GJIA - 13.2 Rethinking Global Philanthropy

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Rethinking Global Philanthropy

FORUM CONTRIBUTIONS BY:

Rajiv Shah | Bob Diamond | Elizabeth Gore & Kent Ford | Carol Adelman Administrator

Chief Executive

USAID

Barclays PLC

Global Partnerships

UN Foundation

Director CGP

Hudson Institute

With an Introduction by Raj Desai Interviews with Thomas Pogge & Carol Lancaster ALSO FEATURING: Shashi Tharoor on Indian Investment in Latin America Bruce Hoffman on Combating Terrorism Paul Pillar on Artificial Intelligence Reform Lawrence Jacobs & Eric Schwartz on U.S. Presidential Power

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Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

summer/fall

2012

volume xiii, number 2

IN CHINA, THE TYPICAL IMAGE OF EUROPE IS THAT OF A SOCIALIST WELFARE PARADISE…TO USE CHINA’S HARD-EARNED FOREIGN CURRENCY TO PURCHASE EUROPE’S DISTRESSED SOVEREIGN DEBTS SO THAT SUCH SOCIALIST LIFESTYLES COULD BE MAINTAINED WOULD MAKE FOR A TOUGH SELL INSIDE CHINA. MINXIN PEI AS DOMESTIC POLICY ASSUMES GREATER INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE, ONE OF THE [UNITED STATES] PRESIDENT’S PRIMARY OBJECTIVES MUST BE TO COUNTERACT THE DRAW OF PARTY. LAWRENCE R. JACOBS AND ERIC SCHWARTZ PROFIT. WEALTH. DEVELOPMENT. THOSE WORDS MAY SOUND LIKE AN ODD COMBINATION. BUT AT A TIME WHEN BUSINESSES BELIEVE IN THE URGENCY OF OUR MISSION, THOSE WORDS WILL DEFINE THE FUTURE OF OUR FIELD. RAJIV SHAH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS BEEN AROUND THE TRACK WITH ALMOST EVERY SUPPOSEDLY INNOVATIVE IDEA REGARDING BETTER WAYS TO DO ITS BUSINESS. PAUL PILLAR

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Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Summer/Fall 2012, Volume XIII, Number 2

1

Editors’ Note

Forum: Rethinking Global Philanthropy 3

Introduction RAJ DESAI

The best hope for the world’s poor lies in the ability of private aid givers to transform the current system of foreign aid, and to develop partnerships with the public sector, to advance common good.

7

Embracing Enlightened Capitalism

15

Global Philanthropy and Beyond Reinventing Foreign Assistance

25

Citizenship The Evolution of ‘Corporate Philanthropy’

31

Joe Public The Most Important Partner in International Philanthropy

39

Global Institutions and Partnerships The Future of International Development?

RAJIV SHAH

CAROL ADELMAN

BOB DIAMOND

ELIZABETH GORE AND KENT FORD

CAROL LANCASTER AND THOMAS POGGE

Politics&Diplomacy 51

Presidential Power and the Internationalization of Domestic Policy LAWRENCE R. JACOBS AND ERIC P. SCHWARTZ

The upcoming American presidential election will overlap with a changing political schema. The United States has begun to witness an “internationalization” of its domestic policy. How the next administration adapts to this paradigm shift will have profound implications upon the future of U.S. prominence on the world’s stage.

61

China in Sudan The Challenge of Non-Interference in a Failed State ANDREW S. NATSIOS

China has encountered increasing difficulty maintaining its foreign policy directive of ‘noninterference’ in Sudan, as complex internal conflicts lend an inescapably political dimension to the superpower’s economic activities within the developing African country.

Summer/Fall 2012 [ i]

India-Latin America Relations A Work in Progress

69

SHASHI THAROOR

Examining the increasing interconnectedness of India and Latin America’s economic and diplomatic interests, a more robust tie between the two seems likely to emerge. Nevertheless, political and trade-related reform needs to take place before this partnership can reach fruition.

Conflict&Security Securing the Olympic City

75

CHRISTOPHER GAFFNEY

In anticipation of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympics, the implementation of Police Pacification Units (UPP) in select favelas of Rio de Janeiro has transformed the city’s security dynamics. Is this security effort bringing benefits for some at the expense of others?

The Future of Terrorist De-Radicalization Programs

83

JOHN HORGAN AND MARY BETH ALTIER

A number of countries run programs aimed at rehabilitating and reintegrating captured members of terrorist organizations. Yet recidivism of “rehabilitated” terrorists has called into question the effectiveness of these initiatives.

Combating Terrorism Adapting Global Strategy to the Evolving Threats of a New Decade

91

BRUCE HOFFMAN

In a quickly changing landscape of security threats, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency expert Bruce Hoffman discusses U.S. security policy in combating non-state actors across the world.

Culture&Society Abu Dhabi and What it Means to be a Global Cultural Capital

99

CYNTHIA P. SCHNEIDER

In 2004, Abu Dhabi announced its plan to develop a cultural center on Saadiyat Island, taking a leading role in the burgeoning cultural scene in the Gulf. Is Abu Dhabi capable of developing and sustaining the climate, personnel, and audience to nurture its new cultural institutions?

Law&Ethics 107

The Piracy Prosecution Paradox Political and Procedural Problems with Enforcing Order on the High Seas EUGENE KONTOROVICH

Nations release pirates upon capture in order to avoid the increasingly stultifying hazards of legal bureaucracy and liability. Perhaps a more direct approach to combating the threats posed by these criminals would solve the piracy prosecution paradox once and for all.

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Contents

115

From Retribution to Reconciliation Transitional Justice in Rwanda, 1994-2011 DAVID RAWSON

The process of post-genocide transitional justice begins to come to a close in Rwanda. Vital operational lessons can be learned from the international blunders and local triumphs of the past two decades to create a more rapid, meaningful, and reconciliatory global response system.

125

Strange Bedfellows The Convergence of Sovereignty-Limiting Doctrines in Counterterrorist and Human Rights Discourse ROSA BROOKS

A fragile ideological coalition has emerged with members of both the human rights and hard security communities advocating for more robust sovereignty-limiting doctrines. Perhaps it is best to simply embrace the organized hypocrisy that surrounds this case of strange bedfellows.

135

Doping, Gambling, and the Decline of the IOC

JOHN HOBERMAN

The International Olympic Committee has struggled to address the dual problems of illegal drug use among elite athletes and gambling. It has now turned to policing mechanisms to solve these challenges—criminalizing doping and focusing on the supply chain rather the end user.

Business&Economics 143

Banking on Legitimacy The ECB and the Euro Zone Crisis

KATHLEEN MCNAMARA

During the euro zone crisis of 2008-2009, the European Central Bank was held responsible for maintaining economic stability throughout the EU, without necessary support from political institutions. Several policy reforms are needed within the EU and the European Commission itself to prepare Europe for internal and external economic shocks in the future.

151

Playing Hard to Get Why Has China Been Reluctant to Help Europe?

MINXIN PEI

Political divisions within Europe and domestic considerations within China have prevented China from providing substantial financial aid to Europe during its ongoing debt crisis, and are likely to prohibit it from doing so in the foreseeable future.

Science&Technology 155

Mobile Phones Challenges of Capability Building

ROBIN MANSELL

While use of mobile phones has been increasing in developing countries, the capabilities of using this technology to its full potential have lagged. If fully developed, such capabilities would strengthen the potential for profiting from mobile networks and for coordinating wealth-generating activities in developing countries.

163

Missing Links Crime-Prevention, IT, and the Case for Trilateral Collaboration JEFFREY AVINA

Public-private partnerships on crime prevention have not truly affected sustained global change.

Championing academia as the operational panacea, a proposed four-step program targeting

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IT firms and other viable partners seeks to streamline corporate social responsibility-related endeavors.

Books 173

Whither Arab Awakening?

JOSHUA W. WALKER

A review of The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East by Kenneth M. Pollack and others.

A Look Back 177

Artificial Intelligence Reform Social Amnesia and the Intelligence Community PAUL R. PILLAR

Examining the organizational and methodological restructurings of the last few decades, a twenty-eight year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency and National Intelligence Council explains to those calling for intelligence reform why they might be suffering from a case of intelligence déjà vu.

185

My Time on the Line Examining the Afghan–Pakistan Border as a Factor in Counterinsurgency ROBERT KEMP

A Foreign Service Officer looks back on the lessons learned from his time posted on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area between 2004 and 2009. Continued international assistance will be necessary to sustain the border-area’s fragile ecosystem as troop levels are reduced.

View from the Ground 195

Fighting a Pandemic The World’s Effort to Control Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis ALEX BOZZETTE

Through conversations with practitioners in the field and travels across three continents, the author studies various efforts and challenges to developing and executing a cure for multidrugresistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB).

203

Kazakhstan’s New Capital Its Importance and Implications DENA SHOLK

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan’s administration relocated the capital city from Almaty to newly built Astana. The author recalls her personal experiences in both of these cities, and warns that, despite expansion and investment, Astana’s growth may be too much, too soon.

Cover photo credits (left to right): Tanzania: Science Education Class - Zahur Ramji, U.S. Agency for International Development Aghanistan: Truck Loaded with Bags of Wheat - Nitin Madhav, U.S. Agency for International Development USAID Partnership with Iraqis Helps Revitalize Orchards, Vineyards - U.S. Agency for International Development

[iv] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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Summer/Fall 2012 [ vii]

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Articles submitted to the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs must be original, must not draw substantially from articles previously published by the author, and must not be simultaneously submitted to any other publication. Articles should be around 3,000 words in length. Manuscripts must be typewritten and double-spaced in Microsoft™ Word® format, with margins of at least one inch. Authors should follow the Chicago Manual of Style, 15th ed. Articles may be submitted by e-mail (gjia@georgetown.edu). Full names of authors, a two-sentence biography, and contact information including addresses with zip codes, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, and e-mail addresses must accompany each submission. The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs will consider all manuscripts submitted, but assumes no obligation regarding publication. All material submitted is returnable at the discretion of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.

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[vi i i ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Editors’ Note

The latest round of leadership changes at the IMF and the World Bank has generated increasingly intense criticism of the tacit Western hold on governance of these institutions. While this dynamic is indicative of global power adjustments, it also signals a paradigm shift in thought about issues and methodology of development and growth. John Maynard Keynes famously noted the influence economists exert on leaders as: “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.” Perhaps it is time, especially in the field of development, to question the traditional monopoly of economists, and to effectively include scientists, anthropologists, and others to provide collaborative thought leadership.

The Forum of this issue of the Journal brings together leading policy makers, business professionals, and academics to evaluate the changing landscape of international development. New forms of assistance and greater connectivity among development stakeholders have reduced relevance of the traditional role of multilateral or bilateral agents of foreign aid and pillar organizations of the Washington Consensus. These bodies must adapt to an ever-changing world while being constrained by laws and bureaucratic processes. There is also a need to balance the perennial temptation of using official development assistance to promote national agenda with the interests of recipients. To deal with these and similar challenges effectively, the future lies in building networks of hybrid partnerships between governments, individuals, and other stakeholders in development.

It is never easy to divest political motivations from economic undertakings.

Beyond the articles in the Forum, Andrew Natsios describes China’s difficulty in applying its international policy principles of non-intervention while investing in Sudan, and Shashi Tharoor provides an assessment of India’s political and economic activities in Latin America. In a special two-part series on the euro zone crisis, Kathleen McNamara explains how the crisis transformed the European Central Bank from an independent body to a political entity, while Minxin Pei describes how different political economies have made China reluctant to assist the euro zone.

As always, this issue of the Journal confronts important but less examined questions in international relations. How do ethnic groups live together after grave atrocities? David Rawson, Ambassador of the United States during the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, describes the ongoing efforts to promote reconciliation between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Can terrorists be reintegrated into society?

John Horgan and Mary Beth Altier evaluate the effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s terrorist rehabilitation programs. With the U.S. presidential elections coming up, Eric Schwartz and Lawrence Jacobs provide a timely assessment of the increasingly ambiguous line between foreign and domestic policy issues in the U.S. president’s portfolio.

Summer/Fall 2012 [ 1 ]

Editors’ Note

The Journal continues to enjoy prominence in shaping policy debates and analyses of international affairs. As USAID prepares to hold its inaugural Frontiers in Development Forum in June 2012, we hope that issues raised in this volume will contribute to debates on challenges to development at the Forum and beyond.

Finally, we have continued to facilitate access to this publication through fully uploading archives on the website and developing more regular features online.

We hope that the readers find the analyses presented in the Journal engaging and conducive to forward-looking discussions.

Michael Brannagan

Sikander Kiani

Summer/Fall 2012 [ 2]

Forum GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Rethinking Global

Philanthropy

Each spring, two annual gatherings shape the agenda for international development assistance. One of these is well known and widely reported—some 800 press credentials are routinely issued. The other meeting is largely ignored. Unfortunately, the world has it backwards. The meeting that no one cares about offers as much hope for ending global poverty as the one in the limelight.

Readers will likely know of the annual Spring Meetings of the World Bank and the IMF, held in Washington, D.C., but how many will have heard of the annual Global Philanthropy Forum? This community of donors and social investors committed to international causes aims to promote a new kind of global philanthropy that often blurs the line between “non-profit” and “for-profit” approaches.

The essays in this issue of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs address the challenges that the private sector poses to traditional forms of aid channeled by bilateral or multilateral agencies to governments

7 Embracing Enlightened Capitalism RAJIV SHAH

15 Global Philanthropy and Beyond Reinventing Foreign Assistance CAROL ADELMAN

25 Citizenship The Evolution of ‘Corporate Philanthropy’ BOB DIAMOND

31 Joe Public The Most Important Partner in International Philanthropy

ELIZABETH MCKEE GORE AND KENT FORD

39 Global Institutions and Partnerships The Future of International Development?

CAROL LANCASTER AND THOMAS POGGE

Summer/Fall 2012 [ 3]

INTRODUCTION

in recipient countries. As USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah notes, official donors such as the United States must adapt to the new realities of a changed global landscape for foreign aid, a major component of which is an expanded role for the profit motive in reducing poverty. For citizens in poor countries, as Shah argues, encouraging private investment in creating incomegenerating opportunities is now as vital as administrating agency-funded programs directly.

The landscape has indeed changed.

This year private donors will give more aid to world’s poor than the World Bank or USAID. Prior to the global financial crisis in 2008, the World Bank disbursed $24 billion in loans and credits per year, not counting debt relief, and total U.S. economic assistance was about $30 billion. Although these amounts rose between 2008 and 2010, World Bank disbursements have fallen back to levels in pre-crisis years. Meanwhile, American foundations, charities, and philanthropies now give almost $40 billion to international causes—a number more or less unchanged during the crisis.

As Carol Adelman of the Hudson Institute explains, a new generation of philanthropists has been using new technologies to link donors and recipients together, to provide better access to information (whether about microcredit availability or rainfall forecasts) and to build social networks in poor communities. Their work threatens to make official development assistance irrelevant if it does not adapt to the new realities of foreign aid.

One of the factors driving the expansion of private aid is summarized by Bob Diamond, CEO of Barclays PLC: an imperative faced by the private sector to do more business with poor commu-

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nities. That millions of rural residents live without access to formal banking networks, credit, insurance, and other financial instruments, suggests potential gains for both the unbanked and the banks that can tap into these savings.

This growth in private aid is being seen at all levels from mega-charities to smaller foundations to “citizen-philanthropists,” who, as Elizabeth McKee Gore and Kent Ford vividly demonstrate, have been mobilized in large numbers to contribute to global causes.

In addition to publicity by celebrities, individuals now have access to Internetbased giving and microlending platforms such as GlobalGiving and Kiva through which they can deliver funds directly to frontline organizations and individual recipients.

What can private aid accomplish? In a nutshell, it can transform the effectiveness of global foreign aid by making it more competitive. For decades, poor developing nations have faced a “take-it-or-leave-it” attitude from international financial institutions and official donors, and they were forced to deal exclusively with a particular official bureaucracy on development projects.

Private aid now can change all that by providing an alternative channel for development assistance. But to make this competition work, recipient countries must be free to choose whether aid is channeled through an official government project or through a more efficient foundation, NGO, or private company.

More importantly, there is reason to believe that private aid can be more effective than official development assistance. The allocation of private aid is less likely to be based on strategic considerations and more according to the actual needs of recipients.

Because it deals directly with NGOs

DESAI

and civil society, private aid can avoid the corruption associated with developing country governments. Smaller portions of private aid are spent on overhead and administrative costs, and on “technical assistance”—money that often funds contractors and consultants in rich countries.

Private aid can make a difference, but it is by no means a panacea for all that ails the world’s poor. For all the amounts that have been granted, there has been little evaluation of the costeffectiveness of private aid, and there are few examples of privately funded programs being expanded in ways needed to make a dent in global poverty.

The history of global charity has also had its share of scandals involving misappropriations of funds and theft. And the universe of foundations, charities, educational organizations, and private and voluntary organizations may be too crowded and too fragmented to make a real difference on a large scale.

A competitive aid system requires a better understanding of what works and what does not. Neither the “demand” side—what the priority needs of the underserved are—nor the “supply” side—who is doing what and for which

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

communities—have been mapped out at the country level. Without that, it is inevitable that both public and private aid providers will fail to provide systemic change, and will fail to help poor nations develop their own capabilities, both of which are needed for sustained poverty reduction. Recipients of aid must also be able to rely on “benchmarks” that compare the effectiveness of private and official aid programs.

The best hope for the world’s poor lies in the ability of private aid givers to transform the current system of foreign aid, and to develop partnerships with the public sector, to advance the common good. These are the efforts to which the international development community should dedicate itself, not to the maintenance of the current foreign aid system, but to its modernization.

Raj M. Desai is Associate Professor

of International Development at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, and a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

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Call for PaPers The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs is accepting submissions for the Winter/Spring 2013 issue. The submission deadline is 15 August 2012. Articles must be about 3,000 words in length. They should have the intellectual vigor to meet the highest scholarly standard, but should be written with the clarity to attract a broad audience. For submission details please refer to our website: http://journal.georgetown.edu/submissions/

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

Embracing Enlightened Capitalism Rajiv Shah For the vast majority of our history, humankind was stuck in a trap. Up until the Industrial Revolution, every time the world became richer or technology led to advances, populations would subsequently grow. Even though the pie got larger, it was quickly cut into more slices. Aside from an extremely small number of royals and elites, people, on average, did not become wealthier. Economic growth and development as we understand it today simply did not occur.

But for the past 300 years—and really only since then— large parts of the world finally managed to spring that trap.

The productivity gains of the Industrial Revolution took hold and the resulting economic growth began to lead to large, sustained increases in the global standard of living.

The rising tide did not lift all boats—many countries were left underwater. As incomes rose and poverty fell in Europe and North America, countries in Asia and Africa saw much slower growth, leading to a great divergence between those in the West and those in the rest of the world. For the next several decades, some developing countries—primarily in Asia—began to climb out of poverty, while others were paralyzed by economic shocks. It was not until the end of the Cold War that the world witnessed the rapid growth of a very

Dr. Rajiv Shah serves as the 16th Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

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EMBRACING ENLIGHTENED CAPITALISM

large group of emerging economies and democracies throughout Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

Throughout this period, development assistance went through its own phases of evolution. Originally, it served as a way to help countries build infrastructure and capital stocks. This was the spirit behind the Marshall Plan, which provided unprecedented aid to the devastated capitals of Western Europe. Then the focus turned to “basic human needs,” as former Defense Secretary and World Bank President Robert McNamara coined them: health, education, clean water and sanitation.1 In the late 1980s and early 1990s,

once more.

Amidst the seismic changes in today’s world, development assistance can no longer serve as a substitute for private capital—official development assistance in 2010 was $128.7 billion while global foreign direct investment was $1.22 trillion.2 But it can help encourage private investment. Development assistance must prioritize broad-based, sustainable economic growth that can boost incomes, create jobs, and reduce poverty—including in the United States. Development assistance must emphasize mutual accountability. We must hold ourselves accountable for the money we invest in foreign nations,

Foreign assistance must help countries

ensure that the poor do more than survive the next famine, or the next epidemic, or the next fall in commodity prices—it must help them thrive. development assistance focused on stabilizing economies suffering from budget and debt crises through structural adjustment programs, which were advocated by the West and the multilateral development banks. Over the past two decades, development assistance had measurable success focusing much more on delivering specific outcomes in debt relief and health, most notably in fighting AIDS and malaria. Now—as President Barack Obama’s first-ever Policy Directive on Development made clear and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review operationalizes— development assistance must evolve

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while partner governments must demonstrate their own strong commitment to improve governance and promote growth. Development assistance must help countries ensure that the poor do more than survive the next famine, or the next epidemic, or the next fall in commodity prices—it must help them thrive. Development assistance must work more collaboratively, albeit critically with a much wider range of partners—foreign governments, civil societies, and even private companies.

Embracing Enlightened Capitalism. While there is no single recipe for delivering sustainable, broad-

SHAH

based economic growth, over the course of USAID’s fifty-year history, we have consistently identified three key ingredients. First, a country must have strong institutions—governments and civil societies that can accountably respond to people’s needs and aspirations. Second, a country must develop its sources of human capital and ensure that its people are healthy and educated enough to contribute to their societies and economies. And the third ingredient we have seen in every country that’s grown its way out of the poverty is the emergence of a strong and dynamic private sector.

The development community has a long history of strengthening institutions and developing human capital.

Our record of supporting the investments of private firms in the developing world, however, is far more mixed. Despite strong returns in several low-income countries, private sector investment in the developing world is nowhere near its potential. As China invests billions in African economies, Western corporations largely sit on the sidelines. While reforming private sector regulations has been a focus for some time (for instance, USAID worked with the World Bank to develop the Ease of Doing Business Index), the development community has not typically embraced the encouragement of private sector activity as part of its core mission.

If those working in development hope to remain relevant to the challenges of the developing world, this must change. The sectors we most associate with development work—healthcare, agriculture, infrastructure—are dominated by private sector activity.

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

If we want to encourage truly sustainable, broad-based economic growth in developing countries, we have to do a far better job of working with private firms and encouraging their investment abroad.

In order to meaningfully address poverty in developing countries, we have to help companies find profit opportunities, not photo opportunities. These linkages must be more than partnerships for partnership’s sake. They must be more than corporate social responsibility efforts or charity work. That work, while well intentioned, does not yield the kind of sustainable growth that can shape economies and raise incomes at scale. We must work with firms to support well-functioning markets that can deliver profits and generate income for women, minorities, and the poor.

In addition, we must partner with the private sector much more deeply from the start based on shared goals and interests, instead of treating companies as just another funding source for our development work. In short, we must embrace a new wave of enlightened capitalism.

Uneasy Territory. This is uneasy territory for many in the development community. The early experience of corporate investment in the developing world was characterized by activity that sometimes caused great harm. Sweatshops, infant formula, Bhopal—these are all words that conjure images of corporations taking advantage of weak regulations and exploiting the poor.

Those early experiences led to a deep mistrust of the private sector by developing countries and the development community alike. As a result, our com-

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EMBRACING ENLIGHTENED CAPITALISM

munity became far less comfortable partnering with the private sector to generate growth. Today, most development experts working in the field understand a longitudinal study better than a balance sheet. And they probably know the names of more NGO heads than developing world CEOs. That mistrust is increasingly misplaced. Many of the best modern companies have a much more enlightened understanding of the aligned interests they share with the development community, and, for good measure, they are subject to far higher standards of transparency and accountability. Walmart knows that when it partners with USAID to buy crops from

need to be reported publicly thanks to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which President Obama announced the United States would join last September at the UN. To help drive sustainable and transparent economic growth abroad, the development community must step out of its comfort zone to build new linkages with private sector firms.

Profit. Wealth. Development.

At the Clinton Global Initiative in September 2011, USAID announced a new partnership with PepsiCo and the World Food Program (WFP) to invest up to $6 million in Ethiopia to improve the yields of smallholder chickpea

Profit. Wealth. Development. Those

words may sound like an odd combination.

But at a time when businesses believe in the urgency of our mission, those words will define the future of our field. subsistence farmers in Guatemala at fair prices, it helps lift these farmers from poverty. It also knows that working with these farmers strengthens its own supply chain and builds markets.

Coca-Cola knows that our public-private partnership to bring clean water to global communities helps fight disease.

It also knows that this work allows the company to build bottling facilities in locations much closer to its customers, saving money and generating economic opportunity. Exxon Mobil knows that when it makes payments to the governments of Liberia, Ghana, or Nigeria for oil concessions, those payments

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farmers. Pepsi will buy chickpeas from those farmers, creating stable demand, and use them to make a high-energy, extremely nutritious paste. The WFP can use this paste to save the lives of malnourished children suffering from the ongoing drought in the Horn of Africa. This is not charity work. Pepsi will also use those chickpeas to make hummus that it can sell for profit in markets around the world. Pepsi’s work is generating wealth for poor farmers and giving malnourished children lifesaving products that will improve their development, while improving its supply chain.

SHAH

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

Profit. Wealth. Development. Those words may sound like an odd combination. But at a time when businesses believe in the urgency of our mission, those words will define the future of our field. Will future growth be driven by those firms that transparently and responsibly invest abroad, thanks to international standards and norms like the EITI? Will we embrace an enlightened capitalism that helps private companies profitably invest abroad while helping the world’s poor? Or will stateowned corporations with little global accountability drive growth? Will they continue to use huge, opaque investments to curry favor with trade partners, leaving American companies at a severe disadvantage?

As President Obama has said, the strongest foundation for human progress lies in open governments, open societies, and open economies. By embracing a model of enlightened capitalism, I believe that USAID can help support that foundation. In fact, the United States is ahead of the curve when it comes to directly engaging with firms to invest abroad. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recently recognized USAID as the best among our peers when it comes to private sector engagement. Yet despite the progress we have made in energizing private sector activity in the developing world, we have to go much further.

tion to launching new private-public partnerships, this office will house the Development Innovation Ventures, a venture capital-like fund that evaluates and invests in high-potential, scalable development solutions.3 We will also focus on leveraging local capital through our Development Credit Authority (DCA). In many developing countries, financial institutions are hesitant to lend to sectors perceived as high-risk, including small business, agriculture, clean energy, health, and education. As a result, large pools of available capital often sit dormant in bank vaults. By offering partial credit guarantees on loans made to these sectors, we can unlock huge sums of local money to fuel domestic investment.

When USAID risk-sharing guarantees expire, these private institutions often continue lending to the same borrowers they previously perceived as unqualified.

For instance, in Uganda, to support our effort to reduce rural poverty, DCA was able to facilitate more than $26 million worth of local private lending to micro, small, and medium enterprises. This investment was critical not only to transform two fledgling microfinance institutions into deposittaking institutions, but also to convince two traditional commercial banks to open small businesses and microfinance lending windows based on the encouraging results. Recently, DCA, J.P. Morgan Chase, and a unique colAn Agenda for Action. To elevate lection of impact investors capitalized a the role of partnerships at USAID and to $25 million private investment fund in streamline the way we form these part- sub-Saharan Africa focused exclusivenerships across the Agency, we recently ly on growing agriculture enterprises. created a new Office for Innovation The African Agricultural Capital Fund and Development Alliances. In addi- will infuse equity and expertise into a

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sector that has suffered from underinvestment for decades, increasing the incomes and food security of at least a quarter of a million subsistence-farming families.

Many people in the development community currently talk about the need to move beyond development assistance. They say that the United States simply cannot afford to stay engaged in the world, even though The Most Exceptional Ameri- foreign aid is less than 1 percent of our can Idea. In 1954, USAID’s prede- budget. They ask what good developcessor, the International Cooperation ment assistance actually does, despite Agency, made an $800,000 grant to decades of results fighting disease and start a plastics company in Taiwan. That strengthening governance. They also grant helped establish Formosa Plastics, ask what countries growing between 1 a corporation that first produced PVC and 2 percent a year even have to offer to make water pipes. Today, Formosa to countries growing at 5, 8, or even 12 Plastics is a global corporation, with a percent a year. division in the United States that sells The answer is simple: the United more than $4 billion in goods every States has the most innovative, technoyear. It also employs 2,110 people in logically advanced, and dynamic econ-

When I visit developing countries and

meet with developing world officials rarely am I asked for more cash. Instead, I’m asked for something far more valuable: connectivity.

Delaware, Louisiana, and Texas.4 In 1954, USAID’s Food for Peace program brought flour to Taiwan for the first time and taught people how to bake. Today, Taiwan is our sixth largest agricultural market, our ninth largest wheat market, and our fourth largest corn market. We sell more corn to Taiwan than we do to China, Canada, or the EU. Our entire history of development assistance to Taiwan cost American taxpayers about $1.4 billion from 1949 to 1963, or about $100 million a year over fourteen years. Today, Taiwanese tourists spend over $1 billion every year traveling to the United States.

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omy in the world. If we want to stay in pole position, then we need to maintain our engagement with the developing world. China can write big checks and build roads throughout Africa, but it still cannot offer countries what U.S. companies and institutions can.

When I visit developing countries and meet with developing world officials, rarely am I asked for more cash.

Instead, I am asked for something far more valuable: connectivity. Developing countries ask us to connect them to our world-class universities and research institutions because they want to build their own but do not know how to start. They ask us to connect

SHAH

them with retired U.S. businessmen and women to help their firms plan and invest more efficiently and effectively.

They ask us to certify their hospitals and doctors so they can improve their standards of care. Above all, they ask us to connect them to U.S. corporations to help them develop new supply chains and markets.

In short, they ask us to serve as connectors to American ideas. Transferring ideas enriches all parties by opening opportunities for developing countries and creating new markets for American goods and services and new jobs for American workers. Today, exports support more than nine million jobs in the United States—jobs that pay 18 percent more than average.5 Just last year, our surge in exports supported half a million additional jobs here at home. If we are going to continue our economic recovery, then we must continue to deliver on President Obama’s pledge to double exports by 2015 and reach the 95 percent of the world’s customers that live outside our borders.6 Those people do not live solely in India, China, or Brazil. They live in Nigeria and Bangladesh and the Philippines, places where our development work is providing critical support. The engagement we have with these countries today will impact how much we can trade and partner with them tomorrow, just as our strong trade relationship with Taiwan began decades ago with our development relationship.

There is nothing surprising about the fact that the United States just signed free trade agreements with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama. After all, the United States has had strong diplomatic and development ties to

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

those countries for decades. In recent years, USAID has worked with South Korea to develop its health and educational systems, helping transform a country of smallholder farmers, poorer in 1960 than most countries in subSaharan Africa, to a technological powerhouse, a donor of development assistance, and a trading partner responsible for hundreds of thousands of private sector jobs in the United States.

Today, we trade more with South Korea than we do with France. We can tell similar stories of growth about Colombia and Panama, countries that worked with USAID to build colleges, hospitals, and waterworks. These institutions gave their citizens the opportunity to fulfill their potential, generating wealth and driving growth. The free trade pacts of tomorrow, the ones that will strengthen American companies and create jobs, will be in exactly the places that USAID is working now—helping to improve standards of living and provide linkages to American firms.

In order to tap into the $5 trillion of purchasing power that the poorest twothirds of our world has today or capture a leading share in an African common market that has more economic potential than China, it is necessary to invest in the diplomatic, developmental, and private sector engagement that will get us there.7 Because there is another American idea we offer to countries through our engagement. It is an idea that stretches back to our nation’s founding, manifested in a sixdecade long record of bipartisan support for development assistance: that all people are created equal, and as beneficiaries of prosperity, Americans have a responsibility to support that equality

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for those less fortunate.

That is the idea that drives hundreds of thousands of people of faith to volunteer abroad, leads millions of students to study development and

global health, and compels millions of American families to donate money to earthquake relief in Haiti. For an exceptional country, it is perhaps our most exceptional idea.

NOTES

1 Devesh Kapur, John Prior Lewis, and Richard Charles Webb. The World Bank: The First Half Century. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997): 266.

2 United Nations Conference on Aid and Development. Internet, http://www.unctad.org/templates/ webflyer.asp?docid=13643&intItemID=1528&lang=1 (date accessed 15 January 2012); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Development Aid Reaches an Historic High in 2010” Internet http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,374 6,en_2649_34447_47515235_1_1_1_1,00.html (date accessed 15 January 2012).

3 Development Innovation Ventures. USAID, Internet, http://idea.usaid.gov/organization/div .

4 Formosa Plastics. “About Formosa Plastics – an overview” Internet, http://www.fpcusa.com/about.

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html (date accessed 15 January 2012).

5 Johnson, Martin. U.S. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration “Projected Jobs Supported by Exports, 2009 and 2010” Internet, http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003363. pdf (date accessed 16 January 2012).

6 Helene Cooper “Obama Sets Ambitious Export Goal” New York Times Online, Internet http://www. nytimes.com/2010/01/29/business/29trade.html (date accessed January 16 2012).

7 Allen Hammond et al. International Finance Corporation. “The Next 4 Billion: Market Size and Business Strategy at the Base of the Pyramid.” Internet, http://pdf.wri.org/n4b_fulltext_hi.pdf (date accessed 15 January 2012).

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

Global Philanthropy and Beyond Reinventing Foreign Assistance Carol Adelman We are in the middle of a paradigm shift in how we can best promote economic growth and well-being abroad. Sophisticated technology, new financing mechanisms, and a generation of hands-on problem solvers are blurring the lines between philanthropy, investment, remittances, and profit/ not-for-profit, socially-conscious organizations. Entirely new forms of giving using new financial mechanisms are poised to change the face of international philanthropy and global foreign aid as we know it today.

To understand this new landscape calls for a look at current and future trends in international philanthropy along with new forms of giving aided by the Internet, social networking, and mobile (cell) phones. Finally, the role of government aid needs to be examined against this backdrop of emerging trends in global giving.

At the same time, the growth and emerging dominance of private financial flows from developed to developing countries offer a great opportunity to reinvent official aid, allowing the aid community to address real results for a change.

Since USAID is now a minority shareholder in foreign aid, with an expensive and outdated delivery model, it can save money while achieving better results by investing in a vast

Dr. Carol Adelman is Director of the Center for Global Prosperity at Hudson Institute, and served as an Assistant Administrator at USAID for Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe when the Wall fell.

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array of successful and efficient projects initiated and tested by private entities.

Rather than a problem, the U.S. government should view this as an opportunity to stay relevant to the developing world.

Trends in International Philanthropy: A Changed Developing World. Reviewing the changes in

the developing world over the last thirty years provides a better understanding of the overall transformation of international philanthropy. First, there has been an increase in open markets and open societies for the majority of developing countries. According to the World Bank, the percentage of individuals living in extreme poverty declined from 52 percent in 1981 to 22 percent in 2008. The Millennium Development Goal of cutting extreme poverty in half by 2015 has already been met.1 Increases in economic growth, a skilled labor force, life expectancy, and freedom to associate and start businesses and other institutions have all created more local talent with whom overseas investors and philanthropies can partner.

Second, technology and education have played important roles in transforming developing countries.

Television, radio, the cell phone, and Internet have increased communications, the transfer of knowledge, and the speed and efficiency of delivering foreign aid. Millions of foreign students who have studied in developed countries have returned home with an increased demand for best products and practices. In the 2010-2011 school year alone, over 460,000 students from developing countries stud-

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ied in the United States.2 Among these, for example, are medical students who continue to return to their home countries with new medicines, diagnostic equipment, and protocols for treating patients more effectively.

Finally, these changes have led to the expansion of indigenous private philanthropy as well as philanthropy and remittances from abroad. Increases in the skilled workforce, longer life expectancies, adoption of new technologies, and growth in private investment, has spurred economic growth and increased disposable income for philanthropic giving in developing countries. There are now major new streams of money from both domestic sources and abroad that did not exist by the end of World War II. Community foundations, high net worth individuals, corporate social responsibility programs, local NGOs, and entrepreneurs are now businessready in developing countries.

Private sources represent 82 percent of all financial flows from the developed to the developing world. Government aid is now only 18 percent of total financial flows. As shown in the graph on the next page by the intersection of the two lines, private monies began to exceed public flows in 1991.3 Of the $575 billion total in private flows, capital investment is the highest source at $329 billion, remittances are second at $190 billion, and philanthropy is third at $56 billion.

When remittances and philanthropy are combined, they are almost twice the amount of official government aid to the developing world. They are two of the most stable forms of assistance over time and serve as a vital lifeline to the world’s poor, helping them weather

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Rethinking Global Philanthropy

economic shocks. When we look at just U.S. financial flows to the developing world in the table on the next page, total U.S. international philanthropy amounted to $39 billion compared to $28.8 billion in government aid.

Remittances, widely believed to be a significant agent in poverty reduction, were huge at $95.8 billion.

three decades, we have seen a transformation in private assistance delivery methods: Social Investment is a term for a variety of trends known as “philanthrocapitalism,” business at the bottom of the pyramid, and creative capitalism.

These programs combine a myriad of hybrid approaches—non-profits funding for-profits and for-profits funding A Changed Aid Delivery Sys- non-profits—but the bottom line is that tem. In addition to the major new the exit strategy is a successful, ongostreams of private funding over the last ing enterprise helping poor people

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increase incomes and prosperity. Many organizations work in this area, including Acumen, Endeavor, KickStart, ACCION International, and Opportunity International, along with a wide variety of microfinance organizations.

One of these, Kedai Balitaku (My Child’s Café), a for-profit company launched by Mercy Corps, tackles the dual issues of child malnutrition and unemployment in the slums of Jakarta, Indonesia. Instead of its traditional feeding programs, Mercy Corps pro-

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vided start-up loans and training for poverty-stricken people in the community who sell nutritional food for children and keep their profits. The owners sold 14,000 meals in the first month of operation, and new entrepreneurs continue to join this selfsustaining social investment.4 Cause-Related Marketing refers to programs that donate percentages or fixed amounts from sales of products to selected charities or multilateral aid programs. Sometimes called “embed-

ADELMAN

ded philanthropy,” the charitable contribution is implanted in another financial transaction, such as the option to contribute to a charity when checking out at a grocery store. Some of the better known international causerelated marketing programs include those of UNICEF, Starbucks, (PRODUCT) RED, TOMS shoes, and MAC cosmetics.

E-Philanthropy and the Mobile (Cell) Phone as Purse include giving programs through Ebay, Global Giving, Kiva, IGive.com, FreeRice.com, and Facebook, among many others. Dennis Whittle, the founder of Global Giving, points out that the internet has helped create the democratization of philanthropy where “ordinary Oprahs” give to causes of their choice at their own budget levels.

It costs donors as low as 10 percent overhead on their contributions compared to as high as 100 percent overhead on government aid contractors. Internet donors can monitor their projects online and even communicate with the entrepreneurs and project staff—a connection not available between U.S. citizens and their tax-supported foreign aid programs.

Mobile phones have been called the industrial revolution of the developing world. An innovative project in Kenya featured in the Hudson Institute’s 2011 Index is Kilimo Salama, which means “safe agriculture.” This micro-insurance program, created by the Swiss-based Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture, allows farmers to both buy insurance for their crops against drought and receive payouts through their mobile phones. The partnership includes Safaricom, one of Kenya’s largest mobile phone provid-

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

ers, and Kenyan meteorological and insurance agencies.

Public-Private Partnerships have proliferated over the last decade. Bilateral governments, multilateral agencies, corporations, NGOs, religious organizations, and migrant worker associations have come together in different combinations, bringing their respective time, talent, and treasure to tackle tough development problems.

Remittances are one of the most stable and direct financial flows reducing poverty in the developing world today.

Long-hailed by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and economists across the world, these flows provide funding for food, clothing, medicines, and shelter throughout the developing world. In addition, remittances are being used as loan collateral at both the village and country levels. Local entrepreneurs can obtain loans based on a history of receiving remittances, and developing nations can improve their credit ratings based on incoming remittances.

An interesting project by TechnoServe, a Washington, D.C.-based non-profit economic development organization, successfully tested a program in 2010 that leverages remittances to help grow El Salvadoran businesses. Based on incoming remittances, four businesses received loan approvals and two were already expanding their operations. Moreover, the loans were 20 to 50 percent less expensive than traditional loans due to bundling of remittances into the loan applications.5 While remittances are not considered philanthropic flows per se, they serve the same purposes as philanthropy in providing basic human needs and eco-

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nomic development opportunities in low-income countries.

Remittances are the largest single financial flow to the developing world, second only to private capital investment. They are just another example of how new private giving financial mechanisms—whether through migrant groups, the traditional philanthropy of foundations, charities, churches, and individuals, or innovative social investment programs facilitated by the Internet and mobile phones are redefining both philanthropy and government aid.

The above new private assistance delivery models have helped correct many of the problems with bilateral

subject matter skills; 4) Continuous feedback loops must inform program managers in real-time, not at the end of the project where critiques are useless; 5) Programs need to be flexible for diverse and changing problems in different countries, not long-standing earmarks with one-size-fits-all silver bullets; 6) Funding should be transmitted to organizations quickly and efficiently with low overhead costs; and 7) Programs must be transparent, measure outcomes and not inputs, and survey customer satisfaction.

Philanthropy and other private financial flows have surpassed and transformed

the very nature of current and future development assistance. government aid. Lessons learned from over 145 successful programs featured in our Index editions over the last seven years include: 1) Programs need to be true partnerships, where local investors or foundations are co-financing the initiative and are actively involved; 2) Programs should not be dictated by government agencies or consulting firms, but should be demanddriven from local partners; 3) Partnerships must involve peer-to-peer relationships so that, for example, overseas doctors and hospital administrators work directly with their counterparts in the United States instead of consultants without

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Where International Philanthropy is Headed. The nature and

speed of changes in the developing world compel policy makers, practitioners and academics to understand fully where international development, in all its forms, is going, not merely where it has been. Philanthropy and other private financial flows have surpassed and transformed the very nature of current and future development assistance.

New vehicles have allowed individuals, foundations, and businesses to go beyond philanthropy to relatively new forms of investment, which incorporate socially conscious, philanthropic or mission-driven components. The descriptions below help us understand

ADELMAN

how international philanthropy is evolving.

Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) typically refers to standard investments that avoid companies that may negatively impact the environment or society as whole. These types of investments often have a screening component based on specific indicators of the fund. Thus, Socially Screened Investments (SSI) fall under this category. Such screening eliminates investments in companies producing undesirable products such as tobacco, pornography, or in companies with poor human rights or environmental records.

In 2010 there were nearly 493 funds totaling over $500 billion in assets, which incorporated environmental, social and governance factors in their investment strategy.6 Financial service organizations, such as TIAA-CREF, provide SRI options for their clients that screen for environmental sustainability, labor standards, and product safety.

Program Related Investments (PRIs), unlike SRIs, are closely linked to charitable activities of an organization and are strictly defined by the IRS. These capital investments are made by foundations to support philanthropic activities that have the potential to return the capital within a certain timeframe. Unlike grants, PRIs have a return on investment through repaying loans or returns on equity. U.S. foundations, including Rockefeller, MacArthur, Ford, and the David and Lucille Packard foundations, undertake PRIs. In 2005 the Rockefeller Foundation made a three year, $500,000 guarantee to CERUDEB, a Ugandan bank so that it could lend to small farmers.7

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

After three years, the bank’s portfolio was over $1 million and the default rate was less than 2 percent. Over 2,000 farmers benefitted from these loans.

In some cases, the term Mission-Related Investment is used synonymously with PRIs. The distinguishing factor is that PRIs use program funds, rather than investment funds. The main purpose of PRIs must be consistent with the purposes of the foundation, and the main purpose of the investment cannot be to produce a profit. Thus many PRIs have below market returns.

Impact Investing or Mission-Related Investing (MRIs) occur when capital is invested in projects that seek to generate societal change and financial returns with the ultimate goal of creating an impact on a scale larger than what can be achieved by traditional philanthropy alone. Unlike SRIs, impact investing and MRIs do not screen companies based on negative impacts, rather they focus on finding a positive societal benefit in addition to the profit.8 MicroVest Capital Funds is one such group. This family of funds invests in over fifty microfinance institutions in twenty-five countries globally that provide financial products to the world’s poor. Similarly, LeapFrog Investments invests for “profit-withpurpose” in companies that help people living below the poverty line by providing products such as crop insurance and microcredit.9 Social Enterprises refer to any nonprofit or for-profit organization that applies business strategies to advance the organization’s social goals. Social enterprises differ from corporate social responsibility because their products and services directly impact disadvantaged populations in accordance with

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the enterprise’s mission. Husk Power Systems, started by two business students from the University of Virginia, works in India to provide electricity by transforming unused rice husks or biowaste into biofuel used for electricity.

With 60 mini power plants in 250 villages, the enterprise now provides power to 150,000 people in rural India.10 Social Stock Exchanges are regulated investment marketplaces that allow investors to buy shares in social enterprises or in development projects. Brazil’s Bolsa de Valores Sociais (BVS) operates within the country’s largest stock exchange, Bovespa. BVS has raised $6 million to finance eighty-two educational and environmental projects, and investors measure their return in social impact, holding citizen organizations accountable through regular reporting. Similarly, in South Africa, the South African Investment Exchange connects donors with social enterprises and non-profits that deal with issues including treating HIV/AIDS patients and biological conservation.

about dollars, but about engaged leadership with loyalty to solutions instead of institutions. The exit strategy of the new hands-on social entrepreneurs is not writing more checks. Instead, it is developing a self-sustaining solution to a problem. There is also little distinction between investments and philanthropy. Donated dollars to non-profits can be co-mingled with commercial investments to get the job done.11 According to Raymond, high net worth individuals are giving money today than at earlier ages over a longer period of time than in the past.12 This is game changing when combined with the rapid growth of the middle class in emerging economies, estimated to reach three billion people by 2030.13 It means that, over the coming decades, there will be large and increasing amounts of private philanthropy available for stimulating growth and prosperity throughout the world.

Government Aid: A New Role for the Minority Shareholder.

The U.S. government foreign aid busiHow New Financial Mecha- ness model must be overhauled. In nisms Reflect New Donors and Washington today, there are few policy the New Developing World. conclusions that elicit such bipartisan The above innovative forms of financ- agreement. In fact, the bipartisan HELP ing are responding to new donors and Commission, established by Congress a new developing world in which the to review and make recommendations “government-to-government” and on foreign aid, concluded in its second “donor-recipient” models have been paragraph: “Our foreign assistance sysreplaced. The new model reflects many tem is broken. We ignore this reality at things, particularly, the democratiza- our peril.”14 Calls to increase governtion of voice and shared responsibil- ment aid in light of this conclusion are ity in which all partners have a stake questionable. Calls to reduce it should in the game and contribute to fix- be based on aid that works and can be ing the problem. As Dr. Susan Ray- delivered more efficiently. mond, Vice President at Changing Our The reasons why the foreign aid busiWorld, points out, the new model is not ness model needs to change are:

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1) The pervasive lack of convincing evidence that official aid contributes to economic growth in recipient countries; 2) The government-to-government nature of U.S. aid, where money is fueled through large U.S. contractors with little peer-to-peer relationships between U.S. and foreign professionals and little building of local capacity and institutions; 3) The developing world has changed dramatically over the last thirty years, resulting in more affluent populations, including an increased skill-based talent pool of

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

eign assistance dollars should not be for contractors, but rather for ideas coming from the multiple actors now involved in private philanthropy and social entrepreneurship. USAID can act more like a foundation (and less like a disbursement agency of entitlements), where it can use its funds to leverage and scale up successful private programs that emphasize innovation, self-reliance, and sustainability.

While the new business model will still need to provide for U.S. national security interests in international crises and post-conflict situations, the bulk of funding and default mode of

Competition for U.S. foreign assistance dollars should not be for contractors, but rather

for ideas coming from the multiple actors now involved in private philanthropy and social entrepreneurship. professionals and entrepreneurs.

This has enhanced opportunity to promote local ownership, self-reliance, and sustainability in overseas aid programs; 4) Private financial resources far exceed official aid today, which was not the case when foreign aid began; 5) Private assistance is generally delivered more efficiently with more hands-on involvement and scrutiny of results; and, 6) New financial mechanisms have the potential to scale up the enormous private philanthropic flows expected over the next thirty years.

The new foreign aid business model is clear. Competition for U.S. for-

USAID should be to work with existing civil society projects. It can also be argued that such projects contribute more effectively to our national security because they: 1) Create power sources outside of central governments so that open markets and open societies can flourish; and, 2) Support the “intermediary organizations� hailed by Alexis de Tocqueville in his travels throughout the United States, where citizens of different faiths, ethnicities, and genders work together on common problems, thereby increasing the pluralism so vital to democracies.

This approach is not just valid for the

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United States. World Bank President Robert Zoellick has argued for a new multilateral aid system more connected to private and civil society networks that do a better job at demonstrating

aid effectiveness. This approach, he predicts, will “unleash a world beyond aid, a world that highlights prosperity not palliative; potential not patronage; dignity not dependency.”15

NOTES

1 Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravallion. Development Research Group, World Bank, “An Update to the World Bank’s estimates of consumption poverty in the developing world,” March 1, 2012. Print.

2 P.Chow and R. Bhandari Open Doors 2011 Report on International Educational Exchange. New York: Institute of International Education, 2011. Print.

3 The Index of Global Philanthropy 2012. Center for Global Prosperity. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2012.

Web. http://gpr.hudson.org/ (date accessed 3 Jan 2012).

4 Mercy Corps http://www.mercycorps.org/ muhammadrizal/blog/20575 (date accessed: March 25 2012).

5 The Index of Global Philanthropy 2010. Center for Global Prosperity. Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2010. p.64. Print.

6 2010 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States. Social Investment Forum Foundation. Washington D.C.: Social Investment Forum Foundation, 2010. Internet. http://ussif.org/resources/research/ documents/2010TrendsES.pdf (date accessed 7 Feb 2012).

7 The Rockefeller Foundation, Program Related Investments, Internet, www.rockefellerfoundation.org/what-we-do/program-relatedinvestments/#page3, (date accessed March 24 2012).

8 Sean Stannard-Stockton, “Mission Related Investing for Individuals.” Stanford Social Innovation Review, Internet, <http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/mission_related_investing_for_individuals> (date accessed 7 Feb. 2012).

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9 “Impact Investing: Happy Returns.” The Economist, Internet, http://www.economist.com/node/21528678 (date accessed 7 Feb 2012).

10 Jenara Nerenberg, “Husk Power Systems Wants to Lead a ‘Revolution in Electricity,’” Internet, http:// www.fastcompany.com/1714395/husk-power-systemsfrom-power-to-empowered (date accessed March 25 2012).

11 Susan Raymond. Global Philanthropy: The Ties that Bind. Washington, D.C.: Changing Our World, Inc., 2011. Print.

12 Raymond, Susan. Skating to Where the Puck Will Be: Philanthropy and the Societal Future, keynote address to Philanthropic Foundations Canada, pg. 3, October 3, 2011, Changing Our World, Inc., NY, NY, October, 2011.

13 Sandra Lawson and Douglas B. Gilman. The Power of the Purse: Gender Equality and Middle Class Spending. Goldman Sachs Global Markets Institute. New York: Goldman Sachs Group, Inc, 2009, Internet, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/women-and-economics/ power-of-purse.pdf (date accessed 7 Feb 2012).

14 Beyond Assistance: The HELP Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reform. HELP Commission. Washington, D.C.: Help Commission, 2007, Internet, (date accessed 6 Jan 2012).

15 Robert B. Zoellick “Beyond Aid.” The World Bank. 14 Sept 2011, Internet, http://web.worldbank. org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,contentMDK :23000133~pagePK:34370~piPK:42770~theSite PK:4607,00.html (date accessed 7 Feb 2012).

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

Citizenship

The Evolution of ‘Corporate Philanthropy’ Bob Diamond There is no question that the role and impacts business has in wider society is today subject to unprecedented scrutiny and debate. The 2008 financial crisis and the continued turmoil in financial markets have raised some profound questions about how all businesses—perhaps banking more than others—can best make a valuable contribution to society.

It is a debate that can engender polarized views. One point of view extols the primacy of maximizing shareholder returns to the exclusion of any other consideration. Another view deems business, per se, to be generally detrimental to the wider interests of society. Neither view, however, withstands much detailed scrutiny, because businesses are a part of society. The way that they operate and behave as citizens should matter greatly to shareholders. That is because business sustainability is not achieved through occasional philanthropic gestures. Instead, the social license to operate is constantly renewed by consistently demonstrating responsibility and engagement. In other words, businesses need to be active citizens that use their skills, expertise, and commercial activities to help achieve broad social benefits as an integral part of how they generate returns for their shareholders. Citizen-

Bob Diamond is the Chief Executive of Barclays PLC.

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ship means behaving with integrity by making responsible decisions that take the needs and the best interests of customers, clients, and communities into account. Not only is that the right thing to do; it is also sound business.

trust now needs to be rebuilt, and confirmation that we have achieved that will be the acknowledgment of the general public of our status as responsible citizens. It is also critical that we are able to show our progress in working towards that, and that we communicate our The Socio-economic Context. efforts effectively along the way.

The global economy is experiencThat does not mean that corporaing major challenges on a number of tions can achieve this by simply allocatfronts. Those difficulties are prompt- ing more of their income to ‘philaning some very fundamental questions thropic’ causes. Shareholders do not about the role of business in society and want their businesses to be philanthrothe many ways in which the public and pists. They want them to behave as good private sectors intersect. citizens. Responsible citizenship is not In combination, these challenges are about giving money to good causes, having the effect of focusing concern but rather about seeking opportunities on widening inequalities and raising where the organization can invest in

Responsible citizenship is not about giving

money to good causes, but rather about seeking opportunities where the organization can invest in

communities and add value... questions about the value of some types of economic activity. Young people in many regions of the world have been hit especially hard by a lack of jobs. This presents the real risk of further social unrest around the world if the situation persists or deteriorates as a result of our collective inability to work together to generate stronger economic growth and more jobs.

Businesses are being forced to address these issues today because the financial crisis has changed perceptions of what society expects from them. In recent times, businesses, particularly large corporations and banks, arguably lost touch with broader social concerns, and that has led to a loss of trust. That

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communities and add value by leveraging its people, expertise, and assets.

Barclays and Citizenship. With-

in this context I will now focus on those things I know best—the banking industry and specifically Barclays. Banks’ stakeholders are sending a very clear message: banks need to accept responsibility for what went wrong in society and become better citizens. At Barclays, those demands accord strongly with our capabilities as a bank, and so Barclays’ citizenship vision is rooted explicitly in responding to our stakeholders’ demands. The single most important role for banks today is to focus on helping create jobs and driving economic

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growth. Banks can best do this by operating firmly in the private sector, providing products and services through a free and competitive market. To do that effectively, banks need a much more constructive relationship with customers, with the public, with governments, and with regulators, so that the focus can be on a shared and mutually beneficial future. That, in turn, depends on three things: 1. Accepting responsibility for what has gone wrong; 2. Building a better understanding of how businesses and banks work together to generate economic growth; 3. And, most importantly, making practical use of the profound lessons learned in order to become better and more effective citizens.

We realize that this needs to go much further than a conceptual commitment.

Banks will be judged by their actions. It is therefore essential that we demonstrate how we add value to the economy and wider society, set explicit objectives for those goals, and then measure and report our progress towards them. This is precisely the journey on which we have embarked.

Citizenship is one of our four strategic priorities at Barclays. Accordingly, we have invested considerable time, energy, and resources to develop a rigorous framework and to demonstrate our progress in a transparent manner.

Our approach focuses on the connections between societal and economic progress. That means contributing to economic growth and helping to drive activities where social and commercial value align. In practice, it means that Barclays is able to have the biggest

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

positive impact on society by harnessing people, expertise and assets, and as part of that, by aligning community support with business strengths. The goals of the business and those of society are, in this view, seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. We are committed to ensuring we do this, and success will be measured by our stakeholders.

Citizenship and Business Strategy: Two Sides of the Same Coin. At Barclays, we have a clear

sense of our business purpose—to help individuals, businesses, and economies progress and grow. We realize, too, the importance of articulating this. We use the term “Citizenship” to capture that purpose. It is built around three pillars of activity: 1. Contributing to growth in the real economy— we support economic growth and job creation by operating a strong, profitable business that is focused on helping individuals, businesses, institutions, and governments pursue their goals in fifty countries.

2. The way we do business—our clients’ interests are at the heart of what we do at all times. We reinforce our business integrity every day by striving to improve the service that we provide, making responsible decisions in how we manage the business, and actively managing the social and environmental impacts of what we do.

3. Supporting our communities—we play a broader role in the communities in which we live and work beyond what we deliver through our core business activities. We do this through community investment programs and the direct efforts of our employees.

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We are focused about the ways in which we invest in the communities in which we are present. It is essential, however, that what we do in the space of community support must build explicitly on what we do in the other two areas.

Citizenship in Action—Supporting our Communities. It is

perhaps the last pillar that most closely corresponds with any traditional understanding of corporate philanthropy, so I will discuss that area of activity in more depth. Investing in the communities in which we operate has been important to Barclays for over three hundred years.

Rather than seeing our activity as starting and ending with a cash donation, we believe that our community investment should be treated with the same rigor and scrutiny that apply to any other investments we make. That means we need to approach community investment with focus, ensure we set explicit expectations about what we hope to achieve from our involvement, and take the steps necessary to realize them. We work to coordinate activity across the organization so that everything we do reinforces our commitment to what we are trying to achieve.

In 2011, we invested £63 million ($100 million) in community programs, reaching more than two million people around the world. We encouraged 73,000 employees to volunteer, raise money, or give money. The focus of our community support is on the “next generation,” as we believe that by equipping them with the necessary financial, business, and life skills we can empower them to achieve economic independence and security, now and in the future. We deliver support for

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the communities in which we operate through a combination of employee programs and by partnering with charities and non-governmental organizations. In both cases, we seek to encourage and empower our colleagues to use their professional skills and expertise in such as way that creates maximum benefits for young people.

These activities are built on the core belief that it is vital for the next generation to manage its finances effectively.

We aim to equip young people with the confidence and knowledge to create a stable financial platform from which to make successful life choices and achieve their goals. One of our initiatives, Barclays Money Skills, tackles topics such as opening a bank account—budgeting, saving and spending—and it gives practical guidance on what to do if something goes wrong. Barclays employees support this program through giving their time and expertise in one-to-one sessions and group seminars. We have committed £15 million ($24 million) to this industry-leading initiative and are working in partnership with leading youth charities to reach one million people by the end of 2012.

Another initiative, Banking on Change, aims to provide around 400,000 people across eleven countries with the opportunity and skills to save and manage their money more effectively. The partnership between Plan UK, CARE International UK, and Barclays brings together the independent interests and expertise of each partner to improve the quality of life for poor people by extending and developing access to basic financial services. Banking on Change focuses on savings-led microfinance and supports

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the establishment of savings groups, such as Village Savings & Loans Associations (VSLA) in poor communities.

For those communities that effectively and consistently save, the VSLAs will be given opportunities to link with formal banking systems and accessible financial products, enabling them to be self-sufficient. This is being piloted in Uganda, Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania.

In the United States, Barclays supports a number of programs that aim to encourage the entrepreneurial skills and career potential of young people.

These partnerships include harnessing our colleaguesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; business skills to advise Echoing Green social entrepreneurs; supporting Endeavorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s eMBA Program that sends top business school

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

of initiatives to help students plan for their future careers with confidence.

In much the same way, the Barclays partnership with Youth Business International (YBI) helps young people start their own business and create employment. YBI works with young people to provide access to capital, training, mentoring and other business development services, benefitting 50,000 young entrepreneurs in around thirty-four countries. Barclays employees volunteer in a variety of ways, including mentoring and through providing strategic support.

Business Fundamentals for Successful Citizenship. These programs are just some examples of

It is crucial to adopt exactly the same approach to community initiatives as any other commercial activities. students to work with their emerging market entrepreneurs; assisting at-risk adolescents to successfully enter and graduate from college through the Barclays Good Shepherd Services Brooklyn LifeLink Program; and, in collaboration with the West End Neighborhood House, creating small businesses to hire and teach transferable business skills to underprivileged youth.

Barclays is also working with Junior Achievement Worldwide to help young people in ten countries improve their opportunities for employment. From mentoring sessions in the workplace to entrepreneurship camps and awards events, Barclays and Junior Achievement Worldwide have launched a range

Citizenship in practice. They are modeled on the principle that a business can focus its expertise in its area of greatest concern (in Barclays case, young people) and to work on a number of fronts to secure lasting change. But regardless of the specific aim of any single initiative, each must have some key attributes and conditions to be effective and have the greatest positive impact. Here again, it is any given organizationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s abilities as a business that must come to the fore. It is crucial to adopt exactly the same approach to community initiatives as any other commercial activities. That means, for example, establishing the right governance framework. It involves increasing the focus, quality, and quan-

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tity of engagement with stakeholders, just as with customers and investors.

A combination of innovative global and local partnerships, employee support, business-led social efforts, and other assets will help achieve maximum impact. It is also important to measure and report progress with discipline and rigor. This means implementing an annual reporting calendar within which progress and strategy are reviewed against consistent metrics with standardized reporting protocols, submitting report content, where possible, for independent assurance.

In addition to having the right governance and reporting structures in place, it is essential that leadership is fully engaged and internal buy-in is

integrating Citizenship criteria into performance and talent management systems, so that the right behaviors and activities are not perceived as an optional extra, but are placed at the very heart of how all employees are encouraged and expected to act.

Conclusion. Consensus is growing

that businesses must increase profits in a way that creates sustainable shareholder value, not just short-term gain.

Achieving this requires a focus on the interests of the customers, clients, and communities we serve. The actions of business must reflect society’s increasing demands to demonstrate that it has taken account of the impacts it has.

Businesses must explicitly and publicly

To the question “Can the corporation be

a good citizen?” the answer must not only be that it can but, in fact, that it must. achieved. The very top of an organization must make a visible commitment not only to the aims of community engagement but also, critically, to their delivery—Barclays does this through our Board Citizenship Committee, a formal sub-committee of our Board of Directors. A senior leadership team has to help drive the understanding of what community engagement means, and set those reasons out rationally to secure the appropriate level of emotional engagement throughout the business.

Communication is an essential tool that can help engage and educate all internal and external stakeholders. That engagement should be further reinforced by

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demonstrate that they contribute to societal progress. That is why I view Citizenship as a business priority that is essential for rebuilding confidence and restoring trust. It is vital that all businesses continue to engage on tough issues that confront industry within society. We need to recognize that we will not always be able to get everything right the first time and will be subject to criticism, but that should not deter us from continuing to engage, building consensus, and working towards mutually beneficial goals. To the question “Can the corporation be a good citizen?” the answer is not only be that it can but, in fact, that it must.

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

Joe Public

The Most Important Partner in International Philanthropy Elizabeth Gore and Kent Ford Bishops. Basketball players. Boy Scouts. These are not the usual actors associated with the UN, international development, public-private partnerships, or solving pressing global issues. Yet for at least the past five years all three have joined together to help combat malaria in Africa by raising awareness and funds to distribute millions of insecticidetreated mosquito bed nets. Who do you think is working with the UN in the effort to eradicate polio? It is the Rotary group in your hometown that is probably meeting down the street today. We call them “strange bedfellows,” and they are often exactly what make the most successful partnerships in international philanthropy. These combinations bring together the most strategic but elusive partner that is saving lives today—Joe Public. We have moved to an era in which global partnerships are most effective when they create an environment that allows the general public to contribute to solving problems. The partnerships that inspire movements of hundreds of thousands of people advocating, educating, and fundraising for one end goal are the new recipe for sustainable solutions.

Elizabeth Gore is the Vice President of Global Partnerships for the United Nations Foundation. She is currently managing partnership and cause marketing strategies implemented in programs and campaigns of the United Nations.

Kent Ford is Global Partnerships Associate at the United Nations Foundation.

Partnerships and Malaria. Great progress has been Summer/Fall 2012 [ 31 ]

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made in the global fight to end malaria deaths. Just two years ago a child died from malaria every thirty seconds.1 Now, with the help of bed nets and other prevention and treatment tools, that number is sixty seconds.2 Malaria deaths have been cut in half in eleven African countries in less than three years.3 Thanks to the malaria awareness movement, millions of dollars from the public, governments, and foundations have been invested in prevention, treatment, education, and hopefully soon, a new vaccine. The combined partnership of many strange bedfellows has brought together Joe Public and his family, friends, school, church, and community to elevate this issue to the forefront of the international development agenda.

A little more than five years ago the malaria community received an unlikely but welcome partner when then Sports Illustrated columnist Rick Reilly wrote an article titled “Nothing But Nets,” calling on his readers and all sports enthusiasts to join the global fight to end malaria.4 His article inspired a grassroots campaign aptly named Nothing But Nets, which brought together the world’s largest grassroots network of partners and supporters to protect families in Africa from malaria.

A public-private partnership led by the UN Foundation, Nothing But Nets brings together a diverse set of players including multiple UN agencies.

These include the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), multimedia organizations, professional sports leagues, faith-based and civil society organizations, corporations,

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and foundations.

Crafting the perfect mix of partners is not easy. Today organizations do not enter into partnerships for altruistic reasons. It is important to consider public-private partnerships as if they were business partnerships. Why is your organization entering into this partnership? What are the outcomes that are important to your organization? If your partner is a company, it is essential to understand the business objectives behind that company’s decision making. Does such a partnership help the bottom line in forms of corporate reputation, opening new markets, or garnering new customers? If objectives from both sides are articulated from the beginning, then an understanding of how to make the partnership sustainable will develop. Additionally, all partners must return to the table often to evaluate the progress being made. Tweaking and revisiting the objectives will ensure nothing is left to assumption. Lastly, partnerships must be formalized in writing. Memoranda of understanding, partnership agreements, and letters of intent can save a partnership when employees transition or larger influences try to move the partnership away from its original goals. Partnerships can be difficult and they require attention and resources, but when managed correctly they pay huge dividends. Finding the right partners and getting them to come to the table is a significant part of the puzzle, but it is a mistake to focus only on this piece. The real question is what to do with the partners once they agree to enter into the partnership.

Since Rick Reilly’s article and the launch of the Nothing But Nets cam-

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paign, some big power players have joined in this partnership, including the people of The United Methodist Church (UMC), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and the Boy Scouts of America. The combined power of millions of people advocating for one issue cannot be ignored.

Today the global malaria community reflects on the fact that seven years ago it would have been difficult to gather a handful of people other than scientists to talk about combating malaria. Now this effort is featured on American Idol before an audience of millions. It is an incredible testament to the power of grassroots mobilization that through these partnerships, hundreds of thousands of people, most of whom were unaware of malaria, as it was eliminated in the United States in 1951, have taken action, raised awareness and funds, and helped save lives.5 Bishops are an example of how this mass mobilization can work. The UMC has a membership of approximately 7.6 million people in the United States.6 Its fastest growing population is in Africa, where malaria is one of the largest health burdens. When Methodists began speaking about malaria in their congregations, millions of dollars started pouring in to Nothing But Nets. From whom? From Joe Public, sitting in the pews. In an era in which every partnership or development agenda has a celebrity spokesperson, the champion who received the most media coverage for Nothing But Nets was Katherine Commale, an eight year old Methodist from Pennsylvania who raised $260,000 singlehandedly to end malaria.7 This is a powerful constituency in the United States, especially as

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it relates to mobilizing federal development dollars from Congress.

In 2011 a group of UMC clergy and lay leadership went to Capitol Hill to advocate for continued federal funding for malaria prevention through the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB), and Malaria and the President’s Malaria Initiative. According to Mike Beard of the Better World Campaign, “This was one of the most successful advocacy days we have ever seen.

The Congressional staff and leadership would not turn down a meeting with these folks because they had already raised $19 million for the issue and had 7 million people behind them.”8 Thanks to the work of the Methodists and other supporters, U.S. funding for malaria in 2011 was sustained at $732.8 million, the highest it has ever been, and the President’s 2012 fiscal year budget request places funding at $834 million.9 As the malaria movement has made more Americans aware of malaria, and actively support efforts to combat it, U.S. funding to fight the disease has increased by 270 percent since 2004.10 Mobilizing the masses has also taken place through sports. There are about 17,000 fans at each NBA game. Each team plays eighty-two regular season games a year, and there are thirty teams.

During this partnership, every NBA team has promoted Nothing But Nets and malaria eradication in some way.

Players, coaches, owners, and David Stern, the Commissioner of the NBA, have all advocated, fundraised, travelled to Africa to distribute nets, and even been invited by former President George W. Bush to talk about malaria at the White House. The U.S. Agency for

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International Development, the UN, and the Gates Foundation combined could never by themselves command an audience of this level and at these numbers to talk about malaria.

Finally, the Boy Scouts have contributed to mass mobilization, too. The power of thousands of young men talking about one issue in a very organized way has resulted in the creation of an official merit badge for malaria prevention efforts. The Boy Scouts’ efforts have impressed members of Congress, the Secretary-General of the UN, and even Time Magazine. The Boy Scouts of America joined the Nothing But Nets campaign in 2010 as part of its then newly-launched “A Year of Celebration, A Century of Making a Difference” program, part of its one hundredth anniversary celebration.11 When we met with the Boy Scouts for the first time, we jointly decided that a gift to Africa in the form of malaria awareness was a fitting tribute to their founder.

Two years later, thousands of hours have been logged by the Boy Scouts in educating their fellow citizens on the importance of the fight against malaria.12 The Boy Scouts are both engaging their peers and catching the attention of decision makers in Congress.13 An example of the Joe Public partner is Nate Stafford, a thirteen-yearold Boy Scout from Fayetteville, North Carolina. At age eleven, he walked one hundred miles to celebrate one hundred years of scouting, and along the way he educated people about the challenge that malaria presents for millions of people every day.14 His journey received so much attention that he was invited to address members of Congress, featured by ExxonMobil in

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an advertorial of the 2011 Time 100 issue, and honored by the SecretaryGeneral at the UN.15 When it comes to partnerships, those that engage youth are becoming the new power players.

Today’s youth are future consumers, investors, philanthropists, and voters.

While previous generations have given away their wealth through estates and legacy gifts, this generation is going to give it away while they are alive. This is the generation of ‘philanthro-teens,’ and the partnerships that engage them now will reap the benefits because as they age and their financial base and networks grow, these teens will trust the mission of these partnerships. As Nate and his fellow Scouts reach voting age, they are learning not only about important issues but also how to engage others around them to raise awareness and advocate action. They will comprise a civically engaged generation that knows and cares about global health and development and that is empowered to effect change.

Partnerships and Polio. Polio

is on the brink of eradication, due to what is one of the most effective sustained public-private partnerships ever: the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), an effort that has seen the number of polio cases worldwide reduced 99 percent since 1988.16 The GPEI was launched in 1988 by a World Health Assembly resolution to end polio and is led by national governments in partnership with four spearheading partners: WHO, Rotary International, UNICEF, and the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Other partners engaged in GPEI include the Bill

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and Melinda Gates Foundation, the UN Foundation, development banks, donor governments, and humanitarian organizations. In its twenty-four years of operation, this partnership has engaged 200 countries and 20 million volunteers to immunize 2.5 billion children around the world.17 In 1988, there were 350,000 new cases of polio in the world. In 2010 there were only 1,352 new cases.18 Today, only parts of three countries remain polio endemic.19 In January, India marked its first year with no new cases, a tremendous accomplishment considering that only two years ago nearly half the world’s new cases were there.20 The world is less than one percent away from permanently eradicating polio.21 This phenomenal progress is a result of the partners and supporters of GPEI, a platform of strange bedfellows who have linked together to engage Joe Public. Rotary International first visualized a world free from polio through the collaborative efforts of millions of people from across the world. Rotary’s involvement in polio prevention began with a grant in 1979 to immunize six million children in the Philippines, an effort that was so successful that it led Rotarians to launch their landmark program, PolioPlus, in 1985.22 The first and largest internationally coordinated private-sector support of a public health initiative, PolioPlus, committed an initial pledge of $120 million.23 More importantly it raised a support base for Rotary International members to raise awareness and funding for polio prevention efforts.

Rotary and PolioPlus played a significant role in inspiring the World Health Assembly resolution to end polio and

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

the subsequent formation of the GPEI. To date, Rotary has contributed more than $900 million in support of polio eradication, and estimates that its contributions will approach $1.2 billion by the time eradication is certified.24 That almost twenty-seven years after launching its polio program Rotary continues to energize its members and surpass fundraising goals is a testament to the organization’s commitment to the then seemingly impossible vision in 1979 of a polio-free world. Rotary’s success, and that of the eradication effort as a whole, has been made possible by Rotary’s ability to galvanize the support of its diverse membership pool. In other words, this success is a result of the ability of a huge organization to move people at a local level. No matter how small the Rotary club, Rotarians can proudly share the story of their role in eradicating polio forever.

In his 2012 annual letter, Bill Gates aptly describes Rotary as “the heart and soul of polio eradication,” noting the organization’s direct support to polio eradication and its role in engaging others.25 Today Rotary has over 1.2 million members in more than 34,000 clubs worldwide.26 They volunteer in polio-affected communities. They also raise money and engage others in an effort to end polio through diverse and creative ways. For example, eighth-grade Interact (Rotary’s service club for young people) members at the Episcopal School of Knoxville created a children’s book using illustrations from kindergarten through fifth-grade students. The club members gave presentations on polio, then compiled illustrations into the book titled Change 4 Change, which they will sell to raise

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funds for Rotary’s polio work.27 In addition to the millions of dollars raised directly by Rotarians both young and old to fund polio eradication efforts, they have also leveraged the collective voice of their membership base to advocate for greater government funding. Through its Polio Eradication Advocacy Task Force, Rotary appoints a national advocacy advisor to coordinate the advocacy work of Rotarians in a potential donor country to secure government support for the eradication effort. According to Dr. Steve Strickland, Senior Liaison Officer to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative at the UN Foundation, Rotary’s advocacy component, particularly through the

overall budgets. Gates observed that, “this will be possible only if their constituents understand that aid, which is less than one percent of the budget in most countries, has a significant impact on people’s lives.”29 The best intentions and hardest work of international development agencies and NGOs is best sustained when there is a constituency that understands the issues and supports the work. This is especially true regarding polio, when eliminating the final one percent of cases will be the most costly and difficult. For many donor governments and supporters who have not been directly affected by polio in decades, it may be tempting to prioritize other challenges, especially

The best intentions and hardest work of international development agencies and NGOs is best sustained when there is a constituency that understands the issues and supports the work. national advocacy advisors, has played an instrumental role in maintaining global momentum in the polio fight.

These advocacy efforts in collaboration with the other GPEI partners have collectively engaged forty-two donor countries to support the GPEI (all countries still affected by the disease also contribute to the efforts domestically), netting additional funding of greater than $8 billion from donor governments since 1995.28 In his letter, Gates also reflects on a recent experience at a G20 conference in November 2011. He found government leaders in support of maintaining funding for aid despite the necessary and difficult choices required to cut

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in tight fiscal times. Thankfully, polio is out of sight for most of the world, but to let it slip out of mind would be a mistake with terrible consequences.

Conclusion. Through partnerships, the international development community has engaged Joe Public to build unstoppable movements to advocate and fund sustainable solutions for issues such as malaria and polio. Other groups that are getting it right with Joe Public are Charity Water, Invisible Children, and Girl Up. They all move huge constituencies towards one goal.

Bishops, basketball players, and Boy Scouts do not initially seem a natural fit to join hands with the UN to elimi-

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nate the world’s most deadly diseases.

Likewise, global polio eradication may not seem a likely topic for discussion at a Rotary meeting in Friendswood, Texas or Hattiesburg, Mississippi. But today the most successful partnerships

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

are those engaging large constituencies to advocate for issues globally, and they put the number one spokesperson at the forefront of these issues—Joe Public.

NOTES

1 WHO, “Ten Facts on Malaria,” Internet, http:// www.who.int/features/factfiles/malaria/en/index. html.

2 WHO, “Fact Sheet: Malaria,” Internet, http:// www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs094/en/index. html.

3 WHO, “World Malaria Report 2011,” Internet, http://www.who.int/malaria/world_malaria_ report_2011/en/index.html.

4 Rick Reilly, “Nothing But Nets,” Internet, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2006/writers/rick_ reilly/04/25/reilly0501/index.html.

5 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), “The History Of Malaria, An Ancient Disease,” Internet, http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/ about/history/.

6 United Methodist Church, “2011 State Of The Church: The People,” Internet, http://www.umc. org/site/c.lwL4KnN1LtH/b.6765229/k.D5ED/2011_ State_of_the_Church_The_People.htm.

7 Donald McNeil, “A $10 Mosquito Net Is Making Charity Cool,” Internet, http://www.nytimes. com/2008/06/02/us/02malaria.html; Fundraising level based on internal UN Foundation sources.

8 Michael Beard, Interview with Elizabeth Gore 9 Kaiser Family Foundation, “The President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI),” Internet, http://www.kff. org/globalhealth/upload/7922-02.pdf.

10 Ibid.

11 Boy Scouts of America, “Nothing But Net Teams Up With Boy Scouts Of America To Fight Malaria,” Internet, http://www.scouting.org/Media/ PressReleases/PreviousYears/2009/20090827.aspx.

12 Nothing But Nets Campaign, “What’s Annoying To You Is Deadly To Them,” Internet, http://www. globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/pdf/NBN/ BSA_NBN_Toolkit.pdf 13 Nate Stafford, “Buzzing On Capitol Hill,” Internet, http://www.nothingbutnets.net/ blogs/?blogger=nate-stafford.

14 Chris Tucker, “Help Fight Malaria With Nothing But Nets,” Internet, http://scoutingmagazine. org/2012/02/help-fight-malaria-with-nothing-butnets/ 15 Nate Stafford, “Buzzing On Capitol Hill,” Internet, http://www.nothingbutnets.net/

blogs/?blogger=nate-stafford; ExxonMobil, “Advertisement,” TIME, (May 2011): 103-105; Cathy Smith, “Champions To End Malaria,” Internet, http://www. un.int/wcm/content/lang/en/pid/27601.

16 Global Polio Eradication Initiative, “Progress,” Internet, http://www.polioeradication.org/Aboutus/ Progress.aspx.

17 Global Polio Eradication Initiative, “About Us,” Internet, http://www.polioeradication.org/AboutUs. aspx.

18 WHO, “Fact Sheet: Poliomyelitis,” Internet, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs114/en/.

19 Ibid.

20 Nikhila Gill, “India Wins The Battle Against Polio,” Internet, http://india.blogs.nytimes. com/2012/01/13/india-wins-the-battle-againstpolio/.

21 WHO, “Fact Sheet: Poliomyelitis,” Internet, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs114/en/.

22 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, “Rotary International: A Hands On Effort,” Internet, http:// www.gatesfoundation.org/grantee-profiles/Pages/ rotary-international.aspx.

23 Global Polio Eradication Network, “A History Of Polio,” Internet, http://www.polioeradication.org/ Polioandprevention/Historyofpolio.aspx.

24 Rotary International, “PolioPlus Program,” Internet, http://www.rotary.org/en/ServiceAndFellowship/Polio/RotarysWork/Pages/ridefault.aspx.

25 Bill Gates, “Annual Letter 2012,” Internet, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/annual-letter/2012/ Pages/home-en.aspx.

26 Rotary International, “At A Glance,” Internet, http://www.rotary.org/en/AboutUs/RotaryInternational/ataglance/Pages/ridefault.aspx.

27 Ryan Hyland, “Tennessee Club Wins Interact Video Contest Grand-Prize,” Internet, http://www. rotary.org/en/MediaAndNews/News/Pages/120127_ news_videocontest.aspx.

28 Rotary International, “Rotary and Polio,” Internet, http://www.rotary.org/en/EndPolio/Pages/ learn.aspx.

29 Bill Gates, “Annual Letter 2012,” Internet, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/annual-letter/2012/ Pages/home-en.aspx.

Summer/Fall 2012 [ 37 ]

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Rethinking Global Philanthropy

Global Institutions and Partnerships The Future of International Development?

Thomas Pogge Carol Lancaster and Touching on various tiers of the global structure–from individual donors to public-private partnerships to multilateral aid agencies– these two thinkers share their perspectives on what can be changed and initiated in the years ahead to alleviate the plight of the world’s poor.

GJIA: Recently, high net-worth individuals such as Bill Gates and Warren Buffet have pledged to step up philanthropic efforts in developing countries. What is the importance and potential for visible impact of such endeavors? To what extent do you think that these individual efforts diminish the importance or complicate the role of goverment and international aid agencies?

Pogge: I think these endeavors have been successful for the most part and have made a huge difference. This is nowhere clearer than in the area of global health where maybe ten to fifteen years ago it seemed entirely utopian to think that we could make meaningful progress against HIV/AIDS in the poorest and most deprived regions of the world; now treatment is right up to above the 50 percent level in some poor countries. There are still millions of people without treatment, but we have stepped it up to a very considerable

Carol Lancaster is the current Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Professor of Politics at Georgetown University. She was previously the Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development and a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa.

Thomas Pogge is the Director of the Global Justice Program and the Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University. He is also a Research Director of the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature at the University of Oslo.

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extent. This is now being extended to other areas such as malaria, TB, various tropical diseases, maternal health, and neonatal health. Remarkably, the new money from Gates has not diminished public spending on global health. On the contrary, it has been matched by new governmental initiatives such as the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and new contributions to multilateral organizations such as the Global Fund and the GAVI Alliance. On the whole, the various funders of transnational health aid have worked reasonably well together, and the quite impressive increase of funding for global health since 1998 or so has shown very significant positive results.

or more official aid agencies operating within their borders, not to mention many NGOs and foundations. That has its costs: the administration of all these agencies takes a toll on the government. In effect, if it is not implemented well, aid can make the strong stronger and the weak weaker. At the same time though, there is so much to do that there is no lack of important activities to be supported by the bilateral and multilateral aid agencies along with the Bill Gates’s, the NGOs, the venture philanthropists, and the corporate sector. The dynamic area in a lot of development work today is in corporate enterprise-funded shared value investments to help build up the communities in which they are living, while strengthening enterprises’s own Lancaster: First of all, philanthropists business potential. are already visible. Bill Gates has had an All the work done by the Coca-Cola extraordinary impact on issues involv- Company on water management in Jaiing health. Now he is getting into issues pur is for Coke, but it also helps Jaipur. involving agriculture. I would not say That type of investment, if managed that everything done has been com- well, can yield huge benefits. To call pletely successful, but individuals and upon a phrase that one of my entreprefoundations like his have accomplished neurial friends uses: “There is a seleca lot. People are benefiting from these tion of activities that are called one-toprojects. The more you get people like one, a selection called one-to-many, Bill Gates involved in addressing major and a selection called many-to-many.” world problems, the more others will That applies to the history of what is join him in addressing those issues and happening in the development field. In the better off we will be. The amount of the “old days” efforts were often onemoney he is putting into such endeavors to-one: government-to-government. is significant and provides, potentially, There was a sense that one party would a great impact and visibility, provided it supply the capital and tell the other is planned and implemented well. what to do with it. Aid quickly became As far as complicating or supple- one-to-many, not just governmentmenting the work of aid agencies, ques- to-government, but governments-totions can be raised regarding the nature NGOs and other organizations. What of coordination–an area in which we we have now is many-to-many (i.e., have long had challenges. Countries many sources and many recipients of like Lesotho have around thirty-five aid). And that has potential transaction

[ 4 0] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

LANCASTER & POGGE

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

and coordination costs, but I think it is also an awfully great opportunity to get a lot done.

Obviously, philanthropists and corporate enterprises are part of the scene.

Why are they and many NGOs not engaged in the whole development conversation as much as official donors? It just has not happened yet. There is a problem in the development community: people do not talk to each other as much they should. While a lot of conversation goes on between NGOs and Washington aid agencies like USAID and the World Bank, many philanthropists do not talk that much to these people. It is difficult when the philanthropists are not located in Washington; easy interaction does not happen.

The corporate sector is another piece of this picture. I talked at one point to the President of Georgetown University about doing a development “Davos” to bring people from different groups together to talk about some of these issues. USAID is actually doing this this summer at Georgetown with a conference on the Frontiers of Development.

Pogge: It is very hard to generalize about these matters, to say that there is a category of organizations that are working better than others. Aid has in many ways been ineffective, or less effective than it could have been, and this remains true even with these new vehicles. But there are large variations. One very big problem has been that aid organizations based in the North are coming in with certain ideas about how to deliver aid that are driven, on the one hand, by their own educational background and prejudices and, on the other hand, by their fundraising needs. This is always important to bear in mind: that there is a disconnect between what would really be most useful to the intended beneficiaries and what is actually being delivered by the organization that comes in.

This disconnect is driven by the need to raise money and hence to please the people who are giving the money.

These people have certain views and they have certain psychological mechanisms and motivations. An organization’s fundraisers therefore have to ask themselves “Where should we plant our flag? Where should we be active? What GJIA: You have both written a lot should we be doing? In which counon organizations like the IMF, World try?” Organizations are often driven Bank, USAID, and others in terms by the need to be present in the media of their effectiveness to alleviate pov- of the countries where they are trying erty through aid distribution. Recently to raise their funds. And also of course there has been a push toward rethink- these organizations are often competing their approach on new mecha- ing against one another, which can nisms through focusing on, as many also get in the way of effectiveness. So of our contributors to the issue ask I think a good part of the problem is for, public-private partnerships and actually this need for fundraising and empowering the local aid recipients trying to be responsive to two very difthrough transfers of ideas and technical ferent audiences. You have to keep the expertise. What are your thoughts on donors happy and keep them motivated the impact of such realigned objectives? to give money. But then there is also the audience of the people whose lives are

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supposed to be improved.

Lancaster: Public-private partnerships are a relatively new activity for aid agencies. They really got going in the early part of the last decade; it is a great idea, but I do not think it represents a major portion of the public aid business at this point and I do not think it will become a major portion of the public aid business in the future. Public aid agencies have a set of objectives that are not always aligned with those of the private sector. Our aid agency, USAID, does a lot of development, but it also has a political agenda. It is an arm of U.S. foreign policy. The World Bank, which is a true multilateral agency, works in certain areas in which public-

you,” you might get some business, but I suspect you would not get a lot. It is the combination of ideas and money that create incentives for people to explore and undertake transformative initiatives.

GJIA: What do you think Dr. Jim Yong Kim’s nomination as the World Bank president signals for the world development agenda? Many prominent economists have argued this signals the Obama administration’s de-emphasis on “pro-growth, macro-level reforms in favor of small-payoff, micro-level change”1 and focus on the humans need school of development, which is not the right course of action. What are your thoughts?

It is the combination of ideas and money that

create incentives for people to explore and undertake transformative initiatives. private partnerships may or may not fit; it often provides public goods that the private sector is not really interested in.

The other part of your question asks if aid agencies are going to turn themselves into knowledge institutions.

There is a lot of talk about the World Bank becoming a knowledge institution. I think that is great. My own personal view is there are a lot of places to get knowledge from. Aid agencies can certainly be helpful in that. That said, I think that governments and other aid recipients really look to aid agencies for money. If the money aspect is taken away from organizations like USAID or the World Bank and they simply approached a problem with the mentality of “we’ve got lots of ideas for

[ 4 2] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Pogge: I know Dr. Kim a bit from academic meetings and especially also from his service on the Advisory Board of Incentives for Global Health, the NGO that is developing and promoting the Health Impact Fund proposal. Dr. Kim is a splendid appointment, far better than I dared hope for. This is so for two main reasons.

First, Dr. Kim really cares about what the World Bank is supposed to be all about: “our mission is a world without poverty.” In the past, the Bank has largely done the bidding of the principal states and of the United States in particular. It has lent its expertise to presenting whatever the powerful governments wanted as good for the poor.

LANCASTER & POGGE

In fact, of course, the schemes of the powerful rarely benefit the poor. While the share of global household income going to the richest five percent of the world’s population has increased from 42.87 to 46.36 percent between 1988 and 2005, that going to the poorest half has declined from 3.53 to 2.92 percent and that going to the poorest quarter from 1.16 to 0.78 percent.

During this same period, the Bank has participated in building our new supranational institutional architecture — the rules governing finance and investment, trade, intellectual property — while doing little toward articulating or defending the interests of the poor. Dr. Kim’s appointment signals a change in emphasis by giving a constant defender of the poor a substantial role in international politics.

Secondly, Dr. Kim is politically skillful. He works well with others and understands how to realize moral imperatives in political practice. A great example of this is the 3-by-5 initiative he launched in 2003. Its immediate objective was to get life-saving antiretroviral treatment to 3 million HIV/ AIDS patients in low- and middleincome countries by 2005. This initiative was immensely important in drawing world attention to the huge and shameful global health deficits and in greatly increasing international outlays on reducing these deficits. It convinced many in the affluent countries that all people living with HIV/AIDS ought to have access to the treatment they need and likewise all those threatened by malaria, TB, and other debilitating or life-threatening diseases. Having pushed hard for Dr. Kim, the United States cannot easily undermine or dis-

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

card him. And I am optimistic, too, that he will be able to inspire many people in the Bank to take to heart its official purpose: to defend the interests of the world’s poor in decision making about social institutions and policies that affect their prospects for survival, health, education and political participation.

Lancaster: I was very impressed by Dr. Kim, whom I met several weeks ago. He is a medical doctor and anthropologist and has done a lot of work with the WHO, but he struck me as so much more than that–as someone who has a broad concept of development. He agrees that without growth, we are not going to have development, but there are other things besides growth that need take place. We want people to be able to lead decent lives–that may mean providing education, bed nets, healthcare, or it any number of things that growth may or may not take care of. What Dr. Kim is really interested in, as I understood him, is something he called the “science of execution” around social values–how things can be done better. Everyone talks about planning, but his focus seems to be not on how to get the money out the door, but on how to implement plans in an evidence-based manner that draws on our best practices.

Regarding the selection of Dr. Kim, the issue is who chooses the head of the World Bank. I understand all of the reasons why the U.S. government gets to choose, at least unofficially, the head of the World Bank (and the Europeans get the head of the IMF)–it makes active participation more politically attractive in Washington and in the Congress.

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But it is no longer clear that having a head of the World Bank is essential to continuing U.S. support for that institution. Is not it time for these international institutions to stop being patronage organizations at the top? It is time to choose the best person possible for the job from an international pool of candidates.

interest rates were very high and some poor people who borrowed from his Grameen Bank ended up worse off than before. Still, such opportunities should be identified and explored.

One friend of mine, Leila Chirayath, runs a non-profit outsourcing company, Samasource, that trains poor people in computer-based work and then connects them to employers in GJIA: Is there a duty or a role for affluent countries. Another friend of financial institutions in alleviating pov- mine, Andy Kuper, runs an investment erty and contributing to development? fund, LeapFrog Investment, which takes substantial stakes in micro-insurance Pogge: Yes, indeed. If these institu- companies, helping these companies tions were motivated to help with that design and market insurance products task, of course there would be a role for that reduce the vulnerabilities of poor them. They could contribute greatly by people while still earning some profit helping governments close the secretive for the insurer. Such insurance enables channels through which poor countries poor people to weather sudden shocks,

It is no longer clear that having a head of the World Bank is essential to continuing U.S. support for that institution. suffer some $1,000 billion in illicit outflows each year â&#x20AC;&#x201D; channels that are also heavily used by traffickers in drugs and human beings as well as by terrorists. The problem is that many banks are not motivated to do this: they make lots of money by facilitating illicit financial flows and therefore want to keep those channels open.

Financial institutions could also do better in serving the poor in ways that are also profitable to themselves. This may seem unpromising at first because the poor have so very little money. Yet, Mohammad Yunus has shown with his micro-lending that serving the poor can be profitable. His effort has been controversial, of course, because his

[ 4 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

such as a disease or bad harvest, and to transition to a new way of making a living without risking the lives of themselves and their families. Both enterprises are doing well, which shows that such efforts can be sustainable.

Lancaster: I do not think that the banks accept that they have a duty or obligation to shared value of investments.

They think in more practical, bottom line terms. If they want to function in a community and minimize friction or problems in that community and beyond, they must contribute to that community. There is another benefit for philanthropy from banks, investment firms, and enterprises-it gives

LANCASTER & POGGE

their employees a value proposition in what they do every day that is not just making money. That makes a difference in terms of morale and engagement. In my view, the functional aspects of duty emerge from the way people see things– they are constructed values in societies.

These norms are being constructed even as we speak.

GJIA: Dr. Pogge, on the issue of USAID brought up earlier by Dr. Lancaster, do you think that there are currently any particular shortcomings to its philosophy and operational strategy?

Could it be reformed in such a way so that it would be a morally defensible institution and if so, what would that look like?

Pogge: In some ways it is morally defensible now. It does spend money on development. To be sure, it is often doing so in a way that is adulterated by other ulterior motives. It is often used as a policy instrument toward advancing the geostrategic interests of the United States, but it is also doing real good. It could do much more good.

One important reform USAID could be involved in is to make aid more multilateral. Americans are always cagey about multilateral efforts and, for the reasons I mentioned before, it would be very good to have more collaboration in the development field. Development organizations should not, for example, burden developing nations and their administrations with writing reports and justifications and so on for a huge number of different donors, and jumping through all sorts of hoops.

Endless hours are wasted on accounting for this and that and meeting the vari-

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

ous different criteria of — and physically meeting with visiting officials from — all the governmental, non-governmental, and supra-governmental organizations that are giving money for various purposes, all to make sure that each of the various bits of money is spent in the way its donors intended. This is hugely wasteful, and often the objectives are at cross-purposes from one another.

Much more could be achieved if we had a more collaborative approach which would also prevent, by the way, corrupt governments in the developing world from playing off development organizations against one another. For USAID, as one of the largest agents in this field, I think this would be a big step forward if they could be a catalyst for better collaboration.

GJIA: Collaboration on the ground in the countries where they are working?

Pogge: That is right. One way to achieve this would be to have different prominent aid agencies, like Britain’s DFID or Sweden’s SIDA take the lead in a certain country or area. This agency could then be, in partnership with local government officials and local civil society organizations, the organizer and catalyst. It would study the country in great depth, identify its priority needs, and then others could come in to the extent that they want to with resources and ideas. But there would be one lead agency for coordination to make sure that waste is kept to a minimum. This sort of model would also be nice because different styles of aid leadership would emerge, and one could then learn from the successes and failures of these different styles. There

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would be a bit of experimentation and a kind of wholesome competition. And there would be a substantial reduction in waste which is now such a big drain on development efforts.

One other thing USAID could also do—and I think this is the most important thing in this whole area of development—is to think beyond the tiny box of development assistance. The evolution of world poverty is affected, of course, by the quantity and quality of aid, but it is also profoundly affected by the other 99 percent of current international practices: by the foreign policies of the wealthier countries and by the supranational institutional arrangements these countries design and impose. If USAID

in and say we need to give money, to subsidize, so that poor people can also get a little medicine. But it would be much better to bear this in mind when deciding about how to incentivize pharmaceutical innovation in the first place — and then to incentivize it in a way that will not impose enormous burdens on the poor, burdens that development and humanitarian organizations would then have to mitigate. Compartmentalization is highly inefficient because it is typically much more expensive to mitigate adverse side effects on the poor than to avoid them.

GJIA: In other words, you are arguing that contribution from those benefiting

Compartmentalization is highly inefficient

because it is typically much more expensive to mitigate adverse side effects on the poor than to avoid them. could effectively bring its expertise to bear on these other poverty-affecting features, the need for development assistance would over time be much reduced.

Development aid is mitigation that compensates for the complete exclusion of the interests of the majority of humankind from supranational rule making. The TRIPS Agreement is one example. We now have this very strong protection of intellectual property rights forced upon the poor countries as a condition of membership in the WTO. Such strong intellectual property rights obstruct access to medicines; and then the development people come

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from potentially destructive practices should begin sooner and with more forethought so that it can be coordinated with the work of aid agencies?

Pogge: Yes. The two sides should operate in full knowledge and coordination.

If USAID had a seat at the table when the next trade agreement, such as the TRIPS agreement, is negotiated, then USAID could be there speaking up for the poor. And USAID would say, “from the point of view of development, which is our mandate, we have to tell you that the TRIPS agreement is a very bad idea, very costly for the poor.” At least, USAID could point out that the

LANCASTER & POGGE

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

agreement has this big side effect and could provide an estimate of how much it would cost fully to compensate this effect by helping the poor retain access to important new medicines. This cost could then be taken into account in the design of international agreements.

In the real world, of course, supranational arrangements are designed without any attention to the poor. Only major corporations, banks, industry associations, etc. are in a position to lobby the most influential governments which call the shots. These powerful agents do not hate the poor, of course, but they are single-mindedly focused on their own advantage, on securing as large a slice as possible of the global product. They take no account of the adverse side effects that the success of their institutional schemes imposes on the majority of humankind. These side effects are left to be dealt with by those on whom they fall and by governmental and nongovernmental aid organizations financed by taxpayers and the general public — typically, as I have said, at much greater cost than what the cost of avoidance would have been.

and reformed on those grounds.

The main concern I have had over the last ten years with USAID is that it is in a very awkward bureaucratic position. It is semi-independent of the State Department and that reflects the political reality that I just spoke about–that it is serving political goals, or diplomatic goals if you like, and it is also serving development goals. Sometimes they combine well, and sometimes they collide. “Semi-independent of the State Department” means that it is not completely under control of the State Department, but it is not completely autonomous either. The debate that really raged a couple of years ago pertained to where it should fit into the bureaucratic and administrative structure of the U.S. government. This seems to you probably small and not important, but it can make all the difference in the world. If one puts a small agency in a bigger agency, the small agency’s mission is going to become the mission of the bigger agency. USAID is half-in and half-out of the State Department, but it is more in than it was ten years ago.

A lot of us in the development comGJIA: And you, Dr. Lancaster? How munity worry that eventually USAID do you think USAID could be reformed will lose its autonomy and become much in a way that would make it more of an more of a banker for the State Departeffective institution? ment, though that has not happened yet. Hillary Clinton put that issue to Lancaster: USAID is, as I said, an arm bed because she knew what she wanted of U.S. foreign policy, so it is active in to do. She wanted a closer alignment Afghanistan. For thirty years it provided of USAID and State. However, the very large amounts of money to Egypt. reforms that USAID has implemented It would not have provided that amount have simultaneously given it back some of money to Egypt if Egypt were not a autonomy. An aid agency cannot operkey part of the United States Middle ate with any policy influence if it does East strategy. USAID is doing a lot of not have a policy shop and a budget different things and it has to be judged shop. Those were taken away; they have

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now been given back.

GJIA: How should USAID revise its contributions to international aid flows to accommodate for the increasingly prominent role of BRIC economies in international development assistance?

Lancaster: The BRICs, but above all the Chinese, are getting into the development assistance field as donors as well as recipients. The Brazilians have been around for a while with small amounts of money being sent to Mozambique, Angola, and other Lusophone places, but the Chinese have really gone big in the aid business. The problem is that we do not know how big their aid is.

The Chinese do not to use data consistent with the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) data. I do not think the Chinese separate aid from export promotion or investment, so theirs is a whole different package of economic transfers. How can Western and Japanese aid agencies accommodate these new entrants? There has been a real effort to bring the Chinese into the Western aid system, but the Chinese do not want to be a part of the Western aid architecture; they do not want to be a part of DAC, the OECD aid arm. They want to be independent of the West and seen as such.

So, their own aid is different from that of traditional aid countries and is sizeable, so it is important to engage them in conversation. There are a number of structural problems. Whom do you talk to in China about Chinese aid? China does not have an aid agencyâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;Chinese aid is run out of the Ministry of Commerce, which tells you something about Chinese aid by the

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way; their administrators are not development experts, they are just managing the money with an evident commercial interest in where it goes and how it is used. In the aid business, when you want to go talk to someone you go to the government aid agency, and you also go to whatever think tanks are around town. In London, you go talk to the Overseas Development Institute; in Germany, you visit the German Development Institute. There is no such thing in China. China has a huge number of semi-government research institutes, but none of them is really situated to talk in an informed fashion to others about the Chinese aid program. That is what we needâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;we need a portal in China where we can talk to people and they can talk to us. Then at least we would know what the other party is thinking. The British and others have made some progress in engaging the Chinese, but the Chinese are really dong their own thing. The question of how to engage them has yet to be solved in an effective and efficient manner As a final note to conclude this conversation, I will say this: there is a lot still to be done about poverty reduction in the world. We have the knowledge and the resources. We may not have the ability to make change quickly because things in societies do not change quickly, but as the century wears on and we continue to do better with poverty, the debate will shift to an emphasis on global public goods. That has a real impact on developing countries as well. If the oceans rise because of global climate change, the Maldives will disappear and other places disappear too or become too dry or too wet. I suspect these are going to be increasingly important and

LANCASTER & POGGE

compelling issues of the twenty-first century. They are going to overlap–they have already overlapped–with the development issue. That is something we need to be thinking a little more about.

How this all comes together will be the next big challenge for the coming gen-

Rethinking Global Philanthropy

eration to tackle.

Carol Lancaster was interviewed by Sikander Kiani and William Handel on 12 April 2012. Thomas Pogge was interviewed by Katharine Stonehill on 2 April 2012.

NOTES

1 Jagdish Bhagwati, “Obama’s Blunder at the Bank” The American Interest Online. Internet, http://blogs. the-american-interest.com/bhagwati/ (date accessed: 6 April 2012).

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Politics&Diplomacy Presidential Power and the Internationalization of Domestic Policy Lawrence R. Jacobs and Eric P. Schwartz Presidential power in the U.S. constitutional system is not fixed, but is rather dynamic and changing as the global system and the country’s place in it evolves. During the early decades of the Republic, when large segments of the United States and its economy were inward facing, presidents often took a backseat to Congress and refrained from public promotion of themselves and their policies in favor of working through a collaborative process of elite decision making.1 As World War II ushered in a new era that integrally linked American security and prosperity to international affairs, presidential power emerged as the decisive force in directing U.S. diplomacy and national security. For much of the twentieth century, the United States operated with “two presidencies”—one competitively shared powers with the legislative and judicial branches on domestic issues, while the other often asserted the prerogative to act unilaterally on international matters.2 And while the post-Vietnam Congress enacted and implemented a range of measures to enhance the legislative role in deciding U.S. policy in international affairs, the effort never fully realized “codetermination” of foreign policy as presidents continued to assert prerogatives to conduct national security and U.S.

Lawrence R. Jacobs is Director of the Center for the Study of Politics and Governance at the University of Minnesota’s Hubert H. Humphrey School. He co-edits the University of Chicago Press’ series in American Politics.

Eric P. Schwartz is Dean of the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota.

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foreign affairs.3 The dawn of the second decade of the twenty-first century brings a new set of circumstances that are internationalizing what had previously been considered insular, domestic issues within the United States. In the past, decisions over taxing and spending, the servicing of U.S. debt, government aid for research and development, and other issues were made by lawmakers with little regard for international reactions and often with little adverse effects on the standing of the dollar as a preeminent international currency, the United States’s ability to borrow in international markets, and trade abroad. The earlier bifurcated governance model is, however, less applicable to serving U.S. interests in the coming decades as

to check executive assertion of power, and as legislators and jurists defend their institutional positions. Nor is it feasible for the president to defer to a decentralized and often myopic and stalemated legislature to address developments with significant and often diffuse long-term consequences. As we suggest below, presidents must adopt an approach to guarding U.S. interests on internationalized domestic issues that combines agenda setting and coalition building.

The Internationalization of Domestic U.S. Policy. The Unit-

ed States now confronts major shifts in world power and resources that will impact the country for generations.

Emerging market economies (EMEs)—

Presidents must adopt an approach to

guarding U.S. interests on internationalized domestic issues that combines agenda setting and coalition building. domestic decisions on fiscal, financial, and trade policy pose significant consequences for the American standard of living at home and influence abroad.

How should the United States adapt its domestic governance to the new global economic contexts? Neither birfurcated nor preemptive governance is likely to prove effective as a general rule. Relying on presidential prerogative to address internationalized domestic issues is likely to spark inter-branch confrontation, continued gridlock, and even a contagion of constitutional crises as stakeholders rally

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including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the so-called “BRICS”) as well as Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey, and other growing markets— have developed large economies that are often growing at higher rates than in the United States and similarly affluent nations. The BRICS comprise 40 percent of the world’s population on three continents and produce a quarter of global GDP.4 Studies by the IMF and others credit the rapid growth of EMEs with sustaining the three-fold increase in global trade over the past half century and creating new “systematically

JACOBS & SCHWARTZ

important trading partners.”5 Even in the wake of the financial crisis, the IMF reports comparatively high rates of economic growth for 2011 and 2012 in India and China (7.8 percent and 9.5 percent, respectively) and moderate growth in Russia, Brazil, and South Africa at a time when Japan and the EU struggled to grow at all and the United States experienced only a small expansion.

Although EMEs do not by any means constitute a coherent alliance, their expanded trading relations and economic growth are impacting the global balance of power and will require new geopolitical relations and strategies.6 Along with the EU and Japan, the United States is finding it necessary to adjust, while international organizations like the IMF face compelling pressure to expand the role of emerging market countries to acknowledge their new economic might. The BRICS, for instance, responded to requests from the EU for funding to stave off its financial crisis with demands for a “bigger say in how the IMF is run.”7 The emergence of new global economic centers and the fundamental consequences of the transformed international context for the United States at home and abroad is most clearly crystallized by China. In terms of its importance in global trade, China has recently been described by the IMF as “on par with the United States—ranking first in systemic importance not only in terms of size but also in terms of significant bilateral trade relations.”8 As China abandoned a centrally planned economy for a more market-based system after 1978, it enjoyed an extraordinary rate of economic development,

Politics&Diplomacy

outpacing the Industrial Revolution in Europe or the growth of nineteenth century United States. Its economy became the world’s second largest by 2010 as average annual GDP rose by 9.5 percent from 1980 to 2002 and by an even stronger pace of 11 percent per year between 2003 and 2007. Even as the global financial crisis consumed many countries, China’s economy grew by 10.3 percent in 2010 and by more than 9 percent in 2011. Some projections expect China to account for 20 percent of global GDP by 2030 compared to 15 percent for the United States.9 China’s economic growth has been closely connected to the global system.

Its factories have produced goods for markets abroad, expanding exports by about 15.5 percent a year between 1980 and 2002 and increasing its share of world trade from 1 percent in 1980 to over 8 percent in 2008.10 China’s enormous trade surpluses established it as a net creditor to the world while contributing to the slide of the United States to debtor status.

Implications of China’s Rise.

China’s economic rise has steadily—if not evenly—enhanced its power on the world stage in ways that will impact the United States. According to a 2008 report of the National Intelligence Council, the “historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East…is without precedent in modern history,” putting China, in particular, on track to have “more impact on the world over the next twenty years than any other country” and to make the United States “less dominant.”11

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Although projections of China’s future economic growth and influence are in dispute, its rise has at least three implications for the United States.12 First, national and international economies are increasingly vulnerable to fluctuations in the Chinese economy. Arora and Vamvakidis of the IMF find evidence of significant, direct, and immediate Chinese impacts on other countries owing to the size of its economy and close integration of its trade and capital exchanges.13 Second, the United States will increasingly face competition for resources—from oil and gas to precious metals. China increased its importation of basic commodities from less than 2 percent in 1992 to 9 percent in 2009.14 Third, the United States’ “exorbitant privilege” of having the dollar as the world’s currency will be challenged as the renminbi and perhaps the euro become alternate international currencies.15 The Chinese government is taking steps to transition the renminbi into a convertible reserve currency for foreign companies financing projects in China and for trading partners such as Japan, which recently reached agreements to start trading and accumulating renminbi in its foreign exchange reserves.16 To be sure, it is easy to mischaracterize the challenge posed by China, as the nature of that challenge is often blurred by mechanistic extrapolations of a “near unipolar [world] dominated

by China.”17 Rapid economic growth has unleashed high inflation and real estate bubbles, as well as high expectations among Chinese citizens that could create economic and political disruptions, or conversely, pressures

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for political and social reforms that enhance the possibilities for U.S.-Chinese cooperation.18 Moreover, simplistic projections of China’s dominance neglect American power and networks of alliances in Asia, not to mention the eagerness of governments in the region to see that the United States remains deeply engaged. Nevertheless, even if we need not treat China’s rise as a zero-sum game and instead recognize that China’s evolution could create opportunities for mutual gain, this does not detract from the importance of effectively marshaling U.S. power and influence as we negotiate any future relationship with China.

U.S. Domestic Policy on a World Stage. For the United States, the rise of China and other new EMEs has transformed what previously could be considered “domestic” issues to be decided in an insular manner into choices with possibly dramatic implications for U.S. interests and standing both abroad and at home.

While decisions “at home” have never been completely free of foreign policy implications, they could often be made largely in a vacuum, based solely on the clash of domestic interests and political struggles. Today, Washington’s choices on such issues impact American indebtedness and economic competiveness in global markets, with enormous consequences for Americans. Global transformation raises a profound question: Will American decision-making at home adjust? If it fails, Americans may face a drop in their standard of living and greater constraints imposed from outside the country’s borders.

The “internationalization” of U.S.

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domestic policy is evident across a range of areas. Fiscal choices over spending and taxation have long been treated in the United States as the sine qua non of insular decision-making—an exclusive preserve of competing parties, politicians, and stakeholders. And yet, deficit spending today requires the United States to increasingly borrow abroad, ballooning China’s current account and expanding its leverage.

Partisan deadlock that nearly prevented the United States from servicing its debt in August 2011 rattled overseas financial markets and confidence in Treasury bonds, threatening the country’s Standard and Poor’s rating and its low cost of borrowing. And although

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is subject to partisan controversy, as illustrated by Republican attacks not only on the failure of Solyndra, but also on the principle of government aid to next generation energy production. Whatever the correct role of government in promoting manufacturing infrastructure, there is no question that these “domestic issues” can have dramatic international implications.

The Limitations of Existing U.S. Foreign Policy Frameworks. The president inaugurated in January 2013 will find that the dominant frameworks for U.S. foreign policy are of limited help in identifying and acting upon the international interests

The president inaugurated in January 2013

will find that the dominant frameworks for U.S. foreign policy are of little help in identifying and acting upon the international interests of the United States in domestic policy decisions. bipartisan majorities have long backed financial support and tax credits for agriculture, partisan division over the appropriateness of industrial policy (such as government aid for next generation energy production) has put the United States and its corporate community at a disadvantage against competitors that enjoy subsidies at home.

The Chinese government has capitalized, for instance, on American scientific innovations to spawn large and growing production of solar panels for global markets, while American manufacturing remains slight. What little government support has been supplied

of the United States in domestic policy decisions.

In the broadest terms, at least three divergent models have tended to guide the making of U.S foreign policy in recent years. Liberal internationalists believe that the United States has a critical interest in a rules-based international system with strong multilateral organizations and strong U.S. support for key allies. Neo-conservatives, in contrast, are far more comfortable with the assertion of unilateral American power to promote not only economic and security interests, but also the ideal of American democracy.19 Finally, for-

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eign policy “Hobbesians” are less concerned about spreading American values, and would argue that the primary focus of U.S. national security policy must be on anticipating and responding to security threats in a brutish international arena characterized by a “war of all against all,” as Thomas Hobbes put it in Leviathan.

Despite their differences, these three divergent conceptions of U.S. foreign policy are characterized by two significant similarities. First, all three accept the basic realist proposition that states seek to promote their economic and political power and position in a competitive international system. Second, and of particular relevance for us, all have asserted and adopted strong positions on presidential prerogatives in foreign policy decision making to capitalize on what is seen as the executive’s distinctive capacity—as Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist Paper 70—for “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.”

These prevailing approaches to U.S. foreign policy offer little leverage, however, on answering one of the defining challenges of the coming decades— whether and how the United States will respond to the internationalization of its domestic issues. None of these traditional foreign policy paradigms offer reliable and effective guides to domestic decision-making. In particular, they do not tackle the dual challenge of fostering action in a system biased toward inaction and developing programmatic coherence in a decision-making process where policy is typically the “accidental by-product” of individual interests.20 Liberal, neo-conservative, and Hobbesian perspectives will not provide

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guides to handling internationalized domestic policies. They fail to plot an effective strategy for presidential engagement with the partisan and constituent interests that drive domestic policy.

The assertion of presidential prerogative to impose domestic policy to promote U.S. interests abroad risks destructive backlash and policy collapse. In the realm of domestic affairs, the president’s constitutional authority for unilateral action is limited and the institutional interests of the legislative and judicial branches in protecting their jurisdictional influence are concentrated and immediate.21 While the judiciary tends to tolerate executive initiative in pursuit of national security and foreign policy abroad, it has scrutinized and not infrequently struck down presidential actions at home that arguably circumvent the separation of powers by impinging on legislative authority (as in the case of impoundment of appropriated funds), threatening private property rights, precluding judicial review, and broadly asserting executive privilege.

Members of Congress have often acquiesced in presidential foreign policy decisions or have been unable to take collective action on foreign policy issues on which there is limited constituent interest or congressional consensus.

The internationalization of domestic policy, however, presents fundamentally different political and institutional dynamics. Domestic policies that distribute concentrated costs and benefits with direct, traceable effects on constituents and stakeholders maximize the probability of political and judicial engagement.

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In short, legislative interests in protecting and wielding power over spending and taxation generally exceed the more diffuse stakes in collectively checking in presidential conduct abroad related to diplomatic and national security policy—one is intense and compelling while the other is often distant and attenuated.

As negotiations over raising the U.S. debt limit intensified during the summer of 2011, President Obama was pressed by members of Congress and pundits to assert unilaterally the power to order Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner to continue borrowing money to pay the government’s debts.

Their recommendation to assert the presidential prerogative to circumvent Congress was rooted in the fourteenth amendment’s dictum that “the validity of the public debt of the United States…shall not be questioned.”22 While the country’s near default damaged its standing abroad and may have sapped the fragile economic recovery, President Obama rejected this approach on the grounds that his lawyers “are not persuaded that is a winning argument.”23 The administration acceded to the clearly enumerated powers of Congress “to borrow money on the credit of the United States” and to the probability of sustained and perhaps adverse judicial scrutiny.24 While unilateral action appeared to to some to offer an effective means to resolve the deadlock, the administration accurately appreciated the protracted and accumulating costs of sustained judicial review, divisions among Democrats on institutional grounds, and political backlash heading into an election year.

This experience offers a valuable les-

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son in an era marked by a shift from legislative toward executive power: the president inaugurated in January 2013 will face choices over American budget deficit, debt servicing, and research and development support that will require sustained and balanced institutional participation with Congress in reaching policies that respond to domestic pressures and to a less forgiving international context.25

Presidential Engagement and Internationalized Domestic Policy. Internationalized domestic

policy will require a form of future presidential leadership marked by sustained commitment to and engagement with Congress. In many respects, this is a departure from the decision-making style that has characterized foreign policy-making in recent years.

The default of the legislative process is inaction, especially on policies with diffuse benefits such as domestic legislation that impact U.S. overseas interests. Presidential initiative is necessary to focus the country and Congress on the stakes and to stimulate momentum to overcome the normal barriers to collective legislative action. While the bully pulpit does not compel Congress to act, it can set the terms of debate to target blame for inaction on Congress. One of President Obama’s effective strategies during the 2011 debt battle was to demonstrably assign Congress and House Republicans responsibility for the consequences of default, a potent threat that Speaker John Boehner and other GOP leaders came to fear.

Although the rise of China and other new powers will increasingly focus U.S. officials outward toward international

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arenas, presidents will also need to focus inward, toward greater engagement with Congress and stakeholders. Our polarized political environment makes this challenge a formidable one, but it is a challenge that must be engaged. One of the presidentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s primary objectives must be to counteract the draw of party. The formation of counter-coalitions in Washington, as well as in the business community and among professional and voluntary associations, is a particularly potent way of achieving this goal. President Bush, for instance, rallied Democratic donors in the high-tech industry and in crucial states to pressure Democratic members of Congress to vote for trade legislation

followed by broad compliance. Inefficiency is unavoidable as is conflict over the validity of claims that certain domestic choices threaten U.S. international interests, as President Obama discovered when Republicans opposed his efforts to increase investment in new energy as inappropriate, wasteful, and unnecessary. To be sure, these types of policy debates are likely to be drawn out and without easy resolution, but it is more essential than ever that future presidents take on this new challenge in earnest.

While presidents are likely to continue to enjoy broad latitude on traditional peace and security issues, including resort to the use of force, those

As domestic policy assumes greater

international significance, one of the presidentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s primary objectives must be to counteract the draw of party. that was opposed by organized labor.

President Obama pursued a similar strategy when he mobilized independent financial experts and members of the business community who were longtime GOP allies to offset Tea Party opposition to raising the debt limit without draconian cuts in domestic spending. Successful engagement with Congress will demand a broadening and a deepening of coalition building within and outside of Washington.

The inevitable costs of delay and deadlock of inter-branch relations may well frustrate advocates of standard foreign policy paradigms who are accustomed to presidential command

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prerogatives are not adequate for the twenty-first century challenges we confront in international affairs. Presidents must now also turn inward, with a commitment to more intensive engagement with Congress on the management of domestic issues with substantial international consequences. If the next president and his successors do not successfully engage Congress and Americans on internationalized domestic issues, we will fail to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century and our failure will have profound implications for U.S. interests abroad and for the economic prosperity of future generations at home.

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NOTES

1 Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

2 Aaron Wildavsky, “The Two Presidencies,” TransAction 4 (December 1966): 7-14.

3 Thomas Frank and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); James Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981); Harold Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

4 Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050,” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper 99 (October 2003); Jim, O’Neill and others, “How Solid Are the BRICS?” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper 134 (December 2005); Stefan Wagstyl, “The Growth Map,” Financial Times, November 27, 2011.

5 Nagwa Riad and others, “Changing Patterns of Global Trade,” International Monetary Fund Strategy, Policy, and Review Department (2012); Uri Dadush and Bennett Stancil, “The World Order in 2050,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (April 2010).

6 Ibid.

7 Alan Crawford, “G-20 Rebuffs Europe Aid Calls With Bigger Firewall Needed.” Bloomberg News, February 26, 2012.

8 Nagwa Riad and others, “Changing Patterns of Global Trade,” International Monetary Fund Strategy, Policy, and Review Department (2012).

9 “China: Economic Performance and Policy Challenges” (International Monetary Fund and National Council of Applied Economic Research Conference, November 14-16, 2003); World Bank, “China Quarterly Update” (April 2011).

10 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook” (April 2011); Vivek Arora and Athanasios Vamvakidis, “China’s Economic Growth: International Spillovers,” International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/10/165 (July 2010).

11 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, (Washington, D.C., 2008).

12 Arvind Subramanian, “The Inevitable Superpower: Why China’s Dominance Is a Sure Thing,” Foreign Affairs 90 (September/October 2011): 66-78; Salvatore Babones, “The Middling Kingdom: The Hype and the Reality of China’s Rise,” Foreign Affairs 90 (September/October 2011): 79-88.

13 Vivek Arora and Athanasios Vamvakidis, “Chi-

na’s Economic Growth: International Spillovers,” International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/10/165 (July 2010).

14 Ibid.

15 Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); World Bank, Global Development Horizons 2011 — Multipolarity: The New Global Economy, (Washington D.C., 2011).

16 Edward Wong and Natasha Singer, “Currency Agreement for Japan and China,” The New York Times, December 26, 2011.

17 Arvind Subramanian, “The Inevitable Superpower: Why China’s Dominance Is a Sure Thing,” Foreign Affairs 90 (September/October 2011): 67-9.

18 Salvatore Babones, “The Middling Kingdom: The Hype and the Reality of China’s Rise,” Foreign Affairs 90 (September/October 2011): 79-88.

19 Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003).

20 Morris Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

21 Harold Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); James Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981); Lawrence Jacobs, “Building Reliable Theories of the Presidency.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 (December 2009): 771-80.

22 Katrina Vanden Heuval, “Invoke the 14th and end the debt standoff,” The Washington Post, July 5, 2011; Ryan Grimm and Samuel Haass, “14th Amendment: Democratic Senators See Debt Ceiling As Unconstitutional,” The Huffington Post, June 28, 2011.

23 Adam Liptak, “The 14th Amendment, the Debt Ceiling and a Way Out.” The New York Times, July 24, 2011.

24 Lawrence Tribe, “A Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away,” The New York Times, July 7, 2011.

25 Terry Moe, “The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage,” in The Presidency and the Political System, 7th edition, Michael Nelson, ed.

(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2003), 425-457; Harold Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Lawrence Jacobs, “Building Reliable Theories of the Presidency.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 (December 2009): 771-80.

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for more info or to subscribe visit http://journal.georgetown.edu

Politics&Diplomacy

China in Sudan

The Challenge of Non-Interference in a Failed State Andrew S. Natsios China has encountered increasing difficulty maintaining its prime foreign policy principles in Sudan, especially the directive of non-interference, as complex conflicts in the Darfur region and between the North and the South have lent an inescapably political dimension to the superpower’s economic activities within the African country. The divisive impact of Chinese arms sales, oil extraction, and selective investments within Sudan reveal how, in practice, it is often impossible to separate economic and political activity in foreign policy.

China’s Historical Interaction with Sudan.

Andrew S. Natsios is Distinguished Professor in the Study of Diplomacy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He previously served as Administrator at USAID and was U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan under former President George W. Bush from 2006 to 2007. His latest book is Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know.

Chinese policy in Sudan historically has been based on four principles: non-interference, state sovereignty, mutual benefit, and equality. The non-interference and state sovereignty principles—the prime directives of Chinese foreign policy worldwide—are strongly linked and based on Chinese domestic policies. China officially does not judge foreign governments in their own domestic decisions, and will not intervene to try to change their policies. China’s non-interference directive emerges from its own actions in subduing internal unrest among the Tibetans and the Uighurs. ChiSummer/Fall 2012 [ 61 ]

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na’s political leaders wish to avoid foreign interference in how they address these challenges, so the Chinese are reluctant to support interference in the internal affairs of other countries with regional and ethnic tensions. China respects Sudan’s sovereignty and has often leveraged its position on the UN Security Council to resist western efforts intended to stop Khartoum’s abuses against its own people.

Mutual benefit and equality are two sides of the same coin. China argues that its relationship with Sudan must provide benefits to both countries on an equitable basis. China’s interaction with Sudan has provided mutual benefits, though many Sudanese would argue that China is getting the better end of the deal, as they are buying oil at a price discounted by Sudan’s limited market and lack of refining capabilities. Relative to Sudan, China is more stable, prosperous, powerful, and more developed in nearly every way. Western countries consider Sudan a poor and underdeveloped country— an aid recipient, an abuser of human rights, and a former colony of Egypt and Great Britain. China and Sudan are not equals. While these four principles have set a theoretical framework for Chinese foreign policy, economic interests have forced China to act in a more pragmatic and intrusive manner, causing an international backlash and potentially compromising China’s long-term interests in the region.

Mutual Dependence. China’s investment in the Sudanese energy sector has become increasingly important for both countries, leading China to defend its economic interests by

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compromising the spirit of non-intervention. In the 1990’s China began heavy investment in the development of the Sudanese oil industry—it built one of the two oil refineries in northern Sudan, the oil pipeline from the oil fields to Port Sudan, and owned about 40 percent of the oil fields. Sudanese dependence on China, along with Chinese investment in Sudan, grew when a set of economic sanctions imposed by the United States government on Sudan between 1997 and 2007 forced most western companies to exit the country. After Sudan was caught backstopping a 1995 attempt by a Egyptian terrorist group to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak at a meeting of the African Union in Addis Ababa, the United States and Egypt pushed a resolution imposing economic sanctions on Sudan through the UN Security Council. Later, the United States imposed its own bilateral sanctions, citing Khartoum’s human rights abuses in South Sudan during the second north-south civil war (1983-2005), its support for international terrorist groups, its involvement in the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, and for widespread atrocities committed in the 2003 Darfur rebellion. Oil companies based in North American and Europe eventually divested themselves of their position in the Sudanese oil industry following the onset of U.S. sanctions in 1997.

Western economic sanctions forced Sudan to shift from Western to Arab and Asian countries (particularly China) for sources of development financing, markets for its oil, investments in Sudan’s weapons manufacturing plants, and weapon purchases. Asian coun-

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tries, particularly China, were relatively insulated from the political pressures of western civil society, which wielded substantial influence over western governments and oil companies. As a result, China, along with India and Malaysia, has been a commercial, military, and diplomatic beneficiary of western sanctions on Sudan.

Despite China’s attempts to separate its oil investments in Sudan from its foreign policy, domestic and interregional conflict has forced China to act against its principles. In the early 2000s, China purchased oil from Sudan in exchange for weapons, which the government in Khartoum used to quell the rebellion in Darfur. Human rights violations aside, this policy

Politics&Diplomacy

many as 300,000 people died in a rebellion against the central government. Members of the U.S. Congress, advocacy groups such as the Save Darfur coalition, and even Hollywood actors, called for a boycott of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, seeking to pressure China to end arms sales to Sudan and withdraw its investments in the country. More than a hundred U.S. Congressmen wrote a letter to President Hu Jintao in May 2007, urging China to end its commercial relationship with the Sudanese government and to work aggressively to resolve the Darfur conflict. Otherwise, as Sean McCormack of the U.S. Department of State put it, “history will judge your government as having bankrolled a

China, along with India and Malaysia, has been a commercial, military, and diplomatic beneficiary of western sanctions on Sudan. seemed to reinforce the regime—China’s business partners. As the Darfur conflict began to spread, it placed Chinese investment at risk and lead to major international challenges to China’s Sudan policy.

genocide.”1 The Chinese government had planned the Beijing Olympics to celebrate their formal entrance onto the world stage as an emerging world power, but instead it turned into a public relations nightmare. This reversal of Olympic fortunes took place because Challenges to China’s Policy. of internal contradictions in Chinese International interest in China’s rela- foreign and economic policy. tionship with Sudan rose dramatically Escalation of the situation in Darafter 2006, when human rights groups, fur into an international conflict also non-governmental organizations, and became a liability for China. In January religious leaders accused the Chinese 2007, China’s state-owned National government of selling weapons to the Petroleum Company (NPC) bought an Sudanese military. They argued that interest in the Chadian oil fields, at a Chinese weapons were being used to time when both Chad and Sudan were commit atrocities in Darfur, where as on the verge of war. Chad and Sudan

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each accused the other of fomenting rebellions across their shared border.

While Gaddafi was in power, Chad had served as a conduit for Libyan weapons to rebel groups in Darfur fighting against Khartoum. The Sudanese government repeatedly attempted to unseat Chadian President Idriss Deby through local proxies in an effort to stop these weapons flows to their enemies.2 Chinese weapons sales to the government in Khartoum may have provoked a regional arms race.

In April 2008, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, the leader of the most powerful rebel group—the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—led an assault on Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, traveling from the Chadian border with nearly 2,000 troops, 130 vehicles, and heavy weaponry across 900 miles of desert.

Ibrahim fought his way to within a mile of the presidential palace until finally being turned back by the National Security and Intelligence Services (NISS), Sudan’s brutal internal security forces, in heavy street to street combat—the first in thirty years to occur in the capital city. Had the attack on Khartoum succeeded in deposing the Bashir government, it would likely have plunged Sudan into a civil war across the North with unpredictable outcomes, particularly for the oil sector, in which China was heavily invested.

While negative press during the 2008 Olympics and the near capture of Khartoum exposed China’s Sudan policy to major vulnerabilities, the greatest challenge to the prime directive of non-interference arose out of Sudan’s north-south conflict. Approximately 75 percent of the proven oil reserves of historic Sudan are in the newly estab-

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lished independent Republic of South Sudan. When I visited South Sudan as Administrator of USAID in July 2001, I heard first-hand these grievances, which united virtually the entire South against the North. Making matters worse, northern oil revenues were being used to buy weapons from China to kill Southerners in the civil war, in addition to being used to commit the atrocities in Darfur.

In July of 2007, during a trip to Beijing, Salva Kiir, who led the semiautonomous Government of southern Sudan from August of 2005 until finally becoming President of an Independent South Sudan on 9 July 2011, explained South Sudan’s concerns to Chinese President Hu Jintao. Kiir told Hu that if the South were to achieve independence in 2011, memories of past Chinese policy of support for the North might pose a risk to Chinese investments in southern oil reserves.

International pressure, the threat of war between Sudan and its neighbors, and especially the risk of losing access to oil in South Sudan has prompted China to alter its approach in Sudan, increasing Chinese interference.

China’s Departure from its Traditional Policy. Turbulent events have forced China into an ever more active role in Sudanese affairs in order to protect China’s standing in the international community, its heavy economic investments in Sudan, and its relationship with neighboring countries. The Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, took an active role in a Darfur peace conference in November 2006 in Addis Ababa at which I led the U.S. delegation as Presi-

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dent Bush’s Special Envoy to Sudan.

The conference of thirty countries, cochaired by Kofi Annan for the United Nations and Salim Ahmed Salim for the African Union, worked to develop a roadmap for resolving the crisis, which included the deployment of a joint 25,000 UN/AU peacekeeping force to Darfur. Ambassador Wang pressed the Sudanese government to accept a UN and AU proposal to establish the peacekeeping force in Darfur, responding to the Sudanese delegation’s argument that the proposal constituted a violation of Sudan’s sovereignty.

But Sudan continued to resist international efforts to resolve the Darfur crisis, and additional pressure on Khartoum was needed. A month later

Politics&Diplomacy

of the growing intrusiveness of Chinese policy came in May 2007, when Beijing announced the appointment of career diplomat Ambassador Liu Giujin as Special Chinese Envoy to Africa. It was a title that tried to avoid appearing too Sudan-focused, though this was a diplomatic finesse, as Liu’s real job was to deal with the Darfur crisis. I worked with Ambassador Liu to press the Sudanese to resolve the Darfur crisis, as it became increasingly clear to me that the very existence of a Chinese special envoy suggested a more aggressive diplomatic role for China in addressing Sudan’s internal problems.

China also became increasingly active in South Sudan. Prior to 2005, when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The very existence of a Chinese special envoy to

Darfur suggested a more aggressive diplomatic role for China in addressing Sudan’s internal problems.

President Bashir of Sudan declared that no blue helmeted (UN) peacekeeping force would ever set foot in Darfur.

U.S. President George W. Bush later called President Hu Jintao and asked him to urge Bashir to reverse his position. Hu made the call and Bashir eventually agreed to the plan despite his earlier opposition. Soon the largest UN peacekeeping force in UN history (25,000 troops and police) was sent to Darfur. While many countries pushed Sudan to accept the troops— I urged President Bashir myself in a meeting I had with him in December 2006—I believe it was Hu Jintao’s call that changed Bashir’s mind.

Perhaps the most obvious evidence

(CPA) between the North and South was signed, Chinese businesses had virtually no activity in the South. After Salva Kiir’s warning to President Hu, official Chinese government activity accelerated in the South: a Chinese consulate was opened, loan offers were made to the southern government, and Chinese businesses stepped up direct investments in the South. Increasingly, senior Chinese diplomats appeared at southern government functions in Juba and met with southern leaders. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed and the new southern government began to build or rehabilitate government offices in Juba, many of the contracts were awarded to Chinese

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construction companies.

Continuing Threats. China’s

increasingly active role in Sudan’s economic development has led to further threats to its investments as old rivalries continue. Increased Chinese government activity in South Sudan after 2007 infuriated President Bashir and his allies in Khartoum, who saw it as a virtual recognition that the South would separate and form an independent country. Political visits by Chinese diplomats to the South became so visible that Khartoum protested directly to Beijing, forcing the recall of their Juba Consul General in 2010 in order to calm the North. The Chinese were hedging their diplomatic bets to protect their tenuous position in the South, but by doing so they alienated their clients in Khartoum. In the end South Sudan voted for independence by a 98 percent margin in January 2011 in a free and fair referendum, justifying Beijing’s diplomatic approach to the divided country.

Chinese investments in Sudan’s oil industry were threatened most recently in January 2012, when negotiations broke down between Khartoum and Juba over oil transport costs. Billions of dollars in oil revenues shifted from Khartoum’s treasury to Juba’s after independence on July 9, 2011, causing a 30 percent deficit in the North’s budget. In an effort to offset the deficit, the North demanded $36 per barrel for transporting oil across its territory, while the South offered the standard international rate of $1 per barrel.

When the South refused to agree to the higher fee, Khartoum unilaterally began diverting oil from the pipeline

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and selling it to reimburse itself at the higher rate even though the South had not agreed to it. The Southerners reacted by turning off the pumps at 900 oil wells, which remain shut down as of this writing. In response, President Bashir warned that war was about to break out between the North and the South, as Sudan’s Defense Minister threatened to use the Sudanese military to retake Juba. The shutdown of Sudanese oil wells deprived China of needed petroleum just after Beijing agreed to join the United States and Europe in boycotting Iranian oil imports. Ambassador Liu Giujin rushed to Khartoum to try to support international mediation efforts and avert a new war. Once again the Chinese found themselves in the middle of a divisive diplomatic dispute that they had sought to avoid in both policy and practice.

A New Approach. Threatened by

continued instability in Sudan, China is now pursuing plans to support the economic growth of Sudan through major infrastructure projects—five dam projects—with the hope that they will stimulate economic growth which will lead to stability. Khartoum’s legitimacy as a government, and arguably China’s, is based less on just governance, protection of human rights, or the provision of decent public services, and more on its ability to produce economic growth.

As northern Sudan’s oil revenues have precipitously declined, Khartoum’s plan is to substitute the economic benefits of these infrastructure projects for the oil wealth they have lost. This approach is known as the “Sino-Sudanese School of Development.”

Sudan’s leadership believe mega-

NATSIOS

infrastructure projects hold the potential to produce sustained economic growth if the country remains stable enough to take advantage of power and water resources generated by the dams.

The Chinese government joined several Gulf States also investing in the region to finance these projects; their collective investments are at high risk should the Bashir regime collapse. Recently, three state-owned Chinese companies, including Sinohydro Corporation, have secured contracts to build a massive chain of dams on the Nile River between Khartoum and the Egyptian border. The companies completed the $3.5 billion and 1250 MW capacity Merowe Dam on the Nile and will also construct four smaller dams at Upper Atbara River/Siteit, Kajbar, and Shreik. All of these dams are designed to produce electrical power while developing irrigated agriculture on a massive scale. The long-term plan is to create a more secure source of food, which both Gulf States and China will need as their populations increase.

What the Sino-Sudanese model does not do is build institutions, which, more than anything else, sepa-

Politics&Diplomacy

rate poor underdeveloped countries from developed ones. Stable, legitimate, and resilient political, economic, and social institutions enable poor countries to use their natural resources wisely and distribute revenues fairly.

Experts around the globe, including many in Sudan, have questioned the wisdom of these massive dam projects on economic, agricultural, and environmental grounds. The fragile condition of Sudan’s governmental institutions, the shrinking size of northern Sudan, controlled by the central government, and Khartoum’s remarkable inability to manage its internal political problems may put these mega-projects at risk. Should the North destabilize and the central government disintegrate, China will once again be forced to realign its existing policies toward Sudan and hedge its substantial investments in the country against the uncertainty of Sudan’s political and economic future. Whether China’s investment in infrastructure will provide the Bashir administration the growth and stability it needs to protect China’s interests in Sudan remains to be seen.

NOTES

1 “What Others are Saying About China”, Internet, http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/what_others_are_saying_about_china (date accessed: 29 March 2012).

2 Deby is from the Kobe Zagawa tribe, which has

populations in Darfur, Chad, and Libya. Since the Zagawa tribe is one of the three tribes engaged in rebellion in Darfur, he had a direct interest in the outcome of the Darfur rebellion.

Summer/Fall 2012 [ 67 ]

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India-Latin America Relations A Work in Progress

Shashi Tharoor As India looks to fashion a major role for itself on the world stage in the second decade of the twenty-first century, its gaze has been settling on wider horizons than it has traditionally been afforded due to its preoccupation with its own troubled neighborhood. One part of the world that is beginning to attract increasing attention is Latin America. It has long been the “forgotten continent” to India—a region with which India might have found much in common, but instead, separated as the two were by distance, language, and the lack of any common history of interaction, did not. Yet, with a population of 580 million, a GDP of $4.9 trillion (four times larger than India’s), and 6 percent of global merchandise trade, Latin America is clearly a part of the world that Indian policymakers cannot afford to neglect.

At twenty million square kilometers, Latin America also has a larger land surface than Russia or Canada, the largest biodiversity and the biggest fresh water reserves on earth; it is also largely democratic and peaceful, far removed from the inter-state wars that have bedeviled the rest of the world.

Most importantly, over the past decade it has managed to grow at an average rate of 5 percent despite the global recession, with figures of 6.1 percent in 2010, and about 4.5 per-

Shashi Tharoor currently serves in the Indian government as an elected Member of Parliament and served previously as Minister of State for External Affairs. He is a former Under-SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations and twentynine year veteran of the organization. He is the prize-winning author of twelve books and a widely-published columnist.

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cent in 2011. This performance makes it a global success story to rival India’s own, and suggests a natural fit in an era in which modern communications has ensured that geography is now history.

It is not that India has been neglecting the region. As one who briefly served as the minister responsible for the region in the Ministry of External Affairs, I am conscious of the increasing salience of Latin America in the government’s thinking. Latin Americans are also waking up to the potential of relations with India. A recent report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) titled India and Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities and Challenges in Trade and Investment

a case for the “New Latin America” that advocates for solid macroeconomic and fiscal management, as well as prudent financial and banking supervisory practices, sustained growth, and poverty reduction, all of which would strengthen and enhance trade relations with the “New India,” a land of “high savings and investment rate, and rapidly expanding middle class, whose demands for western consumer products is growing in leaps and bounds” (to these factors could be added the LAC’s impressive public finances, current account surplus and substantial reserves, and India’s increasing outreach to the world).2 The case is a strong one. Though Latin America’s exports to India are

It is clear that India is well on the way to becoming the “next big thing” in Latin America.

Relations followed hard on the heels of a similar piece of literature from the Inter-American Development Bank by Mauricio Mesquita Moreira and another on the same subject by the Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe (SELA).1 As such, it is clear that India is well on the way to becoming the “next big thing” in Latin America.

The trends are encouraging. Trade between India and the region of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) increased nearly nine-fold between 2000 and 2010, reaching about $21 billion. While these numbers are relatively modest given the number of countries involved, Chilean academic and diplomat Jorge Heine has outlined

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largely natural resources or products based on them, its import basket differs from the usual stereotype. Unlike Chinese exports, which have tended to flood the market at prices at which domestic manufacturers cannot compete, at least half of India’s exports, as Heine and Indian diplomat R. Viswanathan point out in a recent article in Americas Quarterly, “consist of raw materials and intermediate goods such as bulk drugs, yarn, fabrics, and parts for machinery and equipment, which can help Latin American industries cut production costs and become globally competitive.”3 The worry that increased trade could become a net negative for Latin America, by reducing it to a

THAROOR

purveyor of agricultural products and an importer of finished goods (leading even to possible “deindustrialization”), therefore does not apply to trade with India. Of course, India’s food security needs will require it to continue to import ever larger quantities of such natural-resource products from the region—oil, copper, soya, and iron ore feature prominently—but LAC countries could, in turn, develop more sophisticated and better targeted farm products which would be of interest to Indian consumers in the years to come.

In his Inter-American Development Bank study, Moreira concluded that while “the fundamentals exist for a strong trade relationship between the two regions,” economic cooperation is being hampered by tariffs and other trade barriers. The answer to this, of course, is more trade and less protectionism. “More trade is likely to strengthen the virtuous circle in which trade boosts incentives for cooperation while cooperation creates even more opportunities to trade,” argues Moreira.4 The $20 billion in IndiaLAC trade is highly concentrated in a few countries—Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay provide the bulk of the region’s exports to India, and Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and Nicaragua provide a large chunk of the imports.

India has, however, concluded Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) with Chile and with Mercosur that have contributed to improving trade with the countries concerned, and there is no reason why a similar approach could not be applied to the currently underserved countries of the LAC. Indian investments in the region are also increasing, amounting to some

Politics&Diplomacy

$12 billion since 2000, with Indian companies present and active in six key LAC economic sectors: agrochemicals, energy, information technology (IT) and IT-enabled services, manufacturing, mining, and pharmaceuticals.

Some of India’s bigger companies are already an established presence in the region, including ONGC Videsh, the IT majors Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) and Wipro, and the agrochemical giant United Phosphorus. Indian investment is helping Latin America diversify its sources of economic growth, making the region less dependent on its traditional source of economic strength, commodity exports.

Smaller Indian ventures are also making inroads in the region thanks to individual entrepreneurs who have challenged convention by making new lives in the region. I met a young Sikh in Colombia who has established a flourishing ayurvedic practice in Bogotá, helping fuel high-level interest in India’s alternative health systems.

As in Africa, additional investments are likely in the relatively unexplored area of agriculture. In its quest for food security, India cannot help but notice that many LAC countries possess exactly what India is looking for beyond its own borders; in the words of Heine and Viswanathan, Brazil, for instance, has “a large and fertile land mass with abundant water that can significantly increase the production of food—something India will always need, be it soybean oil, legumes, or sugar.”

History has also planted the seedlings of a literary connection. When I published my first novel, The Great Indian Novel, in the United States, the then UN Secretary-General, Peru’s Javier

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Pérez de Cuéllar, told me how enamored he was by Indian literature and poetry as a young man, especially the work of Tagore, evocatively translated by Argentina’s legendary Victoria Ocampo. Tagore and Ocampo, it is said, inspired each other to write beautifully, leaving behind a poetic legacy that is part of the Indo-Latin heritage.

The legacy was broadened by the work of Octavio Paz, whose service as Mexico’s Ambassador in India witnessed the flowering of profoundly evocative poetry and prose about the land he saw around him. His books, The Monkey Grammarian and his valedictory In Light of India, are both testaments to a sophisticated affair with India that may yet animate a new generation of Latin

the course of which he met Jawaharlal Nehru and wrote to him to offer Cuban aid in the Kashmir earthquake that year, is fondly remembered, even though no aid was actually sought or received. The most popular “telenovela” in Brazil in the first decade of the 21st century was a soap opera set in India, with Brazilian actors portraying Indian characters. These are all cultural connections waiting to be developed and built upon, and could one day give people-to-people contact more depth and meaning.

Another area with huge potential for growth is information technology.

In Latin America as elsewhere, India’s IT and IT-enabled services industry has played a significant role in expand-

In Latin America as elsewhere, India’s

IT and IT-enabled services industry has played a significant role in expanding its presence.

American intellectuals. Tagore’s appeal lingers, but more contemporary Indian writers, some of whom have been translated into Spanish, have not made a comparable impact. On the other hand the “magic realism” of Gabriel Garcia Marquez has seeped into the sensibilities of many Indian readers, including in translation into Malayalam, making him one of Kerala’s most beloved novelists.

There are other affinities: a Gujarati businessman runs a Mahatma Gandhi Foundation devoted to propagating Gandhian teachings in the violenceprone city of Medellín. Che Guevara’s two-week visit to India in 1957, during

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ing its presence. Latin America clearly welcomes this and is looking to greater Indian involvement in these areas, including some significant technology transfers. As Indian IT companies establish themselves in the LAC, hire locals, train them in Indian ways, and expose them to the opportunities generated by providing IT-enabled services in a globalized world, this sector is likely to be seen increasingly as India’s unique contribution to the development and prosperity of the region.

The recent growth of trade and investment ties between India and Latin America has also encouraged much closer diplomatic relations. Today,

THAROOR

LAC countries have nineteen diplomatic missions in New Delhi, while India has fourteen missions in the LAC region, both representing significant increases from twelve and seven, respectively, in 2002. In 2010 India opened a new Embassy in Guatemala to cover Central America, but pending invitations from countries like El Salvador and the Dominican Republic to do the same have been deferred solely because of a lack of human resources in India to staff new establishments adequately.

Inadequate attention to Spanish-language training in the Indian Foreign Service has also given New Delhi far too few diplomats ready, equipped, and inclined to interact with Latin America in the language with which it is most comfortable.

That said, Spanish is, of course, not a factor in the noticeable warming in the bilateral relationship between India and (Portuguese-speaking) Brazil, each of which is the largest economy and most populous country in its region.

The two countries have already expanded the scope of their bilateral dialogue to go well beyond trade issues alone, and there are hints that defense and security co-operation are also on the anvil. The former Brazilian President Lula de Silva visited India three times during his eight years in office, more than any other head of state. The creation of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum came out of the Brasília Declaration of 2003 in order to promote enhanced trilateral cooperation on issues such as trade, investment, education, poverty reduction, and the environment.

As in Africa, comparisons with China are inevitable. The extraordinary

Politics&Diplomacy

increase in China’s trade with Latin America is the greatest bilateral spurt in any trade relationship in the world—an astonishing nineteen-fold rise over the past decade, to a staggering $150 billion in 2010. That figure dwarfs India’s $20 billion, but it also gives rise to some disquiet in the LAC countries, which fear dependence on Chinese manufactured goods and the extractive (some would say exploitative) nature of China’s interest in the region, which (again unlike India’s) is largely governmentled and not private sector-driven. As to investment, as The Economist noted a few years ago, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America “has hitherto amounted to less than meets the eye.”5 The fact that Indian companies have begun to make significant investments is welcomed by many who are hoping to see the South Asian country balance China’s impressive presence in the LAC, but it would again be idle to see the two in competition—not least because the two systems are different and India is never likely to match the Chinese government’s single-minded strategic drive abroad.

And yet, the narrative of the last decade is sufficiently impressive to augur well for a significantly transformed relationship. The time has clearly come to look beyond the relatively modest figures for India-LAC trade or of Indian investments in the region to the direction of current and future trends.

The current occasional (and relatively infrequent) visits of policy-makers have to be augmented in both directions, and the success of the handful of existing trade agreements needs to be built upon with systematic efforts to conclude similar agreements with more

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countries. It is time to take India-LAC ties to the next stage: institutionalizing regular contacts (from Foreign Office consultations to state visits), signing new trade agreements, offering more incentives to both the public and the private sector, and putting more energy and vision into trade and investment promotion (for instance, offering governmental support to small and medium enterprises from one region to explore market access in the other).

High-level policy dialogues on improving relations should not merely take place but, as Heine suggests, become part of the regular agenda of governments on both sides.

As such, it is noted that the IndiaLAC relationship could be the most interesting example of the transformation of the under-developed concept of South-South co-operation–from the rhetorical days when both regions advocated the statist concept of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and

clamored for more resource transfers from the developed world, to an era in which the indigenous private sectors of both have become powerhouses driving their own growth and prosperity. In India, where rhetorical genuflections to socialism have stubbornly persisted for longer than in Latin America, the pursuit of the unexplored potential of the region should and will transform the “forgotten continent” into the “continent of opportunity.” That requires a vision and energy that I believe to be incipient (though in need of encouragement) from the highest levels in New Delhi.

Editors’ note: This piece represents an exclusive preview (with appropriate modifications) of Shashi Tharoor’s forthcoming book Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century, which is slated to be published by Penguin India in late June 2012.

NOTES

1 United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, India and Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities and Challenges in Trade and Investment Relations, LC/L346, (Santiago, November 2011); Mauricio Mesquita Moreira, “India: Latin America’s Next Big Thing?” Inter-American Development Bank, 2010; Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe, India’s Economy and Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean: Current Status and Prospects, (Caracas, July 2009).

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2 Jorge Heine, “Latin America, India’s Next Big Thing?” The Hindu, 22 February 2012.

3 Jorge Heine and R. Viswanathan, “The Other BRIC in Latin America: India,” Americas Quarterly 5, no.

2 (Spring 2011).

4 Moreira, 137-138.

5 “The Dragon in the Backyard,” The Economist, 13 August 2009.

Conflict&Security Securing the Olympic City Christopher Gaffney In November 2010, as my flight descended into Rio de Janeiro’s international airport, a laser-beam tracked the plane as we passed over the Complexo do Alemão, one of Rio’s largest favelas.1 Once we passed its reach, another laser flashed past my window, then another: a coordinated effort across several kilometers of air space. I felt vulnerable knowing that earlier in the year drug traffickers shot down a helicopter during a police operation in the Morro dos Macacos.

Was my flight being tracked as a prank, or was there a malicious finger on the end of a bazooka or RPG? Was it possible that Rio de Janeiro’s air space could not be secured? What could this mean for Rio+20, the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and the 2016 Olympics?

A week later, in response to a series of urban disruptions coordinated by drug trafficking factions from inside federal prisons, the Brazilian military and Rio de Janeiro state military police invaded and occupied the Complexo do Alemão. This nationally televised event showed tanks blasting through improvised roadblocks, shock troops kicking down doors, and fleeing drug traffickers being shot from police helicopters. “Embedded” reporters followed the troops, and the major daily paper O Globo ran special sections on “The

Christopher Gaffney is a visiting professor in the Graduate School of Architecture and Urbanism at the Universidade Federal Fluminense. His current research looks at the social and urban impacts of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Gaffney also works as a journalist and keeps tabs on Rio’s unfolding mega-event world at www.geostadia. com.

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War for Rio.” Reports of human rights violations and summary executions of “bandidos” contrasted with the complete absence of military casualties, bringing into question the use of the word, “war.” Among the confiscated weapons, however, were rocket launchers, grenades, bazookas, and machine guns, very few of which had been used to resist the occupation. While the low-income residents of the Complexo do Alemão

a long-overdue process of approximation and is the centerpiece in Rio’s security preparations for a series of mega-events. As of February 2012, the seventeen UPP units have dramatically shifted security dynamics in Rio de Janeiro, underscoring the complexities and contradictions of Rio’s Olympic Era.2 Mega-events are huge, expensive neon signs that Brazil is hanging in its

…it remains uncertain whether security efforts are actually helping the Brazilian people, or if this campaign merely gives the appearance of security and stability... were placed under curfew and had their homes searched (and some ransacked) without warrants, the population at large appeared to approve of the government’s actions. The sentiment that “a good bandido is a dead one” echoed throughout the mainstream media and on social networking sites. A year and a half later, the Complexo do Alemão is still under military occupation, its security profile improved but under conditions of martial law.

The invasion of the Complexo do Alemão was an improvised response to a critical security situation and a major turning point in the expanding military occupation of strategic areas of Rio de Janeiro. This occupation began in 2008 when the state of Rio de Janeiro installed the first of a series of Police Pacification Units (UPP, Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora) in select favelas of its capital city. UPP is intended to serve as an instrument for the police and low-income communities to begin

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shop windows. The German economist Markus Kurscheidt calls this “signaling”: letting the world know that you are there, open for business, and looking good.3 Whether in London, Johannesburg, or Rio de Janeiro, security is the lynchpin for realization of a mega-event. In Brazil’s case, it remains uncertain whether security efforts are actually helping the Brazilian people, or if this campaign merely gives the appearance of security and stability without actually implementing sustainable, comprehensive solutions.

Background. As the films Cidade de

Deus and Tropa de Elite II demonstrated and Bryan McCann explained in this journal in 2007, hugely distinct and parallel life-worlds define Rio de Janeiro.4 The social contrasts are as stark and dramatic as Rio’s physical landscape. For decades, traficantes have controlled the morros, the hills of the favelas.5 They are armed with the same

GAFFNEY

weaponry as the police, sell cocaine and marijuana, and run their neighborhoods like vigilante chiefs. There are warring factions, alliances, invasions of territory, revenge killings, young men dying in extraordinary numbers, gun battles with the police, and the application of instant justice. Traficantes keep a macho, militarized order, and in some instances act as benign dictators, distributing presents and paying for community improvements. The martial law of the traficantes, in effect since the 1980s, underscores the already strong distinctions between the morro (informal city) and the asfalto (formal city).

The traficantes have a symbiotic relationship with the police. The State Military Police of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ) is responsible for the daily policing tasks of the state.6 A 2010 Human Rights Watch report identified PMERJ as the most lethal in the world.7 Within PMERJ are the elite Special Operations Battalion (BOPE, Batalhão de Operações Especiais) troops, whose insignia of a skull with a dagger stuck through it laid across a black shield with two crossed pistols leaves little doubt about their primary mission.8 BOPE is recognized as the world’s most highly skilled and lethal urban fighting force; the favelas are their daily training ground. A new division of PMERJ is the specially trained UPP force, responsible for the daily management and policing of occupied, or pacified, favelas. Their task is to establish the presence of the state through community policing practices as a first step towards reformulating relationships of mutual distrust and violent confrontation between PMERJ and Rio’s low-income communities.

Complicating the security situation

Conflict&Security

further are groups known as milícias (militias). Milícias are typically comprised of off-duty members of PMERJ who have taken control of favelas. By some estimates, milícias control more than half of Rio’s favelas, including most of the western suburbs.9 Milícias have become increasingly important players in Rio’s security profile and operate with the implicit and occasionally explicit support of the city and state governments.10 In some cases, milícias have killed traficantes to take over territory. In others, they have arrived before the traficantes and offered “protection services” to residents. They are responsible for the intimidation of public officials, the killing of judges and journalists,11 and the transmission of death threats to those who dare to bring their criminal organizations to light.12 Whereas the traficantes only trade in drugs and guns on a relatively small scale, milícias regulate the provision of cable television, cooking gas, electricity, transportation, security, weaponry, and drugs. With these immense riches, milícias are able to deliver votes and occupy increasingly higher positions, not only within PMERJ, but also within the city and state governments, consolidating control and expanding their territories.13 The experience of securing the 2007 Pan American Games did nothing to change the status quo between the traficantes and the police. PMERJ invaded the Complexo do Alemão on the eve of the event, killing at least forty people. Seventeen hundred Brazilian army troops occupied the city for three weeks, and there were rumors of payments to traficantes to keep the peace. UPP emerged as a longer-term solution to chronic

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insecurity as Rio de Janeiro prepared to host the 2014 World Cup and refined its bid for the 2016 Olympics.14 Rio’s UPP project is modeled on a similar program installed in Medellin, Colombia in 2002.15 The controversial project is directed and financed by the State Secretary of Security, José Maria Beltrame, who controls PMERJ. This is how it works: PMERJ announces the occupation of a favela, generating significant media attention and allowing time for the armed traficantes to leave the area. BOPE seizes the favela early in the morning and establishes headquarters high on the hill, where they triumphantly hoist state and national flags. The police that comprise the UPP force receive special training, in addition to a salary bonus of $300 per month. The numbers dedicated to each UPP unit vary according to the size of the favela and, in the case of larger occupations such as the Complexo do Alemão (more than 70,000 residents), involve coordination with the Brazilian armed forces.16 The UPP forces control what happens in the occupied favela, including regulating the comings and goings of residents, establishing curfews, conducting random body and house searches, setting hours for dance parties, and settling domestic disputes.

Rio’s UPP project radically changes security dynamics and has gained significant praise for its early successes.

What follows is an evaluation of those changes in the context of Rio’s megaevent cycle.

tural benefits to cities or improvements to income, employment, housing, democratic processes, or quality of life—especially in societies marked by already strong socio-economic disparities.17 These market-oriented, consumer-based festivals are not predicated on long-term urban and social planning but on producing “deliverables” to be consumed within strict timeframes.

Thus, in order to convince populations that massive public expenditures and extraordinary policing measures are for the common good, rhetorical and discursive justifications for mega-events focus on “legacies” in social programs, infrastructure, tourism, employment, and security. As a key element of Rio’s mega-event preparations, UPP reflects the possibilities, problems, and contradictions of these events.

In pacified or occupied areas, there has been a vertiginous increase in realestate values because of the real and perceived security improvements in the areas surrounding occupied favelas. In the three days following the December 2011 occupation of Rocinha, home values increased by 50 percent.18 In many of the UPP-occupied favelas, real-estate values have increased by as much as 400 percent.19 Rio’s generalized insecurity had kept a lid on real-estate values in the context of Brazil’s expanding economy.

The arrival of UPP, combined with the inevitable speculative bubble that megaevents generate, has made Rio’s market spiral out of control. As the formal real-estate market expands in value and the informal market becomes regularThe Appearance of Security ized, the city and state governments will as Important as its Reality. likely see an increase in property tax There is almost no evidence to suggest receipts in the coming years, leveraging that mega-events bring lasting struc- the cost of UPP to recoup some of the

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GAFFNEY

costs of occupation.

UPP is the first coordinated, sustained security plan implemented in Rio’s favelas. Secretary Beltrame has been very clear (and accurate) in his assessment that massive public investment in education, infrastructure, health care, and governance need to follow on the heels of the pacification process, calling UPP “a chance to create fertile territory for human dignity.”20 This investment, however, is very slow in coming, leaving many worried that after the world’s attention has moved on, UPP will disappear, and the drug traffickers will return. This fear, combined with the arrogant policing tactics of PMERJ and a historically antagonistic relationship, limits the potential for leveraging the real benefits of Rio’s UPP project.

Conflict&Security

rity may be temporary, as residents of favelas that have had a UPP presence for more than a year do not exhibit the same degree of concern. The moment of occupation marks a rupture in a neighborhood’s history, creating a narrative of pre- and post-UPP. Pacification has carved open an opportunity for state-led development projects to be implemented. The historical neglect of favelas on the part of the state was exacerbated by the presence of the traficantes. Now that this barrier has been removed, the city government is implementing physical infrastructure. Unfortunately, projects are rarely discussed with residents and are more likely to attend to the imagined desires of tourists or real-estate interests than to the actual needs of those who live there. Worse, many of these

Many people feel less safe under UPP

occupation, as state-led justice is more opaque and distant than that of the traficantes.

UPP occupations immediately destabilize long-established hierarchies, substituting one form of martial law with another. This instantaneous shift generates profound uncertainties among residents. Many people feel less safe under UPP occupation as state-led justice is more opaque and distant than that of the traficantes. As one resident of Rocinha told me, “Before UPP, we never used to lock our doors.” There are reports of increased robberies as suddenly unemployed traficantes look for new sources of income. Encouragingly, the decrease in the perception of secu-

projects forcibly dislocate residents, who, because they lack title, are offered compensation for the assessed value of the materials used to construct their residence and not for the value of the land. This leaves them few residential choices other than to build another home in a more distant favela. If the city government can use the rupturing of the security status quo to formulate relations predicated upon participatory governance with low-income communities, then the UPP project will be more successful.

There is no longer significant dan-

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ger that an international flight will be shot out of the sky or that there will be armed invasions of five-star hotels in Rio’s principal tourist zones. The UPP program has broken with long standing public policy in the limited areas in which it has been implemented. Outside of Rio’s Olympic Zone, however, there has been no break with the status quo, no changes to public policy, and few significant investments in physical or social infrastructures. In the nonOlympic city, cycles of violence and retribution continue. Public policies that give such uneven treatment to citizens and geographic regions based on economic and symbolic capital must be critically examined. Without systemic overhauls of the political institutions and social policies that condition security in Rio de Janeiro, there will be no permanent change to the pre-UPP dynamics.

Secretary Beltrame was explicit (and accurate) when he said in 2009 that the initial goal of the UPP program was to “protect the most economically productive areas of Rio de Janeiro.”21 UPP may eventually extend to forty favelas.

This is not sufficient to fundamentally change the systemic or structural problems of security in a city that has more than one thousand favelas with more than a million residents. Concepts of security that are predicated on guns, boots, and nineteenth century notions of criminality are incomplete. Without investing in education, health care, sanitation, land tenure, and job training, there will be no lasting changes to Rio de Janeiro’s security situation.

The implementation of UPP is a very narrow treatment of the complex political geography of Rio de Janeiro.

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The PMERJ strike in February 2012 showed the fragility of the institutional structures, the lack of investment in professional police forces, and the volatility of security dynamics. PMERJ has a base salary of $984 per month, which leads to corruption as officers look to boost income.22 The classification of daily metropolitan police tasks under the aegis of the Brazilian military does not allow for institutional flexibility, and there are occasional battles between rival factions within Rio’s security apparatus. The condition of insecurity within the security apparatus also must be addressed if meaningful changes are to take root.

Nothing is being done to combat the expanding influence of milícias in terms of territory or political influence. On the contrary, the open complicity and collaboration of the mayor and governor with agents that have erected a parallel yet intertwined state structure generates immense profits and redoubles the milícias’ influence. Milícias offer a quasi-official security platform that serves the basic goal of the public administration: to provide the appearance of a city and state prepared to maximize return on capital investment.

The fact that milícias deliver votes and prove increasingly ensconced in urban and state administrations complicates the situation even further.

UPP has brought international media attention to the government’s attempt to change security dynamics in some parts of Rio de Janeiro. As a showpiece of public policy, UPP has achieved provisional success in breaking with old dynamics and opening market opportunities. This showpiece has distracted attention from the more profound cri-

GAFFNEY

sis of public security characterized by the geographically and institutionally influential milícias, the fragility of Rio’s social and urban infrastructures, and the dire need for institutional reform and transparency.

Conclusion. Questions regard-

ing the success or failure of UPP will never have clear answers. While the vast majority of residents under UPP approve of the units’ presence, there is also a wide recognition that it is only a first step. There is lingering doubt that UPP will continue past 2016 and even greater concern that spending on basic infrastructure or social programs will not accompany the investment in policing. There is no question that UPP has improved security and quality of life in the communities in which the program operates. In the places where UPP has been the longest, the rule of law has stabilized. The city government, however, has yet to find a way to develop infrastructure projects that are based on open dialogue with communities.

While UPP has visibly improved security in the wealthy Zona Sul, statistics reveal contradictory information about Rio’s security situation. The state ministry of health reported a 28.7 percent decline in homicides, which the governor’s office attributes to its effective programs. Deaths classified as other crimes rose dramatically, however, and “disappearances” in the State of Rio de Janeiro number more than 30,000 over the last eight years.23 That is equivalent to the disappearances in Argentina’s Dirty War.24 Thus, the crisis of security continues, though its most visible manifestations have been dislocated to other parts of the city

Conflict&Security

and state, or disguised by manipulating statistics. While a few of the symptoms of inequality are being addressed in strategic parts of the Olympic City, the expansion of informal settlements and increasingly unequal distribution of wealth continue apace. Thus, the megaevent cycle exposes and exacerbates the inherent problems and brutalities of a radically unequal society.

The much-lauded UPP program can be considered a necessary first step towards asserting the authority of the state in communities that it has traditionally and systematically ignored.

Conceptions of security that are limited to the physical integrity of individuals and their property are not sufficient.

There has been some recognition of this by the government, which has launched a program called UPP Social, the stated goals of which are to “promote social development, incentivize the exercise of citizenship, tear down symbolic barriers, and realize the integration of the city.”25 These very vague notions have not been followed by the same investment of financial and political capital in social programs that has been given to armed occupation. This situation, combined with the movement of armed drug trafficking to other parts of the city and the absence of a larger program for all of Rio’s favelas, suggests that the city might be more secure for some at the expense of others. The concentration of security resources in the wealthiest areas of the city is consistent with the circumscribed geography of Rio’s mega-event investments. Thus, it may be that, for Rio de Janeiro’s politicians, the appearance of security is as important as its reality.

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NOTES

1 Favelas are the Brazilian version of squatters’ settlements.

2 Within a decade, the city will have hosted the 2007 Pan American Games, 2011 World Military Games, 2012 Rio +20 environmental conference, 2013 Confederations Cup, 2013 International Youth Day, 2014 FIFA World Cup, 2015 Copa America, and 2016 Olympics.

3 Markus Kurscheidt, “Mega-event Think Tank 2 Presentation,” (University of British Colombia, Vancouver, BC, November 2011).

4 Bryan McCann, “Criminal Networks in Urban Brazil,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 8, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2007): 13-19, Internet, http://www12. georgetown.edu/sfs/publications/journal/82/highres/ mccann.pdf (date accessed: 1 March 2012).

5 It is important to note that not all favelas (or communities) are dominated by trafficantes or milícias, but in nearly all instances they are insecure places. For instance, the Vila Autôdromo community in Jacarepaguá is free of these nefarious influences but is under threat of forced removal in order to make way for a transportation line that will link the Olympic Village with the Olympic Park. The security situation there is not one of robbery or personal safety. Rather, the main concerns are community integrity and housing permanence, which are under threat by the government.

6 There is no armed municipal police force; Rio de Janeiro’s Guarda Municipal does the “soft” work of ticketing, policing streets, dealing with minor emergencies, and handling traffic accidents. It is also responsible for initiating judicial proceedings.

7 Human Rights Watch, “Lethal Force: Police Violence and Public Security in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo,” Internet, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ files/reports/brazil1209webwcover.pdf (date accessed: 1 March 2012).

8 Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, “Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais – BOPE,” Internet, http://www.pmerj.org/bope/ (date accessed: 1 March 2012).

9 Marcelo Freixo, lecture, (Lona Cultural da Maré, 30 September 2011).

10 Eduardo Paes, comment on the benefits of milícias, Internet, http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=DXY7DRa2PXA (date accessed: 1 March 2012).

11 The state judge Patricia Acioli was killed by Military Police in São Gonçalo in 2010. The twentyone bullets found in her body were all traced to the PMERJ squadron that she was investigating. Amnesty International, “Police Suspected in Armed Ambush

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that Killed Brazilian Judge,” Internet, http://www. amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/police-suspectedarmed-ambush-killed-brazilian-judge-2011-08-16 (date accessed: 1 March 2012).

12 Rio State Deputy Marcelo Freixo was forced to leave the country for several weeks in 2011 so that a more effective security apparatus could be arranged for him and his family after a series of death threats from Rio’s milícias.

13 Assembleia Legislativa Do Estado Do Rio Janeiro, “Relatorio Final Da Commisao Palamentar De Inquerito Destinada A Investigar A Acao De Milicias No Ambito Do Estado Do Rio De Janeiro,” Internet, http://www.marcelofreixo.com.br/site/upload/relatoriofinalportugues.pdf (date accessed: 1 March 2012).

14 Mascharenas, Sánchez, and Bienenstein (eds.), O Jogo Continua: Megaeventos Esportivos e Cidades (Rio de Janeiro: EdUERJ, 2011).

15 Folha de Paulo, “Modelo de UPP do Rio falha em Medellin,” Internet, http://coletivodar. org/2011/01/modelo-de-upp-do-rio-falha-emmedellin/ (date accessed: 1 March 2012).

16 The Complexo do Alemão has yet to receive a UPP and has been occupied by the Brazilian military since November 2010.

17 John Horne and Garry Wannel, Understanding the Olympics (London: Routledge, 2011).

18 Luiz Ernesto Magalhães, “Em três dias, preço de imóvel no Rocinha aumenta 50%,” O Globo, 16 November 2011.

19 “Imóveis em favelas com UPP sobem até 400%,” O Globo, 29 May 2010.

20 Jose Mariano Beltrame, interview by Leituras Favre, Internet, http://blogdofavre.ig.com.br/tag/ upp/ (date accessed: 1 March 2012).

21 Christopher Gaffney, interview with foreign journalist press corps, Chapeu-Mangueira Favela, 19 June 2010.

22 Juliana Barbassa, “Rio police strike exposes marred institution,” Internet, http://www.guardian. co.uk/world/feedarticle/10088072 (date accessed: 1 March 2012).

23 Daniel Cerqueira, “Mortes Violentas Não Esclarecidas e Impunidade no Rio de Janeiro” (working paper, OAB-RJ, 2011).

24 Alfonso Daniels, “Argentina’s dirty war: the museum of horrors,” Internet, http://www.telegraph. co.uk/culture/3673470/Argentinas-dirty-war-themuseum-of-horrors.html (date accessed: 1 March 2012).

25 UPP Social, “The Project,” Internet, http:// www.uppsocial.com.br/o-projeto (date accessed: 11 January 2012).

Conflict&Security

The Future of Terrorist De-Radicalization Programs John Horgan and Mary Beth Altier In August 2009, Abdullah Hassan al-Asiri attempted to assassinate Saudi Prince and Deputy Minister of the Interior Muhammad bin Nayef in a suicide bombing. The prince had been responsible for the development of Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism policy since 2003, and al-Asiri, a member of al-Qaeda, had cleverly gained access to his palace by expressing a desire to turn himself in and participate in the Saudi terrorist rehabilitation program. The suicide bombing failed, killing al-Asiri and only slightly injuring bin Nayef. A few months later, Ibrahim al-Rubaish, the latest mufti of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), released an audiotape in which he used Islamic doctrine to justify the assassination attempt on bin Nayef and al-Qaeda’s use of targeted assassination against “the enemies of Islam,” more generally.1 Ibrahim al-Rubaish had, in 2001, been captured by U.S. soldiers and was subsequently detained at Guantanamo Bay until December 2006, when he was repatriated to Saudi Arabia and enrolled in the terrorist rehabilitation program there. In April 2008, al-Rubaish fled Saudi Arabia, allegedly with eleven other former Guantanamo detainees, to join AQAP in Yemen.2

John Horgan is Director of the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University. He is Associate Editor of Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, and is a member of the editorial boards of journals including Terrorism and Political Violence, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.

Mary Beth Altier is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University.

She holds a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University and researches political attitudes and political behavior in divided societies.

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Three years later, in April 2011, Congressman Robert Wittman—who chairs the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee for the House Armed Services Committee—opened a congressional hearing on Guantanamo Bay detainee transfer policy by reiterating the conclusion (made two months earlier) of then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that the United States was still “not particularly good at predicting which returnee will be a recidivist.”3 The issue of terrorist recidivism

at least for now.

Still, terrorist de-radicalization programs represent truly creative and innovative approaches to counterterrorism efforts. They offer benefits far beyond those originally envisaged in attempting to reduce the risk of recidivism of terrorist offenders. There remains great potential for repentant and voluntarily disengaged terrorists to help counter violent extremism by reducing the allure of involvement to would-be recruits and deconstructing the myths

Ultimately, disengaged terrorists them-

selves may be the most potent force in pre-empting engagement among prospective recruits. had reached a boiling point in recent months with some “former detainees… reportedly involved in attacks against U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.”4 Equally troubling was the knowledge that some of those who had returned to the fight, such as alRubaish, had participated in what have become widely known as terrorist ‘deradicalization’ programs.

For the past five years, the prospect of terrorist de-radicalization has proven consistently enticing. In fact, so alluring has the hope been for ‘deradicalization’ programs that, in 2008, a Time magazine special declared terrorist rehabilitation to be one of the “best ideas of the year.”5 Yet despite the extraordinary interest in these initiatives, opinions about their effectiveness remain divided. Terrorist recidivism remains a reality of detainee repatriation, and reliable and valid risk assessment of terrorists remains out of reach,

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that feed recruitment narratives. Ultimately, disengaged terrorists themselves may be the most potent force in preempting engagement among prospective recruits. Until that potential is realized, however, de-radicalization programs must be rigorously evaluated to determine their effectiveness with regard to a host of issues. To be credible, these initiatives must be transparent in their objectives, explicit in their criteria for evaluation, and evidencebased in their claims for success.6 More forcibly, the most important step in increasing the inherent effectiveness of these programs and enhancing proper risk assessment is a greater understanding of the processes by which members of terrorist groups disengage and re-engage with terrorism.

This article concludes by offering some issues for exploration by policy makers that include principles for creating and maintaining effective risk reduc-

HORGAN AND ALTIER

tion initiatives.

Unpacking De-radicalization Programs. By the time the 2008 Time special emerged, at least a dozen efforts to reverse radicalism were in existence. De-radicalization programs had sprung up in multiple countries including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, and Morocco. Many of the assumptions surrounding what terrorist de-radicalization programs are, and what they do, arise from popular characterizations of the most familiar: the Saudi Arabian program for rehabilitation and reintegration. In this initiative, launched by Saudi authorities in 2003 and 2004, imprisoned former members of terrorist groups participate in a program of tightly structured learning and socialization activities that seeks to achieve a strategic objective of reeducation, rehabilitation, and reintegration. The program begins for the prisoner while in custody but extends to a series of aftercare activities postrelease.7 Staffed by social workers and psychologists, participants in the Saudi program are taught critical thinking skills while coming to change their views about the legitimacy of their previous activities. The goal of the rehabilitation effort is not just to turn former terrorists, but also to assess the risk of reoffending and to equip the former terrorist with the social and psychological tools to re-enter society.

When de-radicalization programs first became publicly known (most of them long after they were established), their attractiveness was understandable. Could terrorists really be turned, and was this indeed a reversal of radi-

Conflict&Security

calism? Those who ran the programs claimed impressive success rates. The Saudi authorities asserted a recidivism rate of 10 to 20 percent, depending on which media profile of the program one read.8 Even at the high end of that rate, it remains far lower than that expected for the normal offender population, which in the United States and the United Kingdom often tops 40 percent.9 Scholars, however, have repeatedly questioned the accuracy of the Saudi recidivism rate, noting that it is based on anecdotal evidence of individual cases of re-engagement. Accurate assessment requires a longer follow-up period to account for the fact that former terrorists may re-engage years, not months, after their release.10 The late Christopher Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace frequently warned that despite the apparent successes of the Saudi initiative, what it represented was, in reality, a â&#x20AC;&#x153;Saudi solution to a Saudi problem.â&#x20AC;?11 Given how the Saudi program draws on its own long history and culture of rehabilitative tradition, Boucek cautioned that we should not expect this program to work elsewhere, and thus, we should be equally cautious in attempting to identify lessons learned from the Saudi experience that might inform the development of programs in other locales.

Slowly, news of more and more de-radicalization programs began to emerge. Some were formal, highly structured, and well-funded, such as the Saudi program, while others were much more informal and often the result of entrepreneurial individuals working creatively within a prison or police setting, as in Indonesia. Other

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initiatives hardly could be considered formal programs. They each, however, had their own distinctive titles, and that proved to be a clue as to their contextspecific expectations for what constituted success. Some initiatives attempted to counter ideological extremism, as in Yemen, Singapore, and Malaysia. Others, such as one in Northern Ireland, continued to focus on reintegration or, at least as a nominal first step, demobilization, as in Colombia. Some of these initiatives initially developed as efforts to win hearts and minds in the battle against violent extremism, as in Bangladesh, whereas others seemed to emerge from efforts to turn former terrorists into potential witnesses. The language, terminology, and official descriptions of these programs remain as varied

as implicit models of what might work elsewhere. Identifying which programs appear to be most successful (a task often expected of such reports) is not as important as understanding how and why a given program effectively reduces the risk of terrorist re-engagement.

A key challenge lies in the basic nomenclature. Though de-radicalization programs became an attractive and catchy short-cut label to describe these creative, unique, and varied initiatives, in reality many of the programs are not overly concerned about de-radicalization as it is popularly imagined. Broadly speaking, de-radicalization includes any effort to change or re-direct views that are supportive of—and thereby, the assumption goes, conducive to—violent action. Notably, the term, ‘de-radical-

...True renouncement of violence or the rejection of…“extremist ideology” did not necessarily feature in the aims and objectives of each program. as the expectations surrounding them.

They remain, to paraphrase Boucek’s aforementioned analysis of the Saudi initiative, a product of their own time and place and not easily transferable.

Although the past few years have seen some reports attempting to compare various programs, these comparisons typically fail to identify anything beyond the most public and superficial features of the programs, neglecting an analysis of the metrics, methodologies, and actual data necessary for systematic evaluation. To this effect, most comparative studies of these programs tend to be proscriptive opinionpieces, highlighting regional successes

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ization,’ is scarcely found in any formal description of these initiatives. The acquisition and development of cognitive skills formed the basis for some of the programs, but true renouncement of violence or the rejection of whatever the state deemed to be an extremist ideology did not necessarily feature in the aims and objectives of each program. Some programs, such as those in Yemen and Algeria, did require a renouncement of the former group or its leader, but many did not require the individual to conclude that what he or she had done was wrong. Instead of placing blame, the emphasis, as in the Saudi program, was on cultivating a

HORGAN AND ALTIER

Conflict&Security

shared sense of victimization and identifying pro-social ways of expressing the acknowledged and legitimate grievances held by the individual terrorist, or at least, acquired by them once they joined a terrorist group. For these reasons, in a recent study sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Horgan and Braddock offer the term â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;risk-reductionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; programs as a viable and more accurate description of these initiatives.12 De-radicalization in the sense that we use it here may or may not be a core feature of any riskreduction program.

In light of these cases, the question emerged as to whether the Saudi program was really as effective as claimed.

This concern has since broadened to a much more generic critique of all such programs. Despite the increased popularity of risk reduction initiatives, it remains difficult, if not impossible, to procure reliable data regarding their effectiveness. Even explicitly identifying the criteria for measuring effectiveness remains an elusive or reluctant feature of most of these programs. It is ironic that some of the greatest clarity on these issues is actually associated with the process surrounding the decisions to repaDo These Programs Actually triate detainees from Guantanamo Bay. Work? Even if we take a context-spe- Though the Guantanamo repatriation cific approach to thinking about risk- process is certainly not classifiable as a reduction programs, the burning ques- risk-reduction initiative, the Departtion remains: are they effective? And if ment of Defense has at least provided they are effective in reducing the risk its own clear sense of what constitutes of re-engagement to terrorism, what recidivism to terrorism.13 On a more is causing that result? Is it an effort to promising note, psychologists within counter violent extremist ideology at the National Offender Management the level of the individual prisoner, or Service (NOMS) in the United Kingdoes it have more to do with addressing dom have recently developed a peerrelapse prevention upon release from reviewed methodology for assessing risk custody? Much of the overt criticism of of recidivism among terrorist offenders risk-reduction programs is reinforced and a set of targeted interventions.14 with examples of terrorist recidivism Concerns about the apparent lack like that of Ibrahim al-Rubaish or Abu of transparent concepts and metrics Hareth Muhammed al-Awfiâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;another for measuring de-radicalization in the former Guantanamo detainee who, short-term (i.e. during participation after being released from Saudi custody in a program) as well as the long-term in 2008, traveled to Yemen to join (i.e. post-release) remain. Terrorist AQAP and appeared in a 2009 jihad- recidivism has not yet been appropriist video message before his re-arrest ately characterized, and it would appear and reentry into the Saudi program. from early research on this subject that Though the numbers of known recidi- re-engagement is a broader and more vists is small relative to the numbers appropriate concept to help our analyof those originally detained, there are sis.15 Moreover, it is an inescapable fact dozens more documented cases of re- that, despite the unfortunate and now engagement in terrorism. misleading nomenclature, achieving

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de-radicalization as a necessary step in reducing the risk of re-engagement can at very best represent a limited and partial solution. This issue has been recognized for some time, but the concerns that inform that recognition continue to be explored in a systematic fashion.16

we can assess whether or not certain risk reduction initiatives are likely to be effective in reducing recidivism. We currently lack the empirical evidence to answer, for instance, whether a certain kind of person or a terrorist recruited to a specific role or function may be a more or less suitable candidate for It Is (Still) About Disen- de-radicalization efforts. Similarly, we gagement, Not De-radi- do not yet know how many terrorists calization. The assumption that disengage as a result of being apprewe need to de-radicalize terrorists in hended, and how many volunteer for order to reduce the risk of re-engage- help (the latter most likely a function ment is easy to understand. After all, if of a specific prison culture). Answerwe can change detaineesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; beliefs about ing these questions would lead to more violence, it would presumably result in targeted and effective programs.

We cannot reliably predict if people will re-engage in terrorism without knowing how or why they disengage and re-engage. a change in their behavior. In addition, a concern with addressing thoughts (and thereby, the assumption follows, intentionality) is consistent with the current counterterrorism policy of preemption. But there are considerable problems with this position. Aside from the fact that attitudes and behavior rarely correlate in a reliable fashion, a phenomenon that is well-documented in the field of psychology, there is a broader looming issue of far greater importance. We cannot reliably predict if people will re-engage in terrorism without knowing how or why they disengage and re-engage.

Just as people engage in terrorism for different reasons, they also disengage for various reasons. If we know why, when, and how people disengage from and re-engage in terrorism, then

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Different approaches could be tailored to different types of individuals.

De-radicalization is frequently associated with attempts to disrupt adherence to a particular ideology. This approach might best serve a captured and convicted terrorist for whom ideology played a significant role in his or her mobilization. Yet the evidence from social science continues to assert that, just as not all radicals will seek out involvement in terrorism, not all terrorists hold radical beliefs. Therefore, an equally relevant goal in reducing future risk would be undermining the perceived attractiveness of involvement in a terrorist group, independent of ideology.

The Future of Terrorist Risk Reduction Programs. We remain

steadfast in our belief that terrorist

HORGAN AND ALTIER

risk reduction programs informed by the processes we highlight here hold great promise. Significant challenges in assessing the effectiveness of terrorist risk reduction programs remain, but we believe the critical rate-limiting factor in their continuing development is whether or not the individual assessment of detainees is informed by a deeper understanding of the disengagement (as opposed to de-radicalization) and re-engagement processes. Effective risk reduction initiatives for the imprisoned terrorist must also take into account the individual’s personal trajectory, or “arc,” of involvement, engagement, and disengagement. A treatment program to promote reduced risk of involvement may require addressing very different sets of issues depending on the individual in question. The most important considerations must include individuals’ initial motivations for becoming involved, the idiosyncratic experiences and meaning they derived from their involvement, and their own pathway out of the group. An attempt to help an individual reinterpret hadiths is far less important than understanding the meaning of their involvement, the factors that mobilized them into action in the first place, and what led to their disengagement. Though disen-

Conflict&Security

gagement may be voluntary or involuntary, identifying and addressing those individual-level experiences is critical to developing a person-specific, and not doctrine-specific, prioritization of treatment objectives to reduce risk of re-engagement. Additionally, it is difficult to see how any risk reduction program can reliably predict reengagement in terrorism without being able to acknowledge that the grievances held by detainees are, in their eyes, legitimate and highly meaningful. An attempt at de-radicalizing a detainee that is not cognizant of these issues is doomed to failure.

There is a current danger that unless we find ways to ensure that terrorist risk reduction programs retain a firm footing they may be relegated to the ever-increasing trash heap of silverbullet solutions in counterterrorism.

De-radicalization programs can never be expected to fix terrorism or all those who participate in it. Yet, helping bring terrorist risk reduction initiatives into an evidence-led, rigorous framework informed by a deeper understanding of the factors and processes that underpin terrorist disengagement and reengagement will bring with it benefits that are too great to ignore.

Note From the Authors: We are grateful to Max Taylor for comments on an early draft. All errors are ours.

This research is supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate’s Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD). Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations presented here are solely the authors’ and are not representative of DHS or the U.S. government.

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NOTES

1 Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Ibrahim al-Rubaish: New Religious Ideologue of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia Calls for Revival of Assassination Tactic,” Terrorism Monitor 7 25 (November 2009): 3-4.

2 Ibid.

3 House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Armed Forces, Guantanamo Detainee Transfer Policy and Recidivism: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Armed Forces, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 13 April 2011, 23.

4 Ibid.

5 Amanda Ripley, “What’s next 2008: Reverse Radicalism,” Time (13 March 2008).

6 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22 (2010): 267-291.

7 T. Bjorgo and J. Horgan (eds.) Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (New York: Routledge, 2009).

8 Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009): 26.

9 See: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics study of offenders released in 1994 and study of offenders released in 1983 available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/recidivism/index.cfm# as well as a recent study by the Pew Center available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/ Pew_State_of_Recidivism.pdf. For the United Kingdom, see the 2007 “Compendium of reoffending statistics and analysis” available at http://www.justice.gov. uk/publications/docs/compendium-of-reoffendingstatistics-and-analysis.pdf.

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10 See: Alan Lankford and Katherine Gillespie, “Rehabilitating Terrorists Through Counter-Indoctrination: Lessons Learned from the Saudi Arabian Program,” International Criminal Justice Review 21 (2011): 119; Marisa L. Porges, “Getting Deradicalization Right,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2010).

11 Christopher Boucek, “Extremist re-education and rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” in Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (New York: Routledge, 2009), 212-223.

12 T. Bjorgo and J. Horgan (eds.) Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (New York: Routledge, 2009).

13 United States Department of Defense, “Former Guantanamo Detainee Terrorism Trends,” (Washington DC, 2009), Internet, http://www.defense.gov/ news/returntothefightfactsheet2.pdf (date accessed: 12 February 2012).

14 Monica Lloyd and Christopher Dean, “Intervening with Extremist Offenders,” Forensic Update 105 (January 2012): 35-38.

15 In research sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, researchers at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Penn State University are currently engaged in a three-year study of terrorist disengagement and re-engagement.

For more information on this project, see www.icst. psu.edu.

16 Alan Lankford and Katherine Gillespie, “Rehabilitating Terrorists Through Counter-Indoctrination: Lessons Learned from the Saudi Arabian Program,” International Criminal Justice Review 21 (2011): 118-133.

Conflict&Security

Combating Terrorism

Adapting Global Strategy to the Evolving Threats of a New Decade Bruce Hoffman As the United States’s receding international military presence coincides with growth of new, international terrorist outfits, brutal crackdowns perpetrated by authoritarian regimes, and gaping regional power vacuums left behind by the myriad of revolutionary movements that presently sweep the globe, our collective future may seem inevitably tumultuous. Bruce Hoffman sits down with the Journal to discuss the pitfalls of current operational mantra and the specific organizational mechanisms utilized by recalcitrant groups and bureaucracies around the world to further their destabilizing ends.

GJIA: How will terrorism fare as a policy priority for the government and security sector over the course of the next decade, and how will U.S. foreign internal defense strategies continue to play out?

Hoffman: How terrorism will fare as a policy priority depends on whether there is a serious terrorist threat or attempt in the United States over the next few years. I think these days most people in the United States, including our leaders, are tired or fatigued by the War on Terrorism. They are justifiably preoccupied with our faltering economy and there is an enormous temptation to turn inward. I think we always have to guard against the temptation to become com-

Bruce Hoffman is Director of both the Center for Security Studies and of the Security Studies Program at Georgetoen University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He was previously Director of the RAND Corporation’s Washington, D.C. office and Scholar-in-Residence for Counterterrorism at the Central Intelligence Agency. His forthcoming book, Anonymous Soldiers: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Palestine and the Rise of Israel, will be published in 2013.

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placent or to lower our guard because history has always shown such moments are precisely when terrorists strike, not only because it is easier for them to attack—if we are not taking the threat seriously our defenses will not be as strong as they could be—but also because they understand that the dividend is much greater in terms of the fear and anxiety that is created in the wake of a successful strike. The overreaction such catastrophe provokes is what the ter-

domestic policies therein?

Hoffman: The drone strategy and the high-value targeting strategy have been enormously effective at degrading al-Qaeda’s capability. As President Obama has said, it has eliminated more than half of al-Qaeda’s leaders, which I think is a tremendous accomplishment.

We have certainly weakened drastically al-Qaeda not only with the death of Osama Bin Laden, its founder and

Serial decapitation strategies, as opposed to

strategies that eliminate leadership simultaneously, have rarely been effective in the long term. rorists count on. We have been enormously fortunate in the past decade that there has not been a successful terrorist attack in the United States.

Certainly, in terms of our overseas military commitments and involvements, foreign internal defense is going to be more important than ever. The shift we are seeing in the drawdown of U.S. conventional forces overseas and the increasing emphasis on special operations illustrates a paradigm shift.

Special operations critically includes unconventional warfare, which at least, according to the U.S. special forces doctrine, is the training of indigenous forces, foreign internal defense, and internal defense development, which may involve non-kinetic training missions as well as kinetic ones.

GJIA: How would you assess the current U.S. models for counterterrorism? And what are the implications of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act upon the development of

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leader, but also by throwing the movement off balance.

That said, there are several things that worry me. First of all, historically, serial decapitation strategies, as opposed to strategies that eliminate leadership simultaneously, as was the case in Peru in 1992 with the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), have rarely been effective in the long term. I worry that we delude ourselves into thinking that the tremendous progress we have made can be sustained just by using this tactic. Terrorist groups, or at least the better ones, are always learning organizations—they are a dynamic, evolving phenomena. I would argue al-Qaeda fits this classification and will adapt and adjust to successful tactics. Secondly, a lot of our success has been dependent on our cooperation with the Pakistanis for gathering intelligence, which has become a much more tenuous phenomenon as U.S.-Pakistani relations have deteriorated. Finally, air power and technology not only depend on on-

HOFFMAN

the-ground intelligence, but also need an on-the-ground presence. Perhaps we are now in a new era of warfare and this trend will be reversed, but I think it is too soon to say.

I worry that we have conflated a tactic with a strategy. The drone program and high-value targeting is not a strategy—it is a tactic. In general, counterterrorism is more tactical than counterinsurgency—it is about getting the “bad guys” and eliminating the threat. Counterinsurgency attempts something much more ambitious and is much more strategic. It involves intense non-kinetic as well as kinetic approaches. Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer, who was one of the people responsible for the highly effective, historical counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya, once famously said that, “The shooting side of the business is only 25 percent of the trouble, and the other 75 percent lies in getting the people of this country behind us.” We have been very successful in knocking back the threat, but not in changing the ecology of terrorist groups, in deadening their appeal, or watering down their brand. This ensures a problem that I think will constantly regenerate and reconstitute itself—hopefully, as we have seen in the last few years, in weaker and less capable forms, but we cannot afford to be fighting this kind of war for decades hence. What worries me is that our approach now ensures that we will constantly be fighting.

I think we need to get as good at breaking the cycle of recruitment, regeneration, propaganda, and messaging that sustains these movements as we have been at killing off their leaders, which will never be a successful, longterm strategy. The history of counter-

Conflict&Security

terrorism and counterinsurgency shows that technology cannot trump innovation. Insurgents or terrorists will eventually find a way to work around our use of the drones. In Bin Laden’s case, he went to Abbottabad. The conventional wisdom was that he was hiding in an isolated cave. Instead, he went to where the drones cannot operate without risking civilian causalities. Drones will similarly become less effective in urban areas as more terrorists relocate there, and we will be left without any long-term development to fall back on.

GJIA: How would you suggest the United States and the international community to move beyond the mentality of “getting the bad guys” in the upper echelons of leadership and really address the roots of terrorism and insurgency?

Hoffman: The recognition of the importance of this transition is present in many documents, such as the 2006 Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, published in the final years of the Bush administration, and certainly exists in the counter-radicalization strategies that were released by the Obama administration last July and earlier this year. I am not advocating for an even focus on these aspects of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, but I would say that the current focus is 99 percent on kinetic action and 1 percent non-kinetic. That is incredibly skewed. Part of the problem is that the United States is a metric-obsessed country—metrics of effect or metrics of success. As Brian Jenkins, a terrorism expert at RAND and my mentor, observed a few years ago: baseball is the most popular sport in the United States

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because it is statistics-driven. This obsession with metrics and high-value targeting is manifested in the drone program because the President can say we have killed ‘x’ number of terrorists, the intelligence community has a good idea of how many leaders there are, and you can measure progress and put value to defense expenditure. Conversely, there is no way to measure if you have prevented someone from becoming a terrorist or “deradicalized” someone.

zations like the UN assist in combating terrorism?

Hoffman: The UN is still struggling to come up with an accepted definition of terrorism ten years after 9/11; this should illustrate enough the formidable challenge of working through such bureaucratic mechanisms. Additionally, no nation when ranked by defense spending as a percentage of GDP, especially in these dire economic times, is

Appropriate non-kinetic action is not undertaken because its results cannot be quantified in the timeframes that suit our budgetary process or our electoral cycle.

Moving forward, we have to recognize that there are some things that do not have neat metrics. Even if they exist, they will certainly not be metrics that can be measured within the lifespan of a year or a four-year presidential term. Much of the time, appropriate non-kinetic action is not undertaken because its results cannot be quantified in the timeframes that suit our budgetary process or our electoral cycle. This is a shame, because I think non-kinetic initiatives are just as important and just as valuable. We need to avoid becoming so intoxicated by the success of our current kinetic programs that we fail to recognize that terrorists and insurgents can find a workaround. There may even be foreign policy constraints that render these same tactics that have proven so successful over the past few years far more difficult in the future. Redistribution of focus needs to start now.

GJIA: How should the international community and international organi-

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comparable to the United States. This is why the United States needs to lead, but we are going to have to fight the War on Terror differently if it is to be a sustainable endeavor. We are going to have to be just as innovative and dynamic as the terrorists. However, unlike terrorist organizations whose revolutionary raison d’être is to change something, governmental bureaucracy is often the opposite. The military, for instance, spends years developing doctrine that then informs all the training, the equipping, and the organization of its forces. It is very difficult to change that process.

It took four to five unsuccessful years in Iraq to spur us to fundamentally change our approach. It becomes very comfortable to rely on yesterday’s and today’s tactics and strategies instead of thinking ahead. Historically, that is why we are always responding and reacting to terrorism, rather than proactively countering it.

GJIA: What is the most effective way

HOFFMAN

Conflict&Security

for the United States to deal with the over the Libyan arsenals that were Haqqani network? amassed under the Qaddafi regime.

What Syria has completely eclipses Hoffman: Irrespective of the Paki- whatever Libya did, not only in terms stani military, the Haqqani network has of sophisticated surface to air missiles been around for several decades and and other portable missiles, but also in is entrenched in its support networks, terms of biological and chemical weapits constituencies, its operations, and ons as well. its effectiveness. It is one of those proThis is also one of the big probtean terrorist movements that are very lems in Iraq. Saddam Hussein had vast difficult to eliminate. It is also tribal stockpiles of weapons that were beyond and clannish, as well as familial. What the capacity of the U.S. military forces we often fail to recognize is that even to secure. As such they were all looted. organizations that do not have the neat We have seen the same problem in wiring diagrams you might encounter Libya. Syria would be worse. We know on the usa.gov web site or in the finan- that it was exactly the provision of those cial reports of major corporations have weapons that sustained the insurgency clear plans of succession. The contin- in Iraq. ued existence of the Haqqani network is There are already reports of nonnot just a result of what many American democratic elements—fighters who batofficials see as a permissive environ- tled in Iraq, for example, that used ratment created by Pakistani leadership. lines and conduits from Syria to enter That is part of it, but the network also the country—are now doubling back has a constituency and has an agenda and infiltrating Syria. It will be absothat resonates with its supporters. I do lutely critical to manage any process that not think there is any one solution for results in the fall of the Assad regime. It an entity that has existed for multiple is certainly already proving to be a lot decades. There has to be a multiplicity messier because the regime is a lot more of approaches, a strategy, to counter it. capable and is resisting much more There is always a proclivity to find the strenuously and effectively than that of “silver bullet” that stops terrorism once Qaddafi. Libya is basically isolated in and for all, but this universal solution North Africa both geographically, and will never exist. even in a strategic sense. Conversely, Syria, because of its geographic posiGJIA: What impact do you think a col- tion, is enormously pivotal. Assad’s fall lapse of the Syrian regime would have would be a real blow to Iran. That also both domestically and in the region? ensures that the conflict in Syria will More broadly, what does the Arab play itself out longer because Iran and Spring indicate about trends regarding Hezbollah have tremendous interest in the appeal of terrorism? maintaining the status quo.

It is too soon to tell whether the Hoffman: On a tactical level, a lot of Arab Spring has made al-Qaeda and concern now is being expressed about terrorism irrelevant. Thirty-six years the lack of control that was exercised of studying the subject has made me

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a pessimist because in the 1970’s we thought terrorism was bad and difficult to counter, and it was nothing like it is today. What worries me is that whatever stability and economic and political reform emerges from the Arab Awakening is going to take a long time to play out. The United States also began its war of independence in 1776, and it did not end until 1789. Many revolutions take decades to complete. Even if alienated, disillusioned, disenfranchised young people are not a problem now, they could be in a few years. Many have very high expectations. Similarly in North Africa and the Middle East, this process is going to be much slower and less linear than anybody thought, and that is ripe for breeding impatience and frustration, especially amongst the young. I have no doubt that terrorist groups will attempt to exploit this situation, because that is their natural constituency, and the average age for the past two centuries of terrorists has basically been between eighteen and twenty-eight. This potential pool of disillusioned, disenfranchised, impatient, frustrated young people in countries that already have an enormously disproportionate population of youth (in Jordan, one-third of its population is under the age of seventeen) could be reservoir that could reinvigorate existing terrorist organizations or create new ones.

Recently, al-Shabaab has formally allied itself with al-Qaeda, and terrorist groups do not hitch their fortunes to what they see as falling or waning stars.

This indicates that at some level al-Qaeda’s core is continuing to make sense of the world’s changes and still has, with its present amalgamation—with this show

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of unification—a message that resonates. They will be patient and wait for the right constituency to emerge. That is the thing about terrorism that we also forget—it is not a numbers game. The Red Army Faction, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, terrorized West Germany for three decades through three successive generations; it had no more than thirty trigger pullers or bomb throwers. Terrorist organizations are comprised of a very small number of people that are able to have a disproportionately large impact upon society. That is the attraction. Terrorists also do not necessarily have to be for something; they just have to be against something. What they seek to do is undermine popular confidence in the ability of government-elected officials to provide stability and security and to discourage investment. In the countries currently experiencing the benefits of the Arab Awakening, it is exactly this instability that terrorists hope to exploit in order to polarize those societies.

GJIA: How do distinctly African groups such as Boko Haram and al-Shabaab fit into the classical profiling models of terrorist organizations? Will counterterrorist policy and strategy need to shift as they become more prominent?

Hoffman: Very recently, the first female suicide terrorist attempted to stage an attack on behalf of Boko Haram, so this group is, in a very short period of time, becoming increasingly threatening and challenging. With counterterrorism and counterinsurgency there is never a one-size fits all solution. We have to adapt and adjust the response to the conditions in each

HOFFMAN

country and to the local environment.

These movements, especially in West Africa, are in part traceable to the proliferation of weaponry. The cost of an AK-47 from Libya is less than half of what it was a year ago. These weapons are circulating much more and they are emboldening groups like Boko Haram.

The Nigerian authorities as recently as two or three years ago pursued very much of a decapitation strategy there.

In fact, they apprehended and killed the founder and leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf. That did not end the threat. In fact, it has worsened now.

Pursuing different strategies such as working through and with local governments in those regions for grassroots solutions to the conditions that give rise to groups like Boko Harman and al Shaabab and to create the stability that is needed in Somalia is absolutely essential.

GJIA: How would you say the political impasse between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas might, through the stalled peace process, affect terrorism in the Middle East?

Conflict&Security

ties, and when the Palestinian economy was extremely strong. The next year there was the Second Intifada, which was devastating to both sides. Whether we are in the midst of the peace process or the peace talks are stalled, there does not seem to be any recipe to what precipitates terrorism in the region.

Terrorism does not exist in a vacuum.

Anything from the instability in Syria to questions and uncertainty about Iran could have a potentially enormous impact on local conflicts. We are in a more perilous time for PalestinianIsrael relations than we have been in a while, because there are so many external factors that potentially affect them.

Another important factor will be the success (or lack thereof) of the recent Hamas and Fatah unity agreement.

Hamas ran its 2006 campaign by portraying itself as a non-corrupt alternative to Fatah. They see Fatah as far too willing to compromise, as being far too inefficient in its governance, and far more corrupt. It will be interesting to see if this coalition actually succeeds and works. If it moderates Hamas, it would be all to the better, but it is too soon to tell, because this situation is incredibly susceptible to external developments.

Even events in the Sinaiâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;where there are new terrorist groups linked if not to al-Qaeda than at least professing Salafist aims and ideology similar to that of al-Qaedaâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;can play a major role in the determination of what happens.

Hoffman: The fact that the peace process has not gone very far creates precisely the disillusionment and frustration that I said earlier would potentially give rise to terrorism elsewhere. So it is certainly a factor. That said, we have to think back to 1999 when the Bruce Hoffman was interviewed by William Handel Oslo process was at its zenith, when and Matthew Sullivan on 20 February 2012.

Israeli-Palestinian relations were in full bloom, when there was tremendous cooperation in both economic and security terms between the two par-

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Culture&Society Abu Dhabi and What it Means to be a Global Cultural Capital Cynthia P. Schneider Today, cities and countries within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are engaged in a friendly cultural competition, which is reminiscent of the rivalry between Florence and Venice during the Italian Renaissance. The first in the GCC to emerge as a cultural capital was Dubai, a city renowned for its Film Festival and Art Fair. It has developed into a vibrant visual arts community with a presence in film and television production. Sharjah has specialized in theater and visual arts, earning a reputation for its Biennial. Doha and Abu Dhabi have sought to develop outstanding cultural centers and initiatives in multiple fields. All have opened institutions of higher education based on American models.

This article will analyze Abu Dhabi’s growth as an international cultural center with a focus on the city’s current priority of developing the human capital essential to support its ambitious cultural agenda. Questions to be considered include: 1) How does Abu Dhabi balance its twin goals of becoming a global cultural hub and fostering local cultural heritage? 2) What have been Abu Dhabi’s success stories so far and what are likely to be its greatest challenges? 3) How does Abu Dhabi’s cultural expansion compare with that of others in the Gulf? 4) How does it impact the broader

Cynthia P. Schneider is a former U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands and a current Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. She is also a codirector of the Muslims on Screen and Television (MOST) Resource and a senior nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution.

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Middle East region?

With the 2004 announcement that introduced its ambitious plans to develop a regional cultural center on Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi took center stage in the burgeoning cultural scene in the Gulf. News of partnerships with the Louvre, the Guggenheim, and the British Museum, plus commissions to top architects such as Frank Gehry and Zaha Hadid, increased the excitement around the most ambitious cultural project in recent memory.

Curiosity mixed with schadenfreude greeted the announcement during fall 2011 that the completion of the Lou-

Abu Dhabi’s cultural projects.

The reorientation of priorities by the Abu Dhabi authorities seems to align with the thinking of Ghassan Salameh, chairman of the Arab Fund for Arts and Culture, who recently observed that investing in people over the long term through serious education and cultural production reaps far more benefits than the “real estate view of things.”2 Abu Dhabi has not abandoned its building projects; as planning progressed for the museums, however, and as other cultural entities such as the Abu Dhabi Authority for Culture and Heritage (ADACH) launched new ini-

An important part of this process involves the

ongoing ‘Emiratization,’ or gradually weaning the cultural institutions and agencies from foreign managers and workforce and replacing them with Emiratis. vre, Guggenheim, and Sheikh Zayed Museums would be delayed, owing to the “immense magnitude” of the work associated with such “consequential projects.”1 It seemed as if the Abu Dhabi authorities had decided to take a collective breath to re-assess their priorities and the overall organization of these massive projects—an entirely reasonable reaction in the face of the daunting task of designing, building, and curating three world-class museums in less than a decade. Outside factors probably also played a role.

The combination of the Dubai bailout after the financial crash, and the increased expenditures on infrastructure for the poorer Emirates in the wake of the Arab Spring, diminished the funds immediately available for

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tiatives, the need for a cultural infrastructure became even more apparent.

It comes as no surprise that a relatively new city like Abu Dhabi, whose urban life is only one generation old, had to make a concentrated effort to develop the climate, personnel, and audience to foster a welcoming environment and nurture these new institutions. An important part of this process involves an ongoing effort of ‘Emiratization,’ or gradually weaning the cultural institutions and agencies from foreign managers and workforce and replacing them with Emiratis. Successful ‘Emiratization’ requires trained, professional Emiratis to step in. A myriad of initiatives, such as the Emirates Foundation’s curatorial training courses, initiated by Salwa Mikdadi,

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Culture&Sociery

director of the Arts and Culture Program at the Foundation, have been launched to prepare a local workforce of curators and museum professionals.3 Although architectural construction has slowed, ‘building’ of another kind is taking place in Abu Dhabi. Only time will reveal the success of the efforts to develop a local workforce and an audience both worthy and capable of sustaining the world-class institutions to be built on Saadiyat Island.

future, researchers from ADACH, led

by Deputy Director Dr. Sami el-Masri, have painstakingly reconstructed its past. About ninety miles inland from Abu Dhabi, al-Ain is home to the remnants of prehistoric structures as well as the restored nineteenth century alJahili Fort, where history and culture come to life in the form of concerts and performances. Kuwaiti director Sulayman al-Bassam’s riveting “Richard III: An Arab Tragedy” was staged in alJahili’s courtyard, featuring a murder Cultural Heritage: the Past as on the parapets. UNESCO recently the Gateway to the Future. Abu acknowledged the importance of the Dhabi’s emphasis on culture and edu- architectural history in and around cation owes much to the open-minded Abu Dhabi, adding al-Ain to its “World and intellectually curious spirit of the Heritage List.”

United Arab Emirates’s (UAE) foundThe most important architectural er Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahayan monument in Abu Dhabi is the Qasr (1918-2004). Zayed, whose dedication al-Hosn fort (1760) that anchors the to preserving architectural and living center of the city. When the plans heritage has long been celebrated in to turn this fort into a multi-faceted the UAE, once said, “He who does not cultural center—with spaces for perknow his past, cannot make the best of formances and exhibitions, a national his present and future, for it is from the library, and a cultural business cenpast that we learn.”4 ter—are accomplished, this monument, For many Emiratis, the Sheikh Zayed already familiar to Emiratis, will also Museum will represent the most impor- become a destination for foreign visitant testament to their heritage and will tors. Dr. Sami el-Masri describes Qasr also convey lessons for the future. Sala- al-Hosn as “a place that embodies Emima al-Shamsi, a young Emirati working rati identity and culture, a place to on the museum, explained, “It is good conserve and nurture traditions and for Emiratis, especially the youth, to to showcase new forms of creativity, a understand that we are where we are gateway for Abu Dhabi to discover the because of him.”5 Planned in consul- world and for the world to discover tation with the British Museum, the Emirati culture.”6 The renovation will museum will explore the history of the take four years, but already some parts region, organized around themes of of Qasr al-Hosn have hosted exhibiimportance to Sheikh Zayed: environ- tions. A recent retrospective of the ment and conservation, faith, science leading contemporary Emirati artist and learning, unity, and heritage.

Hassan Sharif was accompanied by the While the media has focused on the first complete monograph of his work. museums planned for Abu Dhabi’s In order to build the human capital

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to preserve al-Ain and Qasr al-Hosn while opening these sites for tourism, ADACH has partnered with the University of Bauhaus and the UN’s International Center for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) to develop certificate courses in cultural heritage and preservation, including special tracks for craftspeople. These courses, open to all applicants including nonEmiratis, could provide a valuable service to the countries emerging from revolution such as Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Libya, with its extraordinarily rich ancient heritage, urgently needs training in cultural preservation, as well as conservation equipment and facilities.

How generous the UAE will be with its wealth and educational resources to countries that are richer in cultural heritage but poorer in means to preserve their history remains an open question. The argument could be made, however, that the path to becoming a true global cultural capital involves becoming part of the greater international community and supporting cultural preservation and education where needed. Ultimately, such generosity would benefit the UAE’s growing class of cultural workers by giving them the opportunity to learn with and from people of diverse backgrounds and experiences.

Cultural heritage encompasses more than buildings in the Emirates. A visit to the al-Dafra Festival, which is completed by the Camel Beauty Contest, offers a glimpse of Bedouin life as well as the intersection of living cultural heritage and the modern world.7 While families “walk” their camels to the contest,

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sometimes for days or weeks from as far away as Saudi Arabia, the prizes for the most beautiful camel consist of white SUVs and cash. Camels are evaluated according to long-established principles of dromedary excellence, which have been configured into a computer program developed especially for the annual contest. The fact that the elites of Abu Dhabi all attend the festival with their families testifies to the importance placed on preserving living cultural heritage, even if it is enhanced by fancy cars and modern technology.

The Arts. Abu Dhabi has developed

rich and varied programs encompassing education and production in the areas of literature and poetry, film and television, and the visual arts. Hissan Hilal, Saudi Arabian housewife turned fearless poet, has been involved in multiple aspects of Abu Dhabi’s cultural life. Her rise to fame shows how tightly tradition and modernity are interwoven in Abu Dhabi, as well as the extent to which living culture informs life in Abu Dhabi, even without the Saadiyat Island museums.

The Million’s Poet television program introduced Hilal to the Arab world.

Originated by Nashwa al-Ruwaini, one of the Middle East’s leading media executives, Million’s Poet marries traditional Bedouin poetry in the Nabati style with the fast-paced competition of American Idol. Not only has this unlikely union developed a following for Nabati poetry among the Arab public, but it has also provided a platform for women to hold forth in verse on controversial topics such as women’s rights and religious extremism.

Hilal is one of several women who

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Culture&Sociery

have reached the final rounds of the competition—a feat that requires both the approbation of the judges and the call-in support of the public. While the image of a veiled social critic may confound western audiences, Hilal has risked death threats to voice her biting criticism of “subversive and ad hoc fatwas.”8 The poetry equivalent of a rock star, Hilal also has been celebrated at an ADACH project, the Abu Dhabi Book Fair, where she was a featured speaker in 2011. Organized in partnership with the Frankfurt Book Fair, the annual event defies any predictions of the demise of the book as a literary form.

In 2011, over 200,000 visitors browsed among the stalls of 875 publishing houses from 58 participating countries (545 from 17 Arab countries). They could choose from among more than 100 talks and discussions featuring 130 presenters. Since 2006, the number of participating publishing houses and countries has almost tripled.9 Not surprisingly, the Abu Dhabi Book Fair has not attracted as much media attention as architectural designs

by Frank Gehry and Norman Foster, but the Book Fair has helped to create a dialogue of ideas between Abu Dhabi and the world. The Kalima translation initiative also has helped to open readers in Abu Dhabi, as well as elsewhere in the Arab world, to ideas from other languages. By supporting new voices in the Arab world such as Hilal, the Book Fair also fosters the spirit of inquiry and dissent that are essential components of any truly vibrant cultural environment.

earned the coveted support of the Abu Dhabi Film Festival’s (ADFF) Sanad fund.10 Established under the leadership of Peter Scarlett and Marie-Pierre Macia, Sanad (“support” in Arabic) grants provide development and postproduction funds for Arab cinema, with a special category for Emirati filmmakers added this year.11 Five Sanadfunded feature films earned places at ADFF 2011, a testament to the success of the program.

Now in its sixth year, the ADFF has moved from its home in the sumptuous Emirates Palace hotel to the Fairmont Hotel, a shift that symbolizes the Festival’s evolution from the extravagant glamor of the early years to a sharper focus on supporting filmmakers and developing audiences. Screenings now sell out in contrast to the relatively empty theaters characteristic of the Festival’s first years. Building audiences takes time, and festival organizers are in for the long haul.

“ADFF has grown into a serious film festival, one that goes beyond the red carpet glitz, although it has that, too. It supports film-making in the region with desperately needed funds for emerging artists,” observed Khaled Abol Naga, a frequent ADFF participant, Egyptian filmmaker, actor, and activist.12 After early forays into filmmaking on a global scale, Abu Dhabi Media Company increasingly has emphasized developing capacity in the Arab world.13 Together with Twofour54, a media and entertainment hub, Image Nation, a film and television production company, has launched Arab Film Studio to Film and Television. Hilal is also identify, train, and produce new talent the subject of a documentary that has in film. At the same time, Image Nation

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also has signed deals with some of the most respected filmmakers in Hollywood, such as Walter Parkes, former head of DreamWorks Pictures. “Image Nation’s leadership strives to balance international investment, in companies like Hyde Park, Participant, and our own, with a real commitment to building a local and regional film capability,” said Parkes.14 The first Emirati feature ever screened at the Festival, the 2011 coming of age story Sea Shadow, directed by Nawaf al-Janahi, points to the emergence of an ecosystem for film making in Abu Dhabi. Initially funded as a short film by the Emirates Foundation, Sea Shadow was picked up by Image Nation, making it the first feature by an Emirati director to be produced by the Abu Dhabi-based company.15 The success of Sea Shadow aside, Abu Dhabi ultimately also will be judged by how much it supports film in countries with gifted filmmakers but lesser means. In the wake of the revolutions, many new voices seek expression through film.

Will Abu Dhabi help them to be seen and heard?

In 2011, the Abu Dhabi Film Festival hosted an unprecedented gathering of Egyptian leaders in film and television that provided “the chance to compare notes about this unforgettable year, and to share thoughts on the future.”16 Sometimes the exchange of ideas can provide almost as important a fuel as funding in the creation of new films.

Visual Arts. Visual arts also have

benefitted from moving out of the formal setting of the Emirates Palace Hotel, where exhibitions previously took place, to the lively atmosphere of

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the Manara exhibition hall on Saadiyat Island. The large crowds and lively discussions at the fair, which boasted more than forty-five participating galleries exhibiting more than five-hundred artists, showed that the delay in museum construction had not slowed the development of a lively arts scene.

Foreign visitors to the fair were pleasantly surprised by the stimulating, high-quality art on view, along with the free-flowing conversations and panel discussions.17 Their reactions were similar to those of the guests at the 2010 UAE National Day celebration in Washington, D.C., which showcased contemporary Emirati art and artists.

Many guests expressed pleasant surprise at the sight of innovative art coming from the Emirates.18 Even the most stunning architectural masterpieces will not necessarily nurture a climate of excellence and innovation for art. The art itself will do so. The buzz around Abu Dhabi Art in November 2011 without the new museums gave a taste of Saadiyat Island’s potential as a cultural hub.

Private Philanthropy. Private

philanthropy also has contributed to both the development and the presentation of arts and culture in Abu Dhabi. Founded in 1996 by Hoda and Mohamed Kanoo, the Abu Dhabi Music and Arts Foundation (ADMAF) combines year long outreach and education programs in arts and culture with the production of the annual Abu Dhabi Arts Festival, which brings world class performers in classical music and theater, as well as visual artists to the UAE. Engaged and committed patrons, Mr. and Mrs. Kanoo have made significant

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contributions to the development of a climate for culture in Abu Dhabi. An artist and curator himself, Mohammed Kanoo is the co-owner of Ghaf Gallery, the first independent visual arts space in Abu Dhabi.

The 2012 program “Connecting Cultures” reflects ADMAF’s focus on arts and culture as a means to increase understanding across cultures, both within the UAE and with the world.19 With its Nationals’ Gallery program to mentor emerging visual artists, ADMAF

Culture&Sociery

balance modernity and tradition, and to develop a climate that nurtures and sustains new institutions.

Abu Dhabi stands out for the breadth and depth of its cultural programs as well as its ambition to build local ecosystems of creators and audiences. What is still unknown is whether an organic culture can also be nurtured to grow, and eventually, support the architectural masterpieces springing up around the Gulf. The current hiatus in construction and re-assessment of strategy

Abu Dhabi stands out for the breadth

and depth of its cultural programs as well as its ambition to build local ecosystems of creators and audiences. has partnered with other organizations, including the Emirates Foundation, to identify and foster local talent.

Salwa Mikdadi, director of the Arts and Culture program at the Emirates Foundation, has built a network of programs and relationships, including many artistic residencies abroad, to help train arts and culture professionals in the UAE. Mikdadi strives to teach professional independence as well: “You want to give them an opportunity and it is not in a check. This is structured philanthropy. We show them how to do a line item budget. We team them with mentors.”20

suggests a desire to do just that.

The final question is whether Abu Dhabi will become a global cultural center. Will it foster the development of arts, culture, and creativity beyond its own borders and share its resources of wealth, access to knowledge, and capacity to convene with countries like Libya, which needs expertise and technological capacity to protect and preserve its ancient heritage? Will it support artists from countries like Egypt, with rich traditions and powerful contemporary voices, but, during this time of transition, minimal funds and infrastructure? Answers to these questions will determine the degree to which Abu Conclusion. It is too early to assess Dhabi creates a legacy of arts and culthe long-term success of any of the ture for the Emirates, the region, the cultural initiatives in the Gulf. Like world, or all three.

Abu Dhabi, its neighbors also strive to

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NOTES

1 Vivian Salama, “Abu Dhabi Delays Louvre, Guggenheim, Zayed Plan Citing ‘Magnitude of Work,’” Internet, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1029/abu-dhabi-delays-louvre-guggenheim-citingmagnitude-of-work-.html (date accessed: 8 January 2012).

2 Jim Quilty, “An Education in Funding Arab Arts,” Internet, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=157684&mode=print (date accessed: 14 January 2012).

3 “Museum Training Course for Emiratis”, Internet, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08. asp?col=&section=theuae&xfile=data/theuae/2011/ November/theuae_November379.xml (date accessed: 14 January 2012).

4 “Sheikh Zayed in quotes,” UAE Interact, Internet, http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/Sheikh_Zayed_ in_quotes/18411.htm (date accessed: 27 March 2012).

5 Salama al-Shamsi, interview with Cynthia P. Schneider, Washington, D.C., 14 January 2012.

6 Sami el-Masri, interview with Cynthia P. Schneider, Washington, D.C., 14 January 2012.

7 Cynthia P. Schneider, “The Loveliest Humps West of Abu Dhabi,” Internet, http://tmagazine.blogs. nytimes.com/2010/05/12/the-loveliest-humps-westof-abu-dhabi (date accessed: 14 January 2012).

8 Hassan Hassan, “Million’s Poet Finalist Defies Death Threats,” Internet, http://www.thenational.ae/ news/uae-news/millions-poet-finalist-defies-deaththreats (date accessed: 14 January 2012).

9 Eliza Ilyas, personal correspondence with author, Washington, D.C., 12 January 2012.

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10 Stefanie Brockhaus, “Abu Dhabi Film Festival: Projects,” Internet, http://www.abudhabifilmfestival. ae/en/sanad/projects/2011/stefanie-brockhaus (date accessed: 14 January 2012).

11 Unknown, “Abu Dhabi Film Festival: About SANAD,” Internet, http://www.abudhabifilmfestival. ae/en/sanad/about-sanad (date accessed: 14 January 2012).

12 Khaled Abol Naga, personal correspondence with author, Washington, D.C., 15 January 2011.

13 Tim Alder, “Image Nation Separates Hollywood Division,” Internet, http://www.deadline. com/2011/10/image-nation-separates-hollywooddivision (date accessed: 14 January 2012).

14 Walter Parkes, personal correspondence with author, Washington, D.C., 15 January 2011.

15 Twofour54 Abu Dhabi, Internet, http://twofour54.com/en (date accessed: 14 January 2012).

16 Khaled Abol Naga, personal correspondence with author, Washington, D.C., 15 January 2011.

17 Rianne Norbert, personal correspondence with author, Washington, D.C., 3 January 2012.

18 Cynthia P. Schneider, “Cultural Diplomacy and the ‘Oh, I Didn’t Know That’ Factor,” The Huffington Post, 15 December 2010.

19 “Abu Dhabi Festival Announces Stellar Line-up of International Talent for 2012,” Internet, http:// www.admaf.org/en/pressrelease/abu-dhabi-festivalannounces-stellar-line-up-of-international-talentfor-2012.html (date accessed: 14 January 2012).

20 Salwa Mikdadi, interview with Cynthia P. Schneider, Washington, D.C., 7 January 2011.

Law&Ethics The Piracy Prosecution Paradox

Political and Procedural Problems with Enforcing Order on the High Seas Eugene Kontorovich The State of Twenty-First Century Piracy Prevention. The surge of Somali piracy that began in mid2008 has, instead of being suppressed, become institutionalized. Pirate motherships have broken out of the Gulf of Aden to roam the Indian Ocean. While an increased naval presence has, after several years, succeeded in lowering the number of attacks and their rate of success, this has been more than offset by greater spoils: ransoms have increased more than fivefold since 2007 . At the end of 2011, an Italian ship was released for an astronomical $11.4 million.

The persistence of Somali piracy is an embarrassment for international institutions and international law, which have devoted considerable energy and time over the past four years to the problem. There are few issues that command as uniform an international consensus as the need to prevent and prosecute piracy. The UN Security Council has passed ten resolutions on Somali piracy alone. The SecretaryGeneral has issued numerous reports; five working groups of experts convened by the Security Council have been highly active; and countless parliaments, maritime organi-

Eugene Kontorovich, professor at Northwestern University School of Law, is one of the leading experts on maritime piracy, universal jurisdiction and international criminal law, with his research cited in cases in federal courts. He is currently working on a book about piracyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s lessons for international law, to be published

by Harvard University Press.

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zations, and agencies have consulted, conferred, and reported. Meanwhile, in an unprecedented display of military cooperation, dozens of national navies have coordinated to protect shipping.

These efforts have disrupted numerous attacks, and caught many pirates.

The paradox of the anti-piracy campaign is that finding courtrooms and jails has turned out to be harder than

plan would see the “Somaliazation” of prosecution by transferring suspects to Puntland, a relatively well-functioning autonomous northern Somali province.

Under international law, the country that captures pirates can, and presumptively should, try them in its own courts.

Historically, pirate suspects have not been sent to a third country for trial

What international law giveth in powers to

prosecute international crime, it taketh away in human rights and other norms that make exercising such powers burdensome. finding the pirates themselves. Thus, many attempts have been made to persuade countries in the Horn of Africa to accept captured pirates in return for compensation. The EU and United States, among others, reached such an arrangement with Kenya in 2009, but it quickly fell apart. Other notable suggestions, like creating an international piracy court—an approach favored by several states and discussed at length at the UN—have been dismissed as slow and inefficient by leading nations, including the United States.

With both international courts and regular prosecution by the capturing nations off the table, international attention has focused on two proposals that emerged from a series of Security Council reports.1 One calls for trying and jailing pirates in one or several nearby countries, such as Seychelles or Tanzania, while giving these nations international assistance to develop their legal infrastructure. This was also the Kenya model. A more ambitious

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unless it was that nation’s ships that had been attacked. To evaluate the merits of the current UN proposals, one must consider why pirates are being released in the first place.

Surprisingly, international criminal law, despite its growth in the past several decades, finds itself incapable of dealing with a basic problem. What international law giveth in powers to prosecute international crime, it taketh away in human rights and other norms that make exercising such powers burdensome. This paper will explore the effects of this tension upon the international framework for bringing pirates to justice.

Catch and Release. Piracy is one

of the first and oldest international crimes. International prosecution of pirates should be easy. Under international law, any nation can try any pirates it catches, even if it has no connection with the crime. This model of expanded international criminal law

KONTOROVICH

has also resulted in the application of this doctrine of universal jurisdiction (UJ) to other major offenses like torture and genocide.

Nonetheless, more than 90 percent of Somali suspects apprehended by patrolling navies have been promptly released.2 Security Council documents and international leaders have expressed alarm for years over the effective impunity that pirates enjoy because of the “catch-and-release” policy the patrolling nations have adopted.3 Unfortunately, the practice of catchand-release “has now become the rule, and judicial prosecution the exception,” according to the report of the Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on Legal Issues Related to Piracy. At this point, many active pirates have themselves likely briefly been the involuntary guests of some foreign navy at some point. Given that “an end to impunity” has become the unofficial motto of the International Criminal Court and similar institutions, pirate impunity is particularly troublesome.

There are several reasons nations are loath to prosecute. Proving piracy is complicated when the defendants are not caught during an attack, but simply encountered on the high seas equipped with weapons and boarding equipment. Pirates often claim to be innocent fisherman. Logistically, all the evidence must be preserved by the navy and shipped back to court. Somali translators are needed. The crews of victim vessels must be tracked and located in order to obtain their testimony.

Yet these issues, while significant, have proved to be surmountable.4 The biggest concern of captors about bringing captured Somalis back with

Law&Ethics

them for trial is that these pirates are unlikely to ever return to their homes.

The international law doctrine of nonrefoulement prevents transferring people to countries where they may face persecution, unfair trials, or death, all commonplace in Somalia. European nations have long taken a broad interpretation of this principle, refusing to extradite criminals to countries such as the United States, where capital punishment is legal, or return al-Qaeda suspects to their home countries.5 Now, their generous interpretation of international human rights law effectively boxes them in with regards to piracy.6 The pirates are certainly not in any hurry to leave. Five to seven years in Western prison is frequently all suspects face. Pirates that have been tried in the Netherlands and Germany report to be delighted with their surroundings.7 With Somalia’s large pool of potential pirates, a nation that agrees to try pirates could be inviting in a growing permanent pirate population.8 Despite these concerns, a growing number of nations have undertaken prosecutions in cases where their own nationals or vessels have been attacked.9 This indicates that countries outside the region are not opposed to prosecuting pirates per se, they simply do not wish to prosecute them under universal jurisdiction, that is, when there own shipping has not been victimized. This teaches something about catch-andrelease. From an economic perspective, prosecuting pirates through UJ provides a global public good. The benefit of locking up pirates is shared by all countries connected to shipping in the region, but the costs are borne entirely by the prosecuting nation. When

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nations prosecute for attacks on their own vessels, they capture much more of the benefit, privatizing the good. Widespread unwillingness to use UJ simply reflects the classic underprovision of public goods. The fact that nations are more willing to act as global police than global prosecutor suggests something about public organization today. For many countries, law has become more expensive and burdensome than military action. Moreover, it shows that, despite the growth of modern international aw, it may be more of an obstacle than a solution to the most ancient of global security problems.

elaborate judicial systems. Pirate trials take years to complete in Europe, but only months in Kenya. Nonetheless, these nations tend to have limited ability to provide security, problematic human rights records, underdeveloped justice systems, little prison capacity, and potentially unreliable political cultures. Again, there is a tension between the human rights strand of international justice and the international criminal law strand. The imperatives of the latter may often point to prosecution in regional rather than captor states, but human rights concerns would suggest the opposite.

The Somali-based plan for prosecutProblems of Prosecution. For ing pirates is not fully sketched out, but public goods, a scheme whereby a it mainly contemplates captors transfew states volunteer to prosecute in ferring suspected pirates for trial and exchange for reimbursement from the imprisonment in Puntland. The main rest could be an efficient solution, attraction of Puntland is that, unlike especially if the prosecuting states have much of the rest of the world, it has no cheaper, quicker justice systems. The reluctance to take transferred Somali UN proposals for â&#x20AC;&#x153;Somaliazationâ&#x20AC;? or pirates. Additionally, setting up a court the use of regional countries represent system there could speed development just that. In contrast to other pub- of the Somali legal system overall. Even lic arrangements, however, there is a in the best-case scenario, though, this countervailing concern about adequate plan is several years from being ready, proceedings and long-term conditions and the challenges are immense. Puntfor those transferred by third par- land lacks anything resembling a conties. The host countries may disagree ventional legal system and has extremely regarding appropriate compensation or poor prison conditions. The UN Office regarding changes in costs or condi- on Drugs and Crime is building new tions, both of which may be what hap- prisons, but these will not be ready for pened with Kenya. Alternatively, the years, and even then will barely accomstate may simply lack the capacity or modate the existing overflow. Setting stability to carry out the arrangement. up a justice system that rises to interThis is the biggest concern about the national standards is more complicurrent proposals. cated yet, and is the work of decades or Regional or local prosecution has centuries. Puntland is also a breakaway obvious logistical advantagesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;these region with no international recognicountries are close to the crime and tion, and thus legal agreements could may be less burdened by expensive and be unclear. Somaliland, another part of

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KONTOROVICH

northern Somalia that could be a viable candidate, has declined to participate because of lack of international recognition. Moreover, the UN-sponsored Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, which itself is considered to be incapable of dealing with piracy trials, opposes such plans, presumably because they would elevate the status of these regions.

The other salient option is to continue with transfers to regional states that have agreed to accept suspects and have reasonably well-functioning legal systems. There are not many volunteers— principally Seychelles, and potentially Tanzania or Mauritius. Seychelles has a tradition of allowing Commonwealth jurists to participate in their courts, expanding the potential pool of manpower and expertise. But Seychelles is a very small country near maximum capacity: pirates already comprise 20 percent of the country’s prison population. It is unlikely that it can accept many more. Furthermore, Seychelles, along with other regional states, ultimately wants to re-transfer convicts to Somalia for incarceration, raising many of the problems discussed above.

The proximity of Puntland and regional states also raises the possibility of pressure from the pirate gangs. The shipping vessels or hostages from a locus nation could face reprisal. Puntland is the most vulnerable; many pirates are actually based there. Other regional states have also expressed fears about being targeted by pirates, as they do not have the naval resources to protect themselves. Indeed, pirates have already sought to trade hostages for the release of their colleagues held for trial abroad.

Seychelles has apparently traded pirate

Law&Ethics

suspects for Seychellois fishermen held by pirates, and at least part of Kenya’s second thoughts stemmed from the fear which has since been realized, of crossborder attacks.

In turning to regional states to deal with captured pirates, it must be remembered that to be successful, such arrangements must be durable. Kenya provides a cautionary lesson in this regard. It signed numerous agreements with other nations to accept pirate suspects as well as guaranteeing human rights and fair trials. But within a year, Kenya terminated the agreements, saying it was tired of being a pirate dumping ground. This threw into doubt the disposition of the approximately one hundred suspects awaiting trial, and raised questions about the future of the roughly fifty already convicted.

A number of factors help explain Kenya’s rapid reversal. The trials were politically unpopular in Kenya, the penal system overflowing, and the economic rewards not as great as anticipated. Finally, unrelated issues complicated the matter. Kenyan leaders may have resented being asked to do the dirty work of international criminal law while simultaneously under investigation for human rights abuses by the International Criminal Court.

In short, these types of agreements may prove unstable. Transferring nations are simply looking to place their captives, but receiving countries take on long-term duties, as well as responsibility for the subsequent treatment of those detained. There are no mechanisms to ensure that the specified human rights standards will be maintained over time (let alone if the agreements are prematurely terminat-

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ed), or that the deals themselves will be followed closely.10 Indeed, in late 2011, a German court ruled that its government had violated the prohibition of torture and inhumane treatment when it transferred Somali suspects pursuant to the European Union’s Memorandum of Understanding with Kenya, in spite of the set of human rights conditions and guarantees written into the agreement.11 Efforts to improve conditions in regional states just above some internationally acceptable minimum could backfire if they slip below that line in the future and the transferred pirates sue the capturing nation for a lucrative sum.

Perhaps the fanciful nature of proposed solutions to the pirate “hot potato” problem suggests that catch-andrelease is not a huge problem. A ship’s home state has primary jurisdiction over crimes on board; UJ is just a

use of such flags suggest the trade-off is worth it.

Self-Defense: A More Viable Solution? The cooperation of states

like Seychelles is helpful, and should be encouraged, but is, at best, a stopgap.

Other proposed solutions, like transfers to Somalia or international courts, seem quite unrealistic.

Thus, with systematic prosecution wrought with challenges, more attention should be paid to legal reforms that could reduce the piracy problem without a need for trials. Self-defense by merchant mariners has historically been the first line of defense from piracy. Yet today most ships go unguarded, in part because of restrictive national regulations. Even at the height of the piracy crisis, leading maritime nations and organizations strongly opposed firearms on ships. Nonetheless, no

With systematic prosecution wrought with

challenges, more attention should be paid to legal reforms that could reduce the piracy problem without a need for trials. backstop. The majority of commercial shipping, however, operates under flags of convenience from states such as Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands. These flags offer low costs and a lax regulatory environment, but not extensive support and security services, meaning that a large portion of global shipping is unlikely to rely on domestic assistance in a piracy crisis. Shippers choose flags-of-convenience knowing they are unlikely to receive naval or law enforcement assistance; the continued

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ship with an armed security team has even been successfully taken. Only in recent months have governments begun to internalize this reality, with several states considering reversing their conservative stance on armed security teams afloat.

Yet even with the new measures, shippers face a daunting slew of legal and regulatory obstacles. Ships with arms on board must comply with the firearms regulations of every port they call in: a web of bureaucratic permis-

KONTOROVICH

sions and requests. Moreover, the rules governing the use of lethal force by ships against pirates remain murky, as international law does not generally regulate conduct purely between private parties. Thus, the relevant regulations depend on individual nationsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; criminal law principles on self-defense, but there are minimal precedents for their application at sea. The specter of criminal liability and civil suits by putative pirates still hangs over private security.12 Leading maritime nations should jointly develop and promulgate easyto-understand guidelines for weapons possession and use on the high seas.

Such guidelines would not be legally binding, but would help create a consensus of opinion that would guide prosecutorial discretion and judicial judgments. Current draft guidelines in circulation only allow the use of lethal force when facing imminent danger to life or limb, a standard that echoes many countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; domestic self-defense law. This is unduly restrictive. Criminal law self-defense doctrine assumes some potential police response, which is unlikely on the high seas. Moreover, while pirates rarely hurt people, they do systematically kidnap themâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;that is their business model. Maximum deterrent force should be permitted, although this does open the door to tragic accidents. While the problem of prosecuting pirates may not be easily solved, it would certainly help to remove the legal barriers to shippers and security teams, given the impunity pirates themselves

Law&Ethics

enjoy.13 Prosecution has a role to play, and trials in Seychelles will do no harm.

Nevertheless, any national prosecution system will only be willing to deal with a fraction of the pirates. Moreover, unlike prosecution, armed security takes effect before an attack. It also costs less, is simpler to implement, and works with rather than against the incentives and interests faced by the various parties. A statement of principles by leading maritime states asserting that lethal force is a presumptively reasonable response to armed attack on the high seas would be a start, as would a relaxation of port firearm regulations by regional states. That seems a smaller request to make of countries than to host a potentially endless procession of piracy trials.

Conclusion. Piracy is the classic and

the simplest of international crimes.

Yet, the current Somali crisis reveals that international law does as much to hamper as to help prosecute international criminals. This should have cautionary implications about the effectiveness of international criminal law to prevent more serious crimes, like ethnic cleansing, committed by sovereign states, rather than by criminal gangs.

Given the international law has in part created the prosecution problem, it makes sense that a good solution will focus on deterring and defeating pirate attacks, and thus hopefully avoid international law prosecutions altogether.

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NOTES

1 See Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Lang Report), S/2011/30 (Jan. 2011); Report of the Secretary-General on specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other States in the region, S/2012/50 (20 January 2012).

2 UK House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Piracy off the coast of Somalia Tenth Report of Session 2010–12 (20 December 2011).

3 For example, see Lang Report at 9.

4 Eugene Kontorovich, “‘A Guantanamo on the Sea’: The Difficulty of Dealing With Pirates and Terrorists,” California Law Review (2010): 234 5 Ruth Wedgwood, “What Do You Do With a Captured Pirate,” Defining Ideas: A Hoover Journal, Internet, http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/ article/.

6 See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Report on the necessity to take additional international legal steps to deal with sea piracy Par. 42 (April 10, 2010), available at http://assembly.coe.int/ Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc10/ EDOC12194.htm#P264_37295.

7 “Somali Pirates on Trial in Netherlands,” Internet, http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/ archives/2009/05/somali_pirates_on_trial_in_net. php; Beate Lakotta, “German Justice Through the Eyes of a Somali Pirate,” Internet, http://www.spiegel.

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de/international/world/0,1518,755340-2,00.html.

8 The concern is not fanciful. In December a French court sentenced four Somalis to prison, but acquitted one, who will remain in France. “Somali Fisherman Alone in Paris After Piracy Acquittal,” Internet, http://news.ph.msn.com/business/article. aspx?cp-documentid=5686302.

9 Such countries include the United States, Holland, France, Germany, Spain, Korea, Malaysia, Oman, Tanzania, India and more.

10 Eugene Kontorovich, “Introductory Note to Exchange of Letters Between the European Union and the Government of Kenya on the Conditions and Modalities for the Transfer of Persons Suspected of Having Committed Acts of Piracy,” International Legal Materials (Published by the American Society of International Law), (2009): 747-750.

11 “German Court Finds the Transfer of Somali Pirates to Kenya to be in Violation of Germany’s Obligations Under International Law,” Internet, http://www.sharesproject.nl/news/german-administrative-court-finds-the-transfer-of-somali-piratesto-kenya-to-be-in-violation-of-germanys-obligations-under-international-law/.

12 “Clarify ‘Lethal Force’ Piracy Defence Rules, Say MPs,” Internet, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukpolitics-16410671.

13 “Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia,” 25-28.

Law&Ethics

From Retribution to Reconciliation Transitional Justice in Rwanda, 1994-2011 David Rawson Lest we forget! Seventeen and a half years ago, Rwandan society was convulsed in a paroxysm of genocide. An extremist Hutu government, its military and militia, as well as village gangs, tried to hold on to power and avenge the death of their president by killing over eight hundred thousand Tutsi and Hutu opponents in about one hundred days. How does a nation overcome the effect and memory of such a cataclysmâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; such gross injustice? Transitional justice regimes may seek to punish offenders, bring solace to victims, rebuild the rule of law, consolidate democratic institutions, or achieve political reconciliation and national unity.1 The eighteen years since those brutal events in Rwanda give some insights into the dilemmas and prospects of transitional justice in this most extreme example of manâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s inhumanity to fellow man.

This brief review finds that, after the genocide, both the international community and the new Rwandan government adopted transitional justice strategies that concentrated on punishing offenders. In the case of the international community, early interventions by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) floundered on the shoals of bureaucratic wrangling and host government intransigence. Large investments in extensive

David Rawson was the U.S. Observer at the Rwandan Political Negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania from Augustâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;October 1992; he was also Ambassador of the United States to Rwanda from January 1994-January 1996. He teaches at Spring Arbor University and Hillsdale College.

All opinions in this article are entirely his own.

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judicial procedures of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda brought limited results. Within Rwanda, the determination to break the cycle of impunity led to massive arrests, an untenable growth in prison populations, and a complex new law seeking to fit the punishment to the crime.

Mid-stream in the transitional process, however, the Rwandan government created a system of local popular courts that took over the trials, unburdened the prisons, and restored thousands to communal life. While the international community and human rights organizations criticized the communal justice system for their lack of due process and abuse of procedures, the locally-based Rwandan system brought justice more quickly, with greater solace to victims and more effective measures towards rebuilding communities than did all of the time and treasure poured into retributive justice by the international system, especially through the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

judicial appointments and controlled decisions of lower courts on politically relevant issues.2 In October 1990, an exile force of the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) moved across the Ugandan border and headed for the capital city of Kigali. When the Rwandan army finally stopped the insurgent force, onand-off civil war ensued, until it was brought to a halt by a cease-fire in July of 1992. During the subsequent political negotiations held in Arusha, Tanzania from 1992-1993, the Rwandan government delegation and the RPF delegates quickly agreed on a number of basic institutional tenets of transitional justice including the construction of an independent judiciary, the formation of an independent Human Rights Commission charged with looking into war crimes potentially committed by both sides, and the establishment of an apolitical High Council for the Magistrates that would name judges without regard to â&#x20AC;&#x153;power sharing among political forces.â&#x20AC;?3 Those understandings were The End of the Habyarima- part of the peace agreement signed in na Regime. JuvĂŠnal Habyarimana, Arusha on 5 August 1993. the military leader who took power in That agreement, however, was never Rwanda in 1973, received good marks implemented; the Arusha peace profrom the international community for cess perished with President Habyaria well-administered state. What passed mana, who was killed when his plane unnoticed was that an important part was shot down by a ground-to-air misof the Rwandan community, the Tutsi sile on 6 April 1994. The negotiated living within the country, was systemati- understanding of what transitional juscally denied equity in schooling, occu- tice would look like under the Arupations, and political voice. Meanwhile, sha Accords quickly dissipated in the an exile population from the same aftermath of civil war and genocide. In group was prohibited from return- the new government set up by the vicing to their homeland. Moreover, the torious RPF after 14 July 1994, human customary channel for redressing these rights activist Alphonse Nkubito, as grievances was directly controlled by Minister of Justice, initiated efforts to President Habyarimana who made all rebuild the physical infrastructure and

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RAWSON

began prosecutions of genocide crimes under existing codes on 6 April 1995.

Nevertheless, the government soon ordered the judicial process adjourned indefinitely. The fear was that the existing criminal code—with its procedural guarantees—made it possible for leaders and planners of genocide to walk free.4 Justice under the new regime in Rwanda would have to wait while the government and the National Assembly debated on judicial appointments and the elements of a basic law establishing criminal categories for genocide.5 Meanwhile, the international effort to seek judicial redress against genocide surged ahead.

Law&Ethics

Rwandan plans.

Even with direct engagement in the Rwandan justice system foreclosed, the prosecution of those who had committed the atrocities remained the pillar of the international response to genocide in Rwanda. Following a whirlwind tour of regional African capitals in late April 1994, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck had told reporters in Geneva that “crimes against humanity and acts of genocide were being committed and that those responsible should be investigated and brought to justice.”6 Shattuck and others saw countermeasures as possibly following two tracks.

Elements of the International The Office of the UN High Response. With the end of the civil Commission for Human Rights war and genocide and the establish- Engages. As a first step, Shattuck ment of the new government, offers to help put Rwanda’s justice system back together came from several quarters including the United States, Canada, and members of the European Union.

Lawyers from the International Association of the Francophonie scurried to help. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) coordinated a multi-ministry plan that would rebuild facilities, provide training, and bring in international jurists to help with trials. Initially, the Rwandan government welcomed foreign assistance in helping to stop impunity by putting genocidal killers behind bars. But as the program came to the implementation phase, it too was halted. Rwandan authorities decided that foreign jurists could not interpret Rwandan law, judge Rwandan citizens, or establish the contours of Rwandan justice. That was for Rwandans to do; donors would solely fund

had urged the new High Commissioner for Human Rights to go to Rwanda to initiate the international inquiry. A Canadian-led special session for Rwanda of the UN Human Rights Commission held May 24-25 appeared to put the High Commissioner at the center of the international response to human rights violations in Rwanda with a direct line to the Secretary-General.

The Special Session sent a Special Rapporteur to Rwanda with a mandate to document human rights violations including “possible acts of genocide.”

The Session also approved deployment of human rights observers to Rwanda as funding would become available. This observer corps established a Special Investigation Unit of lawyer-observers to investigate genocide crimes.7 The Special Rapporteur submitted his first report concluding that conditions laid down by the 1948 Convention

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on Genocide had been met and that the term “genocide” should henceforth be used as regards the Tutsi.”8 But while the Office of the High Commissioner, through the missions of the Special Rapporteur and the field presence of its observers, might investigate and report on human right violations, it could not prosecute them. Moreover, the human rights track of investigating atrocities in Rwanda was soon enmeshed in UN turf battles, in slow deployment of monitors, and in the Rwandan government’s stonewalling of monitors’ reports.9 If those responsible for genocide were to be brought to justice, the international community would have to find another instrument.

An International Criminal Tribunal. This second instrument began

to take shape on 1 July 1994, when the Security Council, voting on a Spanish resolution, established a Commission of Experts to provide the SecretaryGeneral with “its conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda including evidence of possible acts of genocide.”10 The work of this Commission was seen as a necessary prelude to the establishment of an international criminal tribunal. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his report to the Security Council on the establishment of the Commission of Experts, was acutely aware of the “similarity of the mandates entrusted to the two investigative bodies.”11 The more one knew about human rights crimes in Rwanda, the better.

The idea of setting up an international criminal court based on the Yugoslav model rapidly took shape. On

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a trip to Kigali in August, Assistant Secretary Shattuck secured from the Rwandan government a letter requesting the establishment of such an instrument, notwithstanding the government’s expressed concerns about location of the tribunal, provisions for capital punishment, and Rwandan jurisdiction over key perpetrators.12 In November, however, when those concerns were not met within the proposed charter of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Rwandan government voted against the enabling Security Council resolution. Because the vote passed anyway, the Rwandan Permanent Representative pledged cooperation with the new Tribunal, but relations between the Tribunal and the Rwandan government remained adversarial. Arguments arose regarding jurisdiction over key suspects, delays in the Tribunal’s indictments and judgments, the Tribunal’s handling of high profile cases, and, especially, the Tribunal’s effort to carry out its mandate to prosecute war crimes perpetrated by RPF forces. At times, the Rwandan government threatened to cut off all relations with the International Tribunal.13 The work of the International Tribunal has been slow and ponderous.

Instead of bringing swift punishment of offenders and solace to their victims as major sponsors, as the United States had hoped, the work of the court has been embroiled in administrative red tape and judicial wrangling. It took two years for the ICTR to determine whether Rwanda’s social categories constituted ethnic groups as defined by the Genocide Convention. The first actual trial of an offender opened four years

RAWSON

after the genocide was over.14 In the sixteen years since its founding, the Tribunal court has only indicted ninety-two persons, some fifty of whom have been convicted, ten have been released, and the rest are in process or still at large. Conclusion of trials, originally set for 2008, has been pushed back to 2012 and the end of the appeals process

Law&Ethics

1995. It took until August 1996 before the National Assembly had drafted and approved the “Organic Law on the Organization of Prosecution for Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity.” This law put genocide planners and mass murderers, as well as persons who committed acts of sexual torture,

The physical and cultural aloofness of the

International Tribunal left victims uncomforted by a distant, sophisticated judicial process. back to 2014.15 One may, nonetheless, conclude that the Tribunal is wrapping up its business, albeit slowly. The international response to transitional justice for Rwanda is nearly over.

in as “category one” offenders and prescribed capital punishment upon conviction.18 As the government and the National Assembly were setting up the new judicial order, the imprisonment of perThe Rwandan Search for Jus- sons suspected of genocide increased tice. The security of persons and apace, raising Rwandan prison populaproperty had been among the cardinal tions to about 1,300,000 by 1998 in a principles put forward by the Rwan- system constructed for 12,000. Most dese Patriotic Front in its initial public were held without formal charges or statements.16 Behind this concern was any chance to prove their innocence. the determination to put an end to the Initiating trials in January 1997 under impunity with which extra-judicial kill- the Organic Law, the government prosings and communal violence had been ecuted only 1,200 detainees in one perpetrated in Rwanda’s First and Sec- year’s time. In January 1998, then-Vice ond Republics. Rwanda’s discomfort President Paul Kagame announced that with ICTR rules and procedures came, the government could not afford the in part, because the government wanted $20 million a year cost of the huge to try leaders of the genocide within prison population.19 Rwanda to ensure their condemnation, Estimating that it might take two and in part, because the physical and hundred years to clear the docket using cultural aloofness of the International regular trial methods, the government Tribunal left victims uncomforted by a set up a series of “Reflection Meetings” distant, sophisticated judicial process.17 from May 1998 to March 1999. Out of The Rwandan government had halt- these meetings was born the notion of ed genocide trials in Rwanda in April applying the Rwandan tradition of the

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FROM RETRIBUTION TO RECONCILIATION

Gacaca court, a system with ancient roots in solving familial or village disputes, to the transitional justice process whereby prisoners would be returned to their home areas to face accusers before the local community. In June 2002, Vice President Kagame announced five core objectives for the program, put in place to: • Reveal the truth about what happened, • Accelerate genocide trials, • Eradicate the culture of impunity • Reconcile Rwandans and reinforce their unity, and • Prove that Rwanda has the capacity to resolve its own problems.

A nation-wide publicity campaign, the training of Gacaca judges, and an information-gathering phase were immediately initiated. As Gacaca courts took root, prisoners were returned to

grounds, the UN Human Rights Committee concluded the Gacaca system did not operate in accordance with basic fair trial rules. The Committee raised concerns about the protection of the rights of the accused and the impartiality of the judges. The UN Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, after a visit to Rwanda in 2007, cited the haste of trials, the lack of legal training for judges, and the heavy penalties imposed on convicted persons. On the operational side, human rights observers found inconsistent implementation of Gacaca procedures, hurried judgments, and lack of transparency.21 The Rwandan government has insisted that the Gacaca courts are a transitional measure to “allow all Rwandans to be the main actors in trying perpetrators of genocide, with the main objective of rebuilding our society,”

The Gacaca process is an effort finally to move beyond retributive justice toward larger national goals. their villages to stand before the local courts and the prison population began to steadily decrease from about thirteen hundred thousand in 1998 to fifty-eight thousand in 2011. Eventually Gacaca courts heard category one cases of planners, criminals, and rapists. Conventional courts focused on ringleaders and officials at the prefecture level. By the end of 2011, the Gacaca courts had tried 1.2 million cases since the program was initiated in July 2005.20 From the beginning, the international legal community has been critical of the Gacaca process. On normative

[ 1 20] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

as well as to create unity and accountability within Rwandan civil society.22 In intent, at least, the Gacaca process, which is coming to a close, is an effort finally to move beyond retributive justice toward these larger national goals.

Some Final Observations. One cannot fairly assess the transitional justice systems within and without Rwanda without going back to the horrors that ripped this society apart in 1994, leaving an almost impossible task of punishing offenders, bringing solace to victims, and re-knitting the tissue of

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a collective in which so many offenders and victims must now live sideby-side. With due recognition of the difficulties entailed, I would suggest that the Rwandan government wrap up the transitional Gacaca process, quickly dealing with Gacaca appeals. With a prison population of over fifty thousand, of which around half are thought to be accused of genocide, the Rwandan judicial system needs a vetting mechanism to ensure that those guilty can be duly charged and convicted, releasing those who have already served long sentences without the benefit of trial.

With the transition over, Rwanda needs to build a forward-looking judiciary suited to its aspirations for national unity and its desires for sustained development. In the mode agreed to long ago in Arusha, such a judicial system would need to be independent of political control and blind to social difference. Instead, establishing a rule of law that requires a wholesale change in the current judicial culture (in which state security plays such a large role that charges of endangering state security, inciting civil disobedience, and divisionism are commonly leveled against any who publish views contrary to the established line) is absolutely necessary. Letting the new law on genocide ideology establish normative standards, but reducing its prosecutorial scope, might help offset the nefarious, and perhaps unintended, consequences of the aforementioned attempts to control thought and speech about genocide.

The international community should realize that the period of transitional justice for Rwanda is over and quickly shut down the International Tribunal in Arusha before it adds to the

Law&Ethics

over $1 billion already spent on very limited achievements. Channels have been set up for transfer of cases to the International Criminal Court. Those channels should be put into use immediately. If the international community wants to support justice in Rwanda, let it continue to fund police training, courses for jurists, infrastructure rehabilitation, and programs of reconciliation and trauma healing through nongovernmental organizations. Graduate training for justices could create a corps of jurists especially versed in the difficult issues of rending justice in crises of human atrocity and genocide.

Meanwhile, in anticipation that such inhumanity may persist as a factor of domestic strife and international crisis, transitional justice systems around the world should look back on the Rwandan experience and draw some inferences. One is that the Genocide Convention is an unwieldy instrument for preventing and punishing crimes against humanity. In spite of the horrors witnessed, it took four years after the event before charges of genocide under the Convention could be applied in court. An international study group needs to carry forward the hortatory work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (The Responsibility to Protect doctrine), melding applicable codes and developing operable modalities that can quickly be implemented the next time man chooses to eliminate, in whole or in part, a group of his fellow men.

A second observation is that the (understandable) decision of the new Rwandan government and of the international community to favor strategies of retributive justice during the transi-

Summer/Fall 2012 [ 1 21 ]

FROM RETRIBUTION TO RECONCILIATION

tion led to enormous problems. In the case of Rwanda, it produced intractable prison problems with thousands being held without charge for many years in the most inhumane of conditions.

Rwanda finally dealt with that problem by instituting a system of local justice that, while found by many to be substandard, did bring prisoners home and began the process of rebuilding communities. In the case of the international community, the determination to prosecute genocide crime while holding to the highest standards of international justice led to mismanagement, endless legal procedures, enormous expense, and few results.

This leads to three conclusions. To

be effective, transitional justice needs to be swift, hence the urgent need for reform of ready-response mechanisms and applicable codes. To be meaningful, justice needs to be culturally appropriate, carried out by local authorities or by some mixed court of international and local jurists, as was the case in Sierra Leone. It cannot be imported. Finally, retribution needs the complement of national unity and reconciliation in the full achievement of transitional justice. Only with such conceptual understandings and streamlined processes can fractured societies start to mend, and humanity as a whole begin to realize the systemic peace and closure it has always craved.

NOTES

1 Neil J. Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press), Vol. I. “General Considerations.”

2 For background on this period, see David Rawson, “Coping with Chaos While Acting Justly: Lessons from Rwanda,” in, David Barnhizer, ed., Strategies for Protecting Human Rights (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2002) 125-134.

3 Protocol of Agreement on Power-sharing Within the Framework of a Broad-based Transitional Government Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, Articles 25-39, Arusha, 30 October 1992 (DPR); and, Protocole d’acccord entre le Gouvernment de la Republique Rwandaise et le Front Patriotique Rwandaise sur le partage du pouvoir dan le cadre d’un gouvernment de transition a base elargie. Articles 84-85. Arusha, 9 janvier, 1993 (DPR).

Documents cited in this review ending in (DPR) are unclassified documents available at drawson@arbor. edu.

4 06 Apr 95 Kigali 01076, “April 6: First Genocide Trial Ends in Fiasco,” (DPR).

5 20 Jun 95 Kigali 01937, “Parliament Rejects Supreme Court Nominees; A Search for Untainted Judges Begins Anew,’ (DPR); and, 12 July 95 Kigali 02164, “Parliament says No to Foreign Magistrates,” (DPR).

6 John Shattuck, Freedom on Fire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003) 49; Shattuck made the same points to the Secretary of State on his return. See INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, May 9, 1994; To: the Acting Secretary; From: HA-John Shattuck; Subject: “My Trip to East and Central Africa.” (DPR).

[ 1 22 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

7 The State Department considered the Special Session a “major victory for U.S. multilateral human rights policy.” May 26, 1994, Information Memorandum, To: The Secretary; From: DRL-John Shattuck and IO-Douglas J. Bennet; Subject: “UN Human Rights Commission-Special Session on Rwanda,” (DPR).

8 A/50/709/-S/1995/915, 2 November, 1995, “Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, including summaries of his mission of 9-20 June, 29-31 June and 14-25 October 1994 and 27 March-3 April and 25-28 May 1995,” The United Nations and Rwanda, 569-571.

9 For a discerning evaluation from an outside observer see, 19 Jul 95 Geneva, 05612, “ICRC President Urges Establishment of Global Tribunal System, Questions Effectiveness of Deployed Human Rights Monitors in Rwanda,” (DRP).

10 S/RES/935 (1994) 1 July 1994, ‘Security Council resolution requesting the Secretary-General to establish a commission of experts to examine information on grave violations of international humanitarian law and possible acts of genocide in Rwanda.” Document no. 72, The United Nations and Rwanda, 309-310.

11 “Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of the Commission of Experts on Rwanda pursuant to resolution 935 (1994 ).” Document no. 79 The United Nations and Rwanda, 321-322. The Secretary-General had the previous day submitted to the Security Council the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights which summarized his findings and the preliminary findings of the Special Rapporteur.

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12 For a detailed version of this story see David Rawson, “Prosecuting Genocide: Founding the International Tribunal for Rwanda,” Ohio Northern University Law Review, XXXIII,2, 641-663.

13 Kingsley Moghalu, Rwanda’s Genocide: the Politics of Global Justice (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); and, DinaTemple-Raston, Justice on the Grass (New York: Free Press, 2005) for two renderings of this story.

14 Paul J. Magnarella, Justice in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide, Its Courts, and the UN Criminal Tribunal (Burlington VT, Ashgate, 2002) Chapter 7, “The Akayesu Case.”

15 Address by Judge Khalida Rachid Khan, President of the ICTR, to the United Nations Security Council, “Six-monthly Report on the Completion Strategy of the ICTR,” December 7, 2011, http://www. unictr.org.

16 Rwandese Patriotic Front, The Genesis of Rwandese Patriotic Front, Kampala: Africa Leadership Forum; Kampala Forum on CSSDCA, 19-23 May, 1991, 16.

(DPR) 17 While making some landmark decisions in international law, the Tribunal’s lengthy and meticu-

Law&Ethics

lous legal procedures are so distant from the concerns of Rwandan genocide victims as to make the Tribunal the object of derision in Rwanda. The United Nations Detention Center, for example, is popularly known as the Arusha Hilton. See: Justice on the Grass, 97-98.

18 For analysis of this law and its application see Justice in Africa, Chapter 5, “The Situation in Rwanda.”

19 Justice in Africa, 79-80; and, Human Rights Watch, Rwanda, Justice Compromised: the Legacy of Rwanda’s Community Based Gacaca Courts (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011) 13-26.

20 Human Rights Watch, Country Summary for Rwanda, January 2012.

21 Justice Compromised; and, Carina Tertsakian, “ ‘All Rwandan are Afraid of being Arrested One Day’: Prisoners Past, Present and Future,” in, Remaking Rwanda, eds. Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011) 22 “Letter of the Minister of Justice, Tharcisse Karugarama to Human Rights Watch,” May 5, 2011, in, Justice Compromised, Annex II, 137,140.

Summer/Fall 2012 [ 1 23]

Is Oil a Strategic Commodity?

Oil has a bloody history. The ghost of petroleum often hovers in the background of military conflicts—even of wars fought ostensibly to secure the blessings of liberty and democracy.

In No War for Oil, foreign-policy analyst Ivan Eland examines the troubled legacy of wars and military actions undertaken to secure access to oil, and reaches a conclusion profoundly at odds with the conventional thinking about oil and economic security. Contrary to the beliefs shared by the architects of U.S. foreign policy for most of the past century.

The choice is not whether to prepare to fight oil wars or to risk losing energy resources that power the American economy—that’s a false alternative, Eland shows. Rather, the choice is whether or not to continue to devote increasingly costly resources to military and diplomatic policies that are both unnecessary and detrimental to the economic and political interests of the American people.

Readers of No War for Oil will come away with a solid understanding of the flaws in conventional thinking—unexamined nostrums shared by liberals and conservatives alike— about oil security and the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf.

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Law&Ethics

Strange Bedfellows

The Convergence of Sovereignty-Limiting Doctrines in Counterterrorist and Human Rights Discourse Rosa Brooks It is hard to imagine two groups with less in common than national security hawks and human rights activists. They represent different cultures with different views on the use of force, the role of rights, and the constraining power of international law. Yet despite their differences, the two groups seem to be converging on an understanding of state sovereignty as limited and subject to de facto waiverâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;an understanding that appears to legitimize military interventions even in the absence of state consent and Security Council authorization.

This convergence is reached via different routes in each community: for the national security community, counterterrorism provides the sovereignty-limiting logic, while for the human rights and humanitarian law communities, it is the prevention of atrocities that leads to sovereignty-limiting doctrines.

The convergence is surprising. The human rights and humanitarian law communities and the national security community have historically differed in their views of the centrality of national interests versus the centrality of inter-

Rosa Brooks is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and a Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation. From April 2009 to July 2011, she served as Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

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national institutions, laws, and norms.

They have also held different views on the legitimacy and desirability of the use of armed force to solve problems.

The national security community tends to view international law as a political constraint, but not a significant legal constraint, and sees the use (or at least the credible threat) of force as an essential means of protecting national interests and promoting global security.

The human rights and humanitarian law communities come from a different tradition, tending to regard the narrow protection of national interests as inimical to the establishment of a strong and normatively legitimate international system, one that protects rights through law, rather than force.

In this tradition, the use of force is viewed as an occasionally unavoidable necessity that should be tightly controlled by international law.

Despite these differences, as the human rights and humanitarian law communities grapple with the problem of atrocity prevention, and the national security community grapples with the challenges posed by transnational terrorism, the two have arrived at strikingly similar legal theories about sovereignty, intervention, and the use of force.

Specifically, both the human rights and humanitarian law and the counter-terrorism/national security law discourses have come to rely increasingly on the view that sovereignty is less a right but a privilege—a privilege that is effectively waived by states that fail to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities, and when waived, entitles other states to lawfully use military force on the territory of the “waiving” state.

This convergence of sovereignty-

[ 1 26 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

limiting doctrines is partial and uneasy, but to the extent that it further opens the door to the use of force on the territories of non-consenting states, it poses significant challenges—both to the stability of the always-shaky international order, and to the convictions and traditions of the human rights and humanitarian communities.

In this essay, I want to trace how this convergence has come about in two very different discourse communities, and point out some of the unintended consequences and unresolved problems that result.

Sovereignty-Limiting Doctrines in the Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Communities. Start with human rights

and humanitarian law discourse. It has become a truism to proclaim that Westphalian sovereignty is on its deathbed, weakened first by the UN Charter and the emergence of human rights law, and now virtually eviscerated by globalization. For the human rights community, the big story is about the decline of the state as the primary subject of international law. Over a period of less than a hundred years, international law has ceased to be solely a matter of the rights and duties of states vis-àvis other states—individuals also have entered the international law picture.

The UN Charter spoke of fundamental human rights, and these were soon elaborated in numerous UN resolutions and international human rights treaties. Increasingly, states have begun to accept that human rights law limits their internal sovereignty: after the Holocaust, few were willing to advance the position that states could do what-

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ever they wished inside their own borders. What is more, international law began to give states obligations to act to prevent human rights abuses inside the territory of other states: under the Genocide Convention, for instance, states “undertake to prevent and to punish” genocide.1 By the mid-1990s, a range of increasingly robust sovereignty-limiting institutions and efforts were emerging as a result of the human rights revolution. Some were judicial, such as the international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court. Others were political: the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide led to a growing international willingness to view humanitarian intervention as legitimate, at least under limited circumstances. In the former Yugoslavia, NATO’s intervention—though halfhearted and belated—occurred with UN Security Council blessing.2 Even in the post-Cold War world and when faced with the most egregious of circumstances, however, the Security Council could not necessarily be relied upon to authorize humanitarian interventions. During the Rwandan genocide, the looming threat of vetoes helped preclude meaningful Security Council action, and the same was true during the Kosovo crisis. In Kosovo, though, when ethnic cleansing seemed imminent, the NATO states opted for military intervention even in the absence of Security Council authorization. NATO’s justification was fundamentally extralegal in nature: it rested, in effect, on a claim of moral necessity.3 The intervention likely saved thousands of lives, and was given a form

Law&Ethics

of post hoc validation in subsequent Security Council resolutions.4 Still, the legal and moral dilemma was acute. In a 1999 speech, then-UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan spelled it out: State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined-not least by the forces of globalization and international cooperation.

States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa...When we read the [UN] Charter today, we are more than ever concious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them. The genocide in Rwanda showed us how terrible the consequences of inaction can be…

But this year’s conflict in Kosovo raised equally important questions…5 By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the 1990s’ debates over humanitarian intervention had morphed into discussion of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), a doctrine initially developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). ICISS offered a starkly different understanding of sovereignty than that taken for granted prior to World War II: State sovereignty implies responsibility…Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.6

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ICISS was careful to note that military force should be a last resort, and that any military interventions should be authorized by the Security Council. But ICISS was unwilling to view Security Council authorization as an absolute requirement: “If the Security Council rejects a proposal [to intervene to protect a population] or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative options…[include] action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization.”

After all, if the Council “fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action,” warned ICISS, “concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation…”7 Within a decade, both the United States and the UN had offered R2P at least a lukewarm embrace. In 2011, the Security Council referenced R2P in Resolution 1973, which authorized the use of force to protect civilians in Libya, and in Resolution 1975, authorizing the use of force in Cote d’Ivoire.8 For the human rights and humanitarian law communities, the trend towards sovereignty-limiting doctrines premised on human rights had reached its apotheosis. Though R2P’s implied willingness to dispense with Security Council authorization has not been put to the test, it is difficult to doubt that if another Kosovo-like situation arose, concerned states might well take matters into their own hands.9

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Back to the National Security Community. Turning back now to

the national security community, we see a parallel trend. Only two months before ICISS issued its initial report on R2P, the terrorist attacks of September 2011 shook up traditional notions of sovereignty, self-defense, and armed conflict.

Prior to 9/11, most states accepted (publicly, at least) the general international law principle that force could not be used inside the territory of a sovereign state unless the state at issue consented, the Security Council had authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or the use of force was in self-defense following an “armed attack,” as delineated in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Standard interpretations of the right to selfdefense included the right to use force to prevent an “imminent” attack, but the idea of imminence was construed narrowly.10 UN Charter provisions on the use of force rest firmly on traditional understandings of sovereignty: as long as a state refrained in its external actions from threatening other states, the use of force inside the territory of a nonconsenting sovereign state would be unlawful.11 If a state chose to develop or harbor terrorists, this was its own business; unless terrorists carried out attacks beyond its borders, no other state had a legal basis to use force inside the “harboring” state.

Though this principle was sometimes more honored in the breach, it remained relatively unquestioned by states until the 9/11 attacks. But 9/11 made glaringly apparent a trend that had been underway for decades: glo-

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balization—and accompanying changes in transportation, communication and weapons technologies—had democratized the means of mass destruction, reduced the salience of international borders, and accelerated the speed with which money and materiel could travel.

Inevitably, these changes undermined the logic of sovereign non-intervention principles. Within the national security community, counterterrorism concerns sparked the rapid emergence of both normative and legal arguments for expanding the basis for using force within the territory of other states.

There were generally two strands to these arguments. First, the traditional self-defense-based justification

Law&Ethics

second strand of counterterrorismbased arguments justifying the use of force does, however, reflect a deep shift in understandings.

The argument comes into sharpest focus when we consider drone strikes and other cross-border uses of force outside of “hot” battlefields. Since 2011, the United States has repeatedly used force inside the borders of sovereign states with which we are not at war, at times without the consent of the affected state. In October 2008, for instance, U.S. troops in Iraq crossed the Syrian and attacked targets inside Syria.13 The United States has also attacked targets inside Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. In some cases,

Counterterrorism concerns sparked the

rapid emergence of both normative and legal arguments for expanding the basis for using force within the territory of other states. for using force was expanded, most strikingly in the Bush Administration’s embrace of so-called “preemptive” selfdefence, which was used to justify the war in Iraq.12 The logic underlying the Bush argument was straigt forward. In the age of ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical, and biological threats, states may only have a moment’s notice before an imminent attack. Surely the framers of the UN Charter would not have required states to wait for an “armed attack” to occur or be imminent in the traditional sense to lawfully use force in self-defense?

This extension of the principle of self-defense stretches traditional understandings of sovereignty, but the

the affected states have consented to the United States’ use of force. In other cases, their consent is, at best, questionable.14 While the United States has been reluctant to offer much detail or legal justification for these actions, the logic used appears structurally identical to that embraced by the human rights and humanitarian law communities: sovereignty implies responsibilities as well as rights; states must refrain from internal acts that threaten the citizens or basic security of other states, and must prevent non-state entities from engaging in such acts inside their borders. If a state fails to fulfill this responsibility—by, for instance, harboring ter-

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rorists—other states are entitled to use force within its borders if doing so is necessary to protect themselves or uphold global security.15 As President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor John Brennan stated in a 2011 speech, “We reserve the right to take unilateral action if or when other governments are unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions themselves.”16

A Strange Convergence. The

human rights and national security discourses appear to have converged on structurally parallel sovereignty-limiting theories—though neither community is entirely comfortable with the logical implications taken for granted by the other community.

notion that states have a responsibility to protect the populations of other states from atrocities. The emerging R2P doctrine has largely been greeted in national security law quarters as irrelevant or pernicious, likely to draw the United States into diversionary foreign entanglements at the expense of protecting our core national security interests.

Meanwhile, those in the human rights community are even more suspicious of the hard security discourse, often finding the actions it enables repugnant. To many in the human rights and humanitarian legal communities, drone strikes and other uses of force outside of “hot” battlefields are seen as little more than extra-territo-

The human rights and national security

discourses appear to have converged on structurally parallel sovereignty-limiting theories.

One might even say that the R2P coin ought logically to be seen as having two sides. On one side lies a state’s duty to take action inside its own territory to protect its own population from violence and atrocities. On the other side lies a state’s duty to take action inside its own territory to protect other states’ populations from violence. Either way, a state that fails in these duties faces the prospect that other states will intervene in its “internal” affairs without its consent.17 There is a substantial irony here: human rights advocates and counterterrorism hawks make strange bedfellows. The “hard security” community, historically realist in its orientation, tends to be uncomfortable with the

[ 1 30] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

rial, extrajudicial executions—a flagrant violation of international human rights and rule of law principles.

Yet the logic of each sovereigntylimiting theory is virtually identical, and each theory serves to legitimize the other, though neither the human rights community nor the national security community tends to want fully to acknowledge this.

Whether the potential use of force is justified on counterterrorism grounds or on humanitarian and human rights grounds, the potential for a slippery slope is apparent. Those who would justify either human rights-based interventions or counterterrorism-based interventions should face precisely the

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same set of questions: Who gets to judge when a state should be deemed to have “waived” its sovereignty and abrogated its responsibilities? Who gets to decide when a use of force inside the border of a non-consenting state is lawful? And which actors get to use force? A single state acting unilaterally? Regional organizations? Coalitions of the willing?

If each state claims the right to judge for itself when force can be used inside the borders of another state, the world may become an even more frightening and unstable place, given the continued weakness of most existing international institutions. Indeed, we risk a return to the Hobbesian international order the UN Charter was designed to eliminate.

This should trouble us—and it may be particularly troubling for those in the human rights community. After all, it is the human rights community that has traditionally been most concerned with the integrity and normative value of international law and institutions.

Those in the national security community may be inclined to take a less apocalyptic view on the theory that the Hobbesian world order has been with us all along.

Yet, these sovereignty-limiting theories emerge for compelling reasons, and reflect changed facts on the ground. Sometimes states engage in such egregious atrocities against their own populations that morality, if not law, appears to demand a response.

Sometimes states will be unwilling or unable to take action against dangerous terrorist groups operating inside their borders—and in an age in which technologies, money, people and materiel can cross borders rapidly and easily, it seems unreasonable to expect other

Law&Ethics

states, if threatened, to stand idly by.

The clock cannot be turned back.

What is to be done? The dilemmas

created by current sovereignty-limiting doctrines are clear. It is less clear, however, what our response should be. Two possible approaches exist.

First, of course, we might view this as a call to get serious about addressing the international rule of law problems created by current sovereignty-limiting doctrines, and begin the long, difficult project of developing alternate forms of restraint and accountability. We might focus, for instance, on trying to create a more responsive and representative Security Council, one less likely to be paralyzed by ideology and less vulnerable to charges of partiality and selfinterest.

Alternatively, we might seek to create or adapt international judicial institutions to serve as a check on uses of force: we might develop an international legal or normative framework requiring states that wish to use force for humanitarian or counterterrorism reasons to seek prior (or retroactive) approval from some relatively “objective” international judicial or quasijudicial body.

None of these projects would be straightforward; each might be seen as facing barriers so high as to be virtually insurmountable. If the various institutional and legal “fixes” we might envision are unrealistic in the near term, is there any responsible way forward?

The overall thrust of this essay has been to call for intellectual honesty about the logical implications of emerging sovereignty-limiting doctrines. But, perhaps, this is one of those areas where

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discretion—even disingenuousness—is the better part of valor, or at least the better part of preserving stability.

Stephen Krasner makes a variant of this argument in some of his recent work. Krasner famously dubbed sovereignty “organized hypocrisy,” noting that while the notion of “sovereignty” has long been associated with clear legal criteria and rules, states have, for just as long, routinely ignored those rules when it suited them to do so.18 To Krasner, this organized hypocrisy is nonetheless functional—or at least more functional than any available alternative.

In a 2010 essay on “The Durability of Organized Hypocrisy,” Krasner argues that this remains true today.19 He grants that emerging normative or legal doctrines will continue to challenge and delegitimize traditional notions of sovereignty, and significant “shocks”— such as “the possibility of mega-terrorist attacks”—might lead to radical

change: “Governments in advanced countries would begin to reconfigure their bureaucratic structures to… [reflect] new rules and principles about responsibilities for territories or functions beyond national borders.”

But, argues Krasner, “Such fundamental challenges to the existing sovereignty regime are not to be welcomed.

Any new set of principles…would be contested. External actors, even if their claims were legitimated…would not find it easy to exercise the authority they had asserted…there are no formulaic solutions.” Krasner concludes, “Sovereignty has worked very imperfectly but it has still worked better than any other structure that decision-makers have been able to envision.”20 In other words: in the end, perhaps, when it comes to teasing out the implications of emerging sovereigntylimiting doctrines, organized hypocrisy is the best we can do.

NOTES

1 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, New York, 9 December 1948, Internet, http://www.un.org/millennium/law/ iv-1.htm.

2 Under SC Res. 813 (1993), for instance, UN member states were authorized to use force to enforce the no-fly zone in the Balkans; SC Res 1031 (1995) authorized NATO to establish the multinational protection force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3 The Kosovo air campaign was arguably illegal under international law, since intervening states could offer neither plausible self-defense arguments nor Security Council authorization. See, e.g., Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 174–191; see also Bruno Simma, “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,” European Journal of International Law 10, no. 10 (1999): 1, 22.

4 See, .e.g., SC Res. 1244 (1999), which ”welcom[ed]” the agreement NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had reached to end the

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conflict, “decide[d]” to deploy international civil and security personnel under UN auspices, and “authorize[d] Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo.”

5 Kofi A. Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” The Economist 18 September 1999, http://www.un.org/ news/ossg/sg/stories/kaecon.html.

6 “The Responsibility to Protect,” December 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.

7 Id., at XIII, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ ICISS%20Report.pdf 8 S.C. Res 1973 (2011).

9 As of this writing, it remains possible (though unlikely) that events in Syria will pose such a challenge.

10 See, e.g., John Bassett Moore, The Caroline (exchange of diplomatic notes between Great Britain and the United States, 1842), Digest of International Law (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

BROOKS

Office, 1906) 2: 409, 412.

11 See, e.g., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua; Nicaragua v United States, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14 (1986), 25 ILM 1023.

12 If the post-war evidence had validated pre-war assertions that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and planned imminently to use them against the United States, few would have questioned the lawfulness of US military action to prevent such an imminent attack. As President Bush famously commented: “Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”

George W. Bush, “Remarks on Iraq” (Cincinnati Union Terminal, Cincinnati, OH, 7 October 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html.

13 The cross-border raid reportedly killed several people, including an Iraqi suspected of being an al-Qaeda operative. See, e.g, Nicholas Blandford, “What’s Behind the US Military Raid on Syria?”Time Magazine, 27 October 2008, http://www.time.com/ time/world/article/0,8599,1854169,00.html; Council on Foreign Relations, “Cross-Border Attack on Syria Raises Iranian Eyebrows,” available at http:// www.cfr.org/iran/cross-border-attack-syria-raisesiranian-eyebrows/p17648 14 One difficulty is raised by the fact that the

Law&Ethics

affected state may agree in private to allow US strikes but object in public. This, and the secrecy surrounding most of these strikes, makes it difficult to fully evaluate the degree to which consent has been obtained.

15 See, e.g., UN Security Council in Resolution 1373, which notes that state must prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism. SC Res 1373 (2001).

16 John O. Brennan, “Strengthening Our Security

by Adhering to our Values and Laws” (Remarks by John Brennan, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, 16 September 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennanstrengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an 17 From a strictly legal perspective, the security case is arguably stronger than the humanitarian case, since it is bound up with the right to self-defense, which predates and is reflected in the UN charter.

18 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1999).

19 Stephen D. Krasner, “The Durability of Organized Hypocrisy,” in Soverignity in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Concept, ed. Hent Kalmo, Quintin Skinner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

20 Ibid.

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Georgetown Journal of

International Affairs

religion& power From...

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Espionage Exposed

- - - tackling the issues that shape our world - - -

Call for PaPers The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs is accepting submissions for the Winter/Spring 2013 issue. The submission deadline is 15 August 2012. Articles must be about 3,000 words in length. They should have the intellectual vigor to meet the highest scholarly standard, but should be written with the clarity to attract a broad audience. For submission details please refer to our website: http://journal.georgetown.edu/submissions/

Law&Ethics

Doping, Gambling, and the Decline of the IOC John Hoberman It has long been a convention to describe the president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as the world’s most powerful sports official. “The most powerful man in world sports is purging corruption,” The Huffington Post reported recently on Jacques Rogge’s ongoing campaign against the doping practices of elite athletes and the growing threat of illegal gambling on sports events that might someday tarnish Olympic competitions.1 In recent years, however, the IOC’s influence in what international sports officials describe as a war against global organized crime has been declining.

The IOC now finds itself in a partnership with several other organizations that are involved in combating doping, illegal gambling schemes, and the organized crime networks that allegedly profit from both of these illicit markets. This collaborative arrangement has put the IOC in a complicated situation: it now shares authority with other international bodies in an unprecedented way in the history of the Olympic movement. The IOC’s diminished role in global sports politics is a consequence of two problems that the IOC cannot cope with on its own: the doping crisis and the manipulation of Olympic competitions by criminal organizations.

The IOC’s doping problem partially resulted from the

John Hoberman is Chair of Germanic Studies at the University of Texas at Austin and has also taught at Harvard University and the University of Chicago. He has done extensive research on sports doping and the intersection of sports, politics, science, public opinion, and the Olympics.

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disinterest in addressing doping that persisted until the end of Juan Antonio Samaranch’s IOC presidency (19802001).2 The IOC’s anti-doping measures that dated from 1968 were almost completely ineffectual because doping test results did not reflect the actual levels of use. Between the 1968 Mexico City Games and the 1996 Atlanta Games, approximately just one in a thousand Summer Olympic athletes tested positive for a banned substance, and only a small fraction of these fiftytwo positive tests involved anabolic steroids. The 1998 Tour de France doping scandal forced the IOC to found the

FIFA World Cup competition in South Africa was the fourth World Cup in a row at which not a single doping athlete was found.4 Since its founding in January 1999, WADA has been playing the primary anti-doping role in world sport. As a result, the IOC now finds WADA as a rival that competes for influence in the field. In fact, WADA was the second IOC-affiliated body that would eventually limit its authority. A similar scenario began in 1984, when the IOC created the international Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) to resolve disputes that came up during the Olympic Games.

The IOC’s anti-doping measures that dated from 1968 were almost completely ineffectual because doping test results did not reflect the actual levels of use.

World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) with national governments interested in promoting more effective doping control. Consequently, the IOC was locked into a power-sharing arrangement that accentuated its failure to carry out serious anti-doping measures.

Even after WADA went into operation on 1 January 2000, Olympic drug testing continued to be ineffectual. At the 2000 Sydney Games, 2,359 drug tests produced 11 positives; at the 2004 Athens Games, 3,667 tests resulted in 22 positives; and at the 2008 Beijing Games 4,770 tests yielded 20 positive tests.3 This seemingly minimal rate of success is impressive compared to that of the International Soccer Federation (FIFA) World Cup. The 2010

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Ten years later CAS underwent reforms to make it independent of the IOC after the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland challenged its impartiality. Today its authority covers much of world sport. The 2009 World AntiDoping Code established the jurisdiction of CAS to rule on doping charges brought against athletes by sports federations.

The diminished authority of the IOC in doping matters became evident in October 2011, when CAS ruled to reverse the IOC’s Rule 45, which barred many athletes from participating in the 2012 London Olympic Games.

The IOC Executive Board had instituted Rule 45 in 2008 in order to ban from the next Olympic Games

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any athlete who had received a doping suspension of more than six months.

The CAS decision was sharply criticized by the British Olympic Association (BOA), which had passed its own bylaw in 1992 to establish this strict standard. While the BOA was supported by the IOC, WADA sided with CAS, ruling that the BOA rule violated WADA’s World Anti-Doping Code.5 At the time of writing, CAS was deliberating after hearing the BOA’s appeal against WADA on 12 March 2012. The BOA chairman Colin Moynihan portrayed this conflict as a contest between the passionless legalism of WADA and CAS and Olympic idealism itself: “The BOA selection policy is a direct expression of the commitment British athletes have made to uphold the values of fair play, integrity and clean competition— values that are at the heart of Olympic sport.” It was the BOA’s strict policy, Moynihan said, that was “consistent with the Olympic Charter.”6 Nonetheless, WADA’s pragmatic anti-doping strategy seems to have prevailed over the authority of the IOC. A secondary cause of the declining status of the IOC is a series of corruption scandals that has involved at least twenty IOC members since the late 1990s. The founding of WADA in January 1999 coincided with the Salt Lake City bribery scandal that severely tarnished the image of the IOC. For the IOC the nadir of this controversy occurred on 15 December 1999, when President Samaranch faced hostile questioning by members of the U.S. House of Representatives investigating the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics scandal.

More recently, the current bribery

Law&Ethics

scandal involving members of FIFA involves IOC members who belong to both bodies. The FIFA scandal has once again focused attention on the corruption that is endemic within major international sports federations. IOC President Rogge does not see corruption among top sports functionaries as a problem. “The overwhelming majority of sports leaders are absolutely clean and impeccable,” he told Agence France-Presse in December 2010.7 In fact, this assessment does not accord with the historical record. Many of the IOC members Samaranch inducted into the IOC during his term have found themselves discredited, in legal trouble, or in prison.8 These serial scandals have undermined the IOC’s claim to moral leadership.

The primary cause of the IOC’s diminished authority has been official reactions to the threat that doping and illegal gambling pose to the credibility of Olympic competitions. To counter this threat, over the past few years international sports officials have embarked upon a coordinated campaign to criminalize a doping problem that has previously been dealt with as a regulatory procedure that employs drug testing and bans from competition as deterrents to doping. One consequence of this redefinition of the doping phenomenon has been to shift the rhetorical emphasis from the doping practices of athletes to the machinations of what is presented as a global criminal mafia that is selling drugs to elite athletes.

Both the IOC and WADA have now embraced law enforcement agencies and their police powers as the major solution to the threat that organized crime allegedly poses to the Olympic

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Games and other elite competitions.

to forge alliances with police organizations, border-control agencies, and any Fighting Global Crime: the other legally empowered authorities to IOC, WADA, and Interpol. On 1 combat the twin threats of doping drugs February 2012, IOC Director General and gambling.

Christophe De Kepper told the AssoThe rhetorical effect of this arguciated Press that the organized crime ment was to push the intractable comthreat required a coordinated interna- plexities of doping into the background tional strategy: and thereby include the Olympic drug We absolutely need governments problem in the much larger categoto wake up to the magnitude of ry of global organized crime. From a the problem. This is affecting not law enforcement perspective, conjoinonly the credibility of sports, but ing doping and gambling made a cerit’s a criminal activity that moves tain kind of sense. In November 2010 very quickly around the world.

WADA President John Fahey told a There needs to be an underSports Law Conference in Sydney that, standing from the public authori“Interpol has indicated to us that the ties of the threat of criminal netunderworld figures responsible for works and the powerful financial trafficking prohibited substances...are transactions involved. The threat in fact the same groups that comin our opinion is at least as serimit to illegal betting.” He indicated ous as doping for the credibility that there was now pressure on WADA of sport, and probably even worse to get involved in investigating illegal if you look at the sums involved.9 gambling activity as well as doping netThis strategy had already been proposed works.11 by the former president of WADA, The new emphasis on crime-fighting Richard Pound, in December 2008: was reiterated in a coordinated series The doping system is organized of statements that were released during along mafia-like lines… So what February 2011 by the IOC, WADA, and we need is close collaboration other officials. IOC President Rogge with the police and public prosplayed up the difference between police ecutors. Our weapons are too powers and the relatively impotent reglimited; we can only test urine ulatory measures that were available to and blood. Police investigators sports organizations. It is governments can read emails, tap telephones. that can “conduct investigative searches Their arsenal is bigger than a and initiate criminal proceedings. As bottle of pee. Getting the execit becomes increasingly obvious that utive authorities onto our side large criminal networks are benefitis an arduous process, but we ing from illegal betting, we encourage have recently started working with governments, wherever possible, to put Interpol. Step by step we are movin place specific criminal legislation ing ahead.10 dealing with match-fixing and cheating This unequal struggle, Pound sug- in sport.”12 gested, requires sports organizations The CEO of UK Anti-Doping, Andy

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Parkinson, weighed in with an enthusiastic endorsement of the new strategy of bringing in legal enforcement. Sport, he said, was “moving away from focusing on the end user to focusing on the supply chain. If sport thinks that it can solve doping on its own, then it is foolishly deluded. The impact that law enforcement has had in the last eighteen months has been incredible. It has provided a much-needed sharpness to what we do.”13 Taking the spotlight off of the “end user”—the athlete who took doping drugs—would serve, as noted earlier, to draw attention away from the moralizing dramas and often tawdry soap operas involving the many athletes who continue to test positive for doping substances, despite improvements in anti-doping technology.

In June 2011 WADA signed a memorandum of understanding with the World Customs Organization (WCO) that is based in Brussels. WADA Director General David Howman called the agreement “a significant development for WADA as it will enable the agency to increase intelligence on upstream perpetrators involved in doping activities, the illegal organizations and individuals that provide doping substances to the sporting world.” Howman emphasized the global dimension of this campaign. There was, he said, “strong unity amongst agencies across the world to eradicate all forms of doping – not just for the sake of sport, but for the health and well being of society as a whole.”14 Now the anti-doping mission was being redefined in an expansive manner as a contribution to global public health. The irony here is that the demand for doping drugs from the world’s elite athletes is dwarfed by black

Law&Ethics

market demand for anabolic steroids from bodybuilders, law enforcement personnel, recreational athletes, and a global population of male adolescents who take steroids for ‘cosmetic’ purposes. Given the demographics and dimensions of this illicit global market, there is little sports officials can do to oppose the growing consumption of androgenic drugs that serve both instrumental and narcissistic purposes around the world. Their traditional anti-doping mission has been to discourage the use of doping drugs by elite athletes within the sphere of their authority. Now that they see themselves confronting the machinations of global criminal networks, they want partnerships with police agencies.

Yet even as WADA and the IOC are deeply impressed by the powers wielded by police agencies, these powers have failed to control a global market for illicit drugs that is now estimated to be worth about $350 billion a year.15 This enormous amount of illicit money suggests that law enforcement agencies are interdicting a very small part of the illegal drug trade. The Global Commission on Drug Policy declared in June 2011 that the global “war on drugs” has been a failure and recommended a move away from criminalization as a policy: “The global war on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world.”16 And this is the drug enforcement policy in which WADA has invested its hopes.

International sports officials have put special emphasis on their relationship with Interpol. WADA gets information about the illicit drug trade from Interpol. In May 2011 FIFA agreed to

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donate 20 million euros ($27 million) “to create an unprecedented ten year programme…at a dedicated FIFA AntiCorruption Training Wing within the INTERPOL Global Complex (IGC) in Singapore.”17 The fact that FIFA is itself a famously corrupt sports federation raises questions about the potential value of an arrangement with a police agency that may amount to little more than a public relations ploy.

important to us is the objective and not the means. If the consensus is to have a world agency, we would be very happy to create it.”20 Once again the IOC was prepared to cede its traditional leadership role.

Longtime observers of the IOC and its dominant role in world sport over the past century will recognize in this proposal a new stage in the paradigm shift in governance that began with the IOC’s power-sharing relationship with Imagining a Global Sports WADA in 1999. During the two decades Authority. The IOC’s dimin- of the Samaranch presidency, while the ished status in this stark new world of IOC was treating the doping issue as a criminalized doping enforcement was public-relations problem, the doping made clear on 23 February 2011, when practices of Olympic athletes proliferWADA’s David Howman proposed, ated. Even the global uproar caused by “that we in the sports world establish an the Ben Johnson doping scandal at the international body (the World Sports 1988 Seoul Olympic Games did not Integrity Agency) that would have an provoke the IOC to improve upon the overarching governing board made up ineffectual testing that continued to be of Sport and Governments similar to carried out at the Games through the the WADA Board.” One arm of the 1996 Atlanta Olympiad. In the end, upper agency would deal with illegal therefore, it was the long-neglected sports betting while the other would doping crisis that came to undermine attempt to prevent acts of bribery that the stature of the IOC even more than could subvert the integrity of sporting the Salt Lake City bribery scandal and contests.18 Such a plan would further the disgracing of various other IOC diminish the IOC’s traditional status as members. For, unlike these routine primus inter pares among the major inter- scandals, doping is a condition that is national sports organizations. A day here to stay. In the meantime, the IOC later IOC President Rogge endorsed and WADA are trying to figure out what this radical proposal: “I envision that, to do about doping. As we have seen, in the next few years, we may even have their bold new strategy is to promote a global watchdog in place, similar in a dramatic narrative in which Olymstructure to the World Anti-Doping pic and anti-doping officials strugAgency, and that fighting illegal bet- gle to ensure the survival of Olympic ting and match-fixing will be obliga- sport worth watching from the criminal tory for the IFs [International Sports machinations of global criminal orgaFederations] if they wish to remain part nizations that sell drugs and corrupt of the Olympic Movement.”19 On 1 athletic competitions.

February 2012, IOC Director General The anti-crime strategy being purChristophe De Kepper stated, “what is sued by the IOC, WADA, and various

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affiliates both inside and outside of the sports world has two major disadvantages. The first is that, as the Global Commission on Drug Policy noted last year, the conventional crime-fighting approach to the controlling of illicit drug consumption has failed, and even if this strategy proves to be the best available option, it will continue to fail, and mafia-supplied doping drugs will continue to be available to the athletes (and countless non-athletes) who want to buy them. It appears, therefore, that the IOC and WADA have embraced the law-enforcement approach as a last resort, in part because their confidence in their ability to effectively drug test athletes has diminished. Police pow-

Law&Ethics

has been the scapegoating, and at times the demonizing, of athletes who are caught using banned substances. The media routinely present high-profile doping cases as morality plays in which the solitary “doping sinner” is revealed, reviled, and punished. This version of the doping drama removes the structural factors that have driven doping for decades: political pressures from governments and sports federations, financial pressure from sponsors, performance pressure exerted by qualifying norms for Olympic competitions, economic pressures that result from desperate circumstances such as poverty, and the peer pressure that comes from the shared perception that “every-

Reformulating the doping problem into a

crime story evades the crucial question of why so many elite athletes dope themselves despite the risks to their health and reputations. ers, informants, and even sharp-eyed cleaning personnel (at the 2012 London Olympic Games) are now seen as essential allies in the fight against doping.

The other disadvantage of reformulating the doping problem into a crime story is it evades the crucial question of why so many elite athletes dope themselves despite the risks to their health and reputations. The IOC and WADA have always framed doping as a moral transgression committed by an individual who acts in isolation from any other factors that might influence the decision to employ pharmacological enhancement. The result of this selective portrait of the act of doping

one is doping.”

While the IOC and WADA have claimed that only a small number of ‘bad apples’ practice doping, the data present a very different picture. The International Track & Field Federation (IAAF), for example, reports that in this Olympic sport alone no fewer than 170 athletes are “currently suspended from all competitions in athletics following an anti-doping violation.”21 A listing of banned athletes across the major Olympic sports would produce hundreds of additional cases. The IOC and WADA have dealt with the doping crisis over many years by promulgating variations of the bad apples theory and by promoting anti-doping education

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as a respectable panacea whose value is uncertain, to say the least. Transforming doping into an international

crime drama is a very effective way to make these uncomfortable realities disappear.

NOTES

1 Matt Cutler, “BOA Takes Anti-doping Claims to CAS,” Sport Business, Internet, http://www.sportbusiness.com/news/184806/boa-takes-anti-dopingclaims-to-cas (date accessed: 20 January 2012).

2 John Hoberman, “How Drug Testing Fails: The Politics of Doping Control,” in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse, eds., Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement (Champaign: Human Kinetics, 2000), 241-274.

3 Doug Gillon, “Whistleblowers Key to Beating Drug Cheats at London Olympics,” The Herald, Internet, http://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/opinion/ whistleblowers-key-to-beating-drug-cheats-at-london-olympics.16558941 (date accessed: 23 January 2012).

4 “No Positive Doping Tests at 2010 FIFA World Cup,” Internet, http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/ archive/southafrica2010/news/newsid=1280619/ index.html (date accessed: 23 January 2012).

5 “WADA Wants Quick Resolution on Bans,” ESPN, Internet, http://espn.go.com/olympics/story/_/id/7264209/world-anti-doping-agency-wantsquick-resolution-dispute-britain-lifetime-dopingbans (date accessed: 23 January 2012).

6 Matt Cutler, “BOA Takes Anti-doping Claims to CAS,” Sport Business, Internet, http://www.sportbusiness.com/news/184806/boa-takes-anti-dopingclaims-to-cas (date accessed: 20 January 2012).

7 “Officials Need to Shape Up – Rogge,” IOL, Internet, http://www.iol.co.za/sport/more-sport/ officials-need-to-shape-up-rogge-1.981865 (date accessed: 25 January 2012).

8 John Hoberman, “The Myth of Sport as a PeacePromoting Political Force,” The SAIS Review of International Affairs XXXI (Winter-Spring 2011): 17-30.

9 Matt Cutler, “IOC Prepares for Major Anticorruption Meeting,” Sport Business, Internet, http:// www.sportbusiness.com/news/185033/ioc-preparesfor-major-anti-corruption-meeting (date accessed: 2 February 2012).

10 Richard Pound, “Doping Is Organized Along Mafia Lines,” interview by Maik Grossekathofer and Cathrin Gilbert, Der Spiegel, December 2008.

11 Kelly Burke, “Anti-dope Agency Sets Sights on Betting,” Sydney Morning Herald, Internet, http://www. smh.com.au/sport/antidope-agency-sets-sights-onbetting-20101109- 17m3z.html (date accessed: 25 January 2012).

12 Jacques Rogge, “Illegal Betting the Cancer From Which the Olympics Must Stay Immune,” The Australian, Internet, http://www.theaustralian. com.au/news/opinion/illegal-betting-the-cancer-

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from-which-olympics-must-stay-immune/storye6frg6zo-1226010975366 (date accessed: 25 January 2012).

13 Erika Joyce, “Tackling Doping in Sport 2011 a Global Success,” Internet, http://e-comlaw.com/ sportslawblog/template_archives.asp?chosenYear=201 1&chosenMonth=3 (date accessed: 25 January 2012).

14 “WADA and WCO Sign Ground-breaking Partnership,” Internet, http://www.wada-ama.org/ en/News-Center/Articles/WADA-and-WCO-signground-breaking-partnership/ (date accessed: 25 January 2012).

15 Rajeev Syal, “Drug Money Saved Banks in Global Crisis, Claims UN Advisor,” The Guardian, Internet, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/2009/ dec/13/drug-money-banks-saved-un-cfief-claims (date accessed: 25 January 2012).

16 Michelle Nichols, “Global War on Drugs a Failure, High-level Panel Says,” Reuters, Internet, http:// www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/02/us-drugs-commission-idUSTRE7513XW20110602 (date accessed: 28 January 2012).

17 “FIFA Makes Historic Contribution to INTERPOL in Long-term Fight Against Match-fixing,” Internet, http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/ News-media-releases/2011/PR035 (date accessed: 25 January 2012).

18 Stine Alvad, “WADA’s Director General Strikes Alarm Bells Against Organized Crime in Sports,” Internet, http://www.playthegame.org/news/detailed/ wadas-director-general-strikes-alarm-bells-againstorganized-crime-in-sports-5113.html (date accessed: 25 January 2012).

19 Jacques Rogge, “Illegal Betting the Cancer From Which the Olympics Must Stay Immune,” The Australian, Internet, http://www.theaustralian. com.au/news/opinion/illegal-betting-the-cancerfrom-which-olympics-must-stay-immune/storye6frg6zo-1226010975366 (date accessed: 25 January 2012).

20 Matt Culter, “IOC Prepares for Major Anticorruption Meeting,” Sport Business, Internet, http:// www.sportbusiness.com/news/185033/ioc-preparesfor-major-anti-corruption-meeting (date accessed 2 February 2012).

21 “Athletes Currently Suspended From All Competitions in Athletics Following an Antidoping Violation,” Internet, http://www.iaaf. org/mm/Document/Antidoping/SanctionedAthletes/05/61/97/20110516102918_httppostedfile_ Athletescurrentlysuspendedasat16.5.11_24529.pdf (date accessed: 2 February 2012).

Business&Economics Banking on Legitimacy The ECB and the Euro Zone Crisis Kathleen McNamara In this two-part series, the Journal explores the European sovereign debt crisis from two perspectives. First, in Banking on Legitimacy, Kathleen McNamara discusses the origins and evolution of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in order to place in context the evolving role of the European Central Bank (ECB).

Introduction. In the last few years, the eyes of the world

have been focused on Europe and the drama of its financial crisis, which seems to be threatening the future of the euro, as well as the political cohesion of the European Union (EU) itself. As the euro-mess drags on and on, the inability of European leaders to fashion an effective response to failing European banks and the sovereign debt crunch has caused many observersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; eyes to glaze over in stupefaction. But focusing only on the squabbling and deadlock would be to miss the unprecedented policy actions occurring in the European Central Bank (ECB). Founded as a hyper-independent central bank and given a narrow mandate to fight inflation and protect the value of the euro, the ECB has instead played a more political role than that initially envisioned or desired by its creators. In so doing, it has been a critical actor in keeping Europe from financial meltdown, but it also has

Kathleen R. McNamara is Director of the Mortara Center for International Studies at Georgetown University. She is an expert on the politics of international economic relations, specializing in the European Union, the euro and the European Central Bank.

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opened itself up to external criticism and internal turmoil, while highlighting the historically unique and potentially unsustainable political design of the EU. Examining the ECB’s evolution and its role in the sovereign debt crisis in Europe provides a window into the EU’s future path. As the most extreme challenge to date for the European Monetary Union (EMU) project, the crisis is truly a watershed moment for the entire European integration project. Most importantly, it highlights the deep tensions faced by an EU governance system designed to be insulated from politics when confronted with very hard economic times—generating a crisis not only of sovereign debt, but also of political legitimacy both inside and outside the euro zone.

sis was rooted in the housing market bubble and government action successfully calmed markets after some months of uncertainty, although at the expense of a severe contraction in national GDP and skyrocketing unemployment. Taking over failing banks made Irish government debt soar, but deep cuts in government spending and a harsh multiyear program of austerity convinced financial markets that the debt would ultimately be repaid. Ireland fell off the financial media news cycle. The political and economic situation in Greece, however, was not addressed in the same fashion.

In Greece, the government itself had taken advantage of the credit boom of the 2000s, as well as the international financial credibility that came from adopting the euro, to borrow far How Did We Get Here? The beyond what their political economy global financial crisis of 2008 began could hope to sustain. As investors in the United States, seemingly far demanded higher and higher interest away from Europe’s shores. As rev- rates on subsequent Greek loans, fears elations came to light about the toxic grew that the crisis might spill over to assets created and held by major United other, larger economies in the twelve States financial institutions such as Bear member euro zone. A new Greek Prime Sterns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Minister, Lucas Papademos, attempted Lynch, the housing market slowed and austerity reforms, while EU leaders met then crashed. The downward spiral of and dithered over how, or if, to help the U.S. stock market and the freezing bail out the Greeks. In particular, Gerup of day to day lending stunned the man Chancellor Angela Merkel, voicing world. Initially, it seemed that Europe both fears of moral hazard and distaste would escape without suffering from at bailing out profligate euro members, the ill effects of the subprime mort- offered only minimal guarantees and gage blow-up. Smug commentary from loans, creating deep divisions within some quarters about American “cowboy the EU over the nature of the commucapitalism” soon dried up, however. nity they wanted to be. Given uncerIrish banks had to be nationalized in tainty about the future of the euro zone, 2009 due to bad balance sheets, and investors began to demand larger bond by early 2010, questions about the spreads (the rates charged for national financial solvency of Greek sovereign borrowing) on certain EU countries debt began to surface. The Irish cri- now viewed as potentially risky invest-

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ments. Greece, at roughly 3 percent of the euro zone’s overall GDP, was viewed as worrisome but not a serious challenge to the overall economic health of the EU. But when countries such as Italy, the EU’s fourth largest economy, approached borrowing rates of 8 percent, the amount widely viewed as the threshold for default, many observers feared that, if Italy reached the breaking point, the EU could fall like a house of cards. Indeed, over 2011, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and even France took their turn being pummeled by the bond markets.

To understand what the debt crisis really means for the future of Europe,

Business&Economics

percent) are charged.1 The IMF estimates that Japan’s debt will reach 250 percent of GDP in 2015. By comparison, the IMF forecasts that Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio in 2015 will be 165 percent, Italy’s 116 percent, and Spain’s 76 percent.2 Yet no one is talking about Japan’s bond-financing problems.

Except for Greece, long considered the EU’s weakest link, the other European countries have productive, robust economies with the capacity for future growth and the governance structures and political systems to deal with their fiscal imbalances. Markets, however, have historically not cared much for the niceties of such differences, but rather

Arguing that bond markets are merely re-

acting to debt levels and Europeans simply need to “live within their means” therefore is nonsense in a world where there is vast flexibility in how markets perceive the meaning of appropriate debt levels. it is crucial to note that the economic fundamentals did not necessarily point to these market attacks as a logical necessity. Debt and deficit figures diverge widely across the European Union and the rest of the industrialized world, and stated debt levels do not necessarily track the amount bond markets charge sovereign borrowers in Europe or elsewhere. Debt-to-GDP ratios, as recorded by the IMF, vary from 87 percent (France) to 67 percent (Spain) to 121 percent (Italy), yet all these European states are being charged rates above what states like Germany (83 percent), the United States (100 percent), or Japan (an astounding 233

strong contagion dynamics have tended to spread financial crises to neighboring countries, without much regard for the differences in economic fundamentals across them, as happened in the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s.

Arguing that bond markets are merely reacting to debt levels and Europeans simply need to “live within their means” therefore is nonsense in a world where there is vast flexibility in how markets perceive the meaning of appropriate debt levels.

The Euro of Magical Thinking? So how should we think about the very real problems that the euro zone

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and the EU are facing? The key takeaway is that the EU has a very particular challenge when it comes to convincing financial markets about its future solvency and economic credibility. The euro was created in a bold act of political innovation, agreed to in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, at a moment of profound transformation after the fall of the Berlin Wall. But from its début (in the form of irrevocably fixed national currencies in 1999, and then physical currency in 2002) it has been plagued by a serious political deficit that no amount of wishful thinking can mask. The key EU deficit is not a financial one, but lies in the disjuncture between a very developed monetary union centered on the ECB and the vestigial political development of the EU more broadly. This disjuncture is deeply problematic, despite the hopes of the EMU’s designers that an independent central bank with a mandate to keep inflation low and defend the European currency at all costs would make up for it. The EU’s odd mismatch between a sovereign European currency and nationally sovereign fiscal and banking policies clearly have not worked. Historians are not surprised: a single currency without a single fiscal authority and political power at the center of a political union is unprecedented. All functioning single currencies have been created as part of larger state building projects, where transfers of political power made the decision to unite into a single currency an expressly and inescapably political act. What are financial markets to make of the incomplete hodgepodge of sovereign transfers of authority that make the EU such an oddity in the international political

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system? As they have no historical template for judging the future path of the euro, is it surprising that investors are doubtful of the commitment of euro zone members to prop each other up and weather the crisis together?

The Technocrats Strike Back.

The ECB was initially designed to circumvent exactly these types of historically cozy relationships between markets and politics. The ECB began its life as the most independent central bank in history. The insulated term appointment system of the bank, rules about not backstopping national debt or printing money written into the ECB’s legal charter, and the decision to locate the bank in Frankfurt (site of the inflation-fighting Bundesbank), all demonstrated the view that the ECB must be independent from politics and focused on price stability above all other goals. The economists and eurocrats who drew up the ECB’s rules and the political elites that agreed to them all had their eyes fixed on the last economic war—the horrible period of stagflation that began in the 1970s. Economic theories of the “political business cycle” and rational expectations theory called for an end to using monetary policy to stimulate growth or employment. From this perspective, little was given up by making the ECB independent and tying its hands, keeping it away from the political fray of economic crises and hard choices. While some analysts cautioned that central banks cannot be inoculated from the practical and normative necessities of democratic control, there was widespread support for the notion that monetary policy was best left to technocrats, out of the reach

MCNAMARA

of politics. In the 1990s and 2000s, with the flourishing of the euro zone, it seemed that macroeconomic policy in the EU could be treated as a purely technical matter, like traffic rules, that need not engage partisan and distributional debates.

The unending drama of the euro zone crisis, however, has destroyed the notion that central banks and monetary policy are apolitical in nature.

Delegating authority to technocrats and intentionally stripping out democracy from an independent ECB seemed like a great idea at the time, but the illusion ended as the ECB stepped up to play a key political role in salvaging Europe’s economy. The ECB’s interventions and policy proposals have proved to be both novel and surprising. Founded on the ideology of price stability at all costs, the ECB now faces a growth and liquidity crisis. Yet it is also dis-embedded from broader political institutions that in most national settings might offer support and cover for difficult policy decisions. So what has the ECB chosen to do?

Most dramatically, at the end of 2011, the ECB, under the leadership of its new president, Mario Draghi, issued hundreds of billions of euros of emergency loans to European banks.

The policy mirrored to some extent the U.S. Federal Reserve’s previously more aggressive actions to stabilize U.S. financial markets. The ECB’s interventions have been relatively successful, as the interest rates charged on auctioned bonds in the most pressed member states fell in early 2012, allowing for more breathing room: Spain’s tenyear bonds were at 5.5 percent instead of over 7 percent earlier in the fall of

Business&Economics

2011, and Italy’s five-year bonds were selling at close to 5 percent, rather than close to 8 percent as they had earlier.3 But the ECB’s actions have been controversial. A New York Times article reported that in early December, Mr. Draghi had been asked why he could not step in to act aggressively as had the U.S. Federal Reserve or the Bank of England.4 He responded by saying that he was bound by the European treaty, which “embodies the best tradition of the Deutsche Bundesbank.” That is to say, that buying dodgy European bank debt on the scale needed was not in the cards for the ECB. And yet within the month, at the end of 2011, the ECB was injecting cash into European banks that then turned around and bought national bonds at auction, lowering the rates the euro zone member states had to offer to sell their bonds. Some are hoping this could create a positive, virtuous circle where lower debt payments will allow the national governments to get their private and sovereign debt burdens in order. While it is far too early to tell what the final outcome will be, such a result would certainly be greeted with relief by many who worry about overextension of the ECB itself.

The manner in which the ECB has gone forward should give us pause, not only from the perspective of those hard money proponents who see the buying of euro zone debt as a refutation of all the theories of why we should have independent central banks in the first place. Those who care about the evolution of the EU toward a more democratic and functional entity should be worried about the shape of the “Grand Bargain” struck by European leaders after the December 2011 summit, which

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paved the way for the ECB’s actions.

At this summit, all EU leaders, accept for the UK and the Czech Republic, agreed to put in place a new system of accountability for national fiscal policies that will stress budget cutting and sobriety. In essence, the ECB received political cover for its unconventional monetary actions by entering into agreements with national governments that they return the favor by more sincerely pursuing austerity. This “revenge of the technocrats” scenario raises a vitally important question. Should we be comfortable with an institutionally undemocratic institution calling the

financial markets recover. Those who depend on salaries for their livelihoods have suffered from the dramatic rise in unemployment and the shrinking of public investment and expenditure in the wake of the financial crisis.

Monetary policy, like regulatory policy or any other realm of policymaking, has distributional consequences that demand broader democratic conversations about the values and goals of a polity and the social choices that its citizens wish to make. Democracy is messy, but it has the overriding benefit of creating legitimacy by opening up to contestation and discussion the trade-

Monetary policy, like regulatory policy or

any other realm of policymaking, has distributional consequences that demand broader democratic conversations about the values and goals of a polity and the social choices that its citizens wish to make. shots in a situation that is deeply and inherently political, when the decisions determine how resources are used, how money is spent, and who gets what part of the economic pie?

offs that a society wishes to make.

The key to understanding the predicament of the EU and the ECB is rooted in the observation that central bank independence is offset, in national settings, by a robust and repStill Home Alone. Independent resentative set of institutions. These central banks could not protect us from include the legislature (a parliament or the worst financial crisis since the Great congress) and executive level bureauDepression. Moreover, the macroeco- cracies (a finance ministry or treasury), nomic and financial market policies whose very roots are in the democratic, of the last decades have created vast partisan process. Working with those chasms between economic winners and institutional partners and their leadlosers. Those with the financial means ers, a national central bank, even if to invest in risky assets and get out in independent, will engage, interact, and front of the financial system’s collapse ultimately, be supported in its decihave profited, and continue to do so as sions. Without those democratic mech-

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MCNAMARA

anisms, it is impossible for institutions that are responsible for policies hugely consequential for the lives of European citizens to be fully legitimate. The EU desperately needs this legitimacy to somehow drag itself out of the mess it currently finds itself in. The mismatch between market integration and the development of the EU’s political institutions is nowhere better illustrated than in the ECB’s situation and in the difficulties EU and national leaders have had in convincing their tense publics to have faith in the solutions they are offering. Moreover, financial markets themselves will not believe in the solutions unless they perceive that the citizens of Europe see them as legitimate. Single currencies must be backstopped by political authority, founded on robust institutions and channels of representation most critically needed in hard times, when the trade offs and decisions are the most difficult.

How will history judge the ECB and its actions? In the end, history will not be written by the ECB itself, but will heavily depend on the evolution of broader EU institutions, and in determining how to match the power of the ECB with more politically representative partners on the fiscal side, such as a European Treasury. The time has come for more serious discussion of the ways in which to deepen democratic representation in the EU, even if it is not ready for a complete representational system. Referenda are not the way forward, as they do not effectively provide a mechanism for political debate. Instead, at least three arenas should be the focus of reform. First, the European Parliament might move to a more majority rule on important

Business&Economics

issues, where the stakes for winning are thus increased, creating the incentive for publics and policymakers to pay more attention to the ECB. Second, open contestation over the office of the President of the European Commission would grant European citizens a sense that they actually have a say in who governs. The ability to “throw the bums out” through the electoral process is a key part of modern democracy. Finally, more transparency in the European Council, the elite group of heads of state and government that decides on the highest level issues for the EU, would create incentives for better explanations of policy actions and clearer contestation and debates concerning the long term direction of the EU. Not only institutions and policies, but also attitudes across the European political elites need to change for the EU to hold together. Technocracy worked for a long time, but we are now in a transformational moment where the EU is tenuously holding onto its role as a profoundly important political authority and source of governance.

The future of the euro depends on European political leaders recognizing that the ECB is simply too important to be left out on its own in the political arena, without broader legitimating institutions to support it. The EU has developed an extraordinarily successful and innovative governance form for the new century, but the time has come for European leaders to pragmatically embrace the need for legitimacy—in the politics facing central banks, and for remaining obstacles to broader European integration.

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NOTES

1 “Report for Selected Countries and Subjects: General government gross debt (Percent of GDP).”

International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011. Internet. http:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/ index.aspx (Accessed 16 Dec 2011).

2 Ibid.

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3 Nicholas Kulish “Central Bank Becomes and Unlikely Hero in Euro Crisis.” The New York Times, 20 Jan 2012. Internet http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/ world/european-central-bank-eases-euro-crisis-abit.html?pagewanted=all (Accessed 20 Jan 2012).

4 Ibid.

Business&Economics

Playing Hard to Get

Why Has China Been Reluctant to Help Europe?

Minxin Pei Second in the series, Pei provides a comprehensive analysis of the central economic and political factors at play in the decision of Chinese policy makers to come to the rescue of debt-straddled European economies.

Ever since the European sovereign debt crisis burst onto the scene in 2010, many in Europe have counted on China to play a key part in bailing out some of Europe’s most indebted governments. China could use part of its massive $3.2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves to purchase the government debts issued by Greece, Italy, Spain, and Ireland, helping to calm markets and restore investor confidence.

To some, such thinking might seem fanciful, if not wishful. But European policy makers apparently thought that their interests and those of China were more closely aligned.

From their perspective, it would be in China’s self-interest to help Europe weather its debt crisis. Indeed, if we look at how closely the Chinese economy is intertwined with that of the European Union, there is no question that China will suffer fallout from Europe’s economic woes. Although Chinese banks have little exposure to European sovereign debt, China sends almost 30 percent of its merchandise exports to the EU, its largest overseas market. In 2010, China exported

Minxin Pei is Director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College. His research focuses on democratization in developing countries, governance in China, and U.S.– China relations. He is the author of China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy.

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$383 billion in goods to the EU. If the on-going debt crisis triggers a recession in Europe, as now seems almost inevitable, China’s exports to the EU will fall, reducing China’s own economic growth. The weakening of the euro, another consequence of the crisis, will also be bad news for China. Because roughly $800 billion of China’s foreign exchange reserves are invested in euro-denominated assets, Beijing has

European leaders such as President Nicolas Sarkozy, Chinese leaders have refused to budge.

While European leaders expecting Beijing to ride to the rescue will likely be disappointed, they should have known better. Had they viewed the European sovereign debt crisis from the Chinese perspective, they would have understood Beijing’s reluctance to agree to any substantial financial

Several issues that prevented China

from intervening will likely affect any future consideration of Chinese aid to Europe. already suffered capital losses on such holdings. In the worst scenario—the break-up of the euro zone due to a disorderly default by Greece or Italy— China will not avoid the disastrous aftermath.

If China has so much riding on Europe’s economic stability, why has Beijing been playing hard to get? In rhetoric, China has been generous.

Senior officials have repeatedly voiced their support for Brussels in finding a quick resolution. Symbolically, China even sent its future prime minister to Europe in late 2010 on a highprofile tour during which he pledged that China would buy European debt (China did purchase a small quantity of such debt later on). But when the EU’s bailout fund (the European Financial Stability Facility, or EFSF) was seeking big-name investors, and its chief representative visited Beijing in the fall of 2011, his Chinese hosts politely told him they could not invest in such a facility. Despite direct appeals from

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assistance. Several issues that prevented China from intervening will likely affect any future consideration of Chinese aid to Europe.

First, the EU itself was deeply split. There was no consistency in its approach. The richer members were unwilling to use their taxpayers’ money to bail out profligate deadbeats such as the Greeks. The lack of unity and effective leadership within the EU has made it nearly impossible for third parties to make snap decisions on investing tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars in high-risk European bonds deemed to be on the brink of default.

Furthermore, China is a relatively new economic powerhouse, inexperienced in global finance and suspicious of the West. For the Chinese, the Europeans’ own inept management of the crisis gave them a perfect excuse to sit on their hands.

Domestic politics in China has also played a role in pressuring Beijing to turn down Europe’s requests for

PEI

assistance. In China, the typical image of Europe is that of a socialist welfare paradise where workers retire at age fifty-five with generous, publicly funded benefits and pensions. To use China’s hard-earned foreign currency to purchase Europe’s distressed sovereign debts so that such socialist lifestyles could be maintained would make for a tough sell inside China. The ruling Chinese Communist Party, politically falling to the right of the United States Republican Party, has dismantled China’s social safety nets in the last three decades and certainly has no ideological compulsion to help fund Europe’s socialist welfare states. Making China’s foreign exchange reserves available for a European bailout would also be certain to ignite a political firestorm.

The Chinese people, who have suffered years of deteriorating social services in

Business&Economics

which is expected to select a new group of top leaders in October 2012. As a rule, senior leaders become extremely risk-averse on the eve of such transitions. A policy misstep could cost them a spot on the Politburo Standing Committee, the party’s supreme policy-making group. The result of such risk aversion is a period of policy paralysis preceding the leadership transition. The European debt crisis may threaten China’s economic well-being, but in the minds of China’s communist mandarins, nothing is more important than their personal political fortune.

Of course, China would probably have done a bit more to help Europe if doing so would allow it to gain substantial real benefits. Unfortunately, a weakened Europe has little to offer. In the minds of the Chinese, perhaps only two prizes are worth considering. The

China would probably have done a bit

more to help Europe if doing so would allow it to gain substantial real benefits. healthcare, education, and environmental protection, would be outraged.

Hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens would have a field day castigating Beijing for helping finance the cushy social safety nets of rich Europeans while failing to provide much social protection for its own people. China may be a one-party dictatorship, but it is an insecure dictatorship in which the rulers must contend with the power of public opinion.

The timing of the euro crisis also coincides with the leadership transition of the Chinese Communist Party,

first one would be the immediate granting of market economy status for China by the EU. When China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, the EU and the United States forced China to join as a non-market economy. This status has allowed the EU and the United States to impose antidumping sanctions against China with relative ease. So in the fall of 2011, Beijing informally floated the idea that it would participate in a European bailout effort in exchange for the EU immediately granting market-economy status for China. Apparently this proposal was

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received with little enthusiasm in Brussels, and few European leaders stepped forward to embrace it. Beijing also appeared to have second thoughts soon afterwards, probably because, according to Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s WTO accession agreement, the EU would grant China its coveted market-economy status in 2016 anyway. There was not much to gain by making the EU do so four years ahead of schedule.

In terms of the politics of international trade, any EU concessions (i.e., granting China the market-economy status ahead of schedule) would be seen as capitulating to Chinese pressure and making the United States the lone holdout in refusing to give China the same trading status. It is unlikely that the United States would follow suit, if the EU granted China market economy status before 2016. Given the harmful precedent that would have been set by prematurely granting this status to China, it is understandable that the EU did not endorse the informal suggestion from Beijing.

A second prize to offer the Chinese in return for financial assistance would involve the EU lifting its arms embargo against China. The embargo was imposed in 1989 after Chinese troops killed hundreds of pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing during the Tiananmen crisis. It has prevented China from acquiring advanced weapons and defense technologies from European countries. Beijing has been lobbying the EU to lift the sanctions for years and almost succeeded in 2004, when the EU put the action on its policy agenda. The United States, how-

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ever, vehemently opposed the measure.

American pressures finally forced the EU to abandon the idea. Currently, China may be able to use the euro zone crisis to entice Brussels to revive the plan, yet Chinese leaders have decided that driving such a bargain would be too risky. The Americans would be outraged, and the Europeans would appear to be willing to do anything in order to get the Chinese money.

With so much against helping Europe to tide over its sovereign debt crisis, and so little to gain, there is little wonder that Beijing has kept its trillions of dollars in hard currency beyond the reach of disappointed Europeans. Yet, perhaps it is premature to rule out any participation by China in a multilateral effort to aid the EU. In late January 2012, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao suggested that Beijing may contribute to an IMF program designed to assist the EU. Other senior officials also implied that China might purchase some bonds for the EU bailout facility, EFSF. In the end, it is likely that China will make some modest contributions to both vehicles, to demonstrate that it is a responsible great power, if nothing else. Those who wait for China to play a leading role in resolving Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s financial woes, however, will continue to be disappointed.

Science&Technology Mobile Phones

Challenges of Capability Building Robin Mansell The rapid spread of mobile (cell) phones in developing countries is increasing access to an enormous range of communication services that are highly valued by the urban and rural populations of these countries. Many of these services make use of software applications that support new forms of online collaboration. Nevertheless, while the diffusion of the mobile phone has been faster than any other information and communication technology in human history, the capabilities for using this technology to its full potential have been slower to develop.1 Part of the explanation for this lies in the overwhelming emphasis on supply-side initiatives.

Diffusion studies, including those focusing on the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;bottomof-the-pyramid,â&#x20AC;&#x2122; can tell us about the rise of mobile phones and some of the characteristics of use and of users, but they cannot tell us whether access to mobiles is contributing to poverty alleviation in developing countries.

Although problems of access and cost continue to present barriers to use, mobile communication is providing a new basis for entrepreneurship and social innovation.

The complex challenge of enabling people to acquire the knowledge essential for developing innovative applications that are responsive to their local needs, however, is being

Robin Mansell is Professor of New Media and the Internet in the Department of Media and Communications, London School of Economics and Political Science. She is past President of the International Association for Media and Communication Research and former Head of Department. Her most recent book is Imagining the Internet: Communication, Innovation and Governance,

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neglected. The necessary digital skills include operational expertise and an understanding of information structures when the mobile phone is used as a medium for communication. They also include information search and selection skills, communication and content creation skills, and strategic skills needed to use mobile phones in ways that support individual or professional goals. The widespread failure to acquire these abilities is limiting opportunities for empowerment through the use of mobile phones. This paper considers gaps in the existing evidence-base, examines disconnections between policy and practice, and highlights new opportunities for the development of digital capabilities for mobile phonebased entrepreneurship.

Gaps in the Evidence-Base.

Empirical research on the impact of mobile phones in developing countries is fragmented. Many studies focus separately on markets, technology, or social interaction, but they rarely examine a combination of these aspects.2 It often is assumed that access to mobile networks will enable ‘leap-frogging’ or ‘catchingup’ by developing countries, supporting new forms of business or social interaction.3 Research on capability-building processes related to mobile communication services and platforms, however, is absent from studies on the potential benefits for users in developing countries. Even when research focuses on the characteristics of demand for this technology, it emphasizes the individual characteristics of users rather than the relational networks that facilitate online learning. We know that the significance and nature of mobile phone

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use vary across developing countries and that differences in usage patterns exist between wealthy and poor countries. For instance, in poor urban areas of Chile “the mobile phone space is not the space of mobile freedom that advertising images and marketing campaigns present.”4 ‘Bottom-of-the-pyramid’ studies in South East Asia show that social influence within relational networks is a key factor in the decision to adopt this technology. In areas like these, supply-side marketing campaigns encouraging friends and family to use mobile phones might prove to be effective.5 It also is essential, however, to consider demand-side strategies because they build the capabilities needed for local individuals and groups to develop entrepreneurial mobile phone applications. The growing availability of open data resources is opening numerous opportunities for developing capabilities through processes of collaborative online learning, often on a global basis.

Data not subject to proprietary ownership rights can be used to start entrepreneurial initiatives in the private sector and to meet social needs. In the case of public health care, where experiments are facilitating consultation and communication between health care workers and locals, the availability of open information networks is balancing access to public information with the need for privacy.6 Similar networks in veterinary practice, agronomy, and environmental monitoring are being developed.7

Online Social Networks. Online social networks are proliferating, providing new opportunities for interactive

MANSELL

learning. By manipulating, searching, and experimenting with information, making choices about how to present and visualize data, and engaging in dialogue with others about that content, these new platforms provide a basis for ‘integrative’ learning through which

Science&Technology

whether the mobile revolution can support activities involving more complex information-sharing in which intensive data communication and display require the processing capability of the personal computer. Nevertheless, mobile phone applications are extend-

An increasing number of ‘more-than-mo-

bile’ services are making mobile phones a viable option for supporting meaningful integrative learning. new types of data can be combined on mobile and other platforms.8 Although many of these opportunities are based on computer interactivity, an increasing number of ‘more-than-mobile’ services are making mobile phones a viable option for supporting meaningful integrative learning.9 One set of applications that is developing rapidly is the use of geographical mapping and crowd sourcing of real-time data in response to human and natural crises. These initiatives are often responsive to local demand for information and they are providing opportunities for the entrepreneurial provision of digital data platforms on which local information can be placed. For instance, OpenStreetMap is supporting an editable map that can be viewed and edited anywhere in the world and is being used in support of relief work and disaster management.10 All of these applications involving open or real-time data require users to make creative uses of mobile communication networks.

While it is clear that mobile networks are capable of supporting poverty reduction measures, it is still unclear

ing access to those engaged in entrepreneurial activities and the provision of social services. These applications provide better information about markets, promote the distribution of messages to large numbers of people without the Internet, and enable the development of mobile remittance services. Unfortunately, the lack of attention given to demand-side measures to build user capabilities is limiting the diversity of applications.

Disconnected Policy and Practice. Despite the high level of policy

attention that information and communication technologies have received, demand-side considerations are being neglected in strategies to spread mobile technologies in developing countries.

There has been an increase in the availability of mobile services in developing countries as a result of declining costs, the global reach of networks, and software applications for many different purposes. The World Summit on the Information Society Declaration on Building the Information Society emphasized that, “all individuals can soon, if we take the necessary actions, together

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build a new Information Society based on shared knowledge …”11 The “necessary actions,” however, have underestimated the fact that capability building involves pre-conditions.

Addressing this by developing improved understanding of these conditions, especially those related to facilitating learning-by-collaboration rather than individualized trial and error, is a challenge.12 Learning through online interaction has the potential to generate mutual advantage in the private sector and in public sectors such as education, health and the environment. Mobile phone networks can play a fundamental role in the learning process by augmenting collaborations in which online interactions play a central role. This is at the heart of new opportunities for developing countries to strengthen their capabilities to exploit the gains from the application of mobile communication infrastructures.

Capabilities for online entrepreneurship are constructed incrementally. An important factor is the emergence of digital applications supporting the global flow of information and online collaborative working in global value chains. Efforts to build capabilities on the demand-side require specific strategies for building and managing global production networks involving companies and individuals in the coordination of labor in a fluid collaborative manner. These collaborations are important because of the demands of international design, specification, and sourcing of products.13

Building

Capabilities. The prospects for building capabilities are changing dramatically with the spread [ 1 5 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

of mobile networks and their applications that can support learning by collaboration. With the support of these networks, there is a potential for many countries to establish themselves as hubs if they can create the necessary infrastructure and skills and put associated trade, tax, and legal policies in place.

There has been substantial growth of outsourcing alongside the availability of software applications supporting entrepreneurship in business and supply chain management.14 Platforms for mobile team-working and collaboration, employing resources accessed through mobile phones, are becoming more widely available to individuals and smaller companies in developing countries. These developments provide the foundations for new approaches to knowledge management and learning.

Online resources for skill or capability building include manuals for community activists, multimedia training kits, digital literacy resources, training on standard software packages, and region-specific information packages sponsored by donor agencies and companies such as Microsoft.

The generation of innovations and new knowledge through collaboration is a major consequence of building online capabilities. Mobile networks are becoming powerful tools for collecting information that stimulates the imagination and provides clues for new directions in social and commercial activity. When combined with local knowledge, some of this activity is likely to be idiosyncratic, but other activities are likely to become candidates for entrepreneurial initiatives and the development of products and services that can be commercialized, such as

MANSELL

mobile networks serving as platforms for other services. This progression is typical of services such as Esoko, a Ghanaian service that allows uploading of market and other data using mobile phones, and AppZone in Sri Lanka, which enables developers to create, test and sell applications which are then promoted by the mobile operators.15 Demand-side strategies including customization and use of collaborative networking create real prospects for developing countries to generate commercially significant activity.

Digital Capabilities for Entrepreneurship. Online social networks are becoming essential for the filtering, adapting, and exchanging productive information. Recent developments supported by mobile networks and other digital technologies are offering better tools for building and sustaining social networks, but these are not necessarily the tools fit for the purpose of building capabilities for digital entre-

Science&Technology

platforms. For individuals to gain the necessary capabilities they need to move up a ladder involving three important stages: 1) Inclusion, involving functional uses, communication, and information access; 2) Engagement, involving entertainment, social networking, and transactions; and finally, 3) Empowerment, including content creation, virtual interaction, and entrepreneurship.16 Each of these stages typically is associated with a progression of activities beginning with basic skills. By ascending this ladder, new skills are mastered.

In this context, entrepreneurship is about establishing commercial activities but it is also about the capacity for independent initiative and this may apply to civic, cultural, or political activities.

For example, when high-level online capabilities are in place, market or technology innovations can reduce

Online sociability is an end rather than a

means when it occurs in support of information exchange activities. preneurship. Online sociability is an end rather than a means when it occurs in support of information exchange activities such as advertising jobs, providing information that is difficult to find, accessing government services, or communicating with friends or family.

Nevertheless, the process of learning through online collaboration to build capabilities for entrepreneurship requires more than these uses of mobile

frictions in the economy, as in the case of the use of mobile phones to reduce waste in Kerala fish markets in India.17 Innovative uses of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;more-thanmobileâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; services focus on connecting formerly excluded small enterprises in the economy to high-value agricultural, industrial and service business process outsourcing chains, as is the case with services provided by DesiCrew Solutions in India.18 Similarly, in Sri Lan-

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ka, using mobile platforms to provide market price information, crop advisory services, and weather forecasts is improving export-oriented agricultural value chains. This builds on technology-related capabilities and on the coordination of information collectors.19

may lead to the early adoption of new ideas or techniques, and, eventually, to entrepreneurial ideas. In this stage, individuals form relational ties based upon shared interests and purposes that may or may not be â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;local.â&#x20AC;&#x2122; For instance, mobile applications are being developed to support remote tracking Demand-Side Initiatives. This by coffee growers in Costa Rica and capability-building ladder makes it clear are providing information and interacthat a range of demand-side initiatives is tive services that help growers meet fair necessary to achieve the level of empow- trade standards. In this case, Sourceerment for benefiting from access to Trace works with local cooperatives to digital technologies, including mobile develop visualization and other tools phones. In this progression, the use for supply chain management, building of mobile phones to communicate and capabilities by coupling locally shared gather personal information is only the interests with services enabling collabbeginning. As an individual proceeds to orative working online.20 the second level of engagement, learnMobile networks are increasing ing becomes more relational and col- access to open source software, which laborative. It is not only the basic skill, offers the opportunity to acquire an but also a question of developing capa- understanding of the tools required to bilities for making choices about which create and use advanced software proentertainment, social interaction, or ductively in developing regions.21 Taktransaction to engage in. Interaction ing advantage of these opportunities with others with similar interests starts requires background knowledge that to become increasingly important. The can be provided by a relatively modest local and virtual social communities level of technical education. with which an individual interacts help facilitate the acquisition of skill and in Developing Capabilities. A filtering information. These processes prominent example of the development of social engagement and collabora- of capabilities for online collaboration tion continue in the third empower- is the growth of freelance workers who ment stage, where an individual starts progress along the capabilities ladder to engage with fellow community mem- to take on employment engaging in bers. The motivation for progressing activities from basic image tagging to toward online learning through collab- advanced coding. There has been an oration and entrepreneurship depends increase in the incidence of virtual on the perceived relevance of online teams linking small and medium-sized interactions; individuals with interests enterprises, especially in low-income that are broader than their immediate countries.22 For example, the Banglaphysical community are more likely to deshi Software and Information Serperceive the relevance and benefit of vices Association reports some 10,000 continuing to build their skills. This Bangladeshi freelancers who are active

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online. The majority of them work for clients in the United States and Europe, but they also work for local government institutions, non-governmental organizations, and individuals. They provide services ranging from software development to graphic design, search engine optimization, social media marketing, blogging, and data entry.

Projects vary from building electronic commerce websites to entering product information or posting feedback for companies. The revenues generated by more successful freelancers may be in the tens of thousands of dollars, although the average is much lower.23 Software applications often emerge from collaborative discussion about the need for and value of new solutions.

The importance of building professional networks and of accessing tools for collaboration is increasing both within companies and between companies and their suppliers and customers.

Examples include customer relations management software, software for computer supported cooperative work which may be organized around computer aided design and manufacturing software, and software for collaborative document creation. The Chinese government, for instance, is developing the China National Commodity Exchange Center, which has more than five million registered members and supports the exchange of products in twenty-six countries by collecting and distributing information about commodities and all aspects of the trading process as well as providing a system for mobile phone-based payments and information access.24 Just as individuals progress along the capability-building ladder from indi-

Science&Technology

vidual information needs to engagement with other users in information sharing and exchange, companies progress from managing their own operations to interacting with their customers and suppliers in creating larger networks. Some of these networks become large scale platforms for market exchange. Access to mobile networks by entrepreneurial companies in low-income countries can thus provide opportunities for learning and for participation in revenue-generating activities.

Conclusion. These kinds of capabil-

ity-building processes crucially depend on the social context and opportunities for learning. Learning involves a progression from individual skills to collaboration. Without a local community sharing interests and enthusiasm, few people are likely to develop the capabilities or remain motivated to progress beyond the elementary skills level. Progression requires engagement with others with whom an individual identifies and interacts with offline and online.

Interactive platforms offered by mobile services are providing increasingly accessible means for this, suggesting that it is timely to introduce demandside incentives to foster the necessary learning through collaboration online in support these developments.

When the pre-conditions for collaborative learning online exist, people have opportunities to move into freelance employment, driving local demand for digital services, including a growing number of mobile phone applications, and generating income.

Thus, individual empowerment based on digital technologies such as the

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mobile phone is the visible aspect of a major trend that is driving the international division of labor. This, in turn, is opening opportunities for those who are able to progress in building their online capabilities.

When fully developed, these new capabilities strengthen the potential

for profiting from relational mobile networks and for coordinating wealthgenerating activities within a developing country. This progression, however, is unlikely without demand-side initiatives that sponsor training to encourage the capabilities necessary for interacting using mobile and other digital services.

NOTES

1 Kas Kalba, “The Adoption of Mobile Phones in Emerging Markets: Global Diffusion and Rural Challenge”. International Journal of Communication, 2(Nov 2008): 631-661.

2 Jonathan Donner, “Research Approaches to Mobile Use in the Developing World: A Review of the Literature”. The Information Society, 24 (2008): 140-159.

3 Jeffrey James, “Leapfrogging in Mobile Telephony: A Measure for Comparing Country Performance”. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 76, no.

7(2009): 991-998. And see W Edward Steinmueller, “ICTs and the Possibilities for Leapfrogging by Developing Countries”. International Labour Review, 140(2): 193-210, 2001, whose work I have drawn on in this paper.

4 Sebastian Ureta, “Mobilising Poverty?: Mobile Phone Use and Everyday Spatial Mobility Among LowIncome Families in Santiago, Chile”. The Information Society, 24, no. 2 (2008): 83-92.

5 Harsha de Silva, Dimuthu Ratnadiwakara and Ayesha Zainudeen, “Social Influence in Mobile Adoption: Evidence from the Bottom of the Pyramid in Emerging Asia”. Information Technology and International Development, 7, no. 3(2011): 1-18.

6 Joaquin A Blaya, Hamish S F Fraser and Brian Holt, “E-Health Technologies Show Promise in Developing Countries”. Health Affairs, 29 no. 2(2010): 244-251.

7 Nagi K Hanna, e-Transformation: Enabling New Development Strategies. (New York: Springer), 2010.

8 Jan van Dijk, Network Society: Social Aspects of New Media. (London: Sage), 2012.

9 Rohan Samarajiva in ‘Not Just talk’. The Economist, 27 January 2011.

10 Evangelia Berdou, Organization in Open Source Communities: At the Crossroads of the Gift and Market Economies. (New York: Routledge), 2011.

11 Emphasis added, United Nations and International Telecommunication Union, Declaration of Princples: Building the Information Society: A Global Challenge in the New Millennium. (Geneva: United Nations and International Telecommunication Union, WSIS-03/Geneva/ Doc/4-E, 12 December), 2003.

12 Uwe Matzat and Bert Sadowski, ‘Does the “DoIt-Yourself Approach” Reduce Digital Inequality?

Evidence of Self-Learning of Digital Skills. The Informa-

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tion Society, 28, no. 1(2012): 1-12.

13 Olivier Cattaneo, Gary M Gereffi and Conrelia Staritz, Global Value Chains in a Postcrisis World: A Development Perspective. (Washington DC: World Bank), 2010.

14 See Mary Lacity, Shaji Khan, Aihua Yan and Leslie P Willcocks, “A Review of the IT Outsourcing Empirical Literature and Future Research Directions”. Journal of Information Technology, 25(4): 395-433, 2010.

15 Esoko, http://www.esoko.com/ and http:// appzone.lk/ , accessed 19 February 2012.

16 Ian Clifford, It’s All About the People: Telecentre Europe accessed at Digital Inclusion Wales site, http:// www.digitalinclusionwales.org.uk/photos/item/thedigital-journey-telecentre-europe-website, accessed 14 January 2012.

17 Robert Jensen ‘The Digital Provide: Information (Technology), Market Performance and Welfare in the South Indian Fishers Sector’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 no. 3 (2007): 879–924.

18 Desicrew Solutions, http://desicrew.in/ accessed 19 February 2012.

19 Sriganesh Lokanathan, “Reliable Supply, Quality & Price: What can be learned from operational ICT enabled services.” http://lirneasia.net/wp-content/ uploads/2011/10/Lokanthan_ICTPlatformsPDF1.pdf, accessed 19 February 2012.

20 SourceTrace, www.sourcetrace.com accessed 19 February 2012.

21 Juan Mateos-Garcia and W Edward Steinmueller, “The Institutions of Open Source Software: Examining the Debian Community”. Information Economics and Policy, 20 no. 4 (2008): 333-344.

22 Nader Ale Ebrahim, Shamsuddin Ahmed and Zahari Taha, “Virtual R&D Teams in Small and Medium Enterprises: A Literature Review”. Scientific Research and Essays, 4 no. 13(2009): 1575-1590.

23 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Information Economy Report 2011: ICTs as an Enabler for Private Sector Development. (Geneva: UNCTAD), 2011.

24 Jing Zhao, Shan Wang and Wilfred V Huang, ‘A Study of B2B e-Market in China: E-Commerce Process Perspective’. Information & Management, 45 no. 4 (2008): 242-248.

Science&Technology

Missing Links

Crime Prevention, IT, and the Case for Trilateral Cooperation Jeffrey Avina Academia has often played a lead role in crime prevention at the policy level. Academic think tanks and university programs dedicated to sociology, law, criminology, and related social sciences provide the most rigorous and reliable assessments of public performance in this arena. They are the principal means of identifying ineffective policies and setting new policy directions in crime prevention. Civil society at large and government policy makers often rely on academia for objective performance assessments and policy prescriptions based on societal trends and local and global best-case practices.

The private sector is also a natural partner for the public sector in crime prevention. This reflects both companiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; institutional exposure to criminal predation and crimeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s impact on the corporate bottom line. This natural symmetry of interests has generated many public-private partnerships (PPPs) based on revenue generating business models.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR)-based public-private partnerships in crime prevention have also offered shining examples of success. These, however, are often unheralded and rarely scaled, for reasons that relate to the nature of both institutions. Within the CSR frame, ramping

Jeffrey Avina is Director of Citizenship and Community Affairs Director for Microsoft Middle East and Africa. He has previously served as Director of Operations for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna. His work has focused on crosscutting issues affecting economic growth, effective public administration, good governance, and addressing crime.

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up PPPs by focusing private sector core competencies on cutting edge national, regional, and global criminal threats remains a challenge.

Academia can play a major role in ensuring this interface. It can do so by providing what both other parties lack, which is: • A comprehensive view of the overall policy environment, • A capacity to independently assess performance, and • A natural orientation to publish and present best and worst case practices in order to drive the continuing policy debate.

The challenge for both law enforcement agencies and academia, however, is to effectively promote and sustain PPPs with the private sector. Law enforcement agencies lack experience in engaging corporations, and as a result, are often ineffective at attracting necessary interest, resources, and commitment. Academia is often no more adept at this in the crime prevention area. If a trilateral paradigm in the crime prevention space is to be realized, academics will need to think more creatively about how they can function as both a relationship broker between the public and private sectors and as a direct advocate of operational engagement on the cutting edge of crime enforcement. The examples referred to in this document show instances in which academia has taken this proactive lead and has been overly limited. What is required is a rethink of how academia inserts itself into the policy polemic in a manner that leads with action and not just words. It is one thing to review and assess but it is a completely different matter to drive partnerships to impact.

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This is the cutting edge space where academia must venture.

The Current State of PPPs and Crime Prevention. To date, CSRbased crime prevention PPP’s remain ad hoc in nature and not well scaled at the global or even national level. Much more can be done through formalizing the dialogue space between crime prevention agencies and likely private sector partners and by better collaborating around emerging security threat vectors.

Such a convergence, however, is structurally restrained by the institutional nature and mandates of the public and private sector. Due to jurisdictional and legislative limits, public enforcement agencies are poorly configured to attract the private sector.

They are not uniformly strong in either marketing or public relations, as the nature of their work prioritizes discretion over visibility. On the other hand, the private sector seeks scaleable, highly visible CSR opportunities with limited sustained investments— which the field of crime prevention rarely offers—and shies away from any negative associations or press. As such, crime prevention is rarely a priority area listed by corporations in their CSR portfolios. The most popular areas for CSR activities are community-based support services, principally in health and education.

As a result, many CSR-related PPPs between crime prevention agencies and the private sector are efforts championed by individual leaders. For example, in 2003, Microsoft founder Bill Gates received a personal letter from Sergeant Paul Gillespie of the

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Toronto Police concerning the challenge the police force faced in tackling child pornography and related crime.

In response to this plea, Microsoft designed a software solution known as Child Exploitation Tracking System (CETS) that allows various police units to effectively classify, track, and identify links between indecent material, enabling them to pinpoint owners and uncover child-porn syndicates. To date, CETS has been deployed in over ten countries at a total cost to the company of over $10 million.1 In general, IT companies are a very natural fit for crime-fighting partnerships given the particular vulnerabilities endemic to the sector—all of which

Science&Technology

tion infrastructure including disrupting, compromising, or abusing data contained within cyberspace in order to harm, steal, or defraud. Intrusion has even been reported to be the work of “nation-states intent on acquiring among other things, U.S. military designs.”

Governments have begun to augment their collaboration with the private sector in the areas of online scams and fraud. More than forty governments work with Microsoft in its Security Cooperation Program (SCP), a global initiative that enables the parties involved to share information in order to improve computer incident response processes and user outreach. World-

IT companies are a very natural fit for

crime-fighting partnerships given the particular vulnerabilities endemic to the sector. potentially carry significant reputational and market implications. The Internet has created huge economies of scale for information dissemination. The dark side of such information efficiency, however, is that global criminal elements have become equally effective at using the net, all the while becoming more integrated and more powerful.2 This emerging criminal area, commonly referred to as cyber-crime, includes sabotage, espionage, theft, abuse, fraud, counterfeiting, tax evasion, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, kidnapping, money laundering, child exploitation, cyber-related sex crimes, and terrorism. It also includes “hacking”–direct attacks on informa-

wide, IT companies including CISCO, Google, McAfee, Microsoft, Symantec, Verizon, and Yahoo! engage in hundreds of non-commercial government partnerships that offer schools, communities and individuals with Internet safety training programs and educational literature.3 Some corporate employees volunteer to drive these programs in collaboration with community leaders, teachers, and the police force to deliver content.4 Despite the success of CETS, SCP, and other similar initiatives, public sector actors often lack the incentive or the know-how in driving such engagements to a scale beyond their own jurisdictional frontiers and may be completely content with local

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impact.

the raison dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;etre for policy research per se. After all, internationally recognized Placing Academia Front and universities already provide policy level, Center. Although reaching out experientially-based leadership, and beyond the law enforcement commu- guidance in many areas of the economy. nity is not an immediate instinct for Crime-fighting professionals have a crime professionals, they do have cer- more natural symmetry to policy maktain organizational characteristics that ers and academics. Universities have make them attractive to private sector provided institutional and manageCSR partners. Crime-professionals are ment support to increase the effectivetask and results-oriented. Their success ness of crime fighting on a number of is measured in concrete outcomes sup- occasions. For example, Jesus College ported by solid data tracking of both at Cambridge University has provided trends and incidences. Their train- an annual venue for global experts ing and professional obligation enable (both practitioners and academics) on them to comprehensively scope a prob- information sharing on seminal issues lem, define a response, and pursue a related to economic crime for the past measured and monitored implemen- twenty-eight years at its International tation plan. Moreover, the discipline Symposium on Economic Crime. The crime fighting professionals bring to a benefit of this triangulation is clear task makes them attractive PPP partners given the otherwise less-than-symmetas they tend to deliver upon commit- rical relation between the private and ments in a timely manner. All of these public sector crime-fighters. Without a characteristics guarantee a prospective strong policy umbrella to work under, private sector partner, quantifiable most private sector actors will either shy results for their investment, and the away from the public sector or continue promise of high-profile visibility asso- sporadic, largely un-scaled initiatives. ciated with successful performance. As Analytical work demonstrating the value good as the aforementioned examples added by PPPs supporting public secuare, however, they do not represent rity can help public institutions better the scale required to affect a necessary understand what they have to gain from paradigm shift in how academia plays such collaboration and how to structure in the space of public-private partner- it. Moreover, once the collaboration ships. Academia should lead not only has been engaged, impact assessment in prescriptive policy assessment, but and performance reporting from credalso in driving actual partnerships that ible policy and research organizations put their new theories and approaches can ensure that CSR collaborations can to the test. In short, the question is reach scale and achieve positive spillwhether academia can better harness over effects well beyond jurisdictional the potential of PPPs in the crime pre- boundaries. vention area by driving them. I would Few have taken this extra step towards argue that it should and could. Other- collaboration. Beyond the realm of wise, it takes one step too few in foster- crime prevention, however, there are ing actual impact, which is purportedly illustrative examples that serve to dem-

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onstrate the vast benefits of such a union in which academic institutes have ventured directly into operational space.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University has married his role as economist/development practitioner to that of an active driver of PPPs. As the founder of the Earth Institute, and the Special Advisor to the UN SecretaryGeneral on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Professor Sachs drives over $100 million in local project activities in Africa to prove his theories of local development.5 His work begs the question: Given the dearth of actors who can drive scale-able partnerships in the crime prevention area, why does academia not do more? Given that lead research institutions already drive significant components of the policy discussion, supporting the development of operational responses and partnerships for crime prevention is a logical evolution. Moreover, a more active engagement with the private sector will ensure that academia is better aware of the threats facing corporations as well as the tools that they may bring to the fore to encourage a collaborative response to the constantly evolving threat of organized crime.

The natural power of academia in this space can easily be expanded to include the private sector. Forums, both live and virtual, can be used to drive innovative new partnerships on a significantly larger scale than currently exist. This could in turn lead to a very virtuous engagement wherein the corporate sector sees augmented value in direct investment in academia on the operational, and not just the policy, side of the fence. To achieve strong, sustainable, and impactful partner-

Science&Technology

ships, both academia and law enforcement agencies need to tailor requests for private sector support to reflect core private sector competencies and strategic interests. IT firms, for example, are keenly interested in ensuring that the products they bring to the market are relevant and forward-looking. Many IT solutions can be easily tailored to productive uses in the public safety space.

Already, fledgling instances of trilateral partnership—most within the IT community for the previously mentioned reasons—have begun to develop and serve as prototypes for measuring the future merit of more institutionalized initiatives.

One such example relates to online child exploitation–a serious and growing problem. By 2008, trade in childsex images was estimated to have surpassed $20 billion.6 An academic-led partnership to attack this problem in the area of forensic technologies was formed between Dr. Hany Farid, Professor of Computer Science at Dartmouth College, and Microsoft. Their collaboration has led to the development of “PhotoDNA”, a system that can produce the equivalent of a human fingerprint for images. In August 2011, U.S. Federal authorities announced charges against seventy-two persons on five continents in connection with an online bulletin board operation that enabled the trading of over 27,000 graphic images of child pornography since 2008. U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder said the prosecution represented the largest of its kind in the United States, where forty-three suspects were arrested.7 Law enforcement agencies are aware that the use of PhotoDNA technology will significantly

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augment the breadth and impact of this work in the future.

Similarly, The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University presents an excellent case of an institution that is effectively engaged with the private and public sectors at the policy and the operational level in a manner that does not threaten its independence. Faculty and collaborators actively engage with a wide spectrum of Internet issues, including governance, privacy, intellectual property, antitrust, content control, and electronic commerce. Their “Herdict Web,” for example, uses crowd sourcing to learn about and present a real time view of the experiences of net users around the globe. Herdict Web aggregates reports of inaccessible sites, allowing users to compare data to see if inaccessibility is a shared problem. This system democratizes information sharing and moves information on website censorship to real time in the most transparent manner possible.8

augment opportunities to expand the partnerships between crime-fighting agencies and the private sector. This leads to the question of how academia can fill this breach. Given sensitivities related to brand and consumer perception that characterize the private sector, academia can provide a clear added value.

PPPs for crime prevention, and associated CSR work, require a sustained four-step cycle to be effective.9 These steps are: Dialogue, Demand, Design, and Dissemination. All four steps are critical components of a healthy, longterm partnership.

Dialogue. Given the insular nature of crime-prevention work, a proactive “partnership interface” towards the private sector is required. Crime prevention agencies and the private sector need more venues to explore areas of mutual interest where core private sector competencies can augment public sector crime prevention work. What is needed are fertile, independent, Academia and an Open and sustained spaces at the policy and Exchange Market Place: The technical level where crime prevenFour D’s. The above listing of PPP tion agencies and the private sector can activities is just the beginning of what match security and crime prevention can be done. While crime fighting needs creatively to private sector core agencies and private sector entities competencies. The Family On-line can both benefit by prioritizing crime Safety Institute (FOSI), for example, prevention-related PPPs, neither has excels at creating venues for this interpushed for added scale. As noted, this change. For example, its March 2012 is not surprising. The stark differences regional event in Qatar has promoted in organizational structure and moti- a dialogue between government, acavating influences make corporations demia, and the private sector to create and crime fighting agencies somewhat an Arabia-wide portal for best practices strange bedfellows. for Internet safety and security.

Given the extent of the challenge and Within this frame, academia needs the importance of real-time response to think more creatively about how it to real-time threats, there is a need to can package an offer to both the private

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sector and law enforcement agencies as a “relationship broker” and a neutral determinant of on-ground impact.

While this function is perhaps outside the traditional academic role, it is just one operational step removed from policy guidance. It is also, arguably, the “professional stretch” that is required to ensure a new paradigm for academia-brokered, private sector engagement with public safety institutions.

Science&Technology

question was co-sponsored by FOSI, the ICT Qatar, Microsoft, and Google.

Arguably, the return on investment to the private sector from policy-led, operationally-oriented engagements driving concrete PPP interfaces could easily exceed any other form of corporate giving to the academic world in the law enforcement space.

Design. If the presumption that academia can help pinpoint the most proDemand. Dialogue content needs to ductive areas of private-public interface be clearly targeted towards the problems is true, then it is even more the case that the crime prevention agency currently academia can help identify new PPPs face and regarding why companies’ spe- and fine tune the content and design of cific core competencies are relevant ongoing ones. Academia has the instifor PPP. Corporations are designed to tutional capacity to conduct rigorous respond to demand. A clear “ask” will assessments of ongoing partnerships best enable a company to determine if and to extrapolate from them a road it or its partners have the competen- map that can lead to greater impact and cies necessary to respond. In terms of scale. This is the basic philosophy of the impact, there is no better interface Berkman Institute referenced above. for academia than to help define this Even they, however, have only begun to content. Yet, policy research driving scratch the surface of effective partneroperational content focus for PPP’s in ships. this area is sorely lacking. The challenge No matter what the sector, innovatherefore is to identify what institu- tions of this nature are far less likely to tional practices can be put in place to happen without academic engagement. ensure this tripartite engagement.

Rigorous analysis of ongoing PPPs, duly As a start, more directive research incorporating recommendations for oriented towards linking problem iden- improvements in design, could take this tification to technical solutions must be work to the next level and help the priprioritized. In this context, academia- vate sector see the value in a sustained led, hands-on “black hat” style forums CSR investment. Academic support to where policy and research can help building the case, clarify the breadth guide effective interplay between public of application and assessing actual perand private sector actors interested in formance become critical in assuring a crime prevention in designated sec- private sector investment in such cases. tors would be of great value.10 While academic integrity and independence Dissemination. Once solutions are must be kept to the fore, perhaps such developed and implemented, sustained events could be at least co-financed by campaigns are required to broaden the private sector.11 The FOSI event in their utilization. One of the fastest ways

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to kill public-private partnerships is for private sector actors to see their investments are under-utilized and visibility and impact lowered as a result.

For reasons previously noted, public sector agencies have a spotty track record of dissemination. Public relations and marketing for CSR-style solutions in the private sector often fare no better.

For PPP collaborations that are not commercial propositions, a different form of dissemination and visibility is required. Third party attribution is the future in driving internal and external visibility for CSR. Academic attribution for solidly performing CSR PPPs could set a new standard, driving CSR commitments in this segment. Dr. Sachs and his team at the Earth Institute lead

lent venue to foster this outcome. Partnership opportunities and joint initiatives between the public, private, and academic communities should thus be forthcoming given the interest of all three parties in seeing greater visibility to work in this sphere.

Conclusion. The ground for PPPs between corporations and crime prevention agencies is truly rich. Academia can provide policy guidance, contribute neutral and scientific impact assessments, and pinpoint new areas of prospective collaboration. It can also bring attention to successful results and disseminate information on successful collaborative efforts that increase visibility and scale for ongoing part-

The academic world has a unique and powerful opportunity to lead and broker PPPs in a manner that can help solve serious social problems in a creative format. the way in this field. They effectively combine research, reporting, public relations (PR), and attribution to their PPPs in a manner that demonstrates the impact of joint investments and clearly shows the value added by private sector engagement.

Conferences, training events, research, studies, and creative use of the public media all support taking a solution and a partnership to scale.12 Academic institutions provide an excel-

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nerships. Both visibility and scale help cement private sector commitment for future engagement while reinforcing a sustainable long term partnership.

Thus, the academic world has a unique and powerful opportunity to lead and broker PPPs in a manner that can help solve serious social problems in a creative format. This in turn enables companies to demonstrate their global commitment as corporate citizens.

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Science&Technology

NOTES

1 “Tool Thwarts Online Child Predators,” Internet, http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2005/apr05/04-07CETS.mspx (date accessed: 26 March 2012).

2 Microsoft, Microsoft Security Intelligence Report 11, (Redmond, VA, 2011).

3 Often, these companies partner through organizations such as the National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA-U.S.), the Family Online Safety Institute (FOSI), and the Internet Watchers Foundation (IWF – UK). Verizon, among others, helped develop the Safer Internet Alliance to support additional corporate collaboration in this area. The Safe Internet Alliance was officially launched in 2009; Source: “Mission, Goals, and Principles,” Internet, http:// www.safeinternet.org/about/mission-goals-principles (date accessed: 27 August 2011).

4 Private companies are occasionally requested to support national efforts to fight cyber-crime.

Microsoft worked with the Nigerian Government, the Council of Europe, UNODC, Interpol, the FBI and others to organize a Cyber-Crime Summit for West Africa in Abuja, Nigeria in December 2010. In Egypt, Turkey, and Romania where online crime is a relatively new and growing phenomenon, the Council of Europe partners with Microsoft to conduct training for the judiciary, detailing how cyber-crimes are committed, and how criminals can be prosecuted, by demonstrating the most effective methodologies for obtaining evidence; Source: “West Africa Takes Lead in Fighting 419 Scams,” Internet, http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/emea/presscentre/pressreleases/ WAFightScams-02122010.mspx (date accessed: 27

August 2011).

5 Millennium Villages, About Millennium Promise, Internet, http://www.millenniumvillages.org/ (date accessed: 26 August 2011).

6 Frank Walker, “How police broke net pedophile ring,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 March 2008.

7 Kevin Johnson, “Feds charge 72 people in international online child sex ring,” USA Today, 3 August 2011.

8 Herdict Web: The Verdict of the Herd, Internet, www.Herdict.org (date accessed: 26 August 2011).

9 Jeffrey Avina, “Public-private partnerships in the fight against crime: An emerging frontier in corporate social responsibility,” Journal of Financial Crime 18, no. 3 (2011): 282-291.

10 The Black Hat Conference first began in 1997 and has since evolved into the most important technical security conference series in the world.

An estimated 6,500 digital experts and professionals including representatives of federal agencies and corporations along with hackers were present at the August 2011 conference in Las Vegas. Briefings cover various topics including reverse engineering, identity and privacy, and hacking.

11 The Berkman Institute appears to have set the precedent for financial support in this regard.

Their particular funding, which includes donations from both public foundations and the private sector, ensures they retain their independence whilst enabling a robust engagement with, (and in parallel to) the private sector in policy, legality and operational spheres.

12 Council of Europe, Global Project on Cybercrime: Final Report, (Strasbourg, France, 2009).

Summer/Fall 2012 [ 1 7 1 ]

Books Whither Arab Awakening?

Review by Joshua W. Walker Kenneth M. Pollack and others. The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2011. 381 pp. $26.95.

Joshua W. Walker is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States based in Washington, D.C.

Complete list of contributors: Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman, Akram Al-Turk, Pavel K. Baev, Miachel S. Doran, Khaled Elgindy, Stephen R. Grand, Shadi Hamid, Bruce Jones, Suzanne Maloney, Jonathan D. Pollack, Bruce O. Reidel, Ruth Hanau Santini, Salman Shaikh, Ibrahim Sharqieh, Omer Taspinar, Shibley Telhami, and Sarah E. Yerkes.

Co-authored or edited books rarely have the coherent narrative thread or the voice to leave a lasting impression with readers. Similarly, full-length books on fundamental changes or ongoing events in the international system rarely endure beyond the time of the happenings being covered.

As a result, the publication of The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East by eighteen authors connected to the Saban Center on Middle East Studies of the Brookings Institution would at first glance appear to be an ambitious task. Refreshingly, not only is the book a good read, but it is also a valuable contribution to a proliferating genre of think Summer/Fall 2012 [ 1 7 3]

WHITHER ARAB AWAKENING?

tank books that combines area expertise and analytical thinking.

Think tanks in Washington, D.C. are notorious for putting out policy reports and prescriptive handouts that often appear only to scratch the surface of important international events, given the short attention span of policy makers. Conversely, academics of regional politics tend to dive deep into the issues, sometimes losing sight of the all-important question, “So what?”

Journalists often describe unfolding events without the timeline or analytical frame that informs academic writing.

The Arab Awakening manages to combine the best practices of each of these distinct writing styles. It is a fitting exemplar for the future of policy oriented research. The chapters touch on most of the key issues raised by the Arab Spring and offer a refreshing level of analytical depth, capturing the nuance of the issues at play while avoiding the minute details, which would only be of interest to specialists.

The shortcomings of this volume are those one would expect when studying a region as complicated and heterogeneous as the Middle East. At first glance the region seems easy to group as being mostly Arab and all Muslim. In reality, non-Arab powers are predominant given the overarching dysfunction of the region. While Islam is the main religion, the Middle East is also the cradle of the Abrahamic faiths of Christianity and Judaism. In addition, the region is riven by differences between the Sunni and Shiite traditions—not to mention Alevi and Sufi variants. Specialists of the Arab world and Middle East politics will inevitably be disappointed by specific sections in this book, since the short

[ 1 74 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

chapters do not allow the authors to cover the entire breadth of the topics or dwell on specifics. For example, while entire books, such as Ashraf Khalil’s Liberation Square and Steven Cook’s Struggle for Egypt, have been written about the most significant revolution in the Arab world, The Arab Awakening features only a nine-page chapter by Shadi Hamid on Egypt. These chapters do provide, however, useful introductions to each topic, brought into a conversation with one another in a way that few books have been able to accomplish. Specialists of the Arab world, for example, can learn from the specific chapters on each Arab state along with those on Israel, Iran, Turkey, or other external powers such as China, Europe, Russia, and the United States.

Thanks to the collective affiliation and experience of the Saban Center, the narrative arc sets the tone from the beginning of The Arab Awakening: “We wanted to provide an overview of the Arab Spring, the dynamics driving it, and what these dynamics suggest for the future. We wanted to explore the events in each of the various states of the region and how they are interacting.”1 While the organizational structure is unorthodox, with over thirty-six chapters organized in six sections of both single and co-authored pieces that can be read as a whole or a la carte, somehow it works. The introduction is the longest chapter in the book, as it explains the flow of the volume.

While the chapters are not directly connected, each one answers a specific set of overarching questions and engages in an emerging dialogue with the other chapters. For example, discussions of the broader phenomenon

WALKER

of Islamic-oriented parties mobilizing in the aftermath of the revolutions stretch through Egypt’s experience with the Muslim brotherhood to Yemen and into Turkey, each building on the prior case study. As a result, some chapters read as short as six pages and raise broad and pertinent questions in a relatively small space, an unusual undertaking that showcases the depth of knowledge possessed by the Saban Center scholars.

The nine permanent fellows of the Saban Center who collectively framed the intellectual architecture of this book open the first section with general topics regarding the “Dynamics of the Arab Spring.” The authors offer varying perspectives on how functional issues such as public opinions, new media, terrorism, Islamists, economies, militaries, and democratization interacted with the events unfolding in 2011. By setting the tone early without diving into individual case studies or countries, the book charts a more manageable course than some of the overly ambitious chapter and section titles might suggest. The first section is the most unified and thought-provoking part of the book. While it might be common to read about the “Arab Facebook and Twitter revolutions” in the press, books and policy reports have been much slower in adapting to such innovative social media platforms. For example, the “Impact of New Media” chapter features stories of Egyptian activists and victims that resulted in what the author describes as a “smart mob” while questioning the future of the internet as being the “great liberator” of the Arab spring. The collective quality and analytical depth given to commonly misunderstood concepts, such as democra-

Books

tization and Islamism in the aftermath of the Arab awakenings, is especially noteworthy.

The remainder of the book is grouped into analytical categories such as “Countries in Transition,” “The Imperative of Reform,” “States in Crisis,” “Other Regional Actors,” and finally “The External Powers,” yet each of these sections is not equally treated. Greater space and attention from country-experts is devoted to the “Countries in Transition” section on Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Palestine. Inevitable cutting and shortchanging occur in the shorter chapters of The Arab Awakening.

While a casual reader can gain tremendously from the insights in this volume, some of the case studies suffer from a lack of attention. For example, section four, “States in Crisis,” analyzes only Yemen and Syria. While these two cases have been in the headlines, there has been little clarity or narrative that has stuck to either country or regime in question, resulting in an analysis that is unavoidably speculative. Furthermore, the dynamic fluidity of the situation on the ground ensures that the data used for the chapters will be outdated before the book’s publication.

Perhaps the most interesting sections are the “Imperative of Reform” and “Other Regional Actors.” In the ”Imperative of Reform,” Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates), Bahrain, Morocco, and Algeria are grouped together under the assumption that they all need to reform lest they face their own respective “springs.” Given the variance between monarchies as diverse

Summer/Fall 2012 [ 1 7 5]

WHITHER ARAB AWAKENING?

as Morocco and Saudi Arabia and the unique characteristics of republics like Algeria, the simplicity of the concept is attractive, yet impossible to apply in practice. More attention to framing these cases, along with explaining more cogently the “imperative of reform,” is necessary before it can reach the potential that the section asserts. As stated in the introduction, agreement among all of the book’s authors on a single overarching imperative would be impossible. The “Other Regional Actors” section accurately captures the nuances of non-Arab players Israel, Iran, and

gests a West-leaning analytical bias. The fact that the Kurds are barely mentioned throughout the text is a further point for discussion, along with the treatment of Europe as an external power. Europe is considered independent of Turkey, and a more state-centered approach to developments is prioritized over the transatlantic component of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or regional institutions like the Arab League. Finally, American interests are referenced throughout and almost appear homogenous and monolithic as if they can be defined without domestic

Drawing strength from a hybrid approach of re-

gional expertise and critical thinking, this volume should serve as a new foundation for policy-research.

Turkey in the “Arab Spring,” yet it also leaves much to be desired, given its quick treatment of a subject that warrants its own book. Pointing to many issues and raising many questions about these regional actors without adequately answering or connecting the dots makes this one of the weakest sections.

In comparison to the final section on “The External Powers,” which includes Europe, Russia, China, and a chapter on International Order, the regional actors sections is conspicuously short.

The limited attention and compartmentalization of regional non-Arab players such as Israel, Iran, and Turkey, which are shaping developments more significantly than traditional great powers or international organizations, sug-

political considerations.

The Arab Awakenings’ major strength is the scope of analysis and approachability that makes it a must-read for students, along with members of the general public who are curious about the events that have shaped the Middle East over the last year. Unlike most policy volumes, The Arab Awakening does not try to predict the way ahead, nor to offer specific policy recommendations, rather it hints and points towards the trends that it outlines. Drawing strength from a hybrid approach of regional expertise and critical thinking, this volume should serve as a new foundation for policy research.

NOTES

1 Kenneth Pollack and others, The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2011), xi.

[ 1 76 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

A Look Back Artificial Intelligence Reform

Social Amnesia and the Intelligence Community Paul R. Pillar When I started working in the U.S. intelligence community in 1977, the global U.S.-Soviet competition known as the Cold War dominated discourse on American foreign policy.

Leonid Brezhnev was in charge at the Kremlin, Washington and Moscow were sparring over the terms of arms control agreements, and the two superpowers were using proxies to fight for influence in conflicts throughout the less developed world. But the component in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that I joined for my first assignment was examining other issues. My own initial projects addressed the global trade in conventional arms and the prospects of regional security in â&#x20AC;&#x153;Third Worldâ&#x20AC;? countries. Some of my colleagues were studying international terrorism, which at the time was receiving almost no public attention in the United States.

American experts on international terrorism outside of the government could be counted on the fingers of one hand.

Other analysts were scrutinizing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, with particular attention to Pakistan, where in the previous year, nuclear entrepreneur A.Q. Khan had returned with the stolen technology that would make him rich and infamous. Still other colleagues were analyzing ethnic separatism, with a particular focus on Kurdish national-

Paul R. Pillar has been a Visiting Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University since retiring in 2005 from a twentyeight year career with the Central Intelligence Agency and National Intelligence Council. His latest book is Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform.

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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM

ism. The papers they wrote, if dug out of whatever dusty file in which they now lie, would provide valuable insights on the ethnic conflict that is part of the instability that afflicts Iraq today.

None of these aforementioned areas of study are part of today’s common conception of what the CIA was addressing three decades ago. Instead, the popular notion held is that intelligence work during the Cold War was all about the Cold War and all about the USSR—all of the time. Commentary abounds about “new” post-Cold War issues such as terrorism and weapons proliferation. In actuality the only thing new about these topics is the amount of commentary afforded to them. Neither the issues themselves nor the need for intelligence to address them is new.

The actual intelligence work on such issues is similarly timeworn, although the amount of attention to any one issue has changed—as to some degree it should—to conform to shifts in policymakers’ priorities.

The mistaken notion that the intelligence community in the past was focused exclusively on Cold War issues stems largely from the frequent tendency to project our own inattention onto government agencies. Because we, the American public, were paying almost no attention to international terrorism in the 1970s and tended to think about foreign policy simply as a U.S.-Soviet contest, we mistakenly assume the intelligence community had the same perspective.

Collective amnesia also applies to some issues that were a focus of public attention. A good example is energy security and dependence on foreign oil.

This issue became a major concern in

[ 1 78 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

the 1970s because embargoes by Middle Eastern producers, spikes in the price of crude oil, and panicky reactions to both affected Americans directly, most visibly in the form of retail shortages and long lines at gasoline stations.

When I joined the CIA, the agency was doing a great deal of work on energy matters—very little of it related to the Cold War. But generations succeed one another, and decades fade into history.

I have to remember this when speaking about these topics to my students, for whom the gas lines of the 1970s are no more a part of personal experience than bread shortages in eighteenth century France.

Mistaken perceptions about the topics U.S. intelligence has covered, or not covered, through the years are just one part of a broader tendency to exaggerate the newness of almost every issue about intelligence. Commentary and debate about techniques for collecting information, methods of analyzing it, and the best way to organize intelligence agencies usually are phrased as if these questions took shape only in the last several years. The need to “get beyond a Cold War way of doing business” has become a slogan that is chanted repeatedly with very little explanation of exactly how any one intelligence method or organizational structure is more Cold War-like than any other. Little attention is paid to what the intelligence community has already tried and been doing, often for many years, or to the reasons it has not been doing more of something that may seem like a good idea to an inexperienced outsider. The intelligence community has been around the track, at least once and often several times, with almost every supposedly innovative idea

PILLAR

regarding better ways to do its business.

Consider the favorite variety of reform in Washington: reorganization.

The legislation that redrew the top of the intelligence communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s organization chart in 2004 has had less effect on the day-to-day work of intelligence officers than many reorganizations that intelligence agencies have initiated themselves. The CIA, for example, has a long history of creating, abolishing, merging, or separating its directorates, offices, divisions, and centers. One of the more sweeping reorganizations occurred in the early 1980s, when the entire analytical side of the agency was morphed suddenly from a disciplinebased to a largely region-based office structure. It would be difficult to come up with any organizational idea involv-

A Look Back

zation that it is today. The imagery that some of those satellites have produced has been used by photo-interpretation offices at the CIA and elements within the Defense Department, which through another series of reorganizations became the present National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Now consider techniques for the collection of human intelligence. Especially since 9/11, a cascade of commentary and criticism has urged the CIA to adopt ostensibly novel, post-Cold War collection techniques, particularly involving the use of non-official cover for its own officers as well as the utilization of people with needed language skills and access to foreign cultures who might not be suitable for security clearances as full-service staff officers.

The intelligence community has been

around the track with almost every supposedly innovative idea regarding better ways to do business. ing the structure of the CIA that has not already been tried at least once.

A similar history prevails in the rest of the intelligence community. The Defense Intelligence Agency has probably been even quicker to reorganize than the CIA. As an intelligence officer who often did business with that agency, I soon gave up any hope of having a usable directory or organization chart of the DIA because any that were issued quickly became out of date. Another intelligence agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, has evolved from an amalgam of elements from the CIA, Air Force, and Navy to the more unified satellite-management organi-

Again, none of this is new. The use of non-official cover officers (NOCs), who have no visible connection to the U.S. government, has been a particular focus of attention for many years.

Any limitations on the use of NOCs have not occurred because the agencies involved have been impervious to changes in collection techniques, and certainly not because no one inside those agencies had thought enough about the idea. Rather, their use represents a major drain on resources when all of the requirements for maintaining a good cover story are taken into account, rendering NOCs an ofteninefficient method of collection. They

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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM

frequently do not help discover needed information such as the plans of terrorist groups.

The same goes for analytic techniques. Here the common refrains in recent years have been—largely in response to the sordid issue of Iraqi weapons programs—the need for intelligence analysts to question assumptions, to consider alternative hypotheses, to evaluate sources of information rigorously, to distinguish analysis clearly from facts, and to eliminate “groupthink.” To any analyst who worked in an agency such as the CIA at any time during at least the last thirty years, these concepts are so familiar as to be almost clichés. There is hardly a profession that is more methodologically introspective than intelligence analysis, as reflected in the plethora of training courses, many of them mandatory, that officers take. One particularly comprehensive training regimen in analytic techniques that the CIA developed during the 1990s, called Tradecraft 2000, was administered to everyone from the most junior analyst to the head of the entire analytical directorate. When intelligence products fail to reflect sound principles of analysis it is not because no one thought to create the relevant courses and instill such principles into the workforce. It is because in the real world of short deadlines and political pressures what is absorbed in the classroom does not always get applied rigorously in practice. That has been true for many years, and it will continue to be a challenge to intelligence managers in the future.

The manager’s challenge of coaxing the right sounds out of an orchestra of analysts is an old and recurring

[ 1 8 0] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

story. When Robert Gates was running analysis at the CIA a quarter century ago, he propounded many of the same themes heard much more recently in criticism of intelligence analysis. He especially emphasized the practice of distinguishing analytic judgments from factual information. Analysts quickly discovered during Gates’ reign that the safest and easiest way of making this distinction was to start any sentence containing a judgment with the phrase “we believe,” resulting in some of the clumsiest and most stilted prose ever to come out of the intelligence community. Gates’ lack of experience at most levels of management in the directorate he led contributed to this inability to anticipate how the working levels would respond to diktats from above.

Over time, the rough edges of the analysts’ responses to Gates’ orders were smoothed out while the sound principle of identifying what is or is not a fact were preserved. Yet, anyone who lived through this phase of the CIA’s history feels an urge to roll eyes when hearing discussions of the “facts vs. analysis” issue as if it had only recently become a topic of analytic tradecraft.

Some other pathologies of intelligence analysis that have been the focus of recent controversies also have historical precursors. One is politicization. This problem—and especially the tendentious public use of intelligence by the administration of the day to justify a policy—reached an extreme with the selling of the Iraq war, but some aspects of even this episode were foreshadowed by earlier controversies. For intelligence officers of my generation, the closest thing to the stultifying, oneway policy environment that prevailed

PILLAR

during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq was the eagerness in the Reagan administration of the 1980s to find the hand of Moscow in almost every bit of mayhem around the world. The discomfort of CIA analysts who were directed before the Iraq War to prepare a paper that assembled all reports that could possibly connect Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaeda mirrored

A Look Back

this late stage in his career the potential for politicization to be a problem was certainly less than when he was a young CIA deputy director who owed much of his meteoric rise to the patronage of the most ideological of all CIA directors, William Casey. The failure to address politicization in the 1980s, however, was one more instance of collective amnesia about important intelligence-

The national trauma from 9/11 has made counterter-

rorism the subject of much of the misperception of newness about intelligence issues. the angst of analysts two decades earlier who were told to craft literature that made the case that the USSR was behind the attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II in 1981.

Gates, who ordered the paper about the attempted assassination of the pope, was at the middle of the politicization issue in the 1980s. The issue was one reason that his initial nomination to become Director of Central Intelligence was withdrawn, and that after his second nomination to the post he was confirmed only in the face of thirtythree negative votes in the Senate. The other, even more prominent issue that dogged him was his possible role in the Iran-Contra affair. When President George W. Bush nominated Gates in 2006 to be Secretary of Defense, however, all was forgotten. Senators praised his qualifications (one of the principal ones being that he was not Donald Rumsfeld) and confirmed his nomination by a vote of ninety-five to two. The old controversies about Gates did not necessarily mean he was a poor choice to be secretary of defense. At

related issues of the past that can provide perspective when similar issues arise in the future.

The national trauma from 9/11 has made counterterrorism the subject of much of the misperception of newness about intelligence issues. Americans could not believe that their government would allow something so horrible to happen to them unless it came from a threat so novel that no one, including specialists within the government itself, had been aware of it. Here, Americans were not only again projecting their own inattention onto their government but also, as with energy security, forgetting past concerns shared by the public.

Notwithstanding rhetoric about a “war on terror” having begun only after 9/11, terrorism has been a prominent public issue at various other times in the nation’s history. The most recent such time prior to 9/11 was in the 1980s, when a succession of bombings and kidnappings by Lebanese Hezbollah that claimed American victims brought the issue to the fore.

The core of the apparatus still used

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for applying intelligence to the fight against terrorism was established during that decade. In 1986 the CIA created a Counterterrorist Center (CTC), which broke all sorts of bureaucratic crockery by moving collectors, analysts, trainers, technicians, and other types of counterterrorist officers into a single component to work side by side. Although initially staffed largely by CIA officers, the Center also provided the structure in subsequent years for integrating increasing numbers of personnel from other departments and agencies.

The creation of the CTC was easily the most important and effective reform ever enacted involving intelligence and counterterrorism. It responded directly to the perennial objective, still voiced frequently today, of breaking down barriers to communication and cooperation across different organizations. And yet—because this occurred more than twenty years ago, while the Cold War was still being waged, and does not fit the popular story line of needing to adjust to supposedly new post-Cold War realities—it seems to be all but forgotten.

I joined the CTC in 1993 and worked there for six years, first as chief of analysis and then as deputy chief of the Center. My principal contribution to the development of the Center, and perhaps the single most important and long-lasting accomplishment of my intelligence career, was the establishment of a permanent cadre of counterterrorist analysts who could spend their entire careers working on terrorism.

This made possible for the first time the development of expertise that comes only from long-term commitment to such a topic.

[ 1 8 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

The 1990s also saw major strides in enhancing inter-agency cooperation.

The critical relationship between the CIA and FBI improved enormously during this decade. When I was the CTC’s deputy chief I actually was one of two deputies, the other being a senior FBI special agent who occupied the office next to mine. When I presented briefings in the mid-1990s to leaders of the aviation industry and policymakers in the Department of Transportation about the foreign jihadist threat to transportation and especially civil aviation within the United States, it was as part of a team that included counterparts from the FBI. This would be quite a revelation to those who have only heard commentary asserting that before 9/11 the CIA and FBI were not talking to each other and that neither one was warning of the jihadist terrorist threat.

Americans’ lack of awareness of all this important history is partly due to general reasons that also apply to non-intelligence topics. Memories and attention spans are short, and we tend to think of issues of national policy in terms of four-year presidential election cycles. Americans are less historically informed and aware than most other nationalities with comparable economic and educational levels. Surveys have repeatedly demonstrated this, such as a recent one in which only one quarter of Americans knew that the United States achieved its independence from Great Britain. Another reason is the selfinterest of commentators in playing up the supposed novelty of their proposals and criticisms. Touting what seems like a bright new idea sells; patiently explaining what is not really new does not.

PILLAR

Other reasons for the lack of awareness are more specific to intelligence.

One is the necessarily secret nature of much of the intelligence business, which limits public understanding, even if it does not slow pundits on the outside. Another is the unrealistically inflated expectation placed on intelligence. We want to believe that, if working well, the mechanisms in place will save the nation from surprise, folly, and disaster. We are reluctant to delve very deeply into the history of what the intelligence community has tried in the past, because we would like to believe there must be something still untried

A Look Back

and we can indulge in foreign policies that unrealistically assume perfect information about the outside world.

All of these costs have been in evidence in the organizational changes made to the intelligence community in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

After that horror, the public demand for reform was understandable and inescapable. Reorganization satisfied this innate desire for the time being, but in the absence of good new ideas it did not necessarily make Americans any safer. Establishment, for example, of an office of Director of National Intelligence, itself an old idea, has

Collective amnesia about intelligence taxes the efficacy of the mechanisms in place to protect the American people. that, once implemented, will finally overcome all previous problems and enable the inflated expectations to be met.

Collective amnesia about intelligence taxes the efficacy of the mechanisms in place to protect the American people.

One cost is that it encourages change for the sake of changeâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;reinventing wheels and disregarding experiencebased lessons on why some things do not work as well in practice as they might as a concept. At best this involves some wasted motion and disruption. At worst it makes intelligence less capable.

With most of the good ideas already tried, further change may mean reverting to some not-so-good ones. Probably the most serious cost is perpetuation of the notion that if we can just find the right fix to intelligence then uncertainty will be a thing of the past

mainly just added an additional layer of bureaucracy to the agencies and centers that already exist. A good indication of how things have gone in circles occurred with the attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner in December 2009, which came close to being the most lethal terrorist incident in the United States since 9/11.

The recriminations after this incident, about dots not being connected and different strands of information not being woven together, were a replay of those heard after 9/11. Only the names of the agencies and offices that were the targets of the accusations differ. While critiques of these groups and the focal points of popular ire change with shifting media attention, the inherent challenges of collection and analysis that the intelligence community has always faced do not.

Summer/Fall 2012 [ 1 83]

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A Look Back

My Time on the Line

Examining the Afghan–Pakistan Border as a Factor in Counterinsurgency Robert Kemp This article will examine the geographic, security, social, and commercial aspects of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area.

It will focus on the period from 2004 to 2009 in Regional Command-East (RC-East), which covered the border from Paktika province in the south to Nuristan in the north.1 It will specifically analyze the security steps taken by the Afghan government to secure its border, how the U.S. government supported this effort, where and how political-military cooperation with Pakistani forces took place, how the policies and actions of Pakistan’s security forces and government affected counterinsurgency efforts in RC-East during this period, and what lessons were learned.

A Regional Overview. Seen from the air, or even up close on the ground, the location of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in RC-East is often difficult to determine. While the Spin Ghar mountains between Nangarhar province and Kurram Agency provide a clear dividing line, other places exhibit more arbitrary demarcation through low, rugged hills, easily crossed via countless paths and jeep tracks. The predominant ethnic group is the Pash-

Robert Kemp is a U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Officer and a Dean Rusk Fellow at Georgetown University. From 2007 to 2008, he served as the political advisor to the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in eastern Afghanistan and as the deputy director of the Provincial Reconstruction Team section. From 2004 to 2005, he was the political advisor to the Task Force covering Regional Command–East, based out of Khost, Afghanistan.

Any views expressed herein are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. government.

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tuns, who are divided by the border, and themselves split into numerous tribes and sub-tribes. Despite significant modernization, Pashtun society remains very traditional and conservative in many areas. Light and medium weapons are abundant, particularly after the serial wars of the last decades. Close to the border, the population tends to consist of “fence sitters,” waiting to see which side—the Afghan government and its backers, or the insurgents—will prevail before becoming allied.

The Afghan Border Police (ABP) was responsible for border security, including the countering of smug-

[ 1 8 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

gling, drug trafficking, and the infiltration of insurgents. In the east (ABP Zone 2), the ABP was assigned an endstrength goal of 4,200 men to control the border and a zone 50 kilometers into Afghanistan, with a planned initial training period of 8 weeks at the Regional Training Centers. The U.S. Army’s 173rd brigade based out of Jalalabad began a small program to mentor and train some ABP units in 2007. By October 2008 the more formal Focused Border Development Program was established in RC-East by the U.S. military to provide additional training, equipping, and mentoring.

KEMP

The ABP remained, however, a fairly weak force, hindered to some extent by lack of equipment and training, and seemingly due to its lower priority than the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). It also faced logistical and support challenges at its more remote border posts. Some ABP units were also posted relatively far from the border—in Paktika, the ABP provincial commander at one point kept much of his force in the town of Orgun-E, away from contested border areas.

Informal groups played a security role along the border, particularly early in this period. For example, the 24th Afghan Militia Force in Khost province had several hundred men under arms, although most had been demobilized by 2005 on account of the Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) program, allowing the ANA to increasingly take control. Many tribal groups could organize lightly armed units known as alberkai to carry out specific security tasks for set periods of time. During the elections of 2004 and 2005, these alberkai were often effective in providing local security at polling stations in border provinces, particularly given the limited reach of the army and police at the time. In addition, tribal militias prevented the transit of insurgents through their areas.

During the period from 2004 to 2009, cross-border attacks into Afghanistan were fairly common in Khost, Paktika, Paktia, and Konar provinces, and ranged in size from small groups to those containing upward of fifty fighters. Rocket attacks and the setting of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were also frequent. In contrast,

A Look Back

attacks from Afghanistan into Pakistan were, from my experience, very rare since the insurgents’ objective at this time was to destabilize the Afghan state, assert influence, and in the case of the Taliban, regain power. Arrayed along the Afghan side of the border in 2004 was a thin force of U.S. conventional and special forces, some ANP, and a very limited number of ANA. At the same time, by the spring of 2005, the insurgency began gaining momentum and increasing its numbers, weaponry, and ability to carry out operations.

The United States, in coordination with the Afghan government, established and maintained a string of firebases in the border provinces of RCEast. Many of these were subject to attacks by insurgent forces. From my experience in Khost and Paktika provinces between 2004 and 2005, the attackers at times numbered more than fifty, and were repulsed by small arms, often augmented by artillery and close air support, resulting in considerable enemy casualties. Many were operating from the adjacent North Waziristan agency in Pakistan, where the town of Miram Shah was an insurgent center, according to numerous press reports.2 Despite the high insurgent casualties, attacks using similar tactics were repeated. Some of these attacks may have been training exercises for new recruits, while others may have been used to demonstrate military activity to the insurgents’ backers. An additional factor might have been that overrunning one of these firebases would have been enough of a “win,” particularly in propaganda terms, to judge engagement worth the casualties.

These firebases almost certainly

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hindered attacks further into border provinces and further north by acting as a “magnet” for attackers, while simultaneously making it difficult for large groups to move across the border.

These small bases, however, could not effectively stop infiltration by individual insurgents who (unless they were Arabs, Chechens, or other foreigners) could blend in with the local population and then regroup within Afghanistan. This remains a problem: a U.S. political officer based in Khost in 2010 described the border in that province as a “sieve.”3 Further to the north in the border provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman, Nuristan, and Konar (known as N2KL), several joint U.S.-Afghan checkpoints were operating at major infiltration routes. Similar to Khost, this border was difficult to control due to the rugged terrain, the numerous trails and paths that led to the border, an active insurgency, and a population that acted in the interests of self-preservation while calculating the relative strengths of opposing forces. Posts such as “Checkpoint Delta” were located in natural passes through the mountains where it was easiest for the insurgents to move people and material through.

These outposts served to hinder these flows, collect information, and force insurgents to use more difficult routes.

They were often effective counterinsurgency (COIN) tools.

In N2KL the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funded connector roads and bridges, particularly over the Konar River, leading to the border with Pakistan. These served multiple purposes: increasing the mobility of military forces, pro-

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moting cross-border trade, and serving as farm-to-market roads. They were also intended to “funnel” insurgents into these more easily monitored and controlled routes, while flagging those choosing to instead use more difficult trails and paths as potential insurgents.

To the north, the high mountains of Nuristan made border control quite difficult, but also presented challenges to infiltrating insurgents.

During this period the Border Management Task Force (BMTF) within the U.S. embassy had four core responsibilities: mentor operations, the provision of equipment and infrastructure, coordination of a border control and border security strategies both within the U.S. government and with the Government of Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and along with the European Commission, the coordination of international donors.4 One of the BMTF’s main focuses in RC-East was the crossing at Torkham Gate in Nangarhar Province; it provided mentors to the Afghan Border Police and Afghan Customs and focused on immigration, customs, and inspection and detection methods. Biometrics were only beginning to be implemented by 2008, along with any sort of immigration database—both important programs for counterinsurgency and law enforcement.

Economic Factors of the Border. Local economies in Afghan border provinces had strong commercial ties across the border, with some Pakistani towns acting as market and service hubs for Afghans. Pakistani rupees were used as a parallel currency. While most

KEMP

of this informal trade was benign, there was also considerable smuggling of merchandise, drugs, timber, and gems from Afghanistan into Pakistan. One of the driving factors was the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, originally signed in 1965, and updated in June 2011.5 This agreement allowed some goods to be imported duty-free into Afghanistan for use there, but created a strong incentive to smuggle these items back into Pakistan at a profit. The drug trade also drove cross-border smug-

A Look Back

inspection bays, a nearby ISAF firebase, a trilateral coordination center, and a large, chaotic informal sector of vehicle repair shops, truck stops, gas stations, and food stalls.

On any given day, the traffic of trucks, cars and pedestrians through Torkham was substantial, with perhaps 20,000 people crossing. Customs and transit fees were a potentially rich source of revenue for Kabul, a fact noted by many in the international community who pressed for more efficient

The traditional influence of tribal leaders diminished quickly as insurgents assassinated many of them. gling, with precursor chemicals used to refine drugs coming into Afghanistan, and opium, heroin, and hashish moving in the opposite direction. Although poppy production in RC-East was small relative to southern Afghanistan, in some years Nangarhar had a significant crop, and labs in this province refined raw opium apparently brought from other parts of Afghanistan.

Within RC-East, by far the most important border crossing was Torkham Gate, where the road from Peshawar goes through the Khyber Pass and into Afghanistan, continuing on to Jalalabad, Kabul, and eventually central Asia. Torkham was also one of two major entry points for International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) supplies landed in Karachi. By 2008 infrastructure on the Afghan side of the border crossing had been expanded considerably, with buildings for customs and immigration officials, truck

collection.6 Between 2004 and 2009 it was rumored that some of this money remained in Nangarhar, bolstering the local economy and infrastructure.

Cross-border Cooperation and Multilateral Efforts. The reality of a largely artificial border dividing the Pashtuns, coupled with closely related and linked insurgencies on both sides of the border meant that events in Pakistan had a direct impact on Afghanistan. This and the issue of sanctuaries for various insurgent groups have been well documented by various authors.7 The Frontier Corps traditionally had responsibility for much of the border in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) across from Afghanistan, but by 2002 the Pakistani military (Pakmil) had also become engaged.

Importantly, the traditional influence of tribal leaders diminished quickly as insurgents assassinated many of them;

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the long-standing system of political agents lost a great deal of power. In addition to some military operations, the Pakistani military negotiated peace agreements with insurgents, including the “Shakai agreement,” signed in April 2004 in South Waziristan. This was largely ineffectual, while raising concerns among some U.S. military officers in Afghanistan that it would allow the insurgents to focus on cross border attacks. The Pakmil signed a further agreement with North Waziristan insurgents in September 2006. By 2008, however, the Pakistani military, politicians, and many citizens came to the realization that insurgents presented a threat to the Pakistani state and society, spurring large military operations in South Waziristan, Bajaur, and Swat.

During this period several mechanisms were established to coordinate with Pakistani security forces. Border Coordination Centers (BCCs) were agreed to, with the first built just inside Afghanistan in 2008 at Torkham, and manned by Pakistani, Afghan, and U.S. officers. Looking like fortified Quonset huts, they provided a node intended to exchange information and reduce accidental clashes along the border.

Border flag meetings to establish personal relations at the brigade and battalion levels were held. Frequencies for radio communications were designated so that officers on either side of the border could talk in emergencies. At a higher level, in 2003, the Tripartite Commission was established as “a joint forum on military and security issues which brings together representatives from the NATO-led ISAF operation, Afghanistan and Pakistan.”8 In practice, however, these arrangements were

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far from perfect. Meetings were cancelled for various reasons, radio calls at times went unanswered, agreements were not followed up on, considerable suspicions existed, and national interests clearly did not always coincide.

Nevertheless, putting these channels in place was a necessary step, and at times yielded benefits in terms of preventing accidental firefights and coordinating some operations.

On the political side, some governors maintained informal contacts with their Pakistani counterparts.9 The first “peace jirga” held in August 2007 brought together roughly 700 elders from both countries (a direct result of a September 2006 dinner hosted by U.S. President George Bush for Pervez Musharraf and Hamid Karzai) as an attempt to resolve issues through more traditional methods. Afghans in the border provinces during this period, in my experience, often harbored considerable resentment towards the government of Pakistan (as distinct from Pakistanis) over what they perceived as Pakistan’s fueling of violence in border provinces of Afghanistan. These hard feelings were probably exacerbated by the strong rhetoric of leaders on both sides of the border, blaming each other for security problems.

Lessons Learned. This border is a determining factor in the future of the international community’s programs in governance, security, economic assistance, and narcotics control in both countries. Establishing local governance will remain a challenge, as government officials will continue to be targeted by insurgents, and some civil servants will avoid these postings in

KEMP

favor of safer, more comfortable jobs in Kabul. The local population, already skeptical of the government, may be further intimidated into withholding its support. Elections will be more difficult to hold and more costly due to security overhead. International development projects will continue to face significant security costs, and inter-

A Look Back

A clear lesson-learned from 20042009 is that it is impossible to seal the border. It would be possible, however, to secure many of the important crossings given enough resources, crossborder cooperation, and the will to do so. This would provide a solution that, while not optimal, might be sufficient. A second lesson learned is the

In the long run, the Afghan government will not have sufficient revenue to field the necessary security forces along the border. national experts will be less likely to develop the necessary in-depth knowledge of the border areas. In the long run, the Afghan government will not have sufficient revenue to field the necessary security forces along the border; the international community will need to determine what support levels it will sustain, and donor fatigue may set in.

Finally, one of Afghanistan’s significant economic advantages—its location along trade routes, as well as along potential gas pipeline and electrical power line routes from central Asia—will provide the government less revenue from transit fees and customs revenues if this area remains insecure.

Thus, securing the border along RC-East will remain a daunting task, with many variables and challenges. The rugged terrain, the fact that the Pashtuns live on both sides of a largely artificial dividing line, and the disinclination of the local population to be ruled over or controlled are factors that will not change. The planned drawdown of international troops from Afghanistan will make the border even more fluid.

importance of communications channels between security forces on both sides of the border. These forces are often in close proximity so at a minimum preventing accidental firefights is a priority; effective coordination for common goals is a best-case result.

Technological solutions for partially sealing the border—sensors, camera systems, and fences—will not be effective due to the sheer number of routes across the border, the physical ruggedness of the area, the amount of manpower required to react to alarms, and the volume of people who regularly move between the two countries. Minefields would not be effective for similar reasons. They would result in considerable civilian casualties and the death of livestock, and would be unpopular in Afghanistan, which still has millions of landmines laid by the Soviets.

High-tech aerial surveillance, including aerostats, has positively changed the equation, but still requires resources to analyze data and react to alerts. In almost all cases, cross-border strikes by soldiers will be counterproductive

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given the predictable negative public reaction.

In the case that border security becomes worse, this coupled with weak governance will hinder licit cross-border trade, reduce investment, and slow the development of infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, and water, that are needed to move border societies forward. Weak border security is advantageous to criminal groups, drug traffickers, and insurgents. These factors could feed a cycle where the border is increasingly difficult to govern and provide services to, in turn leading to more instability.

Continued, long-term ISAF and U.S. support to Afghan security forces would increase the odds that these forces can provide enough border security to contribute to Afghanistan’s internal stability. This support could take the form of training (particularly with embedded trainers) and assistance with logistics, medical support, communications, and close air support and transport. Equally important would be continuing to support the building of a civil-service cadre, including lawyers, judges, and prosecutors. Of course, this depends on the continued receptivity of Afghans to international assistance. Given concerns about external threats, the perception that the state is still too weak to stand on its own, and the friction within Afghan society, it is probable the Afghan government and people will accept an international presence for the medium term. Alternately, drastically reducing assistance for border security, including the substantial assistance provided to Pakistan, would almost certainly have negative consequences in terms of COIN, coun-

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ternarcotics, licit trade, governance, and perhaps counterterrorism.

The international community could also continue to support cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani civil society and security forces, including through the BCCs and flag meetings, cross-border “peace jirgas,” and meetings at the ministerial level to address border issues.

Rapid social changes are underway that will alter the nature of the border region. Roads are opening up previously isolated localized societies; very rapid advances in telecommunications (particularly cell phones and internet) are having a similar effect, and many Pashtuns have now travelled outside of the border areas as businessmen, migrants (including a large population in Karachi), as refugees, or as overseas guest workers. The considerable presence of aid workers and foreign military over the last decades has also had an impact on local societies. These complex and ongoing trends may lend themselves to more government influence and international assistance.

In the best-case scenario, the border tribes and societies could be influenced by improved education and justice systems, and more representative governments that provide services. Such initiatives will require years to achieve, but could lay a foundation for improved local and regional stability. Similarly, microeconomic improvement—in the form of more (legal) jobs providing steady incomes–would clearly be a stabilizing factor. In the end, the direction and speed of change in the border areas will depend heavily on the local population—what they judge to be in their collective interests (and if they can

KEMP

reach consensus on this), what internal changes take place in their societies including the role of women and young leaders, and their perception of who will prevail in the current conflicts.

Some of these changes will be generational and slow, requiring “strategic patience”—planning cycles that look forward ten to fifteen years, with assistance redesigned to provide less on a yearly basis, but extended over a longer timeline—on the part of the international community, Islamabad, and

A Look Back

Kabul. Maintaining this flow of assistance will almost certainly become more difficult as the international commitments to Afghanistan dwindles, troop levels are reduced, and overall development budgets of western countries are cut back. To justify this commitment, the government of Afghanistan and local communities must ensure that funds are used well, while showing results that clearly benefit donors. Only then can sustainable progress be made in stabilizing this vulnerable region.

NOTES

1 This timeframe was chosen because the author was posted along this border then, but many of the conditions have been the same before and after this period.

2 C. J. Chivers, “Americans Raid Byways of Haqqani Insurgents in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 2 October 2011.

3 All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

4 “U.S. Customs and Border Protection,” Frontline, (Summer 2009): 34.

5 Gulshan Sachdeva, Afghanistan and Pakistan Sign Trade and Transit Agreement, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 1 September 2010.

6 Annette Itigg, “Urban Development in Kabul: An Overview of Challenges and Strategies,” Internet, http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Con-

tributions/Projects/Dr-Ittig/UrbanDev.htm (date accessed: 1 March 2012).

7 Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Rand Corporation, (2010); Congressional Research Service, Islamic Militancy in the PakistanAfghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy, (November 2008); Shuja Nawaz, FATA—A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, (January 2009); International Crisis Group, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, (December 2006).

8 “NATO Cooperation with Pakistan,” Internet, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50071. htm (date accessed: 1 March 2012).

9 All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

Summer/Fall 2012 [ 1 93]

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View from the Ground Fighting a Pandemic

The World’s Effort to Control Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis Alex Bozzette “Si tienes el dinero, puedas hacer maravillas.” If you have the money, you can do wonders. Those were some of the first words Dr. Clara Friele, coordinator of Ecuador’s National Tuberculosis (TB) Control Program, said to me last summer. The disease she and so many others are fighting is fully curable. It has been documented for millennia—recorded in the bones of Egyptian mummies, the pages of the Hindu Vedas, and the scenes of countless films, plays, and operas (from Tombstone to La Traviata).1 TB claimed 1.4 million lives in 2010 and is the leading killer of people with AIDS.2 It infects the lungs before spreading throughout the body and, if untreated, kills almost two-thirds of those with the severe active disease.3 Supported by a generous travel-study grant, I spent June through August 2011 in South America, East Africa, and Southeast Asia learning from those who fight this TB pandemic firsthand.

Funding, as Dr. Friele warned, limits TB control considerably. She explained, however, that dinero is just one of many obstacles opposing efforts to curb the deadly disease. The major obstacle we face today is drug resistance: TB bacteria can become immune to the drugs used to fight them when treatment regimens are interrupted or poorly managed. This

Alex Bozzette is a senior in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.

Awarded the 2011 Circumnavigators Club Foundation Grant, he spent the summer of 2011 traveling to three continents researching the challenges to diagnosing multidrugresistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) in lowresource settings.

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happened rapidly throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, which spawned multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB)—a strain immune to our two most effective TB drugs. MDRTB now affects 650,000 individuals worldwide, and that number is growing.4 Those people live in 114 reported countries, and that number is growing as well.5 Worse still, its complicated laboratory diagnosis and need for rare drugs make MDR-TB more expensive and difficult to treat than its nonresistant counterpart.

Nonetheless, MDR-TB cures are almost guaranteed where laboratories exist to diagnose the disease, drugs are available to treat it, and health care providers ensure that patients stick to their prescriptions. Crucially, the international community has demonstrated that this can be done in the developing countries where MDR-TB is most common. Key initiatives are markedly improving MDR-TB control worldwide by building laboratory capacity, making MDR-TB drugs more available, and promoting best practices for treatment supervision.

But the sense I had in late 2010 was that this progress is not moving nearly fast enough. It is limited by very real challenges on the ground. As a student of global health, I wanted to learn more about those challenges directly from the health workers that face them. I wanted to walk through their hospitals, visit their laboratories, and experience their communities to see current efforts in context. How far have MDR-TB control programs come? Where are they going?

What obstacles do they face? And how might they overcome those obstacles? I traveled 40,000 grant-supported miles

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to meet with people who had answers to those questions.

June in South America. My

visit with Dr. Friele kicked off three months of interviews and site visits with twenty-nine TB professionals in six countries on three continents. I left Washington, D.C. in late May and split June between Ecuador and neighboring Peru. After Haiti, they have the second and third highest rates, respectively, of new annual MDR-TB infection in Latin America and the Caribbean, but effective control efforts have kept those rates well below those in many Asian, Eastern European, and sub-Saharan African countries. Ecuador’s MDR-TB control program is up-and-coming, and Peru’s is hailed as an international success story. I hoped to learn about their work and identify best practices that might fit similar countries. That happened to a degree, but my experiences mainly introduced me to a reality that must change: even relatively good MDR-TB control programs are being outpaced by the disease.

I visited my first TB-specialized hospital after leaving Dr. Friele’s office at the Ecuadorian Ministry of Public Health. Ms. Christiana Fattorelli—an Italian ex-pat and field representative for the Ecuadorian Lung Health Association—guided me to Hospital Pablo Arturo Suarez in downtown Quito.

The waiting room was packed. Neverending lines filed down hallways as healthy families stood and sat alongside the ailing ill. For a disease that is spread through particulates in the air, like TB, it was a biosecurity nightmare.

Ms. Fattorelli explained her work as we waded through the crowd en route to

BOZZETTE

the hospital’s TB director. She spends most of her time searching for the disease in slums and rural villages. Door to door, she asks residents if they know anyone with rapid weight loss, coughing, fever, or night sweats. When they do, she finds those people, meets them, and refers symptomatic TB suspects for diagnosis and treatment. She does all

View from the Ground

sputum sample, and a technician manually searches for them under a microscope. That process is quick, cheap, and simple—three attributes that make it the mainstay of low-resource labs in developing countries—but it only detects 50 percent of positive cases.6 Shooting for more accuracy means making patients wait two months for the results of more

The sick spend this diagnostic limbo getting sicker, dying, and often spreading the disease to those around them (at an average rate of ten to fifteen others per year). this without wearing a standard protective mask because “they make people scared to let you into their homes.” For Ms. Fattorelli, the patients are more important than the risk of infection.

Her incredible dedication was shared by nearly everyone I would meet over the next three months.

If those whom Ms. Fattorelli suspects to have TB can afford to pause their lives—which the impoverished who are most commonly infected often cannot do—and travel to a potentially distant hospital (such as Pablo Arturo Suarez in the city center), they will then be evaluated and asked for a sputum sample—a coughed-up combination of spit and mucus. During the long wait for a doctor or nurse, those who are ill risk infecting the many others stuffed in the hospital’s halls. After patients are seen, their sputum is sent to a laboratory for diagnosis. The overwhelmingly most common method for diagnosing TB worldwide is microscope-based: a stain highlights any TB bacteria present in a

complex, expensive, and rare bacterial cultures—a process that grows bacteria from sputum samples to provide a ‘TB or no TB’ verdict. With Ms. Fattorelli, I visited the lab in Quito that conducts these cultures for the region’s patients.

It was badly understaffed and water leaked through its bowed ceiling.

Once patients are identified as TBpositive, diagnosing suspected drug resistance tacks on another step that takes two more months and is far more complex. Most high MDR-TB burden countries have fewer than three labs sufficient for this later stage of diagnosis.7 Ecuador has one, and it is over two hundred miles away from Quito, in the coastal city of Guayaquil. Factoring in time spent sending samples to that distant and overburdened lab, up to six months can separate a patient’s hospital visit from his or her MDR-TB diagnosis. The sick spend this diagnostic limbo getting sicker, dying, and often spreading the disease to those around them (at an average rate of ten to fif-

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teen others per year).8 Shortening that limbo by securing faster diagnostics is paramount, and it is Dr. Friele’s top priority as Ecuador’s National TB coordinator.

Dr. Oswaldo Jave, Peru’s National TB coordinator, shares that priority.

Days after leaving Quito for Lima, I interviewed Dr. Jave from his office in the Peruvian Ministry of Health.

In front of a wall dotted with epidemiological data, Dr. Jave spoke about his program proudly. And rightly so: Peru boasts a world-renowned TB program that helped pioneer the directly observed treatment, short-course (DOTS) strategy—the gold standard for TB treatment that has cured 46 million people since 1995.9 In 2006, Peru decided to catch its laboratories up to speed by beginning to universalize MDR-TB testing and purchasing faster diagnostics. Fantastic progress has been made, but not all is well with Peruvian TB control. Days after meeting Dr. Jave, I traveled to northern Lima on the local stretch of La Panamericana, the Pan-American Highway that runs from Prudoe Bay, Alaska to Patagonia, to see another side of the disease. As I neared the slums that house the city’s worst MDR-TB epidemic, development deteriorated, homes turned to half-finished concrete shacks, and streets got dirtier by the mile. Nearby, I met with ASETCOMAS, the world’s oldest non-profit created by and for TB patients. Its president, Ms. Luz Estrada Gonzáles, a former TB patient, like everyone else in the organization, explained that, “due to stigma, most don’t talk about TB. And because of discrimination, they don’t want to admit [to having]

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it.” One of her colleagues described TB as a “disease that the government tries to hide” to preserve its image—this in a country renowned for its TB work.

That stigma cripples federal support, treatment success, and community engagement, and it must end.

In Ecuador and Peru, laboratories will bottleneck treatment efforts until diagnostics are improved, but they are far from the only shoddy links in the anti-MDR-TB chain. A shortage of hospital beds, poor social support for the ill and their families, and pervasive stigma are three others. So long as those are realities, Dr. Julio Castro’s oftenquoted take on the Peruvian TB epidemic will ring true in both countries: “The program is good, but the disease is better.”10 Dr. Friele, Ms. Fattorelli, Dr. Jave, ASET-COMAS, and many others I met are working hard to make sure that this changes.

July in Africa. One month into the whirlwind summer, three flights took me from Lima to São Paolo to Johannesburg to Dar es Salaam, where I stayed with a Tanzanian friend from the Jane Goodall Institute and learned about MDR-TB control in the first of two East African countries I would visit. The same challenges I encountered in South America were comparable or worse in Tanzania and Ethiopia, with one major complication: rampant HIV/AIDS. Tanzanian MDR-TB control benefits from a well-organized public health network but suffers from terrible diagnostic delays. A few days into my stay in Dar es Salaam, I hopped on the local dala-dala network—a web of impossibly crowded mini-buses with unposted

BOZZETTE

routes and signs in Swahili—and headed for Tanzania’s central TB reference lab at Muhimbili National Hospital.

Ms. Basra Doulla, the lab’s director, referenced the dala-dalas that my foreigner self barely managed to navigate (with hand signals and lots of laughs) while discussing her country’s biggest MDR-TB challenges. Like Ecuador’s reference lab in Guayaquil, Ms. Doulla’s lab is the only one in Tanzania that can diagnose MDR-TB. Without a more organized transportation system, regional health workers must use unreliable dala-dalas to get sputum samples into the capital for analysis. And they are only permitted to do it one quarter per year because Ms. Doulla’s lab is so overwhelmed; in other words, if a patient contracts MDR-TB during his or her region’s three off quarters, he or she will not be diagnosed.

Days after visiting the central reference lab, I learned that Tanzania’s horribly high HIV/AIDS rate (one in twenty has it nationwide) affects MDR-TB control in more ways than one.11 Dr. Jacob Kayombo, Director of a nongovernmental organization (NGO) called the Tanzanian Public Health Initiative, believes that Tanzania’s dearth of MDR-TB diagnostics, among its other TB challenges, would be best addressed through HIV/AIDS-caliber advocacy, awareness, and engagement.

Dr. Kayombo explained that Tanzanian HIV/AIDS policies have made the disease a “central issue”—one that is discussed in “any government office, workplace, or community.” He stressed that “we need to make TB a social problem whereby everyone should take part [in the solution]. That is what the HIV community has managed to do in

View from the Ground

the country.” Doing the same for TB would improve funding, communitybased case detection, and patient care.

It would also boost MDR-TB awareness and educate patients about the risk of developing resistance by straying from their prescriptions.

In Ethiopia, my interviews focused on the double-edged link between the two pandemics: HIV/AIDS as fuel for spreading TB and TB as the leading killer of those with HIV/AIDS. For internist Dr. Yoseph Mamo of UCSDEthiopia, UC San Diego’s satellite HIV/AIDS project in Addis Ababa, the two diseases are “evil collaborators.” TB flourishes in the weak immune systems of the HIV-positive; they are twenty to thirty-seven times more likely to contract TB than those without HIV.12 Co-infection is a massive problem in Ethiopia because 70-80 percent of the country has latent TB—a dormant and non-contagious infection that healthy individuals easily suppress. HIV strips the body of its ability to keep latent TB from turning into active TB disease—the deadly condition we simply call “tuberculosis.” Picture a large river being unleashed as a dam crumbles; that is what HIV is doing to Ethiopia’s TB epidemic.

Ties between TB and HIV/AIDS are far from limited to Tanzania and Ethiopia or even Africa at large. The “evil collaborators” are at work globally; in 2009, 24 percent of those who died from TB worldwide had also been living with HIV.13 We cannot address one pandemic without fighting the other.

August in Asia. Two months and four countries into my trip, I made for India and Vietnam—two countries

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with raging MDR-TB epidemics. Their similarities with one another and with my previous stops conveyed how truly global MDR-TB is. But their stark differences made it clear that fighting this international crisis requires unique domestic solutions.

Days into my stay in Delhi, rickshaws and an extensive metro network took me to meet Dr. R.V. Asokan, a senior TB expert with the Indian Medical Association. He began by illustrating the horrible magnitude of India’s MDR-TB epidemic. The country of 1.2 billion people generates a stag-

ing, and takes root where limited health care means the sick stay sick. In other words, it affects the urban and rural poor, who cannot pause their tough lives to seek out potentially distant diagnosis or treatment.

That reality is the reason why Operation ASHA, “hope” in Hindi, exists.

The young and growing Indian NGO’s mission is to bring reliable DOTS treatment to impoverished communities.

In a meeting with one of their strategy consultants, I learned that OpASHA does not maintain permanent field offices for their DOTS centers.

India takes the limited labs challenge to

an entirely different level: it diagnoses fewer than 2 percent of its MDR-TB cases and is treating less than 3,000 of them nationwide.” gering 2.3 million new TB cases every year, one hundred thousand of which are estimated to be MDR.14 India takes the limited labs challenge to an entirely different level: it diagnoses fewer than 2 percent of its MDR-TB cases and is treating fewer than three thousand of them nationwide.15 Limited funding and technical expertise slow India’s ongoing laboratory expansion, but part of its MDRTB epidemic is owed to the way existing resources are used. The most sophisticated lab I visited all summer was in the heart of Delhi, but many poor Delhi residents who need its diagnoses cannot access them. TB thrives in weak immune systems (exacerbated by HIV/ AIDS, malnutrition, and poor sanitation), spreads quickly in densely populated areas with poorly ventilated hous-

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Instead, they rent corners of existing spaces to cut operational costs, and they select sites near slum entrances so residents can access treatment on the go. When someone fails to come in for their daily dose, OpASHA finds them to ensure patients get the care they need (and therein prevent MDR-TB from developing). They can do this because they train and employ slum residents as their DOTS providers and counselors, a move that provides unprecedented access to communities that would be near impossible for government services to navigate. OpASHA’s grassroots, patient-focused approach to TB control has huge potential in a world where hospitals wait for the ill to come to them.

As much as it might be needed, the OpASHA model cannot work every-

BOZZETTE

View from the Ground

where. That became very apparent days into my stay in Vietnam. From her office in Hanoi’s National Lung Hospital, Vietnam’s National MDRTB Director, Dr. Hoang Thanh Thuy, informed me that poor diagnostics and patients abandoning treatment are her biggest challenges. Vietnam generates an estimated four thousand new MDRTB patients each year, but only three hundred of those are being treated.16 Unfortunately, domestic NGOs like India’s OpASHA cannot be part of the effort to reverse that reality because Vietnamese civil society is near nonexistent.

In TB terms, India and Vietnam were at once strikingly similar and radically different. Both are in dire need of rapid MDR-TB diagnostics and better, more accessible treatment. But their disparate demographics and public sectors conveyed that international policies cannot be applied without first being adapted to unique domestic contexts.

decade, but much more must be done to realize Dr. Abate’s hopeful words.

Increasing the TB drug supply, redoubling TB-focused public health education, investing in TB-concerned civil society partnerships, and restructuring TB patient care to make treatment more accessible are just some of the ways governments should strive to improve MDR-TB control in their countries.

Above all, the international community must improve laboratory diagnostics by supporting efforts such as the World Health Organization’s EXPAND-TB initiative—a program working hard to strengthen labs in high-burden countries. The world currently diagnoses just 7 percent of its MDR-TB cases, but epidemiologists state that we must diagnose at least 70 percent to stop MDR-TB from spreading.17 A tenfold expansion of this highly technical effort is a daunting goal, but we have already seen the consequences of failing to strive for it: resistance compounds with time, and India just became the Conclusions. Ninety days after leav- third country to report cases of totally ing for Ecuador with only a backpack, drug-resistant TB (TDR-TB), a strain I returned to Washington, D.C. with a that the World Health Organization has mountain of memories and newfound not yet officially recognized but many respect for the terribly complex MDR- scientists believe is resistant to every TB TB crisis. My summer left me intimi- drug in existence.18 dated by the spreading pandemic and Allowing TB to continue to affect inspired by those working tirelessly to millions and worsen is irresponsible control it. One of those professionals, and morally unacceptable. Fortunately, Dr. Kumelachew Abate of UCSD-Ethi- efforts to introduce new rapid diagnosopia, left me with these words: “More tics—such as the user-friendly GeneXcan be done to fight against tubercu- pert system, which can do in two hours losis. If we believe that today is the first what takes two months by bacterial culday of the rest of our lives, we can do a ture—are electrifying the anti-TB comlot for the generations to come.” munity and giving real hope to this Support for MDR-TB control has fight. But many new tests are expensive made huge advances over the past and complex. They cannot replace cur-

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rent diagnostics anywhere close to overnight on the scale that is needed, especially in the countries where epidemics are most severe. Experts I met in Ecuador, Peru, Tanzania, Ethiopia, India,

and Vietnam agree: current progress in MDR-TB control is far from enough.

We must work quickly and collaboratively to change that.

NOTES

1 A. R. Zink, “Characterization of Mycobacterium Tuberculosis Complex DNAs from Egyptian Mummies by Spoligotyping,” Journal of Clinical Microbiology 41, no. 1 (Jan, 2003): 359-367; Lee B. Reichman and Earl S. Hershfield, eds, Tuberculosis: A Comprehensive International Approach (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2000), 4.

2 World Health Organization, “Tuberculosis Global Facts, 2011/2012,” Internet, http://www.who. int/tb/publications/2011/factsheet_tb_2011.pdf (date accessed: 12 February 2012).

3 Catherine J. Watt, “The global epidemiology of tuberculosis,” Simon H. Schaaf, Alimuddin I. Zumla, and John M. Grange, Eds., Tuberculosis: A Comprehensive Clinical Reference (Edinburgh: Saunders/Elsevier, 2009), 17.

4 Ibid.

5 World Health Organization, Multidrug and extensively drug-resistant TB (M/XDR-TB): 2010 Global Report on Surveillance and Response (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2010), 6.

6 Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases, “Two new studies on TB diagnostics tests,” Internet, http://www.who.int/tdr/ news/2011/tb-global-indian-data/en/ (date accessed: 12 March 2012).

7 World Health Organization, Multidrug and extensively drug-resistant TB (M/XDR-TB): 2010 Global Report on Surveillance and Response (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2010), 22.

8 World Health Organization, “Tuberculosis: Fact Sheet No. 104” (November 2010), Internet, http:// www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs104/en/index. html (date accessed: 12 February 2012).

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9 World Health Organization, “Tuberculosis Global Facts, 2011/2012,” Internet, http://www.who. int/tb/publications/2011/factsheet_tb_2011.pdf (date accessed: 12 February 2012).

10 Sandy Smith-Nonini, “When ‘The Program is Good, But the Disease is Better’: Lessons from Peru on Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis,” Medical Anthropology 24 (2003): 265–296.

11 World Health Organization, UNAIDS, and UNICEF, Global HIV/AIDS Response: Epidemic update and health sector progress towards Universal Access, Progress Report 2011 (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2011), 17.

12 World Health Organization, “Tuberculosis and HIV,” Internet, http://www.who.int/hiv/topics/tb/en/ (date accessed: 12 February 2012).

13 Ibid.

14 World Health Organization, “India: Tuberculosis Profile,” Internet, http://www.who.int/tb/data/ (date accessed: 13 February 2012).

15 Ibid.

16 World Health Organization, “Vietnam: Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis Profile,” Internet, http://www.who.int/tb/data (date accessed: 12 February 2012).

17 Leopold Blanc and Jeremiah Chakya, “National tuberculosis programmes and tuberculosis control in developing countries,” Simon H. Schaaf, Alimuddin I. Zumla, and John M. Grange, Eds., Tuberculosis: A Comprehensive Clinical Reference (Edinburgh: Saunders/ Elsevier, 2009), 796.

18 BBC News, “Indian TB Cases ‘Can’t Be Cured,’” Internet, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ health-16592199 (date accessed: 13 February 2012).

View from the Ground

Kazakhstan’s New Capital Its Importance and Implications Dena Sholk Astana: A Capital in the Steppe. When I arrived

in Astana at 7:30 AM, still half-asleep, on a rainy August morning, I was relieved to have survived the train ride.

Three weeks earlier, I had visited Turkestan, a city in southern Kazakhstan that is home to the mausoleum of Sufi scholar Ahmed Yasawi. The Almaty-Turkestan train lasted some twenty-two hours. I shared a four-person sleeping compartment with my travel companion Roberto and two Kazakh men, a retired eighty-nine-year-old school principal from Turkestan and a forty-year-old Kazakh from Shymkent, another southern city. When the Shymkent gentleman entered the cabin, he was wearing a pistol on his belt to “scare people.” Fortunately, he removed the belt at night.

My travel companions to Astana were in their midtwenties and carried smart phones and MP3 players rather than pistols. I traveled to Astana on the new, high-speed Spanish Talgo train—a direct overnight ride that departs Almaty at 7:30 PM and arrives in Astana and 7:30 the next morning. On the older Soviet trains, the Almaty-Astana journey—1,334 km, roughly the distance from Washington, D.C. to St. Louis—took nearly twenty hours. The new train catered to businessmen and young professionals; instead

Dena Sholk is a junior in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service studying International Politics and Security. During the 2011 summer, Dena traveled to Kazakhstan and studied Russian on the American Councils’ Eurasian Regional Language Program as a Fulbright-Hays Scholar.

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of large families, there were men and women in business suits reading newspapers. Each cabin contained wireless Internet, albeit non-functioning.

Walking from the Astana train station towards the city center, I entered the familiar “Soviet” Kazakhstan on the right bank of the Ishim River, which runs through the city. I navigated narrow sidewalks overcrowded with pedestrians, making my way past concrete apartment blocks adorned with Eurasian arabesque motifs and corner kiosks selling everything from tomatoes to cigarettes. For the eight weeks before making my way to Astana, I had been living with a Kazakh host family in a three-room, Khrushchevera apartment in Almaty, the former capital and largest city of 1.5 million inhabitants. Almaty is a “typical” Soviet town with an urban grid layout, trolley buses traversing the city, and plenty of small parks. On every street corner, one can buy flowers, raspberries, cigarettes, or newspapers from a babushka, the Russian term for an elderly woman.

The city, located at the foothills of the snow-topped Tian Shan Mountains has an Asian ethos. The city embodies Kazakhstan’s multiethnic identity with significant Dungan, Uighur, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek populations and hole-in-the-wall restaurants offering their respective ethnic cuisines. The eight weeks I spent in this Soviet-era Kazakh environment made the contrast with Astana’s newer left bank even starker. As I crossed the bridge over the Ishim River, I felt as if I were in a time machine experiencing Kazakhstan’s journey from Soviet Republic to independent state.

In 1994, after three years of inde-

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pendence, President Nursultan Nazarbayev announced plans to relocate Kazakhstan’s capital from Almaty to Aqmola, a small, administrative town of 280,000 inhabitants in the middle of the Kipchak steppe.1 Aqmola was renamed Astana, the Kazakh word for “capital” and, since 1997, has blossomed into a beacon of the new Kazakhstan: a Kazakhstan eager to shed its Soviet legacy, embrace a national identity based on its nomadic history, and lead the global political economy.2 The creation of Kazakhstan’s new capital would not have been possible without the leadership and commitment of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, whose legacy—for better or for worse—is tied up with Astana.

Building a Capital. President

Nazarbayev has invested an enormous amount of political and economic capital into developing Astana. Astana’s buildings are over-the-top, even by the standards of authoritarian regimes.

Astana’s symbol, the Bayterek monument, is a ninety-seven meter-tall glass and steel tower crowned by a giant golden sphere. The Norman Foster design embodies a folktale about a magic bird, Samruk, who laid its eggs on the branches of a mythical tree of life.

At the top of Bayterek stands a pedestal with a gilded imprint of President Nazarbayev’s right hand. The legend goes that if you make a wish while placing your hand on that of the ‘President for Life,’ your wish will come true. As a summer student in Kazakhstan, I of course made a wish.

Another Foster creation, the Palace for Peace and Accord, is a sixty-two meter steel and glass pyramid that will

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serve as the geographic center of the city according to the Astana 2030 plan.

The pyramid will represent Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy, its location at the ‘crossroads of civilizations,’ and its domestic heterogeneity.3 At the top of the $50 million pyramid are 120 yellow stained-glass doves, each one symbolizing a different ethnic group in Kazakhstan. The Palace hosted the Congress of World Religions in 2006 and will do so again in 2012.

A few paces away from the Pyramid along Millennium Avenue, the imaginary line that runs down Astana’s center, stands the $50 million Presidential Residence, the Ak Orda, which is flanked by the Supreme Court and State Auditorium. The three buildings share a Versailles-like courtyard with the Mazhilis, the lower house of Parliament, and Senate buildings. A set of gold towers connects this complex to a row of government departments. With the Ak Orda at the center of the legislative and judicial bodies, Astana’s layout is a perfect geographic metaphor for the country’s politics.

One of my favorite structures in Astana is the Khan Shatyr: a 150 meter-tall, $300 million glass tent.4 Also designed

by Norman Foster, the Khan Shatyr is a modern American-style shopping mall, with some additional luxuries such as the ultra-elite Sky Beach Club on the top floor, where Astana’s wealthy can swim, soak up the sun, and forget that they are in the middle of the Siberian steppe. I could smell the pool’s salty, ocean water from the first floor.

Everything, from the manicured lawns to the yellow and blue street signs, was new and seemingly perfect. Still, it was not until the morning of my second

View from the Ground

and last day in Astana that I toured the Astana 2030 city model, a small mockup of the actual city, on the top floor of the Palace of Independence. My tour guide was a gentle-mannered Kazakh in his mid-twenties who attended university in South Korea and aspired to enter the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In perfect English, he explained the city plan in remarkable detail. According to the master plan for Astana’s development, designed by Japanese designer Kisho Kurokawa and personally selected by President Nazarbayev, the city plan will be fully executed, with all of Astana’s 710.2 square kilometers developed, by 2030.5 Astana’s population will balloon from 800,000 in 2011 to 1.5 million by 2030 due to the increase in employment opportunities.6 As of my visit in August 2011, approximately 20-30 percent of the plan was completed. By 2015, half of the city plan will be constructed. While some $12 billion, 30 percent of which came from the Government of Kazakhstan, had already been invested into developing Astana by 2010, hundreds of millions more will be expended in the future.7 So far, President Nazarbayev has managed to balance competing political interests to ensure a stable investment environment. Abu Dhabi Plaza, financed by the Gulf emirate that bears its name and designed by Foster, will include a retail podium, an integrated plaza, residential apartments, an international grade office accommodation, and a hotel quarter.8 When complete in 2014, Abu Dhabi Plaza will be Astana’s tallest building at 828 meters high, including 88 floors and a price tag of $1 billion.9 The largest mosque in Central Asia, the Nur-Astana Mosque

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and Madrasa, was a gift to Astana given by the government of Qatar. Not to be outdone, Israeli entrepreneur David Ben-Nani is investing $6 billion to construct a ‘Central Park’ complex that will include 10,000 apartment units, parks, schools, two soccer fields, and three hotels.10 Strolling down Millennium Avenue, I realized how bizarrely perfect Astana felt. There were no poor babushkas selling berries in buckets on the corner, samsa vendors cooking up their delicacies, or kiosks stuffed with cigarettes and newspapers. I passed a handful of Dungan restaurants in the right bank, but noticed that Astana is inhabited mostly

der whether Astana is physically capable of handling an inflow of people and the subsequent demand on resources.

How can so much money go into one city in the world’s ninth largest country over the span of several decades? Given Nazarbayev’s intimate involvement in developing Astana, what will happen in the post-Nazarbayev era? Is the development of Astana politically sustainable under different leadership, or will the capital—and the country—disintegrate in the absence of strong political leadership?

I fear Astana is growing at an unsustainable rate. There is too much, too soon.

I realized how bizarrely perfect Astana felt. There were no poor babushkas selling berries in buckets on the corners...or kiosks stuffed with cigarettes and newspapers. by ambitious, professional Kazakhs; Astana’s demography does not reflect the country’s advertised 120 nationalities. The underground passageways in Astana were stone, cold, generic, and devoid of character. Meanwhile, in Almaty, underground passageways thrived as parallel cities where one could visit a tailor, purchase books, use an Internet café, or purchase ice cream.

Of course, Astana is a new city with a short history, but its micromanaged development prevents the creative forces of Astana’s inhabitants from organically driving the city’s development in terms of cultural monuments. Aside from being irked by the city’s sterile appearance, I could not help but won-

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Astana’s Development Challenges. On a micro level, Astana’s

expansion faces significant political and economic challenges. While the government has provided incentives such as subsidized housing to government employees, this will not last forever.

When the government is no longer able to finance subsidies, market mechanisms will place upward pressure on real estate prices. The cost of living in Astana is already high relative to other cities. In 2011, the number of real estate transactions in Kazakhstan increased by 10-15 percent.11 According to the Managing Director of Kazkommertsbank, much of the growth is caused by an increase in demand for

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housing in Almaty and Astana.12 Despite the 30 percent increase in public sector wages in July 2011, my friends in Almaty and Astana who worked for the government complained of insufficient salaries.13 While the Astana 2030 plan includes an area of low-cost housing units for civil servants, the geographic segregation of government employees hinders the growth of effective institutions. Instead, the government should increase wages to motivate public servants to advance professionally through meritocracy.

In Almaty, my host sister informed me that her mother was considering relocating the family to Astana to find work. My host mother was a Kazakh language professor who had been recently laid off from her summer job as a Russian-Kazakh translator for a local company. Given the increased use of the Kazakh language in government and business, my host mother would likely do well in Astana. But for many other Kazakhs, whose skill sets are not directly transferrable to the city’s employment opportunities, migrating to Astana will inflict stress and financial hardship on families detached from the support of their kinship networks.

While Astana’s buildings appear majestic, they are filled with structural flaws due to rushed construction. A Kazakh friend who had interned in Astana told me how the elevator in his apartment in the famed Northern Lights Towers had fallen twenty-three floors. Caused by failed delay sensors, the elevator accident was under investigation by the Astana Department of Emergencies. The fall occurred on July 21, yet the elevator remained out of operation by the time my friend left in

View from the Ground

mid-August. Prior to the accident, my friend had gotten used to waiting five to ten minutes every morning for the elevator to arrive at his floor. Apparently, the elevator was just one of several construction problems in the Northern Lights Towers, which were full of water leaks.

Astana in the Context of Kazakhstan. At the time of independence, Kazakhstan’s economic geography was such that major population and industrial centers were in the Russified North and West, agricultural activity was based in the South, and small railroad and former gulag towns could be found in the center of the country. Constructing a megacity in the middle of the steppe—an irrational move from an economic perspective given Astana’s isolation from most major industrial, transportation, and communication networks—resulted in the inefficient concentration of significant resources. The city’s growth has also accelerated the rural-urban divide created under the Soviet Union.

Astana and Almaty are to Kazakhstan what Moscow and St. Petersburg are to Russia as mega-urban centers. Kazakhstan’s economic geography, as a consequence of the infrastructure inherited from the Soviet Union, parallels the Russian economy, where Moscow constitutes over half of the country’s GDP. Almaty currently produces 20 percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP.15 In the future, Astana will constitute an even larger proportion of the nation’s production. In 2010 alone, Astana attracted 14 percent of the country’s foreign investments.16 Over time, Astana and Almaty will crowd out investment opportuni-

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ties in the peripheral regions, while causing a brain drain in the countryside and an overwhelming amalgamation of resources in these two cities.

The millions wrapped up in Astana’s glossy skyscrapers benefit the privileged few, while peripheral regions suffer from under-investment. I visited Sufi Ahmad Yasawi’s Mausoleum in Turkestan, a small town in southern Kazakhstan not far from the border with Uzbekistan, where there was no Internet access and where most roads, buildings, and facilities have not been

systems. Astana’s grandeur does not compensate for the Soviet shoddiness of Kazakhstan’s smaller towns.

Astana

After

Nazarbayev.

Despite Astana’s incredible growth, its future is jeopardized by the question of political leadership succession. Already an impressive city, Astana will expand at an even more accelerated rate over the next eighteen years, requiring the continuation of the status-quo political and economic environment.

The rule of seventy-one-year-old

The millions wrapped up in Astana’s

glossy skyscrapers benefit the privileged few, while peripheral regions suffer from underinvestment. touched since before 1990. Even in Almaty, my apartment lacked air conditioning, and on some days the gas did not work. In restrooms throughout the city, toilet paper was never flushed but was disposed of in trashcans because the plumbing system could not handle the paper. The city’s buses and trolleys ran on the same schedule and ticketing system from the Soviet period. It took me forty-five minutes to walk to school everyday, while the bus took one hour. The money channeled into Astana would be better allocated to combating corruption by increasing wages for police officers and government employees, upgrading the national infrastructure, modernizing supply chains for agricultural producers in the country’s southern regions, and investing in the national education and public health

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President Nazarbayev will soon end. To guarantee long-term stability, the President must determine a suitable successor. Since independence, Kazakhstan has not experienced a transition of executive power, and it remains extremely unclear how power will be transferred. Nazarbayev’s personal net worth, while not exactly known, is in excess of $1 billion. Meanwhile, his son-in-law and former head of the $80 billion Samruk-Kazyna Sovereign Welfare Fund, Timur Kulibayev, is estimated to be worth $1.3 billion according to Forbes.17 Moreover, President Nazarbayev’s position at the nexus of international political and economic forces in developing Astana renders the office of the presidency extremely important and highly coveted. Astana raises the succession stakes, turning a

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million-dollar question into a billiondollar gamble.

For President Nazarbayev, Astana is a symbolic manifestation of Kazakhstan’s glory, power, unitary system, and multi-vector foreign policy. President Nazarbayev promulgates the new capital as a modern emblem of the Kazakh nation-state in order to augment perceptions about the legitimacy of his regime.

Will Astana’s symbolic “soft power” outlast Nazarbayev? Many parties share a coincidence of interest in maintaining the macroeconomic stability necessary for continued investment and construction. If the incentive of the material gains of the presidency becomes greater than the shared interests in upholding stability, however, then elites will fight for power and destabilize the political system. Many of the Kazakh professionals I encountered confessed fearing for the security of their country and investments once Nazarbayev passes from the scene. The fear is that instability in Astana will spread throughout Kazakh-

View from the Ground

stan, prompting foreign investors to lose confidence in the business climate and withdraw investments, thwarting Astana’s development, and eliminating thousands of jobs. Because Astana is regarded as a center of employment, its development in a post-Nazarbayev era will impact the entire state.

Conclusion.

Astana crystallizes Kazakhstani nationalism as well as the innovation, commitment, and leadership of President Nazarbayev. His failure to select a successor, however, threatens the country’s stability and the growth of the capital. Moreover, Astana’s rapid development has come at a cost. There has been poor quality construction, under-investment in the peripheral regions, and the creation of high expectations that may go unfulfilled in a post-Nazarbayev era. It is not a matter of if, but when, the Nazarbayev presidency ends. When that day comes, I fear Astana will be a symbol of autocratic extravagance rather than an emblem of a unified, developing state.

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NOTES

1 Tim Cashion, “The Building of a City Astana: From Modest Soviet Town to Glittering Capital,” Edge, Internet, http://edgekazakhstan.com/a_building.htm (date accessed: 10 January 2012).

2 Aqmola is Kazakh for “white mausoleum,” while Astana is Kazakh for “capital.”

3 Anonymous tour guide, conversation with author, Astana, Kazakhstan, 5 August 2011.

4 “Discover Astana!” Expo 2017 Astana, Internet, http://www.expo2017astana.com/en/node/105 (date accessed: 22 December 2011).

5 Anonymous tour guide, conversation with author, Astana, Kazakhstan, 5 August 2011.

6 Anonymous tour guide, conversation with author, Astana, Kazakhstan, 5 August 2011.

7 Embassy of Kazakhstan, “Kazakhstan Country Profile 2011,” Internet, http://www.kazakhembus. com/uploads/images/Country%20Profile%202011. pdf (date accessed: 28 December 2011).

8 “Aldar Properties & Al Maabar Launch Abu Dhabi Plaza in Astana, Kazakhstan,” AME Info, 1 November 2007, Internet, http://www.ameinfo.com/136656. html (date accessed: 22 December 2011).

9 “Agreement Signed to Construct Abu Dhabi Plaza in Astana,” Tengrinews, 29 March 2011, Internet, http://en.tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/467/ (date accessed: 28 December 2011).

10 Gad Lior, “Israeli Invests $6B in Kazakhstan: David Ben Nani building luxurious residential quarter for 30,000 residents in Astana,” Yedioth Internet,

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13 August 2011, Internet, http://www.ynetnews.com/ articles/0,7340,L-4098065,00.html (date accessed: 22 December 2011).

11 “Kazakhstan’s Property Market to Grow in 2012,” New Europe, 8 January 2012, Internet, http:// www.kazakhembus.com/index.php?mact=News,cntn t01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=831&cntnt01origid=9 0&cntnt01category_id=6&cntnt01returnid=90 (date accessed: 9 January 2012).

12 Ibid.

13 International Monetary Fund, “Statement by the IMF Mission to the Republic of Kazakhstan,” 28 October 2011, Internet, http://www.imf.org/external/ np/ms/2011/102811.htm (date accessed: 10 January 2012).

14 “Three People Injured in Astana Elevator Fall,” Tengrinews, 21 July 2011, Internet, http://en.tengrinews. kz/disasters/3309/ (date accessed: 28 December 2011).

15 “Every 8th person in Kazakhstan lives in Almaty,” Tengrinews, 28 November 2011, Internet, http:// en.tengrinews.kz/people/5666/ (date accessed: 28 December 2011).

16 “Astana – City with Dynamic Tendency of Growth,” Astana Official Website, 1 July 2010, Internet, http://www.astana.kz/en/node/7321 (date accessed: 22 December 2011).

17 “Timur Kulibayev,” Forbes, March 2011, Internet, http://www.forbes.com/profile/timur-kulibaev/ (date accessed: 10 August 2011).