The IACSP’s Counter-Terrorism Journal V20N3

Tackling Terrorism Through A Revolution In Soft Power Affairs

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Snatch-and-Grab:

Joint Delta Force Raid Nabs Benghazi Mastermind Iraq: Ancient Hatreds Fuel Modern Unrest The Threat Of Westerners Who Become Fighters On Behalf Of Al Qaeda Insurgents In Syria The Terrorist Threats Against The UK And Its Counterterrorism Responses, Growing Threats Of Terrorism From The North Caucasus

Fall Issue Vol. 20, No. 3 2014 Printed in the U.S.A. IACSP.COM

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I N T E R N A T I O N A L

SWAT Operations and Critical Incidents: Why People Die is the textbook at all OpTac International SWAT and Critical Incident Management Programs.

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Vol. 20, No. 3 Fall 2014 IACSP Director of Operations Steven J. Fustero

Page 20

Associate Publisher Phil Friedman

SNATCH AND GRAB:

Senior Editor Nancy Perry Contributing Editors Paul Davis Thomas B. Hunter Joshua Sinai

Joint Delta Force RaidNabs Benghazi Mastermind

Book Review Editor Jack Plaxe

by Dr. Thomas B. Hunter

Research Director Gerry Keenan Conference Director John Dew

Page 36

Communications Director Craig O. Thompson

GROWING THREATS

Art Director Scott Dube, MAD4ART International

Of Terrorism From The North Caucasus

Psychological CT Advisors Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC

by Col. Danny Dickerson (Ret.)

Counterintelligence Advisor Stanley I. White South America Advisor Edward J. Maggio Homeland Security Advisor Col. David Gavigan

Page 6

SITREP Terrorism Trends & Forecasts 2014

Personal Security Advisor Thomas J. Patire

Page 8

Iraq: Ancient Hatreds Fuel Modern Unrest, by David Gewirtz

Page 12

The World Watches, The World Waits, by Kevin Burt

Page 16

Assessing The Threat Of Westerners Who Become Fighters On Behalf Of

Al Qaeda Insurgents In Syria, by Dr. Joshua Sinai

Page 20

Snatch-and-Grab: Joint Delta Force Raid Nabs Benghazi Mastermind,

by Dr. Thomas B. Hunter

Page 26

Tackling Terrorism Through A Revolution In Soft Power Affairs,

by Dominic J. Traina III

Page 32

Assessing The Terrorist Threats Against The UK And Its Counterterrorism

Responses, by Dr. Joshua Sinai Page 36

Growing Threats Of Terrorism From The North Caucasus,

by Col. Danny Dickerson (Ret.)

Page 42

German Police And U.S. Army Counter Terrorism Training Scenario,

by Jim Weiss and Mickey Davis

Page 46

Secure Driver: Security Transportation Revisited, by Anthony Ricci

Page 48

Homeland Security Bookshelf, by Dr. Joshua Sinai

THE JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L is published by SecureWorldnet, Ltd., PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (ISSN#1552-5155) in cooperation with the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals and Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Copyright © 2014. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher.

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (571) 216-8205, FAX: (202) 315-3459 .

Membership $65/year, add $10 for overseas memberships. Postmaster: send address changes to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA. Web site: www.iacsp.com

Transportation Security Advisor Don L. Rondeau Tactical Advisor Robert Taubert Hazmat Advisor Bob Jaffin Security Driver Advisor Anthony Ricci, ADSI Cyberwarfare Advisor David Gewirtz Cell Phone Forensics Advisor Dr. Eamon P. Doherty IACSP Advisory Board John M. Peterson III John Dew Thomas Patire Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Robert E. Thorn Southeast Asia Correspondent Dr. Thomas A. Marks European Correspondent Elisabeth Peruci Middle East Correspondent Ali Koknar National Sales Representative Phil Friedman, Advertising Director Tel: 201-224-0588, Fax: 202-315-3459 iacsp@aol.com Tactical Sales Representative Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Tel: 757-721-2774, scott@mad4art.com

PHOTO CREDITS: Reuters, DefenseImagery.mil Army.mil, Navy.mil, istockphoto.com, shutterstock.com and authors where applicable.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Emergency Management Advisor Clark L. Staten

Vol. 20, No.3

SITREP

A

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Rodney Clark, 1st Recon team leader of Scout Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division (Advise and Assist Brigade), signals to his Iraqi scout partners to lead out during training for upcoming partnered missions at Camp Ramadi, Iraq, on Nov. 18, 2009. The paratroopers belong to the first fully-augmented advise-and-assist brigade to deploy to increase the military and civil capacities of Iraqi institutions. DoD photo by Spc. Michael J. MacLeod, U.S. Army. (Released)

Terrorism Trends & Forecasts 2014 s we know, in Iraq, Sunni jihadis fighting under the banner of al-Qaeda splinter group the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have captured large swathes of territory in the north west. The mobilization of thousands of Shiites into militias and their large-scale rallies across Baghdad exacerbate the danger of sectarian conflict escalating. The U.S. and Iran have moved quickly to support the Iraqi government, however, without a political solution, the fighting will continue. Israeli-Palestinian tensions remain extremely high as of this writing.

With no peace agreement in sight at this time, both parties continue to bomb each other. On another note, a Fatah-Hamas agreement in early June led to the formation of a Palestinian government of independents. Hamas’s assumption that the new government would pay salaries to Gaza’s 43,000 government employees did not materialize to date, leaving the Strip with an unprecedented financial crisis.

Yemen’s transition is gradually unraveling due to unprecedented security and economic challenges, partly caused by political infighting and weak consensus on national dialogue results.

The country’s economic crisis meanwhile worsened

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Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia throughout this summer saw the militant group recapture several recently liberated villages in south-central Somalia, displacing thousands. With the onset of Ramadan, Al-Shabaab will intensify its guerilla offensives.

Kenya suffered further terrorist attacks. At least 58 were killed mid-month in an attack on Mpeketoni town in Kenya’s east, and scores more in attacks on nearby Witu and Poromoko towns in the following days.

Moderate Muslim cleric Sheikh Mohammed Idris was shot dead in Mombasa, the fourth prominent cleric to be killed in the city since 2012.

An attack on Pakistan’s Karachi international airport in early June, claimed by the Pakistani Taliban as well as the Islamic

Movement of Uzbekistan, killed scores and provoked an intensification of the army’s bombing campaign of alleged militant hideouts in the north west.

Two days of anti-Muslim violence erupted in Sri Lanka when supporters of radical Buddhist group Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) attacked Muslim businesses, homes and mosques in the south-western coastal towns of Aluthgama and Beruwela. The attacks followed a BBS rally where its Buddhist monk leader threatened Muslims with violence and which left at least four dead and 80 injured.

Future 2014 TRENDS Deteriorating Situations • Iraq, Kenya, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Syria

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 20, No.3

Improved Situations • None Unchanged Situations • Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China (internal), China/Japan, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India (nonKashmir), Indonesia, Iran, Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Korean Peninsula, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Caucasus, Papua New Guinea, Peru,

Philippines, Rwanda, Somaliland, South China Sea, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Western Sahara, Zimbabwe Conflict Risk Alert • Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Somalia Source: www.crisisgroup.org

Report Reveals Chinese Military Developing New Scramjet-Powered Hypersonic Missile Disclosure follows China’s earlier test of Wu-14 high-speed glide vehicle China’s military is working on a jet-powered hypersonic cruise missile in addition to an advanced high-speed glide warhead that was tested earlier this year.

A Chinese technical journal disclosed new details of research on what China’s defense researchers are calling a hypersonic cruise vehicle.

A line drawing of the scramjetpowered vehicle shows that the concept being studied for eventual construction is nearly identical to an experimental National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) scramjet vehicle called the X-43.

Publication of details of work on the powered hypersonic cruise vehicle indicates China is pursuing a second type of ultra-fast maneuvering missile capable of traveling at speeds of up to Mach 10—nearly 8,000 miles per hour. Such speeds create huge technical challenges for weapons designers because of the strain on materials and the difficulty of control at high velocities.

Large numbers of Chinese military writings in recent years have

focused on hypersonic flight. However, few have addressed scramjet powered hypersonic flight.

The United States is developing both scramjet-powered and glidehypersonic missiles. Russia’s government has made development of hypersonic missiles a priority.

Source: http://freebeacon.com/ national-security/

FBI Director James B. Comey Says U.S. Is Keeping An Eye On Syrian Travelers FBI Director James B. Comey met with law enforcement leaders at the Miramar Cultural Center-Artspark, 2400 Civic Center Pl., last month.

Comey said that the new resources were meant to continue targeting the increasing white collar crime and investigate Syrian travelers through the Joint Terrorism Task Force.

With an estimated 450 agents in nine counties from Key West to Fort Pierce, Comey declined to be specific about the types of resources, other than to say they were “human resources” primarily.

Speaking before some two dozen law enforcement leaders at the Miramar Cultural Center,

Comey has been on the job for about 10 months and is traveling the country to meet with his agents and those who partner with them through the Joint Terrorism Task Force.

Source: Miami Herald

As ISIS Threatens Europe, Dutch Cut Intelligence Funding First, they warn the threat of terrorism has never been so dire. Then they cut the funds to fight it.

This is what has happened in the Netherlands, where experts say ‘homegrown jihadism” is not only growing, but changing, largely as a result of the war in Syria. More than 100 Dutch Muslims have joined the resistance battling dictator Bashar al-Assad, most of them becoming members of terrorist groups Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaida affiliate, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the most violent of the Islamic terrorist groups, now waging a new war in Iraq.

Now at least 30 of those Dutch youth have returned home, but the country’s intelligence agency can’t track them. Budget cuts have crippled their ability to keep pace.

And yet, despite this, Interior Minister Ronald Plasterk is calling for an additional €70 million in cuts – this when the country’s terror alert is at its secondhighest level and the number of Salafist, or radical and often violent Muslims, is on the rise.

Comey said counter-terrorism remains the FBI’s top priority, specifically what he called “Syrian travelers” and homegrown terrorists.

Indeed, Europol reports that in 2013, “Al Qaeda and like-minded terrorist groups abroad continued to encourage self-organized attacks within the EU, aiming for indiscriminate casualties.”

“[These are] people who go to Syria bent on engaging in some misguided jihad and make the worst kind of relationships and get the worst kind of training,” he said. “Some day they will be coming back [home] and that worries me even more.”

Source: The Investigative Project On Terrorism: Abigail R. Esman, the author, most recently, of Radical State: How Jihad Is Winning Over Democracy in the West (Praeger, 2010), is a freelance writer based in New York and the Netherlands.

U.S.-China Counterterrorism Dialogue The United States hosted the U.S.China Counterterrorism Dialogue July 15 in Washington, D.C. Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights Sarah Sewall delivered the opening remarks and Ambassador Tina Kaidanow, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, led the U.S. delegation. Vice Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs led the Chinese delegation.

The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to address the shared threat that terrorism poses to both countries and the international community. Ambassador Kaidanow and Vice Foreign Minister Cheng noted the success of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in Beijing July 9-10 for setting the tone for cooperative bilateral relations, in which counterterrorism cooperation plays an important part.

During the dialogue, the two sides noted their opposition to terrorism in all forms and agreed on the importance of promoting peace and prosperity in regions around the world. Both sides sought practical ways to strengthen cooperation on counterterrorism and agreed to meet again next year.

Source: www.state.gov

IACSP News Many of our members are not receiving our bi-monthly CTS Enews (electronic security report) because we either do not have your email, or you are using a .gov or .mil email address for your membership record. If you would like to receive our CTS Enews, please send me an email with the email address you would like us to use.

Also include your current address.

Please send the information to my attention to my personal email address: iacsp1@aol.com Thank you.

Steven J. Fustero, Dir. Of Operations/ IACSP

IACSP Member Perspective

Iraq: Ancient Hatreds Fuel Modern Unrest

By David Gewirtz

I

Armed Iraqi security forces personnel take their positions during a patrol looking for militants from the al Qaeda faction, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as explosives and weapons in a neighbourhood in Ramadi May 18, 2014. Thousands of civilians have fled Falluja since the Iraqi military intensified shelling in a new bid to crush a five-month old Sunni uprising, killing scores of people in what residents describe as massive indiscriminate bombardment. More than 420,000 people have already escaped the two main cities of western Anbar province, Falluja and Ramadi, in fighting since the start of the year. Picture taken May 18, 2014. REUTERS/Stringer

raq has once again exploded onto the front pages, and -- as usual -- not in a good way. Rather than covering the stages of breaking news, which will change by the time you read this in print, this article will help you understand just why Iraq is the smoldering, festering disaster it has become -and why any new Western involvement will simply be the money pit it has always been.

This whole Iraq mess began in June 2009, when America began withdrawing troops from a conquered and infrastructure-challenged Iraq. By 2011, our troops (actual troops, not mercenaries, which is a whole different story) were pretty much out of Iraq.

That’s oversimplifying a bit. This all began back on September 11, 2001, when Saddam Hussein blew up the World Trade Center. Except he didn’t. He did have weapons of mass destruction that might be pointed at good ol’

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Americans. Or, well, not so much.

The point is, for whatever reason, America started a war with Iraq that was going to prove to be one of the longest, most expensive and stupidest in history.

Let me quantify stupid.

I’m not talking about the $6.7 billion dollars in cash we accidentally misplaced, because that tub of green was eventually found, or so the HuffPost reports. That’s pocket change. No, I’m talking about the $2 trillion (which will eventually be $6 trillion) that Reuters calculated

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

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will be the eventual final price tag of the war.

Just in case you can’t get your head around numbers like “six” and “trillion,” let me give you a few comparisons. America could have just called out sick on the

war, and sent each adult American a check for $30,927. Or it could have given 48 million families (that’s one out of every two American families) a new $125,000 home, free and clear.

Or it could have invested a couple of million bucks each into three million new startup companies (that might have created a few jobs, eh?). Or we could have spent it on curing cancer, while at the same time funding reboots of Firefly, Babylon 5, and Buffy The Vampire Slayer TV shows. Talk about misuse of government funds!

But I digress. We’re about to learn why we’re thinking about going back and fighting this war for a third time (‘cause the third time’s the charm, you know).

This all goes back earlier, to when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. As you all know, we’d been there, done that in Iraq. We even left Saddam there and in power, like that souvenir you buy, but realize just won’t fit in anywhere back home.

Those were the days of Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield, years before Dick Cheney got fitted for his Darth Vader helmet.

It actually made sense to leave Saddam there back in 1991. Poppy Bush was still in charge, Cheney hadn’t yet started the serious meds, and Colin Powell and Stormin’ Norman were on the scene.

Despite most rank-and-file (and geopolitically challenged) ‘mericans bein’ disappointed that we didn’t open a can of whoopass on Saddam, Saddam staying in Iraq was to everyone’s benefit (except his subjects and his neighbors). From our point of view, across an ocean, there was some strategic value in keeping Saddam in place as a firewall against the fundamentalist Shi’a Islamic revolutionaries in Iran.

By the way, before I delve further into America’s meddling history and then get all biblical on you, I need to point out that I am not writing this as a Democrat or as a Republican. Both parties leave much to be desired. I’m one of those non-partisan American patriots, unhappy with the choices we have on both sides of the aisle.

Leaving aside partisan politics for a little while, let’s climb into Dr. Who’s Tardis and travel back a bit further (farther?) Sigh. When it comes to time

travel, “further” and “farther” get kind of smooched together.

Let’s set our speed to 88 miles-perhour and visit 1979. Mohammad Rezâ Šâh Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, King of Kings, Light of the Aryans (yeah, really!), and Head of the Warriors was a bit of schmuck. First, he came to his King of Kings title in a slightly roundy-bouty manner.

to, you know, think. Of the thoughts these somewhat secular, educated folks were having, substantial attention went to the incredible economic excesses practiced by the Shah.

The Shah had built himself a replica of the Peacock Throne. The original would have been worth $810 million in today’s money and was built by the Indian leader who constructed the

From our point of view, across an ocean, there was some strategic value in keeping Saddam in place as a firewall against the fundamentalist Shi’a Islamic revolutionaries in Iran.

Mohammad Reza’s father, Rezā Shāh Pahlavi took the throne in 1925 and lasted there until 1941. His rulership was an odd mix of somewhat secular (i.e., not religious) governance and total brutality (remind you of anyone named Saddam?).

In any case, poppa shah wasn’t playing as nice with Churchill and Stalin during World War II as they wanted, and so the Ruskies and the Brits kicked him out.

In his place, the allies (and, in this case, mostly the Americans) gave Rezā Shāh Pahlavi’s throne to his 22-year-old son, Mohammad Rezâ Šâh Pahlavi.

From 1941 to 1979, Shah Junior ruled the country. He enacted some reforms -- like increasing education, but kind of missed the whole point when thousands of newly educated but jobless Iranians were set loose on the nation.

This was back before Xbox, so they didn’t cooperatively sit in their Mom’s basements, staying out of trouble.

Instead, the newly educated decided

Taj Mahal. Shah Junior apparently figured that since the ancient Persian Nadir Shah had captured the original Peacock Throne, he had a right to one for himself.

Not a popular thing to do with many unemployed folks wandering the streets.

Mohammad Rezâ Šâh Pahlavi also was big on the secular in a part of the world that is way bigger on the religious. It’d be like going into Alabama and telling everyone that they’re not allowed their Jesus and then brutally beating and torturing anyone who let loose a “Hallelujah!”

So, anyway, back from the 1940s through the 1970s, Mohammad Reza was having a blast spending his public’s money, putting down anyone who disagreed with him, and pretty much giving into anything American oil companies wanted. Yes, indeed, our fingerprints are deep in Iran, too.

Eventually, Iranians revolted, the Shah went into exile, and Iran became the

modern, worrisome, fundamentalist nutball state that it is today.

Iran’s official religion (after the 1979 revolution that sent the Shah packing) is Shi’a. In fact, it’s so religious the nation is called the Islamic Republic of Iran. Shi’a Islam, for those keeping notes, is a branch of Islam that believes that the prophet Muhammed’s cousin and son-in-law Ali inherited the Caliphate (pretty much the supreme leadership of the religion and state) kind of like a super-Pope.

Since we’re traveling back in time, let’s note that early Islam began in the 600s -- about 600 years after the dawn of our modern calendar and about 800 years before Columbus sailed on his voyage of discovering what others had already discovered: the lush and verdant land we call America.

If you’ve been keeping track, we’ve managed to slingshot off the sun all the way from 2011, when most US troops left Iraq, to the 600s, when Islam was first forming.

In any case, modern Islam has a number of sects, of which the Shi’a are only one. Another of interest is the Sunni. As it turns out, there are a lot more Sunni than Shi’a. In fact, there are more Sunni in the world than just about any other religion, including Christians.

The problem is, while both Sunni and Shi’a are Islam, they’re not exactly the best of friends. Remember when I said that the Shi’a believe the Caliphate after Muhammed went to Ali? Yeah, well the Sunni believe that the post-Muhammed rule should have gone to Muhammed’s father-in-law, Abu Bakr.

Now, you Christians out there, don’t you do any gloating. Recall that in early Catholicism, there was a “Great Schism,” where the various players couldn’t get along. In fact, there was a pope declared in Rome (Leo IX) and another in Constantinople (Michael Cerularius) -- although each called the other “patriarch,” which is a kind of Pope Jr, and each excommunicated each other.

There are other aspects to the Sunni/ Shi’a discontent beyond ancient religious family feuds, but the point is, both sects are often cranky with each other. Deadly cranky.

We humans sometimes have a bit of a difficulty getting along. But now it’s time to zap ourselves back to the future, to Saddam’s time. His Ba’ath Party was mostly Sunni, leaving little room for the Shi’a.

Look at it this way. When I was a kid, my dad was particularly into tropic fish. He introduced me to a type of fish called Siamese fighting fish. These are lovely tropical fish with bright colors and big fins.

They’re relatively easy to care for, as long as you keep them separate.

It’s a little hard to pin down populations of these groups, especially in a country beat to heck both by its leaders and its so-called allies, but the CIA World Factbook puts the Shi’a at about 65 percent of the population and the Sunni’s at 35 percent or so.

In fact, he had these little tanks where one fish was happily swimming on one side and the other happily swimming on the other side. But remove the glass separator and they go at it, often to the death. It’s what they do.

As you might imagine, with the majority of the population not represented in Saddam’s rule, a whole lot of unhappy people still populate the country.

Of course, this all gets messier, because we’re not just talking religion, we’re talking ethnicity. You’ve no doubt heard of the constantly abused Kurds. While their religion is somewhat different from the Sunnis, they’re often lumped in with the Sunnis. The Kurds, which Saddam constantly brutalized, actually make up almost 20 percent of the Iraqi population.

And then, of course, there’s the remains of al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden wasn’t either Shi’a or Sunni. He was even more fundamentalist, if you can believe it. Today, there’s another militant group called ISIS, which stands for Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. That, alone, is pretty ironic, considering the goddess Isis is all about women and motherhood, and the Islamic fundamentalists are all about squelching women and keeping them in burqas.

And that leads us back to our rippedfrom-the-headlines coverage of Iraq’s latest soap opera.

There is no doubt the current unrest and seismic reconfiguration that Iraq is undergoing was inevitable.

In fact, back in the days before I wrote geopolitical analysis for something of a living, I yelled at the TV. My wife remembers me having a particularly unruly TV yelling session when I tried to convince the entire Bush administration (through the shear power of my outrage aimed at the cable box) that removing Saddam Hussein was bad for America and if they did remove him, Iraq would melt down. They did remove him. Iraq is melting down.

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And now, you also have ISIS in Iraq and to the east of Iraq, in Syria, where nearly three quarters of the population are Sunni. Worse, like Iraq, the Syrian Assad family is primarily Ba’ath, which tends to align Sunni.

Believe it or not, from our American point of view, this meltdown in Iraq might be a good thing. Left in a relatively calm state, Iraq’s 65 percent Shi’a might have sided with Iran’s national Shi’a government, forming what might have essentially become a Shi’a superpower, complete with nukes.

The question for our leaders is exactly who do you attack?

Do you drone-bomb the Shi’a and increase our level of unrest with Iran and indirectly strengthen al-Qaeda? Or do you drone-bomb ISIS and the Sunni, which would indirectly strengthen Iran?

It’s also what the ancient religious and ethnic disputes do in the Middle East.

They fight.

Saddam served the role of the glass barrier between sides. When his oppressive regime was in power, he managed, by brutal force, to keep everyone in line. Since his downfall, we provided the service of the glass barrier. But once we left, the barrier was down, and the fighting became inevitable.

Here’s the geopolitical crapfest we’re heading into. On the eastern side of Iraq, you have a powerful Iran, probably most of the way along to having their own nukes, and certainly having their own source of oil.

In Iraq, you have roughly 65 percent of the population Shi’a, who are religiously and ethnically inclined to side with Iran.

But instead, you have the ISIS folks, the remaining Ba’ath of Syria, and the Sunnis, all causing unrest, all very disinclined from working with the Shi’a government in Iran.

The fact is, for as long as Iran is ruled by religious extremists, we don’t want that nation to grow or increase its power. They’re not exactly friends with our western ways. On the other hand, we sure don’t want to see an al-Qaeda state blink into existence, although the current leadership of Syria isn’t much better. So we don’t want to see ISIS succeed, either.

launch it in aid of what’s left of the provisional Iraqi puppet government -- which stands almost no chance of surviving.

The question for our leaders is exactly who do you attack? Do you drone-bomb the Shi’a and increase our level of unrest with Iran and indirectly strengthen al-Qaeda?

Or do you drone-bomb ISIS and the Sunni, which would indirectly strengthen Iran?

I should also point out that Iran is pretty technically savvy. Back in 2012, I did a situation analysis on Iran for this Journal. You may want to take a few minutes and give it a read: Cyberwar Spotlight: Iran from the Spring 2012 issue.

We could decide to send in a bunch of carrier groups, another 100,000 or so troops, and pick up where Operation Enduring Freedom left off, with Operation Freedom Forced On Them Until They Darned Well Behave.

But you’re looking at billions more in American taxpayer dollars attempting to keep control of a battle which has raged on in the Middle East since before the Norse settled L’Anse aux Meadows in Canada back in the year 1000.

No matter what, you can assume we’re going to spend more taxpayer money on what is a fundamentalist battle that predates American civilization. I’m not seeing much that’s smart here, no matter which side of the political spectrum you’re on.

Oh, joy.

About the Author

Unfortunately, unrest like this is catnip for America.

David Gewirtz is Director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute, Distinguished Lecturer for CBS Interactive, Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP), IT Advisor to the Florida Public Health Association and an instructor at the UC Berkeley extension.

This is just the time when we should keep our billions and trillions and use it for important things here, like fixing bridges and roads.

The problem is, we’re likely to decide to build a drone fleet and

His personal site is at: DavidGewirtz. com. His company site is at: ZATZ. com. Follow him on Twitter at: @DavidGewirtz LinkedIn:http://www.linkedin.com/in/davidgewirtz

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

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The World Watches, The World Waits

By Kevin Burt

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Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters help a fellow fighter who was wounded during what the FSA said was an airstrike by forces loyal to Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad in the southern Idlib countryside July 9, 2014. The airstrike was launched to prevent the FSA fighters from advancing into Wadi al-Deif military camp, which remains under government control, the activists said. Free Syrian Army fighters started the alJaysh al-Wahad (The One Army) battle against forces loyal to Assad over the al-Hamidiyeh and Wadi al-Deif military camps in Idlib, trying to take control of them, the activists added. Picture taken July 9, 2014. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

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f democratic nations do not successfully achieve a concise, coherent, and unwavering explanation of terrorism, then those who combat it (and the innocent who have fallen victim to it) are failed by an injustice. The human toll that has resulted from the lack of a coherent understanding and approach to terrorism among democratic nations is vast and calls for unified action moving forward.

The United Nations announced in 2013 that death toll estimates would no longer be provided for the Syrian conflict after at least 100,000 souls perished from the actions of a hostile government. Those that survived were among 6.5 million displaced individuals or the 2.5 million who fled to neighboring countries, as released in a 2014 report by the CIA. The same hostile government used grotesque tactics by releasing chemical weapons against those who refused to submit to the abuse and stand for freedom. The world watches and the world waits.

In 2013 in North Korea, 10,000 people were placed into a sports stadium and forced to watch the public execution of 80 individuals, by firing squad.

Most victims were accused of watching foreign television dramas, according to a U.S. State Department report released in 2013. The world watches and the world waits.

In 2001, 91 nations were forever impacted when small groups of individuals turned airplanes into missiles targeting the innocent on a clear U.S. September morning. The world watches and the world waits.

Recently, 230 schoolgirls were kidnapped in Nigeria in a region that has struggled with terrorism for the last decade. Still, the world watches and the world waits.

What is terrorism? This is a concept that is bandied about daily on news programs and articles, yet there does not appear to be one commonly accepted definition. There have been many attempts to clearly define what terrorism and that effort requires more attention now than previously in history.

After studying historical and current explanations, I developed

Tanks rolling into Baghdad, the falling of towers, the threat of nuclear weapons in a new age, and the abuse of governments against their own people, all illustrate that as terrorism escalates, society deteriorates.

this definition: “Premeditated acts, domestic or transnational, intentionally committed to endanger peace and destabilize the fundamental aspects of society through perceived and real fear, threats, and other hostile actions that are in direct violation with the fundamental principles of democracy and punishable by death.”

Seeking unanimous consent from all nations to clearly define terrorism must continue, but the time has come for nations who subscribe to and embody demo-

cratic principles to find a shared voice against the evil that plagues the world-at-large. Democratic nations must illustrate that their values extend beyond the borders of their own nations and into all nations whose citizens are oppressed and victimized by state and non-state actors. We must unite to eradicate terrorism regardless of political, economic or other interests. The notion that history repeats itself (if not learned from) is at play here.

Tanks rolling into Baghdad, the falling of towers, the threat of

nuclear weapons in a new age, and the abuse of governments against their own people, all illustrate that as terrorism escalates, society deteriorates. We must find a way to overcome, and that will occur when those determined to commit criminal acts against the innocent fear the response and retaliation.

The words of Edmund Burke have always served to guide the moral compass of character from the loosely interpreted phrase “the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.” Amongst the varying interpretations, of Burke’s words is, “When bad men combine, good men must organize.” However interpreted, the words illustrate that actions from the good or righteous are the only way to stop the evil. It is in words that the evil is defined so it can be stopped.

The Challenges Terrorism seeks to disrupt economies, inhibit operations, and coerce others through violence and aggression. To identify and combat it, democratic nations must not give priority to geography or economic concerns. The preservation of innocent life and fundamental rights granted

to all citizens of all nations must

be the primary concerns. Terrorism does not have to have a long-term plan or goal other than destruction and annihilation. It has the ability to become exponential not only in the number of attacks but in the extent of its attacks.

As such, what will it take to eradicate those seeking to cause harm? In October 2002, U.S. Sen. John McCain stated, “Credibility is a nation’s greatest asset in international affairs. It is the hardest to earn and the most difficult to maintain, but once possessed it makes it possible to compel changes in behavior. Credibility exists only in the eye of the beholder.”

Research continually argues that the War on Terror is broad in scope and ambiguous in mission. If terrorism lacks an agreed upon explanation then how will it be known that terrorism has been defeated? Traditionally, war was won by defeating the enemy on the field and forcing acceptance of political terms, but what is a victory in the war on terror?

In 1812, Carl von Clausewitz wrote an essay prior to battling Napoleon in the Russian army, which became commonly known as the Principles of War. He states, the first step must “establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”

Of the challenges acknowledged in the pursuit of a new explanation, terrorism itself must be defined so as to provide an understanding of what the War on Terror represents. In 2002, R. Keeley wrote an article, Trying to Define Terrorism, discussing how the term terrorism is subjective, to the extent it lacks meaning, and overused as the term is associated with anything that is hated. Furthermore, the term is used interchangeably with aggressors and freedom fighters.

The Structure My research found several definitions, historical and present, from various authors and leaders in the international community and in the United States. I used this to shape a proposed common definition of terrorism. Even if the probability of attack or the probability of certain means being used in an attack is low, the negative impact will always be substantial.

As such, I crafted the definition using strong language that can be applied equally regardless of successful or unsuccessful attempts. Creating

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a universal definition potentially opens the door to pre-emptive action, which is a risk, but further strengthens a proactive versus reactive stance.

The continued and future democracies of the world are dependent upon re-addressing the explanation behind what terrorism is, what it represents and how to deal with it, with the end goal of eradication. I worked from the premise that the terminology must find a neutral stance or be unbiased toward national versus international interests. The explanation must show fairness and equality in a format that allows for adaptation but not excessive interpretation. The challenges presented include the fact that terms such as terrorism, terrorist, aggression, and freedom are open to interpretation.

the first step must “establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”

Analysis of the explanations researched led to five broad categories regarding the similarities including action, intention, target, purpose and result.

These similarities illustrated that terrorism has a cause and effect relationship whereas it is both against something and for something simultaneously. Whether the act is committed successfully, unsuccessfully or creates a threat, all acts are viewed equally within the explanations. Attempting to commit an act of terrorism is and should be no different from actually committing the act.

The differences within the explanations could not be grouped in the same manner as the similarities.

Historically the international community has provided great depth in attempts at defining terrorism. The United States speaks more to the intent and criminal nature. Additionally, the term peace is found only once; within the Sixth Conference in 1935 for the Unification of Criminal Laws. The European Union cited in 2002 that terrorism is a catalyst for destabilization.

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Introduction Of Risk Though widely discussed surrounding the issue of terrorism, risk appears to not be factored into the language explaining terrorism. Risk can be opinionated and factual. Risk exists through perception, which is intangible and resources, such as supplies or funding, which are finite and tangible and thus can be calculated.

In 2010, R. Sagarin wrote an article in Homeland Security Affairs titled Natural Security for a Variable and Risk-filled World noting an intriguing concept that “Fish don’t try to turn sharks into vegetarians. Living immersed in a world of constant risk forces the fish to develop multiple ways to live with risk, rather than trying to eliminate it.” Unlike the fish, we have the ability and responsibility to eliminate risk. What would happen if the risk were shifted from one party to the other, ultimately changing power and impact? Risk is inherent in all aspects of life, but it can be controlled, it can be mitigated, and at times it can be eliminated. However, I argue that risk should be used by democracies to control terrorism.

Risk exists in the actions or lack thereof of those committing terrorism and those combating it. Imagine two equations where one represents those committing terrorism and the second represents those faced with combating terrorism. In both equations risk, “R,” exists as a positive and negative.

Mathematical principles state the positive and negative Rs would cancel each other out. In this case, they do not cancel out as an exponent exists to each R. The exponent determines the scale of the attacks or subsequent responses. The mathematical arguments are based on greater or less than statements where R is on both sides of the equation, but the comparison is between four total equations.

The statements have been grouped, “A” and “B,” in which one statement in A will be compared to one statement in B.

Group A Committing or not committing terrorism: • •

Equation determining the risk associated with committing a terrorist act.

Equation determining the risk associated with not committing a terrorist act.

Group B Responding or not responding to terrorism:

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• •

Equation determining the risk of responding to a terrorist act.

Equation determining the risk of not responding to a terrorist act.

The question for those committing and those combating terrorism is where does less risk occur? The answer derives from assumptions of the opposing party’s equations. For example: •

•

The risk associated with committing a terrorist act (1) is less than the risk of response to the terrorist act (3). As such (1) < (3) arguing the terrorists have more to gain by committing the act then they will lose.

The risk associated with committing a terrorist act (1) is greater than the risk of response to the terrorist act (3). As such (1) > (3) arguing the terrorists will lose more than they will gain.

Belief holds that not responding to an attack always outweighs the risk of responding. Those attacking will continue to do so until they face a power that possesses the strength to eliminate them and their organizations.

The New Explanation I propose the following extended definition of terrorism: •

•

•

•

Premediated acts intentionally committed to endanger peace and destabilize the fundamental aspects of society through perceived and real fear, threats and other hostile actions.

Intentionally targeting civilians, peacekeepers, first-responders, non-combatants – to include those rendering medical assistance, citizens of one’s own nation and; Intentionally targeting governments and organizations to coerce change through violent and aggressive means is to not be tolerated under any circumstance.

Domestic and transnational, whereas distinction between the two is only necessary for determining the level of response to combat it.

A violation against the fundamental principles of democracy in which those executing the acts as well as those responsible for the inception and implementation shall be punishable by death.

Transnational •

•

Requiring democratic nations to prevent, deter, and combat any attack regardless of the democratic nations’ interest, or lack thereof, in the region.

Further requiring democratic nations to identify all parties having any knowledge

of the potential of such acts to be committed and to try such individuals to the same degree as those carrying out the acts.

Domestic • •

•

Requiring the recognition that such is no less serious than transnational acts.

Requiring the Judicial System to seek out those with any knowledge of the potential or real acts committed and try such individuals as accomplices.

The willful use of any weapon or tactic causing public harm, panic, fear and unrest.

The Rationale Peace is a term that should be understood or able to be envisioned by the majority of individuals. Though only seen once in the cited explanations, the inclusion of peace aids in easily understanding terrorism is the opposite of it.

Politics is completely removed from the new explanation. Under this explanation, lone-wolf acts that are non-political can clearly be defined as terrorism. The last few years of domestic attacks have seen ambiguity in being called what they truly were and it was desired to not allow the continued abusive interpretation. By requiring the recognition that domestic terrorism is as serious as transnational, this prevents attempts to minimize the severity of the acts.

it is impossible to make an overwhelming argument for or against it. If all action are reactions then grave damage and harm has already been done and those committing the horrific acts will operate under this assumption continuously.

Terrorism is terrorism regardless if committed by a state or a non-state actor, transnationally or domestically. “The difficulty in defining ‘terrorism’ is in agreeing on the basis for determining when the use of violence (directed at whom, by whom, for what ends) is legitimate,” according to the Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs [AZDEMA]. The targeting of innocent civil-

A violation against the fundamental principles of democracy in which those executing the acts as well as those responsible for the inception and implementation shall be punishable by death.

Terrorism knows no boundary and the only time necessary to categorize it by domestic or transnational is in relation to the subsequent response to combat it. For democratic nations to stand by their principles, they must be willing and able to act regardless of gain or interest in a particular region. If an atrocity is committed, it is on those who consider themselves righteous and just to correct the injustices.

The term criminal does not appear as any level of or attempt at terrorism is a crime and more importantly a crime against humanity.

The explanation does not list types of weapons or types of tactics that may be used. This provides an avenue to go after the lone-wolf attacks, unsanctioned attacks, and brutality or threat toward the public-at-large.

The only section of the explanation that intentionally allows for ambiguity is the requirement of democratic nations to prevent and deter attacks. It is intentional as

ians and all those considered non-combatants is a crime against humanity.

The world, as a whole, will not ever agree on the issue of terrorism as “one state’s ‘terrorist’ is another state’s ‘freedom fighter,’” according to AZDEMA. Those who fight for freedom should not ever be mistaken for or labeled as terrorists, though they may make the mistake of using tactics that appear terroristic.

About the Author Kevin Burt, MPA, served in the U.S. Coast Guard. Based in the nation’s capital region. He seeks the development of knowledge through continual education and public service, with the end-goal of contributing on the global stage.

Burt earned a B.S. in public affairs management from Indiana University and a MPA with a concentration in security management from American Military University. He is currently pursuing a MA in international relations at Webster University.

Assessing The Threat

Of Westerners Who Become Fighters On Behalf Of Al Qaeda Insurgents In Syria Dr. Joshua Sinai

Residents run from a fire at a gasoline and oil shop in Aleppo’s Bustan Al-Qasr neighbourhood October 20, 2013. Witnesses said the fire was caused by a bullet fired by a sniper loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at the Karaj al-Hajez crossing, a passageway separating Aleppo’s Bustan al-Qasr, which is under the rebels’ control and Al-Masharqa neighborhood, an area controlled by the regime. REUTERS/Haleem Al-Halabi

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estern security services are highly concerned about the repercussions to their own countries’ national security emanating from the waves of radicalized Western Muslims (whether Muslim-born or converts) who have been traveling to Syria to fight on behalf of the Sunni-based al Qaeda-affiliated insurgent groups against the Bashar al-Assad regime. With the al Qaeda-affiliated insurgents expanding their insurgency from Syria into Iraq, the presence of Western foreign fighters in Iraq is a growing concern, as well – although it is not covered in this analysis. The concern about these Western fighters is that assuming they survive their military experience in the Syrian civil war upon their return to their Western home countries they would be so imbued with heightened jihadist inclinations that they would not only further radicalize others, but in the worst case scenario conduct terrorist attacks against their own countries.

Such concern was warranted because of numerous cases involving such Western fighters in Syria. The spectrum of the types of individuals who volunteer to become such fighters included the following examples: • A merican “volunteers” have included Michigan-born Nicole Lynn Mansfield, a 33-year-old convert to Islam, who was killed in June 2013 in a firefight between the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and its rival, Jabhat al-Nusra (Victory Front – NF), along with several other fellow Western fighters. As a prototypical example of the type of individual who is drawn to becoming a foreign fighter in Syria, it is instructive that Mansfield was considered a “normal, yet susceptible” homegrown extremist, as her grandmother had explained to a reporter that “She had a heart of gold, but she was weak-minded…

I think she could have been brainwashed.”

• In another example of a prototypical American foreign fighter, Eric Harroun, a former U.S. Army veteran from Phoenix, Arizona, was arrested on his return to the United States in March 2013 and charged with conspiring to employ a rocket-propelled grenade in Syria. Investigators said he acknowledged fighting with NF. Harroun, who had converted to Islam, later committed suicide in an apparent drug overdose in April 2014.

• In another illustrative case, 22-

year old Moner Abu-Salha, from Florida, using the nom de guerre of Abu Hurayra Al-Amriki, who had joined NF, became the first American to conduct a suicide bombing attack in Syria in late May 2014.

• In an example of how such foreign fighters are utilized in jihadi propaganda videos, Salman Ashrafi, of Calgary, Canada, a suicide bomber on behalf of ISIS in Iraq (his bombing had killed 19 Iraqis in November 2013), was highlighted in a jihadi video that urged Muslims to follow his “great example” by becoming a fighter and threatening Canada to change

its “oppressive” foreign policies towards the Muslim world.

• Finally, in a case demonstrating how returnees pose a threat to their home countries, on May 24, 2014 29-year old Mehdi Nemmouche, the primary suspect in the Brussels Jewish Museum shooting of four people, including two Jews, was a jihadist fighter for ISIS in Syria prior to his return to France, his home country, in late 2013.

As of mid-2014, more than two years after the Syrian civil war began intensifying, an estimated 11,000 foreign fighters had reportedly joined the al Qaeda-affiliated Sunni insurgent

Some of the Western foreign volunteers are idealists who are motivated – just like the leftist activists who joined the republican forces in the 1930s Spanish Civil War – by a “romantic” notion of becoming revolutionaries for a great cause.

organizations, with NF numbering an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 fighters and the Syrian-based ISIS estimated at 7,000 to 10,000 fighters. An estimated 8,000 of the foreign fighters in the two insurgent organizations originated in the neighboring Arab countries, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. The remaining 3,000 foreign fighters, according to various estimates – which were not based on an actual census and may be at the low or high end – came from Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and even as far as Australia.

Some 80 percent (a figure that had not been independently verified) of the foreign fighters had reportedly joined ISIS, which is reported to be less strict than JN in its “admission” of these Western volunteers.

While it is understandable why most of the “third-party belligerents” as these foreign fighters are known come from the neighboring Arab countries, since they share a common extremist outlook with the al Qaedalinked anti-Assad insurgents, the involvement of Western-originating foreign fighters on behalf of these extremist insurgents was of particular concern because of its spillover implications to their home countries.

As explained by Matthew G. Olsen, director of the United States’ National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), at a security conference in Aspen, Colorado, in July 2013 (as reported in a New York Times article), the insurgency against the Assad regime has been providing both a rallying

point and a training ground for radical Islamists from other nations. As a result, he added, “Syria has become really the predominant jihadist battlefield in the world,” and “The concern going forward from a threat perspective is there are individuals traveling to Syria, becoming further radicalized, becoming trained and then returning as part of really a global jihadist movement to Western Europe and, potentially, to the United States.” This concern was amplified by Gilles de Kerchove, the European Union’s counterterrorism coordinator, who told the same conference that “The scale of this is completely different from what we’ve experienced in the past.”

What is also different about their involvement is that these radicalized Westerners have been traveling en masse to Syria to fight other Muslims – whether Alawite or Shi’ite – rather than other jihadist hotspots, such as Kashmir, Mali, Somalia, and Yemen. Adding to Western governments’ concern is that violent fighting has broken out not only between the al Qaeda-linked insurgent groups and the FSA, but between ISIS and NF, as they competed for power and resources (including control of oil fields) in Syria, and that such intense rivalry between extremist and mainstream Muslim factions had the potential to spill over into the Muslim communities in their Western countries. As of mid-2014, the sectarian enmity in Western countries between extremist Sunnis and Shi’ite supporters of Iran and the Lebanese Hizballah had resulted in some violence in the suburbs of Sydney, Australia, where some Shi’ite businesses had been attacked, with Sunni extremist neighborhoods becoming “no-go” zones for Shi’ites, but not in Muslim-dominated neighborhoods in other Western nations.

Motivations to Become Foreign Fighters in Syria The Western “volunteers” to become foreign fighters in Syria (and, increasingly, in Iraq), are motivated by factors, such as the following: • A s Sunni Muslims (including some of whom are recent converts to Islam), they are motivated by a sense of duty to wage jihad against the Assad regime that is viewed as an evil, apostate, Alawite-Shi’ite-based dictatorship that is committing atrocities against their fellow co-religionists. This narrative was reinforced in late in late May 2013, when the Qatari-based Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the Muslim world’s most influential Sunni clerics (and a leading ideological figure in the Muslim Brotherhood), called on Sunni Muslims worldwide to fight against the Assad regime and its Hizballah backer.

• Some of the Western foreign volunteers are idealists who are motivated – just like the leftist activists who joined the republican forces in the 1930s Spanish Civil War – by a “romantic” notion of becoming revolutionaries for a great cause.

• Like their counterparts who become homegrown violent extremists, many of these generally young

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Muslims may be dissatisfied with their employment situation, feel isolated from positive Western influences in their societies, and feel they have no future in their Western country.

• Finally, a family member or friend may have become a foreign fighter in Syria and they feel they cannot let them down by remaining in their Western country.

Influential Radicalizers Influential radicalizers, whether in the form of local activists or “returnees,” as well as extremist Islamist preachers who are active in the Internet’s social media, also play crucial roles in transforming initial motivations into actual recruitment mechanisms to becoming volunteer foreign fighters on behalf of the al Qaeda-affiliated insurgents in Syria (and Iraq). While local radicalizers in the Western countries with connections to the networks that facilitate travel to Syria will radicalize their adherents through meetings at extremist places of worship or private homes, what is particularly important about extremist social media sites is that not only will they broadcast videos of Syrian government atrocities against their co-religionists, as well as Jihadi martyr videos, but with the proliferation of Twitter accounts, individual Western fighters now document their involvement in such fighting in ‘real time,’ thus providing potential recruits with an immediacy that is likely to hasten their decision to become foreign fighters themselves.

Who Are the Western Fighters in Syria?

Of the estimated 3,000 Western foreign fighters who had joined the al Qaeda-linked Sunni insurgency in Syria in varying capacities, most were reportedly from Western Europe, with smaller numbers from the United States and Canada. In addition, an estimated 250 foreign fighters had reportedly originated in Australia, 100 – 120 from Kosovo, and 800 from the Russian Federation. Please note that the actual total numbers of Western foreign fighters in Syria are unknown, and it is also unknown how many of them actually engaged in fighting as opposed to receiving training and indoctrination in warfare for their expected return to their Western countries.

Assuming that the actual total and country-specific numbers may be lower or higher, published reports, such as by the International Center for the Study of Radicalization, King’s College London, and the Soufan Group, as well as others, had provided the following estimates for the number of foreign fighters from each country (including the numbers listed above) as of mid-2014: • • • • • • • •

elgium: 350 B • Canada: 30 • Denmark: 100 • Finland: 30 • France: 700 • Germany: 270 • Ireland: 25 – 30 The Netherlands: 120

Norway: 40 – 50 Spain: 50 Sweden: 30 Switzerland: 10 United Kingdom: 500 United States: 70 – 100

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How Western Foreign Fighters Enter Syria The overwhelming majority of the Western foreign fighters entering Syria travel first to Turkey, where, reportedly, paid facilitators link them up with the al Qaeda-linked insurgent groups along the largely porous southern border crossings with Syria. These Westerners are unlikely to enter Syria through Jordan, which exercises strict border controls, or Lebanon, where they might be confronted and apprehended by Hizballah or Syrian government agents.

Conclusion While it is assumed that most of the Western foreign fighters will either remain in Syria (or Iraq), with a proportion of them killed in combat, a minority is likely to attempt to return to their home countries. The actual size of the returnee population, however, is unknown. The threat posed by their return to their own countries is considered severe, as demonstrated by the shooting rampage by Mehdi Nemmouche at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014 and Western suicide bombers in Syria (and Iraq), such as Salman Ashrafi, of Calgary, Canada, who are used as propaganda tools by ISIS, NF, and their jihadi allies in urging Western Muslims to follow their “great example” by becoming foreign fighters as well as carrying out attacks in their own countries to change their “oppressive” policies towards the Muslim world.

What can be done to stop the flow of extremist Westerners to Syria? Preventive measures include bolstering Western nations’ border exit controls and closely monitoring the travel of such susceptible Westerners to countries of concern such as Turkey, and placing them on no-fly lists barring them from returning home. Another measure is for Western security services, working with their Turkish counterparts, to intervene during the crucial transfer points along the Turkish-Syrian border by tracking those who are attempting to cross those border points. A final measure, which has been introduced in varying degrees, is to mount public diplomacy campaigns in Western Muslim communities to seek the assistance of families whose members are considering such suspicious travel to Syria, as well as counter-narrative campaigns that alert those deemed susceptible to becoming foreign fighters that fighting in such foreign conflicts constitutes a violation of their countries’ national laws and that more peaceful means are available to Westerners to counter the Assad regime’s continued hold on power.

About the Author Dr. Joshua Sinai, a Washington, DC-based consultant on counterterrorism studies, is the author of “Active Shooter – A Handbook on Prevention” (ASIS International, 2013). He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

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Terrorists Cannot Run From JSOC-FBI Snatch-and-Grab: Joint Delta Force Raid Nabs Benghazi Mastermind

By Dr. Thomas B. Hunter

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U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers perform a high altitude-low opening jump out of a Royal Air Force C-130K Hercules aircraft over Hurlburt Field, Fla., March 4, 2012, during Emerald Warrior 2012. Emerald Warrior is an annual two-week joint/combined tactical exercise sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command designed to leverage lessons learned from operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom to provide trained and ready forces to combatant commanders. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Matthew Bruch/Released) Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International Vol. 20, No.3

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ntroduction

On the evening of 11 September 2012, a heavily armed militant group conducted an attack against the U.S diplomatic facility in Benghazi, Libya. Several hours later, the terrorists attacked the nearby CIA annex, utilizing mortars, automatic weapons, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). These two attacks resulted in the deaths of U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens, State Department employee Sean Smith, and two former US Navy SEALs, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods, the latter of whom comprised part of the security diplomatic facility’s security detail.

Ansar al-Sharia, a violent Islamic militant group, soon claimed responsibility for the attacks, information that was later verified A later investigation by law enforcement, military, and intelligence services soon uncovered evidence of the perpetrators of the attack. As with several other like-minded groups, it was formed in the wake of the collapse of the Libyan government with the goal of forming an Islamic state and the imposition of Sharia law nationwide. Part of the achievement of this goal meant the eviction of any Western presence from the country, starting with the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi.

The now-infamous attack created a political firestorm that rages to this day in Washington and Tripoli; however, this article sets aside the political debate to focus specifically on the stunning success of a dramatic snatchand-grab mission conducted via a covert joint JSOC-FBI team operation. Legal aspects are noted here, where relevant, as they were a key aspect of this long-term planning and execution of this action.

As a result of the attacks and the killings of U.S. personnel, the White House vowed to bring to justice those responsible. Though it would require two years of investigation and preparation, the U.S. would finally follow through on its promise, utilizing virtually every asset at its disposal.

The tip of the spear, however, would be the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and its myriad counterterrorism assets to track down and capture those responsible, starting with a senior group leader and alleged mastermind of the Benghazi attacks: Ahmed abu Khatallah.

As a result of the attacks and the killings of U.S. personnel, the White House vowed to bring to justice those responsible.

Though it would require two years of investigation and preparation, the U.S. would finally follow through on its promise, utilizing virtually every asset at its disposal.

Delta Force (1st SFOD-D) Delta Force, officially known as 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment, Delta (SFODDelta), is one of the U.S. military’s elite “Tier One” counterterrorist units, also known as a Special Mission Unit (SMU), and has also undergone several name changes over recent years (i.e. Combat Applications Group, Army Compartmented Elements). Like its maritime counterpart, SEAL Team SIX (known also as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, or “Dev Group”), Delta is under the operational control of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) often called upon to conduct some of the nation’s most difficult missions targeting wanted terrorists. Delta joins SEAL Team Six, sometimes working alongside the CIA’s own Special Operations Group, and other units as one of the units called on to conduct covert, global missions.

In recent years, with the launching of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Delta was assigned primarily to the Iraq theater of operations, while SEAL Team Six was largely given the Afghanistan/ Pakistan portfolio. With the departure of U.S. forces from Iraq, however, Delta has been largely redeployed to assist in actions conducted throughout the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere as needed. In most operations, JSOC teams have been directly supported by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) and its elite cadre of helicopter pilots, crew, and aircraft. This has included, for example, the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. This raid, designated Operation Neptune, was carried out by the “Nightstalkers”, who inserted and extracted the SEAL/CIA assault team flying previously unknown “stealth” Blackhawks, one of which was intentionally destroyed following a malfunction at the objective.

Legal Aspects and the Role of the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team It is important to note that, while it was known that al-Qaeda terrorists had participated in the attack on the U.S. compound, and were therefore legitimate military targets, evidence that Khatallah himself had actually worked with al-Qaeda was too limited to warrant action by the White House under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).(1) Therefore, President Obama, as Commander in Chief of the U.S. armed forces, was not legally authorized to kill or capture Khatallah until such time as a valid connection could

be established that met the criteria of the AUMF. For this reason, it was decided that no action would immediately be taken against him. Rather, Khatallah would be placed under focused, constant observation while intelligence could be gathered to either establish a connection between Khatallah and al-Qaeda relating to the attack, thereby establishing the grounds for military action.

Should this not come to pass, his known role in the attack itself would be enough for the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) to build evidence for his arrest and prosecution on any number of charges related to the killing of Americans and the destruction of the U.S. compound. Therefore, the DoJ needed time, too, to gather evidence to justify such an action, particularly as they

ducted to arrest Khatallah. The reason for this was to ensure the legal chain-of-custody for such an arrest and later prosecution – something that the military, alone, could not do, given the nature of the murky intelligence links. Fortunately, for American military and law enforcement planners, this would be far from the first time that HRT would be called on to work side-byside in a covert military action designed to facilitate such tricky legal waters while ensuring the capture of a wanted terrorist.

Members of the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) have increasingly joined select JSOC and SOCOM operations in order to ensure a proper legal processing of terrorism suspects during covert operations worldwide. Typically, these operations involve no more than two HRT operators (though this can vary), with the JSOC assault elements compris-

This mockup, which at times included the use of role-players as live “guards”, best ensured that the assaulters would be able to quickly access the actual compound and make their way to Khatallah’s sleeping quarters.

By June 2014, the Department of Justice had what it needed.

On the 13th of that month, a secret criminal complaint was filed in U.S. District Court in Washington, DC, signed by Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth, formally charging Ahmed abu Khatallah with three counts: murder of a person in an attack on a federal facility, providing material support to terrorists, and using a firearm during a crime of violence. The White House, according to U.S. law, now had what it needed to go after Khatallah.

Watching, Planning, and Training

fbi.gov would be targeting a foreign national residing on foreign soil.

To this end, it was made clear, early in the planning stages, that the FBI’s elite Hostage Rescue Team (HRT)(2) would likely be required for any Department of Justice-backed operation con-

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ing the majority of the assault team. Given then many HRT operators were former members of these elite military units, their integration into these operations presents very little disruption in the overall planning and execution of such raids.

For several months, possibly all the way back to the previous August, Delta did not sit idly by while waiting for the word to proceed. Instead, mission planners and contractors, working with regularly updated satellite and surveillance drone imagery, constructed a full-scale mockup of Khatallah’s compound. The mockup was located in a remote, restricted section of Fort Bragg and included a high level of detail, courtesy of the aforementioned high-resolution imagery

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and reports of covertly collected on-the-ground photography.

Delta assaulters, working with a small contingent of HRT operators, conducted frequent training at the temporary facility in order to best ensure that their pending operation would be executed with the greatest possibility of success. This mockup, which at times included the use of role-players as live “guards”, best ensured that the assaulters would be able to quickly access the actual compound and make their way to Khatallah’s sleeping quarters. And, if the operation went awry, and their quarry was not in his bedroom, the team would be able to navigate their way through the residence quickly and efficiently, with the greatest possible familiarity of the grounds. This would not only reduce the amount of time that Delta would spend on the ground, in very dangerous territory, but also enhance their ability to anticipate the possible movements of Khatallah, should he attempt to escape the compound during the raid.

In the meantime, surveillance assets continued to fly regular

routes over the compound, having been prioritized for the mission via prior communications between JSOC and the White House. These daily missions monitored the comings and goings of enemy personnel to Khatallah’s residence, located on the outskirts of Benghazi.

These flights also pinpointed the locations of guards and any patterns to their movements, further bolstering Delta’s refinement of their assault plan. Given the well-documented nature of their quarry’s robust security detail, any information on their locations, movements, weapons, and other details would be crucial to any developments in the inherently dynamic nature of any such snatch-and-grab operation conducted in hostile territory.

Interestingly, unlike bin Laden, Khatallah was, while not wholly overt in his movements and actions, also not making a concerted effort to remain entirely hidden.

Possibly believing himself safe in Tripoli, and far from the reach of any potential American efforts to grab him, he conducted several interviews with reporters, including several Western reporters. This included a face-to-face report with CNN in which he was described as seeming to be “confident, his demeanor most certainly not that of a man who believed that he was going to be detained or targeted any time soon,”(3) and was sighted repeatedly traveling through the city.

Given that the U.S. had not filed charges against him, he likely felt that he has no reason to hide – he’d gotten away with it. Yet, despite this apparent audacity, or a misunderstanding of U.S. resolve with regard to ringing to justice those responsible for the U.S. embassy attack, he could not know that the Americans were watching him virtually the entire time.

One additional critical bit of intelligence gathered via not only imagery intelligence(IMINT)

platforms such as drones and satellites, but also via human intelligence (HUMINT), it was quickly established that, despite his willingness to expose himself to the public, he maintained a robust bodyguard element. These men would travel with Khatallah during his travels outside the compound, as would be expected. But of equal impor-

Therefore, it was decided that something would need to be done to draw off this heavy protective detail in order to reduce the numbers of guns that Delta would face and increase the likelihood they would indeed come home with their quarry, and no empty-handed, not to mention reduce the risks of casualties to the American operators. Mission

Either way, it was hoped, the air strikes would provide the diversion that was needed to ensure their target would be “home” when the assault team came knocking.

tance, with regard to planning any assault, was that his men also protected the compound with a significant number of armed guards, at all times.

Therefore, planners obviously concluded, something would need to be done to deal with this aspect of the mission.

Clearly, any raid conducted while Khatallah was “at home” would meet with significant resistance from heavily armed and experienced fighters. This increased the likelihood of casualties to the Delta assaulters, in addition to possibly resulting in the failure to capture their quarry. This had been just the experience of SEAL Team Six in a recent operation along the Somali coastline that had been called off mid-assault due to unexpectedly heavy resistance.(4)

planners went to work developing ideas and options to mitigate these threats and to best ensure mission success. Yet, how would they accomplish this in a major urban area targeting a man who clearly valued his freedom and was, himself, a tactician who had proven skilled in paramilitary small unit operations?

The Diversion Key to the successful arrest of Khatallah, it was determined, was the creation of a diversion intended to divide and/or separate him from his loyal and dangerous cadre of bodyguards. While Khatallah was, as mentioned, apparently unafraid of any action being taken against him, he maintained his robust security element and they not only secured his compound, but also never left him unprotected. Therefore,

JSOC planners needed a way to isolate their quarry as much as possible – preferably, without him knowing any such effort was related to US efforts to apprehend him. The plan that was eventually agreed on was a complex and surprisingly large one, compared to previous JSOC High Value Target (HVT) capture missions.

According to some reports, the CIA contacted renegade Libyan general Khalifa Hifter, who maintained control over some Libyan air force aircraft. Gen. Hifter was, at the time, conducting operations against Islamic extremists as part of “Operation Dignity.”(5) While not part of the Libyan government, several military units defected and joined his side in the fight against the terrorists.

Through secret negotiations and planning, the general was convinced to launch a series of air strikes against Islamic militant targets in Benghazi.(6) This, it was hoped, would cause Khatallah to, if he was already at home, to “bunker down” and stay in place for the duration of the air strikes – the same time Delta operators would be moving towards his compound.

Alternately, if he was outside the compound at the time of the air strikes, it was expected that Khatallah would then flee whatever exposed location he may be located at, and race home to seek refuge. Either way, it was hoped, the air strikes would provide the diversion that was needed to ensure their target would be “home” when the assault team came knocking.

Endgame Unlike the two years of intelligence gathering and sharing, tactical planning, diplomatic meetings, and other dynamics that arose in the two years since the attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Delta would execute its own role in bringing the wanted terrorist to justice.

In the early morning hours of 15 June, departed from a nearby base, approximately 24 heavily armed Delta operators, along with at least one (possible as many as three) equally equipped HRT agent(s), drove in multiple vehicles under cover of darkness to Khatallah’s compound. The raid was supported by at least two drones providing live video feeds to the team and to the command element back at the forward base.

United States, all the while hosting Khatallah as a detained person. The choice of this extended method and period of travel was not one made lightly nor owing to a lack of more expedient options. Rather, on board the ship was a team from the High Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG), a joint counterterrorism intelligence task force formed following a recommendation from the Department of Justice in 2009.(7)

said. “Their tireless efforts may only be known to a few, but are felt by all Americans who are proud of what they do every day to defend this nation. This successful counterterrorism operation is another example of the extraordinary capabilities of the United States military and our unrelenting commitment to hold accountable those who harm American citizens.”(8)

The HIG is comprised of personnel from, the FBI, Department of Defense (JSOC and Once there, they disembarked their vehicles the Defense Intelligence Agency), Central and made their way the short distance to Intelligence Agency (CIA) and US State Department, all under the auspices of the National Security Council.

By exfiltrating Khatallah to a Prior anti-US terrorism suspects known to have U.S. Navy vessel, instead of, been interrogated by for example, an aircraft for the HIG include New York Times Square atdirect flight back to the U.S. tempted car bomber for incarceration, the team Faisal Shazad (2010) and Boston Marathon maximized the time it had to bomber Dzhokhar Tsarinterrogate their suspect prior naev (2013).

This arrest, however, will not end the search for additional persons being sought by the U.S. military and federal law enforcement, and is likely the first of several such ongoing operations designed to pursue and bring those perpetrators to justice.

to turning him over to stateside authorities, where interrogations might be deemed illegal in favor of the more legalistic methods of questioning.

Khatallah’s residence, as they had rehearsed many times before back home at the mockup in Fort Bragg.

It has not yet been revealed as to why Delta was able to gain access to the compound without firing a shot, or even apparently encountering significant resistance, but the team infiltrated the compound and was quickly able to identify and grab Khatallah. He was immediately bundled off and the team exfiltrated to their base. The entire operation, from the time Delta left their base to the time they returned, reportedly took less than 30 minutes.

Following the capture, per the operational plan, the team then quickly moved Khatallah via helicopter to the USS New York (LPD21), which was sailing offshore in support of the operation. From its position off Libya, the vessel then began its long voyage to the

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By exfiltrating Khatallah to a U.S. Navy vessel, instead of, for example, an aircraft for direct flight back to the U.S. for incarceration, the team maximized the time it had to interrogate their suspect prior to turning him over to stateside authorities, where interrogations might be deemed illegal in favor of the more legalistic methods of questioning.

Eventually, Khatallah is almost certain to face trial in U.S. federal court facing the charges already noted, in addition to possible additional charges, should authorities deem them appropriate with regard to his role as a lead figure in the attack against the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi on 11 September 2012.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel later released a statement commending everyone involved in the operation: “I want to commend all the service members who were involved in the planning and execution of the operation to capture Ahmed Abu Khatallah,” he

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

About the Author Dr. Hunter is a former senior intelligence analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the United States, focusing on terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). He has published numerous articles on topics relating to civilian and military special operations, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and hostage rescue. He has also published an introductory book on international targeted killing operations titled “Targeted Killing: Pre-emption, Self-Defense, and the War on Terrorism.”

References 1) 115 Stat 224. Public Law 107-40, Sept. 18, 2001, 107th Congress. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf (accessed 26 June 2014).

2) For further reading on the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team, winter issue 2013 of The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security Int’l.

3) CNN.com, “What’s next for Benghazi terror suspect Ahmed Abu Khatallah?” http://www.cnn. com/2014/06/18/us/benghazi-khatallah-whatnext/ (accessed 26 June 2014) 4) For further details on this failed operation, see “Dual JSOC Operations Meet with Mixed Success,” The Journal for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security.

5) BBC.com, “Libya crisis: More deadly clashes in Benghazi,” 15 June 2014. http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-27862365 (accessed 25 June 2014).

6) Jack Murphy, SOFREP.com. http://sofrep. com/35871/delta-snatch-grab-operation-libya/ (accessed 23 June 2014) 7) U.S. Department of Justice, press release, “Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policy Issues It Recommendations to the President.” 24 August 2009. http://www.justice.gov/ opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html (accessed 24 June 2014).

8) American Forces Press Service, “Pentagon Announces Capture of Key Figure in Benghazi Attacks,” 17 Jun 2014. http:// www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle. aspx?id=122491 (accessed 19 June 2014)

Vol. 20, No.3

“I think it’s fair to say that diplomacy today is much harder for the United States of America than it was 10, 20, 30, 40 years ago”.

Tackling Terrorism Through A Revolution In Soft Power Affairs

Hillary Clinton

By Dominic.

J. Traina, III

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton waves as she tours the Shwedegon Pagoda in Yangon December 1, 2011.

Clinton offered Myanmar the first rewards for reform, saying the United States would back more aid for the reclusive country and consider returning an ambassador after an absence of some two decades. REUTERS/Saul Loeb/Pool

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he explosive growth of globalization, which began in the late 1800’s, will continue for the foreseeable future; therefore, global law enforcement along with other security efforts will need to confront the threats from terrorism and that of trans-national criminal organization. This can best be addressed by improving training and exchanges with our international partners. Channeling funds from traditional aspects of Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) security efforts into these programs are not new ideas; however, they have been woefully underused. Past efforts have proven to be successful in scholarly exchanges through programs, such as the Fulbright Scholars that is administered by the Institute of International Education and other programs such as the International Military Exchange Programs (IMET) that offer professional military exchanges.

The DHS is an integral part of the national security apparatus. Therefore, it could take the lead in the international efforts to promote international law enforcement training. This effort is not a tactical or operational solution. This is a strategic herculean effort to a long-term issue.

Through the implementation of a Revolution in Soft Power Affairs (RSPA), the DHS can improve global law enforcement and security measures. The RSPA is an aggressive approach that avoids traditional border security training in the effort to introduce a strategic solution to a globalized society.

Homeland security can harness soft power by improving international training and exchange programs.

Understanding Soft Power Joseph Nye, former dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and author of the 2004 book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (along with several other books on leadership), notes specifically that power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the desired outcome. Furthermore, he argues it is the ability to get what one wants through attraction as opposed to coercion or payments. He suggests, when one is able to get others to admire their ideals they then begin to have the same ideals as one’s own. Nye further notes nation-states do not have to spend as much on hard power, such as sticks (military) or carrots (inducements and payments). Nye, who along with former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, were the co-chairs of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Smart

Power series. They promulgated that soft power is too often overlooked, and this is a part of the current problem as to why the United States’ power has declined so drastically over the past decade. The image of the U.S. as a champion of democracy and a model for others to follow has been eroded.

The Smart Power Commission concluded, “America’s image and influence had declined in recent years and that the United States had to move from exporting fear to inspiring optimism and hope.”

Blue Ocean Strategies And Change Agents

“Blue Ocean” by utilizing what has already worked in international training and professional exchanges programs. The Fulbright Scholars program and military to military exchanges can be mirrored and enhanced for global law enforcement and border security training with our global partners.

Another useful contemporary work to consider is found in The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, by Malcolm Gladwell. He offers useful ideas for innovators. Homeland security and law enforcement practitioners can strive towards a tipping point. Gladwell, argues that a small number of people who start to behave differently can cause a ripple effect, which soon reaches a critical

In a work called the Blue Ocean Strategy, W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne provide useful ideas not just for the creation of new ideas, but also for the creation of whole The authors remind the reader new industries. This starts by looking at the that many of the basic industries “Big Picture” in which the authors devote an of today were virtually unknown entire chapter to lookjust five, ten or even thirty years ing at the “Big Picture.”

The authors remind the ago and that history should reader that many of the teach us that “we have hugely basic industries of today were virtually unknown underestimated capacity to just five, ten or even create new industries and rethirty years ago and that history should teach us create existing ones. that “we have hugely underestimated capacity to create new industries and re-create existing ones. The RSPA is a

mass or a “tipping point.” Through our influence and persuasion and desire to spend public funds wisely the United States, by implementing a RSPA, can identify specific partners from allied nations who can be that “tip” in that particular region. This “tip” can become the force multiplier in promoting global law enforcement in a particular geographic region.

Gladwell, points out three agents of change and that these change agents can be the catalyst for rapidly spreading new ideas. The three are: connectors, mavens, and salesman.

The connector is essentially a computer network or hub.

They know people from many backgrounds and who are from different circles. The mavens accumulate information and have a knack for discourse and social skills. They are the ones that begin the epidemic.

The salesmen are the charismatic drivers who have the persuasive skills to promote the idea. All three are elements are needed to begin a social epidemic. The ability to identify change agents domestically and internationally is critically needed to promote and gain trust for international law enforcement partners. The U.S. can be the connector, maven, and salesman in the promotion of the RSPA.

Breaking Down Cultural Barriers From Education Several programs currently exist in the area of international training and professional exchanges. All branches of the U.S. military have programs and several different agencies within the Department of Justice and DHS have international training programs that should be reviewed in order to have the maximum impact. Greater

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communication among these agencies would also be beneficial to these programs. Another area for consideration could be the development of a joint operations center that will assist in identifying areas of most need and assist in avoiding redundancy. Also, developing a grand strategy could play a significant role in the RSPA. Thorough reviews of the programs in place will assist developers

The course provides an in depth review of USCG organization along with the planning and management of its mission as well as providing an opportunity to experience American culture, which will hopefully establish lifelong ambassadors and friends. In addition, many of the students develop friendships, with fellow participants and USCG members, which continue to flourish throughout their ca-

Arguably, one of the most successful uses of soft power has evolved from cultural exchanges and diplomacy in the effort of student exchanges.

The Fulbright Scholars Program is an educational exchange program that evolved following World War II. Senator J. William Fulbright authored and introduced this bill to congress in 1945 to encourage the “promotion of international goodwill through the exchange of students in the fields of education, culture, and science.”

in building new programs for their particular area of security—programs that mirror the effectiveness of the present programs.

One such program that was implemented in 1995 by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is the International Maritime Officers School that is a part of the International Resident Training Branch at Training Center Yorktown, Virginia. The course is specifically designed to provide a professional military education (PME) to foreign midgrade officers and civilians.

reers. Although many courses cover the tactical and operational areas of the USCG such as: search and rescue, port security, marine safety prevention and response, the course covering American culture is probably the most beneficial for the blue ocean strategy of the RSPA. This course introduces our global partners to the story behind the U.S. and its people. Moreover, educating and developing our international partners is a part of citizen diplomacy, which offers mutual understanding and respect for each other.

Many successful lessons can

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be learned from the Cold War and of the invaluable student international exchange programs such as that of the Fulbright Scholars. It is clear that soft power efforts trumped hard power during this 40 year struggle and that these lessons in soft power from the Cold War should be at the forefront of American engagement in the twentyfirst century.

Arguably, one of the most successful uses of soft power has evolved from cultural exchanges and diplomacy in the effort of student exchanges.

The Fulbright Scholars Program is an educational exchange program that evolved following World War II. Senator J. William Fulbright authored and introduced this bill to congress in 1945 to encourage the “promotion of international goodwill through the exchange of students in the fields of education, culture, and science.”

The Fulbright program was developed to struggle “for the minds of men.” The Fulbright Program was not developed or intended to serve as a national security or foreign policy goal; it was developed as a non-propagandist program.

Simply put, it was a method to improve relations, to gain a better understanding of others, and for others to have a greater understanding of U.S. culture. The relationships built where merely a side effect of the program.

International education has proven to be a successful winner in the tools of statecraft when implemented by the United States. This is the foundation of future efforts and national security officials should not discount its success. Modeling current international educational exchange programs that are being implemented by DoD

nations and garners a greater understanding of needs and wants. These are critical for national security in an increasingly globalized world; language and cultural awareness are essential tools for political diplomacy.

These lessons on student exchanges that universities have been promoting and encouraging for years would bode well for both DoD and DHS. Former U.S. Secretary of State Collin Powel stated in 2001, “I can think of no more valuable asset to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here.”

could improve the efforts by DHS in the international law enforcement and border security realms while improving national security.

Other lessons can and should be considered from academia.

The partnerships that have evolved from DHS and the academic community are invaluable. Many universities have partnered up with DHS to tackle various issues concerning the many pieces of homeland security. With the rapid growth of globalization in the past two decades and its continual march into the twenty-first century, partnering with international universities will enhance global security. The University of Wisconsin International Education Program states: To engage fully with the globalized world of the 21st century, future graduates must possess multicultural and global perspectives gained through intellectual and social exchange with people

These lessons on student exchanges that universities have been promoting and encouraging for years would bode well for both DoD and DHS. Former U.S. Secretary of State Collin Powel stated in 2001, “I can think of no more valuable asset to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here.”

pants become global ambassadors that become soft power championed multipliers.

As with the Counterinsurgency Manual FM 3-24 (COIN) that argues counterinsurgencies demand enormous patience so do the efforts in soft power and international training programs. Also as with the COIN campaigns, they are long and difficult while progress can be hard to measure. The same train of thought and logic can be argued for international training and other soft power efforts.

Revolution In Military Affairs (Rma) Vs. Students who have studied Revolution In Soft abroad bring a global perspec- Power Affairs (Rspa)

of diverse backgrounds. One of the most effective ways to develop such perspectives is to experience living, learning and working in another country or culture.

The same can be said for the promotion of military or homeland security international training programs.

The dollars put forth in these programs are long-term investments that almost guarantee a more secure America.

This training builds bridges between the U.S. and partner

tive to organizations, and this is same for military and law enforcement professionals as a stronger understanding of friendship and goodwill evolve. An international education creates cross-cultural understanding for militaryto-military exchanges as well as law enforcement-to-law enforcement exchanges. The different languages, customs, traditions, political, and religious beliefs are bridged through international educational exchanges. International training and other professional exchanges offer our global partner’s insight into our world and hopefully enlighten participants with a positive view. These partici-

Figure 1. Revolution in Military Affairs

Reflecting back upon the 1990s, it was a decade of U.S. military acceleration in the advancement of modern weaponry, communications, and other technological areas.

These achievements have propelled the U.S. to become a hegemonic power that cannot be matched on the modern battlefield. The decade of the 90s was considered to be a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which asserted advancements and highlighted the evolution of weapons and communication technology.

Following the events of 9/11, the RMA was put to the test across the globe. The RMA that concentrated on speed and technology to quickly overwhelm our adversaries has been nothing short of extraordinary on today’s battlefield. The enthusiast who promoted RMA argued that this was a new era of information-based warfare and that no longer would machines dominate the battlefield; information networks as noted in Figure 1 would now be the key to victory.

Nevertheless, the protracted struggles in Iraq and Af-

ghanistan continued for many years than what most national security authorities had predicted.

Although the success of the American military has been nothing short of spectacular, the countries adversaries are still significant after over a decade of conflict, and the

stroyed, the conflicts of the last decade have shown that even with smart weaponry and other technologically advanced methods of warfare not much has really changed in modern warfare. It is no less discriminating for citizens, and war will always be a dirty and unpredictably ugly business Therefore, as a new era evolves, the U.S. could

The power of influence, persuasion, and, in short, people-to-people contacts and relationship building will continue to be a major part of how DHS and DOD can harness soft power, not only to enhance security, but also to be used as a vehicle to improve international relations.

a Revolution in Soft Power Affairs (RSPA). This revolution is an across the board advancement of soft power strategies to be adopted by the U.S. government. This writing has only championed one small “spoke on the wheel” of national security through promoting greater international law enforcement training and engagements. The RSPA is a long-term investment in diplomacy. Increasing funding for soft power tools of statecraft is an investment in the future of global security, and geopolitical goals will only be met with sufficient investments in diplomacy.

In summary, international exchanges of students, ideas, and thoughts are essentially the tools that were best suited to win the Cold War. These tools of soft power can and should be at the forefront of American national security policies for the near and long-term future. This work posed one important question: what is the role of soft power in homeland security, and how can that role be harnessed to improve homeland security’s international training and professional exchange efforts? The simple answer is that soft power does have a significant role in homeland security by the many international engagement efforts previously discussed and the many that are being developed. The power of influence, persuasion, and, in short, people-to-people contacts and relationship building will continue to be a major part of how DHS and DOD can harness soft power, not only to enhance security, but also to be used as a vehicle to improve international relations.

About the Author Dominic. J. Traina, III served as a Military Policeman in the U.S. Marine Corps.

He holds a BLS from Loyola University in New Orleans, LA. He also holds a MS in International Relations from Troy University in Troy, Alabama and a MA in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He is employed in the field of global maritime and supply chain security.

References

Figure 2. Revolution in Soft Power Affairs

outcome will continue to be unpredictable. Though, the RMA hoped to have quick and clean wars where fewer civilians and less critical infrastructure would be de-

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concentrate on improving global public trust. As previously mentioned and noted in the above Figure 2, this is where the U.S. could pursue an agenda of implementing

“An Interview with Hillary Clinton,” The Economist, March 22, 2012, accessed October 21, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/lexington/2012/03/foreign-policy.

Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004), 6.

Ibid.

Joseph S. Nye, “The War on Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, April 12, 2011, accessed December 12, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/12 /the_war_on_soft_power?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full.

W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make Competition Irrelevant (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2005), 4.

Ibid., 82. Ibid., 4.

Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2000).

Ibid., 70.

“Program History,” Fulbright Online, accessed February 18, 2013, http:// us.fulbrightonline.org/about/history.

Walter Johnson and Francis James Colligan, The Fulbright Program: A History (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1965), 12.

Katy Doran, “The Importance of International Education,” eHow, accessed July 19, 2013, http://www.ehow.com/about_5435770_importance-international-education.html.

Collin Powell. “Statement on International Education Week 2001” https://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ffpiu043.pdf U.S. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Manuel FM3-24.

Ibid., x.

Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2010), 160.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 20, No.3

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Assessing The Terrorist Threats Against

The UK

And Its Counterterrorism Responses Dr. Joshua Sinai

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Muslims hold placards as they march towards the U.S. embassy in London May 6, 2011. On the frontline of the war against terrorism -- and Britain is undoubtedly a frontline -- private initiatives hint at the failure of state-sponsored efforts to counter jihad. Almost six years on from a massive coordinated terror attack on London’s transport system, the main nationwide programme to deter young men from extremism still hasn’t moved past mistrust and suspicion. Picture taken May 6, 2011. To match Special Report BRITAIN-MUSLIMS/RADICALS REUTERS/Suzanne Plunkett

he United Kingdom’s security services have long been highly concerned about imminent terrorist attacks by al Qaeda-affiliated or inspired homegrown Islamist violent extremists, including additional attacks by such militants following their return from training or fighting in Syria. The brutal beheading murder by two British Muslim militants of Drummer Lee Rigby, a British soldier in civilian clothes, near Woolwich Barracks, south-east London, on May 22, 2013, along with numerous terrorist plots that had been thwarted by UK security services, demonstrated that such terrorist threats continued to confront the country. Moreover, although the long-standing Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) terrorist insurgency in Northern Ireland and its spillover into England was largely resolved by the April 1998 peace accord, which led to the integration of many of PIRA’s leaders into the Northern Ireland political system, a tiny dissident faction had continued to carry out isolated terrorist attacks, although of a small scale. The growing size and public demonstrations by the country’s far-right extremist groups also posed a potential threat, although they had not carried out any terrorist attacks as of mid-2014.

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To analyze the UK’s counterterrorism program it is first necessary to examine the magnitude of terrorist threats facing the country.

The Terrorist Threat According to the UK security services, out of five levels of threat, the threat level in mainland Britain from international terrorism (primarily al Qaeda-related) was rated in mid-2014 as “substantial” (i.e., the third level at which a terrorist attack is considered highly likely) and it was rated as “severe” (i.e., the fourth level at which an attack is considered highly likely) from Northern Ireland-related terrorism.

The primary terrorist threat has been posed by domestic homegrown al Qaeda-related Islamist militants.

Although a majority of Britain’s Muslim community (estimated at 2.7 million, about 5 percent of the total population) were peaceful, law abiding, and regarded themselves as loyal British citizens, like other European countries, growing numbers of young British Muslims had become radicalized into religio-political extremism, with a minority among them considered violent extremists. While the exact numbers of such extremist individuals were unavailable from government sources, they were estimated by news accounts at around 4,000 (a figure first announced to media sources by British security services in March 2008), with 2,000 among them considered at the time as serious enough to monitor as “known unknowns” (i.e., extremists with the potential to head towards “going operational” in a violent manner) with the remaining 2,000 considered as “unknown unknowns” (i.e., likely to remain extremist but with their potential future direction towards violence uncertain). This total number was supplemented in mid-2014 by an announcement by the UK government that more than 500 British Muslims had left the country to join the al Qaeda affiliated insurgent forces in Syria and Iraq since 2011, with some of those returning who were not apprehended at UK border crossings likely to conduct terrorist attacks at home.

As of mid-2014, significant al Qaeda-related terrorist incidents and thwarted plots in the UK included the following:

M o s t i m p o r ta n tl y, ce r ta i n extremist British clerics have succeeded in “hijacking” Islam in many of their communities and spreading virulent ideologies that promote violence in defense of Muslims worldwide.

• On July 7, 2005 four homegrown Islamist terrorists carried out a series of coordinated suicide attacks against London’s public transport system, killing 52 civilians, with more than 700 injured.

• On July 21, 2005 five homegrown Islamist terrorists attempted to set off bombs against the London public transport system, but the detonators failed to explode the bombs and the bombers and their associates were shortly thereafter arrested.

• In August 2006, a homegrown al Qaeda-affiliated cell was arrested for plotting to detonate liquid explosives carried on board at least 10 airliners traveling from London to the United States and Canada. Sixteen suspects were charged with terrorism offenses in the plot.

• On January 31, 2007, a group of British Pakistanis in Birmingham, England, were arrested for plotting to kidnap and behead a British Muslim soldier in order to undermine the morale of the British Army and inhibit its recruitment of Muslims. On June 30, 2007 two Islamist operatives attempted to crash a Jeep Cherokee loaded with propane canisters into the glass doors of the Glasgow International Airport terminal and set it ablaze (there were no fatalities, but only five injuries). This followed an aborted attack against a nightclub in London the previous day.

• On May 22, 2008, a Muslim convert from Plymouth, England, attempted a suicide bombing against the Giraffe café and restaurant in Princesshay, Exeter. The bomber was the only person injured.

• In June 2012 five Islamists plotted to bomb an English Defence League rally in Dewsbury, England, but arrived late and were arrested when returning to Birmingham. A sixth was also convicted.

• In April 2013, as part of an investigation termed “Operation Pitsford,” 11 Muslims were arrested in Birmingham for plotting a terror attack involving suicide bombers.

• On May 22, 2013 two Islamists killed a British soldier outside his army barracks in Woolwich, London.

• In October 2013 British police arrested a pair of Muslim men who were allegedly involved in planning a “Mumbai-type” terrorist attack. [A gag order had been placed by British authorities on further information about their plot.]

• In February 2014, four Muslim individuals were arrested in Birmingham on suspicion of involvement in Syria related terrorism. Among them was Moazzam Begg, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee.

• In terms of actual figures of the terrorist threat (including those listed above), according to information provided by MI5’s website, between September 11, 2001 and June 30, 2013, 332 individuals were convicted of terrorism-related offenses, such as “murder, illegal possession of firearms and explosives offenses.” During this period, 2,465 people were arrested under the Terrorism Act. As of June 30, 2013, 128 inmates in British prisons, either convicted or awaiting trial, were classified as “terrorists or domestic extremists.”

In another component of the terrorist threat, Andrew Parker, the Director-General of MI5, revealed in parliamentary testimony that 34 terrorist plots had been thwarted between 2005 and 2013, with the majority of these plots planned by UK citizens.

Radicalization Into Terrorism Why are some primarily young people in Britain’s Muslim community turning to violent extremism?

Reasons range from the combustible nature of the Muslim community, with an estimated half under the age of 25 (a much higher proportion than among the country’s majority Christian population); an unemployment rate estimated at 16 percent (versus 4.7 percent nationally), with approximately a third of 16-34 year olds unemployed; and issues revolving around what is termed “identity politics,” with some Muslims who are susceptible to feeling pressured by radicalizers, especially in the Internet’s extremist social media forums, to join the insurgencies being waged by their brethren, especially in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, and in being proactive in defining themselves as separatist Muslims in their own country. Most importantly, certain extremist British clerics have succeeded in “hijacking” Islam in many of their communities and spreading virulent ideologies that promote violence in defense of Muslims worldwide.

Finally, when some young Muslims visit their ancestral countries, such as Pakistan, they become radicalized by local extremists and upon their return decide to retaliate against their British host country for a variety of perceived grievances. Such were the cases with Mohammad Sidique Khan, the leader of the July 7, 2005 bombings of the London transport system, who had regularly travelled after 2001 to Pakistan (and, reportedly, also Afghanistan), where he was trained in military tactics. In another related example, Nigerianborn Michael Adebolajo, one of the two men involved in the Woolwich killing of the British soldier, had travelled to Kenya in 2010, where he was reportedly further radicalized, and when he attempted to

travel to Somalia to join al Shabaab was stopped by Kenyan authorities, who proceeded to deport him back to Britain, but without being charged (although the Kenyans claimed they had warned British authorities about his extremist activities).

It is because of these and other cases that British security agencies are highly concerned about the spillover impact of foreign conflicts where al Qaeda and its affiliates are active, whether in the ancestral countries of its Muslim population, such as the Pakistan/Afghanistan region, countries such as Iraq and Syria where Sunnis are being threatened

by Shi’ites, or Somalia, where al Shabaab is waging its insurgency.

As mentioned earlier, an estimated 500 British-based Muslims had reportedly gone to fight or train in Syria since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in March 2011, and an estimated 50 to 100 British Muslims had joined al Shabaab – leading to major concern by British government authorities over the risks the ones who had survived the fighting posed upon their return, with some of them likely to carry out attacks using the warfare skills they had acquired in such conflicts. And, as demonstrated in the case of Michael Adebolajo, the Woolwich killing represented a significant setback for UK counterterrorism agencies, since it is reported that they were aware about his militant activities in Kenya, but had assumed that he would not pose a violent threat upon his return to Britain.

UK Counterterrorism Program The UK government’s counterterrorism program is well established, having had to respond to major terrorist threats posed, initially, by PIRA terrorism beginning in the late 1960s, and in the recent period by al Qaedaaffiliated terrorist groups and their loosely affiliated cells and adherents.

In the recent period, the UK’s counterterrorism strategy was based on what is termed “CONTEST,” which was developed by the Home Office in early 2003 and was published in 2006. Further revised versions were released in March 2009, July 2011, and, most recently, in 2013. Under

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the broad objective of reducing “the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence,” the CONTEST strategy is divided into four main components called the four P’s: Pursue (stopping people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism), Prevent (stopping terrorist attacks), Protect (strengthening protection against a terrorist attack), and Prepare (to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack).

UK against threats from espionage, sabotage, and terrorism. MI5 operates under the statutory authority of the Home Secretary, although it is not part of the Home Office.

Primary Counterterrorism Agencies

In terms of legislation for counterterrorism, “The Terrorism Act 2000” provides the legal basis for prosecuting terrorists in the UK and proscribing organizations (i.e., banning them from operating in the UK). The Home Office publishes the criteria and the listing for proscribing such organizations. This was updated in December 2011, with the “Terrorism Prevention and Investigations Measures Act 2011,” which introduced a new system of terrorism prevention and investigation measures, as well as several additional bills that were being considered for parliamentary passage.

Organizationally, the UK Cabinet, chaired by the Prime Minister, serves as the top counter-terrorism decisionmaking body, and under it, the Cabinet Office, which coordinates policy and strategy across government departments involved in homeland security and counterterrorism. A Security and Intelligence Coordinator within the Cabinet Office is tasked with coordinating and developing programs on counterterrorism and crisis management, including setting priorities and budgets for the intelligence services.

The UK has three main intelligence and security services engaged in counter-terrorism. These include the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, or MI6), the UK’s foreign intelligence service, which collects intelligence overseas. The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which is comparable to the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA), provides signals intelligence on terrorist-related threats. Both MI6 and GCHQ operate under the statutory authority of the Foreign Secretary. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which is part of the Cabinet Office, and is comparable to the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), advises on intelligence priorities, intelligence-sharing and cooperation in counter-terrorism among the UK’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

The Home Office (which is comparable to most countries’ Interior Ministry), is the lead government ministry in homeland security affairs, including counterterrorism policy within the UK. The Security Service (MI5) is responsible for the protection of national security within the

The Metropolitan Police (also known as Scotland Yard) is the primary law enforcement agency involved in counterterrorism.

Counterterrorism Legislation

Counterterrorism Challenges Like other states that face continuous terrorist threats, the challenge for the UK’s counterterrorism agencies is how to analyze and assess these threats and their associated risks and consequences, and how to set out and prioritize their responses.

To counter these challenges, as discussed earlier, the UK government had established a multi-faceted counter-terrorism program that addresses the four “P’s.” This was supplemented by other emergency preparedness programs, such as what the government termed a “Communications Capabilities Development Program”, which utilized internetbased communications to protect the public during the course of and in the aftermath of a terrorist incident.

Following its successful protection of the summer 2012 Olympic Games, where no terrorist incidents took place, this emergency preparedness program was implemented in preparation for the summer 2014 Commonwealth Games in Scotland.

The summer 2012 London Olympics also focused government attention

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on other high priority components of counterterrorism emergency planning, particularly preparing for weapons of mass destruction-related potentially catastrophic although low probability biological attacks, as well as those involving chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons and devices (which were also considered of low probability but high consequence if they occurred).

Countering Cyber Threats In addition to preparing to counter terrorist threats involving conventional and WMD weapons, the UK government has also been ramping up its capability to respond to potential cyber attacks against its critical infrastructure, with cyber defense specialists being recruited and budgets increased substantially for the lead agencies tasked with responding to such threats. A new initiative was established to create a “fusion cell” in London that would monitor attacks and provide details in real-time of who was being targeted. It also called for private sector companies such as in finance, defense, energy, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals to cooperate in a Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership (CISP).

Information about future attacks was to be shared by them in what was described as “a secure Facebook [group] for cyber threats.”

Countering Terrorism in Northern Ireland The security situation in Northern Ireland had evolved over the years, with the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and the primary Loyalist groups terminating their terrorist campaigns and joining the province’s powersharing-based political process.

As a result, the nature of the UK’s counterterrorism measures has also changed, with MI5 assuming responsibility for intelligence tasks in Northern Ireland, while working together with the local police forces against the terrorist threats which are primarily launched by militant dissident republican groups that reject the political process. The attacks by such groups, however, were not on the same lethality scale as PIRA, and resulted in few fatalities. According to a January 2014 testimony by Theresa Villiers, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, in 2013 there

were 30 terrorism-related attacks in Northern Ireland, although primarily of low lethality.

CT and International Cooperation On the international front, the UK and U.S. governments have long maintained close bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism issues, particularly in information-sharing on terrorist threats. Successes in such bilateral cooperation included the disruption in 2004 by UK authorities of a cell that was plotting to attack the New York Stock Exchange and World Bank headquarters (among other targets) in the United States, and the important role U.S. intelligence agencies had reportedly played in helping their British counterparts in thwarting the 2006 airplanes bombing plot. A notable failure by UK intelligence services was their inability to effectively monitor the extremist activities of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian-born student at University College London, who had travelled to Yemen to undergo training in terrorist warfare, which he proceeded to carry

out in his aborted bombing of the Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day, 2009. U.S. counter-terrorism agencies were also negligent in this case, as Abdulmutallab’s father had warned officials at the U.S. embassy in Nigeria about his son’s extremist activities, but this warning was not effectively shared among relevant U.S. agencies.

Conclusions Following the highly successful protection of the Summer 2012 Olympic Games, the UK’s counterterrorism program was stung by its failure to prevent the May 22, 2013 Woolwich killing, in which one of the perpetrators was previously known to the authorities, but not judged to pose a violent threat. With radicalization into extremism among the country’s young Muslim population on the upswing and foreign conflicts, such as the Syrian civil war, affecting their co-religionists continuing to mobilize them into becoming foreign fighters in such conflicts, British security services were aware that future terrorist attacks by their homegrown violent

extremists remained a strong probability. In fact, the backlash against homegrown Islamist extremists was also being exploited by the country’s growing far-right extremists, so violent clashes between these two communities were also expected to intensify.

Another challenge facing British counterterrorism planners was the reduction in public spending affecting all government ministries, so resources devoted to counterterrorism responses needed to be prioritized against other national security threats, especially cyber threats against the country’s critical infrastructure which required extensive funding.

In the short-term, the terrorist threat remained likely for returnees from foreign conflicts, particularly Syria, Iraq and Somalia, to launch attacks, including copycat attacks such as the Woolwich killings against British military personnel, although no such attacks had occurred as of mid-2014. As a result, such returnees were likely being closely monitored by the security services.

The increase in the size of far-right violent extremists was also likely to sharply exacerbate tensions and lead to violent clashes between them and the country’s Muslim community. A biological weapon attack on British soil in the long-term was viewed as likely (as it was also viewed as likely against other Western countries). In response, contingency plans by UK emergency service agencies were likely being stepped up, including increasing the stock of medical supplies, to deal with a potential attack from a biological weapon. Finally, with the success of the British government in resolving the long-term insurgencies by PIRA and the Loyalist groups, the terrorist attacks by dissident republican groups were expected to remain of low lethality and relatively “manageable.”

About the Author Dr. Joshua Sinai, a Washington, DC-based consultant on counterterrorism studies, is the author of “Active Shooter – A Handbook on Prevention” (ASIS International, 2013). He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@ comcast.net.

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Growing Threats Of Terrorism From The North Caucasus

By Col. Danny Dickerson (Ret.)

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T

o most Americans the “War on Terrorism” started on Sept. 11th, 2001. In reality, 9/11 was a milestone for militant Islam and its ongoing global war against the West.

The war against the West did not begin in the Middle East, but in Russia, where Moscow had been combating Islamist terrorism in the Caucasus region for more than a decade, primarily in Chechnya. The Caucasus had attracted militants from throughout the world since the early 1990’s, and the Chechnya crisis, which began in 1991 and continues today, was the magnet for these jihadists.

In 1994, before the outbreak of the first Chechen war, Shamil Basaev, of the then self-declared independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya (ChRI), took a group of some 30 men from his battalion of Abkhaz fighters to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda (AQ) training camps in Khost, Afghanistan. This contact led to an increasing¬ly close relationship between Chechen, as well as other Caucasus nationalist groups, and Islamic insurgents. It also helped AQ in developing both its short-and long-term plans for a global jihad.

By the late 1990s, the connections between AQ and the ChRI were common knowledge among U.S. officials, intelligence analysts, and terrorism experts. Then U.S. State Department Deputy Chief for C.I.S. Af¬fairs Stephen Sestanovich told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in his November 1999 testimony, “Chechen insurgents are receiving help from radical groups in other countries, including Osama bin Laden’s network and others who have attacked or threatened Americans and American interests.”

It was well-known and well-documented as early as the mid-1990s that the notorious Abu Ibn alKhattab was an AQ operative and fought in the North Caucasus. The declassified Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) Swift Knight Report documents not just Khattab’s deep involvement, but also

that of AQ and bin Laden with the ChRI in the mid-1990s. “Several times in 1997 in Afghanistan bin Laden met with representatives of the Movlady (Movladi) Udugov’s party “Islamic Way” (Islamskii Put) and representatives of Chechen and Dagestani Wahhabaites from Gudermes, Grozny, and Karamakhi.”

The first Chechen war in 1994 was a nationalistic cause, but halfway through this conflict it became an Islamic issue. Major General Dzhokar Dudayev, the original leader of the Chechen revolt in the 1990’s, described the Chechen war against Russia as a jihad. This call to arms lured the first wave of Afghan and Arab mujahedin to join the ranks of the Chechen forces. Through the 1990’s, a steady flow of mujahedin from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Middle East arrived in Chechnya and large numbers of Chechens were sent, by al Qaeda, to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran for training.

AQ and the Caucasus Islamic separatists agreed to create a jihadist movement and insurgency across Russia. As early as 1996, bin Laden declared his desire to destroy the economies of the U.S. and other Western countries as a tactic toward expanding Islam’s reach and influence over the globe.

“The liberation of the Caucasus would constitute a hotbed of jihad (or fundamentalism as the United States describes it) and that region would become the shelter of

thousands of Muslim mujahidin from various parts of the Islamic world, particularly Arab parts…

The fragmentation of the Russian Federation on the rock of the fundamentalist movement and at the hands of the Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia will topple a basic ally of the United States in its battle against the Islamic jihadist reawakening” With the goal of attacking Russians and Westerners, AQ supplied funding, training, and fighters, the establishment of training camps in Chechnya and Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, a steady supply of trainers

for those camps, and fighters who spread out across Chechnya and the North Caucasus bringing the message of Salfism and global jihadism to the ChRI insurgents and their still very few allies in other North Caucasus regions such as the Republic of Dagestan and the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR). The DIA document details AQ’s plans for the North Caucasus and Russia’s Muslims: [R]adical Islamic (predominantly Sunni) regimes are to be established and supported everywhere possible, including Bosnia, Albania, Chechnya, Dagestan, the entire North Caucasus “from sea to sea”, Central Asian republics, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, all of Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, and the states of the Persian Gulf. Terrorist activities are to be conducted against Americans and Westerners, Israelis, Russians (predominantly Cossacks), Serbs, Chinese, Armenians, and disloyal Muslims. . .

Special attention should be given to the Northern Caucasus and especially Chechnya since they are regarded as areas unreachable by strikes from the West.

The first Chechen war ended in 1996 resulting in Chechen autonomy. With the large number of

This call to arms lured the first wave of Afghan and Arab mujahedin to join the ranks of the Chechen forces. Through the 1990’s, a steady flow of mujahedin from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Middle East arrived in Chechnya and large numbers of Chechens were sent, by al Qaeda, to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran for training.

radical jihadists in the region, this peace was to be short-lived.

In 1999, the al-Qaeda Islamic International Brigade (IIB), based in Chechnya, invaded Dagestan. Russia’s ability to stop this invasion lead to the second Chechen war in 1999, which lasted over nine years before an on again-off again peace was restored in Chechnya.

Since 2008, the legacy of these wars continues, as Chechen separatism, sporadic terrorist attacks and spillover into the North Caucasus republics continues. The nationalist cause that inspired Chechen fighters 20 years ago has resulted in a radical Muslim insurgency that has spread from Chechnya across the entire North Caucasus, threatening Europe and the U.S. The “jihadization” of the Chechen and Caucasus mujahedin began in the mid-1990s and culminated in October 2007 when then President Dokku “Abu Usman” Umarov created the “Caucasus Emirate” (CE) in place of the radically nationalist “Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya” (ChRI). The CE’s goal of jihad against not just against Russia but the U.S., Britain, Israel and “any country fighting Muslims anywhere around the world” was officially declared. Radical Islam was officially recognized in Chechnya in 2007, resulting in a clear upsurge in violence in, and related to, the North Caucasus ever since, and the birth of a new, more radical Islamic group, the Caucasus Emirate.

The Caucasus Emirate is the largest terror group in the ChechnyaDagestan area, but has become the umbrella organization and primary director for other smaller groups in the Caucasus, and it has become one of the most sophisticated and secret terror groups in the world. Its inner membership is estimated in the hundreds and active adherents may be many times that number; the CE’s sole goal is to establish a Caliphate, a Muslim State, in the Caucasus that would eventually recapture all the territory that Mohammed once ruled.

possessing one of the most sophisticated Internet networks of any terror group. As jihadi groups have evolved into more decentralized networks, interacting increasingly for ideology, funding, training, and operational planning through the Internet, the CE has integrated into al-Qaeda’s (AQ) worldwide network of jihadi websites. The AQ-affiliated website, Ansar alMujahideen is used to recruit fighters and raise funds for the CE. The Ansar al-Mujahideen network is typically regarded as a source for those who are self-starter jihadists.

Ansar al Mujahideen’s Germanlanguage site is closely associated with the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), which also has produced several operatives arrested for involvement in AQ terrorism plots. The Taliban has authorized the Ansar al-Mujahideen network

as one of three entities that may publish its official statements, and Ansar al-Mujahideen’s founder noted “we have brothers from Chechnya and Dagestan.” In December 2010, Ansar al-Mujahideen announced “the Start of a New Campaign in Support of the Caucasus Emirate,” signaling a request for fighters and funds for the CE and emphasizing “We ask Allah to make this year a year of constant discord and increasing enmity for the enemies of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus.”

The announcement welcomed emerging signs of jihadism in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, and asked Allah for “a new generation of scholars” to replace Astemirov, Buryatskii, and AQ operative Omar al-Sayif, all mentioned by name. Ansar al-Mujahedeen soon partnered with Astemirov’s and

The Caucasus Emirate is the largest terror group in the Chechnya-Dagestan area, but has become the umbrella organization and primary director for other smaller groups in the Caucasus, and it has become one of the most sophisticated and secret terror groups in the world.

The CE is well organized, disciplined, and, most importantly,

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the CE OVKBK’s Islamdin.com to create a new Russian-language global jihadi website (al-ansar.info)

by July 2010. In August 2010, the webmaster of Ansar al-Mujahideen, an ethnic Moroccan named Faisal Errai, was arrested in Spain. Spanish authorities also reported that the website was already raising money for terrorists in Chechnya and Afghanistan. The Russian-language Al-Ansar.info was set up to “highlight news summaries of the Jihad on all fronts, both in the Caucasus and in all other lands of the fight” and publishes old and new works of scholars on Fourth Generation Warfare. It was from this website that Tamerian Tsannaev may have found the encouragement and instructions for the Boston attacks.

The CE has become a member of the global jihadi revolutionary alliance inspired by AQ. This alli-

ance is really AQ 2.0, expanded to include official affiliates and unofficial allies brought together by the Internet, allowing global network sharing of ideology, propaganda, financing, training, strategy, and tactics.

In 1998, al-Qaeda coordinated the bombings of the American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya from Baku, Azerbaijan. The day before the 9/11 tragedy, the U.S. Congressional Research Service, published a report stating that individuals and groups associated with al-Qaeda were using Azerbaijan as a base for terrorist networks. In 2003, Yulia Yuzik, author of “Brides of Allah,” wrote, “Baku, Azerbaijan is the center of everything—Wahhabism, ideological training of Chechen female suicide bombers, and foreign

financing of terrorist act.” Today, Baku, Azerbaijan has become one of al-Qaeda’s most important communications centers.

While the conflict in Chechnya was partially understood by the West, the growing conflict in Dagestan is proving to be new territory. Dagestan has become the epicenter of the Islamic insurgency in the North Caucasus. In the last few years, the most resilient of the clandestine jihadi forces emerged in Dagestan.

Calling itself Shariat Jamaat, its leaders have pledged allegiance to the global al-Qaeda movement and have joined the Islamic Caucasus Emirates, in shifting their attention to staging attacks against Europe and the U.S. By the five-year anniversary of its founding, the CE had carried out, or participated in, more than 2,200 attacks and violent incidents that had killed approximately 1,800 and wounded 2,600 police, military and civilian officials and servicemen and killed more than 450 and wounded 1,200 civilians.

This record includes 46 suicide bombings – al-Qaeda’s signature tactic – since November 2008. The CE is responsible for such attacks as the ones on the Nevskii Express St. Petersburg-Moscow train in November 2009, the Moscow subway system in March 2010, and Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport in January 2011. Recent CE successes include the suicide-bomb assassination of Dagestan’s leading Muslim Sufi sheikh, the assassination of Tatarstan’s deputy chief mufti, and the wounding of its chief mufti.

The most horrendous attack to date is the Beslan School massacre on Sept. 1, 2004, which left 186 children and 148 adults dead.

The CE’s more expansive aspirations and cooperation with the global jihad movement have been accompanied by closer propaganda and operational ties to jihadists in other regions of Russia, other fronts in the global jihad and, per Maqdisi’s call, even Europe. Members of a CE cell uncovered in the Czech Republic were at one time based in Germany and underwent training in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tatar jihadi “Bulgar Jamaat,” made up mostly of ethnic Tatars,

Because of this, many in the West were baffled as to why Moscow, which had peacefully let the Soviet Union implode, was so determined to maintain its control of the North Caucasus. Underneath and driving the savagery of the last 16 years is a resource that few Western politicians and analysts note – oil.

Few today remember that Putin’s first job when appointed Prime Minister on 9 August 1999 was to build an oil pipeline bypassing Chechnya going through Azerbaijan instead.

based in Waziristan, Pakistan, has declared jihad against Russia and has carried out operations in Afghanistan. Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia have been providing fighters for al Qaeda and the Haqqani network, in Afghanistan. In October, 2012, Orhan Fariz, in Host Province, Afghanistan, detonated his truck, loaded with 3 tons of explosives, killing 40 U.S. servicemen. Fariz reinforces the growing number of extremists who were trained in the North Caucasus region and used to replenish the ranks of terrorists around the world. There have been numerous reports of Chechens fighting not just in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq against U.S. forces.

In 2003, Indian police uncovered an AQ cell, led by a Chechen that was planning to assassinate Vice

Admiral V.J. Metzger, commanderin-chief of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, forcing the admiral’s trip to India to be cancelled.

In Syria, Jaish al-Muhajireen wa Ansar, or Army of the Emigrants and Helpers, is being led by Abu Omar al Chechen, a jihadist from Chechnya, who has more than 1,000 volunteers under his command. Jaish al-Muhajireen wa Ansar played a vital role in overrunning several major Syrian military installations over the past year.

With Moscow’s apparent pacification of Chechnya, many in the West felt that the jihadist threat had been removed. For the past 5 years, the North Caucasus has hardly had an effect on relations between the West and Russia; in fact, both the

media and policy com¬munities in the West have largely ignored the region.

Because of this, many in the West were baffled as to why Moscow, which had peacefully let the Soviet Union implode, was so determined to maintain its control of the North Caucasus. Underneath and driving the savagery of the last 16 years is a resource that few Western politicians and analysts note – oil. Few today remember that Putin’s first job when appointed Prime Minister on 9 August 1999 was to build an oil pipeline bypassing Chechnya going through Azerbaijan instead.

The post-soviet development of the Caspian’s vast reserve of oil and natural gas quickly became Russia’s fixation, with an ever increasing importance as the rest of the post-Soviet economy withered.

Energy was the one export that the Russian Federation could still produce that was guaranteed an international market, and its importance has only increased with time.

In May 2007, the U.S. Energy Information Administration projected that the 2015 Caspian basin energy production could reach 4.3 million barrels per day (bpd), concluding that, in addition to the region’s proven reserves of 17-49 billion barrels, comparable to Qatar at the lower estimates and Libya on the high end, the region could contain additional hydrocarbon reserves of up to 235 billion barrels of oil, roughly equivalent to a quarter of the Middle East’s total proven reserves. Nor is oil the only energy deposit. The potential natural gas reserves are as large as the region’s proven gas reserves and could yield another potential of 328 trillion cubic feet of gas.

Azerbaijan had other plans, having worked with neighboring Georgia to develop an alternative pipeline to Georgia’s Black Sea port of Supsa, completely outside of Russian control.

Russia was determined to hang on to as much of this largesse as possible. An independent north Caucasus could not only lead to a loss of revenue from the republic’s modest oil production but lead to a significant potential loss of Caspian reserves once the sea’s waters and seabed were divided.

The division of the Caspian and its massive energy riches has been stalemated for years. There are competing proposals on how to divide the Caspian seabed. The Russian proposal would base the division on the length of coastline. Without the north Caucasus, Russia’s claim would shrink by almost 80 percent, clearly not acceptable to a state which views energy as the key to its retaining at least a simulacrum of great power status. The north Caucasus is vital to the economy of Russia and the future energy needs of Europe and the U.S. The war in the Middle East will only intensify over the coming decade, especially since Europe and the U.S. are unable and unwilling to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons program. At this time, Iran can halt the flow of oil out of the Strait of Hormuz for a relatively short period of time. With 15 million barrels of oil moving daily through the Straits, any disruption would send oil to over $140 a barrel and $10 a gallon at the pump.

The U.S. currently relies on other nations for much of its oil supplies, a potentially unstable dependence in an increasingly unstable world, while Europe has already taken steps to insure a continuous energy source. Russia is the largest oil, gas, uranium and coal exporter to the European Union.

• 36% of the EU’s total gas imports originate from Russia • 31% of the EU’s total crude oil imports originate from Russia • 30% of the EU’s coal imports originate from Russia In brief, the overriding reason that the Russian government fights so ferociously for all of the north Caucasus, is the overriding reason it does most everything: power and money. When oil stops flowing from the Middle East, or the cost of shipping from that region becomes too great for the consumer nations, alternative sources must be found and found quickly. The top five source countries of U.S. petroleum imports in 2012 were Mexico (6%), Russia (10%), Venezuela (12%), Canada (34%), and the Middle

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East (55%). But, as we know, this is changing and some current predictions have the United States oil-independent by 2020.

Presently, with the threat of war throughout the Middle East and the loss of oil for the West, Russia stands to greatly regain the political, military, and economic power it once held. The Kremlin will go to any lengths to maintain control of the Caucasus region. Sensing victory in the Middle East, Iran, al Qaeda, and their affiliate groups will seek to extend the war against Russia, Europe, and the U.S. by way of a proxy war using the North Caucasus as a staging ground.

The terrorists in the North Caucasus present two distinct threats to Russia, Europe, and the U.S. First, on-going training of jihadists, either in the terrorist’s camps or through the internet, ensures the ability to conduct increasing attacks in the West as the need arises. To cripple the economies of the West, the jihadists are seeking to destroy the energy infrastructure in the Middle East and the Caucasus region.

Their thinking and hope is as follows: Afghanistan will eventually fall back to the Taliban, which, in turn will result in a return to the days when Afghanistan was a haven for terrorist groups and training camps. Iraq will become embroiled in a war of Shia vs. Sunni, with Iran the ultimate winner. This will affect oil exports from Iraq. The threat of Iran escalating the Middle East war under the protection of a nuclear umbrella, followed by attacks on the energy infrastructure in the North Caucasus would bring the world’s economy to the brink of collapse. Radical Islam would experience little resistance in expanding beyond its current borders in the Middle East and enable it to attack targets in Russia, Europe, and the U.S. with increasing frequency.

Down the road there will be growing threats to Russia’s oil, expect harsher measures from the Kremlin toward the jihadists in the North Caucasus. This, in turn, will result in more terrorist attacks in Russia, Europe, and the U.S., in the belief that by attacking the economies and citizens of any country that supports Russia would weaken the resolve of both that government and its citizens to offer any further

support to Russia or any country in the Middle East still friendly to the West.

At the moment, few Western governments have made any contingency plans for just such an outcome.

About the Author Danny Dickerson is a retired Colonel, U.S. Army. He has served as an advisor to the UN, NATO and Interpol on terrorism and intelligence planning.

He has trained law enforcement in the U.S. from the local to federal level on terrorism and intelligence, as well as investigators for the Canadian Attorney General’s office and police officials in Egypt and Jordan, and is recognized as a “presenter” by the Illinois Terrorism Task Force.

He has written articles addressing the growing threat of terrorism which have been republished in Latin America, Europe and the Middle East.

References Basaev in Oleg Blotskii, “Terroristy proni¬kayut v Rossiyu za dengi,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 12, 1996, cited in James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007, pp. 101, 154.

Sesta¬novich Statement on Chechnya to Senate Committee, November 4,” GlobalSecurity.com, USIS Washington File, November 4, 1999 Defense Intelligence Agency Declassified Swift Knight Report, Document No. 3095345, no date, Judicial Watch, available from www.judicialwatch. org/cases/102/dia.pdf.

Ibid. p. 4.

Ayman al Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner (2001).

Ibid.

Ibid. pp. 3-4.

“Fairfax County Man Accused of Providing Material Sup¬port to Terrorists,” U.S. Attorney General’s Office, July 21, 2010, available from www. justice.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/07JulyPDFArchive/10/20100721chesse rnr.html; and “Hammer Time: Ansar al-Mujahideen Webmaster Arrested!”

Evan Kohlmann, “A Beacon for Extremists: The Ansar al-Mujahideen Web Forum,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Issue 2, February 2010, pp. 1-4, available from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/abeacon-for-extremists-the-ansar-almujahideen-web-forum.

“Announcing the Start of a New Campaign in Support of the Caucasus Emirate,” Alqimmah.net,

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December 5, 2010, available from www.alqimmah.net/showthread. php?t=21139&goto=nextoldest.

“V global’noi seti interneta otkrylsya novyi forum v podderzhku Dzhikhada,” Islamdin, July 20, 2010, 16:18, avail¬able from www. islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=849:201007-20-16-49-47&catid=32:2009-0305-23-19-06&Itemid=29.

“Another Online Jihadi Arrested in Spain,” Jawa Report, August 31, 2010, available from mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/203757.php.

“Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors,” CRS Report for Congress, 2002, http://www.fas.org/ irp/ers/RLS31119.pdf.

Yulia Yuzik , “Brides of Allah,” Moscow, 2003, hrrp://reecd.ru/lib/books/ nevesty_allaha/.

Gordon M. Hahn, “The Caucasus Emirate’s ‘Year of the Offensive’ in Figures: Data and Analysis of the Caucasus Emir¬ate’s Terrorist Activity in 2009,” Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eur¬asia Report (henceforth IIPER), No. 7, January 18, 2010; Gordon M. Hahn, “Comparing the Level of Caucasus Emirate Terrorist Activ¬ity in 2008 and 2009,” IIPER, No. 8, February 5, 2010; Gordon M. Hahn, “Trends in Jihadist Violence in Russia During 2010 in Statis¬tics,” IIPER, No. 33, January 26, 2011; and Gordon M. Hahn, “CE-Affiliated Website Reports Number of Jihadi Attacks and Result¬ing Casualties from January Through June 2011,” IIPER, No. 44, August 12, 2011, all available from www.miis.edu/academics/faculty/ ghahn/report.

“Czech Police Arrest Suspected Russia’s North Caucasus Terrorists,” BNO News, May 3, 2011, 2:27, available from wireup¬date.com/ wires/17128/czech-police-arrestsuspected-russias-north-cau¬casusterrorists/.

“Obrashchenie Dzhamaata Bulgar k Musul’manam Rossii, Jammat Bulgar,” February 28, 2009, avail¬able from jamaatbulgar.narod.ru/statiy/ v1_28-02-09.htm.

“Suicide bomber who struck U.S. military base in Afghanistan is Azerbaijan citizen,” Apa News Agency (Azerbaijan), 13 October 2012, http://en.apa.az/news/180664.

“Iraq’s Al-Naqib—‘Terrorists’ From Chechnya, Sudan, and Syria Killed Arrested,” Beirut LBC SAT Television, 1300 GMT, Jan¬uary 30, 2005.

Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Ter¬ror, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 292.

“Russia’s Homegrown Insurgency: Jihad in the North Caucasus.” Strategic Studies Institute Monograph. Oct. 2012.

German Police And U.S. Army

Counter Terrorism Training Scenario

By Jim Weiss and Mickey Davis

These members of the Bavarian State Police are the Bepo-like readiness platoon of Police Inspection Anbach.During two counter terrorist training scenarios, they cleared a building, cleared rooms, and apprehended the terrorist who had shot down the US Army helicopter.

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A

t the request of the U.S. Army Garrison tigation Command (CID) element. The German Police were called in to assist, thus (USAG) Germany, a counter terrorism allowing them to enter US Army territory.

Army MPs also aided in controlling training scenario was carried out by the US traffic, etc. on the base.

Bavarian State Police in collaboration (Side note: US Army MPs can detain any US with and to the standards of the US military personnel off base; on base they can German civilians and hold them for Army. In this simulation, an American detain the German police.) The initial investigation Army helicopter crashed into a building determined that the crashed helicopter had been brought down by single rifle bullet. At within the US Army’s Storck Barracks in Illesheim. The that point the investigation focused upon the damages, casualties, and concerns from the crash in turn shooter as being a terrorist. led to demonstrations. Agitated by radical organizers, the Dealing with the Shooter demonstrations became emotional and violent. USAG Apprehending the terrorist shooter was plus elements of the Bavarian State Police and other handled in two different ways to allow two Bavarian State Police units to train. In both German civilian emergency services worked in a training cases there was one terrorist role player, the shooter/hostage taker. partnership during the scenario.

This German police/US Army exercise was held near the town of Ansbach, Germany, an old, scenic Bavarian town of 40,000, about 26 miles southwest of Nuremberg.

Most of the actual scenario took place at Storck Barracks in Illesheim, a small farm town about 15 miles northwest of Ansbach.

Illesheim borders Storck Barracks with its US Army helicopter airfield. Storck Barracks, Illesheim, is considered to be a sub-community of USAG Ansbach.

The Bavarian State Police and US ARMY Counter Terrorism Training Scenario The training scenario was set up into two parts. The first took place on a wintry November day that involved the crash of the US Army helicopter. The second part

took place in December, and began with the announcement of a demonstration that had turned into a full-scale riot in front of the barracks.

Helicopter Crash The simulated crash site of the US Army helicopter was set up inside Storck Barracks, as was the bulk of the scenario.

First responders to the crash site included US Army firefighters, US Army military police from Storck Barracks, paramedics from the Bavarian Red Cross, and a futuristic-looking US Army firefighter water cannon truck. Bavarian State Police received information about the helicopter crash from the US Army military police (MPs) and the U.S. Army Criminal Inves-

A change in police tactics followed the Erfurt School Massacre in which an expelled 19-yearold student shot and killed 16 people, including one police officer. Seven other people were wounded or injured. As a result of such an AMOK situation, a bad guy using deadly force, now any police officer can either arrest or shoot the suspect, depending on the circumstances.

Spezialeinsatzkommandos (SEK) Nuremberg—In their scenario, the suspected terrorist was seen going into a gym located within Storck Barracks. SEK (SWAT) was called in to address this situation. SEK Nuremberg needed 25 minutes to get ready with all of their equipment, rush on the autobahn, and drive to Storck Barracks. SEK cleared the gym, eliminated the threat, and concluded their scenario by arresting the bad guy.

They were supported by a police armored vehicle from 16 BPH/TEE (a Bepo technical unit) out of Nuremberg. Bereitschaftspolizei (Bepo) are Germany’s Readiness (Riot) Police. The Bepo armored vehicle was a Sonderwagen 4 (SW 4), with a Bepo crew of two.

Inspection Unit Readiness Police Platoon from Ansbach — The search for the terrorist helicopter shooter scenario was also played out with the Readiness Police Platoon from Ansbach.

Before the Erfurt School Massacre of April 2002, the German police plan was that in active shooter situations, street cops should contain and call SEK to handle the situation.

A change in police tactics followed the Erfurt School Massacre in which an expelled 19-year-old student shot and killed 16 people, including one police officer. Seven other people were wounded or injured. As a result of such an AMOK situation, a bad guy using deadly force, now any police officer can either arrest or shoot the suspect, depending on the circumstances. In the terrorist scenario variation for the Readi-

ness Police Platoon from Ansbach, the terrorist was a hostage taker who had been seen going into the Army base gym.

At this point, there was no time to wait for SEK to arrive; immediate action was required. The young officers of this readiness platoon used a diamond formation to get into the gym and arrest the terrorist. Every room had to be cleared by the readiness police officers using full cover to control the room they intended to enter.

In another reenactment of the same scenario, they used the shelter of the police armored vehicle to advance to the gym.

The Demonstration/ Riot in December The information for this part of Bavarian State Police involvement only stated that the demonstration was due to the US Army helicopter crash. This second part of the scenario was called an AMOK (riot)

These members of the Bavarian State Police are the Bepo-like readiness platoon (30-35 police officers) of Police Inspection Anbach. During two counter terrorist training scenarios, they cleared a building, cleared rooms, and apprehended the terrorist who had shot down the US Army helicopter.

They are trained to visually address any possible threats in a room from behind cover before entering. These police officers are armed with Heckler & Koch subguns and pistol.

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training exercise by the Bavarian State Police. Why AMOK? From lessons learned in real riots, the training took into consideration that previous demonstrations have turned into riots when crowds of concerned citizen demonstrators were--and can be--infiltrated by highly motivated, fringe politico-social groups. These dangerous protesters move like wolves in a flock of sheep, coming through woods and backyards to mingle with the crowds.

of the German states has the right to police itself. However, all of the police are members of that state’s police; there aren’t independent city, town, or sheriff agencies.

So while some demonstrators are passive and peaceful, crowds may also involve the lunatic fringe and criminally violent predators, too. As passive demonstrators chant or yell their protests, shake their fists, and carry banners and placards, out-ofcontrol, violent protestors have flung bolts and stones with their sling shots, thrown rocks and bricks, fired pellets with air guns, and, from more hidden locations, fired occasional bullets.

There are two types of Bepo. One consists of the young police cadets going through their two-and-a-half years of basic police academy schooling. The second is made up of the young police officers who have graduated from basic police academy (barracks) school and are now assigned to Bepo police units for their first couple of years of actual police duty. Some of their duties include training as a readiness resource to deal with natural disasters, riots, and crowd control, earning them the name riot police.

Riot Police -- Special units of all of the 16 German federal state police train for riot control. Under the German constitution (Basic Law) each

During the various training scenarios involving an the armed terrorist role player, the Bavarian State Police SEK (SWAT) and the Bepo-like readiness platoon of Police Inspection Anbach were supported by an armored vehicle from 16 BPH/TEE (a Bepo technical unit) out of Nuremberg. Bereitschaftspolizei (Bepo) are Germany’s Readiness (Riot) Police. The armored vehicle was a Sonderwagen 4 (SW 4) with a Bepo crew of two.

Such state police riot control units are the Bereitschaftspolizei (Bepo): Germany’s Readiness (Riot) Police.

Traditionally, Bepo’s primary functions are to train recruits and to support and augment the regular federal states’ police forces.

pioneer engineer, medics, motor pool, and aviation units. Specialized vehicles include water cannon trucks, the armored vehicles for the engineers to remove obstacles, large transportation trucks, tow trucks, communication vans, helicopters, and the vehicles for each Bepo platoon (Zug) such as transportation vans and patrol cars. These units possess their own accommodations, tents, vehicles, meals, cooks, communications, medical support, and everything else necessary to fulfill their tasks.

Previous Bepo Experiences -- The Bavarian State Police’s Bepo were called up for the Munich massacre where of members of the Israeli Olympic team were taken hostage by the terrorist group, Black September.

A Hundertschaft (a Bepo police company based upon 100 police officers) was involved in a long-term gun battle on the army airfield in Fuerstenfeldbruck until snipers were in position to end the hostage taking.

There are special support elements and units within Bepo such as signal,

From 1985 until 1987, the Bavarian government decided to allow

The role players were US Army soldiers in civilian clothing. The protestors employed different behaviors, from chanting and crying to becoming violent when opposed by the riot police officers. Also acting out were demonstrators taking the role of violent protestors, throwing items like soft balls at the members of the Bavarian State Police’s Bepo-like readiness platoon of Police Inspection Anbach. Those violent protestors were arrested,taken down, and secured.

This is the simulated crash site of the US Army helicopter. Those in the red uniforms are members of the Bavarian Red Cross. The injured are role players.

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the nuclear industry to construct a power plant (nuclear reprocessing) in Wackersdorf, a small village in the rural north-eastern part of Bavaria. This decision was greeted with massive demonstrations by the anti-nuclear movement. The Bepo were called upon to assist the police headquarters of Upper Palatinate and Lower Bavaria. During the height of these ongoing riots on Easter 1986, 1000 anti-nuclear activists attacked the police with Molotov cocktails, catapults, and flares, resulting in a total of 183 injured officers.

Other Riot Police in the Scenario -- Within the Bavarian State Police, somewhat mirroring Bepo but under a different, more localized chain of command, are readiness platoons (zugs) made up of 30-35 police officers.

In this helicopter crash/rioting scenario, such a platoon was a police inspection unit (readiness police, like Bepo) from the city of Ansbach.

They perform much the same functions as Bepo.

USK are specialized Bepo officers, who are trained as Bepo support commandos for such cases as downed officer rescues.

They are at focal points of violent actions to arrest perpetrators and preserve evidence for criminal proceedings, as well as to support other officers in action against violent subjects. There are special requirements for a member of Bepo to join USK, including physical fitness and oral and written assessment testing. No Bavarian State Police Bepo USK took part in this downed helicopter training scenario.

All of the 16 state police forces also have SWAT-type units known as Spezialeinsatzkommandos (SEK). These very independent SEK teams are not part of Bepo, but are special police commandos trained to counter terrorism and higher types of crime such as drug, armed criminals, and hostage situations.

Even though SEK teams are not part of Bepo but when needed can support Bepo.

Handling the Demonstrators During the Scenario With Bepo in mind, the second US Army helicopter crash scenario that took place later concerning the same terrorist incident took into account the wolves (AMOK) among the sheep rioters.

Members of an inspection unit readiness police platoon from Ansbach set up an exterior cordon after the German police commander called for a SEK (SWAT) team and an armored police vehicle.

The role players were US Army soldiers in civilian clothing. (German police officers are taught English during their two and a half years at the basic police academy). The protestors employed different behaviors, from chanting and crying to becoming violent when opposed by the riot police officers. Also acting out were the demonstrators taking the roles of violent behavior, throwing items like soft balls at the members of the riot police. Those in their roles as violent protestors were arrested, taken down

and secured. The joint training was successful and it was felt that such counter terrorism training was a win-win for both the Bavarian State Police and US Army.

About the Authors Lieut. Jim Weiss (Retired) is a former Army light infantryman, schooltrained Army combat engineer, a former school-trained (regular Army) Army military policeman, former State of Florida Investigator, and a retired police lieutenant from the Brook Park (OH) Police Department.

He has written and co-written hundreds of articles for law enforcement and safety forces magazines, most notably Law and Order, Tactical Response, The Florida Trooper, Knives Illustrated, Counter Terrorism, Tactical Edge, and Tactical World.

Mickey (Michele) Davis is an awardwinning, California-based writer and author. Her young adult novel, Evangeline Brown and the Cadillac Motel, won the Swiss Prix Chronos for the German translation. Mickey is the wife of a Vietnam War veteran officer and a fire department senior volunteer.

Many decisions need to be based around the risk level and the degree of chance that the Principal and detail may come under the threat of violent attack or even embarrassment. This is the type of risk that puts the client in harm’s way and ultimately could be the end or your career as an Executive Protection Agent.

If there is any degree of chance that an incident may happen to the Principal and family then the Detail Leader (DL) or Agent in Charge (AIC) must decide to hire responsible, reliable, and properly trained Security Drivers for the job.

Secure Driver:

Security Transportation Revisited

By Anthony Ricci

Recently I have had several conversations with Security Directors about how the Security Transportation world has changed over the last seven years. Many transport teams have down sized and others have actually out sourced the driver’s positions to limo companies. It is also amazing to see how many executives that are actually driving themselves to and from work these days. There has been a dramatic correction in the Security Transport Industry obviously revolving around budget restraints and careful examination of the direction that moneys are being spent in. These conversations brought about thoughts of an old article I wrote several years ago and how much it makes sense to have a trained driver and what a trained driver can actually do for the company.

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Whether the detail is a temporary assignment or a permanent job, such as providing protection for a corporate executive, transporting is a major priority!

First, in the event of an accident, there could be terrible consequences for the principal and corporation.

Risk of injury, or worse- fatality, vehicle damage and paying the price of injury/down time for both the Driver and Principal is a large consideration. Using a trained Driver will not get you a 100% risk free get out of jail card. However, it is definitely added insurance that a trained Driver will have a much greater chance and skill level to avoid potential accidents/ ambushes thus lowering injuries and damage rates.

Basically, it is a big step in minimizing risk, which is all anyone, can do. Risk will never go away but any AIC or Security Director can ultimately minimize potential risk. Outside the realm of an accident, there is always a chance of attack on the target (Principal).

Chances are you probably will not know right away that your Principal was selected as a target. For numerous reasons your principal could get targeted by any number of criminals. Kidnapping of Principals is less common in the United States, however, it does happen. In many countries kidnapping for ransom or religious/political reasons is a growing and quite prosperous industry in itself. So what does this have to do with the Driver? Let’s take a quick look back at the last thirty years of vehicle attacks that happened in and along route. This is certainly not a complete list, just a snapshot. The database covers some of the major players that were kidnapped or assassinated throughout the last thirty years.

• 1971 Sir Geoffrey Jackson, Uruguay - simulated accident on motorcade – abduction • 1973 Carrero Blanco, Spain –motorcade explosive ambush – assassinated • 1977 Hanns-Martin Schleyer, West Germany – simulated accident on motorcade -abduction • 1978 Aldo Moro, Rome - simulated ac-

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cident on motorcade --assassination after 55 days captive • 1979 General Alexander Haig, Belgium – motorcade explosive ambush – luckily escaped attack due to terrorist error • 1979 Ambassador Adolph Dubbs, Afghanistan – stopped car at staged search point – abducted and then assassinated • 1980 Ambassador John Dean, Beirut - Road side attack – Detail escaped by reacting quickly returning fire and driving to safe haven • 1980 Samoza, Ambushed and killed by terrorists using RPG’s • 1981 Fredrick Kroesen, West Germany - Road side attack – Assassination attempt failed due to partially armored car and no direct hit from terrorist weapons • 1981 President Ronald Reagan, Attacked and shot while walking to his car – luckily was not fatally wounded • 1982 Freddie Heineken, He was walking to his chauffer driven car when abducted by two masked gunmen • 1982 Colonel Altika, Canada – Assassinated by a gunman while sitting in traffic • 1982 Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ray, Paris –Attacked while walking to his vehicle – Shot and killed by a gunman carrying a small caliber pistol • 1982 Orville Gundaz, Sommerville, Ma., - attacked en route home from work as he approached a choke point – terrorist fired a 9 mm. handgun into the driver’s window killing Gundaz • 1983 Ken Bishop, Bogota – He was being driven to work – came under gun fire attack while in a zone of predictability • 1983 Lieutenant Commander Albert SchaufelBerger, El Salvador Attacked while waiting in vehicle – shot in the head by a 22 caliber revolver / left the window down in his armored vehicle • 1983 Captain George Tsantes, Athens – Attacked and killed at traffic light - came under attack by two men on a scooter shooting a 45caliber pistol • 1984 Master Sergeant James Judd, Athens – attempted assassination – same people as above and same technique – driver required • 1986 Leamon Hunt, was assassinated at the entrance of his house – terrorists shot through a weak spot in the window of his armored car • 1986 George Besse, Paris – walking from car to his front door – a young couple shot and killed him then escaped on motorbike • 1986 Karl – Heinz Becurts – While en-route his vehicle was hit by a road side bomb • 1986 Antonio da Empoli, Italy – Ambushed and shot in the leg and hand while getting out of his chauffeur driven vehicle to get a newspaper • 1987 General Lico Girogieri – was being chauffeured home when attacked and killed by a motorcycle who came up alongside Girogieri’s vehicle and fired into the back window • 1988 John Butler, Bogota – Two car motorcade traveling from his work to his residence – hit with roadside bomb • 1988 William Higgins, Lebanon – driving his car – was abducted and executed • 1988 US Navy Captain William Nordeen , Athens - Road side bomb - assassinated • 1989 US Army Col. James N. Rowe, Philippines – attacked en route to his office - assassinated by two hooded gunmen with M16 rifles • 1990 Alfred Herrhausen, Germany – explosive ambush – motorcade came under attack en route as his motorcade passed through Spa Park in Bad Homburg • 1991 Chefik Wazzan, Beirut – was en-route in and armored car when a road side bomb placed in a parked car exploded. He was injured but survived • 1992 Sedney Reso, New Jersey – was abducted and later died of injury – Attacked at the base of his drive way as he was getting out of the car to get the newspaper This above list is just proof to further drive home the fact that one of the most common points of vulnerability is while the principal is in route and during transition points.

So let’s go back and answer that question about how important is your principal and families lives worth to them? And why not minimize risk before it could cause a problem.

A Security Driver should have extensive training with vehicles in the following areas: • Accidence avoidance and a good understanding and knowledge of how time and distance works while in motion.

• An excellent understanding of vehicles capabilities and safety features both active and passive.

• An understanding of seatbelts / airbags / fuel cut off switches / tires / and armor.

• Knowledge of security maneuvers • Emergency or attack evacuation maneuvers.

• Knowledge of how motorcades work.

• Understanding each vehicles position.

• Understanding of how different vehicles present different problems in a motorcade.

• CPR and AED training proved track record and training certificate in automatic External Defibrillation (AED) • Route surveys • Drivers should be able to conduct their own route surveys and at minimum understands terms used by executive protection staff that may have done route assessment for the driver prior to hiring.

• I strongly suggest if time allowed that the driver always do his/her own route surveys. It is one thing to say you understand the path of travel and another to have driven the route several times before the shit storm happens.

• Understand the need for contingency plans and where to go if something happens.

• Know how to use technology such as GPS and other basic communication devices.

• Prepared to move at a moment’s notice • Ensures safe and comfortable transportation • Knows the vehicle • Reacts to any threat on instructions from the Agent in Charge or Shift Leader • Knows all primary and secondary routes and all React routes such as hospitals and safe havens • Has driven all the routes and is aware that landmarks look different depending on time of day and night • Ensures that the vehicle is clean inside and out, checks the vehicle’s mechanical condition (ex.- oil, tires, power steering fluid, belts, radiator coolant levels, wipers, brakes, lights, flashers, headlights, horn and all emergency equipment – airbags fuel cut of switches, etc.)

• Accounts for all emergency equipment and verifies it is functioning.

Ensures all weapons are accounted for, loaded and in the proper carry position. Test all doors and automatic locks. Asks if unfamiliar with an item or its use.

• Ensures vehicle log is present and filled out, notes any problems with vehicle or security issues.

• Sets vehicle 30 minutes prior to scheduled departure and is ready to be in place when called.

• Starts the engine 15 minutes prior to scheduled departure.

• Knows the motorcade route (even if there is a lead vehicle) so that the motorcade may continue if the lead car is lost. There must be NO surprises. The driver cannot react to danger if he or she does not know what is right and wrong, or part of the norm.

• Safeguard car keys. When the vehicle is not in use, it should be locked and it’s keys kept inside the command post. A spare set should be kept in the follow car.

About the Author Anthony Ricci is President of ADSI (http://www.1adsi.com)

Homeland Security Bookshelf

By Dr. Joshua Sinai Guy Aviad,

The Politics of Terror: An Essential Hamas Lexicon.

Tel Aviv, Israel: Contento de Semrik, 2014. 686 pages, $18.99 [Paperback].

This comprehensive, authoritative, and highly detailed handbook about Hamas is the first book in several years to be published with updated information about this important Palestinian militant organization. The handbook is divided into three parts. The first part presents a 40-page historical overview of Hamas’s evolution in late 1987 from a Palestinian extension of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to its current role as the Gaza Strip’s ruling party (with the rival Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority in control of portions of the West Bank). Also covered in the first part are Hamas’s historical origins and its organizational structure, which is discussed in great detail, including in a highly informative organizational chart. The second part – and the handbook’s longest portion at approximately 570 pages – consists of more than 300 entries about Hamas that are listed in alphabetical order, such as detailed biographies of its political and military leaders and operatives, military units, funding fronts, relations with state sponsors such Iran, and descriptions of major terrorist attacks against Israel. The third part (approximately 60 pages) is composed of four appendices – the movement’s ideological charter, a table containing data about its Legislative Council members, and a listing in chronological order of major terrorist attacks carried out by its operatives against Israeli and Jewish targets. Also included is a detailed bibliography of books and articles about Hamas. With significant new developments involving Hamas since the book’s publication, such as its attempted rapprochement with Fatah and the Israeli roundup of its operatives in the West Bank following the kidnapping of three Israeli youths in June 2014, it is hoped that a new and updated edition will be published that is also better organized with more clearly differentiated sections, including an index. Nevertheless, this handbook is highly recommended as an indispensable reference resource on Hamas. The author has served as an officer and head of training in the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) history department.

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James J.F. Forest, Russell D. Howard, and Joanne C. Moore, editors,

Homeland Security and Terrorism: Readings and Interpretations.

[Second Edition] New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2014. 609 pages, $94.00 [Paperback].

This important and authoritative edited volume presents a comprehensive overview by leading experts of all aspects of homeland security, ranging from analyses of the threats posed by terrorism (as well as cyber threats and natural disasters), the nature of emergency response countermeasures required at the federal, state and local levels, the need to balance countermeasures with civil liberties, and an assessment of the effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security. Individual chapters discuss topics such as defining homeland security, the spectrum of terrorist threats facing America (including this reviewer’s chapter on how American counterterrorism is conducted, using Najibullah Zazi’s September 2009 plot to bomb the New York Subway system as a case study), preventing lone wolf terrorism, the role of information sharing in counterterrorism among law enforcement, intelligence, and military agencies, and the components of resiliency in protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure.

James J.F. Forest is a professor at University of Massachusetts – Lowell, Russel D. Howard is a professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and Joanne C. Moore is with the United States Army.

Andrew Silke, editor,

Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalization and Reform.

New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. 312 pages, US $150.00 [Hardcover], $45.95 [Paperback].

The contributors to this important and conceptually innovative volume apply a multidisciplinary approach to analyze all the dimensions involved in prison radicalization and effective countermeasures. The book, which is divided into five parts, covers theoretical topics such as an overview of the processes of prison-based radicalization into extremism, programs that have been instituted worldwide to de-radicalize and disengage prisoners from violent extremism (within prisons and during the post-incarceration release phase), issues in prison management, risk assessment and reform, as well as case studies of the application of these issues in the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Indonesia, West Germany in the 1970s, and Spain. This reviewer, for full disclosure, contributed a chapter on a seven-phase model of prison radicalization, including (in the worst case) post-release re-incarceration. The volume’s editor is Head of Criminology and Director of Terrorism Studies at the University of East London.

The reviews of the books by Aviad and Forest, et al, are revised and expanded versions of the author’s previously published capsule reviews which appeared in the academic journal “Perspectives on Terrorism.” Reprinted by permission.

About the Reviewer Dr. Joshua Sinai, a Washington, DC-based consultant on counterterrorism studies, is the author of “Active Shooter – A Handbook on Prevention” (ASIS International, 2013).

He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 20, No.3

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Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 20, No.3