The IACSP’s Counter-Terrorism Journal V22N3 by IACSP

Are We Doomed? The Hard Truth About Our Insecure Cybersecurity

Threat Convergence:

A New And More Lethal Category Of Terrorist Warfare Black Axe: Nigeria’s Fraternity Of Terrorism Smoking With The Jackal: Developing An Interview Strategy For A Detainee IACSP Q&A With “The FBI’s First Lady” Homeland Security Bookshelf

Fall Issue Vol. 22 No. 3 2016 Printed in the U.S.A. IACSP.COM

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 22, No.3

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Vol. 22, No. 3 Fall 2016 IACSP Director of Operations Steven J. Fustero

Page 20

Associate Publisher Phil Friedman

Threat Convergence: A New And More Lethal Category Of Terrorist Warfare

Senior Editor Nancy Perry Contributing Editors Paul Davis Thomas B. Hunter Joshua Sinai

by Dr. Joshua Sinai

Book Review Editor Jack Plaxe Research Director Gerry Keenan Conference Director John Dew

Page 28

Communications Director Craig O. Thompson

Smoking With The Jackal: Developing An Interview Strategy For A Detainee

Art Director Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Psychological CT Advisors Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC

by Eugene J. Casey

Counterintelligence Advisor Stanley I. White South America Advisor Edward J. Maggio Homeland Security Advisor Col. David Gavigan

Page 6 SITREP, Terrorism Trends & Forecasts Page 8 We Are Doomed: The Hard Truth About Our Insecure Cybersecurity, by David Gewirtz Page 12 Why The Reduction In Bank Robberies Is A Cause For Concern, by Jason Polanco & Jeremiah Fernandez Page 14 The Four Pillars Of Success: How To Earn A Million Dollars Per Year As A Global Security Consultant, by Luke Bencie Page 16 Black Axe: Nigeria’s Fraternity Of Terrorism, by Tony Kail Page 20 Threat Convergence: A New And More Lethal Category Of Terrorist Warfare, by Dr. Joshua Sinai Page 28 Smoking With The Jackal: Developing An Interview Strategy For A Detainee, by Eugene J. Casey Page 38 Secure Driver: Technologies In Cars Today, by Anthony Ricci & Crystalmarie A. Marzocchi Page 40 Spy vs. FBI: A IACSP Q&A With Jan Fedarcyk, The Former Assistant Director In Charge Of The FBI’s New York Office And The Author Of The Novel, “Fidelity”, interview by Paul Davis Page 44 Jan Fedarcyk And The Investigation Of The Fort Dix Six, by Paul Davis Page 46 IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf, reviews by Dr. Joshua Sinai THE JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L is published by SecureWorldnet, Ltd., PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (ISSN#1552-5155) in cooperation with the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals and Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Copyright © 2016. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher. Editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (571) 216-8205, FAX: (202) 315-3459 . Membership $65/year, add $10 for overseas memberships. Postmaster: send address changes to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA. Web site: www.iacsp.com

PHOTO CREDITS: Reuters, DefenseImagery.mil Army.mil, Navy.mil, istockphoto.com, shutterstock.com and authors where applicable.

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Personal Security Advisor Thomas J. Patire Emergency Management Advisor Clark L. Staten Director of Emergency Ops. Don L. Rondeau Tactical Advisor Robert Taubert Hazmat Advisor Bob Jaffin Security Driver Advisor Anthony Ricci, ADSI Cyberwarfare Advisor David Gewirtz Cell Phone Forensics Advisor Dr. Eamon P. Doherty IACSP Advisory Board John M. Peterson III John Dew Thomas Patire Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Robert E. Thorn Southeast Asia Correspondent Dr. Thomas A. Marks European Correspondent Elisabeth Peruci Middle East Correspondent Ali Koknar CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed National Sales Representative Phil Friedman, Advertising Director Tel: 201-224-0588, Fax: 202-315-3459 iacsp@aol.com

SITREP

Global Overview – Trends and Developments n Venezuela, political tensions between President Maduro’s government and the opposition Democratic Unity (MUD) alliance took another dangerous turn after the National Electoral Council last month indefinitely suspended the signature-gathering process needed to pave the way for a recall referendum challenging Maduro’s rule. The closure of the last formal channel for the

opposition to challenge the government’s political hegemony was followed by nationwide protests and threats from the opposition Also last month, Hurricane Matthew struck Haiti killing hundreds, and creating the worst humanitarian crisis since the country’s 2010 earthquake. According to the UN, 1.4 million people are in need of humanitarian aid, and more than 800,000 require urgent help. The natural disaster forced the cancellation of the planned presidential and parliamentary elections and further complicates efforts to stabilize the country’s political and security situation. In Ethiopia, at least 100 people were killed in a stampede reportedly triggered by security forces firing tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse anti-government protests. In response to more protests and vandalism the government declared a six-month state of emergency that puts restrictions on gatherings, social media and communicating with foreign governments and gives security forces greater search and arrest powers.

Deadly attacks by Al-Shabaab jihadists in Mandera town in Kenya’s north east near the border with Somalia prompted the government to put in place a 60-day curfew in the town, as clashes between ethnic groups flared in the Rift Valley. In Mozambique, the killing of several Renamo armed opposition leaders – including one of its negotiators – and clashes between the army and Renamo fighters endangered already faltering peace talks. In western Niger, suspected jihadists based in northern Mali launched deadly attacks, including one on an army post on, which killed 22 security personnel. In Myanmar, several hundred assailants carried out three separate, coordinated attacks on police bases in northern Rakhine state, killing nine police and seizing guns and ammunition. Over the following days at least 22 more died in clashes as security forces attempted to capture the attackers, reported by the government to be Muslims. Reports indicate that approximately 10-15,000 Rohingya Muslims

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and 3,000 Buddhist Rakhine have been displaced by the violence. Last month saw an increase in conflict-related casualties, detentions and counter-terrorism operations in Russia’s North Caucasus, with around 50 people, mostly suspected militants, reported injured or killed during the month. In the Middle East, Michel Aoun’s election as president of Lebanon ended the country’s presidential vacuum after 45 failed attempts to nominate a president since May 2014. Although the deal may help re-energize Lebanon’s political institutions, it is unrealistic to expect drastic changes. The new government will need to address the country’s deep-rooted problems, including how to manage the presence of over a million Syrian refugees and entrenched divisions within the political class. Deteriorating Situations • Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Myanmar, Russia/North Caucasus, Venezuela, Haiti, Syria, Yemen Improved Situations • Lebanon Source: crisiswatch.org

Credits: The Aerospace Corporation

NASA and FEMA Conduct Asteroid Impact Emergency Planning Exercise What would we do if we discovered a large asteroid on course to impact Earth? While highly unlikely, that was the high-consequence scenario discussed by attendees recently at an NASAFEMA tabletop exercise in El Segundo, California.

The exercise provided a forum for the planetary science community to show how it would collect, analyze and share data about a hypothetical asteroid predicted to impact Earth. Emergency managers discussed how that data would be used to consider some of the unique challenges an asteroid impact would present—for preparedness, response and public warning. “It is critical to exercise these kinds of low-probability but highconsequence disaster scenarios,” FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate said. “By working through our emergency response plans now, we will be better prepared if and when we need to respond to such an event.” Source: FEMA.gov

DHS Releases Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism Violent extremism is an evolving threat and a complex challenge. We have seen ISIL attempt to inspire violence from afar through cyberspace. Meanwhile, events in Charleston, Baton Rouge and elsewhere show that violent extremism is not restricted to terrorism abroad and ISIL-inspired violence. As the threat has developed, so has our response. Two weeks ago, the Administration issued strategic guidance updating the roles and responsibilities of the various departments and agencies that are working together, in partnership with local communities, to address this threat. Today, the Department of Homeland Security released a comprehensive strategy that aligns with this guidance and builds on Secretary Johnson’s September 28, 2015 memorandum, titled “Building Community Partnerships to Counter Violent Extremism.” The Department of Homeland Security Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (285 KB PDF)

recognizes the progress we have made, and lays the groundwork for the future of this critical mission. Source: https://www.dhs.gov/blog

2016 Global Terrorism Index Released The Index is a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism with a special emphasis on how to effectively address the threat of terrorism. The developed world became more dangerous in 2015 with a massive increase in deaths from terrorism, although globally there was a slight fall, according to new figures released Wednesday. There was a 650% increase in fatal terror attacks on people living in the world’s biggest economies in 2015, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2016 reveals. However, the study also shows that across the world as a whole, the number of deaths from terrorism fell 10% to 29,376, compared to the previous year. In 2015, there were 731 deaths related to terrorism in the 34 countries that make up the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes the US, UK, Germany, France, and Turkey. For a copy of the report, please visit: http://economicsandpeace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/GlobalTerrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf

Uncertain Trends And Metrics Of Terrorism 2016 Released There are no simple or reliable ways to estimate the trends in terrorism, and the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) no longer provides any declassified estimate of global trends. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) does, however, provide a useful database for tracking media reporting. In addition to the START database, graphical

analyses by key media sources provide additional information that is current, and helps illustrate the sharp contrasts in given sources and estimates. Several NGOs have also made useful estimates that provide additional perspective. The Burke Chair at CSIS has prepared a report that compares the wide range of such data and trends. It does focus on ISIS and similar extremist groups, but also shows global trends for all forms of terrorism and key trends by region. A case study for the Middle East and North Africa highlights the kind of more detailed trends data available on given regions, countries, perpetrators, and types of terrorism. This report is entitled The Uncertain Trends and Metrics of Terrorism in 2016, and is available on the CSIS website at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws. com/s3fs-public/161107_Terrorism_ Metrics_Survey.pdf

IACSP News Many of our members are not receiving our new monthly CTS Enews (electronic security report) because we either do not have your email address, or you are using a .gov or .mil email address for your membership record. If you would like to receive our CTS Enews, please send me an email with the email address you would like us to use. Also include your current address. Please send the information to my attention to my personal email address: iacsp1@aol.com Until next time, have a wonderful holiday season and, as always, be vigilant and safe. Thank you. Steven J. Fustero, Dir. Of Operations/ IACSP

We Are Doomed:

The Hard Truth About Our Insecure Cybersecurity By David Gewirtz

here are times in all of our lives where we have to experience The Talk. There are actually a few different The Talks we experience over time. One is the birds and bees talk you had as a child. Another one was probably that “I’ll let you go this time” talk some kindly police officer gave you about the number on the speed sign being something you should pay attention to. Then there’s The Talk we’re about to have. It’s tough, but someone’s got to break it to you. Put simply, we’re doomed.

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You readers at the NSA know I love you folks, right? You’re good people. But seriously, how could you have let Harold Martin walk out with 50 terabytes of classified information? Yep. We’re hosed. Done. Toast. Frak’d. Get used to it. Let’s start with the U.S. government. This place often leaks like a submarine with a screen door. Remember the story of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)? No? OPM is essentially the American government’s human resources department. Except that in addition to storing normal job applicant information, OPM gathers tons of deeply personal information for classified clearances. They also gather fingerprints, because, well, that’s what governments do. What governments are not supposed to do is let that info be stolen by a frenemy nation. According to Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid, China stole 21.5 million records and 5.6 million fingerprints. So that happened. Let’s visit for a minute with the NSA. Heck, everyone else seems to have done so. Y’all remember Edward Snowden, right? He’s the former NSA contractor who stole millions of top secret records, shared some of them with a media hungry for attention, and then ran away to Russia. You readers at the NSA know I love you folks, right? You’re good people. But seriously, how

could you have let Harold Martin walk out with 50 terabytes of classified information? He apparently made a hobby of it, taking home piles of information, day after day, for decades. Do you know how big 50 terabytes of data is? It’s a lot. So, fine, the government is somewhat of a sieve. Special. That’s not even counting Wikileaks, which seems to have personal access to pretty much any top official’s email box. Just ask former White House Chief of Staff, and Hillary Clinton campaign manager, John Podesta how it feels to have all your emails spread across the front page of the Drudge Report. Yeah, that made his day. Are you feeling secure yet? No? Good. Because if you had your email in Yahoo, don’t worry about the fact that you were too lazy to use multi-factor authentication to protect your identity. The thieves who broke into Yahoo in 2014 didn’t bother with individual accounts. They just hacked into Yahoo itself and stole 500 million accounts. Half a billion accounts. In case you’re not concerned because you don’t really keep much that’s important on Yahoo, remember that each of those accounts have those so-called

secret questions. What was your first dog’s name? I sure don’t know. But someone in a foreign country can look it up. Health records aren’t safe either. Anthem (which runs a whole bunch of America’s Blue Cross/ Blue Shield insurance programs) was hacked. In 2014, 80 million health records were siphoned out, probably again to China. Not a day goes by where you can’t pick up a newspaper… wait, does anyone read newspapers anymore? Not a day goes by where you don’t check your Web news aggregator and see reports of incomprehensibly enormous breaches. It’s not even really news. It’s just another day, another off-the-charts data theft. So, fine. The bad guys know all about us, not just in the aggregate, but personally. They know your dirty habits. They know your previous addresses. They know what medications you take. They know about your hobbies and interests. They know how boring or salacious your email correspondence is. They know enough about some of us to break into any specific account or, worse, find targets to blackmail. But this stuff is more than just information theft. Hackers can bring down critical infrastructure. In 2015, hackers tied to Russia hacked the Ukrainian power grid, knocking a quarter of a million citizens back to the Stone Age. No missile needed to be launched. No troops needed to be put at risk.

Did I mention drones yet? No? Eight years ago, I wrote an article in this very magazine warning about consumer remote flying machines being coopted by terrorists and bad guys. Now, we’re seeing stories of cheap consumer drones, with autonomous flying capability you can control with a smartphone, weaponized and used by terrorists in Syria. Sometimes, I really, really hate being right.

In October 2016, a hack attack called a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack went after an Internet switchboard

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

company called Dyn, Inc. The attack came from tens of millions of devices. It took out not just Dyn, but services like Amazon, Twitter, and Reddit. Where did the attackers get those tens of millions of devices? They were webcams and home digital video recorders with a complete lack of security. Did I mention drones yet? No? Eight years ago, I wrote an article in this very magazine warning about consumer remote flying machines being coopted by terrorists and bad guys. Now, we’re seeing stories of cheap consumer drones, with autonomous flying capability you can control with a smartphone, weaponized and used by terrorists in Syria. Sometimes, I really, really hate being right. I could go on and on because the bad guys go on and on. They’re just reaching out and bashing the crap out of our systems. We’re not just dealing with activists with a grudge, we’re being attacked by organized crime and nation states. If security firm CrowdStrike is to be believed (and I’m inclined to because some of the FBI’s top cybersecurity folks now work there), nation states are working with organized crime to carry out these attacks. The future isn’t The Terminator, but it’s close. We’re getting our clocks cleaned daily and we’re not even at Peak AI (artificial intelligence). Google, Amazon, IBM, Apple, Microsoft, and Facebook (not to mention many government agencies, as well as the bad guys) are all working on creating super-smart computers. Remember that IBM’s Watson won Jeopardy, and that was years ago. We’re not far from a future of self-driving cars, long-haul

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trucks, and devices in every pocket, all connected and controlled by AI. The bad guys will also use AI, because a lot of very advanced AI code is being open sourced by the big companies in the interest of transparency. Think about it this way. Every day, in every way, we’re relying on digital services more and more. It’s no longer just Web pages. It’s everything. Enemy nations, so-called friendly nations, and greedy cooperatives are blasting through our barely protected firewalls, and having their way with all of it. Our legislators, and even some of our law enforcement officials, are actively trying to make it worse by requiring back doors to be placed into encryption technology. On top of that, much of our

hardware is being made by the country that’s been spying on us most, and — as I discussed here a few years ago — a large percentage of our security software is created by a company in Russia headed by someone with ties to Russian intelligence services. We are doomed and if we don’t change up this game and fast, we’re going to be peeled, sliced open, and violated from the inside out. The challenge is almost unsolvable because science fiction-level technology is now in the hands of everyday consumers. In the interest of making things easy to use (and easy to monetize), these devices are both insanely powerful and terribly insecure. But don’t just blame consumers. As I showed you briefly at the beginning of this rant, organizations who

should know better, who do know better, have been attacked and conquered with mind-numbing regularity. So what do we do? We’re doing some of it. Cyberwarfare is an official battlespace now, and we’re preparing for all out war. But we’re still being stupid in terms of legislation. We’re letting lobbyists and media interests run the show. We’re making short term recommendations (like putting back doors in encryption) that will open us to a future of pain. I guess the bottom line is that we face an army of enemies and allies ready, willing, able to gut us like a pig. But the real problem is that we may be our own worst enemy. We’ve cruised headfirst into these rough seas, and we don’t really have a North Star to guide us home.

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We need to reengineer everything with the awareness that other folks are going to try to do very bad things. It’s going to be expensive. It’s going to be inconvenient. But the alternative is that some day, when we least expect it, one of our so-called allies is going to blast us back into the Stone Age without firing a single missile, simply by clicking a mouse, pressing a key, or gently tapping a finger on a pane of glass. Oh, joy.

About the Author CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed. is Director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute, Distinguished Lecturer for CBS Interactive, Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, IT Advisor to the Florida Public Health Association and an instructor at the UC Berkeley extension.

Why the Reduction in Bank Robberies is a Cause for Concern

By Jason Polanco and Jeremiah Fernandez

rime doesn’t pay. Not like it used to at least. In the last 25 years, bank robberies have fallen over sixty percent. Hollywood renditions like the move “Heat” have cemented the image of organized criminals planning multi-million dollar

heists, but today, more than ever, nothing could be further from the truth. Bank robberies are crimes committed by the desperate, looking to score, on average, just $6,500.

Barely above minimum wage: that’s what a robber’s salary typically amounts to, experts say. So how could it be worth it? The calculation gets even worse once the robber considers just how much

harder it has become to rob banks. Until fairly recently, banks simply accepted the loss of money from a heist as a calculable loss – it is after all, just a few thousand dollars – these same banks have also realized the impor-

tance of a reputation of safety. Small change or not, no bank wants robberies on their record, and as a result, in the last 20 years, banks have made a commitment to spending millions of dollars securing all of their branches,

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no matter how obscure. In an age where billions of dollars are being stolen off of multinational corporations from the comfort of a computer chair, savvy criminals have decided to look for their free lunches elsewhere.

The FBI reports, nearly 60% of bank robbers are caught. The chart below depicts a 46% decrease in overall bank robberies but only a 13% change in the average dollar amount stolen per robbery. Year Total Average Robberies Loss Per 2000 7127 $4,437 2015 4091 $3,884

*Many financial institutions do not disclose the total loss per theft.

So, where have they gone? Unfortunately, criminals using the kidnapping and extortion method, plan thoroughly and need not worry about the latest security features within the bank. The statistics above demonstrate criminals have changed their tactics, become more efficient and are choosing their targets wisely.

New Tactics Part of the romanticized image of the heist is the notion that they’re crimes against institutions instead of people. Hence, kidnapping and extortion, the less risky and modern methods of “robbing a bank,” take on a sinister edge: they target the people who make up the institution. Instead of walking up to the front door and waving a gun, some bank robbers have progressed to keen target selection and surveillance. Criminals select a ‘soft target’ and conduct surveillance for days, or even weeks. It starts with a home invasion. Employees or executives with access to the vault or drawers find out a family member has been kidnapped. They’re told their family member is in an undisclosed location, their safety contingent on the bank employee entering the bank, retrieving a pre-determined amount of money and dropping it off at a specified location. Meanwhile, the criminal circumvents much of the costly security located within the building itself. Given all of this, what can we learn to better protect ourselves and our families from this new modus operandi? With the risks involved in conducting a successful kidnapping and bank robbery, criminals will select a bank executive or employee based on the ease of predictability and control. Accordingly, there are several subtle and nonverbal cues bank employees, and family members must acquire to make themselves less appealing to criminals. Learning and understanding how criminals choose bank employees and conduct surveillance will

assist in ensuring your safety.

Target Selection The preferred victim of a kidnapper is someone who doesn’t watch their surroundings. The indicators of a preferred victim call to mind the archetype of an absent minded professor: abnormal walking stride (dragging feet), slow walking rate, awkwardness of body movements, posture, and even gaze. The next trait a criminal looks for is predictability. Predictability in routine is a huge plus for these criminals looking to pull off a still risky crime. Especially if the criminal can rely on the person in question to perform minimal security checks. One simple way to dissuade being chosen from the very start is simply looking the part: walk confidently, and at least look like you’re aware of where you’re going. Los Angeles, California September 2012: As a result of limited home security, a Bank of America Manager was abducted from her home, strapped with explosives and ordered to remove cash from the vault. The family members were held hostage.

Surveillance and Detection But what if you’re chosen and a target and the criminal starts surveilling you? The surveillance could last anywhere from a few days to a few weeks, ending when the criminal knows the following information: basic patterns in the bankers’ routine, the bankers’ home, the bankers’ family members, and a viable location for the abduction. This gives any reasonably trained and observant person to detect the surveillance and stop the crime before it starts. Remember this acronym: TEDD. Time, Environment, Distance and Demeanor . The first three – time, environment and distance – go together. If you see the same person at different times, in different areas over distances, there’s a good chance you’re under surveillance. In laymen’s terms: if you see the same person in the morning leaving your home, during lunch at a café and again at a stoplight on your way home, then there’s good reason to keep your eyes peeled. There may be other telltale signs in the criminals’ demeanor. With no training and little experience, most criminals revert to what they have seen in movies and are unaware of small indicators that will identify them. Below are a

few things to look for if you suspect you’re under surveillance: • W earing inappropriate clothing in regards to the weather or environment. For instance, someone wearing a sweater or hat during warm weather or sunglasses during a cloudy day. Criminals assume the color black will help them blend in with all environments; to the contrary, this makes them stand out. • Repeated movements or malingering. Someone will repeatedly tie their shoe waiting for you to finish your coffee or check their watch to track the time you’ve arrived and departed. • Other obvious cues are the use of binoculars, cameras, taking notes, making a phone call and making repeated eye contact or blatantly avoiding eye contact. This list can go on and on, but the best advice is to trust your natural instincts. If it looks wrong or out of place, chances are it’s not a coincidence. Call the local police and have them confront the suspected surveillance team. Another important element to remember, surveillance is usually conducted as a team. The use of women, pets, and even children have been used to blend in and avoid detection. Lastly, don’t ignore things you might see every day. The elderly, taxi drivers, homeless and delivery personnel: all these guises operate in most peoples’ psychological blind spots. Knoxville, Tennessee April 2015: Two armed men dressed in dark clothing surveilled the home of Mark Ziegler, a bank executive at Y-12 Federal Credit Union. The assailants placed GoPro cameras on trees and shrubs surrounding Ziegler’s home.

Basic Safety Basic training in detecting surveillance should be part of any self-protection arsenal, but simple prudence goes a long way. Not every criminal is going to make the same mistakes based on a movie they watched, but there are several things you, your employees and your family members can do daily to protect yourself: • W hen entering a location, look around - observe your surroundings. Most people do not look at what is happening inside a store, restaurant, car garage, apartment building or lobby before making an entrance. Noticing something

•

• • •

out of place will ensure you avoid entering and possibly save your life. Stop looking at the ground! When you’re at your most vulnerable (on the phone, driving or jogging, usually) make a mental note to be especially observant. Don’t offer rides to strangers and think twice before you offer to help people. Unfortunately, we live in a dangerous world, and good Samaritans are criminals’ easiest targets. No matter your location (bar, coffee shop or restaurant) watch your drink. Flat tire? Drive to a safe place. New wheels are a small price to pay. Avoid patterns. If possible, vary your routes to and from work as much as possible including the time you depart and arrive daily.

Fort Wayne, Indiana December 2015: An employee of 1st Source Bank was abducted from his driveway and forced to remove an undisclosed amount of money from the bank. Authorities believe the bank employee was followed home from work.

The Way Forward Over the centuries, bank robberies have evolved from horseback riding cowboys and Depression-era outlaws to kidnapping and extortion-style robberies. New security advances and technology integration have forced criminals to adapt and innovate. Unfortunately, criminals have developed a new method to rob a financial institution without setting foot inside. This kidnapping and extortion-style method entirely bypass the sophisticated security systems and increases the dangers of bank executives, employees, and family members. Understanding the victim selection process, the conduct of surveillance and surveillance detection techniques you can avoid becoming a target and prevent becoming a victim. Financial institutions must take their executive and employee training a step further to include family members to avoid the new bank robbery methods.

About the Authors Jason Polanco is a consultant to Security Management International, LLC. Jeremiah Fernandez is a Junior Associate at Security Management International, LLC

The Four Pillars Of Success:

How To Earn A Million Dollars Per Year As A Global Security Consultant By Luke Bencie

et’s cut right to the chase. You have a deep desire to be your own boss and your goal is to make a million dollars over the next twelve months… and why shouldn’t you? Your impressive resume includes decades’ worth of professional experience in the field of security. You probably were – or maybe still are – someone people looked up to. You have been either a senior officer, executive, and/or a recognized expert on a particular security subject. You no doubt have given countless speeches, written numerous articles, and have frequently been interviewed by the media due to your insightfulness. Your education is unmatched, possessing advanced degrees from respected institutions of higher learning. You speak more than one foreign language.

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Finally, after all this time, you are ready to dive into the entrepreneurial pool and open your own consultancy. You will put all your fancy titles, awards, and powerful rolodex contacts to good use, in an effort to become an immensely successful global security consultant. Perhaps you will land a few Fortune 500 clients? Maybe you will be granted a fat government contract? Better still, you might become a trusted advisor for wealthy royal family from the Middle East. However, after the first twelvemonths of operations, rather than swimming in piles of cash and satisfied clients, you find yourself frustrated with a lack of business and drowning under a mound of debt. This is the harsh reality faced by thousands of security professionals each year. So why is it that ambitious men and women, most of whom have recently left successful careers in the military, law enforcement, private security, or the intelligence community, struggle in the global consulting world? Despite enthusiasm and hard work, these professionals quickly discover why 95% of ANY solopractitioner or boutique consulting firms never even makes one million dollars in GROSS sales per year. The reason is simple… running your own business is tough. Unfortunately, many who come from the public sector never have been taught how to build a thriving business. If you fall into this category, don’t feel bad. Many in the private sector – even recent graduates from International MBA programs – have never learned the necessary skills either. Plus, there is a big difference between academic theory and real-world practice. If it was easy, more than just 5% of all consultants would be bringing in over a million per year. Therefore, as someone who has been through the ups-and-downs of running my own global security consulting firm (and have year-after-year earned over $1 million in annual sales), allow me to provide you with some of the hard-and-fast rules for achieving success. Per my own experiences, as well as shared insights from other successful peers in the global security consulting industry, here are the “four pillars of success” necessary to close over a million dollars in annual revenue:

Ask for Referrals. Referrals are the most effective way to grow your global security consulting business. Yet, for some inexplicable reason, most consultants never ask their clients for a lead… let alone multiple ones. How hard is it to ask a client, “If you are satisfied with my work, would you mind providing me with a few names of others who you believe could also benefit from my services?” What’s the worst they could say? No? Referrals are the life-blood of the consulting industry. It goes without saying that in business if you can’t sell, you can’t eat! You should be asking everyone you know for a referral. If you think you have too much pride to do such a thing, it may mean that you don’t believe in the quality of your own deliverables. Ask ten of your past or present clients for a referral this week and see what happens.

Learn to Become an Expert Marketer. Let me let you in on a little secret. You are not in the security consulting business… you are in the security marketing business.

There are probably 500 people, within 500 miles of you right now, who are advertising your exact same security consulting services. If they are winning business over you, it is probably not because of talent. It is probably because they have stronger marketing skills. Even if you hate the whole idea of social media, you must nevertheless embrace it. In today’s hyper-connected world, content is king. You must be publishing fresh, useful content every day. This means you need to be writing articles, blogs, tweets, white papers, etc. every day. You should be delivering podcasts, webinars, videos, interviews, etc., every week. Remember, marketing is not a onetime event. It is ongoing. Your marketing campaigns should be like a stack of dominos – each one immediately follows the one before.

Write a commercially published book. In the consulting world, you must strive to find a way to separate yourself from the herd. It’s seldom about who has the best price. No client wants to say that they hired the “cheapest” security consultant. Rather, consultants are hired based upon their bona fides. If you are the author of a commercially published book – not a self-published or “vanity” book – you now have a calling card on steroids! Additionally, being an author also opens up doors for you to become a public speaker, as well as establishes your credibility in your security field.

Utilize a mentor or coach. No Olympian ever won a gold medal without a coach. Similarly, no great entrepreneur built his/her fortune without a little sound advice from a mentor. Whether you are a novice security consultant or a thirty-year veteran of the trade, it’s never too late to incorporate a second opinion from a trusted source. Even the smartest consultants can find themselves getting too close to an engagement at times, which can unfortunately result in clouded judgement. Find a mentor and learn from their successes and failures. In today’s hostile security environment, consultants must constantly be evolving in order to stay up with the ever-changing threats facing their clients. Effectively utilizing the four pillars of success will help you protect your clients’, as well as help your firm close over a million dollars-worth of annual revenue.

About the Author Luke Bencie is the Managing Director of Security Management International, LLC. He is also the author of Among Enemies: Counter-Espionage for the Business Traveler, as well as Global Security Consulting: How to Build a Thriving International Practice. He has worked in over one hundred countries and his clients have included 18 Fortune 500 companies, four foreign governments, and nine billionaires. He has written articles for Harvard Business Review, Business Insider, and Foreign Affairs. He can be reached at lbencie@smiconsultancy.com

Black Axe: Nigeria’s Fraternity Of Terrorism By Tony Kail

n December 2015, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Canadian authorities concluded a multi-jurisdictional operation known as Project CBG which focused on a rash of vehicle thefts. Investigators discovered an international organized crime that specialized in stealing luxury vehicles and shipping them to Africa using ports in Montreal and Halifax. The number of vehicles were so substantial that it made up 15% of all vehicle thefts in Toronto in 2015. After thieves had stolen over $30,000,000 in vehicles from affluent neighborhoods in Canada, authorities also discovered suspects with numerous illegally owned firearms and narcotics including cocaine and heroin. Investigators say members of the ring are part of a notorious organized crime group from Nigeria known as the ‘Black Axe’.

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Origins The Black Axe (commonly known as the ‘Nigerian Mafia’) is an organized crime group that began as a ‘confraternity’ or benevolent fraternity on the campus of the University of Benin in Benin City, Nigeria. The group was born after disputes between a confraternity known as the ‘Pyrates’ and non-member students on campus clashed. A new confraternity formed a loosely organized group known as the ‘Baraccans’. The name referred to an infamous group of sailors who terrorized the Mediterranean Agean Sea. Group members began to use symbols and aesthetics related to piracy and Viking culture. The group changed their name to the ‘Vikings’ and later took the name of the weapon of the classic Viking as the ‘Axes’ and later with a newfound sense of black nationalism became known as the ‘Black Axe’. The group’s leaders began to focus the group’s philosophy on PanAfricanism, black nationalism and militant action. The group began to research organizational skills among groups such as the Black Panther Party and numerous African revolutionary groups. Today there is controversy as some affiliated with the group also use the name ‘Neo Black Movement of Africa’(NBM). However many in the Neo Black Movement of Africa claim Black Axe is not related to the NBM despite the fact that Black Axe and Black Axe related acts of violence have been discovered posted in NBM social media. The Black Axe conducted their first meeting on March 21,1977. The date coincided with the anniversary of the Sharpville Massacre, an event in which 69 members of a South African anti-apartheid protest group were shot to death by South African police. At the first meeting members of Black Axe built an ancestral shrine on the campus and advised students on campus not to be present during the meeting as the spirits of ancestors would be present at the meeting. This use of local folklore has become a hallmark of the organization as it uses concepts such as spirits, ancestors and supernatural threats as a means of inducing fears in communities.

Mythology Members of Black Axe are given various spiritual teachings regarding group history, rituals and activities. One of the most popular myths taught to new members surrounds

The Black Axe organization uses a number of traditional cultural elements found in African traditional religions and secret societies. Central Africa is home to many secret societies like the Yoruba Ogboni society or the Efik Ekpe society. These subgroups locally known as ‘cults’ focus on the worship of a specific god or spirit and have a dedicated spiritual leader or priest that conducts worship and rituals. The Black Axe operates as one of these secret societies.

the group’s origins. One of the founders of the group named Charles Kokoma was said to have betrayed the group’s secrecy and was beheaded. The word ‘Kokoma’ is used to describe among members as a warning to what can happen to traitors and is a term used to describe the group’s noxious homebrew taken during initiation rites.

Rituals The Black Axe organization uses a number of traditional cultural elements found in African traditional religions and secret societies. Central Africa is home to many secret societies like the Yoruba Ogboni society or the Efik Ekpe society. These subgroups locally known as ‘cults’ focus on the worship of a specific god or spirit and have a dedicated spiritual leader or priest that conducts worship and rituals. The Black Axe operates as one of these secret societies. Potential Black Axe members undergo initiation ceremonies (known as ‘Bammings’) in which they must take an oath of secrecy never to reveal the inner workings of the group. Former members have testified that many oaths involve the ingestion of human blood and a potion made from black rum, peppers, alligator flesh and herbs. Members are given street names known as ‘strong names’ that are used among members of the organization. Members are given protective charms to use to supernaturally remain protected from rivals. Various traditional rituals are performed to gain protection as well.

Group Structure

Black Axe has an organizational structure that assigns members to international geographic regions known as ‘zones’. Headed by a national executive and a national council of elders, the headquarters for the movement is in Benin City Nigeria. The first tier of membership in the group is known as ‘Aye’. Second tier leaders appointed over zone regions are known as ‘lords’. The third tier consists of members in the National Leadership. The group also employs a number of ‘foot soldiers’ and hitmen known as ‘enforcers’.

Criminal Activity

Criminality among Black Axe members began to appear in the Eighties. Members began to assault non-members of the group

in Nigerian communities. Assaults took the form of vicious beatings and later escalated into sexual assaults including rape. In the Nineties members of Black Axe began to target critics of the cult. The group soon became responsible for a number of arsons, beheadings and shootings.

Narcotics Trafficking Earlier this year law enforcement authorities in Italy’s Sicilian capital Palermo have discovered ties between members of Black Axe and the Italy’s Cosa Nostra mafia. Black Axe members have been arrested for attacking rivals with machetes and have recently been discovered selling narcotics for the Italian organized crime groups. Canadian officials have discovered cocaine and heroin among Black Axe members as well.

Forgery Black Axe cells have been discovered performing ID theft, forging documents including passports and cloning of credit cards. One of the perpetrators in the 2014 financial scam in Toronto used a counterfeit United Nation’s ID created by Black Axe members. Black Axe members have become well known for conducting ‘advance fee’ scams known popularly as ‘419 scams’ named after the Nigerian criminal code that outlaws fraud.

Human Trafficking Members of Black Axe have been identified as human traffickers with members in Italy forcing women into prostitution. Black Axe members in Nigeria have also been discovered high jacking minibuses and public transportation and abducting victims.

Money Laundering In October 2015 the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Postal Inspection Service charged members of Black Axe in a money laundering scheme that conspired to defraud victims of over $5 billion dollars using wire frauds and laundering. The bookkeeper for Black Axe’s Canadian ‘zone’ was part of the elaborate scheme to defraud victims.

Violence

Black Axe violence has a modus operandi that typically involves the use of bladed weapons. Many victims of assaults by the group are attacked with machetes and hatchets and left with ‘X’ shaped scars as earmarks of the group. Beheadings are the most common form of violent attack on Black Axe rivals in Nigeria. Victims have been discovered with missing body parts some of which have been used for sale on the international black market. Victims of Black Axe violence have been found positioned to send messages to rivals. One victim’s head was roasted and placed in front of the University of Benin.

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In 1999 Black Axe members in Ile-Ife State Nigeria murdered five students after sending in a ‘death squad’ of 40 Black Axe members into Obafemi Awolow University armed with hatchets and shotguns. The group had orchestrated an attack on the school following the arrest of Black Axe members that had been arrested for attacking students of the university. In 2002 Black Axe members set fire to university buildings at Delta State University and in Benin City in attempt to kill some of their rivals. In 2010 Black Axe members stabbed a Nigerian police superintendent to death. In 2015 a war between Black Axe and rival cults such as Icelanders, Vikings and K5 brought an epidemic of violence to Nigeria consisting of home invasions, kidnappings and murders. Black Axe violence has a modus operandi that typically involves the use of bladed weapons. Many victims of assaults by the group are attacked with machetes and hatchets and left with ‘X’ shaped scars as earmarks of the group. Beheadings are the most common form of violent attack on Black Axe rivals in Nigeria. Victims have been discovered with missing body parts some of which have been used for sale on the international black market. Victims of Black Axe violence have been found positioned to send messages to rivals. One victim’s head was roasted and placed in front of the University of Benin. Much like Latin American drug cartels, Black Axe members will frequently post photos of their attacks on social media to claim ownership and incite fear.

Identifiers The group uses a number of symbols and phrases to identify membership in the organization. The image of an axe and the number seven are used as popular symbols in group clothing, jewelry, graffiti and social media. The number 7 is significant as it appears similar to an axe and after the beheading of one of the group’s eight founders, there were 7 members that remained as true. Members of the group use the number ‘147’ which stands for ‘one for seven’ with seven representing the Black Axe. The group uses a badge depicting a black axe breaking a slave’s

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chains to symbolize the movement. The initials ‘NBM’ for ‘National Black Movement’ are seen on member’s clothing. The colors yellow, black and white are used by members to represent intelligence, race and purity. Traditional outfits worn by members include black trousers, yellow stockings and a white shirt reflective of early sailor uniforms. Members wear black berets and in some cases t-shirts with the organization’s badge. Images of a bird known in Yoruba as ‘Eiye’ are commonly used to symbolize members of a rival confraternity known as the Supreme Eiye Confraternity (SAC) aka the Airlords . Members will commonly use phrases like ‘kill all birds’ meaning death to their rival organization. Common sayings and terms among group members that investigators may discover in communications include: • Axeman: A term used to denote members of Black Axe. • Ayei: A traditional sailor term used to acknowledge the orders of a Captain. The term is used as a traditional salute among members. • Blend: A term used to mean initiation. Members will ask ‘What year were you blended?’ • De-Axe: A term that means ‘to dismiss a person from the movement’ • Dodorima: A term from the Igbo language used to refer to honesty, straightforwardness. ‘Dodorima’ or ‘Dodos’ to you is a form of praise toward a member. • Egede: A greeting used by members usually accompanied with forearms touching. • Inju: A term used to denote a member of another confraternity • Janet: A term used to denote punishment of a member. Refers to the ritual beheading of a female who was beheaded after revealing the secrets of the organization. • Jolly: A term used to denote a gathering of Black Axe members for a party. • Ju: A term used to identify non-initiates • Mother Temple/Murder Temple: University of Benin where the movement began. • OT or Orientation: A term used to denote inside knowledge about Black Axe culture

• Soweto: A term used to reference the 1976 Soweto uprising in South Africa. • Uhuru: A term that means ‘freedom’ in the Kiswahili language. Members of the organization have been documented with various tattoos and brandings with many of them similar to Greek fraternal brands.

The Future

Black Axe membership under the banner of Neo Black Movement in Africa continues to grow. The organization has set up zones within the United States and there are members in cities like Atlanta, Dallas, Houston and New York. Members of Black Axe operate social networking sites and communicate with members of the Nigerian zones. The Neo Black Movement of Africa has publicly claimed no affiliation with Black Axe in spite of the fact that NBM members identify themselves as ‘axemen’, use the black axe as a sacred symbol and have been documented at protests with the words ‘black axe’ on their protest materials. The presence of Black Axe zones in the U.S. and the recent crimes by members in Canada may certainly be the predecessors of future criminal activities by the group in the U.S. The footprint of the Black Axe was seen in June of 2016 when the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard the petition of a Nigerian immigrant who was seeking asylum in the U.S. from the Black Axe after he revealed that his father had been murdered by the group. The man’s father served as a ritual priest for the sect when he converted to Christianity and was murdered after the man’s daughter was raped as a message to those who would leave the group. Investigators should stay vigilant in identifying these potential threats on U.S. soil.

About the Author Tony Kail is the Southern Regional Coordinator for the Symbol Intelligence Group. The Symbol Intelligence Group specializes in the research, analysis and identification of symbols, codes and unfamiliar areas of violent crime. Tony Kail is the author of several books including Narco Cults: Understanding the Use of Afro-Caribbean and Mexican Religious Cultures in the Drug War.

Threat Convergence:

A New And More Lethal Category Of Terrorist Warfare By Dr. Joshua Sinai

new category of terrorist warfare has emerged that is exponentially greater in the magnitude of its capability to radicalize and recruit new members, fund and conduct its operational activities, areas of operation, expand its political impact, and increase the lethality of its warfare than heretofore because it has converged across multiple threat dimensions that previously were largely singular in nature. These converging threat dimensions – some of which are mature while others are still nascent – consist of the following ten dimensions (with the abbreviation “TC” referring to threat convergence):

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TC#1: “Warfare”: Terrorist Groups Seeking ‘World Class’ Warfare Capability As some of today’s terrorists go about converging their capabilities and linkages into a new category of exponentially upgraded warfare, they do not seek to use violence only in the conventional definition of inflicting casualties and physical damages that are still calibrated in order to coerce their adversary governments to give in to their demands. In this new paradigm, however, such terrorist groups view themselves as ‘world class’ destroyers who seek to inflict against their adversaries catastrophic casualties, physical and economic destruction without regard to whether or not such attacks will prevent the targeted governments from giving in to their demands. This category was introduced by al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks in which multiple airliners were employed in coordinated attacks as weapons of mass destruction to cause more than 3,000 fatalities and billions of dollars in economic damages – the first time in the history of terrorist warfare that such catastrophic casualties had been inflicted by a single terrorist group. Seeking to inflict such ‘world class’ catastrophic warfare against their adversaries is also due to their apocalyptic ideology that views their objectives as having a transcendental dimension that is unconstrained by any political and moral constraints, with the catastrophic devastation caused by their warfare expected to usher in an apocalyptic ‘new order.’

TC#2: “Weapons of Mass Destruction”: Proliferation of WMD Weapons and Rogue Scientists/Engineers The next converging component represents the most significant threat in the form of the potential acquisition by terrorist groups of weapons of mass destruction (i.e., chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons), whose employment in an attack would result in catastrophic casualties and physical damages against their adversaries. It is also, nevertheless, the least developed warfare capability by terrorist groups, although several terrorist groups and lone wolves have either launched or attempted to launch attacks using chemical weapons.

The increasing availability to terrorist groups of social media instruments, such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, to conduct propaganda, radicalization and recruitment activities has enabled them to expand such activities into the virtual world of cyberspace, where they are able to reach ever larger audiences, as well as ‘narrowcast’ their messages to specific audiences such as women and children.

Unlike the steps involved in the acquisition of a chemical (or biological) weapon, however, for terrorist groups to acquire a nuclear weapon would require access to highly specialized material and a high level of technical expertise that historically has been beyond their reach. Nevertheless, the political and security upheavals in countries that possess nuclear arsenals, such as Pakistan, are a reminder of how precarious the security of nuclear weapons facilities can be in such weak states where terrorist groups such as al Qaeda operate.

TC#3: “Cyberspace”: Proliferation of Social Media Cyber Instruments The increasing availability to terrorist groups of social media instruments, such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, to conduct propaganda, radicalization and recruitment activities has enabled them to expand such activities into the virtual world of cyberspace, where they are able to reach ever larger audiences, as well as ‘narrowcast’ their messages to specific audiences such as women and children. By utilizing various encryption technologies, the Internet’s cyberspace has also enabled such technologically capable terrorist groups to conduct crucial operational functions (especially between operational managers and local operatives) such as communications, funding and command and control – the types of functions that enable them to significantly expand the geographical range of their activities as well as avoid the surveillance of their activities by their counterterrorist adversaries.

TC#4: “Cyber-Warfare”: Proliferation of New Technologies in Cyber-Warfare Cyber weapons have become an important component of modern warfare. Thus, while terrorist groups have long exploited the Internet’s social media’s instruments, in this new converging trend they may have already or are in the process of acquiring cyber weapons in order to significantly upgrade the lethality of their overall warfare capability. As a component of their new category of terrorist warfare, cyber terrorism is defined as the premeditated, politically motivated warfare by sub-state groups that engage in

terrorist violence against an adversary’s IT infrastructure’s computer systems, software programs and data, which is designed to inflict physical disruption, destruction, as well as economic damage. Cyber terrorism would be conducted on its own or in conjunction with a group’s conventional attack. To develop a cyber-warfare capability would require not only an intention, but resources and trained personnel to achieve such an objective. A terrorist group’s personnel, therefore, would have to possess a technical knowledge of hacking and an adversary’s information technology vulnerabilities, as well as the funds to employ such specialized cyber warriors in those areas. To acquire such cyber warfare capabilities – which already form a component in

states’ warfare arsenals – terrorist groups would have to develop it on their own, for instance, by recruiting radicalized IT engineers and technicians, pay mercenary hacktivists to conduct such warfare on their behalf, or obtain such a capability from a state sponsor. Types of cyber warfare that would be conducted by terrorist groups that would exponentially upgrade their military capability might include a Stuxnet-like virus in the form of a highly specialized malware coded to attack Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that control and monitor specific industrial processes in critical infrastructural targets such as nuclear power plants (for example, to force

In the final development, criminal organizations, particularly those that primarily engage in narco-trafficking operations, are adopting terrorist techniques in their own operations, such as assassinating their political and law enforcement adversaries, in order to punish and deter them from interfering with their illicit activities.

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changes in the rotor speeds of centrifuges), electricity grids, water plants, telecommunication networks, or transportation systems (including traffic lights).

TC#5: “Funding” – Cooperating With Organized Criminal Groups to Expand Funding Sources and Spheres of Activity A second dimension of threat convergence is the opportunistic cooperation between terrorist groups and criminal networks, with the criminal elements providing terrorist groups the means for profit maximization and organizational/ cell maintenance through their expertise in illicit services such as document forging, logistics and human smuggling across borders, money laundering, illicit drug trafficking and arms trafficking. With this ‘conventional’ model continuing, however, three new developments in the convergence between terrorist and criminal groups appear to be emerging. In the first development, terrorist groups could potentially use their criminal network counterparts to escalate the lethality of their warfare against their adversaries by using them to illicitly acquire CBRN/ cyber weapons from rogue elements, including the logistical support in delivering them to their intended targets. In the second development, terrorist groups might adopt criminal techniques in their own modus operandi, for instance by organizing their own drug trafficking enterprises, to raise funds for their organizational maintenance. In the final development, criminal organizations, particularly those that primarily engage in narco-trafficking operations, are adopting terrorist techniques in their own operations, such as assassinating their political and law enforcement adversaries, in order to punish and deter them from interfering with their illicit activities. Examples of ‘conventional’ convergence between terrorist groups that collaborate with criminal organizations include Hizballah, which has a long history of involvement in criminal enterprises, whether illicit drug trafficking, diamond smuggling in West Africa, or petty crimes in the United States. The Afghan Taliban and Colombian FARC are noted

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examples of terrorist organizations with a long history of engaging in illicit drug trafficking. Moreover, examples of terrorist operatives, whether loosely affiliated with groups or operating as lone wolves, that engage in criminal activities prior to executing their attacks include the cell that carried out the Madrid train bombings in March 2003, which financed its operation with funds earned from trafficking in hashish and Ecstasy, and Khalid el-Bakraoui and Ibrahim el-Bakraoui, the brothers who were responsible for the attacks at Brussels airport and a metro station on March 2016 had criminal records for armed robbery and gun dealing.

TC#6: “Recruitment”: Recruiting Criminals to Expand Clandestine Operations and Weapons Capabilities A high proportion of Muslim criminals, especially those incarcerated in Western European prisons, have become radicalized into jihadism and are either joining jihadist groups in countries such as Syria or operating as small terrorist cells in their home countries. Their ability to operate clandestinely in their communities and experience in “self-funding” and weapons use, is providing foreign terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and IS a force-multiplying capability to carry out terrorist attacks in the West. This also enables foreign terrorist groups to use operatives with Western documentation, as opposed to having to infiltrate their combat cells into Western countries. Examples includes the terrorist operatives with a criminal background who carried out the mass fatality attacks in January and November 2015 in Paris, France, and in Brussels, Belgium, in March 2016.

A high proportion of Muslim criminals, especially those incarcerated in Western European prisons, have become radicalized into jihadism and are either joining jihadist groups in countries such as Syria or operating as small terrorist cells in their home countries. Their ability to operate clandestinely in their communities and experience in “self-funding” and weapons use, is providing foreign terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and IS a force-multiplying capability to carry out terrorist attacks in the West.

TC#7: “Insiders”: The Presence of Current or Potential Terrorist Operatives in their Adversary’s Midst As discussed earlier, in what is referred to as “insider threats,” this TC dimension refers to the radicalization and recruitment, whether direct or indirect, such as via extremist social media sites, by terrorist groups of potential Western operatives who work inside adversary organizations, such as a country’s military. The purpose of such radicalization and recruitment of “insiders” is to use their authorized presence within such organizations to conduct, on behalf of such foreign terrorist groups, terrorist attacks within their midst. As an example, former Major Nidal Hasan, an adherent of Anwar al-Awlaki, al Qaeda’s extremist ideologue who was based in Yemen, carried out a shooting rampage against his fellow soldiers at his military base in Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009. In another example of a terrorism-related insider threat, Mu’taz Hijazi, a Palestinian who had worked for about a year in the kitchen at a restaurant in the Begin Heritage Center in Jerusalem, had attempted to assassinate Yehudah Glick, a far-right Jewish extremist, on October 29, 2014. This occurred following Glick’s appearance at a meeting at the center, shortly after Hijazi had completed his work shift at the restaurant. Hijazi, like some 300,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem and its suburbs, while not Israeli citizens, hold Israeli-issued blue identification cards that grant them

permanent resident status, thus enabling them to blend in and work in the largely Jewish West Jerusalem. With heightened tensions between Israelis and Palestinians in Greater Jerusalem, this has made Jerusalem’s Jews anxious about the free movement of a large presence of hostile “insider” Palestinians in their midst.

TC#8: “Safe Haven”: Enabling Conditions in Weak and Failed States Weak and failed states provide conditions that enable terrorist groups to establish safe havens in their ungoverned or poorlygoverned regions. It is in such safe havens that terrorist groups are able to establish areas where they can freely operate, including the ability to manufacture weapons and devices and plan terrorist attacks around the world. In this converging component, the proliferation of anarchic conditions in weak and failing states has enabled terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and its affiliates to establish safe havens in those territories’ ungoverned spaces, such as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria and Yemen. Also of concern is the political and security turbulence in parts of countries such as Egypt, where IS affiliates have found safe haven in the anarchic and lawless Sinai Peninsula, from which they have carried out direct attacks against Egyptian forces and launched rockets and mortars against Israel’s southern tourist city of Eilat. Although they were reported to be small in number, IS adherents were active even the weakly governed Palestinian Gaza Strip, in control by Hamas since 2007, as well as parts of the West Bank, also weakly controlled by the Palestinian Authority.

TC#9: “Safe Haven”: Enabling Conditions in Strong States Enabling conditions in what are considered ‘strong states,’ such as Western Europe and the United States and Canada, in which radical subcultures’ “no-go” areas provide safe haven to terrorist operatives and their cells, constitute the final component of threat convergence. This component is characterized by states that even though they are considered as ‘strong’ still experience problems controlling portions of their own territories,

Weak and failed states provide conditions that enable terrorist groups to establish safe havens in their ungoverned or poorly-governed regions. It is in such safe havens that terrorist groups are able to establish areas where they can freely operate, including the ability to manufacture weapons and devices and plan terrorist attacks around the world. In this converging component, the proliferation of anarchic conditions in weak and failing states has enabled terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and its affiliates to establish safe havens in those territories’ ungoverned spaces, such as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria and Yemen.

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whether through weak border controls (for instance, within the European Union or along the American-Mexican border), or in the form of “no-go” enclaves in certain Diaspora minority-dominated communities (such as in Belgium), where local police forces exert little authority. Such ‘no-go’ neighborhoods also serve as facilitating environments for the spread of extremist ideologies among increasingly radicalized individuals in those communities, some of whom have turned to terrorist violence to achieve their objectives. The failure to fully integrate such minority communities into their larger societies, whether due to discrimination problems or resistance by some among those communities to integrate, is a significant contributor to the convergence of this component to form the new threat category.

TC#10: “State Sponsors” A state sponsor of terrorism is a designation given to governments that provide support to terrorist groups that engage in such activities on their behalf. The incentives for governments to support their terrorist proxies include benefits such as the ability of the terrorist proxy to advance that government’s ideological and foreign policy and national security objectives in their targeted countries and, especially when such support is covert, deniability and absence of attribution and retribution when an attack against the state’s adversary takes place. For terrorist groups that ally themselves with their state sponsors, such state support is crucial because without it they would have difficulty in funding and conducting their operations. Such support can be active (i.e., direct) or passive (i.e., providing political support and tolerating the presence of a terrorist group on its territory). Types of active support include arms procurement and supplies, funding, training and training facilities, diplomatic cover (including false travel documentation, diplomatic pouches to transport weapons and explosives, and immunity from extradition), logistical assistance, safe haven, and headquarters for a group’s organization. A state with CBRN weapons of mass destruction capability and facilities (for instance, Iran, North Korea or Pakistan), could also potentially provide its terrorist proxy such weapons and devices, as well as expertise in launching such WMD warfare.

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Assessment As demonstrated by these ten dimensions, it is when a sufficient number of them converge that a new and more lethal category of terrorist warfare emerges that enables such groups to transform themselves from single dimensional into multi-dimensional threat actors on the ground and in cyberspace. In the worst case scenarios, when such threat convergence components are fully exploited, sub-state ‘terrorist’ groups, such as al Qaeda and IS, become ‘world class’ destroyers, as was demonstrated in al Qaeda’s catastrophic attacks on 9/11 (TC#1), which were planned in its safe haven in Afghanistan, under the patronage of the Taliban rulers (TC#8). Similarly, other catastrophic terrorist attacks, such the attack by al Qaeda’s affiliate cell (however loose such affiliation was at the time) against the transportation system of Madrid in March 2004, involved a linkage between the terrorist cell and criminal elements (TC#5) that enabled the cell to fund the operation. In other cases, particularly as exemplified by groups such as the Colombian FARC, the Lebanese Hizballah, al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Afghanistan Taliban, the Somali al Shabaab, and IS, these groups had succeeded in exploiting significant convergent dimensions, particularly weak and failed states, that enabled them to become guerrilla para-militaries or even rulers over their own ever expanding territories (TC#8). In the case of IS, in fact, the convergence in its organizational and military capabilities, as well as its takeover of oil fields and its defeated Iraqi government’s military facilities, had enabled it to effectively challenge and defeat the Shi’ite-led Iraqi government’s military forces in their battle engagements, thereby vastly expanding the territories under its control in the country’s Sunni provinces (at least, as of mid-2014), including, through its control of territories on both sides of the Syrian – Iraqi borders, creating a new cross-border entity which it had declared an Islamic Caliphate (TC#8). Finally, in the cases of the FARC, Hizballah, al Shabaab and the Afghanistan Taliban, these terrorist groups were also allegedly extensively involved in illicit criminal activities, such as narco-trafficking or maritime piracy, as well (TC#5). In terms of the intention and capability of terrorist groups to launch CBRN-type WMD attacks (TC#2) as a result of threat convergence, several cases of chemical attacks or plots were attempted. These included a coordinated attack in March 1995 by Aum Shinrikyo operatives who released sarin gas on five trains in the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 people and wounding 54. Aum was considered an

Examples of direct state sponsorship of terrorist groups include the Iranian government’s support of Hizballah in Lebanon, as well as its provision of military materiel to Hamas, including rockets and launchers, which exponentially upgraded its military warfare capability vis-à-vis Israel (TC#6). An example of indirect state sponsorship includes the alleged linkages between the Pakistani security services and the Pakistani and Afghanistan Taliban groups, with the latter reportedly intended to advance Karachi’s geo-strategic interests in Afghanistan (TC#6).

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apocalyptic cult, which had hoped that such a WMD attack – as well as its past attempts to acquire a nuclear device – would usher in a new millennium (TC#1). In that plot, in the early 1990s Aum failed in its attempts to procure the services of Russian nuclear scientists, illicitly purchase Russian nuclear technology, or even surreptitiously acquire information about nuclear power plants. Al Qaida, another terrorist group that had sought to become a ‘world class’ destroyer (TC#1), also was thwarted in its attempts to acquire a nuclear or radiological weapons capability, when the purported sellers of such precursor materials in one of the former Soviet republics turned out to be fraudulent. In another example of a chemical agent plot, in January 2003 the British Metropolitan Police raided an apartment in north London, where six Algerians were arrested and charged with plotting to manufacture ricin to be used in a poison attack on the London Underground. Examples of direct state sponsorship of terrorist groups include the Iranian government’s support of Hizballah in Lebanon, as well as its provision of military materiel to Hamas, including rockets and launchers, which exponentially upgraded its military warfare capability vis-à-vis Israel (TC#6). An example of indirect state sponsorship includes the alleged linkages between the Pakistani security services and the Pakistani and Afghanistan Taliban groups, with the latter reportedly intended to advance Karachi’s geo-strategic interests in Afghanistan (TC#6). Examples of terrorist groups exploiting enabling conditions in strong states (TC#9), include the cell that conducted the bombings of the London transportation system in July 2005, whose members had become radicalized in the extremist subcultures in Bradford/Leeds, and the case of Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, whose December 2010 suicide bombing attempt failed in Stockholm, Sweden, was allegedly radicalized at Britain’s city of Luton, a hotbed of Islamism. Also in Sweden large parts of the southern city of Malmö – a quarter of whose population is Muslim – are considered “no-go” zones for non-Muslims, as are large parts of Gothenburg, the country’s second largest city. Gothenburg, in particular, is considered a hotbed of Islamist extremism, with several arrests for terrorist plots in September 2011 and from which a large proportion of Swedish Muslims have become foreign fighters on behalf of al Qaida affiliated insurgents in Syria. Finally, Molenbeek, a working-class district in Brussels, Belgium, is considered a center of Islamist extremism and the home of several operatives involved in terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels.

Terrorist groups extensively employ the Internet’s social media websites for their own benefits (TC#3), with Hamas and its allies employing cyber warfare technologies (TC#4) to launch denial of service attacks against some of Israel’s critical infrastructure. Although, as of third quarter 2016, terrorist groups had not yet launched full-scale cyber-warfare against their state adversaries’ critical infrastructure, this is still considered a significant future threat, including the possibility of combining a cyber-attack with a physical attack on the ‘ground.’ Finally, terrorist groups’ exploitation of their “insider” reach (TC#7) to gain access to sensitive facilities and conduct attacks against such protected targets is likely a serious concern to counterterrorism services. As discussed earlier, examples of such “insider” attacks include Major Nidal Hassan’s shooting attack in Fort Hood, Texas, and Mu’taz Hijazi’s attempted assassination, whether as a Hamas operative or as a lone wolf Hamas adherent, of Jewish extremist Yehudah Glick in Jerusalem.

Conclusion Focusing on the convergences of such threat dimensions that are usually perceived individually, and determining whether such convergences are fully mature or are in the early stages of coalescing, is not intended to imply that each of these specific threat dimensions no longer requires tailored and customized responses. Rather, we need to broaden our thinking and conceptual approaches to effectively address the evolving intersections where these multiple threats are in the process of converging. These converging threat dimensions, whether nascent or current, present problems as well as opportunities for the counterterrorism community. On the one hand, a multitude of facilitating conditions, whether in weak or strong states, are attracting different terrorist groups to such regions, resulting in the convergence of such threats and the overlapping of their networks. As a result of the emergent confluence of such threats and networks, counterterrorism planners now need to anticipate which emerging failed state is likely to become the next attractive safe haven for a transnational terrorist group to set up bases, training facilities, and, in a worst-case scenario, laboratories for the development of WMD-related CBRN weapons and devices. Similarly, a new and previously unknown illicit trafficking network may emerge either in a weak state or in a strong state to provide opportunities for a terrorist group to acquire WMD through illicit means. As mentioned

These converging threat dimensions, whether nascent or current, present problems as well as opportunities for the counterterrorism community. On the one hand, a multitude of facilitating conditions, whether in weak or strong states, are attracting different terrorist groups to such regions, resulting in the convergence of such threats and the overlapping of their networks.

earlier, in a worst-case scenario, certain nuclear states, such as Pakistan, may fall into the hands of terrorist groups. Understanding how these different threats are converging also provides valuable early warning indicators of emerging vulnerabilities that may result in new categories of threats, whether as individual or as converging threat dimensions. To improve our understanding of how to respond to the challenges being generated by threat convergences, we need a comprehensive inventory of the problem areas, whether in weak, failing, or even strong states, in order to identify the threat dimensions that have the potential to converge into new categories of threats. This also provides us with the opportunity to understand which capacities need to be improved in weak states as well as strong states, such as effective governance (including opportunities for wider political participation), control over a nation’s territory, provision of socioeconomic benefits to solve social ills and employment opportunities for aggrieved communities, strengthening of education to improve a population’s skills to advance in society, and countering the spread and appeal of extremist ideologies that have the potential to escalate into widespread violence.

About the Author Dr. Joshua Sinai is a Principal Analyst at Kiernan Group Holdings (KGH) (www.kiernan. co), a homeland security/counterterrorism research, analytical, curriculum development and training, and emergency preparedness planning consulting firm in Alexandria, VA. He can be reached at joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

A widely circulated photo of Carlos from the 1970â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s.

Smoking with the Jackal

Developing an Interview Strategy for a Detainee By Eugene J. Casey

t could happen to any of us. In the course of our work in law enforcement, we can be called upon to interview a terrorist. In my case the terrorist was a self-declared Muslim convert and that day came for me on February 27, 2014, in a prison in Poissy, a distant suburb of Paris.

PLANNING

I had done my homework. I was prepared. The problem was that, as we drove toward the prison, I was still not sure if I would be allowed to conduct the interview. Thatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s because in France, as you would expect, the FBI has no jurisdiction. Our work there is done through our liaison relationship with the French police and intelligence services. A formal request must be submitted

in order to conduct an interview of anyone other than a consenting U.S. citizen that might be used for evidentiary purposes in the U.S. The request is based upon a bilateral agreement between France and the U.S. and is commonly referred to as a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request or an MLAT. Such requests from the U.S. to France are typically carried out by French authorities who would then share with us the written report of their interview. The

terrorist I wanted to interview was a Venezuelan citizen, so there was no assurance that I would be allowed to conduct the interview. However, I made sure that the request, which was submitted by the U.S. Department of Justice to the French Ministry of Justice, included a request to have an FBI agent present during the interview. That was how things stood as we drove from the offices of the Brigade

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Criminelle in Versailles to the Maison Central prison in Poissy. A French prosecutor was assigned to carry out the MLAT, and had to choose someone to conduct the interview. Luckily for me, of all the French police and security services and literally thousands of French officers in those agencies, the prosecutor happened to choose one that I knew. Her name was Adeline. Commissaire Adeline had no problem with my request to be present during the interview but was reluctant to al-

low an FBI agent to actually conduct the interview. I had made the request to personally conduct the interview during a planning meeting a few weeks earlier and did not yet have an answer as we drove to the prison. Adeline had delegated responsibility for the interview to a Captain in the Brigade Criminelle in Versailles. His name was Arnaud. As he drove us toward Poissy, he turned to me and told me I could conduct the interview. Then he gave me a warning. He had spoken to the warden at the prison. The warden told Arnaud that it was not the warden who ran the prison in Poissy, it was the terrorist inmate I was to interview: detainee number 11939C. His name was Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, better known as Carlos the Jackal.

PREPARATION Because the MLAT process takes so long, I had plenty of time to prepare and I took full advantage of that. In response to a newspaper article published in the U.S., Carlos had written a letter from jail in 2008 claiming to know who had killed Josef Alon, an Israeli diplomat who was murdered on July 1, 1973 in Chevy Chase, Maryland. Alon grew up in Czechoslovakia where his father was murdered by the invading Germans and his mother and sister were murdered at Auschwitz. Alon emigrated to Israel and helped establish the Israeli Air Force and fought against the Egyptians during the Suez Crisis in 1956 and in 1967’s Six-Day War. In 1970 Lt. Colonel Alon was appointed to be a Military Attaché in Washington. Alon was shot to death by an unknown assailant upon returning home from an Israeli Embassy function. He collapsed and bled out on his front lawn surrounded by his family. At 43 years old, he had planned on retiring from the military just the next month and returning to Israel. In his letter Carlos claimed that Alon was killed in a secret operation conducted in the U.S. by the terrorist group Black September. Black September became known to the world after its attack against Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. Carlos wrote that he would name names about Alon’s murder in exchange for money to be used for his legal defense in upcoming trials relating to terrorist attacks in France that were attributed to Carlos. Carlos’ third wife, who also happened to be his French attorney, forwarded the letter to the American journalist.

Israeli Air Force Colonel Josef Alon, left, with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.

Interviewing is a critical skill for all FBI agents and police officers. In the FBI our interviewing and interrogation skills are something we pride ourselves on. Because there was no reason to believe Carlos committed this crime, this would be an interview, not an interrogation. So the goal was to obtain Carlos’s cooperation in my investigation, not a confession to a crime.

At the time of the murder, the FBI conducted an extensive investigation along with its partner in local law enforcement: the Montgomery County Police Department (MCPD). President Nixon authorized the use of Air Force One to transport Alon’s body and his family back to Israel. Despite extraordinary efforts, nothing panned out in the investigation and the case was closed unsolved. When this new lead ended up on my desk in the U.S. Embassy in Paris where I was assigned and where the FBI has had a representative since 1945, I reopened the cold case and requested to interview Carlos. Interviewing is a critical skill for all FBI agents and police officers. In the FBI our interviewing and interrogation skills are something we pride ourselves on. Because there was no reason to believe Carlos committed this crime, this would be an interview, not an interrogation. So the goal was to obtain Carlos’s cooperation in my investigation, not a confession to a crime. An interview strategy is simply your plan to achieve your goal of witness cooperation. Crime victims and witnesses often want to help your investigation and no interview strategy is necessary. Uncooperative witnesses can sometimes be won over by explaining the easy way vs. the hard way: talk to me now or I will come back with a subpoena to compel your testimony at a time and place not of your choosing. Ignore the subpoena and you risk facing arrest. That technique just doesn’t apply to an overseas detainee. Imagine you discover that an incarcerated terrorist has information on your case and that terrorist has spent his entire career fighting against everything the U.S. stands for. What would be your strategy? How would you get that terrorist to voluntarily help you with your investigation? It should also go without saying that another important factor to consider in developing your interview strategy is learning as much as you possibly can about the witness you’re about to interview. Carlos was well known in Europe where his attacks took place, but in America Carlos’s real-life story had become distorted and mythologized by wildly inaccurate portrayals from the pens of Hollywood writers. After being expelled from Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, Carlos turned up in Jordan, fighting alongside the Palestinians and joining the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary socialist terrorist organization aligned with the PLO. In Jordan he was given the nom de guerre of Salem Salim Mohammed. In 1973, at the age of 23 he became the European Operational Deputy Commander for the PFLP. His codename was Carlos. His first solo attack came that same year in London when he was ordered to kill Joseph Sieff, the CEO of Marks & Spencer. The CEO was the Vice President of the British Zionist Federation. Carlos used a Soviet Tokarev pistol, forced his way into the CEO’s home and shot the CEO in the face. The gun jammed and failed to fire a second shot. Carlos escaped, the CEO miraculously survived, but the police

found the apartment where Carlos had been staying. Near his bed was a copy of Frederick Forsyth’s popular novel about a lone assassin The Day of the Jackal. The British media subsequently referred to him as Carlos the Jackal. But Carlos really became perhaps the first celebrity terrorist with his brazen attack on an OPEC oil ministers’ meeting in Vienna in 1975. Three people were killed and 66 hostages were taken. Carlos demanded a plane and subsequently flew a group of hostages to Algeria. Huge ransoms were paid for the release of certain oil ministers and Carlos became a media sensation. In Paris, Carlos was already notorious for a triple murder: two DST agents (the DST is the internal

The PFLP’s External Operations flag.

Cover of Carlos’s book L’Islam Revolutionnaire (Revolutionary Islam).

Despite his exploits, Carlos’s true identity remained hidden for years. Both the media and Western law enforcement and intelligence agencies became obsessed with getting a current photo of Carlos. For more than 20 years Carlos was the subject of a world-wide manhunt. Carlos was an elusive fugitive who operated on both sides of the Iron Curtain in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. He seemed to be everywhere and nowhere: Paris, London, Budapest, Beirut, The Hague, Algiers, Baghdad, Belgrade, Prague, Berlin, Tripoli, Damascus, Aden and Amman.

An ad for Olivier Assayas’s biopic Carlos.

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French intelligence service, now known as the DGSI) and Michel Moukharbal, the European Operational Commander for the PFLP who had begun cooperating with the DST. The DST is the agency in France responsible for counterterrorism and the one most like the FBI. Carlos shot them all at close range and seriously wounded a third DST officer. His notoriety increased with several other attacks including a grenade attack in a shopping mall in Paris, an RPG attack at Orly airport, and the bombing of a high-speed train targeting then Mayor of Paris Jacques Chirac. Carlos was also believed to be responsible for several bomb attacks on proIsraeli newspapers and a car bomb attack targeting the Al-Watan al-Arabi newspaper office in Paris, attacks that some believe may have helped inspire the Kouachi brothers’ attack against the Charlie Hebdo newspaper in 2015. During that attack I happened to be visiting my counterparts at DGSI headquarters. Despite his exploits, Carlos’s true identity remained hidden for years. Both the media and Western law enforcement and intelligence agencies became obsessed with getting a current photo of Carlos. For more than 20 years Carlos was the subject of a world-wide manhunt. Carlos was an elusive fugitive who operated on both sides of the Iron Curtain in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. He seemed to be everywhere and nowhere: Paris, London, Budapest, Beirut, The Hague, Algiers, Baghdad, Belgrade, Prague, Berlin, Tripoli, Damascus, Aden and Amman. His frequent contact with the media to issue demands, to take credit for attacks and to grant interviews, presaged a trend in modern terrorism. He knew how to use the media and sought publicity for his exploits. Even from prison Carlos writes and is published, most recently in a Turkish newspaper. Current terror groups such as ISIS have multiple media/propaganda departments in their organizations. Carlos saw himself as a secular socialist revolutionary fighting for the Palestinian cause against Zionism and the West. While a member of the PFLP, he was unique in conducting joint operations with other like-minded terrorist groups or individuals. Carlos worked with the German Revolutionary Cells (GRC), also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, Black September and the Japanese Red Army. Carlos eventually formed his own group, perhaps due to having a difficult-to-control personality. As a freelancer, Carlos’ group worked for Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, Romania’s Nicolae Ceausescu, and the Syrians. Because of all that Carlos “accomplished” in his career as a terrorist, some consider him the inventor of modern terrorism and/or the world’s first celebrity terrorist. He was eclipsed as the world’s most famous terrorist when Osama bin Laden became the face of modern terrorism in 2001. Carlos’s long career as a terrorist and a fugitive ended in 1994 when the CIA located him in Khartoum, Sudan. The CIA checked with the FBI about his

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status, but Carlos had no outstanding indictment or arrest warrant in the U.S. because his victims were not American. The CIA then notified French authorities of Carlos’s location. According to CIA contractor Billy Waugh’s account in Hunting the Jackal, Carlos was living just across runway 340 of the Khartoum airport from where Osama bin Laden was living. After more than 20 years on the run, Carlos was apprehended and transported to Paris where he was given a life sentence in 1997 for the murder of the two DST agents. After his conviction Carlos told the media that he had carried out over 100 attacks killing 1,500 to 2,000 people. My homework began with the normal research expected of any investigator; however, there were challenges. To begin with, the FBI case file on Josef Alon’s murder from the 1970’s was not computerized and not easily located. By the time it was located and scanned and a link provided to me in Paris, I didn’t have time to read all of the over 7,000 pages in the original file. The FBI has a cadre of analysts who are subject matter experts in a multitude of various terrorist groups. However, I couldn’t find any who knew about Black September. I would have to educate myself. Portions of 1970’s FBI case files on Black September are linked to the FBI’s public website. For more information on Colonel Alon I read Fred Burton’s comprehensive book Chasing Shadows. I ordered Carlos’ book L’Islam Revolutionnaire (Revolutionary Islam) from Librarie Galignani on the rue de Rivoli. Carlos published this book from prison in 2003. It contained his response to al Qa’ida’s 9/11 attack and a critical glimpse into his ideology. Carlos proclaimed “every lover of justice

Josef Alon and two of his daughters.

Not knowing which language Carlos would prefer, I brought my FBI language specialist along to serve as an interpreter if necessary. His name was Pierre. My research showed that in addition to his native Spanish, Carlos spoke French, Arabic, English, Russian and possibly German and Hungarian. Pierre was also a strategic choice: he was of the same generation as Carlos and had grown up in the Middle East. Pierre was my insurance policy when it came to establishing rapport with Carlos.

Carlos, Magdalena Kopp and their daughter.

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hates the American imperialists, the worst tyrants in the history of humanity.” In the book Carlos attempts to associate himself retroactively with bin Laden and the jihadists. However, I didn’t buy it. Bin Laden was motivated by his radical interpretation of Wahhabi Islam. Carlos was clearly in the mold of a secular socialist revolutionary akin to Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. The PFLP was secular and anti-clerical. Yet, paradoxically, Carlos claimed to be a Muslim convert. I pressed on with my research and was impressed by the historical accuracy of Olivier Assayas’s 5 and one-half hour biopic Carlos. I also tracked down two French officers who had previously interrogated Carlos in preparation for some of his many trials in France. They told me he had a huge ego and was moody. Some days he was chatty and other days cold, distant or angry. In the end, I had two pages of questions for Carlos and I brought them with me to the prison. They were printed in both English and French depending on who would conduct the interview. Not knowing which language Carlos would prefer, I brought my FBI language specialist along to serve as an interpreter if necessary. His name was Pierre. My research showed that in addition to his native Spanish, Carlos spoke French, Arabic, English, Russian and possibly German and Hungarian. Pierre was also a strategic choice: he was of the same generation as Carlos and had grown up in the Middle East. Pierre was my insurance policy when it came to establishing rapport with Carlos.

MOTIVATION When preparing an interview strategy with any witness, many important factors must be taken into consideration. Motivation is one such important factor. In order to avoid having an interviewee’s motivations control the interview, you must anticipate an interviewee’s motives and plan how to counter them, a process known as circumvention. It was clear from his letter that Carlos wanted money. The FBI routinely pays informants for information and intelligence. Was the FBI going to pay a convicted terrorist for information? No way. I had to prepare a definitive response to his anticipated request for money and identify other potential motivations for Carlos to cooperate with the FBI. For starters, I knew he was willing to talk to a journalist in exchange for money to be used for his legal defense. But would Carlos talk to an FBI agent, a representative of the government he despised who would not offer any money? Perhaps Carlos would be motivated by thinking his former comrades in Black September would “get credit” for the assassination, if that’s what you could call it. His letter indicated a desire to honor the memory of his dead Arab comrades and to reveal their names for history’s If Black September did, in fact, kill Alon, it would be the first successful attack by Black September on

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U.S. soil. A third motivation would be based on a personal appeal: Carlos had a daughter, Alon had three daughters. Didn’t they deserve to know what happened to their father? I knew from his book that Carlos considered himself to be a soldier. Alon had been a fighter pilot in the Israeli Air Force prior to being a diplomat. Perhaps I could reach Carlos’s empathy.

THE STRATEGY My research revealed a ladies’ man with a huge ego. A man who saw himself on par with the major historical figures of his day. Therefore, the core of my strategy was to be able to hold my own in a discussion about Black September and to motivate Carlos via indirect disingenuous flattery aimed to assuage his ego. What do I mean by that? My plan was to bring a copy of his book with me to the interview. I marked it up with tabs as if I had studied it thoroughly. Actually I had studied it, but it was disingenuous of me to bring it with me because it had nothing to do with Josef Alon or Black September. What I mean by indirect was that I planned to have the book with me among my notes and papers, but not display it too obviously. Should he notice the book, it might flatter him that I studied it and, perhaps, trigger an intended response that would urge him to live up to his reputation as a proselytizer for revolutionary justice, the image of himself he put forward in his book. This might also trigger the subconscious reciprocity rule. Studies have shown that a kind gesture, such as getting an interviewee a cup of coffee, often has the subconscious effect of causing them to want to do something nice to us in return. Hopefully, that is cooperation. If Carlos felt I studied him, he might feel that he owed it to me to cooperate. This was the psychological effect I was aiming for. I might even ask him to sign his book for me if the timing was right. My strategy was to feed his self-importance. I discussed this strategy with the FBI’s famed Behavioral Analysis Unit at Quantico (they don’t like to be called profilers). They make themselves available for consultation on counterterrorism interview strategies and they validated my proposed strategy.

RAPPORT At the FBI Academy in Quantico where I am an Instructor now, we teach the new agents that the most important part of a successful interview starts with building rapport. An interview goes nowhere without finding commonalities and then developing these items of mutual interest. People talk to you if they like you, if they are comfortable with you. One commonality we had was that we both came from the Americas and lived and worked in both Europe and the Middle East. Both of us were also students of history and had strong opinions regarding the concept of justice. In the rapport building process, it is critical to share something about yourself, you “give to get,” sharing of yourself in the hopes that they will share in return. As I tell my students at the

academy, this getting-to-know-you phase is a bit like being on a first date. Any whiff of judgment or moral superiority and rapport goes down the drain. I liked to channel TV detective Columbo: act harmless, friendly and most of all – curious. Once rapport is established, let them tell their story by using the most basic questioning technique: open-ended questions. But how does one remove judgement when meeting someone for the first time? Especially when that someone is a terrorist? Is that even possible? I consider all humans to be spiritual beings, and I’ve been working with all kinds of criminals for over 20 years. I know how flawed people can be, it’s my job to know and prove that. But as long as they are not pathological, I have always been able to find, and relate to, their humanity. Rapport building also serves two other purposes. You can use this time to normalize the interviewee’s verbal and non-verbal responses to insignificant questions. “Norming” allows you to establish your observational baseline of verbal and non-verbal cues that can later be compared to substantive questions and may therefore help you notice subtle indicators of deception. The third purpose of rapport is to help identify additional possible motivations to cooperation, or themes to be used to steer further discussion into topics of investigative interest. These themes can also help you to identify people or things to blame that could elicit cooperation. Themes could also be used to rationalize behavior or minimize criminal activity. Knowing Carlos’ history, my plan to build rapport was to start by asking him his opinion about the current civil war in Syria. Carlos had lived in Syria and worked both for and under the protection of the Syrian intelligence service. He was sure to have an opinion. I never got a chance to bring it up.

ENGAGE

was obvious he was not expecting the FBI. He was well dressed in fancy clothes and a leather jacket and not wearing handcuffs or any other restraints. The French police introduced themselves briefly without shaking hands and then came my turn. I shook his hand as I introduced myself. In the FBI we display our credentials, or creds, when we officially identify ourselves. I had done it hundreds or thousands of times over the years and had seen every reaction to it: surprise, fainting, falling down, blushing, resignation, mock surrender, disbelief, feigned confusion, gratitude or even reaching for a weapon. I’d seen it all. But not this. When Carlos heard me say “FBI” he immediately stood up to face me, mouth open in disbelief. He leaned forward to examine my credentials and read the small print out loud: “This is to certify that Eugene J. Casey whose signature and photograph appear hereon, is a regularly appointed Supervisory Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, and as such is charged with the duty of investigating

A photo Carlos gave me taken in 2013. The t-shirt Carlos is wearing depicts Carlos breaking free of his chains and being embraced by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez

Maison Centrale de Poissy was an unimposing facility that, from the front, bore little resemblance to a prison. It was run down and at least 100 years old. The perimeter wall was only about 12 feet high and topped with Spanish tile not razor wire. There were no visible guards. An unassuming guard tower peeked over the wall about a hundred yards away. We checked our weapons and entered the prison. Inside, the prisoners were not made to wear uniforms. It was not the Bastille or La Santé, the infamous prison where Carlos was first held in France, nor was it on par with a maximum security prison in the U.S. Wicked Thénardier, who escapes from solitary confinement in Paris’ La Force prison in Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables, would have had an easier time fleeing this place. No one from the U.S. government had ever interviewed Carlos before. I didn’t know how he would react and I felt the burden of getting it done right. We were shown into the innermost part of the prison and brought into a small room where Carlos sat alone. It

Carlos’s signature on my copy of his book.

violations of the laws of the United States, collecting evidence in cases in which the United States is or may be a party in interest and performing other duties imposed by law, Office of the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation by order of the Attorney General of the United States!” He tilted his head back up and pointed his index finger in my face and, with his voice rising, said “What kind of bullshit is that?” I deadpanned my response, “That’s FBI bullshit.” Carlos gave me a half smile and sat down. He was challenging me right out of the gate. But with that smile, I knew I had passed the initial challenge and a connection was made. With connection being a key to rapport, I opted not to ask his opinion on the Syrian civil war and got right to business. He preferred to speak English and we occasionally spoke French. His South American accent was still intact despite being away from Venezuela for over 40 years. After asking Adeline if she was interested in becoming his fourth wife (she said no), he ignored her and I began the interview almost as if we were alone in the room. I showed him a copy of the letter and asked if he had written it. Of course I already knew the answer to that; I was “norming” Carlos. I was establishing his normal truthful response to a question in order to be able to observe later on in the interview any subtle verbal or nonverbal indicators of deception. He acknowledged authorship of the letter, but when he read the part of his letter that demanded money in exchange for information, he looked up and asked me for a million dollars. I told him I could not pay him. He asked me who I was representing. I told him I was representing the FBI and the MCPD in

The author, Carlos and Pierre.

an attempt to uncover the truth about what happened to Josef Alon, for the sake of his daughters. He held my gaze, gauging my sincerity. I asked him about his daughter. He told me he had four children, one with Fidel Castro’s Russian translator, two others from different women in Europe and the fourth with his first wife, the seeming love of his life, fellow revolutionary and GRC terrorist Magdalena Kopp. Magdalena was ill, but Carlos was grateful to have a relationship with their daughter. Carlos had no children with his second wife, a Palestinian Jordanian, nor his third wife, his French attorney. Carlos also claimed that GRC terrorist Brigitte Kuhlmann was pregnant with their child when she was killed by Israeli commandos in Entebbe during the hijacking of Air France flight 139 in 1976. I steered him toward a discussion of Black September. He had a great memory for events and locations, but struggled with last names. Early on he mentioned Abu Ali, but couldn’t recall his full name. I said “Do you mean Abu Ali Iyad?” and Carlos replied “Yes!” Shortly after that he mentioned Ali Hassan but again couldn’t recall the full name. I said “Do you mean Ali Hassan Salamah?” He again said “Yes!” then turned to the French cops and said “This FBI Agent is serious. I’m going to help him.” Carlos stood up, called for the guard and told the guard to open a series of barred doors. The guard jumped and opened the doors as Carlos instructed. He came back from his cell a few minutes later bearing documents and photographs for me. The documents included a chapter of his autobiography that dealt, in part, with Black September. Carlos doesn’t want his autobiography published until after his death. All the research I had done over the past year paid off. He offered me and my colleague Pierre the best Cuban cigars and offered the French cops cheap Dominican cigars. So we talked and smoked for more than five hours. The good news is that we hit it off and he cooperated. He told me the details of what he had heard of a Black September plot to kill Josef Alon. Carlos had an outsized personality and could be

very charming. With his impressive facility with language, he reminded me of an evil genius. While most of his former Arab comrades were killed, Carlos attributed his longevity not to his own cunning, but merely to the fact that he was not an Arab and therefore European officials were rarely suspicious of his being involved in pro-Palestinian attacks or organizations. It was obvious he liked to talk about the days when he was in the fight. He was robust and strong for a 64 year old. His eyes flashed with a keen intelligence and he spoke with an air of erudition, a professor expounding on the details of a complex time in our history. He saw himself as a simple soldier, an elite killer and a political prisoner who was subjected to an illegal rendition. I empathized with his plight. He responded by saying that it wasn’t that he didn’t do what he was accused of, it was just that he saw legal flaws in his detention. I empathized some more and he told me he had personally killed 83 people with his own hands. Perhaps now he was trying to impress me. I steeled myself not to display any signs of moral superiority or judgment – a sure way to kill rapport and stop him from talking. He reminded me a bit of the adman for Dos Equis – the Most Interesting Man in the World, or, perhaps, at least the most interesting terrorist in the world. He was also a prodigious name dropper: Yasser Arafat, Fidel Castro, Yuri Andropov, Mikhail Gorbachev, Hafez Al-Assad, Bashar Al-Assad, Abu Nidal, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, Osama bin Laden, Ayman alZawahiri, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Manuel Noriega and Eldridge Cleaver to name a few. At the end of the interview I asked him to sign his book. He was very proud to do so and then proceeded to give me photographs of himself (talk about ego!). In our discussion, Carlos would often get sidetracked, and would go off on long tangents. Although it may have annoyed my French police colleagues, I never interrupted these tangents because what he discussed, while not always pertinent to my investigation, would be riveting to any Western intelligence officer who worked from the 1970’s to the 1990’s. Because of these digressions, I had to return to visit Carlos in prison to complete my interview. Between visits, Captain Arnaud did some excellent research and we were

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able to locate and interview other witnesses in and around Paris in an attempt to corroborate Carlos’s story. The second interview was nine months later and he greeted me with a hug. We were genuinely happy to see each other. He gave Pierre a kiss on both cheeks as is customary among close friends in the Middle East (Pierre was born in Egypt to Lebanese parents). Our rapport was clearly established. I came armed with many follow-up questions based on the information he previously provided and my research into his story about Josef Alon. We were both eager to get back to business. This time I gave him a cigar and our smoke filled the room for the next five or six hours. Again because of his amazing memory and attention to detail and his famous digressions, a third interview was necessary. This gave me the opportunity to conduct further investigation into Carlos’s account. When the second interview was over, the French cops needed time to prepare their report on a laptop for our signatures. Carlos and I stood alone in a hallway with a clear view of an inner courtyard, a garden, with a perimeter walkway surrounded by a cloistered cage of iron bars. A woman entered at the far end of the courtyard. Carlos’s eyes lit up. He told me it was the prison’s English teacher and in a whisper, in crude terms, told me what he wanted to do with her. He then called out her name and waved her over, a barred door separating us. He told her “Look! The FBI is here to see me!” I then realized he was using me to impress her in his efforts to sleep with her. She walked away, unimpressed. Carlos told me he was disappointed that she refused to spend any time with him based on the flimsy excuse that he was already fluent in English. I couldn’t imagine this scenario playing out at the Supermax prison in Colorado. Not five minutes later the scene repeated itself. Another woman appeared. This time it was the prison psychiatrist. He again tried to impress her with the fact that the FBI was here to see him. She was equally unimpressed with his routine and quickly moved on. Again Carlos lamented that she refused to see him because he had been declared sane. I felt uneasy being unexpectedly thrust into the

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role of Carlos’s wingman. Yet it was oddly reassuring how comfortable he felt in my presence. He gave me a conspiratorial wink as if I shared his desire. I rolled with it by making a face and shrugging my shoulders: “French girls. What can you do?” I smiled. “Better luck next time.” I said. Earlier, while discussing the Muslim Brotherhood, Carlos told me he “didn’t like the Muslim brothers, only the Muslim sisters.” There was no doubt he still saw himself as a ladies’ man. Our final meeting was in July of 2015. It was a swelteringly hot day, and needless to say, French prisons are not air conditioned. He greeted me as if he were a gracious host welcoming me to his home. He saw Pierre did not have water. He took me by the arm and said “come with me.” He ordered guards to open various barred doors at the end of long hallways. They all complied without hesitation. Finally, we stopped in front of a few vending machines. I reached inside my pocket and came up with a handful of coins. Carlos looked at the euros and said they were no good in prison, the machines only took tokens. As he said this his eyes suddenly sparkled and he started to pick out a few of the larger 2 euro coins from my hand saying “May I?” I quickly had to decide whether or not to allow myself to supply Carlos with prison contraband or risk damaging the rapport I had established with him. Given everything else he seemed to have access to in prison, including an inmate cook and an inmate maid according to the guards, I decided not to risk damaging our rapport. By then he had emptied my hand of all its coins. He used his tokens and got some water for Pierre and asked me if I wanted some coffee. Suddenly I realized I was alone with Carlos deep inside the prison. I could hear other prisoners around a corner. I knew the prison housed other dangerous terrorists including a Hezbollah terrorist that Carlos sometimes prayed with. I realized he had planned this. In a low voice he asked me if I could bring him a certain book on my next visit. The book was Michael Morrell’s The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism from al Qa’ida to ISIS. He had read about it in Time magazine and didn’t want to ask me for it in front of the French

cops. There was now no doubt that he trusted me. Later, during that last interview, when I asked about Magdalena and his daughter, he told me Magdalena had died two weeks earlier. I offered Carlos my condolences. No one else in the room realized that we were discussing the death of his first wife. Carlos appeared to be grateful for my words and proceeded to tell me the rest of what he knew about the murder of Josef Alon. It pays to do your homework. One of the reasons Carlos told me about the Black September operative who was involved in the murder of Alon was because that operative was dead and therefore could not be betrayed. Carlos prided himself on personally killing traitors to his cause. He had already generously given me several examples. Because of his personal warmth, with each prison visit I felt I had to caution my team never to let down their guard in his presence in case Carlos wanted to try and take out an FBI employee. The way he bossed around the guards and carried his own leather portfolio in prison, made it easy to assume he could easily have a letter opener or a crude prison shank in his possession (not to mention his cigar cutter). He never tried anything and remained cordial and professional during our interactions. Only once did I see his anger flash and the transformation of his personality was remarkable. I could see he was agitated, but it did not seem related to our conversation or my line of questioning. It was that unbearably hot day. This time our room was near the inner exercise yard where the prisoners were allowed outside. There was noise coming in from the exercise yard, but nothing unusual for a prison. Carlos was trying to concentrate and access his memory. Suddenly he jumped up and quickly ran out of the room. I could hear him ordering the guards to open several doors. Then I heard him yell out to everyone in the yard in French: “Shut the f--- up! We’re working in here!” Immediately there was silence in the yard. Then I remembered the words of the warden about who was in charge at the prison. The warden was right. EVALUATE Instructors at the FBI Academy teach the new agents this acronym for interviewing: PIECE: Planning and Preparation, Initiate, Engage,

Closure and Evaluate. Once an interview or an interrogation is over, it is important to evaluate and selfcritique your performance in the spirit of continuous improvement. Having a well-considered interview strategy in place is a critical step in interview preparation. In international terrorism investigations it is equally important to thoroughly understand your subject’s motivational ideology and have strong liaison relationships with other law enforcement agencies. My interview strategy was a success, a good rapport was established, and he fully cooperated, displaying no indicators of deception and giving me the name of the Black September operative involved in the murder along with documents and photographs. If I had not proven to Carlos that I knew the subject matter and was serious, he would not have cooperated. After more than 15 hours over three smokefilled days we parted with what I can only identify as a mutual respect. I have always believed that for any witness to cooperate, treating them with respect is a minimum requirement. Aside from criminals afflicted with psychopathy or sociopathy, none of us are wholly good or wholly evil. We are all shades of gray. In the words of Georges Simenon’s famous detective Inspector Maigret: “Understand and judge not.” When closing an interview, it is always best to part on good terms should new developments necessitate another interview. Since we parted Carlos has written to me from prison, sharing with me his opinion on ISIS’s use of psychological warfare. Luck and timing may also have played a part in this case. By the time I spoke to Carlos, he had received a second life sentence and was no longer in dire need of money for his legal defense. The not so good news is that the information he provided may not lead to a definite resolution of the case. The story that Carlos told me was this: Carlos happened to be with a Black September operative, a Syrian exile, in Paris in 1973 when news reached them of the murder in Maryland of Josef Alon. Upon hearing the news, the operative told Carlos the following story. The representative of Fatah in Paris arranged a meeting between the operative and two or three American Vietnam War veterans. They met in a café in the Latin Quarter of Paris. The Americans told the operative that they didn’t want to return to Vietnam, that the war was an atrocity and that they wished to do something for the Palestinian cause.

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The operative told them they could assassinate the new Deputy Military Attaché at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Josef Alon. The Americans said they would do it, but the operative did not take the Americans seriously and never expected to see or hear from them again. When the news broke of Alon’s murder, the operative told Carlos that it must have been the American soldiers who killed Alon and that he was amazed and couldn’t believe that the Americans had actually carried out the hit. Carlos was convinced that, had the assassination been a Palestinian operation instead of an American one, it would have been common knowledge among the leaders of the PLO, the PFLP and Black September. But the opposite was the case, no one seemed to know who killed Alon except this one operative. After Carlos dutifully related this story to his commander, Wadie Haddad the PFLP’s military commander and head of external operations in Beirut, Haddad asked Carlos to try to verify that Alon was killed by Americans by inquiring with the Black Panthers. After 43 years, it is no easy task to verify or prove Carlos’s version of events, but efforts by the FBI, the MCPD and others continue despite the odds. Carlos’s information has breathed life back into a cold case. Armed with new intelligence, Captain Arnaud and I have interviewed many other potential witnesses in this case since I first spoke with Carlos. While the information Carlos provided may ultimately prove to be one more fruitless lead in a long investigation, there remains a small chance that the case could be solved. I sincerely hope the day comes when the FBI and the MCPD can tell Josef Alon’s daughters what really happened to their father. Should you have any information regarding the murder of Israeli Air Force Colonel Josef Alon, please contact the FBI office in Rockville, Maryland at (301) 251-7300, or the MCPD, Cold Case Squad at (240) 773-5070, email coldcase@montgomerycountymd.gov About the Author Eugene J. Casey is a Supervisory Special Agent with the FBI and is an Interviewing and Interrogation Instructor at the FBI Academy in Quantico. Prior to his current assignment, he was the FBI’s Assistant Legal Attaché in Paris.

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Technologies in Cars Today

By Anthony Ricci & Crystalmarie A. Marzocchi

utomobiles may be second to computers when talking about technological advancements over the years. Since the first production vehicle came off the assembly line in the 1920, till todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s modern cars that can drive themselves, vehicles have come a long way. These technological advancements can be a blessing and a curse but for the most part they enable drivers to have more control over the vehicle and provide a safer environment for all road users. While technology has come a long way and overall the engineering in vehicles and safety ratings are very good, today our current selfdriven cars still require an alert driver and hands on the wheel for a possible mistake, which is quite bothersome to me. 38

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It seems that engineers are focused more on the safety aspect rather than creature comforts for most models. As these models become more advanced governmental laws and restrictions become more intense as well. For example, laws are passed that forbid people from not wearing a seat belt. “In 2001 nearly 60% of all passenger vehicle occupants killed in traffic crashes were unrestrained (US Department of Transportation). Newer technology is researched and developed every day in order to push more, safer, vehicles into the market. Today’s drivers want safer vehicles and have a piece of mind that their vehicle of choice has safer technological advancements than the past. People want cars that are quicker, more luxurious, and more environmentally safer. During the 1920’s when cars became a mass-produced product they were known to clean up the environment. Cities were plagued with manure and odor from horses and ironically enough the solution from the 1920s is now polluting our streets. “In India, studies show there is a high rate of respiratory, digestion, ocular and skin problems amongst traffic police. Newly assigned numbers of them are victims of lung disorders in the first few months of their post to the traffic department.” [Sinha Rajiv] This seems to be common in many large cities such as Milan, Ankara, Mexico City, Buenos Aires, and even Tokyo where they are supplying oxygen to the traffic policemen in their cities. Thankfully the United States Congress passed laws that minimize the standard for automobile pollution and push for cleaner vehicles thus the electric/hybrid market growth. Over the years many technological advances have become more and more popular due to several major problems, pollution, crash/fatality rates, child safety, comforts and gas efficiency. In the early 1990’s all new cars sold in the USA were equipped with automatic seatbelts and airbags that inflate on just about any impact of over 15 MPH. Each year these technologies become more refined and advanced. Today’s airbags basically surround the occupants in the car. The sensors that are installed in cars today are quick enough to calculate the amount of weight on the seat of the car and if the crash caused enough force to eject the driver and passenger. Amazingly this calculation happens in milliseconds, which in an emergency situation is the only time the car has to react to maintain occupant safety. Cars today are starting to move into the era of autonomous connected vehicles of a controlled driving system. While the operator will be in control for many years to come, currently our vehicles are equipped with safety technology that can parallel park automatically, adjust cruise control speeds, control braking to avoid frontal obstacles, heads up displays, and showing an alert when your car drifts from its lane to name a few. Companies like Tesla and Google are already test driving self-driven cars and Ford is announcing it

will put fully driverless vehicles with no steering wheels or pedals on the road by the year 2021. This is not too far away, so what does it mean for the security driver and Law Enforcement? There are many lists of some of the most popular technologies for automobiles today, now that we have touched upon the history and how we got to the technology we have currently, what are some of the highest ranked and most popular technologies that modern vehicles have? Let’s start with the front of the vehicle and work our way in. • Smart headlight systems: are equipped on most mid-to high end vehicles, these headlights adjust their direction depending upon the way the car is turning and the angle of the steering as well as intensifying their output and the range they reach to assist in better night visibility. In addition, automatic high beams will detect the light from oncoming traffic and turn themselves off when they sense light. • Emergency Response Systems: Offer communication to Emergency and Medical help in the event of crash and/or road side emergency. • Lane Departure Warning: Many upper level vehicles have a warning system to tell drivers they are veering from their lane of travel. This system helps drivers stay within their lane of travel. • Voice Activated Systems: Taking your eyes off the road to change climate control or radio is one of many things that can distract a driver. By accepting your voice commands your vehicle allows you to keep your eyes on the road where they are supposed to be and reduces distraction. • Crash Mitigation System: Detects vehicle pending collision danger and allows and helps to minimize injuries to the people in the car by applying the brakes, alerting the driver, or a combination of the aforementioned. • Drowsy Driver Alert: Inattentive drivers are very similar to drunk drivers in that they truly do not know that they are swerving and/or about to leave their lane. This alert can tell if a driver is drowsy based on their actions and alert them to wake them up and regain attention towards the roadway. • Assistive Parking System: Basically, allows the vehicle to park on its own. Sensing the distance and any obstacle’s including cars around your vehicle. This convenience is liked by many; it helps make parking easier and increases parking safety. • Reverse Monitoring Systems: A huge assist for navigating in reverse with precision. This is a big help to driver with reduced flexibility who may not have the flexibility to be able to adjust their position in the driver’s seat for better vision when backing up. • Blind Spot Warning Systems: This system can be a big help to drivers who are preparing to change lanes or even during parking proce-

dures. The system will indicate and either flash a light or sound an alarm if another car or object is in your blind spot. • Vehicle Stability Control: A crash reducing system allows the driver to bring the vehicle back under control if they misinterpret the angle of the turn or entrance speed for the turn ahead. These technologies (driving aides) have their place in this modern world. In most cases computers and sensors are much quicker and more reliable than the human eye. In the end the human driver is still responsible for controlling his/her vehicle under current laws. We must allow these controls to help us while still not totally depending on them. While this in some cases works, in others it will develop bad driving habits and dependencies on our vehicle to make the correct traffic decision. The other consideration in some of their cases, such as Blind Spot Warning Systems, is time and distance, and the active driver. Would it be faster or the same time for a trained professional driver to do his/her own head check or just look for a light or sound indicator? By looking for the flashing light the brain still must process the decision, while the head check keeps the driver alert and in the active part of driving. In the following articles, we will start to discuss some of these technologies that have their pros and cons for the Security and LEO arena.

About the Author Anthony Ricci is President of ADSI (http://www.1adsi.com)

Spy vs FBI:

A IACSP Q&A with Jan Fedarcyk, the former Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s New York Office and the Author of the Novel, “Fidelity.”

alled “the FBI’s First Lady” by Vanity Fair magazine, Janice K. Fedarcyk is a 25-year veteran of the FBI. She became an FBI special agent in 1987 and was assigned to the Los Angeles Division where she investigated organized crime, drugs, money laundering and gang matters.

She was promoted to serve as the FBI’s representative to the National Counterterrorism Center, Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning in March of 2005. In February of 2007, she was named the Special Agent in Charge of the Counterterrorism Division of the Los Angeles Division and in January of 2008 she was named the Special Agent in Charge of the Philadelphia Office.

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Ms. Fedarcyk culminated her career as the Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) of the FBI’s New York Office, the largest of the FBI’s field offices and the first woman to hold this position. Under her leadership, Ms. Fedarcyk led efforts against counterterrorism and counterintelligence threats; insider trading on Wall Street; Somali piracy; and accelerated the growth of the cyber program to confront malicious hacking and sophisticated intrusions. Ms. Fedarcyk served as the Office of Domestic National Intelligence (ODNI) Domestic National Intelligence Representative for the New York region Ms. Fedarcyk is a recipient of the prestigious U.S. Government Presidential Rank Award; the Frederick D. Suydam Award for excellence in law enforcement; and the Respect for Law Alliance Federal Law Enforcement Leader Award, as well as having been named by the Philadelphia Business Journal as a Woman of Distinction. Ms. Fedarcyk formed Fedarcyk Consulting LLC upon her retirement from the FBI. Ms. Fedarcyk is an Advisor for LiveSafe, a company committed to providing their users and clients with a trustworthy and dependable mobile safety and security solution. Ms. Fedarcyk is also the author of “Fidelity” (Simon & Schuster). Janice K. Fedarcyk was interviewed by Paul Davis, a contributing editor to the Journal.

If you talk to the public, most will be able to tell you what the FBI does and point to cases like bank robberies, gang investigations or organized crime. But the public really does not have a good understanding of what the FBI does in the counterintelligence arena, and rightfully so. Most of it never makes it into the public domain.

IACSP: To begin, why did you write the novel? Fedarcyk: When I retired after 25 years in the FBI, I had the opportunity to write a novel about a fictional special agent protagonist, who happened to be a young woman. Most people either have never met or had the opportunity to interact with a FBI special agent, but they will form perceptions about the Bureau from what they see on TV or at the movies, or what they read in the newspapers or on social media. So I thought this was a way I could interweave a compelling storyline with the authenticity of what it means to be an FBI special agent. IACSP: Are the characters in the novel based on real people or perhaps autobiographical? Fedarcyk: Not autobiographical. The characters are an amalgam of individuals who, through the years, I either had the pleasure to work with or knew them during the course of my career. So they were not one person per character, just different characteristics of individuals that kind of came together to bring these characters to life. IACSP: Susan Jefferies, the totally dedicated “George Smiley-like” FBI counterintelligence boss in New York, is an odd and interesting character. How did you come up with her? Fedarcyk: Her character is one that I had a lot of fun with. Her character, of all the characters, really stayed constant throughout some of the changes that go into the editing process of a book. I enjoyed bringing her on to the page and making her the mentor of Kate Malloy. IACSP: Is the espionage story in the novel based on an actual case? Fedarcyk: No, it’s not. If you talk to the public, most will be able to tell you what the FBI does and point to cases like bank robberies, gang investigations or organized crime. But the public really does not have a good understanding of what the FBI does in the counterintelligence arena, and rightfully so. Most of it never makes it into the public domain. So I thought this was

a way to talk a little bit about that particular program and to weave a storyline based on what I’ve seen in my career. I strived to ensure authenticity in the book and at the same time, of course, there are some things added to make it an interesting story.

IACSP: Who are your literary influences?

Fedarcyk: Well, I tend to read more non-

fiction than fiction, but when I’m reading fiction, I tend to read more of the thriller and crime genre, like Joseph Wambaugh and Michael Connelly. I spent 9 ½ years out in Los Angeles, right after I joined the Bureau and I loved the city and loved the assignment. Michael Connelly writes about the LAPD and I had many friends in the LA Police Department and still stay in contact with many of them, so when he writes about them it takes me back to my time there.

IACSP: Can you give us a brief overview

of your FBI career? Fedarcyk: Straight out of college I joined the Reno, Nevada Police Department and spent six and a half years there. We worked closely with the local field office of the FBI. Through that contact, I started having discussions about my potential interest in the FBI and I made an application and was hired in 1987 as a special agent. Over the next 25 years I held a number of different assignments and worked both within the FBI’s criminal program area and also the national security area, particularly after 9/11. I was lucky to have other women who inspired me, like the first two female FBI agents in 1972. IACSP: A former nun and a former Marine, I recall. Fedarcyk:: Yes, a fascinating story and when you think about all of the things that were happening back in the early 1970s and to have two women with very different backgrounds joining the ranks of the FBI. They blazed the path for people like myself who saw that there was this opportunity to join this premier law enforcement agency as a special agent. I was also fortunate to have mentors who helped shape both my career path and my leadership style.

Post 9/11, a lot of us went from working in those traditional criminal programs, which are still bread and butter programs for the FBI, into the world of national security. In my case, I concentrated on the counterterrorism arena. When I went out to LA in 2007, I was the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the LA Counterterrorism Division, having also been an inspector and having worked within terrorism financing.

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It’s incredibly important to have strong female role models to help young women understand they can have an exciting career in an organization that is in the forefront of keeping our country safe. To the extent that Kate Malloy, the protagonist in “Fidelity,” has vulnerabilities, at her core she is a strong individual. Post 9/11, a lot of us went from working in those traditional criminal programs, which are still bread and butter programs for the FBI, into the world of national security. In my case, I concentrated on the counterterrorism arena. When I went out to LA in 2007, I was the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the LA Counterterrorism Division, having also been an inspector and having worked within terrorism financing. After Los Angeles, I moved to Philadelphia and became the SAC there and had responsibility for all of the national security and criminal programs. IACSP: Philadelphia is my hometown. I remember when you were there as the SAC. Fedarcyk: We had some really phenomenal investigations in Philly. Philadelphia was an amazing place to the special agent in charge. We had some very good counterterrorism cases. We had the Jihadi Jane case and the Fort Dix Six case. We also had great counterintelligence cases. IACSP: What was your most challenging assignment? Fedarcyk: My most challenging assignment was towards the end of my career, when I became the Assistant Director in Charge, or ADIC, of the FBI’s New York office. IACSP: The biggest FBI office in the country, right? Fedarcyk: It was the biggest office and some would say the most prestigious. There are 56 field offices across the country and New York is the largest. IACSP: New York is also the number one terrorist target. Fedarcyk: Yes. I was there from 2010 to 2012 during the 10th anniversary of 9/11, following Osama bin Laden’s death, and of course we had a never-ending threat stream. There were a lot of challenges associated

with running an office that large. We had many very successful investigations, whether it was in the cyber area or public corruption, or insider trading on Wall Street. We also had the largest national take-down of Cosa Nostra in 2011. It took an amazing amount of work to bring that to fruition, but it was a very impactful investigation that I was privileged to oversee. I cannot say enough about the professional men and women who do that important work every day. And now, being retired for four years and on the sidelines, I still like to consider myself a cheerleader of the great work that gets done day in and day out. You don’t stop caring when you walk out the door. IACSP: How are counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases different from criminal cases? Fedarcyk: When you are working in counterterrorism and counterintelligence, not all cases will end up in a court room. In some counterterrorism cases you will glean a lot of intelligence that will help you either understand a network or help you understand a conspiracy. And in counterintelligence, you often work cases that help you better understand your adversary and how to counter your adversary’s intentions. In counterterrorism and counterintelligence, you want to be on the prevention side of things. You want to be ahead of counter adversarial actions, as opposed to a reactive stance. If you’re showing up in the event of a terrorist act and responding to it, you have to sit back and say, did we miss something? Many national security investigations will not end up in a prosecutorial fashion. Many of them will be intelligence gathering activates that will round up the knowledge base which will help you better understand what actions and activities are being taken by your adversaries without slapping the handcuffs on somebody. IACSP: ‘The Americans’ is a popular TV series about Soviet “illegals” in the 1980s and your novel covers illegals as well. How do illegals - sleeper agents who sneak into an adversary’s country under a “legend,” a false ID - recruit people in reality? Are they active and successful in manipulating U.S. citizens? Fedarcyk: One of the ways that an illegal, or a spy, will be successful is

When you are working in counterterrorism and counterintelligence, not all cases will end up in a court room. In some counterterrorism cases you will glean a lot of intelligence that will help you either understand a network or help you understand a conspiracy. And in counterintelligence, you often work cases that help you better understand your adversary and

the identification of a vulnerability in an individual they are trying to recruit. A vulnerability can be a number of things, such as sex, financial, alcohol or any number of things. All over the media today we hear about “influence” operations, but that’s just a new terminology for something that was called “active measures” or “perception management” in the Cold War. These are clandestine operations that are designed to further foreign policy and expand a country’s influence. What we are seeing in today’s world is a transition from Cold War tactics to the digital age and how the Internet and cyber can be leveraged. IACSP: One very old tactic still in use is the “honey trap.” In one case, a Chinese woman agent drugged a British official in a hotel room and stole his briefcase, which contained classified documents.

Fedarcyk: The world’s oldest profession against the second oldest profession. IACSP: I understand that you are running a consulting firm now. Fedarcyk: I am. When I retired from the Bureau, although I was getting ready to write “Fidelity,” I started an independent consulting company and I’ve been doing that since late 2012. I’ve enjoyed branching out on my own and leveraging my experience in helping private industry and government on different projects, primarily focused on evaluating threat and risks in the national security arena. I’m also a senior adviser on a start-up tech company.

how to counter your

IACSP: Any closing thoughts?

adversary’s intentions.

Fedarcyk: I loved my 25-year career

with the Bureau. I had the opportunity to do so many different things and work with so many tremendously professional people. As a former cop coming in, I was able to work organized crime, gangs, and drug trafficking, and then following the very tragic events of 9/11, as many peers and colleagues did, to then go into the national security arena. I walked away after 25 years at the top of my game, having had the privilege and honor to run the New York office. IACSP: Good luck with the book and thank you

Spies, Crooks, Terrorists And Jan Fedarcyk, The FBI’s First Lady By Paul Davis

s Jan Fedarcyk noted in the accompanying Q&A, she oversaw the investigations of spies, crooks, and terrorists during her FBI 25-year career. While serving as the Special Agent in Charge of the Philadelphia Office, Ms. Fedarcyk oversaw the investigation of the “Fort Dix Six.”

On December 22, 2008, the U.S. Justice Department and the FBI announced that conviction of Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer, brothers Dritan Duka, Shain Duka and Eljvir Duka and Serdar Tatar on count one of the sevencount superseding indictment that charged them with conspiracy to murder members of the U.S. military. The jury acquitted each of defendants of count two, which charged attempt to murder members of the U.S. military. According to the Justice Department, the remaining counts of the superseding indictment, which was returned in January, charged the three Duka brothers, who are illegal immigrants, and Shnewer with firearm offenses; including possession of machine guns. The defendants’ arrests occurred on May 7, 2007, in Cherry Hill as Dritan and Shain Duka were meeting a confidential government witness to purchase four automatic M-16 rifles and three semi-automatic AK-47 rifles to be used in a future attack on military personnel. The other defendants were arrested at various locations at about the same time.

“Vigilance was the key to disrupting the dangerous terrorists convicted today and we are glad they are off the street,” Ms. Fedarcyk said at the time. “We appreciate the tip from an alert citizen who reported this suspicious activity to law enforcement. Without tips from concerned citizens or cooperation from our law enforcement partners, it is much more difficult to safeguard our nation and protect the United States from terrorist attack.” A sixth co-defendant, Agron Abdullahu, 26, of Buena Vista Township, Atlantic County, pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the Duka brothers’ illegal possession of weapons and was sentenced to 20 months in federal prison. Dritan Duka and Shain Duka were sentenced to prison terms of life plus an additional, consecutive 30 years. The third brother, Eljvir Duka, received a life prison term. Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer was sentenced to a term of life in prison plus an additional, consecutive 30 years. Serdar Tatar was sentenced to 33 years in prison.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

On March 9, 2010, the U.S. Justice Department and the FBI announced an indictment charging Colleen R. LaRose, aka “Fatima LaRose,” aka “Jihad Jane,” with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill in a foreign country, making false statements to a government official and attempted identity theft. According to the Justice Department, the indictment charges that LaRose (an American citizen born in 1963 who resides in Montgomery County, Pa.) and five unindicted co-conspirators (located in South Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the United States) recruited men on the Internet to wage violent jihad in South Asia and Europe, and recruited women on the Internet who had passports and the ability to travel to and around Europe in support of violent jihad. The indictment further charges that LaRose and her unindicted co-conspirators used the Internet to establish relationships with one another and to communicate regarding their

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plans, which included martyring themselves, soliciting funds for terrorists, soliciting passports and avoiding travel restrictions (through the collection of passports and through marriage) in order to wage violent jihad. The indictment further charges that LaRose stole another individual’s U.S. passport and transferred or attempted to transfer it in an effort to facilitate an act of international terrorism. LaRose received a direct order to kill a citizen and resident of Sweden, and to do so in a way that would frighten “the whole Kufar [non-believer] world.” The indictment further charges that LaRose agreed to carry out her murder assignment, and that she and her coconspirators discussed that her appearance and American citizenship would help her blend in while carrying out her plans. According to the indictment, LaRose traveled to Europe and tracked the intended target online in an effort to complete her task. “This case demonstrates that the FBI and our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities must continue to remain vigilant in the face of the threats that America faces, in whatever form those threats may present themselves or no matter how creative those who threaten us try to be,” Ms. Fedarcyk said at the time. “We must use all available technologies and techniques to root out potential threats and stop those who intend to harm us.” Colleen R. LaRose was sentenced to 10 years in prison for conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill in a foreign country, making false statements and attempted identity theft. On June 28, 2010, the U.S. Justice Department and the FBI announced that the arrests of suspected Russian secret agents in the United States. Ms. Fedarcyck was the Assistant Director of the FBI New York Office at the time. Eight individuals were arrested for allegedly carrying out long-term, “deep-cover” assignments in the United States on behalf of the Russian Federation, according to the Justice Department. Two additional defendants were also arrested for allegedly participating in the same Russian intelligence program within the United States. In total, 11 defendants, including the 10 arrested, were charged in two separate

LaRose received a direct order to kill a citizen and resident of Sweden, and to do so in a way that would frighten “the whole Kufar [nonbeliever] world.” The indictment further charges that LaRose agreed to carry out her murder assignment...

criminal complaints with conspiring to act as unlawful agents of the Russian Federation within the United States. Federal law prohibits individuals from acting as agents of foreign governments within the United States without prior notification to the U.S. Attorney General. Nine of the defendants are also charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering. Arrested were “Richard Murphy,” “Cynthia Murphy,” Vicky Pelaez, “Juan Lazaro,” Anna Chapman, “Michael Zottoli,” “Patricia Mills, Mikhail Semenko, “Donald Howard Heathfield,” and “Tracey Lee Ann Foley.” “Christopher R. Metsos” remains at large. This case was the result of a multi-year investigation conducted by the FBI; the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York; and the Counterespionage Section and the Office of Intelligence within the Justice Department’s National Security Division. The ten suspects were deported. On January 20, 2011, the U.S. Justice Department and the FBI announced that ninety-one

members and associates of seven Cosa Nostra organized crime families, including the New England family, all five New York-based families and the New Jersey-based Decavalcante family had been charged with federal crimes in 16 indictments returned in four judicial districts. Ms. Fedarcyk was the then-Assistant Director of the FBI’s New York Office. The charges were related to a wide range of alleged illegal activity, including murder, murder conspiracy, loansharking, arson, narcotics trafficking, extortion, robbery, illegal gambling and labor racketeering, in some cases occurring over decades. The indictments charged leaders of these criminal enterprises, as well as mid-level managers, numerous soldiers and associates, and others alleged to be corrupt union officials. “Some believe organized crime is a thing of the past; unfortunately, there are still people who extort, intimidate, and victimize innocent Americans,” said then-FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III.

About the Author Paul Davis is a frequent contributing editor to the Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International.

IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf

By Dr. Joshua Sinai The following are noteworthy recently published books on various aspects of homeland security. The capsule reviews are arranged alphabetically, by authors’ last names.

Counterterrorism and Threat Finance Analysis During Wartime

David M. Blum and J. Edward Conway, Eds., (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 226 pages, $85.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-7391-8043-3.

his edited volume is an important contribution to the literature on countering terrorist financing from an operational military- and intelligence-based counterterrorism approach. As explained in the introductory chapter by J. Edward Conway, the book’s co-editor, “This volume traces what works and what does not when counter threat finance analysis transitions from spreadsheets, slide presentations and link charts to operations on the battlefield across Iraq and Afghanistan.” (p. 2). As such, it is intended to serve as an overview and tool kit of methodologies that analysts can use in their countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) work, whether at military or civilian agencies.

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The volume is informally divided into four parts, with each discussing a different aspect of this topic. The first part discusses the bureaucratic and strategic challenges facing an analyst in an operational military environment. Its chapters discuss the bureaucratic challenges inherent in intelligence collection (including CFT) and the frictions between CFT within the framework of counterinsurgency. The second part focuses on “problem setting,” which is described as the designing the methodologies to counter the threat finance environment. Its chapters discuss the issues involved in estimating the cost of terrorist operations, including salary payments and financing their supply chain. The third part focuses on the planning phase of CFT operations, which is termed the “problem solving” phase. Its chapters discuss the utilization of methodologies and tools such as social network analysis (SNA), Influence Network Modeling (INM), and Multi-Objective Decision Analysis (MODA) to create databases about a terrorist group’s finances and financial networks. The fourth and final part synthesizes the previous sections with a discussion of the role of CFT in an overall military counterterrorism campaign’s components of “manhunting, of financial sanctions like E.O. 13224, as well as other options like information operations, human intelligence source recruitment, and in some cases, the tough decision to realize when doing nothing might be the best call.” (p. 12). The volume’s editors and contributors had worked on CFT issues while serving in the U.S. military or as civilians in a supporting capacity.

Building a Travel Risk Management Program:

Traveler Safety and Duty of Care for Any Organization

Charles Brossman, (Cambridge, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann/ Elsevier, 2016), 222 pages, $42.46 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-012-801925-2. This handbook is an authoritative and comprehensive account of applying what are considered industry best standards for an organization’s travel risk management (TRM) program framework and metrics, which are accompanied with numerous case studies. TRM is aimed primarily at ensuring the safety of business travelers in foreign countries, whether politically stable or unstable. The volume’s chapters cover topics such as planning for travel risks; the duty of care organizations need to follow in ensuring their business travelers are as safe as possible; examples of potential risk exposures and incident types, such as biohazards and pandemics; coping with medical emergencies and natural disasters; the potential for kidnapping and ransom incidents and how to avoid or mitigate their consequences when they occur; assessing an organization’s approach to TRM, including conducting a risk assessment (with risk defined as threat minus mitigation); the components involved in building an organization’s

The first part discusses the bureaucratic and strategic challenges facing an analyst in an operational military environment. Its chapters discuss the bureaucratic challenges inherent in intelligence collection (including CFT) and the frictions between CFT within the framework of counterinsurgency. The second part focuses on “problem setting,” which is described as the designing the methodologies to counter the threat finance environment. Its chapters discuss the issues involved in estimating the cost of terrorist operations, including salary payments and financing their supply chain.

TRM program; managing crisis response when an incident occurs; how to ensure hotel safety from a traveler’s perspective; and tips for procuring the services of TRM companies. The author, based in Tulsa, Oklahoma, is a veteran practitioner expert in travel risk management.

Terrorism, Inc.:

The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare Colin P. Clarke, (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger/Praeger Security International/ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2015), 289 pages, $60.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4408-3103-4.

This is an important account of how terrorist groups fund their operational and organizational capabilities and the counter measures required to disrupt and dismantle their activities and infrastructure. The introductory chapter presents the author’s analytical framework which discusses two types of economies used by terrorist groups to fund their activities. These consist of a ‘gray economy,’ “a combination of licit and illicit activities” used by terrorist and insurgent groups, which focuses on “diaspora support, charities, fraud, legal businesses, and money laundering,” (p. 3) and a ‘dark economy,’ consisting of kidnapping and ransom (KFR), armed robbery and theft, smuggling, trafficking and counterfeiting, extortion and protection payments, and external state support. Also valuable is the author’s discussion of the operational capabilities that characterize effective terrorist groups, which include weapons, intelligence, sanctuary, and training, as well as the requirements for effective organizational capabilities in terms of leadership, ideology, human resources and recruitment, and media, public relations, propaganda, and publicity. Thus, an effective countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) campaign is intended to disrupt and dismantle their financial component which will impact the effectiveness of a group’s overall operational and organizational capabilities. This conceptual framework is then applied to assessing how the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestinian Hamas, the Afghan Taliban, al Qaida, and the Islamic State (of Syria and Iraq), use the gray and dark economies to fund their terrorist activities. The concluding chapter discusses the components of effective counter measures as well as issues for future study, such as emerging trends, such as the increasing use of virtual currencies such as Bitcoin. The author is an Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Thus, an effective countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) campaign is intended to disrupt and dismantle their financial component which will impact the effectiveness of a group’s overall operational and organizational capabilities. This conceptual framework is then applied to assessing how the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestinian Hamas, the Afghan Taliban, al Qaida, and the Islamic State (of Syria and Iraq), use the gray and dark economies to fund their terrorist activities.

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Essentials of Counterterrorism

James J.F. Forest, Ed., (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger/Praeger Security International/ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2015), 456 pages, $73.00 [Hardcover], US $ 44.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-4408-3283-3. This excellent textbook presents a comprehensive approach to analyzing the components of effective counterterrorism (CT). As discussed by James Forest, the volume’s editor, this textbook’s objective is “to help educate future counterterrorism professionals enrolled in university courses and training programs.” (p. ix). This is accomplished through the volume’s contributors who are a mix of academics and [former] government practitioners. The textbook is divided into three parts, beginning with Dr. Forest’s introductory chapter, which presents an overview of counterterrorism studies, including drawing lessons from the history of counterterrorism over the years. In what is intended as the textbook’s chapters’ organizing topical structure, Dr. Forest discusses the seven components of effective counterterrorism which need to be implemented in an integrated manner: military, intelligence, diplomacy, information and public diplomacy, economics, financial, and law enforcement. In his concluding section, he notes that another important component of counterterrorism is the capability to bring about terrorists’ disengagement from terrorism as well as an overall termination of a terrorist group’s activities. This framework is then applied in the textbook’s first part, on policy and strategy in counterterrorism (with chapters on CT in liberal democracies, the geographic dimension of CT, combating state sponsors of terrorism, countering terrorist finance, and countering organized criminal networks and terrorism). The second part, on CT’s tactical and operational dimensions, includes chapters on the role of intelligence in CT, the U.S. Government’s CT’s research and development programs, and employing civil-military relations to deny terrorists sanctuary. The third part present case studies on CT, with chapters on countering terrorism in Peru, Colombia, Italy and the Red Brigades, West Germany’s Red Army Faction, the role of democratization in reducing the appeal of extremist groups in the Middle East and North Africa following the Arab Spring, India’s response to terrorism in Kashmir, the U.S. CT campaign to capture Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (al Qaida’s operational mastermind), and Spain’s CT campaign against its domestic jihadists. The volume’s editor is Professor and Director of Security Studies, as well as Interim Director, Center for Terrorism and Security Studies, at University of Massachusetts Lowell, MA.

The Making of a Homegrown Terrorist: Brainwashing Rebels in Search of a Cause

Peter A. Olsson, (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger/ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2014), 198 pages, $37.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4408-3101-0. In this book, the author, a retired psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, applies his experience in working with individuals with disordered personalities to analyze the pathways of individuals in Western countries, especially the U.S., into becoming homegrown violent extremists. It is a highly insightful analysis. It begins with an overview of the psychological characteristics of the types of groups and leaders that recruit such individuals, which is similar to those that exploitive-destructive cults use to “actively seek to alienate all their members from potential moderating influences found in healthy modern families, communities, and churches of origin.” (p. 7). In such cult-like terrorist groups, the author observes, “The destructive cult leader becomes a father/God/prophet himself.” (p. 7). The author is also insightful when he notes that many of the individuals who join such destructive cults/terrorist groups are what are termed “in-betweeners” – persons who are vulnerable “to seduction by an exploitive cult….They are often lonely and are in life transitions.” (p. 10). This psychological framework is then applied to examining how they play out in detailed case histories of a spectrum of homegrown terrorists. These include, as jihadists, Adam Gadahn, John Walker Lindh, Nidal Hasan, Jose Padilla, Richard Reid, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab; as far right-wing extremists and other fringes such as Timothy McVeigh and Ted Kaczynski; and as far-left extremists such as Bill Ayers and his Weather Underground. Various recruiting mechanisms are also discussed, such as the Internet’s extremist websites and extremist prison chaplains. The Appendices include a useful timeline of homegrown terrorist activities and a glossary of key concepts and definitions. Note that several of these reviews were previously published in the online academic journal “Perspectives on Terrorism.” Reprinted by permission.

About the Reviewer Dr. Joshua Sinai is a Principal Analyst at Kiernan Group Holdings (KGH) (www.kiernan.co), in Alexandria, VA, where he specializes in assessments and curriculum development on terrorism, counterterrorism, active shooter, workplace violence, and insider threats. He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

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