The IACSP’s Counter-Terrorism Journal V23N2

CyberSecurity: IoT: Internet Of Things….Or Internet of Threats?

The Threat Of A Simultaneous EMP Attack

By Iran And North Korea

Safe Travel In The Philippines In An Era Of Terrorism And Kidnapping

A Model For Countering Violent Extremism And Promoting Disengagement From Terrorism IACSP Q&A With Robert O’Neil,

The Navy SEAL Who Shot Bin Laden

Roots Of Conflict: Female Combatant Participation In Nepal’s Maoist People’s War

Summer Issue Vol. 23 No. 2 2017 Printed in the U.S.A. IACSP.COM

Join the ranks of security and public safety professionals worldwide that have achieved the Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer (cATO™) credential as recognition of their unique expertise in the field of managing terrorism-related risk.

The Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer (cATO™) credential is the global benchmark for recognizing career achievement and knowledge in the protection of facilities, organizations, and the public against acts of terrorism. The Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer designation is awarded to a candidate who has met eligibility requirements and passed the cATO™ Certification Examination in accordance with the standards set forth by the Certifying Board of The International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP).

Becoming board certified as a Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer distinguishes you in the security and public safety profession by demonstrating your expertise in the specialized field of managing terrorism-related risk and commitment to the safety and welfare of your community.

Learn more and apply online:

www.catocertification.org Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 23, No.2

Vol. 23, No. 2 Summer 2017 IACSP Director of Operations Steven J. Fustero

Page 40

Associate Publisher Phil Friedman

IACSP Q&A With Robert O’Neil, The Navy SEAL Who Shot Bin Laden

Senior Editor Nancy Perry Contributing Editors Paul Davis Thomas B. Hunter Joshua Sinai

by Paul Davis

Book Review Editor Jack Plaxe Research Director Gerry Keenan Conference Director John Dew

Page 16

Communications Director Craig O. Thompson

The Threat Of A Simultaneous EMP Attack

By Iran And North Korea

Art Director Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Psychological CT Advisors Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC

by Col. Dan Dickerson

Counterintelligence Advisor Stanley I. White South America Advisor Edward J. Maggio Homeland Security Advisor Col. David Gavigan

Page 6

SITREP, Terrorism Trends & Forecasts

Page 8

IoT: Internet Of Things….Or Internet of Threats? By David Gewirtz

Page 10

Safe Travel In The Philippines In An Era Of Terrorism And Kidnapping,

Personal Security Advisor Thomas J. Patire

by Jeff Burns, CDEP, CMAS

Col. Dan Dickerson

Page 24

A Model For Countering Violent Extremism And Promoting

Page 30 Roots Of Conflict: Female Combatant Participation In Nepal’s Maoist People’s War, by Thomas A. Marks

Page 38 Secure Driver: Vehicle Safety Aids Part IV, “Got Your Six” by

Cristalmarie Marzocchi and Anthony Ricci

Laden, by Paul Davis

Cell Phone Forensics Advisor Dr. Eamon P. Doherty IACSP Advisory Board John M. Peterson III John Dew Thomas Patire Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Robert E. Thorn Southeast Asia Correspondent Dr. Thomas A. Marks

Middle East Correspondent Ali Koknar CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed

IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf, reviews by Dr. Joshua Sinai

THE JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L is published by SecureWorldnet, Ltd., PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (ISSN#1552-5155) in cooperation with the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals and Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Copyright © 2017. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher.

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (571) 216-8205, FAX: (202) 315-3459 .

Membership $65/year, add $10 for overseas memberships. Postmaster: send address changes to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA. Web site: www.iacsp.com

Cyberwarfare Advisor David Gewirtz

European Correspondent Elisabeth Peruci

Page 40 IACSP Q&A With Robert O’Neil, The Navy SEAL Who Shot Bin Page 44

Hazmat Advisor Bob Jaffin Security Driver Advisor Anthony Ricci, ADSI

Disengagement From Terrorism, by Dr. Joshua Sinai

Director of Emergency Ops. Don L. Rondeau Tactical Advisor Robert Taubert

Page 16 The Threat Of A Simultaneous EMP Attack By Iran And North Korea, by

Emergency Management Advisor Clark L. Staten

PHOTO CREDITS: Reuters, Army.mil, Navy.mil, shutterstock.com and authors where applicable.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 23, No.2

National Sales Representative Phil Friedman, Advertising Director Tel: 201-224-0588, Fax: 202-315-3459 iacsp@aol.com

SITREP

TERRORISM TRENDS & FORECASTS Global Overview 2017 This summer saw Venezuela’s political turmoil worsen as the government pressed ahead with an election for an all-powerful constituent assembly, prompting fears of further violence and economic collapse. Political tensions rose in the run-up to polls in Kenya as Al-Shabaab intensified attacks. Grievances in the security forces led to more violence in Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia’s president imposed emergency rule. In Yemen, fighting between Huthi rebels and the Saudi-led coalition escalated, raising the risk of worse bloodshed in August, while in both South Sudan and Mali deadly clashes strained fragile peace processes. Talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to reunify the divided island collapsed. In East Asia, North Korea’s launch of two inter-continental ballistic missiles added to growing regional and international concern over the threat posed by Pyongyang.

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Details In Venezuela, President Maduro’s government took a definitive step in replacing the country’s ailing democracy with a full-fledged dictatorship, pushing through a vote on 30 July to elect a constituent assembly with the power to dissolve state institutions – including the opposition-led parliament – and rewrite the constitution. The vote went ahead in the face of intensifying opposition protests, including deadly clashes with security forces and pro-Maduro gunmen, and growing international condemnation.

Tensions that fueled army mutinies in Côte d’Ivoire in January and May led to new violence, and Zambia’s president imposed emergency rule in response to a string of arson attacks he blamed on the opposition.

More than two years into Yemen’s war, fighting between

Huthi rebels and the Saudi-led coalition escalated yet again, especially in Taiz governorate in the south west, portending a more violent month ahead.

Heavy fighting for control of Khaled bin Walid military base east of the Red Sea port city of Mokha left at least 40 government soldiers and rebels dead, while a Saudi-led coalition airstrike on Mawza killed over twenty civilians.

The Huthis claimed several counter-attacks including on a United Arab Emirates military vessel off Mokha, which they say killed at least a dozen soldiers. New fighting strained South Sudan’s fragile peace process when Sudan, in response to the U.S. postponing a decision on whether to lift sanctions on it, supported South Sudanese rebels to attack government forces in northern Unity oil field. Mali also suffered a serious setback to the implementation of its June 2015 peace deal, as fight-

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ing between signatory parties resumed in the northern region of Kidal.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres announced that negotiations to reunify Cyprus had collapsed on 7 July, as another intense round of talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders came to a close in Switzerland, reportedly unable to reach agreement on the issue of security guarantees.

Deteriorating Situations • K e n y a S o u t h S u d a n Zambia Côte d’Ivoire Mali Korean Peninsula Cyprus Venezuela Yemen Improving Situations • None Conflict Risk Alerts • Venezuela Yemen Resolution Opportunities • None Source: crisiswatch.org

Mock terrorists Attack Took Five Minutes To Storm UK Parliament

FBI Warns Students Of Credit Card Scheme At their Campus Bookstores

If the attack had been real, police believe over 100 MPs could have been killed.

Students at colleges and universities across the country are being warned of a credit card scheme that enlists them to help purported classmates buy high-end electronics at their campus bookstores.

Terrorists could force entry into the Palace of Westminster and storm the House of Commons chamber in under five minutes, U.K. police have concluded following an exercise simulating an attack.

During the exercise, which was carried out during the night earlier this year, officers posing as extremists used a boat to gain access to the building from the river before storming the House of Commons chamber, according to a report in the Sunday Telegraph.

The “resilience test” — which took place while the parliament was in recess — was part of an investigation led by British police five months after a terrorist attack yards from the Palace of Westminster.

In that incident, Khalid Masood forced his way into the parliamentary estate and stabbed a policeman after driving into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge. He was shot dead by police.

The Sunday Telegraph cited sources familiar with the simulated terror attack who said that during the test, it took just five minutes for the attackers to reach the Commons chamber.

The newspaper also revealed that an armed guard had now been stationed to protect entrances from the river and that more than 15,000 security passes will be reissued to close security loopholes.

Source: The Sunday Telegraph

A number of universities last spring reported their bookstores lost thousands of dollars in purchases that were made with stolen credit card information. Investigators found similar patterns in each of the cases: perpetrators claiming to have lost their student ID cards enlisted unwitting students to essentially vouch for them at the counter with their valid IDs. The perpetrators then made their purchases—in many cases, high-end electronic products—with a bogus credit card that matched their bogus identification.

Investigators believe campus bookstores may be targets for this scheme because they generally offer specific discounts for students, who may not see anything wrong with helping out an unlucky stranger claiming to be classmate.

“Students are being used to facilitate this activity,” said FBI Special Agent Jennifer Gant, who manages the Bureau’s Campus Liaison Program, which started in 2008 to help improve communications between the FBI and U.S. colleges and universities. The program originated in the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division as a way to build relationships and increase two-way information sharing before a crisis

“If we have information, we share it with them—because our ultimate goal is to keep campuses safe,” Gant said.

Beginning with the report for 2004, it replaced the previously published Patterns of Global Terrorism.

In June, the FBI released a public service announcement through its campus liaison agents warning of the credit card scheme. The announcement offers the following tips on how to protect against the scam: • For students, don’t agree to facilitate a purchase for someone who does not have a valid student ID. • For school administrators, establish a procedure at your campus bookstore that includes a provision against allowing a purchaser to use a credit card in someone else’s name.

• For victims, notify campus police or campus public safety.

Chapters • 1. Strategic Assessment • 2. Country Reports: Africa • 2. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific • 2. Country Reports: Europe • 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa • 2. Country Reports: South and Central Asia • 2. Country Reports: Western Hemisphere • 3. State Sponsors of Terrorism • 4. The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism • 5. Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report) • 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations • 7. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms

If you believe you are a victim of a scam, contact your local authorities or, in the case of online crimes, the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) at https://www.ic3.gov/complaint.

Crime tips can also be submitted at tips.fbi.gov.

For Full Report please visit State Dept Website..Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 (PDF) https:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf

IACSP News

State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 Just Released Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act.

Many of our members are not receiving our new monthly CTS Enews (electronic security report) because we either do not have your email address, or you are using a .gov or .mil email address for your membership record. If you would like to receive our CTS Enews, please send me an email with the email address you would like us to use. Also include your current address. Please send the information to my attention to my personal email address: iacsp1@aol.com Until next time, as always, be vigilant and safe.

Thank you.

Steven J. Fustero, Dir. Of Operations/ IACSP

IoT:

Internet Of Things... or Internet of Threats?

By David Gewirtz

I 8

f you’ve been following the technology news, you may have heard the term “IoT” or Internet of Things. While this is a relatively silly buzzword, the implications of billions of small, interconnected Internet devices is anything but silly. We’ll discuss that here.

IoT is bandied about by a lot of technology pundits, companies, and marketing analysts who are trying to predict the future of the industry. For our purposes, an IoT device is any Internet-connected device that isn’t a general-purpose computing device.

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By that definition, a smartphone isn’t an IoT device, but an Internetconnected 3D printer is. A smart light bulb is an IoT device, as is the robotic vacuum in your house.

The ATM at your bank is, possibly, an IoT device. It’s certainly a smart device, but whether it’s connected via the Internet or its own private network differs by bank. The cameras and monitoring devices in the ATM cubicle are almost definitely IoT devices.

There are a lot of these devices in the world now, and the number is growing exponentially. As I wrote in ZDNet last year: “Gartner reports that 5.5 million new IoT things will be connected every day. According to analysts, the number of connected objects has grown by 30 percent since 2015, to where we now have 6.4 billion connected things in use worldwide this year, 2016. That number will more than triple, to 20.8 billion connected IoT devices by 2020.

Cisco and Intel are even more optimistic in their projections. Cisco claims there are 15 billion IoT devices in use today, and there will be 50 billion IoT devices by 2020.

While Gartner estimates 20 billion and Cisco estimates 50 billion, Intel estimates there will be a whopping 200 billion IoT connected devices in use by 2020.

robotic form of suicide. The vendor has told me that it’s suffering from a bad firmware update. Sometime soon, it should be able to fly again.

Just let your imagination run wild with that concept. Think about it along with self-driving cars. Automated trucking. Driverless trains.

Keep going. Nothing about “oops, my bad firmware” possibly inspires confidence.

In the example of my little drone, the error was made by the vendor.

But an attack vector could come from a hacker modifying firmware before it’s sent to millions of devices. A single hack at the download source could cripple an unspeakable number of devices.

More than causing them to cease functioning, such a hack could cause them to behave in unsafe, dangerous, or even life-threatening ways. Imagine rush hour in 2025, when half of the vehicles on the road might be autonomous. Imagine if all of a sudden, complete with passengers in each of them, they decide to suddenly floor it.

be 2030 or 2035. But you can see the implications. It’s bad.

Internet of Things devices aren’t just in the consumer space. They form the backbone of many of our industrial processes. They’re used to control factories, infrastructure, monitoring systems, and the like. Those, too, could be compromised in very not-pretty ways, causing stoppages, damage, or possibly lives.

Beyond simple compromise, there is also the issue of privacy. Keep in mind that many IoT devices have sensors or cameras on them.

Homes equipped with voice-operated assistants also have the ability to listen in.

Most vendors claim those devices are limited to being on only during the phase where a “wake word” is spoken. But since we’re talking cyberwarfare, we can assume that hostiles may hack those devices to be able to listen longer. They may also hack cameras to be able to watch targets.

From a warfare perspective, compromised privacy can often mean a compromised individual, making

that individual more subject to blackmail, subterfuge, and manipulation. Even something as simple as a phishing email containing malware can be “supercharged” with deeply private information, which might convince a recipient that such a message is from a real or trusted source, like a doctor or a close friend.

What makes all of this particularly troubling is that IoT devices are somewhat difficult to update. Many of them are in the field, many of them are behind firewalls, many of them are so embedded in our lives and work environments that we might forget (or never know) that they are, in fact, tiny computers.

That means many of these devices may go without updates for years, maybe even decades. As a result, security fixes that might have prevented hijacking might not ever be installed. That means we’re looking at the potential of hundreds of millions of out-of-date, flawed, vulnerable devices scattered all over, even in our most private and protected areas.

So, yeah, a lot.

Cisco claims there are 15 billion IoT

Given that, let’s talk threat vectors.

Because, after all, how could 200 billion Internet-connected devices possibly go wrong?

devices in use today, and there will

So what can you do about it? First, be aware that it’s quite likely that a major attack may find a vector through IoT. Take the need to update seemingly benign devices like refrigerators and vacuums seriously. Take devices out of service when security updates are no longer available. Inventory all IoT devices in your domain, so that you can regularly check to see if they are still being maintained and updated.

be 50 billion IoT devices by 2020.

Good luck. We’ll need it.

First, let’s look at the simple things.

Let’s say you have an Internetconnected tractor and its update goes wrong. It won’t start. That’s the most basic level of where things might fail. The device might simply break. I have a drone that, as soon as you hit “take off,” decides to take itself out in a rather spectacular

and Cisco estimates 50 billion, Intel

Okay, it might not be 2025. It might

Cisco and Intel are even more optimistic in their projections.

While Gartner estimates 20 billion estimates there will be a whopping 200 billion IoT connected devices in use by 2020.

About the Author CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed. is Director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute, Distinguished Lecturer for CBS Interactive, Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, IT Advisor to the Florida Public Health Association and an instructor at the UC Berkeley extension. http://www.zdnet.com/blog/diy-it/

Safe Travel In The Philippines In An Era Of Terrorism And Kidnapping

T

By Jeff Burns, CDEP, CMAS

A sniper squad of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in camouflage outfits march during the 116th Police Service Anniversary inside the Philippine National Police (PNP) headquarters in Quezon city, metro Manila, Philippines August 9, 2017. REUTERS/ Romeo Ranoco

he Philippines is an archipelago of over 7,000 lush, tropical islands that entices you with its natural beauty and vibrant culture. The islands are categorized broadly under three main geographical divisions from north to south: Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao with the capital city being Manila. Geographically isolated from the rest of Southeast Asia, the Philippines was first discovered by Europeans during Magellan’s voyage to circumnavigate the world in 1521, and at that time existed as a collection of tribal kingdoms. The Spanish ultimately succeeded in uniting these kingdoms under the Spanish flag, naming the country Las Islas Filipinas after King Philip II of Spain. The Spanish proceeded to colonize the country for over 300 years, followed by the United States for another 40 years.

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The Philippines played a major role during World War II as the allies sought to overturn Japanese occupation, and finally in 1946 the Philippines became an independent republic. While centuries of colonial rule have had a significant influence on the culture, it has created a unique harmony between traditional Eastern practices, Spanish influenced architecture and modern Western sensibilities. The Filipino people are incredibly friendly and outgoing and very welcoming to visitors. Approximately 80% of its population is Roman Catholic and while there are 19 recognized regional languages, it is one of the largest English speaking nations in the world.

The Philippines diverse beauty includes many spectacular centuries old Baroque Churches and natural wonders like the Chocolate Hills, the Puerto Prinsea Subterranean River in Palawan, breathtaking limestone cliffs, sparkling lagoons and its vibrant coral reefs teeming with colorful sea life making this archipelago a real treasure.

Pristine turquoise waters featuring miles of coral reefs beckon to divers, surfers, windsurfers and kite boarders. Those looking to explore on land may enjoy spelunking in the caves of Sanmar or trekking the local volcanoes.

Terrorism and kidnapping in the Philippines has been a developing problem since the 1970’s and since January of 2000, radical Islamist groups in the Philippines have carried out numerous bombings against civilian targets. Jihadist kidnappings have become a particular problem. The Jihadist kidnapping differs from economically motivated kidnappings in that the victim is selected and held in exchange for some type of political demand being met, however in many

Terrorism and kidnapping in the Philippines has been a developing problem since the 1970’s and since January of 2000, radical Islamist groups in the Philippines have carried out numerous bombings against civilian targets. Jihadist kidnappings have become a particular problem. The Jihadist kidnapping differs from economically motivated kidnappings in that the...

recent cases we have seen groups like ISIS and Abu Sayyaf demand cash ransoms as well. The demand in many cases includes a governmental policy change, release of prisoners, etc. These types of prisoners may be utilized as bargaining chips, or to send a message and instill terror by releasing a video of the prisoners executions. Unless there is military intervention, Jihadist kidnappings do not usually end well for the victims.

The Holiday Oceanview Samal Resort kidnapping is a perfect example of the jihadist kidnapping threat in the Phillipines. Just past 11:00pm on September 21st, 2015, a group of at least 11 gunmen abducted John Ridsdel (68) and Robert Hall (50), both Canadian; Kjartan Sekkingstad (56), a Norwegian; and Filipina Marites “Tess” Flor. Two Japanese tourists bravely tried to intervene but were unsuccessful and the kidnappers made their getaway with their captives via boats. Witnesses claimed that the gunmen appeared to target the victims.

The resort is guarded round the clock by licensed armed guards as well as CCTV. John Ridsdel was the president of TVI Minerals Processing, Inc. a mining company based in the Philippines. He had previously worked for Petro-Canada in the Middle East and was a journalist at the CBC in Alberta. Ridsdel is known to have previously had some hostile environment and anti-kidnapping training.

Robert Hall was born in Calgary but lived in various places in Western Canada. He owned and operated several small business throughout his life ranging from a small engine repair shop to a pizza stand. He spent 25 years building his custom welding

A Filipino Moslem vigilante prays at a mosque in Talipao village a few kilometres away from the suspected hideout of the Islamic fundamentalist Abu Sayyaf rebels in Jolo island in southern Philippines April 28. More than 1000 soldiers are chasing the Abu Sayyaf islamic rebels who claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of 21 hostages including 10 foreign tourists from a Malaysian dive resort last weekend. The hostages are believed to be taken to an interior part of Jolo island, up in rugged hilly territory.

business which specialized in everything from custom trucks to aircraft repair. Hall had a passion for flying, sailing, sports and coached a local soccer team.

Kjartan Sekkingstad is the manager of the Holiday Oceanview Samal Resort marina.

On July 4th, 2016, Abu Sayyaf had agreed

Little is known about Marites “Tess” Flor but she is believed to have been the companion of Hall.

to stay the execution

The four captives were taken to the remote southern island of Jolo, an Abu Sayyaf stronghold where they were held. The kidnappers later issued demands that the Canadian government work with the Philippine government to stop the bombing of the southern islands and demanded 300 million pesos, around $6.5 million dollars for each of the foreign hostages. When the deadline lapsed on April 25th, 2016 the militants beheaded Ridsdel. His head was found in a plastic bag in Jolo and his body was later found by villagers in a creek bed near Talipano.

Sekkingstad while an

Hall was the next to die. On June 14th, 2016 the brutal video of Hall’s beheading appeared on ISIS social media channels.

His body was found almost three weeks after he was beheaded in Barangay Upper Kamuntayan on Sulu.

Marites “Tess” Flor was released by Abu Sayyaf in Sulu a southern archipelago known as an Abu Sayyaf hideout on June 24th, 2016. A local politician named Jesus Dureza told reporters that he negotiated her release with the kidnappers on behalf of then incoming Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte.

of Norwegian Kjartan emissary of Presidential Peace Adviser Jesus Dureza negotiated with the militants, although the militants still demanded 300 million pesos or they would execute him.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) became involved in the negotiations and on September 16th...

On July 4th, 2016, Abu Sayyaf had agreed to stay the execution of Norwegian Kjartan Sekkingstad while an emissary of Presidential Peace Adviser Jesus Dureza negotiated with the militants, although the militants still demanded 300 million pesos or they would execute him. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) became involved in the negotiations and on September 16th, 2016, Abu Sayyaf released Sekkingstad in Patikul, Sulu after receiving a P30 million ($627,228) ransom.

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Abu Sayyaf is a small terrorist group based in the Southern Philippines that pledges it’s allegiance to ISIS, combines radical Islamic ideology with ethno-religious separatism, and uses kidnap and ransom as a primary means of financing its operations. While Abu Sayyaf does not have nearly the numbers they once had, their activities in kidnap and ransom have dramatically increased since 2008. The majority of their K&R operations have taken place in the Sulu Archipelago but their operations appear to be expanding with recent raids along the Malaysian coast in Semporna, Lahud Datu and Sandakan. Their targets have included major executives and government officials, tourists, fisherman, factory workers, teachers, foreign aid workers and even children.

Generally they conduct their raids in teams of 4-20 depending on the target. The forecast is that Abu Sayaaf will continue to increase their K&R activities to exploit the growing instability in the south Philippines which will undermine the government’s attempts to develop the fledgling tourism industry and strengthen the economy in the southern providences.

Foreign citizens should avoid all nonessential travel to the Sulu Archipelago and the southern Sulu Sea, and exercise extreme caution when traveling to the island of Mindinao or Eastern Sabah province.

Since January 2016, at least 13 separate kidnappings of foreigners have been reported across Mindanao and in September a bombing in Davao City killed 15 people and wounded another 69. Those wishing to travel to the Philippines should carefully consider the risks to their personal safety and security when planning their trip and you must be certain to not overlook the risk of terrorism. Additionally, there are occasionally political demonstrations that can create security concerns for travelers. Visitors should consider their personal security when visiting hotels, restaurants, beaches, entertainment venues and other recreational sites.

Confidence games, pick pocketing, credit card/ ATM card fraud and internet scams, violent assaults, murder for hire and other violent crimes are some of the crimes that travelers to the Philippines may face.

Taxis and ride-sharing applications are the recommended form of public

Vol. 23, No.2

transportation and other forms of public transportation such as the light rail system, buses and “Jeepneys” should be avoided.

Be aware that taxi drivers and individuals using stolen taxi cabs have committed robberies and you should consult your hotel, restaurant, and or reputable business establishment to recommend a reliable taxi service. You should avoid entering a taxi if it already has another passenger. Request that the driver use the meter to record your fare. If the driver is unwilling to meet your requests, you should find another taxi. In these cases, make a mental note of the license plate number of the cab or text it to someone in case there is an issue. If you choose to drive in the city, make sure that the vehicle doors are locked and the windows are rolled up. Travelers have been stopped and robbed shortly after leaving Manila Aquino Ninoy Aquino International Airport in both taxis and private vehicles.

When traveling to the Philippines there are several personal security countermeasures you can utilize to reduce your risk of harm.

Situational awareness is the foundation of personal security since you must be aware of your surroundings and what is happening in your environment in order to be able to recognize potential threats and effectively manage them. Whether it’s a minor crime like pick-pocketing or purse snatching, or a violent crime like a sexual assault, armed robbery or kidnapping, many of these crimes can be avoided or at least their impact mitigated if the potential victim exercised better situational awareness in the moments leading up to the event. Identifying where and when you are most likely to be attacked and reasonably adjusting your situational awareness level based on your environment and situation is key to recognizing and avoiding potential attacks. Some critical times when you must focus on situational awareness and avoid distractions include arrivals and departures from any location, when boarding mass transportation, choke points or areas where your movements are channelized and restricted or that are suitable for ambushes and identified danger areas that have a history of criminal activity or violence.

Listen to your instincts and pay attention for the danger that comes

Taxis and ride-sharing applications are the recommended form of public transportation and other forms of public transportation such as the light rail system, buses and “Jeepneys” should be avoided. Be aware that taxi drivers and individuals using stolen taxi cabs have committed robberies and you should consult your hotel, restaurant, and or reputable business establishment to recommend a reliable taxi service. You should avoid entering a taxi if it already has another passenger.

from feeling “safe”. We have an innate ability to subconsciously detect indicators of potential danger in our environment that must recognize, and then use to guide our behavior and implement reasonable and necessary personal security countermeasures. It is very easy to become complacent in what feels like a familiar or safe environment and as a result you will inadvertently expose yourself to risk, so you must always be cognizant of your situational awareness, constantly assessing your environment and adjusting your situational awareness levels and personal security countermeasures appropriately.

You should be wary of anyone you don’t know that tries to befriend you, particularly just after your arrival in the Philippines. Do not accept food or drink from strangers or rides in private vehicles, even if they appear to be legitimate. There have been incidents of travelers being drugged and robbed after accepting an invitation to a tourist destination outside of Manila.

I’ve mentioned personal security countermeasures but let’s discuss what I mean. Personal security countermeasures are the actions you take to mitigate the risk of crime and violence in your environment. These concepts are flexible and should be employed in a manner that is reasonable and necessary for your environment and threat profile. Some basic personal security countermeasure you can utilize to minimize your exposure to risk while traveling or working in the Philippians include: Conducting a personal risk/threat assessment, avoiding predictability, blending in, sanitizing yourself for travel, using decoy/ dummy wallets, purses, surveillance detection and defensive tactics.

Good personal security while traveling should be reasonable, necessary and designed to address the specific threat you face while remaining as least restrictive to your daily routine as possible. You must research and understand your destination.

To determine your threat level, you must conduct a risk/threat assessment. While you can do this yourself and it’s the best way to really understand the environments you will be traveling in, it is very time consuming to do properly and there are several strategic security / close protection firms that offer threat assessment and other professional travel security related services at very reasonable prices.

If you elect to conduct your own personal risk assessment you must be realistic and as comprehensive and detailed as possible.

To accurately determine your exposure to risk, your assessment should identify the specific threats you face for the specific environment and activities. Also assess vulnerabilities in your schedule, routine, and lifestyle. Another aspect that you should consider is probability vs. criticality and impact of a particular incident. Your assessment should focus on the threats you will face each day and consideration should be given to schedule, location, predictability, modes of transportation, type of accommodations, venue, activities, etc. Consider how attractive you really are as a target. Are you well known, wealthy or will you be perceived as wealthy? Are you politically active or is there any other reason why you are likely to be targeted? Does your physical appearance make you an inviting target? You must attempt to view each threat from the perspective of the potential adversary. If possible identify modus operandi and the specific tactics and techniques you may face, in order to identify the most appropriate personal security countermeasures.

Avoid predictability. You can dramatically reduce the likelihood of becoming a victim of a targeted attack by insuring that your daily schedule and routine are not predictable.

Most criminals and terrorists will conduct some sort of preoperational surveillance in the target selection and planning phases of their operation to identify predictability in the targets routine and assess where they are most vulnerable to attack. By varying your daily routine, routes, departure and arrival times, parking spots, etc., you make yourself a much harder target and reduce the likelihood you will become a victim.

Blend in. When we travel it is important that we blend is as best we can. However,

As we already discussed, the Philippines is one of the largest English speaking nations in the world. You want to look as neutral as possible in a crowd based on your dress, personal accessories and demeanor. Sanitize yourself for travel. It is important to think about the things you are carrying whether it be on you person, in your bags or electronically and how they may impact your travel safety and security.

You may want to utilize a dummy wallet/purse with just enough cash to pacify a local criminal...

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this is very dependent on the society we are traveling in and in many cases it simply may not be possible to truly blend in. You can minimize unnecessarily standing out. Items like cowboy hats and boots, sports jerseys, American brand name products, T-shirts with flags or patriotic slogans, conspicuous jewelry or national, political or religious identifiers should be avoided. Consider your race, gender, complexion, hairstyle, personal grooming and any body piercings or tattoos you may have and how they could be used to identify and classify you. Wear clothing the locals wear but don’t go full native as you may make mistakes that make you stand out. Do not wear souvenir or military related clothing. Your footwear should not be trendy and have any logos that identify them as American. And do not wear military style boots. Always consider your conduct and demeanor in public and whenever possible, use the host country’s language. As we already discussed, the Philippines is one of the largest English speaking nations in the world.

You want to look as neutral as possible in a crowd based on your dress, personal accessories and demeanor. Sanitize yourself for travel. It is important to think about the things you are carrying whether it be on you person, in your bags or electronically and how they may impact your travel safety and security.

You may want to utilize a dummy wallet/ purse with just enough cash to pacify a local criminal, so that you can willingly surrender it without losing everything. You may want to consider dividing your currency, credit cards and other valuables amongst different locations including your person, luggage and lodging to minimize loss in the event of a theft or robbery. Avoid using the in-room or hotel main safe and it is best to leave unnecessary valuables at home.

Surveillance Detection should be utilized when traveling, working or living in an environment where there is a threat of terrorist attack or kidnapping. The ability to detect hostile or suspicious activity early in the target selection and planning phase is the primary means of defeating a terrorist attack or kidnapping. Terrorist attacks follow a distinct process referred to as the Terrorist Attack Cycle. The terrorist attack cycle includes: Target selection, planning, deployment, escape and exploitation. Regardless of the type of attack whether it be terrorist such as a bombing or kidnapping or a criminal attack such as a theft there is almost always some amount of preoperational hostile surveillance conducted. This hostile surveillance is intended to assess a potential target for value, security measures and vulnerabilities. It’s during this phase that terrorists, kidnappers and other attackers are vulnerable to detection.

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In general terrorists have relatively poor surveillance skills or tradecraft. It is this poor surveillance tradecraft that if recognized can provide individuals and organizations with the time needed to involve the proper authorities, avoid an immediate threat and help prevent an attack.

In Surveillance Detection (SD), the acronym T.E.D.D. is often used by the U.S. government to define the principles and stands for Time, Environment, Distance and Demeanor. In other words, if you see someone over time, in different environments and over distance, or someone who displays poor surveillance tradecraft, then that person can assume they are under surveillance.

Time, environment and distance are not applicable when a specific location or mode of public transportation is targeted or in the case of an ambush attack. Therefore, when talking about hostile surveillance, demeanor is the most critical of the four elements. Poor demeanor will often help the target (you) or a surveillance detection unit, identify hostile surveillance.

Demeanor indicators include: people wearing unsuitable clothing for the weather or environment, people with unusual bulges under their

clothing, wires protruding from their clothing, people who are sweating profusely, people mumbling to themselves or fidgeting, people who appear to be attempting to avoid security personnel or law enforcement and people who appear out of place.

In the event of an attack, you must determine whether or not and when to resist an attacker.

This will be dependent on the situation and your personal skillset. Generally, property and economically motivated crimes should not be resisted. Violent crimes such as assaults, attempted rapes, kidnapping, etc, should be resisted at all costs and your response will be dictated by the dynamics of the situation. The same is true for situations involving restraints.

You must remember that any time you allow yourself to be restrained, you reduce and or eliminate your ability to fight back. If you commit to using violent physical resistance you must utilize the element of surprise, speed and violence of action, employing as much violence as possible seeking to disable the attacker sufficiently to allow escape. Your attack should focus on vulnerable soft tissue areas such as the eyes, throat and groin and be repetitive until the attacker is disabled or breaks contact and retreats. Palm strikes, hammer fists, elbows, knees, rakes and improvised weapons allow you to inflict

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maximum damage on your attacker without inadvertently injuring yourself. Most importantly, you must have a combat mindset and be determined to survive at all costs.

Travel in the Philippines can be an amazing experience but travelers must not let the beauty of this tropical destination and its friendly people lull them into a false sense of security, as its dangers are very real.

However, by combining a comprehensive personal risk/threat assessment with sound personal security countermeasures, travelers can minimize their exposure to risk while maximizing their enjoyment.

About the Author Mr. Burns is the Director of Operations for Burns Group International, LLC. and has over 20 years of high-threat protection and investigations experience, in both the government and private sectors. He is board certified in Dignitary & Executive Protection (CDEP) by the American Board for Certification in Homeland Security and board certified as a Certified Master Antiterrorism Specialist (CMAS) by the Anti-Terrorism Accreditation Board. His firm, Burns Group International, LLC provides highly specialized protection, risk/crisis management, travel services and anti-terrorism training to clients worldwide.

More information can be found at www.burnsgroupintl.com.

The Threat

Of A Simultaneous EMP Attack By North Korea And Iran

By Col. Dan Dickerson

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The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65) fires a standard missile (SM 2) at a target drone as part of a surface-to-air-missile exercise (SAMEX) during Valiant Shield in the Philippine Sea. Valiant Shield is a biennial, U.S. only, field-training exercise with a focus on integration of joint training among U.S. forces. Benfold is on patrol with Carrier Strike Group Five (CSG 5) in the Philippine Sea supporting security and stability in the IndoAsia-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Andrew Schneider/Released)

he threats posed by North Korea are at their greatest level in two decades — and there isn’t clarity about what the geopolitical or military responses should be. This increased aggression on the part of North Korea’s leadership isn’t the result of an injured ego on the part of their leader but, the culmination of a well thought out plan that might be nearing fruition.

North Korea has two sponsors, China and Russia, both of whom consider the Hermit nation to be useful in their geopolitical games with the U.S. and the West.

raised concern regarding its stability and direction, and China fears even more a unified Korea.

North Korea is no close ally of Moscow but a pawn in Putin’s great geopolitical game with the West, and by continuing to support North Korea, Moscow is preventing the one thing it fears as much as China does, and that is a united Korean Peninsula under Western influence.

China is North Korea’s biggest trade partner, but North Korea’s latest actions have

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In April 2015, Admiral Bill Gortney, commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, told reporters that the KN-08 road-mobile ICBM “is operational today. Our assessment is that they have the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the [U.S.] homeland.”

Russia and China understand the risks of economic and political sanctions against the North. Economic sanctions could cause the North to implode and both countries would lose the buffer zone. Political pressure could result in Kim Jong-un viewing China and Russia as the enemy and then the missiles that were directed at the U.S. and South Korea could be pointed at them.

On May 4th 2017, North Korea issued a rare and direct criticism of China saying its “reckless remarks” concerning North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are testing its patience and could trigger unspecified “grave consequences”.

North Korea has for decades managed to conduct costly nuclear and ballistic missile

development projects while under some of the strictest and most widely endorsed sanctions, and in 2012, spent an estimated $1.3 billion on its rocket program. North Korea has conducted over 20 ballistic missile tests in 2016 and 7 nuclear tests in the last decade, with two of those in 2016.

In April 2015, General Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, testified that he believes the North Koreans “have had time and capability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead. They have stated that they had intercontinental missiles and they had a nuclear capability, and they paraded it.”

In April 2015, Admiral Bill Gortney, commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, told reporters that the

KN-08 road-mobile ICBM “is operational today. Our assessment is that they have the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the [U.S.] homeland.”

Thae Yong-ho, a high-ranking North Korean diplomat who defected in 2016 described how North Korea was in the final steps of arming its missile units with nuclear weapons. Pyongyang is developing an offensive doctrine for the large-scale use of nuclear weapons in a first strike capability, and in the past two years, has stepped up the launching of Scuds and No-dongs from different locations in the North which can be explained as military exercises for a nuclear war. North Korea has stated that it did not fear or care about U.S. sanctions: it

was planning a preemptive first strike and is closer than ever to being able to overwhelm U.S. missile defenses.

Four times this year, North Korea has conducted an ejection test of its submarine “cold launch system”, and a Romeo-class submarine engaged in “unusual deployment activity” in the waters off the coast of Japan, patrolling farther that it has ever gone, sailing some 100 kilometers out to sea in international waters.

The Congressional Research Service reported that North Korea has tailored its ballistic missile tests to defeat the U.S.-stationed defense systems ready to protect the South and Japan from descending warheads.

North Korea regularly flight-tests a panoply of ballistic missiles that could, in war, be capped with miniaturized nuclear warheads.

The U.S. military has matched this threat by first stationing Patriot anti-missile batteries and upgrading to the wider-range, mobile THAAD system. In response, North Korea launched test missiles last year in flights precisely designed to avoid interception by rocketing them into much higher altitudes.

The result: The re-entry warhead will descend at a steeper angle and faster speed, “making it potentially more difficult to intercept with a missile defense system. North Korea has also demonstrated an ability to launch a salvo attack with more than one missile launched in relatively short order.

This is consistent with a possible goal of being able to conduct large ballistic missile attacks with large raid sizes, a capability that could make it more challenging for a missile defense system to destroy each incoming warhead. The test launches are not just for show. They may be intended to increase the reliability, effectiveness and survivability of their ballistic missile force.”

This begs the question how has their government been able to continue development in both nuclear weapons and ICBM’s without active participation from either Russia or China?

Iran and North Korea have a long history of weapons deals: North Korea develops the weapons and Iran covers the expenses. Two Israeli experts at the Begin Sadat Center, revealed in a study that Iran is using its strategic relationship with North Korea to advance its nuclear weapons program. For Iran to comply with Washington’s nuclear deal while continuing its nuclear program, its leaders simply outsourced most of its work to North Korea while it negotiated the nuclear deal with the West that would result in desperately needed relief from economic sanctions.

The clearest indication of a North Korean/ Iranian connection regarding nuclear weapons and their intentions of war with the U.S. has been revealed in both countries missile tests and North Korea’s nuclear weapons

tests. North Korea and Iran have nuclear weapons and, according to the Federation of American Scientists, North Korea and Iran were both using the same miniaturized warhead design that can be traced back to Pakistani scientist, Dr. A.Q. Khan. In 2011, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Ronald Burgess testified that North Korea has weaponized its nuclear device into warheads for ballistic missiles. In 2009, European intelligence agencies concluded that North Korea has armed with nuclear warheads its Nodong missiles capable of striking Japan. The CIA’s top East Asia analyst publicly stated that North Korea had successfully miniaturized nuclear warheads for missile delivery in a 2008 interview.

Both countries have openly stated that they are prepared to go to war with the U.S. and have indicated their first strike would be with EMP’s, followed by nuclear weapons.

In June 2002, Russian General Yuri Baluyevsky, declared: “Iran does have nuclear weapons.” This information appears to confirm Reza Kahlili’s warning that Iran already had tactical nuclear warheads from Russia.

How did General Baluyevsky know so much about Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and why was he so complacent about Iran already having tactical nuclear weapons? After the fall of the USSR, in 1995, a military think tank called INO-

Iran and North Korea have a long history of weapons deals: North Korea develops the weapons and Iran covers the expenses. Two Israeli experts at the Begin Sadat Center, revealed in a study that Iran is using its strategic relationship with North Korea to advance its nuclear weapons program. For Iran to comply with Washington’s nuclear deal while continuing its nuclear program, its leaders simply outsourced most of its work to North Korea while it negotiated the nuclear deal with the West that would result in desperately needed relief from economic sanctions.

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BIS, that serves the Russian General Staff, wrote a paper recommending that Russia deliberately proliferate missile and nuclear weapon technology to nations hostile to the United States. Nuclear proliferation would balance growing U.S. power, and thwart Washington’s efforts to establish a New World Order dominated by America.

Is it possible that the Russian General Staff followed the INOBIS policy, deliberately transferred tactical nuclear weapons, including an Enhanced Radiation Warhead, and purposely leaked the secret of the Super-EMP nuclear warhead to North Korea and Iran? These Russian generals further added that Russia had developed a “Super-EMP” nuclear warhead, and that design information for this weapon had leaked to North Korea.

Is it possible that Russian leaders, or at least some Russian faction, regretted this policy by 2004, fearing they had created a Frankenstein Monster, and so warned the EMP Commission?

In 2004, South Korean intelligence repeatedly warned their government that the Russians were helping the North Koreans develop a Super-EMP nuclear warhead. In response, the South Korean government launched projects to harden their military communications and other critical infrastructures.

In 2010, according to some reputable European analysts, radioisotope data indicated that North Korea may have conducted two clandestine nuclear tests of a very low yield “nuclear device” of sophisticated fusion design. This is indicative of a weapons program that is very technologically advanced, and consistent with development of a Super-EMP warhead. In 2012, a military commentator for the People’s Republic of China told a Hong Kong journal that North Korea had Super-EMP nuclear warheads.

Official Iranian military documents have mentioned the effectiveness of an EMP attack at least 20 times and specifically talked about using it against the U.S. In an article titled, “Electronics to Determine Fate of Future Wars,” published in 1999 by Nashriyeh e Siasi Nezami, the article explains how an EMP attack on America’s electronic infrastructure, caused by the detonation of a nuclear weapon high above the U.S., would bring the country to its knees.

In 2006, Iran tested several missiles and exploded them as they reached their apogee.

At the hearing of the Senate Committee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, it was noted that this event indicated that Iran may be practicing for an EMP attack. Iran has also been observed test firing missiles from barges and freighters in the Caspian Sea and Dr. Vincent Pry warned: “One nightmare scenario is a ship-launched

EMP attack against the United States by Iran, as this would eliminate the need for Iran to develop an ICBM to deliver a nuclear warhead against the U.S. and could be executed clandestinely, taking the U.S. by surprise.”

In a South Korean Defense journal (August 2005), the threat of a North Korean EMP attack was discussed: What the late North Korea leader, Kim Jong I1, would have done is to first explode nuclear weapons at a high altitude. . . while destroying electronic devices and computers and paralyzing the functions of military strong points, logistic, plants, and cities. If it is exploded at a high altitude of 100km or so all kinds of electrical machinery and, in particular, electronic devices are damaged. More seriously, many of the artificial satellites orbiting from 400 to 800km above the earth get demolished.

Then, neither satellite telephones nor GPS could be used; while the US military which depends on satellites, immediately falls into a panic and becomes combat incapable, other nations around the world that used these satellites would also be greatly affected. The threat from North Korea cannot be taken lightly, as noted by statements from several retired Russian generals to the EMP Commission: “North Korea, armed with an EMP weapon, would constitute a grave threat to the wor1d.”

Apparently, there’s no longer any reason for speculation as to North Korea possessing

A U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress aircraft approaches a KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft to refuel over the Pacific Ocean July 13, 2009. Airmen from the 506th Expeditionary Refueling Squadron, March Air Force Reserve Base, Calif., are deployed to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, to support U.S. Pacific Command theater security package and continuous bomber presence in the Asia-Pacific region. (DoD photo by Senior Airman Christopher Bush, U.S. Air Force/Released)

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EMP’s. In 2013, a Chinese military commentator stated North Korea has super-EMP nuclear weapons. Like the Russians, the Chinese have come to fear the very Frankenstein monster both countries have created.

Press releases and statements from ranking military officers carry credibility, but physical evidence would prove more conclusive and the actions of both North Korea and Iran provide this evidence.

In 1998, Iran began test launching a Scud missile from the platform of a ship; the tests continue today. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Dr. William Graham stated, “The Iranians would detonate the warhead near apogee, not over the target area where it would eventually land, but at altitude. They’ve got test ranges in Iran which are more than long enough to handle Scud launches and even Shahab-3 launches…The only plausible explanation we can find is that the Iranians are figuring out how to launch a missile from a ship and get it up to altitude and then detonate it. And that’s exactly what you would do if you had a nuclear weapon on a Scud or a Shahab-3 or other missile, and you wanted to explode it over the United States.”

Iran has purchased Russia’s Club-K missile launcher, which can be hidden in tractortrailer-sized cargo boxes: “Russia’s ClubK is a complete missile launch system, disguised to look like a shipping container that could convert any freighter into a missile launch platform. The Club-K, if armed with a nuclear warhead, could be used to execute an EMP attack.”

North Korea has conducted missile tests in which the missile would get to an altitude of between 40 and 70 miles and detonated. Detonation at those altitudes of a nuclear warhead with a yield of 10 to 20 kilotons, similar to those already tested by North Korea, would produce major EMP effects and inflict catastrophic damage to unhardened electronics across hundreds of miles of surface territory.

North Korea has followed Iran in test launching missiles from cargo freighters.

Jeffrey Lewis stated, “In the past, we would see things in North Korea and they would show up in Iran. In some recent years, we’ve seen some small things appear in Iran first and then show up in North Korea and so that raises the question of whether

North Korea and Iran have shared more than technology and tactics, as demonstrated by their satellite launches, which use a south to north pole orbit, effectively negating U.S. missile defenses which are positioned for an attack from the north, “Iran and North Korea have successfully orbited satellites on SouthPolar trajectories that appear to practice evading U.S. missile defenses, and at optimum altitudes to make a surprise EMP attack.”

trade -- which started off as North Korea to Iran -- has started to reverse. This active transfer of technology could well extend to Iran providing North Korea with the Club-K missile system. Armed with this technology, North Korea and Iran could position freighters off the coasts of the U.S., Japan, Hawaii, and Europe and launch missiles armed with either nuclear weapons or EMP’s with little risk of being intercepted.

North Korea and Iran have shared more than technology and tactics, as demonstrated by their satellite launches, which use a south to north pole orbit, effectively negating U.S. missile defenses which are positioned for an attack from the north, “Iran and North Korea have successfully orbited satellites on South-Polar trajectories that appear to practice evading U.S. missile defenses, and at optimum altitudes to make a surprise EMP attack.”

An EMP attack could cause more lasting damage than a nuclear explosion and both countries could get the most leverage out of a nuclear bomb by using it to crash large parts of the electrical grid in the US, Europe or the Middle East. A successful EMP attack on the United States could knock out the critical, life-sustaining infrastructures that depend on the national grid, including telecommunications, banking and finance, automated control systems, petroleum and natural gas, transportation, food and water delivery and emergency services. Cascading failures of critical infrastructure could also lead to secondary disasters, including cataclysmic failure of nuclear plants. The Congressional EMP Commission estimates that, given the nation’s current unpreparedness, an EMP attack would plunge the United States into a protracted, perhaps permanent, blackout-and within one year about two-thirds of the national population, 200 million Americans, would probably perish from starvation, disease, and societal collapse.

It isn’t the intentions of either Iran or North Korea to limit these attacks to just the U.S. North Korea would, simultaneously, attack South Korea. If one EMP was detonated in the atmosphere 40 miles above Seoul, it could inflict catastrophic damage on South Korea’s electric power grid, leading to a prolonged blackout that could have deadly consequences. The United States has 28,500 soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in South Korea stationed below the 38th par-

allel—and more at sea nearby.

An electromagnetic pulse attack on South Korea could play havoc with America’s ability to mount an effective response to North Korean aggression, leaving these U.S. servicemen to become possible POW’s as North Korea invaded the South.

Japan and U.S. military bases in the Pacific could be targeted as well, creating a political and military vacuum that would be filled by North Korea. This is not to say there wouldn’t be resistance, but this would be met by North Korea launching ICBM’s armed with nuclear or biological warheads without any fear of these missiles being intercepted by Japanese or U.S. defensive measures: “First of all, Japan, which is the U.S. forces’ logistics, launch and sorties base, would be blanketed with radioactive clouds if a nuclear war occurred on the Korean Peninsula. It’s a piece of cake for the North Korean army, which is putting even the United States into its scope, to strike Japan.” It would be just a matter of time before Guam and Hawaii was attacked with EMP’s and nuclear weapons, and, according to U.S. Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, of Hawaii, “The concern regarding the threat of an EMP attack on Hawaii’s electrical grid and communications systems is real and must be taken seriously,” An Iranian detonated EMP would not only destroy all of the defensive forces in the Middle East, but it would effectively render all of the US CENTCOM forces in the region helpless, leaving Saudi Arabia and its allies, and 30,000 US military personnel stationed in the area, at the mercy of the Iranian military. The blast would blind all the US military spy satellites overhead, and likely burn out all of the US CENTCOM Saudi Theater communications back to the Pentagon. With its soldiers as POW’s and the Middle East under an Iranian nuclear umbrella, the U.S. could never launch a counterattack of any type.

Iran would next turn its attention to Israel and fulfill a promise to destroy Israel. Dr. Emily Landau believes that Iran could very well be planning an EMP attack on Israel, based on statements the Iranian regime has made and actions it has taken, “Some are skeptical that Iran would use a nuclear bomb just for an EMP attack. If they already

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have a nuclear weapon, why not use it for the main purpose for which it was designed?

While a nuclear bomb targeting an Israeli city would cause mass destruction on a local or regional basis, an EMP attack could cause even more lasting damage, destroying Israel’s electrical grid.”

Iran’s arsenal of atomic bombs would be no match for the US or Israel, but an EMP would give Iran the most leverage by using it to destroy large parts of the electrical grid in the Middle East, Israel or the US, making it easy for the Islamist regime to swoop in and act as it wishes in the Middle East and on the world stage.

There is no easy solution to this threat and the longer the U.S. and the world delays, the greater the threat becomes: “the damage level could be sufficient to be catastrophic to the Nation, and our current vulnerability invites attack.”

It is not just the U.S., South Korea, Japan or the Middle East that, alone, faces this threat; for now, the world stands on the brink of total political, social and economic collapse and it may already be too late to take preemptive measures.

About the Author Danny Dickerson is a retired Colonel, U.S. Army. He has served as an advisor to the UN, NATO and Interpol on terrorism and intelligence planning.

He has trained law enforcement in the U.S. from the local to federal level on terrorism and intelligence, as well as investigators for the Canadian Attorney General’s office and police officials in Egypt and Jordan, and is recognized as a “presenter” by the Illinois Terrorism Task Force.

He has written articles addressing the growing threat of terrorism which have been republished in Latin America, Europe and the Middle East.

References According to physicist David Albright, the founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, the North Koreans have between 13 and 30 nuclear weapons and can build as many as five more every year.

“U.S. general says he believes North Korea can build nuclear warhead,” AFP-JIJI, The Japan Times, October 24, 2014.

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Stephanie Nebehay, “Exclusive: North Korea has no fear of U.S. sanctions, will pursue nuclear arms – envoy,” Reuters, March 21, 2017.

Rowan Scarborough,”North Korea tests missiles designed to defeat U.S.THAAD defense system,” The Washington Times, May 3, 2017 “North Korea’s Nuclear Missiles Threat: Very Bad News,” Peter Pry and Peter Hussey, The MacKenzie Institute, February 29, 2016.

“North Korea’s Nuclear Missiles Threat: Very Bad News,” op. cit.

“Underestimating North Korea and Iran,” Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, Arutz Sheva. Israeli National News, February 2, 2013.

“Underestimating North Korea and Iran,” Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security, March 5, 2014.

Min-sek Kim and Jee-ho Yoo, “Military Source Warns of North’s EMP Bomb” JoonAng Daily, September 2, 2009; Daguang Li, “North Korean Electromagnetic Attack Threatens South Korea’s Information Warfare Capabilities” Tzu Chin, June 1, 2012, 44-45.

Zhang Shouqi and Sun, Xuegui, Jiefangjun Bao, May 14, 1996.

Dr. Mark Schneider, “The Emerging EMP Threat to the United States,” United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, November, 2007, Commission to Assess the Threat from High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), “Protecting the Infrastructure Military Science, Technology (Part 2),” Seoul Kunsa, August 26, 2005. Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Doc. ID: KPP20060929311002.

Peter V. Pry, Statement Before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security Hearing on Terrorism and the EMP Threat to Homeland Security: “Foreign Views of Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,” March 8, 2005, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ CHRG-109shrg21324/pdf/CHRG-109shrg21324.pdf.; Min-sek Kim and Jee-ho Yoo, “Military Source Warns of North’s EMP Bomb” JoonAng Daily, September 2, 2009; Daguang Li, “North Korean Electromagnetic Attack Threatens South Korea’s InformationWarfare Capabilities” Tzu Chin, June 1, 2012, 44-45.

Kenneth R. Timmerman, “U.S. Intel: Iran Plans Nuclear Strike on U.S.,” Newsmax, 29 July 2008.

Paul Bedard, “Expert: Iran ships a dry run for later nuclear/EMP attack; humiliate Obama,” Washington Examiner,14 February, 2014 A missile proliferation expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic (EMP) Attack, Vol.1: Executive Report, 2004.

Gemma Mullin, ON Thin ICING: Tyrant Kim Jong-un warns it would be a ‘piece of cake’ to nuke Japan and leave it ‘blanketed in radioactive clouds,” The Sun, May 2, 2017.

Rick Moran, “ Concern growing over potential North Korean EMP attack,” American Thinker, May 13, 2017.

Director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Program at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies and a lecturer at Tel Aviv University Emily B. Lanau, “But what if Iran simply exits the deal?” The Times of Israel, 4 April 2015.

Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic (EMP) Attack, Vol.1: Executive Report, 2004.

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A Model For

Countering Violent Extremism

Spain’s King Felipe and Queen Letizia pay respects at an impromptu memorial where a van crashed into pedestrians at Las Ramblas in Barcelona, Spain, August 19, 2017. REUTERS/Albert Gea

And Promoting Disengagement From Terrorism

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By Dr. Joshua Sinai

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he objective of counterterrorism is to resolve and terminate terrorist insurgencies. This is accomplished through the “hard component” of military, law enforcement, and intelligence measures to defeat the insurgents on the ground, as well as the “soft component” to counter the radicalization of susceptible individuals into the type of violent extremism that sustains terrorist groups and, instead, promotes the disengagement of its members and adherents from terrorism. In this “soft component” it is crucial to identify the factors that would prove effective in persuading such individuals and, if possible, their groups, activists, and sympathizers, as well, to de-radicalize from violent extremism and promote their disengagement from terrorism towards more constructive and non-violent means to achieve their objectives.

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The second measure, countering violent extremism, involves focusing a CVE campaign on individuals who have become violent at the apex of the pyramid, but also those who become activists for their cause in the middle of the pyramid who could potentially further ascend the radicalization pyramid into terrorism. The larger sub-culture of sympathizers at the bottom of the pyramid also need to be focused on in a countering violent extremism campaign because terrorists and activists depend on them for their support base Since terrorist groups and their adherents operate in different types of political environments, ranging from authoritarian, failed states, to democratic systems, where the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorism differ (although they may cross over from one specific type of environment to another, for instance, in having a conflict in an authoritarian environment such as the Middle East influence adherents in a democratic country), this approach focuses on countering violent extremism (CVE) in democratic societies, where constructive alternatives to engaging in violence are feasible, for example, through freedom of expression, assembly, and voting.

In repressive authoritarian or failed states, the model presented in this article would need to be reconfigured to address the specific challenges presented by terrorist insurgencies that operate in such environments.

a minority of individuals who will ascend to become activists at the middle of the pyramid.

The activists are non-violent extremists who are active on behalf of their extremist cause, for example, by participating in street demonstrations, handing out pamplets, or managing extremist websites. In Islamist movements, such individuals would be active in extremist, yet largely non-violent organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir or the Muslim Brotherhood, both of which are outlawed in some countries. In far-right movements, they would be active in organizations such as the English Defence League (EDL). Within such extremist movements, a smaller minority might turn to terrorism, whether as members of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (ISIS) or as lone wolf adherents of such groups. At the apex will be two types of violent extremists.

The first type are those who support violent

Countering Radicalization into Violent Extremism Countering violent extremism in democratic societies involves persuading such susceptible individuals that more effective and useful non-violent alternatives to express themselves politically, religiously, or on other issues, are feasible. The first measure in countering violent extremism is to identify the components of the pyramid of radicalization that need to be countered (see Figure 1,). In this approach, the process of radicalization into violent extremism is comparable to ascending an increasingly narrow pyramid, where the majority nonviolent sympathizers are located at its base and violent extremists (i.e., those who become terrorists) are at the smaller apex. Most individuals holding strong political beliefs, who can be characterized as sympathizers of extremist movements, are located at the bottom of the pyramid. They provide the pool for

Terrorists

Activists

Sympathizers Figure 1.

The Pyramid of Radicalization into Terrorism

extremists in a direct way by providing them with financial, logistical, weapons, and other means of operational assistance. The second type are the violent extremists who engage in terrorist operations.

The second measure, countering violent extremism, involves focusing a CVE campaign on individuals who have become violent at the apex of the pyramid, but also those who become activists for their cause in the middle of the pyramid who could potentially further ascend the radicalization pyramid into terrorism. The larger sub-culture of sympathizers at the bottom of the pyramid also need to be focused on in a countering violent extremism campaign because terrorists and activists depend on them for their support base.

An important point about countering violent extremism is that in a democratic and pluralistic society it is legitimate for sympathizers, at the bottom of the radicalization pyramid, to hold “radical� views as long as they are not expressed through violent means. Thus, expressing extremist ideas would not make one subject to arrest, but once an extremist sympathizer begins to explore the possibility of acquiring weapons and ammunition, then they would begin to cross the threshold into violence, making them liable for potential arrest. The objective in countering violent extremism campaigns, therefore, is to facilitate the disengagement of such extremist individuals from terrorist violence into peaceful activities, while recognizing that they might continue to harbor strong beliefs about their objectives that those holding moderate views may not necessarily agree with, but, most importantly, that they will remain non-violent in nature. When such possibilities for disengagement from terrorism exist, government and community programs need to find ways

to rehabilitate and integrate such formerly extremist individuals into mainstream society so that they can pursue their objectives within a competitive, pluralist and democratic framework – while accepting the will of the majority for policies they may not necessarily agree with, but that can be contested through democratic means.

In countering extremism it is crucial, therefore, to determine the degree of political, religious or other forms of extremism that is acceptable in a democratic society and the threshold where individuals and groups cross along the radicalization pyramid toward violent extremism, in order to identify the intervention points to mitigate any upward progression toward violent extremism and maximize the downward changes away from violence. As discussed earlier, countering violent extremism campaigns do not necessarily mean that extremist individuals will return to their pre-radicalized state. Rather, the goal of such programs programs is to facilitate the disengagement of extremist individuals from terrorist violence into peaceful activities.

Seven measures are involved in effective countering extremism campaigns. These measures need to be addressed comprehensively and in an integrated manner, with different measures used to intervene throughout the base, middle and top levels of the radicalization pyramid.

First, the underlying conditions that give rise to radicalization into extremism need to be identified and addressed. The radicalization processes that may give rise to violent extremism do not emerge in a vacuum, but are the product of a confluence or coalescence of multiple interrelated drivers, whether in the societies where terrorist uprisings originate or their targeted adversaries. The causes vary and change dynamically over time. In the case of the Islamic State, for example, a major driver is an ultra-puritanical interpretation of Islam that rejects tolerance and acceptance other religions, including any secular beliefs and practices, with all of these declared enemies to be destroyed.

Other drivers may include the alienation of such individuals from their societies, due to a variety of factors, including social and professional failures, with such ideologies promising to transform them into heroes for their cause. Thus, in the case of individuals who become violent jihadist, it is important to understand the effect of such genocidal ideologies in producing individuals who decide to implement them through violence.

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Sixth, it is crucial to use former and rehabilitated militants in a countering extremism campaign to serve as role models for the appeal and benefits of nonviolence. Former extremists’ extensive knowledge of an extremist ideology and how militant groups operate, particularly their problems, internal contradictions, and what often turn out to be false promises to their adherents, will have greater credibility than ‘establishment’ types in attempting to persuade militants on the advantages of disengaging from violent extremism.

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Second, as with the underlying causal drivers, it is crucial to identify the ideological center of gravity within a radicalized social movement and its violently extremist offshoot (in the form of a terrorist group). Extremist political and religious ideologies mobilize individuals and groups to commit acts of terrorism, and provide them with a guide for action to redress their grievances (whether these are justified or not).

A social movement’s narrative constitutes an important ideological center of gravity. Such narratives generally consist of a perception that a movement’s members have a great role to play in society yet are marginalized by that society, that they are divinely ordained by a supreme being to impose their ideology and way of life on their society, that its adversary society and government are unjust and hypocritical, and other grievances.

Certain documents or tracts provide such extremist social movements with their ideological underpinning. For example, the 1980s Jewish Terrorist Underground and its Greater Land of Israel members were influenced by the ultranationalist and messianic writings of Rabbi Abraham Kook; William Luther Pierce’s 1978 racist novel, The Turner Diaries inspires white supremacist groups; and Islamist extremists are influenced by Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones, and other extremist publications.

Thus, an effective counter-narrative program needs to understand how to persuade extremists to turn away from such extremist ideological tracts towards more moderate and constructive ways of thinking about how to achieve objectives that fall within a society’s legal boundaries.

Third, the radicalization process into extremism needs to be countered within a social movement’s individual level at the earliest possible phase in the radicalization pyramid.

For example, according to Arie Kruglanski, extremist ideologies appeal to individuals experiencing psychological uncertainty because such ideologies are “formulated in clear-cut, definitive terms” and provide “cognitive closure.” (1) It is such extremist ideologies that provide the fertile ground for support of, and recruitment into, terrorist organizations.

Early intervention at the pyramid’s three levels is more effective than having to react against an array of more mature extremist manifestations later on in the radicalization process.

It is here that governments and NGOs engaged in de-radicalization into violent extremism

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programs would focus on the question of “who is likely to become a non-violent or violent extremist.” For example, once a group’s narrative starts to resonate, for instance, in the case of jihadists with their adherents belief that the opportunity has arrived to implement their quest for an Islamist Caliphate in a geographic location such as Syria, that they will begin searching for groups that provide the comradeship, the sense of social belonging, status, excitement, and empowerment in achieving such objectives.

These are the individuals in Western societies, for example, who travel to Syria to become foreign fighters on behalf of groups such as the Islamic State.

Fourth, the tipping points in radicalization from non-violent extremism into terrorism need to be identified and countered. In the case of the radicalization pyramid, these tipping points would take place when susceptible sympathizers become activists and then ascend to the pyramid’s terrorism apex. While lots of individuals may share extremist beliefs at the bottom of the pyramid, few actually become violent extremists or operatives in a terrorist group. Thus, an effective de-radicalization strategy and campaign must focus on the tipping points from sympathizers to activists and then into becoming terrorists.

This is the part of the process of radicalization into terrorism, where formal groups, such as terrorist organizations, or informal extremist networks, such as “friends and family” (with many terrorists, especially in the West, operating with their family members or friends) begin to mobilize individuals to engage in violence to achieve their shared objectives. It is at such mobilization “tipping points” that de-radicalization

measures need to be implemented at the earliest point of intervention.

In countering radicalization into violent extremism, it is crucial to identify during the radicalization process activities by such individuals and their associates that might leave detectable traces. Unlike operational terrorists, for whom avoiding detection is a high priority, facilitators of radicalization, such as extremist religious preachers, community leaders, “friends and family”, have to locate individuals within their communities who may be susceptible to becoming radicalized. Studying such recruiting processes, including how they are manifested in the Internet’s social media sites, and recognizing its radicalizing techniques will result in a focused counter-extremism and de-radicalization intervention.

Fifth, individuals who have already become violent extremists at the apex of the pyramid (whether directly or through provision of various means of support) need to be de-radicalized in order to facilitate their disengagement from terrorism. Here, it may be easier to de-radicalize the pyramid’s mid- and bottom-tier activists and sympathizers, because, unlike the apex’s terrorists who are already set in their ways, those below them in the pyramid will likely be more susceptible to changing their minds about supporting those who promote terrorist warfare to achieve their objectives .

Since de-radicalizing an active, at large terrorist is a most difficult task, one locus for such deradicalization efforts may lie in prisons, where many violent extremists, as well as criminals who might be susceptible to becoming terror-

ists, are incarcerated, giving authorities an opportunity to intervene. With prisons providing a large pool of potential terrorists, especially in Western Europe, this has become a major area for countering violent extremism programs in those countries.

In another area, even with violent extremists, some may become “worn out” by the difficult and grueling struggle of constantly remaining underground, or may not wish their families to suffer as a result of their terrorist activities, so an opportunity for de-radicalization intervention may be possible.

Sixth, it is crucial to use former and rehabilitated militants in a countering extremism campaign to serve as role models for the appeal and benefits of nonviolence. Former extremists’ extensive knowledge of an extremist ideology and how militant groups operate, particularly their problems, internal contradictions, and what often turn out to be false promises to their adherents, will have greater credibility than ‘establishment’ types in attempting to persuade militants on the advantages of disengaging from violent extremism. It is also important to ensure that the former militants are fully rehabilitated, with several cases of such ‘formers’ later found to engage in illicit activities while claiming to have turned toward a new non-violent path.

Finally, countering violent extremism campaigns need to implemented on the ‘ground’, where radicalizers and other agents of radicalization operate, such as ‘friends and family’, as well as in cyberspace, where extremist websites and forums serve as radicalization influencers. It is here that effective counter-

Armed Catalan Mossos d’esquadra officers stand guard at Las Ramblas street where a van crashed into pedestrians in Barcelona, Spain, August 18, 2017. REUTERS/Sergio Perez

narratives need to operate, either, if possible, inside such extremist websites or in close proximity to them so that they will be viewed by extremists.

Metrics to Assess CVE Programmatic Effectiveness: Britain as a Case Study To assess the impact of such countering violent extremism programs, metrics of effectiveness need to be implemented. In this article, Britain is used as a case study, since it faces an extensive Islamist terrorist threat, as it was noted in a 2015 report that British security services faced a domestic threat by 3,000 Islamist extremists.

(2) With British Muslims estimated to number three million, and with an estimated ten percent (300,000) considered extremist [note that this is the author’s guesstimate, since no publicly available estimates are available], it means that of the remaining 297,000 persons, with a further guesstimate proportion proposed by this author of terrorists to activists at 1:10, 30,000 could be considered as activists, and the remaining 267,000 considered as sympathizers. For British security services, as well as the government’s CVE agencies, their investigators, analysts, and social workers, would therefore need to focus and prioritize their CVE resources on this overall radicalized subculture in British society, with the estimated 3,000 militants a top priority for monitoring and preemption.

It would be valuable, therefore, to determine how many of the estimated 3,000 Islamist militants could be persuaded to de-radicalize and disengage from potential terrorism, how many of their “next-in-line” 30,000 activists could be influenced to cease supporting these militants, and how many of the remaining 267,000 sympathizers could be convinced to adopt a more moderate view of Islam and the benefits of nonviolent political engagement.

In terms of metrics of effectiveness, although no such quantitative metrics have been developed in the CVE discipline to score levels of programmatic success, this model proposes a scale to score the success level of such programs in de-radicalizing and disengaging their targeted populations from terrorism. In this model, scoring the success of de-radicalizing and disengaging a targeted group from terrorism whether as terrorists, activists, or sympathizers, is proposed as: 90% to 100% (very high), 80% to 89% (high), 70% to 79% (moderate), 60% to 69% (low), and 50% to 59% (very low). A score of 0% to 49% would be considered as various degrees of “failure,” since it would indicate that a terrorist insurgency, backed by a radical subculture, was likely to remain intact

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and protracted., whereas a baseline of 70% and higher would demonstrates the beginning of various levels of success.

intervention, including persuading susceptible individuals to turn away from extremist informal networks into more constructive alternatives.

• Identifying the radicalization pyramid’s sympathizers and activists that can be persuaded by a counter-narrative campaign to to pursue peaceful alternatives to express themselves, in order to spread doubts about the legitimacy of continuing to support the terrorists’ violent cause.

• Utilizing rehabilitated former militants as influencers in CVE campaigns.

• Implementing the CVE campaign on the ‘ground’ and in cyberspace.

It is important to note that a CVE campaign, by itself, is not sufficient to resolve a terrorist insurgency in a comprehensive manner. This is due to the fact that, as mentioned at the beginning of this article, an effective counterterrorism campaign also requires certain “hard components,” such as military, intelligence and law enforcement measures to ensure that an insurgency’s physical manifestations are terminated, as well.

An example of effective and quantifiable de-radicalization and disengagement from terrorism of terrorist combatants, activists, and their sympathizers is the case of the IRA/ Provisional IRA in the Northern Ireland peace process, which resulted in their demobilization and reintegration into the province’s political and economic spheres in the late 1990s. In accordance with this model’s scoring system, the British-led counterterrorism campaign (and its CVE component) would be given a score of more than a 90% success rate. Examples of current-day protracted and unresolved terrorist insurgencies that have failed to be influenced

by CVE campaigns of varying degrees of seriousness include the Palestinian Hamas vis-àvis Israel, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Islamic State and al Qaida in their various configurations around the world, and others.

Returning to the British case, over the past ten years government authorities have established several programs to counter violent extremism, such as the “Prevent” strategy, first introduced in 2007, as well as the October 2015 “Counter Extremism Strategy.” But, with the persistence of the illustrative’ figure of 3,000 Islamist militants of concern, as well as the continues prevalence of extremist activists and sympathizers, it is not sufficient to establish such CVE programs that appear promising “on paper”, but they require the achievement of concrete results in turning a substantial number of their targeted militant population away from engaging in potential terrorist activities towards peaceful and constructive ways of conducting their lives.

Conclusion Effective counter radicalization into violent extremism measures, therefore, are seven-fold: • Addressing the underlying political and socio-economic factors.

• Countering the violent extremists’ ideological centers of gravity.

• Focusing a CVE program on a social movement’s individual level.

• Identifying the tipping points for early

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In conclusion, in countering violent extremism, when this becomes possible, one should not expect violently extremist individuals to become completely de-radicalized. In such cases, the objective should be to facilitate their disengagement from terrorism into more peaceful and constructive activities, even as they might retain some element of extremism in their ideologies. As long as political and military conflicts persist in areas under dispute, such as the Middle East, that produce a range of unresolved problems, perceptions of injustice, alienation and anger, one cannot expect those who are sympathetic to their cause and grievance to suddenly give up such sentiments. Moreover, as terrorist groups such as the Islamic State continue to lose ground in Iraq and Syria, their areas of operations will likely shift to other regions, including intensifying their activities in the West. To counter the appeal of such terrorist groups, the goal of counter- and de-radicalization programs should be to facilitate the disengagement of violent extremist individuals who believe that violence is the sole answer out of terrorism and into more constructive nonviolent paths where they can continue their oppositionary activism in a peaceful and legitimate way.

About the Author Dr. Joshua Sinai is a senior analyst at Kiernan Group Holdings (KGH), a homeland security and counterterrorism consulting and research firm, in Alexandria. VA. He can be reached at Sinai@kiernan.co.

References 1.Arie Kruglianski, “Inside the Terrorist Mind,” paper presented to the National Academy of Science annual meeting, Washington, DC, April 29, 2002.

2. http://www.express.co.uk/news/ uk/606092/Islamist-Extremist-IslamicState-ISIS-MI5-Britain-Andrew-Parker-Security-David-Cameron.

Vol. 23, No.2

ROOTS OF CONFLICT:

Female Combatant Participation In Nepal’s Maoist People’s War

By Thomas A. Marks

M

“

y Grandmother was a Nazi,” reads the headline of a recent op-ed by well-known author Jessica Shattuck.(1) The point of the article needs little explanation.

How could grandma be one of them? What was she thinking? Or was she? And we all know precisely who and what the “them” were that she joined: the epitome of evil, the Nazis.

S w i t c h t h e o b j e c t s l i g h t l y, though, and the waters muddy.

“My Grandmother was a Maoist,” for instance. Or, “a terrorist.”

What if grandma had fought for the vaunted Lincoln Brigade, which has the distinction both of having sided with the communists and been on the losing side of the Spanish Civil War

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– yet has come to be associated not with defending evil but with individual commitment to democracy facing fascism in its first phase? Do we label her a hero or a dupe?

It is situations such as this which confront any researcher pursuing individual motivation on the nonstate side of irregular warfare.

Terms of Reference Armed with a MINERVA grant, I have spent three months in Nepal during this past academic year, as well as a great deal more time buried in the relevant literature devoted to female combatant motivation, examining the Maoist insurgency which wracked the country from February 1996 to November 2006. In reality, as I have noted in this journal and other periodicals,(2) the war did not neatly end, and radical Maoist splinters continue to use violence to pursue their political goals. That is, they continue to use terrorism.

If insurgency is the object of study, we are examining a political mass mobilization project intent upon forming a new world to challenge the existing world. Terrorism is but one method among many,

This brief formulation serves to highlight the challenge: just what is it we are examining?

and there is limited utility in

On the one hand, an insurgency against a democratic state used a people’s war strategy in an effort to seize power and institute a version of Maoism that held the pinnacle of political progress was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Not only was terrorism integral to the insurgent effort – the most iconic image of the conflict is an executed teacher hanging from a pole after he refused to pay a revolutionary tax – but the objective, Maoism, ranks well ahead of even Nazism as the bloodiest ideological crime ever inflicted upon the human race. The Cultural Revolution, in fact, was itself not only a monstrous episode but is considered to be such even by the Chinese. Surely, any participants in such an endeavor merit any label we care to give them, from terrorists to criminals to murderers.

“terrorists.”

On the other hand, leaders are not followers. The mass mobilization movement that is an insurgency necessarily uses terrorism, but most participants generally do not. They are busy doing other things.

Likewise, as we have had recent cause to be reminded, most supporters of any political endeavor, whether it is elected or violent, do not necessarily reflect the attributes or ideological ideas of the leadership beyond buying into slogans of renewal and hence mobilization.

Going a step further, as Ms. Shattuck grappled with, most “Nazis” were “not,” even as the organization of which they were a part produced the death camps.

labelling the subjects involved as

If insurgency is the object of study, we are examining a political mass mobilization project intent upon forming a new world to challenge the existing world. Terrorism is but one method among many, and there is limited utility in labelling the subjects involved as “terrorists.”

Necessarily, this also determines that speaking of radicalization is not particularly helpful, unless by the term we mean simply that anyone who moves from nonviolent to violent action has been “radicalized.”

This is a stretch.

The involvement of women also demands attention as our subject.

This can be pursued from two angles, not mutually exclusive but necessarily different.

First, in a violent political mass mobilization effort, why were women targeted and why did they respond eagerly, as evidenced by 20-40% of the combatants being female by war’s end?

Second, what did they actually do in the conflict, for better or for worse, and how did this jibe with their individual objectives for joining, staying, and leaving (as most appear to have done in the shift to post-war covert violence by the Maoists)?

Engendering People’s War Addressing these questions begins with context.

So what to label grandma and her actions?

We can still take another step further, given that this is the sixteenth year of “the long war,” and ask, “Is it correct, as much literature would do, to say that grandma was radicalized? Or was she simply mobilized, an individual whom a group used as means in the execution of its ways to achieve its own (evil) ends?

What precisely, then, should we call her? Fellow traveler? Clueless hang-

er-on? Unindicted co-conspirator?

Neither can it be missed that the example under consideration is female, thus bringing into play another level of analysis and, certainly, our stereotypes. It is a bit like the surprise that registers when one encounters the prominent role played by women in the post-World War I revival of the Ku Klux Klan.

(3) Aren’t they supposed to be the ones from Venus?

Grappling with such queries goes to the heart of my project. Two issues, therefore, demand focus: subject and object.

Having evolved in the post-WWII years from a closed polity dominated by a hereditary prime minister to a constitutional monarchy reigning in uneasy partnership with a parliament, Nepal was by the 13 February 1996 outbreak of insurgency a formal democracy. In reality, socio-economicpolitical issues, complicated by an exploding population and geographic reality, resulted in a stratified order perhaps defined less by democratic process than by structures of community (a mix of Hindu caste, linguistic, and ethnic divisions) and patriarchy.

Into this mix was thrown the determination of a small Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) to make a revolution.

Working hand-in-glove with the Maoist parties that were members

of RIM, the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, the Nepali Maoists questioned only the timing for the launching of their people’s war not the morality or practicality of the endeavor. Though male-dominated, the insurgent organization (a product of the usual infighting and factionalism that is integral to revolutionary politics) always included women. It was also true, though, that from first to last, the organization and its movement remained patriarchal and that no decision of moment eventuated from – or true position of leadership – was entrusted to a woman.

This should not surprise. Nepali Marxist analysis was never able to look beyond “class” as the fundamental contradiction from which all else derived and revolved. Gender was not viewed as an independent variable with qualities and concerns all its own. While basic political economy analysis seeks to highlight cross-cutting cleavages, and feminist theory speaks to intersectionality, the numerous fissures present in Nepal were not used in and of themselves as anything but tactical avenues of approach. The poor position of women societally, which included various forms of violence (to include widespread rape), was thus never treated as a theme for mobilization, only as an opportunity to bring individuals into an organizational matrix where indoctrination would reveal the ultimate economic basis for their alienation and marginalization.

Still, unlike most violent radical Islamist movements, the Maoists sought manpower wherever they could, even if it was “womanpower.”

This led to a steady influx of women into the insurgency, a trend which dramatically accelerated once the people’s war had moved (in planning as well as in reality) from the defensive to the stalemate and offensive phases of people’s war.

A central point for research emerges from this fact. Maoist strategic approach called for violence to create the space for political organizing, with the Party firmly in control of strategy and operations. Terrorism and guerrilla action by local forces eliminated or neutralized individual resistance as well as the structure

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and forces of the state. Teachers, for example, more than 300 of whom were victims, were a particular target, as were local government offices at the county level (of which there were 3,913 constituted as elected Village Development Committees). The armed local presence of the state, the police, were forced to retreat to the 75 district capitals and several urban centers as their smaller stations in rural areas (where 85% of the population lived) proved indefensible against a foe which could pick time and place for attack.

Only with the November 2001 assault upon the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) barracks in Ghorahi, capital of Dang District, did the conflict shift to emphasis upon the fielding of regular forces by the insurgents to challenge the military forces of the government. Terrorism and guerrilla action continued, of course, as did a variety of nonviolent forms of warfare, such as mobilization through front organizations, extensive use of propaganda (especially through agitprop teams energized through new, revolutionary song and dance), and efforts to neutralize external support for Kathmandu.

Yet the focal point of insurgent effort shifted to fielding battalions (constituted as standard squads, platoons, and companies), which themselves were under brigades and finally divisions.

It was only at this point that women began to flow in substantial numbers into the combatant ranks. This is why one can only speak of a 20-40% range.

Prior to November 2001, most women in the insurgency, as with most manpower in general, were at the local level. Though they took part in terrorism, the numbers in guerrilla units were limited; indeed, so limited that experiments with all-female units were tried to maximize performance and incentives for recruiting.

It also appears to be the case that local terrorism was overwhelmingly committed by men, though this remains a subject to be examined. What did change was direct female involvement in military action. The data supports a post-mid-2001 or even slightly later widespread flow of women into regular combatant ranks, where they participated on an equal basis with men.

The implications of this brief description for my study should be

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clear. Combatant units were comparable to Viet Cong main force units and spent nearly all their time preparing for and executing “military” tasks. Though tasking might flow through channels directing a squad to report to local Party authorities for the purpose of executing a convicted “spy,” the astonishing abuses that characterized the insurgency – with attendant criminality and violence necessary to raise funds and recruit manpower – was in the main done by those outside my study’s focus.

This could obviously have been quite different. No such distinction, for instance, is found in a Maoist movement such as the Khmer Rouge.

Motivation for Mobilization Still, given the realities of the insurgent organizational and strategic model adopted, all combatants began as local Party members. This necessarily resulted in a certain level of personal avoidance in post-war questions with what had been seen and done when not yet combatants (or when e.g. detailed home on convalescent leave), but this was no more than to be expected in a brutal conflict. It was, in fact, brutality which was the overwhelming driver creating the link between societal imperfection and the resort to violence to set matters right.

In-depth interviews were conducted with 45 female People’s Liberation Army (PLA) veterans, overwhelmingly officers, with shorter interviews conducted with a dozen more. The choice of officers was deliberate, because they had the most solid understanding of movement structure and procedures. Selection was “topdown,” in the sense that key female command personalities were known in advance by name and were interviewed, with subsequent interviews deriving from working down the chain of command. The women were accessed through the PLA female veterans association, which claims some 5,000 members. There are perhaps an equal number who have not joined any formal organization. ‘

Particular focus was upon women who had commanded at the battalion or brigade levels, though, in a major finding, it was determined that while the former position was earned through combat attainment, the latter was overwhelmingly awarded for PLA organizational reasons once the insurgents had entered regroupment camps after November 2006, and then only to the second-in-command (2IC) level. A single female earned brigade command rank (of 33 slots under 7 divisions notionally of 5 brigades each), and she was promoted from a commissar position after the end of overt hostilities. Indeed, the promotion process for women, as will be discussed below, reflected patriarchal norms bending to expediency as much as fulfillment of professional metrics.

Regardless of rank, each individual was engaged in a manner which allowed recruitment and career progression to unfold. All interaction of any sort was conducted in Nepali, and no individual could be interviewed in English (or even engaged in light conversation), a reality which extended to male combatants who were necessarily encountered in the course of the fieldwork (overwhelmingly, female ex-combatants were married to male ex-combatants).

Two experienced female researchers with whom I have a longtime professional association were used simultaneously to ensure fidelity.

All contact was arranged through

In-depth interviews were conducted with 45 female People’s Liberation Army (PLA) veterans, overwhelmingly officers, with shorter interviews conducted with a dozen more. The choice of officers was deliberate, because they had the most solid understanding of movement structure and procedures.

Selection was “top-down,” in the sense that key female command personalities were known in advance by name and were interviewed, with subsequent interviews deriving from working down the chain of command.

Maoist intermediaries, which allowed access to individuals who now are in rival Maoist factions but nonetheless had fought together in a common cause and so maintain contact.

the clumsy and brutal state response that interjected itself into marginalized areas where the Maoists had made considerable political progress.

The behavior of the unprepared police – the army (there were no other services) would only be committed after it was attacked in late 2001, and a police field force, or Armed Police Force, APF, would only be formed later – was a textbook case of creating the very conflict it sought to address.

That cause, for the normal combatant, regardless of rank, was a quest for social justice. Ideological factors were a part of the organization’s socialization process but played little role in most recruitment or sustainment. Indeed, knowledge of Maoist ideology even today is rudimentary and extends essentially to use of idiom married to crude structural analysis. One should hasten to add this does not mean the analysis is incorrect in its identification of systemic contradictions, only that the same results are obtained with basic political econometrics.

The injustice attendant to a traditional society that remains globally in the bottom twenty economically was compounded by a sense of powerlessness stemming from the reality that the promise of democracy and formal ending of social inequities such as untouchability had, in reality, resulted in too little visible change for the overwhelming majority of the population. This was especially true for women, whom data demonstrate not only do the bulk of the work in Nepal but suffer from a staggering level of structural and personal violence. Being locked in a shed during monthly menstruation (Chhaupadi), for example, regardless of time of year, persists in certain areas of the country. So, regrettably, does rape.

The concept of intersectionality speaks to the mutually determinant and reinforcing nature of such contradictions. None exists in isolation, with the disadvantaged position of women a natural consequence. This reality provides particular insight into the insurgent recruiting dynamic. For it was the Maoists who stepped into the void, who mobilized the desire for change, for movement to a more just order.

Though it could be argued that societal progress was slowly being made, this was in a sense swallowed by several factors. First, there was the unmet expectation that democracy, which had been instituted in

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As men bore the brunt of repression, it was they who dominated the insurgent profile. Yet as women saw their families and persons violated, they, too, flowed into the rebellion in increasing numbers. At this point in time, it is difficult to discern definitively the boundary between actual and perceived atrocity (no transitional justice mechanism has yet been implemented). Yet this is in a sense irrelevant. The dominant impetus to take up arms was perceived self-defense.

1990, would make a difference more quickly than was the case. Second, there was the continuing patriarchal nature of the dominant political parties, which meant women’s voices were invariably used as tokens of enlightenment but held no power.

Finally, there was a mushrooming population that by the 2001 census saw more than half the population 19 and under, which meant there was little if any memory of improvement, whatever its pace, only of an imperfect world.

Into this situation, the Maoists interjected their narrative of exploitation, which framed democratic reality as feudal, capitalist exploitation carried out by an internal colonial dynamic.

In a polyglot population, where only just more than half the population were formally within the caste system and spoke Nepali as their first language, all power was controlled by the Nepali-speaking top two Hindu castes, Brahmins and Chhetris, allied with the external imperial forces of America and India.

Such a line would likely have remained on the sidelines were it not for

Not surprisingly, this surfaced initially amongst minority populations in districts with exceptionally poor development metrics even by Nepali standards. From Rukum and Rolpa in the Mid-Western Development Region, the insurgency rapidly spread, focusing in particular upon recruiting the young. Of the 45 (full) interviewees, 17 were recruited when 15 and Under, another 24 when between 16 and 18. Thus 91% of the total were very young, though most had at least some of what we would term a middle school education.

Whatever may be said as to their “child soldiers” status legally, a demographic point just as salient was that 33 of the sample, nearly three-quarters, came from families with 5 or more children (with 6 or more being a plurality). As an additional 6 subjects provided unclear data, only 5 of the women came from families with 3 or less children (oddly, there was no family with 4 children in the sample).

Clearly, a factor was present of a regional carrying capacity no longer capable of sustaining the mushrooming population. Though the conflict was a nationwide phenomenon, it was concentrated in the western part of the country, with the heartland being in the MidWestern region.

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The sample reflected this reality, though there was no particular dominance of groups that provided the initial impetus for revolt. Magars, for instance, though central to the takeoff of the insurgency, were prominently represented at battalion command level (3 of 5 in the sample) but provided but one of the 6 brigade level (sample) command positions. As it is known that key commanders were in fact both Magar and male, it is possible that a different result would come from a reversed gender focus.

Regardless, Nepali was indicated in interviews as the movement language of command and interaction, though other ranks spoke whatever worked best in particular circumstances.

Numerous eye-witness accounts of Maoist assaults attest to the mix of languages spoken by combatants.

You’re in the (People’s Liberation) Army Now Actual entry into Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) formations was always through the Party. It was there that socialization and indoctrination occurred. The youth of recruits, the well-developed framing process inherent to people’s war in general and the Nepali version specifically, and the commitment of veterans to the professed goal of societal transformation, all served to facilitate the rapid absorption of a Marxist-Leninist vocabulary and analytical approach to assessment and action. A system of commissars and consultative mechanisms reinforced the communist nature of the endeavor.

The transition to combatant, when it came, was a natural evolution.

The desire to “make a difference” combined with the opportunity for direct action to propel most subjects willingly into the ranks of the PLA. The rapid expansion of the organization provided ample opportunity for advancement, and the Maoists demonstrated much greater awareness and flexibility in their utilization of individual skills than the state.

It could hardly have been otherwise given the realities of insurgency. The old-order was defending established prerogatives and procedures and deploying armed manpower as such.

There was minimal understanding of the need for a holistic approach

through whole-of-government mobilization that addressed the roots of conflict even as it addressed insurgent message and strategy.

To be fair, the state had such limited means that it would have been in a difficult position regardless of approach. Still, its rigidity and lack of imagination were to some extent overcome only when a parallel military was in effect created through, first, the formation of a U.S.-sponsored Ranger capability and, second, the simultaneous fielding of officers who were products of Western military education and training, hence counterinsurgency thinking (which remains dominated by nonkinetic aspects in theory if not always in practice).

as a whole. It was in the local Party organizations that manpower was concentrated. And at the local level, female participation, while not as widespread as for males, did not lag substantially behind.

Only, as mentioned earlier, in the actual implementation of terrorism do women seem dramatically underrepresented; and no woman interviewed admitted to participation or even to witnessing such acts – which were so numerous that they could not be missed – even as they would discuss, as relevant, participation in the structured execution of “spies.”

It was in this period that female commanders came into their own.

A combination of expansion and casualties (in what had been predominantly male-held positions) resulted in numerous women advancing to command even as a larger proportion of the line became female.

Acculturation to application of violence would have been obstacle enough. For Nepali women to make the transition to combatant status required a level of commitment and determination that was commensurate with the societal barriers, both physical and mental, to participation as equals in combat operations.

Few allowances were made for male:female differences, particularly menses and pregnancy, with a proportion of the interviewees having engaged in combat while in advanced stages of pregnancy. The latter stemmed from consensual, officially-sanctioned relationships only, because the movement maintained absolute control over participants’ sexuality.

Estimates tend to throw out a figure of 40%, but this seems as unlikely as the same figure ascribed to FARC in Colombia and the PKK in the larger Syria-Iraq conflict. It was a pronounced surge in manpower recruitment that occurred after the collapse of the conflict’s second ceasefire, which took up the first half of 2003 (and was tactical upon the part of the Maoists), which saw a substantial increase in female numbers, perhaps to a third. Yet most of these newcomers saw limited combat.

It was this equality of terms of service and participation in combat which sparked a debate in scholarly and media literature concerning the empowerment involved. One position, advanced particularly by those speaking from a radical perspective, lauded the trend and claimed it to be transformative. An opposing position emphasized the tactical and contingent nature of the equality, since the organization and its strategy remained, from first to last, a completely male project.

This estimate should not be taken, though, to describe the movement

Hisila Yami, for instance, head of the All Nepal Women’s Association

In contrast, the new-order that was “the revolution” (the term always used by interviewees) reflected the time-tested principles of people’s war. This meant advancing on lines of effort that brought into play a correct mix of kinetic and nonkinetic campaigns for the purpose of neutralizing state power at the local level. Once the struggle to dominate the rural areas in order to encircle the urban areas had progressed to the effort to impose strategic stalemate through attacking the military head-on, a pronounced process of militarization put recruiting for the PLA into overdrive.

(Revolutionary) and a Central Committee member, has been regularly lauded by foreign commentators for her central position in opening up avenues for women within the Maoist movement, but she in reality appears to have had little or no influence upon decisionmaking. Her role appears to have stemmed principally from her marriage to the longtime second ranking Maoist figure, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai.

Of greater moment were those female combatants who rose to PLA command positions, but they, to a woman in interviews, were those most keenly aware of the limits imposed upon them by patriarchy – a term they used readily and correctly, though it is hardly one derived from Maoist idiom.

As noted earlier, no woman, regardless of combat attainment, was promoted to brigade command during the conflict; and the sole woman to become a brigade commander, Kamala Naharki aka Sapana (35 years), was elevated only after the peace process was initiated and the PLA had moved into regroupment camps. This was also the case of important female battalion commanders such as Leela Sharma aka Asmita (35), Sushila Kumari Gautam aka Sushma (35), Sabrita Dura aka Astha (39), and Kushal Rakshya (32), though the latter may have received her promotion just before regroupment.

All combatant ages are as of September 2016. The low figures at the time of interview, a decade after the formal conclusion of hostilities, highlights their youth during the conflict. The one noticeable exception, Lila Mahara Paudel aka Kalpana (34), perhaps emphasizes the point. Though she had an exceptional combat record, with command at the intervening

levels through brigade, she was but a brigade 2IC when peace came.

A number of explanations for this and other cases can be advanced. Kalpana herself notes, “It was because women started participating in the war later than men. This is why there were fewer women in commanders’ positions. Women joined later because of their lack of awareness. They needed to be oriented from scratch.”

To be sure, actual combat experiences varied, but the Nepali conflict had

by November 2002 at Jumla already seen a significant massing of insurgent main force battalions that sought to overrun government reinforced companies in defensive positions.

Hence combatants were exposed to both small tactical actions and major engagements consequent to operational art, with converging columns, simultaneous attacks nationwide to confuse and diminish response, and integrated nonkinetic elements such as propaganda and front activity deployed to force-multiply.

All such action unfolded according to regularly promulgated strategic plans that explicitly sought political effects from the marriage of kinetic and nonkinetic actions. These were carefully explained before operations, then critiqued in after-action sessions.

Women time and again emphasized the liberating and empowering impact of such consultation.

Legacy of War The overt phase of conflict was 1996-2006. Thereafter, 2006-present, a covert effort was waged to seize

power using paramilitary forces, notably the Young Communist League (YCL) and student organizations.

Most female combatants appear not to have participated in this second decade of strife, though certainly some did, as well as many female Party activists.

Leadership of the effort was, as during the overt phase, essentially male.

Nonparticipation in the main stemmed from the most prosaic of causes: domesticity. This was a highly contingent process.

Profound political changes in early 2005 had seen the reigning monarch in effect declare royal rule. This had the effect of sidelining the legal political parties, which, under Indian auspices (New Delhi marching to its own regional hegemonic requirements), formed a united front with the Maoists to overthrow the monarchy.

Once achieved, though, this action gave way to the violent transitional period noted above. As decided at a key September 2005 strategy meeting, the Maoists had opted for peace to prepare for urban war.

Already in control of as much as 80% of the population, they intended the “post-war” period to provide access to the “white areas” (i.e., those under state control) and the opportunity for mass, decisive action (i.e., an urban uprising) in these same areas.(4) Central to this strategy was the peace provision that placed both the military and the PLA in supervised areas, the former in its normal barracks, the latter in newly constructed regroupment camps.

Even as the PLA moved into these camps, though, key PLA personnel moved out into the YCL, with their places taken by local forces and new recruits. It was this reality that opened up the brigade level command slots (albeit 2IC) for women.

In fact, though some women moved laterally into the paramilitary YCL, most did not.

Instead, as the years wore on – five, altogether – marriage and starting a family became the chosen (and socially driven) course of action.

Potential partners were overwhelmingly selected through traditional pairing procedures, though in the

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revolutionary movement, choice was always necessary. In pairing, as well, traditional norms asserted themselves, with the male often of senior rank to the female.

Not traditional at all, however, was the overwhelming domination of out-marriage (i.e., intercommunal pairings). This breaking of the mold obviously extended, examination indicated, to the actual nature of the spousal relationships.

Ironic, given the explicit targeting of “bourgeois education” by the Maoists, was the total commitment to education of their children expressed by every interviewee. Though several did not yet have children (and several remained single), most had two or more and (as determined through the interview process) were going to exceptional lengths to see to their education.

It was the loss of their own educational opportunities which was most regretted, as expressed directly by the ex-combatants. This, of course, cannot be separated from their assessment now of their participation in the revolutionary project.

Most saw value in what they had committed themselves to, and most saw profound change in Nepali society as a result of their efforts. Simultaneously, though, there was a mix of wistfulness for unrealized potential and bitterness, often extreme, directed at senior Party figures who are perceived to have parlayed their revolutionary project into power and wealth, while the bulk of the combatants, certainly most below officer rank, have struggled.

This reality has been extensively covered in Nepali media. Many of the women interviewed, both those questioned in-depth and those of the more brief encounters, had been wounded; they spoke of symptoms that clearly were associated with PTSS; and they noted the profound disconnect they now experienced with very traditional society home locales that existed within the larger picture of change they felt had occurred. A private selfhelp organization, Ex-PLA Women’s Academy, was formed in 2013 but proceeds with limited funding.

None of the support network that came into being in the U.S. with the return of the First World War veterans

exists in Nepal. Demobilization, when it finally came, brought a lump sum payment, which the astute parlayed into employment or lodging; but for most, it was too little to make up for youth devoted to a great cause which had given way to a new-order that was different, better yet in many respects resembled the old.

For longtime observers, Nepal has advanced considerably in the past two decades. The key question is whether violence was necessary to achieve that end. The question was put to every interviewee. The answers give pause for continued backers of radical approaches to societal change.

Most women were obviously empowered personally by their experiences and their Marxist-Leninist education. The latter gave them the ability to analyze society and its contradictions. Unfortunately, as Max Weber is purported to have observed, Marx was 100% correct, he simply had missed two-thirds of reality. In claiming that all stemmed from economics, he missed the other legs of the stool, status (social factors) and politics.

The interviewees know they are missing something, and they label it “education.” What they personally struggle with now is the limited opportunity that comes from having been educated in a skewed Marxist manner. Worse, with Leninism thrown in, they have an approach for destruction but none for construction.

Nepali Maoism, to return to the point made at the beginning of this article, exults as the zenith of human progress what in reality was one of its great depths, the Cultural Revolution. Not even acknowledged by the Maoist leadership – I know this from interviews with them – is the reality that the abomination of Pol Pot’s “Year Zero” resulted from an attempt to out-Maoist the Maoists.

To take this a step further, every interviewee was asked, beyond jus ad bellum – was it right to go to war, to use violence? – to reflect upon jus in bello – the conduct of the war. The inability to grapple with this issue has already been noted.

Senior figures, however, to include all those at the brigade level, were

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keenly aware of the strategic approach integral to people’s war, the need to destroy the old-order to create the new. This meant, as articulated directly by all, that the power of the state was exerted through its personnel and institutions present in local areas.

Thus these had to be destroyed. To the extent this could only be achieved with violence – if the old-order did not peacefully surrender – then such was the way forward.

The obvious contradiction in this analysis, particularly when the object is a democratic state, however imperfect, was long ago addressed by Lenin. It is the vanguard party that is the bearer of correct interpretation of societal realities, he claimed, and the necessary way forward. With such guidance, it is no accident that the principal object of study in the early years of the Nepali Maoists was Shining Path of Peru (Sendero Luminoso), one of the best illustrations in the postSecond World War world of atrocity in pursuit of revolution.

Women, it was noted very early in Peruvian conflict, were also a major component of Sendero’s tragic trajectory.

About the Author Dr. Thomas A. Marks is a freelance writer and frequent contributor to the Journal.

References 1 Jessica Shattuck, “My Grandmother was a Nazi,” The New York Times, 25 March 2017, A21; available at: https:// www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/opinion/iloved-my-grandmother-but-she-was-anazi.html (accessed 14 April 2017).

2 E.g. “Nepal: What Happens After Terrorism?” Counterterrorism 21, no.1 (Spring 2015), 24-31; “Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgent, 1996-2016,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 28, no.1 (2017), 81-118.

3 Kathleen M. Blee, Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

4 The relevant wording from the resolutions of the September 2005 meeting states [as translated from Nepali]: “To extensively militarize the party, authority, party members, and people and attempt to configure, specialize, and training the People’s Liberation Army to take necessary action in cities, center, region, district, and capital [Kathmandu].”

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Secure Driver:

Vehicle Safety Aides Part IV “Got your Six”

I

By Crystalmarie Marzocchi & Anthony Ricci

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f you’ve been following our automobile technology series, welcome to part four! If you haven’t, welcome aboard! In this segment we will be featuring the hands-free options that many of today’s vehicles have. Voice command prompts that can change temperature, and chart the car on a different course all with the press of one button and maintaining your hands on the steering wheel. We will also touch upon Emergency Response Systems and how this technology is lifesaving for some individuals in the event of a crash.

In addition we will touch upon another hands free system that is now taking the parking garage world by surprise with autonomous valet parking.

Emergency Response Systems Emergency Response Systems offer quick assistance for medical and crash assistance. Models vary between manufacture and there are several aftermarket services as well. Most corporations have this set up prior to lease or purchase. For example Chrysler (FCA) utilizes the UConnect system which has a 911 button built into the rearview mirror. A press of the button initiates the Emergency Response system and the vehicles built in Bluetooth technology calls 911 for you. In addition to placing the call, the vehicle gives its location, and the area of the vehicle that was damaged

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

to the emergency response team allowing for better preparation upon arrival.

Chevrolet and GM products have a similar product by the name of OnStar which operates very much like UConnect does. Certain packages operate for an annual fee while others remain with the car for the life of ownership.

In the event of a crash many of the vehicles with these built-in systems will contact 911

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for you, often times so fast that you don’t even realize it happened and the next thing you know there’s an operator talking through your vehicle’s speakers asking if you are injured.

The “black box” that has been in existence for decades on planes now exists to a certain extent within vehicles as well. The computers can relay information before the crash and during the crash to crash analysts to give a more accurate picture of what happened just before the crash occurred.

Picture this scene: you’re driving the CEO to a friend’s house in the mountains. The roads are rarely traveled, dark and windy and it is a route you have never taken before. While your car is well equipped and you are up to date on your annual driver retraining you aren’t prepared for what happens next. A moose walks across the road in a blind corner, try as you and the car might you cannot avoid impact and hit the animal head on. The force of the crash knocks you and the CEO unconscious. Thankfully your vehicle is equipped with a UConnect system which alerts 911 of a crash with possible injuries. When you are awakening the emergency medical personnel are already there providing care. Without this system would someone have known you were there? Your injuries prevented you from calling, but your car did it for you, potentially saving your life.

Hands Free Systems The variance of hands free systems in today’s vehicles is immense. From simple commands such as changing the temperature of the climate control to more complex commands such as charting a new course, changing your final destination or adding a way finding mid point – vehicles can do so much on their own it’s almost frightening. The helpfulness of all of this technology is wonderful as it allows the driver to keep their hands on the wheel and operate the vehicle without having to input data manually.

(FCA, 2016) However, these systems as with any computer are not perfect and can operate in error causing driver frustration.

To relate this for our purposes, your CEO gives an address, and you press the VR (Voice Recognition) button on your steering wheel to input the address. The vehicle is unable to understand your command, and/or cannot find the address. This results in you having to pull the vehicle over, manually input the address and then continue on your way to the meeting that the CEO is now late for, resulting in frustration on both parties. As we know from articles past, operating a vehicle in a frustrated state of mind is never a positive thing which can cause erratic inputs and poor decision making. This isn’t to

say that this happens for all vehicles, but it has happened in my personal vehicle with both the GPS and the Phone commands. Maybe it’s my Rhode Island accent….I haven’t quite figured it out yet but if I over annunciate words, I can get it to work most times.

Mercedes has added additional language to their Linguatronic system in order to offer the driver more commands in addition to those that were already mentioned. Commands such as seat height, temperature, what the date is, when the next service is due, and what the vehicles range is are just a few. The system has in excess of 450 voice commands that it now recognizes available in multiple languages. Want a massage? Ask the new E-Class to “massage me” and it will activate the seats massage function for you.

Mercedes Benz Intelligent Drive Leading the field in technological advances is Mercedes Benz with their newest 360 degree camera system. Four cameras mounted on the vehicle provide the driver with a 360 degree view of everything around the vehicle at any given time. What advantages does this have?

Park Assist, Pedestrian Recognition, Speed and Braking assistance, land changing and departure warnings, traffic sign and roadway marking recognition and more. This is accomplished with radar in addition to the camera systems and can be viewed on the in-car screen at any time. Thermal recognition adds another advantage of not just detecting pedestrians, but also being able to detect animals, such as deer, that may be in the vehicles path. The Intelligent Drive will then adjust the speed, brakes, and trajectory in order to avoid the obstacle in it’s path. How about traffic jams? The new Mercedes will partially autonomously follow other cars in the traffic jam with no assistance from the driver.

Autonomous Valet?

These systems developed by Bosch and Daimler have been used in Mercedes testing of autonomous valet parking all operated in the palm of the attendants hand by smart phone. The vehicle is assigned a parking spot and proceeds, autonomously, to the spot parking itself without any need for human intervention. This project is premiering at the Mercedes Benz museum in Stuggart as I write this article. On July 24th, 2017 the new rental vehicle fleet will allow a customer to choose their car via the application on the smart phone, and it then arrives without the need for a driver to the pickup point. As you can image there are sensors galore that monitor the parking spaces, the roads to and from the

drop off and pick up points, and the delivery area. The plan is that automated car parking will be available in the museum parking garage to everyone by the start of 2018. What could possibly be an advantage of this? Mercedes claims that 20 percent less parking space would be taken up, allowing more vehicles to park in the garage when autonomous systems are used.

(Mercedes Benz, 2017) Technology is wonderful, it can assist our response times and help save lives, it makes our driving more efficient and almost mindless.

But where are we heading from here? In our first article we mentioned autonomous cars and their ability to navigate through traffic without human assistance. Tesla pioneered this and it seems that Mercedes is not too far behind with autonomous valet active as of today’s date!

What does this mean for our future? I’m not quite sure, but with the addition of all the technologies and assistance they provide, where does that leave the need for driver skill sets and training? If the vehicle does it for you, how will an individual know how to react when the systems fail? Or the hands free system doesn’t work? While technology sure is nice, we still need the skill sets to back us up in the event that something goes wrong.

About the Author Anthony Ricci is President of ADSI www.1adsi.com) Picture Credits: Jeep, FCA, Mercedes Benz, Onstar

(http://

IACSP Q&A

With Robert O’Neill The Navy SEAL Who Shot Bin Laden

By Paul Davis

F

ormer Navy SEAL, Senior Chief Petty Officer Robert O’Neill, has written a book in which he states that he was the man who shot America’s number one enemy, the man responsible for the horrific 9/11 terrorist attack, Osama bin Laden.

In the book, “The Operator: Firing the Shots that Killed Osama bin Laden and My Years as a SEAL Team Warrior,” Mr. O’Neill not only tells of the Abbottabad raid, he also recounts his involvement in the operation to rescue fellow SEAL Marcus Luttrell of “Lone Survivor” fame in Afghanistan, as well as his involvement in the rescue of Capt.

Richard Phillips, who was abducted by Somali pirates. The book also chronicles lesser known, but equally interesting military operations.

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Robert O’Neill was born and raised in Butte, Montana, and lived there for nineteen years until he joined the Navy in 1995. He became a SEAL a year later and participated in more than four hundred combat missions across four different theaters of war.

He was decorated more than fifty times and among his honors are two Silver Stars, four Bronze Stars with Valor, a Joint Service Commendation Medal with Valor, three Presidential Unit Citations, and a Navy/Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Valor.

Since leaving the Navy, Robert O’Neill has become a motivational speaker and he is the co-founder of “Your Grateful Nation, website, yourgratefulnation.org” - an organization committed to transitioning Special Operations veterans into their next successful career.

Robert O’Neill was interviewed by Paul Davis, a Navy veteran who served on an aircraft carrier during the Vietnam War and who is a frequent contributing editor to the Journal)

IACSP: Why did you write your book?

O’Neill: I wrote it because the story and my name had been out for a few years and it is a good American piece about a kid from Montana who didn’t know how to swim, became a Navy SEAL, and found himself on some of the most historic missions in recent history. There have been books and movies made out of it and I wanted to tell a different part of it – my part of it.

IACSP: Why did you come forward as the shooter who killed of bin Laden?

O’Neill: Initially I came forward because of

the assist in healing that I was able to give some of the 9/11 families. I donated a shirt to the 9/11 Museum in New York City and part of the deal was to get a private tour of the memorial. At the end of the tour there were about 30 or so family members who had lost love ones on 9/11, and that was

I gave him the opportunity to surrender and he didn’t and he was maneuvering, so I operated well within my rules of engagement. As far as someone criticizing me for shooting him up close like that, I’d ask them what they’ve ever done, besides run their mouth off, to risk their lives for anything.

the first time I told the story. I saw their reaction from seeing a real person with a real name and face who was there and saw the guy who funded 9/11, the worst day in their family’s history. They said I helped with the healing process.

IACSP: As you are aware, a good number of active and former SEALs have criticized you for coming out. Are you in any way ostracized from your former teammates?

O’Neill: Not the ones that I know of, no.

It’s a fast moving train down there, and if you hop off, it keeps going. I’m still in touch with quite few and I’ve lost touch with several others. If they were there, I respect their opinions, but if they weren’t there, it doesn’t really bother me. I have the upmost respect for all the guys I worked with.

IACSP: Do you get any negative feedback

from people for your role as a SEAL and the bin Laden shooting?

O’Neill: You can’t count Internet trolls, so no. I had people who came in to hear a speech and potentially criticize, but once they heard it, they said they liked it.

IACSP: Some people have said that you violated the international rules of engagement by shooting an unarmed man. How would you respond to that?

O’Neill:: We have what is called a “TIC,” Troops in Contact, and when there is an enemy aggressively maneuvering upon American or coalition forces or property, it is considered a TIC. Bin laden was not surrendering and when you deal with suicide bombers, you don’t have a lot of time to decide what to do with them, as they’ll blow everybody up and kill themselves.

I gave him the opportunity to surrender and he didn’t and he was maneuvering, so I operated well within my rules of engagement. As far as someone criticizing me for shooting him up close like that, I’d ask them what they’ve ever done, besides run their mouth off, to risk their lives for anything.

IACSP: In your time, what was the role of Navy SEALs in the war on terrorism?

my passion. It has gone from let’s help the veterans get jobs to let’s help the companies get veterans.

O’Neill: Before 9/11, we had

IACSP: Can you describe the shooting of bin Laden for our readers?

a couple of jobs here and there.

We did a lot of recon and surveillance at Kosovo, trying to maintain some stability there. We did a couple of things in Africa and Albania for embassy security and I was involved in a few ship take-downs in the Persian Gulf. We mainly did exercises and training with our allied special forces. After 9/11 we went out after high value al-Qaeda targets and eventually Taliban targets. First it was al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and then we shifted to fighting the Taliban. We were fighting against al-Qaeda in Iraq and then went after the Sunni insurgents. We were part of the “surge,” the Sunni awakening when we turned the tables in Iraq. It was basically going on “capture/kill” missions every single night based on intelligence that we found or our coalition partners found. It was a standard wake up when the sun was going down, get a brief, get some food and coffee, and then fly out to somewhere and rustle up the bad guys and save the good guys. We did it every night and we got really good at it. It was an interesting game of tactics, because the enemy was always trying to be one up on us and we had to adapt and change our tactics. It was an incredible experience.

IACSP: Do you believe you saved American lives?

O’Neill: Yes, there is no doubt. We would

It was basically going on “capture/ kill” missions every single night based on intelligence that we found or our coalition partners found. It was a standard wake up when the sun was going down, get a brief, get some food and coffee, and then fly out to somewhere and rustle up the bad

IACSP: An incredible act of bravery.

guys and save the

O’Neill: Amazing. He would have given his

good guys. We did it every night and we got really good at it.

target a lot of improvised explosive device makers who were trying to blow up coalition forces every single day. With every IED guy we took out we knew we were saving lives.

There were American soldiers who had much more dangerous jobs than we did. We were able to fight on our terms and we picked the buildings and picked the nighttime. They were out there patrolling the streets, walking through minefields, driving through roads.

Taking out someone who was trying to take them out was very noble.

It was an interesting

IACSP: What are you doing these days?

It was an incredible

O’Neill: Through my foundation, Your

experience.

game of tactics, because the enemy was always trying to be one up on us and we had to adapt and change our tactics.

Grateful Nation, I’m helping veterans transition from the military to the private sector with individualized support. A lot of vets don’t realize how much they have to offer. That is

42

O’Neill: Because of where our helicopter sat down, we didn’t go up on the rooftop as we planned. I was sort of in the back. That changed when we got to the top of the second set of stairs after we ran into Khalid bin Laden and the point man killed him. I turned into the number two man pointing up to the third floor.

I was behind one dude and everyone else was clearing the second floor. The point man was sort of telling me we have to get up as there was a curtain at the top of the stairs and we could see people behind it. He assumed they were putting on suicide vests, so we wanted to get there and try to neutralize them before they could blow the whole house up. I squeezed him on the shoulder to indicate let’s go upstairs. We went upstairs and he peeled the curtain aside and there were a few people there, mostly women. He thought they were suicide bombers, so he sort of tackled them and put his body on top of them.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

life if they did have suicide vests. I remember thinking how brave and how proud I was of him, and I turned to the right and through the doorway a few feet in front of me was bin Laden standing there with his hands on his wife’s shoulders. He was sort of pushing her towards me. He’s tall, 6’3, skinnier than I thought, his beard is shorter, it’s gray, he’s a threat, he’s not surrendering, I need to take him down. And I shot him in the head a few times as he was standing and once more on the ground just to make sure he couldn’t set off a vest that I thought he was wearing or an IED that could have been in the room. I pushed his wife to the bed and a made a brief search. His three-year-old son was in there and I remember thinking, poor kid, he’s got nothing to do with this. I picked him up and put him with his mom and then other SEALs came into the room. That’s when it started to sink in. One of my guys asked if I were OK and then said “Your life just changed. You just killed bin Laden.”

IACSP: Thank you for speaking to us and thank you for your service.

Vol. 23, No.2

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IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf

By Dr. Joshua Sinai

This column capsule reviews recent books in the areas of terrorism, counterterrorism (and counter-insurgency), and countering active shooters.

Managing the Unthinkable:

T

Crisis Preparation and Response for Campus Leaders Gretchen M. Bataille and Diana I. Cordova, editors, (Sterling, VA: Stylus, 2014), 256 pages, $95.00, $39.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-6203-6072-9.

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his important book provides useful practitioner-based insights, guidance and check-lists by leading experts on college/university campus security in areas such as emergency preparedness, assigning roles and responsibilities, and responding to crisis contingencies, whether the disasters are natural (e.g., hurricanes, tornados, etc.) or human (e.g., terrorism, active shooters, etc.). The book is divided into five parts: Part One: “Preparing for and Managing a Crisis” (e.g., the role of leadership during a crisis, creating resilience to recover from disaster); Part Two: “Accidents, Catastrophes, and Natural Disasters (e.g., the roles of preparation, response, and recovery from a natural disaster, including sheltering from a storm); Part Three: “Building a Team: Shared Responsibilities” (e.g., tailored leadership responses to levels of crises, managing crisis communications with university governing boards, and utilizing tools to rebuild after a crisis); Part Four: “Dealing with the Media: Who to Tell What and When” (e.g., lessons learned in crisis communications from the Virginia Tech 2007 tragedy, managing crisis communications vis-à-vis the media that will require information); and Part Five: “Remembrance and Healing” (e.g. the importance of remembering the incident and restoring hope, and managing the “blame game” which might ensue in the aftermath of a disaster).

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Vol. 23, No.2

Warnings Unheeded:

Twin Tragedies at Fairchild Air Force Base Andy Brown, (Spokane, WA: WU Press, 2016), 378 pages, $19.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-9978-6340-6.

The author of this important book, at the time a five-year veteran of the Air Force who was deployed as a security policeman on bike patrol, was responsible for firing what became known as “the shot” that stopped Dean Mellberg’s murderous shooting rampage through the Fairchild Air Force Base hospital complex on June 20, 1994, in Spokane, Washington, killing four and wounding 23 others. Mellberg, a mentally unstable 20-year-old who had been dishonorably discharged from the Air Force as an airman some five weeks earlier, had embarked on his vengeful shooting rampage against a psychiatrist and psychologist whose diagnosis of him had finally led to his discharge from the service. In this book, the author meticulously reconstructs all the events in Mellberg’s troubled life and problematic Air Force service that had led to the shooting, including the impact of the incident on his own life and subsequent military career.

Tragically for the shooting’s victims and all those who had to endure associating with him during his problematic military service, as the author writes, Mellberg had always been unable to fit in, with several psychological exams revealing him as having a “generalized anxiety disorder with strong obsessive traits,” with a potential to do harm to himself and others. Despite these warning signs, he was able to continue his military service, because, as the author writes, “On three separate occasions, squadron leadership selected to retain Mellberg on active duty despite strong recommendations from mental health professionals to discharge him.” Moreover, Mellberg was also “able to affect his treatment by purging unfavorable documentation from his medical records.” This case had important repercussions for the Department of Defense’s mental health instructions, the author adds, with new instructions including “a requirement to development treatment plans for ‘imminently dangerous’ service members before they are discharged. They also defined imminent and potential dangerousness and established requirements to take precautions against threatened injury.” This book discusses another “warning unheeded” incident, as well, concerning a B-52 pilot at the base whose reckless aerial maneuvers had caused concern among his colleagues, eventually leading to crashing his aircraft at an air show practice mission four days after Mellberg’s shooting. Also discussed is the author’s own troubled recovery process in the aftermath of the shooting incident, including his eventual successful recovery and work at the Department of Homeland Security. The book also includes valuable reference materials, such as a listing of the traits of a violent person and the phased-pathway to violence of mass killers, as well as reproductions of Mellberg’s psychiatric evaluations. As a meticulous reconstruction and assessment of Mellberg’s pathway to violence and how his case was handled by military authorities, as well as its impact on the author’s life and career, this is one of the most insightful books written on the phenomenon of active shooters and how they end up affecting the lives of others in their surroundings.

Israel’s Edge:

The Story of the IDF’s Most Elite Unit - Talpiot

Jason Gerwirtz, (Jerusalem, Israel/New York, NY: Gefen Publishing House, 2016), 256 pages, $18.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-9-6522-9713-6.

This is a fascinating and detailed account of Talpiot (Hebrew for “sturdy strongholds”), an elite Israel Defense Forces (IDF) training program, which was established in 1979. As the author explains, it is intended for recruits who demonstrate outstanding academic ability in the sciences and leadership potential, which are utilized to further IDF research and development in military technologies. Over the years, as detailed by the author, once the program’s graduates joined various IDF units, they were responsible for developing innovative military systems such as “The Trophy” (a tank-mounted anti-rocket device that is deployed on Merkava tanks), programming warfare-related software systems in Unit 8200 (Israel’s equivalent of the NSA), and anti-missile defensive systems such as the Iron Dome. It is likely, the author notes, that

recent Talpiot graduates are also involved in developing cutting-edge technological solutions to counter Hamas’s underground tunnels from Gaza into Israel. Another contribution of Talpiot is in the private sector, where early graduates included such luminaries such as Marius Nacht, the co-founder of the Israel-based Check Point Software Technologies, a cyber protection firm. In Chapter 19, the author provides a useful listing of Talpiot’s 26 classes’ outstanding graduates and their contributions. The author concludes that Talpiot’s indispensable contribution, as noted by one of its graduates, is that “Research through Talpiot is often about originality. I would not have been as good of a researcher or a physicist without Talpiot. It empowers you.” The author is an U.S.-based executive producer for the business network CNBC.

Defensive Shield:

An Israeli Special Forces Commander on the Front Line of Counterterrorism

Gal Hirsch, (Jerusalem, Israel/New York, NY: Gefen Publishing House, 2016), 450 pages, $29.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-9-6522-9865-2.

This is an English version of a highly popular book published in Hebrew by retired Israeli Brigadier-General Gal Hirsch, considered the main scapegoat of Israel’s problematic 2006 Lebanon war with Hizballah. In this account, the author takes the reader on a journey through his distinguished 34 years in military service, which concluded with a controversy over his role in the 2006 Lebanon War. What makes this book especially noteworthy is not only the fascinating account of his military service, including his role in commanding numerous battles, but the extensive insights he provides on how to conduct war against asymmetric adversaries, such as the Lebanese Hizballah. As he writes, “There is a significant difference between classical warfare involving regular armies of countries and asymmetric conflicts. The conflict between irregular forces and national institutions (the country’s regular military and security services) requires continuous interpretation, continuous creation of solutions, and continuous development of capabilities. The fight against evasive-subversive elements includes many difficulties because the violence, terror, or guerrilla warfare includes many difficulties because the violence, terror, or guerrilla warfare it carries out is dependent on the civilian population, on national institutions (even though they themselves are being attacked), and on the shelter provided by the institutions, the law, culture, and the population.” In a concluding section, he presciently recommends reformulating the “all-too-familiar formula C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance)” as C6ISR, which would include the additional fifth and sixth elements of “cyber” and “special forces,” since special forces are now required to counter what are largely asymmetric adversaries. This is an indispensable book by a top military commander for understanding how to wage war against the current threats posed by asymmetrical adversaries. The author is a successful entrepreneur at a private sector defense firm.

Living Beyond Terrorism:

Israeli Stories of Hope and Healing

Zieva Dauber Konvisser, (Jerusalem, Israel/New York, NY: Gefen Publishing House, 2014), 356 pages, $26.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-9-6522-9643-6.

This is an important account, within the Israeli context, of the psychological and emotional consequences of those who survive terror attacks, including their impact beyond the victims and their families to wider circles in society. These issues are examined by answering questions such as: “How do Israeli survivors and families of survivors and victims live with the constant threat of terrorism and the social and economic disruptions of their lives? How do they develop coping skills and adapt to their situation? What do these changes look like and how are they manifested? What accounts for the fact that so many of them did as well as they did? Was their

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recovery due to certain pre-trauma personality traits and inner resources and/or to their post-trauma environment – their families, their communities, and the organizations with which they had contact?”

These questions were posed to a study sample of twenty-four Israelis who had survived Palestinian terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2003, with the interviews conducted in 2004, with follow-up interviews held in 2007 and 2013. The book consists of an introductory overview of terrorism and its impact on its victims and others in society, which is followed by an account of the personal stories of the survivors. The concluding chapter presents the author’s findings, for example, that with the help of support networks, such individuals can experience post-traumatic stress as well as post-traumatic growth and resilience. The Appendices include an explanation of the research methodology, a chronology of major events in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a glossary and a selected bibliography. The author is a Fellow of the Institute for Social Innovation at Fielding Graduate University, in Santa Barbara, CA.

Hacking ISIS:

How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad

Malcolm Nance and Chris Sampson, (New York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 320 pages, $27.99 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-5107-1892-0.

This is an invaluable reference resource about how the Islamic State (IS/ISIS) operates in cyberspace and the measures being employed to counter and defeat what the authors term “cyber jihad.” The book’s chapters cover topics such as the history of the cyber jihad (e.g., from al Qaida in Iraq to the Islamic State of Iraq); the cyber caliphate’s “spy chain of command” (the media propagation teams and media council); the extent of its cyber battlespace (e.g., the surface web, the the deep web, and the dark web); its applications such as Telegram, Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, and others; the software used by the global jihad, such as end-to-end encrypted messaging apps, WhatsApp, and others; its official and “wannabe” cyber warrior units, such as online jihadi groups, the Islamic State Hacking Division; its video media structure, video themes, and magazines; the involvement of women in the cyber jihad; and the appeal of the cyber jihad to lone wolves. The final chapters discuss the anti-ISIS’s cyber campaign (e.g., the online campaigns against ISIS by the United States, other countries, and social media corporations, such as Facebook and Twitter, and even a counter-ISIS campaign by the Anonymous hacker community); and intelligence tools that are used to counter ISIS’s websites, such as counter-narratives, the use of malware, and trolling. In the conclusion, the authors insightfully point out that “the destruction of ISIS will be a historic achievement, but the by-product will be a less centralized terror group that will rely much more on inspiring terror attacks rather than planning them and deploying cells.” As a result, they foresee a rise in attacks by lone wolves, “who dream up a plan and then execute it without saying a word or leaving a deep digital footprint, [which] are extremely difficult to detect.” It is such insights and an encyclopedic listing of entries on ISIS’s operations in cyberspace that make this book an indispensable reference resource for analyzing latest trends in cyber jihad and how to counter it at the governmental and private sector levels. Both authors are veteran terrorism and counterterrorism experts and executive leaders of the research institute TAPSTRI – Terror Asymmetrics Project on Strategy, Tactics, and Radical Ideologies.

Turning to Political Violence: The Emergence of Terrorism

Marc Sageman, (Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2017), 520 pages, $49.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-8122-4877-7.

In this book the author proposes a conceptual model of what is termed “social identity perspective” (SIP) to explain the process by which a tiny proportion of individuals in society who are strongly disaffected turn to terrorist violence. It is an uneven book. The book’s preface and the first chapter in which the SIP model are discussed are highly theoretical and abstract and will be of primary interest to academics, but not the general public. This discussion also lacks a diagram to visualize the model, which would help in better understanding it. Some of the author’s analysis can be disputed, such as his opaque and drawn out definition of terrorism as “out-group political violence during domestic

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peacetime” (it took this reviewer a while to figure out where the definition was actually described) – when this term is generally defined in the literature as a military tactic employed by sub-state actors in peacetime and wartime, and which is distinguished from guerrilla warfare or conventional warfare.

Moreover, while the author is correct that “Discursive political protest communities, based on a sense of shared social identities, do not emerge by themselves,” but are the product of a wider “political context,” when he begins to generalize that all groups that become “terrorist” (at least as he defines it) emerge from a “disillusionment with nonviolent strategy” and a “moral outrage at state aggression,” then such an explanation does not characterize terrorist groups such as al Qaida, the Islamic State, and others that never consider nonviolent strategy as an option in fulfilling their genocidal objectives. The book becomes more interesting and informative when its chapters turn to case studies of the political resort to violence prior to the 1920s by groups during the French Revolution, Russian and American anarchists. The book concludes with the author’s policy recommendation for preventing political violence, which is more relevant to resolving the resort to political violence by groups such as the IRA or others that can be reasoned with, than genocidal groups such as al Qaida and the Islamic State.

In the Appendix, the author uses a quantifiable formula to test the SIP’s applicability to explaining the turn to political violence to 34 cases of terrorist-type groups. The author is a forensic psychiatrist who advises U.S. government agencies in counter-terrorism. He is the author of three books on Jihadi terrorism, the first two of which this reviewer highly praised.

Anatomy of Terror:

From the Death of Bin Laden to the Rise of the Islamic State

Ali Soufan, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017), 384 pages, $27.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-3932-4117-4.

In this sweeping, comprehensive, and interesting account, the author , a former FBI Special Agent who was one of the first to investigate al Qaida prior to 9/11, focuses on key individuals responsible for the evolution and current state of al Qaida and the Islamic State. As the author explains, through tracing important figures such as Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri (his long-time deputy and the group’s current leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian militant who established the organization that would become the Islamic State (IS), and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, its current “caliph,” and others, “we will trace the transformation of al-Qaeda as an organization, the simultaneous development of bin Ladenism into a far more potent and lethal force, the rise and decline of the Islamic State, and the impending resurgence of al-Qaeda.” There is much to commend in this account, including the author’s discussion of the Islamic State’s attempt to implement their doctrinal Management of Savagery’s three phases of establishing an Islamic Caliphate (terrorism, insurgency, and establishment of a proto-state), with the prospect for the third phase currently being rolled back by its government adversaries, which will result in its reverting to the terrorism phase. The concluding chapter presents the author’s recommendation for countering the Islamic State, which is based on four measures: exposing this movement’s “basic hypocrisy,” utilizing effective spokesmen, such as rehabilitated former extremists in counter-narrative campaigns, “inoculating” the population that supports them with “the tools of critical thinking to resist false narratives and identify true ones”, and offering them rehabilitation programs to help them re-integrate in their societies. The author is the CEO of The Soufan Group, a consultancy on counterterrorism, in New York City.

About the Reviewer Dr. Joshua Sinai is a senior analyst at Kiernan Group Holdings (KGH), a homeland security and counterterrorism consulting and research firm, in Alexandria. VA. He can be reached at Sinai@kiernan.co.

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Vol. 23, No.2

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