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Debalina Ghoshal, Brussels/Kashmir The India-China nuclear equation The nuclear threshold remains high
The India-China nuclear equation
The nuclear threshold between India and China remains high
by Debalina Ghoshal, Asia Pacific fellow, East-West Institute, Brussels/Kashmir
Nuclear weapons have served as weapons for deterrence and a currency of power, status and prestige. Different states have different reasons to develop nuclear weapons. Both China and India have – China following the Korean War that left China susceptible to nuclear blackmail from the United States, while India’s road to nuclear weapons was to enhance its international stature and make nuclear weapons as a status of power and prestige. However, strengthening deterrence remained the central focus for both states.
Two conditional “no-first use” strategies For China, going nuclear in the 1960s, the main focus was to strengthen its nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and the former Soviet Union (now Russia). Nuclear weapons have enabled China to display its assertiveness in the South China Sea as well as in the East China Sea where it is entangled into a myriad of territorial disputes with several countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan. Peking has adopted a ‘no-first use’ doctrine, however, this is not relevant for the territories that China considers its own.
For India, on the other hand, China’s nuclear weapons are a direct threat to its security considering that they are both entangled in border disputes in Arunachal Pradesh – an Indian state that China claims. India also faces the threat from Pakistan, therefore, its nuclear deterrence is vis-à-vis both China and Pakistan. It has also adopted a ‘no-first use’ doctrine, with the exception that it does not apply to states that use chemical and biological warheads against it. However, while China is a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), India continues to remain a nuclear power (NWP). China adopted a ‘limited nuclear deterrence’ posture in the recent past – a shift from its ‘minimum deterrent’ posture. India continues to maintain its ‘credible minimum deterrence’ posture, even in the present circumstances. China already possesses an intercontinental ballistic missile capability (ICBM) in its nuclear arsenal while India is yet to develop the same. Though the Agni-V intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) has a range of 5000 km, many, especially the Chinese, are worried that the missile can reach an intercontinental range.
Divergences and convergences However, amid the divergences, there are also some convergences. Considering that both the countries have adopted a ‘conditional no-first use’ doctrine, both rely on the survivability of their nuclear forces. For this, both countries have worked to strengthen this survivability.
China’s arsenal For instance, Peking has constructed deep and strong tunnels where it stores its missile facilities to avoid enemy detection and make it difficult for adversaries to completely destroy their nuclear forces. It has developed dummy silos for its silo-based missiles and has replaced its liquid fuelled ballistic missiles with its solid propelled DF-21s. Liquid propelled missiles re
quire greater launch preparation time. Hence,
Debalina Ghoshal
subjected to adversary attack, solid propellants provide greater stability with increased mobility and greater launch time preparation, thereby reducing the scope of ‘use them or lose them.’ China has also worked on ‘seabased nuclear deterrence’ for strengthened counter- and second-strike capabilities. China also keeps its missiles de-mated from its warheads at a de-alerted state. Not only this, China has worked on the post-launch survivability of its nuclear forces by developing counter-measures on its land- sea-, and aerialbased nuclear forces against enemy air and missile defence systems. Missiles that travel lofted and depressed trajectories can evade enemy missile defence. China has developed Multiple Independently Targetable Vehicles (MIRVs) after years of struggling with nuclear warhead miniaturisation process. It has also made efforts in the field of Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRV), another counter-measure to evade enemy missile defence systems, and is working on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) that could be mounted atop ballistic missiles and evade missile defence systems. Photo: © Guillaume Le Bloas, stock.adobe.com
India’s nuclear potential India has also worked on the survivability of its nuclear forces and its nuclear deterrence relies on this. Solid propelled ballistic missiles, mobile ballistic missiles, keeping nuclear warheads de-mated from their delivery systems, and canister-launched missiles are all ways to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces. Just like China, India too has relied on a counter-strike capability. Not only this, New Delhi is also working on post launch survivability methods like the introduction of MIRVs and other counter measures.
Photo: private
is a Non Resident Fellow with the Council on International Policy, Canada and Asia Pacific fellow with the East West Institute, Brussels. She specialises in regional stability with issues pertaining to nuclear, missile, and missile defence and space issues. She is the author of the monograph ‘Missile Development in the Middle East’ with the Middle East Institute.
Strategic stability in the region Both India and China, are striving for the protection of their nuclear capabilities. Therefore, both are developing a missile defence capability to strengthen their no-first use doctrine. On both sides, sophisticated air and missile defence systems should prevent adversaries from launching nuclear strikes against China or India (or both could be deterred from launching nuclear strikes against each other), thereby reducing the scope of ‘use them or lose them’ for weapons, and convincing the state to retain its ‘no-first use doctrine’. Both India and China, at least at the moment, do not believe in developing tactical nuclear weapons or battlefield nuclear weapons, despite the capability to do so. Both claim that they do not believe in any kind of arms race. It is probably this ‘no-first use’ doctrine adopted by the two countries, coupled with their strengthened nuclear force survivability, which has led to the nuclear threshold remaining high between India and China. This has resulted in strategic stability in the region.
1 NWS (Nuclear Weapon State): Permanent nuclear weapon countries (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, United States of America). 2 NWP (Nuclear Weapon Power): Countries that have developed nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but are not (yet) members of the 5 Nuclear Weapon States (e.g. India, Israel, Pakistan)
+++ NEWS +++
A nuclear Force can’t be shared
(ed/hb, Paris) On 7th February 2020, the French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech on defence strategy and nuclear dissuasion at the Ecole Militaire in Paris, the same place where President Charles de Gaulle had developed the “force de frappe” and the French strategy of nuclear deterrence. In his speech, Macron made it clear that the country’s nuclear forces “are not directed towards any specific country” and that “France
has always refused that nuclear weapons be considered as battlefield weapons”. He reaffirmed that France will never engage in a nuclear battle or any forms of graduated response. The French President pleaded for a strong and autonomous European defence, where France - as the only nuclear power in Europe after Brexit - will fulfil its responsibilities. He offered European partners a strategic dialogue on the nuclear protection of European territory, and he suggested that they develop together a coherent strategy to reduce nuclear weapons. But the French President evidently didn’t have in mind to open the discussion to the sharing of France’s nuclear power. The credo of Charles de Gaulle, that a nation can only employ nuclear weapons for the protection of its own country, respecting retaliation, is still valid.
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