The IACSP’s Counter-Terrorism Journal V22N1

How Bad Guys Are Using The Web’s Own Encryption To Hide Malware Payloads

Cleveland, Ohio:

The Role Of Local Law Enforcement In Counterterrorism The Challenge Of Passenger Rail Security The Myth Of Safety: The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Five Years On Jihad And The Attacks In The 21st Century IACSP Q&A With Mark Henshaw: Author of The Fall Of Moscow Station

Spring Issue Vol. 22 No. 1 2016 Printed in the U.S.A. IACSP.COM

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 22, No.1

Vol. 22, No. 1 Spring 2016 IACSP Director of Operations Steven J. Fustero

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Associate Publisher Phil Friedman

The Myth Of Safety:

Senior Editor Nancy Perry

The Jukushima Nuclear Disaster Five Years On

Contributing Editors Paul Davis Thomas B. Hunter Joshua Sinai

by Luke Bencie & Yuji Kumamaru

Book Review Editor Jack Plaxe Research Director Gerry Keenan Conference Director John Dew

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Communications Director Craig O. Thompson

Salafi/Takfiri Micro-Theology:

Art Director Scott Dube, MAD4ART International

The Non Illusive And Motivational Ideology Behind Jihadists Attacks In The 21 Century

Psychological CT Advisors Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC

by Brig Barker

Counterintelligence Advisor Stanley I. White South America Advisor Edward J. Maggio Homeland Security Advisor Col. David Gavigan

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SITREP, Terrorism Trends & Forecasts 2016

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How Bad Guys Are Using The Web’s Own Encryption To Hide

Malware Payloads, by David Gewirtz

Personal Security Advisor Thomas J. Patire

Page 12 The Challenge Of Passenger Rail Security, by Robert Seasonwein Page 14 The Myth Of Safety: The Jukushima Nuclear Disaster Five Years

On, by Luke Bencie & Yuji Kumamaru

Page 18 Salafi/Takfiri Micro-Theology: The Non Illusive And Motivational

Ideology Behind Jihadists Attacks In The 21 Century, by Brig Barker

Page 26 Protecting The Power Grid: Target Analysis And Vulnerability Assessment, by Leo Labaj & Bruce Barnes Page 30 Cleveland, Ohio: The Role Of Local Law Enforcement In Counterterrorism, by Bob O’Brien, Jim Weiss & Mickey Davis Page 36 Secure Driver: Vision, by Anthony Ricci Page 38 An IACSP Q&A With Mark Henshaw, Author Of: The Fall Of

Director of Emergency Ops. Don L. Rondeau Tactical Advisor Robert Taubert Hazmat Advisor Bob Jaffin Security Driver Advisor Anthony Ricci, ADSI Cyberwarfare Advisor David Gewirtz Cell Phone Forensics Advisor Dr. Eamon P. Doherty IACSP Advisory Board John M. Peterson III John Dew Thomas Patire Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Robert E. Thorn Southeast Asia Correspondent Dr. Thomas A. Marks European Correspondent Elisabeth Peruci Middle East Correspondent Ali Koknar CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed

Moscow Station

Page 44 IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf: Reviews by Dr. Joshua Sinai THE JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L is published by SecureWorldnet, Ltd., PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (ISSN#1552-5155) in cooperation with the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals and Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Copyright © 2016. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher.

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (571) 216-8205, FAX: (202) 315-3459 .

Membership $65/year, add $10 for overseas memberships. Postmaster: send address changes to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA. Web site: www.iacsp.com

Emergency Management Advisor Clark L. Staten

PHOTO CREDITS: Reuters, DefenseImagery.mil Army.mil, Navy.mil, istockphoto.com, shutterstock.com and authors where applicable.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 22, No.1

National Sales Representative Phil Friedman, Advertising Director Tel: 201-224-0588, Fax: 202-315-3459 iacsp@aol.com

SITREP

T

Terrorism Trends his quarter saw fighting escalate again in Syria and Afghanistan, and erupt in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenian-backed separatists and Azerbaijani forces. In Bangladesh, election violence and killings by extremist groups showed how new heights of government-opposition rivalry and state repression have benefitted violent political party wings and extremist groups alike. Political tensions intensified in Iraq and Macedonia, and security forces

severely suppressed opposition protests in the Republic of Congo and Gambia.

On a positive note, new governments were formed in the Central African Republic and South Sudan to consolidate peace gains, and talks to end Yemen’s one-year-old civil war got underway, albeit later than planned.

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In Syria, the fragile “cessation of hostilities” which began on 27 February collapsed in the north of the country and UN-brokered talks in Geneva unraveled. Violence escalated in Aleppo, where over 250 people were reported killed by days of regime and rebel bombardments starting on 22 April. That the truce lasted as long as it did shows the positive potential the U.S.-Russian partnership can play; its collapse, however, illustrates the limits of that partnership as well.

In the South Caucasus, heavy fighting erupted between Armenian-backed separatists and Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh on 2 April, claiming dozens of lives in the most serious escalation since the 1994 ceasefire.

Several brutal murders in Bangladesh, including the killing of law student and secular blogger Nazimuddin Samad on 6 April, underscored the growing power and impunity of violent extremist groups.

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, the launch of the Taliban’s spring offensive led to major clashes in several provinces, further dimming hopes of insurgents’ participation in peace efforts and contributing to increasingly strained relations between Kabul and Islamabad.

In Iraq, Prime Minister Abadi’s failure to push his cabinet reshuffle through parliament, blocked by over 100 protesting parliamentarians, angered public opinion to such an extent that crowds of demonstrators broke into the fortified Green Zone on 30 April, prompting authorities to declare a state of

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emergency. Macedonia’s political crisis worsened as the opposition Social Democrats announced on 6 April that they would boycott the 5 June parliamentary elections due to the government’s failure to implement media reforms and clean up the electoral roll.

In Africa, the Republic of Congo saw government forces continue to crack down on protests against President Sassou-Nguesso’s disputed 20 March re-election. In Gambia, security forces broke up peaceful demonstrations calling for electoral reform and free speech on 14 April, arresting at least 50 protestors. The news that one arrested senior opposition official had been tortured to death sparked more protests and highlevel arrests.

In a major step forward, after more than three years of turmoil, the Central African Republic’s newly-elected President Touadéra appointed his prime minister, who in turn chose a new government.

Likewise South Sudan inched closer to implementing its August 2015 peace agreement when on 26 April Riek Machar, leader of the armed opposition (SPLM/A-IO), returned to Juba and was appointed first vice president. Two days later a transitional government was formed.

In Yemen, although fighting continued, UN-sponsored talks between President Hadi’s government and the Huthi/Saleh bloc – which got off to a stuttering start on 21 April – offer the best chance to end the war that began over a year ago and should be actively supported by all sides.

TRENDING

Deteriorated Situations • Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Gambia, Iraq, Macedonia, Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Republic of Congo, Syria Improved Situations • Central African Republic, South Sudan

OUTLOOK

Conflict Risk Alert Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) Conflict Resolution Opportunity South Sudan, Yemen Source: www.crisiswatch.org

Statistics On Cargo Thefts Released The FBI has just released its second annual compilation of cargo theft data reported through its Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. This latest release—which contains data from 2014—reveals that 547 incidents of cargo theft were reported to law enforcement during the year. The stolen cargo was worth more than $32.5 million.

Why does the FBI collect this data?

Because cargo theft can have a significant impact on the U.S. economy and because it’s often described as a gateway crime that can lead to broader investigations in areas like organized crime, drug trafficking, health care fraud, terrorism, etc.

Also, the USA Patriot Improvement and Re-Authorization Act of 2005 passed by Congress contained a mandate to “take the necessary steps to ensure that reports of cargo theft collected by federal, state, and local officials are reflected as a separate category in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting system.”

Participation in the UCR Program is voluntary, and in 2014, a total of 29 states submitted cargo theft data to the FBI, up from seven states in 2013. The Bureau expects participation to increase further as states implement technical changes within their systems, align state and local policies with federal requirements, and provide education and training to participants.

Cargo theft data reported to the FBI will eventually be incorporated into UCR’s annual Crime in the United States and National Incident-Based Reporting System publications.

To view the report go to: https:// www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ cargo-theft-2014

GXV-T Revs Up Research Into Nimbler, Faster, Smarter Armored Ground Vehicles Today’s ground-based armored fighting vehicles are better protected than ever, but face a constantly evolving threat: weapons increasingly effective at piercing

armor. While adding more armor has provided incremental increases in protection, it has also hobbled vehicle speed and mobility and ballooned development and deployment costs. To help reverse this trend, DARPA’s Ground X-Vehicle Technology (GXV-T) program recently awarded contracts to eight organizations.

DARPA has awarded contracts for GXV-T to the following organizations: • Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, Pa.) • Honeywell International Inc. (Phoenix, Ariz.)

• Leidos (San Diego, Calif.)

• Pratt & Miller (New Hudson, Mich.)

• QinetiQ Inc. (QinetiQ UK, Farnborough, United Kingdom) • Raytheon BBN (Cambridge, Mass.)

• Southwest Research Institute (San Antonio, Tex.) • SRI International (Menlo Park, Calif.)

The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps have expressed interest in future GXV-T capabilities.

Source: www.darpa.mil

Summer Reading The Craft of Intelligence: America’s Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free World If the experts could point to any single book as a starting point for understanding the subject of intelligence from the late twentieth century to today, that single book would be Allen W. Dulles’s The Craft of Intelligence. This classic of spycraft is based on Allen Dulles’s incomparable experience as a diplomat, international lawyer, and America’s premier intelligence

officer. Dulles was a high-ranking officer of the CIA’s predecessor-the Office of Strategic Services-and was present at the inception of the CIA, where he served eight of his ten years there as director.

Here he sums up what he learned about intelligence from nearly a half-century of experience in foreign affairs.

My favorite part of the book is his account of the Bay of Pigs incident, denying that the 1961 invasion was based on a CIA estimate that a popular Cuban uprising would ensue. This account is enlivened with a wealth of personal anecdotes.

This is a book for readers who seek wider understanding of the contribution of intelligence to our national security.

Book available at: www.amazon.com

IACSP News Many of our members are not receiving our new monthly CTS Enews (electronic security report) because we either do not have your email address, or you are using a .gov or .mil email address for your membership record. If you would like to receive our CTS Enews, please send me an email with the email address you would like us to use. Also include your current address. Please send the information to my attention to my personal email address: iacsp1@ aol.com Until next time, as always, be vigilant and safe.

Thank you.

Steven J. Fustero, Dir. Of Operations/IACSP

How Bad Guys

Are Using The Web’s Own Encryption To Hide Malware Payloads

By David Gerwitz

I

n almost all penetration-related cyberattacks, there are two stages: establishing command and control inside a target network, and then doing whatever nastiness is the goal of the attack. From a security point of view, if you can prevent the first stage, you can prevent the second stage from ever happening.

Let’s look, then, at the command and control portion of a cyberattack. The idea is to establish a foothold inside a target network.

The Trojan Horse analogy is apt here. Once the horse was allowed inside the walls of Troy, Odysseus’ troops were free to wreak havoc.

In a cyberattack penetration, the goal is to get some sort of executable piece of software inside the

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target organization’s firewall and cause it to run. That piece of software is usually quite small, all the better to sneak inside the protections of the victim organization.

Once it starts running, it tunnels out of the organization, pulls down more advanced software, and installs that software surreptitiously.

In some cases, that code runs on its own, becoming a malicious pre-programmed software robot

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that carries out the sinister intent of its hacker masters. In other cases, the downloaded control software opens a channel to a human user, who interactively explores and savages the target network from the inside.

We call that entire class of software “malware,” as distinguished from a computer virus.

A computer virus is a particular

form of self-replicating malware, but the entire class of malicious software is called malware.

At this point in our discussion, it’s important you remember this: an attacker needs to get a piece of malicious software inside a target network and induce it to execute.

So how does an attacker breach the protected walls of a network?

There are many ways, but in this article, we’re specifically going to discuss payloads distributed through Web pages. Here’s an example of how that might work.

Let’s say Bob works in an agency and needs to access a Web page.

So he points his Web browser to that page. If you’re not familiar with the process of what happens when you read a Web page, what actually occurs is the transfer of a number of files from a server to the user’s computer. Each page consists of many files, including graphics files, the HTML that describes how the page looks and its content, and a number of supporting files that execute inside the user’s browsers, most notably using JavaScript, Java, or Flash.

Every single time Bob visits a Web page, he’s downloading an entire set of files, many of which run on his own computer.

Now, let’s say Bob visits the Web page of a trusted vendor.

Unfortunately, this vendor has been hacked. This, by the way, is a common technique attackers use to gain access to more secured environments. They attack the often less-fortified networks of vendors and supporting organizations. These organizations all have Web sites, whether they’re HVAC repair guys or the local pizzeria.

In our case, Bob needs to order a part from his HVAC supplier.

Unknown to that supplier, their Web site has been hacked.

Now, every time anyone visits their Web site, each Web page delivered from their server includes a malicious script payload that is transmitted to the visitor’s machine.

In most cases, nothing happens because the visitor’s browser is up to date, the operating system is running the latest set of patches, and the organization’s firewall is operating at peak efficiency.

But hackers play an odds game.

All they need is one set of events to line up for them to get inside Bob’s agency. When Bob visits the hacked Web site, the malicious packet is sent to his computer.

As it turns out, Bob is visiting the Web site of the vendor using a secured connection (one that has an https:// URL and the little lock icon). A secured connection means that what Bob sends and receives from the vendor is encrypted, so hackers can’t easily sniff what’s in transit and read confidential information.

Here’s where it becomes problematic. Hackers can’t read the encrypted data, and neither can most firewalls. So while a firewall might be able to scan for patterns of unencrypted text that look like credit card numbers or malware signatures (known unique patterns that identify a bad packet), most firewalls can’t read inside encrypted packets.

So when Bob visits the corrupted site, the malware packet sails right through the firewall, uninspected and uninterrupted. That packet, which would have been blocked if the firewall could see through the encryption, is now on Bob’s machine.

Unfortunately, Bob’s agency has been operating on a budget shortfall for many years, and has hesitated to upgrade its

computers. Bob is running on an old Windows XP machine with an old version of the Microsoft Internet Explorer browser.

More modern operating systems and browsers would be able to identify the signature of the malware packet Bob has downloaded, but old systems let it sail on through.

Bob’s computer and browser doesn’t know that the chunk of script code embedded in a Web page is malicious. The browser simply executes the code, as it would any instruction to drop down a menu or provide a sliding graphic display. Except this isn’t a pretty user interface component. This is a piece of software that reaches back out the network and downloads a package which runs on Bob’s machine.

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What’s disturbing about this scenario is how easily it could have been prevented. It has become inexcusable to run out of date computers, operating systems, and browsers. National security is at stake. It’s absolutely critical that exploitable machines are taken out of service and replaced with more secure systems.

The agency’s firewall was also out of date. Newer firewalls, often called next-generation firewalls (or NGFWs) are often capable of examining encrypted packets as they come inside the network. With an NGFW, the https payload Bob downloaded would never have made it to his machine.

Late that night, the malicious code scans Bob’s machine, and starts talking to the bad guys (organized crime, terrorists, rogue nation states, whatever).

Late that night, the malicious code scans Bob’s machine, and starts talking to the bad guys (organized crime, terrorists, rogue nation states, whatever). It sends them most of the email messages Bob has stored. Some of these messages include passwords, password reset codes, email addresses for co-workers, and more.

It sends them most of the

Using that information and the malware on Bob’s machine, the attackers systematically dig further and further into Bob’s agency network, until they have almost complete access to everything inside.

The hackers remain inside the network for two years, constantly siphoning information out of Bob’s agency and reselling it to the highest bidder. They also plant misleading and erroneous data inside certain database records, laying the groundwork for future operations.

email addresses for co-

email messages Bob has stored. Some of these messages include passwords, password reset codes, workers, and more.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Firewalls are not terribly expensive, but they’re often ignored as part of an ongoing security strategy. Once they’ve been purchased and deployed, many managers assume they’re on the job. However, as we see in the news every day, the sophistication of the attacks against us increases exponentially every year. That means that a firewall that’s just a few years old is likely to be a complete sieve when it comes to protecting against current-day attacks.

Here are your five key takeaways: 1. Old computers and operating systems must be taken out of service 2. So-called secure https:// sites are not necessarily secure if they have been hacked at the server side 3. Any site you may access, even from top-notch organizations, may have been hacked 4. Secured communications links often allow malicious packets to travel into organizations 5. Firewalls must be able to inspect secured packets, which means it might be time to update your firewall Here’s one final thought: As terrible as it is to experience a cyberbreach or cyberattack, it’s even worse to know it wouldn’t have happened if only you’d updated your defenses. That’s it. Just update your stuff. Go ahead. Do it now.

About the Author CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed. is Director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute, Distinguished Lecturer for CBS Interactive, Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, IT Advisor to the Florida Public Health Association and an instructor at the UC Berkeley extension.

Vol. 22, No.1

â€?A  marvelous  book!  ...  The  most  handy,  the  most  accessible   ’how-­to’  book  to  be  aware  of  the  threats  that  we’re  facing.â€?        Â

! ( $! !

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How  prepared  are  you   to  protect  your  business  secrets?  Each  business  day,  some  35,000  executives,  scientists,  consultants  and  lawyers  pass  through  the  nation’s  airports  to  destinations  across  the  globe.  They  carry,  along  with Â

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On  the  other  side,  carefully  watching  most  of  those  travelers,  beginning  the  moment  they  arrive  at  the  airport  –  and  often  sooner  –  are  uncountednumbers  of  espionage  ope-­ ratives.  These  individuals  work  for  foreign  intelligence  services  and  economic  concerns.  They,  too,  are  pursuing  a  goal:  to  separate  international  business  travelers  from  their  trade  secrets. Â

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IACSP Perspective

The Challenge Of Passenger Rail Security

F

By Robert Seasonwein

rom 1991 to 2004 I was a member of the U.S. Justice Department’s Criminal Division. On September 11, 2001 I was in Tirana, Albania on business when I received word that at 8:46 a.m. in New York City the World Trade Center’s North Tower had been struck by a “small black airplane,” later determined to be American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767. A half hour later I learned that the South Tower had also been struck, and I began my odyssey to return to Washington, DC.

After spending several nights in Milan and Warsaw, I was able to fly to New York’s Kennedy Airport on Monday, September 17. Because no flights were being allowed into DC, I took a taxi to Pennsylvania Station and boarded an Amtrak train. There was no enhanced screening or searching of passengers boarding the train, although an Amtrak Police officer did come through the car with an explosive detection canine.

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As the train exited the tunnel on the New Jersey side of the Hudson River, I witnessed the magnitude of the destruction wrought on 9/11: all that remained of the “Twin Towers” was a large cloud of smoke and debris rising from where the buildings had stood. That sight was both chilling and profoundly sad, given the knowledge that thousands of innocent citizens had died at the hands of a few terrorists. As I rode south it became evident to me that

passenger trains were even more exposed to criminal and terrorist acts, yet there was little to no security, even after 9/11 provided proof positive that transportation venues were vulnerable and could be exploited.[1] In part to address that vulnerability, in 2004 Congress passed the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005 (Pub. L. 108-334) providing a total of $24 million for rail security; “to support

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the deployment of up to 100 TSA federal rail compliance inspectors;” and for the deployment of canine explosive detection teams. Essentially, these measures were to ensure compliance with certain security directives for Passenger Rail, and to identify and reduce vulnerabilities and gaps in passenger rail.[2] However, the only regulatory tools available to the TSA Rail Inspectors were in the form of those security

Fast-forward to August 2015, when a heavily armed gunman opened fire on a highspeed train travelling from Amsterdam to Paris before being overpowered by three US citizens, two of whom were soldiers. But for those three young men, and the fact that the gunman’s weapon jammed and he was unable to clear it, the result would have been much worse, with dozens killed or seriously wounded. directives which were hastily issued in 2004 in response to the horrific Atocha Station bombing of passenger trains in Madrid, Spain, in March of that year. Additionally, the security directives were essentially unenforceable, and the TSA Inspectors were given no enforcement authority over passenger rail and mass transit in the U.S. Subsequently a federal regulation was issued that provided an enforcement tool for freight rail; it gave the inspectors the mandate to ensure regulatory compliance concerning the transfer of tank cars containing hazardous material (such as chlorine, sulfuric acid and certain other toxic by inhalation chemicals) from one freight rail operator to another.

However, there had to be an actual transfer, and a tank car filled with such hazardous material could sit on a siding for days or weeks with no viable enforcement tool, so long as it had not changed hands. But even if they identified this very narrow regulatory violation, they had little to no authority to fine the violator.

Most importantly, they had almost no authority to assess the security of passenger trains other than vague language in the one federal rule at Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations section 1580 that clarified their authority ‘to inspect.’

While there have been minor tweaks in the rail inspectors’ authority, the forgoing has pretty much remained the state of, or the absence of, federal passenger rail security.

In 2007, Congress passed the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission; measures the 9/11 Commission urged Congress to adopt to ensure greater security on all of America’s transit systems. The legislation required TSA to create a regulatory framework that addresses the threats facing our passenger rail and transit agencies by having secu-

rity plans in place, ensuring proper security training for employees, and requiring thorough vetting for those working on the systems. However, while some programs were developed, albeit not regulatory, to address the training and security plan mandates of the 9/11 Act, most of those recommendations have not been implemented.

Fast-forward to August 2015, when a heavily armed gunman opened fire on a high-speed train travelling from Amsterdam to Paris before being overpowered by three US citizens, two of whom were soldiers.

But for those three young men, and the fact that the gunman’s weapon jammed and he was unable to clear it, the result would have been much worse, with dozens killed or seriously wounded. Whether the gunman was a terrorist or a lone-wolf with a grievance has not been determined; but the vulnerability of a passenger train, with passengers having the ability to bring onboard weapons and other dangerous items, was graphically demonstrated, In light of the foiled attack, European security and transport experts met to reconsider train security. Baggage scans, identity checks and more armed guards were among measures that were discussed; however, unlike airline passenger travel, trains are designed to carry large numbers of passengers along fixed routes with multiple intermediate stops where passengers board from long, unsecured platforms that offer no central checkpoints before reaching the train’s final destination, so screening each passenger and bag, a la airport checkpoint screening would seriously impact travel. Mass transit trains such as subway, and light rail systems present even more security mitigation problems for which significant gaps remain.

On August 28, 2015 Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Cory A. Booker (D-N.J.), members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, called on the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to immediately implement outstanding security and safety improvements to the nation’s passenger rail systems that were mandated in the 2007 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

The most obvious vulnerability is the sheer size of the domestic rail system. There are over 100,000 miles of rail in the United States, most of it unmonitored, providing a targetrich environment for terrorists.[3] It is physically impossible to monitor every inch of railroad track at any given time; and hundreds of miles of track are open to a potential terrorist attack.[4] Additionally, because passenger trains run on predictable, published schedules on fixed routes, their operations depending on people having quick and easy access to stations and trains; and the number of access points and volume of ridership make it impractical to subject all rail passengers to the type of screening that airline passengers undergo.[5] So given those inherent vulnerabilities, the security of intercity rail and mass transit and their passengers must and can be improved. Generally, government and law enforcement agencies react in response to an event or a demonstrated vulnerability, but as soon as countermeasures are implemented, new ways to defeat them are often developed.

An intelligence-focused program, using commercially available information is an effective way to pre-clear most passengers. By way of example, Amtrak passenger trains are all reserved, and passengers cannot purchase a ticket without providing

personal information in the form of an acceptable photo ID, so such a system could be feasible.

As with most things today, technology plays an important role, and cameras, including state of the art ‘smart cameras’ that provide additional mitigation capabilities (i.e.; facial recognition, algorithms that can identify unattended baggage or repetitious suspicious behaviors, etc.) have already been installed, but more are necessary.

Cost, passenger relations, schedule delays are all factors that must be addressed in enhancing passenger rail security, but that said, complacency (or defeat) is not an option, and effective countermeasures must be designed and put into place.

About the Author

Mr. Robert Seasonwein is Principal of HTS Consultancy in Washington, DC. He is a retired high-ranking official in the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), with his last position serving as the TSA’s Assistant Chief Counsel – Security Threat Assessment Operations.

References:

[1] Additionally, the March 2004 bombing in Atocha passenger rail station in Madrid, Spain, resulting in the death of 191 people, highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attack.

[2] See also, Conference Report (House Report 108-774).rail [3] See Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, “RAIL SECURITY, Some Actions Taken to Enhance Passenger and Freight Rail Security, but Significant Challenges Remain.” (United States General Accounting Office, March 23, 2004).

[4] By way of example, on Amtrak alone more than 84,700 passengers ride over 300 Amtrak trains on an average day [5] See Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues. (Congressional Research Service, Updated May 26, 2005).

The Myth of Safety:

The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Five Years On

By Luke Bencie and Yuji Kumamaru

Anti-nuclear protesters march in Tokyo March 10, 2013. Thousands of protesters marched in the Japanese capital calling on the government to shun nuclear power, a day before the second anniversary of an earthquake and tsunami that triggered the world’s worst atomic disaster in 25 years. REUTERS/Issei Kato

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he March 11th, 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (simply referred to in Japan as “3/11”) exposed vulnerabilities in Japan’s emergency preparedness and crisis response systems, which continue to linger five years after the horrific catastrophe. The devastating Tohoku earthquake, and subsequent massive tsunami, led to the the largest Level 7 nuclear accident since Chernobyl (by comparison it was 1/10th the radia-

tion fallout of the 1986 Chernobyl event). As a result, nuclear reactor units 1 and 2, belonging to Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), suffered critical meltdowns, hydrogen explosions, not to mention the release of radioactive elements that blanketed nearby residential areas of the Fukushima Prefecture. Nearly twenty-thousand people died (90% of deaths were drownings) or disappeared as a result of the 9.0 magnitude earthquake and nearly 50foot high tsunami wave, while another 150,000 were forced to evacuate from their homes. To this day, over 90% of the Fukushima residential areas have remained uninhabitable, drawing eerie comparisons to scenes out of postapocalyptic movies.

So what happened? Why did Japan – a country epitomized by its traditions of efficiency and quality assurance – fall victim to a lack of foresight and indecisiveness in the face of chaos?

The answers are various and complex, but to those in the world of emergency preparedness, one phrase best summarizes the confusion…

“The Myth of Safety.”

“The Myth of Safety” essentially promulgates the idea that the nuclear industry is so critical and sophisticated, that surely redundancies for security and safety, as well as every conceivable emergency response protocol, have been tediously thought out and tirelessly exercised to ensure maximum safety to operations and the civilian population who reside within nuclear areas. As a result, when the events of 3/11 began to unfold, the TEPCO and Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) emergency response manuals had no such contingencies for unusually high tsunami waves. For example, the protective concrete

walls of the plants along the water were built to a height of 19 feet, while the wave that struck the Fukushima Daiichi Plant was an incredible 49 feet. Furthermore, it was concluded that a loss of AC power, or even what to do in the event that the nuclear reactors began to boil away their coolant, were too improbable to happen – until they did!

According to the Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, published in 2014 by a civilian lead coalition, in conjunction with the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation: “In 2010, for example, the government of Niigata Prefecture, on Japan’s western shores, made plans to conduct a joint earthquake and nuclear disaster drill. This was imminently sensible, since just three years

before an offshore earthquake had temporarily shut down a TEPCO nuclear power station on the Niigata coastline. But the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the nation’s main nuclear regulator, advised the local government that a nuclear accident drill premised on an earthquake would cause ‘unnecessary anxiety and misunderstanding’ among residents. The prefecture instead conducted a joint drill premised on heavy snow.”

were ignored, or even flatly disobeyed.

Much of the confusion came from the simple question of who was actually in charge.

• Senior leadership was making tactical decisions rather than strategic ones - It was noted that during the disaster that, Prime Minister Kan spent time trying to personally locate and order portable battery units in an attempt to keep power running to the reactor pumps, rather than managing the larger picture of the unfolding situation.

• No standardized communications system was in place – There were no uniform radio systems encompassing various government response agencies, leading to poor communication between

Rather than being accused of fear mongering, TEPCO and the Japanese government continued along their steady path of relying upon a belief that if it has never happened

Japan fell victim to a chain reaction of failures that has lead to billions of dollars’ worth of property damage, a mass migration of the population, an expected forty years’ worth of clean-up efforts, fiftythree of the nation’s fifty-six nuclear power plants being taken off line indefinitely, and most significantly, the long-term effects of radiation exposure to Fukushima residents and employees. before, there is no need to prepare for such an event in the future. Unfortunately, by not considering and training for – much less talking about – worst case scenarios, Japan fell victim to a chain reaction of failures that has lead to billions of dollars’ worth of property damage, a mass migration of the population, an expected forty years’ worth of clean up efforts, fifty-three of the nation’s fifty-six nuclear power plants being taken off line indefinitely, and most significantly, the long-term effects of radiation exposure to Fukushima residents and employees.

Could planning have solved every predictable challenge that fateful day in March?

Probably not. Natural disasters are often the most difficult threats facing any emergency responder. However, as General Dwight Eisenhower so famously stated, “Plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”

Had the Japanese Government and TEPCO been more forward looking with their crisis

16

response planning, they might not have encountered as many difficulties as they did.

teams on-the-ground, as well as in command centers.

• No mass casualty plan was previously established – a standardized, nationwide, response protocol - much like the US National Incident Management System (NIMS) or the Incident Command System (ICS) - would have allowed responders from different jurisdictions to respond seamlessly by knowing their roles and responsibilities.

• The use of social media was employed only in one direction – Despite using social media platforms to relay informational messages, the Japanese government did not monitor responses on social media to determine feedback from residents on-the-ground. This simple step would have provided them with much needed intelligence.

Just some of the major response failures of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Disaster included: • Lack of information-sharing systems - When the incident first occurred, information was insufficiently passed between the various public and private sector partners, as well as to the civilian population. The System of Prediction for Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) was the government agency especially assigned to pass information to the public about any accidental release of radioactive material.

During the crisis, SPEEDI was unable to pass critical information in a timely fashion.

• Poor decision-making – During the disaster, it was stated that some orders

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ment five years after the accident at Fukushima. Accordingly, anyone can “Monday Morning Quarterback” the response efforts from afar. It is not the intention of this article to spread blame or point fingers. Rather, the events of this tragic historical event should be put into context as a means of case study and improvement. Much like the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 led to exponential enhancements in the security posture of the United States, 3/11 should also be a catalyst for change in Japan.

Per the testimony delivered to Parliament by the Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, the following recommendations should be enacted: • Establish a permanent committee in National Diet (Parliament) to oversee the regulators, with regular investigations and hearings.

• Reform of the crisis management system, making boundaries between responsibilities of local and national governments and the operators clear, and establishing clear chain of command in emergency situations.

• Establish a system to deal with long-

•

•

• •

term public health effects, including monitoring and decontaminating radiation-affected areas.

Enact dramatic corporate reform of TEPCO and new relationships established among the electric power companies built on safety issues, mutual supervision and transparency.

Create a new regulatory body established on independence, transparency, professionalism, and consolidation of functions.

Reform of laws related to nuclear energy to meet global standards of safety, public health and welfare.

Develop a system of independent investigation commissions.

There is no question as to whether or not another earthquake will strike Japan. It could happen again at any time (in fact, a magnitude 7.3 earthquake recently struck the Kumamoto area on April 16th, leading to the death of approximately 50 people - most of them were crushed in a landslide). The magnitude could be worse than a 9.0 and the heights of a resulting tsunami could very well exceed 50 feet. The fact of the matter remains, failure to prepare means preparing

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to fail. Five years after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Disaster, we can only hope that the Japanese government, as well as the Japanese private sector, have learned from their mistakes and will once and for all destroy the Myth of Safety.

About the Authors Luke Bencie is the Managing Director of Security Management International, an intelligence advisory firm in the Washington DC area that specializes in global emergency response and crisis management.

He can be reached at lbencie@smiconsultancy.com.

Yuji Kumamaru was formally the Deputy Fire Chief at US Army Regional Fire and Emergency Services at Camp Zama. He was the first Japanese national to hold this position, where he was responsible for $40B worth of US Government assets. Additionally, he built the first Japanese regional certified rookie firefighter academy, which was accredited by Texas Engineering Extension Service and the Department of Defense.

Finally, per the request of the Japanese Government, Mr. Kumamaru obtained a translation and publication license from Oklahoma State University and the International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA) to translate the 1600-page manual “Essentials of Firefighting and Fire Department Operations” (which took over 2,000 hours for him to complete). He can be reached at kumamaru@jerd.co.jp.

Salafi/Takfiri Micro-Theology: The Non Illusive And Motivational Ideology Behind Jihadist Attacks In The 21st Century

By Brig Barker

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Palestinian Salafists shout during a protest against satirical French weekly magazine Charlie Hebdo’s cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, outside the French Cultural Centre in Gaza city January 19, 2015. Dozens of Jihadist Salafi men rallied in Gaza to condemn continued publication by French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo of cartoons deemed offensive to Islam’s Prophet. Charlie Hebdo published a picture of Mohammad weeping on its cover last week after gunmen stormed its offices in Paris, killing 12 people. The gunmen said the attack was revenge for cartoons the magazine had published mocking Islam. REUTERS/Suhaib Salem

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iven the increased media exposure to ISIS and its activities in Western countries, the question of motive continues to plague society. Why would an individual attack others in such a diabolical and barbaric way? Society is now well past accepting that ISIS and those inspired by their ideology will continue to kill others, but the question remains why. The media displays or denotes that another individual has been beheaded, crucified, or deliberately run over by a tank and society rightfully asks the question as to why. The truth is, the attack itself albeit horrific in nature, is only the tip of the iceberg. Below the surface lies the deeply rooted cause that has led to the ostensibly unexplainable action. Understanding the hidden body of this iceberg provides the full explanation for all Jihadist attacks in western society since the 1998 Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

Ideological Motives What is the cause behind these attacks and why does Western society re-question the motive after each attack. The cause however is already known and understood by those in the Middle East. It is talked about on Arab television on a daily basis. It is regularly discussed in the streets amongst those that live in the Middle East. In fact, the majority of those living in the Islamic world know exactly what the motive is behind the ongoing attacks and further understand its ideology.

This purportedly illusive ideology by western standards is well known and well understood in many other regions of the world. At its baseline, this ideology is deeply rooted in Islamic doctrine and the subjectivity of scholars and non-scholars. This ideology sits on a shelf as an extra-denominational belief system that is followed by a small percentage of Muslim followers. Yet this small percentage has greatly impacted the world of terrorism in recent history. This

On a practical level this ideology as promulgated by ISIS is now entering the lymph nodes of western society through the stream of returning foreign fighters.

small percentage has in fact shut down economies, terrorized and scarred individuals and families, and changed the world forever. This deeply rooted ideology has established itself as a force to be reckoned with all around the world. On a practical level this ideology as promulgated by ISIS is now entering the lymph nodes of western society through the stream of returning foreign fighters.

This new bleak reality is here to stay and must be understood. The good news is that once western society understands this ideology, then plans and strategies can be developed and implemented to engage and disrupt its effects. This article will clearly define this otherwise illusive ideology and further identify well known indicators for those with a potential predisposition towards Jihad.

What is this ideology? It’s an ideology that lives just outside the moderate and majority Muslim world. It steps away from the four

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such have no connection nor inclination towards Jihad. The color coding represents the inherent moderation of these denominations except for Hanbali that can sometimes be a stepping off point towards the Salafi/Takfiri realms. Overall, these denominations are generally aligned geographically and sometimes are historically country specific. For example, the Hanafi school is followed by the majority of Sunni Muslims and is deeply rooted in the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia. The Shafi’i school is followed by many in the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and coastal parts of Asia. The Maliki school is found most predominantly in North Africa and the Gulf region of the Middle East. The Hanbali school is the smallest, most strict school, and is mainly followed by Saudi Arabia. It was greatly propagated by Ibn Abd Al Wahab and the Al Saud family in the 18th to the 20th century. Again, although Hanbali is a forerunner towards the Salafi/Takfiri ideology, it is separate in and of itself. In regards to Islamic terrorism today, the majority of attacks take place by those within the Salafi/Takfiri realm and more specifically of the Takfiri bent. Can one move

standard Sunni schools of jurisprudence (hereinafter referred to denominations) identified as Hannafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, and Hanbali.

This ideology of concern which also is in fact the root cause of Islamic terrorism today is known as the Salafi/Takfiri belief system. Those that follow this ideology believe that the mainstream denominations were touched and influenced by man and as such are “innovations” (Bida) not pure in nature.

between the various denominations? Certainly. However, the majority of the Islamic world remains in one of the more moderate schools identified as Hanafi, Shafi’i, or the Maliki Fiqh. Hanbali in particular remains a denomination but can be a precursor towards the redline Salafi/Takfiri ideology.

The chart above depicts this ideology to the right of the dotted line.

As depicted in this example once one converts to Islam the majority (85%) choose to follow the Sunni sect. Within Sunni Islam there are four mainstream denominations also known as Usul al Fiqh or Mathahabs (Schools of Jurisprudence). The majority of Sunni Muslims follow and practice one of these denominations and as

So what is the definition of Salafiism? Salafiism is the ideology or movement wherein one follows the Way of the Salaf. The Way of the Salaf essentially indicates that one follows the teachings of the first three generations of Islam. This belief system is derived from a Hadith wherein the Prophet Mohammad stated, “The best of people is my generation, then those who come after them,

Departure from Moderation

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then those who come after them (i.e. the first three generations of Muslims).” Further, followers of the Salaf are known internally as followers of the “Pious Predecessors”. Salafiism in and of itself is the ideology that has found itself as the label for all things Jihad.

In the Middle East, those that are radical are considered Salafis by the moderate Muslims. The Salafi belief system (Manhaj) is an ideology but without an attached action arm. The action arm is where the teetering point of Jihad actually lies. If the Salafi never commits to carrying out action in furtherance of Jihad then it remains a low grade fever of radicalization. If the Salafi actually takes action based on his belief system then he becomes a Takfiri.

The Takfiris are those with a Salafi belief system and commit to action. Al Takfir as a concept is defined as excommunication wherein Takfiris declare others non-believers or infidels. Examples of Takfiris are members of ISIS, Al Qa’ida, Boko Haram, and Al Shabaab. These groups and those that follow the Salafi-Takfiri mindset believe in a very strict circle of micro-theology. They fur-

Preemptive Lifestyle Indicators

So, if the Salafi-Takfiris are those that are carrying out Jihadist actions in the name of Islam how can they be preemptively identified and disrupted? Although there are many opinions on this topic, this article will provide various real world indicators for those that present with a potential predisposition for Jihad.

Individually these indicators cannot be relied upon in a vacuum.

Generally there will be a noticeable collective pattern as recognized by those around them such as family and friends. These are listed and defined as follows: 1. Trajectory/Movement towards increased religiosity. This can be identified through one’s increased attendance at mosque or isolated prayer time with a more extremist group of believers. It can further be identified if one’s normal pattern of life changes. Family members may notice the individual spending more time consuming Islamic texts, propaganda,

So what is the definition of Salafiism? Salafiism is the ideology or movement wherein one follows the Way of the Salaf. The Way of the Salaf essentially indicates that one follows the teachings of the first three generations of Islam. This belief system is derived from a Hadith wherein the Prophet Mohammad stated, “The best of people is my generation, then those who come after them, then those who come after them (i.e. the first three generations of Muslims).” Further, followers of the Salaf are known internally as followers of the “Pious Predecessors”. Salafiism in and of itself is the ideology that has found itself as the label for all things Jihad.

ther believe that those outside the circle are infidels. The Takfiris in particular not only believe those outside the circle are infidels but further believe action must be taken to resolve the situation.

Infidels must be targeted for Jihad if they don’t convert to this ideology or pay a tax identified as Jizya. The Takfiris find their origins in the teachings of those such as Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Abd Al Wahab, Maulana Maududi, and Sayed Qutub. Although the ideology is a deep ocean, much of the thought system is rooted in an exclusive belief system about Sharia law and the definition of those that are non-believers. Further, the Salafi-Takfiris believed they are the “Saved Sect”, escape judgment, and are the true followers. They additionally believe that Islam is a way of life and that it must be lived under the concept of Al Wala Wal Bara (loyalty to the true followers and disavowal of the nonbelievers).

and potentially espousing his new found beliefs with others. The trajectory towards increased religiosity could take place over days, weeks, months, or recent years, but will be present with a noticeable change to those around him or her. Alone, this indicator will be present with others listed below and should not be considered of concern unless the accompanying belief system is more radical in nature.

2. Increasing/steady consumption of religious propaganda.

Similar to the above indicator, propaganda as an indicator proves quite predictable in its influence towards radicalization. Consumption of radical propaganda such as Dabiq, Inspire, or watching ISIS beheading videos appear to be almost addictive in nature. Consumers of this propaganda seem to find themselves moving from curiosity to that of intrigued and ultimately addicted. This is common when one is ushered or mentored along by another. Similar to pornography, radical Islamic propaganda appears to draw an individual into a never ending circle of numbness, leaving only a desire for

the western believer’s desire includes traveling to the Middle East to experience all the senses of this ancient and austere way of life. This emancipates the believer from living in the materialistic and evil world known as the Dunya and instead learning and living on hard dirt floors and eating raw foods of the Middle East.

4. Haram Corridor: Increased restriction on western ways of living. With a growing disdain for western ways, the radical believer will often begin shedding the comforts of the Western way of life. Due to the aforementioned desire to live like that of the first three generations, one will forego the perceived opulence of the ways of life in North America or Europe. As the individual studies and learns more about the rules based belief system of Islam, the individual will deem it important to implement these rules almost to the verbatim. This may include letting one’s beard grow, brushing their teeth with a twig/Miswack, not driving but walking, forbid drinking alcohol and consuming western foods, etc. Again, this will present as a changing pattern, sometimes slow but sometimes

Isolation/Judgmental attitude towards the moderate Muslim community: With an increased scrutiny and adherence to Islam’s 4500 or so rules, the individual begins to follow an obligatory requirement to correct others in their trespasses. He will criticize other Muslims for not growing their beard longer, praying enough, or even attending mosque frequently enough. This further synergistically increases with his progress down the Haram Corridor, seeing the need to shed all things western and believing others should do the same.

increased consumption. Eventually, it eclipses one’s life and as a result leaks out as an indicator in general conversation and demeanor.

3. Travel/Desire to travel to Qur’anic and Arabic schools. Generally coupled with an increasing religiosity, those traveling down the radicalization road can sometimes become almost hypnotized to believing that they need to seek out deeper teachings regarding both Islamic texts and in their development of the Arabic language. Of course, Islam teaches that the Qur’an was passed down from Allah through the Angel Gabriel to the Prophet Mohammad in perfect Arabic. As such, Arabic has always been considered a special language.

Learning from scholars in the Middle East and Africa seems to be an important step in becoming more respected by fellow believers. Travel to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, or Morocco provides a platform for the individual to gain a deeper understanding of the texts. For those with a radical bent it also appears to fulfill a desire to live and experience life in a more austere location. Many times, the trajectory towards radicalization includes an inherent desire and effort to live like those of the first three generations of Islam. Part of

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noticeable to friends and family. It can also present to others in the mosque. This Haram (forbidden) Corridor can also be aligned with an ongoing mentorship or kinship by another individual who is traveling down the radicalization road.

5. Isolation/Judgmental attitude towards the moderate Muslim community: With an increased scrutiny and adherence to Islam’s 4500 or so rules, the individual begins to follow an obligatory requirement to correct others in their trespasses. He will criticize other Muslims for not growing their beard longer, praying enough, or even attending mosque frequently enough.

This further synergistically increases with his progress down the Haram Corridor, seeing the need to shed all things western and believing others should do the same.

6. Physical appearance: Due to the regulatory structure of Islam’s life system, those following the radical path again feel an obligation to live life as the first three generations. This includes growing out the beard while ensuring the moustache does not grow beneath the upper lip. They will also often roll the pants up in compliance with Hadith rules as well.

7. Increasing/Steady involvement in immorality (Alcohol, drugs, pornography): Although appearing counterintuitive to the pre-

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vious obligations and a strict way of life, radical believers in reality tend to find themselves involved in illegal and immoral activities just as non pious believers. Examples include Usama Bin Laden’s apparent involvement in pornography, Anwar Al Aulaqi’s participation in prostitution, and the 9/11 Hijackers perceived immoral activities the night before the attack.

8. Apathy towards mainstream life: As Islam eclipses their mainstream lifestyle, the radical believer begins to find the priorities of everyday life waning in comparison to the practices he’s called to. This can include keeping up with secular academic studies,

ship or familial connection. Again, if someone is outside their small circle of micro theology they are perceived as an infidel and as well must be confronted.

11. Focus on micro-theology of rules: Increased consumption of Hadith rules and commentary by radical groups such as ISIS, one becomes hyper fixated on every activity in their life. This includes activities down to the micro level such as how one eats, brushes their teeth, and who they associate with.

12. S tar struck by particular Islamic scholars: Radical believers begin to hold certain Islamic scholars on a pedestal to the point of blindly following whatever rulings or Fatwas the scholar

notice that he has almost become mesmerized by the radical way of life.

In a practical sense, some of the above identifiers are clear and easily identifiable while others aren’t. Overall, one of the indicators is that the believer will become fixated on this radical life to the point of losing all sense of his otherwise normal faculties. This “being under a spell” will be obvious to those close to him much as those that sense one is addicted to drugs or alcohol.

Conclusion In the end, the radical ideology of Islamic terrorists must be identified and better understood. The majority of the Muslim world does not follow this strict belief

Star struck by particular Islamic scholars: Radical believers begin to hold certain Islamic scholars on a pedestal to the point of blindly following whatever rulings or Fatwas the scholar sets forth. Many of the radical Salafi scholars emanate from Saudi Arabia and are revered almost to the point of idolatry by radical believers.

arriving on time to work, and continued interest in hobbies and other non-Islamic activities.

9. Splitting (viewing all of life through a black and white lens): Given the strict nature of Salafism, the radical believer increasingly views the world in black and white. Much like the symptoms of the Borderline Personality Disorder, as one becomes more steeped in the pious ways of Salafiism, all things become pure good or evil, righteous or sinful, accepted or forbidden.

10. Confrontational/Divisive/Argumentative: With a growing piousness comes an increasing criticality of others.

The radical believer can become so judgmental of even those closest to them they will disavow one’s friend-

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sets forth. Many of the radical Salafi scholars emanate from Saudi Arabia and are revered almost to the point of idolatry by radical believers.

13. Lack of recognition of authority: As the importance of Sharia law increases in one’s mind, all other authority begins to fade. This is seen often in court hearings wherein one charged with Material Support to Terrorism blatantly tells the judge that he does not recognize the court’s authority.

Further, the radical believer will only recognize certain Islamic scholars with known and reliable Ijaza (Credentials) while all others are dismissed for lack of scholarly authority.

14. Under a spell: In evaluating the radical believer’s way of life, others will

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

system but yet in fact can recognize this departure from mainstream Islam. Further, indicators are almost always present and recognizable in an individual prior to an attack. Remaining aware and cognizant of these potential indicators is critical and assist society as well as law enforcement authorities in preempting or thwarting Jihadist attacks.

About the Author Brig Barker is a retired FBI Special Agent who worked counterterrorism for the majority of his career. He completed numerous tours in Africa and the Middle East and is considered a subject matter expert in the area of Islamic radicalization.

Prior to the FBI he spent five years as an Army officer. He now works in the area of global security, assessment, and training.

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Protecting The Power Grid:

Target Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment

By Leo Labaj and Bruce Barnes

A

s a nation, the United States has become addicted to the steady and dependable delivery of electrical power. Without electricity the world, as we know it, would cease to function (imagine no lights, television, cell phones, computers etc.). The US Power Grid is enormously complex and consists of over 11,000 generation facilities, in excess of 200,000 miles of high

voltage transmission lines, and thousands of substations. As such, the energy sector is considered the most critical of critical infrastructure and is arguably the backbone of our modern society, due to critical dependencies and interdependencies with other utility sectors.

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With today’s heightened risk of terrorist attacks, threats to the energy sector have been increasing, and it is only a matter of time before a major attack is conducted directly against an electric utility or indirectly against the community it serves. For those malicious individuals or groups who seek to inflict harm against the United States, striking the electrical grid would cause significant physical, economic, and psychological damage. The loss of electric power resulting from a successful attack, could quickly cascade to other lifeline infrastructure sectors, potentially degrading essential services necessary for public health and safety.

Since the vast majority of the power grid is owned and operated by the private sector, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), appointed by the Department of Energy to promote the reliability and security of the power grid, has created a new reliability standard for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) to ensure the grid remains robust and resilient.

Per recent NERC guidelines, the regulation known as Critical Infrastructure Protection 014 (CIP-014) has been established to ensure that individual power operators comply with a standard level of security protection.

The CIP-014 regulation states: To identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in a widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an interconnection.

The CIP-014 standard standard is non-prescriptive, in that it does not mandate specific security measures. However, the intent of the standard is clear in ex-

Since the vast majority of the power grid is owned and operated by the private sector, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), appointed by the Department of Energy to promote the reliability and security of the power grid, has created a new reliability standard for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) to ensure the grid remains robust and resilient. pecting electric utilities to “step up their game� when it comes to protecting the power grid.

Utilities have a strong incentive to comply with this standard, since NERC has the ability to levy fines for non-compliance in the amount of up to one million dollars per day!

NERC CIP-014 Requirements CIP-014 consists of six primary requirements that transmission owners and operators must follow to enhance the physical security of identified transmission substations and primary control centers. It starts with conducting an initial risk assessment to identify critical assets, conducting vulnerability assessments of potential threats, and developing associated security plans to mitigate those risks identified.

Finally, the utility must seek out an independent third party to review and validate their plans (See www.nerc.com for specific requirements).

Utilities have a choice to conduct the assessments utilizing in-house security professionals, or to outsource the entire process to an independent third party.

Regardless of who performs the

work, the process used to conduct the threat and vulnerability assessment and physical security plan (Requirements R4 & R5) must be well-documented and defined, so that it can withstand potential scrutiny from a variety of sources such as concerned customers, local governments, public utility commissions, as well as the media.

Additionally, due to the inability to protect their vast network of components from attack, as well as limited financial resources, utilities may be unable to deploy all of the physical security countermeasure they might like to have in order to protect their assets. This reality

requires utilities to have a firm understanding of their critical facilities, key components, and vital control systems in order to appropriately prioritize and protect these assets.

Employing the CARVER Target Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment Methodology To best meet CIP-014 requirements, Security Management International (SMI), a leading intelligence advisory firm located in the Washington DC area, has employed the CARVER Target Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment Methodol-

ogy – an assessment

tool made famous by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the 1970s at a multitude of high-risk facilities.

CARVER is an acronym for the following vulnerability assessment criteria: Criticality, Accessibility, Recognizability, Vulnerability, Effect, and Recoverability. SMI’s security subject matter experts (who are primarily comprised of former intelligence officers and military special operations personnel) found that the CARVER Methodology was an extremely well-suited tool, which could be used to both evaluate the potential vulnerabilities of Critical Infrastructure and to prioritize critical assets based upon their probability of being attacked (i.e., target attractiveness).

The CARVER Methodology was originally developed as an offensive target assessment tool, allowing to evaluate the vulnerabilities of enemy assets, and to determine how best to exploit those vulnerabilities to attack a target. The methodology had its early roots in World War II, where bomber pilots used its precursor, known back then simply as “CARVE,” to identify attractive targets to bomb. Fast forward over fifty years and CARVER was still being used by the Department of Homeland Security as part of its Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS).

ACAMS provided a set of tools and resources that helped law enforcement, public safety and emergency response personnel assess Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource (CI/ KR) asset vulnerabilities. ACAMS was decommissioned in June, 2014; however, all of its files have been migrated to another program, the Infrastructure Protection Gateway (IP Gateway).

•

or adversary from achieving success and thus, launching and completing the operation Assumption that conspicuous security procedures and equipment will not stop a determined terrorist or other adversary

Because the CARVER Methodology addresses both the physical security of a facility and the operational capabilities of terrorists or other adversary, it acts as a target selection tool that uses a quantitative ranking methodology to identify those targets most attractive to attack by an adversary.

The relative risk for each threat and target combination is determined using algorithms to analyze potential consequences, relative importance of targets to the aggressor, and security vulnerability levels.

Countermeasures are then recommended to minimize the risk and; subsequently, the same methodology can be re-applied to determine if the risk reduction is achieved.

This iterative process is continued until the most cost-effective method of reducing the risk to an acceptable level is identified.

The CARVER Target and Vulnerability Assessment process used by

The importance - and subsequent challenges - of protecting the electric power grid in the United States are well known. As such, NERC has performed an exceptional job in response to these threats by implementing the CIP-014 requirements. However, with only limited resources often available, utilities must now find a way to protect their most critical assets and focus resources on their primary objective… that of keeping the lights on!

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

With the new requirements of NERC CIP-014, the CARVER Methodology not only has the additional benefit of helping electric utilities comply with standards, but it also documents both the quantitative and qualitative process used to review all of the critical assets identified on site. Furthermore, it provides a clear quantifiable (and repeatable) process that can effectively be used to document and defend the decisions made to identify and protect critical assets.

The importance - and subsequent challenges - of protecting the electric power grid in the United States are well known. As such, NERC has performed an exceptional job in response to these threats by implementing the CIP-014 requirements. However, with only limited resources often available, utilities must now find a way to protect their most critical assets and focus resources on their primary objective… that of keeping the lights on!

About the Authors: Leo Labaj retired from Central Intelligence Agency and has over 40 years of Counterterrorism experience. He currently serves as the Director of Critical Infrastructure Protection at Security Management International and frequently teaches the “CARVER Target Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment Methodology Training Course™.” Mr. Labaj can be reached at llabaj@smiconsultancy.com.

Bruce W. Barnes retired from the US Army and is accredited as a Certified Protection Professional (CPP)

by ASIS International. As a Senior Associate with Security Management International, he has over 10 years of security management experience working for the electric utility industry. Mr. Barnes frequently teaches the “CARVER Target Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment Methodology Training Course™.”

Mr. Barnes can be reached at bbarnes@smiconsultancy.com.

The CARVER assessment encompasses the following basic principles: • Examination of all security programs from the terrorist or adversary’s viewpoint, (i.e., how would I, if I were the adversary, attack this asset and what would I target?)

• Determination of what countermeasures would be required to prevent the terrorist

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SMI has proven to be an effective tool for conducting a multitude of vulnerability assessments for water treatment plants, chemical manufacture and packaging facilities, transportation facilities, military bases, sports arenas, as well as electric substations and primary control centers.

Vol. 22, No.1

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The Role Of Local Law Enforcement In Counterterrorism: The Cleveland, Ohio, Police Experience

By Bob O’Brien, Jim Weiss, and Mickey Davis

CleveCounterTerrJ13. In neighborhoods where respect for the law is thin, the appearance and intervention of a police armored rescue vehicle (ARV) can make them reconsider.

Cleveland Police Department SWAT with Mother-2.

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B

efore we can define the role of law enforcement in counterterrorism, we need to first define “true” terrorism. While this sounds simple, it’s not.

Many/most terrorism experts would likely agree with Jim Weiss and Mickey Davis [Law and Order, Sept. 2014 – “Answering Terrorism Prevention and

Homeland Security Threats”]. There is no universally accepted definition of “true” terrorism, which consists of terror acts with terror motivation. International or domestic, these acts are motivated by ideology, politics, or religion.

Acts of true terrorism (i.e. 9/11, Oklahoma City, etc.) are relatively rare within the U.S. itself, yet virtually every day of the year, somewhere in America, local law enforcement responds to, and handles, terror acts.

These are what Weiss and Davis refer to as “quasi-terrorism” acts, and differ from “true” terrorism by being criminally, not ideologically, motivated. These may involve the use of terrorist techniques and tactics in situations that are not terrorist crimes per se, such as active shooters/snipers, mass/spree killers, hostage takers, barricaded suspects, drug/street/gang violence, etc.

“Quasi-terrorism” was recognized as far back as the definitive 1976 federal Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism. America’s success in handling quasi-terrorism was true in 1976, and continues to be true today, nearly 40 years later.

This success isn’t by accident, but rather is the product of thousands of real-world experiences over the years by dedicated law enforcement tactical visionaries.

This can be seen in the following three uniquely American developed, universally employed, worldwide tactical concepts/inventions: 1. Special Weapons and Tactics

The NYPD Hostage Negotiation Team concept involved specially selected, trained negotiators employing proven effective negotiating principles. It was an immediate success, quickly spreading from NYPD throughout American law enforcement, and ultimately throughout the world.

(SWAT): This concept was developed by LAPD (Los Angeles Police Department) in the wake of the deadly 1966 University of Texas Tower Sniper, a situation that left 16 innocent peoples dead and 32 others injured by sniper gunfire. LAPD recognized there was a critical need for specially selected, trained, and equipped SWAT officers employing proven, sound strategy and tactics to handle extraordinary violent situations beyond the capabilities of other police. This new (at the time) SWAT concept proved so effective, it spread quickly throughout America, and ultimately throughout the world’s law enforcement communities.

2. Hostage/Crisis Negotiations Team (HNT/CNT): The concept was created and developed by two NYPD (New York Police Department) detectives in the wake of the deadly 1972 Munich Olympics Israeli athletes massacre. Prior to Munich, police negotiations were uncommon and spur of the moment, conducted by untrained officers.

The result was predictably hit or miss. The NYPD Hostage Negotiation Team concept involved specially selected, trained negotiators employing proven effective negotiating principles. It was an immediate success, quickly spreading from NYPD throughout American law enforcement, and ultimately throughout the world 3. Immediate/Rapid Response to Active Shooters/Killers: This concept was created and developed by the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) in the wake of the 1999 Columbine High School massacre. Prior to Columbine, the standard police first responder response was to contain and wait for SWAT. NTOA recognized that with active shooters/killers, time worked against waiting for SWAT. Police first responders needed to be trained and equipped to intervene immediately and rapidly in order to save lives. Rapid deployment

Cleveland, Ohio

by police first responders has proven to be a resounding, lifesaving success.

World-wide “True Terror” Incidents The coordinated 2008 Mumbai, India, terrorist attacks served as a much needed wake-up call for law enforcement worldwide, including U.S. counterterrorism law enforcement.

Local Indian police first responders were outmatched, outgunned, overwhelmed, and ineffective in preventing what amounted to mass slaughter of innocent persons. It wasn’t until many hours later that specially trained counterterrorism personnel were finally able to stop it.

For evidence of how universal and successful the three innovations above continue to be, we need look no further than the following recent terrorist attacks and police response: • Quebec and Ottawa, Canada: Two separate deadly terror attacks targeted Canadian soldiers and Canada’s Parliament building. The latter repulsed the attack by rapid intervention by an armed Parliament Retired Police Sergeant-atArms, and the terrorist killed.

• Sydney, Australia: During an hourslong, deadly terrorist attack in a downtown coffee shop, Hostage Rescue was performed by police SWAT and the terrorist killed.

• Paris, France – The deadly Charlie Hebdo newspaper attack resulted in multiple fatalities, including an executed police officer. A second police officer was also killed afterward.

• Paris, France: Related to the above terror incident, there was a deadly grocery terrorist hostage takeover. Hostage Rescue was conducted by police SWAT and the terrorist killed.

• France (outside of Paris): A massive, nationwide police manhunt related to the above terrorist incidents culminated in a shootout between police SWAT and two terrorists who were both killed by police SWAT. • Belgium and Denmark: Multiple deadly terrorist attacks ended with terrorists killed or arrested by police SWAT. These real-world “true” terrorist incidents were handled not by military counter-terror units, but rather by local/state/national SWAT/ CNT law enforcement officers, all of whom were following the American SWAT/CNT model and successfully employing the same tactics and techniques. This speaks to the success of the American counter-terror tactics that can be applied to both “true” and “quasi” terrorism response.

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CPD Task Force officers conducting a stakeout of a militant group were attacked without warning by 15-35 militants heavily armed with high-powered rifles and automatic weapons. The militants then fanned out in the darkness throughout a multi-block, denselypopulated residential area, engaging in numerous shootouts with responding Cleveland Police.

This leads us to the Cleveland, Ohio experience.

Cleveland is a major Great Lakes port city where the East Coast meets the Midwest. Cleveland was once the sixth most populous U.S. city with a population over 900,000. In recent decades, hard times have caused Cleveland’s population to fall to just under 400,000.

Cleveland is now a city on the rebound, its resurgence evidenced by thriving sports, dining, entertainment, downtown building, etc., and the hosting of the 2016 Republican National Convention.

However, as is the case with most major U.S. cities, Cleveland has a serious crime problem.

Since the 1960s, its crime rate has consistently ranked among the highest in the nation, so it’s no surprise that Cleveland Police are consistently among the busiest in the nation. It is also no surprise that the job of a Cleveland police officer is dangerous and sometimes deadly, as evidenced by the 106 badges of fallen Cleveland police officers located in the Justice Center Badge Case.

Four of these badges are from a single quasiterror incident–the deadliest, most violent event in Cleveland Police Department (CPD) and city of Cleveland history: The Glenville Shootout.

July 1968 Glenville Shootout and Riot CPD Task Force officers conducting a stakeout of a militant group were attacked without warning by 15-35 militants heavily armed with high-powered rifles and automatic weapons.

The militants then fanned out in the darkness throughout a multi-block, densely-populated residential area, engaging in numerous shootouts with responding Cleveland Police.

When the nearly two-hour shootout was over, seven were dead: three police officers, one civilian helping police, and three militants. A fourth officer died years later from his gunshot wounds. More than a dozen additional Cleveland police officers were wounded by gunfire, most of them seriously. The intensity of the militants’ fire power could be seen in one CPD-marked zone car which sustained nearly 200 bullet holes; both occupant officers were shot multiple times with one killed, one critically wounded.

CleveCounterTerrJ1. The eventual evolution of Cleveland Police counter-terror response originated with Task Force, which, after the Glenville Shootout, was incorporated into the Tactical Unit.

This was dissolved in the mid-1970s and replaced by a series of different tactical concepts, ultimately becoming the present-day, full-time SWAT Unit.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Many of the police casualties were the direct result of being shot during heroic attempts to rescue downed fellow officers. Hours later, police obtained and deployed seven Brinks armored trucks, but it was too little, too late.

Although the initial shootout was over, the Glenville Riot had only just begun. The ensuing days of rioting resulted in four more gunfire deaths, numerous injuries, widespread sniping

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and looting, and arson fires that destroyed a wide swath of Cleveland’s East Side. The seven armored trucks proved invaluable in preventing even more loss of life.

It took five days before overwhelmed Cleveland Police and Ohio National Guardsmen were ultimately able to restore calm, but the riot left deep scars and vacant lots that linger today, nearly 50 years later.

In the aftermath of Glenville, Cleveland Police went back to the drawing board, forming a new, better trained and equipped Tactical Unit, whose centerpiece was a custom-built Armored Command Vehicle, designed and tasked with rescuing downed civilians and police. The Tactical Unit affectionately named the armored vehicle “Mother,” because she protected and rescued them. And to the bad guys, she was “A Mother …”

May 1974 East Cleveland Shootout Over the years, Cleveland’s Tactical Unit and Mother earned a deserved reputation for effectively resolving quasi-terror situations. Mother’s baptism of fire came in the 1974 “East Cleveland Shootout” between police and heavily armed shooters with high-powered, scoped rifles who held an innocent family hostage.

The ensuing, intense gun battle resulted in five police officers and one hostage being wounded.

Thousands of rounds were exchanged between militants and police. Two other officers sustained non-gunfire injuries. The three militants were eventually arrested, charged, tried, and convicted. The East Cleveland Shootout was also where Mother earned her keep by successfully rescuing many downed and pinned-down officers. Mother is also rightfully credited with preventing a far greater number of casualties, along with the surrender of the militants.

Armed with a handgun with extra ammunition, a female suspect ran past the security checkpoint with responding Cleveland airport police in hot pursuit.

The suspect then shot and wounded a Pan-Am flight boarding ticket agent, ran onto the Boeing 727 jet, and took nearly 40 passengers hostage at gunpoint. In the confusion, both pilots managed to escape, leaving the jetliner pilotless.

November 1984 United Freedom Front Domestic Terrorist Group Arrests

November 1984 - The FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), Cleveland FBI SWAT, and Pittsburgh FBI SWAT were assigned to do simultaneous takedowns/arrests at both the Deerfield and Cleveland locations: HRT and Cleveland FBI SWAT to Deerfield, while Pittsburgh FBI SWAT to Cleveland. Backup assistance was to come from uniformed Cleveland Police.

A tactically-thinking Cleveland PD uniformed captain realized CPD SWAT was far better suited for this dangerous assignment than uniformed PD, and requested that the team assist Pittsburgh FBI SWAT in Cleveland. Together, Pittsburgh FBI and CPD SWAT commanders worked out their takedown plan with FBI SWAT as primary, and CPD SWAT with CPD SWAT’s imposing, venerable ARV Mother as backup. Mother played what would become the key role in the safe and successful arrests.

The Deerfield arrests by FBI HRT and Cleveland FBI SWAT went as planned, without incident or injury.

In Cleveland, Pittsburgh FBI SWAT and CPD SWAT took up positions surrounding and locking in the UFF house. Then Mother was deployed in front of the location. Via loudspeaker, all occupants were ordered outside: “NO weapons; hands UP.” After a tense period of time, the UFF members finally surrendered as ordered, and were arrested without incident.

They were charged, tried, and convicted. All indications were that the UFF fully intended to shoot it out with the FBI and police… that is, until they saw Mother out front.

A couple years later, the lead New Jersey State Police detective in the trooper’s 1981 murder gave a presentation about the UFF case to several hundred law enforcement intelligence officers and prosecutors. When he got to the UFF arrests, he told the audience, “I don’t know what kind of crime Cleveland has, but they brought out this tank and the UFF gave up to it.” Except it wasn’t a tank; it was only Mother.

The United Freedom Front (UFF) was a 1970’s-1980’s FBI-Most-Wanted domestic terrorist group. Over a 10-year period, the UFF was responsible for numerous East and Northeast U.S. bombings, armed bank robberies, and armed assaults on law enforcement.

December 1981 – A highly decorated New Jersey State Trooper conducted a routine traffic stop on I-80. Unknown to the trooper, the vehicle’s occupants were wanted UFF domestic terrorists. Without warning, the UFF members shot and killed the trooper, then fled. The ensuing intense, massive, multi-state manhunt was spearheaded by the New Jersey State Police and the FBI. Many months of dogged, tireless

detective work finally paid off in 1984 with information that the UFF was now living in Northeast Ohio. The FBI and New Jersey State Police staked out possible UFF hiding spots and were able to track down the UFF to locations in Deerfield and Cleveland.

January 1985 Cleveland Hopkins Airport Jet Plane Hijacking, Hostage Rescue CleveCounterTerrJ11B. As with most major U.S. cities, Cleveland has a serious crime problem. Since the 1960’s, Cleveland’s crime rate has consistently ranked among the highest in the nation. So it’s no surprise that Cleveland Police are consistently among the busiest in the nation. It’s also no surprise that being a Cleveland Police Officer is dangerous, and sometimes deadly, as evidenced by the 106 badges of fallen Cleveland Police Officers located in the Justice Center Badge Case. Cleveland Police Department SWAT with Mother-2.

Armed with a handgun with extra ammunition, a female suspect ran past the security checkpoint with responding Cleveland airport police in hot pursuit. The suspect then shot and wounded a Pan-Am flight boarding ticket agent, ran onto the Boeing 727 jet, and took nearly 40 passen-

gers hostage at gunpoint. In the confusion, both pilots managed to escape, leaving the jetliner pilotless.

The suspect shot at but missed responding airport police, who immediately requested CPD SWAT. They were on scene and locked in front and back within 20-30 minutes. Cleveland Police SWAT/CNT would remain primary throughout the ensuing six-hour hostage drama, backed up by FBI SWAT/CNT.

The suspect immediately fired on SWAT, who returned fire. Thus began a multifloor, running gun battle

Through negotiations, the majority of hostage passengers were able to leave the Boeing 727 via the rear door and stairs. They were then were escorted by SWAT to the safety of Mother to be debriefed. Negotiations were essentially limited to the suspect’s only demand: to be flown to South America.

between the suspect and

The suspect now held just four hostages – a young mother and infant, and an elderly, retired couple with heart conditions. Because of the presence of the infant and because of the elderly couple’s heart conditions, tactical options were limited. Negotiations stalled as the suspect becoming increasingly threatening and unstable, stating she was “getting tired” and strongly indicating she was about to shoot the remaining four hostages.

Cleveland SWAT was

The only remaining viable option was to initiate a Hostage Rescue. It is fortuitous that only a couple months earlier, Cleveland and FBI SWAT had conducted joint jet aircraft hostage rescue training. Now it was for real. Cleveland SWAT again rehearsed the rescue, this time on a nearby identical 727 filled with passengers waiting to depart.

SWAT. Due to the size and complexity of the building,

assisted by three additional SWAT teams: Cleveland FBI, Cuyahoga County Sheriff, and Euclid PD.

Heavily armed with two firearms and lots of extra ammunition as well as wearing armored ballistic vest and steel military helmet, a suspect smashed his way through a glass security door to gain entrance to the

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Cleveland Police responded rapidly, as did Cleveland SWAT. They were on scene and engaging the suspect within minutes. Ironically, SWAT had just finished conducting Active Shooter–Rapid Response training for CPD officers.

The suspect immediately fired on SWAT, who returned fire. Thus began a multi-floor, running gun battle between the suspect and SWAT. Due to the size and complexity of the building, Cleveland SWAT was assisted by three additional SWAT teams: Cleveland FBI, Cuyahoga County Sheriff, and Euclid PD. The building’s design included a multi-story atrium that gave the suspect a distinct tactical advantage over SWAT. He would suddenly fire from a hidden, high-ground location, then immediately disappear, only to resurface somewhere else. This cat-and-mouse pattern continued throughout the entire operation.

During the ensuing six-seven hours, SWAT discovered and rescued approximately 100 people who had hidden and locked themselves inside rooms of the sprawling building.

As the structure was methodically secured floor-by-floor, SWAT was able to safely rescue the hidden innocent persons. Additional SWAT personnel then escorted them out of the building where other SWAT members and Mother-2 provided their safe passage.

The Cleveland SWAT hostage rescue consisted of simultaneous front rescue and rear diversion, each with designated assignments. The suspect managed to fire one shot, which struck a SWAT officer in his vest and glanced off his knee. Simultaneously, a second SWAT officer shot and critically wounded the suspect. All four hostages were rescued unharmed. The suspect survived and was confined to a mental institution.

May 2003 Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) Active Shooter/ Killer – Seven-Hour Running Gunbattle/Multiple Hostages Rescued.

CWRU’s enormous, modernistic Peter B. Lewis building. He then immediately opened fire on anyone he saw, killing a graduate student and wounding two others. His attention was diverted by responding university officers who exchanged gunfire with the now-retreating suspect.

Despite the enormity and complexity of this extremely challenging operation, the four SWAT teams, who knew and trained together on occasion, meshed and coordinated their missions and areas of responsibility, and were ultimately able to rescue all of those hidden.

Also, while simultaneously and methodically taking ground away from the suspect, he was forced to retreat to higher floors where he was ultimately cornered and captured without further incident.

CleveCounterTerrJ2. As the face of “terrorism” and “quasiterrorism” evolves and changes, law enforcement must evolve and change also. As we’ve seen, law enforcement has already changed by developing highly effective counterterrorism strategies and tactics, including SWAT, HNT/ CNT, Rapid/Immediate Response to Active Shooters/Killers.

Shown are Cleveland Police SWAT members taking cover behind an Armored Rescue Vehicle (ARV) from a neighboring suburb.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Thanks to rapid, effective intervention by responding police and SWAT, after the initial attack CPD SWAT discovered the only casualty was the gunman, who was shot by SWAT several times during the hours-long ordeal.

The gunman–who turned out to be 60+ years old and militarily trained in the Indian Army-was subsequently charged, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison.

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The Cleveland Experience The “Cleveland Experience” is hardly unique to Cleveland. As in many, if not most, other major U.S. cities, Cleveland police have experienced many other large and small “terror/ quasi-terror” type incidents since the 1960s.

And as is the case with most other major city police, the Cleveland Police counter-terror response has evolved to meet the constantly changing face of the terror threat, successfully employing SWAT, ARV, CNT, and Incident Command concepts. In addition, Cleveland has continually strived to learn from its own experience and that of others.

The eventual evolution of Cleveland Police counter-terror response originated with the Task Force. After the Glenville Shootout, this was incorporated into the Tactical Unit, which was dissolved in the mid-1970s and replaced by a series of different “tactical concepts,” ultimately becoming the present-day, full-time SWAT Unit.

CPD’s original “Mother” Armored Rescue Vehicle would go on to faithfully protect and serve the citizens of Cleveland for 27 years, despite three power train replacements. Mother was officially retired in 1997, and replaced by the custom-designed, purpose-built “Mother-2” who continues carrying on the original Mother’s life-saving mission.

Both Mother and Mother-2 have successfully withstood being struck by gunfire--including from high-caliber weapons--on numerous occasions since 1970 while providing effective protection to their Tactical/SWAT crews, along with numerous grateful downed, pinneddowned civilians and officers alike.

As the face of terrorism and quasi-terrorism evolves and changes, law enforcement must evolve and change also.

As we’ve seen, law enforcement has already changed by developing highly effective counterterrorism strategies and tactics, including SWAT, HNT/CNT, and rapid/immediate response to active shooters/killers.

The face of “terror/quasi-terrorism” has continually changed since the 1960s as snipers have morphed into today’s active shooters

As the face of terrorism and quasi-terrorism evolves and changes, law enforcement must evolve and change also. As we’ve seen, law enforcement has already changed by developing highly effective counterterrorism strategies and tactics, including SWAT, HNT/CNT, and rapid/immediate response to active shooters/killers.

The lines between “true” and “quasi-terror” have increasingly blurred over the years.

Yet, the one constant throughout this time is that law enforcement is always the first to respond to, and handle, acts of terror. As a result, law enforcement–both first responders and SWAT/CNT--needs to be as well prepared, trained, and equipped as possible to meet the changing terrorist threat to society.

If we are to learn from the “Cleveland Experience,” it is this: Terrorism (whether “true” or “quasi”) can--and does--happen anywhere and everywhere. The lesson is that we need to “learn from yesterday, live in today, and look to tomorrow.”

Because, as former Army Special Forces (Vietnam), and former Ashtabula County SWAT Commander Terry Thorpe, wisely said, “When you aren’t practicing, somewhere, someone is. And when you meet him, he will win.”

About the Authors Sgt. Robert “Bob” O’Brien, Cleveland, Ohio, Department of Police, SWAT (Retired) is a member of the TREXPO Advisory Board and founder of the R.J. O’Brien Group Ltd., a law enforcement training and consulting service that advises and trains a number of local, state, and federal SWAT teams. He is the co-founder of the Cleveland SWAT team and a former SWAT team leader. He is also an Army Vietnam War veteran.

And many an intimidated suspect has been persuaded to surrender without incident because of, and at times directly because of, “Mother” and “Mother-2.” As a result, contrary to what some SWAT/ARV detractors say, real-world experience has repeatedly shown the judicious use of CPD ARVs to be highly effective in causing the safe resolution of numerous high-risk threat situations since 1970.

To repeat, the “Cleveland Experience” with “terror/quasi-terrorism” is likely little different from that of many, if not most, major American cities and law enforcement agencies. Their counterterrorism responses to “true” and “quasi-terrorism” are essentially the same, and have repeatedly proven successful in safely resolving and diffusing dangerous police incidents.

and hostage/barricade incidents are now common occurrences. Even “true” terrorist groups have changed, and sometimes mirror “quasi-terrorist” tactics. This is evidenced by the emergence of “Lone Wolf Terrorists.”

Lieut. Jim Weiss (Retired) is a former Army light infantryman, school-trained Army combat engineer, a former school-trained (regular Army) Army military policeman, former State of Florida Investigator, and a retired police lieutenant from the Brook Park (OH) Police Department. He has written and co-written hundreds of articles for law enforcement and safety forces magazines, most notably Law and Order and Tactical Response.

CleveCounterTerrJ5. The eventual evolution of Cleveland Police counter-terror response originated with Task Force, which, after the Glenville Shootout, was incorporated into the Tactical Unit. This was dissolved in the mid-1970s and replaced by a series of different tactical concepts, ultimately becoming the present-day, full-time SWAT Unit. Cleveland Police Department SWAT with Mother-2.

Mickey (Michele) Davis is an award-winning, California-based writer and author. Her young adult novel, Evangeline Brown and the Cadillac Motel, won the Swiss Prix Chronos for the German translation. Mickey is the wife of a Vietnam War veteran Army officer. She is a senior fire department volunteer.

Secure Driver:

Vision

H

By Anthony Ricci ave you ever wondered how people make traffic decisions on the road? What makes a driver brake when they should have swerved? Why did they hit a car when they could have positioned themselves to see it coming? Why is it that what seems so obvious to some drivers is a complicated choice or action for another?

One of the main reasons this happens is simply every

drivers field of vision is different from another and in addition their ability to predict what visual clues to look for differs as well. These two variables are what gives each driver a different perception of a situation. Think about watching a football game, have you ever wondered why the quarterback threw for an interception rather than pass to the wide-open receiver in another part of the field? The quarter back can see the entire field but not from the same vantage point of you while you’re sitting at home.

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On the road, I have seen many crashes that were obviously avoidable, and wondered how the driver didn’t react to the danger that was right in front of them. What goes through a person’s mind during these moments? I began to wonder . . . do we see everything around us, but process information incorrectly, or do our eyes not give us all the pieces that we need to solve the puzzle? “Vision” has two definitions which are both very crucial for driving.

images thus making it easier for the brain to process information.

“Tunnel vision” is the brain’s survival approach to reduce its space/world to what it can control. Tunneled vision, or compressed vision is when the field of vision is constricted to a relatively small field. Focusing only on what one see’s in this “tunnel,” people with compressed vision view the world in two-dimensions which presents dysfunction in judging distance and/or motion.

1. The act or power of sensing with the eyes; sight.

2. The act or power of anticipating that which will or may come to be.

We can compare this to our quarterback. With 21 other people moving in different directions at different speeds and depths, the brain actually blocks some images from being processed. The brain is trying to process visual information while at the same time calculating how long it will take to get the ball to his receiver and where that player will be once the ball arrives.

In definition, one eyes act as sensors that allow light into the brain, the brain transfers this light into recognizable objects and then starts to formulate a plan to evade the object or get around quicker. The eyes don’t get to tell the brain what to look for nor do they recognize danger. The brain directs the eyes and interprets the data thus the reason this conversation is so delicate.

Every person sees what their brain directs them to look at and some people interpret and act with enough time and space to easily maneuver around a potential hazard.

Others don’t even interpret data, they may see a car but don’t actually process the fact that the car is a potential hazard. Thus the reason you see it and they don’t try to avoid it.

The brain takes short cuts and stores some of the information allowing you to process only what is most important to you at the moment. As a driver, however, it is important to understand that this may cause momentary confusion if the mind’s image is in conflict with what the eyes are actually looking at.

Although the second definition refers more to using your imagination for driving it is necessary to know what traffic scenarios look correct and which appear incorrect. If you look around you when you are driving there are many people who seem clueless as to what is going on around them. Some even appear to stare ten feet in front of the hood and never adjust their gaze. The first step in our active scanning process is, you guessed it, scan. If your eyes are fixed on one spot you immediately take away much of your ability to anticipate future events.

Somewhere in between scan and predict we throw a little word in. Identify.

If we go back to the beginning of this article, we see that this is where our quarterback went wrong. Why did he identify the covered receiver as the one to which he should throw the ball?

The third step listed in our “active scanning” process is to predict. The more you drive, the more experiences you have to draw from, and the better you can take external cues and use them to anticipate what will happen next. A driver who has had his license for a month will interpret these cues differently from someone who has ten years of driving experience.

Well, that’s what the theory tells us anyway.

The most widely known descriptions of the vision process are tunnel vision and peripheral vision. The human eye has receptors in the retina, which are concentrated towards the center. This causes our peripheral vision to be rather weak compared to our vision if we focus on an object.

According to the Center for Visual Management, the human eye can process many overlapping objects, which may be moving in different directions. Although the brain has the ability to process more than one object, it can become overwhelmed tracking multiple objects. When this happens, the brain pushes out some of these images to focus on a smaller number of

If this happens in the body’s natural environment, what happens in a car? The fastest humans do not travel faster than 30 mph on foot. If the brain blocks excess information in a static environment, what happens when we travel at high speed?

When driving 60 mph, the driver is moving approximately 90 ft. in one second, it is imperative that the driver looks far down the road. Drivers who look one or two car lengths in front of them will have unexpected events occur with fractions of a second to react. If enough of these events happen in a short period of time the brain will be overwhelmed and will constantly be behind the events playing catch-up. Looking further down the road will get information to the brain earlier. This will allow the driver to process the information and come up with a plan of action before the other driver has even seen the hazard.

Another thing that happens at high speeds is that the field of vision narrows - 180 degrees when stopped and 40 degrees at 60mph.

As a result, it is important for the driver to constantly scan the roadway.

Scanning allows the driver to increase their field of vision, so to speak.

While the amount the eye can see will remain the same, by scanning different sections of the road and mirrors, they will have a better understanding of the big picture around them. Drivers should pay special attention to scanning when tired, since peripheral vision diminishes when fatigued.

Mirrors are important because you may not have time to check what is alongside the car during an emergency. If there are lanes on either side of you, knowing where other cars are will allow you to make a lane change decision quickly.

The more experience you have, the more comfortable you will be in stressful situations. It is important to keep your mind sharp as well as your driving skills. If a driver feels as though they are overwhelmed, the best course of action is to slow down. If, however, during an emergency it is not possible to slow the car, it is imperative that a driver views as much of the road as possible. By actively scanning far in advance, the driver can identify hazards as early as possible. Using their training and experience, they can predict what may happen next. These predictions can be used to decide on the best course of action to avoid trouble. When you have made the correct control inputs take a deep breath and smile knowing that being prepared just made your life a whole lot easier.

About the Author Anthony Ricci is President of ADSI 1adsi.com.

A IACSP Q&A

Mark Henshaw,

Career CIA Analyst and Author of “The Fall of Moscow Station”

M

ark Henshaw is a veteran CIA analyst. He is the recipient of eighteen Exceptional Performance Awards and the Director of National Intelligence’s 2007 Galileo Award for innovation in intelligence analysis.

A former member of the CIA’s Red Cell think

tank, Henshaw is the author of three popular and critically acclaimed spy thrillers featuring CIA officers; “Red Cell,” “Cold Shot” and his most recent, “The Fall of Moscow Station.”

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Mark Henshaw holds a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Brigham Young University (BYU) and master’s degrees in Business Administration (BYU Marriott School of Management) and International Relations (BYU Kennedy Center for International and Area Studies ‘99). He is a graduate of the Sherman Kent School’s Advanced Analyst Program.

He was interviewed by Paul Davis, a contributing editor to the Journal.

IACSP: I read your three spy thrillers and enjoyed them. Why did you write the novels?

Henshaw: I’ve always wanted to write books, but it was my wife who really got me going on it. She decided it was finally time to stop talking about it and do it. And the genre I’ve always kind of leaned towards when I’m reading fiction is espionage, military thrillers, and those kinds of things. Not only write what you know, write what you love as well. So that was naturally the genre I gravitated to. I began by picking out stories that I wanted to tell, touching on different aspects of espionage, military development and those kinds of things.

IACSP: Did you join the CIA because of your interest in these areas? Were you spurned on by the thrillers you read?

Henshaw: I suppose that was part of it. I grew up in a family where my father had been in the Marine Corps, and he stayed in the reserves until he met the mandatory retirement age. Mom had been in the Air Force as a captain.

I grew up in a family where I was surrounded by current and former military members. I thought about going into the military in the mid-90s when the Clinton administration was cutting the military way back. The one piece of advice my father gave me was, “if you are going to go in, go in as an officer”, but because of the cut-backs, they couldn’t

When the first book, “Red Cell,” came out, the actual CIA Red Cell, the real unit, had me come in and sign copies for their family and friends. They had a copy of the book cover blown up to poster size.

They liked the books very much. They recognized that no novel can ever truly and accurately reflect life in the agency. You can’t write a thriller where the guy spends most of his time at a desk reading intelligence traffic.

They recognized that I tried to make the books as realistic as possible and still make them entertaining. When I got something wrong, they did not hesitate to tell me.

guarantee that I would get a shot at officer candidate school. So I went back to graduate school and the agency recruited me there, as someone liked the master’s thesis I had written. I wrote about cyber security and this was the late 90s when nobody was talking cyber security. So, having grown up in a family where military service, patriotism and all those kind of values were taught to you at a young age, the CIA seemed like an interesting job and a way that I could serve my country and protect national security. I’ve found the CIA to be very fulfilling.

IACSP: How have your bosses and colleagues at CIA responded to your novels?

Henshaw: That has been really interesting. People show up at my desk with copies of the book and ask me if I can sign them for their relatives, as they want to give a copy out for Christmas and whatnot. When the first book, “Red Cell,” came out, the actual CIA Red Cell, the real unit, had me come in and sign copies for their family and friends. They had a copy of the book cover blown up to poster size. They liked the books very much. They recognized that no novel can ever truly and accurately reflect life in the agency. You can’t write a thriller where the guy spends most of his time at a desk reading intelligence traffic. They recognized that I tried to make the books as realistic as possible and still make them entertaining. When I got something wrong, they did not hesitate to tell me.

IACSP: Did you have any problems with your bosses?

Henshaw: No. Once you go to work for the agency, you have to sign an agreement that if you ever write anything you have to submit your stuff through the review process. There were a few times they came back and said this had to come out or I need to change that. I pushed back on a couple of occasions, but no one said this is bad or anything like that.

IACSP: What can you tell us about your career at the CIA? Henshaw: : I was hired in 1999 and I’ve been a military analyst. I’ve done a number of things, focusing on cyber security and military analysis, which are the two big areas I’ve worked on. I was with Red Cell for three years, which was one of the best assignments that I’ve had. It was fascinating.

Currently, I’m the editor of a daily publication at the agency that highlights various stories which are of interest to people who work in our area. An analyst for the agency is very academic.

You read the intelligence reports of the day and try to piece together what is going on in the world, what somebody is up to, and what are their capabilities and intentions. You write those things up and get it in front of policy makers. You spend a lot of time briefing people and answering their questions. You do a fair amount of training and you get out into the field and go places. I spent 10 days sailing on the USS Blue Ridge out in the Pacific one time. I heard the ship was sometimes referred to as the “Hotel Blue Ridge,” because they say it is such a swank place. I thought that if this is the Navy’s idea of swank, I’d hate to see what the rest of the fleet looks like.

IACSP: I enjoyed your naval battle in “Red Cell.” I thought it was done very well. As a Navy veteran, I can be critical of fictional portrayals of ships and sailors.

Henshaw: When I read espionage thrillers, I sometimes notice when the author gets it wrong. I have a hard time watching spy movies and TV shows because I see what they absolutely get wrong and it takes me out of the story.

IACSP: What is the Red Cell unit at the CIA and how realistic is your portrayal of it?

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Henshaw: The Red Cell was set up on September 13, 2001 by the then-CIA director, George Tenet.

He realized that the agency had suffered what the 9/11 Commission would later call the “failure of imagination.” So late one night when he had an opportunity to catch a breath, he called in his senior people – the deputy director for intelligence and the deputy director for operations – and said he wanted to set up a unit that will make sure we don’t have that kind of failure again. He wanted get some people in the building who were known for being sort of loose cannon thinkers and get them in a room. He wanted them to start connecting the dots that other people don’t think should be connected. So they went and got a couple of guys in and they recruited a number of other people.

Tenet said he wanted them to tell him what nobody else was telling him and make the other analysts around here nervous. Initially they were focused on terrorism, but he later told them to look at the rest of the world as well.

They try to develop scenarios that they think are plausible, but not necessarily probable. They are not trying to predict the future.

They are trying to start a discussion. They want policy makers to be thinking about scenarios that are out of the box, because if the policy maker doesn’t think the scenario will ever come true, he will at least have to think about it in order to disprove it. It means you are expanding your horizons, you’re broadening your mission, and you’re taking a look at the world in a way you may not have looked at otherwise. The Red Cell is an analytical unit. It is a group of people who write papers and think about things. Obviously, they don’t go out in the field in the sort of the way I have them in the books, because, let’s face it, a thriller where a guy sits at a desk all day is not very thrilling.

IACSP: No, but it can be suspenseful.

Henshaw: I’ve had to come up with reasons to get them out in

the field doing things and I hope they are believable enough for people to get into it. The most exciting thing you do is give a briefing to somebody and they go out and act on your information. Every once in a while the Red Cell goes out in the field and consults and helps people to work out some thorny problems.

They are not universally loved at the agency. A lot of people don’t like that the unit can talk about any subject and they don’t have to clear it or coordinate with some other office.

IACSP: Jealous?

Henshaw: There is some of that.

Sometimes they come and complain that the Red Cell said this or that to this policy maker and he threw them a bunch of questions and now they have to answer them. The Red Cell’s attitude is, you’re upset that a customer is coming to you and asking your opinion about something? This is a Red Cell success. They got the policy maker thinking about this subject.

IACSP: I interviewed former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer and former CIA case officer Gary Berntsen for the Journal a while back. They were both very complimentary about each other’s skill set. Is the professional and cultural divide between analysts and case officers still wide, or has it changed since 9/11?

Henshaw: It has changed a lot since 9/11. It used to be very wide, a gaping canyon. After 9/11 it became apparent to all that the agency could not afford to have this divide anymore. The analysts needed to have better access to more of the raw information the case officers were collecting and the case officers very definitely needed the analysts’ expertise to piece together what was going on.

So there has been a lot of effort since then to help both sides work together more closely. Now you have places in the agency where you have both sides sitting in the same room, sitting at desks right

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Vol. 22, No.1

across from each other, and they work together very closely. There probably is still some rivalry between the two, but there is no longer the almost open hostility that there used to be.

IACSP: What type of person becomes an analyst and what type of person becomes a case officer?

Are there personality traits at work here?

Henshaw: It is introverts and extroverts. Analysts are academic types who like sitting at a desk, reading, thinking and analyzing, whereas a case officer has to be an extrovert. You have to very much be a people-person. You have to get out there and talk and engage with people. Those are the two big traits IACSP: Did you base your two reoccurring characters, Jonathan Burke and Kyra Stryker, on real people?

Henshaw: Not really. There is probably a little bit of me in both of them. I like to think I have a little bit more of a filter on my mouth than Jonathan does. I stole little bits and pieces from different people I’ve known and put them in different places. I try not to base any of those characters on any one person, because I’d hate for somebody to think “that’s me, and he got this or that wrong.” I might steal a line or two. That gives me more freedom to develop the character the way I want.

IACSP: Is your character Alden Maines, the CIA traitor in your latest novel, and the two Soviet GRU military intelligence generals based partially on real people?

Henshaw: Maines is based on a real person, but not the one most people think. Alden Maines sounds similar to Aldrich Ames, but I based Maines more on Edward Lee Howard. He was a CIA officer some years who defected to Russia. He died some years ago. The official story is he fell down the steps in his townhouse and broke his neck.

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IACSP: Sure, once the KGB pushed him down the steps.

Henshaw: The GRU general whose body washes up on the beach was based on a real guy.

In 2010 the deputy director of the GRU was doing a tour of Russian military bases and a couple of days later his body washes up on a beach in Turkey. The official government story was he drowned while going on a recreational swim, but I’m thinking, he was formally Spetsnaz, which means he was the equivalent of a Navy SEAL, and as a deputy director, didn’t he have a security detail with him?

So how can a former Special Forces guy with a security detail drown while going for a recreational swim? I thought it was an interesting event, so I used that. Strangely, a while back the director of the GRU died at a relatively young age. So in less than five years, both the deputy director and the director of the GRU died under what I would think were unusual circumstances.

IACSP: In most thrillers these days the bad guys are terrorists. I noticed in your thrillers you have your good guys go up against adversarial governments, like Venezuela, China and Russia. Why is that?

Henshaw: I made a conscious choice. When I started writing back around 2003, 2004, that’s what everybody was writing about.

I thought, first, how can I compete against those guys who are much better known?

And second, I realized they all read like the same story to me. Just because 9/11 happened it doesn’t mean all of the other U.S. adversaries had gone away. I thought I would do better by focusing on some of them. I thought I would stand out in a crowded market and I could remind the reader that in some cases, because we have been so focused on terrorism, these guys have become more active.

IACSP: I compared you to Tom Clancy in my Washington Times review of “Red Cell.” Was he an inspiration? What thriller writers influenced you?

Henshaw: Tom Clancy was one of the bigger influences. I was in high school when “The Hunt for Red October” came out and it was unlike any other book at that time.

I was a geeky computer programmer kind of guy, so his focus on the technology and how it worked appealed to me.

IACSP: What other spy writers do you like?

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Henshaw: There has probably never been a better espionage writer than John le Carre, but he can be a tough read. The books can be pretty dense and slow and tedious, and then you hit those last ten pages, like “Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy,” and your mind is blown. He has always been character-focused. He develops those characters as very real people. His books are probably the most realistic espionage fiction ever written.

IACSP: Well, yes and no, in my view. I reviewed a biography of le Carre. He’s a fine writer, but his later novels are too anti-American for my taste. In my review I noted that le Carre’s old boss and mentor at MI5, the man who helped le Carre get published and who was partly a model for the George Smiley character, hated the moral ambiguity portrayed in the novels.

John le Carre is very critical of Ian Fleming. Fleming admittedly wrote highly romanticized spy thrillers, although they are much darker and more complex than the silly films, but they portrayed British and American intelligence as a force for good in the world. And I’d stack Fleming’s “From Russia With Love” up against any le Carre Cold War novel.

Henshaw: I’ve not read a lot of le Carre’s later stuff.

IACSP:I think he’s gone off the rails since 9/11, but I too love “Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy” and his early novels. Any other spy writers you admire?

Henshaw: Yes, Frederick Forsyth, who wrote “The Day of the Jackal,” one of the greatest thrillers of all time. What I appreciate about that one is the first chapter describes a real event – the attempted assassination of Charles de Gaulle – and then he wanders off from there. That was what inspired me to try and weave actual history into my books. I try to base my fictional stories on real events.

IACSP:: What TV spy shows and spy moves do you like?

Henshaw: I can’t say I’ve seen many that I like. I liked “Argo.” Ben Affleck came to the agency several times and talked to people. He demonstrated great respect for what agency people do. It is a true story and there were some “Hollywood” liberties taken, but nothing that I thought was particularly grievous. The film showed what the agency will do to rescue people.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

IACSP: Any shows that you really hate?

Henshaw: Most of them. The movies I particularly dislike are the ones with a CIA person portrayed as a mustache-twirling villain. I wish people knew that the CIA is stacked with average Americans who are smart and patriotic.

IACSP: Over the years I met a good number of law enforcement, intelligence, government and military people who simply love thrillers? Why do you think they love this genre?

Henshaw: People who are attracted to these careers are those who like the excitement the job offers and doing something bigger than yourself. I think thrillers give you that. It allows you to enter a world where you are riding alongside a character who is doing something important and leading an exciting life. I think that taps into the same emotions that maybe attracts people to that kind of lifestyle.

IACSP: I’d add that thrillers generally portray them as good guys when so many others out there try to paint them as the bad guys.

Henshaw: I’ve heard military guys say that about Clancy’s books. “The Hunt for Red October” came out in the early 80s when the military was still trying to shake the negative image from the Vietnam War. The novel showed the military as a group of honorable professionals. Military people responded and said yes, most of us are.

IACSP: Do you see the CIA as a force of good in the world today?

Henshaw: Yeah, I do. If you don’t like the CIA, imagine a world where the CIA does not exist. Imagine a world where you do not have an agency that collects information on what America’s adversaries are trying to do and where you don’t have someone putting that information together and taking it to the president so he can make more informed decisions on what to do to advance American interests and protect American national security.

I believe the United States is a force for good in the world and I believe the CIA helps the United States make better and wiser decisions.

IACSP: Thank you for speaking to us, thank you for your service, and good luck with your novels.

Vol. 22, No.1

IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf

By Dr. Joshua Sinai The following are noteworthy recently published books on various aspects of homeland security. The capsule reviews are arranged alphabetically, by authors’ last names.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2016 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 504 pages, $618.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-85743-835-2.

T

he annually published The Military Balance, which is published by the London-based The International Institute for Strategic Studies, is considered the most authoritative, comprehensive and detailed assessment of the military capabilities and defense economics of 171 countries. It is widely used as an unclassified reference resource by governments’ military and intelligence agencies, as well as public policy research institutes, around the world.

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The volume is divided into two parts: Part One, “Capabilities, Trends and Economics,” and Part Two, “Reference.” Attesting to the significance of the terrorist threat facing much of the global community, the editor’s introduction, entitled “Modernising Military Capabilities; Familiar Security Challenges,” begins with an overview of the terrorist threat, as he writes that “A surge in highprofile terrorist attacks at the end of 2015 added to the increasing crises, conflicts and sense of uncertainty preoccupying the planning staffs of defense ministries worldwide.” (p. 5) Given “the reality that combating terrorism was a global, not just a regional issue,” the editor adds that terrorist groups such as ISIS “cannot be eradicated solely by military means. Tackling these groups will require multinational attention and the concerted and long-term application of policies and tools blending political, military, security, information and development capabilities, and agreement on ends as well as means: [with] the track record on such cooperation… mixed at best.” (p. 5) With the volume’s chapters focusing on the military capabilities of global regions and their countries, of particular interest to the counterterrorism community is their detailing of countries’ combating terrorism forces. Thus, for example, it details that the United States’ Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) consists of 63,150 active forces and 6,550 civilians (p. 48), France has 3 Special Forces groups (p. 98), that Norway’s Army has 2 Special Forces groups and one Naval Special Forces group (p. 126), the United Kingdom has a large contingent of Royal Navy, Army and RAF Special Forces regiments and squadrons (p. 155), Russia has 489,000 Paramilitary forces, 10,000-30,000 Federal Protection Services forces, and 170,000 Interior Troops, India has 1,403,700 Paramilitary forces and 7,350 National Security Guards (p. 255), and that Israel has 3 Army Special Forces battalions and 1 Special Operations brigade, 300 Naval Commandos, and 8,000 Border Police forces (pp. 333- 335). The appendices include a listing of estimated forces and equipment by selected terrorist groups such as the Lebanese Hizballah, ISIS, and Boko Haram.

United States of Jihad: Investigating America’s Homegrown Terrorists

Peter Bergen, (New York, NY: Crown, 2016), 400 pages, $28.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0804139540.

Peter Bergen’s “United States of Jihad: Investigating America’s Homegrown Terrorists” is a gripping account of the motivations and activities of a tiny proportion of Muslim Americans (including converts to Islam) who have become jihadist terrorists since Sept. 11, 2001 on behalf of global terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and ISIS, and the measures the U.S. government employs to counter their plots and attacks domestically and overseas. Mr. Bergen, a prominent journalist on terrorism issues, is the author of several best-selling books on al Qaeda.

Mr. Bergen’s analysis, overall, is sound and revealing, especially when he discloses new details about many of these terrorist plots and attacks, and the

way law enforcement agencies such as the FBI, the NYPD and others have attempted to counter them. At the same time, however, his argument that the threat posed by American jihadists (or by foreign jihadists against America) is often hyped and “overestimated” by politicians and opinion makers could have benefited from a closer look.

Mr. Bergen claims that “since 2001 [up to the end of 2015] 45 Americans have been killed by jihadist terrorists in the United States.” Yet, what he does not mention is that during this period, if certain major plots and operations by such jihadists had not been thwarted by U.S. law enforcement agencies or by the sheer luck that their explosives did not detonate, hundreds of Americans would have lost their lives. These include a failed operation by Najibullah Zazi, who attempted to conduct a suicide bombing with two associates of the New York City subway system in September 2009, which had been masterminded by al Qaeda in Pakistan; the attempt by Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to set off an explosive bomb on board a Northwest Flight 253 over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, which had been masterminded by the Yemeni branch of al Qaeda; and Faisal Shazad’s attempted bombing of Times Square on the evening of May 1, 2010, with his explosiveladen SUV car failing to detonate, in a plot masterminded by the Taliban, an al Qaeda-affiliate in Pakistan.

While Mr. Bergen discusses these three aborted operations — and his account of them makes especially gripping reading — he sidesteps the issue of the number of casualties that were avoided. Mr. Bergen points out that since 9/11 “330 people in the United States have been charged with some kind of jihadist terrorist crime ranging in seriousness from murder to sending small sums of money to a terrorist group.” He also notes the rise of anti-Muslim “hysteria” since 9/11. But had he computed the total potential fatalities produced by aborted plots along with the 45 fatalities that he highlights from his listing of “successful” attacks, then the full magnitude of the jihadist threat to America would have been revealed. And this threat, moreover, appears to be escalating rather than declining in lethality, as demonstrated by last December’s mass shootings

by ISIS-inspired husband-and-wife team of Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik in San Bernardino, Calif., which ushered in a new form of “tag team” jihadist terrorists.

Mr. Bergen’s assertion that the jihadist militants in America “are, on average, as well educated and emotionally stable as the typical citizen” can also be challenged by extensive counterevidence.

For example, were the mass murderers Maj. Nidal Hassan, Najibullah Zazi, Faisal Shazad, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, and numerous others, really as “well educated and emotionally stable” as the average American citizen (and with Maj. Hassan, in particular, receiving poor performance reviews from his medical school supervisors)?

Nevertheless, there is much to commend in Mr. Bergen’s important book. Readers will benefit from his astute observations, based on numerous case studies, of how American jihadists become radicalized and mobilized into terrorism (and, in particular, how some are self-radicalized lone wolves while others

act on behalf of their terrorist group sponsors). The book also deftly offers insights into the methods that the FBI employs to profile the radicalization pathways into terrorism, including possible inhibitors that may hold back the vulnerable from becoming violent extremists. His prognosis regarding what he terms “future jihad,” particularly the emergence of ISIS as the world’s preeminent terrorist organization, is convincing and instructive. Moreover, his discussion of ISIS‘ success in exploiting the Internet’s extremist social media sites to radicalize and mobilize its adherents into either becoming foreign fighters in Syria or to conduct terrorist attacks in their U.S. homeland offers a sobering assessment that should not be overlooked.

His prognosis regarding what he terms “future jihad,” particularly the emergence of ISIS as the world’s preeminent terrorist organization, is convincing and instructive. Moreover, his discussion of ISIS‘ success in exploiting

role of background investigations in vetting employees who might present an ‘insider’ threat, how to recognize deception by potential insiders, and the components of a preventative program to mitigate such threats to an organization). As a textbook, each chapter includes a summary conclusion, questions for classroom discussion, exercises for group projects, and endnotes.

The appendices include additional questions and issues for further discussion. This textbook is ideal for university courses and as a practical handbook for security departments that focus on countering the insider threat. What is especially noteworthy about this textbook is that it was published prior to the insider attacks by Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden – but had its insights and preventative guidelines and protocols been employed at the time could have aided in preventing such costly breaches into the U.S. government’s national security classified information systems. The author, a veteran security director, teaches homeland security and emergency management at the School of Management, University of Alaska.

the Internet’s extremist social media sites to radicalize and mobilize

Managing the Insider Threat: No Dark Corners

Nick Catrantzos, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2012), 363 pages, $76.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4398-7292-5.

This is an authoritative textbook on the manifestations of the insider threat and the methods required to mitigate the challenges presented by the threat. It is divided into three parts: Part I, “Diagnostics” (defining the nature of the threat and the danger posed by such individuals who possess “legitimate access and occupies a position of trust” in an organization that is ultimately betrayed, and various analytical approaches employed to assess this threat); Part II, “Key Players” (the types of ‘insiders’ ranging from those who wage cyber sabotage or breaches on behalf of foreign governments or political causes, those who seek financial gain, to those who engage in workplace violence); and Part III, “Making a Difference” (the

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its adherents into either becoming foreign fighters in Syria or to conduct terrorist attacks in their U.S. homeland offers a sobering assessment that should not be overlooked.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

The Terrorism Lectures: A Comprehensive Collection for Students of Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and National Security

[2nd Edition] James J.F. Forest, (Santa Ana, CA: Nortia Current/An Imprint of Nortia Press, 2015), 408 pages, $39.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-9400503-06-6.

In this comprehensive and well-written textbook, the author’s aim is “to stimulate the experience of a semester-long uniVol. 22, No.1

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versity course on terrorism.

Each chapter represents what is meant to be a 35-40 minute classroom lecture.” (p. xiii).

This is accomplished through the book’s five parts. The first part, “Definitions and Historical Frameworks,” discusses how terrorism is defined, its general objectives, David Rapoport’s famous formulation of the four historical waves of modern terrorism, and how terrorist groups, as “learning organizations,” learn from each other’s modus operandi and weaponry. The second part, “Underlying Contexts That Motivate and Facilitate Terrorism,” examines the underlying grievances that drive terrorism, how individuals are radicalized and recruited into terrorism, the exploitation of the media and the Internet by terrorists, the economic dimensions of terrorism (e.g., economic conditions as grievances and facilitators, and the economic impact of terrorism on their targeted societies), the financial and criminal dimensions of terrorism (e.g., the nexus between terrorist groups and criminal organizations and engagement by terrorist groups in criminal activities), and the political dimensions of terrorism, ranging from state support of terrorist groups to the competition over control of weak and failed states between terrorist group insurgents and their weak governments. The third part, “Terrorist Group Ideologies and Strategies,” discusses the ideological types of terrorist groups, ranging from ethnonationalist/ separatist, left-wing, right-wing, to religious.

The fourth part, “Contemporary Challenges,” analyzes the latest challenges posed by terrorism in the form of al Qaida [which also applies to its parallel variation, ISIS], lone actor terrorism, the use by terrorist groups of the tactic of suicide bombings, and the threats presented by the potential use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction. The fifth’s part, “Concluding Thoughts,” presents the author’s on the future trajectory of terrorism in terms of possible new trends in their organizational formations, ideology, weaponry, areas of operation, and warfare scenarios.

As a textbook, each chapter includes a summary, questions for discussion, recommended readings, and endnotes. The comprehensive and authoritative treatment of these subjects makes this an ideal primary textbook for courses on terrorism and counterterrorism.

The author is Professor and Director of the Security Studies program at the University of Massachusetts Lowell and the co-editor of “Perspectives on Terrorism.”

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The second part, “Underlying Contexts That Motivate and Facilitate Terrorism,” examines the underlying grievances that drive terrorism, how individuals are radicalized and recruited into terrorism, the exploitation of the media and the Internet by terrorists, the economic dimensions of terrorism (e.g., economic conditions as grievances and facilitators, and the economic impact of terrorism on their targeted societies), the financial and criminal dimensions of terrorism (e.g., the nexus between terrorist groups and criminal organizations and engagement by terrorist groups in criminal activities), and the political dimensions of terrorism, ranging from state support of terrorist groups to the competition over control of weak and failed states between terrorist group insurgents and their weak governments.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Policing Terrorism: Research Studies into Police Counterterrorism Investigations

David Lowe, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016), 203 pages, $80.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4822-2683-6.

This is an authoritative, practitionerbased socio-legal study by a former veteran UK counterterrorism detective of significant issues involved in terrorism investigations. The volume is divided into two parts. The first part, “The Law Governing Terrorism Investigations,” covers topics such as the legal definition of terrorism, defining and ascertaining evidence that confirms when a religiously extremist activity can be associated with terrorism, statutory preventative measures against terrorism, legal justifications for engaging in surveillance of suspects, and countering the funding of terrorism. The second part, “Investigating Terrorism,” discusses the legal guidelines in conducting intelligence gathering operations by police forces, understanding the signs and activities that accompany radicalization into terrorism (based on a case study from Northern Ireland), police recruitment of informants in counterterrorism investigations, and the laws and policies governing the handling of such informants, including managing their court testimony, immunity from prosecution or reduction in their sentencing.

The author is a principal lecturer at Liverpool John Moores University Law School in the UK.

Vol. 22, No.1

The volume’s editor is affiliated with the Stockholm International Program for Central Asian Studies (SIPCAS), Sweden.

The Dynamics of a Terrorist Targeting Process: Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism: Past Experience, Future Outlook, and Response Strategies

Michael Fredholm, editor, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 312 pages, $145.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-138-10051-0.

This edited volume is the result of an international seminar organized by the editor in Stockholm, Sweden, for the National Center for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT), a working group of the Swedish Security Service, Military Intelligence and Security Directorate, and National Defence Radio Establishment. This was followed as an academic project on lone actor terrorism, with follow-on discussions by the participants.

One of the unique aspects of this project is that most of the volume’s contributors are European experts – with the exception of this reviewer, who contributed two chapters on profiling the mindsets and activities of different types of lone actors: active shooters and those who become insider threats to their organizations. This reviewer was also added to the project following the holding of these workshops. Aside from this reviewer’s two chapters (one, on profiling active shooters, and the second on profiling insider threats), the contributors to this volume examine the relationship between the lone actor (also known as “lone wolf”) and terrorism, historical lessons drawn from early anarchist lone actors, whether left-wing or right-wing, environmental and animal rights extremists operating in the current period, lone actors inspired by al Qaida and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), female long actors, lone actors who conduct school shootings, lone actor terrorism and CBRN weapons, the mindsets of lone actors, lone actors’ online activities, the components of effective countermeasures against lone terrorist actors, and future trends in lone actor terrorism.

Cato Hemmingby and Tore Bjorgo, (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), X, 131 pages, $69.99 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-137-57996-6.

This is a conceptually innovative examination of terrorists’ targeting decision-making processes, using Anders Breivik’s July 22, 2011 attacks in Norway as a case study. In conducting their research, the authors (both prominent Norwegian criminologists) were provided unique access to source material about the investigation of Breivik’s attacks and the subsequent trial, making the case study highly revealing and authoritative. Although the authors focus on a “solo” terrorist as opposed to a larger organized terrorist group, many of their findings apply to all terrorists, as they write that “this case demonstrates how terrorists – single actors as well as group-based – may have to change their [targeting] plans as things often do not develop as they had intended and expected.” (p. 6) Terrorists’ target selection, therefore, is a “highly dynamic process,” involving factors “such as time, capacity and funding…” (pp. 6-7) To examine their thesis, the book’s chapters discuss topics such as theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches to targeting decision-making (e.g., the relationship between ideology and strategy, and the internal and external factors that influence a perpetrator’s tactics); a taxonomy of the types of targets and target categories that serve as a “menu” to terrorists from which to choose in their attacks; the ideology and strategy that drove Breivik to select his targets (e.g., in his case, the strategy of a “massive ‘shockattack’”); selecting his weaponry in the form of bombs and guns for his intended maximum effect attacks; conducting pre-incident surveillance as well as selecting a farm to conduct his training; and finalizing his attack plan. The remaining chapters reconstruct the attacks and analyze its consequences in terms of the effectiveness of the police response, present an

overview of the trial, the results of Breivik’s psychiatric examinations, his sentencing; and examine the differences and similarities between Breivik and other lone terrorists in the West in terms of their strategies and tactics, including the constraints facing security services in detecting potential lone actors as opposed to larger terrorist groups. The authors conclude that “in a holistic perspective, solo terrorism cannot be characterized as the gravest threat we face, but it is certainly a serious threat that cannot be neglected.” (p. 114) The authors are affiliated with the Norwegian Police University College, where Dr. Bjorgo is a Professor of Police Science, and Mr. Hemmingby, a research fellow, also serves as a senior advisor in the Norwegian Government Security and Service Organization.

Note: The review of Peter Bergen’s book originally appeared in “The Washington Times,” with the other reviews originally published in “Perspectives on Terrorism.” All reviews are reprinted with permission.

About The Reviewer Dr. Joshua Sinai is a Principal Analyst at Kiernan Group Holdings (KGH) (www.kiernan.co), in Alexandria, VA. Dr. Sinai can be contacted at: joshua. sinai@comcast.net.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 22, No.1

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Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

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