The Claremont Journal of International Relations | Fall 2018 by Claremont Journal of International Relations

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

V O L U M E IV | I S S U E 1 | SF PA RL I LN 2G0 1 2018 8

Claremont Journal of International Relations Volume IV | Issue 1 | Fall 2018 January 2019 - Claremont, CA

Masthead Volume IV | Issue 1 | Fall 2018 Founded in 2013 EDITOR IN CHIEF Helena Gabrielle Ong, PO ‘20 EDITORS STAFF

CONTRIBUTORS

MANAGING EDITOR Noah Kim, PO ‘20 Kamil Lungu, PO ‘20 Agnes Mok, PO ’21 Sean Lee, PO ‘22 Erin Puckett, PO ‘22 Jacinta Chen, PO ‘21 Ruby Simon, PO ‘22 Helena Tia Ong, PO ’22 Sumesh Shiwakoty

PR/COMMUNICATIONS Audrey Jammes, SC ‘22 Brynn Parkinson, PO ‘19 Carol Chen, PO ‘22 Edward Jung, PO ‘22 Kari Siegenthaler, PO ‘22 Cover design by Layout design and graphics by

Kari Siegenthaler, PO ‘22 (EIC) Helena Gabrielle Ong, PO’20

Claremont Journal of International Relations Volume III, Issue 1, Fall 2018 Cover Design Layout Design Published in 2019 by Helena Gabrielle Ong and the editorial board of the Claremont Journal of International Relations Faculty Advisor(s): Professor Geoffrey Herrera, Pitzer College For enquires please contact: Helena Gabrielle Ong, Editor in Chief helenagabrielle.ong@pomona.edu Pomona College, Claremont, CA 91711 Journal e-mail: claremontjir@gmail.com Web: www.claremontjir.wordpress.com Twitter: @ClaremontJIR

CONTENT

6 8

16 24 30

Editor’s Note

Helena Gabrielle Ong

Explaining the Obama Administration’s Pivot to Asia & U.S. Relations with China in 2011 Jacinta Chen

Abu Rasa: Father of the Bullet Erin Puckett

Impact of Brexit on a Dividing Northern Ireland Ruby Simon

A Flourishing Civil Society: Good or Bad for Democratization? Sumesh Shiwakoty

Each article in the Claremont Journal of International Relations reflects the opinion of the author and does not represent the Claremont Journal of International Relations, its editors, other staff members or the Claremont Colleges.

Editor’s Note When I first became interested in restarting the journal, I had to reach back into its past. It wasn’t an easy task, tracking down alumni and professors for emails, passwords and administrative material. But it was essential to being able to move forward with the journal. This action of looking back and moving forward at the same time has become a theme for this issue. It’s not easy to do both, splitting your vision both ways. But we have welcomed the challenge. This is seen not only in our writers who tackle hefty international topics; but also through the topics they focus on. It’s not surprising that most of our writers are freshman. They provide a fresh perspective, drawing from their own backgrounds and experiences. As freshman, they signal of a new wave of political thought. At the same time, each of them look back into the past through their writing.

These papers trace a theme of looking back at history and redrawing new lines, new patterns and new connections. They highlight the predictive power of the past, trying to better understand our present and map out a potential future. I believe it reflects the broader progress of the journal. It is no easy task to restart a publication from the ground up, but looking back to understanding the background and inspiration behind CJIR allows us to reshapes itself and provide new lens. Today, the Claremont Journal of International Relations aims to build conversation around international affairs. We welcome a more interdisciplinary approach of international relations, with its relevance to history, politics, anthropology, philosophy, sociology and other topics. Our focus is on building conversation and community around the breadth of the IR discipline.

Looking Back, Looking Forward

Jacinta Chen PO’ ’21 22 looks back at the Obama administration’s approach toward China through the lens of the individual, liberalism and realism. In a glance back toward the individual history and background of Muhammed bin Salman, Erin Puckett PO’22 analyzes its implications for the domestic and international politics of Saudi Arabia. Ruby Simon PO ’22 looks at the history and background of Ireland and England to shine a light on impact of current Brexit negotiations. It is also fitting that our guest contributor includes a Claremont College alumnus, Sumesh Shiwakoty PZ ’18. In his paper, Shiwakoty applies a historical theory around the development of the Nazi party to the development of authoritarianism in the Arab states.

Finally, I’d like to thank our staff writers for their enthusiastic work this semester and my team of editors for their work and effort. Handling the other side of the publication, I’d also like to recognize the design and communications team, and our managing editor, Noah Kim, for his unflagging support for CJIR. Editor in chief,

Helena Gabrielle Ong, PO’20

I. INTRODUCTION

Explaining the Obama Administration’s Pivot to Asia & U.S. Relations with China in 2011 PO ‘22 ‘21 Jacinta Yuan Sze Chen, PO edited by Helena Gabrielle Ong, PO’20

In 2008, global powers seemed to be shifting. While the United States was suffering from wars in the Middle East and economic turmoil, China had just projected itself on the world stage and hosted the Olympics. In response to the changing global order, the American public elected President Barack Obama, a Democrat who had committed to pulling the U.S. out of entrenchment in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as addressing the role that burgeoning China would play. In addition to rebuilding the U.S. economy, Obama’s administration decreased the number of troops stationed in the Middle East and announced “the pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia during his first presidential term.1 This policy was met with mixed responses: the Chinese were concerned about a Cold War-like containment of their nation; allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region were reassured of the U.S.’s hegemonic role; and European and Middle Eastern nations feared that the U.S. was permanently deemphasizing their relationships. Interpreting this complex policy is no easy task and requires interpretation and re-interpretation of speeches, announcements, discussions and proposals by many scholars and governments. The purpose of this paper is to explore “the pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia and what explains this strategic policy shift. In order to do this, it will analyze the rhetoric as well as the implementation of the policy through two lenses: structural realism and liberal internationalism. On one hand, it will demonstrate how rhetoric from the White House and the State Department was designed to present “the pivot” through a liberal lens. On the other hand, policy analysis from the Department of Defense and its implementation by the Obama administration can be perceived as acting within a realist framework. In a nutshell, this paper will argue that the administration’s overwhelmingly realist approach to implementing the “Pivot to Asia” diverged from their largely liberal rhetoric used to introduce the policy on the world stage. As a corollary to this, Homo Psychologicus, one of David Patrick Houghton’s theoretical approaches from The Decision Point, will show how the individuals and their personalities within the administration pulled the policy toward to different direc1 Ewen MacAskill & Patrick Wintour, “Afghanistan withdrawal: Barack Obama says 33,000 troops will leave next year,” The Guardian online (June 22, 2011). https://www. theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/23/afghanistan-withdrawal-barack-obama-troops w

tions. Thus, this paper will employ the dynamics between these three frameworks—liberalism, realism and Homo Psychologicus—to demonstrate how the Obama administration envisioned and promoted a liberal “Pivot to Asia” that ultimately resulted in a harder, realist stance toward China alone and a semi-liberal, semi-realist stance toward the whole Asia-Pacific region.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE PIVOT TO ASIA The Obama administration’s strategic rebalancing, known as the “Pivot to Asia,” marked a revived U.S. effort to engage in the Asia-Pacific region. By “implementing a comprehensive, multidimensional strategy,” the U.S. signaled that it was not only done with heavy entrenchment in the Middle East, but was also “all in” as a “Pacific power,” seeking to double down on its early efforts to cultivate regional security, peace and prosperity.2 The policy contained six key elements: (1) strengthened relations with rising powers in the region (China, India and Indonesia), (2) stronger military support for allies, (3) greater regional military presence, (4) renewed engagement in multilateral institutions, (5) enhanced economic relations and a new Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and (6) sustained support for American values regarding democracy and human rights. This paper will more closely examine how the rhetoric and implementation of these six aspects of the “Pivot to Asia” can be seen through liberal and realist lenses. Furthermore, Houghton’s Homo Psychologicus will help explain why these theories fell short and resulted in the mix of theoretical approaches that we see today. The U.S. fully embraced liberalism on two fronts: the U.S. entered dialogue with China, India and Indonesia regarding economic integration and security, among other hot topics; and the U.S. lauded various nations in the region for instituting democratic reforms, while calling on authoritarian regimes to consider adopting universal values. Meanwhile, the Obama administration set forth two liberal-sounding policies that involved participation in multilateral forums, including the East Asian Summit, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) as well as proposing terms for trade, investment and economic integration, which culminated in the TPP—a celebration of fair trade 2 Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” remarks made at The Asia Society (New York, NY, March 11, 2013); Barack Obama, remarks made at the Parliament House (Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011).

practices within the region. However, these policies could also be understood as the administration’s intent to act within a realist framework, and reshaped again by the individual backgrounds of those involved in the policy implementation. Furthermore, Washington also saw “the pivot” as a realist moment of solidifying military power within the Asia-Pacific, despite calls to lower overall military spending in the budget. This was accomplished by allocating more funding to its regional naval forces, increasing the frequency of its freedom of navigation operations (FNOPs) in the South China, Sea, promising to open new regional bases and expanding joint military operations with its five allies: Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand.

III. LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM Liberalism argues that power is not the only thing that matters in the world order. It stipulates that states have common interests and values, with bilateral and multilateral trade comprising the ultimate goal.3 From the liberalist point of view, there is a desire to create a global marketplace. Through this integration, states will become increasingly interdependent and be guided by a set of rules that transcend borders.4 This international system of global governance based on laws and transnational institutions, like the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), ultimately generates a sense of predictability and stability.5 There is also a desire that values of democracy and human rights are shared across nations within the global order. Though there is no enforcement mechanism, the liberal worldview contends that nation-states keep each other and themselves accountable; they abide by these laws of global governance and cooperate rather than engaging in a rivalry. From this view the U.S. and China have no concern for a hegemonic competition within the Asia-Pacific region. Instead, the two nations focus on further integrating their economies, while deepening their multilateral economic ties. Liberalism also indicates that China will follow international law and adopt universal values in order to pursue a larger membership role in the global order.6 While the two nations’ economies flourish 3 Stephen W. Hook., U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2017), 81. 4 Stephen W. Hook, U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2017), 80. 5 Tony Smith, “Liberal Internationalism,” in The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, ed. James M. McCormick (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 33. 6 Suisheng Zhao, “Shaping the Regional Context of

through globalization, liberalism assumes that neither nation threatens its counterpart as it rises. Major voices of the policy, including Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, outright denied realism as an explanation for the “Pivot to Asia,” instead adopting liberalism in their rhetoric for diplomacy to strengthen bilateral relations with China. The policy was first fleshed out in a feature article written by Clinton in Foreign Policy magazine in October. Clinton rejected public “fears” of those who “see China’s progress as a threat to the United States” and “misperceptions” of those “worry that America seeks to constrain China’s growth.”7 In sharp contrast to the widespread, realist understanding of the evolving world order at the time, Clinton affirmed that “a thriving America is good for China and a thriving China is good for America,” while suggesting that the two nations “have much more to gain from cooperation than from conflict.”8 With an emphasis on “cooperation” as an antithesis to “conflict,” she attached a liberal attitude to the administration’s approach to U.S.-China relations in light of this policy. Rather than taking an isolationist stance, Clinton underscored the importance for “sustained and substantive military-to-military engagement that increases transparency” in an effort to strengthen the bilateral relationship.9 Additionally, she stressed her personal commitment “to working with China to address critical regional and global security issues,” while outlining her frequent diplomatic efforts, pertaining to a liberal view, to meet with her Chinese counterparts in both formal and informal settings.10 Her liberal sentiments regarding military “cooperation” and “healthy economic competition” with China were echoed by Obama just one month later in Canberra, Australia. Grouping the U.S. with Australia as existing members of the greater liberal world order, Obama asserted that the U.S. welcomed “the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China.”11 At an Asia Society conference a couple years later, Donilon maintained that the U.S.’s rebalancing strategy aimed “to sustain a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness.”12 While underlining points China’s Rise: how the Obama administration brought back hedge in its engagement with China,” Journal of Contemporary China 21, no. 75 (2012): 385. 7 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy online, October 11, 2011. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Barack Obama, remarks made at the Parliament House (Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011). 12 Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pa-

previously made by Clinton and Obama, Donilon also opposed the realist perspective that the U.S.-China relationship was “defined by rivalry and confrontation” and “destined for conflict.”13 He fully rejected ideas of “great power confrontation” or “containment,” holding that the U.S., “an existing power,” was seeking to build a “constructive bilateral relationship” with China, “an emerging one.”14 Ultimately, these three key representatives of the “Pivot to Asia” demonstrate the U.S.’s overarching desire for liberal engagement with China, which contradicted the popular narrative predicting inevitable conflict. Beyond denying realist ends to the “Pivot to Asia,” these proponents of the Obama administration’s policy advocated a liberal goal of engaging in multilateral institutions. Clinton adopted a liberal stance in her espousal of the policy, citing that multilateralism was “capable of mustering collective action” to tackle the region’s “complex transnational challenges.”15 The first set of these shared challenges involved “proliferation and maritime security,” with respect to the South China Sea.16 In order to insert the U.S. as a mediator in a “peaceful resolution of disputes,” Obama met on multiple occasions with ASEAN leaders and was even “the first American President to attend the East Asia Summit.”17 In addition to security, the Obama administration highlighted a liberal goal of operating in “free and fair trade,” with regional partners who would abide by the rules, respect workers’ rights, allow U.S. businesses to “compete on a level playing field,” protect “intellectual property” and permit currencies to be driven by free markets.18 Under this policy, Washington was working toward “[serving as] an active member the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), contributing to the expansion of trade and investment, [promoting] sustainable growth and strengthening of regional relations.”19 cific in 2013,” remarks made at The Asia Society (New York, NY, March 11, 2013). 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy online, October 11, 2011. 16 Barack Obama, remarks made at the Parliament House (Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011). 17 Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” remarks made at The Asia Society (New York, NY, March 11, 2013); Barack Obama, remarks made at the Parliament House (Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011). 18 Ibid. 19 Thi Thuy Hang Nguyen, “The US Rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific: Really Realist?,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3, no. 3 (2016): 301.

Furthermore, these three advocates of the “Pivot to Asia” policy expressed adamancy to uphold the liberal respect for international law and universal democratic values. In response to Chinese activity in disputed territories within the South China Sea, the United States remarked that it would not accept “coercion or the use of force to advance territorial claims,” but rather that it favored “peaceful, collaborative and diplomatic efforts, consistent with international law [to] bring about lasting solutions that will serve the interests of all claimants.”20 This dedication to the management of disagreements and the enforcement of “international law and norms” is a demonstration of the Obama administration’s portrayal of liberal policy.21 With respect to human rights abuses “of public-interest lawyers, writers, artists and others who are detained or disappeared,” the U.S. confirmed that it would speak up and even work with authoritarian regimes, such as Burma and Vietnam, to address violations as well as necessary protections.22 By projecting itself as a beacon for “universal rights and freedoms,” Washington further illustrated its stake as a proponent of liberalism in 20 Jacob Shively, Hope, change, pragmatism: analyzing Obama’s grand strategy (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 6; Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” remarks made at The Asia Society (New York, NY, March 11, 2013). 21 Barack Obama, remarks made at the Parliament House (Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011). 22 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy online, October 11, 2011.

the region.23 In direct contrast with the realist favor for military power, the liberal rhetoric of “the pivot” notes that the U.S.’s “most potent asset… is the power of our values--in particular, our steadfast support for democracy and human rights” in the pursuance of global stability.24 Though representatives from Washington may not have publicly admitted it, they felt pressured by China’s growth to act in a realist manner. With the “threat” of the realist actions put forth by President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, those in Washington who likely desired to have a more optimistic liberal view of the world still saw a need to respond with a policy with overwhelming realist facets. As a result, the White House and State Department’s focus on multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region that isolates China is much 23 Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” remarks made at The Asia Society (New York, NY, March 11, 2013); Barack Obama, remarks made at the Parliament House (Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011). 24 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy online, October 11, 2011.

more realist below the surface. These three key voices of the policy ultimately wanted the public and governments in the Asia-Pacific region to believe that liberalism was their ultimate strategy and that strengthening the global liberal order was their true goal. They created a narrative for the policy that made it seem like an embrace of liberalism and were extremely careful with their word choice to avoid invoking realist thoughts. Clinton was the State Department’s biggest representative as a Secretary of State. She is known for being the primary implementer of “the pivot,” even though she may not have been heavily involved in the formulation of the policy’s details. Rather, she can be credited for publicizing the policy and for putting it into action through regular dialogue with diplomats on her own and through the work of her institution in the Asia-Pacific Region. Obama and Donilon were the most important members from the White House on the foreign policy front. Their speeches, which were written for leaders and the global public, meant to signal that Washington wanted to take a liberal approach. In particular, it showed that the U.S. would engage with the whole Asia-Pacific region through increased discussion of trade. All three of them publicly denied realism and descriptions analogous to realism that were being proposed by other major figures in the foreign policy world. In turn, they wanted realism to shine through by noting how they sought to enhance relations with China through “the pivot.” Due to the high degree of economic integration between the U.S. and China, they did not want to publicly antagonize China when carrying out the policy. As such, the U.S.’s engagement in multilateral institutions, enforcement of international law and promotion of universal values

were all designed to be seen through a liberal lens by the public and nations in the Asia-Pacific.

IV. STRUCTURAL REALISM Realism recognizes power--in the form of the military, technology, information, economy, etc.--as the only thing that matters. With power, the hegemon has the ability to influence secondary and tertiary nations. Realism holds that democratic ideal, ethics and international law are irrelevant in the competitive global arena. It sees the world as anarchic, where there are no rules to govern it and nations act in their own self-interest.25 It looks at the world as a zero-sum game where one power must trump the other. Believing in the security dilemma, realists see diplomacy in the form of economic rewards and punishments as a powerful tool when backed by force.26 Through a realist lens, the U.S. and China are in direct competition for power. In fact, this view asserts that China, as a rising power, is seeking to challenge the current unipolar balance of power. Due to this fear of losing its hegemonic role to China, the U.S. should “respond logically with security-seeking behavior.”27 Supporters of realism postulate that Washington should actively work to contain China and stop it from “restor[ing] the position of its ancient dominance.”28 Otherwise, U.S. allies and partners within China’s sphere of influence may feel threatened to yield to China’s overwhelming power. Since power is most important under the realist theory, China will work to “accumulate as much power as possible” from nations within the Asia-Pacific region at the U.S.’s expense.29 Realism suggests that the U.S. will respond by balancing China’s power with the power of other nations, while also asserting American primacy within the region. The U.S. increase in its military presence and reallocation of resources to the Asia-Pacific region helps demonstrate the realist aspect of the “Pivot

25 Stephen W. Hook., U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2017), 79. 26 Colin Dueck, “Conservative American Realism,” in The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, ed. James M. McCormick (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 43. 27 Oliver Turner, “The U.S. ‘pivot to the Asia Pacific,” in New Directions in US Foreign Policy, eds. Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller and Mark Ledwidge (London, UK: 2014), 221. 28 Suisheng Zhao, “Shaping the Regional Context of China’s Rise: how the Obama administration brought back hedge in its engagement with China.” Journal of Contemporary China, 21, no. 75 (201): 385. 29 Rong Chen, “A Critical Analysis of the U.S. “Pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific: How Realistic is Neo-realism?,” The Quarterly Journal 12, no. 3 (2013): 48.

to Asia.” Since China was investing in new technology and exerting claims in the South China Sea, the U.S. adopted a realist stance when boosting its military presence within global security arena. This was evidenced by the Obama administration’s shift in the distribution of deployable naval and air power assets from 58/42 to 60/40, which would directly enhance U.S. capabilities in the South China Sea.30 Additionally, the Pentagon transferred “some of the best military personnel and equipment to the region,” with 70,000 troops sent within a year of the policy’s announcement.31 Rhetoric from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta shows that Washington felt threatened by the “troubling lack of transparency [regarding China’s military modernization efforts], coupled with increasingly assertive activity in the East and South China Sea.”32 In light of his “concern about China,” Panetta noted that the Department of Defense would work “to project our force into the Pacific--to have our carriers there, to have our fleet there.”33 His direct invocation of “force” as a solution to the threat of China shows his realist understanding of the policy and can explain the way it has been implemented by the Department of Defense. Moreover, the consistent prioritization of regional bilateral security alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand is representative of the Obama administration’s realist perspective. In announcements related to the “Pivot to Asia,” Washington has clearly stipulated the importance of its allies as a top priority as well as its desire to bolster these bilateral relationships with the policy. The U.S. announced several moves to strengthen their regional military operations, including “new troop deployments to Australia, new naval deployments to Singapore and new areas for military cooperation with the Philippines,” despite reductions in defense spending.34 By calling alliances the “foundation of our strategy,” Washington inadvertently superseded the economic component of the policy with the 30 Thi Thuy Hang Nguyen, “The US Rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific: Really Realist?,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3, no. 3 (2016): 298. 31 Weixing Hu, “China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific: Towards a New Model or New Normal of Major Power Relations?,” China: An International Journal 15, no. 1 (2017): 67; Thi Thuy Hang Nguyen, “The US Rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific: Really Realist?,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3, no. 3 (2016): 298. 32 Elisabeth Bumiller, “U.S. Pivots Eastward to Address Uneasy Allies,” The New York Times online, October 24, 2011. 33 Phil Stewart, “U.S. Lauds China’s Measured Response to Taiwan Arms,” Reuters online, October 23, 2011. 34 Williams Lawrence S. Prabhakar, “The Clash of Interests: Issues of the US Pivot to Asia and China’s Maritime Silk Road,” in China’s Global Rebalancing and the New Silk Road, ed. B.R. Deepak (Singapore: Springer Nature Press, 2018), 173.

military one.35 Ultimately, “the pivot” was designed to reassure allies that the U.S. was going to maintain “future stability and growth,” instead of leaving them to struggle with overbearing military pressure from China.36 Although ASEAN, TPP and APEC are multilateral organizations, the Obama administration’s involvement in them and exclusion of China on multiple occasions can be seen as an offensive act within a realist view. On the one hand, the TPP supported a multilateral agreement to embrace “free trade principles cherished by the U.S.”37 These practices were too strict for China to measure up to so soon, so China was left out of this sweeping multilateral trade relationship. At an APEC summit, Obama called out China for not “play[ing] by the rules,” especially with regard to its currency practices.38 This form of publicly shaming China’s economic practices alone stands as another example of the U.S. asserting its dominance and pushing China off its pedestal. On the other hand, the U.S. has been strategically positioning itself at the center of these other nations by coordinating policies like the ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) initiative to build up the Southeast Asian economies.39 Washington even participated in the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus and the annual Pacific Forum meetings to foster stronger ties at China’s expense.40 Ultimately, the U.S. has used economic multilateralism as a tool for its realist approach to marginalize China for failing to live up to U.S. standards. Though representatives from Washington may not have publicly admitted it, they did feel pressured by China’s growth to act in a realist manner. With the “threat” of the realist actions put forth by Xi, those in Washington who likely desired a more optimistic, liberal view of the world still saw a need to respond with policy that had realist aspects. As a result, the White House and State Department’s focus on multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region that isolates China is much more realist below 35 Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” remarks made at The Asia Society (New York, NY, March 11, 2013). 36 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington D.C., 2012. 37 Chi Wang, Obama’s Challenge to China: the pivot to Asia (New York, USA: Routledge, 2016), 90. 38 Caren Bohan & Laura MacInnis, “Obama Says China Must Play by the Rules,” Reuters online, November 12, 2011. 39 Williams Lawrence S. Prabhakar, “The Clash of Interests: Issues of the US Pivot to Asia and China’s Maritime Silk Road,” in China’s Global Rebalancing and the New Silk Road, ed. B.R. Deepak (Singapore: Springer Nature Press, 2018), 173. 40 Ibid.

the surface. Meanwhile, realist rhetoric from the Department of Defense, especially from Defense Secretary from Leon Panetta, contrasted with the mostly liberal rhetoric from Washington for the public. This major difference in the message being sent to both the American public, allies and China, among others, was likely because the Department of Defense, as an institution, has a significantly more realist nature than the State Department and the typical White House. As the institution commanding the U.S. military, the Defense Department recognizes its ability to leverage military power in a realist world order, while a liberal world order diminishes its role in policy-making. Additionally, the Department of Defense’s implementation of the policy’s primary goal of enhanced alliances is realist in itself because it stresses a need to show off military power in relation to China. The increase of military resources in the region also signifies an important departure from security norms with the Asia-Pacific region before then. Clearly, the Obama administration saw that too many resources were being siphoned off to the Middle East. In order to escape the seemingly-endless and extremely costly wars of the Middle East, the Obama administration imposed dominating military resources in the Asia-Pacific region that could combat a rising China.

V. HOUGHTON’S HOMO PSYCHOLOGICUS Houghton’s Homo Psychologicus is based on the idea that humans “are inherently ‘limited’ creatures who frequently rely on cognitive shortcuts.”41 Because of these cognitive structures, policy-makers are not always rational in their decisions and are “remarkably resistant to change.”42 In turn, the “personality” and “emotions” of decision-makers can impact the character of the decisions that are made.43 As a result, “misperception of adversaries is commonplace” and analogies or scripts are incorrectly applied to new policies.44 After receiving pressure for adopting a rather ineffective liberal approach to relations with China, Obama’s personal background shaped his support for the “Pivot to Asia.” As a Democrat, Obama faced domestic criticism for adopting a policy of “strategic reassurance” toward China 41 David Patrick Houghton, The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 2013), 83. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid.

early in his first presidential term.45 Boxed in by this need to appear tough, he abandoned the “soft” policy that positioned China as a “potential friend and ally,” paving the way for the “Pivot to Asia.”46 Moreover, his international background and personal experience can help explain his desire to direct the U.S.’s attention away from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region. He repeatedly noted the role that the Pacific Rim played in shaping his worldview, as someone who “was born in Hawaii and lived in Indonesia as a boy.”47 His sister was born in Jakarta and married a Chinese-Canadian, while his mother provided women in Southeast Asian villages with “a sewing machine or an education.”48 As a leader, Obama was said to be very conscious of the limits of American power. He did not see a future in the Middle East and thought that it would be favorable for the U.S. to shift its attention to the Asia-Pacific region. Fatalistic and curious, Obama believed that there were structural forces that shaped world events. Thus, during his formulation of the rebalance policy, he saw a need to leverage U.S. power in a careful manner, which likely led to the realist reality of its facets. Beyond Obama, drastic changes in top-level individuals putting together the policy for the Asia-Pacific region in 2011 can help us understand the realist lens through which the world order was interpreted, resulting in a harder line taken on China. Deputy Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James B. Steinberg and the Senior Director for Asian Affairs on the National Security Council Jeffrey Bader were considered experts on China who dominated the Obama administration’s early policy.49 Following their departures in 2011, Donilon began playing a larger role in the U.S.’s China policy, while also yielding to the rising influence of the new Senior Director for Asian Affairs Danny Russel and the new Deputy Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell. While Donilon, Russel and Campbell were assigned to manage East Asian affairs, none of them had expertise regarding China. Instead, Russel and Campbell’s backgrounds with Japan prompted Washington to not only shift away from a “China focus” and toward a “regional focus,” to also also 45 Chi Wang, Obama’s Challenge to China: the pivot to Asia (New York, USA: Routledge, 2016), 5. 46 Chi Wang, Obama’s Challenge to China: the pivot to Asia (New York, USA: Routledge, 2016), 30. 47 Barack Obama, remarks made at Suntory Hall (Tokyo, Japan, November 14, 2009). 48 Ibid. 49 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, “The American Pivot to Asia,” Brookings Institution online, December 21, 2011.

adopt a tougher, more “aggressive” stance on China.50 Moreover, Campbell’s prior experience in Soviet studies and U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations likely made him perceive the current world order through a Cold War-era framework and apply analogies that resulted in a more realist policy of confronting China.51 Interpretation of “the pivot” on the security front was also tainted by the switch in the Defense Secretary from Robert Gates to former Director of the CIA Leon Panetta in 2011. While Gates was respected and had cultivated a positive relationship with Chinese leaders, Panetta’s “hawkish and aggressive” personality, as well as his background in intelligence and lack of experience with handling China resulted in the “pivot” being seen as “hostile.”52 Through this lens of Homo Psychologicus, we can see that the liberal intentions of many within the Obama administration fell short due to the instrumental role of cognitive scripts, personality and emotions in the policy-making process for the “Pivot to Asia.” The background of Obama can partially explain the administration’s geographic emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. His application of cognitive scripts and personality can also help us understand his pursuit of a realist-leaning and pragmatic approach. While he likely wanted to welcome China into the liberal order, he recognized that there were many forces out of the U.S.’s control and that there were inherent drawbacks of the liberal model. In his view, tools of liberalism, such as multilateralism, could help address the realist security threat of an increasingly powerful China for the U.S. and its regional allies. Unlike their predecessors, his major advisors, Donilon, Russel and Campbell were not specialists on China. Their formulation of policy relied on their understandings of the global order as well as their application of cognitive scripts of former Cold War tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Russel and Campbell’s choices to broaden the policy’s geographic focus are also reflected by their personal connections to Japan. Meanwhile, Panetta’s public comments on the “Pivot to Asia” can be understood through his personality and lacking connections with China compared to his predecessor. The Obama administration’s adoption of liberalism is partially overshadowed by their underlying realist stance toward China. We see that China 50 Chi Wang, Obama’s Challenge to China: the pivot to Asia (New York, USA: Routledge, 2016), 82. 51 Ibid., 46. 52 Ibid., 40; Baker, Peter, “Panetta’s Pentagon, Without the Blank Check,” The New York Times online (October 23, 2011).

was perceived through a realist lens, while allies and new partners in the region were treated in a liberal light. From this macro perspective, the “Pivot to Asia” is best rendered as a semi-liberal, semi-realist policy with respect to the Asia-Pacific region. VI. CONCLUSION In conclusion, the multi-faceted “Pivot to Asia” in 2011 seems to be a culmination of the non-China centric, but Asia-focused global order that Obama and key figures within his administration had in mind when formulating the policy. Washington’s adoption of a tougher stance on China with the “Pivot to Asia” is a reflection of the worldviews and personalities of the Obama administration in 2011. While some scholars have interpreted the “Pivot to Asia” as the Obama administration’s full embrace of realism, idealist nuances embedded within the policy suggest otherwise. On the one hand, top officials, with the exception of realist-leaning affiliates of the Department of Defense, demonstrated an affinity for liberal rhetoric—the adoption of universal values and engagement in multilateralism—to characterize the policy. On the other hand, the administration’s actual implementation of most aspects of the “Pivot to Asia” can be explained through a realist lens because of its focus on security and alliances as well as its exclusion of China from multilateral institutions. Overall, it indicates that the strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region during the Obama era can best be understood as a combination of the theories of Homo Psychologicus, liberalism and realism. Since the end of the Obama era, President Trump has removed the U.S. from the TPP, slapped numerous tariffs on China, bolstered regional allies and cozied up to Taiwan. Given China’s continued rise and the instability of the Trump administration’s staff, it will be interesting to see how realist views will shape the U.S.’s Asia-Pacific policy in the next couple of years.

Abu Rasa: Father of the Bullet Erin Puckett, PO ‘22

Saudi Arabia has been characterized as a nation that “shows a striking accommodation between the old and the new” – at least at face value. 1 And that image has never seemed more true than today, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the son of current King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. He has instituted many modernizing reforms in Saudi economy, religious and social life, educational system and other sectors. He also indicates many future plans in the works: these reforms are no one-time occurrence. MBS signals the want for long-term trends of modernization and permanent change in Saudi Arabia.2 Or so it seems. To better understand MBS and his agenda as a leader, one must take a deeper look and analyze his actions, not just the statements he has made. In this paper, I will first show how MBS has been advancing human rights and creating progressive social and economic change. These changes have worked toward creating a narrative of modernization in a nation that has long been viewed as stuck in the past.3 I will show how certain events contradict this narrative of reform and perception of MBS in the larger framework of development and modernization. Finally, I will consider the implications of these contradictions for MBS as an individual, the domestic affairs of Saudi Arabia and the implications of this in the international system. This requires understanding the context of life in Saudi Arabia, the distribution of political power and Saudi Arabia’s place in the region and in the international system.

RELIGION, FAMILY & POWER IN SAUDI ARABIA The relationship between state and religion is central to how power is wielded in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been ruled by both the House of Saud and Wahhabi clerics. The Wahhabi clerics gained power from the House

1 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5. 2 Al Jazeera, “Profile: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman,” Al Jazeera, December 14, 2017, accessed November 28, 2018, https://www.aljazeera. com/indepth/features/2017/06/profile-saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-170621130040539.html. 3 Rosie Bsheer, “How Mohammed bin Salman Has Transformed Saudi Arabia,” The Nation, May 21, 2018, https://www.thenation.com/article/how-mohammedbin-salman-has-transformed-saudi-arabia/.

of Saud by assisting in conquering the peninsula in 1932. Since then, the Wahhabi clerics have been able to retain power. Essentially, “the formation of Saudi Arabia brought together “(1) the austere religious traditions of central Saudi Arabia (which is the Wahhabism), (2) the oil wealth of Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, and (3) the mantle of religious legitimacy from controlling the two holiest sites in Islam, in Saudi Arabia’s west.”4 Today, that relationship is still visible through the clerics’ “substantial independence, [control] of key ministries and [share] of the wealth of the kingdom” which they receive from the monarchy, in exchange for fatwas (religious proclamations) that they issue in support of the monarchy’s decisions in times of crisis.5 In a country where the king’s official title is “Custodian of the Holy Mosques,” and where the Qur’an is the constitution, these religious opinions are a great boon to the monarchy in buttressing its power.6 All of this means that while the monarchy has long been powerful, partly because of the religious authority its location bestows on its, it has also had to respect to the will of the religious elite. It is also important to understand how political power is distributed amongst the royal family, and more importantly, consolidated. In this monarchical system, King Abdulaziz bin Saud has thirty-six recognized sons (the number of daughters has not been recorded), born of several different mothers. Seven of his sons have been king. 7 MBS, himself, is the last son of Abdulaziz bin Saud. The House of Saud is seemingly made up of, “thousands of princes and princesses.”8 They claim that as a whole, their net worth is one 4 Saudi Arabia’s Troubling Educational Curriculum: Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, 115th Cong., 1st (2017) (statement of David Andrew Weinberg), accessed November 28, 2018, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/ FA18/20170719/106289/HHRG-115-FA18-Wstate-WeinbergD-20170719.pdf. 5 Jason Burke, “Saudi Arabia’s clerics challenge King Abdullah’s reform agenda,” The Guardian, last modified July 1, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/01/saudi-arabia-clerics-king-abdullah. 6 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2008, accessed November 28, 2018, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/ irf/2008/108492.htm.; House of Saud, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Founding a Modern Saudi State,” accessed November 28, 2018, https://houseofsaud.com/saudi-royal-family-history/.; Burke, “Saudi Arabia’s,” The Guardian. 7 “All in the Family,” The Economist, January 5, 2006, https:// www.economist.com/special-report/2006/01/05/all-in-the-family. 8 Ben Hubbard and Daniel D. Kirkpatrick, “Uproar Over Dissident Rattles Saudi Royal Family,” New York Times, October 19, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-jamal-khashoggi.html.

and half trillion dollars.9 The family is managed through the king “Saudi Arabia was traditionally ruled by senior princes who divided major portfolios and made big policy decisions by consensus under the king.”10 Given the size of the family, MBS’s position, and the money at stake, the potential for power grabs is high.

MBS: THE INDIVIDUAL In order to analyze and better understand MBS’s actions, the context of the individual needs to be understood. MBS, the current Crown Prince, was born in 1985; so at 33 years old, he is young to have the position and power he has in comparison with other world leaders. His public image has portrayed him as intelligent – he was ranked amongst Saudi Arabia’s top ten students in primary school, and then graduated second in high class at King Saud University. He has also long been seen as philanthropic and progressive, as he served in leadership roles for a number of firms that he himself established. That perception is seen through Forbes Middle East’s 2013 awarding of “Personality of Year” for his work establishing the MiSK Foundation. At the age of 22, in 2007, he became involved in politics as an adviser to the Council of Ministers, but quickly worked his way up. After his father was crowned in 2015, he was appointed the position of defense minister and now serves as head of the Council of Economic Affairs and Development in addition to his other positions.11 It’s important to note his father’s political career as an influence on MBS. King Salman has long expressed interest in development, regardless of the consequences. In an article written by Rosie Bsheer, the direction of King Salman is described: Since the early 1990s, Salman had also been instrumental in conceiving a new national development plan...The topdown plan promised to overhaul social, economic, and cultural life in the kingdom, beginning with gradually diminishing the power of the religious establishment and diversifying the national economy...With Salman just one step away from absolute power, “may God help us” was the common refrain among Saudis of all political stripes and socioeconomic classes.12

9 House of Saud. 10 Hubbard and Kirkpatrick. 11 “Profile: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.” 12 Rosie Bsheer, “How Mohammed bin Salman Has Transformed Saudi Arabia,” The Nation, last modified May 21, 2018, accessed November 28, 2018, https://www.then-

It’s evident that his father’s style of rule (both as governor of Riyadh and now king) has had great influence on MBS. Bsheer recognizes this, stating, “[King Salman] was known to be ruthless toward those who did not heed his orders or toe his line, a lesson that has served his son and current crown prince, Mohammed, rather well.... Mohammed is a product of his father’s upbringing and political ideologies, even if he has shown himself to be less cautious, discreet and tactful than the now-ailing king.”13 King Salman’s reforms, for the most part, focused on domestic impacts. However, MBS’s reforms and accompanying method of ruling differ from his father and are groundbreaking because of the effects they have on Saudi Arabia’s place in the international system. MBS’s agenda seeks to radically shift global perception, attitude and actions towards his nation. In his role as Crown Prince, MBS has rolled out a series of reforms, and has established plans for many more. His vision is of a more socially progressive Saudi Arabia with a modern and less oil-dependent economy with a great deal of foreign investment, less powerful clergy, greater gender equality and less corruption. He has opened movie theaters to the public for the first time since the swing towards conservatism in 1979, allowed women to drive and implemented a big new economic plan, Vision 2030.14 The reason behind this change is best summed up by his foreword of Vision 2030: “The first pillar of our vision is our status as the heart of the Arab and Islamic world,” and that “…we can strengthen the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s position as a great nation in which we should all feel an immense pride.”15 Implicit in both statements is the notion that MBS wants to modernize Saudi Arabia, and change external perceptions of the nation.

MODERNIZATION MBS has shown himself to be committed to a

ation.com/article/how-mohammed-bin-salman-has-transformedsaudi-arabia/. 13 Ibid. 14 Lisa Richwine and Stephen Kalin, “Saudi Arabia’s first new cinema in decades to open April 18,” Reuters, last modified April 4, 2018, accessed November 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-saudi-cinemas/saudi-arabias-first-new-cinema-in-decades-to-open-april-18-idUSKCN1HB2LC.; Shannon Van Sant, “Saudi Arabia Lifts Ban on Female Drivers,” NPR, last modified June 24, 2018, accessed November 28, 2018, https://www.npr. org/2018/06/24/622990978/saudi-arabia-lifts-ban-on-womendrivers.; “Vision 2030,” Vision 2030 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accessed December 11, 2018, https://vision2030.gov.sa/en. 15 Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, “Foreword,” Vision 2030 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accessed December 11, 2018, https://vision2030.gov.sa/en/foreword.

trend of modernization with social and economic progress, and a careful eye to how change can impact international perception toward Saudi Arabia. However, at the same time he has tightened his grip on power, turning Saudi Arabia into a more aggressive and controlled state. This indicates that MBS is not truly the benevolent reformist he has long been applauded as. Since appointed Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, MBS has implemented policy changes to improve the conditions of human rights, especially concerning gender equality and religious freedom. These changes show a trend of modernization and progress in Saudi Arabia, portraying MBS as a beacon of benevolent development. This began in April 2016, a year after his appointment to the position of deputy crown prince with the unveiling of Vision 2030.16 The project promises more jobs, better living conditions, greater government transparency and accountability, and a diversified economy amongst other things.17 With six main programs – the National Transformation Program, the Financial Sector Development Program, the Quality of Life Program, the Privatization Program, the Fiscal Balance Program, and the Public Investment Fund – Vision 2030 addresses every aspect of Saudi life that the monarchy can have influence over.18 The project has been described as “nothing short of overhauling everyday life in Saudi Arabia.”19 This change fits into MBS’s agenda as it shows an overall vision of progressiveness, not just in a singular area. For an insular, tightly-controlled, conservative nation that has been reliant solely on oil, this shows significant change. This trend of modernization continues. In November 2017, MBS significantly decreased the power of the religious establishment. Previously, Saudi Arabia has been reported to have “no legal recognition of, or protection under the law for, freedom of religion, and it is severely restricted in practice.”20 It also noted that “most non-Muslims and Muslims whose beliefs do not adhere to the Government-approved interpretation of Islam must practice their religion in private and are vulnerable to discrimination, harassment, detention, and if a noncitizen, deportation.”21 However recent changes have shown a shift in power away 16 Ibid. 17 “Vision 2030.” 18 Ibid. 19 Bsheer. 20 Ben Hubbard, “Saudi Prince, Asserting Power, Brings Clerics to Heel,” The New York Times, November 7, 2017, https:// www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-wahhabism-salafism-mohammed-bin-salman.html. 21 Ibid.

from the religious sect. The New York Times reported that religious police were stripped of their arrest powers, as “dozens of hard-line clerics [were] detained, while others were designated to speak publicly about respect for other religions.”22 These changes, led by MBS, reinforces a more tolerant version of Islam, and a semblance of tolerance towards other religions. MBS’s action that month constituted a large change in the condition of human rights in terms of religious freedom. And given that the protection of human rights and the freedom of religion is a hallmark of a modern nation, this indicates the trend of modernization. In the same month, MBS also promised women the right to drive, which came to fruition in June 2018. Interviews from Saudi citizens’ perspectives highlight greater modernization. Faisal Mohammed, a 30 year-old interviewed by the New York Times, said, “I am glad to see such progress, empowering women to be more involved in this development.”23 Furthermore, that article states, “The lifting of the ban is just one of many changes planned by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman [who] has begun a sweeping campaign of liberalization in the kingdom.”24 Not only is this progressive in terms of gender equality, but it also signals a greater trend of development that is expected to continue. The next month, MBS announced that movie theaters, banned since the monarchy’s sharp turn towards religious conservatism in 1979, would return.25 This is especially interesting because the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia had, only a few months prior, referred to movie theaters as a cause of depravity.26 This action shows the determination of MBS to modernize, even against the interests of the religious sect who have held power for a long time.

another one of MBS’ moments of modernization. Ruwayda Ali Qassem of Jeddah told the BBC that it was a “historic day in the kingdom which culminates (in) ongoing fundamental changes,” and “I am proud and extremely happy for this development and for the kingdom’s moves to catch up with civilized measures adopted by many countries.”27 These were not the only reforms instituted by MBS, but they are examples of his policies and announcements advancing the trend of modernization and socio-economic progress in Saudi Arabia. Vision 2030, in particular, has many smaller social and economic reforms contained within sub-programs. However, that progress is undercut by MBS’s aggressive consolidation of power domestically, his deliberate destruction of political activism, and his cruelty in foreign policy towards other Middle Eastern nations and groups. Therefore, while MBS has established a trend of modernizing social and economic reforms, he has also established a trend of devastating political changes that pull Saudi Arabia 27 “Saudi Arabia allows women at football game for first time,” BBC, January 12, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-42668841.

In January 2018, women were allowed into stadiums to watch sporting events. Though they were segregated from the men, it drew the attention of international news media, which pronounced it 22 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious. 23 Shannon Van Sant, “Saudi Arabia Lifts Ban on Female Drivers,” NPR, June 24, 2018, https://www.npr. org/2018/06/24/622990978/saudi-arabia-lifts-ban-on-womendrivers. 24 Ibid. 25 Yaroslav Trofimov, “1979: Remembering ‘The Siege Of Mecca,’” interview by Renee Montagne and Steve Inskeep, NPR, August 20, 2009, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId=112051155. 26 Alan Cowell and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Saudi Arabia to Allow Movie Theaters After 35-Year Ban,” New York Times, December 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/world/ middleeast/saudi-arabia-movie-theaters.html.

Mohammad bin Salman

further into the past.

POLITICAL REPRESSION Through power-grabs within his own family, MBS has shown the intention to consolidate political power in order to further his agenda. In November 2017, MBS took a drastic step by imprisoning Saudi elites, including royals in the Ritz-Carlton in Riyadh. They were arrested ostensibly for taking bribes and/or falsely increasing business expenditures, so they could pocket the extra cash. Though those allegations are not necessarily untrue, the true purpose of the sweep was not to put a lid on corruption. As reported by Reuters: “The purge was ordered by 32-year-old Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Officially next in line to the throne to his father, King Salman, he is now in effect running the country which he has said he will transform into a modern state. To do that - and in an attempt to shore up his own power - he has decided to go after the Saudi elite… The Crown Prince’s ability to rule unchallenged depends on whether the purge is successful. Prince Mohammed decided to move on his family, the person familiar with events said, when he realized more relatives opposed him becoming king than he had thought. “The signal was that anyone wavering in their support should watch out,” said the person familiar with the events. “The whole idea of the anti-corruption campaign was targeted towards the family. The rest is window dressing.”28 28 Samia Nakhoul, Angus McDowell and Stephen Kalin, “A house divided: How Saudi Crown Prince purged royal family rivals,” Reuters, November 10, 2017, https:// www.reuters.com/article/ us-saudi-arrests-crownprince-insight/a-house-

At least one Saudi died during imprisonment from a heart attack brought about by “harsh treatment during interrogation.”29 MBS benefitted from this event; those who had been threats had been subdued and a message was sent to those who might have been threats in the future: don’t. Furthermore, MBS has effectively changed how Saudi Arabia is ruled. Traditionally, Saudi Arabia has been run by a king with the consensus of a council of princes below him, none of which were more powerful than the others. Now that has changed: what was once decided by consensus is now decided solely by the Crown Prince. And where family once filled the advising positions, MBS has appointed non-family members to those positions, many U.S. or U.K trained.30 In short, MBS has gone backwards politically through his power grabs, so that the anti-corruption raid and change in advising both represent that destructive trend. The Saudi intervention in the Yemen civil war also represents the destructive political agenda of MBS through the violence in his foreign policy to other nations and groups in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia’s forces have been accused of targeting civilians, bombing schools and hospitals with air raids. They have also blockaded the port of Hodeidah, stopping access for humanitarian aid.31 In this Sunni-Shia proxy conflict, Saudi Arabia, along with other coalition countries, is fighting the Houthi rebels, which are heavily supported by Iran. The port has been blockaded to stop the flow of weapons from Iran to the Houthis. Deputy Secretary of State, Tony Blinken divided-how-saudi-crown-prince-purged-royal-family-rivals-idUSKBN1DA23M. 29 Dexter Filkins, “A Saudi Prince’s Quest to Remake the Middle East,” The New Yorker, last modified April 9, 2018, accessed November 28, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/09/asaudi-princes-quest-to-remake-the-middle-east. 30 Nakhoul, McDowell and Kalin. 31 “Profile: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.”

Washington Post journalist, Jamal Khashoggi

stated that M.B.S. told him that his agenda was “to eradicate all Iranian influence in Yemen.”32 But it has come at great expense: just since 2015, 10,000 people have been killed directly by the violence of the conflict, with many thousands more dead from famine and millions internally and externally displaced.33 The Saudi Arabian forces are working to specifically to further MBS’s agenda to completely crushing any peninsular ally of Iran, regardless of the human cost. Essentially, this is a conflict that the Saudis, led by MBS, entered not just because of national security concerns but to further his political agenda – one of immense cruelty and disregard for the values of human life in the face of political gain. Another example is the assassination of Washington Post journalist, Jamal Khashoggi. It advances MBS’s trend of regressive political crackdowns through his obliteration of political activism and free speech in Saudi Arabia. And this crackdown itself is part of a large trend of crushing any and all political dissidence. Khashoggi had come to the Saudi embassy in Ankara, Turkey to receive documentation of his divorce so that he could marry his new fiancé, and once inside, was almost immediately strangled and dismembered.34 MBS has been seen as the mastermind behind this brutal killing. His role in the murder of Khashoggi was described as having “most probably knew about this, he ordered this.”35 It was reported that “At least five of the 15 members of the death squad are in the royal guard. And the head of the death squad, [reportedly] made four calls to MBS’ office on the day of the murder”36 The orchestration of this assassination again demonstrates the trend of MBS’s crackdown on political dissidence, as Khashoggi was a journalist who frequently criticized the regime and its actions, and MBS in particular.37 The lengths that MBS is willing to go to shows how important consolida32 Dexter Filkins, “A Saudi Prince’s Quest to Remake the Middle East,” The New Yorker, April 9, 2018, https://www. newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/09/a-saudi-princes-quest-toremake-the-middle-east 33 “Mohammed bin Salman: The dark side of Saudi Arabia’s crown prince,” Al Jazeera, October 19, 2018, https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/mohammed-bin-salman-dark-sidesaudi-arabia-crown-prince-181015123719153.html. 34 “Jamal Khashoggi case: All the latest updates,” Al Jazeera, last accessed November 28, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/jamal-khashoggi-case-latest-updates-181010133542286.html. 35 Mershiha Gadzo, “Erdogan points finger at Saudi ‘puppet masters’ in Khashoggi case,” Al Jazeera, November 3, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/erdogan-points-finger-saudi-puppet-masters-khashoggi-case-181103085649836. html. 36 Ibid. 37 “Jamal Khashoggi: Saudi journalist in his own words,” BBC News, October 22, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-45900684.

tion of power and a Saudi Arabia of his creation are to himself. There are other examples of a trend of political cruelty and the destruction of dissidence. Executions, carried out in the form of beheading, are on the rise – one hundred and thirty-three people were executed just in the eight months after he was appointed Crown Prince.38 While he allowed women to drive, he also imprisoned women’s activists and some of them were tortured – flogged, electrocuted, and sexually harassed.39 He led the diplomatic and trade blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia and four other countries, and recalled the Saudi ambassador from Canada after Justin Trudeau called for the release of human rights activists in prison and human rights reforms in Saudi Arabia.40 These show the general trend of MBS’ utter intolerance of political dissidence, and aggressive quest for power in all arenas.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DIFFERENT POLITICAL ARENAS What does this mean for MBS as an individual and as a ruler? It’s hard to know. His orchestration of Khashoggi’s death has the potential to upend both his agendas. Khashoggi’s killing threatens the perception he has worked very hard to create in the international system. His curated image as a reformer, a force of change, a human-rights and women’s-right proponent, and modern politician, will be more easily seen for what it truly is—a farce created to invite foreign investment and allow Saudi Arabia greater soft and hard power. Khashoggi’s killing has invited closer inspection of all of MBS’s actions. There is the potential for Khashoggi’s killing to turn the House of Saud against him and cause his removal as heir to the throne, but that is unlikely, and thus there would be little domestic consequence.41 Furthermore, given that the U.S.’s President Donald Trump is currently refusing to acknowledge MBS as the architect of murder, it seems unlikely that there will be drastic consequences as a direct result of this event. Even if unquestionably damning evidence surfaces, there is still no certainty that the U.S. will risk their highly beneficial relationship with Saudi Arabia. However, with or without evidence linking the kill order 38 “Profile: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.” 39 “Profile: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman”; “Jamal Khashoggi: Saudi journalist in his own words.” 40 “Profile: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.” 41 Robin Wright, “Can Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, Survive the Jamal Khashoggi Murder?” The New Yorker, October 25, 2018, https://www.newyorker. com/news/news-desk/can-saudi-arabias-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-survive-the-jamal-khashoggi-murder.

directly to MBS, and looking at other international responses, MBS could still be affected in a more minor fashion—some speculate King Salman could reduce the amount of power he holds, or remove him from some of his positions (outside of princedom) entirely.42 It is also possible to work with a country, but not its leader. That could be the course of action for other nations in their future interaction with Saudi Arabia—and that would greatly decrease Saudi Arabia’s and MBS’s power in the international system. What implications could this have for Saudi Arabia as a nation? On one hand, the trend of economic and social modernization could potentially benefit many of the kingdom’s citizens who struggle to find a job or practice their religion, or women seeking greater freedom, or Saudi businesses outside of the oil industry. Middle East director at Human Rights Watch, Sarah Leah Whitson noted, “Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s ‘reform campaign’ has been a frenzy of fear for genuine Saudi reformers [becuase…] the message is clear that anyone expressing skepticism about the crown prince’s rights agenda faces time in jail.” 43 This trend of increasing crackdowns on political dissidence within Saudi Arabia will create a nation with even less freedom of speech and ability to speech about injustices perpetrated by the monarchy. Human rights activism will be stifled, and Saudi Arabia will slip further away from the realm of modern, political freedom. Saudi Arabia might strive to modernize in the socio-economic areas through Vision 2030, but it will only succeed in a shallow ways as political rights decrease. The contradictions of MBS’s agenda and actions could also have dire destabilizing consequences for the Middle East. The war in Yemen alone, currently a proxy war, could become a full-on war with Iran, with tensions that have long bubbled under the surface coming to a full boil. Though Saudi Arabia has legitimate national security reasons for engaging the Shia Houthis, as an Iran-influenced nation on their border could spell danger for the kingdom.44 The consequences of true war directly between Saudi Arabia and Iran, would be large. However, that kind of war seems unlikely right now; more likely is an escalation of the Syrian proxy war, the testing of missiles near each other’s airspace or aerial confrontations. But any escalation, as MBS has done through his 42 43 44

Ibid. “Profile: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.” Martin Reardon, “Saudi Arabia, Iran and the ‘Great Game’ in Yemen,” Al Jazeera, March 26, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/saudi-arabia-iran-greatgame-ye-201492984846324440.html.

horrific style of war in Yemen, carries the risk of full-blown war. Michael Knights, the Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote in Foreign Policy: “At some point in the coming years we are likely to see both sides miscalculate and unleash a very short, very sharp burst of military force against each other. This will be a wake-up call. Both Iran and the Gulf States are far more powerfully armed than they were during the Iran-Iraq War. The advanced air forces of the Saudis and their key ally the UAE are now capable of destroying practically all Iran’s port facilities, oil loading terminals and key industries using stand-off precision-guided munitions. Iran can shower the Gulf coastline with multitudinous unguided rockets and a higher concentration of guided long-range missiles than ever before.”45 However, the Yemen conflict and the related Saudi-Iranian conflict are not the only ways in which MBS will impact the Middle East. However, perhaps what should be considered is how MBS will not impact the Middle East. The potential domestic and international backlash against him after the Khashoggi assassination may force him to temper his ambitious political agenda, at least for a while. Before that event, MBS had headed an effort to force an agreement on the Israel-Palestine conflict. His plan was “radically favorable to Israel. It would recognize Israel’s claims to Jerusalem and ratify nearly all of its settlements in the West Bank, offering the Palestinians only limited autonomy in areas under their control.”46 But if King Salman takes the reins back, or international scrutiny forces MBS to abandon any plans that could potentially be politically contentious, that proposal may not prove successful. Depending on one’s opinion of the Israel-Palestine conflict, that can mean different things. But either way, it will only prolong a conflict that badly needs mediation and resolution, albeit fair and effective mediation and resolution. These two contradictory trends could also impact the international system, in how Saudi Arabia is treated and how that shapes its future. At this point in time, where once nations saw MBS as a shining star that would modernize Saudi Arabia and expand human rights in the kingdom, they now see him as a monster. The mask is off because of the Khashoggi incident. Some nations 45 Thomas E. Ricks, “What Would a Saudi-Iran War Look Like? Don’t look now, but it is already here,” Foreign Policy, December 21, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/21/whatwould-a-saudi-iran-war-look-like-dont-look-now-but-it-is-already-here-4/. 46 Filkins.

have started reacting and pulling back from their involvement with Saudi Arabia. Many European nations have issued scathing rebukes. Germany has stopped all arms sales to Saudi Arabia.47 The European Parliament passed a resolution calling for an EU arms embargo.48 But perhaps the nation in the international system that could have the biggest impact on MBS and Saudi Arabia’s future, seems poised to do a whole lot of nothing. The U.S. has put sanctions on seventeen Saudis involved in the murder, but Trump has refused to acknowledge MBS’s orchestration of the whole thing, in direct contradiction of a CIA report.49 Trump remarked that the Khashoggi assassination was an “unacceptable and horrible crime,” but then argued that Saudi Arabia’s arms purchases, oil exports and strategic alliance Iran were more important than taking any action. As he said, “the United States intends to remain a steadfast partner of Saudi Arabia to ensure the interests of our country.” 50 That could change, but not much seems to be changing in U.S.-Saudi relations. However, it seems likely that the EU will take the concrete step of banning arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

CONCLUSION All in all, at this point in time, MBS and Saudi Arabia have a very uncertain future. So much depends on the details that are released during the investigation into Khashoggi’s death, and how the actors react to the that information. That one event, rather than the Yemeni crisis with its terrifying statistics, is the event that changed the narrative. And because it happened so recently, and the full results are not known yet. But one thing can be said: now is a brief window, before the world moves onto the next crisis or catastrophe, where action can be taken, and that action will have an impact. If the world wants to keep more journalists from being murdered, more women’s rights activists from being jailed and tortured, more innocent souls from being behead-

47 Quentin Aries and James McAuley, “European Parliament passes resolution urging arms embargo on Saudi Arabia,” Washington Post, October 25, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/europe/european-parliament-passes-resolution-urging-arms-embargo-on-saudi-arabia/2018/10/25/cb324140-31724dc8-b373-4acc065fdb69_story.html?utm_term=.59c13503f00b 48 Ibid. 49 Mark Landler and Gardiner Harris, “U.S. Levels Sanctions on 17 Saudis for Alleged Involvement in Khashoggi Killing,” The New York Times, November 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/11/15/world/middleeast/saudis-sanctions-khashoggi. html. 50 Robin Wright, “Trump’s Utter Denial About Saudi Arabia and Its Crown Prince,” The New Yorker, November 20, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trumps-utter-denial-about-saudi-arabia-and-its-crown-prince.

ed and more Yemeni children from starving to death, comprehensive and unified action must be taken now. This matters in the potential individual, domestic and regional implications that I outlined above. But looking beyond that, MBS and his actions matter in their contribution to the idea of political image in this global twenty-first century world. MBS has shown that a projected benevolent and modernizing image allows a political leader to quietly, or not so quietly, undertake some rather unsavory projects that are the opposite of benevolent and modernizing. MBS and his actions have shown that a dissonance between projected political image and actions, even if not hidden all that well, is inconsequential in terms of regional, transnational and international relations. To a point at least: depending on what action the world takes after Jamal Khashoggi’s murder, that could be proven untrue. But if the world fails to act and to change its relations with Saudi Arabia and MBS, then MBS will have shown something very important. He will have shown that even in the twenty-first century, in which an abundance of information exists and truth will always be uncovered, a virtual dictator can survive and be praised on the world stage as long as he maintains an altruistic image.

Impact of Brexit on a Dividing Northern Ireland Ruby Simon PO’22 On June 23, 2016, British voters decided in a referendum to leave the European Union, an economic and political organization including 27 European countries.1 In the wake of this decision, Parliament has been tasked with determining the terms of the withdrawal—Britain is scheduled to leave the EU on March 29, 2019.2 One of the most significant issues that has arisen involves the impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland. The border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, which will remain a part of the EU, has historically been a contentious region, impacted by disagreements between Irish unionists, who believe Northern Ireland should be part of the United Kingdom, and nationalists, who believe that Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland should unify. The border, which, since the Good Friday Agreement, has been open, is more than just a symbol—it is relied on by many for economic purposes.3 Because Northern Ireland will no longer be a part of the EU, Brexit runs the risk of forcing a hard border to form between the two, potentially creating the need for physical checks and having a serious economic impact.4 Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Theresa May 1 Alex Hunt and Brian Wheeler, “Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU,” BBC News, January 16, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

has promised to oppose this at all costs. In her proposed withdrawal plan, which was approved by the European Union, she included the use of the “backstop solution.” The solution details that, as a last resort, Northern Ireland would align more closely with the European Union’s customs and regulations than with the United Kingdom’s in order to ensure that there will never be a need for a hard border.5 However, there is widespread opposition to her withdrawal plan, raising the serious possibility that it may not be passed in Parliament.6 If the UK leaves the EU without a plan (a “no-deal Brexit”), a hard border may be almost inevitable.7 While violence flaring up again does not seem to be an urgent concern, it is clear that there is declining unionism within Ireland, and the implications of Brexit serve to play a crucial role in Northern Ireland’s relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom.

Good Friday Agreement The Good Friday Agreement established the current border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It was created as a solution to the Troubles, the conflict in Northern Ireland that began in the late 1960s about whether Northern Ireland should be a part of the United Kingdom or leave and unite with the Republic 5 Stephen Castle and Steven Erlanger, “E.U. Leaders and U.K. Agree on Brexit Divorce Terms,” New York Times, November 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/11/25/world/europe/brexit-uk-eu-agreement.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur&fbclid=IwAR1Q8i7AJQSIUL1GwLaA-kxmcYRFrB8Udx8QeVGm_ w9dYeqady3gK9_az1g 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.

of Ireland. The conflict was closely related to sectarian divides within the region, conflicted feelings of either Irish or British nationalism, and a Catholic and Protestant religious divide. All of these factors shaped people’s opinions on what Northern Ireland’s relationship with the United Kingdom should be. These divides escalated and led to violence between republican paramilitary organizations, loyalist paramilitary organizations and the British army. The Troubles were defined by violence and chaos within the region, as well as poor economic and political conditions.8 The Good Friday Agreement was reached on April 10, 1998, and was an agreement between the British and Irish governments as well as eight Irish political parties. It served as a plan for how Northern Ireland should be governed, detailing a democratically elected Northern Ireland assembly, a North/South ministerial council, a British-Irish council and British-Irish government conference. It also acknowledged Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom based on the wishes of the people. However, it also established the principle of consent, which was that a united Ireland could occur if the majority of the people in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland both wanted it. The Good Friday Agreement also relied on an open border between the Republic and Northern Ireland in order to allow the two to remain closely connected, and ensuring an easy trade relationship between the two. While there was still some violence in Ireland following the Good Friday Agreement, in 2005 the Irish Republican Army (IRA) disbanded and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin emerged as the main unionist and nationalist parties, and Northern Ireland established political stability.

Brexit and the Irish Border In a June 23, 2016 referendum, 52% of British voters supported the United Kingdom leaving the European Union in what was referred to as Brexit. The vote served as a backlash against globalization, multiculturalism and immigration. It also highlighted economic and cultural concerns within Britain. Brexit was an expression of British nationalism, and in particular, English, as Northern Ireland and Scotland voted to remain in the EU. With the current administration determining the logistics of Britain leaving the EU, the Irish border is a serious cause for concern. Because Northern Ireland is a part of 8 Michael Parker, “Changing History: The Republic and Northern Ireland since 1990,” in Irish Literature Since 1990: Diverse Voices, ed by Parker Michael and Brewster Scott, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009): 3-4. http://www. jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1wn0rxk.5.

the United Kingdom, and the Republic is not, currently Northern Ireland is set to leave the EU, and the Republic of Ireland will remain. Currently, and promised by the Good Friday Agreements, there is free movement of people and trade between the two. The open border has an economic and cultural importance. It is crossed by over 30,000 people daily for purposes of work alone, and is symbolically an important sign of the close relationship between the two. However, because the UK is leaving the EU, it will be free to establish its own border and trade laws. There are a lot of fears around the implications of this, especially amongst border towns. There are concerns about maintaining the current peace established by the Good Friday Agreement, as border towns often rely on the open border for work and trade. There are also worries that a hard border will cut Northern Ireland off both culturally and economically from the Republic of Ireland. May has pledged to avoid a hard border at all costs. In her proposed withdrawal plan, which was approved by the 27 European Union members, she proposes the backstop solution.9 The backstop would go into effect only if a trade solution encompassing the entire United Kingdom was not found before the end of the Brexit transition period in 2020. 10 It would consist of a temporary customs union between the United Kingdom and the European Union, with Northern Ireland aligning more closely with the European Union’s customs and regulations than the United Kingdom’s.11 The Northern Ireland provisions would apply to agriculture, the environment, state aid, and some other areas.12 The purpose of the backstop would be to avoid any chance of a return to a hard border and to avoid physical checks on goods.13 The plan has been received positively by the European Union, with the backstop having been initially agreed as part of the Brexit deal, although with some disagreement on specifics.14 Taoiseach Leo Varadkar of the Republic of Ireland stated that the deal was “the next best outcome” to the UK staying in the EU.15 The backstop solution presents itself as a feasible alternative to a hard border, capable of protecting 9 Michael Staines, “EU would not accept any deal that did not include a backstop preventing a return to a hard border in Ireland,” Newstalk, November 15, 2018, https://www.newstalk. com/Brexit-deal-impossible-without-Irish-border-backstop--Theresa-May10 Castle and Erlanger. 11 Castle and Erlanger. 12 Staines. 13 Castle and Erlanger. 14 Peter Walker, “What is the Brexit backstop?” The Guardian, October 15, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/ oct/15/what-is-the-brexit-backstop 15 John Campbell, “Brexit: Theresa May says deal will ‘safeguard progress’ in NI,” BBC News, November 25, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46334478.

Northern Ireland’s economic interests. While May’s withdrawal plan includes the backstop solution, there is a widespread lack of support for it within Parliament, and many MPs have stated that they will vote against the Brexit deal.16 Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the Labour Party, called the deal, “the worst of all worlds,” and there is some opposition amongst the Conservative party.17 One of the most significant opponents to the deal is the DUP, who oppose the backstop, and whom May relies on to back her government.18 Arlene Foster, the leader of the DUP, stated that the group would not support the deal because of the backstop.19 There is widespread fear throughout the party of being “sold out” and economically cut off from the rest of the United Kingdom, and therefore not truly being a part of the Union.20 Nigel Dodds, the deputy leader of the DUP, described the deal as “pitiful and pathetic,” and “worse than no deal.”21 The DUP has allies within the Conservative Party, and Conservative MP Boris Johnson stated that Britain was “on the verge of making a historic mistake.”22 The clear lack of support for the deal suggests that there is a strong chance it will not pass, therefore making a “no deal” Brexit a possibility.23 The implications of the UK leaving the EU without a deal are severe, making a hard border potentially inevitable, as there would be no buffer between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. There is a clear divide between the DUP, which opposes May’s Brexit deal, and Northern Ireland businesses, which largely support it. Almost all businesses in Ireland stand to be affected by any potential disruption to trade across the border caused by Brexit, according to the Office of National Statistics.24 Northern Ireland is reliant on trade 16 “EU leaders agree UK’s Brexit deal at Brussels summit,” BBC News, November 25, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk46334649. 17 Matthew Symington, “Brexit, Northern Ireland and a hard border: What you need to know,” Al Jazeera, November 22, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/brexit-northern-ireland-hard-border-181121233036148.html. 18 Symington. 19 Rory Carroll, Michael Savage and Toby Helm, “Britain on verge of historic blunder, warns Johnson at DUP conference,” The Guardian, November 24, 2018, https://www.theguardian. com/politics/2018/nov/24/dup-prepared-to-bring-down-government-may-brexit-deal. 20 Symington. 21 Carroll, Savage and Helm; Jayme McCormack, “Brexit: DUP’s Nigel Dodds says Brexit deal ‘worse than no deal’,” BBC News, November 25, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-46335118. 22 Carroll, Savage and Helm. 23 “EU leaders agree UK’s Brexit deal at Brussels summit.” 24 Gavin Jackson and Arthur Beesley, “Brexit disruption threatens businesses in Northern Ireland,” Financial Times, August 13, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/90ed11989eef-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4.

with the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain, as well as having strong ties with the United States and Canada, and more than half of international exports are sent to the Republic or the United States.25 Food and live animal industries stand to be especially affected, as more than ⅔ of Northern Ireland’s exports are to the Republic.26 Almost all businesses are intertwined in some way with cross-border trade, so the implications of any change as a result of Brexit have to potential to be severe.27 For these reasons, many businesses in Northern Ireland are very worried about the effects of Brexit, and are focused on ensuring that they will not be economically harmed. For many businesses, the possibility of a no-deal Brexit would be catastrophic and the backstop plan, which would avoid a hard border, has appeal.28 The Confederation of Business Industry director Angela McGowan stated that Northern Ireland businesses “simply cannot cope,” with a no-deal Brexit, and the head of Northern Ireland Civil Service David Sterling stated that a “chaotic or disorderly no deal would be very bad for us legally.”29 For this reason, many business and farming groups are urging the DUP to change its position and accept the deal, with the hope that the backstop will not even be necessary.30 The difference in position between the DUP and many Northern Ireland businesses and individuals worried about being economically affected by a no-deal Brexit has created a significant rift, and raises the possibility of a rift between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom if Brexit, which the majority of NI did not vote for, has severe economic implications. The rift between the DUP and people worried about a no-deal Brexit has the potential to distance the DUP from other unionists, creating a political gap and opportunity for other strategies to be explored. Many Northern Ireland unionists are not aligned with the views of the DUP.31 Many wanted to remain in the European Union, and think the DUP has too much influence and is destroying its relationship with the people.32 With business groups and leaders speaking out against the DUP’s 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 “No-deal Brexit ‘would leave business on brink of chaos’,” BBC News, November 19, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/ uk-northern-ireland-46259639; “NI firms ‘cannot cope with nodeal Brexit’,” BBC News, November 26, 2018, https://www.bbc. com/news/uk-northern-ireland-46338344. 30 “NI firms ‘cannot cope with no-deal Brexit’”; “No-deal Brexit ‘would leave business on brink of chaos.’” 31 Annabelle Dickson, “Northern Ireland’s other unionists,” Politico, November 23, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/ northern-ireland-brexit-other-unionists-uup-dup/. 32 Ibid.

approach to Brexit, it is clear that the group is not on the same page as many of the people, creating the issue of a large group of moderate unionists who do not feel as if their voices are being represented in the main unionist party.33 Sinn Féin, on the other hand, has taken a different approach. On its website, it cites the fact that Northern Ireland voted to remain in the EU, and that, “Brexit poses a huge threat to the future of the people of Ireland in terms of a land border on the island, the north being forced out of the single market, barriers to trade, potential devastation of agriculture, not to mention the implications for the peace process and the Good Friday Agreement.”34 It argues that the best solution is for Northern Ireland to be designated special status in the EU, and for both Northern Ireland and the Republic to remain within the EU.35 Sinn Féin also does not shy away from the possibility of reunification, and in January 2018, Leader Mary Lou McDonald, stated that a closed border would be so disastrous, with such serious potential economic implications and the fear of a return to violence, that reunification is “on the table.”36 Tensions between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom as Northern Ireland are high as the country braces for the implications of Brexit, as well as the rift between the DUP and Northern Ireland businesses have helped bring the question of reunification onto the table. Both Northern Ireland and

33 Ibid. 34 “Brexit,” SinnFein, accessed January 19, 2018, http:// www.sinnfein.ie/brexit. 35 Ibid. 36 Romain Houeix, “Irish reunification ‘on the table’, says Sinn Fein’s new leader amid Brexit talks,” France24, February 26, 2018, https://www.france24.com/ en/20180226-northern-ireland-sinn-fein-mary-lou-mcdonald-reunification-referendum-brexit.

the Republic of Ireland have thrived since the Good Friday Agreement, with many people only remembering peace.37 While there is no desire to return to the violence of the Troubles, the lack of faith in the Brexit process as well as demographic changes (Northern Ireland has become increasingly more Catholic) have contributed to a distance between NI and the UK.38 Many people are worried that a hard border to reignite sectarian tensions thought to be quiet, and there is graffiti in the Bogside reading, “join the IRA.”39 The lack of faith in the withdrawal process, and the view that many hold that the UK does not care about Northern Ireland and may sacrifice it for the sake of Brexit have brought talk of reunification into the national consciousness.40 While no definitive actions have been taken, many have the view that loyalism is decreasing in Northern Ireland.41 In the 2017 Northern Ireland elections, Sinn Féin performed almost as well as the DUP, and in a poll, two-thirds of young people stated they wanted to leave Northern Ireland, with seven out of ten saying that they believed that politicians were not capable on agreeing for a future for the country.42 There has been a recent jump in people applying for Irish passports, with some people stating that the situation is so frustrating to them that they might be better off in a United Ireland.43 A recent online poll suggested that Brexit might cause there to be a majority for a united Ireland once the 37 Andrew Testa and Megan Specia, “Invisible Irish Border Carries the Scars of a Fractured Past,” New York Times, October 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/world/europe/ northern-ireland-brexit-border.html. 38 Rory Carroll, “Talk of a united Ireland is rife. But is it a fantasy?” The Guardian, September 16, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/sep/16/united-ireland-brexit-irish-unification-back-on-agenda. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Dickson.

UK leaves the EU.44 Sinn Féin, which has been pushing for the question of reunification to be on the table, is pushing for a border poll, arguing that the solution makes sense for many people.45 Ultimately, the future of Northern Ireland is contingent on the result of the Brexit withdrawal. If a no-deal Brexit occurs and forces a hard border, Northern Ireland will have to deal with potentially devastating and life-altering implications. If an open border is maintained, implications would be a lot less severe, allowing many to retain largely unchanged daily lives. However, the issue of Brexit has brought many previously undiscussed problems back into the national forefront, especially Northern Ireland’s relationship with the UK. Previously, while people might have been curious about reunification, it did not make sense, because it was seen as a change from the norm that would take a lot of effort and might not be worth it. Now, in the face of a potential border crisis, reunification might be worth the trouble. Brexit has made differences both historic and recent between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland clear, and brought the question of reunification into the picture at a time when demographics were shifting in such a way that many were willing to support it. And if Brexit causes a hard border between the countries, it is likely that many will turn to reunification as a solution, convinced that the UK does not stand for Northern Ireland’s needs.

“Brexit ‘could create a majority for a united Ireland’,” BBC News, September 3, 3018, https://www.bbc.com/news/ uk-northern-ireland-45391529. 45 Carroll.

The European Union Center at Scripps College is now accepting submissions for the 17th Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union. The primary purpose of this conference is to enhance undergraduate training in and knowledge of the European Union and US-European relations. The conference will be held on April 4-5, 2019 in Claremont, CA. Applications are due by February 15, 2019. In addition to the conference, the EU center sponsors various summer internships and training opportunities for undergraduate students from the Claremont Colleges. To apply for the Conference and/or learn more about the EU center, please visit eucenter.scrippscollege.edu 29

A Flourishing Civil Society: Good or Bad for Democratization? Sumesh Shiwakoty PZ’18

Some argue that a flourishing civil society adds enthusiasm to the process of democratization. It assumes that participation in an organization not only brings citizens together, bridging cleavages and fostering skills for democratic governance, but also satisfies their need to belong to a larger grouping.1 However, Sheri Berman in her article, “Civil Society And The Collapse Of The Weimar Republic,” challenges this idea. Weimar Republic, an era in Germany from 1919 to 1933, is known as the time period after World War I until the rise of Nazi Germany. During this time, German society began fragmenting into various groups and associations. 2 The fragmentation and associational life of the Weimar Republic provided a training ground for Nazi cadres and a base from which the National Socialist Workers’ Party (NSDAP) launched its seizure of power.3 Drawing from this historical event, Berman argues that population of any country should not divert its public energy and interest into secondary associations. It leads populations to perceive that its government, politicians and parties are inefficient and unresponsive. She argues that doing so may only exacerbate problems, fragment society and weaken political cohesion.4 Referencing the Weimar Republic, Berman maintains that high levels of associationism along with an absent national government and political parties was responsible for fragmenting its citizens rather than integrating them into the political system.5 Berman’s argument that association with civil society disintegrates people and makes the democratic process difficult seems to hold true in the case of democratic transitions among Arab countries. Furthermore, similar to how civil associations contributed the rise of Nazi party during the Weimar Republic, authoritarian regimes of Arab countries are also using civil society organizations (CSOs) and associational life for promoting their political agendas and to 1 Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” World Politics 49, no. 3 (1997): 424. 2 “Weimar Republic,” Germany After World War I, December 4, 2017, https://www.history.com/topics/germany/weimar-republic. 3 Ibid, 402. 4 Ibid, 428 5 Ibid, 402

scrap democratic experiment. This comparative assessment will illustrate that people’s direct participation in the political process is the best way for achieving democratic aspirations rather than associating with CSOs. The development of CSOs will result in a highly organized but vertically fragmented society. This is what happened during Wilhelmine Germany and the Weimar Republic. During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which is also referred to as the Wilhelmine period, associational life grew rapidly in Germany.6 Voluntary associations were active in public life in areas ranging from education to land preservation.7 However, by the end of the nineteenth century, a distinct and troubling pattern had already begun to appear in Germany. When national political institutions and structures proved either unwilling or unable to address their citizens’ needs, many Germans turned away from them and involved themselves with the institutions of civil society instead.8 Under these circumstances, associational life served not to integrate citizens into political systems, but rather to divide them or mobilize them outside.9 The same process repeated in Germany during the Weimar years. The democratization of Germany at the end of World War I opened up a new phase in the country’s associational life. The number of local voluntary associations, national associations and professional organizations grew throughout the 1920s.10 During this period, Germans threw themselves into their clubs, community groups, and patriotic organizations while increasingly abandoning the seemingly ineffectual liberal parties.11 Yet, as in Wilhelmine Germany, the rise in associationism signaled, not the spread of liberal values or the development of healthy democratic political institutions, but the contrary. The vigor of associational life served to further undermine and delegitimize the republic’s political structures. The result was a highly organized, but vertically frag6 7 8 9 10 11

Ibid, 408. Ibid, 408. Ibid, 411. Ibid, 411. Ibid,413. Ibid,416.

mented and discontented society.12 The society was organized as a result of associationism, but it was fragmented as associationism created an environment of lesser cross-association cooperation. It created an atmosphere where individuals of cross groups started viewing each other with doubt and rivalry.13 There was associational unity but lack of national unity. This created an infertile ground for democratic transition during the Weimar Republic. In the line of Berman’s argument, many other scholars have also acknowledged how the rich associational life of the Weimar Republic scrapped the possibility for democratization. In their article, “Bad Civil Society,” Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein wrote that “the Weimar Republic had a vibrant and well-organized civil society that gave birth to and nurtured the Nazi movement.”14 Michael Walzer, a prominent American political theorist, also acknowledges that the tendency of various class-based or religious groups of the Weimar Republic drained the full attention and all the associational time and energy of their members, leaving no room for multiple memberships.15 This contributed in deserting the chances of democratization in the Weimar Republic. Ultimately, a associational life does not contribute to the process of democratization, but instead assists in the rise of groups, such as the Nazi party, abandoning possible chances for democratization. What happened in the Weimar Republic is repeated among democratizing Arab states. The expansion of CSOs in Arab states resulted in fragmenting segments of society rather than uniting them. CSOs in Arab states could not mobilize a critical mass of supporters throughout society against autocratic regimes. This is because most of these CSOs in Arab states were single-issue oriented organizations and therefore there were no cross-sector coalition among those groups. This created an atmosphere where different segments of CSOs started viewing each other with suspicion.16 Furthermore, the lack of overarching anti-regime slogans created the cycles of dissonant politics in the society which resulted in the absence of any united constituency for democracy.17 As a result, Arab civil societies suffered from weak, broad-based support in society and fragmented among themselves. This is seen in Egypt, during the Arab uprising of 2011. At that time in Egypt, civil society can be understood through Karl Marx’s label of “bourgeois society,” elites who owned the means of production. This group’s societal concerns were based around the value of property and the preservation of capital.18 In turn, civil society in Egypt contributed in fragmenting Egyptian society by only strengthening elitist imposition.19 Furthermore, during that time, many aspects of

12 Ibid,414. 13 Ibid. 14 Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein, “Bad Civil Society,” Political Theory 29, no. 6 (2001): 842. 15 Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka, eds. Alternative conceptions of civil society, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 16 Ibid, 19. 17 Ibid, 19. 18 Karl Marx, “Bourgeois and Proletarians,” Manifesto of the Communist Party, accessed December 28, 2018. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm#007. 19 Ibid, 261.

associational life in Egypt were controlled or influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood.20 This became more evident when civil society leaders supported the military coup of July 2013, ousting democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi.21 Civil society groups in Egypt, rather than assisting in securing a path to democracy, preferred a return to an authoritarian regime of extensive military power.22 Egypt shows that civil society groups, rather than uniting society for democracy, fragmented different segments of society and contributed in making the path to democracy even more difficult. Thus civil societies, though uniting individuals within a group, divides society. This results in less cross-group interaction and increased skepticism among groups. This division of society provides a fertile ground for authoritarian regimes to achieve their political goals by repressing democratic movement. Civil societies create organized yet fragmented associations of individuals which makes it easier for any politically charged group to manipulate those individuals into achieving their political agendas. For instance, during the Weimar Republic’s era, the rich associational life provided a favorable environment for the Nazi’s rise. In the words of Berman, “the dense networks of civic engagement provided the Nazis with cadres of activists who had the skills necessary to spread the party’s message and increase recruitment.”23 Hitler recognized that participation in associational life provided individuals with the kinds of leadership skills and social ties that could be very useful for the political arena. Thus, civil society activists of the Weimar era formed the backbone of the Nazis’ grassroots propaganda machine. Without the opportunity to exploit Weimar’s rich associational network, the Nazis would not have been able to capture important sectors of the German electorate so quickly and efficiently.24 This development of an organized yet fragmented society provided the Nazi party with a favorable atmosphere to systematically promote their political agendas and get broader support and compliance from the public on their agendas. In the same ways, the authoritarian regimes of Arabian states are also using civil society organizations for achieving their political agendas. In his article, “Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World,” Sean L. Yom argues, “civil society grew not because the state retreated, but because authoritarian incumbents deployed a new tactic of control--they could reassert power and slake dissension by granting concessions too mild to produce systemic change, but hefty enough to merit symbolic applause at home and abroad.”25 Civil society organizations are being used by Arab autocrats for achieving their political agendas. Authoritarian

20 Niklas Plaetzer, “Civil Society As Domestication: Egyptian and Tunisian Uprisings Beyond Liberal Transitology,” Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 1 (2014): 261. 21 Ibid, 261. 22 Ibid, 261. 23 Berman. 24 Ibid, 420. 25 Sean L. Yom, “Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 9, no. 4 (2005): 23.

regimes are also using these groups for systematically repressing any possible threat to their regime and securing their compliance in an indirect form. They use civil society organizations as a means to monitor wider public activities while getting credit for providing citizens with fundamental rights. Arab autocracies utilize systematic policies of legal constriction that defuse civic activism long before it becomes threatening.26 For instance: “In most states, all CSOs must register with Interior or Social Affairs Ministries, which use complicated ‘Associations Laws’ to vet new organizations. To receive operating permits, civic groups must clear arduous security investigations and promise to refrain from activities of “subversion.” Moreover, state administrator exercises tight authority over the existing group; they may audit operating budgets, direct the internal intelligence services to infiltrate major associations, cancel board elections of unions and syndicates, impose arbitrary fines for mismanagement, ban financial contributions from backlisted donors, and dissolve any group found to commit minor legal infractions. In short, as Quintan Wiktorowicz finds, CSOs are ‘embedded in a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes which allows those in power to monitor and regulate collective activities,’ rendering civil society institutions as ‘more an instrument of state social control than a mechanism of collective empowerment.’” 27 Most Arab states also have particular laws as surveillance mechanisms for civil society organizations through which they control the activities of civil societies and use them for their political benefits. For instance, Egypt formulated Law 32 to regulate the activities of associations in its territories:28 “Law 32 required citizens wishing to form voluntary organizations to obtain permission from the ministry of social affairs. Once approved, non-governmental organizations had to inform the ministry of activities. The law also closely regulated fundraising. Only membership dues and offering given during religious ser26 Ibid, 24. 27 Ibid, 24. 28 Vickie Langohr, “Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 193.

vices could be collected without ministry permission, and permits for other types of fundraising, including the foreign fund so central to nongovernmental advocacy were frequently denied or significantly delayed.”29 Thus, autocratic regimes in Arab states are using CSOs to fulfill their narrow political interests. As Weimar’s rich associational life provided fertile ground for Nazi political aspiration, in the same way, the development of CSOs in Arab states provided tremendous opportunities for authoritarian regimes to use CSOs for their political benefits. It would be absurd to argue that CSOs can someday contribute to the process of democratization in many Arab states in the manner that authoritarian regimes are already using them for benefiting their regimes. It should be noted that the role of CSOs during the Arab uprising was nil. It was people’s direct participation in revolt against authoritarian regimes that shaped the Arab uprising. Ander C. Harding’s article, “Beyond The Arab Revolt: Conceptualizing Civil Society in the Middle East and North Africa” emphasizes that “formal NGOs and associations did not lead the uprisings across the Arab world in 2011. Instead, it was informal networks, primarily consisting of youth, which mobilized in the streets.”30 This reflects the non-functional role of CSOs in the democratization process. The experience from the Arab Spring also suggests that people’s direct participation in the political process is the best way for achieving democratic aspirations rather than associating with CSOs. On the other hand, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan argue that a robust civil society is a necessary precondition for a successful democratic transition. They maintain that a robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state, can help start transitions, resist reversals, push transitions to their completion, consolidate and deepen democracy.31 Many of these critics who view civil society as a pre-condition for democratization like to back up their assertions by presenting a comparative assessment of Libya and Tunisia during the Arab Spring. As per their argument, Libya’s transition failed because of a lack of a healthy civil society while Tunisia succeeded as a result of a robust civil society, which existed before the revolution 29 Ibid, 193. 30 Anders C. Härdig, “Beyond the Arab Revolts: Conceptualizing Civil Society in the Middle East and North Africa,” Democratization 22, no. 6 (2014): 1140. 31 Juan J. Linz, and Alfred C. Stepan, “Toward consolidated democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (1996): 18.

in 2011.32 However, there were other factors responsible for the different outcomes of Libya and Tunisia during the Arab uprising rather than the role of CSOs. The Tunisian state was among the most progressive of the Arab world. Tunisia has the Arab world’s best education system and a large middle class.33 Therefore during the Arab uprising, people in Tunisia were capable of engaging in a mass demonstration by the proper use of digital media and ousting their dictatorial ruler. However, Libya, in contrast, was faced with significantly different challenges. Muammar Gaddafi was a ruthless dictator who was seen as a nuisance to the region and the international community as a whole.34 His failed attempt to consolidate power lasted for 42 years, which created 42 years of poor living conditions in Libya. This was partially why the international community did not hesitate to intervene in Libya. As a result, Libya had a different outcome in the Arab Spring than its neighbor Tunisia.35 These, there is not enough evidence to suggest the role of civil society for these different outcomes in Tunisia and Libya. Furthermore, unlike critics who assert that a robust civil society is a prerequisite for democratization, evidence from around the world suggest that the existence of civil society has done more harm than good for the democratic transition. Similar to how rich associational life in the Weimar Republic and Egypt assisted dictators of those countries to postpone the possible democratic transition, the existence of civil society has made the process of democratization difficult in many other countries as well. For instance, evidence shows that a high level of associational participation in post-1918 Italy helped Mussolini in garnering support for his agendas.36 Furthermore, new civil societies of Russia and Eastern Europe are home to groups like Russian National Unity and Romanian National Union which rallies large numbers of citizens for proto-fascist ideologies.37 During the Communist era, former Yugoslavia arguably had the most developed civil society of any Eastern European country. Yet, this did little to prevent the post-Communist era to be inaugurated with ethnic cleansing, civil war and massacre.38 Thus, recent evidence from around the world shows that the existence of civil society has done more harm to the process of democratization and the spread of the liberal 32 Jason William Boose, “Democratization and Civil Society: Libya, Tunisia and the Arab Spring,” International Journal of Social Science and Humanity 2, no. 4 (2002): 310. 33 Lisa Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (2011): 3. 34 Boose. 35 Anderson. 36 Chambers and Kopstein. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.

values than good. It is widely believed that the CSOs play an instrumental role during the democratic process, but in reality, it is not so. Civil society organizations fragment segments of societies under different associations and create an atmosphere, which separates individuals. Groups seeking to challenge authoritarian rule require widespread popular support and civil society organization, which are typically single-issue groups with small local constituencies, are ill-equipped to lead the charge.39 Furthermore, CSOs organize individuals in such a way that they can be easily used by political groups and authoritarian regimes to fulfill their own political desires. As a result, their existence further strengthens the regime and complicates the path to democratization. Therefore, the available evidence points to the conclusion that robust civil society do not contribute to the process of democratization but oftentimes makes the democratic transition even more complicated. Instead, people’s direct participation in the political process is the best way for achieving democratic aspirations rather than associating with CSOs.

Langohr.

Fall 2018 Writers & Editors Writers and editors involved in the Fall 2018 publication, alphabetically listed. 21 Staff Writer Jacinta Chen, PO’22 Jacinta Chen is a sophomore, majoring in politics and minoring in history. She is involved in the Pomona-Pitzer Varsity Women’s Tennis Team, Pomona College Academy for Youth Success College Advising Program, The Student Life and Claremont Captures. She is interested in U.S. foreign policy, Asia-Pacific region and international law; and has assisted research on the U.S. response to the Arab Spring.

Sean Lee, PO’22 Editor

Sean Lee is a freshman at Pomona College. He is an editor for the Claremont Journal of International Relations.

Kamil Lungu, PO’20 Editor

Kamil Lungu is a junior at Pomona, double majoring in International Relations and Russian Studies. His research interests includes European Union and Russian politics. He enjoys cooking, gardening and collecting coins.

Agnes Mok, PO’21 Editor

Agnes Mok is a sophomore at Pomona College, majoring in PPE (politics, philosophy, economics). She speaks four languages: German, Cantonese, Mandarin and English.

Helena Gabrielle Ong, PO’20 Editor-in-Chief

Helena Ong is majoring in politics and English, with a minor in linguistics. She is a design editor for The Student Life, staff writer for CJLPP, and volunteer judge for HSPDP debate tournaments. She has written for San Francisco Public Press, The Student Life, The Blue & White Magazine and Columbia Spectator.

Helena Tia Ong, PO’22 Editorial Assistant

Helena T. Ong is a freshman at Pomona College, pursuing an economics and Politics double major. Helena helps edit other staff writers’ pieces. In addition to writing, Helena also loves public speaking, debating, and playing the cello.

Erin Puckett, PO’22 Staff Writer

Erin Puckett is freshman, intending to major in interrnational relations, with a focus on the Middle East, and potentially minor in computer science. She is from Dallas, TX, and credits her interest in international politics and those of the Middle East, in particular, to her high school history teacher, Scott Cotton.

Ruby Simon, PO’22 Staff Writer

Ruby Simon is freshman at Pomona College. She is a staff writer for the Claremont Journal of International Relations. Sumesh Shiwakoty, PZ’18 Contributor Sumesh Shiwakoty studied International Relations at Pitzer College. He’s worked with the World Policy Institute, Center for Constitutional Rights and is currently a Board Member and South Asia Director for United by Love. He frequently contributes op-ed for publications including The Diplomat, Asia News Network and The Kathmandu Post.