GJIA - 12.1 Espionage Exposed by GJIA (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs)

Georgetown Journal of

International Affairs

Espionage Exposed

Changing Threats, Emerging Actors, and Evolving Applications of Intelligence in the Modern World

CONTRIBUTIONS BY:

INTERVIEWS WITH:

Michael Oren

Ambassador of Israel to the United States

Álvaro Uribe Vélez

Former President of Colombia

Matthew Walker Harvey Rishikof and Kevin Lunday Bruce Riedel Matthew Levitt Marissa Fenech, Stuart Jones Jr., David Murray, and Neal A. Pollard Eamon Javers

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With an Introduction by Catherine Lotrionte

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W inter /S pring 2011 • $9.95

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Winter/Spring 2011, Volume XII, Number 1

Editors’ Note

Forum: Espionage Exposed 3

Introduction

CATHERINE LOTRIONTE

Espionage and intelligence-gathering activities have evolved significantly since the end of the Cold War. State governments are no longer the only actors to make use of these practices, and information collection methods range from covert surveillance activities to monitoring financial transactions. Espionage plays an ever-greater role in the operations of states, non-state actors, and corporations, and has, as a result, created a host of new challenges to U.S. interests. The Forum of this issue addresses the changing threat of espionage after the Cold War, some of the new consumers of intelligence, and the unique and effective ways that actors have begun to use these practices.

Should Intelligence Support to Private Industry be Enhanced? MATTHEW WALKER

Corporate Responsibility in Cybersecurity Building International Global Standards HARVEY RISHIKOF AND KEVIN LUNDAY

Terrorist Intelligence Capabilities: Lessons from the Battlefield BRUCE RIEDEL

Follow the Money Leveraging Financial Intelligence to Combat Transnational Threats MATTHEW LEVITT

The Challenge of Convenience Understanding and Regulating Global Mobile Financial Services

Secrets and Lies The Rise of Corporate Espionage in a Global Economy

MARISSA FENECH, STUART JONES JR., DAVID MURRAY, AND NEAL A. POLLARD

EAMON JAVERS

Politics&Diplomacy 61

Continuity and Change Israel’s relationship with the United States and the World MICHAEL OREN

Michael Oren has served as Ambassador of Israel to the United States since July 2009. In this interview, he discusses Israel’s relationship with the United States, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and political, environmental, and social challenges that Israel is currently facing.

Winter/Spring 2011 [ i]

Conflict&Security 68

Sudan between Peace and War JON TEMIN

In a historic referendum that took place in January, the people in southern Sudan voted whether to remain part of a united Sudan or to secede. Possibilities of creation of the first new state in Africa since 1993 were high. The article discusses the events leading up to the scheduled vote, possible outcomes, and responses to the post-referendum situation in the region.

Trends in Terrorism Since 9/11 Is terrorism still a threat to the United States? LOUIS KLAREVAS

With an increased focus on terrorist threats on U.S. soil, the author investigates whether terrorism is as great a threat as conveyed by the media and policymakers. The article analyzes trends in terrorism worldwide over the last few years by using data from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and a unique dataset created by the author. The author concludes with some brief policy guidance in light of observed trends.

Culture&Society 89

The Global Abolition of Human Trafficking The Indispensible Role of the United States MARK P. LAGON

Much progress has been made in the fight against human trafficking over the past ten years thanks to the implementation of a UN treaty and a comprehensive U.S. law to combat this crime. What actions have states and non-state actors taken against human trafficking so far, and what more should be done in order to help the millions of trafficking victims worldwide?

Law&Ethics 99

Ethnicity, Elections, and Reform in Burma DAVID C. WILLIAMS

In November 2010, Burma elected a partially civilian government after fifty years of military rule. The country’s ethnically diverse citizenry is rightfully concerned that the Junta will seize power again, as Burma’s constitution permits. The international community must work closely with Burma’s new government, composed of military personnel and civilian office-holders, to ensure basic rights, fair treatment, and political voice for all of the country’s inhabitants.

107 Glaciers, Monsoons, Rivers, and Conflict: China and South Asia PAUL SULLIVAN

With increasing country demands but a changing supply of water due to climate change, tensions may increase over international water sources in South Asia and China. The article investigates these trends and discusses the existing and potential treaties and impacts of different scenarios on the region’s politics and economics.

Business&Economics 118 Reducing Inequality: The Role of Reforms in Brazil PHILLIPE G. LEITE

Government programs have significantly reduced inequality in Brazil over the past fifteen years. Much work remains, however, to ensure these initiatives remain sustainable. Cover & page 3 photo credits: Getty Images

[ii] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Contents

Science&Technology 125

Maps, Power and the Destruction of the Mau Forest in Kenya JACQUELINE M. KLOPP AND JOB KIPKOSGUI SANG

Deforestation is a complex issue linked not only to economic and social dynamics at both global and local levels but also to questions of power and politics. Nowhere is this more evident than in the ongoing struggle over the Mau Forest in Kenya. This article explores the history of political struggles surrounding the Mau forest and the role that mapping has played in determining the political and ecological landscape of the region.

Technological Leapfrogging in the Developing World 135

JOSÉ GOLDEMBERG

Leapfrogging allows developing countries to skip many of the steps that developed countries have had to take when making technological advancements. This article examines the processes developing countries have undergone in order to take advantage of leapfrogging and to develop more efficiently.

Books 142

Memory, Politics, and International Relations KAZUYA FUKUOKA

A review of Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations by Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain.

View from the Ground 150

Harnessing the Positive Potential of Global Interdependence ELAINE KELLEY

The Interdependence Movement is devolving. The 2010 Berlin Interdependence Day Forum and Celebration emphasized the increased role of communal action in promotion of global peace, democracy, and justice.

A Look Back 159

Pondering the Presidency ÁLVARO URIBE VÉLEZ

58th President of Colombia and recently named Distinguished Scholar in the Practice of Global Leadership at Georgetown University, Álvaro Uribe Vélez discusses his time in office and the future of Colombia.

Winter/Spring 2011 [ iii]

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF

Michael B. McKeon, Imani S. Tate

MANAGING EDITORS

Michael Brannagan, David Gregg, Sikander Kiani, Emma Nagy, Melis Tusiray

BUSINESS MANAGER

Elizabeth Livengood

DESIGN MANAGER

FORUM EDITORS EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS BUSINESS & ECONOMICS EDITORS EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS CONFLICT & SECURITY EDITORS EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS CULTURE & SOCIETY EDITOR EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS LAW & ETHICS EDITOR EDITORIAL ASSISTANT POLITICS & DIPLOMACY EDITORS EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY EDITOR EDITORIAL ASSISTANT BOOKS EDITOR VIEW FROM THE GROUND EDITOR DIRECTOR OF PR & MARKETING DIRECTOR OF ADVERTISING MARKETING PROJECT MANAGER LAYOUT ASSISTANTS

ADVISORY BOARD

UNIVERSITY COUNCIL

Benjamin Talus Alexandra Lazorchak, Caitlin Fogarty Ryan McKinstry, Philip Walker William Handel, Medha Raj Kenneth G. Anderson, Carolina Delgado Parul Aggarwal, Jeffrey J. Yu Gillian Evans, Bina Surati Rowley Rice Joseph McColley Upasana Kaku, Daye Shim Lee Dijana Elliot Michael Lopesciolo, Elena Malik Elizabeth Saam, Daniel Solomon Alexandra Lencznarowicz, Meredith Strike Benjamin Rosenblum, Vail Kohnert-Yount Noor Haboosh Caroline Puckowski Ben Mishkin Graham T. Robertson Jens Blomdahl Alexa Lombardo Gina J. Park, Esther Sorenson, Hilary Wong

David Abshire, Susan Bennett, H.R.H. Felipe de Borb贸n, Joyce Davis, Cara DiMassa, Robert L. Gallucci, Lee Hamilton, Peter F. Krogh, Michael Mazarr, Fareed Zakaria Anthony Arend, John Esposito, Christopher Joyner, Charles King, George Shambaugh, Robert Sutter, Jennifer Ward, Charles Weiss

Jennifer L. Windsor is currently the Associate Dean for Programs and Studies at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Prior to joining Georgetown in August 2010, she served for ten years as the Executive Director of Freedom House, an independent group dedicated to the advance of freedom. From 1991-2000, Jennifer Windsor worked at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID,) last serving as the Deputy Assistant Administrator and Director of the Center for Democracy and Governance. From 19861989, she worked for Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) and then for Congressman Ted Weiss (D-NY) on foreign affairs. She is a graduate of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University (MPA 1991) and received her undergraduate degree (BA 1986) from Harvard University.

[iv] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

The

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs would like to thank the following sponsors Christiane Amanpour, Cable N ews N etwork Patrons Committee Chair

D aimlerChrysler Corporation F und Corporate Founding Sponsor

Patrons The

The Richard Lounsbery Foundation Paul & Nancy Pelosi Charitable Foundation Mr. Paul C. Besozzi Friends Mr. Jeremy Goldberg Mr. Eric Peter Mr. John Guy Van Benschoten

To become a sponsor, contact Thomas G. Esch, Senior Director of Development, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University 3300 Whitehaven Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20007 Telephone (202) 687-7088 / Email:tge5@georgetown.edu

Summer/Fall 2010 [ v]

Notice to Contributors

Articles submitted to the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs must be original, must not draw substantially from articles previously published by the author, and must not be simultaneously submitted to any other publication. Articles should be around 3,000 words in length. Manuscripts must be typewritten and double-spaced in Microsoft™ Word® format, with margins of at least one inch. Authors should follow the Chicago Manual of Style, 15th ed. Articles may be submitted by e-mail (gjia@georgetown.edu) or by U.S. mail; those sent by U.S. mail must include both a soft copy on a compact disc and a hard copy. Full names of authors, a two-sentence biography, and contact information including addresses with zip codes, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, and e-mail addresses must accompany each submission. The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs will consider all manuscripts submitted, but assumes no obligation regarding publication. All material submitted is returnable at the discretion of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (ISSN 1526-0054; ISBN 0-9824354-2-8) is published two times a year by the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 301 Intercultural Center, Washington, DC 20057. Periodicals postage paid at Washington, DC. Annual subscriptions are payable by check or money order. Domestic: $16.00; foreign: $24.00; Canada: $18.00; institutions: $40.00. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Subscriptions Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service 301 Intercultural Center Washington, DC 20057 Telephone (202) 687-1461 Facsimile (202) 687-1571 e-mail: gjia@georgetown.edu http://journal.georgetown.edu All articles copyright © 2010 by Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University except when otherwise expressly indicated. For all articles to which it holds copyright, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service permits copies to be made for classroom use, provided the following: (1) the user notifies the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs of the number and purpose of the copies, (2) the author and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs are identified, (3) the proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy. Except when otherwise expressly provided, the copyright holder for every article in this issue for which the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs does not hold copyright grants permission for copies of that article for classroom use, provided that the user notifies the author and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the author and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs are identified in the article, and that proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy. For reprinting permission for purposes other than classroom use, please contact Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Permissions, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 301 Intercultural Center, Washington, DC 20057. Telephone (202) 687-1461. Facsimile (202) 687-1571. The views expressed in the articles in the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs do not necessarily represent those of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the editors and staff of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, or Georgetown University. The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, editors and staff of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and Georgetown University bear no responsibility for the views expressed in the following pages.

[vi] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Winter/Spring 2011, Volume XII, Number 1

Editors’ Note

Forum: Espionage Exposed 3

Introduction

CATHERINE LOTRIONTE

Should Intelligence Support to Private Industry be Enhanced? MATTHEW WALKER

Corporate Responsibility in Cybersecurity Building International Global Standards HARVEY RISHIKOF AND KEVIN LUNDAY

Terrorist Intelligence Capabilities: Lessons from the Battlefield BRUCE RIEDEL

Follow the Money Leveraging Financial Intelligence to Combat Transnational Threats MATTHEW LEVITT

The Challenge of Convenience Understanding and Regulating Global Mobile Financial Services

Secrets and Lies The Rise of Corporate Espionage in a Global Economy

MARISSA FENECH, STUART JONES JR., DAVID MURRAY, AND NEAL A. POLLARD

EAMON JAVERS

Politics&Diplomacy 61

Continuity and Change Israel’s relationship with the United States and the World MICHAEL OREN

Winter/Spring 2011 [ i]

Conflict&Security 68

Sudan between Peace and War JON TEMIN

Trends in Terrorism Since 9/11 Is terrorism still a threat to the United States? LOUIS KLAREVAS

Culture&Society 89

The Global Abolition of Human Trafficking The Indispensible Role of the United States MARK P. LAGON

Law&Ethics 99

Ethnicity, Elections, and Reform in Burma DAVID C. WILLIAMS

107 Glaciers, Monsoons, Rivers, and Conflict: China and South Asia PAUL SULLIVAN

Business&Economics 118 Reducing Inequality: The Role of Reforms in Brazil PHILLIPE G. LEITE

[ii] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Contents

Science&Technology 125

Maps, Power and the Destruction of the Mau Forest in Kenya JACQUELINE M. KLOPP AND JOB KIPKOSGUI SANG

Technological Leapfrogging in the Developing World 135

JOSÉ GOLDEMBERG

Books 142

Memory, Politics, and International Relations KAZUYA FUKUOKA

A review of Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations by Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain.

View from the Ground 150

Harnessing the Positive Potential of Global Interdependence ELAINE KELLEY

A Look Back 159

Pondering the Presidency ÁLVARO URIBE VÉLEZ

Winter/Spring 2011 [ iii]

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF

Michael B. McKeon, Imani S. Tate

MANAGING EDITORS

Michael Brannagan, David Gregg, Sikander Kiani, Emma Nagy, Melis Tusiray

BUSINESS MANAGER

Elizabeth Livengood

DESIGN MANAGER

ADVISORY BOARD

UNIVERSITY COUNCIL

[iv] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

The

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs would like to thank the following sponsors Christiane Amanpour, Cable N ews N etwork Patrons Committee Chair

D aimlerChrysler Corporation F und Corporate Founding Sponsor

Patrons The

The Richard Lounsbery Foundation Paul & Nancy Pelosi Charitable Foundation Mr. Paul C. Besozzi Friends Mr. Jeremy Goldberg Mr. Eric Peter Mr. John Guy Van Benschoten

Summer/Fall 2010 [ v]

Notice to Contributors

[vi] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Forum GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Espionage Exposed Changing Threats, Emerging Actors, and Evolving Applications of Intelligence in the Modern World The end of the Cold War eliminated or reduced many of the threats that preoccupied the United States during much of the second half of the twentieth century, but it did not bring with it an end to conflict. On the contrary, world politics continues as it has for much of mankindâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s existence. The types of actors that engage in world politics have changed, and the issues and threats that concern them have changed as well. What has not changed is the uncertain and dangerous world where threats abound from both states and non-state actors. Today, as before, states and non-state actors will still resort to armed conflict, produce and disseminate weapons of mass destruction, and support terrorism and international crime. This issueâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Forum focuses on the role of U.S. intelligence as the landscape has changed since the end of the Cold War.

6 Should Intelligence Support to Private Industry be Enhanced? MATTHEW WALKER

Responsibility in 15 Corporate Cybersecurity

Building International Global Standards HARVEY RISHIKOF AND KEVIN LUNDAY

Intelligence 24 Terrorist Capabilities: Lessons from the Battlefield

BRUCE RIEDEL

the Money 32 Follow Leveraging Financial Intelligence to Combat Transnational Threats

MATTHEW LEVITT

42 The Challenge of Convenience

Understanding and Regulating Global Mobile Financial Services

MARISSA FENECH, STUART JONES JR., DAVID MURRAY, AND NEAL A. POLLARD

and Lies 51 Secrets The Rise of Corporate Espionage in a Global Economy

EAMON JAVERS

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 3]

LOTRIONTE

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has faced significant nontraditional challenges to its interests, including the rise of nonstate actors such as terrorist organizations and transnational issues such as cybersecurity and climate change. Such changes in the international community following the Cold War have had a number of consequences for U.S. intelligence. As the threats and targets have changed, the U.S. intelligence community has had to assess its role in countering threats, which has led to dramatic changes in the task of gathering and using intelligence. Keeping in mind the changes that arose out of the end of the Cold War, this issue’s Forum highlights a number of common themes that run through the different changes faced by the intelligence community today. First, as the nature of the threat has changed, so too has the nature of the risk. During the Cold War the Soviets could be deterred with the threat of mutually assured destruction by nuclear weapons. The threat of retaliation by the United States if the Soviets were to launch such a weapon served to hold each of the great powers at bay, preventing the use of nuclear weapons altogether. When the enemy is a nation state with a specific geographic location and tanks and missiles that can be counted, such retaliation is a very credible possibility. Terrorists, however, who are willing to die for their cause as suicide bombers and seem to value little that can be threatened

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Espionage Exposed

with retaliation, make deterrence more difficult. Therefore, there is even more pressure on intelligence to do more than merely structure deterrent threats. Today, intelligence must be able to reach deeply into small groups— be they terrorist organizations or cyber sleuths stealing intellectual property from U.S. companies—to determine their capabilities and intentions in order to provide an understanding that can lead to preventive action. The contributions of Matthew Levitt and Bruce Riedel address the terrorist threat and illustrate how the U.S. intelligence community has altered its practices in order to combat it successfully. Levitt’s article explains how the intelligence community restructured itself in order to reflect the current threat environment where terrorists depend upon the international transit of funds to carry out their attacks. Since 9/11, the U.S. intelligence community, working with international partners, has used financial intelligence tools to successfully track and freeze terrorists’ assets, disrupting their operations and preventing attacks. In “Terrorist Intelligence Capabilities: Lessons from the Battlefield,” Bruce Riedel provides a cautionary note about the ability of today’s jihadist transnational terror networks to organize globally, executing complex intelligence operations against U.S. assets. The author highlights the need for U.S. intelligence to work cooperatively with liaison services across the globe in order to preventively disrupt these groups before

INTRODUCTION

they can commit another deadly attack. Three of the articles in this issue focus on the new threats that have arisen as dependency on the Internet and connectivity has increased. Matthew Walker discusses the rise of corporate espionage against U.S. firms after the Cold War and the negative economic impact it has had on the United States. The author recommends a new role for the intelligence community—conducting corporate espionage on behalf of U.S. corporations—while recognizing that this has been a contested role for the intelligence community in the past. In his piece, “Secrets and Lies,” Eamon Javers, examines various forms of corporate espionage, and focuses primarily on China as a traditional state threat against the United States. The author illustrates how the Internet has altered the way that China and other actors have targeted the United States by stealing intellectual property through cyber exploitations of U.S. corporate infrastructures. Lastly, Kevin Lunday’s and Harvery Rishikof’s article on “Corporate Responsibility in Cybersecurity” discusses the threat of cyber insecurity existing within the computer networks of U.S. corporations. The authors lay out the legal and corporate ramifications for those that do not act to eliminate this insecurity, and call for an international effort to establish standards in order to address this threat. A second theme related to the changes faced by the intelligence community since the end of the Cold War

is the expansion in the number of consumers of intelligence. National intelligence was at one time designed primarily for a relatively small set of political and military leaders of states. Today, however, intelligence could be of use to a large number of consumers, from police officers on the beat who need to look for terrorists who have assimilated into our community, and members of foreign liaison services cooperating with the United States to deter terrorists, to private sector IT managers of critical infrastructures. In the past, the sharing of information was based upon the “need to know.” Today, intelligence information sharing is based upon a “need to share.” This trend too will have ramifications for the future of intelligence operations. A third theme is the increased number of needs for, and types of, intelligence across a variety of time horizons, from immediate warning about military threats to longer term understanding of threats such climate change. During the Cold War, intelligence was mainly about collecting the needed piece of information to put together a puzzle about the enemy. How many weapons does the Soviet Union have? Once the right intelligence was collected, one could arguably solve the puzzle. Today, however, the job of intelligence begins once the evidence has been collected. For example, today, the capabilities of terrorists or cyber criminals are contingent and not set. Solving the mystery of these threats often has more to do with people rather than things like

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 5]

LOTRIONTE

tanks. Unlike the capabilities of the Soviets, which could be determined by counting their tanks, the capabilities of todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s threats may actually depend upon us. Intelligence targets like the terrorist or cyberattacker are asymmetric threats and shape their capabilities to our vulnerabilities. To effectively counter these asymmetric threats, U.S. intelligence must first assess U.S. vulnerabilities and know our weak defenses; the strategies of these asymmetric threats will be dependent upon our own vulnerabilities and capabilities. The end of the Cold War not only did not bring an end to conflict, but it did not bring an end to the requirements for a full-service intelligence capability either. The authors in this

[ 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Espionage Exposed

Forum illustrate that U.S. intelligence is necessary to counter new threats, and that intelligence must be improved and empowered to take on new roles and tasks accordingly. Catherine Lotrionte is the Associate Director of the Institute for Law, Science & Global Security and Visiting Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Dr. Lotrionte has served as Counsel to the Presidentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board at the White House, and as Assistant General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency. Dr. Lotrionte is Director of the Cybersecurity Project and a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Espionage Exposed

Should Intelligence Support to Private Industry be Enhanced? Matthew Walker Francis Cabot Lowell returned from England to Massachusetts in 1811 with the secrets of the Cartwright Loom. Lowell had stolen the plans in violation of English patents and international agreements. The looms he created with this information not only helped him expand his familyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s business, but were also instrumental in the creation of the New England textile industry, which became a vital part of the economy for decades.1 This was one of the first episodes of industrial espionage in U.S. history.2 The end of the Cold War brought the U.S. Congress and policymakers into a debate over whether national intelligence should be used for economic espionage to counter undercover operations conducted by other nations against U.S. firms and other economic targets.3 However, since 9/11, discussion about the use of intelligence as a tool to address economic threats has diminished significantly. While U.S. national security policymakers have been focused, rightly, on addressing the threat posed by international terrorism, threats from foreign economic competitors continue to develop. Traditional trade competitors have continued to improve their position relative to U.S. firms by using private and government spies to steal intellectual property and

Matthew Walker has held senior leadership positions in technology at Oracle Corporation. In the mid-1990s he left Oracle to create his first start up company. Since then Mr. Walker has been involved in the creation of four companies, and pursued advanced degrees in International Relations from the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, and the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown.

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 8]

SHOULD INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PRIVATE INDUSTRY BE ENHANCED?

strategic technology products that target private assets owned by U.S. companies, such as critical infrastructure and iconic properties. The last two National Threat Assessments made by the Director of National Intelligence in 2009 and 2010 have highlighted economic threats, such as the global financial crisis, as top threats to national security.4 With the economy in the midst of such high-level security threats and the increasing risk of threats to national security and corporate competitiveness, it is time to consider, once again, expanding and enhancing national intelligence support to U.S. firms.

important to national security, a more subtle and nuanced discussion on the use of national intelligence to support U.S. firms is required. “Intelligence” in its simplest definition is the gathering and dissemination of information in support of decision-makers engaged in a competitive enterprise.7 This includes military intelligence used by generals in the battlefield, and information used by CEOs in boardrooms. All organizations conduct intelligence either formally or informally. Companies gather intelligence through market research, customer surveys, analysis of market data, and consumer reaction to sales. Intelligence Has a Role in Private companies are limited to legal, Economic and Commerical open-source means of gathering inforSecurity. Much of the debate in the mation. Governments, on the other 1990s about the use of intelligence in hand, can avail themselves of a broad support of U.S. economic interests set of tools for collecting information, was waged in very broad terms: the both domestically and internationally. use of intelligence was merely deemed In some cases these tools may violate the appropriate or inappropriate. When- laws of a foreign country. While U.S. ever asked, intelligence leaders would intelligence officers must obey the laws unequivocally state “we do not engage of the United States, their jobs are to in industrial espionage.”5 Since the recruit foreign nationals to reveal their 1990s, however, intelligence agencies national secrets, or steal items from have provided support to U.S. com- foreign governments and firms in viopanies in two key areas: protection lation of U.S. laws. of critical technologies and intellecThe use of government agencies to tual property, and defense of privately gather information therefore requires owned critical infrastructure. Since the that, in the event that the operation passage of the Economic Espionage is discovered, the potential impact on Act of 1996, as many as ten agencies of national security be weighed against the U.S. intelligence community have the value of the information gathered. been actively engaged in collecting and The impact of such a discovery is pardisseminating intelligence specific to ticularly acute in the area of economic activities of foreign actors who attempt intelligence. America has a vital interto steal intellectual property or stra- est in—and our values are built on the tegic technologies from U.S. firms.6 foundation of—private property and As economic competitors emerge and free markets. If national intelligence economic activity becomes increasingly capabilities are used in the economic

[ 9 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

WALKER

arena, the threat to national security has to be great enough to overcome the potential impact on our interest in promoting and maintaining free markets. There are, however, some economic competitions in which U.S. national security policymakers and corporate presidents have aligned interests. Balancing national security with national interest requires us to acknowledge that not all economic competitions are important to national security. From a domestic and international policy perspective, having national intelligence agencies involved in firm-vs-firm market competition (i.e. gathering intelligence to improve the competitiveness of a single U.S. firm relative to all others) is detrimental to our interests. There are, however, at least two areas of economic competition that have received support from U.S. intelligence agencies over the last decade or more: protection of critical military technology and trade secrets, and protection of privately owned critical infrastructure. Understanding how intelligence supports businesses in these areas can give us a more complete understanding of the role of intelligence in economic affairs, and provide guideposts to enhancing that support. In 1996, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act, which criminalized economic espionage.8 Since 1995, the intelligence community has been required to report to Congress each year on economic collection and industrial espionage conducted by foreign entities. United States firms lose in excess of $100 billion each year from the loss of trade secrets, proprietary information, and key technologies.9 Congress

Espionage Exposed

and the executive branch have deemed these losses to foreign spies to be threats great enough to engage national intelligence capabilities in support of, and in collaboration with, private U.S. firms. Another area of collaboration between private firms and intelligence agencies is in the protection of critical infrastructure. National intelligence agencies support private firms because private companies own many of the components of our national health, energy, transportation, and communications infrastructure. An attack on one or more of these components would pose a real threat to national interests and has therefore been deemed a potential national security threat. As a result, the Department of Homeland Security has implemented an information-sharing regime between national intelligence agencies and private firms.10 Notifications of external threats come from intelligence agencies spying on foreign and domestic groups or individuals that pose threats to national infrastructure. Private companies share subject matter expertise and incident reports with national intelligence agencies to provide a fuller picture of the threat and the competitive landscape.

Current Doctrine Can Provide Guides to Enhancing Support.

Protection of critical technologies and the defense of privately owned infrastructure share key characteristics that may serve as a guide to the expansion and enhancement of intelligence support for U.S. firms. First, national intelligence is used in support of the defense of company assets, not in the acquisition or appreciation of new or existing assets. In other words, national

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 1 0 ]

SHOULD INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PRIVATE INDUSTRY BE ENHANCED?

intelligence is not used to enhance the value of any single companyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s assetsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; only to defend assets characterized as critical to national interest. This defensive use of intelligence represents

countries increases, there are two ways in which this balance between free market and national security concerns can be enhanced. First, this defensive, information-sharing doctrine should

From a domestic and international

policy perspective, having national intelligence agencies involved in firm-vs-firm market competition (i.e. gathering intelligence to improve the competitiveness of a single U.S. firm relative to all others) is detrimental to our interests. a balance between protecting national security and avoiding a compromise of free markets values. The second common factor is a heavy reliance on a two-way flow of information. Formal and informal contact between government agencies and private firms facilitates the flow of information and builds trust that is critically important during episodes of increased threat.11 National security decision-makers gain access to expertise and information about critical infrastructure that they can use to better defend national interests, and owners of critical infrastructure become more aware of threats and vulnerabilities. By leveraging private and public information, decision-makers on both sides gain an improved understanding of the competitive environment. A defensive intelligence posture and a reliance on information-sharing represent the current doctrinal approach in providing intelligence support to private enterprises. As economic competition among

[ 1 1 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

be extended into other areas of economic competition. Second, our intelligence assets should be applied offensively in economic competitions where U.S. firms are competing in non-free markets, or where the national security stakes are high. The first approach to strengthening intelligence support for economic competitors is to adopt the current defensive doctrine in two other areas of competition: access to resources and access to markets. Much like protecting critical infrastructure and key technologies, these two areas of economic competition are becoming increasingly important to national security. Access to resources has been a traditional nexus of governments and private enterprise, from the formation of the Dutch East India Company to the relationship between the U.S. government and the oil industry in the early days of the U.S.-Arab alliance. Competition for access to resources in recent decades has become increasingly intense. Resources that have traditionally been important,

WALKER

such as oil and water, are becoming scarce as the rise of emerging economies increases their global demand. In addition to traditional assets, obscure materials like rare earth metals are becoming key components to economic competitiveness. All of these trends are increasing the economic and security implications of access to these resources. Using national intelligence capabilities to provide defensive support in this area would include the use of clandestine means to identify unfair or illegal competitive practices on the part of foreign competitors. While this kind of intelligence support will assist U.S. companies as they compete for access rights to foreign natural resources, it will not confer an unfair advantage to any single U.S. firm. National intelligence should be used only to level the playing field. Evidence of unfair practices could be used by U.S. diplomats to put pressure on host governments to take legal action, or by U.S. firms to confront their competitors. At a minimum, collecting this intelligence would provide U.S. policymakers with information about how prevalent such practices are, and would give diplomats bargaining tools to use in negotiation. In exchange for such intelligence support, U.S. firms should be subjected to an information-sharing regime similar to the one currently set up by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS model for sharing information regarding critical infrastructure relies on an informationsharing environment that is accessible by both private firms and government agencies. With this model, government agencies share threat information

Espionage Exposed

and private firms share subject matter expertise. Private firms and government officials can use this information to assess risk and make appropriate security decisions and investments. This model, applied in the competitive arena of access to resources, would provide U.S. companies with mechanisms for sharing information with U.S. intelligence, trade, and diplomatic communities. Companies would indicate opportunities and threats they see â&#x20AC;&#x153;on the groundâ&#x20AC;? as they attempt to bid on access rights to foreign natural resources. Access to foreign markets is another area of economic competition where intelligence support to private companies could be extended. In theory, access to markets is governed by bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. In practice, both private and national foreign competitors that violate trade agreements, engage in unfair or illegal practices such as bribes and kickbacks, and coordinate preferential treatment for domestic firms make access to foreign markets difficult for U.S. firms. Further, American firms are subject to U.S. laws (and stricter enforcement regimes of laws) that prohibit many of these unfair practices by domestic firms. The use of national intelligence to uncover evidence of such practices by foreign firms is an appropriate defensive use of these capabilities. In cases where evidence is uncovered by U.S. intelligence agencies, such information should be used by U.S. diplomats, or shared with international trade enforcement entities, in order to attempt to seek redress with the foreign government or sanctions that curb the anti-competitive activity. This would

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SHOULD INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PRIVATE INDUSTRY BE ENHANCED?

level the playing field for all competitors. Extending intelligence support to U.S. firms as they face foreign competitors would enhance national security by strengthening economic competitiveness without disrupting free markets. In fact, there is evidence that U.S. intelligence agencies may have provided such support in the past. In the mid-nineties, U.S. intelligence agencies used the Echelon surveillance program to collect intelligence showing that foreign companies were paying bribes to obtain favorable export contracts. Foreign governments and companies objected when the program was disclosed, but former CIA Director James Woolsey suggests that the information gathered provided significant competitive support to U.S. firms.12 In addition to expanding the intelligence doctrine in defense of U.S. firms, there is a second approach to strengthening national security: intelligence agencies could adopt a more offensive set of objectives in areas of economic competition that are key to national security. The previous discussion focused on the use of intelligence to support U.S. industry defensively, both to protect the value of private assets (i.e. preventing the theft of intellectual property or damage to critical infrastructure allows the owners to realize the maximum value of those assets) and to prevent U.S. firms from falling victim to anti-competitive practices. Using intelligence offensively would mean engaging in activities that could enhance the value of U.S. firms by providing an unfair advantage over foreign competitors or by degrading the value of assets of foreign firms.

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This approach is admittedly much more controversial because it would involve using intelligence to create an advantage for U.S. companies relative to foreign competitors, and, possibly, for some U.S. firms relative to other U.S. competitors. As such, an offensive approach should not be pursued in all areas of economic competition. Policymakers should focus on economic competitions that could have a direct impact on national security. The most important role for offensive intelligence support to industry is in the area of technological innovation. While the U.S. is widely held to be the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leader in innovation and creation of new industries, other nations are becoming increasingly capable of producing critical technology innovation. Several trends are driving this. American colleges and universities grant a majority of science and technology PhDs to foreign nationals.13 The recent economic slowdown and the growth of economies elsewhere in the world mean that more of these highly talented foreigners are returning home after receiving their education in the United States. Finally, with the availability of talent and lower employee expenses overseas, many U.S. firms are moving research and development facilities to foreign countries. With this talent overseas, foreign competitors are increasingly likely to spawn indigenous research facilities and to make advances in technologies that could be critical to national security. Foreign innovation does not have to supersede U.S. innovation in the aggregate to threaten national security. A foreign competitor taking the lead inâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;or worse, dominatingâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a single

WALKER

new technology for the production of clean, renewable energy could pose a real threat to U.S. security. This would be especially true if the breakthrough were made by a foreign competitor who could deny U.S. consumers and the military easy access to it. The application of offensive intelligence in the area of innovation could help prevent this scenario by using government resources to monitor the progress of, and gain access to, advances in fields of research critical to national security. Deciding which technologies are critical to national security is the task of national security policymakers. American firms can provide industry expertise to help identify areas of promising technology and scientific research. U.S. intelligence about the progress and activities of foreign firms is very likely to compromise sources and methods, and, therefore, would have to be shared with a limited number of private U.S. companies. More likely, any secrets gained through offensive intelligence would have to be â&#x20AC;&#x153;laundered.â&#x20AC;? One way to mask the source of innovations obtained from foreign labs would be to filter it through a U.S. national research laboratory. The national lab could take raw intelligence and use it to produce research that plausibly could have been generated from the lab itself. Once the innovation is revealed through the lab, existing licensing and commercialization processes would allow U.S. firms competitive access to the technology. Many foreign countries are actively pursuing access to U.S. technologies todayâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the most important of which are Iran, Russia, China, and India.14 The United States should pursue an equally aggressive approach given the

Espionage Exposed

increasing likelihood that important innovations will be produced overseas. However, care must be taken to ensure that exploitation of any innovation gain made through this mechanism does not advantage any single U.S. firm, but is instead available to all U.S. firms capable of leveraging the new technology.

A Proper Balance Must be Maintained. Using offensive intel-

ligence in other areas of economic competition would be difficult without providing an advantage to one or more U.S. firms, and is not advisable. At a practical level, U.S. firms gain access to resources and markets through contracts with foreign entities. Offensive use of intelligence in these areas would mean doing more than just leveling the playing field (e.g. influencing decision makers offering the contracts to choose U.S. firms, or undermining competitive bidders). Such activity would create political problems at home if the subterfuge were ever discovered, not to mention the diplomatic problems that such use of intelligence might create. There is one area where we engage in an offensive doctrine relative to foreign commercial entities. Offensive intelligence in the domain of infrastructure protection means actively going after and neutralizing threats and penetrating components of foreign infrastructure in anticipation of an attack or counterattack on U.S. installations. This use of intelligence provides no advantage in economic competition and is currently in the domain of the U.S. Department of Defense. Industrial espionage and economic intelligence have always been controversial missions for U.S. intelligence

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SHOULD INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PRIVATE INDUSTRY BE ENHANCED?

agencies. As global economic competition increases, the subject of economic intelligence requires a deeper understanding and analysis of how intelligence can be used in international economic competition. The debate must move from broad condemnation or advocacy of economic intelligence activities, to one that considers the nature of economic competition, the intelligence tools at our disposal, and the various national interests involved. Because intelligence supports policymakers engaged in competition, spies

and other intelligence assets can be used to support offensive policies as well as defense of U.S. economic interests. Armed with this understanding, policymakers and informed citizens should expand intelligence support to U.S. firms and find the proper balance between free market ideals and the use of intelligence in commerce. Once this balance has been reached, policymakers should be unabashed in the use of intelligence in economic competitions where other nations spy in order to gain advantage for their industries.

NOTES

1 John J. Fialka, “Giving Away the Store,” Wilson Quarterly (Winter 1997): 48-63. 2 In this article the terms “industrial espionage” and “economic intelligence/espionage” are used somewhat interchangeably. Industrial espionage for the purposes of this article is considered to mean instances where intelligence is conducted by, or against, a single target firm. The decision advantage gained by this activity accrues to a single corporate entity. Economic intelligence is used as a blanket term to mean all intelligence activity where the target is one or more economic actors. The decision advantage gained is shared by all or many economic firms. 3 In the mid-1990s many writers in the popular press, and several Congressional hearings explored the potential harm of economic espionage from abroad to national interest from economic espionage, and the appropriate US response. See: John Fialka, War by Other Means: Economic Espionage in America, (New York: Diane Publishing Co., 1997); Loch K. Johnson, “Spies”, Foreign Policy, Issue 120 (September/October 2000); Stanley Kober, “The CIA Should Stay Out of Economic Spying”, USA Today Magazine, September 1993; House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime, “Hearing on Economic Espionage”, May 9, 1996; Joint Economic Committee, “Hearing on Economic Espionage, Technology Transfers and National Security”, June 17, 1997. 4 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment”, (delivered by Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence), Feb. 25, 2009; House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”, (delivered by Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence), Feb. 3, 2010. 5 Robert Gates quoted in: George Lardner, Jr. 1992. “U.S. Demands for Economic Intelligence Up Sharply, Gates Says.” Washington Post, April 14; Woolsey, James. 2000. “Why We Spy on Our Allies.” Wall Street

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Journal, March 17. 6 For a list of agencies involved see Appendix A (page 7) of National Counter Intelligence Executive, “Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage – 2007” (September 2008). This list is updated each year in the annual report. 7 Jennifer E. Sims. “A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics.” National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects. Ed. Greg Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 8 Economic Espionage Act of 19967, § 18 U.S.C. § 1831-1839 (1996). 9 National Counter Intelligence Executive, “Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage – 2002” (February 2003) 10 Department of Homeland Security, “National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009.” http://www. dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf); and “National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Information Sharing.” http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_InfoSharing.pdf. 11 See “Key Findings” in National Infrastructure Advisory Council, “Public-Private Sector Intelligence Coordination Final Report and Recommendations by the Council”, on the importance of trust in information sharing (July 1997): 14 12 James Woolsey. 2000. “Why We Spy on Our Allies.” Wall Street Journal, March 17. 13 Johnson, Jean M. and Regents, Mark C., “International Mobility of Scientists and Engineers to the United States – Brain Drain or Brain Circulation?” 1998. National Science Foundation Directorate for Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences Issue Brief, June 22. 14 National Counter Intelligence Executive. 2010. “Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage – 2009”

Espionage Exposed

Corporate Responsibility in Cybersecurity Building International Global Standards

Harvey Rishikof and Kevin Lunday Crisis reigned in the boardroom; catastrophe lurked outside. Marziperk Medical Insurance Company1 was in a state of confusion and the CEO and Board of Directors struggled to understand the nature of the calamity and how much worse it would become. Online and televised media outlets were carrying lead stories about a massive release of hundreds of thousands of Marziperk customer records, including medical and financial data, purportedly obtained and disseminated by â&#x20AC;&#x153;hackersâ&#x20AC;? (cyber criminals). Marziperkâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s computer systems were still down. Media demands for statements from the company were increasing by the hour. The corporation, officers, and directors were facing potential criminal prosecution and civil liability. Significant damage to their business reputation was likely; whether the company would survive was unknown. This hypothetical scenario is not fiction, but rather a collage of publicly reported incidents. In 2009, personal information from Health Net on nearly 500,000 Connecticut residents and 1.5 million patients nationwide was leaked.2 Since 2005, over 1,750 data breaches involving more than 510 million records have been publicly reported, a majority involving computer networks or other informa-

Harvey Rishikof is a professor of law and former chair of the Department of National Security Strategy, National War College. Kevin E. Lunday is a Captain and judge advocate in the U.S. Coast Guard. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Commandant or the Judge Advocate General, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Government, the National Defense University, the National War College, or the U.S. Department of Defense.

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tion technology systems.3 The number of actual data losses from similar incidents is probably much higher given the incentive for companies to minimize public exposure in order to protect business reputation. This article describes the potential legal and business consequences of cyber incidents, the expanding duties of corporate leaders to manage risk through strong cybersecurity, and the need for an international effort—driven by the corporate sector—to establish and implement authoritative global cybersecurity standards.

Cyberspace and Cybersecurity.

The accelerated development and use of both computer networks and the Internet to manage information has been one of the critical engines driv-

nities presented by the proliferation of computers and Internet technology are accompanied by extraordinary risks. The more companies rely on these cyber tools to perform key business functions, the more opportunities are available for others to steal intellectual property through accessing, compromising, and disrupting these tools. To mitigate these risks, companies take actions to secure and defend their computer systems and networks from compromise. These initiatives and practices are collectively known as “cybersecurity.” Cybersecurity is the act of managing risks to computer networks and transactions conducted in cyberspace;5 it is a mosaic of numerous interdependent actors taking measures individually, whether in cooperation or competition

The more companies rely on these cyber

tools to perform key business functions, the more opportunities are available for others to steal intellectual property through accessing, compromising, and disrupting these tools. ing globalization over the past two decades.4 This has enabled companies to expand markets, reach previously inaccessible individuals or companies, rapidly conduct economic exchange among networked participants instantaneously around the world, and create new markets for emerging products and services. Corporations have increased their use and dependence on computer networks and the Internet in order to remain competitive. However, the remarkable opportu-

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with others, to reduce the risk of failure or compromise of information systems.6 Cybersecurity involves preventive measures such as Internet firewalls, updating operating systems to address vulnerabilities, physical protection of computers and networks, user security protocols, digital encryption, and electronic keys. It also includes responsive measures such as anti-virus programs, network resilience following incidents, and law enforcement actions against cyber criminals.

RISHIKOF AND LUNDAY

Espionage Exposed

Because technological development continues to accelerate, cybersecurity is continually struggling to keep pace with the networks it must protect. It has traditionally been relegated to a supporting function—the province of Chief Information Officers (CIO) and network administrators who worked in the server rooms with the “geeks” who could understand how the systems operated.7 The extreme dependence of corporations on computer networks and the Internet, the factors that make cyberspace unique, and the vulnerabilities and consequences of security breaches demand that corporate leaders view cybersecurity as a core business operation rather than a supplemental administrative task. Corporate officers and directors must take steps to better understand and actively govern security of company computers and networks and adopt measures to improve security of those to whom they are connected—for better and worse—through the Internet. The failure to act may result in potentially catastrophic situations similar to that faced by the Marziperk officers and board.

cesses relied on computer networks to manage and store patient and customer record information, how those networks were managed and protected, and the vulnerabilities of their networks to breach and compromise. Corporate executives must avoid this fate by remaining up-to-date on computer system and network concepts and operations, in addition to setting objectives for managers at each echelon to follow suit. Next, corporate leaders must understand the landscape of potential legal obligations regarding cybersecurity, along with the consequences of ineffective Internet governance. Corporate officers and directors may face potential criminal and civil penalties for failure to comply with key statutes and regulations governing cybersecurity, including requirements to notify affected parties that information security has been breached. Within the United States, there are three primary Federal statutes that may impose governmental sanctions for cybersecurity failures. The SarbanesOxley Act (SOX) of 20028 employs criminal sanctions as an incentive to require senior corporate officers Understanding Risks of Poor to certify key corporate information Cyber Governance: The Geek as reliable and safeguarded.9 SOX Gap. Corporate leaders must have a requires that the corporation assess foundational knowledge of computer the effectiveness of internal control networks and the Internet, how their measures, including cybersecurity, perbusiness employs them, and how they form internal audits, and report the are managed. Corporations must certification to the Federal governbridge the “Geek Gap” between man- ment.10 For corporations involved in agement and CIOs in order to establish health care (e.g., Marziperk Medical), policy coherence. In the opening sce- the Health Insurance Portability and nario, Marziperk Medical officers and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 directors were paralyzed by an inability requires compliance with strict stanto understand how their business pro- dards governing the security of cer-

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tain health information contained in and transmitted by computers and networks.11 For companies that provide financial services, the Gramm-LeachBliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 and accompanying regulations require financial institutions to establish strict privacy policies and adequately safeguard customer financial information, including protection of information in electronic form.12 Outside of the United States, most developed countries have information privacy and computer security laws that are comparable or stricter than the U.S.

constitutes negligence per se and give rise to a cause of action for compensatory damages from a data breach and loss of personal information.16 The viability of such suits is uncertain because there is not an established body of law involving such so-called “cyber torts.” As a result, plaintiff class action shareholder suits may find significant obstacles to proving both that actual damages occurred and that the cyber incident was the “proximate cause.” Companies may also face risk of contract liability for breach of provisions related to cybersecurity. Con-

Outside of the United States, most devel-

oped countries have information privacy and computer security laws that are comparable or stricter than the U.S. legal framework. legal framework.13 For example, U.S.based corporations that conduct business in Europe are subject to the European Commission’s Directive on Data Protection as implemented through the U.S.-European Union Safe Harbor Framework, which requires detailed certifications indicating that companies have adequate information privacy and cybersecurity controls.14 In addition to governmental sanctions, the failure of corporations to meet legal and regulatory requirements for cybersecurity or information breach notifications may arguably raise tort liability on a negligence per se basis.15 If plaintiffs can demonstrate that Federal or state laws mandated certain cybersecurity measures, they may argue that the failure to comply with those standards

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tracts increasingly include terms governing each party’s obligations to protect information, including from cyber attack. These newer provisions are based on a growing imperative for parties to allocate and manage risk of cyber incidents when involved in transactions with others over whom they exercise limited internal control, but who nevertheless share risk because they suffer the consequences of the other party’s cybersecurity failures. Corporate officers and directors may be subject to an expanding risk of liability for breach of fiduciary duty. State common law imposes a fiduciary duty of care by officers and directors to shareholders, requiring that officers exercise prudence in making decisions affecting the corporation.17 Courts

RISHIKOF AND LUNDAY

have traditionally given great deference to decisions by corporate officers under the “business judgment rule,” holding generally that any reasonable basis for a decision made in good faith is sufficient to protect officers from liability resulting from the consequences of the decision.18 Director liabilities for a breach of the fiduciary duty to exercise care, or a duty of loyalty, may in theory arise in two distinct contexts. First, such liability may be said to follow from a board decision that results in a loss because that decision was ill advised or “negligent.” Second, liability to the corporation for a loss may be said to arise from an unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss.19 However, the nature of decisions involving computer and network security and protection of business information may be subject to an expanding duty of care.20 The growing body of Federal and state laws requiring establishment of effective internal controls for computer systems and networks, coupled with the demand for some legal mechanism to compensate victims of cyber incidents, is likely expanding the defined scope of the duty of care. It may no longer be sufficient for executives to simply make de minimus reasonable decisions regarding the infrastructure of security functions within the corporation. These cases will be fact specific, and much will depend on what was known, explained, and advised to the board. Based on the growing body of laws and regulations mandating stronger internal corporate controls, courts may set a higher bar for the essential actions directors must exercise to achieve the

Espionage Exposed

due care required by their fiduciary duty to shareholders.21

Building Corporate Governance in a Networked World. Effective governance requires that corporate leaders view cybersecurity as a core business operation and act accordingly, prioritizing investment of resources and time based on the risk to core operations. This entails synthesizing business requirements with an assessment of risks to develop a robust cybersecurity policy, with the objectives of ensuring the confidentiality of information within computer systems and networks, the integrity of the networks from intrusion or breach, and the resilience and sustained availability of networks during and following a cyber incident. However, having a strong internal cybersecurity program is not enough. Executives must look beyond their own corporation and work collaboratively to establish a framework of universally accepted international standards to achieve broader governance. Just as companies are linked through an interdependent network in cyberspace, corporate governance must employ a similar networked approach that raises cybersecurity practices. Although standards in most areas are dictated through domestic and international laws, the private sector is best positioned to develop and implement solutions based on economic imperatives and market incentives. The widely accepted accounting standards employed by businesses worldwide are a primary example of existing national and international corporate governance that developed from the

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private sector. In response to the Great Depression, the U.S. financial community developed accounting procedures and standards to improve security, reliability, and confidence in corporate financial accounting. These standards eventually evolved into the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP).22 In 2001, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) created the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), a comparative set of international accounting standards to the U.S. GAAP. Currently, the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board and IASB are working to converge the U.S. GAAP and IFRS over the next several years into a universal set of accounting standards that will apply worldwide.24 Building on the accounting model, corporations and industry sectors share a similar imperative to establish authoritative international cybersecurity standards to ensure the security, reliability, and confidence in business computer network and Internet-based

security professionals. The GAISP was intended to provide framework similar to GAAP and IFRS.25 However, GAISP exists among an array of overlapping and complimentary standards established by other bodies (e.g., International Telecommunications Union,26 ISO/ISE 27009,27 Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT)28), meaning no single authoritative set of cybersecurity standards has emerged. Without a universal set of authoritative standards to inform policymakers, governments will require legal compliance with varying standards by companies operating within their jurisdictions, presenting growing challenges for multinational corporations that exist across jurisdictional boundaries. Corporations and industry sectors would benefit by converging the various frameworks to form common standards in this field. Corporations and industry sectors should seek to establish an International Cybersecurity Standards Board (ICSB) as a non-governmental body to

Executives must look beyond their own

corporation and work collaboratively to establish a framework of universally accepted international standards to achieve broader governance. operations. There is already a preliminary body of work in this area: the Generally Accepted Information Security Principles (GAISP), established by the Information Systems Security Association (ISSA), a private international organization of information

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create generally accepted, authoritative cybersecurity standards similar to IFRS. Converging ISO/IEC 27009, COBIT, GAISP and other standards and guidelines, the ICSB would develop and provide one set of authoritative standards for use by companies worldwide that

RISHIKOF AND LUNDAY

would also inform governmental law and policy development. The unique nature of cyberspace, our extraordinary reliance on it, and the risks it poses demand a significant evolution in corporate governance. Effective governance requires that officers and directors not only develop and execute an active and robust internal cybersecurity policy that is part of core business operations, but also move to establish an international, non-government body to develop and implement universal cybersecurity standards. Both international and domestic corporate standards of fiduciary duty regarding cyberspace must be harmo-

Espionage Exposed

nized or else sporadic civil suits and legal black holes of ungoverned sovereign irresponsibility may well define corporate cyberspace’s future, with certain states becoming magnets for cyber negligence. The move toward universal accounting standards was borne out of the Great Depression. The corporate world must not wait for a comparable “Cyber Great Depression” to initiate needed improvements; it must instead lead the way. Marziperk Medical is a casualty of the failure of corporate governance. Without effective and immediate action, there will be many more such breakdowns to come.

NOTES

1 “Marziperk” and “Marziperk Medical Insurance Company” are fictional names created for this hypothetical scenario. Any relation to actual names or companies is not intended. 2 Congressional Research Service, Federal Information Security and Data Breach Notification Laws (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 28 January 2010), 2–3. 3 Ibid. 4 Executive Office of the President, U.S. Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2010), iii. 5 Ibid, 3. 6 U.S. General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, May 2004), 11. 7 “Special Report: A Survey of Digital Security: Securing the Cloud,” Economist, October 24, 2002, http://www.economist.com/node/1389589 (date accessed: Oct. 24, 2002). 8 Pub. Law 107-204, H.R. 3763, U.S. Cong. 2nd Session (23 January 2002). 9 18 U.S.C. §§ 1350, 1519 (2009). 10 15 U.S.C. § 7252 (2009). 11 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d et seq. (2009); Title XII, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. Law 111-5 (Feb. 17, 2009). 12 15 U.S.C. §§ 680-6809 (2010); 16 C.F.R. Part 314 (2010). Almost all states have enacted information privacy or cybersecurity laws that bind corporations doing business within their jurisdictions to notify

customers of data breaches. See, e.g., California Security Breach Information Act (SBIA), Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5-.82 (2005); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-2107(a); Congressional Research Service, “Data Security: Federal and State Laws,” Feb. 3, 2006; National Conference of State Legislatures, “State Security Breach Notification Laws,” available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/ breachlaws.htm. 13 See, e.g., European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, Official Journal L 281 of 23.11.1995 (Oct. 24, 1995), available at http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ISPO/legal/ en/dataprot/directiv/directiv/htm; United Kingdom Data Protection Act of 1998 c.29 (July 16, 1998), available at http://statutelaw.gov.uk; France Act no 78-17 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties (Jan. 6, 1978). 14 Chuan Sun, “The European Union Privacy Directive and Its Impact on the U.S. Privacy Protection Policy: A Year 2003 Perspective,” Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 2, no. 1 (Fall 2003); U.S. Department of Commerce online, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/. 15 Vincent R. Johnson, “Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability,” South Carolina Law Review 57, no. 255 (2005): 267–268. 16 Ibid. 17 Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.Ch. 1996). In Caremark, the Delaware Chancery Court reasoned that corporate directors are charged with

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the fiduciary “duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.” 18 Ibid. 19 Abbott Laboratories Derivate Shareholders Litigation, 325 F. 3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003). 20 Vincent R. Johnson, “Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability,” South Carolina Law Review 57 no. 255 (2005): 280–282. 21 Julia Allen, “Governing for Enterprise Security,” Carnegie Mellon University/Software Engineering Institute (Jun. 2005): 14–17. 22 Financial Accounting Standards Board, “Facts about FASB,” Internet, http://www.fasb.org (date accessed: 21 October 2010). 23 Securities and Exchange Commission, Commission Statement in Support of Convergence and Global

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Accounting Standards (Washington, D.C.: Security and Exchange Commission, 2010). 24 Ibid. 25 See Generally Accepted Information Security Principles (GAISP), Ver. 3.0 (2004), available at http://www.gaisp.org. 26 See International Telecommunications Union, “Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries,” available at http://www. itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/itu-understanding-cybercrime-guide.pdf. The ITU, a United Nations agency for information and technology issues, has issued technical standards that are increasingly driving policy determinations. 27 See ISO/IEC 27002, “Information Technology-Security Techniques—Code of Practice for Information Security Management,” (2005), available at http://www.iso.org. 28 See Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) 4.1 (2005), available at http://www.isaca.org.

Editors’ Note

State actors are no longer the sole practitioners of espionage and intelligencegathering activities. Today, private firms, multinational corporations, and even terrorist cells use covert surveillance techniques to plan and execute their operations. As the number of consumers of intelligence has increased, effective and reliable counterintelligence methods have become critical for national governments and other actors. These new and evolving trends are of particular importance to the U.S. intelligence community, which not only gathers intelligence for national security purposes, but constantly guards against espionage from stateand non-state actors as well. The authors in this issue’s Forum provide a glimpse into the ubiquity and complexity of espionage and intelligence-gathering, and offer insight into the implications of their use in finance, industry, and national security. Catherine Lotrionte introduces the Forum with a discussion of the modern intelligence community, and deftly brings together themes that are common throughout the section’s articles. Bruce Riedel writes about the intelligence-gathering capabilities and sophisticated counterintelligence strategies of transnational extremist terrorist groups. Matthew Levitt addresses the use of financial intelligence to counter transnational terrorist threats. Neal Pollard, David Murray, Stuart Jones, and Marissa Fenech collaborate to discuss policy measures to address the rise of nonbanks and their use in illicit activities. Harvey Rishikof and Kevin Lunday write about cybersecurity, and both they and Matthew Walker argue that cooperation between the public and private sectors is necessary in order to combat espionage effectively. Finally, Eamon Javers describes the threat of espionage that American corporations face from other companies, financial firms, and foreign governments. Other contributions to this issue include articles about the end of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, constitutional reform in Burma, anti-human trafficking policies, and power politics in Kenya’s Mau Forest Complex. The issue also features interviews with former President of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe Vélez and Ambassador of Israel to the United States, Michael Oren. We are proud to remain a source of information on a wide range of topics, and to give voice to leading academics, policy experts, and practitioners in the field of international affairs. We thank our staff, advisers, supporters, and the School of Foreign Service for their tireless work and dedication to the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. Michael B. McKeon

Imani S. Tate

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Terrorist Intelligence Capabilities: Lessons from the Battlefield

Bruce Riedel Transnational Islamist extremist terrorist groups have a demonstrated capability to conduct thorough intelligence collection strategies against their targets and to undertake sophisticated counter intelligence measures against the United States and other Western intelligence communities. Two contemporary case studies clearly demonstrate this capability. First is the case of David Headley, an American citizen who has pleaded guilty this year to working for the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) terrorist group. Headley spent three years collecting intelligence for the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s November 2008 attack on targets in the city of Mumbai, India, where he conducted repeated intelligence collection missions using a sophisticated cover story to mask his real identity. Headley and LeT also used a criminal network to augment their intelligence activities. The second case is the 30 December 2009 al-Qaeda attack on the CIAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s forward operating base in Khost, Afghanistan, which killed seven CIA employees and a Jordanian intelligence officer.1 In this case, al-Qaeda used a Jordanian triple agent to spy on the CIA and to gain access to the base. These two case studies demonstrate how terrorist organizations can conduct complex intelligence operations and share intelligence with

Bruce Riedel is a former CIA officer and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings where he focuses on political transition, terrorism and conflict resolution. He was a senior advisor to three U.S. presidents on Middle East and South Asian issues.

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like-minded groups to attack targets on a global scale. Defeating these sophisticated groups will require shutting down their sanctuaries and wrapping up their global cell networks. Critical to that effort is strong liaison partnerships to share information globally. Transnational terrorist groups with an Islamist orientation have developed sophisticated intelligence collection strategies to case the targets for their terrorist operations. Since their plots can sometimes take years to mature, these intelligence collection operations require careful cover stories and welltrained operatives. To prevent their clandestine activity from being uncovered by American or other intelligence counter terrorism operations, the terrorists have also become skilled at counter intelligence and then use double agents to strike their enemies. These two contemporary case studies additionally provide excellent insights into both capabilities.

of LeT as a major player in the global Islamic jihadist movement. Indeed, the targets of the killers—Indians, Westerners (including Americans), Israelis, and Jews—are targets shared by the global Islamic jihad and al-Qaeda. The attack was meticulously planned with extensive intelligence collection, and the terrorists were well trained and equipped. In July 2009, the lone survivor of the terrorist team, Mohammad Ajmal Amir Qasab, surprised prosecutors in his Mumbai trial by confessing in an open court session that he and his nine comrades had been recruited by LeT, trained at LeT camps in Pakistan on commando tactics, equipped by LeT with AK 56 automatic assault rifles (the Chinese version of the Russian AK 47), hand grenades, GPS sets, cell phones and other equipment, and dispatched by senior members of the LeT from Karachi, Pakistan in a small boat with orders to hijack an Indian boat at sea to take them into Mumbai. In Mumbai the group split into four teams and attacked David Headley and LeT’s Interna- their prearranged targets—the central tional Intelligence Network. The train station of the city, a hospital, attack by ten terrorists of the Pakistan- two famous five star hotels known for based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) organi- hosting Western visitors and the elite zation on multiple targets in the city of of Indian society, a Jewish residential Mumbai, India, on 26-29 November complex known to host visiting Israelis, 2008, was among the most significant and a famous restaurant also known acts of international terrorism since for attracting foreigners. The terrorists 9/11.2 Not only did the terrorists put also set small bombs behind them to a city of 14 million people under siege, add to the confusion and terror after but they also captured the attention of they had fired indiscriminately into the global media for sixty hours and ful- crowds at the various target sites.3 filled the first objective of any terrorist Throughout the siege, the terrorists attack: to terrorize one’s target audi- stayed in touch with their LeT handlers ence. They also completely disrupted a back in Pakistan by phone. These hanbudding rapprochement between India dlers provided the terror teams with and Pakistan, probably one of its major updated intelligence on the tactical goals, and highlighted the emergence situation on the ground, which they

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gleaned from watching Indian television reports. The Indian authorities have released the chilling transcripts of their calls, showing that the handlers provided guidance and encouragement to the killers, and even ordered them to kill specific hostages. Qasab identified the leader of the operation as an LeT senior official, Zaki Rehman Lakhvi, who oversaw his training and was present when the team left Karachi. The training included three months of intense exercises with small arms, including watching videos and photos of the targets on a laptop computer. Qasab worked with a group of LeT members, from which he was selected to receive more specialized training for the attack itself. The team then waited another three months while the LeT leadership determined the best timing for the attack.

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lance, clandestine operations and other terrorist skills.4 Beginning in 2005, Headley was given the task by LeT of traveling to India from the United States and conducting the surveillance for the Mumbai attacks. Born Daood Sayed Gilani in Washington, DC in 1960, his first move involved changing his name to David Headley in Philadelphia to hide his Pakistani identity when traveling abroad. He then made five trips between 2005 and 2008 to India, each time stopping in Pakistan on the way back to get new instructions from LeT and to report his surveillance results. He visited each of the targets and recorded their locations with GPS systems; he carefully studied the security around each site and became one of the masterminds of the plot. He had a co-conspirator in Chicago, Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Canadian citizen,

Terrorist organizations can conduct

complex intelligence operations and share intelligence with like-minded groups to attack targets on a global scale. Perhaps the most shocking element of the Mumbai attack was the role played by an American of Pakistani descent, David Coleman Headley, in the intelligence collection that preceded the attack. Headley pleaded guilty in March 2010 to conspiracy to commit murder based on his role in the attack. According to his guilty plea, he joined LeT on a visit to Pakistan in 2002. Over the next three years he traveled to Pakistan five times for training in weapons handling, intelligence collection, surveil-

who helped devise a cover story with Headley, which had him working for a travel agency that Rana had set up in Chicago. Rana also traveled to Mumbai and stayed in the Taj Hotel to help the reconnaissance mission. The HeadleyRana affair underscores the meticulous intelligence planning that lay behind the Mumbai attack. Over time, the target set expanded. At first only the Taj Hotel was selected. As Headley brought in more data, he and his handlers added more targets, most notably including

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the Jewish Chabad house which was a global jihadist target, not a traditional Pakistani or Kashmiri target. LeT continued to use Headley for intelligence collection after Mumbai. First, LeT sent him back to India to look at more targets, including Israeli targets like the offices of El Al airlines. It also outsourced him to al-Qaeda for

intelligence. They would do a miniMumbai, seizing the offices, and then beheading all the employees captured with maximum publicity and, finally, fighting to the death against the police and Danish security forces. According to his guilty plea later, Headley had even managed a meeting with the alQaeda team in Europe.

To defeat a global terrorist network

requires the broadest possible alliance of intelligence services working together and pooling information on the enemy. another collection mission in Europe.5 His task was to conduct surveillance on the offices of a Danish newspaper that published cartoons mocking the prophet Mohammad. The cartoons had aroused a storm of anger in the Islamic world, where depictions of the prophet in any form are rare but ones making fun of him are considered blasphemous. Al-Qaeda had promised to make Denmark pay and had already attacked the Danish embassy in Pakistan. Headley made at least two trips to Denmark and surveilled the newspaper’s offices in Copenhagen. He even entered the offices using his travel agent cover. Headley reported back to al-Qaeda in Pakistan, meeting with Ilyas Kashmiri, a senior al-Qaeda operative who had once worked for the Pakistani intelligence service, the Directorate for InterServices Intelligence (ISI). Kashmiri told him that the “elders” of al-Qaeda were very interested in this project and that an al-Qaeda cell was already in Europe ready to conduct the operation once Headley collected all the necessary

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Headley was arrested at Chicago’s O’Hare airport in October 2009 before he could get on a flight back to Pakistan for a final planning session with Kashmiri. There is speculation among Danish authorities that the plan was set to take place in December 2009 when Copenhagen hosted the Climate Change Summit and dozens of world leaders would have been in the city along with media outlets from around the world. His subsequent guilty plea and confession has provided extraordinary insight into the intelligence workings of the LeT and al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda’s Infiltration of the U.S.Allied Intelligence Community. AlQaeda has also demonstrated sophisticated counter intelligence skills. The best example was in December 2009 when it attacked a CIA facility in Khost, Afghanistan, using a triple agent. A Jordanian using the nom de guerre Abu Dujana al Khorasani, an Arabic name for Afghanistan and neighboring regions, persuaded the Jordani-

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an General Intelligence Department (GID) that he would be a double agent for them against al-Qaeda in 2009. His real name was Human Khalil Abu Mulal al Balawi and he had already been a propaganda specialist for al-Qaeda’s franchise in Iraq and its dead leader, Abu Musaib al Zarqawi, so it was a plausible cover story. Khorasani went from Jordan to Pakistan and contacted GID, claiming to have information on the location of al-Qaeda’s number two, Ayman Zawahiri. The bait was dangled. Khorasani was actually a triple agent, still working for al-Qaeda. He blew himself up when he got inside the CIA’s base in Khost, Afghanistan, on 30 December 2009, killing seven CIA officers and abu Zaid, who was his Jordanian case officer. Al-Qaeda took credit for the attack, which it dedicated to the memory of a leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Baytullah Mehsud, who was killed in a drone attack in mid 2008. In early 2010, Mehsud’s successor appeared in a videotape with Khorasani in which he described how he lured the Jordanians into trusting him and gained access to GID headquarters in Amman. He foreshadows his plan to bomb the CIA base and revealed that the GID officer had been fooled by al-Qaeda’s counter intelligence skills. The Haqqani network of the Afghan Taliban also later said they had a hand in the attack by helping Khorasani reach his target. The attack thus was the product of three terrorist organizations collaborating against the CIA, perhaps unprecedented in pooling capabilities. This operation symbolized the intricate intelligence and operational connections today between al-Qaeda and

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its allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The agent was an al-Qaeda operative, yet to gain access to the target the Afghan Taliban facilitated his movements, and to help publicize their success the Pakistani Taliban contributed to the propaganda effort to demonstrate the purpose and planning behind the plot. Conclusion – A Global Intelligence Challenge. The U.S. intelligence community has recognized the challenges these two case studies present. The CIA conducted a detailed review of the Khost attack, after which CIA Director Leon Panetta told the press that the agency was changing some of its operational procedures to prevent a recurrence. Understandably, he did not give details. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has separately ordered a review of the Headley affair, which is not yet complete. These reviews are focusing on the tactical aspects of the challenges and appropriate changes in tradecraft. There are also more strategic challenges these cases raise about the global nature of the terror threat today, the vital importance of strong liaison relationships to defeat it, and the unique importance of Pakistan in this struggle. The Headley and Khorasani affairs underscore the intelligence and counterintelligence skills and capabilities of today’s jihadist transnational terror networks. These networks do meticulous intelligence planning and surveillance using deep cover intelligence assets and conduct intricate counter intelligence deception operations using clandestine agents trained to penetrate the very best intelligence agencies in the world.

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This is a global battle waged from Chicago to Karachi. The epicenter is in Pakistan where the Islamic terrorists have developed their most secure safe havens and hideouts. The Pakistani intelligence service, ISI, has longstanding relations with some of these networks, most notably LeT, even as it is a crucial ally to the United States in the battle against al-Qaeda. Furthermore, Indian intelligence has interrogated Headley and the Indian press has reported that Headley claims the ISI was also involved in the Mumbai plot. The Indian Home Minister said publicly that, based on what Headley told New Delhi, they believe the ISI was involved at every stage of the plot. The Indian interrogation of Headley suggests he was constantly in touch with ISI officers, and that they provided him with $25,000 to open Rana’s office

al-Qaeda. In the United Kingdom it is eight hundred thousand strong and almost every plot uncovered in the UK since 9/11 has involved members of this predominately Kashmiri-origin diaspora. Shutting down small cells like the Headley-Rana team requires careful intelligence work and close cooperation with the law enforcement community. The Obama administration is well aware of the enormity of the task it faces and has devoted considerable resources to the challenge. The President has rightly made the destruction of the terrorists’ sanctuary in Afghanistan and Pakistan his top foreign policy priority. He has also wisely focused on countering the jihadist propaganda narrative with his own policy of reaching out to the Muslim world. On the intelligence front itself, this grand strategy translates most specifi-

Sound intelligence does not assure good policy nor does it provide policy answers to difficult issues. in Mumbai, and even provided frog men training for the ten commandoes. Those charges remain unproven at this time but raise profound questions about the terror networks’ links to the Pakistani government. Defeating this global challenge will require a global strategy that disrupts, dismantles, and destroys the networks’ safe havens in Pakistan and elsewhere and does the same to their cells around the world, especially in the United States and Europe. The Pakistani diaspora community is a favorite recruiting ground for groups like LeT and

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cally into how to handle information sharing and liaison relationships with our global partners in counter terrorism. To defeat a global terrorist network requires the broadest possible alliance of intelligence services working together and pooling information on the enemy. Liaison partnerships need to be strengthened with old allies like the British, French, Israelis, and Jordanians and with potential new partners like the Libyans and Algerians who may have unique insights into the global enemy. It was no accident that the CIA was working with the Jorda-

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nians in Khost as they have long been among our most trusted and effective counter terrorism partners, playing critical roles in many successful operations including the death of Zarqawi in Iraq in 2006. Additionally, India must become a closer partner in the struggle and Panetta was wise to make it his first foreign visit in 2009 after taking office. The hardest liaison challenge to manage is with Pakistan, which requires intense engagement, but should also involve internal verification and stocktaking. We need their help and they have provided invaluable assistance in tracking down al-Qaeda operatives since 2001 including key figures behind the 9/11 attack. However, they also have close ties to other groups that threaten our interests. We must be constantly alert to these two sides of Pakistan. It is always tempting for a general, diplomat, or station chief who is deeply engaged in a dialogue with a foreign partner to want to say that we are getting what we want. It is only human to suggest you and your interlocutor are working together toward the same end and that he or she is truly cooperating. Further, embassies and stations tend to adopt the views of the people they work with. So the U.S. Embassy in Kabul is likely to be more skeptical of the ISI claim to have given up its ties to the Taliban than the Embassy in Islamabad would be. Good policy should not be based on impressions. The President should task the Director of National Intelligence to prepare, perhaps quarterly, an allsource intelligence report on Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s

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role in terror, reporting both the good news and the bad. The DNI should be in charge because he is supposed to coordinate the views of all of the intelligence community. The CIA has a vested interest in its relationship with its partners; the military has a vested interest in its ties to the army and the State Department has a vested interest in promoting bilateral ties. All should be involved in the intelligence process, but the DNI should run the show and demand the necessary data to make a judgment on Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s behavior on terrorâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the good, the bad and the ugly. He then should report directly to the President and National Security Council principals. Sound intelligence does not assure good policy nor does it provide policy answers to difficult issues. However, periodic, comprehensive intelligence reports do make it harder for policymakers to ignore facts they find unpleasant. Key members of Congress should be given access to the intelligence as well to ensure the Hill is doing its job of overseeing intelligence and advising policy. Indeed, the Islamic terrorists have developed intelligence skills that are formidable. To defeat them we must adopt a subtle approach to build partnerships with better intelligence skills. In this endeavor, Pakistan will be our most important and our most difficult partner. The struggle is truly global and requires a global response. That means presidential leadership of an intelligence battle that is far more sophisticated than many recognize.

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NOTES

1 Information about the planning of this attack and the intelligence used to plot it is limited. The attack took the lives of the perpetrator, seven CIA officers, and the Jordanian official who served as his case manager, and U.S. intelligence data surrounding the event are not publicly available. 2 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba was created in the late 1980s by a Pakistani cleric, Hafez Saed, with the help of Osama bin Laden and Pakistani intelligence to wage war against India. 3 The details of the attack have been widely reported. A good summary is in “The Lessons of Mumbai” an Occasional Paper by the RAND Corporation published in early 2009 by a team of RAND experts which also includes a useful chronology of the incident. Qasab’s confession was reported by

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the BBC among others. See “Excerpts form Mumbai suspect’s confession,” BBC News (20 July 2009). 4 See the guilty plea agreement, United States of America v David Coleman Headley, No. 09 CR (March 2010), 830-3. The prosecutor was Patrick Fitzgerald. It is also useful to see the indictment released by the DOJ on October 27, 2009. 5 Ibid. 6 The video has been translated by the NEFA foundation and is available on their website under “An Interview with the Shaheed Abu Dujaanah alKhorasani, Hero of the Raid of the Amir Baytulah Mehsud.” 7 Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt and Ginger Thompson, “The US had warnings on Plotter of Mumbai Attack, New York Times (17 October 2010).

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Follow the Money

Leveraging Financial Intelligence to Combat Transnational Threats Matthew Levitt In July 2006 al-Qaeda nearly executed what would have been its most devastating terrorist attack since 9/11. A group of British citizens had planned to detonate liquid explosives aboard at least ten airliners en route from the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada. British authorities were able to foil the plot, in large part because of critical financial intelligence. As a result they quickly announced plans to increase the use of financial intelligence tools to disrupt future terrorist operations. “Our aim is simple,” then-Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown asserted. “Just as there be no safe haven for terrorists, so there be no hiding place for those who finance terrorism.”1 Mr. Brown described this effort as a “modern Bletchley Park.” Much as intercepted communications foiled Axis military planning during World War II, tracking the financial footprints left by today’s terrorists, proliferators, drug kingpins, and other adversaries can thwart attacks, disrupt logistical and financial support networks, and identify unknown operatives. Despite the fact that well-publicized uses of financial intelligence may be few and far between, it remains an integral component of international efforts to confront transnational threats. Tracking funds as they trav-

Dr. Matthew Levitt directs the Stein program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for intelligence and analysis from 2005 to early 2007. He is the coauthor, with Michael Jacobson, of The Money Trail: Finding, Following and Freezing Terrorist Finances (Washington Institute 2008)

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el through the global financial system demands both interagency and international cooperation to develop intelligence collection, storage, and dissemination policies. Since 9/11, both U.S. and international intelligence agencies have restructured to reflect this current threat environment. Tremendous strides have been made to stop the flow of funds to illicit actors, but the international community must continue to emphasize the importance of financial intelligence in order to constrain terrorists’ operating environment and pursue individual threats.

not independently defeat these threats— nor is it intended to. These tools must be part of a broader strategy that leverages all elements of national power to successfully confront and eliminate the international security threats we face today. In the aftermath of nearly every recent terrorist attack, the utility of financial investigative tools has been reaffirmed. Financial data provided investigators with critical and early leads immediately following the attacks on 9/11, as they did following the 11 March 2004 attacks in Madrid and the 7 July 2005 attacks in London, among others. Focusing on Effective but Underappreci- the financing of transnational threats ated. Despite the effectiveness of has other benefits as well: financial intelligence (often referred to as FININT), it is underappreci- Deterrent effect. It is difficult ated. Intelligence activities, when prac- to deter hardcore operatives, yet the ticed best, are unreported. The public threat of terrorist designations can and pundits alike must judge efforts to deter non-designated parties. Major combat the financing of transnational donors inclined to finance extremist threats solely on overt actions such groups—who may be heavily involved in as U.S. Treasury designations, indict- business activity throughout the world— ments and prosecutions. These are not will think twice before putting their the sum total of international efforts personal fortunes and reputations at to combat terrorist financing—they are risk. only the most visible. Diplomacy, law enforcement, and intelligence collec- Preventive intelligence. Finantion operations also provide a variety of cial transfers are a matter of fact. Raisother equally productive ways of coming, storing, and transferring money bating terrorist financing. leaves a financial trail for investigators Freezing funds will constrict the to follow that links numbered accounts operating environment for illicit actors and moneychangers with individuals in and disrupt their activities, while fol- terrorist organizations and cells. This is lowing the money trail up and down a powerful preemptive tool that allows the financial pipelines of terrorists and authorities to interdict potential threats insurgents will expose their donors and before they fully develop. operators. Although these tools have tremendous tactical utility, it is impor- Disruptive tool. Denying terrortant to recognize that combating the ists, insurgents, and proliferators easy financing of transnational threats will access to the international financial

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system forces them to use more costly, less efficient, and often less reliable means of financing. This may not stop all plots, but it will likely frustrate illicit activities. In 1995, captured World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef was flown over the twin towers on his way to a New York jail. When an FBI agent pointed out that the towers were still standing, Yousef replied, “They

(BDA), a small Macanese bank, access to the U.S. financial system. According to a U.S. government statement issued at the time, “Sources show that senior officials in Banco Delta Asia are working with [North Korean] DPRK officials to accept large deposits of cash, including counterfeit U.S. currency, and agreeing to place that currency into circulation.”4 U.S. officials not-

Illicit actors leave financial footprints that

can often be traced by virtue of having to operate within the single global financial system. wouldn’t be if I had enough money and explosives.”2 All of these efforts are intelligence-driven and have proven to be quite successful. Those who follow the money are increasingly being called on to use their skills and tools against the hardest targets.

Identifying Illicit Conduct.

Identifying covert financial activity is inherently difficult given that criminals will go to great lengths to cover their tracks and evade detection. Often, only intelligence gleaned through a variety of sources and methods can inform policymakers as to which banks and humanitarian organizations should be targeted for engaging in illegal and deceptive financial practices that mask their support of terrorism. In the United States, the Treasury Department’s Terrorism and Financial Intelligence branch discusses potential targets based on allsource intelligence.3 In 2005, for example, the U.S. government denied Banco Delta Asia

ed that the bank pursued activities on behalf of a “well-known North Korean front company” involved in distributing counterfeit currency and smuggling counterfeit tobacco products, and “has also long been suspected of being involved in international drug trafficking.”5 The Treasury Department cited the bank as a “primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act and blocked BDA—and any other banks continuing to do business with BDA—from accessing the U.S. financial system. Similarly, intelligence gathering efforts directed toward Iran’s illicit activities revealed the use of Iranian state-owned banks, including its central bank, to secretly facilitate terrorism financing and WMD programs. For example, Iran has used Bank Saderat as a preferred means of transferring funds to terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command. In 2006 the Treasury Depart-

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ment went public with declassified intelligence, stating that from 2001 to 2006 Iran transferred $50 million to Hezbollah by sending funds from its central bank through Bank Saderat’s London subsidiary.6 Iran’s stateowned Bank Sepah was also blacklisted for providing extensive financial services to Iranian entities involved in WMDrelated activities. According to the Treasury Department, Sepah engaged in “a range of deceptive financial practices in an effort to avoid detection,” which included asking that its name be removed from international transactions.7 As U.S. officials have discovered, providing hard financial evidence helps to build international consensus and to “achieve a multilateral alignment of interests.” Faced with hard evidence, even states that are not traditional allies cooperate to support actions that target the financing of illicit conduct.8

hunt terrorists, understand their networks, and disrupt their operations.”9 Following the money gives the added benefit of using confirmable streams of data to create linkages between known and unknown terrorist operatives and supporters. Though the nature of that link must still be determined, such lead information is critically important to investigators and analysts. Moreover, Treasury officials note, “While terrorist supporters may use code names on the phone, when they send or receive money through the banking system they often provide information that yields the kind of concrete leads that can advance an investigation.”10 Armed with details like names and addresses, analysts can identify key actors and map their networks. Consider the case of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Documents seized by the United States have revealed a treasure trove of information about AQI fundFollowing the Money Trail ing, organizational structure, and posand Constricting the Operat- sible fissures within the organization. ing Environment. Illicit actors In one illuminating example, on 11 leave financial footprints that can often September 2007 coalition forces raidbe traced by virtue of having to oper- ed a suspected AQI safe house in Sinjar, ate within the single global financial an Iraqi town along the Syrian border. system. Following money up and down Analysis of seized documents revealed these financial pipelines helps pro- AQI managers’ concern when they were vide critical intelligence that identi- unable to account for every dollar in fies which key nodes in these financial their control.11 Given the operationnetworks should be targeted. Using this al and security risks associated with financial intelligence as an investigative maintaining such an extensive paper tool also allows intelligence agencies to trail, these details provided insight into more fully understand the scope of tar- AQI operations and helped analysts geted networks. In the words of the 9/11 understand the importance AQI senior Commission, while stemming the flow leaders attached to the organization’s of funds to terrorists is a useful tool, finances.12 “Expect less from trying to dry up terFinancial intelligence has been sucrorist money and more from following cessfully leveraged to disrupt terrorist the money for intelligence, as a tool to operations, target individuals, and even

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prevent attacks. For example, Philippine police reported that the Abu Sayyaf Group’s plans to set off bombs in Manila and target a chemical plant in 2006 were never executed due to a lack of funds—a direct result of the group’s inability to access the international financial system and the funds they were holding elsewhere.13 Similarly, intelligence analysis contributed to the capture of Hambali, Jemaah Islamiyah’s operations chief, who masterminded the Bali bombings in 2002. Treasury officials stated that financial transactions between a known al-Qaeda suspect and a previously unknown figure in South Asia provided the link that helped locate Hambali in Thailand in 2003.14 According to Undersecretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey, the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) “played an important role in the investigation that even-

supporters in the United States.17

A Case in Point: The Terrorist Finance Tracking Program. Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Treasury Department initiated the TFTP to take advantage of the financial footprint left behind when terrorists and their backers transfer funds in order to enable the U.S. government to proactively identify terrorist threats. Under this program, the Treasury obtains financial data substantively connected to terrorist activity by issuing an administrative subpoena. The requested data is provided by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a Brussels-based entity responsible for conducting much of the world’s bank-tobank communications. Financial intelligence provided by TFTP has assisted in many investigations, including the

Financial intelligence has been success-

fully leveraged to disrupt terrorist operations, target individuals, and even prevent attacks. tually culminated in the capture of Hambali.”15 Additionally, the U.S. Treasury Department reported that a financial intelligence collection program supplied a key piece of evidence confirming the identity of a major Iraqi terrorist facilitator and financier, leading to his designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).16 Finally and perhaps most importantly, four different terrorist attacks abroad have been disrupted, according to the FBI, based in part on its investigations of the financial activities of terrorist

Van Gogh murder in 2004, a plot to attack New York’s JFK airport in 2007, the Mumbai attacks in 2008, and the Jakarta hotel attacks in 2009. As of April 2010, over 1,550 TFTP reports have been shared with European Union member states.18 This shared information allows both the United States and the EU to direct local law enforcement toward specific threats. As Levey noted in April 2008, “In many circumstances we have found that our most effective tool is simply sharing information about illicit actors with other govern-

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ments and members of the international private sector.”19 In June 2006 the New York Times and other media exposed the existence of the TFTP.20 When SWIFT subsequently moved its U.S. facility to Europe, the United States and European Commission began negotiations to ensure data would continue to be available to TFTP. These talks were largely informed by two reports from French counterterrorism magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere, issued in late 2008 and early 2010, which found that TFTP was subject to significant and effective controls and safeguards, and generated significant value for counterterrorism investigations.21 After several fits and starts, an agreement was ultimately reached in July 2010 authorizing Treasury Department access to SWIFT’s data, with specific measures added to allay privacy concerns.

tion to handle financial intelligence issues. Even the Treasury Department, whose enforcement capabilities had been nearly eliminated with the 2003 reorganization that created the Department of Homeland Security, began to ramp up its efforts once again. In 2004, the Treasury Department created the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.22 These offices couple authorities at Treasury with intelligence community resources and expertise to identify, disrupt, and follow the flow of illicit funds supporting terrorism or other national security threats.23 In a sign of its demonstrated utility, the 9/11 Commission’s Public Discourse Project highlighted the government’s “significant strides in using terrorism finance as an intelligence tool.”24 The Treasury Department has had an enhanced role at the center of a major Structural Changes to Com- national security initiative that reflects bat Illicit Finance. Structural a broader shift in its post-9/11 mission. reforms following 9/11 have enabled In the past, the Treasury—like other intelligence organizations to focus their finance ministries around the world— attention on following the money. The was largely focused on economic and FBI established a special branch at its financial issues and often reluctant to headquarters, known as the Terror- get involved in matters of national secu-

Structural reforms following 9/11

have enabled intelligence organizations to focus their attention on following the money. ist Financing Operations Section, to focus exclusively on tracking financial intelligence and coordinating investigations at its fifty-six field offices. The Justice Department also established an office within its counterterrorism sec-

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rity. As a former Clinton State Department official noted, “Years ago, people at State would go to Treasury and say, ‘We’ve got a lot of financial muscle, we should use it to pursue political goals.’ But Treasury would always say it didn’t

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want to mess around with the international financial system.”25 This historic reticence has changed drastically in the last decade. For example, the Department of Treasury has been instrumental in building pressure on Iran outside of the UN. The Treasury has focused its strategy specifically on Iran’s illicit conduct—mainly its nuclear-related activity, support for terrorism, and deceptive financial practices—and the dangerous ramifications Iran could have on the integrity of the global financial system.

Interagency and International Efforts. While the creation of the

TFI represented an important step forward, combating the financing of transnational threats must be an integrated, interagency effort. The Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC), based in Baghdad, is a perfect example of one such interagency effort that works. Co-led by the Department of Defense and Treasury, ITFC was established in 2005 with the purpose of enhancing the collection, analysis, and dissemination of timely financial intelligence on the Iraqi insurgency. It has become a key component of interagency and Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) efforts to detect, identify, and disrupt financial networks supporting insurgent and terrorist elements operating in Iraq. The new Afghan Threat Finance Cell in Kabul, run by the Drug Enforcement Administration with the help of Defense and Treasury deputies, builds on the demonstrated success of the ITFC. Other countries’ finance ministries have also assumed greater national security responsibilities. The G7 and G20 finance ministers released an

action plan to combat the financing of terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11.26 In September 2006 the G7 finance ministers agreed to expand their focus to address money laundering in support of terrorist and WMD proliferation networks, and to concentrate on “those jurisdictions that have failed to recognize international standards”—a pointed reference to Iran’s support for terrorist organizations and efforts to attain nuclear weapons.27 The British government has also been a leader in this effort, unveiling a comprehensive strategy in 2007 to combat terrorist financing and money laundering, titled The Financial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism. The strategy provided the British finance ministry—Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT)— with additional tools to crack down effectively on terrorist financing in the United Kingdom. For example, the British established a “Terrorist Asset Freezing Unit” within HMT to work closely with British law enforcement and intelligence agencies. HMT was also, for the first time, allowed to use classified information to freeze assets in certain cases.28 International and interagency efforts have produced tangible results. In his April 2008 testimony, Levey noted that the government’s efforts to combat terror financing “are more integrated than ever before” and have made “significant progress mapping terrorist networks” to enable the government to disrupt or deter some sources of alQaeda finance. Proof positive, in a May 2007 interview al-Qaeda leader Mustafa Abu al-Yazid stated “there are hundreds wishing to carry out martyrdomseeking operations, but they can’t find

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the funds to equip themselves.”29 The CIA’s former Deputy Director John McLaughlin testified that the government’s success in this area was attributable to the “relentless grinding away at other essential components of the terrorist networks—the couriers, the facilitators, the fundraisers, the safehouse keepers, the technicians.”30

transnational threats arise, FININT will increasingly be called upon—Bletchley Park style—to connect the dots and prevent attacks. Making effective use of lead intelligence demands international cooperation. The recent renewal of the SWIFT agreement is an important step in maintaining one of the international community’s most effective financial intelligence tools. Meanwhile, it is Conclusion. The international com- imperative that we further strengthen munity has undoubtedly made great our commitment to strategies aimed headway combating the financing of at making it more difficult for illicit various security threats. The Unitactors to raise, launder, and access the ed States’ efforts to combat terrorist funds they need to carry out operations. financing have been particularly effective, earning an A- from the 9/11 Com- There is much that the United States mission’s Public Discourse Project in can do on its own, yet in the words 2005.31 Interagency efforts that threat- of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury en finance cells in Iraq and Afghanistan David Cohen, “When the community and improved intelligence gathering of nations works together, in a coormethods such as the TFTP are impor- dinated fashion, to combat terrorist financing, we all benefit.”32 The public tant factors in these successes. Traditional efforts to combat terror should take comfort in knowing that financing by “seizing and freezing” ter- both financial intelligence tactics—seizrorists’ assets are effective counterter- ing funds and following the money rorism tools. But as terrorist groups trail—are being pursued, even if only continue to evolve and as additional one makes the daily paper. NOTES

1 “Brown outlines terror crackdown,” BBC, 10 October 2006, Internet, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/uk_news/politics/6035861.stm (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 2 Benjamin Weiser, “Suspected Chief Plotter in Trade Center Blast Goes on Trial Today,” New York Times, August 4, 1997, http://www.nytimes. com/1997/08/04/nyregion/suspected-chief-plotterin-trade-center-blast-goes-on-trial-today.html (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 3 Remarks by Treasury Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing Patrick M. O’Brien, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 February 2008, Internet, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2724 (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 4 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act,” 15 Sep-

[ 4 1 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

tember 2005, http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ js2720.htm (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 5Ibid. 6 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Cuts Iran’s Bank Saderat Off From U.S. Financial System,” 8 September 2006, http://www.ustreas.gov/ press/releases/hp87.htm (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 7 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Prepared Remarks of Stuart Levey Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence On the Designation of Bank Sepah for Facilitating Iran’s Weapons Program,” 9 January 2007, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/ hp220.htm (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 8 Testimony of Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonpro-

Espionage Exposed liferation, and Trade, 17 April 2008, http://www. treas.gov/press/releases/hp933.htm (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 9 9/11 Commission, “Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Executive Summary,” http://govinfo.library. unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 10 Testimony of Stuart Levey, Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury, before the House Financial Services Committee on Oversight and Investigations, 11 July 2006, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/ hp05.htm (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 11 The Sinjar documents show that the AQI’s border emirate spent $727 on food during a two-month period, in addition to tracking a number of other different subcategories for expenditures, including salaries, weapons, document forgeries, and smuggling costs. 12 Brian Fishman, ed., “Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: Al-Qai’da’s Road in and Out of Iraq,” Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point: 2008, Internet, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/ harmony/pdf/Sinjar_2_Jul_23.pdf (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 13 “Militants in SE Asia Rely on Donations – Experts,” Reuters, 9 July 2008. 14 Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Bank Data is Sifted in by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror,” New York Times, 23 June 2006, Internet http://www. nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel. html?pagewanted=print (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 15 Elizabeth Kelleher, “U.S. Defends Use of Bank Messaging System to Track Terrorists,” The Washington File, Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, 23 June 2006, Internet, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/ June/20060623173804berehellek0.1277277.html (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 16 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Financial Supporter of Iraqi Insurgency,” 17 June 2005, Internet, http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/js2500.htm (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 17 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Testimony of John S. Pistole before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, “Identifying, Tracking and Dismantling the Financial Structure of Terrorist Organizations,” 25 September 2003, www. fbi.gov/congress/congress03/pistole092503.htm. 18 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Assistant Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen, Remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,” 7 April 2010, Internet, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07. php?CID=522 (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 19 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey Testimony Before the Senate Committee on

Finance,” 1 April 2008, http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/hp898.htm (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 20 The New York Times would later run an apology. See Byron Calame, “Can ‘Magazines’ of The Times Subsidize News Coverage, Banking Data: A Mea Culpa,” New York Times, 22 October 2006, http:// www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/opinion/22pubed. html?pagewanted=2&_r=2. For more on the protections built into the TFTP program, see States Department of the Treasury, “Statement of Undersecretary Stuart Levey on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program,” 23 June 2006, http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/js4334.htm. Also see Elizabeth Kelleher, “U.S. Defends Use of Bank Messaging System to Track Terrorists,” The Washington File, Bureau of International Information Programs, United States Department of State, 23 June 2006, Internet, http://www. america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/June/200606 23173804berehellek0.1277277.html (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 21 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Assistant Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen, Remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,” 7 April 2010, Internet, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07. php?CID=522 (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 22 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Bush Administration Announces Creation of New Office in Ramped Up Effort to Fight the Financial War on Terror,” press release, 8 March 2004, Internet, www. treas.gov/press/releases/js1219.htm (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 23 OFAC and FINCEN participate in the process of enforcing sanctions and tracking criminal organizations, but they continue to rely on the intelligence organizations within the U.S. government (such as the TFI) to provide the intelligence necessary to carry out their office missions.” 24 Thomas H. Kean et al., “Final Report of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations,” 9/11 Public Discourse Project, December 5, 2005, http://www.911pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf. 25 Bay Fang, “Treasury wields financial sanctions; US strategy straddles the line between diplomacy, military might,” Chicago Tribune, 23 April 2007. 26 Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Washington, D.C., 6 October 2001; Statement of G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 17 November 2001. 27 Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Singapore, 16 September 2006. 28 “Move to combat terror gang funding,” London Evening Standard, 28 February 2007; “The Financial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism,” February 2007. 29 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Finance,” 1 April 2008, http://www.treas.gov/ press/releases/hp898.htm.

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30 Testimony of John McLaughlin, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Changing Face of Terror – A Post 9/11 Assessment”, 6 June 2006, Internet, http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/ testimony/2006/McLaughlinTestimony060613.pdf (date accessed: 8 January 2011). 31 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey Testimony Before the Senate Committee

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on Finance,” 1 April 2008, Internet, http://www. treas.gov/press/releases/hp898.htm (date acce. 32 Remarks by Assistant Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7 April 2010, Internet, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ templateC07.php?CID=522. (date accessed: 8 January 2011).

FENECH, JONES JR., MURRAY, POLLARD

Espionage Exposed

The Challenge of Convenience

Understanding and Regulating Global Mobile Financial Services Marissa Fenech, Stuart Jones Jr., David Murray, and Neal A. Pollard In an increasingly globalized world, technology presents opportunities for growth and productivity and creates security risks that governments must manage. The rise of the nonbanking financial institution, or “non-bank,” enabled by the growth of mobile financial services, typifies this challenge for governments. Such entities can foster economic development, increase access to transnational financial systems, and lower transaction costs. In the process, they expand the availability of records, which facilitates tax enforcement and criminal investigations. However, these systems can provide transnational criminals and terrorist groups with a rapid and potentially anonymous way of moving money. The challenge for governments is to craft policy and regulations that keep apace with emerging banking and payment technologies. Governments need continued access to critical information—such as financial transfers to identify funding sources—in order to prevent, detect, and prosecute crime and terrorism. This data resides in international banking and payment technologies. Democratic governments must derive and use information from these technologies without undermining the privacy of legitimate consumers or jeopardizing the economic viability and social progress

Marissa Fenech is a manager at PRTM Management Consultants in the Global Public Sector group. Stuart Jones Jr. is the U.S. Treasury Attaché to the Gulf Cooperative Council countries. David Murray is the U.S. Treasury Attaché to Pakistan Neal A. Pollard is a senior officer at the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the U.S. Department of Treasure or the U.S. government.

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enabled by the emerging technology. In striking this balance, governments must clearly identify the activities they seek to prevent or prosecute, and then design policies and regulations that are technology-neutral and equally applicable when a bank or “non-bank” provides the financial service (i.e., policies and regulations are effective when the device consumers use to access the service is a card, a phone, a password or even, perhaps, a fingerprint). Such technology-neutral policies and regulations will assure that concerns over security, economic viability, and civil liberties align with government goals without depending on or falling behind

including terrorism and organized crime. Indeed, the technological engine of growth benefits legitimate and illicit activity alike.1 Meanwhile, a growing multiplicity of databases that can aggregate data and identify patterns about individuals and entities can either result in better marketplace efficiency or enable invasions of privacy. These characteristics of globalization are present in the emergence of global payment services: credit and debit card networks, and phone-based payment services, or mobile financial services (MFS). Global payment services have many benefits. Electronic payments lower

Indeed, the technological engine of

growth benefits legitimate and illicit activity alike. specific or emerging technologies. The United States should take the lead on energizing an international public debate on the implications of emerging technologies on privacy.

Globalization’s Dark Side.

Modern globalization—the increasing low-cost transnational movement of information, people, and goods— helps to create and empower a variety of multinational enterprises, including states, corporations, and non-governmental organizations. Globalization reduces political, economic, and technological hindrances to commerce, communication, and movement. This in turn lowers transaction costs for virtually every transnational enterprise,

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transaction costs and put more money into the financial system without increasing the money supply, and bring more participants into increasingly efficient networks. Eventually, providers seek to penetrate the “unbanked” consumer markets (those without accounts at banks or financial institutions) by marrying financial services with devices carried by virtually all economic classes, thus making payment and exchange tools as ubiquitous and cheap to use as cash. Other benefits to global payment services are not related to economic efficiency. Unlike cash, electronic payments generate an extensive paper trail useful for tax authorities, intelligence agencies, and criminal investigators seeking to stem organized crime, money laundering,

FENECH, JONES JR., MURRAY, POLLARD

tax dodging, and terrorist financing. Ensuring the utility of this paper trail for such purposes is where governments must balance tradeoffs among several policy objectives. Governments use regulation to assure the reliability and availability of financial records, and regulation is where the tradeoffs begin.

Regulatory Tradeoffs. U.S.

policy seeks to maximize the benefits of global mobile financial services while assuring that appropriate safeguards are in place to mitigate criminal exploitation and raise the costs for exploiting the global financial system. The message to criminals and terrorists is that if they abuse the financial system, law enforcement agents will use traceability to identify and dismantle their organizations. Ideally, a regulatory regime will underscore government efforts to prevent or prosecute criminal exploitation of financial systems, without undermining the system’s economic viability or unreasonably violating the privacy of the system’s user. At the heart of the U.S. regulatory effort is the “risk-based approach,” which requires financial institutions to focus efforts on suspicious or criminal activity while allowing lower dollar-value activity to proceed with little scrutiny. Recent U.S. government proposals for financial regulation also seek to provide tools to law enforcement. In September 2010, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a Treasury Department bureau, proposed a new regulation requiring financial institutions to report crossborder electronic transmittals of funds (CBETF).2 This effort builds on the long-standing requirement that

Espionage Exposed

financial institutions report suspicious activity and cash transactions over ten thousand dollars. The CBETF proposal would establish a database of transaction activity that could be mined for illicit transactions. When used in tandem with other investigative techniques and source information, this database could provide investigators with critical clues to terrorists’ and criminals’ movements within international finance’s ordinary “sea of noise.”3 FinCEN could quickly identify attempts to circumvent financial institutions’ suspicious activity detection systems if criminals structure or spread their activity across several financial institutions. The cross-border reporting requirement exempts two common types of transactions: credit or debit card activity and ATM withdrawals. The consumer payment networks’ increasing global footprint makes the foreign bank nearly as convenient as the bank down the street; it is easy, cheap, and instantaneous for customers to access money in foreign accounts.4 These networks potentially connect the corner market with financial institutions in far-flung places, some of which have inadequate safeguards in place to assure the reliability and availability of financial records. “Nonbanks” are playing greater roles in consumer payment networks, with some attaining the functional equivalent of bank accounts. Yet governments concentrate their oversight resources on the banking system. This makes sense from the standpoint of prudential regulation in terms of what governments can reasonably achieve given limited resources and competing priorities. Risks are diverging,

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however, and government policies have not kept pace with this change.

percent of the population has a mobile phone; in the self-declared republic of Somaliland, telecom providers Future Challenges of Global that offer MFS are “thriving.”7 Consumer Payment Systems. So far, mobile payment systems are Consumer payment systems make the mostly local and carry strict limitations financial system available in more on international financial activity. places and reduce reliance on cash But the day will come when it makes and negotiable instruments. The economic sense to connect these local general concept behind global MFS systems to global payment networks. The is technology-neutral—the customer question remains whether governments needs a payment system on a mobile are prepared to create a dynamic and device which links to the merchant’s scalable regulatory framework to meet the point of sale terminal to pay for rapid expansion of electronic payments goods or services. Thus, customers commensurate with the increased can conduct transactions, including number of “non-banks” worldwide. repayment of loans or remittances to Asking whether countries such as the family members domestically or abroad, United States or the United Kingdom wherever they have a network signal; are ready to connect their electronic retail shops are needed to deposit payment systems to systems in war-torn and dispense cash.5 Mobile payments countries like Afghanistan or Somalia are building on widespread mobile paints the question in stark relief. phone access to deliver additional, previously unavailable banking Policy Imperatives and and financial services to unbanked Challenges. Government policies populations around the world. designed to confront transnational The emergence of the mobile threats must pursue strategic objectives phone as a means of paying for goods that deter or detect criminals using and financial services is proliferating the global financial system, while worldwide in countries like Kenya, maintaining other important policy South Africa, Philippines, Indonesia, objectives such as privacy, economic India, and Afghanistan, which efficiency, and the viability of the system traditionally do not have brick-and- itself. The growth of mobile financial mortar banks in rural areas. In some services creates significant policy areas, this technology removes cash challenges for governments around the from battlefields and keeps wages world. While there is certainly an upside in the hands of civilian and security to large-scale introductions of MFS forces, thus reducing opportunities products, entities such as banks, law for corruption and graft.6 Indeed, the enforcement agencies, and regulatory migration to mobile financial services authorities must adapt to the sheer is increasingly driven by its physical and volume of projected increases in industry electronic security in areas of the world transactions over the next ten years. where banks are inaccessible for many Targeting finances is a central element citizens. Even in war-torn Somalia, 18 of countering transnational crime and

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FENECH, JONES JR., MURRAY, POLLARD

terrorist organizations. The value of transfers varies greatly from the billions laundered by transnational criminal cartels to small sums used by terrorist cells. Nevertheless, these sources and infrastructure are critical to terrorists’ ability to arrange and pay for the logistics of operations, and must be targeted. There are two models for MFS growth, particularly in unbanked, highly populated areas of Africa and Asia. The first is the “bank-based model,” where the customer’s account is tied to a supervised financial institution in the country of origin. The second is the “non-bank model.” In this model, the customer’s account does not connect to a supervised

Espionage Exposed

due diligence, developing red flag indicators, and submitting suspicious transaction reports. Regulators have taken different approaches to address the challenges related to MFS. Some countries, such as India and Pakistan, have made clear that only “bank-based models” are acceptable. This potentially denies a more efficient payment mechanism that can still be subject to oversight. In Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, the “nonbank model” is favored, with oversight from the country’s supreme regulatory body. In the United States, FinCEN has proposed rules for “non-banks” that offer account-based services, a class of businesses it refers to as “providers of

The message to criminals and terror-

ists is that if they abuse the financial system, law enforcement agents will use traceability to identify and dismantle their organizations. financial institution but is processed, monitored, and managed by a retail agent of a larger telecommunication parent company, or a credit card company paired with telecom. These models differ little in functionality, but each requires a different regulatory framework. In the “bank-based model” MFS services fall under a regulatory umbrella; it is simply another financial service that gets wrapped into the bank’s anti-money laundering program. In the case of a “non-bank model,” the telecommunication company itself functions much like a financial institution, processing customer accounts, performing

prepaid access.” The proposal subjects “non-banks” to requirements similar to those that apply to deposit accounts, including customer identification and verification, record keeping, transaction monitoring, and suspicious transaction reporting. While implementation may provide difficulty in the short-term, this is likely the correct approach. This model has also been supported internationally. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the premier international standard-setting body for regulating anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes. FATF Recommendation 23 states that businesses providing money or value

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transfer services should be subject to monitoring systems that comply with national requirements to combat money laundering and terrorism financing.8 Special Recommendation VI amplifies Recommendation 23, in that providers of financial services should be licensed or registered and “subject to all the FATF Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions.”9 Congress mandated that FinCEN issue regulations addressing both new and emerging payment methods and technologies. This embodies the wisest regulatory approach of avoiding a single-minded focus on the service

proposed regulations represent one such set step. Challenges will persist, however, if governments choose to organize their regulatory structures around technologies rather than service providers. Banking regulations will become more complex and unwieldy when “non-banks” start to play a role in activity that resembles deposit taking. To overcome this challenge, regulators need to play to their organizational strengths. They must work effectively with law enforcement and private sector stakeholders to assess risks and design regulations that appropriately counteract risks. The

The growth of mobile financial services creates serious policy challenges for governments around the world. delivery channel itself (e.g. mobile phone, landline telecom, Internet, magnetic stripe card). Regulators must understand that to maximize potential revenue in all payment systems, entrepreneurs will seek to make their services as widely available as possible by interfacing with other services and allowing multiple access devices. This approach in policy and regulation offers a balance in assuring growth, efficiency, and transparency of services, while making the payment systems less attractive to criminals and terrorists.

industry a service provider self-selects (e.g., telecom versus banking) is not as significant as what the service provider does (e.g., providers of financial services are labeled as financial institutions). By way of comparison, at the central banks in both Afghanistan and the United Arab Emirates—where mobile service providers offer MFS— regulations are emerging organically. The central banks work with private sector services and technology providers to understand the product as it evolves from technical and service-oriented perspectives, and to regulate the Recommendations. Governments services in ways that makes sense from should develop policies and regulations economic and security perspectives. that assure some level of access by Joint working groups will also play security agencies to international an important role in maintaining financial transaction data. FinCEN’s and routinizing this public-private

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FENECH, JONES JR., MURRAY, POLLARD

Espionage Exposed

communication. As services grow and technology inevitably changes, governments will benefit from understanding both the impact of working groups and the implications of new technology on changing financial services, especially in regard to modifying regulation. Governments must also make public policy choices about what is allowed to be a financial institution, what is required of financial institutions (i.e. capital requirements), and whether to support or impose the bank- or “non-bank” model. There are merits to each approach. By requiring banking licenses, regulators following the bank-based model ensure that prudential, consumer, and anti-money laundering protections apply to similar services. This approach also wraps the services into their supervision regime for banks, which is usually the best supervision regime in the country. Non-banks have less experience in financial services than banks. However, for some countries banking regulations may be too stringent for institutions that do not lend and the combination of entrepreneurial nonbank financial services and cheap entry-level technologies means that economic progress is more likely to flow from the non-bank approach. Again, continuous public-private communication is key and regulation must be responsive to the function of delivering financial services, not vice versa. Both should be responsive to technology as an enabler, not a driver.

consensus on the privacy protections that states should afford their citizens as well as how they extend to trading information with other governments. This lack of international consensus is exacerbated by a lack of domestic consensus regarding the effects of governmental data aggregation and use of data mining technologies on privacy. Indeed, critics have called FinCEN’s proposed regulations the latest effort in a trend of government attempts to pursue personal data without adequately demonstrating its utility to national security. Some financial institutions have further complained about over-burdensome anti-terrorism rules requiring them to provide data.10 These criticisms illustrate persistent problems in reconfiguring old policies and regulations. To address these criticisms, governments should take additional steps to balance the transparency of global consumer payment systems with transparency of government efforts to monitor such systems. As a general principle, reporting mechanisms and requirements should focus on function rather than technology. That is, governments should clearly identify the activity they are seeking to proscribe and the need for the data they seek. This begins with governments leading a discussion on the extent to which criminals and terrorists abuse global consumer payment systems, and the damage this abuse has on national interests. Governments should articulate how reporting or monitoring policies and regulations will mitigate Privacy. Privacy is the remaining the deleterious effects of abuse, and consideration that must be taken into how the gains outweigh the risks to other account. There is a lack of international public policy objectives, such as privacy.

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 50 ]

THE CHALLENGE OF CONVENIENCE

Privacy issues pose a significant hurdle to international support for cooperative enforcement. Demonstrating that security interests outweigh privacy interests requires a more modern understanding of privacy in the age of globalization. Laws and policies on privacy in the United States date largely from the mid-1970s, a time when technology and threats from both terrorist attacks and government abuse were different. Today, the risk of abuse comes less from illegal government access to information than from uncertainty as to what the government should do with information to which it has legal access.

must develop tools, many rooted in regulation, that raise the costs of these services to criminals. This must be done without imposing unreasonable costs on legitimate users and the economic, technological, and social benefits they enjoy. This requires regulators to strike a balance between their approaches and security, economic viability, and social and civil liberties. Regulations that focus on services instead of technologies and delineate their proscribed activities with transparency will afford governments flexibility to strike these balances as they consider different models to Conclusion. New technologies will understand financial service providers enable the development of new services and regulate them against abuse. That such as MFS. Such services are yet another example of the emerging fruits said, there are several areas where of globalization. However, these services governments must lead an international can be exploited equally by legitimate public debate as a means of gaining and illegitimate actors. As terrorists consensus. These areas include the and criminals exploit mobile financial services to increase their productivity consideration of non-bank providers and stay below the radar of government as financial services as well as the effects security services, governments of privacy on regulating these services.

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FENECH, JONES JR., MURRAY, POLLARD

Espionage Exposed

NOTES

1 Jeffrey Carmichael and Michael Pomerleano, “Development and Regulation of Non-Bank Financial Institutions,” World Bank Publications (2002): 12. 2 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Tapping the Unbanked Market Symposium,” National Press Club Washington D.C., 5 November 2003, Internet, http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/ community/unbanked/index.html (date accessed: 15 November 2010). 3 “Cross-border reporting of electronic funds transmittals,” Code of Federal Regulations Title 75, Pt.60377, 30 September 2010. 4 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “FinCent Proposes Regulatory Requirement for Financial Institutions to Report Cross-Border Electronic Transmittals of Funds,” 27 September 2010, Internet, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ nr/html/20100927.html (date accessed: 15 November 2010). 5 The U.S. government has asked a federal court in Florida to demand that the Union Bank of Switzerland identify the holders of fifty-two

thousand accounts that Americans are suspected of having used to dodge taxes. See David S. Hilzenrath, “U.S. Man Pleads Guilty to Tax Evasion,” Internet, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2009/07/30/AR2009073003947. html (date accessed: 15 November 2010). 6 Ibid. Chris Bold, “In Afghanistan, Going Where No Bank Has Gone Before,” Poor, Internet, http://technology.cgap.org/2010/01/19/in-afghanistan-going where-no-bank-has-gone-before/#more-1879. (date accessed: 15 November 2010) 7 Financial Action Task Force, “Report on New Payment Methods,” Internet, http:// www.fatf-gafi.org/document/31/0,3343, en_32250379_32236920_43726495_1_1_1_1,00. html: 19. (date accessed: 15 November 2010) 8 Ibid. 9 “Money Transfers Face New Scrutiny,” Internet, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/26/AR2010092603668.html (date accessed: 15 November 2010).

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 52]

JAVERS

Espionage Exposed

Secrets and Lies

The Rise of Corporate Espionage in a Global Economy Eamon Javers In 2008, thousands of employees at American defense and technology companies received emails from an executive-recruiting firm based in Tokyo called Fox Adams. The correspondence hinted at lucrative job opportunities and urged the employees to reply with contact information. However, there was something wrong with the email: Fox Adams did not exist. Security experts and veteran U.S. intelligence agents examined the issue and concluded that Fox Adams was simply a front for Chinese intelligence.1 According to these authorities, the spam emails were part of a very wide net cast by the Chinese to help identify American executives with access to sensitive technologies. Under the guise of a job interview, anyone who replied to the email would likely be quizzed for details about his or her work, access to technology, and experience. Several veteran U.S. intelligence officers described the Fox Adams ploy as a routine Chinese intelligence probe of U.S. corporate infrastructure, something they say has been on the rise in recent years as the Beijing government attempts to steal technology and infor-

Eamon Javers is a Washington correspondent for CNBC and author of the book Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: The Secret World of Corporate Espionage.

Winterr/Spring 2011 [ 53]

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mation that can help keep the country’s astonishing economic growth on pace with aggressive government goals. All of this means that American corporate executives must be increasingly guarded against spying by current employees, former employees, computer hackers, and the full gamut of Cold War-style intelligence techniques.

credentials, the Mattel market intelligence employees allegedly used spy cameras to film secret demonstration models of toys that rival companies planned to launch. Mattel said there was no merit to the charges, which came in the course of a long-running litigation battle over which company should hold the rights to the Bratz dolls. In the second category—financial

It was this wave of Chinese hacking

attacks that finally drove Google into the arms of the U.S. National Security Agency. Forms of Corporate Espionage. firms gathering information to use in China is not the only perpetrator. Corporate espionage can be separated into three broad categories: spying practiced by companies, by financial firms, and by nations. An example of the first category of corporate espionage—companies spying against other companies in order to harm competitors—came to light late this summer. MGA Entertainment Inc., the maker of the wildly popular Bratz line of toy dolls, filed documents in federal court alleging that rival Mattel Inc. maintained an internal “market intelligence” unit whose members traveled the country under fake identities, gaining entrance to confidential product briefings by posing as potential customers of rival toy makers.2 There, with their cover stories backstopped by fake business cards and [ 5 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

market trading—corporate spy organizations operate around the globe, working for Wall Street, hedge funds, and wealthy individuals. In one case, a private spy firm even flew aerial surveillance missions for the notorious energy-trading firm Enron. This private spy firm was Diligence, a company founded by two former intelligence officers (one previously worked for the CIA, the other for British MI5). In the early 2000s, Diligence was hired by Enron to develop information about the European power industry that might prove advantageous in Enron’s daily buying and selling of energy contracts. However, Diligence operatives didn’t scour trade publications and interview experts, as a typical consulting firm might have; instead, the spies-for-hire set up thermal imaging equipment in fields around some

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of Europe’s biggest power plants.3 They used the data to develop a comprehensive, real-time look at the production of energy being sold into the market. The more energy being moved into the market, the lower prices would be. The less energy, the higher prices would be. That is invaluable information for an energy trader like Enron. Diligence did not stop with thermal imaging. Veteran CIA officer and cofounder Mike Baker chartered private airplanes and flew surveillance missions over the power plants, looking for signs of when the plants might be taken off line for maintenance.4 A power plant shutting down has a dramatic effect on supply and demand in the market, and pinpointing the dates of such a shutdown in advance could yield arbitrage opportunities for Enron. Baker relentlessly circled the plants, looking for declining coal stacks—because the power companies would not order more coal in advance of a shut down. The planes even searched for port-opotties being set up on the property since annual maintenance can involve a large number of workers.5 By watching for such mundane details, Diligence was able to spot trading opportunities in the market. The last category of corporate espionage—nations spying on companies— can be difficult to prove. Government intelligence agencies operate behind layers of plausible deniability. The bogus Fox Adams emails were hamfisted in comparison to a slew of recent cases in which Chinese-connected

Espionage Exposed

agents have tried to steal American hybrid car technology, insecticide manufacturing techniques, and—in the most high profile case to date—the cyber secrets of the search-engine giant Google. In order to keep their economic growth miracle going, the Chinese are trying to move up the manufacturing food chain, evolving from low-cost providers of unskilled labor to producers of more technically complicated goods at higher price points.6 Since the United States is far ahead in a wide array of industries, one way to catch up is to steal the plans, formulas, and algorithms that allow American companies to dominate world markets. If the Chinese can steal such secrets faster than Americans can develop new ones, they will close the gap between the two economies. Andrew Arena, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI office in Detroit that conducted one investigation into Chinese corporate espionage, noted that “theft of trade secrets is a threat to national security,” demonstrating the U.S. government’s concern with these intrusions.7 In secret diplomatic cables revealed by the website Wikileaks in late 2010, American diplomats in Beijing concluded that the electronic attacks on Google’s home servers to obtain the identities of Chinese dissidents and Google’s proprietary source code had been ordered at the highest level of the Chinese government. In one cable, the diplomats said they had a well-placed source who said that Li Changchun, a

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member of China’s Politburo Standing Committee, had been shocked to find negative information about himself when he Googled his own name on the Chinese language version of the search engine’s website. Another cable revealed that Mr. Li was a key leader in China’s anti-Google efforts, and that his self-Googling likely led to his interest in the company.8 The effort was part of a wider campaign of corporate espionage against American companies and government agencies that began as early as 2002, the American cable-writers concluded. Particularly vulnerable were Chinese subsidiaries of non-Chinese companies, whose local executives were often afraid to inform their Western bosses about the extent of Chinese government meddling. “Contacts in the technology industry tell us that Chinese interference in the operations of foreign businesses is widespread and often underreported to U.S. parent companies,” reported one U.S. diplomat.9 It was this wave of Chinese hacking attacks that finally drove Google into the arms of the U.S. National Security Agency, announcing a partnership with the American technological spy agency to help Google fend off intrusion attempts.10 For Google, as for many companies, one option when faced with government-funded spying is to team up with another government. Even in a global economy, it seems, companies sometimes have to choose sides. Although it appears that the Google incident was partially

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motivated by politics, it highlights the willingness of foreign countries—and China in particular—to resort to illegal activities in order to collect the secrets of private companies. If it is any consolation to Western intelligence, Chinese economic espionage is not always flawless. Fox Adams, the bogus executive recruiting firm experts suspected of being a front for Chinese intelligence, made some noticeable mistakes. Emails coming from purported “Fox Adams” recruiters used names that looked like they had been randomly mixed and matched from American phone books—and by someone with little feel for American culture. One email was signed by a recruiter supposedly named “Jesus Black.” The Internet domain registration for the website www.foxadams. com was listed to a New Jersey address that does not seem to exist. The phone number listed was “1-234-5678.”11

The Rise of Private Intelligence Firms. Corporate intelligence gathering has created a new market for a rising class of private espionage firms— companies set up by veterans of the world’s intelligence agencies that sell their services on a contract basis to companies and financial firms. In the 21st Century, companies and financial firms have a greater need for information than ever and—particularly in emerging markets—the best providers of that information are former intelligence officers who are deeply steeped

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in the leadership and politics of a given country and intimately familiar with its local powerbrokers. There is nothing wrong with companies turning to such intelligence advisors for information on potential new business partners and advice on the political landscape in unfamiliar countries, but there is enormous potential for abuse by corporate intelligence firms. The ways in which they gather information can wander into a legal gray area, and their offensive operations—efforts to damage competitors through underhanded tactics includ-

Espionage Exposed

freelancers, each layer papered with strict non-disclosure agreements. In public, they describe their services as “strategic advisory consulting,” “risk mitigation analysis,” or “litigation support.” With names like “Diligence,” “Control Risks Group,” and “Hakluyt,” these private intelligence firms hide in plain sight, offering extremely lucrative post-government career options for veterans of the CIA, the British MI5, and the former Soviet intelligence agency, the KGB. The industry’s growth is driven by several trends. The increased globaliza-

The corporate espionage industry is deliberately hidden in a thicket of complex relationships. ing surveillance, placing of operatives inside competitors’ firms, and other techniques the companies would be embarrassed to admit in public—can deprive legitimate businesses of opportunities to succeed. Indeed, the corporate espionage industry is deliberately hidden in a thicket of complex relationships designed to obscure just who is working for whom. Often, these firms are hired as subcontractors for corporate law firms and they argue that everything they do is covered by attorney-client privilege.12 Thus, their operations do not surface to the public. In other cases, these private spy firms protect the secrecy of their operations around the world by using a series of cutouts and

tion of commerce has created a demand for companies to understand the relationships between business and political elites in countries they often know little about. Who better to help piece together the puzzle than the men and women who spent their careers gathering the same information for their governments? And, of course, there is the romance of it all. Globe-hopping corporate executives sometimes cannot resist the glamour of the spy business. The romance factor is often implicit in the spies’ sales pitches to prospective clients. In 2001, for example, former British secret intelligence service officer Christopher James wrote to Enron executive Jeff Skilling, hop-

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ing to land Skilling as a new client of his London-based private intelligence firm, Hakluyt. “Dear Mr. Skilling,” he wrote, “Your office has asked me to outline Hakluyt’s services. … I would simply say this: Hakluyt is what you make of it—it places an unparalleled private intelligence network at the personal disposal of senior commercial figures.” 13

cies have a vested interest in knowing where such people are employed and they should therefore track that information. Retired spies working in corporate espionage are not motivated by love of country any longer; they are motivated by love of money. When the spies have taken their skills and gone to work for paying clients, the governments that trained them with taxpayer money should monitor their activities Responding to Corporate to make sure that they are not deployEspionage. What is astonishing about ing those skills in ways that undermine this private spy industry is how little the the very governments that provided them.

What is astonishing about this private spy industry is how little the U.S. government seems to know about it. U.S. government seems to know about it. The CIA says it does not know where its former agents are working today and argues that tracking where they are employed would violate the civil rights of those agents; it surely behooves the U.S. intelligence community to have some sense of where its alumni are plying their trade, however, and whose payrolls they join when they enter the private sector.14 The CIA and similar organizations should know where their alumni work, particularly when they are being hired by foreign governments, oligarchs, and political parties. Some of the information is not difficult to come by; the websites of some of the private intelligence firms are a handy place to start. Western intelligence agen-

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What is more, Western governments should be working harder to learn just how intertwined their intelligence services are with companies in the global economy. American intelligence agencies, for example, have long had a policy stating that their operatives are allowed to “moonlight” in their off hours and work for private sector firms.15 That is, active duty intelligence officers, including those of the CIA, are allowed to work for private companies in order to make extra money. This creates a conflict of interest; agents who have access to classified materials of national security are also working with private firms that sometimes engage in questionable practices and undermine or violate domestic and international

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laws. But even intelligence community leaders profess ignorance of the entire moonlighting system. In public testimony, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair said he had been surprised when the moonlighting was first revealed in the media. “Sometimes I too am surprised about what I read in the press about my own organization,” Blair told Congress in February.16 As of fall 2010, the Director of National Intelligence has promised that a full review of such moonlighting will be completed and turned over to Congress.17 That is a promising first step, but the American taxpayers need to know much more about the moonlighting habits of their intelligence officers. How often, for example, are active duty officers going to work for intelligence contractors—effectively forcing the taxpayer to pay twice for the same work? American executives, too, need to educate themselves on the range of corporate espionage tactics arrayed against them. Unfortunately, the best way for them to do that right now is to reach out to some of the very private spy firms that are already in the corporate espionage business. Companies would be well advised to create internal monitoring units so that they can increase their ability to recognize and respond to corporate espionage. Some firms have already implemented these practices, but these are few and far between. At its worst, corporate espionage

Espionage Exposed

between Western companies can include unethical and even illegal tactics, resulting in economic victories for the most underhanded firms, not necessarily for the most innovative. That is bad for capitalism. Corporate espionage by financial firms results in a transfer of information—and huge financial rewards—into the hands of the most powerful and wealthy, robbing average investors of a chance to participate in the benefits of the financial markets. That too, is damaging to the market economy, causing market participants to conclude that the system is stacked against them. Markets only work best when all players—large and small—have confidence that the rules are fair. Finally, Western intelligence agencies must ratchet up their counterintelligence capabilities in the economic space. The intelligence community needs to focus on the threat to American global economic dominance that comes from Chinese economic espionage. One of the United States’ greatest advantages in its competition with China is its corporate ingenuity, inventiveness, and sophistication. If Chinese intelligence is able to chip away at that advantage though corporate espionage techniques, it will do as much or more for China’s position in the world than traditional spying on America’s military capabilities or political leadership. Corporate espionage against the United States is one of many tools that China uses in its effort to Winter/Spring 2011 [ 59]

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undermine America’s position as the number-one economy on the planet, and to take for itself the geopolitical power and influence that comes with

the position. This is a far deeper threat to free-market capitalism and is why America’s counter-intelligence effort had better be up to the challenge.

NOTES

1 Eamon Javers. Anonymous interview, July 2009. 2 Jonathan Stempel and Dan Levine, “Mattel accused in Bratz battle of spying on rivals,” Internet, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67G4FZ20100817 (date accessed: 17 August 2010). 3 Eamon Javers, Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: The Secret World of Corporate Espionage (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010) 18. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Li Cui and Murtaza Syed, “IMF Working Paper: The Shifting Structure of China’s Trade and Production,” Internet, http://books.google. com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=dADHBsFWJLQC&oi= fnd&pg=PA3&dq=Chinese+economy+more+sophis ticated+manufacturing&ots=FBaAzl5ZPY&sig=7uC -JIlzZD5igh1Bm1xtcBjQB34#v=onepage&q&f=false (date accessed: September 2007). 7 The Associated Press, “Ex-General Motors worker, husband accused of stealing hybrid vehicle secrets,” Internet, http://www.mlive.com/auto/ index.ssf/2010/07/ex-general_motors_worker_ husba.html (date accessed: 23 July 2010). 8 James Glanz and John Markoff, “Vast Hack-

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ing by a China Fearful of the Web,” The New York Times, 4 December 2010. 9 “A Selection from the Cache of Diplomatic Dispatches,” Internet, http://www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cablesviewer.html#report/china-99BEIJING999 (date accessed 5 December 2010). 10 Ellen Nakashima, “Google to Enlist NSA to help it Ward off Cyber Attacks,” The Washington Post, 4 February 2010. 11 See supra note 1 12 Eamon Javers, Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: The Secret World of Corporate Espionage (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010), 265. 13 Archived Enron emails available at the website of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/ wec/enron/info-release.asp. 14 Interview by the author with CIA public affairs office, 2009. 15 Eamon Javers, “CIA moonlights in corporate world,” Politico, 1 February 2010. 16 Kasie Hunt, “CIA Moonlighting to be Investigated,” Politico, 3 February 2010. 17 Ibid.

Politics & Diplomacy Continuity and Change Israel’s relationship with the United States and the World Interview with Michael Oren GJIA: How has the relationship between the United States and Israel evolved since President Obama took office and what have been your greatest challenges in working with the current administration? Oren: The relationship is characterized by continuity and change. The continuity stems from the U.S.’s historic commitment to Israel’s security, Israel’s identity as the nation state of the Jewish people, and Israel’s search for peace with its neighbors. The relationship has been maintained and enforced. The change relates to far-reaching, profound changes in America’s relationship with the world and its relationship with itself. Part of our job here at the embassy is to understand the nature of that change and where we fit in it. And the Obama administration in particular has adopted a foreign policy which is more consensual than that of the previous administration, less unilateral, and much more committed to engagement. All of those changes impact us. GJIA: The recent mid-term elections brought a republican majority to Congress. A number of newly elected congressmen have voiced staunch support for Israel, and some

Michael Oren currently serves as Ambassador of Israel to the United States. He has written for The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and The New Republic, and has authored several books as well. Himself a graduate of Princeton and Columbia, Dr. Oren has taught as a visiting professor at Harvard, Yale, and Georgetown.

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have expressed intention to cut foreign aid, regardless of its destination. How do you think this new dynamic in Congress will affect relations between the U.S. and Israel? Has there been any reaction from the Israeli government or the population as a whole? Oren: There has been no reaction from the Israeli government or from the population, certainly because we believe this is an internal, domestic political issue in the United States and we are thoroughly, unreservedly, and

young Jewish Americans are identifying with Israel less strongly than in the past and are more apt to question, criticize, and oppose Israeli government policies. Do you feel that there is any truth to this claim, and if so, how might this trend affect the unique cultural and political ties between our countries? Oren: The American Jewish community is moving in two directions at the same time. I often say that the Jewish community is like the universe – expanding and contracting at the same

Though it’s true that Congress is over-

whelmingly what we would call pro-Israel, the mood in Congress now is to be very conservative on issues of foreign aid. unequivocally non-partisan. Conversely, we view bipartisan support for Israel as a paramount strategic asset for Israel. Though the conduct of foreign policy is the responsibility of the president, Congress does play a role in expressing its support, and it particularly plays a role in the question of foreign aid. Though it’s true that Congress is overwhelmingly what we would call proIsrael, the mood in Congress now is to be very conservative on issues of foreign aid. As a recipient of foreign aid for defense purposes, Israel monitors this situation very carefully and makes its interests and concerns known to members of Congress. GJIA: Peter Beinart wrote a piece for the New York Review of Books entitled “The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment,” in which he asserts that

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time. Around this wide periphery of the American Jewish community, as Peter said in his article – though I think that his conclusions are wrong – there is a drifting away from Israel. But the drifting away from Israel is not just because of Israeli policies, but because there is a drifting away from Judaism and Jewish identity generally through assimilation. Among the core of the American Jewish community – and this is an expanding core – people are very much attached to their Jewish identity, and that is the part of the Jewish community that is growing the fastest. People are deeply engaged in Israel. GJIA: How would you assess the Israeli government’s response to the wildfires raging in the country’s north, which have been the worst in Israel’s history? As the country has had great difficulty

OREN

dealing with these fires, how would you respond to concerns that it would not be able to deal effectively with other civilian crises, such as conflicts with neighboring countries? Oren: Though there were shortages revealed, in the fire retardants we had stored, not having the requisite numbers of fire engines or firefighters, I think generally the government responded very swiftly and very decisively to combat the fire. It’s not easy for us. We’re used to being first responders as a nation. We responded first to Haiti, we responded first recently to an African village in the Congo that had been decimated by an oil fire. We’re used to doing that. We have never asked the international community for help – it sort of goes against the Israeli grain. But Prime Minister Netanyahu did not stand on pride, and immediately asked the international community for assistance, particularly with airplanes. And we got it; we got it very, very quickly. I believe nineteen out of the thirty aircrafts we had fighting the fire came from other countries. And from a long list of countries – that’s including the United States, but what was interesting was that some of the countries with which we do not always have a friendly relationship also responded, like Turkey and several Arab states, which was interesting. Generally we managed to get this fire under control within three and a half days. It was a fire very similar to the fires that have devastated very large sections of the western United States – there was drought and we have our version of the Santa Ana winds. Even states like California that have all of the requisite equipment still have a

Politics&Diplomacy

hard time with fires, some of which can rage on for weeks. So we were fortunate in being able to get it under control within a couple of days. It could have been much worse – as it was, it was very bad. It was the largest natural disaster that Israel has seen – 10,000 acres destroyed, 17,000 people displaced, four million trees destroyed, and 42 people died. GJIA: According to a December 3, 2010 report from Reuters, Israel’s appeal for international help in dealing with the wildfires elicited responses from a wide range of countries, including Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. What does this say about Israel’s relationship with the international community and how might it affect relations going forward? Oren: As I’ve said in an article I’ve written for the LA Times, Israelis often feel alone, we can feel misunderstood by much of the international community, but this made us feel much more a part of the caring in the international community. When it comes to human suffering and decency, countries are able to put a lot of their differences aside and intervene effectively. GJIA: There has been a significant influx of African immigrants – namely from Eritrea and Sudan – to Israel in recent years; some have come as refugees, others as foreign workers, and many live in extremely poor conditions. Can you explain why there has been such an increase in the African immigrant population and what the government’s policy is toward them? Would an open, receptive policy set Israel up Winter/Spring 2011 [ 63]

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for greater flows of refugees, and does Israel feel any obligation or responsibility to accept them? Oren: Israel is the only Middle Eastern country that has an open border with Africa. Over the past few years we’ve had a major influx of refugees from Africa. This has created a mounting social and economic challenge for Israel. We’re a very small country with a limited ability to absorb refugees and we have absorbed many hundreds of thousands of refugees – not just Jewish refugees – but refugees from around the world, from Bosnia, Vietnam, and Darfur, but now we’re facing a challenge of mounting proportions. I’ve engaged in discussions with the administration about ways of understanding the influx, first of all, and distinguishing between the different types of refugees. As a result of these conversations, we were able to distinguish three different types of refugees. One is refugees from genocide in Darfur. As a country that has a particularly painful historical memory of genocide, we feel we have a certain responsibility. There are political refugees from elsewhere in Africa, of course seeking, basically, shelter. And then there are what we call economic refugees, people who come to Israel looking for work. There would be different solutions for each of these three different categories. Ultimately, we’re going to have to secure our border in one way or the other – we can’t be completely open – while preserving what we regard as our historic and moral obligation to the victims of oppression, particularly genocide. GJIA: How has the influx of immi-

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grants – not only from Africa, but from Russia and other countries as well – affected the population as a whole? What are the cultural implications of increased immigration from diverse populations and has there been a noticeable response from the Israeli citizenry? Oren: Israel by definition is a melting pot. We have people who have immigrated to Israel from over seventy countries and each one brings its own cultural influence and has its own impact on Israeli society, politics, the arts, and culture. For example, in Hebrew slang, we have words from Turkish, Russian, Arabic, Romanian, Yiddish, a lot of English – you see the impact in the language itself. The biggest influx has been from the former Soviet bloc – close to a million people have come in and you can see the influence on the street. Whereas the signs used to be in Hebrew, Arabic, and English, now the signs are in Hebrew, Arabic, and Russian. There’s a Russian press and Russian TV station. It is an extraordinary event in Israel’s history – here is a population that was educated completely at the expense of another country and is moving into our country; we get all the benefits from it. Part of the reason Israel is so economically successful today, particularly in the area of high-tech, is a direct result of the Russian immigration. GJIA: What kind of challenges does Prime Minister Netanyahu face from within the Israeli government in dealing with the Palestinian Authority, surrounding countries, and the United States?

OREN

Oren: Israel has a coalition form of government, unlike the United States government. We say that American democracy is a Roman-style republic and we are an Athenian-style democracy. In the government, every minister – and there are thirty of them – is a potential prime minister. And so decisions have to be made consensually; sometimes it’s a cumbersome system, but when a decision is made at least you know you are actually representing a very large set of the population. The coalition is generally center/centerright, but there are center/center-left elements in it, such as the Labor Party, and sometimes members of the government are very skeptical of whether the Palestinian leadership has either the will or the ability to strike any sort of peace accord. They are very wary of a situation where Israel is always being pressured to make unilateral concessions when those concessions are not being reciprocated by Arab states. They feel that in order to embark on peace process there must be concessions from the other side, and then ultimately, when the Palestinians say that they’re ready to make peace that their leaders can guarantee that that peace can be obtained and preserved. GJIA: The Obama Administration has facilitated peace talks between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority, and has dedicated diplomatic resources to reaching an agreement that is acceptable to both sides. In your opinion as Ambassador of Israel to the United States, is there anything in particular that the U.S. government should be doing in this process that it is currently not?

Politics&Diplomacy

Oren: No. We’ve had our differences – over the issue of settlements, over issues about Jerusalem – but for the most part, we’ve agreed to disagree and together we’re working very hard and very intensely to try to move this process forward. We’re also working very creatively. GJIA: The U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement has been in effect for 25 years, making it the longest-running FTA the United States has. U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk has asked that U.S. and Israeli officials develop measures for addressing remaining barriers in bilateral trade between the U.S. and Israel – namely, liberalizing trade in agricultural services and a Mutual Recognition Agreement for Telecommunications Equipment. Where are the two countries in this process, what changes do you think Israel is likely to make, and how will this affect trade between the U.S. and Israel moving forward? Oren: As you said, this is the longeststanding free trade agreement in United States history and we recently celebrated its 25th anniversary. It’s been a very successful agreement, but we are always tweaking it. Last year we worked out an intellectual property agreement, which is very complicated. Israel is one of the world’s leaders in the manufacture of generic drugs and this country and our country are very happy with what we did. There are issues in the agricultural sphere which we’re still negotiating. Israeli farmers are concerned about a massive influx of much cheaper American produce. Israel was founded as an agrarian economy and the agricultural Winter/Spring 2011 [ 65]

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sector is still very important to us and we feel we have to protect it. But it is a continuing dialogue; the fact that we have this agreement doesn’t mean that we cannot continue to have these negotiations. With the United States we have three major funds – BIRD, BARD, and BSF. BARD is Bi-national Agricultural Research and Development; BSF is Binational Scientific Fund; and BIRD is Bi-national Industrial Research and Development. These funds promote research and development in these various areas and they’ve been fantastically successful; they’ve created thousands of jobs in both countries and we’re involved together in fields of nanoscience, biotechnology, the search for alternative energy, medicine, and things like the Better Place Project, a U.S.-Israeli project for an electric car system.

because the nature of our relationship with the United States is so close, and second, because our public relationship so closely dovetails with our private relationship. The Wikileaks also tended to confirm things that we had been saying publicly – that is, that the Arab states are very much concerned about the Iranian issue, far more so than they are about the peace process issue, and that they view Iran as an existential threat to their regime. GJIA: Hamas has been cited as one of the greatest obstructions to the peace process between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Are there any non-military measures that Israel, the United States, and President Abbas can employ in dealing with this organization? How significant is Hamas as legitimate government authorities try to establish peace and security in the GJIA: The recent leaks of U.S. State region? Department cables through Wikileaks have caused stress in the diplomatic Oren: Hamas is a terrorist organizacommunity. What effects have the leaks tion. It’s recognized as a terrorist orgahad on relations between Israel and nization by the United States, by the United States? Between Israel and other European Communities, and by the countries in the Middle East? Specifi- Quartet. Hamas’ covenant calls for not cally, do you expect that information only the destruction of the state of Israrevealed through the leaks will influ- el, but for the destruction of the Jewish ence Israeli foreign policy decisions? people worldwide. It’s a genocidal doc ument and is also deeply anti-Semitic. Oren: The Wikileaks were irrespon- It blames the Jews for the outbreak of sible and reckless. For those who care World War I, World War II, and the about world peace and its preservation, bubonic plague; it’s a medieval docuone of the ways you do obtain and pre- ment. With that Hamas has been invited serve peace is through diplomacy, and to join the peace process if it meets three diplomacy is predicated on confiden- conditions—if it recognizes Israel and tiality. So it’s a blow to world peace. its right to exist, if it disavows terror, There are some countries in the world and if it accepts previous agreements of that I imagine would be uncomfortable the Palestinian Authority. As of today it now, but we’re not one of them. First, has rejected all three of these. Hamas is

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OREN

not a partner for peace, neither today nor in the foreseeable future. Israel and its allies are taking non-military steps against Hamas. We maintain a maritime blockade off the Gaza strip which seeks to deny Hamas access to military supplies from Syria and Iran. So there’s a free flow of goods—food, construction materials, medicines—over the border into Gaza. But as for the sea, if it were open it could be the conduit for many thousands of rockets into Gaza, so we maintain that blockade. The United States and the international community support that right; you’ve read about some of these flotillas, but the maritime blockade is still maintained in accordance with international law. We’re countering Hamas by denying its ability to influence the peace process in any way. This interest is shared with Egypt, which has much to fear from Hamas, and with the Palestinian Authority, to which Hamas is an existential threat. GJIA: What would you say are Israel’s greatest priorities in the peace talks with the Palestinian Authority, and how do they fit into Israel’s greater diplomatic agenda in the Middle East? Oren: We have one paramount objective, and that is to get the Palestinians to sit down and talk to us, which we haven’t been able to do yet. If they sit down and talk with us, Prime Minister Netanyahu

Politics&Diplomacy

is confident that we will have an agreement with them, or at least a framework for an agreement, within a year. That agreement will in turn serve as the precedent and conduit for achieving historic peace with all of Israel’s surrounding neighbors—what we call comprehensive peace in the Middle East. That’s our objective, our vision, and it’s our operative plan. GJIA: What do you consider to be your greatest success since being appointed Ambassador of Israel to the United States? Oren: I came into office at a very difficult time, when there was a change of government in Israel and a change of government in the United States, at a time of great flux and change within the American Jewish community and its relationship with Israel, with the emergence of sectors of the American electorate that have not traditionally been close to Israel. I think that the Embassy staff has done an extraordinary job of reaching out to all of these different sectors and establishing these connections, maintaining very good communication between our governments. I think that we can say today that we’ve had some bumps along the way and I think you’ll notice now that it’s far less bumpy. We’re working quite well together now.

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Jon Temin The January 2011 referenda in Sudan will constitute a monumental event for Africa. On 9 January, the people of southern Sudan will vote whether to remain part of a united Sudan or to secede, and the people of Abyei, a small enclave on the internal north-south border, are scheduled to decide on whether they want to be part of Sudanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s north or south. For decades, Sudan has suffered from the centralization of power and resources at its core (Khartoum), to the detriment of the periphery. It is expected that southerners will vote to secede, creating the first new state in Africa since 1993. Whether one state or two, Sudan is at heightened risk of large-scale violence during and after the referendum process. The referendum marks the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which has only been partially implemented but has, critically, maintained relative peace between Sudanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s north and south (though the tragic conflict in Darfur in continues). If there is secession, both states will face enormous challenges to their stability and prosperity, and a return to war between them is possible. It is widely expected that southerners will vote overwhelmingly to secede, which could result in the first new internationally recognized state in Africa since the formation

Jon Temin is a Senior Program Officer at the United States Institute of Peace, where he focuses on Sudan and leads the Instituteâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Sudan team.

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of Eritrea in 1993. But while Eritrea is small and physically lies on Africa’s periphery, Sudan is the largest country on the continent by size and lies on the volatile Christian-Muslim fault line that stretches from the Atlantic to Indian Oceans. Its division could send shockwaves across the continent, and challenge the uti possidetis principle of accepting Africa’s colonially drawn borders. It will also generate difficult questions about the viability of both resulting states, the possible return to civil war, and spillover effects throughout the region. This essay examines the history leading up to these important referenda, explores the possible nature of the state or states that might emerge, and offers suggestions for building stability in this notoriously unstable part of Africa.

that the people of southern Sudan are Africans who adhere to Christian and animist beliefs, while northerners are Arab and Muslim. While generally true, this oversimplification masks many complexities that drive some of Sudan’s constant instability – for example, while nearly all Darfuris are northern and Muslim, some are considered “African” and others “Arab.” The first civil war ended with a peace agreement in 1972, which fell apart in 1983, leading to the second civil war. The charismatic Dr. John Garang rose to leadership of the southern-based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A), a guerilla army that Khartoum was never able to defeat, despite significant military advantages. The second civil war ended only in 2005, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), The Road to Referenda. The a landmark achievement that creatpotential break-up of Sudan is decades ed complex power-sharing structures in the making, and above all else, the involving north and south. It also laid product of a destructive core-periphery out a six-year interim period, after dynamic that has poisoned Sudanese which the people of southern Sudan politics through multiple regimes. The have the right to vote on unity or secescore is Khartoum, the nation’s capital sion. Overall, Sudan’s north-south in which much of Sudan’s wealth and civil wars cost the lives of roughly two political power are concentrated. The million people. periphery is, essentially, everywhere else Garang publicly professed his supbeyond Khartoum and a few nearby port for the unity of Sudan through his satellite cities, including all of south- vision of a democratic and secular “New ern Sudan and Darfur. The periphery Sudan”. But Garang, who was popuhas been the source of multiple revolts lar in the south and had a significant against the core over the course of northern following, died in a helicopSudan’s troubled post-colonial history. ter crash only weeks after being swornThe first of these revolts began in in as Sudan’s FirstVice President, tak1955, a year before Sudan gained inde- ing with him any real hope that the pendence from Britain, with the south- south would opt for unity. Garang was ern Anya-Nya (“snake’s venom”) gueril- replaced by his deputy, General Salva la movement fighting to resist northern Kiir, a longtime military man who predomination. The oft-repeated adage is sides over the semi-autonomous Gov-

[ 6 9 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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ernment of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Since Garang’s death the SPLM and northern National Congress Party (NCP) have maintained an uneasy partnership in the Government of National Unity (GoNU). The NCP and GoNU are led by President Omer al-Bashir, who came to power through a coup in 1989. Along with two others, he is wanted by the International Criminal

Conflict&Security

of war has temporarily subsided. But memories of the violence remain fresh, and the north is continually accused of fomenting violence between rival groups within the south. The presence of oil complicates the picture. First discovered in the 1970s, Sudan is now Africa’s third largest oil producer, pumping roughly 490,000 barrels each day. Most of the oil is

The potential break-up of Sudan is decades in the making, and above all else, the product of a destructive core-periphery dynamic that has poisoned Sudanese politics through multiple regimes. Court on charges relating to Darfur. Bashir was re-elected in nationwide elections in April 2010, while Kiir was also reelected as president of the GoSS. Those elections were deeply flawed in both north and south, essentially resulting in a confirmation of the status quo. The elections were viewed by many as a prelude to the main event: the referendum on southern unity or secession. While the CPA requires both NCP and SPLM to “make unity attractive,” little has been done on the ground to make this a reality. Southern Sudan is one of the most impoverished regions on the planet, with income, health and education indicators among the lowest anywhere. Beyond the burgeoning capital Juba, there has been little investment in basic infrastructure and services in the south. Few southerners have seen their quality of life improve since the signing of the CPA, though the threat

in close proximity to Sudan’s northsouth border, with over three-quarters of known reserves in the south, but the majority of oil infrastructure— including refineries, and critically, pipelines to the Red Sea—located in the north. China is the primary consumer of Sudanese oil; approximately five to seven percent of Chinese oil imports originate in Sudan, and many of its largest overseas oil investments are located there as well. Both the GoNU in Khartoum and the GoSS are highly dependent on oil revenue, with the latter relying on oil revenue for an alarming ninety-eight percent of its budget (not including foreign aid). The CPA established a revenue sharing formula that allows the north to keep all revenue generated from oil found in the north and evenly divides revenue from southern oil between the GoNU and GoSS. Southerners often chafe at this arrangement, arguing that they

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should not be forced to split their oil revenue with the north while the north gets to keep its oil revenue (though the south is dependent on the north for oil technology and pipelines). Therefore, they look toward secession as a means of controlling more of their own oil and the revenue it produces. Another challenge to stability is Abyei, the small area on the northsouth border that was given “special administrative status” in the CPA. Abyei residents are scheduled to vote simultaneous to the southern referendum on whether they want to be part of the north or south. Abyei has oil underground and is of significant emotional and symbolic importance to both north and south. Sometimes referred to as “Sudan’s Kashmir,” it is often viewed as the place where Sudan’s civil war could restart. As recent as 2008, Abyei was the scene of significant violence. Both north and south claim it as their own, and will be loathe to cede it to the other. A southern vote for secession seems inevitable. What is unknown is whether the voting will be peaceful and the results accepted, leading to a new southern state, or if Sudan will be plunged into another round of civil war.

ments, sometimes giving the impression of being brilliant tacticians but at other times appearing to be internally at odds and interested only in retaining power. While some conservatives within the NCP may favor southern secession—as it could allow the remaining Sudan to grow into a more theocratic state—many NCP members are against it, as southern secession is unpopular with many northern citizens (some of whom remain remarkably unaware of the strength of the southern will to secede). Financial considerations are also vital: the north, dependent on oil for a large portion of its revenue, stands to lose substantial revenue if a new oil revenue-sharing arrangement is less favorable than the current one. If the north is fundamentally opposed to secession, a return to war is likely. The intermediate step may be a southernrun referendum or unilateral declaration of independence by the south, if all other avenues to secession are blocked.1 A “third civil war” is unlikely to be like the last two for three reasons. First, the south is fully in control of its territory, as opposed to the previous wars, in which large swaths of the south were occupied by northern troops. With a few exceptions, all northern troops Prospects for Peace – or War. have withdrawn from the south (though Perhaps the most important question a notable number of southern troops is whether Khartoum is prepared to remain in northern states just over the let the south secede. Northern inten- border). Second, the SPLA is a more tions can be extremely difficult to deci- advanced and mature army than in pher, and one of the greatest western the previous wars. While there remain weaknesses in dealing with Sudan over major command-and-control condecades has been limited understanding cerns within the SPLA, there have been of dynamics and the balance of power significant recent efforts (some funded within Khartoum. Northern leaders by the United States) to professionalize constantly make contradictory state- and modernize the SPLA. Third, the

[ 71 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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northern army, known as the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), may not be able to focus solely on fighting the south, as it still engages intermittently with Darfur rebel movements, who may relish an opportunity to force the SAF to fight on two fronts. Both the SPLA and SAF have used the CPA period to upgrade their military hardware, with the north receiving significant arms shipments from China and the south purchasing military equipment from a range of sources.2 For these reasons, a new civil war may be fought further north than the previous twoâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;possibly around Khartoum itself. This would make for a fundamentally different conflict than the previous two, which were fought hundreds of miles away from Khar-

Conflict&Security

run largely by men who transitioned from combat fatigues to business suits only six years ago. Capacity and education levels are low, government payrolls are bloated, and corruption remains a major concern. It will be important to prevent the same core-periphery dynamic from being replicated in the south if it secedes, with Juba as the new core. That said, the demise of the GoSS has been predicted for years, but its leaders have done an impressive job holding together a shaky coalition of competing interests and ethnic rivalries. Security in the south is a significant concern, even absent a new civil war. Violence is a daily reality. In 2009, approximately two and a half thousand violent deaths occurred across the

The pressures on Sudan, including sanctions, have been in place for some time, with only modest appreciable impact. The reason is largely due to the unilateral nature of these measures. toum and had little impact on the daily lives of people in the highly populated areas in and around Khartoum. How they would react to a war closer to their doorsteps is unknown, but this is likely to affect northern calculations. Even if war is avoided, a peaceful future for north and south is not assured. Each will face its own internal challenges, and they will continue to share a roughly two thousand-kilometer border, important sections of which remain disputed. In the south, the GoSS remains underdeveloped, and

south, caused by a variety of issues.3 Cattle are prized possessions in the south, and cattle-raiding has gone on for centuries. Proliferation and availability of small arms makes this all the more deadly today. Competition for scarce resources, most notably food, can drive instability, especially during poor harvests. Longstanding ethnic rivalries are an additional source of friction. There are also frequent accusations by the south that northern forces support dissident elements, and â&#x20AC;&#x153;other armed groupsâ&#x20AC;? in the south, a

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SUDAN BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR

tactic that was used frequently during the civil wars to stir up instability. The south is ill-equipped to respond to local instability. The police should be the first responders, but the southern police force is nascent, poorlyequipped and under-trained. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the UN peacekeeping force charged with overseeing implementation of the CPA (separate from the peacekeeping force operating in Darfur), operates under a Chapter VII mandate, which authorizes it to use force if necessary. Historically, however, it has been reluctant to intervene in local conflicts. This leaves the SPLA to intervene, but sometimes in a heavy-handed manner that exacerbates the situation and leads to additional deaths. There are also major concerns about command-and-control within the SPLA. The CPA mandated that many armed groups operating in the south—including some Khartoum proxies—merge into the SPLA. This has largely been achieved, but with the merger come questions of loyalty of certain segments of the SPLA. There have been troubling incidents of intraSPLA fighting, and of the SPLA dividing along ethnic lines when responding to local violence. The internationally driven efforts to professionalize the SPLA are important, but this substantial task can only be achieved over years, if not decades. Amidst frequent discussion of the viability of an independent south, questions about the nature and viability of the remaining northern part of Sudan are often lost. But there should be concern about whether that state can maintain stability, given the continuing

[ 73] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

conflict in Darfur, sporadic rebellions in the east, and discontent populations on the northern side of the northsouth border. There should also be concerns about whether the Khartoum government could become increasingly repressive if the south secedes. During the CPA the south has, to a modest extent, been a moderating influence on northern behavior. But that influence may be lost after the referendum, allowing some of the more repressive elements in the north to exert greater authority. It is also uncertain how the United States and others in the west are going to engage with the north post-referendum. Since 2005, the CPA has offered an entry-point for western dialogue with Khartoum, but that entry-point will disappear in 2011. If there is secession, the west is likely to be blamed for supporting that process. This may lead to even chillier relations between Sudan and the west—especially the United States.

Outside Influence, Internal Realities. What can the United States and others do to prevent disaster in Sudan? There is constant dialogue in Washington about the pressures and incentives that can be employed, but their ability to actually change Sudanese behavior is questionable. The NCP is eager to achieve greater international legitimacy and to see the United States unwind its sanctions and remove Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. However, the United States’ willingness to grant such measures—and what Khartoum must do to achieve them—remains uncertain. The pres-

sures on Sudan, including sanctions, have been in place for some time, with

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only modest appreciable impact. The sionist elements at home. Ultimately, reason is largely due to the unilat- given Sudan’s history, the right to selferal nature of these measures. Pres- determination should be decisive. The

The presence of oil complicates the picture.

sures would go further if they were endorsed and enforced by more countries, but few are as engaged in Sudan as the United States, and some, such as China, have longstanding relations with Khartoum that they are unlikely to jeopardize. The CPA was a product of significant pressure exerted on and incentives offered to both parties by the international community. In recent years the international community has been unable to replicate that persuasive combination. Sudan’s neighbors and the African Union have a particularly important role to play. Sudan borders nine countries, some with strong allegiances to either north or south. A few—notably Ethiopia and Egypt—can exert real influence on the situation, and should be encouraged to engage productively with Khartoum and Juba. The African Union, as an important voice, should be among the very first to recognize the results if the referenda meet a credible standard and the will of the southern Sudanese is clear. If the vote is for secession, some African countries may be reluctant to recognize southern independence given seces-

United States and other powers should be close behind in recognizing the outcome of credible referenda. If the south secedes, it will need substantial development assistance for decades, and the international community should remain vigilant in promoting democracy and good governance in the new southern state. But it will be equally important—though more challenging—to continue to encourage democratic development in the north, and the rights of minority populations in the north will need continued international attention. The reality, however, is that the fate of Sudan is in the hands of the Sudanese. They will make the critical decisions in this delicate period that will lead to a return to war or to a brighter future. Outside influences are an important part of the equation, but ultimately Sudanese leaders will do what they believe is best for some combination of themselves and their people. In the past they have often opted for war. It remains to be seen whether this time will be different.

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NOTES 1

As opposed to the collaborative north-south referendum process prescribed by legislation agreed to by the north and south. 2

Including a bizarre episode in which a cargo ship hijacked by Somali pirates was revealed to be

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loaded with tanks reportedly destined for Juba. 3 â&#x20AC;&#x153;Rescuing the Peace in Southern Sudan,â&#x20AC;? Joint NGO Briefing Paper, January 2010, http://www. oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/ downloads/rescuing_peace_s_sudan_en_full_080110.

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Conflict&Security

Trends in Terrorism Since 9/11 Is terrorism still a threat to the United States? Louis Klarevas On the eve of the ninth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission, former New Jersey governor Tom Kean and former Indiana congressman Lee Hamilton, presented a report of the Bipartisan Policy Center entitled Assessing the Terrorist Threat. The main conclusion of the report is that terrorism still poses a major security threat to the United States, both abroad and at home: â&#x20AC;&#x153;Although it is less severe than the catastrophic proportions of a 9/11-like attack, the threat today is more complex and more diverse than at any time over the past nine years. AlQaeda or its allies continue to have the capacity to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a single attack.â&#x20AC;?1 High-profile plots in the last year alone to attack the New York City subway system, to bring down an airliner over Detroit, and to detonate an explosive in Times Square certainly show that there are still plenty of people dead set on inflicting violence against the United States in order to make a political statement. Yet, a closer look at these three plots also reveals another commonality that often goes underreported: they all failed in their objectives. Examining recent terrorist activity raises a very important policy question: Is terrorism still a serious threat?

Louis Klarevas is a member of the clinical faculty at New York Universityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Center for Global Affairs. His academic and professional interests include international security, transnational terrorism, American foreign policy, and national security law.

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TRENDS IN TERRORISM SINCE 9/11

Most policymakers and experts seem to view terrorism as one of the gravest threats to international security. As President Barack Obama told a group of students while visiting China, “I continue to believe that the greatest threat to the United States’ security are the terrorist networks like Al Qaeda.”2 But there is also a growing chorus of analysts who believe that the threat of terrorism is, in the words of Ohio State political scientist John Mueller, “overblown.”3 Now is a good time to pause and examine the trends in terrorism since 9/11 in an effort to gauge the nature and extent of the threat. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. government established the National CounterTerrorism Center (NCTC) to coordinate terrorism-related intelligence and to maintain a publicly accessible database on terrorist events worldwide. In 2005, the NCTC began collecting information on every event that met the statutory definition of terrorism: “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”4 As of 2010, we finally have five years of comparable

[ 77] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

trend data—allowing us to discern objective patterns in terrorism overseas.5 This article analyzes trends in terrorism worldwide over the last few years.6 The first half of the article draws on NCTC data to identify trends abroad.

Source: wits.nctc.gov

The second half of the article, drawing on a unique dataset collected by the author, focuses on trends inside the American homeland since 9/11.7 The article concludes with some brief policy guid-

Source: wits.nctc.gov

ance for the counter-terrorism community in light of the observed trends.

Terrorism Abroad. Good news: For the last two years, the lethality of terror-

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ism worldwide has been on the decline. Terrorism is indisputably a violent enterprise. In the past five years, terrorists have killed tens of thousands of innocent people. Last year alone, over 15,000 people died at the hands of terrorists. While it is hard to interpret such a horrific statistic in positive light, the reality is that in relative terms, last year’s death toll marks a significant decrease over the past two years from its peak in 2007. Since 2005, the NCTC has documented 62,370 attacks abroad.8 The death toll at the hands of terrorists abroad during this same time period has been 88,135, with 173,902 wounded. The height of foreign terrorism in the past five years came in 2007, when 14,431 attacks combined to kill 22,736 people and wound another 44,141 people. The incidence of terrorism has decreased since, reaching a four-year low in 2009 of 11,002 attacks (see Figure 1). One of the more interesting findings is that most terrorist attacks worldwide do not result in death. As Figure 2 displays, only 47 percent of incidents are lethal. In fact, the odds of a terrorist attack killing 10 or more people are less than one-in-fifty. Moreover, out of a total 62,370 attacks in the past five years, only 22 involved the mass fatality capabilities and wherewithal to result in 100 or more deaths—the largest such attack claiming the lives of 430 people in the Iraqi town of Sinjar (near the Syrian border) in August of 2007. Over the past five years, Iraq has been the location of over one-third of all terrorist attacks, nearly half of all terrorism fatalities, and over half of all non-lethal terrorism-related injuries. Indeed, the three main fronts

Conflict&Security

of the United States’ war on terror— Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—are the countries most victimized by terrorism (see Figure 3). The top five is Figure 3 - Terrorism in Iraq/Afghanistan/Pakistan Versus Rest of World 2005-2009

Source: wits.nctc.gov

rounded out by India and Somalia, which when combined with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, account for over three-quarters of lethal terrorist attacks. Not surprisingly, those nationals most likely to die from terrorism correspond to the states most victimized by extremist violence (see Table 1). While, relatively speaking, the American homeland has been largely spared from lethal terrorist attacks, Americans are nevertheless in the top twenty-five nationalities that have been murdered by terrorists abroad (see Table 1). In the past five years, Americans have been victimized in 648 terrorist attacks abroad. Of these, 142 produced lethal results, killing a total of 258 Americans. Most of these lethal

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attacks occurred in Iraq (105), followed by Afghanistan (20), and Pakistan (3). Indeed, 134 of the 142 deadly anti-American attacks occurred in the Middle East and South Asia. As the data indicate, the number of Americans abroad coming under attack as well as dying at the hands of terrorists has been on the decline, reaching a five-year low in 2009 (see Figure 4). While the NCTC has not been able to identify, with a degree of confidence, the specific perpetrators in 32,823 attacks, it has concluded that religious extremists are accountable for most of the remaining attacks from 2005-2009.9 As a whole, religious extremists accounted for 15,114 attacks, with Sunni extremists involved in 14,049 of these attacks.10 Secular motives were behind 14,740 attacks and ethnic/tribal motives were behind 518 attacks.11 Religious extremists as a whole were associated with 35,460 fatalities (31,263 of which were associated with Sunni extremists). By comparison, secular/anarchist and ethnic/tribal terrorists were, respectively, associated with 13,288 and 1,668 deaths.12 Perhaps the most surprising finding is that guns are the most common and lethal means of terrorism. Out of the 62,370 terrorist incidents

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orchestrated abroad in the past five years, firearms were involved in 25,313,

Source: wits.nctc.gov

or 40 percent, of those attacks. No other weapon was employed with the frequency of guns. The closest was the improvised explosive device (IED), which was involved in 16,160 attacks. Nor was any weapon more lethal than the firearm in terms of total death toll, with guns associated with 40,208 fatalities.13 When explosives and IEDs are combined, they were involved in 19,504 attacks and associated with 39,093 deaths. To put

Source: wits.nctc.gov

it in slightly different terms, firearms were associated with over 45 percent of

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all deaths caused by terrorists in the past five years. All around the globe, the gun continues to be the weapon of choice for terrorists, followed by the bomb.14 Another interesting finding is that suicide terrorism accounts for only about 3 percent of all terrorist attacks. Yet, those 3 percent of attacks accounted for 20 percent of all fatalities attributed to terrorism in the past five years—a gross disproportion that shows the lethal impact of this form of terrorism.15 Fortunately, suicide terrorism has been on the wane, reaching a new five-year low of less than 300 such attacks in 2009 (see Figure 5).16

Terrorism

America.

Bad news: In the past two years, the lethality of terrorism in the United States has been on the rise. In a recent interview with George Stephanopoulos on ABC’s Good Morning America, former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani decried, “We had no domestic attacks under Bush. We’ve had one under Obama.” Stephanopoulos, who failed to correct Giuliani on the show, later took to his blog to add two more incidents from the past decade: “Giuliani seems to have forgotten about the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks and shoe bomber Richard Reid.”17 Actually both Giuliani and Stephanopoulos are way off.18 Since 9/11, there have actually been 105 terrorist attacks inside the United States (see Table 2). When compared to overall incidents worldwide, terrorism on the American homeland might seem like a rare occurrence. That, however, does not mean terrorism is not a security threat. On the contrary, twenty-seven people have been killed

Conflict&Security

and another ninety-four people have been injured by domestic terrorism. Conventional wisdom suggests that New York is the favorite target of terrorists. But the data show that the most common site for terrorist acts is California, location of twenty-four of the 105 attacks. New York was the site of eleven attacks. When the acts are re-calibrated to account for only lethal attacks, the deadliest location inside the United States since 9/11 has been Texas, where two incidents of terrorism claimed fourteen lives. Next in line has been the District of Columbia, associated with three terrorism deaths. Since 9/11, only one person has died at the hands of terrorists in New York—a hospital employee who died after inhaling anthrax in 2001. In other words, despite concerns that New York is the primary target since 9/11, terrorist attacks have been widely distributed across over half the states (with terrorists killing innocent Americans in ten different states). The most common motive of domestic terrorism since 9/11 has been ecoterrorism. Animal rights and environmental rights organizations have been behind fifty-three of the 105 attacks. By contrast, jihadist terrorists have attacked inside the United States on thirteen occasions since 9/11.19 Three of those attacks, however—the armed assault on the Jewish Federation in Seattle, Washington, the drive-by shooting of a U.S. military recruiting office in Little Rock, Arkansas, and the Fort Hood massacre near Killeen, Texas—accounted for over half of all fatalities inflicted by terrorism.20 As Table 2 displays, incendiary devices are the weapons most commonly used by domestic terrorists. When the lethality

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of domestic attacks is emphasized, however, there is an inescapable finding: twenty-one of the twenty-seven people killed by terrorists in the United States since 9/11, were shot to death. Of the remaining six fatalities, five were caused by the delivery of anthrax through the postal service and one was the result of a plane being deliberately crashed into a government office building. Table 2 clearly shows two other post9/11 trends: (1) the number of deadly terrorist incidents in the United States has been on the rise in the last few years; and (2) the perpetrators of all of the deadly extremist violence in the United States were acting alone.21 There is an important lesson here: the number of individuals within our national borders itching to strike is not diminishing. If anything, it seems to be rising. Not everything is bad news, of course. Since the 9/11 attacks, the federal government has done a good job of improving airplane security, improving domestic intelligence, and clamping down on access to the pre-cursor materials needed to make explosive devices. These successes are evident in the large number of post-9/11 plots that have been foiled. In fact, since 2002, no terrorists have been able to manufacture a bomb or IED inside the United States that has been used to seriously injure, let alone kill, anyone. With the means of violence available to terrorists drastically reduced, extremists have drawn a disturbing lesson from terrorists overseas: just use a gun. Guns are cheap, readily available, and easy to use. And guns produce the exact kind of lethal results sought by terrorists.

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Conclusion. Does terrorism still

pose a serious threat? The fact that terrorists have wounded or killed over a quarter million people in the past five years leaves room for no other conclusion. But the data reviewed in this article present a more complex picture of terrorism in the post-9/11 era. First, terrorism is on the (relative) decline worldwide, with the number of attacks and the number of deaths reaching new four-year lows last year. Moreover, the three deadliest locales also happen to correspond with where the U.S. military is currently involved in active combat operations: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Where discernible, most terrorism abroad is committed by religious extremists (especially Islamic extremists). However, secular terrorists are not far behind in terms of activity. The biggest difference between the two categories of actors is that acts of terrorism perpetrated by religious extremists are nearly three times more lethal than those committed by secular terrorists. In terms of means, guns are the most popular and lethal instruments of terrorism worldwide, although bombs injure more people. One particularly interesting finding is that suicide attacks (which typically involve explosives of some sort) tend to have the highest kill ratioâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;just over 9:1 (kills per attack).22 Despite global concerns over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, there were no significant terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in the past five years.23 The picture of terrorism within the United States is significantly different than the one overseas. Compared to the rest of the world, the United

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States has been relatively spared from terrorist violence at home: 105 attacks resulting in twenty-seven deaths and ninety-four injuries since 9/11. Unlike attacks abroad which produce lethal consequences around 47 percent of the time, attacks in the United States are deadly only approximately 11 percent of the time. Moreover, wherein over the last five years approximately 141 people have been killed per 100 terrorist attacks outside the United States, the number of people murdered by terrorists in the United States since 9/11 is only twenty-six per 100 attacks. When terrorists do choose to strike against the homeland, New York may still be a popular target, but it is clearly not the only target. Terrorists—jihadist or otherwise—are open to striking anywhere, including in the heartland. Indeed, inside the United States, eco-terrorists are clearly the terrorists who strike with the greatest frequency, accounting for over half of all attacks since 9/11—all with no lethal results, nonetheless. When terrorist activity is limited to fatal incidents, Islamic extremism emerges as the deadliest force. That said, as the data show, violent Islamic extremists hardly have a monopoly on lethal terrorism inside the United States, with secular, ethnic, Christian, and white supremacist motives also fueling deadly political violence against innocent Americans. Perhaps the most important finding is that, just as with terrorism worldwide, lethal terrorism in the United

Conflict&Security

States most frequently involves firearms—readily available conventional weapons. Policymakers often paint rather grim scenarios of WMD terrorism, such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s warning during the run-up to the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit: “A 10-kiloton nuclear bomb detonated in Times Square in New York City could kill a million people. Many more would suffer from the hemorrhaging and weakness that comes from radiation sickness. And beyond the human cost, a nuclear terrorist attack would also touch off a tsunami of social and economic consequences across our country.”24 With the exception of the 2001 anthrax attack—a rare attack that authorities now believe was perpetrated by a disgruntled government insider with access to the deadly biological material—complex weapons like bombs, let alone WMDs, are just not available to violent extremists in the United States.25 Terrorists tend to be opportunists that operate within reasonable means of asymmetric attack. As such, the real terrorist threat in the United States comes out of the barrel of a gun.26 If the members of the international community (especially the United States) are serious about combating terrorism, their focus must shift toward conventional terrorism—especially gun-driven terrorism like that which occurred in Fort Hood as opposed to nuclear terrorism which only occurs in Hollywood. Winter/Spring 2011 [ 82]

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Conflict&Security

Table 1 Countries Most Victimized by Lethal Terrorism 2005-2009 Rank

Country

Death Toll from Terrorism within National Borders

Iraq

43,185

Afghanistan

8,663

Pakistan

6,964

India

5,461

Somalia

3,569

…

United States

Nationals Most Victimized by Lethal Terrorism 2005-2009 Rank

Nationality

Number of Nationals Killed by Terrorists

Iraqis

42,272

Afghanis

8,593

Pakistanis

6,793

Indians

5,412

Somalis

3,154

…

23 Americans 277 Source: wits.nctc.gov Note: Death tolls from within the U.S. and of American nationals are drawn from the NCTC dataset as well as from data in Table 2. Overseas, 258 Americans were killed by terrorists between 2005-2009. Domestically during the same time period, 19 Americans were killed by terrorists. Overall, this produces a death toll of 277.

[ 8 3] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

TRENDS IN TERRORISM SINCE 9/11

Table 2 Terrorist Attacks within the United States since September 11, 2001 1

Year

State

2001

Incident

Killed

Wounded

Weapon

Alleged Perpetrator(s)

Motive

Incendiary

ALF

ECO

1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1

5 1 6 6 1 1 2 0 0

Biological Biological Biological Biological Biological Biological Biological Biological Biological

Bruce Edward Ivins Bruce Edward Ivins Bruce Edward Ivins Bruce Edward Ivins Bruce Edward Ivins Bruce Edward Ivins Bruce Edward Ivins Bruce Edward Ivins Bruce Edward Ivins

SEC SEC SEC SEC SEC SEC SEC SEC SEC

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

FL NJ NY DC NY NY NY DC NY

Firebombing of government research center Anthrax attacks via postal delivery Anthrax attacks via postal delivery Anthrax attacks via postal delivery Anthrax attacks via postal delivery Anthrax attacks via postal delivery Anthrax attacks via postal delivery Anthrax attacks via postal delivery Anthrax attacks via postal delivery Anthrax attacks via postal delivery

Anthrax attacks via postal delivery

Biological

Bruce Edward Ivins

SEC

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Firebombing of government wild animal corral Tree spiking in Nez Perce National Forest

Primitive

ELF

ECO

Burning of construction site

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Vehicle

Charles Bishop

JIH

ECO

Incendiary/ Primitive Incendiary

ELF

Crashing of airplane in Bank of America building Burning of crane and tree spiking at construction site Burning of horse slaughtering plant

ALF

ECO

Burning of vehicle

Incendiary

ALF

ECO

19 20 21 22 23

IL IA NE TX CO

Pipe bombs left in mailboxes Pipe bombs left in mailboxes Pipe bombs left in mailboxes Pipe bomb left in mailbox Pipe bomb left in mailbox

0 0 0 0 0

3 3 0 0 0

IED IED IED IED IED

Lucas Helder Lucas Helder Lucas Helder Lucas Helder Lucas Helder

SEC SEC SEC SEC SEC

Firebombing of Cuban exile political organization offices

Incendiary

Unknown (Ethnic)

ETH

Shooting at El Al Ticket Counter at LAX

Firearm

Hesham Mohamed Hadayet

ETH

Incendiary (Fake) Incendiary

Unknown Animal Right Activists ELF

ECO

Military-style smoke bombs thrown into Seattle office buildings Firebomb thrown at research station in Allegheny National Park

Attempted burning of construction site

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Shooting at United Nations headquarters

Incendiary

Steve Kim

ETH

Firebombs left at university buildings

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Burning of business

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Burning of vehicles

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Firebombs left at businesses

Incendiary

ALF

ECO

32 33

2002

2003

ECO

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 84]

KLAREVAS

Conflict&Security

Firebombing of business

Incendiary

ALF

ECO

35 36

NM DC

Firebombing of businesses Crashing of tractor and bomb hoax

0 0

Incendiary Vehicle/IED (Inactive)

ALF Dwight Watson

ECO SEC

Burning of residences

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Burning of government vehicles at military recruiting office Crashing of vehicle into March Air Force Reserve Base

Vehicle

Eid Elwirelwir

JIH

40 41

IL CA

Burning of business Burning of residence

0 0

Incendiary Incendiary

ALF ELF

ECO ECO

Burning of residences

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Burning of residences

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Burning of vehicles

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Explosives at business

IED

ECO

Burning of residence

Incendiary

Animal Liberation Brigade Revolutionary Cells ELF

Firebombs left at business

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Explosives at business

IED

Animal Liberation Brigade Revolutionary Cells

ECO

Burning of residences

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Ricin discovered at mail facility

Biological

Unknown

UNK

Ricin delivered to White House

Biological

Unknown

UNK

Burning of CANDLES Holocaust Memorial Museum in Terra Haute

Incendiary

Unknown White Supremacist(s)

WHI

Ricin delivered to U.S. Senate office building

Biological

Unknown

UNK

Burning of construction site

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Molotov cocktail thrown at Temple Bâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Nai Israel in Oklahoma City

Incendiary

Sean Gillespie

WHI

Burning of residences

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Burning of business

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

Burning of university building

Incendiary

ALF

ECO

Burning of residences

Incendiary

ECO

CA CA

Firebombs left at construction site Firebombs left at business

0 0

Incendiary Incendiary

Unknown Environmentalists ELF ELF

62 63 64

CA WA WA

Firebombing of residences Firebombs left at construction site Burning of residences

0 0 0

Incendiary Incendiary Incendiary

ELF ELF ELF

ECO ECO ECO

Explosives thrown at British Consulate

IED

Unknown

UNK

Burning of residences

Incendiary

ELF

ECO

60 61

2004

2005

[ 8 5 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ECO

ECO ECO

TRENDS IN TERRORISM SINCE 9/11

67 68 69 70 71 72

CA CA WA

Firebombing of vehicles Firebombing of residence Running over pedestrians with automobile Firebomb left at residence Explosive device left at residence Shooting at Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle Crashing of gas-soaked automobile into health clinic Firebomb left at residences

Time-bomb left at abortion clinic

IED

Paul Ross Evans

CHR

IED

Unknown

UNK

Explosive thrown at Mexican Consulate Firebombs left at three separate bank branches Firebombing of residence Firebombing of mosque in Columbia Fire set to Six Rivers Planned Parenthood offices Firebombing of residences Explosion at U.S. military recruiting station Shooting at Unitarian Universalist Church IED left on U.S. Border Patrol route Firebombing of automobile and residence Burning of Macedonia Church of God in Christ in Springfield

Incendiary

ALF

ECO

0 0

Incendiary Incendiary

ECO WHI

Incendiary

0 0

Incendiary IED

ALF Unknown white supremacist(s) Unknown Pro-Life Activist(s) ELF Unknown

ECO UNK

Firearm

Jim Adkisson

CHR

IED

Unknown

UNK

Incendiary

ECO

Incendiary

Firebombing of automobile

Incendiary

89 90

KS AK

Attempted explosion of inactive IED at synagogue Shooting of abortion doctor Shooting at U.S. military recruiting office

1 1

0 1

IED (Inactive) Firearm Firearm

Unknown Animal Rights Activists Benjamin Haskill, Michael Jacques, Jr., Thomas Gleason, Jr. Unknown Animal Rights Activists Newburgh Four

CHR JIH

91 92

DC WA

1 0

Firearm Vehicle

WHI ECO

JIH

TX MI

13 0

32 1

Vehicle

Hosam Maher Husein Smadi Nidal Malik Hasan Umar Farouk Abdulmattallab Joseph Stack

JIH

95 96

IED (Inactive) IED (Inactive) Firearm IED

Michael Finton

Shooting at Holocaust Museum Running over of radio station towers with bulldozer Attempted explosion of inactive IED left at federal building Attempted explosion of inactive IED left at federal building Shooting at Fort Hood Attempted lighting of IED onboard airplane Crashing of airplane into IRS offices Shooting at Pentagon Firebombing of business IED left at Times Square

Scott Roeder Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad James von Brunn ELF

SEC

0 0 0

2 0 0

Firearm Incendiary IED

John Patrick Bedell ALF Faisal Shahzad

SEC ECO JIH

78 79

2006

2007

2008

CA WA NC

CA TN

81 82

WA NY

97 98 99 100

2009

2010

TX VA CO NY

0 0 0

0 0 9

Incendiary Incendiary Vehicle

ECO ECO JIH

Incendiary IED Firearm

ELF ELF Mahammed Reza Taherrazar ALF ALF Naveed Afzal Haq

0 0 1

0 0 5

David Robert McMenemy ELF

CHR

Vehicle/ Incendiary Incendiary

ECO

ECO ECO JIH

CHR

WHI

ECO JIH

JIH JIH

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 86]

KLAREVAS

101 102

UT MD

103

104

105

Firebombing of business Hostages taken at Discovery Channel headquarters Attempted explosion of inactive IED left near Wrigley Field Attempted explosion of inactive IED at Christmas tree ceremony Attempted explosion of inactive IED at military recruiting office

0 0

0 0 0

0 0

Incendiary Firearm/IED (inactive) IED (inactive) IED (inactive) IED (inactive)

Conflict&Security

ALF James J. Lee

ECO ECO

Sami Samir Hassoun Mohamed Osman Mohamud Antonio Martinez

SEC JIH JIH

Sources: http://wits.nctc.gov; http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents; and Lexis-Nexis Note: All perpetrators are presumed innocent unless proven guilty in a court of law. Casualty counts do not include death or injury sustained by the alleged perpetrator(s). Multi-prong attacks that occur in the same location on the same day are treated as single incidents. The Amerithrax attacks are presented in a manner consistent with the START database, which codes them as 10 separate incidents and only catalogues serious injuries. Key: CHR=Christian Extremist; ECO=Eco-Terrorism (Environmental and Animal Rights); ETH=Ethnic/ Nationalist; JIH=Jihadist/Islamic Extremist; SEC=Secular/Political; WHI=White Supremacist/Neo-Nazi; and UNK=Unknown. NOTES

1 Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010), 1, Internet, http:// bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/assessingterrorist-threat. 2 Quoted in Fox News, “Obama: Terror Networks Are Biggest Threat to U.S.,” 16 November 2009, Internet, http://www.foxnews. com/politics/2009/11/16/obama-terror-networkslargest-threat. 3 John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them (New York: Free Press, 2006). 4 22 USC § 2656f(d)(2). In general, military personnel and assets in war zones and warlike settings are excluded as victims of terrorism, as they are deemed combatant targets as opposed to noncombatant targets. The exception to this rule is when the NCTC determines that an attack against combatants was “reckless and indiscriminate,” meaning that “terrorists could have reasonably foreseen that their attack would result in civilian casualties.” For more on how this definition is utilized in collecting data on incidents, including what constitutes a “noncombatant,” see http://www. nctc.gov/witsbanner/wits_subpage_criteria.html. 5 The NCTC was established in 2004. As part of its duties, it maintains the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), a publicly accessible database of all actual attempts of terrorism throughout the world. At present, the database only covers terrorist events that have taken place between January 1, 2004, and July 31, 2010, although only data from January 1, 2005, onward are comparable. Many events that occurred in 2004 are not accounted for in WITS because a narrower definition of terrorism was employed prior to 2005. To access the database, visit: https://wits.nctc.gov. All NCTC data cited herein were accessed on September 11-12,

[ 8 7] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

2010. For a discussion of the value of incident trend data as well as an excellent overview of WITS, see John Wigle, “Introducing the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS),” Perspectives on Terrorism, 4, no. 1 (March 2010), 3-23. 6 While NCTC data is available for the first half of 2010, it is not addressed herein so as to permit analysis of comparable annual (i.e., 12 month) trends. 7 While the NCTC does a commendable job of maintaining a comprehensive collection on terrorist incidents outside the U.S., it does not identify domestic incidents using the same standards. Instead, domestic incidents are identified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which has not assembled a comprehensive list in line with the statutory definition found at 22 USC § 2656f(d) (2). For this reason, domestic terrorist attacks since 9/11 have been compiled by the author and his research assistants. The sources for these incidents are identified in Table 2. All data is current as of 1 January 2011. 8 The NCTC statistics discussed in this section, unless otherwise noted, do not incorporate data from attacks inside the United States. 9 The reason that the NCTC has not identified the perpetrator(s) in nearly 33,000 attacks relates to the NCTC’s past practice of not inferring responsibility. In 2009, on the recommendation of a group of experts, the NCTC began inferring responsibility. In the years to come, the number of unknown events should begin to decrease significantly. 10 The other categories of religious extremists involved in terrorist attacks abroad are as follows: Shia (512); Christian (247); Uncategorized Muslim (222); Jewish (49); Hindu (18); and Other (7). 11 The tallies add up to a total greater than the number of attacks because some attacks involved

TRENDS IN TERRORISM SINCE 9/11

multiple motives. 12 Outside the United States, environmental/ anti-globalization and neo-Nazi/white supremacist groups were only affiliated with a total of seven attacks. Neo-Nazi/white supremacist groups were only responsible for one known death overseas. Environmental/anti-globalization groups were not behind any deaths. 13 IEDs were associated with 37,416 deaths. However, in terms of non-lethal injuries, IEDs wounded 109,481 people whereas firearms only wounded 34,009 people, indicating that IEDs victimize more people than guns. When IEDs are combined with other explosive devices, they become associated with 39,093 deaths and 116,896 nonlethal injuries. 14 Americans overseas are not exempt from gun terrorism either. Of the 142 overseas terrorist attacks that cost Americans their lives, 42 involved firearms, most prominent among them the siege of Mumbai in November 2008. 15 Where it was discernible, the NCTC determined that between 2005-2009 Islamic extremists accounted for 1,101 suicide attacks (producing 11,650 deaths), whereas secular terrorists accounted for only 36 suicide attacks (producing 394 deaths). 16 The vast majority of suicide attacks (over 99%) involved an explosive of some sort. 17 George Stephanopoulos, “Rudy Giuliani Wrong in Saying ‘No Domestic Attacks under Bush,’” 8 January 2010, Internet, http://blogs.abcnews. com/george/2010/01/rudy-giuliani-no-domesticattacks-under-bush-one-under-obama.html. 18 Incidentally, the shoe bomber episode did not occur inside the United States, and is therefore not considered a terrorist attack within the homeland. 19 The remaining attacks were distributed across the following groups: secular/political (19); Christian fundamentalist (5); white supremacist (5); and ethnic (3). Motivations could not be discerned with precision for 7 of the 105 attacks since 9/11. 20 Secular/political terrorists accounted for six deaths; Christian fundamentalists accounted for three deaths; ethnically motivated terrorists accounted for two deaths; and a white supremacist accounted for one death.

21 An interesting thesis—which warrants further investigation—emerges from this study: plots involving groups and cells, which require communications subject to interception by authorities, are easier to identify and foil. On the other hand, lone wolves who keep to themselves seem to be less susceptible to penetration by intelligence and law enforcement, which perhaps explains their higher success rate in executing lethal attacks. 22 By contrast, the kill ratio for non-suicide attacks is just under 1.2:1. 23 According to the NCTC data, between 2005-2009, there were 14 attacks involving chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological materials outside of the United States. All of these incidents (which occurred in Iraq) involved chlorine, and in all but one instance the weapon was an explosive laced with chlorine. There is no evidence that the chlorine itself caused any fatalities in any of these incidents. 24 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Nuclear Nonproliferation at the University of Louisville as Part of the McConnell Center’s Spring Lecture Series,” 9 April 2010, Internet, http://www. state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/04/139958.htm. 25 U.S. Department of Justice, Amerithrax Investigative Summary, 19 February 2010, Internet, http:// documents.nytimes.com/amerithrax-investigationreport. 26 See also, Louis Klarevas, “Easy Target,” The New Republic (online), 13 June 2010, Internet, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/75515/easytarget; Louis Klarevas, “Bombing on the Analysis of the Times Square Bomb Plot,” The Huffington Post, 5 May 2010, Internet, http://www.huffingtonpost. com/louis-klarevas/bombing-on-the-analysiso_b_565428.html; Michael R. Bloomberg, “Terror Suspects Are Buying Guns and the FBI Can’t Stop Them,” The Huffington Post, 5 May 2010, Internet, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-bloomberg/ terror-suspects-are-buyin_b_564069.html; and Louis Klarevas, “It’s the Guns Stupid: Why Handguns Remain One of the Biggest Threats To Homeland Security,” The Huffington Post, 7 November 2009, Internet, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louisklarevas/its-the-guns-stupid-why-h_b_349705.html.

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 88]

Culture&Society The Global Abolition of Human Trafficking The Indispensible Role of the United States Mark P. Lagon Human trafficking, whether for forced labor or sexual exploitation, preys upon people on the margins of society and the globalized economy. They include women, children, migrants, and minorities, all treated as less than human. What lessons can be learned on the tenth anniversary of the implementation of both a UN treaty and a comprehensive U.S. law to fight this dehumanizing global crime? What has worked, and what will work best in the future to marginalize human trafficking? The tenth annual Department of State Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report estimates that there are 1.8 trafficking victims for every 1000 people in the world.1 That figure is based on a very conservative International Labor Organization (ILO) estimate of 12.3 million victims globally2â&#x20AC;&#x201D;less than half of what scholar Kevin Bales estimates.3 This means that at least one out of every 555 people in todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s world is a human trafficking victim. Ten years ago in Palermo, Italy, UN members finalized an anti-Trafficking in Persons (TIP) protocol to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime.4 The Palermo Protocol offers a template for fashioning national laws to fight trafficking, and is monitored and support-

Ambassador Mark P. Lagon, Ph.D. is Visiting Professor and Chair for International Relations and Security in the Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) Program at Georgetown University. He is also Adjunct Senior Fellow on Human Rights at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 89]

THE GLOBAL ABOLITION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

ed by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). More valuable than its splashy conferences and awareness emblem underwritten by Persian Gulf potentates, UNODC offers technical assistance to countries to craft laws and has sponsored a handbook for legislators worldwide to do so as well.5 In the same year that the Protocol

and helping all groups that are vulnerable to trafficking. An assessment of the last decade and those two needs suggests that the United States is particularly important as the indispensible and chief anti-trafficking voice in the world, and that the business community must step up its own efforts in fighting human trafficking.

The United States has been the primary anti-trafficking voice in the world. was completed, the United States enacted a sweeping anti-trafficking law, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA).6 It created an anti-TIP Office at the U.S. Department of State to lead diplomatic and interagency endeavors, and to prepare a global report on other countries’ efforts. Under the amended TVPA, governments are placed in one of four ranking categories according to legal principles very similar to the UN Palermo Protocol, irrespective of the sheer scale of the problem in a country. Governments are placed on Tier 1 if they are making major efforts and are largely succeeding. They are placed on Tier 2 if they are making significant efforts with mixed results, and on Tier 2 Watch List if they are making some efforts with limited visible impact. Finally, Tier 3 is reserved for governments making negligible efforts. The “Watch List” was added to signal danger of slippage to the Tier 3 category, which also carries potential economic sanctions. There remain two major needs to address ten years after the Palermo Protocol and TVPA: realizing rule of law,

[ 9 0] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

The Need for Rule of Law in Practice. Human traffickers treat

vulnerable groups such as women, children, migrants, minorities, and disadvantaged castes as if they were not human beings in full. They go unpunished when—through neglect, prejudice, and complicity—societies, businesses, and government personnel permit them to, leaving those vulnerable groups without equal access to justice. The main tangible impact of the TVPA, U.S. TIP Office’s diplomacy, and the Palermo Protocol in the past ten years has been the passage of new laws addressing human trafficking in well over half of the world’s countries.7 This is a major achievement for rule of law and for ensuring equal access to justice for TIP victims. Yet rule of law consists of much more than laws on the books, whether in the United States or in the least developed of nations. There has been substantial progress in training law enforcement officials and empowering non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to find victims and to provide

LAGON

them access to justice. But transformative change has not yet taken place. Of the three Ps—prosecution of perpetrators, protection of victims, and prevention—which both the Palermo Protocol and TVPA enumerate as areas for state action, prosecution has received the most emphasis to date. The TIP Report documents 7,992 prosecutions in the world in 2003, down to 5,506 in 2009. Of those 5,506, only 432 were for labor trafficking.8 Prosecutions are limited in general, and minimal for non-sexual exploitation. Implementation of rule of law is lagging, and also deeply needed. Implementation will require more prosecutions to hold perpetrators accountable, and a greater emphasis on victims’ access to justice and reempowerment.

The Need to Address All Vulnerable Populations. Human trafficking is very prevalent in a number of areas of the world. South Asia is one of them; of the estimated 27 million TIP victims in the world, some 55 to 75 percent are in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, chiefly in bonded labor.9 Another is China, where the problem takes numerous forms because there are so many vulnerable populations there. Migrating workers move around the country without a safety net. Women are targets of exploitation because of a Wild West sex trade and the female deficit, attributable in great part to sex selection abortion. Uighurs and Tibetans face official discrimination making them vulnerable to trafficking, and North Koreans who flee atrocious political and economic conditions are not rightfully treated as refugees. East Asia is also of particular concern, given

Culture&Society

the prevalence of human trafficking for both labor and commercial sex. The Gulf is a major flashpoint, where, in spite of some strides prompted by U.S. diplomacy and self-interest, women and foreign guest workers are apt to be treated as lesser humans. Human trafficking is widespread and takes many forms, but there are no “lesser” victims of this crime. AntiTIP policy should therefore not privilege some victims over others. Measures taken against TIP have not had wider and more visible effects for a number of reasons, including a “fissuring” of efforts among agencies and countries, and a siloed focus on particular vulnerable groups. Anti-TIP policy should not focus on any particular group at the expense of another. For instance, victims of forced labor are no less important than victims of sex trafficking (and vice versa), and sex trafficking is not the only source of exploitation and violence against women. Some think that sex trafficking has been overemphasized because of alleged moralism, but to focus solely on labor would be equally wrongheaded. It is important that the pendulum not swing toward labor to the near exclusion of adult sex trafficking. The 2010 Report includes an informational “box” on “What Is Not Human Trafficking” and emphasizes that prostitution is not trafficking, which is counterproductive.10 Prostitution is not one and the same as slavery, and few contemporary abolitionists think it is. Still, prostitution is the enabling environment for sex trafficking, whether in brothels, seedy streets, or, until recently, on craigslist.org. Sex trafficking and its basic enabling environment ought not to lose

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THE GLOBAL ABOLITION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

attention. One sees fissuring of responses elsewhere. Some responses devoted to combating sex trafficking focus only on children. This area is arguably easier for policy responses, given global consensus that there is no meaningful consent by minors to be prostituted. But sex trafficking is not confined to minors. If someone is lured into the sex trade as a minor, does it suddenly become a choice the day someone turns 18? Moreover, numerous adult females in the global sex trade are subject to force, fraud, or coercion—including subtle psychological terror and trickery—which makes them trafficking victims even under the strict standards of the Palermo Protocol. There is one other serious area of fissuring: “trafficking” may sound like it refers to crossing borders, but it actually refers to turning people into commodities robbed of autonomy. Despite what some at the U.S. Department of Labor, the ILO, and some businesses may believe, crossing borders is not a necessary element of trafficking. Abolishing human trafficking depends on rule of law and equal dignity, both rightly understood as tests for the efficacy of anti-TIP efforts. Rule of law requires implementation beyond the passage of laws. And the fight for the dignity of human trafficking victims requires equal value and energy accorded to all victims. These two tests will be the basic signs for demonstrating whether the world has successfully embarked on the road toward abolishing modern-day slavery. There are four important areas of activity that are most important for meeting these two tests of success, and

[ 9 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

that will be essential to stamping out human trafficking.

American Exemplar. The United

States has a moral stake in fighting trafficking; like genocide and HIV/AIDS, such a high-order threat to basic dignity requires the United States—as the single global power most capable of catalyzing global action—to do so. It also has vital interests in fighting trafficking. It is immensely important to the U.S. economy to sustain the legitimacy of globalization as a largely positive force for broader prosperity. To prove that slavery is not the inexorable product of globalization, and that rule of law can tame globalization’s excesses, is an interest, not altruism. It is worth recalling that Madeleine Albright, the U.S. Secretary of State at the time of the TVPA and Palermo Protocol’s promulgation, described the United States as having the role of “indispensible nation” in the world. Despite rancor about the Iraq invasion, legitimacy-sapping treatment of detainees, and economic turbulence, it still remains the indispensible nation. The United States has been the primary anti-trafficking voice in the world for ten years, making a palpable difference by encouraging dozens of nations to address the issue. Yet it could be all the more convincing with the credibility that would come from practicing what it preaches even more. There has been a clear bipartisan continuity in the TIP Office leadership to increase emphasis on the United States as a good example, using the chairmanship of the inter-agency Senior Policy Operating Group codified by Congress in the TVPA. A central premise of the

LAGON

TIP Office’s efforts between 2007 and 2009 was that the United States needed to be an exemplar to be an effective promoter of the anti-trafficking agenda globally. The analogy of how the U.S. Guantanamo, black-site, and enhanced interrogation detainee policies undercut U.S. promotion of freedom, good governance, and credible anti-terrorism policy internationally was obvious at the time. For example, in the Bush era, the Department of State profiled the United States in the TIP Report, intensively disseminated the Department of Justice (DOJ) annual report on the U.S. record on TIP worldwide,11 and

Culture&Society

Director I volunteered to co-lead the U.S. delegation to report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on how the United States was implementing two Optional Protocols that it has ratified (on sale and prostitution of children, and on child soldiers).13 Admitting failings in the areas of the child sexual exploitation protocol was extremely helpful in the United States’ constructive leadership role in urging other governments to do more. In the Spring of 2010 at Georgetown University, the South Korean Chairperson of that UN Committee, Yanghee Lee, emphasized the substantial benefit of that U.S. candor.

Presidential and Cabinet-level diplo-

macy should make clear that human trafficking is not a peripheral U.S. concern. convinced the DOJ to produce it the same month as the TIP Report (with the “optics” of assessing the United States itself just at the time the United States assessed others). It is tremendous that Secretary of State Clinton has gone further, including a profile with a ranking and lengthier recommendations about areas of weakness in the Report.12 The U.S. chapter of the global NGO End Child Prostitution and Trafficking (ECPAT) submitted a comment on that U.S. profile in its report, noting that it did not reflect U.S. Government statistics from 2008 and 2009, which show that almost three times as many prostituted children were arrested as were offered protection and assistance. To be transparent about this very problem of punishing victims, as TIP Office

Concretely, there are three key further steps that the United States should take in order to be a better exemplar. First, the United States should make human trafficking the entrenched focus of domestic policy and spending at the federal, state, and local level, much as domestic violence has become, investing especially in better capacity to give shelter to victims (including prostituted minors). Second, the United States must do what it tells other nations to do: take implementation as seriously as passing laws. The key is to provide law enforcement and prosecutors training, as well as professional incentives to prioritize prosecutions for human trafficking relative to other crimes, given finite resources. Federal officials, Congress, and the fifty State Attorney Generals

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THE GLOBAL ABOLITION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

have it in their power to signal that priority for career advancement. Finally, congressional hearings should examine whether a focus on prosecutions is in effect de-prioritizing access to justice for victims. In particular, minors should not be jailed for being prostituted even to encourage testimony against traffickers. Moreover, the United States should adopt the norm of the Council of Europe Convention on Trafficking in Persons that a migrant victim should be given a period to reflect on whether to testify against his or her exploiter, rather than to be further traumatized and face deportation for not cooperating with law enforcement.

A Helping Hand. U.S. efforts to

persuade other governments to do more are advanced by offering a helping hand. It is not fully appreciated, but the assistance given to NGOs and more efficacious international organizations like the International Organization of Migration (IOM) is as important a part of the U.S. policy as any. If this fight against human trafficking is about rule of law and access to justice, civil society organizations are crucial partners of law enforcement to identify victims, make

or with counterparts in other nations. Above all, it means offering training to other nations’ law enforcement branches to help turn law on paper into reality. Law enforcement, immigration officials, and judges worldwide need a helping hand through training to learn to see a victim as a victim, not as a dirty or willful criminal. Governments with a will to change (that is, on Tier 2 and Tier 2 Watch List of the State Department report), but with limited resources, deserve help. Less developed African nations need not so much “grading on a curve” in the U.S. TIP Report (more generous rankings due to lacking governmental capacity) as they need tangible U.S. and multilateral assistance.

Tough Love. Acting as an exemplar

and offering a helping hand are important complements to pressuring other governments to increase their anti-TIP efforts. But after ten years of the “tough love” pressure embodied by the TIP Office and its unique report, one that gives grades, is indeed still needed. The TVPA has manifestly worked, as the rankings and global awareness raised by the report has put constructive pres-

A business coalition will be most successful if it goes beyond a single sector. them feel safe, and help them. Victims become more stable, helpful witnesses in the process. A U.S. helping hand can be offered directly to some governments as well. A helping hand does not mean deploying U.S. law enforcement to do the job for

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sure on governments worldwide. This has been true even among U.S. allies unused to prodding: Turkey, Israel, the Philippines, the UAE, and even Ireland, which recently appointed an anti-trafficking “czar.” Although some say this “tough love”

LAGON

has not worked, the claim is flatly untrue. The TIP Office and the Report focus the minds of other governments on the problem; and they focus the minds of U.S. diplomats who would otherwise not have this issue factor into their priorities. The TVPA Reauthorization Act of 2008, aptly named after British abolitionist parliamentarian William Wilberforce, had one particularly important and welcome provision. It offered a time limit on a country being given a Tier 2 Watch List ranking.14 This threat of a downgrade should be used, and the waiver authority Congress gave to the Executive Branch to defer or avert an automatic Tier 3 ranking should not be misused in the name of alleged national interests. A so-called â&#x20AC;&#x153;Watch Listâ&#x20AC;? is only meaningful if there is a significant prospect of a downgrade to the lowest tier. As such, Russia and India (7 years at Tier 2 Watch List), and China (6 years) require intensified engagement by the United States and other nations. In all three cases, this engagement will involve going to the top, partners, and sharing lessons with them. First, Presidential and Cabinet-level diplomacy should make clear that human trafficking is not a peripheral U.S. concern relative to economic, counter-terrorism, or nuclear equities. Second, the United States should enlist other great powers in collective dialogue with each of these nations (such as with Russia), for instance at the G-20. Third, the United States should offer examples of what has worked domestically. We must share with India our painful experience of how, in a federal system like its own, U.S. national government action was

Culture&Society

necessary and possible to make desegregation happen in all states. This too will be the case with bonded labor for disadvantaged castes in India. There is one other area for tougher love. One of the places where trafficking for labor and victimization of women converge takes place on U.S. soil: domestic servitude for diplomats. A woman from Goa who alleged she was the human trafficking victim of a Kuwaiti official stationed in the U.S. told me something striking in 2008. She said the family treated her far worse as a domestic servant in the United States than in Kuwait because there was even less reason to think they would face consequences in the U.S. than in a Gulf country.15 That observation should make anyone pause in horror. It was worse in the United States because of the impunity delivered by diplomatic immunity. The U.S. Congress was rightly crystal clear in the TVPA, thrice reauthorized, that attention should be paid to government officials found complicit in human trafficking.16 Unpunished official complicity is precisely the issue here. It is inevitable that governments may exercise the option to withdraw accused diplomats rather than agree to lift diplomatic immunity to allow U.S. prosecution. Still, to meet the intent of the TVPA, these cases should be cited in the TIP Report (without using individual names, as has been the case to date with other types of TIP).

The Role of Business. In short, both carrots and sticks, both honey and vinegar, are essential in U.S. diplomacy. Secretary of State Clinton is carrying forward an approach of the

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Clinton and Bush Administrations to mobilize partnerships with NGOs, philanthropies, and businesses in our foreign policy. She deemed “partnerships” a fourth “P” along with the prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims, and prevention enumerated in the TVPA and Palermo Protocol—more labeling of a continuing, sound, non-partisan policy than introducing an initiative.17 To be effective, the U.S. Government must go beyond giving money to NGOs and soliciting money from businesses, to coordinating veritable collaborative development of an abolition strategy with these partners. The business community is a particularly crucial partner. Market demand is a powerful force, and demand for cheap products and commercial sex are drivers of human trafficking. In 2009 the Department of Labor finally fulfilled a 2005 and 2008 Congressional mandate to produce a list of goods tainted by forced and child labor.18 If consumers knew some businesses were committed to reducing human trafficking, then demand would become an enormous force for good, creating an incentive for businesses to get ahead of the curve and join the fight. Globalization need not inexorably lead to slavery, but it will take the proactive efforts of businesses to prevent it. It is not too much to ask businesses to take preventive action against the most extreme and autonomy-denying forms of exploitation, which are manifestly illegal under international law and most countries’ domestic law. It is high time that businesses become more actively and tangibly involved in the global fight again human trafficking. For ten years, governments,

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NGOs, and international organizations have dedicated sizeable efforts to fight trafficking. More definitive results will come, however, if businesses work together to advance in anti-TIP policy. A business coalition would seize the opportunity to leverage varied and unique resources to take a quantum leap in the fight, with the goal of abolishing trafficking. In October 2010, major businesses from sectors as diverse as information technology, soft drinks, cosmetics, labor placement, energy, the auto industry, the airline industry, travel and hospitality, banking, legal publishing, and entertainment met in Washington to explore such a business coalition. A business coalition will be most successful if it goes beyond a single sector (like cocoa or apparel), but nonetheless starts with a modestly sized group of truly committed players attracting others to join. Businesses should go further than they have to date. They must go beyond merely pursuing dialogue with government and the UN, single-sector accountability efforts, and public awareness efforts not involving accountability of their own business operations. How can human trafficking be abolished if businesses are not fully engaged in working collaboratively across sectors and in reducing enabling environments? If they did so, there would be a much more significant chance to abolish this contemporary form of slavery.

Out of the Shadows. The State

Department TIP Office and Report have done much to bring the issue of human trafficking out of the shadows. It is worth thinking about how over the last decade the TIP Office, created

LAGON

ten years ago by the U.S. Congress, has found a formula for exercising public diplomacy more effectively. The TIP Office has told the story of universal values and the partnership the United States offers to extend them. That role has been even more important than the office’s traditional diplomacy, and has indeed strengthened that traditional diplomacy. Maybe that model can help fix the broken U.S. public diplomacy policy. That larger policy has lost its way due to post-Cold War dissolution of the U.S. Information Agency, overreliance on burgeoning private sector television and Internet outlets, ill-conceived ideas that public diplomacy is much like corporate marketing, and occasionally ham-handed forays into engaging the Muslim world after 9/11. As for human trafficking, bringing

Culture&Society

the issue out of the shadows is the starting point, and U.S. and multilateral efforts in last ten years have achieved that. Human trafficking victims themselves are indeed in the shadows—socially and economically marginalized groups seen by society and law enforcement as at fault, criminal, or expendable, rather than brutalized and degraded. Human trafficking can slowly but surely itself be marginalized, as slavery was in the 1800s. Among other measures, it will require diplomatic leadership from the U.S. as the enduring “indispensible nation,” offering a good example and a helping hand to partners, and strengthened by assistance from the business community. This formula is what it will take to abolish trafficking, so that rule of law is fully realized and that all types victims are offered a chance to reclaim their inherent dignity.

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NOTES

1 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, (Washington, D.C., 2010), 7. 2 International Labour Organization, “Forced Labour,” Internet, www.ilo.org/global/Themes/ Forced_Labour/lang--en/index.htm (date accessed: 31 December 2010). 3 Kevin Bales, Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 8. An estimate used as the primary benchmark by the major U.S. NGOs is 27 million slaves in the world. 4 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Protocols Thereto, (New York, 2004), 41-52. For the text of the Protocol and the principal Convention, see www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/ Publications/TOC Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf. 5 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Combating Trafficking in Persons: A Handbook for Parliamentarians, (New York, 2009). The handbook was developed by UNODC along with the Inter-Parliamentary Union. See www.unodc.org/documents/humantrafficking/UN_Handbook_engl_core_low.pdf. 6 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Pub L No 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, codified at 22 USC. § 7101 (2000 and Supp. 2003, 2005, and 2008). 7 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, (Washington, D.C., 2010), 45. 8 Ibid. 9 Kevin Bales, Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of Cali-

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fornia Press, 2004), 9. U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, (Washington, D.C., 2010), 8. 11 See, for instance, U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Annual Report to Congress and Assessment of U.S. Government Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons Fiscal Year 2008. 12 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, (Washington, D.C., 2010), 338-345. 13 U.S. Department of State, “Initial Report Concerning the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography,” Internet, www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/84467.htm (date accessed: 31 December 2010). U.S. Department of State, Initial Report Concerning the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Internet, www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/83929.htm (date accessed: 31 December 2010). 14 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. Public L No 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, codified at 22 USC. § 7101 (2008), sec 107(a). 15 See the treatment by the American Civil Liberties Union of Tina Fernandez in the case of Sabbithi, et al. v. Al Saleh, et al., Internet, www.aclu.org/humanrights-womens-rights/case-profile-sabbithi-et-alv-al-saleh-et-al (date accessed: 31 December 2010). 16 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, sec. 108(b)(7). 17 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Partnering Against Trafficking,” The Washington Post (17 June 2009). 18 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Affairs, The Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, Internet, www.dol.gov/ ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2009TVPRA.pdf (date accessed: 31 December 2010).

Law&Ethics Ethnicity, Elections, and Reform in Burma David C. Williams On 7 November 2010, after fifty years of military rule, Burma elected a partially civilian government under a constitution adopted in 2008.1 Much of the international community pressured the government of Burma—called the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC—to ensure that the elections would be free and fair, though few believed that they would be.2 Whether the elections were free and fair mattered only if the constitution under which they were held addressed the underlying ethnic discord that brought on military rule in the first place. If it did not, Burma will almost certainly revert to military government within a few years—as the constitution itself permits. Sadly, the 2008 constitution fails to come to grips with Burma’s problems: it makes no provision for meaningful power sharing among the ethnic groups, and it gives the minorities no protection against continued military oppression.3 For that reason, the central focus of the international community should not be free and fair elections; instead, it should be seeking ways to encourage the Burmese government—both the military, which holds real power, and the new civilian office-holders— to undertake sustained dialogue with all of the country’s stakeholders, especially its ethnic minorities. The goal of

David C. Williams is the John S. Hastings Professor of Law at Indiana University Maurer School of Law and Executive Director of the Center for Constitutional Democracy.

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that dialogue should be a constitutional settlement giving all of the stakeholders at least a minimally acceptable bargain with which they are prepared to live. This article first reviews the roots of Burmaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s civil war in post-independence ethnic conflict and the subsequent military takeover. It then examines the dimensions of the current ethnic conflict. It then explains why the current constitution and the elections taken under it will do nothing to ameliorate that conflict. Finally, it argues that the international community should use whatever leverage it has over the regime to encourage constitutional reform, rather than focusing on electoral fairness.

The Roots of the Conflict.

Ethnicity lies at the base of the conflict in Burma. Too often, commentators portray the contest as a simple division between the proponents of military rule and of democracy.4 In this view, if the generals can be forced off stage, Burma will return to stability. In fact, however, Burma erupted into ethnic war at a time when it had a democratic constitution and no one espoused military rule.5 The ethnic minorities took up arms because they believed that the constitution did not provide them enough self-determination, and the military seized control in response.6 Even if a new constitution returned the country to civilian rule, it still would not bring peace unless it also addressed the source of ethnic discord. The 2008 constitution does neither. When Burma became independent from Great Britain in 1948, it included a majority ethnic group, the Burmans, and many ethnic minori-

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ties, such as the Karen, the Kachin, the Mon, the Shan, the Chin, the Karenni, and the Rakhine.7 In centuries prior, the Burman kings had attempted to extend their rule over the other groups but never managed to gain complete control.8 During World War II, the minorities had largely supported the Allies,9 but until the end of the war, most Burmans allied themselves with the Japanese, who permitted a puppet government.10 As a result, Burma became independent after the war under conditions of marked ethnic hostility. Many ethnic minorities feared that if they became part of Burma, the Burmans would oppress them.11 Some wished for independence,12 and others would agree to merge only if the constitution gave them special protection.13 Some leaders asked the British government for a gradual process of negotiation before independence.14 By contrast, Aung San, the principal leader of the Burmans, wanted immediate independence.15 He met with leaders of the Frontier Areasâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;which the British had governed separately from the rest of Burma because they were populated largely by ethnic minoritiesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;in order to persuade them to form a United Burma. In the resulting Panglong Agreement, Aung San promised substantial home rule to the ethnic leaders, and in exchange they agreed to become part of the federal union of Burma.16 Tragically, Aung San and many of his associates were assassinated shortly afterward,17 and the subsequently adopted 1947 Constitution gave the minorities little of what they wanted.18 Many of the ethnic groups, including the powerful and restive Karen,

WILLIAMS

Law&Ethics

received no home rule at all, and others became the titular nationalities in states with varying degrees of limited power.19 The country soon broke into civil war. The conflict was partially ideological: the Communist Party took up arms because it had been driven out of government.20 But it was also partially ethnic: the Karen formed an insurrectionary force to fight for selfdetermination.21 Over the following decades, more ethnic groups would join the Karen in resistance, and today virtually every sizable group has formed an insurgent army.22 Meanwhile, the Communist Party dissolved into smaller, ethnically identified pieces.23 As a result, virtually all the resistance forces today conceptualize their struggle as a fight for ethnic self-determination, rather than a disagreement over economic ideology. In response to the civil war, the civilian government asked the army to run the country for a period in the late 1950s.24 The military returned to the barracks, but in 1962, with the war raging unabated, the military took power again, this time uninvited, and for good.25 Since then, the army has insisted that it must rule because it alone can keep the country together against the ethnic forces that would tear it apart.26 In other words, military rule in Burma is the product of ethnic unrest.

rienced democracy for fifty years, so few officials have practice in running one. The juntaâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;which continues to dominate even after the electionsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;is deeply xenophobic and uninterested in learning from neighboring democracies.28 Even if the country were not ethnically divided, making democracy work in Burma would therefore be a difficult task. But whenever a democratic government ultimately comes to power, it will confront a profoundly fissured country, full of groups suspicious of the government and each other. Burma is torn by the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s longest-running civil war, which is rooted in ethnic fear. The ethnic armies are not strong enough to overthrow the military junta, but the junta has been unable to suppress the opposition. Despite decades of conflict, some of the ethnic armies are still in active resistance, bloodied but unbowed.29 The junta bought peace with most of the larger groups through ceasefire agreements allowing substantial self-rule.30 Recently, the regime ordered the ceasefire groups to become border guard units within the Burmese army, but as the groups have refused to join and the regime has allowed deadline after deadline to pass, it seems increasingly clear that the junta cannot enforce the edict.31 These decades of war have left a deep legacy. Decades ago, the ethnic tensions did not run as deep, but for many years, The Current Problem. A return ethnic differences have been politicized to democracy will therefore not bring and the minorities have been marginalpeace to Burma unless the constitution ized. The result is a climate of distrust also addresses the ethnic division there. that would make any democratic regime Burma faces tremendous obstacles in fragile. On the one hand, although transitioning to democracy. The econ- many pro-democracy Burman leadomy and the educational system are in ers believe in ethnic self-determinashambles.27 The country has not expe- tion, the regime has taught ordinary Winter/Spring 2011 [ 1 0 1 ]

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Burmans to fear the ethnic armies. Some likely buy into the junta’s selfportrait as the nation’s savior; in this view, without a dominant military, the minorities would swoop down and kill ordinary people in their beds. Many from the army’s top brass built their careers fighting the ethnic armies, and thus view them with hatred.32 On the other side, the ethnic minorities have long feared the central government. They want to govern themselves in their own way because their cultures differ from that of the Burmans, especially with respect to language, religion,

for centuries. Democratization without special constitutional protections will not address their concerns.

The 2008 Constitution. After

Burma becomes democratic, the citizenry will need the right constitutional tools to address the country’s underlying problems. At a minimum, the constitution must empower the minorities beyond merely granting them voting strength proportionate to their numbers. The reasons are two-fold. First, if the constitution does not meet at least some of the minorities’ demands, they

At this point…the international community should focus on promoting deep structural change rather than dissecting elections that were only window dressing. and culture, and the SPDC has sought to “Burmanize” the minorities.33 Even putting cultural differences aside, however, the minorities do not want to be ruled from the center because they do not trust the people there. For the Burmans, the military takeover in 1962 marked a sharp departure from parliamentarianism to authoritarianism. For many of the minorities, by contrast, 1962 was not especially important; before the transition they felt oppressed by the Burmancontrolled parliamentary government, and after, they felt oppressed by the Burman-controlled military. From their perspective, the current atrocities are largely continuous, with mistreatment meted out from the center

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will not lay down their arms. Second, ethnic relations will remain poisonous so long as the majority is able electorally to dominate the minorities. Only when the constitution forces the two groups to work together as partners will the situation improve. Unhappily, the 2008 Constitution fails meaningfully to empower the minorities, and the resistance groups have overwhelmingly rejected it.34 Their objections are many, but three are especially important. First, they want federalism.35 Burma’s ethnic minorities are concentrated in seven states lying in the country’s periphery.36 Devolution of power to these state governments will therefore entail devolution to the

WILLIAMS

minorities. Federalism will bring the minorities what they want, however, only if the minorities themselves are in control of the state governments and those governments have power over the issues that are especially important to the minorities. The 2008 constitution provides for neither. The most powerful official in the state governments will be the Chief Minister, who will be entirely controlled by the President of the Union. The President has the power to name the Chief Minister,37 and the state legislature may reject the president’s nominee only if he lacks the constitutional qualifications to serve in that capacity.38 In addition, “[t]he Chief Minister of the Region or State shall be responsible to the President,”39 so the President may presumably remove him at will. In short, the Chief Minister will not be answerable to the state citizenry; he will be a local agent of the central government. In addition, the state governments will be very weak. Schedule One of the Constitution lists the powers of the Union legislature; Schedule Two lists the powers of the state legislatures. It is not possible concisely to summarize these two lists, but a few points may give a sense of how feeble the states will be. In the official English version, the list of Union powers spans seven pages; the list of state powers, only three. As one example of the balance of powers, Schedule One gives the Union power over “[m]inerals, mines, safety of mine workers, and environmental conservation and restoration,”40 as well as “[g] ems.”41 By contrast, Schedule Two gives the states power over “[c]utting and polishing of gemstones within the . . .

Law&Ethics

State.”42 In addition, the Constitution gives the Union legislature residual legislative power, meaning that all powers not specifically enumerated in the Schedules belong to the Union.43 Finally, whenever legislation passed by a state legislature conflicts with legislation passed by the Union, the latter shall prevail.44 In other words, the central government has the power to void state law. Second, the minorities want a superproportional share of power in at least one major decision-making body in the central government. In particular, they desire that representation in the upper house of the legislature be structured in the same way as the U.S. Senate; each state, regardless of population, would have the same number of representatives.45 Because the minorities tend to live in the less populated states, they would have super-proportional power. This sort of arrangement is not anomalous in Burma’s history. The 1947 Constitution provided for a Chamber of Nationalities in which the ethnic minorities received superproportional power.46 Even the 2008 Constitution provides that each of the seven states shall send equal numbers of representatives to the upper house. But the Constitution also provides that each of Burma’s seven regions—which are dominated by Burmans—will send the same number of representatives.47 In addition, the minorities will not likely elect all of the representatives even from the states, both because the SPDC has resettled large numbers of Burmans there, and because under the constitution, the military will appoint 25 percent of all members of the upper house, even those from minority states.48 As a

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result, the minorities will not have the numbers to influence legislation. Third, the minorities want guarantees that the military will not resume attacks. The 2008 Constitution promises the opposite. Article 20(b) provides that the civilian government shall have no power over the military within its domain: “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces.” That domain is extremely broad; it includes “safeguarding the non-disintegration of the Union, the non-disintegration of National solidarity and the perpetuation of sovereignty.”49 The army’s power to write its own ticket is a threat to all Burmese people, but it is a special threat to the ethnic minorities. The junta has long claimed that the ethnic minorities want to disintegrate the union and that only armed force can stop them. Article 20(e)’s reference to “non-disintegration of the Union” is therefore code; it means that the army can do anything it wants to the minorities. Further, if the military perceives a threat from the ethnic groups, it has power to dissolve the civilian government altogether. “If there arises a state of emergency that could cause disintegration of the Union . . . the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services has the right to take over and exercise State sovereign power . . .”50 In other words, the Tatmadaw could seize control as it did in 1962, but this time it would be legal. The whole constitution is based on a “wait and see” strategy—if the civilian government does what the Tatmadaw wants, then it will be allowed to rule; if not, then it will be forced out.

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Beyond the Elections. By all

accounts, the 2010 elections were not free and fair, but even if they had been, it would not have mattered because under the constitution the military still rules and the ethnic minorities are still at risk. The elections did not and could not bring real change by themselves. At this point, therefore, the international community should focus on promoting deep structural change rather than dissecting elections that were only window-dressing. As has become clear, the rest of the world has limited influence on the SPDC, but for that very reason, it must spend its limited capital wisely. As the United Nations has long realized, the only path for real change in Burma is trilateral dialogue between the SPDC, the democracy proponents, and the ethnic minorities. Such dialogue is necessary not only for justice, but also for peace. Though the elections will not themselves cause reform, they may create more fluid conditions in which reform might become more possible. The best option for the international community will be to support those domestic actors who have the will and the capacity to move the country toward reform. That support should consist of direct funding, legitimization, education, opportunities for travel and exposure, and, to the extent possible, protection. At least two sets of actors are particularly relevant: the new civilian legislators and the ethnic resistance armies. As to the first, the 2008 Constitution allows the military to dominate the civilian government, and the SPDC surely hand-picked virtually all the new

WILLIAMS

legislators. Over time, however, the civilian office-holders may develop a sense of shared interest, separate from the military. Many of the candidates in the last election were until recently army officers whom the SPDC had forced to retire so that they could take up civilian seats.51 These ex-officers have cause for resentment; in depriving them of military rank, the SPDC also deprived them of their revenue base, and they may now be interested in creating a new legislative revenue stream. In other words, they will have a focused self-interest in shifting power away from the army and toward the somewhat-more-democratic union, state, and regional parliaments. Second, many of the ethnic resistance armies command local loyalty and deeply desire democracy and selfdetermination. These groups currently govern territory, will be critical to any peace settlement, and will play a leading role in any genuinely democratic local government. They need the assistance of the international community to govern their territory wisely now and to prepare themselves for a democratic future.

Law&Ethics

Other groups have been more concerned with profiteering than democracy, but even some of those groups are now changing their focus. The United Wa State Army, for example, is seeking assistance from the United Nations to shift its economic base away from narco-trafficking.52 The international community should help and encourage these groups to reform themselves. Admittedly, it can sometimes be difficult to discern the complicated agendas of the various groups, but the international community must learn the landscape. It will not be possible to script the next several years. As conditions become more fluid, change will occur, but its exact nature will be difficult to predict. For that reason, international actors should now be collecting information and forging the relationships that will allow them to respond quickly and intelligently when opportunities appear. The strategy of pressuring the SPDC from the sidelines has failed. It is time now to help those Burmese people who want to find a way to lasting ethnic peace.

NOTES 1

Seth Mydans, “Myanmar Junta Sets Election Date,” New York Times, 13 August 2010, Internet, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/ world/asia/14myanmar.html?scp=1&sq=burma%20 2010%20election&st=cse (date accessed: 31 August, 2010); for voting qualifications, the nature and powers of the legislative body to be elected, and the formation and duties of the electoral commission, see Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ch. IX (2008), available at http://ccd. indiana.edu/file_download/10/cob2008_eng.pdf. 2

U.S. State Department Deputy Spokesman

Mark Toner said, “This election cannot be inclusive or credible under current circumstances…We urge the authorities to release all political prisoners and to enter into genuine dialogue with all stakeholders as a first step towards national reconciliation.” Lalit K Jha, “US, UN Respond to Burma’s Election Date,” Internet, http://www.irrawaddy.org/article. php?art_id=19216 (date accessed: 31 August, 2010). 3 “The President… may, if necessary, restrict or suspend as required, one or more fundamental rights of the citizens residing in the areas where the state of emergency is in operation.” Constitution of Myanmar ch. XI, sec. 414(b) (2008).

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4 Editorial, “Democracy, Burma-Style,” Washington Post, 4 May, 2008, B6; Seth Mydans and Mark McDonald, “Court Case of Dissident Under Way in Myanmar,” New York Times, 19 May, 2009, A6. 5 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 2nd ed., (New York: Zed Books, 1999), 106, 107, and 110. 6 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 169. 7 Smith, Burma, 30-33. 8 Ibid., 38-39. 9 Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies: the Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945, (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 204-06, 279, and 352-53. 10 William Slim, Defeat into Victory, 2nd ed., (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1956), 484-85. 11 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, xiv. 12 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma, (New York: Ferrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2006), 253. 13 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, xiv. 14 Ibid. 15 Smith, Burma, 66. 16 Ibid., 78. 17 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, xiii. 18 Smith, Burma, 79. 19 Ibid., 80-87. 20 Ibid., 106. 21 Ibid., 110. 22 Ibid., 93-94. 23 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 364-68. 24 Ibid., 143-45. 25 Ibid., 169. 26 The military’s role in the constitution includes “safeguarding the non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of National solidarity and the perpetuation of sovereignty.” See Constitution of Myanmar, ch. I, sec. 20 (2008). 27 David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 164-66, 20 6-210. 28 Ibid., 107 and 238. 29 Lawi Weng, “Ethnic Groups Enter Alliance,” Internet, http://www.irrawaddy.org/article. php?art_id=18568 (date accessed: 2 September, 2010). 30 Smith, Burma, 440-50. 31 Lawi Weng, “KIO Calls for Free and Fair Election,” The Irrawaddy (Thailand), 1 September

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2010, Internet, http://www.irrawaddy.org/article. php?art_id=19356 (date accessed: 3 September, 2010). 32 E.g., Maung Aye and Shwe Mann, “SPDC Who’s Who,” Internet, http://www.altsean.org/ Research/SPDC%20Whos%20Who/SPDCWWHome.php (date accessed: 1 September, 2010). 33 Smith, Burma, 441. 34 Lawi Weng, “Mon Cease-fire Group Says Election Not the Solution,” The Irrawaddy (Thailand), 25 August 2010, Internet, http://www. irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=19301 (date accessed 2 September, 2010). 35 Aung Naing Oo, “Burma: Compromise and Freedom,” The Irrawaddy (Thailand), 24 August 2010, Internet, http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=3824 (date accessed: 2 September, 2010). 36 Smith, Burma, 262. 37 Constitution of Myanmar, ch. V, art. 261(b) (2008). 38 Ibid., ch. V, art. 261(d). 39 Ibid., ch. V. art. 262(l)(i). 40 Ibid., Schedule One, Union Legislative List, art. 6(c). 41 Ibid., art. 6(d). 42 Ibid., Schedule Two, Region or State Legislative List, art. 4(c). 43 Ibid., ch. IV, art. 98. 44 Ibid., ch. IV. art. 198(b). 45 Sai Aik Pao, interview, The Irrawaddy (Thailand), 28 July, 2010, http://www.irrawaddy.org/ article.php?art_id=19075 (date accessed: 2 September, 2010). 46 See Constitution of the Union of Burma, ch VI, pt. III, art. 87 (1947) and Ibid., Second Schedule, available at http://www.blc-burma.org/html/ Constitution/1947.html. 47 Constitution of Burma, ch. IV, art. 141(a) (2008). 48 Ibid., ch. IV, art. 141(b). 49 Ibid., ch. I, art. 20(e). 50 Ibid., ch. I, art. 40(c). 51 Sarah Jackson-Han, “Businessmen Urged to Run,” Radio Free Asia, 31 March 2009, Internet, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/burma/business-03312009123802.html (date accessed: 2 September, 2010). 52 Shawn L. Nance, “UN Denies It has Yanked Staffers,” The Irrawaddy (Thailand), 11 March 2005, Internet, http://www.irrawaddy.org/article. php?art_id=4457&page=1 (date accessed: 2 September, 2010).

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Glaciers, Monsoons, Rivers, and Conflict: China and South Asia Paul Sullivan The waters from the glaciers and snows of the Himalayas and the Tibetan Plateau affect the lives of at least one in every five persons on earth. They can potentially affect many other people, depending on how issues over water and climate work out in this region. The entire global economy could be particularly affected by water-induced downturns in India and China, as conflict in the region could have global costs and implications. It is vital that water become a full part of all security discussions and strategic thinking about this part of the world.

Dr. Paul Sullivan is an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown Universityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Security Studies Program and a Professor of Economics at the National Defense University. His academic and professional interests include global energy and security, global water security, and natural resources and conflict.

The Asian BRICS and the Water that Could Dissolve Their Hopes. Much has been written about

the development of the BRICS, and particularly about the phenomenal recent growth of India and China.1 However, few analysts have addressed the obvious: water and water agreements may determine the future of China and the countries of South Asia. These vital water connections between South Asian countries and China will tie them either in tension and conflict, or peaceful coexistence, for long into the future. Climate change may make the situation more turbulent and complex. Winter/Spring 2011 [ 1 0 7 ]

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The Tibetan Plateau is a major contributor to the waters and rivers of China, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Subsequently, it is a source of livelihood for the people who live there and depend on it for agriculture, fishing, transport, and more. The size of the rivers’ drainage basins could be as large as Brazil.2 In addition to the glaciers of the Hindu Kush and Karakoram ranges, the importance of these glaciers and their related snowmelt extends to Central Asia and the most important rivers there. The Tibetan Plateau holds

have dropped accordingly, even with the occasional improvements in water management. By 2050, there could be approximately 846 million new people in the region—an increase equal to five times the population of Bangladesh.

The Water Problems of the Major South Asian States and China. Pakistan is one of the world’s most arid countries. It relies almost entirely on the Indus River, which is sourced in India, the two Kashmir territories, and the mountains and gla-

The waters from the glaciers and snows of the Himalayas and the Tibetan Plateau affect the lives of at least one in every five persons on earth. the world’s third largest ice reserves and it is an important geophysicalmeteorological area for the development of the monsoons in South Asia and China.3 If the glaciers and snows of the Tibetan Plateau dissipate substantially, it is possible that monsoon cycles will be severely disrupted and the entire meteorology of South Asia and China will be affected in a very negative way. If the glaciers are heavily depleted because of rises in temperature, it could mean that the rivers of South Asia and China (and well beyond) will become more like the seasonal rivers of other parts of the world. This would be a disaster of unthinkable proportions. The population in all of these countries has increased by about 1.9 billion people since 1947.4 Water supplies per capita in all of these countries

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ciers of China.5 About fifty percent of Pakistan’s water is from glacial melt and snowmelt from the mountains (during the dry months this increases to seventy percent). Overall, Pakistan relies on international rivers for seventy-seven percent of its water supply, and about ninety-six percent of the country’s water is directed toward agriculture. Pakistan also has massive hydropower potential, most particularly in its northern reaches, but uses only about thirty-two percent of it.6 The need for power will increase as the country develops and its population grows. Building dams could help improve electricity production and water storage. However, one of the most favorable locations for building dams is the disputed area of Kashmir – this issue between India and Pakistan has a lot to do with water conflicts. The Indus River Treaty signed

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between Pakistan and India gives India rights to the eastern rivers—the Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas—until they run into Pakistan. It gives Pakistan almost exclusive rights to the western rivers—the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. Without this treaty, tensions in the area would be considerably worse. Increased water stress and pollution could stifle economic and human development in the country, which, together with ever increasing urbanization, could cause even more serious political and social strife in this already turbulent country. Bangladesh7 relies on international rivers for ninety-one percent of its water needs.8 Most of its water comes from the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna rivers via sources in India and beyond. The sources of the Brahmaputra and Ganges are in the Glaciers of the Himalayas. Generally, ten to fourteen percent of the water that flows in these rivers comes from glaciers and snowmelt; during the dry months, however, the rivers rely on these sources for fifty to seventy percent of their water. Rainfall occurs in strong, but fairly short-lived, bursts of a few hours or days at a time during specific periods of the year, and provides only one-quarter of Bangladesh’s water. During dry months, Bangladesh is almost entirely reliant on outside water, and storage capacity in the country is tiny compared to its needs. Bangladesh is a water-based economy and society. Fishery constitutes four percent of its GDP and employs nine percent of the labor force. About sixtythree percent of its labor force operates in the agricultural sector, which constitutes twenty percent of the country’s GDP. Water transport makes up fifteen

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percent of its GDP. Bangladesh faces severe water challenges from many angles—the actions of India, China, and Nepal have significant implications for its water supply. The damming up of the headwaters of the Brahmaputra and Ganges by any other state can affect the water flows to Bangladesh. There are currently no effective treaties or agreements in effect that could give Bangladesh the required negotiating clout to deal with these multilateral water stresses properly.

India9 relies heavily on monsoons and

snowmelt for water, but seventy-five percent of it comes from international rivers.10 As with Bangladesh, rains fall for a short time during the year, albeit heavily and sometimes with great variance across this huge country. River flows during the dry months rely significantly on the glacial melt from the Himalayas. This is particularly true for the rivers of the north—the Ganges, Brahmaputra, Sutlej, Ravi, Beas, Kosi, Gandak, and the Yamuna. The Indians want to develop a scheme to transfer water from the more reliable and fuller rivers to those that are weak. India’s National Rivers Linking Project will cost tens of billions of dollars and will link rivers not only from the northern rivers sourced in China, but also to the rivers that connect with Bangladesh, such as the Brahmaputra and the Ganges.11 The Bangladeshis are quite concerned about the possible outcomes of India’s initiative. India also has a serious water storage problem and faces nearly constant energy shortages. The country hopes to address these problems through huge dam projects—most particularly in the

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northern mountains—in order to capture water for storage and to generate electricity. Although India’s current hydropower production is approximately fifteen gigawatts, its hydropower capacity is significantly higher, at about eighty-four gigawatts. As with Pakistan, India’s energy and water problems are made more complex and potentially more turbulent through the importance of Kashmir as a source of water flows from glaciers and snow melt.12

China13 relies on international riv-

ers for only about one-percent of its water.14 Had it not taken over Tibet in 1950, China would be significantly reliant on Tibet for its water, especially in the Yellow River Basin. One might even say that the recent economic developments of China may have been far more difficult, if not impossible, had the country not been in control of Tibet. If China does not divert its water, the country could face severe problems. China is directing much of its development resources to its northern provinces, and water is required for development to be successful. Since the revolution in the late 1940s, the water table in the north was drained by severe overuse, poor controls on water usage, and extremely poor management of water systems. China’s planned and actual water diversion and damming projects in the Tibetan Plateau have caused consternation in India and Bangladesh. These worries are shared in the Mekong Basin and Southeast Asia, which also rely heavily on the waters of the Tibetan Plateau. Water storage is a serious problem. Consequently, it is likely that China will focus on hydraulic economics and the

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politics of dams for some time to come. Without this power and water, economic development in China could be much more limited than some predict. China is growing at about ten percent annually. Some expect China’s growth rates to continue for a while, but worry about the water constraints and environmental costs that might result from development initiatives. The Chinese recognize these constraints and risks and are trying to develop and employ ways to address them.

Solutions. The problems that this

region faces in regard to climate change require global solutions that extend well beyond this area of the world. Global warming is a global problem; therefore, an effective global treaty is necessary for managing it. The UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses drafted a tribunal framework and some excellent ideas for addressing water-sharing issues. China, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have not ratified the measure and not enough countries have ratified it to bring it into force. These countries are most likely discouraged by Article 7, which requires that ratifying countries agree not to cause significant harm to others over shared waters, and that countries will compensate others if such harm or damage occurs.15 Regarding the rivers of South Asia and China, it may be best to rely on diplomatic efforts and common law of watercourses. The Chinese plan to divert water and build hydroelectric dams at the “Big Bend” at Shuomatan Point on the Brahmaputra. This is potentially one of the most difficult and tense issues

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among states in this region. There is no water-sharing treaty between China and India. The Brahmaputra flows into India from Tibet, cuts through Bangladesh, and drains into the Ganges Delta. Bangladesh does not have a water treaty with China either. The Chinese see this water as a major source for their plans to provide water to the north and other dry parts of the country. The Indians and Bangladeshis see this is a direct threat to their water and livelihoods. There seems to have been some Track II dialogue between Chinese and

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of bad rains and, more importantly, in times of rapid climate change and glacial melting in the region. Bangladesh should be part of these discussions, but it does not seem to be as engaged in the issue as India is. The water tensions between India and Bangladesh may keep these two potentially important parties from even agreeing to meet to discuss these issues.17 If a solid and effective agreement is not made between India and China, serious tensions could arise between the two countries. If Bangladesh is affected

One might even say that the recent eco-

nomic developments of China may have been far more difficult, if not impossible, had the country not been in control of Tibet. Indian Experts over the recent years but many people have not realized the seriousness of the issue.16 Of course, officials in states where the river is most important see an agreement or obstruction of the damming as vital to their countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; survival. India has asked for an agreement on the river in the past, but has had little success. Results of the Track II dialogues must be integrated into more formal efforts in order to develop a proper water agreement between India and China. This treaty should be developed with a long-run perspective toward what the demographics and necessities of these countries will be in the next decades and beyond. There should be some strict agreements on the amount of water-sharing and water use, as well as some discussion with trigger clauses that would go into effect during times

by any diversions of water or weather changes, tensions between this country and other states in the region could increase as well. Bangladesh and China have had friendly relations for at least three decades. Bangladesh would benefit from supporting India on this issue, however, given that the river first passes through India on its way to Bangladesh. Very importantly, collaboration on the Brahmaputra issues with China may also bring India and Bangladesh closer to cooperating on other water challenges they share. The water tensions between Pakistan and India have been reduced via the Indus River Treaty, which was brokered by the World Bank in 1960.18 The Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) has been established to facilitate decisions on issues related to water sharing, dam construction, and the like. If no Winter/Spring 2011 [ 1 1 1 ]

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agreement results, the World Bank is entitled to assign an arbitrator to the case, after which the countries in question could turn to the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague.19 One major source of disagreement here is the Kashmir territories and their

treaty and the commission are far from perfect, but they have survived two wars, many serious tensions between India and Pakistan, and numerous water disputes. Considering that water disputes are among the most contentious issues between these two nuclear powers, it is

Multilateral and multi-basin treaty negotiations could prove to be too difficult to undertake. Effort must be directed toward negotiations for river-by-river or basin-bybasin agreements. place in this treaty. China is helping Pakistan to build hydropower dams in the region even though the two countries have no water agreement. India wants to involve the PIC in determining the legality of the Pakistani dam in Kashmir, and Pakistan questions India’s dam projects on the Indus River. Indian projects in Kashmir territories include the Baglihar Dam, the Tulbul Navigation Project, and the Kishenganga Dam.20 The Baglihar problem has been mostly dealt via The World Bank appointing an expert per the Indus Treaty Agreement and at the behest of the Pakistanis in 2005, three years after the construction of the dam began. However, the 2007 final arbitration left Pakistan dissatisfied.21 Historically too, India’s diversion of water from the Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej rivers has been a great source of tension in the region.22 The Permanent Indus Commission continues to aid in the resolution of disputes regarding violations of the Indus River Treaty. The

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clear that the situation is better with a treaty and its arbitration mechanism than it would be without it.23 As the populations of both countries and their water demands increase, and as climate change continues to affect the glaciers that provide these countries with water, the strains on the treaty could become severe. Other non-water tensions between the two countries may also cause a snap in water relations. Since 1972, India and Bangladesh have had various agreements and treaties regarding rights to water. The most important include the establishment of the Joint River Commission and the 1996 Ganges River Treaty. The greatest disputes between the two countries involve the Farakka Barrage—which diverts Ganges water to India from Bangladesh, disagreements over the Teesta River barrages built by both countries, and Bangladesh’s near apoplectic predictions about the massive water diversion projects planned in India.24 Various treaties and agreements,

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starting with the 1977 Ganges Water Agreement, have not been long lasting or comprehensive. Another Ganges Treaty in 1996 facilitated a mechanism to sort out the complexities of the effects of this barrage, and is to be in effect until only 2026. This treaty will likely be yet another stepping-stone to a better agreement, since it does not resolve the issues of severe drought or emergencies and does not cover the environmental impacts of the barrage. Looking carefully at the water agreements and treaties among India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, it is clear that outside of the Indus River Treaty and the Ganges River Treaty, agreements are fairly ineffective or nonexistent. Furthermore, there are many other important rivers and water sources that have not been included in the treaty discussions to date. In the past, both brute force and careful and clever diplomacy were employed to deal with disputes over the dozens of rivers that these countries share. It is surely the time to systematize the existing treaties and agreements into a comprehensive whole. Many of the rivers in the region

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flow through more than two countries, and their basins are often intertwined. River linking projects, hydropower, barrages, and water diversion projects will likely lead to serious tensions throughout the region. If these water tensions are not properly addressed through diplomacy and binding treaties, conflict will not only continue, but will likely become worse as well. Multilateral and multi-basin treaty negotiations could prove to be too difficult to undertake. Effort must be directed toward negotiations for riverby-river or basin-by-basin agreements, which could ultimately expand into multilateral and multi-basin agreements. It is worth noting that these issues do not exist in a vacuum, and numerous political, economic, and diplomatic problems may preclude this solution. These issues are daunting, complex, and worrisome, but the future of China and South Asia truly rests on effective water-sharing and water treaties. Otherwise, far more than just thirst and famine could result.

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NOTES

1 Goldman Sachs, “Is this the BRIC’s Decade?”, Internet http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/brics-decade-doc.pdf Goldman Sachs, “The Long Term Outlook for the BRICs and the N-11 Post Crisis”, Internet http:// www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/long-term-outlook-doc.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011). 2 The tens of thousands of glaciers of the Tibetan Plateau are important sources for the waters of the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers in China, the Mekong River, the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra, The Sutlej, The Irrawaddy, The Salween, The Indus, the Ganges and more. The glaciers of this region often give as much as 10 percent of the water for the Ganges River that is shared by China, Nepal, India, and Bangladesh. They supply about 20-30 percent of the water needed by China via the Tangtze. They supply about 12 percent to the Brahmaputra, 45 percent to the Indus, 7 percent to the Mekong, and about 9 percent to the Salween. 3 If we take look at all of the water sources of the world 97 percent is salt water. Only 3 percent is fresh water. Of that fresh water 2.5 percent is frozen in the form of ice reserves in the “three poles.” See also: The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, “Water on the Tibetan Plateau”, Internet http://www.hcss.nl/en/publication/1157/Water-on-the-Tibetan-Plateau:-Ecological-and-Strat.html (date accessed: 9 January 2011) UNEP, “Freshwater Under Threat: South Asia”, Internet, http://www.roap.unep.org/pub/southasia_ report.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Central Tibetan Administration, Environment and Development Desk, Internet, “The Impact of Climate Change on the Tibetan Plateau: A Synthesis of Recent Science and Tibetan Research”, Internet, http:// tibet.net/en/pdf/diirpub/environment/copenhagen/ climatechangereport.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Behrman, Nina (ed.) “The Third Pole: Sources of Threat, Sources of Survival”, Internet, http://www.abuhrc.org/Publications/ Third%20Pole.pdf, and ICMOD (date accessed: 9 January 2011) “The Changing Himalayas”, Internet, http://apps.icimod.org/elibrary/uploads/tmp/icimod-the_changing_ himalayas.pdf, http://www.bbc.co.uk/weather/features/understanding/monsoon.shtml (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Massimo Bollasina, “The Role of the Tibetan Plateau and the Himalayas in the Asian Monsoon System”, Internet, http://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/ abs/10.1175/BAMS-85-7-1001 4 The population of Pakistan is now about 175 million. In 1947 it was only about 32 million. India’s population in 1947 was 350 million and now it is 1.2 billion. China’s population in 1947 was about 560 million and it is now 1.3 billion. The population of Bangladesh in 1947 was about 40 million and now it is 156 million. The population of Nepal and Burma

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were 8 and 18 millions in 1947. They are now 28 and 50 millions. U.S. Census Bureau, Internet, http:// sasweb.ssd.census.gov/idb/ranks.html (date accessed: 9 January 2011). 5 Asia Society, “Asia’s Next Challenge: Securing the Region’s Water Future”, Internet, http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/WaterSecurityReport.pdf, (date accessed: 9 January 2011). Behrman, Nina (ed.), “The Third Pole: Sources of Threat, Sources of Survival”, Internet, http://www. abuhrc.org/Publications/Third%20Pole.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011). ICMOD, “The Changing Himalayas”, Internet, http://apps.icimod.org/elibrary/uploads/tmp/icimod-the_changing_himalayas.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), IFAD, “Climate Change Impacts – South Asia,” Internet, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/ Resources/sustainingwater.pdf, The World Bank (date accessed: 9 January 2011), “Pakistan: Country Water Resources Strategy”, 2005, Internet, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSAREGTOPAGRI/Resources/PKWaterCAS.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Asian Development Bank, “Water Knowledge Center Statistics”, Internet, http://www.adb.org/water/ Knowledge-Center/statistics.asp (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Briscoe, John, “The India-Pakistan Water Dispute”, Internet, http://www.johnbriscoe.seas.harvard.edu/ publications/publications/112.%20Briscoe%20 World%20Politics%20Review%20The%20IndiaPakistan%20Water%20Dispute%202010.pdf/view (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Briscoe, John, “War and Peace on the Indus”,Internet, http://www.johnbriscoe.seas.harvard.edu/publications/publications/108.%20John%20Briscoe%20 War%20or%20Peace%20on%20the%20Indus%20 201004.pdf/view (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Kugelman, Michael and Robert Hathaway, “Pakistan’s Water Crisis: Running on Empty”, Internet, http:// www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ASIA_090422_ Running%20on%20Empty_web.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), IPCC, “Climate Change 2007: Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Asia”,Internet, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_ data/ar4/wg2/en/ch10.html (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Batti, Asif, et al, “Agricultural Water Demand Management in Pakistan”, Internet, http://management. kochi-tech.ac.jp/PDF/ssms2009/sms09_172.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Condon, Emma etal, “Resource Disputes in South Asia: Water Scarcity and the Potential for interstate Conflict”, Internet, http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workshops/2009/southasia.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011).

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6 Asian Development Bank, “Country Profiles - Pakistan”, Internet, http://www.adb.org/Water/ Indicators/cwsi-country-profile.asp?ctry=PAK (date accessed: 9 January 2011). 7 The World Bank, “Bangladesh: Country Water Resources Strategy”, Internet, http://siteresources. worldbank.org/BANGLADESHEXTN/Resources/ Final_Water_CAS-print_version.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), U.S. Census Bureau, “International Data Base: Country Rankings”, Internet, http://sasweb.ssd. census.gov/idb/ranks.html (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Asia Society, “Asia’s Next Challenge: Securing the Region’s Water Future”, Internet, http://asiasociety. org/files/pdf/WaterSecurityReport.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Strategic Foresight Group, “International Workshop on Challenges of Water Stress and Climate Change in the Himalayan River Basins”, Internet, http://www. strategicforesight.com/Kathmandu%20Report.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Strategic Foresight Group, “The Himalayan Challenge: Water Security in Emerging Asia”, Internet, http://www.strategicforesight.com/Himalayan%20 Challenge%20ES.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Asian Development Bank, “Water Knowledge Center Statistics”, Internet, http://www.adb.org/water/ Knowledge-Center/statistics.asp (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Condon, Emma etal, “Resource Disputes in South Asia: Water Scarcity and the Potential for interstate Conflict”, Internet, http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/ publications/workshops/2009/southasia.pdf, IPCC (date accessed: 9 January 2011), “Climate Change 2007: Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Asia”, Internet, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/ en/ch10.html (date accessed: 9 January 2011). 8 Asian Development Bank, “Country Profiles - Bangladesh,” Internet, http://www.adb.org/Water/ Indicators/cwsi-country-profile.asp?ctry=BAN (date accessed: 9 January 2011) 9 Briscoe, John, “The India-Pakistan Water Dispute”, Internet, http://www.johnbriscoe.seas. harvard.edu/publications/publications/112.%20Briscoe%20World%20Politics%20Review%20The%20 India-Pakistan%20Water%20Dispute%202010.pdf/ view (date accessed: 9 January 2011). Briscoe, John, “War and Peace on the Indus”, Internet, http://www.johnbriscoe.seas.harvard.edu/publications/publications/108.%20John%20Briscoe%20 War%20or%20Peace%20on%20the%20Indus%20 201004.pdf/view (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Asia Society, “Asia’s Next Challenge: Securing the Region’s Water Future”, Internet, http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/WaterSecurityReport.pdf, (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Condon, Emma etal, “Resource Disputes in South Asia: Water Scarcity and the Potential for interstate

Law&Ethics

Conflict”, Internet, http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/ publications/workshops/2009/southasia.pdf, (date accessed: 9 January 2011) FAO, Aquastat, Internet, http://www.fao.org/nr/ water/aquastat/main/index.stm (date accessed: 9 January 2011) IFAD, “Climate Change Impacts – South Asia”, Internet, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/ Resources/sustainingwater.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Institute for Defense Analysis and Analyses, “Water Security for India: External Dynamics”, Internet, http://www.idsa.in/book/WaterSecurityforIndia, (date accessed: 9 January 2011) International Rivers, “Mountains of Concrete: Dam Building in the Himalayas”, Internet, http://www. internationalrivers.org/files/IR_Himalayas_rev.pdf, (date accessed: 9 January 2011) IPCC, “Climate Change 2007: Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Asia”, Internet, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/ wg2/en/ch10.html, (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Mirza, Nasrullah, “Water, War, Peace: Linkages and Scenarios in India-Pakistan Relations”, Internet, http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/ volltexte/2008/8084/pdf/Heidelberg_Papers_final. pdf, Pai, Nitin, (date accessed: 9 January 2011) “Climate Change and National Security: Preparing India for New Conflict Scenarios”, Internet, http:// nationalinterest.in/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/ inipolicybrief-no1-climatechangeandnationalsecurity-nitinpai-april2008.pdfAsia Society (date accessed: 9 January 2011) 10 Asian Development Bank, “Country Profiles - India,” Internet, http://www.adb.org/Water/ Indicators/cwsi-country-profile.asp?ctry=IND (date accessed: 9 January 2011) . 11 The World Bank, “India’s Water Economy: Bracing for a Turbulent Future”, The World Bank, 2006, Internet, http://www-wds.worldbank. org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/ 2008/06/25/000333037_20080625020800/Rendered/PDF/443760PUB0IN0W1Box0327398B01P UBLIC1.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Khalid, Iram, “Bangladesh Water Concerns”, South Asian Studies, June-January, 2010, Internet, http:// www.pu.edu.pk/csas/journal/PDF/Dr.%20Iram%20 Khalid%205.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Condon, Emma etal, “Resource Disputes in South Asia: Water Scarcity and the Potential for interstate Conflict”, University of Wisconsin, 2009, Internet, http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workshops/2009/southasia.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Upali A. Amarasinghe, “Strategic Analysis of the Indian River Linking Project”, Internet, http://www. iwmi.cgiar.org/publications/Other/PDF/NRLP%20 Proceeding-2%20Prelims%20&%20overview. pdf(date accessed: 9 January 2011) 12 Wirsing, Robert, “The Kashmir Territorial

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 1 1 5]

GLACIERS, MONSSONS, RIVERS, AND CONFLICT

Dispute: the Indus River Runs Through It”, Brown Journal of International Affairs, 2008, The Christian Science Monitor, “The Other Kashmir Problem: India and Pakistan Tussle Over Water”, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0811/ The-other-Kashmir-problem-India-and-Pakistantussle-over-water, Internet, (date accessed: 11 August 2010). 13 Asia Society, “Asia’s Next Challenge: Securing the Region’s Water Future”, Internet, http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/WaterSecurityReport.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Asian Development Bank, “Water Knowledge Center Statistics”, Internet, http://www.adb.org/water/ Knowledge-Center/statistics.asp (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Behrman, Nina (ed.), “The Third Pole: Sources of Threat, Sources of Survival,” Internet, http://www. abuhrc.org/Publications/Third%20Pole .pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) International Rivers, “Mountains of Concrete: Dam Building in the Himalayas”, Internet, http://www. internationalrivers.org/files/IR_Himalayas_rev.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Gleick, Peter H., “China and Water”, Internet, http://www.worldwater.org/data20082009/ch05.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) ,Malik, Mohan, “India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes” Internet, http://www. gees.org/documentos/Documen-02608.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), World Wildlife Fund, Nepal Program, “An Overview of Glaciers, Glacier Retreat, and Subsequent Impacts in Nepal, India and China”, Internet, http://assets. panda.org/downloads/himalayaglaciersreport2005. pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Wong, Julian, “The Food-Energy-Water Nexus: An Integrated Approach to Understanding China’s Resource Challenges”, Internet, http://www.americanprogress.org/ issues/2010/07/pdf/haqspring2010final.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Zhao, Michael and Orville Schell, “Tibet: Plateau in Peril”, http://sites.asiasociety.org/chinagreen/tibetplateau-in-peril/, Pomeranz, Kenneth, “The Great Himalayan Watershed”, Internet, http://japanfocus. org/-kenneth-pomeranz/3195 (date accessed: 9 January 2011) IPCC, “Climate Change 2007: Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Asia”, Internet, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ ar4/wg2/en/ch10.html(date accessed: 9 January 2011) 14 Asian Development Bank, “Country Profiles -- China, People’s Republic of,” Internet, http:// www.adb.org/Water/Indicators/cwsi-country-profile. asp?ctry=PRC (date accessed: 9 January 2011) 15 General Assembly of the United Nations, “Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Internet, http:// untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf (date accessed: 9 January

[ 1 1 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

2011) 16 Track II dialogue is usually informal and involves experts and business people, retired officials of note, and others from the countries who have some issue to work out. Track 2 is usually done quietly outside of the limelight of the press. It is also sometimes used to work out technical and other complex issues to build confidence across the sides involved. See also: Indian Express, “Chinese dam will not impact flow of Brahmaputra: Krishna”, Internet, http:// www.indianexpress.com/news/chinese-dam-willnot-impact-flow-of-brahmapu/609953/, 22 April 2010 (date accessed: 9 January 2011). The Times of India, “Foreign Secretary Questions China on Dam over Brahmaputra, Stapled Visas, and POK Issues”, Internet, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/ china/Foreign-Secy-questions-China-on-damover-Brahmaputra-stapled-visa-and-POK-issues/ articleshow/6937728.cms (date accessed: 10 November 2010) The Hindu, “India Raises Concerns over Brahmaputra Dam”, Internet, http://www.thehindu.com/news/ international/article890265.ece, (date accessed: 16 November 2010) Joydeep Gupta, “Nervous Neighbors”, Internet, http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/ en/3959 (date accessed: 9 January 2011) RTT News, “India, China Hold Fourth Round of Strategic Dialogue Ahead of Wen’s Visit”, Internet, http://www.rttnews.com/Content/GeneralNews. aspx?Id=1481823&SM=1 (date accessed: 16 November 2010) Hindustan Times, “Mega Dams, Mega Disquiet”, Internet, http://www.hindustantimes.com/Megadams-mega-disquiet/Article1-629734.aspx (date accessed: 9 January 2011) The Assam Tribune, “Over 50 bodies send Memo to India, China PMs”, Internet, http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/detailsnew.asp?id=nov1710/city07 (date accessed: 16 November 2010) Radio Free Asia, “Work Starts on Tibet Dam”, Internet, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/dam11162010132853.html, (date accessed: 16 November 2010) 17 The Daily Star, “Sharing Water Among CoBasin Nations”, Internet, http://www.thedailystar. net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=161633 (date accessed: 8 November 2010) A. Nishat and M.F.K. Pasha, “A Review of the Ganges Treaty of 1996”, Internet, http://www.awra.org/proceedings/dundee01/Documents/Pashafinal.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) UN, “India and Bangladesh: Agreement on the Sharing of the Ganges at Farakka”, Internet, http:// untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/29/21/00057029. pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) Khalid, Iram, “Bangladesh Water Concerns”, South Asian Studies, June-January, 2010, Internet, http:// www.pu.edu.pk/csas/journal/PDF/Dr.%20Iram%20 Khalid%205.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011)

SULLIVAN

18 The World Bank, “The Indus Water Treaty”, Internet, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,c ontentMDK:20320047~pagePK:146736~piPK:583 444~theSitePK:223547,00.html (date accessed: 9 January 2011) 19 Condon, Emma etal, “Resource Disputes in South Asia: Water Scarcity and the Potential for interstate Conflict”, University of Wisconsin, 2009, Internet, http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/ workshops/2009/southasia.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) 20 Condon, Emma etal, “Resource Disputes in South Asia: Water Scarcity and the Potential for interstate Conflict”, University of Wisconsin, 2009, Internet, http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/ workshops/2009/southasia.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) 21 Condon, Emma etal, “Resource Disputes in South Asia: Water Scarcity and the Potential for interstate Conflict”, University of Wisconsin, 2009, Internet, http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/ workshops/2009/southasia.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) 22 Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, “Water Security for India: External Dynamics”, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 2010, http:// www.idsa.in/book/WaterSecurityforIndia , Internet, (date accessed: 9 January 2011) The Christian Science Monitor, “The Other Kashmir Problem: India and Pakistan Tussle over Water”, Internet, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-SouthCentral/2010/0811/The-other-Kashmir-problem-India-and-Pakistan-tussle-over-water, (date accessed: 11 August 2010) The World Bank, “India’s Water Economy: Bracing for a Turbulent Future”, The World Bank, 2006, Internet, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/ default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/06/25 /000333037_20080625020800/Rendered/PDF/4 43760PUB0IN0W1Box0327398B01PUBLIC1.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Condon, Emma etal, “Resource Disputes in South Asia: Water Scarcity and the Potential for interstate Conflict”, University of Wisconsin, 2009, Internet, http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/work-

Law&Ethics

shops/2009/southasia.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011) 23 The Hindu, “India, Pakistan resolve Baglihar dam issue”, the World Bank, “Indus Water Treaty, Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant”, Internet, http://www.hindu.com/2010/06/02/stories/2010060260170100.htm 2 June 2010 (date accessed: 9 January 2011), IBNLive, “Pak won’t object to Indian Projects on Indus”, Internet, http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=oFFfHUJgNRo (date accessed: 9 January 2011), The World Bank, “Indus Water Treaty”, Internet, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-1105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), The World Bank, “Indus Water Treaty, The Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant”, Internet, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20320047~pag ePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00. html (date accessed: 9 January 2011), Wirsing, Robert, “The Kashmir Territorial Dispute: the Indus River Runs Through It”, Brown Journal of International Affairs, 2008, The Christian Science Monitor, “The Other Kashmir Problem: India and Pakistan Tussle Over Water”, Internet, http://www.csmonitor.com/ World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0811/The-otherKashmir-problem-India-and-Pakistan-tussle-overwater(date accessed: 11 August 2010). 24 The Daily Star, “Sharing Water Among CoBasin Nations”, Internet, http://www.thedailystar. net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=161633 (date accessed: 8 November 2010), A. Nishat and M.F.K. Pasha,“A Review of the Ganges Treaty of 1996”, Internet,http://www.awra.org/proceedings/dundee01/Documents/Pashafinal.pdf (date accessed: 9 January 2011), UN, “India and Bangladesh: Agreement on the Sharing of the Ganges at Farakka”, Internet, http:// untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/29/21/00057029. pdf(date accessed: 9 January 2011), Khalid, Iram, “Bangladesh Water Concerns”, South Asian Studies,June-January,2010, Internet,http:// www.pu.edu.pk/csas/journal/PDF/Dr.%20Iram%20 Khalid%205.pdf(date accessed:9 January 2011).

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 1 1 7 ]

Business&Economics Reducing Inequality: The Role of Reforms in Brazil Phillippe G. Leite Brazil has made significant efforts to reduce inequality over the past thirty-three years, yet it remains one of the most unequal countries in the world. According to the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Brazil’s Gini coefficient dropped from 0.623 in 1976 to 0.543 in 2009.1 Although Brazil’s inequality is still considered very high according to international standards, the main policy reforms initiated by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) and expanded by his successor, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva successfully tamed the hyperinflation of the 1980s while generating steady growth, particularly for the poor. Because of social protection policies implemented over the past fifteen years, Brazil has experienced positive gains in all income categories with relatively higher growth rates for the very poor. The social protection reforms started in 1995 have generated a set of cost-effective programs that were initially limited in coverage, but efficient and well-targeted to the appropriate population. Once established, these programs were expanded, increasing its impact on inequality and poverty.

Phillippe G. Leite is an Economist at the Social Protection and Labor unit of the Human Development Network (The World Bank).

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REDUCING INEQUALITY: THE ROLE OF REFORMS IN BRAZIL

Table 1: Brazil 1981-2009 Macroeconomic statistics Year

Population1

Annual

Gini2

Poverty

Household

GDP real

GDP per

Annual

variation of

Head-

per capita

Value in

capita

GDP

prices1

count

income -

income of

billions

real

per

ratio2

Oct/2009

the poor -

of 2005

Value in

capita

prices

Oct/2009

dollars

2005

varia-

dollars3

tion

prices2 1981

121,381,328

93.5

0.584

40.8

467.4

103.1

543.9

4,480.5

-6.3

1989

143,997,246

1863.6

0.636

41.4

562.9

98.7

693.0

4,812.6

1.4

1993

153,985,576

2489.1

0.604

43.0

467.6

97.9

700.9

4,551.6

3.3

1995

158,874,963

22.0

0.601

35.1

579.9

102.6

775.1

4,878.7

7.2

2002

176,303,919

14.7

0.589

34.4

571.6

104.9

890.5

5,051.1

1.2

2003

178,741,412

10.4

0.583

35.8

538.2

103.3

900.8

5,039.6

-0.2

2009

191,480,630

4.1

0.543

21.4

705.7

111.4

1,114.9

5,822.5

-2.0

Source: 1. IBGE, 3. IPEA, and 3. World Bank World Development Indicators, International Financial Statistics of the IMF, Global Insight, and Oxford Economic Forecasting.

The Rise of Inequality between The Decline of Inequali1981 and 1993. After growing ty between 1994 and 2009. rapidly in the 1970s, Brazil’s economy stagnated in the 1980s as a result of the Latin American debt crisis.2 Calculations based on the Brazilian macroeconomic indicators presented in Table 1 show that economic volatility in the 1980s was punctuated by a deep recession between 1981 and 1983, followed by a brief two-year recovery and a period of severe hyperinflation after the failure of the 1986 Cruzado price stabilization plan.3 As a consequence, high inflation and its negative effect on income caused Brazil’s Gini coefficient to rise to a high of 0.636 in 1989. In 1993, Brazil was one of the most unequal countries in the world, with a Gini coefficient estimated at 0.604.4

[ 1 1 9 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Despite the high inequality levels in the early 1990s Brazil began to experience pro-poor growth in 1994, when a combination of the de-indexation of contracts and an exchange ratebased stabilization policy—the Plano Real or “Real Plan,”–tamed inflation and established precedent for many other reforms.5 Since 1994, Brazil has experienced declines in both inequality, as the Gini coefficient decreased from 0.604 in 1993 to 0.543 in 2009, and poverty, as the Poverty Headcount Ratio for the same period declined by fifty percent (see Table 1). Brazil successfully promoted growth, protected people’s rights, and reduced inequality through two main policy reforms. First, by implementing trade reforms during the first years of FHC’s administration, Brazil ended all skill-

LEITE

biased protectionism, generating steady growth in all sectors of the economy, particularly those employing unskilled labor. Second, by reforming its weak and fragmented Social Protection system, Brazil was able to expand welfare coverage and increase benefits for the poor. As a result, Brazil was able to protect the poor and redistribute income more efficiently and intensively during the Lula administration.

Business&Economics

Expansion of the Social Security System. Until 1988, the social

security system in Brazil primarily provided limited benefits and low coverage for rural workers and greater privileges for special categories such as military and government workers. With the reforms mandated by the 1988 Constitution, Brazil implemented a rural non-contributory pension, equalized disparities in urban-rural benefits, and The Role of Social Protection indexed benefits to the minimum wage. Reforms. Brazil’s social protection This increase in coverage has not caused policies launched by FHC prepared dependency; rather it reduced inequalthe field for Lula. By redesigning and ity by correcting some of the disparities expanding key programs in terms of of the old system. The sustainability of both coverage and benefit amounts, the program, however, is an issue to be Lula’s administration has been praised considered. by the international community as a Before 1994, small and family farmrole model for fighting inequality and ers had very limited access to credit, and poverty. The main social protection the government designed PRONAF to policies include an expansion of social fill this gap. The program started slowly security to rural citizens to equalize but it expanded during the first year rural-urban benefit disparities; the of Lula’s administration to promote implementation of the Program to the Brazilian agricultural sector. This

The social assistance system has proven to be efficient and sustainable Strengthen Family Agriculture (PRONAF), which protects and promotes small agriculture businesses by providing micro-credit and technological assistance; the expansion of social assistance programs such as the Benefício de Prestação Continuada, which protects the elderly, disabled, and poor through cash transfers; and the Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Familia programs, which protect poor families and promote incentives for the education and health of poor children.6

program is particularly important for reducing inequality in Brazil, as small and family-owned farms employ seventy-four percent of all agricultural workers. As a result of investments in PRONAF and growth in the agricultural sector, exports have increased, the international price competitiveness for some commodities has improved, all production factors have experienced productivity gains, and wages of agricultural workers have risen substantially over the last decade. These changes have

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REDUCING INEQUALITY: THE ROLE OF REFORMS IN BRAZIL

significantly reduced poverty in rural areas, and consequently, inequalities among urban and rural areas of the country.7

assistance system among the country’s poorer populations.

assistance programs started with the Projeto Alvorada in 1994. The Projeto Alvorada developed new programs to modify the existent social assistance programs by targeting poor and vulnerable populations. The enlargement of existing programs, the development of new programs, and the promotion of more equitable benefits decreased both poverty and inequality starting in 2000, and more intensively after 2003. Currently, the Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC) and Bolsa Família (BF) are the two main social assistance programs in Brazil.8 BPC, enacted in 1993 and launched in 1996, was designed to cover elderly and disabled poor citizens. After 2003, Lula heavily invested in its expansion, nearly doubling its coverage, and today the BPC reaches 3.3 million beneficiaries.9 BF, created in 2003 by Lula, consolidated the four main social assistance programs of FHC’s administration, Bolsa Escola, Cartão Alimentação, Bolsa Alimentação, and Vale Gás. BF made use of the existent Bolsa Escola structure to expand the number of beneficiary families rapidly, including poor families without children.10 Over the past eight years, Lula has invested in these two social assistance programs by increasing their coverage and their benefit amounts. Despite their popularity, these welfare policies can generate dependency on the social

tion programs in promoting equality in Brazil, but the main focus has been on social assistance programs. Social security reforms have had a significant impact on the composition of household income, with the number of families reporting government transfers nearly doubling between 1993 and 2004. During this time, the average transfer amounts per household rose, while the level of inequality fell dramatically.11 About half of the decline in inequality between 2001 and 2005 stemmed from improvements in the distribution of non-labor income, primarily from larger and better-targeted social transfers.12 Other researchers have highlighted the importance of the social security system and of social assistance programs such as BPC, Bolsa Escola and BF on the decline of inequality in Brazil.13 The importance of social assistance transfers can be summarized as follows: according to the IPEA report “Comunicados do IPEA # 59,” inequality measured by the Gini coefficient would have been 2 percent higher in the absence of social assistance transfers in 1978, 3.2 percent in 1988, 5.5 percent in 1998, and 10.2 percent in 2008. Because of their proven coverage and cost-effectiveness, both PRONAF and the BF programs were recently used to mitigate the negative impacts of the food and financial crises, despite the fact that the BF program is not a coun-

The Role of Social Protection Programs in Reducing Social Assistance Program Inequality. Numerous studies presExpansion. The expansion of social ent the importance of social protec-

[ 1 21 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

LEITE

tercyclical instrument. To combat the food crisis of 2007-2008, the government increased the benefit levels of the BF program and expanded the budget allocation of PRONAF to keep prices stable and support small and family farmers in domestic food markets. These two actions, combined with other policies launched by the Government and Central Bank during the financial crisis, helped Brazil to continue to reduce its inequality levels from 0.548 in 2008 to 0.543 in 2009, despite the economic contraction of two percent of per capita GDP during the same period

Business&Economics

es its sustainability. Brazil needs pension reform. One key reform that has remained dormant in Congress since 2007 is the development of a Complementary Fund in the public sector. Such a fund, if launched, may take a few years before reducing the social security deficit. Unlike the social security system, the social assistance system has proven to be efficient and sustainable. The two main social assistance programs, the BPC and the BF, cost less than two percent of Brazil’s GDP.14 The programs have generated strong results, not only in

The continuing challenge for Brazil’s

social assistance system lies in...shifting the function of the programs from ‘safety nets’ to ‘opportunity ropes.’ (see Table 1). In summary, the set of social protection reforms described above has proven effective in redistributing income in Brazil. Nevertheless, in its current form the social security system is unsustainable, and greater cross-sectoral synergy among government ministries, including Planning, Health, Education, Labor, and Social Assistance, are needed in order to help the country move its social assistance system from a protectionist approach to a promotional approach, while avoiding issues of over-dependence.

Policy considerations. Despite the importance of providing for the elderly, the generosity and rigidity of Brazil’s social security system jeopardiz-

redistributing income, but also towards boosting the human capital accumulation of poor families. Recent evaluations of the BF program by the International Food Policy Research Institute indicate that, among participants, families were better off in 2009 than they were in 2005; pregnant women attend more pre-natal visits, infants are more likely to receive vaccinations on schedule, and students attend school and graduate more frequently.15 Notwithstanding the positive impacts of these programs, the continuing challenge for Brazil’s social assistance system lies in reducing dependence by promoting sustainable self-reliance and shifting the function of the programs from “safety nets” to “opportunity ropes.” In other words, Brazil

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REDUCING INEQUALITY: THE ROLE OF REFORMS IN BRAZIL

needs to enhance the basic architecture of its programs to improve their effectiveness and to promote the “graduation” of beneficiaries.16 International policymakers have focused on “opportunity rope” agendas such as enhancing educational incentives for grade completion and graduation, generating more incentives for older children to attend school, and creating employment opportunities for students who graduate by the age of eighteen.17 Additional training and market placement can improve adults’ competitiveness, and can help young graduates, especially in large cities, avoid the stigma of seeming to have lower skills because they studied in public schools.18 Early Childhood Development programs (ECDs) can also help achieve better long-term outcomes, given their proven correlation with future success in education, labor market attachment, and earnings.19 To generate the high incentives needed to eradicate the existing poverty cycles experienced by poor families, additional social inclusion programs must be designed to complement the BF program. Some good initiatives already implemented include: ProJovem trabalhador, which focuses on eighteen through twenty-nine year-old

[ 1 23] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

people who have not completed middle or junior-high school, and Prominp, which waives enrollment fees for current or former BF/BPC beneficiaries.20 The foreseeable challenges are related to the promotion of inter-institutional coordination between sectors so that current or former beneficiaries of social assistance programs experience better social inclusion. Brazil should consider giving current or former beneficiaries priority to enter undergraduate institutions if their grades at the ENEM (High School National Exam) are above the required threshold to enroll in undergraduate institutions. Furthermore, Brazil should provide government-financed training activities and workfare programs, access to micro-credit lines like the CrediAmigo program to promote small businesses, and access to financial institutions to promote savings.21 The challenge for Brazil’s fight against inequality is to identify the right channels for creating an effective social protection system that is both sustainable and equitable. The government must try to prevent people from falling into poverty or becoming vulnerable to risks, to reduce dependency on the welfare systems, and to promote overall educational and income improvement.

LEITE

Business&Economics

NOTES

1 The Gini coefficient is the standard measure of inequality: 0 denotes complete equality, while 1 denotes complete inequality. The authors’ calculations indicate a 0.42 percent change per year. 2 During the 1970s, GDP per capita in Brazil has grown 5.5 percent a year. 3 The Cruzado plan aimed to reduce inflation by freezing the prices of key commodities as rice, beans and meat. 4 Milanovic B., “Global Income Inequality: What It Is And Why It Matters,” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Working paper #26, 2006. 5 Ferreira, F. H. G., Leite, Phillippe G, and Litchfield, J.A., “The Rise and Fall of Brazilian Inequality: 1981-2004,” Macroeconomic Dynamics volume 12 (6 May 2008): 199-230. 6 The 1988 Constitution gave the rural population that had never contributed to the system the right to retire at 60 years-old for men and 55 years-old for women if they proved they had worked the required time in a family business. PRONAF is a Portuguese acronym for the National Program to Strengthen Family Agriculture (Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar). Bolsa Escola was a Conditional Cash Transfer program implemented between 2001 and 2003 that provided cash to poor families with children aged 6-15 on the condition that they were attending school. The program benefits were fixed at R$15 per child (US$5 if using 2003 exchange rate or US$ 8.6 if using Oct 2010 exchange rate), with a ceiling of R$45 per household. Bolsa Familia is the flagship cash transfer program of the Zero Hunger program launched in 2004 to protect the poor and vulnerable. Extremely poor families are eligible to a fixed unconditional cash transfer program, while those with children aged 0-17 can reach a variable (per child cash transfer) transfer dependent on the children’s school attendance and the number of children/mothers/pregnant women’s regular check-ups in health centers. The program benefits range from R$22 to R$200 as of today (US$ 12.5 to US$ 114.3 if using actual exchange rates). 7 Pucci de Mesquita, P., O PRONAF B e a pobreza rural no município de Caucaia, estado do Ceará, 2009. Ruiz Olalde, A., Santos, I.J. and Santos, E.L., O PRONAF e as desigualdades na agricultura familiar, 2007. 8 These two programs share 88% of the total Ministry of Social Development - MDS budget for social assistance and food security programs in the country. 9 The number of BPC beneficiaries increased from around 300,000 in 1996, to 1.4 million in 2001, to 1.7 million in 2003, and to 3.3 million as of June 2010. 10 Bolsa Escola was the flagship program of FHC with more than 6 million beneficiaries families.

11 Ferreira, F. H. G., Leite, Phillippe G, and Litchfield, J.A., “The Rise and Fall of Brazilian Inequality: 1981-2004,” Macroeconomic Dynamics volume 12 (6 May, 2008): 199-230. 12 Paes de Barros, R., de Carvalho, M., Franco, S., and Mendonça, R., “A Importância da Queda Recente da Desigualdade na Redução da Pobreza” Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, IPEA Discussion paper # 1256, (2007). 13 Veras Soares, F. Soares S.,Medeiros, M., and Guerreiro Osório, R., “Programas de Transferência de Renda no Brasil: impactos sobre a desigualdade,” Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, IPEA Discussion paper # 1228, (2006). 14 Author’s calculations based on the GDP presented in Table 1 and budget programs available at the Minister of Social Development website (www.mds. gov.br). 15 “Study Finds Bolsa Familia Children Healthier, Doing Better in School,” Internet, http://www. ifpri.org/pressrelease/study-finds-bolsa-familia-children-healthier-doing-better-school (date accessed: 5 December 2010). 16 The participation in few social assistance programs is still negatively affected by the lack of required documents such as identification card, social security number, labor market card, or birth certificate, and even by the restricted availability of childcare to poor families. 17 A and B policies are seen as necessary policies to generate incentives for children to study more and as a consequence to learn more while in school, and to reduce the trade-off between working and studying among the elderly children. These policies intend to increased effectiveness of the Conditional Cash Transfer programs. 18 The large majority of Brazilian children go to public schools. In developed cities private schools are synonymous with quality and private school children are more likely to enter the best Universities. Recently, Public Universities started to reserve space for children from public schools with higher grades in the High School National Exam-ENEM taken during their senior high school year. 19 See the Chilean experience with programs like Crece Contigo and Chile Solidário programs. 20 Programa de Mobilização da Indústria Nacional de Petróleo e Gás Natural. 21 Recently the Minister of Social Development (MDS) started to promote such initiatives under its Productive Inclusion programs, e.g., BF beneficiaries are exempted from fees to enroll in the selection process and job- training activities of Prominp. 25 For examples of training activities and workfare programs see the recent experiences with programs such as Acreditar, Próximo Passo, and Prominp

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Science & Technology Maps, Power, and the Destruction of the Mau Forest in Kenya Jacqueline M. Klopp and Job Kipkosgei Sang Tropical forests, which provide rich resources and critical eco-services, are under severe stress.1 Some theories regarding the causes of this stress emphasize “irreducible complexity,”2 while others point to specific factors, such as population pressures or human encroachment through “shifting cultivation.”3 Deforestation is indeed complex, in part because it is linked not only to economic and social dynamics at both global and local levels, but also to questions of power and politics.4 Nowhere is this more evident than in the ongoing struggle over the Mau Forest in Kenya. Spanning 900 km2, the Mau forest is a complex of sixteen contiguous forests and six separated satellite forests. Together, they form a single ecosystem and make up the largest remaining indigenous forest in East Africa. While less is known about this forest than many other East African forests, the Mau forests complex is immensely important, as it serves as a catchment for rivers west of the Great Rift Valley. These rivers in turn feed major lakes in the region, including Lake Nakuru and the trans-boundary lakes of Lake Victoria in the Nile River Basin, Lake Turkana in Kenya and Ethiopia, and Lake Natron in Tanzania and Kenya. Thus, the Mau forest provides critical ecosystem services, not

Jacqueline Klopp is an assistant professor of international and public affairs at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Dr. Klopp’s research focuses on the intersection of development, democratization, violence, and corruption.

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only for Kenya, but also for the entire region.5 The Mau is also the home of the Ogiek people, who have lived in the forest hunting and gathering since well before colonial times.6 Surrounding communities also use water, firewood, grazing areas, food, and medicines from the forest. The government and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), based in Nairobi, claim that the forest is critical to Kenyaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s tea, tourism, and energy sectors as well.7 One estimate suggests that in the tea sector alone, approximately 35,000 jobs and the livelihoods of 50,000 small farmers with some 430,000 dependents rely on the eco-services of the Mau.8 Thus, the destruction of the Mau would have significant cultural, social, and economic implications. Little debate exists around the fact that the Mau forest is massively degraded and has undergone substantial deforestation. Satellite data, a useful tool for monitoring deforestation worldwide, shows the damage,9 and ground-truthing by the Kenya Forests Working Group, UNEP, and the Kenya Wildlife Service confirms it.10 A recent government task force report suggests that in the last fifteen years alone some 107,707 hectares, representing approximately 25 percent of the Mau Complex area, have been converted to settlements and farmlands.11 This paper explores the history of political struggles surrounding the Mau forest and the role that mapping has played in them. This is essential for navigating the current complex politics of the Mau forest and to understanding the way power, maps, and political mobilization, along with other human

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interactions, shape the ecological landscape. This article will illustrate that one official conservation program (Kenya Indigenous Forests Conservation Programme) actually helped to legitimize the destruction of the forest. Finally, this article will examine a more recent bottom-up mapping process involving local forest dwellers and will highlight how these alternative conservation strategies exemplify new ideas on how best to manage forests and other common pool resources.

Maps and Power. One key theme

that emerges in the analysis of the Mau Forest struggle is the question of who creates and controls forest data, particularly maps. Maps are, of course, never simply neutral technical instruments, but throughout history have been linked to power dynamics such as colonial conquest. Maps, as human creations, reflect not only scientific data, but the imagination and interests of those who commission and/or create them as well.12 What is interesting, however, is that current democratic pressures demand more open access to information such as spatial data,13 and civil society groups are claiming the use of this satellite imagery and GIS technology to monitor issues such as human rights and deforestation.14 Still, precisely because of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;power of maps,â&#x20AC;? governments in many places are overly restrictive of satellite data and official large-scale topographical maps needed for planning, monitoring and informing public policy discussions. There is a growing awareness of the ways that power determines who is able to access spatial information and participate in the use of mapping technolo-

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gies. The Open Street Map Foundation, for example, has undertaken a collaborative effort to create an editable map of the world that is accessible to all.15 Recently, the Foundation mobilized Kenyan communities and completed an atlas of one of the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s largest slums, Kibera.16 Usually a large dark area of what appears to be empty space on most street maps of Nairobi, Kibera now has an atlas that shows its streets, homes and services. The Mau forest case suggests that whether a map like the

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project also failed to bring the Ogiek into discussions and the mapping process from the beginning. The map of indigenous forest boundaries was wellconstructed. The problem lay in the institutional and power dynamics of the map-making process, and in the way it was subsequently used by powerful actors to appropriate the forest and marginalize the Ogiek further. In contrast, a recent participatory threedimensional modeling exercise of one part of the Mau forests complex directly

Tropical forests, which provide rich resources and critical eco-services, are under severe stress. new atlas of Kibera or the Ogiek model of the Mau becomes a tool of empowerment or a form of dispossession will depend critically on who makes maps, how they make them, and how accessible the maps are in open public processes. Map making cannot be divorced from wider struggles over resources and broader endeavors for democratization of decision-making. In the case of the Mau forest, a donor-funded Kenya Indigenous Forest Conservation Project (KIFCON) mapped boundaries and made an inventory of the remaining indigenous forests in Kenya in the early 1990s. The project was meant to protect these forests, but it failed to consider the long history of the Mauâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s incorporation into networks of state power and patronage, and unwittingly supplied the rationale for large-scale excisions of the forest through its provision of boundary information. The

included local Ogiek elders, the traditional conservers of the forest. These two contrasting approaches illuminate how maps play into power relations and mobilizations for and against conservation of this critical forest.

Historical Background. Starting

when Kenya was under British rule (1895-1963), the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s main forests came under control of the central state. Forests originally managed by local communities became the locus of a struggle among a colonial government attempting to control access and introduce modern forestry and conservation,17 local people who did not recognize this right, and settlers and companies eager to gain logging concessions. Within this political process, the colonial government started to produce cadastral maps that showed boundaries of land appropriated for its own

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use.18 The Mau forest became part of this mapping linked to the land appropriation process, and parts of the forest came under colonial state control for various purposes, including settlement. By 1930, parts of the Mau complex were cleared for the establishment of forest plantations and introduced mainly exotic species. Throughout this period, the colonial government refused to recognize the claims of the Ogiek people to the forest and argued that the ultimate way to deal with them would be assimilation into other communities.19 The Ogiek were spread out across Kenya’s forests, but they did not fit neatly into ethnic “reserves” that the colonial gov-

of the Environment and Natural Resources. Under the Forest Act at the time, the Minister had the power to alter boundaries but was required to publish that intention and a map in the Kenya Gazette. The Gazette is written in English and is not easily available, particularly to those living in and around the forest. To make the the excision legal, the area needed to be surveyed, a boundary plan drawn up, and approval granted by the Chief Conservator of Forests. If objections were not raised after 28 days of notice in the Gazette, the land was no longer considered protected forest. Since the Minister of the

Maps, as human creations, reflect not only scientific data, but the imagination and interests of those who commission them as well. ernment created to contain Africans in well-defined territories and to protect land expropriated for white settlers.20 While the Ogiek had interacted with— and at times assimilated into—the different communities neighboring the forest,21 they resisted this policy and continued to live in the forest and claim rights to it. Currently, approximately 15,000 to 16,000 Ogiek live in the Mau forests complex.22

Environment was a presidential appointment, the President and his associates could alter legal boundaries of forests without informing the relevant forestry officials. This made decisions over forest excisions susceptible to the politics of patronage and rendered foresters “helpless when a logger [or settler] comes armed with a letter from the provincial administration or a high political office.”23 Thus, as in other parts of the world, this institutional Forests and the Politics of system granted politicians and their Patronage. After independence, the supporters preferential access to forpost-colonial state continued to play est resources and, as in colonial times, a key role in mediating access to for- top-down mapping played a role in tryests, which was fundamentally linked to ing to legitimize these appropriations.24 patronage networks of powerful figures With the advent of multi-party polin the state. In the 1990s, the Forestry itics in Kenya at the end of 1991, Department came under the Ministry high-level state actors, including the

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President, used these institutions to leverage forests as valuable patronage resources in order to buy support and fund campaigns.25 At the time, one top Kenyan government official stated that “if there were an election every year, there would be no forest left.”26 Similarly, an Ogiek activist noted “because trees acquired free of charge fetch millions once made into timber, this free money is to be used in financing elections besides buying political support.”27 During this time the Mau forest became one of the clearest demonstrations of how power and patronage dynamics caused massive deforestation as well as dispossession of the Ogiek.

boundaries, studying the dynamics of forest degradation, and providing recommendations for conservation.29 In the course of the KIFCON study, researchers observed Ogiek living in scattered settlements. Replicating a long history of “fortress conservation”30 in Africa, KIFCON recommended the settlement of Ogiek families in a suitable section of the forest. Failing to understand the complex politics around power and land in Kenya, KIFCON made a recommendation that would legitimize settlement in the forest. The KIFCON-recommended “Ogiek settlement scheme” became a cover for massive and irregular appropriations. Throughout Kenya’s history, in the absence of checks and balances, public Kenya Indigenous Forest monitoring, and transparent allocaConservation Programme tion processes, settlement schemes have and the “Ogiek Settlement allowed those in power to mediate who Scheme.” Between 1991 and 1994, has access to land. In practice this meant the United Kingdom provided approx- that political supporters, friends, and imately $2.5 million in assistance for relatives were favored, and at times the first phase of the Kenya Indigenous the settlements expanded beyond their Forest Conservation Programme original borders. This is one reason (KIFCON). The project aimed to ben- why the families of Kenya’s past two efit both the environment and the local presidents own vast tracts of land31 and people. Its goals included “developing Kenya has some of the highest levand enforcing guidelines for the sus- els of land inequality in the world.32 tainable exploitation of forest resourc- Predictably then, the “Ogiek settlement es, providing for the effective manage- scheme” became a site of land accumument and conservation of forests, pro- lation and patronage politics by those moting social forestry, and improving in power, producing exclusion, conforest cover mapping and monitoring;” flict, and environmental destruction. it also sought to conserve “the biodiKIFCON took time to survey and versity, ecological services and produc- compile a list of Ogiek to be settled. tivity of indigenous closed forests, and Given the complexity of this task, which improv[e] the welfare of poor peo- involved highly mobile and sometimes ple hitherto dependent on the forest elusive people, even those working for for their livelihood.”28 As is the usual KIFCON doubted the accuracy of the practice, consultants were brought on list. Nevertheless, it was passed on to board to carry out the task of mapping the government and grew as it moved

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through the corridors of power down to the local provincial administration. One Ogiek source suggests that after an initial KIFCON estimate of 1,800 families, the new list contained 3,500, only 200 of which some sources claim were Ogiek.33 By the time the first settlement scheme (25,000 hectares) commenced in Kiptagich34 in southwest Mau in 1996, the number of families had climbed to 9,000.35 By that time, KIFCON had ended and phase II was discontinued. In 2001, one year before the historic election that would see President Daniel arap Moi step down and the Kenya African National Union lose power, the government announced the excision of 61,586 hectares of the Mau forest for a number of different “settlement schemes,” some of which had already existed on the ground as early as 1994. Among the official reasons for the excisions was the need to settle Ogiek and people who were displaced because of state-instigated violence surrounding the elections of 1992 and 1997.36 The announcement sent shock waves through international environmental groups and local civil society, who raised their objections through official channels. Regardless, the government moved forward with the publication of legal notices and subsequently became embroiled in court cases, including one led by the Ogiek Welfare Society. Throughout this period, many Ogiek protested their treatment, the influx of large numbers of people into the Mau, and the ensuing destruction of the forest.37 Public anger was high over irregular land appropriations by the old KANU regime. When a new government came

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to power it initiated a series of investigations in 2003 that confirmed what many Kenyans already knew: “[t]he real intention of excising the forest was definitely not to resettle the Ogiek community. The objective was to allocate forestland to influential personalities in the former KANU regime.”38 These influential personalities parceled out land at minimal prices to their supporters. Some of those who received land were indeed poor, but others simply accumulated land because it was cheap, sometimes owning plots in different schemes. As political alliances shifted and highlevel politicians lost power, reclaiming parts of the Mau forest became politically possible. It was inevitable, however, that the process of addressing Mau deforestation would be embroiled in contestation. Indeed, the push to reestablish Mau forest boundaries and conserve the forest meant evicting large numbers of KANU supporters who perceived this as punishment for losing power. In 2005 a series of haphazard and brutal evictions reinforced this view, and human rights groups like Amnesty International became involved.39 The Ogiek continued to protest that their rights and needs were being ignored and that they were being grouped collectively with those who settled in the forest and hence—as in colonial times—were being cruelly and unjustly evicted.40 Powerful beneficiaries, including the former president, demanded compensation and turned the Mau evictions into a high profile political issue.

Mapping and CounterMapping. KIFCON embodied a kind

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of technical approach to conservation that ignores both power and institutional dynamics and the “power of maps.”41 The project, of course, did produce helpful scientific knowledge about the forest and did not cause the deforestation in the Mau. The President, the Ministry of Environment, and provincial administration used the KIFCON maps showing the boundaries of existing indigenous forests and seized their recommendation to create an Ogiek settlement scheme there. This attempt to accelerate and legalize irregular settlements ultimately contributed to forest destruction. For this reason, some Ogiek remember KIFCON with anger; they feel that KIFCON collaborated with a government that at the time was the source of many of their problems. KIFCON phase II was discontinued in part because of these unintended negative impacts, couched diplomatically as “lack of government support.” Since the 1990s when KIFCON

Science&Technology

2005, they grew interested in working with the local NGO Environmental Research Mapping and Information Systems in Africa (ERMIS-Africa)42 on participatory three-dimensional modeling (P3DM). This kind of modeling is a collaborative process involving “grassroots participation in spatial problem analysis and decision-making” and “integration of people’s knowledge and spatial information (contour lines) to produce standalone scale relief models.”43 Discussions among community members help to determine which critical features (e.g hills, rivers, cultural areas, and clan territory) should be documented and mapped through use of aerial photographs and participatory Geographical Information Systems (GIS). The models that emerge out of these processes are actual physical models with topographical and cultural features marked. They are easy to comprehend and, when executed well, rela-

As political alliances shifted and

high-level politicians lost power, reclaiming parts of the Mau forest became politically possible. operated, understanding of power relations and local knowledge in the management of forests and other resources has grown. Based on their historical experience, Ogiek activists are keenly aware of the need to counter-map the Mau Forest, and have tapped into sympathetic local and international support to do this. After attending a Mapping for Change Conference in Nairobi in

tively accurate ways to store, visualize and discuss spatial information. ERMIS argues that these models and the participatory process of creating them is a useful way to transmit local knowledge and preserve historical mem-

ory and culture.44 Furthermore, by using these new mapping technologies to reassert a historical narrative about their century-old presence in Winter/Spring 2011 [ 1 31 ]

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the Mau, Ogiek activists can bolster their efforts to reassert their rights to inhabit and manage the forest. This counters attempts to render the Ogiek invisible and that fail to distinguish between them and the large numbers of settlers brought into the forest through patronage politics.

Conclusions. After the last tumul-

tuous election in December 2007, Kenya’s new Prime Minister Raila Odinga assembled a Task Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forests Complex. Kenya’s hard-won democratic space, the advocacy of local and global environmentalists and civil society, the media, and the changing political alliances that allowed for the creation of the task force forcefully showed how policy around forest conservation relies on political factors. The task force executed a careful audit of the destruction of the forest and recommended a number of concrete and important steps for its conservation. One key recommendation is that all those who were involved in “the irregular allocation of forestland in an irregular manner and/or against the government’s stated purposes of the settlement schemes should be investigated and prosecuted in accordance to the law.”45 The task force also recommends that the Ogiek receive land outside of critical water catchment areas and biodiversity hotspots and that a process of registration be estab-

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lished that would involve a council of Ogiek elders.46 All of this represents significant progress. In September 2009, the Ministry of the Environment and UNEP announced a multi-million dollar appeal for funds to rehabilitate the forest. One encouraging development was that besides USAID, the European Union, and other foreign donors, Kenyan businesses and civil society, including Nobel Laureate Wangari Maathai’s Greenbelt Movement, mobilized to create their own “Save the Mau” campaign and trust fund that has already allowed some reforestation to occur. Serious political hurdles remain in translating Kenya’s continuously more democratic institutional order into an ecological landscape. Contention continues over evictions, as well as the mapping of where the Mau’s boundaries are or should be, and hence, who must leave and who can stay. These negotiations over saving the forest are also embroiled in the politics of alignment before the next election in 2012. The struggle over reforestation and revival of the Mau forest, like deforestation in the first place, is intimately linked not only to social and economic forces, but to politics, patronage, and the power of maps as well.

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Science&Technology

NOTES

1 Michael Williams, Deforesting the Earth: From Prehistory to Global Crisis (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 2 H.J. Geist and E.F. Lambin, “What drives tropical deforestation? A meta-analysis of proximate and underlying causes based on sub-national case study evidence.” LUCC Report Series 4 (2001): 1. 3 More recent work suggests that urbanization and global agricultural trade are key factors. See Ruth S. DeFries, Thomas Rudel, Maria Uriarte, and Matthew Hansen, “Deforestation driven by urban population growth and agricultural trade in the twenty-first century.” Nature Geoscience 3 (2010): 178-181. For a critical look at the link between poverty and deforestation, see Michael Dove, “A Revisionist View of Tropical Deforestation and Development.” Environmental Conservation 20, no. 1 (1993). 4 Nicholas Guppy, “Tropical Deforestation: A Global View.” Foreign Affairs 62, no. 4 (1984): 928-965. 5 These include river flow regulation, flood mitigation, water storage, reduced soil erosion, biodiversity, carbon sequestration, carbon reservoir, and microclimate regulation. 6 For more on the Ogiek culture and history see Towett Kimaiyo, Ogiek Land Cases and Historical Injustices 1902-2004 (Nakuru: Ogiek Welfare Council, 2004); Corinne Kratz, “Are the Okiek Really Masai? Or Kipsigis? Or Kikuyu?” Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 20, no. 79: 355-368; Louis Kang’ethe, Edward Ontita and Esther Mwangi, Forestry and Food Security in Kenya: The Case of the South-West Mau Forest (Nairobi: Forest Action Network, 2000). 7 The estimated potential by hydropower generation in the Mau forests complex catchments is approximated to be 535 Megawatts representing 47 percent of the total installed electricity generation capacity in Kenya. Fredrick Owino, chairman, “Report of the Prime Minister’s Task Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forests Complex.” Republic of Kenya, 2009, 16. 8 Ibid., 15-16. 9 P. Njuguna, M. Mbegera, and D. Mbithi, “Reconnaissance Survey of forest blocks in the west and east rift valley.” Permanent Presidential Commission on Soil Conservation and Afforestation, 1999; Erick Akotsi, Michael Gachanja, and Jacob Ndirangu, “Changes in Forest Cover in Kenya’s Five Water Towers 2003-2005,” Internet, http://www.unep.org/ dewa/assessments/EcoSystems/land/mountain/Tower2/index.asp (date accessed: 29 December 2010). 10 United Nations Environmental Programme, “Mau Complex Under Siege: Values and Threats,” Internet, http://unep.org/dewa/assessments/EcoSystems/land/mountain/MauCrisis/index.asp. (date accessed: 29 December 2010). 11 Fredrick Owino, chairman, “Report of the Prime Minister’s Task Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forests Complex.” Republic of Kenya,

2009, 6. 12 Denis Wood, The Power of Maps (New York and London: Guildford Press, 1992). 13 See, for example, the project by Open Street Map to make a freely accessible map of the world, Internet, http://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Main_ Page. 14 Giacomo Rambaldi, “Who Owns the Map Legend?” Paper presented at the 7th International Conference on GIS for Developing Countries (GISDECO 2004), 10–12 May 2004, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Johor Malaysia; T. Lung and G. Schaab, “A comparative assessment of land cover dynamics of three protected forest areas in tropical eastern Africa.” Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 161, no. 1 (2010), 531–548. 15 OpenStreetMap, Internet, http://www.openstreetmap.org/ 16 Erica Hagen, http://wbi.worldbank. org/wbi/devoutreach/article/370/puttingnairobi%E2%80%99s-slums-map (date accessed: 30 December 2010). 17 By the post-colonial period, Kenya’s forest cover had dwindled from about 30% of the total landmass in 1895 to approximately 3% today. Large amounts of forest loss occurred during the colonial period. 18 Stone notes the shift from the topographical maps of the early explorers to cadastral maps during the colonial period that focus on where people to be administered were located. See Jeffrey C. Stone, “Imperialism, Colonialism and Cartography.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 13, no. 1 (1988), 57-64. 19 Report of the Kenya Land Commission (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1934), 260. Towett Kimaiyo, Ogiek Land Cases and Historical Injustices 1902-2004 (Nakuru: Ogiek Welfare Council, 2004), 8. 20 Corinne Kratz, “Are the Okiek Really Masai? Or Kipsigis? Or Kikuyu?” Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 20, no. 355-368. 21 Lucy Claridge, “Illegal eviction of Ogiek indigenous community from ancestral home in Mau Forest, Kenya,” Internet, http://www.minorityrights. org/?lid=9326 (date accessed: 28 October 2009). 22 A. Ochola, “Rescuing a forest plundered by its custodians.” East African Standard, 10 July 2006. 23 The World Conservation Union notes that “logs continue to be the preferred currency of political patronage in many countries with old growth forests.” S. Rietbergen, “Forests – A Century of Destruction.” Gland: IUCN:1 (2000); Peter Dauvergne, Shadows in the Forest: Japan and the Politics of Timber in Southeast Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997). 24 Jacqueline M. Klopp, “Pilfering the Public: The Problem of Land Grabbing in Contemporary Kenya.” Africa Today 47, no. 1 (2000): 7-26.

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25 F. Seymour and J. Mugabe, The Right Conditions: The World Bank, Structural Adjustment and Forest Policy Reform (Washington: World Resources Institute, 2000), 115. See also Republic of Kenya (2002) Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Law System of Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printers) 59; Republic of Kenya (2004) Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land. (Nairobi: Government Printers) 83, 150-9. 27 Towett Kimaiyo, Ogiek Land Cases and Historical Injustices 1902-2004 (Nakuru: Ogiek Welfare Council, 2004), 88. 28 Department For International Development, Internet, http://www.odi.org.uk/work/projects/9899-tropical-forestry/projects/2413.htm#UK (date accessed: 30 December 2010). 29 “Kenya Indigenous Forest Conservation Programme phase 1 report.” KIFCON, 1994. 30 Dan Brockington, Fortress Conservation: The Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve (Bloomington.: Indiana University Press, 2002). 31 Otsieno Namwaya, “Who Owns Kenya?” Internet, http://blog.marsgroupkenya.org/?p=92 (date accessed: 1 October 2004). 32 A recent World Bank Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment notes that land inequality in 1997, as measured by the Gini coefficient of the whole population, was .612. By 2005/6, it appeared to rise to about .83. The report suggests that, “the increase in land inequality in most parts of the country over the past decade has been at a rate that suggests that this issue is rapidly becoming more serious in objective terms as well as in terms of political salience. World Bank, 18. 33 Recent interviews with local people who worked with KIFCON revealed that approximately 800 Ogiek families on KIFCON’s list never got land, yet, they were part and parcel of the commons that had been registered. Interview with Chesilim Kimutai and Gabriel Too, Nakuru, August 2010. 34 Credible evidence exists that the “most of the 653 Ogiek families that had settled in Kiptagich Extension Settlement Scheme were evicted, paving the way for the fresh allocation to prominent civil servants and Moi’ allies.” David Okwembah, 35 Daily Nation, “How Moi allies acquired land meant for Ogiek,” Internet, http://www.nation.co.ke/ News/-/1056/818058/-/vnkkoe/-/index.html (date accessed: 5 December 2009).

[ 1 34 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

36 Republic of Kenya,“Report of the InterMinisteral Committee on Forest Excisions,” Mau Task Force, April 2001. 37 Jacqueline M. Klopp, “‘Ethnic Clashes’ and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya’s Electoral Despotism.” Canadian Journal of African Studies 35, vol. 2 (2001): 473-517. 38 Ogiek Welfare Council, The Ogiek, Internet, http://www.ogiek.org/report/ogiek-ch2.htm (date accessed: 30 December 2010). Towett Kimaiyo, Ogiek Land Cases and Historical Injustices 1902-2004 (Nakuru: Ogiek Welfare Council, 2004). 38 Republic of Kenya, “Main Report,” Internet, http://marsgroupkenya.org/pdfs/Oct_07/ Main_Report/forestlands_national_%20parks_game_ reserves_wetlands_riparian_reserves_and_protected_ areas.pdf, p 154 (date accessed 30 December 2010). At the top of the list is former President Daniel arap Moi and many of his key associates. 39 Amnesty International , “Nowhere to go: Forced evictions in Mau Forest, Kenya,” Internet, http:// www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR32/006/2007 (date accessed: 30 December 2010). 40 Cultural Survival, “Mau Forest Evictions Leave Ogiek Homeless,” Internet, http://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/karin-oman/mau-forest-evictionsleave-ogiek-homeless (date accessed: 10 March 2005). 41 Leila Harris and Helen Hazen, “Power of Maps: (Counter) Mapping for Conservation.” ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 4, no. 1 (2006): 99-130. 42 The Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA) and the Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee (IPACC) was also a key supporting actor. 43 Giacomo Rambaldi, Julius Muchemi, Nigel Crawhall and Laura Monaci, “Through the Eyes of Hunter-Gatherers: Participatory 3D modelling among Ogiek indigenous peoples in Kenya,” Internet, http://iapad.org/publications/.../InfoDevPaper. grambaldi.a078592.pdf (date accessed: 30 January 2010). 44 Internet, http://www.ermisafrica.org/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25&Item id=111. 45 Republic of Kenya,“Report of the Inter-Ministeral Committee on Forest Excisions,” Mau Task Force, April 2001. p. 45. 46 Ibid.

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Science&Technology

Technological Leapfrogging in the Developing World José Goldemberg As pointed out by Joseph Schumpeter in his groundbreaking book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy1 successful companies with a monopoly on some technology are bound to take fewer risks; they stand to lose their technological leadership role when competitors, willing to take more risks, adopt new technologies to “leapfrog” ahead. Such are the “gales of creative destruction” described by Schumpeter, which are not necessarily successful, but increase technological options for development. Technological learning and innovation are not synonymous with leapfrogging. Leapfrogging in industrialized countries is usually a continuous, incremental process, eventually leading to breakthroughs or revolutions, such as the replacement of fixed line telephone infrastructure by cellular phones. Technological learning and innovation can lead to lower costs for existing and new (or higher quality) products, and can enhance productivity, competitiveness, and inclusive growth. In developing countries, such breakthroughs can be more dramatic because basic infrastructure may not exist. In developed economies, new versions of technology are often used to upgrade older versions. In developing econo-

José Goldemberg was educated at the University of São Paulo, Brazil (PhD, Physical Sciences, 1954). He is currently Professor of Physics at the University of São Paulo and Visiting Professor at the Intl. Academy of the Environment in Geneva, Switzerland. He is a member of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences; Academy of Sciences of the State of São Paulo; and the Brazilian Association for the Advancement of Science.

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TECHNOLOGICAL LEAPFROGGING IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

mies, still older versions of technology are prevalent, if they exist at all. These countries have greater opportunities for leapfrogging over generations of technology to the most recent versions, and may be able take advantage of this process to accelerate their development. Developing countries face unique challenges in adopting advanced technologies, however, as their capacity for implementing change is often limited. These countries are latecomers in the industrialization process. Furthermore, little technology is generated internally, and it is usually introduced by multinational enterprises. When developing countries have the opportunity to adopt already established technologies, they can avoid retracing the development process previously undertaken by industrialized countries.2 In other words, developing countries have a choice: they can either mimic industrialized nations and undergo an economic development phase that is dirty, wasteful, and creates an enormous legacy of environmental pollution, or they can leapfrog over some of the steps of development and incorporate currently available, modern, and efficient technologies into their development process.

Technological Leapfrogging and Environmental Concerns.

In the closing decades of the twentieth century, environmental pollution and sustainability became a salient concern for nations around the world. Leapfrogging was recognized as a strategy [ 1 36 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

for developing countries to avoid environmentally harmful stages of development, and to abstain from the polluting development trajectory that many industrialized countries have followed. For example, the early adoption of solar energy technologies in developing countries enables these coun-

tries to avoid the problems that highly industrialized nations faced in creating energy infrastructures based entirely on fossil fuels. In this way, countries can avoid following a Kuznets Curve, which indicates that as income grows, environmental quality must become worse before it can improve.3 Developing countries can learn from the experiences of industrialized nations and restructure growth and development to prevent potentially irreversible environmental damage, and thereby â&#x20AC;&#x153;tunnelâ&#x20AC;? through any prospective Kuznets Curve (as indicated by the dotted line in Figure 1). Exemplary cases of the adoption of successful leapfrogging strategies in developing countries include the modernization of the use of biomass, Brazilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s sugarcane ethanol program, information and communication technologies, steel production, and waste disposal in developing countries. Leap-

GOLDEMBERG

Science&Technology

frogging strategies can also be applied to the present challenges of individual transportation.

excellent motor fuel: it has a motor octane of 90, exceeding that of gasoline, and it is suitable for use in higher compression engines. The Modernization of the Use The expansion of sugarcane plantaof Biomass. Biomass in the form tions from less than 1 million hectares of fuelwood, agricultural residues, in 1990 to 7.5 million hectares in 2009 and dung provided 13 percent of the and the construction of 434 processworld’s energy consumption in 2008.4 ing plants to produce large quantities In developing countries—particularly in of ethanol have resulted in the creation many African countries where biomass of approximately 1 million jobs. Etharepresents approximately 35 percent nol distilleries initially encountered a of all energy consumed—it is predomi- number of environmental challenges, nantly used as a non-commercial cook- such as the disposal of liquid effluents ing fuel; in this form it is burned in and bagasse (dry residue), but many inefficient cooking stoves, generating of these problems have been resolved. fumes and soot in the process. In addi- Ethanol stillage, for example, is now tion, fuelwood collection contributes converted into fertilizer and bagasse is to deforestation in many parts of Africa used to generate electricity.8 and Asia. In the initial phase of Brazil’s ethaThe efficiency of fuelwood stoves is nol program, the cost of production dismally low, on the order of 10 per- was very high and ethanol could only cent.5 Enormous gains in efficiency can compete with gasoline if supported by be achieved by “climbing the ladder” to heavy government subsidies. This is modern fuels such as kerosene and liq- not unusual; the price of any produefied petroleum gas (LPG), in essence uct declines as production increases “leapfrogging” some of the steps in this and producers move along experience ladder. Among them, the most sig- curves, also known as learning curves. nificant is LPG, which was introduced Experience curves reflect gains due to in Brazil more than seventy years ago, technological progress, economies of and more recently in many developing scale, and organizational learning. countries in Africa.6 From 1981 to 2009, there has been a decline of production cost evaluation The Sugarcane Ethanol Pro- of ethanol.9 gram in Brazil. Ethanol is proThe production cost, which was 3.5 duced from fermented sugarcane juice times the cost of gasoline in the interand is used as a substitute for automo- national market, dropped rapidly as bile gasoline in Brazil. The ethanol production increased and became a equivalent of approximately 350,000 competitive alternative to gasoline after barrels of gasoline is used there each 2004. Subsidies of approximately 50 day, halving the amount of gasoline the billion dollars were spent in this learncountry needs for its 25 million auto- ing period of ethanol production. Presmobiles.7 Although it has lower caloric ently, the substitution of ethanol for content than gasoline, ethanol is an gasoline avoids emissions of 13 megaWinter/Spring 2011 [ 1 37 ]

TECHNOLOGICAL LEAPFROGGING IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

tons of carbon per year, corresponding to 3 percent of all carbon emissions in Brazil.10 Brazil is researching ways to produce ethanol from cellulosic materials, which are more abundant and widespread than sugarcane, a crop that grows well only in tropical countries. If successful, this technology could become an alternative to gasoline and could therefore represent a new leapfrogging advance not only in developing countries, but in industrialized nations as well.

competitive for regular service. The International Development Research Center of Canada (IDRC) set up the Pan Asian Network (PAN) in the early days of ICT to fund ICT infrastructure and research projects in developing countries across Asia, which paved the way for the broad use of such technologies.12 In Bangladesh, PAN worked with the grassroots Grameen Bank; in Laos, it encouraged the government to build the necessary infrastructure for a dial-up e-mail service. In Ghana, PAN helped to establish Information and Communica- a system that used Low Earth Orbit tion Technologies (ICT). Over satellites and telephone-based computthe last two decades, much of the devel- er networks to exchange and transfer oped world has been transformed by health-related information, and it crewhat are now termed Information and ated a telephone-based computer netCommunication Technologies (ICTs). work in Sierra Leone. In many cases, These technologies impact most aspects developing nations have been able to of our lives, ranging from economic forego many of the costs of buildactivities to education, entertainment, ing information and communication communication, and travel.11 infrastructures after adopting more Although this technology has been advanced and established technologies developed primarily in the United from industrialized nations. States and Western Europe, it plays an increasingly important role in develop- Steel Production. In recent years ing countries. Furthermore, as it gains large conventional steel mills requiring recognition as a means for accelerating the use of blast furnaces, coke ovens, development and as the cost of obtain- and sintering plants have come under ing it continues to fall, many develop- attack for their environmental impacts, ing countries grow increasingly eager to including the release of toxic and caracquire and adopt the technology for cinogenic byproducts. In many parts their development endeavors. of Europe, licenses for new plant conFor example, the adoption of cellu- struction have become almost imposlar telephones has supplemented, and sible to obtain.13 has at times replaced, traditional wired One result of this move away from telephone systems in Manila and certain conventional steel production has been regions in China. Although cellular an increase in the use of electric arc telephones were originally developed furnaces. These furnaces were used in for mobile use or rural areas where 35 percent of worldwide steel producwiring is expensive, technical develop- tion in 1995, compared to 10 percent ments have made them economically in the 1960s.14 This technology depends [ 1 38 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

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on the availability of low-cost electric energyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;usually based in hydroelectric generating stationsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;which is abundant in many of the developing countries to which the modern steel industry is migrating. Another trend has been the decentralization of small- and midsized mills with a production capacity of less than one million tons per year. The worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s first plants for producing iron by direct reduction were built in Mexico. This technology, used in conjunction with electric arc furnaces

Science&Technology

smelt reduction process to be commercially successful was the COREX process, at a 300,000 ton-per-year plant in South Africa. Although this small scale COREX plant was at first no more energy efficient than a modern blast furnace, future developments for this technology led to substantial gains in energy efficiency and are in wide use in South Korea. The favorable economics of COREX plants also address scrap and coke shortages and the increasing demands for better steel quality.

Leapfrogging in developing countries

critically depends on the work of scientists and engineers who are capable of understanding modern technologies in use around the world. (EAFs) for steelmaking is especially well suited to many developing countries. Favorable economics can be realized at scales of 100,000 tons of annual capacity or less, compared to capacities of 2.5 to 3.5 tons per year needed for conventional blast furnaces with oxygen-blown converts. Incidentally, this process also creates higher quality steel and alloys. Smelt reduction is an emerging technology that has improved ironmaking, the first and most energy-intensive step in the production of primary steel. Smelt reduction plants are designed to use coal and ores directly in integrated plants, thereby reducing capital costs, pollutant emissions, and the energy intensity of ironmaking. Operating costs are reduced because ordinary steam coal can be used instead of more costly metallurgical coal. The first

Waste Disposal. Waste disposal is

a serious problem in many developing countries, where only a fraction of the population has access to such services. Sanitation represents a considerable portion of government investment. Great efforts are being made in many countries to collect urban and industrial waste, separate metals and other valuables, and recycle them. The remaining material, rich in organic products, is deposited in previously prepared areas where the methane resulting from biomass decomposition can be collected and used to generate electricity. Similarly, liquid wastes can be treated by aerobic (open pools) and anaerobic (closed pools) technologies. In the latter, methane is collected to generate electricity. Biogas generation from animal waste in poultry, pigs, or Winter/Spring 2011 [ 1 39]

TECHNOLOGICAL LEAPFROGGING IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

other animals can also be collected and used for heat or electricity production. An alternative is to incinerate the organic products to produce electricity, a practice currently performed in many parts of Germany, and particularly in the province of Bavaria. In developing countries where sanitation services are lacking, modern technologies for generating heat and electricity may help governments, such as that of Brazil, to avoid the ruinous path wrought by primitive waste disposal.

Leapfrogging and the challenge of personal transportation. The world has approximately

600 million automobiles, fueled primarily by gasoline, and to a lesser extent by diesel oil and biofuels. Automobile ownership is very uneven around the world; for example, approximately 80 percent of the United States population owns an automobile, compared to less than 1 percent of China’s population15. Although it is improbable that all of the world’s countries will ever see rates of automobile ownership similar to that of the United States, it is wise to consider the implications of any increased auto use. The effects of greater auto use could be very serious, not only because of the emissions it would create, but because of the burden it would pose on the world’s fuel supply as well. Technical alternatives to gasolinepowered auto motors existed even a century ago in the form of fully electric

[ 1 4 0] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

cars run by batteries and biofuels (ethanol and biodiesel). Creating reliable, long-lasting batteries is still problematic, however. A more viable option is the hybrid car, which is an electric automobile that carries a small gasoline engine to charge its batteries. These three options—hybrids, fully electric, and present-day gasoline/ethanol—are in use today. If the present problem regarding battery longevity is resolved, electric cars could become dominant, since the electricity needed to recharge them can be derived from renewable energy sources. This instance of technological leapfrogging has not yet been achieved, but it certainly holds great promise for the future. Technological leapfrogging means that developing countries have numerous choices in formulating their development trajectories, and that they do not have to retrace the paths that today’s industrialized countries made in past decades. Leapfrogging in developing countries critically depends on the work of scientists and engineers who are capable of understanding modern technologies in use around the world. Policy makers and private enterprises must rely on these informed communities to provide insight that may accelerate these countries’ development, and that may allow them to advance with as little environmental impact as possible.

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Science&Technology

NOTES

1 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York : Harper, 1942). 2 José Goldemberg, “Leapfrogging Energy Technologies,” Energy Policy 2, (1998): 729-741. 3�� Mohan Munasinghe, “Is Environmental Degradation an Inevitable Consequence of Economic Growth: Tunneling through the Environmental Kuznets Curve,” Ecological Economics, 29, no. 1 (April 1999): 89-109. 4 Renewables 2010 Global Status Report. Rep. Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH., September 2010, Internet, http:// www.ren21.net (date accessed: 1 January 2011). 5 Samuel F. Baldwin, Biomass stoves: engineering design, development and dissemination. (Arlington: VITA, 1987). 6 West Africa LPG Development Study. The World Bank and World LP Gas Association. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2001. 7�� José Goldemberg, “The Brazilian Experience with Biofuels,” Innovations Journal 4 (Fall 2009): 91-107. 8 José Goldemberg, “Ethanol for a Sustainable Energy Future,” Science, (2007): 315. 9 Isaias C. Macedo, Joaquim E.A. Seabra, and João E.A.R. Silva, “Green House Gases Emissions in the Production and Use of Ethanol from Sugar-

cane in Brazil: The 2005/2006 Averages and a Prediction for 2020,” Biomass and Bioenergy, 32 (2008): 582-595. 10�� Robert Davison, et al. “Technology Leapfrogging in Developing Countries: An Inevitable Luxury?” Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries. (2000) Internet, http://www.is.cityu. edu.hk/research/ejisdc/vol1/v1d5.pdf (date accessed: 12 January 2011). 11 International Development Research Center of Canada Annual Report 1996-1997. Rep. Ottawa: International Development Research Center of Canada, 1997. 12 Ibid. 13 Amulya Reddy, Robert H. Williams, and Thomas B. Johansson, Energy after Rio: Prospects and Challenges (New York: United National Development Programme, 1997). 14 Ernest Worrell, “Advanced Technologies and Energy Efficiency in the Iron and Steel Industry in China,” Energy for Sustainable Development 2 (November 1995): 27-40. 15 The Sustainable Mobility Project Full Report 2004. Rep. World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2004, Internet, www.wbcsd.org/web/publications/mobility/mobility-full.pdf (date accessed: 12 January 2011).

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 1 41 ]

Books Memory, Politics, and International Relations Review by Kazuya Fukuoka

Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain, Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010. 244 pp. $29.95

Nations are haunted by the memories of the past. In 1882, Ernst Renan made the widely recognized remark, “the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances,” which noted national remembrance or national collective memory as important ingredients of the national spirit. Ever since then, they have been a critical part of the study of nations and nationalism.1 People remember the past as members of mnemonic communities.2 As national symbols, memories help frame and nurture the perceptions and feelings about nations. This is the “existential fusion” in which “our own personal biography with the history of the groups or communities to which we belong” becomes “an indispensable part of our social identity.”3 Furthermore, this is why we collectively feel a sense of honor, shame, or even pain from time to time in terms of our national history. The so-called memory boom has been widespread in the humanities and in the social sciences over the last three decades, yet international relations (IR) as a field has been relatively quiet regarding the notion of memory. Despite the fact that collective memories of contentious pasts so often

Kazuya Fukuoka is a professor of political science at Saint Joseph’s University. His specific area of focus is on the sociopolitical implications of collective memory and nationalism in Asia.

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MEMORY, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

complicate international relations between former perpetrator and victim nations, and that people in the world are so frequently attracted, swayed, and annoyed by national pasts, the question of national diversities (and the constitutive nature of the formation of national consciousness) has long been a non-issue in IR. Although IR has finally started discussing memory dynamics, especially in terms of collective trauma, it is still in a nascent stage.4

abuses to justice have not come to the fore.”5 This omission is simply unacceptable since historical issues are real and the empirical importance of memory is undeniable. In this vein, the book tries to explore the profound ways which collective memories in various societies help to shape international politics. Empirically, this project pertains to the question of how specific memories are constructed, contested, and re-constructed, which also leads

As national symbols, memories help

frame and nurture the perceptions and feelings about nations. Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations addresses the very question of the role of collective memory in international affairs. Editors Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain (both affiliated with Georgetown University) compile a variety of case studies that make this volume an important contribution to our understanding of the inter-connected relationship between memory, identity, and international relations. According to the editors, “[t]he international policy impact of collective memory…has not received the systematic attention in either the academic or the policy arena that it deserves” even though “it is difficult to find a country or region where memory and related concerns such as working through a traumatic past and bringing perpetrators of human rights

[ 1 4 3] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

to the discussion of the constitutive nature of memories in nation-formation. Theoretically, the editors explore how IR constructivism can incorporate memory problematique into its research agenda. The volume has four main purposes. First, the editors consider the book “a serious effort to study the impact of post-9/11 collective memories on international affairs and foreign politics.” Second, the book claims a “breadth of empirical coverage,” including case studies that cover Austria, China, Israel, Japan, Poland, Switzerland, and the United States. Third, the volume also aims at making “a conceptual and theoretical contribution” to international relations theory. Fourth, the analytical stance of the book is intentionally “interdisciplinary” with con-

FUKUOKA

tributors from both the humanities and social sciences.6 The book is based on “a series of discussions and symposia” held at Georgetown University in 2005, comprising two theoretical chapters (Chapter 1 and the conclusion) and nine cases studies (Chapters 2 - 10).7 Co-editor Langenbacher’s theoretical review constitutes a key chapter of the volume (Chapter 1). The extent of his coverage is commendable. He discusses the key figures in memory studies in the fields of history, anthropology and sociology, and explores the possibility of incorporating those insights into the study of international relations. The chapter serves as a good introduction to the concepts of history and memory. The author cogently explains the level of objectivity (or interpretation) embedded in the analytical concepts such as the past, history, historical consciousness, memory, and myth. He also succinctly summarizes different types of memories by referring to communicative, generational, collective, and cultural memories.8 The volume fails, however, to generate a theoretical coherence. It does not seem that the contributors consistently share the theoretical agenda the editors try to develop. Admitting that one of the book’s strengths lies in its interdisciplinary approach (as the editors rightly suggest), this is not a book where each essay articulates the book’s theoretical and cultural framework through different dimensions. More theoretically, the volume also suffers from a lack

Books

of reference to the recently burgeoning collective trauma literature in IR. Langenbacher’s theoretical discussion touches on the work of scholars such as Duncan Bell and Jenny Edkins; however, he only hints at the impact of the traumatic experience in identity-formation.9 More significantly, the concept of trauma was never clearly defined even though most of the chapters deal with memories of the Holocaust and 9/11. The phrase is rather uncritically used without theoretical consideration. Accordingly, memory and trauma are used synonymously very often. This is not negligible. There is an array of opposition to the usage of the psychoanalytical approach in the study of collective memory because, most simply, collective memory is not the aggregate of individual, autobiographic memories.10 Again, people remember the past as part of a nation. Trauma does not exist naturally; rather, it is a socially constructed cultural structure (“cultural trauma”).11 The editors seem generally aware of this, but the volume needs a more sophisticated treatment of this key concept.12 Langenbacher’s stress on the theoretical affinity between IR constructivism and political culture research, however, is certainly an appropriate move.13 I also agree that IR constructivism is now ready for the incorporation of memory into the study of international relations.14 However, the question should also be raised regarding its underlying ontology. That is, one of the problems of mainstream IR

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MEMORY, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

constructivism is too much concession to rationalist state-centered ontology.15 Scholars often fail to pay appropriate attention to the issue of nation and nationalism as a dependent variable (or a unit of analysis). This very lack of ontological treatment is one of the reasons for IR’s late register for memory problematique. To merely say that an ideational factor such as memory is at work in the international sphere does not advance our theoretical understanding. The volume does have a variety of cases that surely show its strength. However, this very variety renders the incoherency of the book. The nine case studies are not coherent in either scope or depth. Among them, four Holocaust chapters are composed of in-depth case studies and present the strongest part of the book. Bettina Warburg’s chapter (Chapter 2) provides a nice introduction to German collective memory in the post-War years. She explores the way Holocaust memory in Germany shaped Germany’s international role. Langenbacher’s case study on GermanPolish relations (Chapter 3) shows the potential relativization of Holocaust memories with the emerging theme of German suffering. Avi Becker focuses on the increasing importance of nonstate actors in the institutionalization of Holocaust memories in Switzerland and Austria (Chapter 4). Focusing on the American Jewish community and its multifarious voices, Ori Soltes looks into the question of “Jewish political interests” (Chapter 5).

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Three chapters on 9/11 are the contributions by historians. Omer Bartow discusses the very question of the use of the past memories for the sake of understanding and justifying present events (Chapter 6). He cautions that the West uses its “distorted” memories so as to legitimize the aftermath of 9/11, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Michael Kazin’s provocative chapter problematizes “12/12,” i.e., the date for the U.S. Supreme Court decision which initiated the presidency of George W. Bush on December 12, 2000 (Chapter 7). Although largely forgotten, the 12/12 event was also significant because the aftermath of 9/11 (the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq) was possible at least in part due to the Bush administration—the product of the 12/12 decision. Referring to German Prime Minister Gerhard Schroder’s appeasement stance toward Saddam Hussein as well as President Bush’s preemptive strikes, Jeffery Herf’s elaborated essay criticizes the ways those leaders “selectively” used historical images and analogies to justify their policies (Chapter 8). This is important because “speaking the truth about the past is not only a moral demand but also essential for good foreign policy.”16 Each chapter presents interesting aspects of the issues surrounding 9/11 from the historians’ points of view. As a result, however, they do not pursue the memory of 9/11 in a theoretically coherent way as the editors stressed at the outset, showing the double-edged sword of the interdisciplinary project.

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Although the cases on Japan and China provide important insights on East Asia’s memory politics, their contribution to the overall theme of the book is unclear. Thomas Berger skillfully explores the puzzling resurgence of memory (and memory politics) in Japan in particular and in East Asia in general (Chapter 9). Driven by the universal discourse of historical justice, memory issues often stall the negotiation processes in other issue areas such as territorial and/or trade disputes.

Books

Second, Shain emphasizes that there are “complex interactions between elites and mass publics” over memory construction. Although the process is mainly “top-down,” it is also true that “mass public are not merely passive vessels.” Third, Shain stresses “unintended consequences” surrounding memory politics. Fourth, it is emphasized that we now see international affairs differently “through the filter of collective memory.” Fifth, the author maintains that “the volume…demonstrates how

The reader should take the volume’s shortcomings as a part of the growing pains for IR in striving for a new challenge. Gerrit Gong, referring to China’s antiterrorism cooperation with the U.S. after 9/11, stresses that ideational factors (such as international prestige and justice) became more and more important relative to perceived national interests in contemporary foreign policy makings (Chapter 10). The chapter does talk about the 9/11 event as a catalyst for “the fundamental realignment of Chinese-U.S. relations.”17 But, it is not abundantly clear if the chapter engages itself in the discussion of the working of memory in the way which the book promises. As a conclusion, Yossi Shain summarizes five “common themes” derived from the discussions in the volume. First, it is the empirical reality that “collective memories emerge in a variety of cultural and national contexts.”

important sustained academic attention and reflection remains.”18 Relating to the second point of elitepublic interaction, Shain also emphasizes the function of memory as an orienting symbol, which seems to warrant further consideration. He states, “the pools of memories never dry up, since the present continuously evolves into the past and instructs the future.”19 This orienting function of memory is important, yet the thesis is underdeveloped. Social psychology would hint this in terms of “schema.”20 Capturing collective memory as a cultural system, sociology of culture also emphasizes the role of collective memory as a template.21 The chapter would surely benefit from these theoretical insights. Shain also asserts that “the 9/11 terrorist attacks and their aftermath

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MEMORY, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

opened new debates on questions of morality, justice, legitimacy, and values in international affairs.”22 This could be true in the U.S. context. Presumably, the Iraq war “heightened the ‘mood swing’ and confused longstanding alliances of values and their prioritization.”23 Shain also argues that “September 11 constituted a signpost, signaling a new era and a formative new memory”24 because post-9/11 international politics are “governed not only by force but also by assigning legitimacy to actors’ decisions and behaviors.”25 All of these claims are interesting and important, but they need empirical verification. There are many mov-

[ 1 4 7] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

ing parts to consider (political, social, and cultural) and Shain’s rather casual discussion does not pass the empirical test. That being the case, Power and the Past is still a notable achievement. This is a volume to be read by the students of international affairs in general as well as those who take the cultural turn of IR theories seriously in particular. Each case study provides important implications for the contemporary memory problematiques at work. The reader should take the volume’s shortcomings as a part of the growing pains for IR in striving for a new challenge.

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Books

NOTES

1 Ernest Renan, “What is a nation?” Translated and annotated by Martin Thom. In Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhaba (London and New York: Routledge, 1990[1882]), 9. 2 Eviatar Zerubavel, 1996, “Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past,” Qualitative Sociology 19(3): 283-299. 3 Ibid., 290. 4 See, for example, Duncan Bell, ed., Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relatinship Between Past and Present (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 5 Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain, eds., Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 1. 6 Power and the Past, 2. 7 Power and the Past, 12 (footnote 2). 8 Power and the Past, 28-29. . 9 Power and the Past, 22. 10 For the caution in applying psychological and/or psychoanalytical frameworks into the study of collectivity (and collective memory), see, for example, Wulf Kansteiner, 2002, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” History and Theory 41: 179-97. 11 Jeffrey C. Alexander, 2002, “On the Social Construction of Moral Universals: The `Holocaust’ from War Crime to Trauma Drama,” European Journal of Social Theory 5(1): 5-85. See also Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Bernhard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser, and Piotr Sztompka, eds., Cultural Trauma and

Collective Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). 12 See Bell, Memory, Trauma and World Politics; Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics. For “all-embracing view of trauma,” see also Jenny Edkins, 2004, “Ground Zero: Reflections on Trauma, In/distinction and Response,” Journal for Cultural Research 8(3): 247-270. See also Maja Zehfuss, 2003, “Forget September 11,” Third World Quarterly 24(3): 513-28. 13 Power and the Past, 25-27. 14 Power and the Past, 21-25. 15 See, for example, Lars-Erik Cederman and Christopher Daase, 2003, “Endogenizing Corporate Idnetities: The next Step in Constructivist IR Theory.” European Journal of International Relations 9(1): 5-35. 16 Power and the Past, 187. 17 Power and the Past, 207. 18 Power and the Past, 213-214. . 19 Power and the Past, 220. 20 See, for example, Paul DiMaggio, 1997, “Culture and Cognition,” Annual Review of Sociology 23: 263-287. 21 See, Barry Schwartz, 1998, “ Frame Images: Toward a Semiotics of Collective Memory,” Semiotica 121(1/2): 1–40. See also Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 22 Power and the Past, 214. 23 Power and the Past, 214-215. 24 Power and the Past, 219. 25 Power and the Past, 220.

Winter/Spring 2011 [ 1 48]

View from the Ground Harnessing the Positive Potential of Global Interdependence Elaine Kelley An infinite number of connections stretch across national and geographic boundaries, allowing local action to produce global effects. Interdependence is not an ideal, but rather it is the current state of our world; it helps to catalyze peace and spread democracy, foster transnational economic partnerships, and alleviate poverty and inequality. It can be harnessed for positive global change, but it also creates more possibilities for exploitation. Human and drug trafficking, cyber security breaches, the spread of extremism, and nuclear proliferation are all made easier because of interdependence. Some negative realities can no longer be prevented entirely, such as climate change, the global financial crisis and infectious disease, but necessitate a united global response nonetheless. The eighth annual Interdependence Day Celebration and Forum renewed my hope for the future of international cooperation. In September 2010, I participated in a weeklong session in Berlin with more than eighty scholars, civic organizers, artists, scientists, religious leaders, and NGO executives to strategize for global cooperation across borders. This annual event is part of the larger Interdependence Movement.

Elaine V. Kelley is a Presidential Management Fellow at the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Kelley received her Master of Arts in German and European Studies from Georgetown Universityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s School of Foreign Service in 2010. The views expressed herein do not reflect those of the Federal Emergency Management Agency or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

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The Interdependence Movement developed at the turn of the millennium, and continues to evolve and decentralize today. This article outlines a background, my experiences, and the challenges to and future of an evolving positive Interdependence Movement.

threats. Interdependence Day delegates come together each year with the common belief that global problems necessitate worldwide cooperative solutions. Such solutions are often not achievable at the sovereign state level, as is evidenced by the failure to agree upon a meaningful, Background. I had never imagined comprehensive climate change plan by I would join the youth delegation at the 2009 Climate Change Summit in Interdependence Day 2010 as I read Copenhagen. Because of the need for (Interdependence Movement founder) collective environmental action, this Benjamin Barber’s Jihad vs. McWorld dur- year’s Interdependence Day Celebraing my graduate coursework at George- tion and Forum carried the theme of town University.1 The book argues that climate change and sustainability. The both tribalism and globalism threaten harsh reality that developing nations democracy, and will inevitably clash with lower carbon emissions suffer a with one another. Barber expanded disparate impact from climate change the concept from his 1992 article, than their top carbon-producing counwhich preceded Huntington’s similar- terparts makes cooperative solutions ly themed Clash of Civilizations paradigm, even more challenging.

Interdependence Day delegates come together each year with the common belief that global problems necessitate worldwide cooperative solutions. as well as both World Trade Center attacks.2 The actual Interdependence Day falls on September 12th, symbolizing the “brutal tutorial” in interdependence provided by the atrocities of 9/11.3 Barber sees this hard lesson as a catalyst for greater worldwide interdependent action. The annual celebration of heightened cooperation is preceded each year by a 9/11 memorial concert, which features a diverse compilation of discourse and performances and serves as an impetus for proactive participant dialogue for addressing transnational

[ 1 5 1 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Typically, when a global problem is recognized, solutions are proposed and negotiated at the national level. In international forums, such as the G- summits or United Nations General Assembly, delegates represent the interests of their respective home constituents. Imagine a world where all nations are held accountable for basic human needs of the world’s constituents. Individual and collective actions in one nation have historically carried worldwide ramifications, but industrialization and globalization

KELLEY

made these consequences and benefits travel even further and faster. Will we ever respond to global problems not merely as national citizens, but as global citizens who are also members of specific/local communities? The Interdependence Movement advocates that we make global citizenship a virtue out of necessity. Initially sparked by an elite group of intellectuals, the Interdependence Movement is decentralizing very quickly, or glocalizing—that is, permeating local communities on a global scale.4 The ninth annual Interdependence Day is planned for New York City in 2011, but its events will be organized by a decentralized Arts Committee and an emerging Youth Coordinating Committee, and not by CivWorld.5 These groups have emerged in 2010 from the larger movement, as the arts and youth are already particular foci for interdependent change. Culture and the arts present a unique forum for promoting transnational understanding, and youth represent a lasting future for global cooperation. A number of artists and directors of art institutions were part of the original CivWorld International Steering Committee (now the Interdependence Movement Steering Committee), and youth activists have held summits at Interdependence Day since 2008.6 This represents an overall evolution of the Interdependence Movement to spread and take on its own local character in communities worldwide. At the same time, the Movement itself is underway. There are many perspectives within the movement, and some individuals around the world have even exercised interdependent thinking without labeling it as such. My inter-

View from the Ground

dependence story is from the western, academic, and young professional perspective.

Experiences with Interdependence.

My first association with the word interdependence was in reference to the European Union (EU). Like Benjamin Barber, I was inspired by Robert Schuman’s vision of peace and his work on the EU forerunner, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).7 In the wake of the Second World War, Schuman and others sought to foster an interdependence of Europe’s potentially war-making resources, hoping to render future wars in Western Europe impossible. His plan was essentially successful; the ECSC has enlarged to twenty-seven member states that have peacefully coexisted since then. In order to prevent future wars, European nations have been integrated through the concession of sovereignty to the supranational level. These concessions differ from the United Nations model, because the EU is not only pooling national sovereignty but also limiting it greatly. I chose to explore the intricacies of the European Union at Georgetown’s BMW Center for German and European Studies because of my interest in this grand experiment in international cooperation and interdependence. So when I found myself in former East Berlin, with citizens of five continents from a multitude of political systems who were exchanging ideas freely through words, movement, and music, I could not help but be moved by the significance of our location, a mere twenty-one years after the Fall of the

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Wall and end of the Cold War. This perspective was not the main focus of the event, but it caused the experience to have a far more profound impact on me because of my interests and educational background. The 2010 Interdependence Forum offered more than the political perspective I focused on in graduate school. I discovered that elements of the humanities, sciences, and arts were equally included. If this event had been intended to be purely an academic conference, it would have missed its mark, given its creative atmosphere and many live performances such as Indian Bharatanatyam dance, hip-hop, political performance art, acoustic soul, and a singular absurdist dance production, “Zweiland” (filled with motifs of German division and unity). Had I expected a fully interactive and artistic meeting, I would have been disappointed by the inclusion of social and hard scientific data, including a lecture by renowned climate change scientist Professor Hans Joachim Schellnhuber. The most interesting blend of science and art was when songwriter Pam Rose actually dedicated her song “Hanging out with Einstein” to all mathematicians and scientists, remarking lightheartedly, “because there isn’t enough of those.”8 At the 9/11 memorial concert, Reverend Osagyefo Sekou encouraged us to clap along to “This Little Light of Mine,” which followed a passionate appeal for interfaith tolerance by Imam Dr. Abduljalil Sajid from the UK. The official Interdependence Day Celebration included a speech by an engaging young Kenyan civic organizer, Jared Ondieki about our common destiny— [ 1 5 3] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

not to live in isolation, but to work together.9 That same day, UK Parliament House of Lords member and former Oxfam director Lord Frank Judd cautioned us of the folly of returning home, only to forget what we had learned about our ability to impact positive change in others’ lives around the world: “damn you if you return home only to put [this knowledge] away in a drawer].”10 These statements echoed in my mind on my return flight across the pond. The question remains, how can we overcome the challenges of our political constraints and multicultural realities to make a difference?

Interdependence and Sovereignty. New problems

requiring transnational solutions emerge constantly. Beyond nuclear proliferation and climate change, many local issues are cross-border. For example, the ongoing drug cartel wars in Mexico involve cross-border drug trade, affect emigration to the United States, have consequences for U.S. businesses in Mexico, and have resulted in the death of hundreds of U.S. citizens. U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies have begun to work more closely together, after more than two thousand people—including eighty-four U.S. citizens—died in the turf wars in the Mexican state of Chihuahua in 2010 alone.11 Elsewhere, the oil and gas transport systems from Central Asia, Russia, and the Middle East involve pipelines passing through multiple countries before reaching the consumer. Western Europe is affected by the energy price disputes between Ukraine and Russia. Moreover, earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes

KELLEY

know no political boundaries and can affect multiple nations simultaneously. In this scenario, one’s proximity to the disaster area should be more relevant than which side of the border

View from the Ground

values of interdependent thinking. Additionally, Former Vermont Governor Howard Dean has taken part in multiple Interdependence Day events, and delivered a video address to the

Pluralism may lengthen democratic

processes and dispute resolution, but there are ultimately more benefits in diversity than homogeny. he or she is on—but nationality can have ramifications for access to postcatastrophe resources. We must be prepared to tear down the imaginary walls that prevent the national “us” from helping “them.” Elected officials may be the most constricted in cross-border assistance, because their job security depends on votes from national constituents, who may or may not see value in providing foreign aid. President Obama has attempted to bridge these differences of opinions by highlighting that in helping other societies, we help ourselves: “In our global economy, progress in even the poorest countries can advance the prosperity and security of people far beyond their borders, including my fellow Americans…let’s put to rest the old myth that development is mere charity that does not serve our interests.”12 President Obama has cited disease, business, human rights, and violent extremism as variables that transcend state boundaries. National governments and interdependent ideals are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the Obama-appointed American Ambassador to Germany spoke at our 9/11 concert about the

2010 delegation. Other national politicians who have participated include former French Prime Minister and current Member of European Parliament Michel Rocard, former Dutch Prime Minister Andreas van Agt, and former Bogotá Mayor and Colombian Presidential hopeful Antanas Mockus. It is a promising sign for the Interdependence Movement when public servants—whose lives are dedicated to serving national interest—can openly recognize interdependence. The Interdependence Movement is not antiestablishment; it challenges parochial isolationism.

The Challenge of Uniting in Diversity. Just as global unity does not equate with the dissolution of the state, it should also not endanger local cultures. Pluralism may lengthen democratic processes and dispute resolution, but there are ultimately more benefits in diversity than homogeny. Large components of diverse local cultures are the arts, which often act as a universal language. Without speaking the same language or sharing a common homeland, people from around the world can move to the same rhythms,

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see tensions in performance art, or feel the warmth and coldness in paintings. The 9/11 memorial concert allowed for such a space, as did an earlier benefit concert, “Panthropos,” which means “all peoples.” Free and open to the public, Panthropos featured hip-hop and soul artists, as well as more alternative genres such as beat-boxing. One twosome from a group called the Peace Poets from the Bronx, New York made their hometown struggles more accessible through rhythm, rhyme, and connection to a live audience. Peace Poet Frantz Jerome noted in a later breakout session, “art creates space for rebellion that challenges violent aggression.” These words carry as much meaning for the global community as they do for youth gang members in the Bronx. Creativity can catalyze a transcendence of our immediate individual interests, creating the possibility for a peaceful struggle for global justice. The same concert featured live video addresses by Civil Rights activist Harry Belafonte, his daughter, and fellow activist Gina Belafonte, as well as a Skype call from

there are great obstacles to achieving this goal. A non-elitist, democratic gathering that can only accommodate a limited number of people is inherently paradoxical. The movement intends to be inclusive, but material and political constraints present challenges in achieving complete representation from all possible sub-groups. Oppressive regimes and travel visa regulations make it difficult for many to leave their home countries, but Interdependence Day should also not be controlled entirely by citizens of the already powerful, developed democracies. The United Nations (UN), born of ideals for peaceful global cooperation, is plagued by a similar vulnerability to political reality. The UN allows for equal representation of its 144 member states in the General Assembly, yet the Security Council Resolution veto power lies disproportionately with its permanent five Security Council members. With the Second World War victors holding these five seats, the UN reflects the balance of power in the postwar era.

Individuals on nearly every continent are

working towards the optimization of globalization for all–whether they call it interdependence or not. actor Danny Glover, promoting nonviolent but deliberate action against global injustice. Their statements at this youthful concert, alongside Barber’s, brought together a sense of intergenerational connection as I had never experienced. While the Interdependence Movement aims to be fully inclusive,

[ 1 5 5 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Likewise, the Interdependence Movement sponsoring the organization CivWorld is not blind to the political status quo, but attempts to facilitate a racially, regionally, and occupationally diverse group by offering travel and accommodation subsidies to many delegates. Not only does this allow for many par-

KELLEY

ticipants to join the forum who would not be able to finance the trip independently, but it also helps mitigate the under-representation of various interests. While the sovereign state structure shows no sign of complete dissolution, a transnational forum can still take small steps towards solving global problems. Another debate raised in Berlin was about the prioritization of global problems. Is climate change truly the most pressing issue when there is ongoing genocide in Africa? Is the failure of capitalism in the global financial crisis as crucial as the threat of an incurable flu pandemic? There are those who champion a great array of different causes, claiming their preeminence. For instance, the Peace Poets who work to mitigate inner-city youth gang violence see race and class as underlying issues in most problems. Renowned climate change scientist Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, sees carbon emissions as critically important, because they not only transcend borders but also centuries of time.13 This diverse array of perspectives can complicate processes, but the interaction of experts with unique expertise strengthens many types of dialogue. As Lord Frank Judd stated in his speech to us, “diversity is what makes a living world worth having.”14 Interdependence Day participants were not expected to have an allencompassing knowledge of the world, and it facilitates greater cooperation when such a heterogeneous group is also open to learning about new disciplines and regions. It is easy to be skeptical of reconciling the difficulties in multi-societal cooperation, but as YoYo Ma stated in his recorded message

View from the Ground

for Interdependence Day, “the cynics are always right.”15 Put another way, without the optimism that an egalitarian, mutually supportive world is possible—it becomes impossible.

A Look to the Future. What is

more significant than the next annual Interdependence Day gathering are the initiatives that will come to fruition between now and then. An “Interdependent Kindergarten” in Germany, a benefit for empowering Serbian women, and Ondieki’s project for agricultural sustainability training in Kenya are just a few of the efforts made by Interdependence Day participants to enhance global cooperation. Instances of transnational engagement such as the fall 2010 Chilean mine rescue (one of the most-viewed worldwide web events), while not labeled as interdependent action, equally serve as powerful evidence of the positive power of interdependence.16 The brand of Interdependence Movement outlined here may present a heavily western perspective, but this is not representative of the larger movement towards healthy reciprocal relations among peoples. Individuals on nearly every continent are working towards the optimization of globalization for all–whether they call it interdependence or not. One person could never represent an inclusive movement with such a diverse array of perspectives, and I am not attempting to do so. So how could we ever unite to solve the world’s problems? The emergence of a common enemy is the best way to provoke unity of action from large, diverse groups of people. Yet common global enemies

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do not only reside in science fiction. The wake-up calls to cooperate are sounding in the form of natural disasters, pandemics, economic downturn, nuclear proliferation, intolerance, and violent extremism. No person is destined to live in isolation, and no

locality or nation is more powerful in addressing worldwide challenges alone than when acting in concert with others. The reality of interdependence is here, but the work to embrace our interconnectedness to promote positive change is only beginning.

NOTES

1 Benjamin R. Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld.” The Atlantic 269, no. 3 (March 1992): 53-65 2 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993): 22-49. 3 Benjamin R. Barber, “Shrunken Sovereign: Consumerism, Globalization, and American Emptiness.” World Affairs, American Peace Society (Spring 2008). http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/ articles/2008-Spring/full-Barber.html (accessed Fall 2010). 4 Harry Merritt, E-mail interview. November 20, 2010. 5 CivWorld is Barber’s NGO, now located at Demos in New York, and supported by grants and patrons. See www.civworld.org/web/iday-2010. html. 6 Harry Merritt, 2010. 7 See The European Commission, “The History of the European Union.” Europa.eu: Gateway to the European Union . http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm (accessed Fall 2010). 8 Pam Rose, September 11th Memorial Concert. Radialsystem, Berlin (September 11, 2010). 9 Jared Akama Ondieki’s speech on September 12, 2010 in the Rotes Rathaus, Berlin, Germany 10 Lord Frank Judd’s speech on September 12, 2010 in the Rotes Rathaus, Berlin, Germany. 11 See Olivia Torres, “Mexico: 4 US Citizens killed in separate attacks.” Washington Post, November 2, 2010. Accessed November 6, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

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article/2010/11/01/AR2010110106538.html. and Olivia Torres, “Official: Student killed in Mexico was US citizen.” Associated Press, November 5, 2010. Accessed November 6, 2010. http://hosted. ap.org/dynamic/stories/L/LT_DRUG_WAR_MEXICO_AMERICANS_KILLED?SITE=AP&SECTION =HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT. 12

The White House, Office of the Press

Secretary. September 22, 2010. Remarks by the President at the Millennium Development Goals Summit in New York, New York. Accessed September 2010. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2010/09/22/remarks-president-millennium-development-goals-summit-new-york-newyork. 13 Schellnhuber is the director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. 14 Lord Frank Judd’s speech on September 12, 2010 in the Rotes Rathaus, Berlin, Germany. 15

Yo-Yo Ma’s recorded message played on

September 12, 2010 in the Rotes Rathaus, Berlin, Germany. 16 See John D. Sutter, “Miners’ rescue among top Web events,” October 13, 2010. CNN. Accessed November 6, 2010. http://articles.cnn.com/201010-13/tech/chile.miners.online.traffic_1_chileanminers-video-streams-rescue?_s=PM:TECH.

A Look Back Pondering the Presidency

Interview with Álvaro Uribe Vélez GJIA: During your time in office, you instituted a number of policies with the goal of increasing national security in Colombia. After assuming the presidency in August of this year, Juan Manuel Santos publicly stated that his policies will differ from those of your administration in a number of ways. Do you think that any changes will be made to the security infrastructure and system that you created, and if so, how might they affect political, economic, and social progress?

Álvaro Uribe Vélez was the 58th President of Colombia. In August 2010, he was named a Distinguished Scholar in the Practice of Global Leadership at Georgetown University.

Uribe: President Santos was elected on behalf of our policies. The new administration has its own ideas, however, we do not see any abandonment of our fundamentals. President Santos is pushing for structural reform in royalties given the boom in the oil, coal and the mining sectors. The country needs this reform that my government could not get and now this is no time for postponement. GJIA: The recent Venezuelan legislative elections, which many considered an important run-up to the 2012 presidential election, highlighted President Hugo Chavez’s waning popularity. How might the outcome of Venezuela’s presWinter/Spring 2011 [ 1 59]

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idential election affect the country’s relations with Colombia and the greater political makeup of South America?

tion you have provided for President Juan Manuel Santos?

Uribe: The United States and Colombia have had a long tradition of friendly relationships. Bipartisan approach has been a valuable asset in U.S. policies to Colombia. Unilateral preferences were introduced by President Bush, maintained by President Clinton, and are still operating. Plan Colombia was signed by the Clinton Administration, and was continued during President Bush’s tenure. With President Obama’s government, Colombia has signed an GJIA: You implemented a number of agreement to cooperate in the fight security measures throughout Colom- against narco-terrorism. However, the bia to counter the activities of the FARC ratification of the Bilateral Free Trade and paramilitary groups. How much Agreement is waiting for Congressional further does the current Colombian approval. government have to go in establishing and maintaining peace and stability, GJIA: The theme of the Forum secparticularly in rural areas? tion of this issue of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs is centered on the Uribe: We were working with three development and utilization of intelpolicies: security with freedoms, invest- ligence. During your time in office, ment promotion with social responsi- you called upon civilians to act as inforbility, and social cohesion with educa- mants for the government, offering tion at the top. Colombia has suffered monetary rewards for credible intela long history of violence. Security is ligence. Looking back, do you feel that necessary as a permanent policy when this was an effective means of gatherpassing from one government to the ing intelligence? Did you worry that other. paying informants might have reduced the reliability of the information they GJIA: You had a positive working provided? relationship with President George W. Bush. Can you describe how this Uribe: People collaborating with relationship helped or hindered your the institutions in charge of security implementation of domestic policies is essential for this superior public during your time in office? Do you good to be attained. The more civilthink that President Obama, whose ians cooperate with the police, for foreign policy differs significantly from example, the more effectiveness and that of his predecessor, will be instru- transparency. We rewarded only informental or detrimental on the founda- mation with quality. We got 4 milUribe: Democracy is not a question of mere elections. Progressive democracies need five parameters: security with democratic values, freedoms (private initiative), sustainable social cohesion, independent institutions, and the highest degree of people participation. Comparing daily practice with these points makes it possible to know where we have lagging democracies.

[ 1 6 0] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

URIBE

lion unarmed civilians collaborating through phone calls and for the reason of being solidary with the community goal of having a safe country. Some received rewards on Mondays, generally small amounts, but on time. We publicized Mondayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rewards, expressing the importance of the information, without disclosing identifications of recipients. Confidence in the government pledge is a key issue. Exceptionally huge amounts were paid for emblem-

A Look Back

Uribe: Every country has its own circumstances, nonetheless it is necessary to draw intelligence from technical and human sources. Sophisticated intelligence is necessary. The better the equipment, the better the output of human intelligence. GJIA: During your time as president you promoted a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States which has the potential to benefit both coun-

Security is necessary as a permanent

policy when passing from one government to the other. atic cases. There are places, especially in rural remote areas, where we paid monthly bonuses of little amounts to the residents for them to keep their eyes on electricity transmission towers or on the oil pipeline for the armed forces to prevent terrorist explosions. The assignment to coordinate cooperators in such a big number of 4 million was a task of high rank officials in every brigade and police command.

tries. What importance would the FTA carry for the Colombian government in combating guerrilla and paramilitary groups? Do you feel that the allegations of human rights violations which have been directed toward your administration have had any effect on the FTAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s progress? Finally, what sectors of the economy stand to benefit the most from a bilateral agreement with the United States?

GJIA: Afghanistan has experienced a number of issues relating to narco trafficking and insurgency that are similar to those you dealt with during your presidency. Do you think that your model for establishing security and drawing intelligence from civilian sources might be relevant to policymakers in Afghanistan? Is there anything that they can learn from you and/ or what you did during your eight years in office?

Uribe: [Regarding human rights violations] My government disclosed, investigated and punished every single case. We opened public hearings on TV for public opinion in order to bring their complaints on human rights and the administration, and to respond with my presence. The United Nations has reported that Colombia made significant progress in human rights between 2002 and 2010. In June, the International Labor Organization, for the first time in many years, exclud-

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ed Colombia from the list of Non Compliant Countries mainly because of the steady decrease in killings of unionists. We successfully fought the penetration of narco-trafficking in isolated individuals of the Armed Forces, and that has been determinant of human rights abuses. Our Armed Forces are well prepared for complying with the highest standards and have an excellent performance in human rights. GJIA: You have been lauded as having brought greater security to Colombia during your years in office. At the same time, several labor organizations have criticized your administration for loosening labor laws and not providing good working conditions for Colombian workers. A number of trade union leaders have been the target of threats and violence over the past five years as well. Can you shed some light on the discrepancy between these criticisms and your success in establishing greater security? Can you offer some insight into the complexities of the labor and union situation in Colombia?

cases. Our administration introduced the tripartite agreement that, under the supervision of the International Labor Organization, included employers, workers, and government. We supported the expansion in the justice administration and as a result of our determination, Colombia passed from one sentence to more than two hundred condemning murderers of trade unionists. Now, there are more than two hundred people in jail. We provided effective individual protection to many Colombians; in some periods the number reached ten thousand. Twenty percent were unionists. The minimum wage grew 10 percent in real terms and affiliation to social security more than two times, having reached almost full coverage in health. The number of unionized workers went up from more than 800 thousand to over 1.5 million. We strived for investment with social responsibility and for workersÂ´ organizations to quit the old system of vindication and adopt the new stand of participation. In many corporations we succeeded in the introduction of outsourcing contracts with the workers

Legal consumption has not proven to be a remedy to eliminate criminals. Uribe: In the previous answer, I referred to the positive evolution of my country in the report by the International Labor Organization. Before our administration, there were years of more than 276 killings of trade unionists; last year we had 28 cases. We were not satisfied with the reduction because what we need are zero

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and their own organizations instead of resorting to external suppliers. Every one or two months, we had working lunches with worker representatives even at the middle of debate. I am proud that the new Vice President of my country comes from being a conspicuous unionist leader; once he knew us in depth, he became a member of

URIBE

A Look Back

our coalition.

GJIA: What was the single greatest GJIA: There have been many debates challenge â&#x20AC;&#x201C; whether domestic or from in the United States about the legaliza- abroad â&#x20AC;&#x201C; that you faced during your tion of marijuana, and the issue was time as president? even voted on in California in the recent mid-term elections. Proponents Uribe: There was a greatest challenge of legalization assert that it would sig- at every hour, and in all the hours: to nificantly cut back on the violence asso- rescue the hostages without accepting ciated with illicit drug trade, and that terrorist demands. it would sap power from groups that profit from it. Do you feel that legaliza- GJIA: What do you think President tion of drugs in the United States would Santos can learn from your experience have an effect on violence in Colombia in office? What is the most important and Latin America in general? Are lesson he can take from having worked there any other factors to consider here with you on developing and implebesides combating the violence associ- menting domestic and foreign policies? ated with the drug trade? Uribe: I am the one who learned from Uribe: There is a mistaken approach my colleagues. to the debate: instead of proposing legalization, there should be a rethink GJIA: According to the news source of the permissive way that consump- Colombia Reports, you were interviewed tion has been legalized. My country this summer by RCN Radio and were has increased the number of addicts asked whether you would consider runand consumers, and what is worse, ning for the position of mayor of Bogothe associated criminality. Legal con- tĂĄ. Have you given any more thought to sumption has not proven to be a rem- running for the position? Would you edy to eliminate criminals. Whatever be interested in re-entering politics at the cheap price, legal production will some point in the future? threaten the destruction of the Amazon rain forest. And finally, if today it is Uribe: I beg my God to give me the difficult to answer why alcohol yes and opportunity to work for my country marijuana no, in ten years hence, how until the last day. I am not looking for can someone answer why marijuana yes posts; I am looking for a trench in the and cocaine no? battle.

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Georgetown Journal of

International Affairs

religion& power From...

to...

Dynamics Dissent of

- - - tackling the issues that shape our world - - -

Call for Papers The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs is accepting submissions for the Winter/Spring 2012 issue. The submission deadline is 31 August 2011. Articles must be about 3,000 words in length. They should have the intellectual vigor to meet the highest scholarly standard, but written with the clarity to attract a broad audience. Please send articles and questions to gjia@georgetown.edu.