GJIA - 1.1 Religion and Power by GJIA (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs)

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Ladiesand Gentlemen: From time to time, we have the privilege of writing to you to tell you of opporlunities to connect wilh Georgetownin an areathat may be of interestto you. Enclosedis a complimentarycopy of the premier issueof the GeorgetownJournal of International Afairs. TtreJournal is produced by graduateand undergraduatestudentsof GeorgetownUniversity, and will be availablebiannually. It featuresinterviews and articleswritten by prominentpolicymakers,scholars,and businessleaderson a comprehensive range of issuesin internationalaffairs.

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Pleasetake a momentto review this academicjournal managedby someof the brightestyoung minds on the Hilltop. Their mission is to offer you a fresh and engagingperspectiveon foreign affairs that reflects the rapidly shifting dynamicsof the world today.Moreover,rheJournal servesas one of thoserare cocumicularactivitiesthat enablesGeorgetownstudentsto gain practicalexperiencein creatinga professionalpublication. Ifyou would like to subscribe,pleasereturn the enclosedbusiness-replycard, call (888) 297-0757,or visit the -/or.rrnal'sWebsite at http://joumal.georgetown.edu. Whether or not you decideto receive future issuesof the -Iournal,l know that you want to join me in congratulatingtheseGeorgetownstudentslor their initiativeand commitmentto making this joumalistic enterDrise a success.

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Foreword fromthe Founding Editors gUltors'Note

Forum Religionand Powerin InternationalAffairs. Themodernmindrnay separate Caesar and God, but old connections remain. Religion is currently at the heart of conflicts in Ireland, Indonesia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Kashmir, Sudan, and scores ofother trouble spots across the globe. It has been the world's most enduring source of conflict, and will probably remain so for the foreseeable future, just as it will rernain a powerful force for good. Our Forum focuses on religion, power, and how the two will interact into the next century.

WithGodonTheirSide W I L L I A I \ i ]I V ] A R T I N

Rethinking U.S.Foreign PolicyandIslamafterl(osovo J O H N L , E S P O S I T O& V A L I R , N A S R

Responding Terrorism to Religious MARKJUERGENSMEYER

Faithin Development B R Y A N TI V l Y E R S A ,L A N W H A I T E S & B R U C EW I L K I N S O N

Conflict& Security +r

Threats: Cyber TenIssues for Consideration F R A N KJ . C I L L U F F& O P A U LB Y R O NP A T T A K New threats from cyberspace demand an immediate response from the national security community-and beyond.

Interview: Is l(enneth WaltzStillM.A.D.aboutNukes? Concerns about loose nukes and rogue states' nuclear ambitions are proliferating, but Kenneth Waltr isn't worried.

til

Culture &Society s7

NorthernIreland'sBurdenof History JoHNE.osBoRN The key to peace is to understand history-and

then to overcorne it.

Finance Business& 67

r. GRrswoLD StopWorrying aboutthe U.S.TradeDeficit onrurrr Despite the concern of pundits and the public, the United States should do nothing about its historic trade deficit.

Interview: Douglas Ivester Coca-Cola's Coke's CEO talks about being local in the age of globalization.

Law&Ethics Ethicsand Foreign Policy DAVrD A. wELcH Emerging global ethical norrns based on consent may render moral debates about foreign policy irrelevant.

Politics& Diplomacl 89

pRrNcEroN N.LyMAN andthe Demands of Governance Globlization Globalization's new challenges will require active, multilateral U.S. engagement.

ertnerJoscHKA FrscHER T h eI n d i s p e n s a bPl a A confident Europe can only strengthen the transatlantic alliance between the "indispensable nation" and its "indispensable partner." ro3

LAVrN Listento the Public? FRANK ShouldPolicymakers The short answer is no. A case for leadership.

Science&Technology ro7

A. MATTHEW In Searchof Environmental LeadershipRTcHARD Post-Rio depression' Wfrere have all the Arnericans gone?

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Gonlents

Books II5

TheStrange Deathof the USSR Belief' The William Wohlforth reviews Paul Hollander's PolificolWII and Personal Declineand Fallof SotietCommunismand Gorbacheu'On M1 County and the World.

rrB

AfricanMercenaries Herbert

M. Howe reviews Mercenartes, An AfricanSecuri! Dilemma.

TheVirtualState& GlobalPolitics Richard Mansbach reviews Richard Rosecrance's The Riseof the Vrtual State,Wealth andPouer in the ComingCentury.

ViewfromtheGround t23

BrKo In Searchof the PromisedLand HLUTvELo South Africa's woes have not disappeared with the end of apartheid.

A LookBack t27

TheCIA and RadioFreeEurope coRDMEyER A forrner CIA operative on the Agency's covert involvement Radio Free Eurooe.

with

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Jqurttal Georgetown F O U N D I N GE D I T O R S M I G U E L B U C K E N M E Y E R JEREMY COLDBERG DAVID HENSCHEL

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Foreword fromthe Founding Editors

Brave NewJo,rrnal Dner REaonrs, In rgg/, a group of students at Georgetown lJniversity's School of Foreign Service set out to establish a publication that would push the boundaries of traditional international affairs discourse and, in the process, appeal to a broad audience. The of InternationalAffairs. product is this, the GeorgetounJournal have From the outset, students been the driving force behind the;lournol'sexpansive rnission, and it is our hope that the graduate-undergraduate staff will continually test the limits of the discipline. Their proximity to government and business as well as to an exceptional faculty, to be sure, will keep this publication ahead of the curve. For you, the reader, we offer comprehensiveness and accessibility. The/ournol features interviews and articles-some by narnes you will recognize, and some by those who merit wider exposure-that cut across the discipline, providing fresh perspectives on complex issues.At the center of each issue is a Forum, where experts weigh in on a pressing topic from different angles. This vehicle for thought and debate on international affairs has been the product of countless individuals, without whose efforts the Georgetown Journal of InternationalAffairs could not have become a reality. Miguel Buckenmeyer, co-founder of the Journal, deserves special mention. During the definitive r997-98 academic year, Migrrel played a critical role in the conceptualization theJournal. Since graduating from the MSFS program in t998, he has served as therlournal'sdesigner, spending countless hours developing its look and feel.

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Editors-in-Chlef Stephanie Kaplan and Ben Powell undertook the tremendous task of producing this inaugrrral issue. In our early days, Michael Rabjohns and Elias Soussou played indispensable roles. Beyond these individuals, scoresof students have helped the Journalreach this point. 'We are also grateful for the support of the School of Foreign Service and the Georgetown administration. Without Dean Robert Gallucci's foresight, leadership, and support, this endeavor would not have been possible. We would also like to recognize Mary Carrasco and Christine Smith, as well as the Development Office and countless others in OAUR; Lisa Krim and the Legal Counsel's Office; Associate Dean Jennifer Ward and the SFS Dean's Office; and the Office of the President. The support and grridance of the faculty has been invaluable as well. Special thanks toJames Clad for his insight and inspiration; to Dean Emeritus Peter Krogh, Peter Dunkley, Carol Lancaster, Susan Pinkard, Howard Schaffer, and Casimir Yost; to original Advisory Circle members Anthony Arend, Michael Brown, John Esposito, Herbert Howe, Christopher Joyner, and George Shambaugh; and to all members who have joined us subsequently. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to the alumni and patrons who supported the Journal long before our authors had even put pen to paper. And to the reader, we offer you a quote from an Editor's Note in ForegnPoligthree years ago that servesas our rallying cry' "Nearly three decadesago, Samuel Huntington, one of the founders of ForeignPolg,justified the decision to launch [the] journal by noting that the history of magazines concerned with foreign poiicy and international affairs [sho*s] that at each major turn in U.S. foreign policy, each shift in the U.S. role in the world, a new magazine has come into existence," We're here. Jrnruv Gornsrnc

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Editors'Note Tl:e Georgetoun Affans premieres in a new millenJoumal of International nium wrought with growing contradictions and enduring tensions. Advances in communications technology and a growing acceptance of democracy and capitalism have effectively put interdependence on steroids. The disrupting forces of globalization now collide with the traditional order, redefining standard notions of security, identity, and the state itself. The consequences of this collision will determine how we come to understand-and define-this new era in international affairs. A principal theme of this inaugural issue is that in a globalized world, no country can go it entirely alone. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer writes that Europe and America's future lie in increased cooperation, with a more independent Europe playing the role of "indispensable partner." Frank Cilluffo and Paul Byron Pattak make the casefor a stronger partnership between the public and private sectors to meet unprecedented security threats in cyberspace. Despite the globalization revolution, however, old issues stubbornly persist. Our Forum contributors weigh in on religion's role as a catalystfor conflict, an agent of peace, and a moral lens through which to view the world. John Osborn looks to history for an answer to peace in Northern Ireland, and Kenneth Waltz cites the past as evidence to explain why nuclear doctrines of old still apply in the post-Cold War world. And all of this on the watch of a leader that does not alwayslead. As Richard Matthew argues, the United Stateshas been more laggard than leader on international efforts to protect the environment. Washington, long a force in the global environmental movement, may today be "irrevocably out of touch with the rest of humankind." Princeton Lyman echoes this sentiment, arguing that globalization has brought with it new challenges that firmly resist unilateral control and that will require a concerted public response. How will nations, especially the United States, react to this unfamiliar world of growing contradictions and enduring tensions? With some humility, we hope. Towering over the world like a global colossus, a benign hegemon, or a drunken gorilla (depending on taste), the United Stateswould be wise to followJohn F. Kennedy's intonation that with privilege comes responsibility. Today and into the foreseeable future, responsibility means applying vision, equanimity, reliability, and good faith to the conduct of statecraft. We hope the articles in our first issue contribute to this goal, and we hope that you enjoy reading them. BrN PowErr-

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GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

:hat in a globalized Ian Foreign Minis ~rica's future lie in Europe playing the nd Paul Byron Pat een the public and reats in cyberspace. r, old issues stub l on religion's role norallens through ;tory for an answer tz cites the past as I still apply in the

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power 7 VVith God on Their Side

Jews, Chris tians, Muslims and their influence on U.S. foreign-policy making. WILLIAM MARTIN

For more than

two thousand years Rethinking U.S. Foreign Poliry and Islam faith and politics have been inextricably , after Kosovo Islam is neither monolith linked. The modern mind may separate ic nor America's enemy. Caesar and God, but old connections I JOHN L. ESPOSITO & VAll R. NASR remain. Religion is currently at the heart of conflicts in Ireland, Indonesia, Kosovo, Responding to ReligiOUS Terrorism Five Chechnya, Kashmir, Sudan and scores of approaches to fighting it. other trouble spots across the globe. It has MARK JUERGENSMEYER been the world's most enduring source of conflict, and will probably remain so for the Faith in Development An insider's foreseeable future, just as it will remain a perspective on the work of faith powerful force for good. Our Forum focusbased NGOs. es on religion, power, and how the two will BRYANT MYERS, ALAN WHAITES & BRUCE interact into the next century. WILKINSON

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Religion andPower

WithGodonTheirSide William Martin The United States' record on religious tolerance, though far from perfect, is a notable achievement in hurnan history and one of the nation's most adrnirable accomplishments. This is not to say, however, that religion has not, does not, or should not play a significant role in shaping the nation's domestic and foreign policy. Indeed, examples of such religious influence abound. In this article, I analyze three significant current efforts: the long-established, highly successful, and still-evolving activities of the Jewish-American community with respect to Israel and the Middle East; the increasing impact of the conservative Christian rnovernent known as the Religious Right; and the nascent efforts of a diverse and growing American Muslim population to speak with a unified voice on matters of vital interest to Islamic peoples.

William Martin i" the Chavanne Professor of Religion and Public Policy, Department of Sociology, Rice University and a senior scholar at the JamesA. Baker III Institute for Public Polic"

ic t}re

author of Wifh Godon Our Side'TheRiseofthe Relisious Rightin Americo.

The Jewish Community. The phenomenal success of

'Jewish Lobby" over the past half-century began with a the successful campaign in rg47 to persuade Harry Trurnan to recognize Israel despite opposition from Secretary of State George Marshall and mernbers of the professional diplomatic corps who felt the status of Palestinian claims in the region needed to be clarified before the United States gave its blessing. Over the years, American Jews have combined trernendous organizational ability, accessto wealth and media, and diligent networking with corporate executives and govern-

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ment leaders to create a coalition that has exercised decisive influence over the shape of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. The centerpiece of that policy has been the "special relationship" between the United Statesand Israel, a relationship that, despite its own stormy spells and the difficulties it poses for relations with Israel's neighbors, has provided Israel with firm guarantees of security and over $3 billion annually in grants and loans for many years. Politically active American Jews are involved in a variety of organizations covering the entire range of the ideological spectrum. The AmericanJewish Congress has long played a key role in apprising Congressional members of Israel's needs and concerns. Every year, for example, it gathers U.S. politicians in Israel to provide them with firsthand exposure to that country's security situation and to impress upon them "the critical importance of an undivided Jerusalem." For some time, however, the leading pro-Israeli lobby has been the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). In a typical example of its unflagging determination to promote and protect Israel's interests, AIPAC recently launched a "community-wide" effort to lobby for the Congressional authorization of $r.z billion to help Israel meet the demands of the Wye River Accords, which call for Israel's withdrawal from occupied territory and the relocation some of its militarybases. The "community" AIPAC sought to rally includes the Conference of Presidents, representing more than fifty Jewish organizations and more than one hundred political action committees able to direct their support to members of Congress who demonstrate strong loyalty to Israel. Standing further to the right is the Zionist Organization of America, with strong

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ties to both Likud and right-wing forces in Congress and strong resistance to the peace Process. Despite the well-documented benefits American Jews have been able to secure for Israel, it has become increasingly clear in recent years that labeling theJew'Jewish money" or ish community (or "theJewish vote") as a single, monolithic entity with a unified political agenda is hardly accurate. The division between secular and religiousJews in Israel is deep and serious, and those broad aggregates are themselves divided into hawks and doves; into groups willing to trade land for peace and groups willing to seize land and displace Palestinians regardless of the consequences;into OrthodoxJews committed to actions they feel will pave the way for the Messiah and Orthodox Jews who believe that trying to rush the Messiah's coming will incur God's wrath; and into parties on the left and right of both Labor and Likud, some of which are rnore concerned with dornestic issues than with territorial disputes or the internationalization of Jerusalem. It should not surprise us, then, that American Jews differ in their political opinions and interests, and while some feel closely bound to particular factions in Israel, many others lack such ties and regard events in the Middle East with considerable detachment. It is highly likely that any serious threat to Israel's survival would immediately cause most American Jews to lay aside their differences. But short of such a situation, no such unanimity exists. Many Reform and Conservative Jews, not to non-practicing mention Jews, are offended when Orthodox Israelis seek to set the criteria for deterrnining who is truly aJew or to shift the course of Israelofflcially a secular democracy-in a theo-

r v r A R r r NR e l i g i o na n d P o w e r

cratic direction. Similarly, growing numbers of Jews in both countries acknowledge that the only formula for a lasting peace in the Middle East must involve cessation of settlements in Palestinian areas and surrender of some land in the West Bank and Gaza. For example, the Democratic National Convention's rgg2 platform included for the first time a plank that, while still strongly influenced by AIPAC positions, nevertheless made a commitment to the peaceprocess"rooted in the tradition of the Camp David Accords." Also for the first time, the drafting committee included members of Americans for PeaceNow, a leader in the American "peace camp." Such willingness to diverge from unquestioning support of hardline positions is increasingly common. A tgg8 poll conducted simultaneously by the LosAngeles Timesand the Israeli newspaper Tediot'4haronot revealed that only {o percent ofAmericanJews felt they had an obligation to support Israel if they disagreed with its policies.'

gious Right leaders or supporters, as well as direct mailings, telemarketing campaigns, and Internet sites. They also use a multi-layered network of churches and "parachurch" organizations to identify supporters, fundraise, and provide programs and candidates around which to rally. When their candidates are elected, they supply them with a steady flow of research and position papers and, when the need arises, inundate their offices with a barrage of faxes, e-mails, letters, and telephone calls. The result is impressive. As some members of Congress have noted, rnany groups have a great Washington presence and some have great grassroots, but few combine them both. The Religious Right first began to flex its muscles during the Reagan years, when, with encouragement from the State Department, adherents offered both ideological and financial support to anti-Communist forces in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. More recently, with experience and enhanced organization, Christian conservativeshave widened the scope of their agenda. Some of their causes echo the interests of their allies and mentors among the New Right or "movement conservatives" who in recent decades have nudged U.S. foreign policy to the right. Others are driven by the same values that underlie their domestic agenda. They have, for example, consistently opposed any foreign policy initiative that might facilitate abortion, expand the rights of homosexuals, or devalue the role of the conventional hornemaker and mother. Religious conservatives have also vigorously lobbied for legislation that would impose sanctions on countries that persecute or limit the freedom of Christians to worship and evangelize. In this context, they have paid particular attention

A newGhristian Conservatives. er-but increasingly potent and more distinct-religious influence on American foreign policy has emerged from the ranks of politically active Christian (mostly conservatives Caucasian Protestants), commonly identified as the Religious Rlght. Researchers who track this movement estimate that it comprises approximately one-sixth of eligible voters-a substantial aggregate, but nevertheless a minority. LikeJewish activists, Christian conservatives compensate for their size by mastery of technology and organization. The United States has more than r,6oo Christian radio stations and nearly 2$o Christian television stations, almost all of which carry programs produced by Reli-

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to China, and were instrumental in pressuring Congress to passthe International Religious Freedom Act in late rgg8. This act creates a White House office for reporting religious persecution worldwide and allows the president to choose from a variety of measures, ranging from

mission, the Council on Foreign Relations, the World Council of Churches, and, in some quarters, the Roman Catholic Church. This propensity stems frorn several sources, including standard-issue isolationism, a fear of losing national sovereignty to a liberal internad i p l o m a t i c p r o t e s t t o e c o n o m i c s a n c - tional order, and a conviction that the tions, in order to punish offending UN and other efforts at global govercountries. Though less stringent than the nance are controlled by Marxists, secular Religious Right wanted, this legislation humanists, and radical (often homosexcould impact dozens of countries with ual) feminists bent on eradicating tradiless than exemplary records on religious tional Christian .,alues-perhaps with a freedom. These include close Arnerican standing UN military force to back their trading partners such as Egpt, India, goals. Another important source of these Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. concerns is a theological doctrine widely In rggB, religious and social consery- shared in fundamentalist and Pentecostal atives in the House of Representatives circles known as "Dispensationalist Prenearly blocked $IB billion in appropriamillennialism." This doctrine holds that tions for the International Monetary highly figurative apocaiyptic passagesin Fund, in part becausethe fund channels such biblical sources as Ezekiel, Daniel, money to countries and organizations and the book of Revelation furnish a that regard abortion as an acceptable blueprint for the "Last Days," which are form of family planning or population likely to come upon us at any mornent. control. The United Nations is another Dispensationalistsbelieve that the imrnifavorite whipping boy. In large measure n e n t a p p e a r a n c e a n d r e i g n o f t h e because of opposition from the ReliAntichrist will feature a unified political gious Right, the United States did not and economic dictatorship so complete contribute to the UN Population Fund that buying or selling will be impossible in 1998, jeopardizing a program that without his authorization. A mighty False provides contraceptives to nearly l {. Prophet will lead a global religion to bolmillion wornen in I5O countries. More ster this regime. In such an atmosphere, in tellingly, the billion or so dollars UN terms such as "global governance" and (the "new world order" resonate with omiarrears United States and the UN disagree on the amount) was held nous overtones and any organizatior: hostage at the insistence of House aspiring to multinational or global influRepublicans aligned with the Religious ence is sure to be viewed with suspicion. Right that funding be tied to legislative Dispensationalisrn also underlies the language barring aid to organizations unwavering support which virtually all that seekto legalize or fund abortions. segments of the Christian Right give to Israel. The key to understanding this Religious Right activists have also been is the belief that a complete phenornenon critical of the International Criminal restoration of the nation of Israel, Court and other multinational or broad-scope organizations such as the including the rebuilding of the Temple inJerusalem, is a prerequisite to the end European lJnion, the tilateral Com-

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M A R T T NR e l i g i o na n d P o w e r of the present age (or "dispensation"), which will usher in the Second Coming of Christ and the establishrnent of his millennial reign. Consequently, Christians must support Israel. While overlooking this ironic scenario which envisions a mass conversion of Jews, Jewish leaders have welcomed the efforts of America's evangelical Christians to bolster Israel's defense against hostile neighbors. The Israeli government has assiduously wooed prominent evangelical leaders-such as television evangelists and presidents and deans of evangelical seminaries-by bringing them to Israel at lit-

At one rgg8 meeting, Falwell pledged to administration's resist the Clinton efforts to pressure Israel into ceding more land back to the Palestinians. "There are about 2OO,OOO evangelical pastors in America," he observed, "and we're asking them all through e-mail, faxes, letters, and telephone to go into their pulpits and use their influence in support of the state of Israel and the prirne minister." In an extensive October r99B article in Christiant!Todg, evangelical historian Timothy Weber noted that, in addition to such high-level efforts, "scores of small, grassroots,pro-

tle or no cost and favoring the tour

Israel organizations that rarely get into

: I

The Israeli governmenthasassid.uously wooed evangeliJd leaders, brins"ing thern to Israel at little or n"o cost and favoring-the"tour groups they lead with briefings by cablnet officeis groups they lead with briefings by cabinet officers. And when an Israeli Prime Minister visits America, he is sure to meet with leaders of the Christian Right, both in public and private. In April 1998, when Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a Washington audience of 3,ooo people attending a Voices United for Israel conference-at least two-thirds of whom were evangelical Christians-he observed that "we have no greater friends and allies than the people sitting in this room." In return for such attention, conservative notables such asJerry Falwell and Pat Robertson arrange meetings between evangelical leaders and Israeli officials, deliver passionately pro*Israel messages on their radio and television programs, and invite their followers to urge their mernbers of Congress to support Israel.

the headlines exist to educate and mobilize their local communities to support Israel. " Weber also called attention to "an enormous network of pro-Israel and Christian Zionist organizations" and noted that "Most of them have their own Web pages on the Internet, and they usually have links to one another."'

The MuslimCommunity. until quite recently, Muslims in the United States have shown little interest in organizing themselves to wield political influence. This appears to be changing as thoughtful leaders recognize that strategic mobilization of approximately six million co-religionists could enable thern to speak with a louder voice. Most major cities have a few prominent Muslim activistsand organizations. In tgg/ a

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group of national Islamic organizations formed a Coordination Committee designed to provide consistent advice to Muslims about political issues and candidates. In addition, the Committee attempts to "bring Muslims off the political sidelines and onto the political playing field." This trend is spreading through the American Muslim population. Richard Curtiss, the executive editor of the I4loshinglon Reporton Middle EastAffairs, favors a plan to devise a questionnaire to be sent to all candidates for U.S. federal office, with the results to be discussed "in every mosque in America." If candidates are aware of such a process, Curtiss contends, "they will start paying attention to the issues which concern the Islamic community," issues that would include "an even-handed U.S. foreign policy in support of human rights, self-determination, and fair play abroad." Such an initiative could be expected to have an impact on U.S. foreign policy. The point, he stresses,"is to become known as a community that votes, and can vote as a bloc when one candidate is judged better suited on the basis of Islarnic standards. " Some of these standards-particularly those supporting conservative family values-would mesh smoothly with those of the Religious Right. Others relate directly to distinct Muslim concerns, such as greater religious tolerance toward the Islamic community, accommodation of religious observances and practices of Islamic workers, and securing chaplains for Muslims in the military. Regarding foreign policy, key concerns include selfdetermination for Kashmir, support for the Muslim-led government of Bosnia, opposition to Serbian repression of Kosovar Albanians, cessation of Russian attacks on Muslirn civilians in Chechnva.

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and self-determination, to the establishment of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.3 Several Muslim leaders have imitated the tactics of the Religious Right and implored their co-religionists to become more politically active. They have encouraged the Islamic community to influence the political process by conducting voter registration drives, attending precinct caucusesof the political party of their choice, establishing personal contacts with congressmen, and seeking elective and public office. Noting that Christians have risen to power in some Muslim countries, predominantly Professor Ali SUNY-Binghamton Mazrui asks, "Why shouldn't Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries increasing and seek participation ernpowerrnent for themselves?" While conceding that "American Muslims may never equal the power of the Jews in the U.S. system," Mazrui thinks it reasonable to hope that "Muslims rnay one day help provide some counterbalance in policy formation." For the Islamic community not to take advantage ofthe resources and opportunities for full participation in the American political system "is an exercise in political castration."a The size of the Muslim population in America is roughly equal to that of the and is growing Jewish community rapidly as a result of immigration. That is a longway from a majority, to be sure. Richard Curtiss notes, however, that it is difficult for a candidate to become president without winning California, and that the /oo,ooo or so Muslims in Palestinian opposition

California, working together, could make it difficult for a candidate to win California without their vote. As both Jews and Christian Conservatives have shown, well-organized minority con-

MART|N ReligiOn and Power stituencies can wield power out of proportion to their numbers. The challenge for Muslims will be to achieve a sufficient level of organization. James Zogby, director of the ArabAmerican Institute, which represents both Muslim and Christian Arabs, notes that to speak of "the Muslim community" as a homogeneous entity is to engage in "mythic construction."5 Zogby reckons that American Muslirns of Pakistani origin are the most active and best-organized component, but their primary motive has been to support self-determination for Kashmir. The Arab component, more concerned about the Middle East, is fairly well organized but comprises only about IO to I5 percent of Arnerican Muslims. A large Iranian community shares a widespread displeasure with the current regime in Iran, but is itself sharply divided over what kind of government they would like to see in their homeland. The Turks have shown limited political activism and would likely refrain from uniting with the Islamic community at large because of their secular orientation. And African-American Muslims-one of the largest constituencies in the American Muslim community -have little historical reason to be concerned about any of the aforementioned issues.Thus, Muslims could well become significant players on the American political scene, but that time may not be as close as some would like to believe.

their participation in politics inevitably Iead to increased hostility and conflict with lamentable results both at home and abroad? Given the faith-flavored potions that have poisoned so many regions, no realistic assessmentcan ignore the possibilities for harm. Still, careful attention to "the religious factor" is not only analytically indispensable, but can offer at least modest grounds for an optimistic reading of the role religion can play in international relations. Because religion is often tightly interwoven with particular cultures and ethnic groups, it can be impossible to disentangle discrete cornponents and label them correctly as secular or religious, sincere or manipulative, beneficial or dangerous. It is also true, however, that religion can be a powerful force in its own right since religious structures often exhibit strength enormous and resilience. This important fact may be overlooked by political scientists, economists, sociologists, mainstream rnedia, and policymakers, whose milieu is likely to be in an advanced stage of secularization. Too often, if religion is not taken seriously in one's own circle, it is easyto conclude that it is not to be taken seriously at all. A second point worth considering is that, while greater political involvement by religious groups can obviously increase tensions and lead to open conflict, the diversity within and among the three traditions discussed in this article-Judaism, Christianity, and Islam-can serve to What are the implications of the fewent check and moderate extreme claims and and growing efforts of religious activists initiatives. When legislators recognize to affect American foreign policy? How that no group can claim to speak for the should legislators and other government Jewish, Christian, or Muslim communiofficials respond to them? How seriously ty as if there were no dissenting voices, should diplomats and political analysts they will be in a better position to weigh view their behavior and concerns? WiIl competing claims with greater care.

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People of faith have a right to be politically active, and they cannot be expectedto abandon their religious convictions when they enter the political arena. They have a right to organize themselves to work effectively for the good of their country as they understand it and to attempt to shape public policy, domestic and foreign, within the limits of a constitutional framework that promotes religious toleration and pluralism. It is not acceptable to shape U.S. policy in the Middle East on the basis of a belief that Jews should be allowed to inhabit "all the land," including'Judea and Samaria," because God promised it to the descendants of Abraham; or a belief that the Dome of the Rock and the Al Aksa Mosque must be removed from the Temple Mount inJerusalem, one of the holiest sites in Islam, so that the Messiah can come (whether for the first or second time): or a belief that efforts to achievepeace are futile, even perverse, since that goal will only be achieved by the Mahdi (the expected one), a messianic figure who will one day return to usher in a perfect Islamic society. Such beliefs, dependent as they are upon revelation thought to be divine, are simply not a viable basis for the foreign policy of a secular, multicultural democracy in a pluralistic world. Many members of the religious communities previously discussedunderstand and accept that. Others do not. Our government should pay closest attention to those who do, and who asserttheir opinions on the basis of

justice, fairness, and collective welfare of the involved parties and the global community. Finally, we should recognize that religion can be a powerful force for peace and amity. The world's many religions cannot be fully harmonized so as to remove all barriers among them. They are not all the same even after we get beneath the superficial veneer. And yet, comrnon to most is a preference for peace over war and for non-violence over violence; a tradition of compassion, however unequally directed; an admiration for ethical integrity and the keeping of promises; and a consistent reminder of the imperfections of human nature. Religious leaders may be able to draw upon the best of their respective traditions to create something positive that might have been missed had matters been left entirely to political or military leaders. Congress, the president, and other key policymakers cannot ans\Mer all of the prayers of equally devout but diverse religious communities. Neither can they fashion a "one-size-fits-all" approach to groups with strong religious orientations. And sometimes the differences may be so great and intense that religion would best be omitted from the discussion. But those who would shape U.S. policy must be aware of the resources for compassion, reconciliation, justice, and peace that exist within religious traditions and should not hesitate to explore their possibilities when the opportunity arises.

NOTES The author would like to thank Colin

Vandell

for his

assistance in researching this article. fediot Aharonot t. "One People, Two Continents," (Haifa), Supplement, April 16, t998, z-lt. 2. Timothy

Weber, "How

Evangelicals Became Israel's

ChnstianigTodg, October 5, t998, 38. 3. Richard H. Curtiss, "U.S. Muslims may Put Them-

Best Friend,"

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selves on Anerican Reporir8t 76-77. 4. Ali A. Mazrui, American Muslims tion. " American m.amconline. !. Inteniew

Political "A

New

Map

in 1998,"

Cultural

Washington

Constituenry:

& the Crisis of Political ParticipaMuslim

Council

website-

org/publications. withJames

Zogby, October

r5, 1999.

Religion andPower

Policy Rethinlring US, Foreign andIslamafterl(osovo John L. Esposito & Vali R. Nasr Islarn has been the single most persistent foreign policy concern of the United States for the past two decades. No other issue has preoccupied American foreign policymakers during this period for as long, nor evoked as consistent a response. This response shows the influence of entrenched attitudes and civilizational posturing in what has developed as an "informal policy" aimed at containing Islam. The official position in Washington, however, embodies more flexibility, espousing no hostility toward Islam in particular, only concern with Islamism or political Islam (commonly referred to as Islamic fundamentalism). In the aftermath of recent events in Kosovo, it is time to redefine American policy on Islam, reevaluate its basic its validity and usefulness,and consider the assumptions, assess possibility of new approaches. Kosovo was a European crisis which elicited first a humanitarian and ultimately a strategic responsefrom the United States.Religion at the outset was not a decisivefactor. Still, insofar as Kosovo ernerged as a unique case of U.S. support for a Muslim population against an avowed Christian state and led to an alliance with a Muslim guerrilla army, it is something of a watershed event. The breakthrough in Kosovo also came about at the tail-end of major changes in the international and domestic politics of

J o h n L . E s p o s i t o; s Professor of Rehgion and International Affairs at Georgetown L l n i v e r s i t ya n d D i r e c t o r of the Center ibr Mus l i r n - C h r i s t i a n L ln d e r standing. Editor of the Reirgion & ClobolPolitia s e r i e s( O L I P ) , h i s recent publications include fie Isiomrc1}reot, Mlth or Reolib?. Ilan & Polrlirr, and Thz Otford Histog of lslant. Vali R. Nasr is A".o ciate Professoro{' Politi c a l S c i e n c ea t t h e U n i versityof Sar Diego. He is the author of lhe Vonqtordofthe IslonicReuo lution' Thelona ot-t Islomi oJ Pokitan.

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Muslim societies over the course of the preceding decade. Policymakers are challenged to respond to those changes in order to bring American foreign policy in line with the reality of Islam's place in domestic, regional, and international politics. Given the importance of Islam to international affairs and the sheer number of Muslims who live in areas that affect Western and U.S. interests, rethinking America's foreign policy on Islam may be a welcome development. The current policy was first developed during the Bush administration in a 1992 statement by then Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and North African Affairs, Edward Djerejian. The spirit of the statement was reiterated and expanded upon by his successor,Robert Pelletreau, during the Clinton adrninistration. Djerejian emphasized that the United States did not regard Islam or Islamic movements as the enemy. It recognized the right of movements to participate in the political process, provided that they do not use democratic elections to seize power-that is, come to power motivated by the belief in "one man. one vote. one time." Pelletreau observed that the "image of Islam in the minds of the average newspaper reader is often one of an undifferentiated movement hostile to the West and ready to use violence and terrorism to achieve its ends." Pelletreau distinguished the many "legitimate, socially responsible Muslim groups with political goals frorn Islamists who operate outside rrare the bounds of law." The latter properly called extremists," and like other extremists they "can be secular or religious." Pelletreau acknowledged that some Islamic groups participate within their countries' systems and others use violence against existing governrnents

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and their citizens. Like Djerejian, he notedr "-We're suspicious of those who would use the democratic process to come to power only to destroy that process in order to retain power and political dominance. " Djerejian's I992 statement and subsequent policy statements by American foreign-policy makers suggest that the contours of American policy are changing, becoming more nuanced as they make the distinction between Islam and Islamism, moderates and radicals. U.S. policy itself, however, in contrast to policy statements, seldom has shown the kind of nuance and discernment that it claims. For example, since rgg2 the United Stateshas not identified a moderate Islamist force deserving of participation in the political process and has not defended the right of parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Hizb alWasat (Party of the Middle) in Egypt to participate in elections. And the United States has not approved a visa for Tunisian Islamist Leader Rachid Ghanouchi, whose views on Islam and democracy fit the Djerejian and Pelletreau criteria, and whom Pelletreau identified as an acceptable Islamist.

TheLongShadow of lran. si,,.. the Iranian Revolution of t979, Islamic radicalism has been a persistent problem for American foreign policy. A long line of hard-hitting anti-Western ideologues and militant activists, from Ayatollah Khomeini to Osama Bin Laden, and from Hizbollah to Islamic Jihad, have clearly demonstrated the nature and scope of the Islamist challenge to American interests. In the process, they have seemed to formalize a single "Islamic" policy toward the United States. Responses to such activists reflect a cir-

EsPostro& NASRReligion and Power cling of the wagons in the West-the of which is intellectual culmination Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis and his assertion that "Islam has bloody borders. " Huntington's approach soon found a foreign policy corollary, which the historian Ali Mazrui characterized as the "Islamization of American foreign policy." Mazrui maintains that postulating a "West versus the rest" attitude toward Islam and Islamism greatly resembles the old Muslim division of the world into the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam) versus the Abode of the Unbel i e v e r( D a r a l - H a r b ) .

claims of Islamist radicals at face value. Radical Islamism claimed to speak for Islam and to postulate a single Muslim and Islamic position on the West. The United States proved willing to endorse these positions as constituting the "Islamic" position. This was especially the case during Ayatollah Khomeini's reign in Iran. The JMestanointed him as the sole spokesman for Islam, reflected in the "AleroTork Times headline during the Rushdie affair' "Islam led by Khomeini." Regarding Islam through the IranKhomeini prism has led many to reduce all expressions of Islam to the threat of

Regarding ISlam throushtheIran-Khorneini prism has led many to reduce all expression of Islam io the threat of lrahian-style fundainentalism. approach reached its apogee during the early part of the Reagan administration. Reeling from the wave of anti-American attacks, in particular the slaughter of Marines in a suicide bombing in Lebanon, an "us versus them" approach became politlcally effective. The new enemy, Islamic fundamentaiism, was now placed alongside the dominant Cold War foreign policy paradigm of the "Evil Empire." This This

position was reiterated during the Bush administration by Vice President Dan Quayle, as well as by the media and a host of political analysts,who equated Islamic fundamentalism with earlier threats of nazism and communism. The clarity of this binary vision in the face ofwhat appeared to be a direct and concerted challenge did not always compensate for its costs. The American position was premised on accepting all of the

Iranian-style fundamentalism. Whether in Sunni states like Eglpt or Algeria, Islamist opposition was equated with the desire to promote lranian-style revolutions and governments. Algeria found pundits warning that Abbasi Madani Sudan's might be another Khomeini; Hasan Turabi was called the "Ayatollah of Africa." Thus, often unwittingly, policymakers and Western media directly contributed to the dominant perception of a monolithic radical Islamism and in the process supported the claims of the radical few to speak for the majority of the Muslim population. Radical Islamists were not, however, the only beneficiaries of the emerging radicalism. reaction to American Authoritarian rulers across the Muslim world quickly learned that real or fictional threats from Islamists translated into American support and aid, reduction of

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pressure for democratization, and greater latitude in human rights violations. Ironically, this occurred at a time when U.S. policy on support for authoritarianism was undergoing radical change as it pursued democratization in Latin America and East Asia. Since many Muslim dictators had already squeezed the United States for aid and support by using the bogey of communism in the r97os, they were well aquainted with the ways in which Washington could be manipulated. From Algeria to Egypt, Turkey, theWest Bank, Gaza, and Uzbekistan, claims of an impending Islamic threat have been used to justify violation of human rights, suspension of civil liberties and civil disorder, and to further legitimate and entrench dictatorship. More often than not, as during Tunisian and Egyptian elections, democratic forces rather than Islamists alone have been the target of the ruling regimes. In Algeria, where the United States and France were all too quick to support a brutal military regime, the knee-jerk reaction to the Islamist threat proved catastrophic for the country, perhaps dooming its prospects for stability and development for a whole generation. Some Muslim leaders, such as Kings Hussein ofJordan and Hassan of Morocco concluded that the cost of rejectionism was too high, and that in Algeria the usefulness of the black-and-white vision had reached its limits. Even President Abdelaziz Boutaflika in Algeria seems to have drawn the same conclusion, as he has endorsed some degree of participation for Islamist forces. Still, the shadow of Algeria looms long. Ti.rrkey seems determined to traverse the same course, although at a more deliberate pace. Ironically, it was also in Algeria that Islamism witnessed the limits of uncom-

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promising assault against the secular state. In the words of Rachid Ghanouchi, a Tunisian Islamist, Algerian Islamist conclusions-that secular regimes, as in Iran, will fall to a resolute call to Islamism-were \!Tong. Thus, in many Egyp,, countries-Turkey, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, and even AlgeriaIslamists were willing to participate in the systern. Although the inclusion of Islamists is not free from contention and risk, it requires a much more sophisticated understanding of and approach to Islamism in the West. Inclusion will, per force, make Islamism a more complex phenomenon, one whose fate and fortune will be determined in diverse local arenas. While there are Islamist movements that are likely to disrupt the political process, there are also those that may follow the example of Eurocommunism, provided that, as in Europe, sociopolitical conditions that support ideological politics and give radical forces the upper hand are removed, and institutions that support pluralism are strengthened. Including Islamism in the political process only becomes a challenge when political institutions are too weak to contain illegitimate challenges to state authority and security. Yet such institutions are weak because of the abuse of power by dictatorial regimes, which often receive support from Washington. Hence, American policy is caught in a "Catch 22" situation. It supports dictators in order to contain Islamists. Those dictators, in turn, guarantee that Muslim polities remain institutionally weak, thus making Islamism a perpetual challenge. The problem facing Muslim societies is not Islamism, but dictatorship. The solution for Washington should not be more dictatorship, but strengthening institution-building and civil society. The Unit-

EsPostro& NASRReligion and Power ed States followed this course in Europe, leading to the inclusion of Eurocommunist parties in the political process. American policy on Islam has been in large measure influenced by the most strident Islamist rhetoric rather than by more mainstream voices. It has also been unduly affected by the vested interests of Muslim dictators rather than being directed first and foremost at discerning, and then promoting, those factors that foster and sustain viable stability. In the long run, this is a better protection for American interests and those of the U.S. regional allies, most notably, Israel.

Megawati Sukarnuputri as Vice President, and Amien Rais as Speaker of Parliament is reflective of this trend toward a more open political system in which 'Wahid Islam plays a participatory role. and Rais have had a long association with Indonesia's two largest Islamic social and educational organizations. Wahid is the leader of the Nahdatul Ulama (The

R e n a i s s a n c eo f R e l i g i o u s S c h o l a r s ) a n d Rais is the former head of the Muhammadiya. The rise of these leaders belies the Islam-versus-democracy conception that is prevalent in the West. U.S. interests in Indonesia are better served by continuing to support forces of changeRethinking rnrethink-including Islamic movements-rather U.S.Policy. ing foreign policy, it is important to look than relying on violent, albeit secular, more broadly beyond the Middle East, factions in the Indonesian rnilitary. which has dominated Washington's Similarly, the United States and the thinking about Islam and Islamism. It is I M F o p e n l y s u p p o r t e d t h e f o r m e r instructive to look at Islam's political role Islamist leader in Malaysia, Anwar in Southeast Asia and at its role in the Ibrahim, in the face of the increasingly Afghan war. The United States has long anti-Western rhetoric and rejectionist enjoyed close relations with Southeast policies of Mahathir Mohammad. Anwar Asia's most Islam-oriented state leaders. fell from power not because he was too The extent of this rapport became clear Islamic or too anti-Western, but because when BJ. Habibie took over Indonesia he was too pro-Western. Anwar Ibrahim and Anwar Ibrahim fell victim to the proved to have been far more modern, autocratic tendencies of Mahathir and indeed than post-modern Mohammad in Malaysia. Mahathir, whose anti-IMF rhetoric and Habibie was much maligned for his jabs at George Soros and a so-called efforts to "Islamize" the Suharto regime international Jewish conspiracy against by combining economic nationalism and Malaysia fueled the fecund imagination Islamic reformism, and was feared by the of radical anti-IMestern forces across the Christian minority in Indonesia and its Muslim world. allies in the West. Whatever his failings, In Southeast Asia, secular nationalist he oversaw the movement to elections leaders and institutions, from Prime and the referendum on East Timor. As Minister Mahathir to the Indonesian witnessed in national and presidential military, have proven to be the most elections in Igg$, a democratic future troublesome and unruly parts of the for Indonesia is in fact impossible withequation. As these examples show, out some form of inclusion of Islam in Southeast Asia is different from the Midthe political process. The election of dle East; thus, one Islam policy does not Abdurrahman Wahid as President, fit all. The United States may gain more

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in the Middle East by displaying the kind struggles asJihads-characterizations that of flexibility that it has unintentionally Indians, Russians, and the Western shown in Southeast Asia. media have proved all too eager to Afghanistan is the other notable case. endorse. It is important not to be blindSince IgBg the United Stateshas sought , s i d e d b y r e d u c i n g t h e K a s h m i r i , to distance itself from the AfghanJihad. Chechen, and Daghestani conflicts to Attention has been focused on the uninIslamic militancy. In the years to come, tended consequencesof the war-namethese may be repeated more ubiquitously ly, Ahmed Ramzi Yusuf, Osama Bin in India, in other Russian Turkic Laden, and some 25,OOO activists from republics, and among the Kyghurs of across the Muslim world who fought in Western China. As the proceedings of the Afghanistan, some of whom are at the recent Chinese-Russian Kyrgiz Summit forefront of anti-regime activism in show, these two states are quite contheir own countries. Whatever the cost of cerned about unrest among their Muslim the AfghanJihad is for the United States populations and are eager to characterize today, it is difficult to deny the fact that their problems in terms that elicit symIslamism-and indeed militant and radipathy for Moscow and Beijing in Washcal Islamism-contributed directly to ington; namely, as terrorist Islam. ending the most significant foreign polShould the United States see this unrest icy concern of the United States since in terrns that the Indians, Russians. and WorldWar II: the ColdWar. Afghanistan Chinese would prefer? Or will Washingshould have elicited new approaches to ton look to these Muslim minorities as contendingwith Islamism and the role of potential allies in the larger struggles of Islam in politics from American for- I domination between the United States, eign-policy makers. Instead, the United India, Russia, and China that will define States was all too eager to wash its hands geopolitics in the new century? In each of of the entire experience, which in part these great powers, the Muslim minority explains why one-time allies so quickly i question within their borders and a became intractable enemies. While it was potential conflict with Muslim populanot a mistake for the United States to tions in adjoining states will be signifis u p p o r t t h e A f g h a n J i h a d , i t w a s cant to their global position. It is also undoubtedly short-sighted to walk away important to note that the Indian-Chifrom Afghanistan and Pakistan in rg8g nese-Russian axis forms an arc abutting and to continue the "West versus the the heartland of the Muslim world, which rest" posture in policymaking with makes the latter geostrategically signifiregard to Islam. cant to the United States. Thking stock of the Afghan experience Samuel Huntington may have been is important, for it may be of relevance in wrong in assuming the inevitability of India, Russia, and China-the t h r e e an Islamic-Confucian alliance against powers that are forming an anti-U.S. the West. The future may witness many a global axis in the aftermath of KosovoWestern-Islamic aliiance against Conin the years to come. Kashmiri, fucian and Hi.ndu coalitions in Asia or a Chechen, and Daghestani separatists S l a v i c - O r t h o d o x b l o c i n E u r o p e . have already seen much benefit in the Bosnia, and more so Kosovo, may have Afghan model and have fashioned their already provided a preview of the shape

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In the CaSeof Kosovo,it wasnot Muslirns

who were guided bv civilizational fidelities . nor was th"e conflict between Islam and the West. of the alliances to come. During the past five years, while the United States has continued to posture against Islamism in Muslim lands in Europe, it has found itself unwittingly in alliance with Muslims, whom it has defended in order to maintain its influence in Europe and expand its power westward at the expense of Russia. Insofar as there has been a civilizational conflict in Europe, it has not been between Islam and the West. Rather, it occurred first between Catholicis- (it Croatia) and Serbian Orthodoxy, and now more generally between the Western alliance (the United States and lMestern Europe) and the cultural-civilizational resistance of the Moscow-Belgrade axis that also cornmands support among Eastern Orthodox populations in Greece, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Ukraine. The main animus behind geostrategic changes in Central and Southern Europe is not a reenactment of the battles of the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, but the opening of the fourth-century rift between the Eastern and'Western church. There are those who see reflections of Afghanistan in Bosnia and especially in Kosovo. The Serbian propaganda machine, and some like California State Senator Tom Hayden, who parroted its message, chastised the United States for bombing Christians to defend Muslims in Kosovo. Hayden charged that the KIA was "beholden to the doctrines of Osama Bin Laden." The fact remains that the United States did save Muslims from

extinction in Eastern Europe. The United Stateswas the only Western power that accepted Bosnian and Albanian claims to be Europeans and to have a right to exist in Europe. Herein lies the difference with Afghanistan. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the United States' role was not surreptitious, and as a result the links that it forged are not as tenuous. Kosovo also offers another valuable perspective. The United States and Albania crossed civilizational lines to forge an alliance, designed to guarantee the existence of Muslims in Eastern Europe. In the case of Kosovo, it was not Muslims who were guided by civilizational fidelities, as Huntington would have suggested, nor was the civilizational conflict between Islarn and the West. Muslim countries did not raise the banner of Islam to come to the aid of the Kosovars. In fact, Slobodan Milosevic, initially at least, received far more public statements of support in Muslim capitals (especially in Baghdad and tipoli) than did the KlA. Even Iran, the flag-bearer of Islamist causes, shied away from openly supporting the Kosovars. In fact, Iran has more often than not supported Christian ruling orders in confrontations with separatist Muslim forces. Iran was among the last Muslim countries to support the independence of Azerbaijan and Central Asian states, preferring instead to support Gorbachev's vision for the future of the Soviet ljnion. More recently, Iran has alternately supported the Russian position on Chechnya and

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Daghestan or has remained quiet in the face of Russian atrocities. During the recent Russian-Chechen conflict in the fall of rggg, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi assured Russia of Iran's full support and cooperation in Russia's campaign to reign in Chechnya. Iran has also supported Armenians against its fellow Azeri Shias in the NagornoKarabagh conflict, proving that the Islamic Republic of Iran is primarily motivated by national interests, not civilizational allegiances. Surprisingly, this pursuit of state interests has not raised as many eyebrows among Muslim populations as one might expect. The levels of private aid for Kosovar refugees in Muslim countries lagged behind those provided by Europeans and Arnericans. Kosovo at all times remained a European humanitarian tragedy, not an Islamic one. The experience of Kosovo demonstrates that it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions about Muslim political attitudes solely in terms of civilizational allegiances. The West is often guided by the myth of what Muslim attitudes are rather than by their reality. Recent developments in East Timor further underscore this point. Muslims have shown far less concern for the secessionismin the most populous Musl i m n a t i o n , I n d o n e s i a , t h a n e x p e c t e d .I n contrast, Catholicism has displayed far more civilizational posturing in its support for East Timorese, whose cause, advocated since rg]$ through a broadbased international network, stretches from the Vatican to the U.S. House of Representatives to Catholic colleges and universities in the United States. Far rnore bishops have been involved in East Timor's quest for independence, both in East Timor and abroad, than mullas

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were involved in Kosovo. In Kosovo, it was rather the Slavs that were guided by a civilizational vision, inspired by Slav myths and an ambition for a panOrthodox (Serbian, Greek, and Russian) arc stretching frorn Athens to Moscow via Belgrade. Kosovo is a foreign policy breakthrough. A the conceptual level, it belies many of the assumptions that have undergirded the "Islam versus the West" foreign policy conception dominant in Washington since 1979. At the practical level, it underscores the fact that Islamisrn and the relation between Muslims and the West is too complex to be satisfactorily managed by the deterministic directives of that binary vision of the world.

The Sectarian Dimension of ISlamiSm. In thinkingaboutAmerica's Islam policy in years to come, it is irnportant to take stock of and revise some of the assumptions that frame that policy. Containment of Islamism meant, at first and then for a long time, containing Shi'ism. The Islamic threat was, at the outset, a Shi'i threat. Iran for long posed the greatest single threat to the United Statesand continues to be singled out by Israel for its support of Hizbollah and Hamas. Former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres called Tehran "the capital of terrorism" in Sharm al-Shaykh when the group responsible for Tel Aviv bombings had an office in Damascus. Similarly, in Lebanon the Shi'i Hizbollah forced both the United Statesand Israel to withdraw and now poses as the only effective Arab fighting force against Israel. As a result, Shi'ism has been viewed as the most revolutionary and militant force in Islam, contributing to America's lack of support for the Shi'is in Iraq after the Gulf War. As the Iraqi Republican

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Guards passed before American troops to quell the Shia uprising in southern Iraq in rg9r, the United Statesremained unmoved by Shia pleas for help. Policymaking in Washington appeared to be captured by what Time rnagazine called "the Shia's historical opposition to the United States." U.S. and European silence-in the government as well as the media-regarding the repression of Shi'i opposition in Bahrain seemsto be motivated by the same perspective. Sunni fundamentalism or Islamism has in effect been treated as the "lesser evil." In many instances, lacking lran's hegemonic ambitions, Islamism has been primarily preoccupied with internal matters. Its ebbs and flows often appeared to be controlled by governments in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Malaysia. Even in the worst cases, it was no match for the mukhabarat (security) states in the Arab world, asbecame evident in Syria in r9B2 (when Hafiz al-Asad leveled the city of Hama, killing in excessof roo,ooo people to quell a Muslim Brotherhood uprising), and then in Ben Ali's Tunisia, Eradicateur's Algeria, and Mubarak's Egfpt. In fact, the United States has not had so much a Sunni problem as a public relations problem among many Muslims who charge that the United States practicesa double standard in its promotion of dernocracy. While advocating democratization in Russia, Eastern Europe, Latin Arnerica, and Africa, it has often been seen as ambivalent, if not silent, with regard to the mukhabarat states that suppress democratization in the name of containing radicalism. For similar reasons, the United States turned a blind eye to Saudi Arabia's significant investment in Sunni militancy, designed to create a wall around Iran extending from Central Asia to the Per-

sian Gulf. As Iran's revolution begins to show signs of exhaustion, and the country takes steps toward normalization of its domestic and international politics, Sunni militancy now stands ready to take over where Iran is leaving off. The phenomenon of the Thliban, Harakatul Mujahedin in Kashmir, the Osama Bin Laden and Ahmed Ramzi Yusuf network, and their fellow militants in many parts of the Muslim world represent a new phase in militancy that is highly sectarian in character. It is often rooted in a Sunni militancy that is anti-Shi'i and is gradually turning its attention toward the West. In Pakistan, for example, the same Sunni militant forces that until recently remained focused on domestic issues, now directly threaten American interests if the United States is to pursue Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan. This new brand of Sunni militancy, in whose creation the United States and its regional allies have had a hand, is rapidly replacing Shi'ism in shaping radical Islamist politics. Still, the United States should look beyond the "Islamic threat" paradigm to consider broader regional implications that are afoot. As Sunni militancy surfaces in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan. Chechnya (*here it is referred to as Wahhabism on account of its Saudi financial backing), Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf, the United States and its regional allies may face a new dynamic-a conflict between Shi'is and Sunnis. The opening phase of this conflict occurred with the massacre of Shi'is in Mazar Sharif and Bamiyam by the Thliban and the military standoff on the Iran-Afghanistan border. Where will U.S. interests stand in this conflict? What do the changes in the perceived threat from Shi'ism and Sunnism rnean? These questions are impor-

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tant in thinking about an Islam policy as well as whether there should be a "single" Islam policy. The complexity of this issue is reflected in the manner in which Sunni militancy has become intertwined with Pakistan's regional and domestic politics. In the surnrner of 1999, the Pakistan military used Sunni militant forces as a cover for incursion into the Kargil region of Kashmir. This precipitated a serious standoff between the two South Asian nuclear powers and damaged a year of diplomacy and trustbuilding between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The direct role that Sunni militancy now plays in Pakistan-India relations will no doubt complicate negotiations between the two states. The same mili-

approach that is cognizant of the many dimensions of Islam in regional and domestic politics.

Accounting for 0fficialIslam. In recent years, many rulers continue to find it useful to appeal to Islam. Hussein ofJordan donned a beard, as has his son Abdullah II. Hassan of Morocco built a grand mosque to his own honor, as has Haidar Aliyev of Azerbaijan who also erected a museum celebrating his contributions to religion. One-time secular dictators have repackaged themselves as "believer presidents", Algeria's Boutaflika speaLsof Islam, as does Hafiz al-Asad and Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian ruling elite are seen at rnosque and in prayer more frequently as are Turkish politicians, and most recently, the President of

. The political changâ&#x201A;Źin Pakistan requires approach a ggquinely I ' e^ a ' nu_anced 1' cogrrzant of tlre rnany dlmenslons o.f tant forces that were involved in Kargil were used by General Pawez Musharraf, who masterminded Kargil, to precipitate a law and order crisis in Pakistan in order to undermine the dernocratically elected government of Sharif. In the ten days leading to the military coup of October 1999, some forty-five Shi'i religious and communal leaders were Pakistan by assassinated throughout Sunni sectarian gangs which included fighters from Kashmir. The political change in Pakistan is of great significance to the U.S. national interest. The issuesinvolved here cannot be adequately addressed by the Islam-versus-secularism paradigm of American foreign policy. It requires a genuinely nuanced

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the Kemalist state, Sulayman Demirel The pace of state rnandated by Islamic policymaking has increased as well. The public arena across the Muslim world has become more Islarnic, and the state itself has assumed the role of chief Islamic legislator and irnplementer. In Egypt, for instance, there is little difference between the social program of the Mubarak-backed al-Azhar and that of the opposition. As Muslim Brotherhood regimes secular become more Islamic in their rhetoric and promise to push through programs demanded by their Islamist oppositions, it becomes increasingly clear that Islam is not the issue. The issue is authoritarianism versus democratization and pluralisrn. As the state and

ESPostro & NAsRReligion and Power its opposition in diverse contexts speak in the political and cultural language of Islam, Islam ceases to be the guide in understanding and explaining multifaceted struggles for power.

lims live too close to the comrnercial and geostrategic pathways that matter to the West. It does not serve lJ.S. interests to construct all-encompassing characterizations of Islamism and Muslirns or to respond in kind to ideological posWhereto from Here?Today much turing of Islamist radicals, a distinct, of the Muslim world is still suffering albeit dangerous, minority arnong under dictatorship and langrrishes in Islarnists and in their societies. The economic stagnation. This can ultiUnited States does not need a position mately produce rnany more challenges on Islam, so rnuch as one on political, for the West, not all of which will be s o c i a l , a n d e c o n o r n i c c h a n g e w h e r e ideological nor necessarily Islamist in Muslirns live. The threat to the United character. In response to such chalStates will not come from civilizational lenges, it is better to have policies that directives, but frorn the socioeconomic are designed to serve interests rather and political reality that breeds radicalthan underscore civilizational chasms; ism. This is what requires U.S. attenpolicies that, as was the case in Kosovo, tion and where policymaking on Islam, respond to events, not religions. MusIslamism, and Muslims should beein.

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Terrorism Responding t0 Rettglous Mark Juergensmeyer In December 1999, as the world braced for anticipated millenial eruptions of religious rnayhem-which never occurredthe Russian government was decimating Chechnya in response to sabotagesin Moscow. In 1998, the United States'retaliation in answer to terrorist attacks on its embassies in Africa were warranted, but ultimately futile. Both examples demonstrate the inadequacy of most responses to religious terrorism. Just after the attack on the U.S. embassies in Africa, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright proclaimed that America was at war with religious terrorists, adding that "unfortunately, this is the war of the future."'She rnight have added that it is awar that we do not know how to win. According to military and diplomatic leaders, the fight against religious terrorism is a kind of global grrerrilla war that defies the logic of conventional warfare, but can still be won by applying military tactics. Many religious activists, however, view their battle not in military, but in theological terms. They regard social conflict as a spiritual contest, and thus see their acts of religious terrorism as an aspect of cosmic war. For this reason, viewing terrorism as a political and military strategy has proven insufficient for understanding and combating religious violence. In rny recent book on the subject, Terror[n the Mind of God, which is partly based on interviews with religious terrorists, I conclude that many of these acts had a more symbolic than strategic significance. Even those terrorists who have

Mark Juergensmeyer is Professor of Soci ology and Director of Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author or editor of ten books, includ ing Ihey'{euColdWor? RelgrousNctionolism Confrontsthe Secular Stoleand Terrorin the Mind of God' The Clobol Riseof ReligiousViolence.

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specific goals were to some extent engagother hand, was able to virtually oblitering in forms of "performance violence," ate the most militant of radical Sikhs in dramatic acts meant to call attention to a Igg2 in part because it embarked on a vast hidden war." ruthless search-and-destroy mission Any government's response to reliagainst the activists, almost all of whom gious terrorism must, therefore, address were located within the limited confines both the realities of this spiritual war and of the state of Punjab. the human aspirations that often accomLegal means of quelling a religious p a n y i t , i n c l u d i n g t h e d e s i r e f o r a insurrection have also been effective, but renewed role for religion in public life. only when a government possesseslegal How should governments respond? authority over the attacking group. The There are at least five approaches that Japanese government, for instance, not only brought the Aum Shinrikyo leaders governments have recently used in countering religious violence. to trial and imprisoned them, but also employed legislative and police powers RetaliatoryForce.Themostdirect to restrict the movement's activities. response to religious terrorism is retalSimilarly, in early tggg China outlawed iatory force. It is probably also the most the Falun Gong rnovement on the difficult to undertake effectively. It grounds that it was anti-government and includes the possibility of killing or potentially dangerous. But as the United forcibly controlling terrorists. This States discovered in the case of Libyan strategy is often dangerous because it terrorists who allegedly destroyed Pan can legitimize the very worldview reliAm ro3 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in rgB8, persecuting activists in another gious terrorists themselves use to justifr their actions-one in which secular and country-especially an unfriendly onereligious forces are at constant war. A can be a difficult marrer. belligerent secular enemy is often just Activist groups do, however, somewhat religious activists hope for, since it times destroy themselves. The infighting increases their support. In Algeria, for within some movements has become so instance, when the military junta halted severe that they have literally disintegratelections and enacted martial law, poped, or become so impotent that their ular support for the Islamic party and governrnent opponents can handily subviolent resistance against the junta due them. The internal squabbling of mushroomed. various factions within the Sikh moveIn order for the retaliatory strategy to ment, for example, enabled the Indian work, a secular government must be government to crush that movement. In willing to declare a total war against relithe year before he instigated the nerve gious terrorism and wage it over many gas attack in the T"ky" subways, Shoko years, perhaps decades. The prognosis Asahara, the leader of Aum Shinri\o, for victory is, however, positive only mentioned group suicide as a way to when the opponents are easily identified escapewhat he thought was a government and contained within a specific region. conspiracy against his movement.3 Thus, Israel's attempts to control its Muslim it is not always necessary for a governenemies have had varying degreesof suc- ment to use military power to obliterate cess. The Indian governrnent, on the a terrorist band, since sometimes the

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band's own internal tensions can accomplish the job themselves. In general, however, terrorist groups are not easilv destroved.

Did the air strikes have anything to do with this outcorne? Although it may be possible that Libya was intimidated by the air strike, the gove r n m e n t ' s i m m e d i a t e r e s p o n s ew a s q u i t e Sword Rattling, Thereis a second different. The ntimber of temorist inciscenario in the category of knee-jerk dents linked to Libya and directed against responsesto terrorist acts' the rattling of the United States actually rose in the two swords. Its aim is to threaten such harsh years following the U.S. air strikes' fifviolent reprisals that they will deter reliteen in r9B/ and eight in r988.a The most devastating terrorist attack against gious activists from pursuing further terrorist missions. Many law enforcethe United States in which Libya has been ment agencies base their "crack down" implicated-the tragic explosion of Pan strategy on the assumption that even if Am Io3 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which authorities cannot destroy the tenorists killed all 2$g on board-occurred after completely, they can at least frighten the air strikes in December 1988. them by raising the stakesof engagement It is not clear why terrorist attacks in terrorist activity. from Libya decreased overall in the Though it is possible that some fringe decade following American action. Perm e m b e r s o f a n a c t i v i s t g r o u p a r e haps Qaddafi was eager to normalize sobered by such brinkmanship, it is relations with other governments for unlikely that a "get tough" strategy will trade reasons as much as any other. have much of an effect on the more Indeed, statements made by Qaddafi in dedicated members. According to these IggB seem to indicate that the economic m e m b e r s ' p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e w o r l d i s sanctions leveled against Libya were much already at war, and they expect authorimore persuasive than the military actions. ties to respond harshly. In fact, they In any event, there is no clear evidence would be puzzled if governments did that he or any other supporter of internanot. The threat of additional penalties tional terrorism has been intimidated by and punishment, therefore, has little if America's show of military might. any deterrent effect. Libya is often offered as a case in Tgrrorism Wins, Thethirdoutcome which intimidation was successful.In the is when terrorism, in some way, wins. mid-rg8os, Libya was thought to harbor This is the aim for which every religious Muslim activists perpetrating a series of terrorist yearns. acts of international terrorism against When askedwhetherJews and Muslims t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .I n r e s p o n s e , i n I g 8 6 , could live in harmony in the area he the United States executed an air strike described as Palestine, Dr. Abdul Aziz against the leader of the country, Rantisi, the Hamas leader, affirmed that Muammar Qaddafi. The missiles targetthey could-but not under the present ed one of his residences and killed a a r r a n g e m e n t . H e s a i d h e c o u l d n o t member of his family, but Qaddafi himaccept "Israel's sovereignty over Palestinself survived. Almost fifteen years have ian land," but the two groups could live in peace if the situation were reversed passed,and very few anti-American terrorist acts have been attributed to Libya. and the land were controlled by Palestin-

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ian Arabs. 'Jews would be welcomed in our nation," Rantisi explained. He pledged not to mistreat them "when we become strong."5 Needless to say, this solution has not been enthusiastically embraced by Israel. Given Israeli opposi tion, and realizing that Israel holds the preponderance of military power in the region, could any part ofRantisi's Islam ic Palestinian objective be achieved? The answer is yes, but only as long as Rantisi and his colleagues in Hamas accept an incremental or compromise solution. If that occurs, the violence of Hamas will have won its leaders the power to negoti ate the settlement. In other cases, the leverage obtained through terrorist acts has indeed been converted into bargaining chips for negotiated settlements, and former ter rorist organizations have been forged into political parties. Examples include peace negotiations in Northern Ireland that led to the Good Friday Agreement and the emergence of Sinn Fein as an effective political voice for the Catholic community. Yet as the bombing in the village of Omagh in August 1998 revealed, such negotiations have not always been accepted gracefully by rene gade members of activist movements who insist upon continuing their violent paramilitary campaigns. Mter all, the ideology of cosmic war does not easily submit to compromise. The government response has made all the difference in a successful transition from violence to compromise. The attempted resolutions of the Northern Ireland and Palestine conflicts are inter esting cases. In Northern Ireland, the British did not blame Sinn Fein for the Omagh violence, and both British and Sinn Fein leaders formed a united front against it. The public therefore perceived

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Omagh as a senseless act that was coun terproductive to the political purposes of the Northern Irish Catholic community. In Israel, however, Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders publicly blamed the Palestinian peacemaker, Vasser Arafat, when Hamas resumed terrorist activities after the Peace Accords. Hamas activists gained credibility since Netanyahu equated them with Arafat, while Arafat's legitimacy was undercut by the existence of renegade activists that he could not control. With Arafat weakened and Hamas emboldened, violence con tinued. In this case, violence won Hamas the ability to control the peace process and even settle it entirely.

Separating Religion.

In the fourth scenario, religion is removed from politics and moves to moral and metaphysical planes so that conflict can be rid of absolutist demands. Even if the leaders of a movement are crushed, intimidated, or compromised, no per manent solution can be forged as long as images of spiritual warfare remain strong in the minds of other religious activists and are linked in the popular mind with social struggles in the world around them. In some instances, howev er, the image of cosmic war itself can be transformed. Religious activists can conceive of a more moderate view of religious warfare that leads their groups away from political and social con frontation. The extreme form of this option-religion's privatization in the post - Enlightenment world-is, however, unlikely.6 Few religious activists are will ing to retreat to the time when secular authorities ran the public arena and religion stayed safely contained within the confines of churches, mosques, tem ples, and synagogues.

In the late Islamic countri! against politici2 Iranian students of leaders such , theolOgian Abdc argued that politi Islam.; Sorous] between ideolo claimed that Mu ness in politics. 8 made by moden as Hassan Hanafi nouchi In T\ Mohammed Ark the image of stH battle-a contest rather than arme Their positio image of cosm from public life er. Rather, the the battlefield 0 must be met, l t ransfo rmation bers of the activi ty must embrac( social struggle a tation of cosmic nents of religi accept this re authorities hay! about the fir requires a tran and leadership' Yet they can aff by resisting bel confirm the in fighting a cosm an open role f( frontational co

Capturing tl fifth option is capture the n

J U E R G E N S M E YREeR l i g i o na n d P o w e r I n t h e l a t e I $ $ O s , h o w e v e r , m a n y embrace the dominant values of society, Islamic countries witnessed a reaction especially those associated with religion. against politicized religion. In 1999, Such a position would undermine the Iranian students demonstrated in support claims of religious activists to be of leaders such as the moderate Muslim spokespersons for a righteous public theologian Abdol Karim Soroush, who order. Moreover, in many conflicts, argued that political activism undermined solutions are dependent on the contendI s l a m . T S o r o u s h m a d e a d i s t i n c t i o n I ing parties' abilities to summon at least a between ideology and religion, and minimal level of trust and respect for one claimed that Muslim clergy had no busianother. The likelihood of a comproness in politics.u Similar statements were mise solution increases when religious made by moderate Islamic thinkers such activists perceive governmentai authorias Hassan Hanafi in Egypt, Rashid Ghanties as having a moral integrity equal to, nouchi in Tunisia, or accommodating of, religious values. and Algeria's Mohammed Arkoun.e For these leaders, In some cases,where religious violence the image of struggle is largely a spiritual has been quelled, religion has been subbattle-a contest between moral positions sumed under the aegis of governmental rather than armed enemies. authority. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the Their positions do not require the efforts of the government to destroy the image of cosmic war to be removed Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (IVP), th. from public life or abandoned altogethPeople's Liberation Front, which was er. Rather, the image is redirected to supported by many radical Buddhist the battlefield of ideas. Two conditions monks, were two-pronged. The harsher must be met, however, before such a measures involved tracking down and transformation can occur. First, memexecuting the most dedicated rnembers of bers of the activists' religious communithe radical movement. The more accomty must embrace this moderate form of modating measures included efforts to social struggle as a legitimate represengain the support of militant religious tation of cosmicwar. Second, the oppoleaders. President Ranasinghe Premadasa nents of religious terrorism have to funded Buddhist schools and social sera c c e p t t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . S e c u l a r vices, and in Iggo created a Ministry of authorities have been able to do little Buddhist Affairs, naming himself the about the first criterion, first Minister. Premadasa also formed a since it requires a transformation of thinking council of Buddhist advisers, which and leadership within the religion itself. included Buddhist monks who had been Yet they can affect the second criterion critical of the secular government. One by resisting bellicose actions that would of these advisers told me that Premadasa's confirrn the impression that they were pro-religious measures had made the fighting a cosmic war, and by developing government finally begin to "reflect an open role for religion in a less conBuddhist values."'" frontational context. In Northern Ireland, the British response to Irish terrorism emphasized the government's stance to follow the fifth option is for secular authorities to rule oflaw and not overreact to terrorist provocations. This demonstrated to capture the moral high ground and

Capturing theHighGround. r,.

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both its friends and foes the government's subscription to moral values. It also made it difficult for religious activists to portray Britain as the evil enemy. Finally, it increased the possibility of cooperation with religious activists on both sides of the Northern Ireland dispute-and led to the signing of a provisional peace accord in r998. Such measures,of course, do not erase all sources of opposition to a government, but they markedly reduce the terrorists' basesof support within their own communities. Since violent religious activists rely on this support to carry out

of modern nations of being morally corrupt, since modern nationalism is based on Enlightenment moral values. Yet the ability to label secular leaders as hypocrites has animated religious activists frorn the Enlightenment until the present day. This point was made to me in a peculiar place-the Federal Penitentiary in Lompoc, California-where Mahmud Abouhalirna, a convicted terrorist, lectured me on the lack of moral and spiritual purpose in IMestern society. Incarcerated for his role in the World Trade Center bombing, he accused all secularists of being hypocritical. He challenged

It iS p0ignant that relisiousactivists haveso often accusedthe .qovernmlentsof rnodern nations of being riorally corrupt, since modern natio nalism is b"ase d o n' E nlighte nrnent mo ral values. and gain politically from their ventures, a diminution of community support is tantamount to cutting off terrorism's life blood. Governments that chose the other route-abandoning their own democratic principles in response to terrorism-have embarked on perilous journeys. The violence that erupted in Algeria after the military junta annulled elections in Igg2 was in part due to the perception that the government had discredited itself. In the eyes of many supporters of the Islamic Salvation Front, the secular leaders had demonstrated that they could not meet even the mundane moral standards of secular democracies, much less the presumably higher standards suggestedby religion. It is poignant that religious activists have so often accused the governrnents

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secularists' dedication to the virtue of tolerance when they could not tolerate religious activists such as himself. He insisted that he knew that Western people lacked "the soul of religion," and said that people in the secular world "are just living day by day, looking for jobs, for money to live."" Several thoughtful observers of \Mestern society have agreed with Abouhalima's latter point. They suggest that the time has come for religion to reenter the public arena. Marcel Gauchet, a French social theorist, has argued that Western society needs to recover the spiritual roots it abandoned early in the Enlightenment when it transferred the sense of sacrality from God to the nation." American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr made a similar argument.

J U E R G E N S M E YREeR l i g i o na n d P o w e r Although Niebuhr was suspicious of religion's ability to absolutize and moralize political calculations that were conducted for reasons of self-interest, he saw a political role for what he called the "illusions" of religion in providing the ties that bind people together "in spite of social conflict." He described these as "the peculiar gifts of religion to the human spirit."'3 Niebuhr was right, What religion provides society is not merely high-mindedness, but a concern with the quality of life, a goal more noble than the simple accumulation of power and possessions. It is for this reason that religious rhetoric has entered into political discourse at turbulent times like these, when the moral and spiritual roots of traditional communities are challenged or in danger ofbeing severed. At such times, groups have seized on religious ideas to give a profundity and ideological clarity to what, in many cases, have been real experiences of economic destitution, social oppression, political corruption, and a desperate

need to rise above the limitations of modern existence. The image of cosmic struggle has given these bitter experiences meaning, and for some participants the involvement in a grand conflict has been exhilarating-even empoweri.g. Persons and social movements engaged in such conflicts have gained a senseof destiny. In such situations, religious believers view acts of violence as both appropriate and justified. Those who oppose religious terrorism have to find a way of rejecting the violence without the religion. The most effective strategy is to affirm the public validity of religious values-even those to which acts of violence have been occasionally and deviously attached-while rejecting the violence. This is a goal that cannot be achieved easily or quickly. There are turbulent years ahead in which religious activists will attempt to stake their claims in vicious ways,and in which moderate governments will be called upon to exercisea great deal ofpatience, reason, and a continuing subscription to their own moral values.

NOTES I. Press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, reported on ABC Nightline, August2t, tgg8. 2. Mark.Juergensmeyer,Ierrorin thelllindof God'TheGIobol Rxeof Rel$ow Urblcncc(Berkeley, CA , University of California Press, 2ooo). This essayincorporates revisedexcerptsfrom the last chapter of the book. 3. Shoko Asahara, in a speechgiven in April, 1994, cited in I an Reader, A Poisonous Cocktail ? AumShinrilgo's Pathto I 4 o l e n c(cC o p e n h a g e n , D e n m a r k ' N o r d i c I n s t i t u t e o f A s i a n S t u d i e s ,I 9 9 6 ) , 6 9 . (NewYork, ,{.. Cited in Bruce Hoffman, InsideTerrorim N . Y . , C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t yP r e s s ,I g g B ) , r 9 2 . g. Inteniew with Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi, M.D., cofounder and political leader of Hamas, Khan Yunis, G a z a ,M a r c h r , r g 9 8 . 6. Jose Casanova,Pubiic in theModernWorld(ChicaXelgrons g o , I L . , U n i v e r s i t yo f C h i c a g o P r e s s ,t 9 9 4 ) , 4 o f f . /. Robin Wright, "lslamist's Theory of Relativity," los Angeles Times,lanwary 2/, I995, At.

8. Behrooz

Ghamari-Thbrizi,

"From

ology to State Ideology,

Modern

in Revolutionary

Ali

Iran,

Liberation

Conceptions

Shari'ati

The-

of Islam

and Abdolkarim

Soroush," unpublished article, Igg/. See also Robin Wright, "lran Moves to Stifle Exchange of Reformist V i e w s , " l o s A n g e l e fsi m e s , D e c e m b e r l O , r g 9 g , 4 6 . g. For English translations of some of these writings see (New Charles Kurzman, ed., Iiberal /slcn, ,4 SourcebooA York, N.Y., Io. Inteniew

Oxford,

1998).

with the Venerable Palipana Chandanan-

da. Mahanayake. Asigiriya chapter. Sirhul"r" Sangha, in Kandy,

Sri Lanka,January

tl.

Mahmud

Interiew

with

Buddhist

4, r99r. Abouhalima, September

30, r997. I2. Marcel Gauchet, TheDisenchantment of theWorld'A PoliticalHtstoryof Rel$on, translated from French by Oscar Burge (Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, r998). (New t3. Reinhold Niebuhr, Iuloral ManandlmnorclSocre!, Y o r k , N . Y . ' C h a r l e sS c r i b n e r ' sS o n s , I g 3 2 ) , 2 5 5 .

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Faithin Development Bryant Myers, Alan Whaites & Bruce Wilkinson The modern Western world largely regards spiritual matters as separate from and subordinate to scientific and material realities. For the vast majority of the world's six billion people, however, religious faith informs every facet of life. Particularly in communities of the developing world, faith is an essential aspect of the relationships between family members, peers, and cultures. For these comrnunities, religion is a powerful source of identity, surpassing even nationality and ethnicity. Beyond embracing religion as an essential component of identity, faith-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) regard it as a source of well-being. They believe that the causesof and solutions to poverty include the spiritual as well as the material. Christian NGO activists believe that the separation of the earthly from the spiritual is impoverishing and that people of faith suffer on a spiritual level when they ignore what they perceive as evidence of God at work in the world. The resulting distinct motivations translate into differences in organization, administration, and function from non-faith-based NGOs. Today, faith-based NGOs play a key role in developing regions and are gaining respect in the international community. Both the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency have concluded that faith-based NGOs

Bryant Myers i' Group Vice President for International Program Strategy at World Vision Intern a ti o n al .

Alan Whaites coordinates policy and advocacy at World Vision Inter national.

Bruce Wilkinson is Vice President of ['rograns at World Vision, United States.

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share considerable common ground with bilateral donors and multilateral agencies. The assumption that the spiritual and physical domains of life are separate and unrelated has permeated development theory and practice. It has reduced poverty to a condition merely reflecting a lack of social justice and the absence of rnaterial possessions such as money, water, food, and housing. In turn, development is reduced to a series of material responses designed to overcorne these needs. Faith-based NGOs-such as Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps, World Vision, and groups linked to denominations, including the Seventh-day Adventists, Lutherans, and the Orthodox Church-employ many of the same material responses in their work. These organizations, most of them founded by priests and evangelists, are now staffed by public health workers, food security experts, micro-enterprise development specialists,and development professionals. Their programs are nearly identical to those of their secular counterparts, particularly in countries that prohibit the faith to which the agency adheres.

the central tenet that, as expressed by the Hindus, "All human activities are part of the sacred pattern of the universe. " At the heart of the Christian faith are teachings regarding charity, compassion, solidarity, and justice. These provide a strong rnotivational framework for relief and development work. Virtually all faiths have mechanisms for dispensing charity, starting with local efforts operated from a single temple, mosque, church, or congregation. Like their secular counterparts, faith-based NGOs have varied funding mechanisms, goals, and target audiences. Most faiths also have missionary organizations, some of which provide relief and development assistance in the course of their work. Missionary organizations' primary goalsevangelism and conversion-distingrrish them from faith-based NGOs. Faith-basedNGOs acceptcomprehensive accountability to the people they serve, to donors, and to God. They regard the poor as individuals with the same rights to dignity and respect, regardless of ethnicity, political, or religious values. Unlike other development agencies, they refrain from thinking of "the poor" in the abstract, a practice that invites well-intentioned people of compassion to speak on behalf of the poor while engaging in the latest fads in social engineering' In the rg/Os, it was development as good rnanagernent; in the r9Bos, development as participation; and in the r99Os, development as economics. The poor became the wards of the state, objects of professional study, or a social group waiting to be organized. On the contrary, people of faith find it more difficult to play God in the lives of others becausethe poor are not an abstraction, but rather, a group of human beings with n a m e s . l i v e s .a n d i d e n t i t i e s .

WhatMakes Faith-Based NGOs DiStinCt? Therearea numberof characteristics that distinguish faith-based NGOs, particularly Christian, from secular NGOs. Most prominent among those differences is their distinct ethos and development strategy. Faith-based NGOs are shaped by their respective theologies. Christian NGOs believe that humankind and all human institutions, including the state and the church, exist in reference to God, and that the Bible provides a framework for thinking about human weII-being. Indeed, most faiths uphold a variation of

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MYERS w,H A t r E S& w t L K t N S o NR e l i g i o na n d P o w e r

Faith-based organizations believe in approaching the communities to achieve the spirituality of development. In fact, the greatest impact. faith informs the very definition of Faith-based groups often function in "development." Rather than adhere to the same manner as other NGOs, but for different reasons. Both faith-based the Western world's definition of development on purely economic or qualityNGOs and many other aid agencies share common goals, including poverty of-life criteria, faith-based NGOs look reduction and sustainable developrnent. for spiritual and moral progress; the emphasis is on being more, not just hav- Where those interests intersect, the paring more. ties work together. Faith-based NGOs Even secular groups acknowledge that frequently conduct programs in cooperation with the World Bank, various IJN efforts to rigidly divide religion and the agencies, and bilateral donors such as development process can be inapprothe United States Agency for Internapriate and counterproductive. Relig i o u s b e l i e f s a r e i m p o r t a n t n o t j u s t t o tional Development. Additional shared objectives include the cultural ties within a community, economic growth, modern medical care, but as a powerful lens through which improved agriculture, and water managindividuals perceive and interpret realiment. To faith-based NGOs, the techty. They have a profound impact on how nologies that support these objectives are people act and relate. The cultural, moral, spiritual, and religious dimenmerely tools. OnIy when they are used sions of human life should not be sepa- sensitively and appropriately can these rated from the materialistic. economic. technologies enhance life and make peoand scientific processes employed by ple more productive. But when separated from the spiritual, they cannot improve development practitioners. Development work in Senegal, for the whole of the human condition. By example, was significantly more success- themselves, markets, water supplies, sanitation facilities, and health care systems ful when the strategies for working with communities incorporated the cultural, are not sustainable.Relationships, on the religious, and moral dimensions. Until other hand, are sustainable and can recently, development efforts surroundensure improvements in the lives of families and communities. ing the sensitive issues of female genital mutilation and HIV/AIDS awareness Hence, many faith-based organizaachieved only meager results. Developtions are involved in the search for a new ment agencies then began targeting their paradigm for economic development efforts at respected community leaders, that rates values such as solidarity and most of them religious. Once these cooperation as highly as it does wealth. leaders understood the dangers their Development that focuses only on the communities faced from AIDS and economic or the material is inadequate. female genital mutilation, a moral and Rather, development must include the religious imperative emerged encouragcultural, social, spiritual, and political ing them to work with their community spheres, echoing the Hebrew tradition: "Where there is no bread, there is no to effect behavioral changes. These leadthen helped ers development practitionTorah, and where there is no Torah, ers to understand the ways and means of there is no bread."

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Faith-based NGOs are conscious of the importance of value change. All development agencies must have both a theory to account for the causeofpoverty and a set of beliefs and values which derive from it. Without such a theory, a development agency becomes a charity that dispenses welfare to relieve the more visible symptoms of poverty, but does little to combat its causes.In fact, its efforts can sometimes inadvertently reinforce the conditions of suffering and injustice. Development agencies have beliefs and values which they promote, explicitly or implicitly' the role of the market, respect for human rights, protection of the environment, democracy, or the role of women. Values change when development workers convince rural residents to use

God. The state is just another institution that must fulfill its mission appropriately or be subject to correction. Faith-based NGOs will not accept state policies that devalue the life of individuals or their communities. They view the state as just one of many actors in the development process, not as the supreme actor. This conception of political power drives people of faith to challenge systems and power structures. In Europe, churches and faith-based organizations have led advocacy efforts on such issues as child labor (Christian Aid is a leader of these efforts) and ethical consumerism. Caritas, Christian Aid, and other faith-based groups have been at the forefront ofJubilee 2ooo, a movement dominated by churches and faith-

EVen SeCUlafgfO.UpSacknowledge efforts to divide religion and the development process can be countErproductive. latrines or persuade parents that educa- based organizations seeking global debt tion is as important for their daughters as relief for poor countries. At the Iggg for their sons. meeting of the G7 ln Birmingham, ErgReligion is an important part of culland, some 70,ooo peoplejoined hands tural values, both good and bad. As the to form a human chain in protest against previous example showed, female genital Third World debt. mutilation is difficult to combat Faith compels its followers to seek because,as a purely cultural practice, it is peace and justice. The role of faith in often defended on religious grounds by peacemaking is evident through many C h r i s t i a n s , M u s l i m s , a n d a n i m i s t s , modern examples. Men of faith-Mahatalthough it is not rnentioned in any of ma Gandhi, Dr. Martin Luther King, their sacredbooks. Value change must be Jr., and Archbishop Desmond Tutu-led informed not only by medical reasons or some of the twentieth century's greatest on grounds of gender equity, but on a movements for peaceful change. Mentheological basis. achem Begin and Anwar el-Sadat were Fbith-based NGOs do not accord the willing to take great personal risks for state the final say. Rather, they assert that peace because of their religious convicpeople are accountable to each other and tions. "Each of the principals at Camp their communities-and to their chosen David recognized peace to be both a gift

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M y E R Sw, H A t r E s& w t L K t N S O N R e l i g i Oa nn d P o w e r from God and a preeminent human obligation, " noted former President Jimmy Carter. "To have overlooked the importance of religion for both Sadat and Begin would have resulted in a failure to understand these two men. Such a failure could have had a pervasive and incalculable impact." ln recent decades,the vast majority of wars have been intra-state conflicts. Here, too, the church and other faithb a s e di n s t i t u t i o n s a r e i m p o r t a n t a c t o r s . The role of the churches is considered central, if not critical, to a relatively peaceful transition to multi- ethnic democracy in South Africa. The Quakers havebeen activein conciliation and peace efforts in the Biafran war, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. In Biafra, the Quakers were seen as trustworthy by both sides in the conflict. Asked whether the Quakers were regarded as religious or secular actors, then Secretary-General of the British Commonwealth Arnold Smith replied, "I think people who knew them understood that their motivation was spiritual. But spiritual is not an opposite of secular;it's an attitude of values, of how one deals in secular matters. "

developing countries not only as recipients of aid, but also as equal partners. For World Vision, this led to a risky move toward partnership with entities in the industrialized and the developing world, each locally governed and legally autonomous. The resulting international board is composed of representatives from nineteen countries and seven regions, nine of whom are from developing countries. The only glue that u n i t e s t h e s ep a r t n e r s i s a c o m m o n m i s sion, core values. and a covenant. Faith-based organizations believe that development is a means to an end, not an end in itself. The true goal is transformation. The focus is not on transferring resources, building capacity, or increasing choices. It is on changing people. At the heart of all the major faiths is the aim of personal transformation-to draw nearer to the divine, to gain a true understanding of the meaning of life, and to reach inner peace and contentrnent. Isaiah writes that when the poor hear the good news and receive freedom, they become "oaLs of righteousness that rebuild the ancient ruins and restore the places long devastated." People, not programs, restore their worlds.

Vision is an international Christian relief and TheFuture ofFaith-Based NG0s.World development organization. It currently supports more

Faith-based organizations must view

t h a n 3 , 4 - o Op r o j e c t si n n e a r l yt o o c o u n t r i e s w o r l d w i d e .

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Threats: Ten Cyber Issues forConsideration FrankJ. Cilluffo & Paul Byron Pattak As the United Stateshurtles into the Information Age, we are forced to grapple with a new set of national security problems heretofore not contemplated. Distance, time, and geography have been reduced to the point of irrelevancy. Information networks have given the United States an unrivaled, perhaps unsurpassable,lead over the rest of the world in virtually every facet of modern life. To an unprecedented degree American national security and economic well-being depend upon critical infrastructures, such as banking and finance, electric power, information and communications, oil and gas production, transportation, water supply, emergency services, and the continuity of government services.These infrastructures in turn depend upon telecommunications and networked information systems.Along with the clear rewards of information systemscome new risks and a host of unintended consequencesthat need to be better understood by corporate and government leaders. The United States faces threats from peer nations, trading partners, hostile countries, non-state actors, terrorists, organized crime, insiders, and teenage hackers. While few adversaries would attempt to confront the United States in a conventional war on the traditional battlefield, its adversaries recognize that terrorisrn and other asymmetric forrns of conflict,

Frank J. Cilluffo is the Deputy

Director

the Global

Organized

Crime Center

at the

project

for Strategic

and International Studies (CSIS), Washington,

D.C.,

where he directs seven task forces tional

on transna -

threats

organized

and

crime.

Paul Byron Pattak is President of the Byron Group, Ltd. in Alexandria, Virginia. He has served asa Senior Consultant to the President's Commission on Critical lnfrastructure Protection (PCCIP)-

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B its and byteS will nevercompletely replace bullets and bornbs, but th-eycan be synergistically combined. such as cyber attacks, are more effective methods of striking the United States where it is most r,r.rlnerable.Bits and bytes will never completely replace bullets and

tions of U.S. military comrnand-andcontrol systemsin the Pacific and Emergency-glr systemsin the United States. In response to the emerging threat of bombs, but they can be synergistically c y b e r t e r r o r i s m , o n M a y 2 2 , r 9 g 8 , P r e s combined. Imagine if the Oklahorna idential Decision Directive 6g (PDDCity bombing had been accompanied by 63) authorized the creation of a Nationelectronic disruptions of federal, state, a l I n f r a s t r u c t u r e P r o t e c t i o n C e n t e r and local emergency and public safety (NIPC). The NIPC is now housed withcommunications systerns, including in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and serves as a lookout for Emergency-gII. The ability to network has far outpaced attempted intrusions and monitors the ability to protect networks. When the cyber attacks. PDD-63 also led to the Internet was created, it was designed with establishrnent of the Critical Infrastruc"openness" and accessibility as grriding t u r e A s s u r a n c e O f f i c e ( C I A O ) w i t h i n p r i n c i p l e s . M o s t i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m s the Department of Commerce to serve have been engineered in the most ecoas a policy coordination staff for infranornically efficient manner, and are structure assurance issues within the therefore dependent upon a small numexecutive branch. ber of critical nodes, making them r.ulWhile the U.S. g'overnment has taken nerable to attack. As computer systerns these important steps, a more holistic, becorne increasingly interdependent, high-level policy debate is required. damage to one can potentially cascade lnformation warfare, cyber crime, and and impact others. cyber terrorism all overlap, yet require Arnerica's lrrlnerabilities were dramadifferent domain expertise and varied tized during a r997 Joint Chiefs of Staff responses.At present it is impossible to exercise, code-narned "Eligible Receiv- refer to clearly delineated rules. Before er. " The purpose of the exercise was to cornmitting ourselves to policies with test the United States' ability to respond enormous potential for adverse results to cyber attacks. The results opened the and misspent taxpayer dollars, the Uniteyes of skeptics. Using software widely ed States must first fully understand the available fr-orn hacker Web sites, the thirdangers of cyber threats. Ten issues ty-five-person team showed how they require tho ughtful consideration. could have disabled elernents of the U.S. electric power grid by exploiting Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SpaGe. Cyber warfare raises serious (SCADA) systems (*hich allow remote questions about how future conflicts c o n t r o l o f t h e s y s t e m s ) . T h e y a l s o and wars are prosecuted. What constidemonstrated how to incapacitate portutes an act of war? How does one dif-

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ferentiate between a terrorist attack and a financial crime committed with a computer? What is the adequate balance between protecting civil liberties, businesses,and national security? To a large extent, determiningwhether the United States is at war depends on the antagonist. A cyber attack by China's People's Liberation At-y requires a substantially different series of responses than an attack by teenagers from China, although American victirns of an attack might never know the difference. In late January and early February rgg8, as the United States considered deploying forces to the Persian Gulf, hackers attacked scores of Defense Department networks. Pentagon and FBI investigators thought that these intrusions might have been launched in response to a military build-up in the Persian Gulf. Fearing the worst, senior Defense officials informed the White House that an Iraqi information warfare campaign may have been underway. Their fears were substantiated because the hackers used foreign Internet service providers, including one located in the United Arab Emirates, as a staging point for their attacks. After several days of investigating, the FBI learned that two California-based teenagers, mentored by an eighteenyear-old Israeli national, had conducted the attack. They were able to preserve the anonymity of their attack by routing it through a host of computer systems around the world. They successfully breached U.S. military computer defenses and gained access to the Defense Department's unclassified (yet important) logistics networks. The attack and the subsequent investigation, dubbed "Solar Sunrise," were characterized by John Hamre, Deputy Secretary of

Defense, as "the most organized and systematic attack" on U.S. defense networks discovered thus far. Cyber warriors can systemically attack networks in relative vital American anonymity. The person on the other end could just as easilybe a child, a competitor, or a foreign intelligence service. A few months after "Solar Sunrise, " a Massachusetts teenager was charged with disabling the IAA control tower at for six Worcester Regional Airport hours. Incoming planes could not use the runway lights. Later in rgg8, a rnan in Toborg, Sweden managed to disable major portions of South Florida's Emergency-9II system. To date, most of these denial-of-service incidents have either been perpetrated by insiders or hackers and are best characterized as annoyances. Hackers, largely thrill-seeking young people, have demonstrated that vulnerabilities can be exploited by those with hostile intent. Any one of the increasing number of groups and individuals hostile to U.S. interests could exploit these mlnerabilities to harm those interests. Current U.S. policy does not draw clear distinctions between these various scenarios. Without established rules of engagernent, there is no battle plan in place to address the dangers raised by the various attacks. Likewise, because of the virtual nature of cyberspace, conventional force projection will not preempt or prevent cyber assaults.As we are by and large dealing with "actors without addresses," conventional military projection will not prevent a cyber assault. But a well-defined policy and an established strategy would go a long way toward showing our adversaries that the United States is willing and able to resoond both in kind and conventional-

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Iy. In the final analysis, the nation's best deterrent may be the ability to quickly reconstitute our damaged systems, regardlessof the perpetrator.

is now more important than its ability to project power.

3. Non-StateActotS.Theincreased

availability of advanced technology has 2. Rulesof Engagement. Nation-strengthened the capabilities of hostile al planners need to define carefully the non-state actors. The situation will only criteria for U.S. rules of engagement for worsen as the requisite level of knowlcyberspace. In short, they must deteredge and skill decreaseswhile the power mine how the United Statesselectsinforand technological sophistication of mation warfare targets, as well as who and these cyber attack tools increase expowhat are fair garne. In turn, this may be a nentially. As a result, tenorists have harbinger of how U.S. systems will be become empowered and have moved targeted by adversaries. away from the fringes of world affairs A c c o r d i n g t o U . S . m e d i a r e p o r t s , toward the center stage. President Clinton issued a highly classiCyber warfare can also be a tool to colfied finding authorizing the CIA to use lect intelligence in support of terrorist c o v e r t m e a n s t o u n d e r m i n e S e r b i a n operations and campaigns, and to comPresident Slobodan Milosevic. The municate and disseminate propaganda. President allegedly authorized governGiven today's state of technology and ment agencies to conduct cyber operadual-use applications, terrorist groups tions against Mr. Milosevic by tapping can easily acquire an inexpensive, yet into his bank accounts. Intelligence robust communications intelligence sources believe Mr. Milosevic secreted (COMINT) collection capability. First, money in Swiss,Russian, Greek, Cypritenorists can intercept valuable political, ot, and Chinese banks. A cornpelling economic, and military secrets; run reason to support this effort is that it counter-surveillance on law enforcement; and perform profiling analysesto personalized the target and did not result in collateral damage-in this case identify individuals who can be bribed, innocent Serbian civilians. co-opted, coerced, or "neutralized." The problem with this particular Much of this work can be done anony"covert" action is that it ceased to be mously, diminishing the risk of reprisal covert upon the public's awareness of its and increasing the likelihood of success. occurrence. Accordingly, it is substanSecond, terrorists can use advanced techtially more difficult to execute this type of nology for communication and tradeplan when the would-be target is aware of craft. The Internet and other informathe action. The first rule of covert action tion systems provide terrorist groups a is to keep it clandestine and maintain global and near real-time cornrnand, plausible deniability. control, and communications capability. An information arms race does not The availability of sophisticated encrypbode well for the United States given its tion devices and anonymous re-mailers u n p a r a l l e l e d d e p e n d e n c e o n c r i t i c a l also provides relatively secure communiinfrastructures. In many ways, it is the cations or stored data.' reverse of Cold War nuclear deterrence Nearly all major terrorist organizations policy-America's ability to defend itself have a Web site, including the Shining

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Path, Hamas, the Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Columbia (IARC), the Liberated Thmil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), and the Irish Republican At-y (IRA). They Iook to the Internet largely to disseminate communiquds, fundraise, and recruit. The United States'most-wanted transnational terrorist, Osama bin Laden, uses laptopswith satellite uplinls and encrlpted messagesto conduct operations and maintain links across national borders with his terrorist network. There is no shortage of terrorist "cookstep-by-step

the potential for global organization and mobilization. On June 18, 1999, demonstrators organized a global protest, with manifestations in major cities on several continents and along a broad spectrum of agendas. Groups were implored to demonstrate against the rubric of globalization, but without a unified theme or forrnat. The result was sirnultaneously orchestrated global disruptions and Internet attacks. In London, individuals described in the media as "evil savages"and "masked

It is onlya mattâ&#x201A;Źt

of time beforethereis

books" on the Internet,

a converg'encebetween those with hostile intent and thosE with techno-savvy-where the real bad guys exploit the real good stuff. recipes for hackers, crackers (criminal hackers), and cyber terrorists." An adversary can circumvent national militaries completely, armed only with automated "weapons of mass disruption." It is only a matter of time before there is a convergence between those with hostile intent and those with techno-sarvy-where the real bad guys exploit the real good stuff.

4. Public 0pinion. Malfeasants can easily hide in cyberspace'svoid and lash out either precisely or indiscriminately. The Internet also provides the perfect mediurn for people to communicate their ideas, organize initiatives, and execute activities on a distributed basis.3This raises the possibility that adversaries could organize covertly on an unprecedented scale. The activities of "hacktivists" such as theJr8 and the Electronic Disturbance Theater begin to illustrate

thugs" assembled in the financial district in a rampage against capitalism. Stilt-walkers, magicians, jugglers, and musicians lined the streets, targeting the London Financial International Futures and Options Exchange. Dismissed locally as a drunken mob, the "New Age guerrillas" rnanaged to disrupt the ebb and flow of business. Meanwhile, on the same day in Austin, Texas, a bicycle ride by a group called Critical Mass arrived at a particular coffee shop to be part of a global "reclaim the street" project. As the first set of bikers started to arrive, they encouraged others to stand in the street, which had been barricaded to interrupt traffic. The organizers managed to briefly address the crowd and hand out fliers before the police arrived and dispersed them. While people protested, the Electronic Disturbance Theater organized a "vir-

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tual sit-in," a denial-of-service attack that called on people around the world to point their Internet browser toward the Zapatista Floodnet URL between { : o o r . r r . ra. n d r o , o o p . v . ( G M T ) . T h e computers continually sent reload commands to the Floodnet site. Floodnet then redirected these requests to the Mexican Embassy in London. Thus, rnuch like the previous two examples, the Internet "streets" were crowded with "people. " The results of the virtual sit-in were even more impressive than the physical demonstrations, tB,6I$ unique contributors from forty-six countries were part of the assault. The events of June rB, 1999 raise frightening possibilities. Protesters in more than forty countries mobilized on the same day, physically and virtually. If the protests had existed for a single organized purpose, the results could have been devastating. These events further illustrate that the Internet can be both a tool and a target. JrB passed largely unnoticed by the media, which to date has focused only on highly visible activities, while ignoring many of cyber warfare's subtle dangers. The November rggg World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings became the site of the most recent iteration of Internet-mobilized protests. Under the same anti-globalization banner, chief organizer Michael Dolan used the Internet to organize and mobilize a large unrelated group of protesters under the collective banner of "NOZWTO." The protesters represented a panoply of issues. Everyone from animal rights activists to supporters of the Zapatistas in Mexico carne from all across North America to voice their grievances. The result was the "Battle in Seattle." Individual messageswere lost in the ensuing vio-

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lence. Through their Web site, a group calling themselves the "Electrohippies" organized a virtual sit-in, shorthand for a denial-of-service attack, just as other groups had done withJrB. were successful Jr8 and NOzWTO protests in that they succeeded in disrupting that day's, and even that week's, events. They illustrate a new model or principle dubbed "disorganization," or decentralization by experts. This precept encourages many simultaneous local protests addressing specific concerns. Protesters thereby benefit from "demonstrations of scale." NOZWTO also introduced new faces to the protest crowd. It showed the appeal of being not only able to reach a wider audience, but also to draw from a larger pool. In many ways, however, this was a one-trick pony. Groups with an established constituency and a defined message, like the AFL-CIO, clearly suffered some loss in legitimacy by association with violent protests. While future protests rnay lose several better-known organizations, the more radical elements have everything to gain byjoining forces in this paradoxical global-local protest. Already many of the groups that brought the world Jr8 and NOzWTO, including the Direct Action Network (DAN) and People's Global Action (PGA), are planning MayDay2ooo. As May Day has a tradition of protests, chances are that MayDay2ooo will be larger in scope thanJr8 and NOzWTO. Local governments and emergency responders need to be aware of the potential for the type of disruption displayed in Seattle and plan accordingly.

5. MediaMisunderstanding. The most visible attacls on American systems result in a disproportionate amount

c t L L U F F& o pArrAK cOnflict&security of media attention. Indeed, there has been no shortage of headlines with the recent battle between federal officials and computer intruders. Web sites maintained by the Senate, the FBI, the Interior Department, the White House, the U.S. Arrny, and the North Atlantic teaty Organization (NATO). to name a few, were defaced in tggg. The transgressionswere usually nothing more than graffiti and unsightly annoyances. Meanwhile, a number of truly dangerous incidents have passed relatively unnoticed. The recent spate of hacker events has drawn a great deal of publicity. The media focused on the attacks against the FBI and Senate Web pages and dutifully reported that a top U.S. Justice Department official labeled the attacls as "serious." On June 2, rggg, apparently in retaliation for FBI raids against their peers, hackers overwhelmed the agency's Web site and le{i messagescriticizing the FBI's investigation of the hacker incidents. They were limited to the Web pages and did not penetrate the FBI's main computer systems. These attacks were serious in that they disrupted the government's ability to effectively communicate its messageto the population at large, but they are not the most serious threats. While the perpetrators should be punished, they do not warrant the highest level of coverage or attention. Young hackers want to show off, and hacktivistsseekto use the Internet as simply another means to draw attention to their respective causes.What both groups have in common is a desire for attention, and the media is happy to oblige. Insufficiently covered in press reports are the discreet and often silent efforts by serious adversariesto deveiop tools, techniques, and doctrines for conducting information warfare against the United Statesand

its interests. The imbalance of reporting must change in order for the American public to better understand the extent of the emerging threats. Despite the extensive coverage of Web hacks and Web site vandalism, they amount to mere graffiti in cyberspace. \{hile it is essential that the media act responsibly and not panic the citizenry, they play a crucial role in educating the public as to the dangers, both overt and subtle, presented by information warfare.

5. Lessonsfrom Y2l(. Insiders and. internal saboteurs, either disgruntled employees or moles, are perfectly positioned to wreak havoc within organizations. Moreover, these people know where the most sensitive information is stored, how to accessit, and what to steal or damage. Insiders are ideal candidates for subversion by foreign governments or terrorist organizations. Pressure to solve the YzK dilemma led the United States government and private industry to emphasize expediency over safety in many cases. As a result, thousands of YZf consultants have been given unprecedented accessto systemsthat are otherwise strictly protected. Most crisis managers knew a lot about the YZK problem, but not enough about its possible consequences. There are some issues that have not generated much media interest but present possible national security hazards. Aside from the counterintelligence concerns, backdoor Y2K access can be exploited for theft or disruption. Some of the programmers contracted to exterminate the YzK bug may have exploited their position by leaving a "backdoor," granting them the ability to subsequently access the system undetected. The profile of likely perpetrators in such a scenario

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would be a highly skilled software engineer who worked on Y2K remediation efforts and understands both the information systernsand the business processes of the enterprise that hired them. Ideally, the YZK experience should seryeas both a wake-up call and a training exercise so that industry and government can use the lessons learned to becorne better informed about the potential effects and consequences of cyber threats. Hopefully, YZKwlll inspire both industry and governrnent to strengthen information protection and infrastructure assurance. Success is possible with plans in p l a c ea n d a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n .

broken into every twenty seconds. While an assailant can penetrate borders in a matter of nanoseconds, the law enforcement official charged with their apprehension must stop at these borders and cannot adequately pursue the attacker. In essence,we have created a "global village" without a police department. Enemies also have the luxury of choosing between civilian and military targets. As military targets becorne better protected, assailants will naturally turn to more lrrlnerable prey. Industry and government need to solidify their partnership in the face of this reality.

7. Cyber Invasion. Currently, sev-

Due to financial considerations and efficiency principles, military and civilian sectors are interdependent. The U.S. military is becorning increasingly dependent on applications developed by the civilian world. Specifically, U.S. forces rely on Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology, and commercial systems and services. U.S. forces also count on commercial transportation services and facilities for mobilization and logistics support. These all have an information technology component, be they air traffic control or ground transportation. These systerns are largely under civilian control and are responsible for ensuring the delivery of people and machines from place to place. About g$ percent of Defense Department cornmunications travel over commercial networks, serwices, and lines. The substance of the communiqu6s can be protected through encryption, which can better protect confidentiality of inforrnation, and to a lesser extent, the integrity of the information. All of the encryption in the world, however, cannot prevent denial-of-service attacks.

eral countries possessoffensive information warfare capabilities comparable to those of the United States. Most of these nations. however. would be foolish to take down U.S. systems, as this would comprornise a valuable intelligence collection rnethod for them. Nevertheless, they are conducting surveillance, mapping critical nodes that can be exploited during future crises. The ability to identify and reconnoiter such targets is today possible due to the Internet and powerful search engines on the World Wide Web. Moreover, information warfare extends the battlefield to incorporate all of society. In the same way that we can no longer rely upon Fort Knox's steeland concrete to protect U.S. financial assets,Americans can no longer rely upon the two oceans to prevent a mainland invasion. The myth persists that the continental United Stateshas not been invaded since r8r2. In reality, invasion through cyberspace has become a daily occurrence. Currently, an Internet-connected cornputer or seryer in the United States is

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8. PublicandPrivate Overlap.

c t L L U F F&op A r r A Kc O n f l i C t & secUrity The physical connections-the satellite links, glass fibers, metal wires, and microwave stations-go relatively unprotected. Additionally, in embracing COTS, the Pentagon is now rnore likely to purchase hardware, software, and firmware from various domestic and overseassources. Similar risks occur in business with just-in-time delivery and reliance on electronic information transfers.

issue here is not whether a line must be drawn, but rather, where it will be drawn. The United States must reallocate and manage intelligence assets in order to ensure that policyrnakers develop an accurate, comprehensive understanding of the threat posed by information warfare. Information must not be trapped in narrow channels, but should instead flow to all sources that may be affected, including business concerns. We do not have to choose between privacy and national security-we can have both.

vs.National 9. Privacy Security. The delicate balance between privacy and security is an ever-present tension in American society. One hundred years ago, government employees did not undergo background investigations for security clearances in the same rnanner as today. However, over the course of the tumultuous twentieth century, background investigations, security clearances, and loyalty oaths became the necessaryprice that many Americans paid to serve in critical civilian and military

10. The Rule of Law.Atmost allof

the issues discussed in this article have legal implications, yet the United States has only just begun to consider the necessity of arnending existing laws and passing new ones. Laws that do not necessarily appear to have a direct application to national security are relevant. Unless changes are made to the Freedom of Information Act and certain antitrust statutes, it will be virtually impossible for industry and government to share inforpositions. As government and other organizamation that would help defend against tions compile databases to track everycyber threats. thing frorn driver's licenses to medical Almost all U.S. national security leghistories, Americans have become more islation is based on American operasensitive to privacy issues and the specter t i o n s i n a i r , o n l a n d , o n w a t e r , a n d i n of numerous "Little Brothers" in addispace. And it is not surprising that a tion to "Big Brother." Serious debates large percentage of U.S. laws concern are also raging on such matters as encrypphysical property and associated rights. tion technology and the ability to track Many of these laws, and the entities that and trace cellular phones. enforce them, have their authority Tools that ensure privacy and convebased upon, and limited by, geography. nience for the United States do the same But with the movement of conflict to for its adversaries. The encryption softthe electronic domain, the United ware that protects sensitive financial States, without delay, must conform its information also allows a terrorist to statutes to reflect the corresponding conceal a destructive plot. The ability to j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i s s u e s . O u r l e g i s l a t i v e track cellular phones may prove critical and legal mechanisms are adrnittedly in stopping or capturing those who are cautious in a world that is moving with conducting hostile operations. The key ever-increasing speed. Mindful of the

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tradeoff

between these deliberative processesand the rapid developrnent of cyber threats, the United States cannot effectively address twenty-first-century crimes armed only with nineteenthcentury laws.

Communityand Defense. The United States has faltered in the face of cyber threats because, despite considerable efforts, the national focus is strategically misplaced. The media misdirects the nation's attention, using more ink to report hacker exploits than the substantive national security threats made possible by information technology. This same technology has also enhanced the role of individuals in the national security arena. Gone are the days when one needed to raise an army, build a command structure, train soldiers, and purchaseweapons to attack an adversary. The price of entry is at an all-time low. Widespread destruction can be perpetrated from the comfort of one's living room with inexpensive tools, or over telecommunications networks designed, ironic a l l y . f o r c o l l e c t i v ec o n v e n i e n c e . Industry and government must establish a genuine partnership. In some way, we must introduce the "sandals" to the "wingtips." The Department of Defense should not be the only entity concerned with defending American interests in cyberspace. Government no

longer has the luxury of having all the knowledge or assuming that it will be in a position to provide all of the answers. If we are to ensure that all relevant parties have a seat at the table, a bigger table must be furnished. The administration should be applauded for its initial first efforts with PDD-63. However, to truly enhance national security, such efforts rnust extend beyond the government-centered pararneters of PDD-63. The United States must make an irrevocable commitment in terms of education. awareness. sensible application of technology, and decisive action. Perhaps the old notion that security begins in the communities-neighbors watching out for each other-is more significant now than ever before. Interconnectedness will become the sinequanon of everyday life now that everyone has a vested interest in community protection. As interdependence arnong institutions and individuals grows, particularly in the realm of cyberspace, the distinctions between public and private, industry and government, and "your" and "-y" responsibility fade, and are replaced by "our" responsibility. PresidentJohn F. Kennedy once said, "The best time to fix the roof is when the sun is shining. " The time to begin thinking about, and addressing, the challenges posed by cyber threats is now.

NOTES The authors would

like to acknowledge the substantial

made by George C. Salmoiraghi,

contibutions

year student at the University of Rrchmond t. For a more

in-depth

and

Gergely,

Curt

a third-

Law School.

review see FrankJ. Cilluffo "Information Warfare and

Strate gic Te rro rism, " l-errorismc nd Political Viol ence,Vol. No. t (Spring 1997), 84-94.

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2. For a more in-depth review see CSIS, C2bercnme, Clberterorism,and Cybemorfore' Auertingan Electronic Woterloo, Global Organized Crime Project 1998. 3 . F o r a m o r e i n d e p t h r e v i e ws e e J o h n A r q u i l l a a n d David Ronfeldt [eds.], In Atheno's ConCamp'Preporingfor (Santa Monica, CA. ' The RAND fictinthelnformation,4ge Corporation, I!g]).

T N T E R V TCEoW nlfi c t& S e c u r i t y

IS I(ENNETH WALTZ STI LL

ABOUT NUI(ES? he fatherof neorealism asserts that nucleardeterrence is

aliueanduell

a The

nuclear

threat did not diminish

with the end of the Cold War-it merely shifted its locale. India and Pakistan's decisions in May r99B to conduct nuclear tests raised new questions about the prospects for nuclear stability in South Asia. Israel's nuclear program remains shrouded in secrecy,while nuclear aspirants Iraq and Iran press forward in their quest to join the nuclear club. North Korea's intentions and nuclear capabilities are unknown, as is the extent of the nuclear assistanceit receives from abroad. Russia struggles to maintain control of its nuclear arsenal, while the Chinese seem unsatisfied by the size and reach of their own. And terrorists may be in the market for nuclear weaponry, as they shift their focus away from dernonstration toward devastation. \Arhat do these developments tell us about nuclear security in today's world? Tlne lournal asks Kenneth Waltz, one of the world's foremost experts on nuclear deterrence and author of The Spreadof NuclearWopons, ADebate(with Scott Sagar,). Kenneth Waltz ir Adjunct Professorat Columbia University and Research Associate at the Institute of War and Peace Studies.

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J o u RNAr- In your writing, you argrre that the rapid spread of nuclear weapons may be destabilizing. How quickly will new nuclear powers emerge? wALrz It is now estirnated that about twenty-five countries are in a position to make nuclear weapons rather quickly. Most countries that could have acquired nuclear military capability have refrained from doing so. Most countries do not need them. Consider Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. Argentina and Brazil were in the process of moving toward nuclear military capability, and both decided against it-wisely I believebecause neither country needs nuclear weapons. South Africa had about half a dozen warheads and decided to destroy thern. You have to have an adversary against whom you thinkyou might have to threaten retaliation, but most countries are not in this position. Germany does not face any security threats-certainly not any in which a nuclear force wouid be relevant. I would expect the pattern of the past to be the same as the pattern in the future, in which one or two statesper decade gradually develop nuclear weapons. J 0 u R N A rW i l l n e w p r o l i f e r a n t s b e d e s t a bilizing? 'fhe wALrz new proliferants are mainly, but not entirely, weak states. Pakistan and India are good examples of new nuclear powers that are going to have only a small number of nuclear warheads. The United States has at least seven thousand strategic nuclear warheads. If you have thousands of nuclear warheads then you need elaborate bureaucracies to control the arsenal. But if you have ten nuclear warheads or fifty, you are going to cher-

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ish those nuclear warheads. You obviously feel that you need them, and therefore you have every reason to be very careful. The accidents and near-accidents that have taken place with nuclear warheads have been, as far as I know, accidents on the part of the major nuclear powers and not the small ones. J 0 u RNAL So, you do believe that these new proliferants of the future can be deterred? wALrz Well, that is a different question. The United States and the Soviet Union developedpeculiar ideasofnuclear deterrence: namely that thousands of warheads are required for deterrence. That notion was always crazy.At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis our estirnateswere that the Soviet Union had only about seventy true strategic systems.We had thousands. Were we deterred? Yes we were. We did not strike at the nuclear warheads that the Soviet lJnion had in Cuba. The Air Force was asked if they could hit and destroy all the targets. And remember that they were close by, and there were not that many of them. The Air Force answered, "We promise we can get 90 percent." Not enough. IMe were deterred. Now, nuclear weapons do not deter everybody frorn doing everything. They do not deter forays. They do not deter, for example, Arab countries from starting wars over the disputed terroritories. But they did dissuade the Egyptians and Syrians from trying to divide Israel during the lg/g Yom Kippur War. They pulled back for fear that the threat of the destruction of the Israeli state would prornpt the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons deter threats to the vital interests of the state, and they have done so in every casethat comes to mind.

T N T E R V TCEoW n f l i c&t S e c u r i t y J o u RNAr- What about those states whose leaders might not use rational calculations in considering the threat of nuclear weapons, such as Saddam Hussein of Iraq, if he were to acquire nuclear weapons? wALr z We have this peculiar notion about the irrationality of rogue states.When he was Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin said these rogrre leaders might be undeterrable. Others contend that some states may undertake courses of action even if they know that catastrophe may result. But who would do that? Not Saddam Hussein. Not Kim Il Sung when he was ruler of North Korea. What is a key characteristic of all those rulers? They are surwivors, as they struggle to live in a harsh environment-both internally, with the constant danger of assassination, and externally, as they're surrounded by enemies. And they survive for decades until they are carried out in a box. Are they irrational? Their behavior is ugly and nasty to be sure, but irrational? How could they surwive? If they were not deterrable, howwould they ever have survived? They don't run the kind of risks that would put their regime into question. Kim Il Sung wanted to pass his reign onto his son, Kim Jong Il. They obviously love to rule, but they've got to have a country. They're not going to risk the existence of their country. For example, Saddam Hussein was deterred during the Persian Gulf War. He did not arm the SCUD rnissiles with lethal warheads and shoot thern at Israel. They were nuisance attacks. Why? Becausehe didn't want us to pound him more heavily than he was being pounded. The allies, led by the United States, could have substantially destroyed that country without ever using nuclear weapons, and

he knew it. Sure he was deterred. So how can we say irrational or undeterrable? But we do say it. J o u R N A r -Y o u c o n t e n d t h a t S a d d a m Hussein did not launch lethal missiles at Israel during the GulfWar because he was deterred by the nuclear threat. This raises the question of how Israel's undeclared nuclear status affects nuclear stability. Does opacity diminish the effectiveness of deterrence? wAlrz I take Israel as being a nuclear state, and I do not think anybody doubts that Israel has nuclear weapons. But as a tacit nuclear state, it doesn't adrnit that it has nuclear weapons. By keeping its nuclear status opaque or tacit, it relieves some of the pressure on potential adversaries. It prevents Israel from goadingArab statesby alwaystalking about its nuclear weapons, which would make it more embarrassing for surrounding Arab states not to have them, and encourage them to try a little harder to acquire the capability. So it tends to dampen it, but it doesn't fool anybody. J 0 u RNAr- Let's turn our attention to the nuclear situation in South Asia. While nuclear weapons rnay have arguably helped stabilize the contentious relationship between India and Pakistan-no war has been fought since the introduction of nuclear weapons in the early lglosmany observers worry that nuclear stability may not hold. What do you see as the prospects for stability? wALrz Stability in the subcontinent now exists; it had not existed since World War II and the partition of India and Pakistan. Now with nuclear weapons on both sides, India and Pakistan can no longer fight

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even a conventional war over Kashmir, as former General Beg and former General Sardarji both admitted. But we still fear instability such as the intractable dispute over the Kashmir. Yet the bitterness between the United States and the Soviet IJnion was deep enough during the Cold War, and deterrence worked. Why would India and Pakistan be different? Does India and Pakistan's common border increase the risk? Probably not in a modern world where there are airplanes and missiles that can reach anywhere. What difference does it make that you've got a common border as long as it's perfectly easyfor the two countries in an adversarial relationship to reach each other? Geographic proximity rnay shrink warning time, but nuclear deterrence does not depend on being able to react with split-second timing. What's the hurry? If you have received a damaging blow from another country and you're going to retaliate, what difference does it make if you retaliate now, ten rninutes from now, or tomorrow? A country still has that same fear of the retaliation, and it's that fear of retaliation that deters. Proximity also does not rnean vulnerability. EverT country has enough space to move its weapons around; in order for me to believe that your force is vulnerable and consider a preernptive attack, I have to convince rnyself that I know exactly how many deliverable nuclear weapons you have. So if I think you have twelve weapons, I've got to know you don't have a couple more. I've got to be sure that's the number. And if I persuade myself that you have twelve and no more, I have to know where they are, and I have to be sure thatyou do not move them by the time I decide to attack. It's estimated by Herbert York, former

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director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, that a country making a relatively crude nuclear warhead would be able to make one weighing less than a ton-srnall enough to place in a van and move around. JouRNAu Sorne military analysts would contend that India's conventional superiority makes Pakistan's nuclear capability vulnerable, largely because Pakistan relies on its air capability to deliver weapons, and in a conventional war, its air capability could be destroyed very quickly. Could that development, with the implications on Pakistan's inability to withstand a preemptive attack, possibly disrupt nuclear stability? wALrz You've got to be sure that in an attack, whether with nuclear weapons or conventional weapons, you re attacking weapons. Now, it's hard-nuclear weapons are small-to be sure that you're going to destroy those weapons quickly and completely. With conventional weapons you at least have the illusion of control; that is, you can defend, you can delay, and you can exact a toll from the enemy. The ultimate question is whether you are going to win or lose. If you are fighting with nuclear weapons the issue is survival, not necessarily physically, but as a political entity. Military commanders are well aware of how many things can go wrong: failed intelligence, undetected warheads in an unexpected location. If Pakistan has two dozen nuclear weapons spread around and at least four or five India does not know about, is India going to attack and risk four or five warheads blowing up Indian cities? While the attack might not destroy India, what could be at stake that would be worth that price? It's a risk to their regirne, it's a

T N T E R V TcEOW nfliCt&secUrity risk to rulers, and it's a risk to the military. You don't get much enthusiasm out of the military for fightingwars it's going to lose. J 0 u RNAr- At the present tirne, neither India nor Pakistan is satisfied with the size of their nuclear arsenals and neither of them can afford to build up their second strike retaliatory capability. How is that going to affect the strategic balance on the subcontinent? I hope that these new nuclear countries will have learned from the mistakes of the United States and the Soviet Union. We spent trillions of dollars on nuclear weapons. Why? A1l you need is a second strike force. Once you get a second strike force adding more weapons does not give you any more military capability. You have a deterrent force, and if you add more to it, you still have a deterrent force. You can't fight nuclear wars, as nobody has ever figrrred out how you would conceivably do that. A reason for optirnism is that they are poor. They don't have enough rnoney to do it. They can't build large nuclear forces, and that's fortunate because they don't need them. wAlrz

J 0 u RNAr- But does the lack of funding for security measures increase the possibility of a miscalculation or an unauthorized launch? wALrz I think large numbers of weapons would raise that concern. But I think we can rely on their self-interest and their ingenuity to prevent accidents. Every country goes through a period where it has relatively crude weapons, although relatively crude weapons are not as crrde as they used to be, and where they have

small numbers and where there are some questions of vulnerability. But we have rnanaged to get through those periods. The only strikes we've had have been at nuclear facilities before any warheads were produced, with no attacks where there were existing warheads and for good reason: Deterrence works. J 0 u R N A r -W h a t a b o u t n o n - s t a t e a c t o r s ? Can nuclear weapons deter terrorists? wALrz Well, first you need an address; you have to know whom you are retaliating against. Oddly enough, as the nurnber of terrorist incidents-worldwide and in the United States-has decreased, our concern with terrorisrn has increased. Former CIA Director John Deutch said that in rgg6 alone, the United States experienced the lowest number of terrorist incidents in the last twenty-five years. That is rather striking. J0uRNAL Will terrorists thernselvesseek to acquire nuclear weapons? wALrz Would they want them? I think that the answer is no. Terrorists have always been in the position where they could have done more darnage than they have chosen to inflict. As BrianJenkins, one of the great experts on terrorism, said a long time ago' "Terrorists want more people watching, not more people dead." They are trying to make a point. They are fighting what looks to be a weak and hopeless cause, and they adopt these drastic measures because they do not have the strength to make their cases in an acceptable fashion. J 0 u RNAl Terrorists rnay not want nuclear weapons, but they have a variety of other weapons at their disposal.

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WA LT Z People who now worry about bio logical, chemical, or nuclear terrorism have invented a whole new kind of ter rorist. They are terrorists without secu lar objectives; they want to kill for the sake of killing. They believe that the end of the world is coming, and they want to hasten or dramatize it. In other words, they are seen as truly irrational. What can you say, and furthermore, what can you do? All you can do is acknowledge that instruments capable of inflicting great damage do exist and concede that they can fall into the hands of terrorists. And then you can say, let us improve our intelligence, let us stockpile vaccines, and let us make sure we have response measures in place.

J 0 URN A L We have discussed terrorism. We have discussed the risks of accidents and miscalculation. Is there anything that worries you in the future in terms of the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons?

Nuclear weapons are a serious business. Countries, some more than others, do like to have the respect and

WA LT Z

attention of other countries. But no country is going to get nuclear weapons for prestige alone; countries acquire nuclear weapons only if there is a per ceived serious security threat. Japan per ceives that kind of threat from China. Japan is one of the candidates to get nuclear weapons, and I would expect Japan one day to have nuclear weapons. It is conventional weapons that have proliferated. And conventional weapons are of ever-greater lethality, and, unlike nuclear weapons, are frequently used. We have had nuclear weapons since 1945, and never has a nuclear weapon been fired in anger in a world in which two or more countries had nuclear capabilities. Now that is a good and unparalleled record. Can you think of any other weapon in the history of the world with such a record'? In other words, nuclear deterrence has worked. It has worked both for big nuclear powers, like the United States and the Soviet Union, and for small nuclear countries. Dr. Waltz was interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg and Parag Khanna. Both received their bachelor's degrees in 1999 from the School of Foreign Service. Georgetown University.

Norther

of HistQ

John E. 0

A year ago last No the infamous Fall~ the heart of a work mous with sectaria drivers will refuse Road. With some t speak with a forme about the deterior process, but I beg into a pub just aft( me as an outsider place that welcon periphery in searcJ men suddenly con of the Protestant ( of the anxiety that Fortunately, I was i meet my mates. T the prisoner relea~

Trust is a precio in a community ar implementation 0

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0ulture&Soclety -

Northernlrffiden of History John E. Osborn A year ago last November I found myself in West Belfast on the infarnous Falls Road, the rnain thoroughfare bisecting the heart of a working-class Catholic neighborhood synonymous with sectarian violence. Even today, Protestant taxicab drivers will refuse an evening fare to an address on the Falls Road. With some trepidation, I had accepted an invitation to speakwith a forrner Irish Republican Army (IRA) spokesman about the deteriorating state of the Northern Ireland peace process, but I began to question my judgment as I ducked into a pub just after nightfall. My dress and manner rnarked me as an outsider, and it was apparent that this was not a place that welcomed outsiders. Ar -y eyes scanned the periphery in search of my contact, two rather large, tattooed men suddenly confronted rne. Though I arn not a member of the Protestant cornrnunity, for a rnornent I felt just a bit of the anxiety that many residents encounter on a daily basis. Fortunately, I was immediately introduced as a friend"John, meet my mates. They've just got out of Maze Prison under the prisoner release program."

John E.Osborn served as a special assistant with the U. S. Department

of State

the Bush

during

administration,

and

has been a visiting lecturer

at the University

of Michigan, Arbor.

Eisenhower Ireland

Ann

He was an Fellow

in t998.

Trust is a precious commodity. It binds disparate elements in a comrnunity and facilitates the successful negotiation and irnplernentation of agreements. Its absence is palpable in

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Northern lreland. The two communities of Northern Ireland (one Protestant and one Catholic, albeit with various shades of gray within them) share the same territory, and much of the same history, but their prevailing cultural and political perspectives are distinctly different. Beyond this essential reality, three decadesofviolence tend to put people on edge. Vagrre anxieties on both sides have been sharpened and exacerbated by the increased presence of released paramilitaries. Although the 1997 IRA ceasefire generally has held firm, Protestants have demanded that the IRA demonstrate its commitment to peace by laying down at least some of its vast weapons stockpile under the so-called "decommissioning" process, an act that many republicans view as tantamount to surrender in a war they have all but won. At the same time, quintessential British institutions like the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) are seen by unionists as vital to their safety, and by nationalists as an illegitimate occupying army that must be disbanded. The power of these divisive sentirnents was sufficient to delay for one-and-aof the half years the implementation rgg8 Good Friday Agreement, even in the face of significant political pressure brought to bear by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland. The decision by the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in late November 1999 to participate with Sinn Fein party members in the new Northern Ireland executive body finally allowed for the long contemplated devolution of power from London to Belfast. However, this should not be construed to mean that peace is at hand. If the IRA has not begrrn to disarm before the February meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council, UUP leader and Northern Ireland First Minis-

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has pledged to resign ter David tirnble and bring down the delicately balanced ten-member executive body. More broadly, there rernain significant obstacles to restoring civil society, curbing violence, reconciling political interests, and satisfying emotional grievances. Tempting though it may be to focus narrowly on questions of arms and political prisoners, the primary barrier to lasting peace lies in the historical and cultural legacies of a divided people. As one government official told me: "Decommissioning is not the is the disease. Decommissioning symptom of the disease. The disease is the lack of good will."

ldentity.History HistoryCreates can be read irnpartially, honored, or manipulated. Certainly it may be regarded from legitirnately different perspectives so that the same series of events are used to support rival nationalist claims. This has surely been as true in Ireland as it has in the Balkans. There are two periods of Irish history that cemented the separate identities underlying the conflict in Northern Ireland. The first occurred prirnarily in the seventeenth century, as the English established "plantations" in the north of Ireland. This was not designed initially to result in broad dispossession, but rather had several more benign goals, urbanizing the eastern portion of Ulster, segregating Scottish and English from Irish, irnposing English property law so as to secure land holdings, and ensuring a more reliable measure of political support in Westminster. Gradually, a less ambitious policy of Anglicization appears to have metamorwhich colonization, phosed into redefinition of titles involved a broad

osBoRNCulture & Society and land ownership. As insurrections by the existing landed gentry arose and were systematically repressed, the English used the opportunity to broaden the scope of confiscation in Ulster. Plantation settlements led to overt conquest by the middle of the seventeenth century, and it came to Ireland in the person of Oliver Cromwell. Cromwell's army ran roughshod over token Irish resistance, burned villages, slaughtered peasants, and sacked castles. The devastation wrought by Cromwell in 1649-50 was so complete that in rnost areas, Irish land ownership of more than 60 percent was reduced to alrnost nil. Any residual Catholic hopes for meaningful emancipation from the English were dashed when Stuart King James II was defeated by Williarn of Orange in the Battle of the Boyne (16go). This seminal event, which is still celebrated annually by the Orange Order parade marches, assured more than two centuries of Protestant British rule over Ireland. The second critical period began in the latter part of the nineteenth century, when Charles Stewart Parnell led the Irish movement for land reform, and with others fornented for horne rule. These developrnents were distinct but related, and further separated lJlster from the rest of Ireland. As historian R.F. Foster has noted, the land reform movement "reinforced the politicization of rural Catholic nationalist Ireland, partly by defining that identity against urbanization, landlordisrn, Englishness Irish and-irnplicitly-Protestantisrn."' politics thereafter took on an increasingly radical cast, beginning with Arthur Griffith's formation of Sinn Fein in opposition to British participation in the Boer War. It reached the zenith of futility in the death, arrest, and martyrdom of

hundreds in the Easter Rising of 1916; progressed through Michael Collins's genius in applying modern grrerrilla tactics to assassinatelocal constabularies and British agents; and culminated with the Anglo-Irish War of I9I9-2r and the infamous peace truce that established the Irish Free State in December rg2r. Finally, a brutal and divisive civil war pitted the new Free State forces led by Collins against an anti-treaty grrerrilla army backed by future Irish Prime Minister Eamon de Valera. The history of these few years is dense and fascinating. How important was this time for lreland? In truth, the Irish would have had horne rule eventually under a law passedby Parliarnent in Igr{, and it can fairly be argrred that the "bloody catalog of assassination and war" accomplished only a little rnore. As Collins said during the dramatic treaty debate in the Dail Eireann, it offered merely "the freedom to achieve freedorn." But the implications for the solidification of separatist beliefs among Protestants in LJlster were extraordinarily important. Ulster Protestants became prory holders for the paranoia and resentrnent directed by Catholics against their British rnasters. As a legal rnatter, the fate of ljlster was decided under the Government of Ireland Act (tgzo), when Britain formally declared six of the original nine counties to constitute a separatepolitical unit. Northern Ireland Protestants regarded Home Rule as "Rorne Rule," and in rg2r voted along religious lines to rernain part of the United Kingdom. Although nationalists in the south viewed partition as unfortunate, many accepted it as rnerely the formalization of a political settlement that was the price to be paid for independence from Britain.

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Necessaryor not, Northern Ireland's populace was split two to one between Protestants and Catholics, with Protestants congregating in the east, Catholics in the rural west, and urban ghettos of both groups in Belfast and Derry. Catholics faced widespread discrirnination, while Protestants believed they were under siege from the south. Underlying the conflict were opposing ideologies concerning the status and nature of the state. Little has changed in the past seventy-five years.

of formal religiosity. These statistics tend to reinforce the perception of outsiders and local atheists that the conflict can be attributed to dogrnatic religious beliefs. In substantiating the basis for this perception, secular humanists would cite the occasional propensity for combatants to use religion as a device to rationalize vio' lent acts which would otherwise be socially and morally unacceptable; "sacred violence" makes politics absolute. Admittedly, religion often defines group identities. Religion also reinforces the social boundaries between Protestants

and sectarian Divisions.Notwithstanding the inexorable rnarch toward modernity and secularity in Britain and the other industrialized statesof western Europe, religion continues to play a critical role in many ethnic conflicts. Indeed, the prevailing wisdom is that religion is the allconsurning source of enmity that divides the people of Ulster. During my time in Dublin, a business executive with extensive dealings in the North assured me that while there were political, historical and econornic roots to the troubles, "the conflict most certainly is about religion. If we were sitting in Belfast right now, we would both spend the first ten minutes of our meeling trying to determine our respective religions." Whether or not it is fair to generalize about the increasing secularity of the western world, it is apparent that any such generalization does not apply to Northern Ireland. Although religious influence in the North appears to be in relative terrns, both diminishing Roman Catholics and Protestants in Ulster continue to report rates of churchgoing that are two and three tirnes higher than those of the same religious faith in other European countries, and they score high ranks on other measures

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Catholics established principally through segregation in housing and education, and through rigidly endogamous marriage patterns. A such, religion rnay be viewed as a kind of class marker that tends to indicate a person's likely perspective on a number of issues. Even so, it is not alwaysdispositive. Other dynamics are at least as important to understanding the origins of the dispute, includingbroader cultural differences, a history of antagonisrn, and socioeconomic discrirnination. In a survey conducted by the Policy Studies Institute in 1986, Ulster residents of both principal religious groups were asked their views as to the cause of the troubles, and among the responses offered by Protestants, religion came in fifth behind political or constitutional concerns, discrirnination, violence, and general attitude. \Mhen Protestants were asked in a r97B survey what they would fear rnost about unification with the Republic of Ireland, they listed fear of the Roman Catholic Church as a significant concern, but this was outweighed by fear of the loss of their British identity and the loss of the standard of livlng. There are other irnplications that would flow from granting religion primacy as the source of conflict in North-

osBoRNCulture & Society ern Ireland. If the Ulster brand of evangelical Presbyterianism itselfis the cause, then it would seem (as others have argued) that the conflict would not be susceptible to resolution by other than religious-based solutions, such as secularization, ecurnenism, or integrated schools. Polling data has indicated an unprecedented correlation between political partisanship and religion in Northern Ireland, supporting a widespread perception that is reinforced by the reality of visible participation by Protestant clerics. There is a logical fallacy at work here, though, which concludes that because only Catholic nationalists support the IRA, and only Protestants support lJlster unionists, it is the religious variable itself that is determinative. If religion is the principal source of the Ulster conflict, then a fundamental paradigm shift ought to occur early in the next century as two apparent trends continue to their logical end. Catholics will soon outnumber Protestants in the north and the Catholic Church will soon have negligible influence over political issues in the south. This expectation is the source of rnuch of the political strength of Sinn Fein, and its concornitant willingness to share power-for the mornent-in an arrangement that may well be a prelude to a national Irish state.

Politics of Peace.Politics istheculprit most often blamed for stagnation in the peace process, and in Northern Ireland, politics is a blood sport. The locals have coined many a colorful phrase to describe the process and its participants: tribai politics; cul-de-sac politics; i la carte politics; apocal)?tic politics; inyour-face politics; riverdance politics. Symbols have always been important in

politics, but in Northern Ireland politicians brandish their syrnbols like weapons. For example, upon entering the Parliament Building at Stormont, one confronts large, rather grim statues of Protestant, British governors. When meeting Reverend Ian Paisley's lieutenants, or UK lJnionist party leader Robert McCartney, one must first regard their proud and prominent display of UnionJack cufflinls and red poppy lapel pins so as to dispel any question of their political alignrnent. Such things rnay seem trivial and inoffensive to outsiders, but the people of Northern Ireland have been rubbed raw; the excruciating level of sensitivity is such that every gesture is a rnanifestly powerful tool that goes beyond self-identification to define and incitethe other side. When the Apprentice Boys Club of Derry sought to cornmemorate the anniversary of the occasion in t6BB on which the city gates were shut to ward off James's advancing army, Catholics staged a riot. The commemorative march clearlywas an expression of pride and a reflection upon an important historic event for the entire City of Derry, but after years of hostility and discrimination any march by a predominantly Protestant group is construed as overtly antagonistic by many in the Catholic cornrnunity. This dynamic of suspicion and mistrust denies the other side the legitimate right to celebrate its heritage. In such an atmosphere, even attempts to politically neutralize established institutions are virtually impossible without giving offense. More recently, former Hong Kong Governor Christopher Patten's report on the RUC was criticized vehemently for recomrnending elimination of the organization's British vestiges, including a standard which places a

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crown over a harp and shamrock. Symbols aside, no one disputing the report has suggested alternative, substantive reform measures that would transform the RUC into a police force remotely reflecting the demography of the constituent population.

An Irish Nation? The continued

proliferation of these destructive behavioral patterns are at once deeply discouraging and cornpletely predictable. Yet the frarnework of the Good Friday Agreernent remains as the foundation frorn which political progress will be rnade. Ironically, one of the great strengths of Culture of Violence.Therealso the Agreement lies in its explicit recogniremains violence. It is diminished from tion that Ireland is a case of nation and state, specifically one Irish nation years past; there are no British tanks in the center of Belfast. But the irnposing encompassing two states. In conternplat"Peace Wall" still stands, separating the ing the region in 1993, University of Catholic and Protestant working class Chicago law professor Gidon Gottlieb communities in the Shankill and the Falls prophetically suggested that the parties Road areas behind brick, concrete block, might airn to create a new all-Irish barbed wire, and hostile graffiti slogans. homeland that would exist as an overlay No one denies that violence still perrneto the existing Republic of Ireland and atesgreat swathsof Northern Irish society, p r o v i n c e o f N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . 3 T h i s and extends far beyond what Americans Irish national horne, Gottlieb predicted, comrnonly perceive to be limited to sec- would "restore the symbolic unity of Iretarian Protestant on Catholic retributive land . . . without prejudice to the existing attacks, and vice versa. statusof Eire and Northern Ireland."n "Punishrnent beatings" have filled the This symbolic unity is vital because, void created by the complete absence of like history itself, it affects perceptions, Iocal policing activity in many parts of and perceptions in turn affect behavior. the North, and are only the most visible So again, reflect upon Irish history. A exarnple of a thirty-year disintegration tenant farmer will point to a hillside on rule law rnoral of the of and the values the horizon and say, "my family used to that underlie it. These "beatings" are own that land; they took it frorn us." meted out to punish informants and Only later in the conversation does it sexual deviants alike and can range in become apparent that he is speaking of severity from being hit repeatedly with a events that occurred in the seventeenth nailspiked baseball bat, to "kneecapcentury. The Catholic world order was p i n g s , " t o a " 5 o / 5 o , " i n w h i c h t h e altered irrevocably by the English invaoffender is shot once at the base of the sion and the subsequent deprivation of spinal column, leaving him with a $o liberty; being further deprived of their percent chance of retaining the use of sense of Irishness simply is unbearable. his legs. Protestant and Catholic paraProtestant resentment toward Catholics militaries employ these tactics not only is triggered as rnuch by feelings of abanfor purposes of intirnidation or retribudoment by their English cousins as it is by tion, but also to further increasingly terrorist bombings. Their senseof secusophisticated drug trafficking operarity can only be preserved if they know tions, gun running, and other criminal that they will remain part of the United activities.' Kingdom.

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Culture & Society osBoRN The beauty of Gottlieb's formulation is that one side need not Iose to allow the other to win. Catholics (and Protestants, for that matter) residing in Northern Ireland could elect to become citizens of the Republic, but unification would never be forced upon those who wished to remain citizens of the United King-

ern Ireland executive body prior to any IRA decommissioning. Although the Agreement does not explicitly require disarmament prior to implernentation, the parties agreed that all paramilitaries must disarm and that they would "use any influence they may have to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary

wasaltered The Catholic world ord,er

irrevocablv by the En.qlishinvasion and the deprivatidn of liberty; beins further subsequgrit'thbir senseof Irishness sirnply is deprived of unbearable.

dom. Rather, the objective would be to foster national identity arnong all those who equate a unified Eire with the true senseof being lrish, and to ensure effective cooperation on matters such as tourism, transportation infrastructure, and cornrnerce that affect the entire island. Though Gottlieb's prescription for joint citizenship rnay not be workable, his concepts underlie the objectives Ministerial of the new North-South Council, and various other collaborative arrangernents inter-governmental involving the North, the Republic, and the United Kingdom that have been established under the Agreement. With time allowed for incrernental progress, these arrangernents perhaps can narrow the divide amongst politicians and their constituents.

RebuildingTrust. Davidr.imble !

and Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams have taken enormous risks to bring their respective constituencies to this stage. Mr. timble has been more audacious of late in his willingness to join the North-

arms" by May 2ooo.5 As such, the time has come for the "hard rnen" of the IRA to demonstrate that they have no intention of resorting to violence again, and that they are willing to freely give up their weapons and live under the norms of civil society. The legendary resourcefulness of the IRA means that such an act is necessarily symbolic. But the impact of purely symbolic gestures in Northern Ireland at this time cannot be overstated. You can almost envision British Prime Minister Blair pacing back and forth in utter frustration at No. rO Downing Street, crying out in Shakespearian verse: "A simple gesture, a good faith gesture, my kingdom for a gesture!" This gesture apparently rnust come soon, lest the elaborate exercise in trust building collapse before our eyes. Regardless, the Good Friday Agreernent cannot alone end the violence, foster civil discourse, or bring harmony to a fractured polity. Other elements within the Catholic and Protestant comrnunities must work in concert with implementation to sustain the nascent

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legal framework. There have been tens of thousands killed and maimed during the last three decades. Virtually everyone involved in the peace negotiations has been affected directly by the violence. It will take decades to heal the deep wounds inflicted on the populace, but there are exceptional people making exceptional efforts in an attempt to do just that. The Irish Council of Churches, and many individual priests and ministers of various congregations, have brought an ecumenical approach to faith-based reconciliation. The Greater Shankill Partnership and Restorative Justice Project of West Belfast is working to limit punishrnent beatings and other forms of vigilante justice. Political leadership is vital as well, and not simply as the kind of leadership that takesrisks in negotiations. Blair's order to reexamine tli'e t!J2 killing in Derry of fourteen unarmed Catholics by British troops on "Bloody Sunday" was a vital step toward broad reconciliation. Irish President Mary McAleese, her own farnily a victim of sectarian violence, displays a kind of charismatic, vibrant, emotive leadership that can soften the hearts of the most hardened souls as she speals eloquently and often of the collective need to forgive and heal. Echoing Professor Gottlieb, she told me that "the lesson of the Good FridayAgreement is that there need not be one winner and one loser. We need gradually to convince people in the N o r t h t h a t e v e r y o n ec a n w i n . " 6 The cumulative effect of rising levels of European integration and economic development will make it increasingly difficult and especially painful to reverse course. In the past decade, Ireland has attracted a wealth of multinational technology firms to Dublin and Cork, though in many rural areas its economy still lags

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well behind that of the United Kingdom. In the North, economic privileges borne of decades of subsidization stem from affiliation with Britain; rnany Protestants (and some Catholics) are naturally apprehensive about the prospect of relinquishing these privileges. But if there is a single factor that is most responsible for the violence in ljlster, it is the centuries of animus, segregation, and mistrust. And if there is a single factor that hardens the position of Ulster Protestants in their desire to stay in Britain, it is their fear of what life may come to be should they be incorporated into the Republic of Ireland. This history, and this fear (misguided or not). rnust be addressedto the satisfaction of both communities if lasting peace is to come to Ulster. A permanent peace in Northern Ireland cannot be imposed frorn the outside without the active participation and support of the parties themselves. Prirne Ministers Blair and Bertie Ahern of Ireland have been instrumental in the process; without their immense political skill, influence, and tireless efforts there would be no "process" at all. Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell has been heroic as he literally pulled the parties back from the brink time and again. Ultimately, well-intentioned external actors must step aside and the people themselves must embrace reconciliation, participate in the new political process, and develop a shared sense of community. The Good Friday Agreement can be rnade to work, but only if all parties are committed deeply to principles of self-governance, and to ending systemic violence. The sole cause for optimism, therefore, lies within the polity of Northern Ireland. There are many Protestants who are proud to call thernselves Irish, who deplore violence, and who recognize the

& Society osBoRNCulture futility and irrelevance of attributing significance to a border separating six counties in the northeast corner of a windswept island, especially now that it is integrated into the European lJnion. There are many Catholics who do not consider the cause of unification to warrant spilling another drop of Irish blood. It is the collective force of these many

thousands of good people in Northern Ireland, who have acted responsibly and charitably in the face of extraordinarily difficult circumstances, that can compel Messrs. Trimble and Adarns to continue to take the political risks necessary to complete the task at hand. Only then will Northern Ireland be permitted to rejoin the civilized world.

NOTES t.

R.F.

U.K.,

Foster,

Modern lrelond

1600 1972 (London,

Penguin, rg8B), 4r5.

z. See John Lloyd, "The Troubles That Won't Co (December 12, 1999). Away," fie"MeruforkTimesMogo4ine (NewYork, N.Y. ' 3. Gidon Gottlieb, Nation.fuoinstState C o u n c i l o n F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n sP r e s s ,r 9 9 3 ) , 5 2 - 5 8 .

4. Cottlieb, 58. Reached in the Multi-Party 5. Agreement tions (r998), 24. 6. Inteview with Mary McAleese, of lreland,

at Aras an Uachtarain,

Negotia

President, Republic Dublin (November

ro, r99B).

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Buslness &Flnance ahoutthe Stop\Aforryrng U.S.TradeDeficit Daniel T. Griswold The United Statesis enjoying its longest peacetime economic expansion in history, and the boom shows few signs of relenting. Rising productivity continues to fuel strong GDP growth, while inflation and unernployment remain near thirty-year lows. The stock market has emerged unscathed from recent bouts of volatility and resumed its record-shattering ascent. More than eight years into this expansion, the IJ.S. economy still seems to be firing on all cylinders. Yet, in the public mind at least, there is an ominous cloud on the horizon that seems to threaten this newfound prosperity' America's yawning trade deficit. The trade deficit, a widely reported but poorly understood figure, has become a symbol of lingering angst over America's uneasy marriage to the global econorny. To labor union leaders and their anti-trade allies on the left, the trade deficit means lost jobs and "de-industrialization." The anti-deficit invective from isolationist factions on the right has been equally potent. Reform Party Presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan calls the trade deficit a "cancer" that threatens to devour the American dream. Even a few pro-trade economists and policy wonks have begrrn to question whether the current trade deficit is indeed "sustainable."' Such is the furor surrounding this statistic that in t998 Congress felt

Daniel T. Griswold is Associate

Director

the Center

for Trade

Policy Studies at the Cato Institute Washington.

in D.C.

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compelled to spend $Z rnillion to create a Trade Deficit Review Commission. The Commission's task is to examine the causes and consequences of the trade deficit and to recomrnend what, if anything, the U.S. government should do about it. The short answer is: nothing. The trade deficit poses no threat to America's economic prosperity. In this article, I explain why the United States has run such large trade deficits over the past two decades, what those deficits tell us about the relative strength of the U.S. economy, and how the trade deficit is relevant to America's place in the global economy.

Follow the DollatS. It is an indis putable fact that Arnerica's balance of trade has turned sharply negative, both in absolute and relative terms. In r998, the deficit on the current account-the broadest measure of current international transactions-reached a record $Zzo billion, and this figr-rre will almost certainly top $3oo billion in rggg. Relative to gross dornestic product, Arnerica's current account deficit in Iggg could surpassthe r9B7 record of 3.6 percent. The merchandise trade deficit by itself amounted to $247 billion in rgg8 and is on pace to reach $33o billion for rggg. When combined with services, where the United Statestypically runs a surplus, the trade deficit was on track in r9g9 to exceed$z6o billion-yet another absolute record." While the size of the trade deficit is unusual, its existence is not: Americans have run trade deficits with the rest of the world for the last twenty-three years. Why all this "red ink" in trade? As counterintuitive as it may seem, Arnerica's trade deficit is not a result of unfair trade barriers abroad or declining industrial competitiveness at home,

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but of a net inflow of capital. The trade balance is the mirror image of the capital account, We run a trade deficit year after year because, year after year, more capital flows into the United States than flows out. The cause of the trade deficit is easier to understand if we borrow the axiom of investigative journalists and "follow the money." U.S. dollars tend to flow in a circular fashion. Dollars that leave the country to buy imports or to be invested overseassoon make their way back to the United States to buy the goods and services we export. or to invest in our domestic assets.In practice, for every one hundred U.S. dollars that flow into the international exchange rnarkets, more than ninety-eight flow back to the United States. (The rest stay abroad where they are often used in place of local cur."n"y.) When we send $r5,ooo overseas to pay for an imported Japanese car, alrnost all of those dollars return to the United States to purchase such items as wheat, computer software, a Disney World vacation, or stock in a NASDAQlisted company. In the aggregate, then, when Americ a n ss p e n d $ 3 o o b i l l i o n m o r e o n i m p o r t s in a year than foreigners spend on our exports, nearly all those excess dollars flowing overseas return to the United States. But rather than using them to buy American goods and services, foreigners spend them to acquire American assetsreal estate, stocks, corporate bonds, bank deposits, and teasury bills. In other words, they invest in America. Thus America's trade deficit is inextricably linked to domestic savings and investment. When a country's level of s a v i n g se x c e e d sd o m e s t i c i n v e s t m e n t ( a s inJapan), its excesscapital will flow overseas, resulting in a current account sur-

G R r s w o L DB u s i n e s s &F i n a n c e plus. When a country's level of savings falls short of domestic investment (as in the United States), capital wiII tend to flow in from overseas to fill the eap, resulting in a current account deficit.

essential ingredients in the rising U.S. trade deficit. In the Economic Report of the President 1999, the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) concluded, "Arg'uments about the adverse consequences of trade are largely misplaced' the rising U.S. trade deficit is primarily a reflection of strong U.S. investment, employment, and output growth, not a symptom of economic weakness."t

A Signof Economic Strength.deficits One consequence of this linkage is that America's trade deficit tends to rise in line with domestic investment, which in tur-n rises along with the overall econorny. As a result, trade deficits are strongly pro-cyclical. When the U.S. economy is expanding, as it has through most of the rggos, the trade deficit grows. When the economy slips into recession, the trade deficit shrinks drarnatically (as it did during the IggO-gI downturn). America's large trade deficit is not a sign of economic weaknessbut of relative strength. In today's international marketplace, it is American consurners who are flush with cash to buy ever-greater amounts of imports. And it is the U.S. economy that is producing the investment opportunities that attract savings from around the world. In contrast, Japan has been plagued l o r m o s t o f t h e d e c a d eb y s l o w g r o w t h ( i f n o t o u t r i g h t r e c e s s i o n ) .l a l l i n g d e m a n d , rising unemployment, and a bust in asset v a l u e s .M e a n w h i l e . t h e m a j o r e c o n o m i e s of the European Union have struggled with sluggish growth and chronic high unemployment. In fact, advanced nations that ran trade deficits in the Iggos (the United States and Great Britain) grew faster and created more jobs than those that ran trade surpluses (Germany, Italy, andJapan). The result of economic troubles abroad has been a flight of capital to the United Statesand the stagnation of U.S. export growth-

Any objective look at the U.S. economy will confirm the CEA's conclusion. By almost every measure, the lJ.S. econorny has performed spectacularly well in the rggos even as our trade deficit with the rest of the world has continued to climb. Since rgg2, the trade deficit has increased more than sixfold. During this same period, real GDP has grown by a cumulative 2$ percent, the economy has added a net fifteen million newjobs, real private fixed nonresidential investment has increased Br percent, and real wages have at last begun rising for workers all along the income scale. Even manufacturing, long the symbol of international economic might, has enjoyed resurgence in the benign shad-

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This may seern a huge debt for a nation to carry, but it is much lessworrisome when put in perspective. Although nominally large, Arnerica's negative net investment position at the end of t99B represented only {.2 percent of its total financial wealth. It is also misleading to describe a negative investment position as "debt" in the usual senseof the term. Of the $7.5 trillion in foreign-owned assets i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e si n I g g B , $ 2 . 2 i l i l lion represented direct investment in U.S. businesses and real estate, and another $r.I trillion was in the form of investment in corporate Anxiety about the trade deficit seems to portfolio have shifted subtly from the present to stocks.aNone of this equity investment the future. Sure, the U.S. economy is represents debt in the sense of an obligahumming now, skeptics acknowledge. tion to repay a fixed amount over a cerBut how long can these large and chrontain time period. A related worry about the net accurnuic trade deficits continue? Those fearful that if lation of foreign assets in the United Congress of the trade deficit warn States is the ability to make future payand the Clinton administration fail to ments to the owners of those assets.Like take steps to curb the deficit, our chilleft mountain fordren will be with a of the federal government's accumulated f i s c a ld e b t , t h i s i s s u ea r o u s e si n t e r g e n e r eign debt to pay. Creditor nations will ational concerns that we rnight be burgain intolerable leverageover the United dening our children with future obligaStates,exposing the U.S. government to threats from foreign finance ministers tions in order to support current consumption. But by any measure, Ameriand central bankers. Eventually foreign investors will lose confidence and withca's net payments on investment are draw their money, and the U.S. economy modest and should be manageable for and dollar will both come crashing down. the foreseeable future. In 1998, AmeriLet's exarnine each of these fears in turn. cans paid out $z/o.g billion to foreign The most corrrmon worr] relates to the investors and received $z5B.g billion from U.S. investments abroad, for a net accumulation of net foreign ownership of IJ.S. assets.In the late rg8os, America payments deficit of $rZ.Z billion. Once again, what may seem to be a switched from being a net creditor to a net debtor nation, at which point the value of large arnount in nominal terms proves to foreign-owned assetsin the United States be modest when compared to America's surpassed the value of American-owned $8.5 trillion CDP in r9g8. As a shareof assetsabroad. By the end of t998, the gap w h a t w e p r o d u c e , t h e n e t i n v e s t m e n tp a y ments flowing out of the United Statesin between the current market value of forassets in States rgg8 amounted to less than one-fifth of eign-owned the United assets one percent of GDP. The equivalent net and that of American-owned "debt service" payment for a family earnabroad had reached $r.5 trillion.

ow of the U.S. trade deficit. Since rgg2, total industrial production in the United Stateshas risen 34 percent, and manufacturing output by 39 percent. Production of durable goods, including motor vehicles, heavy machinery, and appliances, is up a robust 6! percent. By comparison, industrial production has grown only 3 percent in Germany since rgg2 and has actually fallen slightly in Japan. So much for the de-industrialization of Arnerica.

asa I'Debtor Nation." America

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B u s i n e s sF &i n a n c e GRtswoLD i n g $ 8 5 , o o o a y e a r w o u l d b e $ t z z , a n tors would also suffer if the U.S. econoamount easily sustainable. my were to tip into a recession. Falling Even if the trends of the last ten years demand in the United States would continue, Americans should have no quickly translate into falling exports to trouble financing the accumulation of the U.S. market, while a depreciating net foreign investment in the United dollar and slurnping economy would States for the next decade or longer. If lower the value of foreign-owned assets remaining in the United States. payments on foreign-owned assetsin the United Statesand receipts onAmericanThis far-fetched scenario also assumes owned assetsabroad were to continue to that foreign investors would act in congrow at the same rate as during the last cert. In reality, such an orchestrated decade, America's net payments deficit withdrawal of credit is unlikely. Private would reach $Io3.r billion by 2oog. But investors in industrialized countries do if we assume a $ percent annual growth of not usually act at the behest of their govnominal GDP during that same period, ernments. Even in Japan, a government net payments would still amount to only decision to dump dollars or withdraw o.I percent of GDP. funds from U.S. markets would not Meanwhile, the additional domestic mean that private companies and indiinvestment made possible by the net viduals in Japan would necessarily do inflow of foreign capital will help make l i k e w i s e . I f t h e r e a l U . S . e c o n o m y America a more productive country. remains fundamentally sound, other Current and future workers will be more global investors would likely see the temproductive because of the larger capital porary decline in the dollar and U.S. stock, thus expanding the economy and asset prices as an opportunity to buy. easing the relative burden of servicing F o r e i g n g o v e r n m e n t s a t t e m p t i n g t o e x e r l o u l - n e t f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n tp o s i t i o n . leverage over the United States would in A second, persistent worry is that growthe end inflict only temporary darnage on ing foreign ownership of U.S. assetswill the U.S. econorny at the cost of their own leave America vulnerable to foreign long-term interest. manipulation. The fear is that America's When an economy is as large and as principal creditors-Japan in particularimportant to the global economy as that could wield influence over lJ.S. governof the United States, its chief creditors ment decisions by threatening to cut off have a stake in keeping its economy on the supply of capital inflows, or by threattrack. They have a strong incentive to act ening to withdraw capital already invested. prudently with their investments so as not Foreign investors in theory could to undermine their own position. If any attempt to exert political pressure on the country wields the leverage, it is the U n i t e d S t a t e s b y t h r e a t e n i n g t o s t o p world's chief debtor, the United States.u investing here, but such an act would have A third looming concern about the negative consequences for the creditor as trade deficit is that it will eventually well as the debtor. Americans would lose, underrnine the confidence of foreign of course, because a withdrawal of capital investors. According to this scenario, w o u l d d r i v e u p d o m e s t i c i n t e r e s t r a t e s foreign investors will wake up one mornwhile the falling dollar would stoke inflaing and realize that the U.S. trade deficit pressures. tionarv But America's crediis really big. They will then rush to with-

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draw their investment funds, leading to a IJ.S. econorny is its potential effect on plunging dollar, rising inflation, higher public policy. Persistent worries about interest rates, and a hard landing-even the trade deficit could prompt policy recession-for the U.S. economy. makers to implement a "cure" for the Such a chain of events is unlikely to trade deficit that itself could impose serioccur. Most international investors are ous darnage on the economy. sawy enough to understand that ArneriOne such response would be to raise ca's trade deficit is a reflection of undertrade barriers on the mistaken assumDlying strength, not weakness, for all the tion that fewer imports would rnean a reasons outlined above. Even if a rising smaller trade deficit. An across-thetrade deficit were to become a concern of board 20 percent tariff, for example, investors, it would not prompt a rnass would drastically cut the amount of exodus of capital. The U.S. econorny, the irnports entering the United States. But it largest and most sophisticated in the would also reduce the amount of U.S. world, is fundamentally sound. Its finandollars flowing into the international cial rnarkets are highly liquid and exchange markets as Americans reduce remarkably transparent. Returns on U.S. spending on irnports, thus causing the assets remain high relative to risk. dollar to appreciate. The stronger dollar Investors are unlikely to abandon this would partially offset the impact of the attractive market simply because the curtariff by reducing the price of imports for rent account deficit is rising. American consurners while at the same As for exchange rates, the trade deficit time curbingAmerican exports by making is not the cause of a weak dollar but thern relatively more expensive for foreign rather the result of a strong dollar. Since buyers. The end result would be the r98o, the trade deficit as a percent of imposition of huge dislocations and inefGDP has closely tracked the real value of ficiencies in the U.S. econorny without the dollar on the foreign exchange maraltering the size of the trade deficit. ket. When the dollar rises, so does the The best policy response would be to trade deficit, and vice versa. Despite its ignore the U.S. trade deficit and concenrecent fall against the yen, the real value trate on maintaining a strong and open of the U.S. dollar has been trending domestic economy that welcomes foreign upward in the r99os alongwith the size of investment. As long as investors around the trade deficit. the world see the United States as a safe and profitable haven for their savings, Worrying. The Stop onlyrealsense the trade deflcit will persist, and Ameriin which the trade deficit is a threat to the cans will be that much better off. NOTES r. See, for example, about the Trade

Ernest H.

Deficit,"

Preeg,

Statement

'Why

before

I Worry the U.S.

Trade Deficit

Review Commission, Washington, Septenber g, Iggg; and Catherine L. Mann, "ls the U.S.

Trade Deficit

Institute

Sustainable?"

for International

Economics, September t999. 2. Current sus Bureau,

trade data are available from Foreign Trade

Division,

sus.gov/foreign-trade/w,/tradedata.

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the U.S. Cenhttp,//w.cen-

html.

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of Economic Advisers, The 3. Council Report of the President r9g9 (Washington'

Economic U.S. Gov

ernment Printing Office, rggg), p. 296. 4. U.S. Department of Business /g, no. /,July $. For a nore detailed "American Debt and Journal 48, I993.

Commerce,

Suney of Current

1999, pp. 36 45. discussion, see Helen World

Power."

Milner,

International

T N T E R V TBEuW s i n e s sF &i n a n c e

.alll cwcumstance luestertalksaboutbeing Coca-ColaChtefDouglas Iocalin theageofglobali<ation

most farnous consumer brand, The Coca-Cola A the world's Company is sensitive to political circumstances. Recent health scaresand regulatory problems in Europe, and NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, have adversely affected cornpany sales in both Europe and China. Simmering tension on trade between the Euro-

t I

pean lJnion and the United States has only added to Coke's global headache. Yet in spite of these recent problems Coca-Cola remains the apotheosis of the global company. From Mexico to Iceland (the world's top per capita Coke consumers) the planet drinks the bubbly black liquid to the tune of 9,ooo bottles a second. Just before he announced his departure frorn the company, Coca-Cola CEO Douglas Ivester talked with theJournolabout doingbusiness in the age of globalization. Douglas

lvester

i s C h i e f E x e c u t i v eO f f i c e r o f T h e C o c a C o l a C o m p a n y .

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J o u RNAr- Statistics show that the cornbined income of the top 2oo global enterprises now surpassesthe combined economies r82 of countries. Throughout your career at Coca-Cola, how have you seen the relationship between business and government change? I v E s r En O v e r a p e r i o d o f t i m e , t h e r e w i l l be a growing understanding that both government and business have a role to play in bettering the lives of the people in a given community. Each of us is different-the government has its role to play, and at the sarne tirne, a corporation has its role to play. The corporation's role is to provide capital for businesses to get started and, in our case,to bring innovation to the marketplace. We teach entrepreneurial skills to people, including everything from manufacturing to selling skills, which ultimately createsjobs in the econorny and contributes to the overall tax revenue of the country. \Me see the roles asvery complementary. One group, the governrnent, sets the context and rules for everyone to play by, and a cornpany like ours cornes in and provides capital and the underlying entrepreneurial skills to build comrnerce. J 0 u R N A r -B u t t h e U . S . g o v e r n r n e n t f r e quently takes unilateral trade sanctions against countries, such as Cuba and Iraq, that are counter to the wishes of its global trading partners and American corporations. Do you believe that trade sanctions are an effective oolicv tool? rvEsrER The world is changing, and trade sanctions are far less effective than they were at one point in tirne. One example is Cuba. Although I have not been to Cuba, I understand that there is

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wide availability of international products. I think the real question is whether one country can have an economic impact of significance when other countries do not honor the trade sanctions. JouRNAL Does it hurt American corporations when the United States takes a stand counter to the ground rules that other countries lay for their corporations? rvEsrEn I can not say that it necessarily hurts, but rather delays. Ultimately, if sanctions were lifted, we would have a late start, but could probably make that up. An example that is fresh in everyone's rnind is North Korea. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger was quoted as saying that the administration is swapping Coca-Cola for a ban on rnissiles.That is a pretty positive thing. If Coca-Cola goes into North Korea, we will build an industry where one does not exist. We will createjobs, we will create investment, and we will create a very refreshing product for the people of North Korea. If the American government gets the added benefit of not having to worry about rnissiles, that is an overall positive as well. J 0 u R N A r -T h e t r a d e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the United States and the European Union has worsened due to disagreements on issues such as hormoneenhanced beef and quotas on steel. IJ.S. trade restrictions against EU products have caused public outcry in countries like France. Does anti-American sentiment impact your bottom line in Europe? IvEsrER For The Coca-Cola Company, we try our best to be non-political. We believe in free trade and the free flow of

TNTERVTE BW u s i n e s s &F i n a n c e

done a lot of consumer research in Europe, and we have not found consumers to be anti-American. Consumers basically want to do their job, they want to buy products that they want to buy, and Coca-Cola happens to be one of those products they want to b u y . l n t e r m s o f g o v e r n m e n t s .w e j u s t need to do a better job of educating them on the value that we bring to a particular econorny. Within the European Union, for exarnple, we know that we have a significant economic impact and

munication process at a higher level. We certainly will undertake to do that. At this point in time it has not slowed our growth, and it certainly has not dampened our enthusiasm for investing in Europe as a whole. J0uRNAl Your literature attributeslowered consumption of Coca-Cola products in China to the accidental bombing of the Chinese Ernbassy in Belgrade. How can U.S. multinationals mitigate the economic backlash of unpopular-

We have dOnâ&#x201A;Ź a lot of consurrrerresearchin Europe, and we have not found consLrrnersto be anti-American. that we are positive in terms of employment. Our business is expanding and we are actually meeting a lot of the governrnents' objectives in terms of econornic development. However, we probably need to do a better job of explaining ourselvesto those governments.

and in the Chinese case,unpredictableIJ.S. government action?

try basis in Europe; so, we have a great business in virtually every country. We now find ourselves having to begin the education process and begin the com-

tirne that you are expanding the corporation's global reach through mergers. Your merger with Cadbury-Schweppes comes to mind. Frequently, these merg-

rvEsrER The major mitigating factor for Coca-Cola is that our business is a local business. In China, Chinese operate the bottling business and the employees are overwhelmingly Chinese. That is the case J 0 u RNAr- Do you think that increased in France, that is the case in Belgium, friction between Coca-Cola and Europe that is the casein Germany, or Brazil, or is a result of the growth of the European any other place we operate. Our business Union as a political force? is essentially a local business and we are affiliated through the trademark and r v E s r E n A n y t i m e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s through The Coca-Cola Company, but undergo transition, it is incumbent it is a series of local businesses making a upon the company that is dealing with local contribution. That ultimately is the that political organization to educate best thing we can do. and inform them of the benefits that they bring to a given economy. We have J o u R N A L I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t y o u l a b e l alwaysdone that on a country-by-counCoca-Cola a "local business" at the same

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ers require the approval of government institutions in accordance with anti-trust legislation, making mergers more difficult. Do you view this as a logical consequence of globalization, and how do mergers irnpact competition and expansion of global corporations?

business infrastructure. and in this case Cadbury-Schweppes benefited because they got some cash to invest in their core business. J 0 u R N A r -C o m p a n i e s w i t h a g l o b a l s c o p e such as Coca-Cola and McDonald's are identified around the world as icons of Arnerican culture. In what way does Coca-Cola leverage or discourage this association?

rvEsrER There is no doubt about it-you are seeing large companies extend their distribution into other countries. It is true of European cornpanies, DaimlerBenz buying Chrysler. It is true of WalIvEsrER Our tradernark is the rnost Mart buying Asda in the United identifiable global trademark. It probaKingdorn. Alot of activity is takingplace. bly represents the best ofAmerican busiUltimately, such activity is good for conness in terms of what American business it higher has sumers because brings them a done to promote commerce and transfer skills to local environrnents. quality product and better service with better value. It does not do anything negThere[ore, it boils down to a communiative. It does not hurt ernployment, nor cation issue: The challenge is to cornmunicate the benefits we bring to the d o e s i t l e s s e nt a x c o l l e c t i o n . I think that as governrnents begin to local econorny. understand the benefits of some of those mergers, they will be more supportive of J 0 u R N A LC o c a - C o l a h a s b e e n a d v e r t i s e d them. The DaimlerChrysler venture had around the world as a positive and a stan o p r o b l e m s , p r o b a b l y b e c a u s e a ble partner for developing countries. During the recent economic crisesin Gerrnan cornpany was the parent cornpany. The same rules that apply to that Russia, for example, Coke was recogmerger actually apply to everything else. nized as the rnost trusted cornpany in It is really just a matter of comrnunicatRussia. How does your company's coming to the government the benefits that mitment to troubled markets such as can emerge from such a transaction. In Russia and Southeast Asia fit into a largour case, the Cadbury brands were weller corporate global strategy? respected international brands, and we think that the rnerger will make those I V E s r E n O u r c o m p a n y w a s b u i l t o n t h e brands more available to consumers backs of people who had the willingness around the globe. For the employees of to stick with an investment once they had Cadbury-Schweppes, the rnerger puts made it. If you go back and look at some them into a worldwide systern and gives of our rnajor countries today, such as t h e m t r e m e n d o u s o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o Japan, Germany, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, or Mexico, there were times when enhance their skills and earnings potential as they join a cornpany with a global it did not look like they were a positive scope. So, the ernployees benefit, coninvestment, but our cornpany and our sumers ultimately benefit, governments previous management had the foresight benefit because of the expansion of the and willingness to stick with those invest-

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u s i n e s sF &i n a n c e t N T E R V t EBW and willingness to stick with those investments during those difficult times. We have the sarne obligation to the people that come after us to take a long-term view and to look at these rnarkets not in terms of what they are today, but where they are going to be twenty or thirty years from now. We now enjoy a very prosperous business in Japan, not so much because of what we do in Japan today, but because of the commitments of our forefathers who stuck with it in the late rggos and early 196os. It is part of our history and part of the fabric of The Coca-Cola Company to be a pioneer and to move into these markets with a long-term view. JouRNAI- Other programs like CocaCola's international consumer development group assist U.S. companies in developing successfulstrategiesfor overseas expansion. Why does Coke believe this activity is worthwhile and how does it fit into the overall company business strategy? rvEsrEn Fivepercent ofthe global population lives in the United States,and 95 percent lives outside the United States. It is natural for a company to look outside of its own geographic boundaries, whether it's an Arnerican company looking to the Far East, a French company looking to Latin America, or a British company looking to India. As those organizations look to expand their businesses,they come to us for expertise and guidance. We do a lot of work with our customers as they look to the international markets. Expansion is also beneficial to the local economy. As development on the local economic level increases, people can afford to spend more in all sectors of the econorny.

JouRNAL On the other hand, critics often argue that multinational corporations exploit countries with cheap labor and weak environmental regulations. How does Coca-Cola respond to such criticism? IvEsrEn We are very proud of our environmental record because we follow the same environmental standards both inside and outside the United States. In terms of labor, we do employ labor at the local level, and we pay good and competitive wages in the local environment. But, at the same tirne, we sell our products in that country for local prices. We do not go to a country, make the products, and then export thern back to the United States, which is the way some companies do business-in effect producing in a low-wage country, and exporting to a high-wage country to sell at a higher price. Our products typically are produced, sold, and consumed in the sarne country. Yes, in Vietnarn, for example, we use local labor, but we also sell the product into the local econorny so that lower labor costsbenefit the consumer as well. As wage rates rise and as the economy develops, we will continue to be competitive and will pay the going rates in the marketpiace. J o u RNAr- In the next twenty years, what do you believe will be the largest growing overseasmarket? r v Es r En Most people would give you Asia as the obvious answer because of its vast population. Certainly, Asia is a priority market for us. I think the key for the Coca-Cola systern,however, is not to rniss the opportunities that the other areas of the world offer just because there is a high growth opportunity in Asia. We have

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organized our business in six geographic t h o u g h t s a n d p r e d i c t i o n s a b o u t t h e and business groups, each of them having future of Coca-Cola and the world in the opportunity to invest capital, and the the new millennium? opportunity to independently develop rvEsrEn I think the best predictor of their business. We are spending a lot of time and attention toward growing a our future is probably our past. Between business in Africa, for example, because ten years ago and today, our business has we think there is vast potential for a bevdoubled, and I see no reason why our in Africa. We make erage business want to business can not double over the next ten sure that just because there is a glaring years as well. We approach the turn of the century with a great optimism, not only opportunity in one part of the world that w e d o n o t m i s s t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s e x i s t i n g in the world, but also in the people and in other parts of the world. brands of The Coca-Cola Cornpanv. J 0 u R N A LA s C o c a - C o l a p r e p a r e st o s e i z e these opportunities, what are your

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M r . l v e s t e r w a si n t e r v i e w e d by Kathryn *"-ra ""0 K a r i m C h r o b o g . B o t h a r e j u n i o r s i n t h e S c h o o lo f ForeignService,GeorgetownUniversity.

Law&Ethlcs Ethics andForergnfilicy David A. Welch

It is a common mistake to oppose "morality" and "prudence" in the analysisof foreign policy-as we do, for instance, if we chastiseour government for paying too rnuch or not enough attention to issues such as hurnan rights, or for pursuing an insufficiently (or o,,erly) hard-headed realism intended to promote "the national interest." Foreign policy is an inherently moral activity, and "the national interest" is an inherently moral category. The statement "leaders ought to be gr-rided by the national interest rather than by moral considerations" is absurd because the ought in question is a moral ought. (Moral oughts, such as "One ought not to steal," are different from instrumental oughts, as in "If you want to win this chessgame, you ought to sacrifice that pawn.") What would be the non-moral reason that leaders ought to be guided by the national interest? The realist critique of Wilsonianisrn and interwar appeasernent understood this. They argued that leaders who pursued these policies were morally wrong because in their attempts to promote laudable but secondary moral objectives, they failed to discharge a higher moral obligation, namely, to ensure the security and survival of their state.' Thus, all debates over foreign policy are moral debates, whether or not we recognize them as such. For example, every position in the debate over NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia last spring was imbued with moral content. Oppo-

David A. Welch i. Associate Political

Professor

Science at the

University

of Toronto

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It is difficult to decide merely by obsewing state behavior. Suppose a Moral Motives in Foreign Policy leader must choose between two foreign policies, A and B. The table M O R At NON.I\4ORA L CHOICE T R U ER E A S O N to the left describes the five possible II\4PULSE I I VP UL S E F O RC H O I C E cases. Note that on the basis of observed behayior, it is possible for the cynic almost always to conclude that the choice reflects non-moral motives: In four of the five cases, the chosen policy would also be the I policy chosen by a leader acting nents argued either that ethnic conflict in solely on the basis of such motives. It is Kosovo was an internal matter in which therefore hardly surprising that when the international community had no leaders' impulses are not obvious, cynics rnoral or legal right to interfere, or that have such an easy tirne dismissing moral the moral consequences of such an explanations for their choices. intense bombardrnent were on balance The Argentine decision to invade the negative. Proponents denied both claims. Falkland/Malvinas Islands in rg82 proIn essence, the debate was over what is vides a classic illustration. For twenty right or wrong in international affairs. years, in the absence of a strong body of It should not surprise us that foreign evidence and testimony about motives, policy debates are moral debates when we analysts blithely assumed that the Argenrecognize that hurnan beings are inhertine Junta mounted the operation to ently moral creatures with natural rnoral distract the Argentine people frorn their faculties. The propensity to evaluate the domestic economic woes.a Now, howevworld in moral terms, and to act upon er, we know that the members of the our moral judgrnents about it, is both Junta were motivated over-whelmingly by hard-wired and socially reinforced.' But the desire to rectif' what they perceived while debates about foreign policy are to be an intolerable injustice: Britain's inescapably moral, the motives that lie forcible occupation of the islands in f o r e i g n behind p o l i c i e sa r e n o t n e c e s s a r i r 8 3 2 . 5 I t w a s i m p o s s i b l e t o c h o o s e ly moral.3 Non-moral and immoral between these two explanations simply by impulses are natural, too. Often what we observing the invasion, for the act itself consider the right thing to do is inconvewas fully consistent with both moral and nient or unpleasant, and does not serve non-rnoral motives. our immediate selfish interests. The Sometimes there are subtle behavcommon wisdom both within the field of ioral clues as to the relative strength of international relations and among the m o r a l m o t i v e s i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . general public holds that leaders of states Leaders who act on the basis of moral almost always act on the basis of narrow motives, for instance, tend to be rnore political or rnaterial self-interests, not strident in their dernands, less sensitive genuine rnoral commitments, and that to costs,and more difficult to deter.o their moral arguments, when they bother This was all true of Argentine leaders in to make them, are insincere. Is this true? the early rg8os. But there may be self-

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)

interested or purely tactical reasons why leaders would exhibit this behavior. At the end of the day, the only way to know for sure whether moral or non-moral irnpulses lie behind any given act is to look closely at the decision-making process itself. The data requirernents for identifying the motives that lie b e h i n d s p e c i f i cf o r e i g n - p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s are typically very high and are frequently impossible to satisfr, making cynicisrn difficult to overcome. Obviously, some leaders are rrore sensitive to moral considerations than are others. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the cynicism about leaders' motives that pewades our field-and the public alike-is unwarranted. After all, leaders of states are human beings with moral faculties, too. They take guidance from moral considerations far more often than people tend to think, and they do so even in circumstances where cynics ought to expect it least.TSince there is no evidence to suggestthat moral considerations bear less frequently or less heavily on foreign-policy decisions than on othe r t y p e so f d e c i s i o n s .c y n i c i s m i s a p r e j u dice without justification.

any action and its opposite could be justified ethically, and it would be impossible to take guidance from ethical deliberation. There are moral reasonsfor pressing China harder on human rights, and there are other moral reasons for not pressing China harder on human rights.

Even though leaders make decisions on the basis of moral motivations far rnore often than we think, no state'sforeign policy as a whole meets my rather demanding standard for ethical action. There are few individual policies for which it is both possible to provide a systematic ethical justification and for which there is strong evidence that the policy was itself the result of ethical deliberation. Moreover, there are good reasons for thinking that this is a very difficult standard to meet in the world as we know it. What are the obstacles, and how serious are they? There are two categories of problerns that frustrate ethical foreign-policy rnaking. The first set of problems is internal to sorne ethical systemsthemselves.In this category fall ambiguity and indeterminacy. Ambiguity arises because all rnoral judgment requires applying general principles to specific cases. Commonly, the idiosyncrasiesofspecific casesleave room for doubt and for honest disagreement While foreign policy is an inherently moral activity with moral considerations over the proper application of general principles. An important element of playing a far greater role than we tend to suspect, the foreign policies of statesare Christian ethics, for example, is a general prohibition against killing. Neverthevirtually never truly ethical. By "ethics" I mean the practice of making systematic less, faithful interpreters of Christian moral decisions. My use of the terrn is ethics disagreeover whether the prohibinarrower and more technical than the tion is absolute, the conditions under everydayuse, where we tend to ascribe an which killing might be justified if the is not absolute, and the prohibition ethical motive to someone who acts sirnply on the basisof moral considerations.o principles that should govern judgment in circumstances where killing is I feel compelled to use it thus because if just any moral reason counted as an ethunavoidable. Even where the application ical justification for policy, then virtually of general principles to specific cases is

Are Foreign Policies Ethical?

W i n t e r / S p r i n gZ o o o

IB r ]

ETHICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

unproblematic, some eth ical systems are indeterminate and do not generate clear prescriptions or proscriptions. This is often because two or more general prin ciples conflict in a given case. In addition to a strong prohibition against telling lies, for instance, Kantian ethics includes a strong prohibition against breaking promises. Sometimes the only way to avoid telling a lie, however, is to break a promise. The only way to deal with these problems when they arise is to have robust second-ol'der norms for resolving them, such as an authoritative interpreter or procedure. In contrast to legal systems and constitutions, which typically have a process for settling such disputes, Kant ian and other historical ethical traditions are relatively weak in this regard. q The second set of obstacles to ethical foreign-policy making is external to eth ical systems and involves the nature of the foreign-policy process. It would be difficult enough to formulate and pur sue an ethical foreign policy if everyone were singing from the same song sheet; but the actors involved in the foreign policy making process commonly sing from very different song sheets. The two crucial problems here are heterodoxy and variability. Different participants in the policy making process typically have incompatible moral commitments and a mixture of moral and non-moral motives. This makes it difficult for poli cymakers to persuade each other of the superiority of their moral reasoning. Variability refers to the fact that the par ticipants in fOl'eign policy debates change over time as personnel changes and as diffel'ent foreign policy issues engage different domestic interests. From an ethical perspective, foreign policy debates therefore tend to be chaotic. The best way around this is to

l82J

Georgetown Jourrl"l of Intet'national Affair'

choose or to design an ethical system that includes strong procedural norms for resolving conflicting interpretations of moral principles in specific cases, and for making authoritative judgments in cases of ambiguity, indeterminacy, and disagreement. By and large, historical systems are unsuitable because of their parochialism, Theol'ies of deliberative democracy, legal systems, and constitu tional orders provide better models.

Broadening Consent.

The ques tion naturally arises whether it is a bad thing that states have such difficulty justi fying their foreign policies ethically. This is a moral question that can be broken down into two parts. First, does the fact that states have dif ficulty justifying their foreign policies ethically have consequences that most people are likely to consider objection able? There is evidence that normative disagreement increases the likelihood of death, illness, poverty, lower material quality of life, environmental degrada tion, and so forth. There is also evi dence that normative agreement reduces the likelihood of conflict and of the ills associated with it.'o All other things being equal. any systematic ethic of which I am aware would applaud a reduction in international conflict and enhanced material quality of life. In addition, foreign policies that are diffi cult to justify in ethical terms are apt to appear hypocritical, disingenuous, and opportunistic, and are therefore likely to provoke the kind of distrust that undermines international cooperation. Thus one can make a fairly good prima facie case that it is better to have ethical foreign policies than not, and it is likely that this judgment will be compelling to a heterodox audience,

A heterodox au, applaud just any ~ the choice betwee foreign-policy ma are used to in the foreign policies in: ular ethical trad would prefer mon They would prefel represent less of a moral commitme organized,rigorou ed upon antagon J ames Madison ob individual interest are safer from infri tern of checks and l hegemonic orthod, possible to make a case that foreign p ethical justification justifications ethic ceases to be compe persuasive-both as logical fact, and fre perspective of any' (a) cannot establisl or (b) cares about tI conflicts that woul become hegemonic make a compellin! policy making ough The answer turn: providing ethicalju policies that will COl consent. It is diffi( pe Iling case that we ~ President Clinton} cation for his foreig it may command t else. The larger the that can be broughl compelling the case will satisfy the natl moral justification,

WELCH

lical system that Iral norms for erpretations of cific cases, and ~ judgments in terminacy, and arge, historical lecause of their of deliberative ;, and constitu tter models.

"t.

The ques

~ther it is a bad

difficulty justi es ethically. This t can be broken :1

It states have dif foreign policies ences that most sider objection ~ that normative the likelihood of lower material mental degrada lere is also evi Teement reduces ct and of the ills .11 other things ematic ethic of )uld applaud a Ina1 conflict and ality of life. In les that are diffi terms are apt to singenuous. and therefore likely of distrust that nal cooperation. fairly good prima :1' to have ethical )t, and it is likely be compelling to

A heterodox audience is not likely to applaud just any ethic, however. Given the choice between morally haphazard foreign-policy making (of the kind we are used to in the modern world) and foreign policies informed by any partic ular ethical tradition, many people would prefer morally haphazard policy. They would prefer it because it would represent less of a threat to their own moral commitments than would an organized, rigorous set of norms found ed upon antagonistic principles. As James Madison observed in Federalist 10, individual interests and commitments are safer from infringement under a sys tem of checks and balances than under a hegemonic orthodoxy. Thus, while it is possible to make a fairly robust moral case that foreign policies ought to have ethical justifications, once we give those justifications ethical content the case ceases to be compelling. It becomes less persuasive-both as a matter of psycho logical fact, and from the philosophical perspective of any ethical tradition that (a) cannot establish its own hegemony, or (b) cares about the disagreements and conflicts that would arise if it were to become hegemonic. How, then, can one make a compelling case that foreign policy making ought to be ethical? The answer turns on the possibility of providing ethical justifications of foreign policies that will command ever-broader consent. It is difficult to make a com pelling case that we should insist only that President Clinton have an ethicaljustifi cation for his foreign policy. even though it may command the assent of no one else. The larger the community of people that can be brought on board, the more compelling the case, the more his policy will satisfy the natural human need for moral justification, and the more likely it

Law & Ethics

is that his policy will produce the mater ial benefits an ethical order can deliver. Thus we ought to prefer that foreign pol icy be formulated in terms of, and inspired by, an ethical system that can command as wide an assent as possible ideally, global consent. It is good to be able to convince an American audience that American foreign policy is consistent with American liberal democratic moral commitments. It would be even better to be able to convince a global audience that American foreign policy is consistent with a global ethic of state action.

Progress. While moral disagreement over foreign policy is inevitable. its scope and intensity may be narrowed over time, and it is conceivable to imagine gradual, piecemeal progress toward the ideal of a global consensus on the appropriate eth ical considerations to inform-and eval uate-the behavior of states. A broad and deep consensus on moral principles is only possible at the expense of moral particularity, which typically has strong roots in culture and religion. As culture and religion are central elements of individual and group identity, it is tempting to conclude that this is asking far too much. It is important to recognize, however, that while moral judgments commonly differ between cultures and religions, people of all cultures and I'eli gions employ the same basic set of moral concepts-good, bad, right, wrong. just, unjust, fair. unfair, deserving. undeserv ing. and so forth." Moreover, they understand them in approximately the same way. Crucial differences arise not at the level of moral concepts, but at the lev el of conceptions-the specific interpreta tions of concepts in specific circum stances. It would be difficult to hold out any hope in the face of radical moral disWinter/Spring

2000

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E T H I C SA N D F O R E I G NP O L I C Y

agreement-if people of different cultures and religions not only interpreted morai concepts differently in specific cases,but if they also used entirely different, incompatible and mutually unintelligible moral concepts in the first place.'" Broadly speaking, there are two mechanisms by which it is possible to narrow the range of moral disagreement. The first is social interaction. Through contact, dialogue, collective problem solving, and institution building, it is possible for indir.iduals and groups to develop empathy and a nascent shared identity. When they do, they sometimes transmit and transmute values, and they sometimes reformulate their interests. Whereas prior to social interaction they might have u n d e r s t o o d t h o s e i n t e r e s t sa s c o m p e t i n g a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e , i t i s s o m e t i m e sp o s s i ble after social interaction to understand them as at least in part complementary and mutually reinforcing.'3 The second rnechanisrn for building global consensus on moral issuesis generational change.As new cohorts socialize morally and politically, and as they consciously react to what they perceive as the errors and failings of their forebears, they internalize social and normative changes.'a It is important to note that these are not inevitable processes. Centuries of social interaction can aggravate differences and undermine empathy. With generational change, normative differences can becorne more rather than less acute, and lessrather than more tractable. The Holocaust, after all, took place in the twentieth century, not the fifteenth. There do appear to be sorne important developments, however, that suggest a dominant historical trend and a clear direction of progress. Examples include the dernise of slavery, de-legitimization of major war, development of pluralistic

tA+l

CeorgetownJournal

of lnternational Affairs

security communities, proliferation of international organizations, regional economic integration, and the ascendancy of international law.'5 \Alhile sorne of these deveioprnents reflect natural social change made possible by technological progress, others were at least hastened by deliberate poiicy choices. Thus foreign policy can itself help engineer the international social context that would facilitate ethical foreign-policy making. If they are not oppressive, pluralistic societiesmanage heterodoxy by means of principles and rules that define and protect private spheres of activity, in which individuals are free to indulge their particular commitments and pursue their particular conceptions of the good, and that define and regulate public activity. The dominant norms of statebehavior in recent centuries reflect this general pattern: The central moral nol-m of state sovereignty was intended to provide a check against outsiders' attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs of s t a t e s . " 'A r g u a b l y . w e a r e w i t n e s s i n g a transformation in this central norm. International society is less and less willing to turn a blind eye to what goes on within states.and more intent upon holding regimes to specific standards of conduct.'7 Sovereignty is something states can no longer rnerely claimr It is something they now must earn. There was a certain poetry in the fact that NATO unleashed an unprecedented attack on a sovereign state to enforce good behavior at home on the very day that the House of Lords finally cleared the way for General Augusto Pinochet's extradition to Spain to stand trial for human rights abuses while in power. Thirty years ago, neither action would have been conceivable. Both are important markers on the road to a truly global human rights regime.

w E L c H L a w& E t h i c s There is reason to believe that emergcal foreign-policy making becomes posing human rights norms reflect a nascent sible-or, at least, it becomes possible to global consensus on the rninimum moral approximate ethical foreign-policy maktreatment due to individuals. The crucial ing more closely-when the operative "ethic" is provided by an internally question is what the emerging global standards of conduct will look like and coherent, broadly accepted set of princiwhere they will corne from. If they are ples, rules, and procedures for interpregrounded in a particular ethical tradition tation and judgment. This points in the and are imposed hegernonically, they are direction of conventionalism." From a Iess likely to have desirable long-term global perspective-and, indeed, frorn effects on international conflict and welthe dornestic perspective of any pluralisfare because they will find only grudging tic or heterodox state-foundational ethacceptance. Many argrre that this is preical doctrines are unlikely to provide a cisely what is happening in the world basis for ethical foreign-policy rnaking today.'' If indeed emerging global stan- becauseof their inherent parochialism. dards of hurnan rights have a firrn basis What specific principles, rules, and only in a Western liberal rnoral tradition procedures should we hope for or that other cultures find foreign and encourage? Only those that can be unpersuasive, and if their spread is sirn- broadly acceptable to a pluralistic world ply the result of Western punishrnents society. We cannot prejudge the outcome and incentives, then they will persist only of the struggles and debates that will ultias long as \{estern hegemony does.'e mately shape the conventions that will Non-Western cultures are embracing define the global ethic. They are, these norms in ever-increasing numbers inevitably, the result both of politics and

Thefe WaSa Ceftain po"tryin thefactthat NATO unleashed an unpreaederited attack on a sovereign state . on the very day that the "of House Lords finally clearea th6 way for General Augusto Pincichet's extradition . . because they seem to have an ineluctable appeal." lf this is the case,then they provide an increasingly solid foundation for a shared ethic of world politics and a corresponding legal order."' A crucial condition for ethical foreign-policy making, therefore, is that statesembrace shared external norms as the legitimate basis for ethical deliberation about statebehavior, and relinquish parochial norlns for that purpose. Ethi-

of argrrment, and as a result they will alwaysbe contested, at least on the rnargins. The piecemeal proliferation of conventions is also likely to generate substantive inconsistencies, so it is important for an emerging global ethic of state action to give priority to principles and rules for resolving disputes, contradictions, and differences of interpretation. Norrnative evolution is slow, somewhat haphazard, proceeds in fits and starts, and advances

Winter/Spring zooo

IB 5 J

E T H I C SA N D F O R E I G NP O L I C Y

more quickly in some domains than in others."3 Moral progress that depends upon socialization processes can only be hurried along to a limited degree. But in order to encourage ethical foreign-policy practice, we ought to encourage conventionalism and institution-building, and keep the long view in mind. All of this leads to a final paradox-though it need not cause us great concern. The direction of progress I have suggested is one that strengthens transnational civil society and weakens the state.'+ Its agents include individuals, corporations, non-governmental organizations, the media, and other transnational groups, a n d t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s g ' e n e r a t ea body of rules, norms, and institutions that both constrain state autonomy and erode state sovereignty. A world in which ethical foreign-policy practice is truly possible, therefore, is a world in PafadOX.

which foreign policy does not rnatter very much, because the state has lost much of the prerogative that makes an independent foreign policy both possible and consequential . It is difficult to know what the endpoint will be. There are rnany different possibilities, global civil society, David Mitrany's functionalism, Clark and Sohn's world governrnent, benign anarchy, a new medievalism, or something asyet unimagined.'5 But if a true transnational ethic develops of the kind that rnakes systematic ethical judgment possible, the net result will certainly be the weakening of states as actors. At some point, therefore, our concern for ethical conduct on the world stage will ceasebeing primarily-or even largelya concern with the foreign-policy practice of states. If we truly seek to make ethical foreign policy possible, therefore, we must work to make it irrelevant.

NOTES The author would Brown,

Seyom

Friedrich

like to thank Thomas

Stanley

Kratochwil,

Hoffmann,

Cecelia Lynch,

tern, Linda Miller. Amir

Biersteker,

Nancy

Kokaz,

Matthew Mat-

Pasic, Michael Smith,.John

National

Interest

tires (Hillsdale,

ipants in seminars at the Thomas.J. Watson Jr. Insti tute for International Studies, Brown University, and

I989).

for

Center

International

Affairs,

Haryard University, for their verv helpful comlnents; and both

the Watson Institute

and the WCFIA

for

generous institutional support during the preparation of this essay. l

Morgenthau

moralism

wrote:

with morality

immorality

"The

equation

political

and of political realism with

is itseU untenable.'fhe

between moral

principles

choice

and the national

is not

interest,

devoid of moral dignity. but between one set of moral

Abstractions."

NJ.,

Lawrence Erlbaum

Kohlberg's ories."

and Hoffman's

Moral Development

H u m c n D e u e l o p m e n3t 4 , B 8

o f B u s i n e s5s9 ' S z B 5 - 5 3 o o .

See MJ.

[eds.], The lusticeMotiue in SociolBehauior'Adapting to Tines of Scorci!'ond Change(New York, N.Y.' Plenum

York

and the national interest is not only intellectually mis-

Aggression and the Sense of.justice."

taken, but also morally pernicious.

SrientistJ,f.:J/t

moral

to a foreign

principles."

Mainsprings

t86]

policy

inspired

by universal "The Morgenthau.

See Hans J. Foreign

American

CeorgetownJournal

Policy,

The

of lnternational Affairs

Lerner, and S.C.

Lerner

ity. . . Hence, the antithesis between moral principles

superiol

See

D. Kahneman, J.L. Knetsch, and R.H. Thaler, "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," /ournal

Press, t98t).

the national interest is in fact morally

See J.Greenond;lustice in Sociai

berg, and R.L. Cohen [eds.J, fgug Belorior (NewYork, N.Y., Academic Press, I98z).

frolutionc2 \4err (Albany,

derived from

The

t04.

er set of moral principles, derived from political real-

policy

Associates,

See R. Folger led.1 , fie Senr o/Iryustrce,Sorial Py (New York, N.Y., Plenum Press, chologcal PerspectiLes Ig84). See.j.C. Cibbs, "Toward an lntegration of

principles, divorced {r'orrrpolitical reality, and anoth

A foreign

Americon

feds.]. Sociol ond Moral Values,Inditiduol ond SocrctalPerspec-

Tomasi, Michael Tomz, Melissa Williams, and partic-

the Weatherhead

vs. Moral

PoliticolScienceie uiea 4 4 : 8 53- B 5 +. 2. See N. Eisenberg, N., J. Reykowski, and E. Staub

See M. Mavell,

Press, lggo).

Moralih'Among"\ttrons'.4n

N.Y. , State University of New See M.T. McGuire, "Moralistic AmtricanBehadorol

385. See L. Thomas, P.sr,clrolog oJ' trlorol Charocter(Philadelphia,

LiuingMorollt, A PA., Temple

University Press, I989). "Matching Humanitarian Norms J. K. Hartigan, with Cold, Hard lnterests' The Making of Refugee

W E L C HL A W& E t h i C S

tgSo-89."

Policies in Nlexico and Honduras,

/nferno

tional Organiption +6,7o9 73o. .{-. See C. Dobson, J. Miller, and R. Payne, Ihe Fol,(' I a n d sC o n f t i c t( L o n d o n , U . K . , C o r o n e t , r g 8 z ) . S e e P . Eddy.,

and The Sunday f e a m . I i e F o l k l o n d , V ' o(, L o n d o n . U . K . ,

Linklater,

Times Inright

P. Cillman,

t6. See J. Bartelson, A Cenealog o/ Soreregn| (Cambridge, U.K., Cambridge University Press, 1995). See TJ.

Biersteker

1984). SeeJ.S.

Lery, and L.l.

P r e s s , I g 9 6 ) . S e e F . H . H i n s l e y . S o r e r e r g r g ,z n d E d i tion (Cambridge, U.K., Cambridge University Press, r986). See D. Philpott, "Sovereignty, An Inroduc

by Authoritarian

Case,"

"Diversionary

Vakili,

Regimes: in

Argentina

Manus

in the

led.],

Midlarsky l"he lnternationalizationof Communal Strif (London,

U.K.,

Routledge, Igg2), rrB-r4.6.

bridge, U.K.,

Cambridge

University Press, rggJ). "Morality. Ideology. Legiti-

/. See R.P. Beschel. Jr., macy, and American Soviet Policy." tion, Hanard

Ph.D

disserta

University, lggI.

8. We are sometimes tempted to call an action ethical if it is motivated

by the actor's

ments, whatever they may be;

sincere moral more

judg-

commonly,

reserye the term for actions motivated by moral judgmenrs with which we agree (i.e.. what we consider the "right" ones). 9 . T . N a r d i n , a n d D . R . M a p e l l e d s . J , T r a d i t i o n s olfn t t r nctioncE / t h i c s( C a m b r i d g e , U . K . ' C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i

U.K.,

University

Carnbridge

and Brief History." lournol oJ lnternational AJfoirs Michael Walzer's now classic attempt to 48,353-368. for what he calls the provide an ethical justification "statist paradigm" may be found in /u.rl ond Unjun Wan' A M o r a l A r q u n r n ! , r ' r i lH r . i o r i c o /i / / u r l r o h o n .( N e w Y o r k . N . \ . , tion

Basic Books, I9l/). r/. See P.G. Magnarella, Universal

"UniversalJurisdiction

Rights'

Human

and

Progression."

Global

J.S. Barkin ancl Journol of Third World Studies12:rl!-rJr. "'fhe State and the Nation, Changing B. Cronin, and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations. " I nt crnotionolO rgonipti on 48, I 07 I 30. rB. See C.M. Cerna, "Universality of Human Rights Norms

and

Cultural

I)iversity:

Rights in Different

Implementation See KJ.

Rightsq)orterb 16,7+o-752.

Democracy:

cipline,

Then

Human

Rights Alien

Human

Contexts." Human Kelley, "First Dis-

Socio-Cultural Are

Western

Ideas ol

t o A s i a ? " L t t n eR e o d e rt ]

18. See

Myers, The PoliticolMoral$ of the lnternationalMonetory F u n d( N e w B r u n s w i c k , N J . ' T r a n s a c t i o n B o o k s , r 9 B / ) . RJ.

r9. Note that if imposed standards are later internal-

ty Press, Igg2).

ized and acquire

IV, Liberol Peoce,Liberol wor' Americn Politicsand lnternotionolSecur$, (lthaca, N.Y.' Cornell

generational change, they can become durable. It is an

Universitv Press, rggJ). tr. See K. Duncker, "Ethical Relativity? (An Enquiry

corne to accept principles that $'e initially resist alrd have forced upon us (e.g., racial equality; witness civ

into the Psychology of Ethics)," Alind, newser.+839 57. r2. See P. French, "Exorcising the Demon of Cultur-

and the dismantling

to.

See J.M.

Owen,

of these processes fbr international

relations ernpiri-

cally is R.O. Keohane andJ.S. Nye,.lr. leds.], IrcnsnoMass. ' Har tional Relotionsand World Politics(Cambridge, vard University

Press, Ig/2).

The

torch

has passed

to constructivists. scholars of interdependence See Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make

from

Social Construction of Power Politics." I n i e r n o i i o n oOl r g a n i z a t i o+n6 3 g r - + 2 5 . A l e x a n d e r W e n d t , "Collective Identity Fornation and the lnternational of It, The

State." Anericcn PoltticalScienceRerien,B8'384-396. Eisenberg, .J. Reykowski, and E. Staub Ieds.] Sociai ond,4[oral Values,Indiuiduol ond SocietalPerspectiues (Hillrdul", N J. , Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, rg8g). l ! . S e e E . A d l e r a n d M . B a r n e t t . S e c u r i hC o n m u n i t i e s (Cambridge, U.K., Cambridge University Press, I{.. See N.

r g g 8 ) . S e e E . A d l e r a n d B . C r a w f o r d [ e d s . ] , P r o g r e .isn. , Postuarlnternation ol Relctions(New York, N.Y. , Columbia University

Press, tggr).

See K.W.

Deutsch,

Polticcl

Communtg and the Nofth Atlantic Area' International Orgonl4ation nce(Pri nceto 11, N J.' Prince in theLght of H 6toriml Experie

through

socialization

il rights and school desegregation in the United

S t e p h e n L u p e r - F o y f e d . 1 . P r o b l e m , o 7 Arguably, opment" I nt ernationalI ustice(Boulder, Colo., Westview, r 9BB). r3. The first work to begin exploring the implications

legitimacy

irony of moral life that we or our children sometimes

al Relatirism.'in

Stcte Soueregn! cs Socicl

The Bottle lit'tfu

Internat[onol ]ournal 1rz, 483 5o7. of Wor (Cam6. See D.A. Welch, Justice and the Genesis

and C. Weber,

Conslruct(Cambridge,

5. See L. Freedrnan and V. Gamba-Stonehouse, Srgncls of War, Tfu Fnlklands Confict of t g 8 z ( Lon don, U. K.' Faber and Faber, I99o). See D.A. Welch, "Remember the Falklands? Missed Lessons of a M isunderstood War. "

\brk,

See M. Hastings and S.Jenkins, Falklonds(New York, N.Y., Norton,

Falklands/Malvinas

Rcfreot

Andr6 Deutschr98z).

Action

ton University Press, rgg/). SeeJohn Mueller, ol' Molor Wor (New from Doomsdov fie Obsolescence N.Y.: Basic Books, r989).

States.

in South Africa). of "sustainable devel-

of Apartheid

the emerging is acquiring

norm

considerable

moral

content

See S.F. Bernstein, Tlre ComproniseoJ'LiberolEm:ironmenlolisn(New \brk,

despite its largely economic

origins.

N.Y., 20.

Colurnbia University Press. forthcoming). See C. Taylor, "A World Consensus on Human

R i g h t s ? " D i s s e n{t! : r j 2r. "lJniversal International Law. " 2 t. .J.1. Charney, AmericonI ournal of Internationol Low 87, 529 - |il. 22. D.A. Welch, "Can We Think Systematically About al Affain B,z3- g 1'. Ethics and Statecrall ?" Ethia d' /ntemotion 21. For useful e*amples of norrnative evolution of the kind the possibility of which my discussion presupposes, See A. Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Clobal

Racial Equality

and

U.S.

Sanctions

against

InternationolOrgani3ation'{j:{jt {./8. See " H o w P e a c eC a m e t o E l S a l v a d o r . " O r b i i J.G. Sullivan, 38,83-98. For discussionsof raechanisms, see, e.g., Organizations as See M. Finnernore, "lnternational South Africa."

Teachers Of Norms, The United al, Scientific, And Cultural Policy." Florini.

Nations Education

Organization

and Science

Internationol Organi4atton 47,565-597. "The Evolution of International

See A. Norms. "

Winter/Spring 2ooo

[8 7 ]

ETHICS AND FOREIGNPOLICY

I n t e r n o t i o n a lS t u d i e sQ u a r t e r ! + o ' 3 6 3 389. See E.A. "Global Prohibition Regimes, The Evo

Nadelmann, lution

of Norms

in International

Society."

Ogcnriotion 44' +79- 526. 'Verha o I S"o q Fhrli.h Ulrima:

Order

International or Free-

d o m ? O n t h e P l u r a l i t y o f B i n c l i n g P a t t e r n . so f B e h a v ior and their Systems."

InternationalPoliticalStienceReuiew

17,333+o. 2!.

For a sample ofvisions

and their associated argu-

ments and justifications, see, e.g., G. Clark and L.B. Soh n, lntroductiort to World Pearc Through World Lau (Chi.u -

g o , I L . , W o r l d W i t h o u t W a r P u b l i c a t i o n s ,I 9 7 3 ) . S e e Territorioh! Econo D. Elkins, Beyond andPolitical Souereign!' ny intheTuen!-FirstCenturl(Toronto, Ontario, Univer s i t y o f T o r o n t o P r e s s ,r g ! g ) . S e eR . A . F a l k ,F u t u r W e orlds ( N e w Y o r k , N . Y . , F o r e i g n P o l i c yA s s o c i a t i o n ,I g / 6 ) . (Chicago, IL., See D. Mitrany, ,4 WorkingPeateSl,stem 1 9 6 6 ) . M . R . S e e O g d e n , "Politics in a Quadrangle, Parallel Universe: Is There a Future for Cyberdemoc r a c y ? " F u t u r e2s6 . 7 1 3 7 2 9 . S e e J . R o s e n a u , T u r b u l e n c e i n WorldPolitics' A I1rcoryof Change ond Continui!1(Princeton, N . . J . ,P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,I g g o ) .

CERES offers a two-year progtam ofgraduate study leading to the degree ofMastet ofArts in Russian and East European Studies. Our curricular programs serve students planning further graduate study and those seeking professional training. Students may concentrate in historyl governmentl economicsl social, ethnic and regional issuesl or literatute and culture. More than halfofour students currently receive financial aid through University scholarships and F-I-ASfcllowships. Fot more information about CER-ES, frnancial aid, or about our joint dcgtee programs (M.A./Ph.D. profcssional),pleasecontact: Harlcy D. Balzer, Director Christianne Hardy Wohlforth, Associate Di(ector CERES . Box571031 Georgetown University Washington, DC 20057-1037 phone: (202) 687-6080 fax: (202) 687-5829 E-mail: grrceres@gunet.gcotgeto$al.edu Visit our web site z/ WWW.GEORGETOWN.EDU/SFS,/CERES/CERES.HTM

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GlobatizationandJhe Demands of Governance Princeton N. Lyman Globalization has ushered in sweeping new trends that challenge traditional concepts of governance. International organizations will have to adjust to these new challenges, for they are not currently equipped to address them effectively. U.S. multilateral diplomacy must adjust as well, although there is resistancewithin the American political psyche to do so. As the world's only superpower, the United Statesapproaches international agreements differently from other countries. It is caught between the comforting reliance of its owrr overwhelming power, and the imperative of leading the international community into a system that protects and enhances American interests. The United States is not wrong to be wary. Contemporary international mechanisms of governance are hardly paragons of efficiency or neutrality. But the new global threats to American interests are no longer easily addressed through unilateral action. The new threats cut across borders, defr national controls, and pay no respect to relative national power. They demand new forms of governance. International governance does not mean international government; rather, it is effective management within a system still based on independent nation-states. The United States is the only country with the power and resources to help create these new forms of governance. Without active American engagement and leadership,

Princeton N. Lyman isvisiting Fellow at the Overseas ()ouncil Development and Senior

Fellow at

the U.S. Institute of Peace. He has sened Assistant

Secretary

State for lnternational Organization

Affairs

and as U.S. Ambassador to South

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the twenty-first century may be a very messy, unhappy place.

Beyond Finance. Theterm"globalization" is often used to describe the rapid growth of interdependency and connection in the world of trade and finance. This growth has been phenomenal. In r9l8, trade accounted for nine percent of the world's GDP, compared to 2{ percent today. Thirty percent of the growth experienced in the United States over the last six years cornes from expanding markets overseas.' International financial transactions have exploded even more dramatically. is Every day more than $r trillion exchanged in foreign transactions. This is enough to finance the entire world's trade an investment for ayear. Much of this $r trillion thus goes into short-terrn loans or speculative currency transactions.2 These trends have changed the nature of the debate about economic growth. In the spirit of Francis Fukuyama's dictum about the end of history, democracy and market economies have become the mantra of economic policy advice for industrialized and developing countries alike. Previously, official aid flows to developing countries far outstripped private financial flows. Today, B$ percent of financial flows to developing countries come from private sources and only r$ percent from aid.3 Advocates of development policies seek to tap into this major explosion of trade and private financing. Nevertheless. there is rnuch rnore to globalization than expanding trade and financial flows. There are other trends driven by the same explosion of technoIogical capability that have facilitated the financial changes. Globalization of communications is one such trend. According to Walter Wriston, the flood of real-time

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data has transformed the international economy more fundamentally than simply the movement of goods and finance. "For the first time in history, rich and poor, north and south, eastand west, city and countrTside are linked in a global electronic network of shared images . . . . Ideas move across borders as if they did not exist. Indeed, time zones are becoming more important than borders. "a The consequencesof these globalizing trends demand a fundamental reordering of the world. James Rosenau presents the issue in terms of the need to develop a new worldview. Such a worldview should recast the relevance of territoriality, highlight the porosity of boundaries, treat the temporal dimensions of governance as no less significant than the spatial dimensions. recognize that networking organizations have become as important as hierarchical ones, and posit shifts of authority to subnational, transnational, and nongovernmental levels as normal.5

WorrisomeTrends,Theneedfor a new worldview is heightened by worrisome global trends that accompany those taking place in finance and technology. Mrone'rroN. Today, r2o rnillion people in the world live in a country other than that of their birth. Most move from one developing country to another.o Howevâ&#x201A;Źr, rnigration pressures have created political tensions in Europe as it now faces sociopolitical demands from the rnillions of foreign workers that live there and who continue to enter. Countries like Egypt and the Philippines promote the export of workers as remittances from these workers dwarf other sources of finance. In the case of the Philippines, worker rernittances amount to three

L Y M A NP o l i t i c s & D i p l o m a c y times the amount of foreign aid.i Migrat i o n w i l l n o t d i s s i p a t ea n y t i m e s o o n a s population levels continue to grow in developing nations.

and six times that of t95o. The income ratio between the world's richest 2o percent and the poorest 20 percent was thirty to one in rg60; today it is more than sixty to one. Twenty percent of the C r v r r W e p e N o R n r u c n r s . D e s p i t e world's people in the highest income general peace among nations, the numcountries account for 86 percent oftotal ber of civil wars has grown dramatically. private consumption expenditures, In the I99os, fifty-eight armed conflicts while the poorest 2O percent account for r a n k e d a s h u m a n i t a r i a n e m e r g e n c i e s a mere I.J percent. For energy concompared to five in 1985. The number sumption, the figures are $B percent of people affected in these wars are enorversus 4 percent. And in this age of m o u s . w i t h c i v i l i a n sc o m p r i s i n g 9 0 p e r international cornmunication, the richcent of the casualties.uThe ramifications est fifth have JQ percent of all telephone of such internal wars are global. Fifteen lines, the poorest have r.$ percent; the million refugees and twenty million top fifth make up 93 percent of the internally displaced people stretch the world's Internet users, the poorest fifth resources of neighboring countries and makeup O.2 percenl.. international agencies. Expenditures on Environmental degradation also poses UN humanitarian emergency programs grave threats to the poor, which are at now exceed funding for the UN's Develleast equal to, if not greater than, those opment Program.e The United States p o s e d t o t h e r i c h . T h o s e i n w a t e r spent as much on relief aid for victims of stressedcountries are prirnarily the poor. genocide in Rwanda as it provides annuDegradation of forests occurs mostly in ally in aid to all of sub-Saharan Africa.'o developing countries, while the products Despite these expenditures, political are largely sold to industrialized natio ns . " trends do not bode well for refugees. The The World Bank lists twenty-two nations Democratic Republic of the Congo is as having severe water problems and currently engulfed in a civil war that has as eighty nations with serious ones.'' much to do with refugees as anything else. Meanwhile, globalized finance lifts The future of that country is uncertain at only a few. While private financial flows best. In the Balkans, Montenegro barred have been rapidly increasing to developAlbanian refugees from its territory during countries, outstripping aid, twelve ing the fighting in Kosovo, and Germany countries alone accounted for more than has pressured Serbian and Croatian 80 percent of those flows. Of $zo6 bllrefugees to return home under uncertain lion in private financial flows to developconditions. The United States rejected ing countries in rgg/, only $Z billion the UN's pleas when turning back Haitian went to the least developed.'3 boat people in the early Iggos. Asylum The sheer disparities in size pose a for refugees is under assault. major threat to the poorer countries in this age of capital account liberalization. G r o w r N o I N c o v r I N n q u e l r r v . P e r - The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) points out that a hypothetical shift sistent and growing economic inequality is another facet of globalization. World of one percent of equity holdings by consumption is twice what it was in I$/$ institutional investors away from dornes-

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each organization's character and bono tic equities in the Group of Seven (G/) countries would represent only slightly y'des. But today, the system is swamped with thousands of applications, and these more than one percent of total market capitalization. But a shift of the sarne organizations are dernanding not only accreditation but more access, more amount of funds from equities abroad speaking time, more equality with memwould be equivalent to 2J percent of rnarket capitalization in Asian ernerging ber states, and rnore influence. The growing presence of NGOs, on economies and over 66 percent of Latin the other hand, offers the potential for American equity markets. The BIS did new forms of public-private partnernot even measure African economies. As South Africa's President Thabo ships. We see these in the World Commission on Dams, the public-private Mbeki noted wryly in his address on Movebeginning on vaccines for to the Non-Aligned partnership globalization "A ment in rgg8, slight turn by the AIDS and other diseases, and in environmental programs.'5 sleeping elephant, to make itself more comfortable, can result in the complete annihilation of the entire universe of a United States' response to the trends of colony ofants." globalization as regards governance-and The Rise of NGOs. Astheinterna- in particular the role of international at best ambivalent. organizations-is tional community seeLsto come to terms Despite its almost overwhelming power, with these more disturbing trends, and others like them (infectious disease, the United States has found it expedient i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m e , d r u g s ) . a n e w to seek support from other nations and from international institutions for a entrant on the scene adds both potential variety of efforts such as the Gulf War, and complexity to the challenges of governance. This is the growth of non-govpeacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo, counterterrorism, and the fight against ernmental organizations, operating not AIDS. There is recognition as well that only within statesbut increasingly across them to influence both governments and global trends call for even greater degrees of international governance. At the same international bodies. time, there is a strong body of opinion NGOs led the way to the Ottawa treaty to ban land mines. They played a within the United States that is opposed critical role in the negotiations over an to, or at least fearful of, the ramifications for sovereignty. There is a current of disInternational Criminal Court, virtually trust, according one critic, of giving cowing some governments. According to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, power to supranational organizations r u n b y u n e l e c t e db u r e a u c r a t s . ' 6 we are seeing the creation of a global American public opinion adds to this civil society.'a Even if an international organization ambivalence. As polls show, the great majority of Americans want and expect like the UN is committed to more openness to NGOs-and not all are-the sheer their country to play a leadership role in logistics are daunting. The UN has a sys- the world. Americans support the UN, and indeed support foreign aid and othtem for accrediting NGOs to participate er international undertakings. However, in its work, requiring a careful review of

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further studies show that these same Americans are convinced that the United States already does more than its share. American troops make up less than g percent of UN peacekeepers,but the public estimates the participation to be at an unacceptable level of Zo percent. The majority of Americans believe we should provide about $ percent of our GDP for foreign aid and believe aid is fifteen percent of GDP.'7 In reality, foreign aid accounts for less than one percent of GDP, one of the lowest percentagesof all the industrialized countries. Americans do support involve-

ized and losing political support. As Madeleine Albright has remarked, the United States is the UN's harshest critic and its best friend. As a result of U.S. prodding, in the past two years the UN has produced nogrowth budgets throughout the system for the first time in a decade. At the same time, it reduced personnel by nearly ro percent, streamlined the Secretariat, strengthened internal oversight, and improved the coordination of its many developrnent programs. There is no doubt that the reforms have improved the efficiency and credibility of the orga-

) t

Foreignaid counts for less thanone i

percent of U.S. GDP,one of the lowest percentagesof all the industriali zed countries. ment in international activities and institutions, but are wary of overextending the country's commitments. Finally, Americans worry about problems inherent in international bodies such as organizational structures that distort influence. Under the UN system of one vote per country, countries that contribute little to the budget can make decisions that could be costly to the United States, which contributes 2$ percent of the UN budget. Furthermore, the credibility of the UN is called into question when countries like Iraq and Cuba sit on the UN Human Rights Commission.

UN PhObia. U'rit"d Nationsreform reflects American ambivalence toward international organizations. The United States has led reform of the UN and its specialized agencies, arguing that without reform the UN risks becoming marginal-

nization. Furthermore, most members believe that payrnent of the more than $r.3 billion of U.S. arrears would go a long way toward facilitating the U.S.backed reforms. The Congress finally passed legislation in 1999 to pay a significant part of these arrears, though laden with conditions that other UN members resent and may resist. The United States has had a similarly mixed response to the UN's role in the growing number of internal wars and humanitarian ernergencies. Beginning in the rggos, the United States stressed collective responsibility and international involvement. From I99I to 1998, UN peacekeeping exploded, with the number of peacekeepers and the peacekeeping budget more than tripling. The failure of UN peacekeeping in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, however, produced a backLashin the United States. This resulted in widespread criticisrn of

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multilateralism, evidenced by Congress's refusal to appropriate funds for peacekeeping operations. The backlash led to other criticisms of the UN, and other arrears to such organizations as the World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization. The United States now views each new

more than $6oo million on peacekeeping in Bosnia and Croatia to support the Dayton Accords. The cost of the Kosovo operation was estimated at for the first three $ 5oo rnillion months. African nations responded with anger as they saw their own hopes for large UN peacekeeping in the Con-

Even mOfe pfOv0Gative to othernations, America now looks to the United Nations to '

rrnplernent rn the tormer

'ltheholistic

Yugoslavri

nation-building task that the United Stateshas rejected elsewhere. UN peacekeeping proposal with a wary eye. It insists that peacekeeping funding be strictly confined to military or police activities only, and rejects a more holistic approach involving economic reconstruction and conflict resolution. The United States has insisted on short time frames, early exit strategies, and tight financing. Even when having won on all these points, America has not alwaysprovided its share of the funds. In 1998 the United States succeeded in limiting the mandate. size. and time frarne of a small peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic. Nevertheless, Congress thought that the Central African Republic was of no strategic importance to the United States, and refused to appropriate the American share. Even more provocative to other nations, America now looks to the United Nations to implernent in the former Yugoslavia the holistic nationbuilding task that the United States has rejected elsewhere. Already with U.S. urging, the United Nations has spent

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go or Sierra Leone command lower attention from the Security Council and, in particular, the United States. In response, Washington belatedly supported a six-thousand-person peacekeeping force for Sierra Leone and a rnajor UN operation in East Timor. In other areas, signals from Washington are similarly mixed. Although it championed the concept of "sustainable development" at the Rio Summit in rgg2, the United Statesdid not fulfill its first-round funding cornrnitment until tgg8. America worked assiduously to obtain agreement at the Kyoto conference on greenhouse gases, but strong opposition in Congress and a blistering ad campaign (targeting "the UN treaty") make ratification of any such treaty problematic.'8 The negotiations to create an International Criminal Court (ICC) further exempli$' America's mixed support for international organizations. Washington encouraged the creation of a more perrnanent institution-rather than the ad

LYMANPolitics&Diplomacy hoc tribunals established for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda-as a more effective deterrent to war crimes, However, it also wanted protection against politically inspired actions against U.S. servicemen and women abroad in sensitive situations. Despite some accommodation of its concerns, Washington refused to endorse the treaty that would have created the ICC. As a result, the United States found itself outside an endeavor it had originally championed. Struggles between the adrninistration and Congress are often behind the ambivalence of U.S. foreign policy. A combination of partisan politics, distrust of international agreements, and a compunction to rely on unilateral power led the Senate to defeat the Comprehensive Test Ban teaty, undermining a fundamental tenet of the multilateral approach to non-proliferation. Congress has not ratified the Convention for the Elimina-Women, tion of Discrimination Against nor the Seabed Legal Authority, each negotiated and supported by the Clinton administration. In each of these cases,a deep suspicion of the impact on U.S. sovereignty is at the heart of congressional reaction.

[T1he logic of 1945 . . was the conviction that to be successful, international liberalism had ;.o be anchored in social compacts in which national governments provided for the social welfare needs oftheir citizens in exchange for public support for an open world economy.'!

The challenge today is to ascertain whether it is possible to create a similar but broader social compact. If one includes nations both developed and poor, with widely different political and social systems, and takes into account the growing complexity of issues, no simple governing structure is practicable. In the financial arena alone, economists like Jeffrey Garten argue that it will take at least a decade to create the new global economic institutions that can play the roles needed in the wake of the latest financial crisis."" Others are more skeptical of such international institution-building. Conservatives,such asAnne-Marie Slaughter, favor the expansion of international markets without the international institutionbuilding that goes with it. Instead, she advocates "trans-governmental initiatives" that foster international cooperation in the regulation of specific problems and in the enforcement of resulting regrrlations. She cites as an example the F i n d i n ga N e wP a r a d i g mS. o m ergSB agreement of central bankers to have argued that what we are seeing today establish capital adequacy requirements on a global scaleis a repetition of events for all banks under their supervision.'?' in the United States at the turn of the Such "trans-governrnental" arrangecentury. The backlash of farmers, popments would meet some of the chalulists, unions, and reformers to the l e n g e s o f g l o b a l i z a t i o n , b u t n o t a l l . excessesof capitalism of the nineteenth They would not resolve the debate c e n t u r y l e d t o a n t i t r u s t l e g i s l a t i o n , regarding the orientation of the ecogreater regulation of banking and finannomic policy of the IMF. They would cial institutions, collective bargaining not resolve the issue between North and rights, unemployment insurance, and South over growing income inequality. Social Security. A wider global compact Moreover, they run counter to the was struck after World War II. Ethan growing power of NGOs that lean Kapstein writes: toward strict internationalization of

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norms and regulations, rather than regional or smaller arrang'ements. For the time being, any such effort to redesign the present system will surely have to be more ad hoc than sweeping. No universal institution, including the UN, is equipped to handle a systemic overhaul efficiently or free from ideological rhetoric. Despite the growing importance of NGOs in the international system, the future responsibility of civil society is unclear. As much as globalization has changed the reach and authority of nation-states, it is still national governments that in the end must make the decisions about new international structures, rules, and regulations. In the meantime, national governments will have to address the new political space of changing borders between community, national, and international boundaries within which any system of international governance must evolve. James Rosenau has called this space the "Frontier. " He writes: The problem of governance involves sorting out multiple contradictions. The international system is less commanding, but it is still powerful. States are changing, but they are not disappearing. At certain times, publics are more demanding, but at other times, they are more pliable. Borders still keep out intruders, but they are also more porous. Landscapes are giving way to ethnoscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes, technoscapes, and finanscapes, but territoriality is still a central preoccupation for many people. How do we assessa world in which the Frontier is continuously shifting, widening, and narrowing, simultaneously undergoing erosion with respect to many issues and reinforcements with r e s D e c tt o o t h e r s ? " "

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The United States is, for better or worse, the leader of this turbulent world. Traditional concepts of sovereignty, national strength, insulation and, indeed, ambivalence, are inadequate for this challenge. The United States is caught up in all the trends of the contemporary world, and often pays the biggest price for crises that occur. It is not possible to seekunilateral protection from international crime, international epidemics, acid rain, global warming, or terrorism. Americans-who constitute international of percent travelers {.o and whose wealth is the target of drug cartels and other criminal activities-will suffer from these threats as much or more than any others. Therefore, the task of bringing coherence and clarity to an international structure of governance necessarily falls largely to the United States. The task at hand requires finding the means for the international community to rnanage, rather than govern, the multiple and interactive trends of globalization. It would be wise not to accept the conclusion of Robert Altman that "markets have emerged as the ruling international authority, more potent than any military or political power.""3 Markets cannot control hate radio, arms smuggling, the spread of disease,economic inequality, or the passion of ethnic conflict and the havoc it produces. Markets alone can neither modulate the volatility of capital nor the deepening of economic inequalities. To face these challeng'es,we will need international institutions equal to the task and adapted to the realities of the contemporary world.

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I I

NOTES

WoterondrNhatWeCan D o Aboutlt. National PressBooks. r998,6o. t3. Atwood, op. cit. I { . R o s e n a u ,o p . c i t . , 3 2 6 - 3 4 0 . Washington DC, September ro, I998. See alsoJeffrey r!. Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "The Other World Wide Economics' Sachs, "International Unlocking the Web' Clobal Public Policy Networks," Forergn Polig (winter t!!! Mysteries of Globalization," Foregn Pofic2, (Spring 2ooo): {{-{$. r g g B ) 9, 7 r o o . t 6 . R o s e n a u o, p . c i t . , 4 7 - 5 0 . J e s s eH e l m s , " S a v i n g t h e (September/October 1996) : 2-7. 2. Robert Borosage, "For a New, Progressive IMF," UN, " Foregn,ATflcirs (April t998): 18. "A.gry Heins Slams UN for Its Lack of Cratitude," ForegnSeruiceJourncl W s h i n g l oinl m e sJ, a n u a r y 2 I , 2 o o o , r . 3. Ibid. r/. John Rielly Ied.J, Americon PublicOpinionondIJ.S.For4 . W a l t e r W r i s t o n , " B i t s , B y t e s ,a n d D i p l o m a c y . " I o r e g n A f f a n(sS e p t e m b e r / O c t o b e rr 9 9 / ) : 1 7 5 1 7 6 . ergnPolig tggg , The Chicago Council on Foreign Frontier' R e l a t i o n s ,1 9 9 9 a n d S t e p h e n K u l l , I . M . D e s t l e r , C l a y !. James Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign E$loring Couernance in a TurbulentWorld(New York, NY, Ramsay, TheForeign Polig Gop,Center for International C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,r 9 9 / ) , 2 9 . a n d S e c u r i t yS t u d i e sa t M a r y l a n d , r 9 9 / . 6 . M i c h a e l P a r f i t , " H u m a n M i s r a t i o n , " N a t i o n a l G e o - I8. Ruth Wedge*ood, "Fiddling in Rome," Foregn g r c p f r i(cO c t o b e r , I g g B ) : 2 I . A f i i r s , N o v e m b e r , / D e c e m b e r1 9 9 8 , 2 0 - 2 5 . K e n n e t h Roth, "Sidelined on Human Rights," ForegnAffiirs 7. Ibid., 3r. 8 . J o h n S t r e n l a u a n d F r a n c i s c o R . S a g a s t i ,P r e u e n t i n g ( M a r c h / A p r i l 1 9 9 8 ) : 2 6 . Deod! Conf ict' Does TheWorld Bank H oueA Role?, Repoft t o the t 9 . E t h a n K a p s t e i n , " W o r k e r s a n d t h e W o r l d E c o n o CornegieCommission on PreuenlitgDead!1ConfTici,June my." Foregn,Afoirs(May{une rgg6): r6ff. Peter D. r998, r7. Sutherland, "Managing the International Econony Emergencies, Unitin an Age of Clobalization," The rggS PerJacobsson 9. Jonathan Moore, Ihe UN ondComplex ed NotronsReseorch Institute I996, 54. Lecture. Printed by the Overseas Development for SocialDeuelopment, to. Michael Brown and Richard Rosencrance, TheCosts C o u n c i l , W a s h i n g t o n D . C . of Confrct (Lanham, MD., Rowman and Littlefield, zo. Jeffrey Garten, "Lessons for the Next Financial r 9 9 9 ) , 6 57 3 . Crisis, " Foreign Affairs(March/April I99g). I t . U N D P , H u m a n D e u e l o p m e nRte p o r t r, ! ! 8 , O x f o r d 2I. Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New World U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,c h a p t e r 3 . S e ea l s o M a r t i n W o l f , " A O r d e r , " F o r e i g nA f f a i r s( S e p t e m b e r / O c t o b e r r 9 9 / ) ' World Divided" , Finonciallimes (London), July 14 r93-r98. r999, ro. 2 2 . R o s e n a u ,o p . c i t . , p p . 4 5 . t 2 . P a u l S i m o n , T c i P e dO u t ' T h eC o m i n g W o r l C d r i s i si n 2 3 . Q u o t e d i n R o b e r t B o r o s a g e ,o p . c i t . 3 8 . L Address by President Clinton

to the Council

Foreign Relations, NewYork, September I4, I99B.J. "Development Brian Atwood, and a Dangerous World, " Address to the Council on Foreign Relations,

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Thslndispensable Partner Joschka Fischer Last year marked the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin WaII that precipitated the end of the Cold War. The North Atlantic alliance linking the United Statesand Canada with the -Western democracies of Europe was, from its inception, distinctively shaped by the historical constellation of the Cold War. The most succinct and apt definition of the Alliance in those dayswas provided by Lord Ismay, its first Secretary- General, who described NAIO's mission as: "To keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." Since that time, however, the strategic environment in Europe has changed dramatically. The Russian empire in the form of the Soviet Union and its satellite statesno longer exists. Germany, now a successful democracy, has with the consent of all its neighbors and the major powers-especially with the steadfast support of the United States-been reunited in peace and freedom. It is integrated in manifold ways into the Euroatlantic and other international structures. In Lord Ismay's terms, only the first of the three NAIO objectives is left, that of providing an indispensable security link between North America and Europe. In the Washington Post, Henry Kissinger recently raised the question of whether the Kosovo crisis heralded the end of NATO as we have known it. The background to his concern, and to those of many other American partners, was the commitment made by European Union leaders at last year's

Joschka Fischer i. Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany.

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Cologne summit to establish a specific European security and defense identity. To that concern my immediate response is: It is unfounded. The Alliance is still the grrarantor of collective defense and security in the North Atlantic area and will keep this role in the twenty-first century. For Germany in particular, transatlantic partnership and the U.S. political and military presence in Europe remain the key to peace and security on our continent. Four times in this century the United States has intervened militarily in Europe, most recently in Kosovo, because we Europeans believed ourselves incapable of acting on our own. That is a lesson we must heed for the future, too. And given its geopoiitical position, even a Europe that is one day united will still need transatlantic safeguards.

Hobsbawm has aptly called an "age of extremes, " this is a lesson hopefully both the United States and Europe will never forget. The two components of this transatlantic bridge-Europe's importance to America's security and America's role in European securitytogether constitute the strong and solid foundation of shared interests on which we have to build a transatlantic security partnership adapted to the new environment. The crisis in Kosovo confronted NATO with a severe test. It passed the test with flying colors, demonstrating extraordinary cohesion and the capacity to act. The Alliance proved it had successfully realigned itself, as agreed at the Washington summit, to respond to the new strategic environment in Europe and assumean important role in conflict

In a glObalized*o.ld, therecanbe no security and prosperity ^secuiity on either side of the Alantic ahd prosperity are shared. that The United States is vital to Europe's security, whether internal or external. In this age of globalization and increasingly shared interests and challenges, however, one thing is also more obvious than ever: Europe is crucial to America's security. This nexus is reinforced by the new challenges that both the United States and Europe face, ranging from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorism, and organized crime to environmental threats. In a globalized world, there can be no security and prosperity on either side of the Atlantic unless that security and prosperity are shared. After ail the blood spilled in what the British historian Eric

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prevention and management. As in Bosnia, NATO placed its military capabilities at the service of the international community, aiding the search for a political solution to restore peace and respect for human rights. NATO's intervention halted rarnpant nationalism, violence, and expulsion in Kosovo, paving the way for the long-term stabilization of Southeastern Europe. Another remarkable outcome of the war in Kosovo was the way the Europeans demonstrated a will to assume unprecedented political and military responsibility within the Alliance-not only in terms of their military contributions, but also through the political initiatives

F r s c H E RP o l i t i c s &D i p l o m a c y

of the German EU presidency and the final breakthrough achieved by the EU intermediary, Finnish President Ahtisaari, and Russian special envoy Victor The Stabillty Pact for Chernomyrdin. Southeastern Europe also highlights the fact that Europeans are now more willing than ever to shoulder political responsibility and its consequences. It was at the Washington NAIO Summit that the common challenge was first outlined, to enhance the vitality of the transatlantic bond by developing a balanced partnership in the field of security and defense policy. A self-confident, emancipated Europe can no longer assume that the United States is going to become involved in European crises at all 'We times and under any circumstance. have come to realize that the end of the East-West conflict not only opened up exciting prospects for building a comprehensive order for peace in Europe, but also introduced new risks to security and stability on our continent. Bosnia and Kosovo underscored the need for Europe to improve both its political and its military effectiveness. Precisely because we cannot always call on our North Arnerican partners for help, the European Union must develop its own military management capabilities so that it has the ability to act whenever such action is judged necessary. That, however, means the Europeans must first learn to speak with one voice. In that respect Europe has made considerable headway with the appointment of Javier Solana as High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Clearly, a true comrnon foreign and security policy is still a long way off, but it is essential that we stay the course and develop political and military instruments that will give us the capacity to act

on our own in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. Galvanized by the war in Kosovo, Europe has already made significant progress in this area. In theirJoint Declaration in St. Malo, France and Great Britain laid the groundwork for the creation of a European security and defense union. During its dual EU and WEU (Western European Union) presidency, Gerrnany made the most of this new dynamism, paving the way for groundbreaking decisions at the tggg Cologne European Council on the establishment of permanent political-military structures. In concrete terms, it is envisaged that the European Union should be able to plan, politically endorse, and carry out i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s r e s p o n s eo p e r a t i o n s , with the necessaryinstitutional framework in place by the end of the year 2ooo. EU member states have committed themselves to further developing their military assets and capabilities for deployment in European-led operations. That includes transport and reconnaissance capabilities as well as improved command and information systems. The Eurocorps is to become a European crisis response force available for deployment in NATO and EU operations. Another important aspect is enhanced cooperation within the European defense industry and closer coordination in planning and procurernent of defense equipment. At the same time, however, one thing is certain: In relations with United States, "hegernony" in the field of foreign or security policy or a duplication of efforts is not our goal. Qrlite the contrary, we remain committed to the closest possible cooperation within NAIO, and particularly with the United States. A self-confident Europe is not a denial of

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the transatlantic partnership. Obviously, a new form of burden-sharing within the Alliance, with the Europeans making a bigger contribution, is also in the American interest, for even the United States asthe sole remaining superpower is neither willing nor able to take care of all crises in all parts of the world-especially not when they happen on Europe's doorstep. A Europe that is able to act effectively can, together with the United States, rnake a notable contribution to global stability. The world of the twenty-first century needs multilateral institutions and shared rules. The UN was a magnificent and historic idea of one of America's greatest presidents, Franklin D. Roosevelt. We need a global platform for common action in order to be able to meet effectively the challenges of the future. Moreover, history shows that unilateral action by major powers invites the imitation or even the forrnation of opposing powers, and thus ultimately has a destabilizing effect. There is a lesson here for both sides' Europe must develop in order to be a valuable partner and to remain credible, while the United Statesmust be wise enough-as it has been so often before-to choose the arduous process of transatlantic coordination over the tempting but dangerous option to "go it alone." of Combating the proliferation nuclear weapons should be an area of particular concern. Here, an important task awaits both Arnericans and Europeans in the years ahead. In this light, the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.S. Senate was perceived as a major setback for worldwide efforts to prornote nuclear disarma-

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ment. The Comprehensive Test Ban teaty is an important cornerstone of global efforts in this field, and without it the whole system of cooperative disarrnament and arms control could be jeopardized. This matter depends particularly on the stance of the United States,the world's largest nuclear power. If we embark upon the course in the wrong way, a new, highly dangerous nuclear arms race could begin in crisis regions. Even the U.S. could not control such a developrnent, the result of which could instead be nuclear anarchy. It is vital, therefore, that the Senate's rejection of the treaty last November not be the last word on the subject. fMe must not place at risk all of the painstaking progress made in recent decades in the field of disar-rnament and arms control. The same goes for the ABM Treaty, a crucial pillal of the arms control regirne. A strong Europe will also make for stronger transatlantic relations across the board-in the political, economic, and military domains. In a globalized world, only a European Union that can act effectively-not just on economic and financial issues, but also in the area of foreign and security policy-will be able to safegrrardpeace in Europe and rise to the global challenges on today's agenda. It is clearly true that the United States is the "indispensable nation" in that its is essential to resolving contribution international issues.It is up to Europe to develop and become the "indispensabie partner" to the United States,while it is up to the United States to accept and support this process. This is the challenge-but also the transatlantic opportunity-of a European security and defense nolicv.

Politics& Diplomacy

Makers Should Foreign-Policy Listento the Public? Frank Lavin For the majority of Americans, U.S. foreign policy is an abstract phenomenon, one of little intrinsic interest or value. It enters the popular consciousness only when it threatens to irnpinge on the more fundamental aspectsof life, such as farnily, work, and education. For many practitioners, academics, and journalists, on the other hand, foreign policy defines professional Iife and public stature. This gap between practitioners and the public is reflected in two contrasting approaches to foreign policy rnanagelnent' the "consequentialist" and "hortatory" schools. The consequentialist school holds that only the practical effects of actions matter in foreign policy. Foreign policy must concentrate on achieving goals, not advocating policy. As Patrick Henry observed, a public assertion of the desire for peace does not necessarilypromote peace. Actions that work toward peace are more important than rhetoric supporting that goal. At times, an arms build-up rnight be more conducive to peace than a rally or a speech that proclaims a heartfelt desire for peace. The hortatory school views advocacyas a critical element of foreign policy, holding that "words speak louder than actions." The unstated premise of the hortatory school is that the conduct of foreign policy is not as important as the

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expression of foreign policy. The best participate in such regimes because in way to influence events is to come down their casethese treaties are less restricting. "right" rhetorically on the side of an It is difficult to imagine a defense minisissue. Passionate expressions of beliefs ter of any country commenting, "So Sweb e c o m e s u b s t i t u t e s f o r p o l i c i e s t h a t den will no longer use land mines, eh? might turn those beliefs into reality. That does change things." Economic historian Joseph SchumDespite these differences, the two peter touched on the hortatory-conseschools are not mutually exclusive.A horquentialist split in Capitalkm,Socialism,and tatory approach to an issue can reinforce Demouag, in which he discussed the a consequentialist policy. For example, diminished senseof reality and responsithe United States can call for Russia to bility encountered in dealing with matbetter safegrrard its nuclear materials, ters remote from one's direct experience. backing up its rhetoric with practical

I It iS diffiCUlt to irnaginea.{efqnseminister of any country commeniing, "So Swedenw"ill no lohser use land mines, Eh? That does changelhings. "

People who dedicate their lives to foreign policy tend to belong to the consequentialist school, whereas those rernoved from day-to-day policy manag'ement usually belong to the hortatory school. Statesalso illustrate the hortatory-consequentialist divide. Small and middle powers such as Sweden, which have only a modest ability to influence events, typically prefer the hortatory approach. In a sense they are free to say whatever they like, becauseno major powers are obliged to listen to them. Countries that have the power to pursue their policy goals-such as the United States-tlpically favor the consequentialist school. America tends to take a more cautious approach to international regimes like the Ottawa teaty on Landmines, the Comprehensive Test Ban Tieaty, or the International Court ofJustice becausethese regimes could constrain American ability to act in the international arena. Smalier powers can freely

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inducements, such as paying for the safeguards. Examples of the successfulcombination of hortatory and consequentialist approaches is U.S. foreign policy under the Kennedy and Reagan administrations. Under Reagan, anti-Communist rhetoric was backed up with concrete action. Speaking to the broader public and morally justifring America's aggressive defense policy was a hortatory device, but it was consistent with the consequentialist approach ofweapons build-ups and direct challenges to Soviet initiatives. More often, however, these two schools are at odds. Throughout the IggOs, we frequently saw a hortatory-consequentialist dichotomy over issuessuch as trade, human rights, and the IMF's role in economic restructuring. This tension often leads to meaningful debate, but it can also lead to unintended negative consequences. The I995-96 U.S.-Japan automobile trade negotiations are a casein

LAVrN Politics & Diplomacy point. During negotiations, the United States remained committed to numerical targets for its imports to Japan. This inflarned Japanese public opinion and made cornpromise extremely difficult for the Japanese political leadership, despite their acceptanceof the need to open the Japanese automotive market. Thus, while America's use of hortatory tactics appealed to the domestic audience, in this case it actually worked against the consequentialist goal of opening trade. This split between the consequentialism of practitioners and the hortatory approach of non-practitioners causes considerable tension between the executive and legislative branches. The executive branch favors the consequentialist approach, where action bacls rhetoric, due to its direct control over foreign policy. On the other hand, the hortatory tactic is particularly appealing to members of the U.S. Congress, who have limited power to shape foreign policy. Since all they can do is influence it at the rnargin, why not at least advocate the cause close to the hearts of constituents? The result of this legislative-executive split is tension, frustration, and at times, utter disdain. As Henry Adams noted in TheEducation of Hen"The Adams, Secretary of State exists only ry to recognize the existence of a world which Congress would rather ignore; of obligations which Congress repudiates whenever it can; of bargains which Cong:ress distrusts and tries to turn to its advantageor to reject." There is no solution per se to the hortatory-consequentialist dichotomy, nor is one necessary. The split does, however, place a burden on the foreign poiicy leadership to operate at times without public support. The greatest challenge to foreign-policy makers is to pursue an active, consequentialist fbreign policy in the face

of public opposition, and the greatest danger arises when the executive branch chooses to acquiesceto the public's lack of interest rather than lead on foreign policy issues.We should expect that the more removed one is from day-to-day foreign poliry responsibility, the rnore likely one is to adopt a hortatory approach. But when the executive branch sharesthe public's lack of interest in foreign policy matters and begins to follow a hortatory approach, it rnoves away frorn its consequentialist duties, emphasizing only foreign policies with domestic political repercussions, and neglecting those with less immediate domestic repercussions. Important issues that do not attract public attention, such as nuclear proliferation in South Asia or the political stability of Indonesia, can fall by the wayside. The need for executive branch leadership on foreign policy issues is particularly pertinent in shaping U.S. bilateral relations and attaining long-range goals with emerging or latent powers such as China, India, and Russia. The public, and to a lesser extent Congress, is more responsive to short-term foreign policy issues. Only the executive branch has the capability to look ten to fifteen years down the road and formulate more forward- Iooking foreign policies. Public lack of enthusiasm for a proposed policy must not bear the blame for failures in U.S. foreign policy management. Foreign-policy failures stem from the refusal of the political leadership to pursue the right policy regardless of political cost. For lay people to hold a superficial view of foreign policy is acceptable. It is when political leaders succumb to the impulses of episodic shifts in public opinion and epherneral congressional sentiment that the drift to policy mismanagement begins.

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In Search of Environmental Leadership Richard A. Matthew

Test Ban." 999: If you ~ation,

"o.frri()re

In spite of well-intentioned efforts to green foreign policy, the United States is widely regarded by the international community as an obstacle to advancing the global environ mental agenda. From Norway to China, America is seen as a country that undermines multilateral efforts, retreats from strong initial positions, fails to meet international obliga tions, and points an accusing finger at the developing world while doing little to restrain an economy based on unprece dented and highly wasteful consumption. It is hard for the United States, as the world's only superpower, to support international environmental initiatives when Americans are preoccupied with maintaining wealth, power, and authority. The United States should lead as it has led in the past: with boldness and inspiration. But leadership in a multilateral world requires team play. And here, the United States has thus far proved inadequate to the task.

Richard A. Matthew i, Assistant Professor of Social Ecology and Interna tional Relations at the Univcl'sity of Califor nia, I rvinc. and author of the forthcoming work. PollflC.l Dlulded, .Alotion Ver.:.:us State in World

AU''''''

Post-Rio Depression. Disappointment with U.S. envi ronmental policy became widespread at the 1992 Eart.h Sum mit held in Rio deJaneiro, Brazil. The Cold War was over, and Americans were talking enthusiast.ically about a "New World Order. The 1987 Brundtland Report, "Our Common Future," had convinced much of the world that international Winter/Spring 2000

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cooperation on an aggressiveand binding environmental agenda was crucial for the future of humankind. As the world's richest country, biggest polluter, and Cold War victor, the United States was expected to play a leadership role in designing and implementing this agenda. Instead, in the negotiations leading up to Rio, the United States unilaterally gutted the Frarnework Convention on Clirnate Change, which looked to set binding targets and timetables in the fight against climate change. In Rio, President Bush kept his promise not to sign the Convention on Biological Diversity. Described by many as the skunk at the picnic, the United States seemed to have singlehandedly crushed the first post-ColdWar opportunity to chart a new course for the planet based on principles of environmental sustainability, social justice, and international cooperation. The United States generally accepts the profound challenge of environmental degradation around the world, but Americans are also deeply satisfied with the statusquo. In tgg|, the United States Department of State released "Environmental Diplomacy," a sugary report stressingAmerican commitment to global cooperation on internationai and regional environmental problems. Meanwhile, the United States has steadfastly refused to ratify four out of the five major environrnental agreements that became international law in this decade: the Basle Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes(t992); the Convention on Biological Diversity (r9gg); the Convention to Combat Desertification (1996); and the Kyoto Protocol to the Climate C h a n g eC o n v e n t i o n ( r 9 9 8 ) . Alrnost every country believes that compromise enables important agree-

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ments to corne into force and invoives taking risks commensurate with the urgency of environmental degradation. Not so for the United States, whose objections are based on technical points rather than the spirit of these accords. Arnericans desperately want to view environmental change either as a manageable technical problem amenable to scientific and market-based solutions, or as a security issue solved by containrnent s t r a t e g i e s .T h e y c a n n o t e n v i s i o n s t r a t e gies that call into question a privileged position in the world or the institutions, beliefs, practices, and values that have led to the current arrangement. The United States thus has difficulty accepting the logic of argrrments that link environrnental rescue to social change. This, more than anything else, makes it hard to accept treaty constraints on behavior as other nations do. Americans think of themselves as exceptional and can even accept the fact that it's lonely at t h e t o p . B u t m i n i m u m p a r t i c i p a t i o ng o e s a iong way toward enhancing the persuasion and consensus building that are essential to effective global leadership in a multilateral world.

Born to Lead? In the not-too-distant past, the United States led in the environmental realm. Having played an important role in the conservation movement of the mid-nineteenth centr.y, the United States inspired the global environmental movement that emerged in the r96os. Nineteenth-century Americans helped define the conservation movement with appeals to virtue and nobility. In t864, George Perkins Marsh w'rote Man and Nature,a thoughtful pioneering treatise on the causes and consequences of humangenerated environrnental degradation. In

M A T T H E WS C i e n C&eT e C h n O l O g y

t8/2, Congress created the world's first national park, Yellowstone, through a piece of legislation that countries would emulate worldwide. Twenty years later John Muir founded the Sierra Club, an early signal that the private sector would be heavily involved in safeguarding nature. The naturalist writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, the forestry studies of Charles Spragrre Sargent and Gifford Pinchot, and the political activities of Theodore Roosevelt and William Temple Hornaday further contributed to a potent and distinctly American version of conservationism. In the rg6os the United Statesplayed an influential and constitutive role in the emergence of a new, global environmental movement. Indeed, Rachel Carson's SiientSpring,published in 1962, is widely used as a marker for the advent of contemporary environmentalism. In the early lglos, hundreds of thousands of Americans turned out to celebrate Earth Day. The Environrnental Protection Agency was established, becoming a model for much of the world. Congress passedrigorous air and water quality legislation. Hundreds of environmental non-governmental organizations, such as Friends of the Earth, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the Natural Resources Defense Council were created. The United States even supported the UN's environmental initiatives at Stockholm in r!J2, including the crea t i o n o f a n e x p e n s i v en e w o r g a n i z a t i o n , the UN Environrnent Program. During this period, American intellectuals proved tremendously creative in developing analytical and normative frameworks for discussing and assessing environmental problems. Garrett Hardin's concept of the "tragedy of the commons." Donella Meadows's "limits

to growth" thesis, the writings of Paul andAnne Ehrlich on population trends, and Barry Commoner's notion of "flawed technology" provided environrnental discourse with ideas that remain influential to this day. Vice President Gore rnust have felt that he was building on a venerable and winning tradition when he penned Earthin the Balanceand then made the environment a prorninent election issue in rgg2. After all, here was an agenda that had deep roots in American culture, that was due for a policy upgrade after the lackluster performance of the I98os, and that would be well received abroad because it was good for the entire world. Or so it seemed.

Tasmanian Al. In the annalsof American politics, Al Gore has been the Thsmanian Devil of en'rironrnental foreign policy initiatives. Working with a handful of supporters including Tirnothy Wirth, Eileen Claussen, Melinda Kimble, and Sherri Goodrnan, Gore has pressured the Departrnents of Defense and State and the CIA to integrate environmental concerns more fully into their activities. In Igg2, he instigated the Medea project, which paired intelligence a n a l y s t sw i t h c i v i l i a n s c i e n t i s t s t o a s s e s s the environrnental value of current and archived satellite imagery. Responding to Robert Kaplan's r9g{ article, "The Coming Anarchy," Gore established the Thsk Force on State Failure. After its initial report was presented, the vice president pushed for a second phase focusing on the environmental aspects of crisis, war, and other disasters. In response to Gore's demands, the CIA established an Environmental Security Center tasked to track environmental trends that might generate threats to U.S. interests or dernands for

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humanitarian aid, and to provide imagery and analytical services to organizations involved in environmental rescue activities. Similarly, during the r99os, the Department of Defense expandedits commitment to environmental security well beyond efforts to clean up basesand reduce pollution and waste. Under the guidance of Sherri

world's population. And Gore was the driving force behind the restructuring of U.S. foreign policy announced by then Secretary of State Warren Christopher in rgg6. It is true that most of the specific actions Christopher prornisedincluding an annual report on environmental priorities, partnerships with the private sector, and a multilateral confer-

Despitethis whirlwindof activity, the environrnental agenda of the current administration is resisted at home and disappoints abroad. Goodman and Gary Vest, the Pentagon into its integrated the environment operational concept of preventive defense, devoted considerable resources to studying the relationship between environmental change and conflict, and cooperated with militaries around the world to analyze and address serious environmental problems. Through military-to-military contact programs and high-level conferences organized by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and the At-y War College, defense specialists used the environrnent to encourage dialogue and build mutually beneficial relationships with counterparts from the former Soviet bloc and the Pacific Basin region. Vice President Gore himself has been closely associatedwith a series of highprofile bilateral commissions and common agendas signed with Canada, the Ukraine, South Africa, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Russia, Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Australia, and Mexico-a select group of countries that together hold more than half of the

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ence on strengthening compliance with law-have international environmental been abandoned as too costly. The Regional Environmental Hub Program, however, was implemented, and twelve hubs are now operational around the world. More importantly, having senior officials speak forcefully about the environrnent has done much to underscore to the rest of the world the continuing importance of this issue in Arnerican foreign policy. Despite this whirlwind of activity, the environmental agenda of the current administration is resisted at home and disappoints abroad. No amount of scientific probability, engineered solutions, and economic modeling will substitute for tough decisions based on social values, vision, and inspiration. New agencies, studies, and agreements do not compensate for the U.S. failure to ratifr important multilateral treaties, push for binding timetables and targets, or help developing countries grow in environmentally sustainable ways. The United States may be busy, but it is not

t v A r r H E W S c i e n c e& T e c h n o l o g y to (or even instead of) beefing up militarT capabilities. Although security specialists were accustomed to thinking about threat and r,'ulnerability in the context of certain M u d d l e d T h i n k i n g . T h e c i t yo f environmental concerns, their focus had Washington feasts on new ideas, and been on problems such as rnaintaining environmental issues have proven an access to scarce resources abroad and exceptionally fertile landscape for the protecting soldiers from exotic diseases. propagation of originai concepts, sce- T h e v e r y b r o a d n o t i o n o f s e c u r i t y narios, strategies, and policy-driven defined in environmental terrns was of solutions. But much of the world finds limited interest to most of the security the ever-changing swarm of ideas anicommunity until the arrival in the early mating the policy process in Washington r99os of more explicit linkages between to be confusing. Moreover, some of these environmental scarcity and violent conideas have been perceived as potentially flict. Suddenly, impassioned prothreatening; others are seen as camounouncements by politicians such as flage for status-quo-or-iented policies. Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the effect that And despite much discussion, many future wars would be over water, Washington insiders are equally unsure appeared to be substantiated by a growing of what rnany of the new ideas signifr. body of academic research that reached The concept of environmental security is policymakers through the drarnatic prose a good illustration of the rnuddled thinkofJessica Mathews and Robert Kaplan. ing that permeates Washington policyGore and his supporters began to rnaking circles. this linkage aggressively. prornote In the post-Cold War ela, linking Indeed, many of the initiatives noted in e n v i r o n m e n t a n d s e c u l i t y s e e m e d a the previous section were pur-suedunder straightforward way for the Clinton the rubric of "environmental security." administration to entice Congress to act As a framework for foreign policy, howin an area in which it otherwise had little ever, "environmental security" is woefulinterest. Eager policyrnakers thus began ly inadequate. framing the environment as a security First, the phrase "environrnental secuissue. Scholars, environmentalists, and rity" is vague, and it is often unclear as to journalists had been suggesting such what policymakers mean when they use it. linkages between the environment and Is it about protecting the environment? securitysince the Ig7Os. In most cases, Is it about ensuring that all of the linkage was made as part of an arguhumankind has fair access to environment that pollution, disease, poverty, rnental goods and services? Or is it about and hunger were as threatening as civil protecting the environmental interests of violence and war to the well-being of the United States?In the United States,a most people on the planet. Hence indilively debate rages over these definitional viduals such as Lester Brown, Richard issues. Outside the United States, the Ullmann, and Norman Myers argued language of security has conjured images that maximizing security required applyof threat and confrontation, of intervening resourcesto these problems as well as tion and the use of force, and of one side doing the sort of things the rest of the world wants it to do. rvfhy is there such a discrepancy between the world's expectations and America's perfor-mance?

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winning at the expense of the other. Other countries are especially concerned about being victims of a baitand-switch game in which they are lured to the table with hints about the security of humankind, only to discover that the policies being formulated are designed to protect U.S. interests while shifting c o s t sa b r o a d . Second, a fair amount of the phrase's policy appeal is based on the ostensible connection between environmental scarcity and conflict. Kaplan, drawing on the research of Thomas HomerDixon, predicted that the "environment would be the national security issue of the twenty-first century," and used the powerful irnage of a "coming anarchy" to intimate what was in store for all of us. He'd seen the signs in West Africa; Clinton and Gore saw them in Haiti; the die was cast. But very quickly a slew of criticism indicated persuasively that the relationship was overstated. The dire predictions were largely without foundation, and the policy effort was hence misguided. Over the years, policymakers have confused people by continuing to appeal to this image while simultaneously expressing doubts about its validity. Finally, elsewhere in the world there is a strong predilection for the concepts of environmental justice and sustainable development. It has been unclear to many people whether "environmental security" supplements these concepts or replaces them with an agenda that has little to do with the eradication of poverty and closing the gap between North and South. Other countries worry that an environmental discourse painstakingly constructed over decades is being muscled aside by one more compatible with America's "us versus them" worldview.

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In spite of these concerns, certain aspects of environmental security have been well received in much of the world. In particular, many countries share America's fear that violent conflict related to resource scarcity is likely to escalate in the future. And many are interested in "greening" the military, making its behavior lessenvironmentally destructive and harnessing its skills to tasks such as reforestation. Nevertheless, people at home and abroad are not sure what "environmental security" means; some of the stronger claims seem to have little empirical support; and its relationship to other concepts such as sustainable development is unclear. It is not surprising that "environmental security" has inspiredmore talk than action. The sarne muddled thinking is evident in the State Department's rapidly disintegrating plan to incorporate the environment into foreign policy. Announced by Secretary of State'Warren Christopher in I996, the proposed integration included four parts, issuing regular reports on America's environmental priorities, hosting a global conference on strengthening compliance with international environmental agreements, establishing a network of regional environmental hubs, and promoting a range of cooperative partnerships with other countries and with the private sector to tackle specific problems. Something, however, was noticeably lacking from this new agenda, vision. Without a clear expression of how environmental issues fit in with our national interests and foreign policy objectives, an image that officials could use as the basis for setting new goals and m o d i l i n g t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s ,n o o n e w a ss u r e about how to proceed. What, in the final analysis,were we trying to achieve through this four-pronged strategy?What did this

MArrHEW Science &Technology integration mean for conventional activities like trade negotiations?

isa There Cultureof Uncertainty. pervasive assumption in the United States that saving the environment requires economic sacrifice. Since American enterprise has yet to pioneer a full toolbox of earth-saving technologies, rescuing the environment must not be profitable. Green business strategies do not add to the bottom line. And if environmental problems are really so urgent that we must sign on to binding global initiatives, it then stands to reason that to friendly achieve an environmentally economy the United States will need to sacrifice economic growth, produce less, and consume less-all at greater cost. Internationally, the United States will be

property owners and citizens. One hundred fifty years later, U.S. efforts led to victory in two world wars. The United States unden^rrote the costs of reconstruction in Europe, set up the GATT, World Bank, and United Nations, and hastened the process of decolonization. The United States brought the Soviet Empire to its knees. The very string of successesthat carried the United States from the margins of the world to center stage has created a political culture that is now essentially administrative in orientation, concerned with fine-tuning conventional processes, and resolving technical problerns rather than tackling new challenges. Consequently, when a vast, cornplex, pervasive problern arises, like environmental degradation, the instinct of the Ameri-

At the endof the long green duy, the world

might be a better place-{-oi everyone except the United States. forced to absorb the bulk of the cost of saving the planet while at the same tirne transferring technology to other countries. The United Stateswould, in effect, be unilaterally giving up its competitive advantage. At the end of the long green day, the world might be a better placefor everyone except the United States. Americans thus have a hard time accepting global environmental initiatives that are perceived to challenge Arnerica's current privileged status. This inability to grapple with complicated new challenges stems directly from America's very successas a nation to date. In tJJ6, the United States started the revolution that raised people in the Western world frorn serfs and subiects to

can political system is to deyise and apply incremental solutions through known and trusted tools, the market and the law, Americans do not expect to have to probe rnore deeply and critically into nationa^ values, beliefs, practices, and institutions. The United States has been there and done that. Francis Fukuyama has argrred that the big debates over the ideal form of political and economic arrangernents have ended, with America's onceradical proposals emerging victorious. Given such rhetoric, how difficult might it be for American politicians to respond to a dramatic new challenge to existing arrangernents? And how much easier instead is it to fragment, discredit, and delay the environmental agenda?

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In a democracy, however, the buck stops with the citizens, not with the president or members of Congress. Poll after poll confirms that Americans want a healthy environment and expect the government to enact legislation that will satisfy this desire. Support weakens, however, when a healthy environment is linked t o s i g n i f i c a n r l yh i g h e r p r i c e s o r t o v i r t u ally any forrn of inconvenience. Support for the environrnent pales outright when forced to compete against other dernands on resources, such as education and crime prevention. Americans talk the talk but don't walk the walk. The Clinton-Gore rhetoric has numbed any senseof personal responsibility by creating the impression that environmental problems have been addressed through tough commandand-control strategies. Adding to the problem, many Americans do not really understand the stakes here; in fact, as a nation, Americans have profound misconceptions about the causesand consequences of pollution, land modification, and resource scarcity. Scientific knowledge is not definitive and is often confused; appreciation of economic and health issuesis not much better. Americans are thus easily alarmed, but not given to researching and discussing the things that cause us to be alarmed. Public uncertainty begs for leadership.

decide to provide leadership, the following three steps would make a good start. First, reframe environmental issues in terrns of equity, culture, and livelihood. Everyone seels outcornes that are fair, culturally sensitive, and that put food on the table. We should limit the concept of environrnental security to issues pertaining to conflict and the role of the military. Second, lead by example. The founding fathers envisioned the United States as a beacon of light that would demonstrate to a skeptical world that democracy is not just a viable form of government, but the best form of government. America should now demonstrate to the world that environrnental design, environmen -

tal planning, environmental education, environmental accounting, and so on, are not just viable practices, but best practices. To do this we must set a few challenging goals for ourselves-practical goals that bring out our best qualities, our ability to be persevering. crearive, pragrnatic, entrepreneurial, and daring. Third, identifr a concrete and visible way to irnprove the global environmentand pursue it. The United States will continue to inch forward on the environmental agreements that are under negotiation or already in place. But to justify American exceptionalism, the United States should do something exceptional. Eliminate polio, tuberculosis, or malaria. Develop renewable and inexpensive forms of generating and world's the only superpower, the United applying energy. Stamp out food insecuStates may be irrevocably out of touch rity. Build water catchment and purificawith the rest of humankind. It may well tion systemsfor the poor. And don't wait that middle NGOs be powers and will for sorneone else to act first or assume have to take the initiative here and perthe costs. These are all challenging objechaps on every new environmental issue tives, fraught with hardship, but they are that is placed on the global agenda. Nevnot beyond America's rneans. Indeed, e r t h e l e s s , s h o u l d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s such activity is the stuff of leadership.

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TheStrange Death oftheUSSR

ing of the new world order, it pays to remember that no one remotely foresaw how the old one might end, and no one Reaiew William Wohlforth fv has produced a compelling explanation of its demise even after the fact. The Peur HoTTANDER. PoliticalWII and Personal books under review, Paul Hollander's Belief' TheDeclineand Fallof SouietCommunism. PoliticalWII and PersonalBelief and Mikhail New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999, Gorbechev's Gorbacheu' On M1 Countyandthe World, offer some clues-not only to the 3 5 4P P .$ 3 5 ' o o . Soviet collapse itself, but also to the failMrrnerr GonsA.cHnv. Gorbacheut On M1 ure to predict or explain it. Countryandthe l4lorld.tans. George ShrivWhat startled onlookers and sparked er. New York, Columbia University the new wave of optirnisrn about world P r e s s2,o o o, 2 7 +p p . $ z g . g 5 . politics was the simple fact that the Soviet rulers chose not to fight to preserve The collapse of the Soviet Empire their state and its status as a world powb e t w e e n 1 9 8 9 a n d r 9 9 r i s t h e m o s t er. The reason scholars and policymakimportant geopolitical event of the last ers could not foresee the course that half-century. If history has ended, as events would take in r989-9r was not Francis Fukuyama famously argued, it has due to blindness to the material decline done so courtesy of the Soviet Union, of Soviet communisrn. They expected which graciously exited history-stage Soviet bloc elites to use force if necesleft-with hardly a whimper. As intellecsary to preserve their grip on power. As tuals and pundits line up to follow Paul Kennedy put it in r987-in words Fukuvama and pronounce on the meanfew would have questioned at the time:

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"There is nothing in the character or the tradition of the Russian state to suggest that it could ever accept imperial decline gracefully. " Paul Hollander, a sociologist at the University of Massachusettswho has written widely on cornmunism, seeks to explain why ruling elites in the Soviet Union and its satellites confounded e v e r y o n es e x p e c t a t i o n s ( i n c l u d i n g h i s own) and accepted decline so gracefully. He acknowledges that Soviet-style economies had been declining since the r97Os, but rightly points out that Soviet bloc regimes had ample coercive means to crush dissent and reestablish control had they been willing to spill blood. To be sure, any Soviet Tiananmen would have meant an end to financial credits from the West, a new Cold War, and sustained repression to exact further sacrifices from the populace. Communist true believers, Hollander argues, would not have thought twice about imposing such sacrifices. Why did that sense of self-assurance and entitlement to rule desert not just reformers like Gorbachev, but hard-liners in Moscow and Eastern Europe in r98g-gr? (After all, when hard-liners got a chance to show their mettle in August IggI, they too proved unwilling to issue orders to fire on protesters.) In searchof answers,Hollander examines the biographies of two dozen former high-ranking officials in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Marxist and Leninist ideologies, he finds, turn out to be the key. These alien, utopian, and profoundly false ideas inevitably produce human misery when put into practice. Those who run a communist system must perforce do evil. At some moment, this contradiction between utopian theory and immoral practice must produce a crisis of

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will. Hollander wants to know when and under what conditions this happened to former Soviet and Eastern European elites. This is a fascinating question, but it is extraordinarily hard to answer since it requires probing the innermost convictions of people who face strong incentives to justify their behavior to themselvesand to history. Hollander's main source is memoirs and interviews, which brings to mind Phillipe Petain's response when asked whether he intended to write his mernoirs. "Why should I write memoirs?" the French hero of World War I and villain ofVichy reportedly replied, "I have nothing to hide." It may be asking too much to expect straight answers to Hollander's question, which is essentially, "When did you realize that you had devoted your life to serving an evil, corrupt, dead-end system?" Hollander is well aware of these challenges and is careful in extracting firm conclusions. Still, some tentative generalizations emerge. Some members of the ruling elite lost faith in the system when it turned on them, such as when they were fired or mistreated by corrupt, mean or incompetent bosses. However, the most common cause of a declining will to power was, by far, learning about the material failings of the system. Usually, this involved two processes: learning about the realities of life in the West, and discovering how bad things truly were for normal citizens behind the Iron Curtain (which, for pampered members of the elite, was often the greater revelation). Slowly the system's growing inefficiency, against the backdrop of its manifold cruelties and inanities, corroded the confidence of those who led it. Of course, the true extent of the loss of will could only be known to them and to outsiders when circumstances dernanded tough-mind-

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edness. Mikhail Gorbachev unwittingly provided such a test when he tried to revitalize the system and thereby provoked its terminal crisis. Thus, Hollander neatly explains why the Soviet Empire collapsed, and why its collapse could not have been predicted. Hollander wants to make the case for the power of ideas, but his analysis falls short becauseit is mainly poor economic performance that caused most of his subjects to question their convictions in the first place. If communist ideas only lost their power when the economy turned sour, is there any need to place ideas in the forefront? A far stronger casefor the role of ideas in bringing the Soviet Empire down is made by Gorbachev

many, and other major stateshave turned away from new thinking in pursuit of narrow power interests. But Gorbachev remains convinced that he has history and world politics figured out. The reason for taking this book seriously is that Gorbachev faces strong incentives to portray himself in hindsight as a hard-headed realist. After all, he is constantly accusedby Russian nationalists of having been a Krernlin drearner who sold the Soviet Empire for a song. But here he plays right into their hands, affirming his faith in humanistic new thinking and a new world order based on a balance of interests and common values. Perhaps, just perhaps, this book (rrnllke his memoirs) sho*s the real Gor-

L t

It may hg asking too muchto expect straight answersto Hollander's question, which is e;Jgntially: "\Mhen did you. realize that you had devoted your life to servrn.g v an evil, corrupt, deall-end systern?" himself, though perhaps unintentionally. His latest book, Gorbacheu' On M1 Country and the World, is a collection of loosely connected ruminations in which Gorbachev argues that the socialist idea is alive and weli; that the Soviet Union could have been preserved by peaceful means; and that "new thinking" will triumph over power politics. lJnfortunately, Gorbachev is constantly disappointed by the realities he must confront. The socialist idea was hijacked by Stalin and millions died. Narrow-minded leaders like Boris Yeltsin defected from the Soviet Union in searchof personal power and enrichrnent. The United States, Ger-

bachev' an idealist and an optimist despite all, lecturing us on right and wrong, totally convinced of his views, supremely unconcerned by all the evidence to the contrary. The fact that the reins of Soviet power fell into the hands of this confident, idealistic, and optimistic man rnay hold the key to some of the puzzles that elude Hollander. For while Gorbachev was unambiguously unwilling to use large-scale violence to preserve the system, he was self-confident enough to embark on the extraordinarily risky reforms that sent the system into its terminal crisis. His deftness at Kremlin intrigue, coupled with his rhetorical

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ability to rationalize his reforms in the terms of Soviet ideology, were the critical ingredients that prevented reformer and hard-liner alike from seeing that the garne was up until it was nearly over. He managed to breathe enough life into the idealistic side of Soviet ideology to cany the Soviet Communist Party to its own self-destruction. Hence, by the time rnost of Hollander's subjects faced their crucial test of will-rgB9-9I-it was clearly too late to savethe system. Of course, it remains difficult to pin down the real Gorbachev. It is hard to reconcile the sometimes-tedious pontificator of these pages with the extraordinary figure who, intentionally or not, contributed more than any other individual to the peaceful demise of the Soviet Empire. Despite the thousands of pageshe has written since his retirement, he remains elusive, and the events of I9B9-9r remain fascinating but endless fodder for scholarly argarment. Hollander's book is a rewarding read. But it joins a long list of books on this subjectincluding some, like David Remnick's Lenin'sTomb, that are even more rewarding and entertaining for general readersthat raise more questions than they answer satisfactorily. As for Gorbachev's treatise, it contains clues about the rnan, but often seems clueless about the world in which he lives. Wohlfolth William i s A s s i s t a n tP r o l e s s o r a t t h e S c h o o l o f F o r e i g n S e r v i c e ,G e o r g e t o u n L l n i v e r s i t y .

AfricanMercenaries Reaieub7Herbert M. Howe 'Kryonr Arorr-Ferau Muserr ,lr.roJ. Feynur, eds. Mercenaries' An AfricanSecun! Dilemm a .P l u t o P r e s s ,r g g g , 3 2 o p p . $ 6 g . S S .

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The burgeoning private security business troubles many international affairs specialists who fear that the nation-state is losing its control of miliary coercion to private, profit-seeking forces. Mercenaries: An African SecuriltDilemmabegins by asking whether "rnercenaries [a.e] becoming the shock forces of corporate recolonisation 'necessary or, as some contend, a evil' in out-of-area conflict management in the post-Cold War arena." The book concludes that "mercenaries cannot be an alternative or a supplement to rnultilateral conflict management." This work's generally solid argrrrnents and wealth of new information contribute significantly t o t h e l i t e r a t u r e o n p r i v a t es e c u r i t y . Mercenaries, usually defined as foreign citizens fighting for a foreign cause for financial prirnarily gain, have African development plagued ever since they advanced the interests of foreign trading companies in the late r8oos. Africa's independence, which started in the late Igsos, continued to witness mercenary activity: Katanga and Biafra i n t h e I g 6 o s a n d R h o d e s i a( Z i m b a b w e ) in the rg/Os provide major examples. -War The end of the Cold has encouraged fighting in much of Africa, and foreign military specialists have recently displayed their increasingly specialized skills inAngola, the Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and elsewhere. African geopolitics have taken a sad twist, as states increasingly-and often unpredictably-fight each other. Against this background. mercenary companies market themselves as stabilizing forces protecting sovereign states, but are often affiliated with multinational mining companies. Executive Outcomes (EO), which temporarily helped to resolve military conflicts in Angola

W O HL F O R T H

AfricanMercenaries Reaieub7Herbert M. Howe 'Kryonr Arorr-Ferau Muserr ,lr.roJ. Feynur, eds. Mercenaries' An AfricanSecun! Dilemm a .P l u t o P r e s s ,r g g g , 3 2 o p p . $ 6 g . S S .

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Books and Sierra Leone, enjoyed a syrnbiotic relationship with a London-based mineral concern. This combination of foreign military and econornic power sparks worries that Africa may be entering a period of recolonization. Kevin O'Brien offers an overview of private security companies (PSCs) d".ing the decade. Case studies of recent rnercenary involvement include that of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone by Abdel-Fatau Musah and the "white legion" in the former Zaire by Khareen Pech. Alex Vines looks scathingly at the lack of respect for human rights and legal behavior displayed by mercenaries. Kofi Oteng Kufuor notes the significant limitations of the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Convention 'Funmi against mercenaries, while Olonisakin argues for greater regional control of PSCs. The appendices thoughtfully include UN and OAU staternents against rnercenaries. Eboe Hutchful, in a section that should have come earlier in the book, declares that the "African Security Dilemma, the attempt [by rulers] to strengthen internal security, also increases the power of 'strongrnen' within their security apparatus, and hence the threat to the ruler himself." One of the book's few weaknesses is that the contributors only infrequently place rnercenaries within this core dilemma. The book also fires a number of accusations at PSCs. Fayemi, a highly respected security analyst, maintains that "it is in the interest of the new mercenaries that the world rernains in a perpetual state of instability." The implication is that PSCs may wish to start or prolong conflict. Musah contends that the work of PSCs like EO and Sandline International "has pushed the debate

about the political recolonisation of Africa from the realm of fantasy to that of real possibility." Musah also correctly notes "the rnutations, rnergers and absorption of companies . . . are all part of strenuous ploys and decoys aimed at covering their trails and leading inquisitive eyesinto blind alleys." Suggested solutions include international campaigns to abolish the mercenary trade and for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the African Peoples and Human Rights Court to treat mercenary rnisconduct as violations of international law. The OAU will not play a leading role in such a carnpaign, given the difficulty of obtaining consensus and money from its fifty-three rnernbers. Fayerni argues that sub-regional cooperation "offer[s] the best hope for conflict management and preventive diplomacy in Africa . . . ." Olonisakin supports politically accountable regimes and better subregional military cooperation, maintaining that ECOMOG (a West African intervention force) probably prevented the entry of mercenaries into the Liberian civil war. The authors could have considered sorne other salient aspects of private security, notably the demand for mercenaries and recent changes within private security. Why does Africa continue to ernploy the "dogs of war"? Hutchful is right in asserting that insecure personal rulers have prevented the professionalization of their security forces; rulers such as Zait:e's Mobutu deliberately emasculated their own forces and hired rnercenaries who might prove more loya l . T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s u g g e s t sa p o s s i ble solution' More democratic regimes rnay lessen political unrest and encourage more competent armies-developments that would reduce opportunities

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for mercenaries. Fayemi, Olonisakin, and others correctly argue for more effective subregional security capability. Yet it is national militaries that will form the building blocks for such forces. Herbgrt M . H o w g i s R e s e a r c hP r o f e s s o r o f A f r i c a ' P o l i t i c sa t t h e S c h o o l o f F o r e i g n S e r v i c e ,C e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y . H i s u p c o m i n g b o o k o n A f r i c a n s e c u r i t yw i l l be published by Lynne Rienner.

ingly based on intangibles and brainpower," and manufacturing has been progressively moved offshore. Thus, the world is divided between "head" nations, which design products, and "body" nations, which manufacture them. Head and body statesbecome more and more interdependent as firms downsize and move their productive facilities offshore. This "interdependence of production," Rosecrance claims, is "far stronger than

an interdependence of trade." His conTheVirtualState& clusion is strong and confident' "The GlobalPolitics:Anotherrise of the virtual state thus inaug-uratesa new epoch of peaceful competition Illusion? Great among nations, promising a cooperative

Reuieub7Rlchard Mansbach

tr-ansition to the new millennium." Rosecrance'sargument fits squarely in Rrcrupn Rosncn-rNcr . TheRiseof theVirtual the liberal tradition that sees economic State'WealthandPouerin the ComingCenhg. progress bringing an end to interstate N e w Y o r k ' B a s i cB o o k s , 1 9 9 9 , 2 5 6 p p . violence. Its thesis recalls the work of $z6.oo. William James and Joseph Schumpeter who argrred that industrial capitalism "The operations of the virtual state and would make war and warriors obsolete. of nations concentrating on high-level Even more strongly, Rosecrance's work cannot but remind readers of Norman servicesare fundarnentally progressive," declares Richard Rosecrance near the Angell, whose prophetic and highly beginning of The Riseof the Vitual State. influential book fie Creat lllusion, pubThis claim sets the tone for this splenllshed before World War I, persuasively didly written, highly accessible, and argued that war among Europe's highly From industrialized stateshad become prohibimportant start book. genuinely to finish, Rosecrance is determinedly itively expensive owing to financial and u p b e a t a n d o p t i m i s t i c . H i s t o r y , h e commercial interdependence. believes, is going somewhere, driven by The declining importance of territory economic change in which commerce plays a central role in Rosecrance's arg'ufirst replaced territory as the main ment. The transition of statesfrom their s o u r c e o f p r o s p e r i t y a n d p o w e r , a n d mercantilist past through their industrial then yielded to a globalized economy and commercial stages until achieving "virtual" status has progressively reduced driven by knowledge and creativity. The theoretical perspective behind the importance of territory in global politics. Encouraged by the revolution in this argument is a step beyond the trading state that Rosecrance described in his microelectronic technology, factors of t9B6 book, TheRiseof theTradingState'Com- production in the virtual economy have merceand Conquest in the Modern World. T}r^e produced a "progressive emancipation economy of the virtual state is "increas- from land as a determinant of produc-

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tion and power." Statesincreasingly recognize that territory no longer provides m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t yo r e c o n o m i c p r o s p e r i t y . Whereas the seizure of land used to lead directly to increased wealth and power, the fact that this is no longer true reduces incentives to war. While there is much that is true in this argument, we should be wary about accepting it without reservation. Rosecrance's optimism is partly the result of his narrow view on the causes of war. "War," he declares, "has retained a place in international history because it enables one country to seize resources from another." Rosecrance curtly dismisses arguments that wars might have additional causes. It is difficult to accept his conclusion that the frequency of war will decline becausethe role of territory has declined. From Kosovo to Kashmir and from the Golan Heights to Chechnya, territorial disputes continue to threaten large-scalewar. Rosecrance, however, is too sophisticated to see peace as an inevitable outcome of the process he describes. He reviews what he calls "the conflict-asusual thesis" and concludes that war will continue in those caseswhere territory remains a major factor. He examines a variety of clairns about domestic and interstate conflict, admitting that there is significant potential for ethnic and classb a s e dd o m e s t i c c o n f l i c t s . Rosecrance asserts that in some instances, a "history of cornpetition for power among states does not generate confidence that major conflict can be avoided." He does, however, firmly reject the structural deterrninism of neorealism. Indeed, Rosecrance's argurnent here assumessornething of a constructivist face when he affirms that what states actually do "is a function of the

relationships they maintain with other nations." Thus, he declares that state interests and their sources of influence have changed dramatically. If, in fact, economic incentives become as detached from particular territorial basesas Rosecrance envisions, then the resulting fluidity in state objectives might make international interests quite malleable indeed. "The influence that twentyfirst-century countries seek is not nineteenth-century control," but is instead the influence to be gained by opening foreign markets. Having elaborated his theoretical perspective and its implications for global politics, Rosecrance turns his attention to the major players. Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thiwan are, for Rosecrance, prototypical virtual states. They have prospered with little or no territory by specializing in services at home and by investing in offshore production facilities, especially in China. By contrast, Japan, though pioneering the role of trading state, has not g'one as far as the United States in emphasizing services, moving production offshore, or, even more significantly, reimporting that production. Japan, he concludes, "has mastered half the revolution: it encourages flows outward, not flows inward." Rosecrance identifies the United States as the leader of the virtual revolution with Europe a close second. Russia and China remain at least partly territorial in outlook, yet even these casesfail to dampen his optimism. "The lesson of the new international economy," he declares,"should be that countries that have already achieved economic hegernony do not need to assert it militarily." This "should" is reminiscent of Angell. Frorn this liberal perspective, the European states of

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r9r4 should have known better but apparently did not. Certainly, the economic revolution described by Rosecrance givesgrounds for optirnisrn. It has been an unprecedented source of prosperity for many countries, yet it is not hard to imagine how major conflicts rnight erupt involving sorne of the world's lessliberal states:Russia, China, North Korea, Pakistan, Iraq, and so forth. (And as the U.S. Senate's refusal to ratiS' the Comprehensive Test Ban teaty and hesitation to pay Arnerica's debt to the United Nations should remind us, recognition of the superiority of economic over military competition and of high interdependence of virtual states is s c a r c ei n W a s h i n g t o na sw e l l . ) O n e s h o u l d hope that the world is going where Rosecrance thinls it is, but it is difficult to feel secure that it is doing so. Indeed, it is not a stretch to imagine the United States falling prey to isolationist and neomercantilist attitudes. Were that to happen, all bets are off. Indeed, neither Russia nor China poses as great a threat to Rose-

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crance's peaceful world of virtual statesas does the United States. Although he writes at length about the role of transnational corporations in creating a virtual world, they seem curiously devoid of autonomy. They are described as "the essential link between head nations and body nations" and as "transmission belts that provide for mutual influence between design nations and production nations," but they never assume a life of their own or play an independent role in global affairs. Needless to say, this seems to contradict the spirit of his broader arg\rment. The Riseof the Vitual Siote is more than a stimulating work of considerable theoretical rnerit. The clarity of its prose, its analysis of the historical evolution of the relationship between global economics and global politics, and its detail of contemporary case studies make the book an excellent candidate for a sophisticated primer in international political economy. Richard Mansbach lowa State Universitv.

i s P r o f e s s o ro f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c ea t

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In Search Land ofJhePrornised Hlumelo Biko It seems strange that only ten years ago, various laws in South Africa forbade me from engaging in the most simple activities: strolling along Cape Town's world famous beaches, shopping at certain malls, living in certain neighborhoods, and attending certain schools. I was viewed, by those kind enough to regard me as human, as a second-classcitizen. fMorse still, my experience was not unique, but shared among millions who suffered the atrocities of apartheid. Today, we have the freedom for which generations fought for years at a great expensei the liberation movement has delivered us to the "Promised

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HlumeloBiko i. o first year student in the MSFS program at Georgeto*,n fJniversi ty. He is the son of slain South African anti apartheid leader, Sr"^h-- R;L^

Land." Current political discourse regarding South Africa focuses on the famous W.H.A.M. ("Whut Happens After Mandela?") question. The African National Congress (ANC) has emerged as the governing party and must now undertake the formidable task of governing the Promised Land. The key to South Africa's future is whether post-Mandela leadership will be able to eradicate the legacyof apartheid. Equally important is whether the ANC can overturn the legacies of the antiapartheid movernent, particularly the distrust many black South Africans feel toward the country's political and legal institutions. For those who believe that great personalities shape the course of history, Mandela is their champion. Mandela is one of those individuals that makes "great man historians" srnile.

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His ability to confront and harmonize the system was legendary, and he will undoubtedly be considered one of the twentieth century's great freedom fighters. Mandela sowed the seedsof democracy as one of the few African leaders (I can only recall Julius Nyerere in Thnzania) who peacefully relinquished power, while establishing a code of conduct for future South African leaders. But Mandela would be the first to acknowledge that he is merely a personification of the South African struggle, and not the lone crusader as he is sometimes portrayed. To assume that Mandela's struggle was more acute than everyone else'swould be a mischaracterization. It is easy for South Africans to identif with Mandela because most of us have been through pains of equal magnitude, albeit under different circumstances. Thabo Mbeki is South Africa's future. What we have in the recently elected President Mbeki is a man who has made it his business to become South Africa's "Mr. Delivery, " for he knows that reelection depends upon his ability to improve the quality of life for South Africans. Mbeki must face the aftermath of apartheid and liberation. As a young and militant ANC member, Mbeki called for the youth and the black population at large to "make the townships ungovernable." This was part of the ANC's destabilization strategy, which worked in conjunction with other Liberation tactics such as sanctions and arrned struggle. The impact of these strategieson the black South African mentality are debatable, but it is clear from looking at the lawlessness in contemporary townships that the combined effects of oppress i o n a n d d e s t a b i l i z a t i o nc o n t i n u e t o p e r meate South African townships.

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I lived in a Cape Town township called Gugrrlethu, on a street renowned for vioIent confrontations between the youth and the police. During apartheid, the law prohibited the gathering of a substantial number (as fe* as twenty) of individuals, unless approved by law enforcement officials. In those times, comrades of the struggle died almost every day, and their funerals were supported by thousands of other comrades who would sing songs of liberation while ushering their fallen cornrade to his or her final resting place. The police would arrive, often shooting tear gas with little or no warning, and would then fire automatic weapons toward the mourners as a means of "crowd control." As a chlld, I rernernber the terror of seeing an army squad car loorning ominously at the end of the road. Although I had done nothing wrong and the car was not even chasing me, the mere glimpse of it triggered my instinctive reaction to run, almost resulting in a fatal accident with another car. This is the nature of most township experiences. Perhaps some have more gruesome tales, but the underlying mentality is the same: The law is your enemy; avoid those who enforce the law, or suffer the consequences. It comes as little surprise that police are not seen as being there "to protect and to serve" the people in South African townships, but instead are viewed as an oppressive force. How ironic, then, that the man given the task of mending this patchwork of unstable townships is Thabo Mbeki himself. Any stabilization measures Mbeki and the post-apartheid administration enact must focus on reducing crime in the society. Crime prevention, however, is troublesome in a country where people have traditionally mistrusted the legal system.

ViewfromtheGround Econornic disparities reinforce racial division. In Cape Town's wealthiest areas, such as Seapoint and Camps Bay, Ferraris and Porsches line the streets. But sadly, after a fifteen*minute northwesterly drivâ&#x201A;Ź, one arrives in one of the many ungovernable townships in South Africa, where gang violence, drugs, and malnutrition are prevalent. Although apartheid has been abolished, residual consequences rnanifest themselves daily. Most of the faces in those Ferraris and Porsches are white faces, and all of the faces in the poor townships are black faces. Thus, one can legitimately inquire as to whether much has changed in South Africa. The obvious response is that now blacks have the freedom to live this extravagant lifestyle. But this freedom can yield little when most black South Africans remain rnired

defeating characteristics in such ernpowerment. In South Africa, a majority of the population was discriminated against by a minority purely on the basis of race. In post-apartheid South Africa, the previously rnarginalized majority rnust be empowered, even if sornetirnes at the expense of the privileged rninority. Governrnent and srnall- to medium-sized black empowerrnent groups have been charged with this task. The few that do from prosper these empowerrnent schemes accumulate a disproportionate amount of wealth. And because the new elites now have more to lose, the temptation to hinder the redistribution of wealth is great. It is encouraging that President Mbeki has waged a personal war on poverty, crime, and corruption. What remains to be seen is how his government

FreedOmCan yield utttewhenrnostblack South Africans rernain rnired in poverty. in poverty. White South Africans benefited so much from apartheid econornically that it is difficult-if at all possiblefor the rest of the population to catch up. But an even greater danger looms on the not-so-distant horizon' the rising black elite further marginalizing the rest of the population in the name of "black empowerrnent." This is a group characterized by politicians-turned-businessmen, exiled citizens who have returned with superior qualifications, and the lucky few who were able to prosper under the apartheid regime because of personal attributes of one kind or another. At face value there is nothing wrong with this new class. But further analysis shows some fundamentally self-

will react to his calls and how they will carry out his mandate. These are the challenges that face the governors of this Promised Land. For all of the strides that we have taken as a country, many more remain. Recently, on a flight to Johannesburg, I sat next to a child and his mother. In the course of our discussion, I discovered that this white South African family was planning to permanently leave the country and relocate to the United States. This struck me as particularly disturbing, that a rnother could uproot her child from school at the age of thirteen and face an uncertain existence in the United States rather than endure the growing pains of their mother country.

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This sentiment has been echoed elsewhere. Last year, TheMail and Guardian,a weekly newspaper in South Africa, quoted some black kids from Soweto as saying that they would "rather have a white president, because they felt that whites are smarter and more honest than blacks, and would thus be able to do a better job of running the country than a black president would." The comments of these children are ironic, considering that Soweto is the Johannesburg township famous for the student uprisings in tgl6 that arguably represented the climactic rnoment of the Black Consciousness movement. Their comrnents also reflect a deeply ingrained racism. Apartheid has succeededin convincing many in South Africa that blacks are an inherently inferior race. Much will have to be done by the educational system to rescue children from buying into the old myths and perpetuating them through under-perforrnance. Regardless of race, the fears that we face about the future of South Africa are

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real. Yet it is a sign of closed-mindedness when a society believes that a transfer of power from a white racist governrnent to a rnore democratic and proportionally representative government will endanger the future of its citizens. Such a shift in public opinion is a result of a lack of positive examples of good governance in Africa. South Africa has a prime opporunity to become one such example. Good governance, however, does not mean a suppression of certain historical truths. The swiftness with which the wrongs of the last two decades were swept under the carpet has resulted in South Africa's prematurely reaching what is, in essence,a false senseof reconciliation. It will be critical for the nation-building strategy to include new history curricula geared at informing children about the true history of the country, regardless of how uncomfortable it is for them to learn it. Only through strong leadership and honest education will South Africa truly become the Promised Land.

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Cord Meyer In Septernber Igg{,, I became Chief of the International Organizations Division of the Central Intelligence Agency (Ctn;, and with it inherited the responsibility for the Agency's relationship with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. At that time, both radio stations forrned part of the operations covertly funded by the ClA. Although much has been written about the radio stations' unique effort to communicate across the Iron Curtain, the nature of the twentyyear relationship between the CIA and the stations rarely has been described accurately. In retrospect, the approval to fund Radio Free Europe broadcasts to occupied Eastern Europe and subsequently Radio Liberty broadcasts to Russia was one of CIA Director Allen Dulles's most critical decisions in the struggle against communism. As a private citizen, Dulles had been an original founding mernber of the Free Europe Committee. He had many personal acquaintanceson the boards of trustees of both that cornmittee and the Radio Liberty Comrnittee, which was forrned in r95r with confidential ClA funds by a group of American citizens at the governrnent's instigation. It was not until i9lr that the widely held belief that these two organizations received most of their funds from the CIA was officially confirrned by Republican Senator Clifford Chase of NewJersey. As a result, Congress terminated all CIA funding for the radio stations and arranged for their continued exis-

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tence by open appropriations. The stations survived the transition. Throughout the following two decades, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty proved effective in keeping their mass audiences in the Soyiet Union and Eastern Europe informed of the dissident activity that swept these countries in the wake of the Helsinki Declaration of I975. Dulles's confidence that the radio stations could spark dissent in the Soviet bloc played a decisive role over the years in ensuring their survival and expansion. For instance, in the early Ig$Os I first proposed to build a transmitter site in Spain for Radio Liberty broadcasts to the Soviet Union (at the heary cost of $5 million). Dulles answered that there was little evidence of any substantial dissident opinion behind the monolithic facade of the regime's control. However, he had recently finished reading an Agency study

the radios convinced Congressional committees to fund the broadcasts. By the end of the rg{os I regarded the triumphant extension of Soviet-directed comrnunist rule into other countries as a development that would only strengthen the Soviet system at horne and lead to the gradual isolation of the United States. In my opinion, the United Statesneeded to demonstrate with patient firmness that Stalin's police state was not exportable and that a cornmunist-dominated world was not a historical inevitability. Arnerican-sponsored broadcasts would provide the best avenue toward that end. During the Cold War, both sides recognized that information played a huge psychological role. I had become increasingly mindful of the danger posed by the Soviet regime's determination to completely control access to information. Strict travel restrictions, censorship of all

During the COld War bothsides recosrrized. that information played a huge psychologicil role. which demonstrated that the Soviets had made great strides in eliminating illiteracy and in improving technical training available to Soviet citizens. Dulles regarded this as the very basis upon which the radios could succeed. I remernber Dulles stating that the Soviet people were no longer an "uneducated peasantry." Despite the narrowness of the Soviet education system, he believed that it was bound to stimulate the imagination and curiosity of millions of citizens. Dulles concluded that they would inevitably begin to ask questions and then listen to foreign broadcastswhen the dusty answers of the regime left them unsatisfied. In the end, Dulles's determination and faith in

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incoming mail, and total control of all i n t e r n a l m e d i a g ' a v ec o m m u n i s t r e g i m e sa monopoly on what their citizens were told about events both in the bloc and the outside world. Breaking through this curtain of censorship was an essential step toward reducing the threat of a managed, monolithic public opinion. Securing the United States' vital national interests required the emergence of civil societies in authoritarian regimes around the globe. By broadcasting short-wave programs in foreign languages prepared by highly competent exiles, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty played a critical role that eventually broke the communist grip on both

A LoohBacl< Eastern Europe and Russia. Crucial to this successwas the early decision to make the news reports as objective and accurate as possible and to concentrate coverage on internal developments within the bloc not covered by the Voice of America or the BBC. I believe that the journalistic accuracy of the stations was relatively well known behind the bloc, and the communist governments tried to counteract this through a variety of efforts. Psychological warfare was rampant. Contrary to persistent Soviet allegations that exiles working for the radios were being used as CIA agents, this was simply not the case.At the Agency, we recognized that it would have been foolishly shortsighted to expose the radios to the type of attacls made possible by the apprehension of a single spy behind the curtain. Nonetheless, the Soviets routinely infiltrated the staffs and controlled double agents, who would pretend to defect with loud accusations that they had been hired as CIA spies while working for the stations. Although the Radio staff did not engage in covert intelligence work, they openly collected vast amounts of information about their target countries. The CIA maintained control over content by formulating general policy guidelines, which were supplemented by daily meetings to determine the handling of specific news items. This cornpromise agreement led to a productive partnership between exile talent and American policy advisers, which made the radio broadcasts widely popular on the other side of the Iron Curtain. At the same time, great care was taken to assure objectivity and to avoid any attempted news manipulation for propaganda purposes. I can remember that even in the case of the tgg6 Hungarian Uprising, we avoided exaggerating the significance of the

revolt. The Radio staff consistently met the challenge of upholding its standard of objective reporting in the face of the most complex emergencies. Finally, the stations had to deal with continued attempts by Soviet and Eastern European secret police to intimidate exile staffs, sabotagethe installations, and exacerbate friction between the stations and the host governrnents. This campaign of harassrnent ranged frorn the ludicrous to the deadly. In West Germany, two Radio Liberty exiles were murdered under mysterious circumstances, and suspicion fell on two Soviet agents who disappeared behind the Iron Curtain during the mid-rggos. A Russian colonel confessed that part of his assignment had been to "silence" Wanda Bronska, a former communist working for Radio Free Europe. The KGB and the satellite secret serwicesinfiltrated the Radio staffs in order to identify exile personnel and take reprisal actions against rnembers of their families who remained behind the Curtain. Ridiculous and botched attacks included attempts to poison the salt in the Radio Free Europe cafeteria and to blow up transmission balloon sites. The Russians also tried to smuggle a doctored tape into the West German Radio Free Europe library in order to convince the West German government that an anti-German policy was being pursued. None of these heavy-handed actions succeeded. There is no doubt that over tirne the continuous exposure to accurate news broadcasts had an enormous effect on Russian and Eastern European opinion. The communist line was much more difficult to sell when confronted with an increasingly well-informed and skeptical public. In many Russian and Eastern European homes, it became an

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evening ritual to listen to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcasts, and ultimately Moscow was powerless to prevent it. Despite the traditional manipulation of opinion practiced by communists in the past, they now had to confront a more informed public that was knowledgeable enough to be able to question the gross simplifications of Russian propaganda. During subsequent travels as a journalist through Eastern Europe, I continuously encountered people who remembered their nightly rituai of listening to the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty news broadcasts. In his Nobel Prize speech in r97o, Aleksander Solzhenitsyn described the danger of public disinforrnation in dramatic terms: "Suppression of information renders international signatures and agreements illusorT; within a muffled zone it costs nothing to reinterpret any agreement; even sirnpler, to forget it as though it had never really existed. A muffled zone is, as it were, populated not by inhabitants of the Earth, but an expedition corps from Mars; the people know nothing intelligent about the rest of the Earth and are prepared to go and trarnple it down in the holy conviction that they come as liberators." T*o years later, Solzhenitsyn spoke of the irreplaceable role that the broadcasts had played in bringing the powerful voice of democracy to people behind the Iron Curtain. When askedwhat he thought of Radio Liberty, he replied' "If we learn a n y t h i n g a b o u t e v e n t si n o u r o w n c o u n tr7, it's from there." A decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Radio Liberty and Radio Free

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Europe continue to play an important role. Their broadcastssupport the emergence of civil societies in formerly authoritarian countries. Many democratic leaders in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union rely on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to support the development of political pluralism, market economies, and an independent media. According to Czech President Vaclav Havel, "These radio stations are significant even after the end of the Cold War . . . not only because human rights are not fully respected [and] democracy has not fully matured, but also because they set a goal for the new independent media, creating a healthy competitive environment. " Dulles's strategic decision in favor of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, combined with the efforts of those associated with the stations, has left us with a uniquely democratic legacy that continues to serveArnerica's national interests. Few of the people involved at the Radios' inception had any idea of the substantial role these stations would come to play in world affairs. Based on the hugely successful and influential broadcasts of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to Eastern Europe and Russia, Radio Free Asia began its first broadcast on September !g, 1996. Similarly, the Voice of America now provides eighty-three million listeners in almost every corner of the globe with broadcasts in fifty-three langr-rages.A we begin the new millennium, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Asia, and the Voice of America continue to play a unique and vital role in America's ongoing struggle to bring freedom to the world.

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