THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION
The India-China nuclear equation
The nuclear threshold between India and China remains high
by Debalina Ghoshal, Asia Pacific fellow, East-West Institute, Brussels/Kashmir
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uclear weapons have served as weapons for deterrence and a currency of power, status and prestige. Different states have different reasons to develop nuclear weapons. Both China and India have – China following the Korean War that left China susceptible to nuclear blackmail from the United States, while India’s road to nuclear weapons was to enhance its international stature and make nuclear weapons as a status of power and prestige. However, strengthening deterrence remained the central focus for both states.
Two conditional “no-first use” strategies For China, going nuclear in the 1960s, the main focus was to strengthen its nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and the former Soviet Union (now Russia). Nuclear weapons have enabled China to display its assertiveness in the South China Sea as well as in the East China Sea where it is entangled into a myriad of territorial disputes with several countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan. Peking has adopted a ‘no-first use’ doctrine, however, this is not relevant for the territories that China considers its own.
that both countries “Considering have adopted a ‘conditional nofirst use’ doctrine, both rely on the survivability of their nuclear forces.”
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For India, on the other hand, China’s nuclear weapons are a direct threat to its security considering that they are both entangled in border disputes in Arunachal Pradesh – an Indian state that China claims. India also faces the threat from Pakistan, therefore, its nuclear deterrence is vis-à-vis both China and Pakistan. It has also adopted a ‘no-first use’ doctrine, with the exception that it does not apply to states that use chemical and biological warheads against it. However, while China is a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), India continues to remain a nuclear power (NWP). China adopted a ‘limited nuclear deterrence’ posture in the recent past – a shift from its ‘minimum deterrent’ posture. India continues to maintain its ‘credible minimum deterrence’ posture, even in the present circumstances. China already possesses an intercontinental ballistic missile capability (ICBM) in its nuclear arsenal while India is yet to develop the same. Though the Agni-V intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) has a range of 5000 km, many, especially the Chinese, are worried that the missile can reach an intercontinental range.
Divergences and convergences However, amid the divergences, there are also some convergences. Considering that both the countries have adopted a ‘conditional no-first use’ doctrine, both rely on the survivability of their nuclear forces. For this, both countries have worked to strengthen this survivability. China’s arsenal For instance, Peking has constructed deep and strong tunnels where it stores its missile facilities to avoid enemy detection and make it difficult for adversaries to completely destroy their nuclear forces. It has developed dummy silos for its silo-based missiles and has replaced its liquid fuelled ballistic missiles with its solid propelled DF-21s. Liquid propelled missiles re-
