GJIA - 12.2 Resilience

Georgetown Journal

Resilience of

International Affairs

The Will to Overcome

FORUM CONTRIBUTIONS BY:

D. Elwood Dunn Manuel Orozco and Beatriz Slooten Michael C. Davis Randy Newcomb Brian Sayers Mark Ward

With an Introduction by Matthew Carnes, S.J. ALSO IN THIS ISSUE:

Inside an Embassy

An Interview with Ambassador James Jeffrey

Behind the Façade of Rwanda’s Elections Filip Reyntjens

An Unfinished Revolution Shadi Hamid

Converging Africa Rosa Whitaker

Drone Attacks Inside Pakistan

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Editors’ Note

Over the past decade the world has been rocked by earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornadoes on a seemingly endless pattern of destruction. From villagers in Haiti to businessmen in Japan, the Earth’s population has watched as—within the blink of an eye—lives have ended, families have been torn apart, and whole communities have taken massive hits to their morale. Yet while these tragic events broke the hearts of millions across the globe, another phenomenon has revealed itself among the rubble. Out of hope for a more promising future, possibilities for recovery arose from even the most drastic circumstances. Now, more than ever, the resilience exhibited by those who have been weakened by disaster has allowed them to bounce back and prove their true strength to themselves and to the world.

Resilience examines resilience from a diverse set of political, economic, and social perspectives. Matthew Carnes introduces the section through the unique lens of a Jesuit academic, and discusses his own experiences with resilience working with Honduran victims of Hurricane Mitch. Manuel Orozco explores modern forms of political resilience to corruption and inequality among Central America’s young professionals.

Randy Newcomb writes about the challenges that Sudanese refugee communities face in Chad after fleeing genocide in their country, how they are working to coexist with their Chadian hosts, and what this means for peace in Darfur. Mark Ward provides us with an analysis of disaster risk reduction following the 2005 earthquake and 2010 floods in Pakistan, and writes about how local communities and foreign aid organizations have worked together to prepare for future natural disasters. Elwood Dunn offers a perspective on resilience from Liberia after its civil war, as well as recommendations for reestablishing order in post-conflict environments. Michael C. Davis discusses the resilience of Tibetans in response to oppression from the Chinese government, offering broader lessons on community strength and solidarity in the face of repression. Finally, Brian Sayers writes about the resilience of international institutions in the face of everchanging international security threats, and discusses how NATO has managed to remain a functioning, relevant organization after the end of the Cold War. The Journal invites you to enjoy the contributions in our other sections as well. Shadi Hamid writes about the political results and consequences of Hosni Mubarak’s exit from government in Egypt. Filip Reyntjens provides an in-depth look into the unsettling political environment in Rwanda since its 2010 presidential election. Jo Marie Griesgraber discusses the effects of the Financial Crisis on global financial institutions, and what it has meant for decision-making and governance at the International Monetary Fund. An interview with U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, James Jeffrey, promises to be an engaging discussion about his experiences as a diplomat, the U.S. Mission in Iraq, and current security and trade issues in the Middle East that you will not want to miss.

It has been our pleasure providing you with cutting-edge international affairs analysis over the past year. We hope that you enjoy the unique and varied contributions of our authors, and we appreciate your continued support of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.

Michael B. McKeon

Imani S. Tate Summer/Fall 2011 [ 1 ]

Forum

Resilience

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

There is an arc that runs from destruction and devastation, from diminishment in all its forms, to restoration and renewal and rebirth. We call this resilience—the capacity of individuals and communities to react, respond, rebuild, and begin again on firmer foundations. It is political, economic, and social. And it is revelatory of the deepest and best parts of the human spirit.

My own experience of resilience derives from living and working in northern Honduras, following the devastation of Hurricane Mitch (October 1998).

Assigned by my Jesuit superiors to coordinate rural reconstruction projects, I vividly remember standing with displaced communities in their makeshift encampments as yet another rainstorm drove them up onto levees and further threatened their already-precarious existence. With mosquitoes swarming and the rain running off the plastic shelter, making a mess of clothes and flesh alike, we huddled over maps and housing plans, and discussed how a new village might spring up on the higher ground nearby. I would do my part, in dealing with international aid agencies, but more importantly, they would do their part,

7 The Liberian Experience

Fostering Stable Post-Conflict Governance D. ELWOOD DUNN

16 Fighting for the Right

Community Participation in Latin American Post-Transitional Democracies MANUEL OROZCO AND BEATRIZ SLOOTEN

30 Repression, Resistance, and Resilience in Tibet MICHAEL C. DAVIS

39 Survival and Prospects for Peace Refugee Communities in Chad RANDY NEWCOMB

48 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization A Study in Institutional Resilience BRIAN SAYERS

56 Disaster Risk Reduction

U.S. Responses to the 2005 Earthquake and 2010 Floods in Pakistan MARK WARD

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CARNES

with each family contributing its labor to the construction of the new village.

The work of the next several months— digging deep foundations, mixing cement, negotiating basic services with local government authorities, laying bricks and fashioning doors and windows—would culminate in the birth of a new community in the midst of Sula Valley. The method employed, called ayuda mutua (mutual aid), made the beneficiaries the protagonists of change and improvement. They had designed the layout of the village and its communal building, school, and green spaces, and they eventually would give it a name.

When it was finished and they moved in with their families, I was most struck by the fact that it was not a new creation, but a rebirth of a marvelously resilient community, now on more solid footing.

Emphasizing resilience is to stress that solutions are not exogenous. They cannot simply be imposed by outsiders, but are a sign of a community’s own identity and strength. Indeed, in recent years, both policy practitioners and academics have developed a growing conviction that communities themselves must be at the center of rebuilding after crises, and more generally, of all development efforts. Institutions must fit local cultures and conditions. The examples of communities that have risen to this challenge—despite long odds—have become an inspiration for concerned citizens, and have invited international study, imitation, and collaboration.

In the Forum that follows, our contributors take up this theme of resilience, exploring the ways in which communities are taking responsibility for rebuilding and re-establishing political and economic life in the wake

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of disasters, both natural and human.

The scope is as wide as the crucial challenges of our world today. Two studies examine the challenges of preserving identity and political status of communities in exile—Tibetans, on the one hand, and Darfuris in Chad, on the other. Another delves into the many unresolved issues in post-conflict Liberia, while yet another describes the ways that Central American countries are rebuilding trust and social capital after years of non-democracy and economic stagnation. One of the articles addresses the resilience of NATO as a functioning, relevant organization after the end of the Cold War and in the face of new international security threats. Our authors also turn their attention to natural disasters, with an examination of earthquake and flood relief efforts in Pakistan.

The work collected here highlights best practices as well as policy failures, and even offers some tentative policy proposals. These are written with a generous dose of humility, acknowledging both the complexity of the problems they address and the need for local agents to take the lead in rebuilding and reconstruction. But this Forum retains a forceful insistence that the international community cannot be a passive observer. The needs are too great, and the human call of solidarity too profound, to be ignored. Indeed, as a partner and facilitator, the international community bears a particular responsibility in ensuring that local efforts at resilience reach their fulfillment. The renewal and rebirth of the cases examined here have implications for us all, regardless of where we live or how secure we are. In seeing the

INTRODUCTION

arc completed, from crisis to restoration on surer ground, we rediscover our own capacity for beginning again, and gain hope for dealing with the future challenges our world will face.

Matthew Carnes, S.J. IS AN ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN THE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY.

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The Liberian Experience

Fostering Stable Post-Conflict Governance D. Elwood Dunn At the dawn of the new millennium, the Brahimi Report on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping reform signaled the global community’s renewed engagement in a rapidly transforming world. The UN embarked on a number of complex peace operations, some with significant nationbuilding content. Although these endeavors have yielded mixed results, they seem to be gaining popularity, especially in regard to their operational norm: “the responsibility to protect.”

Political communities must respond to challenges that test their mettle and their capacity to rebound in the aftermath of crises. The literature regarding the leading role of global and regional organizations, particularly the UN, in such processes is extensive.1 Attention is focused on the restorative role of the UN as it enters countries emerging from civil war, rehabilitates them, and then gradually departs. Humanitarian interventions by the international community are certainly useful in mitigating crises, but resilience is—and ought to be—a national and regional matter first, because the stakes of rebounding are much higher at these levels.

Although there is increasing interest in utilizing the UN to support post-conflict reconstruction around the world, the internal resilience of the affected countries is possibly more important.

D. Elwood Dunn is the Alfred Walter Negley Professor of Political Science at Sewanee, the University of the South. Before starting at Sewanee, Dunn served as Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Minister of State for Presidential Affairs in his native Liberia. Dunn has written widely on Liberian foreign and domestic policy.

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POST-CONFLICT RESILIENCE

Post-conflict reconstruction implies nothing less than a re-knitting of national societies and a renegotiating of the relationship between their political and social orders. Such actions are intimately linked to regional players because geographic proximity tends to merge national and regional circumstances. While the overarching role of the UN is important in terms of its “responsibility to protect,” material resources, and political capital, the wide-ranging nature of interests at this level and the inconsistency of state action are problematic. Peacekeeping

the foundations of nationhood. Such undertakings are imperative because they go to the roots of conflict, which are often deeply imbedded social cleavages that have been inadequately managed in colonial and Cold War contexts. Care must be taken not only to restore the status quo ante, but also to move the incipient national community away from autocracy toward democratization in its many manifestations.

A few questions might structure our thinking: What, theoretically, do such communities need if they are to move forward from conflict successfully?

...the UN cannot do for Liberia what the country must do for itself... operations are deployed primarily to assist in the implementation of peace agreements, which must first be created at the national level.2 Therefore, the rebuilding of post-crisis communities must foremost be the responsibility of those groups.

This article examines the Liberian experience of resilience as an essential ingredient in post-conflict restoration.

Resilience refers to the capacity of the national community to tap into its own resources and look within itself when faced with crises. This introspection necessarily must encompass immediate neighbors, given the cultural similarities and porous borders between countries. The ability of a state to be resilient in the aftermath of a conflict depends not only on containing the immediate manifestations of conflict, but also on the ability of national leaders to search their inner recesses, tap their latent energies, and re-imagine

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What practical lessons can be gleaned from successful cases? A number of African states have emerged from crisis and have moved toward good governance, and may now serve as models for other conflict-torn states.3 Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa are included in this set, as they have all experienced a sharp reduction in conflict as measured by the number of domestic conflict incidents per year.

Below these “emerging countries” are “threshold countries,” of which Liberia is a prime example.

Considering Liberia on the trajectory toward “emerging country” status, this paper will estimate the multidimensionality of the country’s physical, political, and socio-cultural resilience.

A levels-of-analysis approach will illuminate the domestic, regional, and global dimensions of conflict and its resolution prospects. Given Liberia’s history of violent conflict, along with

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its geographic location, reconstruction will necessarily depend on complex interactions at all three of these levels, but most crucially at the national and regional levels. Central to reconstruction will be issues of resilience and the country’s potential to rebound. The speed at which Liberia revives itself will depend on a combination of circumstances. Yet, we must bear in mind how constituents and leaders at each level succeed or fail to seize opportunities for community renewal in the aftermath of crisis.

All three levels are in play in the Liberian experience; the national and regional levels are prime drivers of action, and the global level has had an uneven, belated, but nonetheless supportive role. As the conflict waxed and waned over a fourteen-year period, the tenuous role of the global level was underscored by reluctant entry and contingent presence (six-month cycles). While the UN’s role in Liberia has been and continues to be significant to the peace process, the UN cannot do for Liberia what the country must do for itself—marshal the will to regroup and restore that which political violence has destroyed. The resilience of a country in a post-conflict period will ultimately be shaped by the ability of players at the domestic and regional levels to structure peace and development, with peace operations of the UN or other global actors serving an auxiliary role.

The country survived precarious beginnings marked by exclusivist immigrant community governance. An immigrant minority, which was instrumental in the founding of the modern Liberian state, did not equitably incorporate the indigenous majority into the body politic. The country also survived European colonization and decolonization. Reshaping the system of exclusive governance gathered momentum in the context of African decolonization, heightened by the political opportunities of the 1970s during which an open political space enabled the development of a national discourse that effectively challenged the old regime of immigrant autocracy. A bloody military coup d’état led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe intervened in the country’s political progress as the decade ended.4 Many unsettling events transpired in the months following April 1980, but the most profound effect of the coup was the end of immigrant hegemony and a turn towards democratic governance that incorporated all communities of Liberians. Historically, one of Liberia’s defining characteristics has been its citizens’ efforts to bring about majority governance, and the civil war that later ensued reflected this unsettled national issue.

The civil war was marked by two phases: 1989-1996 and 1999-2003.

While a product of many factors, it was crucially linked to socio-political inequities and imbalances. The UN remained on the sidelines during the Historical Background. Prior first year of violent conflict, while comto descending into civil war in 1989, mending the Economic Community Liberia had experienced a century of of Western African States (ECOWAS) political stability within the context of for its pioneering role in containing western colonialism and the Cold War. the war. In November 1992, the UN

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POST-CONFLICT RESILIENCE

appointed a Special Representative to evaluate the situation and to offer diplomatic support to ECOWAS and other mediating parties such as the United States.5 A UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established in 1993, but more active UN involvement did not come until the second phase of the conflict.

The first settlement (Abuja II Peace Accords of 1996) brokered by regional and global players proved to be a winners-take-all outcome in a fragile socio-political environment. Warlord Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia insurgency was transformed into a political party, the National Patriotic Party. That party, in an atmosphere of continuing arms coercion, won the 1997 elections with 75 percent of the vote. With the end of UNOMIL’s mission in November 1997 corresponding with Taylor’s election, a UN peace building support office (UNOL) replaced UNOMIL. Taylor’s presidency proved to be problematic for Liberia as well as for the regional and global organizations that sought to establish peace there.6 Since the civil war was fought to end militarized autocracy, Taylor’s restoration of the old order unsurprisingly energized opposition. Many Liberians at home and abroad—including Liberia’s current president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who was then an international civil servant—decided to resist the regime. The legitimacy issues that plagued the Taylor government limited the impact of the UN presence. As the second phase of the Liberian conflict was coming to a head, the UN Secretary General appointed a new Special Representative to the country. This was a

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prelude to the complex United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which came in the wake of a three-phased deployment of international troops.

Eventually, a combination of renewed Liberian and regional insurgencies, as well as the call by President George W. Bush for Taylor to step down from office, led to Taylor’s resignation and departure from the country.

Meanwhile, Liberian parties and their civil society counterparts were already assembled in Ghana attempting to renegotiate an end to the conflict with the assistance of a host of regional and global players. Following Taylor’s departure, negotiators signed on to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Liberia (CPA). Part of UNMIL’s mandate was to facilitate the implementation of the CPA brokered in Ghana by Liberian and regional leaders. An interim governing arrangement was put in place, and elections followed in 2005. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s Unity Party won by 60 percent of the vote, and Johnson Sirleaf was installed as president in January 2006.

The heavy investment of the UN and other global players played a significant role in the Liberian peace process, yet the unpredictable ad hoc nature of their actions should not be discounted.

The UN mandate has received periodic renewal as the country transitioned from the 2005 elections to the current Liberian administration, whose own mandate draws to a close in 2011.

UNMIL has doubtless played a key role in preserving the peace and helping Liberia to prepare to shoulder the full responsibilities of self-governance, but the efforts of Liberians themselves, with the assistance of ECOWAS, proved to

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be the most critical element in establishing peace.

tion have made to Liberian resilience.

ous challenges and conflicts, including a series of civil wars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a civilian coup d’état in 1871, a major human rights scandal that required intervention by the League of Nations in the 1930s, and the military coup d’état of 1980. Given its ability to weather these storms, there is little doubt that the Liberian state has demonstrated remarkable staying power.7 In the wake of violent conflict in 1990, community resilience was tested yet again, though

leaders were perhaps the first to step forward as mediators in the Liberian conflict early in 1990. They established the Interfaith Mediation Committee (IFMC) whose ideas for Liberian peace were adopted into the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia. Their schematic led the regional body to deploy a peace force, ECOMOG (ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group), and spearhead the diplomatic activity that contributed to containing the situation. The UN was on the diplomatic fringe, establishing

The Liberian Interfaith Elements of Resilience. Liberia’s Mediation Committee and 1989–2003 civil war followed numer- ECOWAS. Christian and Muslim

When the state falters, the people come to the rescue.

in a new and very different context. The old Liberian regime gradually receded into history as a consequence of the 1980 government overthrow, Doe’s turbulent decade in power, and the civil war that followed it. At the national level, the politics of majority rule were tested for the first time. At the regional level, the old norms of strict noninterference in the domestic affairs of ECOWAS member states underwent significant revision. At the global level, the end of the Cold War and globalization redefined politics among nations.

It was against this backdrop that Liberia was challenged to respond to its national difficulties, most notably the instability that preceded the civil war, the civil war itself, and its aftermath. The following examples capture the contributions that community leadership and participa-

an observer mission three years into the conflict (UNOMIL/93). Only in 2003, as the conflict appeared to be ending, did the UN become involved in a significant way with the establishment of its complex peace operation, UNMIL. The Role of Women. The film “Pray the Devil Back to Hell” best captures the efforts of the Liberian women who organized and rallied in the dark days of the civil war, and whose work ultimately became a major catalyst for peace.8 Leymah Gbowee, who was only seventeen when the civil war started, initiated the movement of Christian and Muslim women in Monrovia. At this time, three critical societal forces fused and began to have visible impacts on the peace process—the youth, the religious com-

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POST-CONFLICT RESILIENCE: THE LIBERIAN EXPERIENCE

munity, and the women’s movement.

The women’s movement reportedly played a significant role in the 2003 peace negotiations in Ghana. When the contending Liberian conferees threatened to depart with no agreement, the women proceeded to erect barricades around the hotel. According to Kristian Berg Harpviken, director of the Peace Research Institute Osco, “security personnel instructed to remove the women stopped when the women threatened to undress themselves.”9 The tactic worked, and thus contributed to the establishment of the CPA. Such activism demonstrates resilience, as state structures are but extensions of the societies from which they emanate.

When the state falters, the people come to the rescue. In this regard, resilience must be broadly viewed as the act of domestic and regional agencies collaborating to restore and rebuild.

leadership ethos, and the creation of a national mindset against autocracy.10 The plea was not heeded. Elections went forward, perhaps because many saw them as means of quickly restoring the state, an end that Liberian officeseekers as well as international stakeholders desired.

The Poverty Reduction Strategy. The governance program of the

elected Liberian administration must join civic activism as an element of resilience, for it also contributed to the country’s rebound in the aftermath of conflict. While no government achieves all that it sets out to accomplish, especially considering the challenging circumstances of a post-conflict society, the nearly six years of the Johnson Sirleaf administration have registered a measureable degree of progress. This is apparent in the accomplishments that its signature program, the PovThe National Conference. erty Reduction Strategy (PRS) has made Another civil society effort to estab- under its four pillars—national securilish peace took the form of a group ty, economic revitalization, governance of opinion leaders advocating for a and the rule of law, and infrastructure National Conference—a structured and basic services.11 national conversation for stocktaking— Late in her six-year term Sirleaf prior to the 2005 elections. Liberian decided to advocate for a version of a authors, journalists, academics, cler- national conference, enmeshed in a ics, and other professionals addressed second phase of the economic section correspondence to the major national, of the PRS. “Liberia Rising 2030” regional, and global players, imploring operates under the aegis of the Libethem to facilitate such a gathering to rian government and a management affirm the national community and to contract with African Futures Institute. begin the process of developing lead- It aims to consolidate the gains that ership consensus about a national way the country has made since peace was forward. These opinion leaders sought restored, and to engage all Liberians an organized forum in which they could in creating a long-term vision for the speak to their future leaders and forge country that would incorporate ecoa national reform agenda that would nomic, social, political, cultural, enviaddress issues of institutional reform, ronmental, and technical “variables of

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Liberia approached as a system.”12 The exercise aims to develop a national consensus of where the nation should be in twenty years and of how a Liberian Development Strategy (LDS) would be informed by the national vision.

In her 2011 State of the Nation Address, President Johnson Sirleaf offered her own description of her stewardship as her first mandate comes to a close: “I found my inspiration and my strength in the resilience of the people of Liberia, those who never gave up, those who toiled in every possible way to keep this nation going, and those who fought every day for peace, justice and a fair society.”13

global actors playing a supporting role.

The nation and the region, which are the direct representatives of the concerned communities, must lead the charge. The global community should then facilitate the collective effort, both in diplomatic and coercive terms. The interests of global players are too varied to take account of the requirements for re-knitting African social fabrics in the aftermath of violent conflict, and national- and regional-level instability can prevent international efforts from achieving their full potential. This suggests that there is merit to the idea of an “African solution to African problems” against the global level framework of the “responsibility to protect.”

Conclusions. Liberia is clearly not This brief analysis suggests that in yet out of the woods, but the above post-conflict periods in African counexamples of Liberian community resil- tries, the international community ience illustrate the country’s dedication should provide support where possible. to addressing the political, social, and Emphasis should be placed on encoureconomic elements of reconstruction aging national and regional actors to through national consensus.14 In these take a leadership role. The UN should matters, one must never discount the refocus its programs not only to “delivimpact of history and the sense of com- er as one,” but also to provide explicit munity that is created by that shared support for domestic-led initiatives. history. Beyond the historic, each of The commitment and staying power the events recounted demonstrates how are stronger at this level. Furthermore, the Liberian national community and countries should encourage civic group its regional affiliations rose to the chal- participation and activities, especially lenges of conflict and made it possible where a governing consensus in the for the national society to begin the country begins to falter. All constiturecovery process. The Liberian com- ent elements, including Diaspora community has not sought a return to the munities, should be involved. Finally, status quo ante, but rather, to follow a post-conflict countries should pursue judicious blend of the progressive qual- national conferences along the Benin ities of the past and community actions model. That is, they must revisit the for future peace and development. entire political order to determine a Community resilience is shaped by national way forward. Such an exercise the ability of players at the national would enable national course correcand regional levels to structure post- tion as the country primes for sustainconflict peace and development, with able peace and development.

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NOTES

1 Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, “Back to the Future: UN peacekeeping in Africa,” International Peacekeeping 7, no. 4 (2000); T.M. Ali and R.O. Mathews, Civil War in Africa (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999); Norrie Macqueen, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960 (London: Longman, 2002); Funmi Olosinsakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2008).

For a counterargument of the negative effects of the ECOWAS/ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, see Herbert Howe, “Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping, International Security Vol. 21, no. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), 145-176. Howe’s argument notwithstanding, it is important to note that ECOMOG emerged out of emergency circumstances without having the luxury to think through the initiative fully. One can therefore appreciate some of the expo facto issues raised by Howe, which largely have been addressed by the 1999 ECOWAS security mechanism.

It is inappropriate to declare the effort a failure when one considers both the organization’s purpose, which was to serve as part of a peace plan for Liberia. In spite of shortcomings, it clearly contributed to the peace that came to Liberia in 1996. ECOMOG was again on hand in 2003 as the “First Reactor” that made UNMIL possible. Furthermore, ECOWAS learned from its ECOMOG experiences in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire, and created a permanent security mechanism for the West African sub-region in 1999. Against the foregoing, one must guard against the temptations of “Monday morning quarter-backing!”

2 See Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

3 Steven Radelet, Emergent Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading The Way (Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2010).

4 For account of the coup d’état, see D. Elwood Dunn and Byron Tarr, Liberia: A National Polity in Transition (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1988).

5 For the measure of U.S. involvement see D. Elwood Dunn, Liberia and the United States During the Cold War: Limits of Reciprocity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2009).

6 Contrary to the peace pact that made possible the 1997 elections, Taylor took a solo approach to governance, alienating a growing number of domestic opponents. Armed rebellion materialized two years into his administration. He was brought down

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in 2003, indicted by a Special Hybrid International Court for Sierra Leone, and is standing trial in the Netherlands for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

7 See Joseph Guannu, Liberia and the League of Nations: The Crisis of 1929-1934 (PhD Diss, Fordham University, 1972).

8 In the film, filmmakers Abigail Disney and Gini Retcker showcase Leymah Gbowee, who rallied Liberian women in the earlier stages of the conflict, led women involvement in the events that produced the CPA in Ghana in 2003, and took Liberia into the Africa-wide Peace and Security Network (WIPSEN).

The organization collaborates with partner associates and affiliate organizations across Africa. The effort is strategically anchored in such international instruments as UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security of October 2000, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003), and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004).

9 “Liberian Tipped to Win 2011 Nobel Peace Prize,” APNEWS, 8 February 2011.

10 The signatories are independent Liberians exercising their constitutional rights and are not necessarily representing institutions with which they may be affiliated.

11 Republic of Liberia, “Poverty Reduction Strategy,” UN Liberia, Internet, http://www.unliberia.org/ doc/Final%20PRS.pdf (date accessed: 4 April 2011).

12 Liberia Rising 2030, 14 October 2010.

13 See “Annual Message of the President to the Legislature, 2011,” Internet, http://www. emansion.gov.lr/content.php?sub=Annual%20 Messages&related=Speeches (date accessed: 8 May 2011).

14 Continuing signs of peace fragility include the yet untested second post-conflict election, the unfinished task of national reconciliation as reflected in the controversial report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the negative effects of the continuing Ivorian crisis. See Republic of Liberia, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, (Monrovia, 30 June 2009). A key highlight of the TRC report is the vexing but unresolved issue of justice vs. peace in the Liberian context. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Dave Paterson, “Liberia Starts Over,” in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 179-193.

Resilience

Fighting for the Right

Community Participation in Latin American Post-Transitional Democracies Manuel Orozco and Beatriz Slooten The international community is once again turning its attention to Central America, where challenges to governance are increasingly threatening stability, democratic progress, and economic development. Corruption, abuse of authority, organized crime, weak economic growth, and continued migration and environmental degradation constitute pressing issues that affect daily life in the region. The ways in which Central Americans cope with these challenges reflect an effort to be resilient by confronting problems and dealing with reality in ways that transcend simple survival.

This article reviews some of these challenges and identifies instances where resilience among actors is taking shape. It also questions the ability of U.S. policymakers to commit to and collaborate with local actors to improve this region.

Political Difficulties in the 21st Cenutry. Fol-

lowing the lull that accompanied democratic transitions in the early 1990s, Central America is facing increasingly turbulent times. The societies are confronting the demons of outdated political institutions such as populist caudillos, along with rampant social inequality and organized crime.

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Manuel Orozco is senior associate and director of remittances and development at the Inter-American Dialogue and a visiting scholar at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University.

Beatriz Slooten is national coordinator of Compliance in Migrants Labor Rights at Trust for the Americas.

FIGHTING FOR THE RIGHT

institutions, elite leadership resistant to democratic norms, and increasingly influential unelected players, whose power surpasses that of government officials who are protected by the countries’ constitutions.

When Central American countries transitioned to democracy following the civil wars and political unrest of the early 1990s, they confronted a weak civil society, as well as militaries, political elite, and private-sector players who were reluctant to adopt progressive, democratic principles. Political change has not yet yielded a democratic dividend and instead has become marred by political tension, elite polarization, and violence. In fact, democratic consolidation has been hindered by corruption and limited political participation led by a cadre of individuals, many of whom maintain a firm grasp on the leadership of the political parties, the state, and other institutions. Political

parties and other social sectors, thereby excluding new leaders.

The 2009 military coup in Honduras, in which President Manuel Zelaya was forcibly removed from office following his attempt to amend the constitution to enable a reelection bid, illustrates the internal decomposition that has characterized Central American politics in the post-conflict era.2 In the case of Guatemala, political parties remain fragmented and voting turnout is low. Nicaragua has experienced regular ups and downs in its democratic process, as both President Daniel Ortega and Arnoldo Aleman, his predecessor, sequestered political institutions and intimidated civil society, the media, and political dissenters.

The region also exhibits slow and uneven economic development. Economic growth and social policies have yet to complement each other or be effective on their own terms. The global

These societies are confronting the demons of outdated political institutions‌ parties are substantially polarized, with relatively few young leaders in a region where the median age is under 25.1 A political power vacuum is resulting from aging political elites and the alienation of young leaders. Elites who led the political transition of the eighties are reaching the ends of their careers. These politicians, who in some cases were the architects of democratic and peaceful change, have become an obstacle to future modernization and political reforms. By barricading themselves in power, they have hijacked spaces of political authority within their

recession has exacerbated the deceleration of the current growth model based on attracting companies into free trade zones (known as maquilas), exploring tourism diversification, and galvanizing international migration. Exports in garment manufacturing have fallen, in part because of international competition and market saturation. Growth in tourism has also decreased from an average growth of 20 percent to 10 percent annually over the past twenty years.3 Though these growth rates are still considerably higher than growth in other sectors, the trend is horizontal

Summer/Fall 2011 [ 1 7 ]

OROZCO AND SLOOTEN

or downward. Foreign aid is also falling, except at times of natural disasters, when calamity garners the attention of the international community. The greatest concern is that these sources of national income are not accompanied by strategies that build longterm sustainability, but rather by practices that consolidate countries into enclave economies. If one third of GDP depends on so few industries, a decline within these select industries would have devastating effects on the economy as a whole. Meanwhile, informal economies persist and taxation is not being raised sufficiently, constraining options for social policy.

Central American criminal organizations, which include drug and arms trafficking networks and youth gangs, have been gradually thwarting democratic political activism and challenging local institutions. What should be normal, everyday decisions are being made under the duress of homicides, coercion, extortion, and intimidation. The number of daily homicides in Central America has reached the levels seen during the civil wars of the 1980s.4 The increased power of these organized criminal networks has raised the profile of instability and is becoming a formidable problem as worldwide drug consumption increasingly shifts toward synthetic drug varieties and drug manufacturing moves out of industrialized countries. Criminal organizations are also attracted by the high profits yielded through the production of raw materials for the synthetic drug industry. As a result of both the consolidation of organized crime after bloody battles between Mexican and Colombian cartels and the security vulnerability that

[ 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Resilience

exists in countries such as Honduras and Guatemala, there is an increasing trend to redirect global drug manufacturing to Central American countries.5 Solutions that address these challenges must be found.

Understanding resilience and its forms in Central America.

In the midst of these realities, Central American society is grappling with how to cope. There is no uniform set of responses. To some, this is a matter of resilience—a question of how people and institutions manage events in order to sustain their current position. The methods they resort to include adaptation or resistance, but not acquiescence. Resilience is a political expression whereby people, institutions, agents, or structures do not seek to actively transform society, but to sustain and protect their place in it. Resilience posits itself against other expressions of being, such as defeatism or indifference. Resilience in Central America has taken several forms, including rebellion against clientelism, cross-border labor mobility in response to economic adversity, and activism among educated youth, particularly women, to confront the establishment. Such manifestations are akin to Albert Hirschman’s thesis about political decisions to exit, use voice, or be loyal to the political system.6

Voice: The Case of Clientelism. Throughout the region, the practice of prioritizing political favors over rules has been a historical paradigm. After twenty years of democracy-building, state modernization has established regulations, procedures,

FIGHTING FOR THE RIGHT

and cultures that are led by a bureaucratic class interested in protecting its own turf. These bureaucracies are not above abusing authority for personal gain, but civil servants who joined the public administration are increasingly accepting the rules of procedures over patron-client interference.

In Nicaragua, for example, government officials have quietly but openly criticized President Daniel Ortega’s abuses of authority. Some officials have resigned during the course of the Ortega administration, while others have utilized demonstrations or filtered information to the public. In one case, company officials working for Albanisa (ALBA de Nicaragua, S.A), a privately-owned company that is largely controlled by the Nicaraguan government, disclosed to the public information about the company’s mishandling of company funds. Albanisa is a Venezuelan (PDVSA) and Nicaraguan (Petronic) investment scheme designed to utilize revenue from oil re-sales to invest discretionarily in social projects in Nicaragua. The company is not accountable to Congress or government and was allegedly using funds to finance clientelistic activities in support of President Ortega.7 The officials’ decision to leak Albanisa’s accounts, which revealed the mishandling of over one billion dollars in revenue, constituted an act of rebellion against a regime that keeps a tight grip on its cadres and bureaucracy, and brought about political costs for the government.

Similar instances of institutional resilience through the use of bureaucratic voice have occurred in Guatemala. Most notably, the International Commission Against Impunity

in Guatemala (CICIG), tasked with investigating Guatemala’s criminal networks and prosecuting their members, has achieved notable successes since its formation in 2007. By 2009, it had removed seventeen hundred police officers and fifty police chiefs who had been involved in organized crime, in addition to its work in advocating for legal reforms.8 Accompanying the rebellious bureaucrats, the Central American media has shown resilience through its critiques of clientelism and other abuses of authority in the face of an oftenrepressive media environment. The media has consistently posited itself as an important watchdog of democracy, creating the space to include dissent whenever its investigative journalism allows it. For example, the details of the Albanisa scandal were leaked to Confidencial, a prestigious media outlet that was able to investigate the case further and corroborate government abuses of authority.9 The media’s efforts, however, have resulted in mixed outcomes in the region as a whole. In Honduras, for example, independent media havebeen punished with death threats and deadly violence against journalists.10 Media owners, who are considered part of the county’s political elite, have promoted self-censorship. Leading journalists in Honduras were censored during the 2009 coup, but they persisted in their effort to break through the sanctioned reporting provided by the de facto government and the elite-owned, mainstream media.11 In El Salvador, independent journalists have investigated cases of corruption and have been critical of the prosecution of public offi-

Summer/Fall 2011 [ 1 9]

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Resilience

cials. Independent journalists have also constructed their own media outlets to promote alternative ways to further free media and inform the public. The cases of El Faro in El Salvador, el Periodico in Guatemala, Confidencial in Nicaragua, and C-Libre in Honduras illustrate efforts to remain resilient under state pressure and even repression by some paramilitary groups.12 Central American media outlets continue to promote democracy in the midst of political adversity, and several have capitalized on opportunities to publicize and prevent further abuses of authority.

tion of familial obligation to look after relatives demonstrates resilience even in times of adversity. As the recession hit the pockets of remittance recipients, the share of remittances as a percent of overall income increased despite a decline in total remittances. During the recession, migrants, even after losing their jobs or earning less, continued to send money back home.14 Many Latin Americans started receiving less money from relatives working abroad, but rather than using their savings, people have sought to cope with these challenges in a variety ways, such as reorganizing their finances. Many remittance recipiExit: Cross Border Migration ent households decided against spendand Remittances. Under such dif- ing their savings.15 The end result is a ficult conditions, some people are vot- population has become adept at maning with their feet. Labor migration has aging their financial resources, even in turned into a salient aspect of daily life. times of hardship.

Resilience is a political expression

whereby people, institutions, agents, or structures‌ sustain and protect their place in society.

Migration from this region is a result of poor economic performance, growing violence, and better economic opportunities elsewhere. Over the past thirty years, over five million people from Central America have left the region,13 and an average of ten thousand are likely to emigrate per year to come.

Emigrants endure severe conditions while abroad, earning less than average income and facing health risks because of lack of access to medical insurance and anti-immigrant sentiments.

Despite this, they continue to show signs of resilience. Upholding the tradi-

[ 2 0] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Loyaltiy to New Norms in Cenral America: Youth and Women. The number of collegeeducated individuals is growing, which may have important political and economic implications. While the number of Central Americans with a primary education has remained at 15 percent of the population, the percentage of college graduates has grown from 1 percent in the 1990s to 4 percent in 2008.16 There is also an emerging generation of young professionals who are choosing to opt out of the mainstream political

FIGHTING FOR THE RIGHT

populist tradition. They are part of a critical mass of the middle class that has consolidated in this region. University graduates account for 10 percent or more of the workforce, indicating disproportionate opportunities for youth with higher levels of education.17 In the coming years, the number of professionals will continue to grow and

leaders who have advanced a debate and agenda about Honduran migration, particularly in light of human rights violations of migrant workers. The Foro has been proactive in demanding government policies that protect migrant rights, and has increased its pressure on policymakers after the killings of cross border migrants at the hands of the

Groups are increasingly... pushing back

against attempts to bend the political spirit of democratic institutions. their position in their respective countries will become more relevant, fueling hopes that their economic status and interest in responsible political participation will also increase.

Central to this young cohort are women leaders who have sought to champion many issues and causes, from social policy reform to labor rights.

Women’s influence in civil society has left a footprint on the country’s political agenda, as women have advanced various social debates within the political mainstream. This cadre of women leaders is connected to the emerging educated generation. Women in the region are more likely to hold a tertiary education than men and are taking on more activist positions.18 The work of women in Honduras exemplifies this trend. Women lead several of the major organizations that are driving the debate over social reform, investment in education, migration rights, and citizen security. The Foro Nacional para las migraciones en Honduras is a coalition of civil society organizations led by women

Zetas, a criminal organization operating in Mexico.20

More voice: Resilience among Marginalized Civil Society. Civil society organizations have increased in size and number across Central America and social movements continue to be resilient in spite of the challenges they face from states reluctant to listen to their demands. Within social movements, there are migrant organizations both in the United States and Costa Rica that are seeking to assert their rights.

Migrants make up 15 percent of Costa Rica’s population, and although many of them are temporary and illegal workers, they have sought to organize in order to defend their social rights.

These migrant associations have participated in policymaking despite antiimmigrant sentiment within both the government and the general public.

In 2009 various organizations joined together to create the Migrant Council.

The Council is a decision-making body

Summer/Fall 2011 [ 21 ]

OROZCO AND SLOOTEN

that engages five government ministries and two civil society organizations, one of which is a Nicaraguan-led association, in debates on migration policy.21 Female migrant domestic workers, who make up substantial portions of the migrant population, are a particularly important group that has mobilized against abuses of their labor rights.

Female migrant workers make up 30 percent of domestic workers in Costa Rica, and 25 percent of Nicaraguan migrants.22 Employers often abuse these workers; they are underpaid, do not receive social security contributions, and are fired without access to due legal recourse. In 2010, the Asociación de Trabajadoras Domésticas de Costa Rica, representing thousands of migrant workers, was able to change the law on labor rights to include domestic work as a protected occupation.23 Labor unions are another important group that is often neglected or disregarded. Trade union membership in Central America has dropped in recent years. In El Salvador and Costa Rica, for example, union membership is below 5 percent. Governments and a growing number of private-sector entities have been directing antagonism toward unions in an effort to weaken them further.24 Increasingly, the private sector is limiting democratic participation by reducing the role of unions in the workplace and speaking out on policy matters without the involvement of labor movements. Labor unions continue to be resilient despite these pressures, which sometimes come in the form of intimidation and assassination of union leaders, or efforts to replace unions with other kinds of social enter-

[ 2 2] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Resilience

prises, as is the case of the Solidarista movement in Costa Rica. In Honduras, after the army claimed that teacher strikes were instigated by outside forces, the courts sent eighteen teachers’ union leaders to prison on charges of sedition. The measure reflected a repressive anti-union tactic to portray the organizations as destabilizers and a threat to the regime.25 Labor unions continue to be active despite government efforts to minimize their role. According to a FLACSO poll, citizens rank labor unions as the institution that best supports their needs when confronting governments.26

A Role for U.S. Policy? Is a

political crisis likely to arise in the midst of slow economic growth, continued violence, and deficient public policies that fail to respond to development needs, or can this critical mass of professionals and a transnational middle class thwart future deterioration of institutions in Central America? The answer is uncertain.

The extent of resilience to confront these problems does not yet suggest that these actors are achieving the growth necessary to combat the deterioration of political institutions. Economic policies that deepen development opportunities for the majorities are limited in scope, violence continues to affect most people in rising numbers (see chart below), and cronyism has not receded despite the efforts of rebellious bureaucrats to counter it.

The region’s problems must be actively addressed before the deterioration reaches a critical point. The Obama administration has neglected to consider its options in Central America

FIGHTING FOR THE RIGHT

carefully. Instead, it adopted a perfunctory approach, mildly increasing foreign assistance on security issues, disregarding a wide array of challenges, and ignoring many of these resilient actors who can effectively serve as triggers of political change. While Central America is not a priority in the U.S. foreign policy agenda, attention to these issues would serve the U.S. national interest. The U.S. government can nurture the needs and wants of the emerging bureaucracy, young professionals, and women leaders by providing incentives to support the rules of democracy. A policy that is directed toward critical areas such as security, but that devotes few resources to train-

ing, is a patchwork policy. With the exception of the military coup in Honduras, the United States has remained uninvolved in the region. It has failed to condemn human rights violations and abuses of authority in Nicaragua, among other countries, indicating reluctant U.S. diplomacy in the region. It is in the American national interest for the Obama administration to take the region seriously, to tackle the links between migration and development, to push the envelope on much needed political reforms, and to nurture individuals who are seeking to assert their position in a slowly emerging political vacuum.

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Resilience

Main Sources of Economic Growth in Central America, 2008 (US$,000,000)

Sector

Guatemala El Salvador

Honduras

Nicaragua Costa Rica

Remittances

4315

3788

2707

1056

624

Exports without Maquila

5375

2620

2639

1487

9312

Maquila

1683

1928

3344

1152

1683

External assistance

551

243

1677

2043

129

Tourism

1275

733

630

267

2160

GDP

34020

22110

14220

6360

29490

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2010. Maquila exports data is obtained from the Central Bank of each country. It is obtained from the balance of payment units of each Central Bank in the region.

Daily Homicides in Central America Source: UNDP, Freedom House.

Country

2000 2001

2002 2003

2004 2005

2006

2007

2008 2009

Belize

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Costa Rica

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

El Salvador

7

7

6

7

8

10

11

10

9

9

Guatemala

9

9

10

12

13

15

17

16

18

19

Honduras

9

10

12

12

6

7

9

10

12

12

Nicaragua

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

Panama

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

Central America

28

29

32

34

31

37

41

40

44

46

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FIGHTING FOR THE RIGHT

Central America: migration and remittances Migrants in total

1980

1990 Migrants

2000

Migration

Remittances (000, 000)

Costa Rica

2,333

El Salvador

2008

Migration

Remittances (000, 000)

Migration

Remittances (000, 000)

4

20,671

43,47

120

225.333

624

6,347

10

139,578

557,821

1,750

1,206,960

3788

Guatemala

15,167

26

46,193

158,956 563

1,217,339

4315

Honduras

1,167

2

21,666

184,888 409

1,221,909

2043

Nicaragua

17,051

11

90,145

326,172 320

1,075,801

1056

Panama

37,917

65

47,666

69,333

160

140,833

Central America

84,632

118

382,312 1,399,9 47

3,351

5,283,778

Central American population

22,785,735

28,536 448

35,607,239

40,777,815

Central Americans abroad

0.37%

1.34%

3.93%

12.96%

Source: Figures on remittances are obtained from the Balance of Payment unit of each Central Bank in Central America. Figures on migrants are estimated by the author from the volumes in remittances.1

1 The estimate on migrants are obtained from survey data about the percent of migrants who remit, the average amount remitted and the frequency remitting yearly. The annual amount per capita remitted divided by the volume yields a total number of transactions that reflect those migrants who only remit. For more information, see Orozco, Manuel and Bryanna Millis.

MINING REMITTANCE DATA: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON SURVEY DESIGN AND ADMINISTRATION. (microREPORT #119. United States AID, 2008)

Summer/Fall 2011 [ 25]

OROZCO AND SLOOTEN

People with tertiary education in Central America 2008

Country Costa Rica

Resilience

(% of pop.)

354,690

7.8%

El Salvador El Salvador 249,781

4.1%

Guatemala Guatemala 370,741

2.7%

Honduras Honduras

196,955

2.7%

Nicaragua Nicaragua

159,516

2.8%

Panama Panama

383,892

11.3%

Región Region

1,715,575.59

4.2%

Source: World Bank. World Bank Economic Indicators, 2010. Washington, DC. The World Bank, 2010. CD version.

Women leaders of civil society organizations in Central America (%, 2009) Country

2001 2009

Belize

47

51

Costa Rica

52

51

El Salvador

40

37

Guatemala

37

40

Honduras

38

42

Nicaragua

40

37

Panama

43

47

Total

43

44

Source: Author’s tabulation based on an analysis of almost 300 NGOs in Central America in September, 2009; more than 1,000 NGOs in Central America in November, 2001. The review of NGOs was based on fieldwork in Central America by the author and includes meetings, interviews, and data collection of directories and databases on NGOs in the region.

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FIGHTING FOR THE RIGHT

Institutions Seen As Most Attentive to the Needs of Central Americans Organization

Costa Rica

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Nicaragua

Panamá

Region

TV

32

16

17

11

14

34

21

Trade unions

20

13

11

12

16

13

14

Political parties

9

13

13

16

12

11

12

Religious authority

5

13

6

15

13

10

10

Business, private sector

9

10

14

15

5

9

10

Youth led organizations

5

10

8

7

13

5

8

All are equally heard by the government

6

12

4

7

6

4

7

None is heard

4

5

7

4

7

2

5

Women organizations

5

3

5

3

8

3

5

Newspaper

3

3

4

3

2

3

3

Minority, indigenous organizations

1

2

7

2

1

2

2

Radio

2

1

2

2

1

3

2

Army

0

2

2

2

1

1

1

Source: FLACSO, Gobernabilidad y Convivencia Democrática en América Latina. San Jose: FLACSO, 2010.

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Resilience

NOTES

1 World Bank, “World Bank Development Indicators 2010,” Internet, http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2010 (date accessed: 4 April, 2011).

2 Manuel Orozco, “Honduras,” in Countries at the Crossroads (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2010).

3 World Bank, “World Bank Development Indicators 2010,” Internet, http://data.worldbank.org/ data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi2010 (date accessed: 4 April, 2011).

4 See appendix.

5 Stephen Meiners, “Central America: An Emerging Role in the Drug Trade,” Stratfor, March 26, 2009, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090326_ central_america_emerging_role_drug_trade.

6 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

7 Carlos F. Chamorro and Carlos Salinas Maldonado, “Las cuentas secretas de Albanisa,” Confidencial, 5 March, 2011.

8 ASIES, “Carta Informativa Semanal no. 8,” Internet, http://www.asies.org.gt/carta-informativa/2009/carta08-2009.pdf (date accessed: 4 April, 2011).

9 Chamorro and Maldonado, “Las cuentas secretas de Albanisa.”

10 Manuel Orozco, “Honduras.”

11 La Tribuna, for example is owned by former president, Carlos Flores Facusse and Heraldo and La Prensa are owned by the Canahuati family. Their tradition of self-censorship is not new. See Chamorro, Carlos, El poder de los medios (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Dialogue, 2001) and Rockwell, Rick and Nooren Janus, Media Power in Central America (Press of University of Illinois, 2004).

12 Carlos Chamorro, “El poder de los medios,” Inter-American Dialogue, 2001.

13 Development Research Centre, “Globalization and Poverty 2007,” Internet, http://www.migrationdrc.org/ (date accessed: 4 April, 2011).

14 Manuel Orozco, “Understanding the continu-

[ 2 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ing effect of the crisis on remittances to Latin America,” Inter-American Dialogue, 2009.

15 Manuel Orozco, “Migration and Remittances in Times of Recession: Effects on Latin American Economies,” Inter-American Dialogue, April 2009.

16 World Bank, “World Bank Development Indicators 2010,” Internet, http://data.worldbank.org/ data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi2010 (date accessed: 4 April, 2011).

17 Ibid.

18 Rhoda Reddock, “Gender and Achievement in Higher Education,” Paper presented at the Conference of the Association of Caribbean Higher Education Administrators, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, July 10, 2009.

19 El Heraldo, “Honduras y México deben responder: Fonamih,” El Heraldo, http://www.elheraldo.hn/content/view/full/425947 (date accessed: 4 April, 2011).

20 United Nations, United Nations Population Division, (New York: United Nations, 2009).

21 Ley General de Migracion y Extranjería: Capítulo I Autoridades Migratorias - Consejo Nacional de Migraciones, 8764, La Gaceta 170, (2009).

22 Manuel Orozco, “Transnational Engagement,” Institute for the Study of International Migration, 2005. Another survey of migrants carried out in 2009 confirmed that statistic. According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo de Costa Rica there were in 2004 130,000 domestic workers.

23 Pablo Biffi, “Costa Rica: Juntas somos más,” Observador Global, 21 June, 2009.

24 ITUC International Trade Union Confederation, “Costa Rica: Helping Migrants Organise,” Union View, no. 12 (December 2008); Don McIntosh, “CAFTA Fight Boils Down to Who Will Benefit in Trade,” Northwest Labor Press, May 20, 2005.

25 “Auto de prisión con medidas sustitutivas para maestros, decide tribunal,” Proceso Digital, 30 March, 2011.

26 See appendix.

Resilience

Repression, Resistance, and Resilience in Tibet Michael C. Davis The tragic March 2008 riots in Tibet surprised the Chinese government and the world both by their occurrence and intensity. Decades of harsh Chinese suppression of even the mildest forms of dissent left many citizens falsely assuming that the situation in Tibet was under control and that Tibetans were satisfied with Chinese rule. The timing of the riots was inspired both by the March anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule when the Dalai Lama fled into exile and by the Beijing Olympics, which gave them the opportunity to attract attention to their cause.

The ferocity of the demonstrations appeared to catch even the exiled Tibetan leadership off guard. Long committed to non-violence and mindful of putting Tibetans at risk of a harsh Chinese response, these leaders would not have encouraged such public confrontation. The Chinese have long claimed to have liberated Tibetans from feudal and repressive indigenous rule and to have brought about popular democratic reform—a claim now refuted by these protests, which demonstrated both the inadequacy of current Chinese policies and the resilience of the Tibetan identity.

The Tibetan cause has shown a surprising resilience through a prolonged series of crises over several decades. [ 30] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Michael C. Davis,a Professor of Law at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, has held visiting chairs at Northwestern University Law School and Notre Dame Law School. His books include Human Rights and Chinese Values, and International Intervention: From Power Politics to Global Responsibility.

REPRESSION, RESISTANCE, AND RESILIENCE IN TIBET

The Sino-Tibetan narrative is a familiar story of the occupation and resistance of an indigenous people. The 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that calls for guarantees of autonomy and self-rule, likewise acknowledges the difficulties and rights-deprivation that indigenous peoples experience around the world.1 The PRC voted for the UN Declaration and yet seems to have missed this point in its own back yard.

The current resilience of the Tibetan cause is a product of this failed understanding and the harsh repression associated with it. The three R’s in the title—repression, resistance and resilience—reflect a causal chain, as indigenous communities subject to sustained periods of repression feel encouraged to resist, and that resistance in turn shapes their identity and resilience as a people.2 The sections that follow address the explicit Chinese and Tibetan reactions to the 2008 crisis, the historical SinoTibetan relationship, and recent Chinese official policies on national ethnic autonomy. The article then concludes with a policy prescription that draws on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

able pressure to meet with Tibetan exile leaders. A quick meeting in Shenzhen was followed by two formally scheduled conferences with the Dalai Lama’s representatives in July and October 2008.

The latter two dates were considered the seventh and eighth rounds in a series of largely unproductive Sino-Tibetan meetings that began in 2002.3 While Beijing was interested solely in damage control, the Tibetans came to the table with a serious proposal for negotiation.

In response to a Chinese request at the July meeting that they outline their position on autonomy under the Chinese constitution, the Tibetans prepared and submitted at the October meeting a “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People.”4 In this memorandum the Tibetans proposed a hybrid of China’s two constitutional models for regional autonomy: the PRC Constitution Article 4 model on minority nationality autonomy and the PRC Constitution Article 31 model on special administrative regions, as is applied to Hong Kong.5 The Tibetan Memorandum offered this “middle way” approach as a negotiating position.6 This approach favors “genuine autonomy” under Chinese rule and has long been advocated by the Dalai Lama as an intermediate posiThe 2008 Crisis and the tion between full independence and the Current Impasse. After the March current lack of autonomy. Even before 2008 demonstrations in Tibet and var- the meetings, the Chinese reiterated ious supportive demonstrations that their long-standing position that the followed the Olympic torch around the “contacts and dialogues were about the world, the Chinese government aggres- Dalai Lama’s personal future, and not sively condemned the Tibetan rioters so-called ‘China-Tibet negotiation’” and pressed foreign governments to or “dialogue between Han and Tibetan contain overseas demonstrations. With people.”7 They went so far as to chalOlympic success at stake, however, the lenge the Dalai Lama’s credentials to PRC government was under consider- represent the Tibetan people, insisting

Summer/Fall 2011 [ 31 ]

DAVIS

that he must speak to the central government as a “common person.”8 The Chinese position hardened in response to the Tibetan Memorandum, accusing the Tibetans in a State Council Press Conference of seeking “halfindependence,” and “covert independence.”9 They argued that Tibet has always been an inseparable part of China and accused Tibetan exiles of various misdeeds, including proposals of “ethnic cleansing” in the Memorandum and activities such as colluding with “Eastern Turkistan terrorists.” The State Council Address declared, “[w]e never discussed the so-called ‘Tibet issue’ and will never make a concession.”10 In the face of Chinese rejection of the Tibet-

Resilience

with their own culture and traditions.

The Historical Sino-Tibetan Relationship. While Chinese poli-

cies have acknowledged that Tibetans have a distinct nationality, they have pressed Tibetan leaders to accept the Chinese interpretation of the SinoTibetan past that the Dalai Lama has explicitly rejected. The Sino-Tibetan dispute over interpreting their shared history continues to drive the current policy debate over the legitimacy of Chinese rule and Tibetan claims for greater autonomy. The Chinese claim to have ruled Tibet indirectly during the dynastic period through a relationship in which the Tibetan gov-

The Sino-Tibetan Narrative is a familiar story of the occupation and resistance of an indigenous people. an Memorandum, a large November meeting of Tibetan exiles continued to support this “middle way” approach, even while suspending discussions.11 This uncompromising approach has made it clear that Chinese leaders have no interest in responding to Tibetan concerns about greater autonomy.

The historical and continued repressive policies and denial of a separate Tibetan identity has no doubt moved Tibetans to defend their distinctive character vigorously, more so than they would have without such subjugation, as was evident in the anger expressed during the 2008 demonstrations and riots.

The continued desire to defend their identity as Tibetans contributes to their resilience as a distinctive community

[ 32] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ernment and its religious leaders were subordinate to the Chinese emperor.

The Tibetans have seen themselves as independent—though at times as a vassal state—with the Dalai Lama in a patronpriest relationship with the Chinese Emperor. Under either view, there was no direct Chinese rule until after the 1950s occupation. Even the SeventeenPoint Agreement, which the Chinese thrust upon the Dalai Lama after the 1950 invasion, still called only for indirect Chinese rule over an autonomous Tibet.12 Chinese accounts usually date China’s claimed incorporation of Tibet to the Mongol-ruled Yuan Dynasty (12701368). Tibet scholar Warren Smith describes a carefully crafted diplomatic

REPRESSION, RESISTANCE, AND RESILIENCE IN TIBET

relationship between ruling Tibetan lamas and Chinese emperors from the Yuan Dynasty forward, in which Chinese imperial attempts at subordination were matched with Tibetan resistance.13 Tibet appeared to be at most a vassal state much like Korea on China’s northeast border.14 While the Yuan Emperors valued a patron-priest relationship with Tibetan lamas, the subsequent Chinese Ming Dynasty (13681644) appeared to value Tibetan lamas more for their intermediary role with the threatening Mongols. It was only in the middle of the Manchu-dominated Qing Dynasty (1636-1910) that imperial China occasionally occupied and ruled Tibet, and even then the method appeared to be indirect rule as part of the Qing’s “exterior empire,” though the Eastern Tibetan provinces of Kham and Amdo were sometimes under direct Qing control.15 After the Qing’s decline Tibet enjoyed de facto independence from 1911 until its occupation by the PRC in 1950. While the Chinese are fond of characterizing Tibet during this period as hopelessly feudal in order to justify its “liberation,” there is little evidence to show that it was any more feudal than China itself.16 The indigenous Tibetan government seems to have by then begun the process of modernization, which has since gained further traction with the establishment of democracy for the current government-in-exile.17

freely interfered in Tibetan affairs.

Tibetan anger at such encroachment eventually led to the 1959 uprising, the flight of the Dalai Lama, and the establishment of a government in exile. This government-in-exile has offered an independent Tibetan voice of resistance through the long years of authoritarian policies and strict Chinese control.

This has no doubt contributed to the resilience of the Tibetan identity, which was further developed and encouraged by the many writings and efforts of the exile government. Repression reached its height during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Though there was some remorse and liberalization after the Cultural Revolution, Tibetan demonstrations in the late 1980s led to further crackdowns.

The same harsh Chinese policies of suspicion and distrust have persisted ever since, though in recent years Chinese leaders have sought to temper their political control with economic development assistance. This is seemingly done in the belief that Tibetan anger and resistance is driven by economic factors and not the strong sense of ethnic and religious identity expressed by Tibetan exiles. Tibetans resent these policies, based on their perception that much of this economic activity does not assist Tibetans, but instead aims to achieve Chinese security objectives and to benefit ethnic Chinese who are encouraged to move to the region.18 Tibetans have meanwhile China’s Current Ethnic Auton- expressed quiet resistance in numerous omy Policies. After its 1950 inva- ways, including sending their children sion, China promised Tibet full auton- to Tibetan schools run by the exile govomy with indigenous self-rule under the ernment in India. With the lack of free Seventeen-Point Agreement. However, expression and association in Tibet, the in its post-revolutionary zeal, China leadership in exile, especially the Dalai

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Lama, has long provided the coherent expression of Tibetan identity that sustains the community today.

China’s formal policies on Tibet are promulgated in articles on national regional autonomy in the 1982 PRC Constitution19 and in the Law on Regional National Autonomy (LRNA) passed in 1984, as revised in 2001.20 The LRNA expressly provides protection for national minorities in the areas

Resilience

this brand of governance is accompanied by the harsh security measures of China’s omnipresent Public Security Bureau and the People’s Liberation Army, Tibetans may feel the urge to resist Chinese rule in any way they can.

The May 2004 Chinese White Paper on Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet offers a Chinese rebuttal of such criticisms, highlighting favorable statistics on Tibetan participation in autono-

Resistance is difficult when nearly all

avenues to defiance have been closed by strict control of expression and aggressive policies of reeducation. of language, education, political representation, administrative appointments, local economic and financial policies, and the use of local natural resources. Still, Article 15 of the LRNA provides that autonomous areas carry out their role “under the unified leadership of the State Council and shall be subordinate to it.” A basic regulation on the exercise of autonomy has never been enacted for the Tibet Autonomous Region, though other separate regulations that largely track national laws have. In practice, these national minority laws enhance central authority and address Chinese security concerns in respect to their two most restive minority regions, Tibet and Xinjiang.

Central officials are generally appointed to important Chinese Communist Party (CCP) positions, and a complex process of CCP review and approval of all local legislative initiatives assures very little local minority autonomy.21 When

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mous governance, including a 93 percent voter turnout rate for county level elections and over 80 percent Tibetan occupation of the top positions of various autonomous governments and standing committees.22 Critical reports, however, argue that Tibetans lack real power and are generally subordinate to more powerful Chinese officials.23 The weakness of minority autonomy is evident in the exercise of administrative power on both national and local levels. Pragmatically, the top official in the TAR will nearly always represent the interest of the Central Government.

This leads Tibetans to see themselves as a subordinate class, further encouraging the repressive siege mentality that may sustain their cause. Furthermore, there is no sign of the indigenous form of self-rule promised in the Seventeen-Point Agreement—promises of autonomy under indigenous systems of governance were clearly envisioned as

REPRESSION, RESISTANCE, AND RESILIENCE IN TIBET

temporary. A 1997 report of the International Commission of Jurists supports this argument, noting that while “Tibetans are in positions of nominal authority, they are often shadowed by more powerful Chinese officials” and “every local organ is shadowed by a CCP committee or ‘leading group.’”24 Added to these structural and ideological impediments has been a long history of repressive acts. Chinese repression has included military occupation and crack-downs, the sacking and razing of Buddhist monasteries during the Cultural Revolution, coerced “reeducation” of monks and nuns in monasteries, large-scale imprisonment of dissidents, compulsory renunciation of the Dalai Lama, and the forced relocation of rural dwellers and herders to more populated areas. Tibetan resentment is expressed in public, but more often muted, ways such as sending their children to India for education, or declining to wear Tibetan ceremonial clothes when asked by Chinese officials. Resistance is difficult when nearly all avenues to defiance have been closed by strict control of expression and aggressive policies of reeducation. Such heavy-handed tactics and the consequent urge to resist appear to encourage Tibetan loyalty to the Dalai Lama and China’s demands for his renunciation. Tibetan resentment has bubbled over into mass demonstrations in 1959, 1989, and 2008. An argument grounded in Tibet’s rich sense of history, and sustained in the Dalai Lama’s guardianship of Tibet’s religious and cultural traditions, demonstrates that repression breeds determined resistance, which in turn breeds a deeper sense of identity and resilience.

Beyond Repression and Resistance. The unrelenting Chi-

nese political control over Tibet has encouraged Tibetan resistance. The few changes the Chinese government has made have too often fallen short of what had been promised, and have failed to meet international standards.

Soon after the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was passed, China declared that there are no indigenous peoples in China,25 claiming that “for 5,000 years the Chinese were always united with minorities living on their own lands.”26 The 2008 demonstrations in Tibet call into question this image of ethnic satisfaction and harmony. The immediate harsh Chinese crackdown followed by expressions of Chinese indifference in the late-2008 discussions did little to repair Tibetan alienation and despair.

If China and the world would like to see this situation improve there are clear avenues to consider. First, the political leadership in China should acknowledge that their current policies of excessive control have only bred the kinds of sustained resistance and doubts about Chinese rule they have sought to dispel. The Chinese government has long feared that Tibetans simply want to split the country. They claim to prefer what they characterize as a harmonious society, effectively denying the Tibetan identity. To achieve this society, the Chinese need to return autonomous control to the Tibetan community.

Second, they need to admit that the genuine autonomy proposed by the Tibetan Memorandum is consistent with both China’s domestic constitutional framework and its international obligations. The agreement between

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the constitution’s and Seventeen-Point Agreement’s recognition of a special obligation to indigenous groups has been widely acknowledged as the impetus behind the “one country, two systems” model applied to Hong Kong under PRC Constitution Article 31. By voting for the UN Declaration, which offers similar commitments to indigenous peoples worldwide, China demonstrated a capacity to appreciate this point. The Memorandum was offered as a negotiating platform and should be taken as such. It reflects a Tibetan willingness to compromise from the independence they might otherwise be entitled to seek.27 Third, the Chinese Government should take advantage of the Dalai Lama as a negotiating partner. Speculation often has it that the Chinese government is playing for time, hoping that

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the tensions in Xinjiang by allowing the Uyghurs control over their own situation within a currently prosperous China. Moreover, large numbers of Tibetans have consistently supported the Dalai Lama’s “middle way” approach and would likely support any agreement he proffered. The recent Tibetan election of the youthful 42-year-old Lobsang Sangay as the new prime minister of the exile government, along with the Dalai Lama’s indications of a desire to withdraw from his historical political role, promises not only sustained leadership in the exile government, but also signals that the window of opportunity to deal directly with the Dalai Lama will someday close.28 Fourth, international partners should use their offices to encourage Chinese officials to embrace the Tibetan Memorandum as a negotiating doc-

Such generosity in spirit and substance

will ultimately prove the measure of China’s Tibet policies, both for Tibetans and the world. the Tibetan cause will die with the Dalai Lama. With his death, however, this superb and reasonable negotiating partner will be lost. Beyond the equanimity of his autonomy proposals, Chinese officials should be mindful of his superior capacity to deliver on his promises. There is no reason to fear the slippery slopes often raised by Chinese officials—that Uyghurs in Xinjiang may seek a similar deal or that Tibetans may use this as the first step to independence. Such an arrangement may offer a very positive model for resolving

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ument. China has talked with Tibetan representatives about this issue, but to little purpose, proving that it is not enough to encourage discussions. The Memorandum, in conjunction with the various documents discussed under the second point above, offers a more concrete framework for productive discussion and should specifically be promoted in foreign policy.

Finally, China’s relationship with Tibet should be built on cooperation and respect instead of repression and control. Chinese leaders, who have

REPRESSION, RESISTANCE, AND RESILIENCE IN TIBET

long promoted Tibetan culture to tourists, should respect Tibetan traditions instead of demeaning them as backward and feudal. At the same time, China’s growing economic capacities should be shared. Such generosity in spirit and substance will ultimately prove the measure of China’s Tibet policies, both for Tibetans and for the world.

These policy prescriptions are ultimately interconnected. It should be remembered that China’s policies on the indigenous Tibetan people do not exist in isolation from China’s other foreign policy concerns. The Nobel Laureate Dalai Lama has long been ranked as one of the most popular political figures in the world. As the fourth item above suggests, even while formally recognizing the PRC, leading foreign nations have long been

uncomfortable with China’s repressive Tibet policies. With its recent rise, China’s approach to ruling a peripheral community has become an even more personal concern for foreign leaders.

If China achieves a dominant position in global affairs, as is widely predicted, how can we expect it to treat other peoples around the world? In this sense Tibet has become a barometer of what might be expected from PRC dominance. A policy built on cooperation and respect in Tibet would not only benefit the Tibetan people, but would surely send the right signal to the world at large.

NOTES

1 United Nations, “UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” Internet, http://www.tebtebba.org/tebtebba_files/ipr/undrip/OfficialResolution/ A61L.67%20eng.pdf (date accessed: 4 April 2011).

2 James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

3 Over the decades there have been other SinoTibetan meetings, but the round of meetings beginning in 2002 have been the most sustained. While the Tibetans, as advocated again in their 2008 memorandum, aimed to reach a settlement that guaranteed genuine autonomy under what they characterize as the “middle way” approach, the Chinese have generally declared that they are only interested in discussing the status of the Dalai Lama, as again articulated in response to the Memorandum.

4 Tibet Autonomous Region, “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,” Seventh Sino-Tibetan Meeting, 4 November 2008.

5 The critical language in PRC Constitution, Article 4 provides: “Regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact communities; in these areas organs of selfgovernment are established for the exercise of the right of autonomy.” PRC Constitution, Article 31 provides: “The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People’s Congress in light of the specific conditions.”

6 Tracking the areas of autonomy typical of indigenous people’s rights listed in the UN Indigenous Peoples’ Declaration, the Tibetan Memorandum sought autonomy in eleven policy areas, including language, culture, religion, education, environmental protection, utilization of natural resources, economic development and trade, public health, public security, population migration, and cultural, educational, and religious exchanges with other countries. All of these except for the requested guarantees relating to local control over public security, migration, and external exchanges reflect unfulfilled commitments to ethnic minority autonomy already promised by the Chinese under Article 4. As with Hong Kong, the Tibetan side further asked that local autonomous laws not be subject to Central Government approval and that the Central Government not be allowed to amend the arrangement unilaterally. They added a controversial request that the current thirteen contiguous Tibetan autonomous areas be unified into one as a geographical matter. Beyond the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), there are presently twelve contiguous Tibetan autonomous areas in adjoining provinces.

China has long objected, since such a unified Tibetan area would constitute one quarter of contemporary China. While China’s existing national autonomy laws seem to promise that identified minorities living in a contiguous area will enjoy a single autonomous region for local self-rule, they have refused this for Tibetans. Tibetans argue that since they are only seek-

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request that the current thirteen contiguous Tibetan autonomous areas be unified into one as a geographical matter. Beyond the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), there are presently twelve contiguous Tibetan autonomous areas in adjoining provinces.

China has long objected, since such a unified Tibetan area would constitute one quarter of contemporary China. While China’s existing national autonomy laws seem to promise that identified minorities living in a contiguous area will enjoy a single autonomous region for local self-rule, they have refused this for Tibetans. Tibetans argue that since they are only seeking autonomy there is no reason their areas cannot be united, while China seems to fear such unity will pose temptations toward greater national disunity.

7 “Chinese official urges Dalai Lama to respond with sincerity after recent contact,” Xinhua, 6 July 2008.

8 “Expert calls for dialogue on Tibet within China’s constitutional framework,” Xinhua, 18 July 2006.

This view was further supported by Dong Yunhu, the Director General of the State Council Information Office, who stated, “The Central Government will never discuss the future of Tibet with the Dalai Lama,” as “he has lost all right to negotiate on the future of Tibet.” - “China unwilling to broach Tibet with Dalai,” Indo-Asian News Service, 15 July 2008.

9 Zhu Weiqun, “Address at the Press Conference” (State Council Office, Beijing, 10 November 2008).

10 Xinhua, “Tibet Sets ‘Serfs Emancipation Day,’” Internet, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-01/19/content_7410293.htm (date accessed: 19 January 2009,).

11 “China’s Communist Regime Losing Ground,” Agencies, 16 January 2008.

12 “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,” Internet, http:// www. ti-bet.net/en/diir/pubs/phri/17point/data/app1. html (date accessed: 4 April 2011). The SeventeenPoint Agreement was essentially an agreement presented to the Dalai Lama on a “take it or leave it” basis after the Chinese invasion of Tibet. It promised Tibet autonomy under Chinese rule with the right to maintain the traditional form of government 13 Warren W. Smith, Jr., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), 83-100.

14 Pamela Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (University of California, 1999), 327-336.

15 Warren W. Smith, Jr., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), 134-138, 145, 151.

16 Robert Barnett, Authenticating Tibet, Answers to China’s 100 Questions, Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) 81-84.

17 Lobsang Sangay, “Tibet: Exiles Journey,” Journal of Democracy 14, No. 3, (2003):119-130.

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18 Warren W. Smith, “China’s Policy on Tibetan Autonomy,” East-West Center Washington Working Papers, No. 2 (October 2004); Andrew M. Fisher, Authenticating Tibet, Anne-Marie Blondeau and Ka-tia Buffetrille, eds., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 269.

19 PRC Constitution (1982), Articles 4, 59, 65, 89 and 112-122.

20 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy, 1984, revised 2001.

21 See Chunli Xia, Autonomous Legislative Power in Regional Ethnic Autonomy of the People’s Republic of China: The Law and the Reality,” presented in Conference on “One Country, Two Systems, Three Legal Orders—Perspectives on Evolution,” Macau, February 2007 (citing Organic Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 7 and the Legislative Law, Article 63).

22 Office of the State Council of the PRC,White Paper on “Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet, (Beijing, May 2004).

23 Minority Rights Group International, “Human Rights in China and Minority Rights Group International, China: Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension” Internet, http://hrichina.org/public/ PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.Report.pdf (date accessed: 4 April 2011).

24 Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1997), 14-21.

25 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Switzerland, “China Concerned with Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,” Internet, http:// ch.China-embassy.org/eng/ztnr/rqwt/t138829.htm (date accessed: 4 April 2011).

26 Tong Zhihwa, (speeches, Human Rights Council, 1st Meeting, 11th Drafting Session)..

27 Advisory Opinion, Accordance With International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, International Court of Justice, 22 July 2010; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960 UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV), 15 UN Gaor, Supp.

(No. 16), UN Doc. A/4684 (1960), 66.

The exile government, its Kolan Tripa or prime minister and cabinet have long served in a subordinate role under the Dalai Lama, with whom China generally deals directly, but the Dalai Lama’s expressed desire to relinquish his political role will no doubt produce changes in this formula when eventually accepted by the exile community. While the Chinese government will likely maintain the fiction that they are dealing only with the Dalai Lama, his stated intentions and the emergence of new exile leadership surely signal a coming diminution of the Dalai Lama’s role. “Lobsang Sangay elected Tibetan exile leader,” BBC, 27 April 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asiapacific-13205481.

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Survival and Prospects for Peace: Refugee Communities in Chad Randy Newcomb Introduction. The rapid growth of refugee camps along

the eastern Chad–western Sudan border represents one of the most dramatic population flows in modern history. Following attacks on government targets in 2003 by Sudanese rebel groups in Darfur, including the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), nearly 2.5 million people were displaced within a matter of months. Of that total, upwards of 255,000 Darfurians sought refuge outside of Sudan in the harsh conditions of eastern Chad. For more than seven years, many of the families and refugee communities have maintained humble, albeit diminishing, livelihoods against all standards of humanitarian practice and principle. Although they crossed a border, spoke the same language, and maintained similar customs, they entered into a fragile and insecure existence in a resource-poor land where the climate is harsh, fresh water is limited, few trees provide wood for fuel, and the opportunity for productive livelihoods is marginal at best. It is into this setting that the Darfur refugees arrived and have, over time, shown a capacity to survive while maintaining hope for

Randy Newcomb is the President and CEO of Humanity United, a leading private donor in the field of international human rights.

He holds a doctoral degree in the field of organization and leadership, a M.Sc. in development economics, and a M.A. in Cross Cultural Studies.

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a rapid return to their lands in Sudan.

This article explores the resilience of Darfuri refugee communities in eastern Chad following their displacement from Sudan into a hostile environment of chronic insecurity.

The resilience demonstrated by these refugees offers a stark contrast to the ways in which the international community has typically managed “refugee problems.” The refugees’ ability to adapt and rebuild serves as a resource to be drawn upon in resolving this conflict and others similar to it. In order to create a lasting and durable peace in Darfur, policymakers must draw from the experience and resilience of refugee communities, and recognize that refugees themselves are an unrealized resource in managing crises.

600,000 people depend on assistance from seventy UN agencies and private humanitarian aid organizations.1 Even with the massive response by UN agencies and international NGOs, high levels of competition exist among refugees, internally displaced peoples, and host communities for access to limited resources, including water, land, and firewood for fuel. Against all odds, these humanitarian aid organizations aim to bolster the resilience of refugee communities by developing agricultural programming, securing food stocks, and supporting market systems.

In the face of these grim conditions, the Darfuri refugees in Chad have demonstrated a resilience eked out of surviving in a subsistence economy in their ancestral lands in Darfur.

Now, some seven years after the conflict Resource Challenges and Host began in Darfur, the hope for a rapid Communities. Along a six hundred- return has matured into the realization kilometer border from Libya in the that the subsistence-economy livelinorth to the Central African Repub- hoods that the refugees knew at home lic in the south, 255,000 Sudanese requires adaptation for long-term surrefugees struggle for survival among vival in Chad. Yet maintaining a fragile twelve refugee camps operated by the co-existence with internally displaced UN High Commissioner for Refugees Chadians and host communities, while (UNHCR). They join an already fragile competing for scarce resources in a and highly insecure population of near- semi-arid environment, presents enorly 1.6 million people in Chad’s Sahelian mous challenges. belt, where food insecurity, malnutriEvery morning at the break of dawn, tion, and resource depletion represent women in the Iridimi refugee camp some of the most extreme conditions in wake to queue at the community well.

Sub-Saharan Africa. Among the Dar- These women huddle for the scarce fur refugees along the border are an water that is shared by the 18,000 additional 137,500 internally displaced residents of the Iridimi refugee camp Chadians, upwards of 43,000 return- and the 1,100 villagers in the nearby ees, and a host population of 150,000 host village of Iriba. Even before the people in established towns and villages. Darfuri refugees began to migrate to The humanitarian needs of this pop- Chad in 2004, water was in short supulation are among the most significant ply in Iriba and largely dependent on anywhere in the world today. Nearly aquifer replenishment during the rainy

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season. With refugees arriving with few possessions and in desperate need of relief, both the hosts of Iriba and the new neighbors in the Irigimi refugee camp found themselves forced into an unlikely liaison bound by the struggle for survival.

This unlikely liaison is not promising, as competition for scarce resources in this region often leads to conflict.

Outside the support of humanitarian aid organizations, the potential for escalating conflict and bloodshed is considerable. Such was the case in Iridimi when the camp was formed in 2004. Humanitarian aid workers recall early fights between refugees and hosts over depleted water resources.

Eelko Browner, head of International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent notes, “we had to avoid a

Resilience

lect wood outside the camps creates an extremely hostile environment. In the face of violence, sexual assault, and growing desertification across the Sahel in Chad, refugees and aid workers try to hold back the desert and maintain the forests. Areas around camps and villages that had been stripped of wood have been reforested in order to serve the cooking fuel needs of both refugees and host communities. In an attempt to stave off rapid deforestation, refugees in eastern Chad, with the support of UNHCR, planted 400,000 trees in 2009 as part of a regional reforestation program. Overall, the program covered nearly 200,000 hectares of land alongside the twelve refugee camps, the camps for internally displaced, and the local villages.3 A more significant outcome, however, depends on the

All too often, outside parties negatively

influence an already fragile environment when they fail to fully understand long-standing traditions and practices. situation in which there were more and more strains between the refugees and the local population when they compete for resources.�2 In Iridimi, the potential for localized conflict was reduced dramatically when the refugees and villagers, with support from aid agencies, finally formed a traditional committee to mediate water access.

Accessing fuel for cooking represents another challenge in Darfuri refugee communities. Firewood is scarce in depleted forests and the threat of physical harm and rape of women who col-

mobilization of many more refugees.

Greater numbers must become active participants in crafting solutions and advancing development to overcome their own environmental challenges.

To overlook this capacity would be to diminish a community-wide opportunity to assume greater levels of local control over resource constraints and the development of durable livelihoods.

In addition to these natural resource challenges, refugees face inter-tribal fighting driven not only by resource sharing, but also by a proxy war

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between Sudan and Chad. Moreover, longstanding disputes among settled farming tribes and nomadic pastoralists persist; arms and weapons trading continues along the border region; children are commonly abducted for enlistment as child-soldiers; and militia groups have gained presence and power in the region. Yet, with support from humanitarian aid organizations, refugees and host communities demonstrate the capacity to manage these conditions and mediate emerging conflicts, whether driven by the constraints of limited resources or flash points borne out of security concerns.

Even under highly strained conditions, the culture and legacy of both refugee and host communities includes traditions that support mediation and the development of solutions. Many of these communities bring a localized analysis that takes into account historical traditions for how conflict is resolved. All too often, outside parties negatively influence an already-fragile

interventions has the perverse effect of reducing resilience and undermining a community’s capacity for survival.4 In the best of circumstances, where refugee communities manage the development of their livelihoods through more traditional and localized practices, a limited market economy emerges.

Here, refugees find entrepreneurial ways to establish their livelihoods by growing vegetables, sewing cloth, making baskets, and selling and trading local commodities. Supporting not only the emergence of these markets, but also localized traditions of addressing conflict, helps these communities to be far more resilient to crises and to exercise greater control over the extreme conditions that threaten them.

Global Advocacy and Local Action.In addition to the environmental and security challenges that test the resilience of refugee communities in eastern Chad, these populations are increasingly linked to a broader global

The will to survive despite an ever-pres-

ent, geopolitical battle being waged all around offers a window into the power of resilience. environment when they fail to understand these long-standing traditions and practices. This, in turn, escalates existing conflicts when those dynamics are unaccounted for. In contrast, building the capacity of local communities to pursue appropriate traditional practices fosters greater resilience and subsequently enables a higher threshold for survival. To abandon traditional practices solely in the pursuit of outside

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advocacy movement. This movement holds promise, but also faces significant challenges. While the efforts of global advocacy organizations to end the conflict in Darfur and to address the needs of refugee communities represent some of the most robust in modern history, these same organizations often face inconsistent and fragmented policy approaches from the international community. The outcome of these

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approaches has, in practice, conspired to wedge refugees in eastern Chad into a dichotomous position. On one hand, the promise of efforts to save Darfur creates the anticipation among refugees that peace and a rapid return to their lands is surely in the making. On the other hand, these highly visible and vocal advocacy efforts have been blunted by an international community that seems unable or unwilling to act. This inaction leaves hundreds of thousands of refugees, who believe that a return to their land is due in short order, in a state of daily insecurity and chronic instability. Yet, even under these conditions, their will to survive despite an ever-present, geopolitical battle demonstrates the power of resilience in managing crises.

With the advancement of social network technologies and communications capacities, refugees, though geographically isolated, can remain deeply connected to the politics, diplomatic measures, and aspirations of global advocacy efforts.5 While exposed to the vagaries of international public policy, this interconnectedness through technology as well as visits to refugee camps by human rights activists builds a network of relationships between refugees and many other like-minded individuals around the world. This connection bolsters the capacity of communities in crisis to endure despite very difficult circumstances.

The depth of knowledge and the understanding of current events among these refugees points to a unique phenomenon in community resilience.

These individuals are caught in crisis, yet simultaneously have access to a broader global movement that aims to

Resilience

achieve justice for crimes and secure peace in Darfur. Clearly, this global interconnectedness is a source of resilience for these communities. Though faced with insecurity and instability, they hold on to a broader ambition borne out of global political, diplomatic, and advocacy efforts.

Still, an almost callous approach to managing humanitarian crises leaves desperate people clinging to the every word and action of international diplomacy with little opportunity for engagement. Ultimately they suffer from the shortcomings of the same diplomacy that put them in harm’s way and are left almost entirely dependent on humanitarian aid. With few mechanisms by which to participate in broader efforts to secure peace, an important constituency is left out of the very efforts that determine their future.

All too often, the common instinct among bilateral and multilateral actors is to exclude refugee communities from participating in crafting solutions to the problems that led to their displacement. The conflict in Darfur and the resulting refugee movements to eastern Chad have exposed flaws in international diplomatic and humanitarian efforts that do not fully engage those who suffer most from hostilities. In fact, the kind of resilience that these communities have demonstrated is central to the mediation processes that are required to secure peaceful solutions to conflicts. While the Sudanese refugees demonstrate an astonishing ability to survive, they also represent an important part of a complex puzzle to ensure a durable solution that will allow them to return to their lands.

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The great irony in the exclusion of those who have suffered the most in this crisis is that these communities represent some of the most resilient people in the broader conflict. Worn down by the trauma of war, displaced from their lands, and forced to share scarce resources in crowded refugee camps, these individuals carry on. Mothers care for their infants, children go to school, and entire refugee camps name their schools after politicians and international diplomats in hopes of a peaceful return to their homes. With this demonstrated resilience, refugee communities represent a key constituency that should be included in crafting solutions and engaging in mediation.

With land tenure, security, and natural resource-sharing central to the grievances that led to the displacement in Sudan, these communities offer unique

and many other challenges make this a complex set of concerns to address.

Several policy recommendations, however, serve as a guide to improve the likelihood of successfully engaging refugees and drawing from the resilience they demonstrate.

Drawing from Resilience. The ability of refugees to adapt and survive under difficult conditions compels policymakers to reconsider the role that these communities play in resolving the conflicts that led to their displacement. It is not enough for the international community to allow the extreme humanitarian needs of refugees to continue in the short term without considering the long-term role that refugee communities might play in resolving the broader issues of the conflict. With this orientation, refugees become a

With limited means and no mechanism to participate in broader efforts to secure peace, an important constituency is left out of the very efforts that affect their future. opportunities for engagement in reconciliation efforts.

Of course, key questions remain regarding the aim of including loosely affiliated and decentralized refugee communities in justice, peace, and reconciliation processes. These questions are as basic as coming to an understanding of who speaks for refugee communities, how the mere survival needs of individuals and their families are met, and how these issues relate to broader bilateral and multilateral efforts where numerous actors are engaged. These

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resource to be accessed rather than a problem to be managed. A shift in engaging with refugee communities is required to achieve this reorientation.

UN agencies and international NGOs often serve best as interlocutors among parties to support mediation efforts rather than as direct mediators. Refugee communities have unique access to local knowledge and approaches that help them to survive and adapt in moments of crisis, which they may then draw upon to participate in the mediation process. Mediation

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that is dominated by outside parties potentially undermines the capacity of refugees to craft and develop solutions to the very concerns that have led to their displacement. Of course, in such severe conditions, outside assistance is required. However, excluding refugees from efforts to address these challenges reduces the likelihood of securing durable solutions and undermines the long-term resilience of these communities. As documented among the refugees in eastern Chad, despite harsh environmental conditions, chronic insecurity, and the lack of a robust international response to their situation, these communities have demonstrated the impulse and capacity to participate in advancing their own solutions to the crisis.

Attempts at engagement must reject the tendency to include these members simply as an epilogue to broader bilateral and multilateral efforts. This predilection tends to characterize refugee identity and the refugee experience in a particular and limiting way. Issues of identity and labels are not restricted to refugee communities alone, but these communities are particularly prone to the injurious effects of labeling when this practice is exercised carelessly.

UNHCR launched a program in 2009 to provide identity cards to Darfuri refugees over the age of eighteen who were living in eastern Chad. The identity cards, in effect, provide a refugee passport that allows for unrestricted movement in a host country and access to basic services as allowed by the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. In this case, the UNHCR program has served as an enabling resource for these communities and has allowed for greater

Resilience

freedom of movement and development of livelihoods. If implemented without forethought, however, these efforts risk grouping refugees into one class without taking into account traditional and tribal influences. This is exacerbated when the identity of the various traditions is reduced simply to the label “refugee� and, moreover, when these communities become an epilogue to a process for achieving reconciliation rather than active participants in pursuing solutions. This risks the rejection of the outcomes by those excluded from the process and undermines the resilience that serves as a resource among these communities.

Finally, the international community must recognize that engaging refugee communities requires a labor-intensive and lasting commitment on the part of policymakers. While this commitment may run parallel to high-level political and diplomatic efforts, the engagement of refugee communities is equally important, if not far more essential, for achieving durable outcomes.

The involvement of actors with a deep understanding and cultural literacy for the political, ethnic, and social permutations in places such as eastern Chad, Darfur, and Khartoum is essential.

Effective solutions cannot be reached solely through the ingenuity of an outsider who tries to negotiate an unfamiliar political and ethnic landscape.

Rather, capitalizing on the resilience of the very people who are affected brings into play some of the greatest assets for addressing the central substantive issues that led to the displacement of refugees in the first place. Relying on technocratic approaches based solely in Western values of conflict resolu-

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SURVIVAL AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

tion will likely lead to failure. By cre- while drawing from their resilience, ating conditions where members of the potential for achieving lasting and refugee communities can participate in productive and meaningful ways durable solutions is greatly advanced.

NOTES

1 United Nations Security Council Briefing, “United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad Begins Process of Liquidation on 1 January,” 14 December 2010.

2 David Axe, “Water and Wood Shortages Worsen,” Inter Press Service, 26 June 2008.

3 Annette Rehrl, “UNHCR and Refugees Fight to Hold Back the Desert,” UNHCR News Stories, 21 August 2009.

4 Fabien Nsengimana, Eugene van Kemenade and Aurelien Tobie, “Strengthening Local Mediation Efforts: Lessons From Eastern DRC,” International Alert, 19 November 2010.

5 Walk across Djabal refugee camp and you readily meet boys named Ocampo—a tribute to the Chief

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Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

Continue further and you meet girls named Mia, in honor of the actress and Sudan activist Mia Farrow.

Among six primary schools, one has been renamed from Primary School #1 to the Obama Primary School after the 2008 election. The efforts of the Enough Campaign, Genocide Intervention Network, and the Save Darfur Coalition, all based in the United States, are common knowledge among many refugee leaders.

Members of the advocacy organization Stop Genocide Now frequently visit eastern Chad and facilitate video and telecommunications connections between schools in the United States and Darfuri refugee camp schools.

Resilience

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization A Study in Institutional Resilience Brian Sayers International organizations are by and large a modern construct. Some historians trace their foundation to the Congress of Vienna, which less than two hundred years ago established the diplomatic foundations for a new European security order following the devastation of the Napoleonic Wars (1814-1815).1 It was the end of World War II, however, that led to the formation of several of the international organizations with which we commonly identify today, including the UN, the EU, NATO, the IMF, and the WTO.2 The aim, scope, and raison d’être of these international organizations have changed as time and events have created a largely peaceful co-existence within the developed world.

This has created the assumption that these organizations should have become obsolete. Despite this, several of the international organizations noted above have instead significantly increased in size, capacity, and expenditure.

What makes an international organization so resilient in character? A closer examination of NATO may provide some answers. This article will identify elements of NATO’s resilience, including the Strategic Concept model, which has been a conduit for reviewing priorities, taking action, and preparing for emerging threats and challenges; [ 4 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Brian Sayers is a policy officer in the Operations Division of NATO’s International Secretariat. His current work includes NATO’s operations in Libya and counterpiracy off the Horn of Africa and coast of Somalia. In 2009 the NATO Secretary General appointed him as deputy political adviser to the Commander of Kosovo Forces.

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NATO’s operational strategies; and the Strategic Concept would be more than relationships between its members and the company’s annual review; it would other global partners. be something similar to the board of directors revisiting an entire business Elements Contributing to model and restructuring the enterprise NATO’s Resilience. The NATO on the basis of the changed model. A Alliance has demonstrated a unique new Strategic Concept would not, and resilience to the changing exigencies arguably should not, occur frequently. of international affairs and conflicts. It is a deliberate process that requires This resilience is practiced through several months of consultation, both a measured approach that can be among the internal structures of the described as a “continuity and change” Alliance, and with external actors such principle. On the one hand, NATO as academics, intellectuals, and strategic upholds the fundamental principles planners. of the Washington Treaty and the Since 1950 NATO has approved guarantee of collective defense. On seven Strategic Concepts: three from the other hand, it adjusts to the new 1950 to 1957, one in 1968, and three requirements of international conflict, more during the post-Cold War period maintaining flexibility in response in 1991, 1999, and 2010. Moreover, an to change. This is important because additional policy shaping document— threats and challenges to the Alliance the Harmel report in 1967—paved the function under the same continuity way toward collective foreign policy and change principle. In other words, on security matters while committing while NATO has faced a continuity the Alliance to both defense and of threats over its sixty-two-year deterrence.3 history, the actual nature and scope of The adoption of three Strategic these threats has changed over time, Concepts in those formative years whether in countering the Warsaw Pact, between 1950 and 1957 exposed both combating international terrorism in an early identity crisis and a flexible Afghanistan, defeating cyber criminal response which ultimately steered the activities, or implementing a no-fly Alliance into a new set of action plans. zone in Libya. As threats and challenges The 1950 Strategic Concept largely change, the Alliance evolves in an dealt with the need for potential analogous manner. military activity against an adversary, The Strategic Concept is the key and the additional two in 1952 and guiding document that shapes NATO’s 1957 were based on the foundation resilience. The Strategic Concept is and development of the organization.4 not intended to predict the outbreak of These initial plans laid the groundwork specific international security crises, but for the role of the organization in rather to articulate the wider framework the foreseeable future, defining NATO of current and future challenges, as as a security organization designed to well as the necessary capabilities and respond to traditional military threats resources of the Alliance. If NATO that had arisen during World War II. were a commercial enterprise, the Nearly ten years later, the rise of

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the Soviet Union and the development of the Cold War changed the nature of the security threat that NATO allies faced. During this period, the Harmel Report5 emerged and helped to shape the process of a “balance of forces” between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.6 This report, coupled with the

Resilience

1991 Strategic Concept, however—the first to be published unclassified— underscored cooperation, dialogue, and assistance to other nations in their path to democracy, as well as crisis management and conflict prevention.

With the backdrop of Yugoslavia partitioning and the 1990 Gulf Crisis,

The adoption of three strategic Concepts in those formative years between 1949 and 1957 exposed both an early identity crisis and a flexible response.

1967 Strategic Concept, moved the Alliance’s strategy toward broader dialogue and a “flexible response” in the event of conflict between NATO and the Soviet Union. These new reports suggested that the expectation of a full nuclear war was not realistic and allowed NATO to develop a flexible structure and approach that would be able to respond to any interaction with the Soviet Union, regardless of what form hostilities took. In addition, the 1967 Strategic Concept made a large and lasting impact on NATO’s current operations when it called for the development of a more mobile, prompt, and adaptable force posture.

The requisites outlined in the 1967 Strategic Concept continue to exist in today’s operational planning.7 The fall of the Soviet Union unavoidably prompted NATO to review its political and strategic dimension.

Public discourse argued that with the end of the Cold War and the demise of NATO’s nemesis, the Soviet Union, the organization was no longer necessary for the security of its members. The

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force posture moved rapidly from a static linear defense into a more flexible and mobile response. On this basis, the 1991 Strategic Concept acknowledged the importance of crisis management through early political and military intervention. This introduced a dual-phased approach to maintain military capabilities while broadening political dialogue, which was critical to establishing practical bilateral cooperation between NATO and partner countries through the Partnership for Peace program.8 By emphasizing the addition of these new values that were equally as important as Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the 1991 Strategic Concept reshaped the organization and made it an important player once again.

Within eight years, NATO moved toward expanding its engagement with former Soviet Union states in tandem with military and peacekeeping interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo.

At the same time, NATO broadened its activities in other areas as well. Under the banner of the fiftieth anniversary

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of the Washington Treaty, the Allies adopted the 1999 Strategic Concept, which summarized recent security threats that had emerged from “internal problems” of non-NATO countries, including armed reprisals against minority groups, military threats against NATO partners, and internal corruption and organized crime within NATO countries on the border of weaker states.9 Over time, the Strategic Concepts have contributed to the development of operational flexibility, internal consensus-making cultures, and international relationships that have bolstered NATO’s resilience and ensured its continuity and relevance in the face of changing security threats and challenges.

to six operations within the last decade.

Five are still active, including the more recent operation in Libya. After NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003, the Alliance gradually expanded the reach of its mission from its original limit of Kabul to all of Afghanistan’s territory. This was notable as it set the precedent for deploying forces “out-of-area,” or outside the Euro-Atlantic sphere.

NATO’s reach was further extended to assist the African Union by providing airlift for the transport of additional peacekeepers into Darfur and through the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, which continues to help the government of Iraq in creating effective armed forces. Finally, since 2008 the Alliance Operational Flexibility. has helped to deter and disrupt pirate The start of the new millennium attacks from vessels and to increase the was transformational for NATO, general level of security in the region. particularly following 9/11 and the The ability of NATO to shift strategic first-ever invocation of Article 5 of the priorities to theatre operations outside Washington Treaty.10 This unparalleled of the traditional Euro-Atlantic sphere display of solidarity from the nineteen shows the organization’s ability to be member nations led to the makeover resilient in the face of changing security of NATO as an active operational body demands, suggesting that NATO will and starkly confirmed that threats remain a relevant security complex for to peace and security were now far years to come. beyond the domain of the EuroAtlantic sphere. This also required Culture of Internal Consensusthe Alliance to answer a deep-seated Making. The major shift to augment question about its relevancy, given operational policies did not go without that for over ten years NATO was the occasional crisis of unity. One not statically defending Allies against a notable example was in early 2003 common enemy. Instead, the Alliance after three allies resisted sending airwas globally engaged in operations defense units to Turkey to underline supporting peacekeeping missions or their opposition to the planned U.S.against actors willing to compromise led invasion of Iraq, despite Turkey’s the security of the Alliance. invocation of Article 4.11 Although NATO’s operational capabilities the entire North Atlantic Council swelled from one operation in Kosovo agreed in principle to defend Turkey,

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three Allies—Belgium, France, and Germany—feared that deploying defensive measures would influence the ongoing debate on Iraq within the UN Security Council and thereby send a message that war was all but certain.

After sobering discussions within the North Atlantic Council, the allies eventually worked toward a solution within a separate committee structure.

Analysts wasted no time suggesting that the inability of allies to reach full consensus, particularly on matters of collective defense, was sufficient confirmation of a serious crisis within the organization.12 NATO’s consensusdriven process and internal structures encouraged allies to find a diplomatic solution, however, and demonstrated the resilience of the Alliance even in the face of internal conflict.

Resilience

piracy off the coast of Somalia, NATO is also considering measures through which it can help local authorities by offering regional capacity building.

This could include enhancing their own capabilities to combat piracy activities.

These efforts have also promoted greater cooperation at the tactical level with international interlocutors, including the UN and the EU. Within Kosovo, NATO is acting as a thirdresponder to civilian disorder in coordination with the Kosovo Police and the EU’s Rule of Law Mission (EULEX).

The same cooperative principle applies to the European Union’s policing mission (EUROPOL) in Afghanistan and its naval forces (EUNAVFOR) in countering piracy. NATO has also enhanced relations with the UN and the AU by responding to requests to airlift supplies and provide air bridges in International Relationships. crisis areas, and by escorting UN World It should be underscored that NATO’s Food Programme ships that might evolution into an operational body encounter piracy attacks off of the coast goes far beyond the issue of deploying of Somalia. The expansion of NATO forces, assets, and capabilities. In line activities to include partnerships and with the last two Strategic Concepts, cooperation with countries outside NATO demonstrated that a long-term of the organization’s membership cooperative approach is necessary to demonstrates how NATO has changed secure peace within theaters of operation its behavior since its inception to and to develop broad and integrated respond to changing security demands. relations with other international Guided by the Strategic Concepts, partners. In Afghanistan, for example, these three elements in NATO’s NATO is currently considering approach to security have contributed to measures by which it can support an NATO’s resilience and have enhanced “enduring partnership” agreement its role as an international organization with the Afghanistan government to in the twenty-first century. contribute to peace and security in the longer term. The Alliance is working Future Security Challenges. on a similar cooperation framework The Alliance and its partners have made with authorities in Iraq and Kosovo. an invaluable contribution to relative Given the standing mandate to assist the peace and prosperity within the EuroAU and NATO’s current fight against Atlantic sphere and have expanded

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THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

their activities to regions around the world. Nonetheless, the 2010 Strategic Concept highlighted that the organization could not afford to stand idle while the next challenges emerge.

The primary principles that contribute to NATO’s resilience—continuity and change—remain salient today, and require that newer Strategic Concepts recognize emerging challenges in order to assess how NATO can best continue to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security interests.

The latest Strategic Concept identified many fast-moving targets to which the Alliance must be prepared to respond. Despite all of the work to counter terrorist activities, terrorist networks will continue to target highvalue human and infrastructure targets in the Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, other criminal activities (particularly cyber-crime) have no boundaries; as these attacks become more frequent they can wreak incalculable damage on governments, business, and critical infrastructure. Other non-traditional security concerns have also grown.

For example, the growing dependence of NATO member states on foreign energy supplies increases the potential for energy disruptions by malicious entities. In this framework, NATO nations are increasingly reliant on vital communication and transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security, and prosperity depend.

Finally, recent events in the Middle East and North Africa have confirmed that NATO must be prepared to engage in conflict areas at short notice. The crises in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya demonstrated the pace with which

rapid communication can incite conflict. Tomorrow’s disasters will not necessarily provide the opportunity for long-term strategic or operational planning, as NATO has experienced in the past. Therefore, the organization must be prepared for an equally rapid response. As this is written, NATO is responding to the crisis in Libya by implementing a no-fly zone and arms embargo and taking action to protect civilians and civilian-protected areas.

With a balanced approach between continuity and change, current operations in Libya represent NATO’s unvarying principle toward collective defense and common security in line with the mandate of the UN. At the same time, operations in Libya also show the importance of enhancing a cooperative role with global partners.

Strategic

Concept

2010.

During the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept that would form the basis of NATO’s current posture for the next decade and beyond. Similar to the structure of previous Strategic Concepts, this document presented a balanced argument in defense of its core principles against a comprehensive review of current structures and priorities in light of emerging security challenges. Additionally, the 2010 Strategic Concept underscored the importance of moving beyond current boundaries by working more closely with international partners, while offering global partners an extensive role in shaping the operations in which they participate.13 Today, over twenty of NATO’s partners are entrenched with NATO

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allies in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo, and they provide a significant number of personnel in theatres of operation. While dialogue and security cooperation with operational partners already exists at the highest political levels within the enlarged Afghanistan (ISAF) and Kosovo (KFOR) formats, it is clear that partners play a useful role in the “decision-shaping” process while fully accepting that ultimate “decisionmaking” remains the prerogative of the North Atlantic Council.

Partnerships with international interlocutors at the strategic level are a high priority. There has, for example, been remarkable improvement in UN-NATO relations. NATO also seeks greater strategic cooperation with the EU, particularly given their complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in support of international peace and security. This is supplemented by the growing necessity to minimize duplication and maximize cost-effectiveness and enhance practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum. On Russia, NATO has now embarked on an unprecedented level of political and strategic dialogue, and NATO governments and their respective heads of state have reaffirmed their commitment to enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russian authorities in areas of shared interests, including missile defense, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, Afghanistan, counter-piracy, and the promotion of wider international security.

Although full cooperation with external actors in these areas will not arrive overnight, they demonstrate the

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Resilience

seriousness with which allies wish to steer the future of the organization.

In this context, NATO views global cooperation not only as an integral part of its future structure, but also an element at the heart of its relevancy.

Within this line of reasoning, NATO’s prospective resilience will be judged in part by how much it succeeds in developing these global relations.

Within the first few years of its founding, NATO struggled to set a vision that would be acceptable to allies, and on that basis endorsed a series of Strategic Concepts that helped to shape the allies’ “business plan” for the future.

As a political-military organization, NATO’s resilience comes foremost from its adaptable approach: strengths must be recognized, weaknesses must be accounted for, and the Alliance’s strategic position must match the best assessment of current and emerging security threats. If these fundamental questions were never asked it is possible that the Alliance would have been defunct years ago. At the same time, collective defense and common security remain at the very heart of NATO’s raison d’être and they are critical components that maintain NATO’s relevance today.

The developments over the past decade have helped to create a platform by which the international community perceives NATO’s overall image as an international organization of goodwill with assets and capabilities that can provide a constructive influence on overall peace and security. This change did not occur overnight. International coordination and expanded dialogue took a great deal of vision and persistence on behalf of NATO’s

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leadership. The final paradox may be from an attitude of persistence—that is, that NATO’s resilience was wrought persistence to do the right thing.

NOTES

1 Alexander Thompson and Duncan Snidal, International Organization (University of Chicago Press, 1999), 694.

2 “The NATO Strategic Concept Bibliography,” Internet, http://www.nato.int/strategicconcept/ strategic-concept-bibliograpy.html (date accessed: 28 February 2011) 3 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance,(Westport: Praeger, 2004), 6.

4 “The Three Wise Men,” Internet, http:// www.assembly weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ ordinaires/rpt/2010/2085.php?PHPSESSID=f4dc ed2b91df166f3a973bbc25f527ff (date accessed: 27 February 2011) 5 “The Harmel Report,” Internet, http:// www.assembly weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ ordinaires/rpt/2010/2085.php?PHPSESSID=f4dc ed2b91df166f3a973bbc25f527ff (date accessed: 27 February 2011). Pierre Harmel was Prime Minister of Belgium in 1965-1966 and the country’s Foreign Minister from 1966-1968.

6 Carl H.Amme, NATO Strategy and Nuclear Defense (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 113.

7 “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” Internet, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ official_texts_23847.htm (28 February 2011) 8 S. Victor Papacosma, “NATO in the Postcold War Balkans,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 24 no. 2 (1996).

9 Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), 13.

10 “The North Atlantic Treaty,” Internet, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_ texts_17120.htm (date accessed: 16 February 2011): The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America

shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised

by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

11 “The North Atlantic Treaty,” Internet, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_ texts_17120.htm (date accessed: 16 February 2011): The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

12 Aaron D. Lindstrom, “Consensus Decisionmaking in Nato: French Unilateralism and the Decision to Defend Turkey,” Chicago Journal of International Law, 4 no.2, 2003.

13 “Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,” Internet, http://www.nato. int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf (date accessed: 28 February 2011).

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Disaster Risk Reduction

U.S. Responses to the 2005 Earthquake and 2010 Floods in Pakistan Mark Ward “Disaster risk reduction is not a luxury. It’s an essential insurance policy for a more disaster-prone world.”1

Introduction. The mandate at the Office of U.S.

Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) at USAID for disaster relief is clear: save lives, alleviate suffering, and reduce the social and economic impact of disasters. But the scale of disasters in 2010, including the earthquake in Haiti and the devastating floods in Pakistan, forced OFDA and disaster relief agencies around the world to rethink their approaches. The international humanitarian community and UN agencies were stretched beyond capacity to cope with the demands in Haiti and Pakistan. Consequently, the best financed, staffed, and equipped disaster response that the world could mount was not enough to address the challenges of 2010, and may not be enough in the future.

There is consensus among disaster agencies in the international community that emphasis and investment must be on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). According to Margareta Wahlström, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Preparedness, 2010 was one of the worst years for deadly natural disasters, [ 5 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Mark Ward is Deputy Assistant Administrator in the U.S. Agency for International Development Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, and was previously Acting Director of USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance.

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

and without better preparations many more disasters can be expected in years to come.2 To be clear, better preparations will not change weather patterns or prevent earthquakes.

Effective mitigation of impact can be the difference between regular annual rains and devastating floods, however, or between an earthquake claiming hundreds of lives rather than tens-ofthousands. According to data compiled annually, some 373 natural disasters claimed the lives of more than 296,800 people last year, affecting nearly 208 million people and costing nearly $110 billion.3 These figures are bad, but could be seen as benign in years to come.

Unless we act now, we will see more and more disasters due to unplanned urbanization and environmental degradation. And weather-related disasters are sure to rise in the future, due to factors that include climate change. Disaster Risk Reduction…is a strategic and technical tool for helping national and local governments to fulfill their responsibilities to citizens.4 A comparison of two major disasters in Pakistan—the October 2005 earthquake and the 2010 flooding—and the U.S. government’s response, reveals important lessons about the value of preparedness activities.

humanitarian community responded quickly and robustly, with a total of over $1.1 billion in donor contributions and commitments specifically for disaster assistance.6 The U.S. government pledged $510 million for long-term reconstruction, including $90 million in humanitarian assistance provided

by OFDA. The U.S. Department of Defense (USDOD) flew over five thousand helicopter missions and transported almost fifteen thousand tons of relief supplies.7 The earthquake response was also significantly strengthened by multilateral efforts.

Air bridges from Germany and Turkey set up by member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supplied emergency commodities to affected communities and life-saving hospital facilities in the mountains of Pakistan.

The response effort was judged a success, but also highlighted gaps in disaster management capacity on the ground. Some of these challenges included the lack of a central disaster management agency, difficulty managing and channeling less useful in-kind donations from charities and private-sector donors that choked the airports, and the lack of seismicstandard requirements in local building practices. These represent areas for planning and preparation that require 2005 Earthquake in Pakistan. investments and should be addressed The magnitude 7.6 earthquake that in advance of a disaster response. struck Azad Kashmir in northern Another critical key “fair weather” Pakistan in October 2005 killed an investment is strengthening institutions estimated 73,000 people, injured and organizational infrastructure to 128,000 others, and left more than ensure more effective coordination and 5 million people homeless.5 This was assistance prioritization. the largest disaster in Pakistan’s history, Similarly, enactment and strict and the United States and the global enforcement of building codes in

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any earthquake-prone region is an investment with dramatic benefits in the event of a major earthquake near an urban area. The resilience of a population in recovering and rebuilding is clearly much greater if people are not crushed under buildings that collapsed in the initial disaster event, whether an

Resilience

response was again the quickest and the largest, accounting for 33 percent of the total international response.9 The OFDA, the State Department, and the U.S. military provided close to $600 million in emergency shelter and relief supplies, including water purification and storage and construction materials.

Having experienced leadership is vital

to an effective disaster response, and it made a demonstrable difference in Pakistan in terms of effective coordination of the international response. earthquake, hurricane, or other violent weather episode. This requires that engineering and construction standards meet possible seismic stress. Even a cursory comparison of the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti (magnitude 7.0, death toll estimated to exceed 300,000, primarily from collapsed buildings), the 2010 earthquake in Chile (magnitude 8.8, death toll estimated less than 500), and the earthquake that struck Japan in March 2011 (magnitude 9.0, combined missing and killed less than 30,000, mostly from the tsunami that followed the earthquake) reveal dramatic differences in initial fatalities from collapsed buildings.8

The USDOD rescued more than forty thousand people and provided almost $100 million worth of in-kind assistance, including more than thirteen thousand tons of supplies such as halal meals, rations, and pre-fabricated steel bridges. More than $227 million in emergency food assistance was provided directly to the UN World Food Programme for local purchase, and reached millions of Pakistanis.10 There were also some notable improvements in the 2010 response to the floods compared to the 2005 response to the earthquake, thanks to investments in preparedness between the disasters. New institutional structures, public health surveillance 2010 Floods in Pakistan. and response mechanisms, milestones Five years after the earthquake, in civilian-military cooperation, the torrential rainfall in Pakistan during incorporation of new participants in the summer of 2010 led to flooding disaster assistance, and the emphasis of almost biblical proportions that on “building back better� helped the covered one-fifth of the country in international humanitarian community water and displaced at least 18 million to respond more effectively to the Pakistanis. The U.S. government’s unprecedented 2010 flooding.

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DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

Institutional Structure— response. The OFDA had invested Pakistan National Disaster in capacity for the new NDMA Management Authority. The organization before the floods began, enormity of the 2005 earthquake spurred the Pakistan government to strengthen its institutional structure for disaster response. Recognizing that they did not have a systematic approach to disaster risk management—which made coordinating an international response very difficult—the Pakistani government passed legislation in 2006 to create the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), which integrated DRR into all development policies and programs. The aim was “to reduce vulnerabilities to disasters and control… the negative consequences of disasters on development plans.”11 Five years later, at the onset of the flooding disaster, the NDMA set clear priorities for the Pakistani government’s response efforts and for international actors. At the time, the chairman of the NDMA was retired Lieutenant General Nadeem Ahmed, a veteran of the earthquake response.

Throughout the disaster response and under his leadership, the NDMA was the key contact within the Pakistani government. General Nadeem did not shy away from directing resources to fill gaps and stop duplication. He was also authorized by Pakistani legislation to bypass bureaucratic roadblocks to speed funding and approvals.

Having experienced leadership is vital to an effective disaster response, and it made a demonstrable difference in Pakistan in terms of effective coordination of the international response. General Nadeem had worked closely with USAID and other relief agencies during the 2005 earthquake

providing him with a skeleton staff to manage the initial response. Given his expertise, General Nadeem has become a great champion of DRR activities in the region. He recently spoke at a high level symposium on earthquake preparedness in Kathmandu, Nepal—a particularly vulnerable city in an active earthquake zone—where the world’s disaster relief agencies had gathered to push for better planning and building codes.

Public Health—Disaster Early Warning System. The damage,

disruption, and physical displacement caused by an earthquake or flood may trigger a secondary crisis—a public health epidemic—if mechanisms are not adequate to detect and respond to disease outbreaks when they first occur.

Secondary effects from a disaster can cause an increase in epidemic diseases such as cholera, dysentery, meningitis, malaria, and acute respiratory infections. Flooding emergencies in particular can result in an outbreak of waterborne disease since displaced families are crowded into camps with limited access to sanitation facilities and safe drinking water. Avoiding a cholera epidemic was the first priority of OFDA when the magnitude of the 2010 floods became apparent.

USAID was prescient after the 2005 earthquake, and in 2008 founded the Disease Early Warning System (DEWS) with the World Health Organization (WHO) and Pakistan’s Ministry of Public Health. This surveillance system, consisting of epidemiology and

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public health laboratories, can detect an impending epidemic by tracking early individual cases and responding to them rapidly to control spread of the disease. DEWS was initially put in place in thirty-seven districts in Pakistan that were judged earthquake and flood-prone, with the aim to build the capability of health personnel at the most peripheral level for early detection of epidemics.

In the first month of the 2010 floods in Pakistan, an unprecedented 12 million people were displaced, and DEWS reported a rising trend of acute watery diarrhea cases in several floodaffected provinces. In several districts the increase was sudden, well outside normal seasonal trends. Thanks to the DEWS, authorities in USAID, and WHO, the Pakistani government quickly knew about the spikes and where they were occurring. This knowledge allowed them to quickly establish sixty-three diarrhea treatment centers (DTCs), while rapidly expanding the DEWS network to more flood-affected areas. Between 10 August and 31 October, more than 60,500 patients were treated and fifteen thousand were admitted for longer-term care at DTCs countrywide. Among those admitted, only fifty-eight diarrhea-related deaths were recorded and no cases of cholera were ever confirmed.

In an average year, diarrheal diseases are the fourth most common cause of death in Pakistan, accounting for approximately 9 percent of all deaths countrywide.12 With the help of the DTCs and DEWS’ information, health workers in Pakistan were able to maintain an uncommonly low fatality rate—less than 0.01 percent of patients admitted

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Resilience

to diarrhea treatment facilities.13 This is a very positive achievement that resulted from strengthening public health surveillance systems after the 2005 earthquake. Establishing the DEWS network strengthened the resiliency of the public health system in Pakistan and increased their preparedness for the 2010 floods.

LocalCapacity—NonGovernmental Organizations.

Adequate human capacity to respond to a huge disaster like the earthquake in Haiti or the floods in Pakistan was another challenge in 2010. The international NGOs that are funded by disaster relief agencies as implementing partners were “tapped out” in terms of experienced personnel on the ground in Haiti and Pakistan, and even more so when the cholera epidemic hit Haiti.

Partnerships with local NGOs to expand the pool of experienced humanitarian workers must be part of the answer in countries with strong civil societies.

Pakistan, for example, has a deep and robust civil society. Local NGOs with contacts and on-the-ground knowledge and presence can greatly enhance a disaster response. USAID took advantage of local capacity as the flooding spread south to Sindh and the Punjab. The developing magnitude of the disaster made it clear that the international NGOs working in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, where the floods began, were stretched too thin to respond in the south as well.

In the past, disaster assistance funds only reached local organizations as sub-grants from international and multilateral agencies and international non-governmental organizations. In

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

a departure from previous practice, USAID’s OFDA awarded grants directly to several strong Pakistani organizations that could follow the path of the floodwaters and provide relief across large swaths of southern Pakistan.

USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah said in a recent speech, “USAID is no longer satisfied with writing big checks to big contractors and calling it

organizational capacity strengthens the resilience within communities, as opposed to building the ability of an outside international organization to step in when needed.

Reconstruction and “Building Back Better”. Earthquake

experts say that earthquakes do not kill people, buildings do. Disaster and

Working with local communities

to help civil society groups develop their organizational capacity strengthens the resilience within communities, as opposed to building the ability of an outside international organization to step in when needed. development. We’ve already accelerated our funding to local NGOs and local entrepreneurs, change agents who have the cultural knowledge and in-country expertise to ensure assistance leads to real local institutions and lasting, durable growth.”14 This is particularly true in disaster response. Indeed, the U.S. government has set a target for partnering with local implementers to ensure sustainable development, and to foster a faster and more durable transition to recovery in situations of disaster assistance. Of course, this is achieved through years of building relationships and incorporating the same anticorruption, accounting, and duediligence measures required for any grant activity supported by USAID. Working with local communities to help civil society groups develop their

reconstruction professionals always encourage local populations to “build back better” after a disaster, in order to mitigate the damage that might result from the next disaster. This is not just good marketing; it is a recovery model that saves lives. But it also takes time and can be expensive. In January 2006, three months after the Pakistan earthquake, the U.S. government pledged to reconstruct dozens of schools and hospitals destroyed by the earthquake. This was no small undertaking. The terrain where the earthquake struck is some of the most inaccessible in the world. But mothers and fathers had to have confidence in schools again after that horrible Saturday morning in October 2005 when more than 10,000 children perished in schoolhouses across Azad Kashmir.

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USAID is still building those schools today, five years later. For the first time in Pakistan they are building them back to regionally appropriate seismicstandard requirements in order to withstand the next earthquake. USAID constructed temporary tent and wood structures as it engaged the community on how to “build back better” during the design and construction phases.

Working closely with the local communities increases the sense of local ownership and responsibility, and contributes to better management and maintenance of the facilities in the long term. Local Pakistani architectural firms did all of the design work in full collaboration with communitybased school and clinic construction management committees, and with representatives from the district education and health departments.

Earthquakes in Pakistan may be inevitable, but the collapse of public buildings in the fault zone is not. Taking the time and devoting the resources to “build back better” while fully engaging the participation and involvement of the local community will make a lifesaving difference next time. This model can foster steps to strengthen resilience in other communities as well.

Resilience

have saved lives and livelihoods. Indeed, DRR activities proved their worth in lives saved, epidemics avoided, and hope restored for millions of people.

But the sad lesson of 2010 after the Haiti Earthquake and the Pakistan floods is that contemporary response efforts were not enough. Despite setting records for providing food, shelter, and water, and avoiding a cholera epidemic in the face of the greatest floods in Pakistan’s history, the efforts were not enough to meet the needs of all the people affected. So we, in the most expansive sense of encompassing the local and international community, governments, non-governmental organizations, and civil society, have to do even more to prepare for future disasters and to increase the global capacity to respond.

Increasing global capacity means continuously examining existing roles and relationships. Response efforts must reach into local organizations, as USAID did in Pakistan, and assess when and where these partnerships can be made more effective. Host governments in disaster-prone countries must devote far more of their own resources to build capacity, enforce building codes, and prepare communities for natural disasters that Conclusion. The strides made in they can expect. Donor countries also response efforts between the 2005 need to increase spending on disaster earthquake and the 2010 floods in preparedness and work mainstream Pakistan amply demonstrate the benefits DRR activities into their long-term of investments that strengthen public development strategies for countries health networks, build institutional at heightened risk of natural disasters. capacity for national disaster planning, New actors, whether from the Pakistani and create the institutional and diaspora or the private sector, should professional relationships that ensure be encouraged to play an increasing effective coordination. These steps role and to participate meaningfully in taken in Pakistan and around the world dialogue and coordination with disaster

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relief professionals who have hardwon experience and expertise. To its credit, the U.S. government accepts that it must do more. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review released in December 2010 expressly recognized the importance of greater capacity in humanitarian disaster response, and called for doubling the staff in USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign

Disaster Assistance.15 More than two centuries ago Benjamin Franklin taught us that, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” That message is still salient today in a world facing larger and more costly natural disasters. If we can be disciplined and give prevention its due, we will not fall short in future disaster responses.

NOTES

1 Remarks by Jan Egeland, former U.N. UnderSecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, 10 October 2006.

2 UN News Centre, 9 February 2011.

3 Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) of the Université Catholique de Louvain in Belgium.

4 Margareta Wahlström, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Preparedness, cited in UN ISDR press release, 24 January 2011.

5 USAID, “South Asia – Earthquake Factsheet #44,” 25 August 2006, p. 1.

6 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Funding to South Asia Earthquake – October 2005,” Internet, http://fts.unocha.org (date accessed: 2 April 2011).

7 USAID, “South Asia – Earthquake Factsheet #44,” 25 August 2006, p. 2.

8 USAID, “Haiti – Earthquake Factsheet #11,” 4 March 2011, p.1; USAID, “Chile – Earthquake Factsheet #18,” 22 April 2010, p.1; USAID, “Japan – Earthquake and Tsunami Factsheet #13,” 24 March 2011, p.1.

9 UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs, “Flash Appeal: Pakistan Floods Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan,” Internet, http://fts.unocha.org (date accessed: 2 April 2011).

10 “New United States Agency for International Development Contribution Helps Feed 7.3 Million Flood-Affected Pakistanis”, USAID press release, 8 November 2010.

11 National Disaster Management Authority, “Government of Pakistan National Disaster Risk management Framework,” 2006, p. VII. 12 USAID, “Prompt Diagnosis and Treatment Prevents Epidemic in Pakistan,” 18 November 2010, Internet, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb. nsf/db900sid/VVOS-8BBTUP?OpenDocument (date accessed: 2 April 2011).

13 Ibid.

14 Remarks by Dr. Rajiv Shah, “The Modern Development Enterprise,” Center for Global Development, 19 January 2011.

15 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review “Leading Through Civilian Power,” U.S. Department of State, (December 2010): 133-143

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Politics&Diplomacy Behind the Façade of Rwanda’s Elections Filip Reyntjens Elections are important moments in the political life of a nation. They throw past government performance into the spotlight, allow for the unveiling of national policy visions, introduce new political actors, and shake up power configurations. Rwanda has been denied these opportunities. Since its independence from Belgium in 1962, the country has been a democracy in name only. It became a de facto oneparty state in 1965 and was governed by a de jure single party between 1975 and 1991. After a nine-year transition following the 1994 genocide, the current regime claimed to move toward more democratic governance, with parliamentary and presidential elections in 2003. The next parliamentary poll took place in 2008, and the most recent presidential election was organized on 9 August 2010. These electoral exercises disguised an authoritarian dictatorship with a thin veneer of democratic legitimacy.

This article outlines the history leading up to the last election. It then analyzes the run-up to the presidential poll and the election itself. Finally, it addresses the significance of elections in post-genocide Rwanda and considers the role that the international community should play in support of the country’s democracy and growth. This article argues [ 6 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Filip Reyntjens is a Professor of Law and Politics at the Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp, Belgium. He has worked for 35 years in and on the African Great Lakes Region, on which he has published several books and numerous articles.

His latest book is The Great African War. Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006 (New York, Cambridge University Press).

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that Rwanda is not even a moderately functioning democracy, that politics of exclusion result in widespread structural violence, and that the international community should act now to deter any future violence.

Post-1994 Rwanda: From genocide to dictatorship.1 The

ideology” (2008) allowed the RPF to eliminate dissent and to impose its own readings of history and truth. Almost one thousand people had been thrown in prison by August 2009 based on these broadly phrased laws that served political and personal interests.

Despite the disappearance of opposition parties before the 2003 election, the RPF did not feel secure. As a result, it appropriated the National Election Commission for use as a weapon of control, a move that the International Crisis Group has called “political control at its best.”3 The ICG further described the commission as “both too powerful and too partisan…a tool of political control, not an independent and transparent institution.”4 The campaigns preceding the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections and the 2008 parliamentary elections were marred by arrests, disappearances, and intimidation.5 During the 2003 vote, an EU observer mission observed fraud, intimidation, the manipulation of electoral lists, ballotbox stuffing, lack of voting secrecy, and lack of transparency in the counting procedure. The mission concluded that “political pluralism is more limited than during the transitional period.”6 As a result of such tactics, the RPF obtained over 98 percent of the vote— a result so unbelievable that it was reduced by 20 percent in the official tally and eleven seats were offered to two parties that were part of the RPF’s coalition.7 Rwanda was now a de facto single-party state, with the RPF as its “sole legal political operative.”8

Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) came to power in July 1994 following its victory in the civil war and the end of the genocide. It claimed to establish a “Government of National Unity,” purportedly in line with the 1993 Arusha peace accord. The RPF immediately started to consolidate power and to silence dissent, however, and even used physical force in a number of cases.

While the initial victims were Hutu, during the following years the same fate befell Tutsi politicians, journalists, and military officers. In short, the regime persecuted anyone whose loyalty to the regime was in doubt. The last political party that asserted some autonomy from the RPF, the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR), was banned in 2003, just prior to the national elections held later that year. The little that remained of civil society was eliminated in 2004, when the leadership of Rwanda’s last remaining independent human rights organization, Liprodhor, was forced into exile.

The media was also suppressed, and journalists were threatened, murdered or exiled. As early as 2001, Réporters Sans Frontières labeled President Kagame a “predator of press freedom.”2 The legal system also proved to be a powerful tool that the RPF used to deal with dissent. Most notably, statutes The 2010 presidential elecon “divisionism” (2001) and “genocide tion. While the political opposition

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seemed to have been eliminated in 2003, it resurfaced in 2009 and 2010 in the run-up to the presidential elections. Until then none of the existing parties considered themselves to be in the opposition. Rather, they were part of an RPF-dominated coalition. As one of the leaders of the Liberal Party stated during a 2008 meeting, “We are not here to oppose President Kagame, but to build the nation. Rwanda does not need a European-type opposition.”9 Beginning in mid-2009, opposition parties sought recognition. Only the Parti Social (PS)-Imberakuri had registered, however—and with great difficulty—by July 2009. Chaired by the outspoken Hutu lawyer Bernard Ntaganda, it announced a policy of change and strongly criticized the record of the RPF, an action that no party had taken in years. Yet, two other parties failed to secure recognition. The Democratic Green Party was created by RPF dissenters—one of whom was a former RPF chairman. The Forces Démocratiques Unifiées (FDU)-Inkingi was among several political movements active in exile, and its chair, Victoire Ingabire, returned to Rwanda to run for the presidency. The regime accused her of espousing “divisionism” and “genocide ideology.”10 Repression intensified after April 2010, when Ingabire was arrested and indicted for “genocide ideology,” a charge later extended to include “forming a terrorist organization.”11 Two months later, PS-Imberakuri leader Bernard Ntaganda was accused of “ethnic divisionism, organizing a meeting without authorization, constituting a criminal grouping and attempted murder.”12 The assassination of the vice-

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president of the Democratic Green Party on 13 July only worsened the country’s political atmosphere, which had already been darkened by threats against party leaders. It engineered splits in opposition parties, and erected administrative barriers that prevented independent parties from functioning.

The press was hit hard as well. The Media High Council (MHC), Rwanda’s broadcasting and print media regulator, suspended two of the few remaining independent newspapers Umuseso and Umuvugizi, for six months, thus barring them from covering the lead-up to the presidential poll. Their editors fled to Uganda after receiving repeated death threats. One editor was the victim of an assassination attempt in Kampala. Jean-Léonard Rugambage, the co-editor of Umuvugizi, was shot and killed in Kigali at the end of June, barely a day after he published a story covering the regime’s hit squads on the journal’s website, which was blocked by servers inside Rwanda. While the government wanted to portray Rugambage as a victim of a revenge killing, his exiled editor indicated that “Rwandan intelligence services were on a killing spree,” and alleged that these killings were conducted “with the knowledge of President Kagame himself.”13 In July 2010, two journalists of a third paper, Umurabyo, were arrested on charges of “sedition, publishing material defamatory to the person of the President, inciting public disorder, ethnic divisionism and promoting genocide ideology.”14 On 28 July, the entire print stock of The Newsline, a newspaper set up

by Umuseso journalists in Kampala, was seized at the Uganda-Rwanda border.

On the same day, the MHC released

BEHIND THE FAÇADE OF RWANDA’S ELECTIONS

a list of media outlets authorized to operate in the country. None of the major independent outlets was included, which meant that they were no longer suspended, but banned altogether.15 The RPF’s silencing of the media revealed a deep sense of insecurity.

Despite its total control over the country’s political bodies, military, and law enforcement mechanisms, it could not afford to face open political competition on a level playing field. In the RPF’s eyes, opposition would constitute an unacceptable challenge to its political monopoly, especially at a time when internal tension posed a serious threat to the regime’s power.

Prior to the election, divisions had indeed begun to appear within the RPF and, in particular, within the army, the party’s historical base. On 26 February, former Chief of Army Staff General Kayumba Nyamwasa, fearing arrest, fled the country and sought asylum in South Africa. He told the international press that the regime was evolving toward “total dictatorship,” and he accused Kagame of being corrupt.16 The regime immediately started constructing a judicial file against Nyamwasa and other opponents, including Colonel Karegeya, who fled to South Africa in 2007. The regime accused them of involvement in a spate of grenade attacks committed during the previous months.17 On 19 June, Nyamwasa was shot and seriously wounded in Johannesburg. Some suspects were apprehended and, on 1 July, the South African government, without specifically naming Rwanda, revealed that “intelligence operatives” from a “country with which we have good and strong diplomatic relations” were involved in

the attempted murder.18 The purges in the army did not stop there; on 19 April two Generals were arrested, followed by a retired Colonel on 22 April and another General on June 10. Rumors of an impending coup d’état again circulated, contributing to the regime’s apprehension.

While opposition candidates were prevented from running, the National Election Commission announced on 7 July that three other contenders had been given the green light to participate in the presidential poll. These “stooge candidates” were from three parties that were in the same coalition as the RPF, and they stood no chance against Kagame. In fact, the listing of candidates who pose no serious challenge to the incumbent is an old tactic in Rwanda. Such candidates are known locally as “bridesmaids.”19 Despite overwhelming condemnation from international human rights organizations, the polls went ahead. Kagame “won” with 93.08 percent of the vote, while his opponents garnered 5.15 percent, 1.37 percent, and 0.40 percent respectively. The turnout was a whopping 98.06 percent.20 The regime achieved “victory” by pressuring voters and by conducting massive fraud at two levels. At the local level, many ballot boxes were stuffed with ballots filled out by local officials.

At the national level, ballots and tabulations disappeared between the polling day (9 August) and the announcement of the results on 11 August. No independent observers were present at the counting. According to well-placed sources, the poll result was so overwhelming that the electoral commission reduced Kagame’s score when they

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published it. This might explain the uniform nature of the results across the country—Kagame obtained between 92.5 and 93.99 percent in all provinces.21

Conclusion. Rwanda is a de facto one party state. The RPF maintains its political monopoly through intimidation, threats, human rights abuses, and the elimination of dissent. The regime fully controls the political landscape from the national to the local level. This control is exercised by an elite composed of the minority Tutsi ethnic group, and causes resentment and frustration among the Hutu majority. The RPF is fully aware that opening up the political system would eventually lead to a loss of power. It astutely exploits the “genocide credit” to guarantee the tolerance of the international community.22 The RPF has gradually explored the limits of that tolerance, creating widespread political distortions that may again lead to acute violence. The elections of 2003, 2008, and 2010 have been cosmetic exercises, created primarily for international consumption. Unfortunately, President Kagame is just one part of the country’s many systemic problems, which include a blatant disregard for the lives of Rwandan citizens, pervasive structural violence, a completely cordoned-off political system, and dangerous and growing inequality between the capital city and the rest of the country. Therefore, solely replacing Kagame with another dictator would be both an

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unrealistic and futile solution to the country’s problems.

So what should the international community do to encourage change?

Acting in a consortium, the country’s main donors—the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United States, the European Union and the World Bank—should engage the Rwandan government in a discussion to establish a road map for the next decade. This road map should contain a number of clearly identified benchmarks, ranging from political (such as the opening of political space for opposition parties, respect for human rights, independence of the judiciary, and the restoration of media freedom) to socio-economic (such as poverty alleviation, reduction of inequality, acknowledgment of the skills of smallholder peasants, and respect for the urban poor). The Rwandan government and the consortium should assess progress on an annual or biannual basis, and trends toward or away from the benchmarks should lead to appropriate reorientations of aid. Over 25 percent of aid is in the form of general budget support, and aid accounts for roughly 50 percent of the country’s GDP. In light of Rwanda’s extreme dependency, this may provide the necessary leverage to keep the country from reverting to conflict. The need to act is not only about democracy and human rights, but also about peace in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region.23

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NOTES

1 For a more detailed overview, see F. Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship,” African Affairs (2004): 177-210; F. Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda” African Affairs (2011): 1-34.

2 Reporters sans frontières, Rwanda. Discrete and Targeted Pressure: President Kagame is a Predator of Press Freedom, Paris, 7 November 2001.

3 International Crisis Group, Rwanda at the end of the transition: a necessary political liberalization, (Nairobi-Brussels, 13 November 2002) 12.

4 Ibid, 23.

5 Mission d’observation électorale de l’Union Européenne, Rwanda. Election présidentielle 25 août 2003. Elections législatives 29 et 30 septembre, 2 octobre 2003, Rapport final, n.d.; European Union Election Observer Mission, Republic of Rwanda, Legislative Elections to the Chamber of Deputies 15-18 September 2008, Final Report, n.d.

6 Mission d’observation électorale de l’Union Européenne, 4.

7 This calculation by members of the EU observation team was based on a very robust sample size of 24.96% of the total vote (which gave a standard error for the smallest sample of under one percent).

8 International Crisis Group, “Consensual Democracy” in Post Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections, (9 October 2001): 23.

9 “Rwanda. Elections en trompe-l’oeil” Le VifL’Express, (4 August 2008).

10 “Ingabire Appears in Court,” The New Times (Kigali: 22 April 2010).

11 “Ingabire Appears in Court,” The New Times (13 October 2010).

12 In February 2011, Ntaganda was condemned to a four-year prison term. Ingabire was awaiting trial at the time of this writing. “Rwanda: les arrestations d’opposants se multiplient,” (Kigali, AFP, 25 June 2010).

13 “Editor’s murder ‘approved by Rwandan President,’” The Independent (London: 2 July 2010).

14 On 4 February 2011, they were sentenced to seventeen and seven years imprisonment. “Police speaks out on Umurabyo arrests,” The New Times (14 July 2010).

15 For an overview of actions taken by the regime, see Human Rights Watch, Rwanda. Attacks on freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of assembly in the runup to presidential elections. January to July 2010 (New York: 2

August 2010).

16 See “Gen. Nyamwasa responds to Kagame,” Sunday Monitor (Kampala: 30 May 2010).

17 “Kayumba, Karegeya behind terror attacks – Prosecution,” The New Times, (3 March 2010).

18 “Foreign ‘security operatives’ involved in Gen. Nyamwasa shooting,” Kigali, RNA, 1 July 2010. The government reacted strongly to the suggestion that Rwandan agents were involved, and Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo summoned the South African High Commissioner to complain about the “very unprofessional” way in which the South African police conducted the investigations. In early August, Pretoria recalled its High Commissioner “for consultations,” a strong indication of discontent with Rwanda’s handling of this matter. Relations between the two countries have remained distant since. The attempted murder is due to go to trial in South Africa in July 2011, and this may create new tensions.

19 Of the two candidates presented to the Senate for appointment to the Supreme Court, one is meant to be chosen, while the second is there only for show.

The second candidate is known in the profession as “the bridesmaid.” For details, see Human Rights Watch, Law and Reality. Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda, (New York: 24 July 2008) 46.

20 National Electoral Commission, Presidential elections of August 9, 2010, Final results in summary (http://www.comelena.gov.rw) 21 Ibid.

22 On this, see F. Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship,” African Affairs (2004), 199-200.

23 Regional destabilisation by Rwanda since 1996 has been widely documented (for an overview see F. Reyntjens, The Great African War. Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006, [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009]). The massive human rights violations committed by the Rwandan army in the DRC has been the object of an extensive report of the UN High Commission for Human Rights: United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003. Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, (Geneva: August 2010).

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An Unfinished Revolution Shadi Hamid On 25 January 2011, the first day of Egypt’s uprising, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton affirmed: “our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable.”1 Eighteen days later, Egypt had a revolution, which concluded when the Egyptian military forced President Hosni Mubarak to step down from his position. After this remarkable turn of events, the Egyptian regime was simultaneously thought to be both more ruthless and more unified. After several years of impressive economic growth, the regime had the support of a powerful emerging business elite. It also had the United States as its primary benefactor. None of that was enough.

On the night of the revolution, I was in Tahrir Square.

The crowd erupted in cheers, chanting, “You’re Egyptian!

Raise your head up high!” when they heard the announcement. The Muslim Brotherhood youth activist Abdelrahman Ayyash sent me a short, simple text message: “We did it.” And they had. For Egypt’s new revolutionaries—many of them young and some of them still in college—the revolution is far from complete though. In some ways, the transition phase will prove just as critical as the revolution itself. [ 70] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Dr. Shadi Hamid is the Director of Research at the Brookings Doha Center and is a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy. He has a B.S. from Georgetown University and a Ph.D. from Oxford University. He has written extensively about democracy, politics, and Islamism in the Middle East and has previously worked for Stanford University and the U.S. Department of State.

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New Roles. Despite its “revolution,” Tahrir Square.

Egypt is not currently led by revolutionaries. It is led by the military, under the auspices of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Far from a pro-democracy organization, Egypt’s armed forces have been the backbone of the Mubarak regime for a very long time. Mubarak, after all, was a member of the Egyptian military and they dutifully supported his rule for three decades. Thus, it was ironic that throughout the eighteen days of protest, “the people and the army hand in hand,” became a popular chant among the protesters. Some of

For many civilians, 9 March was a turning point, bringing back painful memories of the old regime. That day, soldiers and plainly clothed thugs armed with pipes and electric cables stormed the square and detained nearly two hundred people, and then took them to be tortured in a makeshift prison at the Egyptian Museum. Because the military operates above the law in a transitional void, Egyptians have few resources to challenge such abuses. In the new Egypt, the military and the revolutionaries quickly found that they wanted two different things. The former wished to preserve stability at all

Re-building Egyptian politics means

having a conversation about institutions, why they matter, and how they put an indelible footprint on the future practice of politics. this was certainly tactical on the part of the protesters—a way to create a sense of solidarity and, hopefully, to bring the military to their side. With the military defying orders to shoot into crowds, it seemed to work.

In the early months of the revolution, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces acted in an ad-hoc manner, communicating with Egyptians through cryptic communiqués and failing to consult civil society before making major decisions. A considerable amount of backdoor negotiating was taking place, but no one quite knew how, when, or who was involved. Moreover, the military was not averse to using force in order to disperse protesters in

costs, while the latter desired to push forward aggressively with democratization.

The army has been thrust into a new and challenging position. It was asked to take charge of an unwieldy, crumbling country and to govern it—a task for which none of its commanders was prepared. Meanwhile, the military faced constant pressure from Egypt’s protest movements, which continued to bring out large crowds. There was a new “protest ethic” in Egypt; if there is a problem, gather tens of thousands and occupy your country’s main square. Do not leave until you get what you want.

But the insistence on street presence obscures the larger challenges of Egypt’s transition. The revolution was led by

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young Egyptians. Their goal was simple: to oust Mubarak from office. Now they face the challenge of translating a relatively amorphous, spontaneous movement into a new regime that is both organized and sustainable.

One of the youth coalitions in question, a movement known as “April 6,” drew inspiration, tactics, as well as the clenched fist design for its logo, from Otpor (“resistance”), the youth movement that brought down Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic. If Otpor’s subsequent history is any indication, youth movements established to oppose autocratic regimes fare considerably better before, rather than after their revolutions. Eventually, after some internal dissent, Otpor established itself as a political party ahead of the 2003 parliamentary elections but only managed to win a mere 1.6 percent of the total vote. Otpor’s first problem was coming up with a distinctive mission or ideology. They knew what they were against— repression and corruption—but what exactly were they for?

These are the same challenges that Egypt’s young (and old) revolutionaries will need to grapple with. All of the country’s various groupings, from the Muslim Brotherhood to various leftist and liberal parties, found themselves in an entirely unprecedented situation on the morning after Mubarak’s resignation. Egypt’s fractious opposition spent little time thinking seriously about what it would do in power. The prospect of governing seemed too remote. While in opposition to an autocratic regime, vague political programs calling for little more than political freedoms and democratic reform were more than enough. But if Egypt becomes a democ-

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racy, these groups and parties will need to decide what sort of democracy they would like to see develop. Rebuilding Egyptian politics means having a conversation about institutions, why they matter, and how they put an indelible footprint on the future practice of politics.

Rebuilding Egyptian Politics.

Successful revolutions often lead to dashed expectations and disillusion.

Democratic transitions are notoriously messy, unpredictable, and uncertain.

The essential challenge for revolutions is building or rebuilding a new political regime—one with its own distinctive rules and institutions. This, even in the best of circumstances, is no easy task, as Egypt’s revolutionaries are discovering. The choices before them are not clear-cut. Most of the youth movements as well as prospective presidential candidates Mohamed El Baradei and Amr Moussa support extending the transition period from six months to at least one year, but under the auspices of a mixed military-civilian rule. Established political groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and remnants of the ruling National Democratic Party argue that Egypt is ready to move quickly to civilian rule and to elect a new parliament and president. Each side, not surprisingly, is arguing in its own interests. Well-organized groups with existing networks of support and funding would benefit from early elections, allowing them to eclipse the country’s newly emerging political forces. After

AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION

aggressively lobbying for a “yes” vote, such groups claimed victory in the 19 March referendum, which ratified constitutional amendments that pave the way for a shorter transition period leading up to parliamentary and presidential elections.

What happens within the interim phase will have lasting effects. The Egyptian military, even if it makes a quick return to the barracks, has the power to shape and influence outcomes that determine the allocation of resources and opportunity structures for newly legalized groups and parties.

Once institutions are introduced and solidified, it becomes more challenging to change them. As Frances Hagopian comments, “political arrangements, once in place, condition future political behavior and possibilities.”2

ingly religious. Islamist groups, despite government harassment, enjoy relatively reliable funding streams; as mass membership organizations, they bring in millions in annual dues. Many operate as states-within-states, with a wideranging institutional infrastructure that includes mosques, schools, hospitals, clinics, banks, businesses, daycare centers, and even Boy Scout troops. Liberals and leftists, on the other hand, have little more than themselves.

Just a few months before the revolution, analysts were writing off the Muslim Brotherhood. The group had struggled to respond to the regime’s mounting repression, which included seizing financial assets, routine arrests, and a constitutional amendment effectively banning Islamist political activity.

As senior Brotherhood figure Esam alErian acknowledged in 2008, “if things

Egypt’s Islamists, experiencing unprecedented freedom of movement, have grown more emboldened since the revolution.

Such considerations are particularly important for a country like Egypt, which lacks strong political parties or a level playing field. The Mubarak regime long benefited from portraying itself as the only alternative, however imperfect, to Islamist rule. It did not want the emergence of strong liberal or leftist parties to spoil the narrative.

But that was only one part of the story. Islamists had the advantage of a recognizable ideology that was naturally attractive to large numbers of Egyptians in a society that was growing increas-

continue as they are… the Brotherhood won’t have any [parliamentary] seats at all.”3 At the time, it sounded like an exaggeration; after all, the group had eighty-eight seats, making it the leader of the parliamentary opposition. But, as it turned out, the November 2010 polls were arguably the most fraudulent in Egyptian history, giving 209 of 211 seats to the ruling National Democratic Party. The Brotherhood was shut out.

In short, the outlook appeared exceedingly bleak.

Today, by contrast, the Brotherhood finds itself in an enviable, delicate

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position as the most powerful group in Egypt. On 4 March, Egypt’s new prime minister, Essam Sharaf, addressed a raucous crowd in Tahrir Square. Standing by his side was none other than senior Brotherhood leader Mohamed al-Beltagi, capping what amounted to a remarkable reversal of fortune for the long-banned group.

This has made many leftists and liberals nervous. If elections were held tomorrow, they would not stand a chance. And, even if elections are held within six months, they might still have trouble competing. Building credible political parties takes time. The Brotherhood, for its part, has tried to allay some of these fears, saying that it would not seek a parliamentary majority. This should provide some consolation— Islamist groups have a history of losing elections on purpose to avoid provoking powerful domestic or international actors.4 In the new Egypt, the old regime might be gone, but Islamists still fear a backlash if they rise too quickly. In the coming phase, the Brotherhood will want to focus on rebuilding its battered organization and expanding its influence in public life through educational activities and social service provision.

That said, Egypt’s Islamists, experiencing unprecedented freedom of movement, have grown more emboldened since the revolution.

Politics & Diplomacy

not just on their own efforts but also on the political institutions that mediate and channel political activity. Unlike some of its neighbors, Egypt has a set of existing political institutions, however flawed, left over from the old regime.

There is no need to start from scratch.

Not surprisingly then, Egypt’s transition has proceeded more smoothly than would normally be the case in a country emerging from sixty years of uninterrupted authoritarian rule.

But the fact that Egypt has something to build on has its downsides as well.

In the absence of political institutions, actors are free to consider new and varied arrangements. They are less bound by preconceived notions of what does or does not work. Instead of drawing up an entirely new constitution, amendments were proposed to govern political life in the interim period. Those amendments were ratified by 77 percent of voters in a 19 March referendum. Some opposition figures find the old constitution to be inherently flawed. El Baradei, for example, said that keeping the 1971 constitution is “an insult to the revolution.”5 Even with the amendments, the Egyptian constitution gives privilege to the position of the president, failing to put any real limits on his power.

The most important institution—one that Giovanni Sartori calls “the most specific manipulative instrument of politics”—may be the electoral system.6 How to Design Institutions. Egypt has grown accustomed to FirstWith or without the Brotherhood, Past-the-Post, the system used in the Egypt’s young revolutionaries and its United States and Britain, where the smattering of small secular parties will recipient of the highest number of votes need to find a way to extend their reach in any single district takes the seat. It beyond the cities, build grassroots sup- does not matter if the runner-up wins port, and devise distinctive political 48 percent or 24 percent. Unfortuprograms. Their success will depend nately, because of their evident dispro[ 74 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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portionality, majoritarian systems may be appropriate for some societies, but not for others. The debate over which electoral system best fits the country is one that emerging democracies should have but often do not. As Barkan notes, leaders in transitional situations have “rarely considered the likely outcomes of alternative forms of electoral systems when choosing a system for their countries.”7 Usually, the choice is made “on the basis of what is familiar.”8 What, then, should Egypt want—and need—from a new electoral system?

Single member districts will boost large, well-organized parties and manufacture artificial majorities, while shutting out smaller parties from significant representation. Hypothetically, a mediumsized party could win 15 percent of the national vote in a majoritarian system and end up with absolutely no seats in parliament. Majoritarian systems also depress women and minority represen-

re-elected or voted out of office.

Meanwhile, proportional systems aim to minimize the gap between the votes that a party receives and the share of seats it gains. They therefore privilege fairness over effectiveness, and consider the inclusion of minority voices to be critical to democracy-building. With even small parties guaranteed representation, Egyptians will have more choices at the ballot box, making them more likely to vote in the first place. Of course, the fact that more parties are represented means that no one party is likely to win an outright majority and govern alone. One can envision a scenario where small Salafi parties are able to play the role of “kingmaker” in close elections. Government coalitions that include ideologically diverse parties are more likely to fall, which may lead to frequent government collapse and holding of early elections which produce similarly unstable coalitions.

If Egypt fails – either by reverting to

authoritarianism or descending into chaos – it will have a profoundly negative effect on the tation because parties have an incentive to run a candidate with the best chance of winning, and in Egypt, that would usually mean a Muslim male. On the other hand, because it is more likely to produce one winner, a majoritarian system would facilitate effective and stable governance. After five years, voters can then decide whether the party— rather than a confusing coalition of parties—did a good job and should be

Considering what is at stake, Egyptians need to have a wide-ranging conversation about the advantages and disadvantages of each of the available options. With fears of Islamist dominance, the relative weakness of political parties, and the marginalization of women and Copts, an electoral system that prioritizes proportionality and representation would appear to be the more promising option. During an

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uncertain transition, it is important that all groups, from Nasserists to conservative Islamists, feel they have a stake in the new system. Otherwise, they may be in a position to play spoiler. At the same time, there are risks in a divided parliamentary system, where divisions in the cabinet and the disproportionate sway of radicals lead to policy paralysis, which in turn can lead to a loss of faith in the democratic project. Egyptians will want to see any democratically elected government quickly take up their concerns, reforming bloated bureaucracy and the crumbling health and educational systems while aggressively addressing economic inequity.

With this in mind, electoral systems such as Germany’s—a mixture of proportional representation and single member districts—may be worth considering.

Beyond the electoral setup, there is also the matter of presidential power.

For the past five decades, the president concentrated power in his own hands, dominating all decision-making at the expense of legislature and the judiciary.

Should Egypt remain a presidential system? And if so, what is the appropriate balance between the president and the legislature? Such decisions are made at the beginning of a transition and there are rarely opportunities to reconsider them. As Stephen Krasner cautions, “once a particular fork is chosen, it is very difficult to get back on a rejected path.”9

Politics & Diplomacy

were in the streets protesting, which leads to a disconnect between those who want more and those willing to accept less. These divisions became apparent in Egypt when “opposition” parties and others seen as close to the old regime quickly shifted position and tried to align themselves with the right side of the revolution. Established political parties like the liberal Wafd and the leftist Tagammu, distrusted by the protest movements for perceived collaboration with Mubarak, now have a chance to refashion themselves in the new Egypt.

They were seen as participating in—and therefore legitimizing—a broken system under decades of authoritarian rule.

The Brotherhood, to a lesser extent, has been accused of failing to confront the regime when it was the only group— with upwards of 300,000 people—that could challenge the National Democratic Party’s grip on power.

Meanwhile, remnants of the ruling party, which officially claimed three million members before the protests began, remain a potent force. They have begun refashioning themselves as faithful to a revolution that they first opposed. In early March, the party’s new secretary-general Mohamed Ragab, in an effort to “clean the party,” formally expelled twenty-one leading members, including President Mubarak’s son Gamal and other hated symbols of the old regime. What is their role to play in the new Egypt?

Such tensions are inevitably difficult to manage. Any revolution needs to Negotiating the Transition. De- balance the desire for retribution and cision-making during the transition accountability with the need to forgive requires painstaking negotiations, of- and rehabilitate. At what point does ten outside the public purview. Often, punishing regime officials and preventthe ones negotiating are not those who ing them from participating become [ 76 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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counterproductive? At the same time, allowing regime officials to reconstitute themselves in a different guise runs the risk of allowing old patterns of power to persist well into the transition.

This is only likely to hasten popular disillusion, as it has after transitions and revolution in Latin American and Eastern Europe. Hagopian writes that “after the peaceful alternations of power almost everywhere in Latin America lies a widespread disaffection, if not with the idea of democracy then with existing democratic regimes and established political parties.”10 In Brazil, for example, voter turnout dropped from a high of 95 percent in 1986 to 70 percent just four years later.11 With these obstacles, Egypt’s transition will be difficult and uneven.

As capable as Egyptians are, international support and financial assistance will be necessary, particularly from the advanced democracies of the United States and Europe. To be sure, Western countries have a checkered, tragic history in the region, having funded and supported Arab autocrats for upwards of five decades. Now, those countries have an opportunity to learn from past mistakes, and this time, to play a more positive role in Egypt. The United States was rightly credited for helping facilitate transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The fact remains that democratization is more likely to succeed with, rather than without, constructive engagement from Western governments and organizations. In their new book, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way make precisely this argument; in states with extensive ties and linkage to the West, democratic transitions stand a much better chance

of leading to democracy. “Among highlinkage cases…nearly every transition resulted in democracy.”12 For these reasons and many others, Egypt should be a top policy priority for the United States and the international community. If Egypt fails— either by reverting to authoritarianism or descending into chaos—there will be a profoundly negative effect on the rest of the region. On the other hand, Egypt, as the most populous and influential Arab nation, has the potential—with the right sort of assistance—to become a model for others. Even if the latter happens, it will be a long, difficult road.

Egypt is in a strategically vital position. The region will be watching Egypt closely, with autocrats hoping that it will fail and reformers drawing inspiration from its successes. Inevitably, while the United States will be part of the unfolding story, it has a great deal of work ahead of it if it plans to overcome the distrust of Egyptians. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Cairo for the first time since Mubarak was ousted, the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth refused to meet with her, citing “her negative position from the beginning of the revolution and the position of the U.S. administration in the Middle East.”13 Indeed, there is a widespread sense that the Obama administration stuck by President Mubarak and his regime well into the uprising. But now that Mubarak is gone, the United States has a chance to put the past behind it and to develop a new relationship with Egypt and, more importantly, with the Egyptians who long ago lost faith that America would do the right thing.

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NOTES

1 David Sanger, “As Mubarek Digs In, U.S. Policy in Egypt is Complicated,” Internet, http://www.nytimes. com/2011/02/06/world/middleeast/06policy.html?_ r=1 (date accessed: 11 May 2011).

2 Frances Hagopian, “Democracy by Undemocratic Means? Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil,” Comparative Political Studies 23 (July 1990): 148 3 Interview by author with Esam al-Erian, 16 July 2008.

4 For more on why Islamists deliberately lose elections, see Shadi Hamid, “Arab Islamist Parties: Losing on Purpose?” Journal of Democracy, 22 no. 1 (January 2011) 5 “ElBaradei: Keeping 1971 Constitition ‘Insult to Revolotuion,” Internet, http://www.almasryalyoum. com/en/node/354318 (date accessed: 10 May 2011).

6 Giovanni Sartori, “Political Development and Political Engineering,” Public Policy 17 (1968): 273 7 Joel D. Barkan, Paul J. Densham and Gerard

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Rushton, “Space Matters: Designing Better electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies,” American Journal of Political Science 50 (October 2006): 926 8 Ibid 9 Stephen Krasner, “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” Comparative Politics 16 (January 1984): 225 10 Frances Hagopian, “After Regime Change: Authoritarian Legacies, Political Representation, and the Democratic Future of South America,” World Politics 45 (April 1993): 475 11 Ibid, p. 479 12 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 13 Kristen Chick, “Clinton, Rebuffed in Egypt, Faces Tough Task on Arab Upheaval,” Internet, http:// www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0315/ Clinton-rebuffed-in-Egypt-faces-tough-task-onArab-upheaval (date accessed: 11 May 2011).

Conflcit&Security Drone Attacks Inside Pakistan Wayang or Willing Suspension of Disbelief?1 Shuja Nawaz The United States’ unannounced and unacknowledged war against Pakistan in the form of drone attacks launched from sites in Afghanistan and Pakistan continues to be a source of political unrest in the region. It has fortified opposition to the United States among the people of Pakistan, especially in the hinterland, where it has become a symbol of what many consider an unequal partnership between the United States and the government of Pakistan. Compounding the confusion about the legality of such attacks and the anger directed against them is the behavior of the Pakistani authorities, who publicly condemn these attacks and privately condone them.

It is widely believed, though hard to corroborate with concrete evidence, that the Pakistani military and civil authorities abet these attacks or have abetted them in the past.

This situation can be compared to the Indonesian shadow puppet shows, or Wayang, with the United States playing the role of puppet master and Pakistani officials willing to suspend disbelief in private exchanges with the United States while protesting against drone attacks in public.

U.S. authorities do not acknowledge drone attacks, nor do they share publicly the results of these attacks. Privately, they trumpet the success of these attacks in eliminating key

Shuja Nawaz is Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council, a bipartisan think tank in Washington DC. He is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within and numerous articles and monographs on FATA and the region and U.S. relations with South Asia.

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Al Qaeda and Taliban figures. Yet the attacks continue and have risen dramatically in the years since President Barack Obama took office, even as the number of civilians killed appears to have dropped. But at the heart of the problem are not just the drones and their legality, but the chronic mistrust that pervades the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, which has deeper historical origins. The drones are simply a reflection of that clash.

According to analysis completed by the New American Foundation for the period 2004 to 2011, some two hundred twenty-two strikes have taken place inside Pakistan, specifically in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas,

and the fatality rate is suspect, as the United States anonymously claims a far higher number of militant, rather than civilian, deaths. Civilian deaths have reportedly been on the decline in recent years, as better intelligence and more precise weaponry allow the United States to target militants inside FATA more effectively.

Pakistan’s official position indicates opposition to the attacks, which are seen as an infringement on Pakistan’s sovereignty. There have been cases, however, such as the 2009 attack that killed TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud, in which the Pakistani government has openly praised such operations. Both the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and

The Pakistani government has often

taken more pointed positions toward drone attacks that have created difficulties in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship... or FATA, that form a buffer zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan.1 Most of the strikes have occurred in the area of North or South Waziristan, where Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda, other foreign militants, and the Tehreek-eTaliban, Pakistan (TTP) have had their main bases. The flights originate from bases inside Afghanistanor the Shamsi air base in Pakistan, and are controlled

by CIA personnel in the United States.

The Obama administration has ratcheted up the numbers of attacks, with over one hundred thirteen attacks in 2010 alone, nearly twice the reported attacks in 2009.

Both the numbers of attacks and their effects are hard to pinpoint,

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its Prime Minister celebrated the attack against Mehsud without any criticism of U.S. actions—proclamations that were in stark contrast with earlier official denunciations of drone activity inside FATA.2 The Pakistani government has often taken more pointed positions toward drone attacks that have created difficulties in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, and have fueled public anger against the United States, especially in Pakistan’s hinterland. Following an attack outside FATA in the Bannu district, for example, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani issued a statement to parliament strongly condemning the attacks as “intolerable.”3

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Against this background of uncertainty and mixed messages, key factors affecting drone attacks and their future begin to emerge. These include the historical relationship between FATA and Pakistan, the nature and state of U.S.-Pakistan relations, the legal basis for drone attacks, and what is likely to emerge in the period between 2011 and 2014, as the United States and coalition forces prepare to draw fighting forces out of Afghanistan.

FATA and Pakistan. Ilaqa Ghair, or the “foreign land,” is what most Pakistanis call the strip of land between Pakistan proper and Afghanistan, a territory inherited from the British and protected on its western border by the Durand Line. This line was drawn by the British to demarcate the border between Afghanistan and British India and to fix the limits of their “respective spheres of influence” in the region.

After Pakistan gained independence in 1947, the area was left to the management of local tribes, with scant federal government presence in the form of Political Agents.

Pakistan adopted the system of British laws in the region, which held tribes collectively responsible for any crimes committed in their territory. The government maintained relative control by paying tribal elders (Maliks) fixed amounts relative to their status in tribal society. This allowed the government to play favorites and to keep the tribes divided, competing with each other for largesse from the state.

Beyond this engagement, the Pakistani state, like the British, seems to have forgotten about FATA. It remains a backward and poor part of the country

Conflict & Security

that, even sixty-three years after independence, has standards of living that are lower than the rest of Pakistan. Significant increases in its youth population produced recruits for migration to the bigger cities or for the insurgency.

Karachi, in the south, drew upwards of 4 million Pakhtun, and a lucky few managed to enter the workforce of the Persian Gulf states. The rest were left to forage for themselves in an inhospitable land with little investment in infrastructure, health, and education.

Confiscating duty-free items destined for Afghanistan, and smuggling drugs and weapons became business pastimes for the tribes. A few joined the Pakistan military and others joined the Taliban, but FATA remained the foreign land for most Pakistanis.

During the war against the Soviet Union (1979-1989), FATA became the beachhead against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, especially as money from the CIA and the Pakistani InterServices Intelligence (ISI) poured into the hands of the Mujahedeen. In the aftermath of this war, FATA welcomed the former Jihadist fighters. Many Arab fighters who had been attracted to the battle in the name of Islam stayed behind, since their home countries saw them as a threat to local order and would not have welcomed them back.

These fighters became the core of Al Qaeda under Osama bin Laden, and constituted a new and major disruptive force in the entire region following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

FATA became a new battleground for Pakistan as Pakhtun youths saw the Pakistani army and state as an enemy.

It also became a magnet for Afghan Taliban who used tribal affiliations to

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seek sanctuary on the eastern side of the Durand Line. A number of illadvised military forays into the territory, followed by inept efforts to strike deals with local tribes, compounded the difficulties for the Pakistani army.4 In effect, the invasion of Afghanistan bred two insurgencies—one inside Afghanistan and the other inside Pakistan.

The Pakistani government was unwilling and unable to battle the Afghans seeking sanctuary inside FATA, as it was fully occupied fighting the local insurgency. Furthermore, its longtime strategy to see Afghan politics through a Pakhtun prism made it difficult for leaders to battle Afghan Taliban who may one day be part of the government in Kabul. Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan did not coincide with those of the United States. This ambivalence, or as the United States described it, “double game,” became a source of constant tension in the tenuous strategic alliance between the two countries. In effect, Pakistan was saying, “We’ll fight our battle against our enemies, you fight yours.” Frustration with this Pakistani approach likely contributed to U.S. willingness to take the battle into Pakistan using drones.

The drone technology was ideal for U.S. purposes. It involved no human beings crossing any lines, and therefore no one could be killed or captured on the wrong side of the border. Even Congress, which had authorized the war in Afghanistan under the aegis of a U.S.-led coalition, looked the other way when the military expanded its theater of war into Pakistani territory.

When the Pakistani government played along, the de facto became more or less de jure.

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The Predator drones were unmanned aerial vehicles that flew silently and far, and for long periods of time. They could hover over territory, using their cameras to identify and track people as needed, and could rain down Hellfire missiles onto targets. When combined with good intelligence, they provided plausible deniability against U.S. laws that forbade assassinations in foreign countries. The newer version of these drones, the Reaper, was even more effective and lethal. After some years of messy operations, when reports of collateral civilian deaths angered the local populations inside both FATA and Pakistan, the improvement in technology gave greater confidence to its users. The Obama administration was thus able to gear up drone operations, even as questions regarding their legality mounted.

Are drones operating legally? There has been much scholarly debate about the legality of drone operations inside FATA. First and foremost is the issue of crossing the international boundary that was inherited from the British and agreed upon by Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite Afghanistan’s objections to the permanence of the Durand Line, its actions since 1947 as well as its lack of recourse to any international court to settle the issue of the line, make FATA a foreign territory for both Afghans and for foreign forces using Afghanistan as a base. If this were not the case, there would be no need for formalities for residents of FATA to cross into Afghanistan at will.

A common argument is that FATA is an “ungoverned territory,” and therefore was open to intrusion from neigh-

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boring territories. A cottage industry of studies has sprung up around this argument asserting that the United States’ security interests trumped legal boundaries if those boundaries encompassed “ungoverned territories.”5 These authors describe FATA as a “prototypical ungoverned territory,” since it lacks state penetration and has external interferences, and a substantial presence of weapons in the hands of the local population make the state’s control negligible, if not non-existent.6 A number of commentators capitalized on the concept of ungoverned territory to support invasion of FATA from the air.7 In March 2010, Harold Koh, the State Department’s legal adviser,

Conflict & Security

sons who intend to harm Americans or are involved in armed conflict against the United States. According to these scholars, if the fighting in Afghanistan led to the attacks against U.S. forces by militants hiding in Pakistan, then pre-emptive attacks on the militants are justified.10 The critique of this policy was also trenchant, however, highlighting issues of collateral damage, the weapons’ lack of precision, and the uncertain intelligence on which the attacks are based.

The use of drones against targets that may or may not be genuine enemies of the United States is always a possibility. The unreliability of on-the-ground informants leads to a large proportion of non-combatant civilians being killed

Some 58.8 percent of respondents in a

poll conducted in FATA in 2010 thought that U.S. drone attacks were ‘never justified’. defended the use of drones for targeted attacks against the country’s enemies under the argument that it “may use force” under its “inherent right to self-defense under international law.”8 Koh went on to state that the administration had been conducting its operations in line with law of war principles, such as distinguishing between “military and civilian objects” and limiting attacks only to those which do not cause excessive loss of life.9 Some legal scholars and supporters of human rights opposed Koh’s legal interpretation. Others supported his view that the government has the right to defend itself by acting against per-

in drone strikes.11 Moreover, civilian deaths caused by the drones have helped the local Taliban’s recruitment efforts inside FATA. Baitullah Mehsud was reported to have relied on collateral damage to recruit for the TTP, gathering one hundred fifty volunteers for the organization after a U.S. drone attack.12 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provides countries the right of self-defense against other countries, not against militants or non-state actors. Opponents of drone warfare have advanced this point, asserting that the use of drones is in contravention of international laws that govern the conduct of armed force. They claim

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that the United States has not limited its attacks to situations of armed conflict, and note that the UN Security Council has not given authorization for the attacks.13 Enough doubts have been raised about the legality of cross-border incursions by drones into another country’s sovereign territory to question it. This is perhaps one reason why the United States government has never officially admitted its role in the strikes and why the attacks are often referred to as “covert” actions of the CIA. A legal stalemate appears to have emerged, shrouded in a fog of conflicting statements from the authorities of the United States and Pakistan. The former does not admit to conducting warfare via drones, even as it celebrates the success of this weapon of war. The latter is unwilling to take responsibility for the strikes, but at times clamors for co-ownership of the drone attacks and technology. This is the complicated paradox that these two reluctant allies face as the Afghan war enters its tenth year.

ing to some 2,052 deaths. 2010 was the deadliest year, with one hundred thirty-two attacks killing nine hundred thirty-eight people.

All leading political parties in Pakistan declared their opposition to these attacks in a statement on 28 December 2010, finding them “tantamount to compromising the sovereignty of Pakistan.”14 They urged the government and the army to take immediate steps to stop them. The next day, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani supported their view in parliament, further stating that these attacks were bringing the tribes of FATA closer to the terrorists. Moreover, a case filed by a relative of persons killed in a drone attack in North Waziristan named U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, CIA Director Leon Panetta, and CIA’s station chief in Islamabad, Jonathan Banks, as complicit in the drone attack, effectively bringing U.S.-Pakistan relations to a boil.15 While the discord and debate continue at the governmental level, there is broad opposition to drone attacks inside FATA among the Pakistani population.

What do the people of FATA think? Some 58.8 percent of respondents in Meanwhile, most people in Pakistan a poll conducted in FATA in 2010 continue to oppose the drone attacks thought that U.S. drone attacks were inside their territory and see them as an “never justified.”18 Some 24.5 percent infringement on Pakistan’s sovereign- felt that drone attacks were “sometimes ty. Their government’s acquiescence justified, if properly targeted and civilto these attacks may well be one of the ian casualties are avoided,” and 4.4 reasons why President Asif Ali Zardari’s percent thought that drone attacks were ratings in opinion polls remain in the “always justified.” In North Waziristan, teens. Between 2004 and 2010, a total which has witnessed the most drone of two hundred twenty-eight drone attacks in recent years, 99.3 percent of attacks were counted by the Conflict respondents felt that the attacks were Monitoring Center in Islamabad—four “never justified.” At the other end of more than the New American Founda- the scale, in Kurram Agency, where tion registered in the same year—lead- elements of the Haqqani group are

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reported to have fled to seek a new sanctuary, 63.2 percent of respondents felt that drone attacks were “sometimes justified,” and 16.9 percent felt they were “always justified.”19 This survey may not be the final word on opinions, given that it could not reach people in inaccessible areas where fighting rages, or where the government’s presence is limited. BBC reported on another survey conducted in FATA by the Ariana Institute in Islamabad, which found tribe members to support drone attacks since they tend to affect foreigners in particular.20 Looking ahead. Drone warfare is a sign of the times. Unmanned weapons systems and aircraft, whether operating on land or at sea, appear to be ascendant in terms of preference and costs.

They do not need to be fed, clothed, or tended to beyond their technical maintenance. In many cases, they are much more efficient and reliable than human beings, and can perform both offensive and defensive roles. It is only a matter time before drones are programmed to function fairly autonomously. Debates over the legal and moral use of drones will continue, however, as long as the role of human beings in attacks is not clearly defined, ground verification of targets is unclear, and the complete effects of attacks are unknown.

Drone attacks are increasing in the FATA region, even as the United States and its allies prepare to draw their forces out of Afghanistan and to hand over larger territory to their Afghan counterparts. The attacks are part of an effort to change the momentum of the conflict in favor of the United States and coalition forces, and are driven

Conflict & Security

by budgetary pressures and war weariness among populations in Europe and North America.

Pakistan is watching these developments with a wary eye. It has seen a similar scenario unfold after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, when the United States and others left the area suddenly, leaving Pakistan with many refugees and the attendant problems of drugs, gun running, and political unrest. The presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan fuels the insurgency, but a precipitate withdrawal will create its own problems, as chaos may ensue in Afghanistan and the border region. The presence of both Al Qaeda and homegrown insurgency in FATA and Balochistan—creeping into the hinterland—worries the Pakistani leadership and the population at large.

The Pakistani government’s own equivocation on the drone issue and lack of transparency in addressing it has added to the problem. So long as the government’s public statements and private actions are not consonant, the Pakistani people will remain confused about the role of their government in abetting drone attacks, and about the intent of the United States to use them.

This will, in turn, continue to fuel anger against the United States as an invader of Pakistani space.

The United States has not been particularly forthcoming with Pakistan about the drone attacks and has not sought to reach an agreement amenable to both sides. Mutual distrust persists between these the two countries.

Reports in western media that the Pakistanis have been dragging their feet on the creation and operation of fusion cells on both sides of the border add to

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this distrust. Despite public statements to the contrary, the CIA and the ISI are unable to resolve their communication problems and create confidence in each other’s ultimate aims in the area.

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As long as the war in Afghanistan rages on, and until Afghanistan and Pakistan return to a better understanding of each other’s concerns and needs, the drone war will likely continue and add to the instability in the region.

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Conflict & Security

NOTES

1 New America Foundation, “The Year of the Drone,” Internet, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones (date accessed: 8 May 2011).

2 In October 2010, for example, Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit said that such attacks were counter-productive and a violation of his country’s sovereignty, and that U.S. drone strikes in the northwest had “neither justification nor understanding.” See “Pakistan criticizes ‘unjustified’ US drone strikes,” Internet, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-south-asia-11490722 (date accessed: 8 May 2011).

3 Shahid Hussain, “Strong protest over latest drone attack,” Internet, http://gulfnews.com/news/ world/pakistan/strong-protest-over-latest-droneattack-1.144315 (date accessed 8 May 2011).

4 Shuja Nawaz, FATA: A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2009); Shuja Nawaz, Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army’s Experience with Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2011).

5 One such study was produced by RAND for the United States Air Force in 2007. It examined eight case studies that included the Pakistan-Afghan border region. A key attribute of such spaces was that the “the state is unable or unwilling to perform its functions.

This is not to say that these territories are devoid of governance. Rather, the structures of authority that do exist are not related to the formal institutions of the state.” See Angel Rabasa, Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks, (Washington, DC: RAND 2007): xv–xvi.

6 Ibid.

7 Jackie Northam, “Drone attacks in Pakistan under review,” Internet, http://www.npr.org/ templates/story/story.php?storyId=100131283 (date accessed: 8 May 2011).

8 Harold Hongju Koh, “The Obama Administration and International Law,” (Washington, DC, 25 March 2010) http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/

remarks/139119.htm (date accessed: 20 February 2011).

9 Ibid.

10 See Thomas Billitteri, “Drone Warfare” CQ Researcher 20, no. 28 (August 2010): 653–676.

11 Jane Mayer, “The Predator War, What are the Risks of the CIA’s Covert Drone Program?” The New Yorker (October 2009): 44.

12 Shuja Nawaz, FATA: A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2009): 18.

13 Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing With Combat Drones: a Case Study of Pakistan 20042009,” Notre Dame Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper, no. 09-43.

14 “All Pakistani Parties Demand End to Drone Attacks,” Internet, http://www.newsfrommiddleeast. com/?xstart=b&new=73356 (date accessed: 8 May 2011).

15 Shuja Nawaz, FATA: A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2009): 13.

16 Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Understanding FATA: attitudes towards governance, religion & society in Pakistan’s Federally administered Tribal Areas IV (2010): 59-60.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Aleem Maqbool, “America’s secret drone war in Pakistan,” Internet, http://www.dailytimes.com. pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C01%5C02%5Csto ry_2-1-2010_pg3_5 (date accessed: 8 May 2011). The study found that around 80 percent of people interviewed in Pakistan’s tribal belt felt that targeting by the drone strikes was accurate. Many said that foreign fighters (Arabs, Uzbeks and Tajiks, among others) in particular were being affected.

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HEMERIJCK

Culture & Society

Crisis Aftershocks and European Welfare State Futures Anton Hemerijck The European welfare state as crisis casualty?

The welfare state has people worried in the aftermath of the deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression. For member states of the European Union, where collective coverage of modern social risks is comprehensive compared to other geopolitical regions, the long-term social and economic consequences of the 2008-2011 financial crisis mark a serious ‘stress test’ for 21st century welfare provision. The global economic crisis is fundamentally redrawing the boundaries between states and markets. Will the recent recession, like its Great Depression and “great inflation” predecessors, mark a new opportunity to reconfigure and re-legitimize social policy? Or, are European welfare states in danger of becoming a crisis casualty in the cascade of violent economic, social, and political aftershocks, unleashed by the first crisis of 21st century global capitalism?

The financial crisis, at least initially, changed the picture of dysfunctional welfare states. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009, German Chancellor Angela Merkel asserted that the days of low trust laissez faire capitalism of the Washington Consensus had come to pass.

Blaming unbridled Anglo-American capitalism for the eco-

Anton Hemerijck is the dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the VU University Amsterdam. From 2001 to 2009 he was director of the Netherlands Council for Government Policy (WRR), while simultaneously holding a chair in Comparative European Social Policy at the Department of Public Administration at Erasmus University in Rotterdam.

Summer/Fall 2011 [ 89]

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nomic mess, Merkel openly endorsed the European ‘social market economy’—a free market tempered by a generous welfare state, consensus-building politics, and labor relations—as a ‘best practice’ model for the future. The Lisbon Treaty officially endorsed the EU’s normative commitment to a (highly competitive) ‘social market economy, geared toward employment and social progress.’ To underscore the realism of these commitments, the more comprehensive welfare states of the EU, such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany, proved surprisingly resilient in mitigating the aggregate demand decline and social hardship in the wake of the Lehman bankruptcy. Generous social benefits acting as robust automatic stabilizers, together with high quality social services, effectively ensured that workers on short-term unemployment benefits could maintain their human capital.

Costly bank bailouts, automatic stabilization, tax cuts, and other initial stimulus measures drained the public purse, however, resulting in a double bind of rising social protection expen-

eral bail-out package, worth up to €750 billion. Next, Greece, Spain, and Portugal staged impressive fiscal consolidation programs, including significant welfare retrenchment and labor market reform. Soon after, conservative governments in Germany, France, Italy, the UK, and the Netherlands launched austerity measures, and moved away from the post-Lehman Keynesian crisis management.

A short history of pre-crisis reform. From the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, total public social spending as a proportion of GDP absorbed between 25 and 30 percent of GDP.1 High and constant social spending is often taken as an indicator that comprehensive welfare states are largely unable to adapt to environmental change. Paul Pierson, a leading scholar in comparative welfare state research, has characterized contemporary welfare states as immovable objects—impossible to reform because of the immense popularity of mature social programs, in an era of permanent austerity.2 Behind stable government social

The financial crisis... changed the picture of dysfunctional welfare states. ditures and declining government revenues. In the spring of 2010, the Greek sovereign debt crisis confronted the European economy with a new and challenging crisis aftershock, and contagion fears spread across the weaker periphery of the euro zone. The EU ultimately came to the rescue of Greece and other weak economies with a gen-

[ 9 0] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

spending, however, the policy repertoires of advanced European welfare states have experienced profound transformation over the past two decades. From a public policy perspective, modern welfare regimes are best conceptualized as complementary packages of interdependent social policy programs.3

HEMERIJCK

Keynesian priorities were prevalent in macroeconomic policies until the late 1970s, with full employment as the principal goal of macroeconomic management. After 1980, macroeconomic policy gave way to a stricter policy framework centered on economic stability, hard currencies, low inflation, sound budgets, and public debt reduction, culminating in the introduction of the European Monetary Union (EMU). In the field of wage policy, the 1980s saw a reorientation in favor of market-based wage restraint in order to facilitate competitiveness, profitability, and employment under conditions of increasing economic internationalization.

In the area of labor market policy, in the 1990s, the new objective became maximizing employment rather than inducing labor market exit. With respect to labor market regulation, several European countries have moved toward greater acceptance of flexible labor markets.

The term labor market ‘flexicurity’, based on relaxed job protection and balanced by strong standards of social protection guarantees, was endorsed by the European Employment Strategy as a deliberate attempt to correct the imbalance between an inflexible labor market for core workers and insecure labor market conditions for the growing contingency workforce.

In terms of social insurance and assistance, the generosity of benefits has been curtailed. Access to social insurance for inactive able-bodied persons has become progressively conditional on participation in training and counseling programs and behavioral requirements, such as job search obligations.

Old age pensions are often seen as the

Culture & Society

most resilient artifacts of the postwar welfare edifice, ‘least likely’ to undergo profound reform. A string of adjustments, however, has fundamentally altered retirement welfare over the past two decades. A key shift has been the development of multi-pillar systems, combining pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and fully funded methods, ensuring tighter links between pension benefits and contributions, with strong incentives to delay early exit from the labor market.4 Social services have significantly expanded, especially in the 2000s. Spending on family services, childcare, education, healthcare, and care for the elderly has increased in almost all Western European states.5 As future social provision and welfare depends on how well Europeans address issues associated with women’s new career preferences, the reconciliation of family functions has become a key policy concern.6 To finance welfare provision, policies have sought to relieve public finances and to shift some of the responsibility for welfare provision to individual workers or social partners, and to reduce charges on business and labor.

A final overarching reform trend has been administrative reform, largely based on New Public Management (NPM) concepts of purchaser-provider models within public welfare services.7 The shift to services in welfare provision has been accompanied by individualization and customization of new public-private mixes in capacitating local social servicing.

The inventory of social reforms before the economic crisis reveals, contrary to the “new politics” expectation of social policy immobilism, that the majority of European welfare Summer/Fall 2011 [ 91 ]

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states have made adjustments in macroeconomic policy, industrial relations, taxation, social security, labor market policy, employment protection legislation, pensions, social services, welfare financing, and social policy administration. Even though public social spending has been consolidated, practically all advanced welfare states have been reconfiguring the basic policy mixes that have been in use since 1945.

earner families marks a clear departure from the longstanding male breadwinner/female homemaker legacy, especially in continental Europe. Family support, gender roles, and childcare have moved to the center of recent social reform.8 One of the fundamental reasons why the “active” welfare state today must provide enabling and capacitating social services is inherently related to the erosion of the effectiveness of the social insurance principle, The social investment turn. upon which the post-war transferWithout proper contextualization any biased male breadwinner welfare state list of profound social reforms remains was based.9 When the risk of indusunsatisfactory. Since many of the above trial unemployment was largely cyclical, policy reforms were made before the it made sense to administer collective onslaught of the recent recession, it social insurance funds for consumption is worthwhile to take stock of the gen- smoothing during spells of demand eral direction of profound social policy deficient unemployment. When unemtransformation. ployment becomes structural, however, From fighting unemployment toward raising unemployment insurance can no lonlabor market participation: Different policy ger function as a reserve income bufprovisions have been brought into new fer between jobs in the same industrial institutional relationships with each sector. For the effective mitigation of other through important redefinitions new social risks, such as skill depletion of salient policy problems. In line with and tension between work and family the general shift to supply side econom- responsibilities, the new welfare state ics, the overarching social policy objec- must provide capacitating services taitive has shifted from fighting unem- lored to particular social needs. Such ployment to promoting labor market services in fact better protect citizens participation. As income protection against new labor market risks than remained the key function of social conventional unemployment insurinsurance policy, it has been increas- ance. ingly complemented by employment Neither retrenchment nor “frozen welfare landactivation and reintegration measures, scapes”: Most EU member states have evident in augmented conditionality undertaken social reforms since the for unemployment insurance of social 1990s and have not singularly followed assistance benefits and supported by the neoliberal retrenchment and deregactive labor market policy measures. ulation recipes of the 1980s. Rather, Toward capacitating and family-friendly social the focus has been on social pacts, active services: Loosely aligned with the shift ageing/avoidance of early retirement, toward activation, the development part-time work, lifelong learning, of capacitating social services of dual- parental leave, gender mainstreaming, [ 9 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

HEMERIJCK

and labor market “flexicurity.” In the process, additions in some policy areas have been accompanied by subtractions in others. The novelty of the recent epoch lies in the simultaneous application of both positive incentives of active and investment-oriented labor market policies and negative incentives of retrenched welfare benefits of shorter duration, increased targeting,

Culture & Society

claims on equity and fairness, and goes far beyond issues of economic redistribution to include dimensions of gender roles, the work ethic, child rearing, and intergenerational equity. The changes listed above have contributed to a slow redefinition in the very idea of social justice: a shift away from understanding fairness in terms of equality toward an understanding of solidarity and fairness

For the effective mitigation of new

social risks, such as skill depletion and tension between work and family responsibilities, the new welfare state must provide capacitating services tailored to particular social needs. and sanctioning. The recent reform momentum amounts to neither ‘neo liberal’ convergence nor change resistant ‘frozen’ welfare states.

From “freedom from want” to “freedom to act”: We have entered a distinctively new phase of welfare state development, characterized by an incipient move toward active service-oriented welfare states, and away from the traditional passive, transfer-oriented systems of the past. Today, the highest levels of employment are found in the Nordic countries, which have been able to hold on to generous social welfare systems.

The recent reform momentum represents a Gestalt switch, from an orientation on social compensation to citizenship empowerment with state-provided or regulated investment in human capital and social quality.

The welfare state, it should not be forgotten, is a normative concept based on the image of a social contract, with

as an obligation to give due to the needs of each individual, so as to enable all to flourish. At the heart of the new welfare state lies a reorientation in social citizenship, away from the compensating freedom from want logic toward the capacitating logic of freedom to act.

Social investment in jeopardy? Will the social investment paradigm, which gained credit before the onslaught of the 2007 economic crisis, carry the day, or will it revert to marginality and be left orphaned in the new epoch of austerity and welfare chauvinism? Support for the welfare state remains high among the European public, but the politics of social policy change are surely not benign in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

Inevitably, demographic headwind and drained public finances will bring social contracts under duress, especially in countries facing high unemployment Summer/Fall 2011 [ 93]

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and immediate budgetary pressures.

The extent that long run societal changes have not been adequately dealt with before the crisis will surely intensify austerity reform pressures. Oth-

Keynesian policy solutions. Practically all advanced political economies intervened with stimulus measures in support of ailing banks, monetary easing, and temporary social policy expansion,

Inevitably, demographic headwind and

drained public finances will bring social contracts under duress, especially in countries facing high unemployment and immediate budgetary pressures. erwise, the pressures of demographic change in the aftermath of the current crisis will strengthen the importance of poverty relief, social insurance, macroeconomic stabilization, and the need for human capital investment. Spending under constrained public budgets will be crucial. In this respect, it should not be forgotten how much domestic social policy and European economic policy have become intertwined since the mid-1980s. It is fair to say that we have entered an era of semi-sovereign welfare states. The establishment of the internal market and the introduction of the EMU and the Stability and Growth Pact have added a new economic supranational layer to domestic social and economic policy repertoires of individual member states, which have surely constrained the political space of national (and EU) policy choices.

Over the past three years, the political economy of Europe has gone through two phases of crisis management. In the immediate aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in the fall of 2008, the first wave of crisis management was critically inspired by the return of

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in order to sustain effective demand and save jobs. Between 2008 and 2010, many European countries put their employees on short-term assignments or temporary lay-offs, alongside further training initiatives, with the aim of increasing the adaptability of workers and thereby the competitiveness of enterprises. Many of these preventive measures were consistent with social investment priorities.10 To date, the more comprehensive welfare states of Northwestern Europe have been the most successful in the initial phase of crisis management.

It should be emphasized that during the immediate turmoil of the global financial crash, the large majority of policy makers defined the crisis as a crisis of (international) financial institutions.11 After December 2009 a more conservative macroeconomic definition of the crisis took root, punctuated by the Greek sovereign debt predicament.

After governments had been forced to bail out banks using taxpayers’ money, the new definition of the crisis became one of state failure. In the shadow of a looming fiscal crisis of the state, coun-

HEMERIJCK

tries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, as well as France and Italy, have since pushed through austerityoriented social reforms.12 In the second half of 2010, the stateblame narrative became the masterpiece of the EU crisis resolution strategy. The Annual Growth Strategy (AGS), published by the European Commission in February 2011, marks the unmitigated return of neoliberalism, reminiscent of the OECD jobs study of the mid1990s. The Commission dispels fiscal profligacy, overregulated labor market, overgenerous welfare states, excessively strong trade unions, and rigid wage bargaining institutions as the main impediments to European growth and competitiveness. In insisting that EU actions should ‘not require large public investments,’ the AGS is fundamentally supportive of the imperative of social

Culture & Society

market institutions and excess welfare spending. It is not state intervention that caused the crisis, but rather the lack of it in regulating and supervising financial markets.

Even more important than the unlearned economic lessons is the independent role of politics in the aftermath of the crisis. Even before the financial meltdown, the EU became the scapegoat of choice for anti-immigrant and Euro-sceptic complaints. In the wake of the crisis, there is real danger of national austerity coalition, mixed with strong elements of xenophobia.

Although populist anti-EU and antiimmigrant parties may not muster the strength to take office in most countries, their growing support will put pressure on existing governments to expand nationalist responses to the crisis and limit their commitments to

Progressive politicians wishing to defend

and accelerate the social investment imperative will have to find new legitimizing narratives. investment in the wake of the crisis. It should come as no surprise that Jacques Delors has called the ASR the most “reactionary” document that the European Commission has put out in at least a decade.13 It is indeed perplexing how visibly the neoliberal state-blame narrative resurfaced to the center of the debate since the Greek sovereign debt crisis. Within the span of a single year, EU policymakers seem to have completely forgotten that the financial crash originated in behavioral excess and excessive faith in financial markets, and not in labor

European integration. It will become particularly difficult for the pro-European mainstream parties to continue to support much needed pan-European macroeconomic solutions to the crisis based on social investments.

The aftermath of the financial crisis has brought European welfare states to a new political crossroads. The overall political sentiment is conservative, bent on defending the status quo, both with respect to the single market, EMU, and the Stability and Growth Pact, and in terms of the basic popular culture of national welfare chauvinism. In the Summer/Fall 2011 [ 95]

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current context of the new European austerity and welfare chauvinism, it is doubtful whether the social investment paradigm will carry the day.

Progressive politicians wishing to defend and accelerate the social investment imperative will have to find new legitimizing narratives. If politicians hope for a more activist role of the state in the European economy and social policy they must re-establish the terms on which such a role is deemed legitimate.14 In the recent past, political leaders have demonized globalization while using the EU to expand competitive markets at the expense of domestic social protection. Electorates see through this hypocrisy, and it has left them jaded about the candor of progressive politicians and the credibility of what governments can do. As a consequence, the challenge of progressive governance in the wake of the first crisis of twenty-first century capitalism is to find more effective EU macroeconomic policies and pareto-optimal social investments. The future resilience of European welfare states requires both fiscal austerity measures and accelerated social investment initiatives. Progressive politicians, parties, and organized interests must articulate a social vision capable of restoring their legitimacy in difficult times, a vision which breathes new life into an EU discredited by its role as the police agent of market competition.

It is crucial that the political left-ofcenter articulate a policy vision of the interdependent roles that the EU and member states should take on in order to address and respond to the impli-

[ 9 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

cations of the crisis aftershocks in an offensive and pro-active manner. This should be accompanied with a strong social narrative of a ‘caring Europe’ as one of the founding principles of European cooperation. We must not lose track of the pre-crisis evolution toward employment-friendly, fair, and efficient welfare systems. The critical challenge lies in redirecting the broad political support for the welfare state in most EU member countries toward designing a new model of welfare state that is able to equip European citizens and societies to face endogenous social change and growing global competition.

The EU has a key role to play, not only as an agenda-setter, but also as a regulator of minimum social standards and as a tough guardian of the internal market with a critical stance on unfair intra-EU competition. The new ‘Europe 2020’ strategy will have to give the social dimension greater prominence than did the Lisbon Strategy. Let us hope that in due course, with a little more policy creativity, we will be able to turn the current tide of inward-looking pessimism about the sustainability of the welfare state into renewed political efforts at forward-looking “social pragmatism.”

NOTES

1 The Laeken-10 group consists of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

2 Norman Davies documents the intertwining of Polish national and Catholic identities in Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) and Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). The topic has also been the subject of recent research by Brian Porter (see “The Catholic Nation: Religion, Identity, and the Narratives of Polish History,” Slavic and East European Journal 45, no. 2).

3 Elzbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, interview by author, 3 September 2002. Hanna Suchocka, interview by author, 28 August 2002.

4 Marek Czachorowski, interview by author, 6 September 2002.

5 Tadeusz Pieronek, interview by author, 2 September 2002. Also, Suchocka, interview by author, 28 August 2002.

6 Marek A. Cichocki, interview by author, 23 August 2002.

7 Krzysztof Zanussi, interview by author, 29 August 2002.

8 Zdzislaw Najder, interview by author, 4 September 2002.

9 Marek Czachorowski, interview by author, 6 September 2002.

10 John Paul II, Speech in Gniezno, 3 June 1997.

Reprinted in Henryk J. Muszynski, A Spiritual Europe (Europa Ducha), 7.

11 Jonathan Chaplin, “Christian Theories of Democracy” (1998). Internet, http://www.psa. ac.uk/ cps/1998/chaplin.pdf, 8.

12 Johannes Rau, quoted in Diary of the Senate of the Republic of Poland, April 2001. Internet, http://www. senat.gov.pl/k4/dok/diar/61/6101.htm.

13 Józef Zycinski, interview by author, 6 September 2002.

14 Anne E.M. Van Lancker, European Parliament Committee on Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunities: Report on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (6 June 2002). Accessible at: http://www2. europarl.eu.int/.

15 Brigid Laffan, “The Nice Treaty: The Irish Vote,” Notre Europe (Research and Policy Group, July 2001), 7.

16 Adam Boniecki, interview by author, 2 September 2002.

17 Józef Zycinski, interview by author, 6 September 2002.

18 “Axiology” is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “the theory of value.” The word found its way into each of the author’s interviews. Individuals used it to convey a variety of context-dependent meanings that illustrate the paradox underlying any attempt to define the influence of religion on sociopolitical decisionmaking. The values that guide Catholicism’s influence are both an historically-established component of the Polish national ethos and an ambiguous matrix of emotional and spiritual propensities that manifests itself differently depending on the regime in power and the contemporary cultural spirit.

19 Elzbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, Return Path or Road to the Unknown? Poles’ European Dilemmas (Warszawa: Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1998).

20 Tadeusz Pieronek, interview by author, 2 September 2002.

21 Krzysztof Zanussi, interview by author, 29 August 2002. Also, Róza Thun, interview by author, 3 September 2002.

22 Alojzy Z. Nowak, interview by author, 9 September 2002.

Summer/Fall 2011 [ 97 ]

Law&Ethics Repatriating Justice

New Trends in Stolen Asset Recovery and Fighting Corruption Mark V. Vlasic and Greg Cooper The political history of the twentieth century is peppered with stories of corrupt presidents, ministers, and dictators who have enriched themselves at the expense of their people.

In most of cases, victim states were largely either unable or unwilling to recover these stolen fortunes. In the last two decades, however, states’ willingness and legal capacity to pursue assets have increased, as demonstrated by the enactment of the 1999 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the 2005 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa over the last few months may make this one of the busiest years for international asset freezes and talk of asset recovery.

Although particular developments in the recovery of Haitian President Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier’s asset recovery case were prominent, it was not the only one to make headlines in 2011. By April, the governments of the United States and Switzerland had taken action to freeze or monitor assets of former presidents Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Moammar Gaddafi of Libya.1 In addition, the Swiss government had frozen the assets of Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to cede power (and was later taken into custody) after losing a UN[ 9 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Mark V. Vlasic, an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University and a partner at Ward & Ward PLLC, and is the former head of operations of the World Bank’s StAR Initiative, where he served on the Duvalier/Haiti asset recovery team. He currently serves as international legal advisor to the Charles Taylor/Liberia asset recovery team.

Greg Cooper, a former Fulbright Scholar at the International Centre for Asset Recovery, and is a student at the University of Texas School of Law.

REPATRIATING JUSTICE

monitored election in the Ivory Coast.2 A number of significant challenges arise in the process of recovering assets from allegedly corrupt leaders, including insufficient legal precedent, domestic political interference, lack of cooperation from offshore financial centers, and proving criminal conduct when leaders have died or fled into exile.3 Despite the billions of dollars involved, the recovery of stolen assets is not focused solely on money. Indeed, in many cases, stolen asset recovery

years of exile in France, returned to Haiti just days before a new Swiss law came into effect that would enable the return of his frozen assets to Haiti.6 Grand corruption in Haiti is not an isolated story; similar scenarios occur across the world. Such cases often go unpunished, but occasionally, corrupt individuals and their beneficiaries have been brought to justice and countries have been able to recover a portion of their plundered assets. For example, the Philippines managed to

Despite the billions of dollars involved, recovering stolen assets is not focused simply on money. serves three distinct purposes: to recover monies to fund government programs and initiatives; to provide a semblance of justice for victims while challenging a political culture of impunity; and to deter officials from engaging in future corruption.4 While challenging, these efforts are considered worthwhile by many in the development, human rights, and law enforcement communities. Indeed, all three communities are currently involved in ongoing efforts to recover approximately $6 million in funds from “Baby Doc” Duvalier, which are stashed in Switzerland.5 Duvalier’s kleptocratic rule, escape into exile, and subsequent struggle to retain his allegedly plundered millions serve as an interesting yet prototypical case study in stolen asset recovery issues—a nexus of politics, corruption, and international relations. The case re-entered the news earlier this year when Duvalier, after twenty-five

recover over $1.8 billion in assets from former President Ferdinand Marcos,7 while Nigeria has been able to recover approximately $1.9 billion from former President Sani Abacha and his family.8 Like the Marcos and Abacha cases, the Duvalier case is based upon years of alleged high-level corruption.

Haiti’s poverty was established well before its tragic earthquake in 2010, and was arguably due at least in part to a culture of corruption that permeated the highest levels of Haitian elite.9 Duvalier took over the “Presidency-ForLife” after his father’s death in 1971.

Estimates of the total amount of money exchanged through bribes or embezzled start at $300 million, but a joint World Bank–United Nations report estimates that Duvalier stole the equivalent of 1.7–4.5 percent of Haitian GDP for every year that he was in power.10 This corruption came at a high cost—Haitian economic growth stag-

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nated, poverty increased, and the use of semi-legitimized violence by Tonton Macoute secret police led to a state of fear among the population.11 Only when Duvalier faced the near total breakdown of the Haitian state in the form of rioting and a potential coup d’état, did he give up the “Presidency-for-Life” and accept a gilded exile in France.12

Law & Ethics

of the most troublesome obstacles to asset recovery. In many ways, this was one of the greatest challenges that those who sought to bring Duvalier to justice faced in the early stages of the case.

According to Jed Ringel, an attorney originally hired by Haiti to recover Duvalier’s assets, the Haitian government’s lack of political will was instrumental in the failure of initial recovery efforts.

Initial proceedings against According to a New York Times report, Duvalier. Despite widespread inter- despite receiving twenty-five requests est in asset recovery at the beginning for assistance from counsel in New of Duvalier’s exile, the vast majority of York, Haiti’s government had “inexpliDuvalier’s assets were never recovered, cably stopped cooperating and stopped largely because of two major setbacks. paying its attorneys and investigators” First, a French civil court dismissed by September 1988.15 In a letter to then Haiti’s recovery efforts for $120 million Haitian Prime Minister, Haiti’s outin 1987, which left his assets in France side counsel expressed its frustration: untouched.13 Second, and perhaps “The behavior of your ministers more importantly, Haiti’s deteriorating leaves us no alternative except to conpolitical situation led to the ascension clude that your ministers apparently of pro-Duvalier leaders and the weak- want our efforts on behalf of Haiti to ening of political willpower to con- fail, are not concerned that Haiti will tinue pursuing Duvalier’s illicit assets. lose the substantial investment it has This outcome is not unusual. Many made in pursuing the Duvaliers, and countries are deterred from initiat- want the Duvaliers to keep the money ing recoveries based on the threat or they stole.”16 actual absence of political will from Subsequent asset recovery efforts top leadership to sustain complex and in the United States, renewed by the often politically sensitive asset recovery government of President Aristide, operations. And even when domes- yielded only minimal results, the most tic political support exists, navigating prominent of which was the recovery foreign legal systems can be taxing. of $350,000 from Duvalier’s wife’s To enforce a recovery, for example, account at the Bank of New York.17 Mr. many countries require a criminal con- Ringel estimated that if the original viction, which can be impossible to Duvalier asset recovery efforts had not obtain if the perpetrator is dead or in been dropped, the Haitian governexile, or if a conviction would cause ment could have recovered between significant political unrest in a coun- $25-75 million by the end of 1989.18 try.14 Without a criminal process, legal Instead, the resulting debacle left systems of these countries may prevent Duvalier free, the majority of his assets any forfeiture of assets. Nevertheless, untouched, Haiti stuck with a $1.2 absence of genuine political will is one million legal bill, and justice denied.19

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REPATRIATING JUSTICE

Increased international focus Swiss renew efforts to on Stolen Asset Recovery. Since confiscate assets through the setbacks of the initial Duvalier legislation. Over the last two years, recovery efforts, the world has taken greater measures to fight grand corruption and regulate offshore financial centers. In addition to increased financial controls and mandatory diligence procedures in much of the banking industry (largely in response to international terrorism), a turning point came in 2005. After years of negotiation, one hundred forty countries signed the UNCAC, the world’s first truly global treaty against corruption.20 In many ways, stolen asset recovery was elevated to the world stage in September 2007, when World Bank President Robert Zoellick and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon launched the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative at the UN General Assembly. Designed to aid developing countries in finding and recovering stolen assets from past grand corruption cases, the StAR Initiative links the fight against corruption with the good governance and development agendas of the UN—thus placing asset recovery on the G20 agenda and making it a more salient world-wide topic.

One of the StAR Initiative’s first cases helped to facilitate a joint effort between Haiti’s new leadership and Swiss authorities to recover approximately $6 million of Duvalier’s frozen assets from Switzerland.21 In this renewed effort, Swiss authorities sought to confiscate the assets and return them to Haiti to support humanitarian organizations, while simultaneously sparring against Duvalier’s legislative efforts to lift the freezing order.

a number of positive factors, including increased support from the Haitian government, the StAR Initiative, and Swiss determination to resolve the Duvalier matter, have contributed to significant legal successes in Switzerland.

Last year, Swiss officials took the exceptional step of re-freezing Duvalier’s assets using the government’s foreign policy powers, as it crafted a new legislative solution to the Duvalier asset recovery matter. The new law, called the Restitution of Illicit Assets Act (RIAA), focuses on corrupt assets from fragile states and has retroactive application.22 It was passed by the Swiss Parliament in October 2010, and officially came into effect on 1 February 2011.23 RIAA, also known as Lex Duvalier, was designed for matters involving assets frozen in Switzerland that have been acquired unlawfully, but that cannot be returned via typical international mutual legal assistance channels because of failures in the victim state’s judicial system.24 Specifically, RIAA allows for asset confiscation in situations where the current state of the victim country renders it impossible to conduct a proper exchange procedure via traditional judicial procedures. In these cases, the RIAA would allow a unique “burden shift” after requiring the Swiss government to show that the funds held in Switzerland by an allegedly corrupt official are significantly larger than one could have credibly earned in office, and that the country from which the funds originate is known to be corrupt.

Then, the burden of proving that the

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money came from legal sources would lie with the allegedly corrupt official, rather than the Swiss state. If the official could not prove a legitimate origin of his or her Swiss assets, they would be confiscated by the Swiss state.26 Interestingly, approximately a week before Lex Duvalier came into effect, Duvalier chose to emerge from his exile in France and return to Haiti. While some of his supporters claimed that he wanted to return to help rebuild his earthquake-ravaged country, it seemed odd to many that he would wait over a year after the earthquake to do so.26 Despite Duvalier’s return, Swiss officials are optimistic that the RIAA will work as intended and provide for a successful return of assets to Haiti.

Even if the current asset recovery case succeeds, however, $6 million is only a fraction of what Duvalier allegedly stole, and it pales in comparison to the $5.3 billion pledged to the country at an international donors’ conference in 2010.27 Asset recovery efforts are not motivated solely by financial factors, and in this case, they serve a greater purpose. A recovery against Duvalier would be an important challenge to Haiti’s culture of impunity, and ideally, would deter future leaders from engaging in wholesale theft.

Law & Ethics

and asset recovery operations. Common obstacles include bank secrecy laws that may prevent access to records, and limited political inclination to initiate and cooperate in asset recovery cases.

Additionally, victim countries sometimes demonstrate a reluctance to rely on foreign experts—possibly because they perceive such action as yielding their own sovereignty. For asset recovery efforts to be successful, the governments of victim countries must cooperate with and increase their reliance on international legal experts. These experts, in turn, must build local capacity to ensure that these countries do not fall victim to similar crimes in the future.

The success of future asset recovery cases also relies on the current efforts of forward-leaning countries—such as the United States and Switzerland—that are actively taking measures to freeze illicit assets.

Sadly, not every country is proactive in fighting corruption and asset theft.

While no one realistically expects every UN member state to design new laws to resolve decades-long asset recovery cases, merely ratifying UNCAC is a step in the right direction. As of 31 March 2011, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime listed sixteen countries that have signed but not ratified the Convention.28 In some cases, Moving forward: corruption even states that have ratified UNCAC - a global problem without are not fully compliant with many elean easy solution. Most research ments of the mandatory provisions of stolen asset recovery is comparative concerning asset recovery, thereby furby nature. The facts, actors, political ther limiting the treaty’s effectiveness.29 economy, and legal systems in which As highlighted earlier, the existence these efforts are undertaken are often of genuine political will to see an asset very different. Nevertheless, even with recovery case to completion is often UNCAC in place, there are consistent the most important factor in a successchallenges to corruption investigations ful recovery; frustratingly, it is also the

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REPATRIATING JUSTICE

hardest factor for outsiders to verify.

Generally, only domestic political will or pressure in a victim country is sufficient to start a recovery effort with a good chance of success. While international actors—even well-meaning financial center states—can support and encourage recovery efforts, they are highly limited in their ability to inspire victim country governments to initiate one.

Difficulties with issue of political will are found not only in “victim” countries; “recipient” countries can be difficult to convince as well. For example, the Paris Prosecutor’s Office has been unenthusiastic about the legal efforts of several non-governmental organizations, including Sherpa and Transparency International, to begin a criminal investigation of three alleged African despots’ potential illicit wealth in France.30 Such a conflict played out before the Cour de Cassation (the highest court in France) in 2010, which ordered the appointment of an investigating judge and the launch of an inquiry.31 It remains to be seen, however, whether a genuine inquiry will actually produce results.

Additionally, progress on corruption has been increasingly tied to the distribution of foreign aid money.

Consequently, it is difficult to know whether a victim country’s leader is serious or simply “making the right noises” to appease outside pressure, as Jonathan Githongo, Kenya’s former “anti-corruption czar” can attest.

The former president of Transparency International (Kenya), Mr. Githongo was appointed as Kenya’s “anti-corruption czar” by President Mwai Kibaki in 2003. While investigating the nearly $1 billion dollar Anglo Leasing scandal,

Mr. Githongo surmised that the Kenyan government’s new anti-corruption efforts were likely a charade designed to attract Western aid agencies.32

Conclusion. Over the last two

decades, the Duvalier recovery effort has illustrated many of the difficulties and advancements made in the field of asset recovery. Fortunately, it is now but one case among a new tide of successful anti-corruption investigations.

Much good has already come from the renewed effort to recover Duvalier’s assets for the benefit of the Haitian people. Haitian domestic law enforcement authorities, notably the offices of the Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption and Prosecutor General, have gained valuable anticorruption experience—from learning critical mutual legal assistance techniques to building critical international networks and making the threat of future prosecution of corrupt leaders more likely—and those fighting corruption are now making positive headlines.33 From a global perspective, the StAR Initiative’s work in fostering cooperation between countries, North and South, provides a blueprint for future advocacy in grand corruption cases. At the same time, by designing Lex Duvalier, Switzerland is gaining a reputation as a world-leader in asset recovery by providing “out of the box” examples of how to resolve complex asset recovery cases.

These examples—including the Duvalier case—were discussed as recently as April 2011, when the Slovenian Prime Minister, Slovenian Justice Minister, and U.S. Attorney General opened a unique conference for European justice ministers in Brdo, Slovenia that focused solely on the topic of asset recovery.34

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Despite the good that has already been done, Haiti still has far to go.

For legitimate, sustainable progress to be achieved in the country, the traditional culture of impunity for corrupt government officials must end. For this to happen, the Haitian government and its people must see corruption as an immediate problem, and must demand political willpower from its highest officials in order to create an immediate solution.

It is still uncertain whether Duvalier will be successfully tried for the corruption and abuses of his regime, but confiscating his Swiss assets will be a small step forward in Haiti’s long journey towards good governance. It is hoped

Law & Ethics

that Haiti’s success in recovering Duvalier’s allegedly illicit funds will empower other governments to end the impunity of other former leaders by freezing and seizing additional stolen assets. Indeed, judging by the international outcry regarding allegations of grand corruption that emerged after recent governmental transitions in the Middle East and North Africa, it appears that global attitudes may be shifting, and there may be less tolerance for the safeguarding of allegedly illicit assets. Should this be the case, it is change worth celebrating; only with such a change in attitude—and increased political will to end grand corruption—can we ensure there will be no future Duvalier-type cases to pursue.

NOTES

1 “Swiss freeze Tunisian accounts,” Internet, http:// www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/foreign_affairs/Swiss_ freeze_Tunisian_accounts_.html?cid=29272782; “Egypt seeks Mubarak assets freeze,” Internet, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12527404; Robert O’Harrow Jr., James V. Grimaldi and Brady Dennis, “Sanctions in 72 hours: How the U.S. pulled off a major freeze of Libyan assets,” Internet, http://www. washingtonpost.com/investigations/sanctions-in72-hours-how-the-us-pulled-off-a-major-freezeof-libyan-assets/2011/03/11/ABBckxJB_story.html (date accessed: 24 March 2011).

2 William Underhill, “Swiss Banks Take Aim at Despots,” Newsweek, 6 February 2011.

3 Jack Smith, Mark Pieth, and Guillermo Jorge, “Recovery of Stolen Assets: A Fundamental Principle of the UNCAC,” Internet, http://www.u4.no/themes/ uncac/asset-recovery.cfm 4 Ibid.

5 “Ex-dictator’s assets set to help Haitians,” Internet, http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/foreign_affairs/Ex-dictators_assets_set_to_help_Haitians. html?cid=986822

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6 Mark Vlasic, “5.7 Million Reasons for Duvalier to Return to Haiti,” Huffington Post, 3 February 2011.

7 “Philippines recovers US $1.8b from Marcos,” Internet, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/ afp_asiapacific_business/view/412773/1/.html 8 Timothy Daniels, “General Sani Abacha – a Nation’s Thief” (paper presented at the Basel Institute on Governance’s Regional Seminar for Asia-Pacific, Bali, Indonesia, 5-7 September 2007); Ali M. Ali, “Nigeria: U.S. $450 Million Abacha Loot ‘Can’t Be Traced’,” This Day (Nigeria), 21 May 2009.

9 Jack Smith, Mark Vlasic, and Gregory Cooper “Rebuild the right way” Opinion-Commentary, The Washington Times, (26 March 2010), Internet, http:// www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/26/ rebuild-the-right-way/.

10 “Haiti, Still Counting, Says Duvalier Took $300 Million” New York Times, 13 May 1986;World Bank and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan (Washington, D.C., September 2007).

11 Elizabeth Abbott, Haiti: The Duvaliers & Their Legacy, (New York: Touchstone Publishers, 1991).

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12 Siri Schubert, “Haiti: The Long Road to Recovery,” Internet, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/ stories/bribe/2009/05/haiti-the-long-road-torecovery.html.

13 Jonathan Randal, “Haiti Loses Lawsuit Against Duvalier; French Court Sets Back Bid to Recover $150 Million,” The Washington Post (24 June 1987).

14 Xan Rice, “The Looting of Kenya,” Internet, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/31/ kenya.topstories3 (date accessed: 5 April 2011).

15 David Margolick, “THE LAW: AT THE BAR; Law firm, in Pursuit of Haitian Property, Finds the Chase Can Be Tedious and Frustrating,” The New York Times, (27 October 1989).

16 Ibid.

17 Yvette Collymore, “HAITI: U.S. Court Moves Against Duvalier Assets,” Interpress Service, (1 March 1996).

18 Ibid.

19 Frederic Dannen, “Lifestyles of the Rich and Infamous,” Vanity Fair, (April 1992).

20 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “United Nations Convention Against Corruption,” Internet, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/ CAC/index.html (date accessed: 5 April 2011).

21 Simon Bradley, “Baby Doc Assets Saga Takes Another Twist,” Internet, http://www.swissinfo.ch/ eng/politics/foreign_affairs/Baby_Doc_assets_saga_ takes_another_twist.html?cid=8229664.

22 The Associated Press, “Swiss Court Reverses Award of Duvalier Millions,” Internet, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/04/world/ americas/04duvalier.html.

23 Federal Council of Switzerland, Federal Act on the Restitution of Assets of Politically Exposed Persons obtained by Unlawful Means (Bern, Switzerland: 1 October 2010.

English copy available at http://www.scribd.com/ doc/38995251/Restitution-of-Illicit-Assets-ActRIAA#> 24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Pascal Fletcher “Haiti’s ‘Baby Doc’ is back: but for love or money?” Internet, http://www.swissinfo. ch/eng/news/international/Haitis_Baby_Doc_is_back:_ but_for_love_or_money.html?cid=29312976. See also Mark Vlasic, “5.7 Million Reasons for Duvalier to Return to Haiti,” Huffington Post, February, 3, 2011.

27 “Over US $5 billion pledged for Haiti recovery,” Internet, http://www.haiticonference.org/story. html.

28 A list of countries that have signed but not ratified: Barbados, Bhutan, Cote d’Ivoire, Comoros,

Czech Republic, Germany, Guinea, India, Ireland, Japan, Myanmar, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Swaziland, and Syria. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website - UNCAC Signature and Ratification Status as of 31 March 2011, Internet, http://www. unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.

29 “Articles of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption on Asset Recovery: Analysis of Reported Compliance and Policy Recommendations” (paper presented at the Third Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Doha, Qatar, 9-13 November 2009).

30 Lisa Bryant, “French Court Clears Way for Investigating African Despots,” Internet, http:// www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/FrenchCourt-Clears-Way-for-Investigating-African-Despots-107055904.html.

31 Cass. crim., Nov. 9, 2010, No. 09-88-272, Association Transparence International France, F-D, §1 32 Rachel Brown “Kenya’s Anglo-Leasing Scandal: Doing Our Part to Fry the Big Fish” Task Force for Financial Integrity and Development, 10 July 2009, Internet, http://www.financialtaskforce.org/2009/07/10/ kenyas-anglo-leasing-scandal-doing-our-part-tofry-the-fish/ 33 Basel Institute on Governance, “Training on Corruption in Haiti,” Internet, http://www.baselgovernance.org/big/news-single-view/article/trainingon-corruption-in-haiti/?tx_ttnews[backPid]=295&c Hash=ad3f8ec6ed.

34 Mark Vlasic, one of the authors, was invited by the Minister of Justice of Slovenia to present a keynote address on asset recovery issues at the Brdo Conference of Western Balkans’ justice ministers (also attended by the U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder); a topic of discussion at the Brdo Conference was the Swiss RIAA. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, Prof. Dr. Hajredin Kuçi, is participating in the Conference of Ministers of Justice of the Western Balkan countries, being held at Brdo near Kranjit in Slovenia. Internet, http://www. md-ks.org/?page=2,83,345. This followed a March 2011 conference in Brazil hosted by the International Association of Prosecutors, that also focused on asset recovery, and where Mark Vlasic also was asked to speak about the Duvalier case.

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Business&Economics Realpolitik and the IMF Jo Marie Griesgraber Striking like a tornado, the Financial Crisis caused a fundamental shift in the global economic system. In its wake, a summit of the twenty largest economies, considering the International Monetary Fund (IMF) an essential tool to mitigate the effects of the crisis, provided the institution with additional resources and mandated governance changes to boost its capacity and legitimacy. While the G20 has made valiant efforts to reform the IMF, much work remains to revitalize its spirit of equality and innovative structure pursued at its founding at Bretton Woods.

The new IMF governance framework strives to reduce the voices of overrepresented powers, provide greater voice for emerging economies, and protect the interests of less developed member states. Initial efforts towards these reforms revealed the challenges of consensus among nations seeking their own interests. The realpolitik decision-making of the IMF resulted in political maneuvering in which every country attempted to increase or preserve its control to the detriment of weaker nations. In the midst of the urgency caused by the financial crisis, the IMF has a unique opportunity to modify its structure to more accurately reflect the changing dynamics of the global economic system, to provide great[ 1 06 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Jo Marie Griesgraber is the Executive Director of the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition and the Economic Policy Institute.

She is on the Advisory Committee of the Carnegie Council/New School project, Ethics and Debt. Previously she directed the Rethinking Bretton Woods Project at the Center of Concern, where she worked on reform of the World Bank, regional development banks and International Monetary Fund.

REALPOLITIK AND THE IMF

er voice for the dependent borrowing countries, and to more effectively meet the economic risks inherent in our interconnected world.

The IMF’s Governance Structure. To understand proposed chang-

es to the IMF’s governance, it is essential to understand its governance structure as set forth in the Articles of Agreement. The highest authority is the Board of Governors, made up of either the Minister of Finance or the head of the Central Bank from each of the current one hundred eighty-seven member states.

The Executive Board, which conducts the business of the Fund, is currently comprised of twenty-four Executive Directors (ED), some of whom represent single countries, and others who represent groups of countries called constituencies.1 The votes that each Executive Director controls are determined by the size of the economy that he or she represents, as measured by a quota formula. The quota determines the amount of money each member state contributes to the resources of the Fund, the amount the state can borrow from the Fund, and the number of votes the country can cast on Board decisions. In addition, each member state receives an equal number of basic votes, which originally comprised 11.4 percent of the total votes. With the addition of more members and larger quotas, the basic votes as a share of total votes have declined to 2.1 percent.2 Unfortunately the Executive Board currently contains imbalances in its representation. The Articles stipulate that the five largest economies (currently the United States, Japan, Ger-

many, France, and the United Kingdom) each appoint an ED, but for political reasons, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China also each appoint their own EDs.3 The remaining one hundred seventy-nine members occupy the remaining sixteen seats in self-selected constituencies, which function and vote collectively. European nations hold eight, sometimes nine, of the twentyfour seats, while all of Africa occupies two seats.4 The Articles limit the size of constituencies to maintain rough parity, but this has been difficult to achieve in practice.5 The Managing Director (MD) is both the Chair of the Executive Board and the head of management.6 The Articles designate selection of the MD to the Executive Board, but effectively, Western European countries, with the approval of the United States, choose the MD.

Governance Reform Efforts 2006 - 2010. The concepts of the 2008 IMF governance reforms were a continuation of previous initiatives.

Since the 1998 Asian financial crisis, many countries, especially emerging market economies (EMEs), dreaded the stigma of poor financial management attached to IMF loans. The Executive Board and the Managing Director sought to “close the democracy deficit” through more equitable representation of member states.7 In 2006, the IMF granted ad hoc quota increases to four severely underrepresented countries (China, South Korea, Mexico, and Turkey) and promised further adjustments in 2008 through the use of a simplified and transparent quota formula.8

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In 2008, the regular five-year review of the size of IMF quota-based resources and the allocation of quota shares resulted in a mere 3 percent reallocation from the most over-represented countries to the most under-represented countries, despite the rumblings of a coming financial cataclysm.9 Given political constraints, the promised quota formula was too complex and unbalanced, and it came with the pledge of yet another new and better formula.10 During the London Summit in April 2009, the G20 promised to triple the assets of the IMF, approved an amend-

Business & Economics

language of the Pittsburg G20 communiquĂŠ restricted the ability of the IMF to significantly alter the system. Irritated by European refusals to reduce their number of chairs and by assertions that the 2008 formula over-valued the size of the U.S. economy, the United States vetoed the normal biennial increase of seats from twenty to twenty-four in August 2010, insisting that Europe give up 4 seats. If Europe did not capitulate or the United States did not change its mind, the four smallest constituencies (those led by India, Brazil, Argentina, and Franco-phone Africa) would have been dissolved and their members

The Pittsburg G20 communiquĂŠ

restricted the ability to significantly alter the system. ment to the Articles granting newer member states higher SDR (Special Drawing Rights) allocations, doubled the SDRs for all members, and pledged to endorse the 2008 governance agreements.11 The September 2009 G20 Summit in Pittsburgh put forth further efforts to enhance the IMF’s legitimacy and effectiveness by moving the regular quota review forward by three years, acknowledging the ongoing need to increase the quota shares and votes of the EMEs. The Pittsburgh Summit challenged the IMF to make these changes by the time of the Seoul Summit in November 2010, using the existing quota system as a platform.

Realpolitik Unveiled. By calling

for a change in the existing governance structure rather than a new formula, the

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compelled to join other constituencies.

In the end, the United States agreed to the twenty-four seats, and the Europeans agreed to reduce their seats by two.12 While the elephants fought, the G20 EMEs negotiated behind closed doors until the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) figured in the top ten economies at the IMF. Without antagonizing the largest economies, they effectively increased their representation, which was largely transferred from lessdeveloped countries. The EMEs showed themselves skilled in self-promotion, unfettered by principles of inclusion or equity. As a result of the 2010 changes, the Managing Director declared victory, though the IMF remained grossly inequitable. All parties pledged to continue the fight, and the G20 again promised a new quota formula, this time by 2012.

REALPOLITIK AND THE IMF

The Fututure of IMF Gover- percent of total votes from its current nance: The Desirable and the 2.1 percent.

3. When arranging a loan, “equal Possible. What governance principles and practices could the IMF implement to achieve its goal of becoming a more legitimate and effective institution?

The 1944 model of governance combined four principles: 1) all member states had responsibilities to contribute and the right to borrow; 2) member states were recognized as legal equals; 3) members had a right to representation, most through indirect representation in constituencies; and 4) those countries able to contribute more received more votes. Several recommendations have been made to improve IMF governance in recent years to return the current institution to these standards and adjust it to contemporary norms

treatment of all member countries� should not be interpreted as requiring virtually identical policy reform within the borrowing country, regardless of domestic context. National preferences should be incorporated.14 4. Executive Directors and their offices should visit member countries, consult with national parliaments, and be available to communicate with local academics, media, and civil society.

Executive Directors should have job descriptions and receive performance evaluations from member countries and their citizens.

5. The Board of Governors should evaluate the Executive Board as a whole.

Pressure of a mounting global crisis

could not overcome the inertia caused by... national interest. for good corporate governance.13 These recommendations include the following: 1. Constituencies should be roughly equal in size and the Executive Director should be able to divide the votes of the members.

2. The quota formula should measure GDP in terms of Purchasing Power Parity rather than in nominal terms; treat currency zones that act as a single economy, such as the European Union, as single economies; give representative weight to countries with higher populations; and strengthen the voices of smaller countries by returning the portion of basic votes to the original 11.4

6. The Managing Director should be chosen on merit, regardless of nationality, through an open nominating process. He or she should no longer chair the Executive Board, but rather, a separate Executive Director, selected by his or her peers, should chair the Board.

7. Executive Board discussions and votes should be made public, with limited exceptions for personnel issues and market-sensitive discussions.

8. A complaint mechanism should be established that would enable the IMF to learn from its mistakes and eventually compensate persons who suffered from inappropriate actions by the

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institution, while punishing those who fail to comply with accepted practices.

These are practical and realizable recommendations, but they will only be implemented when and if IMF member states see the legitimacy of the institution as a high national interest. As the world recovers from the financial crisis, the international community must use the current sense of urgency and interdependence to effect realistic reforms in the IMF governance.

Summary and Conclusion. The

financial crisis occurred when the IMF was at its political and economic nadir.

The G20 determined that the Fund is a vital resource for mitigating the effects of the crisis and for reducing the impact of future crises. Increased responsibilities required increased effectiveness, and there was wide consensus that the Fund’s effectiveness was stunted because many members, notably large emerging markets, did not regard the Fund’s governance as legitimate.

The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference established a complex but innovative governance structure for the IMF that brought all member countries to the table, while limiting numbers to a manageable size through constituencies. Over time, the legitimacy of the IMF declined as member states evolved into two castes—donors who made the

[ 1 1 0] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Business & Economics

rules and borrowers who followed them.

Prior to the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, the IMF tried to win back legitimacy by taking marginal steps toward more inclusive arrangements.

Changes in Fund governance incorporated new financial powers and their considerable resources, while doing little to address the needs of the LICs. Within the halls of the Fund, even the pressure of a mounting global crisis could not overcome the inertia caused by privilege, entitlement, and shortterm perceptions of national interest.

The academic community, civil society, and several governments have designed pragmatic steps to boost the IMF’s legitimacy, built on principles already undergirding IMF governance.

To be implemented, the steps require coherent and persistent pressure from a sufficient number of member states.

Capitals need to take initiative so that representation among the Executive Directors equitably reflects changing global dynamics. Transparency, equality, and accountability can transform the IMF from a survivor of the postwar years into a more effective institution serving the good of the world with integrity.

REALPOLITIK AND THE IMF

NOTES

1 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Article XII, Section 3, (b) (i) indicates 5 appointed members, and (ii) indicates 15 elected members for a total of 20. Since 1992, every two years the Executive Board “temporarily” increases the Board size to 24.

2 Ralph Bryant, “Reform of IMF Quota Shares and Voting Shares: A Missed Opportunity,” The Brookings Institution, April 8, 2008, http://www. brookings.edu/papers/2008/0408_imf_bryant.aspx (date accessed: 17 March, 2011).

Basic votes were given to acknowledge the equality of sovereign states.

3 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Article XII, Section 3, (b) (i).

4 Ariel Buira, “An Estimation of IMF Quotas based on a formula derived from the G-24 Ministers Communique,” a note based on Ariel Buira (ed.), “The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without Legitimacy,” Reforming the Governance of the IMF and World Bank, (London: Anthem Press, 2005) Chapter I. 5 Ngaire Woods and Domenico Lombardi, “Uneven patters of governance: how developing countries are represented in the IMF,” Review of International Political Economy 13, no. 3 (August 2006): 480-515.

This article describes the political dynamics within constituencies, and between other informal political blocs within the IMF Board.

6 “Key Findings and Recommendations of the High-Level Panel on IMF Board Accountability,” New Rules for Global Finance, April 2007, Internet, http://www.new-rules.org/about-new-rules/ publications/37-key-findings-and-recommendations-of-the-high-level-panel-on-imf-boardaccountability (date accessed: 17 March, 2010). The dual role of the MD, and of the World Bank President, and his allegiance to the major powers, has effectively weakened the Board. The MD consults with the Finance Ministers of the permanent 5 or the G7, and together they set the agenda for the Board and the Institution.

7 Domenico Lombardi, “Report of the Civil Society (Fourth Pillar) Consultations with the International Monetary Fund on Reform of IMF Governance,” Internet, http://www.new-rules.org/about-new-rules/ publications/118-report-on-the-civil-society-fourthpillar-consultations-with-the-international-monetary-fund-on-reform-of-imf-governance (date accessed: 17 March 2011). Illustrative of the Managing Director’s attitude is Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s invitation to New Rules to Global Finance to coordinate

civil society input into the Fund’s internal governance debates.

8 “Report of the Executive Board to the Board of Governors; Quota and Voice Reform; Progress Since the 2006 Annual Meetings,” International Monetary Fund, 16 October 2007. Internet, http://www. imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/101607.pdf (date accessed: 17 March 2011).

9 IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis: IMF Surveillance in 200407,” Independent Evaluation Office, International Monetary Fund, February 2011. Internet, http://www. ieo-imf.org/eval/complete/eval_01102011.html Lesley Wroughton, “Washington Economists Press Geithner on IMF Reforms,” Reuters, January 27, 2009, Internet, http://www.new-rules.org/news/in-the-news/96washington-economists-press-geithner-on-imfreforms (date accessed: 17 March 2011).

10 Ralph Bryant, “Reform of IMF Quota Shares and Voting Shares: A Missed Opportunity,” The Brookings Institution, April 8, 2008. Internet, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/0408_imf_ bryant.aspx (date accessed: 17 March 2011).

11 The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement the existing official reserves of member countries. SDRs are allocated to member countries in proportion to their IMF quotas.

The SDR also serves as the unit of account of the IMF and some other international organizations. Its value is based on a basket of key international currencies.

12 How the Europeans might reduce their seats has resulted in bizarre calculations: Spain might join Italy’s constituency, thereby giving up Spain’s rotation with Mexico and Venezuela to serve as an ED: this represented one-third of a chair; and Belgium might alternate with Poland, a member of the Belgian-led constituency, thereby giving up one-half of a chair, yielding a total reduction of Europe’s presence on the Board by five-sixths of a seat.

13 Monica Blagescu and Robert Lloyd, Pathways to Accountability, (London: One World Trust, 2005).

14 Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NY, 2007).

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Business & Economics

Converging Africa

The 21st Century Development Dilemma Rosa Whitaker Introduction. Integrating Africa into the 21st century

global economy is proving to be one of the most daunting development challenges of our day. Africa presents policy leaders and development practitioners with a special case.

Diverse in its economic fundamentals and uneven in its progress, Africa is the only region of the world in which people are growing poorer by virtually every economic and social indicator. There is broad recognition that this divergence contributes to a more insecure international system and severely challenges global efforts to address transnational issues such as health care, environmental degradation, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking. The world, after all, is only as secure as its weakest link.

Fortunately, global leaders largely recognize the grave consequences of inaction and the urgent need to partner with African stakeholders in addressing Africa’s divergence, as is evidenced by the public compacts made by multinational bodies such the G8 and G20 and the World Bank. However, much can still be done to improve efficiency and efficacy of such endeavors.

History has taught us that sustainable development models require robust national and international private sector [ 1 1 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Rosa Whitaker, recently named to Foreign Policy Magazine’s Top 100 List of Global Thinkers, is the President and CEO of The Whitaker Group. She served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa in the administrations of both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and was an architect of the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

CONVERGING AFRICA

participation in the economy. Foreign investment and an emerging African private sector can together create economic growth—a virtuous cycle of business climate reform and substantial developmental dividends. A 1 percent increase in world trade translates to $195 billion, more than five times the

Group have validated the idea of Africa as a dynamic market. The McKinsey report argues that Africa’s past decades of growth originated in macroeconomic and business climate reform and will manifest in a growing consumer market. Between 2010 and 2020, Africa’s consumer class is expected to grow to

The key to job creation is the private sector, both global and local.

foreign aid sub-Saharan Africa receives annually.1 Put simply: trade delivers.

Africa has found success over the last decade with a familiar formula: human and institutional capacity-building, trade liberalization, and trade preferences programs, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), supporting private investment and innovation. This rubric, shepherded by the genuine commitment of many of Africa’s under-lauded political and business leaders, has ushered in a new wave of business innovation and opportunities and has paved the way, in the apt words of Dr. Paul Collier, for Africa’s convergence with the rest of the world.2 We do not need to reinvent the wheel. By building on what is working, we can achieve meaningful results in Africa.

one billion, generating $1.4 trillion in consumer spending in 2020.3 Investors have responded to Africa’s promise. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows increased over 800 percent between 2000 and 2008, during which time Africa generated the highest return on FDI of all developing regions.4 With the anticipation that private equity and FDI inflows will continue apace, African economies will return to pre-global economic crisis growth rates faster than any other region of the world.

The core of Afro-optimism is predicated on a critical assumption—that Africa’s enormous youth population will become strong consumers and entrepreneurs. Over two hundred million sub-Saharan Africans are between fifteen and twenty-four years of age, accounting for 60 percent of sub-SahaUnderstanding an Emergent ran Africa’s unemployed population.5 Africa. Over the past decade, the Even relatively strong economies like perception of Africa as a business South Africa’s have averaged more than opportunity has shifted from consid- 25 percent unemployment over the last eration by only a small group of poli- decade.6 The continent’s opportunities cymakers to the mainstream of global can never be realized, however, withdiscourse. Independent reports from out tackling education, diverse skills organizations like the McKinsey Global development, and mass job creation. As Institute and the Boston Consulting recent events in Egypt and Tunisia have

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demonstrated, we cannot talk about reform in Africa without discussing the jobs that undergird stable democracies.

The key to job creation is the private sector, both local and global. No country in the world has developed economically without first empowering the private sector and expanding its trade. Yet, development professionals trip over each other in disjointed, uncoordinated activities, riddled with bureaucratic territorialism and perverse incentives that divert resources away from the business growth that Africa’s development demands. Western donors have done well in providing humanitarian relief but are poor in delivering effective development assistance. In fact, billions of dollars in aid to Africa—about $324 billion over the past fifty years from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members—has resulted in the growth of a massive aid-industrial complex in Western capitals rather than job creation and poverty alleviation on the continent.

Africa’s future growth will depend on increased private sector capital flows, innovative financing, and most importantly, strong indigenous private sectors bolstered by partnerships with external investors. While there is no magic bullet, this formula will deliver scalable job creation and liberate a mass of African people from poverty. Western aid has an important role to play if it is held to tangible results and reoriented to advance Africa’s economic convergence with the rest of the world.

Business & Economics

America shifted its Africa policy paradigm and embarked on an historic new trade and investment-centered approach towards the continent. AGOA removed all U.S. tariffs and quotas from almost all African-produced goods and gave rise to Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) investment and equity funds that support business growth in the region. Enacted into law by President Bill Clinton in 2000 and expanded three times by President George W. Bush, AGOA has maintained consistently strong bipartisan Congressional and public support because it is cost-effective and makes good policy sense.

With a modest investment of a few million dollars annually, AGOA has generated notable results, not the least of which has been its role in shifting the global discussion from Africa as an aid-dependent poster child for charity to an array of frontier economies poised for growth, business, and investment. Viewed through the lens of job creation, export growth, and income generation—all critical pillars for Africa’s convergence—AGOA has delivered impressive results, creating three hundred thousand jobs in Africa and more than tripling African exports to the U.S. from $21.5 billion in 2000 to $66.3 billion in 2008. While exports to the United States under AGOA declined in 2009 to $33.7 billion following the global economic downturn, they began to rebound last year and are on track to return to 2008 levels.7 While much attention is given to oil and energy-related products in AfriAGOA: A Model That Works ca, the non-oil sector has registered and Should Be Scaled Up. Ten similar proportional gains, accountyears ago, with the passage of AGOA, ing for $5.1 billion of African exports

[ 1 1 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

CONVERGING AFRICA

in 2008 before the full effects of the global recession were evident (nonoil exports decreased to $3.4 billion in 2009). AGOA has provided the impetus to new manufacturing sectors, most notably an apparel sector that has transformed the lives of workers in countries like Lesotho and Kenya.

Under AGOA, Lesotho’s apparel sector provides jobs for about forty thousand workers, accounting for nearly 50 percent of employment in Lesotho’s formal sector.8 In 2009, South Africa exported over $1 billion in automotive and transportation equipment to the United States under AGOA in the wake of the global recession, after growing to over $2 billion in 2008. It is important to note that AGOA supported an increase in African exports to the United States, but not at the expense of Detroit or U.S. workers. Instead of importing automobiles assembled in Europe, AGOA’s duty-free treatment gave Africa the opportunity to com-

modities from across the continent, to name just a few.

Behind these exports are African families, farmers, and youth, who are escaping from the fetters of poverty.

AGOA is helping to produce the new class of African consumers and entrepreneurs who are, in turn, buying U.S. products and fueling growth in the global economy. This is why all fortyeight countries in sub-Saharan Africa have supported AGOA and why development economist Dr. Paul Collier is urging developed nations, in particular in Europe and Japan, to align their market access and trade preference schemes with AGOA to create a “Super AGOA” that would exponentially multiply its benefits.

In the current body politic, it is more important than ever that trade preference and development programs demonstrate mutual benefits and the ability to achieve multiple policy objectives simultaneously. By creating both

Aid to Africa…has resulted in the growth of a massive aid-industrial complex... pete with Europe, ultimately providing American consumers with more choices at more competitive prices. Between 2000 and 2006, industry giants like Ford, General Motors, Toyota, Daimler, and BMW quadrupled their investment in production and export infrastructure in South Africa from about $208 million to $868 million. Other export sectors have also benefited from AGOA: cut flowers from Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; seafood from Senegal; and a host of agricultural com-

mutuality and additionality, AGOA exemplifies the kind of policies that U.S. policymakers should focus on scaling-up.

In addition to driving growth in Africa, AGOA provides strategic benefits for the United States. One in five U.S. jobs depend on international trade, and the United States experiences a 7 percent increase in employment for every 10 percent increase in exports.9 Since AGOA, U.S. exports to sub-Saharan Africa have increased over

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Business & Economics

150 percent. Lower trade barriers also provide spillover benefits, lowering the cost of importing inputs and increasing consumers’ purchasing power and choices. Another hidden benefit of AGOA is increased energy security. Oil comprises slightly over 90 percent of AGOA’s exports, supplying the United States with energy sources that alleviate its dependency on volatile Middle Eastern and South American countries.

Today, the United States imports more oil from Africa than it does from the Persian Gulf.

Given the United States’ historical belief in the power of free enterprise, we will never match the artificial level of business and investment subsidization that Chinese enterprises enjoy. The U.S. private sector, however, rightfully needs government support in international markets. Building on AGOA and its scope of incentives can offer additional paths to U.S. competitiveness, while simultaneously helping Africa integrate and converge with other growing economies.

Effective action must now follow the increasingly recognized fact that private sector and enterprise solutions are critical to sustainable development.

These are the only solutions scalable for Africa’s economic growth and global integration. Nevertheless, the type, quality, and source of investments will be critical to achieving the full measure of development initiatives.

It is widely acknowledged that China is having its way in Africa. Policymakers in Washington and private sector companies share a concern that the benefits of U.S.-Africa trade will be overshadowed by a growing China-Africa relationship. Direct trade between China and Africa has expanded almost 1,500 percent from just $6.5 billion in 1999 to $103.2 billion in 2008.10 Africans have asked for infrastructure and manufacturing investments and the Chinese have delivered, with more than two hundred targeted manufacturing investments between 1980 and 2001 that have translated into over nine hundred Chinese-owned, Africa-based companies in 2006.11

Enterprise for Development (EnDev), a roadmap that builds on AGOA to the mutual benefit of Africa and the United States, and that presents a formula for Africa’s convergence with the global economy.

EnDev first and foremost calls for AGOA’s protection and expansion.

Currently set to expire in 2015, the legislation requires Congressional extensions every few years, causing uncertainty that may soon translate into job and income loss in the region. A key provision of AGOA’s apparel benefits expires in December 2012, throwing open the door for hypercompetitive Asian manufacturers. Due to the eight to twelve month lead time of American garment orders, U.S. retailers are likely to start looking toward alternative sources in Asia, less for their comparable prices than for their business certainty.

In addition, EnDev calls for increasing the pool of resources available to organizations like the U.S. ExportImport Bank (Ex-Im Bank) and OPIC and encouraging the practice of con-

Enterprise for Development.

Building on What Works. AGOA’s stakeholders have created the

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cessionary lending by these organizations. As both the Ex-Im Bank and OPIC promote trade-based growth and work to increase U.S. businesses’ ability to export abroad, their efforts can help to shore up the American private sector’s ability to make use of the opportunities and market access made available

by AGOA.

inputs could receive a partial tax writeoff on their investments. Firms investing in value addition projects in Africa that promote local industrialization and employment could be eligible for a development tax credit. Although critics may argue that tax breaks are a domestic impossibility in the current economic climate, AGOA’s pas-

One in five U.S. jobs depend on international trade.

The products provided by the Ex-Im Bank can give U.S. companies an edge when they bid against Asian competitors for contracts in foreign markets.

Recently, the Ex-Im Bank made history when it helped General Electric to bid competitively on a contract to sell locomotives to Pakistan by matching its concessionary lending terms to those available to a competing Chinese firm.

OPIC, in addition to providing long-term lending to some of the most dynamic sectors in Africa, has a strong legacy of responsiveness and technical capacity-building on the continent.

When African policymakers called for increasing financial services to underserved micro-, small-, and medium-sized African companies, OPIC responded by partnering with Africa’s only multilateral trade and risk insurer to expand the reach of their products and extend their product line. As a selfsustaining entity, OPIC added $342 million to the U.S. Treasury in 2010.12 EnDev also proposes to strengthen AGOA with tax-based incentives for U.S. businesses. Companies investing in Africa’s non-oil, non-mineral sectors using largely African-sourced

sage against the odds in 2000 suggests that U.S. political interests can always be moved if proposed initiatives are in harmony with U.S. economic interests.

Africa is central to the global effort to address climate change. Under EnDev, the United States can combine financing from OPIC and the Ex-Im Bank with new tax incentives for American companies that invest in green technology in Africa—a sector in which the United States hopes to lead the world.

This will benefit Africa by mitigating its susceptibility to climate change while sparing the continent from the environmental consequences of traditional energy production that other countries and regions have experienced.

AGOA was never intended to be a panacea for Africa’s challenges, and it has become clear over the past decade that African nations do not yet have the universal capacity to take advantage of AGOA’s benefits. It is critical, then, that the United States complement AGOA with trade capacity building and targeted development assistance in order to build on those sectors, such as agriculture, where Africa can develop a clear competitive advantage,

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move quickly up the value-chain, and develop complementary industries.

This assistance must focus on improving market access and zeroing in on critical infrastructure challenges, such as poor transportation and insufficient power capacity. Incentives can also be offered in the form of WTO-compliant procurement credits and benefits to companies that partner with African companies in U.S. trade and development programs like those offered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Such partnerships would help to build African capacity and ensure technology transfer while also providing U.S. companies with local knowledge and access to Africa’s markets. The U.S. government should provide incentives to American companies to partner with African companies in implementing USAID and MCC projects. The involvement of private enterprises in these projects would curtail the alarming number of Americanfunded contracts that are awarded to Chinese companies that man projects with imported labor rather than African workers.

Innovative Models for Success in Africa. The U.S. companies that

are succeeding in Africa share a combination of optimism about the continent’s possibilities and realism regarding its challenges. This perspective gives rise to flexible and innovative business models that generate positive bottom-line results for shareholders while delivering development dividends.

SABMiller, an American-African conglomerate, is a good example. In 2010, it brought in $2.7 billion worth of revenues in Africa while employ-

[ 1 1 8 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Business & Economics

ing over twelve thousand workers in fifty-one breweries and bottling plants in fifteen African countries.13 In addition, the company provided a sustainable livelihood to tens of thousands of smallholder farmers who grow the local content for SABMiller products sold in Africa.

The success of the Coca-Cola Company, one of Africa’s largest private sector employers, can be traced to both its innovative sales and distribution models and its inclusive business model, which integrates low-income populations into its value chain as consumers, suppliers, distributors, and retailers.

With African sales growth outstripping global sales growth by 100 percent, the company plans to invest $12 billion in Africa in the coming decade.

General Motors East Africa (GMEA) is partnering with the Kenyan government to supply high-capacity Isuzu buses for Kenya’s public transportation system. Under the agreement, GMEA will supply to the Kenyan government at concessionary rates, while financing will be conducted through a Kenyan national bank, building local capacity and expanding local income.

While these companies may not be AGOA-dependent, they are AGOAinspired. This win-win paradigm makes the “good” the companies are doing in the region much more sustainable and less vulnerable to the often fleeting sentiments and tides of mere philanthropy.

Conclusion. Converging Africa

into the global economy is a complex challenge requiring a comprehensive approach. The prescription outlined here is not new. History has shown that

CONVERGING AFRICA

the road to prosperity runs through the marketplace, and it is the task of the United States to support Africa as it navigates that journey.

Central to that prescription should be the protection, extension, and expansion of AGOA. Paul Collier has described AGOA as the “pump-priming mechanism” that is helping African nations break into manufacturing and global markets with multiplicative effects. If the United States’ OECD partners would adopt the AGOA model to create a “Super AGOA,” it would provide a powerful impetus to Africa’s engine of growth and facilitate Africa’s integration into global supply chains.

So, too, would keeping AGOA’s benefits exclusive to Africa and making them permanent, thereby providing potential investors with the certainty

they need in order to invest in Africa’s export manufacturing sector. Finally, the United States must make a sustained and focused commitment to investing in building business capacity in Africa through infrastructure development, education, and skills training.

How we view Africa will determine how we engage it. Africa must now be seen through the prism of her possibilities rather than judged by her vulnerabilities. While there will be setbacks and disappointments, it is on a path of convergence. One of the United States’ most profound legacies is her bold leadership in seizing opportunities, spurring growth, and building new frontier markets. The United States must definitively and immediately commit to being Africa’s partner in progress.

NOTES

1 One Campaign, “Trade & Investment,” Internet, http://www.one.org/c/us/issue/17/ (date accessed: 28 January 2011).

2 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 80.

3 McKinsey Global Institute, “Lions on the Move,” Internet, http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/progress_and_potential_of_african_economies/ pdfs/MGI_african_economies_full_report.pdf (date accessed: 28 January 2011).

4 UN News Centre, “Africa’s rapid technological acquisition indicates emerging industrial base,” Internet, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID =37344&Cr=africa&Cr1=economic (date accessed: 28 January 2011).

5 World Bank, “World Bank Report Highlights African Youth Employment Issues,” Internet, http:// web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21997732~pa gePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00. html (date accessed: 2 February 2011).

6 Statistics South Africa, “Key Indicators: Unemployment,” Internet, http://www.statssa.gov.za/keyindicators/keyindicators.asp (date accessed: 2 February 2011).

7 AGOA, “Total Trade between AGOA Countries and the U.S.,” Internet, http://www.agoa.info/index. php?view=trade_stats&story=all_trade (date accessed: 02 February 2011).

8 Better Work Lesotho, “Project Summary,” Internet, http://www.betterwork.org/EN/resources/ Documents/Better%20Work%20Lesotho%20Project%20Summary.pdf (date accessed: 07 February 2011).

9 Mark Green, Jim Kolbe, and Rob Mosbacher, “More effective foreign assistance can pay real dividends,” Internet http://dailycaller.com/2011/01/28/ more-effective-foreign-assistance-can-pay-real-dividends/ (date accessed: 25 January 2011).

10 East Asia Forum, “China’s Exports to/Imports from Africa,” Internet, http://www.eastasiaforum. org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/ChinaAfricaTrade2009.bmp (date accessed: 07 February 2011).

11 Deborah Bräutigam, “’Flying Geese’ or ‘Hidden Dragon’? Chinese Business and African Industrial Development,” China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, Chris Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, eds., (London: Hurst, 2008), 51-68.

Peter Kragelund, “Chinese Drivers for African Development? The effects of Chinese investments in Zambia,” in Africa in China’s Global Strategy, Marcel Kitissou, ed., (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, 2007), 162-181.

13 SABMiller, “Sustainable Development – Africa,” Internet, http://www.sabmiller.com/index. asp?pageid=893 (date accessed: 07 February 2011).

Summer/Fall 2011 [ 1 1 9]

Science & Technology China Is My Backyard

China’s Environmentmal Degradtion in a Global Context Darrin Magee Environmental degradation in China is no secret.

International news media frequently remind us of the environmental and human health tragedies occurring as a result of widespread air, water, and soil pollution in China.

Moreover, in a world of nation-states, pollution knows no boundaries, and certain incidents—such as the Songhua River benzene spill that fouled Russian waters in 2005, or the persistent dust and smog storms that contribute to acid rain deposition on the Korean Peninsula—mushroom into diplomatic headaches between China and its neighbors.

Indeed, much of the world raised a scornful eyebrow just a few years ago as estimates of China’s annual carbon emissions approached and then surpassed those of the United States. A 2007 study at the University of Sussex in England, however, pegged some 23 percent of China’s carbon on goods bound for export.1 In a word, along with its factories, the West has outsourced its pollution to China.

This article complicates the “China’s environmental degradation” story by sketching a cursory political ecology of that degradation. China’s environmental problems are inextricably intertwined in a global system of consumption and disposal—or of manufacturing and de-manufacturing— [ 1 20] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Darrin Magee is Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies at Hobart and William Smith Colleges in Geneva, New York.

His academic interests include energy, water, and environment in China.

CHINA IS MY BACKYARD

in which we are all complicit to some degree. In general, a political ecology approach seeks to understand the ways in which a seemingly “local” environmental problem or phenomenon is embedded in wider-scale sociopolitical processes, and the ways in which some actors are marginalized (politically, economically, culturally, or geo-

Pollution in China. Air, water, and soil pollution are widespread and serious in many parts of China, a fact to which even official statistics attest.

Throughout the reform period (1978 to present), local officials have been evaluated and promoted primarily based on their ability to meet economic development and family planning targets. To a

Environmental degradation in China is no secret.

graphically) through “development” processes.2 The point of this article is not to excuse inaction or negligence on the part of Chinese governmental entities, corporations, or individuals, for all of those actors could surely do more to mitigate the myriad environmental tragedies currently unfolding in China.

Rather, this article aims to expand the geographic scale of inquiry into the problem of environmental degradation in China in order to uncover the ways that the global political-economic system contributes to those problems.

The following sections examine several key indicators of environmental and human health in China and address the very real consequences of declining health there and, in many cases, in neighboring countries downstream or downwind. Two industries—high-tech manufacturing and waste processing— that exemplify the political ecology of industrial pollution in China and the extent to which it resides in global webs of production, consumption, and disposal are highlighted as well. Finally, the article concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of the research findings.

large extent, then, the heavy footprint of widespread and rapid industrialization in China is understandable.

Moreover, similar footprints have been left elsewhere around the world; one readily observes the legacies of human and environmental sacrifice at the altar of state-led industrial development elsewhere in East Asia.3 Yet, as in many other ways, the situation in China is qualitatively and quantitatively different. For one, the rapidity of industrialization in coastal areas, especially during the 1990s, has brought a great deal of foreign investment and has far outpaced any legal or regulatory apparatus that might seek to curtail that industrialization. In addition, the growth of private-sector or hybrid industries in China’s manufacturing cities along the southern and eastern coasts has absorbed large amounts of labor from the state-owned sector. This is compounded by the mass migration of agricultural laborers to the industrial cities. And finally, the case of China is spatially different. Unlike Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, China has an immense “backyard,” a hinterland capable on the one

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hand of supplying many of the inputs necessary for such large-scale industrial development (e.g., labor, minerals, electric power), and on the other, of absorbing (or at least appearing to do so) many of the noxious by-products of that industrialization. Thus, when an out-of-compliance aluminum smelter, for example, is forced to close because of local pressure to address pollution, the smelter owners can simply rebuild a few valleys over, where villagers are more desperate for work and officials are more willing to risk potential longterm negative impacts for short-term improvements in the economic wellbeing of their constituents.4 Here, size does matter; the ability to relocate factories and thereby dilute their negative impacts is simply greater within the vast boundaries of China than it is in Taiwan, South Korea, or Japan.

An examination of a handful of indicators of China’s industrialization

Class

Science & Technology

and its impacts is warranted. Water is perhaps the most telling; in a country as vast and with such varied terrain and climates as China, ensuring adequate water supplies has been a priority of China’s leaders for centuries, from the Qin governor/engineer Li Bing who built the famous irrigation and flood control works at Dujiangyan, to the present leaders who are overseeing the gargantuan South-North Water Transfer (nanshui beidiao), which aims to bring some forty-eight cubic kilometers annually from the water-rich Yangtze Basin in the south to the drier Yellow basin in the north.5 Yet simply guaranteeing quantity of water is not enough, and the Ministry of Water Resources has even begun using the term “qualityinduced scarcity” (shuizhixing queshui) to describe situations where degradation in water quality renders it unfit for most uses. Table 1 shows the grading system used by the Chinese Ministry of

Table 1: China’s Water Quality Classification System Description and Appropriate Uses

I

Primarily water in source-region of watersheds and national natural protected areas

II

Grade 1 Protected Areas that are surface water sources for centralized drinking-water systems; breeding/spawning grounds for aquatic species (fish, shrimp, etc.)

III

Grade 2 Protected Areas that are surface water sources for centralized drinking-water systems; pathways for anadromous fish returning to spawning grounds; other fishing and aquaculture areas

IV

Industrial use and recreational areas without direct human contact

V

Agricultural use and general “landscape” (jingguan) water needs

>V

Worst quality; unfit for all uses

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CHINA IS MY BACKYARD

Environmental Protection (MEP) to classify the quality of water resources in the country.6 Based on the above grading system, and according to the Ministry of Water Resource’s own data, more than 70 percent of the monitored reaches of rivers in China’s urban areas were polluted (Grade IV or worse) in 2007.7 Perhaps more startling, the same report also claims that 74 percent of six hundred forty-one groundwater wells tested were polluted at Grade IV or worse.8 Negative impacts of surface water pollution on China’s neighbors are most notable in the heavily industrialized northeast, where transboundary basins such as the Songhua and Liao

zens of neighboring countries. Coal combustion, of course, is a major contributor; like the United States, China derives much of its energy from coal— some 77 percent of primary energy in 2008, and roughly 80 percent of its electricity production.9 There are some potentially promising developments, however. In a bid to improve the overall efficiency of coal-fired power generation and reduce emissions, the Chinese government shut down more than 70 GW of old and inefficient coal-fired power plants during the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010).10 That displaced capacity will of course be replaced with new power plants, but preliminary data suggest that the growth rate of net coal-

Despite the impressive growth in low-

carbon renewables, those sources produce only a tiny fraction of China’s electricity now. and the tributaries that feed them serve as conduits for pollution to Russia, North Korea, and Mongolia. The 2005 Songhua benzene spill noted above is one particularly egregious example, but even without such noteworthy pointsource contamination events, surface water quality standards in the northeast are generally poor. The situation for transboundary rivers in the northwest and southwest is generally much better, due primarily to lower levels of industrial development and irrigated agriculture within the basins.

Air pollution is a second major concern in China, with immediate and long-term consequences for the health of Chinese citizens as well as for citi-

fired power generation capacity is slowing, which gives some cause for optimism. Despite the impressive growth in low-carbon renewables, those sources produce only a tiny fraction of China’s electricity now, and their contributions to China’s overall electricity mix will be modest (though still impressive) for the near future.

In China’s cities, automobiles are increasingly responsible for fouling the air. This problem is expected to worsen, given the growth rate of automobile ownership in China in recent years (see Fig. 1).11 China’s own Ministry of Environmental Protection acknowledges ongoing problems of urban air pollution using almost any index (e.g.

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Science & Technology

Figure 1: Private Vehicle Ownership in China

oxides of nitrogen and sulfur, particulate matter of varying sizes), along with the associated implications for public health.12 And while official data show that there have been surprisingly few cases of “environment pollution and destruction accidents” (e.g., only four such events in heavily industrialized Guangdong in 2008) those numbers reflect only “sudden accidents, due to economic or social activities that are contrary to environment protection laws or due to unforeseen factors or natural disasters.”13 Industry: Manufacturing and De-manufacturing for the World China’s transformation into a manufacturing powerhouse during the Reform Era (1978 to present), and especially since the 1990s, has been nothing short of stunning. The wave of industrial development that swept through Japan and the Four Little

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Dragons (Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong) after World War II began to break on China’s shores in the late 1980s, and became visible in coastal cities over the following two decades with foreign investment capital, expertise, and economic dynamism. Beginning in the Special Economic Zones14 and spreading rapidly along coastal China, the industrial base has grown from humble beginnings as back-room producers of components for low-value manufactured wares, into more modern and technologically sophisticated joint ventures in a wide variety of sectors, and finally into homegrown companies able to compete successfully in the world market.

The rapid growth and modernization of China’s manufacturing sector has been largely export-led, with manufacturers setting up shop in China to take advantage of lower costs of labor and other inputs. Along with the growth

CHINA IS MY BACKYARD

in foreign direct investment has come equally impressive growth in exports to more developed countries, with the United States as the largest market.

While many Americans resent the flight of manufacturing jobs to China, few complain about the lower costs that such outsourcing has brought for goods ranging from everyday household items to laptop computers and high-efficiency air conditioners. Less visible from the store shelves, and of far less concern to the average American consumer, are the environmental and human health costs of manufacturing those goods that have also been outsourced to China.

The high-tech sector—from laptops to LED bulbs, LCD flat panels to solar photovoltaic panels—perhaps best exemplifies the evolution of China’s manufacturing sector. Moreover, when compared to the “traditional” industries that characterized industrialization and modernization, such as iron and steel, textiles, fertilizers, chemicals, cement, and paper, the high-tech sector is often seen as a “cleaner” alternative, as microchip fabrication plants (“chip fabs”) tend to belch far less visible smoke and steam than do heavier industries. Yet the environmental impacts of high-tech manufacturing are far from benign, even in countries where environmental regulations and manufacturing standards are relatively stringent. IBM’s legacy of contaminated sites in New York, most of which involve serious, long-term, and essentially irreparable soil and groundwater contamination, is one example.15 The fact that the greatest concentration of Superfund sites in the United States is in California’s Silicon Valley area is yet another example.

In China’s backyard, high-tech manufacturing in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan has left toxic legacies at all steps of the manufacturing chain, from mining and smelting of ores to production of circuit boards. Untreated or minimally treated wastewater discharged from chip fabs in Hsinchu, Taiwan’s Silicon Valley, has been blamed for disrupting the endocrine systems of mussels in coastal waters, leading to hermaphroditism or similar mutations of reproductive organs.16 Studies in coastal waters receiving the effluent from South Korea’s high-tech centers have yielded similar findings.17 Medical science is only beginning to understand the breadth and variety of endocrine disruptor compounds (EDCs) among the thousands of chemicals used in everyday manufacturing processes around the globe. Even at minute concentrations thousands of times lower than previously believed to be significant, these compounds interfere with the endocrine (hormonal) systems of living beings, resulting in what are often trans-generational impacts. Clearly, access to low-wage labor, raw materials, and other factors play key roles in any company’s decision to relocate a factory to another country. Yet awareness of these impacts in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea has translated into pressures on governments to regulate polluters more strictly. It is hardly surprising that much of the industry that previously called Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea home has now landed in China, where awareness is low, regulation is spotty, and enforcement is lax.

In addition to the environmental and human health costs of hightech manufacturing, China has come

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to bear the costs of de-manufacturing much of those high-tech goods in increasingly painful and visible ways. Electronic waste (“e-waste”) has become a scourge of many coastal towns in southern China, just as it did in certain parts of Taiwan two decades ago. Thus, the 1990s’ e-waste crisis in southern Taiwan, in which discarded circuit boards lining the riverbanks were so densely packed that they resembled pieces of slate, has become today’s

Science & Technology

laji), and a 2009 regulation threatens fines of up to 500,000 Yuan (roughly U.S. $75,000) on unauthorized e-waste processors.20 Yet wellworn smuggling routes along China’s southeastern coast, along with unscrupulous brokers and “recyclers” in Hong Kong, the United States, and elsewhere in more developed countries, contribute to the continued leakage of foreign e-waste into China.

China’s environmental degradation

and resultant human health impacts are embedded in global political and economic cycles.

Guiyu, a town in coastal Guangdong Province where mountains of discarded computers, cell phones, monitors, and other electronics are de-manufactured by fire, acid, and hammers in order to retrieve trace amounts of precious and semi-precious metals.18 In the process, however, dangerous chemicals—including brominated fire retardants and toxic metals such as cadmium and mercury—find their way into the soil, water, and air of China’s e-waste villages. Not surprisingly, through pathways such as ingestion of metal-contaminated foods and water, those same poisons find their way into the bodies of villagers, where they may do irreparable damage to their skeletal, nervous, and renal systems.19 The Chinese government has sought to eliminate imports of what the Ministry of Environmental Protection labels “environmentally dangerous electronic waste” (weihai huanjing de dianzi

[ 1 26 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Conclusion. This article is not an attempt to excuse inadequate regulation or lax enforcement of environmental or health standards in China, but rather, to show how China’s environmental degradation and resultant human health impacts are embedded in global political and economic cycles.

China’s 11th Five-Year Plan (20062010) emphasized the need to develop a cyclical economy (xunhuan jingji) in order to reduce waste generation and promote more efficient use of resources. The corollary of the “Made in China” phenomenon is a tragically cyclical global economy in which China, as the world’s factory but also its junkyard, absorbs much of the pollution associated with manufacturing the goods we desire, as well as with demanufacturing the “bads” we discard.

Although the above analysis addresses only one particularly pernicious cat-

CHINA IS MY BACKYARD

egory of waste—electronic waste—China imports massive quantities of other wastes, which are then fed back into the manufacturing process. Indeed, waste is one of the principal categories of containerized exports from the United States to China; in 2009 alone, California’s exports to China of “waste and scrap” were some $2.1 billion (of the state’s $9.7 billion of total exports to China, roughly 22 percent).21 To be sure, recovering and reusing materials such as copper and gold from discarded electronic items is preferable to mining them anew, so long as the materials are indeed recyclable with safe and energy-efficient technologies, and as appropriate environmental and health standards are upheld. Given the rapidity and intensity of industrialization in China, the concentration of much of those globally-oriented industries, and the resultant potential for long-term exposures of significant populations to toxins,22 there is an urgent need to minimize the release of noxious byproducts of manufacturing and de-manufacturing into the environment. This will likely only be achieved by the coordinated efforts of Chinese authorities to tighten regulations and strengthen enforcement, by

the demands of corporations for higher standards along their supply chains, and by the demands of consumers (via purchasing decisions) for manufacturers to prioritize environmental and health concerns. Progress on any one of these fronts is challenging; making real headway on all three will be no mean feat, but is imperative. Pollution knows no political boundaries, and for toxins that are easily transported in air, water, or any number of goods flowing around the globe, the distance between backyard and front door is increasingly small.

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Science & Technology

NOTES

1 Jim Watson and Tao Wang, “Who Owns China’s Carbon Emissions,” (Sussex: Tyndall Centre, 2007).

2 See, for instance, Paul Robbins, Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction, Critical Introductions to Geography (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004).

3 See, for example, Brett L. Walker, Toxic Archipelago: A History of Industrial Disease in Japan, Weyerhauser Environmental Books. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010).

4 Bryan Tilt, The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

5 Darrin Magee, “Moving the River? China’s South-North Water Transfer Project,” in Engineering Earth: The Impacts of Megaengineering Projects, ed. Stanley D. Brunn (Springer, 2011).

6 Ministry of Environmental Protection of the PRC, “Environmental Quality Standards for Surface Water (Gb 3838-2002),” ed. Ministry of Environmental Protection and Inspection and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China General Administration of Quality Supervision (2002).

7 Ministry of Water Resources of the PRC, “2008 Nian Zhongguo Shuiziyuan Gongbao (2008 China Water Resources Report),” Ministry of Water Resources, Internet, http://www.mwr.gov.cn/zwzc/ hygb/szygb/qgszygb/201001/t20100119_171051. html.

8 Wells tested were located in Beijing, Liaoning, Jilin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Hainan, Ningxia, and Guangdong.

9 National Bureau of Statistics, ed. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2009).

10 Min Wei, “National Development and Reform Commission Energy Office: 11 Gigawatts of Small Thermal Power Retired Ahead of Schedule,” Zhongguo Jingji Wang (China Economy Net), Internet, http://www.ce.cn/cysc/ny/dl/201010/25/ t20101025_20529670.shtml.

11 National Bureau of Statistics, ed. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook).

12 Ministry of Environmental Protection of the PRC, “Report on the State of the Environment in China,” (Ministry of Environmental Protection of the PRC, 2008).

13 National Bureau of Statistics, ed. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook).

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14 Port cities along China’s southeastern coast that were opened to foreign investment and trade as part of the economic reforms of the early 1980s under Deng Xiaoping.

15 Elizabeth Grossman, High Tech Trash: Digital Devices, Hidden Toxics, and Human Health (Washington: Island Press : Shearwater Books, 2006).

16 See, for instance, Tsu-Chang Hung et al., “Organotins and Imposex in the Rock Shell, Thais Clavigera, from Oyster Mariculture Areas in Taiwan,” Environmental Pollution 112, no. 2 (2001).

17 Karri Ramu et al., “Spatial Distribution and Accumulation of Brominated Flame Retardants, Polychlorinated Biphenyls and Organochlorine Pesticides in Blue Mussels (Mytilus Edulis) from Coastal Waters of Korea,” Environmental Pollution 148, no. 2 (2007).

18 Anna Leung, Zong Wei Cai, and Ming Hung Wong, “Environmental Contamination from Electronic Waste Recycling at Guiyu, Southeast China,” Journal of Material Cycles and Waste Management 8, no. 1 (2006).

19 Liangkai Zheng et al., “Blood Lead and Cadmium Levels and Relevant Factors among Children from an E-Waste Recycling Town in China,” Environmental Research 108, no. 1 (2008), Taiyi Jin et al., “Osteoporosis and Renal Dysfunction in a General Population Exposed to Cadmium in China,” Environmental Research 96, no. 3 (2004).

20 Ministry of Environmental Protection of the PRC, “New Environmental Protection Regulation: Unauthorized E-Waste Processing Maximum Fine of 500,000 Yuan (in Chinese),” Ministry of Environmental Protection of the PRC, Internet, http://www.mep.gov.cn/zhxx/hjyw/200903/ t20090305_134913.htm.

21 The U.S.-China Business Council, “US Exports to China by State: 2000-09,” The U.S.China Business Council, Internet, http://www. uschina.org/public/exports/2000_2009/full_state_ report.pdf.

22 Min Shao et al., “City Clusters in China: Air and Surface Water Pollution,” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 4, no. 7 (2006).

View from the Ground Weirdos and Old Men Melinda Reyes “Only weirdos and old men go to mosques!” My Turkish host-sister flipped her hair and took a sip of her coca-cola, equally amused and annoyed that she had to inform me of that apparent “fact of life” after I had asked her whether she ever visited the many mosques in her hometown, Alanya.

I had already been in Turkey for three months and had seen some of the world’s most exquisite Islamic architecture in the heart of what was once the Ottoman Empire.

I had visited the Yeşil Mosque of Bursa and the Selimiye Mosque in Edirne, both former Ottoman capital cities, and had watched the Sultanahmet Mosque of Istanbul fill with worshippers for the final evening prayer before breaking fast during Ramadan. I had wandered the basilica-turnedAlaeddin Mosque in Konya, one of the most religiously conservative cities in the country and the inheritor of Rumi’s dervish legacy. I had even spent a hot afternoon at the Umayyid Mosque in Aleppo, Syria, and ducked into a neighborhood Shia mosque in the backstreets of old Damascus.

But never had I been to a mosque that was less than one hundred and fifty years old. Never had I donned a headscarf to enter a place younger than airplanes, tootsie rolls, or telephones. And as my host sister laughed at my naiveté and [ 1 30] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Melinda Reyes is a junior specializing in Turkish, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Melinda studied in Turkey at Georgetown’s McGhee Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies (fall 2010) with scholarship from the Turkish Coalition of America. She has also studied in Russia with the State Department’s Critical Languages Scholarship.

WEIRDOS AND OLD MEN

moved on to tell me the latest gossip about Angelina Jolie, I imagined there had been a challenge in her words; she had said “only weirdos and old men go to mosques” but “only weirdos and old men go to mosques… and if you go, you’ll see I’m right” was what she meant.

So one Thursday after the winter rains had come, I swept my hair into a ponytail, grabbed a headscarf, and went to a number of mosques to see for myself just who frequented Alanya’s mosques.

I walked towards town, away from the Ottoman-era villa that houses Georgetown’s McGhee Center of Eastern Mediterranean studies. Counting the minarets down in the valley, I passed two neighborhood mosques built into the side of the hill that featured the same pastel mid-90’s resort architecture that you might find in Florida. They would have been indistinguishable from the apartment buildings surrounding them if not for a small brass placard bearing

As I ventured further into Alanya, I received much the same reaction. The majority of women I had encountered in my time there did not cover, and of those who did, a fair percentage was either elderly or part of the salvar -wearing contingencies from the mountain villages fifteen minutes outside of town.

Part of the Turkish Riviera, Alanya sits just at the spot where the softly sloping Taurus Mountains fall to meet the Mediterranean Sea. The story goes that Marc Antony gave Alanya, with its blue waters, beaches, and caves, to Cleopatra as a wedding present. It is a visually stunning place, a fact not lost upon the thousands of Russian, Dutch, and German tourists who flock there every summer, nor upon the migrant workers and permanent residents, many of whom depend on the revenue pulled in during the tourist season for their livelihood.

Politically speaking, it is a notably secularist area. In line with the political

A “live and let live” sentiment prevails

in social and personal interactions, while in institutional and bureaucratic contexts, the secular-religious debate tends to be much more divisive. their names and a minaret at the back that, from a certain angle, just barely cleared the rooftop and resembled a little pointed hat. Further down the hill, I said ‘hello’ to the smiling grandmother at the restaurant that had the best mantı - Turkish minced meat ravioli in garlic yogurt sauce- in town. She registered a look of surprise at my headscarf but said nothing about it.

leanings of the rest of the Mediterranean coast, the Antalya region overwhelmingly voted against a Fall 2010 referendum that one journalist I had spoken with had called a “vote of confidence in AKP” – the conservative Islamist party that currently holds the majority of seats in the Turkish Parliament. It is difficult to doubt that a liberal sense of laicism is de rigeur when, Summer/Fall 2011 [ 1 31 ]

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on any given night from May through November, the not-so-subtle sound of Euro dance music from 30-inch subwoofers floats over the valley and up the peninsula. Yet there is also respect for religious customs; the more traditional Anatolian villages a few miles inland offset the liberal Alanya. A “live and let live” sentiment prevails in social and personal interactions, while in institutional and bureaucratic contexts, the secular-religious debate tends to be much more divisive.

As soon as I made it to the town center, I crossed the street to Alanya’s newest mosque,—built in the early 2000s. Architecturally modern from the outside, it had quotes from the Qu’ran in Turkish, mildly mistranslated English, and German. Slipping off my shoes and tiptoeing across the carpet, I peeked through the front door.

A man vacuuming smiled and let me wander around a bit before he came over to introduce himself and show me around. He was the only one there.

The ceilings were sharply angled, and there was a bold color scheme right down to the sun shining through the green and blue highlighter- colored floor-to-ceiling stained glass windows.

The man took me around, explaining how the builders had hoped it might be a place for the whole community of Alanya, tourists included.

He insisted on taking a picture of me standing in the minbar – the podium from which the imam delivers sermons. (Me: “Is this allowed?” Him: “No problem, is good, is good.”) He gave me an English-language booklet about Islam and walked me to the door.

I wandered down near the harbor and stumbled upon Yeni Cami, [ 1 32 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

View from the Ground

a mosque I had passed several times before, but had not noticed. It sat in a brick paved oasis, tucked behind an uneven row of storefronts advertising Lacoste polos and Bjorn Borg boxer briefs for seven euros. Silent and shaded, Yeni Cami seemed far removed from the more unsavory discos of the town across the street. I took off my trainers and adjusted my scarf, this time heading for the door marked “place reserved for women” in Turkish and “visitors’ entry” in Turkish and English.

A number of older mosques I had visited had an optional women’s section for the women’s comfort, much as the upper level of many restaurants is reserved for women and families. The other women’s sections I had seen occupied a balcony or space cordoned off by ropes and screens, and were just as separate; still, I bristled at the prospect of using a side door just because of my sex.

That made the mosque’s incredibly stereotypically girlish color scheme all the more surprising; it looked as though Barbie had been commissioned to decorate. Strategically placed crystal baroque chandeliers cast patterns on the carpet. They reflected back in the mirrors painted over with flower patterns that lined the walls of the second floor. In comparison to the first mosque, the dome was high, smooth, and outfitted with several dozen petite softly curved arches that allowed light to enter the room. The ceiling was painted with a design of light gold, silver, spearmint bubblegum green, aquamarine, cerulean, robin’s egg blue, and pink.

There was pink everywhere, on the ceiling, on the minbar, the marble, the moldings, the mirrors, the windows.

One man sat praying at the front

WEIRDOS AND OLD MEN

of the first floor of the mosque. I waited a few minutes, but no one else came. Admittedly, I had gone to the first two mosques during nonprayer times, and they had been empty in the same way a church might be when Mass is not being celebrated. All the same, I began to wonder whether my host sister had been right.

I happened upon the last mosque while walking past the familiar cafes and currency exchanges. I saw a minaret over the roof of a BP station. Curious, I dodged a car exiting the lot and went around back.

The mosque was smaller and had fewer exterior ornaments than the other two had. At the side yard fountain, a handful of men washing their hands and feet in ritual ablution took no notice as I straightened my scarf one more time.

The mosque had what I could only equate to a front porch. My grandmother’s home had the same thing when I was growing up – the worn yellow carpet, the shelves for shoes, flat large-paned windows looking out on the street. I placed my shoes on the shelf just as the müezzin—that is, the prayer caller and imam’s helper— began his call to prayer. Not wanting to intrude, I hesitated on that little porch, moving out of the way as men set their shoes down and filed into the building.

I was trying to decide whether to grab my shoes and leave when a bent old man in a green prayer cap approached me and pointed to the corner of the porch. “Go,” he said.

“No, no,” I protested in Turkish as politely as I could, “I just want to watch.

I’m not here to pray. I’m not, I don’t…”

He herded me over to the corner said “Wait,” before snapping a curtain

closed, leaving me alone in the pseudo room—another women’s section—staring out the window and trying to decide just how to feel. I was not used to being ordered around because of my gender. I could just imagine my host sister laughing at my confusion and the curiosity that had landed me there in the first place. “See,” she would say, “old men and weirdos! So have you heard the new Katy Perry track?”

The man returned two minutes later and ushered me into the mosque with “the prayers are about to start” as the only explanation for the change in location. He hung my handbag on a coat rack in the corner and brought over a plastic gardening stool for me to sit on.

From my perch at the back, I counted the men shuffling into the small room.

Twenty, thirty-five, fifty-two, seventy…

Among them were the retirees – the old men – my host sister had predicted,but there were also workmen, shopkeepers, businessmen, middle aged men, and men who could not have been older than twenty, all kneeling down in reflection as soon as they entered. As the room filled up, the official prayers began and the men arranged themselves in lines and went through the sequence of motions that accompanied the words.

I glanced over at the man in the green cap who had set me up in the corner.

He was one of three müezzin who were taking turns passing the microphone.

After the prayers had finished, the old man came over and introduced himself as Hikmet. He explained the meaning of some of the Arabic script that adorned the space and noted that the balcony at the back was where women “belonged.” My secularist host sister’s words reverberated from a conSummer/Fall 2011 [ 1 33]

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versation we had had months ago. “They want us all in burqas. That is the problem with the religious.” Hikmet kept talking. I did not agree with him, but I liked him and his quick gait, like a merengue dance that only moved forward.

Hikmet led me to a café afterwards.

Upon hearing that I was not hungry in the least, he ordered me enough pilaf and kofte to last me until the next day’s dinner. As we talked, his deliberate stillness and measured way of speaking reminded me of my grandfather.

It turned out that Hikmet had lived in Rochester, NY for much of his life.

He had wanted to be an imam, but his parents encouraged him to pursue tailoring, and so he studied and worked in Paris for thirteen years before relocating his family to New York. In his own words, he had “two sons, two daughters, three grandbabies, and a fat wife,” half of whom lived in America, half in Ankara, and all of whom he loved very much. He showed me a picture. His daughters did not cover their heads; he shrugged and said that was between them and God. We talked for two hours, barreling through several cups of tea augmented by a bowl’s worth of sugar cubes. In the end, he would not let me pay, and to my amusement, he did not pay either. He simply waved goodbye to the waiter and began the slow dance to the door. Hikmet invited me to come back for tea the next day, and I happily accepted the invitation.

When it came time to visit Hikmet again, I brought along Musa, a friend who had become like a brother to me.

He was the kind of friend who tugs on your pigtails to get your attention, shares tea and advice freely, and insists on helping you move on his day off, even though it is his first free day in weeks. [ 1 34 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

View from the Ground

Hikmet greeted me warmly, but to my surprise he looked up at my tall friend as though he were looking at a street dog, trying to decide whether it was dangerous. Musa responded with equal suspicion, using the most polite and formal language I had ever heard from him. As the three of us walked down the street together, Hikmet quietly asked Musa in Turkish where he was from and which mosque he attended, and Musa supplied a short, vague, and apparently unsatisfactory answer. After that, they ignored each other, looking straight ahead and only addressing me.

Hikmet relaxed a bit when we arrived at the café. We sat at a table and talked for a few minutes. Musa sat off to the side, fiddling with the silverware and staring out the open door to the street.

When Hikmet offered to order tea for us, Musa, without looking at him or thanking him said that we would not be able to stay; he then grabbed my arm and steered me out of the shop.

I did not know what to say to Musa as we walked along Ataturk Caddesi, the main street in town. He had never acted like that before. Slowing his pace and ruffling my hair, he called me dengesiz (technically unbalanced, but also a term used among friends that means silly, crazy, clumsy, or careless). “You’re not in America anymore. You can’t trust people like that. You don’t know him,” he said.

“He was just a nice old man! Besides, at one point I didn’t know you, either.”

“Yeah, but you can trust me. You can’t trust everyone.”

Down by the harbor, we ducked into a café where some of our friends were relaxing. Musa greeted them and relayed in rapid-fire Turkish what had just happened. They looked at me with entertain-

WEIRDOS AND OLD MEN

ment and incredulity, and shaking their heads, echoed Musa’s sentiments.

“Why would you go to a mosque? Religious men are dangerous here,” one said.

“Today you’re drinking tea with him, and then after a little while, he’ll convince you to wear the headscarf, and then he’ll say you can’t be friends with men…” another said.

“You have to be aware,” the third one said gently. “There are certain things about this place that you won’t understand until you’ve been here for a long time, and until you fully speak the language, and even then, you might not get it… you have to be careful.”

I was surprised by their concern.

It went beyond my host sister’s distaste for religious institutions to a consummate distrust of religious leaders and mosques. “But he has the same faith as you. Shouldn’t you by default have at least some respect for him?”

They exchanged looks for a minute, then one at last leaned in and said “It’s not the same. He is Sunni. We are Alevi.” All of a sudden, Musa’s discomfort at Hikmet’s questions made more sense.

Alevism is a sect of Islam that entertains elements of both Shia and Sunni traditions in addition to a number of its own unique rituals and beliefs. These customs include different holidays and times of fast, liberal values, strict secularism, extreme gender equality, a unique ceremony and religious leader (called the “cem” and “cem dede,” respectively), and no requirement to pray five times a day. Relations between the majority Sunni and minority Alevi, around 20 percent of the population, range from cooperation to uncomfortable peace to occasional bursts of violence in larger cities, most recently

in the unstable climate of the 1990s.

“Silly,” they said, watching my face as the pieces came together. “And you were going to be their newest convert….” They laughed and teased me. “You’d already be doing your daily prayers if we weren’t looking out for you. Dengesiz, dengesiz.”

I did not see Hikmet again before leaving Turkey; soon after the second afternoon finals had arrived, followed by packing and one last visit with my host sister. Alanya is small, and word of my adventures had already spread to her.

“So, what did you think?” she asked over tea.

I was not sure how to respond. It all seemed a little comical in retrospect— traipsing around in a Georgetown raglan shirt and a headscarf; sulking as I was corralled into the women’s section; meeting the müezzin; Musa “rescuing” me from all the trouble I had supposedly gotten into. “Despite what you may have heard, no one tried to convert me.”

She took a sip. “But you still had to cover, and you still were told what to do, and still they were so…well, now do you understand why I don’t go?” She looked at me with wide, entreating eyes for a long moment.

And I did understand. The concept of traditional mosque-going weirdos and old men who wanted her to hide her hair was the specter she, as a woman, as a young person, as a distinctively Western-oriented secularist Turk, feared and fought above all others.

When juxtaposing secularists and Islamists, paternalism and feminism, and the Alevis with the majority Sunnis, the 99 percent Muslim demographic of the state no longer seems so monolithic. Vast swaths of the population, including my host sister, Hikmet, and Summer/Fall 2011 [ 1 35]

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Musa, generally share a sense of national pride and identity but remain divided along political, ideological, and social fault lines, reinforced inter-group stratification, and mutual distrust.

“Weirdos and old men,” I said carefully, thinking of the broad sampling

[ 1 36 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

View from the Ground

of men from the community who had prayed together, thinking of how Hikmet’s pinky looped around the bottom of the tea glass in just the same way my host sister’s pinky did. “I understand.”

View from the Ground

Calls For Reform

Challenges to Saudi Arabia’s Education System Karen Courington and Vanessa Zuabi Driving along the desert highway north of the ancient port city of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, ten Georgetown students and Saudi guides approached the highly acclaimed King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST). It was our last day on a ten-day exchange trip sponsored by Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Higher Education, designed to foster cultural and professional ties among U.S. and Saudi students and to give us a clear idea of how education reform is impacting universities in Riyadh, Jeddah, and the Eastern Province.1 From the tree-lined, landscaped driveway of KAUST, we circled to the main entrance with anticipation, only to find that the doors were closed for a state visit. KAUST has been a symbol of reform in the Kingdom, lauded for its coeducation, state-of-the-art facilities, and top scientific research. Its closed doors, however, embodied the obstacles Saudi students face in entering the modern, global economy.2 Recent unrest in the Middle East has put a spotlight on issues of unemployment, the need for education and economic reform in the region, and the rising power of tech-savvy youth. The storm of overarching development challenges has shaken the region to its core, even in wealthy

Karen Courington is a 2010 graduate of the Master of Science in Foreign Service program at Georgetown University, and 2001 graduate of the University of Virginia. She is a Fellow with the Truman National Security Project.

Vanessa Zuabi is Associate Director of Middle East Programs at the Aspen Institute.

She is a 2010 graduate of the Master of Science in Foreign Service program from Georgetown University and received a B.A. in Political Science from the University of California, Irvine.

Summer/Fall 2011 [ 1 37 ]

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countries like Saudi Arabia. Similar to Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia shares the challenges of a demographic shift: a growing youth population, under-employment and unemployment, and a lack of qualified graduates with a private-sector skill set. With its petroleum resources and revenue, Saudi Arabia has attempted to address its economic and social challenges by diversifying its economy, opening up to foreign investment, and reforming its higher education system.

Impetus for Reform. At King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, foreign workers, many from South Asia, swamped the lines for customs and immigration. The number of foreign workers in the past six years has risen by 37 percent to 8.4 million.4 But why is a country with high levels of youth unemployment importing teams of foreign labor? In 2010, the official Saudi unemployment rate was around 10.5 percent.5 Making matters worse, of Saudi Arabia’s unemployed, 94 percent

As more women look to enter the labor

market, Saudi Arabia must try to accommodate them or risk losing highly educated citizens.

Our visit to the Kingdom in January 2010 gave us a snapshot of ongoing education reform through personal interactions with faculty, administrators, and Saudi students. We returned with the impression of a dynamic country with an impetus for reform, viewed through the lens of students aspiring to better themselves and their community in a traditional culture confronting modernity. Yet from our observations at five major universities, education reform in the Kingdom has not gone far enough. In order to tap into Saudi Arabia’s next greatest resource—its people—education reform must solidify basic liberal freedoms and increase broad-based educational opportunities.2 Social realities, such as gender inequality ingrained in the culture and laws, and the inadequacies of the public sector education system, challenge Saudi Arabia as it moves forward.

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were under the age of thirty-five.6 In a country where 50.8 percent of the population is under age twenty-five, unemployment within this demographic is a major concern. As protests in the region have demonstrated, “creating jobs for young Saudis is a matter of national security.”8 The government is attempting to create private sector jobs for its growing youth population by enticing private investment, constructing “economic cities,” and reforming education.

According to Dr. Jean-Francois Seznec of Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Saudi Arabia will have to create on average of 300,000 jobs a year to move beyond its role solely as an oil-producing nation.9 Creation of public sector jobs cannot keep up with the rising population, so the government has attempted to place Saudis into international companies

COURINGTON AND ZUABI

through quotas and labor laws, aimed at “Saudization” of the workforce. In the private sector, however, as a Reuters Special Report states, “companies much prefer to hire expatriates instead of locals, in large part because of shoddy education” that fails to equip Saudi graduates for high-tech, high-skilled jobs.10 According to John Sfakianakis, chief economist of Banque Saudi Fransi, “expats now fill nine out of ten jobs in the private sector.”11 A 2008 report by Booz Allen Hamilton indicated an “abundance of certain specializations not aligned with private-sector demand,” particularly a deficit in areas requiring engineering, sciences, and social sciences.12 Saudi Arabia’s plan to create economic cities represents one of the more ambitious attempts to diversify the economy, spur regional development, and create local jobs.

During our visit to Riyadh, Mr. Amr Al-Dabbagh, Governor of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), stressed the great potential of such economic cities. The SAGIA staff guided us through a room filled with scaled models of Dubai-like cities throughout the country. Yet when we set foot on the construction site of King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC) north of Jeddah, only model homes had been completed. While the detailed and utopian plans for KAEC may someday resemble other urban planning successes in Saudi Arabia (such as Jubail Industrial City in the Eastern Province), the realization of economic cities to create employment opportunities— complete with petrochemical plants, ports, and cultural centers—seems a distant future.

Saudi Arabia’s education system is

View from the Ground

trying to progress even faster, so that the new economic cities do not become similar bastions of youth unemployment and graduates lacking in privatesector professional skills such as creative thinking, problem solving, and business and communication skills. Currently, private firms circumvent rather than comply with Saudization labor laws, and hire expats who can meet their needs for skilled workers at a lower cost.13 Since King Abdullah came to power in 2005, Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in education, with an increase of 18 percent in education funds in the 2009 budget, the construction of 3,600 schools between 2006 and 2008, and an expansion of universities, private sector cooperation, and scholarships for study abroad programs.14 Just as the Kingdom must diversify its economy, its universities must diversify their curriculum and course offering, even at technical schools. During our visit to King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), an all-male university in Dhahran, originally affiliated with state oil company Saudi Aramco, administrators were eager to discuss how they could enhance curriculum in social sciences to prepare students for a globalized world. KFUPM’s graduates are in demand, yet faculty members recognize the need to broaden an engineering curriculum to include courses such as international studies. As one KFUPM professor put it, global competitiveness requires a “global mindset.”

Education Reform and Equality of Opportunity. In the heart of Riyadh, King Saud University (KSU), a public school, is the largest university

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in the country, with nearly thirty-eight thousand men and women on separate campuses.15 Our visit to KSU was a first glimpse into how education reform has affected men and women differently. Our delegations visited the campuses separately, according to gender.

Among the women, and without our abayas and headscarves, we sat comfortably, and candidly shared our goals and aspirations as female university students. Rima,16 a PhD candidate in communications, shared her love for her

business, law, and engineering are now open fields of study for women, “on the premise that work in these fields will become more widely available to women in the future,”20 women continue to take courses primarily in areas of social sciences and communication.”21 The young women at KSU Girls’ University Studies Center were excited to guide us through their campus, which formerly belonged to the men. While the female students had computer labs, libraries, and a science and medicine curricu-

… the influence of religious clerics still

impedes full reform in all aspects of education, particularly in curriculum development and in women’s education. iPhone and Facebook, and discussed her post-graduation plans to go into teaching. Most of our questions for Rima and her classmates centered upon the opportunities presented to them in the classroom and beyond. While higher education is an area where Saudi women are increasingly on par with men,17 we wondered if teaching was the only option for Rima to use her communications degree. Would she be well prepared for private sector jobs, and if so, are they even available to her?

Women are a critically underutilized resource in the Kingdom. Women’s higher education currently receives only about 18 percent of the funds that men’s higher education receives.18 Saudi women constitute 68 percent of university graduates, but only 14 percent of the workforce, most being “employed in the Kingdom’s single-sex education bureaucracy or in health care.”19 While

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lum, our post-visit conversation with the men on our trip revealed how disparate the resources were between the campuses.

For example, we had heard about KSU’s Entrepreneurship Center of Excellence, focused on developing practical training in research, consulting, and communications, and key to expanding employment and strengthening the private sector. KSU partners with Babson College, one of the top U.S. schools for entrepreneurship, to assist them with their curriculum.22 Yet the center, housed on the men’s campus, was inaccessible to women. While entrepreneurship centers for women exist at a few other universities in the Kingdom, such as Prince Sultan University’s College for Women, female students deserve the same access to the entrepreneurship center and curriculum as their male counterparts. A

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“center of excellence” cannot fully tap into the excellence of all students—male and female—with such limited access to training.

Effat University, an all-women’s university in Jeddah, showed us a private university exemplifying a reform effort, and offering courses in business, engineering, and computer science.

Effat’s students were bright, engaging, and looking toward the future. Yet, they were concerned that they would not find job opportunities locally, and hoped to travel abroad to pursue careers in their field. As more women look to enter the labor market, Saudi Arabia must try to accommodate them or risk losing highly educated citizens.

The implementation of women’s inclusion in all aspects of education reform is critical for the future of Saudi Arabia, as the country expands its private sector and experiences technological growth and innovation. As we finished our final university visit at Effat, we wondered whether Saudi Arabia would need to expend so many resources on building new universities if existing institutions such as KFUPM were to become co-educational.

After the country’s religious-based education system came under scrutiny following 9/11, King Abdullah pushed to overhaul the state system and its curriculum, and focused particularly on the inclusion of women in education. An initial step included appointing a female minister in the Ministry of Higher Education and focusing on private sector cooperation with higher education. While women are increasingly represented in the education sector, rising from 33 percent to 48 percent of students in the last thirty years,23

View from the Ground

they do not share the same access to education as men. On our visit to KSU we struggled to understand a system starkly different from our own. What we perceived as unequal might be viewed in Saudi Arabia as “equivalence,”—according to Saudi education expert Eleanor Abdella Doumato—where distinctions among the sexes are “a balance between the rights and duties of men and women as prescribed in Islam.”24 Education reform is not just about increasing capacity for a knowledge based-society, it is also about “enhancing basic freedoms” and equality of opportunity among genders.25 As Dr. Seznec argues, “the employment creation stimulated

by World Trade Organization (WTO) accession will lead to education being adapted to science and creative thinking. It will require more openness to foreign technology and welcoming women into the workforce. In other words, it will bring about the growth of a society that may pay lip service to the Salafis’ ideals, but in essence will marginalize them.”26 Salafism, often used interchangeably with Wahhabism, refers to a strict interpretation of Islamic law, impacting the cultural norms of traditional separation of the sexes in nearly all aspects of society. As conservative religious values are the basis of the relative inequality in educational opportunities for men and women in the Kingdom, they will continue to pose a major obstacle to full education reform.

Progress on women’s education has been slow. When King Abdullah took power, women’s education moved from the Ministry of Religious Affairs to the Ministry of Education. Despite the shift in policy for the Kingdom, the influence of religious clerics still impedes

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full reform in all aspects of education, particularly in curriculum development and in women’s education. “The Saudi education system is particularly difficult to reform because it is traditionally one of the main areas where the clerics have influence,” observes Jane Kinninmont at the Economist Intelligence Unit. She notes that “asserting technocratic control over education may require a power struggle with the conservative clerics.”27 A visit to the Kingdom is enough to see the pervasiveness of religion in everyday

get the technical expertise.” The Saudi education system has been criticized for its focus on rote memorization, but it is now beginning to stress practical skills and collaborative classroom environments, and is embedding technology and innovation into the curriculum.

Private universities typically have more leeway in enhanced curriculum development, as they are not subject to the state restrictions faced by public universities. The public education system must continue to develop curricu-

In a country where 50.8 percent of the

population is under age twenty-five, unemployment within this demographic is a major concern. life. From gender segregation to religious police at the shopping mall, Saudi Arabia’s governmental, social, and thus educational structures are rooted in the state-supported interpretation of Islam.28 Until women have equality of opportunity in education and employment, education reform cannot reach its full potential.

lum in technology, science, business, finance, and entrepreneurship for preuniversity level education.

In addressing primary and secondary education, the Kingdom has introduced a policy of tatweer, which means “reform.” The tatweer vision is to create a “distinctive and innovative education that builds high-quality citizens for the knowledge economy.”29 Tatweer will Reforming Public Education develop curricula that provide students and Curriculum. “The way educa- with the technological expertise, entretion is presented in the United States is preneurial skills, and technological that it is fun and encouraging, focused tools needed to foster economic activon teamwork and everyone contrib- ity and meet the needs of the private utes,” explained a King Abdul Aziz sector in the Kingdom. These reforms University student who had been edu- have yet to make a noticeable impact on cated at both American and Saudi sec- youth performance in the job market ondary schools. “In Saudi Arabia, you and within society, however, and the have to memorize things very well and 2008 Booz Allen Hamilton Report put it down on paper… it’s the same states that, the “impact of education in [Saudi] medical school, we get the policy may not become apparent until theoretical base but have to go abroad to years after implementation.”30

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Saudi Arabia is the number one spender on public education, spending, on average, 6.9 percent of its GDP.31 Despite these high levels of spending, Saudi Arabia must still reform a public sector education system plagued by inefficient bureaucracy and heavy religious influence.32 Religious clerics have placed strong emphasis on Arabic language and Quranic studies, posing a challenge to globally-minded reforms.

Reform of the education system could create a serious power struggle between conservative clerics and reformists that support King Abdullah’s calls.

A true measure of the success of the Saudi education system reform, according to Booz Allen Hamilton’s 2008 Report, is the system’s ability “to produce highly skilled individuals who are able to create and achieve social goals.”33 All Saudis, men and women alike, must be afforded the same equality of opportunity for innovation and creativity to impact their development.

While the push for education reform in the Kingdom shows positive signs of a modernizing regime, reform will be slow and will continue to face enormous obstacles. Unemployment in the Kingdom continues to trend upward, and will pose serious risks to overall development.34 Noticeable changes in the education system may take decades, and the realization of a full economic impact and increase in private sector jobs may take an entire generation.35

Reform and the Future. In light

of youth-led movements in Egypt and Tunisia, Saudi Arabia is again in the spotlight. The effects of decades of a lack of freedom and opportunity, particularly for the youth population, are

View from the Ground

sending shockwaves—and bullets—across the region. As noted in the 2002 Arab Human Development Report, lack of freedom is the biggest hindrance to tapping into human potential.36 When seeking economic opportunity from unresponsive governments, educated youth in Egypt and Tunisia turned to political demonstration. So far, the Kingdom’s response to potential protests, while disallowing political opposition, has been to use its vast oil wealth (through boosts to public-sector pay and unemployment benefits to quell economic dissatisfaction). Yet these methods are unsustainable in the long term without economic diversification and job creation. As Saudi universities across the country reform their curriculum, it is possible that the cultivation of a “global mindset” will empower youth to seek greater rights and freedoms. Student exchanges, such as our trip, can at the very least open dialogue, and perhaps one day open the door more fully to student voices—both male and female—in the political arena.

Our visit to universities throughout the country was an exceptional glimpse into Saudi Arabia’s society. Each faculty member, student, businessperson, and government official we met expressed hope in the future direction of the country. There was a keen sense that youth were eager for more though, and that the current reforms were not enough. One year after our trip, we received a phone call from a medical student we had met at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. He called to say that some videos of our trip were on YouTube, and to express his excitement about his upcoming medical residency in the United States. Despite the high

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level of education he had received in Saudi Arabia, he required advanced training that is only available abroad in order to become a skilled doctor with international accreditation.

His experience reflected the gaps in Saudi’s education system that forced him to travel abroad for more specialized training. Those students without the means or the opportunity to rec-

ognize their potential in the classroom or the workforce may take to the streets and follow in the footsteps of their neighbors. As the region erupts with social unrest, the Kingdom’s efforts for long-term education reform are more urgently needed than ever.

NOTES

1 Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Higher Education has sponsored numerous trips for American graduate students in the past few years. As representatives from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, we visited from January 6-15, 2010. We American visitors recognize that aspects of the trip, including presentations, conversations, and site visits, may have only provided the distinct perspective of the Ministry of Higher Education.

2 Of KAUST’s student body, only 22 percent are Saudi, with plans to grow to 44 percent in 2011.

Hassan Bin Youssef Yassin, “KAUST is no science fiction, it’s a true wonder,” Arab News, 1 May 2010.

3 Nabih Maroun, et al., “How to Succeed at Education Reform: the Case for Saudi Arabia and the Broader GCC region,” Ideation Center, Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., March 2008.

4 Ibid.

5 Ulf Laessing and Alma Al-Sharrif, “In Saudi Arabia, A Clamor for Education, ” Reuters, 10 February 2011.

6 “Saudi Arabia: The Report,” Oxford Business Group, 2009.

7 “The Autumn of the Patriarchs,” The Economist, 17 February 2011.

8 Abeer Alaam, “Joblessness Spurs Saudi hostility to expatriates,” Financial Times, 7 September 2010.

9 Dr. Jean-Francois Seznec, interview with Karen Courington and Vanessa Zuabi, notes, Washington, D.C., February 2010.

10 Laessing and Al-Sharrif, “In Saudi Arabia, A Clamor for Education.”

11 Ibid.

12 Maroun, et al., “How to Succeed at Education Reform.”

13 Ibid.

14 “Saudi Arabia: The Report,” Oxford Business Group, 2009.

15 “King Saud University,” Internet, http://ksu. edu.sa/AboutKSU/Pages/Factsandstatistics.aspx (date accessed: 18 February 2011).

16 Original name not cited for privacy concerns 17 Eleanor Abdella Doumato, “Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa.” Freedom House, 2005.

18 Amani Hamdan, “Women and education in Saudi Arabia: Challenges and Achievements.” [ 1 4 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

International Education Journal, 6 no. 1 (2005): 42-64.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 “Top 25 Colleges and Business Schools,” Entrepreneur, Internet, http://www.entrepreneur.com/ topcolleges/undergrad/1.html, (date accessed: 5 April 2011).

23 “Women’s Education in Saudi Arabia: The Way Forward,” Ideation Center, Internet, http:// www.ideationcenter.com/women_education_saudi_ arabia (date accessed: 5 April 2011).

24 Doumato, “Women’s Rights.”

25 Maroun, et al., “How to Succeed at Education Reform.”

26 Jean-Francois Seznec, “Changing Circumstances: Gulf Trading Families in the Light of Free Trade Agreements, Globalization, and the WTO,” in The Gulf Familiy: Kinship Policies and Modernity (London: Saqi Books, 2007).

27 Laessing and Al-Sharif, “In Saudi Arabia, A Clamor for Education.”

28 Doumato, “Women’s Rights.”

29 “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Education Tatweer Project,” Internet, http://www.tatweer.edu.sa, (date accessed: 5 April 2011).

30 Maroun, et al., “How to Succeed at Education Reform.”

31 Ibid.

32 Laessing and Al-Sharif, “In Saudi Arabia, A Clamor for Education.”

33 Maroun, et al., “How to Succeed at Education Reform.”

34 “Rising Saudi unemployment needs urgent reform,” The Saudi Gazette, Internet, http://www. saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home. regcon&contentID=2011021793951, (date accessed: 7 April 2011).

35 Ibid.

36 Rima Khalifi, “Arab Human Development Report,” United Nations Development Program, 2002, Internet, http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ ahdr/ahdr2002e.pdf, (date accessed: 20 February 2011).

37 “Throwing Money at the Street,” The Economist, 12 March, 2011.

A Look Back Inside an Embassy

Perspectives from a U.S. Ambassador An Interview with James Jeffrey GJIA: You began your position as United States Ambassador to Iraq in the summer of 2010 after serving as Ambassador to Turkey. How has your job changed since this move and how does your experience in Iraq so far differ from your experience in Turkey? How have the posts you have held in the past prepared you for your current position?

Jeffrey: First of all, Iraq, like Turkey, is in the Middle

East. It’s an important regional player and a major oil exporter, but the main difference is that Iraq is a country that is still suffering from the ravages of high-level terrorism, the residual aspects of an insurgency that was raging just a couple of years ago, and we have a very large military presence in the country. And the United States still plays a central role in many non-military aspects of Iraq, such as, for example, parts of air traffic control.

In terms of preparation, in a job like this, basically you build on everything you’ve done before. Being an ambassador in one large country gives you skills for managing an embassy, dealing with the highest levels of the host government, and generally, dealing with Washington. And of course working in Washington helps you understand [ 1 4 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

James Jeffrey currently serves as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. A career member of the Foreign Service, Jeffrey has also served as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Albania, and as Deputy National Security Adviser and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

INSIDE AN EMBASSY

the perspective of where an American president, where a Secretary of State, a Secretary of Defense, etc. will be on certain issues, or at least generally, the concerns that they’ll have.

Middle East.

GJIA: Turkey has applied for acces-

sion to the European Union, but has been unsuccessful in joining, in great part because of opposition from parts of GJIA: How would you describe Tur- the European populace. In your opinkey’s potential as a mediator between ion, should Turkey become a member Western countries and states in the of the European Union, and why? How Middle East, or just among Middle might Turkish accession affect our dipEastern countries? In your opinion lomatic and military relations with the and experience, would the Turkish gov- country? ernment want to take on such a role, and what would it mean for the United Jeffrey: U.S. policy has been clear States? over several administrations. While we’re not a European Union country— Jeffrey: Well you can look at the and these decisions have to be taken by statements by the Turkish government, the European Union and by a Candithe book by its current Foreign Minis- date for succession among themselves— ter, Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, called Strategic we certainly think from many standDepth, and its very active role in the Bal- points that it would be a good thing if kans and in Middle Eastern conflicts, Turkey joined the European Union. It and its very active role in Iraq. They’ve is in all other major European instibeen major players in the Arab-Israeli tutions—NATO, Council of Europe, dispute, including an intermediary role OECD—which is actually not a Eurountil 2009 between Israel and Syria. pean institution, but a Western instituTurkey is uniquely placed because it is tion—and of course geographically, it a NATO country, and a country with is in part, indisputably in Europe. So almost—at least in the West—a Southern why shouldn’t it be in the European European per capita GDP. It is a mem- Union if it wants to be and if it is the ber of the Customs Union, and thus an European Union’s position, which it internal trading partner of the Europe- generally is, that all European counan Union. As an important NATO ally, tries are potential members? And havit’s closely tied to the United States. On ing opened the door to membership, the other hand, Turkey has a thousand- the agreement between Turkey and the year tradition in the Middle East. It’s European Union is that if Turkey meets a majority Muslim population country these various criteria, then its memberand it has extraordinary social, cultural, ship will be brought to a vote of each and even linguistic ties in the Middle country inside the European Union.

East. So I think that they can play a role. The problem is that to do this, there The problem that the Turks have, which are number of what are called “chapis also a problem that we have, is that it’s ters”—over thirty of them—that need to devilishly difficult to achieve clear-cut be met. Some chapters, the European successes in mediating disputes in the Union has, under pressure from one

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or another country, refused to open to Turkey. And this mechanism has been used to block progress on some of those chapters, de facto slowing down Turkey’s membership drive.

A Look Back

Kuwait and Iraq stemming from the 1990 invasion and 1991 war. In terms of Turkey, first of all, while there are some issues where there is not agreement, the relationship is actually quite good and is improving dramatically from GJIA: You served as the ambassador the standpoint of trade, relations with to Turkey and are now in a neighboring the Kurdistan regional government, country that has had strained relations and in several other areas. Nonetheless with Turkey. How does this affect your there are several problems—the probability to be an effective ambassador lem, for example, of water. There’s to Iraq? Do you ever feel a conflict of another problem that is a particular interest in this situation or has your concern for the Turks, but also for the past experience been helpful in deal- Iraqis, on the presence of residual PKK ing with situations that involve Turkey, (Kurdistan Workers Party) forces along Iraq, and the United States? the border in Northern Iraq. And there is a set of trilateral engagements that we, Jeffrey: One of the reasons that I the Turks, and the Iraqis all work on to think I was selected to be Ambassador try to improve that situation. to Iraq, is aside from having served as a deputy in Iraq, I’ve had four tours GJIA: Furthermore, what do you in Turkey to the north, and a tour in think future relations between Iraq and Kuwait to the south. It’s a good ques- Turkey will be like, based on your expetion. First of all, when you’re ambas- rience working with both governments? sador to a given country, that country receives the focus of your attention and Jeffrey: Well I think that Turkey is you’re responsible for the relation- the more stable country at the moment, ship between the United States and that and by far, the richer country. Turkey country. Nonetheless, it’s helpful to has a population over two times larger know what the United States’ relation- than Iraq’s and a total GDP that is ship is with neighboring countries and ten times that of Iraq, despite Iraq’s how neighboring countries think about oil exports. I would say that there is a the country you’re in. Part of our role, natural and growing trade relationship. particularly in that region, is to amelio- Certainly, Iraq is an important part of rate possible sources of friction between the strategic depth theory and the “zero the various countries. For example, problems policy” of Ahmet Davutoğlu we strongly support, as Vice Presi- and Prime Minister Erdoğan, and we dent Biden noted on December 15th, find Turkey an extremely effective when he presided over the UN Secu- and expert interlocutor in working on rity Council on lifting certain Chap- problems related to integrating Iraq ter 7 sanctions on Iraq, that we want better into the regional architecture. to be helpful in resolving differences, including those covered by Security GJIA: Turkey recently attempted to Council Chapter 7 resolutions between broker a nuclear deal with Iran in part-

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INSIDE AN EMBASSY

nership with Brazil, which elicited criticism from Western countries, particularly the United States. Turkey has also made other overtures to its neighbors on the grounds of its “zero problems” policy. What is your position on this issue and do you feel that the United States should handle it any differently than it has so far?

resolution that was eventually passed was submitted to the Security Council. So from our standpoint, it wasn’t a criticism of Turkey, but rather, a criticism of Iran, that it only accepted the deal to forestall the sanctions vote. And of course we’ve seen in the Istanbul negotiations held last week, that again, Iran was not willing to consider seriously any of the ideas along these lines.

Iraq today is far less violent than it

was just two to three years ago; nonetheless, violence has not been completely eradicated.

Jeffrey: Well, as a serving American GJIA: The Status of Forces Agreediplomat, I always believe that however the United States has handled any crisis was the very best way to handle a crisis. That goes without saying. Turkey is following up on an offer that the Permanent Five UN Security Council states and Germany made to Iran on shipping its enriched uranium outside of the country at the end of September 2009. There were several concerns that have been covered in American press statements—it’s fairly complicated if you look at the various releases made over a week by the U.S. side after the announcement of the deal. One major problem that we had was that the Iranians had been rejecting this deal for the better part of seven months; they had increased their holdings of uranium well beyond the twelve hundred kilograms that the deal encompassed; and they started enriching their uranium to about 20 percent. And the deal did not cover those issues. In addition, the Iranians announced that they would accept the deal just days before the sanctions

ment is scheduled to end at the close of 2011, and will significantly reduce the American military presence in Iraq.

Iraqi officials contend that their government no longer needs U.S. troops stationed within the country. What is your opinion on the accuracy of this assessment of Iraq? At what point will Iraq be politically stable enough to sustain itself without foreign military presence? How will the transition be handled, and what role will the American diplomatic corps play in it?

Jeffrey: President Obama reiterated

U.S. policy in his State of the Union address, affirming that all U.S. troops would be out in accordance with that agreement by the end of 2011. Iraq today is far less violent than it was just two to three years ago; nonetheless, violence has not been completely eradicated. However, we have a lot of a confidence in the Iraqi security forces and counterinsurgency forces.

Where they need help is in develop-

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ing their conventional capabilities to defend their country against conventional attack, to protect their borders.

We have an ambitious program with the Iraqis that will continue after 2011 with the Embassy, with what are called Security Assistance Organizations, which exist all around the world. They’re Title 22, which under the U.S. Code, is diplomatic activity, not Title 10, military activity, although they involve support from the Department of Defense, as well as officers from the Department of Defense serving as members of the embassy staff who coordinate training, equipping, advising, and mentoring other countries’ armed forces as part of foreign assistance trade. And we will have a very robust program with that, and see it as the main way forward.

A Look back

GJIA: The 2010 midterm elections

brought a number of policymakers to Congress who are very intent on curbing government spending. One of the largest proposed cuts has been on U.S. spending in Iraq. In your opinion, what kind of budget is necessary in order to maintain peace and stability in Iraq, and how should it be spent (i.e. security, humanitarian aid, reconstruction, etc.)? Do you think the newly elected Congress is headed in the right direction for progress in Iraq, or would these proposals, if implemented, hinder U.S. efforts in the region?

Jeffrey: We think that the FY2011

budget calls for several billion dollars for U.S. embassy operations, including an initial effort from our sixteen Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) GJIA: The Status of Forces Agreement under the aegis of the military, to create allows the State Department to establish two consulates in Basra and Erbil, and an Office of Security Cooperation in two temporary embassy branch offices Iraq, which would likely resemble U.S. in Kirkuk and Mosul to help work with military offices at embassies in Saudi local actors on various political and Arabia and Turkey. In your experience economic energy questions, maintain as Ambassador to Turkey, and now as eyes-on platforms to do the OSCI misAmbassador to Iraq, what role would sion, to do a police training mission, this Office, if established, play in main- and to continue some aid and developtaining peace in Iraq, and how would ment programs. In addition to that, it work with other diplomatic-military the Department of Defense will be entities such as NATO in the country? receiving about $1.5 billion for equipping the Iraqi military. And between Jeffrey: Well, maintaining peace in the Department of Defense and the Iraq is the responsibility of the Iraqi Department of State, because we’re in government, which is a democratic gov- transition, there is a very large sum of ernment reflecting the will of the peo- money for police training. And we’re ple. The role of that office and other comfortable with that amount and we institutions, the UN presence there, think that it is a good program to conEU offices, and particularly the NATO tinue on, and we hope to continue on training mission, is to help to give Iraq generally with a program of that size. the tools to do the job, not to do the job themselves.

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INSIDE AN EMBASSY

GJIA: What role does the U.S. Embas- for rural development. sy in Baghdad play in establishing normalcy for the citizens of Iraq—and of the capital city in particular—long torn by war and civil unrest? Beyond working on government-to-government relations, are our diplomats involved in the promotion of social, cultural, and educational programs, for example, for the Iraqi people?

GJIA: How would you characterize

Iranian influence in Iraq? Is it an issue of concern? How do you foresee the relationship between the two countries developing and how might the United States and other countries react to it?

Jeffrey: Iran is an important neighbor of Iraq. It has ties with Turkey as a

Jeffrey: First of all, we’re not the trade partner, and as the victim of an government of Iraq. The Iraqi government has that responsibility. What we do—in conjunction with the government of Iraq, and with other international donors—is focus on areas where we can be helpful, where we think we make a difference, in order to augment and supplement what Iraqis themselves are doing. We’ve talked about this in the security and police fields. Obviously, our fifty thousand troops that we have there are helping with the training and equipping and direct security operations. In addition, we have a very extensive set of USAID and various other programs, some of which are closing down after many years, pouring concrete and turning dirt. Most of those projects in the energy, electricity, water, and medical areas are coming to completion. However, we do have hundreds of millions of dollars in USAID programs for capacity-building, small business support, democracy promotion in elections, training of all of the ministries’ staffs in budgeting for administrative affairs and complicated government operations. And we also have various targeted programs—some for the Christian community, some in support of NGOs, and in the countryside we have several different programs

invasion from Iraq in 1980, Iran obviously has concerns about its neighbor to the west. That said, we believe that Iran, like any other country, should conduct its relations with another country transparently and within the framework of diplomatic propriety. We do not always see that in the case of Iran—not just in Iraq, but including in Iraq—and we’re particularly concerned about Iranian support for militant armed groups who attack us, the Iraqi armed forces, and the Iraqi populace.

GJIA: How do you think the U.S. Embassy and diplomatic corps are viewed by the average citizen in Iraq?

What efforts are being made to ensure that the Embassy, and the overall presence of U.S. diplomats, is not seen as an occupying power or a symbol of negative events since 2003?

Jeffrey: Iraqis do not really focus

on the Embassy; they focus on the U.S. military presence. I do not think that most Iraqis see that as an occupying presence; however, what they do see is, understandably, a desire not to have foreign troops in their country. That is a feeling we encounter around the world. And we respect that—it is one of

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JEFFREY

A Look Back

the reasons we have agreed to the 2011 lomatic missions. Where and how do withdrawal date. you allocate your time priorities in this job, and what do you find to be most GJIA: In light of the riots and unrest challenging about it? we’ve seen in Tunisia and Egypt recently, how does the U.S. diplomatic corps Jeffrey: That’s a good question. Givdeal with these situations and does the en the size of the embassy, a fair amount diplomatic corps in Iraq have a contin- of time is spent simply on the internal gency plan if something similar were to monitoring of various activities, staff happen there? meetings, specific meetings on ongoing problems and that kind of thing.

Jeffrey: All embassies have contin- We do many teleconferencing meetgency plans that are mainly focused on ings with Washington—much more than

There is no playbook about what to do

if a country is faced with riots, upheaval, or revolution. Essentially, you rely on people who have had experience in other countries and areas where this has happened. their own safety, and basically, operating in a crisis environment, in terms of what we call Emergency Action Committees, twenty-four hour staffing, certain communications changes, and obviously, various security precautions.

There is no playbook about what to do if a country is faced with riots, upheaval, or revolution. Essentially, you rely on people who have had experience in other countries and areas where this has happened. Every situation is unique, but sometimes you can apply, for example, the lessons of Germany in 1989, where I was stationed, to Tunisia in 2011.

GJIA: You have had a unique and decorated career in the Foreign Service and now run what is unarguably one of the United States’ most important dip-

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most embassies do because of the special significance of Iraq. We have a great deal of joint meetings with the U.S. military. My partner is Lloyd Austin, the commander there, and we spend a lot of time traveling to his headquarters and then traveling to my headquarters at the Embassy. And of course we spend a good deal of time with both the Iraqi government itself—in formal meetings with the Prime Minister, with the Foreign Minister, and others—and in less formal contacts with all of the political and other power brokers in Baghdad.

And finally, I have to do a lot of traveling. As I said, I have sixteen PRTs throughout the country, and we go out and visit them quite frequently. What is most challenging is that it is relentless.