The Selling Of The U.S. Navy SEALS
Keep On Sale Until November 21, 2012
Encouraging
Jihadist Lone-Wolf Suicide Terrorism
Deconstructing Stuxnet: The Beast Is Loose The Art Of Business: Lessons On Counter Espionage The Iran Hezbollah Strategic And Terrorist Threat To Africa New Trends In Aviation Security
FALL Issue Vol. 18, No. 3, 2012 Printed in the U.S.A. IACSP.COM
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
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Vol. 18, No. 3 FALL 2012 IACSP Director of Operations Steven J. Fustero Associate Publisher Phil Friedman
Page 28
Senior Editor Nancy Perry
Encouraging Jihadist Lone-Wolf Suicide Terrorism
Contributing Editors Paul Davis Thomas B. Hunter Joshua Sinai
By Nissan Ratzlav-Katz
Book Review Editor Jack Plaxe Research Director Gerry Keenan Conference Director John Dew
Page 38
Communications Director Craig O. Thompson
The Selling Of The U.S. Navy SEALs: America’s Newest Heroes are the Tip of the Spear in the War on Terrorism
Art Director Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Psychological CT Advisors Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Counterintelligence Advisor Stanley I. White
By Paul Davis
South America Advisor Edward J. Maggio Homeland Security Advisor Col. David Gavigan
Page 6
SITREP
Personal Security Advisor Thomas J. Patire
Page 8
Deconstructing Stuxnet: The Beast Is Loose, by David Gewirtz
Page 12
The Art Of Business: Lessons On Counter Espionage, by Luke Bencie & Josh Tallis
Page 12
The Iran Hezbollah Strategic And Terrorist Threat To Africa, by Ely Karmon
Page 28
Encouraging Jihadist Lone-Wolf Suicide Terrorism, by Nissan Ratzlov-Katz
Page 32
New Trends In Airport & Aviation Security, By Dr. Joshua Sinai
Page 38
The Selling Of The U.S. Navy SEALS, by Paul Davis
Page 42
IACSP Looks Back, The Incident At Haymarket Square By Joseph A. Devine, Ed.D.
Tactical Advisor Robert Taubert Hazmat Advisor Bob Jaffin Security Driver Advisor Anthony Ricci, ADSI Cyberwarfare Advisor David Gewirtz
Page 48 Special German Police Units Climb High To Make Arrests By Jim Weiss and Mickey Davis Page 50 Secure Driver: Brake Assist, by Anthony Ricci & Sean McLaine Page 52 An IACSP Q&A With Commander Kirk S. Lippold, by Paul Davis Page 56
Emergency Management Advisor Clark L. Staten
Cell Phone Forensics Advisor Dr. Eamon P. Doherty IACSP Advisory Board John M. Peterson III John Dew Thomas Patire Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Robert E. Thorn Southeast Asia Correspondent Dr. Thomas A. Marks
Book Reviews, by Dr. Joshua Sinai
European Correspondent Elisabeth Peruci Middle East Correspondent Ali Koknar National Sales Representative Phil Friedman, Advertising Director Tel: 201-224-0588, Fax: 202-315-3459 iacsp@aol.com Tactical Sales Representative Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Tel: 757-721-2774, scott@mad4art.com
THE JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L is published by SecureWorldnet, Ltd., PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (ISSN#1552-5155) in cooperation with the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals and Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Copyright © 2012. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher. Editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (703) 243-0993, FAX (703) 243-1197. Membership $65/year, add $10 for overseas memberships. Postmaster: send address changes to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA. Web site: www.iacsp.com
PHOTO CREDITS: Reuters, Army.mil, Navy.mil, istockphoto.com and authors where applicable.
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Afghan National army soldiers carry a victim of an attack on a hotel, on the outskirts of Kabul June 22, 2012. Elite Afghan police backed by NATO forces ended a 12-hour siege on Friday at Spozhmai hotel outside Kabul, leaving at least 20 dead after Taliban gunmen stormed the lakeside building, bursting into a party and seizing dozens of hostages. REUTERS/Mohammad Ismail
W
orld Trends & Forecasts
In Pakistan, political turmoil worsened as the Supreme Court disqualified Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani following his contempt of court conviction for refusing to reopen a corruption case against President Zardari. Gilani’s departure deepened the standoff between the courts and the executive and legislative branches; a standoff that plays into the hands of the Pakistani military. The security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated with a series of militant bombings, including a Taliban assault on a hotel outside Kabul that killed ten. In Khost, a suicide bomber killed 21 at a checkpoint, including three U.S. soldiers. 6
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Nagorno-Karabakh witnessed some of its worst violence in recent years with escalating clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops resulting in numerous casualties. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has warned tensions could escalate into broader conflict, while OSCE Chairman Eamon Gilmore has urged both sides against using force to resolve their long-running dispute. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s eastern Kivu provinces saw increasing violence and displacement as the army continued to hunt April’s mutineers. In Paraguay, the removal of President Fernando Lugo by the Senate – ostensibly over the killing of seventeen people during land clashes – provoked widespread criticism. Neighboring countries refused to recognize any new government led by Vice President Federico Franco and regional organization UN-
ASUR suspended Paraguay from the MERCOSUR common market. Violence continued unabated throughout Syria, with scores of civilians massacred and increasingly ferocious fighting between rebels and pro-regime forces, prompting the suspension of the UN observation mission amidst warnings of all-out sectarian war by UN/Arab League envoy Kofi Annan. Third Quarter 2012 TRENDS Deteriorating Situations • Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaidjan), Pakistan, Paraguay Conflict Risk Alert • Burma/Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria Source: CrisisWatch.org
New Training Simulator for CBRN Argon Electronics has launched the latest version of PlumeSIM, a state-of-the-art CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) / HazMat (Hazardous Materials) response training simulator that has enhanced flexibility and ease-of-use in field exercises and table training for counter terrorism, HazMat or nuclear incidents. The PlumeSIM software, which is used with chemical and radiological detector simulation instruments from Argon enables users to plan exercises on a PC or laptop without system hardware, offering a
portable simulation system with easy-to-use menus that can be swiftly set up and used to create a virtual emergency scenario. In addition to its flexibility and ease-of-use, the modular Argon Plume SIM system is also costeffective for end-users, since the number of simulation tools used can be expanded as and when budgets permit, and because all simulators can be used independently of Plume SIM there is no redundancy of equipment. Existing users of Argon detection simulation instruments will be able to upgrade their equipment for use with PlumeSIM. Those interested in a free evaluation copy of the PlumeSIM software can contact Argon Electronics at email: sales@ argonelectronics.com.
Both Political Conventions Need Perimeter Protection Equipment The U.S. Secret Service wants to hire a contractor that can provide all necessary perimeter security equipment -- including portable vehicle barriers, anti-scale fencing and crowd control barricades -- which will be used to control crowds and protect dignitaries at the Republican National Convention in Tampa, FL, and the Democratic National Convention in Charlotte, NC.
to a recent Secret Service solicitation. The selected contractor will be expected to deliver and set-up equipment such as temporary fencing, concrete barriers, bike racks, vehicle barriers, privacy screening and other materials. The GOP convention will take place at Tropicana Field in St. Petersburg, FL, on August 26 and the Tampa Bay Times Forum on August 27-30. “The RNC will host 2,286 delegates and 2,125 alternate delegates from all 50 states, the District of Columbia and five territories,” the solicitation explains. “The convention will also include 15,000 credentialed media.” The Democratic Convention will be held at the Time Warner Cable arena and Bank of America Stadium in Charlotte on September 3-7. Further information is available from Neil Lanzendorf, of the Secret Service, at 202-406-6657 or Neil. Lanzendorf@usss.dhs.gov.
Floating Base Gives U.S. New Footing InThe Persian Gulf WASHINGTON - One of the Navy’s oldest transport ships, now converted into one of its newest platforms for warfare, recently arrived in waters off Bahrain, a major addition to the enlarged presence
station providing fuel and maintenance for minesweeping ships. But with the relatively simple addition of a modular barracks on the deck, the Ponce can also be a mobile base for several hundred Special Operations forces to carry out missions like hostage rescue, counterterrorism, reconnaissance, sabotage and direct strikes. Even with the addition of the barracks, there is ample room for helicopters and the small, fast boats favored by commandos. A version of this article appeared in print on July 12, 2012, on page A7 of the New York edition with the headline: Base Afloat in Persian Gulf Shows New U.S. Way of War.
This Fall, See Yourself As A DARPA Imagery Researcher Teams wanted for eight weeks of radical innovation in visual and geospatial data analysis There’s a lot to be said for the road that is taken it’s safe, it’s well lit, and you probably know where it leads. Rarely does an opportunity present itself to leave the road entirely and venture off in search of new vistas. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) seeks trailblazers to explore the unknown in the areas of visual and
The vendor will provide coordination and management services at both events, which have each been determined to be a National Special Security Event, according Blake Midnight/U.S. Navy, via Associated Press
The Ponce, one of the Navy’s oldest transport ships, transits the Persian Gulf en route to Bahrain on July 4.
of American forces in the Persian Gulf designed as a counter to Iran. The first mission of the reborn Ponce was designed to be low profile and defensive, as an operations hub for mine clearing in the Strait of Hormuz, a counter to threats from Tehran to close the vital commercial waterway. In that role, the Ponce will be a launching pad for helicopters, a home to underwater diver teams and a seaborne service
geospatial data analysis. Researchers will participate in a short-fuse, crucible-style environment to invent new approaches to the identification of people, places, things and activities from still or moving defense and open-source imagery. Details on the proposal process and program can be found at: http://c4i.gmu. edu/InnovationHouse/.
Deconstructing Stuxnet: The Beast Is Loose By David Gewirtz
I r a n ’s P r e s i d e n t Mahmoud Ahmadinejad speaks during a ceremony at the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility 350 kilometres (220 miles) south of Tehran April 9, 2007. The White House said on Monday it was concerned about Iran’s announcement that it had entered the industrial stage of its nuclear program. REUTERS/Caren Firouz (IRAN)
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I
n the early summer of 2012, the Internet was abuzz with a story about the U.S. going on the cyberoffensive. According to David E. Sanger in an article published on June 1 in The New York Times, the Stuxnet worm was created by the United States with some involvement by Israel. The design goal of the worm was to damage the Iranian nuclear program. By all reports, it succeeded.
Discussing Stuxnet is a difficult matter. First, we all know the rules about discussing ongoing operations. Stuxnet (and another worm called Flame) may still operating in-country in Iran. Second, although the Times piece claims with certainty that the United States orchestrated the worm, NYT doesn’t actually cite any official sources or name any names of individuals actually involved with the op. Absent some official U.S. government confirmation, I’m unwilling to simply accept on faith the veracity of the Times’ story although much of what they describe is plausible enough. Therefore, in discussing Stuxnet, we’ll look at it as something that “might have” and “possibly” originated with the U.S., rather than “did” or “has” originated with the U.S. The difference is subtle, but important,
The result: nearly a thousand nuclear centrifuges spun out of control and were damaged. Iran’s nuclear efforts were set back by months and possibly years. If this was a Tom Clancy novel, we’d celebrate the heroic spies who managed to pull it off, and wait impatiently for the sequel. But this isn’t a novel. If what The New York Times reported is true, some very dangerous mistakes were made. The worm was delivered though HUMINT (HUman INTelligence) meth-
The New York Times article reports that there’s a bit of a twist to our story. Apparently, Israel was involved in the coding of the worm itself, or in recruiting the human agent who delivered the thumb drive into the Natanz facility. In either case, as the story goes, it’s possible that Israel removed some of the self-destruction provisions from Stuxnet, so once it got out into the wild, it didn’t die like it was supposed to, and instead was able to spread. Since we can’t confirm the NYT reports, we’re not going to focus
And that brings us back to Iran. In 2007, President Bush said, “Iran’s active pursuit of technology that could lead to nuclear weapons threatens to put a region already known for instability and violence under the shadow of a nuclear holocaust.” as you’ll see throughout the rest of this analysis. So, what is Stuxnet alleged to have done? It was designed to interrupt the Iranian nuclear program by modifying the code inside Siemens PCS7 process controllers and destabilize nuclear centrifuges. A second element of the op was to mislead human operators working in Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility into thinking everything was working within normal parameters, so they wouldn’t perform emergency shutdowns on the centrifuges.
ods into Natanz, located in the northern part of Iran’s Isfahan Province. It was smuggled in by a dupe or a collaborator on a USB thumb drive. Once inside the facility, Stuxnet traveled over the internal computer network, seeking out the process controllers and systems it was intended to damage. Unfortunately, the worm also apparently found its way onto an unsuspecting worker’s laptop. The worker took the laptop home, connected it to the Internet, and unknowingly released the very advanced Stuxnet technology onto the wild, open Internet.
on what happened. Instead, let’s stipulate for the moment that the U.S. did initiate this action, and then discuss where such an operation fits as a matter of national security strategy. Iranian clerics carry a banner as they arrive to create a human chain around the Natanz uranium enrichment facility during a rally to show support for Iran’s nuclear programme, in Natanz, 350km (217 miles) south of the captial Tehran, November 18, 2005. Iran took the highly unusual step of running a costly full-page ad in the New York Times defending its nuclear activities and accusing the United States and European allies of creating an “unnecessary crisis.” REUTERS/ Morteza Nikoubazl
is undeniable, however, is that espionage has been a key element of national security for almost every major nation state, including America.
Many analysts and members of the press outside the operation’s inner circle have been aware of Stuxnet for quite some time. As far back as January 2011, I wrote a piece for ZDNet (an online site for IT professionals that’s part of the CNET and CBS networks). In it, I described Stuxnet as “a watershed event in weaponization, ushering in a new era and type of weapon that will have a profound effect on the theater of war”. What we’ve found since then is that Stuxnet hasn’t been used so much as an offensive weapon, like a nuke, but far more as an additional tool in the kitbag of spycraft and espionage.
The problem is this: somehow the genie was let out of the bottle. The world -- and our enemies -became aware that not only did America presumably engage in a form of cyberespionage, but more to the point, it worked.
Espionage is a curious beast. Nearly all major nations have conducted spying operations since the beginning of recorded time. Almost 2,800 years ago, Sun Tzu described spying as the “divine manipulation of the threads.” He claimed, “It is the sovereign’s most precious faculty.” Then, like now, spying was used as a way to prevent and/or gain advantage in war. In wartime, spying could clear the fog of war, giving forces an advantage. This could make an army more effective, and it could save soldiers’ lives. In peacetime, spying can help prevent war by destabilizing a nation, technology, populace, or government. If a specific end goal is desired by the spying nation, and if it can be achieved through covert means, espionage can actually eliminate the need for attacking with force. Unless, of course, you get caught. In that case, a failed espionage operation could actually accelerate the rush to war. Espionage is a delicate tool, best used with the precision of a scalpel, not the brute force of a sledge hammer. The morality and “rightness” of espionage has been debated for almost as long as there has been organized governance. What
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It is in this light that we must look at Stuxnet. If The New York Times is to be believed, the Stuxnet operation (called “Olympic Games”) began under President Bush and continued under President Obama. President Bush, of course, is a lightning-rod for controversy when it comes to conducting warfighting. There is considerable debate about whether America should have ever begun our two longest-running wars: Iraq and Afghanistan. An infamous element of this debate is the question of whether America ever fully believed weapons of mass destruction existed in Iraq -and, if so, whether it was the responsibility of U.S. troops to find and neutralize them. In truth, which side of the debate you’re on doesn’t matter. It is a matter of doctrine that America (and some of its allies) cannot allow rogue, fundamentalist, or unstable states to attain nuclear status. And that brings us back to Iran. In 2007, President Bush said, “Iran’s active pursuit of technology that could lead to nuclear weapons threatens to put a region already known for instability and violence under the shadow of a nuclear holocaust.” Echoing this as a candidate for President, Barack Obama stated, “Let me be absolutely clear: Iran is a grave threat.” For both administrations, then, it’s clear that Iran has been a source of considerable concern. Again, we’re not debating whether this determination is right or wrong. It’s enough, for our purposes, to understand that -- as a matter of policy -- the United States does not wish to allow Iran to join the nuclear club. Given that matter of policy, the question then becomes simple: how do we prevent Iran from achieving functional nuclear status? America has many tools here, ranging from diplomacy and sanctions to traditional espionage, bribery, fomenting rebellion, encouraging regime change, and -- as a worst case -- all out war. This is just the sort of situation that’s almost textbook-perfect for espionage: use covert means to accomplish a goal, which otherwise might have to be accomplished by expensive, protracted war. When we’ve looked at cyberwar in the past, we’ve generally looked at it from the point of view of digital defense. We’ve looked at it as an asymmetric battlespace, where we have to protect against every possible attack and all the enemy has to do is get through in one or two areas to do damage. We’ve looked at defending the nation from cyberattack, not using Internet-based tools to conduct an attack. But Stuxnet showcases a
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more nuanced and perhaps less idealistic view of cyberwar technology. Espionage -- and, in fact, governance itself -- often operates in a gray zone between the black and white of right and wrong. It operates in a stark ends-justifies-themeans reality that’s both easy and hard to refute. It’s easy, on one hand, to say that attacking or spying on a sovereign nation is wrong, period. But it’s hard to refute the legitimate concerns that say we can’t let troublesome regimes get their hands on nuclear technology. If a morally gray activity like espionage -- or like Stuxnet -- can prevent nutball regimes from getting nukes, and keep us from all-out war, it might be worth doing. Clearly, that was the “ripped from a sciencefiction novel” option presented to Presidents Bush and Obama. Were operational security maintained throughout its execution, the use of Stuxnet to destabilize Iran’s nuclear program might well have been the most “Presidential” decision possible in light of the other options. The problem is this: somehow the genie was let out of the bottle. The world -- and our enemies -- became aware that not only did America presumably engage in a form of cyberespionage, but more to the point, it worked. This had the unfortunate side effect of letting our enemies know that this new modality was not only in use, it was effective. Worse, because the worm itself escaped into the wild, the actual code, the actual technology that makes Stuxnet possible escaped with it. Any competent programmer could reverse engineer the code and find out what makes the thing tick, determine its essential blueprint, and then use that knowledge to build a new weapon, one aimed at us. This was the fundamental mistake of Stuxnet. Whether it was a mistake made at the National Command Authority level or an oversight in the project management process, we may never know. Either way, the beast is loose.
About the Author David Gewirtz is the director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute and editor-in-chief of the ZATZ technical magazines. He regularly writes commentary and analysis for CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360, and has written more than 700 articles about technology. David is a former professor of computer science, has lectured at Princeton, Berkeley, UCLA, and Stanford, has been awarded the prestigious Sigma Xi Research Award in Engineering, and was a candidate for the 2008 Pulitzer Prize in Letters. He is the Cyberterrorism Advisor for IACSP. David’s personal Web site is at DavidGewirtz.com Read his blog at CNN Anderson Cooper 360 for politics, policy, and analysis. Read his blog at CBS Interactive’s ZDNet Government where tech meets politics and government. Or Follow him on Twitter at @DavidGewirtz
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The Art Of Business:
Lessons On Counter Espionage By Luke Bencie and Josh Tallis
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T
he contemporary business tie has a long and unexpected history behind it. Tracing its way back through Victorian fashion and 15th century Parisian fancies, it seems as if the necktie originated as a cravat worn by Croatian warriors. So, modern businessmen—wear your armor boldly. Corporate Espionage:
“One good spy is worth 10,000 soldiers” -Sun Tzu, The Art of War Spying has been called the world’s second oldest profession (you can guess the first…). Since the dawn of civilized man, only time itself has proven o be a more valuable commodity than information. In the cutthroat world of business warfare, this gathering of information vis-à-vis a competitor comes in a variety of forms and takes several names. On the “ethical” end of the spectrum, business professionals may refer to this collection effort as: • • • •
Open-source research Market analysis Due-diligence Competitive Intelligence
These terms represent how a company legally acquires dirt on their rivals. However, what if a company wanted to know more about their competition than just what a few clicks on Google could tell them? In these particular instances, the information becomes exponentially more valuable – with sometimes millions, if not billions of dollars at stake. Think Pepsi going after Coke’s secret recipe. Or Mrs. Fields hunting for the Keebler elf cottage. When we transition from dealing with balance sheets that contain a few zeros to ones with seven or eight, the knowledge desired ceases to be called information and becomes what is known as intelligence. According to the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), the folks who play James Bond for a living, intelligence is defined as: A body of evidence and the conclusions drawn there from that is acquired and furnished in response to the known or
perceived requirements of consumers. It is often derived from information that is concealed or not intended to be available for use by the acquirer. Remember, the major difference between information and intelligence is that intelligence is something you do not want your competition to know. It’s that not yet patented schematic you have stowed under your mattress or that business plan you made your partner swallow. Now, acquiring that intelligence need not be illegal or unethical, but it does require a degree of vigilance and perception above and beyond the gathering of basic information. However, to gain access to this intelligence, many individuals, companies and governments do in fact engage in the more dubiously legal end of the scale, practicing what is known as: • Economic Espionage • Industrial Espionage • Corporate Espionage Although slightly variable in definition, each can be equally damaging to the person or organization targeted for attack.
The Creed of Success: The Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu, author of the manifesto The Art of War (written around 500 B.C.E), continues his prolific resistance to outdating by once again proving relevant to the topic at hand. Sun Tzu’s immediate applicability to the 21st century businessman may still
seem ambiguous to you though. Allow us to clarify. To begin, one must simply note his pragmatic approach to the economics of warfare. In chapter 2, “Waging War,” Sun Tzu opens with a detailed explanation of the cost of raising a host. He is painfully aware that a military is only as fast and as able as its supply line. The same lesson is entirely applicable to business. To quote The Art of War for Managers by Steven and Gerald Michaelson, “all business problems become financial problems.” Taking heed from Sun Tzu is a way to ensure your business problems are addressed before they become money issues. Yet while all of this conniving may appear to be a symptom of the modern world, an appealing battle cry for the Occupiers in Central Park, recall how we opened this article; spying is as old as information. In fact, the authoritative treatise on warfare and espionage, which has withstood the test of time like no work other than the Bible, is nearly 2,500 years old. Whether you know of this famous Chinese general through the history books, or likely the 1980’s movie “Wall Street” (where Gordon Gekko instructs his young protégé, Bud Fox, to read up on Sun Tzu’s strategic principles), the classic Art of War has become a staple of popular America culture. From military leaders, to businessmen, to athletic coaches, and even a few overzealous divorcees, The Art of War has been required reading for anyone who thinks to gain an advantage over their competition.
From military leaders, to businessmen, to athletic coaches, and even a few overzealous divorcees, The Art of War has been required reading for anyone who thinks to gain an advantage over their competition.
In it, Sun Tzu dictates five constant factors of warfare: moral influence, weather, terrain, commander, doctrine. Through time and place they have proven true. And in much the same way as armed conflict, those constants can be applied to any competitive environment. In The Art of War for Managers, the authors outline how these constants translate into a modern business world:
to meet the realities of your terrain. Your doctrine makes it simple for new employees to integrate into your operations and old employees to adapt to emerging conditions. Of course your troops are an integral part of all of this, and it is officers and discipline in the ranks that makes a business work as a coherent unit.
Moral Influence - a spirit of mission, the belief in the superiority of your purpose or product
So central is the gathering of information to success that Sun Tzu dedicates an entire chapter
Spy Game
work out there. And while the British SIS may not be rifling through your luggage while you wait for your bag at Heathrow (although hey, you never know!), you can be sure that your main overseas business competitor has a bookshelf that looks awfully similar… So now that we know what intelligence is and what your competition is after, how can you protect that valuable information? The answer is that knowledge of the motivations, intentions, and capabilities of an opponent are the most effective and efficient means of successfully protecting your organization. By rec-
As true today as it was centuries ago, Sun Tzu continues: “Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver…One good spy is worth a thousand soldiers.” Sun Tzu recognized that although one military (business) may outmatch its opponent in terms of size and strength (market penetration and revenue), knowledge of the opponent’s intentions is often times much more valuable than brute force. To parlay that into
“Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver…One good spy is worth a thousand soldiers.”
Weather - outside forces, as in competition or unexpected changes in the business environment Terrain - marketplace, the arena within which your company fights for ground Commander - leadership, much the same as a good leader in any situation Doctrine - your guiding principles, the ideology that paves the way for success Applying these constants is a guaranteed way of increasing your odds of success in battle. Allowing your business to operate morally gives your employees a sense of purpose. Superior leadership keeps everyone working with a devoted objective. An understanding of market conditions means that objective will be targeted
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to the subject. In “The Use of Spies,” Sun Tzu tells us: “Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men…Be subtle, use your spies for every type of business.” This idea, that “knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men,” is the underlying fundamental of every intelligence agency on the planet. In fact, The Art of War is probably found on more bookcases of the world’s 100+ foreign intelligence services than any other
ognizing that your knowledge is potentially lucrative for a competitor, i.e. Coke’s secret recipe or how McDonalds cooks those amazing french-fries, you can make small adjustments that pay tremendous dividends. Never leave your laptop in your luggage or hotel room, for example; do not access non-secure Wi-Fi connections; do not volunteer information to your overly friendly taxi driver, and look over your shoulder before stuffing secret documents into your pillow.
business terms, one company may posses more capital and resources than its nearest competitor, but if that competitor is developing a new product that will change the landscape of the marketplace, the larger company may be doomed to irrelevance in just a short amount of time. Think of how different Apple’s meteoric rise from near bankruptcy to the most valuable company in the world would have been had Microsoft understood the appeal of the products Steve Jobs was to unleash.
Of course that is all defensive in nature. Yet Sun Tzu did not survive 2,500 years because he played it safe. His advice is clear: the best defense is a good offense. Essentially, through spying, a coach, general, CEO or angry spouse can protect his or her own organization’s resources by taking advantage of their competitor’s concealed weaknesses.
Deception:
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“It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.” Chapter 13, Line 23 Sun Tzu’s emphasis on knowledge and deception leads him so far as to assert that subduing
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the enemy without fighting is the supreme objective. By engaging in a conflict of price slashing, expensive media attacks, product duplication or angry yelling outside at 3 A.M., you are fighting a war. If you can sidestep those traps and address the market’s needs better than any other competitor, you will have won without the need to fight. Winning without fighting is not easy of course, and not always possible. But learning how to
serious structural damages. The sophisticated operation could have given the Libyans enough time to successfully enrich weapons grade material. Earlier still, Japanese diplomatic deception left Roosevelt’s administration entirely unprepared on the early morning of December 7, 1941. Pearl Harbor’s terrible success crippled the United States’ Pacific Navy in a nearly successful attempt by a lesser power to overcome traditional odds.
not be afraid to invest time and money into the collection of information. And above all recall Sun Tzu’s prologue to chapter two; an endless campaign is far more costly over time than the devotion of resources to a quick and battle-less victory.
dom into easy to implement steps. Sun Tzu favors them extensively in his writings, so it seems fitting to end with one final list. These principles will help guide you and your business through establishing your own identity:
By practicing deception, you gain control over what your competition knows. This means you can control how they will react and consequently how you can capitalize on that misdirection. Perhaps Sun Tzu’s single most important quote in the Art of War is that “all warfare is based on deception.” Whether you are operating of-
• Know when to fight and when not to; sometimes inaction is an action. • Know your competition; do not address a Fortune 500 as you would a momand-pop shop. • Stay united in purpose and action. • Always be prepared; taking advantage of a rival’s
Perhaps Sun Tzu’s single most important quote in the Art of War is that “all warfare is based on deception.” Whether you are operating offensively or defensively, your most reliable weapon and ally is hiding your true intent from the competition. deceive your competition is a fundamental way of maximizing your chances of a clean victory. By watching what they are doing, what they are not doing, testing their responses and involving your entire operation, you can know your rivals well enough to employ deceit effectively. There is no better weapon for the out-gunned than deception. Consider these examples from history: Operations in World War II implemented deception to create everything from fictitious artillery divisions to entire cities. One instance has allied forces building fake villages across the Nile Valley by simply using flashlights to confuse German bombers on night runs. In the 1990s U.S. intelligence officials permitted Libyan nuclear ambitions to go unchecked when they were tricked into believing a plant had sustained
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Today, deception by companies, governments and politicians clouds our ability to accurately predict the power and wealth they may or may not possess. Again Apple is a good example. The proliferation of fake trial devices and compartmentalized information they employ before product launches, in the development stage, keeps competitors and reporters in the dark until they are available en-masse. This gives Apple a tremendous advantage in creating and predicting markets. No one knew what the iPad could do before it was unveiled, or even what it would look like. After all, you cannot out-design a product you haven’t seen! What does deception mean for you? We are certainly not implying you hire a host of corporate spies. Though far be it from us to stop you… Rather, encourage an intelligent business atmosphere that thrives on observation and reward. Do
fensively or defensively, your most reliable weapon and ally is hiding your true intent from the competition.
Conclusion: Individuals, organizations and nations rise and fall but the basic principles of survival and success remain unchanged. Gathering knowledge about the competition is synonymous with achieving economic, political and personal gain. This will always hold true. The only option you have is which side of the fence you will end up on. To return to Gordon Gekko: according to Sun Tzu, every battle is won before it is fought. Intelligence provides you the context to know where victory lies. Business is not throwing darts at a dartboard. Bet on a sure thing and you will always win. Lists are a good way of consolidating your collection of wis-
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temporary mistake requires vigilance. • Empower your employees, especially your managers; if you have a well-understood set of principles you can grant greater independence to your teams without worrying toward what end they are working. So go on, don those suits of armor and Croatian battle tassels. If you know yourself and your enemy, you should never have cause to fret.
About the Authors Luke Bencie is the Managing Director of Security Management International, LLC. His experience traveling to over 100 countries and teaching the “Counter-Espionage for Business Travelers” course was the inspiration behind his upcoming book. He can be reached at luke.bencie@ smiconsultancy.com. Josh Tallis is a Junior Security Associate at SMI. He can b e re a c h e d a t j t a l l i s @ smiconsultancy.com.
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The Iran Hezbollah Strategic And Terrorist Threat To Africa By Ely Karmon
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Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir (R) walks with Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his arrival at Khartoum Airport September 25, 2011. Ahmadinejad arrived in Sudan late on Sunday for talks expected to focus on boosting political and economic ties between the two allies, Sudanese officials said. REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah
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B
ackground
Since President Ahmadinejad’s inauguration in 2005, Iran’s foreign policy focus has shifted from Africa to Latin America in order, as he put it, to “counter lasso” the U.S. This change accelerated after Ahmadinejad’s 2007 visits to Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Bolivia and the International Conference on Latin America held in Tehran in February 2007, where Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mehdi Mostafavi, announced the opening of embassies in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay and a representative office in Bolivia. This strategy seemed to be driven by the opportunity President Chavez gave Iran to build an anti-American axis with Venezuela and its “Bolivarian” allies in the backyard of the United States. However, Iran did not abandon its “great power” ambition to enhance its presence and influence in Africa, in the backyard of Western Europe, possibly to balance the growing European pressure on its nuclear program. According to an analysis by The Economist, while Iran has exploited anti-American sentiment in Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela, “in Africa it has concentrated on strengthening Muslim allegiances with offers of oil and aid.” In 2009, some 20 ministerial or grander visits to Africa by Iran’s diplomats, generals and president led to the signing of “a bewildering array of commercial, diplomatic and defence deals.” Addressing a group of Iranian ambassadors to African countries in December 2011, Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs Hossein Amir-Abdollahian underlined that Iran attaches major significance to the expansion of ties with all African nations “in the stra-
tegic continent and in Muslim states in particular.” He emphasized that the promotion of ties with African states is a major priority for Iran’s President Ahmadinejad, who has agreed to provide African nations with essential resources to facilitate their development and progress. Amir-Abdollahian called on the Iranian ambassadors to speed up the implementation of ongoing Iranian cultural, economic and commercial projects based in Africa. Earlier in June, in a meeting with former Malian President Alpha Oumar Konare, President Ahmadinejad expressed Tehran’s readiness to launch a joint fund with Africa.
found in attempts by the international community to isolate it. Iran has moved to find access to African markets to which it can export oil and other goods, and from which it can import strategic resources.
In January 2012 Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi underlined that bolstering ties with African countries is a top priority of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy on the background of the pressures imposed by the West to undermine Iran’s progress.
The importance of Africa in Iran’s strategic thinking was displayed by its hosting of a two-day Iran-Africa summit in Tehran on September 14-15, 2010, which brought heads of state, diplomats, business leaders and cultural representatives from over 40 African nations to Iran to discuss a range of issues. This is how Ja’far Qannadbashi, an Iranian expert, has presented Iran’s “clear strategy in Africa”:
The reasons behind Iran’s activity on the African continent are to be
The diplomatic support of African states in the United Nations (UN) has also been a strong motivation for Iran to keep African Governments close. Tehran’s efforts to boost ties and cooperation with Africa have recently led to its acceptance as an observing member of the African Union (AU), where it has shown an active presence in the AU summit meetings.
“A considerable collection of the continent have accepted Iran as their strategic ally. Iran has achieved a special place which is coveted by many of the industrial countries. The 21st century belongs to Africa due to the needs of the industrial world to merge the African economy with the global economy to use its raw material and emerging markets. Iran is well equipped with industrial and engineering capabilities of which Africa is in urgent need. In the political arena, the US’ unilateralism, domination of capitalism after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and collapse of the bipolar order, have made African countries weary of the West’s inexhaustible efforts to re-colonize the continent. Africans are politically in need of collaboration with independent powers capable of stabilizing their position in the power hierarchy. Iran can be this reliable power through which the independence of Africa is preserved.” The threat of new sanctions against Iranian oil exports has forced Iran to diversify its oil exports to include growing economies in Africa, which also helps other forms of economic, diplomatic and security cooperation with the continent. Nigeria for instance, by gaining access to Iranian oil would be able to export its own oil to other markets. Like in Latin America, Iran has promised to build energy infrastructure in several African countries: to refurbish refineries, to assist in the construction of power plants and even to share its civil nuclear technology. In the commercial field, Iran has shown interest in purchasing cocoa from Ghana. One relatively successful project has been the establishment of an Iranian car manufacturing business in Senegal for production of local cabs. The export of cars to Senegal and Sudan helps sustain the cost for Iran’s own internal automobile industry.
The importance of Africa in Iran’s strategic thinking was displayed by its hosting of a twoday Iran-Africa summit in Tehran on September 14-15, 2010, which brought heads of state, diplomats, business leaders and cultural representatives from over 40 African nations to Iran to discuss a range of issues.
uranium reserves in Somali areas under the rebels’ control.
The stressing of cultural proximity to the Islamic population of certain regions of Africa have allowed Iran to position itself as an alternative to what it refers to as the neo-colonial mindsets and imperialist intentions of the West. “I said Iran is near us, is getting nearer by each day. I am not referring to bilateral relations, important though these are. I am referring to the ineluctable fate that binds Iran to the rest of the world, including us, especially us. She is Third World, which we are. She is anti-imperialist, which we are,” claimed an op-ed in Zimbabwe’s most popular daily newspaper. Finally, Iran is determined to counter the diplomatic and economic activities of its arch-enemy Israel, which has a history of strong diplomatic, economic and security rela-
During a visit to Teheran in March 2011, Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister, Simbarashe Mumbengegwi, said his country is willing to cooperate with Iran on uranium mining. “Zimbabwe has rich uranium reserves,” he said, “but is faced with a shortage of funds and does not possess the technical knowledge and equipment needed for extracting rich uranium ore […] If we can work together on uranium mining, it will improve the economic situation of both countries.” In April 2011, the Sunday Telegraph reported that Iran had struck a secret deal with Zimbabwe to mine its uranium reserves in return for supplying oil. Iran has also tried to establish a strategic relationship with Niger, one of Africa’s most important uranium producers, but these at-
In December 2011, Iran announced that it will open an embassy in the uranium-rich Namibia, thus strengthening the already existing bilateral ties. Namibian Foreign Minister Utoni Nujoma declared that “Iran’s resistance in acquiring peaceful nuclear technology despite all pressures was praiseworthy… and [the two countries] must find ways to make plans on expansion of bilateral ties operational.”
Iranian efforts to expand its strategic presence and influence in East Africa Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki visited Tehran in December 2008, and Ahmadinejad went to Djibouti in February 2009, where he signed five cooperation agreements with his Djiboutian counterpart. According to the Eritrean opposi-
the port of Assab randomly; in case of a conflict with the West over the nuclear question, Tehran would be in a position to carry out a “maritime jihad.” Iran is engaged lately in high level contacts with the leaders of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and the Comoro Islands while contacts with Ethiopia have been occurring at a lower level. Kenya’s government stated that is looking forward for Iranian investments. According to a statement issued by the Iranian Red Crescent Society (RC), Iran’s third polyclinic in Kenya will be opened in Mombasa in the near future. Iran has already set up two polyclinics in the capital city of Nairobi. It seems though Iran is also interested to advance the Shiite religious presence in Kenya. The Kenyan Shia cleric, Morteza Morteza, said that “the number of Shia Muslims
An Iranian naval ship travels through the Suez Canal near Ismailia, some 120 km (75 miles) north of Cairo February 22, 2011. Two Iranian naval ships entered the Suez Canal on Tuesday and were heading toward the Mediterranean, a canal official said, a move certain to anger Israel. REUTERS/Stringer
In December 2011, Iran announced that it will open an embassy in the uranium-rich Namibia, thus strengthening the already existing bilateral ties. Namibian Foreign Minister Utoni Nujoma declared that “Iran’s resistance in acquiring peaceful nuclear technology despite all pressures was praiseworthy”… tions with sub-Saharan Africa, and compete with Egypt, an important regional rival with a long tradition of relations with Africa.
Uranium trade and nuclear ambitions The “dark side” of Iran’s Africa policy is its attempts to extract uranium from African nations.
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tempts failed when former President Mamadou Tanja was removed from power during a coup in 2010. In 2005, Tanzania stopped a ship that was found to be carrying uranium from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Iran. In 2009 the UN reported that Iran had struck a deal with Somali rebels in which it would deliver certain weapons to these rebels in return for access to
tion media, Asmarino, Eritrea has granted Iran total control of the Red Sea port of Assab, where Iranian submarines “deployed troops, weapons and long-range missiles... under the pretext of defending the local oil refinery.” Other media outlets have stated that Eritrea was hosting military bases for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Radio France Internationale (RFI) remarked that “Iran has not chosen
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has sharply increased, and a lot of Kenyans became familiar with this honorable school of thought.” The Iranian Speaker of the Parliament, Ali Larijani, met in Tehran with former Tanzanian president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, and with the Speaker of the Tanzanian House of Representative, Pandu Ameir Kificho, who attended the Fifth International Conference on the Palestinian
Intifada. On that occasion, Larijani maintained that the development of relations with Africa was one of Iran’s priorities.
Sudan the pivot of Iran-Africa relations “Sudan is the pivot of Iran-Africa relations,” and “expanding ties with African nations is high on Iran’s foreign policy agenda,” said Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar in Khartoum during a four-day official visit in March 2008. He explained that “religious and cultural affinities between the two countries and a common understanding of major regional and global issues significantly contribute to the expansion of Iran-Sudan relations.” The Sudanese counterpart, Gen. Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein called Najjar’s visit to Sudan a “turning point” in Iran-Sudan defense ties. Sudan has strengthened its relationship with the Islamic Republic since 1989, when Brigadier Omar al-Bashir took power in Sudan in an Islamist coup. Iran sent weap-
ons and oil supplies and some 2000 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisors to train Bashir’s army shortly after the revolution. Four years later Iran provided Sudan valuable military support in armored cars, heavy artillery, and radar equipment. In fact, the entire organization and doctrine of the Sudanese Popular Defense Force (PDF) is based on the concept of popular mobilization of the IRGC. Sudan and Iran are subjected to U.S. economic sanctions as states sponsors of terrorism and the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir for war crimes in Darfur. Even Russia and China backed away from overtly cooperating with Sudan’s military as a result of the Darfur crisis. However, Ayatollah Khatami explicitly condemned the International Criminal Court saying that the warrant was issued because Sudan “has stood up to the extravagance of colonial powers” and has sought to implement Sharia law, “actions that Iran supports.”
This pushed Sudan and Iran in recent years to increase their bilateral economic, military, and nuclear cooperation. In March 2008, the two countries signed a mutual defense agreement, “providing for consolidated defense ties and joint efforts to strengthen peace and security in the Horn of Africa,” including training for Sudanese army and intelligence officers in Iran. Iran is engaged in several development projects in Sudan, including a $30 million water treatment project and a $130 million electrical production project. In 2006, Ayatollah Khamanei told Sudan President Omar Al-Bashir that “the Islamic Republic is ready to transfer this experience and the technology and knowledge of its [nuclear] scientists” to other friendly countries. In return, Bashir called Iran’s enrichment of uranium a great victory for the Islamic world and supported Iran’s right to its peaceful nuclear program. In December 2009, Sudanese FM Deng stated that, “our fundamental stance is to back Iran’s nuclear issue and we always stand by Iran.”
During his September 2011 visit to Sudan, Ahmadinejad said that Iran and Sudan were standing together as “defenders of Islam” in the face of “pressure from the colonialists, who want to impose things that affect our people negatively.” Omar al-Bashir, for his part, stated that his “country, that owns rich natural resources, has opened all ways of cooperation to Iran so that the two countries can benefit from these resources in the interest of their nations and the entire Islamic Ummah through partnership and joint cooperation.” Sanam Vakil, an expert on Iran at the Johns Hopkins University, thinks Iran has been successful in strengthening ties with Sudan because the two countries have an ideological link: “standing up against the West and imperialism.” According to Amir Ziadzadeh, an Iranian African affairs expert, Ahmadinejad’s last visit to Sudan is possibly related to the recent developments in Egypt and Libya and “the separation of southern Sudan” and has an important political and strategic dimension in the framework of the two countries’ cooperation “against the mutual enemies, i.e. the US and Israel.”
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Thus Sudan has become central to Iranian foreign relations in the Horn of Africa.
Major regional blunder: Iranian Arms Shipment to Nigeria In late October 2010, Nigerian officials seized in Lagos’ Apapa Port thirteen shipping containers of weapons, including artillery rockets, rifle rounds and arms. The seizure came after a twin car bombing on October 1, 2010 (Nigeria’s Independence Day) in Abuja, which killed at least twelve people and sparked new concerns, as Nigeria presidential elections were set to be held in April 2011. A few weeks after the seizure of the weapons’ cargo, Nigeria’s drug enforcement agency captured in Lagos 30 kilograms of high-quality heroin worth nearly $10 million inside a shipment of auto parts sent from Iran and with Europe as its final destination. Gambia-Iran Relations Iran and Gambia enjoyed a good diplomatic and economic relationship, a mutual understanding in foreign policy base on “shared feeling of oppression from the West: Iran under sanctions for its nuclear program and Gambia accused of
cooperation with the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been cancelled,” the Gambian Foreign Ministry stated. Senegal’s Reaction According to African expert J.Peter Pham, Senegal’s President Abdou Diouf shut down the Iranian embassy in Dakar in 1984, accusing its diplomats of spreading Shia religious propaganda and covertly financing Senegalese media and other organizations. The diplomatic mission was allowed to reopen in the 1990s and “relations between Dakar and Tehran warmed considerably since Abdoulaye Wade became president in 2000.” The Economist has noted that Senegal, though poor and quite small in population, carries diplomatic weight in Francophone Africa and at the UN, so “Iran has been bombarding it with goodwill” by building the Khodro car factory, promising to build tractors, an oil refinery and a chemical plant, and provide cheap oil. Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade “has gratefully accepted this bounty.” Under Wade, permission was given for an Iranian cleric to build a Shi’a seminary, or hawza, in Senegal, where Senegalese youth are educated by mullahs trained in
Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute even claimed in a 2008 article that Senegal was “quietly turning into West Africa’s Venezuela.” Senegal was extremely worried about the Iranian arms shipment, fearing that given the Gambian President’s alleged relation with MDFC, the weapons could have ended up in the rebels’ hands. These fears were confirmed when the Senegalese found evidence that the MFDC were in possession of sophisticated Iranian weapons. Therefore, after a failed Turkish mediation, and in spite of the excellent relations of President Wade with Ahmadinejad, Senegal decided to definitely cut its diplomatic ties with Iran.
Iranian sponsorship of subversion and terrorism in Africa Morocco and Iran have had a difficult relationship since the Iranian revolution in 1979 and normalized relations only in the late 1990s. Sunni scholars in Morocco have denounced what they say is an effort to convert people to Shia Islam. Morocco severed diplomatic relations with Iran accusing its diplomatic mission of seeking to spread Shia Islam in the predominantly Sunni Muslim kingdom, threatening “the religious unity of the country.” As Mohamed VI, Morocco’s king, is the country’s
training them as Hezbollah operatives or Iranian intelligence agents. In 2002, Shafi Ibrahim, a leader of a cell of Ugandan Shi’as working for Iran and possibly Hezbollah, was arrested by Ugandan Police. Sharif Wadoulo, another Ugandan Shi’a member of the same cell, fled to a Gulf country. Ibrahim and a group of African students traveled to Iran in 1996 on scholarships to study theology at Razavi University in Mashhad. Alongside Lebanese Hezbollah trainees, Ibrahim and Wadoulo underwent training in 2001 at two facilities in the Amaniyeh area of north Tehran. They were taught to use small arms, produce explosive devices, collect pre-operational intelligence, plan escape routes, and withstand interrogation techniques. The students were given fictitious covers, money, and means of communication, then “instructed to collect intelligence on Americans and Westerners present in Uganda and other countries.” In October 2003 Israeli intelligence thwarted an Iranian plot to kidnap Israeli businessmen and political leaders in Africa. Iranian intelligence targeted Israelis in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania. In February 2004, an Iranian diplomat was taken into custody by Nigerian police for spying on the Israeli embassy, the Nigerian Petroleum Corp towers, the British Council, and the Defense Ministry and Army headquarters in the capital of Abuja.
Hezbollah operates mainly in West Africa, here it has been operational since the early 1980s. Like in Latin America, most of Hezbollah’s infrastructure is based on local Lebanese Shia communities.
human rights abuses.” In November 2009 Ahmadinejad visited Gambia to strengthen ties. In November 2010, in reaction to the weapons shipment, the Gambian government cut diplomatic ties with Iran and asked the Iranian diplomats to leave the country within 48 hours. “All Government of Gambia projects and programs, that were being implemented in
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Iranian institutions. These institutions converted a small, but not insignificant, number of Senegalese Muslims to Shiism. Wade has supported “Iran’s commitment to struggle against the proliferation of nuclear weapons” (!) and expressed confidence in “the assurance by his Iranian counterpart to not exploit uranium for anything other than peaceful and civilian uses.”
official religious leader, “any attempt to convert Sunni Muslims has been equated to an attack on the monarchy,” the Moroccan foreign ministry said. According to Israeli intelligence, “many foreign students, including [Shi’a students] from Uganda and other African countries, are sent to study theology in Iranian universities” as a means of recruiting and
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The 2,000 members of the IRGC and the Quds Forces, which helped train Sudanese security forces at the beginning of the 1990s, also trained foreign Islamist fighters, as Khartoum permitted Tehran to use Sudan as a secure transit point and meeting site for Iranian based radical groups. According to the U.S. indictment of Osama binLaden, the Al-Qaeda leaders met with an Iranian religious official
in Khartoum as part of an effort to arrange a tripartite agreement between Iran, Al-Qaeda and Sudan’s ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) for putting aside ideological differences and work against the U.S., Israel and other Western countries. After the expulsion of Al-Qaeda elements from Sudan in 1996, this cooperation appears to have been ceased.
Sudan’s role in the Iranian efforts to deliver weapons to Hamas Reports that Israel may have carried out an air attack on an Iranian weapons convoy in the Sudanese desert in January 2009 have drawn attention to an Iranian arms smuggling network to deliver weapons to Hamas in Gaza, in which Sudan is believed to be playing a key role. The weapons are transported with trucks across Sudan into the Sinai Peninsula, from where they are smuggled by Bedouins to Gaza through an underground tunnel network.
Actually it was reported that since January 2009 Israel had conducted three military strikes against smugglers transporting Iranian weapons shipments destined for Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, at the height of the fighting during the Israeli Cast Lead operation against Hamas terrorism in Gaza.
Hezbollah activity in Africa
The opposition Sudanese newspaper Rai al-Shaab claimed that, as part of a secret clause in the 2008 defense pact between Iran and Sudan, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is operating a secret weapons factory in Sudan to funnel weapons to Iran-sponsored terrorist organizations in Africa and the Middle East, including supplying the “Houthis [in Yemen], Somalis, and ... Hamas in the Gaza Strip with missiles.” Soon after it was published, Sudanese authorities shut down the entire newspaper and its deputy editor was arrested on charges of “terrorism, espionage and destabilizing the constitutional system.”
Lebanese, mostly Shiite immigrants, first arrived in West Africa around the turn of the century. They came to dominate, produce and retail trade within a few decades and gained control of the lucrative diamonds market discovered in eastern Sierra Leone in 1930. “Lebanese merchants play a major role in the region’s economy today, particularly in the Ivory Coast (home to over 100,000 Lebanese), Senegal (roughly 20,000), and Sierra Leone (roughly 6,000 today; about 30,000 prior to the outbreak of civil war in 1991), and have developed strong ties with governing elites in all three countries.” Thus Hezbollah has found a natural constituency among the local Lebanese Shiite,
Hezbollah operates mainly in West Africa, where it has been operational since the early 1980s. Like in Latin America, most of Hezbollah’s infrastructure is based on local Lebanese Shia communities.
in competition with the Shiite Lebanese Amal movement. Hezbollah collects donations from businesses, recruits new members and launders money, operates front companies, and is also deeply involved in the “blood diamond” trade. In the diamond trade, Hezbollah operates in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. One example, which testifies of the successful money rising by Hezbollah in the region, is the accident of a flight from Cotonou, Benin, in West Africa to Beirut, which crashed on takeoff on December 25, 2003. On board were senior Hezbollah members, carrying $2 million in contributions to the organization from across the region. This amount represented the regular contributions the party receives from wealthy Lebanese nationals in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Benin, and other African states. According to U.S. intelligence officials Hezbollah “maintains several front companies in sub-Saharan Africa” which are assumed to include import-export companies. The same
sources informed that many Hezbollah activists in the South America’s tri-border region relocated to Africa as a result of the investigations on Hezbollah activity after the group’s involvement in the 1992 and 1994 truck bombings in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In May 2009, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Kassim Tajideen and Abd Al Menhem Qubaysi, “two Africa-based supporters of the Hizballah terrorist organization, under E.O. 13224, by freezing any assets the designees have under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with them.” Kassim Tajideen, who operates a network of businesses in Lebanon and Africa, has contributed tens of millions of dollars to Hizballah and has sent funds to Hizballah through his brother, a Hizballah commander in Lebanon. Tajideen and his brothers run cover companies for Hezbollah in Africa. Abd Al Menhem Qubaysi is the personal representative of Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Cote d’Ivoire, communicates with Hezbollah leaders and has hosted senior Hizballah officials traveling to Cote d’Ivoire to raise money for the organization. Qubaysi also helped establish an official Hizballah foundation in Cote d’Ivoire which has been used to recruit new members for Hizballah’s military ranks in Lebanon. According to former DEA operations chief Michael Braun, Hezbollah is moving tons of cocaine into West Africa, onward to North Africa, and eventually into European markets. According to David Asher, an expert on global illicit financial networks, over the last five years, large sums of cash, often escorted by Hezbollah security guards, have been shipped from Africa to Lebanon.
“Nigerian Hezbollah”? Contrary to the shadowy and controversial Hezbollah Venezuela, the “Nigerian Hezbollah”, actually called the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), is a much more representative and active organization. The IMN is most identified with its leader, Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, who began his political career as a
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Sunni fundamentalist student leader influenced by the works of Sayyid Qutb, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood radical ideologue whose ideas lay the basis for Al-Qaeda’s ideology. In the mid-1980s he decided to pass to Shiism and his movement has grown rapidly since he was embraced by Iran. Zakzaky’s opportunistic association with the Iranian regime was rewarded with substantial funds and training, both religious and military. His movement is operating in Nigeria’s northern Muslim states Kano, Kaduna, and Zaria. Zakzaky fights not only for the implementation of the Sharia law, already imposed in some Nigerian states, but demands that Nigeria abandons secularism and becomes an Islamic state modeled on Iran. According to expatriate former senior Iranian diplomat Adel Assadinia (who personally met Zakzaky in the mid-1980s, while he was serving on the Iranian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee), IMN is poised to strike Western interests on Iran’s behalf. According to Assadinia, Zakzaky was given money to create an organized and radical Islamic force in Nigeria as “Iran’s objectives are to establish a local power base to exert influence over the national government and to act against Western interests.” A report of the Nigerian Security Organization noted that the training received by Zakzaky in Iran included “planning and executing student unrest” with a view to overthrowing the Nigerian government. IMN’s popularity is growing among the impoverished Nigerian Muslims and it is challenging the country’s traditional Muslim leaders. In January 2009, Zakzaky’s followers plunged the northern city of Zaria into turmoil after attacking the motorcade of a revered religious and cultural leader, Emir of Zazzau Alhaji Shehu Idris, on his way to a meeting on security in the city of Kaduna, at which the IMN was to be one of the subjects under discussion. The IMN’s main centers of operation are the northern universities: Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, Bayero University in Kano and the Usmanu Dan Fodio University. Although the IMN commands the following of impoverished Nigerian Muslims, its leadership is exclusively comprised of graduates from these universities.
Zakzaky’s views are radical and deliberately inflammatory. He claims Al-Qaeda and Osama bin-Laden do not exist and terrorist attacks in the West are the work of Western intelligence services, Tony Blair was responsible for the 7/7 bomb attacks in London and the U.S. and Israel are the only terrorist states in the world. He alleged that Nigeria’s secular leaders engaged in ritual sacrifices of unborn children ripped from their mothers’ wombs, asking his followers to fight them. The IMN has also been implicated in the decapitation of Christians for allegedly offending Islam. Despite Zakzaky’s plea for Muslim unity, Sunnis have been targeted during the IMN’s highly confrontational demonstrations. But Jews are the chief targets for attack, as Zakzaky portrays them as “dastardly infidels”, imploring Allah to “hasten their destruction in the world” and calling for Israel to be “wiped off the world map,” exactly like his Iranian masters. Zakzaky frequently draws inspiration from Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the deceased Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin, whose portraits are carried at the front of every IMN march and demonstration, as can be seen in many pictures and videos of the movement on the Internet. Zakzaky spoke at the London Al-Quds Day in October 2010, an annual demonstration held at the end of Ramadan in support of the resistance movements against Israel, organized by the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), a Hezbollah and Iran supporting organization. The movement’s website also reported on an event it hosted with Islamic scholar Sheikh Yusuf Ali, who said that the “utmost aim” of Jews is to “own the whole world and bring it under their control” and “enslave everyone.” In February-March 2012 Sheikh Zakzaky made a six weeks trip to the Iranian religious city of Qom where he was proud to meet Sheikh Jafar Ul-Hadi and Ayatollah Haeri Shirazi. Ayatollah Shirazi is one of the most radical Mahdist Iranian leaders who in a shocking appearance on Iran’s state television stated that instead of arresting and suppressing the opposition protesters after the elections of 2009, it would be better to kill them. “The more of them are killed, the more beneficial. If the armed forces kill some of them, it is to our benefit.” he said. He insisted that killing the
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opposition protesters “is sanctioned by obedience to Allah and the prophet and is handed down to the Supreme Leader.” Interestingly, Zakzaky claimed lately that “the current wave of attacks in the name of Boko Haram is a deliberate agenda to suppress Islamic resurgence in Nigeria, with special focus on the Islamic Movement in Nigeria.” According to him “a highly profile security report has clearly indicated the fear and apprehension of the so-called super powers on the current agitation for Islamic revival in Nigeria, that the country will eventually become Islamic, and in particular Shi’a Islam.”
Conclusion Iranian and Hezbollah presence and activity in Africa, like the one in Latin America, goes beyond the legitimate political, economic, social and cultural levels and creeps into the dangerous area of terrorism and subversion, threatening not only outside actors and interests but the very stability of the host countries. The diplomatic and political crisis resulting from Iran’s involvement in the clandestine and illegal shipment of weapons to three West African states, Nigeria, Senegal and Gambia, are a clear example of this potential threat and should be taken in consideration by other African states where Iran is active. Iran’s political and economic assets in Africa strengthen the Tehran regime, permits it to circumvent UN sanctions and diminishes the possibility of UN-backed international diplomatic and economic pressure to convince it to renounce its nuclear project. Thus, indirectly at least, it enhances the threat of Iran’s nuclear hegemonic projection in the Middle East and beyond. The Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in the January - February 2012 terrorist attacks in Azerbaijan and Georgia, Thailand and India, is a bad omen for the future. In the event of Iran’s vital interests – such as the survival of its nuclear project – being threatened by the international community, by the US alone or by Israel, Africa could be a preferred ground for retaliation, directly or with Hezbollah’s support. The Islamic Movement of Nigeria, for the moment a violent movement but not yet terrorist, could be also tempted to imitate Boko Haram, its Sunni nemesis, and enter the field of terrorist activity in the service of Iran.
About the Author Dr. Karmon is a Senior Research Scholar at the Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at IDC. He lectures on Terrorism and Guerrilla in Modern Times at The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, at the IDF Military College, and at the National Security Seminar of the Galilee College.
References 1. “Paraguay’s Persian Presence: Iran’s New Friend in Latin America,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs website, August 21, 2008, at http://www. coha.org/paraguay%E2%80%99s-persian-presenceiran%E2%80%99s-new-friend-in-latin-america/. 2. See Ely Karmon,”Iran Challenges the United States in Its Backyard, in Latin America,”American Foreign Policy Interests, 32: 5, 276 — 296. 3. Iran and Israel in Africa. A search for allies in a hostile world,” The Economist, February 4, 2010. 4. “Iran Plans to Expand Relations with African Nations,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly, December 26. 2011. 5. “FM: Expansion of Ties with Africa ‘Iran’s Top Priority,’” FARS News Agency, January 3, 2012. 6. Sim Tack “Iran’s diplomatic and economic lifeline in Africa ,” Consultancy Africa Intelligence, February 2, 2012, 7. “FM Renews Iran’s Preparedness to Foster Africa, Ethiopia’s Development,” FARS News, January 29, 2012. 8. Chris Zambelis, “Iran deals itself into African game,” Asia Times Online, January 13, 2011. 9. “In Search of a Foothold in Africa, Could the Iranian delegation’s attendance in the African Summit be a new chapter in Tehran’s African politics? Interview with Ja’far Qannadbashi,” IRD Diplomacy website, January
21, 2012, at http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/news/20/ bodyView/1897477/In.Search.of.a.Foothold.in.Africa. html. 10. Tack, Iran’s diplomatic and economic lifeline in Africa. 11. Ibid. 12. Opinion, “Iran: When mere existence is enough casus belli,” Harare The Herald Online, January 7, 2012. 13. Chris Zambelis, Iran deals itself into African game. 14. Tack, Iran’s diplomatic and economic lifeline in Africa. 15. “Iran to open embassy in uranium rich Namibia,” Africa News.com, December 12, 2011, at http://www. africanews.com/site/Iran_to_open_embassy_in_ uranium_rich_Namibia/list_messages/40602 16. Sudan Tribune, November 30, 2008; http://ww.selfidemocracy.com, November 25, 2008; http://www. Eritreadaily.net, November 29, 2008, cited by MEMRI at http://www.thememriblog.org/blog_personal/en/11759. htm. 17. Anna Mahjar-Barducci, “Iran Scooping Up African Uranium,” Stonegate Institute, October 7, 2011. 18. FARS News Agency, December 25, 2011. 19. Mahjar-Barducci, Iran Scooping Up African Uranium. 20. “Sudan the pivot of Iran-Africa relations: defense minister,” Tehran Times, March 6, 2008. 21. Ariel Farrar-Wellman, “Sudan-Iran Foreign Relations,” AEI Iran Tracker, January 17, 2010. 22. “Iran’s Military Relationship with Sudan,” The Arkenstone, Amateur Blog About Iranian Defense Issues, March 6, 2010, at http://thearkenstone.blogspot. com/2010/03/irans-military-relationship-with-sudan. html 23. Ibid. 24. “Iran ‘Could Share Nuclear Skills,’” BBC News, April 25, 2006. 25. “Sudan Supports Iran’s Right to Get Access to Peaceful Nuclear Energy,” News.Az, December 12, 2009, http://www.news.az/articles/4473 (January 5, 2010). 26. Mahjar-Barducci, Iran Scooping Up African Uranium. 27. “Sudan Needs Further Attention,” Interview with Amir Ziadzadeh, an African affairs expert, Iranian Diplomacy website, 28 September 2011, at http://www. irdiplomacy.ir/en/news/68/bodyView/16613/Sudan. Needs.Further.Attention.html.
28. Anna Mahjar-Barducci, “Iran’s Charm Offensive in Africa,” Stonegate Institute, March 18, 2011. 29. StarTribune.com, November 19, 2010. 30. Anna Mahjar-Barducci, Iran’s Charm Offensive in Africa. 31. See J.Peter Pham, “Shi’a in Senegal: Iran’s Growing Reach into Africa,” FamilySecurityMatters.org, February 18, 2010, at: http://www.familysecuritymatters. org/publications/id.5541/pub_detail.asp. Peter Pham presents an interesting picture of the Shia and Iranian religious activities in Senegal since 1978. 32. The Economist, Iran and Israel in Africa. 33. J.Peter Pham, Shi’a in Senegal: Iran’s Growing Reach into Africa. 34. Ibid. 35. Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Global Ambition,” AEI Middle East Outlook Series, March 1, 2008. 36. Anna Mahjar-Barducci, Iran’s Charm Offensive in Africa. 37. “Morocco severs relations with Iran,” Al Jazeera, March 8, 2009. 38. “Iranian State Sponsorship of Terror: Threatening U.S. Security, Global Stability, and Regional Peace,” Testimony of Matthew A. Levitt, Joint Hearing of the Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, and the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation United States House of Representatives, February 16, 2005. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Ronald Sandee, Paper titled ‘Islamism, Jihadism and Terrorism in Sudan’ presented at the American Enterprise Institute on 6 August 2004, at http://www.aei. org/files/2004/08/06/20040809_SANDEEremarks.pdf. 42. Alisha Ryu, “Alleged Israeli Attack Draws Attention to Sudan’s Ties to Iran,” VOA, 04/02/09. 43. Michael James, “Exclusive: Three Israeli Airstrikes against Sudan,” ABC News, March 27, 2009. 44. Jonathan Schanzer, “The Islamic Republic of Sudan?” ForeignPolicy.com, June 10, 2010. 45. MEIB staff, “Hezbollah and the West African Diamond Trade,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 6 No. 6-7, June/July 2004. 46. Ibid. 47. Douglas Farah, “Fighting Terrorism in Africa” Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, April 1, 2004. 48. Matthew Levitt, “Hizbullah’s African Activities
Remain Undisrupted,” RUSI/Jane’s Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor, 1 March 2004. 49. Ibid. 50. “Treasury Targets Hizballah Network in Africa,” U.S. Department of the Treasury website, May 27, 2009, at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ Pages/tg149.aspx. 51. Ibid. 52. “Party of Fraud: Hizballah’s Criminal Enterprises,” PolicyWatch #1911: Special Forum Report Featuring Michael Braun, David Asher, and Matthew Levitt, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 22, 2012. 53. About Hezbollah Venezuela see Ely Karmon, “Hezbollah America Latina: Strange Group or Real Threat?” Institute for Counter-Terrorism website, November14, 2006, at http://www.freerepublic.com/ focus/f-news/1773483/posts. 54. This subchapter is based in great part on Dan Brett, “Profile of an African Hezbollah,” MESI Issue of the Week, January 25, 2009. The paper is based on an interview with former senior Iranian diplomat Adel Assadinia, who served as Iran’s Consul General in Dubai from 2000 and 2003, served two terms in the Iranian parliament as representative of Ahwaz, holding the post of Deputy Chairman of the Parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee from 1982. He left parliament to become Iran’s ambassador to Portugal in 1990 and advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1993. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. See IMN’s website at http://www.islamicmovement. org/. 59. See “Terrorism In The World Today, What Is Terrorism? Who Are The Terrorists?” By Mallam Ibraheem Zakzaky, at http://www.islamicmovement.org/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=109 &Itemid=143 60. Dan Brett, Profile of an African Hezbollah. 61. Ibid. 62. Jonny Paul, Islamic Movement preacher to address London conference, The Jerusalem Post, October 6, 2010. 63. See the pictures of the meetings at http://www.islamicmovement.org/index. php?option=com_
The ComplexiTy of modern AsymmeTriC WArfAre By Max G. Manwaring
$45.00 Hardcover • 224 Pages
Today more than one hundred small, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars are being waged around the world. This book provides invaluable tools for fighting such wars by taking enemy perspectives into consideration. The third volume of a trilogy by Max g. Manwaring, it continues the arguments the author presented in Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime and Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries. Using case studies, Manwaring outlines vital survival lessons for leaders and organizations concerned with national security in our contemporary world. This multidimensional paradigm offers military and civilian leaders a much needed blueprint for achieving strategic victories and ensuring global security now and in the future. It combines military and police efforts with politics, diplomacy, economics, psychology, and ethics. The challenge he presents to civilian and military leaders is to take probable enemy perspectives into consideration, and turn resultant conceptions into strategic victories.
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The IACSP Announces Its’
20th
Annual Terrorism Trends & Forecasts Symposium The IACSP will be presenting its 20th Annual Terrorism, Trends & Forecasts Symposium on Thursday, September 20th, 2012. It will be held at the prestigious Bergen County Law & Public Safety Institute in Mahwah, New Jersey. Who Should Attend? • • • • • • • • •
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First Responders Military Law Enforcement Security Directors Emergency Management Government Intel Professionals Emergency Preparedness Homeland Security
When:
• Thursday, September 20th, 2012
Where:
• Bergen County Law & Public Safety Institute: Hall of Heroes: • 281 Campgaw Road, Mahwah, New Jersey, Just 45 minutes from New York City.
Directions:
• For directions to Bergen County Law & Public Safety Institute from your particular location please visit: www.co.bergen. nj.us/bclpsi/Directions.html • From New York, New Jersey area go to McCarthur Blvd. exit about 20 minutes on Rte 17 Turn left at Light On to McCarthur. Go to end Road about 1/2 Mile Turn Right on to Darlington Ave. make first left on to Seminary Road. Take Seminary Road about 1/2 mile to Campgraw Rd. Institute is about 1/2 mile on left. Enter building on left BC Bergen Law * Public Safety Institute
Dress Code:
• Casual Business
Rates:
Rates for this conference are as follows: Standard Rates: • Current IACSP Member after Aug 10th: $169 • Non-Member after Aug 10th: $199 • Vender Table Rates: Limited Availability • IACSP Members: $495 • Non-Members: $595 6 Ft Tables / Hand out Brochures / 2 people per table / Includes Free Lunch
Go to www.iacsp.com To Register Today! Or Call The IACSP Office At: Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
Vol.18, No.3
Symposium Agenda: Moderator: John Dew 07:00 - 08:30 Registration/Coffee Continental Breakfast 08:30 - 08:45 Opening Remarks by Director Brian Higgins 08:45 - 09:45 Speaker: J M Peterson
Topic: Antiterrorism for Law Enforcement & Security - News You Can Use and what you can do about the threat. Currently serves as the Special Projects Director of the Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. As a long-time IACSP member and periodic contributor to our journal, he has served on the Advisory Board as General Advisor since being appointed in 1997. He has spent all of the past 10+ years supporting the war effort, with positions including deployed on the ground as an Army Special Forces soldier, as a government civilian at the U.S. Department of Homeland security, and as government contractor in a variety of roles both domestically and overseas. He is an annual member of ASIS, NTOA, IALEFI, ILEETA, ITOA, IDPA, AFCEI/CHS, and the Nine Live Associates. He is a life member of all of the following: the Academy of Security Educators & Trainers, Special Operations Association, Special Forces Association, AFCEA, IACSP, NRA, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Since the mid 1990’s, Mr. Peterson has donated much of his time to the IACSP, to include teaching at 5 of its symposia and representing the association at most of the 51 professional conferences that he has presented at, including the 3 largest law enforcement conferences. As one of our ‘true believ-
ers,’ he plans to continue helping the association for as long as there is a threat of terrorism. 09:45 - 10:15 Coffee/Networking Table Viewing 10:15 - 11:15 Speaker Luke Bencie
Topic: “CounterEspionage and the International Traveler.” This presentation is designed to educate those individuals in an organization who may become targets of espionage, whether knowingly or unknowingly, from an economic competitor or a hostile intelligence service. This highly informative lecture will open the audience’s eyes as to how vulnerable intellectual property actually is while traveling, and the lengths others will go through to steal it. A small sample of the topics covered include: Economic vs. Industrial Espionage. Foreign Intelligence Collection Methods, How to Recognize Elicitation and Recruiting Techniques, Operational Security (OPSEC) Awareness, Communication Security (COMSEC) Awareness, Data Attack and Intrusion Methodologies, How to become an “Invisible Traveler”, Surveillance Detection Techniques, Plus much more… 11:30 - 12:30 Speaker: Amery E. Vasso
Topic: Content at the Edge: From City Streets to the Combat Outpost Accompanying significant advances in communication technology is the capability for an individual to receive a breathtaking amount of content. The volume of information available to homeland security professionals and dismounted Soldiers provide similar benefits and creates new challenges. An understanding of these factors is critical to reaping the benefits technology can provide. With the advent of Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks for law enforcement and emergency services
and a variety of military networking solutions under consideration for the dismounted Soldier the availability content at “the edge” is here now. There is considerable debate surrounding this information capability. How to secure the information? Who receives what? Who needs what? What is the cognitive burden imposed by this technology? When does the amount of information impair intuition and diminish the value of experience? Answering these challenges is essential in maximizing the benefits of this technology and enabling optimum human performance. 12:30 - 01:30 Lunch/Networking 01:30 - 02:30 Speaker Todd McGee
Topic: Behavior Analysis and Recognition Training This presentation will cover topics such as the Current Threat, a timeline of domestic terrorism case studies in U.S. Tradecraft of the Lone Wolf Domestic Terrorist, and Behavior Analysis Continuum. Participants will learn the limitations of the lone wolf Tradecraft and how P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Training System® methodology can identify high risk behavior indicators commonly associated with criminal activity. By the use of techniques taught in the presentation, participants will be able to better secure critical infrastructure and increase their situational awareness while on patrol. 02:30 - 03:00 Coffee/Networking Table Viewing 03:00 - 04:00 Speaker: David Opderbeck
Topic: Cybersecurity and Cyberterrorism: New Threats, New Responsibilities
The Internet pervades every aspect of American life. Financial markets, news outlets, public utilities, telecommunications industries, education, government - name any sector of public infrastructure and
you will find that it is “wired.” But the characteristics that made the Internet successful - its accessibility, open architecture, and scalability - also make it vulnerable. Cyberspace is ripe for exploitation, and in fact is already being exploited, by organized criminals, terrorists, and other enemies of the State. In this talk, Prof. Opderbeck will discuss these and other challenging legal and policy issues surrounding cybersecurity and cyberterrorism. 04:00 - 05:00
Cyber Operations: Target Access, Location & Intelligence Identification Revelations from Osama bin Laden’s capture and death have exposed the use of a networking concept known as airgap to “sneaker-net” communications to the appropriate channels. Chances are likely that other high-profile terrorists are using this same concept to send and receive communications. Forensic exploitation operations can reveal potential location data, nearby access points, thumb drive transactions, files accessed, communication attempts, etc. Efforts need to be focused on the use of cyber collection opportunities to target adversarial information systems in order to develop and identify current tactics, techniques and procedures. Topics covered will include methods of exploitation used to obtain access to computer or mobile devices. Attendees will learn specific cyber collection opportunities, as well as techniques for target footprinting and geo-location. The presentation will culminate with discussion concerning mitigation strategies to counter the operations detailed within this presentation. 05:00 - 05:30 Awards Drawing: You must be present to receive an award. Conference Wrap - Up ...
Again, seating is limited. Register today at www.iacsp.com See you there!
201-224-0588 or 571-216-8205. Special “Bring A Colleague” Prices Available.
Encouraging Jihadist Lone-Wolf Suicide Terrorism By Nissan Ratzlav-Katz
A Palestinian Hamas militant takes part in an anti-Israel rally in al-Nuseirat refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip December 5, 2010. REUTERS/ Mohammed Salem
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Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
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S
everal new communications have highlighted a long-developing trend among global jihadist movements, especially Al-Qaeda franchises, to encourage lone wolf terrorism. Recently, the emphasis has been on lone wolf suicide terrorism (or terrorism with almost no chance of escape) as a praiseworthy form of jihad against the West and Western assets globally.
A clear example of this is the 5 June 2012 publication by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) entitled Convoy of Martyrs. Targeted Actionable Monitoring Center researchers identified the publication as intended for potential lone wolf operatives looking for guidance on techniques to carry out attacks. It also serves as an online tool for recruitment and motivation.
The guide begins by defining the legitimate targets for an operation: 1. Those waging war against Islam 2. Economic targets of the enemy 3. Military targets belonging to the enemy 4. Media targets belonging to the enemy. The guide also lists nations and groups to be attacked, in order of importance: 1. American targets 2. Israeli targets 3. French targets 4. British targets 5. Kuffar [“heathen”] groups on Muslim land The guide provides a system for how to choose a target: 1. After the mujahid chooses his target, he should deliver a detailed proposal to the military council [of AQAP]. The council will determine whether to authorize the operation or not. 2. The council will analyze the target chosen, the location of the request, and the location of the jihadist. Finally, the guide provides a means for getting in touch with AQAP, via email accounts and a public encryption key, similar to that used to contact the editors of AQAP’s English-language publication, Inspire.
TAMC analysts note that there is a distinct attempt by AQAP to promote its control or oversight of ostensibly lone wolf operations. This is reminiscent of the group’s links to lone wolf attacks such as the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, carried out by a US officer with his own firearms. The attacker, Nidal Hasan, had contacted AQAP’s now-deceased figurehead Anwar Awlaki before the attack.
‘Shooting Spree’ Attacks In May 2012, an exchange of jihadist communications provided guidance specifically for suicide shooting attacks. The communication advised parking a van or similar vehicle near a crowded public gathering, such as a market or political rally, waiting until an advantageous moment, opening the large side or back door, and firing from inside the vehicle into the crowd. The jihadist writer noted that, in the case of heavy security protecting a static gathering, the van “can be on street that is parallel” to the main target. The jihadist recommended a similar tactic to attack passing adversaries, as well: “Make it seem that the car is parked in a normal fashion on the side of the road or on a side street across from the main street. ...Upon the arrival of the convoy, he can open the door and start firing in the same way as the first method.” The communication emphasized that “we must keep shooting until martyrdom.”
The global jihadist advocacy of shooting attacks by lone wolves did not start with the above publication, of course. In the second edition of Inspire, AQAP included the “shooting spree” as a choice tactic among several ideas for lone-wolf terrorism in the United States (see the TAMC briefing for the week of 18 October 2010).
Specifically, the online magazine advised: For this, choose the best location. A random hit at a crowded restaurant in Washington DC at lunch hour, for example, might end up knocking out a few government employees. Targeting such employees is paramount and the location would also give the operation additional media attention. The “advantages of the random shooting,” as AQAP noted, are that it requires little preparation and no accomplices to carry out. While it may not be planned as a suicide operation, per se, TAMC analysts note that the perpetrators often expect to die at the hands of security forces. Examples of such attacks include: • The aforementioned Ft. Hood shooting of 2009. Hasan shot and killed 13 people before being incapacitated and captured by a fellow soldier.
• The 2008 Mercaz HaRav Yeshiva shooting, in which a lone gunman murdered eight students before being killed by responding armed citizens. • On 2 March 2011, two United States airmen were killed and two others wounded in Germany when a gunman opened fire on an American military bus at the Frankfurt airport. The attacker was identified as an immigrant from the majority-Muslim state of Kosovo. [TAMC analysts note that there have of course been many similar attacks over the years - school shootings, random shopping cen-
ter shootings in Europe and the United States, the 2011 Anders Breivik massacre, the 1994 Baruch Goldstein massacre in Hebron, etc. However, this strategic analysis is intended to specifically examine the global jihadist focus on lone wolf suicide terrorism.]
Vehicular Attacks In the aforementioned Inspire edition, AQAP presented guidance for a uniquely twisted lone wolf vehicular attack. In an article entitled, “The Ultimate Mowing Machine,” a jihadist author suggested using a pickup truck with steel blades welded to its front grill as “a mowing machine, not to mow grass but mow down the enemies of Allah.” As the article explained: • “Pick your location and timing carefully. Go for the most crowded locations. ...The ideal location is a place where there are a maximum number of pedestrians and the least number of vehicles. In fact if you can get through to ‘pedestrian only’ locations that exist in some downtown (city center) areas, that would be fabulous. There are some places that are closed down for vehicles at certain times due to the swarms of people.” • “Narrower spots are also better because it gives less chance for the people to run away. Avoid locations where other vehicles may intercept you.” • “To achieve maximum carnage, you need to pick up as much speed as you can while still retaining good control of your vehicle in order to maximize your inertia and be able to strike as many people as possible in your first run. ...[It] is important to study your path of operation beforehand.” • “If you have access to firearms, carry them with you so that you may use them to finish off your work if your
30
vehicle gets grounded during the attack.” • “If Allah guides your heart to such a great operation please leave behind a note. Tell the world why you did it.” In a section called “Tips for Our Brothers in the United Snakes of America”, the same author lists the advantages of several tactical attack options. Regarding the “ultimate mowing machine” he notes: • “This method has not been used before.” • “It would cause chaos and trauma among the public. The ‘terrorizing’ element here is great.” • “It is a simple operation with great results.” • “...The authorities would have no way of figuring out what you are up to.” Other calls for vehicular attacks have been issued in jihadist communications over the years. For example, the TAMC briefing for
and police officers. • In May 2007, Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer, a Jordanian-American cab driver from Philadelphia, allegedly plotted to use a tanker truck as a weapon against a heavy concentration of soldiers near Ft. Dix. • In May 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar used a rented SUV and tried to run down students at the University of North Carolina. He explained that he acted in the name of Islam. • Similar attacks took place in January 2007 in Minneapolis and in August 2006 in the San Francisco Bay area. Again, this sort of attack is not always a suicide mission, but jihadist perpetrators take into account the likelihood of losing their lives in the course of events. The attacker’s death under such circumstances is deemed a desirable “martyrdom” in jihadist circles.
Knife Attacks As with gun and vehicular attacks, knife attacks can also end in death
Success in Death for Lone Wolves Nearly all jihadist communications in recent years agree that lone wolf attacks of all kinds have generally been a success, regardless of the number of casualties. The fallout of such attacks, as has been repeatedly explained by the Al-Qaeda leadership, is to impact the Western economy through ongoing disruption. This sort of success is primarily due to the lone attacker’s unpredictability and, therefore, his ability to psychologically terrorize the targeted public. TAMC analysts note that a suicide terrorist provides the additional public terror of perceived irrationality, for he or she is impervious to normal disincentives of potential death at the hands of law enforcement. As noted in the TAMC’s 19 December 2011 special report on the lone wolves of Europe, Al-Qaeda factions have routinely encouraged lone wolf operations in all European languages. Furthermore, through publications and online videos, Al-Qaeda, AQAP, and other jihadist groups have been
In Israel, terrorists have used bulldozers and their hydraulic-powered blades to ram, crush, flip and run over other vehicles and pedestrians. The attackers were shot and killed by armed citizens and police officers. the week of 14 November 2011 highlighted a jihadist communication advocating that Muslims “run over Jews in their office entrances in Europe.” The communication emphasized, “It is quite simple, you just need to drive your vehicles and kill as many Jews as possible.” TAMC analysts point out that such attacks have already been planned and carried out several times: • In Israel, terrorists have used bulldozers and their hydraulic-powered blades to ram, crush, flip and run over other vehicles and pedestrians. The attackers were shot and killed by armed citizens
for the jihadist perpetrator. As noted in the TAMC briefing for the week of 13 December 2010, an intercepted jihadist communication addressed the Muslims of Europe, saying: It’s your turn, wait no longer. Come up with whatever you can, even if it is just a knife - and I know you can bring more than knives. Fear no one, fear not prison, fear not death. Similarly, as noted in the TAMC briefing for the week of 14 November 2011, researchers identified a jihadist communication calling for attacks on targets within Israel and on Jewish-identified targets outside of Israel. “My brothers, every Muslim home has a knife (there is no need for an AK47 assault rifle),” the communication noted.
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steadily upgrading the tactical guidance available to lone-wolf attackers the world over. TAMC analysts note that previous internal jihadist targeting communications have clearly influenced lone-wolf and small terror cells. Thus, the current - sometimes subtle, sometimes overt - shift to encouraging and providing guidance for suicidal lone wolf actions can be expected to continue to influence self-radicalized Islamists worldwide. For additional information, please contact the TAM-C of the I n s t i t u t e o f Te r ro r i s m Research and Response at: +1.215.922.1080 or itrrtamc@itrrintel.org
New Trends In Airport & Aviation Security By Dr. Joshua Sinai
New York Police Department Hercules team on patrol near Penn Station in New York August 24, 2011. NYPD Hercules teams patrol through New York making multiple appearances around the city each day at locations that are decided either in response to specific intelligence or simply to provide a show of force at high-profile sites. The police department has worked since 9/11 on a long-term project to permanently increase vigilance in Lower Manhattan and Midtown, home to prominent financial institutions and national landmarks. Picture taken August 24, 2011. REUTERS/Lucas Jackson
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passengers on board the planes. ince the advent of and Those coordinated attacks demonmodern terrorism, the strated glaring vulnerabilities in U.S. aviation security at the time, transportation sector which the U.S. government and its around the world have since has been among the allies attempted to substantially upgrade. most frequent targets In response, a spectrum of security of terrorist attacks. techniques and methods have been to protect the aviation For those determined implemented sector from future terrorist attacks. to kill indiscriminately It is part of a sort of endless “cat and mouse” game being played by and in massive quantities to inflict mass government agencies to continuinnovate technologies and casualties, economic disruption, world ously methods to upgrade their aviation headlines, and psychological anxiety security while terrorist groups, such as al Qaida and its affiliates, and fear among wider publics, aviation seek to identify new vulnerability to exploit as they have been transportation in the form of airplanes and gaps doing since 9/11, and use new techairports are ideal targets. Also making them niques to target this sector to inflict maximum casualties and physiideal as potential targets is that they cannot cal, economic and psychological against their nation-state easily be protected without interrupting the damages adversaries. flow of passengers and goods which the Terrorist Incidents general public takes for granted.
The aviation sector is especially vulnerable because large numbers of people pass through airports on a daily basis. During holiday seasons, the volume of passengers increases exponentially, resulting in the issuance of
The aviation sector has long been targeted by terrorist groups. In the 1970s and 1980s hijacking airlines
This was followed on September 6, 1970 when PFLP operatives hijacked four airliners departing from European airports, diverting two to a disused airfield in the Jordanian desert, with a third airliner diverted to Beirut and then Cairo. Another hijacking attempt was thwarted by El Al security its flight from Amsterdam. On September 9, a PFLP sympathizer seized a BOAC flight in Bahrain and brought it to the same Jordanian airstrip as the first two. On May 30, 1972, after departing their aircraft, three members of the Japanese Red Army carried out an attack at Lod Airport (now known as Ben Gurion International Airport), in Tel Aviv, killing 24 people and injuring 78 others. On 27 June 1976, Air France Flight 139, originating in Tel Aviv, took off from Athens, Greece, heading for Paris, was hijacked by two operatives belonging to a PFLP offshoot, who were joined by two German terrorists. The airplane eventually arrived at Entebbe Airport in Uganda.Finding it difficult to hijack aircraft due to intensified
The aviation sector has long been targeted by terrorist groups. In the 1970s and 1980s hijacking airlines was a widespread terrorist tactic, with the hijackers using the airliners as a negotiating tactic, either to free prisoners, concede to political demands, or extort ransom payments. heightened threat levels. On a tactical level, the aviation sector provides alluring targets for terrorism because of the high volumes of people located in a particular location at airports, such as ticket counters, the high concentration of people on large airliners and the potential for high death rates caused by blowing up such aircraft, and the utility of using a hijacked airplane as a lethal weapon to inflict additional catastrophic damages by flying them into physical structures on the ground. Also of concern is the security of aviation cargo. While a high percentage of air freight is carried in passenger planes, which are subject to inspection by x-ray, the rest is transported on specialist cargo planes, with only a small amount of air cargo checked in the same way. Terrorist Threats Against Aviation The greatest catastrophic attack against the aviation sector was al Qaida’s coordinated, simultaneous hijacking of four airliners on September 11, 2001, intentionally crashing two of the planes into the World Trade Towers in New York City, with the third plane crashing into the Pentagon, in Arlington, VA. The fourth plane crashed into a field near Shanksville, PA, after passengers attempted to take control before it could reach the hijackers’ intended target of Congress or the White House in Washington, D.C. Nearly 3,000 people died in those attacks, including the hijackers
was a widespread terrorist tactic, with the hijackers using the airliners as a negotiating tactic, either to free prisoners, concede to political demands, or extort ransom payments. One of the first hijackings by a Middle Eastern terrorist group, which was also the first time an Israeli airliner was hijacked, occurred on July 22, 1968, when an El Al plane departing from Rome and headed for Tel Aviv, Israel, was hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and diverted to Algiers. Its crew and passengers were held hostage for five weeks and were released following 40 days of negotiations. Following the hijacking, El Al became extremely security-conscious and instituted the first baggage check program.
security measures, so in December 1985, Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) operatives attacked the Israeli national El Al airline’s ticket counters at the Rome and Vienna airports, killing 20 people. A similar incident occurred on July 5, 2002, when an Egyptian-American gunman opened fire at El Al’s ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport, killing two people and injuring four. Prior to 9/11, the deadliest airline catastrophe occurred on June 22, 1985 when Air India Flight 182, operating on the Montréal–London–Delhi route, was downed by a bomb on board that had been placed by Sikh terrorists, killing its 329 crew and passengers.
In an example of state-directed terrorism, in November 1987, two North Korean operatives planted a bomb on a Korean Airline Boeing 707 en route from Baghdad to Seoul, causing it to explode in midair over the Andaman Sea off the coast of Burma, killing its 20 crew members and 95 passengers aboard. In another major airline bombing, on December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103, a Boeing 747, en route from London Heathrow to New York’s JFK International Airport, was de-
to bypass bomb detectors at airports by detonating liquid explosive bombs on board multiple airliners destined for Canada and the United States. The plot led to tighter restrictions on carrying liquids and gels in hand luggage in the European Union, Canada, and the United States. Another innovative al Qaida operation was the attempt by Richard Reid, a British national, to detonate his special shoes packed with plastic explosives in their hollowed-out bottoms on board American Air-
was preempted by a tip from a Saudi infiltrator into an al Qaida cell. That plastic bomb reportedly contained little or no metal, making it harder to detect by airport security screeners X-ray systems or body scanners. At the time, unverified reports claimed that al Qaida was seeking to surgically implant a bomb into a “martyr”, that would be even more difficult to detect. It is reported that to find ways to get bombs onto an airplane that will evade detection from airport screeners, Ibrahim al-Asiri, AQAP’s innovative bomb-maker, may be experimenting with cameras, computers, and even pets to hide explosives to board aircraft.
sors of terrorism,” such as Cuba, Iran, North Korean, [North] Sudan and Syria. Second tier airports of concern are those in regions of weak or failed states and terrorist “hotspots,” such as Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Third tier airports of concern are located in countries undergoing turbulence, such as Egypt, Nigeria, Tunisia, and others, which might affect the degree of security at their airports. All passengers flying, for example, to the United States from such countries face increased random screening, with some patted down and subjected to careful searching of their carry-on bags. In practice, this would result for a traveler with a Yemeni passport or
November 28, 2002, shortly after Arkia Israel Airlines Flight 582, in a Boeing 757-300 aircraft, took off from Moi International Airport, in Mombassa, Kenya, al Qaida operatives fired two SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, which narrowly missed the plane. stroyed by a bomb on board as it was flying over Scotland, killing its 243 passengers and 16 crew members. The aircraft’s explosion also resulted in the deaths of 11 people in Lockerbie, in southern Scotland, as large sections of the plane fell, destroying several houses. The Libyan government was charged for the bombing. In examples of terrorist groups such as al Qaida and its affiliates continuously attempting to exploit gaps in aviation security they were largely thwarted in their attempts, despite the innovative tactics and weaponry used in each operation. The most notable forerunner of catastrophic airliner bombings was the December 11, 1994 bombing of Philippine Airlines Flight 434. Although the explosion was small, killing one person, with the plane making an emergency landing, it turned out to be a test run for a planned terrorist attack by Ramzi Yousef, called Operation Bojinka, to blow up 12 airliners and their approximately 4,000 passengers as they flew from Asia to the United States. Yousef’s uncle, Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, later used this blueprint of using multiple airliners in a single operation to plan 9/11, with the terrorists’ goal not merely to hijack aircraft but to use them as suicide bombs to cause mass destruction. The Bojinka plot was later duplicated by an al Qaida conspiracy in August 2006, which was foiled by British authorities by arresting the operatives during the pre-incident phase,
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lines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami on December 22, 2001. Further innovating their tactics against aviation, on November 28, 2002, shortly after Arkia Israel Airlines Flight 582, in a Boeing 757-300 aircraft, took off from Moi International Airport, in Mombassa, Kenya, al Qaida operatives fired two SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, which narrowly missed the plane, which was en route to Israel, although they caused two trails behind the left wings, causing the aircraft to rock slightly. In a similarly innovative plot, on December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a radicalized Nigerian who had been studying in London, attempted to detonate plastic explosives hidden in his underwear while on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253, en route from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan. In a different type of innovative tactic against the aviation sector, in late October 2010, al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) placed several sophisticated parcel-bombs containing 300-400 grams of the explosive PETN on passenger and cargo planes. Although the bombs did not go off, they severely disrupted freight and parcel traffic in the region. In another attempt, an AQAP scheme to create a more sophisticated version of the plastic PETN explosive device
Finally, even when faced with increased security, terrorists are not abandoning civilian aviation as a venue for their attacks, as demonstrated on January 24, 2011 by a suicide bombing attack by North Caucasus Islamist militant in Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport’s international arrivals hall, killing 35 and wounding 152.
Airports and Airlines Most Vulnerable Worldwide Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, with concerns raised about the effectiveness of security, as the 19 hijackers managed to pass through checkpoints to board the aircraft with their box knives and, with few exceptions, without being placed on ‘No Fly’ lists, as which was followed by the gaps in security that enabled Farouk Abdulmutallab to board the flight to Detroit in December 2009, security at many airports worldwide has been substantially upgraded to lower the probability of comparable attacks occurring again. Certain airports around the world are of concern because of lax security or being located in volatile regions plagued by widespread terrorismrelated extremism. Under this categorization, airports of the first tier of concern would include those in countries considered as “state spon-
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a passenger transiting through Yemen to be subjected to an extra body inspection or scan when transferring from a European airport to the U.S. Based on terrorists’ targeting history, Israeli airliners would be considered their top targets, with U.S. airliners in second place. In a further breakdown of terrorists’ targeting, the downing of large aircraft would be favored over smaller planes.
Measures to Secure Airlines and Airports Effective security is intended to make attacks more difficult for terrorists, increase their likelihood of being detected, minimize casualties and disruption, reduce resulting panic and anxiety, and reassure passengers that the aviation sector is safe and secure. It is also recognized, however, that no single defensive measure or technology is sufficient in being 100 percent effective in thwarting inventive and determined terrorist operatives. To be effective, a security regime must be multi-layered, employing measures and technologies to secure airports and aircraft, beginning at the operational level with what are called “watchlisting” databases containing information about individuals that might have a nexus to terrorism to prevent them from flying, to the tactical level where armed guards are deployed to maintain security at
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airport terminals and screeners who manage body scanners and explosive trace detection systems, as well as profile passenger behaviors to detect possible suspicious intent.
Watchlisting Databases One of the best lines of defenses in aviation security is the “NoFly” list. Virtually all governments around the world maintain such
ordinary security lines by using a special fast track security facility.
Security on Aircraft One of the first requirements of aviation security is installing bulletproof and locked and strengthened cockpit doors to protect the aircraft’s pilots from unauthorized access. An additional measure is equip some aircraft with CCTV
who patrol the facilities. In the U.S. prior to 9/11 airport screening was provided by private security companies which were contracted with an airline or airport, but this changed in November 2001 with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deploying its own personnel to handle screening at all US airports.
suspiciously, but those with an unusual travel patterns, such as travel to countries of concern. With terrorist groups continuously seeking to recruit new operatives who do not “fit” stereotypes associated with their membership, the use of behaviorally-based profiling can, therefore, be efficient and judicious.
In a tightening of checkpoint screening, those passengers who set off a walk-through metal detection alarm, however innocently, are then patted-down and thoroughly checked with a hand-held metal de-
A “best practice” in behavioral profiling is the “Behavior Pattern Recognition” (BPR), a tool and training program developed by Rafi Ron, a former director of security at Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport and one of the
Using remote-controlled “small drone airplanes” packed with explosives and guided by GPS to attack their intended targets. In an example of such a tactic, in late September 2011, Rezwan Ferdaus, of Massachusetts, was arrested for plotting to use a remotecontrolled F-86 Sabre in his plot to attack the U.S. Capitol and the Pentagon. databases with information about individuals deemed suspicious. As this system, as soon as people purchase an airline ticket, their airlines are required to submit lists of their passengers, including their names and dates of birth, to the their appropriate government transportation security administrations, which then compare the names to their own watchlist databases to determine their suitability to fly. In the U.S., the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains the database of individuals from around the world who are not permitted to board a commercial aircraft for travel in or out of the United States. As of summer 2010, according to the TSC the list contained about 8,500 names. Additional lists tag would-be passengers for extra inspection. These lists differ from the Terrorist Watch List, which is larger list of individuals suspected of some involvement with terrorism. As of summer 2011, the Terrorist Watch List contained around 400,000 names, according to the TSC. Various means are available to individuals whose names might have been inadvertently added to such lists to enable them to appeal to be removed from them. In a new trend related to watchlisting, airports have introduced a program for frequent flyer passengers to pay a charge to undergo a background check to enable them to by-pass the
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cameras, to enable pilots to monitor potentially suspicious activities inside the cabin. Pilots are given the option of carrying a gun, once they are trained to use it. Finally, federal air marshals are deployed in many flights to ensure an added layer of security. As they blend in with other passengers on board the aircraft, to protect the flying public they employ their investigative techniques, criminal terrorist behavior recognition, aircraft specific firearms techniques and close quarters self-defense measures.
Airport Screening
In the first line of defense are airport security guards who patrol, observe, report on any suspicious activities they might encounter, or protect by deterring any violent activity on the premise they are working. Security guards can be armed or unarmed, requiring either a patrol or static position. In the second line of defense, screeners are deployed to check the millions of passengers who fly around the world daily. They are the human component of the technological system of metal detectors, X-ray machines, and explosive sniffers. At many airports, the screeners are complemented by contingents of armed guards
tector. Those detectors can scan and detect within seconds the spectrum of chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear and explosive materials. In response to the August 2006 London plot, a new screening measure was instituted to forbid passengers from carrying liquids, gels and aerosols in quantities greater than 3 ounces, with all permitted bottles placed in a clear plastic bag and sent through screening separately. Finally, all passengers must show valid government-issued identification documents in order to fly. These are checked to ensure that they match the passenger’s information on the printed boarding pass.
Profiling In aviation security, if done correctly, behavioral profiling is considered an effective anti-terrorism tool, particularly without being based on racial, religious, or ethnic grounds. The earlier and more precisely that a potential threat can be identified prior to a passenger with suspicious intent boarding an aircraft, the sooner that preemptive measures can be taken, beginning with secondary screening. Behavioral profiling not only checks for persons who might be behaving
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world’s foremost aviation security experts. It provides airport security staff with the capability to recognize and assess passengers’ behaviors ranging from distress or confusion to potential criminal or terrorist intent that may not correspond with what could normally be expected in a particular environment. The BPR, which has been deployed at many airports around the world, was developed to provide security personnel a risk-based decision making process to meet the level of threat facing them, without engaging in religious discrimination or racial profiling.
Ramifications of Upgraded Aviation Security While continuously improving aviation security, the vast upgrades in such methods and technologies have also incurred a spectrum of economic costs, whether direct in terms of increased costs for government, local authorities and airlines to implement them or in increased inconveniences to passengers who have to arrive at airports several hours prior to their scheduled departures and wait on lengthy and time consuming security lines. The restrictions accompanying upgraded security have also led to
New Trends
The complaint accuses Massachusetts resident Rezwan Ferdaus, 26, a U.S. Citizen, of plotting to attack the U.S. Pentagon and U.S. Capitol by using remote-controlled aircraft filled with plastic explosives. According to the Justice Department the aircraft shown in the photo is not an actual device constructed by the defendant, but is similar to the remote control aircraft he planned to use in attacks on Washington. REUTERS/U.S. Department of Justice/Handout
debates over issues such as the need for security versus civil liberties for passengers. Such debates over privacy violations are expected to grow, especially over the expansion of watch lists and as airport security increases the use of invasive whole body imaging (WBI) and biometric screening devices and behavioral recognition technologies to detect potential suspiciously hostile behavioral intent. To overcome such controversies, new screening technologies are being developed, such as what is known as a “millimeter wave technology,” which is still in the experimental stage, and is expected to be less intrusive with the images analyzed by computer, not a human operator. Additional concerns over upgraded security technologies are medically related, as they might affect people with medical conditions, the elderly and pregnant women who might be negatively impacted by such radiation technologies.
With the “cat-andmouse” chasing games between government agencies and terrorists continuing to escalate, certain new trends are discernible. With hardened security at airport terminals and aircraft, terrorists might resort to new warfare tactics such as bombing them in midair by firing heat seeking shoulderlaunched surface-to-air missiles, such as manpads. Another new trend might be not involve attacking civilian aircraft, but using remote-controlled “small drone airplanes” packed with explosives and guided by GPS to attack their intended targets. In an example of such a tactic, in late September 2011, Rezwan Ferdaus, of Massachusetts, was arrested for plotting to use a remote-controlled F-86 Sabre in his plot to attack the U.S. Capitol and the Pentagon. In response, government agencies are also coming up with a spectrum of new countermeasures. For example, to circumvent an aircraft’s engines
from being attacked by a heat seeking surface-to-air missile, a decoy flare has been developed as a countermeasure. As proposed in a report by a homeland security association, another new countermeasure would involve the application of artificial intelligence ranging from deploying sophisticated imaging technologies using advanced algorithms that make sensors and cameras ‘smart’to predictive analytical software that identify suspicious human behavioral patterns, including terrorists’ pre-incident ‘dry runs.’ In the future, the report adds, machine learning, computer vision and artificial intelligence could be combined in new ways to push out security checkpoints from the terminal to the street curb.
About the Author Dr. Joshua Sinai is Senior Manager, National Security Programs, at Infinity Technology, LLC, in McLean, VA. He can be reached at: jsinai@itllc.com. An earlier version of this article appeared in Christopher G. Bates and James Ciment, editors, “Global Social Issues: An Encyclopedia,” published by M.E. Sharpe in 2012.
COUNTER TERRORISM
SECURITY NEWS YOU NEED TO KNOW
Aviation, Corporate, Cyber, Global, Homeland, Maritime, Law Enforcement, Intelligence Photo credit U.S. Department of Defense.
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The Selling Of The U.S. Navy SEALs:
America’s Newest Heroes are the Tip of the Spear in the War on Terrorism By Paul Davis
SEAL Peers Over Railing
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he U.S. Navy SEALs are America’s new heroes.
With several notable successful operations publicized, culminating with the raid on Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani compound, the Navy SEALs (Sea, Air, Land) have become the subject of many features in the media, as well as being portrayed as fictional heroic characters on film, TV and in novels.
Seals Returning To The Sub
But not everyone thinks this is a good thing. When the Commander of the Special Operations Command, Navy SEAL Admiral Bill McRaven was speaking at a public forum last February, he was confronted by retired Lt. General James Vaught, who criticized the admiral for allowing the deeds of Navy SEALs to be splashed all over the media. “I flat don’t understand that,” said the 85-year-old retired general. “Now back when my special operators extracted Saddam Hussein from his hole, we didn’t say one word about it… we just faded away and kept our mouths shut.” Vaught warned Admiral McRaven that the media attention
would serve to alert the enemy and one day they would be ready for the SEALs when they flew in on a new operation. “Get the hell out of the media,” Vaught said flatly as he sat down to laughter in the audience. Admiral McRaven responded that he became a Navy SEAL due in large part because he saw John Wayne’s 1968 film, “The Green Berets.” “The fact of the matter is, there have always been portrayals of Special Operations Forces,” McRaven said. “… it’s very difficult to get away from it.” McRaven added that the media coverage could actually help Navy SEALs do their job better.
SEAL Fires From Carrier Helo
Admiral McRaven responded that he became a Navy SEAL due in large part because he saw John Wayne’s 1968 film, “The Green Berets.” In addition to news coverage of the SEALs, several former SEALs have written books, including Chris Kyle’s “American Sniper” and Howard Washdin’s “SEAL Team Six.”
“The quintessential SEAL is the true quiet professional who does it for the right reasons, as quaint as it may sound; it is for God and country and those who can’t help themselves.”
Interviewed last year here in the Journal, Howard Washdin said his book was not meant to be a chest-thumper.
A popular film premiered this year, “Act of Valor,” which was about Navy SEALs and featured active duty SEALs in the leading roles. Professional actors played supporting roles in the film.
“I wrote the book for two reasons,” Washdin said in the interview. “The first reason was to show how to overcome adversity at any age, using my childhood as an example.” Washdin said the second reason was to show, without giving up any tactics, techniques or secrets, what a great group of men America has protecting them.
Produced and directed by Mike McCoy and Scott Waugh, the film is about a group of SEALs who rescue a kidnapped CIA officer and uncover a deadly terrorist plot. A novelization of the film later hit the bookstores this summer, called “Tom Clancy Presents
Act of Valor,” written by Dick couch and George Galdorsi and based on a screenplay by Kurt Johnstad. The film’s producers partnered with best-selling author Clancy and the book is published by Clancy’s long-time publisher, Berkley Books.
Ranger,” said the publicity surrounding the SEALs was a doubleedged sword. “Obviously, there are some operational issues and tactics, techniques and procedures that you want to remain restricted,” Couch said.
“These men are American heroes,” said Clancy. “And when I heard about this project, I wanted to get involved and use all the resources available to me to make it a success.” “The events in this book and movie may not always be easy to read about or watch,” Clancy wrote in the introduction. “But it is important for us to get a glimpse into the lives of these courageous Americans and a deeper appreciation for sacrifices they make for us.” Dick Couch, a former Navy SEAL and the author of several novels and nonfiction books on Navy SEALs, including the noveliza-
Couch, who served as a member of SEAL Team One in Vietnam and retired from the Naval Reserves as a SEAL Captain, said he would have been happier to see the credit go to Special Operations as whole, rather than just the Navy SEALs. But Couch believes the good publicity may serve as a deterrent. “I think in many cases, the bad guys say, you know maybe we shouldn’t do this as this is a business where life expectancy is not long,” Couch said. “Some of them may think they want to be a martyr and go on and do it, but a lot of their recruits may say they don’t think they want to.” “Act of Valor,” the book and film, may give the terrorists pause. “Nobody could have done the book except someone like me and George Galdorsi because of our Navy knowledge,” Couch said.
Dick Couch
In addition to the “Act of Valor” novelization, Couch also wrote “SEAL Team One” about his time in Vietnam and “Pressure Point,” a good thriller about terrorists
Valor.” “I was astounded. I said you can’t do this,” Couch recalled. “This was a camel’s nose under the tent. They were doing a documentary and then it sort of led to another thing.” Couch said people have told him that the active duty SEALs were a little bit wooden, and he replies that Kevin Costner is also a bit wooden at times. “Mike McCoy told me that it was easier to teach SEALs to act than to teach actors to change magazines on the run,” Couch said. But Dick Couch is concerned about some of the other books by former SEALs. “People who are writing books about Navy SEALs should be careful. All of my nonfiction work is vetted through the commands. I invite that scrutiny. I don’t think these other books do,” Couch said. “I get access like nobody else does. I walked through a Ranger class, start to finish, and I’m the first guy to do that. I’ll also be embedding with the Marine Special Operations component in October. They know I will honor their profes-
“Except for the fact that you were invading another country and you could have had a company of Pakistani infantry coming down the road, it was a pretty generic kind of raid,” Couch explained. “As McRaven said, the bin Laden raid was one of eleven missions that went off that night”. tion “Act of Valor” and his latest nonfiction book, “Sua Sponte: The Forging of a Modern American
“The bin laden combat assault was not rocket science,” Couch said. “The real secret stuff, if you will, is how we gather intelligence and do our targeting - the ops-intel fusion that allows these types of missions to take place.” “Except for the fact that you were invading another country and you could have had a company of Pakistani infantry coming down the road, it was a pretty generic kind of raid,” Couch explained. “As McRaven said, the bin Laden raid was one of eleven missions that went off that night. These guys are trained to do that. They are good at it. The real hero was some analyst sitting back there connecting some dots.”
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taking over a ferry in Seattle, Washington. “Some of the things in the movie were neat, cinematically, but necessarily brief,” Couch explained. “I expanded on how these guys would do these things operationally and their relationships with other people. It was kind of fun, but there is many a slip between the cup and the lip when you’re taking a movie and making it into a book.” Couch said he received a call from producer Mike McCoy last May who said he were interested in Couch’s nonfiction book about Navy SEALs in Iraq, “The Sheriff of Ramadi.” He asked Couch to come over and look at their current work, “Act of
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sion.” Couch said every military unit is looking for good people. “The Navy SEALs have about 5,000 qualified candidates sitting on the sidelines waiting and every year the Navy sorts through those 5,000 looking for the 1,000 best qualified to bring into the Navy SEAL training,” Couch said. “The SEAL’s publicity has done immeasurable good things for recruiting.” About the Author Paul Davis, a Navy veteran who served on an aircraft carrier during the Vietnam War, is a contributing editor to the Journal.
IACSP Looks Back
The Incident At Haymarket Square By Joseph A. Devine, Ed.D.
http://homicide.northwestern.edu/ historical/movements/haymarket/ downloaded 6/24/2012
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he recent NATO Summit demonstrations and riots in Chicago through late May 2012 were demonstrative of American traditions of free speech and public protest. Also evident was the dedication of a professional law enforcement organization to the protection of those rights while ensuring public safety and order maintenance. The NATO Summit riots were reminiscent of an earlier time when those competing demands on law enforcement were not so adroitly balanced. The City of Chicago has a long and notorious reputation for violence. Much of this historic violence was attributable to criminal activity while some to domestic terror. The incident at Chicago’s Haymarket Square on May 4th, 1886 would be one such incident. The American labor movement was well-organized and actively agitating for change through the late 19th century. The movement sought changes, such as an eight-hour workday. The movement would be radicalized by the violent resistance of management, infiltration by anarchists and others seeking to agitate for their own purposes. The confluence of labor activists, demonstrators, anarchists, bomb makers, foreign agents and aggressive police tactics would lead to chaos, death and reform. The Haymarket Square incident provides lessons in leadership, professional ethics, intelligence gatheringanalysis, crowd control, and incident-consequence management. The American labor movement was well-organized and actively agitating for change through the late 19th century. The movement sought changes, such as an eight-hour workday. The movement would be radicalized by the violent resistance of management, infiltration by anarchists and others seeking to agitate for their own purposes. The fulcrum of these forces for change and resistance would be the streets of Chicago in May 1886. Although organized demonstrations would be held throughout the United States the violence experienced at Chicago’s Haymarket Square would define the year. The Haymarket Square riots of May 4th 1886 were prefaced upon the culture of violence, which characterized Chicago for decades. The expansion of American capitalism and industrial production was challenged by the expansion of labor
Sketch by Thure de Thulstrup (Harper’s Weekly 5/15/1886)
unions. Unions advocating for higher wages, improved working conditions, and an eight-hour workday targeted the manufacturing industries of Chicago. Although several unions were active the Knights of Labor claimed over half a million members. In May 1886 The Knights of Labor led a strike against the McCormack Harvesting Machine Company. The Chicago Police Department acting in the interests of McCormack Harvesting deployed officers to protect corporate assets. This demonstrable failure of impartiality would further polarize the city. On May 3rd 1886 strikebreakers became involved in physical altercations with the demonstrators. Continuing a pattern of impartial and unprofessional behavior the Chicago Police Department protected the strikebreakers. The confrontations would escalate resulting in at least one death and numerous injuries. News of this spread through the city fueling those who sought to instigate further violence.
hall, a traditional platform of free speech that be at the cross roads of social change as labor activists, agents of management, anarchists and the police violently clashed. The May 4th demonstrations in Chicago were simultaneously inflamed by the violence of the prior day and tempered by a cold rain. Although 20.000 demonstrators were predicted estimates of the actual crowd were between 1500-2000 people. The mayor of Chicago was present at the demonstration and reported at eight p.m. that the crowd was peaceful. A short time later the Mayor and Police Superintendent Frederick Ebersold departed leaving Police Inspector “Black Jack” Bonfield in command. “Black Jack” Bonfield acquired his nickname and a “considerable reputation for clubbing people, especially during a streetcar strike the previous year.” That reputation in tact the Mayor and the Police Superintendent left “Black Jack” in command of a volatile situation.
McCormack Hall had traditionally been the platform for the “10 cent lectures”. In the late 1880’s the lectures were becoming increasingly socialistic. This was not unusual for the period, however the charged social environment of Chicago was. McCormack
Several sources report that shortly after the Mayor and Superintendent left, Inspector Bonfield “ordered his men to form columns and led them toward the crowd. Immediately after Captain William Ward uttered the words of the riot act, a bomb landed in the midst of the police, who began firing their
Cook County Criminal Court Building http://homicide.northwestern. edu/historical/movements/haymarket/
The Riot at McCormick’s Reaper Works in Chicago (May 3, 1886) http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/haymarket/haymarketimages.html
revolvers.” In his work, The Blue Parade Thomas A. Repetto writes that eight officers were killed and seventy were wounded. There are reports that some of the police casualties may have resulted from “friendly fire”. The initial panic and the “fog of war” combine to make this a reasonable probability. The reported numbers of civilian dead and injured varies among sources. As the poor had little access to hospitals there was no centralized accounting for casualties. Repetto also writes that while; “Bonfield called for an all-out assault on the radicals while Superintendent Ebersold and detective chief’s wanted to proceed with caution, believing, that the rash Bonfeld was partly responsible for the disaster”. To
“Black Jack” Bonfield acquired his nickname and a “considerable reputation for clubbing people, especially during a streetcar strike the previous year.” That reputation in tact the Mayor and the Police Superintendent left “Black Jack” in command of a volatile situation. clarify, Bonfield was calling for yet another assault on the “radicals”, subsequent to the assault, which resulted in the bomb throwing. In The Haymarket Tragedy, Paul Avrich writes that Bonfield had previously told the mayor that some in the crowd would use explosives. Avrich also notes that witnesses reported that Bonfield had said prior to the incident “blood would flow before midnight”. Bonfield’s initial actions aside it is apparent that a bomb was already present within the crowd and its use likely inevitable.
Chicago Mayor Harrison http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/haymarket/mayorharrison.jpg
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The Chicago Police Department would aggressively pursue anarchists and other radicals. The German neighborhoods of Chicago’s north side became the focus of police actions as Captain Mile Schaak, a supporter of Bonfield, led a squad of “German detectives” as they “hunted down anarchist leaders”. Meanwhile as, Repetto notes, “Bonfield raided the west side cracking skulls” and “the jails were soon full of anarchists”. The record shows that “martial law was imposed” and warrantless searches were common. The historic record indicates that various prominent businessmen paid “blood money” to repress anarchists. While some of this money may have been given to the families of fallen officers some reportedly went to secure convictions. Avrich reports that Cyrus McCormack was a major contributor to these funds. The anarchists, the police and the corporations used the newspapers to propagandize their respective positions. The police and prosecutors used the sustained panic to their advantage. Through the application of unconventional police tactics eight men were tried for inciting violence through their writings and speeches. Repetto writes, “This was a new departure; the more traditional course would have been to prove that the defendants conspired with the actual bomber, but he was not known.” The subsequent trials and convictions would prove controversial. The historic record indicates that; “In the end, eight anarchists were put on trial and seven were convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. Four were hanged in November 1887, one committed suicide and three were later pardoned by Illinois governor, John Peter Altgeld”. (http:// www.u-s-history.com/pages/h750.html) While he legal debate would continue for decades, the careers’ of “Blackjack” Bonfield and Captain Schaak however would end in 1889. A newly elected mayor fired them for attempting to cover up the murder of Dr. Patrick Henry Cronin. A Chicago detective was convicted of arranging the murder of Dr. Cronin who was “accused of being a British spy”.
individuals constituted a greater threat to the American democracy than did the actions of the anarchists. The Haymarket Square Riot illustrates the complexity of policing a democracy. It also demonstrates the critical leadership dimension of having ethical, well-trained, well-disciplined personnel in the right place at the right time. “Back Jack” Bonfield was probably not the appropriate individual to lead police into a volatile environment. The management of the initial incident failed to contain violence and facilitate investigation. Consequence management perpetuated the “hunt” for anarchist leaders rather than the pursuit of evidence and the truth. Further, police leadership failed to identify that those with contrary agendas could hijack any movement or organization, including the Chicago Police Department. The ethical dimension of leadership failed as police and prosecutor’s acted as surrogates for McCormack Harvesting Machine Company, et al. The corruption of the Chicago Police Department would continue into the 20th century. The distrust of authority would cause some to conclude that the actual bomb thrower; “was actually an agent of the police, an agent provocateur, hired to throw the bomb and thus enable the arrest of hundreds, the destruction of the revolutionary leadership in Chicago”. In the absence of professional investigation, evidence and prosecution this perception will echo through the ages.
About the Author Joseph A. Devine, Ed.D. is an Assistant Professor at Fairleigh Dickinson University. Email: jdevine@fdu.edu
References
The very nature and intensity of these anarchist and police tactics would serve as prelude to the espionage, sabotage and anarchist behaviors practiced at the start of the First World War. Each of the entities would act and react to the other but none would overreact to the degree of “Black Jack” Bonfield and the Chicago Police in 1886. The conduct of these
1) Avrich, Paul. (1984). The Haymarket Tragedy. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-04711-1. 2) Messer-Kruse, Timothy. (2011). The Trial of the Haymarket Anarchists: Terrorism and Justice in the Gilded Age. Palgrave MacMillion, NYC. ISBN 978-0230-12077-8 3) Repetto, Thomas A. (1978). The Blue Parade. The Free Press, NYC. ISBN 002-92630-3. 4) Zinn, Howard. (2003). A People’s History of the United States: 1492-Present. Harper-Collins, NUC. ISBN 978-0-06-083865-2. 5) http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h750.html (June 14, 2012)
7 Defendants http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/haymarket/mayorharrison.jpg
Execution of Haymarket defendants http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/haymarket/mayorharrison.jpg
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
Vol.18, No.3
Special German Police Units
Climb High To Make Arrests By Jim Weiss and Mickey Davis
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Anti-nuclear activists of German environmental organisation Robin Wood hang on a rope over a rail track in Leitstade between Lueneburg and Dannenberg November 12, 2006. Thousands of demonstrators try to block the transportation of Castor rail containers of reprocessed German nuclear waste from the La Hague reprocessing plant in France to the Gorleben interim storage facility which started on Friday. REUTERS/Christian Charisius (GERMANY)
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n Germany, there are small tactical and technical special police units called Taktisch-technische Massnahmen in Hoehen und Tiefen (TMHT), a technical Hundertschaft. (A Hundertschaft is a barracks-based police unit made up of roughly 100 officers. Historically there were 100-soldier units of ancient, imperial Rome, who were led by a centurion. The Germanic tribes created fighting groups of 100 men.) This term is currently used to designate company-sized, readiness police units.
TMHT police officers are trained to climb trees, move from tree-to-tree, and go up industrial smokestacks and other very high structures to counter and take law enforcement action against environmentalist groups like Greenpeace and Robin Wood. Robin Wood is a German environmental advocacy group whose members broke off from the international Greenpeace organization to decentralize their efforts. These groups often have members who engage in terrorist anti-government and anti-police activities. Members of radical environmentalist groups take advantage of high-up locations to get public and media attention. To make arrests, police officers have to climb up to remove them. Protesters also unfold and hang large banners in high places. For example, activists from these groups climbed a very high railroad bridge in Dannenberg, close to the former salt mine in Gorleben where nuclear waste deposits are now made yearly, and where major antinuclear protests take place. Another anti-nuclear activist roped his gear to the crown of a tree in order to later rappel down onto a nearby railroad track to block the passage of a train loaded with
Bureau of Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt - BKA) to search for improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These defensive counter terrorism actions for public safety and regulatory measures are conducted during visits of political leaders, where TMTH officers look for IEDs in or on public buildings, hotels, congress halls, and other types of event and meeting halls. During their operations, they search on roof tops, bridges, towers, exterior facades, or in shafts and cisterns. These inspections took place during the last visit
mit meeting in Strasbourg, where security measures were at the highest level. To get ready for this NATO summit, TMTH trained on a crane at the port of Kehl, backed by a police boat.
Members of radical environmentalist groups take advantage of high-up locations to get public and media attention. To make arrests, police officers have to climb up to remove them. Protesters also unfold and hang large banners in high places.
Castor (Cask for Storage and Transport of Radioactive material) containers. That activist was detained and removed from his treetop perch by a TMTH police officer. In cases of a threatened attack, TMTH officers are called in by the German Federal
of the Holy Father Pope Benedict XVI in Berlin, Erfurt, and Freiburg (Black Forest). In another example, a TMTH climber searched over a Rhine River railroad bridge at Kehl in preparation for a NATO sum-
History of TMHT At the start of 2000, more and more organizations like Greenpeace and Robin Wood looked for opportunities to receive additional public and media attention. Activist
campaigners of these organizations climbed and occupied high railway bridges and drill towers. As mentioned previously, this happened in the federal state of Lower-Saxonia on a very high railway bridge in Dannenberg close to the nuclear waste deposits in Gorleben. These activists then unfolded large banners and occupied the bridge in an attempt to stop a train carrying nuclear waste materials. Governmental leadership demanded that the police take enforcement action, bring the protestors down, and arrest them.
zational concept, and to install special teams. In German these were called, Taktisch-technische Massnahmen in Hoehen und Tiefen (TMHT) which translates to” tactical and technical measures in heights and depths.” In other
Augustin (near Bonn in NorthrhineWestfalia). Today five of these technical Hunderschaften have a TMHT task force, with two officers with the rank of a lieutenant or higher and eight sergeants, divided up into two squads. This is so that in situations involving bad weather and long-term operations, a backup element is available. Each TMHT squad has a leader with the rank of polizeikommis-
TMHT units must also keep up with the changing tactics of activists. Now the activists often climb trees instead of industrial smoke stacks and towers. In one situation TMHT officers took a highclimbing activist at an industrial plant into custody and removed him to the ground by cable.
TMHT in the Field TMHT officers are utilized in field operations cases that involve heights of two meters (about seven feet) or more. In addition, they also save documentary evidence, support the German Federal Bureau of Investigation as it looks for evidence and suspected items such as explosive devices, and operate with air rescue specialists with the support of police helicopters. In addition, they can also support the local police forces (state police forces) in working in high areas such as on high towers, industrial buildings and other places no one on normal police operations can climb.
In other cases, people used climbing gear and joined themselves together with a rope, high enough that traditional equipment such as ladders and car lifts could not reach them. Yet police forces at the scene were ordered to clear out the protestors using their creativity and resources. Federal police leaders called for the “GSG 9 height intervention team” and state police leaders called for their SEK units. (GSG 9 is Germany’s world-class counter terrorism unit) and SEK consists of SWAT-type units of the individual states known as Spezialeinsatzkommandos). According to Erster Polizeihauptkommissar (major) Torsten Gerbig, of a Bundespolizei technical Hunderschaft, in most cases the climbing activists are not violent. GSG 9 and SEK officials questioned being used in such longterm missions because if they were,
during an operation, because, for example, climbers can get suspension trauma, also known as harness hang syndrome (HHS).
words, Federal Police ordered its special crowd and riot control battalions to address the problem by training specialized police officers to form within TMHT units. During the reorganization of the Federal Police some years ago,
sar (police lieutenant), one or two climbers, one rescue climber, and one or two safety police officers. When in action, the squad leader informs his police leader about the possibilities of the operation and the limits of performance, and estimates the danger for the operating officers.
Once at a situation, the squad leader leads the operation. A climber has his safety assistant, who takes charge of guiding the rope from the ground. A second climber and his safety assistant are ready in case of emergency. These special TMTH units have been successful, and many environmental activist campaigns have ended quickly. One result, however, is that the activists have
And operate with air rescue specialists with the support of police helicopters. In addition, they can also support the local police forces (state police forces) in working in high areas such as on high towers, industrial buildings and other places no one on normal police operations can climb. these special operations officers were not available to perform their regular tasks such as dealing with violent criminals and terrorists. As a result, the Federal Ministry for Interior Affairs ordered the BPOL rapid response battalions headquarters to train specialized police officers for these high-up operations, to write an organi-
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technical Hundertschaften (technical police engineer type companies that remove barricades, operate small boats, build bridges, and are responsible for demolitions, power tools, and have special engineer vehicles) were installed in Ratzeburg (Schleswig-Holstein), Hünefeld (Hessia), Deggendorf (southern Bavaria), Blumberg (Baden-Wuerttemberg), and Sankt
Every operation has risks for the officers and for the activists. All TMTH actions normally operate under industrial safety regulations. Only the commander of the entire police operation can order an activity that counters German industrial safety regulations.
changed their tactics, climbing higher and higher in trees. Then when they reach the treetops, they jump to other trees and structures. This technique is popular in tree trimming businesses, as well as in sport climbing events at a world championship level.
It is also important to have a paramedic or a doctor available
The difference between sport climbing and police rescue climb-
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ing is that a police officer has always two ropes instead of one-one for security/safety and the other for working. TMTH team members also train to rope down from helicopters through the use of a winch. This action becomes necessary when the police can’t reach a high-up situation by conventional means, or in emergency cases involving high water when an area is isolated. The French environmental activist Cecile Lecomte was arrested, controlled, and lowered on a railway track by TMTH forces.
Uses for TMHT, Equipment and Qualifications Operational possibilities of TMTH are: 1. Support local (state) police forces in high altitude situations--such as high towers and industrial buildings--when no one in the operation field can climb. 2. Rescue people and police officers from high attitudes or
from a deep gorge or crack. 3. Clear the situation during police operations when activists have occupied drill towers, high chimneys, bridges, tall buildings, ships, cranes, and trees. 4. Intervene when activists have stretched ropes or cables over streets and railway tracks. 5. Support the German Federal Bureau of Investigations’ body guard unit and their officers when protecting politicians. 6. Save documentary evidence. 7. Look for suspect items with operation air rescue specialists using police helicopters. Equipment: Climbing harness, helmet, rappelling gear, ropes with a length up to 300 feet, and helmet cameras for saving of documentary evidence have been field tested. Qualification of the personnel: Fitness, technical intelligence, the ability to work under pressure, no signs of any acrophobia (the fear of heights). Education: Training involves a nineweek program to become a member of a technical Hundertschaft, and two additional two-week basic
courses of instruction to become a member of a TMHT.
Additional German Police/Bundespolizei Insights There are three forms of police in Germany: the state police of each of the 16 federal German states, the federal police (Bundespolizei or BPOL) and the BKA.
The organization of such readiness battalions are similar to and still informally referred to by the name of the post-war Bundesgrenzschutz (Border Police or BGS), but they now have additional duties. The border police are now part of the BPOL.
About the Authors
Within the BPOL about 6,000 police officers serve as standby police and are organized into ten police battalions; five of these ten police battalions contain TMHT units. There are no TMTH units within the individual German state police forces’ readiness/riot police battalions (Bereitschaftspolizei). They are only found in the BPOL.
Lieut. Jim Weiss (Retired) is a former Army light infantryman, schooltrained Army combat engineer, a former school-trained (regular Army) Army military policeman, former State of Florida Investigator, and a retired police lieutenant from the Brook Park (OH) Police Department. He has written and co-written hundreds of articles for law enforcement and safety forces magazines, most notably Law and Order.
Under Germany’s system of democracy, the BPOL fulfills a need by providing large formations of highly trained, ready and mobile police for emergencies. These police battalions are also referred to as the Federal Riot Police. These BPOL response battalions are mobile support and rapid reaction battalions.
Mickey (Michele) Davis is an awardwinning, California-based writer and author. Her young adult novel, Evangeline Brown and the Cadillac Motel, won the Swiss Prix Chronos for the German translation. Mickey is the wife of a Vietnam War veteran officer.
Get Involved With The IACSP And Our International Chapters!
Get Involved Today!
We have opened a new chapter in Japan. IACSP member Terrence Noonan will be heading up the effort. He can be reached at: dir@iacspjapan.org Chapter involvement means networking opportunities.
Get Involved Today!
In addition, our SE Asia Chapter Director, Andy Raj wants to encourage all IACSP members in SEASIA to contact him and sign up with the chapter. He can be reached at: andrin.raj@stratad.net Chapter involvement means networking opportunities.
Not Receiving IACSP’s Monthly ENewsletter?
Earlier this year the IACSP began a monthly ENewsletter for its members. If you are a member and are not receiving our ENewsletter, please contact me at the IACSP office: iacsp1@aol.com and we will be happy to put you on our Elist. Thank you. Steven J. Fustero/Dir. of Ops/IACSP
IACSP.COM
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Secure Driver:
Brake Assist By Sean McLaine & Anthony Ricci
I
n racing school we were told that braking is the most difficult thing to do correctly. In the police academy we were told that a majority of rear end accidents could have been avoided had the driver applied the brakes with more force earlier in the braking process. At ADSI we repeatedly see students who don’t want to use the brakes to the vehicle’s braking potential. We experience some really good drivers who just don’t want to press hard on the brakes to shed speed, but rather gradually add increasing pressure that doesn’t allow the vehicle to shed speed quick enough or put weight on the front tires for steering. Manufacturers understand the statistics and more importantly the habits of drivers and in recent years brake assist has become prevalent in many models offered for sale. Let’s take a look at how this system can be beneficial.Why was so much emphasis placed on braking? What is Brake Assist, how does it work, and why is it important?
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We first need to understand the process involved in slowing the car down. Drivers usually reference the speedometer to gauge how fast you are traveling. This is a linear measurement and speed is easy for most people to feel with driving experience in a familiar car. Of course this is a general statement for the purpose of this article, however judging speed also very much depends on the drivers risk, skill and knowledge levels. What is not shown on any dashboard device is the amount of force acting on the car. As your speed increases (linear measurement), the forces acting on your car rise, not in a straight line, but exponentially! In effect, a small increase in speed leads to a large increase on cornering and braking forces. The ability to feel the degree of force acting on the car is what separates a good driver from a professional driver.
Let’s now examine the braking process. If you travel the same road every day at the same speed you know approximately where you have to apply the brakes to bring the car to a smooth stop at the stop sign. How many times do you stop the car at the limit of the cars capabilities at that stop sign? If you did, the stopping distance would be substantially shorter. Hypothetically, over time you would be able to find out exactly where to apply the brakes to stop with the front bumper right on the line. Now, approach the same stop sign 20 mph faster, and try to apply full braking and put the bumper right on the line. It will be very difficult, but why is that? Let’s throw out a word from high school, exponents. The speedometer is a linear measurement (simple addition and subtraction) but what you may not realize is that the forces on the car increase to the square of the speed.
With that being said we now know that you can’t just move the brake point back by a set amount for each 20 miles per hour added to the speed of the car. That is where the difficulty comes in when judging the stopping distance. So why is it important to be hard on the brakes early in the stop? The earlier you can bleed off that speed the more manageable the stop becomes. Because the forces acting on the car are so powerful at those high speeds if you gradually slow the car and then realize you will come up short, you may still be traveling at such a high speed that you will not be able to stop the car (even if you raise the brake pedal force to the limit of its ability to stop the car). What you have to do is scrub that speed off quickly and early in the stopping process. 20x20 is 400 but 10x10 is only 100 so a tenmile per hour decrease in speed greatly lowers the force acting on the car. Getting rid of that speed earlier in the stop gives a much greater cushion when we
reach that imaginary point in our last example when we realize we need to stop in a shorter distance than initially anticipated. This brings us to our topic. What is brake assist and how can it help me? Brake assist is a system in the vehicle that senses when a heavy stop may be needed. Under sudden braking, many people do not apply the brakes with enough force to stop the car in time, so the engineers designed these systems to help prevent avoidable collisions. The premise is simple; when a driver suddenly applies force to the brake pedal, the system will clamp the caliper down to the point that the ABS system is activated whether the pedal is pushed down hard enough to get to that point or not. Some cars will even pressurize the brake line when the accelerator is lifted abruptly in anticipation of an emergency stop. Many
high-end cars have systems that work in conjunction with GPS or with a forward facing radar. The car can even learn from your driving habits to know when not to activate the brake assist, in order to avoid an embarrassing moment for you when you have passengers in the car. The system’s ability to preventor reduce the severity of accidents makes it one of the most useful features to be added to a new car. As with most new technologies, there are many different variations available, so check on your particular manufacturer to see how your car’s system works. About the Authors Anthony Ricci is the President of ADSI and an active IACSP member. Sean McLaine also works with ADSI. For more information about ADSI, please visit their website at: www.1adsi.com
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The IACSP Q & A With
Commander Kirk S. Lippold
C
The U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) is towed away from the port city of Aden, Yemen, into open sea by the Military Sealift Command ocean-going tug USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168), in this file picture taken October 29, 2000. REUTERS/Sgt. Don L./USA Marine corps
USN (Ret), Former Commanding Officer, USS Cole ommander Kirk S. Lippold, USN, (Ret) is a 1981 U.S. Naval Academy graduate. He assumed command of the USS Cole (DDG 67), an Arleigh Burke-class AEGIS-equipped guided missile destroyer, on June 25th, 1999.
He was the commanding officer of the USS Cole on October 12, 2000 when al Qaeda terrorists detonated a bomb alongside the ship as she was being refueled at Aden in Yemen. The terrorist attack on the USS Cole resulted in the death of 17 American sailors and the wounding of 37 others.
The U.S. Navy completed its Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation of the USS Cole terrorist bombing on January 19, 2001. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
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Vern Clark, completed the JAGMAN investigation and agreed with the findings of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Robert Natter, that Commander Lippold acted reasonably in adjusting his force protection posture
based on his assessment of the situation that presented itself when the USS Cole arrived in Aden to refuel. “The investigation clearly shows that the commanding officer of Cole did not have the specific
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Vol.18, No.3
intelligence, focused training, appropriate equipment or on-scene security support to effectively prevent or deter such a determined, preplanned assault on his ship,” Clark said. “In short, the system – all of us – did not equip this skipper for success in the environment he encountered in Aden harbor that fateful day.” Commander Lippold was later assigned to the Pentagon. On the morning of September 11, 2001, Commander Lippold met with CIA officials to receive information about the USS Cole attack and be briefed on Osama bin Laden’s increasing threat to America. Commander Lippold was at CIA headquarters when the Pentagon was attacked by an airliner hijacked by al Qaeda terrorists. Commander Lippold retired from the Navy in 2007. His personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Award Combat Action Ribbon among others.
Commander Lippold has written a book about the Cole attack and how he and his crew saved the ship from sinking and further loss of life called, “Front Burner: Al Qaeda’s Attack on the USS Cole.” Today he resides in Carson City, Nevada and remains active in current events and military affairs. Commander Lippold was interviewed by Paul Davis, an online columnist (Threatcon) and a contributing editor to the Journal.
IACSP: I read your book and I thought it was gripping. I’m a former sailor, having served on an aircraft carrier during the Vietnam War. When I heard about the attack on the USS Cole I wondered what an AEGIS warship doing refueling in Aden? Millions of dollars spent on a major weapons defense system, yet AEGIS was turned off in this unsafe harbor making the ship vulnerable.
but prior to your attack we had embassies attacked in the Middle East and earlier we had barracks attacked. What did you think of the order when your first received it?
Lippold: I made the natural assumption, as most commanding officers would; that we weren’t the first ship that pulled in there. I knew that there had been literally dozens of ships over the previous couple of years that pulled into that port. While we were operating in the Middle East under a higher threat condition than we had been in the Mediterranean, nonetheless all the intelligence information I received that morning indicated that while there was a known terrorist threat throughout the region, there was absolutely nothing specific to the port of Aden that would indicate the type of threat that we were about to face. IACSP: You were unaware that
there was an al Qaeda outfit operating in Yemen, am I correct?
successful terrorist attack against a Navy ship.
IACSP: I recall during my days
in the Navy we often had UNREPs (underway replenishment) with fuel tankers off the coast of Vietnam. Would it not have better to do an UNREP rather than pull into Aden?
Lippold:
Absolutely, it would have been better. Unfortunately, we had gone to a Navy where we went from more than 4,000 ships following World War II to a Navy just shy of 600 ships at the height of the Reagan build-up to the morning of October 12th, where we only had 315 ships in the Navy. The only oiler in the region was up in the Arabian Gulf. There wasn’t an oiler within a thousand miles of us.
rate. We moored the ship about 9:30 that morning. Shut down all the engines and prepared to refuel. By around 10:30 we started refueling the ship and we had been refueling for approximately 45 minutes when there was a tremendous explosion. You could feel all 505 feet and 8,400 tons quickly and violently thrust up and
IACSP: Would you explain what happened on that awful day? Lippold: That morning we had pulled into the port of Aden, Yemen
All the intelligence information I received that morning indicated that while there was a known terrorist threat throughout the region, there was absolutely nothing specific to the port of Aden that would indicate the type of threat that we were about to face.
Lippold: Any time you pull into Lippold: That is correct. We did a port, you have to shut down the AEGIS weapons system because you are that close in proximity to other ships.
IACSP: I understand that. I don’t
understand why you were ordered into Yemen. It was before 9/11,
not know, nor did our intelligence community know, that there was an al Qaeda cell in that port, for what we estimate was between 12 and 18 months, observing Navy ships refuel, what pier they went to, what boats came out to them, so that they could operationally plan the
for what we thought was going to be a brief stop for fuel, taking on approximately a quarter million gallons of fuel. We expected the refueling rate to be somewhere between three to 500 gallons per minute, so we thought we would be there probably six to eight hours plus, depending on the flow
to the right as power went out in the ship. Ceiling tiles popped out, everything on my desk popped up. I knew that we had been attacked; just by virtue of the direction the ship had been thrust.
IACSP: You didn’t think it was a fuel explosion?
Lippold: Like everyone else, I initially thought fuel explosion. Within a few
seconds though, because we had been shoved up into the right and nothing was on the port side of the ship. So something must have come alongside and detonated. I went back into my cabin, grabbed the nine millimeter, loaded it, chambered a round, decocked it, grabbed two clips of ammunition, took a deep breath and went outside the ship. I didn’t know if we were going to be boarded. I didn’t know if there was going to be a follow-on attack. All I knew was that I was going to defend my ship and defend my crew. As I went out to the port side to find out what had happened all of I was thinking to myself was don’t leave an empty round in the chamber. Very quickly we determined that we were not being boarded, it didn’t appear that there was an immediate follow-up attack, although we were very concerned about that. I looked over the port side and you could clearly see the hole in the side of the ship. You could tell from the indentation of the metal that something had detonated alongside.
IACSP: How was the boat able to come alongside the ship and detonate their explosives?
Lippold: We had contracted that morning for three garbage barges to come
out to the ship as part of routine operations in port. We also contracted, in addition to the refueling, to have sewage removed and top off our fresh water tanks. Two of those garbage barges had come out to the ship and as the two were leaving, the third boat began to approach the ship and followed a very similar path as the previous garbage barges. I was operating under peacetime rules of engagement, there were no supplementary measures authorized, and as the boat approached it did not exhibit what we call any hostile intent, like aiming a gun at us. The boat did not exhibit a hostile act, like actually shooting at us, so therefore everyone interpreted that it was the third garbage barge making a routine approach to the ship. It came down the side and came to the middle of the ship to the exact same spot the previous garbage barge had been. Two guys were in it as it came down the side of the ship. They stood up, waved to the crew, and once alongside, they detonated.
When you try to take away a nation’s ability to defend itself by attacking a warship, it is an act of war. We did not respond to the attack and consequently, 11 months later, on 9/11, the nation paid a tragic price. We’ll never know if responding to the attack on the USS Cole would have detected the growing 9/11 plot, but by doing nothing, we sealed our fate. IACSP: They waved. Unbelievable. Lippold: The suicide attack created a 40 x 40 foot hole. When that happened the announcing system for the ship failed. The back-up system and the battery back-up failed. The alarm systems for the ship, because of design flaws, failed. So consequently, there was complete silence on the ship. Nobody could tell the crew what had happened, where to go, or what to do. They immediately fell back on their training. They began to go out and investigate damage around main engine room number 1, the galley area, and the mess line area. They began to
54
grab their shipmates and get them outside the ship. Within about two hours we were able to determine that the ship was fairly stable and at that point in time we would be able to keep her afloat. If we could maintain the flooded areas to essential two of the four sets of engineering spaces, we were going to be fine. The crew also did an absolutely phenomenal job with the triage effort, which was ongoing at the same time. That first day we evacuated 33 wounded off the ship, we did it in 99 minutes and of those 33, 32 would survive. Unfortunately, at the grim tally at the end of the day, was 17 sailors were killed and 37 were wounded.
IACSP: You and your crew performed admirably. Good ole Navy training.
I found it interesting that you had to resort to sound-powered phones, which go back to my Navy days in the early 1970s – World War II, even.
Lippold: It might as well have been the South Pacific in World War II. We also went back to the good ole messenger. The repair locker officer would write down what he had found and what he recommended doing, give it to a messenger, who would run back to damage control central, hand it to the damage control assistant and the executive officer who was working with them. They plotted the damage, wrote a message and handed it back to the messenger. We were in 1945 for intents and purposes. IACSP: Who do you believe are the people responsible for placing the USS Cole in Aden?
Lippold: First and foremost was the ambassador in the country, Barbara Bodine. She was the president’s representative and it was her responsibility to determine whether or not we had the intelligence and mechanisms in place that allowed us to put our young men and women into harm’s way in that country. The second person I looked at was the CIA station chief. He is the U.S. government’s intelligence representative in-country and he should have known what the threat was, and he should have had a better handle on it. But as I’ve been told, he was merely using that assignment as a professional check-in-the-block for promotion within the agency. Those two combined are responsible for going to the military and saying it is safe and in our national security interest to engage in this country by pulling ships into port. Based on the information he had, General Zinni (Marine General Anthony Zinni, Commander in Chief Central Command) also had an obligation to use his own assets through the Defense Intelligence Agency to determine if it was safe. I don’t blame them, but there was a very shortsighted attitude in appreciating the threat that al Qaeda posed even after the attacks on our embassies in Africa. IACSP: Are you bitter that the Clinton Administration did not respond to the attack on the Cole in any way? Lippold:
I fault both the Clinton and the Bush administrations for doing nothing. A warship defends U.S. citizens and national security interests around the world. When you try to take away a nation’s ability to defend itself by attacking a warship, it is an act of war. We did not respond to the attack and consequently, 11 months later, on 9/11, the nation paid a tragic price. We’ll never know if responding to the attack on the USS Cole would have detected the growing 9/11 plot, but by doing nothing, we sealed our fate.
IACSP: Who in your view
are the heroes of this story?
Lippold: Clearly, my crew. Those involved in the damage control effort did a phenomenal job getting the ship stable and prevented it from sinking. Others were involved in the triage effort, which is why we were able to save as many lives as we did. Also the crews of the ships that showed up to help us. I will also always be grateful to the FBI-NCIS team that gathered evidence against the terrorists who were involved in the plot. Thankfully, we have one of the terrorists in custody down in Guantanamo Bay. IACSP: The attack on the USS Cole was a tragic chapter in American history, but as you note in your book, your crew and others performed heroically in the aftermath. Thank you for speaking to us.
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
Vol.18, No.3
Book Reviews
Islamists hold a picture of Osama bin Laden during a protest in Cairo, May 6, 2011. Al Qaeda confirmed Osama bin Laden was dead on Friday, dispelling some of the fog around the killing of the “holy warrior”, and vowed to mount more attacks on the West. REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih
By Dr. Joshua Sinai The Hunt For Ksm: Inside The Pursuit And Takedown Of The Real 9/11 Mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
American targets. KSM served as bin Laden’s “independent contractor,” having refused to formally join al Qaeda. Bin Laden approved the plan, provided the necessary funding to execute it and appointed KSM as its operational manager.
By Terry Mcdermott And Josh Meyer Little, Brown And Company, 2012, $27.99, 368 Pages
‘’The Hunt for KSM: Inside the Pursuit and Takedown of the Real 9/11 Mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed” by veteran investigative reporters Terry McDermott and Josh Meyer, is a gripping account of how KSM, one of al Qaeda’s most prominent terrorist “entrepreneurs,” played such a crucial role in one of the deadliest terrorist operations in history. It is also a dramatic account of how the decade-long persistence and hard work of FBI and CIA investigators eventually succeeded in tracking and bringing KSM and his associates to justice, although, as described in great detail by the authors, it took a painstakingly long time in their global pursuit to finally identify him, pinpoint his location and roll up much of his network. Interestingly, even though KSM had been involved in terrorist attacks against the United States (beginning with the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 by his nephew, Ramzi Yousef and his associates) he was little known to U.S. authorities. His prominence grew once he hooked up with Yousef, who had managed to escape to Manila, to plot a series of spectacular attacks. These included plans to assassinate the Pope John Paul II and President Clinton during their visits to the Philippines, and, in what became known as the Bojinka Operation, to blow up a dozen American-flagged jumbo airliners in flight eastward over the Pacific. Fortunately, their plans were scuttled in January 1995 by Yousef’s carelessness, which eventually led to his arrest in Pakistan. KSM, however, managed to escape, which began the manhunt to apprehend him, although his significance wasn’t fully known to U.S. counterterrorism agencies.
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The Sept. 11 plot was KSM’s most spectacular terrorist operation. He personally pitched it to Osama bin Laden, who liked its basic premise of using airliners as weapons against iconic Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
Vol.18, No.3
KSM was involved in numerous other terrorist operations, including one, in January 2002, when, on behalf of al Qaeda, he insinuated himself into the kidnapping of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan, an operation that was carried out by another jihadi group, by paying $50,000 to take possession of the hostage. As the authors write, he “quickly and with frightening efficiency” slit Pearl’s throat with the camera running for maximum propaganda impact. Also noteworthy is the authors’ dramatic account of how U.S. counterterrorism agents eventually succeeded in “linking the dots.” Greatly helped by the cooperation of an al Qaeda informer and with the assistance of Pakistani intelligence and security forces, they finally apprehended KSM as he was sleeping at the residence of his associates in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Although the book is a compelling read, one wishes the authors were more attentive to tying up loose ends. For example, they extensively discuss the interactions Mohammed Jamal Khalifa,
a prominent al Qaeda financier from Saudi Arabia, had with KSM and Ramzi Yousef in the Philippines and elsewhere beginning in the mid-1990s - including his arrest and later release in Jordan in 1997 when a witness against him “recanted” - but then Khalifa falls off the radar, leaving the reader to ponder his fate. It turns out he was killed in late January 2007 in Madagascar, while tending to a gemstone mine he had owned on the island. Moreover, the authors allude to Aafia Siddiqui, an American-educated Pakistani cognitive neuroscientist who was involved after 9/11 with KSM and a suspect in Baltimore (who was later arrested), but Siddiqui also falls off the book’s radar, with no discussion of how she came to be arrested in Pakistan in July 2008 and subsequently extradited to the United States to face trial and lifelong imprisonment on terrorismrelated charges. Finally, in the book’s conclusion, the authors dismiss Osama bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahri, as “more of a propagandist than an operational force,” when in fact he may have always played an important tactical function in al Qaeda, a role that should not be underestimated. Who is al Qaeda’s current KSM-like terrorist entrepreneur? According to the authors, it is one of KSM’s handpicked proteges, Adnan elShukrijumah. Like KSM, el-Shukrijumah has an engineering background, was born in the Middle East, lived and studied in America, is a fanatic jihadi and is currently masterminding many of its attacks against America and Europe from his hideouts in Pakistan. Surely, somewhere, an American task force is currently employing all the sophisticated tools necessary to hunt him and his associates, just as the one that eventually succeeded in catching KSM - so vividly portrayed in this important book.
Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search For Bin Laden From 9/11 To Abbottabad By Peter L. Bergen Crown Publishers, 2012, $26, 384 pages A year ago, on May 1, 2011, an elite U.S. SEAL team killed the world’s most wanted terrorist. After a decade of near misses and dead ends, Osama bin Laden was finally cornered in a fortress-like compound, in the city of Abbottabad, Pakistan, close to that country’s elite military academy, and fatally shot. The following day, his body was buried at sea by the U.S. Navy in an Islamic ceremony. While the general contours of the decisions and operations that led to Bin Laden’s killing are well-known, Peter Bergen’s “Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad” is the first inside account of the enormous efforts by U.S. intelligence agencies
to locate and apprehend the al Qaeda leader who was responsible for so much catastrophic bloodshed against America and its allies, including attacks against fellow Muslims in countries such as Iraq. Mr. Bergen, CNN’s national security analyst, came to prominence in early 1997 when he interviewed bin Laden in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan and then published three acclaimed books about al Qaeda and bin Laden. For this book, Mr. Bergen interviewed the key players involved in hunting for bin Laden and was granted access to some of the “treasure trove” of materials collected by the SEAL team from bin Laden’s compound. Mr. Bergen’s gripping account begins with the initial attempts that failed to capture bin Laden following the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001. As he writes, the opportunity to capture or kill bin Laden and his bodyguards before their escape from their Tora Bora hideout in the Afghan mountains failed when U.S. military leaders and the George W. Bush administration turned down urgent requests from military and CIA special forces operatives for large reinforcements, fearing that “they would be treated like enemies by the locals.” Even the capture and interrogation of top al Qaeda operatives such as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in 2003 failed to reveal new information about bin Laden’s whereabouts, Mr. Bergen writes, although they produced a wealth of intelligence about the organization that helped to apprehend or kill other senior-level operatives. In the absence of any plausible leads, in 2005 the hunt for bin Laden took on a new shape, according to Mr. Bergen, when a paper written by a CIA analyst became the blueprint for the ultimately successful operation. An effective search, according to the blueprint, was based on four pillars: locating al Qaeda’s leader through his family members, his communications with his organization’s senior leadership, his occasional outreach to the media and his courier network. With three of the pillars yielding little information about bin Laden’s whereabouts, identifying his courier network became the “glue” that had the potential to reveal the way he operated. Mr. Bergen then describes how intelligence analysts began creating a “composite of the ideal courier: he would have to be able to travel in Pakistan without sticking out, he would have to speak Arabic to communicate effectively with al Qaeda’s Arab leadership, and he would have to have been trusted by bin Laden before the 9/11 attacks.” Piecing together countless leads, intelligence analysts were able to identify such a courier:
Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, who, they found out, lived inside a compound in Abbottabad with a still unidentified “high value” inhabitant, and, as a result of surveillance of his movements throughout Pakistan, including setting up an observation post in a nearby house, proved successful in ultimately locating bin Laden’s whereabouts. In a testament to the exhaustive and meticulous planning that preceded the SEAL mission to ensure its success, Mr. Bergen discusses the myriad alternative outcomes that were considered, such as the possibility that bin Laden’s presence in the compound might have been circumstantial, not actual, that the SEAL helicopter-based mission from Afghanistan was too dangerous because it could be met by Pakistani military resistance and relations with Pakistan would be severely damaged in the aftermath. After President Obama gave the formal go-ahead two days before the May 1 mission, Mr. Bergen’s narrative turns dramatic when he discusses how tight operational secrecy was maintained by the small group involved. This was the case when Mr. Obama participated in the lighthearted humor of the White House Correspondents Dinner of last year, never giving away the evening’s true high drama and the stunning military operation that would be carried out the next day. In the book’s conclusion, Mr. Bergen writes that bin Laden’s death eliminated “the one man who provided broad, largely unquestioned strategic goals to the wider jihadist movement.” Al Qaeda’s “jihadist brand” isn’t yet finished, Mr. Bergen cautions, because in what he terms a “wild card,” “one of bin Laden’s dozen or so sons - endowed with the iconic family name - could eventually rise to take over the terrorist group.” Moreover, despite the leadership shortcomings of Ayman al-Zawahri, his less-charismatic successor, al Qaeda is in a position to exploit the current chaos in the Middle East, including establishing a new safe haven in Yemen, where many of its members have ancestral roots. In “Manhunt,” Mr. Bergen has produced a masterful account of bin Laden’s life and activities, how al Qaeda operated in the aftermath of Sept. 11, and the American government’s success in tracking down the world’s most notorious terrorist leader. Both reviews originally appeared in The Washington Times. Reprinted with permission. About the Author Dr. Joshua Sinai is Senior Manager, National Security Programs, Infinity Technology, LLC, in Mclean, VA. He can be reached at: jsinai@itllc.com.
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
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