Progress in Israeli-Palestinian Talks is Unlikely By Efraim Inbar
May 2010
The UK and Cyprus; from Guarantor Power to interested party By Bill Park
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EurasiaCritic May 2010 Vol. III ISSUE 2 Monthly Magazine on Eurasian Politics Published every month by Eurasia Critic Yayincilik Ltd. Head Office: Esat R. No: 55/5 Kucukesat ANKARA/TURKEY T: 0090 (312)4170383 F: 0090 (312)4170392 Publisher Hakki AHMETBEYOGLU Editors Ozer CETINKAYA Ali ALTAN Assistant Editor Burcu OZCELIK Volkan GUNER Regional Directors Middle East Yousuf AL SHARIF Southestern Asia Fazal-UR-RAHMAN Caucasus Hasan KANBOLAT Balkans Ibrahim ARSLAN India Prof. Dr. Ajay Kumar PATNAIK Azerbaijan Ganire PASHAEVA Syria Ibrahim HAMIDI Kazakhstan Murat SHAHANOV Uzbekstan Ali KULEBI Japan Prof. Dr. Masanori NAITO Eastern Europe Shemsey VODINOV Energy Strategies M. Mete GOKNEL Nuclear Studies Prof. Dr. Saleh SULTANSOY Millitary Affairs David AXE UK Represantative Gizem Fowler Jamie Fowler Advisory Committee George HEWITT Nuzhet KANDEMIR Ismael HOSSEIN-ZADEH Norman STONE Ali KULEBI
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Drug Trafficking in Uzbekistan By Mazhar Yasin Tuyluoglu
Progress in Israeli-Palestinian Talks is Unlikely By Efraim Inbar
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Terrorism as an Important Element of Armenian Internal Policy By Ilgar Majidli
Media Director Cigdem BEDIZ Photography Provider: AFP Illustrations Mahmut KARATOPRAK Distribution Manager Mert ALTAN ISSN 1308-1560 Printers: Basak Matbaacilik HOW TO CONTACT US General enquiries: 0090 (312) 4170383 info@eurasiacritic.co.uk Letters to the Editor : editor@eurasiacritic.co.uk Š2010 Eurasia Critic News Agency Ltd. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of Eurasia Critic News Agency Ltd.
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A Treaty Hard to Activate By Ozer Cetinkaya
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The McChrystal Plan By Simbal Khan
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The UK and Cyprus; from Guarantor Power to interested party By Bill Park
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Roots of German Orientalism By Alp Hamuroglu
The “New Born” State of Kosovo By Jonilda Rrapaj
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Relations with the EU and the Cost of the Customs Union By Prof. Dr. Emin Carikci
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Europol: The New European Law Enforcement Agency By Alparslan Tarkan
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Editorial 4
EurasiaCritic May 2010
ermany’s east policy is always a determining element for Europe. It also has a trigger function in the changeover periods of the world politics. Ostpolitik is known as the policy for decreasing the efficiency of US in the country of Chancellor Willy Brandt. It also aims at normalizing the relations with the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union in the late 1960s. There are 3 main elements of this policy: 1) Direct Relationship with Soviet Union. 2) Normalizing the relations with Warsaw Pact. 3) Signing a temporary argument with Eastern Germany without recognizing it as a separate element. Affects of this policy decreased by time and its collapsed with the destruction of the Berlin Wall. Since the year 2000, Social Democratic Party of Germany has started to revive Ostpolitik. This is a new step for a geopolitical alliance separated from western alliance which is welcomed by new Russian Leadership too. This slow and historical progress is growing up recently. Roots of these efforts goes back to the Charles de Gaulle’s visit to Soviet Union at which French-Soviet Alliance Treaty was signed in the 1944. This visit was also a result of French effort for gaining France’s politically central location in Europe while they are putting a distance with US and UK or in other words the countries who are not likely to establish an alliance with USSR. Geopolitical interests have more importance than ideological difference for De Gaulle.
Common thing for Central Europe’s efforts were they were suspicious for US and they are interpreted as contradictory for global interests of US. Russia was getting closer to the US while they are under the Boris Yeltsin administration and they got out of these discussions for a while. The close relations of Western Europe and Russia were created a huge relief in post – communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Russian policy started to build new close relationships with Western Europe especially with Germany and France while the Vladimir Putin has the power. This relationship proved itself while opposing the US and UK invasion of Iraq in the UN Security Council by these 3 countries’ cooperation. Washington clearly defined this alliance as a contradictory movement for US global aims. In spite of US and Eastern-Central Europe governments’ opposition, this alliance is growing. Putin used one of its most powerful cards to consolidate this alliance: natural gas exportation of Russia. Discussion which was carried on since the 1990s was ended with the directing Russian and Central Asian gas pipes to Western Europe. Russians are developed projects called Nord Stream and South Stream. Nord Stream will reach to Germany through Baltic Sea, Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and it will pass around the Baltic Countries. South Stream will pass through Black Sea after Stream reaches to Bulgaria it will have 2 directions, one direction(northwestern route) will reach to Austria through Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia. Other direction(southwestern route) will reach
to Italy through Greece and Adriatic. US is working for constructing another natural gas route called Nabucco which aims to build a pipeline through Turkmenistan. Goal of this project is to link the pipeline to Austria, Germany and Czech Republic through Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. Natural gas supply of Turkmenistan is not enough to establish this project so Russia will expected to supply gas for Nabucco and this will reduce the geopolitical productivity of the project. France is also working for different geopolitical movements as well as Germany. President of France Nicholas Sarkozy’s call for establishing a mutual security zone between Europe and Russia can be counted as a concrete sign for it. Besides this, Sarkozy is seen as the most American friendly president of France by Washington since the 1945.
Fear of New Europeans While the cooperation between Russia and Germany developing, criticisms against the project in the Baltic Region are developing too. Especially the countries which will be by passed by Nord Stream are showing reasons like environment, mines from Second World War, resurrection of Russian spying activities and sunk ships to create a regional public opposition against the Nord Stream. Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are not only against to Nord Stream because of their loss of advantageous transit location but also they have historical conflicts with Russia and historical syndrome created by Germany-Russia cooperation is
another reason for them to oppose this project. Besides all these problems, the concept of German-Russian corporation means to a dangerous alarm for Baltic Countries. These countries which had passed the anniversary of Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact as mourn, also worrying about the Germany and Russia to get closer. Ostpolitik was established as the new east policy of Western Germany, in 1970s for to build close relations with Russia. Ostpolitik became the fear of new Europeans, by its rebirth in 2000s with the Putin-Schröder cooperation. Worries of Europeans not only derived from Germany-Russia bilateral trade growth which became 4 times bigger in the last 10 years and investments are generally focused on strategic industries also Europe’s energy dependence to Russia and Germany does not react about this issue. Merkel did not supported either Nabucco project nor establishing an European energy market. Merkel seems to be so much excited for Nord Stream project. Project which will operate according to German interests and which will harm the Baltic Republics, rise the historical fear again. Economical crisis and political ambiguity in the Burgaz – Alexandropolis line left Greece with its fears alone. Tendency of delaying the pipeline project is increasing in the government party PASOK. Right winged opposition party is carrying a campaign for cancelling and putting a high level of pressure forward to this aim. In these conditions, Turkey is becoming crucial for South Stream
project. Turkey is getting closer to Russia-Germany alliance because of the ambiguous Greece approach to the South Stream Project and Turkey is becoming advantageous for becoming an energy bridge.
German Army Security strategy of Germany has a high level of importance at this point. Change of the constitution article in 1994 which indicates that the “Duty of German Army is to Protect Germany’s borders” to “Germany can be defended anywhere on the world” has so much meaning today. Bundeswehr was aiming to land 14000 troops in 5 different regions for oversea missions. German army was expected to undertake the military personnel or accomplishing missions through the supporting the main duties of the German Army. German Army is educating the Afghan Police force today and German Soldiers are at the key positions in the Balkan Missions. New strategy of the German Army is to push up the operability of the European Army. Besides this German Army seems to be ready for preventing a possible violence in the Baltic Region too. It is understood that again geopolitical interests are more determining than ideological differences once again. Eastern and Central European countries expected to follow the same route in spite of their fear. This is a fact pushing itself as a historical truth. US has not so much to do for slowing down the cooperation between Germany and Russia. EurasiaCritic May 2010
5
Middle East
Progress in IsraeliPalestinian Talks is Unlikely By Efraim Inbar
T
he Obama administration placed ing. Mahmoud Abbas refuses to enter the attempt to solve the Israeli- direct negotiations, although he seems Palestinian protracted conflict to inch toward proximity talks with Ishigh on its foreign policy agenda from rael, while Hamas is still dedicated to the very beginning (January 2009). Yet, the destruction of the Jewish state. Abbas in his May 2009 Washington American diplomacy has failed to restart negotiations between Palestinians Post interview emphasized that he is in no hurry to negoand Israelis and even if tiate with Israel and the US is successful in The main problem is that he expects the re-launching bilateral the split between the Americans to force talks the chances of PLO-ruled West Bank Israel to accept the reaching an agreement and the Hamas-ruled Palestinian condiand implementing it at Gaza with very little tions. His prime minthis stage are nil. ister, Salam Fayyad, The main problem chance of the two announced a plan to is the split between the areas becoming one unilaterally establish PLO-ruled West Bank political entity. a Palestinian state in and the Hamas-ruled two years instead of a Gaza with very little chance of the two areas becoming one state emerging from negotiations with political entity. It is the Israeli routine Israel. Both “moderate� leaders honor counter-terror activity that makes sure suicide bombers as martyrs and provide that Hamas does not take over the West their families with state pensions. They Bank. The competition between the allow the PA-controlled media, educaWest Bank and the Gaza leaderships tion system and mosques to continue stiffens positions on the issues pertain- to promote rabid anti-Semitism. Both
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EurasiaCritic May 2010
reject recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. The Palestinians seem to have a great territorial appetite and historically, they have displayed a lack of political pragmatism that is a prerequisite for reaching a compromise. As long as Islamist Hamas has a powerful grip on Palestinian ethos and aspirations, and as long as its ruthless rule over Gaza continues, Palestinian politics are hostage to the extremists and are unable to move toward an historic compromise with the Zionist national movement. The belief that American pressure can change the positions of the protagonists in the conflict is also ill-founded. Outsiders have little influence and peace can be reached only if the parties are ready to do so. The main breakthroughs in ArabIsraeli relations, the
Middle East visit of Egypt’s president, Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem (1977) and the Oslo agreements between Israel and the PLO (1993), were result of bilateral interactions in which the Americans were not involved. Outsiders have limited ability to induce change in how Middle Easterners conduct their business, as recent American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate. Moreover, Obama’s behavior has not been helpful. He has insisted on a comprehensive settlement freeze, which the Palestinians turned into a precondition for sitting at the negotiation table. Recently, Obama’s administration has demanded to stop Israeli building in Jerusalem. So far these demands have backfired, indicating Washington’s limitations in imposing its will on Jerusalem. Furthermore, when the US promised to secure Arab gestures as a quid pro quo for Israel’s concessions, Washington was unable to deliver, indicating again the limits of American clout in the region. Unfortunately, the heyday of American influence in the Middle East is over. When American diplomacy is not backed by “hard” power, the “soft” power extolled nowadays by Washington carries only little weight with the realpolitik oriented Middle Eastern elites. Most capitals of the region regard Obama as weak. This does not augur well for American diplo-
EurasiaCritic May 2010
7
Middle East
macy, as even the weak Palestinians are making more efforts to create the poable to say NO. Moreover, American litical conditions conducive to economdiplomacy can hardly make a dent in ic growth. The EU largely maintains the schism within Palestinian society a bloated and corrupt Palestinian bureaucracy. The aid to that is the main stumHamas-ruled Gaza is bling block for progAs long as Islamist particularly disturbing ress in peace making. Hamas has a powerful because it helps the Similarly, The US illgrip on Palestinian Jihadist Hamas to stay advised when it tries ethos and aspirations, in power and sustains to pressure the Israeli the war waged by the government to make and as long as its Hamas entity against concessions in Jerusaruthless rule over democratic Israel. The lem. This is probably Gaza continues, March visit of the EU the best issue any IsPalestinian politics foreign policy chief raeli government can are hostage to the Katherine Ashton find in order to make extremists and are to Gaza on the very a stand against Washday Gazans launched ington. unable to move deadly missiles to IsEuropean involvetoward an historic raeli towns is a recent ment is also not helpcompromise with example of European ful. The EU basically the Zionist national nourishes unrealistic misguided policy. Eumovement. ropean money to Gaza Palestinian goals, such also undermines the as the division of Jerusalem, instead of encouraging i greater attempt ffor preferential treatment to Palestinian pragmatism and flexibility. the West Bank, which is allegedly ruled Moreover, its generous financial aid by moderate elements. Blaming Benyamin Netanyahu for spares the Palestinians the need for 8
EurasiaCritic May 2010
the current impasse assumes that the insatiable Palestinians must be placated at the expense of vital Israeli security interests, such as demilitarization of the West Bank and maintaining Israeli control over the Jordan Valley and Greater Jerusalem. Ascribing responsibility to Netanyahu for the lack of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian track also wrongly assumes that the Palestinians have displayed flexibility in their approach to Israel. Yet it is the Palestinians who are not ripe yet for peacemaking. Even Netanyahu’s decision for the ten-month freeze on building in the settlements, an unprecedented Israeli concession, was rejected by the Palestinians. Netanyahu believes that progress on the road to peace can only be achieved by a slow process of institution-building and economic growth beginning from the bottom-up. Indeed, his government has done its best to facilitate economic growth in the West Bank by removing dozens of roadblocks, thereby putting the lives of Jews at risk, and by supporting international and Palestinian economic activity. Moreover, the Is-
Middle East raeli prime minister declared at every opportunity his willingness to enter into unconditional talks with the PA and has even accepted proximity talks despite Israel’s traditional insistence on direct talks. True, Netanyahu’s conditional acceptance of the 2-state solution was Netanyahu’s was accompanied by demands for demilitarization and secure borders. Netanyahu government’s cautious approach toward the Palestinians enjoys large popular support and his Bar-Ilan address was endorsed by over 70 percent of Israelis. Indeed, most Israelis display a realistic appraisal of the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. According to a recent poll, 82% of the IsUnfortunately, raelis regard the claim a large part of that Israeli withdrawestinians in order to the international al to the 1967 lines bring peace have been community fails to would bring peace for proven wrong. Two Isunderstand that the generations since the raeli prime ministers Arabs would no lonethnic conflict waged offered to cede virtuger have any claims ally all of the disputed in the Holy Land will against Israel, as a territories. The offers end only when the naïve and simplistic. of Ehud Barak and parties will tire. Such views indicate Ehud Olmert were rethe need for caution spectively rejected by and popular support ffor th the currentt Arafat A f in i 2000 and ignored by his sucIsraeli government. This public mood cessor, Abbas, in 2008. Moreover, in makes also Israel less vulnerable to out- 2000 the Palestinians launched a camside pressure. paign of terror and recently they have So far, those advocating great Is- threatened to renew it. Similarly, after raeli territorial concessions to the Pal- the Sharon government unilaterally
withdrew from Gaza and dismantled all settlements in 2005, the Gaza Strip was converted into a launching pad for intensified missile attacks. Unfortunately, a large part of the international community fails to understand that the ethnic conflict waged in the Holy Land will end only when the parties will tire. So far, Israelis and Palestinians still have energy to fight for what is important to them. Therefore, peace is not in sight. The author is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.
EurasiaCritic May 2010
9
AfPak
The McChrystal Plan By Simbal Khan
T
he McChrystal strategy for Af- the Helmand River in Helmand Provghanistan proposes to secure the ince, so the focus is on the agricultural bulk of the Afghan population communities in the green zone there. by protecting key cities and towns in Most of the population of Kandahar south and eastern Afghanistan. By se- province lives in Kandahar city, so logically the strategy urges curing population centhe concentration of tres, the strategy aims This endorsement of forces and effort in to foster responsible the McChrystal plan and around Kandahar governance within the and the announcement to secure Kandahar secured areas and, city. The underlying wherever possible, to of 30,000 more U.S. rationale being that persuade the Taliban troops to be largely the Taliban can only fighters through presdeployed to the remain an existential sure and incentive to southern and eastern threat to Afghanistan lay down arms. war fronts came after when they have influThe strategy of a period of intense ence over the popusecuring the populalation and economic tion centres must not deliberations within centres. Once they be confused with an the American policy are cut off from sup“urban� strategy. It making circles. port and funding and is a population-cendriven into the barren tric strategy which requires deploying soldiers to where countryside, they would become irrelthere is a concentration of people. As evant and easier to be neutralized later. Although the strategy aims to focus a large number of Afghans live along
10 EurasiaCritic May 2010
on all large concentrations of populations such as the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and Herat in the west, there is a prioritizing of effort in the insurgency-hit areas in the south and southeast. Most of the 30,000 additional troops approved by President Obama are likely to be despatched to the dangerous insurgency-hit areas in Regional Command or RC (South) and in the Greater Paktia area of RC (East).
Regional Command (South) In RC South, critical population concentrations lie mainly in the two Pushtun-dominated southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. In the Helmand province, critical population concentrations lie along the Helmand River Valley, mainly around the towns of Sangin in the north to Garmsir in the south. The estimated population of this area is around 650,000-700,000. Coalition and ANSF Forces on the ground in Helmand as of January 2010 include 13,000 U.S. Marines. Out of the 9,500 British soldiers who are serving in Afghanistan, 6,200 are deployed in Helmand province. The coalition troops there also include 700 Danish soldiers and 1,800 Afghan National Army soldiers. All in all, there are already more than 20,000 coalition troops and trainers in Helmand as of January 2010. By March 2010, a further addition of two Marine Brigades is likely to boost the U.S. marine contingent in Helmand to roughly 20,000-plus. With the deployment of a new Afghan Army Corps in Helmand in support of the coalition forces, the troop levels in the province would approach the 25:1,000 ratio of forces to locals that the McChrystal strategy specifies is required to win a counterinsurgency campaign.
AfPak
The other vital province in RC South, Kandahar, is also likely to see a deployment of 15,500 additional U.S. troops (roughly 4.5 brigades) by August 2010. The additional troops are likely to target the concentration of population in the Kandahar province around Kandahar City of approximately 1 million. This combined population of around 1,650,000 concentrated in an area of approximately 450 square miles in and around Kandahar and approximately 800 square miles in Helmand province, is likely to be the main target and focus of counterinsurgency operations and greater force induction as outlined in the McChrystal assessment. The planned troop surge is also likely to provide security cover to the city and environs of Tarin Khowt, the provincial capital of Uruzgan which forms the northern tip of the axis of the RC South. Tarin Khowt has an estimated population of around 95 thousand, along with an additional 750 thousand people widely dispersed along small villages and hamlets that often serve as
The combined population of these three eastern provinces is around 650 Regional Command (East) thousand which is dispersed over an COIN efforts are also likely to be area of 3,500 square miles. This area reinforced in RC (East) as greater abuts Pakistan’s North and South Waziristan agencies and number of troops beprovides a number comes available in The strategy of infiltration points 2010. The RC East of securing the for Afghan Taliban spans 14 provinces in population centres aligned primarily with central and eastern must not be confused the Haqqani network, Afghanistan with a which operates bases combined U.S. and cowith an “urban� on both sides of the alition troop strength strategy. It is a border. Many villages of 24,000. However population-centric and mountainside the new military stratstrategy which hamlets provide supegy focuses on the requires deploying port and sanctuaries to contested population soldiers to where there the Taliban. centres in greater PakCurrently, there tia region (Loya Pakis a concentration of are around 4,000 U.S. tia) which include the people. troops in the P2K area three eastern provalong with 4,200 Afinces of Khost, Paktia, ghan National Army soldiers. The U.S. and Paktika or the P2K region. These three eastern provinces which troops in this sector are spread around border the restive FATA region of Paki- Camp Salerno in the area around the stan are likely to see an increase in the city of Khost and Camp Hariman in the number of U.S. and coalition forces. south Paktika region. In the RC East Taliban sanctuaries and support zones.
EurasiaCritic May 2010 11
AfPak
also lies the important province of Nangarhar which abuts the vital transportation route through the famed Khyber Pass and the Khyber Agency in Pakistan’s FATA region. Nangarhar, due to an early and enduring pact between the pro-Karzai influential Arsalai family and the local warlord, Commander Hazrat Ali, had been relatively peaceful with limited Taliban presence, until 12 EurasiaCritic May 2010
at least 2008. The past two years have however seen a steady encroachment of Taliban influence, especially in areas controlled by the Khogiani tribes. The recent announcement by the powerful Shinwari tribal elders vowing to keep the Taliban out of their areas in Nangarhar is an indication that promises of aid (in the Shinwari tribes case it is $1 million in development aid to be
directly channelled through the tribal elders) and exploiting local conflicts with the Taliban, can be successful. The situation in the northern part of the RC East which spans the border provinces of Kunar and Nuristan is far more complex. The United States has withdrawn its troops from its four key bases in Nuristan, which lies close to the border with Pakistan, leaving the northeastern province as a safe haven for the Taliban-led insurgents. The U.S. has retained some forces in Nuristan’s capital, Parun, to provide security for the governor and government facilities. The U.S. position concerning the withdrawal is that due to winter conditions, supply arteries are choked, making it difficult to keep forces in remote areas. The U.S. has pulled out from some areas in the past, but never from all four main bases. The move by the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, followed the death on October 3, 2009, of eight American soldiers as well as a number of Afghan National Army forces, when their outpost in Kamdesh was attacked by more than 300 militants. Earlier, on July 13, 2008, nine American soldiers were killed when their outpost in Wanat was attacked by local Taliban. The province is now under the effective control of the network belonging to Qari Ziaur Rahman, a Taliban commander with strong ties to Bin Laden. This makes Nuristan the first Afghan province to be controlled by a network inspired by al-Qaeda. While the U.S. is still maintaining its forward operating bases in the Kunar province which borders the troubled Bajaur Agency in Pakistan, it is unlikely that it would add more troops in this sector of the RC East.
Training of Afghan security forces A central part of McChrystal’s strategic assessment is the acceleration of the training of Afghan security forces so that the coalition troops can effectively partner with them and eventually hand security over to the Afghan forces. The priorities here include training of the
AfPak Afghan National Security Force which includes the police and the army. a) Afghan National Army (ANA) As of June 2009, the Afghan Ministry of Defence had 103,475 authorized personnel, with 89,521 actually assigned. The Afghan National Army operational units had 66,406 soldiers authorized, with 53,417 assigned to around 80 kandaks or battalions. The remaining personnel are assigned to civilian posts in the Ministry of Defence and serve in the headquarters, infrastructure, ministerial and general staff positions, training and transfer accounts. There have been claims by various independent sources questioning the reliability of the official figures regarding the turnover rate in the Afghan Army. According to the U.S. Department of Defense reports to the U.S. Congress also the duration of such training. Also, on Afghanistan in January and June scepticism has risen that the new targets 2009, the AWOL (Absent without set by President Karzai during the Lonleave) rate is running at around nine don conference would ever be met. In the final communiqué per cent. However, issued after the LonSome early misgivings this figure is condon Conference, the tested within the Dehave been expressed participants also compartment of Defense by the Pakistan mitted to providing the itself. Published data military command necessary support to the by the U.S. Defense engaged in battling phased growth and exDepartment and the the Tehreek-ipansion of the ANA in Inspector General order to reach the figTaliban Pakistan in for Reconstruction in ure of 171,600 personAfghanistan reveals South Waziristan to nel by October 2011, as that one in every Gen. McChrystal, approved by the Joint four combat soldiers as he made a an Coordination and Monquit the Afghan Naunannounced trip itoring Board on Janutional Army (ANA) to Islamabad after ary 20, 2010. during the year endb) Afghan NaHillary Clinton’s visit ing in September tional Police (ANP) 2009. With the total to reassure Pakistani “The Afghanistan strength of ANA in officials of the National Police is Af2009 estimated to be American resolve. ghanistan’s frontline of 103,475, according to defence against insurthis calculation, the d gency and organized crime. Yet, despite turnover rate among Afghan soldiers is early $10 billion in international police as high as 25 per cent. However, both assistance, the Afghan police are ridthe turnover and the recruitment rates dled with corruption and incompetence are likely to improve with the improved pay package announced in December and are far from the professional law enforcement organization needed to 2009. Still, doubts remain regarding about ensure stability and development.” These words mark the opening the level of training imparted to the paragraph of the 2009 report published hurriedly expanded Afghan Army as
by the United States Institute of Peace. While detailing the past failures and current challenges facing the international police assistance programme in Afghanistan, the report draws the conclusion (shared by other stakeholders) that the police have been ineffective and often act to encourage the greater spread of insurgency through their corruption and penetration by militias and insurgents. Despite the impressive growth in numbers, the expenditure of $10 billion on international police assistance, and the involvement of the United States, the European Union, and multiple donors, the ANP is riddled with corruption and generally unable to protect Afghan citizens, control crime, or deal with the growing insurgency. The European Union has replaced Germany as the lead partner for police reform, but the United States has the largest police programme which is directed by the U.S. military. Putting soldiers in charge of police training has led to militarization of the ANP and its use as a counterinsurgency force. Using improperly trained, illequipped, and insufficiently supported ANP patrol men as “little soldiers” has resulted in the police suffering three times as many casualties as the Afghan National Army. The police are assigned in small numbers to isolated posts withEurasiaCritic May 2010 13
AfPak out backup and are targeted by the insurgents. Beyond funding the Taliban, the explosion in Afghan narcotics production has fuelled widespread corruption in the Afghan government and police. Drug abuse by police officers has become increasingly common as have other forms of criminal behaviour. As outlined in General McChrystal’s assessment, the new strategy aims to radically improve the training and effectiveness of the ANP with more resource inputs, partnering with mentors and better equipment and salaries. The London Conference communiqué also focused on the need for the qualitative and quantitative improvement in the ANP and committed the Afghan government to the expansion of the police force to the strength of 134,000 personnel by Oct. 2011.
Community Defence Initiative (CDI) Militias have been formed and have begun taking up arms against the Taliban in several places, including the provinces of Nangarhar and Paktia. However, different approaches are being followed by U.S., British and Afghan forces that are training these militias: • The U.S. has been working with the Shinwari tribes in Achin district
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Also in the Paktia province of eastin Nangarhar, to form militias to resist the Taliban. A recent feud between the ern Afghanistan, Chief Ajmal Zazai, an Taliban and the Shinwari elders caught Afghan Canadian, announced the forthe attention of American officers who mation of a tribal police force by unitsent a team of Special Forces soldiers to ing the 11 Zazi tribes that owe him althe valley. The first phase was carried legiance. Recently, Ajmal Zazai spent out by U.S. special operations group a month’s fellowship at Johns Hopkins that had been helicopter-dropped in enrolled at the Central Asian-Caucasus Institute’s Silk Road areas where locals Studies Program. Durhad indicated willingAfghan Taliban groups ing his visit to the U.S., ness to set up these aligned to the Haqqani he met a number of militias. Initially, the network based mainly important personaliU.S. provided assisin North and parts of ties including former tance in food, trainSouth Waziristan, and U.S. Secretary of Deing, and equipment. the Afghan Taliban fense, Donald RumsThe second phase feld. After a tour of involved the proviassociated with the Washington discussing sion of communicaso-called “Quetta the need for a tribal tion equipment to the Shura”, have a neutral role in bringing peace militia to enable them but ambivalent and stability, Zazai to coordinate with the relationship with the formed the tribal poAfghan Police and the Pakistani State and lice force in June 2009. military. According to Both south-eastern reports, since Decemhave largely confined Nangarhar and the ber 2009, the U.S. has their activities to P2K area in the RC initiated plans to set attacking the U.S./ East have recently up a military base in NATO forces inside seen a strong resurthis Shinwar district of Afghanistan. gence of the Taliban the Nangarhar provand the Haqqani netince. In January 2010, t th k E Encouraging the formation of the tribal jirga which represents the work. 400,000-strong Shinwari tribe formally militias through these community defiannounced the formation of the tribal ance initiatives is an integral part of the lashkar to resist the Taliban activities in new McChrystal strategy to undercut the rising force of insurgency through their area. informal militias until the expansion of the regular Afghan national security forces. However, it remains doubtful how enduring and meaningful this militia-building exercise would prove to be in time. The Shinwari territory in the Nangarhar province spans the important transport lifeline that makes its way through the fabled Khyber Pass in Pakistan. The trucking and transit trade on both sides of the border is directly and indirectly managed by pro-Taliban networks. It is not altogether clear how these anti-Taliban militias are going to uproot such enduring common financial interests which bind power brokers on both side of the border in complex economic and political relationships. • The British have largely endorsed the Arbaki model. Arbakai, the
AfPak
Pashto word for militias, has been an groups, especially those around Kunidea which has met with a lot of criti- duz. These groups are not formed cism and scrutiny and has been contro- around tribal structures but are based versial. In Helmand, the British have around Uzbek or Pushtun commanders been training local youth from the com- who are ready to raise militias against the Taliban. In Kunmunities who are being duz, there have been offered the opportuThe year 2010 reports that these minity to train in the new promises to be litias, after evicting Police Training Acadeventful, and there the Taliban from some emy in Nad Ali district is a broad sense of villages, imposed of the province. Here, anticipation that by there own taxation local youth are being on the people. That is given the opportunity the end of the year the raising concerns in all to train alongside the stage would have been relevant quarters. British and the ANA set for a new era to Targeting developpersonnel. Concerns begin in the war-torn ment projects to key revolve around these country. population centres forces as they may creThis ‘militarizaate new warlords out tion’’ off h humanitarian aid in Afghaniof their leaders as also th thatt ttribal Pashib l P h ti tun rivalries could be reignited. There stan has also been widely criticised by are hundreds of Pashtun tribes, so there the United Nations officials in Afghaniis also the question of who to arm and stan. With reference to the latest military operation, officials have stated that how to control these militias. • The Afghan government has the U.N. agencies would not participate used a different approach. They are in the military’s reconstruction strategy channelling assistance to large armed in Marjah as part of its current offen-
sive there. General McCrystal’s postoperational plan for providing quick governance to Marjah, referred to by some detractors as “government in a box”, has been criticised and not endorsed by U.N. officials. However, at this stage, it is not clear whether the arrests signify an attempt at applying controlled pressure against the Taliban leadership to moderate their negotiating position, nudging them in line with the McChrystal strategy timelines, or a strategic turnaround for Pakistan. If the arrests signify the former, the changes desired in the Taliban position by the Pakistan security establishment are likely to include: 1) Their giving up the demand for the re-establishment of an emirate in Afghanistan; 2) More flexibility on the withdrawal of foreign troops as a pre-condition for dialogue; 3) More willingness to negotiate with the Karzai government; and 4) A shift away from Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. EurasiaCritic May 2010 15
AfPak
More importantly, the Pakistani State would like to remain relevant to the peace negotiations with the Taliban as the Karzai government is engaged in a multitude of secret peace talks in the region. After suffering the brunt of the fallout of the Afghan war, Pakistan does not want to be marginalized at this critical juncture when the shape of postwar Afghanistan is being decided. The second element of the strategy, that is causing serious concern in Pakistan, is the expected increase of around 30,000 troops, to be amassed largely along the southern borders of Afghanistan which are contiguous to Pakistan’s troubled Balochistan Province and southern FATA region. While the U.S. military has recently abandoned a few of their forward operating bases, effectively ceding the north-eastern province of Nuristan to Taliban forces; elsewhere, especially in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, a base-build16 EurasiaCritic May 2010
ing boom has been underway. Although originally built for 12,000 people, the Kandahar military base and airfield now house between 30,000 and 40,000 – and is growing by the day. Both China and Iran remain critical to Pakistan’s regional security environment. At the same time, Pakistan is also intensifying its strategic military relationship with the major extra-regional player, the U.S., which is currently expanding its military infrastructure in Afghanistan. It is of critical importance for Pakistan’s security to understand the full implications of its different strategic partnerships with different regional actors and how they are likely to be affected in any future military conflagration in the region.
Conclusion The re-invigoration of the U.S. policy focus on Afghanistan led by the Obama administration has provided a
frenzied momentum to developments in Afghanistan. The year 2010 promises to be eventful, and there is a broad sense of anticipation that by the end of the year the stage would have been set for a new era to begin in the war-torn country. However, the multiplicity of actors involved; both State and nonState, both regional and extra-regional; implies that the endgame would involve a very complex process of balancing various and often competing interests. Much of this process is likely to unfold in secrecy, shielded away from public scrutiny. However, the McCrystal strategic assessment for Afghanistan is likely to provide the broad guidelines and the accepted script, guiding much of the action that is likely to unfold in Afghanistan in the current year. The challenge for Pakistan will remain to find space for its own interests within the confines of a strategy whose objectives lie far beyond just ensuring Pakistan’s stability.
Cyprus
The UK and Cyprus; from Guarantor Power to interested party By Bill Park The UK as Guarantor
T
he UK, along with Greece and Turkey, is a Guarantor power of the Republic of Cyprus. This status derives from the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, Article II of which obliges the three guarantors to ‘recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution’. The three also
18 EurasiaCritic May 2010
‘undertake to prohibit, so far as concern declares prohibited any activity likely them, any activity aimed at promoting, to promote, directly or indirectly, either directly or indirectly, either union of union with any other State or partiCyprus with any other State or partition tion of the Island’. Ankara justified its 1974 military intervention on the island of the Island’. For its part, according to the Treaty’s by plausibly claiming that both Cyprus Article I, the Republic of Cyprus ‘un- and Athens had acted in breach of their obligations under the dertakes not to parTreaty. Turkey surely ticipate, in whole or London, with other had a point, for Athin part, in any politiEU members, ens and Nicosia had cal or economic union had feared both a with any State whatundoubtedly conspired Greek veto on EU soever. It accordingly to subvert the treatyenlargement in eastern based status of the island and its internal Europe, and a Greek governance. It could block on negotiations also be argued that Cyfor Turkey’s EU prus’s 2004 accession accession. to the European Union (EU) breached Ari l I off the h T ticle Treaty because of the EU’s commitment to political and economic union of its members, but especially so in the light of Greek EU membership. On the other hand, with the formation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983 and Ankara’s diplomatic recognition of it, it can also be argued that Turkey too has breached its obligations as a Guarantor power. Subsequent threats by Turkey to annex the TRNC and thus permanently divide the island, and Turkey’s widely perceived intransigence – at least until the election of the Justice and Development Party (Adelet ve Kalkinma
Cyprus
Partisi – AKP) in November 2002 and its support for the Annan Plan in 2004 – served only to reinforce this impression. Furthermore, the UK chose not to act militarily alongside Turkey in 1974. In general, the UK has interpreted its Guarantor status in a somewhat passive manner. Thus, it also failed to act decisively in the face of Greek Cypriot transgressions against the 1960 treaties during the years that followed the establishment of the island’s independence. London also agreed to the 2004 accession of Cyprus to the EU, even though no agreement on the island’s future had been arrived at. London, with other EU members, had feared both a Greek veto on EU enlargement in eastern Europe, and a Greek block on negotiations for Turkey’s EU accession. This record serves as a reminder that Cyprus does not loom as large in the minds of British policy makers as it does in the minds of Cypriots. Thus each of the three Guarantor powers could be said to have breached
their obligations at one time or anoth- cede its rights as Guarantor as part of a er, or to have failed to live up to them. negotiated settlement. From the British Yet, until the 1960 treaties establishing perspective, the island’s continued divithe Republic of Cyprus are superceded sion serves as an obstacle to much more by a new diplomatic settlement, the important objectives, such as full inclustatus remains legally in force. From sion of Cypriot territory into the EU’s acquis, and progress London’s perspective, on Turkey’s EU acceswhat does this amount Greek Cyprus, and sion. For the principle to? Greek Cyprus, and especially its present of Guarantor status especially its present government, wants to be discarded, howgovernment, wants an end to the idea of ever, the Greek and an end to the idea of external guarantors, Turkish sides would external guarantors, regarding it as both first have to agree on regarding it as both the question of secua colonial legacy and a colonial legacy and rity guarantees. Thus as a legitimisation of as a legitimisation of far, the prospects of Turkish interference Turkish interference in the island’s affairs. any such agreement in the island’s affairs. Turkey and the TRNC being achieved have prefer its retention, as been dim. And the an insurance policy to protect the UK off today h rights i h d iis not the military power and security of the island’s Turkish mi- that it was, or thought it was, in 1960. nority against further encroachments The UK as interested party from the Greek side. London, however, is best described as ‘neutral’ on the isIn the meantime, the UK remains sue and would probably be prepared to very much an interested party where EurasiaCritic May 2010 19
Cyprus the future of Cyprus is concerned. The that failure to settle the Cyprus issue appointment of the experienced dip- constitutes a major obstacle to Turkey’s lomat, Sir David Hannay, as the UK’s eventual membership. Special Representative for Cyprus, a Cyprus is also a domestic issue for post he held from 1996 until 2003, is the UK. There are reckoned to be altestimony to London’s high level of en- most 80000 Cypriot born residents in gagement with the issue. Indeed, Han- Britain, and around 300000 subjects of nay’s hand is widely held to have been Greek Cypriot descent. Those of Turkinstrumental in drafting the UN’s An- ish Cypriot descent – 100000 or more nan Plan, which was – constitute a larger Little information put to a referendum in community than exists both parts of the island in Cyprus itself. Furis available in the in April 2004. This thermore, UK-based public domain, but engagement is partly Cypriots are concenthe importance of explained by the UK’s trated in a relatively Cyprus to US and UK historical responsibilfew areas of north and intelligence efforts in ity for Cyprus, and its east London, which the Middle East, the knowledge and experienhances their capacience of the island and ty to organise and lobCaucasus and Central its problems. Indeed, by. The UK’s universiAsia is substantial. some – especially on ties are also popular the Greek Cypriot with hundreds of Cypside - would argue thatt th the UK b bears riot There are also believed i t students. t d t T primary responsibility for the mess that to be around 60000 British expatriates emerged subsequent to the granting if living in Cyprus, and thousands more independence. For this reason alone no British second-home owners. The legal external state has been more active than status of some British-owned properties the UK in trying to achieve a negotiated located within the TRNC zone also ensettlement. The UK is also one of the sures a degree of British political intermost consistent advocates of Turkey’s est in the island’s affairs. Furthermore, accession to the EU, and recognises the UK is Cyprus’s main trade partner.
20 EurasiaCritic May 2010
Cyprus is a member of the Commonwealth, and both the Cyprus and the UK are EU member states. The UK has also been the biggest contributor to the island’s UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The UK also possesses the two Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs), at Akrotiri and at Dhekelia, agreed by the 1960 Treaty of Establishment. These constitute around three percent of the island’s territory, although around sixty percent of the area enclosed within them is locally owned, mainly for farming. Seven thousand Cypriots live on this land, Cypriot laws apply, and Nicosia is obliged too to provide services to the areas within the SBA’s boundaries, such as water, power, transport and food supplies. London offered to give up the bulk of this locally owned land within the SBAs as part of the Annan Plan, and the offer remains on the table in the event of a negotiated agreement.
Cyprus and intelligence gathering Although the SBAs retain their usefulness to the UK for the purposes of troop rotation, training, and basing, more important are the intelligence gathering, signalling and intercept facilities that have been progressively installed on the island since 1960. These have far greater significance than could possibly have been envisaged in 1960, when the UK acquired the bases in pursuit of its role as a regional, and still colonial, power. Today, their interest to London lies much more in their intelligence utility, most especially to the US. Many of these facilities have been quite recently enhanced at considerable cost, and include the British electronic intelligence gathering station at Ayios Nikolaos in Dhekelia. The 1960 Treaty also gave the UK extensive rights to and control over a number of additional socalled ‘Retained Sites’ on the island, and some of these too contain intelligence facilities, such as the Mount Olympus radar facility in the Troodos Mountains. Cyprus-based intelligence facilities, some of which are US-owned such as
Cyprus those at the US embassy in Nicosia, and many of which, one can assume, are partly or wholly US-funded, are incorporated into the USA’s global Echelon intelligence network. UK-US intelligence sharing arrangements are intense and comprehensive and are governed by informal agreements dating back as far as the 1940s. Little information is available in the public domain, but the importance of Cyprus to US and UK intelligence efforts in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia is substantial. This ensures both that the US has a stake in the problems of the island, and that any position the UK adopts is likely to take account of US sensitivities and interests. Whatever agreement can eventually be arrived at by the island’s opposing factions, it is hard to envisage circumstances in which the UK and the US would be prepared to lose their ability to use the island’s geographical advantages and expensive intelligence facilities. This too needs to be taken into account when contemplating the UK’s approach to Cypriot affairs. The status of the SBAs is not directly related to the current negotiations between the two Cypriot communities. Indeed, Article III of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee declares that, ‘Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus’. London would prefer to maintain the distinction between the two issues of the future settlement of the Cyprus dispute on the one hand, and its retention of the SBAs on the other, and Nicosia has respected that wish. Indeed, under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between London and Nicosia on 2008, the Greek Cypriot government pledged to honour its obligations to the SBAs under the 1960 Treaties. Relations between the British authorities in the SBAs and the Greek Cypriot authori-
ties are generally cordial, and cooperation close. Even so, the present leftist Greek Cypriot President, Demetris Christofius, is on record as regarding the SBAs as an unwelcome colonial presence and has expressed his wish to extend Cypriot sovereignty to them, although he is currently content to defer this objective until after an end to the island’s division has been achieved.
The future? London tries to maintain a degree of neutrality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, although many citizens of an island so attached to conspiracy theories and zero-sum diplomacy as is Cyprus refuse to accept that fact. Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike have been reluctant to recognise either their own responsibility for their island’s misfortunes or that primary responsibility for settling these differences lies with them. The current leaderships of the two communities – Christofius for the Greek side and Mehmet Ali Talat for the TRNC - embarked on direct negotiations under the auspices of the UN in 2006. Although the two leaders have amply demonstrated their goodwill – a circumstance that might not easily be repeated in the future - progress on the core issues has been limited. Yet, when in early 2010 the two leaders somewhat
surprisingly announced that progress had been made and would continue to be made, London welcomed their profession of faith with enthusiasm. This does not mean that meaningful progress will necessarily be made or that an end to the island’s division is imminent. London can encourage and facilitate progress, but it cannot force it. London can, and does, seek ways to limit the isolation of the TRNC, but it is unlikely to act in ways that contradict the position of the EU as a whole. The UK’s preference is that a settlement be found that is acceptable to both communities, that all Cypriots can live in security and prosperity, and that the EU acquis be extended to the entire island. London also wishes that the Cypriot logjam to progress on Turkey’s EU accession be removed. But it has no magic want to wave. The arrangements on Cyprus of which the UK was Guarantor have long since been discarded, and the UK’s physical capacity - let alone its will - to act as Guarantor in the sense in which the term was understood in 1960 has long since eroded. Bill Park is Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College, London University. He has published, lectures and broadcast on a range of issues relating to Turkish foreign and security policy, and is currently writing a book on Turkey and Globalisation. EurasiaCritic May 2010 21
Central Asia
Drug Trafficking in Uzbekistan By Mazhar Yasin Tuyluoglu Narco-Terrorism
N
arco-Terrorism is a relatively new term in international relations. In 1983, Fernando Belaùnde Terry, the former president of Peru, described the terrorist attacks against his nation’s counter narcotic police as narco-terrorism. In late 1980’s and early 1990’s, narco-terrorism was characterized by Pablo Escobar and Medellin Cartel, in Colombia. After that the usage of the term broadened. RAND Corporation and especially Brian Michael Jenkins used narco-terrorism in their studies. “In the original context, narco-terrorism is understood
22 EurasiaCritic May 2010
to mean the attempts of narcotics traffickers to influence the policies of a government or a society through violence and intimidation and to hinder the enforcement of the law and the administration of justice by the systematic threat or use of such violence.” Central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in particular, suffers greatly from the involvement of the terrorist groups in narcotics trade. “A group’s involvement in crime, of course, changes the equation of its relationship to the state and to society. Crime enriches the group, making it possible to acquire more sophisticated arms, to employ more fighters by paying them, to corrupt state officials, and
to propagate its ideology to the population.” “In Uzbekistan, for instance, even long before the events of 11 September 2001, the officials were warning that transnational terrorism in the region represented a serious threat to international security. At the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Vienna, Austria 10-17 April 2000), Uzbek officials emphasized that terrorism in the region was often connected with other criminal activities, including the smuggling of firearms and drugs, from which terrorist groups financed their operations.” As we mentioned before, cutting all possible resources of terrorist groups is a must for Eurasian Security. And of course, it includes exposing the ties between the terrorists and drug trafficking in the region. “Uzbekistan plays an important role concerning this drugterror connection since the Russian human rights observers estimate that 17.1 percent of the drugs enter the Russian Federation from Uzbekistan.” “Despite the highly negative Muslim attitude toward the use of drugs and a ban on drug consumption that Islamist organizations of this type strictly observe, the use of drug-generated money for financing jihad is justified by the need to weaken the main enemy (that is, the West).” The West is also taking some serious measures regarding to the drugterror connection in Central Asia but “UNDCP estimates that unless they
Central Asia
are able to seizure at least 75 percent of trafficked drugs, they will be unable to diminish the profitability of the drug trade.” In 1996 the UNDCP estimated that they were seizing 5 to 10 percent of illicit drugs. However, in 2006 the number raised to 23 percent. a) The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) The origins of IMU can be traced back to early 1990’s. Juma Namangani a former Soviet Union soldier who fought in Afghanistan and Tahir Yoldashev, the head of the Adolat (Justice) Party and an unofficial mullah came together to implement sharia law in the city of Namangan in the eastern part of Uzbekistan, Ferghana Valley. By the late 1990s, the IMU was formed. The IMU is the very first terrorist organization which aims to overthrow the government in Uzbekistan by assassinating
the president Islam Karimov and has ity in their area in order to secure the close ties with al-Qa’ida and the Tal- routes they use for the transportation iban. Senior IMU leaders have held po- of drugs.’” The IMU’s funding sources sitions in the al-Qa’ida hierarchy. The include donations from sympathizers IMU used Afghanistan and Pakistan as and al-Qa’ida as well as criminal activibases for launching forays into Central ties like drug trafficking. The IMU’s inAsia, as well. According to Interpol, volvement in drug traf“The Islamic ficking is yet another Movement of Uz“the drug mafia problematic issue in bekistan (IMU), in was controlling the Central Asia. In late particular, is believed governments of at 1990s and early 2000s to finance terrorist least 12 states in 1999. the IMU was controlactivities from drug ling the Afghanistantrafficking, commod(Osh) drug route effectiveity smuggling and contributions ib i ffrom Kyrgyzstan K (O external sources.” “Ralf Mutschke of ly. “Drug control experts concur with the Criminal Intelligence Directorate the estimate that the IMU in that peof Interpol labeled the IMU ‘a hybrid riod, controlled up to two-thirds of the organization in which criminal interests opiates entering Kyrgyzstan.” Furtheroften take priority over ‘political’ goals,’ more “the organization was handling 70 adding that ‘IMU leaders have a vested percent of the heroin and opium traffic interest in ongoing unrest and instabil- through Central Asia.” EurasiaCritic May 2010 23
Central Asia “IMU leader, Juma Namangani in trafficking Afghan opiates was the Iswas actively involved in drug smuggling lamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). through Tajikistan, and used his net- However, given the organization and work of IMU militants in Central Asia operations of the IMU prior to Septemand his links with the Chechen militants ber 11, it appears that they were driven to increase his trade. Namangani with more by criminal interests than by pothe assistance of other drug traffick- litical or religious purposes. Unlike other insurgent or terers had also set up Production and rorist groups operating in laboratories to reAfghanistan—identified fine heroin largely consumption of illicit by their political motivacoming from Afdrugs paves the way to tions—the IMU is the ghanistan. It was transferring them to only group that encomfurther alleged that non-producer but high passes the entire range of there was a transconsumer parts of the the crime-terror nexus. It shipment base in world. is both criminal and terKhojent, situated in the Sogd region, rorist in nature: criminal because off iits direct involvement in the which was under the control t l off respec- b tive field commanders of IMU. Bolot drug trade, and terrorist because of its Dzhanuzakov, the head of the National explicit (even if only rhetorical) politiSecurity Service of Kyrgyzstan, in an cal declarations. interview to Slovo Kyrgyzstana alleged “IMU carried out incursions in that IMU controlled the northern sec- 1999–2000 to create instability and tion of the drug traffic route from Af- chaos in the region so that they can smoothly operate their drug trade. As ghanistan.” IMU’s involvement in drug trade efforts were made to control drug trafficking through the Osh–Khorog route, was also highlighted by Makarenko : The only group significantly involved IMU militants chose the Batken route
24 EurasiaCritic May 2010
situated closely to the Uzbekistan and Tajikistan border.” IMU militants carried out incursions in August 1999 just after the harvesting of opium, keeping in view the fact that during winter the passes through which the traffickers operated their trade remained inaccessible to heavy snowfall. IMU suffered a setback subsequent to the 2001 US-led military operation against the Taliban and al-Qa’ida forces in and around Afghanistan. Juma Namangani was reportedly killed during the operation. However, press reports suggested the regrouping of IMU. Russian newspaper Pravda stated that IMU changed its name to Islamic Movement of Turkestan and terrorists from Chechnya, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Xinjiang joined its ranks. The ability of the radical forces, under whichever name, to target state authorities in Central Asia became evident from the terrorist attacks in April 2004 and in Andijan in May 2005.
According to Makarenko: Several aspects of the modalities of the IMU incursions suggest that they were in fact conditioned to a great extent by the drug trade. These include both the geographical areas targeted, the timing of the attacks, as well as the tactics used. That drugs transit Central Asia is no novel phenomenon. It has in fact been an increasing problem since the mid-1990s, as traffickers increasingly faced efforts by the Iranian government to curtail trafficking through Iran—the erstwhile chief smuggling route. As trafficking through Iran became dangerous and therefore expensive, Central Asian states—with their porous borders, newly established state authorities and corrupt climate— became a major new trafficking route. “It should be noted that the IMU never lived up to the reputation of a monolithic, hierarchically structured organization. Most studies of the movement seem to indicate at least two focal points coexisting, not without friction, within the IMU: the more guerrilla-oriented and criminal part of the organization led by Namangani, and the more
Central Asia
Tajikistan: major gateway for Afghan drugs TAJIKISTAN
To RUSSIA
KAZAKHSTAN
To RUSSIA
To EUROPE
Aral Seal
UZBEKISTAN
AZ. BAKU Caspian Sea
BISHKEK
KYRGYZSTAN
TASHKENT
TURKMENISTAN
Samarkand
CHINA DUSHANBE
ASHGABAT
To EUROPE TEHRAN
Almaty
L. Saubadu
Accounts for 90% of Afghan opium and heroin seized in Central Asia Transits up to 100 tonnes of heroin a year Earns $0.5-1 billion from heroin trade per year (country's annual GDP is $2.1 billion) Approximately 80% of Tajiks live in poverty
TAJIKISTAN Bridge
IRAN
Mazar-e- Kunduz Sharif
Mashhad
Heroin costs (per kilo): $400-500 in Afghanistan $1,000 on the Afghan-Tajik border $10,000 on the Moscow market
Herat
KABUL
260210
religious part controlled by Yoldashev.” To conclude this chapter, finally we may refer to Frederick Starr. Starr has pointed out that the IMU is best understood as an ‘‘amalgam of personal vendetta, Islamism, drugs, geopolitics, and terrorism.’’ b) Other Terrorist Organizations There are several other terrorist groups operating in Central Asia and particularly Uzbekistan, most of them are connected directly with the drug trade in the region. Al-Qa’ida, probably the world’s most notorious terrorist organization correlates with narcotics trafficking. The group is involved in narco-terrorism, especially in Afghanistan and in certain parts of Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In the last few years the organization became a conflux of crime and terror. Taliban is yet another terrorist organization which is heavily involved in drug producing and trafficking in Eurasia. Its actions alarmed the governments of neighboring countries in recent years. “Under the Taliban, Afghanistan became an extremist sanctuary and base of operations for rebel incursions into nearby states. Central Asia and the Ferghana valley in particular, became the nexus for an unsavory mix of ethnic disputes, drug trafficking and Islamist terrorism.” Apart from these groups, there are two other major terrorist organizations operating in Uzbekistan: The Islamic Jihad Union and Hizb-ut Tahrir (Party of Liberation). The IJU is a splinter group of IMU. It is formed in Pakistan, in 2002. There are two founders of IJU; Najmiddin Jalolov (also known as Abu Yahya Muhammed Fath) and Suhayl Buranov (also known as Abu Huzayfa). Hizb-ut Tahrir aims to build the Islamic Caliphate and is popular among ethnic Uzbeks. Although their connection with drug trade is at low levels, it is still believed that the Hizb-ut Tahrir is involved in trafficking of illicit narcotics in the region. The United States led war against terror, however, caused dissolutions among the terrorist organizations. Especially the operation “Enduring Free-
PAKISTAN ISLAMABAD
INDIA
AFGHANISTAN
dom” in November 2001 resulted with a relative success. Many members of the above mentioned terrorist groups, including Taliban, al-Qa’ida and IMU, reportedly have been killed or captured.
ism.” The government is taking serious steps to prevent further damage to the state. It is essential to point out that, “Uzbekistan is a signatory to most major conventions relating to drug control, including the 1961 UN Single ConvenRecent Trends and tion on Narcotics, the 1971 UN ConGovernment Efforts vention on Psychotropic Substances, After the collapse of the Soviet and the 1989 UN Convention on illicit Union, newly independent states have traffic in Narcotic Drug and Psychotroborn. “Along with the newly indepen- pic substances.” dent countries came After the indepennew borders that had dence, “the GovernAs we mentioned to be patrolled and ment of Uzbekistan before, cutting all new border guards has repeatedly empossible resources who had to be trained. phasized the imporof terrorist groups is These new borders retance of international a must for Eurasian mained virtually transcooperation in the Security. And of parent until new nafight against drugs tional customs services and transnational orcourse, it includes were created in 1993– ganized crime, and exposing the ties 1994. This was one of has made efforts to between the terrorists the reasons that interintegrate the country and drug trafficking in national drug traffickin the system of inthe region. ers took a strong interternational cooperaest in the region.” tion.” “Uzbekistan has “The Government off U Uzbekistan b ki signed i d more than h 20 bilateral and muland independent analysts have argued tilateral agreements on cooperation in that the most significant threats that fighting illicit drug trafficking with its Uzbekistan currently faces are related Central Asian neighbors, and also with to complex linkages between terrorism, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, trafficking in drugs and firearms and Georgia, Germany, Iran, Italy, Pakipersons, and corruption, in particular stan, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.” where the proceeds of transnational or- In 1994 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and ganized crime are used to fund terror- Uzbekistan formed the Central Asian EurasiaCritic May 2010 25
Central Asia
Economic Commission and pledged to nomic Community, presidents of the cooperate in the battle against illegal member states noted the necessity to drugs. combat terrorism, religious and politiFurthermore, “a Memorandum of cal extremism, and illegal circulation of Understanding on Sub-Regional Drug drugs, weapons, and explosives. President Islam Karimov of Control Cooperation Uzbekistan has made was signed in TashThe Islamic Movement any number of public kent in May 1996 of Uzbekistan (IMU) speeches on this probby the governments carried out incursions lem.” of the five Central in 1999–2000 to create As Mohapatra Asian republics and instability and chaos states; the UNODC.” The in the region so that To curb the producRussian Federation tion and illicit transfer and the Aga Khan they can smoothly of drugs and other subFoundation joined operate their drug stances, the Uzbek law on 16 January 1998. trade. enforcement agency Later on, Azerbaicarried out an operation jan also signed the treaty, in 2001. Meanwhile, “at the June widely known as ‘Poppy-99’ in 1999. 1999 summit of the Central Asian Eco- The volume of narcotics confiscated 26 EurasiaCritic May 2010
increased from 113 kg to 1.5 tons in five years from 1994 to 1999. The lawenforcement machinery of Uzbekistan also at the same time detained over 480 drug couriers and confiscated 1,949 kg of narcotics from them during 1998–99. Uzbekistan informed the UN Drug Control Programme that during the same period drug trafficking through Uzbekistan increased to a staggering high of 600 per cent. “In November 1999 Uzbekistan became the first Central Asian state to sign an agreement with China on cooperation in the area” and “in April 2000, Uzbekistan initiated and signed – with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the Central Asian Agreement on the Joint Fight against Terrorism, Political and Religious Extremism, Transnation-
Central Asia al Organized Crime and Other Threats to Stability and Security of the Parties.” Uzbekistan’s efforts proceeded, in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit, held in Chisinau in October 2002, as the CIS adopted a document aimed at evolving a common approach in the fight against drug trafficking, organized crime, international terrorism and other manifestations of terrorism. “The fact that all of the countries of the region are members of the CIS was an added benefit. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are members of the CIS Customs Union, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are members of the Central Asian Economic Community. Kyrgyzstan is also a member of the World Trade Organization. Though most of these organizations are largely just de jure creations, they still make drug trafficking easier by, for example, maintaining a visa-free travel regime for the citizens of the CIS countries , as well as by having various bilateral agreements that facilitate free trade between countries.” Related with this, drug trafficking in the region also has a multiethnic structure. “It has been reported that 65.3 percent of the region’s drug traffickers are citizens of Tajikistan, 10.8 percent are citizens of Russia, 9.2 percent are citizens of Kyrgyzstan, and 8.2 percent are citizens of Turkmenistan.” The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) maintained a Collective Rapid Reaction Force of 1,500 military personnel deployed in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Besides CIS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in recent years has also been taking an active interest in combating threats like drug trafficking, organized crime and religious terrorism. The Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) is yet another organization which is also taking a keen interest in meeting the challenges emanating in this region due to the proliferation of the drug trade and cross-border terrorism. In addition to multilateral regional bodies like SCO, CACO
and CSTO, the Central Asian states are also involved in bilateral engagements with other external actors to combat this menace. “Joint efforts to counter drug trafficking have produced some results. For example, in February 2008, law enforcement agencies of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan launched Operation Typhoon, a joint operation targeting one of the largest drug trafficking groups in
Central Asia.” Again, in 2008, the Government of Uzbekistan broadcast 129 TV and 304 radio broadcasts to raise awareness about the dangers of drug use, and 232 newspaper articles were published. “In March 2008, UNODC-trained law enforcement officers intercepted a large amount of heroin being smuggled through Uzbekistan. The investigation uncovered one of the biggest drug smuggling cases in the country.” EurasiaCritic May 2010 27
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As a conclusion, we must admit that “Uzbekistan’s main counter-narcotic efforts centers around destroying the illicit crop cultivation. The efforts are sponsored by the UNODC (United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention). The UNODC is supporting research at Uzbekistan’s Institute of Genetics on the development of a fungus capable of destroying the opium crop at its root. The fungus was first discovered at a former Soviet biological warfare plant in Uzbekistan, originally designed to destroy NATO’s food supplies.” The UNODC has an office in Tashkent, Uzbekistan for effective cooperation and joint action, as well.
Conclusion In the introduction part of the article, we have mentioned about the drug trafficking and its effects on Central Asia, generally. We touched to political and societal repercussions of drug trade and addiction to drugs, by referring to several authors. Before passing 28 EurasiaCritic May 2010
In the fourth part, also the second on to the other part we gave place to statics concerning drugs, in Uzbekistan. main part of the article, we have studIn the second part, we searched ied on narco-terrorism, the meaning through the history of drug trafficking of the term, the usage of the term and in Central Asia and Uzbekistan. While drug-terror connection. After introbenefiting from the historical timeline, ducing into the fourth chapter we rewe also underlined that Uzbekistan is searched the primary terrorist organization in Uzbekistan: not only a drug-tranThe Islamic Movesit country, but also After eliminating a producer country, ment of Uzbekistan drug trafficking, even if the production (The IMU). Having second step has to be levels cannot be comsaid about the group’s the solution of the pared with those of history, we then conAfghanistan, Pakistan tinued with IMU’s above mentioned local etc… involvement in drug conflicts in the region. The third part is trade, in Central Asia one of the two major and Uzbekistan. We parts of this article as it analyzes the underlined the connection between main drug trafficking routes and their IMU and the regions other significant extensions. We tried to find an answer terrorist groups like Taliban and alto the question: Why it is easy to smug- Qa’ida. We tried to point out that the gle drugs between some borders and most dangerous development in the why it is not in others? We concluded region would be the evolution of the chapter three with an enlightening map inter-regional cooperation between the about the drug trafficking routes in Uz- terrorist groups to a more complicated bekistan. one: inter-national terrorism. We con-
Central Asia cluded the chapter by mentioning other terrorist organizations operating in the region. In the fifth and the last part we touched on recent trends and especially on government efforts to stop illicit drug trafficking in Uzbekistan. Again we referred to several scholars who are experts of this topic. The main sources were Martha Brill Olcott and Natalia Udalova Zwart, Swante E. Cornell and Niklas Swanström, Tamara Makarenko, Nalin Kumar Mohapatra, Ahmed Rashid and the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC). We also used several web sites and reports made by several institutes. As last words before conclusion, we can admit that the drug money has supported all sorts of radical movements and terrorist organizations in the past and it will support them in the future. Drug trafficking and the profit made from it is indispensable for terrorist groups in Uzbekistan, in Central Asia and in other regions of the world. It has certain political, social and economic effects and the consequences will be higher than estimated if some radical decisions would not be taken. In the meantime, abolishing drug trafficking and eliminating the traffickers are difficult tasks partly because of the reactions of certain centers of power. Yet the sponsors of the extremist terrorism which cause troubles to Central Asian states are thought to be the rival states. This means that the regional conflicts between the states may result to furtherance of the terrorism threat, in the future. Therefore, the main issue has to be the termination of drug producing centers, first in Uzbekistan and then in Central Asia as this will bring limited funding to the terrorist organizations. After eliminating drug trafficking, second step has to be the solution of the above mentioned local conflicts in the region. Otherwise, there’s a risk that the changes in political, social and economic systems of Central Asia may affect the neighboring countries such as Russia, China and Iran, turning the entire region into a “hot spot”.
Bibliography Abeyratne, R. (2008) “The Illicit Transfer of Narcotic Drugs by Air”, Journal of Transportation Security, 1:229–255 Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998) “Security: A New Frame”26 Problems of PostCommunism July/August 2006 work for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 37. Burgess, M. (2002) “In the Spotlight: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)”, CDI Research Analyst, p.1, 25 March Chernogaev, Y. (1999) “Russia Struggles with Bolivian Drug Mafia on the Tajik-Afghan Border,” Kommersant- Daily, December 17 Cornell, S. E. (2006) “The Narcotics Threat in Greater Central Asia: From Crime-Terror Nexus to State Infiltration?” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4, No. 1 p. 60 Cornell, S. E. and Swanström, N. L. P. (2006) “The Eurasian Drug Trade A Challenge to Regional Security”, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 10–28. Cornell, S. E. (2005b) “Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 17, pp. 577–97. Cornell, S. E. Regine A. S., (2002) “Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists”, Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 193–206. Giragosian, R. (2004) “The US Military Engagement in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus: An Overview”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17, 1, p.44 Kudakaev, A. (1999) “Drugs”, Gazeta.Ru, Available at http://www.gazeta.ru/society/30-04 1999_narko_Printed.htm Madi, M. (2004) “Drug Trade in Kyrgyzstan, Structure, Implications, and Countermeasures”, Central Asian Survey 23, no. 3–4: 249–273. Makarenko, T. (2002) “Crime, Terror and the Central Asian Drug Trade”, Caspian Brief, no. 25, Available at http://cornellcaspian.com/publications/pdf125.0207CA_drugs.pdf Makarenko, T. (2001) “Traffickers Turn from Balkan Conduit to ‘Northern’ Route,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 13, no. 8 pp. 27–29. Makarenko, T. (2000) “Crime and Terrorism in Central Asia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 12, no. 7 McConnell, A. (2002) “Islamic Radicals Regroup in Central Asia”, Eurasia Insight, Available at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/ insight/articles/eav051502.shtml Mohapatra, N. K. (2007) “Political and Security Challenges in Central Asia: The Drug Trafficking Dimension”, International Studies, 44 Money Laundering and Related Issues in Uzbekistan (2002) GPML Central Asia Briefing No.2, 24 Mutschke, R. (2000) “Threat Posed by Organized Crime”; Donnie R. Marshall, Drug Enforcement Administration administrator, Testimony to the Subcommittee on Crime of the Judi-
ciary Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/ terror/00121301.htm Olcott, M. B. and Zwart, N. U. (2000) “Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road,” Working Paper no. 11 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). Olcott, M. B. and Zwart, N. U. – Meyer, K. and Parssinen, T. (1998) Webs of Smoke (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.) Patnaik, A. (2002) “Central Asia and CIS Integration”, Contemporary Central Asia, vol. VI, no. 3, pp. 1–13. Pravda. (2001) “Muslim Fundamentalists in Central Asia are to establish the New Joint Organization”, Available at http://english.pravda.ru/ cis/2001/05/30/6301.htmls Rashid, A. (2002) “Separatist Group in Uzbekistan Selling Drugs for Purchase of Arms”, Available at http://www.eurasianet.org/resources/ Uzbekistan/hypermail/200109/0009.html Rashid, A. (2002) Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press). Stepanova, E. (2005) “Illicit Drug Trafficking and Islamic Terrorism as Threats to Russian Security, The Limits of the Linkage”, PONARS Policy Memo No.393 Thachuk, K. (2001) “Transnational Threats: Falling Through the Cracks?” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 10, no. 1: pp. 47–67. Townsend, J. (2004) “Country Factsheets, Eurasian Narcotics, Uzbekistan” Silk Road Studies Trifunovic, D. (2007) “The New Terrorist Organization «LIVO» Creating an «Islamic State» in the territory of Central Asian countries”, Research Institute For European and American Studies (RIEAS), Research Paper No: 115 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2003) “Global Illicit Drug Trends” (Vienna: United Nations) U.S. Department of State (2008) International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2008 Weitz, R. (2004) “Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27 (2004): 465-490. Williams, P. (1997) ‘‘Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security,’’ in In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the information Age, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 329 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND) Internet Sources www.unodc.org, www.ncdc.uz, www.stratfor. com, www.ag.gov.au, www.irinnews.org, www. silkroadstudies.org, www.cacianalyst.org, www. estandardsforum.org, http://www.flashpoints. info/CB-Uzbekistan.htm, http://www.unodc.org/ unodc/en/frontpage/uzbek-officers-put-unodctraining-to-gooduse.html, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/panorama/transcripts/transcript_02_10_00.txt EurasiaCritic May 2010 29
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Terrorism as an Important Element of Armenian Internal Policy By Ilgar Majidli
I
n the newly independent countries who declared of building democratic society following the collapse of the Soviet Union, thread for state terrorism might have appeared as intentional directing the population of these countries to the wrong direction aimed at realisation of militarist-agressive plans as well as groundless territorial claims on the neighbouring states. This thread did not pass Armenia by. According to the common practice terrorism is actively benefited by the separatist forces and the states supporting them as a tool for achieving political goals. One of these states is a Republic
30 EurasiaCritic May 2010
of Armenia who has territorial claims on neighbouring countries (Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and supports the international terrorist organizations operating against the above-mentioned countries. After achieving the state independence extremism and violence shaped the system of political struggle in Armenia. The leaders of this country raised terrorism to the level of state policy in order to justify the ethnic cleansing implemented by them through the Armenian regular army in Azerbaijani territory, through illegal armed units made up of the Armenians residing
the Mountainous-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and through international terrorists wanted by a lot of states of the world. Terrorist feature of the regime existing in Armenia was progressing on the ground of social disorientation of its citizens and the critical state of Armenian society thus causing the most part of the country’s population to be reduced to penury. From other hand having benefited from the social tension inside the country, opposition forces started to create new myths purposely poisoning the mind of Armenian society and characterized with the appeals for struggle by violente means. Namely such kind of developments lead to the establishment of internal terrorism in Armenia by extremist opposition forces thus generating violence, in other words terrorism of regime systematically carried out by state. Governing body of Armenia endeavouring to reabilitate the leaders of international terrorist groups since the early 90th, had launched large-scale campaign aimed at concentrating the most active members of such radical organizations of Armenian diaspora as “Dashnaksutyun”, ASALA, MAG, “Armenian union”, “Armenian Liberation Front” and other terrorist ones in the territory of the country, granted them political asylum by providing political-legal terms for their activities and supplied them with money, weapons, forged documents as well as transport. Meanwhile terrorists, weapons and
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financial aid had been transferred to Azerbaijani territory densely inhabited by Armenians under pretext of the aid. Futhermore release and support of Armenians – perpetrators of terrorist acts against Turkish diplomatic missions had been organised at state level in Armenia. The above-mentioned process was given particularly wide scope after Robert Kocharyan ascended the power. Following president Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s resignation the members of terrorist organizations “Dro” and “Vaan Ovanesyan+31” were released “due to the change of political situation” by the first decrees of acting president and prime-minister R.Kocharyan. An interesting point was that this action had been done out of any formal judicial judgement on premature releasing or closing the case. Initially Grant Markaryan, wellknown terrorist of Iranian citrizenship was released. Being a bureau member
of “Dashnaksutyun” he was transferred ist activities of “Dro” organization in from Armenia to Karabakh on the basis 1996, was released from Yerevan prison of forged documents in 1991. Markary- on president’s initiative. Following such kind of support renan together with Monte Melkonyan dered by the authoriand Vazgen Sislyan, ties to the terrorists other well-known terRepublic of who had turned to be rorists were entitled Armenia who has more or less as “Hea part of the political territorial claims ros of Karabakh war” power in Armenia, the on neighbouring on an initiative of country was shrouded countries (Turkey, R.Kocharyan. Vazgen in terror wave (murder Azerbaijan and Sislyan who was sent of general prosecutor, deputy ministers for to Khankandi in 1992 Georgia) and supports interior and defence). benefited terrorist acts the international perpetrated by him The bloodshed carried terrorist organizations out in Armenian parjointly with Abu Ali, operating against liament on 27 october Gilbert Minasyan and the above-mentioned 1999 was an unprecother terrorists from countries. edented event which Near East in order to did not have analogue draw the attention of the international community Arme- in the history of world terrorism. As munity to Arme nian issue. Following Kocaryan’s elec- five terrorists (four out of them were tion to the presidency Vaan Ovanesyan, “Dashnaksutyun” members) on quietly leader of “Dashnaksutyun” who was entering the sitting hall of the parliasentenced to imprisonment for terror- ment midday shot down five ministers, EurasiaCritic May 2010 31
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speaker of parliament and his three deputies. Futhermore several members of parliament and a member of the cabinet of ministers got wounded. Terrorists headed by Nairi Unanyan, former member of “Dashnaksutyun” had been keeping hostages the members of parliament as well as almost all government officials within 15 hours. Only following the meeting with president Kocharyan and his verbal guarantee for the physical immunity of the life of the bloody action participants the terrorists unconditionally surrendered to the authorities. Human rights defender P.Ayrikyan was noting in this regard: “On 27 October 1999 terrorist act was commited in Armenian parliament – ten persons were murdered”. K.Damirchiyan, chairman of Popular Party of Armenia was also among the victims of terror. His son said the following in his statement to the media: “Not everything related with the crime perpetrated on October 27 has become clear. Only one thing is clear: government of republic is actually protecting terrorists”. However Edward Ovanesyan, one of “Dashnaksutyun” ideologists 32 EurasiaCritic May 2010
had stated to “Postfactum” programme of “A+1” TV company that it was still early to assess the events of October 27 as terrorist act and only after the political assessment of the activities, personality and deeds of the murdered persons by history the above-mentioned events could be assessed. Following the parliamentary elections of 2003 “Dashnaksutyun” was again represented by three ministers in the government (notably if taking into consideration that party member Levon Mkrtichyan was in charge for education and enlightment and his party colleague Roland Sharoyan for culture, youth and sport, one could obviously see the determinant role of “Dashnaksutyun” in bringing up the country’s future potential and commonly its future generation), moreover Vaan Ovanesyan, party member and chief of its terrorist group “Vaan Ovanesyan+31” who had been “due to the change of political situation” released by the first decrees of Kocharyan was appointed counsellor of the president, Hrayr Karapetyan, another party spokesman was appointed the governor of the province of Aragat-
son. On 25 November 1997 at the memorial night of Monte Melkonyan organized in the building of Yerevan philarmony it was said in the submitted address of Kocharyan: “... Artsakh has been liberated and Monte Melkonyan has given his life as a sacrifice for it, this can never be forgotton”. Afterwards the above-mentioned international terrrorist was declared a national hero of Armenia and his name was given to one of the subversive centers of the Ministry for Defence of Armenia. The indicated facts are known to the world community as well. Alan Fogelkwist, head of Eurasian Center in California in the chapter on Karabakh of the book entitled “Caucasus. War and peace. New World Order and Caucasus” discloses the behind-the-scenes side of the initial stage of the conflict – deportation of Azerbaijanis from their historical homelands in Armenia, the role of Armenians of non-Karabakh descent in the developments taking place in Mountainous Karabakh, Sumgayit events, “Black January” events in Baku. In that book Dutch journalist Charlz
Caucasus van der Leu on touching the issue of of Constituion was not legitimate. As Armenian terrorism indicates that for- when taking his office he had not been mer ASALA terrorists Davidyan and a citizen of the Republic of Armenia Melkonyan who have come from Leb- within last 10 years. anon to Karabakh and taken service Ashot Blenyan, chairman of “New with Kocharyan in the capacity of field way” party, former minister for educacommanders have played an important tion applied in 1998 to the country’s part in the political career of the fu- Constitutional Court demanding to ture president of Armenia and namely check the legality of the registration of these two persons are accountable for Kocharyan’s candidature to the presislaughtering Azerbaijanis in Khojali, dency. Instead, following Kocharyan’s Shusha and Lachin. He also notes that election to the presidency in 1998 he ASALA which transwas sentenced to seven formed into “Vrej” years imprisonment Another American by changing its name on the basis of charges poltical researcher is connected with seon economical crimes Samuel Weems came cret services of Arfabricated by the court. to the following menia and Russia, as “Present presiconclusion: “Politically the above-mentioned dent of Armenia motivated murders terrorist organization R.Kocharyan is gulty owns its representaof plunder and loot are ordinary cases in tives in Rostov from carried out during the today’s Armenia. where it has been percapture of Azerbaipetrating terrorist acts jani city of Aghdam in the passanger trains moving towards and after looting Aghdam KochrayAzerbaijan in 1994-1996. an considers that our country can be Another American poltical re- looted as well”. Leader of Republican searcher Samuel Weems came to the party Aram Sarkisyan had characterfollowing conclusion: “Politically mo- ized Kocharyan’s activities through the tivated murders are ordinary cases in above-mentioned statement. It should today’s Armenia. The mayor of coun- be noted that Kocharyan was heading try’s capital Yerevan complained of in- a big illegal armed detachment called terstate corruption and was murdered. “Mountainous Karabakh self-defense” Most people trying to protest discussed the abuses of power by authorities and were murdered”. Slaughters were carried out in Yerevan and other cities of Armenia on the eve of Kocaryan’s coming to power. In Armenian sources Kocaryan’s coming to power is called “velvety coup” and this case in its turn is explained by the fact that extremism and violence turned to be an integral attribute of the political life in Armenia. In compliance with Article 50 of the Constitution of Armenia, each person who reached the age of 35, has been a citizen as well as living in the territory of the Republic of Armenia within last 10 years and enjoying suffrage can be a president of the Republic of Armenia”. For that reason today the Constituion is not running in Armenia. However R.Kocharyan, expresident of Armenia as a guarantor
detachment (later on “Mountainous Karabakh Army”) during the active military operations in Mountainous Karabakh. Well-known international terrorists from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, as well as France and Canada were fighting against Azerbaijan within this detachment. In paralell with all the above-mentioned, deputy chairman of Armenian National Movement A.Ovakimyan having characterized internal political situation in Armenia as anarchy considers terrorist acts emanating from such situation to be logical thus reminding of the atmosphere of intolerance, fury and hatred created in the country. In 2003 during presidential elections in Armenia Kocharyan and his mileu applied methods of terror in order to keep the power in their hands. However two weeks before the above-mentioned elections in the center of the district of Artashat near Yerevan an attempt was made upon the life of Ayka Babukhanyan who had joined the pre-election demonstration of Aram Karapetyan, chairman of “Union of constitutional law” party, member of Armenian parliament and candidate to the presidency. Having got a knife wound in the back she was taken to one of Yerevan hospitals and operated there. The victim herself
EurasiaCritic May 2010 33
Caucasus Having characterized the situassessed the indicated incident as one of the violent actions planned by au- ation emerged in Armenia lawyer M.Danielyan was writing: “... Let us thorities against their rivals. t conceal their close coopera- take Common Declaration on Human tion with various terrorist groups in- Rights – in line with all 30 articles hucluding ASALA. Most likely among the man rights are being harrased in Arclose people of Kocharyan there were menia. ...Judiciary has been corrupted members of terrorist group “Dro” who from top to bottom. Judges are not dewere keeping direct contact with secu- pendent, to be exact they do not depend only on the laws. All rity, defence and law judicial proceedings enforcement agencies Regadless of being are attended by the of Armenia. As terrorcharacterized as guard armed with subist group “Dro” whose interstate terrorism, machime gun... Police main activities consistterrorism of regime arbitrariness passes ed of drug trafficking or terrorism of all bounds. The fate of and transportation, system carries a implementation of the arrested persons are determined in pethe ordered murders global character nal colonies, just there and participation in being inherent in no they receive their judgcriminal disputes, was ideology. ments. All detainees headed by well-known are faced with psycointernational terrorist Grant Markaryan. However a person logical and physical pressures”. The reports of US state department called Petrosyan had been murdered by Kocharyan’s personal bodyguard who indicate that combatting international was at the same time an active member terrorism makes up one of the priority guidelines of this state’s activities in the of “Dro”.
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area of ensuring its national interests. Nevertheless, among over 500 terrorist organizations operating in most regions of the world, the United States take notice solely of the ones threatening its national interests. Such kind of choice facilitated ASALA, “Dashnaksutyun” and other Armenian terrorist organizations which actively cooperate with most international terrorist organizations and comitted numerous bloody actions against the citizens of various countries including US, to escape the balck list. Simultaneously despite the fact that Armenia is pushing the policy of terror in the region, providing material-technical assistance to the most terrorist organizations, granting asylum to the well-known international terrorists in its territory and promoting the leaders and members of terorrist organization “Dashnaksutyun” to the highest public posts, this state has not been enlisted by American experts as the state sponsoring international terrorism. However the terrorists after perpetrating terrorist acts in other states are granted political asylum in Armenia, any kind of condition for their rest and treatment is provided, campaigns directed to justifying terrorism by applying dirty information technologies are conducted, image of “national heros”, “fighters for justice” are created for terrorists at state level. As state policy on reabilitation of the most active members of international Armenian terrorist groups (these groups set off explosion in “Orly” airport and Moscow Underground in 70-80th of the previous century, murdered Turkish diplomats in Sweden and Greece, captured Turkish embassy in Paris and perpetrated a number of other crimes) is pursued in this country. Declaring the well-known international terrorist Monte Melkonyan a national hero of Armenia is an obvious example for this, as the above-mentioned person at times comitted terrorist acts in France, lead terrorist groups in Mountainous Karabakh, took the most active part in mass murder and deportation of Azerbaijanis. Furthermore, well-known terrorist Grant Markaryan and Vazgen
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Sislyan who was one of the organizers in Armenia proves the particularity of of capture of Turkish embassy in Paris this attitude. The committee which in 1981 were ranked as “Hero of Kara- demanded the release of the “popular revenger” held a bakh war” for their acsigniture collecting tive engagement in the The forces who under campaign through the terrorist acts carried the slogan “Struggle opportunities of Echout against Azerbaifor Karabakh miadzin church thus jan. collecting 1 227 473 In the context of Armenians right to signitures. One of 6th the above-mentioned self-determination” classes of Yerevan facts an attitude of the benefited from school was named afentire Armenian sociterrorism for the ter Karapetyan as well ety to the terrorist acts purpose of ensuring as exhibition of his picand the executors of their ideological tures was arranged in these acts can not preEchmiadzin and Yerevent an interest generdeeds and ambitious ated in this regard. A van. President L.Terterritorial claims, long-term activities of Petrosyan’s apply to came to power in this the committee for prohis French colleague country tection of the rights of J.Shirak regarding Varujan Karapetyan pardoning Karapety(Syria-born Armenian terrorist i and d an, participation i i i of Armenian political ASALA member who was arrested by elite headed by Kocharyan in the solFrench police for installing explosive emn funeral of the well-known intersetting in Turkish Airlines office in Orly national terrorist Monte Melkonyan airport (8 civilians perished due to the (the funeral were attended by 50 thoustart up of that setting) and sentenced sand persons including terrorist’s “colto imprisonment for life by the deci- leagues” from Iran, Syria and Lebanon) sion of court dated from 3 March 1985) testifies the sympathy to the terrorists
expressed by the highest authorities of the above-mentioned country. On 23 Aprel 2001 French court released Karapetyan before his time (if considering that 24 Aprel is declared by Armenians “day of genocide”, releasing Karapetyan by French court one day earlier this date arises attention) on condition that he abandon the borders of France within the shortest while. In the court decision the necessity for providing Karapetyan with a job by Yerevan mayor as well as granting him asylum by Armenian authorities was being stressed. In Armenia prime minister Andronik Markaryan received Karapetyan by praising him for the heroic fight carried out for his motherland and charged the minister for health with a duty of taking the terrorist’s health under special controle. The criminal was received very grandiloguently by Armenian society as well. However media representatives who were waiting very excitedly for press conference organized in Armenia on May of 2001, on forgetting for an instance the reason of their coming together, continuously applauded entering person who was EurasiaCritic May 2010 35
Caucasus to highlight them. This man was not a diplomat, politician, worldwide famous sportsman or artsman, he was just ASALA terrorist, bloody killer Varujan Karapetyan who had written his name in numerous crimes. The press-conference held by Journalists’ Union of Armenia on the eve of September events of 2001 (explosion of the World Trade Center building in New-York city of the United States) were attended by ASALA members as well. Notwithstanding the repeated denial of the existence of the indicated organization by Armenian officials and media representatives, ASALA members as a protest to the definite articles lately published in the media and assessing the activities of the above-mentioned organization as terroristic one, made the following statement on the course of the conference: “Activities of ASALA has nothing to do with terrorism. In the terms of the existence of Armenian state these activities carries political character and is directed to the revival of motherland. ASALA was founded as a reaction to the indifferent attitude displayed by the great powers with regard to the problem of recognition of Armenian genocide of 1915 thus turning to the organization uniting Armenian diaspora and stating that Armenian issue was waiting for its solution”. The indicated information spread by Armenian information agency Arminfo can be called sensation. On 10 April 2002 one of the courts of first instance of Yerevan complied with an action on providing Armenian terrorist Vano Siradegyan wanted by Interpol with a certificate of the place of residence, the indicated action had been brought by “Armenian national movement” party. A moment generating related interest was that a certificate had been given to the above-mentioned terrorist for the enrollment of his candidature to the membership of Armenian parliament. According to RIA “Novosti” Armenian terrorist V.Siradegyan had been wanted by Interopol for two years. When talking of perceiving terrorism by Armenian public on the light 36 EurasiaCritic May 2010
of special sympathy with this inhuman phenomenon expressed by the political elite of the indicated country, it should be noted that in Armenia when the issue is terrorists this word instantly refreshes the surname “Teyleryan” (Armenian terrorist who murdered Talat pasha, former minister for interior of Ottoman empire, blaming him as one of the major organizers of the made-up Armenian genoside, in Berlin in 1921) in memories. In the mentality of contemporary Armenian society the notion of terrorist is associated with the names of Simon Ter-Petrosyan, nicknamed as “legendary revolutioner” or “Kamo” as well as with the names of “popular revengers” Sogomon Teyleryan, Varujan Karapetyan, Monte Melkonyan and other “national heroes” who gained fame by putting their signitures in numerous crimes against humanity. The public-opinion poll held by Armenian National Sciences Academy among 600 respondents in Yerevan immediately following the tragedy of 27 September 1999 (shooting down the members of parliament) proves that. However 26,8% of the indicated respondents stated that the deed of terrorists was a step taken to save the country and the nation. Another public-opinion poll held among Yerevan students (2070 respondents) in December of 1999 put forward analogical outcomes – nearly 25% of respondents justified the deed of terrorists. Furthermore, Armenian political scientist T.Akopyan considers that act of terror is associated with a noble idea as well as with a misson of justice in the mass consciousness of Armenian society and the shadow of the indicated justice leans on “Armenian reveng acts” and “ethnoterrorism”. So political and intellectual elite of Armenia is not going to give up worshipping terror (inauguration of Sogomon Teyleryan’s monument in Yerevan on 8 August 2003 is an obvious evidence of that) which has been existing within decades in the country. Armenian intellegentsia and political elite calles Teyleryan “loyal and dignified national hero who did his sacred duty before his murdered innocent relatives and entire-
ly Armenian people”. They assert that his “saint name” is always in the tounge of Armenian people and Armenians should proudly remember and shamelessly pronounce this name. We guess that an erection of the monument to terrorist Teyleryan in Yerevan is an obviuos example of support rendered by Armenian authorities to violence thus serving this country’s long-term plan for preserving Armenians’ mass psychosis on creating mythical “Great Armenia”. At the beinning of 2002 a plan of terrorist acts to be carried out against Turkey and Azerbaijan was adopted in the meeting of the world’s various Armenian organizations held in Armenian religious center in Bucharest. In the meeting Arakelyan, “Dashnaksutyun” spokesman stated that the victims of Armenian terror should not be Arabians and other Moslems but Turks and Azerbaijanis. It should be noted that participants of this event had also a meeting with Karen Kasyan, Armenian ambassador to Romania. This fact indicated that the above-mentioned meeting had been arranged with a permission of official Yerevan. Regadless of being characterized as interstate terrorism, terrorism of regime or terrorism of system carries a global character being inherent in no ideology. This form of violence historically and currently doing harm to separate persons as well as to entire peoples makes up a separate type of terrorism irrespective of form of applying. In this regard since achievement of state independence Armenian authorities have been pursuing the policy of violence and terror with respect to their citizens. Terrorism was made a state policy as well as a major tool for external and internal policy mechanism by Armenian authorities. The forces who under the slogan “Struggle for Karabakh Armenians right to self-determination” benefited from terrorism for the purpose of ensuring their ideological deeds and ambitious territorial claims, came to power in this country. Moreover, terrorism as a serious thread to international security fully benefites from the moral support of Armenian society.
Germany & East
Roots of German Orientalism By Alp Hamuroglu
G
erman approach about Otto- solutions. Until the end of Bismarck man Empire was to maintain- period Germany contented with selling ing the unity of Ottoman Em- weapons, trade and economic relations. pire in the 19 th Century. The main rea- In the end of the 19 Century Germany started to emerge an son of this approach expansionist policy was the Germany’s Traces of this analysis and Ottoman Empire concerns on possibilcan still be seen in the was seen as the most ity of not gaining profit Germany’s approach suitable ally by Gerfrom the collapse of many. The time for the Ottoman Empire. about Turkey’s the effective policy Germany not only membership process was arrived and Othelped for Ottoman of EU. Fear of a toman lands have the Army’s modernization Muslim country which priority for expansion. but also Germany aidhas a population of Germany was planed Ottoman Empire 70 Millions can be ning to advance Weltseriously for survival politik through Ottoof the Ottoman econcounted as a tactical man Empire. German omy. move for Europe’s plans were also aimed In the first half of internal policy. at performing Drang the 19 th century Gernach Osten through man Unity was not established yet, Germany was not a super Ottoman Lands. Germany did not power and Germany did not have the hesitate to make huge investments like ability to use force to gain profits. So Berlin - Bagdad railway which would Germany used the peaceful relation- threaten German economy. In the advice letter which was sent ship methods to be effective to reach
38 EurasiaCritic May 2010
by Austrian Prime Minister Metternich to accredit Graf Appony who was sent to Istanbul, Metternich advised the Ottomans to have an anti - European position and he explained the reasons for negative effects of revolutionary ideas so he was advising Ottomans to not perform the reforms which were offered Ottoman Empire by Europe. Ottoman Empire should be just like Austria, Ottoman Empire should not be Europeanized. Traces of this analysis can still be seen in the Germany’s approach about Turkey’s membership process of EU. Fear of a Muslim country which has a population of 70 Millions can be counted as a tactical move for Europe’s internal policy.
Turkey as the Middle East Bridge for Europe Being an eastern which was the characteristic for Ottoman Empire was the true choice for Ottoman Empire according to Germany. Effect of religion should be maintained in Ottoman Empire. Islam had a role for protecting Ottoman State and Ottoman Society. Leadership of the Islamic World which would be gained through the caliphate would be so much beneficial for Germany. The authority of Ottoman Empire in the Islamic World would make Ottomans advantageous against their opponents in the region. This reason leaded Germany to design and support Panislamist policy of Ottoman Empire. Germany tried to unite Islamic Countries under the rule of Ottoman Empire. Germany has sympathy towards the Turkey’s friendly policy through Islamic Countries in the last seven years according to the German approach in 19
Germany & East th century. If there will not be an Anglo-Saxon dominated Middle East than it is a wise and practical way to reach Islamic World through Turkey. “Sick Man” was hardly maintain its territory and it had problems with controlling economy also keeping the multicultural society loyal to the state was becoming harder and harder. Ottoman Armies could not mess with European armies and it was losing lands because of the war defeats. Ottoman Empire was not able to solve its economic problems which were deriving from the huge depts. Nationalist movement of Greece showed Ottomans that it will be impossible to unite nations under a rule of an empire in the future. Ottomans would easily understand that nationalism will be a huge threat against empires. Empires were collapsing at that era and Ottoman Empire became a part of this collapsing period of the empires. Change progress of Islamic Countries today, is a reformation which has been started in the separation period of Ottoman Empire. US is stepping forward as being the determiner of this period. On the other hand, Germany wants to eliminate all problems which may prevent Europe from being an alternative power center. Problems emerge from the new members of the EU which are seemed to be economically, politically and militarily weak. Berlin is not in a need of a huge EU with several new members, Berlin needs a centralized and powerful Europe. New members and candidates can only be parts of second and third circle (like Turkey) members. Countries in the second and third circles should be under the determinacy of the central Europe and they should be bridges for enlargement to the east. US effect on this process should be minimalized.
New Missionary When the missionary actions of Christian Countries did not succeeded among non-Christian Ottomans, missionary actions started to aim at Christian Ottomans. Christians from Eastern Christian Communions are attacked by Catholic and Protestant missions.
Christian Propaganda Organizations with using economic reasons. All retransformed to organizations which ligious, cultural, trade, social, politiare aimed at communion propaganda cal and diplomatic organizations were organizations working for their gov- aimed at Ottoman Christians mainly. ernments’ interests. These communion The basis for those actions was alpropaganda movements are protested ready planned. Eastern Countries, by Eastern Christians Eastern History and time to time. CathoCulture became eduWhile cultural lic and Protestant cational disciplines. features of east were communions showed Scientific disciplines researched eastern a kind of spreadwhich were named as products and lands ing among Balkans, oriantalism became became elements for Eastern Anatolia and an advisory departmarketing and selling. Middle East. “Eastern ment for governments Churches” were colafter a short time. InWriters and educators lapsed. New Churches stitutes, publishes and recognized the established in many associations which importance of the east places. Missionary were founded for reand they were focused Schools which were searching Eastern on east in their pieces. founded by westerners Countries started to started to educate mishave political coni Th sioners for European C Countries. These tent. Whil While cultural features of east planned actions started to work for the were researched eastern products and political benefit of European Countries. lands became elements for marketAfter a decade European Countries ing and selling. Writers and educators openly started political and diplomatic recognized the importance of the east campaigns inside the Ottoman Borders. and they were focused on east in their They were started to establish consul- pieces. Some of them committed themates in the places where they choose selves to those new explored countries EurasiaCritic May 2010 39
Germany & East
of the east. Some of them even died for those purposes. Explored mythologies, newly recognized cultures brought the independence ideas to the agenda for Christian and Muslim communities living in the Ottoman Borders. All those religious and cultural activities were offering the separation of the communities from Ottoman Empire. Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Armenia, Kurdistan and Arabia were planned to be the new emerged countries from Ottoman Empire by the state policy. New established colonies and economic privileges were parts of this separation policy. New organizations established for protecting and cooperating the communities within the Ottoman Empire. These organizations had demands from government and they are functioned through the governments’ demands too. They gained support and money from people and governments. They had gathered and supported the Ottoman minorities who are living in Europe together so they had established lodges like Diaspora. Europeans gave opportunities for establishing schools, hospitals, dispensaries, public-kitchens, 40 EurasiaCritic May 2010
farms, production places and trade houses on Ottoman Lands. People who were moved to Europe for education, educated as the administrators of the “New Countries” in the future. Method was very similar with the method used in Iraq and Afghanistan today.
German Orientalism These studies which are mainly made in colonial countries like England and France are started to made in Germany by the mid of the 19 th century. German orientalism which was shaped through emotionalism, romanticism and individualism in 18 th century, had important reflections on German society. Importance of Eastern culture was stepping forward for newly uniting Germany in the beginning of 19 th century then the benefit of Eastern culture showed its crucial benefit for German Empire towards the end of 19 th century. German orientalism had started to managed by German State. Political and societal drift through east was raised through the accordance of both state associations and civil studies. By the foundation of legal and semi-legal
associations, initiatives for defending the rights of Ottoman minorities and Ottoman nations were increased. While Orientalische Frage (Eastern Question) was raised, Germany and Austria started to get prepared for being on the stage. New policy of Keiser Wilhelm the 2 nd which ends up the Bismarck’s policy of not intervening out of Europe, requested new colonial activities and armament policy which was an efficient policy in that era. A new monopoly established on selling arms to Ottoman Empire, England and France pushed out from this trade. Germany started to become an imperial country and Germany was risen for world dominance. Mechanisms and institutions of Atlantic trade were using a route across west-east Europe so Germany did not have the institutions which western Europe had in that time. Germany was located far away from the Atlantic so Germany could not get out of its borders and could not have colonials so Germany was a step behind of its rivals. Germany understood the importance of colonialism after the reign
Germany & East of Bismarck and prepared for being a colonial country. Deutschen Kolonialvereins„ (German Colonial Association) was established in 1882, „Deutschen Kolonialgesellschaft“ (German Colonial Institution) was established in 1888, „Kolonialabteilung„ (Department of Colonialism) which was an organ of Foreign Ministry was established in 1890. German Navy became the one of world’s strongest navies. A department of Foreign Ministry, Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient“ (East Intelligence Department) which was managed by famous diplomat, Explorer, middle east expert, archeologist and orientalist Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, was focused on the problems of Ottoman Lands. This new and secret department expected to work against the English and French existence in the region. Oppenheim, who traveled and explored Eastern Anatolia, Iraq and Syria, became the no: 1 enemy of the English and French. Oppenheim was announced as a spy. Secret establishment of the department and Oppenheim’s secret appointment could not hide the agency of Oppenheim. Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft“ (German Oriental Association) which was established for competing English and French orientalism in the end of 19 th century became an efficient and authorized body about the issue. Fundgraben des Orient (Oriental Treasures) magazine which was published by an Austrian researcher, Ottoman Historian and diplomat Joseph Hammer von Purgstall in 1808, was the first periodical publish on world orientalism. In 1887, Seminar für orientalische Sprachen“(Seminar on Eastern Languages) was established in Berlin. , „Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft“(German Oriental Association Magazine) was started to get published. Deutsche OrientMission“(German East Mission) which has the first place in the missionary associations in Turkey was aimed at Armenian Community. After a while a special organization for Armenian Community established: Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft“(German – Armenian Or-
ganization). Then new associations and books helped anti-Ottoman ideas to organizations started to established one spread among the world. by one “Deutscher Hilfsbund für christThese attempts of Germany did not lichen Liebeswerk im Orient e.v.“ (Ger- lead Germany to its goals; Germany man Delegation for Cooperation with started to walk through a end which Eastern Christians), „Deutscher Hilfs- was not desired by Germany. Separabund für Armenien“(German coopera- tion of Ottoman Empire prevented the tion Association with Armenians), in German Strategy which was aimed at Berlin „Deutsche evangelische Mission- having a share from the east. This failHilfe“(German Proture paved the way for estant Cooperation Second World War. Turkey seems to be Association), „OrientTurkey seems to the key element for und Islam Mission be the key element for Germany to increase des deutschen evanGermany to increase German efficiency in gelischen Missions German efficiency the east. Germany is Ausschußes“(German in the east. Germany making a historical Protestant Missionis making a historiary, East and Islam cal mistake again with mistake again with Delegation). These supporting the argusupporting the associations were ments against Turkey arguments against managed by German like supporting ArTurkey like supporting intellectuals, academimenian Question and Armenian Question cians, writers and reKurdish Question. If and Kurdish Question. ligious people. Cleric, Germany continues to Dr. Johannes Lepsius, insist on this mistake, Pasteur Ernst Lohmann, po- T Turkey n writer riter and nd po rke would o ld be pushed more to the litical scientist Dr. Paul Rohrbach are US side. Established economic coopthe most known people among them. eration would change its way. Germany Lepsius was studying like he was com- may get so much away from Turkey. mitted himself to Armenians. His stud- This kind of an inclination would colies on Armenians will be the basis for lapse the eastern bridge for Germany. Armenian Question which would be- It would be a big mistake to think that come bigger in 20 th century. He wrote Russia or Iran would be the eastern books against Ottoman Empire. These bridge on their own. EurasiaCritic May 2010 41
Turkey & EU
Relations with the EU and the Cost of the Customs Union By Prof. Dr. Emin Carikci Çankaya University, International Trade Department
Introduction:
B
efore and since the founding of the EU Customs Union (CU) and without any serious research many contradictory and false figures have been put forward about its negative effects. The initial purpose of this article is to elaborate a brief history of Turkey-Eu relations using the statistical data from 1995 through 2008 used in discussions of the CU and to identify the amount and number of industrial goods exports.
Did the CU Cost 100 Billion Dollars? Turkey became a partner member of
42 EurasiaCritic May 2010
the European Economic Area (EEA) when the Ankara agreement, signed on September 12, 1963 between EEA and Turkey, came into effect on December 1, 1964. While the ultimate aim is full membership, the CU was an initial step. In reality, in terms of trade in industrial goods, Turkey entered EU and CU in 1996. With the Additional Protocol signed on November 23, 1970, and effective on January 1, 1973, Turkish industrial products began to enter the European Community (EC became the EEA’s new name in 1968) without being subject to customs. In exchange for this capitulation Turkey promised to remove customs taxes (CT) on EC countries’
industrial products for 22 years beginning in 1973. The 1963 Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol was approved in the parliaments of both parties made Turkey’s inclusion in the EU and the CU an official promise. Unfortunately, we used and are still using Turkey-EU relations and the CU as a domestic political card for more than 45 years. In recent years the damaging effects of the CU have often been mentioned in discussions about relations with the EU. However, nobody mentions either the positive effects of Turkish industrial products entering the EU without CT 23 years before the founding of the CU on Turkey’s industrialization or the EU’s 33 years of CT loss. Starting with 45-50 billion 4-5 years ago, the CU’s cost was increased up to 100 billion dollars by adding 10 billion dollars each year. The calculation was as follows: since joining the CU Turkey had x billion dollars of international trade gap in its trade with the EU and additionally lost 15-20 billion dollars of CT= cost of CU! If we continue with this false calculation, our international trade gap with EU in the 1996-2007 period reached 121 billion dollars and if we add 10-15 billion dollars of CU losses, does the CU’s cost amount to more than 135 billion dollars?! No. Scientifically, this calculation is completely wrong. Unfortunately this baseless calculation has been accepted by everyone and all parties involved and the public continues
Turkey & EU
to be deceived. dollar difference, see table 1). Since In the CU’s last 13 years, approxi- AGDP increase rate is expected to dimately 88% of the imports have been minish by around -5% in 2009, between raw materials, intermediary products 2008-2009 current balance gap might and investment products, while 12% increase from -41.7 billion dollars to +5 consists of perishable and durable con- billion dollars (see note 1, article 2 for sumer products. “The details). increase in imports and To summarize, Some critics claim international trade gap since CU, between that, “in the 13 years in Turkey is completely 1995-2008: before and after CU, related to the increase - AGDP increased Turkey’s international in the rate of GDP from 210 to 741.2 biltrade gap with the growth (investment lion dollars ( 3.5 times and production) and more) EU reached almost as a result increase of - imports increased twice the size.” This exports with high imfrom 35.7 to 202 bilis true. However, the port input.” In fact, lion dollars ( 5.7 times real reason for this the rate of growth had more) is, between 1995backed down to 5-7% - exports increased 2008, that with a high in 2001, and between from 21.6 to 132 bil2000 and 2001: lion dollars (6.1 times import rate the total - imports diminmore) exports increased 6.1 ished from 54.5 billion - imports from the times and export to to 41.4 billion dollars EU increased from the EU increased 5.8 - the international 16.9 to 74.8 billion doltimes (exports to EU trade gap fell from lars ( 4.4 times more) increased from 11 to 26.7 to 10. billion dol- exports to the EU lars increased from 11 to 63.4 billion dollars) - the international 63.4 billion dollars ( and that the GDP trade gap with the EU 5.8 times more) increased by 352% or fell from 12.3 to 2.2 - the EU share in 3.5 times. billion dollars Turkish imports fell - the current balfrom 47% to 37% ance gap which is the difference be- EU share in out exports fell from tween good and services income and 51% to 48% cost changed from -9.8 billion dollars - the rate of export-import correto +3.4 billion dollars (a 13.2 billion spondence with the EU (X/M) jumped
from 65% to 84.8% - the EU share in total international trade gap fell from 41.8% to 16.3% (See table 1).
Turkey’s Total International Trade and Trade with the EU (in billions of dollars) 2005-2008 Some critics claim that, “in the 13 years before and after CU, Turkey’s international trade gap with the EU reached almost twice the size.” This is true. However, the real reason for this is, between 1995-2008, that with a high import rate the total exports increased 6.1 times and export to the EU increased 5.8 times (exports to EU increased from 11 to 63.4 billion dollars) and that the GDP increased by 352% or 3.5 times. In the 1996-2008 period our total imports are 1 trillion 120 billion dollars, our exports are 705 billion dollars and our total international trade gap is 415 billion dollars. Only around 121 billion dollars of this gap is with EU member states (29.1%), while 294 billion dollars is with non-EU countries ( 70.95%) (See table 1). Here we need to ask this question: if the CU caused the international trade gap and its increase with the EU, what are the reasons for international trade gaps with non-EU states and how can we explain that gap? Unfortunately, no one is able to answer this question. In 2008 exports are 132 billion (a EurasiaCritic May 2010 43
Turkey & EU (8.2-2.0) and 24.4%; with South Korea –3.9 billion (4,1-0.2) and 5%; Switzerland –2.7 billion (5.6-2.9) and 51.8% and with Japan –3.7 billion (4.0-0.3) and 7.5%. The countries with whom we achieved excess IT (X-M) are: with England 2.9 billion$ (8.2-5.3); with Iraq 2.2 billion (3.9-1.3), with Greece 1.2 billion (2.4-1.2); with Azerbaijan 0.8 billion (1.7-0.9); with Romania 0.4 billion (4.0-3.6), and with Holland our IT gap is 0. The real issue for Turkey is not the -8.2 billion dollar IT gap with 27 EU countries in 2007, but the fact that there is a -18.8 billion dollar gap with Russia alone and a -21.5 billion dollar gap with 4 far eastern countries ( China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan). It should be pointed out that a large portion of our IT gap with Russia is compensated for by incomes from tourism, “suitcase trade” and building services, while no similar incomes from Far Eastern countries cover the IT gap.
The Advantages of Joining the CU 23% increase), imports are 202 billion (an 18.8% increase), the international trade gap is 70 billion and X/M is 65.3%. In terms of regions, the total international trade gap (M-X=billion dollars): - 44.4% (-31.0=38.1-7.1) is with Far East and other Asian countries and X/M is 18.6% - 35.4% (-24.7=45.6-20.9) is with BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) countries, X/M=45.8% and - only 16.3% (-11.4=74.8-63.4) is with EU countries and X/M=84.8%. In 2008 while only -11.4 billion dollar (16.3%) of a -70 billion dollar international trade gap is with EU countries and 58.4 billion (83.7%) of it is with non EU countries, this gap is -24.8 billion with Russia alone and -14.2 with China alone. (55.6% of the total IT gap is with Russia and China). Moreover, products imported from the Far East make up almost 90% of durable consumer goods, while imports from the EU are at least 80% investment and production goods. 44 EurasiaCritic May 2010
On the other hand, although from 1995 to 2008 Turkey’s export/import percentage (the ratio of exports to imports) rose from 60.5% to 65.4%, in EU countries this ratio jumped from 65.1% to 84.8% (and to 88% in 2007). I dedicate these facts to those that blindly oppose the EU and the CU. To summarize, even if seen only from the international economic relations perspective, the important thing is not to lose the EU vision and motivation. Moreover, the EU project’s 35 headings is a driving force towards modernization that will develop and improve Turkey’s economy, living standards and democracy. Otherwise, 46 years of struggle, labor and gains on the EU path will be wasted. In 2008, the highest national IT gaps (in dollars) and ratios of imports to exports (X/M) in order is: with China -14.2 billion ( 15.6-1.4) and 9%, with Russia –24.8 billion $ (31.3-6.5) and 20.8%; with Germany –5.7 billion (18.713.0) and 69.5%; with Iran –6.2 billion
Textile quotas: As a result of the CU, Turkey moved from fourth to the second place in the EU textile market after China, because quotas in the textiles and ready clothing products were lifted in 1996. The total textile and clothing export of Turkey in 2004 was 17.7 billion dollars and 73% of this export was to EU countries. Turkey’s share in the EU market was 13% in textiles, 9% in clothing, while China’s share is 10% and 18%, respectively. FTA advantage: as a result of Turkey joining the CU with the EU, the opportunity to make Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), Baltic countries, Balkan countries, North Africa and some Middle Eastern countries arose. In fact, establishing FTA’s with these countries is beneficial for Turkey because at the end of the 1990s Turkey was relatively superior to these countries in industrial goods trade. Secondly, because EU countries have previously established FTA’s with them, industrial products imported from the
Turkey & EU
EU were entering these countries without being subject to customs. The FTAs that Turkey established eliminated the EU’s unfair competition in these countries, and as a result our exports especially to CEEC countries in the 20012004 period came close to double our average annual export increase.
Slogans and Facts abut the EU and the CU The claim, “10-15 billion dollars of customs taxes are lost,” because of the CU is exaggerated and ridiculous because the rate of protection against EU countries in 1995 was only 5.47%, and it fell to 1.34% in 1996 (SPI, November 2004, p. 23). Moreover, since almost 90% of exports in the last 12 years are related to investment and production goods, if the Turkish business world did not pay their own country this amount in taxes, we must mention its positive effects. With the unpaid customs taxes, the cost of Turkish employees fell and as a result their international competitiveness improved, while in the domestic market the welfare of the consumers
that were enabled to purchase at lower as suitcase trade, and especially tourprices was improved. ism. What is important is to turn these Another claim says that, “the IT gap foreign currencies into investment, prowas increased by joining the Common duction and export increases. The way Customs Tariff (CCT) of the CU and to do this is to increase imports and the IT gap. the EU.” Meanwhile, Although it as been the facts that should The EU project’s claimed, “IT gaps with be known are: a) even 35 headings is a other countries were in 1995, before the driving force towards increased due to the CU, when our annual modernization that CCT,” this claim is export was only 21.6 will develop and not correct enough billion dollars, wasn’t because, in industrial Turkey’s IT gap 14.1 improve Turkey’s goods imports, Turbillion dollars? (See economy, living key won exceptions table 1) b) Turkey’s standards and from the CCT bePayment Balance democracy. Otherwise, tween 1996-2001, and structure is required to 46 years of struggle, because in all councreate a gap continulabor and gains on tries, including Turously because around key, average customs 88% of exports are raw the EU path will be tax rates for industrial material, intermediary wasted. goods exports fell to gods and investment single digits, joining goods. Moreover, in addition to export income, in recent the CCT did not cause any significant years (5-6 years) Turkey has 30-44 bil- harm to our international trade. Before lion dollars (with 11-17 billion dollars the CU in 1995 the average customs of service costs) of foreign currency tax for industrial goods imported from income through service incomes such EU to Turkey was only 9%. If Turkish EurasiaCritic May 2010 45
Turkey & EU industry was destroyed by the CU, we Dynamic effects: the qualitative dycould have achieved protection before namic effects of the CU are also very the CU by means of a 10% devaluation. important. Turkey’s involvement in A 40 year old slogan says, “they are the CU along with the EU irreverspartners, we are the market.” From 1995 ibly introduced domestic producers to 2007, Turkey’s import share in EU to international competition and thus exports have increased only from 0.9% contributed to the weakening of insufto 1.5%. Taking into consideration that ficiently competitive and conservative 60% of the EU countries’ international lobbies. As a result, our firms that used trade consists of trade to produce expensive between themselves, goods with low effiA 40 year old slogan Turkey’s imports conciency were forced to says, “they are stitute around 3% of reorganize, produce partners, we are the their non-EU exports. high quality and cheap market.” From 1995 to Therefore, only from gods, increase produc2007, Turkey’s import the international trade tion and to export. perspective, Turkeys Turkish textiles and share in EU exports is as important to the clothing, automotive have increased only EU as much as Iran and electronics indusfrom 0.9% to 1.5%. and Iraq is to us (in tries are among the terms of international best examples of this. trade), because the share of these coun- However, in 1995 Bursa’s automotive tries in our exports are 1.3% and 2.6%. labor unions organized a big protest The harm of the CU: since 1996 against the CU. Today the most sucwhen we joined the CU, there has not cessful export sector is the automotive been any news in the media about a sector. firm owner that claims to have gone Figures for Industrial Goods bankrupt because of the CU. Businesses are being opened and closed for Exports from 1996 to 2006 years. Firms that could not adapt to The purpose of this section is to increasing domestic and international share industrial goods export figures competition since the CU and have and their distribution among countries been closed are actually transferred to with the public for the first time in Turmore skilled hands that can increase key. their productivity. Here we will summarize the main
46 EurasiaCritic May 2010
industrial goods production and export figures that are accessible to the public, and then share with the public for the first time in Turkey industrial goods export figures and their international distributions. I will answer with numbers those who claimed “Turkish industry will collapse with the CU” before the establishment of the CU. According to the January 2005 Exporters’ Union records, export increases from 1995 to 2004 in billion dollars are: - textile and clothing from 8.2 to 21 including suitcase trade ( 2.6 times more) - vehicles (automobiles, busses, etc.) and parts from 0.8 to 10.8 (13.5 times more) - iron and other metals from 3 to 9.2 ( 3.1 times more) - electronic appliances from 0.9 to 6.1 billion dollars ( 6.8 times more) From 1996 to 2000 and 2006, in millions of items the production increase from 1996 to 2004 in sectors successful at exporting are: - televisions from 1.8 to 8.8 and 18.3 (10.2 times more), 12.6 million items in 2007 - refrigerators from 1.7 to 2.4 and 6.2 (3.6 times more), 6.2 million items in 2007 - laundry machines from 0.9 to 1.4 and 5.4 million items (6 times more), 5.4 million items in 2007. - ovens (LPG) from 0.6 to 0.7 and 6.8 (11.3 times more), 5.9 million items in 2007. - automobiles from 196,000 to 306,000 and 756,000 (3.9 times more), 801,000 items in 2007 - bus and minibuses from 19,000 to 29,000 and 52,400 (2.8 times more), 50,100 items in 2007 As Table 2 shows, the number of items (and millions of dollars in parentheses) for main consumer and industrial products exported. - televisions from 1.2 million (217) to 7.3 million (840) and 16.4 million (2,800), - refrigerators from 645,000 (103) to 929,000 (142) and 4.2 million (765), - laundry machines from 49,000 (11)
Turkey & EU to 275,000 (42) and 3.4 million (582), - automobiles from 26,000 (200) to 83,000 (619) and 441,000 (5,700), - buses-minibuses from 3,200 (258) to 6,400 (281) and 6,400 (556), - tractors from 943 (7.7) to 4.9,000 (45) and 11,000 (836) items. From 1996-2006, our main industrial goods export numbers are: - televisions: to England from 167,000 to 3.0 million, to Germany from 428,000 to 2.8 million, to Italy from 21,700 to 1.5 million, to Spain from 42,000 to 1.9 million, to France from 76,000 to 1.6 million, to Romania from 14,800 to 733,000, to Greece 23,000 to 514,000, to Sweden from 10,000 to 331,000, to Russia from 8,600 to 29,000, to Austria from 36,000 to 172,000.
Main Industrial Goods Export Numbers according to Products and Country (The First in Turkey) - refrigerators: to England from 153,000 to 743,000, to France from 149,000 to 604,000, to Iraq from a few hundred to 256,000, to Germany from 41,600to 370,000, to Italy from 9,500 to 306,000, to Algeria from 2 thousand to 176 thousand, to Israel from 21,000 to 59,000, to Spain from 11,500 to 324,000. - washing machines: to Germany 16,800 to 447,000, to England from 726 to 283,000, to France 4,000 to 470,000, to Russia 1,300 to 157,000, to Spain from 310 to 304,000, to Romania from 5,200 to 130,000. - automobiles: to France from 473 to 69,600, to Germany from18 to 28,800, to Italy from 10,800 to 66,700, to Spain from 8,000 to 19,500, to Russia from 893 to 42,200, to Israel from zero to 14,000, to Algeria from one to 8,800, to England from 3 to 8,200, to Poland from one to 7,900, to Finland from zero to 9,900. As can be seen, by the end of 2006, millions of English, French, German, and Italian citizens are using Turkish televisions, refrigerators and laundry machines. Turkish industrial products are already in the EU since in 2006 89.6% of the 18.3 million televisions (16.4 million), 67.7% of the 6.2 mil-
a commercial issue, but also a process with political, legal, military, economical, financial, technological and even cultural dimensions for both sides. For Turkey, it also is a complete modernConclusion ization project. Otherwise, 46 years Statistical data shows that the size of struggle, labor and gains on the EU of Turkey’s international trade gap is path will be wasted. For more informamostly related to the AGDP growth tion on economic developments and rate. It is wrong to declare the inter- Turkey-EU relations, see note 1. In one or two years, when the global national trade gap harms Turkey-EU crisis ends, Turkey has relations or the CU. an open path. In fact, In 2008, while the rate Statistical data as a result of the dyof total export-import shows that the size of namism and competicorrespondence (X/M) Turkey’s international tion due to CU with was 65.3%, this ratrade gap is mostly the EU, in 2008 the tio is 84.8% with EU related to the AGDP Turkish economy has countries, 45.8% with growth rate. It is the potential to earn BSEC countries and more than 176 billion only 1.6% with Far wrong to declare the dollars of foreign cureastern countries. So international trade rency annually. 132 Turkey’s IT gap probgap harms Turkey-EU billion dollars of this lem is more with nonrelations or the CU. amount is from exEU countries than with ports and the remainthe EU. For Turkey, even only seen from the ing 44 billion is from service incomes perspective of international economic such as tourism, transport and construcrelations, the EU is very important. tion, as well as suitcase trade. Turkey The important thing is that Turkey does exports to around 140 countries with its not lose its EU vision and motivation army of 40,000 exporters. In Turkey’s since the EU project’s 35 headings are exports, the share of the manufacturing a driving force towards modernization sector is 94-95%, forestry and fishing’s that will develop and improve Turkey’s is 3-4% while mining and quarries have economy, living standards and democ- around 1.5%. There is no reason for racy. Turkey-EU relations are not only pessimism. lion refrigerators, 63% of the 5.4 million laundry machines and 58.3% of the 756,000 automobiles produced by the Turkish private sector were exported.
EurasiaCritic May 2010 47
Nuclear Treaty
A Treaty Hard to Activate By Ozer Cetinkaya
48 EurasiaCritic May 2010
Nuclear Treaty
T
here were two important inter- Medvedev states that treaty could be national achievements on nu- applied until the anti ballistic missile clear weapons in april. First US capacities are not increasing, he is also and Russia signed the non-proliferation reminding the importance of the issue treaty then Nuclear Security Summit from the Russian perspective. Russian was held. These two related achieve- Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is also ments are important in respect to build underlining the difficulty of activating the nuclear policy of the non-proliferation superpowers in the treaty because of the Main signal is for Iran. next 10 years. missile shield project US and Russia will Both these two of US. Vladimir Putin work cooperatively critical steps have a defines the problem about nuclear priority for US to inas: “while our Ameriarmament in the next crease the pressure on can partners are build10 years. It is clear Iran and North Korea. ing a missile shield, we Global power centers do not do the same that this study will like Russia, China thing.” not only effect US and EU have efforts Moscow indicates and Russia. Russia for transforming the that missile shield supported nuclear international system project of US harms program of Iran and into a system which the balance which missile shield project they could dominate was approached in more. Washington’s the cold war era and which is planned to approach of progress they defend that they be located to Eastern through negotiation, are pushed to develop Europe by US will pulls other countries new attack weapons. determine the destiny more to the US. US withdrawal from of the START – 2. US and Russia acthe missile limitation cepted decreasing treaty and their intheir strategic nuclear warheads by clination through developing the mish d b li ti th 1/3 and they also accepted decreasing sile shield is understood as a threat by their planes, bombardment planes and Moscow. Russian experts are mentionsubmarines by half which carry nuclear warheads by signing START. New treaty allows these countries to have 1550 nuclear warheads in the next 7 years. Treaty also aiming at showing the serious attention about nuclear nonussia tested the intercontinental proliferation ballistic missile which is capable of US and Russia which own the of carrying 10 nuclear warheads in 90 percent of nuclear weapons in the December 2009 in respect to extend world. Main signal is for Iran. US and the usage time of the nuclear weapRussia will work cooperatively about ons which were developed by former nuclear armament in the next 10 years. Soviet Union. It was stated that the It is clear that this study will not only 20 tons weighted RS-20V missile effect US and Russia. Russia supported which was launched from Orenburg nuclear program of Iran and missile region successfully hit its target in shield project which is planned to be loKamchatka. Missiles and Artillery of cated to Eastern Europe by US will dethe Ministry of Defense of the Rustermine the destiny of the START – 2. sian Federation stated that they want 1. Missile Shield to extend the usage period of the Missile project of US is the biggest RS-20V missiles until the year 2019. problem for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. While Russian President
ing about the uncertainty about the application of the START - 2 while they are reminding that US disobedience to former treaty. According to the program which will be shaped by committees of both sides, Kremlin would want to decide what they will do at what percentage. It means that Russia will simply do nothing until US makes a move. According to Russian Military experts Russia will behave with controlling US moves. Russian Ministry of Defense will have an important role on determining the action plan. Russian Foreign Ministry will manage the political negotiations. There are some objections of the Russian Army about the treaty. One of these objections is how to manage the missile shield project which is not stated clearly yet. Army is insisting on taking a guarantee for Russia. While some of the Russian Foreign Ministry members are supporting this objection, the hesitation that the US disobedience to previous treaty, is the determining fact. If objections of Kremlin do not taken into consideration then Russia will not make a progress through approval or the application of the treaty. US will be focused on the issue of Russia’s intercontinental mobile missiles. They may offer flexibility about
Russia is Renewing the Nuclear Weapons
R
It is critical that Russia’s desire of extending the missile usage period matches the same time period with the negotiations of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. President Dimitriy Medvedev stated that they will be carrying on developing the nuclear technology to protect their national interests and he underlined that their nuclear actions are not contradicting with treaties signed with US. Medvedev said that “It is impossible to protect our country without nuclear weapons . This is the truth. EurasiaCritic May 2010 49
Nuclear Treaty
mobile ballistic missiles against the mis- American steps may be collapsed while sile shield project. This flexibility seems the voting at the parliament approval is eventual. Russian officials pointing not to convince Kremlin at this stage. out that if there will be a delay on ap2. Parliament Approval There are some parliamentarians proval calendar of US, Kremlin will be who are supporting the army’s objec- standing by. There are no difficulties for Kremlin on the tions. To perform the approval period. Aptreaty, approvals of There are no proval from Obama both parliaments are difficulties for administration will needed. Russian side Kremlin on the not be so much easy. is worried about the approval period. To approve the treaty US side to accomplish Approval from Obama 67 acceptation votes this progress. Moscow administration will out of 100 votes are desires to approval needed. In this condifrom both two states at not be so much easy. tion, Obama will need the same time. In this To approve the treaty 8 republican senators’ progress, traditional 67 acceptation votes votes to approve the differences of Russian out of 100 votes are treaty. If events while and American parlianeeded. the Health Policy Rementarians should be form is remembered, taken into considert li i actual t l th it is thatt it is hard for Obama adation. Synchronization b between parliaments will be hard to achieve accord- ministration to have this support. Also ing to this perspective. The Russian US army is at war in both Afghanistan condition of moving according to the and Iraq. Approval period will be start50 EurasiaCritic May 2010
ed while Iran is threatening the US by using nuclear weapons. It is stated that the most serious issue in US threat doctrine is the terrorist elements to own nuclear weapons nowadays. All these issues will strengthen the opposition within the US parliament. Another risk is the Congress Elections which will be held in November. In these conditions, possibility of Republicans to increase their chairs in the congress is eventual. If approval progress is delayed after the elections (it has a high possibility) Obama will have to find 15-20 votes for approval. Strategic weapon producers are putting a high pressure on the senators since the last year. 2. Blind Alley of Iran and China President of US states clearly that spreading of nuclear weapons is other states will be fasten the armament competition in Far East and Middle East. This is a risk which cannot be accepted. The countries mentioned by Obama are
Nuclear Treaty Iran and China. According to US, the main threat is China, not North Korea. It is known that North Korea is supported by China and North Korea is taking nuclear technology from the China. China which is growing like a hungry dragon is understood as a threat in Middle East, Africa and South America as well as in the Pacific from the US perspective. In the new doctrine of Washington, its stated that the bilateral relations with Russia and China will be performed for more stable and transparent strategic relations. Nuclear weapons of China are smaller than nuclear weapons of Russia and US but the statement that there are question marks about the future strategic will of China because of the lacking transparency of nuclear programs should be understood as a serious warning. Because of this reason, US is giving signals through establishing an alliance with Russia against its global rival China. Kremlin is aware of the situation. Russia leadership is forming a strategy to stop NATO expansion through Eastern Europe with using this card. It will be hard to proceed the application of the non-proliferation treaty while the mistrust about Georgia, Iran and missile shield issues. Russia is expected to give all efforts to prevent an intervention to Iran at all costs. Russian support for Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is moving on. Although it seems that the sanctions planned for Iran would be eliminated, Russia may support the sanctions for having the desired result about missile shield. While doing this Russia would develop the cooperation with China. It should not be forgotten that interests of China and Russia are conflicting in some areas. Interests of these two countries through the developing and supply-rich countries of South America, Central Asia, Middle East and Southeastern Asia are increasing. Russia is signing treaties on cooperative energy production and weapon with these regions’ countries. It is obvious that the China is behaving so much aggressive about those regions. This conflict would create tactical advantages for US but it will not effect the main strategy so much.
New Nuclear Weapon Policy of US
B
arack Obama administration stated its new policies through limiting the use of nuclear weapons in US. By the document which is prepared through the negotiations with other allied governments of US, US is eliminating the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the countries which do not have nuclear weapons. But this new strategy includes an important element which orders that if countries stay loyal to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), they will not objected to an American Nuclear Retaliate. This element is interpreted as a warning to Iran and North Korea because they do not obey the NPT so they will continue to be the potential
targets. New strategy of US which indicates that the use of nuclear weapons can only be in agenda at extreme conditions and undertakes the not developing of new nuclear warheads, decreases the role of nuclear weapons in the national security and this strategy will strengthen the conventional weapons. Document is also underlines the efforts to negotiate with Russia about the nuclear weapons issue. Document also includes that the possibility of nuclear war threat is decreasing but nuclear attack possibility is increased. Document can be counted as a major change in the American Nuclear Doctrine in the last 15 years.
EurasiaCritic May 2010 51
Balkans
The “New Born” State of Kosovo By Jonilda Rrapaj
K
osovo is the newest state in the world, it is only two years old and its state building process is just in its infancy stage. After a long struggle for freedom, Kosovo could win its independence only on17 February 2008 as a result of an international intervention. From the beginning of the 20th century until 2008 Kosovo was firstly part of Yugoslavia and later of the Serbian Republic. The Kosovo Albanians- who constitute 88 percent1 of the entire Kosovo’s population at present- were one of the nationalities inside Yugosla-
52 EurasiaCritic May 2010
via, which had not the right to separate bia and later maybe to unite with their from it. But the oppressive and quasi “motherland” (Albania). Thus, the apartheid state politics of Milosevic re- radical politics of Milosevic towards the gime forced the Kosovo Albanians to Kosovo’s Albanians in 1990’s led to the struggle for their freewar between the Albadom, and to oppose nians (in Kosovo) and The declaration of the Yugoslavian and the Serbs. After the independence does later Serbian politics. mistake at the Dayton not mean that all of Hence, the Albanian Conference in 1995 the Kosovo’s problems nationalism increased (the issue of Kosovo were solved. among the Kosovo’s was not mentioned Albanians as a reacat all), the Western tion to Serbian nationalism. Therefore Countries li h f i ((US and EU) noticed that they saw as the only way to reach their the issue of Kosovo could not be just a freedom via independence from Ser- domestic problem of Serbia anymore, but a serious problem that in the near future could threaten the stability of the other countries in the Balkan. Therefore, after NATO’s Kosovo Humanitarian Intervention in 1999, UN in collaboration with US and EU worked for the state-building of Kosovo. The Western countries understood that the only way for the stabilization of the region was Kosovo’s independence. Thus, on 17 February 2008 Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence and was directly recognized by the important international actors like US and most of the EU members. However, the declaration of independence does not mean that all of the Kosovo’s problems were solved. The new state still remains very fragile and it has many internal and external challenges to deal with. One of the challenges that this article focuses on is the meaning of the Kosovo’s political symbols and its impact on Kosovo’s citizens.
Balkans
The Importance of Political Symbols as Tools of Identity Construction
legitimize their political and institutional existence. Thus, the symbols of any state must be different from those of the other states. States’ political symSince the independence of Kosovo bols are also important because they are considered as beone of the main ising the indicator of the sues concerning the But the time showed common values and Kosovar society is the that the Kosovo’s shared heritages of the debate about KosoAlbanians did not citizens within a given vo’s political symbols, win the independence state. Even when there design and meaning. by themselves. After are no common values Therefore, before exa much discussed and heritage to share, amining this debate, it the appropriation of is necessary to have a humanitarian these symbols – not general look at the sigintervention it was the only officially but also nification of political Western states that by accepting and feelsymbols. materialized it. ing them- would pave Broadly speakthe way for the building, political symbols are used as tools of polity building and ing of common values and heritages by national identity construction, gener- the time. One of the most important ally designed by the elites in order to aspects of the political symbols is that
they are promises; they represent important proposes, aspiration and visions about the future.2 As modernist theorists of nationalism (Gellner, Hobsbawm etc.) argue, modern states’ identities can be socially constructed by top down political visions; therefore political symbols play an important role in this process. If all the citizens of one state concede the state’s political symbols as their own, this makes them feel as an integral part of the state. Generally this process depends on the homogeneity of the state or the vision of the citizens have about the form of state and its diversity.
History of the National Symbols of the Republic of Kosovo Kosovo does not have a homogeneous population. Despite the fact that Albanians constitute the main part of EurasiaCritic May 2010 53
Balkans
the population there are also other eth- tional symbols like flag, emblem and nic groups like Serbs, Bosnians, Gorans, anthem. Thus, they struggled for buildTurks, Roma etc. But as it is mentioned ing a second ethnic Albanian (nation-) above, Albanians were state in the Balkans. the one who fought for But the time showed The independence of the independence of that the Kosovo’s AlKosovo is not a “clear” Kosovo while the other banians did not win self-determination -it ethnic groups did not the independence by still remains depended have problems with the themselves. After a on international Serbian rule, instead much discussed huthey were favored by manitarian intervencommunity- at best the Serbian governtion it was the Westit is an independence ment at the time. This ern states that materifrom Serbia. caused some Albaalized it. nians to wrongly feel As is mentioned that Kosovo belonged firstly to them. above after NATO’s Kosovo HumaniThe oppressive and violent policies of tarian Intervention, Kosovo was placed the Serbian government towards them under the UN transitional administraforced the revival of Albanian national- tion (UNMIK) and the NATO’s peaceism. As a matter of fact, they used to keeping force (KFOR) based on the identify themselves with Albania’s na- UNSC 1244 Resolution. Then, inter54 EurasiaCritic May 2010
national negotiations began in order to define a final status for Kosovo, led by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. This makes it clear that Kosovo’s politics could not go outside the borders of UNSC 1244 Resolution and Ahtisaari Plan. One of the main points of Ahtisaari Plan was the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo as the only way for stabilization in the region. Accordingly, Kosovo was designed as a multiethnic state. As a result, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo is based on the principles of a multiethnic state. The new state symbols like flag, anthem and obelisks were created in accordance with these principles. The flag consists of six white stars, which represent the largest ethnic groups in Kosovo, placed above the golden map of Kosovo on a blue background; the
Balkans national anthem does not contain any text, and reflects the multiethnic character of Kosovo; while the “New Born” obelisk represents the birth of the a new nation. The conception of a multiethnic state disappointed Albanians in Kosovo and was also in contradiction with their expectations. Their nationalist feelings made it very difficult for them to be familiar with the concept of a multiethnic state. From one point of view, they were right, because it was them who struggled for the independence of Kosovo, and also they constitute the majority of the population. On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that the Kosovo issue was considered as a sui generis case, e.g. there are many other cases in the world that struggle for independence like Kosovo, but no international support is given to them. Moreover, today the conditions of selfdetermination have changed; and the romantic philosophy of 19th century which gave birth to nation-states is not available any more. The incidents between the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo after the 1999 intervention enforced the idea of the international community that an ethnic state was impossible in the case of Kosovo. In the case of an ethnic state of Kosovo, the Serbs could be oppressed The Albanians of and the societal secuKosovo fought rity dilemma would a lot for their escalate into a new conflict. independence, so if not represent the Shortly, the decthey do not recognize Kosovo’s Albanians’ laration of Kosovo’s their state’s symbol, it concepts and deindependence and its is hard to conceive the sires about a national political symbols could other ethnic groups state, but certainly be materialized only in they promise building in Kosovo and other accordance with intera common national national community’s states to recognize identity for all the project expressed in them. ethnic groups. On the “Ahtisaari Plan”. Poliother hand, neither ticians were aware of th S b are the Serbs of Kosovo so pleased with the fact that the multiethnic symbols the Kosovo’s symbols. They identify would cause protests, so they declared themselves with the national symbols the Kosovo’s official symbols just a few of the Serbian state. However there is days before the declaration of indepena great difference between the Serbian dence. It is clear that these symbols do and Albanian state regarding their of-
ficial policies about Kosovo. While the former encourages the Serbs of Kosovo to disobey the Kosovo’s authorities and to continue identifying themselves with the Serbian national symbols, the latter consider Kosovo as a state of its own, and encourage all the citizens of Kosovo to embrace their state’s symbols. On 17 February 2010 Kosovo celebrated its second anniversary of independence, under the logo “Celebrate with Kosovo- with the new Europeans”.3 All the television channels and newspapers communicated this event. However, only the titles of news and some official congratulations would make one EurasiaCritic May 2010 55
Balkans to remember that this is a special day for Kosovo. People were celebrating on streets carrying out Albanian flags and symbols which were not Kosovo’s. It was difficult to notice any of Kosovo’s official state symbols. This demonstrates that it is mainly the Albanians of Kosovo who celebrate. On the other hand, the majority of Albanians embraced the independence but not the multiethnic form of the state or its symbols. The majority of Kosovo’s Albanians except for official cases tend to identify themselves with Albanian political symbols. This is a serious problem for Kosovo, because if its citizens do not recognize it, then it is difficult to be recognized by the others.4 Citizens of Kosovo, especially Albanians and Serbians, must be aware of the fact that the international community’s support for the Kosovo’s independence was not in direction of establishing a new “traditional” ethnic state which would favor a particular ethnic group. But they wanted to preserve the multicultural nature of Kosovo and building a multiethnic state according to European principles. Thus, international community’s decisions not only constrain but also construct the identities of the states. Kosovo’s political symbols demonstrate clearly the aim to construct a new comprehensive identity, where all the citizens will be equal, in short a civic state. The “New Born” obelisk best represents the idea of fo-
56 EurasiaCritic May 2010
cusing on the future where all the citizens of Kosovo can contribute on the construction of a new identity for the new born state.
the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaar(…) We declare Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic(…)We accept fully the obligations for Kosovo contained in The Discontents of the Ahtisaari Plan(…)We welcome the Kosovo’s Albanians international community’s continued A myriad of information, news, ar- support of our democratic development ticles and several activities demonstrate through international presences estabthat the Albanians in Kosovo are not lished in Kosovo on the basis of UN Secupleased with the Kosovo’s official poli- rity Council resolution 1244 (1999). We tics and they still underline the desire invite and welcome an international civilfor an ethnic state while continuing to ian presence to supervise our implementation of the Ahtisaari see the philosophy of Plan, and a European the multiethnic state Kosovo’s citizens must Union-led rule of law far away from the realconcede to the fact mission.”6 ity. that, national identity According to this Albin Kurti, the document the indeis not a finished or leader of the “Vetependence of Kosovo vendosja” (self-deterstatic phenomenon, is not a “clear” selfmination) organizainstead it is a process determination -it still tion, protests and critiof construction and remains depended on cizes the conditions reconstruction, and international comwhen Kosovo acquired it must not wipe munity- at best it is an its independence.5 He independence from out (exclude) other states that the AlbaSerbia. Kurti is right nians of Kosovo have identities (ethnic, highlighting that the not acquired the indereligious or cultural). name of Kosovo appendence they fought pears less than the for, by criticizing the document of independence which is name of Ahtisaari and UN, and the name “Albanian” does not appear at given below: “We, the democratically-elected lead- all within the document. However the ers of our people, hereby declare Kosovo present conditions also must be taken to be an independent and sovereign state. into consideration; the only way for This declaration reflects the will of our Kosovo to win its independence was to people and it is in full accordance with declare its independence in accordance with “Ahtisaari Plan”. The declaration of independence via UNSC would be unsuccessful because of Russia’s veto. On the other hand, it must be emphasized that the Ahtisaari Plan for a multiethnic state is crucial and inevitable for the stabilization of Kosovo. On the contrary other ethnic groups, especially Serbs, would continually destabilize the new state. Another criticism to Kosovo’s government, form its Albanian citizens, rise because the government do not take the proper care about the celebration of 28 November (1912), which is the national day of the Albanian independence. This day is not even defined as an official holiday. The critics denounce the fact
Balkans
that while the European Day is in the list of the official holidays, the day of Albanian independence is not included. However they fail to understand that while the European Day speaks to all the Kosovo’s citizens, the later belongs only to a particular nation. They also accuse the Kosovo’s government for decreasing the values of Adem Jashari -one of the chief of Kosovo Liberation Army killed by Serbs in 1998 with all his family and known as the symbol of independence and national hero for the Kosovo Albaniansin proportion with multiethnic values. According to critics, politicians focus on Kosovo’s state symbols which came out as a result of political and diplomatic necessity.7 All these discontents demonstrate that the Kosovo’s Albanians have not comprehended the “multiethnic” nature and the new identity of Kosovo. They need to understand that only a civic state can ensure the recognition of the new state in current world politics. They must also be conscious of the fact that the new identity of the
Kosovo does not exclude the other identities like Albanian, Serbian, Turk etc., on the contrary, it enriches each of them on behalf of a common culture.
Conclusion The declaration of independence does not necessarily mean an end of Kosovo’s problems. Besides economical and social challenges, the recognition by other states is also of crucial importance for the new state. Until now only 66 states8 have recognized the state of Kosovo, which is not a sufficient number. Certainly there are many reasons why other states do not recognize it, but the Kosovo’s own population – especially Albanians- has their part in this issue. The Albanians of Kosovo fought a lot for their independence, so if they do not recognize their state’s symbol, it is hard to conceive the other ethnic groups in Kosovo and other states to recognize them. Kosovo’s Albanians must see the Serbs and other ethnic groups as an integral part of Kosovo
which would make all the ethnic groups more familiar with the new state and its symbols. The Kosovo’s citizens must concede to the fact that, national identity is not a finished or static phenomenon, instead it is a process of construction and reconstruction, and it must not wipe out (exclude) other identities (ethnic, religious or cultural). References 1 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html (accessed April 18, 2010). 2 Albrecht Sonntag. Political Symbols, Citizenship and Communication. London: “Communicating European Citizenship” Conference, 22 March 2010, p 3. 3 “Festo me Kosoven”. Korrieri, 2010. 4 Top-chanel tv. 17. 02.2010. 5 Albin Kurti. “Festa qe na Bashkon”. Korrieri, 18 shkurt 2010. 6 “Full Text: Kosovo Declaration” BBC News, 17 Febryary 2008. 7 Alma Lame. “28 Nëntori si Subkulturë” Korrieri, 30 Nëntor, 2009. 8 http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,4,481 (accessed April 18, 2010) Graduated Student in International Relations, r.jonilda@hotmail.com EurasiaCritic May 2010 57
Europol
Europol: The New European Law Enforcement Agency By Alparslan Tarkan
A
s it is known world-wide, EU independent states as members from is the organization which is Eastern Europe. EU was something more than a unique especially in its funcregular international ortioning as a supranaganization, so it started tional organization. “With the Schengen acting differently from Before the MaasAgreement, the the federal system in tricht Treaty (1992), concept of the freeits strict sense and also the main aim of the circulation of the from the regular interEU project was to individuals and national organizations connect the Europeknown before EU. an states to each othproducts came into With this study, I er in order to reach existence. This meant try to explain developa wealthier Europe that the criminals and ments in the “justice and to recover the the organized criminal and security” field that destruction caused groups would also be took place after EC during the World able to circulate in the became EU. As can be War II. EU project presumed, Europol is started a commuSchengen Area.” comprising a very imnity, by establishing portant part of this new a common market in Europe. At the end of the Cold War it type of organization, namely of the EU. was switched to EU including the new Starting from the very moment of the
establishment of Europol, we hear and read comments about Europol’s current and future status in the EU. We hear comments whether it is becoming an organization similar to the American FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). I am going to try to detect its differences from the American FBI and to examine the Council Decision (2009/371/ JHA dated 06.04.2009) which entered into force on 01.01.2010 and in the end I am going to make an assessment trying to support the fact that Europol is currently not functioning the same as FBI, but in the future it may function like FBI or at least it is on the way to function similar to such.
Europol from the beginning until the council decision (2009/371/JHA dated 06.04.2009): The idea of creating a police cooperation organization in EC came into minds in the 1970s and the first group, named TREVI (Terrorism Racism Extremism Violence International) came into being in 1970s. After that, in the Maastricht it was decided that a police cooperation organization would come into being and in 1994 EDU was established. In 1995 it became European Police Office and in 2010 it is named European Law Enforcement Agency. As can be seen, the idea of a police cooperation organization in Europe came into being before the establishment of the EU in the sense we conceive it, but it was after the Maasrticht Treaty where the establishment of Europol was agreed. From this moment on, one
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can ask “what is it Europol doing as a police cooperation organization?” I am not going to be giving the list of crimes that Europol is responsible for, however I will try to give the idea of why such a huge and meticulous organization was needed. With the Schengen Agreement, the concept of the free-circulation of the individuals and products came into existence. This meant that the criminals and the organized criminal groups would also be able to circulate in the Schengen Area. This situation was the one to be handled by EU’s law enforcement and judicial authorities. After the necessity coming out of this situation, Europol was established as a police cooperation organization. The first crimes that had to be handled were drug smuggling, smuggling in the radioactive substances and terrorism. As can be guessed, these crimes are the crimes which need an or-
Determining which crimes shall be ganizational structure and can be active in more than one country, namely more under the competence of Europol and which crimes shall not be, took a bit of a than one EU country. Under the conditions mentioned time. After the Council Decisions from 2000 to 2008 the Euabove, Europol has the ropol-crimes became competency to deal “What actually as following: with these cases. What it is doing is that Forgery of money actually it is doing is it provides the (money counterfeitthat it provides the member states’ law ing) and means of member states’ law enenforcement bodies payment, money launforcement bodies with dering, terrorism, trafthe useful information with the useful or the specific analysis ficking in human beinformation or the they may need in their ings, illegal immigrant specific analysis they national or joint invessmuggling, corruption, may need in their tigation. unlawful drug trafficknational or joint On the other hand, ing, computer crime, investigation.” in Europol we see the organized crime, racJITs (Joint Investigaism and xenophobia. tion Teams) and AWFs With the new (Analysis Work Files), which provide Council Decision (2009/371/JHA dated very useful information and analysis 06.04.2009) we have some new arguwith the national units. ments to contradict the phrase “EuEurasiaCritic May 2010 59
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ropol is NOT an FBI, and not intended Europol is urged to take part more to become a comparable instrument of actively in the investigations taking place in member states, of course withthe EU”.1 First of everything, Europol became out the competency to arrest people, namely without invesan EU institution, tigative competencies. which means with the “As long as This includes the fact new Council Decision, commercial that when there are it is switching from and economic strong evidences that an intergovernmental integration moves a serious or organized organization into an forward, an active crime was committed, official EU institution police cooperation the fact that Europol such as OLAF(Office should take part in Européen de Lutte organization and the JITs more often Anti-fraude), FRONa law enforcement between the memTEX, EUROJUST, agency becomes more ber states, the fact etc. With that decinecessary.” that from now on the sion, it is going to be ENUs (Europol Nareceiving its budget directly from European Commission and tional Units) are going to have direct its budget is going to be supervised by access to the Europol Information Systhe European Parliament. tem and that Europol is going to be enWith the new Council Decision, titled to request an investigation from 60 EurasiaCritic May 2010
the member states. The new council decision brings a new establishment in Europol, which is making it more reliable in the personal data protection. There is going to be a personal data protection officer who is going to be independent from Europol Organizational Structure. It is the new standard for it to be safer in data protection. Since it becomes an EU institution, OLAF is going to be able to examine the financial acts of Europol. Another very important aspect of the new council decision is that the existence of an organized criminal structure is not a limiting element for its competency anymore. From the date of the new council decision, serious crime is more important in deciding whether a crime is under the competency of Europol or not. When we consider this side of the council decision, I assume that
Europol Europol is urged to take part in more investigations technically and this move seems to widen the scope of the crimes for which Europol is responsible.
A Brief Comparison of Europol with American FBI After presenting Europol and a very short presentation of the new council decision, we can start giving a very brief introduction to the American FBI. First of all, we have to see the fact that EU is not a federal state like the US, hence we have to admit that at least for the moment we should not wait from Europol to have the competency to arrest any person or to take part actively with its investigative powers in any of the operations except the cases mentioned in the council decision (2009/371/JHA dated 06.04.2009) which entered into force on 01.01.2010. FBI is the primary law enforcement agency of the Department of Justice. It is an investigative agency, capable of investigating the crimes accepted as federal. In addition to this task, it has the responsibility of gathering intelligence which is making the task of FBI two main responsibilities: national semore complicated. However, these two curity (counter terrorism, counterintelresponsibilities give FBI the ability to ligence, cyber crime) and criminal priorities (public corruption, civil rights, handle especially the terrorism threat. When we consider Europol and organized crime, whitecollar crime and FBI, we see that Europol does not have violent crime)3. When observing anything like the “FBI the competency of Charter”. According to “Similar to the FBI, we can deduce the federal law which situation in European one specific issue: As is in force in the US, Europol-, the long as the inter-state FBI has the authority enforcement of the commerce increases to investigate all the state law is left to the with the inter-state federal crime not asstate law enforcement crime -thus inter-state signed exclusively to crime- the federal inanother federal agenagencies.” tervention becomes cy. (US Code, Title 28, justified. This aspect Chapter 33- Federal Bureau of Investigation, Section 533; of the development of the competency Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28, of FBI, seems similar to the history of Subpart P- Federal Bureau of Investiga- Europol in the sense that the Eurotion, Section 0.85)2. On the other hand, pean States also needed a unified law FBI has the authority to investigate enforcement agency, namely Europol, threats to national security such as in- after the Schengen Agreement, makternational terrorism, espionage, sabo- ing the free circulation of goods and tage, assassination conducted by or on people, namely of the criminals and the behalf of foreign powers, organizations organized groups: As long as commeror persons. Hence, as we see FBI has cial and economic integration moves
forward, an active police cooperation organization and a law enforcement agency becomes more necessary. The Treaty of Amsterdam increased the EU effect on the internal decision of the member states and that approximated the process concerning the criminal acts committed in a member state and their elements with the European dimension. This had been a similar case in FBI, too. The substance of federal criminal law sometimes duplicates with some of the state criminal law which makes it harder to separate the federal top layer from the state bottom layer. Similar to the situation in European Europol-, the enforcement of the state law is left to the state law enforcement agencies. We know already that Europol does not have any investigative powers, however the attempts to define its competency and the competencies of the states’ national law enforcement bodies are worth mentioning. On the other hand, the application of International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting CurEurasiaCritic May 2010 61
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rency (Geneva Convention) dated 1929 also gives us some clues concerning the increasing role of Europol, not a direct one though. Further to the article 12 of the mentioned convention stating that “In every country, within the framework of its domestic law, investigations on the subject of counterfeiting should be organized by a central office”, Europol is assigned as the European Central Office of the EU, functioning like a regular NCO. As we see here again, the attempts to ascertain Europol as something more than a regular international police cooperation organization are again visible and in practice. In the sphere of justice and police cooperation in EU, there are very sharp and fast developments as I tried to outline above. With the organiza62 EurasiaCritic May 2010
tional development of EU and its institutions, the brand-new EU institution of Europol’s development also seems to be inevitable. As I also mentioned above, as long as the commercial activities and the movements of persons become more common in EU, generally the regulations and more specifically the council decisions become more and more comprising in the sense that the application of the EU institutions are becoming more like federal state laws, it is out of the question for the moment though. Opposite to the phrase “Europol is NOT an FBI, and not intended to become a comparable instrument of the EU”4, as we saw above, with the new council decision and with the developments took place since the establishment of Europol, it become more
like FBI, still not something comparable though. References: Alexandra De Moor Gert Vermeulen, “Shaping The Competence of Europol. An FBI Perspective” (2010) Dr. Willy BRUGGEMAN, “Europol- A European FBI in the making? “, 2000 Official Journal of the European UnionCouncil Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office(Europol) (Endnotes) 1 Dr. Willy BRUGGEMAN, “Europol- A European FBI in the making?” 2000 2 Alexandra De Moor Gert Vermeulen, “Shaping The Competence of Europol. An FBI Perspective” ,2010, p. 77 3 Vermeulen, a.g.m. p. 78 4 Dr. Willy BRUGGEMAN, “Europol- A European FBI in the making?” 2000