The IACSP’s Counter-Terrorism Journal V21N4

Strong Encryption For Everyone Is A National Security Advantage

The Enemy Within Terrorism As A Multidimensional Phenomenon New Trends In The Terrorist Threats Against The Business Sector Q&A With Ray Kelly: Former N.Y. City Police Commissioner Terrorism Bookshelf

Winter Issue Vol. 21 No. 4 2016 Printed in the U.S.A. IACSP.COM

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 21, No.4

I N T E R N A T I O N A L

SWAT Operations and Critical Incidents: Why People Die is the textbook at all OpTac International SWAT and Critical Incident Management Programs.

Copies can be purchased for $29.95 by calling 443.61.OPTAC(67822) and at ďŹ ner bookstores.

For further information on OpTac International publications, programs, and services please visit: www.optacinternational.com or email your request to: info@optacinternational.com.

Vol. 21, No. 4 Winter 2016 IACSP Director of Operations Steven J. Fustero

Page 30

Associate Publisher Phil Friedman

Terrorism As A Multidimensional Phenomenon,

Senior Editor Nancy Perry Contributing Editors Paul Davis Thomas B. Hunter Joshua Sinai

By Jonathan Appel, Ph.D, and Dohee Kim- Appel, Ph.D.

Book Review Editor Jack Plaxe Research Director Gerry Keenan Conference Director John Dew

Page 16

Communications Director Craig O. Thompson

The Enemy Within: Violent Extremism In The U.S.,

Art Director Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Psychological CT Advisors Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC

By Jerome Kahan

Counterintelligence Advisor Stanley I. White South America Advisor Edward J. Maggio Homeland Security Advisor Col. David Gavigan

Page 6 SITREP, Terrorism Trends & Forecasts 2016

Personal Security Advisor Thomas J. Patire

Page 8 Strong Encryption For Everyone, By David Gewirtz Page 12 U.S. Justice Department’s National Security Division, By Paul Davis

Emergency Management Advisor Clark L. Staten Director of Emergency Ops. Don L. Rondeau

Page 16 The Enemy Within: Violent Extremism In The U.S., By Jerome Kahan

Tactical Advisor Robert Taubert

Page 22 New Trends In The Terrorist Threats Against The Business Sector,

Hazmat Advisor Bob Jaffin

By Dr. Joshua Sinai

Security Driver Advisor Anthony Ricci, ADSI Cyberwarfare Advisor David Gewirtz

Page 30 Terrorism As A Multidimensional Phenomenon,

By Jonathan Appel, Ph.D, and Dohee Kim- Appel, Ph.D.

Page 36 Secure Driver: Is Perception And Reaction Time Overlooked,

By Anthony Ricci

Page 38 An IACSP Q&A With Former N.Y. City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly,

By Paul Davis

Cell Phone Forensics Advisor Dr. Eamon P. Doherty IACSP Advisory Board John M. Peterson III John Dew Thomas Patire Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Robert E. Thorn Southeast Asia Correspondent Dr. Thomas A. Marks European Correspondent Elisabeth Peruci

Page 44 IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf: Reviews by Dr. Joshua Sinai

Middle East Correspondent Ali Koknar National Sales Representative Phil Friedman, Advertising Director Tel: 201-224-0588, Fax: 202-315-3459 iacsp@aol.com Tactical Sales Representative Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Tel: 757-721-2774, scott@mad4art.com

THE JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L is published by SecureWorldnet, Ltd., PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (ISSN#1552-5155) in cooperation with the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals and Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Copyright © 2016. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher.

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (571) 216-8205, FAX: (202) 315-3459 .

Membership $65/year, add $10 for overseas memberships. Postmaster: send address changes to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA. Web site: www.iacsp.com

PHOTO CREDITS: Reuters, DefenseImagery.mil Army.mil, Navy.mil, istockphoto.com, shutterstock.com and authors where applicable.

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Vol. 21, No.4

SITREP

T

Terrorism Trends he last quarter of 2015 saw an intensification of Yemen’s war, amid heightened regional rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran complicating prospects for peace.

Political tensions increased in Haiti, Guinea-Bissau and Moldova, where protests over endemic corruption and a lack of confidence in the government could escalate. In Africa, Boko Haram’s deadly attacks increased in northern Cameroon, and Burkina Faso was hit by an unprecedented terror attack. On the nuclear front, in East Asia, North Korea’s announcement that it had carried out a successful hydrogen bomb test was roundly condemned, while nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were rolled back in accordance with the July 2015 deal.

In Yemen, violence increased as the Saudibacked coalition intensified its air campaign, mostly targeting the capital city Sanaa, in response to cross-border incursions and rocket attacks by the Huthi/Saleh bloc. The Huthis continued to carry out a dev-

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astating siege of the southern city of Taiz, where both sides routinely use heavy weapons in civilian areas Lawlessness and the expansion of jihadist groups continued to plague the south, particularly Aden, where ten people were killed in a car bomb outside the security chief’s home on 17 January and eleven in a suicide bombing

outside the presidential palace on 28 January.

Elsewhere political tensions heightened. Moldova’s capital Chisinau was rocked by protests over corruption and demands for early elections, highlighting severe discontent which could worsen if protesters’ demands are not met. Haiti’s presidential run-

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off election, originally planned for 24 January, was postponed for the second time amid growing concern over a series of violent protests by opposition supporters, and disagreement over the validity of last year’s legislative and presidential polls.

In Guinea-Bissau, the struggle within the ruling party (PAIGC)

between the dominant faction led by former Prime Minister Pereira and the coalition around President Vaz worsened, almost causing an institutional crisis.

Elsewhere in West Africa, deadly Boko Haram attacks intensified in northern Cameroon, with 25 separate attacks, which left at least 88 killed and some 100 injured. In Burkina Faso, 30 civilians, most of them foreigners, were killed in an unprecedented terrorist attack on 15 January claimed jointly by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Mourabitoun, an AQIM splinter group. In the north, jihadi groups are also suspected to have attacked gendarmes near the border with Mali and kidnapped an Australian couple.

2016 TRENDS Deteriorating Situations Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Korean Peninsula, Yemen, Somalia Improving Situations Iran Conflict Risk Alert Moldova Source: http://www.crisisgroup. org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch.aspx

NCTC’s Counterterrorism Calendar 2016 Now Available NCTC’s Counterterrorism Calendar provides information on known terrorist groups, individual terrorists, and technical information on topics such as biological and chemical threats.

This edition, like others since the Calendar was first published in daily planner format in 2003, contains many features across the full range of issues pertaining to international terrorism: terrorist groups, wanted terrorists, and technical pages on various threatrelated topics. The Calendar also marks dates that terrorists may believe are important if planning attacks to commemorate particular events.

To download the calendar, please visit: http://www.nctc. gov/site/pdfs/ct_calendar.pdf

2016 Information Security Predictions No bones about it, 2016 is sure to see some spectacular, newschomping data breaches, predicts many in infosec. If you thought 2015 was interesting, get your seatbelt and helmet on and prepare for lift off…

• Wearable Devices: Cyber crooks don’t care what kind of data is in that little device strapped around your upper arm while you exercise, but they’ll want to target it as a passageway to your smartphone.

Think of wearables as conduits to your personal life.

• Firmware/Hardware: No doubt, assaults on firmware and hardware are sure to happen.

• Ransomware: Not only will this kind of attack continue, but an offshoot of it—“I will infect someone’s device with ransomware for you for a reasonable price”—will likely expand.

• The Cloud: Let’s not forget about cloud services, which are protected by security structures that cyber thieves will want to attack. The result could mean wide-scale disruption for a business.

• The Weak Links: A company’s weakest links are often their employees when it comes to cybersecurity. Companies will try harder than ever to put in place the best security sys-

tems and hire the best security personnel in their never-ending quest for fending off attacks— but the weak links will remain, and cyber crooks know this.

You can bet that many attacks will be driven towards employees’ home systems as portals to the company’s network.

• Linked Stolen Data: The black market for stolen data will be even more inviting to crooks because the data will be in sets linked together.

• Cars, et al: Let’s hope that 2016 (or any year, actually) won’t be the year that a cyber punk deliberately crashes an Internet connected van carrying a junior high school’s soccer team. Security experts, working with automakers, will crack down on protection strategies to keep cyber attacks at bay.

• Threat Intelligence Sharing: Businesses and security vendors will do more sharing of threat intelligence. In time, it may be feasible for the government to get involved with sharing this intelligence. Best practices will need hardcore revisions.

• Transaction Interception: It’s possible: Your paycheck, that’s been directly deposited into your bank for years, suddenly starts getting deposited into a different account—that belonging to a cyber thief.

Snatching control of a transaction (“integrity attack”) means that the thief will be able to steal your money or a big business’s money.

Source: http://robertsiciliano. com/blog/2016/02/02/2016-information-security-predictions/ Author: Robert Siciliano is an identity theft expert to TheBestCompanys.com discussing identity theft prevention.

Released: 2016 National Seasonal Preparedness Messaging Calendar The Ready Campaign has just released their 2015_Ready_Seasonal_Calendar. This PDF document outlines intended strategic messaging month by month with links to resources that can be used

for employee and family training and awareness.

For a copy, please visit: http:// www.ready.gov/calendar

FBI Releases Preliminary Semiannual Crime Statistics for 2015 Statistics released today in the FBI’s Preliminary Semiannual Uniform Crime Report revealed overall declines in the number of property crimes reported and overall increases in the number of violent crimes reported for the first six months of 2015 when compared with figures for the first six months of 2014. The report is based on information from 12,879 law enforcement agencies that submitted three to six months of comparable data to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program for the first six months of 2014 and 2015. Source: www.fbi.gov

IACSP News Many of our members are not receiving our new monthly CTS Enews (electronic security report) because we either do not have your email address, or you are using a .gov or .mil email address for your membership record. If you would like to receive our CTS Enews, please send me an email with the email address you would like us to use. Also include your current address. Please send the information to my attention to my personal email address: iacsp1@aol.com In the meantime, happy 2016! And, as always, be vigilant and safe.

Thank you.

Steven J. Fustero, Dir. Of Operations/ IACSP

Strong Encryption For Everyone Is A National Security Advantage

By David Gewirtz

I

n the wake of recent terrorist attacks, citizens and those responsible for protecting them are asking the same questions. How could the attacks have happened? What else could we have done to prevent them? What should we have known that we didn’t know?

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Many of those questions eventually lead to the subject of intelligence gathering. If only we knew ahead of time what the terrorists were planning, perhaps we could have stopped them. If only we knew who to suspect, perhaps we could have looked into them -- and then stopped them.

If only we knew ...

If only we could listen in on their conversations, read their e-mail, sift through their social network conversations. If only we could get ahead of the attack, if only we knew what they were saying, then we could have taken action.

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Gathering that information is a formidable challenge that ranges from the policy and privacy concerns of citizens to technological issues. In this article, we’re going to ignore the very complicated and important privacy and policy issues and go straight to the technical problem: how can we know?

The key premise here is that there is an ongoing stream of data being transferred and if we could somehow tap into that stream, read it all, and take intelligent action based on the incredibly tiny fraction of the data, that’s meaningful from a counterterrorism perspective, we might prevent another attack.

Most of the issues of tapping into the various streams are solvable from a partnership or legal perspective. Agencies work with some private companies -- often as a result of a court order -- to tap into some information flow and derive some targeting value.

Again, for the purpose of this article, let’s assume that works well enough. Let’s again delve further down, into a technical issue: encrypted communication.

Because once we have the policy and judicial approval to tap into digital communication, and once we have the ability to get a data stream from the vendors (or from, uh, “other” sources), if the messages themselves are encrypted, we still have to be able to decrypt them to read them.

Given that it’s relatively obvious to terrorists and criminals that law enforcement and national security organizations will be attempting to read their messages, it’s not a big jump for them to decide to use strong crypto to protect their communications from prying eyes.

That brings us to our current challenge: bad guys are encrypting their messages and

if we could decrypt them, we could read them -- and possibly prevent another attack.

An obvious -- but dangerously incorrect answer -would be to make sure that government and law enforcement can crack any encryption the bad guys might use, usually through the use of “back door” vulnerabilities built right into the encryption technology.

This is an approach being actively advocated by legislators and national law enforcement officials, particularly when it comes to smartphonebased communications and other consumer-level communications protected by high-quality encryption.

They reason that if there were back doors engineered into the cryptography algorithms, then once authorized by an appropriate oversight body, they could easily flip a switch and listen into any such authorized conversation.

It seems to make sense, but building in back doors is a very, very bad idea. Here are six reasons why: 1. Back doors are deliberately engineered flaws in the system. Any flaw that we can exploit can be found and exploited by our enemies. Since this is an asymmetric battle, if we engineer flaws into things like smartphones, we are -- by design -- subjecting every smartphone user to penetration by the enemy. Back doors are a gift to the enemy.

2. Back doors give the enemy an excuse to innovate. If we

build back doors into our systems, it’s not like enemy actors won’t know. The fact is, they’ll find alternate ways to hide their communications, most likely building their one encryption technology in secret. So not only will we still have to crack encryption, we’ll have to find out what it is first.

3. Don’t assume terrorists don’t have access to top technology skills. As an example, back in 2012, I wrote about Iran’s investment in higher education. Despite seeming backwards in some areas, the nation has more than 3.5 million college students, 40,000 masters-level students, and 20,000 Ph.D. students. Back then, more than 20 million Iranians were online. So while I would never recommend you conflate terrorists with Iranians, it’s important to realize that Iran is representative of the sort of nation that produces terrorists -- and many of them are technologically astute.

4. Back doors and encryption flaws open the door to other forms of spying. Don’t just assume that back doors will be exploited only by governments and terrorists. Back doors will open the door to industrial espionage of an unimaginable level. While allies have always spied on each other, once it’s easy to crack encryption, everyone will be doing it -- and no secret or competitive advantage will be safe.

5. Privacy isn’t just about people hiding stuff. If bad guys, terrorists, enemy states

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or others can access personal, private information (like normally-protected health care secrets), the potential for blackmail increases exponentially.

and enemy states) will use that information for stalking, harassment, and other run-of-the-mill bad behavior that might otherwise be kept in check.

So here are the talking points you should take back to your agencies, departments, and organizations. One, built-in encryption back doors will be used against us more than it will help us. Two, if we build in back doors, the bad guys will engineer alternate encryption solutions. And finally, if we let encryption be the best it can be, we will be the only ones with the resources to crack that encryption - the old fashioned way. By actually breaking the code.

all, our asymmetric advantage is our enormous economic and industrial might (and enormous brain trusts like those at the NSA and in companies like Google and Apple).

If we build encryption that anyone can crack with the right codes, anyone can crack it. But if the very best encryption is out there and used by everyone, the only ones with the resources to possibly crack it -- doing it the hard way -- is us, because we have more resources than anyone else to throw at the problem.

So here are the talking points you should take back to your agencies, departments, and organizations.

One, built-in encryption back doors will be used against us more than it will help us. Two, if we build in back doors, the bad guys will engineer alternate encryption solutions. And finally, if we let encryption be the best it can be, we will be the only ones with the resources to crack that encryption -- the old fashioned way. By actually breaking the code.

And it’s not like we haven’t used our overwhelming code breaking skills before.

This is what we do.

6. Engineered-in back doors will be used by individuals as well. Once engineered-in back doors are created, you can bet those exploits will be for sale online. And then you can bet that scumbags (as distinguished from terrorists

Perhaps, most importantly, an engineered-in back door gives up our asymmetric advantage. You see, while the terrorists’ asymmetric advantage is they can hit any one target and we have to protect them

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About the Author David Gewirtz is Director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute, Distinguished Lecturer for CBS Interactive, Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, IT Advisor to the Florida Public Health Association and an instructor at the UC Berkeley extension.

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U.S. Justice Department’s National Security Division Prosecutes Record Number of Terrorism-Related Cases

By Paul Davis

T

he U.S. Justice Department has prosecuted more than 60 individuals in terrorism-related cases in 2015.

Speaking before the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law’s Event on More Effective Responses to the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Threat in New York City this past September, Assistant Attorney General for National Security

John P. Carlin stated that since the previous year’s meeting, foreign terrorist fighter cases in the United States increased from about a dozen to more than 50.

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“In total, since 2013, we have publicly charged more than 70 individuals, in over 25 districts, for foreign terrorist fighter or homegrown violent extremist-related conduct. And the FBI has open investigations of suspected supporters of ISIL in all 50 states,” Carlin told the group.

“At the U.S. Department of Justice, we fight against ISIL to protect the American public, here and abroad. But we also understand that our work contributes to global efforts to eliminate the threat ISIL poses to innocents around the world.

We recognize our collective responsibility to prevent our citizens from going overseas or funding others to join ISIL in a campaign that uses rape, sexual slavery and the murder of civilians, including children, as tactics for success.”

According to the Justice Department, Carlin said that the U.S. uses law enforcement investigative tools and techniques that are both effective and protective of individual rights and the rule of law. Sophisticated undercover operations disrupt those who plan to travel to engage in terrorism, allowing the government to identify the threats early – before potential fighters travel, train or return.

“We criminalize providing a broad range of material support for terrorist activity. These

Asst Attorney General John Carlin

are tools we have used for many years and ones that are now globally recognized as invaluable in our fight against terrorism,” Carlin said.

Carlin explained that ISIL uses social media – the language of youth and a global marketing tool designed to reach households around the world. According to FBI Director James Comey, ISIL now has about 21,000 English-language followers on Twitter alone. ISIL exploits social media to recruit, to disseminate messaging and to plan attacks. We have seen each of these borne out in the United States.

“We know that ISIL used Twitter to terrorize Mosul before their attack. ISIL also uses social media to make public calls for lone offender attacks in the West,” Carlin said. “ISIL continues to target the young, including children, in its recruiting efforts, and its message is getting through. In the United States, over 55 percent of defendants in foreign terrorist fighter cases are under 25-years-old.

Over a third are 21 or younger” Carlin went on to say that the U.S. is witnessing a surge in what we call homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) – individuals inspired by this extremist ideology to conduct attacks inside the United States. ISIL and its supporters have repeatedly called for attacks right where potential attackers live. Terrorism with the reach of mass, global marketing: No passport or travel required.

Carlin, a career federal prosecutor who serves as the Department of Justice’s top national security attorney, oversees nearly 400 employees responsible for protecting the country against international and domestic terrorism, espio-

nage, cyber, and other national security threats.

The National Security Division (NSD) was created in March 2006 by the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization and Improvement Act. The mission of the National Security Division is to carry out the Department’s

In a recent and notable case, the NSD announced on December 30th that Enrique Marquez Jr., 24, of Riverside, California, a longtime friend of Sayed Rizwan Farook, the male shooter in the San Bernardino, California, terrorist attack, was named in a federal grand jury indictment that charges him with conspir-

“We know that ISIL used Twitter to terrorize Mosul before their attack. ISIL also uses social media to make public calls for lone offender attacks in the West,” Carlin said. “ISIL continues to target the young, including children, in its recruiting efforts, and its message is getting through. In the United States, over 55 percent of defendants in foreign terrorist fighter cases are under 25-years-old. Over a third are 21 or younger”

highest priority: to combat terrorism and other threats to national security.

ing with Farook in 2011 and 2012 to provide material support to terrorists.

The NSD’s organizational structure is designed to ensure greater coordination and unity of purpose between prosecutors and law enforcement agencies, on the one hand, and intelligence attorneys and the Intelligence Community.

The NSD also reported that Marquez was also charged with two counts of making a false statement in relation to the purchase of two assault rifles that were used in the deadly shooting at the Inland Regional Center (IRC) on Dec. 2, 2015.

The five-count indictment additionally charges Marquez with marriage fraud and making a false statement on immigration paperwork in relation to an alleged sham marriage with a member of Farook’s family.

Marquez is currently being held in federal custody without bond and was arraigned in U.S. District Court in Riverside on Jan. 6, 2016.

“Enrique Marquez Jr. has been indicted for his role in plotting terrorist attacks on American soil with Sayed Rizwan Farook in 2011 and 2012, attacks which were, fortunately, not carried out. He is also charged with firearms violations for making straw purchases of weapons for Farook – weapons that were eventually used to carry out the recent terrorist attack in San Bernardino,” Carlin said. “This indictment is the next step in holding Mr. Marquez accountable.

I would like to extend my gratitude to all the members of law enforcement involved in this ongoing investigation.”

“Mr. Marquez is charged for his role in a conspiracy several years ago to target innocent civilians in our own backyard with cold-blooded terror attacks, and with providing weapons to an individual whose endgame was murder,” added David Bowdich, the Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office. “The covert nature of the defendant’s alleged actions is a stark reminder of the challenges we face in preventing attacks planned in the name of violent jihad, and underscores the critical need for those with knowledge about terror plots to come forward.”

The NSD reports that the indictment charges Marquez with conspiring with Farook to provide material support and resources, including weapons, explosives and personnel, to terrorists, knowing and intending that such support was to be used in preparation for and in carrying out the use of fire or explosive to maliciously damage or destroy any institution or organization receiving federal financial assistance and property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.

“Marquez is also charged with two counts of making a false statement when purchasing two assault rifles for Farook – a Smith and Wesson, model M&P-15 Sport, 5.56-caliber rifle that was bought on Nov. 14, 2001, and a DPMS, model A-15, 5.56-caliber rifle that was bought on Feb. 22, 2012 – which, according to an affidavit previously filed in

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Syed Farook

this case, were used in the Dec. 2 attack on the IRC that killed 14 people and wounded 22 others. Specifically, he is charged with stating on a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) form that he was the actual buyer, a statement that was, and which defendant knew to be, false.” the NSD announcement stated. “The final two counts in the indictment allege that Marquez entered into a sham marriage with a member of Farook’s family in November 2014 and that on July 17, 2015, he signed an immigration form, under penalty of perjury, that he was living with the purported spouse in Corona, California, when he was not actually living there.

According the NSD the charge of providing material support to terrorists carries a maximum sentence of 15 years in federal prison.

The charges of making a false statement in connection with acquisition of firearms each carry a statutory maximum penalty of 10 years in federal prison. The marriage fraud count carries a statutory maximum sentence of 5 years in prison, and the charge of making a false statement on immigration paperwork carries a statutory maximum sentence of 10 years in prison.

Nicholas Teausant Facebook Photo

In another recent and notable case, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Pennsylvania announced on December 22nd that Jalil Ibn Ameer Aziz, 19, a U.S. citizen and resident of Harrisburg, was indicted by a federal grand jury in Scranton on charges of conspiring and attempting to provide material support to ISIL, a designated foreign terrorist organization According to U.S. Attorney Peter Smith, the Indictment alleges that from July 2014 to December 17, 2015, Aziz knowingly conspired to provide, and attempted to provide, material support and resources, including personnel and services, to ISIL

Jalil Aziz Mugshot

Eric Marquez Mugshot

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

“Aziz used at least 57 different Twitter accounts to advocate violence against the United States and its citizens, to disseminate ISIL propaganda and espouse pro-ISIL views. Aziz allegedly posted a hyperlink containing the names, addresses, and other identifying information of 100 reported members of the U.S. Military and calls for violence against them,” the announcement stated. “On at least three occasions, Aziz allegedly used his Twitter accounts and other electronic communication services to assist persons seeking to travel to and fight for ISIL. In one instance, Aziz allegedly acted as an intermediary between a person in Turkey and several well-known members of ISIL.” Vol. 21, No.4

Aziz also passed location information, including maps and a telephone number, between these ISIL supporters and a search of a backpack located in Aziz’s closet identified five loaded M4-style high-capacity magazines, a modified kitchen knife, a thumb drive, medication, and a balaclava (ski mask).

The case is being investigated by the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which includes the Pentagon Force Protection Agency and the Pennsylvania State Police, with assistance from the Harrisburg Bureau of Police.

This case is being prosecuted by Assistant According to the NSD, the maximum penalty provided in the statute is 20 years’ imprisonment and a $250,000 fine.

A third recent and notable case was announced on December 1st, by Carlin and U.S. Attorney Benjamin B. Wagner concerns Nicholas Michael Teausant, 22, of Acampo, who pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.

According to court documents, on March 17, 2014, Teausant was arrested near the

Canadian border en route to Canada with the intent of continuing to travel to Syria to join ISIL. On March 26, 2014, Teausant was indicted on one count of attempting to provide material support or resources to a terrorist organization. He pleaded guilty to the single count in the indictment without a plea agreement. Teausant is scheduled to be sentenced by United States District Judge John A. Mendez on March 8, 2016.

“Nicholas Michael Teausant attempted to travel overseas to join ISIL and to provide material support to the terrorist organization,” said Carlin. “The National Security Division’s highest priority is counterterrorism, and we are committed to stemming the flow of foreign fighters abroad and holding accountable those who attempt to provide material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations.”

“This case, like others in communities across the United States and around the world, is an example of how a young person from any place and any background might make the terrible decision to try and become part of a terrorist organization,” added U.S. Attorney Wagner. “Fortunately, the FBI intervened in this case before any harm could be inflicted

upon innocent persons. We hope that this case will be a reminder to us all to stay vigilant and involved in the lives of our youth, and in particular, with respect to the dangerous influences they may be subject to on the Internet where these organizations are very active.”

Teausant faces a maximum statutory penalty of 15 years in prison and a $250,000 fine.

“Law enforcement will remain a strong tool in this battle. But it alone is not enough.

Our first goal ought to be to dissuade would-be foreign fighters from joining ISIL in the first place,” Carlin said. “That requires us to engage with our communities and support efforts to identify possible interventions at every step of the foreign terrorist fighter development cycle, from recruitment and radicalization, to mobilization and return. We must work together to disrupt and detain those who have already gone, while simultaneously deterring those who seek to follow that path.”

About the Author Paul Davis is a frequent contributing editor to the Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International.

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1/9/14 10:51 AM

The Enemy Within

Violent Extremism in the United States

By Jerome Kahan

Tashfeen Malik, (L), and Syed Farook are pictured passing through Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport in this July 27, 2014 handout photo obtained by Reuters December 8, 2015.

U.S.-born Farook, 28, and his spouse, Malik, a native of Pakistan who lived in Saudi Arabia for more than 20 years, died in a shootout with police hours after a December 2, 2015 attack on a holiday party at the Inland Regional Center social services agency in San Bernardino, California about 60 miles (100 km) east of Los Angeles.

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he Enemy Within, a PBS FRONTLINE special TV broadcast in 2006, exposed the unpleasant fact that there was an enemy within our midst composed of a network of Islamic extremists living in a small town in California that sought “to encourage, to energize, to activate ... extremist Islamic sentiments, to carry out acts on behalf of these terrorist groups and their extremist beliefs” here in

the United States. In addition to these so-called home-grown terrorists, who have grown in numbers since the PBS special, the enemy within also includes an expanding group of extremists of all stripes capable of carrying out violent attacks on the nation’s people and property in the name of their causes, which are not related to the jihadist terrorist ideologies. Surprising as it may seem, given the plethora of security dangers we face, the Obama administration has identified violent extremism as the “pre-eminent” threat to the United States.

Who exactly are these enemies in our midst? What dangers do they pose? What are the reasons individuals become violent extremists? How can we counter these threats? Are there roles for citizens as well as federal agencies and local police in rooting out and prosecuting these hidden hazards? This article will address these issues and draw some conclusions.

inspired by jihadism or even self-radicalized by propaganda placed on the Internet by terrorist organizations such as ISIS who also publish and broadcast anti-West and pro- terrorist messages via a series of online magazines and social media outlets. Suicide attacks are one of the most serious threats posed by jihadist extremists, reminiscent of Kamikaze pilots of WWII.

Who is the Enemy?

Domestic violent extremists, on the other hand, are U.S. citizens driven to violence by personal beliefs or extremist ideologies having no relationship to foreign terrorists. They are drawn to violence as a means of supporting a variety of scary causes including sovereign citizen anti-government movements, racism, bigotry, anarchy, white supremacy, right-wing militants, neo-Nazi views, anti-religious views, right wing and left wing political extremists, left wing civil liberties advocates, and even environmental extremists. These domestic extremists can act alone, but often join militant, ideologically motivated groups, who form their own small communities in which individuals with shared extreme beliefs live together in small “communities” and by their own rules of society without breaking the law-- disseminating extremist propaganda and retailing the ability to suddenly commit egregious acts. While

Jihadist violent extremists are Americans who may have traveled abroad to become exposed to the extreme ideologies of terrorist groups and returned radicalized and prepared to carry out domestic terrorism in the name of a jihad –defined as a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty. They are found in communities, often as part of clandestine terrorist “sleeper cells,” waiting for direction by their foreign masters to take violent action against specified targets, inspired by jihadist beliefs to take action when and as they see fit, or independently undertaking extremist activities against people or property at a time and place of their own choosing. Other individuals with unhappy or unrealized lives looking for a new direction and meaning can stay in the U.S and become

terrorist attacks since 9/11 have made more headlines and tend to instill greater fear in the population, more Americans have been killed since 9/11 by such non-Islamic domestic terrorists than jihadist extremists.

The most immediate threat to the nation, as assessed by the FBI , however, are from “lone wolf” violent extremists – antisocial and disengaged individuals, as in the case of Dylann Roof who massacred nine citizens in a South Carolina church, motivated to take action by personal grievances, familial problems, individualistic ideologies, psychoanalytic dynamics, or extremist Islamic

for preventing violent extremism, and seeking “to protect, strengthen, and empower these communities” to discover and remove the basic drivers of violent extremism. The strategy acknowledges that an effective CVE strategy must first identify potential jihadist extremists and only then can there be interventions designed to halt if not reverse their path to radicalization or, if already radicalized, to thwart efforts to take destructive actions including suicide attacks. The strategy also entails efforts to counsel other forms of violent extremists who make themselves known in ways that make them see a productive future within existing society, while at the same time

lated lifestyles and the ability to plan and act without worrying about being part of a group activity, but may not be able to easily instigate a complex and high-consequence incident. This form of extremism poses a special danger, since it is easier for law enforcement to penetrate plots “concocted by several people than individuals who act on their own “given that the lone wolf’s chief asset is no one else knowing of any plans for violence, making this threat exceedingly difficult to disrupt,” as stated in the Age of the Wolf: A Study of the Rise of Lone Wolf and Leaderless Resistance Terrorism, by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) in February 1, 2015.

seeking to identify and track other domestic violent extremists in order to block and then reverse their efforts to turn distorted and dangerous beliefs into destructive actions.

As a practical matter, the above strategic objectives are virtually impossible to achieve, especially the all-important step of identifying individuals ripe for jihadist radicalization or those already radicalized.

Most of these individuals already know how to blend into communities across the nation, staying in touch with other members of a small cell, typically with no visible signs of being dangerous to their societies. This is also the case for individual domestic violent extremists who can hide within communities, as distinct from those who live as part of outlier communities with their colleagues where they walk the line to avoid arrest.

If individuals monitored for a number of years exhibit no further progression in the radicalization process and provide no basis for intervention, these targets “fall off the radar screen” – often to surface later and conduct an act of violence. As in the case of other open Western nations, the U.S. faces a monumental challenge in trying to identify and then track potential violent extremists. In words that ring true to American authorities, a former senior French counterterrorism official noted there are “too many of them, too few of us [….and] that monitoring one suspected individual “requires three to ten agents for round the clock surveillance and such resources are not available to monitor all these people,” as reported

by CNN, Washington, January 8, 2015.

Lone wolfs of any persuasion are especially hard to identify, given their relatively iso-

The Administration’s CVE strategy expects all relevant federal agencies – primarily

FBI and police investigator are seen around a vehicle in which two suspects were shot following a mass shooting in San Bernardino, California December 3, 2015. Authorities were working to determine why Syed Rizwan Farook, 28, and Tashfeen Malik, 27, who had a 6-monthold daughter together, opened fire at a holiday party of his co-workers in Southern California, killing 14 people and wounding 17 in an attack that appeared to have been planned.

REUTERS/Mike Blake

beliefs. Studies done by the SPLC indicate that these “lone wolves” are responsible for the large number of domestic extremist attacks that have occurred over the past five years.

Countering Violent Extremism The causes of violent extremism are complex and numerous, shaped by the lure of terrorism as well as deep rooted political, social, cultural, and economic grievances as well as isolation from society. For these reasons, the Obama Administration’s Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) issued in 2011 stressed the importance of finding and eliminating the root causes through enhancing engagement with local communities that may serve as “breeding grounds” for violent extremists, building government and law enforcement expertise

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Role of Federal Agencies

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the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as well as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) – to pursue specific programs within their areas of responsibility, relying upon and improving existing programs and instituting new initiatives. At a White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism in February of last year, the President called for federal agencies to build awareness of the dangers of violent extremism at the community as well as national level, and be prepared to intervene in order “to undermine the attraction of extremist movements and ideologies that seek to promote violence […efforts to] address the root causes of extremism…”

development, and other efforts to identify and take actions to disrupt violent extremist plots, both jihadist violent extremists and domestic violent extremists. In response to concerns over civil liberties, FBI agents have been encouraged to use the least intrusive methods possible in their investigations.

Coordinated by a Senior Executive, efforts of DHS to counter violent extremism cover a spectrum of activities across most of its major components, including the Intelligence and Analysis Division (I&A) tracking individuals who leave the U.S., become radicalized, and later return;

and local levels. Efforts along these line as appearing in DHS’s Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, issued in 2012, include working with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and state and local law enforcement partners “to train front line officers, first responders, and community leaders […on such topics as effective and ethical policing] and best practices in community outreach […in order] to improve communication, build trust, and encourage collaboration between officers and the communities they serve and protect.” Community Awareness Briefings (CAB), developed and delivered by DHS in partnership with NCTC, are scheduled

As in the case of other open Western nations, the U.S. faces a monumental challenge in trying to identify and then track potential violent extremists. In words that ring true to American authorities, a former senior French counterterrorism official noted there are “too many of them, too few of us [….and] that monitoring one suspected individual “requires three to ten agents for round the clock surveillance and such resources are not available to monitor all these people,” as reported by CNN, Washington, January 8, 2015.

As presented by the Bureau’s Director before a Senate Committee, the FBI has established partnerships with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and built closer relationships with communities for countering the threat of domestic violence by jihadist or other extremists, whether groups or lone offenders. FBI special agents in charge (SACs) continue to run CVE educational programs for communities and assign designated points of contact in this issue at over two dozen FBI Field Offices.

FBI field offices host the Community Relations Executive Seminar Training (CREST) program to develop positive relations with minority groups in their communities and in particular to dispel feelings among Muslims that government agents treat them all as extremists. Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) under FBI leadership, have been modified and upgraded to take the primary role in investigative, surveillance, source

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) uncovering dangerous extremists who may be illegal immigrants; and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) preventing individuals with radical extremist beliefs from entering the country or potentially fleeing if they fear authorities are about to disrupt their plans for conducting violent actions. As bluntly put by the Reuters news service this past June, the Department’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has largely failed in its longstanding struggle to deal with the fact that terrorists have become increasingly adept in circumventing airport security when boarding international flights to the U.S. DHS seeks to engage local communities in the fight against violent extremism, coordinating as appropriate with the FBI and other agencies at the federal, state,

to share unclassified information on the threat of violent extremism with community leaders and discuss how this danger can be dealt with at local levels.

Community Policing for CVE Local law enforcement and federal government officials have the experience to engage and build relationships with the communities they serve – a longstanding approach for fighting crime that can have value in curtailing violent extremism of all kinds. With such capabilities, police moving about communities and tapping their sources can hear about or come into contact with individuals acting suspiciously, might observe indicators of radicalized behavior or other signs of violent extremist leanings, and might be able to recognize potential dangers that could be missed by federal authorities, such as terrorist related sleeper

cells or underground extremist groups. Indeed, over the years, local law enforcement agencies have played a critical role in containing violent extrem­ism in their communities, working with state and federal authorities to disrupt many plots and in some cases to dismantle local branches of terrorist organizations.

If building and exploiting relations at the community level are not done with care, however, community members, notably Muslims, could conclude that they are being treated as priori suspects and not as partners working to lower the dangers of extremism. Federal agencies need to

execute their normal responsibilities. This has led to requests from local law enforcement for federal assistance. At the same time, identifying, tracking, and intercepting the potentially violent actions of what now has become thousands of potential terrorists and other extremists residing in the U.S. is overwhelming federal assets, notably the FBI that needs help “to keep tabs on… hundreds of possible terror suspects, “as CNN reported in its program, FBI struggling with the surge in homegrown terror cases” on May 30, 2015. Oddly enough, this has resulted in the dilemma of federal agencies calling for local police assistance in CVE, while community law enforcement agencies ask for federal help to identify and root out would be violent extremists.

IWATCH complements SAR by creating tailored opportunities for citizens to observe and report unusual activities that seem out of place in their own community, not only signs of terrorist planning but also indicators of all kinds of potentially violent extremist behavior. As recently put by the Secretary of Homeland Security in April 2015 as a guest on the CBS TV Show 60 Minutes, “If you feel you’ve observed something suspicious, do not dismiss it […as many] terrorist plots have been averted just because someone was observant enough, and reported what they saw to the authorities. Programs relying on alert citizens to report suspicious behavior may be uneven in results and can lead to as many false positives

Citizen involvement in CVE is already being implemented in the Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) program, for instance, which involves citizens, businesses, and banks as well as local law enforcement authorities in a procedure for identifying and reporting actions of individuals that might represent unusual activities by extremist individuals or groups. avoid what has been termed “securitizing” relations with the Muslim community that risks maintaining trust due to perceptions that a peaceful group of citizens are being subjected to extra governmental scrutiny.

As local law enforcement officers work with their communities, moreover, they themselves are targets of attacks from violent extremists primarily representing anti-governmental ideologies. Anti-government extrem­ist such as mili­tia groups and sov­er­eign cit­i­zens believe that police are agents of the ille­git­i­mate gov­ern­ment and should be attacked, as is the case of white suprema­cists who, as reported by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) last year, believe police are tools of the “Jewishcontrolled” gov­ern­ment.

Local authorities in thousands of communities across the nation face a demanding and resource-heavy process in identifying and tracking high risk extremists, often as part of intense and time consuming federally-led JTTF investigations, while continuing to

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Unfortunately, the lack of more resources to recruit substantially large numbers of additional local and federal law enforcement personnel to beef up the fight against violent extremism has led to a an impasse.

However, this proverbial Gordian Knot might be cut through greater active support in CVE from alert citizens.

Citizen involvement in CVE is already being implemented in the Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) program, for instance, which involves citizens, businesses, and banks as well as local law enforcement authorities in a procedure for identifying and reporting actions of individuals that might represent unusual activities by extremist individuals or groups. If You See Something, Say Something is a DHS initiative that supports SAR through a nationwide campaign that enhances awareness of the need to report suspicious activities as well as programs that award prioritized state and local grants for developing such programs.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

as credible leads, but they are a useful element of CVE.

Where Do we Go From Here?

Most Americans do not worry in their daily lives about the threat of violent extremism within our borders, but enjoy their freedoms while accepting more traditional dangers such as natural disasters and accidents as well as criminals and gangs that rob and kill. This public attitude has been influenced by experts who purport to demonstrate that many extremist plots have failed due to local law enforcement efforts, FBI overt and covert operations, or sheer incompetency on the part of the perpetrators. As of 2013, it was estimated that since 9/11, almost all of over four dozen terrorist planned attacks against the nation were thwarted. Recently, a series of jhadist extremist plots to bomb high profile targets, including banks, capital buildings and commercial establishments were

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disrupted. Some extremists managed to get their hands on explosives or materials to make a bomb, with more than half of these acquiring components for bombs from federal informants or agents as part of a sting operation, as reported by the Heritage Foundation a few year ago.

Yet it only takes one such incident making headlines to remind us that violent actions by extremists in the U.S. do in fact occur on a regular basis, and that it would be foolhardy not to take seriously the threats posed by jihadist and domestic violent extremists as both these vectors of violence become more numerous, capable, and dangerous.

Consider the recent anti-racist slaughtering of innocent people in Charleston as men-

and programs for CVE, they also need to engage in programs that help communities deal with the issue of violent extremism. However, resource constraints plus the lack of confidence in federal agencies found in some communities, limit the ability of “the feds” to make sustained contributions to CVE at this level. This is why it is essential to build trusting relationships between police and their communities that can open up opportunities to identify at-risk individuals or groups in time to enable appropriate interventions before violent actions are committed. As the Guardian wrote in a June 25, 2015 piece titled “Beyond Dylann Roof,” actions to prevent or at least identify potential violent extremists

for radicalization and violent behavior with little hope of reversing this uninhabitable environment and returning to relative normalcy.

In conclusion, it is clear that strategies for meeting the challenges of CVE, which can be quite persuasive when articulated, are difficult to implement in practice, often leading to results that do not work or trigger counterproductive consequences.

This led a Brookings Institution expert in February of last year to suggest either ignoring ineffective CVE engagement programs that do nothing but can cost a lot or to “do no harm” by avoiding “programs that might exacerbate the situation and alienate communities already vulner-

Federal agencies have sought to enhance their ability to counter the plans of violent extremists by employing intelligence, surveillance, investigational, and interventional capabilities while striving to protect the public’s constitutional freedoms.

tioned earlier, the jihadist-driven bombings at the Boston Marathon in 2013, or the mass murdering of theater goers in Colorado three years ago.

Federal agencies have sought to enhance their ability to counter the plans of violent extremists by employing intelligence, surveillance, investigational, and interventional capabilities while striving to protect the public’s constitutional freedoms. In the view of the FBI, the Attorney General, and the President, this challenge would be far more difficult without key features of the Freedom Act, including the modified but vital NSA programs for gathering and being able to access metadata on phone records of U.S. citizens and business given a court order. However, the Freedom Act still requires the government to respect the constitutionally based laws of individual privacy and liberty.

While these federal agencies have the responsibility to provide top down policies

need to “go beyond law enforcement … to family members, friends, teachers, sports coaches, religious mentors and mental health professionals who all require training to spot what the secret service terms ‘stressors’ – triggers that will turn violent words into action.”

While strong community-oriented policing can contribute to CVE, however, pressures are rising from public officials as well as the officers themselves for police to revert to more “traditional” approaches as they face increasing problems in engaging with communities suffering from high crime rates, serious socio-economic problems, reduced budgets, and individuals bent on using force against the cop on the beat. More generally, until and unless major changes are made by state and local law enforcement on one side and demonstrators and their leaders on the other, many communities across the nation with their imploding situations and strained police relations will remain ripe

able to radicalization.” Nevertheless, from a positive perspectives, it can only be hoped that this article will generate new interest in developing and carrying out governmental and community level programs to counter if not conquer the enemy within through effective and affordable means that result in successful and measurable ends.

About the Author Jerome Kahan is currently an independent writer and analyst, having worked for over 40 years in the national security, arms control, and homeland security fields. At the State Department, Mr. Kahan held positions on the Policy Planning Staff, as Deputy Assistant Secretary with the Political-Military and Intelligence Bureaus, and as Politico-Military Counselor in our Embassy in Turkey. Mr. Kahan has written and/or contributed to a number of books, published articles in a variety of journals, and taught for ten years as an Adjunct Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

New Trends

In The Terrorist Threats Against The Business Sector

By Dr. Joshua Sinai

WTC NY 9-11-2001

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he business sector constitutes one of the primary strategic targets of contemporary terrorism because attacking it can cause severe and cascading economic damages to the targeted businesses and other sectors in the country’s overall critical infrastructure as well. In such a way, inflicting cascading damage on a country’s economy is one

of the four objectives, alongside human fatalities/injuries, physical damage on the targeted facility, and psychological damage on a country’s population, of terrorism’s overall objective to damage, undermine, and extort political and other concessions from the threatened government and its economic sector.

In the recent period, in addition to bombings and shootings, terrorist groups have begun employing other types of warfare tactics against their business adversaries.

In the first development, terrorist groups and their supporters (as well as state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran) now employ cyber weapons to inflict economic damage against their adversaries, such as the cyberattacks by pro-Hamas Palestinian hackers against the website of the Israeli stock exchange on April 7, 2015.

In a second development, with terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS/ISIS) controlling vast amounts of territory in weak and fragile states, they also employ terror to loot and appropriate for themselves bank accounts and illicitly sell the oil from the production and storage fields in the areas they govern, particularly in Iraq and Syria, in order to substantially grow and expand their funding sources (in addition to forcibly taxing the populations and businesses in those areas).

As mentioned earlier, terrorism utilizes elements of military, economic and psychological warfare against the targeted country and its economy. In terms of psychological warfare, terrorists aim to spread fear, anxiety and panic throughout the wider society by transforming a specific terrorist incident beyond its localized setting, thereby creating a perception that every citizen and critical node in a country’s infrastructure is vulnerable to attack. Thus, when a nation is incapable of deterring or preventing the terrorist adversary from attacking its businesses, whether restaurants, shopping malls, hotels, transport, and even public gatherings such as movie houses and concert halls, it causes the affected government to appear inept and incapable of protecting its citizens and critical infrastructure from terrorist harm.

vey, a professor of international business at Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business, “This is all about vulnerability.”

“When consumers feel less safe, it changes their spending patterns. Businesses will change their investment and employment plans. Lack of confidence negatively impacts growth.” And terrorism not only disrupts normal business activity, but also increases the costs of doing business, either directly through economic damage or indirectly through the consequences on society of increased terrorism risk insurance rates and costly security measures. Countries or regions that experience frequent and large scale terrorist attacks, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia, have virtually no tourism industry, which also results in low levels of consumer spending and minimal foreign investment.

Repeated and large-scale terrorist targeting of the business sector, therefore, has cascading effects on other critical infrastructure sectors. As explained by Campbell Har-

Even highly developed countries that experience less frequent terrorist incidents suffer economically from such attacks.

This was demonstrated by the ISIS-led si-

multaneous attacks on November 13, 2015 against business targets in Paris, France, where restaurants, the Bataclan concert theater, and a packed sports stadium were intentionally targeted, in which 130 people were killed, and some 368 others were injured.

Such mega terrorism incidents end up affecting every sphere in a country’s economic activity, for instance, in this case, resulting in a drastic decline in foreign tour-

inflicting a greater impact on the country’s economy.

Even ‘low level’ impact terrorist knifing attacks that might average one to three fatalities and injuries per an attack’s shooting, knifing, car ramming, or stone throwing, can lead to a country’s overall economic decline. This has been the case in Israel, where revenues at restaurants, hotels and the overall tourism industry have sharply declined, particularly in an important tourism city such as Jerusalem, which is highly

including stoppage of some airline flights from Egypt’s popular Sharm el-Sheikh resort following the blowing up of the Russian passenger airplane that had departed its airport.

In an example of the most significant economic disruption in the aftermath of a terrorist event, al Qaeda’s simultaneous suicide airplane attacks against the World Trade Towers on September 11, 2001caused the loss of life of some 3,000 civilians, with the terrorists likely expecting thousands more

ranging from low to high complexity and lethality of weaponry and tactical execution As suggested by this notional illustration, the business sector, like the rest of society, faces a continuum of types of potential terrorist attacks, weapons, and lethality. These tactics range from relatively low impact “conventional” attacks, such as shootings and bombings to cyber-attacks in the form of computer viruses, denial of service, and data breaches, to those involving biological,

Egypt’s Prime Minister Sherif Ismail (2nd L) and Tourism Minister Hisham Zaazou look at the remains of a Russian airliner which crashed in central Sinai near El Arish city, north Egypt, October 31, 2015.

The Airbus A321, operated by Russian airline Kogalymavia under the brand name Metrojet, carrying 224 passengers crashed into a mountainous area of Egypt’s Sinai peninsula shortly after losing radar contact near cruising altitude, killing all aboard. REUTERS/Stringer T

ism, with hotels and restaurants experiencing substantially lower revenues. Interestingly, in what became known as the “Charlie Hebdo” (and follow-up) attacks in Paris on 7-9 January 2015, in which a total of 16 people were killed and 22 injured, these attacks resulted in less economic damage than the later November 13 attacks because they were considered “one-off” type incidents. Once these attacks were followed by a mega, mass casualty attack, however, both attacks cumulatively demonstrated the severity of the ISIS/ al Qaeda terrorist threats against France’s economy, whether by local or foreign operatives, and the government’s security forces inability to prevent them, thereby

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dependent on a steady stream of tourists for its economic wellbeing. In Jerusalem, moreover, even local residents have become wary of dining at restaurants or shopping at popular outdoor markets such as Machane Yehuda.

Even more seriously, Arab restaurants in Israel, whether in East Jerusalem, Nazareth, or in Jaffa’s mixed Jewish-Arab neighborhoods, have been experiencing sharply reduced volumes of Jewish customers, resulting in much reduced revenue and increased Arab-Jewish friction.

Finally, in non-Western countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, tourism has been sharply reduced as a result of al Qaeda/Islamic State attacks in those countries,

Types of Terrorist Threats Against the Business Sector

chemical, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) “unconventional” weapons and devices. To forecast the likely type of terrorist threat, weapons, lethality and impact on the targeted business, it is necessary to consider the terrorist adversary’s intent to damage particular businesses, its past attack history, local presence and support, and its capability to conduct an attack of various levels of complexity of tactics and weaponry, and, especially, its ability to physically reach its targeted location, or, in the case of a cyber-attack, to breach its IT defenses.

The business community, whether in the form of its personnel, facilities, or operations, is threatened by a continuum of terrorist attacks

It is also important to note that terrorist threats do not affect all businesses alike. Bigger companies, for example, especially those

fatalities). In terms of economic losses, as reported by a June 30, 2004 New York Times article, the attacks cost the city’s economy 143,000 jobs a month and $2.8 billion in lost wages in the subsequent three months. Overall, it also resulted in $40 billion in insurance losses, with the ripple effects of the attacks impacting the country’s airline industry, as well. The attacks also resulted in additional billions of dollars in indirect consequences, as well.

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with extensive overseas presence, such as multinational corporations in oil and gas, automobile manufacturing, military equipment sales, hotel chains, and restaurants, may more be vulnerable to certain types of terrorist attacks than smaller and more localized companies. In addition to the different motivations by terrorist groups to target their perceived business adversaries, some multinational companies, such as hotel chains and restaurants, may present much softer targets than their more hardened automobile, oil and gas,

portation (aviation, ground and maritime), energy (nuclear power, oil and gas facilities, and chemical plants), financial institutions (such as stock exchanges and banks), tourism (hotels and restaurants), and shopping malls. The terrorist risks to these business sectors are discussed in this section.

Transportation Sector Throughout the history of terrorism, the transportation sector has been among the most frequent targets of terrorist attacks, as

the 1970s and 1980s, hijacking was a pervasive terrorist tactic.

This tactic was transformed in 9/11 when the terrorist goal was not to hijack and then land the aircraft but to use planes as suicide bombs to cause mass destruction.

In response, as security has been hardened at airport terminals and aircraft (especially by automatically locking cockpits), instead of hijacking planes, terrorists have turned to other tactics such as bombing them by firing shoulderlaunched Stinger missiles at flying aircraft. This was demonstrated by

disappeared on March 8, 2014 while flying from Kuala Lumpur International Airport near Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to Beijing Capital International Airport in Beijing, China, might have been caused by one of the pilots. In another case, although not terrorism-related, the deliberate crashing on March 24, 2015 of Germanwings Flight 4U525 by Andreas Lubitz, its copilot, in the French Alps while the aircraft was en route from Barcelona to Dusseldorf, demonstrates the potential for radicalized insiders to carry out such attacks.

Throughout the history of terrorism, the transportation sector has been among the most frequent targets of terrorist attacks, as reinforced by recent terrorist incidents, such as the bombing on November 24, 2015 by an ISIS affiliate in the Sinai Peninsula of the Russia-bound Russian airliner in mid-flight, killing all 224 people on board. and military sales company counterparts. Similarly, businesses in regions that are frequently targeted by terrorists, such as the Middle East and North Africa, face more frequent and higher lethality threat risks than those in areas that terrorists do not consider vital for attack because of their hardened defenses, such as Western Europe, where terrorist attacks, as a result, are less frequent although still more ‘sought after’ because of the worldwide publicity such attacks generate for their cause.

Categories of Businesses Targeted by Terrorism Certain business categories are of greater risk to terrorist attack than others. These include trans-

reinforced by recent terrorist incidents, such as the bombing on November 24, 2015 by an ISIS affiliate in the Sinai Peninsula of the Russia-bound Russian airliner in mid-flight, killing all 224 people on board. As demonstrated by this and other attacks, for terrorists determined to indiscriminately kill in high quantity in order to cause economic disruption and psychological anxiety, aviation transportation (airplanes), ground transportation (trains, subways and buses), and maritime transportation (cruise ships and oil tankers) are iconic targets.

Aviation The aviation sector has long been targeted by terrorist groups. In

al Qaeda’s unsuccessful attempt to down the Israeli Arkia Boeing 757 aircraft, carrying 261 passengers, that had just taken off from Mombassa’s airport in Kenya in late November 2002. In another new trend that was successfully executed, ISIS operatives reportedly exploited weak Egyptian security at the Sharm al-Sheikh airport to plant a soda can that had been converted into bomb to explode the Russian aircraft while in flight. Airlines are also highly concerned that insiders, such as radicalized pilots, who might intentionally crash their aircraft in mid-flight. Although still under investigation, it might be possible (although unproven) that the crash in international waters of Malaysia Flight 370, which mysteriously

Ground Terrorists seek to exploit new vulnerabilities in their adversary’s defenses, so as one sector is hardened, those that are considered soft and less fortified will be attacked. Thus, as the aviation or maritime sectors have become more secure than they were prior to Sept. 11’s aircraft hijackings, terrorists turn to less protected targets such as commuter trains, buses and subways which they attack with greater frequency. Interestingly, only one attack against the transportation sector has involved a weapon of mass destruction, which occurred on March 20, 1995, when Aum Shinrikyo’s operatives employed sarin gas to attack Tokyo’s subway system, killing 12 and injuring more than 5,000 persons. Since then, attacks against

ground transportation have involved “conventional” weapons such as guns, bombs, and knives. Examples of targeting subways include a 1997 plot by two Palestinian operatives (who may have been acting on their own) to carry out suicide bombings in New York City’s subways, which was foiled by the New York Police Department, the February 6, 2004 bombings by a Chechen suicide bomber of a Moscow underground train (killing 41 and injuring about 120 people); the bombings by al Qaida-affiliated terrorists of Madrid’s trains on March 11, 2004 (191 fatalities and more than 1,800 injured) and the suicide bombings of London’s underground (and above

like ground and aviation terrorist warfare, groups that engage in maritime warfare seek to damage the overall economic well-being and sense of security of their state adversaries. For example, when terrorists belonging to the Egyptian Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (also known as Islamic Group – IG) attacked cruise ships along the Nile River on four occasions from 1992 to 1994, tourists kept away from Egypt.

In the Philippines, when the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) attacks cargo vessels or abducts foreigners from a tourist resort (as it did in 2001), it impacts on the entire country’s trade and economy. In Somalia, when al Shabaab militiamen hijack foreign ships sailing off the country’s coastline, vessels steer away from that region.

The January 1996 seizure of a Turk-

operates in the southwestern part of the Philippines, also engages in piracy as a means to raise funds for its operations.

The highly popular international cruise industry is a potential terrorist target. Moreover, new classes of mega cruise ships are in service that exceed 140,000 gross tons, carry upwards of 5,000 passengers and crew members—making them desirable ‘trophy’ targets to ambitious terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda. A terrorist attack against such mega ships would not only cause a catastrophic number of casualties, but threaten the entire cruise industries’ economic viability. To counteract such threats, the cruise industry has instituted security measures guided by regulations set

sector, but that insurgency, which is in its final phase, has been primarily localized. In Africa, separatist rebels in Nigeria have been attacking the facilities and employees of foreign oil companies, such as Royal Dutch Shell, in the oil-rich Niger Delta.

Other types of threats to the gas and oil sectors are presented by the al Qaeda and ISIS insurgencies, which have become transnational and created ripples throughout every critical node in the affected countries’ economic infrastructures. The facilities and personnel of Western oil companies, for example, have been attacked by al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups in Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. In one of the most prominent

In countries such as Israel, buses have long been targeted by Palestinian terrorists, with such attacks intensifying during the al Aqsa intifada (September 2000 to early 2005), and again, in what is considered the Third Intifada, beginning in September 2015, with Palestinian terrorists attacking Israeli passengers, primarily with knives, on board buses or at bus or train stops. ground) trains on July 7, 2005 (52 fatalities and more than 700 injured), and the plot in September 2009 by Najibullah Zazi and two associates to conduct a suicide bombing of the New York City subway system, which was also thwarted a few days prior to the date of the intended bombings. In countries such as Israel, buses have long been targeted by Palestinian terrorists, with such attacks intensifying during the al Aqsa intifada (September 2000 to early 2005), and again, in what is considered the Third Intifada, beginning in September 2015, with Palestinian terrorists attacking Israeli passengers, primarily with knives, on board buses or at bus or train stops.

Maritime The threat of maritime terrorism is particularly significant because just

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ish passenger ferry by pro-Chechen terrorists exposed the vulnerability to terrorist attack of passenger ferries in the Bosporus, Aegean and Black Seas astride the straits. The October 2000 suicide bombing of the USS Cole by al Qaida operatives in the Yemeni port of Aden, killing 17 U.S. Servicemen; the thwarted plot in June 2002 by al Qaida operatives to bomb American and British warships in the Gibraltar Strait; and the October 6, 2002 suicide bombing of the French Limburg tanker in the Gulf of Aden— all represented stark reminders that the world’s military and economic vessels represent ‘trophy’ targets of opportunity to terrorist groups. Since these terrorist attacks against maritime vessels, most attacks against this sector have involved criminal piracy, although terrorist groups such as Abu Sayyaf, which is affiliated with al Qaida, and

forth by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), such as employing security officers and security watchmen aboard ships, restricting access to ships, maintaining security zones around ships, screening of passengers and luggage, and monitoring the supplies that are loaded onto ships.

Energy Sector The energy sector, especially the gas and oil industries on which a nation’s energy supply is so dependent, is perceived by terrorists as an important strategic target. Currently, al Qaeda and its affiliates, and the Islamic State, represent the primary terrorist threats against the energy sector, although threats are also presented by other localized conflicts. The FARC’s insurgency in Colombia, for example, has targeted that country’s energy

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of such attacks, in mid-January 2013, al Qaeda linked terrorists affiliated with Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group, took foreign workers hostage at a gas facility near Amenas, in Algeria, killing some 39 of the hostages (along with an Algerian security guard).

In another type of terrorist threat against the oil and gas sector, the ISIS group, which captured numerous oil fields in Syria, which are primarily located in the eastern region bordering Iraq, enable it to reportedly earn, according to a Financial Times report, an estimated $1.5 million a day from its black market oil sales to various customers in Syria and Turkey.

Financial Sector Financial institutions and banks have been directly targeted by terrorist

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groups for attack. Terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, its affiliates, and ISIS, regard the financial sector as extensions of Western economic power and dominance. Noteworthy terrorist attacks or plots against this sector have included the following:

region. The same type of bank funds appropriation also likely has taken place in the territory under ISIS’s control in Syria. Such massive bank thefts have elevated ISIS to the world’s best-resourced terrorist organization.

* The November 2003, dual suicide bomb attacks in Istanbul, Turkey, against the British consulate and the local headquarters of HSBC bank, killing at least 50 people. Al Qaeda and a Turkish Islamic militant group, the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’ Front (IBDA-C), claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Tourism is vital to a nation’s economy because it impacts on a government’s revenue, national income and employment. In many nations, tourism is a major economic sector and source of revenue, so attacking it leads to economic recession and unemployment. Thus, in such susceptible countries, terrorist groups perceive hotels (and especially Western hotel chains), restaurants and tourist resorts as major targets for attack, as demonstrated by recent incidents. In one of the most prominent examples, on June 26, 2015, an Islamist terrorist carried out a mass shooting at the tourist resort at the Tunisian Port El Kantaoui, killing 38 people, of whom 30 were British tourists. This followed an attack in on March 18, 2015, when al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists conducted an attack by three Islamist terrorists in the Bardo National Museum, in Tunis, killing 22 people, of whom 20 were foreigners who were visiting the museum. With tourism contributing an estimated 10 percent of Tunisia’s gross domestic product (according to a recent news article), as well as employing 400,000 people directly or indirectly, these terrorist attacks (as well as uncertainty over future attacks) resulted in an estimated 80 percent decline in foreign tourism, with more than 70 hotels forced to shut down.

* In summer 2004, the U.S. government raised the terror alert for financial institutions in New York City, Newark, NJ, and Washington, DC, after uncovering an alleged al Qaeda plot to attack the Citicorp building in New York and the NYSE; the International Monetary Fund and World Bank buildings in Washington; and the Prudential building in Newark. The alert was lifted after several weeks. * In August 2005 the police chief for London’s financial district (the “City”) warned that terrorists might strike that business hub, where they had been surveying targets. London’s business quarter includes hundreds of banks, insurance companies, law firms and other critical institutions—including the London Stock Exchange and the Bank of England. It is also a leading international center for trading in metals, oil, and other commodities.

The City of London was targeted in previous years by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).

While no high profile terrorist attacks against the banking sector have occurred in Western countries since this earlier period, banks continue to be targeted by terrorist groups. In a new trend, terrorist groups and their supporters have attempted in several instances to conduct cyber-attacks against their adversaries’ banking institutions, such as the April 7, 2015 attacks by pro-Hamas Palestinian hackers against the website of the Israeli stock exchange.

In another type of terrorist exploitation of the banking sector, such groups and their associated commercial/charity fronts have reportedly used the international financial system for money laundering or to move funds from one country to another, posing another form of substantial risk to the financial sector.

In an especially worrisome new trend, terrorist groups, such as ISIS, use their captured territory in weak and fragile states to appropriate funds from its banking sector. In a prominent example, in June 2014, with ISIS’s capture of Mosul, Iraq, which is one of Iraq’s main oil centers, it reportedly appropriated, according to a Financial Times report, an estimated $500 million in funds from its central bank, including gold bullion. It reportedly also seized additional funds from banks across the

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Tourism Sector

Although the war-torn and economically poor West African country of Mali is not a tourist destination, the November 20, 2015 terrorist attack on the luxury Radisson Blu Hotel in its capital Bamako, in which 22 people were killed, was a reminder that foreigners working in economic development and humanitarian assistance programs, who constituted most of the victims, are continuous targets of terrorists who seek to undermine a country’s return to stability.

In response to such terrorist threats, the hotel industry around the world has beefed up its security departments, implementing a range of security measures to protect guests at their properties, ranging from deploying armed guards to erecting concrete barriers and metal detectors, although security breaches continue to be exploited by terrorist groups as demonstrated by such recent incidents.

Retail Sector As iconic symbols of a nation’s wealth and consumerism, the retail sector’s shopping malls are especially attractive targets to terrorists. With their open spaces and bustling shoppers, they represent “soft” targets because of their lack of controlled access and other security fortifications. Even though American shopping malls have not yet

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faced such attacks, there is concern that a suicide attack on a single shopping mall would cause the public to consider all malls to be unsafe. At the same time, however, although retail centers were not directed targeted, the detonation of the pressure cooker bombs by the Tsarnaev brothers of a block of Boylston Street filled with spectators and runners near the finish line of the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013 (killing 3 people and injuring 264 others), caused an economic and psychological toll on the owners and employees at the stores and offices in that area, some of which were shut down for several weeks afterwards.

Other countries, however, have experienced mass casualty terrorist attacks against their shopping malls, notably the September 21, 2013 mass shooting attack by al Shabaab gunmen at the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, which resulted in an estimated 67 fatalities and more than 175 injured.

Conclusion As demonstrated by the types of terrorist attacks that have targeted various business categories, for business executives, ranging from security directors to financial executives, managing and mitigating the risk from terrorism in all its manifestations is now part of their overall business decision-making process in order to make their enterprises as hardened and resilient as possible against such threats. To manage their risk to terrorism, business managers need to prioritize the types of terrorist threats likely to challenge their businesses and allocate protective resources in response, based on those measures that will likely yield the greatest return on investment. Specifically, business security directors are aware that effective defensive responses to the challenges presented by terrorism require their enterprises to be continuously vigilant, putting in place appropriate security and risk mitigation measures and protocols and continually updating and testing their emergency response plans as these threats continue to evolve, often in unpredictable directions. They also need to ensure that their commercial property insurance policies are supplemented with terrorism insurance to cover losses that might be caused by a terrorist attack.

Finally, in case of a major terrorist attack, business security directors also understand the need to implement continuity of business operations measures.

As examples of such foresight, in the aftermath of 9/11 the New York Stock Exchange— a perennial potential target of terrorist attacks—established an alternative trading floor outside New York City, as have other financial institutions since then to replicate their business operations outside their municipal areas in case of terrorism-caused catastrophes.

About the Author Dr. Joshua Sinai is Director of Analytics & Business Intelligence at CRA (www.cra-usa. net), in Vienna, VA. He can be reached at Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

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Terrorism As A Multidimensional Phenomenon:

Implications for an Ethical and Legal Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism Response

By Jonathan Appel, Ph.D. and Dohee Kim-Appel, Ph.D

A French soldier secures the access to a Jewish school in Paris as part of the highest level of “Vigipirate” security plan after last week’s terror attacks January 12, 2015. Jewish schools and synagogues in France have been promised extra protection, by the army if necessary, after killings by Islamic militants in Paris, the head of the community’s umbrella group said on Sunday after a meeting with the French President. REUTERS/Gonzalo Fuentes

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ntroduction Terrorism did not begin in a vacuum, nor is it merely a modern phenomenon. Many Americans only became acutely aware of modern terrorism after the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995. Yet, modern terrorism began decades, even centuries, before these recent activities in the United States. As Walter Laqueur (1996) observes, the meaning always changed with the flow of historical circumstances, and different time frames gave various meanings to terms like terrorism, socialism, and anarchism. The past 30 years have witnessed an unprecedented growth in the number of bombings, kidnappings, arsons, assassinations, and other forms of violence and terrorism as tactics to achieve political objectives.

Since the terrorists attacks of September 11 there is even more reason than ever to conduct a vigorous analysis into the causes, impact, prevention, and understanding of violence and terrorism in a modern day and multidimensional context. Terrorism is often over-simplified as a religious, fundamental or irrational act. Terrorism is best seen as a dynamic and everchanging phenomenon—but one that is best organized trough a multi-dimensional lens. It stands to reason without a proper and accurate understanding of terrorism—the response will be less than optimal, and lack firm ethical and legal moorings. It is “wide lens” view of terrorism that will offer the best

hope of organizing an appropriate and effective response for homeland security and counterterrorism efforts.

The Changing Meaning of Terrorism The meaning of terrorism has changed over time. Many experts suggest the concept of modern terrorism originated from the 18th century. This notion of terrorism, at least from the Western perspective, grew from the French Revolution (1789–1799), and was originally used to describe the actions of a government, not a band of revolutionaries (White, 2010). Terrorism developed and expanded throughout the nine-

teenth century, changing forms and ideology, and was often used as a tool to combat perceived imperialism. After World War II, the meaning of terrorism changed again and often became associated with the horrific acts perpetrated by the Nazis regime. By the mid-1960s to early 1980s, the term terrorism was most often applied to the actions of violent leftwing groups, as well as those of nationalists or even official states.

Several authors (Kushner, 1998; Carr, 2002) have distinguished between government-sponsored terrorism and terrorism done by non-governmental groups; however, a typology especially relevant to criminal justice was developed by Wolf (1981). Wolf referred to government terrorism

as enforcement terrorism, used by nations internally to maintain social control. Examples included the “white terror” of Chile’s military intelligence services, the Death Squads in Brazil, the White Warriors Union in El Salvador, and the K.G.B. in the U.S.S.R. (Wolf, 1981). Many countries that report extremely low crime rates may be characterized by enforcement terrorism. Non-government terrorism, which Wolf characterized as agitational terrorism, is done by small groups of individuals who want to alter the country’s status quo, but must do so within restricted time and space perimeters and must restrict their organizational membership to a handful of persons (Wolf, 1981).

Into the 1980s, the meaning of terrorism changed once again as terrorism was now the tactic of Middle Eastern groups with the use of hostage taking and the targeting of U.S. interests around the world. Some violent activities of hate groups were also included in the evolving definition. As terrorism has evolved into the new millennium – there has been an increase in the diversity of offender groups.

There is now terrorists who are independent from a state, hold violent religious fanatics, and/ or are groups or individuals that terrorize for a particular cause such as the environment.

The nature of the post- Cold War world has seen a change in the dynamics of the international system where nations do not clash merely over economic or territorial issues, but now also over long-submerged cultural issues. According to Huntington (1993) the division of the world in the future will be exceedingly based upon a clash of civilizations and their people’s cultural and religious identities (Huntington, 1993, p.25). This appears to be the case with a comparison of Islamic and democratic nations and is reflected in the increase of conflicts and terrorism in the last few decades.

But, as terrorist attacks have increased sizably since the 1970s, and the plurality has been directed against United States citizens abroad—especially diplomats and persons doing business. While “traditional terrorism” was MarxistLeninist in ideology, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the “new terrorism” has been seen as largely inspired by the Shi’a Islamic faith. Along with this trend into the 21st century has been increasing lethality

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and the American Homeland as a target as exemplified by the WTC/Pentagon 9/11 attacks.

The United States is now longer protected by its geographic isolation –as terrorism has truly found a transnational home in the global age.

limitations. This new terrorism is cell-based or asymmetrical, has access and use of modern technologies, and may have the capacity to develop exceedingly lethal methods -- including with WMD or biological weapons potentials (White, 2010).

The “New Terrorism”

The newest forms of terrorism also while often politically vague is also often fundamentally religious driven (but often in a religious-political hubris).

While some see the new terrorism as primarily driven by

There is perhaps a dividing point between “old” and “new” terrorism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This dichotomy is between selective and nonselec-

Most suicide bombings are motivated by strategic, political, and territorial reasons. Religion can serve as a justification and can even help motivate the bombers, but not all terrorism is inspired by religion idealogy and religious fundamentalists. Even religious fundamentalism is unlikely to be a single cause of terrorism, but it may reflect other aspects of group and personal dynamics (Borum, 2004). tive destruction. Laqueur (1996) argues that modern terrorists are more ruthless and more violent than their historical counterparts. Laqueur also states that modern terrorism has been typified by indiscriminate violence and the intentional targeting of the civilian population.

The “New Terrorism ” or terrorism since the 1980s --can be categorize as a truly global phenomenon not bound by geographic—but also as a process not bound by traditional organizational hierarchies or structural

religious ideology, other experts note that radical Islamic terrorism is first and foremost a political and psychological response to contemporary political issues and does not reflect the essence of Islam (Esposito, 1999).

Armstrong (2005) contends “fundamentalism is often a form of nationalism in religious disguise,” and suggests one should not over-generalize that such atrocities are caused by Islam or that the entire motive for terrorism is religious. It is noteworthy to point out that while widely associated with religious funda-

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mentalism, suicide bombers are not exclusively religious; only 43% are identifiably religious (Brym, 2007) Most suicide bombings are motivated by strategic, political, and territorial reasons. Religion can serve as a justification and can even help motivate the bombers, but not all terrorism is inspired by religion idealogy and religious fundamentalists. Even religious fundamentalism is unlikely to be a single cause of terrorism, but it may reflect other aspects of group and personal dynamics (Borum, 2004).

One must also carefully distinguish between terrorism rooted in Palestinian nationalism and terrorism rooted in Islamic fundamentalism. The former has its roots in radical leftist groups, not religious fundamentalism.

The two have very different beliefs and agendas although they have influenced each other over the years (Poland, 2011). This is important because it helps to undermine the belief that Islam is monolithic and that Middle Eastern politics is homogeneous. Moreover, many often lump all terrorist groups from the Middle East together – an error that often leads to a gross misunderstanding of the region and its people.

The Multidimensionalism of Terrorism As suggested earlier, much of the “new terrorism” has been the product of the emerging independence of Islamic countries and is multi-dimensional with political, psychological, social, and religious aspects.

This multi-dimensional process exists both on an individual and at a country and state level. It involves groups of people forming associations, defining social realities, and taking actions based on the meanings given to those realities. Terrorism consequently has become the new

reality for the United States (a reality it was really unprepared for). Unlike many other social processes and realities-- terrorism is violent and is conducted in situations where violence is not expected. Motivation for terrorism and an effective response cannot be considered apart from political, historical, psychological, familial, social, and group dynamics, and even purely accidental factors.

Political Aspects of Terrorism. Terrorism (and counterterrorism) can be viewed as a political process. It is violent political activity designed to force particular interpretations of reality on others. Throughout history, many nationalists who found themselves under foreign control adopted the tactics of the terrorists in order to fight foreign powers occupying their lands. Nationalist groups throughout Europe turned to the philosophy of the bomb, and nationalistic terrorists began to follow the pattern set by the violent anarchists (according to White, 2001- Terrorism in the modern sense came from violent anarchists in the late 1800s). Nationalists believed they were fighting patriotic wars. They often adopted the tactics of the anarchists. The nationalist Irish Republican Army (IRA) rose from such nationalistic growth against colonialism (Laqueur, 2004).

Conflict over secession and self-determination has grown in many postcolonial nations, resulting in extended and often far-reaching campaigns of violence, civil war, and terror.

Nation-states with a colonial past are significantly more likely to experience secessionist conflicts by both ruling and excluded groups of people, suggesting that segments of the population are accustomed to self-rule, even under indirect colonialism, and then likely to

resent the shift to direct rule by the modern nation-state (Blanton, R., T.D. & Mason, Athow, B. 2001). Prior to 1945 the world was multi-polar, but after WWII, it became bi-polar with regards to a deterrent competition known as the “cold war” between two super powers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. began to enjoy and assume a position of primacy. According to Betts, the U.S. confused primacy with invulnerability (Betts, 2002).

Scholars of all disciplines have extensively argued the longlasting adverse effects of colonial control in a post-colonial world is that it unleashed violent ethnic conflict. This is one of the many negative side effects of colonial control (Blanton et al. 2001; Lange et al. 2003; Lange and Dawson 2009; Ratner 1996). Pluchinsky (1998) has suggested “blood feud terrorism”—retaliatory acts of violence to satisfy the vengeance code of a clan—will only see an increase through the early part of the 21st century. Blood feud terrorism seems likely in the 15 newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

In the more modern era—CIA covert activities, including assassination and regime destabilizing missions and U.S. nation-building efforts (IRAN is offered in the text as the classic example) have a backlash potential with indigenous populations. It often creates the hotbed of conditions that foster the development of resentment and terrorism. Vengeance is often a ‘trigger’ in terrorism individuals engaging in terrorism violence is a complicated problem and the question why they engage in terrorism is still more difficulty to determine than we can conclude on face value. The demand for retribution or expression as vengeance

can serve as merely a public justification or excuse. Terrorism is likely the result from a combination of other multiple factors as well.

Social Aspects of Terrorism.

Terrorism and counter-terrorism is also a social process. Bandura (1990) noted that the path to terrorism can be shaped by fortuitous factors as well as by the conjoint influence of personal proclivity and social inducements. Horgan and Taylor (2001) have noted: “What we know of actual terrorists suggests that there is rarely a conscious decision made to become a terrorist. Most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialization towards extreme behavior.”

The “Social-Developmental” approach has been suggested, in various forms, by a wide range of researchers and observers.

Terrorism, in this view, is not the product of a single decision, but the end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward a commitment to violence over time. The process takes place within a larger political and social environment involving the state, the terrorist group, and the group’s self-designated political affliation. The interaction of these variables in a group setting is used to explain why individuals turn to violence and can eventually justify terrorist actions. Three factors - injustice, identity, and need for belonging –have been found often to co-occur in terrorists and strongly influence decisions to enter terrorist organizations and to engage in terrorist activity (Borum, 2004).

Psychological Aspects of Terrorism. Terrorism and counterterrorism is also a psychological process. Individuals take actions within associations, applying interpretations of reality and reacting to environmental

stimuli and possible motivators.

Psychology has tried to profile terrorists with limited success as they constantly change over time. Former CIA psychiatrist, Jerrold Post (1984) built on the earlier models that sought to explain terrorism a form of psychopathology or personality defect, arguing that two different forms of dysfunction produced two different patterns of terrorist behavior. The first type was the Anarchic-ideologue. These individuals were hypothesized to come from severely dysfunctional families where they likely had suffered severe abuse or maltreatment, leading them to have hostile feelings toward their parents. Their extremist ideology was a displacement of their rebellion and hostility onto the state authority. That is, they acted out hostility by rebelling against the state of their parents (Post, 1984). In contrast, the second type, the “Nationalistsecessionist was not hostile, but loyal to his parents, and his extremism was motivated to retaliate or avenge the wrongs done to his parents by the state. In essence, they rebelled against external society out of loyalty to their parents” (Post, 1984 p.16). Crenshaw, (1992) notes that the idea of terrorism as merely the product of mental disorder or psychopath is unlikely to be accurate as a psychology of terrorism cannot be considered apart from political, historical, familial, group dynamic, organic, ideological, and even purely accidental, coincidental factors.

Religious Aspects of Terrorism.

Finally, since the last part of the twentieth century, terrorism has often become embedded in a religious process, that is hard to separate from other contexts.

Religious and Spiritual traditions across cultures and epochs have traditionally focused on the transpersonal accepts of living, but as psychological

science evolves, there may be a recognition and the need to study this transpersonal level of self and group ideologies. (Appel & Kim-Appel, 2010). The Transpersonal domain represents the need for an “expansive” identity beyond the personal ego and the desire to experience “transrational” stages of consciousness (see Walsh & Vaughan (1993). It is at the transpersonal sphere of influence one can be driven towards aggressive acts. It is from this level one can express what Grof (1985) calls “malignant destructiveness.” Grof indicates the need to distinguish “defensive” or “benign aggression” which is in service of the (perceived) survival of the individual or the species. “Malignant destructiveness” is a form of aggression that can be done with even without any biological or economic reasons. “Malignant destructiveness” is born out a lack of an integrated transpersonal perspective (e.g. experiencing a discontinuity among living organisms) as well as in a striving for transcendence in the context of desiring death-rebirth.

A transpersonal search can be worked through in a constructive moral and ethical system, or it can be abandoned in despair and/ or existential crisis. This innate desire for purpose, meaning, and transcendence beyond a finite material life can also be perverted or hijacked by spiritual or religious systems that advocate self or other destruction Islam and Muslim countries are not a monolithic entity, and we must educate ourselves on the nuance of its plurality, internal dynamics, and historical complexities. Our national policies, laws and counter-terrorism strategies should reflect this fact.

However, Islamic terrorism is still only one of countless forms

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of terrorism today, including revolutionary, political, nationalist, cause-based, environmental, criminal, religious, enforcement, maverick, splinter, and even psychotic or lone-wolf terrorism.

The “new domestic terrorist” movement includes Christian Identify advocates, Klan members, militias, Freemen, skinheads, survivalists, Populists, gun enthusiasts, militant antiabortionists, tax protesters, and neo-Nazis.

The Legal and Ethical Framework in a Multidimensional Address of Terrorism Most important, Homeland Security and most importantly our legal system should develop a clear definition of terrorism, such as that suggested by the Terrorism Research Center, which excludes singling out one ethnic or religious group or nonviolent acts of protest by American citizens that are not potential violent crimes against persons. Davis & Jenkins (2002) note to successfully deter terrorism we must: “Manifest strength and, perhaps even more important, manifest purpose and determination.”

These authors go on to say: “We must also show: (1) Consistency with American values in war and a moral validity apparent to others with whom the United States needs to work; and (2) A balance between efforts to crush a particular terrorist organization and efforts to mitigate the factors that give the organization appeal and power (requiring consistent attention by policy and lawmakers and those who execute the strategy)” (p.25).

This approach also indicates efforts through interdiction— which includes gathering information and intelligence and

disrupting terrorists operations and arresting planners. Profiling was also identified as a possible means of prevention (as part of deterrence)—but this can problematic if based solely on racial or religious factors because it could alienate the very communities in which one needs to engage for information and prevention efforts. Profiling should be based on a multidimensional analysis of the multipath factors that come together to create the tipping point for expression of terrorist behavior.

that any civilized society would denounce them. This includes (but is not limited to-- (1) piracy; (2) slavery; (3) war crimes; (4) crimes against peace; (5) crimes against humanity; (6) genocide; and (7) torture (The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 28, Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs, 2001). Many countries can use principles of Universal jurisprudence to provide a unified approach to addressing these issues including dealing with terrorism.

Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates advocates the developmental of relationships. He believes security begins by developing a concept he calls partner capacity (Gates, 2010). The prime goal of this policy is to help countries develop the means to defend themselves and creating alliances to support them and the right towards democratic rule. Partnerships require new cooperative intergovernmental relationships, assistance from allies, and pooling resources to solve security problems. Secular Muslim nations are also critical players in international security-so to blindly frame terrorism as a problem inherent in Islam itself is a strategy that is unlikely to be effective.

Slowly but surely over time, the principle of universal jurisprudence appears to be developing world- wide (Van Alstine, 2009). This is in regards to the protection of human rights and environmental concerns and now towards a global stance against terrorism. Such an approach would not have countries operating in isolation—but in extended partnerships and universal rule applications.

Universal Jurisprudence “Universal jurisprudence” is a broad concept and embedded in the idea that: “The nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.” (The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, 2001, p. 1).

These crimes are usually so heinous and universally condemned

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Human Rights and Democratization as Central to Ethical and Legal Actions The United States took the lead after World War II in the adoption of Human Rights agreements, but more recently human rights have taken a back seated to global politics (Carr, 2002).

Right after World War II the United States was essential to establishing institutional and legal infrastructure intended to develop peace while promoting human rights. In light of the human travesties of World War II the United Nations developed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the most famous human rights agreement in the world. The key messages of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are

that human rights are globally universal, equal, interdependent & indivisible (Than, & Shorts, 2003). This document can serve as a scaffold for an ethical and legal framework for a universal counterterrorism effort.

A more central human rights guiding philosophy protect rights of individuals—even those accused of the heinous acts of terrorism. This would not mean releasing or going “soft” on those suspected terrorists who are detained. But what this means—would be more guarantee of due process—humane treatment (psychological and physical) within a context of fair justice. This would be in a contrast to a legal or criminal justice process that might be a “knee-jerk” or a revengeretribution based systems. Authoritarian state tactics may ultimately negatively impact the outcome of counterterrorism efforts as exemplified by the abusive interrogation and detention procedures used at Abu Graib Correctional Facility

by Coalition forces in Iraq (Cole, 2003). It is still not known what other abuses have occurred with some 1200 persons detained under the PATRIOT Act because their detention is shrouded in secrecy. But if the United States is seen as abusive in their pursuit of terrorism—this can hinder needed partnerships and moral and ethical authority.

We must work diligently to understand why and how some people become terrorists. We must also become aware of the processes, developments, and factors contributing to the end of Terrorism. There have been terrorists organizations that have disbanded which we can learn from –and since 1968, 268 terrorist groups have disbanded according to Jones & Libicki (2008). Jones and Libicki (2008) found that the most common way for

terrorist groups to end was by joining the political and the legal process—either through a peace settlement with the government and abandonment of violence or through “civic action” in the absence of an explicit agreement. According these researchers of the 268 groups that have ended since 1968 114 (or 43 percent) did so by entering nonviolent politics in one way or another.

Examples include the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador, and the Mozambican National Resistance. Implications for such groups as al Qaeda remain unknown, but perhaps political solutions to extraneous supportive affiliation could weaken the synergy of terrorist’s causes.

A more universal and human rights approach to terrorism would also involve the inclusion and use of exceedingly more international legal mechanisms. This would include more counterterrorism operation partnerships, as well as, use of more international legal structures—such as the use of international laws to prosecute alleged terrorists and more use of international courts. This also would include the development of perhaps of a more inclusive political processes that could hear international complaints and grievances (thus allowing the venting of anger that otherwise would be expressed through terrorist actions).

So we must show force and perseverance—but in a measured and consistent way. This consistency must also be in line and congruence with American moral and legal values we profess. It must also be seen as part of universal human values that exist, not merely for selfserving benefit of a particular nation-state.

Conclusion Ultimately, the individuals involved in terrorism require a more complex response from society than simply a quest for their apprehension and blind persecution. Responses to terrorism, including security and legal ones based on inaccurate and misleading characterizations will lead inevitably to damaging policies and deficient outcomes as campaigns of violence are needlessly prolonged. It is from a narrow perspective that the concerns will arise with those who fight terrorism – and the policy makers and laws that guide them. We must replace the fragmented view of terrorism as a single issue (e.g. religious) and examine the phenomena from a wide lens. It is from this enlarged vantage point that we might be able to see intervention in different pathways as we move forward towards homeland and world security-while maintaining the ethical and legal high ground.

About the Authors Dr. Jonathan Appel has worked in the field of Behavioral Health for almost three decades. He is currently a Full Professor in the Department of Behavioral and Social Sciences, within the School of Criminal Justice and Social Sciences at Tiffin University. Dr. Appel, teaches criminal justice and psychology as has developed and taught a “psychology of terrorism” course for Tiffin University, and is certified in the Psychology of Terrorist by the American Psychotherapy Association. Dr. Appel has degrees in psychology and criminal justice with a specialization in Homeland Security.

Dr. Kim-Appel was born and raised in Seoul, South Korea, where she got her undergraduate degree in Art from Seoul Women’s University. She came to the United States in 1991. She then obtained two masters degrees (one in Art Therapy and one in Family Counseling). Her Doctorate was then earned in Counseling with an emphasis in Family Therapy and a Cognate in Gerontology.

She currently is an Associate Professor of Counseling and Art Therapy at Ursuline College, and she has taught at both the undergraduate and graduate levels.

References • Appel, J. K., & Kim-Appel, D (2010). The multipath approach to personality: Towards a unified model. Psychology Journal.

• Bandura, A. (1990). Mechanisms of moral disengagement. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, and states of mind (pp. 161-191).

• Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

• Banks, W. C., Nevers, R. D., & Wallerstein, M. B. (2009). Combating terrorism, strategies and approaches.Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

• Brym, R. (2007). Six lessons of suicide bombers. Contexts 6, 40-45.

• Borum, R. (2004). Psychology of terrorism.

Tampa: University of South Florida.

• Carr, C. (2002). The lesson of terror: A history of warfare against civilians: Why it has always failed and why it will fail again.

New York: Random.

• Cole, David (2003). Enemy aliens: Double standards and constitutional Freedoms in the war on terrorism. New York City: The New Press.

• Davis, P. K., & Jenkins, B.M. (2002), Deterrence an influence in counterterrorism: A component in the war on al qaeda. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation.

• Esposito, J. (1999). The Islamic threat: Myth or reality. New York: Oxford University • Gates, W. (June 2010) Helping others defend themselves: The future of U.S. security assistance. accessed at: http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/66224/robert-mgates/helping-others-defend- themselves) • Grof, S. (1985). Beyond the brain: Birth, death and transcendence in psychotherapy.

State University of New York, New York.

• Horgan, J. and Taylor, M. (2001). The making of a terrorist. Intelligence Review, 13(12), 16-18.

• Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72, 3, 23-49.

• Jones, S. and Libicki, M. (2008), How terrorist groups end: Lessons for countering al qa’ida • Washington, D.C.: RAND. • Kushner, H. (1998). The new terrorism (pp.

3-20). In H. Kushner (Ed.) The future of terrorism: Violence in the millennium. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

• Laqueur, W. (1996). Postmodern terrorism.

Foreign Affairs, 75, 5, 24-36.

• Laqueur, W. (2004). No end to war: Terrorism in the twenty-first century. Continuum International Publishing Group.

• Pike, G. H. (2006). USA PATRIOT Act: What’s next? Information Today, 23, 4, p.15.

• Poland, J.M. (2010). Understanding terrorism: Groups, strategies, and responses. NJ: Prentice Hall.

• Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction (2001). The Princeton principles on universal jurisdiction 28. Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs. Accessed at: http://lapa.princeton.edu/ hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf • Pluchinskya, D. A. (1998). Terrorism in the former Soviet Union: A primer, a puzzle, a prognosis. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 21, 119-147.

• Silke, A. (ed.) (2011). The psychology of counter-terrorism. London: Routledge.

• Silke, A. (2003). Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences. Chichester: Wiley.

• U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2006). DHS six-point agenda. Accessed November 8, 2012 at: http://www.dhs.gov/ xabout/history/editorial_0646.shtm • Walsh, R & Vaughan, F. (1993). On Transpersonal definitions. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 25 (2) pp. 125-182.

• White, J. (2010). Terrorism: An introduction.

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Wolf, J.B. (1981). Fear of fear - A survey of terrorist operations and controls in open societies. New York, NY: Plenum Publishing.

Secure Driver:

Is Perception and Reaction Time Overlooked?

I

By Anthony Ricci

s Perception and Reaction Time an often over looked skill or just one that is taken for granted? This is a skill that cannot be taught in one lesson, but it is a technique and muscle response that can be practiced and understood over time. Many Officers/road users take these two words or actions at face value. We first hear of these topics in High School Driver’s Ed class: the classroom teacher addresses the importance of “scanning the road - our eyes never stop moving” or “we need to look 12 to 15 seconds down the road and be ready to react” and of course in some PD Academies there may be discussions on time and distance and even some math to show students just how fast things really do happen.

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The reason this topic cannot be taught in one lesson is that there are so many underlining factors involved. For example we tell our students to scan the road but we forget to tell them how to scan, how the eyes and mind work, and what to look for. In some instances looking at the car down the road may not be enough but glancing down at the tires may give you a better indication of which way that car is going to start moving. By knowing what to look for the driver can save time and start to react sooner.

caller is hiding in a downstairs closet. Your mind is set on the importance of the situation, saving a life, catching a thief, a potential confrontation of a weapon and maybemore than one suspect, your own well being, oh and I almost forgot DRIVING TO THE SCENE SAFELY. En route a car pulls out in front of you 300 feet down the road (football field). Your PPCV is traveling at 60 MPH with lights and siren. The question is do you have enough time to stop and/or avoid the vehicle?

As we are approaching the next blind curve or the next car pulling out to cross the intersection what should we be thinking about? It is one thing to teach a student to see the car well ahead, but to tell the student to begin the information processing technique from the time they approach the vehicle to the time they get out takes on a whole new meaning. WE MUST CONSTANTLY PROCESS INFORMATION – SEEING IT, DOES NOTHING BUT IDENTIFING, RECOGNIZING AND REACTING QUICKLY and ACCURATELY, SAVES LIVES. A Law Enforcement Officer must take this process to a much deeper level. He/she has to scan the roads for many things, not just potential accident situations.

Since accidents happen in feet not hours we first have to change MPH to FPS. An Accident Re-constructionist would multiply 1.47 times 60 MPH = 88 FPS which is exact. However, for the sake of this article let’s make it easy by multiplying 60 by 1.50: (60MPH/2= 30) (30 + 60 = 90 FPS) At 60 MPH for every second you travel you are traveling 90 feet. Using the BEST case scenario if it takes you .5 second to recognize the car as a potential hazard and another .5 second for your brain to tell your hands and feet to do something, you have just covered 90 feet and are still moving at 60 MPH or 90 FPS. Problem is before you saw the car you were looking down at the police radio for only a split second, which put you 90 feet deeper into the accident zone. You now have 120 feet and approx. 1.3 seconds to stop, this situation just got real serious. If the driver froze on the steering wheel and slammed on the brakes, which is quite common, your vehicle would end up 30 feet through the obstacle. A PPCV should be able to stop from 60 MPH in approx. 140 to 150 feet if using correct braking technique.

Perception time: the time it takes for the brain to identify an object as a potential hazard is at best .5 to .75 seconds if the driver is alert and ready to react.

Reaction time: the time it takes your brain to tell your hands and feet to do something again it can take .5 to .75 seconds if the driver is in ready mode. While your brain is telling your foot to get to the brake-pedal, time is quickly passing and you are getting much closer to the dreaded contact point. Remember at this point the brakes have not been activated and your vehicle is still traveling at the same speed. Hopefully you will have enough space left to allow the brakes and steering wheel to work. The less space you have the more skill and luck you will need.

You’ve been called to a break-in where a female

Since accidents happen in feet not hours we first have to change MPH to FPS. An Accident Re-constructionist would multiply 1.47 times 60 MPH = 88 FPS which is exact. However, for the sake of this article let’s make it easy by multiplying 60 by 1.50: (60MPH/2= 30) (30 + 60 = 90 FPS) At 60 MPH for every second you travel you are traveling 90 feet.

Since the driver does not control braking distance the only place to make up time and create more distance is in the perception and reaction process. Driving is mostly a skill of the eyes and mind and trainers need to focus a large amount of time on how and what the officer perceives as dangerous and reacting quickly and properly to it.

About the Author Anthony Ricci is President of ADSI 1adsi.com.

A IACSP Q & A

With Former New York City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly

R

ay Kelly, the author of “Vigilance: My Life Serving America and Protecting Its Empire City“, served twice as the New York City police commissioner. In his book, Ray Kelly writes about the sixteen terrorist plots against New York City that were thwarted after 9/11. He also offers his views and insights into the challenges and controversies facing law enforcement today.

The son of a milkman and a Macy’s dressing room checker, Ray Kelly grew up on New York City’s Upper West Side. He served as a Marine officer in Vietnam

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and later became a New York City police officer. Kelly rose quickly through the NYPD ranks and he became the police commissioner under Mayor David Dinkins,

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where he oversaw the police response to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and spearheaded programs that would help usher in the city’s historic drop in crime.

Eight years later, after the 9/11 attacks, newly elected Mayor Michael Bloomberg appointed Kelly to be NYC’s commissioner once again.

After a decade serving as Under Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, overseeing U.S. Customs, and commanding an international police force in Haiti, Kelly believed that the city could not afford to rely solely on the federal government for security. Kelly created and improved the NYPD’s counterterrorism and intelligence bureaus.

Ray Kelly retired from the Marine Corp Reserves with the rank of colonel after 30 years of service. He holds degrees from Manhattan College, St. John’s University School of Law, New York University Graduate School of Law and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

(Editor’s note: Mr. Kelly was interviewed prior to the terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California and the shooting of a Philadelphia police officer by a man who confessed to the crime and supporting ISIS).

It got us what I was looking for, which was trip wires and listening posts for New York.

For instance, during the London bombing, I was on the phone with our person in London before the head of the Metropolitan Police knew about the bombing. We didn’t know if this was part of worldwide series of attacks or what. We got granular information very quickly. We didn’t have anyone in Mumbai during the bombing there, so we sent three officers there just after the shooting stopped. They were able to gather some really detailed information.

gest serving commissioner I thought that I should put down some of the things that I was engaged in. I enjoyed the experience and it made me reflect on a lot of things.

I tried to make it a readable book and it didn’t have a lot of numbers and that sort of thing.

IACSP: It had some good

stories.

Kelly: I hope it was a good read.

IACSP: In addition to being police commissioner twice during tumultuous times, you also had other experiences, such as serving in Vietnam, Washington and Haiti. You could have written an entire book just on your time overseeing international police operations in Haiti.

Kelly: You’re absolutely right. They say that about 85% of the people there are Catholic, but 100% believe in Voodoo. That fatalistic spiritualism basically says that when problems arise they come from evil spirits.

IACSP: One of the things

IACSP: Why did you write this book?

you should take credit for is creating a robust counterterrorism bureau and you enhanced your intelligence bureau, including sending NYPD detectives overseas.

Was this effective? Was it worth the time and money?

Kelly: I’ve been blessed with a lot of experiences and opportunities and in those experiences are lessons learned and I wanted to memorialize it. My predecessors all wrote books, so as I was the lon-

Kelly: Yes, I think it was.

First of all, the funding for the overseas program comes from a private foundation.

The only thing that was on the public payroll was the salaries and living expenses

Ray Kelly was interviewed

by Paul Davis, a contributing editor to the Journal.

of the officers. We did that from the get-go because I knew there would be problems and issues. You have a guy in Brooklyn whose car was broken into and, hey, you have a detective in Abu Dhabi?

It got us what I was looking for, which was trip wires and listening posts for New York. For instance, during the London bombing, I was on the phone with our person in London before the head of the Metropolitan Police knew about the bombing. We didn’t know if this was part of worldwide series of attacks or what. We got granular information very quickly. We didn’t have anyone in Mumbai during the bombing there, so we sent three officers there just after the shooting stopped. They were able to gather some really detailed information. They landed on a Sunday and by the following Friday I had a 75-page report from them. We had 400 people in our audience listening to them when we had a hook-up.

These were security directors in the New York and surrounding area. We had a tabletop exercise that I administered with our executive corp. I sent the 75-page report to the FBI and they had it that morning, and we had an actual exercise in the field, roughly approximating what had happened in Mumbai. That’s what I was looking for from the program – speed. Speed is information.

It worked. It wasn’t only looking at the culture they were assigned to, but being able to travel to other locations and get information quickly. We don’t want to wait two years for a federal government report. We want to learn what happened

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and how we can better protect ourselves. Is there a possibility of something like this happening in New York?

IACSP: And meanwhile the

bad guys are communicating immediately worldwide via the Internet, emails and telephones.

Kelly: Yes.

IACSP: Did your detectives

meet any resistance from foreign governments or our government, like the State Department, the CIA, the FBI and so on?

Kelly: They didn’t receive it.

There was some grumblings on the ground level, but Bob Mueller, who was the FBI director then, supported it. Some ambassador wanted them to report to him, but our position was this is a cop-to-cop relationship. Now I was the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and then the U.S. Customs Commissioner and one of the things we did was to have out LEGATs, our legal attaches, in other embassies throughout the world. I was aware of that program, but this was going to be different.

This was between cops and it worked very well. We now have cops in the NYPD who were born in 106 countries.

This gives the department tremendous diversity. We were able to match individuals with the country based on language skills and that sort of thing. As far as I know, it is still working well.

IACSP: In your book you do

a good job of describing the thwarting 16 terrorist plots against New York. Can you give us an overview of what

you thought was the most serious of those plots and how they were thwarted?

Kelly: I want to be clear: basically, it was 16 plots that were thwarted, but I never stated that the NYPD did it. The FBI does great work and the NYPD does great work, and oh, by the way, we were lucky. We’ll take luck every time. One attack in particular, where the individual drives into Times Square in 2010, finds a parking spot for his SUV on 45th and Broadway, and sets off this bomb. He walks away, sets off a fuse and thinks he’s going to blow up this car. It only smoked. There was a vendor near there and a police officer on horseback who saw the smoke coming out of the car, reported it and the fire department came and ultimately the bomb squad came. What he had done was dumb-down the formula he was given. He was a naturalized Pakistani. He had gone to Pakistan and came in contact with the Pakistan Taliban and they gave him the instructions on how to do this with readily available equipment.

However, he thought that he looked Pakistani and he would raise suspicions, so on his own volition, he dumbs down the formula. He uses a lessor grade of fertilizer because a higher level would be reported to the federal government. He goes to Pennsylvania to buy firecrackers, but instead of buying M-80 firecrackers, which are very powerful, he buys M-88 firecrackers. So he kind of outsmarted himself.

IACSP: Thankfully.

Kelly: He gets away but we’re able to track him based on the

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transaction where he bought the car in Connecticut. We identified him the next day.

The FBI goes to his house in Bridgeport and surrounds his house thinking he’s in there, but he’s not. He drove to the airport with an M-9 rifle, which he was going to use to shoot his way out. When he gets to the airport, he leaves his rifle in the car, pays cash for a ticket and gets on a plane to Abba Dhabi.

The plane pulls away from the ramp but brought back and he’s taken off the plane. He’s arrested and confesses to all of this. If in fact that bomb had worked, it would have killed probably scores of people.

Times Square on a warm May night was packed with people.

You would have had a lot of people killed.

IACSP: In your book you called terrorism “theater.”

Kelly: That’s what it is. They want to make a show. Terrorism sort of by definition means they are trying to level the playing field. Terrorists are fighting against a much biggest force or entity – the U.S. Government or another government – so what they are trying to do is instill fear in people, and that’s the theatrical part. And quite frankly, New York is still the world’s biggest stage. It is the financial capital, the communications capital and the cultural capital. So you get more bang for the buck, no pun intended, by attacking New York City.

IACSP: Why did you write in

your book that after the 1993 attack World Trade Center bombing you believed we were facing a new breed of Islamic jihadists that were more daunting than anything America

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has ever seen before? More daunting than Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan?

Kelly: The Internet has been a game-changer in terms of motivating people and also in showing the means of how to conduct mayhem - I’m sure you know about Inspire magazine.

So it is a very different threat from the threat we faced from the Japanese or the Germans. Fighting a standing army is one thing, but being able to identify a needle in a haystack and prevent a terrorist attack is very difficult.

IACSP: How does law enforcement and intelligence agencies deal with the lone wolf terrorist?

Kelly: With great difficulty. In the book we talk about Jose Pementel. He was born in the Dominican Republic and he comes here when he’s three or four years of age and he later becomes a Muslim.

He is motivated by films he saw on the Internet, including the alleged atrocities that happened at Abu Ghraib. So he wants to kill U.S. troops returning from Afghanistan. We got lucky by getting a confidential informant next to him. He’s using the confidential informant’s apartment, which we totally wired, so while this case is going on, I’m watching him make elbow bombs, three-joint bombs, basically. Making the fuel for that was 600 match tops. He took the tops off of the matches. The simplicity of it makes it very, very difficult to identify these people.

We get into these chatrooms and pick up some concerns, but a lot of times now the chatrooms are password-protected and it is a one-on-one conversation. It is difficult to monitor that sort of thing. But because of our increased diversity we are able to have someone undercover interacting on a chatroom who uses the dialect or the street jargon of Karachi, because they were born in Karachi.

IACSP: If I may change gears and cover crime, why do you think proactive police tactics like “Stop & Frisk” are effective?

I read that you prefer the term “Street

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Inquiries,” or “Stop, Question & Sometimes Frisk.”

Kelly: It is common sense. It says that if people, particularly young people, have a tendency to carry a gun and have the potential for being stopped and having that gun found, they are less likely to carry it, therefore you will have less spontaneous shootings. When stops are done at a reasonable level I think it will reduce shootings. We’ve seen it here in New York and we’ve seen it in other cities. There was an article in The NY Times in the last month or so saying there is an increase in shootings in 30 cities in America. That’s not a coincidence. That’s a result of backing off from these types of tactics and strategies. It is perfectly lawful. It has been validated by a Supreme Court case, Terry vs. Ohio, and it works. The NYPD has cops from 106 countries, so to think we have a policy of racial profiling is wrong. “Stop & Frisk” is not a be-all or end-all, but the total tactics and strategies that we used in the Bloomberg administration’s 12 years that resulted in almost 9,500 fewer murders than in the 12 preceding years. That is a phenomenal number. And if history is any guide, those lives saved are men of color.

IACSP: I’m against most forms of gun control, but taking illegal guns away from street criminals is true gun control, in my view.

Kelly: You’re absolutely right.

IACSP: The DEA chief recently backed up the FBI director by agreeing that there was indeed a “Ferguson Effect” on police officers. Do you agree?

Kelly: I totally agree. Just ask the cops.

They’re the best source. Don’t ask the White House. Ask a cop on the street.

IACSP: In addition to your long service with the NYPD, you also served as a Marine officer, a federal law enforcement official and a corporate security executive.

Do you think these experiences helped you in your job as the police commissioner, especially during your second tour?

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Kelly: Yes. I think the sub-total of my experiences are pretty varied and defused.

They certainly helped me. I think I was sort of the right guy at the right time. I had been in the federal government, I ran a federal law enforcement agency in the federal government and I had seen what the federal government could do. I had been in Haiti and worked with federal authorities and I worked for a long time as a street cop, running police commands and that sort of thing. So it all sort of came together for me to get the job done just three and a half months after the horrific events of September 11th. The city was in the doldrums and I like to think that under the leadership of Mayor Bloomberg we did a good job of bringing back the spirit of the city and reducing violent crime by 40% at the same time. This was done, by the way, with 6,000 fewer police officers than the previous administration.

IACSP: What was your high point as police commissioner and your low point?

Kelly: The lowest points are always when police officers are shot and killed. We had on my watch two instances where two cops were killed at the same time. You have to make those announcements to the family and it is always gut-wrenching. The best moment was when I was appointed. We sent out the three Cs, we called it: crime suppression, counterterrorism and community relations. I think we succeeded on all fronts. No successful terrorist attacks and we had crime reduced to record lows.

We had record low shootings and record low shootings by police officers. We’re proud of it.

IACSP: I read that ABC is producing a TV series based on you and your book. Can you tell us anything about that?

Kelly: Well, we met with them and I have an ABC contract and we are starting to put it together now with a writer. We’ll see how it develops.

IACSP: Thank you for your long service and thank you for speaking to us.

Vol. 21, No.4

IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf

By Dr. Joshua Sinai The following are noteworthy recently published books on various aspects of homeland security. The capsule reviews are arranged alphabetically, by authors’ last names.

Critical Infrastructure System Security and Resiliency Betty Biringer, Eric Vugrin, and Drake Warren, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013), 229 pages, $75.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9781466557505.

T

his is a valuable textbook on the methodologies and technologies required to minimize risks and upgrade resilience in critical infrastructure. The book is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the methodologies involved in conducting security risk assessment (e.g., estimating security risk by conducting threat and consequence analysis on ‘undesired events’, whether terrorism or natural disasters, against critical assets, and assessing the effectiveness of protection systems). The second section focuses on the evaluation and design of resilient systems (e.g., a discussion of the current state of qualitative and quantitative resilience assessments, measuring the costs of resilience in terms of absorptive capacity and recovery costs); and case studies of how to apply the study’s infrastructure resilience analysis framework to assessing an entity’s level of resilience.

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The concluding chapter discusses future directions in resilience assessments. The appendices include an example of the application of a root cause analysis-type ‘fault tree’ to examine the elements that might cause the potential breakdown of an electric power transmission in order to understand how to prevent such events. The chapters are accompanied by numerous tables and diagrams, including a chapter summary and reference resources. Two of the authors are senior members of the technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, NM, where the third author had worked until he joined the RAND Corporation in 2011.

tastrophes such as in Kansas, China, India, and Thailand; the impact of natural disasters on indigenous populations in cases such as Mindanao, Indonesia, and Louisiana, U.S.; and the role of local communities in helping recovery efforts.

tions during such incidents; and the processes involved in recovering from such incidents, including having a fully implemented business continuity plan in place. The Appendices include a series of checklist questions and issues to consider in preparing pre-incident preventative and post-incident recovery programs.

The authors are veteran practitioners in public safety, with Mr. Shepherd also a retired high ranking FBI official in counterterrorism and a former director of security for the Venetian Resort Hotel Casino, in Las Vegas, NV.

Active Shooter: Preparing for and Responding to a Growing Threat

Disaster’s Impact on Livelihood and Cultural Survival: Losses, Opportunities, and Mitigation

Michele Companion, editor, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015), 354 pages, $79.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9781482248432.

This is one of the few books that comprehensively examine the discipline of disaster management as it is applied to managing disasters around the world. This edited volume is divided into five sections: a discussion of disaster risk reduction in general; post-disaster resettlement and implications for rebuilding in the cases of the Ecuadorian Andes, Honduras, Algeria, and Japan following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami; the components involved in rehabilitating livelihood in cases involving natural ca-

Kevin T. Doss and C. David Shepherd, (Boston, MA: Butterworth Heinemann/Elsevier, 2015), 318 pages, $44.96 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-12-802784-4.

This book provides a comprehensive and detailed examination of the measures required to prevent active shooter events, ranging from preparing for, responding to, and recovering from such incidents. Following an introductory overview of the threat presented by active shooters primarily against private sector workplace facilities, the chapters cover topics such as how to profile the behaviors and mindsets of active shooters, including triggers that might drive such susceptible individuals into violence; the components involved in preparing preventative programs, including response and recovery programs; how to train and exercise employees in understanding how to respond to such violent events, such as in accordance with the ALICE response protocol of alert, lockdown, inform, counter, and escape; understanding the roles and responsibilities of first responders with whom affected security personnel need to coordinate effective response measures during such incidents; how to conduct internal and external crisis communica-

Counterterrorism Law

Stephen Dycus, William C. Banks, Peter Raven-Hansen, and Stephen L. Vladeck, editors, [Second Edition] (New York, NY: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2012), 912 pages, $209.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9780735598638.

This highly useful legal textbook presents a comprehensive and detailed overview of counterterrorism law within the larger field of national security law. The book is divided into eight parts: an introduction, authorities and limits in the war on terrorists, detecting terrorist threats, detaining and interrogating terrorist suspects, criminalizing terrorists, prosecuting terrorists and their supporters, applying counterterrorism law in homeland security, and applying “noncriminal sanctions” against terrorists and their supporters by means of public sanctions and launching lawsuits against terrorists and their supporters. The textbook’s chapters are accompanied by excerpted sections from relevant criminal codes and criminal cases, including notes and questions for discussion.

Investigative Interviewing: Psychology, Method, and Practice

Eugene F. Ferraro, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015), 389 pages, $63.96 [Hardcover], ISBN 9781466590861.

This is an authoritative, comprehensive and detailed examination of the practice of investigative interviewing whether in criminal proceedings or in the private sector where due process still has to be followed.

The book’s chapters cover topics such as the process of investigations (investigation terminology, the elements of successful investigation, whether physical or electronic, including undercover, or via interviews); the difference between public and private sector investigations; the fundamentals of interviewing, including collecting evidence in the course of such interviews, evidence retention and the chain of custody over such evidence); differentiating interviews from interrogation; methodologies to detect deception and, when appropriate, overcoming deceitful denials by suspects; handling legal challenges to interrogations; future trends in investigative interviewing; and methods to improve results in interrogation interviewing. The appendices include a glossary of investigative terms and terminology, an investigations checklist, a preprinted statement form, and an employee statement checklist.

The author, a veteran expert practitioner in compliance (including in the U.S. military), is Chief Ethics Officer of Convercent, Inc., in Denver, CO.

46

The book’s chapters cover topics such as the process of investigations (investigation terminology, the elements of successful investigation, whether physical or electronic, including undercover, or via interviews); the difference between public and private sector investigations; the fundamentals of interviewing, including collecting evidence in the course of such interviews, evidence retention and the chain of custody over such evidence); differentiating interviews from interrogation; methodologies to detect deception and, when appropriate, overcoming deceitful denials by suspects; handling legal challenges to interrogations; future trends in investigative interviewing; and methods to improve results in interrogation interviewing.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Policing in Israel: Studying Crime Control, Community Policing, and Counterterrorism

Tal Jonathan-Zamir, David Weisburd and Badi Hasisi, editors, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016), 263 pages, $79.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9781498722568.

The contributors to this edited volume, who are prominent Israeli criminologists, examine three significant aspects of policing in Israel: crime control (e.g., analyzing crime “hot spots”, measures to ensure road safety, and the impact of the organization of the criminal justice system on crime rates); police and community (e.g., the relationship between the police and minority communities, such as Israeli Arabs); and policing terrorism, with the Israeli police also responsible for maintaining internal security. Also discussed is media coverage of police performance, including in confronting terrorism. Although the Israeli police has recently experienced several high-profile scandals involving financial corruption and mismanagement of criminal cases, it is hoped that the installation of Roni Alsheikh, the former deputy head of the General Security Service (Shin Bet) as Police Commissioner, will restore the type of efficient policing that is so well discussed in this important volume.

Vol. 21, No.4

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Homeland Security and Private Sector Business: Corporations’ Role in Critical Infrastructure Protection Elsa Lee, [Second edition] (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015), 354 pages, $79.96 [Hardcover], ISBN 9781482248432.

This practitioner-based handbook provides a comprehensive and detailed overview of all the components involved in conducting risk assessments to safeguard private sector business facilities against the spectrum of threats, such as terrorism, cyber breaches, and malicious employee insiders. The book’s chapters cover topics such as an overview of the Department of Homeland Security and its National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP); trends in the evolution of the terrorist threat and warfare, including how terrorists plan their attacks; the components involved in conducting risk assessments, in which risk is defined as the product of threat x vulnerability; how to conduct an intelligence investigation in cooperation with law enforcement; and how to exercise a facility’s security plan. The handbook includes numerous highly useful tables and diagrams that serve as templates for putting together the security plans discussed in the chapters. The author, a former U.S. Army Counterintelligence Officer and Special Agent, is the CEO and founder of Advance SCI, LLC, a professional services firm in security and investigations.

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Policing Terrorism: Research Studies into Police Counterterrorism Investigations

Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection

Written by a former British counterterrorism detective, this highly useful practitioner-focused book is divided into two sections on policing terrorism. The first section, “The Law Governing Terrorism Investigations,” discusses the law governing terrorism investigations, including how terrorism is legally defined, government policies and statutory preventative measures against terrorism, the need to balance the interests of national security and individual civil liberties in conducting surveillance and information sharing on terrorist suspects, how terrorism is funded, and a comparative study of how terrorism-related laws are applied in a number of states. The second section, “Investigating Terrorism,” discusses issues such as the need for police officers to understand the levels of legal powers granted them to track the radicalization of individuals into terrorism, how to recruit informants and how they need to be handled, including in court proceedings.

This reference handbook is a comprehensive examination of the methodologies and technologies required to conduct risk analysis and to select effective countermeasures required to develop a security program. The handbook, which is intended for security professionals, is divided into three sections: selecting appropriate methodologies and tools to conduct a prioritized risk analysis of one’s assets, in terms of the probability of the threat to their being attacked; the components in terms of policies, standards, guidelines and procedures involved in implementing a security program; and metrics of effectiveness in selecting and budgeting for countermeasures in terms of security personnel and technologies, as well as the author’s guidelines for writing threat and vulnerability assessment reports. The author is a veteran security risk management consultant.

David Lowe, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016), 203 pages, $71.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9781482226836.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Thomas L. Norman, [Second edition] (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016), 483 pages, $55.96 [Hardcover], ISBN 9781482244199.

Vol. 21, No.4

Intelligence-Based Security in Private Industry

Thomas A. Trier, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015), 187 pages, $55.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9781498722032.

This is a highly useful practitioner-based overview of the components involved in conducting in-house intelligence-based security assessments and the guidelines required to mitigate a private business’s risk and vulnerability to criminal, workplace violence and other types of illicit activities.

The book is divided into six sections: an introductory overview of intelligence and the advantages of an intelligence-based security program; assessing a security program in terms of its capabilities and compliance to security standards; building consensus among stakeholders for a security program; the components of a security assessment in terms of external, internal, and industry threats vis-à-vis vulnerabilities; planning and resourcing involved in conducting an intelligence program assessment; developing a strategic and tactical plan to mitigate enterprise risk; and case studies that demonstrate best practices in implementing an intelligence-based security plan. The author, a retired former high-ranking FBI official in intelligence management, provides advisory services to the private sector through his firm, Security Intelligence Consulting, LLC.

Introduction to Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA): The U.S. Military’s Role to Support and Defend Bert B. Tussing and Robert McCreight, editors, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015), 224 pages, $71.96 [Hardcover], ISBN 9781466595675

The contributors to this highly useful textbook examine the roles and missions of the U.S. armed forces in support of civil authorities in homeland defense, particularly during emergency and disaster events, such as natural disasters and terrorism. The chapters cover topics such as the constitutional and legal frameworks governing the support of the military to civil authorities (including the role of US NORTHCOM in homeland defense), the air, land, and maritime domains where the military supports civil authorities, the military’s role in countering potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-type events, and emerging challenges in homeland defense in areas such as competition over the Arctic Region, cyber security, and unforeseen catastrophes. Each chapter includes diagrams, tables, discussion questions, and reference sources. and legal frameworks governing the support of the military to civil authorities (including the role of US NORTHCOM in homeland defense), the air, land, and maritime domains where the military supports civil authorities, the military’s role in countering potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-type events, and emerging challenges in homeland defense in areas such as competition over the Arctic Region, cyber security, and unforeseen catastrophes. Each chapter includes diagrams, tables, discussion questions, and reference sources.

Please note that three of the capsule reviews originally appeared in the December 2015 issue of the online journal “Perspectives on Terrorism” (www.terrorismanalysts.com). Reprinted with permission.

About the Reviewer Dr. Joshua Sinai is Director of Analytics & Business Intelligence at CRA (www.cra-usa.net), in Vienna, VA. He can be reached at Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

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