The IACSP’s Counter-Terrorism Journal V21N1 by IACSP

A Look Back At The History Of U.S. Navy SEALS

Wolves Amongst The Sheep:

Assessing The Threat To Academic Institutions in the U.S. Terrorism Threats Against Indonesia “Post-Conflict” Terrorism In Nepal

Spring Issue Vol. 21 No. 1 2015 Printed in the U.S.A. IACSP.COM

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 21, No.1

Attention,

Journal of Counter-Terrorism Readers Save 20% on your copy of Global Security Consulting by using the promo code GlobalSecurity20

Vol. 21, No. 1 Spring 2015 IACSP Director of Operations Steven J. Fustero

Page 14

Associate Publisher Phil Friedman

Wolves Amongst The Sheep: Assessing The Threat To Academic Institutions in the U.S.,

Senior Editor Nancy Perry Contributing Editors Paul Davis Thomas B. Hunter Joshua Sinai

by Dr. Thomas B. Hunter

Book Review Editor Jack Plaxe Research Director Gerry Keenan Conference Director John Dew

Page 24

Communications Director Craig O. Thompson

“Post-Conflict” Terrorism In Nepal,

Art Director Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Psychological CT Advisors Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC

by Dr. Thomas A. Marks

Counterintelligence Advisor Stanley I. White South America Advisor Edward J. Maggio Homeland Security Advisor Col. David Gavigan

Page 6

SITREP

Page 8

Cyberdefense Guidelines For Agencies And Departments, by David Gewirtz

Personal Security Advisor Thomas J. Patire

Page 12 Simple (Cyber) Sabotage, by Tina C. Williams, Esq., CISSP, PMP Page 14 Wolves Amongst The Sheep: Assessing The Threat To Academic Institutions in the U.S., by Dr. Thomas B. Hunter Page 20 Assessing The Terrorism Threats Against Indonesia And Its Counter-Terrorism Response Measures, by Dr. Joshua Sinai

Emergency Management Advisor Clark L. Staten Director of Emergency Ops. Don L. Rondeau Tactical Advisor Robert Taubert Hazmat Advisor Bob Jaffin Security Driver Advisor Anthony Ricci, ADSI Cyberwarfare Advisor David Gewirtz Cell Phone Forensics Advisor Dr. Eamon P. Doherty

Page 24 “Post-Conflict” Terrorism In Nepal, by Dr. Thomas A. Marks Page 32 An IACSP Q&A With John F. Lehman, Jr., by Paul Davis Page 36 Secure Driver: Is Perception And Reaction Time Overlooked? by Anthony Ricci Page 38 Urban Shield, by Bob O’Brien, Jim Weiss, and Mickey Davis

IACSP Advisory Board John M. Peterson III John Dew Thomas Patire Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Robert E. Thorn Southeast Asia Correspondent Dr. Thomas A. Marks European Correspondent Elisabeth Peruci

Page 42 A Look Back At The History Of The U.S. NAVY SEALS, by Paul Davis Page 48 Book Review: Global Security Consulting: How To Build A Thriving International Practice, by Luke Bencie (Review by Dr. Joshua Sinai)

Middle East Correspondent Ali Koknar National Sales Representative Phil Friedman, Advertising Director Tel: 201-224-0588, Fax: 202-315-3459 iacsp@aol.com Tactical Sales Representative Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Tel: 757-721-2774, scott@mad4art.com

THE JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L is published by SecureWorldnet, Ltd., PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (ISSN#1552-5155) in cooperation with the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals and Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Copyright © 2015. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher. Editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (571) 216-8205, FAX: (202) 315-3459 . Membership $65/year, add $10 for overseas memberships. Postmaster: send address changes to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA. Web site: www.iacsp.com

PHOTO CREDITS: Reuters, DefenseImagery.mil Army.mil, Navy.mil, istockphoto.com, shutterstock.com and authors where applicable.

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SITREP

Terrorism Trends & Forecasts 2015

he year 2015 opened with a worsening of the ongoing conflicts in Yemen, Nigeria and Ukraine, each with potentially major regional implications. Violence escalated in Sudan, as well as in Lebanon’s Tripoli and along its southern border with Israel, and a deadly clash between police and militants in the southern Philippines threatened to derail the peace process there.

In South Asia, both Bangladesh and Nepal saw political tensions intensify. On a positive note, the Sri Lanka elections resulted in a peaceful transition of power from long-time President Mahinda Rajapaksa to Maithripala Sirisena, despite initial fears of election-related violence.

• • • • • • • •

Bangladesh Lebanon Nepal Nigeria Philippines Sudan Ukraine Yemen

What we are watching: Deteriorating Situations

In an effort to increase transparency and accountability, Customs and Border Patrol

Source: www.crisiswatch.org

U.S. Border Patrol Agents Testing Body-Worn Cameras

(CBP) has launched a study to test the feasibility of incorporating body-worn cameras by Border Patrol agents in land, air and maritime operational environments. The testing will help determine whether cameras should be deployed across the agency. Border Patrol agents are currently testing the body-worn cameras in El Paso, Texas; Seattle; Blaine, Washington; West Palm Beach, Florida; and Detroit.

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CBP has already completed Phase I of the study, which involved the evaluation of the body worn cameras in training environments at the agency’s training academies. The study is now in Phase II, field testing, which is scheduled to be completed by mid-2015. Source: http://www.scmagazine.com

LRASM Prototype Is Three-for-Three On Successful Flight Tests Initiated in 2009 in collaboration with the U.S.

Navy and U.S. Air Force, DARPA’s Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) program has been investing in advanced technologies to provide a leap ahead in U.S. surface warfare capability. The LRASM program aims to reduce dependence on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, network links and GPS navigation in electronic warfare environments while providing innovative terminal survivabil-

ity approaches and precision lethality in the face of advanced countermeasures. After LRASM prototypes completed two successful flight tests in 2013, LRASM transitioned from a DARPA technology demonstration program to a formal U.S. Navy program of record in February 2014, with fielding set for 2018.

to get the prize or be trained for the employment. Some scams are so very obvious, but still, people get taken, like those ridiculous e-mails claiming you inherited a windfall from some deceased prince named Gharbakhaji Naoombuule. But people actually fall for these, not considering that this same e-mail was sent to 10,000 others.

Top 10 Scams Caller ID spoofing. Has your phone ever rung and you saw your phone number and name in the caller ID screen? Caller ID spoofing is also perfect for scammers posing as the police, government agency, corporations etc all with the intention to get you to part with your money. Mystery shopping. Though

You may think you’re not dumb enough to fall for scams, but consider that someone you care deeply about is naïve enough to be conned. Besides, some scams are so clever that even those who think they’re scam-proof have actually been taken for a ride. A big tip-off to a scam is that you’re told you won a prize or have been hired for employment—but must send money

Time Share. You get a call from someone claiming to have found buyers for your timeshare. You receive a contract, but are told you must pay funds to cover some fees. The contract is phony. Tech support. Someone calls you claiming your computer needs servicing. They’ll fix it after you give them your credit card information. Legitimate geeks don’t call people; you must call them. Postcard survey. Out of the blue you’re told you’ve won a gift card, or, just take a brief survey to get one. Go along with this and soon you’ll be asked to provide your credit card number. You’ve Won! A notice says you’ve won a big fat prize. To claim it, just pay some fees. Yeah, right. Never pay fees to collect a prize!

Source: www.darpa.mil

Top Ten Scams Currently Running

pay for shipping or transfer fees (wire transfer) to get your puppy. The money is gone and you never get your puppy.

mystery shopping is a legitimate enterprise, scammers take advantage of this and mail out checks (phony) before the “shopping” is done Calls about unpaid taxes. Always hang up, regardless of threatening nature to pay up or else. The IRS always uses snail mail to notify people of unpaid taxes. Puppy scam. You find a website offering purebred puppies at very low prices or even for free, but you’re told you must

Grant Money Is On The Way. You’re told you’re eligible for a grant or have been awarded one, but must first pay processing fees. Federal grants don’t require fees. Subscription renewal notice. The notice says you can renew for a lower rate. Check to see if the notice was sent by the publication itself or some third party (the crook).

Source: Robert Siciliano is an identity theft expert. Go to: BestIDTheftCompanys.com

Are You Prepared? In order to encourage Ameri-

cans to prepare themselves, their families, and their communities, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in partnership with The Advertising Council, has sponsored public service advertisements (PSAs) that educate and empower Americans to prepare for and respond to all kinds of emergencies. The Ready Campaign has created suites of advertisements directed towards individuals and families, owners and managers of small and medium-sized business, and Spanish speakers. Because the Ready ads are PSAs, they run entirely in donated media space. Business PSAs include radio, print, outdoor, and Web advertisements. Listo PSAs include television, radio, print, outdoor, and web advertisements. To view all of the Ready Campaign’s PSAs visit the Ad Council Web site www.adcouncil.tv or http://psacentral. adcouncil.org

IACSP News Many of our members are not receiving our new monthly CTS Enews (electronic security report) because we either do not have your email, or you are using a .gov or .mil email address for your membership record. If you would like to receive our CTS Enews, please send me an email with the email address you would like us to use. Also include your current address. Please send the information to my attention to my personal email address: iacsp1@aol.com Until next time, be safe. Steven J. Fustero, Dir. Of Ops/IACSP

Cyberdefense Guidelines

For Agencies And Departments By David Gewirtz rom a cyberdefense perspective, 2014 was a long year. Barely a day went by without reports of another breach, another hack attack, and another devastating security violation.

For agencies and departments tasked with their own missions, cybersecurity has often been an afterthought. But with so many disturbing reports in the news, administrators and directors have started to ask what they need to do to be prepared. Although a full security policy is beyond the scope of this column, the following baker’s dozen of security guidelines will give you a starting point as you make recommendations to your organizations.

1. Prepare to budget-up. You’re going to war whether you want to or not. Expect to spend on security software, systems, and consultants. This is a war and making sure you have the right defenses will cost money. The only thing that might make you feel slightly better is that it would cost you vastly more if you were attacked without any defenses. 2. The threat is asymmetrical. You have to defend against everything. All they

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have to do is find one weak entry point. Enemy actors aren’t just enemy actors. They are also organized crime organizations, activist hackers, and anyone trying to find information they can resell. As a result, you will need to defend against a wide variety of unknown attackers, and all they need to do is find one employee who has poor cybersecurity hygiene. 3. The damage can be catastrophic and can range from

physical to security to ending careers. We have all read about the costs to Target, Home Depot, Sony and many other popular brands when their networks were breached. But it’s not just about information breaches. As more and more devices are connected to the Internet, expect physical threats ranging from gas station explosions to hijacked vehicle control and even damage to the electric grid. Of course, there’s one other aspect to a big breach and that’s if you were in charge when it happened, the only office you’re likely to be going to anytime soon is the unemployment office. 4. No matter how much more important other potential targets may be, everyone is a target. You may not think your organization is as juicy a target as, say, the agency down the block. But most cyberbreaches (particularly those trolling for monetary gain) are about numbers, not quality. Anything that can be found (credit card information, login credentials, personal information) can often be resold or used as a way into other organizations. Bottom line: you are a target. Get used to it. 5. Don’t worry about who might attack. Focus instead on how they might get in. When you try to figure out who might want to attack you, you will undoubtedly miss some potential bad guys. The point in preparing is not to try to guess who the bad guys

might be, but how they might try getting in. When planning your defense, look for vulnerabilities, not personalities. Look for weaknesses. A recent breach occurred because all servers had been

getting enough performance out of the hardware. As a result, older systems weren’t built with cyberdefense in mind and are often exceptionally vulnerable. Windows XP is no longer supported and is also very vulnerable.

Older tech is highly vulnerable, so it’s time to let go of all those old Windows XP machines. Back in the day, cybersecurity wasn’t the first concern when designing systems software. Instead, it was getting enough performance out of the hardware. protected with multifactor authentication, except for one older machine, which still just used user names and passwords. Wouldn’t you know it? The bad guys found that weak machine and used it to gain access to the network, then proceeded to wreak havoc. 6. Older tech is highly vulnerable, so it’s time to let go of all those old Windows XP machines. Back in the day, cybersecurity wasn’t the first concern when designing systems software. Instead, it was

If you are running systems more than two or three years old, it is time to consider moving on. When it comes to desktops, if you are running Windows older than Windows 7, you must upgrade. If you are running OS X older than “Mavericks,” you must upgrade. Older Android devices are vulnerable as well. Worse, older systems are no longer getting security upgrades, so guess what sorts of machines the bad guys will look for first?

7. New tech often contains older components and modules. These often open up unexpected vulnerabilities. For example, systems engineers discovered extreme vulnerabilities in the SSL encryption used to keep data safe in the browser. While browser code is updated constantly, the SSL function called by the browser had been built years ago and hadn’t been updated since. Hackers found that vulnerability and used it aggressively. Your best defense here is to be sure you update whenever an update is provided. Go beyond just updating the operating system. Make sure you update all of your supporting software. Remember, all the hackers need to do is gain a foothold. Then they’re in and you’re out of luck. 8. Do everything you can to control how applications and apps are downloaded. Where are you getting your applications and apps from? Are you just downloading them from the manufacturer’s app stores or are you or your people “side-loading” apps from individual sites on the Internet? One corrupted app, installed by one team member and then brought inside your firewall, can let loose the dogs of cyberwar inside your facility. To prevent this, consider installing mobile device management systems that restrict what software and systems can be added to

mobile devices. Not only will it add to your security, but it will

help you manage your licenses and simplify overall network management, saving time and money on the long run.

competent and careful may be your best protection.

9. Government-mandated back-doors simply make the situation worse.

11. Training is a key defensive strategy.

There has been a lot of discussion recently about governments demanding that encryption systems be accessible to law enforcement organizations. The scheme being proposed is that every secure system be built with a back-door that law enforcement can use when fighting terrorist threats. On the surface, this seems like a fine idea, but in reality it provides enemy actors an easy, built-in access point for penetration. If you think that law enforcement-only back doors will ever be able to remain exclusive to law enforcement, you’re terribly wrong. They will simply be red carpet entrances for the enemy to get into our systems. If national security organizations need to break encryption, they need to do it the old fashioned way: spend more than anyone else can, hire smarter engineers and scientists, and Manhattan Project their way to an answer. It is the only strategy that leaves the advantage in America’s hands and not the terrorists or criminals.

Now, if only we could get Congress to put competence and care first, imagine how far we’d get!

There are two categories of

movie or a ghost-written Tom Clancy novel. The effort involved in keeping individual systems safe, while not huge, can be tedious and somewhat time consuming. So you need to train. You need to make sure that your teams take these threats seriously, understand just how bad the consequences can be

Most of all, don’t penalize anyone for calling for emergency help if their concern doesn’t turn out to be an emergency. This stuff is like a highly infectious disease. The last thing you want your folks doing is infecting others because they were too afraid to get help.

10. Practicing best-practices can substantially reduce your threat profile.

training you will need to consider: training that there is actually a threat, and training about how to minimize the threat through best practices.

should a breach occur, and understand what each individual can do to make sure he or she isn’t the entry point for the incursion.

There is one bit of good news in all of this: if you manage your systems properly and you’re diligent in performing best practices, the chances of a breach go down tremendously. Yes, in fact, being

To many people, this is new stuff. The idea that some evildoer from across the planet can tunnel into their computer or phone and cause damage seems like something out of a low-budget science fiction

12. Make emergency responders available to everyone, 24/7. There is a difference between the Geek Squad and emergency cybersecurity responders. For questions similar to “I can’t

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figure out how to set up my email,” traditional tech support personnel and a reliable help desk should easily meet your organization’s needs. But there needs to be a procedure that every employee understands so that if something unexpected happens on their computer or mobile device, they have someone to call. Remember that it’s most likely that one individual at the edge of your organization will provide the foothold for an attack. Your people need to have an emergency response desk to call -- and those people manning the desk need to be friendly, knowledgeable and patient. Most of all, don’t penalize anyone for calling for emergency help if their concern doesn’t turn out to be an emergency. This stuff is like a highly infectious disease. The last thing you want your folks doing is infecting others because they were too afraid to get help. 13. Bonus guideline: While you’re at it, keep an eye on what devices can be brought into your facility overall. Remember that Stuxnet, the virus used to attack Iranian centrifuges, gained access to that network via a physical USB thumb drive. We’ve talked about the USB threat in these pages before. Take it seriously. Don’t let USB devices travel your perimeter without care and inspection.

About the Author David Gewirtz is Director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute, Distinguished Lecturer for CBS Interactive, Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, IT Advisor to the Florida Public Health Association and an instructor at the UC Berkeley extension.

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Simple (Cyber) Sabotage By Tina C. Williams, Esq., CISSP, PMP

hile I am no history buff, a few years ago, I worked with a team to chronicle the history of cybersecurity law. My takeaway from that effort was quite compelling; while the term “cybersecurity law” itself is relatively novel, there are laws that predate “cyber” that are quite relevant to the cybersecurity body of law. Such laws include the National Security Act of 1947 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. Of course, both of these Acts have undergone revisions since initial inception, and contemplated different technical and political environments than today.

However, the takeaway I left my Cybersecurity Law and Policy students with is that there is a lot that can be borrowed from history that is germane to helping counter today’s cyber attacks. Of particular focus in this article is what can be borrowed

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from the United States’ approach to World War II simple sabotage. The approach is outlined in the now declassified “Simple Sabotage Field Manual” published by the Office of Strategic Services, America’s first intelligence agency, predecessor to the

Central Intelligence Agency , dated January 17, 1944. This manual can be found online in various site repositories by using the Manual’s title as keywords in an online search. Right from the start, very early in the Manual, we get an explanation of what simple sabotage is as contrasted with “highly technical coup de main that require detailed planning and the use of specially trained operatives.” Simple sabotage “does not require specially prepared tools or equipment; it is executed by an ordinary citizen who may or may not act individually and without the necessity for the connection with an organized group; and it is carried out in such a way as to involve a minimum danger of injury, detection, and reprisal.” Consider this notion that cyber attacks can often commence in a “safe” (or at least protected) environment; and only require a computer, Internet access, the ability to do a bit of rudimentary online research, possibly some small to moderate amount of cash, and a personable personality. The Manual goes on to discuss how to motivate saboteurs; for example, “gains [for the saboteur] should be stated as specifically as possible” and “since the effect of his own acts is limited, the saboteur may become discouraged unless he feels that he is a member of a large, though unseen, group of saboteurs operating against the enemy or the government of his own country and elsewhere” and finally “more important…would be

to create a situation in which the citizen-saboteur acquires a sense of responsibility and begins to educate others in simple sabotage.” Consider here how cyberspace is quite an effective tool for communicating gains, giving the notion of a critical mass of likeminded individuals, and

Data Breach Investigation Report and are included in the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) list of critical infrastructure/key resource (CI/KR) sectors. While the Manual speaks to physical access in particular that citizensaboteurs possessed, similar destructiveness in present

“That which has been is that which will be, And that which has been done is that which will be done. So there is nothing new under the sun.” – Ecclesiastes 1:9

garnering additional support through recruiting. Particularly in view of this Manual are insiders – citizens inside a territory of interest, with the closest proximity being within particular environments involving manufacturing, transportation, communications, buildings, water, energy, and agriculture. Many of these target environments in 1944 are also present day targets for cyber attacks as evidenced in the 2014 Verizon

day can not only be achieved by insiders, but can also be achieved remotely through the use of malicious software inserted locally into a target environment to enact harm (e.g. denial of service). As a nation, we understand simple sabotage – we wrote the “book” on it! The 1944 insight we had on how to motivate citizen-saboteurs, what actions to take to accomplish simple sabotage, the relevant environments to target for sabotage,

and the timing in which to carryout such sabotage, can inform our efforts in thwarting similar activities against our own critical infrastructure/key resource environments promulgated through cyberspace. The technology we have today that comprises what is known as cyber space was not always in view of our history. However, if we look at cyber space as simply another environment, we expedite our capabilities and tactics by leveraging tactics and lessons learned from our past to protect our nation’s CIKR today. As a parting thought, I defer to who is described by some as the wisest man that ever lived, namely King Solomon, and state: “That which has been is that which will be, And that which has been done is that which will be done. So there is nothing new under the sun.” – Ecclesiastes 1:9

About the Author TCecure’s Founder and President, Tina C. Williams – Esq., CISSP, PMP, is a long-time participant in, and advocate of, the security and intelligence industry. Ms. Williams started her career at Lockheed Martin as a software developer in the Information Systems Leadership Development Program (ISLDP). She went on to work at Unisys as an Engagement Manager, and then at Dependable Global Solutions, Inc. as Vice President of its Civilian Division. Currently, in addition to her role as TCecure’s Founder and President, Ms. Williams is an Adjunct Instructor for UMBC’s Graduate Cybersecurity Program, and a member of the NICE365 Industry Advisory Board and the Maryland Bar.

Resources 1. https://www.cia.gov/library/center -for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi- publications/books-and-monographs/oss/ foreword.htm 2. http://www.secretsevice. gov /Verizon_Data_ Breach_2014.pdf

Wolves Amongst The Sheep:

Assessing The Terrorist Threat To Academic Institutions In The United States By Dr. Thomas B. Hunter

A Russian police officer carries a released baby from the school seized by heavily armed masked men and women in the town of Beslan in the province of North Ossetia near Chechnya, September 2, 2004. An armed gang, holding hundreds of people hostage in a Russian school, freed four infants and at least two women. REUTERS/Viktor Korotayev

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ntroduction

One of the greatest horrors we can imagine is that of an armed attack against a school, particularly at an institution comprised mostly of children, such as a grammar school or high school. That is why, for example, the world recoiled when Chechen terrorists attacked the primary school at Beslan, Russia, an event that effective captured the world’s attention from 1-3 September 2004. This attack ultimately resulted in the deaths of more than 385 persons, mostly children, and more than 780 injured. Scores of other attacks by terrorists such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, target schools on a regular basis around the world.

To date, the vast majority of violent, armed attacks targeting schools have occurred overseas and, as noted, have been perpetrated by terrorist organizations. Attacks that have occurred in the United States have largely been perpetrated by so-called “Active Shooters” in which the perpetrator’s mental illness has been cited the primary motivating factor (as opposed to a terrorist ideology). The U.S. has yet to experience a terrorist attack conducted by a sane, premeditated terrorist group; however, it is likely only a matter of time before the same horrors visited on schools overseas are brought to the U.S. Homeland, for a number of critical reasons. The primary goal of this brief paper is to provide a summary analysis of the most realistic potential threat posed by terrorists against schools within the United States. In order to achieve this goal, it is most helpful to first provide an overview of the general terrorist threats faced by U.S. and Western schools overseas. With these factors assessed, we can then most accurately assess the current threat facing our Homeland, and

provide a reasoned analysis as to the most realistic terrorist-specific threats facing schools within the United States.

Terrorist Targeting of U.S. Schools Abroad: A Brief Summary U.S. academic institutions overseas, and particularly in the Middle East, have long been targets of various terrorist groups. Given the symbolic nature of any U.S. presence overseas, that such facilities would be targeted is a foregone conclusion. The reasons for these attacks have been as varied as the groups and times by and in which they were perpetrated. One of the most memorable examples of these events occurred in the early 1980s with the kidnapping and murder of numerous administrative and faculty members from the American University of Beirut (AUB). On 19 July 1982, AUB President David S. Dodge was kidnapped and held by pro-Palestinian Lebanese extremists before

being moved to Tehran, where he underwent repeated interrogations, before being released several months later. Then on 18 January 1984, AUB President Malcolm H. Kerr – who had replaced the kidnapped Dodge – was shot and killed by two gunmen near his office. The Islamic Jihad Organization (better known simply as Islamic Jihad) later claimed responsibility for the murder. This same group carried out scores of attacks targeting the Western presence in Lebanon, including the 23 October 1983 bombings targeting the peacekeeping Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF), which included the U.S. Marine Corps barracks and, separately, French forces stationed nearby. Since that time, there have been scores of extremist attacks against American teachers, U.S.-backed schools, and students attending those schools. With the rise of al-Qaeda in the last 1990s and, more recently, ISIL and ISIS, concerns over attacks targeting U.S. academic institutions have become of increasing

concern given the demonstrated willingness and ability of these groups to target innocent children. The ever-growing list of attacks against schools in Afghanistan since the 2001 invasion of that country by the U.S.-led coalition has provided further tragic evidence of the emphasis Islamic extremist groups place on this target set. Other specific, legitimate threats have also been made in the last year, targeting U.S.-backed and/or English-teaching schools. These threats have also generally focused on deterring the education of females, a common thread amongst armed Islamic extremist groups, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In May 2014, a group calling itself Tanzeem-ul-Islami-ul-Furqan issued a local warning to officials in Panjgur (a district in the west Balochistan province of Pakistan). In this warning, it stated that the education of women was haram, or forbidden, in the Koran, and that 23 English Language Learning Centers must be shut down or face unspecified violence. To back up this threat, group members attacked one of the facilities and destroyed some school property, though they did not harm any individuals. The letter further threatened any taxi drivers and other persons who worked in cooperation with those schools. In another recent example, on 13 June 2014, a senior Sudanese Islamic cleric publicly called for attacks (reposted via video specifically for dissemination via the Internet) against a variety of American targets in support of ISIS, stating: •

“Oh Americans, if your armed forces land in Iraq once again, this will mean a new phase in targeting you – your tourist resorts, your embassies in our Arab capitals, your diplomatic

Americans residing in or visiting Egypt should remain vigilant regarding their personal security and be alert to local security developments. 16

delegations, your universities and schools (emphasis added), your coffee shops and restaurants, your airplanes and ships, your shops and companies.” This video, while not of any specific concern with regard to an imminent attack, is presented here only as a representative example of dozens of such videos by senior religious figures and active terrorists and foreign fighters calling on Islamic extremists, in particular, to attack American facilities, including academic institutions. The most recent specific, verified threat was announced on 27 October 2014, when the U.S. Embassy in Cairo issued an official Security Message for U.S. Citizens in which it published the following announcement: •

A recent anonymous posting on a Jihadist website encouraged attacks against American and other western schools and teachers in the Middle East, and specifically mentioned Jeddah in Saudi Arabia and Maadi in Egypt as locations with high concentrations of potential targets. The Embassy is unaware of any specific, credible threat against any American school or individual in Egypt. Nonetheless, the Embassy is working with local schools identified with the United States or that have high concentrations of American teachers or students to review and enhance their security posture. Americans residing in or visiting Egypt should remain vigilant regarding their personal security and be alert to local security developments.

Yet, while this alert did and does merit concern and appropriate precautions, history has shown that this is only the latest such terrorist threat focusing on U.S. and Western schools. There is no reason to believe such threats will end with this posting. In fact, particularly in the age of social media and the ongoing proliferation of Internet-based communications of all types, there is every reason to assess that these threats will only increase into the foreseeable future. These alerts do serve one additional function, however, and that is to remind the American public that terrorists do indeed seek to strike at academic institutions and that such targets remain a priority for groups seeking to strike at the United States overseas. This, also, necessarily raises the obvious question: if terrorists are indeed placing schools amongst their target sets, what is the likelihood they will apply this same value to academic institutions within our Homeland? Clearly, terrorist groups are well aware not only of the vulnerability of such facilities to armed attack, but to the global attention such attacks inherently draw in the international media. As all terrorist groups seek, as a primary goal, to maximize the attention drawn to their actions (thereby delivering their desired “message”), it follows that perpetrating such an attack within the United States is a potentially lucrative undertaking, from a propaganda perspective.

Lone Wolf Terrorism Following 9/11, the Global War on Terror, aside simply from the conflicts on the battlefield, forever changed the face of international counterterrorism, and, in so doing, the face of terrorism

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itself. The 9/11 attacks brought with them a revolution in how the West viewed terrorism, and with that, a proportionate increase in resources devoted to detecting and deterring future attacks. The unprecedented increase in funding for counterterrorism programs of all kinds led, despite some notable growing pains, to myriad advances in technology, training, and other anti- and counterterrorism-related efforts. Terrorist groups, particularly al-Qaeda, however, have adapted quickly to the changing security environment, and, particularly with the loss of their bases in Afghanistan, quickly learned to establish “franchise” organizations in other countries. No longer could al-Qaeda conduct centralized command-and-control from its former safe haven. Instead, it exported its brand of terrorism to other nations by promoting and, where possible, supporting the establishment of terrorist cells abroad. This “franchising” strategy proved viable throughout the Middle East and in other regions. However, given the new security dynamics in place in the West, this model has yet to prove feasible in the United States, the home of its primary enemy. It is for this reason that there has been no major terrorist attack since 9/11. This is not to say, however, that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaeda have been defeated in so far as their ability to attack targets within the United States. Rather, these groups have instead turned to a campaign – when considering attacks within our Homeland – of encouraging a different type of terrorism. This new model, encouraged primarily via Internet-distributed propaganda videos and statements, relies not on groups of persons, nor even leaderless cells. Instead, it relies on the individual, known more commonly today as the “lone wolf.” A lone wolf terrorist may be defined as a person acting alone but on behalf of a larger group, ideology, or belief system without the support of a group or command structure. These persons are not fettered by any connections to any larger group, nor even to another individual. As a result, there are myriad of other strategic, operational, and tactical benefits to lone wolf terrorism, each of which is unique to the individual but can include (but certainly are not limited to) the following: • • • • • • • •

They may have been born and raised in the United States Have access to valid identification and other documents They can hide easily, even near their target location They need not appear “Arab” or foreign, and could just as easily have blond hair and blue eyes They can train at gun ranges without arousing suspicion Easy for them to get guns and ammunition, legally And, in the end, the lone wolf need never even have met another terrorist nor even be known to a group, and may simply be acting of their own accord And may even be able to obtain employment at the target location of their choosing

Clearly, the above list represents just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to potential and actual benefits afforded to lone wolf terrorists – and should offer the reader a glimpse into the realities of the unique nature of this type of terrorism.

The Real Threat To date, there have been no legitimate, specific threats to academic institutions in the United States. However, this has not stopped some persons from making anonymous threats using language apparently intended to incite fear based on the ISIS beheading videos and other groups such as al-Qaeda. To be sure, the current climate with regard to the global attention given to ISIS makes hoax threats all but inevitable. For example, on 08 October 2014, an anonymous source sent a letter to the Johnston Police Department threatening physical violence against elementary school students in the Cranston, Johnston, and Warwick school districts. The letter, which was ultimately deemed noncredible by authorities, contained the phrase

certainly to varying degrees, inherently “soft” targets. This is to say schools lack defensive measures that might defeat or inhibit an attack when contrasted with “harder” targets, such as banks, certain office complexes, or, certainly, military installations. Many schools, particularly older schools and those is rural locations, do not even have deterrents as simple as chain link fencing to keep intruders from entering the premises. Certainly, a great deal can be done to offer a lone wolf attacker some incentive to bypass one school in favor of another. The most obvious steps are those deterrents that are most visible, such as (though certainly not limited to): •

Police presence at the school (e.g. police car in the parking lot, officer patrolling the front entrance area, etc.)

a school. Al-Qaeda, for example, which is, as far as history has shown, unique in its ability to conduct terrorist operations almost anywhere in the world, would almost certainly reserve such invaluable assets for more spectacular and lethal attacks such as suicide VBIEDs, assaults on high profile targets (i.e. airliners, cruise ships, national monuments or museums, etc.), or other “spectacular” events.

Conclusions There is no evidence to indicate that a “traditional” organized, group-centered terrorist attack against an academic institution in the United States is imminent or even likely in the near term. Rather, analysis of the myriad of dynamics at play since 9/11 and even well before that watershed event, indicates that a lone wolf attack, perpetrated by an individual

However, this has not stopped some persons from making anonymous threats using language apparently intended to incite fear based on the ISIS beheading videos and other groups such as al-Qaeda. “beheading is planned” and resulted in the deployment of police to schools throughout all three districts. Yet, to date, none of these threats have proven to be more than cruel and/ or juvenile hoaxes. Having now examined the myriad of issues it is reasonable to conclude that the most realistic terrorist threat facing academic institutions in the United States, specifically, is that posed by the lone wolf. There are a number of reasons why this is the case, but one need look only as far as the Active Shooter events that occurred at Columbine High School (1999), Virginia Tech University (2007), and Sandy Hook Elementary School (2012) to understand the threat posed by just one or two untrained, selfequipped gunmen. These events, and others of this type, provide perhaps the best examples of what can be expected in so far as the most realistic potential terrorist threat facing academic institutions in the United States.

Why Schools? There are a number of reasons why schools offer such an ideal target for lone wolf terrorist attacks. First and foremost, schools are, though

•

Chain link fences around the perimeter of the school grounds Controlled access points, and Security guards (preferably visibly armed)

operating apart from a larger group or command structure, could occur at any time and represents the most realistic terrorist threat facing schools in the United States today.

Second, though equally important, schools are typically densely populated, with large numbers of students in a concentrated area. This offers the attacker a high likelihood of inflicting the maximum amount of casualties in the shortest period of time. Sadly, this is particularly true in proportion to the age of the students, as young children are less likely to react quickly and properly to an armed attacker than, for example, a college-age student. This is the primary reason grammar/elementary schools are typically at the greatest risk from such attacks.

The tragic shootings that have plagued academic institutions, such as those witnessed at Columbine, Sandy Hook, and Virginia Tech, have demonstrated the vulnerability of academic institutions to individual attackers. As the Global War on Terror continues, and groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS call for attacks against the U.S., specifically, security planners must remain vigilant to the possibility that persons operating individually but sympathetic to Islamic extremism, for example, may act without warning to conduct a mass casualty attack against schools within the United States.

• •

Third, given the sheer number of schools in a given city or county, the attacker has the benefit of being able to pick and choose the most vulnerable facilities amongst what are often many within a short driving distance. Fourth, any organized terrorist group is unlikely to expend its finite resources (such as a sleeper cell and its associated weapons and equipment) on a target as easily accessible as

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

About the Author Dr. Thomas B. Hunter is a senior intelligence analyst with Virginia-based Kiernan Group Holdings. Dr. Hunter previously served as a senior counterterrorism intelligence analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Department of Homeland Security. He has authored one book and numerous articles related to terrorism, counterterrorism, and homeland security.

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05/02/2015 14:29

Assessing The Terrorist Threats Against Indonesia And Its Counterterrorism Response Measures By Dr. Joshua Sinai

The body of Bali bomber Imam Samudra is carried out of a mosque after prayers, before his burial in Serang, Banten province November 9, 2008. Hundreds of hardline Muslims gathered under tight security for the funerals of three Indonesian militants executed for the 2002 Bali nightclub bombings that killed 202 people. REUTERS/Supri (INDONESIA)

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s of early 2015, Indonesia’s counterterrorism campaign against Islamist terrorist groups had greatly improved since Jemaah Islamiyah’s (JI) devastating October 2002 bombings in Bali that killed 202 people and injured 240. Improvements in the counterterrorism program that had been introduced in recent years included upgrading its law enforcement, intelligence, and military capabilities, as well as measures to counter radicalization and deter violent extremism, especially among the country’s large pool of young population who were susceptible to the messages of terrorist extremists. While this had weakened the targeted terrorist groups - with Jemaah Islamiyah forced to fragment organizationally - these militant groups nevertheless continued to present a significant security threat. This was especially the case in a new development in 2014, with the growing appeal of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS/ISIL) in mobilizing the country’s radicalized youth into becoming foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq and to potentially conduct attacks in their own country. Around August 2014, some 200 Indonesians were estimated to have become foreign fighters on behalf of al Qaeda-type insurgents in Syria and Iraq. This led Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s President in August 2014, to call for prohibiting his country’s Muslims from joining ISIS, blocking ISIS websites in Indonesia, and declaring ISIS an “un-Islamic” terrorist organization . With Indonesia’s counterterrorism measures since 2002 leading to hundreds of arrests and convictions (exact numbers were unknown), resulting in a downward trajectory of terrorist incidents, the country’s Islamists had nonetheless become emboldened in pressing their extremist agendas, at least politically. As demonstrated by a well-publicized upswing in Islamist militancy, a soldout concert in Jakarta by the American

The cancellation of this event was one of numerous incidents of Islamist groups threatening or employing violence against any infringement on their ultraorthodox vision of society.

pop singer Lady Gaga in May 2012 was cancelled due to threats of violence. The organizers cited security concerns based on protests by the militant Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), along with other Islamist groups, that claimed the show was “too vulgar” for Muslim sensibilities. FPI threatened violent action if the concert went ahead, and warned they would prevent Lady Gaga from getting off the aircraft. The cancellation of this event was one of numerous incidents of Islamist groups threatening or employing violence against any infringement on their ultra-orthodox vision of society. This also led to concern over a resurgence of violent Islamist activism that would threaten the democratic gains Indonesia had made since the end of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998. Following the overthrow of Suharto’s regime, Indonesia had been beset by sectarian and separatist turmoil, including terrorist attacks by organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah, a major al Qaeda ally. Following the October 2002 Bali bombings, with Indonesia’s domestic upheavals cooling somewhat, with Islamist terrorist groups on the defensive,

the country’s democratic institutions attempted, although not always successfully, to mitigate communal conflicts that earlier would have quickly flared into societal-wide communal violence.

•

Significant Terrorist Incidents in Indonesia, 2000-2014 The following listing of terrorist incidents, beginning with the Bali bombings (Indonesia’s equivalent to 9/11), demonstrated the magnitude of the terrorist threats facing Indonesia: • October 2002: In coordinated bomb attacks in the tourist district of Kuta, Bali, 202 people were killed (including 88 Australians, and 38 Indonesian citizens), with 240 injured. Jemaah Islamiyah (an al Qaeda affiliate) was implicated in the attack, with several members of the group convicted for the bombings. • December 5, 2002: A bomb exploded at a McDonald’s restaurant and a car dealership in Makassar, in eastern Indonesia, killing three people and injuring 11. • April 27, 2003: A bomb exploded through the restaurant section of Indonesia’s international airport in Jakarta, injuring 11 people. • July 14, 2003: A bomb exploded outside parliament building, in Jakarta, shattering windows, with no fatalities or injuries. • August 5, 2003: A suicide bomber detonated a car bomb outside the lobby of the JW Marriott Hotel, in South Jakarta, killing 12 people and injuring some 150. • December 31, 2003: A bombing at a night concert in Peureulak, Aceh, killed at least 10 people, including three children, and wounded 45 others. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was implicated in the attack. • September 9, 2004: A delivery van packed with a one-ton bomb exploded outside the Australian embassy at Kuningan District, South Jakarta, killing 10 people including the suicide bomber, and wounding over 100 others. Jemaah Islamiyah was implicated in the attack. • November 13, 2004: An improvised explosive device exploded in a bus, in Poso, Central Sulawesi, killing six people and injuring three. • May 28, 2005: Two improvised explosive devices detonated at a market in the center of Tentena, Central Sulawesi, killing 19 and wounding some 40. • October 1, 2005: In a coordinated suicide attack, a series of bombs exploded at two sites in Jimbaran Beach Resort and in Kuta, Bali, killing 20 people (in addition to the three suicide bombers and injuring more than 100). • December 31, 2005: An improvised explosive device detonated at a market in Palu, Central Sulawesi, killing eight people and wounding 53.

•

• •

•

July 17, 2009: Suicide operatives conducted simultaneous bombings of the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Hotels in Jakarta, killing seven people, and injuring more than 50. March 15, 2011: An attempted bomb attack failed against Ulil Abhsar Abdalla, an activist of Jaringan Islam Liberal (Islamic Liberal Network) in Utan Kayu, East Jakarta, injuring a police officer who had tried to defuse the device. April 15, 2011: A suicide bomber detonated an explosive device in a mosque in a police compound in the city of Cirebon, in West Java, during Friday prayers. While only the bomber was killed, 30 people (mostly policemen) were injured. September 25, 2011: A suicide bomber detonated an explosive device in Bethel Injil Church in Sepenuh, Solo, Central Java, killing the bomber and injuring 22 people. April 8, 2012: Gunmen opened fire on a Trigana Air PK-YRF airplane during its landing approach on Mulia airstrip, Puncak Jaya, Papua, killing a Papua Pos journalist. August 17, 2012: Two policemen manning a traffic post in Solo, Central Java, were wounded by gunmen on motorcycle. October 16, 2012: Two high ranking police officers (in intelligence and counterterrorism) were murdered in Tamanjeka villege, Poso Regency, Central Sulawesi. November 27, 2012: Three policemen stationed in Pirime police post, Jayawijaya, Papua, were killed by suspected gunmen belonging to the Papua separatist movement. February 2013: Eight soldiers were killed in two separate attacks by separatist insurgents in Papua province.

Although this incident took place outside Indonesia, on March 21, 2014, a bomb exploded outside the Indonesian embassy in Paris, breaking windows but causing no casualties.

Indonesia’s Islamist Terrorist Groups Although Indonesia is not constitutionally an Islamic state, Islam is the country’s largest religion, with more than 200 million of its population identifying themselves as Muslim (mostly Sunnis), constituting a large majority of the total population of 237 million – making it the world’s largest Muslim nation. Some 16 percent of the country’s population was estimated as Christian. Indonesia’s Islamist terrorist groups, which constituted a tiny minority of the country’s Muslim population, included the following: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – Indonesia’s largest terrorist organization until it was overtaken

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

by splinter groups. Included in its history of terrorist attacks are the bombings in the Bali vacation resort in 2002 as well as attacks against Western hotels and the Australian Embassy in Indonesia. Prior to 2002, it was highly hierarchical, and was led by operatives who had trained in al Qaeda’s Afghanistan camps where they had established close operational links with al Qaeda Central. Since then, its strength has been diminished due to internal political and personality struggles, arrests, and the killings of its operatives. Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) – founded and led by Abu Bakar Bashir, JI’s spiritual leader, in 2008. JAT has been implicated in numerous terrorist attacks, and Bashir is currently serving 15 years in prison for his activities. It is much smaller than JI, with its ranks degraded by counterterrorist raids against it. The Harakah Sunni Movement for Indonesian Society (HASMI) – came to prominence in October 2012 when Detachment 88, Indonesia’s elite counterterrorism unit, arrested 11 of its members. A search of HASMI facilities uncovered explosives and a list of targets that included the American embassy in Jakarta, the American consulate in Surabaya in East Java, and the Jakarta offices of Freeport-McMoRan, an American mining corporation. The bombing plot was allegedly motivated by the anti-Muslim film “Innocence of Muslims.” The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) – considered Indonesia’s main militant Islamist organization. It engages in violent activities, such as vandalizing bars and nightclubs in retribution for selling alcohol. In addition, FPI has not only attacked Christian worshipers, but also Muslim sects, such as the Sunni Ahmadiyah, that it regards as insufficiently orthodox, and Shi’ite sects that are viewed as heretical. The FPI’s strength is estimated at 3,000, with tens of thousands of social media followers. The FPI’s real strength, however, is its influence in government, with some high level civilian and police officials reportedly sympathetic to the group.

Counterterrorism Measures In response to the Islamist terrorist threats, Indonesia employed the full spectrum of counterterrorism measures, ranging from judicial prosecution to military-based special operations to conciliatory-based religious persuasion. It is a civilian-led approach that is coordinated through the National Counterterrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – BNPT) to focus the joint efforts of the police, the judiciary, and other government bodies in countering terrorism.

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With the police tasked with leading the defensively-oriented antiterrorism effort, the arrested terrorists are prosecuted publicly through the court system, in according with the country’s constitutional processes and regulations. Hundreds of Islamist militants had been arrested in recent years (exact numbers are unknown), with most of them successfully prosecuted. This included the sentencing of Abu Bakar Bashir to 15 years imprisonment for his role in organizing a terrorist training camp in the Aceh region, the area where Islam first took root in Indonesia. In the country’s offensively-based counterterrorism operations, the lead is entrusted to Detachment 88, which was established following the 2002 Bali bombings. Numbering some 400 personnel (with the exact numbers unknown) drawn from police special operations forces, Detachment 88 is reported to employ an extensive intelligence network and special forces personnel to track and apprehend suspected terrorist operatives. Another component of the overall national counterterrorism strategy is diplomatic. Indonesia is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and played a role in enacting this organization’s Declaration of Joint Action to Counter-Terrorism (ADJACT) in 2001 and the Convention on Counter-terrorism (ACCT) in 2007. Indonesia is also active with non-ASEAN countries such as Australia, with the two countries routinely sharing counterterrorismrelated intelligence information. They also share in the operation of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), a joint counter-terrorism police training facility that is funded and staffed by the Australian Federal Police Forces and attached to Indonesia’s national police academy. The JCLEC also trains regional forces to counter both human smuggling and trafficking, with economic migrant asylum seekers (many from Indonesia and neighboring countries) a major problem confronting Australia.

Countering Violent Extremism Countering terrorism through offensive and defensive measures requires additional actions that address the underlying causes of terrorism. This is recognized by Indonesian authorities who, in response, have established programs for countering violent extremism and addressing the manifold factors involved in the radicalization process. Toward this end, some members of Detachment 88 are also trained as “spiritual counselors” and work to persuade religious militants to embark on nonviolent courses of action.

Indonesian authorities regard terrorists as “ideologically confused souls,” and that it is Detachment 88’s policy that suspected terrorists be handled as “good men gone astray.” As a trust-building measure, Detachment 88 officers (most of whom are Muslims) often join their terrorist prisoners in prayer.

Sidney Jones, an expert on Indonesian terrorism with the International Crisis Group, had noted that Indonesian authorities regard terrorists as “ideologically confused souls,” and that it is Detachment 88′s policy that suspected terrorists be handled as “good men gone astray.” As a trust-building measure, Detachment 88 officers (most of whom are Muslims) often join their terrorist prisoners in prayer. Muslim clerics are also brought in to discuss Islamic theology with the inmates and explain the wider contexts of passages that are exploited by extremist clerics in pursuit of their violent objectives. In conclusion, the dilemma for any governmental counterterrorism campaign such as Indonesia’s is that as one terrorist cell is defeated, another arises in a Hydra-like fashion. With the continuous infusion of Indonesian jails with new terrorist prisoners, only limited resources could be expended on de-radicalizing all of them. Moreover, not all former terrorists could be provided employment and other assistance upon their release – especially in a resource poor society such as Indonesia – so comprehensive coercive and conciliatory counterterrorism strategies needed to be implemented to track and assist the country’s released prisoners. As a result, as in other countries, prisons continued to serve as breeding grounds for new generations of terrorists among the general inmate population, with insufficient resources being expended to provide for their post-release rehabilitation, thus making many of them available for recruitment into terrorist groups. Finally, like other countries, whether in Southeast Asia or Western Europe, Indonesian counterterrorism faced the additional threat posed by appeal of the messages espoused by the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), whose appeal was magnified by its control of territory in Iraq and Syria, thus demonstrating that it was “possible” for such groups to become “states-withinstates.” Indonesian recruits into the Islamic State’s ranks were initially radicalized by the group’s videos disseminated over the Internet and other online forums, as well as by local jihadist groups whose leaders had sworn allegiance to the Islamic State. As of early 2015, Indonesia had yet to find a solution to countering this threat, which had greatly exacerbated the other threats posed by the country’s militant Islamists and their localized objectives.

About the Author Dr. Joshua Sinai is Director of Analytics & Business Intelligence at Resilient Corporation (www.resilient.com), in Alexandria, VA. He can be reached at: joshua. sinai@comcast.net.

“POST-CONFLICT” TERRORISM IN NEPAL

Communist demonstrators shout anti-monarch slogans in Kathmandu May 3, 2004. Today marks one year of agitation against the king. Five major political parties are demanding the reinstallation of democracy in the country. REUTERS/Gopal Chitrakar gc/TW

Dr. Thomas A. Marks

ny number of works have sought to explore “how terrorism ends.” The challenge, though, is that terrorism comes in two varieties: that used instrumentally by insurgents, and that used as an end unto itself by stand-alone terrorists. Insurgents build a new world to challenge the existing world; terrorists build nothing save whatever is necessary to make violence against the innocent their political Ends-Ways-Means.

If insurgency may be compared to an iceberg floating in the popular sea but always dynamic in its effort to expand, terrorism is a cork buoyed by a support structure. It floats upon the “sea.” Termination of overt

conflict, then, when it comes, will likely result in very different endstates. Put simply, terrorists are few but insurgents, assuming they have constructed a viable insurgency, are many. This results in a situation fraught with opportunity for backsliding and double-dealing

at both tactical and strategic levels. It is just this that makes the Nepal case worth examining.

Setting the Scene For more than a decade, February 1996 to November 2006, Nepal

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was buffeted by an overt effort by a radical, left-wing group, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or CPN(M) – known simply as “the Maoists” – to overthrow the existing government and remake society according to the Party’s understanding of the works of Mao

Tse-tung. Thereafter, the Maoists waged a covert struggle to achieve the same end, power. Though they ostensibly reintegrated into normal politics as a consequence of a ceasefire agreement in April 2006 and a comprehensive peace accord that went into effect in November 2006 (with numerous follow-on agreements also signed), they continued to state that they were involved in an armed revolutionary struggle strategically and were only proceeding by a different path tactically (i.e., “political struggle”), while maintaining the option of “returning to the jungle” (by which they meant resuming guerrilla warfare). This “political struggle,” however, incorporated terrorism, which was used on a regular and recurring basis. In fact, it was a debate over just what form such continuing violence should take tactically in the ongoing strategic struggle for “people’s revolution” that caused the Maoists to split in June 2012 into two major parties. The most radical faction took with it those Maoists who remained committed to armed struggle; and they have continued in much the same vein as discussed below. Ironically, even as this article went to press, yet a further split occurred in late November-early December 2014, when an ultra-radical faction decided the radicals were not moving aggressively to make good on their violent promises.

Period of Overt War While the Nepali state, in its parliamentary, market economy form, was identified throughout this 1996-2006 overt struggle as the immediate enemy, the Maoists regularly claimed that Indian imperialism was the most pressing threat to the Nepali nation and that the United States and capitalism were the ultimate enemies of mankind. The Maoists were placed on the State Department’s Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL), which enumerates terrorist organizations for immigration purposes, and were one of the groups designated in Executive Order 13224, “Blocking and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to

Commit, or Support Terrorism.” Among the victims of the Maoists were Nepalis employed in U.S. Embassy security. Throughout the prosecution of their “people’s war,” the Maoists used a mix of violent and nonviolent actions (e.g., terrorism mixed with propaganda); of military and political actions; of local and international actions; and of direct mobilization into their political organization in coordination with more subtle co-optation of civil society by front organizations. Political mobilization by democratic government was (and remains) the greatest threat to the violent effort of insurgents to seize power, because democratic empowerment and its accompanying civil society (particularly social welfare and justice organizations) are the premier challengers in efforts to mobilize the populace. To advance their own control of areas and population, the Nepali Maoists made their primary task the neutralization of all opposing political activity, especially at the local level. They did this using violence, relying heavily upon attacks which legally and analytically we would label “terrorism.” To fund their effort, the Maoists relied upon criminality, primarily extortion and kidnapping, directed almost universally at “class” and “political” enemies. Yet for purposes of recruiting, the Maoists sought “conversion testimonials” from those among their foes who could be compelled to “see the light” and join “the revolution.” What incensed them was those who, approached several times and warned (invariably, in the end, with violence), refused to grant the party legitimacy and obedience. The strategic vision implemented initially by the Nepali Maoists (for perhaps five to eight years after 1996) was modeled upon that of Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru specifically and other Maoist groups (such as those in the Philippines and India) generally. Thereafter, the Maoists acted on their own initiative. It is significant that the models that shaped their approach were among the more ruthless and “bloody” to appear

in the Cold War era and immediate period thereafter, especially Shining Path. Consequently, the Maoist effort was propelled by the use of violence to eliminate, first, individual or group resistance of those active in local politics and civil society, second, government presence so that the population in Maoist-controlled areas could be organized as a rival to the state in a contest for political power. All those who resisted at the local level were neutralized. Police response was ambushed by the guerrillas, local police stations eliminated, and entire areas stripped of government presence – to include the government buildings in many cases. Ultimately, even regular army units found themselves attacked, and isolated units were always in danger of being overwhelmed. This “strategic offensive” (i.e., military) phase of the war was initiated by the Maoists in November 2001 with an assault upon the Royal Nepal Army (RNA, now Nepal Army or NA) cantonment in Dang city. Government forces were caught in a conundrum: only dispersed deployment of small units could generate the presence required to secure and protect the population, yet such a posture increased the dangers of annihilation as the Maoists could mass large units of multiple battalion strength (approximately 600 individuals per battalion). Even district capitals were at risk. In such circumstances, the level of brutality and bloodshed increased almost exponentially, because no protection could be afforded to any of the population save partially in district capitals and major cities. In January 2003, the Maoists offered the ceasefire in order to conduct peace negotiations with the government. Their approach followed the most startling evidence up to that point of Maoist penetration of urban areas: on 26 January 2003, a Maoist urban partisan group in Kathmandu, the nation’s capital, ambushed and killed the commanding officer of Nepal’s paramilitary Armed Police Force (APF), Inspector General Krishna Mohan Shrestha. At the

...the Maoists could mass large units of multiple battalion strength (approximately 600 individuals per battalion). Even district capitals were at risk. In such circumstances, the level of brutality and bloodshed increased almost exponentially....

time, APF was playing a leading role in the effort against the insurgents. Shrestha was the highest ranking officer to die in the entire conflict, and the Maoists used the shock of his death as their stepping stone to the ceasefire. The negotiations, though, were but cover for regroupment, resupply, and repositioning of combatants. On 27 August 2003, the Maoists ended the ceasefire. Simultaneously with their proclamation, they attacked a number of government positions using forces they had moved duplicitously during the talks. Further, their urban partisans began an accelerating campaign of targeted killing against important counterinsurgent figures stationed in Kathmandu. Incapable of protecting even a top counterinsurgency general, it goes without saying that in police eyes, even had they been completely motivated, protecting the general populace became a distant priority. In the sequence at hand, the accelerating Maoist effort was supported by the mobilization of a counterstate within the very boundaries of the legal Nepali state. Ultimately, some 70-80% of the population, located primarily in the rural areas outside the 75 district capitals and the several major urban centers, was controlled by the Maoists. This control, in turn, was built upon terrorism, which was used in a ruthless campaign of intimidation and assassination. Flight of targeted individuals – especially from rural areas to the urban centers (with Kathmandu the most common haven) – did not result in safety. Numerous cases testify to an almost pathological obsession of the Maoists in following their victims wherever they were in the small country that is Nepal and, if the victims had fled abroad, in harassing their relatives, demanding that the victims return (“to face the music” might be the appropriate reference). Even officials – as discussed above – were afforded relatively minimal (and often ineffectual) protection. Ordinary people simply could not escape if they remained in Nepal, as was quickly realized and exploited by the Maoists.

Children were a particular target, with widespread recruitment and impressment occurring myriad times. A demand for one “member” of each family, normally a young son or daughter, to enter Maoist service was normal in all areas where the Maoists were able to establish dominance.

While the improvised nature of bodyguard procedures meant that some of Nepal’s key military and police counterinsurgency officials were eliminated in well-planned and executed assassinations, normal people were truly on their own. As individuals sought safety, they streamed to the urban centers and abroad. Though not measured officially, large numbers of individuals fled to India, with which Nepal has an open border. India, though, often proved a poor choice for sanctuary, because it had a powerful, growing Maoist insurgency – which presently affects 182 districts (of a national 640 total) in 20 states. What ensured that the conflict in Nepal would become savage stemmed from the complex human geography of the country, wherein more than a hundred ethnic and caste groups sought to survive in a society which economically was one of the poorest on earth and socially was dominated by the realities of the Hindu caste system (i.e., stratification is the norm). Given the resulting inefficiency and corruption of Nepali politics, the Maoists were able to aggressively exploit the issues of community, caste, and class; and thus sought to enflame every group against others. Children were a particular target, with widespread recruitment and impressment occurring myriad times. A demand for one “member” of each family, normally a young son or daughter, to enter Maoist service was normal in all areas where the Maoists were able to establish dominance. The Maoist movement overall thus was characterized by older, radicalized adults leading younger manpower mobilized by a variety of local concerns but inspired by a warped construction of “the other” and a promise of material gain as the ultimate reward for their efforts. The Party surfed the resulting wave of violence and destruction. It was this ugly underside, driven by the zero-sum game which is the Nepali psyche (a consequence of scarcity as a way of life), that caused the U.S. Embassy to warn regularly of a Khmer Rouge mindset upon the part of the insurgents – referring to the tragedy which engulfed Cambodia when radical

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Maoists took over there in 1975 and ultimately killed an estimated one-fourth to one-third of the entire population. The reality of the Nepali Maoists’ purported “new society,” in other words, was anything but utopia. Making the situation worse was that the dynamic of the insurgency unleashed countless free-lance actors who engaged in criminal activity even as they pursued their tasks as Maoists. This introduced a hopeless situation for victims. On the one hand, the Maoists were conducting an orchestrated campaign of terror; on the other hand, much of the execution was decentralized to local organs over whom the central insurgent authorities did not even try to exercise authority. Family members were watched, as well as often threatened and subjected to violence, as a way to put pressure on the targeted victim. Throughout the events discussed above, Nepal’s response was clumsy and often chaotic. Though the military (NA) improved, the front line of defense was necessarily the police. Under peacetime circumstances, the quality of the police was uneven; during the period of overt conflict, the situation grew much worse. The caving in of the police force upon itself, as it was savaged and forced back to the district capitals and urban centers, often eliminated those pockets of professionalism that existed and left citizens with nowhere to turn. Further, transitioning the police to a counterinsurgency posture proved problematic, since they had in the pre-war years been mainly a “presence” force with minimal training in either Western-style policing or the direct action associated with SWAT teams. Corruption was a major problem, and intra-force rivalry and disagreements caused promising efforts at enhancing intelligence capabilities to be still-born. Taken together, it does not surprise that the police were often ineffective and preoccupied overwhelmingly with survival, which again thrust the victim back on his/her own devices. At the time of the April 2006 ceasefire noted above, statistics were shocking. In addition to nearly 17,000 deaths in the con-

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flict, the numbers maimed, kidnapped, and displaced ran to an order of magnitude higher. In terms of the structure of the state, one-third of the 3,913 county (VDC) offices had been physically destroyed within one year after the November 2001 attack on the army, which the Maoists saw as initiating their final push for victory. A number of the 75 district offices had likewise been attacked. Various efforts at negotiation had come to naught, and even signed agreements had little effect upon Maoist behavior. Indeed, even prior to the declaration of the 2006 ceasefire, a “12-Point Agreement” between the Maoists and its seven legal (but alienated from the government) party partners committed all “to carry out the political activities without any hindrance.” A more comprehensive and explicit “Code of Conduct” followed the next month and committed the signatories “not to make any hindrance and give any mental and physical pressure from either side to the workers of political parties and members of social organizations or individuals to disseminate their opinion, to conduct meetings and assembles, to conduct the act

Not surprisingly, given their destruction of rivals in the 70-80% of the population they continued to terrorize and thus dominate, the Maoists emerged as the largest parliamentary party. of extending organizations through movement around any part of the country.” None of these provisions were observed.

Period of Covert War (“Peace”) Despite overt commitment to peaceful politics, the Maoists continued such actions. The insurgents entered into the April 2006 ceasefire talks, because a shift to subversion under the cover of “peace” was the least costly, most logical way to complete the neutralization of government power and to push the revolutionary struggle through to completion. The state in effect had sued for peace, and the Maoists adroitly moved to exploit the opening. When a formal cessation of hostilities commenced in November 2006, the Nepalese military was confined to its barracks, supposedly along with the Maoist “army,” which was sent to “regroupment camps.”

In reality, a large portion of the Maoist forces in the camps were poorly trained local militia (and new recruits). Key combatants moved into an alleged “youth organization” – the Young Communist League (YCL) – which expanded dramatically and functioned as the storm troopers for the Maoist political arm. This process was repeated throughout the country. The activities of YCL, as well as student and other front organizations, allowed the Maoists to continue their campaign of terrorism within the very structure and protections of democracy, often with the support of misguided international actors (both state and non-state). In April 2007, the Maoists became part of the government in Nepal. By August 2008 they headed it. Considerable irony was at work. On the one hand, surface developments could be seen as a steady process, whereby a “better tomorrow” appeared to loom compared to the ugly realities of the day. On the other hand, each step towards “peace,” whether a ceasefire or a signed agreement to move towards conflict resolution, invariably resulted in dashed hopes. Nothing illustrated this more than the years which rolled by following

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the formal declaration of “peace” in November 2006. To gain power, the Maoists had entered into an arrangement with anti-government but legal political parties, which ultimately placed Maoist representatives in the legislature (still carrying their weapons) and Maoists in control of various government agencies. Part of the powersharing agreement stated that elections would be held for a combined “constituent” (i.e., constitutional) assembly and parliament. Twice (in June 2007 and November 2007), they were postponed, both times due to Maoist subversion – and a Maoist need (as they perceived the situation) to continue eliminating local resistance prior to participating in any “open” vote. A final attempt to hold a vote, April 2008, was successful. Not surprisingly, given their destruction of rivals in the 70-80% of the population they continued to terrorize and thus dominate, the Maoists emerged as the largest parliamentary party. They had less than 40% of the seats (with a lower percentage of the actual popular vote), though, and so were unable to form a government until August 2008, when they brought Marxist-but-non-Maoist politicians into a coalition. Significantly, the Maoist majority, though gained in a “rough” but marginally legal manner in urban centers, was gained in rural areas (where most of the population lives) by systematically excluding, through menace and violence, rival parties. The process included kidnapping, illegal detention, and torture, as well as extensive other forms of covert violence. This happened to all rival political party activists who attempted to crack the physical cordon the Maoists put in place around their captive vote-bank, as well as to various civil society actors who challenged (simply by their social welfare actions) the Maoist monopoly of power. In previously government-held areas, such as Kathmandu, the Maoists not only brutalized opposing political activists but continued to seek the complete neutralization of old foes (to their way of thinking). With their assumption of actual power in August 2008, and with the army still confined to barracks, the

Maoists could use the state itself as the cover for their continued terror, which was aimed at decimating the opposition to the extent no further resistance would be possible. Far from moderating their behavior when faced with the task of actually ruling, the Maoists continued in much the same vein as they always had. Shakti Khor camp, for example, south of Kathmandu and the major Maoist regroupment center, became a nerve center for criminality and death squad activity. Best evidence suggests, however, that it was but a “first among equals” in such a profile. Central to Maoist activity was the generation, through illegal activity, of resources necessary for maintenance of their political party. Such actions reached substantial proportions and were always accompanied by actual or threat of violence. On the surface, democratic norms were observed – at least to a point – while beneath the surface, intimidation and attacks were routine. Myriad incidents that occurred during this period, August 2008 to May 2009, bear witness to the extent Maoist depredations not only increased dramatically but so did police complicity, to include the release of apprehended suspects in torture and murder cases after the police had received orders from Maoist officials. Only when the Maoists completely overplayed their hand did they stumble. In May 2009, a sensational videotape surfaced of Maoist leader Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal @ Prachanda (“Fierce

One”), then the prime minister, openly boasting to a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gathering at Shakti Khor camp of his use of the peace process to subvert parliamentary democracy and of his future plans for eliminating all rivals to the Maoist “people’s republic.” The outrage was such that the highly fragmented opposition, supported by India and a number of other key external players, mustered a parliamentary majority and became the government. The shield behind which this occurred was the much-maligned but considerably improved military (NA) that used its period of confinement to enhance its professionalism, especially doctrine and promotion procedures. Further in the background, was India, acting through its CIA-equivalent, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing). The result was a Maoist tactical retreat to the role of “opposition party,” which allowed greater opportunities for continued covert violence and extortion, free from the scrutiny and irksome oversight that came when they were forced to operate in the open. Indeed, they promptly retaliated by using their substantial numbers to block all normal business and filled the streets with YCL and rural thugs, bused in to man actions designed to bring normal governance to a halt. Anyone attempting to cross their lines set up in demonstrations was met with violence.

Those of the press who energetically pursued stories on continued Maoist crimes were menaced and at times murdered. Among the most prominent cases was that of Ms. Uma Singh, a correspondent for Republica (a nationally distributed Kathmandu daily which appears in both English and Nepali). Ms. Singh was murdered by being hacked to death in March 2009 after her detailed stories exposed the continued Maoist criminal and terroristic activity. Nepali media, after very pointed warnings from the Maoists, largely retreated to self-censorship, which has made gathering comprehensive data difficult. The human rights organizations from which one might expect such an effort were tainted, early in the struggle, by “activism” which at times amounted to complicity with the insurgents. Rivals who might have provided a more balanced picture were neutralized by terror. Nevertheless, some acts have been so astonishingly brutal that they have been impossible to keep under wraps. The case of Ms. Uma Singh is mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Shortly thereafter, in December 2009, Ms. Tika Bista, journalist for Rajdhani daily, was savagely beaten in Dang and left for dead after a column she wrote for a local weekly, Jantidhara, criticized the YCL. Among the weapons used to assault her were razor blades. In contrast, the fatal assault on Uma Khatri was carried out using kukris, the Bowie

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knife-like weapon made legendary by the Gurkhas. Media figures in Nepal remain at considerable risk for reporting perceived as hostile by the Maoists. Events went from bad to worse. In a dramatic turn, a longstanding political gridlock, in which no party could form a majority government (in Nepal’s semi-restored parliamentary system), was broken in February 2011, when a secret deal was cut by the legal Marxist candidate, Mr. Jhala Nath Khanal, with the Maoists to give them control of the Interior Ministry in return for their support. When the deal became known, it was repudiated by the then-Prime Minister’s own party, since it is the Interior Ministry that controls internal law and order, most especially the police. To place the Maoists in control of this ministry thus would have provided the ultimate cloak of legality for their illegal activity. Nevertheless, on 28 August 2011, a further back-door deal, this time with political parties from Nepal’s lowlands, or tarai, brought the Maoists to power and the Maoist “number two,” Dr. Babaram Bhattarai, to the prime ministership. The practice of Leninist democratic centralism dictated that Dr. Bhattarai answer to the Maoist Politburo, which continued to hold closed door meetings to plot its next steps. The implications for the safety of non-Maoist political activists could hardly be overstated. Making the situation still more fraught with peril, throughout these events, the Maoists were locked in an escalating intra-Party strategic debate with at least one faction, the so-called “radicals,” advocating immediate overt use of widespread violence to the extent necessary to overturn the system. The opposing “moderates” in such debate (i.e., the Maoist government at that time) claimed that the Party’s ongoing course of action – covertly using terror to neutralize all opposition while openly participating in politics – was the preferred and least costly approach. This faction

could point to dramatic progress in advancing to a position of absolute power. Placing “party unity” above “party discipline,” the “moderates” allowed the “radicals” to continue to prepare forces for “urban revolt.” The result was that terrorism continued both as a consequence of Party policy and as per individual direction of dissident leadership figures (i.e., those who did not agree with Party strategy). In effect, terrorism was accepted as the price of party unity.

Moving to the Present This arrangement-of-convenience came apart in mid-2012. First, the turmoil surrounding the Constituent Assembly (CA), within which the Maoists controlled the largest block as a consequence of violent vote manipulation (discussed above), was discharged by the president on 27 May 2012 after failing to meet its mandate to produce a new constitution. Dr. Bhattarai announced that he would continue to lead an interim government and that elections for a new CAII would be held. Initially, only the first of these came to pass, so Dr. Bhattarai continued to rule by mandate. The “radicals” saw this chain of events as final validation of the bankruptcy of the

“moderate” approach and formally split in late June 2012 to form their own party committed to strategic use of violence – i.e., committed to a position which argues that overt versus covert violent action constitutes the only viable approach to seizing all power and pushing through revolutionary reordering of the state. Both factions maneuvered vigorously to bring party elements and manpower to their respective sides, with the radicals in particular seeking to incorporate alienated combatants of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Young Communist League (YCL). Though violent clashes between the two factions increased throughout the latter half of 2012 and early part of 2013, both were constrained by their need to move carefully lest they give opponents in the legal political spectrum, who themselves were quite divided, grounds to unite. Such a posture was particularly difficult for the radical faction of Mr. Mohan Baidya, because it had to present a public face which did not excite alarm even as it led its membership in “appropriate” violent action, such as land seizures and violent labor actions (especially favored were the ubiquitous bandas – i.e., general strikes suddenly declared by an organization and which, in the Nepali context, are always enforced through menace and violence). Ultimately, the “radical” design was to provoke repression which would facilitate an urban uprising. It was in this context, in order to buttress the “moderates” – who, to be clear, continued to hold power regardless of legal provisions – that a U.S. decision was made in September 2012 to drop the Maoist TEL designation, in much the manner that the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was suspended from the FTO list when it appeared that it was willing to work towards an end to conflict. In Nepal, the U.S. (and the West in general) has a considerably weaker hand to play than in Northern Ireland.

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In any case, dropping the “moderate” faction from the TEL designation in no way changed the situation of individuals still on the wrong side of the Maoists, because the most radical and violent elements of “the Maoists” had moved into the breakaway “radical” faction that controlled (and controls) some one-third of the former political cadre and, best evidence demonstrates, a much greater percentage of the martial manpower (i.e., those who were members of the PLA and YCL). On 14 March 2013, continued resistance to the status quo from civil society and non-Maoist political parties resulted in a “deal” whereby the four largest parties brokered an arrangement which placed the country’s Supreme Court Chief Justice, Mr. Khil Raj Regmi, as interim prime minister and charged him with holding 19 November 2013 elections for a new CAII, elections the radical Maoists immediately declared openly they would boycott and use violence to thwart. There followed an astonishing period which ultimately saw the entire security forces (to include the long-sequestered army) deployed, in conjunction with tens of thousands of volunteers, domestic and foreign, to provide the security necessary to hold the elections. This kept casualties and damage relatively low – 3 dead and 26 wounded; 109 vehicles torched/ damaged – despite the fact that 54 Bombs/IEDs exploded and another 430 were defused, with 34 instances of small arms firing. As had happened previously, Dahal was again been caught on tape (in the final days before voting), this time urging the members of the inner circle to use whatever means were necessary, legal or illegal, to ensure victory. When early returns indicated the scale of the securityenabled debacle in the making, the “moderates” pulled all election observers, demanded that the vote-counting be stopped, said they would boycott CA II, and claimed that a national and international plot had been engineered. For his part, rival Baidya – whose attempt to implement a nationwide 10-day banda before the voting

Now, “the revolution” – weakened by popular backlash and internal shortcomings, notably unbridled corruption – finds that its most hardened bullyboys have deserted to join those who claim to be the true torchbearers of radical societal restructuring, the “radicals.” Yet the radicals, too, are unsure how to proceed, since the population has so firmly demonstrated its rejection of terrorism. collapsed – sought to take credit for the Dahal faction’s precipitous defeat and vowed to continue with the radical strategy of rural terrorism and engineering “urban revolt.” Baidya’s radicals, in fact, had demonstrated, in Thawang county (VDC) of Rolpa, their still considerable ability to use terrorism to thwart democratic process. For decades, Thawang had been a Maoist stronghold and had remained under radical control. In the election, not a single local ballot was cast (of 1,878 registered voters) once the radicals announced they would attack any individuals who sought to vote. In the event, the massive security and international presence enabled successful balloting. The results were heartening, as the mixed “first past the post” and “proportional” seats, selected through 78% turnout, gave the traditional political party powers, the Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), 61.7% of the total 601 seats (196 and 175 seats, respectively). The “moderate” Maoists were distant third with but 80 seats (only 26 of which were obtained in direct “first past the post” competition).

Life in the U-Turn Lane In the year that has followed, it has become clear that Nepal has returned to its normal chaotic state. To be sure, life in a republic rather than a monarchy has brought significant change, with unleashed

social forces demanding a political voice, and a tremendous proportion of the youthful work force seeking sustenance through employment abroad. Nearly 50% of the 28 million population is 19 or under in a country with a GDP of but $19.3 bn. Remittances are now the mainstay of the economy (28.8% of GDP). If one sense, it was business as usual, the momentary insurgent victory swept away by Nepali reality, in another a grim legacy remained. A large portion of the Maoist manpower has over the past several decades taken its key leaders at their words, to the extent that the most radical one-third has now split so as not to be bound by what it sees as the “betrayal” of revolutionary ideals by the “moderates.” It has continued to use violence pursuant to the radical pronouncements of its leaders. “Irony” is again the appropriate term. Even before the surprising turnabout just described, the “moderate” Maoists, though claiming to be finally in the process at last of integrating their “regroupment camp” military occupants into the established security forces, had not actually done so. Neither had they completely disbanded YCL (much less various other violent front organizations, especially student groups) nor clamped down on the violent actions of their local followers. Menace, extortion, and terror continued. Despite their signed agreements to participate in peaceful politics, they openly and frequently asserted that they

regarded all political arrangements as but a transition to their goal of a “people’s republic.” Violence, therefore, remained the method for political communication. Now, “the revolution” – weakened by popular backlash and internal shortcomings, notably unbridled corruption – finds that its most hardened bullyboys have deserted to join those who claim to be the true torchbearers of radical societal restructuring, the “radicals.” Yet the radicals, too, are unsure how to proceed, since the population has so firmly demonstrated its rejection of terrorism. Indeed, unable to deliver a new “people’s war” strategy, the radicals on 1 December 2014 received a hard slap from their most violent one-third, who bolted the rump to form an “ultra” party. Denouncing the radicals as too cautious and as producing no results in returning the country to a state of war as planned at the time of the original mid-2012 breakaway from the “moderates,” a new Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), declared itself – expropriating the original acronym of the Maoist mainstream. Under the leadership of firebrand (Mr.) Netra Bikram Chand, a series of clandestine meetings was held in the old Maoist stronghold of Rolpa to prepare the way forward. Chand observed that the form of violence the ultra-radicals would adopt would depend upon circumstances, but he called for a “people’s re-

taliation” against those who had betrayed the cause of people’s war. The “principal enemy” – the target against which direct action should be taken – was stipulated as Nepali Congress (NC), the standard-bearer of Nepali parliamentary democracy and the largest democratic party. Lacking firm guidance, confused and frustrated, “radical” manpower continues to act upon fiery summons to the barricades, carrying out acts of menace and violence in the large portions of the country where police presence is minimal and communications difficult (much of the country can still not be reached by road). These often involve criminal action, especially extortion, and make life dangerous for those labelled as enemies of the cause. Hundreds have thus fled abroad. Nonetheless, Nepal lurches forward, leaving the Maoists behind. The result is a situation that is a far cry from the revolutionary world that seemed in the offing when the state collapsed in 2006. In the end, the Maoists have discovered they have lost the key element that briefly gave their instrumental terrorism a veneer of rectitude: legitimacy that was able to mobilize dissatisfaction with the flawed oldorder behind a message of hope.

About the Author Dr. Thomas A. Marks is the Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security Int’l.’s and IACSP’s Southeast Asia Correspondent.

An IACSP Q&A With John F. Lehman, Jr.

The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) transits the Pacific Ocean. Nimitz is on a deployment to the western Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Michael D. Cole/Released)

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(Editor’s Note: Dr. Lehman served as Secretary of the Navy from 1981 to 1987 under President Ronald Reagan. He also served 25 years in the naval reserve and flew A-6 Intruder attack aircraft off of aircraft carriers during the Vietnam War. He served as a staff member to Dr. Henry Kissinger on the National Security Council, as a delegate to the Force Reductions Negotiations in Vienna and as Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He also served as a member of the 9/11 Commission and the National Defense Commission. Dr. Lehman holds a B.S. from St. Joseph’s University, a B.A. and M.A. from Cambridge University and a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He is currently an Hon. Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge University. He’s written several books, including “On Seas of Glory, Command of the Seas and Making War.” Dr. Lehman is Chairman of J.F. Lehman & Company, a private equity investment firm. He is also Chairman of the Princess Grace Foundation USA and is a member of the Board of Overseers of the School of Engineering at the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Lehman was interviewed by Paul Davis, a contributing editor to the Journal.) IACSP: I’ve read and enjoyed your books. Like you, I’m from Philadelphia and I’m a Navy veteran, having enlisted at 17 and served on the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk during the Vietnam War. I was later a Defense Department civilian employee when you were Secretary

of the Navy, so I’ve followed your career with some interest over the years. To begin with, can you give us a brief overview of your career? Lehman: My military career started in the Cub Scouts and proceeded through the “Schuylkill Navy,” where I rowed competitively for the Vesper Boat Club for about a dozen years. I went to La Salle College High School in Philadelphia and then I went to St Joseph’s University and Cambridge University, where I did a BA and a MA, and then came back and did a PhD at the University of Pennsylvania. My first job after Univ. of Penn. was working for Henry Kissinger on the National Security Council. I worked for him for eight years and then I ran a consulting firm based in London and Washington for four years. In the meantime I was busy getting my wings in the Navy. I first joined the Air National Guard and transferred to the Navy to go to flight school. I eventual got my Naval Flight Officer wings and then my pilot wings, flying as a reserve augment in A-6s down in Oceana with short TDY tours all over the world as a squadron augment. I went wherever there were shortages of qualified aviators. I spent four three-week tours in Vietnam, three off of Lebanon, and a lot of other places. IACSP: Which aircraft carriers did you fly off of? Lehman: Certainly the Kitty Hawk, and I flew off of the Saratoga, Ranger, Kennedy - those old ladies. IACSP: How did you become the Navy Secretary? Lehman: I was running a consult-

ing firm when President Reagan asked me to be the Secretary of the Navy and rebuild the 600-ship Navy, so I did that for six years. I continued to fly in the reserves when I was the SECNAV. After the Navy I went to Wall Street. I started my own firm 22 years ago, and I’ve been running it ever since. IACSP: Later you became a 9/11 Commission member. Do you think the 9/11 Commission changes have made the country safer? Lehman: Yes, obviously we’re safer. We have gone 13 years without another attack, even though there are by most estimates more than double the number of Jihadists and terrorists. Some of the reforms that we recommended and then helped push through Congress have had real effect. The NYPD Counterterrorist Unit has probably been the most effective of all. We were able to drive through and get modern communications for the first responders. They needed more band widths to be able to jump channels, so they don’t get saturated like the firemen and cops were during 9/11. So a lot was accomplished by the 9/11 Commission. IACSP: What was your central conclusion of why we were attacked? Why did it happen? Lehman: The intelligence community had really throttled way back on HUMIT, human intelligence gathers, and special operations. We urged a rebuilding of the human sources of intelligence and the breaking down of layers of bureaucracy that had become bloated. Fifteen different agencies had intelligence units and they didn’t talk to each other and they were all

“stove piped.” We recommended the creation of a director of national intelligence to cut bureaucracy to break down those stove pipes. There was better intelligence sharing, which we knew would come at a price. When you get an agent like Edward Snowden, he can gain access into one stove pipe and now he can gain access to a lot of other agency’s intelligence. But that’s a price that’s worth paying. All and all, I think we learned the right lessons. One big lesson that hasn’t been learned - certainly not by this administration - is that you can’t treat terrorists as if they are part of the white collar crime world. That’s one of the reasons that 9/11 happened. Because the same group of people - not then called al Qaeda - attacked the World Trade Center in 1993. They treated it as criminal, rather than an intelligence and counterterrorism operation. And so all the evidence that was gathered for the prosecution was sealed. The president wasn’t allowed to see it for five years. The CIA director told me specifically that he was not allowed to see any of that intelligence, which covered the formation of al Qaeda and their intention to attack in America. He wasn’t allowed to see it until after the Blind Sheikh was convicted five years later. Once it is put on Grand Jury Seal no one in the executive branch is allowed to see anything. That lesson was learned and that’s why military tribunals were used, which does not give them access to those Grand Jury Seals. The Blind Sheikh’s attorney, who was later convicted of crimes, was able to demand and got all of the most sensitive intelligence because in the civil or criminal system they have a right to see the evidence. We now know it went directly to

That’s one of the reasons that 9/11 happened. Because the same group of people - not then called al Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center in 1993. They treated it as criminal, rather than an intelligence and counterterrorism operation. And so all the evidence that was gathered for the prosecution was sealed. The president wasn’t allowed to see it for five years.

Osama bin Laden. That’s what happens when you use the criminal legal system to go after terrorists. It is totally unfit for that. The military tribunals are still theoretically being used in Guantanamo, which is why the current president wants to close Guantanamo. He wants to give them their rights and all of that. IACSP: And he wants to send them home as well. Lehman: At least 60 of them have gone back to being terrorists, fighting the U.S. and plotting against us. IACSP: You mentioned the creation of a director of national intelligence. Do you think that idea has worked out well? Lehman: Well, it has accomplished several things we wanted, but President Bush did not agree with us. He was a great friend to bureaucracy and he expanded it enormously while he was president. And that’s

intelligence community plus run the CIA. That’s like running General Motors and General Foods. That’s why we recommended the DNI be created, because the CIA director should not be doing both jobs. So I do not think it has weakened the CIA director as the director of the CIA. But he really didn’t have the power anyway to exert control over the rest of the intelligence community-certainly not the Pentagon. The DNI in theory has that power and it is focuses on the broader issues of sharing intelligence and protecting it. Overall I would say it is 65-35 plus. IACSP: What did you think of the Senate’s CIA enhanced interrogation report? Lehman: I think it is an horrific disservice to the country for crass, political, partisan reasons. It was a last gasp to get publicity by the outgoing Democratic majority and the chairwoman of the committee is no longer the chair. I think it has done terrible damage because a lot of

then they were about the families of the 3,000 that he killed. IACSP: What are your views on the War on Terror across the globe? Lehman: Tactically, I think we are doing much better than we initially did, because we are using the special forces the way they should be used and giving them the resources they need. The drone attacks are about the one thing I can find to say positive about this current administration. We should not be putting large American forces on the ground. Lets step back and look at the bigger picture. We are demonstrating a continuing instinct for the capillaries rather than the jugular. The jugular is the vast flow of oil resources from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar to the Salafists and the Wahhabists, who are openly sympathetic to the Jihadists. They get a very large percentage of the oil revenue directly from their governments. It is not that they are buying weapons or anything like that, but they built these 800 fundamentalist schools and mosques around

IACSP: You mentioned special operations. Did you have much dealings with Navy SEALs when you were the Navy Secretary? Lehman: Yes, I did. I had the privilege of promoting the first Navy SEAL to flag rank, Admiral “Irish” Flynn. President Reagan, Defense Secretary Weinberger and myself, all strongly supported greatly increasing the resources and numbers of the special operations forces in each of the services, not just the SEALs. If you want to find a person who really transformed the support for, focus on, and enabling of special operations, it’s Ronald Reagan. IACSP: What was your highlight as Navy Secretary and low point? Lehman: The highpoint was just overall being able to work for a leader like Ronald Reagan, and be able to lead the transformation and rebuilding of the 600ship Navy. We got to 594 ships. We supported the pay raises and

They get a very large percentage of the oil revenue directly from their governments. It is not that they are buying weapons or anything like that, but they built these 800 fundamentalist schools and mosques around the world, including in the U.S. and throughout Western Europe, as well as Indonesia and Malaysia, and so on. They are teaching a very extremist version of Islam. what he did to the DNI. We had wanted no more than 300 people on the staff - a lean, agile staff and a powerful director. Instead they are up to 2,700 or so, with their own new Pentagon building out at Tyson Corner. So it is much bigger and much more bloated than we had envisioned. IACSP: Do you think the creation of the DNI has weakened the CIA director? Lehman: The span of control for the CIA director was too broad. He was supposed to direct the

what they say is untrue. They didn’t even interview the key people. IACSP: What is your view of the past use of enhanced interrogation, called “torture-light” by one CIA wit? L ehman : From everything I know, it did produce very valuable intelligence, particularly from Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. The committee was much more concerned about the rights of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and whether we were mean to him,

the world, including in the U.S. and throughout Western Europe, as well as Indonesia and Malaysia, and so on. They are teaching a very extremist version of Islam. IACSP: Catching them young. Lehman: Yes, and that’s why Don Rumsfeld said they are producing far faster than we are able to kill or capture them. No administration to my knowledge has ever raised this with the governments that provide this funding to their clerical radicals.

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allowances for the sailors and Marines. That was a constant high. And my low point was leaving. IACSP: Do you hope to return to government service? Lehman: No, I’ll have to wait until my son, John the III, does that. He was a naval aviator and saw three combat tours. IACSP: Thank you for speaking to us and thank you for your service.

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Secure Driver:

Is Perception And Reaction Time Overlooked? By Anthony Ricci

s Perception and Reaction Time an often over looked skill or just one that is taken for granted? This is a skill that cannot be taught in one lesson, but it is a technique and muscle response that can be practiced and understood over time. Many Officers/ road users take these two words or actions at face value. We first hear of these topics in High School Driver’s Ed class: the classroom teacher addresses the importance of “scanning the road - our eyes never stop moving” or “we need to look 12 to 15 seconds down the road and be ready to react” and of course in some PD Academies there may be discussions on time and distance and even some math to show students just how fast things really do happen. Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

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The reason this topic cannot be taught in one lesson is that there are so many underlining factors involved. For example, we tell our students to scan the road but we forget to tell them how to scan, how the eyes and mind work, and what to look for. In some instances, looking at the car down the road may not be enough, but glancing down at the tires may give you a better indication of which way that car is going to start moving. By knowing what to look for, the driver can save time and start to react sooner. As we are approaching the next blind curve or the next car pulling out to cross the intersection, what should we be thinking about? It is one thing to teach a student to see the car well ahead, but to tell the student to begin the information processing technique, from the time they approach the vehicle to the time they get out, takes on a whole new meaning. WE MUST CONSTANTLY PROCESS INFORMATION – SEEING IT, DOES NOTHING BUT IDENTIFING, RECOGNIZING AND REACTING QUICKLY and ACCURATELY, SAVES LIVES. A Law Enforcement Officer must take this process to a much deeper level. He/she has to scan the roads for many things, not just potential accident situations. Perception time: the time it takes for the brain to identify an object as a potential hazard is at best .5 to .75 seconds if the driver is alert and ready to react.

Reaction time: the time it takes your brain to tell your hands and feet to do something, again, it can take .5 to .75 seconds if the driver is in ready mode. While your brain is telling your foot to get to the brake-pedal, time is quickly passing and you are getting much closer to the dreaded contact point. Remember at this point the brakes have not been activated and your vehicle is still traveling at the same speed. Hopefully you will have enough space left to allow the brakes and steering wheel to work. The less space you have, the more skill and luck you will need. Suppose you’ve been called to a break-in where a female caller is hiding in a downstairs closet. Your mind is set on several things: the importance of the situation, saving a life, catching a thief, a potential confrontation of a weapon and maybe more than one suspect, your own well being, oh and I almost forgot, DRIVING TO THE SCENE SAFETY. En route, suppose a car pulls out in front of you 300 feet down the road (football field)? Your PPCV is traveling at 60 MPH with lights and siren. The question is, do you have enough time to stop and/or avoid the vehicle? Since accidents happen in feet not hours, we first have to change MPH to FPS. An Accident Re-constructionist would multiply 1.47 times 60 MPH = 88 FPS which is exact. However, for the sake of this article, let’s make it easy by multiplying 60 by 1.50: (60MPH/2= 30) (30

Not Receiving Our Monthly IACSP ENEWS? Many of our members are not receiving our new monthly CTS Enews (electronic security report) because we either do not have your email, or you are using a .gov or .mil email address for your membership record. If you would like to receive our CTS Enews, please send me an email with the email address you would like us to use. Email addresses like .gmail, or .hotmail, etc. will work if you have a .mil address. Also include your current address. Please send the information to my attention to my personal email address: iacsp1@aol.com Thank you. Steven J. Fustero, Dir. Of Ops/IACSP

+ 60 = 90 FPS). At 60 MPH for every second you travel, you are traveling 90 feet. Using the BEST case scenario, if it takes you .5 second to recognize the car as a potential hazard and another .5 second for your brain to tell your hands and feet to do something, you have just covered 90 feet and are still moving at 60 MPH or 90 FPS. Problem is, before you saw the car, you were looking down at the police radio for only a split second, which put you 90 feet deeper into the accident zone. You now have 120 feet and approx. 1.3 seconds to stop, and this situation just got real serious. If the driver froze on the steering wheel and slammed on the brakes, which is quite common, your vehicle would end up 30 feet through the obstacle. A PPCV should be able to stop from 60 MPH in approx. 140 to 150 feet if using correct braking technique. Since the driver does not control braking distance, the only place to make up time and create more distance is in the perception and reaction process. Driving is mostly a skill of the eyes and mind and trainers need to focus a large amount of time on how and what the officer perceives as dangerous and then reacting quickly and properly to it.

About the Author Anthony Ricci is President of ADSI (http://www.1adsi.com)

URBAN SHIELD

Berkeley PD SWAT team photo, post scenario involving active shooter with Fire and EMS Integration, Fremont Fire Training Academy. Note: Berkeley Police Department placed first in the SWAT Urban Shield - Alameda 2013.

By Bob O’Brien, Jim Weiss, and Mickey Davis

istory September 11, 2001 – we know it simply as 9/11. It was the deadliest terrorist attack in US history and the deadliest attack on American soil in our nation’s 200 plus-year history. It was even deadlier than Pearl Harbor, which launched America into World War II.

September 11, 2001 also launched America into war but it was a very different type. This was a Counter Terror War, with America’s armed forces fighting terrorism on the world front, and America’s Law Enforcement (LE) fighting terrorism on the home front. 9/11 spawned the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the passage of a number of counter-terror laws and measures that included improved nationwide law enforcement preparation, training, and national responses to terrorist attacks.

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Simultaneously, another terror threat was manifesting itself across America–active shooters. While active shooters might not fit the narrow terrorist definition, their actions are certainly terrorism because they have the same terrorizing effect on a larger audience than just their targeted victims. Fast-forward to April 15, 2013 and the annual Boston Marathon. At 2:49 pm EDT, two back-to-back ‘pressure-cooker’ bombs hidden inside unattended backpacks blew up killing three people and injuring an estimated 260+ more. Responses by Boston police, fire, EMS, bystanders, and race participants were instantaneous and heroic. Boston’s emergency resources and plan were immediately implemented. Under the most difficult conditions imaginable, the result was a highly effective, organized response that effectively saved the lives of many of the severely injured. However this terrorist incident was far from over. Quick, diligent investigative work soon identified two suspected terrorists. Three days later, the same two struck again, shooting/murdering a MIT university police officer, carjacking an innocent motorist, and then engaging responding police in a full-scale gun battle and throwing homemade bombs at officers. This resulted in the critical wounding of a MBTA transit police officer, and the death of one of the suspected terrorists. A massive 20-block search and ‘shelter-in-place’ lockdown of Metro Boston by thousands of local, state, and federal law enforcement officers culminated in the apprehension of the remaining suspected terrorist. Many credit Boston’s extraordinary, rapid, organized, effective response to this large-scale terror act to Boston’s counter-terrorism (CT) preparedness, and specifically to the experience and training received from Boston’s earlier Urban Shield Exercises. Where did Boston’s Urban

Shield training experience get its start? It came from the Urban Shield competition in Alameda, California. This was where Boston PD SWAT first observed, then participated in the Urban Shield competition and training. They thought so highly of their Urban Shield experiences that they put together their own Boston version.

What is Urban Shield? Urban Shield is the brainchild of the Alameda County, CA, Sheriff Office (ACSO). ACSO literature describes Urban Shield as a “full-scale regional preparedness exercise, related to multi-discipline planning, policies, procedures, organization, equipment and training.” ACSO plans, organizes and implements the annual Urban Shield exercises under the auspices of DHS (Department of Homeland Security), UASI (Urban Area Security Initiative), FEMA, CalOES (California Office of Emergency Services Agency).

Urban Shield 2013 in the San Francisco Bay Area Day 1 of the 2013 Urban Shield consisted of participants attending regional preparedness training seminars, including firsthand debriefings of the Boston Marathon Bombing/Manhunt and the Newtown Elementary School Massacre. There was also a vendor show that featured the newest technology, much of which was utilized and field-tested throughout the Urban Shield exercise. Also on Day 1, all participating SWAT (eight officers) teams underwent an orientation and thorough briefings (safety, weapons, equipment, rules, exercises overview, etc.). All SWAT teams had medical checks to establish and record their baselines, which were then monitored at four medical checkpoints throughout the 48-hour extremely stressful and physically demanding exercise.

All others involved in Urban Shield (liaisons, evaluators, site personnel, monitors, role players, etc.) were also very thoroughly briefed. The amount of time, effort, planning, preparation, logistics, and manpower that ACSO put into Urban Shield was enormous, almost beyond comprehension. This was a credit to ACSO’s dedicated commitment to making every Urban Shield the valuable, realistic, counter-terror learning tool it has become. The 59 scenario sites were scattered across five Bay Area counties, whose unified commands included an Incident Command System (ICS) and the nine

Urban Shield involved 5,000 participants from both public and private sectors. Thirty-five SWAT teams of eight--regional, state, federal, and international-participated in Urban Shield–Alameda 2013. Other exercise participants included the following: Players: Agency personnel with active responder roles. Incident Command: Oversaw all exercise functions. ICS was based on the NIMS (National Incident Management System), SEMS (Standardized Emergency Management System) Unified Command platforms. Area Commanders: Worked under the Incident Command,

However this terrorist incident was far from over. Quick, diligent investigative work soon identified two suspected terrorists. Three days later, the same two struck again, shooting/murdering a MIT university police officer, carjacking an innocent motorist, and then engaging responding police in a full-scale gun battle and throwing homemade bombs at officers. Area Commands. Communications, travel routes, etc. had been checked and re-checked to ensure adherence to Urban Shield’s tight time schedule. Of the 59 scenarios, 36 were SWAT (30 tactical, two physical confidence/obstacle courses, and four medical checkpoints); five were EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal); and 18 were fire fighter. Each scenario was related to realworld counter terrorism incident responses, especially chosen, planned, and overseen by experienced professionals.

they were responsible for all activities in their geographical areas. Safety Coordinator: Formulated, implemented, enforced safety procedures throughout the 48-hour exercise. Site Captains: Planned, set up, and managed their respective scenario locations. Liaisons: ACSO deputies were assigned to each tactical team. They were responsible for transportation, logistics, safety, and security of their assigned tactical teams. Exercise Evaluators: Evalu-

ated, assessed, and recorded scenarios. Tactical Evaluators: Experienced tactical operators and trainers from throughout the region were responsible for scoring the participating tactical teams. They briefed, oversaw, recorded scores, and debriefed each team with valuable, positive tactical feedback. VIPs/Observers: These preapproved non-participants were allowed to observe selected exercise segments/scenarios. Observers came from all over America

Shield–Alameda 2014 will be held September 5-8, 2014. Lessons learned from the previous six Urban Shields, combined with valuable feedback, input, observations, and recommendations from Urban Shield participants will be thoroughly analyzed and acted upon to help improve the next Urban Shield. Also throughout the year, Urban Shield planners study and dissect real-world national and international terrorist and counter-terrorist events and trends. Doing so ensures each year’s Urban Shield exercise scenarios reflect current, relevant real-world concerns.

police, fire, and other emergency response tactics. With each hoax/ fake bomb, detectives would be tasked with developing clues to discover and track down the “terrorists” before they could hatch their “real bomb” plan. However, the real-world Boston Marathon bombings arrived before the exercise could be held, forcing Urban Shield– Boston 2013 to be canceled and rescheduled. The planned Urban Shield “terrorist bomb” exercise, while not exactly the same as the actual Boston Marathon bombings, very closely resembled elements of the real-world bomb-

is terrorism. It requires effective highly-trained, skilled, experienced, professional counter-terror strategic and tactical response spearheaded by Spec Ops and/ or SWAT. Such counter-terrorism responses do not happen by accident. Instead, they are the result of years of counter-terrorism study, research, planning, training, and real-world experience by dedicated, professional CT practitioners, and command who understand how, where, when best to employ these CT assets. This is precisely why Urban Shield–whether Alameda, CA;

A Boston Globe June 8, 2013 article by Maria Cramer, “Police Response Training Planned, but Bombs Hit First” is relevant reading. According to the article, long before the Boston Marathon Terrorist bombings, Boston Police had developed a spookily prophetic Urban Shield exercise: “Terrorists” placing a series of “bombs’ in backpacks in select target locations in Boston and surrounding suburbs. and also from foreign nations, often from command and tactical elements, and also from selected media. Public Information Officer: Ensured distribution of key information to the news media. Support Staff: Performed logistical and support duties in all aspects of the Urban Shield exercise. Role Players: Volunteer exercise participants who acted in specific roles, such as victims or bystanders. Immediately following the Urban Shield exercise, an afteraction report was conducted, and ACSO began planning and preparing for the next year’s Urban Shield exercise. Urban

Urban Shield and the Boston Marathon Bombing A Boston Globe June 8, 2013 article by Maria Cramer, “Police Response Training Planned, but Bombs Hit First” is relevant reading. According to the article, long before the Boston Marathon Terrorist bombings, Boston Police had developed a spookily prophetic Urban Shield exercise: “Terrorists” placing a series of “bombs’ in backpacks in select target locations in Boston and surrounding suburbs. In the exercise, the “terrorists” would at first place fake, hoax bombs, and then watch from hidden vantage points to learn

ings and ensuing manhunt. This is precisely the goal of Urban Shield–to predict, prepare, plan, and train for real-world terrorist and counter-terrorist events. Prior to the late 1960s there was no such thing as SWAT, and prior to the 1970s there was no such thing as counter-terrorism. Terrorists employing urban guerilla warfare strategies and tactics caused law enforcement and military to develop and task SWAT and Spec Ops into counterterrorism roles, domestic and international. Make no mistake about it– whether it’s Mumbai, Benghazi, Munich Olympics, or Boston, Oklahoma City, SLA (Symbionese Liberation Army) –terrorism

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Boston, MA; North Central; or Austin, TX–is the ultimate, best (non-military Spec Ops) counterterrorism training and preparedness (spearheaded by SWAT) anywhere. Period. Urban Shield–Alameda is generating much interest and imitation from a growing number of U.S. cities. The reason is simple: It is the gold standard for preparing, planning, training for, and responding to counter-terrorist incidents occurring in America.

Outside the Urban Shield 2013 HQ ACSO was fully prepared to effectively counter any problems with alternate, backup, contin-

Traversing the water obstacle during the Team Confidence/Obstacle Course at Cull Canyon East Bay Regional Park.

U.S. Secret Service Dignitary Protection against a terrorist attack with mass casualties. This scenario took place at the Castro Valley High School Football Stadium.

Officer down rescue during the Bay Bridge terrorist attack/SWAT firefight on the old San FranciscoOakland Bay Bridge.

Weapons safety inspection checkpoint before beginning the barricaded terrorist scenario at Oakland Children’s Hospital.

SWAT Rear Guard at the barricaded terrorist scenario, Oakland Children’s Hospital.

gency plans, and preparation. This ensured that the exercise was run smoothly and accomplished its mission and goals. For example, the Bay Area is notorious for protests and demonstrations, often involving anarchists, militants, and radicals. Many of these protests have turned violent, with rampaging mobs as they riot, vandalize buildings and vehicles, and confront and assault police. These protests generally require massive, multi-agency law enforcement response. The first day of Urban Shield– Alameda 2013 happened to coincide with the second anniversary of Occupy Oakland, bringing protestors and demonstrators to the front of the HQ hotel in downtown Oakland. ACSO and Oakland Police were fully prepared, which was evidenced by the large contingent of riot-ready ACSO deputies ringing the HQ hotel the entire day. Protesters, dissuaded by the heavy, professional ACSO presence, went to their “Plan B”–a “Pig Roast” at a nearby city plaza/park–where Oakland PD took over monitoring to ensure it remained peaceful.

A Look at a Few Scenarios The following select SWAT scenarios illustrate how much time, effort, planning, preparation went into making Urban Shield the realistic, challenging, demanding test of SWAT skills, tactics, teamwork and leadership it truly was. Scenarios were located in realworld settings–urban, suburban, and rural. They included airports and aircraft, rail/light rail stations, trains, buses, regional parks, hospitals, LE/Fire training facilities and ranges, schools, bridges, ports and marinas, high-rise buildings, and more. (Old) SF/Oakland Bay Bridge – Terrorist Attack. Conducted by ACSO/CA Dept. of Transportation. Patrol responds to terror attack (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices and automatic weapons). SWAT tasked with engaging/neutralizing the terrorists and rescuing the downed officers. Castro Valley HS Football Stadium – Dignitary Protection

Terrorist Attack. Conducted by U.S. Secret Service. Terrorists attack dignitary speech (IED’s, automatic weapons). Multiple casualties. SWAT tasked with engaging/neutralizing the terrorists, assisting USSS with evacuating the dignitary, protecting EMS treating/evacuating casualties. Oakland International Airport – Terrorist Attack Aircraft Interdiction. Conducted by ACSO. Terrorists aircraft hostage taking (IED’s, automatic weapons). SWAT tasked with employing Armored Rescue Vehicle (ARV), engaging/neutralizing terrorists, rescuing hostages. Palomares Elementary School – Elementary School Active Shooter Terrorist Attack. Conducted by ACSO. SWAT tasked with locating, engaging, neutralizing terrorists, while providing force protection for responding EMS, treating casualties. Federal Air Marshall Facility – Passenger Jet Aircraft Terrorist Attack. Conducted by Federal Air Marshalls (FAMs). SWAT tasked rescuing hostages, locating, engaging, and neutralizing the terrorists on a full-scale passenger jet compartment simulator.

The Benefits of Urban Shield Tasked with such a wide array of real-world scenarios and settings, SWAT teams and participants crammed more realistic counter-terrorism training into 48 hours than they likely do in a year or more. In addition to the scenarios, SWAT gained valuable feedback from the experienced, knowledgeable SWAT practitioners who conducted and debriefed each tactical exercise. Conversely, the SWAT practitioners and the agencies conducting and debriefing the scenarios also learned from watching 35 SWAT teams as they employed different, and often innovative, successful tactics and techniques to accomplish the counter-terrorism missions. Fire/EMS/EOD/K-9 and public/private sectors benefited greatly from having the unique oppor-

tunity to integrate, participate, and work together with LE/SWAT in a wide variety of realistic terrorist incidents, making them far better prepared if/when there’s another real-world event in their cities. Alameda County Sheriff’s Office and Bay Area regional law enforcement agencies and departments benefited by learning from everyone (all 5,000) involved in helping to make Urban Shield the resounding success and gold standard of realistic counter-terrorism training it has been for six years. But perhaps the most important thing about Urban Shield was a win-win-win for everyone, not only the participants but more importantly for the communities they serve. Just as terrorism is here to stay, so is counter terrorism. The terrorists continue to plot their next terror strike. Just as they never “rest on their laurels,” neither can we. The counter-terror community needs to be even more vigilant and prepared for the next time.

About the Authors Lieut. Jim Weiss (Retired) is a former Army light infantryman, school-trained Army combat engineer, a former schooltrained (regular Army) Army military policeman, former State of Florida Investigator, and a retired police lieutenant from the Brook Park (OH) Police Department. He has written and co-written hundreds of articles for law enforcement and safety forces magazines, most notably Law and Order, Tactical Response, The Florida Trooper, Knives Illustrated, Counter Terrorism, Tactical Edge, and Tactical World. Mickey (Michele) Davis is an awardwinning, California-based writer and author. Her young adult novel, Evangeline Brown and the Cadillac Motel, won the Swiss Prix Chronos for the German translation. Mickey is the wife of a Vietnam War veteran officer and a fire department senior volunteer. Bob O’Brien is a retired Cleveland, Ohio Police Department SWAT Sergeant. CoFounder, long time Team Leader of the Cleveland Police SWAT Unit. Involved in thousands of critical and high-risk SWAT incidents and situations. Authored, co-authored a number of SWAT and police related articles for various law enforcement publications. Army Vietnam War veteran. Currently resides in California.

An IACSP Perspective

A Look Back At The History Of The U.S. Navy SEALs: The Clandestine Warriors Who Are The Tip of the Spear In the War On Terror By Paul Davis

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“D

This past November 11th, on Veterans Day, PBS aired a TV special called Navy SEALs - Their Untold Story.

espite the widespread attention paid to the Navy SEALs (Sea, Air and Land) since they killed Osama bin Laden, the story of how these clandestine warriors evolved in response to changing threats - from WWII to the War on Terror - and how their extraordinary abilities shaped U.S. and world history, has remained untold,” PBS said in announcing the TV special. “Few people know the unheralded tales of the first frogmen who dared to face almost certain death with little training, scant equipment and untested tactics.” PBS went on to state that the

documentary, narrated by actor Gary Sinise, “recounts the ticking-clock missions of the “Commandos of the Deep” through firsthand accounts - including that of a D-Day demolition team member - and through never-before-seen footage, home movies and personal mementoes. Admirals, master chiefs, clandestine operators, demolitioneers and snipers all reveal how the U.S. Navy morphed into the SEALs.” “The SEALs’ history has never truly been told before,” said documentary film maker Carol L. Fleisher, the producer of the PBS special. “This is the first time that Naval Special Warfare has assisted with the research of

a documentary about the Teams and their forefathers.” Dick Couch, a former Navy SEAL, Vietnam veteran and author of several nonfiction books about the SEALs, as well as several thrillers that feature SEALs, served as a consultant on the PBS series and coauthored the companion book, also called Navy SEALs: Their Untold Story. Couch said that there were a good number of facts unknown to him prior to his involvement in the TV special and the book. “In several of my books I’ve gone into a brief history of the Navy SEALs, UDT, and all that type of thing, but very

superficially” Couch said. “So it was very interesting for me to learn in depth about some of the characters who had come before me and some of them who came after me, and what they did and how they did it.”

Couch said he came away with not only a better understanding, but also a bit more admiration for the SEALs. “These guys are tremendous innovators,” Couch said. “From the early days, right up until the present. Flexibility and ingenuity are things that have driven the organization and still drive the organization.” William Doyle, the co-producer of the PBS special and co-author of the companion book, said that like many other people, he became fascinated with the Navy SEALs in the wake of the bin Laden raid. “As a writer, I was also intrigued to discover that there was no complete account of their history from World War II through today in book form and that many of their greatest stories had not been fully told,” Doyle said. “I wrote the book so I could learn their history by interviewing the SEALs themselves. I had a feeling that these stories would make for thrilling reading.” Doyle said that the SEALs have a reputation as near-supermen, but he wanted to learn about their difficulties and failures in order to get a deeper understanding of who they are as human beings. “Carol Fleisher is a gifted, highly respected filmmaker with a passion for great non-fiction storytelling, and wonderful to work with. The SEALs we interviewed loved talking to her, too. One of them told me, “You tell that woman I’m putting her in my will,” Doyle said. Doyle noted that they had two critical sources. One was their original interviews with more than 100 SEALs and Naval Combat Demolition Unit (NCDU) and Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) members (their WW2 and Korea predecessors). The second critical source was thousands of pages of declassified files made available to the producers by the Naval Special Warfare Command.

“One of the most startling pieces of information we uncovered was the fact that in the first year of their existence, a team of SEALs was secretly transferred to the CIA, stationed in Florida, and tasked with training teams of Cuban frogmen and saboteurs to attack targets in Cuba, as part of the Kennedy administration’s antiCastro Operation Mongoose program and related operations,” Doyle said. “We tell the story in our book for the first time of how one of those SEALs accompanied the Cubans on an operation that blew up Soviet missilepatrol-boats in the harbor at the Isle of Pines, Cuba.”

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

“We also consulted the work of other authors, journalists and historians,” Doyle said. “We interviewed an NCDU demolitioneer who was one of the first men on Omaha Beach on D-Day; a UDT member who conducted a hair-raising, mine recovery operation off the waters of North Korea; a SEAL who was loaned to the CIA for a secret attack on Cuba in 1962; the first commander of SEAL Team One; two Vietnam Medal of Honor winners; and SEAL combat veterans of Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of these stories were never told before.” “One of the most startling pieces of information we uncovered was the fact that in the first year of their existence, a team of SEALs was secretly transferred to the CIA, stationed in Florida, and tasked with training teams of Cuban frogmen and saboteurs to attack targets in Cuba, as part of the Kennedy administration’s anti-Castro Operation Mongoose program and related operations,” Doyle said. “We tell the story in our book for the first time of how one of those SEALs accompanied the Cubans on an operation that blew up Soviet missile-patrol-boats in the harbor at the Isle of Pines, Cuba.” Doyle said that one of his favorite moments in the book recalled the day in 2010 when Admiral William McRaven, the SEAL who oversaw the bin Laden raid, appeared at the door of an Afghan farmer whose sons were among five civilians accidentally killed during a raid by his men. “Sir, you and I are very different,” Doyle recounts Admiral McRaven saying to the farmer. “You are a family man with many children and many friends. I am a soldier. I have spent most of my career overseas away from my family. But I have children as well, and my heart grieves for you. But we have one thing in common. We have the same God. He is a God who shows great love and compassion. I pray today that He will show mercy on me and my men for this awful tragedy.” “Politicians love to talk about “American exceptionalism,” but when I see it in action, I feel especially proud to be an American,” Doyle said. Doyle said that most SEALs rarely talk to outsiders about their operations, so they first contacted the U.S. Navy’s Special Warfare Command and asked for their help

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and asked if the command would give the project a security review. Once they had the help of the command, they were able to talk to a good number of SEALs.

“They just came of age, got funded and staffed and commissioned as entities and Vietnam was standing right there in front of them,” Couch said. Doyle said their book was also reviewed Couch said that the SEALs trained the and cleared by the Pentagon and the CIA, South Vietnamese SEALs and also paradding that although there is nothing classi- ticipated in the Provincial Reconnaissance fied in the book, there is much history that Units (PRU) program. This was a CIAwill be new to a great many readers. sponsored program and the intelligence agency used Marine Recon, Army Special “Dick Couch was a critical piece of our be- Forces and SEAL advisors. ing able to tell the story,” Doyle said. “He is a former SEAL with Vietnam combat “This was probably the most effective unit experience, and one of the most respected of all special operations deployed during writers on the history of American special that conflict,” Couch said. “Declassified operations. His name opened a lot of doors North Vietnamese documents show that for us in the SEAL community, and he had a the PRUs were hurting them bad. The guys big hand in the actual writing of the book.” who lived with those PRUs and went out and fought with them--they were a special Couch spoke of the SEALs’ forbearers, the bred of fellas.” Underwater Demolition Teams. Couch also spoke of the SEALs’ involve“There was a need for reconnaissance before ment in the Grenada and Panama conflicts. we put people ashore in WWII,” Couch ex- plained. “This really came into focus during “These things would come up and would the battle for Tarawa, where we started this have to planned and executed very quickly,” long march across the Pacific island-hopping Couch said. “Both Grenada and Panama, campaign. We suffered horrible casualties at and certainly the failed Iranian hostage resTarawa because we lacked knowledge of the cue mission, surfaced the need that we must hydrographic conditions off shore and of the have an on-call, standing, responsive and obstacles placed on the beach by the enemy. effective small unit capability that on very We quickly needed guys who could go ashore short notice can go places and do things.” and find out what was there and at some future point, before the Marines went ashore, go back Couch also said that the unit also had to be in ahead of them and blow up those obstacles. integrated with their support components That is where the UDTs came into being and and communications. they ran in front of almost every major am- phibious operation across the Pacific.” “So when the U.S. Special Operations Command was commissioned in 1986, it Couch said that the UDT in the Korean essentially became a 5th service,” Couch War were tasked with going ashore and said. “You had the Army, Navy, Marine conducting raids along the coast, placing Corp and Air Force, and then you had the demolitions and destroying rail lines and Special Operations Command.” other targets. “They cut their teeth on some of these “Except for the landings at Inchon and missions. They were not the well-oiled, disabling Soviet mines, the UDT function smooth-functioning organizations that was small,’ Couch said. “But it was the first served in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Grenada time the UDT came out of the water, crossed they had some great difficulties and there the beach, and undertook inland targets as were some very expensive lessons learned part of their mission.” in these small, but vicious confrontations.” Couch said that early in the Vietnam War it In Couch’s opinion, the well-publicized reswas determined that there was a need for an cue operation of Captain Philips from Somali unconventional warfare and counterinsur- pirates, was relatively easy for the SEALs. gency capability. So in 1962 the SEALs came into being with SEAL One on the West Coast “The whole thing was getting to the job site. and SEAL Two on the East Coast. You had guys that quickly went half way

120721-N-OX912-110 VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. (July 21, 2012) Navy SEALs demonstrate the Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction (SPIE) rig during a capabilities exercise at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story during the 43rd annual Underwater Demolition Team (UDT)-Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) East Coast Reunion. The annual reunion started in 1969 and has expanded into a weekend of events, contests, and a SEAL capabilities exercise. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Anthony Harding/Released)

around the world, parachuted into the ocean, got in their boats and drove over to the U.S. Navy ship. They went aboard, got set up, and did what had to be done.” “And there was a tight time frame on this,” Couch added. “I admire the commanding officer of the destroyer the SEALs

way into a foreign country, but the takedown of the compound was rather routine for this quality organization.” When asked about the two former SEALs who have spoken out about the bin Laden raid, Couch said there were two issues on the table. “One is the legal issue, and I think they may have stepped over their legal bounds,” Couch

money. To cash in on this while their brothers are still overseas in combat rotation fighting, is to me, very disappointing.” Couch noted that SEALs execute basic infantry tactics to a very refined level. They are not supermen, he said, and they are not super athletes. “The SEALs have been afforded a tremendous amount of training and they have the

to a Vietnam-era SEAL commander named Maynard Weyers, who led an operation during which the first SEAL died in the Vietnam War, a man named Billy Machen,” Doyle said. “In our film, there is a moment when Maynard tears up and is visibly emotional at the memory of Mr. Machen, and I was very concerned that he didn’t object to the way we handled it. After the film, I asked Maynard what he

“I was at a screening of the film at PBS headquarters in Washington, DC, sitting next to a Vietnam-era SEAL commander named Maynard Weyers, who led an operation during which the first SEAL died in the Vietnam War, a man named Billy Machen,” Doyle said. “In our film, there is a moment when Maynard tears up and is visibly emotional at the memory of Mr. Machen, and I was very concerned that he didn’t object to the way we handled it. After the film, I asked Maynard what he thought. He smiled, gave me a thumbs up, and said, “you got it exactly right.” “That made me feel good.” were on, because it was on his authority that the SEALs pulled the trigger on the pirates. It was a gutsy decision.” Regarding the most famous SEAL action - the bin Laden operation - Couch said that the raid was one of about seven special operations that took place that night. “The bin Laden operation was only special in the target, and that made it very special,” Couch said. “They went a long

said. “But the second is the moral issue, and that’s where they really violated their moral obligation to their teammates. What they did on that operation, or on any operation, is team-centric. The analysts, intelligence collectors, aviation support, and combat support all go into getting the SEALs on target. Then there is the teamwork on target.” “In my opinion it is unconscionable that they should step out for what I see as vanity and

best equipment in the world. They say amateurs do things over and over until they get it right, and professionals, like these SEALs, do things over and over until they just can’t get it wrong.” Doyle said the most gratifying response they received after the airing of the special was from the SEALs themselves. “I was at a screening of the film at PBS headquarters in Washington, DC, sitting next

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thought. He smiled, gave me a thumbs up, and said, “you got it exactly right.” “That made me feel good.” The PBS special can be viewed at www.pbs.org.

About the Author Paul Davis, a Navy veteran who served on an aircraft carrier during the Vietnam War, is a contributing editor to this Journal. His late father, Edward M. Davis, was a UDT frogman in WWII.

IACSP Reader’s Lounge

By Dr. Joshua Sinai

Global Security Consulting: How to Build a Thriving International Practice By Luke Bencie, Mountain Lake Park, MD: Mountain Lake Press, 2014. 280 pages, $29.95 [Hardcover].

his is a comprehensive “how-to” guide for establishing a successful security consulting business from the ground up – everything from procuring business cards and office supplies to landing clients and even conducting sensitive business dealings overseas. As described by Michael J. Sulick in his foreword, “The topics represent not a mere checklist of requirements for the fledgling global security consultant. They include practical do’s and don’ts often drawn from Luke’s own business encounters, both good and bad, and they provide insights into all of the areas a budding security consultant will encounter.”

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To accomplish these objectives, the book is divided into two parts. In Part I, the chapters explain what is a security consultant (which Webster’s Dictionary defines as “one who gives professional advice or service,” with security defined as “measures taken to guard against espionage or sabotage, crime, attack or escape”). Mr. Bencie then discusses the types of global security consulting one needs to consider, beginning with niches in security consultancy (e.g., physical security, information technology security, investigations, risk management and due diligence, training, emergency preparedness and crisis-response training, executive protection, security products, and general security consulting). The author then considers how to go about establishing the consultancy, for instance, by getting started by incorporating the business, maintaining financial control, the characteristics of effective company leadership (including formulating benchmarks for business success), management and processes (including knowing how to hire the right kind of employees and entering into profitable partnerships with others), marketing and advertising (including acquiring for one’s proprietary methodologies trademarks, copyrights, and licensing), building a website that will have wide appeal, and the ten commandments for success (e.g., knowing ones strengths and weaknesses, charging what “one is worth,” getting payment for services “up front,” understanding that “cash flow is king,” understanding one’s business “territory,” asking potential clients the “right questions” before beginning a project, working with subcontractors one trusts, asking for referrals for additional work, documenting and measuring everything in case of audits, and, above all, “never stop improving”). Several

other “commandments” are proposed, as well, including the important one of finding a mentor, who is “someone who’s been there” and is in a position to offer professional guidance to help grow the business. Prospective security consultants will benefit from the author’s numerous professional insights, which are based on his extensive experience as founder and managing director of Security Management International (SMI), a global security consulting and intelligence advisory service provider [and, to his credit, per his advice for prospective security consultants to be active in their professional communities, also a long-standing contributor and advertiser in this magazine]. These include advice such as “You obtain financial results by exploiting the problems your clients bring to you, not by solving their problems.” While such a statement might be criticized as overly opportunistic, Mr. Bencie explains that “real value means asking the question: What is it worth to my clients to make their headaches go away quickly? That should be your key methodology as a global consultant, not your trademarked theory on ‘assessing Political risk in African during Unfair Elections,’ or your ‘10-Step Process to Ensure Perimeter Security’”, – because, as Mr. Bencie points out, “let’s face it, nobody will be saying, ‘Get me a consultant who specializes in the geopolitical security theory of Africa!’ or ‘Quick, I need a process to ensure that the perimeter around my house is safe!’” Thus, the objective of a successful security consultant should be to become “the subject-matter expert, to help them determine what they really need,” so that you, in effect, “become the topof-mind consultant, the one who will bring fast-acting relief.”

In Part II, “Growing Your Business,” the chapters cover topics such as marketing (including in the ever expanding Internet’s social media), responding to requests for proposals (RFPs) (especially in understanding the extent of one’s proprietary approach to reveal in such proposals), doing business with foreigners who might engage in different “business mindsets,” the “do’s and don’ts” of global travel (such as knowing as what to pack for a trip, and, especially in this age of corporate espionage, knowing how to maintain personal security), and best practices in delivering products to clients, including knowing how to deal with “difficult clients.” This fascinating and well-written guide is highly recommended not only for those considering establishing a new security consulting business, but also for those already in the business who will benefit from its numerous insights on best practices for growing enterprises in the security consulting marketplace.

About the Reviewr Dr. Joshua Sinai is Director of Analytics & Business Intelligence at Resilient Corporation (www.resilient.com), in Alexandria, VA. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

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