for women to speak to each other about challenges that women experience, not just with menstruation, but also other areas of daily life the refugee camps. With this, refugee women need to get involved with the making and distribution of period products to ensure their efficacy and quality. In the Dadaab refugee camp in Uganda, female refugees were employed to make reusable pads to distribute to other women in the camp (Sommer, “Menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian emergencies” 92). This program gave women financial independence and emboldened them to speak about the “unspeakable” topic of menstruation, benefitting both the men and women around them. These programs are low-cost to create and could save humanitarian organizations a massive amount of funds by producing these products in house and would ensure the adequate distribution of period products.

Menstrual Hygiene Management is a need akin to food, water, and shelter. It must be prioritized in the global community, especially in refugee camps where women are at their most vulnerable.

By neglecting this basic need for women, international organizations are failing to adequately supply for the essential needs of half of the population under their care. MHM needs are not being met equally across camps, either there needs to be a minimum and consistent standard for MHM response in emergency and humanitarian situations. It is the basic obligation of the global community to anticipate the needs of refugee women because “it is unlikely that adolescent girls and women will clamour for help regarding their MHM needs, in comparison with needs for shelter, food, and water, unless specifically approached and asked in a sensitive manner” (Sommer, “Menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian emergencies,” 98). The international humanitarian policy must implement a complete and holistic approach to MHM that guarantees dignity for all.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

WORKS CITED Neglecting the Menstruation Needs of Refugees Must End. Period.

Julia Kelly

Hawkey, Alexandra J., et al. "Experiences and constructions of menarche and menstruation among migrant and refugee women." Qualitative Health Research 27.10, 2017, pp. 1473-1490.

Kågesten, Anna E., et al. "Transitions into puberty and access to sexual and reproductive health information in two humanitarian settings: a crosssectional survey of very young adolescents from Somalia and Myanmar." Conflict and Health 11.1, 2017, pp. 1-15.

Kuncio, T. "Pilot study findings on the provision of hygiene kits with reusable sanitary pads. 2018." 2018, pp. 1-46.

Lonsdale, Cordelia. Research Impact Canada, “Mainstreaming Is Key for Integrating Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) Effectively into Emergency Response.” pp. 1-2.

Machado, Alexandra. Humanitarian Innovation Fund, “Periods Don’t Stop in Emergencies Addressing the Menstrual Hygiene Needs of Women and Girls,” 2018, pp. 1-8.

Masterson, Amelia Reese, et al. "Assessment of reproductive health and violence against women among displaced Syrians in Lebanon." BMC Women's Health (14.1, 2014), pp. 1-8.

Metusela, Christine, et al. "'In my culture, we don’t know anything about that': Sexual and reproductive health of migrant and refugee women."

International Journal of Behavioral Medicine 24.6, 2017, pp. 836-845.

Mimche, Honoré, and Cédric Stéphane Mbella Mbella. Edited by Rockaya Aidara and Mbarou Gassama Mbaye, Water Supply & Sanitation Collaborative Council, “Menstrual Hygiene Management in Humanitarian Situations: the Example of Cameroon,” 2017, pp. 1-7.

Schmitt, Margaret L., et al. "Understanding the menstrual hygiene management challenges facing displaced girls and women: findings from qualitative assessments in Myanmar and Lebanon." Conflict and health 11.1, 2017, pp. 1-11.

Sommer, Marni. "Menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian emergencies: gaps and recommendations." Waterlines, 2012, pp. 83-104.

Sommer, Marni, et al. "What is the scope for addressing menstrual hygiene management in complex humanitarian emergencies? A global review."

Waterlines, 2016, pp. 245-264.

VanLeeuwen, Crystal, and Belen Torondel. "Exploring menstrual practices and potential acceptability of reusable menstrual underwear among a Middle Eastern population living in a refugee setting." International Journal of Women's Health, 2018; 10: 349-360.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

A Detrimental Definition: How the Legal Designation of Refugees Fails to Address Climate Change Displacement Petie Schill

Introduction Who is a refugee? Although the word itself implies that it simply means one seeking refuge, the international recognized definition of a refugee contains more specifications. In fact, several scholars have argued that these specifications are exclusionary to those who genuinely need refuge and should be able to achieve refugee status. According to the current United Nations definition, a refugee is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, nationality, race, or religion. Even though this definition was created decades ago at the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (3), it has hardly been altered or updated to address present-day crises that force individuals to flee their countries.

Perhaps one of the most prominent of these current issues is the rise of climate change, which is resulting in more and more natural disasters and the creation of uninhabitable land. A close examination of the origins of the still-used 1951 definition and increased global displacement demonstrates that the internationally recognized refugee designation fails to address the devastating effects of climate change and allows the international community to avoid obligations to assist an increasingly displaced group.

Origins of the Definition Shortly after World War II, the international community found itself in a disagreement. With millions of unsettled refugees across the globe, countries could not agree on how to handle the situation. Although there was not yet an internationally recognized refugee definition, Western countries agreed that something needed to be done about the refugees who fled from communist-dominated countries, the noncombatants fleeing during the Korean War, the Arabs fleeing Palestine during the Israeli War, and other groups seeking refuge (Marrus 354). The International Refugee Organization (IRO), a temporary UN organization established in 1946 to resettle the last million European refugees in the aftermath of World War II, was overwhelmed.

Less than a decade after its creation, the IRO was replaced by a new UN organization, the United

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

A Detrimental Definition: How the Legal Designation of Refugees Fails to Address Climate Change Displacement Petie Schill Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was established in 1950. It was established early on that the UNHCR would not assist war criminals, refugees already receiving aid from other UN organizations, or refugees already given the same rights as nationals in the countries in which they lived (Marrus 356). However, a specific universal definition of refugees was yet to be created.

The proposition for such a definition sparked debate among Western countries. Some countries, such as the United States and France, feared legal and financial obligations to refugees and desired a specific definition in hopes of having responsibilities to fewer refugees. Others, such as Britain, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, demonstrated more sympathy and wanted to define refugees more broadly in order to assist more of them (Loescher 57).

Ultimately, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defined a refugee as a person forced to flee because of persecution due to race, religion, political view, nationality, or the belonging of a social group. The Convention also specified certain time and geographic limitations on this definition. It was attuned specifically to the European situation as many Western states were reluctant to assume obligations to those outside Europe. The 1951 Convention covered only those who became refugees due to events occurring in Europe before January 1, 1951 (Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 14).

Surprisingly, the 1951 definition has only been amended once in its existence spanning several decades. In 1967, states convened for the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in order to address new refugee crises that arose after the 1951 Convention. Recognizing the existence of groups of people who may have been forced to flee due to events occurring after January 1, 1951 or outside of Europe, the convening parties decided to revoke these geographic and time limitations of the original definition (Convention and Protocol 46). While this expanded the scope of displaced persons that the UNHCR could designate as refugees and assist, the official definition still required that a refugee must have fled because of persecution due to race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or belonging to a specific social group. There have been no formal amendments since, and thus, many people forced to flee their homes have no legal protection under the current definition.

Climate Refugees?

One of these groups of displaced persons lacking legal protection and official refugee status is climate “refugees.” Although the UNHCR claims that they currently aid those displaced by the impacts of climate change, the term “climate refugee” has no legal basis. According to the UNHCR, there is a possibility that the 1951 definition may apply to these individuals in some

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

A Detrimental Definition: How the Legal Designation of Refugees Fails to Address Climate Change Displacement Petie Schill contexts. However, these instances require that the unfavorable impacts of climate change intersect with one of the five reasons deemed valid in the 1951 definition. For example, if one flees because of both the effects of climate change and persecution or armed conflict due to nationality, one may gain refugee status. The UNHCR does not endorse the term “climate refugee” and prefers to refer to these displaced persons as “persons displaced in the context of disasters and climate change,” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees).

Echoing the twentieth century debate on how to address and define refugees, counties have recently demonstrated an inability to reach a consensus on how to address climate “refugees.”

In 2016, there was hope that negotiations on the proposed Global Compact on Refugees and Global Compact for Migration, would spark inspiration for new international policies on climate “refugees” (McDonnell). However, the United Nations’ special representative for the migration compact told the European Parliament in 2018 that UN members were not ready to give “specific legal international protection to climate-induced migrants,” destroying that hope (Chadwick).

One of the leading factors that complicates the international community’s ability to recognize climate refugees is that there are two kinds of climate-induced forced migration that will occur.

Experts differentiate between migration resulting from specific climate disasters, such as typhoons and floods, and displacement resulting from long-term impacts of climate change, such as rising sea levels and desertification (McDonnell). There are situations in which scholars disagree about the causes of migration, and some question the legitimacy of claims that climate change has forcibly displaced persons. For example, while some scholars deny any connection between migration and climate change in Syria in recent years, others have argued that climate change-induced drought has increased unrest and displacement in the country (Kelley, C., et al.

2). However, many scholars and scientists agree that climate change makes bad situations worse, and even if it is not the primary factor that pushes individuals out of their homes, it will undoubtedly contribute to the forced movement of peoples as it worsens.

Climate Change Displacement: Despite the lack of legal recognition for climate refugees, phenomena caused by climate change have already been demonstrated to push individuals out of their homes as a result of both longterm effects and immediate climate disasters. In 2019 alone, nearly 25 million people were displaced due to calamitous natural disasters, such as monsoon, cyclones, and typhoons (“Global Internal Displacement Database”). Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America have been especially impacted by climate change in recent years.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

A Detrimental Definition: How the Legal Designation of Refugees Fails to Address Climate Change Displacement Petie Schill In sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Mali, and East Africa have particularly demonstrated climate change displacement over the past decade. Just in 2012, over 6 million North-Eastern Nigerians were displaced because of floods (Torelli). In the same year, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Somalia, and Kenya faced a disastrous drought that forced millions to move both internally and across international borders (Nyamori). In 2020, East Africa saw deadly floods caused by abnormally high rainfall, and the rising waters of Lake Victoria forced thousands to flee as they inundated surrounding villages and centers.

Similarly, millions have been displaced in South Asia because of climate disasters such as floods, monsoons, and cyclones. In 2019, the top ten global disaster-caused displacements all occurred in the region, particularly impacting India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines (“Global Internal Displacement Database”). In addition to climate change-induced disasters, rising sea levels threaten coastal regions while landlocked countries face drought and glacial melt brought on by rising temperatures (“Climate-Induced Displacement”).

Latin America has also displayed changes in migration resulting from rising temperatures. This phenomenon, along with extreme weather events, drought, and crop diseases, has rendered agriculture an unlivable source of income for farmers, causing people to flee (Hallett). Although this example is debated when it comes to determining legitimate reasons for fleeing, Latin Americans have also experienced more objective climate change displacement. Between 1998 and 2017, Nicaragua and Honduras were identified as two of the ten countries most affected by climate events (Eckstein, David, et al). In addition, recent floods and landslides caused by consecutive hurricanes destroyed over 60,000 homes in Guatemala, forcing some to seek refuge in the United States (Watson).

It is important to note that poor developing countries are most affected the most (Kumar et al).

Countries that are already struggling with other problems, such as mass violence, are also expected to be hardest hit by climate change. The UNHCR has stated that approximately 90% of the world’s refugees come from vulnerable countries that are ill-prepared for the effects of climate change and that lack resources (“Climate Change Link to Displacement of Most Vulnerable Is Clear: UNHCR”). Thus, the futures of displaced persons from poorer and struggling countries will be greatly impacted in the future as climate change continues to rise.

There is compelling evidence for rapid climate change, and scientists are confident that rising temperatures will continue in future decades. According to NASA, this is largely due to the world’s massive production of greenhouse gases. Along with rising temperatures, experts predict

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

A Detrimental Definition: How the Legal Designation of Refugees Fails to Address Climate Change Displacement Petie Schill changes in precipitation patterns; increases of droughts and heat waves; surges in intensity, duration, and frequency of hurricanes; and rising sea levels.

The outcomes of these events will directly increase displacement around the world. The World Bank Group predicts that by the year 2050, tens of millions will be internally displaced because of climate change. Not only will people move internally, but increased movement across international borders is also expected to rise. A study by Columbia University researchers projects that by 2100, the European Union may see up to a 28% increase in asylum applications resulting from climate change (Missirian and Schlenker). Several other projections have been made that estimate that large quantities of people will be forced to flee due to rising climate change.

Conclusion With climate change on the rise, forced displacement due to climate disasters and long-term impacts such as rising sea levels is inevitable, but how the international community will respond to climate refugees is not entirely known. According to the World Bank Group, climate change displacement will drastically increase unless the world takes significant action and cuts down greenhouse gas emissions. Without the chance to obtain official refugee status, those forced to flee due to climate change currently lack legal protections and therefore obligatory assistance from the international community. Although the UNHCR recently issued considerations to “guide interpretation and steer international discussion” on claims for climate refugee status, the leading organization does not consider persons displaced by climate change to be refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees).

In fact, the current legal definition of a refugee is more detrimental than beneficial when it comes to these persons. By retaining the definition from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the international community excludes several groups who face displacement but not one of the five reasons for persecution deemed legitimate. In order to address persons displaced by climate change, the definition needs to be less specific in who is legally a refugee.

Recent trends have echoed the sentiment of the mid-twentieth century, when Western countries expressed their disapproval of helping non-European refugees, yet the regions most affected by climate change displacement today are not European. The UN has yet to act to adopt a broader understanding of refugees in order to address climate change-induced crises in these nonEuropean regions.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

A Detrimental Definition: How the Legal Designation of Refugees Fails to Address Climate Change Displacement Petie Schill Although many experts are skeptical that the refugee definition will be extended any time soon, there has been increased conversation and study on the topic with the rise of climate change. In late April 2021, the United States Biden administration announced its consideration of defining climate refugees. Although more investigation is being performed before Biden announces any official stance, this has continued the discussion on climate change displacement. If the United States were to define a climate refugee in the future, it could signify a major shift in international refugee law and policy. It may very well be the first of many steps toward a change in the legal refugee definition that has historically excluded groups since its creation seventy years ago.

Englart, John. “Climate change = more climate refugees. #Melbourneclimatestrike IMG_5187.” Flickr, 20 Sept. 2019, https://www.flickr.com/photos/takver/48765007057.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

WORKS CITED A Detrimental Definition: How the Legal Designation of Refugees Fails to Address Climate Change Displacement Petie Schill Bhattacharyya, Arpita, and Michael Were. “Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in South Asia.” Center for American Progress, www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2012/12/03/46382/climate-change-migration-and-conflict-in-south-asia/.

Chadwick, Vince. Global Compact for Migration Not the Answer for CLIMATE REFUGEES: UN Representative. 20 Mar. 2018, www.devex.com/news/global-compact-for-migration-not-the-answer-for-climate-refugees-un-representative-92373.

Chen, Joyce, and Valerie Mueller. “Climate-Induced Cross-Border Migration and Change in Demographic Structure.” Population and Environment, vol. 41, no. 2, 2019, pp. 98–125., doi:10.1007/s11111-019-00328-3.

“Climate Change Link to Displacement of Most Vulnerable Is Clear: UNHCR.” UN News, news.un.org/en/story/2021/04/1090432.

“Climate-Induced Displacement: South Asia's Clear and Present Danger.” Wilson Center, www.wilsoncenter.org/article/climate-induceddisplacement-south-asias-clear-and-present-danger.

Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees: Text of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of the Refugees: Text of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees: Resolution 2198 (XXI) Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, UNHCR, 2007, pp. 3– 46.

“The Effects of Climate Change.” NASA, NASA, 23 Dec. 2020, climate.nasa.gov/effects/.

Eckstein, David, et al. “GLOBAL CLIMATE RISK INDEX 2019, Who Suffers Most From Extreme Weather Events? Weather-related Loss Events in 2017 and 1998 to 2017”. Germanwatch.org. 2019.

“Global Internal Displacement Database.” IDMC, www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data.

Hallett, Miranda Cady. “How Climate Change Is Driving Emigration from Central America.” PBS, Public Broadcasting Service, 8 Sept. 2019, www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-climate-change-is-driving-emigration-from-central-america.

Kelley, C., et al., Commentary on the Syria case: Climate as a contributing factor, Political Geography (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.06.013.

Kumari Rigaud, Kanta, Alex de Sherbinin, Bryan Jones, Jonas Bergmann, Viviane Clement, Kayly Ober, Jacob Schewe, Susana Adamo, Brent McCusker, Silke Heuser, and Amelia Midgley. 2018. Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Loescher, Gil. Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis. Oxford University Press, 1996.

Marrus, Michael Robert. The Unwanted. Temple University Press, pp. 354–56.

McDonnell, Tim. The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To. 20 June 2018, www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/20/621782275/the-refugees-that-the-world-barely-pays-attention-to.

Missirian, Anouch, and Wolfram Schlenker. “Asylum Applications Respond to Temperature Fluctuations.” Science, vol. 358, no. 6370, 2017, pp.

1610–1614., doi:10.1126/science.aao0432.

Nyamori, Victor. “The Legal Protection of Climate Refugees in East Africa.” Africa Portal, www.africaportal.org/features/climate-refugee-rightseast-africa-op-ed-victor-nyamori/.

Torelli, Stefano M. “Climate-Driven Migration in Africa.” ECFR, 20 Dec. 2017, ecfr.eu/article/commentary_climate_driven_migration_in_africa/.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Climate Change and Disaster Displacement. www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-change-anddisasters.html.

Watson, Julie. Biden Considers Protections for Climate Refugees. 20 Apr. 2021, www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/biden-considers-protections-forclimate-refugees.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Effective U.S.-ROK Cooperation on South Korean Cybersecurity Erin Puckett

The United States and South Korea have enjoyed a robust military alliance since the Korean War to the benefit of both nations. However, the focus of that alliance has had a fairly narrow scope.

The North Korean nuclear threat dominates discussion of North Korean issues in the U.S.-ROK alliance. As such, other North Korean threats such as the North Korean cyber threat to South Korea’s military, infrastructure, and business community is often overlooked. That gap has translated into policy: existing joint agreements on U.S.-ROK cyber cooperation are limited and thus insufficient to support South Korean security and prosperity. In order to show that change is necessary and that what I propose is the best solution, I will first present the cyber threat landscape on the Korean Peninsula. Then I will discuss existing cooperative mechanisms between South Korea and the United States and finally, I will provide policy suggestions for improving South Korean cybersecurity through bilateral cyber cooperation, specifically the addition of joint cyber operations and specific cooperative strategies drawn from the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance and specific tactics and proclivities of North Korea as a cyber actor.

North Korean Cyber Threat Landscape The cyber threat landscape of the Korean Peninsula can be described as a deluge of North Korean cyberattacks against South Korea, with a great variety of cyber tools employed in those attacks. The Council on Foreign Relations attributes 36 cyber campaigns to North Korean dating back to 2009.

Fourteen of hackers those campaigns, many ranging

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. "US, ROK Fighter Wing Commanders Meet During Exercise Vigilant Ace 2015, Republic of Korea." Flicker, 5 Nov. 2015, https://www.flickr.com/photos/us-pacific-command/22645039080.

SPECIAL ISSUE

months or years and targeting hundreds of victims, were specifically aimed at South Korea. The campaigns can consist of thousands of individual attacks, as such, they are nearly impossible to track individually. Many North Korean cyberattacks are aimed at South Korea’s private sector, with past attacks having targeted a refugee resettlement agency, banks and cryptocurrency firms,

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Effective U.S.-ROK Cooperation on South Korean Cybersecurity Erin Puckett policy researchers, and investigative journalists, among others (Reuters; O’Neill; McNamara; Pauli; Rahn). The reasons for targeting such entities ranges. Refugee resettlement agencies are targeted to allow North Korea to determine the identities of North Koreans defectors, whereas policy researchers and journalists are often targeted to give the DPRK insight on ROK strategic policy regarding North Korea (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, 2020).

Cryptocurrency exchanges and banks are primary targets, as cybertheft is a key funding source for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear program. Unlike every other nation-state that engages in cyber activity, North Korea engages in a significant amount of cybercrime as a result of its financial struggles prompted byUnited Nations sanctions. The regime views its nuclear program as the key to its survival, so it needs an illegal way of funding the program to keep it afloat. The UN estimates that North Korean hackers made off with around $2 billion between 2016 and 2019 that was used to fund their state’s nuclear ambitions (Nichols). North Korea has also targeted a variety of military and government targets for conventional espionage purposes (Choe, Kirkpatrick, and Perlroth; Pauli; Shim; Choe and Markoff). One particularly successful cyberattack on the South Korean government netted them military plans for a decapitation strike on North Korea (Choe, Kirkpatrick, and Perlroth). Both the attacks on the public and the attacks on private targets are detrimental to South Korea’s national security. Attacks on government entities advance North Korea in the sphere of information warfare through stolen classified military documents or make systems vulnerable to blackouts or remote control in the event of war, and attacks on the private sector give North Korea access to the personally identifiable information of South Koreans or North Korean defectors or relevant private sector policy research, or financially support the North Korean nuclear program through cybercrime.

The United States’ private sector has also been the target of North Korean cyberattacks, most notably in the 2014 Sony Pictures Entertainment hack which was presumed to be retaliation for the creation and imminent release of the movie “The Interview,” a fictional tale of Kim Jong Un being assassinated by U.S. journalists (VanDerWerff and Lee). In that hack, North Korean hackers calling themselves the “Guardians of Peace” broke into the systems of Sony Pictures Entertainment, stole unreleased movies, erased and leaked emails, and threatened acts of terrorism at theaters on a code-sharing website (VanDerWerff and Lee).

However, there are far fewer publicly reported cases of North Korean attacks or attempted attacks of a U.S. government target. Two of the few examples are the July 4, 2009 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against U.S. government websites and an October 2020 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) alert about government agencies, think tanks, and commercial firms being targeted by a specific North Korean cyber actor referred to as

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Effective U.S.-ROK Cooperation on South Korean Cybersecurity Erin Puckett Kimsuky for the purpose of gathering intelligence, including open-source intelligence (CISA; VarDerWerff and Lee; Choe and Markoff). Therefore, greater cyber collaboration and improved collaborative strategies would be beneficial to the U.S. and strengthening cybersecurity strategies to manage North Korean cyberthreats should be a growing priority in the U.S.-ROK alliance.

While North Korea has strong offensive cyber capabilities, it has relatively sparse networks, few users of its state-run intranet, and even fewer users of the World Wide Web, meaning that there are few targets for the United States or South Korea to attack (Sanger, Kirkpatrick, and Perlroth; Talmadge; ASPI). Even if they wanted to offensively target North Korean networks, the United States or South Korea would have a hard time choosing a target for an attack that mimicked the target(s) chosen by North Korea. For example, North Korea has no known cryptocurrency exchanges for South Korea to hack. North Korean hackers would also be hard to target as many of them live and work outside North Korea and therefore are difficult to track down (Sanger, Kirkpatrick, and Perlroth). Joint U.S.-ROK strategy must take into account the sheer number of attacks, the motivations, the emphasis on South Korea, and prospective targets. However, given the number of successful attacks on South Korea, it is evident that the current strategy is insufficient.

The State of U.S.-ROK Cyber Cooperation The United States and South Korea have collaborated on military strategy and policy for over 50 years, starting with the Korean War in June 1950. In 1953, at the conclusion of the war, the two countries signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, beginning decades of joint policy on a variety of issues as well as some joint operations. Many of the decisions on collaboration have been made during annual U.S.-South Korea Security Consultative Meetings (SCMs), though collaboration has not been relegated only to those meetings. However, it was only years after the beginning of the proliferation of North Korean cyberattacks on South Korea that the two countries began openly collaborating on the issue and doing so through the SCMs. The beginning of bilateral cyber collaboration between the United States and South Korea was in 2011 when the two countries announced in the joint communique from the 43rd SCM that they agreed there was a “need to strengthen cooperation with respect to protection of, and access to, the space and cyberspace domains, and to promote the resilience of critical infrastructure, including the security of information and space systems.” It was noted that this would occur through “the establishment of a bilateral strategic policy dialogue on cyber-security issues” using “a ‘wholeof-government’ approach and coordination with the private sector” (The Korea Herald). Since then, in other SCMs they have also mentioned the progress made regarding cooperation, including specific

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Effective U.S.-ROK Cooperation on South Korean Cybersecurity Erin Puckett cooperative bodies engaged in related work. The most recent SCM in October 2020 provided a vision of much closer cooperation, specifically that The two sides committed to maintain close communication and coordination regarding the cyber domain through sharing trends of cyber threats as well as discussing corresponding policy changes. They also concurred in the need for exchanges between the respective cyber commands with the aim of discussing and promoting mutual interests (Department of Defense, 2020).

There has been a shift over the years towards increased military-to-military threat sharing as well as policy coordination in the form of more policy meetings and day-to-day communications.

An example of this is the direct White House-Blue House cyber communication channel that was installed in 2015 in order to facilitate increased high-level communication on the North Korean cyber threat. (The White House).

Concrete cooperative work began with policy dialogue in September 2012 with the first U.S.South Korea Cyber Policy Consultation, the “bilateral strategic policy dialogue on cyber-security issues” mentioned in the 43rd SCM. The biggest collaborative effort born out of that first talk was a decision on a South Korean conference on cybersecurity to occur in 2013 with U.S. support (The Korea Times). But by 2014, the issues discussed during meetings had broadened to the assessment of cyber threats, development of international norms of state behavior include in cyberspace and cyber confidence-building measures, cooperation in building the cybersecurity capacity of developing countries, Internet governance and the importance of a multistakeholder approach, cooperation in enhancing cybersecurity, including that of critical infrastructure, and cooperation in international fora (U.S. Department of State “Joint Statement”).

By 2018, the policy dialogue had expanded to also include military-to-military cyber cooperation and collaboration in “deterring cyber adversaries,” though only as two facets of a policy dialogue that tackled a wide range of cyber issues (U.S. Department of State “The Fifth”).

This shows how cyber policy cooperation between the allies has broadened over time and is not just defense policy and activities. The cooperation includes a variety of cyber issues pertinent specifically to democratic countries looking to maintain a democratic global Internet through norm-building. The U.S.-South Korea Cyber Policy Consultations have become important for strengthening the U.S.-ROK alliance through greater coordination of state policies as well as for building international norms around cybersecurity. However, they are not specifically focused on joint cybersecurity strategies and are therefore somewhat tangential to improving state security.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Effective U.S.-ROK Cooperation on South Korean Cybersecurity Erin Puckett Another vehicle for collaboration between the U.S. and ROK militaries is the Cyber Cooperation Working Group (CCWG), a group created for the purpose of “strengthen[ing] cooperation in information sharing, cyber policy, strategy, doctrine, personnel, and exercise to improve [their] collective readiness against cyber threats.” The group was initiated in September 2013 and its first meeting was held in February 2014 (ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Joint Statement”; The Korea Herald; Cordesman and Lin 182). The process has included table-top exercises to practice cyber crisis response as well as joint training and education (ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Joint Statement”; Park). The 48th SCM also mentions that the CCWG launched a U.S.-ROK Cyber Task Force to “better synchronize and enhance [combined] cooperation in cyberspace within the Alliance construct” (U.S. Department of Defense). This series of working-level talks has been beneficial for increasing policy cooperation and coordination, but nevertheless, the group is a policy group, not an implementation group. Despite discussion about cybersecurity cooperation, the 1953 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty only includes the first three domains of war as domains in which cooperative operations can take place – land, air, and sea. Per Article IV of the Treaty, cyber is not within the scope in which “The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States ... forces” (Mutual Defense Treaty).

Therefore, troops from the two states do not engage adversaries in joint cyber operations because they cannot conduct joint cyber operations.

All things considered, there is a significant amount of policy collaboration on issues in cyberspace. The national security-related cybersecurity collaboration falls into five categories: cyber threat information sharing, with a special emphasis on threats to critical infrastructure, investigation of cyber incidents, military-to-military cooperation, research and development and education collaboration, and cooperation between private firms in their respective cybersecurity industries on relevant technologies (The White House). However, there is no collaboration on actual cyber operations, leaving a gap in the implementations of the policies crafted jointly and creating an opportunity for North Korea to take advantage of South Korea’s relative weakness in defensive and offensive cyber operations compared to the United States.

Policy Suggestions I offer four strategic suggestions born out of analyzing the treaties and policy binding the U.S.ROK alliance as well as North Korean hackers’ tactics and targets. Those suggestions aim to improve operations, and the prevention of, attribution of, and retaliation for North Korean cyberattacks, in that order. First, the United States and South Korea should conduct joint cyber operations in the same way they conduct joint operations in the other domains of war pursuant

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Effective U.S.-ROK Cooperation on South Korean Cybersecurity Erin Puckett

to the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, amending the Treaty in order to do so. Second, both countries should enshrine in law that cyberattacks of a certain level against private sector targets are threats to national security and will be treated as such regarding retaliation from the state. Third, there should be direct lines of communication across private cybersecurity companies from both states and the two states’ governments. Fourth, states should target elites in retaliation for cyberattacks of a certain severity. These changes would strengthen cybersecurity in the private sector as well as the government in South Korea.

The first facet of better cooperative strategy is conducting joint cyber operations. The “right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea” as described in the Mutual Defense Treaty strongly posits the ability of the U.S. military to be be present in the sovereign territory of another state. This language is uniquely strong regarding the “right” of the U.S. to intervene militarily in South Korea, even among other mutual defense agreements the U.S. has with allies, demonstrating a level of cooperation and trust should be taken into account regarding cyber cooperation (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1953; Paik, 2020). It follows that the United States and South Korea should conduct joint cyber operations in the same way they conduct joint exercises in the other three domains. This would require an amendment to the Mutual Defense Treaty, specifically the inclusion of cyberspace as a South Korean domain in which U.S. forces are allowed to take action in. Conducting joint U.S.-ROK cyber operations would broadly improve South Korea’s public and private sectors’ cybersecurity.

There is a reason why the Mutual Defense Treaty has lasted since its signing in 1953: the joint operations are beneficial for both countries because they are the fusing of separate capabilities to create an even greater shared set. Thus, they serve as a bigger deterrent to North Korean offensive action and allow for better response options when North Korea takes offensive action.

As such, joint cyber operations would be a natural extension of existing joint operations in the other domains of war. In that sense, it seems strange to not already have joint operations.

Furthermore, the fact that the United States is less of a target or at least less of a successfully compromised target for North Korea than South Korea suggests that the United States’ power and capabilities either deter or stop North Korean cyberattacks. Therefore, South Korea would strongly benefit from joint cyber operations, as with U.S. capabilities and intervention, South Korea would not be seen as such a tempting target. This would be beneficial at augmenting South Korean cybersecurity in general, in the public and private sectors.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Effective U.S.-ROK Cooperation on South Korean Cybersecurity Erin Puckett The second facet of better cooperative strategy related to North Korean cyberattacks, particularly on the private sector, is better protective and due diligence measures to prevent high-impact attacks. Specifically, I propose that both countries make the policy choice to consider private sector attacks of a certain caliber as national security risks and codify this into legislation so that the ROK government can react appropriately. Currently, under both U.S. and South Korean law, private sector cyberattacks are not explicitly denoted as potential threats to national security (National Cybersecurity Strategy; NDAA 2019 Conference Report). However, national security is strongly tied to economic security as serious damage to one’s economy would have catastrophic national security consequences. As such, language to this effect should be included in national legislation in both countries, including the annual National Defense Authorization Act in the United States. Such legislation would function as a deterrent against North Korean attacks on private companies–the stakes are much higher. Though it would not stop all attacks, it would likely be more effective than current language. If North Korea has reason to fear that cyberattacks on private companies could invite strong retaliation, then it would be less likely to attack such targets with such impunity. This would essentially function as a preventive measure. It would be especially beneficial if both South Korea and the United States make this change, as it would further align their cyber policies and make for more seamless cooperation. While the U.S. has not called for such a measure, different agencies, including CISA and the Department of Defense, have been playing a larger role in directing private sector cybersecurity in their specific areas of focus, infrastructure and defense, explicitly for the purpose of securing national security.

The third facet of strengthening South Korean cybersecurity related to cyberattacks on private targets is attributing attacks efficiently and with greater accuracy by creating direct lines of communication between cybersecurity firms, executive branches, and intelligence agencies in both the United States and South Korea to share information about North Korean cyber threats.

This would build off the existing direct line of communication for cyber issues between the White House and the Blue House. Because North Korean cyber actors frequently attack private targets for the purpose of making money, they show up on the radar of private cybersecurity companies. Thus, if there were direct lines of communication across both sectors and countries, when an attack is noticed by one party, others could quickly share input and cross-reference with what they know. Attribution needs to be done quickly and accurately in order for retaliation to be able to take place in a timely manner, so this would be incredibly beneficial.

The United States has conducted retaliatory cyberattacks in the past, and they would have a greater effect when done more quickly than if done months later–the punishment would be

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Effective U.S.-ROK Cooperation on South Korean Cybersecurity Erin Puckett actually connected to the original event. Over time, there would also be a greater shared understanding of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that North Korean hackers use through the merging of information from both sectors.

The fourth facet of improving strategy related to private sector cyberattacks is improving strategy guiding retaliation. As noted earlier, there are no targets inside North Korea equivalent to those they attack in the United States and South Korea. Many of the potential targets for United States or South Korean cyberattacks that do exist are public utilities used by ordinary North Koreans. However, they would not be strategically beneficial for the United States or South Korea to attack. When North Korea conducts cyberattacks that affect private citizens of South Korea or the United States, it provokes a government response. Those governments are beholden to their upset and fearful citizens and need to show their domestic constituencies that they are doing something to assuage their fears and fix whatever damage the North Korean attack caused. The same cannot be said of any United States or South Korean disruption of the day-to-day lives of ordinary North Koreans, cyberattack or otherwise. The Kim regime has already made life miserable for its people. It routinely commits human rights violations, including forced labor in penal camps, and its economic system has led to severe food shortages and significant starvation (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Howard-Hassman). It feels no need to fix things, as it does not fear the responses of its people as it exerts tight control through its dictatorial party system. Therefore, a South Korean cyberattack that disrupted the lives of average North Koreans would be ineffective. Furthermore, if the fundamental goal of deterring North Korean aggression is ensuring security and stability on the peninsula, then increasing the likelihood ordinary North Koreans will lose access to food or electricity or clean water is likely to create more insecurity by increasing the likelihood those individuals will become refugees fleeing to China or South Korea. And lastly from a moral standpoint, ordinary North Koreans do not deserve to be punished for the behavior of a regime that already violates their human rights. Instead, the U.S. and South Korea should follow a different strategy for retaliation. First, clarifying the law to specify that private sector attacks can be considered threats to national security is necessary for this to even happen. Second, quick and correct attribution is necessary to know who to retaliate against and to do so confidently. The question is then how best to retaliate. Retaliation for cyberattacks should focus on North Korea’s elites, a strategy that takes a page from the book of the U.S. Department of the Treasury as well as the UN. Changes in sanction strategy from both parties show that an emerging tactic has been to levy sanctions against party elites as a way of forcing Kim Jong Un to change his ways through elite pressure (Choe; Lee). Similarly, when there has been a cyberattack from North Korea, at a level low enough to not warrant a physical response or even a cyberattack of military

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

Effective U.S.-ROK Cooperation on South Korean Cybersecurity Erin Puckett targets, South Korean and the United States should target elites. That could look like joint cyber operations that identify elites and take down their private networks or remove their access to credit cards or assets—not necessarily cyber operations.

The greatest threat to the U.S.-ROK alliance right now is North Korean cyberwarfare. The U.S. and South Korea should take cyber seriously and plan for the next sixty years with the cyber domain squarely at the forefront of the alliance. This is a critical moment for the U.S.-ROK alliance; increasing UN sanctions have squeezed North Korea’s funds for its nuclear program to a greater extent than ever before and North Korea has grown more skillful in and brazen with its cyberattacks. Therefore, the United States and South Korea should begin to conduct joint cyber operations, enshrine in law that cyberattacks of a certain level against private sector targets are threats to national security, create direct lines of communication across private cybersecurity companies from both states and the two states’ governments, and target elites in retaliation for cyberattacks of a certain severity. The alliance has spent sixty years cooperating in the other domains of warfare, air, land, and sea, to ensure security on the Korean Peninsula, but as technology has improved and North Korea has embraced cyber for its asymmetric nature, the greatest threat against the alliance has changed. The way the alliance responds to the North Korean threat must change accordingly.

UNC - CFC - USFK. "68th Armistice Agreement Anniversary." Flicker, 27 July 2021, https://flickr.com/photos/unc-cfc-usfk/51338159446/.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

WORKS CITED Effective U.S.-ROK Cooperation on South Korean Cybersecurity Erin Puckett

Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency. "North Korean Advanced Persistent Threat Focus: Kimsuky." 27 Oct. 2020, uscert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a.

Cordesman, Anthony H., and Aaron Lin. The Changing Military Balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia. Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.

Council on Foreign Relations. "Cyber Operations Tracker." Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/.

Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E. "State-Induced Famine and Penal Starvation in North Korea," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: vol. 7: iss. 2: article 3, August 2012. https://doi:10.3138/gsp.7.2/3.147 The Korea Herald, editor. "Full Text of Joint Communique of Rok-u.s. Security Consultative Meeting." The Korea Herald, 28 Oct. 2013, www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20111028000544.

The Korea Times. "Korea, US Hold First Policy Consultation on Online Security." The Korea Times, 13 Sept. 2012, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/09/121_119884.html.

Lee, Christy. "Sanctions Threaten North Korea's Old and New Elites." Voice of America, 19 May 2019, www.voanews.com/east-asiapacific/sanctions-threaten-north-koreas-old-and-new-elites.

McNamara, Luke. "Why Is North Korea so Interested in Bitcoin?,why Is North Korea so Interested in Bitcoin?" FireEye, 11 Sept. 2017, www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/north-korea-interested-in-bitcoin.html.

Nichols, Michelle. "North Korea Took $2 Billion in Cyberattacks to Fund Weapons Program: U.N. Report." Reuters, 5 Aug. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-cyber-un/north-korea-took-2-billion-in-cyberattacks-to-fund-weapons-program-u-n-reportidUSKCN1UV1ZX. O'Neill, Patrick Howell. "New Hacking Campaign Targets North Korean Defectors in South Korea." CyberScoop, 11 Jan. 2018, www.cyberscoop.com/new-hacking-campaign-targets-north-korean-defectors-in-south-korea/.

Paik, Amy Min-Jung. "Countermeasures in Cyberspace." Korea JoongAng Daily, 18 June 2020, koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2020/06/18/opinion/columns/Cyber/20200618195700290.html.

Park, Doughui. "Cybersecurity Strategy Advice for the Trump Administration: US-South Korea Relations." Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 17 Feb. 2017, jsis.washington.edu/news/cybersecurity-strategy-advice-trump-administration-us-south-korearelations/.

Pauli, Darren. "Norks Hacks 90 Southern Officials, Journalists." The Register, 3 Aug. 2016, www.theregister.com/2016/08/03/norks_target_90_seoul_officials_journalists_pop_53_email_accounts/.

Rahn, Kim. "NK Launched Cyber Attack on Nonghyup." The Korea Times, 3 May 2011, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/05/117_86369.html.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

WORKS CITED Effective U.S.-ROK Cooperation on South Korean Cybersecurity Erin Puckett

Reuters. "North Korean Defectors' Personal Data Was Stolen by Hackers, South Says." The New York Times, 8 Dec. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/asia/north-korea-defectors-hack.html.

ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Held the 7th Korea-us Cyber ​Policy Working Group (CCWG)." 7 Feb. 2012, www.gov.kr/portal/ntnadmNews/61089?srchOrder=&srchOrgCd=ALL&srchNewsAstCd=ALL&src.

---. "Joint Statement on Republic of Korea-united States Bilateral Cyber Policy Consultations." 26 Aug. 2014, www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do? seq=314184&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=ROK&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=30 7&titleNm=.

---. "ROK and the US to Hold Their 4th Cyber Policy Consultation." 28 June 2016, www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=316698.

Choe, Sang-Hun. "North Korean Hackers Stole U.s.-south Korean Military Plans, Lawmaker Says." The New York Times, 10 Oct. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/world/asia/north-korea-hack-war-plans.html.

---. "North Korea's State-run Economy Falters under Sanctions, Testing Elite Loyalty." The New York Times, 18 Apr. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/world/asia/north-korea-economy-sanctions.html.

Choe, Sang-Hun, and John Markoff. "Cyberattacks Jam Government and Commercial Web Sites in U.S. and South Korea." The New York Times, 8 July 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/technology/09cyber.html.

Shim, Elizabeth. "Spy Agency: North Korea Hackers Stole Sensitive South Korean Data." UPI, 20 Oct. 2015, www.upi.com/Top_News/WorldNews/2015/10/20/Spy-agency-North-Korea-hackers-stole-sensitive-South-Korean-data/9041445353950/.

Talmadge, Eric. "North Korea's Digital Divide: Online Elites, Isolated Masses." Associated Press, 11 Nov. 2017, www.chicagotribune.com/business/blue-sky/ct-north-korea-digital-divide-20171111-story.html.

United States, Congress, House. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2019 Conference Report To Accompany H.R. 5515. 25 July 2018. 115th Congress, 2nd session.

U.S. Department of Defense. "Joint Communiqué of the 48th U.s.-rok Security Consultative Meeting." 21 Oct. 2016, www.usfk.mil/Media/News/Article/981396/joint-communiqu-of-the-48th-us-rok-security-consultative-meeting/.

U.S. Department of State. "Joint Statement on United States-republic of Korea Bilateral Cyber Policy Consultations." 26 Aug. 2014, 20092017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230869.htm.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. "2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic People's Republic of Korea." 2019, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/north-korea/.

U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy & Consulate in the Republic of Korea. "The 5th U.S.-Republic of Korea Bilateral Cyber Consultations" 21 June 2018, https://kr.usembassy.gov/062218-5th-u-s-republic-of-korea-bilateral-cyber-consultations/.

VanDerWerff, Emily, and Timothy B. Lee. "The 2014 Sony Hacks, Explained." Vox, 3 June 2015, www.vox.com/2015/1/20/18089084/sony-hacknorth-korea.

The White House. "Joint Fact Sheet: The United States-republic of Korea Alliance: Shared Values, New Frontiers." 26 Oct. 2015, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/16/joint-fact-sheet-united-states-republic-korea-alliance-shared-values-new.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

About the Writers JULIA KELLY

Julia Kelly is from Denver, Colorado, and she graduated from Scripps College in 2021 with a bachelor’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies. She is currently living in Cairo, Egypt continuing her Arabic studies as a CASA fellow at the American University in Cairo at Tahrir Square. She has an interest in issues in the Middle East and North Africa and women’s issues globally.

ERIN PUCKETT

Erin Puckett is a junior double majoring in international relations and computer science at Pomona College. She is interested in state-sponsored cyberwarfare and disinformation campaigns, particularly related to North Korea, China, and Russia.

Originally from Dallas, TX, she enjoys hiking, baking, and reading in her free time.

PETIE SCHILL

Petie Schill is a senior majoring in Foreign Languages at Scripps College, where she studies Spanish, Italian, Latin, and Swahili. She is passionate about crosscultural communication, international affairs, immigration, and refugee advocacy.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

About the Editors Managing Editors NEJRA KRAVIC

Nejra Kravic graduated from Scripps College in May 2021 with honors in Media Studies and a minor in Middle East and North Africa Studies. She spent a semester abroad in Rabat, Morocco, studying international journalism, new media, and Arabic. Nejra is currently interning at the Bosnian Advocacy Center, researching public policy and media, and CALSTART, where she works as a sustainability communications intern. At Scripps she also worked for the Claremont Journal of Law and Public Policy.

OLIVIA TRUESDALE

Olivia Truesdale is a Project Associate with the Political and Security Affairs group at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in Washington, DC. Olivia was previously an intern for PSA. Prior to joining NBR, Olivia interned at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, South Korea, and studied abroad at Yonsei University. She has been awarded two Critical Language Scholarships to study Korean. Olivia graduated with a BA in foreign languages (Spanish and Korean) from Scripps College.

SPECIAL ISSUE

A WORLD IN CRISIS

For more issues of CJIR, please view https://issuu.com/cjir