EURASIA CRITIC FEBRUARY 2010

New Approaches to Security and the Transformation of the Turkish Military

By Yasar Buyukanit

February 2010

Afghanistan and Volvo

By Ali Kulebi

Iraqi Elections: A New Nation

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EurasiaCritic February 2010 Vol. 2 ISSUE 11 Monthly Magazine on Eurasian Politics Published every month by Eurasia Critic Yayincilik Ltd. Head Office: Esat R. No: 55/5 Kucukesat ANKARA/TURKEY T: 0090 (312)4170383 F: 0090 (312)4170392 Publisher Hakki AHMETBEYOGLU Editors Ozer CETINKAYA Ali ALTAN Assistant Editor Caglar KURC Burcu OZCELIK Regional Directors Middle East Yousuf AL SHARIF Southestern Asia Fazal-UR-RAHMAN Caucasus Hasan KANBOLAT Balkans Ibrahim ARSLAN India Prof. Dr. Ajay Kumar PATNAIK Azerbaijan Ganire PASHAEVA Syria Ibrahim HAMIDI Kazakhstan Murat SHAHANOV Uzbekstan Ali KULEBI Japan Prof. Dr. Masanori NAITO Energy Strategies M. Mete GOKNEL Nuclear Studies Prof. Dr. Saleh SULTANSOY Millitary Affairs David AXE UK Represantative Gizem Fowler Jamie Fowler Advisory Committee George HEWITT Nuzhet KANDEMIR Ismael HOSSEIN-ZADEH Norman STONE Ali KULEBI

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New Approaches to Security and the Transformation of the Turkish Military

By Yasar Buyukanit

Iran’s Possible Nuclear Proliferation and World Scenarios

By Evren Isbilen

Media Director Cigdem BEDIZ Photography Provider: AFP Illustrations Mahmut KARATOPRAK Distribution Manager Mert ALTAN ISSN 1308-1560 Printers: Basak Matbaacilik HOW TO CONTACT US General enquiries: 0090 (312) 4170383 info@eurasiacritic.co.uk Letters to the Editor : editor@eurasiacritic.co.uk ©2010 Eurasia Critic News Agency Ltd. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of Eurasia Critic News Agency Ltd.

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“The Emergence and Evolution of Georgian Security Discourse: Failures and Implications”

By Aslan Yavuz Sir

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A Turkish-Israeli Alliance is Critical to Regional Stability

By Alon Ben-Meir

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Iraq: The Dawn of a New Nation

By Ahmed Zahid

Afghanistan and Volvo

By Ali Kulebi

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Turkey Rising, Arabs Sinking

By Halid Amayreh

Ukraine’s Elections: The Iron Curtain Gives Way to NATO Expansion

By Ozer Cetinkaya

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Environmental Technologies and Renewable Energy: Industry Report

Iraqi Elections Will Determine the Fate of the Middle East W

hen the people of Iraq go to the polling stations on March 7, the process will not only determine the future of their country, but also the fate of the Middle East. After a long and troublesome period, these elections are important since they will be held on the eve of the troop withdrawal. This situation will have a positive effect on the elections. The participation of people and the formation of different coalitions, and the rising consciousness of being Iraqi despite differences in sects and ethnicity are determining factors in the election. From this perspective, the salient features of these elections can be listed as follows:

A Surprise Alliance

Editorial 4

EurasiaCritic February 2010

After seven years of occupation, the people of Iraq are seriously fed up with the increasing ethnic and sectarian conflict/bombings/assassinations. Local elections in March 2009 were a clear triumph for parties that expressed Iraqi consciousness and a disappointment for sectarian groups. We should consider the fact that the role of Iraqi consciousness will increase in the March 2010 elections. At any rate, various political groups that realized this fact have opted to run in the elections as a block.

The Iraqiyya List, which includes representatives from a variety of sects and ethnicities, could surprise us as one of the stronger representatives of increasing power of idea of being Iraqi.

Ayad Allawi, the leader of Iraqi National Accord, which will take part in the elections as part of the Iraqiyya List, was

able to craft the most surprising alliance and appears at its forefront as the leader.

Ayad Allawi, a liberal Shiite, is preparing for the 2010 elections with a comprehensive alliance including: Saleh Al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi Front for National Dialogue; VicePresident and former leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party, Tariq Al-Hashimi’s, Renovation Movement; the brother of Atheel Al-Najafi, who is strong in Mosul and the leader of a movement known as Hadba List, Usama Al-Najafi’s Iraqis List; an important leader of the 1991 Shiite uprising, Iskandar Witwit; the Shiite tribal leader, Sheik Hussein Al-Shaalan and Deputy Prime Minister Rafi Al-Issawi.

Ayad Allawi managed to win 25 of the 275 seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Saleh Al-Mutlaq, the leader of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue that take part in the coalition, represents second biggest Sunni Party and the fifth biggest group in the parliament with 11 MPs. Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi is the former leader of strongest Sunni Party in the 2005 elections, the Iraqi Islamic Party.

Furthermore, as a politician who played a critical role in making various changes favoring Sunnis in the 2010 election law, his popularity is high.

The Ba’ath Effect Despite being a Shiite, Allawi cooperates with the Sunni Party and groups affiliated with the Ba’athist Party, and this has also provoked debates. This is because the accountability and justice board, which was established during the post-occupation period by Paul Bremer, but has not

operated effectively until today, first declared that 511, and then an additional 70 candidates, may not take part in the elections because they are Ba’athist. The list that was announced by the accountability and justice board included dozens of candidates from the Iraqi List, above all, MP Saleh Al-Mutlaq, which suggests that Maliki took this step to put obstacles in front of the rising Allawi.

Despite this, the decision by the Court of Appeals, which declared that those banned may participate in elections, increases the influence of the Allawi alliance on Sunnis.

With votes from both Sunnis and Shiites Allawi’s party could become Iraq’s number two party. However, Allawi’s votes from Shiites are likely to decrease with the accusations of his being Ba’athist.

If we look at Allawi’s voter base, we see that he is in competition with Prime Minister Maliki and the Shiite politician, Ahmed Chalabi. In other words, Allawi will win very few votes from supporters of either Al Hakim or Sadr.

Criticism of Maliki As Iraq prepares for the 2010 elections and right up to the last days before the elections, Prime Minister Maliki, whose success in the 2009 provincial elections went beyond expectations, is without a doubt the favorite. However, he is being accused of using state institutions, economic power and military structure to increase his authority and weaken the opposition.

According to the Shiite parties that

oppose him, Prime Minister Maliki tried to consolidate his grip on government power, rather than sharing it with other partners in the government. The same criticism has also been aired by Kurdish and Sunni parties. The centralization of power and concentration in one man’s hands is dangerous, according to these parties, since this situation could lead over time to the rebirth of a new Ba’athism in the government.

Maliki’s Military Power It is important that Prime Minister Maliki, who is accused of trying to become the only leader, is also accused of trying to expand his influence over the security forces. The Iraqi Army has approximately 600,000 soldiers, 400,000 police that are directly subordinate to him, and 5,000 specially trained Special Forces under the Prime Minister’s control. Furthermore, including the Sunni tribal Sahwa forces in his security forces strengthens Maliki’s hand. Consequently, Maliki is entering the elections with one million soldiers at his command. It is also known that Prime Minister Maliki gives special importance to the police force to obtain the “loyalty” of the military or to prevent coup against himself. Iraq’s police, equipped with heavy and high technology weapons, operate in a wide spectrum of activities ranging from border protection to military activities in disputed regions.

The Effect of Religion Although participating parties and coalitions do not express a religious or

sectarian views directly, it is clear that every party that is participating in the elections will get votes from specific sects or ethnic groups. In other words, Sunnis will vote predominantly for Sunni parties, Kurds for Kurdish parties, and Shiites for Shiite parties.

We should note here that Shiite votes will be divided between the Dawa Party and the Iraqi National Alliance.

In the distribution of Shiite votes, undisputedly the most significant role among the elites will not be played by politicians, but by Shiite religious authorities. Religious leaders who rise to the rank of Ayatollah are the most influential people in Shiite social and political life. In a sense, Shiite religious leaders have moved beyond being the most important spiritual leaders of Shiite society to have determining role in political issues.

It is said that these authorities are not supporting any of the political parties in the 2010 elections, but calling on all parties to serve the nation. Shiite religious leaders openly advocate the inclusion of Sunnis and Kurds in the political process by saying, “Iraq is for everyone. No one has a right to oppose another or not take them into account.”

No matter how much religious, sectarian or ethnic difference exists; Iraq is experiencing a historical election on the eve of military withdrawal. The effects of these elections will not be limited to Basra, Baghdad or Erbil. Results from the voting booth will affect the entire Middle East from Iran to Israel and from Turkey to Saudi Arabia.

EurasiaCritic February 2010

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Military Transformation

New Approaches to Security and the Transformation of the Turkish Military Yasar Buyukanit 25th Chief of General Staff, Consultant of Beykent University

S

ince the stone age, security has always been on people’s agenda.

Without doubt, the theory and practice of security has been continuously transformed in every era depending on nations’ concerns, interests and technologic advancements. In ancient times, people were probably not interested in global climate change. When we look at the history of approaches to security, states and groups of states have paid close attention to a wide range of concerns, such as war, cold war, asymmetric threat terrorism and, in our day increasingly important Cyber war.

The truth is history never repeats it-

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self exactly. When deriving lessons from the past, a very good analysis of the factors that differentiate the past and the present has a vital importance. For example, following lessons it derived from the First World War, France prepared for WWII by constructing an incredible network of bunkers against German invasion, the backbone of defensive structure according to the principles of trench warfare. However, the German conception, Blitzkrieg, rapidly shattered French defensive line and reached the shores of the English Channel.

We can investigate “new approaches to security and the transformation of

militaries” under three sections. In the first section, the historical development of security strategies will be considered.

In the second section, we will investigate the future of the Turkish Armed Forces and finally, we will look at the future of security.

Turkey and the Transformation of Security since WWII The end of WWII can be defined as the most important turning point of recent history. Russia and the United States essentially fought WWII as allies, and became adversaries at the end of the war, establishing the bipolar world.

This period, marked by the division of Germany, the emergence of Russia as the Soviet Union and the establishment of NATO in opposition to the Soviets, initiated the Cold War, which allowed the bipolar system to last until the early 1990s. It also resulted in the birth of a very important approach to security.

NATO membership, following the Korean War, significantly changed Turkey’s approach to security, because nations no longer existed alone like stars in the universe, but were part of a greater system.

The logic behind security structures such as NATO, a grouping of nations, is directly related to threat assessment.

Threat assessment during the Cold War was extremely simple. There was NATO

Military Transformation

on one side, and the Warsaw Pact on towards the end of the 1970s. However, the other. According to threat assess- this fact was carefully avoided in NATO ment, the Warsaw Pact would attack documents. The main reason behind and NATO would respond to this at- this was to hold NATO together.

In 1990, NATO experienced a great tack. According to this understanding, the Warsaw Pact is the aggressor and shock following the collapse of Warsaw Pact and the Soviet NATO is the defender.

All security planning Union, and since the NATO membership, was dependent on this threat that was the following the Korean fundamental principle.

NATO’s raison d’être War, significantly Another matter had disappeared the existence of NATO that should not the changed Turkey’s began to be debated. overlooked is the fact approach to security.

After this turning that intelligence is point, as those who exused for political ends from time to time. The driving powers perienced it know, NATO offered two of NATO (above all, the United States) approaches. The first approach was the tried to make the threat seem greater decision to reduce NATO headquarthan it was with exaggerated approach- ters personnel by 20%. The second es. Books were written to this end. Ac- approach was the inclusion of North cording to these books, an attack by African radical religious movements in Warsaw Pact and Soviet forces could threat assessments. These approaches descend to the shores of Baltic Sea in are typically used by powerful nations. a week. Yet the military effectiveness In fact, the famous historian Toynbee’s of the Soviet Union began to decrease “Challenge and Response” thesis is the

product of such logic. Furthermore, Huntington embraced this idea and used it as the basis for his “Clash of Civilizations.” The point that has been elaborated here is this: nations must evaluate national security from the perspective of their own interests. National security governance cannot be done with imported threat assessments.1 Every nation should construct its own threat assessments.

In fact, the United States has argued that its two interventions in Iraq were due to Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction; however, as the then US Secretary of State has admitted, this was not true. In this process the concept of security changed significantly. Territorial gains have faded into history. At present, the United States is planning to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. In the current situation, “national interest” has the priority over territorial gains in the current understanding of security. This is the biggest change.

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Military Transformation

Towards the end of his life Ataturk described the annexation of Hatay as follows: “I am not interested in territorial expansion. I do not have a habit of breaking the peace. However, I will insist on my rights when they depend on treaties.

I must exercise my rights. I promised in parliament that I will take Hatay. My nation believe in my words. If I cannot fulfill my promise, I cannot face the nation, I 8

EurasiaCritic February 2010

2000. In this report, the national interests of the United States were divided into four categories: vital interests, very important interests, important interests and secondary interests.3 Within this framework, five goals were identified as vital interests: - Preventing nuclear, biological and chemical attacks against the United States or the forces of the United States - Protecting allied nations - Preventing the emergence of powerful adversaries or failed states on the borders of the United States, - Protecting the stability and existence of the global The US’s mistake systems of international was caused by its politics, financial markets overconfidence in and the environment the unipolar world - Establishing effective structure that followed cooperation with the possible strategic adversaries the Cold War. China and Russia in accordance with the national interests of the United States In addition to these five points, “Very Important” and “Important” interests were also defined. This category includes the prevention of WMD proliferation, ensuring respect for international law, the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the prevention of genocide. We need to approach this report, which was published in 2000, critically.

- When we examine the list, the prevention of the proliferation of WMD, which was used as justification for occupation of Iraq some time after the publishing of the report, was not included in “vital interests.” Another weakness of the report is that it overlooked the US’s energy needs.

- Terrorism was not touched upon (one year after the report, the 9/11 attacks occurred). cannot stay where I am.”2 This shows that the US’s mistake was caused by its overconfidence in the New World Disorder unipolar world structure that followed How would the United States orient the Cold War. Security studies have security in the unipolar world created shown, with examples, that overconfiby the end of the Cold War? This mat- dence and arrogance can lead to mister’s importance was global. During this calculations. period, a bipartisan commission was This paper’s author was working at set up in the United States. This com- NATO’s headquarters in Belgium durmission published its report on 12 July ing the pre-Khomeini Iran incidents.

Military Transformation Every morning, briefings regarding developments in Iran were issued to thenNATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Alexander Haig. After every briefing, it was said, “The Iranian military is loyal to the Shah, nothing will happen.” One day the Shah fled the country, and Khomeini returned. The next morning the commander told his SACEUR briefing officer. “Major, you have not provided the right evaluation to me about this matter.”4 The briefing officer replied “Sir, the information I have given you was wholly based on information that we received from US intelligence. You need to pose this question to them.”

No matter how strong your security evaluations are, you surely have some weaknesses. You should not ignore this fact. There is another issue that we need to touch upon concerning postCold War security. It relates to European nations,’ including other NATO members, perspective on military force in the post-Cold War environment.

Nations considerably downsized their military forces following the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, and the disappearance of a threat to Europe.

Initially, this approach seems reasonable. However, force weaknesses that appeared after assuming responsibilities in Afghanistan, first by the US, then

by NATO, have become most important item in the agenda of NATO. The most important item on the agenda of the NATO Military Committee during the last few years has been the need for the deployment of more forces in Afghanistan. This matter closely interests Turkey.

Various nations took charge in Afghanistan. The soldiers that were send by these nations did not meet the required force levels in Afghanistan, thus, these states put limits, generally referred to as a “caveats” on their force levels. Another issue soon became apparent was the realization that the forc-

es deployed were insufficient to defeat terrorism in Afghanistan. What should be done transformed into sending more troops. Here, the Turkish Armed Forces felt the most pressure. According to the US, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) is a human storehouse. However, they were forgetting something.

Changes in the Conception of Security in the Post-9/11 Environment It was rapidly understood that the US intervention in Afghanistan would not yield results. Since then, US pressure on NATO yielded results, and NATO assumed responsibilities in Afghanistan. This decision was NATO’s biggest mistake ever. The current situation proves it.

Turkish soldier in working with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at Kabul Airport.

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Military Transformation The TAF have been fighting terrorism the Hindu Kush mountain range, and since 1984. In this fight, the TAF suf- all of its facilities were destroyed and fered more than 5,000 casualties and it surrounded by minefields. The Turkish was fighting alone. The Turkish nation’s Air Force successfully managed Kabul attitude towards martyrs in the fight Airport during ISAF-II and ISAF-VII. against terrorism was “Long Live the Among the nations that operate in KaHomeland.” If martyrs started coming bul and its vicinity, only Turkish soldiers back from Afghanistan, how could this are conducting foot patrols, since bebe explained to the nation? This is why tween Turkey and Afghanistan there Turkey decided not to send troops for is a cooperation rooted in historical fight terrorism in Afghanistan. This re- realities. This cooperation began with solve is unshaken.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1922, before On the other hand, for Afghanistan the official founding of the Republic Turkey has been one of the most help- of Turkey. Ataturk’s first decision apful nations since the very beginning. Its pointed ambassadors to build bridges main mission for the ISAF (Interna- between Turkey and two other states. tional Security Assistance Force) is in One of these states was Azerbaijan and the Kabul region, and antiterrorism was the other was Afghanistan. The ambasnot included in its sador who was appointmission statement. ed to Afghanistan was In the fight against The Turkish Armed one of Ataturk’s close terrorism, the TAF Forces successfully friends.5 Furthermore, suffered more than two groups were estabassumed command lished to be sent to these of this force during 5,000 casualties and it nations. The first group ISAF-II and ISAFwas fighting alone. was a medical team VII. Turkey assumed and second group was the command during these periods without help from other a security and military training team.

These initiatives caused the extraordinations and succeeded.

Apart from the ISAF, the TAF as- nary sympathy of the Afghan people for sumed another important mission. This Turkey. Those, who went there under mission was the management of Kabul’s the circumstance of those days, devoted airport. This airport is Afghanistan’s their lives to Afghan people and died only connection to the rest of the world. there. Some of these people’s tombs The airport is located in a pocket sur- are located and maintained in Kabul. rounded by Himalayas on one side and The aim here is not only to remember

10 EurasiaCritic February 2010

the past, but also establish a perspective for today. For one day a report was mailed to Ankara from Afghanistan.

The report was prepared by the Turkish unit deployed in Afghanistan and there were striking photos in it. The upshot of the report: some nations fighting terrorism in the southern part of the country, where the level of terrorism was high, attach small Turkish flags on their left shoulders to feel safe. This fact seems to need no further comment.

Two-Headed NATO and Turkey The reality that has emerged is this: events in Afghanistan cannot directly affect Turkey. However, while global actors implement policies and strategies, the expectations of these global actors, especially NATO and the US, may conflict with and even contradict Turkey’s interests. Since 9/11, according to public aspects of the event, the United States’ has approached the situation as counter-terrorism, and this approach has won important public support. Former US President Bush’s words, “If terror hit us at home, we will hit them where they live,” testify to this. At first glance these words seem meaningful.

The US intervention in the Gulf War was initiated with the slogan, “Freedom for Kuwait.” However, it ended up meaning,“Freedom for Al Sabah and the Protection of US interests”. The intervention in Afghanistan began with the US slogan, “Enduring Freedom.”

However, the initial expressions never corresponded to the desired results.

To this end, the attempt to use the NATO Response Force (NRF) to fight terrorism was initiated. The NATO Response Force is a force pool formed by member nations. Members allocate force to the pool according to their strength. Under normal circumstances these forces (in place forces) would not be deployed elsewhere, but remain in their home countries. When NATO need to intervene in a crisis, these forces are responsible for the initial intervention until the main force is ready.

When the main force deployed, they immediately withdraw from operational theater. By definition, it is the force

Military Transformation

that enters and leaves the crisis region - It is necessary to see Afghans first. NATO Commander (SACEUR) with Pakistan have no authority over the use of this - Instability in this nation conforce. The authority belongs to NATO cerns not only these two nations, but Military Committee and the supreme whole region.

- Here the key state is Pakistan. decision making body, the NATO If developments in the region conCouncil. In both of these bodies, Turkey has equal rights and decisions are made tinue without resolution, Pakistan could come under the control of radical unanimously.

At this point, this is the threat to religious groups like Taliban, Al-Qaeda and others. Certainly, Turkey. In 2007, SAthis is a scary scenario.

CEUR came up with a For Afghanistan, Why it is scary? Such proposal to change the Turkey has been one a development would concept of the NATO of the most helpful offer a horrifying picResponse Force. Acture to front of all the cording to the pronations since the very world. This awful picposal, the NRF role, beginning. ture is that of, for first first to enter and first time in the history, a to leave, would be annulled and this force would become terror organization armed with nuclear SACEUR’s strategic reserve. Under weapons. In this situation instability these circumstances, Turkey’s opposi- would spread to India.

- NATO and the US’s ideas of tion at the equally represented Military Committee and NATO Council would counter-terrorism in the region should be be rendered useless. In practice, the change entirely.

Terrorists and people should NATO Commander could doubtlessly use this force anywhere. This would be separated. The best example for this have meant Afghanistan. Under these are Turkey’s practices in its fight against circumstances, Turkey could be in- terrorism. These are also an example volved in terror in Afghanistan against for Israel.

Very serious, not cosmetic, its will. This proposal was not accepted steps should be taken to improve Afdue to Turkey’s objection.

When we consider NATO’s Afghan- ghanistan’s economic and social develistan operation and Turkey’s position, opment. This has not yet been done.

International support at highNATO could ask, what must be done?:

est level should be provided to bring stability to Pakistan. Disablement of Pakistan central government is the beginning of the chaos scenario.

“The struggle against terrorism should be global,” which leaders say, is an ungrounded statement. There are hundreds of agreements at the United Nations. However, the UN has yet to define terrorism. Thus, we find the division of “good terrorists” and “bad terrorists” in all regions. At this point, an inescapable question arises. How do you fight something that we cannot define? Certainly, you cannot. These days the United States, while planning to withdraw its soldiers from Iraq, is trying to send soldiers to Afghanistan. This is a sign of failure.

We’ll complete our evaluation of Afghanistan by providing two examples from the past. These two examples are about leaders’ perspective on the future and they are quite striking. Eleven years after the First World War, Churchill said during a speech in Canada; “For the last fifty years, the hope for peace has never been this strong;” however, ten years after this speech, a new world war broke out and drug human history into disaster.6 The second example is from Ataturk.

Against the excessive English optimism we just described, Ataturk invited the British Ambassador Percy Loraine and made this evaluation: “Honorable Ambassador, I have been saddened by the statements of British officials. There is a danger and it is growing. Dark clouds in the European skies are getting thicker every day. According to my evaluation within four to five years, Italy and Germany will be united and a Second World War will break out.”7 The date of this meeting was July 1936. This evaluation is more than a prophecy. One year after Hitler’s rise to power and six years before the appeasement between Chamberlain and Hitler Ataturk made an even more striking statement to General McArthur, “Germany will soon be able build an army capable of occupying all of Europe, except for the United Kingdom and Russia.”8 The scope of national security has EurasiaCritic February 2010 11

Military Transformation first two sections: hot and cold war.

Today, hot wars (like the Gulf Wars) have become the exception. Cold wars have lost their global reach to a great Armed MilitaryCyber War Rightist Global degree. However, on the regional level, Forces Political such tensions exist in bi- or trilateral reEconomic Pressures Leftist Local lations. Another issue that needs to be discussed is the section “Asymmetrical Political Pressures Radical Groups Threats,” located in the center of the table. The threats that are described International Sanctions Mafia-like formations here threaten many states one way or Drug trafficking Bilateral Sanctions another. In this scope, it is impossible to point out which states are being tarPsychological Operations Human trafficking geted by the twelve asymmetric threats identified. Some assumptions can be Pressures by Groups of States put forward. The author of this paper defined these threats and practices in Intentional NGO Pressures various speeches for the first time as “Dark Wars,” since all of these activiExploitation of Social Differences ties are covert activities. For example, the Cyber attack on Estonia in 2008 Initiatives that Disturb Stability crippled Estonia, which was using internet communication. Daily life, includEthnic, Religious, ing banking sector, came to a halt in Social Provocations Estonia. According to estimates, interMovements to net communications totally collapsed.

Construct Minorities Estonia’s internet life is the busiest in Europe. As a result, cyber warfare is Today, public opinion understands the most important war method of the changed. In addition to this change in scope, the dimensions of threat and se- “security” as security forces, such as future. curity have spread to a wide range. In the military (including gendarmerie), Now, according to the asymmetthe current situation, the expression police, rangers, etc., and this is normal. ric threats table, which of the defined many “security is everywhere or nowhere” However, threats does Turkey face? influential has emerged. Institutions that are re- more Certainly, it is not posGreece acquired the sponsible for security have a more dif- actors that affect sible to indicate exactly most advantageous ficult job than they did in the past, be- national interests which of twelve threats position in its history cause the concept has acquired a defi- have emerged, thus target Turkey. However, by becoming an EU nition that goes beyond the interests of categorizing these if the people who live in have become a nesecurity forces. this country would caremember along with cessity. In some fully consider developthe South Cyprus New Dimensions of Security articles and books, ments, they would see administration. and Turkey such new actors and some of the realities.

Only this example can be Naturally, analyzing the Iraq Wars threats are presentby abstracting from the Middle East is ed in a fragmented fashion rather than given: what caused the collapse of the inevitable. Within a period of ten years as a whole. However, looking at the Turkish economy in 2000-2001. How (1991-2003) Iraq experienced two US phenomenon as a whole will help de- did billions of dollars leave Turkey in interventions. The aim of the first Gulf velop the bigger picture. No doubt, the one night? Isn’t this “some kind of a War was to liberate Kuwait, and the reality cannot be provided as a whole dark war?” second Gulf War was to get rid of the with no weaknesses and even mistakes.

Greece and Turkey WMDs in Iraq and oust Saddam. Re- However, every approach that puts forsults have shown that both justifications ward a differentiation helps us reaching From the perspective of Turkey’s sewere not the real intentions of the US. a better understanding through interac- curity, without a doubt Turkish-Greek However, there is a truth for Turkey in tion. relations come to the fore. Greece acWhen this table is examined, the quired the most advantageous position both interventions. Turkey is the couneasiest sections to understand are the in its history by becoming an EU memtry that has suffered most.

Hot War

Cold War

12 EurasiaCritic February 2010

Asymmetric Threat

Ideological Differentiation

Terror

Military Transformation

ber along with the South Cyprus administration. The European Union showed its position towards Turkey by accepting the South Cyprus Greek administration, which had rejected the Annan Plan, into the EU. This approach is impossible to justify with acceptable reasons. In the EU reports, while it is foreseen that Turkey will “resolve border disputes with its neighbors” (and Turkey does not have border disputes with any of its neighbors), it ignores the problem in Cyprus, the EU’s interesting approach to the Cyprus issue has been recorded by history.

Greece desires to increase its territorial waters to 12 miles. What this means is that the Aegean Sea would become a Greek sea. Turkey’s “decision of casus belli” regarding this initiative froze these desires. However, it is strange to observe that there are some circles, even in Turkey, that desire the annulment of this decision. Another Greek

claim is that Turkish fighter planes are violating Greek airspace. This claim has no backing in any international document. Turkish fighter planes are entering Aegean international airspace for training purposes and according to Greek claims our planes cross the FIR line, justifying their claim that Greek airspace has been violated. FIR line stands for flight information region and Greece has no sovereignty over it.

Greece’s judgement that the FIR line is in its national airspace has no legal basis whatsoever.

Another issue is related to airspace of islands. According to international rules, the airspace of islands is limited to borders of territorial waters. Since the territorial waters of islands are limited to six miles, the airspace of islands are also limited to six miles. Although these are the facts, Greece claims, “Yes, the territorial waters of the islands is six miles, but their airspace is ten miles.”

This initiative has no legal basis. In addition to the three main problems I’ve mentioned, there is a claim about the Economic Exclusive Zone. A line is drawn from Rhodes island to Kastelorizo (Meis) island, which is practically just a rock formation, and this line is extended to the middle of Mediterranean, and then it is claimed, “This region is our Economic Exclusive Zone.”

This is an attempt to confine Turkey, which has the longest coastline in the Mediterranean, to the Gulf of Antalya.

When this basic strategic approach is considered, it can be seen that problems between Turkey and Greece will continue to affect Turkey’s security assessments. This situation has the potential of triggering security problems between Turkey and the EU.

The Turkish Armed Forces Turkey is located in a difficult region and in this region, only the powerful EurasiaCritic February 2010 13

Military Transformation A Turkish soldier of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) distributes ISAF newspapers with news of Afghanistan’s new government in Kabul.

can continue to exist. Being powerful in this region means, above all, having deterrent armed forces. The Turkish Armed Forces have been moving in this direction in a planned and organized manner. This approach is necessary and healthy. When we examine the projects of recent years that have been completed or are on their way toward completion this can be seen. Looking at the Air Force, Navy and Army one can see how the Turkish Armed Forces are preparing for the future.

In the current environment, not only has the TAF’s view of the future changed, but so has that of all modern armed forces, for two reasons. The first reason is that security and areas of interest associated with it have expanded abnormally. Today, when Turkey is examined, the geography that extends 14 EurasiaCritic February 2010

from the Balkans to the Middle East, logical advances are included, the case and from there to Afghanistan, has all becomes even more complicated.

Under the framework of above genbeen included in Turkey’s, and thus the TAF’s, area of interest. Naturally, in eral understanding, some of the prioriprojections concerning the future, this ties of the structure of armies should be matter must unavoidably be taken into identified as follows: account. The second a.

Successful seimportant change is curity planning depends Greece’s judgement that the threats, risks on healthy projections. that the FIR line is in and national interWithout a doubt, deits national airspace ests that affect the termined threats and Armed Forces conrisks within projections has no legal basis cept, doctrine and should be free from whatsoever. restructuring have prejudices and out diversified to a great dated approaches. The extent. As mentioned above, the simple truth is this is not an easy task. understanding of defense and security b. There is no single nation that planning during the Cold War period has a defense industry capable of suphas been very much complicated in the plying 100% of the needs of a modern post-Cold War and, especially, in the army. However, the level of the technopost-9/11 environment. When techno- logical capabilities of a defense industry

Military Transformation and a low level of foreign dependency determine the strength of the industry.

In this matter, although Turkey has improved significantly, it cannot be said to be sufficient. The main reason behind this is the wrong approach to R&D. A weapon system is not a technology by itself. There are subcategories that compose such weapon system. R&D activities in a given nation and funding for this purpose should aim at obtaining these subcategories. Otherwise, when the need for a system arises, procurement of this system through R&D means the sacrifice of at least 10 years.

However, if the sub-technology pool has been established, a good deal of the need can be satisfied. Missing technologies can be bought or produced jointly (joint venture). This approach should take hold in the defense industry. c. The public constantly debates.

Why don’t we establish a 100% professional Army? In order to maintain the Armed Forces’ current force num- a modern Armed Forces should be very bers and become 100% professional, strong. In the last years, the biggest imthe current National Defense Budget provements have probably been made should be increased two fold, which in the field of training.

This writing can be taken as a modunder current budget conditions is imest reflection on fifty-three years of possible. We must ask how sensible it observation, experiis for those who do not ences and knowledge know this fact to bring History does not only gathering in state up the debate so often. not forgive those who service. The turning However, a great efwrongfully look at the points in conceptions fort is being made to future, but also those security began with employ specialized perthe emergence of the sonnel for missions that who are unable to see Cold War following require specialization. the present. the end of WWII, With the deployment of since the twentieth technological weapon century’s greatest shift in conceptions systems, there can be reasonable force of security emerged during the Cold reductions. This approach can be called War. Shortly after the Cold War, the “Effectiveness through reduction.” first Gulf War occurred.

Then, in less d. A chain is as strong as its weakthan ten years, the 9/11 attacks initiatest link. The Armed Forces is also a sysed a new world disorder.

These events tem. All the sub-elements of this system were followed by the Afghanistan and should have similar capabilities. The the Second Gulf War. holistic structure of the Armed Forces There is a lesson that these developshould not be overlooked. No matter ments have taught us. Mankind, since how many technological systems one ancient times, has dreamed of flying. has, these technologies will be used by They dreamed of flying until the ninehumans. Any army’s generals, admirals, teenth century, and at the beginning of officers, NCOs, specialists, soldiers, civthe twentieth century they succeeded. il servants and workers are the parts of Fifty years later, they set foot on the a greater system. The training system of

Moon. It is not only in science and technology that steps are getting smaller, but also in conceptions of security that steps are getting smaller. Today will carry us into the future. Therefore, before looking at the future, we need to see today very clearly. History does not only not forgive those who wrongfully look at the future, but also those who are unable to see the present.

References 1 BÜYÜKANIT Yaşar: Genkur.Bşk.lığı Küreselleşme ve Uluslararası Güvenlik Sempozyumu Açılış Konuşması, Ankara, (30 Mayıs 2003), s.37 2 GÖKÇEN Sabiha: Atatürk’ün İzinde Bir Ömür Böyle Geçti, Türk Hava Kurumu Yayınları (Ankara, 1982), s.343.

3 ÖYMEN ONUR: Ulusal Çıkarlar Küreselleşme Çağında Ulus Devleti Korumak, Remzi Kitapevi, (İstanbul, 2005), s.209–218.

4 Supreme Allied Commander Europe 5 Although Republic of Turkey was not established at the time, according to current jargon his post would be described as that of Ambassador.

6 PARKER Rac: Churcill and Appe Assessment, Paper Mac, (London, 2000), s.14.

7 ERKİN, Feridun Cemal: Dış İşlerinde 34 Yıl, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basım Evi, (Ankara), s.81–83.

8 AKİL Aksan: Quatations from ATATÜRK, Çev.Yılmaz Öz, Ministiry of Foreign Affairs, p.

198.

EurasiaCritic February 2010 15

Israel & Turkey

A Turkish-Israeli Alliance is Critical to Regional Stability

By Alon Ben-Meir

A

lthough Turkish-Israeli relations have gone through several periods of ups and downs during the past six decades of bilateral relations, the rift between the two nations has never raised so much concern on both sides as it has during the past year.

Many strong supporters of the bilateral relationship from both sides have found themselves questioning the future of a strategic cooperation between Israel and Turkey and what impact that might have, if any, on the Turks and the Jews relationship that has existed for hundreds of years. A year after Israel’s offensive in Gaza drove a wedge between the two governments; emotions are still overriding sound reason, causing what was recently seen to be a diplomatic breach on the verge of crisis. There is

16 EurasiaCritic February 2010

no doubt that for this relationship to re- lics that have become increasingly essume, a series of calculated steps must tranged. Turkey and Israel have learned be taken by both peoples who balance a that their spats for domestic consumpdelicate role between East and West in tion are being played out on a world stage. Now it is time for both countries volatile neighborhood.

Both Israel and Turkey recognize the to start acting constructively not only necessity of the bilateral cooperation, for the sake of mending their bilateral despite the challenges and stress tests relationship, but moving the entire reit has endured in this past year. But for gion toward greater stability and peace.

From the time Turkey’s Prime Minboth Turkey and Israel to emerge from these mishaps as global players capable ister Erdogan infamously stormed out of overcoming erratic regional disputes, of Davos in January 2009 telling Israel’s it is critical the Netanyahu and Erdogan President Peres “You know well how to governments show they are capable of kill,” Israelis have cried foul at a string a little more political finesse. This will of overtly public outbursts at Israel’s expense. Repeated include concrete steps accusations of Israeli on hard issues of secuBoth Israel and brutality and disrerity, trade, and logistics Turkey recognize gard of human life as well as a smoothing the necessity of the during the Gaza war over between two pubbilateral cooperation, seemed not only unjust to most Israelis, despite the challenges but they fly in the face and stress tests it has of Hamas’ repeated endured in this past acts of violence over year. a four-year period which included more than 10,000 rockets fired against Israeli civilians. This affront continued with Turkey’s adoption of Judge Goldstone’s report on the war in Gaza and Mr. Erdogan’s visible criticism of Israel in October 2009 from Tehran, as if to show allegiance to the very regime threatening Israel’s existence with its nuclear program. The most recent outburst occurred during the January visit of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Hariri to Ankara, as Mr. Erdogan gained easy political points by criticizing Israel’s nuclear

Israel & Turkey

weapons as the source of regional in- gional ally in an ever tenuous neighborstability. All these incidents were seen hood.

The Turkish government, on the in Israel as pandering for popularity at the expense of Israel’s national se- other hand, has largely felt that as a curity, causing Israelis power for stability to wonder if there has and leadership, it has The relationship indeed been a shift in a direct role to play between the two Ankara’s strategic calin outreach and aid, countries was further culus and what might with the humanitarian be the regional implisituation in Gaza takaggravated by Israel’s cation. Adding to this ing precedence. Many failure to deliver tense atmosphere were Turks felt that the in a timely fashion two Turkish TV series scope and the consedrones which the depicting Israeli solquences of the Israeli Turkish military diers as cold blooded incursion into Gaza needs to combat PKK killers, feeding Israel’s were disproportionpublic frustration. The ate to Hamas’ provoinsurgents. accumulative impact cation, and Israel has of these provocations done little to alleviate pushed the lever of Israeli tolerance international concern over the Palestinto a breaking point, especially as most ian humanitarian crisis. Erdogan rightly Israelis see Turkey as their strongest re- felt duped by former Prime Minister

Ehud Olmert who visited Ankara only days before the Israeli attack on Gaza but failed to mention it to his Turkish counterpart. Moreover, as Erdogan had invested time and political capital to mediate between Israel and Syria— and was on the verge of reaching an agreement—he felt betrayed by an Israeli government failing to live up to its end of the bargain. The relationship between the two countries was further aggravated by Israel’s failure to deliver in a timely fashion drones which the Turkish military needs to combat PKK insurgents. And most recently, the continuous closure of Gaza crossings, even for Turkish humanitarian aid trucks, and Israel’s unwillingness to allow basic commodities to be transported to Gaza has shown Israel’s inability to cooperate with international demands when it comes to the Palestinian issue. Even EurasiaCritic February 2010 17

Israel & Turkey

if he is partially motivated by populism leading up to next year’s elections, Erdogan generally feels for the Palestinian cause, and most Turks agree with their Prime Minister that there is a human crisis in Gaza and that something must be done about it. Israel itself has a special department within the Foreign Office dedicated to protecting and caring for Jews in trouble outside Israel, why should Turkey not be able to take up special concern with predominately Muslim Palestinians in a dire situation in Gaza? Moreover, many Turks contend that Turkey, as a Middle Eastern 18 EurasiaCritic February 2010

flag, Ayalon insulted and disrespected Turkey, and reflected poorly on Israeli moderates. For an experienced diplomat to engage in this kind of behavior is sophomoric and demonstrated a lack of diplomatic savvy. Even after his apology letter and Defense Minister Barak’s visit to Ankara, Ayalon has continued with unnecessary provocations to the chagrin of many Israelis.

In the days since this diplomatic titfor-tat, many opponents to Turkey’s ruling AK Party have suggested Erdogan’s imprudent comments are indicative of a growing trend toward the Islamization of Turkey. Though this criticism has strong roots amongst Erdogan’s opposition parties, its manifestation in Turkey’s new foreign policy is far outshined by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s doctrine of borders with no problems. Turkey simply cannot build strong regional relationships with Syria or Iran at the expense of Israel. This will not only defy the Davutoglu strategy, but it is unsustainable as part of Turkey’s leverage comes from its position as a trusted mediator. Turkey must balance the juggling act of its myriad ties with the EU, Arab world, Iran, Israel, and allies in both the East and West for the sake of its own rise to prominence; drop one of these interests and every other relationship will be inadvertently affected. If Turkey wants to mitigate regional conflicts with which Israel is directly involved, it must demonstrate a capacity for objectivity and sound reasoning. In fact, the need to maintain strong bilateral relations between Israel power in pursuit of regional stability, and Turkey was recognized by Syria’s cannot remain silent in the face of the President Bashar al-Assad who advised Turkey to maintain unfolding tragedy in “solid relations” with Gaza or anywhere else Turkey simply cannot Israel to become an for that matter. build strong regional effective interlocutor.

This simmering enAnd those who argue vironment is what led relationships with that Turkey’s disapto the series of diploSyria or Iran at the pointment with the matic blunders by Isexpense of Israel. progress made on its rael’s deputy foreign EU membership has minister Dan Ayalon. h d iit toward the Arab and Eastpushed By summoning up Turkish ki h Ambassador b d Celikkol and then boasting in Hebrew ern world at Israel’s expense are missto cameras about the symbolism of his ing a central point. EU membership of lower seat and the absence of a Turkish necessity requires that member state

Israel & Turkey

enjoy good relations with all of their neighbors. In fact, the better relations Turkey enjoys with Iran, Iraq or Syria, the better its prospect of an EU membership as these countries would effectively border the EU if Turkey were to become a member-state. Maintaining friendly and strategic relations with Israel remains an integral part of this strategic equation.

It would be unwise at this juncture for Turkey to take Israel’s loyalty for granted at a time when Israel is under international pressure to make major concessions for peace and is looking for allies to rely on who understand its national security concerns. The fact that Israel is a regional superpower, possibly

in possession of nuclear weapons, does their relationship to effectively contribnot automatically mitigate it’s national ute to regional order. security concerns. For this reason, a To engage in new constructive diasolid partnership, eslogue between Israel pecially with another and Turkey, Israel A tactical alliance must must realize that Ayaregional power such mutually reinforce as Turkey, a predomilon is now a liability both nations’ national nantly Muslim state and must be fired not at that, becomes of only because of his security requirements. critical importance in terrible diplomatic Israel’s strategic calgaffes, but because his culus. A tactical alliance must mutually actions will reflect on Israel’s image in reinforce both nations’ national secu- the eyes of the international commurity requirements. The Turkish-Israeli nity. If Israel wants to project itself as bond was never merely an alliance of having one voice under one governconvenience, and to that end both na- ment, it cannot allow itself to succumb tions must take constructive measures to fractious rivalries that undermine to ensure sustainable improvement in its bilateral relationships. Netanyahu EurasiaCritic February 2010 19

Israel & Turkey

should demonstrate to the world that positive ramifications for Israel’s standhe will not tolerate such behavior for ing with enemies and allies alike. The domestic consumption at the expense relative calm along the Gaza borders of Israeli allies. Turkey should also take offers Israel an opportunity to change advantage of Israel’s official apology the dynamics on the ground without and refrain from provoking Israel, end- appearing to have buckled under outside pressure. It is ing verbal incitements fundamentally in Isto restore civility to the Both sides must build rael’s best interest to diplomatic relations beon the good-will demonstrate that the tween countries. Both gestures created by the Israelis care about sides must build on the good-will gestures crevisit of Israel’s Defense Palestinian civilians in Gaza, even if that ated by the visit of IsMinister Barak to indirectly benefits rael’s Defense Minister Ankara.

Hamas. TraditionalBarak to Ankara while ly, Turkey has shown making sure that all bilateral trade and military agreements a great sensitivity to the plight of the are fully adhered to in order to prevent Palestinians, and its relationship with future souring of the relationship.

Israel has often fluctuated depending Since the rift between the two na- on the status of this issue. Nonetheless, tions began with the Gaza incursion Turkey should make efforts to delink and its consequences, Israel should the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from its make some conciliatory moves to ease own bilateral relations with Israel, as the Palestinian humanitarian plight, not the latter must not be hostage to the inmerely for Turkey’s sake but because evitable ups and downs between Israel this is the right thing to do and will have and Hamas in particular. Moreover, 20 EurasiaCritic February 2010

Ankara could use its good relations with Hamas to influence it to moderate its political views in relations to Israel, especially if Hamas hopes to enter the political process.

To restore visible normal relations between the two countries, Israel should reciprocate Barak’s visit to Ankara by immediately inviting Turkey’s trade or cultural minister to visit Israel. This could pave the way during the next few months for a state visit of Turkey’s President Gul to Israel, as there is a pending invitation from President Peres. This high level exchange will send a clear message that Turkey and Israel are ready to cooperate as firm allies while Erdogan continues to reach out to the Arab world. Once mutual confidence and trust is restored and Netanyahu has reigned in his outspoken foreign minister and dealt appropriately with Ayalon, Turkey could potentially renew its mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. In repeated conversations with Israeli officials, it was made clear

Israel & Turkey to me that Israelis would welcome Tur- formation and agricultural technology key playing such a role provided that should be another area of cooperation from now on, Ankara consistently dem- where Israel must take a role in facilionstrates in words and deeds that it is tating smooth private sector exchanges both a reliable friend and an objective between countries. interlocutor.

Turkey on the other hand can help The private sector would be an ideal increase business and government rearena for Turkey and Israel to deepen lations by working on water supply extheir strategic partnership. Substantial changes and an energy pipeline project progress can be made to expand this possibly from Azerbaijan to Turkey to relationship beyond the traditional elite Israel that would be strongly welcomed. exchanges between government to gov- These types of exchanges will strengthernment and military to military and en the people-to-people ties as citizens beyond the Israeli tourism to Turkey see an economic benefit and businesswhich is limited to specific tourist loca- people increase travel. As the United tions and does not necessarily expose States is most supportive of the Turkboth societies to one ish-Israeli strategic another. In this respect alliance, Israel should The private sector Israel needs to demwork with the US in would be an ideal onstrate greater coopprojects of strong naarena for Turkey and eration in dealing with tional interest to TurIsrael to deepen their Turkish-Israeli busikey, such as building a ness exchanges, and nuclear power plant. strategic partnership. be far more accommoTurkey wants this indating to Turkish overvestment, and with tures. For example, Israel should host some convincing the US can help in this CEO’s of large companies such as Turk- sense, which would be a project where cell and Turkish Airlines for network- all three countries can increase trilating and industry exchanges, and agree eral relations. If Turkey’s needs are igto invitations to send Israeli CEO’s to nored, it will inevitably turn to Russia, Istanbul for this same purpose. Any France, or Korea and thereby shift Tursuch efforts made by the Turkish pri- key’s strategic interests. vate sector thus far have been met with Israeli’s repeatedly claim that Turkey incompliance on the Israeli side. In- is second in importance for Israel only

to the United States. If this is truly the case, Israel has much to do in working on its public image in Turkey. Public relations initiatives, media consulting, and Israeli interest groups in Ankara (all which are prevalent in the US) would be a wise investment for Israel. The Ayalon incident is a perfect example of bad PR, and Turkey is important enough to Israel’s interests to invest in stronger public relations in this capacity.

The speculation about the future of Turkish-Israeli relations will continue for some time to come, but one thing remains clear: Turkey and Israel recognize the indispensability of their strategic partnership to each other and to the stability of the greater region. What they must now also recognize is that emotions should never overtake reason. The deeper the bilateral relationship is between both nations, the greater the responsibility will be that they shoulder towards one another. Restoring this relationship will undoubtedly take efforts and personal initiative from leaders on both sides, but the long term interests of both countries must always outweigh myopic infighting. These next few months will be critical to the development of this relationship. Turkey and Israel must now engage each other on common ground, because it is time to rise above the fray.

Israel’s Industry and Trade Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer (L) and Turkish Defence Minister Vecdi Gonul speak during a Turkey-Israel economic meeting after signing an agreement on cooperation on November 24, 2009 in Ankara.

EurasiaCritic February 2010 21

Arabian Perspective

Turkey Rising, Arabs Sinking

By Halid Amayreh

W

hile many Arab states are buried beneath their incapabilities and fighting with each other, Turkey is slowly, but with determined steps putting itself forward

as a leading nation of the Middle East, alongside Israel and Iran. Especially during the period of AKP dominance Turkey has continued to expand its influence towards the East with resolute

steps, preparing itself for the rank of leading Sunni nation.

Doubtlessly, Turkey fills a psychological and strategic gap, especially in the Arab world.

This gap makes it clear that the result of blind obedience to America has led to an unhappy situation and a loss of influence for Egypt and other traditional Arab states.

Turkey’s rise in the region is a complete success story, which can serve as a role model for other nations.

Turkey’s Rising Star Without the use of the political lawlessness found in many Arab states, when the AKP came to power by way of elections it silently and cleverly tried to resolve a set of chronic problems that were plaguing Turkey. In the end, the AKP successfully treated many of the economically rooted sicknesses with surprising effects and aftereffects.

Turkey’s economy overcame its once chronic doldrums, and at the same time extraordinary growth was recorded, especially in the manufacturing and export sectors. Today Turkey ranks as the world’s seventeenth economic power.

Turkey’s rise in the At the same it can region is a complete proudly stand up and success story, which say, “No,” to America and Israel. can serve as a role In domestic polimodel for other tics, the Turkish govnations. ernment, by opening its ears to unresolved Kurdish K di h problems bl and the troubles of Kurdish people, silently tried have their language and cultural rights legitimized, or at least to see to that they were not denied. For stabilizing domestic politics 22 EurasiaCritic February 2010

Arabian Perspective

and increasing domestic security, since economic wellbeing is their basic prerequisite, this was a great help.

Under Erdogan’s leadership Turkey made headway towards resolving its longstanding problems with Armenia, thus depriving Israel and the American Jewish lobby of a sensitive pressure point that they had used over and over to keep Turkey in the the Israeli-American orbit.

However, what’s most worth mentioning concern the AKP is its determination to protect its freedom of will against the US and Israel. Seven years ago as America was about to invade Iraq, the Turkish government refused to let airplanes attacking Iraq take off from the Incirlik base. President Erdo-

gan defended this decision, saying that civilized men. He did not shrink from it reflected the collective will of the confronting the world’s untouchable Turkish people. All this happened while nation, Israel, which stages monstrous most Arab states were competing with and Nazi-like attacks on the unfortuone another in order nate Palestinian people. to please and plaDue to certain practices Socially, the Arabs’ cate the George W. Erdogan maintains relasituation is perhaps Bush administration, tions with Israel, but he the worst it has been which was murdering has shown Israel’s leadsince the fall of the tens of thousands of ers very clearly that the Iraqis. future of Turkey’s relaOttoman caliphate Erdogan had no tions with Israel will deafter WWI. need to give any expend on their behavior, planations to the particularly with respect Americans. He just said, “No.” That to Palestine. was all.

At one time, coming from the leader Erdogan protects the dignity of one of one of Israel’s strategic allies in the nation in the world that more closely Middle East, these would be serious resembles savage life than a society of words. Israel has received the message, EurasiaCritic February 2010 23

Arabian Perspective

but we don’t know if they will internalize them and recognize their gravity.

Not being Arab, it is true that in Turkey’s foreseeable future Palestinians will not become proactive allies.

But along with this, given Israel’s having forced the people of Gaza and other Palestinians to live through a Nazi-like genocidal venture, from now on Turkey 24 EurasiaCritic February 2010

nomic perspective, many Arab states are struggling to stay on their feet, and meanwhile they are openly submitting their sovereignty and national dignity to Israel’s protector, America. Socially, the Arabs’ situation is perhaps the worst it has been since the fall of the Ottoman caliphate after WWI. The Arabs’ collective failure to accomplish the simple task of breaking the Gaza Strip blockade reveals a deep incompetence and the entire social body seems to be afflicted by paralysis.

Similarly, every Arab state or sheikdom is busy with its domestic issues, and efforts toward Arab economic and political unity find themselves blocked.

The main cause of political paralysis, The sovereign sheikhs’ a suffocating kiss ultimate strategy is of death, is the to remain in power at control over the any cost, even if this Arab world of a tribalist mentalincludes submitting ity and the despoto the will of foreign tism of powerful powers. families. One of the most concrete expressions of this tribalist mentality, whether one observes a kingdom or a republic, is that autocratic Arab rulers hold their own people in check, and they exist to secure permanent power for themselves or their sons, but they do not seek to lead their nations or pursue their nations’ interests effectively.

For example, Egypt’s population of 80 million makes it the owner of a tremendous human resource, and it has other resources in reserve, too. Once thought of as the tiger of Africa, due to its regime’s despotic policies and austere management, in every field of life this very important nation is headed backwards. It may easily be surmised that these circumstances feed and deepen will not play deaf and dumb. It will not social depression, indifference and look the other way. At the least, Turkey desperation, since thousands of profeswill no longer be a strategic asset for Is- sionals have emigrated to find dignity, rael, as it was before the AKP. respect and job opportunities.

The Immobile Arab World

The Gulf States

The Arab world, as opposed to the Turkish success story, continues to live with its internal divisions. From an eco-

For these rich Arab nations to be ruled by ignorant, decadent, clan-based despots is a frustrating cycle that they

Arabian Perspective

are caught up in, too, since the sover- tools to protect their economies from a eign sheikhs’ ultimate strategy is to re- real financial crisis. Destructive tribal main in power at any cost, even if this thinking kept the culturally homogenous Gulf Cooperation includes submitting Council nations from to the will of foreign These tribal being able to establish powers. It hardly chieftains, as we a common market or a needs to be said that recently saw in monetary union. Nor in many cases these Dubai, lack the basic have they built a viable despots openly dismilitary force to protect play their ignorance; tools to protect their themselves against the they scandalously economies from a eventuality of a foreign failed to turn the real financial crisis. attack. enormous financial No doubt the Arabs’ resources under their control into concrete and long lasting situation will continue to worsen until economic realities. Some Arab sheik- their house has completely and permadoms are in reality so stupid that they nently fallen. If the Arab masses end pour billions of dollars into ostenta- their laziness, despair and indifference, tious, but economically unprofitable, only then will they grow strong again projects, building tall towers to display and win back the dignity and freedoms their wealth. being usurped from them. Arabs are not However, these tribal chieftains, as stupid. If they want to learn from the we recently saw in Dubai, lack the basic Turks, our brothers in religion, they can

learn. But while you can lead a horse to water, you can’t make him drink.

While the billionaires of the country where the Koran was sent to Hz. Muhammad (s.a.v) chase animal desires, they claim to be implementing Sharia law. Considering that food can’t be found for millions of Muslim children, which Sharia judgement would give such a decadent prince permission to spend his subject’s resources on his own wanton desires? Allah warns such a decadent prince in the Koran, and informs him that his punishment is only a matter of time: “God is rich, while you are poor. If you turn away, He will substitute other people in your place, and they will not be like you” (Muhammad, 47: 38).

Meanwhile, we would like to welcome our Turkish brothers again. We have been missing the Ottomans for a long time.

EurasiaCritic February 2010 25

Nuclear Iran

Iran’s Possible Nuclear Proliferation and World Scenarios

By Evren Isbilen

26 EurasiaCritic February 2010

Nuclear Iran

I

ran’s ongoing nuclear programme is a hot matter of debate in the chancelleries of the world and in the world’s public opinion: The Western world is accusing Iran of defying international norms and to proceed with uranium enrichment in order to possibly weaponise the enriched uranium. Iran defends its position by claiming that it needs uranium for “medical purposes” and for “electricity production”. Lately, Iran has announced that it will enrich uranium to %20.1But what is taking place behind the pro and contra shiny rhetoric that is taking place in world media?

First of all, it should be remembered that nuclear weapon is not like conventional weapons, it has unique peculiarities which confer a state “untouchability” in the competitive international security environment. This is called “nuclear deterrence” which is the ultimate guaranty against external intervention or a possible invasion.

Secondly, there is the fact that USA over the fate of neighbouring Iraq. despite all her hyper-power, has not USA and her allies had invaded Iraq on been able to threaten any country of the rationale that Saddam Hussein’s renuclear deterrence with regime change gime was “producing” weapons of mass or invasion. The episodic nucleariza- destruction. “Had Iraq really got nucletion of North Korea well illustrate the ar deterrence, could the Allies so easily facts:While, Washingoccupy and overthrow ton two years ago dethe Baath regime USA despite all her clared that “all options there?” the decision hyper-power, has not are on the table” for makers in Tehran been able to threaten Iran6, they clearly remight have pondered. any country of nuclear nounced the military In a historic setting, deterrence with regime where the clerical reoption against North Korea in favour of gime in Tehran feels change or invasion. diplomatic negotiamuch less insecure tions, especially after due to the activities of the date of 9 October 2006 when North reformist and opposition street moveKorea tested a nuclear device.7 Thus ments after the disputed elections and an important lesson had been learnt: open US and Israeli threats against the USA is unable or unwilling to militar- country, Iran’s decision makers might ily deal with Third World powers which have concluded that the only way to effectively demonstrate that they have safeguard the current regime and terrireached nuclear status. This lesson torial integrity of the country is through might have been, also grasped in Teh- nuclearization. ran, especially when they contemplate Thirdly, Iran is not an ordinary EurasiaCritic February 2010 27

Nuclear Iran

country: Iran is a regional power with beginning of the cold US-Iranian relainfluence from the Levant to the Per- tions. Moreover, Iran has developed sian Gulf and the Caspian basin. The throughout the revolutionary years, a so called “Shiite Crescent” increases very intimate political and economic Iran’s reach inside Iraq, since a sub- ties with Middle East’s non-state actors stantial portion of Iraqi people is of the like HAMAS and Hezbollah, which same Shiite denomination of Islam. 2 USA has listed in the terror list of the Iran controles huge reserves of oil and US State Department5, where Iran calls natural gas, especially in a historic era them “resistance organisations” against where power struggles Israeli occupation for the control of strateFourthly, Iran’s USA is unable or gic resources escalate to nuclearization efunwilling to militarily unprecedented heights. forts is closely tied deal with Third 3 Also,Iran is a major to Israeli calculus of World powers which power in the “currency security and Israeli effectively demonstrate grand strategy. For wars” ongoing since the depreciation of US doIsrael, who lives in that they have reached lar started. As a major a chronic insecurity nuclear status. hydro-carbon exporter environment, its nuIran has a big leverage clear option8 is the on the fate of the US dollar,and hence ultimate guaranty of its survival as a the health of the US economy.4 “nation-state” in case it is defeated in Iran is also a revolutionary power, a conventional war. Thus Israel is unwhich has assumed itself a mantle to willing to lose its monopoly of nuclear speak for the world’s Muslims since the weapons in the region. Iran’s possible Islamic Revolution in 1979. This date nuclearization will directly challenge Ishas also a symbolic importance of the raeli monopoly, creating a situation of 28 EurasiaCritic February 2010

“balance of terror” between Israel and Iran and further destabilise the region by intensifying the already initiated arms races.9 Also it is possible that the Iranian- Syrian axis and its non-state proxies might feel emboldened visavis Israel if the senior partner of the alliance is nuclearized. Iran might want to provide Syria a kind of nuclear umbrella against the Israeli deterrence.

Fifth, Iran’s close collaboration with terroristic formations bring forth the apprehension that ‘what if Iran provides one of these possible nuclear devices to non-state actors?’ In a historic setting of post 9/11, 2001 and growing risk of an hyper-terrorism10 event in which nuclear weapons might be used, Iran’s nuclear proliferation is not welcomed by the Western capitals. Iran’s possible proliferation will add another element of risk to nuclear calculus when the USA is in an intense effort to safeguard Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in case of a government failure.

Sixth, Iran’s proliferation might trigger a “chain reaction” of nuclear prolif-

Nuclear Iran eration in the Middle East: Turkey and Arab states might be forced to develop their own nuclear technology and possible deterrences in order to redress the nuclear imbalance of power. The Gulf Countries are especially vulnerable and weak visavis Islamic Republic of Iran and nowadays USA is taking military assistance programmes in order to embolden them against Tehran.

Egypt, the traditional leader of the Arab world is feeling intense pressure because of Iranian progress in nuclear technology. Egypt, re-initiated its civilian nuclear project in 2006 which was terminated after Chernobyl accident.11 Saudi Arabia is also very concerned and worried about the Iranian accomplishments 12 and the Saudis are also named as potential proliferators if Iran goes nuclear.

Turkey has an interesting role to play in the nuclear crisis. On the one hand, Turkey is against weaponisation of Iran’s uranium enrichment and informs Turkey’s “friendly warnings” to Tehran via diplomatic channels.13 On the other hand, Turkey who is pursuing Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s “zero problem with neighbours” policy, is definitely opposes the escalation of the crisis to a military intervention by USA and/or Israel. Turkey wants play as a diplomatic broker to ease the crisis. In the coming months, Turkish diplomacy will be tried in a difficult test because Turkey is a member of the UN Security Council and Iranian sanctions issue will certainly come to the attention of the Council. Turkey might be forced to show its hand in a situation which will set Turkey between her neighbour/commercial partner and her NATO allies.

Iran’s possible proliferation will have grave consequences for the current non-proliferation regime, especially in a historic setting where the Obama Administration declared its intent of creating a world without nuclear weapons. 14 It is ironic that the American nation which introduced the world with nuclear weapons in 6 August 1945 to start an initiative to eradicate all nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. However, when it is considered

2

more deeply, it is seen that a nuclearfree world is to the advantage of USA, hence serves US national interests. This might explained as follows: The proliferation of nuclear weapons to the smaller countries of the world,especially the Third World, diminishes the US ability

to intervene in those areas. In other words, nuclear deterrence started to act as “great equaliser” in international relations which automatically confer a “great power” status to would be proliferators. Historically thinking, a dialectical contradiction occurred between the EurasiaCritic February 2010 29

Nuclear Iran

US role as a world-hegemon and the trend of nuclear proliferation to more “backward” parts of the world.

The realists criticise Obama’s vision as too optimistic and idealistic and rightly so: Because let alone de facto nuclear powers, de jure nuclear states as defined by the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty15, stil keep nuclear arsenals and continue their efforts at “vertical proliferation”,just in case. 16 The realist theory foresees that there is a constant mistrust among states and states tend to recourse to (nuclear) armament in order to survive in a anarchic international setting. The security dilemmas form as a result, and the nuclear arms races are too costly in a world where basic needs of most of the people could not be satisfied. This is another major historical contradiction which preoccupies our times.

Obama administration perhaps started this initiative in “good faith” however the legacy of the former Bush adminisrations and their “axis of evil” approach has not made the world more secure, but instigated the small powers to seek for survival guaranty in nuclear deterrence.

To sum up, Iranian nuclear crisis is no doubt the most pressing global issue of our times since all major powers have stakes in the conflict. It should also be remembered that, Iranian nuclear programme has dimensions regarding both domestic politics of Iran and Iran’s foreign policy regarding the region and her 30 EurasiaCritic February 2010

appeal to the Muslim world. Nuclear Project is made a “national cause” in Iran which the local politicians have to pay lip service, especially when one considers the power of Persian nationalism in the country. Also, Iran’s rhetorical and bold defiance of the West, Israel and world-hegemon USA is an effective public diplomacy move to gather sympathy and support both in the Third World and in the “Arab street”.

The stability and welfare of the Middle East as well as Israel’s security,the bigger picture of global nuclear nonproliferation regime and Obama administration’s new “nuclear-free world” initiatives depend on the moves will be made by Tehran’s decision makers.

Historical responsibility fall on the decisionmakers in the capitals of Washington and Tehran to save the world from a difficult and convoluted situation. The key to the peaceful solution of the conflict lies in the alleviating the aura of distrust and insecurity between USA and Iran. As some analysts call a “Grand Bargain” between USA and Islamic Republic of Iran might then be imagined.

References *Evren İŞBİLEN is a Ph.D student of International Relations at Middle East Technical University at Ankara,Turkey. He is the author of the book “Nükleer Satranç: İran’ın Nükleer Politikası ve Türkiye” which was published in 2009 from Ozan Yayıncılık. He is also engaged in free-lance Turkish/English translation.

1“Iran to enrich uranium to %20 as nuclear fears grow”,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_

east/8503555.stm[9.02.2010].

2According to CIA estimates %60 to %65 of Iraqi popultation is of Shia denomination.

“The CIA World Factbook”, https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ iz.html [9.02.2010].

3According to CIA estimates, Iran is the second largest holder of proven natural gas reserves, second to Russian Federation with 28 trillion cubic meter of natural gas. “The CIA World FactBook”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html[9.02.2010].

4For the workings of the petro-dolar system and the struggles around petro-dolars, consult Bülent Gökay’s and Paul Roger’s “Irak,İran ve Petrodoların Sonu”.First edition.Translation by Gamze Erbil.İstanbul:Versus Yayınları,2006.

5“Background Information on Foreign Terrorist Organizations”,http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ rls/rpt/fto/2801.htm[9.02.2010].

6“Bush says U.S prefers diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear efforts”, New York Times. http://www. nytimes.com/2008/07/03/world/americas/03ihtprexy.1.14199650.html[9.02.2010].

7“Nuclear Weapons Programme”, http:// www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index. html[9.02.2010].

8Israel never publicly confirms or denies its nuclear capability but it is a known secret for decades.

9Evren İşbilen, “Nükleer Satranç: İran’ın Nükleer Politikası ve Türkiye”, Ozan Yayıncılık:İstanbul,2009.p.165.

10For such scenarios, consult Graham Allison, “Nükleer Terörizm:Önlenebilir Nihai Felaket.” Translated by Güneş Ayas. Salyangoz Yayınları, İstanbul,2006.

11 “Egypt’s Nuclear Imbroglio”,http://www. isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/ Detail/?lng=en&id=106118[10.02.2010].

12 Rachel Bronson, “Bronson: Saudis ‘Deeply Concerned’ Over Iran’s Nuclear Program”, www.cfr.org/publication/10328/bronson. html[10.02.2010].

13 Turkey is apprehensive that Iran’s becoming a nuclear power will alter the delicate balance of power between the two countries which traditionally kept the peace on Turkey’s eastern borders for centuries. It should be remembered that Turkey oldest border is her eastern border which was set up by the Treaty of Kasr-ı Şirin, in1639.

Notice that this date one and a half century earlier than the establishment of USA in 1,776.

14 “Obama promotes nuclar-free world”,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7983963. stm#graphic[10.02.2010].

15 ‘The Big Five’ or the ‘Nuclear Club’ are comprised of USA,Russian Federation(former Soviet Union), Britain, France and China as implied in the NPT. http://www.un.org/en/conf/ npt/2005/npttreaty.html[10.02.2010].

16 “Vertical Proliferation” refers to the efforts of the existing nuclear powers to enchance the quality and quantity of their nuclear arsenals as opposed to the “horizontal proliferation” of new-comers to the ‘Nuclear Club’.

Iraqi Elections

Iraq: The Dawn of a New Nation

By Ahmed Zahid

L

ife in Iraq has come to a halt. to the next, you can see how the atIt is impossible any officials mosphere changes. Those who believe doing their jobs. Ministers, bu- the occupation will never end seem to reaucrats, even businessmen... Some have had their hopes renewed by the are seeking support in neighboring elections. Even though every coalition patrol that passes wears countries, some in away at these hopes, electoral districts.

Whatever the result Middle Eastern style Campaign offices of the elections, the resignation hangs over have been opened, near future will be Iraqis like a shadow in and the propaganda the wake of political buttons have been determined by a state confrontations. pushed. At times it’s of political conflict.

Whatever the redecorated with relisult of the elections, gious concerns, and at times nationalist themes have been the near future will be determined by foregrounded in the streets. With every a state of political conflict. For the pobreath you take you understand that litical factions which have been formed violence has been replaced by cutthroat artificially, or in other words, by necespolitical infighting. Going from one city sity, the elections will function as a litto another, or from one neighborhood mus test. Moreover, while this situation

became apparent before the elections, today it encompasses the entire nation.

There is really no doubt that what concretized these political differences was the election law. After eight months of debates and resignations and the passage of the law in November, the process has ended, but its pains continue.

And these pains are pregnant with even greater problems for after the elections.

The Linchpin of the Elections According to the arrangements for the elections, the votes of all Iraqis living abroad will be valid for the elections of the province in which they are registered. So someone from Mosul who lives abroad cannot vote in Iraq’s general elections, but can vote for the candidates listed in Mosul. On the other hand, the situation is the same in Iraq.

For example, someone living in Mosul but registered as a Kirkuk resident will be able to vote in the province of Kirkuk. Here it is certainly not incorrect to say that Ayad Allawi’s list benefits from the many votes they expect from Iraqis abroad. Leading Sunni politicians such as Allawi, Saleh al-Mutlaq, Tariq al-Hashimi and Usama Najafi will run in the elections along with the Iraqi Turkmen Front. At this point it can be said that allowing Iraqis abroad to vote in their registered provinces won a partial advantage for Allawi’s list.

Maliki’s Baathist Democracy More importantly, President Maliki’s opposition has been united by the 32 EurasiaCritic February 2010

Iraqi Elections

former President Ayad Allawi’s Iraq elections process.

Above all, the key to determining National List, this was judged to be an whose presidency will form what sort of attack on Allawi’s growing popularity government after the elections lies here. and against Sunni acquisition of power.

This is because January’s developments Despite the Prime Minister’s March 2008 abolition of the caused even deeper jolts accountability and that the election law.

According to the justice board created Iraq’s independent elecarrangements for the after the US invation commission found elections, the votes sion in order weaken 511 candidates in the of all Iraqis living the Baathist party’s elections to be affiliated abroad will be valid power base in Iraq, with the Baathist party announcing such a and that they were colfor the elections of list provoked constilaborators with the opthe province in which tutional debate. The pression of Saddam’s rethey are registered. fact that the presigime. On these grounds their candidacies were dent of the accountannulled. This caused more disputes. ability and justice board, Ali Al-Lami, First of all, among the 511 names an- is running in the elections on the list of nounced were leading Sunni politicians the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, such as Saleh Al-Mutlaq, president of presided over by Ammar Al-Hakim, the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, cast a shadow over the announced list’s and Zafir al-Ani, leader of the Iraqi impartiality. These debates were reAccord Front, and since most of the kindled by a new notice from the Prime candidates were from important Sunni Minister stating that although the acgroups united under the leadership of countability and justice board had been

abolished its decisions were still valid, and generated the threat that Allawi and the Sunni groups would boycott the elections. Deeming that these ongoing developments could lead to sectarian tensions and jeopardize the elections, as the US was beginning its withdrawal EurasiaCritic February 2010 33

Iraqi Elections

Former Iraqi prime minister Iyad Allawi of the National Accord Movement speaks to the press after announcing the formation of a new coalition the Iraqi National Movement (INM) during a press conference in Baghdad on October 31, 2009.

process and hoping not to have problems, it was starting to feel anxious.

Problems that couldn’t be resolved despite US pressure were thought to have been overcome by US Vice President Joe Biden’s surprise visit to Iraq; however, they remain a potential threat for after the elections. This threat will delay the formation of a new post-election government or a long time.

Despite Iraq’s election process being underway and ongoing uncertainties about the electoral system, experiencing this kind of situation brings Iraqi political bargaining to mind. In Iraq every political process turns into a race “to get a piece of the pie.” As the elections approach, all the trump cards that can be had are being played, and every effort is being made to weaken the opposition. Election propaganda is based on political negotiations, and whatever the elections’ results, the focus is on the benefits to be gained from the elections. In other words, in Iraq what’s 34 EurasiaCritic February 2010

important is not the elections’ results, but that they occur, because the negotiations rule the process.

allel to the tension in Iraq. With the US withdrawal the Iranian regime will lose power, too. The mullahs, who have managed to keep themselves in power The US Tug of War with Iran with opposition to the West and fears of and its “Withdrawal occupation, know that withdrawal will with Honor” leave them to face stronger attacks by Currently, Iraq does not belong to their opposition. Moreover, the tension Iraqis. The US military presence in Iraq between the Iranian regime and Iraqi politics is increasing. continues. This is For now the opposition why Iraq has becomThe duel between is seen as a struggle for ing a playing field for the US and Iran influence behind the others, and regional over nuclear energy, scenes. After the elecand international involving Western tions it will also be noisaccounts are being ily expressed by the Shinations and Israel, settled in Iraq. The ites. Iran will be left with and a struggle for duel between the US a small Shiite minorand Iran over nucleregional dominance, ity. In this situation will ar energy, involving too, are all being drag Iran to a more agWestern nations and experienced in Iraq. gressive stance towards Israel, and a struggle Iraqi politics. Although for regional domiUS withdr the withdrawal from Iraq appears to nance, too, are all being experienced i i d increase Iran’s stature in the region, it in Iraq. At this point, the pressure on can be said that the US presence in Iraq Iran over its nuclear energy runs par-

Iraqi Elections The number of seats in Iraq’s Parliament has been raised from 275 to 325, with the increase in seats assigned to Duhok and Sulaimaniya. Of this figure, 310 seats are divided among the provinces, and 15 seats are set aside for minorities and as compensatory seats for Iraqis living abroad.

Provincial Contingents Baghdad

68

Mosul

31

Basra

24

Zikar

18

Sulaimaniya

17

Babil

16

Anbar

14

Erbil

14

Diyala

13

Kirkuk

12

Selahaddin

12

Najaf

12

Vasit

11

Al-Qâdisiyyah

11

Meysan

10

Duhok

10

Karbala

10

Musanna

7

facilitates Iran’s intervening in Iraq and results in the division of US power. This is because as long as the US stays in it cannot concentrate on problematic areas such as Afghanistan. It can clearly be seen that this is why the US wants to get out of Iraq before it loses control. Sunni groups’ blocking or boycotting the elections will put Iraq’s security worries back on the agenda, and this is also the threat most likely to jeopardize the “withdrawal with honor.”

The experience of drafting the election law is an example of this. Moreover, the experience of the 2005 elections is

still fresh in the people’s memory. Sun- mer Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi. ni groups’ non-participation in the JanThe New Coalition uary 2005 elections and limited participation in the December 2005 elections Kurdish sources in Baghdad and Erresulted in them not getting enough of bil do not hide the fact that influential a share in the government, and since sides such as the Islamic Council, the the more they were excluded from the Iraq List and the Kurdish coalition are political process the determined to draw more tensions in Iraq the outlines of new What change means is grew, in the end sectarunderstandings that using elections to push aim to change details ian conflicts emerged.

Prime Minister Nouri Being aware of this, the in order to determine US has reduced tenthe political future.

Al-Maliki out of the sions, for now, by interWhat change means political equation. vening in the process. is using elections to On the other side, Iraq’s push Prime Minisintelligent men, such as Sistani, have ter Nouri Al-Maliki out of the political laid the groundwork for cushioning the equation. Turkey’s active role should be process with the statements they made kept in mind at this point. about the candidates’ return. However, The new parliament created at the after the elections political tensions will end of this effort will include five active increase even more. political forces in its coalition: This is because while new coalitions -The two central Kurdish parreplace the old ones, all sides seem to ties: The Kurdistan Democratic Party have agreed on the exclusion of the (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of prime minister from the politics of the Kurdistan (PUK); ballot box. The coalition process be-The two Shiite parties; the Dawa tween competing lists came to an end. Party currently in power and the Islamic Meanwhile political forces are prepar- Supreme Council of Iraq, ing for coalitions in the parliament that will be formed after the elections. In -The Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party. this context, Erbil is winking to the forFour years of escalating disagreeEurasiaCritic February 2010 35

Iraqi Elections

ments between Maliki and the forces tion. The Kurds and a few of the Shiite within his coalition, lead America and groups in the five party coalition might some Iraqis to thinking that it is time use tactical means to reduce the Sunnis for real change. The US call for change ability to gain power. This will give the to the northern Iraq Kurdish adminis- US a serious headache. tration’s president, Massoud Barzani At this stage Maliki’s has little abiland to Iraqi Vice President Tariq Al- ity to achieve concrete success in the Hashimi is a determining factor. area of national compromise or to parAdditionally, it should be taken into ticipate in such a process. It is certain consideration that the details of con- that the US and many Iraqi forces are ditions in Iraq are not similar to the determined to use every means to force conditions that obMaliki out of political tained during the 2005 elections. Sunni Arabs In response to the elections. The Shiite have withdrawn their Arab card that Turkey formation is starkly support for Maliki. has played, Iran, divided between the The Kurds lost conIsrael, Egypt and national coalition list fidence in the prime led by Abdul Aziz alminister as a result of Saudi Arabia all want Hakim and Maliki’s his slowness in realizto show themselves. new list. The Kurdish ing their constitutional formation has also gains. The Shiite powbeen dissipated by the weakness of ers do not trust Maliki’s tendency to PUK and the emergence of the Change turn Iraq into a powerful central govlist led by Nawshirwan Mustafa, Ta- ernment. Neighboring Arab states are labani’s former deputy. Observing this also bothered by Maliki’s sectarian tensituation made some groups want to dencies. eliminate the 511 people alleged to be Powerful Arab nations in the reBaathist. However, it is certain that gion seem far from being able to fill the Sunnis will emerge from these elections geopolitical gap that has emerged in stronger than they did after the 2005 the Middle East. However, Turkey, in elections. This is practically Maliki’s particular, is increasing its influence on only trump card against the coalition groups in Iraq and tackling other probto be formed during and after the elec- lems. In response to the Arab card that 36 EurasiaCritic February 2010

Turkey has played, Iran, Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia all want to show themselves. While tension between Israel and the Turkish government is rising, Iran is trying to respond to Turkey’s initiatives in Iraq. It is understood that Egypt and Saudi Arabia are also preparing to enter a strategic partnership against Turkey. This is because the strongest Sunni groups in Iraqi politics trust Turkey more than the Arab League.

The Iraqi elections are seen as the most hopeful opportunity ever. Although there are many elements that deserve this conception, it is obvious that the elections bear the potential for heavy political conflict. The possibility that tensions carried from the streets to the political arena could again turn into widespread armed conflict should not be underestimated. Since these are the last elections of the occupation period March 7 is of crucial importance.

Everyone agrees on the fact that the future is a turning point for Iraq. However, the success of the elections will be understood during the formation of the government, or more accurately, the power sharing. Whatever happens, for Iraqis the March 7 elections will be remembered as the dawn of becoming a new nation.

Ukraine

Ukraine’s Elections: The Iron Curtain Gives Way to NATO Expansion

By Ozer Cetinkaya

U

kraine’s elections will be remembered as the first disaster for the glasnost policy NATO enacted regarding human rights and democracy. Above all, it must be seen as the first setback for NATO expansion ever since it began. Since 2001 NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s borders has been blocked at the Dnieper River.

Ukraine has taken on the historical role that was played by Germany after 1945 due to its objective conditions. The borders of the Eurasian bloc formed with Moscow’s leadership have now been established on the Dnieper River. The

38 EurasiaCritic February 2010

ongoing retreat since the fall of the So- Hungarian Empire. The western region viet Union has been stopped. Either a was influenced by the Austro-Hungarnew ceasefire will occur, or else a con- ians, absorbed Central European culclusive peace treaty will be signed. ture and was Catholicized. The eastThis is because ern region fell under Ukraine can be spoRussian dominion and Ukrainian power was entirely Russian ken of as two regions, allied with the West and Orthodox in chareastern and western. represents a break This perspective’s hisacter. The depth of with Russia. this relationship is extorical roots go back pressed in an old Rusto the eighteenth sian proverbs that says, century. In the eighteenth century the Dnieper served as “Moscow is our heart, St. Petersburg is the border between the Orthodox Rus- our brain and Kiev is our mother.” This sian Czardom and the Catholic Austro- context makes it possible to say that there is an undeniable historical bond between Ukraine and Russia.

Ukrainian power allied with the West represents a break with Russia and a rapprochement with the US and NATO. From Russia’s perspective, the loss of Ukraine from its geography would be worse than the loss of any other nation. With its population of nearly 50 million and its vast steppes, Ukraine is both Russia’s door to the West and its first line of defense. Moreover, it is a critical valve for getting Russian hydrocarbon resources to Europe.

If Ukraine were in NATO, it would be the key to the West keeping Russia under its control. For the Transatlantic bloc to keep Russia from once again becoming a threat winning the Ukraine is a necessity. Anyway, this is what the Orange Revolution was about. Fight-

Ukraine

ing in Iraq and Afghanistan, from the its former back yard, Ukraine. On the perspective of NATO, meaning the US, other side, after the Orange Revolution since it was impossible to take control the natural gas crises that began in 2006 and were repeated of the Ukraine by force, intermittently afternew arguments in the Today the threat faced wards were in reality name of democracy and

by Ukraine is not not the basic probhuman rights were used who will attack them, lem with relation to effect regime change. but who will try to between Russia and After the fall of the the Ukraine, but the Soviet Union, as soon as weaken them. reflection of much the Russian motherland was put back in order it deeper problems. began to push against its old borders. On the eve of 2006 their bilateral relaRealizing that a Ukraine allied with tions were worsened much more by the Western power had escaped its control, natural gas price hikes directed at the Russia did not hesitate to use the stra- Ukraine by Russia’s Gazprom and then tegic trump card of “energy” against the natural gas embargo on Ukraine.

To understand relations between Russia and the Ukraine we also need to give an account of Ukraine’s relations with NATO. The main theme of the tension was created by NATO expansion toward the Russian motherland.

While the fact that NATO expansion heralded a basic threat to its security did not escape the Kremlin, a NATO aligned government in Kiev was called a national security threat.

Relations with NATO Ukraine’s integration into European and Atlantic security structures and the permanent conversion of its national security system became inEurasiaCritic February 2010 39

Ukraine Probable effects of the election’s outcome: 1. The Ukraine’s relationship with NATO will be in deep freeze.

2. Relations between Russia and Ukraine will be improved.

3. Russia’s military presence in Crimea will be increased, which will in turn increase its activities in the Black Sea. 4. Georgia will face a policy of isolation in the Black Sea. 5. Europe’s dependency on Russian energy will be increased.

6. Europe interest and support for the NABUCCO project will be diminished.

7. Moscow will help Ukraine to improve its economy. In exchange treaties involving strategic advantages will be signed.

8. Russia will support the modernization of the Ukrainian army for the sake of NATO’s complete withdrawal.

9. NATO expansion will shift towards the Pacific.

10. Moscow will attempt to advance its defense lines towards the West.

separable targets. However, with the weaken them. Understanding this well, last elections Russia managed to stick over the last four years the Ukrainian the Slavic sword right people have watched in the middle of this the weakening of their Reforms were target. pro-Western governstumbling due to For NATO two ment and have changed clashes of interest and driving forces are to their direction. This economic realities, be found behind this basic point caused the target. One of them pro-Westerners to lose and yet gradually was Ukraine’s nathe elections, along with being realized. tional interests. The these factors: other is relations bea) political instabiltween NATO and the Ukraine. Today ity b) economic collapse the threat faced by Ukraine is not who will attack them, but who will try to c) the US and NATO’s failure to de40 EurasiaCritic February 2010

liver on their promises d) deepening social disappointment Reforms were stumbling due to clashes of interest and economic realities, and yet gradually being realized.

Ukraine had been participating in the Partnership for Peace planning and review process since the beginning (1994).

Initially the focus was more on the units to be allocated to the PfP activities led

by NATO. However in 2000, Ukraine decided to use this planning tool for the purpose of supporting defense reform.

For NATO the most important obstacles to the progress of the reforms were seen as existing resources and armed forces not falling under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. Moreover powerful NATO members within the EU, such as Germany and France, kept Ukraine on its toes in order to protect their relationships with Russia. This led

Ukraine to deep social disappointment and the for another year. After the formation people chose to get closer to Russia. of a new government, Russia-Ukraine Interdependence on issues such as relations should be expected to normalenergy, terrorism and radicalism also ize. The first step towards normalizamotivates Russia and NATO member tion is the Kremlin’s immediate assignnations to negotiate ment of an ambassador on points of contento the open position in Thus it can be said tion. Thus it can be Kiev. Next, Russian that the biggest said that the biggest economic aid will beobstacle to a new obstacle to a new cold gin to flow to Ukraine. cold war is both war is both security The basis of this aid security and energy and energy interdewill again be energy. pendence between Ukraine will receive interdependence actors. On the other incremental investbetween actors. hand, it should be rements from Russian membered that there corporations. Energy is a limit to the interdependence be- collaboration will increase Europe’s detween these parties. The Russian Min- pendency on Russia. With the eliminaister of Defense at the time, Sergey tion of the Ukraine problem, European Ivanov, looked his American colleagues in the eye during the NATO expansion meeting in Istanbul and drew these limits by saying, “NATO expansion poses a bigger potential for conflict than the Cold War.” NATO realizes that it is not facing the old Russia. However, the US and England, in particular, have not managed to overcome their mood of distrust towards cooperation with Russia.

Russia is not an enemy, but not yet an ally either. The parties are suspicious of one another. The main factor that will determine the relationship from now on is this suspicion.

countries will reduce their interest and support for the NABUCCO project. In return for all this, Russia will grant strategically advantageous treaties to the Ukrainian government. NATO collaboration with Ukraine will be abolished if possible, or else put in deep freeze.

Black Sea security is a card that Russia will play. With the new mentality Kiev warming towards the BLACKSEAFOR to which Russia and Turkey attribute great importance, Georgia will face policy of isolation in the Black Sea.

The New Capital, Donetsk Yanukovych is generally considered to be on the Russian side, while Tymoshenko is thought to be on the Western side. However, it should be

The Kremlin’s Steps Along with the presidency, the formation of the government under the semi-presidential system is important, too. The Regions Party led by Yanukovych has already started negotiations with almost all the other parties represented in parliament in order to form a new coalition government. The Regions Party might form a new coalition with the Our Ukraine Party founded by former President Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of the Orange Revolution.

This is because many MPs that have little chance of being reelected should be expected to support this government in the case of a new parliamentary election. A new parliamentary election does not seem possible for Ukraine, at least EurasiaCritic February 2010 41

Ukraine crisis brought Ukraine and Russia closer together. According to her, after the global crisis, Russia began to realize its “responsibilities arising from the past” towards its neighbors. During her term as prime minister, she cancelled the privatization of the steel giant, Kirvozihstal, which had been sold to Akhmetov for 800 million dollars and later facilitated its sale to India’s steel giant, Mittal Steel, for 4.79 billion dollars. The likelihood of this situation changing during Yanukovych’s term is uncertain, but Russia’s weight will become more evident in Ukrainian politics.

The Status of Crimea

taken into account that in recent years of children. Yanukovych has assigned this assessment has begun to lose its special importance toward using ecovalidity, since although they seem to nomics during his term, since he got be opposed, both sides make sure to the majority of his votes in the eastern wink at the global circles. It is true that region. The center of this region can Yanukovych gives priority to relations said to be Donetsk where he served as with Russia. He declared that if he is governor. This region is also the heart elected commerce with Russia will in- of the Ukrainian economy. It is often crease from 13 million said that Yanukovych to 40 million dollars. has the support of With the loss of However, he also used the richest businessYushchenko, the the slogan: “Neither man in Ukraine, Rinat support Crimea’s the EU nor Russia, Akhmetov. The owner Tatars have had since the goal is the whole of the SCM Holdworld.” Of course, this the Orange Revolution ings, established in slogan was created in Donetsk, Akhmetov will disappear. order to win votes in is of Tatar origin and the western regions. is among the most According to Yanukovych, his country powerful men in Ukraine. It is known can act as a bridge between the EU and that he is also politically influential. the CIS nations. He also claims that He is also associated with Turkish busiRussian should be the second national nessmen that have close relationships language. For this he uses the slogan: with the Turkish government. This will “two languages, one nation.” If he is bring different options for Ukraine’s elected it will be seen what he will do economic development during Yaabout it, and what reaction he nukovych’s term. With this structure, will get. Meanwhile, and again, if he Donetsk might begin to function as the is elected, he has made domestic politi- real capital of Ukraine. cal promises such as five years of tax exTymoshenko’s Path emptions for small businesses and the provision of government aid for famiIn an article published in Newsweek, lies with low incomes and high numbers Tymoshenko stated that the economic 42 EurasiaCritic February 2010

Ukraine is also important to Russia for its Crimean Peninsula and the Russian naval base located there. Ukraine is an indispensable port for the Russian fleet, which generally uses Ukraine to exit into the Black Sea. Although Russia has started building a new marine base in order to overcome its dependency on Sevastopol, it will certainly remain dependent on Ukraine in this area. Historically, the Russian population in the Crimean Peninsula and the Russian minority living in the country as a whole is a leading factor highlighting Ukraine in Russian international politics.

With the loss of Yushchenko, the support Crimea’s Tatars have had since the Orange Revolution will disappear.

If parliamentary elections are held soon it seems that it will be impossible for the only Tatar representative in Kiev, Mustafa Cemilov, to be reelected. It is obvious that Tatars that have been denied their rights to autonomy, and losing their only representation in the Rada will generate support for the rising Wahhabi Islamists. This will increase tensions in Crimea. Moscow will certainly use its influence in Kiev in the case of a conflict involving the dominant Russian population in Crimea. Ukraine is actually a place where cold war never ended. “Ukraine” means “border country,” and continued its historical role as a field for struggle between the West and the East. Today however, it is emerging as the new Iron Curtain blocking NATO expansion.

Georgian Security

“The Emergence and Evolution of Georgian Security Discourse: Failures and Implications”

By Aslan Yavuz Sir

I

t is common knowledge that the August 2008 conflict erupted in response to the ongoing dispute between Russian Federation and Republic of Georgia. Still without being aware of the fundamental elements of Georgia’s unresolved embroilment with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it would be impossible to understand the recent conflict, its implications and future developments in the South Caucasus. One might ask whether “the South Ossetian war of 2008 [was] inevitable?”1 With Mikhail Saakashvili’s rise to power in 2004, peoples and states in the Caucasus region began to utter a more hope-

44 EurasiaCritic February 2010

ful tone for the possible resolution of declared principles laid out by the Saalong-standing conflicts in the region, kashvili government itself, in a way which was also reflected in Saakash- that the stability not only of Georgia vili government’s promises and policy but of the whole region was threatened choices. However, from the beginning by armed conflicts. There are several of his rule, Saakashvili reasons for the failure government’s policies of this new approach, Saakashvili concerning Georgia’s but this paper specifigovernment’s most detrimental cally aims to highlight security policy and problems proved to Georgian security disits implementation be failure to ensure course and its evolucontravened each security, stability or tion, as well as assess development. On the its weaknesses in relaother. contrary, Georgia’s setion to the dispute with curity policies evolved, Abkhazia and its impliin contradiction with the official and cations for Georgian security policy.

The central point in our analysis is that the security discourse put forward

by Saakashvili government since its coming to power in 2004 failed to prove sustainable. The main argument is that the security perceptions of the two sides became incompatible with each other since these policies were shaped by the mutual clashes as well as the application of a security discourse which does not fit into the peculiar security situation inherent in the Caucasus. On the contrary, Georgian government’s policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia were continuously strained, and consequently, burst into armed conflict in August 2008. Russian Federation’s decision to recognize the independence of the two regions caused an irreversible rupture in the establishment of a normalization process. The security perception of the two sides evolved since

Georgian Security

the dissolution of the Soviet Union tain domestic transformations, potenand since then both sides attempted to tial civil strife and regional violence. push forward unilateral policies upon Caucasus region was shaken with two each other. This study will try to under- major ethnic conflicts, which still continue to threaten sestand the evolution of curity, stability and security perceptions State-building, therefore create unand major issues that economic development certainty for the counshape the security poland securitization tries and peoples of icies of Georgia and the region. Georgian Abkhazia. Thus, it is processes in Poststate declared its indealso argued that a seSoviet Countries had pendence in such circurity discourse which been a more difficult cumstances as a weak takes the international experience compared state in a fragmented institutional and politto the Western nationregion.2 No country in ical perspective domistate model. nant in the West or any of the sub-regions one that is imposed by of the post-Soviet reforeign powers bears gion is more central the threat of incongruity between the than Georgia in determining whether sides and therefore marginalization of settled threats in the region would afthe ongoing security problems. fect other countries and security in the region. Attempting to define the maGeorgian National Security jor parameters of Georgian security is Discourse therefore detrimental to understand Dissolution of the Soviet Union the source of conflicts.

For the sake of a more solid analyleft the post-Soviet space with uncer-

sis, examination of the Georgian security will be limited to the period following the Saakashvili government’s coming to power, which we argue has thawed the frozen conflicts by attempting to adopt a clearly defined security policy, but failed to erect a case-specific solution to its security issues. Still an overall analysis of pre-Saakashvili period on the evolution of Georgian national security concept will be made. Then, what determines Georgia’s security? It can be argued that three main points are worth mentioning: 1. Violent separatist conflicts, seen as threat to the territorial integrity of the state 2. Georgia’s first government’s heritage, which left country weakened and poorly positioned 3. Instability that prevails beyond borders, such as Nagorno-Karabakh to the south and Chechnya to the north Saakashvili government’s efforts towards defining Georgia’s security focused on overcoming these three probEurasiaCritic February 2010 45

Georgian Security

lems in order to be able to break with reflects the confusion that the security the past state practices, reinvigorate studies experiences in the post-Cold the state, strengthen executive power, War period. The inability to define disrupt criminal networks, restore cen- and locate national interests, as well tral authority, create as threats, orientaa trustworthy police tion and policy overWhite Paper, in 2002, force and collect taxes laps with the ambigufailed to provide a etc. The Rose Revoity surrounding the concrete examination lution is assumed to traditionalist views of the security of security inherent bring about a more in the international focused and decisive challenges facing the security structures. policy concerning the country or a definition Despite the prevailabove said problems. of a national security ing anti-Russian sentiHowever, as we will strategy. ment in the Georgian see Saakashvili govpolitics, 1990s obliged ernment’s security policy and its implementation i contravened d all ll ex-Soviet S i republics to search ways to integrate themselves with the Western each other.

Georgia’s experience with the intro- world. The emergence and evolution of duction of a national security discourse the Georgian security concept security 46 EurasiaCritic February 2010

has been a process that clearly predicated the concerns uttered in the debates that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While traditional security studies prioritized a state-centered military-strategic security perception, in all of the post-Soviet republics and in Georgia, state differed from that which was taken for granted by the traditional security studies. Therefore, state-building, economic development and securitization processes in these countries had been a more difficult experience compared to the Western nation-state model. Especially, for Georgia which adopted a policy of emancipation from the Russian influence, 1990s had proved the identification of security and national interests a fragile process. Thus security discourse that

Georgian Security was attempted to be built in the 1990s was inapplicable and became incongruent due to lack of legitimacy, the uncertainty of the state-building process and dissonance within the decision-making levels of the state. After the 1990s, country delved into a colored revolution with a renewed and more decisive attitude towards the establishment of a sound security discourse, but again problems emerged in the implementation of these new policies.

ports produced during that period were state-building, the challenge of separatism, the interference of external players in domestic affairs, corruption, social inequality, the risk of regional conflict, Georgia’s military inferiority, and possible ecological catastrophes. Darchiashvili summarizes the content of these reports: Some of these draft documents invoked the prevalence of ethnic identity over citizenship in the broader public’s attitudes, the low prestige of law enEvolution of the Georgian forcement agencies, and the violation National Security Discourse of human rights by representatives of The evolution of Georgian national those agencies. Many of them emphasecurity began in mid 1990s with the sized the need to protect human rights, Shevardnadze government’s undertak- to achieve civilian control over the ing. Shevardnadze had ordered the cre- military, to foster political pluralism, ation of a state comand to strengthen lomission to develop a cal self-government.

The definition of a national security conThey also urged the security identity for cept in 1996. In 1997, peaceful solution of Georgian state is Parliament adopted a Georgia’s frozen ethlimited. resolution on military nic conflicts.3 doctrine, based on a In summer 1999, a document written largely by the Minis- new draft document was prepared by ter of Defense and modified by the Par- the state commission. The new report liamentary Committee on Defense and outlined a clearer vision of Georgia’s Security. The document followed Rus- strategic vision by indicating the intensian military doctrine’s discourse and tion to join the key institutions of Euroit emphasized the need to cooperate Atlantic community. It recommended with all states, while the document did a break with the past strategic vision not define Georgia’s national interests and prioritized Westernization in all or the threats the country faced. The spheres of socio-political life. Still this document did not find ground in the Georgian parliament.

The first attempt to erect a sound national security concept emerged from the recommendations provided by the London-based International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) that was formed in 1996 to provide high-level independent advice to the Baltic countries on the reform and modernization of their national security sectors. In 1998, Georgian government asked ISAB to prepare a recommendation report on the modernization of Georgia’s security policies. The group’s first report on Georgia was prepared in 1999. In 1999, the National Security Council acknowledged these recommendations to formulate a national security concept.

Major issues emphasized in several re-

new document also failed to provide concrete determination of the threats and risks, and obviously national interests. The adoption of a Western conception of security presumed NATO membership and deepened cooperation with the EU, while expressing skepticism over Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the existence of Russian military bases on the Georgian territory. A report which was published by the initiative of ISAB following this report entitled “Georgia and the World: Vision and Strategy for the Future” advanced further the proposed vision by including new attention to military reform so as to integrate Georgian military and defense policy with the Western world. Yet again both documents received no particular attention in the inner circles of the Georgian politics, nor was it taken into official consideration by the authorities.

In 2002, a White paper was published by the Ministry of Defense4 which simply summarized the organization of the armed forces, emphasized civilian control of the military while minimizing the importance of integration with NATO. The document again failed to provide a concrete examination of the security challenges facing the country or a definition of a national security strategy. In 2003, the National Security Council had prepared a new

EurasiaCritic February 2010 47

Georgian Security integrity and ensuring the non-violability of its internationally recognized borders. Georgia will employ all available lawful means to resolve peacefully and justly all issues that might arise in the process of restoring the constitutional order on the territory of Georgia.”7 The following elements are therefore linked directly to the territorial integrity, since Georgia defines the problem as one of a statehood issue, the attainment of which defines the achievability of the other elements.

Threats, Risks and Challenges to National Security Georgian Ambassador to the EU Salome Samadashvili

and more inclusive draft. This new draft also underscored the possible integration into NATO, but it provided more comprehensive evaluation of foreign relations, Georgia’s regional role and enmity in relations with Russia. Darchiashvili argued that in this draft the core principles such as “democratization and human rights issues were ignored. Instead, the document noted the chance the Georgian nation had to build a state corresponding to its spiritual preferences and cultural distinctiveness.”5 In 2005, a new National Security Document6 was ratified by the Georgian Parliament. This new official strategy adopted a multi-tiered understanding of security, while national interests, threats, risks and challenges to national security and main directions of Georgia’s National Security Policy are outlined. The document is of advisory value, but since together with Constitution of Georgia and National Military Strategy paper, it is one of the defining elements and blueprints of Georgian security.

Fundamental National Values and National Interests of Georgia In the National Security Concept document, Georgia’s fundamental national values are defined as of “ultimate 48 EurasiaCritic February 2010

Possible threats and risks to the maintenance of these values and interests are directly linked with the schema provided in these documents. The definition of a security identity for Georgian importance to the very existence and state is limited and drawn according to security of Georgia, and to the security the main elements hereby declared, but and prosperity of its citizens”. These still the threats and adequate policies to values, namely independence, freedom, overcome these threats do not reflect a democracy and the rule of law, prosper- reformed understanding of Georgian ity, peace and security, are mentioned security. Firstly, the document does not as the values that will be protected by make a distinction between internal all available lawful means. and external dimensions and interprets The National Security Concept factors of Georgian security as interredocument defines Georgia’s national lated issues. For Georgia the primary interests as threat to Georgian 1. Ensuring terstatehood is defined The problematic ritorial integrity as “infringement of vision outlined 2. Ensuring naGeorgia’s territorial tional unity and civil in the national integrity” which is araccord gued to be at stake security documents 3. Regional stadue to the threat of reflects the fact bility “de facto separation that confusion 4. Strengthening of Abkhazia and the surrounding Georgian freedom and democformer Autonomous security-makers since racy in neighboring District of South Ossestates and regions independence. tia from Georgia, and 5. Strengthening loss of control over the state’s transit functhese territories by the tion and energy security Georgian authorities.” The problem is 6. Environmental security of the seen as the root of political, economic country and region and social instabilities in Georgia.

7. Preserving national and culSecondly, the possibility of a spilltural uniqueness over of conflicts from neighboring state As the enumeration suggests, ensur- is defined as a threat. Namely, acting as ing territorial integrity is assumed to a destabilizing factor, spillover of conbe the primary national interest, by de- flicts might cause provocations from claring that the state is “is dedicated to state and non-state actors in and outrestoring and maintaining its territorial side Georgian territory, dragging Geor-

Georgian Security

gia into conflicts in the region due to rity risk and the withdrawal of Russian “uncontrolled borders”. The document military from the Georgian territory as also refers to Russian military presence the basis for “normalization of bilateral in Georgia as a threat factor, which is relations and strengthening of mutual confidence.” no longer the case.

Corruption and inefficient public Thirdly, the document emphasizes the possibility of a military intervention administration system, together with in Georgia, as Russian Federation con- social and economic challenges, entinues to grant citiergy related challenges, zenship rights to the information related Georgian “insecurity” population in the de challenges and environhas become the main mental challenges are facto republics. The problem, as a result of also defined as risks to document highlights the inability to provide Georgian national secuthe possibility that rity. Among these risks, there is a possibility a sound and adaptive corruption and ineffithat Russian Federasecurity strategy. cient public administration could use it as an tion are seen as threats excuse to intervene in Georgian sovereignty, which already to the development of the democratic proved true in the case of South Ossetia regime, institutionalization, economic development, and therefore social coin August 2008.

The document also outlines interna- hesion and balance. Saakashvili governtional terrorism, contraband and trans- ment’s rise to power is interpreted as national organized crime as threats to a result of mistrust in the government, Georgia’s security. Moreover, Russian which the Georgian society saw cormilitary bases are mentioned as a secu- rupted and inefficient. State’s inability

and incapacity to find a permanent solution to the threats posed by the two regions to the territorial integrity of Georgia, worsening economic conditions and corruption were seen as important factors in the period before the Rose Revolution.

Main Directions of Georgia’s National Security Policy as Outlined in the National Security Concept The principles laid out in this chapter outlines major political goals in line with the national interests defined in the document. Strengthening of Public Administration and Consolidation of Democratic Institutions call for institutional reform so as to develop a democratic political system of governance via decentralization and legitimacy of the government. Thus, it emphasizes efforts to combat corruption, increasing transparency and accountability as well as administrative and legal measures necessary to implement adequate EurasiaCritic February 2010 49

Georgian Security

mechanisms to secure democratiza- on the peaceful settlement of the contion. Secondly, the document highlights flicts “based on international law” while the need to strengthen state defense, implying Georgian government’s readimilitary reform and modernization of ness to “ensure protection provide civil, the Georgian army. Cooperation with economic social, religious and cultural NATO through the implementation of rights of all ethnic groups” in Georgia. the Individual Partnership Action Plan The document prioritizes the principle of Georgian territorial integrity and is a major concern. broad regional autonThe critical eleomy and mentions the ment of this section is Modern Georgian proposal put forward by evaluated under the insecurity “does not Saakashvili government heading “Restoraderive from a dearth in 2005 concerning the tion of the Territorial of protection, but from settlement of disputes Integrity of Georthe ‘lack of clarity or and renunciation of gia”, which evaluates its scope.’ forces by highlighting the influence of unresolved dispute with “the principles of selfAbkhazia and the determination of naformer Autonomous District of Geor- tions, cultural identity, minority rights, gia. Accordingly, the inability to control human rights and freedom and equality these two regions “hampers Georgia’s of citizens as stipulated by the Constitutransformation into a full democracy” tion of Georgia.” The vagueness of the and the document offers that with the proposal as to the implementation of a participation of Abkhazia and South plan in line with the principle of selfOssetia, constitutional order of Georgia determination seems to contradict with could be developed. There is emphasis the emphasis on the territorial integrity.

50 EurasiaCritic February 2010

Moreover, the document repeatedly highlights international law and Constitution of Georgia.

Concerning the external dimension of Georgian national security, integration with NATO, EU and relations with United States, Ukraine, Turkey and Azerbaijan are examined. On relations with Georgia, document suggests, Georgia aspires to build cooperation with Russia upon the principles of good neighborly relations, equality and mutual respect. Georgia would welcome transition of Russia into a stable democratic state with a functioning market economy and respect for European values. Democratization and foreign policy predictability of the Russian Federation would positively influence Georgia’s and the regional security environment.

Georgia expresses its readiness to intensify political dialogue, deepen trade, economic and socio-cultural relations, cooperate in solving regional conflicts, and to fight against terrorism

Georgian Security and transnational crime with the Russian Federation. Georgia believes that conclusion of the framework agreement on friendship and cooperation will create favorable conditions for the improvement of relations between the two states. Georgia reiterates its commitment to sign the framework agreement without delay.

The Russian Federation must fulfill the obligations undertaken at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit regarding the withdrawal of its military bases from Georgian.8

Assessment At its core, Georgian security is about statehood. Beyond this case, it reflects the obtrusive reality that an insecure Georgia exists within a region of insecure states. The problematic vision outlined in the national security documents, although bringing no official or formal liabilities for the state policy, reflects the fact that confusion surrounding Georgian security-makers since independence. Beginning from the first attempt at formulating a national security strategy, significant uncertainties surrounding Georgian statehood are placed at the center of the security formulations. Georgian “insecurity” has become the main problem, as a result of the inability to provide a sound and the increasing tensions”11, namely inseadaptive security strategy. Moreover, curity. Saakashvili government’s stateGeorgian security is thrown between building efforts were focused on an the two peaks, namely a Russian-ori- aggressive agenda of democratization, ented and a Western-oriented secu- fight against corruption and institutionrity scheme.9 Therefore al reform. Still the modern Georgian insestate-building efforts Ethnic exclusivity curity “does not derive were aimed at the among the Georgian from a dearth of protecintegration of the unpeople is assumed to tion, but from the ‘lack controlled territories. prevent loyalty and of clarity or its scope’.10 Saakashvili’s aim was social cohesion among Another critical that a strengthened, problem that defines the citizens of Georgia. wealthy and demothe Georgian security cratic Georgian state is the dilemma between would reassure the the state-building process (which is the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossource of insecurity) and security which setia and attract their attention to the is defined as the source of the problems possibility of a reintegration solution to with the statehood. Thus “particular the ongoing dispute.12 centralizing characteristics of Georgia’s The lack of clarity in defining Georstate-building program, some of them gian security, i.e. process itself began necessary reforms … contributed to not with a focus on the security, but

on threats – that is, by defining threats themselves. Thus, security was defined with less reference on Georgia’s ability to fashion a security strategy than to create a development strategy. On the contrary success of a possible Georgia’s development strategy was directly attached to the statehood problem. This however is dependent upon the ensuring sovereignty and independence of Georgia. Statehood precedes security.13 The two processes continuously forced each other and lead to a two-tiered security understanding, namely one of a statehood vs. security situation. The dilemma between statehood and security had been a major roadblock to ensuring security.

Ghia Nodia argues that there are four major roadblocks to statehood in Georgia. First, ethnic exclusivity among the Georgian people is assumed to preEurasiaCritic February 2010 51

Georgian Security

Georgian soldiers participate in NATO training exercises.

vent loyalty and social cohesion among the citizens of Georgia. Second, Nodia argues that a Soviet legacy aiding fragmentation is still influential. Third, powerful alternative national projects gained ground in Georgia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Fourth, Nodia argues that there is an array of potential sources of tension, namely an internal dimension of national security challenge.14 With reference to the first point, Darchiashvili argues that the future of Georgia’s Rose Revolution depends on its ability to mobilize around a national idea. Accordingly, Georgia’s democratic forces must promote Georgian nationalism to strengthen national project, but ethnicity-based nationalism must be abandoned.

Soviet legacy is one of the major causes behind the failure of institutional mechanisms. The institutional structures as well as the political system in Georgia were neatly based on the Soviet legacy and this legacy still continues to have detrimental effects for the country. Therefore, when Georgian government made the strategic decision to break up with the Soviet past and 52 EurasiaCritic February 2010

orient the country towards the Western model, the decision and the intention to be a part of the West in fact refers to the modernization of the country, i.e. the process of securitization. Thus adoption of the Western model is for security’s sake, not because of a strong attachment to the model’s intrinsic world.

Thus another major critical problem for Georgian state-building, in connection to the institutional failures, is the criminalized state, which Saakashvili government targeted by the enervation of institutional organization. Darchiashvili argues that as a security problem, criminalization of the state structures caused the erosion of national security.15 National security concept pays particular attention to the problem of institutional reform and fight with corruption and other criminal activities inherent in the post-Soviet state system in Georgia.

In a similar fashion Pavel Baev argues that “Georgia’s troubles derive principally from the anomalies and distortions of its own society, political institutions, or communist legacies than from the all-penetrating shadow economy and corruption”16. The goal of

the state is defined as creating a liberal democratic system, but one that protects Georgia’s unique cultural and historical identity. Darchiashvili & Nodia, stress the contradiction between the liberal and democratic inclinations of the new elite and the widely popular traditional nationalist sentiment and practices with which they must contend.17 Georgia fell into a duality between democratization by democratic state or a strong state that is powerful and efficient enough to succeed transition process. Even the democratization for the sake of security is compromised18 due to internal political problems between the government and the opposition, now apparent more than ever.

Conclusion Georgian security project is stuck between the attempts to transcend the legacy of Soviet ethno-federalist practices, which are dealt with a Westernbased model of territorial integrity, with democratic forms and efforts aimed at constructing statehood. Consequently, the security discourse put forward by Saakashvili government since its com-

Georgian Security ing to power in 2004 failed to prove sustainable. The security perceptions of the two sides became incompatible with each other since these policies were shaped by the mutual clashes as well as the application of a security discourse which does not fit into the peculiar security situation inherent in the country.

On the contrary, Georgian government’s new security discourse based on state-building measures could not provide a ground for an effective definition of security policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia, continuously straining the security situation and consequently, bursting into armed conflict in August 2008. Russian Federation’s decision to recognize the independence of the two regions caused an irreversible rupture in the establishment of a normalization process.

The security perception of the sides evolved since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and since then both sides attempted to push forward unilateral policies upon each other. While traditional security studies prioritized a state-centered military-strategic security perception, in all of the post-Soviet republics and in Georgia, state differed from that which was taken for granted by the traditional security studies.

Therefore, state-building, economic development and securitization processes in these countries had been a more difficult experience compared to the Western nation-state model. Especially, for Georgia which adopted a policy of emancipation from the Russian influence, 1990s had proved the identifica-

tion of security and national interests a fragile process. Thus security discourse that was attempted to be built in the 1990s was inapplicable and became incongruent due to lack of legitimacy, the uncertainty of the state-building process and dissonance within the decision-making levels of the state. After the 1990s, country delved into a colored revolution with a renewed and more decisive attitude towards the establishment of a sound security discourse, but again problems emerged in the implementation of these new policies.

Bibliography Brockmann, Kathrin & David Bosold (2009) Democratization and Security in Central and Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet States (eds.)

Published by: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige, 12th New Faces Conference March 16–18, 2009, Prague, Czech Republic Coppieters, Bruno (2005) “Locating Georgian Security” in Coppieters, Bruno & Robert Legvold (2005) Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution Cambridge: MIT Press Darchiashvili, David (2005) “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform” in Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution Cambridge: MIT Press Ghia Nodia (2005) “Georgia: Dimensions of Insecurity” in Statehood and security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution, Cambridge: MIT Press Goerge, Julie A. (2009) “The Dangers of Reform: State-building and national minorities in Georgia” Central Asian Survey , Vol. 28, No.2 June Mitchell, Lincoln (2009) “Compromising democracy: state building in Saakashvili’s Georgi” Central Asian Survey Vol. 28 No.2 National Security Concept of Georgia, Last Access: 08/02/2010 http://www.parliament.ge/ files/292_880_927746_concept_en.pdf

References 1 Goerge, Julie A. (2009) “The Dangers of Reform: State-building and national minorities in Georgia” Central Asian Survey , Vol. 28, No.2 June, p135 2 Coppieters, Bruno (2005) “Locating Georgian Security” in Coppieters, Bruno & Robert Legvold (2005) Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution Cambridge: MIT Press, p.339 3 Darchiashvili, David (2005) “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform” in Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 140 4 Ministry of Defence of Georgia: White Paper Last Access: 08.2.2010 http://www.informaworld. com/index/713839623.pdf 5 Darchiashvili (2005) p. 142 6 National Security Concept of Georgia, Last Access: 08/02/2010 http://www.parliament.ge/ files/292_880_927746_concept_en.pdf 7 National Security Concept of Georgia Article 3.1 8 National Security Concept of Georgia Article 5.5.5 9 Maria Raquel Freire and Licínia Simão (2009) “ENP and post-Soviet Transition in the South Caucasus: Triangulating Democracy, Security and Stability” in Democratization and Security in Central and Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet States Kathrin Brockmann, David Bosold (eds.)

Published by: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige pp 63-66 10 Bauman, Zygmunt Europe: an unfinished adventure Polity Press: Cambridge, 2004, p. 95 11 George (2009) p. 135 12 George (2009) p. 141 13 Coppieters (2005) p.9 14 Ghia Nodia (2005) “Georgia: Dimensions of Insecurity” in Statehood and security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution, Cambridge: MIT Press, p.42 15 Darchiashvili (2005) p. 142 16 Coppieters (2005) p.11 17 Coppieters (2005) p. 366 18 Mitchell, Lincoln (2009) “Compromising democracy: state building in Saakashvili’s Georgi” Central Asian Survey Vol. 28 No.2, p. 178

EurasiaCritic February 2010 53

China & Afghanistan

Afghanistan and Volvo

By Ali Kulebi

V

olvo is one of the most prestigious automakers in the world.

An icon of the high quality steel mined along Swedish forests, its brand has been well known for 80 years. Geely, on the other hand, is an unknown Chinese automaker. What is the link between Afghanistan, Volvo and China? The answer to this ques-

54 EurasiaCritic February 2010

tion is not as simple as pointing out that China is a hungry investor because Geely, which produced its first car in 2002, when Afghanistan was occupied, is preparing to buy Volvo from Ford.

This company grew rapidly in the domestic market, and is also exporting to former SSR nations, to the Middle East and Africa. With the capital its

accumulated over the years and help from the Chinese government, it is buying Volvo. We need to recall that Geely established a strategic partnership with Goldman Sachs in producing spare parts for London taxis, and for this job it invested 250 million dollars. It is also necessary to point out that the Chinese government is closely observing these developments, even involved in them, since it is preparing to give one billion dollars to Geely.

Seeing these developments as China’s bid for technological advancement or Beijing’s indifferent development attack means missing the big picture because, with the opportunity created by 2,270 trillion dollar foreign currency reserves, investments are not directed only to safe regions, but also to the world’s Especially China and most problematic, India’s rapid increase even war-ridden areas. in production and Afghanistan, where the United States does consumption has the “heavy lifting,” is increased the demand the most obvious exfor industrial natural ample. Some have arresources. gued that the United States’ occupation of Afghanistan aimed to prevent China from acquiring raw material resources.

This is still being debated. If this is really one of the reasons, the American strategy was unable to block China, even with war because, Beijing chose Afghanistan as the source for meeting Geely’s need for steel and copper, and it succeeded. The Metallurgical Company of China (MCC) bought the management rights of Afghanistan copper fields for twenty-five years. The worth of this investment is eleven million tons.

China & Afghanistan

This is equivalent to one-third of Chi- perpower of the Cold War and today’s only superpower, the United States saw na’s known copper deposits.

Thus, Beijing both guaranteed its fu- the importance of occupying Afghaniture and has become a business partner stan despite heavy casualties and loss of of the Afghan government. Moreover, prestige.

The United States, despite the failthis was accomplished in a situation where the American backed Afghan ure of its Afghanistan adventure with government was struggling even to get NATO, continues to value being present in this country and made the decia confidence vote.

Without doubt, the roots of asym- sion to send an additional 30,000 soldiers in the coming metric warfare go back days. In the same manto the twentieth cenThe largest ner, it requests additury. According to the unexploited copper tional fighting forces founders of the twendeposit in the world from other NATO tieth century science is highly important members, including of geopolitics, Turkesto industry, and Muslim Turkey. This tan is the heart of the development shows world. We observe that it is located in that the United States, this is still valid, given Afghanistan. which wants to get out the occupations that of the Iraqi quagmire, Afghanistan has experienced over the last forty years. We is determined to show a stronger presknow that first the former superpower, ence in Afghanistan and it may even the Soviet Union and then the other su- employ a new strategy. On the other

hand, while the United States increases its military presence, under the framework of the new strategy, it wants to develop this country economically and socially with its allies and reduce the influence of radical religious groups on the Afghan nation.

Underground Strategy As the world population rapidly increases and countries’ living standards rise, the demand for natural resources also increases accordingly. Especially China and India’s rapid increase in production and consumption has increased the demand for agricultural products and especially industrial natural resources. As a result this trend increases the price of various natural resources.

The demand for resources such as oil, iron, zinc, nickel, chrome and especially copper, which industry sorely needs, has increased geometrically.

Thus, the largest unexploited copEurasiaCritic February 2010 55

China & Afghanistan

Moreover, it is said that iron deper deposit in the world is highly important to industry, and it is located in Af- posit in Hajigak, located one hundred ghanistan. This deposit is located eighty and thirty kilometers west of Kabul, is kilometers from Kabul in the Aynak the largest and most important in Asia. region. It is estimated that the worth However, only small amounts of it have of 700 million ton reserves of this pre- been extracted. In other words, these cious metal reserve is 80 billion dollars. important reserves have made no conDoubtlessly, this asset tribution to Afghaniis a godsend and even stan. Continuous wars Iron deposit in a harbinger of rebirth for many years and Hajigak, located one for a nation as poor as occupations by foreign hundred and thirty powers have forced the Afghanistan. nation’s people into a However, copper kilometers west of struggle for survival. is not Afghanistan’s Kabul, is the largest Since mining manonly asset. It has coal and most important in agement requires infields in the Baghlan Asia. vestment and has not region, natural gas been put into action, in Sheberghan, oil in d kh h l b large numbers of people turn to opium Mezar-e Sharif and iron iin B Badakhshan and Sar-e-Pol. It is estimated that these production, which provides secure, regions have significant reserves. In ad- easy and serious income. On the other dition, various parts of the country have hand, difficult terrain and the difficulty lead, zinc, gold, silver, sulphur, beryl of transport to production sites have prevented the exploitation of these reand asbestos deposits.

56 EurasiaCritic February 2010

sources for the benefit of the people and to provide employment.

For example, the iron reserves in Hajigak, approximately 1.5 billion high grade tons, are located at an altitude of 3,500 meters. Since there is no railroad network that could transport the excavated ore, the nation also lacks an ironsteel factory that could process it. Currently landlocked Afghanistan has no way to transport it to the world market.

Would Economy Solve the Problem?

The Obama administration claims that its military will withdraw from Afghanistan in 2011. It is also known that this claim does not fit with the US’s political and strategic line. The US needs Afghanistan and the excuse of terrorism there to maintain its presence in Central Asia. In other words, a forward base like Afghanistan is indispensable to the United States’ strategy for con-

China & Afghanistan trolling Russia on the Asian continent.

On the other hand, the sufferings of the Afghan nation are disturbing to world public opinion. For this reason, the US’s new Afghanistan strategy, while maintaining security to some extent, should provide the Afghan nation with economic opportunities surpass opium production. Thus, natural resources could become means for a US exit strategy. Management of natural resources, the construction of roads for transport to domestic and international markets could provide employment for hundreds of thousands of Afghans.

Consequently, the management project that’s been initiated for Hajigak’s iron fields is a significant step. It is argued that the steel factory planned for this region will provide employment to 80 thousand people. This also means billions of dollars of income for the country’s economy.

It is also known that steps have taken for the management of natural gas in Jowzjan and oil fields in Sar-e Pol and proWho knows, Volvos posals are expected produced with Afghan from foreign comsteel and copper may panies. Iron fields in one day cruise the Logar province have streets of Kabul or already begun to be managed by the ChiHelmand. nese.

But thousands of workers have already begun work under the protection of soldiers and guidance of Chinese engineers at the one of world’s important copper deposits, Aynak. Opening operations here means a new future for Afghanistan and its people.

Afghanistan’s government realistically evaluated this development opportunity and selected China from six- cordance with the criteria set by Afghan teen nations for the management rights government for the management of the of this mining field. They did so because field. This project is China’s biggest China is the closest nation that can pro- overseas investment, and while it reduce the machinery needed to run the veals China’s efforts to acquire natural mine, and because it has the highest resources it underlines the significance demand for copper, you might say, it’s and place of Afghanistan in this stratstarving for copper. China also guaran- egy.

Another plan, promoted by China teed the construction of a power plant, in particular, for transporting Afghaniroads, housing, hospitals and schools, stan’s natural resources to the open a three billion dollar investment, in ac-

Afghan miner drill into rock in a makeshift emerald mine in The Panjshir Valley.

seas is the construction of a railroad that would run from Jeyretan on Uzbekistan’s border, to Kabul and extend east from there to Torkham on the Pakistani border. If this project were realized, it would be realize the stability and security in Afghanistan that American weapons were unable to provide.

Who knows, Volvos produced with Afghan steel and copper may one day cruise the streets of Kabul or Helmand.

EurasiaCritic February 2010 57

Special Report

Environmental Technologies and Renewable Energy: Industry Report

58 EurasiaCritic February 2010

Special Report Domestic Sector 1. Pollution Control, Waste Management and Recycling

E

conomic growth in Turkey has caused an increase in energy demand, industrialization and urbanization, raising concerns about environmental issues. These environmental concerns are forcing Turkey to establish effective water, waste and air pollution control management.

Total environmental expenditure in Turkey was US$7.5billion in 2007. The majority of environmental expenditure was municipality expenditures corresponding to 81.5% of the total, whereas the environmental expenditures of private companies were 8% of the total amounting to US$ 602million.

Turkey’s attempt to become a fullfledged European Union member is creating a positive environment for foreign investment. Regulations in the sector are becoming more favourable for foreign investment, resulting in foreign investors partnering with local businesses in waste management solutions.

The environmental technologies market also benefits from new arrangements in local regulations. Since the change in the article of Environmental Law numbered 2872 in 2006, municipalities have been further enforced to build and establish waste management centres and protocols. The last five-year period has experienced a steep incline in waste management and recycling efforts. As an incentive to reduce and prevent industrial pollution, the government offers industrial plants a re-

duction up to 59% of their electricity goods and services in Turkey. As a rebills if they set up their own waste treat- sult, waste management, water supply ment facilities, in accordance with the and air pollution control have become above-mentioned Environmental Law areas with an ever growing demand and article. opportunities for investment.

Furthermore, the Ministry of EnWaste Management vironment and Forestry proposed a “Solid Waste Action Plan” in order to Currently Turkey’s waste manageorganize waste management policies ment infrastructure is not sufficient and aid in sustaining the sector’s growth to cover the country’s needs where an in 2008. In this report, the Ministry annual amount of 30 million tonnes aimed at drawing out a clear plan for of waste is produced. The majority of the 2008-2012 periods. With the action this waste is stored in municipal waste plan, the number of waste management storage facilities and landfills. Existing centres, the number of municipalities landfills are insufficient in number and participated and the number of people there is only one waste energy plant, that these centres cover reached 108, Izaydas, in the country. Therefore, ex1,128 and 50 million, respectively. And pertise for managing and constructthe number of people that these centres ing landfills and waste energy plants is cover is expected to reach 57 million by needed in order to manage the current 2012. levels of waste proIn order for Turkey duction. Supply of Current water supply to reach the regulatory waste handling equipand management compliance of EU enment, technologies for facilities in Turkey are vironmental requiretreatment of waste, insufficient to meet ments, the EHCIP collection, separation the demand of the (Environmental Heavy and handling are also Cost Investment Planareas with extensive population. ning) Project funded development opporby the EU was estabtunities and therefore lished in January 2004. This project offer investment options in the country. aims to provide funds to the Ministry of According to environmental expenEnvironment and Forestry to increase ditures of Governmental Organizacapacity for a high level of environmen- tions in 2007, water management and tal protection. wastewater management expenditures As seen elsewhere in the world, in- consist of 70% of total environmental dustrialisation and urbanization, rein- expenditure. Comparison of environforced by the economic growth, have mental expenditure by sectors yields increased the need for environmental that wastewater management expenditure in the manufacturing industry incurs 96.7% of total wastewater management expenditure and 79% of total solid waste management in 2007.

Water Supply and Management Population growth in Turkey from 2000 to 2009 from an estimated 65.7

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Special Report

million people to 72.6 million (CAGR monitored by 116 stations between 2005 of 1.1%) resulted in an increasing de- and 2007. The measurement results obmand for drinking and irrigation water tained from the stations are evaluated supply. As of 2008, usable water supply in the environmental laboratories and per capita is approximately 1,600m3, hourly averages are published on the which classifies Turkey as a country fac- air quality monitoring network web site. ing water scarcity.15 Irrigation is the Main obstacles in sustaining an acceptprimary need for water consumption, able level of air pollution are highlightaccounting for 74% of the total in 2008, ed as follows. followed by drinking water at 15% and • Low cost - low quality coal usage industrial use at 11%. in household heating Current water supply and manage• Inefficient use of energy in inment facilities in Turkey are insufficient dustrial production to meet the demand of the population, • Lack of emission control in therand this imbalance is mal power plants likely to increase furAs Turkey’s air The solar energy ther in the future as quality needs to develpotential of Turkey freshwater reserves are op, there will be long is higher than the expected to decline. term opportunities combined potential Only a 34% of the for providers of air of several European population is served by quality control testing water treatment plants stations, with resultcountries. as of 2005. The necesing requirements for sary construction of emission control denew plants and renewal of existing ones vices, electronic displays, and monitorare open to significant investment op- ing devices. portunities in the country.

Air Pollution Control Industrial CO2 emissions, household heating and carbon emissions from vehicles are the two main sources of air pollution in Turkey. Air pollution was 60 EurasiaCritic February 2010

2. Renewable Energy

Alternative energy sources are becoming more and more desirable in the world as pollution has become a global threat and the primary energy sources such as oil, natural gas and coal are

decreasing in supply. The renewable market in Turkey is still at its infant stage with the majority of its capacity coming from thermal plants (66% of total installed capacity as of 2008). Hydro power plants contribute 33%, and the remaining 1% is from geothermal (0.1%) and wind (0.9%) sources as of end 2008.

Recent developments in Turkey such as liberalization of the electricity market and improvements in renewable legislations have opened the door for the growth and investment opportunities in renewable energy sources.

These developments coupled with the country’s naturally endowed potential for solar, geothermal and wind energy resources create a vast potential in this market.

In May 2005, the Law on Utilization of Renewable Energy Resources for Electricity Production No. 5346 was enacted for decentralization of renewable energy sector in Turkey. The law aims to increase renewable energy resources utilization and generate economic, secure, and high quality electricity. Large HEPPs in terms of installed capacity are excluded from the law. The law enacts feed-in tariffs determined by EMRA for power plants in operation for less than 10 years. However, same tariffs for every energy resource are to be determined whereas diversification may be necessary and there is also a need for efficient tax and investment incentives.

Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources prepares to give a draft report which is expected to be presented to Parliament in the first half of 2010. Despite the delay in the incentives, there is a considerable interest of investors to the renewable energy sector.

As of 2008, total electricity installed capacity is 41,802.6 MW in Turkey. 33% of total installed capacity corresponds to hydroelectricity, 32% to natural gas, 24% to coal, and the remaining 1% to other resources.

Hydroelectric Energy The installed hydroelectricity capacity of the 150 HEPPs (13.8 GW) corresponds to approximately 38% of

Special Report

the country’s technical hydroelectricity potential of 36 GW. The electricity generated from the hydroelectricity plants amounted to 33 TWh as of 2008.

66% of the total number of new licences granted to the private sector in 2008 was for construction of new HEPPs. The majority of the HEPPs are owned and operated by the state. The rest is divided among BOT and TORs and the private sector players. In practice, licences are usually granted for 49 years.

Wind Turkey represents an attractive geography for wind energy investments.

The Aegean and Marmara regions are the most attractive regions for wind energy power generation. The installed capacity of wind energy is 363.7 MW in 200819 and the total wind energy potential is estimated at 131,756 MW. TEIAS projections for 2009-2018

include 4 different scenarios; with high- cording to TEIAS, the licence applicaer-lower capacity and higher-lower de- tions need to go under a technical remand. According to the high capacity view to decide on the feasibility of nonscenario of TEIAS, installed capacity of overlapping applications and for the wind energy is expected to reach 1,012 overlapping licence applications which have passed the techMW by 2011 with a nical reviews, TEIAS project electricity genTurkey has high will make its decision eration of 3,176 GWh potential of resources through a tender bidcontinuing to increase for the use of new ding where the highest to 3,663 GWh in 2012. renewable energy bidder will be granted There has been a the licence for a WPP. significant amount of technologies.

As of September interest in wind-based 2009, there are a total generation which has resulted in 1,118 licence applications of 105 WPP given and approved licencfor a total of 86GW capacity since 2002. es, with a capacity of 4,237 MW. There This high level of enthusiasm has fur- are 727 licences awaiting review, correther caused multiple applications for sponding to 31,957 MW. overlapping locations and capacities Geothermal exceeding the supported limits. In November 1st 2007 alone, there have been Turkey takes 5th place for geother725 such licence applications amount- mal resources and 7th for the utilizaing to a total capacity of 71.4 GW. Given tion of these resources in the world. the supported grid capacity of 7 GW ac- However, only 3% of the total potential EurasiaCritic February 2010 61

Special Report

(31,500 MW) is in use23. Two-thirds of the country’s geothermal resources are located in the Aegean region.

Out of the licenses granted by EMRA in 2008, only one was for a geothermal plant of 15 MW. Lack of technical expertise can be one of the main reasons for the low exploitation of the geothermal resources in Turkey.

The exploration, development, ownership rights and economic use of geothermal resources are regulated by the Geothermal Resources and Mineral Waters Law No. 5686, enacted in 2007.

Licensing and feed-in tariff issues, on the other hand, fall within the scope of the Electricity Market Law and Renewables Law.

key. The photovoltaic generation application is insignificant and currently, the total photovoltaic generation capacity in Turkey is 3 MWp25. Photovoltaic energy is used for signalling purposes and in rural areas such as the watch towers of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, light houses and lighting of highways.

Turkey’s annual average insolation duration is estimated as 2,640 hours (7.2 hours/day) and the average annual solar radiation is 1,311 kWh/m2-year (3.6 kWh/m2 per day) by EIE. The total solar energy production equals 420 thousand TOE in 2007.

Solar

Turkey is projected to reach an energy-saving potential of 15% in the transportation sector, 20% in the manufacturing sector and 30% in the building industry. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources aims to reduce im-

Solar energy is mainly utilized as flat plate solar collectors for domestic hot water production despite the huge potential for electricity generation in Tur62 EurasiaCritic February 2010

3. Energy Efficiency

ported energy sources, using energy effectively, protecting wastage, relieving the burden of energy costs on economy, and to improve efficiency in the use of energy sources.

In April 2007, the Law on Energy Efficiency No. 5627 was enacted with an aim to use energy efficiently, to prevent waste energy, to reduce the weight of energy costs on Turkish economy and to increase energy resources. With this law, 20% of total energy costs will be covered with the contract signed between industrial companies and EIE. The industrial companies are to guarantee reducing their energy usage by minimum 10% within three years (Renewable energy is not included).

4. Foreign Trade Turkey exports environmental technologies abroad to countries such as Germany, France, Italy and UK. Germany is the leading country for Turkish

Special Report exports of environmental technologies with US$ 875 million in 2008.

Sector Outlook 1. Pollution Control, Waste Management and Recycling

facilities.

Air policy is another improvement area which Turkey is working towards.

Public spending is low for air pollution as well as other environmental areas.

2. Renewable Energy

The high demand for waste treatAccording to IEA, the ratio of globment facilities have led to creation of 5 al renewable energy power to the total hazardous waste zones which will have energy consumption is expected to inown central storage facility and incin- crease by 53% in 2020. This indicates a erator. This strategy is expected to treat massive potential in the hydroelectric one million tonnes of hazardous waste and other renewable energy market. per year. The investment required for Turkey has significant wind, geowaste management treatment expected thermal, and solar power potential. to be made between 2010 and 2012 is The high growth in electricity demand approximately 1,201 million29. coupled with constraints on the supply The following figure side also signals high presents the storage The Turkish renewable potential in the renewand incineration faable energy market in energy sector has cilities planned to be Turkey. been one of the most built in the five regions Electricity generaattractive sectors in between 2008-2012 by tion in Turkey is curthe Ministry of Envirently largely based terms of M&A activity ronment and Forestry on coal, gas, oil and in the last couple of by taking into considhydro. Gas provides years. eration the growth of about 49% of generindustrialization. It is ated electricity, with observed that the Aegean, Thrace and coal accounting for some 29%30. HyMarmara regions have the greater po- droelectric power generation is expecttential for planned facilities. ed to significantly increase its market Various companies producing waste share by 2013 whereas the share of oil are also trying to find solutions for has been declining31. waste treatment. For example Petkim, Turkey’s hydroelectric plants which is the largest petrochemical com- reached 150 HEPPs with a installed capany in Turkey, is planning to build a pacity of 13.8GW32. According to the new facility to manage its own waste and environmental companies engaged in hazardous/medical waste treatment are also expected to be very active in Turkey.

One of the reasons for low level of waste treatment in Turkey is the lack of landfills, storage for solid waste and solid waste handling equipment. The construction of landfills and storages are expected to start in the coming years.

Municipal water and wastewater treatment is the most emphasized area among others. Proper wastewater treatment is still low in Turkey and there still are small cities without any treatment facility. Although current public spending is low, there is a large potential for development due to scarce treatment

BMI forecasts and BP Statistical Review of World Energy Report, hydroelectric generation is expected to grow with a CAGR of 7% and renewable energy generation with a CAGR of 52% between 2009 and 2013 which are both above the CAGR seen in electricity generation with a CAGR of 5%.

According to TEIAS forecasts, the total installed capacity is expected to grow from 48,817 MW to 71,273 MW between 2010 and 2015 with a CAGR of 6.5%. Renewable energies are expected to form 37% of the total installed capacity and to stay stable in the future years whereas currently the renewable energies correspond to 34% of total.

SWOT Analysis Strengths - Geographical position of Turkey for having various natural resources - Turkey is among the first five leading countries in terms of geothermal resources - The solar energy potential of Turkey is higher than the combined potential of several European countries - According to ETKB information dated May 2009, Turkey’s hydroelectric plants reached 150 HEPPs with a installed capacity of 13.8 GW - The Turkish electricity market represents one of the most promising markets in Europe with respect to

EurasiaCritic February 2010 63

Special Report

growth potential in the next years

Weaknesses

newable energy, in an effort to decrease energy imports.

- Tremendous investment opportunity in renewable market

- Significant need for foreign environmental experThreats tise in Turkey as most The following Turkish firms within Being immajor transactions the environmental port dependent on demonstrate the technologies lack the HEPP and WPP increasing interest capabilities to handle equipments from international large environmental Renewable projects energy resources are investors in the - Lower efficienmainly state owned Turkish market over cy in energy utilization both in Turkey and the last four years compared to Europe globally - Lack of finanDelay in the cial resources of local entrepreneurs liberalization process and the private and proper lending facilities sector investments

Opportunities

Investment Opportunities

- High potential of resources for the use of new renewable energy technologies (particularly boron an thorium resources) - As a result of economic growth, industrialization and urbanisation, the demand for EGS in Turkey is increasing, particularly in the waste management, water supply and management, and air pollution control sub-sectors.

- Turkey has started to focus on re-

There is an encouraging investment environment for Environmental technologies and renewable energy sector in Turkey. There exists significant investment opportunities in hazardous waste and solid waste management, water and waste water treatment and in renewable energy. Current opportunities in waste management and water supply concerns a relatively large market with a broad range of activities whereas the

64 EurasiaCritic February 2010

opportunities in environmental consultancy concerns a smaller market.

There are also other opportunities in air pollution and control, marine pollution, carbon capture and storage, and carbon finance. These segments form nearly none or very minimal sized market where there are limited regulations and restrictive trade and investment policies. These segments are expected to expand and offer attractive investment opportunities to investors in the future.

The Turkish renewable energy sector has been one of the most attractive sectors in terms of M&A activity in the last couple of years. Many utility industry giants have entered Turkey and there are numerous local entrepreneurs who have obtained renewable policies.

The Turkish Privatization Authority has announced the opening of the privatization tenders of 52 river plants currently belonging to EĂœAS. According to the Privatization Authority statements, the closing date of the tender is February 19, 2010.

The following major transactions demonstrate the increasing interest from international investors in the Turkish market over the last four years.