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Jean Dominique Giuliani, Paris Learning the language of power Change of dimension
Learning the language of power
The European Union needs to change dimension
by Jean-Dominique Giuliani, President of the Robert Schuman Foundation and President of the ILERI School of International Relations, Paris
The construction of Europe is, internationally, one of the biggest successes of the second half of the 20 th century, despite tragedy and conflict in the first. Europe could have been excluded from history. Instead, it peacefully rebuilt itself with an unparalleled level of cooperation between the states that form it. The progressive integration of the continent allowed its rapid reconstruction and brought it prosperity. At the turn of the 21 st century, Europe is an economic giant that must be reckoned with. However, the beginning of this new century marks a sudden and accelerated decline of the strategic context. The access of new continents to growth and wealth was good news for hundreds of thousands of people; it marked a new balance of power. Russian and Turkish revisionism accompanied a return of nationalism and caused conflict near Europe, as well as causing pressing tensions and potential problems.
The EU needs to become more political The European Union needs to change dimension and finally become more political, agreeing to pool its strengths and weaknesses to weigh in the world at the height of its past successes. Indeed, nothing would be worse for the European Union than continuing to reason and act as in the past. It must take off geo-strategically, something it finds difficult. A number of Member States are satisfied with the current situation and do not see the value of further integration. Others are ashamed of their laws and their past. Finally, others are inward-looking, victims of the fashionable “anti-globalisation and anti-multilateralism” syndrome. To preserve its achievements, the Union must now be able to speak and act internationally in the same way as the most important powers. It is neither a state nor an empire and it was deliberately built against these models. However, it must learn the language of the balance of power, that of the return of power states, to avoid being taken hostage and suffer decisions made elsewhere, inconsistent with its interests. It needs to give credibility to its fledgling diplomacy through a military capability. It does not have to embark on expansionist or interventionist adventures, it is simply a question of being credible for, precisely, not having to use force, which most of its members are reluctant to do.
Waking up to global strategic realities At the beginning of February, the French President, after his predecessors, took another step towards a slowly progressing defence cooperation. He offered to talk to his partners on nuclear deterrence, of which France is now the only holder within the Union. Those who are not familiar with the most sophisticated diplomacy should remember the characteristics of nuclear weapons. They are the ultimate guarantee; not intended to be used, but to deter, because they promise unacceptable damage to aggressors. They cannot be put under joint command, and there is no example of this ever being done, including NATO in which it is discussed, but where only the American President has the final capacity to use them. Given the evolution of the United States, so caricatured by the extreme sensitivity of its current president (!), the French offer is an unexpected opportunity to give European diplomacy, and still too limited military capabilities, credibility on which a European defence can gradually be built. NATO will continue to exist because it is not incompatible. It is even necessary at this time. But there will be no peaceful, sustainable future for Europeans without their own coordinated deterrent capacities. To guarantee peace, one must be ready, if necessary, to wage war. It is – alas – the law of nations since the origin of the human race. This is likely the reason why the German minister of defence officially accepted the French offer. In parallel, the two partners, France and Germany, are accelerating their defence industrial cooperation. It seems that Europe is waking up to the global strategic realities, with a delay it must urgently make up. May our European leaders finally respond to the requests of their fellow citizens by building a more sovereign and independent Europe that defends its interests all over the world! This may be the condition for the continuation of the European adventure.
Strengthening Europe’s defence through a pillar in NATO Europe and its external challenges in uncertain times
by Dr Hans-Gert Pöttering, Former President of the European Parliament and President of the Berlin Security Conference, Berlin
Among the security challenges facing us, I would pinpoint the following main issues: the balance of power within the transatlantic alliance – particularly between the USA and the European Union – our relations with Russia, the relationship with China and other Asian countries, destabilisation in the Near and Middle East, failing states in Sub-Saharan Africa.
A comprehensive security concept In order to meet these challenges, we need a comprehensive security concept. It encompasses political, psychological, diplomatic, economic, technological and military aspects. None of them can be effective in isolation. We can only make them effective if we attach enough importance to each one of them and ensure that they work together. What worries me is the disconnect between the current security situation and its perception by public opinion in our societies. Demands for a stronger commitment to security policies are often countered with the argument that the necessary resources could be much better spent on social programmes. The challenges facing Europe are in my opinion underestimated in public debate. This is also a consequence of politicians’ reluctance to spell out uncomfortable truths. We are witnessing with surprise or dismay the rise of populist
Dr Hans-Gert Pöttering
is a German politician, who was
born in 1945. He studied at the
universities of Bonn, Geneva and
New York and completed his PhD
in political science and history in
Photo: Klaus Dombrowsky
1974. A member of the European Parliament from 1979 to 2014, he
was the chairman of the European Peoples Party (EPP) from 1999 to 2007, and President of the Parliament from 2007 to 2009. Dr Pöttering was Chairman of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation from 2010-2018. He is currently President of the Berlin Security Conference (BSC).
movements, extremist and even nationalist parties. But in the 21 st century, retreating behind national borders is no way of protecting one’s people. Nationalism eventually turns against the people because it is a threat to peace, and therefore to freedom, the rule of law and democracy. We must also develop, and particularly in Germany, a more realistic relationship with our armed forces. The paradox is that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have tended to view our Bundeswehr as a relic of the cold war and have therefore shamefully neglected it. A generation later, we have doubts about the military preparedness of this very Bundeswehr and
fail to see the vicious circle of neglect and loss of preparedness for which we are ourselves responsible. We therefore need an urgent reappraisal, something that is already starting to happen. I wish our defence minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, every success in rising to this essential challenge. Just as crucially as democracy needs democrats, it needs people who are willing to defend it – and who must also be in a position to do so.
Europe needs a defence capability The strength of Europe and the Western alliance is based on our common values: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and peace. We must not underestimate the capacity for our western community of values to reform and rejuvenate itself. This is equally true of the European Union as it is of NATO. Our goal must be to strengthen the European pillar of NATO through a defence union, a European army. In particular, we should make use of the two percent target to increase our European capabilities. But we should also realise that anyone who questions the role of NATO is not promoting the sovereignty of Europe but dividing it. In spite of all the difficulties and unwelcome developments, I remain convinced that both institutions, the European Union and NATO, are successful models that have served us well in the past. And as long as we all work together to strengthen them, they can also do so in the future.
documentation
BREXIT – what will change in Europe
As a result of the British withdrawal from the European Union, there are a number of changes in the European Parliament and the Council.
Parliament Most legislation needs a majority vote in Parliament to be adopted. The British withdrawal has led to changes in the strengths of the parliamentary groups. The number of parliamentary seats has been reduced by 46 and the remaining 27 seats have been redistributed mathematically. France and Spain are the biggest winners, gaining five extra seats each (see figure). But there are also changes in the relative strengths of the parliamentary groups. The Liberals, with their 15 British members, have lost the most, whereas the conservative European People’s Party, which has had no British members for some years, is strengthened. However, it remains true that the two largest groups in Parliament still need a third partner (or even a fourth if there are internal divisions within the groups) for legislation to be adopted.
Council The balance of power within the Council has also shifted. This will affect most legislation, that has to be adopted by qualified majority voting, requiring a “double majority”. But it will also affect the chances of forming a blocking minority to block legislation. Voting procedure (majorities): legislation can only be adopted if at least 15 member states vote in favour of it. The problem is that these member states must represent at least 65% of the EU population. As the UK was the third largest country, its withdrawal has resulted in an increase in the relative power of Germany and France, which now account for 33% of the EU population. Blocking of legislation: Legislation cannot be adopted if there is a blocking minority against it. Four countries, representing at least 35% of the EU population, can block the adoption of any legislation.
What else is new in Europe? After Brexit, the European Union will have a new geographical centre: on the basis of calculations by the French IGN (Institut Français de l’Information Géographique
photo: Christoph Rose
et Forestière), it will be a small village in Franconia (Bavaria) near Würzburg, with the name of Gadheim: 9°, 54 min, 7 sec East and 49°, 50 min and 37 sec North.
What’s next? On 11th February 2020 President Ursula von der Leyen discussed the post-Brexit period with the European Parliament.
Excerpts of her speech: “It is just two weeks ago that we bid farewell to our British friends by singing ‘Auld Lang Syne’. Since then, we set our sights on the future of our relations with the United Kingdom. And we will enter these negotiations with the highest ambition. Prime Minister Johnson said in Greenwich, earlier this month, that the United Kingdom will be ‘a global champion of free trade’. Frankly, this is music to our ears. And when we agreed the Political Declaration with the United Kingdom, we ambitioned a zero tariffs and a zero quotas trade relation for all goods. Something we have never ever before offered to anybody else. A new model of trade, a unique ambition in terms of access to the Single Market. But of course, this would require corresponding guarantees on fair competition and the protection of social, environmental and consumer standards. In short: this is, plainly and simply, the level playing field. We are ready to discuss all different models of trade agreement. But all these models, whatever you choose, have one thing in common: They all come not only with rights but also with obligations for both sides… (…) We can trigger an upward dynamic competition that would benefit both the United Kingdom and the European Union. To our British friends I say: it is in our mutual interest. And most importantly – it would be consistent with the values we share. Values of openness, values of fairness and values of social justice and free enterprise. These are not only values for good old times. These are values to stay”. Source: European Commission
> web Commission proposal https://bit.ly/38NkHqi
Redistribution of seats in the EP after Brexit
Graphik: ESDU/Celine Merz
Is the European Union’s foreign policy prepared for the consequences of Brexit? Brexit is a historic mistake
by Hilde Vautmans MEP, Member of the AFET Committee, European Parliament, Brussels/ Strasbourg
Brexit is a historic mistake, which will have consequences for decades to come. A mistake with consequences that are still unknown for the relations between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK), particularly in the area of defence, security and home affairs. Nevertheless, we must assume that without the necessary deepening and strengthening of the Union that is now needed to compensate for this loss, our Union risks being poorer.
A lack of clarity on security and defence matters If focusing on the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), we can expect Brexit to ease the traditional pressure on CFSP. Here, the integration was often hampered due to longterm British opposition and this should now no longer be the case. Analysing Brexit from a broader defence point of view, the situation changes dramatically, depending on the negotiations over the future relationship and the UK’s intentions, which remain unclear. The British military commands a wide array of troops, advanced military technologies and weapons as well as possessing a high degree of military expertise. To add to this, the EU post Brexit has lost one of its permanent seats within the UN Security Council. Moreover, the Union, in the context of nuclear deterrence, lost a Member State with nuclear capabilities. The withdrawal of the UK must also be assessed in regard to the fight against terrorism. While the United Kingdom and the European Union committed to addressing potential disruptions to intelligence sharing and justice and home affairs cooperation, there is a distinct lack of clarity on these matters. For decades, the UK’s opposition to defence integration was one of the biggest obstacles for the EU’s foreign and security policy. Without the British “resistance” to deeper EU security integration and cooperation, the potential for previously unimagined political commitment is now tangible and the Union must take this new reality as a fundamental and game changing opportunity. One of the key remaining challenges for the Union to overcome, which will define once and for all our Union’s ambition or lack thereof to be a de facto global actor, is the need to abolish the rule of unanimity. We cannot build a sizeable CFSP if permanently hostage to this rule, which even recently has stymied the development of a coherent and united external policy. It is high time for the European Union to play a stronger role, both in our neighbourhood and by using its potential power effectively on the world stage. This is especially pressing in the current geopolitical climate where certain state actors actively try to undermine the Union’s internal and external political agendas. But for this to work, the European Union must commit and speak with one voice. As the British Winston Churchill once said: “A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.” It is of vital importance than we shed the current pessimism and rise to the occasion. The European Union must take its security concerns in its stride and use them to its benefit. It is crucial to act now. Hilde Vautmans MEP was born in 1972. She has been a Member of the European Parliament since 2015. She sits in the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) and is a member of the Delegation to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (DACP). In the European Parliament, Ms Vautmans is the foreign affairs coordinator for the Renew Europe Group and acts as delegation leader of the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats party (Open Vld). Before becoming a MEP, Ms Vautmans was a member of the Belgium House of Representatives from 2003 to 2010.
NATO is our security – Europe is our soul!
It’s too early to bury NATO
18 The European: Do all NATO members have the willingness to follow the current logic to do more for our common defence? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: I am convinced they do. The time when Europeans could assume that the United States would take care of our security for granted is over. The European: So can we say that Macron got the ball rolling and Member States came together to find common solutions? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: I think that it was President Trump himself who started the polemic. The outcome of our discussions is very positive because we now have a better common understanding and we are having very intense discussions on financial issues. But we can’t even blame President Trump. It was the American administration that warned us long before about the need for more European defence spending, and we somehow ignored it. I think President Trump simply put it more in a straightforward way. The European: Would you say that Europeans have understood that they have to spend more on defence, because if they don’t, the US will no longer be the reliable security provider for Europe? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: Yes, we have to make efforts and the more we do for our defence, the more we can rely on the US. The European: You mentioned that the geopolitical situation is changing. Russia is still occupying part of Crimea and is becomT he European: Mr Garisons, you are the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Defence in Latvia. Some weeks ago, the French President shocked the community by saying that the Alliance is “brain-dead”. How was that received in Riga? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: Of course we had and still have discussions in Latvia regarding that comment, but let us be serious: I think it’s too early to bury NATO. The Alliance has gone through difficult periods. Latvia is one of the youngest members of NATO, but even in our experience from 2004 to today, we have had different and difficult discussions in and with NATO. Finding common solutions is one of its strengths. We discuss issues and agree on decisions – we don’t receive orders and we are grateful for ideas that push the Alliance forwards. And this is the case with Macron. The European: Will NATO be able to adapt to the new political and strategic situation in the world? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: I believe that we are going through a period of transformation. Not only in NATO, but in general, because geopolitics change and the field of security and defence is very much concerned. Consequently, we also have to change our attitude towards security and defence issues. Interview with Jānis Garisons, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence of Latvia, Riga “ The time when Europeans could assume that the United States would take care of our security for granted is over.”
We make the population aware that our democracy is under foreign pressure, thereby building up the resilience of the society. The European: Let me come to European defence. What could be done to give the EU more of a profile in defence? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: My first point is reiterating that we should not write off our transatlantic ties and NATO. Looking globally, Europeans, Americans and Canadians are part of one world and as democratic countries we shouldn’t have differences in global competition. The European: And what do you propose? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: As Europeans, we have to start to understand what capabilities we need, and fill the gaps where we need money. We also have to define our common strategic goals as a pillar in NATO. The European: But don’t we have a common security strategy in the Union? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: Yes, we do, but there is still a variety of goals in security policy. And finally I would say that we need a leadership in Europe. The European: Whom do you see playing this role? Great Britain as a nuclear power is out and the other nuclear power and member of the UN Security Council is France. Ja ¯ nis Garisons: I am convinced that Germany, as the economic power in the centre of Europe, can lead the EU and strengthen its military capabilities, because without a powerful Germany there will not be no credible European defence. The European: You mentioned the European pillar in NATO. How would the US react to a real European pillar? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: In the previous years, I had many meetings in Washington and I would say that the US is very interested in Europeans being capable of reacting and supporting the NATO pillar. I don’t see big differences in that. The European: Allow me a final, very personal question. If you had to decide between NATO and the European Union, what would be your decision? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: There is no decision to make because NATO is our security and Europe is our soul. The European: Thank you, State Secretary Garison, for this exchange of ideas. The interview was led by Hartmut Bühl and Céline Merz. ing the security provider in other regions. China is becoming more and more effective with its economyand, at the same time, is raising the quality of its armed forces. How do you see the geostrategic situation of your country? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: For the Baltic States, there is always pressure from Russia. Geopolitical shifts are only the beginning of a process and they have consequences for everybody. Will it be the end of dominance or will there be new dominant powers? In parallel, there is an ethical shift: the attractiveness of democracy is actually diminishing. The number of countries all over the world following democratic developments is lower than before, but this is not due to our own policies. But I do see a certain danger for our democracies. The European: Could it be that the complexity of governance in democracy, with all the internal problems and external threats, has become difficult? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: Our society has become more and more complex. This complexity has made us very vulnerable. It is important to understand that security is not only defence against conventional threats. We are also facing asymmetric threats: information warfare, psychological warfare, cyber issues and don’t forget social media via the internet. It is difficult to find solutions for law and order in democracy, and in principal people like order. They often look to authoritarian regimes where you can control everything and where you can live law and order in another, repressive, way. The European: The question is how to make democratic societies resilient to dangers to democracy. What means do you apply to make your society confident that you, as a government, have the adapted solution against outside and inside threats? What is your experience? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: Yes, in Latvia, we are trying to make our society become somewhat resilient. We are working in parallel with the population. We are strengthening our defence capabilities against exterior threats, and we have allies, because we are not able to achieve external – or as we say, territorial – security alone. And we show solidarity by supporting NATO and the EU in out of area missions. The European: This is visible, but how are you strengthening Latvian society in general? Ja ¯ nis Garisons: We started doing this by introducing, for example, defence curriculum in schools, teaching first aid and basic military knowledge. We teach cyber security and what can be done to prevent it, or how to act in the case of a cyber-attack. Jānis Garisons is State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Latvia since August 2015. He holds a MA from the University of Latvia and a MA in Strategic Studies from the US Army War College. Mr Garisons first established his career at Latvia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he served as the Director of the Security Policy Department, before joining the Ministry of Defence. In his position as Undersecretary of State - Policy Director, he has been an architect and organiser of Latvia’s defence policy, defence planning and international operations’ policy.
The European Union in a polycentric world: what next?
A view from a Russian Europeanist
20 by Dr Nadezhda Arbatova, Head of European Studies, IMEMO, Academy of Science, Moscow
The end of the East-West confrontation removed the threat of a global conflict. This has, however, resulted in the crisis of the Euro-Atlantic partnership, namely the growing security gap between the USA and the European Union, the emergence of a new China with global ambitions, the rise of the assertive post-Soviet Russia and numerous regional actors – India, Japan, Turkey, Iran, Brazil and others. Compared to the European “concert of nations” of the nineteenth century and the bipolarity of the twentieth century, today’s international system is far more complex and global in scale. States and transnational players can be simultaneous rivals and partners at different levels and on different issues.
Multilateral cooperation versus new bipolarity However, the modern polycentric world is strongly influenced by the evolving balance between two opposite trends – multilateral cooperation on global challenges and a new bipolarity. This new bipolarity is developing within the same capitalist system and can be defined as a growing divide between liberal and authoritarian capitalism. The former is most vividly represented by the EU, the USA and their allies, while the latter by China and Russia. Strictly speaking, nowadays, the only fully-fledged power centre is the United States, whose economic and military potential guarantees its political influence in the world’s affairs. China is approaching these standards. The EU and Russia represent two opposite models. The former is an economic power centre while the latter is a military one. In order to become a real centre of power, Russia needs to modernise its economy based on exports of raw materials. There is a growing understanding in the most liberal part of the Russian political elite that without radical modernisation, it will be marginalised in the modern world. However, economic modernisation cannot but go hand in hand with Russia’s political modernisation. In order to attract FDI into non-oil and gas industries, Russia will have to re-establish a reasonable and balanced division of state powers and create an independent judiciary as well as arbitration bodies able to manage and restrain the bureaucracy and corruption. It is also recognised that Russia cannot achieve modernisation outside the technologically advanced international community, first and foremost represented by the United States, the European Union, Japan and others. The current crisis in the Russia-West relations makes modernisation prospects unlikely. Aside from this, the modern polycentric world is strongly influenced by a relatively new phenomenon – the global spread of anti-globalism or populist nationalism. Despite the common features, this phenomenon has a pronounced national specificity – egoistic nationalism in the US, neo-imperial nationalism in China, great power nationalism in Russia and anti-European nationalism in the EU. These trends are developing in the context of increased regional conflicts, the threat of international terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Strategic autonomy for Europe There is a recognition of these profound changes and a growing understanding that the security of Europe is becoming more and more a European cause. This is reflected by the idea of EU strategic autonomy, PESCO, and the heated discussions about the creation of a European army. The Euro-Atlantic partnership, as it was during the Cold War, no longer exists today. And with the current uncertainty about the readiness of the United States to come to the aid of its allies, Europeans have no other
choice than to think about their own defence. In order to become an influential power centre in international relations, the European Union needs strategic autonomy. It should be noted that the desire of the EU for military autonomy does not cause much concern at the official level of Russian leadership. Russian President Vladimir Putin has openly recognised that the desire of Europeans to be independent, self-sufficient and sovereign in the field of defence and security is completely natural. Apparently, this can be explained by, firstly, the fact that in the eyes of the Kremlin, the creation of a fully-fledged European army seems to be a very distant prospect. Secondly, the growing discrepancy between the Euro-Atlantic allies fully meets Russia’s interests, given its troubled relations with NATO. Nowadays, the prospects for security cooperation between Russia and the EU look illusory, but in the case of solving fundamental contradictions in their relations resulting from the conflict in Ukraine, they could cooperate in countering common threats, above all at the regional level. Photo: ChiralJon, CC BY 2.0, Flickr.com
The normalisation of Russia-West relations? There is no doubt that peace in Ukraine is a fundamental precondition for the normalisation of Russia-West relations. However, Russian leadership sees the current international order as being dominated by the United States and NATO, presenting an existential threat to Russia’s security and interests. This system, found generally satisfactory by the West, has failed to satisfy Russia in its recovery from the crisis of the 1990s. Attempts to transform the existing Euro-Atlantic security system have not yielded any noticeable results. On many occasions Russia sent messages (Putin’s Munich speech of 2007, Medvedev’s proposal on a new European Security treaty of 2010) to its Western partners about its deep dissatisfaction with the existing system of European security. Consequently, the appeal to the international community to come back to the unfinished business of the past and create a genuine post-bipolar order, or at least commonly agree on rules of behaviour, appears justified.
Europe’s way ahead No doubt, European integration is the greatest project of all times. But it is also true that the European Union is currently experiencing the most difficult period in its entire history, being under the pressure of several crises – consequences of the world economic and financial crisis, migration crisis, crisis in relations with Russia and others. But it is an anti-European nationalism in some of the EU Member States – and nothing else – that creates a truly existential threat to European integration and its proper place in a polycentric world. It is obvious that the vector of the EU defence policy will be largely determined by the EU’s relations with its key partners. Most likely, NATO will be transforming towards a functional division of labour between the allies, where Europe will play a regional role in ensuring international security, and the US a global one. The Chinese challenge – China’s growing economic and military power, doubled with its global ambitions – will also remain in the foreseeable future a strong incentive to build the EU defence potential, and under the best scenario to meet this challenge together with its allies and partners including Russia.
Dr Nadezhda Arbatova
is head of the department of Eu
ropean Policy at the Institute for
World Economy and Internation
al Relations (IMEMO) within the
Russian Academy of Science. She
Photo: private
leads the discussion forum “European Dialogue” and is Vice-Presi
dent of the Russian Pugwash committee. Ms Arbatova is also member of the Council on Security and Defence Policy and member of the French Institute for Higher Studies on National Defence (IHEDN). Her publications cover the relations between the European Union and Russia, European security and Russia’s foreign policy.
Enlargement policy must be credible, merit based and serious Hamster in the wheel: credibility and EU Balkan policy
by Gerald Knaus, Founding Chairman, European Stability Initiative (ESI), Berlin
1. A two-stage process: the goal of talks remains full accession, while the intermediate goal is to offer Single Market entry. In a paper circulated in late 2019, France suggested different stages. This idea can be simplified: there are two stages. The first stage is joining the Single Market in the way Finland, Sweden and Austria did in 1994. Joining the Single Market by 2025 would be a realistic goal for Balkan frontrunners. Joining the Single Market by 2030 should be a realistic goal for all Western Balkan countries. This should only depend on them. They would then enjoy the four freedoms – the free movement of goods, capital, services, and labour – that Norway and Iceland enjoy today. 2. Opening and closing all chapters together: instead of opening and closing chapters one by one, they could all be opened at the beginning and closed all at once. The key measure of progress is not a formal one, but substantive changes measured in progress reports. 3. The rule of law becoming truly central: all democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions must be fully met before any country can join the Single Market. Rule of law conditions would be as demanding for joining the Single Market as for full membership, and the monitoring of these even stricter. 4. Reversibility: if any country seriously violates basic human rights or undermines the independence of the judiciary it should be possible to suspend the accession process with the votes of a simple majority. Suspension should have real effects, including freezing pre-accession funding. And it should also be possible to restart talks with a simple majority. Carrying out the reforms needed to join the Single Market and to join the EU has been phenomenally beneficial for peripheral economies. North Macedonia today is at the level of development where Lithuania was in 1999. Serbia today is where Estonia was in 1999. 2018 Bosnia is the Romania of 1999. Countries can change. Enlargement policy can have a major impact. For this it must be credible, merit based and serious. It has happened before. It can happen again. > web: www.esiweb.org B alkan enlargement was in crisis even before EU leaders failed to agree in 2019 to open accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania. Unless there is a change in methodology and pace, no Western Balkan country is likely to be a member of the EU by 2030. On the issue of North Macedonia and Albania, the European Union remains divided. There are three groups of countries: The Netherlands supports opening accession talks only with North Macedonia. France is opposed to separating North Macedonia and Albania and argues that it is better not to start talks with either. Italy insists that talks must start with both. The result of this division is a stalemate. If Paris, Rome and The Hague could find a joint common position, the rest of the EU might rally around it. How might this be achieved? The French position is that the accession process itself needs to change. Without changes in the way talks are organised, Macedonian and Albanian reformers will soon feel like hamsters in a wheel, realising that, regardless of how much effort they make, they are not getting closer to joining the EU even by 2030. To understand why, look at what happened to Montenegro. In eight years, Montenegro managed to close only three negotiating chapters. Two of these were opened and closed on the same day. Did the government in Podgorica stop working? Did the EU decide, politically, that it simply does not want to close any chapters? Reforming the accession process According to the Commission’s assessments, between 2015 and 2019 Montenegro made no progress in 23 chapters; advanced (slightly) in nine; and was backsliding in one. At this time Montenegro is “well advanced” – the best grade – in zero chapters. The focus on opening chapters has misled political attention. It is no indicator of progress. Credible scorecards are. Today, the EU needs to square the North Macedonia/Albania circle. But it must also reform the process, make it truly merit based and offer a credible interim goal that inspires real change. This is possible through a reform that builds on the current system but makes four crucial changes. Gerald Knaus
is ESI’s founding chairman. He spent five years working for NGOs and international organisations in Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 2001 to 2004, he was the director of the Lessons Learned Unit of the EU Pillar of the UN Mission in Kosovo. He is a founding member of the European Council on Foreign Relations and for five years he was an Associate Fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University’s Kennedy School, where he was a Visiting Fellow in 2010/2011. Photo: private
by Cristina García Fernández, Professor, Department of Economy, and David García Cantalapiedra, Professor, Department of International Relations, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM), Madrid
In recent decades, climate change has quickly become a problem that causes great concern in our society. It is a reality that climate change and its adverse consequences do not affect all regions equally: they especially harm less economically developed areas. These are generally the most fragile and least resistant to the challenges to peace and security. However, the scope of the global phenomenon implies that no country, continent or hemisphere can be exempt from suffering its impacts directly or indirectly. Therefore, there is a close link between climate change and international security, a relationship that was already pointed out, over a decade ago, in a document of the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Taking climate change impacts seriously This document asserted that climate change should be considered “a multiplier of threats with extreme existing trends, tensions and instability”. However, despite the urgency with which the international community should have acted given the irreversible nature of many of the materialisations of climate change, it does not usually appear as a priority on the international agenda. Therefore, in relation to the different security policies, we consider it necessary to focus on the holistic analysis of the close relationship between climate change and global security. Besides, the selection of proposals with a focus on these two items will prevail in a multidisciplinary and transversal way, taking into account aspects such as: armed conflicts caused by environmental degradation; intra and interstate tensions caused by the scarcity of resources (especially highlighting the case of water stress and food crises); the migratory movements caused by the drastic environmental changes; the multilateral consequences that variations of the climate system may cause for international security.
A cascade of uncertainty The creation of an agenda for security policy planning is in great difficulty due to the uncertainties and the different scenarios resulting from climate change studies. First, as an integral factor, uncertainties are inherent to climate change since we are dealing with a non-deterministic chaotic system. Only probabilistic projections can be made in the form of models that establish future scenarios or sets of (assembled or coupled) scenarios. The process to carry these out introduces a number of uncertainties, called a cascade of uncertainty, especially structural uncertainty and lack of certainty, which together form the so-called “knowledge uncertainty”. That is the non-predictability relative to projections of human behavior (for example, evolution of political systems) and to chaotic components of complex systems; the structural uncertainty derived from inadequate models, incomplete or competing conceptual
A peacekeeper of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) offers a boy a drink of water.
Photo: © UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti
frameworks, disagreement on the structure of the model, ambiguous limits or definitions of the system, significant or relatable processes omitted or incorrect. There are uncertainties as a result of inaccurate, absent or non-representative data, inadequate special or temporary resolution, changing or poorly defined parameters.
Difficulties to adapt climate models Second, there are technical difficulties in adapting the Global Climate Models (GCMs), designed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to valid Regional Climate Models (RCMs). These and the creation of alternative RCMs (even sub regional), not only by the IPCC, but by other programmes, actually prevents the creation of a whole series of long-term policies due to the large differences between the forecasts of the models used. This is mainly observed in the impacts of the main parameters that will severely affect safety in general, such as temperature increase, rainfall and Sea Level Rise (SLR). In this sense, expectations about future trends in climate change have been worsening rapidly, and, as a consequence, so has its negative impact on international, and therefore on human, security: “Most don’t remember what caused the Syria conflict to start. It started because of a 10-year drought.” “And folks having to move from their family farms into cities where they then were not getting any support, and therefore a civil war began” 1 .
A serious threat to security 58 senior retired US military and national security leaders are advocating for the view that climate change is a serious threat to security. The group gave a few examples of these challenges in an open letter from 5th March to the Trump administration. The letter was sponsored by CCS and the American Security Project: “Around the world, climate change is a ‘threat multiplier,’ making other security threats worse. Its effects are even used by our adversaries as a weapon of war; ISIS used water shortages in Iraq, in part driven by a changing climate, to cement their hold on the population during their reign of terror from 2014 to 2017.” 2
Future trends and expected impacts The negative impact on food security has also been worsening. From this point of view, the latest report of the National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2030: Alternative
Worlds”, echoes the IPCC studies that point to the increase in extreme weather events: persistent droughts during the development seasons of crops and flooding of large river basins are reducing agricultural productivity. This, together with national protectionist policies, have reduced food security. Thus, SLR will affect population concentrations in coastal regions and cities, through the reduction of arable land at a faster rate than expected according to the predictions for all 2030-50 IPCC climate change models.
Pressure on military forces In this sense, the projected impacts of climate change will put pressure on our military forces in the coming decades. More forces will be required to respond due to extreme weather events in the country concerned and abroad, which will limit their ability to respond to other contingencies. The projected climate change will make training difficult and, at the same time, will put at risk the critical military logistics, transport systems and infrastructure, both inside and outside the infrastructure base. The impacts of projected climate change can be detrimental to the physical components of national critical infrastructures, while limiting their capabilities.
Damage of critical infrastructure States and the EU depend on critical infrastructure for economic prosperity, security and the essential elements of everyday life. We are already seeing how extreme heat is damaging transport infrastructure, such as roads, rail lines and airport runways. We also note that much of the energy infrastructure, including oil and gas refineries, storage tanks, power plants and electricity transmission lines, are located on coastal floodplains, where they are increasingly threatened by more intense storms, floods and SLR.
Far-reaching economic impacts The projected increase in temperatures, fires and droughts will strain energy systems with a greater demand for refrigeration, possibly dislocate and reduce food production, and cause wa
“States and the EU depend on critical infrastructure for economic prosperity, security and the essential elements of everyday life.” Dr Cristina García Fernández is a professor of economy at the University Computense de Madrid (UCM). She received a PhD in economics and businessadministration from the UCM in 1998. MsGarcía Fernández coordinates the international masters “The European Union and the Mediterranean” at the EuroMediterranean University Institute (EMUI) in Madrid and received the CIDAN Special award “European Awareness of Security and Defence” in November 2019 in Berlin.
Dr David García Cantalapiedra is a professor of public law and international relations at the University Computense of Madrid (UCM). He holds a PhD in political science and sociology from the UCM. He is the Director of the research programme on US foreign policy at the Instituto Franklin-UAH in Madrid. Mr García Cantalapiedra is also a member of the NATO Defence Threat Reduction Agency in Brussels. His main areas of research are geopolitics & strategy, and the militarisation of space.
ter shortages. Since much of the critical infrastructure is owned or operated by the private sector, government solutions alone will not address the full range of climate-related problems. The projected impacts of climate change will also threaten the main sectors of the economy. Observed warming and other climate changes are causing far-reaching impacts, including international trade, and will be affected by the projected climate change.
Vulnerability of populations The projected impacts of climate change will affect the main sectors of our society and will accentuate social support systems. As coastal regions become increasingly populated and developed, more frequent or severe storms will threaten vulnerable populations in these areas and increase the requirements for emergency services in terms of frequency and severity of storms. Extreme weather events and / or simultaneous or widespread forest fires, accompanied by massive evacuations and degraded critical infrastructure could exceed local and federal government resources and require greater use of military and private sector support.
1 US Congress. The Need for Leadership to Combat Climate Change and Protect National Security. April 9, 2019. https://bit.ly/2Udxtt9 2https://bit.ly/2xslT5q
Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal and Commissioner for Climate Action Policy
Leading the work on the European Green Deal for enshrining the 2050 climate neutrality target into EU law/ Extending the Emissions Trading System to the maritime sector/Designing the Biodiversity Strategy for 2030/Supporting the zero-pollution ambition FRANS TIMMERMANS
President
URSULA VON DER LEYEN Representing the Commission in Council and
Parliament and at international summits/Creating a new momentum for democracy, protection of values and social democracy combined with efforts for a stronger Europe in the world.
Vice-President for
Values and Transparency
Coordinating the European Democracy Action Plan/Building resilience of democratic systems/Countering disinformation while preserving freedom of expression, freedom of the press and media pluralism/Coordinating upholding the rule of law VĚRA JOUROVÁ Vice-President and EU High Representative for CFSP
Make the Union more strategic in external relations/Building a strong European Defence Union/Meeting regularly with national parliaments/Taking part in Citizens’ Dialogues across the Union/Chairing the Commissions’ Group on a stronger Europe JOSEP BORRELL FONTELLES MARGARÍTIS SCHINÁS Vice-President for Promoting our European Way of Life
Coordinating the New Pact on Migration/ Coordinating the development of a
European Security Union/Coordinating the strengthening of prevention,
detection and response measures in hybrid threats/Leading the fight against anti-Semitism.
Commissioner for Energy
Promote a power system largely based on renewables increased interconnectivity and improved energy storage/ Support Europe’s electricity interconnection target and developing cross-border cooperation on renewable-energy installations and networks KADRI SIMSON Commissioner for Economy Designing Unemployment Benefit Scheme/Launching Invest Programme/Implementing Sustainable
Europe Investment Plan/Reviewing Energy Taxation Directive/Preparing proposal for a Carbon Border Tax and/Continuing to fight tax fraud. PAOLO GENTILONI Commissioner for Health and Food Safety
Ensure Europe’s supply of affordable med icines/Support the EU’s pharmaceutical
industry leadFocus on full implementation of the EU One Health Action Plan and Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan/ Put forward sustainable food and zero-pollution STELLA KYRIAKIDES
Commissioner for Budget and Administration
Developing a new human resources strategy to continue the modernisation of the Commission/Ensuring adequate financial,
human and institutional resources/ Achieving the EU’s goals and ensure a smooth and swift transition to the long-term EU budget JOHANNES HAHN
Commissioner for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education and Youth
Creating by 2025 a European Education Area 2025 by making it easier to move between countries/Ensuring swift agreement on, and full implementation of the future Horizon Europe programme/Ensuring implementation of New European Agenda for Culture MARIYA GABRIEL
The six Priorities of the Commission for 2019–2024 1. A European Green Deal 2. An economy that works for people 3. A Europe fit for the digital age 4. Promoting the European way of life 5. A stronger Europe in the world 6. A new push for European democracy
Commissioner for Trade
Leading the reform of the WTO on subsidies, forced transfer of technologies and dispute settlement/Strengthening Europe’s
leadership in trade/Monitoring implementation of climate, environmental and labour protections in trade agreements, with zero-tolerance of child labour PHIL HOGAN
Commissioner for Internal Market Enhancing Europe’s technological sovereignty/Investing in the next frontier of
technologies/Leading the work on EU approach on artificial intelligence: Building a market for cybersecurity/Developing a European strategy on data THIERRY BRETON Commissioner for Environment, Oceans and Fisheries
Putting forward a new Biodiversity Strategy for 2030/Looking at Natura
2000: deforestation, land degradation/ Protected species habitats, and sustainable seas and oceans/ Working on zero-pollution ambition and towards plastic-free oceans VIRGINIJUS SINKEVIČIUS
Commissioner for Justice
Leading the work on consumer protection, notably for cross-border and online
transactions/Focusing on awareness raising to promote a rule-of –
law culture among EU citizens/ Improving judicial cooperation in the EU DIDIER REYNDERS
Executive Vice-President for Europe fit for the Digital Age, and Commissioner for Competition Steering work on a new Digital Services Act/ Strengthening
enforcement of EU rules on competition/Co-leading build-up of a strategy for small & medium-sized businesses and
start-ups/Developing a long-term strategy for Europe’s industrial future/Ensuring synergies between civil, defence and space industries. MARGRETHE VESTAGER
Vice-President for Promoting our European Way of Life
Coordinating the New Pact on Migration/ Coordinating the development of a
European Security Union/Coordinating the strengthening of prevention,
detection and response measures in hybrid threats/Leading the fight against anti-Semitism.
Vice-President for Democracy and Demography
Preparing Conference on the Future of Europe/ Responding to challenges of the demographic
change/Supporting groups affected to reconcile work and family, aging workforce in rural and urban areas / Paying attention on long-term impacts, notably care and pensions, and on how to foster active aging. ŠUICA DUBRAVKA Executive-Vice President for an
Economy that Works for People, and Commissioner for Financial Services Implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights/Strengthening the role of social dialogue at European level/Helping to prepare the Tripartite Social Summit/Strengthening the accountability of the economic governance/Improving financial stability for investors and savers. VALDIS DOMBROVSKIS
Vice-President for Interinstitutional Relations and Foresight
Strengthening the special partnership with the European Parliament and being responsible for relations with the Conference of Committee Chairs / Leading the relations with national parliaments, advisory bodies and the European Ombudsman MAROŠ ŠEFČOVIČ
Ensure Europe’s supply of affordable medicines/Support the EU’s pharmaceutical
industry leadFocus on full implementation of the EU One Health Action Plan and Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan/ Put forward sustainable food and zero-pollution
Commissioner for Agriculture Developing a long-term vision for rural areas/Realising food security, environmental and climate objectives/ Contributing to the new ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy for sustainable
food by improving the agrifood sector in sustainability including organic production JANUSZ WOJCIECHOWSKI JANEZ LENARČIČ Commissioner for Crisis Management Strengthening the Emergency Response Coordination Centre as the EU’s single
operational crises response hub/Coordinating prevention and preparedness for emergencies/Supporting Member States to develop disaster risk strategies
Commissioner for Environment, Oceans and Fisheries
Putting forward a new Biodiversity Strategy for 2030/Looking at Natura
2000: deforestation, land degradation/ Protected species habitats, and sustainable seas and oceans/ Working on zero-pollution ambition and towards plastic-free oceans
Commissioner for Home Affairs
Developing new EU internal security strategy/ Implementing laws on the interoperability of EU’s IT/Improving cooperation in law enforcement/Developing a New Pact on Migration and Asylum/Advancing measures to prevent and respond to terrorism YLVA JOHANSSON Commissioner for Transport
Developing a strategy for sustainable and smart mobility/Making the transport sector fit for a clean digital economy/
Promoting sustainable and alternative fuel transports / Reviewing the Energy Taxation Directive, ending fossil-fuel subsidies ADINA-IOANA VĂLEAN
Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement
Strengthening relations with the EU’s neighbouring countries / Speeding up structural and institutional reforms in the Western Balkans/ Optimising EU financial instruments
through innovative approaches to financial support and public-private partnerships
Commissioner for International Partnerships
Building inclusive and equitable partnerships to reduce global poverty and support sustainable development / Surveying EU’s international cooperation and development policy / Promoting EU’s values as democracy, rule of law, good governance and human rights JUTTA URPILAINEN Commissioner for Cohesion and Reforms
Finding with co-legislators a timely agreement on the Reform Support Programme and the Budgetary Instrument for
Convergence and Competitiveness/ Ensuring with the Member States full and effective use of funds and appropriate control on expenditure ELISA FERREIRA
Commissioner for Equality
Strengthening EU’s commitment to inclusion and equality irrespective of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation/ Leading the fight against discrimination and developing EU anti-discrimination legislation
Commissioner for Jobs and Social Rights Submitting a legal instrument to ensure that every worker in EU receives a fair minimum wage and realising a European unemployment reinsurance / Strengthening
European social protection systems / Developing European Action Plan for social economy NICOLAS SCHMIT
