EURASIA CRITIC MARCH 2010 by EURASIA CRITIC NEWS AGENCY

March 2010

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EurasiaCritic March 2010 Vol. 2 ISSUE 12 Monthly Magazine on Eurasian Politics Published every month by Eurasia Critic Yayincilik Ltd. Head Office: Esat R. No: 55/5 Kucukesat ANKARA/TURKEY T: 0090 (312)4170383 F: 0090 (312)4170392 Publisher Hakki AHMETBEYOGLU Editors Ozer CETINKAYA Ali ALTAN Assistant Editor Caglar KURC Burcu OZCELIK Volkan GUNER Regional Directors Middle East Yousuf AL SHARIF Southestern Asia Fazal-UR-RAHMAN Caucasus Hasan KANBOLAT Balkans Ibrahim ARSLAN India Prof. Dr. Ajay Kumar PATNAIK Azerbaijan Ganire PASHAEVA Syria Ibrahim HAMIDI Kazakhstan Murat SHAHANOV Uzbekstan Ali KULEBI Japan Prof. Dr. Masanori NAITO Energy Strategies M. Mete GOKNEL Nuclear Studies Prof. Dr. Saleh SULTANSOY Millitary Affairs David AXE UK Represantative Gizem Fowler Jamie Fowler Advisory Committee George HEWITT Nuzhet KANDEMIR Ismael HOSSEIN-ZADEH Norman STONE Ali KULEBI Media Director Cigdem BEDIZ

Ballistic Ability of Iran By Ozer Cetinkaya

The Effect of Greece’s Economic Crisis on Military Purchases By Ali Kulebi

Turkish Information and Communication Technologies Industry Report

Reassessing the Genocide Resolution

Photography Provider: AFP Illustrations Mahmut KARATOPRAK Distribution Manager Mert ALTAN ISSN 1308-1560 Printers: Basak Matbaacilik HOW TO CONTACT US General enquiries: 0090 (312) 4170383 info@eurasiacritic.co.uk Letters to the Editor : editor@eurasiacritic.co.uk ©2010 Eurasia Critic News Agency Ltd. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of Eurasia Critic News Agency Ltd.

By Alon Ben-Meir

The Legal Aspects of the Struggle against Terrorism in the Case of Turkey

By Yasar Buyukanit

EU-Russia Relations Will Be Tested Throught Bosnia Pain

Russian Minorities in Ukraine

Russia Creates The Military Fist in The Central Asia By Vladimir Karyakin

A New Cold War between China and the US By Baris Adibelli

By Shemsey Vodinov

By Mazhar Yasin Tuyluoglu

The Kosovo Crisis and the UN By Bahadir Murat Akin

A Historical Year for Iran 2

Editorial 4

EurasiaCritic March 2010

010 is a year in which discussions on Iran’s nuclear program getting more and more complicated. Uranium enrichment operation is nearly reaching towards 20%. If uranium enrichment program reaches to 20% limit then there is no way of controlling Iran. This kind of a situation is not a threat only for US also it would be a actual threat for both Russia and China. Iran’s declarations are predicting new weapon development. Nuclear program is getting away from being an amicable program. Approach of Tehran Government is getting closer to a point at which Iran would abandon the UN and IAEA agreements. This approach will start a dangerous conflict around the nuclear program of Iran. If Iran becomes a side at this conflict, Israel may react before US. Israel’s reaction will be a repressive hit which will aim to hit Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Iran’s response would be a widespread counter-attack and its dimensions cannot be presumed. Furthermore this counter-attack may be started from Afghanistan, Iraq, Basra Gulf and Lebanon in mean time. According to these issues this year will be a historical year for Iran. Decision for a solution or decision for a war will be finalized in this year. Besides the progress of nuclear program, missile trials of Iran show that Iran had developed its ballistic ability too. It is so hard to support Iran, for countries such Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing state the need for more

US pressure on Iran. Common idea is US contends with light precautions. Tehran government is gaining time for uranium enrichment program with the help of this US behavior. Moscow and Beijing are anxious about the possibility of a war which will be a result of this progress because Iran is an important partner for both Russia and China. 5+1 countries trying to calm down the atmosphere in which US and Israel still hide the option of military intervention solution. Time is running out. Diplomatic solution pursuits are on an end and more adamant sanctions are on the way. If sanctions would not work, there is still an option of a military intervention. US officials have this approach while explaining Obama government’s standpoint on Iran. Truth is that US president is getting under more pressure on developing negotiations day by day. US requested Iran a negotiation which will guarantee Iran’s nuclear energy program in a amicable use. Obama was stating that Washington is not working on military solutions but Obama warned Iran a few months ago: “No doubt that we have a limited patience, Iran should put an effort for transparency and Iran should prove that she uses amicable nuclear energy”

New Position of 5+1 Concrete steps were expected from Tehran government until the end of 2009. Obama also underlines the ac-

ceptable request which was formed by five constant member of UN Security Council and Germany is still on the table. Request contains an article which allows Iran to make uranium enrichment out of its borders, in countries like Russia, Turkey or France. Iran is not accepting this request which is expected the stop the studies of an atomic bomb developed by Iran. Accepting this request would eliminate the military intervention option process option in which Russia and China would be hardly convinced on. The reason for Israel’s intervention to Iran will be eliminated by this request too. US clash with Russia and China about sanctions on Iraq would be prevented for now. While working on two important issues like Iraq and Afghanistan, US would have the option of resolving the Iran issue in the easiest way. Also disinclination of western countries (like France and Germany) to agree on adamant sanctions would be solved too. Iran’s refusal of the 5+1’s request for solution had a strong influence on US prediction of Iran’s nuclear weapon program. Contemporary developments increased the military intervention possibility on Iran. Probably, Russia and China will be convinced on this issue too. Israel would put a stronger pressure on US for military intervention with the respect of its rightness about the Iran policies. Also UN would take part on this issue and Iran would be left alone in the International survey.

US Department of Defense Secretary Robert Gates states their worry with these words: “I am worried that we are running out of time for resolving the nuclear problem with Iran in diplomatic ways” Gates is so much certain about Iran’s nuclear weapon development program personally: Ahmedinejad government has the thought of developing nuclear weapons but we are not sure that if they have started or not.

Super Bomb While this period, US Defense Department transpired the information that they are developed a weapon called super bomb for hitting targets for both hitting the targets on the ground and for hitting the targets at underground. This giant bomb which weights 14 thousand kilograms is called as “Massive Ordnance Penetrator“ Gates who states that a military attack is not in their agenda repeatedly, warns Tehran for nuclear armament would weaken the Iran so much. In this sense, development of the super bomb is an instrument for US warning to Iran. On the other hand, nobody in Washington believe that China would participate the possible sanctions on Iran. Russia is ready to support the sanctions in the condition of cooperating with UN. Questions about Israel’s approach and time period for a diplomatic solution stand still. It seems that Iran is not willing to

get less enriched uranium out of the country. Iran is working on alternative solutions. Proposal which suggests the idea of buying nuclear fuel directly for medical usage, should be evaluated carefully.

Options Iran is not opposing IAEA’s argument clearly but Iran worries about the issue of possibility of exchanged uranium would not given back to Tehran. Iran officials state the idea of 20% enriched uranium’s direct buying is more reasonable. Iran’s request which aims at showing their good will and gaining Iran Peoples’ respect by the negotiation countries is not welcomed by western countries and interpreted as a negative behavior. According to the western perspective this offer of Iran is contradicts with the nature of negotiations. Main aim is to use the nuclear material owned by Iran for only amicable purposes. If this aim has a success then Iran cannot enrich its nuclear material for developing nuclear weapons. If Iran keeps less enriched uranium in its borders while buying needed fuel for using medical purposes then Iran will have the uranium for continuing its nuclear program. So nuclear program of Iran cannot be controlled. Result which was reached through negotiations which was started by France and Russia in Wien will have no affect to stop Iran’s nuclear problem. EurasiaCritic March 2010

Ballistic

Ballistic Ability of Iran By Ozer Cetinkaya

ime is running out for Iran. The missile trials of Iran which was dated in the earlier February was not only disturbed US and Israel, it also disturbed which are planning to collaborate with Iran including Russia and China. Russia and China is actually disturbed from Iran’s provocation of US and Israel for an intervention. Moscow and Beijing give significant importance to control Iranian nuclear program with negotiations because Russia and China have strong economic relations among each other. China had reached a trade volume of 32 billions dollars also it should not be forgotten that China signed a treaty on management of CNPC’s 11th phase of South Pars oil field.

Moscow wants Adamant Sanctions Russia is also developing strategic collaboration with Iran. Russia have some agreements for partnership of

EurasiaCritic March 2010

sophisticated weapon selling and pro- support on adamant sanctions onto duction besides this some agreements Iran, Beijing seems more cautious on made for energy alliances with Iran. the issue. US weapon trade with Taiwan Moscow and Tehran also agreed on the is affective on the policy of Beijing. North – South transport path which Iran’s Ballistic Infrastructure was made against TRACECA program. This path will become the only alterIran officials give some clues while native for transportation of goods for stating their pride about missile trials Central Asia. except of their usual rhetoric. One of the All these progress make Russia sen- most important clues is the clue about sitive for an intervention which may the Iran’s developing ballistic ability. be applied on Iran. Iran’s missile trial Iran officials state that their country means a disaster sceachieved a new level nario for Moscow and on space studies. A A senior Iranian Beijing so these two senior Iranian exexpert announced countries are alarmed pert announced that that different missile for this kind of trials. different missile tritrials which will be Russia is ready for supals which will be the the parts of each porting any sanctions parts of each new triwhich will be applied als will be continued new trials will be upon Iran. According in 2010. Trial which continued in 2010. to the senior officials in was made on 3rd of Trial which was made Russia: “ US has a soft February is the core on 3rd of February is policy on Iran”. of the future studies the core of the future Despite of Moscow’s according to the Irastudies according to nian experts. Technical properties of the the Iranian experts. missiles and satellites are such as: New age liquid fuel was used in the new multistage, satellite carrier simurg missile. It can produce the needed energy for putting a 60-72 kg weighted satellite into the orbit which ranged 500-600 km. Simurg, with its engines, it can accelerate 7300 m/s for reaching to a 500 km ranged orbit. Simug’s engine consists of four engines, each weighted 32 tons. The trast which was formed by clustering of these 4 engines, weighted 143-145 tons. This engine system will be able to put 700 kg weighted satellites into the

Ballistic

life is three years. The most important aim at conMisbah 2 structing Misbah – 2 is expressed as Misbah has a prominence because it developing satellite designing and construction technology. is the most developed Iran interprets Misbah satellite system of Iran. The most -2 as a new level for The main features of important aim at construction of more Misbah are gatherconstructing Misbah developed spy sateling information from lites. ground stations and – 2 is expressed transferring them to as developing Tulu Satellite control stations, prosatellite designing viding communication Another develand construction between all military oped satellite system technology. Iran units of Iran across the of Iran is Tulu Remote interprets Misbah country’s territory. Measuring Satellite. It was announced It has a capability of -2 as a new level that Misbah 2 will work launching with Simurg for construction of for providing commusatellite carrier and more developed spy nication and telecomalso has technologic satellites. munication but there is capabilities like sight no doubt that Misbah taking, mechanisms 2 will be used for military intelligence. and supervision of sun cells which are Misbah 2 which is weighted 70 kg, used for the first time. The main duty can work in the orbits which are 700 km of the Tulu Satellite will be the taking high from the ground and its operating cross-section sights, recording them and orbits which are ranged 1000 km.

transferring information to the ground station with its 50 m ranged recognition capability. For achieving this, Tulu will be in communication with telemetric, pursuit and flight inspection stations in the ground. Tulu can scan and transfer any military action in Iran’s borders or within Iran’s neighbors (like Iraq, Turkey, Gulf of Basra, Caspian Sea) to the main station. 2 years of time is planned for Tulu’s utility period. In this period Tehran will finish developing higher technology satellites. New developing satellite is expected to have a 5 years of operating time and it can take high resolution sights. Tulu satellite which is hexagonal shaped has a weight of 100 kg, width of 86 cm and it has a height of 100 cm.

Support of North Korea North Korea added Taepodong – 2 missiles to its inventory after adding Taepodong – 1 missiles which are the developed versions of old USSR producEurasiaCritic March 2010

Ballistic

Declaration of Iran’s Leader Ahmedinejad which states Iran as a “Nuclear Power”, strengthen the thoughts on the Iran’s secret nuclear weapon program.

tion of SSN – 6 missiles. North Korea which could not achieved the trial of these long ranged missiles because of the physical impossibilities, compromised with Iran and started to use Iran lands for the trials of these missiles. In this sense, 4000 km ranged Musudan missiles which were similar to Taepodong – 1 and Taepodong – 2 missiles, developed by the cooperation of Iranian and North Korean defence industry experts are testing in Iran too. According to the Iranian officials, technique/expert cooperation between Iran and North Korea continues. Especially on missile technologies, at least 3 North Korean experts are working in Iran. Also Iranian experts are joining the instructions and development studies in North Korea.

Potential of Nuclear Warhead In spite of Iran’s declaration Inter8

EurasiaCritic March 2010

national Public thinks that Iran has a secret nuclear weapon program. Declaration of Iran’s Leader Ahmedinejad which states Iran as a “Nuclear Power”, strengthen the thoughts on the Iran’s secret nuclear weapon program[1]. Iran is defending that they are working on an amicable nuclear program until the beginning of these discussions. In fact there are only a few countries which are known as owning nuclear weapons officially or thought to own nuclear weapons. Most of the countries are known as only using nuclear energy. Declaration of Ahmedinejad which shows the Iran within the nuclear armament league automatically increases the number of question marks. In spite of world’s focus on nuclear weapons, launching devices which can carry those nuclear weapons will be determining elements. Iran’s missile trials should be examined in this sense. There are various options for

launching missiles to their aims which include freefall of missiles with using hunting-bombardment/bombardment planes, ballistic missiles which can be launched both from ground and undersea, cruise missiles, barrel artillery systems, space located systems, torpedoes with nuclear warheads and mines. Iran may try some of those options if it owns nuclear weapons but the safest and most effective option for Iran is ballistic missiles. Not only using biological, chemical or nuclear warheads but also using conventional warheads, ballistic missiles can be very effective both physically and psychologically when they are launched onto military gathering points and cities. Different of Shah Regime, Iran regime started to build up its deterrence ability mostly on ballistic weapons instead of conventional weapons after the collapse of the shah regime. The most important underlying reason behind

Ballistic this issue is the fear of possible spare part and education problems which risks conventional power construction because of the US configured military infrastructure in the Shah Regime. Another issue in this choice is actually the impossibility of winning a conventional war against US and US supported Gulf Region Countries. Because of this, a destructive asymmetric war doctrine has started to used in Iran against the threats. One of the basic elements of this doctrine is ballistic missiles. Iran had gained the mass - production ability of aversive ballistic missile systems after the 30 years of research and development process. In this process Iran gained the technical aid of North Korea, China and Russia. Iran which gained a know-how ability in spite of the international pressures and embargos, is not only producing small ranged (SRBM, ballistic missiles have a range of 1000 km) and medium ranged missiles (MRBM, ballistic missiles have a range of 1000-3000 km) also Iran recorded many of these kinds of missiles in its inventory. Iran’s next aim is to produce long ranged ballistic missiles (IRBM, ballistic missiles which have a range of 3000-5500 km) and finally Iran aims to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM, ballistic missiles have a range of more than 5500 km).

program which was started for a similar reason with Nezeat, INS guidance system was used and margin of error was so much decreased. Zelzal – 2 rocket’s another version which was produced with the cooperation of Syria is named as Fattah – 110. This 600 mm caliber rockets have a range of more than 200 km. It thought that Iran is transferring those rockets to Hezbollah in Southern

Lebanon. If launched, those relatively small ranged Fattah – 110 rockets can hit many critical civil and military targets in Israel. Existence of these rockets leaded Israel to develop air defence systems (Like Iron Dome and David’s Sling air defence systems owned by Rafale) for destroying small ranged rockets. While the battle in Southern Syria in 2006, Hezbollah launched 4000 rock-

Small, Medium and Long Ranged Rockets According to the announcements of Iranian officials, Iran continues to produce unguided rocket systems named as Nezeat which can be considered as artillery rockets, this type of rockets have 100-200 kg of warheads and their range is between 100-160 km. At Zelzal rocket EurasiaCritic March 2010

Ballistic ets (most of them were Handmade Kassam Rockets) and this attack caused death of more than 40 Israel citizen and temporary migration of 250000 people. Both Şahap-1 and Şahap – 2 rockets are derivations of Russian Scud (R-17) rockets which were using liquid fuel. Şahap – 1 was developed in the end of the 80s with the help of North Korea and it is a derivation of SCUDB Rockets which are ranged 300 km. It was thought that Şahap – 2 had become operational in the middle of 90s. Şahap - 2 rockets are derivations of Russian SCUD-C rockets and it was developed by the cooperation with North Korea. They have 550 km range and they have a warhead weight of 700 kg.

Medium ranged ballistic rockets of around 1300 km. More developed have a range of 1000-3000 km. Iran Şahap – 3A’s range is around 1500-1800 Revolution Guards are using Şahap-3 km. The triangular warhead which is atmosphere cycled, rises rockets actively and the suspicions about testing more deTehran thinks that Iran’s development of veloped rockets in CIA and MOSSAD unconventional warthese days. Şahap-3 have a corporation heads. Circular error rockets are also in on planning and probability of Şahap – 3 this rocket class. organizing the attacks rockets is between 500 Şahap – 3 rockets were designed in the and 1100 m according to which are aimed basis of No Dong-1 Iranian Officials. They through scientists who rockets with the cohave a capacity of carryare working on Iran operation of North ing warheads which are Nuclear Program. Korea. Rockets beweighted 500-800 kg. It came operational is known that, Şahap – 3 in the beginning of 2000s. The rocket rockets gained the capacity of carrying which was known as Şahap has a range atmosphere cycled warheads which can carry nuclear weapons. All series of the Şahap – 3 rockets have one leveled engines which work with liquid fuel. Iran officials are complaining about the difficulty of launching the rockets which use liquid fuel, because those rockets needed to get filled with fuel before launching. This issue directs Iran to develop rockets which use solid propellant with the information and technology gained from North Korea and China.

Future of Missile Program It can be clearly seen that Iran continues working on high level ballistic missile technologies like GPS/INS guidance system, warheads which have capacity to carry nuclear weapons and so on. Iran may take the developments to the further points which they can produce ballistic missiles have more than 3000 km of range, called as IRBM. Iran’s action of putting satellites with its own capabilities is a signal for Iran’s inclination towards the dual use, both for civil and military uses. Iran’s space program may shade the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program in the near future. Officials from Iran state that Şahap – 5 and Şahap – 6 can be tested in 2015.

Mossad has Started Secret Operations Possibility of an intervention on Iran is increased after Iran’s nuclear centrals has started to produce energy and at 10 EurasiaCritic March 2010

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the same time Iran continues on missile development programs. Iran officials announced that according to the studies of Iran intelligence, MOSSAD has already started secret operations. According to those Iranian officials, secret operations of MOSSAD will be applied in three stages by the sign of Benjamin Netanyahu: 1) Planning assassinations for interrupting the Nuclear Program 2) Sabotaging nuclear facilities. 3) Hitting nuclear facilities with limited interventions. According to Tehran death of nuclear physician Prof. Dr Mesud Ali Mohammed in a bombing attack is a part of these MOSSAD operations. Also murder of Mahmud al Mabhuh (one of the leaders of HAMAS) which was happened in his hotel room in Dubai was a part of these operations too. Iranian officials underline that Mabhuh’s role on Tehran-HAMAS relations, he was an important leader on this issue. Tehran thinks that CIA and MOSSAD have a corporation on planning and organizing the attacks which are aimed

through scientists who are working on Iran Nuclear Program. Iranian nuclear physics expert Shahram Amiri’s disappear while his umre visit to Saudi Arabia was a kidnapping operation of CIA, announced by senior official Manucher Muttaki. Besides this, Iran admits the Amiri’s role in the nuclear program. Iran Defense Ministry senior official Ali Rızari Asqhari’s disappearance in Turkey at February 2007 was thought as a part of those operations. If uranium enrichment and missile developments continue this fast, Iran may face with

harsh sanctions of UN. Sanctions cannot convince Iran for stopping these programs at this point. After the US withdrawn from Iraq, Iran will become a military target. It is already known that Israel is closer to the intervention option. Hitting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure with a US aided Israel intervention option will be an issue which will be discussed often after 2011. It should not be forgotten that Russia and China’s opposition towards an intervention on Iran will be stronger than their opposition towards the Iraq War.

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Law on Terror

The Legal Aspects of the Struggle against Terrorism in the Case of Turkey By Yasar Buyukanit

he struggle against terrorism has two dimensions. Terrorists on one side, and security forces combatting terrorism on the other. When we look at the elements fighting against terrorism, they are units of the Turkish military, including the Gendarmerie, and police forces. Terrorists do not respect rules or law. Their struggle is based on violence. On the other hand, the forces against terrorism have to stay within the limits of law, and this is an obligation. Whether we like it or not, as security forces we cannot ignore the legal aspect. However, we have to mention legal regulations that have negative effects on security forces. These are not

just complaints, but include issues that the fight against terrorism should not arise from the practical problems of se- disregard the fact that this concept has curity elements. As well as the fighting two dimensions. forces awareness of the legal aspects The first dimension is internal law. that guide the struggle against terror- This can also be considered as the naism, the recognition of the fight against tional dimension. The other dimension terrorists and terrorism by the persons is the external dimension consisting of and institutions that direct law is just as international treaties, conventions and important. In other protocols. words, collaboration The external law Collaboration and common underdimension is very comand common standing between prehensive. This issue understanding is elaborated in detail the fighters against by all treaties, conventerrorism and the inbetween the fighters tions and protocols, stitutions that enact against terrorism and including those of the legislation is needed. the institutions that UN. None of these are The legal aspect of enact legislation is secrets. They can all be needed. viewed at the web sites of the UN, the EU, the European Council and the European E C Parliament. The reasons for the failure of the world in fighting against terrorism is to be seen in practice.

Terrorism and Domestic Law What are the laws that shape the fight against terrorism? Letâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s talk about legal arrangements and important article in Turkey first. Later we will look at the effects of these on the fight against terrorism. a. Without doubt, the most important law is Counter-Terrorism Law 3713. b. Another important law is Provin12 EurasiaCritic March 2010

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Massacre in Madrid

Train

Alcala-Madrid

SPAIN Hospitals MADRID

Field hospitals

Makeshift morgue

Man zana res

4 bombs explode in a commuter train near Atocha station; 3 others at a train already at the platform

Prado museum

Royal palace Parliament

110304

Atocha station

Santa Eugenia station

2 bombs explode in a train near El Pozo station; 1 other in a train near Santa Eugenia station

Field hospital set up near Atocha station, taxis commandeered to carry the wounded away for treatment

are an s

El Pozo station

Train Guadalajara-Madrid

3 km

Isabelle Dalle - Laurence Saubadu

cial Administration Law 5442. c. For some reasons, the first clause of the ninetieth article of Criminal Court Law 5217. d. Duties and Authorities of the Police Law 2559 (we will look at this law particularly in terms of the scope of authority to stop and control). e. Law 5651 on the Regulation of Internet Publications and Fight against Crimes Committed Through These Publications (The scope of this law does not include crimes of terrorism, which constitutes a gap that can be exploited by terrorist organizations). f. Supplemental 5th Article of the Gendarmerie Organization Duties and Authorities Law (This law gives different authorities to the police and the gendarmerie, which have the same set

2nd field hospital set up near Santa Eugenia station Police detonate 3 bombs left in the trains already hit by explosions Interior minister says there is "no doubt" that the attacks were carried out by ETA

of duties. This leads to various problems in practice. g. We can increase the number of examples. For now, letâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s go into a little more detail and more examples.

The Importance of Transparency One of the most important problems for military units given duties under the 5442 Provincial Administration Law is the difference between its application and interpretation by Republic prosecutors. This causes uncertainties about the legal authorities of the military units and negatively affects elements that are fighting against terrorism. For instance, it is possible that a unit commander responsible for domestic security in the Southeast is told by the EurasiaCritic March 2010 13

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Republic’s prosecutor that he does not Justice in the short term, and a supplehave legal authority and his unit can mentary article to Counter-Terrorism not conduct a search. How can this unit Law 3713 on the powers of military fight against terrorism? A similar situ- units. There are no clauses on this issue in the Counter-Terroration arose in another ism Law. city and the problem It is possible to Another issue is the was overcome by neeliminate problems uncertainties about gotiations. According in situations such as the security forces’ auto this interpretation, operational conditions thority to enter dwellmilitary units cannot where written ings, offices and priuse this legislation’s vate areas in order to legal search powers warrants are needed apprehend terrorists when needed during a from the Republic in the act. These are terrorist follow-up. As prosecutor, and it is serious reservations a result, it is necessary impossible to receive about entering dwellfor the authorities of this warrant, and to ings, offices and primilitary units fighting ensure the detainment vate areas in order to against terrorism to apprehend terrorists be clarified in the Proof the suspects and in the act. These unvincial Administration witnesses. certainties sometimes Law and for legislative result in terrorists esbodies to be informed. In this context, a solution is thought to caping and prevent the accomplishment be a circular order from the Ministry of of the mission. 14 EurasiaCritic March 2010

An event illustrates this problem. On June 13, 2007 an operation was conducted in the Southestern Elezığ/ Karakoçan district. The operation team came across some people in the vicinity of the village of Hamurkesen. They asked “who are you?” in order to confirm their identities, the people said that they were villagers. Although they were asked to “raise their hands and approach” one of them shot their weapon, causing one casualty, and ran into one of the nearby houses. The operation team opened fire on the terrorists, but could not enter the house in question since they did not have a search warrant or authority. They merely patrolled around the house. One day later, on June 14, 2007 the village was searched after receiving a warrant, one of the five suspects was apprehended, but the terrorists involved in the shooting were lost. In many places the fight against ter-

Law on Terror rorism does not occur on football fields. Even though the vehicle had been It occurs under harsh terrain, inappro- stopped as a result of a warning, since it priate weather conditions and far from was not legally possible for the gendarsettlements, and these conditions give merie to search the bed of the pickup advantages to the terrorists. truck, the terrorists could not be found How can this be solved? It is legal- and detained. ly possible. In order to eliminate this This could have led more dramatic problem an addition events (investigation to the 10th article of revealed that these terif the right to live the Counter-Terrorism rorists were moving to becomes the terrorists’ the Black Sea region as Law or a revision of right, this will harm the first amendment part of their ‘Opening the fight against of the 90th article of to the Black Sea’). Criminal Court Law One issue should terrorism. 5217 can be considbe emphasized.Of ered. Thus, it is poscourse, even in the sible to eliminate problems in situations fight against terrorism, we should abide such as operational conditions where the law. However, if the right to live written warrants are needed from the becomes the terrorists’ right, this will Republic prosecutor, and it is impos- harm the fight against terrorism. This sible to receive this warrant, and to en- should not be forgotten. sure the detainment of the suspects and Terrorist Propaganda witnesses.

The Authority to Stop and Search Another striking example is about the scope of the authority to stop and search. Let’s first look at the legal aspect of the issue. As a result of recent changes in the Turkish Police Duties and Powers Law 2553, the authority to stop and search has been narrowed down, by a new amendment stipulating that, when persons are stopped due to complaints or intelligence information, the police are not allowed to take peoples clothes off or search parts of vehicles that are not visible from the outside (such as trunks) even if there is sufficient suspicion that there are weapons or other dangerous objects. Under these circumstances, these powers become meaningless and terrorists are given the opportunity to hide their weapons op explosives in parts of vehicles that are not visible from the outside, such as trunks. On June 18, 2008, in Eastern Anatolia, 5 kilometers outside of Erincan, within the provincial gendarmerie jurisdiction, a pick up truck was stopped at a checkpoint, and terrorists hidden between bee hive boxes opened fire, wounding two NCOs and 2 privates.

and the Internet

Another problem is the prevention of terrorist propaganda. Terrorist organizations win a lot of support through internet publications, and they use this medium especially for recruitment activities. During Interviews with detained terrorists, they clearly state that media\internet activi-

ties have significant influence on their decision to join terrorist organizations. In order to prevent these activities, it is necessary to revise Law 5651 on the Regulation of Internet Publications and Fight against Crimes Committed Through These Publications. Although the existing law is comprehensive, it does not include the crimes cited in the Counter-Terrorism Law 3713 (Article 8). These must be included in the law. This issue is not only about terrorism. Technological developments surely make life easier. However, when technology is used with bad intentions the results are tragic. This law article is tragic for security forces, and makes the fight against terrorism more difficult. The 5th amendment of Article 140 in the Turkish criminal court law prevents surveillance of people’s homes with technical equipment. Criminal organizations, especially, rent houses using couples that appear to be married and organize and plan their activities and hide material to be used in their activities in these houses. The prohibition brought by this article creates an untouchable area for security forces even with court warrants. This article is certainly justified

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and lawful when it comes to the privacy of citizens. Nevertheless, where does the recently publicized unlimited surveillance fit in this article?

Terrorism and International Law a) An examination of international treaties, protocols and conventions reveals the reason for the rise of terrorism on a global scale, since signing a 16 EurasiaCritic March 2010

attention. This is the piecemeal nature of the conventions. There are separate conventions concerning the hijacking of aircraft, and another for maritime attacks; one for attacks on diplomats, and another for the use of plastic explosives; a convention on the financing of terrorism, and another on cross border organized crime. Evaluating these conventions comprehensively, we see that they do not have a comprehensive view of terrorist activities. There are particular conventions to meet the various circumstances that arise. However, however none of these have attained a concrete dimension because none of them have been applied in a practical sense. Let’s say the most important thing. The UN has still not defined terrorism because an international agreement has not been reached on the definition of terrorism. Here a question arises. How can we struggle against a threat that has not been defined? c) As one can understand, although the concept of terrorism has existed for centuries, to this day there is no definition that nations have agreed to without exception. This is essentially because terrorism and concepts related to terrorism are difficult to define, and most importantly, because governments act according to their interests in the international arena. In other words, one orgaIn Europe the PKK nization defined as terlives with better rorist by one country security than Turks do might be seen as freedom fighters by another, and even be at the latter’s service. From this perspective, we can see signs of this approach in the conventions prepared by the UN. convention does not necessarily imply The UN’s first effort to combat terimplementation. As long as nations do rorism was the the November 21, 1947 not incorporate the substance of these decision number 177/11 to charge the conventions into their domestic legisla- international law commission with tion and implement them, these con- preparing, “Draft Code of Offences ventions have no value. Against the Peace and Security of Manb) There are a total of 17 conven- kind.” This draft contains an important tions on the prevention of terrorism: article, defining the following as an of12 United Nations conventions and 5 fense: EU/European conventions. One issue “The organization, or the encourin the UN conventions deserves our agement of the organization, by the

Law on Terror

authorities of a State, of armed bands must list the latter: 1. The European convention on the within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the territory of prevention of terrorism 2. The European Council convenanother State, or the toleration of the organization of such bands in its own tion on the prevention of terrorism territory, or the toleration of the use by 3. The search and seizure of terrorsuch armed bands of its territory as a ist organizations’ revenues base of operations or as a point of de4. The European Council convenparture for incursions tion on the financing into the territory of of terrorism In our long struggle another State, as well 5. Convention on we Turkish security as direct participation cyber forces units have learned in or support of such Now, these convensomething very incursions.” tions notwithstanding, well. The terrorist I am mentioning what has been done? the 1947 UN decision, Let me state clearly organization has in particular, because that nothing has been support from abroad. we see that terrorist done. In Europe today This is certain. activities today oppose the terrorist organization that conducts all it directly. d) There are 2 European interna- kinds of violent activities against Turkey tional conventions and 5 European is leading convoys full of flags, or betUnion international conventions. I ter, rags. PKK television is still on the

air in Europe. In Europe the PKK lives with better security than Turks do. All their income comes from Europe. No doubt counterterrorism should be conducted within the bounds of law. The opposite is unthinkable. While there are attacks on police and the gendarmerie and posters of terrorist leaders are hanging in the streets, it is difficult to find a response for innocent citizens who ask “which law?” There is no difference between the EU and the UN conventions. A terrorist organization cannot sustain itself without external support. In our long struggle we Turkish security units have learned something very well. The terrorist organization has support from abroad. This is certain. Secondary support comes from domestic collaborators. Burying our heads in the sand will not resolve the problems caused by terrorism. EurasiaCritic March 2010 17

CSTO

Russia Creates The Military Fist in The Central Asia By Vladimir Karyakin

n conditions of NATO expansion zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan in the sphere of Russian interests, and Uzbekistan. A final chord was a aggravation of geopolitical concur- session of CSTO which took place on rence for access to Central Asian energy the 14th of July when the presidents of resources and world instability caused these states signed the agreement on creation of Collective by the global economForces of Operative ic recession the RusRight after the August Reaction (CFOR) sian administration war 2008 with Georgia within the CSTO. is focusing efforts on the president of Russia The issue on the building up the miliDmitry Medvedev CSTO conversion tary components of into the full-fledged tegration processes on has pointed out the political-military orthe post-Soviet space. necessity «to intensify ganization is being Right after the August military cooperation» discussed for about 4 war 2008 with Georgia within the Collective years already. But a the president of Russia Security Treaty momentum to impleDmitry Medvedev has Organization (CSTO). ment practical steps pointed out the necesin this direction was sity «to intensify miliwar in August, 2008 in the Collecti R ssian Georg tary cooperation» within Collectivee Russian-Georgian Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). after which it was decided to escalate a The implementation of this idea started military component of the CSTO. Offiin 2009. There was this year a series cially this issue was publicly declared on of CSTO summits with participation February, 4th this year at the Moscow of seven states: Armenia, Belarus, Ka- summit of the CSTO members-coun-

18 EurasiaCritic March 2010

tries1. In the final declaration it was said, that the serious military potential was accumulated in immediate proximity to the CSTO area of responsibility. It was also said, that CSTO members call the NATO countries to weigh all possible aftereffects of alliance expansion to the Orient and deployment of new anti-missile defense positions nearby the CSTO frontiers. In the final part of declaration of this meeting it has noted been, that CFOR forces were created to repel military aggression, to carry out special actions in the context of struggle against terrorism, the organized crime and drug traffic and also to liquidate emergency situations and catastrophes. «These issues under the competence of CFOR and we have agreed that it will be serious, sufficient forces, well equipped, obtaining advanced military engineering, and very effective. Their battle potential will be not worse, than that of North Atlantic forces», - Dmitry Medvedev has illustrated2. Russia will transmit to CFOR structure one airborne division and a landing-assault brigade (nearby 8000 soldiers). Kazakhstan will be represented in CFOR by a landing-assault brigade (up to 4000 soldiers); other allies will transmit in the general disposal one battalion each3. As a Spokesmen for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has informed, «we create the military structure for security of Central Asia in case of external attacks»4. CSTO summit found out in June 2009, that the leaders are not going to stop half-way. The CSTO Secretariat to-

CSTO

gether with Russian Ministry of Foreign and its allies could be broken at any Affairs plans to consolidate an integra- time. tion breakthrough by creation of a miliThe signing agreements on CFOR tary strike group in Central Asia which creation of on June, 14th, 2009 still canshould complete the Russian-Belarus not be spoken about its final registraand Russian-Armenian military formation because of the presidents of CSTO tions already existing in the framework member-countries should sign other of CSTO. At present, the new strike documents, concerning the forces strucgroup includes military formations of ture of the group. five countries: Russia, According to Kazakhstan, KyrgyzCSTO Secretary GenThe struggle for stan, Tajikistan and eral Nikolay Bordyuenergy resources in Uzbekistan. The crezha, effective strength the Caspian Sea and in of CFOR will constiation of the CentralCentral Asia regions Asian military group tute within the limmilitary conflicts are meets Moscow aspiraits of 20000 people. tion to make CSTO alThese military units possible. liance equal to military will be placed on perpower of NATO. manent dispositions at The last edition of the National home permanent bases and in case of Security Strategy of the Russian Fed- need would be redeployed by air to the eration, recently approved by D. Med- region of operation5. vedev, stresses that Moscow considers The operational decision about milCSTO «as the main instrument, de- itary use of CFOR will be made by the signed to resist regional challenges and CSTO Secretariat with the consent the threats of political-military and strate- governments of the CSTO countries. gic character». In this document it is The Secretariat will designate the compointed out, that the struggle for ener- mander of particular operation appargy resources in the Caspian Sea and in ently, from out of military chiefs of the Central Asia regions military conflicts country where the given operation will are possible. The military balance near be conducted. to frontiers of the Russian Federation Deployment planning, combat

training and provision of CFOR forces are assigned to the CFOR headquarters which will be disposed in Moscow. Decisions to conduct particular operations will be made on the basis of consensus. N. Bordyuzha is assured, that, despite of a number of divergences between the CSTO member-countries, CFOR would be an effective instrument to guarantee stability in Central Asia. It is supposed to use CFOR to localize confrontations, settle border disputes and prevent terrorist attacks and struggle against drug-traffic. But these forces will be applied only when national military forces of the CSTO membercountries encounter difficulties6. It is natural, that solution to any conflict situation will come true all over again by political means. If they fail to and armed aggression poses a threat territorial integrity of the CSTO countries CFOR could be involved to defend allies. To repel large-scale external aggression CSTO is planning to create another military formation – Collective Forces for Rapid Deployment (CFRD). At present the CSTO Secretariat is busy developing legislation on crossing the borders of the allied states. This group EurasiaCritic March 2010 19

CSTO

will include large troop formations of group that will be formed in Central military combat readiness7. Asia must be comparable to NATO. The Trans-Caucasian and European Meanwhile, as the reviewers say, military directions are already pro- the most vulnerable point in Moscow tected by the Russian-Armenian and plans on reinforcement of military coRussian-Belarus forces. The current or- operation in the Central Asia with its der of the day is to settle a question of CSTO allies. As is known, there were Central Asian security. As well as in the difficulties in implementation of the case of CFOR, the main striking forc- smaller project – CFOR. Russia had to es will be in the places for permanent persuade Tajikistan and to pay attendeployment. The questions of their tion to separate opinion of Uzbekistan equipment and comthat refused to give its bat training will be deunits it constant comIt is natural, that cided by national command of CFOR. Tashsolution to any mands. Joint operakent declared that it’ll conflict situation will tions of CFOR/CFRD take part only in some come true all over will be planned by the operations of own CSTO Staff Headchoosing. again by political quarters8. For CFRD There were diffimeans. culties with Belarus eiare planned to include ther. But this issue has the tank and artillery units, as well as the naval forces of the also been settled. Alexander Lukashenko has left his initial evasive position Caspian CSTO states. Effective strength of future mili- concerning CFOR and agreed to their tary CFRD group this not been spoken creation, as well as to participation of about but if to take into account that in Belarus contingent in them9. the Russian-Belarus military group inHere it is necessary to note, that becludes all military units of Belarus and fore transforming CSTO into the fullRussian troops on the western direc- fledged military-political block, leaders tion than the five-sided military fist in of CSTO countries should think of how Central Asia can became impressive. to make their membership in CSTO According to the Kremlin point of view comply the national legislations. The on CSTO, planned the CSTO military matter is that in constitutions of some 20 EurasiaCritic March 2010

CSTO member-countries prescribes non-participation of national armed forces in military alliances. Time will show whether is possible for allies to settle this question. It must be said, that Russia does take steps towards it’s the allies. It includes expansion of the military assistance to the CSTO countries. According to Bordyuzha’s statement, Russia and the CSTO member-countries have agreements on arms deliveries on favorable terms which are successfully realized. Besides as the CSTO Secretary-General has noted, within the framework of cooperation CSTO national armies take free-of-charge military training in the Russian military schools. Under these agreements about 800 military men from the CSTO states come to study in Russia annually. It should be noted, that military cooperating of Russia with the CSTO countries is based on the following principles: 1. Organization and realization of joint actions on combat trainings of armed forces with a view of achieving their operative compatibility. 2. Forming of CSTO peacekeeping contingent. To achieve these CSTO participants should ratify a number of documents in this field and detach units

CSTO that should enter collective peacekeeping forces. If such activity is successful CSTO can offer its peacekeeping capabilities to the United Nations. 3. Continuation of development of normative legislative base for legalization of joint CSTO air defense system. 4. Expansion of Russian militarytechnical cooperating with the CSTO countries. At present the work on a draft program on military and economic cooperation of CSTO states up to 2015 is in progress. As to CSTO-NATO relations it should be noted, that North Atlantic alliance tried not to recognize the existence of CSTO until recently. It can be explained only by the fact that the NATO administration has its own vision of the global alliance role and the role on the Eurasian continent that is to strengthen expansion of its politicalmilitary influence. After the arrival of the new USA administration to the White House Washington’s point of view on CSTO has changed. New approach was described in the article by Zb. Bzhezinsky in Foreign Affairs where he suggested signing an official agreement between NATO and CSTO10. This idea found positive reOne can assume sponse not only in the White House, but also that hypothetically in Burrell. Recently symbiosis of NATO elected Secretary Genand CSTO is possible, eral of NATO former but under one Danish Prime Minister condition: the North Andrea F. Rasmussen Atlantic alliance has declared that the alliance plans to conshould agree not sider the proposal of to expand on the the American politistructures of both orEurasian space. cian in the near future. ganizations that now It changes the situation protect the border of radically because the former NATO ad- Afghanistan. «Only by joint efforts we ministration ignored such idea despite can really influence the actual state of the appeal of CSTO administration to affairs», – the CSTO Secretary General alliance during the last years. has emphasized. As he said, now the In this connection the CSTO Secre- Secretariat of CSTO develops a projtary General N. Bordyuzha in this con- ect of memorandum on CSTO-NATO nection has noted that there are some relationships. But there are some quesproblems that CSTO and NATO should tions: 1) Will NATO respond to our solve together. First of all they should proposals about joint cooperation? 2) struggle against drug-traffic and ter- Is it really that NATO has serious interrorism with the use of corresponding est to CSTO or not?

The CSTO administration assumes the cooperation with NATO to be in the field of data exchange about struggle against drug-dealing and terrorism in the Central Asia states, joint operations on suppression of narkocartels and drug traffic. The discussion of NATO freights transportation through the territory of CSTO states is also possible. The solutions of these problems will strengthen regional security. Thus it is clear, that CSTO does not assume it’s participation in any operations of alliance in Afghanistan and will not send EurasiaCritic March 2010 21

CSTO

CFOR to combat zones of this country. fundamental purpose is to strengthen However NATO-CSTO coopera- alliance global role and its expansion to tion according to Bzhezinsky’s version the Orient11. is supposed to have a Rasmussen does different form. He asnot conceal the globThe proficiency of sumes that ideological al rush of NATO to American commandos principle must be the world expansion eiand the history of heart of this cooperather. He considers that their activity arouse tion. In accordance expansion of NATO suspicions that with it he proposes to is necessary first of give the CSTO counall for replacement of their main objective tries an opportunity alliance forces with is reinforcing the in future to enter to the human resources American military each of these blocks which are in excess in presence in Central separately or both Central Asian states Asia, rather than organizations simulthat alliance can proproviding regional taneously. The Offivide necessary engicial Representative of neering, armament security and Russia at NATO Dmiand regimentals from professional training try Rogozin considers the West. The matter is of the local soldiery that this idea infringes that the North Atlanupon Russia national tic alliance with twointerests in the post-Soviet sphere, and million armed forces acutely does not signing of such document will be used have enough human resources for batto remove of Russian objections against tle operations. Now NATO can hardly annexation in the North Atlantic alli- support its contingent of 50 thousand ance new participants from CSTO. As soldiers in Afghanistan. Besides the D. Rogozin notes, it confirms NATO’s park of helicopters of NATO countries 22 EurasiaCritic March 2010

because of its operating characteristics can’t be exploited in mountain-deserted regions of this country. As is known, Moscow categorically objects to NATO expansion in the postSoviet countries. The Kremlin considers that NATO expansion to the Orient will provoke Russia to take adequate measures. Russian expert community supposes that after the destruction of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact alliance aimed to expand its influence to Russian sphere of interests. One can assume that hypothetically symbiosis of NATO and CSTO is possible, but under one condition: the North Atlantic alliance should agree not to expand on the Eurasian space. In Afghanistan NATO should be occupied only with pragmatically problems, instead of struggling against abstract Islamic extremism. These problems include destruction of narkocrops and creation of reliable barriers for their transportation from Afghanistan to the Central Asia and Europe. It can be engaged in joint humanitarian programs. Implementation of these problems will

CSTO demand significant financial resources which can be found with positive political will of both parties. Together with the discussions about CSTO-NATO ways of cooperation, practical problems of American military presence at the Central Asia being solved in Washington. According to EurasiaNet portal, the Pentagon is going to deploy in this region the 3rd Group of American Special Operations Force (SOF) that acted in Afghanistan before. As the PR SOF officer captainlieutenant Fred Quibble has informed, the given variation of regional orientation reflects changing in the general political-military environment of region12. The vague phrase of the American officer means, that in each of Central Asian countries USA armed forces are preparing to carry out the mission on rendering military help to the states of the given region under the program of Foreign International Defense (FID). This program, first of all, implies consulting services to the local military and preparation of national armies for combat operations. But, as it seems, the main task of American forces will be not so much instruction of the local militaries as supervision over political situation in the countries of the given region and military participation in those situations in case they contradict Washington interests. The order of rendering assistance and its purpose are presented in the instruction of Committee of Headquarters Chiefs. This includes military and peacemaking operations, psychological operations, information exchange, reconnaissance, material and technical support. At the same time it is necessary to note, that American instructors train local military organizations more than one year. Joint maneuvers are carried out regularly, however discussions about the necessity to deploy the 3rd Group of American special troops in region on the regular basis have just begun. Yes, the danger of penetration of extremists from the neighbor Afghanistan still presents, but at the same time Central Asia countries have significant

ability to defend its southern frontiers on their own. Tracing the history of the 3rd Group which the Pentagon is planning to place in Central Asian countries, shows it has rich battle experience. In 1960’s soldiers and officers of this Group took part in Vietnam war, in 1990’s they participated in Persian Gulf war, later they defended interests of the USA in Western Africa. With the beginning of antiterrorist campaign these commandos had been thrown to Afghanistan. According to western mass-media, the 3rd Group numbers about 1000 fighting man. It is well-armed with small arms, more than 120 grenade launchers, up to 400 blasting devices, 6 airplanes and helicopters and about 100 cars13. The Central Asia initiative of the Pentagon give rise to some questions: whether the American commandos’ activity in Central Asia will be confined to training and how long will they stay here? A legal aspect of the given initiative is unclear. Deployment of foreign troops on the territory of the countries requires the agreement of their parliaments. The proficiency of American commandos and the history of their activity arouse suspicions that their main objective is reinforcing the American military presence in Central Asia, rather than providing regional security and profes-

sional training of the local soldiery. It’s absolutely clear, those USA reinforcements in this region contradicts Russian and Chinese interests. Taking into account that most of the Central Asia countries along with Russia are CSTO members and have CFOR of their own. References 1 Solovjov V., Sysoev G. Rossia stavit voennyi blok. Kommersant, №19 (4074), 04.02.2009. 2 http://www.newsru.com , 29.05.2009. 3 http://www.km.ru , 29.05.2009. 4 Solovjov V., Sysoev G. Rossia stavit voennyi blok. Kommersant, №19 (4074), 04.02.2009. 5 http://www.newsru.com, 29.05.2009. 6 Kommersant-on-line. 29.05.2009. 7 http://www.newsru.com , 12.09.2009. 8 Soloviov V. Organizovannay nepristupnaya gruppirovka. Kommersant, №95 (4150), 29.05.2009. 9 Solovjov V., Sysoev G. Rossia stavit voennyi blok. Kommersant, №19 (4074), 04.02.2009. 10 Brzezinski Zb. An Agenda for NATO. Foreign Affairs. Sept/Oct,2009. 11 Arbuzov A. Vozmozen li simbioz NATO i ODKB? //http://asia-a.ru/content/view/3797/1/ 12 Michailov G. Pentagon perechodit dorogu NATO. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22.09.2009. 13 Ibid. Vladimir Karyakin, 125413, Moscow, Flotskay, 15b The Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, www.riss.ru Research Fellow, PH. D. (Military) E-mail:vladimir-karyakin@rambler.ru Phone: 8(499) 747-95-71, Ph. Mobile: 8-916-944-06-33

EurasiaCritic March 2010 23

Greece

The Effect of Greece’s Economic Crisis on Military Purchases By Ali Kulebi

or many years, Greece’s baseless paranoia about Turkey led it to allocate huge budgets (Europe’s third largest) to weapons acquisitions, and given the effects of the worldwide crisis, Greece has walked into an economic dead end, one that is both long expected and serious. For this reason, especially during the last few weeks with every day international credit providers bring bad news concerning Greece and announce that its credit rating is being lowered. Actually, it was known that this nation’s entry into the European Union

24 EurasiaCritic March 2010

was characterized by an apparent las- ing financial burden on the economy situde and that it had begun to live on of the 2004 Athens Olympics, which is aid and grants obtained from the EU. expected to last for some time, and the In order to obtain more aid the Greeks cost of the Greeks’ armament efforts even lied and inflated figures about against Turkey. their agricultural proIn terms of soluduction, and EU butions, the option of As well as all of reaucrats have been kicking Greece out of these problems and very busy with this the Eurozone is not mistakes, other matter for a long time. very likely because it heralds of the recently As well as all of these would be too heavy a problems and misblow to the prestige of emerging crisis were the Euro. takes, other heralds of the enduring financial While excessive the recently emerging burden on the arms purchases in recrisis were the endureconomy of the 2004 cent years and the Athens Olympics, Olympic Games’ exwhich is expected to penditures put the last for some time, and Greek government in extreme debt, Greece’s the cost of the Greeks’ persistent arms acquiarmament efforts sitions, and the fact against Turkey. that they did not pay for various weapons, in particular, l S-214 submarines and Leopard tanks acquired from Germany, became an international problem. Geopolitically, Greece is located on the axes of the junction of three continents. It has a medium scale strategic position on energy transportation lines and the seaways connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, namely, the Aegean. Greece’s importance to NATO was significantly diminished with the

Greece

elimination of the Soviet threat and the strategy of gaining access to the Mediterranean by invading Greece through the Balkans. However, it is also obvious that Greece had an important role in ensuring Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s connection to the West, which was under significant Soviet threat during the Cold War era. Nevertheless, perhaps the Greeks often attributed too much importance to their own role, and complained that their allies did not appreciate their importance as much as they did. From a geopolitical perspective, Greek complaints concerning this issue can be interpreted as the result of Turkey being attributed much more importance due to its having many neighbors. When Greece chose to join NATO in 1951 as a direct result of Soviet pressure, it also took its domestic communist threats into account. Despite their entry into NATO, the Greeks oriented their strategy mainly towards Turkey, and even saw both fighting the Soviet

With the 1974 defeat resulting in the partition of the island of Cyprus, 37% going to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the remainder to the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus, the Greeks were traumatized Military Doctrine in Jeopardy and could not accept the situation. Thinking that the US support for They first supported the Armenian terthem in Cyprus in 1974 was insufficient, rorist organization, ASALA, and then the Greeks distanced itself from the US the PKK terrorist organization. On the other hand, while they step by step and develwere arming the Aegeoped good relations From a geopolitical an Islands, they began with the European perspective, Greek community. After this complaints concerning to establish military doctrine entirely oridevelopment Greece this issue can be ented towards Turkey. tried to strengthen its interpreted as the Meanwhile, they also army with the support result of Turkey being tried to give the imof the Europeans and pression to the public sophisticated weapons attributed much and the outside world which they made sure more importance due that Turkey had begun to buy from them. In to its having many to follow a policy of this period, the Karneighbors. expansion, and even dak crisis with Turkey of challenging the staand efforts to unilaterally change the air space ce and territorial tus quo in the region. This is why they began their efforts to arm themselves waters were critical episodes.

armies to stop them from reaching the Mediterranean and countering its domestic communist threat as a secondary choice and a diversionary small scale conflict.

EurasiaCritic March 2010 25

Greece

excessively, which is one of the most important reasons for their financial problems today.

Sophisticated Weapons Purchases Since the beginning of the 1990s, Greece has been systematically acquiring short, medium and long range air defense rockets. Thus they own almost all the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leading systems, such as the PAC-3 Patriot, S-300, TOR-1 Ms, 1-Hawk, OSA-AK (SA-8), SKYGUARD/SPARROW and CROTALE NG/GR. Apart from these, here we should also mention the six frigates that will constitute additional strength for air defense in the Aegean. It is understood that Greece plans to strengthen its armored units rapidly. In addition to their existing inventory of German Leopard-2 tanks, brand new 170 Leopard-2 HEL tanks will be jointly produced by the German Krauss Maffei and the Greek ELVO firms. In terms of 26 EurasiaCritic March 2010

tanks, the Greek army is understood to chases as certain. Four of the 12 AH-64 (D) radar have decided to switch from American platforms to German platforms. They equipped attack helicopters purchased have ordered 130 Leopard 2A4 tanks by the Greek army, said to have the cain addition to the 170 Leopard-2 HELs pacity to track 256 targets at once, have been received. The from Krauss Maffei. It is known that remainder of the deAccording to the livery is expected to be 2007 treaty between Greece, which had delayed. Moscow and Athens, a heavily American The Greek armyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Greece is expected weapon inventory air power will suppleto buy 40 billion dolas a result of its ment its Hueys, which lars worth of weapons NATO membership, have been serving from Russia. The first is leaning towards since 1970s, with 20 part of the 40 billion NH90 helicopters that dollar Greek deal is having more French they plan to buy from an agreement to buy and German weapons Eurocopter, and with 415 BMP-3 tanks and platforms in its 12 Apache attack heliarmored vehicles. inventory due to its copters, and gradually The EU, disturbed by EU membership. retire the Hueys. This the Greeks acquiring plan is also expected weapons from nonpected to block to be delayed, delayed at least until 2015. NATO countries, is expected It is known that Greece, which had most of these purchases due to the economic crisis. European officials see the a heavily American weapon inventory cancellation of a portion of these pur- as a result of its NATO membership,

Greece is leaning towards having more French and German weapons platforms in its inventory due to its EU membership. In order to develop their Navy, they have ordered 3 Papanikolis (Type 214) class submarines, in addition to 8 type 209 submarines. These type 214 submarines are interesting because they can be submerged for a long time with its fuel cell equipment, they are quietness and difficult to detect. However, budget constraints and a series of malfunctions with the first delivered submarine may delay the deployment of the submarines and even lead to the cancellation of the order. The air force conIt is obvious that the tinues to be rapidly strengthened with the likelihood of conflict new F-16 Block 52+ in the Aegean Sea is and Mirage 2000-5 higher now because Mk2. All of these deGreece’s territorial velopments are sigwaters and air space nificant enough to demands persist and influence the regional balances of military Turkey opposes these power. However, the with the principle of deepening economcasus belli. ic crisis also affects these billion dollar purchases. Europe puts serious limits on Athens’ military acquisitions in the name of European budget discipline, and this is understood to mean that the US and Russia stand to lose. On the other hand, it is thought that Germany, which is expected to lend money to Greece, will have an advantageous position in weapons sales.

The Justifications for Armament It can be seen that Greece’s excessive armament is based on the idea that the Turkish military’s increasing sophistication and experience has given Turkey a serious advantage in the military balance of force. The Greek doctrine does not believe that the rapidity or kind of intervention and aid by forces such as the EU, the US or NATO is sufficient for a wartime situation. However, Turkey’s power and potential is incomparably larger than countries in the Near East and even

Europe itself. The justifications for the development of Greek military doctrine can be listed as follows: 1) Turkey, with its population of over 70 million, its large territory and hinterland, is a giant. 2) Turkish shores are a few kilometers away from Greece. 3) Turkey cannot accept the fact that Greece owns most of the Aegean Sea.

4) Turkey is disturbed by the fact that some of the Aegean islands are under Greek rule and equipped with military bases. 5) Nationalist and even Panturkist tendencies in Turkey have expansionist aims. 6) Turkey is resolute about not compromising its territorial waters and air space. 7) Since the 1990s, Turkey has seEurasiaCritic March 2010 27

Greece

riously emphasized the acquisition of casus belli. war planes, helicopters, battleships, arThe Military Doctrineâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s mored vehicles and rocket systems, creDead Ends ating a very modern armed forces. While these justifications for the In 1994 the Common Defense DocGreek military doctrine are shared with trine between Greece and the Greek the public, it is not mentioned that Tur- administration of Northern Cyprus was key is very busy with externally support- put into effect. Accordingly, military coed terrorism across its territory, with operation is foreseen in case of a Turksome level of contribution from Greece ish intervention in Greek Cyprus. itself. One deficit that arose after the CySince the end of the Cold War when prus Peace Operation was the slackness Greece focused all its armament efforts of the Greek system of mobilization. and strategies on TurThe need for serious key, there are three imThe economic crisis efforts to eliminate portant war alarms that this problem arose. made it necessary for Greek strategy experts Although the Greeks to review all emphasize. These are: Greek military doctheir defense options Cyprus, the Aegean trine is defense oriand arms purchases. Sea and Thrace. Conented in comparison flict might erupt in one to NATO strategy, or two of these or all three h at the h same it should be mentioned that signs of a time. It is obvious that the likelihood defense approach that starts beyond its of conflict in the Aegean Sea is higher borders can be seen. now because Greeceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s territorial waters Greece also developed strategies and air space demands persist and Tur- for deterring a potential enemy without key opposes these with the principle of using force. Accordingly, it focused on 28 EurasiaCritic March 2010

armament and military structure that shows it is power to respond. There was a special focus on establishing more mobile military units and in this context, brigades and battalions were formed, rather than divisions and regiments. Qualitative improvements were sought by downsizing and mobilizing military units and by increasing training levels. The new doctrine was expected to offer a more modern approach, to increase cooperation between land, air and sea forces and to deploy capabilities to enemy territories when necessary. In order to create force multiplier effects sophisticated weapons were also acquired in this context. An important subject of argument concerning Greek military doctrine is less dependency on defense since it is obvious that the outcome of wars in our day is determined by air power. It is a mistake to allow your opponent get the initiative during an air attack because it is no longer possible to hide ground forces in the hinterland and draw enemy forces into your territory. As a re-

Greece Greek Army

Greek Naval Forces

Troops: 93,500 active and 198,000 reserve soldiers

Military personnel: 20,000 (4,000 reserves)

1 armored division headquarters

10 Fifty class destroyers

3 mechanized infantry division headquarters

4 Hydra class (MEKO) destroyers

2 service and support divisions

4 Glaucos (type 209) submarines

4 armored brigades

4 Poseidon (updated to 209) submarines

7 mechanized infantry brigades

3 +2 Roussen assault boat

5 infantry brigades

4 Laskos class assault boat

1 airborne brigade

6 Votsis class (old German S148 class) assault boat

3 special forces brigades (1 marine, 1 parachute, 1 special operations) 1 army air brigade

4 Nike class (old German Tethys class) assault boat

4 service and support brigades

2 Kaos class patrol boat

1 logistics headquarters

4 Andromeda class torpedo boat

Weapons

2 Stamov class patrol boats

Tanks: 1,730 (Leopard 2A4, M-60 A, Leopard 1A and M-48 A5)

4 Ketallina class amphibious craft

Armored vehicles: 172 VBL

9 Naxos class amphibious craft

Armored personnel carriers and battle vehicles: 2175 (BMP, Leonidas ve M-113A) Greek Air Force

Cannons: 845 (approximately) Multi-projectile rockets: 115 RM-70, 36 MLRS

Military personnel: 31,500 (30,000 reserves)

Air defense missiles: 42 1-HAWK, 21 TOR-1M, 31 OSA-AK and 1250 Stingers in the 4 helicopter transport battalions: 38 UI7A, 74UH1, 15 CH-47D, 20 AH-64-A Apache, 28 AB-205, 14 AB-206

Total war planes: 293 (F-16 Block 30, F-16 Block-52, RF-4 and F-4E, F-16 Block 52+, Mirage 200 EGM, A-7 and Mirage 2000-5

Ground to air missiles: 2, 200 (MIM-23B I-HAWK, SA-8B “GECKO”, FIM-92 RMP “Stinger”)

sult, Greece does not have the luxury to wait for an eventual attack. Turkey’s high military level, its number of soldiers and its geopolitical depth can cost its opponent serious losses on the first attack, and when the opponent grows weaker, due to its territorial depth and Greece’s small territory, it can reach its targets without facing much resistance. Greek strategists oppose a defense oriented doctrine from this point of view. In light of these issues, in today’s wars a complete defense strategy is impossible to implement and more importantly, is equivalent to suicide. In order to eliminate the problems of this approach to defense, Greek military doctrine emphasizes issues that move away from this passive understanding. The fact that the war will be lost in the first days, in case of a Turkish initial attack, Greeks have to consider the option of their own initiating attack. However, the economic crisis made it necessary for them to review all their defense options and arms purchases.

It is necessary to take into account the fact that it will take a minimum of three years to normalize after the criss. And this will mean a three year waiting period for Greece to establish its new military doctrine and purchase weapons accordingly.

Air defense missiles: 6 batteries (36 ramp) 6 Skyguard/Sparrow, 2 SU-300 batteries (12 ramp), 4 TOR-MI, 9 CROTALE NG Air transport planes: 118 craft (including helicopters) (C-130 B/H, C-27, CL-215, DO-28, CL-415, EMB-135 AEW& C, P3-B Orion, AB-205, B-212, AS-332, A-109)

EurasiaCritic March 2010 29

Balkans

EU-Russia Relations Will Be Tested Throught Bosnia Pain By Shemsey Vodinov

osnians, Croatians and Serbians are highly nervous and stressed nowadays. Fragile stability become more breakable after the Freedom Declaration of Kosovo. Serbians were defining the Kosovo territory as a Serbian land so this Freedom Declaration alerted the Serbians in Bosnia Herzegovina. War drums and separation signals are aimed to Serbians in Bosnia in the most problematic country of Balkans:

30 EurasiaCritic March 2010

Bosnia Herzegovina. dovan Karacicâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s judgment is not finSerbians in Bosnia are defending ished, this separation demand stressed that country cannot live in this situation the region a lot. Complicated Dayton Agreement of conflict possibility any more so a referendum should be made for deciding which was signed in 1995, cannot be exercised anymore. Dayton Agreement separation. While the memories of thousands of which was signed after the efforts of an death which died in the American Diplomat Richard Holbrooke war between 1992 and Serbians in Bosnia are were could only be 1995 are fresh and while defending that country signed by the comformer prime minister cannot live in this of Bosnia, Serbian Rapromises given to situation of conflict both Yugoslavian possibility any more so leader Milosevic and Serbian Republic of a referendum should Bosnia Herzegovina be held for deciding leader Karacic. Miseparation. losevic was died in a prison in Lahey before b f telling lli h his truths and Karacic has started to tell what he knows after a long and slow judging process in the same place which Milosevic was died. Karacic is accused for responsibility of thousands of death and for 11 war crimes. It is expected that his case will not come to a conclusion before the year 2012. On the other hand political crisis in Bosnia may lead to many changes until 2012. The leader of Republic of Serbia, Milorad Dodik offered joining with Serbia in a meeting which was held in Vogosca city near Sarajevo with Bosnia Serbians. Dodik was argued that Serbians rights are not still given in Bosnia Herzegovina and he offered a referendum in April. Dodikâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s offer was accepted by consent. Serbian Republic of Bosnia Herze-

Balkans

govina Parliament approved the draft law with 46 votes against 16 votes, which was designed to make referendums easier after the session which was lasted for two days in 12th of February. By using the existing law, Croatian and Muslim minorities could hinder the referendum with the wait up tactic. New law removed the time limitation and tactics cannot work on this new law. US and EU warned about a potential intervention on Bosnia Constitution towards this move which is counted as a step to freedom. Dodik who decided to have a referendum, was disagreed with the idea of three nations’ live with harmony and he added that conflicts between these nations are started centuries ago. “While this territory was Ottoman for 500 years Muslims or they can be called as Bosnians were feeling comfortable and they were feeling them-

selves as they were integrated to the are transforming in each 8 months pesociety. Austria Hungary became sov- riod. ereign after Ottoman Empire and in All three nations’ agreement is the Austria Hungary era Serbians and needed to decide about important isMuslims were feeling sues. This state structhemselves as under Dodik was argued that ture is not designed pressure. Croatians for finding solutions; Serbians rights are not were feeling comfortit is designed for not still given in Bosnia able. In the Yugoslavia to giving power to one Herzegovina and he period, Serbians were hand, it is for not to offered a referendum comfortable because give power to one nain April. Dodik’s they were living in a tion. Because of this society in which SerbiBosnia Herzegovina offer was accepted by ans were the majority. politicians are trying consent. Dodik was argued that to make new arrangeSerbians rights are not ments on constitution. New arrangements include fundastill given in Bosnia Herzegovina and he offered a referendum in April. Do- mental changes like reforming census and reforming new administrative bordik’s offer was accepted by consent. According to the Dayton Agree- ders. Actions for these changes did not ment which was ended the war in 1995, success in 2009 and change is not seem each nation has a quota on politics. Ser- possible in this year too. For changing bian, Bosnian and Croatian presidents the existing structure which has two EurasiaCritic March 2010 31

Balkans There are Croatians living in the entities and ten cantons, three nations should accept it. This is not possible Republic of Serbia and we will not leave with the new referendum decision of them to live under Serbia after the war Serbians. Serbian Republic of Bosnia happened. Serbia does not giving an explicit Herzegovina decision of joining with Serbia which was taken by the lead of declaration about the issue. It is assumed that Belgrade Govautonomous Serbian Repulic’s(it is ernment is helping bound to Bosnia HerSerbian Republic of zegovina) President If Moscow stands Bosnia Herzegovina Dodik, was criticized strong with Serbians, by unofficial ways and by both Bosnia HerzeEurope’s relation they are making plans govina and Croatia. with Russia would be for annexation of SerFormer Croatia bian Republic of BosPresident Stipe Mecollapsed in spite of nia Herzegovina and sic stated right before the US affect. Serbia. he was leaving, that if Bosnia Serbians deSerbia is helped by cide to join up with Serbia with a ref- Russia, Bosnians and Croatians are takerendum, Croatia may make a military ing help from US and EU. This complicated political chess may intervention against this. end up the history of young Republic of Stipe Mesic,

32 EurasiaCritic March 2010

Bosnia Herzegovina. Nobody wants a Yugoslavian disaster again, especially when extreme nationalist elements are cleaned from Serbia but this political stress is not expected to lead people to a logical conclusion. Kosovo’s declaration of freedom and its recognition by west resulted as recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia. Is it the turn for Serbian Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina now? Referendum which will be held in April, this year will be the tipping point. In the short period until April, international actors’ visits to Sarajevo Airport will be seen more often. Turkey is also trying hard to help for keeping the stability in that territory but Turkey cannot affect Serbians too much for sure. There are two convincing factors for Serbians, first is EU and second is their traditional strategic ally Russia. It is understood that Brussels, Moscow and Washington will have to start negotiating for a new Dayton. If Croatia reacts with an military intervention against a separation decision, Serbia would want to react in the same way. In this case, Balkans may have a new bloodshed. This kind of a conflict expected to have a controlled and local course. If Russia and Germany do not show up with Serbia and Croatia then if Germany which use Croatia as its backyard, cannot activate EU, Germany may behave by itself. In this kind of a situation Serbia would want Russian help. Russia which has a special link with Europe through Germany and France, may not want to be a part of this asymmetric war. If Moscow stands strong with Serbians, Europe’s relation with Russia would be collapsed in spite of the US affect. Lets see if negotiations may come to a conclusion in a time which economic crisis is paralyzing all super powers. If negotiations do not come to a conclusion then new conflicts and wars may start in Bosnia Herzegovina. A new conflict in Balkans will make the Bosnia an arena for testing relations with EU and Russia.

Balkans

EurasiaCritic March 2010 33

China-Taiwan

A New Cold War between China and the US By Baris Adibelli

ith the American government fighting a big economic crisis, the Obama administration decided to go through with a 6.5 billion dollar weapons sale including attack helicopters and rockets to be sold to Taiwan, a package initially presented to Congress by the Bush administration in 2008. The package offered to congress by the Bush administration on October 3, 2008 included sales of 30 Apache helicopters, 30 Patriot rockets and 32 Harpoon rockets fired from

submarines. This package consists of 6 separate weapons deals. These are: 330 Patriot-3 air defense systems worth 3.1 billion dollars; 30 AH-64D Block III Apache Longbow attack helicopters worth 2.532 billion dollars; 32 UGM 84L harpoon Block II rockets fired from submarines worth 200 million dollars; 2 UTM-84L Harpoon Block II rockets, 182 Javelin loaded rockets and 20 Javelin launch command control units worth 47 million dollars, the modernization of 4 E-2T aircraft worth

250 million dollars, and finally, 334 million dollars worth of modernization for F-E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B and IDF war plane communication equipment and radars, as well as logistic support for the repair of other parts. Moreover, the Taiwanese have been lobbying since 2008 for 60 Black Hawk helicopters left out of the package and joint production of diesel submarines, and trying to convince the US to sell them 60 F-16 C/D war planes.

Security Dilemma The problem of Taiwan is the most important problem that China and the US inherited from the Cold War. War almost broke out three times between China and US over Taiwan. In 1950s General Douglas Mac Arthur emphasized Taiwanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s geopolitical importance in the Asian Pacific region for US by calling it the unsinkable aircraft carrier. Throughout the Cold War, Taiwan was a geostrategic advantage for the US, The Taiwanese Straits under Taiwanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s control is a crucial sea route for Japan and South Korea. These straits are the raw material and energy trade route for both countries. Although the US signed three important documents that state that Taiwan is part of China, it did not give up on arming Taiwan against China. Weapons sales to Taiwan have always been a problem in terms of Chinese-American relations. In 1982 the Reagan administration brought up weapon sales to Taiwan and disrupted Chinese-American relations. Similarly, in 1992 the Bush administration brought up selling 16 aircraft to Taiwan,

34 EurasiaCritic March 2010

China-Taiwan

causing further serious harm to Chinese-American relations. In order to sell weapons to Taiwan, the US publishes annual intelligence reports and claims that China is involved in certain military activities against Taiwan. These reports usually conclude that China will attack Taiwan in about a year’s time. The US’s psychological propaganda has effect immediately and Taiwan buys billions of dollars worth of weapons from the US every year. The Chinese however, state that US reports do not reflect reality and emphasize that US is fooling Taiwan into buying weapons using a wily salesman’s mentality. In fact, while previous Pentagon reports claim that the number of ballistic rockets sent to Taiwan was 350, and then 750-800, today the number is over 1000. More than a 1000 ballistic rockets is not a rational strategy for either defense or attack, against a 36 thousand km2 island 160 km of the Chinese coast because China does not want to erase Taiwan of the map but wants to reunite it instead. These amounts show that the US convinces Taiwan to purchase weapons with exaggerated numbers. Since Taiwan buys weapons, China increases armament against Taiwan similarly. The situation where country A sees that

country B is in arming, is threatened and begins to arm itself, too, causing country A to further increase its weapons is called a security dilemma in the discipline if international relations. Country B responds with more armament and situation continues like this. This is like the armament contest between China and Taiwan. In the end, international arms dealers are the ones that benefit.

this step and emphasized that, because of the principle of loyalty to agreements and since Taiwan was a long term ally against communism, the White House should maintain certain previously established relations. Congress was insistent on this and made the Carter administration accept the Taiwanese Relations Law. With this law, a new diplomatic relations mechanism called the Taiwanese model was born. Ma’s The Chill in Taiwanesesupport for weapon sales also put this American Relations peaceful atmosphere at risk. Is Coming to an End Actually, this sale was proposed by the US in 2001. However, Taiwan’s NaIn his declaration, Taiwan’s Presitionalist Party’s MPs, the opposition at dent Ma interpreted the US governthe time, opposed this ment’s approval of purchase because it was the weapon sales as Although the US very expensive, and they the end of a cold pesigned three important blocked the package’s riod that has lasted documents that state passage in Parliament. for the last eight that Taiwan is part of The US shelved the years. The US, on sale. In addition to the the other hand, deChina, it did not give costs, the reason the nafended the legality of up on arming Taiwan tionalists opposed such the weapon sales and against China. a sensitive issue was stated that they are that the acquisition was compatible with the interpreted as military support for the Taiwanese relations law ratified by Conindependence arguments of the Demogress in 1979 and derive their legitimacy cratic Progress Party then in power. The from this law. As you may remember, nationalists, on the other hand, did not when the US cut off diplomatic relawant to be independent from China. tions with Taiwan, Congress opposed EurasiaCritic March 2010 35

China-Taiwan

military and diplomatic meetings with the US. China already considers Taiwan’s declaration of independence as a reason for war (casus belli). While China has such a policy, Washington’s insistence on arming Taiwan shows that the US is seriously gambling. In Taiwan, the election of the pacifically minded leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), Ma, to the Taiwanese presidency in March China’s Reaction 2008 began a new period of peace beAs soon as the news about the arms tween China and Taiwan. Traditionally, the Nationalists sales reached China, wanted to unite with there was very harsh The US’s China. The Democratreaction at the official psychological ic Progressive Party, level. A spokesperson propaganda has effect on the other hand, of the Chinese minisimmediately and advocates Taiwan’s try of foreign affairs independence. With stated that the arms Taiwan buys billions nationalists coming to sales constitute a risk of dollars worth of power there were nufor Chinese national weapons from the US merous protocol visits security, that they will every year. from Taiwan to China. harm the military relaMoreover, commertions between China and the US that have been develop- cial flights started between China and ing for years and that they put Beijing- Taiwan. Tourism contracts were signed, Washington military relations at risk. and Taiwan invited Chinese entrepreChina protested the weapons sale and neurs, while China allowed Taiwan to announced that they cancelled some invest in China. Therefore, the reason However, soon afterwards Taiwan approved the sale, but the US did not put it on the table in Congress for a while. This is because China played a big role in the diplomatic process of removing nuclear weapons from North Korea, and Washington did not bring up the arms sales in order not to provoke China and sabotage this diplomatic process.

36 EurasiaCritic March 2010

for Ma’s recent support for this weapons deal in this context is still being discussed in Beijing. In fact, Taiwan’s Chinese population criticized Tibet and the Dalai Lama during the Tibetan uprisings and said that Tibet had been Chinese territory for centuries. Taiwanese nationalists stated that Tibet’s separation from China is unthinkable and demonstrated an even more nationalist stance than China itself.

The Reasons for the Arms Sale There are two important factors behind the strategy adopted by the US towards Taiwan. First, the most important export item for the US, which is in a big economic crisis, is weapons. The arms industry is the driving force of the American economy. Looking at the recent US history, the first and second world wars, the Vietnam war and the Gulf war all served the weapons industry. Whenever the American economy slows down, the war economy gets it back on its feet. The US economy is being dragged to collapse due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in order to avoid this collapse it has been looking for a chance to start a war against

China-Taiwan Iran for the last two years. Apart from Iran’s strategic position, the US’s main purpose is to revitalize its weapons industry with a regional war and to obtain necessary finances for the American economy. Another reason is completely geostrategic. The fact that the PacificIndian ocean line, which the US has considered the most important security parameter since the Cold War, is falling under Chinese control is another source of concern for the US. The Pentagon thinks of China as one leg of the scissors that will narrow the gap from Hormuz Straits towards the Pacific region and push US out of the region by uniting with the other leg Russia in the Pacific region. In fact, Russia has indicated that it wants to become a determining military power in the Pacific by conducting nuclear rocket drills in the Far East, drills that it did not even hold during the Soviet period. It did not please Washington, and especially Obama and his team, that China not only became dominant in Asian Pacific, but also gained more influence in Eurasia. The Bush administration was not very interested in Eurasia. Its main concern was the Middle East, with Israel’s security in the center. However, almost for a century Eurasia has been the most important target for the US, and Halford John Mackinder was the one who pointed to Eurasia as the primary geostrategic target. Mackinder emphasized that the way to rule the world was mainly through Eurasia then under Soviet control.

domestic product and 3/4 of all known to Brzezinski, the US had to control the energy resources. All the officially ac- surrounding countries. The Clinton adknowledged nuclear powers accept one ministration tried to follow these preand secret nuclear powers are in Eur- dictions for a while but the conjuncture asia. It is the biggest continent on earth did not fully allow it. and is a geopolitical axis. A power that As soon as he took up his position dominates Eurasia can control two of Obama took his mentor Brzezinski’s the three most advanced and economi- road map off the shelf, and following cally productive regions in the world. his advice to control the surroundings, The last five centuries’ world events he set out to improve relations with have been determined by Eurasian peo- Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Japan and ples and powers that fight each other Turkey. In this context, the US reviewed for regional hegemony the issue of Taiwan and global power. Toand rather than seekChina played a big day, a non-Eurasian ing to separate it from role in the diplomatic power is leading EurChina, saw it as part of process of removing asia, and American the strategy of distractglobal leadership deing China and pushing nuclear weapons pends on how long it away from Eurasia from North Korea, and with what effecand Africa by locking and Washington tiveness it will sustain it in the region. With did not bring up the its hegemony in Eurthis logic, the more arms sales in order asia. Either by AmerChina can be kept not to provoke China ica’s withdrawal or by busy here, the more the sudden emergence new regional power and sabotage this of a successful comcenters such as Japan diplomatic process. petitor, the rapid loss and India can develop. of his hegemony will Moreover, without cause deep international instability. China in Eurasia, Russia can be defeatAfter explaining the reasons for the im- ed more easily. Meanwhile, the US’s portance of Eurasia, Brzezinski goes on European allies will replace China in to warn the US in particular. He states Africa. The US’s Taiwan strategy must that a potential rival to America might be evaluated throughly. Evaluating it come out of the most important play- narrowly in terms of blocking Chinese ing field on earth, Eurasia. According economic power would lack foresight.

The US’s New Policy of Containment This concept, which originally reflected the spirit of the Cold War was revived by Zbigniev Brzezinski in the post-Cold War period. Zbigniev Brzezinski clearly explained the importance of Eurasia for the US in his book, The Grand Chessboard. According to Brzezinski, approximately 75% of the world population lives in Eurasia, and the majority of economic initiatives and underground resources are located there. Eurasia has 60% of the world’s gross EurasiaCritic March 2010 37

China-Taiwan and separately. In China’s approach the two regions are seen as an inseparable whole in terms of politics, economics and military, and Eurasia and Asian Pacific complement each other. This is perhaps Washington’s biggest strategic mistake. Washington continues to evaluate its position in especially the Asian Pacific with Cold War parameters and ignores the evolution and transformation of its regional allies such as Japan. Contrary to assumptions, an Asian Pacific strategy that is not adapted to the existing conditions will entail a heavy burden and give strategic priority to China. What lies beneath Obama’s new Afghanistan oriented policy vision that he put forward as soon as he took office is actually the American strategists’ understanding that the new containment strategy against China cannot be conducted merely from the Pacific region.

Conclusion

The most important fact behind the Bush administrations’s attempt to form an organization similar to SEATO in the Asian Pacific is the concern that a growing China will naturally demand an expansion area. This act is more visible with an analysis in terms of geopolitics. This concern is what leads to the frequent comparisons in the West between 38 EurasiaCritic March 2010

today’s China and Nazi Germany or the Japanese empire. McKinder’s prediction not only determined the horizons of American international policy, but China also took lessons from it. China skillfully maneuvered to identify the Asian Pacific region as an adjacent region to Eurasia, while the US threatened these independently

In conclusion, in the year since Obama took office with big hopes, he took an unexpected step and initiated a process that will undermine peace and stability in the Asian Pacific. The long quiet region shifted to a tense posture with Obama’s announcement of the decision to sell weapons to Taiwan. In response to this announcement China made harsh statements and threats. Planting new seeds of instability instead of resolving the regional instability caused by the chaos in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, gives the impression that Obama administration is pushing the US towards a more tangled process. As he is finishing the first year of his presidency, which he won with the slogan of change, Obama disappointed his domestic and foreign policy supporters and began 2010 with a major image change. Although he received the majority of the votes as a result of the American people’s reaction against the Bush administration, he failed to fulfill his promises to have a different profile in every field and began to follow Bush’s footsteps one year later. Without a doubt the most important item on Obama’s agenda at the beginning of his term was the global economic crisis.

China-Taiwan

Failing to overcome the crisis with its neighbors. In this context, initially Chidecisions, the Obama administration na made diplomatic attempts to resolve was not very successful with its policies old problems or misunderstandings against Russia and China, which re- with its neighbors. Similarly, being very cently resumed their roles as traditional sensitive about Taiwan, China lifted rivals of America. He could not find a this sensitivity to another level in 2006, solution for the rapidly decreasing glob- and with the Combat Against Separatal credibility of the US. The traditional ism Law it announced that any step toAmerican internationwards independence al policy strategy of by Taiwan would be No doubt, the creating a crisis if you considered a casus continuation of the US cannot find a solution belli (reason for war). containment policy came into play. Obama Although this was in against China will lead is trying to distract the conflict with the prinAmerican and global ciple of zero problems China to adapt a more public by starting cerwith neighbors, China destructive policy, tain regional crises. sees the problem of especially regarding While he expects to Taiwan as a domestic North Korea and Iran. gain more support with issue rather than an the profile of a hawkinternational policy isish president, provoking China, which sue and evaluates Taiwan as part of the had accepted the principle of peaceful territorial unity of China, calling this development as a model, and causing One China Policy. However, due to its it to follow more aggressive policies long term UN representation, Taiwan constitute more than anything else the has drawn international attention. It is greatest threat to US global interests. hard for China to exclude Taiwan from With Hu Jintao officially becom- its international policy because Taiwan ing the president of China in 2003, an has been dealing with Chinese foreign important process of change in Chi- policy for a long time. Thus, Chinese nese international policy was started, foreign policy is involved in Taiwan’s and Hu Jintao formulated this change status, and the international commuas the principle of zero problems with nity is discussing Taiwan’s status on a

legitimate platform. No doubt China’s definition of Taiwan’s status is based on three documents they signed with the US in the past. China always refers to these documents for Taiwan. However, there is another document which determines the US view of Taiwan, and it legitimizes all steps taken by the US. This documents is the Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress in 1979. As long as the US insists on this act and legitimizes everything with this act, China might enforce its right to use force against Taiwan according to the 2006 Combat Against Separatism Law. No doubt, the continuation of the US containment policy against China will lead China to adapt a more destructive policy, especially regarding North Korea and Iran. The Obama administration’s indirect propaganda claiming that China is responsible for recent problems in Iran and the new process started with Taiwan raises the question: Is the US getting revenge for Chinas support of Iran? It seems that difficult days are ahead for the Asian Pacific. *For further information on Taiwan see Baris Adibelli, Cin Dis Politikasinda Tayvan Sorunu (The Taiwan Issue in Chinese Foreign Policy), IQ Yayinevi, Istanbul, 2006. EurasiaCritic March 2010 39

Industry Report

Turkish Information and Communication Technologies Executive Summary

he Turkish ICT sector is a fast growing sector with a CAGR of 14% between 2005 and 2009. Future trends, global and local developments present more opportunities each year. Since 2005, many large international players have invested in Turkish ICT sector companies. The fact that the size of the Turkish ICT sector is still below EU averages gives Turkey great potential for growth. The overall size of the ICT market in Turkey is estimated as US$29 billion in 2009. The sector can be considered to comprise four main categories: telecommunications, internet & broadband, hardware and software. The Turkish ICT market is dominated by telecommunications, constituting approximately 73% of the total, with the whole IT market comprising the other 27%. The IT market has experienced double-digit growth over recent years ever since the 2001 financial crisis, but the share of software and services are

40 EurasiaCritic March 2010

significantly behind western markets ons with its young population and its and CEE countries, signalling signifi- network infrastructure covering the whole country. Turkey’s fixed line opecant growth potential. The telecommunications sector in rator is Türk Telekom which was wholly Turkey has grown rapidly in recent years state owned until 2005. Türk Telekom as a result of increases in the disposable was privatized and 55% of its shares income level and government support were acquired by Oger Telekomünifor liberalization and privatization of kasyon in that year, and the State’s ownership was further the telecommunications reduced by a public sector. However, Turkey Turkey is an attractive offer in 2008. Mobistill has low fixed-line, market for the le communications internet and broadband is the most compepenetration rates comdevelopment of titive sub-sector of pared to its European telecommunications the Turkish telecompeers. with its young munications market. The large populatipopulation and its There are 65.8 million in Turkey as well as network infrastructure on registered mobile the demand for high-tecovering the whole subscribers in Turkey ch telecommunication as of 2008 year end. services are expected to country. There are currently increase total IT spenthree licenced mobiding to a level of US$9.1 billion in 2013 from US$6.1 billion in le operators namely Turkcell, Vodafone 2009. Mobile penetration levels are ex- and Avea. Average mobile penetration rate for EU countries was 119% as of pected to increase further. Turkey is an attractive market for October 2008 whereas Turkey’s penetthe development of telecommunicati- ration rate is 92%. the mobile penetration rate is expected to increase further. Multinational players constitute a large part of Turkey’s technology sector. Companies such as IBM, Hewlett Packard, Dell, Siemens, Cisco and NCR have local subsidiaries in Turkey. Recently, there has been a huge increase in the number of technology improvement areas and where the Turkish IT companies are located. Technology Development Zones (“TDZ”) have been established. Software houses benefit from significant tax and investment incentives provided by the government in these technoparks. The Turkish government has

Industry Report implemented new legal frameworks to encourage R&D and IT spending, which will support the growth of the sector. Income earned as a result of R&D activities by companies located in technology development zones is exempt from tax. Additional incentives include contributions to the social security payments of R&D employees.

Global Sector Global IT spending reached a level of $2.4 trillion in 2008, from $2.2 trillion in 2007, with a growth rate of 8%. The US is the largest IT spender in the world, with $810 billion of spending in 2008. The Western and Central Europe region is the second largest IT spender, with $663 billion ( 483 billion) in 2008. Asia Pacificâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s IT spending followed closely at $588 billion and is estimated to have grown at double-digit rates in 2008. Eastern European, Middle East and African IT spending was also growing at double-digit rates in 2006 and 20072. In 2009, global IT spending is forecast to fall by 7.1% in US$ terms due to the global economic conditions. Within the global IT market breakdown, the largest category is IT staff costs with 30% share, estimated to have amounted to $699 million in 2008. The kets have switched to cheaper tariffs second largest category in the global and limited their usagewhich placed market is the IT services and outsour- serious pressure on the largest telecomcing category with 22%. The global sof- munication operators. Accordingly, tware spending is lower than the com- a movement towards consolidation is expected in global telecommunications puter or communications. In 2008, the global telecommunica- markets. The global operators are actively seeking toacquire tions market size reacthe few new licences hed US$1,377 billion, However, the growth and takeover targets up from US$ 1,246 bilrate is expected to be left in under-penetralion the previous year, higher in emerging ted emerging markets. a growth rate of 11%. markets than in the The internet marDue to the global ecoket has been facing nomic conditions, the developed saturated difficulties in 2008 global telecommunimarkets. however the number cationssector is expecof people with interted to shrink by 5.3% from 2008 to 2009. The major telecom- net accessis expected to reach c.31% of munication players in the world have the global population in 2009, up from been suffering from the unfavourable 28% in 2008. Broadband, which as yet currency fluctuations and shortage of has a small base, is also growing rapidnew growth opportunities. During the ly. Total broadband subscribers globally slowdown, customers in western mar- are projected to reach c.396m in 2009.

However, the growth rate is expected to be higher in emerging markets than in the developed saturated markets. Worldwide fibre-based broadband subscribers are expected to reach 44.7m by the end of 2009. Most of the growth in this area is expected to arise in the Asian and US markets, where leading fixed-line operators are expanding their networks in the major cities. South Korean and Japanese markets, which are already strong in broadband, are expected to continue to grow in this area. The emerging markets are suffering from the weak investment in broadband services. The Semiconductor Industry Association, a US lobby group that tracks global markets and Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009 The hardware segment was heavily impacted by business spending cuts during the financial crisis in 2008.However it has started to recoEurasiaCritic March 2010 41

Industry Report The four categories are further analyzed in the following sections.

Telecommunications

ver from the effects of the crisis, and personal computer sales have started to grow above expectations. Chip sales in the US have been increasing consistently for several months in 2009 and the Q3’2009 sales were 19.7% higher than Q2’2009. However, these figures are still 10.1% lower than in the previous year and hardware spending is expected to contract by more than 12% in 2009 after a slow growth rate of 4% in 2008.

The Domestic Sector Overview The Turkish ICT sector is a fast growing sector with a CAGR of 14% between 2005 and 2009. Future trends, global and local developments present more opportunities each year. The fact that the size of the Turkish ICT sector is still below EU averages gives Turkey great potential for growth. The overall size of ICT market in Turkey is estimated to be US$29 billion in 2009. The Turkish ICT market dominated by telecommunication, constituting approximately 73% of the total, with the entire IT market constituting the other 27%. The IT market has ex42 EurasiaCritic March 2010

Turkey is an attractive market for the development of the telecommunications sector with its young population and its network infrastructure covering the whole country. The liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in Turkey has led to higher quality services offered at more suitable prices. Total telecommunications revenuein Turkey, comprising both fixed line and mobile, reached US$ 13 billion in 2008 and is expected to reach US $16.9 billion in 2009. In 2008, 33% of total revenue consisted of fixed line revenues whereas 67% was mobile revenues. In parallel with the revenues sector, investment in electronic communications is also growing. Total investments for fixed and mobile operators reached to US$ 3.2 billion in 2008 with an increase of 68% compared to the previous year. Mobile sector investments amounted to c.62% of the investment total in 2008. perienced double-digit growth over re- The fixed line penetration rate reached cent years except during the 2001 finan- a peak in 2001 at 28.5% and has been cial crisis. slightly decreasing starting from 2004 The size of the IT market and the due to the growth of mobile usage. share of software and Turkey’s fixed line services are signifioperator is Türk TeleFollowing that block cantly behind western kom which was state sale, a further 15% of markets and CEE owned until 2005. In Türk Telekom’s capital countries, indicating November 2005, Türk was privatized through significant growth poTelekom was privaa public offering on tential. tized through a 55% The export and imshareholding being the Istanbul Stock port volumes in ICT sold to Oger TelekoExchange, where Türk sector have reached a münikasyon (a consorTelekom has been level of US$4 billion tium led by Saudi Oger traded since May 15, and US$10 billion resand Telecom Italia). 2008. Turkey’s fixed pectively as of 2008. Following that block line and mobile sector The foreign trade vosale, a further 15% of lumes in Turkish ICT Türk Telekom’s capirevenue level is below sector are as follows: tal was privatized thmature markets such The sector can be rough a public offering as Germany, Italy, broken down into four on the Istanbul Stock France and the UK. main categories as folExchange, where Türk lows: Telekom has been tra• telecommunications, ded since May 15, 2008. Turkey’s fixed • internet & broadband, line and mobile sector revenue level • hardware and is below mature markets such as Ger• software. many, Italy, France and the UK.

Industry Report Mobile communications is the most competitive sub-sector of the Turkish telecommunications market. There were 65.8 million registered mobile subscribers in Turkey as of 2008 year end. There are currently three licenced mobile operators namely Turkcell, Vodafone and Avea. Mobile Number Portability was introduced in Turkey on November 9, 2008 to strengthen the free competition in the market. Average mobile penetration rate for EU countries was 119% as of October 2008 whereas Turkey’s penetration rate is 92%. The penetration rate in Turkey is expected to increase further towards the EU level.

Internet & Broadband As shown in the graph below, the household broadband penetration rate in Turkey appears low compared to EU average; however penetration rate in Turkey still exceeds some European countries such as Italy, Bulgaria and Romania, and is very close to the rates in Poland, Portugal, Hungary, Estonia and Spain. On the other hand, the personal computer (PC) penetration level in Turkey in 2008 was only about 22.5%, compared to 72% in the UK. Since internet usage depends on PC penetration, increasing PC usage and ownership in Turkey should create opportunities for the broadband market. After the migration from dial-up and cable Internet to ADSL, ADSL has become the most widely used Internet access tool in Turkey. The number of ADSL subscribers had risen to a level of 5.8 million in 2008 from 1.5 million in 2005. Considering internet usage in Turkey, the ratio of subscribers per 100 people is expected to reach 41% in 2009, compared to 37% in Greece and 45% in Bulgaria. The number of internet users in Turkey has grown with CAGR of 225% between 2005 and 2009. The rates of internet access, the computer usage as well as internet usage have increased consistently between 2007-2009 in Turkey. As shown in the chart below, the internet and computer usage of the enterprises in Turkey has

reached high levels between the same period. Quarterly market shares of the broadband operators are indicated below. The market share of TTNet which is owned by the fixed line operator (Türk Telekom) decreased slightly to 93.3% in the Q4’2008 and the shares of alternative operators reached 5.6% of the market; however TTNet’s dominance remains clear.

Hardware The stock of PCs in Turkey was at

a level of 92 per 1,000 people in 2006 have grown rapidly and reached an estimated level of 225 per 1,000 people in 2008. Compared to European markets, this figure corresponds to c.500 per 1,000 people in Italy and c.720 in France and Germany. The value-added tax (VAT) reduction on consumer durables, introduced in March 2009 in the Turkish market to counter the impact of the financial crisis, has improved the sales of PCs and laptops in 2009. Major multinational institutions, such as IBM, Hewlett Packard, Dell, EurasiaCritic March 2010 43

Industry Report Siemens, Cisco, and NCR, account for a considerable share of Turkey’s technology market. These multinationals typically have local subsidiaries, which assemble PCs and other IT hardware components imported from overseas. Sales are realized both domestically and for export to the EU, Eastern and Central Europe, and the Middle East.

Software The Turkish software industry is a dynamic and fast developing sector. However, the software market is not big as other developing countries such as India, Ireland, Israel, Brazil and China. Turkey has implemented a new export promotion system which is in line with the rules set out in international treaties. There are currently 10 different state aid programs. Four of these programs target only SMEs. Recently, there has been a huge increase in the number of “technology improvement areas” where the Turkish IT companies are located. Technology Development Zones (“TDZ”) have been established. Software houses located in these technoparks and technology development zones benefit from significant tax and investment incentives provided by thegovernment. Law No: 4691, the “Technology Development Zones Law,” was enacted on June 26, 2001. By November 2009, the number of companies located in TDZ’s reached 1,217. Today, there are about 40 Computer Engineering Departments in Turkey in various universities. In addition to that, it is estimated that around 15,000 graduates of other disciplines with IT knowledge enter the market each year. Moreover, the number of private computer training courses under the support of the Ministry of Education is 727. Turkey has highly qualified human resources in the IT software sector. Very competent, young and dynamic computer engineers and software developers have been trained and fulfilled the increasing demand in the sector. It is believed that the rates of employee turnover are lower and loyalty is higher than in many of the low cost base countries developing softwa44 EurasiaCritic March 2010

Industry Report

re around the world. Software piracy is one of the biggest problems in the sector. The software piracy rate in Turkey is around 64%. The Turkish government is taking the necessary actions to prevent copyright theft. Turkish software companies are increasingly obtaining various certifications which are mandatory for large scale projects. The Turkish government is giving high priority to market friendly policies in order to improve the environment for foreign direct investors. Various incentives, tax exemptions and waiver mechanisms introduced in the law create important potential opportunities and benefits to universities, academics and companies that have R&D activities and/or are developing software in technoparks. Accordingly, the participants are exempt from corporate taxes on the revenues generated by software development and R&D activities until December 31, 2013. Additionally, the wages of R&D and software development personnel in the technopark companies are exempt from any taxes until December 31, 2013. The companies can also benefit from the other government support determined by the law.

Main Players Reform of the communications market started in accordance with the Telecommunications Law in 2000. The law established an independent regulator, â&#x20AC;&#x153;the Information and Communication Technologies Authorityâ&#x20AC;? and predetermined full market liberalisation starting from January 2004. Until 2001, the GSM operators Turkcell and Telsim enjoyed a duopoly in

the mobile market. In 2001 the government awarded two further GSM licences, to Aycell, owned by Turk Telekom and to Aria, owned by telecom Italia. The two new mobile operators competed to gain market share and merged in February 2004. The ownership of Telsim was transferred to the government after its owners were convicted of fraud in relation to different areas of their activity. The operator was afterwards privatised in an

international tender won by Vodafone in December 2005. 3G mobile licences were awarded to all three operators in 2008 and services commenced in 2009.

Sector Outlook The Turkish telecommunications and IT markets have grown rapidly in recent years as a result of increases in disposable income levels and the government support for liberalization and privatization of the telecommuniEurasiaCritic March 2010 45

Industry Report cations sector. However, Turkey still declining since a peak around 2001has low fixed-line, internet and broad- 2004 in Turkey, similar to most develoband penetration rates compared to its ped and developing countries. AccorEuropean peers. The large population dingly, the penetration rate is estimated level in Turkey as well as the demand to have decreased to 24.5% in 2008, for high-tech telecommunication ser- from around 28% in 2004. The penetravices is expected to increase total IT tion is low compared to EU countries, for example c.40% in spending to a level of France, 45% in GerUS$9.1 billion in 2013 Low cost base many, 55% in Greece from US$6.1 billion in countries developing and 33% in Hungary. 2009 12. Mobile penetsoftware around the Population growth ration levels are expeworld. Software piracy and the increasing use cted to reach 115 per is one of the biggest of the Internet are the 100 people during the main demand growth same period. Increaproblems in the sector. drivers for telecomsing competition in the The software piracy munications services telecommunication serate in Turkey is in the forecast period. ctor is also expected around 64%. Fixed-line penetration to motivate operators is expected to decline such as Turk Telekom, Turkcell and Vodafone to t continue ti llo- to t under d 20 ttelephone main lines per oking for new business expansion and 100 population by 2013, as more indivicustomer retention strategies to sustain duals choose to rely only on mobile teand gain market share. These compa- lephony. Demand for broadband is exnies are likely to invest in new techno- pected to be the main revenue growth logies such as WiMAX, IPTV and 3G, driver for fixed-line operators in the pushing the deployment of network inf- future. Turkish mobile telecommunications rastructure in the country. Fixed-line penetration has been segment has achieved a considerable

size with its share of c.60% within the total sector revenue in 2008 and is expected to continue growing. The mobile number portability (MNP) which was launched in November 2008, as well as the 3G mobile services which were introduced into the market in July 2009, have accelerated the competition between the three market players. The mobile virtual network operators (MVNO) are also expected to start operating in the market along with the three mobile operators by the end of 2009. The mobile-phone subscribers are expected to grow by an annual growth rate of 5.5% between 2009 and 2013. This will increase the mobile-phone penetration rate in Turkey to about 115% in 2013, similar to most EU countries, where penetration rates are generally around 100-120%. There were 24.5m internet users in 2008 in Turkey, compared to c.9.4m in 2004. The ratio of subscribers per 100 people reached a level of 34.1% in 2008, compared to 13.6% in 2004. The ratio is still low compared to European countries. The stock of PCs increased with an annual growth rate of 38% between 2004 and 2008 and reached 16.2m in 2008. Sales were supported in recent years by declining international PC prices and the strong Turkish Lira (particularly until October 2008), making imported PCs less expensive. The reduction in value-added tax (VAT) on consumer durables, introduced in March 2009 to combat the impact of the financial crisis, has lifted PC and laptop sales. The number of PCs per 100 population is expected to rise to 36 per 100 population in the forecasts.

SWOT Analysis Strengths â&#x20AC;˘ Demand for high-tech telecommunication services, as well as the large Turkish population, are expected to increase total IT spending â&#x20AC;˘ Huge potential for growth considering the young population compared to Western developed countries â&#x20AC;˘ Companies that have R&D activities in TDZs are exempt from income tax for these activities 46 EurasiaCritic March 2010

Industry Report

• Government institutions are one of the biggest IT buyers • Share of IT in total public investment is growing

Weaknesses • High (though reducing) software piracy rate • High taxation (VAT and Special Communication Tax) in the sector

Opportunities • Increasing budget allocation by government for public IT investments • Mobile phone subscriptions are expected to continue to grow • The ability to train highly qualified, young and dynamic computer engineers and software developers in ever increasing numbers

Threats • Undeveloped collaboration culture of R&D and innovation in sector

Investment Opportunities The ICT sector in Turkey has witnessed strong growth in recent years. The mobile penetration rate and inter-

net usage are expected to continue to increase in line with higher demand in the country. Personal computer usage is also increasing, creating a sustained demand for the hardware sector. The Turkish government has implemented new legal frameworks to encourage R&D and IT spending, which will support the growth of the sector. The income earned as a result of R&D activities for companies located in technology development zones is exempt from tax. Additional incentives include contributions to the social security payments of R&D employees. Turkish companies operating in the ICT sector have great potential for growth. Of the top 500 IT companies within the Deloitte Technology Fast EMEA 2009 list, 30 companies were from Turkey, following the UK, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Germany. Since 2005, many large international players have invested in Turkish ICT sector companies. Above is a list of M&A transactions by foreign investors in the Turkish ICT market between 2005 and 2009.

Abbreviations ADSL Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line BMI Business Monitor International CAGR Compound Annual Growth Rate CEE Central and Eastern European Countries CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integration EIU Economist Intelligence Unit EMEA Europe, the Middle East and Africa GDP Gross Domestic Product ICT Information and Communication Technologies ICTA Information and Communication Technologies Authority, Turkey IDC International Data Corporation IPTV Internet Protocol Television ISO International Organization for Standardization MNP Mobile Number Portability PSTN Public switched telephone network SME Small and Medium scale Enterprise SPICE Software Process Improvement and Capability Determination TDZ Technology Development Zone US United States US$ US Dollars VAT Value Added Tax WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 3G 3rd Generation EurasiaCritic March 2010 47

Ukraine

Russian Minorities in Ukraine By Mazhar Yasin Tuyluoglu Introduction

n the 21st century, International Relations are extremely complex because it includes many problematic issues between the states. Among these problems, ethnic conflicts are one of the most significant issues in world

48 EurasiaCritic March 2010

politics. From China to Iraq, Europe to problems are solved. Nevertheless one Africa ethnic problems cause mass vio- of them remains unchanged: The Ruslation of human rights and even result sian Minorities in Ukraine. to genocides. Thus, ethnic studies, a relThe problem is made up of the Rusatively new discipline in social sciences, sians living in the southern and eastern have formed. After the part of Ukraine. This collapse of the Soviet issue is vital because Recently Russian Union, the scholars of after the Orange RevMinorities in Ukraine ethnic studies found olution took place in became a key element a great base for their 2004, the Government of the Russian foreign works. The Union of of Ukraine hardened policy towards Soviet Socialist Rethe conditions of the publicsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (USSR) comRussians in the counUkraine partly munity became the try. Thus, they atbecause of the change citizens of the newly tracted higher Russian in the political system independent states and interest to the area. of Ukraine, and the this situation brought Recently Russian Orange Revolution some problems. BeMinorities in Ukraine which brought profore 1991, they were became a key eleall living in the USSR ment of the Russian Western politicians to however, after the colforeign policy towards the office. lapse, people from difUkraine partly beferent ethnicities left cause of the change in within another states borders. Post-So- the political system of Ukraine, and the viet studies paid great attention to this Orange Revolution which brought proissue. The scholars examined all situa- Western politicians to the office. tions one by one, and as of 2009 many In this article, we are going to analyze the Russian Minorities in Ukraine and try to find an answer to the question about their future in the country. We are going to state the main actors of the issue and underline the basic documents of the problem. After a brief look to the current situation, we are going to mention about the future predictions and conclude in the final part. A) Main Actors and Key Documents As our topic is Russian Minorities in Ukraine, the main actor of the issue is therefore the Russians living in Ukraine. Ukrainian Republic has only one census after the last Soviet Census in 1989. According to 2001 Census of Ukraine, the number of the people

Ukraine

who identify themselves as Russians is 8.334.100 with a percentage of 17.58.1 They speak Russian2 and they live in the region of Novorossiya.3 The areas with high Russian population are the city of Sevastopol (%71.6), the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (%58.3), Donetsk Oblast (%50.8), Dnepropetrovsk (%52.9) and Luhansk Oblast (%61.1).4 The majority of the Russians are Christians of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The second main actor of the issue is the Russian Federation (RF). It is well known that when it comes to the Russians living abroad, the government of Russia takes strict measures. RF has traditional, historic, geographic, cultural, national and religious ties with the Russians in Ukraine.5 Besides, RF has a naval fleet in the port of Sevastopol, the home of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia. The region is the main indicator of the historical Russian goal to reach the warm seas and the Russians living in the

region marks this significance. Related with the first two actors, third main actor is the pro-Russian sect in the politics of Ukraine. One can hardly find someone else than the former Prime Minister, new President Viktor Yanukovych in this category.

Pro-Russian Party of Regions led by Yanukovych is the political choice of the Russians in Ukraine and the only way to make sure that their voice is heard. Also the RF was publicly supporting the party in the Orange Revolution period however, after a while, they changed EurasiaCritic March 2010 49

Ukraine their strategy and the support is implicit in recent years. Fourth actor of the issue would be the Ukrainians living in Ukraine. The term “Ukrainian” commonly refers to those who are ethnically “Ukrain”. They are placed mostly in the western part of the country and speak Ukrainian language. They oppose to Russians and the Russian language in Ukraine, and they support European Union (EU) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) like western organizations. Some of them are die-hard nationalists that they even do not answer the questions which are asked in Russian, claiming that they don’t know Russian.6 This brings us to our fifth main actor which is the revolutionary cadres of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (also known as the “Oranges”) such as the former President Viktor Yushchenko, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Anatoliy Hrytsenko etc… In the aftermath of the Revolution, the cadres were working harmoniously, yet in time they torn apart and the cadres have broken into pieces. Unsurprisingly, the situation strengthened the pro-Russian bloc on the political stage as well as the Russians in the everyday life. The leaders of the Orange Revolution have seen the clear picture and started to oppress the Russians more and more. For instance, they banned the Russian language in the universities and took some political rights away from the Russians. Such examples can be augmentable. There are several documents regarding to the minorities in Ukraine. One of them is the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine (1991). Article 1 of Ukraine’s Declaration of Nationality Rights guarantees equal rights for the nationalities and forbids discrimination based on nationality. Article 2 says that the state takes on itself the creation of circumstances necessary for development of language and culture of national minorities. Article 4 permits the use of national symbols.7 Another key document, The Law of Ukraine about National Minorities (1992) declares that human rights 50 EurasiaCritic March 2010

Ukraine

and nationality rights are inseparable dates for Parliament and for national notions. Article 1 of the Law admits organizations (Article 14), and states citizens to be equal that separate sums of irrespective of their money are allocated In the current nationality, and stain the state budget for circumstances tus that the rights of developing the nationUkrainian nationalists people belonging to al minorities.9 become more antinational minorities are A third document Russian and behavior part of generally acwould be the Concepted human rights. stitution of Ukraine violently towards Article 3 says: “Those (1996). Articles 11, 24 Russians who are citizens of Ukraine who and 92 of the Ukrainigrowing. The country are not of Ukrainian an Constitution touch seems to be on the nationality and declare upon the question of verge of an ethnic their national identity, legal status of nationseparation: The belong to national mial minorities. Article norities”.8 Article 11 11 proclaims that the western-northern part makes it possible for state guarantees “ethof Ukraine versus the the citizens to freely nic, cultural, language eastern-southern tier. choose their nationaland religious developity or its re-establishment of Ukraine’s inment. The Law forbids discrimination digenous peoples and national minorion a nationality basis (Article 18), pro- ties”10. Article 24 prohibits race, ethnic, vides the right of nominating candi- nationality, language etc. discrimina-

tion. According to the wording of the text, the idea of positive discrimination cannot be implied, either. “There shall be no privileges or restrictions based on race, colour of skin, political, religious and other beliefs, sex, ethnic and social origin, property status, place of residence, linguistic or other characteristics”11. Article 92 proclaims that the human and citizens’ rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples and national minorities are defined exclusively by the laws of Ukraine. In addition, there are several international documents regarding the rights of the minorities in general. Although the documents mentioned above do not include the term of “Russian Minorities”, it is obvious that the laws cover Russians too, as they are the largest ethnic group in Ukraine. B) Current Situation The current situation in Ukraine is complicated in many ways. First EurasiaCritic March 2010 51

Ukraine

of all the political stability is at stake. The Orange Revolution’s effects have been lessening day by day and the proRussian camp has been gaining power. Furthermore, the economic structure is partly deteriorated because of the already weak economy of Ukraine and the world economic crisis.12 Social conditions are not well for a great majority of the people. As we mentioned above, Russian Federation’s interest in Ukrainian politics is not overt anymore. Vladimir Putin and his team saw the negative effects of their involvement, thus, they decided to watch the situation from outside. But RF still has the “big brother” title by pulling the wires when necessary. The Ukrainian Gas Crisis right after the Orange Revolution 52 EurasiaCritic March 2010

marked this occasion. Russia intends to pill the pressure on Ukraine by changing the energy prices irregularly. Fairly enough, Ukraine has experienced this matter several times before and acting very carefully when negotiating with Russia. Ukraine also thinks twice when it comes to the Russian Minorities because of the same reason, to prevent offending Russia. Recently the cold atmosphere between Ukraine and Russia seems to be the reason of the stand-off between the two political camps. In the current circumstances Ukrainian nationalists become more anti-Russian and behavior violently towards Russians who are growing. The country seems to be on the verge of an ethnic separation: The western-northern part of Ukraine ver-

sus the eastern-southern tier. Central Ukraine is the only region that holds the country together, serving as glue. The country’s centre is a mixture of all socio-political fractions. The area also plays an important role in the elections. One can admit that whoever gains the support of the Central Ukraine wins the elections since the competing sides already have the support of either eastern or western parts of the country. Finally in this part, we can state that recent trends in Ukraine concerning the Russian population are not so bright. Their numbers have reducing irrepressibly. In between the years 1959 and 1989 the number of the Russians living in Ukraine raised from 7 million to 11 million but in between 1989-2001 the number decreased to 8 million and

Ukraine is still decreasing.13 It is believed that the current number is below 8 million. C) Future Predictions Ukraine became a country of elections in recent years thus 2010 Presidential Elections is a significant indicator for the country’s future. In the six-year period after the Orange Revolution, Russian minorities faced with some difficulties but the 2010 Presidential Elections has a chance to change the whole situation. Opinion polls before the elections were highlighting two major candidates; Viktor Yanukovich and Yulia Tymoshenko. Yet the presidency competition held between these two candidates and the rest of the candidates were not assertive. If Tymoshenko would be the new president, she could have followed a balanced policy both inside and outside the country. But as Yanukovych won the elections and gained power, there are many reasons for him to behave pro-Russian since his electoral base consists of Russian dominantly. In this current scenario, minorities may come into prominence and their political, social, economic rights may be returned. Russian language may once again be used as the education language14 and Russian Federation may feel relieved with a president who tends to oversee the rights of the Russians in Ukraine. As a matter of fact, Russians in Ukraine have very respectable social conditions in terms of economic welfare. The main point of our research lies behind this truth. The pro-Western, nationalist, Ukrainian speaking, western part of Ukraine has relatively bad living conditions, thus, they support the European Union membership and strengthening ties with the Western countries. But the Russian Minorities possess the industrial, agricultural complexes and do not care if they are minorities or not. The only thing that the Russians in Ukraine care about is to use their own language and express themselves freely. They do not seek the economic aid of Russia but the social help of the motherland. Therefore, the Russian Minorities’ future in Ukraine is

related with their socio-cultural rights more than their economic rights.

Conclusion The historical divide of Ukraine is becoming more prominent. The country is walking on a thin line between the collapse and the rebirth. Nevertheless with the current inner and outer problems, Ukraine does not seem to overcome the danger of separation. New president Viktor Yanukovych has a lot to achieve in order to keep the country together. This may be probably the hardest task ever, yet in order to become a stable and prosper country Ukraine has to solve these problems one by one. Only then the minorities will not be an issue anymore. Bibliography BONDARUK, Halyna; “Yushchenko Appeals to Crimean Authority Not to Speculate on Language”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 3 March 2007. KAMALOV, İlyas; “Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikası: Moskova’nın Rövanşı”, Yeditepe Yayınevi, January 2008. MALHYNA, Katerina; “В борговій ямі: економічні виклики для України в 2010 р.”, Available at http://ukraineanalysis.wordpress.com/category/presidential-elections/, 26 December 2009. Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project, University of Maryland, 2004, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ mar/assessment.asp?groupId=36902. TUYLUOGLU, Mazhar Yasin; “Sovyet

Sonrası Dönemde Ukrayna’daki Azınlıklar”, unpublished article, 2007. http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus http://www.hhrf.org/kmksz/english/politics. html References 1 http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/ general/nationality 2 %95.9 of the Russians living in Ukraine speaks Russian while %3.9 speaks Ukrainian. 3 The historic name of the region located mostly in Southern Ukraine, Southern Russia, Bessarabia and Transnistria today. 4 Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project, University of Maryland, 2004, http://www.cidcm.umd. edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=36902 5 Mazhar Yasin Tüylüoğlu, “Sovyet Sonrası Dönemde Ukrayna’daki Azınlıklar”, Unpublished article, 2007 6 In fact it is impossible for a Ukrainian to not to know Russian as the Ukrainian language is almost the same with the Russian language. 7 http://www.hhrf.org/kmksz/english/politics. html 8 http://www.hhrf.org/kmksz/english/politics. html 9 http://www.hhrf.org/kmksz/english/politics. html 10 The Constitution of Ukraine, p. 6. 11 The Constitution of Ukraine, p. 12. 12 Kateryna Malyhina,” В борговій ямі: економічні виклики для України в 2010 р.”, Available at http://ukraineanalysis.wordpress.com/category/presidential-elections/, 26 December 2009 13 http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/ nationality_population/graphic 14 Hayna Bondaruk, “Yushchenko Appeals to Crimean Authority Not to Speculate on Language”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 3 March 2007 EurasiaCritic March 2010 53

Kosovo

The Kosovo Crisis and the UN By Bahadir Murat Akin

osovo, which is formally a UNSC able to protect international southern province of Serbia, peace and security were to be shathas been a case which “exem- tered by a sequence of crises in which plifies the ways in which ethnic com- the use or threat of the veto power rendered the Counmunities in a multiculcil increasingly pastural setting may face With the implications sive.” Kosovo has also problems in an enviof these actions taken been the place where ronment of domestic into consideration this dilemma of Sehostility and regional “Kosovo’s status has curity Council of the rivalry.” However, an been one of the most United Nations was even more important circumvented by the aspect of the Kosovo contentious issues to doctrine of ‘humanicase is that it has “asarise in the aftermath tarian intervention’ sumed a central role of the disintegration of practiced by NATO in the regional politics former Yugoslavia.” in 1999. “The status of the Balkans, a shift of unilateral or unauwith strong implicaintervention, in tions for international security.” i ” IIndeed d d thorized h i d humanitarian h Kosovo has been the place where the which a state or a group of states act “appearance of a unified and vigorous against the sovereignty and territo-

rial integrity of another state in order to prevent a grave humanitarian crisis on its territory, remains controversial. Such was the case in the 1999 war in Kosovo.” But the aftermath has been even more important from the international perspective. The humanitarian intervention at Kosovo has gone beyond the “limited purpose of stopping the atrocities and restoring respect for human rights (and has been) a tool for achieving political goals such as greater political autonomy, self-determination, or independence for particular groups within the country”.With the implications of these actions taken into consideration “Kosovo’s status has been one of the most contentious issues to arise in the aftermath of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia.”

United Nation’s Role UN’s role in a crisis has been first tested during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 1990. “The UNSC, acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter the Charter), reacted swiftly, passing Resolutions 660 and 661, which condemned the invasion, demanded an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops and placed economic sanctions on Iraq. See S.C. Res. 660 (August 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 661 (August 6, 1990). Resolution 661 determined that Iraq had failed to comply with paragraph 2 of Resolution 660 demanding its immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait’s territory, and as a consequence imposed economic sanc54 EurasiaCritic March 2010

Kosovo

tions on Iraq. Unyielding, Iraq ignored a long series of UN Security Council and Arab League resolutions related to the conflict. One of the most important was UNSC Resolution 678 (S.C. Res. 678 (November 29, 1990)), passed under Chapter VII of the Charter, giving Iraq a withdrawal deadline of 15 January 1991 and authorizing member states to use “all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.” As a result of Iraq’s failure to comply with the UNSC conditions, a US led coalition launched a massive air campaign codenamed Operation Desert Storm, which was followed by a ground offensive (Operation Desert Sabre), finally resulting in Iraq’s military defeat and withdrawal from Kuwait. S.C. Res. 686 (March 2, 1991) and S.C. Res. 687 (April 3, 1991) regulated

the aftermath of the conflict. Parallel to a unified and vigorous UNSC able to these military operations, the coalition protect international peace and secuconducted Operation Desert Shield rity” was eminent. But this image would aimed at defending Saudi Arabia from soon be “shattered by a sequence of crises in which the use Iraqi invasion.” The UNSC was so or threat of the veto The triumph of successful in handling power rendered the international law in Kuwait crisis and folCouncil increasingly the aftermath of the lowing ‘Gulf War’ that passive. After the end first Gulf War and it “presented a textof the first Gulf War, a the appearance of a book example of the series of international application of the events unfolded in unified and vigorous Charter’s normative such a manner as to UNSC able to protect framework for the probring about an iminternational peace tection of territorial inportant change in inand tegrity and sovereignty ternational relations, security” was eminent. of a country and the and arguably in public international law. use of enforcement of the break-up of measures under Article the As a consequence l VII of th cons q the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. and Charter.” In this context “the triumph of in- its NATO allies became the dominant ternational law in the aftermath of the global military, political and economic first Gulf War and the appearance of force, with the ability to significantly EurasiaCritic March 2010 55

Kosovo

impact the interpretation of the nor- UNSC .., represents a further chalmative framework regulating world af- lenge to the entrenched understanding of peremptory norms of international fairs.” law.” Indeed “the So the concept of NATO military inter‘humanitarian interUnited States vention of the FRY in vention’ which was no longer wants “characterized by the 1999 temporarily susto assume sole unilateral interpretapended Serbian sovertion of UNSC Resoeignty in Kosovo. The responsibility for lutions and the use of legal framework of this defending the soforce bypassing the suspension was UNSC called free world Resolution 1244 UNSC altogether” and would like to (1999), which gave a should be considered confer new missions Chapter VII mandate in this context. Indeed on NATO and give its to the international applying no fly zones civilian administration in Iraq, “the 1998 Allies a heightened and NATO-led milibombing of Afghanirole in the sharing of tary force.” But UN stan and Sudan in Opthese duties. Resolution came only eration Infinite Reach after the intervention (and) Humanitarian intervention against the FRY( Federal of NATO not before. Republic of Yugoslavia) in 1999” have NATO’s Role all been practiced under this doctrine. However this “circumvention of the With the termination of the Cold 56 EurasiaCritic March 2010

War and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, “rationales for NATO’s existence also ended. A commonly perceived external enemy is, after all, the main reason for forging an alliance... There is no strategic balance in Europe to keep. NATO is dominant and international laws have become inconvenient. So from then on “What now threatens the states is no longer Russia, which has been transformed more or less inevitably into a partner, or interstate conflicts, but rather ethnic and intra-state issues, problems relating to control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and peripheral conflicts such as that involving Iraq. Most of the threats to strategic stability are thus outside the NATO area. At the same time, the United States no longer wants to assume sole responsibility for defending the so-called free world and would like to confer new missions on NATO and give its Allies a heightened role in the

Kosovo sharing of these duties. .. In April 1999 .. the Alliance concluded that its security risks were “complex” and came from “numerous directions”, but ... “maintaining the strategic balance in Europe” was the Alliance’s primary task.10 In the meantime, NATO set new missions for itself. In Oslo, in 1992, it agreed to support case-by-case peacekeeping activities under the aegis of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which became the OSCE (Organization) in 1994, and ... in response to the growing crisis in the former Yugoslavia, it offered to undertake missions for the UN, subject of course to Security Council authorization.” However this would not be a collaboration as described in UN Charter Article 53 as to “ utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.” USA explained that it was very important “not to subordinate NATO to any other international body [meaning the UN] or compromise the integrity of its command structure”. To his mind, NATO could of course “act in concert with other organizations, and with respect for their principles and purposes”, but the Alliance must “reserve the right to act, when its members, by consensus, deem it necessary. (Also with regards to) Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management that NATO will strive, “in cooperation with other organizations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law [emphasis added], including through the possibility of conducting non-... crisis response operations”. As may be seen, Washington appears to be making a concession by agreeing to act in accordance with international law, but this clarification is insufficient because it is merely a matter here of ‘seeking, in cooperation with other organizations’, something that is neither restricting nor binding.”

Concept of Humanitarian Intervention “Because most legal experts agree

that NATO’s action against Serbia was illegal, there is no other choice for “other more Libertarian experts cite humanitarian law or law of ‘collective emergency’ to justify NATO’s action... Any flagrant humanitarian law, be it crimes against humanity, violations of human rights, or the Geneva conventions or ethnic cleansing may provide a

legitimate basis for action on the part of the international community because all this issues have international consequences and go well beyond the sacrosanct principle of the domestic jurisdiction of states. (In this sense) humanitarian law is just as compelling as the law of treaties freely entered into by states. There are some experts who believe EurasiaCritic March 2010 57

Kosovo that if the Security Council is incapable the veto ;second, it creates an intolerof acting, a new norm of intervention able precedent, in that it means that a by a coalition of states would seem to group or coalition of States may now, be entirely justified where large scale with no formal authorization from the Security Council, act as it pleases, citatrocities are being committed. ” In this context “Sean Murphy deing the precedent of Kosovo.” So humanitarian view underlines fines humanitarian intervention as the …threat or use of force by a state, group that “NATO’s action is objectively ilof states, or international organization legal (but) there are nonetheless cerprimarily for the purpose of protecting tain bases for that action that are not the nationals of the target state from legal, but justified” regard the Kosovo widespread deprivations of internation- crisis as a singular case in which NATO decided to act without Security Counally recognized human rights.” cil authorization out However,“ any of overwhelming huinterpretation based Humanitarian view manitarian necessity, on the right to interunderlines that but from which no genvene in the name “NATO’s action is eral conclusion ought of humanitarian law objectively illegal to be drawn. .. Rather, is improper in two the decisive point respects. First, it (but) there are is that we should not amounts to stripping nonetheless certain change the rules simthe veto of the mabases for that action ply to follow our hujor powers of any subthat are not legal, but manitarian impulses; stance, or nullifying

justified”

we should not set new standards only to do the right thing in a singular case. Hence there is another aspect to the intervention on humanitarian grounds. “ The doctrine of humanitarian intervention, if carried out without the mandate of the UNSC, remains illegal under public international law. However, such action can aspire over time to become legal – provided that it does not go beyond its original limited scope (i.e. to prevent humanitarian catastrophe within a sovereign state). In this way, the imposition of self-determination of Kosovo on Serbia by the international community, by bypassing the UNSC, in the case of a potential Russian or Chinese veto, will represent not only a revolutionary challenge to established fundamental international norms, but also de-legitimize the original intervention, and, more importantly, compromise the future legal and practical development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.” Even if Security Council would be unanimously favourable to Kosovo’s independence , “ a legal interpretation granting the UNSC the right to trump the territorial integrity of a state is ambiguous due to the fact that such a situation has never occurred outside of the context of decolonization... (Besides) the post-WWII international legal order was heavily marked by such an example (i.e. the allied partition of Germany). This point brings us to the subject of justifiable conditions of humanitarian intervention

Conditions of Humanitarian Intervention: “According to Cassese, (who is an international lawyer who has dealt with Yugoslavia case(51), in order for individual cases of humanitarian intervention to become gradually justified from the point of view of international law, it is necessary to respect strict conditions: 1- The humanitarian crisis is substantially serious, amounting to “crimes against humanity”, and that the sovereign state on whose territory these crimes occur is either the perpetrator 58 EurasiaCritic March 2010

Kosovo

or is unable or unwilling to prevent the violence. 2- If the crime is a result of anarchy in a sovereign state, there must be evidence that the central authority is unable to prevent these crimes before any intervention can take place. If, on the other hand, the state itself is the perpetrator, then force must remain the last resort. 3- Unilateral intervention can only occur in the case of a paralyzed UNSC. 4- All peaceful avenues must be exhausted before any intervention. 5- It must be carried out by a group of states, and not by a “single hegemonic power, however strong its military, political and economic authority, nor such a power with the support of a client state or an ally. Cassese is arguing

that, in the present world order, the US cannot conduct a humanitarian intervention alone or with its allies individually (e.g. the UK), but would have to reach a consensus within NATO before carrying out such action. ..Intervention in the case of Kosovo would fulfil this condition, whereas in the case of the NFZs in Iraq... would not. 6-The gradual legalization of humanitarian intervention can occur only where the future instances of such unauthorized involvement are strictly confined to the “limited purpose of stopping the atrocities and restoring respect for human rights, not for any goal going beyond this limited purpose.” The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty is even clearer with regard to the “per-

missible” goal and outcome of humanitarian interventions: -…the responsibility to protect is fundamentally a principle designed to respond threats to human life, and not a tool for achieving political goals such as greater political autonomy, self-determination, or independence for particular groups within the country (though these underlying issues may well be related to the humanitarian concerns that prompted the military intervention). The intervention itself should not become the basis for further separatist claims.” In this sense, what has happened in Kosovo with UN resolution 1244 is not acceptable taken into consideration that “the current international military and civilian administration in Kosovo is EurasiaCritic March 2010 59

Kosovo

a direct result of the NATO interven- have been in the position “to impose the independence of Kosovo on Serbia. tion of 1999” Indeed, UN resolution 1244 Resolution However “it is even doubtful that the also took “full account of the Ram- S.C. (assuming no Russian or Chinese bouillet accords” in the context of the veto) has legal basis to separate territory from a sovereign political process leadcountry. This has no ing to “substantial selfAfter the unauthorized precedent outside of government” for the intervention the colonial context, province. establishing an where the application These accords, of a people’s right to in Chapter I, Article administration with self-determination re1, defined the future the task of bringing mains unambiguous.” structure of Kosovo’s Kosovo towards However, in reself-government, leavautonomy and selfverse of the general ing Serbian authority governance was criteria for humaniin the fields of terrinothing but “to tarian intervention torial integrity, comdescribed above, a mon market within the trump the territorial report prepared for FRY, monetary policy, integrity of a state.” NATO maintains that defence, foreign polifinal the purpose of cy, customs services, “federal” taxation, “federal” elec- the humanitarian intervention should tions, and other areas specified in the be to provide self determination. “The aim, therefore, of humanitarian interAgreement. So it seems that NATO countries vention is to stop these large-scale vio60 EurasiaCritic March 2010

lations of human rights and, ultimately, to remedy the violation of the right to internal self-determination. The implicit idea behind accepting humanitarian intervention as a “remedy” is that it is intended to, and should, pave the way for durable solutions with regard to a full respect of the rights of a people living in a territory. What is critical in the face of an intervention is determining that the principle of territorial integrity has to yield in order to defend a set of values enshrined in human rights law.” So it seems that NATO’s action in Kosovo is a clear violation of Article 53 which reads “But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council”;and also Article 2/4 which reads “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other

Kosovo manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Indeed, “ the Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded in its report that the NATO intervention in Kosovo was “not legal but legitimate”. The Commission simultaneously noted that the intervention was illegal because it did not meet with procedural rules provided by the UN Charter and that the intervention was legitimate because prior to its occurrence all necessary diplomatic means were utilized.”

Conclusions: With the break of Kosovo case, the Kosovo region of former Yugoslavia with population of two million people , has not only “ assumed a central role in the regional politics of the Balkans, but it has marked a big shift in the actions of international and regional organizations and also super powers with strong implications for international security. Indeed Kosovo has been the place where the appearance of a unified and vigorous UNSC, able to protect international peace and security, was to be shattered by a sequence of crises in which the use or threat of the veto power rendered the Council increasingly passive. Kosovo has also been the place where this dilemma of Security Council of the United Nations was circumvented by the ‘humanitarian intervention’ practiced by NATO in 1999. However, the unauthorized humanitarian intervention made by NATO in 1999 at Kosovo has gone beyond the “limited purpose of stopping the atrocities and restoring respect for human rights (and has been) a tool for achieving political goals such as greater political autonomy, self-determination, or independence for particular groups within the country” , Just like East Timor case where the UN made a recourse to Chapter VII to re-establish minority rights that had been repressed by Indonesia UN established an administration with a recourse to Chapter VII with the task to bring Kosovo towards autonomy and self-governance within the framework of Yugoslavia following the NATO in-

tervention. However there was two big differences First one was done in the context of non- self governed territories in the process of decolonization with the full consent of Jakarta. In contrast the operation in Kosovo was done by NATO unilaterally and without the permission of the UNSC. Also Kosovo was not a non-self governed colony but a part of a sovereign and UN member state. So after the unauthorized intervention establishing an administration with the task of bringing Kosovo towards autonomy and self-governance was nothing but “to trump the territorial integrity of a state.” “The the long-term effects of this intervention are rooted in the Kosovo problem. Indeed, one might ask, are NATO and the UN from now on to be involved in a process of “majorization of minorities” and if so, how far should this process be pushed? In other words, where should humanitarian neo-interventionism begin and where should it end? This evolving situation suggests that we are now at the intersection of two phenomena: how to assure human security in the context of “majorization of minorities”?

References 1) Enika Abazi, “Kosova Independence: An Albanian Perspective”, Policy Brief SETA Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research April 2008 No:11 2) Srdjan Cvijic, “Self Determination as a Challenge to the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Interventions : The Case of Kosovo”, German Law Journal, 2007, Volume :8 No:1,Articles,Special Issue, “What Future for Kosovo?” 3)Alex N. Dragnich, “The Future of Kosovo”, Chronicles ,April 1995 4) Conflict History: Kosovo, International Crisis Group Conflict Preventing and Resolution 25 December 2009 5) Hector Pustina, “Kosovo” GPF Europe 6) Richard Becker, The Rambouillet accord A Declaration of War Disguised as a Peace Agreement, Agenda May-June 1999 7) UN Charter, Internet Official Site 8)“NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo: Historical Overviev”,15 July 1999 9) G. C. Thomas, “NATO and International Law”, Kosovo and Yugoslavia: Law in Crisis, Jurist Law Professor’s Network 10) Albert Legault, “NATO Intervention in Kosovo : The Legal Context” Canadian Military Journal, Spring 2000 11) Dajena Kumbaro “ The Kosovo Crisis in an International Law Perspective: Self Determination, Territorial Integrity and the NATO Intervention”- Final Report For North Atlantic Treaty Organization- Office of Information and Press 2001

EurasiaCritic March 2010 61

Armenian Question

Reassessing the Genocide Resolution By Alon Ben-Meir

Genocide is a serious label, and nce again, as has happened every spring for years running, requires not only moral authority from the debate over whether the those who use it but a deep comprehenethnic clashes against the Armenians sion of the historical context in which in the break up of the Ottoman Empire these events occurred. Armenians have amounted to genocide has made it into every right to demand official inquiries the US political arena for Congress to about the terms and conditions in which weigh in. The recent resolution adopted hundreds of thousands of their ancesby the House Committee on Foreign tors were killed, but this is not the task Affairs-to officially recognize actions of US Congress, who has neither the moral standing to coagainst the Armenidify armed clashes of ans in 1915 as genociOnce again, as has a century ago without de committed by the happened every spring proper inquiry nor the Ottoman Turks-has for years running, the right to be selective less to do with the US debate over whether about human rights governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s pursuit offenses for political of historical accuracy, the ethnic clashes points. Every effort than political theaagainst the Armenians should be made by ter that has come at a in the break up of President Obama and strikingly inopportune the Ottoman Empire the remaining House time.

amounted to genocide has made it into the US political arena for Congress to weigh in.

62 EurasiaCritic March 2010

Representatives to prevent the resolution from reaching the House floor. Beyond the very serious damage that such a resolution could inflict on US-Turkish relations, should it pass the full House, congressional interference at this juncture could severely erode the very moral argument used justify the resolution. Turkey and Armenia have only recently concluded two protocols calling for closer ties, open borders, and most importantly, the creation of a commission to examine the historical evidence of the tragic events. Not only will this vote undermine the reconciliation process between Turkey and Armenia, but it threatens the US-Turkish relationship at a time when Turkey is playing a critical role aiding the US and the Middle East peace process. Sadly, this resolution was politicized

Armenian Question

at the outset, thereby diminishing much of its moral tenet. Had the purpose been for the US to champion human rights and officially condemn any large scale atrocities in times of war, then why was there no debate about massacres in Sudan, Rwanda, Algeria or the Balkans? The fact that it was supported by a powerful lobby and sponsored by many members of Congress, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the Committee Chairman Howard Berman from California, and Donald Payne and Albio Sires from New Jersey, each of whom represent relatively large Armenian constituencies, takes this debate out of the moral realm and into the political one. Beyond this matter, Howard Berman and the Foreign Relations Committee failed to address the pressing issues behind what such a resolution would invite forth, mainly the land disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the issue of reparations for descendants of the victims, none of which can

be treated in isolation. However large can efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and the political benefit these members of the Arab-Israeli peace process. It is a Congress may garner this election year modern secular democracy, and has by pushing this resolution, it is not in made great strides in remaining open US interests, as the end result will hurt and progressive. Why then should the United States Congthe Turkish-Armenian ress hold the descenreconciliation process Genocide is a serious dants of the Ottomans and severely undercut label, and requires responsible for the Turkish-US cooperanot only moral deeds of their fathers tion should it come to authority from those perpetrated a century fruition. Such a serious who use it but a deep ago? Since Turkey veresolution requires the comprehension of the hemently rejects the application of the higterm genocide, what hest moral review and historical context in judgment should then investigation, not a powhich these events be passed, and by litically convenient act occurred. whom, that will not which is considered an tarnish the present geinsult to Turkish identity. If genocide was in fact committed, neration of Turks? This generation had it should be left to an international in- nothing to do with past events and, in vestigative tribunal, not politicians who fact, condemns the atrocities committed during that heinous war, regardless of need to be reelected every two years. Turkey has been a loyal friend of the who the perpetrators were. What then United States for more than a half cen- gives the United Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; House of Reptury, and continues to support Ameri- resentatives the moral authority to pass EurasiaCritic March 2010 63

Armenian Question

judgment, when domestic political inte- a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh rest shamelessly dominates their moti- territorial dispute. Even the Jewish ves? The argument against the resolu- lobby, in the wake of a series of diplotion by the full House should be based matic rifts between Turkey and Israel, acted quietly in favor on moral grounds, of the Turks, resulting and the members Under no in a close margin in the must not act as judcircumstance should vote. As much as Priges and jurors when Prime Minister me Minister Erdoganâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Turkey and Armenia Erdogan cancel his recent statements have have agreed to estabnot fared well with the lish their own joint upcoming visit to the Israeli public, the Israeli committee to unravel US, as he should use diaspora is keen on mawhat in fact happethis opportunity to intaining the strategic ned. present his case and nature of its relationsAt a time when prove that Turkey is hip with Turkey as well America still suffers capable of handling as Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s relationship from a lagging glowith the West. bal image after years the disputes with But more imporof hawkish foreign Armenia without tantly, the Turkish gopolicy and two ongoUS congressional vernment who acted out ing wars, the United intervention. fervently against the US States Congress must government following support what Turkey and Armenia have agreed d tto d do tto re- the th resolution l ti must come to grips with solve their conflict and help facilitate the separation of power in the United 64 EurasiaCritic March 2010

States. Both President Obama and Secretary Clinton have come out strongly against the resolution-albeit last minute-yet they cannot control the votes or the agenda of Congress. Under no circumstance should Prime Minister Erdogan cancel his upcoming visit to the US, as he should use this opportunity to present his case and prove that Turkey is capable of handling the disputes with Armenia without US congressional intervention. It is by no means certain that this misguided resolution taken by Pelosi and Berman will pass in the full House should it come to a vote. Furthermore, it is unlikely these sponsors will even bring the resolution to the floor unless they are certain it has a substantial chance to pass. This represents a keen opportunity for Democrats and Republicans alike to find a common area of interest and work in unison for the best interests of the US, Turkey, and the future of Turkish-Armenian relations.