The IACSP’s Counter-Terrorism Journal V18N1

A Look Inside

Mexican Crime Cartels

CHINOOK DOWN: What Happened?

Cyberwar: Spotlight On Iran An IACSP Interview With Ronald Kessler

Spring Issue Vol. 18, No. 1, 2012 Printed in the U.S.A. IACSP.COM

Keep On Sale Until May 21, 2012

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol.18, No.1

Vol. 18, No. 1 SPRING 2012 IACSP Director of Operations Steven J. Fustero Associate Publisher Phil Friedman

Page 36

Mexican Drug Cartels

Senior Editor Nancy Perry

By Larry Martines

Contributing Editors Paul Davis Thomas B. Hunter Joshua Sinai Book Review Editor Jack Plaxe Research Director Gerry Keenan Conference Director John Dew Communications Director Craig O. Thompson

Page 48

Art Director Scott Dube, MAD4ART International

Chinook Down

Psychological CT Advisors Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC

By Thomas B. Hunter

Counterintelligence Advisor Stanley I. White South America Advisor Edward J. Maggio Homeland Security Advisor Col. David Gavigan

Page 6

SITREP

Page 8

Cyberwar: Spotlight On Iran, By David Gewirtz

Page 10

International Hotel Rooms: The Enemy’s Gateway To Economic And

Personal Security Advisor Thomas J. Patire

Industrial Espionage, By Luke Bencie Page 14

Anders Behring Breivik: A New Breed Of Lone Wolf Terrorist? By George Michael

Page 20

Creating Dilemmas: Force Security Tactics, By Dov Zwerling

Page 24

No Defense: America’s Growing Vulnerability To An EMP Attack, By Dan Dickerson

Page 30

The Boeing 727 Anti-Terrorism Training Facility, By Jim Weiss And Mickey Davis

Page 36

Mexican Drug Cartels, By Larry Martines

Page 42

Hizballah: A Profile Of One Of The World’s Most Lethal Terrorist

Emergency Management Advisor Clark L. Staten Tactical Advisor Robert Taubert Hazmat Advisor Bob Jaffin Security Driver Advisor Anthony Ricci, ADSI Cyberwarfare Advisor David Gewirtz Cell Phone Forensics Advisor Dr. Eamon P. Doherty Transportation Advisor Don L. Rondeau IACSP Advisory Board John M. Peterson III John Dew Thomas Patire Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Robert E. Thorn

Organizations, By Dr. Joshua Sinai Page 48

Chinook Down, By Thomas B. Hunter

Page 52

An IACSP Interview With Ronald Kessler, By Paul Davis

Page 56

A Look Back At The Vietnam War And Lessons Learned, By Paul Davis

Southeast Asia Correspondent Dr. Thomas A. Marks

Page 60 Secure Driver: Low Light/Night Driving, By Anthony Ricci

European Correspondent Elisabeth Peruci Middle East Correspondent Ali Koknar

Page 62 IACSP Resources: Book Reviews, By Dr. Joshua Sinai

National Sales Representative Phil Friedman, Advertising Director Tel: 201-224-0588, Fax: 202-315-3459 iacsp@aol.com Tactical Sales Representative Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Tel: 757-721-2774, scott@mad4art.com

THE JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L is published by SecureWorldnet, Ltd., PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (ISSN#1552-5155) in cooperation with the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals and Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Copyright © 2012. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher.

The opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher.

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (703) 243-0993, FAX (703) 243-1197. Membership $65/year, add $10 for overseas memberships. Postmaster: send address changes to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA. Web site: www.iacsp.com

PHOTO CREDITS: Reuters, Army.mil, Navy.mil, istockphoto.com and authors where applicable.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol.18, No.1

IACSP International Office ITRR/IACSP, PO Box 18356 Jerusalem, Israel 91182 972-571-1526

SITREP

In this file photo, soldiers load into two Black Hawk helicopters as they prepare to fly to a nearby town and conduct a presence patrol in Taji, Iraq, Sept. 18, 2009. Secretary of the Army John McHugh recently said that although the way ahead in Iraq and Afghanistan will be tough for soldiers such as these, our nation’s Army will be able to handle the challenge. Photo Credit: Sgt. Travis Zielinski

W

orld Trends & Forecasts

In Iraq, the official withdrawal of the last U.S. combat troops, nearly nine years after the invasion, was quickly followed by a political crisis. Authorities issued an arrest warrant for the country’s top Sunni politician, Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi, accusing him of running death squads.

He and other leading Sunni politicians fled to Kurdistan, while the Iraqiya alliance, to which they belong, protested by boycotting parliament. In turn, Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki threatened to abandon the power-sharing agreement.

Meanwhile Baghdad has been hit by several waves of attacks by suspected Sunni insurgents linked to al-Qaeda, reigniting fears of a resurgence of sectarian violence.

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Tension remained high after last year’s flawed presidential and parliamentary elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Continued violence and repression by security forces claimed at least 30 lives. Incumbent president Joseph Kabila was sworn in for a second term on 20 December, despite international observers finding that the results “lacked credibility”.

Relations between Sudan and South Sudan deteriorated further. Tension over the status of Abyei continued, with UN Secretary General Ban Kimoon calling for the withdrawal of both sides’ armed forces, while the two countries’ militaries clashed in the disputed territory of Jau. In Senegal, President Abdoulaye Wade showed no signs of reconsidering his candidacy for a controversial third term. Clashes between ruling party and opposition supporters left one dead and several injured.

In Nigeria a spate of violent attacks by militant Islamists Boko Haram left at least 100 dead and 90,000 displaced. President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency. In Guinea-Bissau an attempted coup by renegade soldiers on 26 December left at least two dead. The navy chief, former army chief, and a number of politicians suspected of orchestrating it have been arrested.

Tensions between Pakistan’s government and military leadership escalated as the Supreme Court began its probe over a memo last May requesting U.S. help to avert a military takeover.

The government continues to deny allegations that its former ambassador to the U.S. Hussain Haqqani authorized the memo and rejects the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Army and intelligence top brass have repeatedly insisted on the Supreme Court investigation, raising fears of a coup.

In Afghanistan bomb attacks by Pakistani Sunni militants Lashkare-Jhangvi in Kabul and Mazari-Sharif killed 84 people on the Shia holy day of Ashura. Relations with Pakistan remained strained, as Pakistan’s boycott overshadowed the Bonn conference.

Bosnia avoided an intensified political crisis as leaders of the six main political parties agreed to form a government at the end of the month, ending fourteen months of deadlock after the October 2010 elections. A new state budget was adopted just in time to avert shutting down state institutions.

First Quarter 2012 Trends Deteriorated Situations • Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, GuineaBissau, Iraq, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Senegal, Kazakhstan, Pakistan Improved Situations • Bosnia Unchanged Situations • Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Kashmir, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyz-

stan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Myanmar/Burma, NagornoKarabakh (Azerbaijan), Nepal, Niger, North Caucasus (Russia), North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Serbia, Somalia, Somaliland, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Western Sahara, Yemen, Zimbabwe

Source: http://www.crisisgroup.org/

At Home: The Year In Review A Look At FBI Cases The FBI conducted thousands of investigations in 2011, from terrorists bent on murder and cyber thieves hacking networks to corrupt government officials and fraudsters stealing billions of dollars from innocent victims.

Part 1 of this report focuses on our top investigative priority: protecting the nation from terrorist attack.

The death of Osama bin Laden in May was a milestone, but al Qaeda remains committed to high-profile attacks against the U.S. And on the home front, lone offenders radicalized on the Internet continue to pose a serious threat to national security.

Here are some of the top terror cases of 2011, in reverse chronological order: Murder of U.S. soldiers in Iraq: A 38-year-old Canadian citizen was indicted this month by a New York grand jury for his role in the murder of five American soldiers in a suicide-bomb attack in Iraq in 2009. The individual was arrested last January in Canada, and the U.S. is seeking his extradition. Details: http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/ press-releases/2011/alleged-terrorist-indicted-in-new-york-for-themurder-of-five-american-soldiers Indictment of senior citizens in ricin plot: Four Georgia men in their 60s and 70s were arrested last month for planning to manufacture the biological toxin ricin and purchasing explosives for use in attacks against American citizens.

The defendants are alleged to be part of a fringe militia group. Details: http://www.fbi.gov/atlanta/ press-releases/2011/north-georgiamen-arrested-charged-in-plots-topurchase-explosives-silencer-andto-manufacture-a-biological-toxin Plot against Saudi ambassador: Two individuals were charged in October for their participation in a plot directed by elements of the Iranian government to murder the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. with explosives while the ambassador was on U.S. soil. One of the individuals is in custody; the other is still at large. Details: http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/pressreleases/2011/two-men-chargedin-alleged-plot-to-assassinatesaudi-arabian-ambassador-to-theunited-states Attack planned on U.S. Capitol: A 26-year-old Massachusetts man was arrested in September and charged with plotting to bomb the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol using remote-controlled aircraft filled with explosives. Details: http://www. fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2011/ massachusetts-man-charged-withplotting-attack-on-pentagon-andu.s.-capitol-and-attempting-toprovide-material-support-to-aforeign-terrorist-organization Material support to terrorists: An Albanian citizen living in New York was charged in September with providing material support to terrorists for planning travel to Pakistan to join a radical jihadist fighting group. He was arrested while trying to catch a flight out of the country. Details: http://www.fbi. gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/ new-york-city-resident-indictedfor-providing-material-supportto-terrorists Texas bomb plot: A 21-year-old soldier who was absent without leave was charged in July with planning to detonate a bomb inside a restaurant frequented by soldiers from Fort Hood. When he was arrested, the individual was in possession of a variety of bomb-making components. In November he was charged with additional crimes including attempted murder. Details: http://www.fbi.gov/sanantonio/ press-releases/2011/federal-grandjury-returns-superseding-indict-

ment-against-naser-jason-abdo-inconnection-with-bomb-plot Plot to attack Seattle military installation: Two men were indicted in July for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction to attack a military installation in Seattle with the intention of killing U.S. citizens. Law enforcement first became aware of the plot when an individual alerted them that he had been approached about participating in the attack. Details: http://www.fbi.gov/seattle/pressreleases/2011/two-men-indictedin-plot-to-attack-seattle-militaryprocessing-center Conduit to terror organizations: A Somali national in his mid-20s was indicted in July for providing material support to foreign terror organizations al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). He was captured in the Gulf region by the U.S. military in April 2011 and was allegedly a conduit between al Shabaab and AQAP. Details: http://www.fbi. gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/ a c c u s e d - a l - s h a b a a b - l e a d e rcharged-with-providing-materialsupport-to-al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula Iraq bomb attacks: An Iraqi citizen who allegedly carried out numerous improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S. troops in Iraq and another Iraqi national alleged to have participated in the Iraq insurgency were indicted in May on terrorism charges in Kentucky, where both were residents. Details: http://www.fbi.gov/louisville/ press-releases/2011/two-iraqinationals-indicted-on-federalterrorism-charges-in-kentucky Jihadist indictment: A 20-yearold Saudi Arabia citizen and Texas resident was arrested in February and charged with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction in connection with the purchase of chemicals and equipment used to make an IED and his research of potential U.S. targets. The individual came to the U.S. in 2008 on a student visa. Details: http://www.fbi.gov/dallas/press-releases/2011/ dl022411.htm

Cyberwar Spotlight: Iran

By David Gewirtz

I

ran has long been the focal point of American strategic concern. Going as far back as 1953, when the U.S. and other allies supported regime-change activities that resulted in the overthrow of the elected leadership of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and the installation of the Pahlavi dynasty, America’s interests have been tightly intertwined with Iranian internal politics.

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Josh Mayeux, network defender, works at the Air Force Space Command Network Operations & Security Center at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado July 20, 2010. U.S. national security planners are proposing that the 21st century’s critical infrastructure -- power grids, communications, water utilities, financial networks -- be similarly shielded from cyber marauders and other foes.

The ramparts would be virtual, their perimeters policed by the Pentagon and backed by digital weapons capable of circling the globe in milliseconds to knock out targets. To match Special Report USA-CYBERWAR/ REUTERS/Rick Wilking

Today, Iran isn’t ruled by the Shah’s constitutional monarchy, but by a theocratic, fundamentalist Islamic form of republic. With a GDP of more than $800 billion, Iran is the world’s 18th largest economy in terms of real purchasing power.

Much of the country’s income, of course, is derived from oil, and oil fuels about 45% of the government’s yearly income. Iran is a key energy producer, as the world’s second largest source of natural gas and the third largest exporter of oil.

Although it may seem paradoxical given Iran’s fundamentalist Islamic government, Iran places a very high priority on higher education, science, and math. This is going to be particularly relevant to our discussion of Iran’s place in the cyberwarfare theatre, so pay at-

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tention here. Iran operates 54 state operated universities, and 42 state medical schools, along with 289 private colleges. There are more than 3.5 million college students in Iran, along with more than 40,000 masters-level students and 20,000 Ph.D.-level students.

Early Iranians contributed heavily to humanity’s understanding of natural science, physics, medicine, astronomy, and mathematics. Although he based much of his work on earlier developments by Greek

and Indian scholars, Iran’s Abu Abdallah Muhammad ibn Musa alKhwarizmi is widely considered to have been the inventor of algebra, contributing to the foundations of both mathematics and computer science, and providing a source of study that helps explain the general surly and resentful nature of high school and college students worldwide.

Iranian citizens have a conflicted relationship with the Internet, due in large part to government censorship efforts. By percentage, Iran has the second largest percentage of Middle Eastern citizens online, second only to Israel. More than 20 million Iranians are online. In the mid-2000s, this was seen by liberal Iranians as a way of bypassing government censorship strictures, and enabled citizens to reach out to the world. However, in particular after the online Twitter explosion around the 2009 Iranian elections, Iran has actively censored citizens and has jailed and harassed bloggers and online activists.

The point of all this is to showcase that Iran has substantial connectivity, resources, and educated citizenry -- more than enough to fuel forays into cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyberwarfare itself.

In a nation like Iran, it’s often difficult to tell which nefarious online activities are done under the auspices of government control, and which are done by a highly connected, sophisticated citizenry. One such example comes from the exclusive investigation I did for CNN back in 2009.

Top secret plans for the U.S. president’s Marine One helicopter cockpit retrofit were found on a “collector’s” computer in Iran. The plans were lifted via a peer-to-peer program acting as spyware from a U.S. defense contractor’s home computer and spirited away to the machine in Iran. The plot twist here is that there was no evidence that the Iranian had any government connection. Instead, he falls into a class of cybercriminal that simply filches anything he can get his hands on, then offers it for sale to the highest bidder. Criminal, yes. Governmentsponsored espionage, no.

On the other hand, there are the recent reports that Iranian hackers brought down an American RQ-170 Sentinel drone. Unverified reports in the Christian Science Monitor quote unnamed sources (see a trend here?) in Iran that claim the drone

By percentage, Iran has the second largest percentage of Middle Eastern citizens online, second only to Israel. More than 20 million Iranians are online.

was brought down after Iranian engineers “spoofed” GPS signals, which essentially tricked the drone into landing in Iran.

While there’s some doubt whether Iran actually downed the drone on purpose, or it just had a failure, there’s no doubt that the Iranian government has been proudly parading their catch as a PR ding against America.

In my professional opinion, it’s unlikely (although possible) that Iran downed the drone by hacking.

While every computer-based system has flaws and exploits, most systems like the drone work off encrypted and redundant systems. The idea that the Iranians were able to crack the GPS signals, create their own GPS transmitter, and then precisely beam the GPS transmissions at the drone (which was 50,000 feet in the air on an undisclosed flight path) seems far fetched.

It seems far more plausible to me that the system had a bug, or some sort of failure. The Iranians are smart, but they’d have to not only be smart, but both have Batman-like aerial skills and Spidey-sense to have been able to zero in on that craft while in flight and alter its perception of position.

That brings us to the more recent talk (at least as I write this in early January 2012) of Iran, possibly teaming up with Venezuelans, to conduct cyberattacks against U.S. domestic targets.

Claims, going through the normal convoluted sets of unnamed sources and disclaimers, were that Iran was planning to (or had attempted to)

hack U.S. infrastructure targets, including nuclear sites.

Did they, or didn’t they? That’s not something we can discuss in a public venue like this magazine.

But what we can discuss is the threat, which is quite real. Let’s be clear. It is highly likely that virtually every nation on the planet is engaging in some form of cyber-mischief or another. While most nation-states aren’t explicitly penetrating or attacking infrastructure of other nations, they’re almost certainly exploring the feasibility of such actions, along with their own ability to defend their digital borders.

Given how often the U.S. has meddled in Iranian affairs, threatened them with attack or surgical strike, and otherwise given Iranian officials the hairy eyeball, it’s certainly likely that Iran has explored cyberwarfare techniques as a way to strike back.

I’m not siding with Iran here. While many Iranian citizens are fine people, Iran’s methods of governance and national priorities make for some sleepless nights for the leaders of many Western nations. The idea that fundamentalist religious zealots are trying to create nuclear weapons is not comforting in the slightest.

But the question isn’t whether Iran is in the right or not. The question is whether Iran is capable of mounting a cyberattack, whether they already have, and whether they’re a threat in the future. In closing, let’s look at three key factors that help juries determine the possibility of guilt in

criminal cases: means, motive, and opportunity. As we’ve seen, with Iran’s well educated and highlynetworked online populace, both the nation as well as its individual citizens have the means to conduct not only cybercrime activities, but engage in cyberwarfare. Motive is certainly there as well. There’s a whole lot of money to be made from cybercrime, and as we’ve seen -- not only recently but as far back as the 1950s -- Iran and America have had somewhat discordant relations. Motivation gets three stars.

Finally, there’s opportunity. Anywhere there’s an Internet connection, an attacker is mere milliseconds away from a victim, anywhere on the planet. It’s not as if an attacker has to travel from Tehran to Teaneck, New Jersey to conduct some sort of terrorist activity. All a bad guy has to do is sit on his couch in his pajamas, fire up his laptop, and take aim at any target, anywhere. Opportunity certainly exists.

So there’s the bottom line for Iran.

They are, without a doubt, a digital threat. Whether they’ve already caused harm is a discussion for a different venue, but without a doubt they are a threat, without a doubt, they will try to cause harm, and without a doubt, we need to stay diligent in maintaining and constantly improving our digital defenses.

About the Author

David Gewirtz is the director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute and editor-in-chief of the ZATZ technical magazines. He regularly writes commentary and analysis for CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360, and has written more than 700 articles about technology. David is a former professor of computer science, has lectured at Princeton, Berkeley, UCLA, and Stanford, has been awarded the prestigious Sigma Xi Research Award in Engineering, and was a candidate for the 2008 Pulitzer Prize in Letters. He is the Cyberterrorism Advisor for IACSP. David’s personal Web site is at DavidGewirtz.com Read his blog at CNN Anderson Cooper 360 for politics, policy, and analysis. Read his blog at CBS Interactive’s ZDNet Government where tech meets politics and government. Or Follow him on Twitter at @DavidGewirtz

International Hotel Rooms:

The Enemy’s Gateway To Economic And Industrial Espionage

By Luke Bencie

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F

or most international business travelers, overseas hotel accommodations can conjure up an array of images.

Depending on the region of the world they travel, frequent fliers know that lodging is never consistent. For example, Southeast Asian hotels deliver a personal attention to detail that can only be found in the Orient, while hotels in the Middle Eastern Gulf states compete against one another through stunning opulence to attract powerful sheiks and wealthy oil barons. Closer to home, Latin America and the Caribbean provide relaxing, tropical beach resorts, while Europe still offers old world charm in quaint surroundings.

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However, no matter what part of the globe your business takes you, there is one constant that should never be overlooked – the threat of economic and industrial espionage. Each year, we see an increase in the number of suspicious incidents reported to both the FBI and DOS involving the targeting of American business travelers. US-protected information and/or trade secrets are commonly stolen, whether overtly or surreptitiously.

Although the US delineates about a dozen countries as the prime locations/suspects in these acts of economic and industrial espionage, travelers have reported incidents occurring throughout the world.

Yet, in no other location is this threat more prevalent than in your own hotel room! The reason for this is simple: a hotel room is one of the easiest places to surreptitiously collect sensitive information and/or business secrets.

International hotel rooms are your enemy’s gateway to economic and industrial espionage. These enemies can include economic competitors, hostile foreign intelligence services, speculators/investors looking for inside information, computer hackers, and “private collectors” – individuals who steal secrets and then sell those secrets to the highest bidder.

The fact of the matter is that if you are a businessperson traveling with sensitive corporate information, odds are you will be targeted for economic or industrial espionage. Unfortunately, the majority of international business travelers, regardless of how often they travel, are oblivious to these threats.

Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify the difference between economic and industrial espionage, as both pose an enormous threat to business travelers.

Industrial espionage is essentially an attempt by an industry competitor to acquire sensitive information from a rival business, government agency, or academic institution. Economic espionage is also an attempt to acquire sensitive information, but it is usually executed by a foreign intelligence service (be it

the host country intelligence service or a third party service). International borders do not restrict foreign intelligence collection operations. Travelers can be targeted by a third party intelligence service, or private collector, with the host country unaware of the type of unilateral activity. The following is an analysis of the different types of espionage that can take place in a business traveler’s hotel room.

Covert Hotel Room Intrusions Traditionally, the easiest way to steal a businessperson’s valuable information is to perform a covert entry into their hotel room while that person is away (Do Not Disturb signs be damned!). Operatives (or collectors) might gain access by picking the lock, bribing/manipulating a hotel employee, or working in conjunction with the hotel itself. It should be noted that many hotels, regardless of whether or not they are part of a major international chain, have an obligation to support the host government’s intelligence and law enforcement services. In many cases, popular hotels are merely a franchise, and thus are owned and operated by a foreign state entity (such as the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Tourism, or a local businessperson who works in cooperation with the government). Regardless of who is behind the attempt, covert intrusions typically top the list of non-open source intelligence gathering techniques.

Once access is gained, the operative will immediately look for sensitive intelli-

It should be noted that many hotels, regardless of whether or not they are part of a major international chain, have an obligation to support the host government’s intelligence and law enforcement services.

gence to exploit. This could be a laptop computer, a computer tablet, a briefcase, a cell phone, a PDA, a company report, a notebook, and/or a day planner. The belief that password protecting your laptop, cellphone, or PDA somehow makes them safe from clandestine exploitation is naive. Most commercially available or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS), electronic computer exploitation devices can easily work around passwords. These devices can image and duplicate the contents of your computer’s hard drive within minutes. Additionally, cell phone SIM cards can be copied in a matter of seconds (our company performs a live demonstration of this hard drive imaging technique in our “Counter-Espionage for Business Travelers Course”).

Those who think that storing valuables in the hotel room safe makes one immune to such dangers, should think again. If anything, hotel safes offer the operative a centralized location at which to begin their “search and exploit” mission. There is not a hotel safe in the world that cannot be accessed with a master code or a master key (otherwise, half of all hotel safes would have to be replaced each year as a result of guests who accidently forget their combinations or lock the safe upon check-out). Unless you travel with your own personal safe, which can be dead bolted to the floor, you are better off just locking your valuables in your suitcase… which, of course, is not that much more secure.

Electronic Surveillance of Hotel Rooms In some instances, an operative will not risk a covert hotel intrusion to gain access to a target.

To combat this problem, intelligence collectors rely heavily on the use of electronic surveillance. It is certainly much easier to gain access to a target’s room prior to check-in, and outfit the room with a series of electronic surveillance devices, than during the target’s actual stay. Audio and video recording devices, telephone wire-tapping capabilities, and opening/sharing room Wi-Fi networks are all common tactics that can be utilized to

acquire information. One should never assume that a discreet conversation would not be overheard in a hotel room. This rule applies to bathrooms, as well.

There are many legendary stories of Cold War spies who would hold meetings with their assets (informants) in the bathroom, as they ran the shower to drown out the recording capabilities of concealed listening devices. However, with today’s technology, this should only be attempted as a last resort. Which begs the question, if you are holding sensitive business meetings in your bathroom with the shower running, what kind of business are you in, anyway?

The other threat that arises when your hotel room is under surveillance has to do with your own behavior. In many countries, businessmen (and women) will be solicited for sex by a local “honeypot,” or pre-paid intelligence asset, in hopes of capturing an act of infidelity on film. Soon after, an unknown operative will blackmail the businessperson. In return for the operative keeping evidence of the encounter hidden, the traveler will have to secretly turn over sensitive company information. A traveler’s best defense against blackmail would be to follow the time-honored advice of the US Intelligence Community: “Don’t do anything with anyone overseas that you wouldn’t want published on the front page of the Washington Post!”

Room Stacking Surveillance Detection Electronic hotel surveillance is a legitimate concern for international business travelers.

One way to help identify whether or not you might be under surveillance is to consider where your room is situated within the hotel.

For some less-sophisticated countries, the use of electronic surveillance is a budgetary issue.

Therefore, many international hotels will place “guests of interest” in rooms that are at the end of the hallway or along the corner of the build-

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ing. If the guest is traveling as part of the group, the group may be “stacked” in these corner rooms, one on top of each other.

For example, if the rooms at the end of the hallway end in the number “02,” the group will be placed in rooms 202, 302, 402, 502, etc. The purpose of this stacking technique allows the local surveillance team to run an unnoticeable wire down the corner exterior wall of the hotel, thus affordably monitoring the conversations that take place in those corner rooms (as opposed to wiring each room individually or having a wire hanging down the middle of the building).

Conclusion According to the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, US citizens traveling abroad continue to be the target of foreign intelligence collection activities.

Many foreign governments and foreign businesses place a high priority on acquiring US Government and private industryprotected information (classified, sensitive, and proprietary). Despite the end of the Cold War, the threat of Americans becoming targets of espionage from intelligence services as well as private collectors has become greater than ever.

Today’s international business travelers are savvy when it comes to frequent flier programs, more efficient methods to process through security lines, and which A traveler’s best defense against airport lounges make the best Bloody Marys’. What most travblackmail would be to follow the elers are missing, however, is the time-honored advice of the knowledge necessary to protect themselves and their company’s US Intelligence Community: sensitive information from eco“Don’t do anything with anyone nomic and industrial espionage.

Intellectual property theft is a overseas that you wouldn’t want $300 billion a year problem, with published on the front page of no signs of slowing down. Until businesspeople recognize the sigthe Washington Post!” nificance of the threat, and more importantly incorporate proper counter-espionage “tradecraft” overseas, it will remain open season on these travelers from competitors, foreign intelligence services, and private collectors. As the US Department of State informs American business travelers headed overseas, “the threat is real!”

About the Author

Radio Frequency (RF) scanners/detectors, as well as “spy finder” camera revealers, can be used to determine if a room might be under technical surveillance. For high-profile business or diplomatic meetings, technical surveillance counter-measure (TSCM) sweeps can also be performed to ensure that hotel and conference rooms are free of audio and video surveillance (although they are somewhat expensive, time consuming, inconvenient and not 100% effective). A more practical alternative would simply be not to hold sensitive conversations in your hotel room.

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Luke Bencie is the President/Managing Director of Security Management International, LLC, located in the Washington DC area. He has traveled to over 100 countries and has personally been a target of economic and industrial espionage throughout his many business trips overseas. He has lectured on the threats against international travelers to Fortune 500 companies, the US Government, and at universities. His book, “The Business Traveler’s Guide to Counter-Espionage” is due out in 2012. He can be reached at luke. bencie@smiconsultancy.com

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Anders Behring Breivik:

A New Breed Of Lone Wolf Terrorist?

Reporters and armed police are seen at the entrance of the court house where mass killer Anders Behring Breivik will have his third court appearance in Oslo, September 19, 2011. Breivik has admitted killing 77 people last July, including eight in a bombing in central Oslo. REUTERS/Erik Johansen/Scanpix

By George Michael

T

he face of terrorism is undergoing considerable change. There is a noticeable trend indicating the increasing frequency of lone wolf attacks by individuals and small cells with little or no connections to formal organizations. Over the past few years, numerous lone-wolf incidents carried out by a diverse assortment of radicals have gained headlines. For instance, in February 2009, Joseph Stack, a 53-year old software engineer and tax protestor, slammed his private plane into a building in Austin, Texas, that contained offices of the IRS, which triggered a massive fireball that set the edifice aflame. In November of that same year, a shooting rampage at Fort Hood, Texas killed 13 and left 30 wounded. The accused suspect, Major Nidal Malik Hasan—a Muslim-American psychiatrist in the U.S. Army—felt conflicted over his role in the U.S. military and his Muslim religion.

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Lone wolf terrorism is not confined to America, as was tragically displayed on July 22, 2011, when a bomb placed in a Volkswagen exploded in Oslo, Norway, near the offices of the prime minister and other government buildings. Eight people were killed in the explosion and several others injured. Less than two hours later, a lone gunman disguised as a police officer, attacked a summer camp that was operated by the youth organization of the Norwegian Labor Party on the island of Utøya in Tyrifjorden. The second attack left 68 people dead.

The admitted assailant in both attacks, Anders Behring Breivik, previously expressed anti-Muslim and anti-immigration sentiments on a web site. In an online manifesto, he counseled his fellow-travelers to emulate his terrorism by acting alone on their own initiative. He maintained no affiliations with hardcore extremists, though he was once briefly affiliated with a youth organization associated with the far right Norwegian Progress, but was not on the authorities’ radar screen. Having no criminal record, other than minor offenses, he was able to procure firearms and fertilizer for his bomb without raising red flags. His attacks seemed to come out of nowhere. Ominously, his style of lone wolf terrorism suggests a high degree of planning and calculation, a trend that could portend greater lethality and mayhem in the future.

Increasingly, individuals and small groups are responsible for some of the most lethal acts of terrorism. To be sure, organizations, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and al Qaeda, continue to mount operations; however, individuals and much smaller cells, sometimes inspired by the

ideologies that inform the more established groups, are able to autonomously mount operations without central direction.

In many parts of the world, the setting is not conducive to large, clandestine groups insofar as many foreign governments are coordinating their counterterrorism efforts with the United States, as they seek to dismantle terrorist organizations and deny them funding and resources.

This trend accelerated after 9-11. Furthermore, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, state sponsorship of terrorism drastically declined. Finally, new surveillance technology has enabled governments to better monitor dissident groups and potential terrorists. As a consequence, larger groups cannot operate as effectively as they had in the past because they are more vulnerable to infiltration and disruption.

On the other hand, contemporary technology, such as the Internet, allows like-minded activists to operate on their own initiative without the direction of a formal organization.

These trends are leading to the miniaturization of terrorist and insurgent movements around the world today. The rise of small-scale terrorism could become more worrisome than the centrally planned attacks about which the U.S. seemed most concerned. In fact, as far back as 2005, the U.S. Department of State observed a trend whereby more dispersed, localized, and smaller-scale groups are increasingly active in terrorism often with great lethal effect. The prospect of leaderless resistance is worrisome for authorities insofar as all that connects the various individuals and cells is a common ideology thus making them more difficult to detect and deter.

Apparently, such tactics are now being employed by al

Qaeda and its affiliates and sympathizers. Since the war in Afghanistan commenced in October 2001, al Qaeda has been moving toward a more decentralized approach to terrorism in which loosely affiliated groups that have only slight connections to the central organization commit acts of terrorism on their own volition. Leaderless resistance has now caught on in the jihadist movement. Ironically, the American extreme right has done the most theorizing on the concept. In 1992, Louis Beam, a longstanding activist, released the seminal essay “Leaderless Resistance”

in which he argued that the traditional hierarchical organizational structure was untenable under current conditions.

This essay was disseminated through computer networks of which Beam was a pioneer in exploiting during the 1980s.

Similarly, around 2005, A Syrian member of al Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Suri, advanced an operational strategy of decentralization to fit contemporary conditions. His 1,600–page on-line tome, A Global Islamic Resistance Call, seeks to provoke a global Islamic uprising led by autonomous cells and individual jihadists. In it, he

Having no criminal record, other than minor offenses, he was able to procure firearms and fertilizer for his bomb without raising red flags.

The government building in Oslo is pictured July 23, 2011, the day after the bomb went off. The hole after the bomb left in a car by Ander Behring Breivik can be seen in the middle of the picture. REUTERS/ Norwegian Police Handout/Scanpix (NORWAY - Tags: CRIME LAW)

argued that it was folly for the movement to fight from fixed locations because their units could be trapped where Western forces could eventually invade and destroy them. Taking into account these factors, al-Suri proposed a “jihad of individual terrorism” in which self-contained cells implement their own terrorist template to start their own jihad. What is critical is a shared ideology that serves to create a feeling of common cause and unity of purpose. There would be no formal organizational links between the cells. He advised Islamists to focus on jihad in their own countries of residence.

To that end, Adam Gadahn, a young man from California who has emerged as al Qaeda’s chief spokesman on the Internet, calls for Muslims residing in the West to commit acts of terrorism on their own initiative without direction from the parent group. In March 2010, al Qaeda’s media arm—asSahab—released a videotape in which Gadahn commended Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, calling him an “ideal role model” whose lone wolf terrorism should be a model of emulation for other jihadists in America and the West. More recently, in June of 2011, Gadahn appeared in another video titled “Do Not Rely on Others, Take the Task Upon Yourself” in which he urged Muslims in America to take advantage of lax firearm laws to purchase guns and carry out attacks on their own initiative.

Fortunately, to date, most episodes of leaderless resistance have been ill-planned and haphazard. For example, on May 1, 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a U.S.

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citizen who lived in Connecticut but was born in Pakistan, planted three bombs in an SUV that was parked in the heart of Times Square in New York City, but the they failed to explode due to poor design. Some of the perpetrators could be aptly described as Berserkers who basically went off the deep end, such as Buford Furrow, a former member of the Aryan Nations who in 1999 terrorized a Jewish day care center and later fatally shot an Asian American postal carrier. Proponents of the concept often assume that lone wolves are calculating and devote careful planning for their operations, but so far, these instances have been the exception and not the rule. However, as the concept gains currency, and with the increasing availability of weapons of mass destruction, it is conceivable that a new breed of more dangerous lone wolves could emerge in the future. For instance, shortly after 9-11, two waves of letters laced with anthrax were sent to various representatives of the media and U.S. lawmakers.

By early November 2001, five persons had died from the contaminated letters and another seventeen were sickened. Had the anthrax been employed more effectively, it could have done even greater damage and possibly shut down the nationwide mail system. The anthrax was weaponized, thus suggesting that it could only have been produced in a sophisticated military lab beyond the expertise of a non-state terrorist group.

However, in August 2008, Dr. Bruce Ivins—a research scientist at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRID)—was identified by the FBI as the person solely responsible for sending the anthrax-laced letters. Just before he was about to be arrested, Ivins was said to have consumed a heavy dose of prescription Tylenol with codeine and collapsed in his house and was then taken to a hospital where he died two days later.

The case of Anders Behring Breivik further illustrates the danger of a more lethal breed of lone wolf. According to his online political manifesto/ diary, Breivik spent nine years methodically planning his attacks. In detail, he explained

The second part of his attack, a shooting spree at a summer camp where some party leaders sent their children presumably, was intended to send a message to the ruling elite that not only they, but also their children, were no longer safe from retribution.

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how he procured firearms, tons of fertilizer, and stashed caches of weapons while evading suspicion from authorities.

He actually rented a farm as a cover for his large fertilizer purchases. During his shooting spree, he was attired as a police officer, which deceived some of the victims into approaching him thinking that he was going to save them. The first part of his attack—a bomb that exploded at the offices of the prime minister—was intended to send a message to the government that he disapproved of Norway’s liberal immigration policies. The second part of his attack—a shooting spree at a summer camp where some party leaders sent their children—presumably, was intended to send a message to the ruling elite that not only they, but also their children, were no longer safe from retribution.

The new media figured prominently in Breivik’s campaign of terror. Shortly before he began his attacks, he uploaded his 1,500-page electronic book— 2083: A European Declaration of Independence—on the Internet. In addition, he uploaded a video on YouTube titled “The Knight Templar 2083,” which contained numerous references to the Islamic threat to Europe interspersed with iconic images of Crusaders. Whereas the Unabomber Ted Kaczynski desperately implored major newspapers to publish his manifesto (from which, incidentally, Breivik plagiarized in his manifesto) in order to ensure maximum exposure of his ideas, Breivik was able to take advantage of the Internet and post his manifesto online thus bypassing the major media outlets. The notoriety stemming from his attack, he predicted, would serve as a “marketing” ad for his manifesto, thus assuring that there would be substantial interest in its contents. Claiming

to be a member of the Knights Templar—a medieval order that protected pilgrims in the Holy Land after the First Crusade in the eleventh century—he saw himself as part of an unorganized and leaderless vanguard that would awaken Europe to the perils of Islamicization brought about by the immigration policies engineered

by Europe’s liberal parties. In that sense, the seemingly senseless shootings at the youth camp were meant to punish ruling party for their “treasonous acts against Europe and Europeans.”

Just how effective his message will be has yet to be seen. In the immediate aftermath, the reaction from the far right has been mixed.

At least in the near term, the general consensus was that Breivik’s rampage was a public relations disaster for far right parties in Europe that favor immigration restrictions. Representatives of the racist and anti-Semitic extreme right could actually credibly distance themselves from the attack.

After all, in his manifesto, Breivik expressed solidarity with Jews and Israel—the traditional enemies of the extreme right. Breivik even went so far as to explain that if he could go back in time and kill one person, he would choose Adolf Hitler to murder for his legacy on post-war Europe which frowns upon enthusiastic displays of nationalism. Moreover, Breivik’s freemasonry would also set him apart from the extreme right insofar as freemasons are often implicated as dupes in the conspiracy against the west. David Duke, the former Louisiana state representative and Klan leader, characterized Breivik as a man whose mind had been deranged by Zionism and had targeted innocent white youths. Breivik, he argued, could more aptly be characterized as an Islamophobic neo-conservative.

Kevin MacDonald, a professor of psychology at California State University—Long Beach and editor of a white nationalist website, Occidental Observer, condemned the attacks, but conceded that Breivik was a “serious political

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thinker with a great many insights and some good practical ideas on strategy.” William Rome, writing on the Occidental Dissent website, did not condone the attacks, but pointed out that it would be hypocritical not to concede that Breivik had struck a terrible blow at the European elite that was responsible for policies that allow for large scale third world immigration into Norway.

Not even a week after Breivik’s attacks, U.S. military authorities announced that an AWOL soldier was in custody for planning an attack on the Fort Hood Army Base, the same place that Major Nidal Hasan

has become a more decentralized, and therefore more difficult entity to stop. Though some observers were quick to declare victory of al Qaeda after the death of bin Laden, the campaign against him and the movement he inspired has come with great costs. As of June 2011, 6,058 U.S. soldiers and U.S. Department of Defense civilians have died in the various theaters in the global war on terror. According to some estimates, the financial cost of fighting bin Laden’s network has reached $3 trillion when economic consequences are taken into account.

Over time, these financial costs have taken a devastating toll on the American economy and are unsustainable in the long term.

As the national debt continues to increase, inevitable cuts in

the news headlines suggest, leaderless resistance has become the most common tactical approach of political violence in the West.

In the current climate of fear in America, leaderless resistance has the potential to be seriously disruptive to the normal functioning of daily life. In that regard, jihadists operating in the United States would not have to resort to more “spectaculars” in the style of 9-11 to be effective, rather any kind of seemingly random assassinations and bombings could be psychologically devastating to the American public. Furthermore, the most notorious lone wolves in the U.S.—Timothy McVeigh, Ted Kaczynski, and Bruce Ivins (the alleged sender of anthrax-laced letters)—wreaked havoc cheaply.

As new technology continues to spread the capabilities for developing weapons of mass destruction, just a few angry people now have the potential to inflict unprecedented destruction.

About the Author

As of June 2011, 6,058 U.S. soldiers and U.S. Department of Defense civilians have died in the various theaters in the global war on terror.

had struck nearly two years before.

Allegedly, explosives and weapons were found in the suspect’s motel room that he rented near Fort Hood. Ironically, a conscientious objector who began questioning the legitimacy of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after studying Islamic teachings about war and peace, Private First Class Naser Abdo admitted upon questioning to planning an attack on the Army base.

As this plot and others suggest, terrorism from Islamic radicals will continue. Not long after the death of Osama bin Laden, some U.S. officials warned that his demise could speed up the trend over the past few years during which al Qaeda

defense spending will make it more difficult for the U.S. military to counter al Qaeda in those countries—Somali, Pakistan, and Yemen—in which the movement maintains a significant foothold.

Although it is more difficult for terrorists to mount a spectacular attack in the United States today because security measures have been significantly raised, a number of smaller, sporadic attacks persist.

As part of a strategy of attrition, leaderless resistance is becoming the modus operandi of contemporary terrorist movements.

As the frequency of sporadic episodes of lone wolf terrorism in

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George Michael received his Ph.D. from George Mason University’s School of Public Policy. He is a professor of nuclear counterproliferation and deterrence theory He is the author of five book: Confronting Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA (Routledge, 2003), The Enemy of my Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right (University Press of Kansas, 2006), Willis Carto and the American Far Right (University Press of Florida, 2008), Theology of Hate: A History of the World Church of the Creator (University Press of Florida, 2009), and The New Insurgents: The Rise of Leaderless Resistance and Lone Wolf Terror (Vanderbilt University Press, 2012).

In addition, his articles have been published in The Chronicle of Higher Education, Skeptic, Journal of International Security Affairs, Terrorism and Political Violence, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Defence Studies, Middle East Quarterly, Middle East Policy, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Journal of Church and State, Patterns of Prejudice, Population and Environment, and the Fort Worth Star-Telegram.

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Creating Dilemmas:

Force Security Tactics

By Dov Zwerling

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Police officers from various departments around the U.S. and Canada salute at the memorial for the four slain police officers in Tacoma, Washington December 8, 2009. Four officers were shot and killed at a coffee shop in the Tacoma suburb of Parkland, November 29, 2009 by Maurice Clemmons, who was later shot and killed by police.

REUTERS/Robert Sorbo (UNITED STATES CRIME LAW)

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n November 29th, 2009, with a smile on his face, Maurice Clemmons walked in to the Lakewood, WA, Forza Coffee Company coffee shop. Upon reaching the counter, he turned while pulling a semiautomatic pistol from his coat and opened fire on a group of police officers who were conducting pre-shift work on their laptops.

From a distance of 12 feet he shot an officer who was facing him, then the officer closest to him, then a third police officer who was reaching for his weapon. The fourth officer managed to charge Clemmons and shoot him twice, before the assailant shot him in the face. There was a getaway car waiting outside the café - Clemmons was not planning on dying; The entire episode demands answers to the question: How could someone believe he could enter a room, shoot four armed police officers and walk away?

An examination of Clemmons’ crime teaches many lessons.

Law Enforcement personnel have taken too long to recognize that they are at times being hunted. According to the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund website nfeomf. com, as of September 21, 2011, there have been 26% more officer fatalities by gunfire than occurred in 2010. The yearly numbers for the last decade have averaged around 55 shooting deaths per year nationwide.

Most often violence against police officers is a result of an attempt to escape or resist arrest. In most situations violence occurs while police are doing their job: Vehicle stops, warrant executions or response to dispatch.

When law enforcement officers carry out these duties they are prepared mentally, physically and tactically. The actions described above are offensive in nature – the police are actively stopping people or searching for suspects; acts for which they undergo vigorous training. When not on the offense, however, one must be on the defensive.

This is where many officers and other security personnel are lacking in proper training. Once one internalizes that one can be a target both on and off the job, behavior changes.

A Symbol Of The State Israeli police have been the targets of attacks since the state’s creation in 1948. In India, more policemen than soldiers are killed every year. Iraqi police have been the target of attacks in public, at bases and at large police stations. Pakistan, Algeria, Spain, France, the Philippines, Greece, Turkey, Mexico, China and Tibet have all endured targeted attacks on police stations and police officers - motivated by religion, national partisan issues, revenge, ego and other reasons often associated with terrorism.

Although most countries do not have posse comitatus laws, civilians are still more likely to have interactions with police officers than interactions with the military because, in part, police are the symbol of sovereignty and the operational branch of local government and law enforcement.

If a foreign interest wants to violate another nation’s sovereignty, it can attack a military target, embassy or consular mission. If the adversary is internal, or located within the nation’s borders, it is only natural that the police or other law enforcement and security personnel will be the target of the attack.

Also as it becomes clearer to adversaries that in the event of other attacks and threats to homeland security, police forces will be the first to respond, the strategic advantage to attacking a local law enforcement installation as a secondary target to a primary attack, will hinder if not prevent effective response both logistically, and emotionally.

A New Old Tactic The targeting of law enforcement in the United States is not a new phenomenon; it was a constant threat in the 18th and

19th centuries in the Midwest and “wild west” by Native American “insurgents” who would not submit to settler control over their lands. Since the law enforcement was executed by the sheriffs at the time, the sheriffs and their deputies were targeted by local tribes who sought revenge or change of policy, an idea that sounds quite similar to terrorism.

A visitor to Israel may have noticed a preponderance of weapons, mostly service weapons (M16 or X-95) on soldiers going to and from base or out

If the adversary is internal, or located within the nation’s borders, it is only natural that the police or other law enforcement and security personnel will be the target of the attack.

walking around. There are a number of reasons for this, but the prevailing reason is self defense. When in uniform one becomes a symbol. For the perpetrator of the attack against such a representative, the person symbolizing the regime in question is a “legitimate target”.

It is my assessment that in the United States an understanding of the importance of attacking such symbols came about after 9/11, when police and rescue personnel (who, in Israel, are often armed) were killed while performing their duties. Although not specifically targeted, it became apparent to those close to the attacks that they had become part of the front line and, in turn, the last line of defense. Domestic threats blur, or combine, these two lines. In this new reality for law enforcement, the first line of defense needs to be proactive intelligence operations with the last line being the individual citizen who, much like the passengers of United 93, take a stand against the perpetrators.

Every act in between is an opportunity to interdict the planned attack.

Sheep In AWolf’s Fur Though well armed and trained, and exhibiting the hard characteristics necessary for cops around the world, police officers often become soft targets when facing as well armed and trained attackers – especially if those attackers are multiple in number and carry with them the element of surprise. In most situations law enforcement can offer formidable response to a threat and neutralize it in a reasonable amount of time; but the key word here is

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response. When a member of law enforcement is the target, the emotional distance of a responder from the event is lost and the behavior can be that of a “victim” – a response that is much more powerful.

The main difference is the amount of control the officer has of the situation, when the initiative is of the assailant’s, the officer has less control.

One possible explanation for this is that police are used to getting involved in violence from the outside - giving them time to become aggressive, read the situation and react accordingly.

Police stations in the US and Canada, are also soft targets - usually with little or no security and almost always with minimal stand-off distance for vehicles. Police stations around the world, where police have been and continue to be one of the main targets of insurgents or anti-government extremists, police stations are hardened like any other strategic installation, with active counter-intelligence operations, patrol security and most important - the awareness that they are a target. We are seeing an extreme example of this in Mexico, where small to medium sized groups of wellarmed gunmen, go into a small town and simply wipe out the entire shift of law enforcement.

Protecting The Protectors My family and friends told me about it first, the “no-eyecontact-conversation”. I was brought up to look at people in the eye for at least some of the time when conversing with another human being.

But I found that my meetings with other policemen in the field was an “I-got-yourback-you-got-mine” situation for the duration of the

conversation, where I would look over his shoulder and he would look over mine. But this came from the lessons learned from our peers who were not as vigilant, and paid for it.

Law enforcement officers in rural areas still work alone and are easily outnumbered by a simple traffic stop. They work in the same areas and stop at the same cafes, restaurants and quickie marts every shift. They frequently

of failure. It has been used in all security doctrines, military and law enforcement. The idea is to look at one’s self from the eyes of a potential attacker. If the intent is to simply kill and incapacitate as many officers as possible, then we need to make this more challenging for the assailant. When a group of officers are standing together, either for a briefing or a coffee break, this gives the attacker the equivalent to “shooting fish in a barrel”. By simply appointing someone to be responsible for

We are seeing an extreme example of this in Mexico, where small to medium sized groups of well-armed gunmen, go into a small town and simply wipe out the entire shift of law enforcement.

park the police car outside the house, allowing the “stalking” enemy information on the officer’s extremely soft home front, the family.

Military tactics are making their way into the police lexicon by both internal use and external use. One of the basic rules of battle for defensive security is to create tactical dilemmas for the enemy. There are many ways this can be implemented but the action is almost always in the officer’s behavior.

Creating The Dilemmas It is the basis of threat mitigation- to make the potential attacker aware of the chance

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“real security” in these types of meetings, we create the first form of dilemma, Awareness.

Awareness- Awareness is the state or ability to perceive, to feel, or to be conscious of events, objects or sensory patterns. In this level of consciousness, sense data can be confirmed by an observer without necessarily implying understanding. What is in fact more important here is the charade of awareness.

This is best shown through eye contact or the assumption of eye contact. Executive security details use this to judge reactions from surrounding unknowns.

The use of dark or mirrored sunglasses, make the act even more ambiguous by not allowing others to see exactly where the agent is looking, but by moving

the head in different directions, one can create the assumption that he is looking everywhere.

What we are hoping for in this instance is to solicit a reaction that will allow us to interdict before the attack has begun, this is a technique used in preventative security.

In every position where an officer is static (even in a vehicle at a red light), there are a number of routes or directions from where an attack would be more successful. Every officer must quickly read the situation and make his self-protection analysis of where he is more vulnerable and to direct more attention. In some cases having ones back to the wall is safer, in other cases it can become a trap. Choosing an escape route in every situation can allow

to spread out the forces, this makes it harder to hit everyone at the same time with whatever weapon may be used. This is the tactical example of a “split” in bowling. This will also hopefully leave some not under direct attack, and they can respond quicker. An assailant sees this, assesses the dilemma, and makes his decisions accordingly- hopefully to look for a different target or at least to stall while thinking about how to overcome the dilemma.

Intentional UnpredictabilityIt is human nature to stick to routine, and even more so for military and law enforcement organizations. When gathering intelligence to carry out an attack, the attacker looks for routine. A place, an action, a time - anything that can be assumed that will allow the attacker the element of surprise and preparation. This can be the times of shift changes, the patrol rounds, lunch breaks, coffee breaks – both the location and the time. Some things in law enforcement need to be routine, but in these instances - there should be a heightened level of awareness. We need to seem unpredictable, and if it is not Thai security forces investigate the site of bomb attack after a remotely detonated bomb done intentionally, we exploded under a vehicle carrying policemen in the southern Yala province May 31, will always go back 2011. Two policemen were wounded after suspected separatist rebels attacked their to routine. When the patrol in southern Thailand as violence intensified in the restive region bordering enemy knows where Malaysia, according to the police. REUTERS/Surapan Boonthanom we are going to be, it allows him the ability to choose the time, place, and the officer the option to utilize It is during this period that we the “flight” reflex, in order to hope that someone’s awareness angle of attack. quickly access the situation, will bring on an interdiction. It Angle of Attack- Military strat- and begin the “fight”. When in is also important not to spread egists from Sun Tsu to Gen. traffic or behind another vehicle out too thin in a way that may Petraeus have been pondering at a stop light, always leave not allow an aggressive, unified over and studying this important enough space between you and and speedy response. We can’t aspect of both offensive and de- the car in front to allow you always stop the attack from fensive strategies. The dilemmas to “get away” in one forward happening, but we can create a of those on the attack and those movement. This is also useful situation that allows us to mition defense are at many times the in responding to dispatch or gate it quicker and with fewer same. Whether to attack head criminal activities that require casualties. The most important bullet shot in this situation is the on with all of the force of the immediate response. second one, and it best be quick army or to attempt to split the defending forces army. For the Offering A “Split”- Since mov- and accurate. defender, there can be no soft ing targets are harder to acquire, spot, a minimal buffer zone and attackers will most likely wait Speed of Response- Obviously mobile forces at the ready. The until we are static, or “sitting this is key in mitigating any game “Battleship” is a simplified ducks”. When on the defen- attack, but the intent here is sive, in a static state, it is best two-fold- it includes reaction lesson of this discipline.

to clear threats, but also those that may be used in fishing for operational intelligence in the planning phase. When planning the attack, the attacker may attempt to gather intelligence to see the reactions of the officers or others. The actions once again may deter him or stall him from carrying out the attack.

The ability and speed of the officers involved to operate the mental “switch” from defense to attack mode will in many cases decide whether they will survive the attack.

The Threat Is Here To Stay Worldwide trends continue to show that international and domestic terrorism, civil disobedience, and crime are on a rise with no reprieve in sight.

Geopolitics, religion, infrastructure, lack of resources, and poverty will continue to make the world a more dangerous place and those on the front line will continue to be targets of attacks. Police and security personnel are the last line of defense for the civilian population who trust them to protect them and their interests. An attack on the police or security personnel is also an attack on the civilian’s sense of security and we owe it both to ourselves, our families, and those civilians to be a strong and productive defensive shield.

About the Author: Dov Zwerling served in the IDF and in The Israeli National Police, Jerusalem Rapid Response Motorcycle SWAT Unit. He was present at dozens of suicide attacks, violent armed riots, and mass casualty events. Mr. Zwerling is an Executive Protection Agent, a licensed warfare instructor, and the Director of Tactical Operations and Training at the Institute of Terrorism Research and Response (ITRR). Responses or questions can be sent to dovzwer@itrrintel.com.

NO DEFENSE

America’s Growing Vulnerability to an EMP Attack

By Dan Dickerson

24

Starfish Prime was successful. The Thor missile carried the test instrumentation and the W-49 warhead/Mk-4 RV payload to 248 miles. The test appeared quite spectacular from Hawaii (800 miles away) and at Kwajalein (1600 miles away), with impressive light displays from an artifical aurora lasting up to seven minutes. The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) from this test sent power line surges throughout Oahu, knocking out street lighting, blowing fuzes and circuit breakers, and triggering burglar alarms.

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ould the U.S. be attacked in such a way that it would be instantaneously removed as a world power? In the case of an EMP attack, the answer would have to be yes. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is a quick, powerful blast of electromagnetic energy that is created by a nuclear denotation. The pulse affects electronics but does no harm to human or animal life or any structures.

Congress, in 2001, established the Commission to Assess the Threat of the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack. This was in response to the growing reports that America’s enemies were developing these weapons. The EMP Commission’s first report, in 2004, warned that rogue states or terrorists could successfully attack the U.S. with an EMP weapon by launching a missile from a freighter off the coast of the U.S. In 2008, the EMP Commission issued its final report, in which Dr. Peter Vincent Pry considered an attack against the U.S. with an EMP weapon a clear and present danger.

This phenomenon was noted with America’s first test of a nuclear weapon (16 July 1945), but the significance of the EMP would not be explored until 1962 with Operation Fishbowl, in which three nuclear experiments were conducted to test the effects of an EMP. At the same time as America was conducting these tests, the Soviet Union was also exploring the weapon capabilities of an EMP. In 1962, under the title “The K Project,”(i) three nuclear tests were conducted over Kazakhstan. The documentation of these tests would not be completely known until after the fall of the Soviet Union, and even today, it is sparse in open scientific journals.(ii) Its potential as a weapon was not recognized at the time as the pulse was not a threat to the technology of that era. It wouldn’t be until the 1970s and world’s growing dependence on electronics that the potential impact of such a weapon would become apparent to some in the science and military communities.

The dangers from an EMP attack have been in a stealth mode within the U.S. Except for a small group in the Pentagon,

several research labs and the members of the Congressional Investigative ComThis exchange has included nuclear mittee on EMP, the technology, especially EMP’s. Russia majority of people in government and and China have conducted extensive in the general popuresearch into their development and lation are unaware of this threat. The possible deployment against the U.S. U.S. currently faces a quadrumvirate of enemies, in the form of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, who, despite their political differences, share a common desire to limit America’s retaliation, we would launch an SLBM power in international affairs and prevent [submarine launched ballistic missile] the further spread of Western-style de- and detonate a single nuclear warhead at mocracy. Toward this end, there has been high altitude over the United States and an exchange of weapons, technology, shut down your power grid and commumilitary and scientific personnel between nications for six months or so.’ Shabonov these four countries. This exchange has added, ‘And if one weapon wouldn’t do it, included nuclear technology, especially we have some spares.(iii) EMP’s. Russia and China have conducted extensive research into their development This statement was made in response to and possible deployment against the U.S. unconfirmed reports that the U.S. had tested a super-EMP weapon in Yugoslavia Since 1963, Russia and China have con- during the first days of the war in Kosovo. ducted tests with non-nuclear EMP weap- Why were our enemies, both then and ons and have considered them as a pre-emp- today, interested in the potential use of tive weapon in case of war with the United an EMP weapon as both a strategic and States. In May, 1999, Congressman Roscoe tactical weapon? Strategically employed G. Bartlett (R-MD) relayed the following: over a wide radius, an EMP would move so fast that ordinary surge protectors We met with three of our Russian coun- would be useless, and the attack would terparts on the Duma International Af- leave communications, computers, public fairs Committee, including its chairman, safety and emergency response systems, Vladimir Lukin, and senior Communist as well as automobiles, electrical power Party member Aleksandr Shabonov. The capabilities, banking systems, commuRussians chastised the United States for nications and food and water systems, military aggression in the Balkans and public transportation and airlines and warned Russia was not helpless to oppose other essential services useless. HospiOperation Allied Force. Lukin said, ‘If we tals would be effectively shut down, and really wanted to hurt you with no fear of those patients with pace makers or other

implanted electrical devices would die. The initial effect of an EMP would be a cascading failure of the major electronic and electrical infrastructure of the U.S. Not every electrical device would be destroyed, but, due to the interdependence of our infrastructure, the damage would be close to 100%. A timely repair to the electrical grids would not be possible; it would take months or years, as our largest transformers are no longer made in the U.S. and spares are too expensive to be kept in reserve. Another problem would be a “black start,” i.e. restarting the power grid. Since a major shut down of all electronic devices has never happened, no one knows exactly what will happen when they all restart after having been out of commission for months.

There is a 60-day reserve of food in the major regional warehouses across the country. In the past, areas devastated by hurricanes and other natural disasters have lost their food reserves due to the lack of refrigeration. If the power grid across the U.S. is destroyed, America’s food reserves would be lost. An EMP attack represents a modern means for our enemies to kill millions of Americans the old fashioned way: through starvation and disease.

Numerous articles have discussed the vulnerability of America’s critical infrastructure and how this may create an incentive for our enemies to attack using an EMP weapon. If the U.S. were successfully attacked with an EMP weapon, the nation would be vulnerable to a follow-up attack by conventional forces or a biological weapon. An EMP could “literally destroy the American nation and might cause the deaths of 90% of its people and set us back a century or more

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in time as far as our ability to function as a nation.”(iv) Presently, Homeland Security has contingency plans for 15 types of disasters, but not for an EMP attack.

Russia and China, along with Iran and North Korea, have shown great interest in the development and use of EMP weapons as a first-strike option. In its first report (2004), the EMP Commission reported that “China and

moreover likely at its maximum Cold War strength. I very confidently predict that it will be one of the last features of Soviet strategic nuclear weaponry to be retired from the Russian strategic force structure.(vi) In recent years, the Russians have openly stated how they would defeat the U.S. with the use of EMP weapons. Russian Major General Vladimir Belous, in 2004, wrote: Space-based and ground facilities of the information-reconnaissance system, without which the missile defense system will prove to be “blind,” are especially

When a country grows increasingly powerful economically and technologically... it will become increasingly dependent on modern information systems....

Russia have considered limited nuclear attack options that, unlike their Cold War plans, employ EMP as the primary or sole means of attack.”(v) Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has reduced the size of its nuclear force, with the exception of the development and deployment of EMP weapons: Soviet strategic strike forces characteristically have featured weaponry well-suited to efficient EMP generation over exceptionally wide areas. That EMP strike component exists today in the Russian strategic order-of-battle,

vulnerable in this sense. During a crisis situation period, “space” mines can be inserted into space.

They are dispersed in orbit around enemy objects and, detonating on command from Earth, disable them at the necessary moment.

The ‘blinding’ of enemy territory by disabling his electronic and power network also is possible.

American specialists determined that in case a large nuclear charge were detonated at an altitude of hundreds of kilometers above the geographic center of the United States, the state of Nebraska, a powerful electromagnetic pulse will disable electronic and power

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systems on the territory of the entire country for a certain time.(vii) Following on the comments of General Belous, Captain H. Rezyapov (2005), in an article titled “Asymmetric Threats to the National Security of the United States,” stated: Such a blast would simultaneously take out of action almost all of the satellites orbiting above the United States. It is thought that a nuclear blast over the territory of the state of Nebraska at an altitude of 300 km would be able to affect up to 90% of the territory of the United States by the action of its EMP.(viii) China’s leaders, in order to survive a major conflict with the U.S., developed the strategy of “shashaojian” or the “assassin’s mace.” This doctrine addresses the ability of “defeating a superior with an inferior,” i.e. uses asymmetric warfare to attack America’s Achilles’ heel: “China’s leaders have placed a near-term emphasis on asymmetric programs and systems to leverage China’s advantages while exploiting the perceived vulnerabilities of potential opponents—so-called Assassin’s Mace (sha shou jian) programs.”(ix) China recognizes that it cannot defeat the U.S. in a conventional war, and if there was a confrontation, the U.S. military would have to be neutralized as quickly as possible. In a paper titled “The Science of Military Strategy,” the Chinese noted the weaknesses of the U.S. military during both Gulf Wars and offered suggestions on how to capitalize on these vulnerabilities: In regard to information systems, we should firmly destroy their surface facilities, jam and cut the enemy’s information feedback transmission circuits first, then try our best to knock

off his awareness platforms and damage his information flow which can form capabilities, so as to achieve the effect of decapitation.(x) In order for China to be able to defeat the U.S. without engaging in a nuclear exchange, emphasis has been placed on the development of EMP weapons, as neither China nor Russia consider their use as being an element of nuclear war. Technical papers on the development and possible use of EMP weapons have appeared regularly in Chinese open sources. (xi) A Hong Kong Based Chinese military analyst reported that China has “developed electromagnetism pulse bombs(xii).” The Chinese, in order to insure that the Washington doesn’t misinterpret their intentions, will print key articles in English, which they have done when discussing the development and possible use of EMP weapons.

Portions of a National Ground Intelligence Study (2005) taken from a classified Chinese military study, revealed that China could potentially use EMP weapons in two different ways: 1) as surprise measure against U.S. naval assets that would be sent to defend Taiwan from a mainland invasion and 2) in a direct strike on the U.S. Neutralizing the naval carrier groups of the U.S. does not remove the threat of a response by Washington.

China realizes that the U.S. has both ballistic

submarines and long-range bombers which could respond to any threat/attack on the U.S. mainland. In response, Chinese military leaders have reviewed the possibility of launching a EMP armed missile from one of their submarines lying off the coast of either California or Washington or using a proxy, in the form of Iran or North Korea, to initiate a pre-emptive strike against the U.S.

the U. S. economy, from banks to telephone systems and from power plants to iron and steel works, relies entirely on computer networks.... When a country grows increasingly powerful economically and technologically... it will become increasingly dependent on modern information systems.... The United States is more vulnerable to attacks than any other country in the world.(xiii)

Chinese military leaders understand that America is most vulnerable regarding the electric grid, computer networks, oil supply routes, and the economy and have developed plans for a pre-emptive strike against the U.S. if the situation should call for such action:

Although China and Russia have explored the value of an EMP attack against the U.S., the real threat comes from Iran and North Korea, either acting on their own behalf or as a proxy for another government. An Iranian military article entitled Electronics to Determine Fate of Future Wars, suggests that the key to defeating the United States is an EMP attack:

Some people might think that things similar to the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ are unlikely to take place during the information age. Yet it could be regarded as the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ of the 21st century if a surprise attack is conducted against the enemy’s crucial information systems of command, control, and communications by such means as... electromagnetic pulse weapons.... Even a superpower like the United States, which possesses nuclear missiles and powerful armed forces, cannot guarantee its immunity... In their own words, a highly computerized open society like the United States is extremely vulnerable to electronic attacks from all sides. This is because

Advanced information technology equipment exists which has a very high degree of efficiency in warfare. Among these we can refer to communication and information gathering satellites, pilotless planes, and the digital system....

Once you confuse the enemy communication network you can also disrupt the work of the enemy command and decision-making center. Even worse, today when you disable a country’s military high command through disruption of communications you will, in effect, disrupt all the affairs of that country....

If the world’s industrial countries fail to devise

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effective ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate within a few years.... American soldiers would not be able to find food to eat nor would they be able to fire a single shot.(xiv) Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, while serving as staff director of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from an EMP Attack, stated, in 2004, that several Russian nuclear scientists informed him that the technology for a “super-EMP” had been given to Iran and North Korea, and that Russian, Chinese and Pakistani scientists, working in North Korea, had assisted the North Koreans in developing a EMP weapon.

In 2006, Iran tested several of its Shahah-3 missiles and exploded them as they reached their apogee.

At the 2005 hearing of the Senate Committee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, it was noted that this event indicated that Iran may be practicing for an EMP attack.(xv) Iran has also been observed test firing missiles from barges and freighters in the Caspian Sea. A nuclear missile concealed in the hold of a freighter would give Iran the capability to perform an EMP attack against the United States homeland with some prospect of remaining anonymous. In 2004, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned of the

dangers of a missile being launched from a rogue ship off our coast and Dr. Pry warned: “One nightmare scenario posed by the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States From Electromagnetic Pulse [Attack] was a ship-launched EMP attack against the United States by Iran, as this would eliminate the need for Iran to develop an ICBM to deliver a nuclear warhead against the U.S. and could be executed clandestinely, taking the U.S. by surprise. Because an EMP attack entails detonating a nuclear weapon at high altitude, in space, it leaves no bomb debris for forensic analysis, no fingerprints identifying the attacker. We might never figure out who hit us, assuming the nation survives and recovers from an EMP attack.” Iran would be interested in launching a missile from a ship only if it intends to attack a nation outside of the Middle East.

Iran, along with the Chinese, have developed “covert cooperation… in the development and testing of EMP weapons,”(xvi) with the Cuban government and currently have active research and testing facilities in Cuba. This is in combination with the missile launch sites Iran has established in Venezuela.

North Korea, following the views of the Chinese, Russians and Iranians, note that the greatest strength,

The threat from North Korea cannot be taken lightly, as noted by statements from several retired Russian generals to the EMP Commission: “North Korea, armed with an EMP weapon, would constitute a grave threat to the world.”(xviii)

and greatest vulnerability, lies in America’s electronic infrastructure.

Toward this end, North Korea has been testing EMP weapons. Dr. Pry warned that North Korea has learned how to miniaturize its nuclear warheads for use on a missile and the 2009 nuclear test was, in fact, an EMP weapon.

North Korea has developed a shiplaunched missile, derived from the Russian SS-N-6, in which tests have been conducted launching the missile from a merchant freighter.

These tests can only indicate that North Korea could launch a missile, armed with an EMP weapon, from a comfortable range in the Pacific Ocean against the U.S. An EMP attack against the U.S. by North Korea would be attractive to China and Iran, because the technology and economy in North Korea is primitive and not nearly as vulnerable to a U.S. military counter-attack as advanced industrial nations and the U.S. would be unable to “point the finger” at either China or Iran.

In a South Korean Defense journal (August 2005), the threat of a North Korean EMP attack was discussed: What the late North Korea leader, Kim Jong Il, would have done is to first explode nuclear weapons at a high altitude . . . while destroying electronic devices and computers and paralyzing the functions of military strong points, logistics plants, and cities . . . [If] it is exploded at a high altitude of 100km or so . . . all kinds of electrical machinery and, in particular, electronic devices are damaged. More seriously, many of the artificial satellites orbiting from 400 to 800km above the earth get demolished. Then, neither satellite telephone nor GPS could be used, so while the US military, which depends on satellites, immediately falls into a panic and becomes combat incapable, other nations around the world that used these satellites would also be greatly affected. (xvii)The threat from North Korea cannot be taken lightly, as noted by statements from several retired Russian generals to the EMP Commission: “North Korea, armed with an EMP weapon, would constitute a grave threat to the world.”(xviii) As Dr. Lowell Wood told the House Armed Services Commission: The

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ability of North Korea to attack the continental United States in the very near term with small nuclear weapons thrown with advanced variants of the current Taepo Dong missiles is well known to the Washington national security community . . .

Thus, for several reasons, each one good-and-sufficient, the U.S. would be well-advised to manifest far more effective concern than prevails at present regarding its national territory and against its forces abroad.(xix) A civilian freighter or a submarine could launch an EMP weapon from off the east or west coast of America; from the Gulf of Mexico, the Gulf of Cortez, Cuba or Venezuela and there would be no defenses to stop the attack. The problem with an EMP weapon is that any country that has the knowledge and the industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons can produce an EMP weapon.

In the event of a Catastrophic Critical Infrastructure event, America will revert to its Colonial era as a very weak and disabled nation as Americans would no longer have the skills and the knowledge to exist on their own without electricity and technology, and our enemies would not let us recover as a world power. Unless the government is prepared, our survival as a country would be unlikely.

About the Author Dan Dickerson is a retired Colonel, U.S. Army. He has and still does serve as an advisor to the UN, NATO and Interpol on terrorism and intelligence planning. He is a member of the National Intelligence Education Foundation, and the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. He is a member of the International Law Enforcement Education and Training Association and has taught for three years at their international conference.

He has trained law enforcement from the local to federal level on terrorism and intelligence, as well as investigators for the Canadian Attorney General’s office and police officials in Egypt .

References for this article can be found on page 66 of this issue.

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The Boeing 727 Anti Terrorism Training Facility

By Jim Weiss And Mickey Davis

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S

ometimes people flying in private aircraft have circled and done some head-scratching over the Walter C. Heinrich Practical Training Site, named in honor of the late Hillsborough County sheriff. Why the curiosity?

This middle-of-nowhere training site is surrounded by fields and trees in a sparselydeveloped section of Hillsborough County, Florida, yet in the center of it sits a full-sized Boeing 727 on a concrete pad. The plane is not a wreck; it looks like it’s in good flying shape and just landed there…without an airport… or a control tower…or a runway. Impossible, yet there it is.

What these private pilots are seeing is the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office’s Boeing 727 Anti Terrorism Training Facility. It’s a great story as to how this huge airplane got to be there, and a secondary story about what else lies within the Walter C. Heinrich Practical Training Site.

The Gift of a Plane The Hillsborough County, Florida, Sheriff ’s Office (HCSO) is one of the larger law enforcement agencies in the U.S. Around 2002, it was offered something for free.

Everyone likes to get something for free, and with law enforcement agency budgets already strapped and continuing to shrink, “free” sounded better than ever.

HCSO wasn’t one to pass up a bargain, especially a donation that would enable them to practice realistic antiterrorist training at their own facility. With busy Tampa International Airport located in their jurisdiction, St. Petersburg-Clearwater Airport in a neighboring county, and other smaller airports nearby, they needed to prepare.

Airplane entry and antiterrorism training needs to be as realistic as possible, and this would help keep up with the times when the plane needed to be replaced.

So when Deputy William Hill’s brother told him there was a stripped-down, engineless Boeing 727 jet available for free from Capital Cargo International, they jumped at the chance. The hitch? The plane was located at the Orlando Airport, nearly 100 miles from the Sheriff ’s Office’s rural training site.

Where there’s a will, there’s a way, and HCSO certainly had the will. All they needed to do was find a way.

After many meetings and considerations, in 2003 the project was given to now-retired Deputy Hill, who is also a retired US Marine (engineer units).

Also heavily involved were Robert Hollis and Jim Nelson.

wires, railroad crossings, tree limbs, and traffic. Sharp turns had to be made. And a final site had to be prepared so that the 55,000 lb. airliner wouldn’t sink into Florida’s sandy soil.

So how do you move a plane that towers 34 feet from ground to the tip of the tail, is 133 feet long, and has a wing span of 108 feet? Without engines, it had to be hauled overland. But that wouldn’t be easy. There were overhead

The 100-mile journey of this large vehicle would eventually involve an unprecedented cooperative effort by 100 people, 24 businesses, law enforcement agencies, state and local governments, the railroad, the phone company,

hundreds of hours of volunteer labor, and donations of equipment, manpower, and time by private corporations. Many people thought it couldn’t be done.

First training facility maintenance employees laid the reinforced concrete in large, interlocking pieces. The pad was built six inches thick in most places, but thicker in the spots where the plane was going to be mounted.

Special concrete supports were also constructed to hold the airliner as well as maintain the Landing Gear Struts and preserve the integrity of the body. Because the bellies of newer, larger planes vary in distance from the ground, cylinders were used in the supports. These could be filled with nitrogen to raise the plane. So while older planes have a four-foot space under the belly, newer ones have six feet or more.

Airplane entry and antiterrorism training needs to be as realistic as possible, and this would help keep up with the times when the plane needed to be replaced. It was clear that the wings and tail would have to be removed in order for the plane to fit on the special low bed trailer needed to haul it on the highways.

Mechanics, those unseen individuals at the airport who keep our planes running, volunteered to help out, and Delta shipped the equipment they needed – such as four heavy lift jacks -- at no cost to the sheriff’s office

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However, no one involved with this 727 had ever taken the wings or tail off a plane before; it was a learning experience for everyone. The wings were unbolted and removed using a crane and straps. They were stored on stacks of tires to prevent damage. The engine housing on the tail and the landing gear were also removed, and the tail section sawed off, rear to front. The nose cap was also taken off to horten the plane.

The actual trip was a job for professional movers, so the HCSO contacted Miami Transfer Company’s Tampa office. Miami Transfer specialized in heavy and specialized hauling, equipment and machinery moving, and rigging and cranes. For the cost of insurance and equipment, the company helped with the move.

On dedication day, the plane stood on its own small tarmac in an empty field. It had been repainted with green and gold stripes – the colors of the Sheriff’s Office – and sported an America’s Most Wanted logo on the tail (paid for by the TV show). After a national competition and used with permission of the Beamer Foundation, it was dubbed “Let’s Roll,” in remembrance of Flight 93 that crashed into the Pennsylvania

It was dubbed “Let’s Roll,” in remembrance of Flight 93 that crashed into the Pennsylvania fields on September 11, 2001.

The journey is a story in itself, but when the plane arrived at the sheriff’s training site, it had to be assembled. The tail section, nose cap, and wings were reattached. The wheels were installed and used seats were added for realism. These were purchased for $3500. Capital Cargo donated plane flaps that couldn’t be used on another aircraft.

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fields on September 11, 2001. “Let’s Roll” were the cell phone words of Scott Beamer as the passengers decided to fight the hijackers and keep the plane from continuing on to Washington, DC. John Walsh from the television show America’s Most Wanted dedicated the plane and commended the

training that would take place on it. Then a helicopter and armored vehicle arrived, and a SWAT team made up of members from various law enforcement agencies including the FBI simulated the rescue of civilians from a terrorist hijacking.

More at the Walter C. Heinrich Practical Training Site

detonation area, making it one of the most complete training facilities in the state, if not the country. The vision of the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office and the cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies has paid off big time in the readiness of law enforcement to fight terrorist actions and to keep the country’s general public and the flying American public safe in today’s world.

The Boeing 727 Anti Terrorism Training Facility and the Walter C. Heinrich Practical Training Site are used by the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office and other law enforcement agencies. The FBI and U.S. Marshals Service train there, as do police departments and sheriff’s offices, special operations units, and multi-jurisdictional task forces, at the Hillsborough County sheriff’s discretion.

Driving Training Course Pad

In addition to the plane, the rural training facility now contains outdoor sniper and other shooting ranges, an indoor dark house, an obstacle course, a six story rappel tower, a driver training course pad, Tactical City, a shoot house, classrooms, structures used for mock disasters, and a 360-degree bomb

With construction begun in 2009, Tactical City is still being built in planned stages. It is connected to the Driver Training Course Pad and is built for scenario training that involves building and room clearing using role players. If/when a role-playing shooter hits law enforcement personnel

This is a realistic road course consisting of three intersections with functioning traffic signals and an observation tower. It is used for law enforcement pursuit driving and scenario training, as well as crash reconstruction, vehicle take downs, and traffic enforcement.

Tactical City

going through the building, Simunition®, a training ammunition, leaves paintball-type marks them. It also shows where those going through the training have shot the bad guys, or unintentionally shot other role players. Those hit with Simunition rounds really feel it.

The training scenarios can involve high-risk warrant service, active shooter(s), robberies in progress, hostage taker(s), barricaded subject(s), etc. Currently, Tactical City consists of a single storehouse, a two-story house, a convenient store, a bank, and a school.

Shoot House Early shoot houses were built from everything from plywood to walls made of used tires. At a greater cost, they are now often constructed by private companies that specialize in shoot houses.

Shoot houses can be built with ¼ inch steel walls for the use of frangible ammunition, or built less expensively to be used with marker ammunition, such as Simunition or

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paintballs. Often they include overhead walkways from which critiquing instructors have a bird’s eye view of the movements of students working their way through the shoot house. Sometimes they are constructed so that the walls of interior rooms can be altered, giving students varying set-ups to avoid repetition.

The Walter C. Heinrich Practical Training Site’s shoot house is built with steel traps for fran-

ing takes place in conditions as close as possible those encountered on the street, but this can be difficult. Generally, nighttime training must either be conducted after dark, or simulated during daylight by wearing sunglasses – an unsatisfactory solution.

The Dark House is an indoor range where darkness is dominant. This firing range, custom built for realistic, low light

comprehend what is happening around them as they shoot and reload. Overhead black lights simulate a full moon. There are also regular white lights that can be used when training is not taking place.

By using a Dark House, nighttime training can be accomplished at any time, day or night, in a safe environment.

Shooters can become accustomed to muzzle flashes, and instructors can offer a full range of hands-on training, combining the combat elements of marksmanship, time, and space in a darkened environment. This is among the few such Dark Houses in the United States.

A Training Scenario

Night is nature’s camouflage, the time when real life bad guys often work, counting on the blackness to cloak their getaway and to ambush.

gible round use; Simunition is also used. It also has the overhead areas for instructors to look down on the law enforcement officers going through the training.

Dark House Night is nature’s camouflage, the time when real life bad guys often work, counting on the blackness to cloak their getaway and to ambush.

How can an officer or deputy prepare for low light shooting and shooting in the dark? The best loading and firing train-

34

shooting, takes real world, constantly changing tactics and training to another level.

In the Dark House it is always night. Everything -- walls, ceiling and floors -- is painted a flat black. There are no windows, and the doors open behind a protecting wall to reduce light from the outside.

When those in the Dark House are using live fire, a flashing red light outside above the entry door lets people know not to go in. Inside, lighting is supplied by red bulbs that allow shooters and trainers to see their targets, be visually safe, and

Terrorists had hijacked the Boeing 727 airliner and made it known that if their demands were not met, they would begin killing the airplane’s crew and passengers. In the middle of this scenario, police armored vehicles, helicopters, and suited-up tactical response teams arrive.

This tactical response was made up of an evolutionary partnership of city police officers, county sheriff’s office deputies and the FBI. Today, often no single law enforcement agency can do it all.

Conclusion

Some people said hauling a Boeing 727 from Orlando to the training grounds of the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office couldn’t be done. A lot of other folks got together, said that it could be done, and then did it.

September 11th and its aftermath showed that teams from various agencies could train and work together. This training can have both a real

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Vol.18, No.1

and a psychological impact on the bad guys. In a like spirit of cooperation, the FBI, and state, county and local agencies also recognized a need to expand their mutual aid partnershipping arrangements.

Now in motion, the FBI’s Hostage Team, the Hillsborough County Sheriff ’s Office Special Weapons and Tactics Team and the Tampa Police Department’s Tactical Response team are training together. Additional Florida teams will be joining this training partnership.

More techniques are being learned. It’s a matter of life and death.

About the Authors Jim Weiss is a former school trained combat engineer light infantryman in the A c t i v e A r m y re s e r v e s , a former regular Army schooltrained Army military policeman, former State of Florida Investigator, and a retired police lieutenant from the Brook Park (OH) Police Department. He has written and co-written hundreds of articles for law enforcement and safety forces magazines, m o s t n o t a b l y L AW a n d ORDER, Tactical Response, Oklahoma State Trooper, F l o r i d a Tro o p e r, K n i v e s Illustrated, The Police Marksman, Counter Terrorism and other magazines.

Mickey (Michele) Davis is an award-winning, Florida-based writer and a u t h o r. H e r y o u n g a d u l t novel, Evangeline Brown and the Cadillac Motel, won the Swiss Prix Chronos for the German translation. She is the wife of a Vietnam Wa r v e t e r a n A r m y officer.

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MEXICAN CRIME CARTELS

By Larry Martines

Thousands of Mexicans protested the country’s raging drug war on Wednesday as dozens of bodies were found in graves near the country’s border with the United States. Demonstrators marched in cities across Mexico, holding signs condemning the wave of killing that has claimed more than 37,000 lives since President Felipe Calderon took office in December 2006 and launched a military-led crackdown against drug cartels.

REUTERS/Carlos Jasso

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he struggle in Mexico that began in 2006 continues unabated. The Mexican government has won victories in the sense that over a dozen major figures in the crime cartels have been captured or killed. Note that I use the term, “Crime Cartels”, instead of the usual “Drug Cartel” term. This is because the very cartels that grew to power behind the smuggling of drugs into Mexico and then into the USA, have branched out into full-blown Mafia style organized crime syndicates.

Drug smuggling is still a major part of business amongst the cartels, but people smuggling, kidnapping, extortion, auto theft/chop shops, receiving stolen property, plus murder for hire, have become huge sources of income.

Insurgency, Crime Cartels, Mafia Or Drug Smuggling Rings: Nomenclature Doesn’t Matter – WHAT MATTERS IS THAT MEXICANS ARE DYING IN RECORD NUMBERS. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called the problem in Mexico an “insurgency.”

President Felipe Calderon has claimed the cartels are behind acts of terrorism.

President Barack Obama says the cartels are not terrorist organizations, nor is there an insurgency in Mexico. I guess the definitions are really with the person with a gun in their face! With now over 40,000 Mexicans killed since 2006, in addition to a smaller number of Americans, I fall on the side of calling the matter a criminal “insurgency” as opposed to a politically motivated one.

Yet, one must also consider that President Calderon is battling the cartels not to keep violence, drugs and other criminal activity from ravaging Mexico, but to keep Mexico from being turned into, as some have called it, a narco-state, or as I see it, a state controlled by very powerful organized crime syndicates. You decide.

In this past few weeks alone, within the time it took me to write this article, according to the M3 Report published by the Border Patrol Association, just one of several sources of my Intel on cartel violence, the crime cartels have killed: • 2-soldiers • 3-Marines • 1- State prison director and 4 prison guards • 1- Mayor and 2 bodyguards • 1-state Governor and 3 bodyguards • 38- Executions of civilians

In addition to a smaller number of Americans, I fall on the side of calling the matter a criminal “insurgency” as opposed to a politically motivated one.

Most of these events occurred in Mexican states along our border.

If one forges deeper into Mexico proper, the number of those killed by the cartels, including the Mexican police, government officials and military, jump dramatically. From Acapulco to Cancun, from the state of Guerrero to Quintana Roo, the battle for cartel turf continues.

Add to this the fact that the cartels have learned for expansion

purposes the value of imposing fear upon a community or nation, and you now have routine decapitations, hanging victims from highway overpasses, and last but not least, adopting symbolic mutilations. It should be noted that according to some captured cartel leaders, the idea of decapitating opponents came from watching the TV media display Al Qaeda execution videos.

Add to this the following examples of “Mutilation Messages”: If a tongue is cut out it means the victim has talked too much. A person who has given up any information on a cartel, no matter how miniscule, has his finger cut off and put into his mouth upon his death. This is because a traitor is known as a “dedo” – a finger. Sometimes fingers are stuck up the rectum of bodies. The meaning is the same: If you are castrated it means that either you have slept with a cartel member’s woman or you have, in the case of a government official, police or the military, become too boastful about battling the cartels. Severed arms mean you stole from your consignment of illegal goods or skimmed profits.

Severed legs mean that you tried to walk away from the cartel. Decapitation, however, is something altogether different. It is a statement of raw power, a warning to all, like the public executions of old. In other words, “we rule here.” These are just a few of the symbolic “messages” the cartels use.

Status Of The Current Crime Cartels In 2006, when the war on the cartels began, there were seven major cartels battling each other for “Plazas” – turf. In 2011 some of

the cartels, like La Familia, have disappeared and a half dozen other smaller cartels, such as the “Knights Templar” and the “Pacifica Cartel”, have appeared. However, the largest of the cartels, the Sinaloa and Los Zetas, still control most of the crime “plazas” in Mexico. “Plaza” is the term for “region” or “turf.” Both the Sinaloa and Los Zetas have even expanded their individually controlled areas into Guatemala and other parts of Central America where combat training camps and people/drug smuggling operations have become operational.

The Tijuana Cartel has been all but swallowed up by the Sinaloans and could be considered a vassal. The Juarez Cartel is reeling under attack by the Sinaloans but has aligned itself with the Zetas. However, its Plaza has shrunk into the city limits of Ciudad Juarez, a city of millions and a major smuggling site into the USA. The Sinaloa Cartel controls the surrounding terrain and is relentless in its attacks against the Juaristas and Zetas. There have even been major population shifts in these regions as refugees from the cartel wars seek safer venues.

truth in this as while the other cartels have suffered losses at all levels in the struggle with the government, the Sinaloans are rarely mentioned as having been caught or disrupted in their organized crime activities.

Only rarely do the Sinaloans get captured or killed by government forces.

syndicate. Also one major gang of Salvadorans - former refugees. Another gang, namely the Barrio Azteca, is headquartered in Ciudad Juarez and works both sides of the border for the Juarez cartel. The operational headquarters of the rest of these gangs reach from San Diego to Chicago, Los Angeles to Vancouver, BC, and from Phoenix to Philadelphia and beyond.

Some have suggested that this could be due to information and significant pressure provided by the U.S. “Task Force 7” stationed in Mexico (see below).

Some Very Important Definitions That Must Be Understood:

One must keep in mind that if the Sinaloa Cartel is “leaking” information on its opponents it can be very useful. On the other hand, if the Sinaloa Cartel, run by the iron hand of Joaquin “Shorty” Guzman, the most wanted man in Mexico by both the Mexican government and our DEA, becomes the sole mega-cartel in Mexico, it will be calling the shots both politically and literally south of the border! It will be a wealthy, well armed shadow government. Membership of “made-men” in the Sinaloa Cartel runs into the thousands. The exact figures are unknown.

Compare this to Los Zetas which has 3,000 plus members trained in both criminal activity and military tactics, and you have a recipe for warfare on a limited scale. Or in cartel terms, “calentado la plaza” – heating up the turf.

If the Sinaloa Cartel, run by the iron hand of Joaquin “Shorty” Guzman, the most wanted man in Mexico by both the Mexican government and our DEA, becomes the sole mega-cartel in Mexico, it will be calling the shots both politically and literally south of the border!

The Gulf Cartel is now a shadow of its former self, controlling solely Vera Cruz and Tampico - for the time being. They too have allied themselves with the Sinaloans as an act of survival, but like the Juarez Cartel, are surrounded by a very militant and ruthless enemy, Los Zetas.

In 2011, the ongoing commentary from captured cartel members is that the Sinaloa Cartel is passing on information to the Mexican authorities regarding where and how to find and eliminate opposing cartel members. There may be some

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The Mexican Government and people are caught in between. Without promised American aid increasing, the government may well find itself soon outgunned and outspent.

Mexican Cartels And The American Gang Connection

According to the National Gang Threat Assessment published by the Department of Justice (Oct. 21, 2011), there are 1.4 million gang members in the USA. In this same report there are 33,000 officially designated gangs in the USA. However, the focus of this article is the gangs within the USA that are operating as ASSOCIATES of the Mexican Cartels.

And there are plenty to go around. Most are made of Chicanos, two are African-American, and there are a couple of Anglo outlaw motorcycle gangs.

Operating along the border are representatives of 32 American homegrown gangs. Plus one gang made up of illegal aliens who have snuck into the USA and organized themselves into a

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1. Prison Gangs – These are hardened members of very organized gangs that initially were organized in state prisons. Originally within California, but now spread across the prisons of the USA….. Most of the membership of Prison gangs are not, I repeat not, in prison.

They “make their bones” there, but return to the streets to carry out the organization’s orders.

They mingle amongst us and are very adept at controlling turf once they have established roots in a given territory. The Mexican Mafia, the first recognized prison gang, as an example, was founded in the late 1950’s in Folsom Prison. It is now the prime mover behind umbrella groups of southern California prison gangs called “Los Surenos” (the Southerners). They are now here in Washoe County (Observed by the author numerous times in 2011. The most recent time was last week.) Bitter opponents of Los Surenos, plus associated to a different Mexican cartel are the Nortenos (Northerners), an umbrella group of northern California prison gangs. (Also seen by this author in Washoe County.)

2. Street Gangs – These are the wannabe prison gang members. They function at the bidding of the more well armed and violent “prison gangs.”

Street gangs are dangerous in their own right and routinely are involved in various crimes throughout the community. They are not “associates” of the cartels, but function as “affiliates” of the prison gangs. Often gang members conduct acts of random or directed violence to gain recognition from the local prison gang establishment.

The Prison Gangs have developed strong ties to various Mexican Cartels for the movement of heroin, methamphedrine, cocaine and marijuana across the USA. These “pandillas” (gangs) have not only set up roots in our major cities, but along those cities and communities that follow our national highway system. According to Mexican law enforcement sources, Reno/Sparks is a one of many “Red’s” (network sites) because of its proximity to I-80.

Add to Sureno and Norteno infiltration, we also have components of MS-13, the Salavadoran gang connected to both the Juarez and Zeta Cartels. A major question arises. How long will it be before our so-called “prison gangs” eventually form heavily armed cartels of their own? No longer dependant on drugs, weapons and other contraband from the Mexican organizations. No longer participating as “associates,” but as equals – partners!

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Back To The Cartels Atlanta has become a major hub for the Zeta cartel. Birmingham, AL, has seen its share of bloodshed due to cartel activity.

Phoenix once led the nation in kidnapping, mostly cartel related.

The Barrio Azteca and La Linea organizations, the muscle for the Juarez cartel have carried out operations deep within the USA. It would appear that as the war between and against the cartels continues in Mexico; these very cartels are fully capable of physically setting up cells within the USA. “Plata o Plomo” (silver or lead), will it permeate US law enforcement and other institutions to the degree it has to Mexican cops?

In summary, weapons continue to flow into the hands of the cartels – and undoubtedly into their associates amongst American prison gangs. The weapons come from Asia, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Africa, the Middle East and Europe…..And, oh yes, the colossal blunder of the ATF acting under the approval of Department of Justice leadership, that passed on over 2,000 assault weapons covertly to the Mexican cartels.

“Fast and Furious.”--One of the worst actions on the part of any federal law enforcement agency in US history and which will one day come back to haunt us as some of these weapons have turned up back on the US side of the border.

The question remains, who can continue the ongoing struggle the longest? Will it be the cartels – including the fighting between each other – or the Mexican government? We have only until the end of 2012 to find out.

TASK FORCE 7: What Role Should The US Play?

This US unit, although relatively small in numbers, has been providing major assistance. The Task Force, exact personnel numbers unknown, is made up of members of the DEA, NSA, DOD and contract police officers from Texas and California. The DEA and NSA provide real time intelligence on the cartels. The DOD has sent Special Forces personnel to train the Mexican military. The State Department has contracted to US law enforcement personnel to train Mexican police in the finer arts of criminal investigation and patrol procedures. American dollars via agreement with the Mexican government are providing the logistics, technology and weapons to combat the cartels.

First, the USG has to increase the size of our Task Force 7 located in Mexico. Second we have to increase our shipments of military and police equipment as promised by agreements signed by President Bush. Note I did not say money, I

said equipment. Cash is fungible and in Mexico dollars disappear instead of getting used for the reasons intended. Third, and most importantly, we have to move regular military, not National Guard, to the border in large numbers and keep them there now that Iraq and Afghanistan needs are apparently over or declining. This movement of our military to the border will allow for the Mexican military to withdraw and get back to fighting the cartels in the interior of the nation. This will have a chilling effect both in reality and psychologically on to the cartels.

By placing Army and Marine regiments along the main smuggling routes we would force the cartels and coyotes to use rougher, more difficult terrain. That would also allow us to concentrate our Border Patrol in specific areas instead of spreading out along a 2,000 mile border. Next, use our military personnel to assist Customs in searching traffic coming north, especially truck and vehicle traffic.

Also we could use them for hunting for the many tunnels along the California side in particular. These have become quite sophisticated routes now and the BP, even aided by the DEA, cannot keep on top of the new ones being built daily.

By cutting off the cartel’s main customer and sources of revenue, the USA, the cartels would become desperate as we make it easier for the Mexican government to root them out and crush them....And in the long run this will hugely disrupt the connections between the Mexican cartels and US prison and

street gangs. Much to our society’s well being.

Call me insensitive, but the thought of a huge Army tank parked next to every official border crossing point - with its cannon pointing towards Mexico, of course - gives me an immeasurable thrill.

As we enter 2012, there very well may be some “mission creep.”

Calderon’s term as president is over the end of this year. Our ability to crush the cartels may end if the PAN (National Action Party) loses power and the PRI returns.

The military will be returning to the barracks and Mexico will return to 2005 when government corruption and drug running across our southern border became the accepted norm. However, in this scenario it will be on steroids!

The US may find out that putting regular troops, not temporary National Guard personnel, on the border, may be the only option left.

(Oh yes, for those who may be unfamiliar with the Posse Comitatus Act – check Article 15). As the military withdraws from Iraq and draws down in Afghanistan, the US may feel that it has the manpower to engage more fully with the rising insurgency (or whatever you want to call it) in Mexico.

This will, however, play against “intervention fatigue” in this country, a growing sense that America has tried too hard and for too long to remake foreign societies. The question for our readers to decide is this: How serious is the threat to the US represented by the vastly expanding cartels in Mexico and what can or should we be prepared to do about it?

About the Author Lawrence Martines M.S. is a former director of Homeland Security, State of Nevada, is a member of the International Police Association, a member of the International Counterterrorism and Security Association (IACSP) and a member of the AFIO (Association of Former Intelligence Officers). Mr. Martines is retired from the Los Angeles County Sheriff Department.

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Hizballah:

A Profile Of One Of The World’s Most Lethal Terrorist Organizations

By Dr. Joshua Sinai

Lebanon’s Hezbollah supporters beat themselves during a Muharram procession to mark Ashura in Beirut’s suburbs, December 6, 2011. REUTERS/ Karim Sharif

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izballah (“Party of God”) was established in 1982 by pro-Iranian Shi’a Muslim clerics and militia leaders following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in June of that year in Operation Peace for Galilee.

At the time, Palestinian terrorist organizations had created a ‘statewithin-a-state’ in Lebanon, which threatened Israel’s security along its border with Lebanon. At the same time, there was also a political awakening by the country’s disenfranchized Shi’a community. With the last census held in Lebanon in 1944, the country’s Shi’a community had vastly increased its proportion of the population by the early 1980s, which was not reflected in its apportionment of power in the political system, which was dominated by the Christian Maronite and Sunni political parties.

Moreover, as a Lebanese-based Shi’a organization, Hizballah was also an ideological outgrowth of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the theocratic preachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini.

Hizballah traces its origins to several small Shi’a organizations in Lebanon, particularly the Islamic Amal militia, which was established by Hussein Musawi. In 1982, Musawi and some 500 members of Islamic Amal had joined forces with other Lebanese Shi’a groups at the instigation of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, whose units had deployed to Lebanon in 1982, to establish Hizballah as a new umbrella Shi’a militia.

(1) Over the years, Hizballah evolved from a sectarian militia into a full-fledged political and military organization.

Hizballah is also known as the Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, and Organization of the Oppressed on Earth.

Hizballah is also known as the Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, and Organization of the Oppressed on Earth.

In the 1980s, Musawi served as the organization’s leader, becoming secretary general in May 1991. He was assassinated in February 1992, when Israeli helicopter gunships attacks his convoy in South Lebanon.(2) It was then that Sheikh Has-

san Nasrallah, the organization’s current leader, became secretary-general.

Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah was Hizballah’s spiritual leader, which he also helped establish. He died of a liver hemorrhage on July 4, 2010, at the age of 75. By late 2011 it was unclear if he would ever be replaced, given Nasrallah’s own stature as the organization’s not only political, but spiritual leader.

Today, Hizballah follows the religious guidance of Khomeini’s successor, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Hizballah is closely allied with the Iranian government and serves as its agent in Lebanon, rarely pursuing its own path. Until the outbreak of the current civil war in Syria, although it does not share the Syrian government’s political ideology, Hizballah--like its Iranian patron--continues to favor the continuation in power of the Damascus government and promotes Syria’s objectives in Lebanon.

Hizballah’s objectives call for establishing a Shi’a theocracy in Lebanon, promoting greater Iranian leadership in the region, destroying Israel and supporting rejectionist Palestinian factions that oppose any Palestinian Authority peace negotiations with the Jewish state, supporting its co-religionists in Iraq, and eliminating Western influences in the Middle East.

Hizballah first gained international notoriety in October 1983 when one of its suicide bombers attacked the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Marines. Other well known attacks include the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. It is alleged that Hizballah’s Saudi Arabia wing carried out the attack on Khobar Towers in 1996.(3) Over the years, Hizballah has been transformed from its origins as a sectarian militia into a sophisticated and complex organization that simultaneously engages in political and military activities in Lebanon, including providing extensive socioeconomic and educational services to the country’s Shi’a community. Operating in a “weak state”, with Syrian acquiesence, Hizballah has succeeded in exerting virtually unchallenged control over regions of Lebanon--especially parts of Beirut and southern Lebanon-which made it a ‘state within a state.’

The full extent of Hizballah’s ‘state-within-a-state’ apparatus was revealed during the July 2006 fighting with Israel, when Hizballah’s well-trained guerrilla fighters fired hundreds of rockets into Israel’s northern region Although a United Nations-led peacekeeping force was deployed in southern Lebanon to prevent a renewed conflagration, Hizballah is considered more influential than ever before in Lebanon’s political system, not only wielding veto power over government decisions, but enhancing its military infrastructure through upgraded rockets and fortified tunnels.(4) A negotiated prisoner exchange agreement between Hizballah and Israel in mid-June 2008 held some promise of easing tensions between the two adversaries.

Tensions, however, continued unabated between Hizballah and Israel during the next three years.

In a major political development, on June 30, 2011 the Special Tribunal for Lebanon established to investigate the death of the former prime minister Rafik Hariri issued arrest warrants for four senior Hizballah members.

On July 3, Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah rejected the indictment and denounced the tribunal as a plot against the party, vowing that the named persons would not be arrested under any circumstances.

Political Component Since the early 1990s when Hizballah began contesting elections to Lebanon’s parliament, it has become increasingly integrated into the country’s government. In 2008, the group held 14 seats in Lebanon’s National Assembly. It is also represented in the Cabinet.

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Hizballah’s political influence increased following the May 21, 2008 agreement with the government, in which its veto power over government decisions was recognized.(5) In August 2008, the country’s parliament approved a national unity cabinet, giving Hizballah and its allies veto power with eleven of thirty cabinet seats. In the June 2009 parliamentary elections, Hizballah lost to Lebanon’s ruling, pro-Western “March 14” coalition, which was reflected in the reduction of its cabinet seats to two.

The Majlis al-Shura (known as Shura Council – “Consultative Council”), is the group’s highest governing body. It has been led by Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah since February 1992.

The Council is comprised of nine members - seven Lebanese and two Iranians, who represent Iran’s interests within Hizballah.(6) The Shura Council consists of five “councils”.(7) These are: the Jihad Council (responsible for terrorist operations in Lebanon and worldwide), the Executive Council (responsible for social welfare programs, education, as well as operational and terrorist activities); the Political Council (responsible for parliamentary and other political activities, such as foreign diplomacy); the Judiciary Council (responsible for administering the judicial system in Hizballah-controlled areas, such as Shi’a neighborhoods and villages), and a Political Advisor (responsible for promoting the organization’s policies and interests outside Lebanon with other organizations and parties).(8) Hizballah’s political wing runs a variety of social programs, including schools and hospitals, augmenting those of the state.

Political Leaders Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, a renowned Shi’a cleric, was Hizballah’s spiritual leader until his death in July 2010. Although he helped establish Hizballah, he was not considered a “technical” member of the organization, as he portrayed himself as being “above party politics”. Fadlallah was born in 1935 in the Shi’ite holy city of Najaf, Iraq (where his father was a religious scholar), and moved to Lebanon in 1966, where he gained fame for his fiery sermons. A strong backer of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Fadlallah called upon Lebanon’s Shi’a community to emulate the Iranian Revolution by supporting Hizballah’s mission in Lebanon.

Hizballah’s leader, Sheikh Nasrallah (51 years old in 2011) began his career as the organization’s military commander, but adding to his “gravitas” were his religious credentials, having studied in the centers of Shi’a theology in Iran and Iraq. He succeeded Musawi as Hizballah secretary general in 1992. A charismatic leader, Nasrallah rarely speaks in public, preferring to broadcast his speeches on a giant screen, while delivering them from a hiding place for security concerns.(9) Naim Qassem is Hizballah’s Deputy Secretary General. He was one of the organization’s original founders and often appears as Hizballah’s spokesman.

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Hashem Safi al-Din is Chairman of the Executive Council.(10) Mohammed Raad is head of Hizballah’s Parliamentary Caucas. He is one of the organization’s founders and an important political leader. He heads the group’s Political Council and is the leader of Hizballah’s contingent in Parliament (having first been elected in 1992). He also sometimes acts as a spokesman for Hizballah.

Hussein Naboulsi, Hizballah’s information and media officer, is considered to be the organization’s “Webmaster”.(11)

Media Apparatus As a political organization, Hizballah make extensive use of print, radio, television and Internet media. It publishes its own newspaper, al-Intiqad, operates its own radio station, alNour, and the television station, al-Manar, and various Internet sites. The group’s Internet forums and chat rooms are highly interactive, with Hizballah officials exchanging information with participants. The audience for these media outlets range from the local Lebanese population (both Shi’a and non-Shi’a), the broader Middle East and, in the case of al-Manar and the Internet, a global audience.

Military Component

Hizballah is considered one of the world’s foremost capable guerrilla armies. It is estimated to have several thousand members, including several hundred terrorist operatives.(12)

Military Apparatus Hizballah maintains security and military departments, which are run by the Shura Council’s Jihad and Executive councils.

The ‘Engagement and Coordination Unit’ functions as its do-

Hizballah has an extensive military infrastructure, which is supported by Iranian Revolutionary Guards that are permanently deployed in Lebanon.

mestic policing apparatus, while a ‘preventive security apparatus’, provides security protection for Hizballah politicians.(13) Hizballah’s military wing is known as the Islamic Resistance Units,(14) and was run until his killing in February 2008 by Imad Mughniyeh. Also called the ‘special operations unit’, Mughniyeh’s military wing operates regionally and internationally.(15) It runs a branch called “Unit 1800,” which coordinates Hizballah’s assistance to Palestinian rejectionist groups, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, in the West Bank and Gaza.(16) Hizballah has an extensive military infrastructure, which is supported by Iranian Revolutionary Guards that are permanently deployed in Lebanon. Prior to the July 2006 war with Israel, its arsenal reportedly included more than 20,000 rockets and advanced anti-tank missiles.(17) Recruitment into Hizballah’s security and military apparatus is primarily derived from the country’s Shi’a community, especially clans associated with Hizballah,(18) but in a recent development, the group’s websites have drawn recruits from outside the Shi’a community.

Military Leaders Sheikh Nassrallah had served as Hizballah’s military chief until January 2008 when Sheikh Naim Qassem, the organization’s deputy secretarygeneral, reportedly took over those duties.(19) Given the organization’s secretive nature, however, this cannot be confirmed.(20)

Until his assassination in a Damascus suburb on February 12, 2008, 46-year old Imad Fayez Mughniyeh (also known as Hajj Radwan) was considered the head of Hizballah’s military wing. It is assumed, although not officially announced, that Israeli agents had detonated the bomb which killed Mughniyeh and his bodyguard in the car blast. Mughniya was believed to be behind a series of attacks against American and Israeli forces in Lebanon, including the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut and the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847.(21) In March 1984, Mughniyeh was reported to have kidnapped and killed William Buckley, the head of the CIA’s station in Beirut.(22) Other operations included the March 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 29 people, and the July 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in the same city, that killed 86 people.(23)

In recent times, Mughniyeh’s special operations unit allegedly operated in Iraq, with his senior officers working with Iran’s al-Quds Force to train Iraqi Shi’a militiamen in insurgent warfare.(24) Mughniyeh was also reported to have managed Hizballah’s war in Israel in summer 2006.(25) n his later years, Mughniyeh shuttled between Beirut, Iran and Syria, where he was provided safe haven in Damascus.(26)

Location/Area Of Operation Hizballah operates in Beirut’s southern suburbs, the Bekka Valley, and southern Lebanon, but it also has support cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia. Although Hizballah had reduced its overt military presence in southern Lebanon in accordance with UNSCR 1701, it likely maintains weapons caches there.

Ahmad Ibrahim al-Mughassil is reputed to be Hizballah’s Military Commander. Born in Saudi Arabia, Al-Mughassil was the alleged head of the military wing of the Saudi Hizballah and has been indicted by the U.S. Government for the June 5, 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers U.S. military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

Ali Atwa (a.k.a. Ammar Mansour Bouslim, Hassan Rostom Salim) is alleged to be a senior member of Hizballah’s military arm.

Hassan Izz al-Din is allegedly a senior member of Hizballah’s terrorist arm. He is also believed to be a member of Hizballah’s Political Council and plays a role in the organization’s media operations.

Shi’ite Muslims march at a re-enactment of the battle of Kerbala during a rally marking Arbain in Baalbeck, in the Bekaa valley, January 14, 2012. Arbain falls 40 days after the Shi’ite holy day of Ashura. Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah dismissed on Saturday a United Nations call for his militant anti-Israel movement to disarm, saying it was determined to maintain a military capacity to defend Lebanon.

REUTERS/ Ahmad Shalha

Funding

Hizballah’s social services and political apparatuses are based in the Beirut area.

External Aid

Iran and Syria are Hizballah’s primary sources of external assistance. Hizballah receives training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran. Iran reportedly provided Hizballah with an estimated $100 million annually, including arms supplies.

(27) Iran’s embassy in Beirut maintains close contact with Hizballah’s leadership.(28) Units of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ ‘Quds Brigades’ (Jerusalem Brigades) who are deployed in Lebanon, provide training and other forms of support, including military materiel, to Hizballah. Hizballah operatives train at Iranian military installations.

that the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad might fall.

(30) It was unlikely, however, that a new Sunni-dominated Syrian government would cut off ties with Hizballah because of its close ties with the Sunni Palestinian Hamas organization and the domination of Iraq by that country’s Shi’a majority.

To supplement Iranian financial assistance, Hizballah generates income from private donations from Shi’a communities in Lebanon and worldwide, Islamic charities, and profits from legal and illegal businesses. Hizballah also generates income from its Shia websites, which call for donating funds to its charities, such as The Islamic al-Emdad Aid Association – Lebanon.(31) Hizballah’s

Units of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ ‘Quds Brigades’ (Jerusalem Brigades) who are deployed in Lebanon, provide training and other forms of support, including military materiel, to Hizballah.

Hizballah operatives train at Iranian military installations.

Until the recent uprisings against the Syrian regime by elements of the country’s Sunni majority, Damascus provided the group with diplomatic, political, and logistical support, especially as the primary transshipment point for Iranian military materiel to Hizballah.(29) Hizballah avoided talking publicly about Syria’s uprising, even going out of its way to deny claims

by Syrian activists that Hizballah fighters as well as Iranians were involved in helping Syrian security forces to crush anti-regime demonstrations and kill protesters.

In Summer 2011, Hizballah moved hundreds of its longrange Iranian-produced Zilzal, Fajr 3 and Fajr 4 missiles from storage sites in Syria to bases in eastern Lebanon, due to concern

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illicit income is derived from “international crime, including narcotics, counterfeiting, stolen goods, smuggling and fraud.”(32) Hizballah obtains funding for projects for its Shi’a constituency in Lebanon from funds allocated by Lebanon’s government, as part of its political involvement on the national and municipal levels.(33)

Relations with Palestinian Groups Hizballah provides military assistance to several Palestinian terrorist organizations, most notably Hamas, its longstanding ally, such as weapons, explosives, training, funding, and guidance, as well as overt political support.(34) In conclusion, the great unknown about Hizballah is whether it has made the wrong bet in backing the Assad regime in Syria when much of the youth in the Middle East is striving to reform their own societies, although the final results may be more theocratic and oppressive regimes. Certainly, Hizballah is no longer viewed as the party of the oppressed, the underdog, or the revolutionaries, but as a tool of the Iranian regime which continues to oppress its own reform movements. Nevertheless, given Lebanon’s weak and fragile political system, Hizballah will continue to exert its domination over that society to the detriment of any prospect for political or economic development in that geographically beautiful, highly cultured, resource rich, but longsuffering country.

About the Author

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards commander Rahim Safavi (L) welcomes Hezbollah deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem during the opening ceremony of a religious meeting in Tehran August 18, 2007. REUTERS/ Stringer (IRAN)

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Dr. Joshua Sinai is an Associate Professor/Research, specializing in counterterrorism studies, at Virginia Tech (National Capital Region), in Arlington, Va. He can be reached at: jbsinai@vt.edu.

R e f e re n c e s f o r t h i s article can be found on page 66 of this issue.

Chinook Down

By Thomas B. Hunter

Members of a West Coast-based Navy SEAL team participate in infiltration and exfiltration training during a Northern Edge 2009 training exercise. An Army aviation unit transported the SEALS in CH-47D Chinook helicopters, performing two-wheel landings atop mountainous terrain in the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex. (U.S. Marine Corps photo/Lance Cpl. Ryan Rholes/Released)

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H

unting The Enemy

Early in the first week of August, U.S. military intelligence obtained information indicating the likely presence of high-ranking Taliban leader Qari Tahir in Wardak Province, Afghanistan. Specifically, this information indicated that Tahir had recently taken command of insurgent forces in the nearby Tangi Valley.

Back at a forward operating base (FOB) in nearby Logar Province, the special operations task force commander realized the opportunity to capture or kill a high value target (HVT) like Tahir was likely a fleeting one. Given the fluid nature of guerilla warfare and the possibility that Tahir might, like so many Taliban commanders before him, simply disappear into the night, the SOTF commander ordered a contingent of his forces, built around a U.S. Army Ranger platoon, to capture or kill Tahir and his comrades.

To bolster their attack capabilities, the Ranger unit was supported by two CH-47D Chinook helicopters and two AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. Also included in the support package were an AC-130 gunship, and an unspecified complement of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft.

The two Chinooks would airlift the Ranger assault package to landing zone near the compound believed to house Qari Tahir. Once disembarked, they would then make their way his compound, clear it of resistance, take prisoners (if possible), and gather any pieces of intelligence within the compound itself.

Just as with many such plans, however, this one quickly deviated from the script. When the assault team arrived via Chinooks (these two having then immediately returned to the FOB to refuel and await order to return and extract the Ranger team. As they did so, however, the Apache gunships radioed that they had engaged enemy forces departing the compound on foot, killing at least six. A second group of Taliban was taken under surveillance by the ISR aircraft keeping an eye on the assault phase as it progressed, watching as they joined with additional gunmen to form a growing force that represented an ever-growing threat to the Ranger team.

It was at this time that the decision was made to issue a warning order to insert the IRF by helicopter, thus providing a much-needed addition of firepower to contend with the new threat posed by the Taliban.

The Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) It was at this time that the decision was made to increase the size and firepower of the IRF, from a relatively small group, to one made up of some of the

most elite warriors in the secretive Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Thus, after the last minute additions, the IRF was ultimately comprised of 15 members of the Navy’s elite counterterrorism unit SEAL Team Six’s Gold Squadron (the team’s elite assault element), five Naval Special Operations support personnel, three U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Airmen (one Combat Controller and two Pararescuemen), seven Afghan commandos, one Afghan civilian interpreter, and a U.S. military working dog.

Contrary to early reports, and worth correcting here, is that none of the 15 SEALs attached to the IRF – though members of Team Six - were among those that took part in Operation Geronimo, the mission undertaken four months earlier to kill Osama bin Ladin. This factual recounting was recently provided by long time SEAL veteran CWO3 Don Mann, as recounted in his autobiography, Inside SEAL Team Six (Little Brown and Co., New York, 2011). The men were, however, veterans of combat in Afghanistan and did belong to the Team Six contingent operating in-country (and on covert missions across the familiar borders).

Typically, a combined JSOC team such as comprised the IRF would typically be transported by the U.S. Army’s elite 160 th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), better known as the Night Stalkers in the highly advanced MH-47 Chinook, or several MH-60 Black Hawks.

However, in this instance, conventional Army pilots, with hundreds of hours of prior flight time, flew the standard Chinooks. The reasoning for utilizing the CH-47 over the MH-47 is unknown, though some have speculated that there were simply no available 160th SOAR aircraft available at the time and location of the operation.

As it was, the order was given to embark the entire IRF into one Chinook, owing directly to the fact that the IRF commander wanted to “mass troops quickly” and to mitigate the increased risk to a second helo approaching the landing zone. Boarding completed, the two IRF Chinooks were ordered to lift off and travel to a known landing zone, albeit one that had been studied and approved for another mission, (though it was never used for that mission).

The SOTF commander ordered a contingent of his forces, built around a U.S. Army Ranger platoon, to capture or kill Tahir and his comrades.

A Shot In The Dark

Rescue And Recovery

As they neared the designated landing zone, both Chinooks began to circle at a pre-determined hold point to await the lead helicopter’s return. At this time, the Chinook ferrying the IRF forces descended to approximately 100150 feet and slowed to approximately 50 knots (58 mph) and slowly approached the landing zone from the northwest. As it did do, a previously unseen group of Taliban fighters fired two or three RPGs at the large, slow target presented by the now-vulnerable helicopter’s slow approach to the LZ. At that time, the fighters fired two or three RPGs from the tower of a two-story mud-brick building from a distance of approximately 220 meters south of the CH-47D.

Immediately, following the helicopter’s fiery impact, the Rangerled assault force was ordered to move to crash site, both to provide a security perimeter and to search for survivors. While some friendly remains were located, secondary explosions coming from the burning Chinook hampered the rescue effort. This caused the Rangers to temporarily suspend both rescue and recovery actions.

The first RPG missed; however, the second struck the Chinook in the aft rotor assembly and exploded. This caused a catastrophic chain reaction in which a major section of the rotor blade separated from the helicopter. Immediately, the aircraft spun violently, the main fuselage dropped vertically into a dry creek bed, followed by an immense explosion of fuel and ammunition, killing all on board.

Those at the crash site reported back to command that the severity of the impact and ensuing fire was of such violence, that rescue was out of the question, and the mission would, unhappily, be downgraded to recovery. Other teams, including a 20-man Pathfinder element, linked up at the crash site to assist in site security and recovery of remains from the wreckage. Eight hours after the crash, the Ranger Platoon Leader accounted for all 38 friendly remains, including the military working dog.

Yet, despite the successful recovery of human and animal remains, the job remained to gather and remove the aircraft wreckage.

Complicating this effort was a flash flood that spread the wreckage 200 meters or more down the creek bed. Nonetheless, the combined teams of U.S. personnel (which had been bolstered by yet more U.S. military personnel) announced the cleanup phase complete by 09 August.

Nowhere To Run In the days that immediately followed the shoot down, retaliation against those who conducted the attack became of the highest priority to local JSOC and SOCOM commanders, operators, and planners. Surprisingly, the perpetrator and his small band of fighters proved relatively easy to locate, given the physical; and electronic dragnet that has been thrown up at the time of the initial attack by the Rangers.

Utilizing communications intercepts and human intelligence reporting, a strike package consisting of F-16 fighter-bombers launched with the mission of destroying the Taliban team responsible for the attack. The air package, armed with accurate and timely intelligence, was directed to the location of the gunmen and conducted a surgical strike on their location. The Department of Defense, just hours after the airstrike, announced the killing of at least 10 Taliban, to include the gunman who fired the fatal RPG, as well as wanted local Taliban leader Mullah Mohibullah.

The Investigation In the days that immediately followed the shoot down, retaliation against those who conducted the attack became of the highest priority to local JSOC and SOCOM commanders, operators, and planners.

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With the reprisal attack successful, attention was then turned to the release of the results of an investigation undertaken into the shootdown.

Initiated shortly after confirmation of the downing of the Chinook reached CENTCOM Commander General James N. Mattis, a 1,200-page classified report was delivered to the general, with a redacted, unclassified summary also released to the public.

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The CENTCOM crash investigation team reported the following conclusions: The mission, including the tactics and resources employed in its execution, were consistent with previous U.S. special operations missions. The strike forces selected to execute the mission were appropriate. The CH47D Chinook was shot down with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fired by a Taliban fighter as the helicopter neared its landing zone.

In short, the investigators found no fault, on any account, in the execution of the IRF mission to aid the Rangers, then under heavy attack and in need of assistance.

Yet, while we cannot know what faults, if any, are contained within the still classified 1,200-page report, there are some questions that have reasonably arisen given the magnitude of the loss of highly trained special operations personnel and those supporting them as part of the IRF team.

Conclusion Shortly after the crash, memorial services took place around the world to mourn the loss of the men killed in downing of the Chinook. At scores of military bases abroad and on the home front back in the United States, many services included praise for the courage and patriotism of the brave warriors who died while unhesitatingly attempting to come to the aid of their comrades, who were, at the time, engaged in desperate combat with the enemy.

In doing so, these men joined the noblest examples of America’s fighting men and women who would lose their lives attempting to bring freedom and security to the most lawless and dangerous corners of the world.

About the Author Thomas B. Hunter is an analyst and frequent contributor to The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security Int’l.. For a list of the fallen, please go to our sister website at: http://www. specialoperations.com/article. php?record=1326388862

The IACSP Q & A With Ronald Kessler, Author Of

The Secrets Of The FBI

I

n Ronald Kessler’s new book, columnist and chief Washington correspondent for Newsmax.

The Secrets of the FBI, he reveals com. operational details about the Mr. Kessler was interviewed by FBI’s previously secret Tactical Paul Davis, an online columnist Operation teams. Kessler states (Threatcon) and a contributing editor to the Journal. that the TacOps teams have prevented a new 9/11. Kessler IACSP: How did you receive appears to be unlimited also writes about the accomplishments what access to FBI officials and have and abuses of legendary FBI director J. those officials discussed with subjects and cases previEdgar Hoover, and he reveals new and you ously not shared with other fascinating facts about the FBI’s most journalists for your book The notable criminal, counterespionage and Secrets of the FBI? counterterrorism cases.

Kessler: I have a track record Kessler is a veteran journalist and the author of 18 other books on the Secret Service, the CIA and the FBI. Formerly a reporter for the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post, Kessler is a

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of telling it like it is. When they do a good job, I say that, and when they don’t, I say that.

One of my books led to the

dismissal of FBI Director William Sessions over his abuses (The FBI: Inside the World’s Most Powerful Law Enforcement Agency). They appreciate that I know the territory and I am honestly interested in how things work, and not just major revelations. So when it came to revealing how the FBI breaks into homes and offices to plant bugging devices without getting caught, they recognized that it was a good story for the FBI. At the same time, some agents are raising their eyebrows. They still can’t believe that the FBI gave me this material and it was all approved by FBI Director Bob Mueller.

IACSP: These break-ins

are legal, as opposed to illegal “black bag jobs” break-ends in the past, I should mention here.

Kessler: Right.

IACSP: The section on the

FBI’s Tactical Operations - TacOps - was one of the most interesting parts of The Secrets of the FBI. Can you tell our readers what TacOps are all about and what the operations entail?

Kessler: TacOps is probably the most secret technique in the FBI.

IACSP: Not anymore.

Kessler: Right. TacOps per-

forms court-authorized breakins to plant bugging devices in homes and offices of terrorists, mafia figures, and even embassies. It is used in almost all high profile cases. They also look into computers and make copies of hard drives. Several weeks before the break-in they conduct surveillance of the premises and determine who goes in and who goes out. On the night of the break-in they will have agents watch these people at their homes and make sure they don’t

go back to the premises, and if they do, the agents will divert them. They’ll stage a phony traffic accident or issue them a ticket while dressed as police officers. They might open a fire hydrant in the area so no one can go back. They also take a photo of any dog that might be on the premises. They show the photo to a veterinarian who is on contract and he prescribes just the right amount of tranquilizer to shoot into the dog with a dart

which they then drape over the front of the house. They work behind that tarp to defeat the locks and alarm systems.

IACSP: If I read this in a

novel or saw it in a movie, I might find it unbelievable. Can you tell us about some TacOps success stories?

Kessler: One success story was the terrorist who wanted to blow up subways in New York

One success story was the terrorist who wanted to blow up subways in New York City.

They broke into his car and copied the hard drive and that led to his arrest.

gun before the break-in. They wake up the dog at the end of the break-in with another shot.

They will bring their own dust in case they disturb any dust on a coffee table or desk top and they will replace it with their own dust. If they are going to break into a home, let’s say, they may create a phony bush and two agents will hold this phony bush and walk slowly towards the home’s front door, concealing them from any bystanders in the middle of the night.

IACSP: Very clever. Like something you read in a spy novel or see in a movie.

Kessler: They will take a photo of the front of the house and blow it up into a huge tarp,

City. They broke into his car and copied the hard drive and that led to his arrest. They also planted bugs in the apartment of the terrorist in Dallas who planned to blow up former President George W. Bush’s home there. The terrorist had two roommates and they had to make sure the roommates weren’t there when they did the break-in. A lot of the mafia cases were broken this way.

For example, they planted bugs in John Gotti’s club. In Rhode Island, they recorded a mafia induction ceremony where they pricked the finger and swore omerta, silence upon pain of death. This was the first time that the FBI had documented how the mafia actually works.

IACSP: Any major failures?

Kessler: There have been some close calls. There was a problem involving FBI technical agents who are not as experienced as TacOps agents in Cincinnati. They put GPS tracking devices under a car in the middle of the night and the drug dealer who owned the car saw them out of his apartment window. He came out with a weapon and would not put it down after they said they were FBI and the agents killed him.

That was a big tragedy. In another case, two TacOps agents were planting bugs in a mafia apartment used for hot jobs. A hit job was being planned and the surveillance team thought they knew where the hit man was, but it turned out he was about to enter the apartment.

The agents heard the key in the lock and they jumped into the bathroom and pretended as if they belonged there. One of the agents got behind the shower curtain with his weapon drawn. The other agent turned on the water in the sink, took off his shirt and when the hit man came in, the FBI agent said “what the f*** are you doing here?” And at the end the hit man laughed and said don’t forget to lock up behind you.

IACSP: This can be very dangerous work.

Kessler: Yes, tremendous risks. Sometimes they will use all kinds of stratagems.

To bug a mafia apartment in New York, they may introduce static on the guy’s telephone line and he’ll call for repair service. Of course, it’s the FBI who answers and says we’ll be right over. They go over with telephone company trucks and telephone company

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uniforms and they fix the line, but meanwhile they put a bug in the phone. The operation is centered at a building called the Engineering Research Facility in Quantico, Virginia, near the FBI Academy. They also have a totally secret off-site facility, disguised as an industrial company in Virginia, where the TacOps teams operate from. There are seven teams and each team has about ten agents. They fly around the country breaking into homes and offices.

IACSP: You mentioned embassy break-ins. I’m surprised the FBI admitted that they broke into embassies, even if they are court-sanctioned.

Kessler: That was the one thing they would not discuss in interviews, but I was able to develop that. This is the most delicate and sensitive operation of all, because you are up against some of the top intelligence agencies in the world.

IACSP: You also write about J. Edgar Hoover in your book.

One of the things discussed was his “secret files.” Did he truly have secret files and did he use them to blackmail, or pressure, politicians? Some believe that was the key to his longevity as the director.

Kessler: The files were the secret to his longevity as director, almost 48 years. He would compile essentially “dirt” on members of Congress, presidents, as well as celebrities, and he would make sure they knew he had that information.

I document that, quoting an administrative aide to Senator Carl Haydon who described just how an FBI agent approached him and said we

understand you’re having an affair with this woman. He was married, but he torpedoed the whole effort by saying I hope you have photos because I want to show the senator.

I also quote the head of the Washington field office at the time, John McDermott. He said, on the record, “Yes that’s exactly what we do. We compiled information on members of Congress to be used to make sure we got what we wanted and that Hoover kept his job.”

Hoover was more powerful than presidents. Presidents were afraid to fire him. Hoover also used this information to titillate presidents and that was another little secret to his remaining in power.

IACSP: In all fairness, though, despite his abuses of power, Hoover did create what is considered to be the finest law enforcement agency in the world. Would you agree?

Kessler: I think of him as half-monster and half-patriot, because he did establish this great organization that was technically advanced at the time, with fingerprint files, filing systems and the laboratory.

He prohibited brutality, which was very common among police agencies. He would even require that suspects be read their rights, long before the Miranda court decision. But as time went on, he became more and more of a tyrant. He would engage in these abuses, ranging from illegal wiretapping, illegal break-ins, keeping files on members of Congress, political surveillance, to personal abuse of FBI funds. He basically had the FBI maintain his home.

He also had FBI agents write his book, which he collected royalties on.

IACSP: What did you think of Clint Eastwood’s film bio of Hoover, J. Edgar?

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Kessler: I thought they missed an opportunity to tell a really exciting story. The film lacked tension. I did think it was pretty accurate in terms in balancing the good and the bad.

IACSP: I have not yet seen the film, but I know that a lot of current and retired FBI agents are not happy with the portrayal of Hoover in a dress.

They also didn’t like that he kissed Clyde Tolson. You state in your book that Hoover was in a “spousal” relationship with Tolson. What did you mean by that expression?

Kessler: We don’t know if he was gay, but he spent all his free time with Clyde Tolson, his deputy. He would have lunch and dinner with him almost every day, they would go on vacations together, and Hoover left Tolson his entire estate, valued in today’s dollars at $3 million dollars. When someone has a relationship like that with a man, that’s what I call a spousal relationship. It summarizes the closeness. He could have been gay and suppressed it, or gay and in denial, or he could have had relations with Tolson. We don’t know.

IACSP: There are those who say he would not engage organized crime because he was corrupted by them. Why do you believe Hoover was hesitant to fight organized crime?

Kessler: Hoover didn’t go after the mafia or politicians because he wanted to keep his job. The mafia controlled whole cities and controlled members of Congress. Keeping his job was the most important thing to him.

IACSP: I thought your book The Secrets of the FBI was very interesting and informative. Thank you for speaking to us.

A Look Back At The Vietnam War And The Lessons Learned

For Iraq, Afghanistan And The War On Terrorism

By Paul Davis

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n his syndicated column published on the anniversary of the 1975 fall of South Vietnam, retired Marine Lt Colonel Oliver North took note of the many commentators who offered parallels between the Vietnam War and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In response, North wrote about the dissimilarity between the wars.

“In Vietnam, U.S. troops and our allies faced nearly a quarter-million conscripted but well-trained, -disciplined and -equipped NVA regulars and upward of 100,000 highly organized Viet Cong insurgents from 1966 onward,” North explained.

North pointed out that the North Vietnamese Army launched multiple major campaigns against American and South Vietnamese troops in accord with orders issued by Hanoi and the communist army which was supported by the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Warsaw Pact.

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“The Republic of Vietnam didn’t succumb to an insurgency 35 years ago this week,” North wrote. “ It was invaded by the army of a hostile neighbor. None of that is happening in the shadows of the Hindu Kush -- yet.”

But North did point out one very important similarity between Vietnam and Afghanistan; a parallel promise of withdrawing American troops and assistance.”

North stated that the Vietnam War wasn’t lost in the paddies or triple-

canopy mountains of Southeast Asia.

“Vietnam was lost in the corridors of power in our own nation’s capital.

That never should happen again.”

As many commentators continue to offer comparisons between the Vietnam War and our current conflicts, it might be good to take a look back at the Vietnam War. To learn more about the Vietnam War, one can start with a coffeetable size book called The Vietnam War: A Chronology of War (Universe Publishing).

Edited by Vietnam veteran and retired U.S. Army Colonel Raymond K Bluhm Jr., the book offers a detailed day-by-day history of the significant Army, Navy, Marine Corp, Coast Guard and Air Force events from the Vietnam War. The time-line goes from the pre-war role of military advisors to the 1975 fall of Saigon.

There are also essays in this encyclopedic account of the history of the Vietnam War, as well as original photos and art from the collections of all four services and military artists. Senator James Webb, a Vietnam veteran and novelist, wrote the forward to the book.

“It was a personal goal of mine to give, as far as the services were concerned, a proper recognition for their role,” Bluhm explained. “In the case of the Navy, for example, I tried to show the unconventional warfare as much as the conventional. The over the horizon ships as well as the sampan sailors and the SEALs and the Brown Water Navy and all of that. We tried to bring that in to show the role of all the services. The Navy, many times, is not mentioned at all in other Vietnam books, except for the SEALs,” Bluhm, a military historian and author who retired from the Army in 1993 after more than 30 years as a Regular Army infantry officer in staff, command and international assignments in the U.S., Asia and Europe, went on to state that he also wanted to satisfy veterans, as there is a good deal of disinformation and misinformation on the Internet and myths and rumors have built up over the years. Bluhm also stated that books have been published that

have misled veterans as to what really went on during the war.

“A veteran knows what occurred, as an infantry guy I would say, in front of my foxhole, but I don’t necessarily know what happened two foxholes away,” Bluhm said. “Nor do I know why it happened. What was going on? Why was I there in that foxhole at that particular time?

Raymond K Bluhm

Bluhm said he wanted to educate the veteran and make them proud of their service, but not paint everything with rosy eyeglasses.

“I felt and I feel strongly today that the Vietnam War was justified and legitimate and a morally correct war,” Bluhm said.

“The war did not turn out well, but that was beyond the veterans’ control. Those were decisions made far higher than our pay grades.”

as to what was happening down at the lowest level.” Bluhm said he offered events chronologically as he wanted to show the decision flow. As Bluhm explained; Decision “A” came out of something that happened previously. One can see how things evolved.

When asked what were the biggest mistakes of the war and what could we have done differently to have prevented a communist takeover of Vietnam, Bluhm stated that the U.S. should have lived up to the agreements that were signed in Geneva with the South and North Vietnamese and the U.S. Congress should have kept up the support of the south.

Philip Jennings

By offering the larger picture, Bluhm wanted to show that the Vietnam War was just one piece of a larger Cold War, which was a much larger conflict that was occurring all around the world at that time.

“The other demographic slice that I wanted to touch were the people who were born after Vietnam.

Those who were getting the misinformation that was flying around. I tried to present the overall picture, but I also tried each day to reach in and give snapshots of more details

“The South Vietnamese had proven that they could, with American Air support and continued logistic support, hold the line. They did it in 1973 against the Easter Offensive and turned back the North Vietnamese attacks.”

“The 1968 Tet Offensive had literally destroyed the Viet Cong infrastructure and the VC forces and if General Westmoreland had been able to get at least some of the reinforcements that he asked for at that time, it would have tipped the balance even more,” Bluhm explained. “In every conflict there a number of balance points where an action one way or another can influence the way it is going to go in the future and I think that was one of them.”

“If we lived up to our side of the agreements, I think there was probably an 80 per cent chance or more that we have a situation in Vietnam that we have in North and South Korea.”

The single biggest mistake early on was that the U.S. didn’t recognize the fanatical dedication of the North and its commitment to take over the South,

Bluhm said the single biggest mistake early on was that the U.S. didn’t recognize the fanatical dedication of the North and its commitment to take over the South, nor did the U.S. realize just how weak the South Vietnamese government and military structured had become.

“We also didn’t really understand the skillful and subtle ways the North Vietnamese and the support-

What are the lessons learned from Vietnam that can be applied to Iraq and Afghanistan? ing communist countries could play psychological warfare. They were able to direct the anti-war movement and anti-war press coverage into their long-term benefit.”

Bluhm stated that the U.S’ biggest military successes were the turning back of the Easter Offensive and the destruction of the VC at Tet in 1968.

“Politically, I thought we made progress with the South Vietnamese government in instilling some more representational aspects to

love for the North Vietnamese communists and the dictatorial government that they knew was going to be imposed on them, with confiscation of their lands and the mistreatment of the Catholic population as well as other religious minorities.”

Bluhm sees some similarities between Vietnam and Afghanistan in the use of advisors and the building up of the local population. General Petraeus’ COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy is from an old doctrine that the army tried to follow in Vietnam

“The arguments about “surge” in both cases had all of the echoes of Westmoreland and the postTet requests for reinforcements.

The use of Special Operations brings back some of the thoughts about Special Forces in border operations in Vietnam and Laos.”

their legislature. I think socially and educational, the village programs and the medical programs had made some major strides. After Tet in 1968 we secured many areas and they were peaceful and the people were recovering. The distribution of land and all the problems that historically had gone on were being sorted out and you just didn’t have the popular support for any anti-government insurgency that you had in the early 60s when we first arrived there.”

“The people were not supporting the VC and they were certainly not supporting the North Vietnamese.

The 300,000 plus North Vietnamese who had come south in the evacuation of the north in 1954-55 had no

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with success in some areas and no success in others, depending on the security of the area.

“The arguments about “surge” in both cases had all of the echoes of Westmoreland and the post-Tet requests for reinforcements. The use of Special Operations brings back some of the thoughts about Special Forces in border operations in Vietnam and Laos.”

On the other hand, Bluhm points out; there are probably more differences than there are similarities.

North Vietnam was an internationally recognized government attempting to overthrow another internationally recognized government in the south.

“The biggest lesson learned is the importance of political support for what you’re going to do and not assuming that that support will continue automatically,” Bluhm said. “The lesson from Vietnam was that local political stability is very important and your relationship with the government is absolutely critical to maintaining any initiative and momentum you have towards the positive. The role of the population, the potential impact of just local action, be it medical teams, educational teams, rebuilding and restoration of the living environment for the local population is critical to building up support or at least keeping them neutral from supporting any insurgency or any sort of outside element that is attempting to come in and establish itself.”

“The orchestration of military and political intervention is absolutely necessary and I think we should have learned that from Vietnam. We forgot many of the lessons from Vietnam and we had to re-learn them.”

Bluhm believes the U.S. has been able to do in Iraq and Afghanistan what they had hoped to do in Vietnam - and that is to support the local government to the point where the government is able to take over and maintain its own internal security and development.

“All they need is a decent chance by us maintaining our support at the proper level and not pulling the rug out as we did in 1973 with the South Vietnamese.”

Phillip Jennings, a Marine who flew helicopters in Vietnam and later flew aircraft for Air America in Laos, is the author of The Political Incorrect Guide To The Vietnam War (Running Press). He also wrote two satirical novels, Nam-A-Rama and Goodbye Mexico.

“I always wanted to write about the war and the real catalytic event occurred in the late 90s when I had a daughter in college,” Jennings explained. “She called me and said you are not going to believe what they teach us about the Vietnam War. She sent me the course material and I just threw up. It’s not that they were

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against the war; it was that they just didn’t care.”

Jennings said we were in Vietnam because after WWII the communists began a concentrated and concerted march towards a domination of huge parts of the world.

“A number of presidents saw what was happening in Eastern Europe, saw what was happening in China, saw what was happening in Korea and what was happening in Malaya and the Philippines. It wasn’t as if we were fat, dumb and happy and just decided to go and attack Vietnam,” Jennings said.

“The communist world was in open aggressive movement against the west. And through a series of unfortunate events we chose Vietnam to make a stand. We chose it because South Vietnam clearly did not want to be dominated by communists and at the same time we had a young president, Kennedy, who had a call to arms to stop aggression.”

“I think you have to be fairly jaundiced not to look at the world in the 1950s and see what was going on and not realize that if you’re the leader of the free world, you need to take some sort of stand against communism.”

In The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Vietnam War, Jenning debunks several myths about the Vietnam War. “The myth that I think is most troubling is the idea that we somehow “lost’ the war,” Jennings said. “It says more than just win or lose. It says that people really do not understand the objective issues of the war. In 1973 the communist were so beaten that they gave up. They were so decimated that they signed the peace treaty.”

Jennings noted that it was not until two years later, after the withdrawal of American combat troops and the U.S. Congress cut off support to the South Vietnamese, that the communists went on to defeat the South Vietnamese.

“It is more than just a viewpoint. By blaming or talking about the military losing, it cast a huge pallor over the American military for years and years.”

Jennings said the second biggest myth is that it was a civil war and the U.S. had no right to be there.

“South Vietnam used to belong to Cambodia. In the 16th century Vietnam was divided between north and south. There is a difference in the people. And if it were in fact a civil war, what were 40,000 North Vietnamese troops doing in Laos? It would be like us fighting a civil war in Canada.”

“If you look at the bombing in 1972, which basically ended the war, people are shocked at what the world press said about President Nixon and the U.S.,” Jennings said “We were called a savage nation; it was the worst war crime in the history of war crimes, and on and on. Rarely do people realize that 1,500 people were killed. That’s half of the number of people killed just in 9/11.”

Jennings said the third myth concerned the Battle of Tet in 1968.

Jennings suggests that many of the people were probably killed by their own anti-aircraft missiles and shells falling back on the city.

Jennings points out that the U.S. went to such extraordinary care to not kill a lot of civilians.

“We basically ended any chance of the Viet Cong being a significant fighting force. We wiped them out,” Jennings said. “The Viet Cong lost almost as many in that Tet offensive as we lost in ten years of war. Then again, the significance of Tet was the change in the view of the war through bozos like TV news anchor Walter Cronkite.

They were just looking for an excuse to be anti-war anyway.”

Another myth that annoys Jennings is the “Christmas bombing.”

“The Vietnam veterans are not given credit for basically winning the Cold War,” Jennings said. “I understand that it was President Reagan, but if we had not held our own in Southeast Asia, I think it might have been a different situation with China and Russia. So, for ten years the Vietnam veterans beat the communists and kept them

in their holes. We killed a couple million of them and the Soviets spent billions.”

Jennings sees analogies between the Vietnam War and Iraq and Afghanistan by way of how the war is being handled in Washington.

“The military is in a constant battle with the media and the military.

The military today is faced with even more horrific rules of engagement than we saw in Vietnam. This makes things even more difficult,” Jennings said. “Those issues were simply that we didn’t learn enough about in Vietnam about how difficult it is for the military to be proactive, which is what you need to win a war. The war dragged on unnecessarily primarily because of the political ramifications.”

Jennings also sees an analogy between the counterinsurgency programs in Vietnam and the current ones.

“The Phoenix counterterrorism and counterinsurgency program was the most successful program of the

war,” Jennings explained. “Phoenix just crippled the communists. I admire Bill Colby (who administered the Phoenix Program) and I think he had a lot to do with our success in the Vietnam War.” Jennings believes that the current counterterrorism and counterinsurgency programs are working well.

“Today our whole risk is political.

It is simply the same risk we had in Vietnam.”

America won militarily in Vietnam but lost the political will, withdrew, and allowed the communists to take over the south.

Likewise, we’ve won militarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, but will we lose our political will, withdraw, and allow our military gains to be lost?

About the Author Paul Davis, a contributing editor to the Journal, served in the U.S. Navy on an aircraft carrier during the Vietnam War.

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Low Light/Night Driving

By Anthony Ricci

A

s professional drivers, we very often underestimate how much stress we put on our eyes each time we set out on the roadways. This is especially true during late afternoon into the evening. The evening is one of the most difficult times to navigate a vehicle and the most stressful on our eyes since during this time our eyes are changing to adapt to the low light environment. Health statistics show that the older we get the harder it is to see and focus as well as the longer it takes to refocus if we happen to glance away and/or get blinded by oncoming headlights.

National Safety Council claims that traffic death rates are three times greater at night than during the day and they give some great night driving tips. Prepare your car for night driving. Keep headlights, tail lights, signal lights and windows (inside and out) clean.

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Don’t drink and drive. Not only does alcohol severely impair your driving ability, it also acts as a depressant. Just one drink can induce fatigue. Avoid smoking when you drive. Smoke’s nicotine and carbon monoxide hamper night vision. If there is any doubt, turn your headlights

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on. Lights will not help you see better in early twilight, but they’ll make it easier for other drivers to see you. Being seen is as important as seeing. Reduce your speed and increase your following distances. It is more difficult to judge other vehicle’s speeds and distances at night.

Don’t overdrive your headlights.

You should be able to stop inside the illuminated area. If you’re not, you are creating a blind crash area in front of your vehicle. When following another vehicle, keep your headlights on low beams so you don’t blind the driver ahead of you.

If an oncoming vehicle doesn’t lower beams from high to low, avoid glare by watching the right edge of the road and using it as a steering guide.

Make frequent stops for light snacks and exercise. If you’re too tired to drive, stop and get rest.

Tip six from the National Safety Council is very important since most of us do not realize that it is a common tendency to drive faster at night. On average most drivers travel five to ten miles an hour faster at night since they feel more comfortable with their surroundings. This may sound backward but in actuality we get

our sense of speed from how we see and interpret our surroundings. When we see things around us whizzing by with some degree of detail, most drivers decide that it may be time to slow down or that they are at an adequate speed for their comfort level. At night our surroundings are blending in and we do not see the same amount of detail, it appears to most that we are driving through a dark safe tunnel. Therefore, without realizing it we are naturally going faster. Combining a low light or dark environment with more speed could be the recipe for disaster. Since you do not have the same line of sight distance you will have less time to make decisions and avoid potential hazards.

For example, let’s just say that your high beam lights give you 300 hundred feet of decent visibility. Newer cars/headlight systems give you much more light however, I’m picking 300 hundred feet since it is the same

distance as a football field.

This is a familiar distance for everyone to relate to for a mathematical example of how quickly things happen on the road way.

If you’re traveling at 60MPH and have 300 feet available before your next potential hazard you have approximately 3.3 seconds to bring your car to a stop or shed enough speed to avoid a hazard.

If it normally takes a driver 3/4 of a second to perceive a potential hazard at night with less light available it could potentially take longer to spot a hazard. Let’s say it takes 1 second to perceive a hazard. You would travel 90 feet into the football field before you would begin to react, having 210 feet left over. After perceiving that there is a threat or hazard in front of you, the next step is to naturally react to the situation. Let’s use ž of a second which is the average reaction time for a driver who is alert and ready. This brings us 67.5 closer to the hazard and the brakes have not started to work yet. Now

you have 142 feet left for stopping, good news is most new cars can just about manage that stopping distance if the driver is trained and well practiced at hitting the brakes at their limit while turning the wheel. Problem is not many people are all that well practiced at emergency stops.

Therefore they are not equipped to handle the vehicles maximum capability limits. Being at 142 feet to bring the car to a stop at 60 MPH is cutting it very close for most vehicles. This is a great example of how you could overrun your head lights quite innocently, just by driving the speed limit on most highways.

Be cautious and leave extra room during evening and night hours.

About the Author Anthony Ricci is the President of ADSI and an active IACSP member. For more information about ADSI, please visit their website at: www.1adsi.com

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IACSP Resources:

Book Reviews

By Dr. Joshua Sinai

“Terrorist Cop: The NYPD Jewish Cop Who Traveled the World to Stop Terrorists”

By Mordecai Z. Dzikansky and Robert Slater Barricade Books, 304 pages, $24.95 “Terrorist Cop” is a fascinating and gripping memoir of Mordecai Dzikansky, a former New York Police Department (NYPD) detective, who began his distinguished 25year career working in a homicide squad, was promoted to investigate several high profile terrorism cases, and ended his career as the NYPD’s first representative to Israel’s police on terrorism issues. Robert Slater, the book’s co-author, is an American-born veteran journalist and writer living in Israel.

After 9/11, as part of Commissioner Ray Kelly’s revamped program to protect New York City from further terrorist attacks, Detective Dzikansky, an American Jew, was sent by the NYPD to Israel in mid-2002 to monitor Palestinian terrorist at-

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An Israeli police officer walks near a bulldozer as it demolishes a home in Arab East Jerusalem’s Sur Bahir neighbourhood April 7, 2009. Israeli police said they shot dead a Palestinian who attacked them during the demolition on Tuesday of part of the East Jerusalem home of a Palestinian who killed three Israelis in a bulldozer rampage last year. REUTERS/Mahfouz Abu Turk (JERUSALEM CONFLICT POLITICS)

tacks, especially suicide bombings, and file reports on terrorist tactics and counter-terrorism lessons that could be applied in New York.

At the time, with the Palestinian intifada at its height, Israel presented Detective Dzikansky with a unique “terrorism rich” environment. With the cooperation of Israel’s National Police, which provided him an office at a police dormitory close to the police force’s headquarters in Jerusalem, Detective Dzikansky was able to visit numerous suicide bombing sites in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Able to practically immediately relay his intelligence gathering information back to the NYPD, this liaison relationship greatly enhanced its understanding of how to defend against potential terrorist attacks, as well as how

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to mitigate casualties in the event of such attacks.

What makes Detective Dzikansky’s book especially noteworthy are his first-hand accounts of numerous Palestinian suicide bombings that go beyond what is reported in newspapers. For example, his account of the suicide attack on April 30, 2003 by two young British Muslims on behalf of Hamas against the Mike’s Place pub restaurant on Tel Aviv’s beachfront, right next to the American Embassy, showed that the target was chosen because of its proximity to an iconic American government facility, thereby demonstrating that both Israel and America were Hamas’s enemies.

Interestingly, unbeknownst to this reviewer at the time, on September 11, 2003 Detective

Dzikansky and I happened to attend the same conference on counterterrorism in Herzliya, organized by the International Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT), when a Palestinian suicide attack took place around 6:00pm just as then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was speaking to our audience. With Peres informed by a very somber Dr. Boaz Ganor, the ICT’s Executive Director, about the incident in which a suicide bomber had blown himself up at a bus stop filled with Israeli soldiers outside an army base not far from Herzliya, Peres decided to continue with his presentation in order to demonstrate that a terrorist attack would not disrupt the country’s daily life. Detective Dzikansky, however, left at once with several of the conference’s participants who were his guests to the suicide bombing site in order to study aspects of the operation.

Later that night, at around 11:20 pm, another Palestinian terrorist blew himself up at a popular Jerusalem coffee house, with seven people killed and 50 wounded. Again, while I happened to watch the bombing’s aftermath live on Israeli television in my hotel room, Detective Dzikansky made his way to the bombing scene to investigate the tactics used in the operation.

By coincidence, I finally meet Detective Dzikansky at the ICT’s September 2011 conference, when we sat next to each other by chance at one of its outdoor luncheon events.

With numerous other gripping first-hand accounts of Palestinian suicide bombing operations described in the book, the reader will also benefit from Detective Dzikansky’s accounts of how cajoled his way to travel with his American passport from Israel to Istanbul (November 2003), Moscow (February 2004

and August 2004), Madrid (March 2004), and Sharm al Sheikh, in Egypt (July 2005) to investigate the aftermath of the suicide bombings that had just occurred in those locations.

Also noteworthy is Detective Dzikansky’s chapter towards the end of the book on lessons learned from the Israeli experience with terrorism that can be applied to American law enforcement’s counterterrorism programs. These lessons include the observation that when a terrorist attack occurs overseas one has to pay attention to such events because “If a terrorist could blow himself up outside a railroad station in Israel, another terrorist could decide to imitate that tactic and blow himself up near the Rockefeller Center ice skating rink or some other Manhattan landmark.” Another lesson is that if a terror attack occurs, one is not helpless because there are measures, such as increasing internal security and widening security perimeters, to reduce casualties and physical damage to targeted facilities. Also important is to conduct random security checks in order to keep potential attackers off guard.

A final lesson from the Israeli experience is the “great importance for the public-at-large to return to normal as quickly as possible. The return to normal sends a powerful message to terrorists: You can’t defeat us!”

For these invaluable reporting and liaison duties in Israel, Detective Dzikansky was promoted to NYPD Detective First Grade.

His assignment in Israel ended in October 2007, with his NYPD replacement already trained by him and introduced to his network of Israeli contacts. He of-

The return to normal sends a powerful message to terrorists: You can’t defeat us!”

ficially retired from the NYPD at the end of January 2008, choosing to remain with his family in Israel, where, as a private citizen he lectures and consults on counterterrorism and policing topics. As demonstrated by this tremendously informative book, the now-retired Detective Dzikansky has lots of insights to offer the counterterrorism community.

“A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism”

By Daniel Byman Oxford University Press, $34.95, 464 pages

Faced with terrorist attacks (and conventional military attacks) by its Palestinian and Arab state neighbors since the earliest days of its existence, Israel has developed exceptionally effective counterterrorism capabilities to protect its citizens on all fronts, making it one of the world’s most innovative and toughest counterterrorism

“powers.” This subject is discussed in Daniel Byman’s “A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism,” a comprehensive account of the effectiveness of Israel’s counterterrorism campaigns since the country became independent in 1948.

Mr. Byman, a prolific author of numerous books and articles on Middle East security issues, is a professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. This book is enriched by his research visits to Israel and meetings with leading Israeli security officials cited throughout the volume.

One of the book’s strengths is its overview of the multiple types of terrorist threats that have confronted Israel over the years. These threats began before 1948, with the Palestinian Arab community’s opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state in part of Palestine.

Although not mentioned by the author, those pre-state Palestinian terrorist groups were similar in their religious militancy to today’s Hamas, while the primary Palestinian organization that was established in 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), adopted the pseudo-

secular and left-wing slogans of 1940s anti-colonialist national liberation movements.

Much history is covered in the book: Israeli counterterrorism responses to the initial Palestinian fedayeen attacks against the fledgling Israeli state in the early 1950s, the rise of the PLO in the mid-1960s and its attacks against Israel from its bases in Egypt, Jordan and south Lebanon after the June 1967 War, the first intifada (uprising) in the late 1980s and the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords, which were intended to establish a political solution to the conflict.

Although a primary goal of Israel’s leaders at the end of the 20th century, Mr. Byman writes, “was to end terrorist violence” and bring about a peaceful reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis, that did not happen. The Palestinians under Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat (including the rejectionist Hamas) continued their terrorist attacks, and the weak Israeli coalition government, led by Yitzhak Rabin, was unable to stop the construction of new Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

Fatal blows to the Oslo Accords were delivered by the Palestinian Hamas, which intensified its terrorist campaign against Israel, and Yigal Amir, a Jewish terrorist. Amir, who represented the Jewish religious extremists that opposed any territorial compromise with the Palestinians, assassinated Prime Minister Rabin in early November 1995.

With Arafat’s poor leadership and Palestinian terrorism intensifying as Hamas began taking over the Palestinian “agenda” in the years that followed, the situation continued to worsen.

Palestinian terrorism assumed new forms, first employing martyrdom suicide operations.

Later - and up through the cur-

64

rent period - it began launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against bordering Israeli towns.

Mr. Byman’s discussion of Israel’s use of strong counterterrorism measures against Palestinian terrorists, such as vigorous interrogation practices and targeted killings, is worth noting. For Israel, interrogating people suspected of involvement in terrorism is “part of a sophisticated process that is at the heart of its counterterrorism intelligence,” Mr. Byman writes. Interrogations can provide information on a terrorist group’s members and activities, its weaponry, sources of funding, locations of its network, and imminent attacks. Such sessions also serve as important intelligence venues for recruiting new informers and agents once they are sent back to the Palestinian territories.

Targeted killings of terrorist leaders and operatives, whether through assassinations or surgical aerial strikes, Mr. Byman writes, are “a form of prevention, killing a ‘ticking bomb’ before he explodes or killing the facilitators who send others to kill. Officials also hope that they will deter terrorists from violence or, if that fails, make them live in fear, rendering them less effective. Over time, and with enough deaths, the killings can also reduce the total number of terrorists.”

Israel regards them as a last resort, to be used only when those being targeted cannot be arrested. It turns to its legal system to provide a “green light” to justify the killings, with consent by top security and government officials required to approve specific killings beforehand.

Additionally, the author discusses the effectiveness of the security barrier Israel has erected to prevent Palestinian terrorists from infiltrating into Israel, the nature of the highly coordinated counterter-

rorism infrastructure instituted to protect the country (e.g., the roles of Aman in military intelligence, Shin Bet in domestic intelligence, the Mossad in foreign intelligence and National Police, including the Border Police).

Some of Mr. Byman’s contentions can be disputed, such as the assertion, “Much of the Palestinian terrorism against Israel is about competition between groups, and hostility toward Israel is only secondary.” Any examination of their rhetoric would easily disprove such a claim.

Mr. Byman is correct in arguing that effective counterterrorism must blend military coercion and efforts at political conciliation that address a conflict’s underlying causes. The latter component has been, as Mr. Byman notes, one of the weaknesses in Israel’s counterterrorism campaign. With the Palestinians’ leaders deeply divided and incapable of providing workable solutions to improving their peoples’ futures, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict appears far from near-term resolution.

billion Muslims in the world, Mr. Kurzman asks, “many of whom supposedly hate the West and desire martyrdom, why don’t we see terrorist attacks everywhere, every day?”

Now, it is true that al Qaedatype terrorist operatives and their supporters represent a tiny proportion of Muslims around the world. Nevertheless, the threat persists, and when Mr. Kurzman writes, “Recruitment difficulties have created a bottleneck for Islamist terrorists’ signature tactic, suicide bombings,” one has to ask: Should we be cheered?

True, while they may lack thousands of willing recruits to carry out martyrdom operations in the West, al Qaeda’s close allies - the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Shabab in Somalia, al Qaeda in Yemen, and al Qaeda in the Maghreb - appear to have no difficulty recruiting an inexhaustible supply of indigenous volunteers in the such countries (as well as others), geographical areas he downplays as threats to the United States and the West.

“The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists”

By Charles Kurzman Oxford University Press, $24.95, 248 pages

In “The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists,” Charles Kurzman, a professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, returns again and again to an ideological premise that fact and common sense do not support.

Mr. Kurzman would have readers believe that the U.S. government’s expenditure of resources in the war against al Qaeda-type terrorism is severely disproportionate to the magnitude of the actual threat because there are, in his words, “so few Islamist terrorists.” With more than a

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Moreover, unlike Mr. Kurzman’s accounting, al Qaedainspired insurgencies in those countries show no signs of diminishing, which explains why Western security services are so concerned. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen function as magnets for homegrown Western extremists who travel to those countries, where they are indoctrinated and trained to carry out attacks in their home countries.

What Mr. Kurzman fails to appreciate is that one of the reasons terrorism in the West has become a relatively rare event is the success of the large and expensive resources governments have devoted to countering it. Thus, reports of arrests of terrorism suspects are quite frequent. Once such robust counterterrorism efforts are reduced, per Mr. Kurzman’s recommendation, to end “the state of emergency that limits civil liberties,” the terrorist threat likely will escalate in the West. And after a major terrorist incident, politicians blamed for cutting such resources invariably will end up as ex-politicians.

Moreover, as a result of the “Arab Spring” in countries such as Egypt, Salafist organizations are winning large shares of electoral votes, raising the question of whether al Qaeda operatives will find safe havens in those countries. Nevertheless, Mr. Kurzman’s book is not without

merit. His observations about how terrorists exploit the Internet and mass media to radicalize and recruit new adherents in their “electronic jihad” are worth reading. His account of how instruction manuals are digitized and posted on websites in order to facilitate the carrying out of attacks is sobering.

Also noteworthy is Mr. Kurzman’s depiction of “radical sheik,” a play on “radical chic,” which “involves expressions of sympathy for [Osama bin Laden] and his ilk as heroes of anti-imperialism and Islamic authenticity.” While Mr. Kurzman’s explanation of this phenomenon is detailed and insightful, one might disagree with his contention that “radical sheik disassociates terrorist symbols from terrorist activities” because its adherents do not “actually want these revolutionary movements to succeed.”

Nevertheless, Mr. Kurzman’s assessment of the differences

between “globalist” and “localist” Islamist terrorists is worth noting. He shows how the former - “generally welleducated, often with scientific training” - speak one or more European languages and pursue “a vision of a pan-Islamic government centered in Arabia.”

The latter, “by contrast, have little education, and more often [come] from Islamic seminaries than from secular schools,” and “their vision of an Islamic state is limited to a single territory.”

While Mr. Kurzman refers to al Qaeda as representative of the “globalist” stream, one might take issue with his categorization of the Taliban as “localist” because they also have sponsored international terrorist operations, such as Faisal Shahzad’s plot to bomb Times Square in early May 2010.

One also might take issue with Mr. Kurzman’s bizarre contention that “Islamist terrorists

seek to modernize society and politics, recasting tradition in modern molds.” Here, he not only distorts their real aim - a theocracy, which is the antithesis of modernity - but claims that they “emphasize social equality, at least among male Muslims.” So much for building a modern society.

Nevertheless, Mr. Kurzman’s concluding chapter, “Predicting the Next Attacks,” is a sensible and insightful overview of the limitations of social science methods in predicting terrorist attacks. A thoughtful and important book can be found here by readers willing to overlook its missteps.

About the Author Dr. Joshua Sinai is an associate professor for research, specializing in counterterrorism studies, at a Virginia Tech center in Arlington, VA. He can be contacted at: jbsinai@vt.edu.

COUNTER TERRORISM

SECURITY NEWS YOU NEED TO KNOW

Aviation, Corporate, Cyber, Global, Homeland, Maritime, Law Enforcement, Intelligence Photo credit U.S. Department of Defense.

IACSP and PlanetData present a new website bringing you counterterrorism news, articles, events, and more.

www.planetdata.net/ct

REFERENCES: Page 42 Hizballah: A Profile Of One Of The World’s Most Lethal Terrorist Organizations, By Dr. Joshua Sinai (1) Carl Anthony Wege, “The Hizballah Security Apparatus,” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 2, Issue 7, http://www.terrorismanalysts. com/pt.index.php?option=com_ rikzine&view=article&id-51.

(2) “Who Did It? Foreign Report Presents an Alternative View,” Jane’s Terrorism & Security, September 19, 2001, http://www.janes.com/ security/international_security/ news/fr/fr010919_1_n.shtml.

(3) Matthew Levitt, “Islamic Extremism in Europe - Beyond alQaeda: Hamas and Hezbollah in Europe,” Testimon of Matthrew A. Levitt, April 27, 2005, before the Joint Hearing of the Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats, U.S. House of Representatives, p. 3.

(4) Shahar Ilan, “MI: Syria Continuing to Arm Hezbollah Despite Peace Moves With Israel,” Ha’aretz, May 26, 2008.

(5) “Who are Hezbollah”,” BBC News, May 21, 2008, http://newsvote. bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/ print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/43144.

(6) Eitan Azani, “Hezbollah, a Global Terrorist Organization,” testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation, September 2006, p. 7.

(7) Eitan Azani, “Hezbollah, a Global Terrorist Organization,” testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation, September 2006, p. 7.

(8) Ibid., p. 8.

(9) “Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah threatened revenge…”, I n t e l l i g e n c e a n d Te r ro r i s m Information Center, February 18, 2008, http://www.terrorism-info. org.il/malam_multimedia/English/ eng_n/html/ct_180208e.htm.

(10) H. Varulkar, “Lebanon on the Brink of Civil War (4),” MEMRI,

November 29, 2006, http://www. memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page= archives&Area=ia&ID=IA30406.

(11) Marijke Keet, “Interview with Hizbollah Web Master Hussein Naboulsi,” Irish Peace Society, http://www.peace.ie/media/ marijke203.html.

(12) Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder: Hezbollah, http:// www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-khizbollah-hizbullah/p9155#p5.

(13) Carl Anthony Wege, “The Hizballah Security Apparatus,” p. 6.

(14) Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “Hizballah conducted a military exercise…,” June 5, 2008, p. 1, http://www. terrorism-info.org.il/malam_ multimedia/English/eng_n/html/ hezbollah_0608e.

(15) Matthew Levitt and David S c h e n k e r, “ W h o Wa s I m a d Mughniyeh?”, Washington Institute Policy Watch, No. 1230, February 2008, p. 1.

(16) Ibid.

(17) Reuven Erlich and Yoram Kahati, “Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, June 2007, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/ malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/ html/hezbollah_e-060.

(18) Carl Anthony Wege, “The Hizballah Security Apparatus,” p. 5.

(19) Matthew Levitt and David S c h e n k e r, “ W h o Wa s I m a d Mughniyeh?”, Washington Institute Policy Watch, No. 1230, February 2008, p. 3.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Matthew Levitt and David S c h e n k e r, “ W h o Wa s I m a d Mughniyeh?”, Washington Institute Policy Watch, No. 1230, February 2008, p. 1.

(22) Who Did It? Foreign Report Presents an Alternative View,” Jane’s Terrorism & Security, September 19, 2001, http://www.janes.com/ security/international_security/news/ fr/fr010919_1_n.shtml.

Ibid.

(23) Ibid.

(24) Ibid., p. 2.

(25) Eyal Zisser, “Imad Mughniyeh: The Aftermath,” Tel Aviv Notes: An Update on Middle Eastern Developments by the Moshe Dayan

Center, February 17, 2007, p. 1.

(26) “Imad Fayez Moughnieh…”, I n t e l l i g e n c e a n d Te r ro r i s m Information Center, February 13, 2008, http://www.terrorism-info. org.il/malam_multimedia/English/ eng_n/html/ct_130208e.htm.

(27) Eitan Azani, “Hezbollah, a Global Terrorist Organization,” p. 9.

(28) Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT), “Profiles of International Terrorist Organizations,” http:// www.ict.org.il/.

(29) Eitan Azani, “Hezbollah, a Global Terrorist Organization,” p. 9.

(30) Barak Ravid, “Report: Hezbollah moves missiles from Syria to Lebanon, fearing fall of Assad regime,” Haaretz, June 25, 2011.

(31) “Funding terrorism…”, I n t e l l i g e n c e a n d Te r ro r i s m Information Center, May 26, 2008, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/ malam_ultimedia/English/eng_n/ html/mt_180508e.htm.

(32) Eitan Azani, “Hezbollah, a Global Terrorist Organization,” p. 11.

(33) Ibid.

(34) Ibid.

REFERENCES: Page 24 No Defense: America’s Growing Vulnerability To An EMP Attack, By Dan Dickerson i Zak, Anatoly “The K Project: Soviet Nuclear Tests in Space,” The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 13, Issue 1 March 2006 , pp. 143-150 ii Loborev, Vladimir M. “Up to Date State of the NEMP Problems and Topical Research Directions,” Electromagnetic Environments and Consequences: Proceedings of the EUROEM 94 International Symposium, Bordeaux, France, 30 May – 3 June 1994, pp. 15–21 iii Statement by Dr. Lowell Wood,” available at: <http://www.house. gov/hasc>. i v L o w e l l Wo o d , b e f o r e Subcommittee on Terrorism, Te c h n o l o g y a n d H o m e l a n d Security, April, 2005. v Report of the Commission To Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, Volume 1: Executive Summary, 2004, p. 1-2. vi Statement by Dr. Lowell Wood,” op. cit. vii Russia: Belous Advocates Asymmetrical Response to US

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

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Missile Defense Capability,” Moscow, Trud, December 22, 2004.

Translated in Open Source Center, Doc. ID: CEP20041221000377.

Viii “Asymmetric Threats to U.S. National Security,” Moscow, Z a u r b e z h n o y e Vo y e n n o y e Obozreniye, March 31, 2005.

Translated in Open Source Center, Doc. ID: CEP20070112322002.

Ix Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy, (Beijing: People’s Republic of China: Military Science Publishing House, 2005) p.465. x Ibid. p.465. xi“Measuring Nuclear Explosive EMP,” Wuhan, Haijun Gongcheng Xueyuan Xeubao , March 1998.

Translated in Open Source Center, Doc. ID: FTS19981222000656; and “Simulation of Electromagnetic Fields in EMP,” Chengdu, Qiang Jiguang yu Lizi Shu, August 1, 1998.

Translated in Open Source Center, Doc. ID: FTS19990317001689. xii HK Phoenix TV on” Nuclear Terrorism, Suitcase Bombs, Precautions Taken”, Hong Kong, Feng Huang Wei Shih Chung Wen Tai, January 4, 2006. xiii Zhang Shouqi and Sun Xuegui, Jiefangjun Bao 14 May 1996. xivTehran, Nashriyeh-e Siasi Nezami, December 1998 -January 1999 xv Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Te r ro r i s m , Te c h n o l o g y a n d Homeland Security, 8 March 2005.

Janes Information Group, Shahab break-ups suggest possible EMP Trial, 1 May 2005, Jane’s Rockets and Missiles. xvi Jaime Suchlicki, The Cuba-Venezuela Challenge to Hemispheric Security: Implications for the United States.” Challenges to Security in the Hemisphere Task Force. Center for Hemispheric Policy, 3 December 2009. xvii “North Korea’s Military S c i e n c e , Te c h n o l o g y ( P a r t 2),” Seoul Kunsa, August 26, 2005 - August 31, 2005.

Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Doc. ID: KPP20060929311002. xviiiCommission to Assess the Threat from High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), “Protecting The Infrastructure And Military on a National Scale,” February 2007 xixStatement by Dr. Lowell Wood,” op. cit.

“toKNOWLEDGE IS CRITICAL deter the threat of terrorism.”

Elena Mastors, Ph.D. | Faculty, School of Security & Global Studies Dr. Mastors represents the caliber of AMU scholar-practitioners, combining in-depth field research with academic rigor. A foremost expert in political-psychology pertaining to counter-terrorism, she taught at the U.S. Naval War College and frequently lectures on subjects of conflict, terrorism, and political leadership. A published author, her works include, Breaking al-Qaeda: Psychological and Operational Techniques and The Lesser Jihad: Recruits and the al-Qaida Network.

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