Christian Cambon, Paris Europe’s strategic autonomy A precondition for European security

Europe’s strategic autonomy

A pillar of a renewed NATO and a precondition for European security

outcome is mainly due to the process of European integration, though the people in Europe tend not to give much credit for this to the European Union. Rather, they blame it for failing to solve their everyday difficulties, even though that was not what EU was originally designed for. Secondly, and this is partly related to the previous point, Europeans have largely given up on providing for their own security, a situation not seen since the fall of the Roman empire. The primary cause of this historically extraordinary situation was the rivalry between the United States and Russia during the Cold War. It led the United States to assume most of the continent’s defence up to now. But as the current US President and his Democratic predecessor have made clear, the United States now considers its main rival to be China, which has led it to divert part of its efforts from Europe and the Middle East to the Pacific region. From this perspective, the American president’s statements questioning the security guarantee promised by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty tend to suggest that the United States considers the original grounds for the creation of NATO, i.e. the threat from Russia, to no longer be so relevant. Thirdly, today Europe is fully integrated into a global economic, social and political context from which it cannot extricate itself and which is developing in a way that Europe influences less and less. Migration flows, about which Europeans have struggled to agree upon a common management, are generated by crises on other continents, whether in the Middle East or in Africa. Likewise, terrorist networks are now globalised, and attacks W ith the issue of the European Defence Fund (EDF) budget, discussions on the European Union’s multiannual financial perspectives have highlighted the question of Europe’s strategic autonomy. On this subject, it should first of all be borne in mind that strategic autonomy is based not only on defence and the existence of a European defence technological and industrial base (DTIB); it also involves a broad range of sectors of the civilian economy. Defence issues have changed in our history Defence issues, however, cast a particularly clear light on the challenges and choices Europeans are facing. Today, we might say that the 20 th century has, in a way, brought Europe back to its position before the modern era. Until the end of the Middle Ages, Europe was just a reasonably well-populated and developed region, with an influence that did not extend greatly beyond its geographical area. The considerable technological and economic advance that Europe gained over the rest of the world from the 16 th century onwards has been levelled out in the last century by two world wars, economic crises, and the partition of the continent in the context of the Cold War. However, there are three important differences between the situation in which Europeans find themselves today and the one that prevailed at the end of the Middle Ages: Firstly, conflicts between European nations are now at a historical low, and this situation seems likely to last. This exceptional by Christian Cambon, Member of the French Senate and Chair of the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Paris

“Recent initiatives show that European defence is in fact already a reality.”

Christian Cambon

Photo: private

is the Chairman of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces of the French Senate. Born in 1948, he earned a Master’s degree in Public Law from the University II in Paris and he graduated from the Paris Institute of Political Studies. Mr Cambon has been a member of the French Senate since 2004, representing the constituency of Val de Marne. He is, among others, Head of the French delegation at the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO and Chairman of the parliamentary delegation to intelligence.

in Europe have often been encouraged, planned and funded from outside of Europe. The issue is therefore to know whether Europeans wish to choose their own destiny, or instead rely on other powers to ensure their security, monitor their alliances and decide their expenditures. This is not at all a matter of being in favour of, or against, the transatlantic link. First of all, Europe is currently still unable to provide for the defence of the continent on its own. Secondly, the United States is our ally for reasons that are mainly political. We share common values that underpin our alliance in NATO: the primacy of the rule of law over the use of force, the defence of the freedom of individuals and peoples, and respect for the human person – these are the foundations of the total solidarity upon which we must act as allies if any one of us is attacked. This is a political reality that is unlikely to change in the future, even if the United States chooses to redirect its focus towards the Pacific. Lastly, it’s worth remembering that it is the Americans who are calling for “better burden sharing” in the defence of our continent. All these reasons show that European strategic autonomy should not cause tension between Europe and the United States; it is, on the contrary, a condition for the achievement of the respective goals of both Americans and Europeans. By strengthening its autonomy, Europe can become a key ally for the United States on the global stage.

France wants a more efficient NATO The French request to redefine NATO’s objectives and re-evaluate the threat analysis made by the allies must be seen from this perspective. It will be difficult to maintain a military alliance if the allies cannot agree on what the threats are. For example, it is clear – as we have seen recently – that we do not define terrorist threats the same way Turkey does. It is clear that we do not share the same understanding of what it means to be in a military alliance when Turkey purchases S400 air defence systems from Russia. It is also clear that we do not share the same concept of what it means to have an alliance when Turkey seems to challenge the sovereignty of other NATO members or EU members. At France’s request, work is in progress to redefine the NATO framework: this will be good for our common security. To be effective and credible, the Atlantic Alliance must have its feet firmly planted on both sides of the Ocean, relying on the formidable military power of the United States, of course, but also on the specific capabilities of European countries. Of course, for many of our European partners, this represents a major shift. It is important that we acknowledge this and allow time for this new posture to mature. It is also important that we recognise the realities at hand, namely that today Europe largely depends on the United States for its security – a fact that no one can seriously dispute. But at the same time, it’s also true that the development of terrorist networks in the Middle East or in the Sahel region does not present the same risk for the United States and European countries. We Europeans are, so to say, on the front line, and are finding ourselves more and more often in a situation where we have to convince our American ally to join our efforts to combat these networks.

A strategic awakening in Europe For all these reasons, we are witnessing a European strategic awakening. The work of our Standing Committee in the French Senate, and especially our report on European defence 1 released last summer, has shown that analysts too often insist on seeing the glass as half-empty, disregarding the glass that is half-full with all the various elements of European defence that are gradually coming together. To mention only a few recent ones: the creation of the EDF, of course, which will make it possible to consolidate the DTIB; the bolstering of dialogue between the EU and NATO; the creation of a joint Franco-German tactical air transport unit to be based in Evreux, France; the unprecedented partnership between the French and Belgian armies, within the framework of the “CaMo” armoured vehicles programme; the creation of the “Takuba” task force allowing the participation of special forces from several European countries in the Sahel, etc. These recent initiatives show that European defence is in fact already a reality. Its further development is still necessary to ensure that it can meet the challenges of a more violent, more unstable world, and allow Europe to guarantee the security of all Europeans, and to serve the cause of peace.