Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Georgetown Journal of
International Affairs
IN THIS ISSUE:
Protecting the Homeland An Interview With Philip Zelikow
North Korean Wrongs vs. Rights Balbina Hwang
Think Tanks: The Fifth Estate James McGann
FORUM CONTRIBUTIONS:
South Africa: Beyond the Scrum summer/fall
Derek Catsam
Taiwan’s Patriot Games Junwei Yu
US-Cuban Diplomacy Strikes Out
2010
Thomas Garofalo
volume xi, number
With an Introduction by Victor Cha
2
Match Point insert
Sports, Nationalism, and Diplomacy
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Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
SUMMER/FALL 2010, VOLUME XI, NUMBER 2
1
Editors’ Note
Forum: Match Point 3
Introduction VICTOR CHA
A mutual love for sport is shared by diverse peoples across the globe. Sport has the power to transcend ethnicity, religion, and class and, in turn, bring together a nation in support of a common team and a shared identity. As such, the reach of sport into every demographic of society has profound implications for the nation-state. In South Africa, the connections between race and rugby come to the fore in anticipation of the 2010 World Cup. Taiwan’s successful World Games provided an opportunity for the island’s citizens to showcase their unique national identity and for the nation to gain critical international breathing space. Sport can also translate across borders and lend succor to diplomatic efforts, as demonstrated by the mutual love of baseball between Cubans and Americans. This Forum examines how the pervasive influence of sport has created opportunities for unity and reconciliation worldwide, turning a pastime into an element of nationalism and diplomacy.
7
The Death of Doubt? Sport, Race, and Nationalism in the New South Africa DEREK CHARLES CATSAM
15
Cross-Strait Tug of War: Taiwan and the World Games JUNWEI YU
25
Sports without Diplomacy: The United States, Cuba, and Baseball THOMAS GAROFALO
Politics&Diplomacy 35
The Fifth Estate: Think Tanks and American Foreign Policy JAMES G. MCGANN
In this increasingly complex, interdependent, and information-rich world, U.S. policymakers face the common challenge of bringing expert knowledge to bear in governmental decision making. American think-tanks are well-positioned to provide alternative views to administrations and foster debate on contentious topics.
43
A Smart Use of Intelligence: Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing LAWRENCE WOOCHER
The intelligence community is uniquely placed to support U.S. government agencies tasked with preventing mass atrocities and genocide. But to be effective, it should conduct long-term assessments, produce watch lists, identify potential high-risk situations, and design and implement preventive strategies.
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Conflict&Security Right Intentions, Wrong Approaches: The Response to North Korea’s Human “Wrongs” Problem
51
BALBINA HWANG
The challenge of addressing North Korean human rights abuses remains a polarized, politically sensitive, and intractable problem within the international diplomatic arena. This article analyzes how the issue has been addressed and offers suggestions for a new approach.
59
Sovereignty on Borrowed Territory: Sahrawi Identity in Algeria RANDA FARAH
Sahrawi refugees have been able to establish a sense of united sovereignty in Algerian camps, despite obstruction from neighboring Morocco.
Culture&Society 67
Ghana’s Fragile Elections: Consolidating African Democracy through E-Voting GABBY ASARE OTCHERE-DARKO
Despite being heralded as a democratic success story, Ghana’s elections are prone to irregularities, which undermine its prospects for democracy. Civil society organizations are therefore promoting a biometric registration and electronic voting system to ensure credible elections and political stability.
Law&Ethics Wither Medical Marijuana
75
LESTER GRINSPOON
Although marijuana possesses many medical benefits and few proven detrimental side-effects, its legalization remains a controversial issue. The author explores the medicinal qualities of cannabis, the efforts of the pharmaceutical industry to capitalize on such benefits, and government inefficiencies in realizing the potential of decriminalizing such a drug.
83
Cannabis Captiva: Freeing the World from Marijuana Prohibition STEPHEN B. DUKE
Marijuana prohibition is a practice exercised by nations around the world—not just the United States. Drug control, in the case of marijuana, is ill-conceived and should be eliminated. A policy of decriminalization may serve as a step toward legalization.
Business&Economics 91
Are Economic Sanctions Still a Valid Option? ZACHARY SELDEN
Financial sanctions, rather than import or export sanctions, may serve as a significant economic tool to alter the behavior of non-compliant states. The merits of this approach are evaluated using Iran’s compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a case study.
Cover & page 3 photo credits: Getty Images
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Contents
Science&Technology 99
Getting Rid of Black Carbon: A Neglected but Effective Short-Term Mitigation Avenue DENNIS CLARE, KRISTINA PISTONE, AND VEERABHADRAN RAMANATHAN
Most policymakers and scientists focus on CO2 reduction when addressing the global warming issue. However, short-term pollutants like black carbon may provide another avenue for winning the battle against global warming.
107
The Search for the Killer App: Precision Farming in Africa JAMES LOWENBERG-DEBOER AND BRUCE ERICKSON
Precision agriculture, in its many forms, has had a significant impact on crop production worldwide. Although it is still searching for its “killer app,” it appears that GPS will become the most valuable type of technology in this field.
Books 117
The Return of Peace PAULA R. NEWBERG
A review of Reconciliation in Afghanistan by Michael Semple.
125 Narrating the Path Toward Genocide Prevention MICHAEL MORFIT
A review of If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die: How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor by Geoffrey Robinson.
View from the Ground 133 Surviving Food Insecurity in North Korea DIANA PARK
As a result of the famine of the late 1990s and the subsequent food shortages, economic and social shifts in North Korean society have made it increasingly difficult for the government to control its population.
139 Beaten but not Broken: Tamil Women in Sri Lanka TASHA MANORANJAN
Sri Lanka’s decades-long conflict has uniquely impacted Tamil women. They have experienced shifting cultural and political roles within Tamil society, and are uniquely affected by the government’s May 2009 victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
A Look Back 149 Protecting America: Are We Doing Enough? PHILIP ZELIKOW
Executive director of the 9/11 Commission Phillip Zelikow discusses the threat of terrorism, the detainment of enemy combatants, and civilian relations with the government.
Summer/Fall2010 [ iii]
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
EDITORS-IN-CHIEF
JULIA M. FAMULARO, SARATH K. GANJI
MANAGING EDITORS
EIMON (EMMA) T. HTUN, DHRUVA JAISHANKAR, ANDREW MILLER, IMANI S. TATE, ALLISON WRIGHT
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BRITTA NICOLMANN, MATT SCHUBERT, KATE STONEHILL WILL TAMPLIN GRAHAM T. ROBERTSON ANDREW COLFORD, WEIXIAN CAI ANDREW WOJTANIK ANDREW C. HAAK, GILLIAN EVANS WILLIAM MOORE ALEXA LOMBARDO, CATHARINE MYUNG MICHAEL B. MCKEON SIKANDER KIANI, SHEA HOULIHAN, DANE SHIKMAN JOHN THORNBURGH ELIZABETH SAAM, DANIEL SOLOMON ADELIA SAUNDERS, VAIL KOHNERT-YOUNT BENJAMIN G. ROSENBLUM, SARAH EVELYN KUNKLE EMMA KELSEY PARUL AGGARWAL JAMES MARSHALL JAMIE MARTINES, BEN MISHKIN JACKIE RYU JULIAN YANG ANTHONY EBEN JENS BLOMDAHL CAROLINE RUTH BAL, ROANNE LEE, ALEKSA MISKINIS, KENING YE RAHUL X. SINGH SHEA HOULIHAN, ANNALEE LEGGETT, KATHERINE LIGHT DAVID ABSHIRE, SUSAN BENNETT, H.R.H. FELIPE DE BORBÓN, JOYCE DAVIS, CARA DIMASSA, ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, LEE HAMILTON, PETER F. KROGH, MICHAEL MAZARR, FAREED ZAKARIA ANTHONY AREND, JOHN ESPOSITO, CHRISTOPHER JOYNER, CHARLES KING, GEORGE SHAMBAUGH, ROBERT SUTTER, JENNIFER WARD, CHARLES WEISS
JENNIFER C. WARD, ASSOCIATE DEAN OF THE EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE AND PRIMARY ADVISER TO THE STAFF OF THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, RECENTLY RETIRED FROM GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY AFTER ELEVEN YEARS OF SERVICE. THE JOURNAL STAFF WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS ITS GRATITUDE AND APPRECIATION TO DEAN WARD FOR HER CONTINUED SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE OVER THE YEARSESPECIALLY FOR HER PATIENCE AND “GENTLE PRODDING” TO ENSURE THAT THE JOURNAL REMAINED A QUALITY PUBLICATION IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WE WILL SORELY MISS HER, AND WE WISH HER THE VERY BEST IN HER FUTURE ENDEAVORS.
[ i v ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
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Summer/Fall 2010 [ v]
Notice to Contributors
Articles submitted to the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs must be original, must not draw substantially from articles previously published by the author, and must not be simultaneously submitted to any other publication. Articles should be around 3,000 words in length. Manuscripts must be typewritten and double-spaced in Microsoft™ Word® format, with margins of at least one inch. Authors should follow the Chicago Manual of Style, 15th ed. Articles may be submitted by e-mail (gjia@georgetown.edu) or by U.S. mail; those sent by U.S. mail must include both a soft copy on a compact disc and a hard copy. Full names of authors, a two-sentence biography, and contact information including addresses with zip codes, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, and e-mail addresses must accompany each submission. The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs will consider all manuscripts submitted, but assumes no obligation regarding publication. All material submitted is returnable at the discretion of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (ISSN 1526-0054; ISBN 0-9824354-2-8) is published two times a year by the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 301 Intercultural Center, Washington, DC 20057. Periodicals postage paid at Washington, DC. Annual subscriptions are payable by check or money order. Domestic: $16.00; foreign: $24.00; Canada: $18.00; institutions: $40.00. GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SUBSCRIPTIONS EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE 301 INTERCULTURAL CENTER WASHINGTON, DC 20057 TELEPHONE (202) 687-1461 FACSIMILE (202) 687-1571 e-mail: gjia@georgetown.edu http://journal.georgetown.edu All articles copyright © 2010 by Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University except when otherwise expressly indicated. For all articles to which it holds copyright, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service permits copies to be made for classroom use, provided the following: (1) the user notifies the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs of the number and purpose of the copies, (2) the author and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs are identified, (3) the proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy. Except when otherwise expressly provided, the copyright holder for every article in this issue for which the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs does not hold copyright grants permission for copies of that article for classroom use, provided that the user notifies the author and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the author and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs are identified in the article, and that proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy. For reprinting permission for purposes other than classroom use, please contact Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Permissions, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 301 Intercultural Center, Washington, DC 20057. Telephone (202) 687-1461. Facsimile (202) 687-1571. The views expressed in the articles in the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs do not necessarily represent those of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the editors and staff of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, or Georgetown University. The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, editors and staff of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and Georgetown University bear no responsibility for the views expressed in the following pages.
[ vi ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Editors’ Note
Ours has always been a sports-crazed world. The ancient Persians delighted in polo, the “game of kings,” and the Native Americans were the first to enjoy the fast-paced sport of lacrosse. At the zenith of their power, the ancient Egyptians developed the earliest form of fencing. Today, athletic competition has the ability to demonstrate the triumph of the human psyche and to transform an entire nation into an unbridled state of jubilation. Similarly, the international tensions and conflicts that plague mankind are played out on the battlefield of sport. Match Point: Sports, Nationalism, and Diplomacy explores how the physical—and political— games we play indeed reflect the challenges that shape our world. Victor Cha provides the backdrop for this Forum by discussing the influence of sport on the nation-state. In a timely piece on South Africa, Derek Catsam examines how the country has harnessed the power of sport to facilitate the process of racial and national reconciliation. Junwei Yu argues that the 2009 World Games in Taiwan served not only to strengthen the island’s national consciousness but also to expand its “diplomatic breathing space” while seeking creative solutions to the cross-Strait dilemma. Finally, Thomas Garofalo explains how “baseball diplomacy” can help mend the rift between the United States and Cuba. However, this issue also devotes attention to a host of other contests whose exposition lies far beyond the stadium. The Law and Ethics section features two prominent articles regarding the battle over medical marijuana, from both medical and legal perspectives. The Journal also highlights the international response to the humanitarian crisis and “human wrongs” situation in North Korea. Moreover, 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow discusses the ongoing threat of terrorism, the detainment of enemy combatants and the Guantanamo Bay prison, and the ways in which the United States can regain its positive standing in the international community. Despite the challenges that confront our rapidly changing world, it is comforting to know that there will always be another scrimmage, another match, and another chance at achieving victory. We hope that this issue of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs entertains and informs our readership at home, in the workplace, and even on the pitch.
Julia Famularo
Sarath Ganji
Summer/Fall 2010 [1]
Georgetown Journal of
International Affairs
religion& power From...
to...
Dynamics Dissent of
- - - tackling the issues that shape our world - - -
Call for Papers The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs is accepting submissions for the Winter/Spring 2011 issue. The submission deadline is 31 August 2010. Articles must be about 3,000 words in length. They should have the intellectual vigor to meet the highest scholarly standard, but written with the clarity to attract a broad audience. Please send articles and questions to gjia@georgetown.edu.
Forum GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Match Point
SPORTS, NATIONALISM, AND DIPLOMACY
7 The Death of Doubt?
Sport, Race, and Nationalism in the New South Africa
15 Cross-Strait Tug of War 25 Sports without Diplomacy Taiwan and the World Games JUNEWI YU
The United States, Cuba, and Baseball THOMAS GAROFALO
DEREK CHARLES CATSAM
George Orwell, in a famous essay in 1945, described sport as “war minus the shooting.”1 Exaggerated as this description may sound, Orwell observed a seemingly obvious relationship between sport and politics that has not systematically been studied. Given all our theories about how nation-states interact in international relations, this gap in the literature is somewhat astounding, especially since sport is an activity engaged in by all of the world’s populationacross territorial, cultural, religious, and ethnic boundaries. There are many ways to think about the link between sport and politics. The historical practice of sport, for example, can have a pacific effect among peoples. In the ninth century B.C.E., at the first Olympic festival of the ancient games, three kingsIphistos of Elis, Cleosthenes of Pisa, and Lycurgus of Spartasigned a treaty establishing the “Olympic Truce,” which banned all hostilities while the games were played. Sport can also be a prism that refracts political conflict. Nowhere was this role more apparent than during the Cold War,
Summer/Fall 2010 [3]
INTRODUCTION
where matches between the United States and Soviet Union had meaning beyond the playing field. Victories became statements of the superiority of one social system over another. Ironically, the politics of this sporting competition reached its apex in Moscow and Washington’s decisions not to compete in the 1980 and 1984 summer Olympic Games, respectively. Sport has also been a political target of terrorism. Athletes, strewn in the colors of their countries, often represent the personification of their nation’s policies and international conflicts. While athletic venues, moreover, were seen as soft targets by terrorists, they offered a world stage on which terrorists could make their grievances known. The tragedy of the 1972 Munich Olympics is so well-known that, today, organizers spend almost as much in dollars on security at venues as on the events themselves. Sport has also become useful as a tool of diplomacy. On certain occasions, it has helped break the ice in otherwise frigid relations between countries—and in a way that years of conventional diplomacy could not. The seminal example here is “ping-pong diplomacy,” in which China invited the U.S. table tennis team to play exhibition matches in Beijing in April 1971. The matches played an important role in helping to pave the way for SinoAmerican reconciliation. Of course, there were a number of other factors at play which led to Richard Nixon’s eventual trip to China, but the image of these unassuming diplomatsranging from an IBM programmer to a housewife from Grand Rapids, Michiganas the first Americans since the 1949 revo-
[ 4] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
lution to sightsee on the Great Wall and to place a long distance call to the United States was an undeniable boost to Nixon’s diplomatic efforts. Keeping in mind the many purposes of sport in the international arena, this issue’s Forum brings together authors who advance our knowledge of the relationship between sport and politics. Junwei Yu’s contribution looks at the highly successful 2009 Kaohsiung World Games in Taiwan. The article’s focus—the relationship between sport and national identity—represents an important facet of sport and politics. Sport evokes emotion and unity in a way that no other form of politics, art, or music can accomplish. In this regard, Yu shows how the Games provided a stage for Taiwan to promote political ideology and Taiwanese identity in the face of difficult cross-Strait relations. In the past, sport has also been used as a form of sanction. The international community banned some countries from participating in the Olympics after the two World Wars; perhaps the most well-known use of sport as sanction concerned apartheid in South Africa. Derek Catsam’s article, however, offers another side of this storythat is, the redemptive power of sport. He looks at the interesting intersections between race and nationalism as they are represented through South Africa’s experience with rugby and—in anticipation of this summer’s FIFA World Cup— football. Finally, Thomas Garofalo’s study of baseball and Cuba shows us the potential opportunities, afforded by this shared national pastime, for diplomacy between Washington and Havana. His work demonstrates that the link
CHA
between sport and diplomacy is more than just love of the game. It requires a degree of political leadership and a willingness to seek change rather than the status quo. As he sees it, with proper leadership, sport can be an agent of political change. The authors of this Forum hold different opinions of the utility and role of sport in international affairs, but they do agree on one thing: the poten-
Match Point
tial influence of sport on the nationstate. Sport, as Orwell opined, may lack the shooting of a full-blown war. But sport, like war, may be just as intense and just as defining for the character of a country and for relations among states. Victor D. Cha is D.S. Song Professor of Government and Asian Studies at Georgetown University.
NOTES
1 George Orwell, “The Sporting Spirit,� in The Penguin Essays of George Orwell (New York: Penguin, 1994), 321; originally published in Tribune, 14 December 1945.
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•I NTERNATI ONALRELATI ONS ANDS ECURI TY
•I NTERNATI ONALDEVELOPMENT •I NTERNATI ONALCOMMERCE ANDBUSI NESS
•SELFDESI GNEDANDREGI ONAL &COMPARATI VES TUDI ES
ht t p: / / ms f s . ge or ge t own. e du/ h t t p s : / / a p p . a p p l y y o u r s e l f . c o m/ ? i d =g t u g
Match Point
The Death of Doubt? Sport, Race, and Nationalism in the New South Africa Derek Charles Catsam In early December of 2009, South Africa held a ceremony to receive the World Cup trophy as a kickoff to a year-long celebration. President Jacob Zuma declared, “Let us display the Rainbow Nation to the world, let us display that here on the southern tip of Africa, where mankind originates from, we can make the home of everyone.”1 Chief Executive Officer of South Africa’s 2010 FIFA World Cup bid Danny Jordaan—whose job is admittedly to boost the significance of the event—added, “All of us who were [involved in the struggle against Apartheid] said ‘one day we are going to be a democratic South Africa, one day we are going to host this World Cup.’ Today, as we welcome this trophy, we announce the death of doubt.”2 The message was clear: throughout the years of contention and struggle between peoples during and even after Apartheid, the world has looked on, doubtful that South Africa would ever find peace and harmony. Now, the World Cup represents a vital component of the country’s process of reconciliation. Indeed, the event signifies the fact that, for generations, sport has been central to the country’s political debate over race and nationalism. It is now seen as central to national reconciliation.
Derek Charles Catsam is an assistant professor of history at the University of Texas of the Permian Basin. He writes about race, politics and social movements in the United States and Southern Africa and is working on a book on sport and politics in South Africa since 1994.
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THE DEATH OF DOUBT?
But why was there doubt that harmony in South Africa could be achieved in the first place? And what does sport have to do with it? Though there are many examples, a telling one is an incident that occurred in 1981. South Africa’s national rugby team, the all white and largely Afrikaner Springboks, traveled to New Zealand to play that country’s All Blacks in a series of matches.3 Due to South Africa’s Apartheid policies, which, by 1981 had made the country a pariah in most of the world, the Springbok tour met with passionate and sometimes violent protests and placed the debate over Apartheid front and center. Supporters of the tour in New Zealand and South Africa argued that sport and politics should not be mixed—a false claim that was itself a political stand.
sented about the dramatic changes that took place in South Africa. With the 2010 World Cup, sportmad South Africans celebrated the opportunity to return to the world stage. Yet, while the Apartheid period’s long sporting isolation has ended, the linkages between sport and politics in South Africa have not. Sport in South Africa today reveals both the distance the country has traveled to overcome its white supremacist past and how far it still has to go to surmount that bitter legacy. Fast forward nearly three decades, after the imbroglio over the Springbok tour of New Zealand. South African sport has received some nice publicity in recent months. In Clint Eastwood’s film Invictus, Matt Damon and Morgan Free-
While the Apartheid period’s long sporting isolation has ended, the linkages between sport and politics in South Africa have not.
In the period between 1960 and 1972, South Africa found itself excluded from the international sporting community— expelled in short order from the Olympics; the world cups of football, rugby, and cricket; and virtually every other sporting event in the world.4 This status largely held true until the country transitioned to democratic rule with the negotiation process that culminated in the 1994 election of Nelson Mandela. Fourteen years after the controversial Springbok tour, South Africa and New Zealand squared off in the finals of the 1995 Rugby World Cup in South Africa. Unlike in 1981, the world now celebrated the match for what it repre-
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man portray World Cup-winning, 1995 Springbok captain Francois Pienaar and Nelson Mandela, respectively, as saving South Africa from descending into chaos. Americans who had never thought about South Africa’s Springboks and who are not familiar with Bafana Bafana— the name of the South African national football team, which means “the boys, the boys” in Nguni—have suddenly been deluged with rather clear-cut narratives about the redemptive power of sports. However, the reality of the interconnectedness of race, nationalism, and athletic competition in South Africa is messier and more complex than Invictus would have us believe.
CATSAM
Match Point
The Informal Institution of of South Africans embraced Mandela Sports. South African rugby is and the idea of reconciliation. Whites
fraught with tension over the idea and practice of reconciliation. The message of 1995 is not one of unalloyed success but rather of the ways in which even a global championship celebrated by millions did not change the realities on the ground for millions of South Africans whose embrace of the Springboks was broad but shallow. For many millions of non-white South Africans, the Springboks represented Afrikaner white supremacy at its apex. Most black Africans despised rugby, and those who did not despise it supported any team except the Springboks. Invictus depicts Nelson Mandela’s calculated embrace of the Springboks despite the potential political blowback; he recognized that bringing about reconciliation in South Africa would require the support of all South Africans, white and black. To truncate a long and complicated story, South Africa hosted the 1995 World Cup as a sort of coming out party. Following decades of sporting and increasingly political isolation, the Springboks made an improbable run to the final game against the mighty All Blacks of New Zealand. Nelson Mandela made an appearance before the game wearing the number six jersey of Springbok Captain Francois Pienaar, with whom he had forged a relationship that helped bridge the gap between a team and a nation. In a tightly fought match, the Springboks defeated the All Blacks in extra time. In its broadest contours, the story told in Invictus is true. Mandela did embrace the Springboks, who made an implausible run to the championship, and in its wake, many millions
used the World Cup as a way to portray themselves as being tolerant of a new regime that the vast majority of them desperately wished had never come to power. Many, but not all, were surely earnest in their newfound embrace of South Africa as “the Rainbow Nation.” Black South Africans embraced the phrase Amabokoboko Zulu—for “our Springboks”—as a way to promote the idea of the democratic, non-racial South Africa they had long envisioned. Thus, Mandela in that jersey and Springbok cap is one of the great symbolic moments in the history of the post-Apartheid era. Unfortunately, reality is a lot more complicated than the movies. Sport can represent a marvelous way to examine a society because it is a microcosm of the world at large. Sport is messy; it occasionally leads social trends; and simple morality plays rarely exist.5 However, symbolism is of limited utility in the face of hard political realities. For example, it may have seemed as though the country had made great progress when the nation embraced Mandela as a result of his support for the Springboks. In actuality, the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, set up to address the gross human rights violations of the Apartheid past, had not even convened when the Springboks stunned the All Blacks. The World Cup victory did not represent the apex of reconciliation—it represented a beginning stage. Even today, rugby itself is far from a multi-racial panacea. The vast majority of the country’s fans are white, and the sport is still a civic religion
Summer/Fall 2010 [9]
THE DEATH OF DOUBT?
for Afrikaners. Additionally, most of the country’s elite players are white, even if almost assuredly the majority of the country’s players, at all age levels, are black.6 Nevertheless, the country’s black masses have not yet fully embraced the professional manifestations of the sport. There is a consistent clamor to eliminate the Springbok logo that is still hated in many corners of the country, and millions still prefer to see the Springboks throttled when they play international matches. For large numbers of South Africans, the Springbok is a racist symbol. In pursuit of reconciliation across politics and society, the South African government has used sport as an informal means to bridge racial inequalities. Due to the unequal racial makeup of professional teams, rugby has become a visible symbol of this fight for racial equality. The government and various sporting bodies have instituted quota policies in sports, a form of affirmative action that requires representation from previously disadvantaged groups. These practices are profoundly unpopular among whites, in particular, many of whom believe that sport—of all arenas—should see outcomes determined solely on merit. Meanwhile, supporters of the quota policies argue that rugby must work to overcome its deeply racist past. Much of this debate may well be settled on the field. As more good players from the majority black population have the opportunity to excel on the pitch, more black players will rise to the highest ranks of the sport and contribute to the success of the national team. No Springbok fan can argue with this trend.
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As a testament to this outcome, today’s Springboks look very different from their 1995 predecessors. In 1995, the only black player, Chester Williams, became something of a poster child for the country’s blacks, despite the fact that he is a native Afrikaans speaker from the country’s so-called “coloured” population—the term still used by South Africans to refer to the mixed race population. By contrast, the Springboks today not only have a number of black players, but some of those players are also among the most popular in the country—and the best in the world—at their positions. For example, stars such as Tendai Mtawarira and Bryan Habana are adored by black and white fans. Additionally, the Springbok coach, Peter de Villiers, is the first non-white to helm the team, leading them to some of their greatest achievements since taking over the national squad in January 2008.
The Meaning of South Africa 2010. There is still ample doubt
among naysayers about South Africa’s ability to host the 2010 World Cup.7 People worry about infrastructure, sufficient lodging, and the country’s reputation for violence. Generally, they wonder if South Africa will be up to the task. Some of these worries are legitimate, while others are overblown. Many of them come from a place that, if not exactly racist, at least falls into the category of thinking of Africans as somehow incapable of handling a global event such as the World Cup. This is, after all, a country that has not quite recovered from its racist past. Doubt about the success of the World Cup is linked to doubt about the coun-
CATSAM
try’s ability to achieve reconciliation. Sport may be a microcosmic representation of society, and quota policies may address inequalities in the racial composition of prominent teams, but they do not translate perfectly into broad change at all levels. While Zuma and Jordaan conveyed an optimistic view of the power of sport during the kickoff ceremony, regular citizens may not share their feelings. On the whole, white South Africans do not seem as optimistic as black South Africans about the success of the World Cup. Where black South Africans see an opportunity to show off the reformed South Africa, white South Africans fear that crime will overwhelm the hordes of tourists, or that the government will be unable to pull off an event of such magnitude.
Match Point
that the default setting is to see racism, including reverse racism, everywhere. The problems that football confronts in South Africa mirror rugby’s dilemmas. As much as rugby has always been “a white sport,” football has long been the favorite sport of the country’s black majority.9 Just as black South Africans have often rejected rugby because of its undeniable history of racism and its connection with Afrikaner nationalism, many fear that whites have rejected local football.10 White South African fans of football seem to have rejected the national team, Bafana Bafana, for other teams: England for the country’s Englishspeaking whites, the Netherlands for Afrikaner fans, or even Brazil, which is popular among black South Africans. Even fewer whites who care about
Doubt about the success of the World Cup is linked to doubt about the country’s ability to achieve reconciliation. On the other hand, European reporters could not resist the narrative of reverse racism they saw and heard unfolding during the 2009 Confederations Cup football tournament. Every time the only white Bafana Bafana player touched the ball, a cascade of what sounded like boos rained down upon him—so much for reconciliation. Rather than catcalling their sole white player, however, the crowd was celebrating him. Every time he touched the ball, the patrons were honoring the last name of possibly their favorite player, Matthew Booth.8 The rest of the world has absorbed the lessons of South African racism so well
football pay attention to the country’s Premier Soccer League (PSL), preferring instead Europe’s elite leagues. As with rugby, race plays a role in South African football. With the country hosting the 2010 World Cup, football is best seen as a lens through which to examine sporting nationalism—the creation or buttressing of national identity through sports.11 President Zuma has been clear in his belief that the World Cup serves as an opportunity to “renew our commitment to national unity and nation building,” calling 2010 the most important year, since 1994, in the country’s history.12
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THE DEATH OF DOUBT?
Bafana Bafana will enter the tournament as arguably the weakest team in the field, having only qualified because of a special provision ensuring that the host team receives automatic entry to the final draw of competing teams. Nevertheless, South Africans will be out in full force to support the national team, which they hope will respond to the excitement of serving as host. Moreover, all of the African teams will be seen as locals in this year’s World Cup, for this is widely viewed not only as South Africa’s World Cup but as the entire continent’s. Thus Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, and Algeria will likely have the support of locals, especially if South Africa falters. Africans across the continent have embraced this World Cup as being theirs and desperately want to see South Africa—and thus Africa—succeed in such a vital, global event. Outside observers also understand what this year’s event means for Africa. Ruud Gullit, a former captain for the Netherlands, has argued that a positive perception of South Africa will change perceptions of the continent. “When people think about Africa, they think about starvation, HIV, civil wars – things like that . . . . But things are changing. Now there is a real possibility to show the world that Africa is much more than” a story of tragedy and privation.13 In the same vein, United Nations Secretary General Ban KiMoon has said that the World Cup has “great power” to present to the world “a different story of the African continent, a story of peace, democracy and investment.”14 While skepticism about South Africa’s World Cup remains, the country’s citizens maintain a fundamental opti-
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mism. This optimism reflects the progress of a country that has come so far since the Apartheid years and that has rejected retributive justice in favor of reconciliation. It may also be spurred on by the tangible benefits that many expect the World Cup to bring. Such benefits include a massive boost to the economy through tourist money and thousands of new jobs. A question underlying South Africa’s preparation for the World Cup is what benefit the majority of the country’s people will accrue from the event, especially when the world has packed up and headed back home. National Commissioner of the Police Bheki Cele argues that policing will be markedly improved because of the extra training, equipment purchasing, and other efforts undertaken for the World Cup.15 It would be easy to dismiss such talk as mere palaver from someone whose job it is to advocate for the police. At the same time, if South Africa derives incremental improvements in policing, infrastructure, and delivery of services, so much the better.16 The World Cup does not need to radically transform South Africa to serve the country well. South Africa needs salve, perhaps, but it does not need salvation. Transformation is an ongoing and long-term process; the event merely needs to contribute to this process.
Conclusion. South Africa has come
a long way since the controversy over the 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand. Soccer and rugby, inarguably the most popular sports among black and white South Africans, reveal both the strengths and the limitations of transformation in South Africa.
CATSAM
Although the legacy of Apartheid deeply cuts the country, one must put modern-day South Africa in the context of history. Just a quarter century ago, as townships burned and the government’s security forces crushed the opposition, the current state of South Africa would have been nearly unimaginable. South African rugby fans—white and black—sitting in a stadium together and cheering wildly for black players would have been the stuff of fantasy, as would Matthew Booth receiving the adoration of the black masses. Yet, both embody the “death of doubt” to which Danny Jordaan referred. On 11 June 2010, Bafana Bafana will
Match Point
take the field to face off against Mexico in the opening match of the World Cup at Soccer City Stadium. An entire country and an entire continent will be behind it. Matthew Booth will take the field with his teammates, and upon him will rain down what most decidedly are not boos. The black, white, and “coloured” members of the world champion Springboks will be in the crowd. So too will be global icon Nelson Mandela, perhaps wearing a Bafana Bafana jersey, possibly even Matthew Booth’s. The World Cup will not signal an end to racism, but it will show the world how remarkably the country has confronted its racist past.
NOTES
1. Paul Hayward, “World Cup: SA ready to provide continental lift,” Mail & Guardian, 3 December 2009, Internet, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/ dec/03/south-africa-world-cup-hosts (date accessed: 30 March 2010). 2. Hayward, “World Cup: SA ready to provide continental lift.” 3. “Afrikaaner” refers to the descendents of the Dutch Boers, or farmers; Malcolm MacLean, “Making Strange the Country and Making Strange the Countryside: Spatialized Clashes in the Affective Economies of Aeotearoa/New Zealand during the 1981 Springbok Rugby Tour,” in Sports and Postcolonialism, eds. John Bale and Mike Cronin (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2003), 57-72; New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage, “The 1981 Springbok Rugby Tour,” Internet, http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/culture/1981-springboktour (date accessed: 14 September 2009). 4. Rob Nixon, “Apartheid on the Run: The South African Sports Boycott,” Transition 58 (1992): 68-88; Douglas Booth, “Hitting Apartheid for Six? The Politics of the South Africa Sports Boycott,” Journal of Contemporary History 38, no. 3 (July 2003): 477-493; Douglas Booth, “The South African Council on Sport and the Antinomies of the Sports Boycott,” Journal of Southern African Studies 23, no. 1 (March 1997): 51-66; Amy Bass, Not the Triumph but the Struggle: The 1968 Olympics and the Making of the Black Athlete (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 131-184. 5. David R. Black and John Naughright, Rugby and the South African Nation: Sport, Cultures, Politics and Power in the Old and New South Africas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Douglas Booth, “Mandela and Amabokoboko: The Political and Linguistic Nationalism of South Africa?” The Journal of Modern African Studies
34, no. 3 (September 1996): 459-477; Jacqueline Maingard, “Imag(in)ing the South African Nation: Representations of Identity in the Rugby World Cup 1995,” Theatre Journal 49, no. 1, “Performing in South Africa” (March 1997): 15-28; Jane Van Der Riet, “Triumph of the Rainbow Warriors: Gender, Nationalism and the Rugby World Cup,” Agenda 27 “Reproductive Rights” (1995): 98-110. 6. Sebastien Berger, “Black and White Reality of South African Rugby,” Telegraph, 20 October 2007. 7. Jere Longman, “Scrutiny for South Africa Year Before World Cup,” New York Times, 28 June 2009. 8. Gabriele Marcotti, “Matthew Booth a white knight for the black masses,” The Times, 22 June 2009. 9. Peter Alegi, Laduma! Soccer, Politics and Society in South Africa (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2004). 10. Setumo Stone, “Do white South Africans hate local soccer?” Mail & Guardian, 6 June 2008. 11. Mike Cronin and David Mayall, “Sport and Ethnicity: Some Introductory Remarks,” in Sporting Nationalisms: Identity, Ethnicity, Immigration and Assimilation, eds. Mike Cronin and David Mayall (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 1-13. 12. “Zuma calls for end of ‘culture of negativity,’” Mail & Guardian, 31 December 2009. 13. Mike Collett, “2010: Another side of the African story,” Mail & Guardian, 4 December 2009. 14. Guy Berger, “Shedding African stereotypes during the World Cup,” Mail & Guardian, 28 October 2009. 15. Donna Bryson, “Cele says cops ‘better skilled after 2010,” Mail & Guardian, 23 February 2010. 16. “Zuma wants SA to build on 2010 momentum,” Mail & Guardian, 25 February 2010.
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Match Point
Cross-Strait Tug of War Taiwan and the World Games Junwei Yu One of the most common clichés associated with sport is that sport and politics should not mix. Sport is apolitical and stands aloof from disputes among states. Yet, scholars generally agree that major sporting events can act as a vehicle for transcending social cleavages, promoting national unity, and projecting a favorable national image. For example, the racially divided South Africa turned the 1995 Rugby World Cup into a moment of color-blind solidarity that culminated in the host nation winning the championship. Of course, sport may also act as a step towards increased nationalism, as was the case in 1936 when Hitler used the Berlin Olympics to showcase Nazism. Similarly, 2008 was China’s year in the global limelight due to the Beijing Olympics. The following year, however, was Taiwan’s turn to host the World Games, an international event meant for sports that are not contested in the Olympics. Held every four years since 1981, the World Games aspire to equal or to exceed the importance of the Olympics. To understand the significance of the 2009 World Games, it is important to be aware of their place and time in the history of Taiwan, formally referred to as the Republic of China (ROC). President Ma Ying-jeou, who took
Junwei Yu is an associate professor in the Department of Physical Education at National Taiwan College of Physical Education. He is the author of Playing in Isolation: A History of Baseball in Taiwan.
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office after an overwhelming victory in March 2008, improved ties with China through a series of commercial deals and direct flight agreements between the two sides. However, the global financial tsunami caused a major economic deluge in Taiwan. Ma’s promises of “633”—which stood for his goals of achieving an economic growth rate of 6 percent, a jobless rate of 3 percent, and a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of $30,000—evaporated completely. Capricious decision making and poor government management beleaguered Ma, causing the president’s popularity to dip as people lost confidence in the KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party) administration. According to surveys conducted two months prior to the World Games, Ma’s approval rating swung between 24 percent and 39 percent, while his disapproval rating oscillated between 46 percent and 68 percent.1 Increasing public disillusionment with the president and his administration was echoed by recent election victories for the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), established in 1986 during the martial law period. Amid economic difficulties, sagging public morale, and political partisanship, the Taiwanese people needed something to revive their national spirit. As such, the 2009 World Games occurred in the right place and at the right time. This large sporting event functioned as a social glue to help hold the nation together. It allowed the Taiwanese to display their national identity and their cultural heritage and to set aside their political bickering and other differences to cheer for the national team. However, due to Taiwan’s political status, the bid to host the Games was
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difficult. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never actually controlled Taiwan, it has threatened to annex the de facto independent nation by force. Accordingly, the United States, a seemingly natural ally to Taiwan due to the two countries’ shared democratic values, admits that the island’s political status is unresolved. Regardless of this political uncertainty, the recent Kaohsiung World Games demonstrate that cross-Strait relations are no longer a zero-sum game in which Taiwan would generally emerge the loser. In the context of sport, the so-called “Olympic Formula” arose out of efforts to appease China. These rigid rules, which dictate Taiwan’s participation in international sporting events, virtually outlaw mention of the name “Taiwan,” the waving of Taiwanese flags, and the singing of the Taiwanese national anthem. However, the new “formula” of the World Games indicates that, despite China’s influence and insistence on a “one China” policy, Taiwan will keep searching for a model under which the country can properly represent itself.
Cross-Strait Relations and the Olympic Formula. When the
PRC replaced the ROC in the United Nations (UN) back in 1971, Taiwan’s membership on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was immediately endangered due to politics over country names and the PRC’s concerns concerning Chinese sovereignty. Taiwan originally had the opportunity to participate in the 1976 Montreal Olympics under the name “Taiwan.” However, Premier Chiang Ching-kuo obstinately adhered to the traditional name
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“Republic of China,” as the KMT still refused to recognize the legitimacy of the communist regime in China.2 Two years after the ROC’s membership was suspended in 1979, the ROC, PRC, and IOC agreed upon three conditions establishing a new Olympic Formula: the ROC must use the name “Chinese Taipei,” a flag featuring the national flower will replace the actual national flag, and the “National Flag Anthem” must be played instead of the Taiwanese national anthem when honoring Taiwanese athletes.3 Any violation of the Olympic Formula could have grave consequences for Taiwan, potentially leading to expulsion from the IOC. Needless to say, for the “Chinese Taipei” Olympic Committee (CTOC) and KMT government, it was a pragmatic, rather than ideal, decision. Although the PRC opposes de jure Taiwanese independence, the IOC rules are crucial to the Chinese notion of sovereignty. The ROC’s national flag and anthem contain symbols that imply the notion of “two Chinas” or at least “one China, one Taiwan.” The English term “‘Chinese Taipei” is itself also very problematic. One can translate it into Chinese as either Zhonghua or Zhongguo. Zhonghua can refer either to the Republic of China or denote something akin to Chinese ethnicity or culture. Zhongguo refers solely to the nation of China. Even so, as foreigners always tend to say “Taiwan” rather than “The Republic of China,” the PRC can take advantage of the words Zhonghua and Zhongguo to potentially mislead foreigners who do not understand the historical origins of or difference between the Chinese terms.
Match Point
The IOC has strictly adhered to the Olympic Formula since its implementation. Authorities in the host countries of international sporting events can punish people who do not abide by it. For instance, in the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, one patriotic Taiwanese student caught excitedly waving an ROC flag during a table tennis final was immediately handcuffed and fined by the American police.4 During a taekwondo match at the 2000 Sydney Olympics, one Taiwanese spectator was told to remove his ROC flag-bearing cap.5 At previous international sporting events in Taiwan, such as the 2001 Women’s Asian Cup, Taipei police collaborated with organizers to prevent spectators from waving the national flag.6 Forced to find creative alternatives, one Taiwanese-American spectator cheered for the “Chinese Taipei” baseball team during the 2008 Beijing Olympics with a Myanmar national flag, since the two flags bear a strong resemblance to each other.7 The Olympic Formula makes it particularly challenging for Taiwan to host an international sporting event. It is true that as a full and equal member of the IOC, Taiwan is entitled to file a bid, as long as it acts in accordance with the protocol. Nevertheless, Taiwan must often endure pressure from China, which sees the island as a “rebel province.” China insists upon adherence to a “one China” principle. From the PRC’s point of view, the CTOC has a status equivalent to the Chinese Hong Kong Olympic Committee: neither is allowed to act in contradiction of the interests of China. Since 1987 Taiwan has made at least five attempts to host major sporting events, including the
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1998 and 2002 Asian Games, the 2001 and 2007 World University Games, and the 2009 East Asian Games. Each and every attempt failed due to PRC intervention and pressure.8 When former Kaohsiung Mayor Frank Hsieh submitted a bid in 2003, along with Amsterdam, Budapest, and Houston, to host the World Games, many said it was a pipe dream. Pessimists believed that Taiwan not only lacked experience hosting such a large sporting event, but also that China would inevitably block the bid. Cognizant of this potential pitfall, the Taiwanese government and the national media reached a tacit agreement not to leak any information on the bid-
avoid giving the impression that Chinese authorities recognized Ma as the political leader of a sovereign country.10 For its part, Taiwan indicated its desire to maintain calm, stable relations with China. Mayor Chen made a surprise, ice-breaking visit to Beijing and Shanghai aimed at overcoming potential misunderstandings and gaining China’s fullest possible support for the Games. This was certainly a breakthrough for the DPP vis-à-vis Beijing authorities. They allowed Chen to enter as the “Mayor of Kaohsiung” without a “Taiwan Compatriot Entry Permit,” which Taiwanese usually need to clear customs.
Sport can help bring a nation together by
facilitating the growth of nationalist sentiments.
ding process, lest China intervene. The strategy worked, and the IOC’s executive members awarded Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s maritime capital, the rights to host the World Games. The Games thus became the first IOC-endorsed competition held on the island.9 Although it had lost the opportunity to pressure the IOC, China did not hesitate to express its displeasure. Beijing has often denied that it politicizes sport, a fiction that was hard for the international community to accept following its crackdown in Tibet prior to the 2008 Games. Yet, in 2009 this pattern of behavior was evident when the Chinese delegation did not attend the Kaohsiung opening and closing ceremonies. President Ma presided over the opening ceremony, and the media surmised that Beijing wanted to
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This gesture did not lead Chen to lessen or downplay the status of Taiwan while in China. Although the Games were technically held in accordance with the “Olympic Formula,” Mayor Chen welcomed all kinds of flags—including the ROC flag and the Tibetan exile flag—at competition venues. During her stay in China, she refused to accept any protocol or wording that would compromise Taiwan’s sovereignty. In a conversation with Beijing Mayor Guo Jinlong, Chen even referred to Taiwanese President Ma as “our president in the central government,” implying that Taiwan’s government was separate from China’s.11 Nevertheless, her visit was well received by Chinese authorities. Chen displayed respect for the PRC as a legitimate country, while asking it to treat the island the same way.
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Analysts believe that, by inviting Mayor Chen, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was employing “united front” tactics to attempt to solicit support from the opposition camp. As the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is often mistrustful of China, the CCP has begun to reach out to the party in the hope of either gaining the trust of some DPP supporters or perhaps even driving a wedge among party members. So far, the DPP has attempted to ban party leaders or politicians from visiting China in any official capacity, although Mayor Chen’s visit was an important exception.
Showcasing Taiwan’s Culture and Identity. Taiwan’s efforts to successfully host the World Games were quite extraordinary, given the pressures the country faced. Yet, as mentioned previously, sport can help bring a nation together by facilitating the growth of nationalist sentiments. This is true even in a country like Taiwan, which has an ambiguous, undetermined international status. In the past, particularly under the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship, Taiwan underwent a process of Sinification. Chinese culture and identity was lauded and deemed superior to Taiwanese culture. For example, the mere acts of wearing local Taiwanese-style flip-flops or speaking Taiwanese were considered in bad taste or indicative of low-class behavior. To counter these misconceptions, the Kaohsiung city government launched a massive promotional campaign highlighting the uniqueness of Kaohsiung and Taiwanese culture. The government also reached out to national heroes such as Major League
Match Point
Baseball pitcher Chien-ming Wang, who endorsed the event. Additionally, the Kaohsiung Organizing Committee (KOC) held promotional activities in China, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and Hong Kong in an effort to draw tourists by advertising Taiwanese culture and the highlights of Kaohsiung. An example of how Taiwan used the World Games to highlight the island’s identity was its choice of the World Games’ mascot. The Water Goblins— named Gao Mei (Little Sister Gao) and Syong Ge (Big Brother Syong) after the host city Kaohsiung (GaoSyong)—are creatures that symbolize water and light and that personify the maritime capital as a city of the sea and the sun. The spheres above their crested heads absorb solar energy, implying a message of green energy and care for the environment, which has been a priority of the Taiwanese government in recent years. Due to the enthusiasm surrounding the event, even a boycott by the PRC national team and inconsistent weather failed to dampen the spirits of the crowd, as the eighth World Games began at the main stadium in Kaohsiung. The Chinese delegation claimed that it “acted according to the arranged schedule, and participation of the opening ceremony was not the main point,” in an effort to play down their absence.12 Despite rumors circulating that Yu Zaiqing, the PRC government’s general administrator of sports, would officiate on behalf of the vice-chairman of the Olympic Committee, it did not happen.13 Ultimately, President Ma Ying-jeou, as head of state, declared the 2009 World Games open in front of a large, celebratory crowd in the main stadium.
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With all of Taiwan’s efforts to present the island’s culture, it is worth comparing the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics with that of the Kaohsiung World Games. In 2008 China presented a grandiose display of fireworks, music, and dancing, conveying images of the “Middle Kingdom” and seeking to revive the ancient nation’s pride. The overall message was that China had become richer and stronger under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, while simultaneously expressing that a rising China was not a threat to the rest of the world. Though the Beijing opening ceremony achieved its objective of awing the world with its flawless execution, it was plagued with controversy. Officials admitted the use of computer-generated fireworks and selecting a “prettier” girl to lip-synch the song of a more talented singer. Politically, the event was problematic, as the Olympic torch relay encountered countless protesters and American activists were arrested in Beijing after holding a pro-Tibet protest just before the ceremony. Some have argued that the Beijing Olympics were “the most politicized Games since the Cold War era.”14
to the islands, such as temple festivals; the local taike manner, which jokingly stereotypes Taiwanese people’s habits; and Pili or traditional puppets. In addition, there was no trace of the types of political protests or overzealous security measures employed by Beijing authorities. More importantly, spectators were free to express any sort of national pride: people waved flags from every nation, even green and white banners symbolizing an independent Taiwanese nation.
“The Best World Games Ever.” To the joy and pride of the Taiwanese people, President of the International World Games Association Ron Froehlich stated, “The 2009 World Games in Kaohsiung have been the best Games ever.”15 A record number of more than 5,000 participants from 103 countries took part in the event, which lasted 11 days. Taiwan’s athletes exceeded the pride of their fellow Taiwanese by winning eight gold medals. Revenues from ticket sales amounted to NT$62.36 million (about US$1.8 million), with both the opening and closing ceremonies selling out.16 More than 280,000 spectators watched the ceremonies and
Second-track “citizen diplomacy” is
perhaps an ideal tool for complementing official diplomacy or overcoming the current stalemate.
In contrast, the opening ceremony in Kaohsiung focused on Taiwan’s cultural diversity, showcasing historical and cultural symbols from indigenous and Han peoples. There were performances displaying traditions unique
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sporting events. Furthermore, it was estimated that 1.25 million visitors came to the World Games Plaza, creating US$53 million in revenue.17 Considering the small size of Taiwan, a country of 23 million people, the
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World Games in Kaohsiung amazed the globe, not just because of the host country’s sportsmanship but also because of the island’s infrastructure. The New York Times called the main stadium in Kaohsiung “a remarkably humane environment” that is “just as intoxicating” as Beijing’s Bird’s Nest.18 Construction of the 40,000-seat stadium required only two years of work. The project is notable for its eco-friendliness: the solar panels on the stadium roof generate 1.14 million kilowatt hours of electricity per year, thus reducing annual carbon dioxide output by 660 tons. Additionally, the raw materials used in the main stadium were made in Taiwan and 100 percent reusable.19 Equipped with most resources and being the political and economic center of the nation, the northern capital of Taipei often projects a condescending attitude toward the rest of Taiwan. However, with the construction of the main stadium and a mass rapid transit system to complement it, the Games showcased Kaohsiung as a technologically advanced and modern metropolis. On the environmental side, the city’s transportation bureau pointed out that the utilization rate of public transportation in Kaohsiung City reached a staggering 80 percent of capacity during the opening and closing ceremonies. The World Games are also an exceptional example of how sporting events affect public opinion and, in turn, politics. Surveys taken after the event showed a dramatic increase in Mayor Chen’s popularity as well as a strengthened sense of Taiwanese identity. According to polls conducted by TVBS, a pro-KMT news network, the approval rating among Kaohsiung City residents
Match Point
for Mayor Chen stood at 73 percent. When, in November 2010, she runs for the first merged Greater Kaohsiung City mayoral election comprising present-day Kaohsiung City and County, 63 percent of Kaohsiung citizens say they will vote for her, while only 15 percent declare otherwise. Polls also found that 90 percent of Kaohsiung citizens felt the Games were a success, and another 89 percent thought the Games enhanced Taiwan’s international status.20
Implications of the World Games. The Kaohsiung World Games
were undoubtedly a proud moment in history for the people of Kaohsiung and Taiwan. The island has long struggled to construct a separate political and cultural identity while in the shadow of its big neighbor. However, World Games organizers not only increased pride in Taiwanese culture and Taiwanese identity in the hearts of the island’s inhabitants, but they also won over participants, who offered nothing but praise. Chen Chu addressed the closing ceremony by saying, “All of our friends are treated with enthusiasm because of our support for peace and human rights. We fight in unity for the dignity of our country because we cherish Taiwan, our motherland.”21 With that, Kaohsiung set a precedent for upholding the nation’s dignity and sovereignty during international sporting events. Such a precedent has also translated into the arena of cross-Strait relations. Two years after Ma Ying-jeou took the oath of office as the ROC’s new president, he and the KMT administration have pursued a diplomatic policy that attempts to build stronger ties with China, with the hope of expand-
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ing Taiwan’s international breathing space through “flexible pragmatism.” To mitigate Beijing’s objections, it has been suggested that “meaningful participation” is more important than “full membership” in UN-affiliated organizations. As such, the “Olympic Formula” was adopted by the KMT when attending the World Health Assembly as an observer under the name of “Chinese Taipei.” However, the Formula is a double-edged sword. While it enables Taiwan to participate in international organizations, Taiwan does so possessing incomplete sovereignty. Though it is too early to tell whether Taiwan’s international participation will become standardized under President Ma, the formula certainly fits China’s national interests. Now that the international community acts according to the Olympic Formula, Taiwan has had a difficult time changing people’s mindsets. Nevertheless, the United States can play an active role in helping Taiwan resist Chinese pressure. First-track diplomacy is probably infeasible, due to increasing interdependence between the United States and China, the subsequent desire for smooth relations, and the lack of an official relationship with Taiwan. The United States generally avoids dramatic gestures in support of Taiwan, which risks offending one of its most important trading partners. For exam-
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ple, although President Obama sold an arms package to Taiwan in January 2010 and met with the Dalai Lama in February 2010, the administration gave the impression that it did so somewhat hesitantly and anxiously. Nevertheless, second-track “citizen diplomacy” is perhaps an ideal tool for complementing official diplomacy or overcoming the current stalemate. For instance, the Los Angeles Dodgers made a historic trip to Taiwan for three exhibition games in 2010. Initially, they insisted on following the Olympic Formula and banning the performance of the Taiwanese national anthem at the game. However, following negotiations between the Taipei City government and Major League Baseball officials, the Dodgers agreed to the city’s request to perform the anthem, allowing Taiwan to maintain a semblance of national sovereignty.22 Currently, public opinion of crossStrait relations is at its lowest point since Ma took office; only 37 percent of Taiwanese have a favorable view of the current relationship between China and Taiwan.23 If the United States wishes to fulfill its democratic ideals and to lend a helping hand to Taiwan’s democracy, it will need to take a more constructive approach toward the cross-Strait dilemma. Taiwan’s political status remains one of the most delicate games in the world.
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Match Point
NOTES
1 Global Views Survey Research Center, “Survey on President Ma’s Approval Rating on First Anniversary of Inauguration and Cross-Strait Issues,” Internet, http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/200905_ GVSRC_others_E.pdf (date accessed: 15 February 2010). 2 Ming-hsin Tang, ed., Woguo canjia aoyun cangsang shi xiapian (The Authentic History of Our Participation in the Olympics, Vol. 2) (Taipei: Zhonghua taibei aolinpike weiyuanhui, 2000), 361-367. 3 Also known as the “National Banner Song” or simply “Banner Song,” it is traditionally played when the ROC flag is raised or lowered. The song was composed in classical Chinese in the days when the KMT still ruled China. 4 ‘‘Taiwanese spectators arrested,’’ The Washington Post, 1 August 1996. 5 Mingli Xu, “Beijing shidayun Zhongguo ni aihua woguo” (“World University Games in Beijing, China attempted to undermine our country”), Ziyou shibao (Liberty Times), 13 November 2005. 6 Jitai Fanjiang and Yuzhong Wang, “Yazhou nuzhu guoqi jin ruchang ma yingjiu beipi” (“Ma Ying-jeou was criticized for prohibiting the national flags in Asian Women’s Football Cup”), Ziyou shibao, 25 December 2001. 7 Weiming Liang, “Qiumi hui miandian guozi tiaozhan guanfang chidu” (“Fans waving Myanmar national flag to challenge officials”), Ziyou shibao, 17 August 2008. 8 Junwei Yu. “China’s Foreign Policy in Sport: The Primacy of National Security and Territorial Integrity Concerning the Taiwan Question,” The China Quarterly, no. 194 (June 2008): 294-308. 9 Taishun Gong and Ruyi Xu. “Zhengqu juban quan dixia gongzuo fang shengbian” (“Bidding for the rights to host needs under-the-table operation to avoid danger”), Lianhe bao (United Daily News), 15 June 2004. 10 “Kexi kaimu shi weijian dalu dui” (“It’s a pity that mainland team did not show up”), Lianhe bao, 17 July 2009. 11 “Minjin dang yingshi chenju buxu cixing” (“Democratic Progressive Party should not squander Chen Chu’s trip”), Lianhe bao, 25 May 2009. 12 Jinsheng Chen, “Kaimu quexi dalu dui zhao xingcheng zou” (“Taking no part in the opening ceremony, China said that it is according to the
schedule”), Lianhe bao, 18 July 2009. 13 “Dakai xinmen huanying jiabin zuohao zhuren” (“Our Hearts Welcome Our Guests Be Good Hosts”), Lianhe bao, 16 July 2009. 14 “Spectacular Opening for Olympics,” BBC News, Internet, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/7548539.stm (date accessed: 5 March 2010). 15 Qiulun Huang, “Zui chenggong de shiyun hui wei gaoxiong hecai” (“The most successful World Games, cheer for Kaohsiung”), Zhongguo shibao (China Times), 27 July 2009. 16 Kaohsiung City Government. “Gaoxiong shiyun piaofang chaoguo 6000 wan” (“Ticket Sales Surpassed NT$60 million in Kaohsiung World Games”), Internet, http://www.kcg.gov.tw/ jsf/KcgNews.jsf?unid=c550a49cd8d6c4be4bcd84 c0ebbace7910a925c9 (date accessed: 22 February 2010). 17 “2009 World Games Generate US$609.8 MLN in Revenue for Kaohsiung,” AsiaPulse, 29 July 2009. 18 Nicolai Ouroussoff, “Stadium Where Worlds Collide, Humanely,” The New York Times, 15 July 2009. 19 Ruyi Xu, “Shiyun zhuchang guan shideng chenju yao zuoke gaoxiong” (“Main stadium tested for lighting facilities, Chen Chu invites visitors to Kaohsiung”), Lianhe bao, 15 January 2009. 20 TVBS Poll Center, “Kaohsiung City Mayor Job Approving Ratings after 2009 World Games,” Internet, http://www.tvbs.com.tv/FILE_DB/DL_ DB/yijung/200908/yijung-20090806144022. pdf (date accessed: 21 February 2010). 21 “Chenju shichang gaoxiong shiyun rang quan shijie kanjian taiwan kanjing gaoxiong” (“Mayor Chen Chu pointed out World Games in Kaohsiung let the whole world sees Taiwan and Kaohsiung”), Internet, http://www.worldgames2009. tw/wg2009/cht/content_j.php?a_id=112 (date accessed: 23 February 2010). 22 Jingping Lou, Zhenyu Qian, and Zongbian, Lan, “Daoqi laitai zhenrong fensi you beipian ganjue” (“Fans feel deceived by Dodger’s roster”), Lianhe bao, 3 March 2010. 23 Research, Development and Evaluation Commission, Internet, http://www.rdec.gov.tw/c t.asp?xItem=4361967&ctNode=12226&mp=100 (date accessed: 17 March 2010).
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Sports without Diplomacy The United States, Cuba, and Baseball Thomas Garofalo That President Richard Nixon made his signature breakthrough to China with the help of “ping pong diplomacy” is one of the verities of U.S. diplomatic history. Since that achievement over forty years ago, those who would like to see an end to the long conflict between Cuba and the United States have often looked to baseball, both nations’ shared national pastime, as a bridge for mutual understanding. While baseball has done its part to bring both countries together on various occasions over the years, the diplomatic impasse remains. In the United States, opposition to the Cuban embargo has been constant and growing. This has been especially true since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which spelled the end of communist Cuba’s dreams of supporting armed revolution around the world. Yet, there remain real differences today that cannot be wished away by bromides about how excessive and even counterproductive the policy may be. The embargo consists of a smothering mass of statutes, regulations, and practices that stifles much that could prove useful in addressing those differences. Change will come only through a concerted effort to change the infrastructure of inertia underlying relations, and cultural diplomacy can help a determined president make that effort.
Thomas Garofalo is a consultant to the New America Foundation’s U.S.-Cuba Policy Initiative and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note. From 1998 to 2001, he directed Catholic Relief Services’ Cuba program.
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The Obama administration has made minor changes to U.S. policy while toning down the previous administration’s confrontational posture. That adjustment has also brought a small glimmer of hope that, at the right time, may facilitate more dramatic overtures. In fact, Cuba and the United States share so many cultural touchstones that it is not difficult to imagine a diplomatic overture using cultural diplomacy to
mer. The trip never happened because, under the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations, the U.S. government refused to accept that the Philharmonic’s patrons fit under any licensable category for travel to Cuba. This event was typical of the U.S. government’s approach to Cuba: it sought to prevent Cuban and American citizens’ efforts at public diplomacy.
Cuba and the United States share so
many cultural touchstones that it is not difficult to imagine a diplomatic overture using cultural diplomacy to advance a new relationship. advance a new relationship. Baseball, boxing, and other sports; jazz, hiphop, and salsa; literature, dance, and a host of other cultural activities—all can be of use in bringing about a new day in U.S.-Cuban relations.
The Difficulty of Cultural Engagement and the Way Forward. Engagement of any kind
between Cubans and Americans has been deeply problematic. During the long years of conflict, cultural activities, including baseball, have provided rare opportunities for mutual regard between both countries. Such activities, however, have occurred with the barest minimum of government support. Indeed, they have usually occurred in spite of government policies, not because of them. A recent example of this dynamic is the failed effort of the New York Philharmonic to travel to Cuba’s capital, Havana, for performances last sum-
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Official, bilateral diplomacy is ongoing. Ending a Bush administration hiatus in migration talks, Obama’s Department of State has restarted biannual meetings. And it has pursued three longstanding avenues for official communication with the Cuban government: information sharing on hurricanes and other meteorological monitoring, drug enforcement by coast guard services, and monthly “fence-walking” discussions related to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. Most importantly, perhaps, the Obama administration broke with the previous administration by lifting Bushera bans on travel and remittances by Cuban Americans. This was a substantial move by President Obama because it will likely have a greater impact in Cuba than any of the administration’s official, bilateral engagements. Not only will it clear the way for a massive infusion of cash into Cuba, improving general welfare, but it will also support the
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stated U.S. goal of supporting Cuba’s nascent civil society in all its diversity. These changes have won the Obama administration a modicum of goodwill among allies in Latin America and around the world. But the administration has done nothing further. Indeed, as the Philharmonic failure shows, the White House is applying the brakes on bilateral relations as effectively as previous administrations have done. In fact, the United States under President Obama continues to enforce sanctions on Cuba that are tougher than those it imposes on any other government in the world. Therefore, it is unlikely that the goodwill will last. However disheartening this dynamic may be, awareness of it also points to suggestions for solutions. First, as Senator Richard Lugar recently recommended, the United States should pursue initiatives of mutual interest: greater engagement on hurricane preparation and natural disaster mitigation, drug interdiction and criminal law enforcement, and environmental study and policy. A more forward-looking policy could even seek creative opportunities to bring in non-governmental entities and to encourage more exchanges between professional counterparts in both countries. Second, the United States should stop enacting policies that run counter to its stated goals. It must avoid supporting civil society efforts that lack relevance and run afoul of Cuban law. Such initiatives often provoke unhelpful or even disastrous reactions. What purpose can cultural diplomacy serve in addressing this situation? It can do a great deal—if both parties are serious about taking the relationship in a
Match Point
new direction. As was the case with Nixon’s China breakthrough, sports diplomacy can demystify the supposed enemy and diffuse tensions affecting both official engagement and the wider public. It is harder to demonize an adversary in the media when confronted with a different image: heavyweights from Cuba and the United States embracing one another at the end of a fight, or an American audience reduced to tears following the Cuban ballet’s performance of Swan Lake. However, in the absence of a comprehensive strategy and a willingness to show that the United States in fact considers Cuba an equal and sovereign power, sports diplomacy will fall far short of achieving the kind of breakthrough that ping pong diplomacy did.
The Politics of Civil Society in Cuba. A little more than a decade
ago, diplomats at the highest levels of the American and Cuban governments were on the brink of a unique agreement that might have put their relationship on new footing after a few particularly problematic years. A U.S. baseball delegation flew to Havana in January 1999 with the blessing of the White House, only to see the enterprise go quickly and dramatically off course. In the midst of sensitive negotiations between the American delegation and senior officials in the Cuban government, the Associated Press reported that the Cubans were “annoyed that a representative from Catholic Relief Services . . . traveled to Cuba with [Baltimore Orioles owner Peter] Angelos to suggest ways to distribute the proceeds.”1 Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is the U.S. Catholic Bishops’ overseas devel-
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opment agency. Orioles owner Angelos and National Archive founder Scott Armstrong had invited CRS President Ken Hackett and Baltimore’s Catholic archbishop William Cardinal Keeler to participate in the initiative.2 The organizers reasoned that a series between a Cuban team and the Baltimore Orioles would have a better chance of success if the Catholic Church was involved. In the aftermath of the highly successful visit of John Paul II to Cuba a year earlier, many reasonably expected that the Church could serve as an intermediary between the governments. However, for the Cuban government—which denied that a category of poor Cubans even existed—a Catholic charity’s involvement in dispersing proceeds to help the less fortunate was a non-starter. The Cuban government’s views notwithstanding, CRS had managed a growing program of humanitarian assistance to Cubans since 1994 in cooperation with its sister agency in Cuba, Caritas. For these Catholic social service agencies, the causes of Cuba’s poverty could never be addressed until the United States and Cuba ended their mutual isolation. The two countries’ longstanding political conflict punished the poor and shattered the Cuban family. The bishops hoped that the games would spark greater openness on both sides and at least provide an opportunity for dialogue. Caritas director Rolando Suarez was a strong advocate of the effort. Suarez, like most Cubans, is a baseball fan. But more than that, the idea appealed to him because the games would force the hardliners in Miami and Cuba to defend a status quo that he regarded as clearly untenable, even absurd.
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Suarez is a savvy operator in the ruthless world of the Cuban conflict, and his goal has been to shake up the “status quo” as much as possible. Since the status quo was in fact a frozen relationship in which both sides eagerly avoided non-essential contact, forcing the adversaries into some kind of mutual regard was necessary. It was this Cold War construct—this status quo—that Suarez intended to damage. A baseball contest between the United States and Cuba would, at minimum, force these adversaries to work out the details of the contest and, more significantly, bring millions of Americans and Cubans to take a second look at the dysfunctional relationship reigning over Washington, Miami, and Havana. Suarez and his American and Cuban allies wanted to drag the two rivals into a struggle over the meaning of the games and to hold the anachronism up to the stark illumination of a night baseball game. In largely the same spirit, Cardinal Jaime Ortega, Catholic archbishop of Havana, had given his imprimatur to the games. Ortega and the Cuban bishops deplored the breakdown in official relations between the United States and Cuba and had consistently opposed the embargo, denouncing it as early as 1969 as an “unjust situation . . . which adds unnecessary suffering” to Cubans.3 Orioles owner Peter Angelos, whose love of the game and distaste for senseless policy brought Orioles and Major League Baseball officials to Havana, harbored these lofty motives as well.4 Baseball fans, having experienced Cuba’s unique baseball prowess, history, and folklore, viewed the U.S.-
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Cuba standoff through a different lens. They treat the matter of Cuba much like the rest of Americans do, but are more passionate about the subject: they might not like communism or the Castros, but they do not see the purpose of the U.S. embargo.5 The Orioles, for example, have donated baseball equipment and uniforms to Cuba and the Dominican Republic for years, relying on CRS to equitably distribute it. Baseball fans also have a more intimate view of the human cost of the conflict. The documentary Lost Son of Havana—about famed Major League Baseball pitcher Luis Tiant’s long road back to Cuba in 2008 after a forty-year absence—poignantly illustrates that cost; the Cuban experience of exile has affected generations of American ballplayers. Politics, unfortunately, failed baseball fans. The 1999 U.S.-Cuban games were a partial triumph, not of “baseball diplomacy” but of baseball alone. In that respect, they are like most of the cultural events involving Cuban and U.S. participants over the years: they succeeded despite the efforts of those who opposed any kind of engagement between the peoples of the two countries. Such opponents, with diverse motivations, fear those rare moments when Cubans of different factions see themselves as one nation and one people. Months after the Havana game, as the Orioles readied for their follow-up game in Baltimore, then U.S. Representative Robert Menendez’s comment to the press clearly expressed that posture: “While the Orioles think this is just an athlete contest, in my mind this is about the world series of human rights and we’re going to be there rooting for Democracy.”6
Match Point
Cuba and China: Approaches Worlds Apart. For many, the Ori-
oles’ effort evoked memories of Nixon’s celebrated ping-pong diplomacy. In an unprecedented overture in April 1971, the Chinese government welcomed the U.S. table tennis team to China. The rift between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China gave Chairman Mao an incentive to reach out to the United States. For his part, President Nixon saw rapprochement with China as a necessary step for the United States to exit Vietnam. Sports diplomacy was a way to push forward for both countries. Wildly positive media coverage rendered Nixon’s diplomatic efforts easier, and he sent his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, to China for secret talks that summer. Early the following year, Nixon went himself, scoring the signature triumph of his presidency and cementing a unique diplomatic legacy. Yet, the state of U.S.-Cuban relations reveals how far-fetched this analogy is. Although the United States’s relationship with Cuba festered for a few years in the 1970s, it is not appreciably different forty years later. Today, an American president intent on reshaping the relationship would certainly incur risks akin to those run by President Nixon in the China effort. However, courageous and decisive steps would serve American interests and thus yield rewards that have long eluded it. Progress on solving the conflict with Cuba is in the United States’s interest for two reasons. First, the embargo and the United States’s general punitive approach to Cuba present a growing problem for American alliances in Latin America and around the world.
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Where once comprehensive sanctions were formerly justified by Cuban meddling in other countries, the global consensus today is that the embargo’s effects are disproportionate to Cuba’s human rights transgressions. This is typified by the United Nations General Assembly’s annual, lopsided vote against the embargo. Second, the consensus of the policy community—from the Brookings Institution to the Cato Institute and, tellingly, the Cuba Study Group—is that the embargo, by undermining relations with Cuba, is counterproductive to enhancing U.S. security and facilitating greater progress on human rights and other issues where the United States and Cuba diverge. Although a Cuban-American consensus created and sustained the comprehensive sanctions that exist today, even that community is increasingly abandoning the idea that the U.S. embargo can bring the change they desire for their homeland.
Cuban exile organization Brothers to the Rescue. In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, President Bill Clinton signed the Helms-Burton Act, tightening the embargo that he had steadfastly opposed. He also accepted a new provision in the act that mandated a congressional vote to end the embargo, placing a substantial part of U.S. Cuba policy beyond executive influence. The course was set: the United States would not pursue a unilateral thaw in relations. The Cuban government did not react immediately when President Clinton signed Helms-Burton into law. By 1999, however, the Cubans had reached the limits of their tolerance for U.S. legislative actions. In March, the same month in which the Orioles and Cuba’s national team played their Havana contest, the Cuban National Assembly passed Law 88, which mandated prison terms of up to twenty years for any Cuban carrying out activities funded under Helms-Burton.
The length of stagnant U.S.-Cuba relations contributes to the political inertia that President Obama seems content to prolong. The opportunities presented to the Obama Administration are ones that did not exist during the Clinton presidency. Threatened by the Cuban-American lobby and compelled by Fidel Castro’s provocative actions, President Clinton followed a different path. Whatever the administration had wanted to achieve concerning relations with Cuba was rendered unrealistic when, on 24 February 1996, the pilots of Cuban MiGs shot down two Cessnas aircraft piloted by José Basulto’s
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Helms-Burton eventually led to a series of Cuba policy measures by the Clinton administration, culminating in a 5 January 1999 announcement just days before the start of the Orioles’ mission to Havana. These measures included promoting people-to-people contacts through expanded, licensed categories of U.S. travelers; easing restrictions on flights to Cuba and on remittances to Cubans; authorizing direct mail service; and permitting the sale of food to non-governmental buyers in Cuba.
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One of the provisions authorized the Orioles’ trip, which the media already touted as “baseball diplomacy.” These moves followed a set of similar changes from the previous year that allowed direct flights to the island, modest remittances by Cuban-Americans to family on the island, and liberalized rules for the shipment of medicines to charities. Announcing these policies in a PBS NewsHour interview, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright repeatedly stated that the United States intended to support the Cuban people while pushing the repressive Cuban regime toward democratic change. Asked if any of the measures had been negotiated with the Cuban government, Albright responded, “Not at all.”7 The administration’s pronouncements reveal the shortcomings of its approach to baseball diplomacy. Indeed, if diplomacy is the art of conducting negotiations between states, the administration was not practicing diplomacy of any kind. Furthermore, by declaring that the games be played for the benefit of Caritas Cuba, Secretary Albright put both the Orioles and Caritas in an exceedingly difficult position.8 Instead of allowing the two sides to simply plan and play the games, the declaration linked the game to the broader effort to develop a civil society that the Clinton administration conceived as oppositional to the regime. By announcing the destination of the proceeds, the administration also effectively removed the Cuban government from a meaningful role in the negotiations. In one fell swoop, the games became a point of contention—another front in the conflict—rather than an opportunity to demonstrate goodwill.
Match Point
Considering the political context at the time of these sensitive negotiations, it is unsurprising that the Clinton administration was not eager to throw its weight behind the 1999 U.S-Cuban baseball games. That the games were played at all is a testament to the perseverance and strong political influence of the Orioles’ management and Major League Baseball.
Conclusion. In retrospect, Nixon’s ping-pong diplomacy was the visible part of a much bolder and more decisive move to recognize the People’s Republic of China. Nixon realized that China would factor into all American relationships in Asia, and he was therefore willing to take the steps necessary to lay the relationship’s foundation. The incentives that prompted Nixon to change U.S. policy toward China are almost entirely absent from the U.S.-Cuba relationship. While Vietnam motivated President Nixon to seek relations with China, there is no compelling reason to “fix” the Cuba problem. The length of stagnant U.S.-Cuba relations contributes to the political inertia that President Obama seems content to prolong. In fact, President Obama’s policy changes toward Cuba—among others, slackening telecommunications rules and easing travel restrictions for those with family on the island—contained little that could be considered a gesture toward Cuba. In essence, they represented the fulfillment of campaign promises to CubanAmericans. Nevertheless, there is a difference in the tone of the Obama administration. This is in part due to the relative moderation of Obama’s Cuba Summer/Fall 2010 [31]
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policy, following the strident posturing of the Bush administration. Moreover, potentiall breakthrough events continue to present themselves. The “Peace Without Borders” concert, performed by Colombian superstar Juanes in Havana in August 2009, showed that major cultural events can sway Cuban-American opinion, providing an opportunity for reevaluating standing U.S. policy and imagining new possibilities. After one million Cubans gathered in Revolution Square to hear Juanes and other stars—including some considered opposed to the Castro regime—prominent Cuban-American Sergio Pino wrote in the The Miami Herald that it was time for change in U.S. policy toward Cuba. While the Cuban government continues to force Cubans to live under “brutal and humiliating conditions,” it was nonetheless time to change U.S. policy: “Juanes opened the door to change . . . With three Cuban-American members of Congress, and one in the Senate, and many well-meaning Cuban-American leaders of hundreds of different political organizations in exile, it is time for one of them to come forward and unite us behind a new and more effective approach that focuses on the Cuban people first.”9 Pino’s position perfectly illustrates the potential for cultural diplomacy. While President Obama’s response to the concert was decidedly reserved,
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it is not hard to imagine that a cultural event—perhaps an Old Timers’ Game between U.S. and Cuban All-Stars— could help warm the frozen relationship if combined with even limited talks on substantive matters. Human rights will remain a sticking point as long as Cuba maintains its totalitarian tendencies. Nonetheless, once the United States ends the most extreme provisions of its sanctions regime and engages Cuba on a multilateral basis, the two governments can openly, and perhaps productively, discuss human rights. We will know whether real change is afoot if the President or his envoys use a future Juanes concert as an opportunity to justify a genuine shift in policy. In the case of the New York Philharmonic, if the Treasury Department had decreed that not only could the patrons go but also that all musical groups and their donors could travel under a general license to Cuba, then they would have heralded a new era of relations. The Orioles initiative fought an irresistible tide of ill will. It is something of a miracle that it happened at all. Someday—most likely after both Castro brothers have left the political scene and change is no longer considered a synonym for defeat—a baseball game, a massive concert, or another visit by a pope will lead a U.S. administration into new territory with its Cuba policy. Hopefully then, the long war will have ended.
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Match Point
NOTES
1. Cubanet, “Angelos Wants Clinton’s Help to Save Orioles-Cuba Game,” 29 January 1999, Internet, http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y99/ jan99/29e6.htm (date accessed: 14 March 2010). 2. Jeff Stein, “Foul Ball: the State Department Interferes With the Second Cuba-Orioles Game,” Salon, 30 April 1999. 3. Agenzia Fides, “Cuban Bishops’ Statement with Regard to Economic Measures Decided By Governments of Cuba and the United States,” 7 February 2004, Internet, http://www.fides.org/ aree/news/newsdet.php?idnews=2751&lan=eng (date accessed: 15 March 2010). 4. Mark Hyman, “Peter Angelos: The Toughest Bird in Baltimore,” BusinessWeek, 10 May 1999; David Corn, “A 37-Year Losing Streak,” 14 May 1999, Internet, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/ david/corn051499.asp (date accessed: 14 March 2010). 5. CNN/Sports Illustrated, “Political Hardball: Orioles’ Game in Cuba Drawing Plenty of Criti-
cism,” 26 March 1999, Internet, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/mlb/news/1999/03/25/ cuba_package/ (date accessed: 14 March 2010). 6. Charles Cohen, “Orioles Attempt to Make Cuban Game Simply Baseball,” 30 April 1999, Internet, http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y99/ apr99/30e4.htm (date accessed: 15 March 2010). 7. PBS OnlineNewsHour, “A NewsHour with Jim Lehrer Transcript: Online Focus Madeline Albright,” 7 February 2000, Internet, http://www. pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/jan-june99/ albright_1-5.html (date accessed: 14 March 2010). 8. Paula Pettavino and Philip Brenner, “The Role of Sports in Cuba’s Domestic and International Policy,” Georgetown University Cuba Briefing Paper Series no. 21 (April 1999): 9-10. 9. Sergio Pino, “The Door to Change is Open,” Miami Herald, 9 September 1999, Internet, http:// www.miamiherald.com/2009/09/29/1256929/ the-door-to-change-is-open.html (date accessed: 15 March 2010).
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Politics&Diplomacy The Fifth Estate Think Tanks and American Foreign Policy James G. McGann The promise and peril of globalization has transformed how we view international relations and opened the policymaking process to a new set of actors, agendas, and outcomes. International relations were once the exclusive domain of diplomats, bureaucrats, and states, but today’s policymakers must consider a diverse set of actors when formulating foreign policy, including organizations such as CNN, alJazeera, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Greenpeace, Deutsche Bank, al-Qaeda, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). While these actors were not necessarily born of globalization, they have been empowered by it. Consider the simple fact that in 1950 there were only 50 nation-states and a limited number of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations operating in the world, and one begins to understand the complexity and unique challenge policymakers face when trying to fashion an effective foreign policy. In this increasingly complex, interdependent, and information-rich world, governments and individual policymakers face the common challenge of bringing expert knowledge to bear in governmental decision making. For policymakers
James G. McGann is director of the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program and assistant director of the International Relations Program at the University of Pennsylvania.
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in many countries, it is not a lack of information that they are confronted with, but an avalanche. Indeed, they are frequently besieged by more information than they can possibly use. Under these circumstances, policymakers and others interested in the policymaking process require information that is timely, understandable, reliable, accessible, and useful. There are many potential sources for such information. But around the world, politicians and bureaucrats alike have increasingly turned to a specialized group of institutions to serve their needs. Independent public policy research and analysis organizations, commonly known as “think tanks,” have filled policymakers’ insatiable need for information and systematic analysis that is policy relevant. This information imperative led to the creation of the first think tanks—the Royal Institute for International Affairs (1920), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1910), the Council on Foreign Relations (1912), the Kiel Institute for World Economics (1914), and the Brookings Institution (1916)— in the early part of the twentieth century, and it continues to be the primary force behind the proliferation of public policy research organizations today.
The Evolution of Think Tanks. For most of the twentieth century, independent public policy think tanks that performed research and provided advice on public policy were an organizational phenomenon found primarily in the United States, with a much smaller number in Canada and Western Europe. The liberal anti-war and civil rights movements in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the conservative backlash in the
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1980s, created a fertile environment for new policy-related institutions, and a new wave of advocacy think tanks began to dot the policy research landscape.1 Unlike their contract-driven predecessors, these think tanks actively sought to involve themselves in policy debates and to influence “the direction and content of foreign policy.”2 This influence was achieved in part through “aggressive marketing techniques” that promoted the think tanks’ specific interests among policymakers and the general public.3 Beginning in the 1980s, there was a veritable proliferation of think tanks around the world as a result of the forces of globalization, the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of transnational problems. Two-thirds of all the think tanks that exist today were established after 1970, and over half were established since 1980. Today, think tanks have grown to the point where they are “the intellectual epicenter of the policy planning process” and are described as “almost a fourth branch of government.”4 Policymakers, government agencies, political parties, interest groups, and the media increasingly rely upon their research, expertise, and technical skills. Many scholars have pointed to think tanks in the United States as having the most impact on public policy.5 U.S. think tanks nurture their government’s willingness to rely on the private sector by playing an active role in advising government officials in both the executive and legislative branches. Think tanks rapidly provide foreign policy information to congressmen and their staffers, helping those who often lack prior experience in domestic and international issues. Many think tanks have become
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highly skilled at providing information and analysis in the right form, such as concise reports or policy briefs, and at the right time, when the legislative agenda is being developed or a critical piece of legislation is being considered. In addition, think tanks maintain a corps of experts, on a wide range of foreign policy topics, who are ready and willing to testify in congressional hearings so as to share expertise with legislators and the general public.
Politics&Diplomacy
opposed to full disarmament was unwise and caused the United States to “lose the initiative” against North Korea. Fisher was also an early advocate of multi-party talks concerning weapons issues and insisted that the United States get South Korea and Japan involved by having them guarantee full diplomatic relations in exchange for the dismantling of the nuclear program. Fisher also advocated China’s involvement in the issue by tying its cooperation to negotiations
An inherent strength of American think
tanks is their position in providing alternative views to administrations and fostering debate on contentious topics. An inherent strength of American think tanks is their position in providing alternative views to administrations and fostering debate on contentious topics. This is exemplified in the role that leading think tanks have played in dealing with a host of American foreign policy issues, including relations with North Korea, the crisis in Darfur, the “Buy America” provision in the 2009 Stimulus Package, and the “surge” strategy in Iraq.
Relations with North Korea. In 1994 the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, in which North Korea promised to freeze and ultimately dismantle its burgeoning nuclear weapons program in exchange for U.S. help in building two powerproducing nuclear reactors. As early as July of that year, Richard D. Fisher of the Heritage Foundation argued that agreeing to a weapons program freeze as
over its “most favored nation” trade status with the United States.6 The Heritage Foundation’s consistent criticism of the Agreed Framework with North Korea helped keep skepticism of the deal alive throughout the Clinton administration and prepared scholars and future policymakers for the prospect of the 1994 agreement unraveling. Upon George W. Bush becoming president, his policy toward North Korea followed the general outline of longstanding recommendations by Heritage Foundation scholars: a refusal to undertake bilateral talks with Pyongyang combined with a reliance on multilateral, six-party talks and an insistence on dismantling the nuclear weapons program. This approach was applauded and encouraged during the 2004 U.S. election by the Heritage Foundation’s Balbina Y. Hwang in light of John Kerry’s promise to engage North Korea bilaterally.7
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In contrast, one-time Brookings Institution Senior Fellow and current Ambassador to the United Nations Susan E. Rice argued in a 2005 publication that bilateral talks offered the best chance of achieving verifiable disarmament in North Korea. At the time, she lambasted the Bush administration’s refusal to negotiate directly with Kim Jong-il and argued that, even if such negotiations failed, the talks would give the United States greater cause with which to persuade China and others to support punitive actions.8 However, the Barack Obama administration initially carried on with the Bush approach. In January of 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the six-party talks “have merit as a negotiating vehicle,” with State department spokesman Sean McCormack adding that “Pyongyang will have to meet its six-party commitments before realizing diplomatic benefits.”9 Whatever the outcome concerning North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the presence of think tanks generating papers and media attention have helped ensure that no decision by the U.S. government will be undertaken in a vacuum devoid of public debate.
The Crisis in Darfur. Think tanks
have played a critical role in the formation of American foreign policy towards the Darfur crisis. Indeed, one of the initial advocates for U.S. intervention in Sudan was Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and former Reagan administration official Michael Horowitz. With a background as a champion of human rights, Horowitz lobbied Congress to implement tough sanctions against Sudan, reminiscent of those levied
[ 3 8] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
against apartheid-era South Africa. While unsuccessful, his actions generated significant public awareness about Sudanese issues and helped push Congress towards passing the Sudan Peace Act of 2002.10 President Bush’s stalwart refusal throughout his two terms to send U.S. troops into Darfur reflected the longstanding position of major conservative think tanks, such as the Cato Institute, who emphasized a “regional solution [that did] not include any American troops.”11 In 2004 Cato foreign policy director Christopher Preble argued that the United States should “encourage [Egypt, Chad, and Kenya] to clean up their own backyard, which they can and should do.”12 The Heritage Foundation was more supportive of the United States imposing bilateral economic sanctions and blocking financial aid to Sudan from international monetary institutions, but similarly urged the Bush administration to “rule out the deployment of US ground troops, which are already stretched thin.”13 Recently, the continued failure and slow-moving progress of United Nations (UN) and African Union-led initiatives has increased pressure from both liberal think tanks and grassroots public interest groups for new and effective U.S.-led strategies. Initiatives like the Enough! Project launched by the Center for American Progress offer detailed policy proposals for U.S. decision-makers, while groups such as the Save Darfur Coalition, which represents over 180 faith-based advocacy and human rights organizations, focus more on increasing public awareness and generating political will. In January 2009, Enough!, the Save Darfur
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Coalition, and the Genocide Intervention Network published a joint letter to the Obama administration arguing for U.S. enforcement of a no-fly zone over Darfur, expanded economic sanctions, enforcement of the arms embargo, and reduced Sudanese influence over the African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) forces in Sudan.14 Together, these organizations are a significant political force. Whether they will directly influence Obama’s foreign policy decisions as much as their respective counterparts did with the Bush administration remains to be seen.
The “Buy America” Provision of the 2009 Stimulus Package. On
27 January 2009 the House of Representatives voted to include a Buy America provision to its economic stimulus package. This would have required that all public projects funded by the fiscal stimulus program use iron and steel processed in the United States. The intent was that the country not be dependent upon foreign suppliers and instead reinvest money into the national economy. Though popular with many policymakers, the provision soon created intense discussion, both at home and abroad. Trade partners were highly displeased with the provision. Some considered it a violation of World Trade Organization guidelines, while others feared it would provoke other states to adopt similar protectionist measures, resulting in a trade war. Vice President Joe Biden, along with many other policymakers, disagreed. “I don’t think there’s anything anticompetitive or antitrade in saying when we are stimulating the US economy that the purpose is to create
Politics&Diplomacy
US jobs. The same thing is happening in Britain, the same thing is happening in Europe, the same thing is happening in China, and they’re not worrying about American jobs.”15 As the opposition escalated, Obama conveyed to Congress that he would not want the bill to pass without any changes. He told a reporter that “we can’t send a protectionist message” in the stimulus bill.16 The stimulus plan, passed on 13 February 2009 with the Buy America provision still in place, though with modified language, in large part due to the input of American think tanks. The Peterson Institute for International Economics could arguably be given credit for starting the debate and bringing the provision into the public eye. C. Fred Bergsten, its director, immediately mobilized the trade team to perform an analysis on the risks and benefits of the provision. After informing key people in the administration that they were performing the analysis, Bergsten noted that “the National Economic Council in the White House (via Larry Summers’s deputy, Jason Furman) asked if we could get them our results by Saturday, January 30th, [2009] so they could use it to prepare for the Senate debate starting on Monday, February 1.”17 The Peterson Institute then published the analysis as an eleven-page policy brief on February 2, posting it to their website, and reached out to media outlets. This created an active debate, with other think tanks quickly weighing in. The Senate drastically toned down its Buy America language by indicating that it should be implemented in a manner fully consistent with the international obligations of the United States, which was the second preferred
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option in the Peterson Institute policy brief after eliminating the amendment altogether. As Bergsten noted, it is difficult to “trace the causality from our analysis of the situation and policy recommendation to the sharp changes in the attitudes of both the President and the Congress. We can observe, however, that no one else even attempted to prepare and publicize an analytically grounded response to the protectionist threat in the very short time available. We can also note that, since the White House asked for our work on an expedited schedule, it is reasonable to assume that they used it.”18 As the language in the final bill was much diluted from the original and increased protectionism was avoided, it is evident that the debate greatly affected the policy outcome. Bergsten saw this event as a nearly prototypical example of how a think tank should try to operate, as they were able to apply their data and models to the specific case very quickly and to develop a highly credible presentation in response to the proposed legislation. He concluded that the Peterson Institute was able to utilize its relationships with administration officials and the media to shape the policy debate.
The “Surge” Strategy in Iraq. In March 2006 Congress appointed the Iraq Study Group (ISG)—a tenperson, bipartisan panel—in response to increased public concern over the United States’s actions and continued presence in Iraq. Though originally lacking a specific statutory mandate, the ISG quickly assumed responsibility for providing a “forward-looking assessment of the current and prospective
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situation in Iraq, including policy suggestions and advice.”19 The initiative to create the ISG was led by Representative Frank Wolf and supported by the Bush administration, despite its not partaking in its creation. The Group’s recommendations, made public in a report on 6 December 2006, included significant downsizing of U.S. combat forces in Iraq to levels below 70,000 troops; increased embedding of U.S. forces with Iraqi military and police units to facilitate training; the conditioning of further assistance to the Iraqi government based on the achievement of certain security and political benchmarks; and the inclusion of diplomats from neighboring states, including Iran and Syria, in discussions on stability.20 On 27 December 2006 retired Army Brigadier General Jack Keane and American Enterprise Institute (AEI) analyst Fred Kagan published a brief article in The Washington Post disagreeing with the ISG’s findings. Instead, they recommended a 20,000 to 30,000-man troop increase for around 18 months—with an emphasis on Baghdad—as necessary to stabilize Iraq for long enough to establish a functional government.21 This view was presented formally by Kagan in a 47-page AEI report on 5 January 2007 entitled “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq.”22 On 10 January 2007 President George W. Bush unveiled his new plan for U.S. operations in Iraq. Consistent with the ISG’s report, Bush emphasized joint operations between American and Iraqi forces. He also promised diplomatic outreach efforts on Iraq’s behalf to neighboring Middle East nations minus the conspicuously absent Iran
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and Syria, despite the ISG’s recommendation for their inclusion. At the same time, Bush announced the deployment of 20,000 additional U.S. troops to Iraq, with the vast majority—five combat brigades—going to Baghdad. President Bush’s lip service to the ISG in the form of increased diplomatic efforts did little to hide the truth. The new “surge” strategy was a clear refutation of a congressionally-mandated bipartisan solution in favor of one proposed by Keane, Kagan, and the American Enterprise Institute.
Why Think Tanks? How did think tanks rise to achieve their prominent perch in American foreign policy formulation? America’s long-standing tradition of trusting the private sector to assist the government, coupled with its equally long-standing tradition of distrusting the government, is certainly a major factor. Think tanks occupy an important position in the policymaking process because they offer comprehensive advisory services to the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government. Most recently, reliance upon
Politics&Diplomacy
is that they have proven to be effective. Think tanks can produce sound analyses of policy problems faster than their public sector counterparts who must contend with the distractions of political maneuvering and a bureaucratic culture that strives to maintain the status quo. Also, think tanks are often more efficient than government bureaucracies at collecting, synthesizing, and analyzing information, and are free to be future-oriented. As they are mostly unencumbered by political constraints, they are more likely to produce bold reconfigurations of policy agenda. Another structural benefit is that the wide reach of think tanks enables them to engage relevant policymakers better than government agencies. Think tanks have more freedom to design their own agenda, adapt to the needs of their clients, and increase collaboration both within and between institutions. This broad scope often empowers think tanks to conceive of policy implementation better than government bureaucracies limited by specific missions and segmentation.23
Think tanks are more efficient than
government bureaucracies at collecting, synthesizing, and analyzing information, and are free to be future-oriented. think tanks for policy research and analysis has gained prominence due to the institutions’ demonstrated efficiency, independence, relevance, and access to key government officials. Another dominant reason that think tanks are heavily relied upon today
This willingness to go outside official channels for solutions makes it very easy for private policy analysts, ideologues, entrepreneurs, or those with a strong interest in policy formation to influence government decision making. During the post-World War I peace conference
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in Paris, Colonel Edward House, a top advisor to President Woodrow Wilson, assembled a group of ex officio advisors from academia to explore the implications of a potential peace treaty. By 1921 this ad hoc corps of consultants became the Council on Foreign Relations, an
organization that continues to influence U.S. foreign policy today. The challenge now facing policymakers is harnessing the vast reservoir of knowledge, information, and associational energy that exists in public policy research organizations for the public good.
NOTES
1 Diane Stone, Andrew Denham, and Mark Garnett, eds., Think Tanks Across Nations: A Comparative Approach (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 113-115; James G. McGann and R. Kent Weaver, eds., Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002). 2 Donald Abelson, “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: An Historical Perspective,” U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda 7, no. 3 (November 2002): 11. 3 Ibid. 4 Tugrul Keskingoren and Patrick R. Halpern, “Behind Closed Doors: Elite Politics, Think Tanks, and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Insight Turkey 7, no. 2 (April-June 2005), 99-113, 102; Lee Michael Katz, “American Think Tanks -Their Influence is On the Rise,” Carnegie Reporter 5, no. 2 (Spring 2009), 1. 5 Abelson, “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy.” 6 Richard D. Fisher, “Fixing Jimmy Carter’s Mistakes: Regaining the Initiative Against North Korea,” The Heritage Foundation, 8 July 1994, Internet, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/asb131.cfm, (date accessed: 31 December 2007). 7 Balbina Y. Hwang, “Giving In to Nuclear Blackmail,” The Heritage Foundation, 4 October 2004, Internet, http://www.heritage.org/Press/ Commentary/ed100304c.cfm, (date accessed: 1 January 2008). 8 Susan E. Rice, “We Need to Talk to North Korea,” The Brookings Institution, 3 June 2005, Internet, http://www.brookings.edu/ opinions/2005/0603northkorea_rice.aspx (date accessed: 1 January 2008). 9 “Clinton Backs Six-Party Talks for Ending North Korean Nuclear Program,” Voice of America, 14 January 2009, Internet, http://www.voanews. com/english/2009-01-14-voa2.cfm. 10 Allen D. Hertzke, “The Shame of Darfur,” First Things: The Journal of Religion, Culture, and Public Life, October 2005, Internet, http://www.firstthings. com/article.php3?id_article=239 (date accessed: 2 January 2008). 11 Ibid.
12 Christopher Preble, “A Regional Solution for Darfur,” The CATO Institute, 19 July 2004, Internet, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_ id=2744. 13 “Pressure Sudan to Halt Oppression in Darfur,” The Heritage Foundation, 4 October 2004, Internet, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Africa/ em943.cfm. 14 John Prendergast, John Norris, and Jerry Fowler, “President Obama’s Immediate Sudan Challenge,” January 2009, Internet, enoughproject.org, http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/president-obama-immediate-sudan-challenge. 15 “Steely Biden tells critics: Buy into ‘Buy American,’” The New York Post, 30 January 2009, Internet, http://www.nypost.com/seven/01302009/news/politics/steely_biden_tells_critics__buy_into_buy_152732. htm (date accessed: 14 April 2009). 16 David Sanger, “Senate Agrees to Dilute ‘Buy America’ Provisions,” The New York Times, 4 February 2009. 17 C. Fred Bergsten, interview and private correspondence with author, 11 February 2009. 18 Ibid. 19 “Iraq Study Group: Fact Sheet,” United States Institute of Peace, 20 December 2006, Internet, http://www.usip.org/iraq-study-group/isg-factsheet. 20 Paul Reynolds, “Iraq Report Sets Stage for Changes,” BBC News, 6 December 2006, Internet, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6209802.stm (date accessed: 1 January 2008). 21 Fredrick W. Kagan and Jack Keane, “The Right Type of ‘Surge’; Any Troop Increase Must Be Large and Lasting,” American Enterprise Institute, 27 December 2006, Internet, http://www.aei.org/ article/25356. 22 Frederick W. Kagan, “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq,” American Enterprise Institute, 5 January 2007, Internet, http://www.aei. org/paper/25396. 23 James G. McGann, “Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 16 December 2002.
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A Smart Use of Intelligence Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing Lawrence Woocher Each year, the top American intelligence official appears before Congress to present the intelligence community’s assessment of worldwide threats to U.S. national security. In his 2010 testimony, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Dennis Blair included something new. Under the heading “Mass Killings,” Blair wrote, “Looking ahead over the next five years, a number of countries in Africa and Asia are at significant risk for a new outbreak of mass killing.” He defined mass killing as “the deliberate killing of at least 1,000 unarmed civilians of a particular political identity by state or state-sponsored actors in a single event or over a sustained period.” This appeared to be the first time the senior-most U.S. intelligence official had called attention to the general phenomenon of mass killing—or the closely related and more common notions of genocide or mass atrocities—in his annual threat assessment.1 Blair’s inclusion of mass killing in his assessment of threats to the United States raises questions about both the national security landscape and the business that we call “intelligence”: Was his discussion of mass killing a distraction from “real” national security and intelligence matters or was he wise in drawing attention to an underappreci-
Lawrence Woocher is a senior program officer in the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the United States Institute of Peace.
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ated threat? What, if anything, should the intelligence community (IC) do to support policy decisions related to mass killing and genocide? What are the broader implications for the future role of intelligence in national security decision making? President Barack Obama and other senior policymakers have communicated that they believe preventing mass killing, genocide, and other mass atrocities is important, and recent policy actions create new opportunities to significantly improve the U.S. government’s performance. When he introduced his appointees for the DNI and director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), then-President-elect Obama declared, “Good intelligence is not a luxury—it is a necessity.” This certainly applies to preventing mass killing and genocide.
U.S. policy responses. If the IC can meet these challenges, it will not only help improve the U.S. government’s record at preventing genocide; it will demonstrate that the IC is able to adapt effectively to the new demands on intelligence.
The Changing Security and Intelligence Environment. By
any measure, the U.S. government’s intelligence enterprise is vast, comprising 16 agencies, some 200,000 persons, and an annual budget of around $75 billion—about one-and-a-half times the budget of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development combined.2 Despite recent reform efforts—especially after the 9/11 attacks and intelligence failures in Iraq—this system still retains much of the character of the
The intelligence community must ask
new questions, collect information from different kinds of sources, and develop a capacity to analyze a variety of subjects with which it may have little experience. Succeeding in this ambitious goal will require not only good intelligence on any particular situation but also the smart use of intelligence. This means devoting the unique assets and skills of the intelligence community to clarify the stakes of mass killing, drawing fully on open sources and outside expertise to improve warning of likely atrocities, to enhance understanding of their underlying situations, and to generate objective analysis about potential
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Cold War era during which it originally developed. The IC was designed largely to collect and to analyze intelligence from and about the Soviet Union—a single state, bureaucratically and hierarchically run, which represented the dominant threat to the United States and its allies. The extreme risk of a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union meant that all other global phenomena were seen as secondary.
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The international security environment that confronts the U.S. intelligence community today is dramatically different. Threats to U.S. national security are more diverse and diffuse, ranging from a possible influenza pandemic to nuclear proliferation to piracy on the high seas. Many serious threats emanate from networks, not hierarchical organizations. Consequently, the IC must ask new questions, collect information from different kinds of sources, and develop a capacity to analyze a variety of subjects with which it may have little experience. While the intelligence community has made real progress, it will continue to grapple with these challenges for years to come. At the same time as the security context has shifted, the information environment has radically changed. There has been a massive increase in the availability of information; on virtually any subject of interest today, it is a greater challenge to sort, organize, and understand the wealth of available information than it is to find information in the first place. The capacity of the U.S. intelligence community to process and analyze information is far outpaced by the one billion pieces of data it collects every day.3 A significant proportion of the increase in information comes from so-called open source intelligence (OSINT)—in essence, anything that is freely available by non-secretive means. OSINT ranges from local radio or newspaper stories to commercial satellite imagery of Darfur or North Korea and professional political analysis by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like the International Crisis Group.
Politics&Diplomacy
Not only is open source intelligence expanding, but it is becoming increasingly relevant. A 2007 Congressional Research Service review concluded, “A consensus now exists that OSINT must be systematically collected and should constitute an essential component of analytical products.”4 Yet, because of the IC’s historical emphasis on secrets and classified products, “far too little attention has been paid to the importance of open sources,” according to CIA officials Carmen Medina and Rebecca Fisher.5 Moreover, it is not enough for a lone intelligence analyst to draw on all sources. Because expertise on matters of interest is distributed more widely than in years past, the IC has begun—slowly—to expand its outreach to knowledgeable persons outside the community.
New Intelligence Debates. The 2009 National Intelligence Strategy describes the fundamental challenge for the IC in the contemporary security context as keeping “a steady focus on enduring challenges in and among nation-states and persistent transnational issues, and also [being] agile in adapting to emerging threats and harnessing opportunities.”6 But striking the appropriate balance is much more difficult than stating the goal. If the IC defines its domain too narrowly, it will overlook important threats to U.S. national security emanating from previously unstudied phenomena, or make analytic errors by seeing only part of a larger, more complex system of connections among global phenomena. There are parallel risks associated with defining the IC’s ambit too widely: the IC may Summer/Fall 2010 [45]
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expand beyond its core capabilities into substantive areas where it lacks adequate expertise, or it may suffer from simple overstretch, leading to a lack of focus on the most pressing analytic needs.
The Threat of Mass Killing. What do these debates about the boundaries of national security concerns and the proper role of intelligence mean for the prevention of mass killing and genocide? On the one hand, mass killing
If the IC embraces a broader conception of
national security matters, it will need to significantly enhance its analysis of open sources and its outreach to experts beyond the community. A similar debate surrounds the role of OSINT. Some argue for a renewed focus on intelligence collection via secret, technical, and clandestine means, since these are the domains where the IC has special expertise and unique capacities. According to this view, the IC should not try to provide full service information and analytical support to U.S. government decision making when the question of interest can be adequately answered with information from open sources. These debates are closely related. In general, the broader one’s view of national security threats, the more important are OSINT and outside expertise. For example, the 2008 national intelligence assessment of the geopolitical implications of climate change—not a traditional security concern—relied almost entirely on OSINT and unprecedented collaboration with non-IC experts.7 If the IC embraces a broader conception of national security matters, it will need to significantly enhance its analysis of open sources and its outreach to experts beyond the community as standard practice.
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and genocide are nothing new. Governments have been massacring their own populations for many decades, even predating the term “genocide” and its proscription in international law by the 1948 Genocide Convention. On the other hand, genocidal violence shares characteristics with archetypal new or emerging threats. It frequently arises in weak states previously thought to be of little strategic importance; non-state actors, such as militias, often play a central role; and its effects on U.S. interests, though significant, may be obscure or indirect. Combating this and similar threats requires timely and flexible U.S. government action, drawing on multiple capacities and informed by strategic warning and accurate analysis of complex socio-cultural and political dynamics. Whether seen as an enduring challenge, an emerging threat, or outside the bounds of U.S. national security concerns, it is perhaps most important that senior U.S. officials appear to believe that preventing genocide is an important objective. Upon his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, President Obama stated, “More and more,
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we all confront difficult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government . . . When there is genocide in Darfur, systematic rape in Congo, or repression in Burma—there must be consequences.”8 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, a key Defense Department planning document, included response to mass atrocities among the contingencies for which the U.S. military should be prepared. Several members of Congress— including the chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dianne Feinstein—have expressed support for the recommendations of the Genocide Prevention Task Force, a group of former high-level officials that issued a “blueprint” report in late 2008. Together, these kinds of declarations and actions should indicate to the IC that many of their most important customers consider preventing mass atrocities an important national security concern. It is not the first time that U.S. policymakers have called on the IC to support policy decisions related to genocide or mass killing. In 1998 President Bill Clinton announced a new genocide early warning center sponsored by the Department of State and the CIA. As then-Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, David Scheffer stated, “Our diplomatic and intelligence communities will collect and analyze information with a keen perspective on the warning signals of these heinous crimes against humankind.”9 This initiative included the creation—within the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research—of a War Crimes and Atrocities Analysis Division, which exists to this day, and an interagency
Politics&Diplomacy
group headed by Scheffer, which lapsed in 2001 after the change in administrations. Four Types of Analytic Support. Earlier this year, the Obama administration established a new high-level interagency committee under the National Security Council dedicated to preventing mass atrocities and genocide. This new body is bound to be a principal end-user of existing intelligence on this subject and a generator of new intelligence requirements. Building an effective working relationship between the IC and the new policy committee will be a prerequisite for the committee’s success and a challenge that may typify much of the IC’s work on “emerging” threats in the coming years. The new committee could benefit from four types of intelligence analysis. First, the IC can help clarify the stakes involved in preventing mass killing and genocide by assessing the geopolitical implications of these crimes globally. As with its assessment of climate change, the IC can supply objective analysis to inform the debate about the connection between mass atrocities and U.S. national security, going beyond anecdotal evidence to evaluate claims about regional spillover, longterm effects, and costs to the United States of failing to prevent mass violence. Independent analysis by the IC can help policymakers determine where preventing mass atrocities should fit in the scheme of U.S. foreign policy and national security priorities. It may also persuade skeptics in the bureaucracy that claims about the importance of preventing mass atrocities are grounded in fact as much as political preference.
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The second analytical challenge is to assess the relative risks of genocide or mass atrocities across the globe. For an actor with global interests like the United States, it is important to identify those states or regions where mass atrocities are most likely to occur so that
racy should come from comparing the results of different approaches over time—for example, as Philip Tetlock has suggested, via “forecasting tournaments that would shed light on the relative performance of competing approaches.”11
The unique ability of the IC to collect information by technical or clandestine means can prove critical in understanding the risks of mass atrocities. additional attention and resources can be efficiently allocated. The main result of a global risk assessment is a “watch list” that identifies the most worrisome situations and briefly describes the reasons for the judgment of risk. The IC has regularly produced a classified Atrocities Watch List since 1998. This was based partly on results from CIA-commissioned work by academics to develop risk models for genocide and mass killing.10 Knowledge about the factors that predispose states to genocidal violence owes a debt to the IC for supporting this painstaking, empirical work. This job is not complete, however. The best extant risk models are not precise enough to identify the very small number of states that are most likely to experience an episode of mass killing without also catching a large number of “false positives.” Since it is unlikely that global risk assessment would rely on secret intelligence, the IC should encourage academics and NGOs, working in cooperation or competition, to conduct their own public risk assessments. Progress in forecasting accu-
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The third challenge is to develop and to maintain a deeper understanding of high-risk situations. A watch list, naturally, is only a starting point. Warning of events that can trigger mass atrocities in the near-term and identifying potential openings for external action that can avert or mitigate mass violence demand detailed knowledge of diverse social, political, economic, and cultural contexts and of specific actors. In some instances, the unique ability of the IC to collect information by technical or clandestine means can prove critical in understanding the risks of mass atrocities. For example, imagine the value of eavesdropping on Slobodan Milosevic’s private discussions in the lead-up to the 1999 negotiations over Kosovo at Rambouillet, or tracking movements of janjaweed militias in Sudan in 2003. More often, however, IC analysts have few special advantages compared with Foreign Service Officers or regional specialists in think tanks and universities. Particularly when the country of interest is not of inherent importance to the United States, the
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IC should go beyond its own house to compile expert judgments and to identify critical uncertainties. Once significant risk and the possibility of positive U.S. involvement is established, preventing genocide requires a fourth kind of analysis: support for designing and implementing preventive strategies. To select the most effective combination of political, diplomatic, economic, and military measures, policymakers need accurate analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, and potential leverage points of relevant actors, as well as the foreseeable effects of various alternative courses of action. This means answering questions such as: Would an arms embargo meaningfully restrict the ability of potential perpetrators to commit violence, or would it just freeze an imbalance of firepower between groups? How likely is it that permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council would support a UN peace operation with a robust mandate to protect civilians? Would economic sanctions against regime leaders impose significant costs? Whose assets should be frozen, and where do these assets reside? Equally important, the U.S. government must assess the impacts of any new measure— as well as other changes in the overall situation—so that it can recalibrate or refine its actions rapidly, before adversaries are able to adjust fully. The 2009 National Intelligence Strategy cites the support of effective national security action—as distinct from policies—as one of the IC’s four strategic goals. While ongoing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations stand out in this regard, one can
Politics&Diplomacy
similarly argue for the value of intelligence in support of U.S. government actions to prevent genocide. Analytic needs in support of policy implementation and revision will more often focus on the decision making of key individuals and small groups, such as government or militia leaders. Leveraging the full potential of the IC’s sophisticated collection capacities can make a decisive difference. Across each of these four types of analytic support, it is above all the unique role and analytic tradecraft of the IC that make it so critical to effective policymaking and implementation. Even when most relevant information is open source, no other U.S. government actor is independent of the policy process so as to provide objective analysis, while being close enough to policymakers to ensure relevance. Likewise, no other U.S. government actor promotes adherence to analytic standards designed to combat common cognitive and group decision-making biases. The impacts of these biases are heavy when concerning rare, hard-toimagine events involving large numbers of people, such as genocidal violence. In particular, the IC’s independence and analytic rigor should guard against “clientitis”—when members of the Foreign Service begin to represent the interests of the foreign government where they serve instead of their own— and against policymakers’ natural reluctance to accept that current policies may be failing, which can be catastrophic in situations at risk of mass atrocities. It is often asserted that preventing mass atrocities and genocide hinges on the “political will” of senior American decision makers. But for a U.S.
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official’s will to translate into policy success, it must be channeled into the right government actions, in the right place, at the right time. This requires rigorous, objective analysis to evaluate the stakes of the problem, assess global risks, enhance understanding of
particular situations, and support decisions about alternative policy measures. Devoting intelligence resources to these analytic tasks in support of preventing genocide—an objective that the President himself has articulated—would be a smart use of intelligence indeed.
NOTES
1 Michael Abramowitz and Lawrence Woocher, “How Genocide Became a National Security Threat,” Foreign Policy, 26 February 2010. 2 Dennis C. Blair, Media Conference Call with the Director of National Intelligence, 15 September 2009. The FY2010 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill totaled $48.8 billion. 3 Dennis C. Blair, “Remarks and Q&A by the Director of National Intelligence” (The Commonwealth Club of California, 15 September 2009), 3. 4 Richard A. Best, Jr. and Alfred Cummings, “Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 5 December, 2007. 5 Carmen Medina and Rebecca Fisher, “Thinking About The Business of Intelligence: What the World Economic Crisis Should Teach Us,” Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 3 (2009): 14-15. 6 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America,” August 2009, 1. 7 Thomas Fingar, “National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030” (Statement for
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the Record to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 25 June 2008). 8 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize” (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 10 December 2009). 9 David Scheffer, “The United States: Measures to Prevent Genocide” (Remarks at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Conference “Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: Early Warning and Prevention,” 10 December 1998). 10 These studies have been undertaken under the auspices of the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), a group of academics convened to develop statistical risk models for major political changes using open-source data. One PITF study on genocide and “politicide” is Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 57-73. 11 Philip Tetlock, “Reading Tarot on K Street,” The National Interest, September/October 2009.
Conflict&Security Right Intentions, Wrong Approaches The Response to North Korea’s Human “Wrongs” Problem Balbina Y. Hwang Nothing seems to engender more impassioned debate than asking the question “how do you solve a problem like North Korea?” Yet, of the numerous and complex issues that comprise the “North Korean problem,” probably none is as vexing as the country’s atrocious human rights record. How to resolve this challenge remains one of the most polarized, politically sensitive, and intractable issues in the international diplomatic arena. One reason for the lack of tangible progress in furthering the human rights agenda with North Korea (or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) is the bifurcation of the problem into either very narrow or specific issues, or an all-encompassing one. Rather than tackling specific issues, this binary approach effectively paralyzes policies within the broader debate on how to solve the entire North Korea problem. Complicating the issue further is the domination of a highly moralistic rhetoric that commandeers the parameters of policy dialogue regarding North Korea. This dynamic has led to the over-politicization of policies towards that country and has severely crippled the ability of many governments to implement practical policies, resulting in schizophrenic efforts that sometimes produce unintended and adverse consequences. Tragically, the end result has at
Babina Y. Hwang is visiting professor at the National Defense University. She also served as Senior Special Advisor to former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill. She received her Ph.D. from Georgetown University.
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times adversely affected the people of North Korea, the very people whom these policies purportedly were intended to help. This article attempts to address policy-making deficiencies in addressing the North Korean human rights problem by disentangling the agglomeration of issues that have confounded previous efforts and analyzing the constraints and impediments that have produced ineffective policies to date. It concludes with suggestions for a new approach.
Constraints on Furthering a Human Rights Agenda. The
deplorable state of human rights in the DPRK is so well recognized that one might as well call the human rights problem a “human wrongs” problem.1 Yet, policy priorities toward the DPRK have focused almost exclusively on security challenges, in particular the nuclear issue.2 The North’s tolerance for highrisk threats and actions—including missile launches, two nuclear tests, and a number of military clashes with South Korea—have prioritized security issues over human rights issues. The necessity of doing so was further reinforced by the 9/11 attacks, which elevated the risk of proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials to terrorist groups or states. Indeed, the unexpected attacks on September 11 contributed greatly to a fundamental shift in the Bush administration’s initial prioritization of human rights in its foreign policy stance; after the 2001 attacks, North Korea’s security threats emanating from its illicit nuclear program became the overwhelming focus. When, in 2003, a formal process for negotiations on the nuclear issue was finally established with the six-party talks, the topic of human
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rights was effectively removed from the regional agenda, as the DPRK refused to engage on any security issue if human rights were also a topic of discussion. The Obama administration has appeared to embrace the same six-party talks framework, which effectively means that human rights will remain subordinate to the nuclear issue as a policy priority. Although human rights issues have often played a secondary role to the achievement of national security objectives, they have oftentimes represented a critical component in U.S. foreign policy formulation. Indeed, choosing to prioritize national security interests over human rights issues has emerged as a moral dilemma for every modern American president who, once in office, is confronted with the reality of having to balance complex regional dynamics that cloud moral clarity. In northeast Asia in particular, differing national priorities regarding the Korean peninsula are the fundamental cause of ineffective policies and the security stalemate that has endured for over half a century. South Korea (or the Republic of Korea, ROK) has remained a staunch U.S. ally since the Korean War. Bilateral relations between the two allies, however, have not always been smooth, particularly in the last twenty years during both the first nuclear crisis (1993-1994) and the current one (2002 – present). American presidents have found themselves at odds with South Korean leaders regarding policies to address North Korea’s nuclear threat. Perhaps because the ROK has spent the past sixty-two years as an independent republic in the shadow of imminent military attack from the North, the South’s national priority has unequivocally focused on preventing
HWANG
another outbreak of armed conflict and ultimately reunifying with the North under peaceful means.3 The DPRK’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, however, altered fundamentally the ROK’s traditional threat calculus by making it more vulnerable not only to an entirely new level of North Korean attack but also to the repercussions of any regional or international attempts to alter the DPRK’s nuclear status. Regardless of whether military force is used, any precipitous change in the status of the North Korean regime—either its disintegration or its strengthening—would produce grave and overwhelming challenges for the South, such as the exorbitant economic, social, and political costs of absorbing a sudden collapse of the North. Thus, ROK policy and public mentality have shifted from that of singular, hard-line containment and isolation to a looser “Sunshine Policy” of engagement and cooperation with the North. Similar ideological shifts occurred in Washington over the years, but they did not coincide with changes in Seoul, weakening the effectiveness of North Korea policy and leading to serious political rifts that at times jeopardized the alliance itself. The Sunshine Policy also had a lasting effect on the human rights issue in the South. President Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) received the Nobel Peace Prize in large part for his life-long struggle as a dissident working to promote civil liberties and democratic rule in South Korea. Yet ironically, one of the hallmarks of his Sunshine Policy was to purposefully mute any discussion of North Korean human rights issues so as to prevent any DPRK objections and to keep engagement between the
Conflict&Security
two countries alive. Instead, Kim chose to narrow South Korean focus on the singular priority of promoting family reunions of divided families, calling this the most pressing item on the ROK’s human rights agenda. America’s other critical ally in northeast Asia, Japan, has also proven to be a tentative partner over the years. Tokyo remained a cautious but nervous bystander during the first nuclear crisis in the 1990s, worried more about its exclusion from a policymaking process that might leave Japan saddled with a large fiscal responsibility than a desire for direct involvement. Japan’s threat perception of the DPRK changed dramatically, however, when North Korea test-fired a long-range missile over Japanese airspace in August 1998. Since then, Japanese security concerns about the North Korean threat became inadvertently hijacked by the abductee issue in September 2002, when North Korea’s role in the kidnapping of a number of Japanese citizens decades earlier came to light. Since then, public outrage essentially has dominated almost the entirety of Japanese debate on North Korea, and it continues to severely constrain Tokyo’s ability to act flexibly or responsively to any changing circumstances surrounding the DPRK. This has produced tension and friction between the two allies as well as relations with the ROK, and has weakened the overall position of all three countries vis-à-vis North Korea.4 Of the six countries involved in the sixparty process, Russia’s interests regarding North Korea are perhaps the most uncertain. Russia’s role has remained largely ancillary although important, given its long and close relationship with
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the DPRK, its nuclear power status, and its seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council. While Russia clearly prefers a non-nuclear North Korea, a number of highly contentious bilateral issues between Moscow and Washington in recent years have made cooperation in the six-party talks fragile at best.5 On the specific issue of human rights, Russia is already the target of international criticism for its own abuses, particularly violence against journalists and suppression of other civil liberties. Thus, Moscow is
North Korea, or a collapsed North Korea leading to a strong and unified Korea under a democratic system dominated by the South–pose alternative, but equally disturbing, challenges for China. Thus, China has resisted pressure from the international community to exert its own influence on North Korea in a manner that might lead to a collapse of the regime, such as cutting off desperately needed energy supplies or economic assistance, or by enforcing sanctions.
Unauthorized departure from the DPRK is considered a high offense by the state, and violators are subject to the harshest punishment including often the death penalty.
unlikely to encourage closer scrutiny of abuses in North Korea, as it could also draw further unwanted scrutiny of its own policies or on the use of conscripted North Korean labor in Russian timber camps. In contrast to Russia, China’s role in resolving the nuclear issue with North Korea was designated as the most crucial early in the process. As North Korea’s closest ally and the last remaining lifeline for the struggling country, China’s position has grown increasingly delicate, as pressure has mounted for Beijing to use its limited but nevertheless relatively large leverage over Pyongyang. China’s ultimate dilemma is that, while it, too, certainly prefers a non-nuclear North Korea, its primary objective is to maintain stability in the region. Changes to the status quo on the Peninsula–whether it is an overly aggressive and strong
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Defining Human Rights Issues. China’s role in the human rights problems associated with North Korea presents a particular challenge, and in part this is due to a lack of defining or differentiating the problem into categories that are essential for effective policy prescriptions. China’s own human rights issues have remained a major area of contention between Beijing and Washington. Yet, China’s treatment of North Korean refugees is also a target of special scrutiny by the international community. Unauthorized departure from the DPRK is considered a high offense by the state, and violators are subject to the harshest punishment, including often the death penalty. Despite its status as a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol intended to ensure protection for displaced persons in a foreign coun-
HWANG
try, China does not recognize North Koreans as “refugees,” instead deeming them “economic migrants.” It has consistently followed a policy of “refoulement,” or forcibly returning any North Koreans caught back to the DPRK.6 The UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) has pleaded for greater access to exercise its mandate to protect the refugees and for Beijing to reconsider its refoulement policy, but China has consistently rejected these pleas.7 China’s unwavering position is based on practical and political calculations that are arguably justifiable. The reality is that many North Koreans fleeing into China do so not necessarily because they want to abandon their home country permanently but because desperate circumstances, including lack of food resources, compel them to seek economic opportunities unavailable at home. Thus, Beijing’s defense of classifying North Koreans as “economic migrants” rather than “refugees” has some merit, although there are certainly those who qualify as the latter because they seek political asylum and protection from a repressive government at home. Moreover, China fears that any formal acceptance of North Korean refugees not only risks upsetting its delicate political relationship with Pyongyang, but it also–and perhaps more significantly–serves to act as a magnet that would unleash a flood of North Korean asylum seekers. This exodus from the DPRK would weaken the North Korean regime to the point of instability, as well as establish a dangerous precedent that could potentially create a tsunami of refugees from China’s many neighbors along its southern border, including Bhutan, Laos, Burma, and Vietnam,
Conflict&Security
whose ethnic conflicts at home have created their own refugee populations. However, regardless of the clear political costs to China of ending its refoulement policy, the practice remains unequivocally objectionable, both morally and within the parameters of international standards and practices. The international community’s inability to effect change has in part remained hampered by the tendency to sweep all challenges facing North Koreans into the singular issue of North Korea’s “human rights problems,” and to demand broad improvement across the board. Thus, it is critical to distinguish between human rights abuses suffered by North Koreans outside of the DPRK and the abuses of those who remain inside the country’s borders to realize a meaningful improvement of conditions, rather than the mere establishment of a platform for moral criticism. The seeming lack of U.S. policy attention to the North Korean human rights issue was the impetus behind the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA), passed by the U.S. Congress in 2004. The reality, however, is that, aside from calling attention to the problem and urging improvements, there is very little that the government can do inside a society as closed as the DPRK. Nevertheless, the government can do more to assist North Koreans outside the DPRK’s borders. In this regard, the U.S. government has actually done far more than it is given credit for by working quietly with third countries to improve protection of refugees and to provide safe passage to South Korea for resettlement. In part, this is because the U.S. government cannot publicly acknowledge its actions, because drawing
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publicity to certain programs would only jeopardize their implementation and undermine their success.
The Ideological Iron Trap. Perhaps the single greatest impediment to achieving comprehensive progress in improving conditions for the North Korean people is that the “North Korea problem” as a policy issue is ensnared within the iron-fisted grip of an ideological trap. Since the end of the Cold War, it has remained the tendency of the United States and other Western countries to approach countries or regimes deemed “rogue” or “problematic” through an ideological prism guided by a highly refined sense of morality. While human rights issues necessarily entail the acknowledgement of moral principles, a rigidly ideological assessment of a regime’s actions against its own citizens prevents the full application of a wide range of policy options that might otherwise produce meaningful and tangible improvements in human rights. Thus, the entire weight of the policy debate guiding U.S. policy toward North Korea has centered on a singular ideological fulcrum: whether North Korea should be punished (contained) for its bad behavior or rewarded (engaged) if it can somehow be coaxed into exhibiting good behavior. Due to the fact that ideological paradigms only provide two opposing alternatives, the policy choices have bounced back and forth between the merits or demerits of an either/or policy: “naming and shaming” immoral behavior to produce enough pressure to crush rogue regimes into submission, or engaging these regimes with the hope that enough exposure and interaction with the more ethical standards of the outside
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world will cause the regime to change its own behavior. Neither approach has proven effective with the recalcitrant and resilient DPRK regime. Yet, even those who reject the containment/engagement dichotomy as ineffective end up unwittingly making arguments that are embedded in a type of default ideology: analogical reasoning. This is a dynamic in which policymakers tend to rely on lessons learned from historical experience to inform how they should respond to contemporary events.8 The power of these arguments derives from the empirical success of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rest of the iron curtain bloc. Because increased access to outside information by a suppressed people is a widely accepted cause of the USSR’s collapse, the analogous conclusion for North Korea is that penetration of that society at every level through an inundation of outside information is the only means of ensuring a collapse of the regime from within.9 Notably, in the case of North Korea, no matter which side of the ideological spectrum one’s views are based, each tends to agree that once outside information flows into the North, it is not only irreversible but can also produce only one, positive outcome: the disintegration of the current system and its inevitable replacement with a more open, free, and prosperous society. While this view may carry with it a certain moral authority and the full weight of a powerful historical example to support it, it is a mistake to assume that North Korea necessarily will follow a similar path. Alternative views are necessary that caution against relying too much on these assumptions.
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Conflict&Security
Conclusion. So what then, if any- redirect their efforts in this regard
thing, can help improve the conditions for North Koreans? The prospects for achieving tangible improvements are not as hopeless as it may seem, but it will require stepping outside the ideological box, targeting realistic goals, and working toward practical solutions focused singularly on the North Korean people rather than other moral or political objectives. This is not to say that morality and politics are unimportant, or that they should not play a role. Indeed, quite the opposite is true: all nations should unequivocally pledge their moral commitment to universal standards for all humans and insist on full compliance. Moreover, the political arena is the primary forum in which they should establish these standards and objectives.
toward working with the regime on nonpunitive assistance targeted exclusively on improving conditions for North Korean citizens. The North Korean regime has absolutely no incentive to improve conditions if the result is selfjeopardizing; indeed, it has every reason to resist such improvements for the very reason of self-preservation. For example, while demands that the regime open its political concentration camps to international inspections, as well as the insistence on their immediate closure, may be morally justified, such efforts have zero percent chance of succeeding. Rather, the international community should consistently call for the regime to reconsider its policy of imprisoning extended families of political prisoners
Efforts should focus on the most urgent
needs in the places and communities in which they can achieve quickly the most good. Outside the political arena, governments must work more closely with each other, as well as with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and groups, to improve coordination and efficiency. Efforts should focus on the most urgent needs in the places and communities in which they can achieve quickly the most good. In the case of North Korea, an optimal strategy would focus attention upon those North Koreans outside the country who are at greatest risk. The greater challenge is how to affect conditions within North Korean borders. Demands placed on the DPRK regime have proven ineffectual and often counterproductive. Instead, actors should
and urge the release of young children and old or infirmed prisoners; doing so poses no real direct threat to the regime or political stability, and would actually benefit the regime by garnering praise from the international community at very little cost. In order to implement these types of strategies, one difficult and even distasteful prerequisite exists: the international community will have to set aside moral objections to working with, instead of against, a repugnant regime. This will remain a difficult challenge to overcome and requires a loosening of the ideological grip that has so long dominated the debate. Another hurdle
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to delivering humanitarian assistance in North Korea is a lack of monitoring. Historically, outside efforts at engaging in humanitarian projects in North Korea have remained frustrated by the fear that assistance is diverted for the regime’s own use rather than reaching the intended targets. As small programs have recently proven, however, it is possible to insist on and achieve satisfactory monitoring standards through patience and resolve by proving to the recipients that no ulterior political motives exist.10 An additional key component to the success of this strategy is a long-term commitment; failure to stay committed to the programs for the long haul will tragically beget greater adverse consequences in the future. Finally, the international public– both individuals and NGOs–should
pause for a period of sober and objective self-reflection and re-evaluation of the effect of their actions and campaigns regarding North Korea. Public attention and focus on the horrors of North Korean human rights abuses is critical; for too long, these crimes against humanity were ignored. However, the international community should realize that sometimes the attention could prove counter-productive and even lead to worse conditions if they are allowed to turn into hostages to ideological or political goals. Civil society-government cooperation and trust is critical in this regard; too often, NGOs and governments, ostensibly on the same side, have wasted energy battling each other. Ultimately one must not lose sight of what matters most: improving conditions for the people of North Korea.
NOTES
1 Even with very little outside access to the country, testimonials regarding serious abuses by the regime against its own citizens is long and includes rigid control over the daily lives of citizens; extrajudicial killings; arbitrary detentions; maintenance of vast political prisons and labor camps (estimated to hold 100,000 to 200,000 prisoners) and torture of prisoners; and use of food as a political tool, resulting in widespread malnutrition and famine. See the annual U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Report; the latest was published on 25 February 2009 (http://www.state. gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119043.htm). 2 For details on the unfolding of the North Korean nuclear issue in the 1990s, see Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); and for a detailed account of the more recent issues, please see Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings University Press, 2007). 3 Note that the Korean War, which began on 25 June 1950 with the North’s invasion of the South, has not been officially concluded; the cease-fire that has prevailed since 27 July 1953 has been under an armistice agreement and has yet to be replaced with a permanent peace treaty ending hostilities between the two countries. 4 For a detailed account, see Funabashi, The Peninsula Question. 5 During the Bush-Putin years, a number of issues caused a great deal of friction, such as American missile defense systems, Russian disputes with Ukraine
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and Georgia, and Russia’s aggressive stance toward NATO. 6 Please see the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and Protocol (1967). Note that, over the years, enforcement of refoulement has waxed and waned, presumably responding either to the state of political relations between Beijing and Pyongyang or to specific domestic developments in China. For example, in the months preceding the Beijing Olympics in 2008, Chinese patrols along the border were increased, as were the numbers of forced repatriations to North Korea. See “North Korea Human Rights Act Does Little to Help Refugees in China,” Korea Herald, 30 December 2005. 7 The UNHCR is the agency charged with maintaining and enforcing the Convention and Protocol on Refugees. Although it has a small office in Beijing, its access to the border region is limited, and its remote location from the border means that gaining physical access to the office by North Koreans is a dangerous and daunting endeavor. 8 For an interesting application of analogical reasoning, see Aidan Hehir, “The Impact of Analogical Reasoning on U.S. Foreign Policy in Kosovo,” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 1 (2006): 67-81. 9 Andrei Lankov is one analyst who is well associated with this view. See “Staying Alive,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2008) and “Changing North Korea,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2009). 10 These include food aid programs, as well some medical assistance and agricultural enhancement programs.
Conflict&Security
Sovereignty on Borrowed Territory Sahrawi Identity in Algeria Randa Farah Situated in blistering heat, exposed to blinding sandstorms, and surrounded by miles of desert, four refugee camps have stubbornly emerged as the embryo of a modern nationstate. Located in the southwest corner of Algeria, the camps highlight the resilience of the Sahrawi people as well as the intractability of the protracted Western Sahara conflict. This article will begin with a brief overview of the pivotal moments in this conflict. It will subsequently argue that, since the Moroccan invasion in 1975, three fundamental factors have enabled the Sahrawis to sustain their struggle for national independence against great odds. First, Algeria’s sponsorship of the Polisario, the Sahrawi national liberation front, has facilitated the movement’s strategy of transforming the Sahrawi refugee camps on its territory into models of a future nation-state. Second, the favorable environment created by the Algerian position granted the Sahrawis a free hand to establish Sahrawi state and civil institutions in the camps, albeit on “borrowed” Algerian territory. This entailed everyday practices and interactions within and among these institutions, transforming “refugees” into virtual citizens of a Sahrawi state-in-exile and entrenching a sense of belonging to a unified Sahrawi nation. Last, the ongoing Sahrawi
Randa Farah is a professor of anthropology at the University of Western Ontario. She has worked at Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur le Moyen-Orient Contemporain (CERMOC) in Jordan and the Refugee Studies Center (RSC) at the University of Oxford.
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Intifada, or uprising, in the Moroccanoccupied Western Sahara has proved crucial in reawakening national consciousness both within and outside the territory. Nonetheless, the mere survival of indigenous struggles amounts neither to a victory nor a durable solution. This article argues that the aforementioned factors were insufficient to resuscitate the decolonization process in the Western Sahara, which began with the withdrawal of Spanish troops in 1976 but did not lead to self-determination. In fact, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly had “urgently” requested Spain to “take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territory of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domination” as early as 1965.1 However, all international efforts aimed at achieving decolonization and a peaceful resolution to the conflict thus far have failed. These include the 1991 UN Settlement Plan and the 1997 Houston Accords, brokered by UN Special Envoy James Baker, which were signed by both parties. These agreements established a timetable for the referendum, whereby Sahrawis would choose either to integrate with Morocco or to establish full independence. To that end, a ceasefire was declared in 1991, and a UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was stationed in the region to monitor the agreement and to supervise the referendum scheduled for the following year. Moroccan forces, however, obstructed the voting procedures. A detailed report published in 1995 by Human Rights Watch confirms that Morocco, “which is the stronger of the two parties
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both militarily and diplomatically, has regularly engaged in conduct that has obstructed and compromised the fairness of the referendum process.” Both parties had agreed that the Spanish census of 1974 would serve as the basis for eligible voters, but Morocco insisted on less restrictive criteria, which it manipulated to register ineligible voters it claimed were Sahrawis. As the Report explained: Just prior to the October 25, 1994 deadline for submission of applications by the parties, Morocco submitted 120,000 additional applications . . . . Testimony from members of the MINURSO identification commission indicates that many of the applicants proposed by Morocco and identified so far have no documents proving links to the Western Sahara, do not speak the Hassaniya dialect of the region, are not familiar with the tribal structure of the region, and have clearly memorized answers to the factual and biographical questions posed by the identification commission. Because each and every applicant is individually interviewed, frivolous applications slow down the identification process.2 Since then, Morocco has consistently rejected all proposals to hold a referendum that includes the option of independence. Yet, such a free vote is at the core of Sahrawi demands and a non-negotiable tenet of their liberation movement; thus, the conflict remains deadlocked.
FARAH
Historical Overview. Located near
the northwest corner of Africa, just south of Morocco, Western Sahara was a Spanish colony for almost a century (1884-1975). Analogous to Indonesia’s actions in East Timor, when Spain was about to withdraw from Western Sahara in 1975, Morocco and Mauritania both made claims of historic pre-colonial sovereignty over the territory. A UN Inquiry Mission concluded on 15 October 1975, however, that the majority of the territory’s inhabitants aspired for independence and viewed the Polisario as their political representation. Moreover, the following day, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) released a legal opinion regarding the issue of sovereignty in Western Sahara.
Conflict&Security
According to writer and journalist Tony Hodges, as soon as the ICJ published its conclusions, Morocco’s King Hassan II addressed the nation, declaring that the court actually had buttressed the kingdom’s sovereignty claim. Therefore, in November 1975 he rallied volunteers for a “Green March,” alluding to the revered color of Islam, to converge on the territory. While the thousands of unarmed marchers gathered in Tarfaya, a southwest Moroccan border town, units of the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces quietly moved into the Western Sahara from the northeast to occupy posts evacuated by the Spanish. Pressure from Morocco, France, and the United States forced a turnaround of the remaining Spanish
Physical landmarks, such as SADR’s
ministries and departments, are marked with the Sahrawi flag, a symbol of a sovereign state. The court unequivocally rejected both Morocco’s and Mauritania’s claims of sovereignty and stated that it had “not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.”3 This resolution, passed on 14 December 1960, declared: “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”4
troops, who did little to resist the invasion. Although Spain had confirmed its intentions to hand over administrative power of the territory to a Polisarioled government just weeks prior, it had surreptitiously negotiated the Madrid Accords, which partitioned administrative control of the area between Morocco and Mauritania.5 The accords, however, were not recognized by the United Nations, and no country has yet to recognize Morocco’s territorial claims.6 The Polisario, which formed on 10 May 1973 to lead the anti-colonial struggle against Spanish rule and had rallied the people of Western Sahara around its objectives of liberation and independence, was now dragged into a
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protracted conflict with both Morocco and Mauritania. The latter, unable to withstand Sahrawi guerrilla tactics, forged a peace agreement with the Polisario in 1979 and withdrew from its occupied territory. With military support from Western countries, particularly the United States and France, Morocco hastened to fill the vacuum and secured the western two-thirds of the territory. The Polisario maintained control over the remaining third.
The National Project on Borrowed Territory. The subsequent
war (1975-1991) involving Morocco, Mauritania, and the Polisario propelled a mass exodus of Sahrawis eastward into the Algerian desert, where they established refugee camps. Algeria granted the Polisario the freedom to run the camps without interference, allowing the Sahrawis to establish a modern institutional framework for governing. On 27 February 1976 the Polisario declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a state-in-exile. SADR became a voting member of the African Union and received recognition from over seventy states. The Polisario defined SADR as “a free, independent, sovereign State . . . and its sphere of legitimate action is currently limited to these refugee camps situated in this area, Algerian territory which has been ceded to the SADR, and the liberated areas of Western Sahara.”7 SADR, however, lacks perhaps the most vital feature of sovereignty: national territory. According to North African specialist George Joffe, territorial sovereignty has proven critical in defining the state.8 If territorial markers of modern nation-states
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are meant to distinguish citizens from “foreigners”—that is, citizens of other nation-states—and to foster “national belonging” within their territories, the experience of living in Sahrawi camps has left an indelible mark on Sahrawi political identity that replicates that of a sovereign nation-state. One may trace the genesis of contemporary Sahrawi national consciousness to the latter half of the twentieth century, when Western Sahara was still under Spanish rule. Rather than abating, the processes that foster national belonging were entrenched during and after the war. Undoubtedly, Algeria’s unique relationship with the Sahrawis assisted the Polisario in its aims to consolidate its national project: Algeria opened its borders and championed the Sahrawi cause in line with its historical role of supporting anti-colonial movements. Its stance, however, was also motivated by fears that Morocco was reviving its historical territorial ambitions to create “Greater Morocco,” which include parts of Algeria.9 As explained by Khatri Addu, the wali (governor) of the Smara province, the relationship between the Polisario and Algeria is perhaps unparalleled in history.10 SADR has jurisdictional powers and political sovereignty within the camps until the repatriation of the Sahrawis to Western Sahara. The camps operate under a separate Sahrawi legal system, rather than under Algerian laws; if a crime is committed within camp boundaries, the Sahrawi police investigate and report it to the Sahrawi courts, and the perpetrator goes to a Sahrawi prison if found guilty. Addu noted that “the land is where sovereignty is embodied, where
FARAH
Sahrawis live by their laws.”11 Even food rations from international humanitarian organizations are distributed by local committees according to specific Sahrawi rules. Checkpoints at the borders, manned by Sahrawi and Algerian soldiers, are visible signs that separate areas of jurisdiction and sovereignty exist. Moreover, physical landmarks, such as SADR’s ministries and departments, are marked with the Sahrawi flag, a symbol of a sovereign state. Sahrawi passports, although not recognized abroad, were issued to underscore and to symbolize Sahrawi citizenship. Mr. Addu expressed what other refugees and visitors feel when in the camps when he noted that within camp borders, he absolutely does not feel as if he is in Algerian territory.
Conflict&Security
tribal identification became taboo.13 Sahrawis often point to their successful establishment of administrative and political institutions as proof that they could run their own state upon repatriation. The framework for SADR, which characterizes itself as a democratic state-in-exile, is embodied in their constitution, which holds all citizens as equal before the law. The Sahrawi congress is made up of elected representatives of “popular councils,” a National Congress, and a judicial body for each district. Camps are run at the levels of wilayas (provinces), dairas (municipalities), and ahya’ (districts). Travel within and between camps reflects the procedural norms and territorial divisions that exist within a sovereign nation-state.
The Intifada reawakened nationalist senti-
ments in the refugee camps, provided another focus of struggle, and re-established the links between the refugees and the Sahrawis in the Territory.
During its second Congress in 1974, the Polisario adopted a “program of national action,” which delineated the organization’s chief short- and longterm goals: national liberation and independence with effective participation of the masses.12 The program, implemented from the bottom-up through local committees, emerged as the blueprint for the new society. Efforts were made to educate, organize, and prepare the refugees as citizens for the future polity in Western Sahara. To ensure that old tribal hierarchies or schisms did not threaten the collective national effort, public expressions of
Over time, Sahrawi efforts to establish a de facto nation-state through their own political institutions have transformed the right to self-determination from an abstract political slogan into an entrenched daily practice. It is reinforced by social relationships and the everyday encounters with SADR’s refugee bureaucrats and officials, entwining SADR with the refugees and rendering the boundaries between them porous. These everyday interactions and symbols of the state constitute and are constituted by what the Sahrawis dub “new traditions of citizenship.”
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The Sahrawi Intifada. Since May human rights. The protests, in which 2005, Sahrawi protests within Western Sahara escalated dramatically, and so did Morocco’s heavy-handed response. The Moroccan state regards Sahrawis who support the Polisario or call for independence as “traitors” and “separatists,” because it does not recognize them as non-Moroccan citizens. Significantly, the May demonstration in al-Ayoun, the would-be-capital of an independent Western Sahara, was subsequently known as the “independence demonstration.” The slogans which the Sahrawis have adopted ever since embody their political objectives, such as la badeel la badeel, ‘an taqreer al maseer, translating to “No alternative to self-determination,” and al Maghreb barra barra, u Sahra hurra hurra, meaning, “Out with Morocco, Sahara is free.” In late 2005, Human Rights Watch issued a report on Moroccan violations committed against Sahrawi human rights activists. Stories of torture began to leak out, including sexual abuse and imprisonment in the infamous Carcel Negra (“Black Prison”) in al-Ayoun. So did the stories of Moroccan soldiers breaking into the homes of activists and threatening their families. For example, the RFK Center for Justice and Human Rights reported that, on 8 October 2009, seven prominent Sahrawi human rights activists were detained at Casablanca airport and “disappeared” after a visit to the refugee camps in Algeria.14 These harsh measures, meant to stifle the uprising, had the reverse effect of catapulting civil society into collective action. The protests turned into a widespread popular movement, adopting non-violence as its strategy and calling for independence and respect for
[ 6 4] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
women and students played a vital role, spread across the occupied territories, reaching cities such as Dakhla, Smara, Boujdour, and even southern Morocco. Although the Moroccan government had imposed a media blockade on the territory, the news travelled far and beyond the Moroccan-fortified sand wall that cuts Western Sahara from the north all the way to the Mauritanian border. The Intifada reawakened nationalist sentiments in the refugee camps, provided another focus of struggle, and re-established the links between the refugees and the Sahrawis in the Territory. However, it also animated the debate regarding the utility—some say futility—of political negotiations that have dragged on for years. The apparent ineffectiveness of these talks has caused some, especially the Sahrawi youth, to believe that the resumption of the armed struggle might be the only remaining option. The Internet and social networking have played an essential role in disseminating news, especially among younger generations. The news of the Intifada is broadcasted almost instantaneously. Acting as rallying calls for their movement, Sahrawi torture victims, protestors carrying Sahrawi flags, and mass demonstrators are often captured on tape, which is disseminated to the Sahrawi cyber community and its supporters. In contrast to the diplomatic lethargy, the economic life in camps reflects what many Sahrawis refer to as “globalization” or “Perestroika” (openness): expanding and vibrant mercantile activities, resulting in growing informal markets in the camps; transnational
FARAH
social and economic networks; and easier communication and access to the wider world through mobile phones and television, run by solar batteries. These processes have led some to question if socioeconomic transformation might pose a challenge to the struggle for self-determination. Globalization and nation-building, however, are not necessarily antithetical processes; they interact and coexist. In fact, informal markets have generated income for some refugee households, while mobile phones and second-hand cars help break the isolation of camps and shrink distances between communities. The Polisario has also used several aspects of globalization to its advantage; for example, SADR celebrated its first television broadcasting service in the summer of 2009. Although the Polisario has thus far failed to achieve its goals for independence, it has skillfully used the diplomatic hiatus to widen the scope of the party’s influence and institutions.15
Conclusion. In the above discussion, one can identify three main factors as crucial elements that have enabled the indigenous people of Western Sahara to sustain their struggle for independence. These include structural and subjective factors, such as Algerian sponsorship of the Polisario’s national strategy, in which Sahrawi refugees became citizens of a “state-in-exile,” and the establishment of self-determination as a marker of collective identity. The aforementioned factors, along with the Intifada and an informal economy, helped to thwart the alienation of the movement’s leadership from the rank-and-file and have deterred refugees from accepting Moroccan sovereignty.
Conflict&Security
While these factors may have sustained the Sahrawi national struggle, thus far the Sahrawi national liberation movement has not achieved its objectives of self-determination. As in many conflicts, the political situation in Western Sahara is vulnerable to the influences and interests of powerful states. Following the most recent round of negotiations held on 10 February 2010 in Armonk, New York, Christopher Ross, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for Western Sahara, told reporters that no progress was made other than a commitment to continue negotiations. During the meetings, Morocco submitted an autonomy plan it considers generous, which considers granting the Sahrawis substantial control to manage their local affairs. This Moroccan proposal was presented as part of a larger Moroccan plan for large-scale structural reforms and a “regionalization process” in all of Morocco. But herein lies the crux of the problem: whether substantial or limited, the autonomy plan is premised on the Moroccan view that Western Sahara is its “southern province.” However, as explained earlier, under international law Western Sahara is not under Moroccan sovereignty but rather is listed by the UN as a non-self-governing territory. Therefore, for the Polisario, the autonomy plan is unacceptable in principle. To date, the Sahrawi negotiators have adhered to international legality: the right to self-determination as expressed in a free Sahrawi referendum that includes the option of independence. Interestingly, as early as 2003, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had submitted a proposal based
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on four years of autonomy followed by a referendum on self-determination. The Polisario accepted the proposal, but because Baker`s plan included the option of independence, Morocco rejected it. Political scientist Stephen Zunes examined Morocco’s autonomy plan and emphasized that it assumes that Western Sahara is an integral part of Morocco–a claim long rejected by the United Nations, the ICJ, the African Union, and broad international legal opinion. He observed that if accepted it would mean that, for the first time since the founding of the UN, the international community would sanction territorial expansion through military force, thereby establishing “a very dangerous and destabilizing precedent.”16
This resonates with what a high-level Polisario official has stated in unambiguous terms: “[n]egotiations for a peace settlement could commence seriously only when Morocco recognizes that its autonomy plan is obsolete.”17 The international community has affirmed time and again the Sahrawi right to self-determination, and a free and fair referendum that includes the option of independence remains the only durable solution guaranteeing stability in the region. The Sahrawis have respected the current ceasefire for fifteen years and expressed their desire to avoid armed conflict. If Morocco does not concede independence as a viable option, however, the Saharan sands may shift again with unpredictable consequences.
NOTES
1 U.N. General Assembly, 20th Session. “Resolution 2072 [Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara].” 16 December 1965, Internet, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/35/ IMG/NR021835.pdf? OpenElement. 2 Human Rights Watch, “Keeping it Secret, The United Nations Operations in Western Sahara,” 7, no. 7 (October 1995), Internet, http://www.hrw. org/legacy/reports/1995/Wsahara.htm. 3 Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1983), 210. 4 U.N. General Assembly, 947th Plenary Meeting. “Resolution 1514 [Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countires and Peoples].” 12 December 1960, Internet, http://www. gibnet.com/texts/un1514.htm. 5 Hodges, Western Sahara, 210-228. 6 Yahia H. Zoubir, “The Geopolitics of the Western Sahara Conflict,” in North Africa, in Transition: State, Society, and Economic Transformation in the 1990s (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), 196. 7 SADR, “Proclamation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic,” Bir Lahlou, 27 February 1976, Internet http://www.arso.org/03-1.htm (date accessed: 10 October 2009). 8 George Joffe, “Ìnternational Court of Justice and the Western Sahara,” War and Refugees: The Western Sahara Conflict, eds. Richard Lawless and Laila Monahan (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1987), 21.
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9 Yahia H. Zoubir and Karima BenabdallahGambier, “Morocco, Western Sahara and the Future of the Maghreb,” The Journal of North African Studies, 9, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 66. 10 Khatri Addu, Governor of Smara camp, interview with the author, SADR Smara camp, Algeria, May 2009. 11 Addu, interview with the author, 2009. 12 Hodges, Western Sahara, 163. 13 Based on extensive field research in camps by author. See also Barbara Harrell-Bond, “The Struggle for the Western Sahara: Part III,” American Universities Field Staff Reports, 39 (1981): 8. 14 RFK Center for Justice and Human Rights, “RFK Urges Moroccan Authorities to Ensure Due Process of 7 Arrested Sahrawi Advocates,” Internet, http://www.rfkcenter.org/node/385 10/9/2009 (date accessed: 13 October 2009). 15 Jacob Mundy, “Western Sahara between Autonomy and Intifada,” Middle East Report Online, Internet, http://www.merip.org/mero/ mero031607.html (date accessed: 10 October 2009). 16 Stephen Zunes, “The Future of Western Sahara,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 20 July 2007. 17 Abdelmajid, “Sahrawis Need Bargaining Power,” Libre Opinion(e)s, Internet, http://saharaopinions. blogspot.com/2009/07/sahrawis-need-bargainingpower.html (date accessed: 10 October 2009). This information was also obtained through personal communications with the author.
Culture&Society Ghana’s Fragile Elections Consolidating African Democracy through E-Voting Gabby Asare Otchere-Darko The February 2010 military takeover in Niger was but one in a series of recent events demonstrating the fragility of multi-party democracy in Africa. That same month in Côte d’Ivoire, President Laurent Gbagbo illegally dissolved the country’s independent electoral commission, influenced by allegations of a bloated voter register in opposition strongholds in the northern parts of the country. His decision risked delaying an election that had already been postponed six times since 2005, when Gbagbo’s five-year mandate ended. Against this backdrop, Côte d’Ivoire’s neighbor, Ghana, often stands out as an example of a working African democracy—a fact underscored by Barack Obama’s landmark visit to the small West African nation in July 2009. The U.S. President described the purpose of his visit as “lifting up successful models” and “[highlighting] the effective governance that they have in place.”1 Yet, despite its glowing reputation, Ghana’s democracy shares more with its neighbors than many would like to admit. Just one year earlier, violence had broken out in response to an election where the result hinged on less than 0.5 percent of the valid votes cast. The main opposi-
Gabby Asare Otchere-Darko is executive director of Danquah Institute, a governance think tank in Ghana.
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tion party, anticipating victory for the ruling party’s presidential candidate, called upon the military and party activists to take up arms and storm the offices of the Electoral Commission. In the end, there was a peaceful handover of power, for which the international community rightfully commended Ghana. Nevertheless, the platform from which Ghana accepted this international applause remains unstable.
fuelled by mistrust between the political parties as well as heated accusations of foul play and intimidation. This was partially the result of a deliberate strategy pursued by some political parties over the course of several months to cast doubt upon the reliability of the results. At times, they based these accusations on credible charges of vote tampering and manipulation against both the ruling and opposition parties.
Despite its glowing reputation, Gha-
na’s democracy shares more with its neighbors than many would like to admit. The current challenge for Ghanaians, Africans, and democracy promoters everywhere is to shift focus to protecting the integrity of future elections, so that Ghana continues to serve as one of the continent’s success stories. The solution may lie in technological innovations, such as biometric registration and electronic voting, reforms currently championed by Ghanaian civil society organizations, the media, and the political parties themselves.
The 2008 Ghanaian Elections. Despite having succeeded in holding five consecutive elections—since the founding of the Fourth Republic in 1993—and witnessing a relatively smooth transition of power from one political party to the other on two occasions, Ghana’s most recent elections demonstrated that the future of its democracy is far from assured. The disputes over the 2008 elections were [ 6 8] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
In the first round of voting on 7 December, the candidate of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), Nana Akufo-Addo, had a lead of merely 102,805 votes over his closest rival, John Evans Atta Mills of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). This gave him 49.13 percent of the vote, 70,000 ballots shy of crossing the constitutional hurdle of 50 percent of the total vote plus one. When it emerged that the election had recorded the highest number of spoilt ballots in Ghana’s history, and that these numbered 205,436, or 2.5 percent of the total votes, suspicions were aroused that rejected ballots could have comprised part of a scheme to rig the election results. Former President Jerry John Rawlings of the NDC, the main opposition party for the previous eight years, was among those who called for rejecting the declared result on the basis of alleged vote-rigging. After voting in
OTCHERE-DARKO
Culture&Society
The reason why Ghana came perilthe second round of the presidential election on 28 December, he told ously close to election violence was ultimately because there was so little conjournalists: fidence in the electoral system’s ability to withstand manipulation and still We have evidence of several machproduce valid results. Once established, inations by the NPP across the this distrust of the electoral system is country to subvert the will of the difficult to overcome. In countries like people of Ghana . . . Obviously the Ghana, where a virtual two-party system integrity of the electoral process has can produce victories based on razorbeen tampered with and Ghanaians thin majorities and where a relatively should not look on and allow their small amount of rigging has the potenright of choice and their will to be tial to dramatically change the result, tampered with in that manner . . . the integrity of the voting system must We will only accept Nana Akufobe enhanced to ensure a high level of Addo’s victory on account of the public confidence. fact that the election is free and fair, but the way things have gone so far the integrity of the process Towards Electronic Voting. In has been badly tampered with so the aftermath of the elections, a 12 May his victory will be questionable.2 2009 joint declaration by the political parties and the Electoral Commission Two days later, on December 30, began a process of electoral reform. hundreds of supporters of the NDC They decided that the commission expressed their disregard for the actual would compile a new voter register that tallying taking place when they besieged included biometric data. The proposed the Electoral Commission headquarters measure was largely a product of public in Accra, demanding that it immediately awareness of the bloated voter register. This awareness, in turn, fed public declare their candidate the winner.
Although every vote counted in a tightly
contested race, there was good reason to believe that not every vote had been properly counted. Thus, the vulnerability of the election process itself held the key to whether Ghana’s 2008 presidential election would result in violent conflict or a peaceful result. Quite simply, although every vote counted in such a tightly contested race, there was good reason to believe that not every vote had been properly counted.
fears that the results were preordained and that parties had colluded with electoral officers to secure victory for themselves, regardless of the people’s wishes. In a communiqué, all seven major political parties in attendance gave their endorsement, stating: “This is very necessary to deal authoritatively with practices of multiple voting and
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impersonation that tend to undermine public confidence in declared election results.”3 A biometric voter register would undoubtedly help overcome voter fraud, including multiple votes and voter impersonation, and would constitute a major step in restoring public faith in the electoral system. However, appreciating the real danger ahead for Ghana’s 2012 general election, civil society organizations have taken the lead in advocating significant improvements to the credibility of Ghana’s electoral process beyond those of a biometric register alone. They argue that the Electoral Commission needs to institute broader reforms to systematically tackle spoilt ballots, ballot box stuffing, and theft. Consequently, there is a growing belief in Ghana—and also in Kenya, which will hold elections in 2012—that electronic voting may offer the solution to the African electoral crisis. With electronic voting, Ghana could lead the way in demonstrating a method and a means by which to overcome one of the major hurdles facing young democracies in Africa: voter fraud and the accompanying public mistrust of election results. Electronic voting can prevent ballot box stuffing, ballot box theft and destruction, multiple voting, and spoilt ballots. It also saves printing, storage, and staff costs. For Ghana, this technological leap could serve as a bulwark against the possibility of future electoral violence, which could severely set back the entire democratic experiment in Ghana. However, during an October 2009 workshop organised in Ghana by the Institute of Economic Affairs for select
[ 7 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
civil society organisations and leaders of political parties, the Electoral Commission made it clear that it had no intention of considering even the viability of electronic voting in Ghana. David Adenze Kanga, a deputy chairman of the Electoral Commission, reasoned that, although voters would receive receipts from voting machines confirming that they had cast their ballots, they would not appreciate how the machine arrived at the final vote tallies for each candidate because they are accustomed to seeing ballots counted in their presence. On 4 February 2010, just days before a major national conference exploring the viability of electronic voting, the Chairman of Ghana’s Electoral Commission, Dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, discounted any immediate plans to shift the country’s electoral system from manual to electronic voting. He did not give a time frame within which Ghana could ready itself for e-voting but stated bluntly: “We can only go e-voting when my grandmother learns to use the computer.”
The Role of Civil Society. Yet, despite an official reluctance to contemplate bold and innovative action that addresses the problems besetting Ghana’s polling processes, civil society organizations are not prepared to so readily dismiss the possibility of electronic voting in Ghana. Faced with visible weaknesses at so many points during the 2008 electoral process, the crucial issue now is to view the system holistically. One must recognise that it is not sufficient to address simply one problematic aspect of the process and leave others unresolved. It is vital that
OTCHERE-DARKO
reforms protect the integrity of the entire process from the commencement of voter registration to the completion of winner certification—in time for the next elections in 2012. Recognizing the constraints of time and resources, Ghanaian civil society has taken it upon itself to push forward this agenda. The 2010 conference analyzed the viability of e-voting in Ghana against a number of criteria, testing several models of e-voting from Australia to Venezuela to see which one best suited Ghana’s environment of high illiteracy and unwired communities. The conference deemed the Indian
Culture&Society
voting. So unless the human factor is removed from the process of authenticating voters, biometric authentication can be linked to the clearance for voting. In this way, the system would still be flawed. In that sense, a better example for Ghana to follow is Jamaica. In 2007 the Electoral Office of Jamaica implemented the Electronic Voter Identification and Ballot Issuing System (EVIBIS). The main objectives of EVIBIS are to prevent impersonation of a voter, multiple voting by individuals, and the use of unauthenticated ballots. With EVIBIS, registered electors are identi-
Together, biometric registration and
e-voting could well provide the best chance of securing a democratic future for Ghana and all of Africa’s fledgling democracies. Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) as the best suited for Ghana. India is home to more illiterate people than the entire population of Ghana. It possesses 714 million registered voters and 828,000 polling stations, many in areas with no electricity. Although one million battery-powered EVMs were used during the last Indian general elections, there were no notable voices of protest. If India could do it, civil society activists reasoned, why not Ghana? However, even the Indian EVM model may require some modifications if it is to tackle inherent electoral problems in Ghana. In Ghana, polling agents representing political parties are prevented from supervising the elections, as electoral officers can conspire with parties to effect multiple
fied and verified at the polling station by using their fingerprints, after which the system issues authenticated ballots for voting. The voter then proceeds to vote using a paper ballot. The issuing of paper ballots is then directly linked to the biometric authentication process, which is crucial to resolving the issue of biased human influence in elections. On 9 February, civil society groups joined journalists, legislators, and the three main opposition parties in Ghana in signing a communiqué: “Our electoral system will be more democratic, credible, less costly, and free from errors, delays, violence, fraud, intimidation and other electoral malpractices that frequently undermine the credibility and general public acceptance of our elections, if we institute a biometric
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registration and electronic voting system in Ghana.”4 They also requested that the Electoral Commission make the necessary preparations for a nonbinding pilot scheme on e-voting, in the shortest possible time. Local government elections in August and September 2010 might offer the perfect opportunity for setting such a scheme in motion.
success as a democratic state reaches far beyond the 24 million people living within its borders. It has profound significance for other African nations whose nascent democracies are still finding their feet. The 2008 Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) democracy survey found only one full democracy in Africa: Mauritius. Seven African states pass muster as “practising flawed
While many Africans are now free to
choose their own leaders, leaders have found ways to “win” electoral mandates without actively promoting greater political liberties and wider political participation. No system is perfect or infallible. However, some are clearly more open to abuse than others, and some circumstances are more likely to see the system tainted than others. Ghana’s political parties need to address the political activities conducted in their name that give rise to the kind of electoral disputes that damage their democracy. Together, biometric registration and e-voting could well provide the best chance of securing a democratic future for Ghana and all of Africa’s fledgling democracies. If action is not taken to assure Ghanaians that the 2012 election results will prove beyond reproach, and that they can trust the electoral process to deliver accurate, fraud-free results, then it seems likely that Ghana will find itself in a familiar state of simmering anger and unrest.
democracies,” 15 are classed as hybrid regimes, and 22 are labelled authoritarian.5 The hybrid regimes, of which Ghana is one, conduct elections and allow some form of political pluralism. However, these elections are not always free or fair. Lise Rakner and Lars Svåsand have found that the lesson emerging so far from the sub-Saharan experiences with multi-party democracy is that it is possible to have elections but no democracy.6 While many African citizens are now, in principle, free to choose their own leaders, incumbent leaders have found ways to “win” electoral mandates in a substantial number of cases without actively promoting greater political liberties and wider political participation. In his seminal 2002 piece, “Why Africa Is Poor,” George B.N. AyitThe Future of Democracy in tey demonstrated how election disputes Africa. The importance of Ghana’s were a significant cause of instability in
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much of Africa. “The destruction of an African country, regardless of the professed ideology of its government, always begins with some dispute over the electoral process,” he wrote. “Unwilling to relinquish or share political power, the ruling vampire elites block, sabotage or manipulate the electoral process to keep themselves in power.”7 There has probably never been a perfect election anywhere in the world, but if democracy in Africa is to succeed, it will require solutions to the problems of rigging which undermine it. These may include a bloated voter register, ballot box stuffing, theft or destruction, multiple voting, voter impersonation, spoilt ballots, intimidation and vio-
Culture&Society
lence at the polling station, alteration of counted ballots before declaration, and manipulation of results during the long periods between the closure of polls and the declaration of results. Africa’s history over the last few decades has provided an almost endless litany of cases suggesting flawed elections, with electoral irregularities featured in countries from Kenya and Ethiopia to Ghana itself. If democracy is to become truly grounded in the continent’s political fabric, it will be extremely important to have a trustworthy electoral process that produces results regarded as reasonably fair by all, with an outcome acceptable even to the losing side.
NOTES
1 Barak Obama, “Interview of the President by AllAfrica.com,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 7 July 2009, Internet, http://www. whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Interview-of-thePresident-by-AllAfricacom-7-2-09/ (date accessed: 7 April 2010). 2 Ghana News Agency, “Rawlings Calls for Extra Vigilance,” GhanaWeb, 28 December 2008, Internet, http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/ NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=155321 (date accessed: 7 April, 2010). 3 The Danquah Institute, “Ghana’s Democracy Is Not There Yet, E-Voting May Get Us There,” The Statesman (Ghana), 7 December, 2009. 4 “Communiqué: At the National Conference on Biometric Voter Registration and E-Voting
in Ghana,” GhanaDot.com, 13 February 2010, Internet, http://www.ghanadot.com/reviews.biometric.021310.html (date accessed: 7 April 2010). 5 Economist Intelligence Unit, “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008,” 2008, Internet, http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/ Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf (date accessed: 7 April 2010). 6 Lise Rakner and Lars Svåsand, “From Dominant to Competitive Party System: The Zambian Experience 1991–2001,” Party Politics 10, no. 1 (2004): 49-68. 7 George B.N. Ayittey, “Why Africa is Poor,” in Sustainable Development: Promoting Progress or Perpetuating Poverty? ed. Julian Morris (London: Profile Books, 2002).
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Law&Ethics Whither Medical Marijuana Lester Grinspoon The medical marijuana problem is a Janus-like conundrum. One face represents the growing number of suffering patients who are denied medical marijuana yet find it less toxic, more useful, and cheaper than legally available medications. From this perspective, the problem is how to acquire and to use this medicine without swelling the ranks (more than 800,000 annually) of those who are arrested for using this illegal substance, and how to avoid jeopardizing job security through random urine testing. The other face represents that of an obdurate government, which defensively and inconsistently insists that “marijuana is not a medicine” while buttressing this ill-informed position with the full force of its legal power. Marijuana is less toxic than almost any medicine in the pharmacopoeia; it is, like aspirin, remarkably versatile, and it is less expensive than the conventional medicines it replaces. One of humanity’s oldest medicines, it has been used for thousands of years by millions of people with little evidence of significant toxic effects. Furthermore, the medical community knows more about marijuana’s few adverse effects than about those of most prescription drugs. This is due, in part, to the work of the U.S. government. It has conducted
Lester Grinspoon is an associate professor emeritus of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School. He served for 40 years as senior psychiatrist at the Massachusetts Mental Health Center in Boston. A Fellow of both the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Psychiatric Association, he was the founding editor of both the Annual Review of Psychiatry and the Harvard Mental Health Letter.
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a decades-long, multi-million dollar research program through its National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) in an attempt to demonstrate significant toxic effects that would justify the prohibition of cannabis as a non-medical drug. This extensive government-supported effort has instead provided a record of safety that is more compelling than that of most approved medicines. There are many thousands of patients who currently use cannabis as a medicine; three are allowed to use it legally. They are the only survivors among the several dozen patients who were awarded Compassionate Use Investigational Use Drugs (INDs) between 1976 and 1991, when the government halfheartedly acknowledged that marijuana has medicinal properties. This program was eventually discontinued because of the exponentially growing number of Compassionate IND applications. Each of the surviving IND recipients receives a tin each month that contains enough rolled marijuana joints to treat his or her symptoms. Because the quality of the cannabis is poor, it requires more inhalation than would a superior quality medicinal cannabis. In fact, some of Compassionate IND recipients have been known to supplement this government-issued cannabis with better quality street marijuana. Patients who use marijuana as a medicine appreciate its therapeutic properties and general lack of adverse side effects. Most, however, use the drug illegally and therefore face a number of serious repercussions, including prosecution and imprisonment. Given the long-established sanative benefits that marijuana provides, as well as the monetary and societal burdens its prohibi-
[ 7 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
tion creates, the U.S. federal government should lift current restrictions on marijuana use and make the drug available to those who could benefit from its unique, therapeutic properties.
Pharmaceuticalization of Marijuana. The current legal alter-
native to medical herbal marijuana was introduced in 1985, when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved dronabinol (Marinol) for the treatment of nausea and vomiting associated with chemotherapy. Marinol is a solution of synthetic tetrahydrocannabinol in sesame oil; the oil is meant to prevent users from smoking the contents of the capsule. It was developed by Unimed Pharmaceuticals Inc. with a great deal of financial support from the U.S. government. This was the first indication that the pharmaceuticalization of marijuana might serve as the solution to the government’s problem with marijuana as medicine, addressing how to make the medicinal properties of cannabis— in so far as the government believes such properties exist—widely available, while at the same time prohibiting its use for any other purpose. Marinol did not displace marijuana as “the treatment of choice,” however; most patients found the herb itself much more useful than Marinol in the treatment of the nausea and vomiting that resulted from chemotherapy. In 1992 the treatment of the AIDS wasting syndrome was added to Marinol’s labeled uses; again, patients reported that it was inferior to smoked marijuana. Marinol has not solved the medical marijuana problem because patients favor the therapeutic usefulness of plant marijuana to Marinol. In general, they
GRINSPOON
find Marinol less effective than smoked marijuana. One cannot titrate it but rather must take it orally, and use in this manner requires at least an hour and a half for the therapeutic effect to manifest itself. In addition, even with the exorbitant prohibition tariff on street marijuana, Marinol is still more expensive. Thus, the first attempt at pharmaceuticalization proved unworkable. One can separate the cannabinoids in whole marijuana from the burnt plant products—which comprise the smoke— by vaporization devices which would be inexpensive when manufactured in large numbers. A vaporizer, which heats—but does not burn—the herb to release the plant’s cannabinoids, causes finely chopped marijuana to release these active compounds when air flowing through it is held within a fairly large temperature window, just below the ignition temperature of the plant material. Inhalation is a highly effective means of delivery. Faster means will not be available, except for the possibility that injectable analogs will be developed and will make it possible to deliver cannabinoids to a patient who is unconscious or suffering from pulmonary impairment. It is the rapid response to inhaled marijuana that makes it possible for patients to titrate the dose so precisely. Furthermore, any new analog like Marinol would have to possess an acceptable therapeutic ratio. The therapeutic ratio—an index of a drug’s safety—of marijuana is unknown because there is no documented evidence that it has ever caused an overdose death. However, on the basis of extrapolation from animal data, it is estimated to
Law&Ethics
have an unheard of therapeutic ratio— lethal dose divided by effective dose— of 20,000 to 40,000; alcohol, by comparison, has a therapeutic ratio of four to ten. While it is unlikely that a new analog would possess a higher therapeutic ratio, it might prove far less safe than smoked marijuana, because it would remain physically possible to ingest more of them. In addition, there is a problem of classification under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act for analogs with psychoactive effects. The more restrictive the classification of a drug, the less likely drug companies are to develop it and physicians to prescribe it. Recognizing this economic determinant, the government, in an attempt to increase physician interest in Marinol, moved it from Schedule 2 to Schedule 3, despite the fact that naturally occurring THC—the same 21 carbon molecule as the synthetic THC in Marinol—remains in Schedule 1. The great advantage of the administration of cannabis through the pulmonary system is the rapidity with which one experiences its effects. This in turn allows for the self-titration of dosage, the best way of adjusting individual dosage. With other routes of delivery, the response time is longer and selftitration grows more difficult. Thus, precise self-titration is not possible with oral ingestion of cannabis. While the response time for sublingual or oral mucosal administration of cannabis is shorter than it is with oral ingestion, it is significantly longer than the response time for absorption through the lungs and, therefore a considerably less useful route of administration for self-titration. Given that these products
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will prove considerably more expensive than natural marijuana, they will succeed only if patients are intimidated by the legal risks, and if patients and physicians consider the health risks of smoking marijuana—with and without a
as medicines. The purpose is to protect the consumer by establishing safety and efficacy. This system is designed to regulate the commercial distribution of drug company products and to protect the public against false or misleading
Thousands of years have demonstrated its medical value, and government efforts to establish a level of toxicity sufficient to support its prohibition have instead provided a record of its safety.
vaporizer—much more compelling than claims about their efficacy and safety. is justified by either the medical or epi- The drug is generally a single synthetic chemical that a pharmaceutical comdemiological literature. pany has acquired or developed and Regulatory Constraints. What patented. It submits an application to options are available to the many thou- the FDA and tests it, first for safety in sands of patients who find cannabis of animals and then for clinical safety and great importance, even essential, to efficacy. The company must present the maintenance of their health? They evidence from double-blind controlled can either use one of the government studies demonstrating that the drug approved pharmaceutical products, is more effective than a placebo. Case such as Marinol or Sativex (a British reports, expert opinion, and clinical pharmaceutical), which most patients experience are not considered suffifind less satisfactory than plant mari- cient. I have come to doubt whether the juana, or they can break the law and use herbal form. Let us consider what FDA rules should apply to cannabis, as might be involved in establishing and there is no question regarding its safety. maintaining such a legal arrangement Thousands of years have demonstrated its medical value, and government in the United States. The first requirement at this time is efforts to establish a level of toxicity sufthat the Food and Drug Administration ficient to support its prohibition have (FDA) approve marijuana as a medi- instead provided a record of its safety. cine. One can argue, however, that Should the government waste time and FDA approval is superfluous where resources to demonstrate for the FDA cannabis as a medicine is concerned. what is already so obvious? Even if it were legally and practically Drugs must undergo rigorous, expensive, and time-consuming tests before possible to conduct the various phased granted FDA approval for marketing studies to win FDA approval, where
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would the money to finance these studies come from? New medicines are almost invariably introduced by drug companies that spend many millions of dollars on the development of each product. They are willing to undertake these costs only because of the large profits they anticipate during the 20 years they own the patent, and marijuana cannot be patented. For this and other reasons, it is unlikely that the pharmaceutical industry will ever develop herbal marijuana as an officially recognized medicine via this route. It is not even necessary to establish this kind of certification. The modern FDA protocol is not needed to establish a risk-benefit estimate for a drug with a history like marijuana—one in use for thousands of years and unproven to have any significant toxic effects. To impose this protocol on cannabis would be like making the same demand of aspirin, which was accepted as a medicine more than 60 years before the advent of the double-blind controlled study. Many years of experience have demonstrated that aspirin has many uses and limited toxicity, yet today one could not marshal it through the FDA approval process. The patent has long since expired, and with it the incentive to underwrite the substantial cost of this modern seal of approval. Other reasons for doubting the possibility of official approval include today’s anti-smoking climate and, most importantly, the widespread use of cannabis for purposes that lack government approbation.
Marijuana as a Prescription Medication. To understand some of
the obstacles to this approach, consider the effects of granting marijuana legiti-
Law&Ethics
macy as a medicine while prohibiting it for any other use. How would one determine the appropriate “labeled” uses and how would one monitor “offlabel” uses? Let one suppose that studies satisfactory to the FDA are somehow completed, affirming that marijuana is safe and effective as a treatment for the AIDS wasting syndrome and/or AIDSrelated neuropathy, and physicians may prescribe it for those conditions. This would present unique problems. When a drug is approved for one medical purpose, physicians are generally free to write off-label prescriptions—that is, to prescribe it for other conditions as well. If marijuana was approved as a medicine, how would it be prescribed off-label? Knowledgeable physicians would want to prescribe it for some patients with multiple sclerosis, Crohn’s disease, migraines, convulsive disorders, spastic symptoms, and many other conditions for which the use of cannabis is well established by a plethora of anecdotal evidence. Generally speaking, the more dangerous the drug, the more serious or debilitating the symptom or illness for which it is approved. Conversely, the more serious the health problem, the more risk is tolerated. If the benefit is very large and the risk very small, the medicine is distributed “over the counter” (OTC). These drugs are considered so useful and safe that patients are allowed to use their own judgment without a doctor’s permission or advice. Thus, today anyone can buy and use aspirin for any purpose at all. This is permissible because aspirin is considered extremely safe; it takes “only” 1,000 to 2,000 lives a year in the United States. One can also purchase
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remarkably versatile drugs such as ibuprofen (Advil) and other non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) OTC as well, because they, too, are considered very safe; “only” about 10,000 Americans lose their lives to these drugs annually. Acetaminophen (Tylenol), another useful OTC drug, is responsible for about 10 percent of cases of end-stage renal disease. The public is also allowed to purchase many herbal remedies whose dangers and efficacies remain underassessed. Compare these drugs with marijuana. Today, there is no doubt that it is, as Drug Enforcement Agency Administrative Judge Francis L. Young stated, “among the safest therapeutic substances known to man.” If included in the official pharmacopoeia, it would rank as a serious contender for the title of least toxic substance in that compendium.
Practical Considerations for Legalization. Then there is the
question of who will provide the cannabis. The federal government now provides marijuana from its farm in Mississippi to the three surviving patients covered by the now-discontinued Compassionate IND program. Surely the government could not or would not produce marijuana for the many thousands of patients who need it, any more than it does for other prescription drugs. If production is contracted out, will the farmers have to enclose their fields with security fences and protect them with security guards? How would the marijuana be distributed? If through pharmacies, how would they provide secure facilities capable of keeping fresh supplies? Would the government need to control the price
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of pharmaceutical marijuana: not too high, lest patients are tempted to buy it on the street or grow their own; not too low, lest people with marginal or fictitious “medical” conditions besiege their doctors for prescriptions? What about the parallel problems with potency? When urine tests are demanded of workers, what would emerge as the bureaucratic and other costs of identifying those who use marijuana legally as a medicine, as distinguished from those who use it for other purposes? To realize the full potential of cannabis as a medicine within the setting of the present prohibition system, one would have to address all these problems and more. A delivery system that would successfully navigate this minefield would prove cumbersome, inefficient, and bureaucratically top-heavy. Government and medical licensing boards would insist on tight restrictions, challenging physicians as though cannabis was a dangerous drug every time it is used for any new patient or purpose. Constant conflict would exist, with one of two outcomes: patients would not receive all the benefits they should, or they would obtain the benefits by abandoning the legal system for the black market or their own gardens and closets. Meanwhile, a number of drug companies, attracted by the obvious medicinal properties of marijuana, are pursuing what one might refer to as the “pharmaceuticalization” of marijuana, the development of synthetic prescription drugs derived from cannabis: isolated individual cannabinoids; synthetic cannabinoids; and cannabinoid analogs. The question is whether these developments will make marijuana itself
GRINSPOON
medically obsolete. Many of these new products would prove useful and safe enough for commercial development. It is uncertain, however, whether pharmaceutical companies will find them worth the enormous development costs. Some may prove worthwhile—for exam-
Law&Ethics
and cost. The number of arrests on marijuana charges has steadily increased, yet patients continue to use smoked cannabis as a medicine. One wonders whether any level of enforcement would compel enough compliance with the law to embolden drug companies to
Today, there is no doubt that it is, as
Drug Enforcement Agency Administrative Judge Francis L. Young stated, “among the safest therapeutic substances known to man.” ple, a cannabinoid inverse agonist that reduces appetite might be highly lucrative—but for most specific symptoms, analogs or combinations of analogs are unlikely to emerge as more useful than natural cannabis. It also seems unlikely that they would possess a significantly wider spectrum of therapeutic uses, since the natural product contains the compounds—and synergistic combinations of compounds—from which they are derived. In the end, the commercial success of any psychoactive cannabinoid product will depend on how vigorously the prohibition against marijuana is enforced. It is safe to predict that new analogs and extracts would cost much more than whole smoked or ingested marijuana, even at the inflated prices imposed by the prohibition tariff. It is doubtful that pharmaceutical companies would seem interested in developing cannabinoid products if they have to compete with natural marijuana on a level playing field. The most common reason for using Marinol or Sativex is the illegality of marijuana, and many patients choose to ignore the law for reasons of efficacy
commit the many millions of dollars it would take to develop new cannabinoid products. Pharmaceutical companies may develop useful cannabinoid products, some of which may not be subject to the constraints of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act. But it is unlikely that this pharmaceuticalization will displace natural marijuana for most medical purposes.
The Lasting Dilemma of Marijuana Legalization. It is
also clear that the realities of human need are incompatible with the demand for a legally enforceable distinction between medicine and all other uses of cannabis. Marijuana use simply does not conform to the conceptual boundaries established by twentieth century institutions. It enhances many pleasures and it has many potential medical uses, but even these two categories are not the only relevant ones. The kind of therapy often used to ease everyday discomforts does not fit any such scheme. In many cases, what lay people do in prescribing marijuana for themselves is not very different from what physicians do when
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they provide prescriptions for psychoactive or other drugs. The only workable way of realizing the full potential of this remarkable substance, including its full medical potential, is to free it from the present dual set of regulations— those which control prescription drugs in general, and the special criminal laws that control psychoactive substances. These mutually reinforcing laws establish a set of social categories that strangle marijuana’s uniquely multifaceted potential. The only way out is to cut the knot by giving marijuana the same status as alcohol—legalizing it for adults for all uses, and removing it entirely from both the medical and criminal control systems. Two powerful forces are now colliding: the growing acceptance of medical cannabis and the proscription against
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any use of the plant marijuana, medical or non-medical. As a result, two distribution systems will emerge for medical cannabis: the conventional model of pharmacy-filled prescriptions for FDA-approved cannabinoid medicines, and a model closer to the distribution of alternative and herbal medicines. The only difference, albeit an enormous one, will be the continued illegality of whole smoked or ingested cannabis. In any case, increasing medical use by either distribution pathway will inevitably make a greater number of people familiar with cannabis and its derivatives. As they learn that its harmfulness has been greatly exaggerated and its usefulness underestimated, the pressure will increase for drastic change in the way that we as a society deal with this drug.
Law&Ethics
Cannabis Captiva Freeing the World from Marijuana Prohibition Stephen B. Duke For thousands of years, people used cannabis sativa free of legal prohibition or regulation. The plant gained the attention of Herodotus, who wrote about it in the fifth century B.C. Romans made a dessert out of it, and it brought relief to women in childbirth at least sixteen hundred years ago.1 It was an integral part of Hindu culture in India in 1000 B.C. The modern prohibitionist movement is an historical aberration, the offspring of an alliance between twentieth century religionists, social reformers, and politicians. In the early 1900s, a group of Protestant missionaries sought to deny Chinese-Americans their opium.2 This was an opening salvo in a campaign against an ever-widening array of substances, from alcohol and tobacco to morphine, heroin, and cocaine. Some states went so far as to prohibit cannabis, then a drug seldom seen in the United States. The apex of the movement was the adoption of alcohol prohibition in 1920.3 For the next decade, a single group of federal agents enforced all drug prohibition at the federal level. In 1930, however, the government separated its drug enforcement enterprise from the discredited alcohol enforcement by creating a new drug enforcement agency called the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. That bureau’s chief, Harry
Stephen B. Duke is a professor of law at Yale University. He has written extensively on drug prohibition and alternate policies and is the co-author of America’s Longest War: Rethinking Our Tragic Crusade against Drugs (New York: Putnam Books, 1994).
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Anslinger, was a passionate alcohol prohibitionist. When alcohol prohibition was repealed in 1933, Anslinger began a crusade against the little known cannabis. Renamed “marijuana” (or “marihuana”), the target of Anslinger’s campaign was fraudulently described as worse than cocaine or heroin, as a substance capable of turning users into
of any evidence of its harmfulness. Indeed, the drug was seldom used in the United States until the 1960s, when it became immensely popular. Although legally prohibited virtually everywhere, marijuana is easily the most popular “controlled” drug, with one-time users constituting perhaps 5 percent of the adult world population.6
In study after study, decade after decade
researchers have found no reliable evidence that marijuana is a serious threat to the health of a normal, adult user. crazed killers.4 The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 effectively outlawed the drug throughout the United States. Although U.S. prohibitionists failed to inspire support in Europe for alcohol prohibition, they found European governments more hospitable to the prohibition of other drugs, which those governments either knew little about or which they had found to be both problematic and unpopular. Today, less than a century after the United States adopted drug prohibition, a network of treaties requires signatories to prohibit a broad array of drugs, including cannabis. At present, 180 nations have signed the treaties and their protocols, making drug “control” a global phenomenon.5 At least as far as marijuana is concerned, this network of international obligations was ill-conceived and should be eliminated.
In study after study, decade after decade, researchers have found no reliable evidence that marijuana is a serious threat to the health of a normal, adult user.7 Both alcohol and tobacco are far more damaging to the human body, as is obesity.8 Unlike alcohol consumption, marijuana use is not chemically linked to violence and crime.9 Millions of marijuana users have decided through experience what the studies suggest: although powerful, marijuana is not a dangerous drug, and most of its users lead healthy, productive lives. Absent too is evidence of the so-called “gateway effect,” the theory that marijuana causes the user to move on to stronger drugs.10 About two out of three marijuana users never even try harder drugs like cocaine or heroin, and for every frequent user of cocaine or heroin, there are about eight frequent users of marijuana.11 By satisfying a drug appetite, marijuana The Failure of Marijuana may in fact prevent many users from Prohibition. The impetus to pro- desiring harder drugs. If the availabilhibit marijuana was not the result ity of marijuana has any effect on the
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consumption of hard drugs, it more likely acts as a “moat” than as an open “gateway” to hard-drug use. The failure of marijuana prohibition, both in the United States and globally, is due in part to the plant’s ease of cultivation. It can be grown virtually anywhere, indoors and out, requiring little horticultural expertise or significant financial investment. In this respect, it resembles alcohol, which was widely homemade during alcohol prohibition and can likewise be produced almost anywhere at little expense. Thus, with both marijuana and alcohol, it is impossible to eradicate the drug’s source, and efforts to interdict the smuggling of the drug only have marginal effects on price and consumption.
The Case for Repeal. Various efforts are underway, both in North America and Europe, to ease or eliminate the prohibition of marijuana use and even, in some cases, to ease or eliminate sanctions against distributors of the drug. Here are just some of the arguments undergirding these efforts. First, regulation of the drug is possible only if prohibition is repealed. The authors of both drug treaties and U.S. statutes euphemistically refer to drug prohibition as drug “control.”12 Prohibition, however, is inconsistent with control, since only that which is legal can be regulated by law. Alcohol, for example, is both legal and controlled, and thus provides a possible template for legalizing marijuana. Under a regulatory model similar to that for alcohol, the federal government would repeal its prohibition of
Law&Ethics
the possession and distribution of marijuana, but it would retain some restrictions against interstate commerce in drugs that were unlicensed, mislabeled, inadequately identified, or lacked appropriate disclosures and warnings. The federal government would share with the states the power to tax the manufacture and distribution of the product. As with alcohol, most regulation would be left to the individual states. Some states might confine the manufacture and distribution of the drug to state-owned institutions; other states would license manufacturing and distribution to private persons or organizations. All states would doubtless limit the venues where distribution and consumption can occur, as they now restrict alcohol. All states would impose sanctions against providing the drug to minors, using the revocation of licenses as a tool not available to prohibitionists.13 Among the benefits of regulation is that regulated drugs are far safer than prohibited drugs: users can rely upon the quality and potency of the product, which is unlikely to be either poisonous or contaminated. Second, prohibition breeds crime and supports criminal organizations. However strongly its supporters may deny it, prohibition inevitably produces crime and violence. The ongoing wars between drug cartels and the Mexican government furnish grisly proof. Fueled by billions of dollars from drug markets in the United States, Mexican gangsters have murdered more than ten thousand people in the past two years, fighting for territory both among themselves and with the government.14 Prohibition even
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funds terrorism: opium production supports the Taliban in its efforts to control the government of Afghanistan and to support enemies of the United States.15 In the United States, large criminal organizations maintained by violence and bribery increasingly control the networks that distribute marijuana. Ironically, although marijuana has never been shown to trigger violent propensities in its users, the billions earned by suppliers generate a great deal of violence, both in the United States and elsewhere. Third, prohibition damages and sometimes destroys lives. The most frequent charge for which a person is arrested in the United States is a drug offense. In 2008, 1,702,537 people were arrested for drug violations.16 In about 44 percent of the cases, a total of about 800,000 arrests, the charge was simple marijuana possession.17 This pattern of drug arrests has been increasing for some time and has never been higher. At least 20,000,000 Americans have been arrested for marijuana possession since prohibition went into effect. About 500,000 men and women are currently incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons for drug violations alone.18 Nearly 30,000 people are in prison for nothing more serious than marijuana possession.19 American prisons inevitably damage and scar their inmates, rendering many of them unemployable. Families are torn apart, and children are neglected or abandoned. People with criminal records, even for arrests not leading to conviction, have trouble finding jobs or housing, gaining admission to college, receiving college loans, and otherwise living productive lives.
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Some of those now imprisoned for marijuana offenses would be there for other offenses were marijuana legalized, but tens of thousands would not be in prison. That U.S. marijuana prosecutions severely damage thousands of young lives every year is both cruel and unnecessary. Fourth, prohibition exacerbates racism. Racism comprises an element of virtually every effort to prohibit drugs, from alcohol to cocaine to marijuana. It continues to play a role in drug enforcement. Blacks and Latinos are arrested for drug offenses at a disproportionately higher rate than are whites.20 Although blacks and Latinos account for no more than 30 percent of the drug using population, they comprise 85 percent of those who are arrested for marijuana possession in New York City.21 This disparity appears to be the result of racially motivated law enforcement and the broad discretion that prohibition regimes give to the police. To solve a traditional crime such as theft or burglary, the police have to conduct an investigation, which entails interviewing witnesses and gathering physical or forensic evidence. All of this takes time. On the other hand, to make a drug arrest, police need only conduct a search of the person. If they find drugs, they have a case and can make an immediate arrest. Few middleand upper-class whites would stand for such baseless searches of their persons, places, or effects. Minority victims, on the other hand, rarely have remedies for such abuses. The racially disproportionate pattern of police searches and arrests foments fear and mistrust of police and of the society that tolerates or condones such behavior.
DUKE
Fifth, prohibition is extremely costly. The costs to state and federal governments of investigating, arresting, prosecuting, and imprisoning persons for marijuana offenses are enormous. Although one conservative estimate is $8 billion per year for the United States alone, that figure could be drastically larger—as much as $100 billion, depending on what is counted as a cost. Professor Jeffrey Miron argues that we could not only save enforcement costs by eliminating prohibition, we could also raise $6 billion or so annu-
Law&Ethics
tion with Mexico, whose cartels produce a large portion of the marijuana and other illicit drugs that Americans consume. Mexico, on the other hand, blames its internal violence on the U.S. appetite for Mexico’s marijuana. The United States repeatedly pressures other countries to act more aggressively in punishing producers of drugs for export. The United States customarily intervenes and objects when any country, even one as small as Jamaica, considers liberalizing its prohibition laws.24
The creation of legal drug markets... would also greatly diminish the international blame game and help rid the United States of its reputation as an international bully. ally by taxing the sale of marijuana.22 California, a national leader in legalizing medical marijuana, is considering a tax on all marijuana distribution. So long as the federal government criminalizes the possession or distribution of marijuana, however, such a tax would be as unproductive as the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.23 Dealers would not file reports and pay taxes that would expose them to federal prosecution. Effective reform requires decriminalizing marijuana at the federal level as well as at the state level. Finally, prohibition impairs international relations. Prohibited drugs are typically produced in one country and consumed in others. The consumer countries blame the producer country and often bully or bribe the producer to enforce its drug laws more effectively. The United States takes such a posi-
Not only would the creation of legal drug markets throughout the world allow for an enormous sum of money to be spent more productively, it would also greatly diminish the international blame game and help rid the United States of its reputation as an international bully.25
In Support of the Status Quo. There are only two serious arguments against legalizing marijuana. One is predictive and the other legal. First, if marijuana is legalized, more people will use more of it. While probably true, this argument is not weighty. Decriminalization at the state level during the 1970s did not lead to significant increases in the usage of marijuana. Nor did that problem occur in the Netherlands, where marijuana was de facto decriminalized decades ago. Nor
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has it happened in Portugal, which in 2001 decriminalized possession and use of small quantities of all drugs.26 Since no country has yet actually legalized the distribution of marijuana, however, these examples of decriminalization are merely suggestive of the increases in consumption that are likely when both distribution and use of the drug are lawful. Marijuana distribution will be more efficient and the drug less costly when selling the drug to users is no longer a black-market operation, as it is even in those countries that have decriminalized or legalized the use and possession of marijuana. And when marijuana is regulated, as it would be under full legalization, the consumer will feel more comfortable, morally and otherwise, in buying and consuming the drug. Thus, it seems quite likely that legalizing both the use and the distribution of marijuana would increase consumption, although not, as some argue, by a factor of two or three. Even if marijuana use were to double under a legalized regime, this would be a small price to pay for the benefits of legalization. Not only would the drug be safer and less potent, but its increased use would likely displace the consumption of alcohol, a far more harmful drug. Even though the physical and psychological effects of alcohol and marijuana are quite different, there is substantial evidence that drinkers who increase their marijuana usage drink less alcohol.27 Thus, increased consumption of legalized marijuana could prove to be a benefit of legalization, not a cost.28 Second, legalizing marijuana is prohibited by international treaties. “Decriminalization” has been the mech-
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anism of choice for several countries and a dozen or more states that have sought to de-escalate drug prohibition. Decriminalization entails reducing the penalties for or in some cases entirely legalizing the possession and use of small amounts of the drug. No government, however, has ever legalized the drug’s distribution, even if that distribution is small-scale and not for profit. Although decriminalization reduces the dreadful costs of full-scale prohibition, it retains and conceivably even encourages the black-market distribution networks.29 Failure to legalize and regulate the market could even exacerbate the violence and corruption that are inherent in those networks. We should remember that alcohol prohibition criminalized only the manufacture and distribution of alcohol, not its possession or use. It was, therefore, a model of decriminalization. Though a good start toward legalization, decriminalization cannot be the ultimate solution. There is a common belief that the drug control treaties, chiefly the United Nations (UN) Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), prohibit any signatory state from legalizing the drugs covered by the treaty, one of which is cannabis. That is why, it is often said, the Netherlands does not legalize the distribution of marijuana but merely declines to prosecute the “coffee houses” that openly serve the drug to consumers.30 Whether the Convention prohibits all efforts to legalize marijuana is debatable. The provision that is often read as prohibitory is Article 4(c), which states that the parties shall take such measures as may be necessary, “subject to the
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provisions of this Convention, to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs.” That clearly allows “medical” legalization. Article 33 provides that the parties “shall not permit the possession of drugs except under legal authority.” This is either meaningless or contemplates the granting of “authority.” Article 36 says that the parties shall make intentional possession, use, etc., of drugs “contrary to the provisions of this Convention” punishable and that “serious offenses” should be “liable to adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty.” This obligation, however, is subject to the parties’ “constitutional limitations.” Article 28 permits the cultivation of cannabis, provided it is controlled and the parties seek to “prevent the misuse of, and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the cannabis plant.” Article 30 requires that the trade in drugs exist “under license” except when carried out by a state enterprise. Some of these provisions seem to invite legalization rather than precluding it. Nonetheless, the prevailing view is that legalization of marijuana, other than for medical or scientific uses, is contrary to the 1961 Convention and later treaties as well. “Full legalization, even of cannabis, will require either reformation or disregard of the UN agreements.”31 Some countries, most recently Portugal, Mexico, and Argentina, have decriminalized or legalized the smallscale possession and consumption of marijuana and other drugs. If the UN
Law&Ethics
Convention requires these states to make marijuana possession criminally punishable, then these reforms, desirable as they are, violate the Convention.32 Surprisingly, however, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, in its most recent report, praises the Portugal experiment and opines that it does not violate the Convention. Decriminalizing drug use “falls within Convention parameters” because “drug possession is still prohibited, but the sanctions fall under the administrative law, not the criminal law.”33 Apparently, therefore, an unenforced $10 civil fine would satisfy the Convention. Reformers can choose between honesty with regulation, which may violate the Convention, and hypocrisy and de jure prohibition, which does not. Either choice is superior to full-scale prohibition.
Conclusion. Millions of marijua-
na users and anti-prohibitionists are increasing the pressure to legalize both medical and non-medical uses of the drug. Marijuana prohibition cannot come close to withstanding a cost-benefit analysis. Decriminalization should be seen as a step toward legalization rather the ultimate objective. If UN antidrug treaties are construed as prohibiting legalization, they should be changed. Each country should remain free to make its own decisions about which drugs, if any, to prohibit and which to control, and how. This is the principle of the 21st Amendment, which freed us from alcohol prohibition. The same principle should spur both the U.S. government and the UN to withdraw from marijuana prohibition.
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NOTES
1 Robert Cooke, “Scientists Find Evidence of Ancent Marijuana Use,” Houston Chronicle, 20 May 1993, A23. 2 Jerry Mandel, Protestant Missionaries: Creators of the International War on Drugs, in Drugs and Society, ed. Jefferson Fish (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 2006), 19. For a somewhat different view, namely that the United States banned opium in order to curry commercial favor with China, see David Musto, The American Disease, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford, 1999), 37-40. 3 Sean Cashman, Prohibition: The Lie of the Land (New York: Free Press, 1981). 4 Anslinger testified before Congress that “[H]ere we have a drug that is not like opium. Opium has all the good of Dr. Jekyll and all the evil of Mr. Hyde. This drug [marijuana] is entirely the monster Hyde.” Jerome Himmelstein, The Strange Career of Marijuana (Westport: Greenwood, 1983), 60. 5 Ibid. 6 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that between 143 and 190 million people used cannibas in 2007, with the highest levels of use in North America and Western Europe. See UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report (Vienna: United Nations, 2009), 15. 7 Steven Duke and Albert Gross, America’s Longest War: Rethinking Our Tragic Crusade against Drugs (New York: Putnam Books, 1994), 51-52. 8 Duke and Gross, America’s Longest War, 29-36 and 147-148. 9 Erich Goode, Drugs in American Society, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 128-136. 10 There is a correlation between the use of marijuana and the use of hard drugs, since virtually no hard drug user has not also used marijuana. Marijuana use may also, in most cases, precede the use of hard drugs where that use occurs. The claim of prohibitionists, however, is that there is a causal link from marijuana to hard drugs. That link is entirely unproven. See Goode, Drugs in American Society, 203-207. The strongest argument for the “gateway” proponents is that since marijuana is illegal, one has to go to illegal drug markets to get it where one is likely to encounter the users and distributors of hard drugs. The causal link there, however, is the illegality. 11 The National Survey on Drug Use and Health reports that 102,404,000 Americans have used marijuana in their lifetimes, but only 36,773,000 have used cocaine and 3,788,000 have used heroin at least once in their lifetimes. Of frequent users (those who have used in the past month), about 15 million have used marijuana, fewer than 2 million have used cocaine and only 213, 000 have used heroin. See table l.lA of SAMHSA, Results from the 2008 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings (Rockville, MD: Office of Applied Studies, 2008). 12 See, for example, UN Office on Drug and Crime, World Drug Report. 13 For detailed descriptions of various models of drug legalization, see Duke and Gross, America’s Longest War, 250-274. The advertising of newly legalized drugs can be effectively eliminated, consistent with the First Amendment, by denying them trade mark protection. See Duke and Gross, America’s Longest War, 271. 14 Howard LaFranchi, “Obama’s Overtures Seek to Help a Spiraling Mexico,” Christian Science Monitor, 5 March 2009, 2. 15 Tim McGirk, “Spotlight: Fighting the Taliban,” Time, 1 March 2010. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Mark Mauer and Ryan King, A 25-Year Quagmire: The
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War on Drugs and its Impact on American Society (Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2007), 2. 19 Ryan King and Mark Mauer, The War on Marijuana: The Transformation of the War on Drugs in the 1990s (Washington, D. C.: The Sentencing Project, 2007), 2 20 John Powell and Eileen Hershenov, “Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, The Constitution and the Black Community,” UC Davis Law Review 24, no. 557 (1991); Gabriel Chin, “Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction,” Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 6, no. 253 (2002). 21 Ruth C. Stern and J. Herbie DiFonzo, “The End of the Red Queen’s Race: Medical Marijuana in the New Century,” Quinnipiac Law Review 27, no. 673 (2009): 762. 22 Jeffrey A. Miron, “The Budgetary Implications of Marijuana Prohibition” 2 June 2005, Internet, http:// www.prohibitioncosts.org/MironReport.pdf (date accessed: 4 May 2010). 23 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. l (2005) held that federal drug prohibition laws are valid and trump California’s medical marijuana laws. Fortunately, the Obama administration is withholding federal prosecution of persons who comply with state and local medical marijuana regulations. 24 See David Gonzales, “Panel Urges Legalization of Marijuana in Jamaica,” The New York Times, 30 September 2001. 25 See Ted Galen Carpenter, “Ending the International Drug War,” in How to Legalize Drugs, ed. Jefferson Fish (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1998), 293. 26 Glenn Greenwald, Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for Creating Fair and Successful Drug Policies (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2009). 27 See John Kaplan, Marijuana, the New Prohibition (New York: World, 1970), 293-295. 28 Notably absent from this list of the benefits of marijuana legalization is the pleasure derived from the drug by its users. That pleasure is sufficient to cause nearly half of the U.S. population over the age of 12 to use the drug at least once, despite the risk of arrest and imprisonment. Those hedonic benefits justify the legalization of alcohol and they should exist as weighty considerations in the marijuana debates as well. One need not even include such benefits, however, to make an overwhelming case for marijuana legalization. 29 A contrary argument, sometimes made to justify decriminalization, is that it allows law enforcers “to focus their attention on major traffickers rather than small–time users.” David Luhnow and Jose de Cordoba, “Mexico Eases Ban on Drug Possession,” Wall Street Journal, 22 August 2009, A9. 30 “[T]he Netherlands is technically in compliance with the Single Convention: the Netherlands criminalizes possession and sale of cannabis, as is necessitated, but it chooses not to enforce those laws. The Single Convention does not address the extent of enforcement required for rules criminalizing possession or sale.” Jim Leitzel, Regulating Vice: Misguided Prohibitions and Realistic Controls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 262. 31 Ibid., 264. 32 As would the bill introduced in Congress by Representative Barney Frank. That bill, H. R. 5843, 110th Cong. (submitted April, 2008), would remove criminal penalties from those who possess small amounts of marijuana and also those who transfer it to others, provided they don’t sell it. No one apparently contends that the UN Treaties impose any restrictions on what states and municipalities do with their drug laws. 33 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, 168.
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Are Economic Sanctions Still a Valid Option? Zachary Selden Is there still a place for economic sanctions as a tool for enforcing international law? Many would say no, especially after the apparent failure of economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. After all, Iraq was in some ways the perfect test case for economic sanctions. Following the Gulf War, there was substantial international agreement on the need for sanctions, a high degree of international cooperation in enforcing them, and an institutional structure for controlling Iraq’s imports and exports. Therefore it is reasonable to ask, if economic sanctions could not achieve their goals under such ideal conditions, what chance of success do they have in less favorable situations? To extrapolate from the Iraq experience, however, is potentially misleading. First, it is important to recognize that there are different types of economic sanctions that may be more or less effective—or even counter-productive—under different conditions. Iraq is only one case among many, and there are examples of sanctions that have achieved their aims. Second, sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq could have been far more effective if the international framework for monitoring and enforcing them was not riddled with corruption.
Zachary Selden is the deputy secretary general for policy at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He is currently on leave from the University of Florida, where he is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science. He is the author of Economic Sanctions as Instruments of American Foreign Policy (Praeger, 1999).
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Much of the discussion regarding the use of economic sanctions has fallen into a debate between proponents who champion their use as an alternative to armed conflict, and detractors who argue that they are a vastly overused and ineffective tool of foreign policy.1 However, the reality is far more complex, and one should possess reasonable expectations of what sanctions can accomplish. Sanctions can act as an important signal in international relations, even if the economic effects are not immediately apparent.2 Sanctions can prove particularly effective when used against relatively friendly states that expect long-term gains from the relationship.3 Economic sanctions with modest goals–such as forcing a resolution to a financial dispute over the expropriation of property–are far more likely to work than sanctions with more grandiose goals, such as regime change. Although different types of sanctions may prove appropriate for different situations, the ultimate goal is to impose enough economic hardship to prompt a change in policy. The critical variable is the cost-benefit calculation of the targeted country, which is conditioned by a variety of factors that vary from case to case. Thus, absolute statements proclaiming that sanctions either “work” or “don’t work” ignore both their numerous successful applications on relatively minor issues, as well as their potential to have counter-productive effects that make the desired policy changes harder to achieve. This article begins by examining various types of sanctions and their potential utility under international law. It then moves on to reconsider the
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sanctions regime against Iraq before the U.S.-led intervention in 2003. Finally, it considers the potential effects of additional economic sanctions on Iran. The article argues that economic sanctions remain a valid tool of international affairs. However, narrowly tailored financial sanctions aimed at disrupting elite access to international capital in the targeted state are generally more effective than broader forms of sanctions. Although the apparent failure of sanctions on Iraq would weigh against their use in the future, the particular circumstances of that case and their highly flawed implementation restrict the utility of drawing comparisons to current cases, such as proposed additional sanctions on Iran. The case of Iran illustrates why one needs to understand the effects of various types of sanctions. The proposed sanctions to restrict the flow of refined gasoline to Iran could prove counter-productive, while targeted financial sanctions aimed at particular Iranian entities may prove effective.
Different Sanctions, Different Effects. At a basic level, there are
three forms of economic pressure that the international community can use to influence the policies of a state. It can place restrictions upon which goods actors can sell to that state (export sanctions) or import from that state (import sanctions). The international community can also restrict the ability of that state to access capital and financial instruments in the international market (financial sanctions). These distinctions are important because, while financial sanctions tend to raise the cost of capital to an offend-
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ing state, export sanctions can function as the equivalent of a protective tariff. By screening out goods that targeted states would otherwise import, domestic suppliers (or smugglers) of those goods profit. Therefore, export sanctions tend to create groups within the offending country with a material incentive to see those sanctions remain in place and, in turn, those groups try to influence the target country’s government to maintain the policies that prompted the sanctions.
Business&Economics
cheaper lenders via the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the cost of capital goes up. Other financial sanctions aimed at specific banks in the targeted country can also raise the cost of doing business and make it difficult for the regime’s leaders to move their personal assets. All of this tends to disproportionately impact the ruling elite, because such sanctions target government financing and specific financial institutions linked to the regime in question. Although this may
However, beyond the question of effectiveness, there are others regarding the ethi-
cal aspects of imposing sanctions and the effects of the sanctions regime on the Iraqi populous. Import sanctions that block a country’s exports, however, should not have this effect, as they will not benefit any constituency except for domestic consumers who might benefit from lower prices on goods that were previously exported. In theory, import sanctions should prove relatively effective, by means of placing economic pressure on a targeted state. In practice, however, the link between economic hardship and political change is not always clear. This leaves the final category: financial sanctions. The international community has used them successfully on a number of occasions—for example, to pressure states to pay compensation for expropriated property. Financial sanctions can be particularly effective because most countries cannot substitute for international capital. By blocking the flow of capital from the
have knock-on effects on the general population, such sanctions tend not to benefit any domestic constituency, as trade-disrupting sanctions often do. As a result, they often prove more effective in achieving their stated goals. In an analysis of twenty cases of the use of economic sanctions since 1960, financial sanctions were effective more than twice as often as trade-disrupting sanctions.4 In addition, trade-disrupting sanctions often sparked a wave of import substitution industrialization, while financial sanctions generally did not have this effect.5
Sanctions on Iraq. After the Gulf War, Iraq was in many ways the perfect test case for economic sanctions. The sanctions were comprehensive, backed by a significant international consensus, and remained in place for an extended
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period of time. Yet, the sanctions did not compel Iraq to abide by the terms of the ceasefire, which demanded that it produce a complete accounting of its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Although economic sanctions did not achieve the desired result, there is evidence that they initially imposed a significant cost on the regime of Saddam Hussein. Of course, they also punished the Iraqi people. In an effort to alleviate the public burden, the international community introduced the Oil-for-Food program in 1997, which allowed Iraq to sell oil through certain channels, with the proceeds going into escrow accounts. United Nations (UN) bureaucrats oversaw those accounts and allowed funds from them to be spent only on items approved for civilian use. By maintaining strict controls on Iraq’s oil exports, as well as the goods it could import through the Oil-for-Food program, the sanctions should have significantly limited the amount of income outside UN control that the regime could spend on military hardware; components for its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs; and luxury items for the elite. Over time, this might have prompted a change in Iraq’s behavior, while minimizing the impact on the general population. However, the Oil-for-Food program allowed Saddam Hussein to select the buyers of Iraq’s oil as well as the suppliers of humanitarian goods, thereby enabling him to profit off of the sanctions regime. Although this flaw may have appeared obvious to some, the UN officials in charge of the program argued that it was the only way to secure the agreement of Saddam Hussein, who
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was clearly willing to use the crisis in living standards in Iraq as leverage to force an end to the sanctions.6 The end result, however, was a humanitarian program that put the Hussein regime in a position where it could demand side payments and kickbacks in exchange for contracts. The commission report, headed by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, presents a detailed picture of how this web of corruption extended to a range of companies and government officials; it documents the corruption within the UN as well as its failure to police the sanctions regime.7 Although few individuals were prosecuted, the trail of corruption implicated officials in France, Russia, and the UN itself.8 The Volcker Commission report, as well as the investigations carried out by the U.S. Congress, showed that the program ran with virtually no auditing or transparency measures that could have prevented this abuse.9 It was not the sanctions that failed but rather their implementation. If proper oversight procedures had been in place during the Oil-for-Food program, it is unlikely that the Volcker Commission would have been needed. However, beyond the question of effectiveness, there are others regarding the ethical aspects of imposing sanctions and the effects of the sanctions regime on the Iraqi populus. It is a significant point to consider for future sanctions regimes, because it is difficult to maintain the necessary level of international cooperation to enforce sanctions when they are depicted as the cause of human misery. The Iraqi sanctions were increasingly subject to attack on precisely those grounds.
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Under the Oil-for-Food program, virtually all contracts for medical supplies were approved by the UN. Iraq, however, failed to spend the funds allocated for pharmaceuticals and medical equipment in the UN escrow account.
Business&Economics
supplies among the regions. In the north, distribution of humanitarian supplies was carried out by the UN in cooperation with the Kurdish authorities in that autonomous region. In the central and southern parts of Iraq, the
Rather than imposing a cost that forces
the Iranian regime to approach the negotiating table in a weakened position, sanctions have the potential to make the regime stronger and less likely to yield to international demands. At the same time that reports from Iraq stated that hospitals lacked basic medicines and equipment, hundreds of millions of dollars in medical supplies sat in Iraqi warehouses.10 The government of Iraq at the time may have had many motivations, but there is little doubt that its actions were primarily responsible for the decline in Iraqi health standards—not the sanctions regime. The evidence of the Iraqi government’s responsibility for domestic conditions is most glaring in the disparity between northern Iraq and the rest of the country’s child mortality rates. Although both parts of the country were subject to the same economic sanctions, World Health Organization records show that, during the 1990s, child mortality and malnutrition rates rose significantly in southern and central Iraq while they declined in northern Iraq. This is all the more striking given that northern Iraq featured higher rates of child mortality than the rest of the country in the 1980s. The explanation for this disparity revolves around the distribution of
government in Baghdad controlled the distribution of humanitarian supplies. If the sanctions were primarily responsible for increases in child mortality in the southern and central regions, we would expect to see similar increases in the north, but in fact the opposite was true.11
Economic Sanctions in the Current Context. The Iraqi expe-
rience with economic sanctions offers some lessons, but nevertheless, one must consider each potential use of sanctions on its own merits. There are several viable candidates for economic sanctions in the current international environment, but Iran is probably the highest-profile case. Unfortunately, tougher sanctions as currently conceived are likely to lead to precisely the opposite outcome from what is desired. Rather than imposing a cost that forces the Iranian regime to approach the negotiating table in a weakened position, sanctions have the potential to make the regime stronger and less likely to yield to international demands.
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Iran, of course, is already subject to certain economic sanctions. Thus, the issue at hand is what, if any, additional measures the international community should take. One option gaining traction at the time this article was written is the imposition of a gasoline embargo on Iran. Despite its status as a major oil producer, Iran is dependent on imports for approximately 40 percent of its gasoline. Proponents of this type of sanction argue that, if this supply was cut off or severely reduced, it could have dramatic effects on Iranian society. They predict that fuel shortages would be intense, gasoline prices would skyrocket, and the regime might find itself having to spend more and more to subsidize gasoline to ward off popular discontent.12 Sanctions aimed at Iran’s gasoline imports and its ability to refine petroleum also send a signal to Tehran. They would indicate that the United States and its partners are willing to assume a more confrontational posture in dealing with Iran. This should increase U.S. leverage at the bargaining table and give the international community one more incentive to offer Iran to comply with its international obligations. At the same time, however, one needs to consider the likely response of the regime and whether intensified economic sanctions are likely to lead to the desired policy change. After all, the point is not to impose economic hardship for its own sake. On the contrary, it is to pressure Iran to agree to enforceable international controls over its nuclear program. A United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution authorizing a sanctions regime against
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Iran focused on gasoline imports is highly unlikely, given that at least one permanent member of the UNSC, China, has heavily invested in Iran’s oil sector. Yet, even assuming a high degree of international cooperation, a gasoline embargo on Iran could have counter-productive effects. To understand why, one must examine why Iran imports gasoline. Government subsidies keep the price of gasoline artificially low in Iran; even after recent increases, the price amounts to approximately forty cents per gallon. The artificially low price not only dampens gasoline production, but it also induces a significant amount of gasoline smuggling from Iran to neighboring countries, where the gasoline is sold at a profit.13 Therefore, the Iranian government would likely respond to economic sanctions by immediately increasing its refining capacity, since doing so is not a particularly difficult task. In fact, Iran has already begun to refine gasoline with the assistance of China.14 Therefore, the likely impact would be an upsurge in Iran’s gasoline refining capacity, which would reduce the potential impact of the embargo. Obviously, this would take some time, but the lengthy discussions in Congress about targeting Iran’s gasoline imports have no doubt given the nation a considerable headstart. It is also very likely that a gasoline embargo would increase the domestic supply of gasoline, albeit at higher prices. The smuggling trade that currently ships Iranian gasoline to Iraq would halt and possibly reverse direction, depending on how high prices rise in Iran relative to Iraq. Thus,
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a successful application of economic sanctions targeting Iran’s gasoline imports could have the desired effect. Sanctions that cut off Iran’s gasoline imports would undoubtedly force the government to impose stricter rationing and raise prices. Both of those actions would prove highly unpopular and could lead to further protests and action against the regime. This could increase domestic pressure on the regime to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the current impasse over its nuclear weapons program. At the same time, however, there is a strong likelihood that intensified sanctions would have precisely the opposite effect. Iran could increase its refining capacity and redirect subsidies to producers, higher prices would lower demand, and smuggled gasoline would fill much of the gap caused by the embargo. The Iranian people would pay, but it is not at all clear that the Iranian government would weaken its resolve or change course. Gasoline shortages would likely prompt protests against the regime, but it showed little restraint when it used violence to repress the population after the 2009 presidential elections, and it suffered no consequences for doing so. The regime has perhaps little to fear from the further repression of protestors; therefore, the likely end result of tougher sanctions would be a more repressive Iran that could independently meet its needs for gasoline and other refined products. Instead of a weakened and chastised Iran, the international community could easily find itself dealing with an emboldened Iran that has faced down what had been billed as “crippling” sanctions.
Business&Economics
This is not to say that Iran is immune to the effects of economic sanctions. Rather than target Iran’s gasoline imports, United States and its partners could better achieve their goals by targeting Iranian financial institutions involved in the country’s illicit activities. Institutions, such as Bank Mellat, Bank Melli, the Khatam alAnbya construction company owned by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, are all subject to sanctions to varying degrees by the United States and, in some cases, the European Union.15 A concerted effort to enact and enforce mulilateral sanctions could constrain the freedom of action of those entities and impose costs on the regime that would not play to their political advantage.
The Future of Economic Sanctions. Economic sanctions are
a multifaceted tool and exist in different forms with different, predictable effects. Asking whether sanctions do or do not “work” poses the wrong question. They can prove effective, ineffective, or even counter-productive, depending on how they are implemented and the particular changes in policy they are designed to cause. One should recall that the goal of economic sanctions is to prompt a change in policy. Even if they succeed in imposing an economic cost on the target country, there is no guarantee that this will lead to the desired political change. In the particular case of Iran, however, the sanctions under discussion might not only prove ineffective but perhaps even highly counter-productive.
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Economic sanctions occupy an important place within the spectrum of options available to the United States, its allies, and the UN in dealing with regimes that threaten regional stability or violate internationally accepted standards. Sanctions fit between the polar opposite options of doing nothing and taking military action, which grant them an intrinsic appeal in the current international environment. In respect to Iran, it is unlikely that the UN will decide to impose significant additional sanctions, given the interests and statements of two permanent members of the UNSC. Yet, this does not mean that a smaller group of states, composed of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia, cannot impose economic sanctions. The gasoline embargo proposed by some, however, actually has the potential to make Iran less likely to negotiate limitations on its nuclear programs. The United States and its partners should therefore target the financial institu-
tions and companies closely tied to the regime, which they could accomplish through closer cooperation, with or without additional UNSC resolutions. The specific use of economic sanctions against Iraq was a failure because they did not force the regime of Saddam Hussein to comply with the UN resolutions that prompted the imposition of sanctions. Yet, sanctions initially imposed a cost on the regime, and over time they could have pressured the regime to comply. The problem was that, in an attempt to minimize the impact on the general population, the UN instituted a sanctions policy that actually benefited the regime. The chief lesson that one should learn from this experience is that the administration of the sanctions regime must be monitored closely to prevent corruption. The Volcker Report is shocking in its revelations, but with proper oversight and transparency, many of those problems could have been avoided.
NOTES
1 See, for example, Beth Rodgers, “Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts,” Security Studies (Summer 1996); Richard Haass, “Sanctioning Madness,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 1997); Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions (Cambridge: Harvard Studies in International Affairs, 1981). 2 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 3 Daniel Drezner, “Serious about Sanctions,” The National Interest (Fall 1998). 4 Selden, 19. 5 Ibid. 6 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, The Oil-for-Food Program: The Systematic Failure of the United Nations, 7 December 2005, Internet, http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/ archives/109/24907.pdf (date accessed: 12 January 2010). 7 Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program, 27 October 2005, Internet, www.iic.offp.org. (date accessed: 21 December 2009). 8 “Oil for Food Program Rebukes Annan, Cites Corruption,” The Washington Post, 8 September 2005. 9 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, The Oil-for-Food Program, 4; Inde-
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pendent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program, 8. 10 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, “Phase VI of the Oil for Food Program,” 17 November 1999, 6. 11 Michael Rubin, “Northern Iraq, Sanctions, and U.S. Iraq Policy,” Washington Institute for Near Eastern Affairs Policy Watch no. 543, 5 July 2001. 12 See, for example, the testimony of Senator Joseph Lieberman before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 30 July 2009, Internet, http://banking.senate.gov/public/index. cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ ID=1f18fbbb-aae7-436c-bf8e-bfa12c59ae71&Witness_ ID=d82ea1ce-257f-4ecb-91b4-543692ff26c1 (date accessed: 15 August 2009). 13 “With Refineries Few, Iraq and Iran Run on Black Market Gas,” Dallas Morning News, 22 October 2007. 14 “How Iran Might Beat Future Sanctions: The China Card,” Time, 16 July 2009. 15 Testimony of Dr. Matthew Levitt before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 30 July 2009, Internet, http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings. Testimony&Hearing_ID=1f18fbbb-aae7-436c-bf8ebfa12c59ae71&Witness_ID=1e0af537-d6a6-4ddda65d-2d12a233a0a4 (date accessed: 15August 2009).
Science&Technology Getting Rid of Black Carbon A Neglected but Effective Near-Term Climate Mitigation Avenue Dennis Clare, Kristina Pistone, and Veerabhadran Ramanathan The signatories to the December 2009 Copenhagen Accord, which included both Group of 8 (G8) and Group of 77 (G77) countries, agreed that “climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time.�1 They also cited a need to keep total global warming below 3.7 degrees Fahrenheit. To achieve this goal, policymakers focus largely on reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions over the long-term.2 Although a long-term, CO2-centered approach to climate change is unquestionably necessary, it is not sufficient. An appropriately comprehensive climate policy must also address the variety of non-CO2 pollutants that cause warming and aim to minimize warming trends in the near-term so that we do not commit the climate system to irreversible and potentially catastrophic changes long before CO2 emissions can be stabilized and reduced. Fortunately, by addressing non-CO2 warming pollutants, such as black carbon, we can achieve some of the short-term results we urgently need and perhaps also buy time for our critical long-term efforts. Proponents of strong climate action correctly assert that we must reduce CO2 emissions between 50 percent and 80 percent this century.3 The climate system has already warmed by 1.4 degrees Fahrenheit, and the blanket of gases
Dennis Clare is an experienced researcher and advocate for domestic and international climate change policy. Kristina Pistone is a graduate student in the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California at San Diego. Veerabhadran Ramanathan is distinguished professor of climate and atmospheric sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California at San Diego.
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that surrounds the planet is already thick enough to warm the system by as much as 3 degrees Fahrenheit.4 Meanwhile, about thirty-five billion additional tons of CO2 are emitted into the atmosphere annually. At this rate, we may commit the planet to yet another 3 degrees of warming this century.5 CO2 emissions are particularly problematic because they can remain in the atmosphere and continue to cause warming for hundreds to thousands of years thereafter.6 Therefore, we must urgently reduce CO2 in order to prevent the future warming caused by our emissions from worsening.
likely the fastest known method to mitigate warming. Technologies are already available to drastically reduce these emissions, and because the lifetime of black carbon is only a few days to weeks, its warming effects will be diminished almost immediately after emissions are reduced. Between now and the mid twenty-first century, removing one ton of black carbon can have the same effect as removing more than one thousand tons of CO2 from the atmosphere.8 Although many countries regulate particulate pollution in general, none presently regulates black carbon specifically. However, as we learn more
According to one study, black carbon has caused roughly half of the observed warming in the Arctic region during the twentieth century alone.
To achieve more rapid, short-term climate mitigation, however, we need to reduce emissions of shorter-lived warming agents that remain in the atmosphere anywhere from a couple of weeks to about a decade. To date, pollutants such as black carbon, methane, ozone, and halocarbons have contributed as much warming to the climate system as CO2.7 Reducing emissions of these short-lived pollutants can help achieve important short-term goals, including alleviating present warming trends; reducing already occurring impacts; and forestalling the worst potential outcomes, such as abrupt climate change. Black carbon is largely ignored in the ongoing policy discussions, yet reductions in black carbon emissions are
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about black carbon’s negative climate and health impacts, narrower regulations may be necessary.
A Potent Climate Warmer. Black carbon is not a greenhouse gas. Rather, it is one of several types of fine particles emitted from incomplete combustion of fossil fuels, cooking with biomass fuels, and burning of open vegetation. Black carbon particles are what give the dark color to smoke from diesel engines, crop burning, and wood and coal fires. Long infamous for its public health and air quality impacts, black carbon is now also acknowledged as the second or third strongest warming pollutant, contributing from 25 percent to 60 percent as much warming as CO2.9
CLARE, PISTONE, AND RAMANATHAN
Black carbon causes warming in two ways. First, while in the atmosphere, black carbon absorbs sunlight, thus directly warming the surrounding air. Second, when it washes out of the atmosphere, usually after only a few days or weeks aloft, black carbon can land on snow and ice, darkening these surfaces. This increases solar absorption by snow and ice and accelerates melting. The melting can lead to even further warming if the bright snow or ice surface melts away and reveals a darker, more absorbing land or sea surface beneath it. Black carbon can therefore contribute to the dangerous warming feedbacks that threaten mountain glaciers and Arctic sea ice. According to one study, black carbon has caused roughly half of the observed warming in the Arctic region during the twentieth century alone.10 Emissions from increased shipping activity in and around the Arctic only threaten to exacerbate this impact. Similarly, in the Himalayan-Tibetan region, studies have estimated that warming due to black carbon may have contributed as much to the large temperature increase in these elevated regions as has warming from greenhouse gases.11 Furthermore, atmospheric warming by black carbon can disrupt rainfall patterns, especially in the monsoon regions of China and India.12 Reducing emissions of black carbon provides a promising means of protecting threatened areas that play a vital role in limiting global warming because of the massive amounts of sunlight they reflect. Indeed, any suite of measures aimed at rapid climate mitigation should prioritize efforts to protect the planet’s natural climate defense systems, such as glaciers and sea ice.
Science&Technology
Sources and Solutions. The good news is that there are many presently available technologies that can be used to substantially reduce black carbon emissions from primary sources. These sources include on- and off-road diesel engines, traditional cooking and heating stoves, small industrial sources, and open burning of biomass, generally from agricultural waste and deforestation. However, black carbon is not the only substance emitted from these sources. Some of the other pollutants emitted along with black carbon, though they are also harmful to human health, can cause cooling because they are light in color and reflect sunlight back into space. Thus, when addressing total emissions from various combustion sources, reductions of warming can be maximized by targeting sources that emit a high ratio of warming pollutants to cooling pollutants. Fossil fuel combustion and cooking with biomass emit account for about 60 percent of black carbon emissions globally. Diesel vehicle emissions, which account for more than 17 percent of black carbon emissions globally, have a particularly high ratio of warming to cooling pollutants and should therefore top the agenda for immediate action.13 The most effective way to reduce emissions from diesel vehicles is to install a diesel particulate filter (DPF), which can eliminate over 90 percent of black carbon emissions.14 In the United States, European Union (EU), and Japan, DPFs are required on new diesel vehicles. One study estimates that the United States’s new vehicle standards will reduce total domestic black carbon emissions by 42 percent from 2001 to 2020.15 The Summer/Fall 2010 [101]
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rules will reduce black carbon from the U.S. transportation sector by 70 percent. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) claims that, by the time the full vehicle fleet is replaced in 2030, 110,000 tons of particulate matter will have been eliminated annually from heavy duty highway emissions; 27,000 tons from locomotive and marine engines; and another 120,000 tons from non-road vehicles.16 The EPA also aims to reduce the emissions of 11 million vehicles in the legacy fleet by 2014, but its programs to address these in-use vehicles are voluntary and now underfunded. On the whole, standards such as those in effect in the United States, EU, and Japan are very positive steps forward, but the health and climate benefits from addressing diesel emissions could be increased and accelerated if vehicles already in use were also required to use DPFs. In New Delhi, a court-mandated switch from diesel to natural gas for municipal transportation vehicles reduced the overall warming effect due to vehicular emissions from 10 percent to 30 percent, largely because of reductions in black carbon emissions.17 A second major opportunity to reduce black carbon emissions in a manner which yields both cost-effective health and climate benefits is by replacing kerosene lamps and traditional stoves used for cooking and heating with more efficient, less emissive alternatives. More than 3 billion people in the developing world depend on traditional solid-fuel stoves for cooking and heating.18 These stoves typically burn wood, coal, dung, or crop residue. Emissions from these stoves, including significant amounts
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of black carbon, organic carbon, and other particles, are the primary source of an indoor air pollution that kills over 1.6 million people annually, most of whom are women and children under the age of five.19 This pollution is one of the major health risks in poor developing countries. In addition to premature death, other negative health impacts from indoor pollution include respiratory illness, aggravated asthma, and chronic bronchitis.20 In South Asia, cooking with biofuels accounts for two-thirds or more of total black carbon emissions.21 Although cooking stoves emit a more even balance of particle emissions than diesel engines, the heating effect from black carbon still dominates the cooling effect from lighter, more reflective particles.22 Thus, reducing this warming and directly improving human health are principal motives for improving these stoves. In locations where biofuel use overlaps with deforestation, such as Central and South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, reduced deforestation from decreased demand for biomass fuel could be yet another benefit of using more efficient stoves. And in regions where particulate emissions from stoves can contribute to the formation of heat trapping clouds, or where black carbon particles from stoves can be deposited onto snow and ice surfaces, the warming impact of stoves increases, so the win-win of health and climate cobenefits from replacing these stoves is strengthened. There is still scientific work to be done analyzing stove emissions and determining the most effective means of reducing them. Standards still need to be
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established to weigh the various factors, such as the cost of the stove, the amount of fuel consumption reduced, and the amounts of the various species of pollutants reduced. For example, some efforts to improve cooking stoves have been successful in reducing net emissions but have still not managed to reduce particulate emissions to safe levels.23 By carefully measuring and comparing stoves in the field for their impacts on health and climate, efficiency, and other benefits, positive results can be maximized. Project Surya is one example of a pilot project reaching toward this goal, and has been initiated in the Indo-Gangetic Plains region of India. Improving traditional cooking and heating stoves is fundamentally a development issue. It touches not only on climate and health but on access to energy and even education, because when children spend less time collecting firewood, they have more time to attend school. Therefore, stove improvement
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technologies to reduce them, fashioning an effective policy response will require choosing the most competent form of governance to catalyze the on-the-ground work that needs to be done. Any reductions would likely result from national plans of action, which could involve funding, technology development, and partnerships between government, non-governmental organizations, and industry. However, how and whether to integrate national efforts into regional or global mitigation efforts remains to be determined, as there are various potential strengths and weaknesses of national, regional, and larger multilateral coordination or governance frameworks. An obvious benefit of any national or regional regime is that, because black carbon is short-lived and not well-mixed in its spread through the atmosphere, it tends to have more localized effects. This means that the benefits of emissions reductions
In South Asia, cooking with biofuels accounts for two-thirds or more of total black carbon emissions. programs should be a larger part of overall development efforts, and should be candidates for funding from international financial institutions and development organizations focusing on such issues as women’s health, girls’ education, access to clean energy, and climate mitigation.
Policy Strategies. In addition to identifying the primary sources of black carbon emissions and the leading
mostly accrue in the areas near the source of emissions. Emitters in close proximity may tend to cooperate if they will benefit directly when nearby emitters reduce pollution. States that share borders or threatened resources, for example, may have extra incentives to cooperate in reducing emissions. A disadvantage of black carbon’s spatial concentrations for cooperative regional governance, however, is that
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if a large emitter in a region is not involved in the coordinated regional effort, other states’ reductions may be unable to meet their air quality goals. Another potential disadvantage of solely regional coordination is that a particular state or region might stand to benefit greatly from black carbon reductions but lacks the resources to bring them about. Conversely, an advantage of broader international approaches may be linking funds, expertise, and technologies from one state to another in need. On the other hand, distant states’ interests in sharing a particular region’s local reduction burden may not correspond as well as they do within that region. To maximize total reductions in near-term global black carbon emissions, a more tailored approach may be ideal: a quadrilateral partnership between the United States, the European Union, China, and India. Together these parties represent more than half of the world’s black carbon emissions from contained combustion sources, such as diesel and stoves.24 The United States and EU have made great strides in reducing black carbon emissions and have developed valuable technologies, but the United States still has high per capita black carbon emissions, at a rate comparable to that in China. These per capita emissions must be reduced. China is the largest emitter of black carbon, and India’s emissions are lower but growing.25 Consequently, China, India, and other developing nations have the most to gain from reductions. Moreover, these parties are connected because some EU emissions end up in South and East Asia and some Chinese emissions are transported to the United States.26
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Such a quadrilateral partnership could evolve from initial bilateral cooperation between the EU and China or India and between the United States and China or India. The partnership might even have a larger overall focus—starting with black carbon, for example—as part of a broader partnership on reducing pollution for sustainable development. The United States, EU, China, and India could then effectively cooperate to address other short-lived pollutants, such as tropospheric ozone. Developing tailored programs to address specific emissions by source or sector might also illustrate a more disaggregated, bottom-up approach that could serve as an example for other climate mitigation efforts. For small developing states interested in reducing black carbon, entering into bilateral, resource-sharing agreements with other states could be a promising option. These agreements could privilege the provision of resources for development programs through cross-cutting benefits. Existing bilateral arrangements, such as those that provide diesel fuel in order to power electric generators, might be altered to favor renewable energy, such as solar power for nations in the middle latitudes where incident solar radiation is greatest. Whether through bilateral, regional, or global arrangements, the strategies for development projects should include an examination of where there are potential, multiple benefits.27 Programs with numerous co-benefits, such as stove replacement programs, should be given priority and should also be eligible for funds directed toward a variety of separate purposes, including development, health, climate mitiga-
CLARE, PISTONE, AND RAMANATHAN
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tion, poverty reduction, girls’ educa- public will see the positive effects on air tion, and improving access to clean quality within the communities where such actions are taken. International energy. policymakers, too, will have a golden Conclusion. To address climate opportunity to verify predictions that change, the nations of the world must act black carbon reductions will slow both now, and they must address the multi- the rapid retreat of Arctic sea ice and the tude of pollutants that cause warming— warming trends over elevated regions of not just CO2. There are three powerful the Himalayan-Tibetan glacier region. and compelling rationales for reduc- Finally, diesel filters, stoves, and other ing non-CO2 pollutants, particularly technologies for cleaning up the air are black carbon. First, these pollutants already available, so mitigation actions have proven negative effects on health, can start immediately. As the time to agriculture, and regional air quality. address global warming grows short, Second, because of their short atmo- an immediate start on reducing black spheric lifetimes, the expected results carbon emissions will bring some of will come quickly. Local policymak- the near-term results we need and will ers will see the positive effects of their build momentum for further rapid cliactions while still in office, and the mate mitigation. NOTES
1 UNFCCC 15th Congress of the Parties, “Copenhagen Accord 2009,” Internet, http://unfccc.int/ files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv. pdf (date accessed: 7 April 2010). 2 Malte Meinshausen et al., “Greenhouse-gas emission targets for limiting global warming to 2 degrees C,” Nature 458, no. 7242 (April 2009):11581162. 3 Members of the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), “Special Report: Solving the climate dilemma: The budget approach,” Internet, http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_sn2009_en.pdf (date accessed: 7 April 2010). 4 Kevin E. Trenberth et al., “Observations: Surface and Atmospheric Climate Change,” in Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 237; V. Ramanathan and Y. Feng, “On avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system: formidable challenges ahead,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 105, no. 38 (September 2008): 1424514250. 5 Malte Meinshausen et al., “Greenhouse-gas emission targets for limiting global warming to 2 degrees C,” Nature 458, no. 7242 (April 2009):11581162. 6 Susan Solomon, “Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106,
no. 6 (February 2009): 1704-1709. 7 Piers Forster et al., “Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing,” in Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 205-207; V. Ramanathan and G. Carmichael, “Global and regional climate changes due to black carbon,” Nature Geoscience 1 (2008): 221-227. 8 Mark Z. Jacobson, “Climate response of fossil fuel and biofuel soot, accounting for soot’s feedback to snow and sea ice albedo and emissivity,” Journal of Geophysical Research 109, no. D21 (November 2004): D21201. 9 For low-end estimate, see the estimate of 0.44 W/m2 of BC forcing in Piers Forster et al., “Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing,”; high-end estimate of 0.95 W/m2 is from V. Ramanathan and G. Carmichael, “Global and regional climate changes due to black carbon,” both including albedo effects. This is compared to the forcing of CO2 to be 1.56 W/m2, given by Piers Forster et al., “Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing.” 10 Drew Shindell and Greg Faluvegi, “Climate response to regional radiative forcing during the twentieth century,” Nature Geoscience 2, no. 4 (April 2009): 294-300. 11 V. Ramanathan and G. Carmichael, “Global and regional climate changes due to black carbon,” 221-227; Veerabhadran Ramanathan et al., “Warm-
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ing trends in Asia amplified by brown cloud solar absorption,” Nature 448, no. 7153 (August 2007): 575-578; M.G. Flanner et al., “Springtime warming and reduced snow cover from carbonaceous particles,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 9, no. 7 (April 2009): 2481-2497. 12 V. Ramanathan and G. Carmichael, “Global and regional climate changes due to black carbon,” 221-227. 13 Tami C. Bond et al., “A technology-based global inventory of black and organic carbon emissions from combustion,” Journal of Geophysical Research 109 (2004): D14203. 14 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Transportation and Air Quality, “Technical Highlights: Questions and Answers on Using a Diesel Particulate Matter Filter in Heavy-Duty Trucks and Buses,” Internet, http://www.epa.gov/cleandiesel/ documents/420f03017.pdf (date accessed: 7 April 2010). 15 Mark A. Bahner et al., “Use of Black Carbon and Organic Carbon Inventories for Projections and Mitigation Analysis” (paper presented at the 16th Annual International Emission Inventory Conference, Raleigh, NC, 14-17 May 2007). 16 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Transportation and Air Quality, “National Clean Diesel Campaign,” Internet, http://www.epa. gov/cleandiesel (date accessed: 7 April 2010). 17 Conor C. O. Reynolds and Milind Kandlikar, “Climate Impacts of Air Quality Policy: Switching to a Natural Gas-Fueled Public Transportation System in New Delhi,” Environmental Science and Technology 42, no. 16 (August 2008): 5860-5865. 18 World Health Organization, “Indoor Air Pollution,” Internet, http://www.who.int/indoorair/en/ (date accessed: 7 April 2010). 19 World Health Organization, “Global estimates
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of burden of disease caused by the environment and occupational risks,” Internet, http://www.who. int/quantifying_ehimpacts/global/globalair/en/index. html (date accessed: 7 April 2010). 20 World Health Organization, “Health effects,” Internet, http://www.who.int/indoorair/health_ impacts/disease/en/index.html (date accessed: 7 April 2010). 21 Tami C. Bond et al., “A technology-based global inventory of black and organic carbon emissions from combustion,” D14203. 22 Nadine Unger et al., “Attribution of climate forcing to economic sectors,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107, no. 8 (February 2010): 3382-3387. 23 R. D. Edwards et al., “Household CO and PM measured as part of a review of China’s National Improved Stove Program,” Indoor Air 17, no. 3 (June 2007): 189-203. 24 Tami C. Bond et al., “A technology-based global inventory of black and organic carbon emissions from combustion,” D14203. 25 V. Ramanathan and Y. Feng, “Air pollution, greenhouse gases, and climate change: global and regional perspectives,” Atmospheric Environment 43, no. 1 (January 2009): 37-50. 26 Baiqing Xu et al., “Black soot and the survival of Tibetan glaciers,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106, no. 52 (December 2009): 22114-22118; O. L. Hadley et al., “TransPacific transport of black carbon and fine aerosols (D<2.5μm) into North America,” Journal of Geophysical Research 112, No. D5 (March 2007): D05309. 27 Mario Molina et al., “Reducing abrupt climate change risk using the Montreal Protocol and other regulatory actions to complement cuts in CO2 emissions,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106 (2009): 20616-20621.
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The Search for the Killer App Precision Farming in Africa James Lowenberg-DeBoer and Bruce Erickson Agriculture in Africa is at a crossroads. Some advocates of precision agriculture would like to imitate the cell phone industry and skip developmental steps. They would like to move African farmers from basic manual farming techniques directly to high-tech agriculture, just as some African phone networks moved directly to wireless without ever having passed through the stage of extensive landline installation. However, precision agriculture in Africa has not yet found a technology so valuable that it validates the utility of a broader set of related technologies, also known as a â&#x20AC;&#x153;killer app.â&#x20AC;? The use of global positioning system (GPS)based technologies is growing in mechanized agriculture in Africa, but mechanized farming represents only a small part of African agriculture. Most African farmers cultivate the soil by hand or with animal power. Research organizations like the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and Regional Center for Training and Application of Agrometrology and Operational Hydrology (AGRHYMET) use satellite remote sensing tools to produce maps for largescale monitoring of vegetation change and soil condition. Some researchers maintain that maps derived from
James LowenbergDeBoer is associate dean and director of International Programs in Agriculture at Purdue University. He is a former associate editor for the Agronomy Journal and the Journal of Production Agriculture. Bruce Erickson is director of Cropping Systems Management at Purdue University. He is a Certified Professional Agronomist and a former consultant to agribusinesses and government agencies within the United States and Canada.
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remote sensing information could be delivered to farmers via cell phone, but currently only a small percentage of African farmers use remote sensing information. Another idea is the development of countertop soil sensors that could provide site-specific tests for monitoring soil nutrients. Agriculture in other parts of the world has gone through a similar process of sifting through the precision agriculture “toolkit” to find those tools that fit their needs. For instance, in the United States, the first precision agriculture tools introduced were remote sensing field images that were able to quantify yields and technology, enabling the application of specific amounts of nutrients to portions of fields. However, the precision agriculture tool utilized most by U.S. growers today is GPS guidance. Currently, there are a few precision agriculture technologies that have the potential for widespread adoption in Africa.
What is Precision Agriculture? Like “sustainable agricul-
regardless of technology: the idea that natural variability in soils, microclimates, and even individual plants and animals will respond to customized time and location-specific management instead of uniform approaches. A U.S. precision agriculture textbook defines its topic as “using information technologies to tailor soil and crop management to fit the specific conditions found within a field.”1 While precision agriculture applies to crops, soils, forest, livestock, and natural resources such as water, this article deals primarily with the precision side of crop production. Precision agriculture has been adopted mostly for its ability to increase the efficiency of inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and fuel while maintaining crop productivity, which serves as a direct benefit to a farmer and the ecosystem. Added benefits consist of increases in productivity or the possibility that information technology could better link farmers with their input suppliers or their buyers/ markets. Both input reductions and productivity increases reduce the environmental impact per unit land area or unit of production. This potentially allows more food and fiber to be produced on the same amount of land while using less fuel, fertilizer, and pesticides. A recent special section of Science included precision agriculture among the technologies needed to feed and clothe the approximately 9 billion people that are expected to inhabit planet Earth by 2050.2
ture,” the words “precision agriculture” or “precision farming” have multiple interpretations. Some focus more on the technologies that underlie many precision farming applications, including GPS, that can guide equipment or pinpoint locations; satellite remote sensing to make field maps or detect large-scale vegetation changes not easily discernable by the human eye; or variable rate technologies (VRT) that allow the amounts of seeds, fertilizers, or pesticides to be customized in portions of fields. Precision Agriculture around Others concentrate more on the site- the World. Precision farming based specific nature of precision farming on information technology has been
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available to farmers in North America for almost twenty years. Adoption of specific technology components, like yield monitors, GPS guidance, and VRT, varies widely from country to country and even region to region within countries, depending on the crops produced and needs of the farming system. One of the key results from the adoption studies of precision agriculture around the world is that the “economics of precision agriculture are site-specific.”3 Technologies that are practical and profitable in one place may not be adopted elsewhere because of differences in soils, crops, farming systems, and social structure.
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in North America are equipped with yield monitors, but only about onethird of them link to GPS. Without GPS, the yield monitor data are not tied to specific in-field locations and hence are not usable for site-specific management. In contrast, over 90 percent of combines with yield monitors in Argentina are used with GPS. The difference relates to the structure of agriculture in the two countries. In the United States, even owners of large farms often spend some time operating harvesters and hence they know the variability of their field personally. In Argentina, large farms are often run by farm managers who seldom operate
The application most important for
mechanized agriculture in much of the world has been GPS guidance. Precision agriculture adoption data must be interpreted with caution. No country in the world maintains complete official statistics on precision farming adoption. T.W. Griffin and J. Lowenberg-DeBoer pieced together information from farm surveys, manufacturer records, government sources, and anecdotal information.4 This was updated by Lowenberg-DeBoer and Griffin in 2009.5 These data show that the “killer app” for precision agriculture in mechanized agriculture in most of the world is GPS guidance. Adoption of other precision agriculture technologies is spotty. Use of yield monitors has been a benchmark of precision farming adoption in much of the world. Most of the combine harvesters now sold
equipment. For the Argentine farm manager, the yield maps are often new information, while for many U.S. farmers the yield maps at best quantify what they already knew intuitively.6 Using technology to apply different amounts of fertilizers within fields, otherwise known as VRT fertilizer, is often seen as the archetypal precision farming technology. The United States leads the world in VRT. Over 50 percent of local fertilizer dealers in the United States offer VRT services, but farmer use of these VRT services has lagged. In the United States, maize is the crop most likely to be managed with VRT fertilizer, but data indicate that at most 17.5 percent of the corn acreage has been managed with VRT in any one year. Constraints
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include the cost of soil sampling to develop rate application maps, the cost of VRT equipment, and the lack of agricultural workers trained to use this technology. Another constraint is the complexity of nitrogen response, which makes site specific prediction of yield increases from nitrogen difficult. Nitrogen is one of the most critical elements influencing crop productivity but also one of the most difficult to quantify and monitor. There was a renewed interest in VRT during the spike in grain and fertilizer prices in 2007 because VRT is more profitable with higher crop and input prices. Worldwide, remote sensing is used by governments, insurance companies, grain marketing firms, and other large businesses to predict crop production and to assess damage from flooding, drought, and other large-scale weather problems. It is also widely used for in-field management of higher-value crops such as fruits, nuts, and vegetables. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) most recent information, among large-scale crops in the United States, cotton has the greatest use of remote sensing at 4.6 percent of planted acres in 2003. Satellite and aerial imagery in cotton is used to develop application maps for chemical growth regulators. Use of remote sensing for managing grains and oilseeds is much less common. For example, the corresponding USDA dataset for soybeans shows that 1.7 percent of acreage in 2002 was managed with remote sensing information. The application most important for mechanized agriculture in much of the world has been GPS guidance. This
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can take the form of manual guidance, or “lightbars,” that provide equipment operators a visual indicator of how closely they follow predetermined paths in the field. Following these established paths can minimize overlap when applying seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides and can reduce crop damage from equipment. GPS guidance can also be automated by linking GPS directly to steering for socalled “hands free agriculture.” With GPS auto-guidance, human operators are mainly on the equipment to deal with malfunctions. Lightbars were first introduced commercially in North America in the mid 1990s. Auto guidance was first commercially introduced in Australia in the late 1990s and launched in North America a few years later.7 The best information on GPS guidance adoption comes from the annual Purdue University/CropLife survey of agricultural input retailers.8 The 2009 survey showed that almost 80 percent of all agricultural retailers of fertilizer and farm chemicals used some form of GPS guidance. Two-thirds of all inputs applied by these custom applicators were applied with GPS guidance. Data and accounts in the farm press indicate that GPS adoption by farmers in the United States and mechanized agriculture worldwide is following a similar pattern. GPS guidance has spawned a group of second generation spin-off technologies that make use of the location finding and driving accuracy of GPS guidance. These technologies include automatic planter and pesticide sprayer controls that can substantially reduce the errors that occur with farm equipment
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operationâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;overlaps and skips between field passes and along field borders, especially in irregularly shaped fields. More accurate equipment passes, and equipment that turns on and off at field edges can save crop inputs such as seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers.
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micro-climates to maximize production. For instance, in Burkina Faso, sorghum might be planted on old termite mounds in groundnut fields because termites have brought up clay from the subsoil, mixing it with organic matter and creating soil better adapted
For smallholder agriculture in Africa,
the use of precision technologies is negligible. to sorghum than groundnuts.9 Even some plantation crops benefit from this kind of manual site-specific management, where precision agriculture concepts are utilized without the aid of electronic tools. For example, tea in Tanzania is produced in sub-field blocks where leaves are hand harvested, yield is recorded per block, and different amounts of inputs are applied by hand in each block as a way to manage both quantity and quality produced.10 Many of the precision agriculture technologies developed for mechanized agriculture in North America, Australia, and Europe have been used to a limited extent in the commercial farming sector of South Africa. For example, Griffin and LowenbergDeBoer report fifteen combine yield monitors being used in South Africa.11 VRT, GPS guidance, remote sensing, proximate N sensors, and soil electrical conductivity sensors have been used commercially in South Africa. Precision Agriculture in Afri- The only article in the Precision Agrica. Manual site-specific management culture journal based on African data is standard practice in smallholder comes from an on-farm study of variagriculture in Africa. Though they use able rate fertilizer application in the very few external inputs, farmers try Free State of South Africa using yield to manage crop varieties, soils, and monitor data.12 The success of GPS guidance is related to automation of the crop management decision-making process, cost of the equipment, availability of technology to retrofit older equipment, and short payback period. VRT and yield monitoring usually require the help of a trained agronomist to interpret data and to develop application maps. With GPS guidance and related technologies that automate decision making; there is no expensive human being in the decision-making loop. GPS guidance technologies have been developed to retrofit any farm equipment with a steering wheel. Even tractors manufactured in the 1930s and 1940s can be equipped with GPS guidance. The cost of the simplest GPS guidance technology is less than five thousand dollars. In many cases in large-scale agriculture, farmers can save enough from reducing skip and overlap to pay for the technology in the first year of use.
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Some of these same precision agriculture technologies were used in the commercial sector of Zimbabwe before the virtual collapse of commercial farming there in the wake of the recent land reallocation. Anecdotal reports indicate that GPS and other precision agriculture technologies are being used on sugar cane farms and large-scale tree crop plantation agriculture in other parts of Africa. In January 2010 Trimble Navigation, the U.S.-based maker of agricultural GPS equipment, opened an office in Nairobi, Kenya, in recognition of the potential growth in GPS use in Africa. For smallholder agriculture in Africa, the use of precision technologies is negligible. The GPS guidance technologies that have become so widespread in North America are of little use in smallholder agriculture that depends on human and animal power. Computer control of fertilizer and pesticide application in typical VRT would be overkill on a continent where very few external inputs of any kind are used. Widespread use of cell phones in rural Africa opens the possibility of delivery of site-specific crop information from satellites or other sensors, but to the best of our knowledge, such site-specific information delivery has not been implemented on a broad scale. Application of precision agriculture technology is usually quite site-specific. VRT and use of remote sensing were originally developed for large-scale grain and oilseed farms but have been adopted most intensively by producers of higher value crops, like vineyards, vegetables, cotton, and
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potatoes. GPS auto-steer was first commercialized in Australia because of unique soil and climate issues faced by its farmers. GPS guidance spread in North America because it offered a relatively quick return on the investment in equipment and gave farmers more flexibility in hiring equipment operators. African agriculture must identify and adapt precision techniques to its site-specific needs. That has not happened largely because of the underdeveloped nature of agricultural research in Africa and the fact that Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s potential demand for inputs has been neglected by multinational agribusiness. Some seed companies have developed genetics for Africa, but outside of South Africa, fertilizer, pesticide, and farm equipment companies have invested little in Africa. They have rarely developed products specifically for African agriculture. In most cases, their distribution systems are at best limited to one dealership per country, in the capital city.
Countertop Soil Testing for Africa. African soils are highly vari-
able, and fertilizers are expensive. Economic research in other parts of the world suggests that this is a situation where site-specific information guiding which fertilizer to use and fertilizer rates is potentially profitable.13 The size, technology, and economics of African smallholder farmers, however, make it difficult to use VRT developed for mechanized farms in other parts of the world. This requires a rethinking of the technology required and the business model into which that technology fits.
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Most soil-testing around the world is accomplished by sending a small quantity of soil to a soil-testing lab, which performs wet chemistry. The standard procedure is to determine soil pH; buffer pH, to quantify any pH correction; cation exchange capacity, to determine the soilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to hold nutrients; exchangeable phosphorus and potassium; and organic matter. Most of the soil information for VRT around the world is generated by intensive soil sampling within large fields and sending those soil samples to a lab. Several approaches to intensive soil sampling have been developed, including grid and soil zone methods. One of the major constraints to VRT is the cost of intensive soil sampling. Some of this laboratory chemistry has been adapted to hand-held devices that can be taken to a field for on-thespot testing. Ion sensitive electrodes (ISE) are commercially available for testing of pH and other soil nutrients. The portable soil pH sensor has been around for years, runs for extended periods off battery power, and is relatively rugged and inexpensive. ISEs for nutrients are also available, although they are more expensive than the pH sensor. The most common use of these devices is in troubleshooting soil nutrient problems. They are not commonly used to provide information for VRT because of field size and the fact that laboratory testing is still more accurate. There has been research on mechanizing ISEs for intensive soiltesting of large fields.14 A pH soil sensor has been commercialized, but sales have been limited by concerns about robustness of the sensor for field use,
Science&Technology
accuracy, and its inability to quantify the corrective responseâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;usually the amount of lime to be applied.15 One aspect of the problem which requires rethinking is the spatial resolution of samples. The modal resolution of soil sampling in the United States is 2.5 acres or about 1 hectare. In many parts of Africa, field sizes are 0.5 hectare or less. A system which used one composite soil sample per field on African smallholder farms would achieve greater spatial resolution than the grid or soil sampling systems used by American farmers. Because of population pressure, field size is decreasing in many African countries. In mechanized agriculture, GPS location-finding technology is essential to VRT because it allows farmers to reliably identify within-field sites which require specific inputs. Depending on the technology, U.S. farmers can usually identify within field sites requiring fertilizer, pesticides, or other inputs within one meter. With the most sophisticated GPS technology, accuracy within a centimeter is possible. In Africa, while there are disputes about field boundaries, the general location of most smallholder fields is well-known. This makes manual location identification a possibility. One solution, which has been discussed by soil scientists and agricultural economists in Africa, is a countertop battery-powered ISE with a digital readout providing a fertilizer recommendation. A farmer could bring a composite soil sample from his or her field. The crop and perhaps some information on soil textureâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;
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whether it is sandy, clay, or loamâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; could be inputted. With mass production, the cost of this device could be relatively low, perhaps less than fifty dollars. Introduction of the countertop sensors should be accompanied by a training program for agro-dealers and extension information for farmers. The countertop ISE could be located in an extension or non-governmental organization (NGO) office, but for sustainability, the most likely location would be in an agro-dealer shop. The dealer would have a strong incentive to maintain the machine because it would bring customers to his or her shop. If tinkering with calibration of the machine or the recommendations is a concern, governments, donors, or NGOs could implement a simple testing program with â&#x20AC;&#x153;reference soil samplesâ&#x20AC;? of known composition. This would be similar to the way that many governments, even those in developing countries, regularly test public scales, gas station metering, and other measuring devices. To the best of our knowledge, while this technology has been discussed, it is not under systematic development.
Utilizing Remote Sensing in African Agriculture. The utili-
zation of remote sensing imagery of African fields can be divided into two categories by scale: large-scale imagery that could influence the decisions of governments or activities over a regional scale, and small-scale imagery that can affect within-farm or withinfield management. Lower resolution (10-30 meter) imagery from satellites is being used in a variety of ways,
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including assessment of crop production for famine early warning systems, forestry and natural resource assessments, and climate change research.16 The ability to distinguish crop types, to quantify plant biomass production, and to detect crop growth stages is well-documented.17 Higher resolution imagery (1 to 3 meters) would be much more useful for in-field, in-season farm decisions. This higher resolution imagery might come from satellites but more likely from loweraltitude sensors such as aerial, drone, or on-ground vehicles. Some applications of remote sensing information on African smallholder farms might include crop management decisions concerning field boundaries. Many African farmers possess no written or other legal title to the land they farm. Land farming rights and ownership are often determined by local custom. Aerial or unmanned aerial vehicles could be used to produce local maps, which could be validated on the ground by local elders, and boundaries could be referenced to any existing survey points or geographic coordinates to produce a record much more cheaply than with ground-based surveying. In Africa, it is technically possible to use satellite imagery to identify weather or pest problems and to alert farmers via the cell phones that many of them now carry. For instance, farmers might be alerted to an advancing cloud of locusts or rain storms that might ruin crops ready for harvest. With very high resolution imagery, it might be possible to alert farmers by cell phone of pest problems and nutrient deficiencies in their fields.
LOWENBERG-DEBOER AND ERICKSON
Science&Technology
Policy Implications. Develop- op these technologies for them. In
ment of precision agriculture technologies for Africa would be promoted by the same policies that encourage innovation in general, including security, stable and remunerative prices for producers, access to international markets, and protection of intellectual property. Public agricultural research institutions will probably play a major role in development of precision agriculture in Africa because farms are small. No farm has the capacity to develop these technologies, nor are they seen as having the purchasing power to motivate agribusiness firms to devel-
Africa, agricultural technology for smallholder farmers is a public good, which in theory should be provided by public institutions. To be successful in this arena, agricultural research, public or private, must break out of the green revolution focus on plant breeding and related inputs like fertilizers and pesticides.18 Information is an agricultural input just like seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. Precision agriculture uses electronic technology to furnish more site-specific and timely information for crop production. This information is important in Africa, just as it is elsewhere.
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1 J. Lowenberg-DeBoer and K. Erickson, ed. Precision Farming Profitability (West Lafayette: Purdue University, 2000), 1. 2 Charles H. Godfray, John R. Beddington, Ian R. Crute, Lawrence Haddad, David Lawrence, James Muir, Jules Pretty, Sherman Robinson, Sandy M. Thomas, and Camilia Toulmin, “Food Security: The Challenge of Feeding 9 Billion People,” Science 327, no. 5967(February 2010): 812-818; Robin Gebbers and Viacheslav Adamchuk, “Precision Agriculture and Food Security,” Science 327:5967 (February 2010): 828-831. 3 T.W. Griffin and J. Lowenberg-DeBoer, “Worldwide adoption and profitability of precision agriculture: implications for Brazil,”Revista de Politica Agricola 14, no. 4 (October 2005): 20–38. S.M. Swinton and J. Lowenberg-DeBoer, “Evaluating the Profitability of Site-Specific Farming,” Journal of Production Agriculture 11, no. 4 (October 1998): 439446. 4 Griffin and Lowenberg-DeBoer, “Worldwide adoption and profitability of precision agriculture: implications for Brazil.” 5 J. Lowenberg-DeBoer and T.W. Griffin, “FutureFarm and the Future of Precision Agriculture in Europe” (Address to the Joint International Agriculture Conference, Wageningen University, The Netherlands, 2-8 June 2009). 6 T.W. Griffin and J. Lowenberg-DeBoer. “Worldwide adoption and profitability of precision
agriculture: implications for Brazil”; J. LowenbergDeBoer, “Precision Agriculture in Argentina,” Earth Observation Magazine (Spring 1999): MA13-MA15, Internet, http://www.agriculturadeprecision.org/ presfut/PrecAgInArgentina.htm (date accessed: 9 April 2010). 7 Griffin and Lowenberg-DeBoer, “Worldwide adoption and profitability of precision agriculture: implications for Brazil.” 8 L.D. Whipker and J. T. Akridge,“Precision Agricultural Services Dealership Survey Results,” Internet, http://www.agriculture.purdue.edu/ssmc (date accessed: 1 April 2010). 9 J. Lowenberg-DeBoer, “Precision Agriculture: Answer to Feeding 9 Billion People?” (Presentation at the Summer Institute for International Agriculture, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, July 2002). 10 S. Blackmore, “Developing the Principles of Precision Farming. Proceedings of Agrotech 99,” Internet, http://www.cpf.kvl.dk/Papers/DPPF.pdf (date accessed: 1 April 2010). 11 Griffin and Lowenberg-DeBoer, “Worldwide adoption and profitability of precision agriculture: implications for Brazil.” 12 N. Maine, J. Lowenberg-DeBoer, W.T. Nell, and Z. G Alemu, “Impact of variable-rate application of nitrogen on yield and profit: A case study from South Africa,” Internet, http://www.springerlink.com/content/f86447265n141342/ (date
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accessed: 1 April 2010). 13 S.M. Swinton and J. Lowenberg-DeBoer, “Evaluating the Profitability of Site-Specific Farming,” Journal of Production Agriculture 11, no. 4 (October 1998): 439-446. 14 B. Sethuramasamyraja, V.I. Adamchuk, A. Dobermann, D.B. Marx, D.D. Jones, and G.E. Meyer, “Agitated soil measurement method for integrated on-the-go mapping of soil pH, potassium and nitrate contents,” Computers and Electronics in Agriculture 60, no. 2 (2008): 212–225. 15 AGRHYMET Regional Centre, AGRHYMET Monthly Bulletin, Internet, http://www.veristech. com/products/soilph.aspx (date accessed: 1 April 2010). 16 FEWS, “Famine Early Warning Systems Network, United States Agency for International Devel-
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opment,” USAID, Internet, http://www.fews.net/ Pages/default.aspx (date accessed: 1 April 2010); M.J. Swift and K.D. Shepherd, “Saving Africa’s Soils: Science and Technology for Improved Soil Management in Africa,” http://www.worldagroforestry. org/sensingsoil/publications/saving_soils_2007.pdf (date accessed: 1 April 2010); AGRHYMET Regional Centre, AGRHYMET Monthly Bulletin 18 (April-May 2008), Internet, http://www.agrhymet.ne/PDF/ Bulletin%20mensuel/Avril-Mai%202008_ang.pdf (date accessed: 1 April 2010). 17 M. S. Moran, Y. Inoue, and E. M. Barnes, “Opportunities and limitations for image-based remote sensing in precision crop management,” Remote Sens. Environ 61, no. 3 (1997): 319-346. 18 Godfray et al. “Food Security: The Challenge of Feeding 9 Billion People.”
Books The Return of Peace Review by Paula R. Newberg Michael Semple. Reconciliation in Afghanistan. Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009. 104 pp. $8.00. More than eight years after Operation Enduring Freedom began in Afghanistan, sixteen years after the Taliban entered the country and ultimately took control of Kabul, and just over thirty years after the Soviet Unionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s invasion, the international community met in London, once again, to discuss the elusive prospects for peace in Afghanistan. The passage of time is disturbing and depressing: in January 2010, thirty years later, the grip of conflict remained corrosive, divisive, tenacious, and unremitting. The years since 2001, when the Taliban were assumed, wrongly, to be routed from power, have been frustrating and dangerous. The installation and subsequent election of President Hamid Karzai, and the passage of a Constitution, led many Afghans initially to believe that opportunities for stability and security might finally be at hand. This impression was brief and misleading. Western troops, air power, and reconstruction teams did not defeat the Taliban movement. Instead, the Taliban turned the confusion of recent years into opportunities for its own renewal, and from its roosts in the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the movement has broadened its reach and, in a sense, reshaped southwest Asia. The Taliban has kept the armies of Pakistan
Paula R. Newberg is the Marshall B. Coyne Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, and former Special Advisor to the United Nations.
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and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the defensive, forced the United States into a costly war, effectively recaptured large parts of Afghanistan’s territory, and created enormous vulnerabilities in Pakistan. But Taliban victories have also instigated a war of slow attrition: the insurgency has impoverished a weak state, undercut a weaker government, and forced perpetual insecurity upon the population. Having only recently returned to the community of nations, Afghanistan appears to have regressed to its status as a place where the contagion of revolt is born. A small resis-
form an unwilling army of the displaced and dispossessed. Each diagnosis justifies different views of the ongoing conflict and its potential solutions. Certainly the return of the Taliban has changed the calculations of success or failure in Afghanistan, for Afghans and for the international community. Dealing with the Taliban, or at least contemplating it, raises difficult questions about the role it plays or will be allowed to play in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere. Everyone acknowledges, however, that the Taliban is now a politically disruptive force with which to reckon.
Fluid politics, changing alliances, and porous borders have had a way of
blurring distinctions among ideologies, interests, and intricate tribal relationships. tance group once thought to be ragtag and impoverished, the Taliban has become tactically clever and strategically flexible. What exactly is this force? Opinions differ. To some, the Taliban is simply a terrorist group that must be vanquished. To others, it is a movement that just won’t go away and will wreak havoc until it is included as part of a solution to Afghanistan’s—and, some would say, Pakistan’s—future. Others believe it to be an ideological movement potent enough to sway a citizenry and thus is either a sworn enemy or a future partner. Some view the Taliban as the source of corruption. Still, others view it as a group of cunning leaders and underprivileged followers who
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Bargains or Bribes? What does reckoning mean? This question lies at the heart of Michael Semple’s slim but incisive volume, Reconciliation in Afghanistan. It is among the most troubling problems facing Afghans and the foreign forces that have been anchoring the antiTaliban battle for many years. Indeed, the current war is a mixed metaphor: foreign troops are fighting partly on behalf of an Afghan government that has little say about the conduct of war and partly, or even more, in their own, not necessarily congruent, interests. The fraught relationship between Afghanistan’s government and its military allies makes not only fighting, but also the idea of peace, complicated and puzzling. While NATO members high-
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light the risk to world peace, Afghans understand all too well that the greatest risk to them is the country’s future governance and, some would say, the future of their state. Negotiation and compromise have troubled pasts in Afghanistan. Fluid politics, changing alliances, and porous borders have had a way of blurring distinctions among ideologies, interests, and intricate tribal relationships. British gazetteers detailed centuries of Afghan history typified by deal-making and failed bargains, similar to news chronicles today.1 Tribal leaders, however, would preside over a form of collective responsibility for their communities and territory in return for retaining their autonomy and gaining access to trade.2 Although Western caricatures portray Afghanistan as a place that remains immune to the blandishments of civilization and full of independent and unreliable fighters, these traditional relationships have broken in the course of thirty years of war, perhaps no more so than in the past decade. Semple’s long career among the Afghans has left him with considerable respect for the complexities of local society. His views on Afghanistan and Afghans are nuanced and sympathetic, and he locates the roots of negotiation and potential reconciliation in Afghanistan’s culture as much as its political imperatives.3 His analysis of contemporary politics assumes not only intrigue but also a polity that desperately needs to repair the wounds of war. He recognizes the profound risks and uncertainties that lie at the heart of today’s Afghanistan and the fallibilities of the government, insurgents, locals,
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and foreigners. He is also unusually patient with duplicity. As a representative of the European Union, Semple was forced to leave Afghanistan by the Karzai government, which accused him of negotiating with the Taliban—he says he was not—while it was itself engaged in talks with insurgents. Nonetheless, the broad contours of recent Afghan history are not encouraging. The war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s reflected divisions between urban and rural Afghans, strains between tribes and territory, and resistance to a central state. Occasionally, efforts were made to negotiate among fighters, including discussions between Kabul’s communist government and westernbacked mujahidin. Nevertheless, the mujahidin were rarely united except against their enemies and, even then, only when forced by their arms suppliers. The acts they committed against civilians rise to the level of war crimes in the minds of many Afghans, who fear that reconciliation would include old warlords as well as new. Therefore, many participants and observers feared the worst when the Geneva Accords sent Soviet troops home in early 1989. The Soviet Union, with Eduard Shevardnadze speaking on behalf of Moscow, feared the chaos that became inevitable by promoting a power-sharing plan among warring mujahidin fighters. It promoted a power-sharing plan with the rump communist government that might have led to the eventual transfer of power to the mujahidin.4 No one wanted to bargain, and in the years between 1989 and 1994, Afghans were both witnesses and victims of stubborn power grabs among all armed groups. Anarchy gave rise to
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the Taliban a few years later. This was a tragedy for Afghanistan, its region, and all the powers—Islamabad, Moscow, and Washington—whose long, deep animosities led to shortsighted decisions that resonate so loudly today. The rise of the Taliban challenged Afghanistan’s traditional societies yet again. In the 1990s, as the Taliban seized power, negotiation took another form. Controlling much of Afghanistan by edict and enforcing its will through community structures, the movement would occasionally deal with international actors for intelligence, discussions of narcotics, or infrequent humanitarian access. Then, as now, the international community would vacillate between rejecting the Taliban and recognizing the need to work with them. Then, as now, questions would be raised about the degree to which occasional cooperation meant validating Taliban ideology. And then, as now, there was little understanding that the Taliban cared little about the opinions of others but did understand the effects of its practices on the Afghan population.
program, but according to Semple, the new government’s programs were weak and ineffective. They concentrated on civilian rather than military leaders, most of them inactive after 2001; included opposition leaders who were not involved with the Taliban; and relied on personal interventions by the government or Western allies rather than institutional, society-wide programs. Most important, reintegration ignored mid-rank insurgents and oppositionists—groups that are critical for stability. In the end, few participated, and most of these efforts stopped when fighting escalated in 2005. Semple’s point is an important one: reintegration was intended as a first step toward ending conflict rather than as a fundamental shift in Afghanistan’s power relationships.6 Without that step, conflict, rather than negotiated peace, dominated the political landscape. Ultimately, reintegration was superficial and thus unworkable. Like the demilitarization, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program fostered earlier by the international community, and the political vetting process insti-
The [Taliban] movement may be singu-
lar and isolated, but it is not likely to disappear. After 2001, the situation changed. Semple details a number of “minimalist” efforts on the part of the Afghan government to help reintegrate individuals associated with opposition.5 On the whole, these were intended to neutralize top leaders rather than former rank-and-file fighters. The Karzai government thought this was a manageable
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tuted in anticipation of the 2004 and 2005 elections, reintegration floundered among the vast complexities of Afghanistan’s domestic and international entanglements. Semple refers to these programs as reconciliation, but his analysis demonstrates that reintegration without reconciliation was hopelessly incomplete.7
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Reconciling Whom to Whom, and What? If reintegration is to mean more than providing jobs to former fighters, it must rest on a firm political foundation that defines the shape of a future polity. If the Afghan government and its allies do not agree on their joint mission—that is, on what it is that peace might look like and how to achieve it—then neither the instrument of reintegration nor the broader theme of political amity makes much sense. The glaring absence of agreement on these fundamental points slices through every element of war and governance. President Karzai came to power promising political tolerance, and his reelection, though deservedly contested, included commitments to increase contacts with the insurgency. Saudi Arabia has encouraged discussions among all parties to the conflict, although its efforts have not borne fruit. The thrust of these talks, feeble though they may be, is clear: war has gone on for too long, and all sides may have to give up something in the name of peace. However, the United States—the major military power and dominant political influence in the region—has eschewed outright negotiation with the Taliban while at the same time increasing its military presence and encouraging reintegration. It treats the reintegration of fighters as an economic instrument that can be separated from the processes of reconciliation, undoubtedly fearing that seeking broader relationships would validate the insurgency’s policies or moral authority.8 The Department of State’s January 2010 policy paper—the result of a year’s reconsideration—made no mention of reconciliation, even as the
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Afghan government was pursuing more avenues for discussion with its opponents.9 Instead, it pursued a triple play: seeking a military solution to the war, attempting to strengthen the economy, and offering reintegration as a way to achieve both. Afghanistan is hardly the only country to grapple with such problems. War is built on partisanships that arise from vastly different views of politics, morality, and the efficacy of violence. Effecting justice in political transition is exceptionally difficult. It becomes all the more so when no institutions exist to shepherd a transitional justice process and when only small artifacts of transition—ministries without ministers, politics without parties, a constitution but few means to protect rights— are apparent to the population.10 The country’s struggle with the Taliban has divided its people since the movement first arrived in the mid1990s. From the beginning, the Taliban used village and tribal power effectively, building on established relationships and, with time, surpassing them. In some areas, the movement remains influential even where it is not powerful, and it has been able to force local and national authorities to take account of its shadow government. Among the ironies of Karzai’s government: parts of Afghanistan now rely on Taliban courts to adjudicate disputes in the absence of state institutions. Semple calls the Taliban a “vanguardist brotherhood”: “They are in the vanguard in the sense that they assert moral authority over the general population, and they are a brotherhood in the sense that they have a strong awareness of identity and solidarity.”11
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Romantic? Perhaps so. The lesson Semple draws, however, is a critical one: fifteen years of the Taliban has changed the country in ways that cannot be ignored. The movement may be singular and isolated, but it is not likely to disappear. Its direct link with terror—its own and, by extension, Al Qaeda’s— has limited the capacity of legitimate governments to deal with the Taliban. Without a political wing—unlike the Irish Republican Army and Sinn Fein, for example—its capacity to deal with government is limited, as is the Afghan government’s ability to engage directly on political matters. The latter, Semple rightly notes, is the fault of the Taliban for conceiving of itself as a military force, and of the government for failing to understand the intricacies of negotiating peace during war.12 This is the reason that Semple argues strenuously for a maximalist view of reconciliation “to restore relationships and create lasting peace.”13 Despite an articulated demand for such reconciliation in the Bonn Accords of 2001, this clearly has not been tried in Afghanistan, and according to Semple, “there is no common vision of what a reconciliation process would look like.”14 The international community drafted principles and practices in 2008 to support an Afghan government-led approach to reconciliation—about which Semple sounds a tad skeptical—but has yet to find many takers. There are many reasons for this, but two are fundamental. First, the moral authority of the Afghan government after the 2009 presidential election has dropped dramatically; multi-faceted corruption and widely acknowledged incompetence make the well-intentioned Karzai government a [ 1 2 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
weak partner at best. For the Taliban and other fighters to reconcile with the government would mean accepting its legitimacy. That has become an increasingly difficult thing to do, even though the Taliban is itself far from legitimate in the eyes of Afghan citizens. Second, there remains a prevailing concern among many Afghans of all political colors “that international partners might be negotiating separate peaces that run counter to the government’s view of the national interest.”15 This fear is well-founded. NATO members have been re-evaluating their commitments to prosecuting this war, and to some, striking deals is a quick route out of the Hindu Kush. Others, including the United States, have publicly announced policies that bypass the central government and pay tribes to change their affiliations. These are not separate peaces, but separate wars of convenience with hardly the bricks on which to build a firm state capable of determining Afghanistan’s political prospects. In the end, Semple is an optimist who believes that justice can be achieved, and is confident that “most” Taliban insurgents can be persuaded to participate in a reconciliation process. But reconciling requires agreement about basic principles—not just about the reconciliation process or the need for all sides to change their minds, but about the ruleabiding, rights-protecting state that Afghanistan must become. The odds of this happening soon seem slim. In a war environment so tainted by terror, with so many outside powers involved in their country, many Afghans still believe that they are once again pawns in a global struggle that extends far beyond them. They probably aren’t wrong.
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NOTES
1 Imperial Gazetteer of India: Afghanistan and Nepal (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1908), 11-20. 2 Michael Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 15. 3 This contrasts with, for example, Major Jim Gant, One Tribe at a Time (Los Angeles, CA: Nine Sisters Imports, Inc., 2009), Intenet, blog.stevenpressfield.com (date accessed: 25 February 2010). Gant looks at Afghanistan’s village culture as a means to effect western goals. 4 Ahmed Rashid, “A Deal with the Taliban?” New York Review of Books 57, no. 3 (25 February 2010). 5 Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan, 29. 6 Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan, 32. 7 Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan, 42. 8 Some also see reconciliation as a form of appeasement for venal warlords. “Such appeasement deals give vulnerable Afghan populations little incentive to stand up to insurgents, especially if they believe those insurgents have the upper hand.” See
Nick Grono and Candance Rondeaux, “Dealing with brutal Afghan warlords is a mistake,” Boston Globe, 17 January 2010. 9 “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, January 2010.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 2010. 10 The International Center for Transitional Justice notes that deteriorating security conditions also marginalize rights protections that are essential to fulfill the Afghan government’s 2005 Action Plan for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation. Sari Kouvo, “Transitional Justice in the Context of Ongoing Conflict: the Case of Afghanistan,” (ICTJ Briefing, September 2009). 11 Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan, 67. 12 Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan, 70. 13 Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan, 1. 14 Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan, 87. 15 Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan, 75. 16 Henry McDonald, “We can persuade Taliban to be peaceful—expelled EU man,” The Guardian, 16 February 2008.
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Narrating the Path toward Genocide Prevention Review by Michael Morfit Geoffrey Robinson, If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die: How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. 340 pp. $35.00. In 1999 East Timor—then a tiny province at the tail end of thirteen thousand islands that constitute the vast archipelago of Indonesia—was subjected to systematic and widespread violence at the hands of local militia and the Indonesian military. The province’s capital city, Dili, was essentially sacked, looted, and burned, along with many small towns and villages. Approximately fifteen hundred people were killed and around half of the population—out of an estimated total of about nine hundred thousand—fled their homes in fear of their lives.1 This orchestrated violence was the explosive response to the September 1999 referendum, sponsored by the United Nations (UN) with the agreement of the Indonesian government. The results were a crushing defeat for those forces, both inside East Timor and elsewhere, who were hoping for a continuation of East Timor’s status as an Indonesian province. Nearly 80 percent of the population voted for complete independence.2 In doing so, they forcefully rejected twenty-four years of Indonesian occupation after an Indonesian military force had invaded the former Portuguese colony in 1975.
Michael Morfit is visiting professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a coordinator for the Master of Science in Foreign Service international development concentration. He also served as a commissioned Foreign Service Officer with USAID and as vice president of Development Alternatives, Inc.
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Appalled by the reports of the savage vengeance by local militia—apparently funded, trained, and directed by the Indonesian military—and by the clear failure of Indonesian authorities to restore order, the international community acted with unprecedented speed. Brushing aside long-standing Indonesian resistance to international peacekeepers, the UN Security Council quickly authorized such a force. Within two weeks of the referendum, the first international troops, largely from Australia, were arriving to disarm the local militia and restore order. The UN established a protective international presence that would expand to encompass a broad range of development programs and remain in place until the new state of Timor-Leste was formally recognized by the UN in May 2002. Geoffrey Robinson’s carefully researched, well-written, and passionate book, If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die, attempts to provide an authoritative account of these turbulent events. As an established and respected scholar of Southeast Asia, he has lived and conducted research in Bali, speaks and reads Indonesian, and has experience as an analyst with Amnesty International. Very ambitious in its scope, Robinson’s book has three distinct objectives. First, it wants to provide a balanced, carefully-documented, and in-depth historical account of the events leading up to the 1999 violence. Second, Robinson was a part of the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) during the critical months leading up to the September referendum and in the period of violent chaos that immediately followed. His book is a first-hand account of the atrocities in East Timor
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and the international intervention that ultimately brought the conflict to an end. Third, Robinson seeks to identify some general lessons learned that can help explain how such violence can be stopped in the future. Can Robinson deliver on this very ambitious agenda? There are good reasons to be skeptical about any such effort. The three different objectives that Robinson identifies entail very different approaches and methods—and different standards and criteria for assessing them. We do not judge the adequacy of a historical account using the same criteria that we use for assessing a personal memoir. An historical account tries to explain past events. It can be criticized for its failure to examine all the evidence or its inability to provide a coherent and convincing explanation of the existing evidence. A personal memoir, in contrast, narrates events from a very individual and defiantly subjective perspective. It can be boring or lack insight, but its failure to consider all the evidence is not relevant. In other words, a very compelling memoir may be a very bad history. Conversely, an excellent history may provide us with no insights into the life and perceptions of any specific individual. In addition, general rules of thumb, lessons learned, or guidelines are to be judged on the basis of yet a third set of criteria. For these, the primary consideration is identifying “what works” rather than “what happened” or “what I experienced.” Lessons learned are judged on how useful they are in dealing with the practical problems of the future rather than how adequate an explanation they provide of the past.
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To combine all three enterprises— each with its own distinct objectives, approaches, criteria, and standards—is not only ambitious, but it also courts confusion. At minimum, it is a perilous exercise. It can overwhelm the reader in detail, lose its focus, and muddle its objectives. It runs the risks of trying to do too many different things—and of doing none of them well. Against this background, how does Robinson fare? Is his book equally successful in achieving all three objectives that he himself sets? The answer is mixed. In some respects, Robinson excels, offering new evidence and a fresh perspective. In others, his ambition trips him up, limits his insights, and undercuts some of the core points he is trying to make.
The Historical Account. Robinson’s attempt to provide an historical account is largely contained in the first six chapters of his book. It is a serious, methodical, and well-researched effort. Robinson has uncovered significant evidence and is able to offer a convincing explanation for the sudden and explosive violence that gripped East Timor during this period. This is where Robinson is breaking new ground, and his work adds significantly to what we know about the events of 1999. His core thesis is that what the world saw in 1999 as a sudden explosion of violence was in fact the continuation of a long-established and deliberate Indonesian strategy of repression to enforce its rule over Timor-Leste. To support this thesis, Robinson has been able to capitalize on his experience as an analyst with Amnesty International as well as his previous fieldwork in
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Bali. His account not only cites public statements by government officials— Indonesian and others—but also draws on a wide range of internal Indonesian government memos, plans, and directives. These demonstrate conclusively that the local militia were not a spontaneous manifestation of local opposition to the results of the referendum. They were instead the deliberate creation of the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI), which nurtured and directed the militia as a key mechanism for defeating opponents of Indonesian rule and generally intimidating society at large. For these reasons, the TNI is the arch-villain in Robinson’s account, which sees the military as the prime strategist, instigator, organizer, mentor, funder, and supervisor of deliberate violence inflicted on the people of East Timor. This arch-villain was enabled by international powers—particularly the United States and Australia—which in Robinson’s view were both politically acquiescent and morally compromised. The international community generally turned a blind eye to this reality for almost twenty years, allowing the TNI to pursue its occupation policies relatively untroubled by international scrutiny or condemnation. This acquiescence began to change only in 1991, when TNI forces opened fire on unarmed civilians at a funeral ceremony for a fallen resistance figure. Even then, the general policies and practices of the Indonesian authorities continued unabated with little serious opposition from most Western governments. In contrast to these villains and their international enablers, the people of East Timor are the heroes of Rob-
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inson’s account and, in the end, are the primary concern of his narrative. Long-suffering and largely neglected by the world, they persevered and ultimately triumphed. Despite their economic poverty, limited political experience, and meager institutional and organizational resources, they endured the violence of a much larger, betterresourced, more powerful, and ruthless foe, and emerged from the flames of 1999 as a tiny, remote, and battered yet brave nation whose experience can illuminate lessons for the UN and the international community. There is no doubt that the Indonesian authorities, particularly—but not exclusively—the military forces, behaved abominably in East Timor. Yet, there is something a bit unsatisfactory about this Manichean division of Robinson’s narrative into an epic struggle between the forces of evil and the forces of good. It is not simply that Robinson has taken sides, although there is no doubt where he stands. It is instead a question about whether this stark depiction of two “sides” quite fits what we know about events in East Timor and within Indonesia.
What were They Thinking. The curiously one-dimensional picture that emerges of the TNI is not only a limited perspective. It also points to a significant problem with Robinson’s account. Permeating his narrative is the view that the TNI wanted to hold on to East Timor at all costs, even at the risk of launching a wave of destruction that brought international condemnation. In his account, we find out a lot about what the Indonesian military did, and how it did it. But we find out little about [ 1 2 8] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
why they did it. We do not get inside their heads. We learn little about their intention, and this is a significant gap. To write history is not simply to try to discover “what really happened” but also to illuminate “what did they think they were doing?” And to ask “what were they thinking” is, at least in part, to ask “which interests did they think they were protecting?” There are two broad sets of interests that seem obvious and that one would expect to see examined in an historical account such as this: political and economic interests. Yet Robinson offers us surprisingly little on either issue. I would argue that the TNI had two significant political interests at stake in East Timor, both of which had little or nothing to do with the East Timorese people themselves. First, in the turbulence of the period immediately following the resignation of Suharto, Indonesia’s second president, the stability and integrity of the entire Indonesian state seemed to be in question. Restive independence movements in the resource-rich provinces of Aceh and Papua threatened to precipitate a process of political unraveling that was profoundly disturbing to the TNI. A successful independence movement in East Timor could set a dangerous precedent for movements in other richer and strategically more important parts of the country. These fears may have been exaggerated or ill-founded, but they were real and they were not confined only to the TNI leadership. Second, during the time that events were unfolding in East Timor, Indonesia was undergoing a fundamental political transformation as it struggled to establish a new political order. On
MORFIT
the national stage, the military was not only losing its long-held position of dominance in Indonesian politics; it was also losing its common vision of its appropriate role. Thus, managing the demands for independence in East Timor was not an isolated problem but part of this broader, unfolding drama. What was at stake was not simply Indonesian control over the territory of East Timor but also the military’s predominant power in the Indonesian polity and its privileged place in the Indonesian economy.
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economic interests to defend. Many of these interests are controlled by and benefit the military, both individually and institutionally. In fact, the Indonesian military still derives a significant amount of its operational revenues from off-budget sources, including a wide range of companies operating in lucrative sectors or resource-rich regions of the country. In examining the policies and practices of the TNI in these provinces, these economic interests help us to understand what they were thinking. Yet, there is very little in Robinson’s
In Robinson’s case, we cannot help feeling that his loathing for the villains he has identified in his personal witness gets in the way of fully understanding them as historical actors. Against this unfolding drama, Robinson treats the TNI pretty much as a unitary body, despite his impressive knowledge of the various intelligence bodies, military command structures, and special operations units. Yet, the military was divided, uncertain, and weakened. This complex political environment, which included “spoilers” who actively sought to undermine the more liberal and accommodating voices that were struggling to prevail post-Soeharto, goes unmentioned and unexamined in Robinson’s account. Similarly, economic interests go almost unmentioned in Robinson’s narrative, apart from a vague reference in his introductory chapter. This is puzzling. In Aceh and Papua, there are vast natural resources, such as oil, gas, and timber, and thus substantial
account that gives us insight into why this happened in East Timor. Because of these gaps, what Robinson gives us is really more of a military and political chronicle than an historical explanation. It is an admirably meticulous chronicle, drawing together a lot of primary and secondary data to create a coherent narrative of a chain of events. But because we see the TNI as one-dimensional villains rather than historical actors with interests and intentions, it falls short in giving us a sense of why things happened.
A “Culture of Violence.” Rob-
inson vigorously disputes the suggestion that some kind of long-established “culture of violence” in East Timor accounts for the savagery of militia attacks by Timorese upon their fellow
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Timorese.3 The existence of this allegedly indigenous culture of violence was used by the Indonesian authorities as both an explanation and an excuse for the explosion of violence following the referendum and for their inability to control it. Robinson argues strongly that this was spurious and self-serving. Instead, Robinson sees the violence, repression, and brutality that erupted in 1999 as the culmination of a longestablished and deliberate policy of the Indonesian-occupying authorities to impose their rule. Robinson acknowledges that the use of local militia to suppress political dissent was already an established practice under the Portuguese colonial regime. He states that, “by the time the Indonesian forces were preparing to invade the country in 1975, the East Timorese were not only familiar with the idea of local militia forces, they had centuries of experience serving in them.”4 The TNI capitalized on this, and as Robinson observes, they incorporated this same strategy to respond to separatist movements in other parts of the country. But when does the long-standing colonial and Indonesian policy of using armed militias to suppress dissent cease to be an external imposition and become a part of the indigenous culture? After centuries of experience in using militia and violence to eliminate political opponents and to intimidate the general society, why not conclude that this was not an external imposition but instead had become an integral part of the indigenous political culture? Robinson’s earnest desire to exonerate the East Timorese and to refute the
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idea of a culture of violence is facilitated by the timeframe of his narrative. His narrative ends on a high point: the Indonesian occupation is thrown out in 1999; international intervention arrives to secure the peace; and by 2000-2001, a shattered economy and brutalized society begin to rebuild under the beneficent protection of the international community, supported by the largess and technical expertise of international development agencies. His book anticipates, but does not specifically describe, the emergence of Timor-Leste as an independent nation in 2002, and it does not venture into the post-independence era. If Robinson’s narrative extended to the present, however, he would have had to account for a pattern of political violence that has continued to plague the independent nation of TimorLeste. In 2006 an international peacekeeping force had to be re-introduced into the country to separate battling factions and to reestablish order. Violence erupted again in 2007, and in 2008 armed factions launched a failed coup and attempted to assassinate President and Nobel Laureate José Ramos-Horta. In short, counter to Robinson’s picture, violence, repression, and armed conflict cannot be dismissed as an external imposition by the Indonesians. They are instead an indigenous mode of operation.
Personal Witness. About halfway
through the book, Robinson clearly shifts from academic-historical to personal witness. Chapter Six marks his own personal entry on the stage as a member of the UNAMET team. In the following chapters, his personal wit-
MORFIT
ness is compelling, tense, gripping, and in several places both heart-wrenching and haunting. He was on hand to witness directly the Indonesian efforts to intimidate the population prior to the referendum and its furious backlash when the call for independence was overwhelmingly endorsed. His anguish in reliving and describing these events is palpable, and the pictures he evokes are vivid, harrowing, and haunting. One powerful example is the time Robinson provides unofficial UNAMET security by simply accompanying an East Timor family to the morgue to reclaim the body of their son. He then follows their pick-up truck home in the dark, with the bouncing feet of the dead son being picked up in the headlights of the following UNAMET vehicle as it makes its way through the smoke of destruction in Dili.5 It is a harrowing example of the intensity of what he witnessed and his ability to convey the scene powerfully. This compelling personal narrative helps us understand the barely-contained anger that Robinson clearly has for the Indonesian military, its collaborators, and its international enablers. It underscores the strength of Robinson’s book as a statement of personal witness, which is his second objective. But it also underscores the inherent tension between his three very distinct objectives. A gripping personal narrative, with anguished first-hand descriptions of outrageous injustice, makes for a compelling memoir. This does not, however, make for good historical narrative. Indeed, as we have seen, it can lead to a one-dimensional characterization of key actors and a failure to understand the perceptions, inten-
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tions, and thinking that explain their actions. In Robinson’s case, we cannot help feeling that his loathing for the villains he has identified in his personal witness gets in the way of fully understanding them as historical actors.
Lessons. Robinson’s third objective—
identifying lessons learned—is probably the least satisfying part of the book. In stark contrast to his careful narrative of events and his record of personal witness, it seems flat, slightly generic, and not terribly insightful. Tacked on as a final chapter, Robinson seeks to provide some broader insights and rules of thumb for future peacekeeping operations. They are not controversial, but neither are they particularly inspired, insightful, or useful. Perhaps his most important insight is that the UN is capable of acting swiftly and effectively when the key political forces are aligned.6 This is encouraging because we are so used to thinking of multilateral and UN peacekeeping operations as cautious, reluctant, lumbering, generally under-resourced, and often out-gunned and out-witted. Robinson tries to show that this is not always or inevitably the case. After some initial agonizing, the international community ultimately moved swiftly and in force to stop the violence, impose order, and provide a benevolent shield under which the new nation of Timor-Leste could be born. At the same time, Robinson’s narrative makes it clear that it was a close call. In most cases, however, the stars are not in alignment, and multilateral peacekeeping efforts frequently are slow, under-resourced, and only partially successful. Although Robinson offers
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a happy counter-example, he does not provide much to help us understand which stars need to be aligned—and which can be brushed aside—how to bring them into alignment, and how to keep them there. Robinson’s book does not succeed as a guidebook for future action, and
there are some significant limitations to his historical narrative. Nonetheless, it is a notable achievement. Wellwritten and lucid, he brings new information into the public realm. Despite the limitations of his approach, he provides a clear narrative and a moving personal account.
NOTES
1 Geoffrey Robinson, If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die: How Genocide was Stopped in East Timor (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), ix; “East Timor unfinished - Editorials & Commentary International Herald Tribune,” The New York Times, Internet, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/06/ opinion/06iht-edtimor.1903512.html (date accessed: 22 April 2010).
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2 World Socialist Website, “Ten Years Since East Timor’s Independence Vote,” Internet, http://www. wsws.org/articles/2009/aug2009/pers-a31.shtml (date accessed: 22 April 2010). 3 Robinson, If You Leave Us Here, 11. 4 Robinson, If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die, 232. 5 Robinson, If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die, 144. 6 Robinson, If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die, 288.
View from the Ground Surviving Food Insecurity in North Korea Diana Park Surveying the ruined landscape thirty kilometers south of Pyongyang, I whispered to my fellow research assistants, asking for my digital camera stored in the van’s backseat. We needed to keep quiet because our government minders had fallen asleep, allowing us a short opportunity to take pictures of the crop damage, mudslides, and collapsed infrastructure along the next twenty kilometers of the abandoned highway. It grew obvious that North Koreans would face a major food shortage in the upcoming winter.1 Upon visiting North Korea in August 2007, my lasting impression of the country was its dire need for prolonged aid and investment. While my government minders had attempted to show me only the best parts of Pyongyang and the countryside, the poverty was impossible to mask. Even the privileged children of the capital city lacked proper nutrition and medicine.2 While visiting a middle school, I witnessed a child faint from exhaustion, after which the other children tried to mitigate our concerns by saying, “Il-ee upsemneedah,” colloquial North Korean for “It’s no big deal.” Yet, the dark circles under their eyes revealed that, due to constant malnutrition, fainting spells were nothing out of the ordinary for even the most privileged in this country.
Dayea Diana Park is a graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and was a James A. Kelly/Korea Studies fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS in 2009.
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Most North Koreans citizens lack basic human necessities, including food, shelter, and clothing. After experiencing a famine in the late 1990s, severe food shortages have persisted. Meanwhile, survival—for both the regime and citizens—has hinged upon foreign assistance from international donors, mainly the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China.3 However, these donor countries have had little success in affecting domestic policies ranging from nuclear security to human rights. Nevertheless, recent economic and social developments—glimpses of which I saw during my visit—made it clear that the government was struggling desperately to retain its decades-long control over the population.
The Regime. North Koreans lack
political freedoms as well as basic human necessities. Previous efforts by the international community to address the human rights situation in North Korea have proven difficult due to backlashes from the regime. According to Andrei Lankov, a scholar on North Korean society, “the regime is remarkably immune to outside pressure.”4 The regime has hitherto held a monopoly over information to “extremes unprecedented even among Communist dictatorships” in order to keep the population under tight control. The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), South Korea’s Lee Myung-bak government, the United States, and others have issued resolutions and statements decrying the regime’s human rights record. North Korea, however, remains highly suspicious of international calls for human rights improvements, and has denounced resolutions
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adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and UN General Assembly as politically motivated.5 The argument that such resolutions constitute “human rights attacks” and an “infringement on our sovereignty” was often used against outside efforts to address this issue. According to Juche, the North Korean socialist ideology, state sovereignty and self-reliance are necessary precursors to the enjoyment of universal human rights. In the meantime, the government often refers to what it calls “our-style human rights.”6 Faced with mounting international pressure, such a response is typical for a regime preoccupied with its own survival. According to an analysis by the Korea Institute for National Unification, “the leadership perceives two fundamental imperatives at any given juncture: regime security and pragmatic needs.”7 Thus, over the years, the society has grown extremely isolationist under the Workers’ Party.8 Yet, the current economic and social landscape appears more susceptible to change from forces beyond the control of the government.
The 1990s Famine as a Launching Point for Change. North Korea has experienced major societal ruptures since the mid-1990s. Though food scarcity has long been a constant concern for the country, the recent famine was particularly devastating. Observers have attributed to the famine anywhere from 1.5 to 3 million deaths. According to Human Rights Watch, the failure of the Public Distribution System (PDS) to deliver adequate amounts of food to the population was the culprit for the disaster. In
PARK
addition to the overall deficit in food, the rationing system was based on loyalty and status rather than on need.9 As a consequence, whole segments of the population received no food through the PDS during the height of the famine. Until restrictions on food trade and farmers’ markets were lifted during the latter part of the crisis, most North Koreans were hard pressed to find viable options for survival.10 As part of the program, the government also severely restricted travel within its borders and required its citizens to obtain visas for traveling from one town to another.
View From the Ground
individuals.”12 People were able to travel outside of their home districts to buy food or to establish farmers’ markets. Perhaps fearing that these minimal liberalizations had eroded its authority, the government officially re-established the PDS on 1 October 2005. The regime cracked down on unofficial markets and asked the World Food Programme, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other organizations that require control over their own food distribution to leave. Despite these setbacks, some changes in North Korea’s economy and
Recent economic and social developments—glimpses of which I saw during my
visit—made it clear that the government was struggling desperately to retain its decadeslong control over the population. Facing intense international pressure and constant media coverage, Kim Jong-il eventually discontinued the PDS in 1996, allowing people to find food on their own.11 Ironically, tearing down the PDS and allowing private trade enhanced overall access to food. According to Human Rights Watch, major changes occurred in the previously tightly controlled agricultural sector that allowed for improved food production and distribution: “The central government allowed provincial governments to engage in food trading, which had been its exclusive domain, allocated farmland to factories and urban households and not just to cooperative farms, and largely turned a blind eye to private food trading by
society have been increasingly difficult for the ruling regime to reverse. The ubiquity of the black market has emerged as one lasting change. People across the social spectrum, including government officials, now depend on the secondary economy to acquire goods for their survival. This is a setback to a regime that should in theory control the entire economy. This economic trend also corresponds to the formation of social relationships (“patronclient networks”) that help an individual acquire necessities through personal connections, rather than through official processes.13 According to the 2008 White Paper on Human Rights, published by Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU):
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Most ordinary citizens would spend the day at the market even though they were required to report to work. They would simply check the attendance (“punch-in”) and leave for the market. High officials who could not engage in private business themselves would engage in peddling through family members or receive money from the peddlers by looking after their problems.14 Patron-client networks also had a profound impact on the spread of information. During the famine, these informal networks and the unprecedented movement of the population provided a means of communication outside of official outlets, a freedom which the regime heavily restricted before the famine. In the past, the North Korean government held a tighter control over communication and a monopoly over the supply of food and other necessities. Now, however, the leverage that the government once maintained over its people through the social security system has largely deteriorated.15
A Regime Struggling to Maintain Control. The regime has been
trying assiduously to reclaim its command over the economy. The 2009 currency devaluation was seen as a measure to eradicate black market activity. The devaluation, however, incited only devastating chaos: “the reform crippled markets, drove up the price of rice and other goods and led to riots and physical confrontations between civilians and police in some places.”16 Pak Nam-gi, a ranking member of the Worker’s Party
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and a key proponent of the revaluation, was fired from his position. Premier Kim Yong-il subsequently apologized for the blatant failure of the measure. In fact, the regime has already “allowed use of foreign currency and eased restriction on market activities.”17 The fallout from the currency revaluation suggests that the government can no longer dictate economic measures and that the public now has a larger influence on the regime’s actions. Previous economic measures, however disastrous to people’s general livelihood, had not merited an apology such as this one. The currency devaluation is the government’s second attempt in eliminating the black market. In 2002 Pyongyang enacted major economic reforms to counteract its dramatic rise through various measures, including the official recognition of some informal markets already in existence. It also relaxed collectivism in the agricultural sector and tested a pilot private farming initiative. Unfortunately, this only led to partial economic alleviation—mostly for political elites—and worsened general economic conditions through unemployment and extreme inflation for necessities such as food. The price of rice, for example, increased threefold in 2003 and 2004, which would require approximately 80 percent of the income of a non-elite citizen living in the city.18 Therefore, the 2002 reforms exacerbated the inflation and unemployment problems that made the shadow economy the best solution for most people. Again in 2009, the government tried passing reforms to counteract the black market. Yet, they are in a position to fail, as the government has already taken the unprecedented step of
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apologizing for the extreme inflation that swept the country as a result.19 The regime has been struggling with more than simply the black market. The growing rate of defections and illicit movement to China has also proven difficult to reverse. During the famine in the late 1990s, North Koreans began crossing the border into China for food and other resources.20 Although it violates the terms of its ascension to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, the North Korean regime still prohibits the free movement of its citizens in and out of the country. Nevertheless, the defection rate continues to rise. In 2008 the Chosun Ilbo reported 2,809 defections to South Korea, an increase of 10 percent from the previous year, with approximately 15,000 total defectors resettled in the South.21 In addition, according to the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, there are approximately 11,000 North Korean refugees in China.22 KINU estimates that 20,000 to 40,000 escapees have fled north.23 The upward trend in defections throughout the late 1990s and 2000s has prompted increased enforcement and harsher consequences for illegally leaving the country. The growing use of police force to maintain control over its population, coupled with a failing economy, suggests that the government is struggling more than ever to retain its power through the use of fear. In 1998 the North Korean government briefly relaxed the law for people crossing the border to China for “economic” reasons, but then forced most returnees into labor camps for one to six months.24 In 2004 the government increased the
View From the Ground
penalty for leaving the country to five years in prison. Family members of defectors who remain in the country are reported to “have been forcibly relocated to remote areas.”25 When another food crisis emerged in 2006, the North Korean government did not relax its policies on defections, as it had in 1998; instead, it increased control over the nation’s borders, signing an agreement with China to curtail the rate of defection. In December 2006 officials conducted a nationwide “absentee check” as the Border Patrol Command carried out an “arrest campaign,” continuing to crack down on attempted defectors.26 Despite these economic and police measures, black markets and defections persist, indicating a certain permanence to the changes that have happened in North Korean society.
A First Hand Account. As a mem-
ber of an American NGO visiting the country, I expected to see grim-faced pedestrians in drab clothing walking the streets of Pyongyang. Yet, I was shocked to encounter ladies who were wearing pink, orange, yellow, and bright blue. I was even more surprised to see food kiosks, bike shops, and other signs of entrepreneurship throughout the city. Although the 2002 reforms had caused hyperinflation, private sector activity subsequently flourished and emerged as a continuing trend during my visit in 2007.27 In this notoriously isolated country, I was surprised to see a number of foreign goods. At a public park, I encountered a child wearing a Spiderman shirt, presumably imported from China. I found it ironic that even Spiderman, an American superhero, had already arrived in Pyongyang.
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The fact that seemingly irreversible trends, such as black markets and informal networks of communication, have already prevailed proves that change is possible even under a regime such as North Korea’s. The strength of these markets and networks has weakened the iron fist of the regime. Persecution will most likely prevail against those involved in unsanctioned activities, such as illegal border crossings into China and the reselling of goods
bought there. The government may also continue its experiment with economic policies designed to discourage black market activity. However, the regime has thus far failed in reversing these trends and would find itself in an even more difficult position as time goes on. In the short term, these developments give hope for further changes in North Korea that will continue to strengthen private society and erode the power of the regime.
NOTES
1 I was traveling with an American NGO to confirm the delivery of medical supplies to a hospital for the disabled in Kangwon, on the country’s east coast. The United States Commerce Department shipped them with a special license, which required delivery verification. Although severe damage to the roads to Kangwon disrupted our itinerary, we inadvertently received a rare glimpse of the catastrophic humanitarian situation unfolding inside this secretive state. “Korea, Democratic People’s Republic (DPRK),” World Food Programme, Internet, http://www.wfp.org/countries/ korea-democratic-peoples-republic-dprk. 2 In a 2004 anthropological survey published by the WFP and UNICEF, 32 percent of women with children less than 2 years old suffered from malnutrition. Also, 37 percent of children under six years old were stunted. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Central Bureau of Statistics, “DPRK 2004 Nutrition Assessment: Report of Survey Results,” (Pyongyang, February 2005), 10 and 32, Internet, http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/sr/2005/0587Nutrition.pdf. 3 Mark Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea,” Congressional Research Service report for Congress, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 9 September, 2009), 12, 14. 4 Andrei Lankov, “Changing North Korea,” The New York Times, 13 October 2009. 5 Ibid., 43. 6 Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea (Seoul, 2008), 37-38. 7 Ibid, 42. 8 Andrea Matles Savada, ed., North Korea: A Country Study, (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research
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Division, Library of Congress, 1994), Internet, http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/60.htm. 9 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “A Matter of Survival: The North Korean Government’s Control of Food and the Risk of Hunger,” 3 May 2006, 10. 10 Ibid., 9-10. 11 Andrei Lankov, “North Korea hungry for control,” Asia Times, 10 September 2005. 12 HRW, “A Matter of Survival,” 14. 13 Ibid., 2. 14 KINU, White Paper, 267. 15 Ibid., 47. 16 Yoo Jee-ho, “North moving to halt currency reform fallout,” JoongAng Daily, 13 February 2010. 17 Ibid. 18 Manyin and Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea,” 7. 19 Choe Sang-Hun, “N. Korea Said to Apologize Over Currency Changes,” The New York Times, 11 February 2010. 20 HRW, “A Matter of Survival,” 22. 21 “North Korean Defectors Up 10% Last Year,” Chosun Ilbo, 6 January 2009, Internet, http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/ news/200901/200901060029.html. 22 U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrant, “China,” World Refugee Survey, Internet, http://www.refugees.org/countryreports. aspx?subm=&ssm=&cid=2352. 23 Korea Institute for National Unification, White Paper, 20. 24 Ibid., 22. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid., 23. 27 Manyin and Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea,” 7.
View From the Ground
Beaten but not Broken Tamil Women in Sri Lanka
Tasha Manoranjan Walking past an Army checkpoint towards her house, a woman snaps at the soldiers harassing her. These soldiers have taken every opportunity to verbally accost her since she filed an official complaint against police officers stealing her property. Neighbors and friends told Murugesapillai Koneswari, a Tamil mother of four, to simply forget about the police’s crimes and ignore the daily injustices. However, her actions had already aggravated the military forces in her village. On 17 May 1997, two months after she filed the complaint, police officers barged into her house in the middle of the night and then proceeded to gang rape and kill her. Koneswari’s story exemplifies the precarious position of Tamil women in Sri Lanka, who have been a particularly vulnerable population during the island’s half-century-long conflict. Between 2004 and 2007, I spent a year and a half in the territory formerly controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), documenting Sri Lanka’s human rights violations and becoming familiar with Tamil stories of suffering. I discovered that Sri Lanka’s brutal civil war had caused an erosion of societal norms that disparately impacted Tamil women. Some women had even assumed unconventional societal roles by joining the LTTE’s armed struggle
Tasha Manoranjan is the founder and director of People for Equality and Relief in Lanka (PEARL), a non-profit advocacy organization dedicated to ending human rights violations in Sri Lanka. Manoranjan received her bachelor’s degree from the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and is currently pursuing a J.D. at Yale Law School.
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for independence and fiercely fighting against the government. Women who abstained from taking up arms also remained under extreme pressure, as the government relentlessly attacked the LTTE de facto government and its populace in the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka. Women, traditionally responsible for taking care of their families, watched helplessly as Colombo’s final military advance in early 2009 forced their loved ones to become refugees. Tamil women struggled throughout the assault, which consisted of a ground advance, aerial bombardment, heavy artillery shelling, and a governmentimposed embargo that restricted food and medical supplies from entering the LTTE-controlled area. This genocidal assault, as well as the conflict as a whole, has had profound ramifications for the cultural and political roles of Tamil women in Sri Lanka, who have reacted in diverse and diametric ways to these dire circumstances. Tamil women have suffered disproportionately throughout Sri Lanka’s decades-long civil war. They have faced both the structural collapse of communities as well as an erosion of societal norms. In response, an increasing number of women have joined the LTTE in recent years and become part of Tamil’s armed resistance against the government. I provide an array of intimate testimonials that explain these women’s motives, as well as a macroscopic look at Sri Lanka’s past, present, and future, focusing particularly on the evolving role of women in conflict. Finally, I examine the ramifications of Sri Lanka’s May 2009 victory over the LTTE. Although Sri
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Lanka urgently needs to end decades of impunity for its genocidal war against Tamil civilians, this requires greater international pressure and sanctions. Without a meaningful political process that includes women and provides selfdetermination to Tamils, Sri Lanka is fated for further conflict.
Women in Tamil Society: Traditional Norms of Patriarchy. Sri Lanka’s recent civil war, which claimed the lives of twenty thousand civilians, is only one phase of the country’s violent past.1 Immediately following national independence in 1948, the Sinhalese majority began to marginalize Tamils. The Sri Lankan Parliament passed laws in 1949 to strip citizenship from nearly one million Tamil laborers of Indian descent. Seven years later, the government declared Sinhalese the national language, which privileged native Sinhalese speakers for advancement in education and employment. Sri Lanka further institutionalized discrimination against Tamils when the Parliament passed the “standardization” acts, which established quotas restricting the number of Tamils able to pursue higher education.2 This structural inequality led to peaceful protests by the Tamil community, which the government’a police forces swiftly crushed. These events arguably served as the catalyst for subsequent decades of conflict, as they prompted Tamils to view armed struggle as the only path to freedom. The LTTE and other armed Tamil militant groups formed in the 1970s, with the first phase of the civil war breaking out in 1983. The LTTE used a variety of tactics during the conflict,
MANORANJAN
including suicide bombers known as the “Black Tigers,” which prompted the United States to brand the group a terrorist organization. While the LTTE occasionally struck in governmentcontrolled territory, the majority of the fighting occurred in the heavily Tamil-populated northern and eastern regions of the island.
View From the Ground
often considered a fate worse than death in the Tamil community. One female LTTE cadre described to me the strict policy of never leaving a fallen cadre’s body behind. She remarked, “It is worth risking my life to save the lifeless body of another female cadre . . . . It would be easier to accept my own death, than the mutilation of their
For many Tamils, the high rates of sexual assault against Tamil women in the
civil war represented an attack on the integrity of their community. As a result of prolonged exposure to this conflict, traditional Tamil gender relations shifted dramatically. Within Tamil society, women were historically valued as the bearers of culture, responsible primarily for maintaining the home. Parents carefully “protected” or controlled women from childhood until marriage, when authority over them would transfer to their husbands. Due to the fact that women’s domains did not typically extend beyond their households, they were generally excluded from the political process. Society rigorously maintained the image of women as sacred bearers of family and community, utilizing females as symbolic markers to measure purity and respect. This cherished image of women rendered the violent experiences they faced during the civil war traumatic not only for them as individuals but for the entire Tamil society as well.
bodies and spirits.”3 Stories concerning the rape and mutilation of women are well-known among Tamils; Krishanthi Kumaraswami’s death is particularly infamous. Kumaraswami was an eighteen year old Tamil student who was arrested while passing through a Sri Lankan Army checkpoint in 1996. Her mother, younger brother, and a neighbor went to the checkpoint that afternoon to find her, refusing to leave until she returned safely with them. The soldiers killed all three of them. An hour later, they gang raped Krishanthi and buried her body. Reflecting the importance of this event within the Tamil community, a Tamil schoolteacher, Padmini Ganesan, told The Washington Post, “Every Tamil remembers the Krishanthi case . . . . For us, the checkpoints are sort of a slow-motion thing, the trauma and the fear that we go through.”4 However, these stories do more than Rape as a Weapon: The Sign- reflect on the vulnerable position of ficance of Sexual Assault in women in conflict. For many Tamils, Tamil Conflict. Sexual assault is the high rates of sexual assault against
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Tamil women in the civil war represented an attack on the integrity of their community. As United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women Radhika Coomaraswamy reported, sexual assault in the context of ethnic conflict has community-wide implications. She states: “To rape or mutilate women in ethnic conflict is to raid the inner sanctum, the spiritual core of ethnic identity and to defile it . . . . The female body is a symbol of a community’s honor and its inner sanctum. To rape women with impunity . . . is to assert domination and to symbolically assault ethnic identity in its most protected space.”5
Fighting Back: Tamil Women Take Arms for Empowerment. In recent years, Tamil women joined the LTTE in greater numbers than their male peers. Though female cadres had different personal reasons for enlisting, many joined after experiencing some form of injustice at the hands of the Sri Lankan Army. Most women came from the heavily militarized north. The permanent insecurity of this environment inculcated a desire for freedom and statehood, which included the motivation to take up arms. One LTTE fighter, Senthulasi, described coming of age in Jaffna, a heavily-militarized city. Her own cousin was raped and killed on her way home. Senthulasi said she ran away from home to join the LTTE and fight against the helplessness she felt daily.6 Although most women initially joined the LTTE to find respite from this suffocating physical insecurity, their involvement in the armed movement had unintended yet profound cultural and social consequences. Local
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psychologists noted that, for Tamil women, “joining the militants [was a] liberating act, promising them more freedom and power . . . . Tamil society had always suppressed women into a subservient position . . . it was the war that has had a liberating role.”7 Many of the female Tamil cadres with whom I spoke expressed their desire to fight for the liberation of both their ethnic community and also their subservient position in Tamil society. When women first began to join the LTTE, they primarily worked in service and support roles as caregivers for the wounded, but they later advanced to positions as frontline soldiers. This initially met with opposition from the conservative Tamil community. Many of the earlier female cadres reported that male Tigers “wanted them to flee with the civilians.”8 Women had to demonstrate their equal competence to earn the respect of the other cadres as they were “challenged to lift bigger bombs.”9 One can also attribute the acceptance of women’s participation in the war to the government’s indiscriminate bombings of civilian homes and schools: “a clear sexual division of labor in war . . . usually disappears when there is no clear differentiation between the ‘battle front’ and the ‘home front’ or ‘rear.’”10 Women were forced to protect not simply their own physical integrity but also that of their children. Female cadres eventually prided themselves on performing all tasks of their male counterparts. The LTTE even established male and female artillery divisions, long considered impossible for women to handle due to their weight. Some female cadres remarked with pride that they surpassed
MANORANJAN
male cadres in certain areas of fighting, such as sharp shooting.11 The LTTE also explicitly committed itself to gender equality and women’s empowerment. The eleventh of October is celebrated as Tamil Eelam Women’s Day, which marks the anniversary of the first female cadre battle casualty in 1987. On International Women’s Day in 1992, LTTE chief-commander Vellupilai Pirabakaran stated: “With pride I can say that the origin, the development and the rise of women’s military wing of the Liberation Tigers is one of the greatest accomplishments of our movement. This marks a revolutionary turning point in the history of the liberation struggle of the women of Tamil Eelam.”12 The LTTE further expanded the agency of both female cadres and civilian women within its territory by abolishing the dowry system and promoting education.13
View From the Ground
of police brutality, ethnic discrimination by the government, and repression of Tamil rights; finally, she accepted that war was the only path to freedom.
Current Situation: Ongoing Trauma in Internment Camps & High Security Zones. In Sep-
tember 2008 the Sri Lankan government ordered all international aid agencies to leave the northern region controlled by the LTTE.15 This action paved the way for an intense military onslaught against Tamil civilians and combatants alike. UN sources initially estimated that 7,000 civilians were killed between January and March 2009.16 However, the former UN spokesman in Colombo, Gordon Weiss, stated that up to 40,000 Tamil civilians were killed during the final stages of war.17 The significance of this death-toll can not be over-looked, especially when
Tamil women must play a greater role in the economic and political development of the northern and eastern regions of the country; a just political solution must address their historically disadvantaged situation. As they advanced to new roles in society, Tamil women strove to realize their political aspirations. The female cadres with whom I spoke said that Sri Lankan soldiers fought only for a paycheck, whereas the LTTE fought for the freedom of their people and land. One female cadre, Isaimozhi, said she aimed to kill on the battlefield, but regretted that violence was the only way to actualize Eelam.14 Isaimozhi cited the decades
compared to other conflicts that have garnered much more media attention. For instance, 1,788 people have been killed since January 2009 in Afghanistan.18 In the months during Sri Lanka’s most intense conflict from January to May 2009, conditions worsened. There was no neatly delineated “battle front,” and the fighting trapped 300,000 Tamil civilians in Mulaivaikkal. Starva-
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tion and malnourishment were widespread, according to UNHCR assessments.19 The government’s embargo against the region was total and indiscriminate, and women could not search for food without dodging gunfire. The conflict reached a deadly and dramatic end in May, when the government regained all territory previously controlled by the LTTE. Up to 300,000 Tamils who had fled from their homes due to the military campaign were interned in governmentrun camps in the northern areas of Jaffna, Mannar, Trincomalee, and Vavuniya.20 The government intended to detain these refugees for three years but began releasing them into High Security Zones across the north after an international outcry.21 Currently, over 106,000 Tamil civilians are still trapped in these camps.22 Tamil parliamentarian Suresh Premachandran expressed concern about the lack of institutional support for resettling refugees, since they return to war-torn villages where most, if not all, structures have been destroyed. 23 Women remain particularly affected by the conflict. Conditions in the internment camps are poor, as access to aid agencies and journalists is sporadic and insufficient. Local sources report that families are often divided, because male and female refugees are separated upon arrival. Sri Lanka is notorious for its use of extra-judicial disappearances, and families must worry whether this is the fate of their sons and daughters. This constant mental anguish exerts further strain in an already tense environment. The camps are heavily militarized. Human Rights Watch researcher Anna
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Neistat described them as “machine gun nests” due to the massive military and paramilitary presence in and around them.24 Sexual assault is also reported to be prevalent. Journalists from the United Kingdom’s Channel 4 News managed to enter a camp and were shocked by what they found. According to journalist Nick Paton Walsh, there were “[bodies] left for days; children crushed in the rush for food; the sexual abuse of women; disappearances.”25 He also reported that after three dead female bodies were found in the bathing area of the camp, refugees requested that they be guarded by female police guards instead of soldiers.26 After the report aired, Walsh and his team were arrested and deported, reflecting the government’s harsh tactics to suppress media coverage of the suffering of Tamils. On 26 January 2010 Sri Lanka held its presidential election. The candidates were sitting President Mahinda Rajapakse and former Army Commander Sarath Fonseka. The Tamil National Alliance pledged its support for Fonseka, having reached an agreement for greater regional autonomy if he won.27 However, there was great ambivalence for Tamils voting in this election: vote for the president, the chief architect of the military onslaught that destroyed their homeland, or vote for the army general, the chief executor of the military offensive? Despite Tamils’ hesitant support for Fonseka, Rajapakse won with 57 percent of the vote; Fonseka received 40 percent of the vote. Following the election, Fonseka said he was prepared to give evidence in international courts on soldiers committing war crimes. “I am definitely
MANORANJAN
going to reveal what I know, what I was told and what I heard. Anyone who has committed war crimes should definitely be brought into the courts.”28 Later that day, Sri Lankan military police arrested him. He remains in custody.
Moving Forward: Recommendations for a Sustainable Peace. Accountability for Sri Lanka’s egregious human rights violations against Tamils is a necessary first step towards re-building Tamil society and recovering from the devastating conflict. The Army General has conceded that war crimes were committed when Sri Lanka prosecuted its final offensive; however, there has been no attempt to hold any soldiers or officials accountable for the thousands of deaths that occurred in a matter of weeks. Until this occurs, every Tamil will continue to feel insecure on the island, fearing another wave of violence. Fonseka’s arrest reveals the limited political space that exists even for dissidents of the ethnic majority. When even Sinhalese critics of the government face repression, Tamils feel threatened to openly express their political aspirations. This suffocating political environment will only breed further violence and instability. As Sri Lankan courts are loathe to hold officials and soldiers responsible for their crimes, justice must be sought through a number of extra-territorial means. First, the UN Security Council should refer Sri Lanka to the International Criminal Court. Second, given that Fonseka holds a U.S. Green Card, and Sri Lanka Secretary of Defense Gothabaya Rajapakse is a U.S. citizen, the U.S. government should use
View From the Ground
domestic legal mechanisms to prosecute them under the law of command responsibility. Third, American companies, such as Victoria’s Secret and The Gap, should move factories off the island to pressure the Sri Lankan government to respect international norms of human rights. With exports constituting nearly one-fourth of Sri Lanka’s economy, these companies have significant leverage over the policies of the government.29 Tamil women must play a greater role in the economic and political development of the northern and eastern regions of the country; a just political solution must address their historically disadvantaged situation. The LTTE made strides in this direction when it conscientiously embraced a policy of gender equality, both in its armed movement and in its state-building apparatus. In LTTE-controlled territory, I witnessed billboards denouncing the dowry system, encouraging families to value children of both genders equally. Female civilians and cadres confidently drove motorcycles in saris and helmets–unheard of a decade ago. The lives of women in LTTE-controlled areas appear to have graduallybut markedlyimproved over time. These advances disappeared with the government’s military assault in early 2009. If Sri Lanka wishes to truly empower Tamil women within a postconflict context, the government must institutionalize Tamil rights and women’s rights by means of a just political solution. It must normalize the north and east through the maintenance of a minimal military presence and with strong socio-economic development. It must also transfer “High Security
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Zones” to civilian control, so that rightful owners can finally return to their homes. All new programs must encourage the participation of women. Finally, since the government has regained control of LTTE territory, it is now obligated to promote the welfare of Tamils. If the regime continues to deny freedom of movement and the right of self-determination to Tamils, the region could quickly descend back into war. As Isaimozhi told me, “Tamils have been living as slaves for the Sinhalese for decades. We can’t live like that anymore.
We have to all achieve freedom or we have to all die trying.”30 As the government claims victory over its most recent conflict with the LTTE, it is urgent that the equal rights for which Tamil women fought are not lost. Sri Lanka now stands at a crossroads, between a continuing conflict exacerbated by the bitterness of life in internment camps and a just peace that respects the political and human rights of all its communities. Women have and will continue to play a role in determining which path is pursued.
NOTES
1 Catherine Philip, “The Hidden Massacre: Sri Lanka’s Final Offensive against Tamil Tigers,” Times Online, 29 May 2009, Internet, http://www. timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6383449.ece (date accessed: 2 March 2010). 2 Bruce Fein, “Tamil Statehood?” The Washington Times, 29 January 2008. 3 Vengai (female LTTE cadre), interview with the author, Sri Lanka, March 2007. 4 Emily Wax, “Privacy Goes Public in Sri Lanka: During Military Checks, Modesty Is a Casualty,” The Washington Post, 3 March 2009. 5 Radhika Coomaraswamy, “A Question of Honor: Women, Ethnicity and Armed Conflict,” Internet, http://www.sacw.net/Wmov/RCoomaraswamyOnHonour.html. 6 Senthulasi (female LTTE cadre), interview with the author, Sri Lanka, March 2007. 7 Daya Somasundaram, “Addressing the Psychosocial Problems of Women in a War Ravaged Society,” Lines Magazine, 8 February 2003, Internet, http://www.lines-magazine.org/Art_Feb03/Daya. htm (date accessed: 30 February 2010). 8 Miranda Alison, “Women as Agents of Political Violence: Gendering Security,” Security Dialogue 35, no. 4 (2004): 456. 9 Pathmini Sithamparanathan (Member of Sri Lankan Parliament), conversation with the author, Sri Lanka,Dec. 2005. 10 Nira Yuval-Davis, “Gender, the Nationalist Imagination, War, and Peace,” in Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones, eds. Wenona Giles and Jennifer Hyndman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 171. 11 Isaimozhi (female LTTE cadre), interview with author, Sri Lanka, February 2007. 12 Neloufer De Mel, Women and the Nation’s Narrative: Gender and Nationalism in Twentieth Century Sri Lanka (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
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Inc., 2001), 208. 13 Pathmini Sithamparanathan (Member of Sri Lankan Parliament), interview with the author, Sri Lanka, December 2005. 14 Isaimozhi (female LTTE cadre), interview with author, Sri Lanka, February 2007. 15 Samanthi Dissanayake, “Aid Agency dilemma in Sri Lanka,” BBC News, 9 September 2008. 16 Thomas Fuller, “U.N. Says Thousands Killed in Sri Lanka,” The New York Times, 24 April 2009. 17 Andrew Buncombe, “Up to 40,000 Civilians Died in Sri Lanka Offensive,” The Independent, 12 February 2010, Internet, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/up-to-40000-civilians-died-in-sri-lanka-offensive-1897865.html (date accessed: 2 March 2010). 18Genocide Intervention Network, “Afghanistan,” Internet, http://www.genocideintervention. net/areas_of_concern/afghanistan (date accessed: 1 March 2010). 19 “Serious Violations of International Law Committed in Sri Lanka Conflict: UN Human Rights Chief,” U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 13 March 2009, Internet, http:// www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/FFDE9 61C9D0236C5C1257578004B8E4B?opendocum ent (date accessed: 15 February 2010). 20 UN Refugee Agency, “Sri Lanka: UN calls for clear IDP resettlement plan,” 21 July 2009, Internet, http://www.unhcr.org/ refworld/country,,,,LKA,4562d8cf2,4a6824431 e,0.html (date accessed: 25 February 2010). 21 Jeremy Page, “Sri Lanka Accused of Planning Concentration Camps,” Internet, http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/12/sri-lankaaccused-of-plan_n_166589.html (date accessed: 27 February 2010). 22 UN Refugee Agency, “Thousands of IDPs
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Miss Resettlement Deadline,” 15 February 2010, Internet, http://www.irinnews.org/Report. aspx?ReportId=88107 (date accessed: 1 March 2010). 23 Ibid. 24 Anna Neistat, “Recent Developments in Sri Lanka,” Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Internet, 24 February 2009, http://foreign. senate.gov/testimony/2009/NeistatTestimony090224p.pdf (date accessed: 2 March 2010). 25 Nick Paton Walsh, “Sri Lanka’s Rajapakse Tells Channel 4 to Leave,” Internet, http://blogs. channel4.com/snowblog/2009/05/10/sri-lankasrajapaksa-tells-channel-4-news-to-leave (date accessed: 10 February 2010).
View From the Ground
26 Ibid. 27 Dean Nelson, “Tamils to Decide Sri Lanka Election Result,” Telegraph, 25 January 2010, Internet, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/srilanka/7072691/Tamils-to-decideSri-Lanka-election-result.html (date accessed: 2 March 2010). 28 “Sri Lanka Election Loser Sarath Fonseka Arrested,” BBC News, 8 February 2010. 29 U.S. State Department, “Sri Lanka Country Report,” July 2009, Internet, http://www.state. gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm (date accessed: 1 March 2010). 30 Isaimozhi (female LTTE cadre), interview with the author, Sri Lanka, February 2007.
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A Look Back Protecting America Are We Doing Enough? Interview with Philip Zelikow Philip Zelikow served as executive director of the 9/11 Commission (20032004) and the Counselor of the Department of State (2005-2007). In this interview, he discusses the threat of terrorism, the detainment of enemy combatants, and civilian relations with the government. GJIA: Almost nine years after the 9/11 attacks, terrorism remains a serious threat to the United States. In your view, what are the most urgent counterterrorism priorities? Zelikow: The deeper issue involves the prospects of violent Islamist extremism remaining a potent force within the Muslim world. The rise of al-Qaeda was not itself a world historical phenomenon; rather, it was a symptom similar to the spread of global anarchist terrorism, which frightened the world in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Anarchismâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s appeal, to many, was rooted in the widespread alienation from industrial modernization and urbanization taking place in Western Europe and North America, while the rise of al-Qaeda and its kindred movements are symptoms of the difficulty the Muslim world is having adjusting to modern society. The
Philip Zelikow is the White Burkett Miller Professor of History at the University of Virginia. Dr. Zelikow has taught at Virginia and Harvard University for the past twenty-five years while occasionally serving in the U.S. government, including as executive director of the 9/11 Commission and the Counselor of the Department of State.
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challenge has led to a serious struggle within the Islamic community over how it will adapt to modernity. Thus, the general problem of “terrorism” has to be understood as an aspect of a struggle within Muslim civilization as a whole.
rather than our own viewpoint. Saudis think that their country is changing relatively fast by their standards, while the pace of change seems glacial to us. However, their society is one that has historically relied on a veneer of consensus. We are very accustomed
The general problem of “terrorism”
has to be understood as an aspect of a struggle within Muslim civilization as a whole. The question for the United States is: do we have a preference for who wins that struggle? In my opinion, we do have a preference. As a result, we should adopt policies that support the emergence of sensible, peaceful, and constructive models of governance in the Muslim world. We also need to prevent violent extremists from gaining safe havens from which they can readily build up their operational capabilities to launch operations such as 9/11, the USS Cole attack, and the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Lastly, the United States needs to harden its homeland defenses in order to raise the level of operational capability required to launch an attack against the United States.
to a culture in which people quarrel and argue out in the open; power is divided, so we lurch forward after overt and heated arguments. This decision-making process is not a part of Saudis’ political or social culture. They prefer to move forward by consensus and to avoid the airing of public divisions. We can argue about whether we agree with this aspect of their culture, but it is the one by which they will make decisions.
GJIA: Regarding your point on preventing safe havens for extremists, one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission was that “the United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan in order to give the GJIA: In the Muslim world’s government a reasonable opportunity challenge to adapt to modernity, Saudi to improve the lives of the Afghan Arabia seems to be at the center of this people . . . [and] the United States struggle. Do you see its political scene should help the Afghan government extend its authority over the country.” moving in a favorable direction? Based on President Obama’s 1 Zelikow: It is important to analyze December 2010 West Point speech, this question from their perspective, in which he stated “after eighteen
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ZELIKOW
months, our troops will begin to come home,” do you think the United States is adequately committed to the Afghanistan effort? Zelikow: Yes, the United States is adequately committed. The recommendation was not that the United States could guarantee a wellgoverned Afghanistan. To assure that outcome, we would have to take full control of the country’s governance. We are in fact very close to a full takeover, given that Afghanistan has already become a de facto protectorate of the United States. This reality is most apparent when you examine the country’s public financial outlook five or even ten years into the future. In my opinion, the United States should not establish a trusteeship government in Afghanistan. We can, however, provide the Afghan government with a reasonable opportunity to succeed. To this end, I think we have expended, and continue to expend, a gigantic amount of blood, effort, and treasure in order to grant such an opportunity to the current government.
A Look Back
Zelikow: After the Christmas Day attempt, there was actually a fair amount of media attention on the issue of whether the government had implemented the Commission’s recommendations, which were largely on point. I think the journalists determined that those recommendations had not been adequately implemented. Their conclusion is true in at least two ways. First, we had made a very specific recommendation on the issue of liquid explosives. We had stressed that it was a “matter of urgency” to quickly adopt screening measures that would be better able to detect individuals carrying these types of explosives. These recommendations were not implemented because the Bush administration and Congress tended to place greater weight on privacy concerns when striking a balance between security and privacy imperatives. Every administration and group of congressional leaders must make these judgment calls, which have both consequences and tradeoffs. Second, we made certain recommendations about information sharing and the use of watch lists, which the government has yet to adequately implement. If the government had put them in place, security personnel would have been much more likely to notice the anomalies in this person’s background.
GJIA: There has been a great deal of criticism directed toward the U.S. government concerning the lack of coordination among agencies leading up to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s attempted attack on Christmas Day. Do you believe that, if the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission were effectively implemented, they could have prevented the attack in its earlier GJIA: You testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2009 stages?
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that, “By 2005, the raging controversy over Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo or torture was hurting the United States’s position in the world more than any other problem in our foreign policy.” How is it hurting the United States, specifically? Given the measures that President Obama is taking, does it still have an impact? Zelikow: I think the Bush administration had begun to significantly neutralize this problem with the measures it was putting in place, especially beginning around September 2006. For its part, the Obama administration redoubled the effort to turn the page on some of the most egregious behavior. Thus, I believe that these steps have alleviated a lot of the reputational damage. People can see that the U.S. government is sincerely trying to manage this problem in a way that comports with a reasonable concept of due process. Most countries in the world do not have due process requirements that are more stringent than the United States’s. In many cases, including in Europe, the legal notions in this regard are considerably less strict. So, in my view, we have made a lot of progress on this issue. However, the situation in 2005 was indeed very bad. The United States does historically get a lot of its “soft power” from standing for certain ideals. While the Bush administration had deliberately chosen to emphasize those ideals, its behavior concerning its central policy initiative—the War on Terror—seemed to belie them.
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GJIA: How does an improved international reputation enhance the security of the United States? Furthermore, what other actions would you suggest to improve U.S. security? Zelikow: There are several answers. First, at the most direct level of security measures, certain ways of treating enemy captives can compromise our intelligence operations around the world. Before the change in policies, it had become much more difficult for countries to cooperate with the United States on intelligence operations. Examples of this are not public and will not become public soon, but officials on the inside were aware of this problem. This was not just a matter of foreigners not liking Americans, or purely one of reputation. These problems were doing direct damage to the government’s ability to conduct security operations against terrorists. Second, these particularly egregious methods were not uniquely valuable in providing the United States with vital information. A different argument has been made by the people who devised these programs, given that their architects are reluctant to concede that they made a colossal and tragic mistake. There is a lot of evidence, including from our counter-terror operations, which demonstrates that these methods are not necessary. For example, we conducted a natural experiment in 2004 and 2005, in which we actually ran one kind of interrogation operation against al-Qaeda outside of Iraq, and ran
ZELIKOW
a different type of operation in our work against al-Qaeda inside Iraq. The al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq were highly professional and dangerous people. Yet, the military, operating under different rules in Iraq, discovered during 2004 and 2005—and informed the President—that they did not need extreme interrogation methods in
A Look Back
GJIA: Given Congressional resistance to closing Guantanamo Bay and transferring detainees to correctional facilities on American soil, how do you envision the Obama administration carrying out its January 2009 executive order? To what extent will President Obama have to modify his pledge?
My personal view is that Mr. Abdulmutallab should have been put into the military system.
order to extract information. Indeed, we ended up breaking the power of al-Qaeda in Iraq between 2005 and the end of 2007 without having to use extreme interrogation methods. In sum, there was a lot of empirical evidence from the Bush administration that undercuts some of the more extravagant claims about the necessity of extreme methods of interrogation. By this time, however, the reputational damage to the United States had not only spilled over to our counter-terror operations but to every other aspect of our foreign policy as well. It is important that the United States stands for something positive in the world, given that it helps if you are operating globally and trying to have others maintain policies that uphold the international system. Consequently, the United States has to hold itself up as the custodian of that system in certain ways, and those activities were undermining our ability to offer leadership.
Zelikow: I think the world sees that he is genuinely trying to close Guantanamo. It is a difficult issue, and his predecessor should have done more. President Bush announced his determination to close the facility in September 2006. Although the Bush administration tried to reduce Guantanamo’s inmate population over the next couple of years, it did not do very much to carry out the closure pledge. The Obama administration committed to close the facility and transfer the remaining inmates to the United States. I think that was the correct action and that the closure will likely still happen. This kind of policy, however, requires the support of the U.S. Congress, and the way the Obama administration has chosen to handle some of the Guantanamo inmates has compromised support in Congress. One example is the administration’s decision to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in a civilian court rather
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than in the military system. I believe that this choice was a mistake, and the 9/11 conspirators can and should be tried in the military system. Regardless, President Obama is still in a good position to craft a bipartisan approach to the future treatment of enemy captives, since Republican leaders like John McCain and Lindsey Graham do not want to revert to the Bush administration’s procedures of 2002 and 2003. They agreed that the page needs to be turned and that we need a different approach in the future. So, there is space to find common ground between leading Republicans and the administration to address this problem in a healthy way that will survive party swings over time.
and intentional mass murder of innocent civilians is recognized as a war crime by all civilized countries in the world. There would be very little outcry around the world if we were to proceed to try these criminals for the acts that they have committed.
Zelikow: My personal view is that Mr. Abdulmutallab should have been put into the military system. He was an enemy combatant attempting to carry out a war crime—the deliberate mass-murder of innocent civilians. It is important to clarify that, as a legal matter, it is not a crime to be an enemy of the United States. If you are an enemy combatant, we may hunt you and kill you during combat, but we detain you as an enemy captive if you are captured. Just because you are not entitled to full Prisoner of War (POW) status does not mean you cannot be held, which was the case during the Vietnam War when we captured Vietcong. The deliberate
Zelikow: The successful working of the American political system has in part corrected this particular problem. Unfortunately, the Bush administration’s extreme interpretation of American constitutional law in that instance had to be effectively overturned by both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court. It was unfortunate that the other parts of the government had to operate to check the activities of the executive branch, but we designed our government to have checks and balances. In this case, they ended up working successfully. The particular context of my point that you quote above was a
GJIA: Based on the techniques outlined in the Office of Legal Counsel memoranda, commonly known as the “torture memos,” you stated that “Americans in any town of this country could constitutionally be hung from the ceilings naked, sleep deprived, waterboarded and all the rest if the alleged national security justification was compelling.” How should Americans work to ensure that their government is following not GJIA: Do you think that Umar simply the letter but also the spirit of Farouk Abdulmutallab should be tried the laws and conventions dealing with human rights? in a military or civilian system?
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peculiar interpretation of Americaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s obligations under an international treaty. The Justice Department had argued that our obligations under that treaty were the same as our obligations under analogous provisions of American constitutional law. The department took the position that the government could continue
A Look Back
Zelikow: My view is that this was a painful episode in American history. Sooner or later the American people were entitled to have a full and public understanding of how its government had come to make these choices so that we could learn from them. I find, as a historian, that when I teach my students about things that
We train people mainly in mastering pro-
cess rather than in mastering substantive policy development.
the methods used in a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) program consistent with the treatyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;thus, they were consistent with American constitutional law. That position led them into an interpretation of American constitutional law that I found indefensible and that would not survive peer or public scrutiny. In this case, once the interpretation became visible to relevant peers and to the public, it fell apart. Indeed, the issue for the Justice Department most recently was not whether this interpretation was right but whether the people who came up with such interpretations had actually committed some form of legal malpractice in devising such eccentric arguments.
seem crazy to them, the hard part is to explain how these ideas looked sensible to people at the time. People actually make seemingly plausible decisions that may not wear well over time, so the object of learning from episodes like this is to guard people against problems in forms that they will actually encounter in their own lives.
GJIA: As President Obama came into office, some commentators suggested that we investigate these matters more fully, while others advocated looking toward the future instead. What is your view?
Zelikow: As people looked to the U.S. government to be responsible for more and more things, they almost inevitably tended to find large shortfalls in government performance. Government asserted a role in
GJIA: Finally, you edited a book in 1997 about trust in the government, which concluded that Americans had increasingly less faith in their public system. With the growing popularity of the Tea Party movement, the observation seems especially salient today. How can the government restore the nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s trust?
Summer/Fall 2010 [155]
PROTECTING AMERICA
regulating all kinds of social relations that it had hitherto mainly stayed out of. Government was perceived as much more responsible for the details of economic performance as had historically been the case. So, you have much higher expectations of what government should do than has historically been true in our country, combined with predictably lower perceptions of how well government is performing. I think to address this problem over the long haul, you need to narrow this gap on both ends. You need to give people more realistic expectations of what government can do well, and then you have to make a concerted effort at
[ 1 56 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
doing those things well. I think in general we Americans do not do a very good job training people for high-level government service. We train people mainly in mastering process rather than mastering substantive policy development. I even find that the quality of the training and experience in substantive policy development at the higher levels of government has actually declined significantly since the 1940s and 1950s. The sheer staff work is much worse now than it was then, and they did not even have computers! Philip Zelikow was interviewed by Julia Famularo and Andrew Miller on 5 March 2010.
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