THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION
In the Spotlight
+++ Iran Deal +++
All the signatories of the JCPOA differ in their rationales, but choose the Iran Deal as one solution
Israel’s perceptions of threat in an unstable geostrategic environment by Dr Rachel Suissa, University of Haifa, Haifa
S
o far, the consequences of the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan (JCPOA) on Israel’s national security can be regarded as marking the start of a new era in the Middle East, one that has provided unique opportunities to establish a balance of power based on Israel’s alliances with Arab Sunni countries. This development is a synergetic irreversible strategic trend that will not shift, even if Iran announces the complete abandonment of its nuclear program.
Opportunities and risks An indirect implication of this opportunity, going beyond mere recognition of Israel’s existence by dominant Middle Eastern states, is the long term benefit for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict when Arab states take a dominant role in re-establishing a peace process. However, until this happens, the muted reaction of the Arab Sunni world to an event such as the Jerusalem declaration is explained by its deep historical enmity with Iran. These consequences of the JCPOA might reveal the signatories’ strategic weaknesses. They cannot envision the significance of this development which, for the time being, has removed the issue of Palestinian statehood from the global agenda while we all wait for Trump’s peace plan. The risks Israel faces in terms of the Iran deal paradoxically indicate that it is the opportune moment to switch to risk assessment. This stands at the centre of Trump’s strategic justification to withdraw from the deal. It will not add to the unrest of the region more than the challenges posed by the eve of the Syrian war, especially under the auspices of a rational super
Dr Rachel Suissa is an Assistant Professor at the National Security Program in the School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa, and a research fellow in different academic affiliations due to her multidisciplinary Photo: private
professional background: Center for Public Management and Policy (U-Haifa), the
department of Geography (U-Haifa), Haifa Center for European and German Studies. Her research interests include security and military studies, intelligence cooperation, strategic alliances, cyber security and EU foreign and security policy.
14
power like Russia. But, surprisingly, the EU has declared that its economic interests are above everything else and that it is committed to the Iran deal. The tumult caused by the American withdrawal might exacerbate instability in crucial gaps that already exist in the relationships between the EU and its Member States.
Containment is not the solution Mark Pompeo’s twelve conditions that the United States considers prerequisites for any firm agreement with the Islamic Republic include giving up ballistic missiles, ending support for terror and halting threats against Israel, amongst other demands. In principle, all signatories agree with these, however they differ in their foreign and security policy approach. The Obama presidency as well as all the other signatories chose a containment policy vis-à-vis Iran in the hope that a neo-liberal approach would eventually divert it from the behaviour condemned in Mark Pompeo’s requirements. However, a geostrategic approach to containment reveals the need for careful analysis when dealing with Israel and the Middle East and a better, relative concept of rational choice rather than international agreements of do’s and don’ts. All the signatories to the Iran deal differ in their rationales, but chose it as one solution. This might somehow explain the consensus among them about the deal as ”default”.
Building back deterrence As a rational actor, Israel’s relativity vis-à-vis the signatories, including the United States, is derived from its perceptions of threat as well as their synergies. Unlike the signatories, as stable geostrategic entities, Israel still perceives threats within existing geopolitical and geostrategic environments and is very much aware of the role it plays in Iran’s policy and strategic culture. Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran deal brings back the deterrence that the Obama presidency omitted. This will give Israel an international and regional proactive platform to call out Iran through a strategy of deterrence by denial, destabilising all the achievements it has reached so far. An added value in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s foreign policy is his deep understanding that his efforts in establishing deterrence by denial against Iran should be conducted at the level of traditional diplomacy vis-à-vis national states rather than NATO and the EU. Ignoring international and supranational
