The Claremont Journal of International Relations | Spring 2019

CJIR •THE CLAREMONT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS •

Volume IV Issue 2 | Spring 2019

Claremont Journal of International Relations Volume IV | Issue 2 | Spring 2018 May 2019 - Claremont, CA

Masthead Volume IV | Issue 2 | Spring 2019 Founded in 2013; Reestablished in 2018 EDITOR IN CHIEF Helena Gabrielle Ong, PO ‘20 EDITORS

STAFF

CONTRIBUTORS

MANAGING EDITOR Noah Kim, PO ‘21 Agnes Mok, PO ‘21 Sean Lee, PO ‘22 Brynn Parkinson, PO ‘20 Cameron Tipton, PO ‘20 Jacinta Chen, PO ‘21 Aubrey Aust, PO ‘22 Jamie Ding, SC ‘

COMMUNICATIONS Kari Siegenthaler, PO ‘22 Carol Chen, PO ‘22

Cover design by Layout design and graphics by

Kari Siegenthaler, PO ‘22 (EIC) Helena Gabrielle Ong, PO’20

Claremont Journal of International Relations Volume V, Issue 2, Spring 2019 Published in 2019 by Helena Gabrielle Ong and the editorial board of the Claremont Journal of International Relations Faculty Advisor(s): Professor Geoffrey Herrera, Pitzer College For enquires please contact: Helena Gabrielle Ong, Editor in Chief helenagabrielle.ong@pomona.edu Pomona College, Claremont, CA 91711 Journal e-mail: claremontjir@gmail.com Web: www.claremontjir.wordpress.com Twitter: @ClaremontJIR

C O N T E N T S 7 26

Editor’s Note: A Different Lens Helena Gabrielle Ong

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Feature: How Ben Rhodes is Still Fighting to Write the Story Helena Gabrielle Ong

Sexual Misconduct in NGOs: Why the Sector Has a Problem and What Can Be Controlling the Story: Done to Fix It How Media Narratives are Brynn Parkinson Exploited on Both Sides of Terror

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Conflict Minerals in the DRC: It’s Not Over Yet Jaime Ding

Aubrey Aust

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Transgender Politics in Iran: An Exploration Cameron Tipton 5

Each article in the Claremont Journal of International Relations reflects the opinion of the author and does not represent the Claremont Journal of International Relations, its editors, other staff members or the Claremont Colleges.

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Editor’s Note: From A Different View I’m a transfer student. It is difficult, as I’ve spent an entire semester arguing with administration about credits--but I’ve also found myself vehemently defending the value of being a transfer. Being a transfer forces you look at the world from a different perspective.

I’ve had the opportunity to work in New York skyscrapers, researching international movements halfway around the world. I’ve also had the chance to work on the ground in San Francisco, covering policy issues in the city. I’ve also spent summers in Indiana and Los Angeles, studying Russian or following national politics. But no matter where I go, more than anything, it has been the people that have constantly surprised me. The shifting environments have only served to emphasize the importance of having a diverse view of the world, from a different set of eyes.

There is no singular window from which we can accurately grasp the entire schema of politics.

So when I came to Pomona College, it was important to find a space for academic engagement that crossed boundaries and viewpoints. CJIR was not active when I arrived, so I founded the journal’s new incarnation as a way to create a space that encouraged diverse approaches and a different view of the world.

I believe that this issue is true to our goal in providing that multifaceted conversation. We were lucky to receive several submissions this semester, and in our decision making process, it was important to highlight the interdisciplinary nature of international relations. In this issue, you will read:

• Cameron Tipton, a psychology major, discusses the influence of Iranian politics on transgender issues and health.

• Brynn Parkinson delves into gender issues by tackling the topic of sexual assault in NGOs. • Jaimie Ding takes a close look at the US policy around mining and its impact on the Democratic Republic of Congo.

• Aubrey Aust looks at how media narratives on terrorism are used for different interests.

• CJIR was also given the opportunity to interview former deputy national security advisor Ben Rhodes. Rhodes, whose background includes an M.F.A in Creative Writing demonstrates the mixed, chimera nature of politics.

Finally, I’d like to thank our staff writers and editors for their thoughful and dedicated work throughout the year. I’d also like to recognize our communications team, Managing Editor Noah Kim, as well as Kari Siegenthaler whose work on the cover and graphics has been invaluable.

I look forward to the next academic year and happy reading!

Editor in chief,

Helena Gabrielle Ong, PO’20

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Sexual Misconduct in NGOs: Why the Sector Has a Problem & What Can Be Done to Fix It Brynn Parkinson, PO ‘19 Brynn Parkinson is a rising senior at Pomona College, studying politics with a focus in international relations.

In the future, she hopes to work with a human rights organization and continue efforts to make NGOs safe and effective. She feels the same way about Eleanor Roosevelt as Leslie Knope does about Madeline Albright and hopes that one day you might too.

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O

n July 12, 2011, senior officials at Oxfam International Britain were notified that Oxfam responders to the recent ravaging earthquake in Haiti had hired local sex workers and were engaging in sexually exploitative and abusive activity. The “whistleblower” who reported the information said that the accused Oxfam employees referred to their Oxfam-funded residences as the ‘pink apartments’ or the ‘whorehouse’ where “it was like a full-on Caligula orgy” and “the girls were wearing Oxfam T-shirts, running around half naked.”1 The whistleblower was also concerned that some of the women were underage - as young as 14. Oxfam sent an investigative team to the country later that month, where they interviewed both the accused and the witnesses. As a result of Oxfam’s investigation, four employees were fired and three resigned with charges ranging from ‘gross misconduct’ to use of prostitutes. The country director in Haiti, who admitted to engaging with and housing prostitutes in his residence, was allowed a “phased and dignified exit.”2 Oxfam issued a small press release regarding the case that following September.

The nature of that press release, however, was quite different from the nature of Oxfam’s private internal report as well as quite detached from the nature of the events that actually transpired. Oxfam’s official press release on September 5, 2011 stated that employees had been involved in “cases of misconduct,” omitting details of any sexual exploitation, prostitution, or intimidation3. In bold lettering, the report stated that “none of these charges involved beneficiaries,” a dubious statement, given that Oxfam’s private internal report neither confirms nor denies that the prostitutes were also beneficiaries of Oxfam’s aid after the earthquake.4 The report goes on to say that the 1 Sean O’Neill, “Oxfam in Haiti: ‘It was like a Caligula orgy with prostitutes in Oxfam T-shirts,” The Times online, 9 Feb. 2018, https:// www.thetimes.co.uk/article/oxfam-in-haiti-it-was-like-a-caligula-orgy-with-prostitutes-in-oxfam-t-shirts-p32wlk0rp.

2 “Investigation Report, FRN5 – Haiti,” Oxfam International, 2018, https://www.oxfam.org/en/oxfam-release-2011-haiti-internal-report.

3 “Internal Investigation Confirms Staff Misconduct in Haiti,” Oxfam International online, 5 Sept. 2011, https://www.oxfam.org/ en/pressroom/pressreleases/2011-09-05/internal-investigation-confirms-staff-misconduct-haiti.

4 Ibid.

misconduct does “not affect the approximately $98 million Oxfam fundraised following the earthquake in Haiti,”5 failing to mention that the sites where the misconduct occurred were paid for by Oxfam.6 The report claims that the country director in Haiti “resigned” from “taking managerial responsibility for issues that occurred while he was heading the program,” failing to mention that the country director also admitted to using prostitutes at his residence.7 The watered-down language must have been a part of his “phased and dignified” exit, as the report also omitted the country director’s name: Roland van Hauwermeiren. Hauwermeiren later joined another humanitarian organization, Action Against Hunger, in 2014, where his new employer had no idea of the details behind his resignation from Oxfam.8 The public, Oxfam’s donors, and the international community were unaware of these events in Haiti until February 2018, when The Times UK published an article with information leaked by closely involved sources who asserted that Oxfam had covered up pertinent details and left affected parties in the dark.

Oxfam confessed to the allegations, committing to improve their approach and transparency to sexual exploitation and abuse (commonly referred to as SEA in the NGO sector). Oxfam then released their originally private 2011 report, with the names of those involved redacted. Reception of Oxfam and the delayed attempts at transparency were not favorable.

The British government, one of Oxfam’s largest donors, threatened to withhold their average $44 million annual funding from the organization.9 More than 1,000 people that February “cancelled their regular donations to Oxfam,” a number more than twice the average monthly 5 Ibid.

6 O’Neill, “Oxfam in Haiti.”

7 “Internal Investigation.”

8 Phillip Whiteside,“Oxfam ‘Gave Us no Details About Ex-Worker Who Admitted Using Prostitutes,’ Says Other Charity.” Sky News online, 14 Feb. 2018, https://news.sky.com/story/oxfam-passed-on-nodetails-about-ex-worker-who-admitted-using-prostitutes-11249767.

9 William Schomberg, “UK Tells Charities: No More Cash if You Don’t Come Clean on Abuse.” Reuters online, 15 Feb. 2018, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-oxfam/uk-tells-charitiesno-more-cash-if-you-dont-come-clean-on-abuse-idUSKCN1FY01B.

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The First Oxfam Shop

Courtesy of Chris McAuley, licensed under Creative Commons Attribution

cancellation rate.10 Oxfam scrambled to rehabilitate their image, NGOs rallied to improve the handling of sexual misconduct in the sector, and public attention to the scandal mostly died down by February 20th. As the shock and immediacy of the situation faded, so did public interest in the story. This desensitization likewise caused NGOs, including Oxfam to lose any sense of urgency to ensure the public that they were working on measures to prevent future occurrences of such situations.

What happened with Oxfam, though, must not be soon forgotten; these events leave a prime opportunity to find better avenues to address and prevent SEA in the NGO and humanitarian sector. Oxfam erred in two areas: “Oxfam Direct Debit Donations Fall Amid Abuse Scandal,” 10 10 BBC online, 14 Feb. 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-43057238.

they failed to safeguard their beneficiaries and beneficiaries of other aid groups by not reporting pertinent information about their employees to future employers, and they failed to deliver relevant information to the public and their donors regarding the results of the investigation in an attempt to protect their image.

NGOs have little incentive to record and report instances of SEA; as evident in the Oxfam case, the organization’s worst fears came true when their funding was threatened as a result of the information being released.

However, on an ethical basis, which is more important than NGO’s image concerns, beneficiaries who are affected by SEA must be protected, and employees with histories of SEA must be restrained from continuing to work in the sector. For this reason, a robust accountabil-

ity system must be in place to keep NGOs honest about SEA and to protect their beneficiaries.

To do so, NGOs should formulate a sector-wide ‘humanitarian passport’ system that tracks all humanitarian employees and their histories of involvement with sexual misconduct cases.

This system would give humanitarian workers a ‘license’ to work, record past reports of SEA for future employers’ knowledge, and prevent multiple offenders from continuing their work in the sector. Donors and the public would be able to trust that employees have been properly vetted, and yearly reports from the system’s board would keep the public informed about the scale of abuse in the sector as well as increase NGO accountability. To support this assertion, this essay following will lay out the following: the scale of SEA in the NGO and humanitarian sector, the current mechanisms in place to prevent SEA and why they have often failed, the need and functionality of a humanitarian passport system, the challenges and criticisms with such a system, and the future of halting SEA in the sector. To support this assertion, this essay will lay out the following: the scale of SEA in the NGO and humanitarian sector, the current mechanisms in place to prevent SEA and why they have often failed, the need and functionality of a humanitarian passport system, the challenges and criticisms with such a system, and the future of halting SEA in the sector.

SCALE OF ABUSE A sector wide accountability standard is necessary, first and foremost, because Oxfam’s scandal is not an isolated incident. Shortly after news of Oxfam broke, Reuters sent out a survey to ten of the largest and most popular NGOs to review “figures on [their] sexual abuse cases” including the number of employees fired for SEA in the past year.11 Save the Children, Oxfam, Medecins Sans Frontieres and Norwegian Refugee Council eventually provided numbers, with 16, 22, 20, and 13 staff 11 Lin Taylor, “Exclusive: Six of 10 Agencies Open Up About Sex Abuse Cases Amid Oxfam Scandal: Survey,” Reuters, 13 Feb. 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-charity-sexcrimes-exclusive/exclusive-six-of-10-aid-agencies-open-about-sex-abuse-casesamid-oxfam-scandal-survey-idUSKCN1FX2LL.

terminated last year, respectively.12 Important to note is that six NGOs declined to report figures or further information, including Plan International, CARE International, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), though the ICRC later released its own numbers on its website.13 The refusal to issue data on the scale of SEA reflects the inadequate accountability standards in the sector. However, the numbers that were released were also indicative of the SEA problem that persists throughout humanitarian work. The UN brought large-scale attention to SEA in the early 2000s, when several UN Peacekeepers in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone were found to have engaged in SEA while deployed.14 As more information emerged, investigators found that the issue spanned across countries and included an additional problem: some peacekeepers had children with local sex workers or beneficiaries and left them behind in their home country. These were instances pervasive enough that the children were given the nickname “peacekeeper babies.”15 Afterwards, the UN cracked-down on their employee conduct codes, but abuse persisted. A 2008 report from Save the Children on child sexual abuse and exploitation from humanitarian workers, for example, found that from 2004 to 2006 the number of “reported allegations of sex with minors” increased from 121 to 371 cases.16 Additionally, Save the Children stated that the level of abuse “suggested by [their] fieldwork and other reports” was significantly higher than levels officially reported by the UN.17 Their report also traced a worrying pattern in the rise of sex workers and childhood abuse 12 Ibid.

13 General Yves Daccord, “Taking Action to Prevent and Address Staff Sexual Misconduct,” International Committee of the Red Cross, 23 Feb 2018, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/taking-action-prevent-and-address-staff-misconduct.

14 Stephanie Matti, “Governing Sexual Behaviour Through Humanitarian Codes of Conduct.” Disasters 39, no. 2 (2015): 627, doi: https://doi-org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.1111/disa.12128.

15 Malaka Gharib, “Why Sex Scandals Persist in the Humanitarian Aid World,” National Public Radio online, 15 Feb. 2018, https:// www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/02/15/586135767/why-sexscandals-persist-in-the-humanitarian-aid-world.

16 Corinna Csáky, “No One to Turn To: The Under-reporting of Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Aid Workers and Peacekeepers,” Save the Children (2008): 11, doi: https://www.refworld. org/docid/483c2a822.html.

17 Ibid., 11.

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in countries receiving aid from either the UN or NGOs, including a finding that almost two thirds of the participants in their study could identify instances of abuse.18 Despite efforts to curtail it, SEA remains present in humanitarian aid work.

Further literature on SEA in NGOs, though, particularly outside of the UN, is relatively sparse. Save the Children acknowledges this weakness in their study, admitting that “few…NGOs collect detailed information on the abuse of children by their own personnel, and even fewer make this information publicly available”.19 As seen with Oxfam, not much regarding transparency, availability of information or accountability has changed since 2008.

After the news of the Oxfam scandal, some humanitarian aid workers expressed little surprise that not only had such events occurred, they were also largely kept secret. For example, Megan Norbert, humanitarian lawyer and director of the now-defunct SEA accountability NGO Report the Abuse, stated that “getting exact data collected and published has not always been common protocol” for NGOs.20 SEA has been prevalent, but existing reports and data on the issue remain difficult to uncover.

CURRENT MECHANISMS TO PREVENT SEA This dearth of information is due to the lack of a central accountability system that requires NGOs to uphold a certain standard of conduct as well as disclose pertinent information regarding investigations. Rather than a central source of accountability, most NGOs hold their own codes of conduct regarding sexual misconduct, including the methods of reporting it and the resulting repercussions.

These codes are often up to the NGO to enforce, open to interpretation, and vacant of responsibility to accurately report to their donors. Moreover, not all NGOs have them. A 2015 study of 100 NGOs found that only 59 at the least referenced having a code of conduct, while only 13 had “organization-specific codes Ibid., 10.

12 18 19 Ibid.

20 Gharib, “Why Sex Scandals Persist.”

of conduct that contain substantive references to sexual misconduct.”21 The codes were occasionally difficult to find on the NGOs’ websites, with their placement of them also varying from site to site, exemplifying the lack of standardization across the sector and the barriers to holding NGOs accountable.22 Language and wording of the codes were sometimes be vague or absent altogether; Oxfam’s code of conduct, for example, did not explicitly forbid the employees’ behavior in 2011, and was only updated in 2018 to require employees to “not engage in any form of sexual abuse or exploitation of persons of any age.”23 While individual codes of conduct have not been particularly successful in enforcing standards, neither have large-scale inter-NGO and UN agreements, which have mostly been empty words and forgotten proposals for change. For example, in light of the UN peacekeeper allocations, the UN formulated the Statement of Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN and Non-UN Personnel, first released in 2006 and last updated in 2008.24 The third principle listed in the agreement claims that all signatories are committed to preventing “perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse from being re-hired or re-deployed,” while the ninth principle states all will commit to “regularly [informing their] personnel and communities on measures taken to prevent and respond to sexual abuse.”25 Signatories included CARE International, Plan International and two country divisions of the Red Cross - notably all organizations that declined to release details of SEA in light of the Oxfam scandal. Missing from the list was Oxfam, who could, presumably, have benefited from the agreement. Other multiNGO attempts at accountability include the Core Humanitarian Standard in Quality and Accountability, set forth by HAP International, 21 Matti, 641.

22 Ibid.

23 “Oxfam Employee Code of Conduct,” Oxfam International, 2017, https://d1tn3vj7xz9fdh.cloudfront.net/s3fs-public/file_attachments/ oxfam_employee_code_of_conduct.pdf.

24 “Statement of Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN and Non – UN Personnel,” ReliefWeb, 19 Aug 2008, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/statement-commitment-eliminating-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-un-and-non-un-personnel.

25 Ibid.

People in Aid and the Sphere Project, which lists nine commitments for humanitarian NGOs in an attempt to “harmonize standards” across the sector (“Core Humanitarian”).26 Regarding SEA, the standard only encourages groups to have effective “complaints-handling” processes, while general complaints including those of SEA should be “taken seriously and acted on according to defined policies and processes.”27 The problem with this stipulation is that it hinges on each organization having effective policies in place – as seen with Oxfam, this may not always the case, and as seen in Matti’s 2015 study, many NGOs may not have any policies in place to begin with.

THE HUMANITARIAN PASSPORT SYSTEM The individual codes of conduct and inter-NGO agreements regarding SEA are better than having no standards at all. However, the inconsistency of the rules across NGOs and the lukewarm agreements between them have 26 “Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability,” CHS Alliance, Group URD, and the Sphere Project, 2014, https:// corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/Core%20Humanitarian%20 Standard%20-%20English.pdf.

27 Ibid.

not succeeded in preventing SEA or stopping those accused from staying within the sector.

For these reasons, the proposed “humanitarian passport” and international communication system is essential to halting and managing SEA within NGOs. The “system of passporting, registration or accreditation of humanitarian and development practitioners” would give humanitarian aid workers a “license” to work or be deployed to a disaster, a license that could also be revoked should they develop a history of misconduct while in the field.28 Ideally, all NGOs and humanitarian aid workers would be included in the system, ensuring that the revolving door of accused aid workers throughout the sector does not continue. The program, systematically, could utilize blockchain technology to track employees, the same type of information-web technology used for Bitcoin; Save the Children has already piloted this program for employees within its organi-

28 Alice Sharman, “What are Humanitarian Passports and How Might They Work?” Civil Society Voices, 23 Feb. 2018, https://www. civilsociety.co.uk/voices/alice-sharman-what-has-been-said-so-farabout-humanitarian-passports.html.

Photo by The Climate Reality Project on Unsplash, licensed under Creative Commons Attribution

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zation.29 For inter-NGO communication, particularly across government boundaries, the system could be modeled off the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). In addition to blockchain technology, Interpol’s technological framework could help the humanitarian passport system develop a method for recording employee history and sharing information across NGO members in the system.

The structure and governing body of the passport system could be modeled off of Interpol as well; similar to Interpol’s General Assembly and Executive Committee, the passport system could have a body of representatives from NGOs and humanitarian aid groups serving on committees to determine the system’s direction and functionality. However, to preserve impartiality and promote accountability, the system may benefit from also having third-party members on the board, including experts in international and criminal law. Utilizing existing agreements, particularly the Statement of Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN and Non – UN Personnel, already involved organizations could set the framework for determining what constitutes SEA as well as which other organizations will be included in the system. To increase transparency to donors and provide reliable figures, each year the system could release a public report detailing the number of cases recorded as well as the number of cases where repercussions were constituted.

This humanitarian passport system, particularly in the wake of the Oxfam scandal, has received support within the sector. Bond International, a human development NGO in Great Britain, has backed the creation of the system.30 Save the Children has listed this system in their proposals for better addressing SEA in the sector, as well as piloting a similar system for just their organization last year.31 Oxfam has named this method in their list of proposals as well, asserting that they will “contribute to the work 29 Sooraj Shah, “Save the Children UK CIO to Pilot a “Humanitarian Passport” Using Blockchain,” ITPRO, 16 March 2017, http:// www.itpro.co.uk/strategy/28321/save-the-children-uk-cio-to-pilot-ahumanitarian-passport-using-blockchain.

30 Sharman, “What are Humanitarian Passports.”

31 Shah, “Save the Children.”

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of initiated by BOND in the UK to develop a concept for a humanitarian passport and/ or anti-offenders’ system housed by an accountable agency” and that they will “support such initiatives in any way [they] can.”32 With the support of these few organizations, especially the one that instigated the most recent high-profile conversations surrounding SEA, the possibility of creating a humanitarian passport system is plausible.

Developing this system, though, will not come without its challenges, nor its criticisms. For those in the sector, one of the greatest hesitations for the system thus far has been that creating it “would be terribly complicated and difficult” as there is no “global or multilateral framework” on which to base it.33 While Interpol and other international tracking systems and databases do exist, there is no system quite like the proposed humanitarian passport. Starting from the drawing board, constructing how the passports will work, and figuring out how to include the large number of organizations would be a tedious and ambitious feat. It would be challenging to decide not only how to include groups, but also which groups to include. The definition of an NGO is somewhat broad; they all perform differing types of humanitarian aid; they range in size and scope; they are sometimes temporary or suffer from shorter life-spans due to struggles with funding. This diversity and inconsistency within NGOs as a group may make it difficult to pin down which organizations should fall within the system. Monitoring current and defunct NGOs, as well as their current and past employees, would be important details of the system to consider as well.

However, while skeptics may say that the developing the system is impractical because of a lacking extant structure, Kevin Watkins, chief executive of Save the Children, has the solution: “create one.”34 Of course, doing so will not be simple, but doing so will also not be impossible. The framework of Interpol, the 32 “Immediate Response Actions: Sexual Misconduct,” Oxfam International, https://www.oxfam.org/en/immediate-response-actions-sexual-misconduct.

33 Sharman, “What are Humanitarian Passports.”

34 Ibid.

use of blockchain technology, and the existing inter-NGO and UN agreements provide a basis for creating and organizing the system, an effort that Watkins, with the Save the Children’s experience regarding the technology, could spearhead. The chance to decide who would join the system could also bring some cohesion to a sometimes-divided sector. Though the demographic of NGOs in the system may be extensive, the point of centrality and commonality could benefit communication and support for NGOs on the whole.

An additional argument against the system is that it could be unnecessarily career-damaging and proliferate false or exaggerated accusations. False or exaggerated claims could of course occur; however, patterns are telling. This system would be able to track types of claims made against an aid worker as well as when they were made, indicating if claims span years and locations. Repeating accusations would send red flags to NGOs and prevent them from continuing to allow a repeat offender into the field. Employees would also have the opportunity to see their reports and appeal them. The system’s goal would be to record behavior and provide room for more thorough investigations, allowing room for justice for employees, but better ensuring protection of beneficiaries.

Importance Developing this system is important, lastly, because it is a method of curtailing behavior that is a blatant violation of human rights in a sector that is supposed to protect them. For NGOs, the lack of transparency with the public regarding SEA accusations violates the trust of their donors. But more importantly, permitting SEA to continue in order to preserve organizational reputation violates trust with their beneficiaries. SEA is “a stain on the conscience of humanity” that, when occurring in NGOs unabated, “undermines the credibility and good intention of charities.”35 It detracts from the good work that NGOs do and harms 35 Stan Chu Ilo, “Commentary: Oxfam Sexual Abuse Scandal Points to a Larger Problem Among Aid Workers,” Chicago Tribune online, 19 Feb. 2018, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-oxfam-sexual-abuse-scandal-0220-20180214-story.html.

all parties involved. SEA has no place in the humanitarian sector’s commitment to ensuring the “right to life with dignity, and the right to protection and security as set forth in international law.”36 NGOs have every responsibility to stop the abuse and to genuinely test plausible methods of doing so.

Conclusion and Future Implications The humanitarian sector is in need of an improved system to vet and monitor employees in order to prevent SEA. Creating a humanitarian passport system is a plausible and comprehensive solution to this problem, and the situation with Oxfam serves as an upsetting example of why this creation is necessary.

Roland van Hauwermeiren was reported for hiring prostitutes while deployed in Liberia in 2004 and for allowing the use of prostitutes on Oxfam premises while deployed in Chad in 2006.37 Oxfam allowed him to continue employment through 2011, his third known accusation, where his “phased and dignified exit” did not include a resume of past reports to his new employer. These repeated incidents could have been prevented with the likes of a humanitarian passport system.

This passport system is an essential first step in effectively addressing misconduct in NGOs. However, it is not the only possible step. This mechanism is and should be part of a multi-faceted approach to improving attitudes and transparency with respect to SEA, including developing a thorough and enforceable set of standards for SEA across all NGOs, as a society encouraging NGOs to report accurately, and as a world shifting the attitude towards sexual misconduct that focuses on discouraging predatory behavior and supporting survivors.

In the era of the #MeToo movement, with the importance of consent and accountability taking the forefront, the global environment is at an opportune time to address this misconduct in the NGO sector. NGOs just need to follow.

36 “Core Humanitarian Standard,” CHS Alliance.

37 “Oxfam Scandal: Ex-Haiti Director Denies Paying for Sex,” BBC online, 15 Feb. 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-43064839.

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Conflict Minerals in the DRC: It’s not over yet.

Jaimie Ding, SC ‘21 Jaimie Ding is a sophomore at Scripps College, majoring in politics with a focus in American politics and international relations. She works at The Student Life newspaper and is interested in international reporting. She speaks Chinese, is currently learning Korean, and is excited to learn German in the fall.

NEED FOR FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW OF US POLICY Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank Act) passed in July 2010 required all US companies on the stock market to report whether the minerals they were using were conflict-free, specifically tin, tantalum, and tungsten (3T), and gold.1 The motivation for legislation was the belief that “the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation … .”2 The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted the rules regarding the implementation of the act on August 22, 2012, and they went into effect November 13, 2012 with the first re1 Nik Stoop, Marijke Verpoorten, and Peter van der Windt, “More legislation, more violence? The impact of Dodd-Frank in the DRC,” PLoS 13, no. 8, 2018, 1, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal. pone.0201783 [accessed December 4, 2018].

2 Dodd-Frank Act, 12 and 15 U.S.C. § 1502 (2010).

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ports due May 31, 2014.3 A map of the “conflict mining zone” was also produced by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) to focus on during the regulatory process, and 3T mines in this zone received more scrutiny.4 A fundamental review of this policy was needed not only because of its ineffectiveness in achieving its goal of ending the violence in the DRC but also its negative effect on the civilian artisanal mining economy. To comply with the law, the DRC government initially shut down the entire mining industry for six months in order to certify minerals as conflict-free.5 However, as of June 2014, only 25 mining sites out of hundreds in South and North Kivu were certified as “green” (no armed groups and no 3 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Final Rule: Conflict Minerals,” 17 CFR Parts 240 and 249b, Release No. 34-67716, August 22, 2012, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/speccorpdisclosure. shtml [accessed November 28, 2018].

4 Dominic P. Parker and Vadheim, Bryan, “Resource Cursed or Policy Cursed? US Regulation of Conflict Minerals and Violence in the Congo,” Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 4, no. 1, March 2017, 5, https://doi.org/10.1086/689865 [accessed December 6, 2018].

5 Sudarsan Raghavan. “How a well-intentioned U.S. law left Congolese miners jobless,” The Washington Post, November 30, 2014, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/how-a-well-intentioned-uslaw-left-congolese-miners-jobless/2014/11/30/14b5924e-69d3-11e49fb4-a622dae742a2_story.html?utm_term=.d9bdd3ceba32 [accessed December 4, 2018].

children or pregnant women laborers).6 As of October 2014, only 11 out of over 900 mines in south Kivu produced minerals deemed “conflict-free.”7 Government and international agencies were not able to certify a majority of the mining areas because of poor infrastructure, size, and insecurity, and the progress they did make was slow. Companies preferred avoiding the hassle of performing due diligence on minerals (ensuring that the mineral is conflict-free throughout the entire supply chain journey) and the risk of possibly accidentally sourcing conflict minerals, implementing a de facto boycott of DRC minerals.8 During 2010-2012, there was a large decrease in official 3T exports (although this does not account for smuggling).9 This affected the estimated 710,000 to 860,000 artisanal miners – independent miners that use minimal technology in a labor-intensive process – that worked in the regions associated with conflict minerals.10 Artisanal mining was an important economic sector in the region that was dramatically disrupted when companies started boycotting Congolese minerals because of the Dodd-Frank legislation. Evidence suggests that due to the loss of income, infant mortality increased by 143 percent in villages either within the “conflict mining zone” delineated or within 20km of a 3T mine.11 This affected villages near 3T mines both with and without the presence of armed groups, even punishing mines that were potentially “conflict-free” that Section 1502 was not trying to target.12 Additionally, the belief that the direct acquisition of mineral resources and the control of mining sites are the main sources of conflict in the DRC no longer holds true. Even from the beginning, though profits from minerals may have been a source of funding for the groups 6 Raghavan, “How a well-intentioned U.S. law left Congolese miners jobless.”

7 Raghavan, “How a well-intentioned U.S. law left Congolese miners jobless.”

8 Raghavan, “How a well-intentioned U.S. law left Congolese miners jobless.”

9 Stoop, “More legislation, more violence? The impact of Dodd-Frank in the DRC,” 5.

10 Parker, “Resource Cursed or Policy Cursed?”, 6.

11 Dominic P. Parker et al, “Unintended Consequences of Sanctions for Human Rights: Conflict Minerals and Infant Mortality,” Journal of Law & Economics, February 28, 2017, 3, https://aae.wisc.edu/dparker5/papers/Parker%20et%20al%20Sanctions%20JLE.pdf [accessed December 5, 2018].

12 Parker, “Unintended Consequences of Sanctions for Human Rights,” 29.

involved, the root causes included disputes over land and political power.13 Other areas of dispute include cattle, charcoal, timber, drugs, and taxation at checkpoints; only 8 percent of all conflicts were over natural resources according to a 2011 UN document.14 Now, a major source of revenue for armed groups is the illegal taxation of goods and movement through roadblocks along transport routes and other important roads. It is likely that as more and more mining sites are certified post-Dodd-Frank, armed groups will focus more on profiting from this illegal taxation rather than directly occupying mining sites themselves. The increased international attention on conflict minerals and efforts to certify clean minerals is in part why armed groups have been “less and less physically present in tin mining sites.”15 There is also no way for road users to tell which roadblocks and taxes are legal and which are not, as MONUSCO and the Congolese police found in 2009 that even 95% of state-operated roadblocks were illegal.16 A net amount of $8.2 million is extorted every year from road users through this system.17 For example, the CNDP armed group is thought to have earned only 15% of its revenue directly from minerals.18 Additionally, the group M23 did not attempt to target mining sites directly; rather, they profited from taxing the movement of minerals in the region and across the border to Rwanda. The groups Raia Mutomboki and NDC-R both occupy mineral-rich areas of Walikale in North Kivu, but neither are involved in mineral exploitation, opting to also tax mineral production and trade at roadblocks.19 The IPIS also mapped 43 tax collection 13 Stoop, “More legislation, more violence? The impact of Dodd-Frank in the DRC,” 6.

14 Séverine Autesserre, “Dangerous tales: Dominant narratives on the Congo and their unintended consequences,” African Affairs 111, no.

443, April 2012, 211, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adr080 [accessed December 5, 2018].

15 Peer Schouten, et al, “‘Everything that moves will be taxed’: the political economy of roadblocks in North and South Kivu,” Danish Institute for International Studies / IPIS. November 2017, 34, http://ipisresearch.be/publication/everything-moves-will-taxed-political-economy-roadblocks-north-south-kivu/ [accessed December 17, 2018].

16 Schouten, “‘Everything that moves will be taxed’: the political economy of roadblocks in North and South Kivu,” 9.

17 “Armed groups in central Africa using roadblocks as funding source,” News 24, December 6, 2017. https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/armed-groups-in-central-africa-using-roadblocks-as-funding-source-20171206 [accessed December 15, 2018].

18 Gavin Lyall, “Rebellion and Conflict Minerals in North Kivu,” Accord, April 24, 2017, https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/rebellion-conflict-minerals-north-kivu/ [accessed December 13, 2018].

19 Schouten, “‘Everything that moves will be taxed’,” 34.

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posts in North Kivu operated by the FDLR, another major armed group in the DRC.20 According to a 2017 United Nations Panel of Experts report, the taxation of charcoal in the Virunga National Park area in North Kivu is the FDLR’s main source of income.21 Many mining sites have a roadblock where the mining site meets the access road, which is where artisanal miners are taxed for their “right to pass,” and suppliers of food, beverages, cigarettes, tools, etc. are taxed as well.22 Then, another roadblock is set up between the mining site and the main road to impose an additional tax; this is often set up by the FARDC as a “strategic” barrier.23 The involvement of the FARDC at roadblocks indicates the problem of a “deeply rooted culture of corruption and the use of military deployment to extract money for superiors.”24 In fact, the FARDC was found at 47% of all the roadblocks mapped by the IPIS in 2017, more than any particular rebel armed group. 25 ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION There are laws in place regulating the artisanal mining sector in the DRC, mainly the 2002 Congolese Mining Code and the 2003 Mining Regulation.26 In 2012, the Congolese Minister of Mines adopted two orders establishing a mineral certification mechanism and setting up procedures for the certification of mining sites for 3T and gold.27 These cover “the production, trade, and transport of minerals from the mine all the way to customs.”28 Almost half of 3T minerals and 98% of gold mined in the DRC is illegally exported to neighboring countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi.29 The smuggled gold has an approximate value of $400-600 million, which the 20 Schouten, “‘Everything that moves will be taxed’,” 40.

21 Schouten, “‘Everything that moves will be taxed’,” 40.

22 Schouten, “‘Everything that moves will be taxed’,” 34.

23 Schouten, “‘Everything that moves will be taxed’,” 35.

24 Schouten, “‘Everything that moves will be taxed’,” 54.

25 Schouten, “‘Everything that moves will be taxed’,” 15.

26 “Accompanying Measures to the EU Regulation on Responsible Mineral Sourcing: Towards an improved governance of the artisanal mining sector in the DRC,” European Network for Central Africa, March 2017, 10, https://www.eurac-network.org/sites/default/files/position_paper_-_eng_accompanying_measures_to_the_eu_regulation_on_ responsible_mineral_sourcing_-_march_2017.pdf [accessed December 4, 2018].

27 “Accompanying Measures to the EU Regulation on Responsible Mineral Sourcing: Towards an improved governance of the artisanal mining sector in the DRC,” 10-11.

28 “Accompanying Measures,” 11.

29 “Accompanying Measures,” 12.

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government loses out on for tax revenue.30 The lower export taxes in those countries incentivizes traders to illegally export their minerals to those countries instead of keeping them in the DRC.31 The DRC has a 13% total tax on exports, while Rwanda only has a 6% export tax on artisanal and small-scale mined (ASM) gold.

Additionally, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni announced February 21, 2017 that there would be a zero percent tax rate on ASM gold exported from Uganda.32 Another incentive for companies to purchase gold from those other countries is that they don’t have to worry about the association with Congolese conflict minerals, since the gold was smuggled and cannot be identified as being sourced from Congo. Given that Rwandan non-3T exports jumped from $8.1 million in 2014 to $80.06 million ($79.52 million of which was gold) in 2016 and Ugandan gold exports jumped from $240,000 in 2014 to $340 million in 2016 even though there is generally low gold production in those countries, it is fairly likely that the extra gold came from the DRC.33 There are a lot more armed groups at gold mines than 3T mineral mines, since gold is lightweight, easy to transport, and difficult to track.34 The IPIS found that 21% of 3T artisanal miners interviewed from 2013-2015 “reported working under the influence of armed actors,” compared to 64% of gold miners. The presence of armed groups also means that not many gold mines have been able to be certified; only one gold mine in South Kivu was certified “green” as of April 2016.35 Maxie Muwonge, chief of the United Nations’ International Organization for Migration office in South Kivu told Public Radio International that “most areas controlled by armed groups in eastern Congo are gold 30 Enough team, “Breaking the Cycle: Delinking Armed Actors from the Gold Supply Chain in Congo and the Great Lakes Region Through Fiscal Reform and Anti-Money Laundering (AML),” Enough Project, May 2017, 4, https://enoughproject.org/files/Enough%20Project%20 -%20The%20Impact%20of%20Dodd-Frank%20and%20Conflict%20 Minerals%20Reforms%20on%20Eastern%20Congo%E2%80%99s%20 Conflict%2010June2014.pdf [accessed December 18, 2018].

31 “Accompanying Measures,” 13.

32 Enough team, “Breaking the Cycle,” 3.

33 Enough team, “Breaking the Cycle,” 3.

34 Kira Zalan, “Tracing conflict gold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Public Radio International, June 23, 2017, https://www.pri.org/ stories/2017-06-23/tracing-conflict-gold-democratic-republic-congo [accessed December 18, 2018].

35 Zalan, “Tracing conflict gold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

hubs.”36 A 2016 United Nations Group of Exports report stated that “gold remains by far the mineral most used to finance armed elements and criminal networks.”37 The current certification system in place involves two components – one certifies each individual mining site as “green,” and the other is a “bag and tag” system of minerals to establish its mine of origin.38 In 2010, the International Conference of Great Lake Region (ICGLR) states adopted the Regional Initiative on the fight against illegal exploitation of National Resources (RINR), which included the Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) used to certify mining sites.39 The bagging and tagging system is done through the organization ITSCI, which covers almost two-thirds of artisanal miners working in 3T.40 This system is also rife with illicit activity, however; ITSCI tags circulate illegally, allowing minerals to be tagged after they’ve already reached a trading house, allowing smuggled minerals to enter official channels in Rwanda, and allowing 3T minerals from the DRC to be tagged as originating from Rwanda.41 It is important to note that 38% of the mines visited by the IPIS between 2013-2015 actually had an Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) presence, not an armed rebel group presence. This is technically illegal, as the protection of mines actually falls under the Police des Mines (Mines Police).42 However the Mines Police and the Provincial Division of Mines do not have the resources or the capacity to carry out their duties.43 PERSPECTIVES OF RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS Congolese government The government’s interests likely lie in wanting more legal mineral trade to increase their tax revenue. The initial shutting down of the mining sector after Dodd-Frank was passed shows their desire to comply with the legisla36 Zalan, “Tracing conflict gold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

37 “Accompanying Measures,” 20.

38 “Accompanying Measures,” 24-25.

39 “ICGLR Declaration on Section 1502 of the US Dodd Frank Act,” International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

40 “Accompanying Measures,” 25.

41 “Accompanying Measures,” 25.

42 “Accompanying Measures,” 19.

43 “Accompanying Measures,” 12.

tion so that companies continue buying minerals, which are the DRC’s primary export. The government is also likely to be cooperative in solving the problems in the FARDC, as the current state of factions within the military makes it difficult for the government to really have control. There is currently a U.N. peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) in the DRC helping tackle issues such as security sector reform.44 Additionally, in April 2012, Interim Prime Minister Louis Alphonse Koyagialo attempted to address the problem of blockades by ordering all provincial governors to remove all illegal barriers on roads and rivers.45 It is clear from IPIS mapping of blockades that did not happen, but the attempt indicates some kind of interest in dealing with the problem.

Congolese military (FARDC) The FARDC is not a centralized or cohesive unit. At the end of the Second Congo War in 2003, the belligerent groups agreed to integrate their troops into the FARDC military.46 There was a wide range of groups, from large well-trained rebel armies to small militias.

44 “Security Sector Reform,” MONUSCO, https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/security-sector-reform [accessed December 19, 2018].

45 “DRC: Louis Koyagialo recommends removal of illegal roadblocks,” Radio Okapi, Trans. from French by Google Translate, April 11, 2012, https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/04/11/rdc-louis-koyagialo-recommande-la-suppression-des-barrieres-routieres-illegales/ [accessed December 18, 2018].

46 Judith Verweijen, “Soldiers Without an Army? Patronage Networks and Cohesion in the Armed Forces of the DR Congo,” Armed Forces & Society 44, no. 4, 2018, 632, https://doi. org/10.1177/0095327X17740096 [accessed December 18, 2018].

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Many soldiers received little formal training or education. After the initial merging, various groups were continuously integrated into the military.47 A lot of the friction within the military was caused by the political appointment of military officers and loyalty within former rebel groups.48 Soldier wages are very low, around $100 USD a month, with no social services or benefits.49 Troops also have to arrange their own accommodation and pay for things like transportation for rotations and healthcare themselves, which leads to engaging in illegal taxation at roadblocks and mines to even maintain a basic standard of living.50 Subordinates must also give a portion of their revenue to their superiors, who in turn give a share of their money up the hierarchy.51 Illegal taxation is necessary to soldiers’ survival and is promoted by the large amount of corruption in all levels of the military. It is unlikely the FARDC would willingly remove themselves from mining sites or road blockades.

Congolese miners According to the World Bank, there were nearly 2 million artisanal miners in the DRC total in 2008, and another estimated 10 million that depended directly or indirectly on artisanal mining.52 Miners’ main interest is to be able to make a living off their minerals and will pursue the most profitably path, regardless if it’s illicit trade or legal trade. Many miners were against the Dodd-Frank legislation because of the economic havoc it wreaked on their communities.53 U.S. companies Many of the companies that utilize 3T minerals are consumer-oriented electronic companies that are sensitive to negative publicity. However, many companies have expressed their opposition to repealing the Dodd-Frank legislation because the law has “created an expectation both inside their corporate headquarters and among consumers that their products will be

47 Verweijen, “Soldiers Without an Army?”, 632.

48 Verweijen, “Soldiers Without an Army?”, 632.

49 Verweijen, “Soldiers Without an Army?”, 635.

50 Verweijen, “Soldiers Without an Army?”, 635.

51 Verweijen, “Soldiers Without an Army?”, 635.

52 “Accompanying Measures,” 16.

53 Raghavan, “How a well-intentioned U.S. law left Congolese

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miners jobless.”

‘conflict free.’”54 Companies have a strong interest in maintaining their public image as well as sourcing minerals profitably, which is why the boycott of Congolese minerals happened in the first place.

Neighboring countries The ICGLR consists of the countries Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Repubic of South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. The ICGLR opposes the repeal of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act because of the fear that it would weaken the existing efforts to certify minerals (i.e. the RCM) and “contribute to the resurgence of armed groups controlling and exploiting minerals.”55 Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda are currently the top destinations for smuggled 3T and gold.56 They profit from the increased tax revenue, since the smuggled minerals enter into formal trade channels in those countries, so they would not have a strong interest in changing their trade behavior without an incentive.

International community The international community has been active in combatting conflict minerals, with Germany, the European Union, the UN, and the World Bank having passed legislation or set up initiatives to prevent the use of Congolese conflict minerals.57 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation released due diligence guidelines in May 2011 to help companies “respect human rights, observe applicable rules of international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict, avoid contributing to conflict and cultivate transparent mineral supply chains and sustainable corporate engagement in the mineral sector.”58 This guidance is endorsed by the U.S. Department of State and is the basis of E.U. 54 Todd C. Frankel, “Why Apple and Intel don’t want to see the conflict minerals rule rolled back,” The Washington Post, December 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/whyapple-and-intel-dont-want-to-see-the-conflict-minerals-rule-rolledback/2017/02/23/b027671e-f565-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html [accessed December 12, 2018].

55 “ICGLR Declaration on Section 1502 of the US Dodd Frank Act,” International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, February 14, 2017, http://www.icglr.org/index.php/en/homepage/127-slider/838-luandasummit-3 [accessed December 5, 2018].

56 Enough team, “Breaking the Cycle,” 3 57 Autesserre, “Dangerous tales: Dominant narratives on the Congo and their unintended consequences,” 211.

58 “OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas,” OECD, http:// www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/mining.htm [accessed December 13, 2018].

regulation, International Conference on Artisanal and Small-scale Mining and Quarrying (ASM18), Chinese due diligence guidelines, and ICGLR guidelines.59 In general, many countries around the world have a strong interest in DRC conflict-free minerals and have contributed to certification and mineral traceability efforts on the ground in one way or another.

KEY FINDINGS (a list of salient facts) 1. The negative effects of the Dodd-Frank legislation on the DRC are mainly stem from the de facto boycott of DRC 3T minerals and gold by companies. This is a result of companies’ lack of confidence in regarding “the compliance of certain stakeholders in the Congolese mining sector with responsible sourcing standards.”60 Rather than risk the negative publicity of potentially not conflict-free minerals, companies preferred to avoid DRC minerals all together.

2. A major incentive for smuggling gold into neighboring countries to be sold there is the fact that the DRC has a much higher export tax than its surrounding countries. Until it is economically profitable to declare gold production officially, producers, traders, and exporters will continue to move their gold illicitly.

3. The initial passing of the 2010 Dodd-Frank legislation shows that negative publicity, or “naming and shaming,” is a powerful tool in changing the behavior of private corporations. This is something that could potentially used again to gather the financial support of companies in certifying gold supply chains.

4. The FARDC military is complicit in occupying mines and setting up illegal roadblocks.

Because of the low salary and lack of benefits for soldiers, they must engage in the illicit taxation in order to maintain a basic standard of living. Furthermore, the system of loyalties within former rebel groups in the military means revenue is often gathered for their commanders to take a portion of.

5. Many roadblocks still go unaccounted for.

Though the 2017 IPIS report was able to map 798 roadblocks in North and South Kivu, 59 “OECD Due Diligence Guidance,” OECD. 60 “Accompanying Measures,” 6.

most of the roadblocks in North Kivu’s Beni and Lubero territories, the Lulenge sector in South Kivu, or the area occupied by Raia Mutomboki in the southeast of Walikale were unable to be covered.61 Within the area that was mapped, there are also many taxation points at market entrances that were isolated and inaccessible. In order to even begin regulating taxation in the mining region of the DRC, whether it’s taxation on goods or passage, the roadblock locations must be identified.

ALTERNATIVE POLICIES CONSIDERED AND REJECTED Maintain the status quo. Taking no additional action is a possible choice as there are no immediately pressing concerns in terms of direct impact on the U.S. Additionally, USAID does already support many initiatives in the DRC through foreign aid. However, it is not enough.

The U.S. must do more to rectify the policy implementation failure of the Dodd-Frank Act instead of viewing it as a band-aid solution to the violence and human rights abuses in the DRC. The reasoning behind the Dodd-Frank Act is outdated, and the U.S. should take action to address the current root source of funding for conflict in the DRC. Repeal Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Another path of action would be to remove the initial legislation that caused the economic problems in the DRC in the first place, namely Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act. This is a viable solution that has been introduced in a bill by itself, such as H.R. 4248 in the 115th Congress. It has also been attached to other bills, such as H.R. 10 (Section 862) and H.R. 3354 (Section 1108 of Division D).62 However, this choice was rejected because it a) ignores the positive developments in the years following the implementation of the legislation and b) does not necessarily guarantee a return to a preDodd Frank economic environment in the DRC. Though the initial passing of the Dodd-Frank Act negatively affected the civilian artisanal miners because of the lack of certification infra61 Schouten, “‘Everything that moves will be taxed’,” 8.

62 Alexis Arieff, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, August 23, 2018, 17, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R43166.html [accessed December 13, 2018].

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structure in place, there have been a lot of improvements since then. The ICGLR certification mechanism, the iTSCi traceability system, and other initiatives have all led to the possibility of companies returning to the Congolese mineral market, provided that these initiatives continue. Additionally, the success of the Dodd-Frank legislation was not that it forced companies to stop sourcing conflict minerals; it was the “naming and shaming” element and public awareness that was so effective. Many companies have expressed their opposition to getting rid of the law because of their commitment to responsible sourcing, and even if the law was removed, the public would still be aware of the conflict mineral phenomenon.

Reduce foreign aid to the DRC. The Trump Administration has requested $214 million in bilateral aid for the DRC in FY 2019 (not including emergency humanitarian aid), which is much less than the $362.2 million that was allocated in FY 2017.63 It is unclear the exact reasoning behind this, but it seems to be correlated with a gradual extrication from the DRC, as Trump also secured a 63 Arieff, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations,” 15.

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MONUSCO troop decrease and eliminated a State Department Special Envoy position.64 This choice is highly recommended against. Until the necessary infrastructure and resources are in place in the DRC governance structures, continual mining site certification, tracing minerals, countering illegal action by the military, and many other initiatives will be difficult without foreign aid. Many of the initiatives currently in the DRC are backed the USAID, and even then there are still difficulties in achieving those objectives. To decrease the DRC’s foreign aid would have a negative impact on the projects already started and the mining economy there.

PROPOSED STRATEGY The optimal strategy involves a multi-faceted approach that involves bolstering existing initiatives in the region as well as engaging closely with the DRC government and regional governments.

Since the passing of the 2010 Dodd-Frank legislation, there has been some progress made in certifying mining sites as conflict-free. The 64 Arieff, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations,” 14.

Courtesy of Gigi on Unsplash licensed under Creative Commons

ICGLR’s certification mechanism follows OECD guidelines, and the ITSCI traceability system, albeit not perfect, provides a framework for ensuring conflict-free minerals can be identified and remain free from contamination from minerals sourced elsewhere. There are also initiatives to develop traceability for gold and ensure a conflict-free supply chain. The NGO Partnership Africa Canada’s Just Gold program, which was launched as a pilot program in 2014, was able to fully trace a gold export from mine to exporter in May 2017.65 This system uses incentives to encourage artisanal miners to go through legal channels to sell their gold. The program receives funding from Global Affairs Canada, the USAID Capacity Building for Responsible Minerals Trade (CBRMT) program, and the International Organization for Migration. It has also received funding from Apple and is supported by the Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade, which shows promise for continued collaboration with the public sector in funding due diligence initiatives in the DRC. The DRC Ministry of Mines also launched the Initiative for the Traceability of Artisanal Gold (ITOA) in June 2017.66 ITOA uses a variety of color-coded smart bags with barcodes to secure the gold as it moves through the supply chain.67 These are all initiatives the U.S. increase its support for to make it easier for companies to source responsibly from the region instead of boycotting. However, even as it becomes easier and easier to produce conflict-free gold, the tax difference between the DRC and its neighbors still makes it more profitable for miners to smuggle gold into those countries and sell it there. The United States should work with the ICGLR to encourage countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda to alter their taxes to be more on par with the DRC’s (tax harmonization). There would be an incentive in increasing the tax rate as that could make up for the loss of revenue if it is 65 “Just Gold,” IMPACT, https://impacttransform.org/en/work/project/just-gold/ [accessed December 18, 2018].

66 “DRC launches its Artisanal Gold Traceability Initiative (ITOA),” Radio Okapi, Trans. by Google Translate, June 20, 2017, https://www. radiookapi.net/2017/06/20/actualite/economie/la-rdc-lance-son-initiative-pour-la-tracabilite-de-lor-artisanal-itoa [accessed December 18, 2018].

67 Tetra Tech, “Capacity Building For A Responsible Minerals Trade (rRMT) Responsible Sourcing Of Artisanal Gold From Matete, Maniema, Dr Congo,” USAID, May 2016, 7, http://solutions-network.org/ site-ragsforum/files/2016/05/Matete-Traceability-and-Due-Diligence-Overview.pdf [accessed December 17, 2018].

successful in decreasing the amount of smuggled minerals.

As seen in the initial passing of DoddFrank, public awareness and opinion can be utilized to cause a change in behavior in private corporations, especially ones that depend on consumer patronage. The State Department and USAID should work with organizations such as the Enough Project that originally led the push for the conflict mineral legislation to generate publicity about illicit gold trade in DRC. If the public is aware that companies sourcing gold from neighboring countries are still contributing to funding armed groups, companies may have more of an incentive to contribute financially to certification and traceability initiatives on the ground.

The FARDC poses a huge problem moving forward as they contribute the most to the illegal mine occupation and illegal roadblocks.

The lack of cohesion with the military and the complicities of individual commanders in these taxation schemes makes it difficult to keep the military accountable, and the government has struggled with timely and adequate payment of soldiers. Though funding is not an issue that can easily be solved, military expertise is something that the U.S. does have in abundance. The U.S. should provide security assistance training to the FARDC military in order to improve cohesion and organization within the military and well as promote respect for international human rights.

Finally, as illegal road blocks are also being operated by armed groups, there must be a more efficient system of identifying where they are for the future when the government is equipped to deal with them. In 2014-2015, the Congolese NGO Save Act Mine operated a telephone hotline for reporting fraud and smuggling of various minerals.68 A similar system could be put in place in again for a longer amount of time to see it is a viable option for reporting suspected illegal taxation.

ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED STRATEGY 1. Attempts to mitigate harm caused by initial 68 “PPA Contributions to Responsible Minerals Trade,” Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Mineral Trade, May 2017, http://www.resolv.org/site-ppa/files/2017/06/PPA-Contributions-to-RMT-Final.pdf [accessed December 17, 2018].

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Dodd-Frank legislation by increasing support for mine certification and mineral traceability. The initial legislation that led to a de facto boycott caused a great amount of harm to Congolese citizens that depended on artisanal mining for survival. Since companies’ sensitivity to negative publicity would prevent them from returning to the Congolese mineral market even if the Dodd-Frank legislation was removed, the solution with the most potential for attracting companies is reducing the difficulty for them to acquire conflict-free minerals moving forward. The proposed solution does this by continuing to support mine certification and supply chain traceability efforts by local actors and development organizations.

2. Continues to promote human rights in the region. By continuing to support certification of mines, the U.S. continues to value and promote human rights in the region.

ICGLR RCM-certified mines are free from “any forms of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,” “any forms of forced or compulsory labour, which means work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of penalty and for which said person has not offered himself voluntarily,” “the worst forms of child labour,” “other gross human rights violations and abuses such as widespread sexual violence,” and “war crimes or other serious violations of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity or genocide.”69 3. Contributes to overall stability in the DRC. The U.S. has been giving more and more foreign aid to the DRC each year, with total aid in FY 2017 adding up to almost $494 million.

A large amount of the funding went towards emergency response, basic health, and development food aid. The proposed strategy attempts to target structural problems in the hope that it will contribute to long-term change and stability in the country. If the artisanal mining economy is improved, it has the potential to increase the standards of living for millions of artisanal miners.

Increased export revenue for the government could allow it to acquire the resources

for local governance structures to function properly.

4. Addresses a major source of funding for armed actors in the DRC. Illegal taxation at roadblocks is a huge burden on civilians, as the cumulative taxes lead to high prices on consumer goods in urban areas after the goods have travelled there. Though the proposed strategy does not directly address the problem, it aims to implement a system that allows the roadblocks to be reported and kept track of for the government to deal with in the future. Additionally, the security assistance provided by the U.S. aims to improve the organization and training of the FARDC so that they may contribute less to the illegal taxation problem in the future.

5. Utilizes U.S. military expertise cost-effectively. The Department of Defense has trained foreign militaries in hundreds of countries all over the world. This is a cost-effective, non-intrusive way of helping reform the FARDC that will improve the government’s ability to utilize it in the future, as it does not require sending large numbers of personnel overseas; rather, they will train the commanders on how to train and organize their units to work together.70

Executive Secretariat International Conference on the Great 24 Manual,” Lakes Region, September 26, 2014, 5, http://www.icglr.org/index.

70 “US International Security Assistance Education and Training,”

69 “ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) Certification php/en/natural-resources [accessed December 12, 2018].

KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Continue to fund the USAID Responsible Minerals Trade program, which in turns funds certification and traceability initiatives in the DRC. The USAID Responsible Minerals Trade program provides support for the Just Gold project, the ITOA gold traceability program, and ICGLR RMC, and more. It is crucial to maintain the U.S.’s support for these programs as well as seek out other programs that show promise in making conflict-free mineral sourcing possible for U.S. companies.

2. Coordinate a public awareness campaign on illicit gold trade in the DRC. The USAID should coordinate with the State Department and work with organizations such as the Enough Project and Global Witness to raise awareness of DRC gold that is Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/ training.html [accessed December 18, 2018].

smuggled to countries such as Uganda and Rwanda. This gold appears to be sourced from those countries and are therefore “conflict-free,” but are still connected to un-certified mines in the DRC that are taxed by armed groups.

3. Create a telephone hotline for reporting illegal taxation, smuggling, and fraud. The USAID should fund a permanent telephone hotline in partnership with the Congolese NGO Save Act Mine since they have prior experience with the logistics of operating a reporting hotline. Civilians would be able to report illegal roadblocks and other illicit activity through this line. The information should be made available to the IPIS for research and mapping purposes as well as the DRC Ministry of Mines and Provincial Mines Division.

4. Engage with the ICGLR and the governments of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda to discuss export tax harmonization within the region. The U.S. Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region Tom Perriollo should be instructed to engage with the ICGLR to negotiate the raising of export taxes in neighboring countries to the DRC and/or the lowering of the export tax in the DRC to a mutually agreed upon level in order to address the problem of illicit minerals trade.

This should be presented in terms of both economic benefit so that countries are not lowering export taxes in a race to the bottom as well as cooperation with the DRC to reduce smuggling across the borders.

5. Secure funding for the Department of Defense to provide security assistance to FARDC. The primary program for security assistance is the International Military Education and Training (IMET). However, Congress has restricted IMET funds for any government in the Great Lakes Region.71 The DoD should request a waiver for the DRC from Congress, emphasizing that the focus of the training would be on “managing and administering foreign military establishments and budgets, understanding democracy and civilian control of the military, improving military judicial systems, and promoting awareness and understanding of 71 Arieff, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations,” 16.

internationally recognized human rights,” which would ultimately promote human rights conditions in the country rather than contribute to more conflict.72 CONCLUSION This policy recommendation is based the view that addressing these problems, though they are only a small subset of the issues that the DRC faces, will eventually improve conditions in all areas and contribute to USAID’s goal of helping the country reach self-reliance, having the ability to “plan, finance, and implement solutions to address its own development challenges.”73 Better certification of mines and traceability of supply chains means that more companies will be willing to return to sourcing 3T and gold from the DRC. This would lead to economic growth in the artisanal mining sector, reversing the damage done by the Dodd-Frank legislation initially and increasing the income for the millions that depend on artisan mining for survival. Tax harmonization among the DRC and its neighboring countries would remove a major cause of illicit mineral trade and allow the Congolese government to gather more tax revenue from its natural resources. The freer movement of goods and people on the roads in the DRC if there were less illegal roadblocks would remove a large burden on traders and the civilian population that are overtaxed and must pay exorbitant prices for goods in urban areas. Though a majority of USAID foreign aid towards the DRC goes towards emergency response, basic health, and development food aid, the Responsible Mineral Trade program received a little over $2 million in FY 2017. However, more funding can be spent on addressing structural problems described in this policy review that are inhibiting Congolese civilians from taking full advantage of their natural resources and economic opportunities. There is more that the U.S. can do to address these problems, and it is worth making the investment to do so in the long run.

72 “US International Security Assistance Education and Training,” Federation of American Scientists.

73 “Congo (Kinshasa) Journey to Self-Reliance: FY 2019 Country Roadmap,” USAID, https://selfreliance.usaid.gov/country/ congo-kinshasa [accessed December 18, 2018].

25

‘WHO LIVES? WHO DIES? WHO TELLS YOUR STORY? - HAMILTON, LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA

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How Ben Rhodes is still trying to write the story: CJIR sits down with former national security advisor for President Obama Helena Ong PO‘20 Helena Gabrielle Ong is editor in chief of Claremont Journal of International Relations. She is majoring in politics and English, with a specialization in international relations and a minor in linguistics.

She is interested in security studies, foreign policy, and media.

B

en Rhodes is talking about his first presidential campaign for President Barack Obama. At forty-one years old, he’s still young for a White House veteran. But he recalls being among the older workers during Obama’s 2008 campaigns. “At the beginning, we had a lot of success in 2008 campaign and building a narrative around Obama and his candidacy that mobilized a coalition of people that had not been mobilized in American politics,” he said.

He tells it like a story—a well-rehearsed story that he’s clearly thought about again and again.

He’s seated at the desk of Pomona professor Mietek Boduszynski, who has lent out his office for our interview. Rhodes was in town for an event at Pomona College’s Rose Hill Theatre: “An Evening with Ben Rhodes.” The event was a conversation with Boduszynski and Rhodes regarding his time in the White House and his memoir. It was a packed house with students, professors, and even politically-inclined locals.

But Rhodes, the former deputy national security advisor to Obama, kept circling back to how important the story is. He knows that legacies aren’t decided by the people who make them. He knows that history is written by the winners. Rhodes is just one of several Obamaera alums still chasing control of the narrative.

His memoir, The World As It Is: A Memoir of the Obama White House, stands next to Dan Pfieffer’s Yes We (Still) Can, David Litt’s Thanks Obama: My

Hopey Changey White House Years, Pat Cunnane’s West Winging It, and Alyssa Mastromonaco’s Who Thought This Was A Good Idea? Those are just a few stand-outs in the multitude of competing voices around the Obama administration.

But the number of publications from within the Obama-era administration also reflects the continuing struggle to win their side of the political story.

As an MFA graduate in Creative Writing, foreign policy speechwriter, and later as Obama’s advisor, Rhodes’ work has always been about rewriting the narrative. In 2008, Obama’s campaign ran their story on motifs of “Change” and “Yes We Can.” Now, out of the White House, he’s still trying to shape the presidential legacy that it leaves behind.

“Politics is about storytelling,” he states firmly. But when asked about competing media, even he admits that storytelling has its fractures.

First, there was the broadening sources of media. “You have this situation where the old way of presidents giving speeches and making statements—suddenly people aren’t consuming full speeches or they’re consuming bits and pieces of information on social media,” he said. Twitter grew from 6.0 million users in 2008—the start of Obama’s presidency—to 319 million users by the

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Pomona College hosts a conversation between Professor Mietek Boduszynski (left) and Ben Rhodes (right).

Helena Gabrielle Ong PO ‘20, 2018

end in 2016.1 This April, the app hit 330 million users, but is still considered “struggling to grow.”2 And Twitter is just one out of many social media platforms. The growing platform of social media makes it harder to get the word out-even for those with the microphone “It became harder to reach people,” Rhodes said, “people were decamping to hermetically sealed media environments. There were literally 30 to 40% of Americans that we could not reach.”

It is ironic that Rhodes still chooses to publish his memoir via book. It’s a traditional medium in the face of the outpour of “hot takes” on the Obama-era online. Articles include: James Risen’s NYT op-ed “If Donald Trump Target Journalists, Thank Obama”; Conor Friedersdorf’s “The Liberal Critique of Obama: Judging the 1 Lahle Wolfe, “Twitter User Statistics 2008 Through

2017,” The Balance Careers, November 4, 2018. https://www.thebalancecareers.com/twitter-statistics-2008-2009-2010-2011-3515899 2 Jacob Kastrenakes, “Twitter’s final monthly user count shows a company still struggling to grow,” The Verge, April 19, 2019. https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/23/18511383/twitterq1-2019-earnings-report-mau

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President by His Own Standards”; Caitlin Johnstone’s “If Progressives Don’t Wake Up to How Awful Obama Was, Their Movement Will Fail”; etc. All are easily accessible online. But Rhodes is determined to make his narrative stick.

He emphasized the importance of connecting story to policy, taking aim at President Donald Trump. “The interesting thing about Trump is that he uses a rhetoric that sets himself in opposition to that brand of foreign policy. And yet if you look at his actual policies, he has escalated every single military conflict that he inherited,” Rhodes said. He cites Iran as an example of growing hostilities and “a real risk of war.”

But Rhodes’ concern of disconnecting brand and policy is similar to criticism of the Obama administration. In Current Affairs, Nathan Robinson summarizes the left’s frustration of the Obama administration: “Change was largely symbolic rather than substantive, and he failed to stand up for progressive values or fight for

serious shifts in U.S. policy.”3 Still, Rhodes is determined to view it through the big picture. If there is an answer to the title of his memoir, then Rhodes’s outlook on “the world as it is” is a broad, macro-level, wide-sweeping picture. This approach in politics has had its critics. In his first term, Obama was criticized as “remote,” “distant” and “perfunctory,” according to the New York Times.4 He seemed untouchable.

But Rhodes continues to aspire to that loftiness as a tool for foreign policy.

“You need to see the world as it is, in order to pursue the world as it ought to be,” Rhodes said.

“We can’t lose sight of how important is it that our leadership has to be anchored in the example that we provide […] The most powerful thing that American can offer in terms of leadership 3 Nathan J. Robinson, “The Obama Boys,” Current

Affairs, March 20, 2019. https://www.currentaffairs. org/2019/03/the-obama-boys.

4 Helene Cooper, “Bipartisan Agreement: Obama Isn’t Schmoozing,” New York Times, December 28, 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/us/politics/ obama-gains-reputation-as-distant-in-washington.html.

is our own example. The best policy to promote democracy around the world is the health of our own democracy.”

Rhodes talked about the importance of a “much broader agenda” for presidential candidates’ foreign policy. But even looking forward to 2020, he circles back to the Obama administration. “This is what we were focused on the second Obama term where climate change is central to our foreign policy, where we’re using diplomacy to resolve conflicts—as with Iran. We were reaching out to former adversaries like Cuba, and that’s the direction we were trying to set in motion. Obviously Trump has disrupted that.”

It’s a narrative that seems to have been disrupted again and again. It’s also one that he knows isn’t going to be fixed with a single story—or a single Democratic president. “I don’t think we would immediately recover our world standing. […] It’s not just the fact that Trump is president that concerns people. It’s the fact that we elected Trump president,” Rhodes said. “That doubt will linger because one election won’t put those doubts to rest.”

While there is still competition for control of the narrative at home, Rhodes thinks the stage is still open on the international level. “I think we can recover a lot of our leadership in part because there’s no other country that is seeking to play the role that the United States has played in the world. Even in China, they don’t want to be responsible for all the things that America’s been responsible for over the last several decades. So there’s an opening for us to reclaim, but I think it’ll take longer than one election to win back the intangible trust and credibility,” he said.

“Some of it’s healthy. It was kind of artificial for America to be so dominant in the post-Cold War period. I don’t think that was ever going to be the new normal. But we do have a lot of work to do.” This aspiration toward the idea of America as a global leader is still debated in public and online discourse around Obama’s presidency. It is impossible not to miss how much Rhodes sees the storytelling and discourse as a form of foreign policy. “Presidential legacies are not a settled thing,” he says. Neither are countries.

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MANIPULATING THE MEDIA: How Media Narratives are Exploited on Both Sides of Terror

Aubrey Aust, PO ‘22 Aubrey Aust is a freshman at Pomona College, majoring in politics. On campus, she is involved with the Pomona Events Committee and enjoys bringing the Pomona community together. Her research interests include U.S. foreign policy and the Middle East.

C

ounterterrorism strategies seek pragmatism before implementation. Today, there is an aspect of counterterrorism that is often overlooked and is deserving of greater attention: the way terrorism is framed in the media. While it is essential to take a closer look at the successes and failures of counterterrorism strategies, we must first ask how the coverage on acts of terror, both in the United States and internationally, contributes to terrorist agendas.

Media narratives exert a great deal of influence in the portrayal and perception of current events. Its response is tailored to the amount of interests that domestic audiences have in international topics and can often be sporadic. However, when Americans feel endangered by events going on worldwide or at home as they do in cases of terrorist attacks, media coverage can change and frame events to benefit certain groups. The working definition of terrorism is too flexible due to the varying attacks it is attributed to. As a result, terrorist groups can use and exploit modern narratives portrayed through media for their own benefit. This paper will examine how different actors manipulate media coverage for their own advantage by gaining support for their respective agendas. First, this will look at the definitions of terrorism in media to show how the media represents the issue and lacks a concrete definition. Then, by looking at the media coverage of the Chibok kidnappings

by Boko Haram and the 9/11 attacks in the United States, this will demonstrate how these groups twist dominant, popular media and culture into a form of increased influence and power. Finally, I will assess how the United States has employed similar strategies in the media in order to gain support for its approach to the War on Terror, specifically under the Bush administration. Media coverage of terrorist groups and attacks is absolutely necessary to inform the public, but in its current format, it gives unwanted influence, strength and power to acts of terror by glamorizing violence, increasing fear and providing worldwide recognition to group leaders.

TERRORISM TODAY

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Even though mass media covers terrorist attacks and organizations, it has failed to adhere to an existing definition of terrorism, resulting in discrepancies between stories of attacks. Generally, it is described to be the “use of threat of violence to

further a political cause.”1 Martha Crenshaw attributes most terrorist attacks to similar causes: the existence of protests among a subgroup, a lack of democratic opportunities, and dissatisfaction with elites and mass passivity.2 However, the understanding of terrorism is undergoing change due to its varying nature. Modern technology prohibits a singular definition as online radicalization spurs terrorist activity internationally. Technology such as end-to-end encryption allows terrorists to conduct remote operations and recruiting.3 Additionally, homegrown terrorism risks being mischaracterized due to the lack of a concrete definition. In 2015, U.S. citizen Robert Dear killed three and injured nine at a Planned Parenthood. His comments after the attack made many question his mental state with some members of Congress, such as Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX), going so far as to say that Dear’s actions were part of a mental 1 “Terrorism.” In Collateral Language: A User’s Guide to America’s New War, edited by Collins John and Glover Ross, 155-74. NYU Press, 2002.

2 Martha Crenshaw. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative

Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 379-99.

3 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross. “Terrorists Are Using Drones Now. And That’s Not the Worst of It.” Fortune. Accessed April 01, 2019. http:// fortune.com/2017/09/09/september-11-terrorism-drones-technology/.

health crisis rather than domestic terror.4 Experts at the Department of Homeland Security, on the other hand, quickly categorized Dear as a terrorist.5 Alex Schmid, research fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, listed the varying definitions of terrorism over time, concluding that there have been more than 260.6 He also noted that the lack of a single definition is not entirely due to the complexity of the topic, as it is valuable for nations to be able to create their own definitions rather than a universally punishable legal definition. However, Schmid does propose a definition, stating that terrorism is the “peacetime equivalent of war crimes.”7 The beginning of the War on Terror after 9/11 created a distinct picture of terrorism, namely consisting of groups affiliated with al-Qaida or the Islamic State. But when a perpetrator carries out a 4 Shaun King. “Robert Dear’s Deadly Planned Parenthood

Attack Was Act of Terrorism, Even If Conservatives Refuse to Admit It .” Nydailynews.com. April 09, 2018. Accessed March 29, 2019. https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ king-colo-planned-parenthood-shooting-terrorist-attack-article-1.2451292.

5 Ibid.

6 Kamala Kelkar. “When It Comes to Defining ‘terrorism,’ There Is No Consensus.” PBS. February 26, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/defining-terrorism-consensus.

7 Ibid.

Courtesy of VOA/Nicolas Pinault, public domain

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terrorist attack who does not fit the mold created by the media, that individual faces different treatment in media narratives. This was evident in debates over whether or not Dylann Roof should be called a terrorist after killing nine people at a church in Charleston, South Carolina.8 Roof, a white Christian, considered himself a white supremacist. His ideology fit previous definitions of terrorism, but as a white American, he solicited debate on the terminology of his actions.9 Grey areas still exist in the quest for a definition, but after 9/11 and the declaration of the War on Terror, a very binary “us versus them” discourse began to dominate media narratives.10 The media coverage of terrorist attacks can perpetuate incorrect narratives and motivations of terrorist groups. This can aid in shaping their agendas to gain the most amount of shock value from the public. Although it can happen unintentionally, it occurs through repeated misrepresentation of events as well as reporting false targets and motivations.

This was the case of reporting on the Chibok kidnappings and Boko Haram in 2014. Boko Haram was once named the world’s deadliest terror group, but the organization has been in decline since 2014 due to a change in factions.11 In 2014, it split up, with the largest portion of the group remaining in the Islamic State West African Province.12 Since aligning with ISIS, they have killed tens of thousands and displaced 2.3 million.13 The group is known for its mass hostage takings, as well as its use of taking women and children as suicide bombers. A failed counterinsurgency strategy combined with an incorrect yet repeated media narrative allowed Boko Haram to strengthen its objectives with the Chibok kidnappings. In 2014, Boko Haram abducted 276 girls from their school dormitory in Chibok, Nigeria. The incident was horrific and shocking, and the media ran with the strong public opinion it solicited. High profile individuals and 8 Philip Bump. “Why We Shouldn’t Call Dylann Roof a Ter-

rorist.” The Washington Post. June 19, 2015. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/ wp/2015/06/19/why-we-shouldnt-call-dylann-roof-a-terrorist/?utm_term=.c7feb55a34d5).

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9 Ibid.

10 Yaeli Bloch-Elkon and Brigitte L. Nacos. “News and Entertainment Media: Government’s Big Helpers in the Selling of Counterterrorism.” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 5 (2014): 18-32.

11 Ely Karmon. “Boko Haram’s International Reach.” Perspectives Courtesy of AK Rockefeller, licensed under Creative Commons on Terrorism 8, no. 1 (2014): 74-83.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

celebrities even became involved in the coverage for the campaign to “bring back our girls.”14 The leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekeau, gained media attention, which increased his credibility as a villain who could successfully execute an operation.

But, according to journals of a few girls who were captured, the militants were targeting a block-making machine that could be useful in the construction of weapons, but when the militants were unable to find the machine, they were left with the captured girls instead.15 But the story of Shekau attacking girls’ education went viral as the media reports made it seem like this was the original intention of the group and ignored information that did not fit into the popular narrative.

The way the media constructed the narrative around the Chibok abductions gave Boko Haram a valuable way to gain even more attention and spread fear. After the Chibok kidnappings, Boko Haram saw the attention it could gain through using women and increasingly relied on more female attackers than males, making them the first terrorist group to use more female suicide bombers than male.16 According to a study from Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and Yale University, out of the 338 suicide bombings, since 2011, where gender could be identified, 244 were executed by women.17 Hilary Matfess, who co-authored the study, suggests that this change was implemented in order to grab media headlines and receive shock from the international community.18 This shows that media attention of terrorist attacks, while important, is also flawed.

The public deserves a warning of these attacks, and victims deserve to be remembered; however, in doing so, the media unintentionally gives a dangerous amount of recognition to those orchestrating these acts. It also encourages supporters to follow in their footsteps. It is not just the television coverage that is problematic, but also the way information is delivered through radio broadcasts. Roughly 90% of adults in most African countries own a radio

receiver.19 These receivers have access to international broadcasters like the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio-France Internationale and the Voice of America.20 Many radio broadcasts exist to stir emotion. Those who listen to it feel the power and influence held by these terrorist organizations.

Violent acts are described over and over and the fear of those harmed by the attack is expanded and glamorized, which bolsters recruitment strategies.21 So, the impact of this specific media narrative heavily influenced Boko Haram’s actions: the attention brought to the terrorist group was used to direct their narrative and aid in their agenda, ultimately resulting in greater recruitment abilities.

The use and exploitation of media framing is not just a tool which benefits terrorist organizations.

The United States also relied on a specific type of media coverage to promote a binary “us versus them,” which gained support for the War on Terror.

After the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the media coverage focused on the symbolism of the attacked targets, which al Qaeda used to promote its agenda. Osama bin Laden used the spectacle of terror as a means of advancing his initiatives and increasing fear in the 1990s. The 1993 assault on the World Trade Center, the 1998 assault of U.S. embassies in Africa and the 2000 attack on the U.S. destroyer in Yemen serve as examples.22 But, the attack on 9/11 was entirely new territory. Previous attacks under al Qaeda’s orders served as a way of demonstrating that the United States was vulnerable to terrorist attacks by hitting a wide range of targets, but the 9/11 attacks were symbolic and on a larger scale.23 The targets of the attacks represented American military power and global capital. News networks repeatedly broadcast coverage of the planes hitting the World Trade Centers, and U.S. citizens felt fear and anxiety. For several days after the attacks, the media spectacle continued, but instead of providing a coherent account of what happened and why 19 David Smith, and Stephanie Wolters. “Radio, Social Media

14 Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani, “Killing for Airtime: How Boko Haram’s Abubakar Shekau manipulates media,” World Policy Journal, June 1, 2018, vol. 35, no. 2: 58–62 15 Ibid.

16 Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, “Why Boko Haram Exists: The

Relative Deprivation Perspective,” African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review, vol. 3, no. 1 (2013): 144-57.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

and Language as an Agent in Conflict: A Case Study of Dandal Kura Radio International in the Lake Chad Basin.”

20 Karmon, Ely. “Boko Haram’s International Reach.” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 1 (2014): 74-83.

21 Ibid.

22 Donald Holbrooke. “The Spread of Its Message: Studying

the Prominence of Al-Qaida Materials in UK Terrorism Investigations.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 6 (2017): 89-100.

23 Ibid.

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it happened, the coverage caused hysteria. News networks relied on national security intellectuals who were ideologically to the right or far right, and in an attempt to explain the horrific events that had occurred, experts categorized the war on terror as the free world against the forces of darkness, contrasting the ‘civilized’ world with terrorism.24 The Bush administration employed similar tactics in their framing of the events by portraying the conflict as a war between good and evil. The administration said that it would “eradicate evil from the world.”25 Even the Pentagon initially named the war against terror “Operation Infinite Justice” and only changed it when they were advised that Americans might have concerns over a war without an end.26 Instead, the Bush administration changed its terminology, calling the war on terror “Operation Enduring Freedom.”

The corporate media’s exploitation of fear aided the agendas of both terrorist organizations and domestic political groups. The reliance on a binary opposition of good and evil, or us against them, was employed by both sides. In the case of the United States, it created an invisible realm of terror. By viewing terrorism as the enemy instead of a specific group or organization, the discourse suggested that a crusader for good had the right to attack any area of organization supporting terrorism.27 This created dangerous narratives around Muslims and Arabs. Radio coverage of these events was worse than the television coverage. Hosts called for violence against Muslims and Arabs, asking for nuclear retaliation and global war as logical solutions. The terror, hysteria and war propaganda only played into the narratives of terrorist organizations that the West was out to attack them.28 The public has a right to know about the threat posed by terrorist groups; but there can be a better way to do so that does not play into the hands of those seeking international attention and striving to provoke worldwide fear.

We are living in a mediated world in which few media companies have control over a majority of 24 Christina Archetti, “Terrorism, Communication and New

Media: Explaining Radicalization in the Digital Age,” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 9, no. 1 (2015): 49-59.

25 G. P. D. “This Terrorism and That Terrorism,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 40, no. 29 (2005): 3115.

26 Ibid.

27 David L. Altheide, “Consuming Terrorism,” Symbolic Interaction vol. 27, no. 3 (2004): 289-308.

28 Ibid.

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broadcasting and print media. It is the responsibility of these corporations to take initiative in limiting the antagonization of the attackers, which the attackers see as glorification, and present the facts of the situation in a way that limits the look of a frenzied, helpless state. News coverage must cut back on mentions of the attacker’s name and face and starve the terrorist group of publicity. Democratic tools like free information released and shared on the internet must be employed in order to avoid the dominant media narratives of “good versus evil” and “us versus them,” since this mindset only contributes to endless violence and periods of destruction. Media serves as a main source of propaganda for these terrorist organizations, for the media narrative on these groups only highlights their role and amplifies their influence and ability to generate fear.

TRANSGENDER POLITICS IN IRAN:

INTRODUCTION

The Middle East has earned harsh condemnation from both liberals and conservatives alike.

Whether they stem from racism, Islamophobia, or the perception of moral deficits reflected in “backwards” legislation, general attitudes--at least in the United States--seem to be decidedly anti-Middle East. A 2013 Pew Research Center report found that approximately 69% of those surveyed in the United States had an unfavorable opinion of Iran, which they attributed to people’s perception that “Tehran does not respect the personal freedoms of its people.”1 The “personal freedoms” in question, while varied, often relate to questions of identity in American discourse; women, homosexuals, non-Muslims and transgender individuals are perceived to be second-class citizens on the basis of their marginalities.

The predominant focus of this paper is on the rights of transgender individuals living in Iran.

While public perception will be touched upon, the information here will mainly consider Iranian legal and religious foundations and the ways in which they have morphed over time. For the sake of clarity, I will define transgender as “of, relating to, or being a person whose gender identity is opposite the sex the person had or was identified as having at birth.”2 Please note that, while I personally regard gender as a spectrum that transcends the “traditional” binary, such concepts are rarely, if ever, discussed by the Iranian government.

AN EXPLORATION Cameron Tipton, PO ‘20 Cameron Tipton is a rising senior at Pomona College majoring in psychology. They come from an Iranian-immigrant heritage and they are passionate about issues relating to gender and sexual minorities. They are senior managing editor for Careless magazine and write for The Student Life.

closeted homosexual who fears coming out to their family and friends for fear of judgment, or worse, legal persecution. In fact, it is not uncommon in discussions of Iran to hear Americans confidently declare something along the lines of, “the Iranian government imprisons, beats, or kills all known homosexuals.” These inflammatory assertions, coupled with the US’s tendency to lump all members of the LGBTQ community into one box (even when their experiences can US PERCEPTION VS. REALITY I want to begin by focusing on US perceptions be and often are so different from one anothof the Iranian government’s treatment of mem- er) would reasonably lead one to conclude that bers of the LGBTQ community more broadly. Americans expect transgender Iranians would What is often invoked is the trope of the scared, be met with a similar fate. This, however, is largely untrue.

1 Pew

Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, Global Views of Iran Overwhelmingly Negative (2015).

2 Merriam Webster Dictionary, Transgender.

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In regard to homosexuality or same-sex relations (more specifically sodomy), it is true that, technically speaking, Iranian legislation dictates that such acts are “punishable by death.”3 However, in most cases, only violent offenses (i.e., sodomy by rape) actually result in the death penalty. In most instances, the “offender” repents and is granted a formal pardon by the judge. Furthermore, a conviction necessitates the testimony of “four righteous men,” and there are rarely four witnesses to such acts; even so, in the case of convictions, Muslims are often only sentenced to “one hundred lashes” in lieu of the death penalty.4 This is not to say that Iran is the paragon of tolerance; rather, I hope to communicate that the American perception is somewhat misguided and that these Iranian laws are actually rarely implemented.

external genital organs from those of one gender to those of the other) is completely legal. In fact, the government will partially subsidize the cost of the surgery.5 To put this into perspective, Iran is the only Middle Eastern country with this sort of policy in support of transgender individuals (according to one article, Iran “has perhaps the most open mindset in the Middle East toward transgender people” in this regard).6 That said, there are shortcomings with this policy, which I intend to unpack over the course of this paper. But first some historical context is necessary in order to provide a better understanding of how this kind of Iranian policy arose in the first place.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Although an exact beginning to Iranian However, I now direct the focus to Iranian pol- transpolitics remains somewhat elusive, it is icies surrounding transgender individuals. Such easy to pinpoint a specific catalyst that propelled policies are generally favorable (for FTM/MTF the government’s perception of transgender individuals, but more often MTF individuals). citizens in the direction of progress. That cataFrom a legal perspective, gender reassignment lyst was Maryam Khatoon Molkara. Assigned surgery (which, for the sake of clarity, we will male at birth, her journey toward womanhood define as a procedure that changes a person’s was one marked by immense struggle, and one 3 Michael O’Flaherty, Sexual Orientation and Gender which transformed her country. Having claimed Identity (Law Trove, 2018). she knew she was “different” from as early as 4 O’Flaherty, Sexual Orientation. two years old, she built a strong support system of friends and family who believed and respected her gender identity. While working in a hospital, she befriended a transgender doctor, who helped her gain access to female hormones and informed her about gender confirmation surgery. However, due to financial, familial, and religious barriers, she was unable to go through with the surgery.7 Molkara began asking various religious leaders about her experience in the hopes of finding some “answer”— some understanding of the moral implications of her identity. Unfortunately, throughout this process (and owing to the hostile climate of the Is5 O’Flaherty, Sexual Orientation.

6 The Associated Press, Iran’s Transgender

36

People Face Discrimination despite Fatwa (2018).

7 Laura Mills, Maryam Khatoon Molkara, a Woman Who Changed Her Country (2017).

lamic Revolution), she was arrested on multiple occasions, and at one point was even forcibly administered male hormones.8 However, she continued in her pursuit, determined to locate and recount her story to Ayatollah Khomeini, who was the ultimate Shia authority at the time.

Upon arriving to his residence wearing men’s clothing, she was assaulted by the guards, and when Khomeini’s brother came to her rescue, all she could say was, “I am a woman, I am a woman.” Upon telling Khomeini her story in its entirety, he sympathized with her and ultimately issued a fatwa (a religious dictum given by a recognized authority), which read as follows: In the name of the Almighty. God willing, sex reassignment if advised by a reliable doctor is permissible, I hope you are safe, and those who you have mentioned treat you well.9 As a result, Iran drastically redefined the way in which it perceived transgender individuals and allowed them to access gender reassignment surgery.10 This victory, however momentous, is imperfect, and the remainder of this paper will be dedicated to a thorough analysis of the pros and cons of Iran’s general climate towards transgender individuals.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who issued a fatwa after

PRO-TRANS To consider the positive aspects of Iran’s attitudes toward transgender citizens, it might help to focus on visibility preceding Molkara’s account. Even within her account, it is apparent that transgenderism wasn’t an entirely foreign concept (for which reason she was able to develop a support network). This is not exclusive to “conventional wisdom” (i.e., the “if you can think of it, it probably exists” mentality); in fact, transgenderism has been specifically depicted in Islam. More specifically, those whom we might today consider to be pre-op trans women were described as mukhannathun, which 8 Mills, Maryam Khatoon Molkara.

9 Vafai Sohayl, Iran: The Formation

of Trans Identity and Possible Paths Toward the Acceptance of Greater Gender “Deviance” (Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern & Islamic Law, 2018).

10 Mills, Maryam Khatoon Molkara.

meeting with Maryam Khatoon Molkara, 2009.

Courtesy of Imam-Khomeini.com from public domain, according to the Law for the Protection of Authors, Composers and Artists Rights (1970)

translates roughly “effeminate ones” or “those who resemble women.”11 This alone suggests the historical visibility of transgender persons in an Islamic context, specifically trans women.

While it is not inherently rooted to any sort of judgment (seeing as how some terms referring to homosexuals are, such as evakhahar, a derogatory term referring to effeminate men who seek casual sex in public12), it can be argued that this indicates, at least slightly, some precedent of tolerance of trans Iranians.

Aside from historical visibility of transgen11 Sohayl, Iran.

12 Doug Ireland,

Jails 17 (2007).

In Brutal Raid, Iran Arrests 87,

37

der Iranians in a non-judgmental context, it is important to consider how profound an impact religion has on Iran’s politics. Iran is, after all, an Islamic nation, initially coming under Islamic rule in the mid-7th century. This resulted in the cessation of the Sasanian Empire and the subsequent decline of Zoroastrianism, which was the predominant religion in Persia.

The country reaffirmed its status as an “Islamic republic” following the Islamic Revolution of 1979.13 As a result, Islam became synonymous with the Iranian government, thereby granting influential religious figures a great deal of power and influence. As stated earlier, Molkara’s interaction with Ayatollah Khomeini resulted in a fatwa that was instrumental in granting legalization for transsexuals to reassign their sex.

This was further reinforced in more recent times

by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader of Iran (he has fulfilled this posi13

CIA, The World Factbook.

38

tion since 1989, before which he served as Iran’s third president from 1981 to 1989).14 Khamenei’s continued support both reinforces the implicit association between religion and power, and reaffirms the profound influence of Islamic dicta on subsequent legalization and ongoing support of certain practices (in this instance, gender reassignment surgery).

Focusing specifically on the topic of gender reassignment surgery, it is important to address the reasonable public perception that legality does not dictate an individual’s likelihood of seeking out a certain service. For example, in an American context, Roe v. Wade, while calling for the legalization of abortion in all 50 states, does not necessarily mean that persons with uteruses can access abortions in any state. In Alabama, recently proposed legislation hopes to severely restrict access and criminalize abortion, even 14

The Iran Primer, The Supreme Leader.

Iran in Amsterdam, Pride Walk 2017 Courtesy of Iran Pride, licensed under Creative Commons

though abortion is still technically legal there.15 This is all to say, legalizing something does not necessarily mean people are able (or even willing) to take advantage of it. However, in Iran’s case, this could not be further from the truth.

According to a 2007 study, Iran carries out more gender reassignment operations than any other nation in the world except for Thailand.16 Following the surgery, every recipient is then permitted to change the gender listed on their birth certificate.17 According to Iranian cleric Hojatol Kariminia, the gender reassignment operation is no more a sin than “changing wheat to flour to bread.”18

ANTI-TRANS

“ultimate say” in, whether or not an individual is “actually transgender” is left almost entirely at the discretion of a person who likely has little to no experience with trans identity. Considering the social context, it is quite likely that a preop, pre-HRT (hormone replacement therapy) trans woman might go to a doctor appearing, for all intents and purposes, to be a masculine, cisgender man. Given that the professionals tasked with giving these diagnoses are more often physicians than mental health professionals (as in Molkara’s case), how are these professionals to deduce that the person before them is actually a woman, when all visual stimuli suggest that she is not? Secondly, through the process of actively having to seek out a professional and receive a “diagnosis,” the actual label of “transgender” or “transsexual” is essentially regarded as a psychological ailment; this has the unfortunate effect of further “othering” a fundamentally innate experience of identity through gratuitous medicalization. In the words of Hojatol Kariminia, “Islam has a cure for people suffering from this problem. If they want to change their gender, the path is open.”20 The use of the words “cure” and “problem” further suggests that by no means is the Iranian government’s endorsement of gender-confirmatory services rooted in any sort of open embrace of all genders; rather, it is but a means of altogether eradicating the visibility of persons with non-normative sexualities.

Despite the seeming progressivism of this policy (particularly when considering the source) there are many shortcomings underlying Iran’s support of transgender individuals as people.

By no means have I meant to argue that Iran is perfectly accepting of trans citizens or gender minorities more broadly; rather, I wanted to dispel the notion that absolute intolerance, typically resulting in imprisonment, public abuse or death, is the norm for LGBTQ (emphasis on the T) Iranians, given that many tend to lump all non-cisgender heterosexual persons into a single category and assume they have identical or near-identical experiences in navigating everyday life. That being said, I will unpack the many flaws in Iran’s policies surrounding (and general attitudes regarding) transgender At the end of the day, the Iranian governcitizens. ment’s support of transgender individuals is heavily rooted in homophobia and heteronorReverting to the beginning of one’s transi- mativity. This paper point to a deeper-seated tioning experience, in order to obtain either prioritizing of masculinity over any concept of hormones or gender reassignment surgery, one trans-ness. This goes hand-in-hand with the permust first obtain a “professional diagnosis.”19 vasive culture of misogyny and ultimately puts The notion of regarding transgenderism as a trans women into a position that is perhaps not “diagnosis” is harmful mainly for two reasons. as dangerous but can ultimately prove to be just Firstly, it implies that the determination of, and as oppressive.

15 Associated

Press, Alabama Anti-abortion Bill Likens Legalized Abortion to the Holocaust (New York Post, 2019).

16 Vanessa Barford, Middle East: Iran’s ‘diagnosed Transsexuals’ (BBC News, 2008).

17 Barford, Middle East.

18 Barford, Middle East.

19 Barford, Middle East.

Heteronormativity is manifested in the occurrence that some homosexual individuals are pressured into undergoing sex reassignment surgery (thereby entering into heterosexual 39 20 Barford,

Middle East.

arrangements) in order to avoid legal and social persecution.21 Filmmaker Tanaz Eshaghian’s 2008 documentary Be Like Others highlights this phenomenon. Following various homosexual men who were forced to undergo gender reassignment surgery, it is painful to notice the seemingly incessant sources of intolerance (from family, friends, and even love interests who themselves behave in a manner that we would deem “homosexual,” though they themselves certainly do not subscribe to those labels). Following the creation of the film, Eshaghian concluded that shame was the driving force behind so many Iranians deciding to change their sex. It is interesting to note that trans women who underwent gender reassignment voluntarily still suffer from this trend, as it actively invalidates their experiences as women and allows for others to reasonably draw the comparison between trans women and queer men merely avoiding persecution.

The government partially subsidizes the cost of the operation. However, the emphasis here should fall on “partially” and not “subsidize.” On average, the surgery costs the equivalent of $13,000; but the government provides individuals with up to $1,370.22 This would not be quite so disheartening if the average income for Iranians were not the equivalent of $400 per month (or $4,800 a year). The government subsidy is perhaps more supportive in theory than in practice.23 While this partial subsidy is better than nothing, at times it is just that—nothing.

According to the testimonies of many who have already undergone the surgery, they received no financial support even after reaching out to the government over the course of many years.24 But what comes next? One might think that, since the operation is legal, the government is paying for it, and many non-transgender homosexuals see it as a viable means of avoiding harassment, some sort of “happily ever after” must ensue. This is certainly not the case. While comMatthew Hays, Iran’s Gay Plan (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2008).

22 O’Flaherty, Sexual Orientation.

23 Neha Thirani Bagri, In Iran, There’s Only One Way to Survive as a Transgender Person (2017).

24 Bagri, In Iran, There’s Only One Way.

paratively acceptable in Iranian society, transsexuality is still regarded as a taboo topic, and no laws exist to protect post-operative transsexuals from discrimination.25 There is an apparent disparity between official religious/governmental stance and societal praxis, although to draw this conclusion would be to suggest that the government is decidedly pro-transgender individuals. Even the government cares more about eradicating homosexuality than it does about adequately accommodating its non-cisgender citizens.

CONCLUSION There are definitely some misconceptions (though not entirely unfounded) concerning transgender legislation and politics in Iran. However, an acknowledgment of the ways in which American perception is somewhat biased as a result of Western media and at-times dubious portrayals of the Middle East is not a proud declaration that Iran is perfectly progressive or supportive of the trans community (or of any of its marginalized communities, for that matter). It is important to consider the context in which these advances were made. The United States is intended to operate under a separation of church and state. Iran has no such separation. The fact that an Islamic nation was able to find a sort of compromise that theoretically helps members of disenfranchised groups within the context of its own deeply traditional practices is astounding and should therefore be recognized. Granted, trans policies in Iran could be more attuned to the humanity of those involved (rather than essentially “eradicating their queerness” by forcibly fitting them into a heterosexual mold), but given their hostility with regard to other members of the LGBTQ community, these policies are generally positive and have helped and will continue to help countless transgender Iranians regardless of the government’s rationale for assistance.

21

40

25 O’Flaherty,

Sexual Orientation.