Achieving a two state solution: A new framework for ending Hamas’ veto over the peace process By Alon Ben - Meir June 2010
NABUCCO-SOUTH STREAM Whose Side is Luck on? By Mete Goknel
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EurasiaCritic June 2010 Vol. III ISSUE 3 Monthly Magazine on Eurasian Politics Published every month by Eurasia Critic Yayincilik Ltd. Head Office: Esat R. No: 55/5 Kucukesat ANKARA/TURKEY T: 0090 (312)4170383 F: 0090 (312)4170392 Publisher Hakki AHMETBEYOGLU Editors Ozer CETINKAYA Ali ALTAN Assistant Editor Burcu OZCELIK Volkan GUNER Regional Directors Middle East Yousuf AL SHARIF Southestern Asia Fazal-UR-RAHMAN Caucasus Hasan KANBOLAT Balkans Ibrahim ARSLAN India Prof. Dr. Ajay Kumar PATNAIK Azerbaijan Ganire PASHAEVA Syria Ibrahim HAMIDI Kazakhstan Murat SHAHANOV Uzbekstan Ali KULEBI Japan Prof. Dr. Masanori NAITO Eastern Europe Shemsey VODINOV Energy Strategies M. Mete GOKNEL Nuclear Studies Prof. Dr. Saleh SULTANSOY Millitary Affairs David AXE UK Represantative Gizem Fowler Jamie Fowler Advisory Committee George HEWITT Nuzhet KANDEMIR Ismael HOSSEIN-ZADEH Norman STONE Ali KULEBI
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Turkey’s Success Barter That Puts The Sanctions Aside By Ahmed Zahid
“Sophie’s Choice” will Drift Poland apart from the West Camp By Shemsey Vodinov
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Ei Ukhnyem!-The Resurrection of the Russian Black Sea Fleet By Arda Mevlutoglu
Media Director Cigdem BEDIZ Photography Provider: AFP Illustrations Mahmut KARATOPRAK Distribution Manager Mert ALTAN ISSN 1308-1560 Printers: Basak Matbaacilik HOW TO CONTACT US General enquiries: 0090 (312) 4170383 info@eurasiacritic.co.uk Letters to the Editor : editor@eurasiacritic.co.uk ©2010 Eurasia Critic News Agency Ltd. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of Eurasia Critic News Agency Ltd.
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Cooperation Confined to Caucasus: Azerbaijan-USA Relations By Dr Hatem Cabbarli
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Achieving a two state solution: A new framework for ending Hamas’ veto over the peace process
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By Alon Ben-Meir
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How Many More ‘Revolutions’ for Kyrgzstan? By Gulay Kilic
NABUCCO-SOUTH STREAM Whose Side is Luck on? By Mete Goknel
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Oil and Politics in Post-election Iraq By Pinar Ipek, PhD
Economic Development of Uzbekistan By Ali Kulebi
Russian Impact on the Power Struggle in Asia-Pasific Region By Mazhar Yasin Tuyluoglu
United States of Eurasia Do you want them to go on, and on and on? Why split these states When there can be only one?
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Editorial 4
EurasiaCritic June 2010
ne of the most outstanding songs of the popular music group MUSE’s 2009-released album The Resistance was United States of Eurasia. In the song that reminds legendary Queen’s Works with its composition and lyrics, those words above stand out. Whether without realizing or with a providence, it as asked when all these states are going to come together and become one. There is serious progress in internal Asia about the answer of this question at one side. There is agreement about a common market in Eurasia, and about the issues of common currency and constituting of Eurasia Exchange Union (MoU), there is an agreement signed. Collective Security Treaty Organization that includes huge lands of Asia was actualized and military exercises were made. With all these moves, Eurasia that is exposed to a messy structured inconsistent period in the time of post Soviets, is setting off a new union, at economic base, day by day. The geography that reaches from the West of China to the Ural Mountains reserves the most important subterranean resources of the world and is on the position of the trampoline of developing economies. The region’s countries that meets most of the energy needs of Europe and Far East are gradually getting stronger.
KAZAKHSTAN: THE LEADER OF THE REGION In Kazakhstan that attained political and economic consistency after independency, there are large petrol, uranium, iron, gold and leaden reserves. Kazakhstan is a significant country in respect of its natural resources and its geography. It is one of the limited countries in the world in terms of capacity and various minerals and stocks seams. In Kazakhstan, there are 493 seams that contain a variation of 1225 different minerals. Because of the rich resources of uranium, chrome, leaden and zinc seams, it is the second in the world, in respect of manganese, third in the world, and as from copper, it is the fifth in the world. In respect of coal, iron and gold reserves, Kazakhstan is in the top ten in worldly rating system; and in terms of natural gas, petrol and aluminum, it is, respectively, in the first 12, 13 and 17 countries. In 1996, there was found the third biggest gold mines in Kazakhstan. 26 per cent of the chrome, 20 per cent of gold and 17 per cent of uranium in the world is in Kazakhstan. The mineral and stocks production is way beyond their own needs. Therefore, 90 per cent of metallic bismuth, spongy titanium, clay and refined copper, manganese and its concentrates production; 80 per cent of petrol, metallic leaden and zinc production; and over 50 per cent of natural gas, coal, iron substance and chrome production is exported. The substantial resources richness that were discovered under Kazakhstan lands is worth over 2 trillion US Dol-
lars. With this structure, it is becoming a giant country, along with the Caspian and in the middle of Middle Asia. The economics that is growing up with political consistency has made Kazakhstan a regional power, especially for Russia. Nazarbayev, with his balanced policies, has been making Kazakhstan the most powerful country in the world. Russia has a 70 per cent of the share in the export of Kazakhstan and a 80 per cent in the import. The binary trade stock that reached 16 billion dollars last year between the two countries, reached 3 billion 930 million dollars by 22,5 per cent increase in the first three months of this year. Besides, in Kazakhstan, there are 3000 Russian businesses running. There are also important industrial facilities at Kazakhstan’s border with Russia. Only under the condition of Kazakhstan’s getting denser in cooperation with Russia in all areas, could it complete the period of economic change and the refreshment of technical implementations. THOSE WITH ACCELARATIONS: UZBEKISTAN AND TURKMENISTAN Turkmenistan, having one of the richest natural gas resources, stands out as an uprising country in Middle East. The most important problem is showed to be isolation policies. However, there is a kind of activation towards paraphrase policies with Berdimuhammedov. Berdimuhammedov, compared to his forerunner Niyazov, is acting more clearly. The opportunities that Turk-
menistan gained play a crucial role in this. These opportunities can be arranged as international conjuncture in which the invasion of Afghanistan and energy (gas) are the determinant elements. Turkmenistan is attracting more and more foreign investment and not only with the west, but also it is making associations with its neighbors and Far East. The clearest indicator of this is energy agreement with China. When the problem about the Caspian’s status is made clear, the investments for Turkmenistan are going to increase by piling up. We might expect that Turkmenistan is soon going to join Eurasia Economic Union. In this situation, the energy production in the Caspian will rise up. Besides this, construction of additional harbors beside the existing two tanker harbors may be in question. Turkmenistan’s approach policy with Russia and China will probably put Europe in strain about the issue of energy in medial time. Just like its neighbor, Uzbekistan is also developing with consistent and strong steps. Gold and fossil fuels make this country attractive. The most serious threat is the radical Islamic. Uzbekistan is the second country in which Afghanistan invasion is creating a threat for. Islamic radicals in Uzbekistan, which already has a rooted tradition, gained more power and expanded their social bases with Afghanistan War. In November 2005, while the economic partnership agreement that has been signed with Moscow, the fact that the expropriations in 2008 and 2009 appalled west-
ern corporations put China in an advantageous position. Subjective control regime prevented Uzbekistan’s getting affected from the global crisis much. Therefore, it is appropriate to expect that Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are going to head to regional policies more than balance policy in medieval period. Risk might be external interventions that would trigger inconsistency. CONCLUSION Together with CIS, taking part in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Community, Middle Asia has developed the competition elements with west in the joint interest perspective with China. There is a approximately 200 million block bazaar and Russia as the leader of it. After this new formation that rising in Eurasia, the path that powerful coutries like Turkey, Iran and India will fallow, is going to effect all countries in the region directly. Middle Asia, was once a region that successful in the fields of cheap workforce and natural resources but has low attraction due to the population and low purchasing power, has became a region that eliminates that two disadvantages and rises as an attractive area. Just like the song says; They just promise to go on, and on and on But soon we will see There can be only one … United States of Eurasia. EurasiaCritic June 2010
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Nuclear Treaties
Turkey’s Success Barter That Puts The Sanctions Aside By Ahmed Zahid
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allowing the debates with Turkey and Brazil leaders, Iran has signed the agreement that accepts uranium enrichment shall go in progress in abroad. Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that low level enriched 1200kg of uranium will be sent to Turkey in exchange for nuclear fuel that to be used for research reactors. It was also reported that the plan can be parallel with an agreement which was offered by United Nations to Iran before. The very same plan was on agenda for the first time last year.
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EurasiaCritic June 2010
Thus will aid the situation and prevent the implementations of new sanctions of United Nation about Iran’s nuclear program. The agreement is signed by President Of Iran Mahmud Ahmedinejad, Prime Minister of Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the President of Brazil Luis İnacio Lula Da Silva in Tehran. According to the agreement, at the rate of 3.5 percent enriched uranium will be sent to Turkey by Iran. Terms Of The Agreement • Iran will inform IAEA in a week
•If the agreement is confirmed by the Vienna Group, 1.200kg of low level enriched uranium will be transported to Turkey. •This substance shall belong to Iran goverment during its operation in Turkey. •Tehran and IAEA can charge an observer to inspect and order the security. •The Vienna Group will present 120kg of nuclear fuel to Iran. •Iran can demand the return of its substance definitively with the fastest way from Turkey. Islamic Republic of Iran Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast has announced that 1200 kg of uranium will be sent to Turkey and International Atomic Energy Agency will be informed “in a week” about the agreement. Thus, Iran can use the beneficial ways of nuclear energy without having risk to reach the limits of nuclear weapon technology. Iran President Mahmud Ahmedinejad called world leaders to negotiate about the matter upon the agreement. Ahmedinejad also says that it is time to negitoate in a “fair, judicious and mutual respective athmosphere .” Minister Of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu, who has great afforts to bring the situation at this point for 18 months, stated that due to the agreement is signed in the consideration for Turkey and Brazil, there is no need for applying sanctions for Iran. According to the agreement, if the
Nuclear Treaties
Vienna Group consisting of USA, Russia, France and IAEA confirms the agreement, Iran is ready to transfer the uranium in a month. It is expected to transfer %20 enriched uranium to Iran in a year to exchange for keeping %3.5 uranium. This rate is below the necessary enrichment level for producing nuclear weapons. However it is enough for energy production and research reactors. According to the experts, the agreement is not clear whether the uranium which is brought to Turkey will be used for new fuel production or will be kept in stock. The Turkish officals says that the uranium is brought to Turkey will be kept in stocks..
Desperateness of West The signing date of the contract is in a period of the forth sanction pack against Iran is being negotiated by the Security Council.
According to Turkish Prime Minis- the necessary assessments about the ter Erdoğan, this step is an indicator last agreement should be in progresfor the trustworthy between Turkey and sed with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) first. Iran. The Misistry Of Foreign Affairs Even though the France Minister Of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner says Spokesman Bernard Valero says that, “Let’s not be duped that they break throuby this, although there gh for the intercourses According to the is a need for an agreabout the sanctions, it agreement, if the ement for medicine will not a metter of disVienna Group reactor, this will not cussion for a decision consisting of USA, be a the solution to about the sanctions. Russia, France and the problem posed by Besides, fallowing the IAEA confirms the nuclear program.” agreement, Russia will The German goclearly object such sanagreement, Iran is verment said that noctions. ready to transfer the thing could replace a Additionally, Presiuranium in a month. deal between Iran and dent Medvedev stated the IAEA. in a the visit to Ankara A western diplomat argued that in 12-13 May that he shares the same opinion with Turkish Goverment. Also believing Iran has 2.000kg of enriched The Russia’s attempts for a deterrent uranium, even thought the 1.200kg of this stock is sent to Turkey, Iran will step are already known. According the France Goverment, still have large amount of enriched uraEurasiaCritic June 2010
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Nuclear Treaties
According to Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, this step is an indicator for the trustworthy between Turkey and Iran.
nium.
Reaction of Israel Explaining the reaction, Israel accused Iran for manipulating the leaders of Turkey and Brazil. The Western countries still insisting on that Iran is trying to develop its nuclear techonology. However Iran says that the nuclear program is for peace. Last year, Western countries had suggested to send the Iran’s low level enriched uranium to Russia and France for trasmuting it to nuclear fuel. Tehran on the other side, had explained that they were impend to the agreement in principle. But later on, the terms desired by Iran on this agreement was not accepted by Westerns. Last chance to arrive at an agreement with Iran Iran is making an effort to against possible UN sanctions. 8
EurasiaCritic June 2010
USA officials says that other countries are close to came to a conclusion against Iran to pass a new pack of sanctions through United Nations Security Council. High level USA and Russian officers state that they take the President Lula’s visit as a last chance of hope to get compensations before starting to implement new sanctions to this countey. Turkey and Brazil, as the non-permanent members of United Nations Security Council, are the countries that donot possess nuclear weapons and trying a diplomatic solution for Iran’s nuclear program. Prime Minister of Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Turkey is against the nuclear weapons and all Middle East shall clear itself from nuclear weapons also. The nuclear energy for civil purpose is a right for
each country. Iran in this context, initiated a diplomatic attack against the possible sanctions and the Minister of Foreign Affairs also visited the 15 members of Security Council.
USA disappointed Turkey As the architects of the agreement, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Brazilian leader Luis İnacio Lula da Silva, raised their hands together with Iranian leader Mahmud Ahmedinecad. They also had a great role for the efforts of conciliation between Iran and West. However the efforts of USA to present the sanction decisions to the UN, angers Ankara. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey Davutoğlu, stressfully states that it is the wrong time for Iran to discuss the sanctions and he is also mentioned the disappointments that
Nuclear Treaties caused by the attitudes of USA. The main demoralising element is the China and Russia’s approval on sanction bill, as they take these countries on their side. However, with the confirmation of the agreement, this possibility is far off. Further more, Moscow and Pekin are cool towards the sanctions for months. Russia is actually face to face with a seesaw here. I. The sanctions for Iran, will effect negatively the economic developments between Moscow and Tehran. Russia’s short term damage will be great. II. In any case, if the decides for sanctions are not taken, the political obstacle for Iran gas to transpot it to the West will be cleared. In this circumstances, the gas support for NABUCCO pipe line will be provided. The importance of the south flow pipe line that Russia invested large amount of money will decrease. If the second choice is actualized, the damage of Russia will not show itself in a short time; but it will be seen in a long term period. Turkey will be the determinant country for the Moscow’s decision. Besides, Turkish side gave some commitments when Medvedev visited Ankara. Signature of 12 agreements and strategic partnership in the field of energy will effect the decision of Russia. The warm relations between two countries and the strategic partnership that based on concrete steps are forcing Russia to oppose the sanctions. Consequently, we can see anti-western speeches in Iran. Their contention will be the Westerns that rejects the friendly approach of Iran thorugh the negotiations. They can also claim that this is the colour of the Westerns. So, anyone in Iran that feels anxious about losing their enriched uranium, may now breathe a sigh of relief.
Success of Turkey Latest agreement will soften the nuclear tension between Iran and Westerns clearly but there is an other important fact for Turkey; If Turkey manages to end this process without effecting negatively the resfect showed by Iran and if the both sides are pleased after
the process, the new bilateral relation that impossible to repair later. a) The decision of USA Congress era between countries can begin. Turkey is trying to find solutions that cre- that confirmes the genocide carried out ates bilateral benefits, but the answers by Turks to Armenians in 1915 b) The Islamic ideology has settled are not satisfying Turkey. There are very important messages in the prog- to Turkey, reviving the califate system c) Putting the scenarios that emerress of this agreement about the enrichment uranium that Tehran had made ged from the collapse of Otoman on great efforts to produce for twenty ye- agenda of Turkey. d) The close perspective of Turkey ars, and the completion of whole proand bearing the concess with consensus of sequences of this situdifferent groups in the Further more, Moscow ation. country. If Turkey was and Pekin are cool All these delirias not a part of this protowards the sanctions will be the messages cess, it would be imfor months. Russia is to the soldiers primapossible for any other rily, then to the secuneighbour country to actually face to face lar people. However accept as a part of this with a seesaw here. the agreement is not agreement. Mutual all about the Islamic respect will also improve the geopolitical partnership that references of Turkish goverment. The based on economy between Turkey and status and power of Turkey was the efIran. This situation, will be serve the fective matter in the agreement. In adpurpose of Europe no doubt. Because dition to that, it should not be forgetton of that, Europeans will see the events that while the EU was acting foolishly, from a long term perspective and they the Turkish Generals were defending the idea that a partnership should be donot support. The increasing power of Turkey established with Iran and Russia. [1] in the region and addition of Iran to Turkey’s strategic circle will anger the Refereces [1] USA and especially Israel. This anger STRATFOR Turkey Using Iran, Russia as may lead the problems or comments Leverage Against EU June 24, 2002 EurasiaCritic June 2010
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Middle East
ACHIEVING A TWO STATE SOLUTION:
A new framework for ending Hamas’ veto over the peace process By Alon Ben-Meir
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s the Obama administration continues to push for the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, one of the main questions still looming is who will ultimately represent the Palestinian
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people. With Hamas’ continuing politi- cut long-term prospects for peace. cal and military dominance in the Gaza Hamas’ participation is essential not Strip, it is unlikely that Israeli-Palestin- only because it is in control of Gaza, but ian peace talks will ultimately succeed because it is a disciplined grass-roots unless the organisation is brought into movement, with a substantial social, pothe political process in some capac- litical and security apparatus, coupled ity. The social and geopolitical real- with a charitable economic structure ity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that provides for hundreds of thousands steeped in mutual distrust, meaning of Palestinians. Whilst it is certainly a that any concessions made or break- radical, violent, militant group, it wields throughs achieved must come from par- too much influence over its followers to ties representing the be discounted. If igmandate of the people. noring Hamas has not There were There can be no lasthelped to marginalise approximately 250 ing peaceful solution it in the past, how do attacks in the nine without recreating a US President Barack months following single Palestinian enObama and the leadthe Israeli military tity in the West Bank ers of moderate Arab and Gaza, governed states bring about reoperation in Gaza, by a single administraform and inclusion of significantly lower tion representative of Hamas in the peace than the October the majority of Palesprocess? Thus far, Ha2001 to February 2009 tinian electors. Future mas’ political particiaverage of 100 per Palestinian governpation has been condimonth. ments must be elected tional upon the organdemocratically and Faisation’s acceptance tah, Hamas and other of the Quartet’s (UN, parties must be able to compete freely. US, EU and Russia) three precondiThis should be the premise on which to tions: recognising Israel, renouncing base any negotiations regarding the two terrorism and accepting prior Israelistate solution. Efforts to exclude any Palestinian agreements. Hamas’ leaderparty from the political process – in- ship has refused to heed the Quartet’s cluding Hamas – could severely under- call and is unlikely to do so any time
Middle East
soon. Such a move would be seen as a major concession to Israel. From Hamas’ perspective Israel is the aggressor and, so long as it continues its occupation of Palestinian land, which Hamas defines as everything from the Mediterranean Sea to the River Jordan, it must be resisted by all means available. At the same time, there exists deep ideological disagreements and personal animosity between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA) that continues to stifle any meaningful discourse between the two sides. This has prevented the Palestinian camp from entering into negotiations with a united front, something it will need to do to ensure any progress of the peace process. That being said, it is important to note that the reduction in rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza on southern Israel that followed Operation Cast Lead, offers greater opportunities to move the peace process forward as compared to before the conflict. There were approximately 250 attacks in the nine months following the Israeli military operation in Gaza, significantly lower
than the October 2001 to February March of 2007 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 2009 average of 100 per month. Hamas could offer the vehicle for this modifihas only taken responsibility for two of cation. It provides a comprehensive forthese 250 attacks, with most claimed by mula for Arab-Israeli peace. More so, smaller extremist groups. In addition, it provides cover for Hamas to commit recent economic and security progress to recognising Israel at the end, rather in the West Bank has been notable, than the beginning, of the process. The initiative establishes with an expected ecoHamas’ refusal to the following princinomic growth rate of ples: 1) Full Israeli seven percent for 2009, recognise Israel withdrawal from all partially due to Israel’s in advance of any the territories occueasing of checkpoints agreement is, in fact, between the major pied since 1967, 2) in line with the 19 out West Bank towns. The Achievement of a of 21 Arab states that international comjust solution to the refuse to recognise munity should seek to Palestinian refugee exploit this comparaproblem, 3) The acIsrael officially before tive lack of violence in ceptance and the all conflicting issues Gaza and progress in establishment of a are settled. the West Bank to push Sovereign Independfor the resumption of ent Palestinian State peace process negotiations. But to take on the Palestinian territories occupied advantage of this situation and trans- since the 4th of June 1967 in the West late it into a real progress, the negotiat- Bank and Gaza Strip, with east Jerusaing strategy must first be modified. lem as its capital, 4) The Arab-Israeli The Arab Peace Initiative (API), conflict ended, a peace agreement with first adopted in Beirut, Lebanon in Israel and security for all the states of March of 2002 and reintroduced in the region and finally, 5) The establishEurasiaCritic June 2010 11
Middle East
ment of normal relations with Israel ble to both the Israelis and the Quartet. Hamas’ refusal to recognise Israel in in the context of this comprehensive peace. Notably, there is a growing re- advance of any agreement is, in fact, in ceptiveness to the API, particularly by line with the 19 out of 21 Arab states Israeli President Shimon Peres and also that refuse to recognise Israel officially by numerous officials in Obama’s US before all conflicting issues are settled. Israel should not feel that it needs the administration. The three preconditions placed on recognition of a group it deems a terHamas by the Quartet should be realis- rorist organisation; it should only need tically assessed in light of the changing the full recognition of the Palestinian government once a dynamics to prevent what may be obsolete Palestinian state has Hamas must resolve been negotiated and requirements from seto forsake violence agreed upon. Moreoriously hindering the permanently and ver, Israel will never peace process. This build on the current be expected to neis not to argue that fragile ceasefire gotiate directly with the conditions are unHamas or any other necessary, the issue is in preparation for Palestinian group unsimply one of timing Palestinian elections. less such a group both and at what point in wins a general election the process Hamas is, rightly, expected to adhere to them. To and forms a representative government that end, the API can be used to pro- that seeks to reconcile its differences vide a common denominator for both with Israel peacefully. For these reaIsrael and Hamas. It offers Hamas a sons, establishing recognition of Israel face saving way of avoiding dealing with as a precondition is premature. It comIsrael directly, whilst becoming part of plicates matters and prevents the proca framework for negotiations accepta- ess from moving forward. Because of 12 EurasiaCritic June 2010
the bitter split between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinians must first settle their differences by allowing the people to choose, through new elections, who they think can best serve their needs. Unlike the question of recognition, Hamas’ immediate renunciation of violence is an absolute requirement under any circumstances. Within or outside the Palestinian government, Hamas must accept the simple fact that violent resistance is unacceptable and its leadership must make that choice if it wishes to become a political partner in any future negotiations with Israel or other members of the international community. Acts of violence against Israelis obligate the Israeli authorities to respond violently, not only to ensure the safety of their citizens but also because attacks evoke a moral imperative on the part of the state to safeguard its sovereign rights, which cannot be violated with impunity. Hamas must resolve to forsake violence permanently and build on the current fragile ceasefire in preparation for Palestin-
Middle East ian elections. This will pave the way for Hamas’ future participation in negotiations with Israel as a representative of the Palestinian government, should it win an outright majority or become a partner in a coalition government. The fact that Hamas is adhering to the current ceasefire and has prevented other militant fringe groups from attacking Israel in the wake of Operation Cast Lead cannot be ignored. This gesture signals that Hamas—though still unofficially—is meeting the requirement of non-violence that Israel and the Quartet required of it, intimating the use of terror as a controlled political tactic that can be stopped and started as a means to an end, but not the end in and of itself. Just as the PLO, which was also labelled a terrorist organization, made the transformation to a political party, Hamas should not be excluded the option run as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people should it comply with the mandate of non-violence. As for the condition that Hamas must accept all prior agreements, this issue can be resolved almost entirely on its own once Palestinian elections are held and a new government is installed. The API is a means to Any future Palestinunravel the current ian government must political conundrum accept prior agreebetween Hamas, the ments or modify them Palestinian Authority, with Israel by mutual agreement. Neither Israel and the Quartet, the Quartet nor Israel providing a dignified should treat Hamas as way out for all players an independent state; involved. Hamas is and must be seen as a Palestinian d hi wants t political party and if its leadership to be a part of the political process they current political conundrum between can run on any political platform they Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Isdesire except militant resistance to Is- rael and the Quartet, providing a digrael. If Hamas sits in the opposition, nified way out for all players involved. their acceptance or refusal of prior Although the Netanyahu government agreements becomes irrelevant but as has not yet formally endorsed the API, a government they must adhere to the it would be a wise step forward as it pronorms of conduct between nations in- vides a solid foundation for an Israelicluding prior agreements or obligations Arab comprehensive peace. The Unitbetween national institutions that have ed States and the EU should formally endorse it and make every effort to perbeen entered into. The API is a means to unravel the suade Israel to do likewise. The EU and
US should also seek to take advantage of growing regional concern over the Iranian nuclear threat and the Iranian regime’s support for militant extremist groups, to encourage Arab states to make a greater effort to promote their peace initiative. If developments in Iran are dangerously destabilising the region, moderate Arab states need to be convinced that the API, with its promise of normalised relations and an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, offers EurasiaCritic June 2010 13
Middle East
them their best chance at countering Iran’s regional ambitions. There is nothing in the API that negates Israel’s ultimate objective of establishing peace and normal relations with all of its neighbours. The initiative was never meant to be presented on an all or nothing basis. Within the general framework of the document everything is negotiable to achieve a secure and durable peace, including the definition of a ‘just’ solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the leading Arab states who wish Israel to accept the API must now use all the leverage they have to persuade Hamas to adopt it as well. Since signing up to the API would be seen as joining the collective will of the Arab 14 EurasiaCritic June 2010
states, the initiative offers Hamas a way to achieve land and peace for the Palestinians without having to concede directly to Israel. However, for Hamas to go down this route, it must be genuinely prepared, as part of a future Palestinian government, to negotiate final status issues and recognise Israel at the end of the process. On more than one occasion, Hamas leaders have suggested that they can see themselves accepting a solution to their conflict with Israel based on Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders. In fact Hamas’ political leader Khaled Meshaal told the New York Times on 4 May 2009 that, “We are with a state on the 1967 borders, based on a longterm truce. This includes East Jerusa-
lem, the dismantling of settlements and the right of return of the Palestinian refugees.” Although this exact formula will never be acceptable to Israel, especially in regards to the ‘right of return’, Hamas may be beginning to move in a more constructive direction. That said, whilst Hamas’ offer of a ceasefire demonstrates a recognition of the centrality of the 1967 Green Line to resolving this conflict, it does not demonstrate a willingness to enter into an indefinite peace with Israel. As stated above, if Hamas is to sign up to the API it will have to publicly state that it will recognise Israel in return for the conditions of the Initiative, as opposed to simply offering a ceasefire or merely accepting the fact of Israel’s existence. The social, security and economic progress achieved in the West Bank offers a glaring contrast to the continuing despondency in Gaza. This presents a serious challenge to Hamas’ rule. If Hamas intends to represent the Palestinian people, it is in dire need of a new strategy to deliver goods and services to its constituents. Israel’s incursion into Gaza in December 2008 left an ineradicable mark on Hamas militants that violent resistance will further diminish, rather than strengthen, their position vis-à-vis Israel. Polls have clearly indicated that continued military resistance has actually undermined its popular support. As a significant Palestinian force, Hamas remains central to the two state solution. However, its leadership must accept that whilst the movement retains the capacity to violently disrupt the peace process, there is no viable option other than the two state solution to ensure its survival as an influential political organisation. Whilst we can surmise that the Hamas leadership is aware of this, this does not mean they have the will to change, or that Hamas’ followers and more violent competitors will let Hamas change. The API provides Hamas with a way of reforming without undergoing public capitulation but, like the Quartet principles, it still requires Hamas to publicly demonstrate a desire for peace.
Iraq Investment
Oil and Politics in Post-election Iraq By Pinar Ipek, PhD
F
ollowing the Iraq Council of Representatives election held on March 7, 2010, the political struggle over forming a government has been fiercely continuing in Baghdad. According to unofficial election results announced by the Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission on March 26, the Iraqiyya or Iraqi National Movement (INM), headed by the former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, has come out first with 91 seats, while State of Law (SoL) led by Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki was second with 89 seats. On the other hand, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) won 70 seats and the Kurdish Alliance won 43 seats out of 325 seats in the next parliament. Nevertheless, the decision of the electoral judicial panel accepting the justice and accountability commission’s
16 EurasiaCritic June 2010
(known as de-Baathification committee) proposal to exclude 52 candidates and annual their votes has triggered a lengthy process of endless legislative and political battles over the election results. While it has been expected that it would take several months to put different parties from the four major coalitions into a new government, any deadlock over political negotiations cannot be afforded by any political groups. Because there has been a desperate need for public services, especially power and water, and for jobs to create for Iraqi people. Accordingly, no matter which scenario of forming a government comes true and whether any potential violence escalates in light of the ongoing security threats, any solution to political and security challenges requires oil wealth of Iraq and its legiti-
mate distribution for the people of Iraq. Within this framework, this article aims to discuss the next challenges in oil politics in Iraq driven by three major issues namely, (i) a need for constitutional amendments, (ii) the hydrocarbon law, and (iii) the status of Kirkuk and disputed territories. The argument asserts that an agreement by political groups on oil revenue sharing in the hydrocarbon law package is strategic for success in other issues above. The reasons for such an argument are explained below by addressing the problems related to oil revenue sharing in the constitution and in the hydrocarbon law to be adopted by the next parliament of Iraq. In light of the historical trajectory of state-building in Iraq, the constitutional framework to distribute and manage oil wealth in Iraq is utmost important. The larger oil revenues and oil-led development in Iraq may create a rentier or distributive state instead of a democratization process built on political inclusiveness of different groups in Iraq. Because the leaders in power can decouple themselves from their constituents given the means in oil-rich Iraq to distribute selective benefits to certain political and social groups in exchange for political acquiescence. In other words, the political leaders can consolidate their power as long as they can control oil revenues, while they do not need to extract resources from a domestic economy that lacks diversified sectors. Therefore, constitutional revisions are critical to remove
Iraq Investment
a set of ambiguities and contradictions contained in the constitution regarding the oil revenue sharing formula as well as ownership and management of oil and gas resources prior to the passage of the hydrocarbon law. The specific articles of the constitution on this matter are given below. First, while Article 111 in Section Four, Powers of the Federal Government states “oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates,” Article 112.1 is contradictory since it refers to the joint management of “present fields” by the federal government, producing governorates and regional governments, implying that new exploration and production to be fully in the control of regions and provinces excluding the federal government. Second, there is ambiguity regarding the management of oil sector under such a federal structure. The exclusive authorities of the federal government
are defined in Article 110 in Section Four, Power of the Federal Government. On the other hand, Article 115 and 121.2 endorses that the regions and producing governorates have the final say in the areas of shared (defined in Article 114) and regional (defined in Article 121) jurisdiction.1 In light of these specific articles of the constitution, the meaning of “present field” in Article 112.1 presents the most contentious point. “Present field” is not a standard term in the terminology of petroleum industry. Thus, it can be interpreted in multiple ways.2 There are 24 developed fields and 71 undeveloped discovered fields holding approximately 115 billions of barrels of oil and equivalent in Iraq. While there is no production in the undeveloped fields, not all the 24 developed fields are producing currently.3 If all undeveloped fields are considered “present field”, then there is no confusion. However, if they are not included in present fields, some of
the giant fields that have been partially developed would create obviously conflict for oil revenue sharing between the federal government, the regions, and the governorates. Third, the ambiguity in the meaning of “present field” in Article 112.1 creates disputes for a revenue sharing formula. The Article 112.1 clearly states that the federal government with the producing governorates and regional governments distributes the revenues from the present fields “in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country.” Thus, revenue sharing in proportion to population is limited only to “present fields.” Unless “present fields” are defined as developed and undeveloped discovered fields of Iraq, the revenue distribution would obviously favor the provinces where the bulk of oil reserves are located.4 Moreover, the revenue sharing principle in Article 112.1 is inconsistent with Article 111, which deEurasiaCritic June 2010 17
Iraq Investment
fines that oil and gas are owned by all Iraqi people. Article 112.1 also endorses a specific treatment for a specified period for the disadvantaged regions and ensures a balanced development. Nevertheless, this provision would be favorable only in the short term because for the long term when production from present fields drop, the disadvantaged regions (including non-producing or small producing provinces) will loose their subsidies from the large producing provinces. Furthermore, the status of Kirkuk and other disputed areas are also strongly related to oil politics. For example, the Kurds, whose territory was neglected for decades build their hopes highly on oil wealth estimated to be in the Kurdish governorates and by incorporating the disputed districts and proven reserves of Kirkuk.5 Given the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) frustration with its dependency on the federal budget and delaying of Article 1406, they passed their own oil and gas law in August 2007 and unilaterally 18 EurasiaCritic June 2010
began signing contracts with foreign companies.7 Most of other Iraqi people, however, oppose Kurdish nationalism and favor instead so-called resource nationalism. In fact, Oil Minister Shahristani declared the KRG’s contracts null and void, blacklisted companies doing business with the KRG and threatened to do the same with those contemplating similar moves.8 Within this framework, the political process over the hydrocarbon law or the oil legislation, including the oil investment law, the revenue-sharing law, and the law for organization of Iraq’s Ministry of Oil and Iraq’s National Oil Company should be centered on the oil revenue-sharing formula in light of the aforementioned constitutional revisions. IMF statistics indicate that more than 90 percent of public expenditures in Iraq are financed by oil revenues. Thus, the current political process to form a new government should take into consideration the urgent need for increasing oil revenues to consolidate the new leadership’s power and to max-
imize its legitimacy on the premise of a fair distribution of oil wealth for all Iraqi people. Accordingly, the nature of oil contracts and their management should seek a balance between the needed large amount of investment and the national ownership of oil wealth favoring rapid improvement of human development indicators in Iraq. For example, a group of officials inside and outside the federal government who, favor centralization, strongly criticize plans to permit foreign companies through production-sharing contracts (PSCs) and the extreme decentralization permitted by the constitution that prevents regulation between federal regions over oil production for export. The KRG and foreign companies, on the contrary, favor PSCs for different reasons. Companies prefer to be paid in oil under PSCs because it raises both their reserve portfolio and the value of their shares. The KRG considers PSCs an indispensable tool for exploration, which is the Kurds’ top priority, having had no
Iraq Investment development in their region and urgent need for income to expand public services in the poorer areas of the Kurdish region. Similarly, the KRG opposes the establishment of federal oil and gas council empowered to veto contracts and rejects the oil ministry’s proposed annexes classifying producing and nonproducing oil fields since it undermines the KRG’s control and assign fields to the federal government.9 Consequently, a narrow focus on power sharing among different political and/or sectarian groups in the new government will undermine the ability of the new political leadership to govern since a political reconciliation process can not be managed without an agreement on a fair oil-revenue sharing formula for all Iraqi people. Moreover, given the problematic relationship between oil-led development and a potentially rentier state, political inclusiveness in state-building process is essential for human development, ensuring the empowerment of Iraqi people for a peaceful future of their country. References 1 The Kurdish region has no listed proven reserves, as these are determined by actual drilling, mapping and continuous production. Drills had been made at only four locations inside the region: at Taq Taq, Demirdagh, Chamchamal (gas) and a dry field near Dohuk. As of 2008 very little production has taken place, all of it from a single field, Tawke, in Dohuk governorate managed by DNO of Norway. Kirkuk contains as much as 13% of Iraq’s proven reserves (15 billion out 115 billion barrels) though estimates vary. . International Crisis Group, “Oil for Soil: Toward a Grand Bargain on Iraq and the Kurds.” Middle East Report No: 80, 28 October 2008, p. 15 and 19. 2 Article 140 has been instrumental particularly for the Kurdish Alliance as it provides a legal basis for “normalization, ” a census, and a referendum. By “normalization” the Kurds mean measures to reverse changes to the disputed territories’ made under Arabisation policy of Saddam. These measures include, most importantly, the return of people forced out of these areas (mostly Kurds and Turkomans), the departure (voluntary, with compensation) of Arabs settled there, restitution of properties and the restoration of these areas’ pre-1968 administrative boundaries. International Crisis Group, 28 October 2008, p. 2. 3 Kamil al Mehaidi, Geographical Distribution of Oil Fields and Its Relation with the New Constitution, (Revenue Watch Institute Report, 27 May 2006), pp. 12-13.
4 For example, Anbar, Dohuk, Babil and Diyala provinces have no developed or discovered oil and gas fields. Furthermore, the ethnic and sectarian distribution of population in oil and gas rich provinces favors relatively Shi’ite and Kurdish except Kirkuk which is a multi-ethnic province. 5 There are several joint fields among provinces that are namely Kirkuk, East Baghdad, Kifl, Ajil, and fields not yet discovered. In addition, some other fields are so close to the borders that they could be considered joint too. 6 Article 140 has been instrumental particularly for the Kurdish Alliance as it provides a legal basis for “normalization, ” a census, and a referendum. By “normalization” the Kurds mean measures to reverse changes to the disputed territories’ made under Arabisation policy of Saddam. These measures include, most importantly, the return of people forced out of these areas (mostly Kurds and Turkomans), the departure (voluntary, with compensation) of Arabs settled there, restitution of properties and the restoration of these areas’ pre-1968 administrative boundaries. International Crisis Group, 28 October 2008, p. 2. 7 The KRG (and before it the parallel administrations run by the PUK and KDP) had signed six contracts with foreign oil companies, including one before the U.S. invasion prior to its own oil and gas law. They include: a January 2003 PUK contract with Pet Oil of Turkey (later joined by Prime Natural Resources of the U.S. and Oil Search of Australia); a January 2004 PUK contract with Genel Energy of Turkey (later joined by Addax Petroleum of Switzerland); a July 2004 KDP contract with DNO of Norway; a May 2006 contract with Western Zagros of Canada; a 2006 contract with Crescent Petroleum/Dana Gas of the UAE; and a 2006 contract with A&T Petroleum of Turkey (a subsidiary of Pet Oil) and Prime Natural Resources (later joined by Oil Search).
Pet Oil was forced to renegotiate its 2003 contract at least three times. As of September 2008, the KRG had signed more than 20 contracts. The precise number depends on how one counts. Some companies have more than a single contract area, and some contracts involve more than one company. The following companies had oil and gas contracts with the KRG in September 2008: DNO (Norway), Addax Petroleum (Canada/Switzerland), Genel Energy (Turkey), Western Zagros (Canada), Pet Oil (Turkey), Prime Natural Resources (U.S.), Oil Search (Australia), Crescent Petroleum (UAE), Dana Gas (UAE), Norbest (an affiliate of TNK-BP of Russia), OMV Petroleum Exploration (Austria), Hunt Oil (U.S.), Hillwood International Energy (U.S.), Perenco (France), Aspect Energy (U.S.), Gulf Keystone Petroleum (UK), Texas Keystone (U.S.), Kalegran/MOL (Hungary), Reliance Energy (India), Heritage Oil and Gas (Canada), Sterling Energy International (U.S.), Niko Resources (Canada), Vast Exploration (Canada), Groundstar Resources (Canada), Korea National Oil Corporation (South Korea) and Talisman Energy (Canada). The KRG awarded four blocks to the Kurdistan Exploration and Production Company (KEPCO), which it owns, on condition it bring international companies as partners into its contract areas. International Crisis Group, 28 October 2008, p. 17. 8 Reuters, 24 September 2007. 9 International Crisis Group, 28 October 2008, p. 24. Pınar İpek is assistant professor at Bilkent University, Department of International Relations, Ankara, Turkey. Dr. İpek has published in Europe-Asia Studies, Middle East Journal, Middle East Policy, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, and Insight Turkey. e-mail: pinari@bilkent.edu.tr EurasiaCritic June 2010 19
Eastern Europe
“Sophie’s Choice” will Drift Poland apart from the West Camp By Shemsey Vodinov
P
olish people awakened from a weekend lag with a shocking news on the morning of Saturday, 10 th of April. Plane which was carrying President Lech Kaczynski and 90 senior officials, crushed while landing on Smolensk City. Nobody survived in the crush. Some people found this tragedy similar to the carnage in the 2 nd World War in which Soviet Russians killed thousands of Polish Military Officers in Katyn Forest. Committee was going to Katyn Forest for the anniversary of this 2 nd World War tragedy. News agencies announced that the plane accident was a result of bad weather conditions. Fog above the
Smolensk prevented the landing of the plane and pilot was crushed in the third trial of landing. According to the claims that the pilot was suggested to land the plane to Minsk after the second landing trial but Kacynski insisted for landing to the Smolensk so pilot tried for the third time. Decoding of the black box still continues with the participation of Polish Officials in Russia.
Conspiracy Theories A video record which was uploaded to the internet after the plane crush confused the minds. In the blurred scenes of this video record, some people were shooting to the people survived from
the plane crush. Public prosecutor in Poland was announced that the scenes are real. News announced by Western Sources were contradicting to the prosecutor’s announcement. Western sources were defending that those recordings are not real. Prosecutor denied the assassination claims which were derived from this recording. Polish people are not thinking in that way. They think that this accident is a planned assassination. That much coincidence do not seem normal. A country’s all senior officials including the military generals were destroyed in the lands of historical enemy Russia. Nobody can accept this kind of a situation easily. Poland was accusing Moscow for the plane crush. A nationalist and conservative state president of a country which is tore between Germany and Russia for centuries could only be killed by the traditional enemy. But was this the truth?
Who was Kacynsky? Lech Kacyznsky, was an important figure for contemporary Poland politics. He was one of the leading figures with his twin brother Yaroslav in the famous Polish Rebellion Solidarnoszc(Cooperation Movement). He was contradicted with the movement’s leader Lech Walesa. While Walesa was cooperating with communists, anti-communist originated Kacyznsky’s desire was to punish those 20 EurasiaCritic June 2010
Eastern Europe
A nationalist and conservative state president of a country which is tore between Germany and Russia for centuries could only be killed by the traditional enemy. But was this the truth?
communists. President Lech Kacyznsky and his twin brother who was once a Prime Minister for temporarily Yaroslav Kacynzsky were members of the religious and peasantry originated PIS (Peasants and Workers Party). Lech Kacinsky who is known as a pro-American political figure was blaming communist degeneration for every mistake of the state. Kacinsky was so much sensitive about the state corruption. Some bureaucrats were afraid of working on the legal issues because of the Kacinsky’s sensitive approach. In NATO and EU member Poland, religious and conservative Kacinsky
and his party is very similar to the JDP and its leader Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ&#x;an. Their style of speech and understanding of the society are so much likely to each other. While half of the polish people were supporting him, other half was thinking that they are taking the country to the dark ages. Another discussion was held because of his bury to
the Wavel Cathedral in Krakow where is known as the burying place for kings and historical heroes of Poland. Public support for Kacinsky was decreasing recently. His pro-American anti-Russian policy was contradicting geopolitical strategy of Poland. Polls were showing that the public support for him decreased to 27%. After the
Employment Increase* Year
2007
2008
2009
Poland(%)
6.5
5.3
5.2
2.9
2.0
2.4
EU(%) EU Interim Forecast
*
EurasiaCritic June 2010 21
Eastern Europe plane crush public support increased above the 50% point. If he was alive, he would probably lose the elections which will be held in the end of the 2010.
Direction of Poland The front-runner for the next elections in 20 th of june is Stanislaw Komorovski who is the acting president after the death of Kacinsky. Komorovski who is a member of central right party: Civil Platform Party was one of the favorite candidates before the plane crush too. Donald Tusk is also a member of the same party who had the leading role on developing the Poland – Russia relations recently. Tusk was thought for presidency but prime minister announced that he will not be a candidate for presidency. Tusk was achieved to make Russia apologize for
the Katyn Massacre and he also shows not have positive implications on the a close friendship with Vladimir Putin. Polish society. Against to this reaction Another candidate for the presidency which contradicts even with the Eurois the twin of the dead pean reality, KomoroKacinzsky: Yaroslav vski and Tusk are havLech Kacinsky Kacinszky. Latest ing an important role who is known as polls about presidency to restore the a policy a pro-American show that Kamorovski which unites western political figure was will win the elections and eastern Europe. blaming communist with a clear differEspecially Germany is degeneration for every ence (55%). If this will supporting this policy not happen then Kaof Poland. Christian mistake of the state morovski’s victory is Democrat Prime Minain in the second ister Angela M thought to be the certain Merkel who got closer to round of the elections. Tusk’s success is the Russia after the US rooted economan important element for this expecta- ic crisis, catalyzes new transformation tion. Tusk is not only an important fig- of the Poland. Angela Merkel was one ure for economics, he also played an of the leading actors on Poland – Rusimportant role on the new foreign pol- sia closure which was started before the icy initiatives. Anti- Russian and pro- tragic plane crush. The saying which beAmerican view point of Kacinskys’ does came a idiom in Polish political culture “Polishes can do a lot with Germans but They can do nothing without Germans are proved again.
WHY IS POLAND IMPORTANT?
P
oland had seen lots of invasions throughout the history because it has no natural borders. During the Second World War, Poland faced with a mass destruction. It was one of the countries which had much causality. Poland had been always an important country because of its geopolitical location between the Baltic Coast and Central-Eastern Europe. Because of the deliberate permission of England and France, Poland was brought to the ground in the Second World War. Anti-Western movement strengthened in Poland and Poland became a part of East Bloc, Soviet Union. Soviet invasion which was lasted until 90s created an Anti-Soviet Poland this time. Poland became economically strong within the EU and NATO membership period. Poland is still rising in Europe with its trade and investment capabilities. The flow of mobile capital to the internal capital in Poland is an important evidence for Poland’s attraction for investors. According to the records: Poland earned 14 Billion Euro by foreign investment, this amount increased
22 EurasiaCritic June 2010
to 15 billion Euro in 2008 and it was increased to 21 Billion Euro in 2009. Citigroup, Fiat, France Telekom, KBC Bank, LG, Metro Group, Unicredito Italiano, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are the important associations which are investing to Poland. Poland has an important role with its strategically important location which is a passing point for EU especially for the active eastern markets like Russia and Ukraine. High productivity in the investments, comparatively low job and life expenses, dimensions of Poland market and high-quality labor force make Poland the China of the Europe. Gross national product of Poland increased twice times more than the average gross national product increase of the Europe. Poland has the second place on planned investments in Europe (Ernst & Young), Poland also has the second place about the trust of investors in Europe (AT Kearney), and it has the seventh place in the top ten of the global investment centers list.
Probable Election Results Result of the election has a potential to an important change in the Eurasia. Predictions which mention that the Polishes-Germans and Russians will determine the next 20 years of the Europe would become a reality. Poland will have a new balance policy on the east-west axis. This balance will have a more tendency to the east when compared to the former policies. So missile shield project may be cancelled after the elections. Start-2 treaty which was signed between US and Russia will become more effective. Similarly, Iran will be affected from Poland elections too. If missile shield project cancelled than sanctions upon Iran will be fastened. NATO will look forward to find a new place to construct missile shield. Turkey will step forward as a lucky ally of the NATO. Ankara cannot accept this kind of an agreement because Turkey is getting closer to the Islamic Countries and Russia. If Turkey which has the second biggest army of the Europe, cannot get into an agreement than all eyes will return to Poland. Increasing NATO pressure will have a negative effect on political stability of Warsaw. As an op-
Eastern Europe
position to the NATO pressure, Russia will have an economic cooperation with Poland.
Human Resources
lions consumers and an enlargement of %14 in retail market.
Investment Incentives
A source of 90 Billion Euro 20 millions of young, educated and gained from EU and national budget foreign language spoken young people. for development, infrastructure and hu24 millions of peoman resources. ple as a labor force 14 private Tusk was achieved (61% of the populaeconomic zones for into make Russia tion) centives (Free Zones) apologize for the 2 millions of peoIndustrial Katyn Massacre ple who has a high and technological and he also shows a school or university parks. close friendship with degree. Transporta450 centers which tion infrastructure deVladimir Putin. are established for velopment. it education. d ti 30 bil high school and university billion euro valued investment for developing the transportation Strategic Location infrastructure for the preparation of Today Poland is able to reach 250 2012 European Football Championship millions of consumers in the heart of (EURO 2012) which will be held in Pothe Europe at a radius of 1000 km. Po- land and Ukraine. Sophie’s Choice (US-1982) Sophie’s land offers Trans-Europe highway corridor, enlarging internal market, 38 mil- Choice is a 1982 American drama ro-
mance film that tells the story of a Polish immigrant, Sophie, and her tempestuous lover who share a boarding house with a young writer in Brooklyn.The film stars Meryl Streep, Kevin Kline, and Peter MacNicol. Alan J. Pakula directed the movie and wrote the script from a novel by William Styron, also called Sophie’s Choice. Sophie eventually reveals that her father was a Nazi sympathizer. Sophie had a lover, Józef (Neddim Prohic), who lived with his half-sister, Wanda (Katharina Thalham), a leader in the Resistance. Wanda tried to convince Sophie to translate some stolen Gestapo documents, but fearing she may endanger her children, she declined. Two weeks later Józef was murdered by the Gestapo, and Sophie was arrested and sent to Auschwitz with her children. Upon arrival, Jan (Adrian Kaltika), Sophie’s son, was sent to the children’s camp, and her daughter, Eva (Jennifer Lawn), was sent to her death in Crematorium Two. EurasiaCritic June 2010 23
Black Sea
Ei Ukhnyem!-The Resurrection of the Russian Black Sea Fleet By Arda Mevlutoglu “Эй, ухнем! Эй, ухнем! Ещё разик, ещё да раз!” All together! All together! Once more, once again, still once more
T
he famous “Ei Ukhnyem”, or “The Song of the Volga Boatmen” starts with a deep, slow and heavy chorus, slowly increasing in tone. It is a motivational song, helping the exhausted Burlaks endure the burden, struggle more, once again, once more. Just like the well known painting with the same name, “Ei Ukhnyem” is the symbol of doggedness, struggle and slow-but-strong steps forward. The struggle for Volga, for keeping the boats afloat in Volga and for pride.
As is the case with Черноморский Флот, the Black Sea Fleet. Formed in late 18th Century, Black Sea Fleet is responsible from the naval operations in Black Sea Region and Mediterranean Sea, especially Eastern Mediterranean. The strength, both in terms of manpower and equipment, decreased dramatically right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by disputes between Russian Federation and Ukraine on the ownership and status of the primary base of the fleet at Sevastopol. However, the rising geopolitical importance of the Black Sea as a gateway between Europe and Caucasus & Central Asia, forced Russia to focus much of its military modernization ef24 EurasiaCritic June 2010
forts on its forces in the region. Thus, to secure vital interests on energy transfer, regional influence and hegemony on the hinterland of former Soviet states, Russian Federation is now on the process of resurrecting the once venerable Black Sea Fleet.
considerable number of warships and by damaging important harbors and ports. Until the Crimean War, Russian navy enjoyed tactical and strategic advantage over Ottoman Empire in the Black Sea, thus securing its presence and dictating political pressure. But Russia also leased the after the defeat in the The Black Sea Crimean War, Russia Saki naval aviation Fleet - Background was forced to accept base and carrier flight humiliating condiThe Black Sea operations training tions in the Treaty of Fleet’s history starts facilities in the Paris in March 1856. with the efforts of Western Crimea. The treaty demilitaPrince Potemkin, who rized the Black Sea founded the naval base and Russia’s access to the sea nd limited R at Sevastopol, a city in the h SouthwestS h to a relatively small portion of land. ern tip of Crimean Peninsula. The fleet However, in 1870 Russia denounced symolized Russian aspirations for conthe treaty and resumed building a fleet. trol over Black Sea and reaching to It was the Montreaux Convention the Mediterranean. The fleet inflicted heavy losses to the Ottoman naval pres- that stabilised the region. Signed by ence in the region, by both sinking a Turkey, Great Britain, France, Bul-
Black Sea
garia, Rumania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Australia and Japan in 20 July 1936, the convention secured safe passage for commercial traffic at all times except during the war. It allowed Russian naval vessels to safely transit to the Mediterranean and also did not prevent other countries’ naval vessels from entering the Black Sea. Exercising this feature of the convention, Soviet Navy displayed naval presence in the Mediterranean and NATO / US Navy projected naval power into the Black Sea, within the limitations and conditions defined. Soviet military had the worry of a NATO blockade of the Turkish Straits in the of a crisis. That’s why the Black Sea Fleet had remained relatively smaller than the Northern Fleet or the Pacific Fleet. Nevertheless, it was a substantial force, with around 18 submarines, two cruisers, 30 destroyers and frigates, around 100 smaller combatant ships plus more than 100 amphibious and auxiliary support ships in the early 1990’s. The fleet also had its own air arm with some 120 fixed wing combat and reconnaissance aircraft and around 80 helicopters. Total manpower was calculated as much
sia (and later Soviet Union and later again, Russia) secure the gateway to the Caucasus from mainland Europe. The legendary Sevastopol Siege during World War II can be considered as a symbolic example to the gigantic struggle to protect this strategic gateway. But this effort collapsed, together The Sevastopol Question with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. After the World War II, Crimean auSevastopol’s geostrategic importonomous region was tance made it the abolished and became natural headquarters The fleet’s flagship, a province of Kremlin. of the Black Sea Fleet a Project 1164 Slava However, in 1954, Rusright from its founclass cruiser Moskva, sia re-transferred the dation in late 18th together with the peninsula to Ukraine, Century. The base Project 1135M Krivak another Soviet State of became the jumping the Union. It is ironic point of Russian naval II frigate Pytlivy and that this transfer has force projection to the the Project 1559V direct consequences Black Sea and Medireplenishment ship on the Russian presterranean; enabling Ivan Bubnov, were ence on the Black Sea constant pressure on scheduled to sail into region. Turkey, and especially the Mediterranean in After Ukraine’s during Cold War era, independence from an amphibious threat late 2002. the Soviet Union in to the Straits. 1991 the lega legal status of the Black Sea After Sevastopol, the h second d llargestt 1991, naval base of the fleet was in Odessa. Fleet together with the ports became Together these home ports helped Rus- an important issue. The ships were tied
as 70,000 personnel, including marines. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the following chaos made it almost impossible to asses the true strength of the fleet. But this was perhaps the least of the problems that surround it.
EurasiaCritic June 2010 25
Black Sea
alongside ports on Ukraine soil, the the Western Crimea. According to the bases too, were on the soil of another treaty, the maximum number of milistate. This situation became more com- tary personnel stationed in the leased bases was determined plex with the ethnic as 25,000. and demographic comA total of 20 corvettes The status of the position of the personof the class is planned, Sevastopol Base was nel and their decision however the project is again brought to the on which flag they plagued with finance agenda of both counwere going to choose problems, which is tries in April 2010, to carry on their unithe reason of the cost when after an exforms. Lengthy and tense tremely heated debate rise and delays of the in Ukrainian parlianegotiations continued first ship ( a planned ment a resolution for until 1997, when the 1.8 Billion Rubles the extension of the two countries aggreed versus a realized cost lease agreement for on the status of the of 7 Billion Rubles). 25 years passed. In fleet, personnel and They are to be divided exchange for allowing bases. An agreement the Russian Black Sea was signed on May 28, between the Baltic and Fleet to remain at Sev1997 by the prime minBlack Sea Fleets astopol, Ukraine will isters of both sides. Acreceive a 30 per cent cording to the agreement, three harbors of Sevastopol was discount on the cost of its natural gas leased by Russia for a period of twenty supplies from Russia. years with a USD 100 million annual Struggling to Survive payment. The lease had an option of renewal in 2017. Russia also leased the The 1997 treaty was an interim soSaki naval aviation base and carrier lution for Russia’s naval presence in flight operations training facilities in the Black Sea. However, this very pres26 EurasiaCritic June 2010
ence was seriously degraded in the 90’s, because of the economic downturn of the country during it’s transition to liberal economy. A considerable number of ships were left to their fates, slowly covered with rust and sometimes falling victim to scrap metal smugglers. Combat readiness of the warships as well as naval aviation units fell down below critical levels. Salaries and morale of the personnel followed. Of more than 10 submarines present during the breakup of the Union, only one, the Kilo class Alrosa remained partly active, until a machinery accident in November 2009 put her out of service. Immediately after the 1997 treaty, Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Viktor Kravchenko stated that Russian Black Sea Fleet would eventually consist of around 100 warships and patrol craft and 150 auxiliary vessels and tenders and new ships were to be commissioned in 1998. At the time of this statement, more than 60 per cent of the fleet was more than 15 years old with very low serviceability. No major commissioning took place in 1998 and the following years and in more than 10 years,
Black Sea total number of warships and patrol powered battle cruiser. craft of the fleet fell down to around 40, Modernization Efforts including those in refit. One of the fruits of the naval modAccording to an article by Rear Adernization program is the Project 20380 miral Valery Aleksin, the Russian NaSteregushchy class multipurpose corval Forces lost half of its power in the vette, designed to replace the Project period of 1991 – 1997. Until 1997, only 1124 Grisha class light frigates. These one nuclear attack submarine and one ships represent Russian Navy’s efforts nuclear ballistic missile submarine were for building up a modern, cost-effective laid down, with no commissioning or fleet, equipped with interoperable and modernization work completed. It was state-of-the-art weapon and commuevaluated that until no urgent measures taken, the Russian Naval Forces would nication systems. Designed to conduct anti surface and anti consist of 2 or 3 guided submarine warfare, A budget of 12.3 missile cruisers, 7 – 10 patrol, search and guided missile destroybillion rubles was rescue and show of ers and around 30 – 40 allocated for a period flag missions, Sterepatrol craft, all to be of 5 years, with the gushchy class is the divided between 5 inplanned completion in first modern warship dependent fleets, some design to be realized 2012. responsible from operafter the breakup of ations in open seas and Union. The first ship of the the Soviet Uni oceans. This state was seen as a threat h class, the Steregushchy was laid down to the capability to protect economic in December 2001 and launched in May and political interests of Russia. 2006. Commissioning under the banner This alarming state of the Black Sea Fleet was clearly exposed in August of the Baltic Fleet took place in Novem2002, when a pre-planned deployment ber 2007, while 4 more ships were laid to the Mediterranean was cancelled on the direct orders of the Russian Federation Navy’s Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov. The fleet’s flagship, a Project 1164 Slava class cruiser Moskva, together with the Project 1135M Krivak II frigate Pytlivy and the Project 1559V replenishment ship Ivan Bubnov, were scheduled to sail into the Mediterranean in late 2002. The task force was to conduct a joint exercise with the French Navy and make port visits in both France and Italy. The reason for the cancellation was given as “economic circumstances”, specifically the critical shortage of fuel. The then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stressed in 1999 that the state of naval forces was in the top of the priority list of Russian defence decision makers. A large scale modernization programme was activated, concentrating on preserving a blue-water naval capability by effectively decreasing in size while modernizing large surface and submarine ships, like the Admiral Ushakov, a Project 1144 Kirov class nuclear
down between May 2003 and November 2006. A total of 20 corvettes of the class is planned, however the project is plagued with finance problems, which is the reason of the cost rise and delays of the first ship ( a planned 1.8 Billion Rubles versus a realized cost of 7 Billion Rubles). They are to be divided between the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. Currently, the Ochakov, a Project 1134B Kara class destroyer and the B380, a Project 641B Tango class diesel submarine which has been unoperational for nearly a decade are the first two ships in the retirement list. Following are the Kerch, another Kara and a number of Grisha class obsolote frigates. These surface and submarine ships are planned to be replaced with Project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov guided missile frigates and Project 677 Lada class diesel electric submarines. Modernization plans oversee the procurement of up to four Project 22350 frigates and four Project 677 submarines until 2015. These fresh arrivals will at least partially replace some
EurasiaCritic June 2010 27
Black Sea of the main combattant fleet in which the average age of ships is around 30 years. The new ships are badly needed not only for power projection and flag display in the Black Sea, but also for participation in international operations such as BlackSeaFor, Black Sea Harmony and Active Endeavor, which the Russian government puts special emphasis. Defence circles were widely surprised when the chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Nikolai Makarov said in August 2009 that, Russia intends to purchase a Mistral class helicopter landing ship from France and jointly produce three or four more. General Makarov went on saying that he was expecting to obtain contract agreements with DCNS, the French shipyard that builds Mistral, allowing the construction and purchase of the ship. In a public relations move, the Mistral of the French Navy visited St Petersburg in November 2009, allowing Russian military decision makers and senior officers to closely inspect the
ship, its capabilities, as well as conduct a number of joint exercises including Russian attack helicopters operating from the ship. The Mistral project would be the biggest foreign military purchase for Russia, which for many years has relied on the Soviet-era principle of producing every piece of military equipment — from a pistol cartridge to a ballistic missile — domestically. It is speculated the total cost could be around $1 billion. Critics of the project have underlined expediency of such a costly purchase in the name of Russian national security. According to the comments, any military conflicts likely to involve Russia would be with its neighbors, which would require land troops and equipment rather than a sea vessel, they say. However, on the other side, Russian Navy seems rather enthusiast about the purchase, as underlined by the words of the commander of Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy. Vysotskiy said that “a ship like that would have al-
lowed the Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes, not 26 hours, which is how long it took us”, referring to the performance of Russian Black Sea Fleet during the armed conflict with Georgia in August 2008.
Trial By Fire: South Ossetia War in 2008 South Ossetia War in 2008 was the first battle experience of Russian Navy since the Second World War. Ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet left Sevastopol base on the evening of 8 August when hostilities began with Georgian troops and separatist South Ossetian and Abkhazian militia. On 10 August, the Black Sea Fleet flagship, the missile cruiser Moskva, destroyer Smetlivyy and auxiliary vessels began operating in Georgian waters and dictated a naval blockade. The ships were supported by three amphibious landing ships, which were deployed to the area earlier from Sevastopol and Novorossiysk. On the evening of 10 August a naval skirmish between Russian and Georgian forces took place. The Russian Nanuchka III class corvette Mirazh engaged and sank a Georgian coast guard patrol boat and sank another with two P-120 Malakhit (NATO reporting name SS-N-9 Siren) anti-ship missiles. Following the clash, remaining vessels of the Georgian navy returned to their ports and remained moored. The Black Sea Fleet ships at the coast later supported Russian ground troops entering Poti harbor and assisted the sinking of several Georgian naval and coast guard boats, as well as destroying military equipment and infrastructure.
A New Home The 1997 treaty was only a temporary solution for Russia. The Black Sea Fleet needed a new strategic base for its operations. The ideal place for this new base was Novorossiisk, because of its location and presence of some primary infrastructure of naval installations. The then President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in 2003 setting up an alternative naval base for the Black Sea Fleet in Novorossiisk after Ukraine 28 EurasiaCritic June 2010
Black Sea
demanded the base in Sevastopol be withdrawn by 2017. The plan to construct a new base at Novorossiisk was first announced by the then commander-in-chief of Russian Naval Forces Admiral Vladimir Masorin in 2007. A budget of 12.3 billion rubles was allocated for a period of 5 years, with the planned completion in 2012. However, latest reports indicate that the relocation may take place much later than planned, mainly due to financial reasons. According a special report by Nikolay Abroskin, the head of Russia’s Federal Agency for Special Construction, the deadline for the construction programme at Novorossiysk was revised as 2020. Shortly after the extension of the lease agreement by Ukrainian parliament, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in May said that, Russia will com-
plete the construction of the Novorossiisk base by 2020, with a cost of 92 billion Rubles, a price much higher than the original budget.
membership of Bulgaria and Romania and Ukraine and Georgia’s aspirations, as well as military and economic cooperation with US and European Union is perceived in Russia Conclusion as direct threat to naThe high tension in tional security. The The Black Sea Fleet the Caucasus with has been a symbol of the Georgia and increasing high tension in the Caucasus with Geordownfall of the Russian US naval presence gia and increasing military power after the with accordance of US naval presence collapse of the Soviet Montreaux Convention with accordance of Union. The state of the Montreaux Convenequipment, morale and dictate a modern tion dictate a modern infrastructure of the naval fleet with rapid naval fleet with rapid Fleet has had negative response capability. response capabileffects on the Russian ity. Keeping the balinfluence in the Black Sea region, which is controls the pas- ance between a modern deterrent naval sage to Caucasus and Central Asia, or force and cost – effectiveness among in other words, the security of energy budgetary problems is a challange for transit lines. Atlantic Bloc’s increasing Russian government and military decidominance in the region with the NATO sion makers. EurasiaCritic June 2010 29
Black Sea Unit
Name
Class
Type
247th Submarine Battalion
Alrosa
Project 877 Kilo
Diesel electric submarine
Moskva
Project 1164 Slava
Missile cruiser
Kerch Ochakov
Project 1134B Kara
Cruiser
Smetlivy
Project 61 Kashin
Destroyer
Ladny Pytlivy Nikolay Filchenkov Orsk Saratov Azov Novocherkassk Tsesar Kunikov Yamal
Project 1135 Krivak I Project 1135M Krivak II
Frigate
Vladimirets
Project 1145 Sokol
Alexandrovets
Project 1124 Grisha I
11th Antisubmarine Ships Brigade
30th Surface Warships Division
197th Amphibious Ships Brigade
68th Coastal Defence Warship Brigade
400th Antisubmarine Ships Battalion
Project 1171 Alligator Amphibious Project 775 Ropucha
Povorino Muromets
Project 1124M Grisha III
Suzdalets
Light frigate
Kovrovets 418th Minesweeper Battalion
Corvette
Ivan Golubets Turbinist
Project 266M Natya I
Vitse Admiral Zhukov 166th Novorossiysky Small Missile Boat Battalion 41st Missile Boat Brigade
295th Sulinsky Missile Boat Battalion
Bora Samum Shtil Mirazh
Project 1234.1 Nanuchka III
R-71
Project 1241.1 Tarantul II
R-60 R-109 R-239 Ivanovets Eysk
184th Novorossiysk Coastal Defence Brigade
Kasimov Valentin Pikul Vitse Admiral Zakharyin Mineralnie Vodi Leytenant Ilyin Zheleznyakov
30 EurasiaCritic June 2010
Project 1239 Sivuch
Fast attack craft
Corvette Project 1241.M Tarantul III
Project 1124M Grisha III
Light frigate
Project 266M Natya I Project 12650 Sonya Project 12660 Gorya
Minesweeper
Central Asia
How Many More ‘Revolutions’ for Kyrgzstan? By Gulay Kilic
K
yrgyzstan, a small and mountainous country in Central Asia, has a population about 5.4 million. Overthrowing the former leader in early April was not an unexpected development for the country since it had experienced similar changes for the third time in the last twenty years due to the many challenges Kyrgyzstan has faced. Therefore, why Kyrgyzstan witnessed three ‘revolutions’ during its early period of independence is quite clear: the country has lived through north-south division, extreme poverty, widespread corruption, ethnic diversity, political turmoil and the foreign policy challenges. The north-south division for instance is one of the determinant factors in the political and economic life of the country.
In fact this separation had its roots in matters, Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia in the second half of the 18th century when general has occupied a significant place the people in the north had accepted in security and economic developments Russian protectorate and the south in the post-Soviet era, especially after entered the control of 9/11 terrorist attacks the Kokand State and to the U.S. The Kyrgyz While Bakiyev made government has had to was composed of the himself out to be a develop foreign polimajority of its army.1 more democratic cies not only bolsterThese differences leader, the policies that ing security and ecohave reflected in the he implemented looked nomic benefits of the political affiliation of like a dictatorial the people, economic country but also disdifferences and social covering and following regime. structure. Additionally a fine balance between so far as other factors are concerned concerned, the regional aand internal interests of Kyrgyzstan did not and is still not rep- powerful states, Russia, the U.S., and resenting a bright picture since it has China. It can be therefore, said that any remained one of the poorest and corrupted countries among the newly inde- of the ‘revolutions’ or turbulent popendent states. As for the foreign policy litical changes were caused not just by the combination of all those elements together. If no improvements are achieved on the serious problems Kyrgyzstan has had, experienced country may well witness similar ‘revolutions’ or turbulent political changes.
The First Kyrgyz ‘Revolution’ and Akayev in Power In the last days of the Soviet Union, with the decision of the “Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, an eight day strike was declared. This was the first time for such a strike to occur. The participants in the strike demanded: 1) the head of Communist Party leader Masaliyev to quit the head of the Jogorku Kenesh2 , 2) to switch to a presidential system, 3) to allow a multi-party system, 4) to ban the Communist Party acting as the official administrative authority, 5) 32 EurasiaCritic June 2010
Central Asia
to investigate the Osh events (the Osh Central Asia” by Western observers.4 events were the clashes that arose from Akayev held power from his elecRussia’s provocation of Kyrgyz and Uz- tion in 1991 until 2005. When Askar bek people as a result of the concerns Akayev came to power, the matter about disintegration. Due to the strike, that he most dealt with was the new Masaliyev submitted to these requests economic structure. As a result of the and quit his position as the head of the dissolution of socialism, like all other Jogorku Kenesh.3 As a result of the member countries of the Soviet Union, presidential elections, the head of the Kyrgyzstan also had difficulty during Kyrgyzstan Academy of Sciences, Dr. the transition to a pluralist democracy Askar Akayev, was elected as the first and free market economy. Especially President of the Republic of Kyrgyz- since it did not have enough infrastrucstan. Although the elections held in tures in economic terms, Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan in 1991 seemed fair, Askar experienced a period of economic crisis from 1992 until 1994. Akaev subsequently With this, it was easily accepted that certain The Tulip ‘Revolution’ amount of irregularwas carried out largely affected by other economic crises throughity had occurred. The in the framework out in the world. For effectiveness of the of north-south instance, the Asian strike and parliamenseparation. Crisis in 1997 and the tary elections were Russian Financial Crievaluated as a ‘revoboth lution’ for some parties. Thus, Th it is i con- sis i iin 1998 b th had a negative effect on sidered that three ‘revolutions’ have taken Kyrgyzstan’s. place in Kyrgyzstan’s history, including The Tulip ‘Revolution’ the ‘revolutio’n on 6-7 April. Due to the relatively democratic parliamentary After the elections in December elections in 1990, Kyrgyzstan was de- 2000, Akayev was re-elected as the scribed as the “Democracy Island of the President of Kyrgyzstan. In the fol-
lowing years, there has not been much change in the administration. Even if Akayev received a series of measures to combat corruption and new decrees were issued, he could not be successful in preventing corruption and bribe. He appointed his relatives and closest friends to the important roles in the mechanism of the state. It cannot be said that Akayev was very successful in finding solution to the economic problems after the economic crises. A serious opposition has been occurred as a result of the continuation of the same problems in the country since 2000. The opposition tried to show its voice by way of protest and demonstrations. However, after the elections in 2005, Akayev came to power again and the people took to the streets with allegations of electoral fraud. In the meantime, the only common point of the opposition was that it was anti-Akayev. One of the important internal dynamics triggering this situation was the division of the country as “poor south-rich north”. The South-North division was caused, as we mentioned above, by historical reasons, cultural differences and EurasiaCritic June 2010 33
Central Asia
economic5 structure. Since the people in the north have more privileges than the people in the south, the southern people voiced their complaints about injustices against them. Thus, more allocation in the state staff and rebellion started from the south. Rather than having existed in the axis of the conflicts between the outside forces (East-West), like any examples of other colorful revolutions, the Tulip ‘Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan was performed by the internal dynamics within the framework of the southern-northern differentiation inside the country. However, it can be possible to talk about the Western impact, although it is limited.
The Post-2005 Process and the Causes of the April ‘Revolution’ After the Tulip ‘Revolution’, which resembled a fight for power between the clans rather than a struggle for the sake of the Western democratic values, Kurmanbek Bakiyev came into 34 EurasiaCritic June 2010
the power. Bakiyev made northerner Feliks Kulov the Prime Minister. In the 2005 Tulip ‘Revolution’, the opposition also included Roza Otunbayeva. At the head of current interim government, Roza Otunbayeva has a strong political relationship with the United States and the West. Between the years of 1991-94, she served at the Kyrgyz Embassy in the United States and Canada. In 1997, she also served at the Kyrgyz Embassy in the United Kingdom. Although it was expected that Bakiyev would take further steps after the ‘revolution’ to become more democratic country and would take more stringent measures in the fight against corruption, he followed the path of Akayev. First, he purged his friends with whom he made the opposition in 2005. He placed his close relatives in the upper echelons of the state one by one. The environment of unrest that led the country to the 2010 events started in 2008 in the preparation process of the opposition for the 2009 elections.
Central Asia Since the rise in corruption and any development has been done in the country during Bakiyev period, it encouraged a hope that the Bakiyev administration could end with the 2009 elections. Bakiyev did not lose power in the July 2009 elections. Northern people were unhappy with the results of elections and held a few demonstrations. But these demonstrations did not create enough impression and the elections were made valid. Nine months after the elections, in April 2010, when the opposition was preparing to question the government, the events erupted. An increase in the price of electricity in the country within the framework of customization and ongoing corruption, while bringing the economy to a deadlock, also put the to be a more democratic leader, the people into a difficult position. While policies that he implemented looked the opposition was going to make a mo- like a dictatorial regime. For example, tion on April 7 in the usual ways, with- he took a step under the name of deout waiting for the opposition, the people mocracy. Accordingly, a general assemin the town of Talas rose up in rebellion bly is going to be created by people who on the night of April 6. The government have been randomly assigned and the put the army and police forces in place assembly will be consulted on decisions. But again, the Presito suppress the insurdent would give the rections. It wanted to After the recent global final decision. Thus, quell the uprising by economic crisis, the this would be an osarresting the adverKyrgyz economy tensible board. On the saries. But these arother hand, by makhas worsened more rests made the public ing concessions to his much angrier. The because the Kyrgyz family and relatives, demonstrators walked migrant workers Bakiyev’s nepotism led to the White House working in Russia people to revolt. in Kyrgyzstan. While and Kazakhstan came 2) Ethnic: The the White House was back. separation between being looted, Bakiev north and south aprun away from Bishplied in the state staff can be expressed li d i h kek to Osh. Opposition leaders Roza Otunbayeva, Almaz Atambaev, Ismail as the second factor. The Tulip ‘RevoIsakov, Omurbek Tekebaev, Temir lution’ was carried out largely in the Sariev and Azimbek Beknazarov were framework of north-south separation. in a hurry to establish an interim gov- In the Tulip ‘Revolution’, the elites of ernment after Bakiev left the country the south revolted because they were (he first went to Kazakhstan and then not comfortable with not taking part in moved to Belarus, like a political exile). state staff and were not represented by The events that pushed the people the government. In the 2010 events, the towards rebellion can be classified as northern people rebelled. 3) Economic: After the recent follows: global economic crisis, the Kyrgyz 1) Political: The policies that Baeconomy has worsened more because kiyev implemented take place on the the Kyrgyz migrant workers working in top of the list of reasons for this situRussia and Kazakhstan came back. The ation. While Bakiyev made himself out
dramatic price increases reflected upon the public due to the privatization of the public service institutions led people to rebel.6 Returning workers have faced unemployment, electricity and natural gas hikes (at a rate of 200%) and cost of living. This situation led people who have nothing to lose to go out into the streets. The inadequate security force in the country to control a dissident group of 10-thousand people is one reason that the ‘revolution’ was successful. The deaths occurred with the recent ‘revolution’ have caused psychological pressure which led the government to resignation. The government did not expect such a reaction from the opposition. The government was overthrown by a rebellion that approximately 10 thousand people attended. The most striking difference from the Tulip ‘Revolution’ is that this ‘revolution’ was primarily a bloody ‘revolution’. The 2010 ‘revolution’, in which 85 people died and more than 1,500 people were injured, could not have been predicted. The public reaction in 2005 and 2010 was a revolt against the political power due to the economic situation. The majority of the group that was established to rebel against the ruling power was unemployed and young. The public was complaining in both of the ‘revolutions’ about the corruption and economic challenges. However, one of the ‘revoEurasiaCritic June 2010 35
Central Asia lutions’ was started by the south and the other by the north. In 2005, the southern elites revolted because they wanted to gain the right of representation in the government and to take part in the state staff. During the 2010 events, the northern people revolted as a reaction to the economic insufficiency and the reasons mentioned above.
As known, the Manas military air base was set up in 2001 by the U.S. for the purpose of giving support to the operations in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan did not lean towards this U.S. base, as also it already permitted the establishment of a Russian air base. In January 2009, closing down the base was on the agenda for the first time on account of the fact that the rent of the base is The Roles of Russia and the U.S. extremely low. The closing order given As one of the external powers which in the same year was approved both by is claimed to have played a role in the the parliament and the president. But 2010 ‘revolution’, Russia played an ef- right after this, the U.S. and Kyrgyz govfective role with regards to the upris- ernments made an agreement in which ing in Kyrgyzstan by capitalizing on the the rent of the base was increased from domestic developments in the country. 17 million dollars to 60 million dollars, In Kyrgyzstan, a TV channel located and the U.S. continued using Manas.8 in Moscow broadcasted TV programs However, Russia did not favor the decision, because it did not against Bakiyev claimwant any other miliKyrgyzstan did not ing that he is guilty of tary bases apart from cronyism and nepolean towards this the Russian base. tism. Right after this, U.S. base, as also it Before Bakiyev Russia urged the already permitted the elected as president, community already establishment of a he thrust Manas into living under difficult Russian air base. the political spotlight, conditions to rebel by claiming that baseimplementing a new tariff for petroleum products. There is related payments had lined the pockets other evidence showing that Russia is of the Akayev family.9 However Bakibehind this uprising: Putin was the first yev seemed to be quickly adopted the foreign leader who celebrated the Kyr- system which he had harshly criticized gyz society for the successful uprising. after he became the president.10 The Central Asian policy of the Russia accepts and welcomes such a U.S. in the last period has been imple‘revolution’.7
mented with respect to Afghanistan.11 For this reason, during the war every strategic point which helped the U.S. to access Afghanistan has been very important. At this point, the U.S. has been criticized strongly for being a mere spectator to the ongoing tension and corruptions in the country. The unresponsiveness of the U.S. to the corruption in Kyrgyzstan led by Bakiyev’s son Maksim after entering Iraq with the cliché of “democracy and human rights” is also being criticized. However, at this point the U.S. should not be criticized very strongly. In 2005, incidents in Uzbekistan proved that when democracy becomes a cliché, countries are being pushed into cooperation with authoritarian countries such as Russia and China.12 Within this scope, if we overview the relationship between the U.S. and Central Asian countries, we will see that for the U.S. it is not easy to actualize the requests for democracy and freedom in Central Asia, and for this reason, it is pushed into cooperation or it prefers to cooperate with the governments which are in the position to contribute to its own policies in the region.13 During the Tulip ‘Revolution’, Russia remained non-reactive and did not attempt to intervene in the situation. However, this time the non-reactive party is the U.S..
Conclusion The latest developments in Kyrgyzstan show that the country’s governmental structure is still delicate. Two ‘revolutions’ made one after another proved to be fruitless for the country. Moreover the latest developments in the country point out to the fact that there will be more ‘revolution’ in the future for Kyrgyzstan if there is not any economic and political recovery. The interim government14 is working on a new draft constitution which forecasts revisions with respect to the authorities and duties of the presidency, government and parliament for the purpose of terminating the constitutional crisis besides the political and economic crisis. In the new constitution, which will be voted on at the ref-
36 EurasiaCritic June 2010
Central Asia erendum that will be held on the 27th of June, the authorities of the president are diminished and his successive election is prohibited. Besides, the authorities of the suspended Constitutional Court (the interim government has terminated the parliament and suspended the Constitutional Court) are transferred to the Higher Court. In the country, conflicts arising from ethnic problems are also important issues that cannot be ignored. During the beginning of the crisis, attacks made on the Meskhetian Turks were a serious source of concern; however, in time it was revealed that these attacks were made by a minority group and the community did not approve such conflicts. While the ongoing concerns related to subversion of the country and a possible civil war continued, by means of handouts with unknown origins distributed in various regions a call was made for the division of the country in two as south and north. On May 13 and 14, in the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad, the occupation of the governorship premises by the followers of Bakiyev ended with 1 person dead and 63 injured. Meanwhile, in order to assure the public that everything is kept under control, the interim government made continuous announcements. This shows that the interim government is prepared for the possible conflicts which may arise in the country. As regards to the spreading of the incidences that took place to other countries in the region, the countries within the region are not expected to be affected by such a domino effect. After the Tulip ‘Revolution’, peace was kept in the other countries of the region; this may indicate that similar incidents will not spread to the neighboring countries. The third ‘revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan is very important with respect to its domestic stability and avoidance of similar incidences in the future. The interim government must put the six-month period to the best use. Today, the geographical position of Kyrgyzstan is very important with regards to the military relationships based on the war in Afghanistan. The developments regarding
the future of the country are also very important for the stability of the region. If the country is weakened further politically and a chaotic environment arises, it may become an available center for terrorist activities and drug and human smuggling. For this reason, politic and economic stability of Kyrgyzstan is crucial for all countries in the region and beyond. (Endnotes) 1 Howorth, Henry H., History of The Mongols, II/2, (London, 1880) pp. 653-659 2 Parliament of Kyrgyz Republic 3 Saray, Mehmet, Modern Kırgızistan’ın Doğuşu, (Ankara, TIKA, 2004), p.39 4 John Anderson has named Kyrgyzstan, Democracy Island of the Central Asia 5 The north of Kyrgyzstan is historically included in the economic field of the Chuy valley of Kazakhstan and it has a tendency towards the southern Urals and Siberia. The south of it is included in the economic field of Fergana valley of Uzbekistan and the tendency towards the Eastern Turkestan region of China is regarded. Akayev could not develop necessary measures while giving enough importance on the difference between South-North and on the coming threats from the south. The problems in the country were focused in the southern region and the government was focused in the hands of the ruling clans of the North. 6 Huskey, Eugene, “Crisis in Kyrgyzstan: Fuel, Conctractors, and Revolution along the Afghan Supply Chain”, The House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Written Statement, April 22,2010, available online at: <http://www.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/ subcommittees/NS_Subcommittee/4.22.2010_ Crisis_in_Kyrgyzstan/Huskey_Written_State-
ment.pdf> 7 Vlademir Frolov, “Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Is Russia Behind Change In Regime In Kyrgyzstan?”, April 16, 2010, available online at: http://www.russiaprofile.org/page. php?pageid=Experts%27+Panel&articleid =a1271441076 8 It is known that Kyrgyzstan leases its lands to Kazakhstan, China, Uzbekistan and Russia besides the U.S. The countries use these lands for military and economic purposes in line with their own interests. For example, Kazakhstan carries on touristic activities in the area at northern Kyrgyzstan which is rented in 2009. 9 Cooley, Aexander, “Crisis in Kyrgyzstan: Fuel, Contractors and Revolution Along the Afghan Supply Chain”, United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommiittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, hearing on April 22,2010, available online at: http://www.oversight. house.gov/images/stories/subcommittees/NS_ Subcommittee/4.22.2010_Crisis_in_Kyrgyzstan/ Cooley_Testimony.pdf 10 Kramer,Andrew E.,”Fuel Sales to U.S. at Issue in Kyrgyzstan,” New York Times. April 11, 2010. 11 “Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses”, International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing, No:102, Bishkek April 27, 2010, p. 13, available online at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/ asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan.aspx 12 Interview with Guner Ozkan, the deputy director of Centre For Eurasian Studies at USAK (International Strategic Research Organization). 13 Guner Ozkan, interview 14 Roza Otunbayeva the head of the interim government promised a just, transparent and democratic order before she formed the interim government. Her successful career as a diplomat may be evaluated as an indicator which shows that she may be a successful leader during this transition period of the country. EurasiaCritic June 2010 37
Uzbekistan Economy
Economic Development of Uzbekistan By Ali Kulebi
T
he strategic country Uzbekistan ics while Uzbekistan prevented the forwhich lies in the heart of the eign intervention. Uzbekistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s stability Central Asia is consolidating and successful administration helped its Republic since the year 1991, the its southern neighbor Afghanistan to year it was established. By the success- prevent the problems get worse. This ful administration of President Islam successful achievement also helped Kerimov, Uzbekistan for protecting Central succeeded in the fight Asian peace. More than 7.3 million By the Neighboragainst the foreign tons of wheat produced hood Foundation syssupported terrorism and 4.4 million tons of tem, democracy is risand anti-progressive cotton collected. en from bottom to top. activities while the Uzbekistan had a fast transition period after on economics and finance in its the independence. Life f standards d d off change h the people increased by the successful first independence years because of the steps for democracy, law and econom- centralist policies of the Soviet Union
which was suggesting regional countries to not to have a self â&#x20AC;&#x201C; sufficient economy. Legal arrangements and norms are established in this period for trade relations with outside world Success is certain today with the point achieved. World Economic Crisis did not affected Uzbekistan besides this in spite of the gross national product decrease in the other developing countries, gross national product of Uzbekistan had a development rate of 8.3% in 2009. New legal arrangements in bank sector and stabilizing the foreign loaning prevented Uzbekistan from the effects of the Economic Crisis.
Success of Economical Reforms Five main principles which was proposed by President Kerimov are the fundamentals for the transition period to free market economy in Uzbekistan. In this sense the key elements of this success are economy priority over politics, stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s regulator role, superiority of constitutional order, protection of the people by social precautions in accordance with the free market economy and trade laws for developing investments. By these principles and their application: Gross national product was increased with a rate of 8.3%, production volume of industrial goods were increased to 9%, agricultural goods increased to 5.7%, goods circulation by retail increased to 16.6%, paid services to people are increased to 12.9%. More than 7.3 million tons of wheat 38 EurasiaCritic June 2010
Uzbekistan Economy
produced and 4.4 million tons of cotton reforms taxes which worth 60% of GNP, have been decreased to 20% and taxes collected. Expected inflation has a low rate upon the private enterprises and companies were decreased by 7%. like 7-9% in 2010. Peoples’ trust to local banks is proRate of supported foreign investected, deposit volume tors increased to 68% of banks in Uzbekiand more importantly Nearly 60% of stan is increased by most of the investUzbekistan’s textile 1.7 times when it is ments became direct sector is managed by investments. Nevai compared to the year Turkish businessmen, Free Economical In2008. it has a crucial dustrial Site which is Financial investdeveloped for supportment projects such as importance for ing the investments has modernization of straUzbekistan. a 90 Km distance to tegic economic fields Buhara and has a 110 and support for small and private managements are aided for Km distance to Semerkant. It is 2 km far away from the international highway long term. Investment volume of Uzbekistan “E 40” and it has a 2.5 km distance to economy was increased by 8.2 US $ in the Nevai International Airport. It can service to more than 100 millions of 2009. After the beginning of economical people in a area which has a diameter
of 2000 km. This fact gives the chance to trade produced goods to European and Asian consumers. Also the airport in the region connects the Central Asia to outside world. With those achievements and applications Uzbekistan increased its development speed and Uzbekistan had definite and successful results for getting over the global economical crisis by anti - crisis precautions packages. It was proved that it is possible to use economical and political potential of the Uzbekistan to reach development and prosperity goals. In addition to all these developments, 940.000 people were employed with the economical precautions in 2009 and this is an important number for a country which has a population of 30 millions. As a result of all these positive deEurasiaCritic June 2010 39
Uzbekistan Economy
velopments success of Uzbekistan’s anti crisis package has been confirmed by institutions such as IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Important results have been achieved about socialization of the youth which consists the more than half of the Uzbekistan population. Year 2010 have been announced as the Developed Youth Year. Aim is to prepare the youth for 21 st Century conditions and to build a youth which has a high level of consciousness. For this project, 40 EurasiaCritic June 2010
With this sense, Uzbekistan became a member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 to make policies for border security, terrorism, economy and culture with the countries of the Nearly 60% of region. They also Uzbekistan’s textile had precautions for sector is managed by fighting against a Turkish businessmen, foreign intervention it has a crucial and exploitation of natural sources of importance for the region. Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan also became a member of organizations such Commonwealth of Independent States, Eurasian Economic Community and Organization of the Islamic Conference. It is clear that Uzbekistan gives a high level of importance to international relations in the recent years. In this sense, “Precautions Against the Global Economical Crisis and Expectations After the Crisis” conference which was leaded by Kerimov in 12 th of April was assumed to be an important step. Uzbekistan is also a member of the Asian Development Bank since 1995. ADB is a trustworthy partner for Uzbekistan and ADB provided 1.2 Billion $ credit for Uzbekistan last year. 29 successful projects have been completed with this credit. ADB’s yearly conference was held in Central Asia for the first time in 4 May 2010. It is an important achievement for Uzbekistan because of its close partnership with ADB. Development potential of Uzbekistan textile sector encouraged Turk8 Trillions of Uzbek Som have been in- ish Businessmen to invest Uzbekistan. vested. Nearly 60% of Uzbekistan’s textile sector is managed by Turkish businessmen, International Approaches of it has a crucial importance for UzbekiUzbekistan stan. Uzbekistan is located in the middle Kerimov’s Uzbekistan continues of the Central Asia, and it has borders with the slow and stable economical with Turkistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, development. Kerimov also successes Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Uzbekistan at keeping the stability in such a comhas no coasts so it has no direct way to plicated region and hard conditions. reach to the seas. Transporting the Uz- The harder quest is to achieve these bekistan’s riches has a crucial impor- successes under the pressure of the big tance because of those conditions. world powers.
Caucasus
Cooperation Confined to Caucasus:
Azerbaijan-USA Relations By Dr Hatem Cabbarli Chairman of Center for Eurasian Security and Strategic Studies
B
ecause of living under the pressure of Soviet regime more than 70 years, Azerbaijan has attached importance to the relations between USA perceived as a democratic state after the independence; however, until the mid-1990s, Azerbaijan had some problems with this country to put relations right. Despite this, relations with these two states made serious progresses with energy, regional and international security, cooperation against the international terrorism, within the framework of NATO participation in peacekeeping force of Iraq, Kosovo( after the declaration of Kosovoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s independence, Azerbaijan withdrew its peacekeeping force), Afghanistan. Al-
42 EurasiaCritic June 2010
though there have been some problems Act)directly prohibiting economic, fifor relations between two countries un- nancial and humanitarian aid to Azertil 2010, these problems have not been baijan should be addressed. serious to tarnish the Another subject cooperation between of assessment is the The legislation of US two states. Howevapproach of USA to Government which is saving the Azerbaijan er, this situation has known as additional territories occupied by changed lately. item (Section 907 While evaluating Armenia. USA is the Freedom Support Act) cochairman of OSCE Azerbaijan- US reladirectly prohibiting Minsk Group which tions, firstly foreign operates for terminapolicy and security uneconomic, financial tion of Azerbaijan terderstanding of USA and humanitarian aid should be evaluated. ritories occupied by to Azerbaijan should Armenia. Although The legislation of US be addressed. Azerbaijan does not Government which is known as additional complain about the item (Section 907 Freedom Support activities of OSCE Minsk Group, attitudes of Minsk Group co-states (US, Russia and France)who make mediation attempt evaluated as negative by Baku can be summarize as: - Not to make pressure to Armenia for saving Azerbaijan territories from occupation, - On the contrary giving every kind of aid and support, - Applying pressure not to Armenia who practices revisionist politics against Turkey and Azerbaijan and also accuses of Turkey for making so-called genocide, but Turkey - Wanting compensation from Azerbaijan whose territories were occupied, These have tightened AzerbaijanU.S relations. After the truth which Minsk Groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s approximately 20-years-activity is in-
Caucasus
conclusive and there was no idea about sanctions against occupant Armenia has emerged, Azerbaijan opened a discussion about functionality of Minsk Group.
Philosophy of U.S Foreign and Security Policy While U.S is preparing the list of terror supporting states, the USA describes the states which are thought to damage its national interests as the supporting states of terrorist organization, not describe the states which threaten the international security, the USA has applied economic and political sanctions to these states. It is ignored that the other states are facing terrorism problems. If the USA assumed the role of being a state providing security in the international arena, and if it took into consideration national interests of the other states with its own interests due
to political ethics, its prestige and cred- cent people more than terrorists but on ibility in the international arena would the other hand coming closer and closer to Russia and China, the USA imposes increase. The United States came to Middle that Azerbaijan, %20 of which territories were invaded ArEast from beyond the Georgia has not felt menia not use military Atlantic in order to power for the resolublock Saddam Husthe support of U.S. tion of the crisis This sein to get weapons Naturally, serious of mass destruction, consequences emerged is truly an two- sided approach. While the and invaded Iraq. Into take a lesson from USA has applied sancvading Afghanistan this for the states of tions against the states which is at the heart this region and the which support terrorof energy reserves in ism, the USA provides the Middle East and other states. financial aid to Arwhich is thousands of allows so-called Nagornokilometers away from with pretexts that menia and all there are weapons of mass destruction Karabakh Republic to open representhere although it is never threatened tative offices in the USA. This situation seriously that country declaring a po- compromises to the force of U.S, sense litical will to be a hegemonic state and of justice, mediation attempts and the having difficulties in maintaining peace importance for democratic values. Although the USA wants to see and securityâ&#x20AC;? that it promised for that country as well, accidently killing inno- Turkey and Azerbaijan with its side for EurasiaCritic June 2010 43
Caucasus
the possible military operations against though the USA has mentioned on all Iraq, to use Incirlik (Turkey) military occasions that the USA felt uncomfortable about a natural base in military operagas agreement signed tions against Iraq, and Georgia has not felt to establish mobile between Turkey and the support of U.S. military base in AzerAzerbaijan due to the Naturally, serious baijan, it does not want problems with Iran consequences emerged and improving the cosuch demands from to take a lesson from Armenia despite havoperation with Azering border with Iran. baijan, it has not boththis for the states of Also, while the Govered about Iran and this region and the ernment of the USA Armenia’s economic, other states. was bringing forward energy, political and the demand directed security cooperation to Turkey and Azerbaijan, it did not re- which occurs a wide range, and even strict the activity of Congress and Ar- about technically support to the nuclear menian Diaspora about the so-called program of Iran. Armenian genocide, it did not give supTRUST ISSUE in port to Turkey for the solution of PKK attacks against Turkey, and it did not SOUTH CAUCASUS Another important issue is the trust declare its support for providing the integrity of Azerbaijan territory. Al- problem of South Caucasus states to 44 EurasiaCritic June 2010
the USA. Georgia mentioned its confidence to the U.S in the relations; after Russia came to the edge of Tbilisi by putting “ the all eggs in one basket”, Georgia has not felt the support of U.S. Naturally, serious consequences emerged to take a lesson from this for the states of this region and the other states. When the present and past history of former Soviet Republics(excluding Baltic states) are taken into consideration, instead of sliding to one side, it is understood that unless Russia became more weakened, these states would have to execute a balance policy. It does not seem possible for U.S with such an approach to demand for support from Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran and does not seem to occur this situation. If there is a regional and international security issue, this is not only the problem of the USA, but also
Caucasus the problem of the other states who also concern the results of problems and trying to solve the problem with a unilateral approach will bring the insecurity problem against U.S.
The Bullet Shooting the Relations: Amendment 907 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States adopted a special law for improving the democracy and human rights in former Soviet states. According to this law, financial and economic aid were contributed to the former Soviet Republics(the Baltic states had been discussed in another context, including Russia. However, while this law was accepted, as a result of intensive propaganda activity of Armenian Diaspora in the USA on the excuse of Azerbaijan’s “embargo and other aggressive manner” to Armenia and Nagorno- Karabakh, there was a special restriction for this country. According to this restriction known as additional article No. 907, it was not possible to help Azerbaijan for U.S Government. If the influence of Armenian Diaspora on U.S government is considered, Azerbaijan, dragging into war by force, does not apply embargo to Armenia, indeed. Proposing of lifting the not applicable embargo as a condition for making aids shows a serious insufficient acknowledge of U.S approach to the issue. Until September 2001, the Azerbaijan Government struggled against the abolition of this decision in all negotiations with U.S, but it did not manage it. However, after seeing the cold side of the terrorism in its own territory, the United States suspended the decision. After September 11 attack, the U.S Government reviewed the decision; in 24 October 2001the Senate, in 14 November 2001 the conciliation commission between the two wings of the Congress, in 19 December 2001 the House of Representatives confirmed the decision about which giving an authority to the U.S President for suspension of the additional article No. 907 until the end of 2002. A noteworthy point about this additional article No. 907 is abolition of this additional article until the end of
2002. Later, additional article No. 907 has repealed since today with a decision which taken every year. However, the abolition of additional article No. 907 not completely but in such a formation is a trump which U.S could always use against Azerbaijan. Indeed, if Azerbaijan began the military operations in order to get back its occupied territories, the USA could apply this law against Azerbaijan by showing the pressure of Armenian Diaspora as an excuse.
Two-faced Mediation of the United States Although the United States has always mentioned that it has recognized
the Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, it did not support the policy of providing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. On the contrary, the USA was with Armenian side when the issue discussed in international organizations such as the United Nations and OSCE. Despite Azerbaijan’s all conveniences for U.S to access to energy and security, keeping peacekeepers in Iraq and Afghanistan, opening its airspace to the U.S aircraft, the USA, under the pressure of Armenian Diaspora, preferred to support to Armenia. The United States is one of the cochairmen of OSCE Minsk Group, and it continues to mediation attempts in EurasiaCritic June 2010 45
Caucasus this context. At the same time, with its own initiatives, U.S brought together the Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev and Armenia President Robert Kocharyan in Key West, Florida, in April 2110, but failed to get results. The United States has seen the separatist demands of 100 thousand Armenians, living in the Nagorno- Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, as “self-determination”, and it has been working on providing Armenian a status of almost an independent state. However, because of some reasons, the USA certainly does not provide the same right to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In April 2007,in the report which was prepared by the U.S Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the USA deleted the Nagorno- Karabakh region of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia from the list, this tensed the relations and Araz Azimov who is the Assistant Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan canceled his visit to U.S in order to go to discuss security issues. One of the problems between Azerbaijan and the USA is that although U.S has recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, it has allocated financial aid as if Nagorno- Karabakh is an independent state. The USA has reported the financial aids which allocated to Karabakh for civilians to solve their
46 EurasiaCritic June 2010
problems. If U.S recognized the terri- President of Republic of Turkey, and torial integrity of Azerbaijan, it would explanation to arrange a meeting with made this financial aid directly over the Obama of Hillary Clinton, U.S SecreAzerbaijan, not to so-called Nagorno- tary f State, did not convince Aliyev to Karabakh Republic, this would be more attend the Forum. Although the USA constructive and would not undermine has not mentioned this situation more, mediation attempts. it thought to wait and did not invite the Azerbaijan saw that activities of President Ilham Aliyev to the “Nuclear OSCE Minsk Group have not giving Safety Summit” prepared in Washingserious results for nearly 20 years, so ton, in April 2010. The US Ministry of Azerbaijan GovernForeign Affairs tried ment has begun questo pass over this situAlthough the United tioning its actions. ation as “Azerbaijan is States has always not related to these ismentioned that it North Winds sues directly” and “the Blowing from has recognized the names which will be the West Azerbaijan’s territorial invited to the USA has The result why cold not disclosed yet.”. If integrity, it did not wind blows in relations the issue of the occusupport the policy between Azerbaijan pation of Azerbaijan of providing the and U.S while the relaterritories had not territorial integrity of tions between Turkey been discussed with Azerbaijan. and Armenia has imArmenian President proved is that the U.S Serzh Sarkisian, it President Barack Obama made d statet t would be so important not to invite ld nott b ment supporting Armenia against Azer- Ilham Aliyev to the Summit. Accordbaijan and making pressure to Turkey ing to some researchers, however, the to open the borders with Armenia while discussion of the US President Obama his visit to Turkey which took place and Sarkisian on the settlement of oc6-7 April 2009 in Istanbul within the cupied territories of Azerbaijan in the framework f Alliance of Civilizations Summit, and Azerbaijan the addressee Forum. For this reason, the Minister of the subject not being invited to the of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Ilham Summit have the quality of warning to Aliyev did not participate the Forum. Azerbaijan because of informing the The insistence of Abdullah Gül, the possible usage of military force for saving its occupied territories. Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan President, underlined in his speech made in April that without giving names, the supporter states of Armenia have prioritized not the problem of occupation of Azerbaijani lands which seriously has undermined the regional security, but the settlement of other problems. Political Affairs Advisor of Ilham Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan, Ali Hasanov reported his opinions as follows: “We estimate that the Americans should not think only the economic problems which Armenia faces... The USA does not execute the policy toward Azerbaijan as a strategic partner... Azerbaijan may revise the USA policy...Washington, the mediator for the settlement of Nagorno- Karabakh
Caucasus
problem, should contribute endeavor baijan, military exercises within the framework of bilateral military relato the solution of the problem.” Although U.S Ministry of Foreign tions which planned to regulate the Affairs explained its opinion about the military exercises, have postponed for issue “U.S does not recognize the inde- an indefinite time. Azerbaijan has pendence of Nagornomentioned on several Karabakh. We are supThe United States occasions about its porting the Minsk prowants to settle its discomforts on passcess, we want to solve democratic values ing from the assemthe issue by peaceful which have become bly of U.S the signed means”, these are not inflexible in U.S protocols which are convincing for Baku. for more than 200 related to the openIf the USA’ “peaceing of border gate of ful means” of settleyears by tapping Turkey to Armenia ment of solutions are into Azerbaijan with and establishing diplotaken as examples for Cinderella’s magic matic relations, makAzerbaijan, it can easwand. ing pressure on Turkey ily save its territories for declining the withfrom the occupation d l off A drawal Azerbaijan lands which Turof Armenia. The objections of Azerbaijan Gov- key occupied from Armenia, accepting ernment to the United States have the so-called Armenian genocide bill turned into actions. In a statement against Turkey by the Congress. made by Ministry of Defense of AzerThe Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz
Mammadov for Ilham Aliyev, by putting forward the U.S Government taking Yeravan’s side in the relations of Azerbaijan- Armenia and by putting forward applying force to Turkey for rapprochement with Armenia expressed his opinions as follows: “ the USA faces to face with the danger of losing its most important and reliable ally in the critical region of world. Washington believes that with Turkey’s rapprochement to Armenia, t will kill two birds with one stone. Thus, the USA thinks that not only one of the most important problems between Turkey and US is that Armenian genocide allegations will soften, but also the rapprochement of TurkeyArmenia will facilitate the settlements of Nagorno- Karabakh issue. While the so-called Armenian genocide bill was being negotiated in the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the U.S House of Representatives, Azerbaijan reported serious objecEurasiaCritic June 2010 47
Caucasus
tions about this issue. On this issue, Azerbaijan National Assembly sent an appeal letter to the House of Representatives, vice-President of Assembly Bahar Muradova made a statement about the issue “ If the U.S Congress decide the so-called Armenian genocide, this would not reflect positively to the relations of U.S- Azerbaijan. Elmar Memmedeyarov the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan also explained the opinions about the topic as “I the members of Congress are discussing the events which took place a hundred years ago, they should negotiate the Khojaly Massacre which happened 20 years ago.
Conclusion Indeed, Azerbaijan and U.S does not desire to live with the problems between them. Azerbaijan has turned his 48 EurasiaCritic June 2010
face towards the West, he faces some problems while accepting the Western values and adopting them, it will continue to go ahead this long way. But the USA to press Azerbaijan’s corn( Nagorno-Karabakh, etc) for each time. In Azerbaijan, there are some deficiencies on democratization, freedom of media and expression, and human rights issues. However, it is not exaggerative like the US State Department and civil society organizations claim. The United States wants to settle its democratic values which have become inflexible in U.S for more than 200 years by tapping into Azerbaijan with Cinderella’s magic wand. In fact, the U.S administration behaves some states more tolerant than Azerbaijan about democracy and human rights, which are weaker than Azerbaijan. Of course, Azerbaijan
and the USA will settle these disputes in time experienced between them and will continue to cooperate. However, the United States should give up the double standards for policy toward Azerbaijan, should be able to maintain its neutrality for the settlements of the problems, should give priority to the laws of international law.
Caspian Energy
NABUCCO-SOUTH STREAM Whose Side is Luck on? By Mete Goknel
C
aspian Basin is at least as important as the Middle East when natural gas resources are taken into consideration. As seen in Chart 1, this region comes second after the Gulf region when considering the natural gas resource that the region holds and therefore is a great economic potential with its natural gas resources1 . This chart clearly stresses the strategic importance of regional cooperation for Turkey. There are great distances between countries who produce and consume natural gas. One of the largest importers of natural gas are USA, West European Countries and Asia Pacific Countries. On the other hand, the largest exporters are Russian Federation, Middle East and North Africa Countries, Norway, Mexico and Canada. England is going to be a neutral country until its current reserves are expired and will be enlisted in the importers group according to North Sea reserves tendency to reduction. China and India, which are displaying a fast industrial development, became two of the important importers and will raise the competition in access to fossil fuels in near future. The Anatolia region where the go-
vernment of Republic of Turkey was established, for centuries served as a bridge between east and west becaus of its geographical position. Because of its geographical position, Turkey, who forms a natural energy bridge between east and west, is the most economical and reliable passageway for taking Middle East and Caspian Basin energy resources out on international markets. This land forms the center of EuropeBalkans-Eagean-Black Sea-CaucasiaCaspian Basin-Middle Asia-East Mediterranean circle and holds importance on energy and security because of its central position. The natural gas resources surrounding Anatolia can be summarized as: Caucasus and Caspian Basin; 57,0 trillion m3, 30% of world reserves, Middle East; 76 trillion m3 41% of world reserves, Anatolia, named as “Fourth Main Supply Corridor” by the EU and the lands of Turkey is the most convenient transition route for Caspian Basin and Middle East resources which hold the world’s largest natural gas reserves (Picture 2). When the transport units (pipelines) of this corridor are completed, an amount of 80,0-100,0 billion m3/year
(bcm) per year will be able to flow from east to west from the Anatolia route. Currently, here are the natural gas pipelines which pass and are planned to pass from Anatolian land through Turkey; Russia Turkey West Natural Gas Pipeline-Active- (14,0 bcm) Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipeline-Active- (16,0 bcm) BTE/ Azerbaijan-Turkey DGBH-Active- (Shah Sea-6,6 bcm) Iran-Turkey DGBH-Active(10,0 bcm) ITG/Turkey-Greece DGBHActive-(currently 750,0 mmcm, plateau capacity 3,0 bcm) ITGI/Turkey-Greece-Italy DGBH project (3,0 bcm Greece, 8,0 bcm Italy) Iraq-Turkey DGBH project (16 bcm) Eqypt-Turkey DGBH project (4 bcm) NABUCCO/ Turkey-BulgariaRomania-Hungary-Austria DGBH project (31,0 bcm) Blue Stream II DGBH project (16,0 afterwards 32,0 bcm) From Turkey’s Black Sea exclusive economical region-EEZ-pass
Chart 1: Natural Gas Production for Countries in Caspian Region2 (billion cu ft) Countries
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Russian Federation TOTAL
176,93 780,53 2.068,40 22.386,18 25.412,05
205,53 881,92 2.224,85 23.664,58 26.976,88
240,85 931,68 2.231,91 24.222,56 27.627,00
595,02 1.043,98 2.432,50 24.173,12 28.244,62
806,84 1.178,89 2.489,71 24.377,94 28.853,38
(35.3 cu.ft=1 cu.mt) 50 EurasiaCritic June 2010
Caspian Energy through South Stream DGBH project (31,0 afterwards 63,0 bcm) Persian DGBH project; the pipeline which will transmit natural gas of Iran Up to this point, for the NABUCCO project, the associate countries, especially the coordinator country Austria and the competent body OMV did not carry on necessary studies for suppliment of resources to pipelines and did not conduct enough lobby activities for the countries with resources. RWE which joined as the sixth after the year 2008 operates in Turkmenistan. RWE, after negotiating with Germany and Turkmenistan authorities in April, 2009, signed an agreement for general purposes which allowed them to carry out researches, production and construction of the Caspian transtition pipeline in the Caspian Sea natural gas area of 360 mi2 (932.400 Km2) and opened a RWE office in Ashkhabad in April, 20103. However, on the date of 5 May 2010 the news were “RWE, a German company which is negotiating natural gas suplement issue with Turkmenistan announced that they postponed the agreement to be signed at the end of this year which was supposed to be signed in the first half of this year4.” Fourth Main Supply Corridor “Source Countries” positions can be summarized as; In the Caspian Basin, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan which have large resources were left as “vacant” for a long period, so in the framework of the agreements signed with Russian Federation (RF) and China, current and possible new resources were assigned to these countries. The most important natural gas resources of the project, Turkmenistan assigned almost all of its excess supply to RF until 2028 with an agreement. On December 2007, RF signed an agreement with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan for the construction of a new RF natural gas pipeline with a capacity of 25,0 bcm which would cover the east coast of Caspian Sea and connect with RF pipelines. 30,0 bcm of natural gas will be transfered and afterwards the capacity
Picture 1: RF-Caspian Basin-Europe Petrolleum and Natural gas Pipelines will be raised to 40,0 bcm. Turkmenistan-China pipeline stepped on 14 December 2009 with a capacity of 6,0 bcm and it is estimated that the capacity will reach its full capacity by 2011. China National Petrolleum Company (CNPC), in 2008, signed production sharing agreements with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and gained the right of search and produce in natural gas fields. Dovletabad-Serahs-Hangeran natural gas pipeline between Turkmenistan-Iran, which stepped in January 2010, has a natural gas transfer capacity of 12,0 bcm. In the first stage of transfer 6,0 bcm of natural gas ingestion and the plateau capacity of 12,0 bcm is planned. Turkmenistan was selling 8,0 bcm natural gas to Iran from the Körpece natural gas channel situated at the west side of the country. From both pipelines 20,0 bcm natural gas is transferred to Iran per year5. As a result of the agreement
signed between Türkmengaz and Gazprom on 22 December 2009, Turkmenistan started to transfer 30,0 bcm natural gas to Russia. On the other hand, Gaffney Cline & Associates-English Company reported in November 2008 that there are 4,0-14,0 Trillion m3 of natural gas reserves in South Yolotan-Osman fields in Turkmenistan and this is 5 times bigger than the countries largest Dovletabad reserves which are the country’s biggest natural gas reserves. In 2004, same company also did evaluation studies on natural gas reserves but did not publish any data6. However, these reserves are not still fully proved7. In the Middle East, Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves. To talk about “energy security of supply” and “sustainability” in the geography is fooling around with ignoring such a reserve. Natural gas agreement with Iran presents great importance for acEurasiaCritic June 2010 51
Caspian Energy
Picture 2: Fourth Main Supply Corridor and Resources
Picture 3: NABUCCO Pipeline Project complishing Nabucco and Fourth Main Supply Corridor projects and to provide the energy Europe needs. Developing EU-Iran relations and business connection with Iran will also flourish political relation with Iran and will provide political stability and balance in the region. However, because of the enforcements by UN and especially the USA, prevents the international capital to make any investments to Iran and the large resource is kept out. 52 EurasiaCritic June 2010
Because of the administrative and politic structure in Iraq, current situation of reserves and the obscurity of the energy sector, the time for the international companies to start researchs and productions is also uncertain. Azerbaijan declared in various meetings that when they improve the “Şahdeniz 2” field, forseen date 2016, they would be able to transfer 8,0-11,0 bcm natural gas to the Nabucco route however, there has not been any written
promise or agreements. With the natural gas capacity of Egypt uncertain, established LNG condensation facility capacity and the natural gas supplied to Syria and Jordan from the pipeline that reaches Syria from Jordan fills the current manufacture capacity of Egypt. As a source to Nabucco, because of the reasons showed above, except from Azerbaijan, which has limited resources, to be able to reach the project capacity of 31 bcm, the free resources and the access route (trans Caspian/trans Iran) should be examined and also, the resources ofTurkmenistan together with the resources of Iran and Iraq should be used. Nabucco project cannot be initiated without the Azerbaijani gas and apart from that if Turkmenistan, Iran or/and Iraq gas are not put upon then the “Project” will be born dead. Another subject is the deadline program declared for Nabucco. According to the deadline program, the 1st stage of the 1st round will step in 2014 and if Azerbaijan is the first country to receive natural gas from this route and that Azerbaijan declared that Şahdeniz 2 project will be completed in 2016 then it seems at the first stage, the routes of BOTAŞ A.Ş. of Turkey will be used. The second deficiency of the project ignored is that the connection of the pipelines to the countries was not forseen both in the project and in the manufacturing cost8 (Picture 3). Even though the resources of Caucasus, Caspian Basin, Middle East, and Gulf is enough to maintain the capacity of “Nabucco” which is 31,0 bcm, it is even enough to maintain the capacity of “Fourth Main Supply Corridor” (80-100,0 bcm) (Picture 4), the main problem here is to produce the resources and then take them to the market. Azerbaijan Link; currently 42 inches 780 Km BTE (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) route’s capacity is 21-22 bcm at maximum with additional compressors. Presently, the capacity of this route is filled because of the agreement with Turkey that provides 6,6 bcm, and the ITGI route that supplies 11,0 bcm to Greece and Italy. To be able to receive
Caspian Energy gas from “Şahdeniz 2” field, construction of a new pipeline is needed. Turkmenistan Link; For the Trans-Caspian pipeline system, which starts from Türkmenbaşı, a total of 1100 Km of pipeline with the 280 Km Caspian Sea transition. In a situation where the Caspian transition is not possible, the length of Trans-Iran route is 2000 Km. The length of the pipeline which will transfer Iran’s gas to Turkish border from “South Pars” is 1800 Km. Iraq natural gas fields connection; The length of the pipelines that will connect Al Mansuriyah, Kahaskem-Al Ahmar, Akkas, Siba fields to Turkish border vary from 400,0 to 800,0 Km. The length of a pipeline which will connect to the main pipeline at AnkaraAhiboz on Turkish borders is 750-800 Km. Because of the fact that the uncertainity of who will undertake the project and financing and how is the lack of technical and financial prediction of the project. If the Trans-Caspian route is used to reach Turkmenistan gas, which is the shortest path, then the total lenght of the project would be 4500 Km and would need a 11,0-12,0 billion Euros of investment. Where and how to find funds for a project that lacks of planning and access to resources is the project’s most important matter with the resource problem. In order to resolve the deficiencies mentioned above Turkey has to play a more active role in the “Nabucco Gas Pipeline International Gmbh”. Turkey has to show leadership in relations with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and especially with Iran. RF Projects; RF, who does not want its regional energy resources to be left out in Nabucco and in similar projects that will allow its resources to be used in international markets, especially on natural gas and also wants to become the monopoly in primary energy market, is trying to prevent EU’s efforts about reducing the dependency on RF. First of all, it enchained Turkmenistan’s, which is Nabucco project’s most important natural gas
Picture 4: Nabucco Natural Gas Route Supplies
Picture 5: Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-RF and Nabucco Pipeline Routes
Picture 6: South Stream Pipeline Route EurasiaCritic June 2010 53
Caspian Energy resource, all gas surplus until 2028 with an agreement in 2003. Also, in December 2007, RF signed an agreement with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan for the construction of a new pipeline with a capacity of 25,0 bcm which will pass through the east shore of Caspian Sea and which will be connected to the RF pipelines9. In order to connect this new pipeline, which is shown in Picture 5 with the color pink, there will be the construction of a new pipeline with a 1700 Km of length for the connection of Aleksandrov Gay (RF) to Turkmenistan’s natural gas fields. The advantage of this route, which will switch on the current RF pipelines after Aleksandrov Gay, is seen when the investment cost which is lower than Nabucco is reflected to the gas price. However, this project will cause Europe to be increasingly interdependent to RF and Gazprom, which is reaching the monopoly position as everyday passes, should not be ignored. In the South Stream Project, Russia will transmit its natural gas via pipeline that will reach Bulgaria from the bottom of the Black Sea and then with different routes to Italy and Central Europe. According to ENI president there are two possible routes. These are South (Gre-
ece and Adriatic Sea) and North (Through Romania and Hungary to Austria and North of Italy) routes. Another route that supplies natural gas to Europe through Anatolia is “Blue Stream II”. RF primarily targets to transmit 16,0 bcm of natural gas and then 32 bcm of natural gas. This route will go through Black Sea parallel to Current Blue Stream I and after reaching Turkey it will reach to Bulgaria paralel to the current national routes. Compared to an another project of RF “South Stream”, this project more convenient both technically and economically and the President of RF V. Putin at a visit to Italy stated that they have no concerns at all about making this project happen and that this project will have positive contribution to RF, Italy and Turkey. The extension of this project to Mediterranean and the construction of a LNG facility is being planned.
EU and RF Projects; What is the Advantage? The most important difference between Nabucco and South Stream is “possessiveness”. On one hand Nabucco is a project that belongs to the community thus having a multi- structure,
Chart 2: South Stream Route and Distances for the Accession to Resources Lengths of South Stream Pipelines
Km
Black Sea and Adriatic Transitions
1200
Europe Routes
2700
Total Lengths of the Pipelines for the Distances for the Accession to Resources Urengoy-Polyanskaya-Petrovsk-Frolovo Compressor
3900
Azerbaijan Şahdeniz-Beregovaya
1350
Turkmenistan Yolotan/Osman Field Frolovo Compressor
3080
Yamal Field Black Sea (Beregovaya) 2 routes
3200
4070
New Pipelines Seas (Black Sea and Adriatic)
1000
Land (Europe Routes)
2700
Yamal Field Black Sea 2 routes
6400
New Caspian Route
1700
Total 54 EurasiaCritic June 2010
11800
on the other hand, the South Stream belongs only to Gazprom. Gazprom, which is generally supports the RF State policies, sees this project as a project of prestige. Apart from the possessiveness situation of South Stream, we can name Nabucco as abandoned because of its associates’ relations with RF. All Nabucco associates have close business connections with Gazprom, especially OMV and they all have contributions to the South Stream Project. However, South Stream has resource problems just like Nabucco. In order to be more economic, the pipeline that will go through under the Black Sea, the capacity of the pipeline should not less than 30,0 bcm. The length of the Blue Stream I, which has the half of the capacity that South Stream has (16,0 bcm), is 396 Km which 1/3 of South Stream. Detail information on South Stream is given by Chart 2. Even though the accession to Europe markets from Beregovaya, a city at the shore of Black Sea, is 3900 Km, the accession to the resources that will supply the route necessitates the new investments on pipelines and natural gas fields10 (Picture 7). Yamal field’s distance to Bovanenko-Ukhta is 1100 Km, with the continuation of the route to Ukhta-Kazan-Frolovo and reaching to Black Sea requires a 3200 Km of a pipeline. For the connection of Stokman field to the nearest pipeline in Volkhov, construction of a 600 Km of sea pipeline and a 1300 Km of land pipeline is required. On the other hand, RF comprises the 30% of the 139,0 bcm burned gas in 2008 about the “gas flare” subject11 and the possibility of the addition of part of the gas to the system can only be feasible if the pipelines are enhanced. Even this plan is not effective enough to store the capacities of the new pipelines.
Conclusion In the past few years most talked projects, both the EU project Nabucco and the RF projects South Stream and Blue Stream II have advantages and disadvantages. As known, when it comes to pipeline investments the most important subject is the throughput agre-
Caspian Energy ement about the oil pipelines and when it comes to natural gas routes the most important subject here is the gas sales agreement, which can be signed between either purchaser and salesman or supplier and market. These agreements is prerequisite for the international relations, association facility, ascertain investors and recruitment of finance. The Nabucco route -as the projecthas more advantages in the fields whether it is gas supply or expenditure than South Stream route. Even though it is ahead when we talk about possessiveness, “South Stream” has huge problems about resource and recruitment of high finance. However, GAZPROM has the power to overcome these problems. Nevertheless, who would buy and at what cost they would buy natural gas from such a route that has high investment cost is an another question that should be answered. On the other hand, the main matter in hand about “Nabucco” is possessiveness and political position of EU. Gazprom, to its “North Stream” project the investment of which started 9 May 2010 and has two parallel routes, promised to provide at first stage (2012) 27,5 bcm of gas and then when the other route is complete in 2013, promised to provide gas at full capacity which is 55,0 bcm. As it is stated before, RF and Gazprom cannot match the gas demand even though they have enough resources, RF and Gazprom –controls 80% of RF resources-, so it is impossible for them to produce enough gas and reach full capacity which is 120,0 bcm12 in a medium term for both “North Stream” and “South Stream”. Consequently, Gazprom can be able to support “Blue Stream II” which its resources will be enough and demands lower investment rather than “South Stream”. This situation will lead natural gas resources of Azerbaijan, Iraq and Iran to west and will enable “Nabucco Project” to be implemented even though it is not finished in planned time. With all these matters in mind, it is proper to say that between the pipelines which will provide gas to Europe, “Blue Strem-2” will be the prior project and
Picture 7: Nabucco, South Stream Pipeline Routes and Accession to Resources
Picture 8: RF Natural Gas Production Chart (2001-2011) then “Nabucco” will be finalised. Turkey’s support to Blue Stream II project will in her benefit. This project with its capacity of 16 bcm, is a project which Gazprom can provide resource, it does not have possessiveness problem and can play leading role on Turkey’s involvement in “Energy trade”. The current Iraq-Turkey petrolleum pipelines (ITP) and the Baku-TbillisCeyhan (BTC) petrolleum pipeline with which the first petrolleum loading was made from Ceyhan on 23 Temmuz 2006, the natural gas pipeline that will
be connected to Greece and Italy through Çanakkale Channel, transfered by the partially effective Azerbaijan Şahdeniz field (ITGI), the route that will transmit RF’s gas through Anatolia to Europe which is named as Blue Stream-2, extending Blue-Stream-2 route to Mediterranean and to build a LNG condensation facility to Ceyhan, crude oil pipeline which will be implanted between Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea and will transmit petrolleum that originates from RF and Caspian Basin, and pipeline projects that will allow EurasiaCritic June 2010 55
Caspian Energy Chart 3: Yamal Field Enhancement Plan Years Projected Natural Gas Production, bcm Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, Turkmenistan and Qatar to connect to Europe through Turkey means that Turkey has the chance to be a “Energy Center”. Because of the reasons explained
2011
2015
2020
2025
2030
8
75-115
135-175
200-250
310-360
above, Turkey should not accept the transit country role that EU is trying inject. Government of the Republic of Turkey should accept the “actor” role keeping in mind that to its west there
Picture 9: RF Main Natural Gas Fields and Pipelines
Picture 10: Yamal and Stokman Natural Gas Fields and Pipelines 56 EurasiaCritic June 2010
is a Europe in need of natural gas and also to its east there are countries who want to appeal foreing investors and want use their resources which really provides advantage to Turkey. Turkey, because of its location is an “energy corridor” and also a “physical centre” where energy resources are gathered. Anatolia provides the best appropriate transition both technically and economically in tranportation and also Caucasus-Caspian Basin-Middle East-Gulf resources are much more than the first three corridors (Russian FederationNorth Sea and North Africa) that still provides resources for Europe. Turkey, with a geography at this importance, is above all a “physical energy centre” and deserves to be the “commercial centre” between the resource owners’ and purchasers’ relations. References 1 http://www.bsec-organization.org 2 EIA-Energy Information Administration,“Country Energy Statistics, End 2008” den derlenmiştir. www.eia.doe.gov 3 UPI-United Press International- 14 April 2010, Ashgabat/Turkmenistan, “RWE Opens Branch in Turkmenistan” 4 EnerjiVadisi, “Alman RWE ile Türkmenistan gaz anlaşmasını erteledi”, 05 Mayıs 2010 Çarşamba, www.enerjivadisi.com 5 TRT Haber, “Türkmenistan’dan İran’a Doğalgaz”, 06 Ocak 2010, www.trt.net.tr. 6 The Wall Street Journal, “Turkmenistan Gas Field Is One of World’s Largest”, Thursday October 16, 2008 http://online.wsj.com 7 Eurasia Energy Obsever, “Turkmenistan overestimates its gas reserves”, Oct 20, 2009, http://www.eurasia-energy-observer.com 8 Nabucco Gas Pipeline International Gmbh, Status Report Q2 2009, www.nabucco-pipeline. com 9 “Russia Signs Central Asian Pipeline Deal”, Judy Dempsey, 20 Dec. 2007-Berlin, International Herald Tribune, www.iht.com 10 EEG-East European Gas Analysis, Mikhail Korchemkin, July 2008, www.eegas.com 11 NGDC-National Geophysical Data Center, “Global Gas Flaring Report”, August 2009, www.ngdc.noaa.gov 12 North Stream Capacity 55,0 bcm, South Stream Capacity 65,0
Russia
Russian Impact on the Power Struggle in Asia-Pasific Region By Mazhar Yasin Tuyluoglu
D
espite the fact that Asia has a long-established history, it has always been in the background, and while developments in other regions often took place in the world agenda, Asia observed these developments for a long time. Whereas on account of its increasing importance starting from the beginning of the 20th century, it has begun to attract attention of the entire world slowly. Under these circumstances, there has been an increase in the number of states, who aimed to have a say in Asian politics. China, Japan, India, South Korea, North Korea, which settled in the continent long time ago,
58 EurasiaCritic June 2010
became the countries, which attracted Asia is long established. However the the highest attention in the region, Uni- matter of dispute at this point is the exted States of America (USA) from the tent of use of this advantage of Moscow opposite coast of Pacific and United and the eras concerned. Kingdom from Europe followed them. After stating the fact that the first However it is impossible to separate grounds of importance attached to Russian Federation Russian Far East by When handled in this (RF), which settled in Putin is ensuring dethe northeast of the velopment of provincontext, it would be region long time ago, ces, located far from incorrect to evaluate from Asia and Pacific. the center, the second Russia as a new actor When handled in issue, we will emphain Asia Pacific Region. this context, it would size is demographic be incorrect to evaluasituation. Despite the te Russia as a new actor or in Asia Pacific fact that Siber Siberia lands are affluent, it is Region. Thus existence of Russians in far more behind in terms of population. Namely the number of human beings, residing in this region of 15 million square meters, comprising of 75 % of the total resources of the country, is solely 20 million.2 The fact that the total population in a country of this dimension is 142 million and it constantly decreases is a risk by itself. Putin, who senses the threat, in the speech delivered in BlagoveĹ&#x;çensk, the capital city of the region of Amur on the date of July 2000, stated that unless necessary precautions are taken for development of Russia Far East Region, Russians, residing in the region would speak Japanese, Chinese or the Korean language as a native tongue in 50 years.3 As is evident, Putin emphasizes the threat of a possible human flow to arise from China to Russia, which is far
Russia
behind China demographically. Thus it is known that a significant amount of Chinese4 residing at the border of Russian-China, pass to Russia every day for work and return to their countries at the end of office hours. Another strategic importance of Russian Far East is Bering Strait, which is a border with America. Strategic importance of the strait, which takes place between Alaska, is not discussed. It connects the waters, named as Ă&#x2021;ukçi Sea on account of the fact that it takes place on Ă&#x2021;ukotka coast and which is a part of Arktik Ocean, and Bering Sea, which forms a part of Pacific. It would not be incorrect to say that even for control of this strait, Russia would aim to have a say in Asia continent and Pacific Ocean.
Economic Ties between Russia and Asian Countries Development of trade with Asian countries, which is the basis of increase of efficiency in Pacific according to RF, ranks the first for Moscow. Russia directs its politics via establishment of firm commercial relations with all Asi-
an countries; primarily China, Japan, ver transmitted to Russia over third and South Korea, which can be named countries; thus not added to Russia-Jaas great economic powers of the conti- pan trade statistics directly, amount to 2 nent. As a requirement and inevitable billion dollars.7 It is beyond doubt that result of this policy, it energy issue has a high became affiliated with share in this table. However automotive APEC5. However automotive sector within the The best example sector within the scope scope of which Totoya to be given in terms of of which Totoya facfactory, established this policy of RF can tory, established in St. be Japan. Moscow viPetersburg and having in St. Petersburg and sit, paid by the prime 50 thousand productihaving 50 thousand minister of that era, on capacity annually, production capacity Junichiro Koizumi, on and in terms of which annually, and in the date of January Nissan, Honda and terms of which 2003, with a couple Mitsubishi companies Nissan, Honda and of agreements signed, seek opportunity to increased the rate of participate has an imMitsubishi companies Russia-Japan comportance in trade with seek opportunity to merce by 2/3 in the Russia. participate has an Impact of econosubsequent two years importance in trade and 8.8 billion Amerimic ties between Ruswith Russia. can dollars, which can sia and Japan on pobe deemed a record in litical arena is not so h d iin the h h i the history of Russia, was reached heart warming. Some border problems year 2004. The said figure by breaking between the two states, and the fact that one more record in the year 2005, rose the said states have not signed peace to 10 billion dollars.6 It is known that the agreements, concluding the 2nd World goods, manufactured by Japan; howe- War, form the basis of the problems. EurasiaCritic June 2010 59
Russia problems it cannot resolve fully.
CHINA-RUSSIA TRADE Another significant partner of Russian Federation in Asia is Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Republic of China. Economic ties between Russia-China arose upon intertwinement of Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s military expenditures and energy importation; the said fields formed the bulk of Russia-China trade volume. In the remaining part, some raw materials, purchased from Russia by China, take place. Russia aims at selling industrial products as well; however China, the party, which handles the case pragmatically, thinks of reducing the amount of military materials purchased.9 In the light of the aforementioned issues, the extent of reliability of China from the perspective of RF is a disputable issue. It is evident that diplomatic relations, established with South Korea in the year 1991, have become dominant in the economic field especially in the last periods. The two countries made common investments in Nakhodka Free Economy Region, and conducted studies for development of Irkutsk natural gas site. It is known that studies are conducted for connection of TransSiberia Railway, which is crucial for South Korea exit to Europe, with InterKorea line within Korea. High investments are made for space investigations, which are commonly performed by Russia and South Korea. When statistical data are taken into consideration, with commencement of the 21rst century, economic relations of Russia with China, Japan, and South Korea are far more advanced when compared with the previous eras.
Powerful Role of Rosoboronexport Thanks to moderate attitudes of both Russian and Japanese leaders, the present point has been achieved. Meeting of Russian Head of State Dimitri Medvedev and Japan Prime Minister Mikuyi Hatoyama in New York on the date of September 2009 and their holding negotiations on the said border prob60 EurasiaCritic June 2010
lems heightened hopes of resolution8. In the course of this process of change within the scope of which Japan takes place as well, it is expected that Tokyo becomes much more independent such as Russia, Seul, and Beijing. However it will not be satisfied with the military development of a border neighbor, whose
Economic development of Asia triggered another crucial issue, and development of military technologies day by day gave rise to execution of new arms agreements of Asian countries on a constant basis. When handled within this framework, these countries, which cannot cover the increasing arms need alone, naturally adopt cooperati-
Russia on with countries, which have a say in world arms market. Russian Federation, which is one of the said countries, in the last years covered an important distance in distribution and sales of military equipment, mechanism, and all sorts of arms production with Rosoboronexport, which is a state controlled company. According to data of the year 2006, RF ranked the first among the countries, effecting arms sales to developing and under-developed countries subsequent to Soviet Union Era for the first time.10 China and South Korea, the greatest powers of Asia, are the countries, purchasing significant amounts of arms from Russia. Especially military relations are one of the factors to be taken into consideration in the bilateral cooperation between China and Russia. Starting from the year 2000, interest of China towards Russian arms increased step by step, and reached 45 % of Russian exportation. Common operations, held between Russia and China under Shanghai Cooperation Organization, play a significant role in military relations of the two countries. Within the framework of these practices, Russia supplied war jets, submarines, and destroyer, whose total value amounts to 2 billion dollars. India, which is another Asian country, and which possesses an observer status at Shanghai Cooperation Organization, imported military equipment, and strategic materials to cover 40 % of the total arms exportation of Russia.11
Driving Role of Gazprom The most significant point, attracting attention in this field, where Russia makes a struggle for being a world leader, is Gazprom. It is known that the state-controlled company is at the position of the sole implementer in energy policies and can increase-reduce natural gas-oil prices according to countries. The primary target of Gazprom, which is constantly not content with what it has on the way to being an energy giant, and aims at more, is Europe; however Central Asia and Far East are significant markets and energy resources at the same time. Thus Gazprom has
reached up to Pacific shores with the Pacific Line, two alternative methods pipes laid within Asia. Whereas in the had been determined. Angarsk provinupcoming years, studies are conducted ce near to Baylak Lake was the start of for projects to connect the two sides of the pipeline and the first sections of the Pacific Ocean; thus reline collected Irkutsk Starting from the year aching USA.12 oils and circled around Russian Fe2000, interest of China the lake. The said first deration used to focus line planned reached towards Russian arms on various opinions in Russian province Nakincreased step by step, terms of energy procuhodka having a port and reached 45 % of rement to Japan and in Japan Sea. Passage Russian exportation. China, two giant counto Japan through sea tries of Eastern Asia. following this port reWhen Angarsk, which was di disputed t d ffor ached h d after ft covering a distance of appa long time, was stated by Vladimir Pu- roximately 4000 km was the next stage. tin, the head of state of that era, as the However this project was not accepted project to be activated in Far East and by China on account of the fact that EurasiaCritic June 2010 61
Russia
China lands were not used, and thereby a natural gas pipeline apart from oil is an agreement was reached on a second planned on the way to China through Angarsk line. Within this framework, Daking, which can be deemed a signioil pipeline, starting from Angarsk, ficant trump card, which will strengthen would reach Manzhouli at the border Russia and Gazprom. Another possibiof Russia-China by passage from the lity apart from that is procurement of south of Baykal Lake and then Daking energy to China through installation from that point. China to step in at the of line to Daking over the province of Skovorodino, which is next stage would have approximately 50 km carried Russia enerRussian Federation distant from the borgy up to the capital by used to focus on der of China and on completion of China, various opinions Angarsk-Nakhodka Daking – Shenyang – in terms of energy line. Thus Russia will and Shenyang-Beijing. procurement to Japan realize its significant Extension of the same and China, two giant target, mentioned line to South Korea fiabove, within this franally is among the poscountries of Eastern mework and will be sibilities as well. Asia. able to reach the opThanks to the line, posite shore of Pacific whose estimated cost to be imposed on the operator company through a line going beyond the ocean. is between 15 – 18 billion dollars, Russia Another significant project apart will succeed in procuring Angarsk oils to from Angarsk, is Sakhalin. Upon comptwo big Pacific countries simultaneously letion of 6 projects of Sakhalin, RF will and will have a say in regional energy obtain an important advantage in Papolicies. Especially establishment of cific as well, and it will ensure that Ja62 EurasiaCritic June 2010
pan depends on Russian energy through these islands apart from China and South Korea.
APB Problems and Russia We can state that two problems of APB are Recognition of Taiwan, and North Korea Nuclear Programme. Besides the most significant issue concerning Russia is Kuril Islands Problem between its part and Japan. Despite the fact that resolution is sought for both under regional and international organizations and through bilateral negotiations of states, no result is obtained on account of the fact that dispute parties do not make concessions persistently. The attitude, adopted by Russia, in “Taiwan Problem”, which can be defined as the issue, which is discussed often, and which is constantly on the agenda, is clear. Russian Federation accepts sovereignty of only one China, which is People’s Republic of China. Russia, which does not establish relations with Taiwan diplomatically,
Russia sustained its economic ties with this country despite this fact and developed commercial relations. In both countries (China-Russia), governments change, new presidents and state heads are elected; however neither Russia nor China changes their opinions in this regard. Putin stated that Russia accepts existence of only People’s Republic of China in the speech he delivered in the year 2000. With the Agreement on Friendship and Good Neighborhood, signed in the year 2001, China and Russia officially announced that they completely resolved the problems between them.12 Whereas one month before execution of the agreement, by establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, they ensured advancement of amicable relations. Whereas North East Nuclear Programme, is a situation, posing threat not only for APB but for the whole world. As a result of the fact that the said country was isolated from the outer world for long years, broke its connections with the outer world under administration of Kim Il Jong, it took a while to be aware of commencement of nuclear studies of North Korea. North Korea, which is the last country, defined as “Evil Axis” by USA, is criticized by all the world; primarily USA on account of its nuclear programme. Whereas it is evident that Russian Federation quit its indefinite attitude on Iran Nuclear Programme in North Korea issue. RF points out that North Korea’s ceasing all sorts of unamicable activities would be positive in terms of both the region and the world, and stated that it was ready to apply sanctions against this country if deemed necessary. Kuril Islands, which is an unresolved issue between Russia and Japan in Asia Pacific approximately for 150 years, can be deemed the sole problem of Russia in this region. The islands, given to Japans in the year 1875 against Sakhalin Island, remaining in this country until the end of the 2nd World War subsequent to falling under domination of Japan following the Revolution of 1917, were shared between Russia and Japan
in peace talks following the war. On the issue in terms of which no agreement was reached on account of grounds such as non-fulfillment of mutual promises up to now, non-existence of constructive promises put forth by both parties, and their making no concessions of their ambitions, Putin made the statement below on the date of September 27, 2005: “4 Kuril Islands in terms of which negotiations are sustained with Japan are under dominance of Russian Federation.” within the framework of which he implied that Russian was not prone to resolution.13 Kuruli Islands are positioned at the eastern edge of Russia, and this situation bears importance in terms of ensuring security of this region, and maintenance of nuclear weapons in case of any threat to be posed from east against Russia. Another importance of these islands, whose economic benefit for both countries is not crucial, is to control the oil fields in the region.14
Conclusion Being defined as a big state in the international arena is possible through being effective not only in its own geography but also in all world policies. As is evident in the course of Cold War, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and USA, the super powers of the era, complied with the definition of big state, and assumed decisive roles in international politics. Russian Federation, the successor of Soviet Union, have broad lands and many border neigh-
bors. Under these circumstances, the fact that it cannot maintain its borders and it remains away from global politics, cannot be in question. Russia wants to protect its eastern region just as its western region, and aims at prevention of possible separatist actions and political aims of other countries on their own lands. Russia yearned return to old splendid days in every area in the course of Vladimir Putin era. Within this framework it would not be incorrect to say that no threat will be posed against existence of Russians in Asia in the near future. References 1. ATAGENÇ, Ömer; Tarihten Günümüze Kuril Adaları Sorunu, Jeopolsar Uluslararası İlişkiler Journal, May 2006 2. CAŞIN, Mesut Hakkı; Rus İmparatorluk Stratejisi, Ankara, 2002 3. DE HAAS Marcel; Russia-China Security Cooperation, PINR, November 27, 2006 4. DUGIN, Aleksandr; Rus Jeopolitiği, Küre Yayınları, April 2005 5. EKREM, Nuraniye Hidayet; Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Dış Politikası, Ankara, 2003 6. GELBRAS Vilya; A Failure to Prepare, Russia Profile, October 5, 2006 7. GLEB Bernard A.; Russian Oil and Gas Challenges, CRS Report for Congress, January 3, 2006 8. KAMALOV, İlyas; Japonya, Kuril Adaları Konusunda Geri Adım Atacak mı?, ASAM Günlük Değerlendirmeler, October 2, 2006 9. KAMALOV, İlyas; Rusya Federasyonu’nun Sınır Sorunları, Stratejik Analiz, volume 6, issue 69, January 2006 10. KAMALOV, İlyas; Rus Halkının Uzak Doğu Toprakları Konusundaki Kaygıları, EurasiaCritic June 2010 63
Russia 3. www.rferl.org 4. www.avsam.org 5. www.kommersant.ru 6. http://en.rian.ru/world/20070315/ 62068083.html 7. www.inosmi.ru 8. http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/ ~chegeo/ 9. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ wjdt/2649/t15771.htm 10. http://en.wikipedia.org 11. www.russiaprofile.org 12. http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/hatoyama-medvedev-agree-toaim-at-solving-territorial-row
ASAM Günlük Değerlendirmeler, November 4, 2004 11. KAMALOV, İlyas; Putin’in Çin Ziyareti Batı’ya Karşı Bir Bloklaşma mı?, ASAM Günlük Değerlendirmeler, October 14, 2004 12. ÖZTÜRK, Osman Metin; Rusya Federasyonu Askeri Doktrini, Ankara, 2001 13. SIMONIA, Nodari A.; Russia in the Asia-Pacific: The Beginning of a New Era?, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol.13, No.1, 2006 14. TÜYLÜOĞLU, Mazhar Yasin; Gazprom: Rus Süvarisi, Jeopolsar Uluslararası İlişkiler Journal, January 2007 64 EurasiaCritic June 2010
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(Endnotes) * Graduate Student in Eurasian Studies in METU 2 a.g.m. p. 6 3 http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2000/ 07/28796.shtml 4 It is estimated that from Russia-China border of 4300 kilometers, approximately 600 thousand Chinese pass to Russia every year. 5 APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) : It is the name of the economic forum, where coastal countries in Pacific convene and hold negotiations on regional economy, cooperation, trade, and investment issues. An ordinary meeting is held every year with participation of ministers of member economies. (2006-Vietnamese) Activities are coordinated by APEC General Secretariat in Singapore. Russia participated in the organization with the 6th Leaders Summit, held in the year 1998 in Kuala Lumpur, the capital city of Malaysia. 6 Simonia; a.g.m., p. 9. 7 Vremya Novosti; “Idyom na Vastok”, November 21, 2005 8 Japan Today; “Hatoyama, Medvedev agree to aim at solving territorial row”, September 24, 2009 9 Vilya Gelbras; “A Failure to Prepare”, Russia Profile, October 5, 2006 10 www.mosnews.com, “Russia Becomes Largest Arms Seller to Third World”, October 31, 2006 11 Marcel De Haas; “Russia-China Security Cooperation”, PINR, November 27, 2006 12 Tüylüoğlu; a.g.m., p. 8–9. 13 For full text of the agreement, see: http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm It is possible to say that this cooperation between Russia and China depends on USA population, which increases step by step. The two countries resolved their border problems and adopted a cooperation within the framework of ŞİÖ. Another importance of this agreement can be the target of balancing EU, Japan and USA superiority in the regional economy. 14 www. avsam.org/tr/gunlukbulten.asp? ID=707 15 Ömer Atagenç; “Tarihten Günümüze Kuril Adaları Sorunu”, Jeopolsar Uluslararası İlişkiler Journal, May 2006, p. 4