GJIA - 1.2 Wired Affairs by GJIA (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs)

Georgetown Journal of International Mfairs

SU,"MERjFALL 2000, VOLUME I, NU~IBER 2

Editors' Note

Irs

_JJlrum~_Wited 3

AffairS-.足

The Babe That Roared. The information revolution is still in its infancy-but what an infant, Already, it has set new limits on traditional notions of sovereignty, given rise to new forms of warfare, forced busi nesses to rethink their basic function and strategy, spawned new firms that dwarf older industrial giants, and created a whole new agenda of international policy issues. And that's for openers. AN INTRODUCTION BY CHARLES WEISS

The New World Information and Communication Order JOHN WALCOTT

From U2 to URL: Technology and Foreign Affairs RICHARD M. MOOSE

Development Goes Digital AN INTERVIEW WITH CARLOS BRAGA

The Promise and Challenge of E-Commerce PATRICIA BUCKLEY & SABRINA MONTES

Virtual Activism: Survivors and the Mine Ban Treaty KENNETH R. RUTHERFORD

Conflici&Security 45

Modern Humanitarianism: Rethinldng Neutrality

MARK BARTOLINI

Taking sides may be a better way to respond to today's complex emergencies.

1---足 55

Undeterred: The Return of Nuclear War

STEPHEN BLANK

If you think that the nuclear threat dissolved along with the Soviet Union, think again.

[i]

Culture &Society

BOJJ

Screening Politics: Cinema and Intervention

129

FRANK STERN

Kenn

Important films are valued not by box office receipts, but by how they define-and

drive-reality. A "reel" history.

Seattle South: Mexico's New Radicalism

Going

13 1

The R

Andn

MARK STEVENSON

A ten-month strike at Latin America's largest university may be a sign of things to come.

134

Vester S. Ro1

Business&Finance 79

The IMF We Need

Vie1

MICHEL CAMDESSUS

The fMF's former managing director provides his vision of the Fund's future. 87

137

Islam

A Tan

Interview: Farther, Faster, Deeper, Cheaper Post-Seattle straight-talk from Thomas Friedman on globalization.

Law&Ethics 95

143

Cloal< and Dagger Diplomacy: The United States and Assassination

MARK VINCENT VLASIC

The history, legality, and philosophic nuances of the world's second oldest profession. I05

Privatizing Culture

SouU What

admil

MATT JACKSON

The real threat to free speech is not media mega-mergers but the growing power

of copyright.

_Politits&Diplomacy II3

Democratic Reversals

MAR I NA OTTAWAY

The international community seems to favor policy outcomes over political process. This

is no way to spread democracy.

II9

Toward a Global Migration Regime

SUSAN MARTIN

Refugees and immigrants are on the rise, and governments don't know how to cope. A

case for agio bal migration regime.

COVER PHOTO

[i i J

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Contents

129

Going Beyond the ABC's of RMA Kenneth Allard reviews Michael O'Hanlon's Technological Change and the Future ofWa1are.

[31

The Rise of Development Law Andres Rigo reviews Rumu SarkaI" s Development Law and International Finance.

134

Yesterday's Lesson, Tomorrow's Game S. Rob Sobhani reviews Meyer and Brysac's Tournament ofShadows.

View fromthe Ground 137

Island Paradise Lost

KRISHNA RAVINDRAN

A Tamil student reflects on Sri Lanka's bloody civil war.

A Lool< Bacl< 143

South Asia Goes to Washington

HOWARD SCHAFFER

What happened when an avalanche of South Asian rulers descended upon the Reagan administration? A tale of American diplomacy.

COVEll PHOTO

KEt\ CHERNUSjf-PG 1",,'TERNATIO:"olAL l.U':.

Summer/Fall

2000

riii]

Georgetory+h,"qru$.| EDITORS-IN-CH I EF STEPHANIEKAPLAN BEN POWELL

M A N A G I N GE D I T O R S P A U L C H E N JA IAN CHONG

A S S O C I A T EE D I T O R S J E A N N E B R I G G S , M E R E D I T H C A M P A N A L E . KARIM CHROBOC,PHILLIPE DE PONTET, JARED FEINBERG, MAHANTH JOISHY, CHRISJURGENS,ANNA-MARIA KANEFF, A N N K R I S T I N K A R L S E N ,J E S S EL E V I N S O N , ELIZABETH MCDONALD, JILL POLLACK, MATTHEW RASSETTE.MARCO SCHAD FROMETA, MARGARET-ROSE TRETTER, LOGAN WRIGH'f , MICHAEL YBARRA E D I T O R I A L A S S I S T A N T S N I C O L E C L O C K , C A S S A N D R AD O L L , NOAH GOTTSCHALK, OZ HACKETT, ADAM HANTMAN, ORIN HASSON, DIANA HOLTZMAN, JAMIE KAPLAN, SHY KRAYTMAN, JEANENE MITCHELL, CALEB MUNRO, DAVID RICHMAN, CHRISTINE SKOUENBORG,GHEDA TEMSAH DESIGN BY MIGUEL BUCKENMEYER DESIGNEDITOR LEO MATSUZAKI E L E C I R O N I CM E D I A K A T H R Y N R E M U S

D I R E C T O RO F E X T E R N A L R E L A T I O N S K A R I M C H R O B O G B U S I N E S SM A N A G E RE L I Z A B E T H M C D O N A L D D I R E C T O R SO F M A R K E T I N G & M E R E D I T H C A M P A N A L E , ADVERTISINGANN KRISTIN KARLSEN C I R C U L A T I O NM A N A G E R N I K F I I L P A T E L LEGAL LIAISON ERIC O'MALLEY

ADVISORY

ABSHIRE,

BOARD DAVID H.R.H. CARA

FELIPE DIMASSA,

PETER

UNIVERSITY

COUNCIL

ANTHONY BROWN, HOWE, JOSEPH

AREND, JAMES

RICHARD

CHRTSTOPHER

SHAMBAUGH,

MICHAEL

CLAD,

LEPGOLD,

BENNETT,

BORBON,

ROBERT

KROGH,

PORTERFIELD,

Ii"]

SUSAN

JOYCE

FAREED

BRAHM,

MICHAEL

JOYNER,

HOWARD .IENNIFER

HAMILTON

LEE

MAZARR,

CHESTER

DONALD

DAVIS,

CALLUCCI,

CROCKER, CAROL

WARD,

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LANCASTER,

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SCHAFFER,

ZAKARIA

DANIEL

GEORCE

CASIMIR

YOST

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fditors'Nlte

The phrase "international affairs" has always seemed to carry a whiff of pomposity. For many, it evokes nineteenth century conferences held in ancient palacesand tuxedoed men with canes. Crumbling embassieshave since replaced those palaces, yet the term still manages to muster a sense of grandeur and gravitas, which is one reason we like it so rnuch in today's celebrity-obsessedworld. Still, there is much more to international affairs (or their than old men with maps and glassesof caluados modern equivalent-politicians in running shorts). Financial markets, international organizations, and NGOs are now firrnly a part of the international affairs canon. Film, media, technology-all topics covered in this issue-are about to join them. Everyone knows that technology is changing the way people do business; this issue's Forum applies that dynamic to diplornacy. For all its promise and peril, technology will take the world from evolution to revolution only if it can transform how people think about their relationship to international events, and only if it servesas a gatewayof inclusion for millions of impoverished individuals the world over. Whether it empowers the best of human nature or exploits the worst remains to be seen. In so many ways diplomacy in the digital age is the same as that of the old world. There are still foes to deter, conflicts to mediate, peace to enforce, and sleepy publics to resuscitate. But in order for foreign affairs to regain the sense of purpose it once had, it must move awayfrom outdated orthodoxies and reflect a more nuanced picture of the world in all its awesome complexity, blurring integration, lurking danger, and technological revolution. This makes for a more cornplicated world, but also for better reading. BnN Powrrr

Srrpn,q.urn Kapuu

Summer,/Fall zooo

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hrum G E O R G E T O W NJ O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A LA F F A I R S

wkedaff@irs The information revolution is still in its infancy-but infant. what an Already, it has set new limits on tradiAN INTRODUCTION tional notions of BY CHARLESWEISS sovereignty, given rise to new forms of warfare, forced businesses to rethink their basic function and strategy, spawned new firms that dwarf older industrial giants, and created a whole new agenda of international policy issues.And that's for openers. More specifically, as pointed out by contributors to this Forum, the Wbrld Wide Web has accelerated and intensified the globalization of markets. It has robbed g'overnmentsof their monopoly on information; ernpowered consr.uners, voters, and political activists; provided rebels and terrorists with new weapons and means of communication; and forced rnarket intermediaries all over the world to add value to their serviceson pain of disintermediation. The last has been a particular blow to many businessesand professionals who may not have realized that they were interrnediaries: retailers, editors, publishers, recording studios, universities, and even professors.

Tlrn BesE

The Neu World Information and Communication Order J O H NW A L C O T T

ROXf,ED

@ 15

FromU2 to IJRL, Technolog andForeign AJfairs R I C H A R DM . I V O O S E

@ 23

Deuelopment GoesDtgtal I N T E R V I E WW I T H C A R L O S BRAGA

@ 29

ThePromise andChallenge ofE-Commerce P A T R I C I AB U C K L E Y& SABRINAMONTES

@ 37

VirtualActiuism: Suruiuors Treaj in theLandmine K E N N E T HR . R U T H E R F O R D

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I N T R OD U C T I O N

Some of the effects of the new technology on traditional concepts of international relations are already obvious. The concept of sovereignty, no doubt, is alive and well. But surely its meaning has changed in an age in which sums of money totaling nations' entire foreign exchange reserves cross international boundaries every few minutes; when thorough restructuring of basic communications infrastructure is required for national survival; and when governments can hardly regulate the transborder flow of personal information, pirated music and literature, bomb designs, pornography, and subversive propaganda of aII kinds. What experience could rnore appropriately illustrate the empowering function of the Internet-and the change in Ken traditional power-balancing-than Rutherford's account of how a handful of people, rnany of them based in rural Vermont, used e-rnail to coordinate a worldwide network of activists? These individuals succeeded in prornoting a proposal to ban a military weapon that forms a key part of standard military strategy and tactics, and in backing the most powerful nations in the world into a diplomatic corner over this issue. As Richard Moose points out, the information revolution has focused attention on the effectiveness of the U.S. State Department as an agency for the rapid gathering, analysis,and distribution of inforrnation. A number of studies have faulted the Department for dysfunctional management structure, cumbersome communication procedures, antiquated infrastructure, an issues agenda, and a culture of riskavoidance formed by the Cold War. All ofthese effectsare exacerbatedby the go percent decline in the real value of the

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Georgetown Journal

of Interuational

Affairs

foreign affairs budget over the past decade. And as the interview with Carlos Braga of the World Bank clearly shows, the impact of the information revolution falls unevenly on different parts of the world. To reap full comrnercial benefits from the Net, nations must not only have equipment, expensive infrastructure, and computer-literate people, but also an array of ancillary habits and institutions not normally associated with "informatics": credit cards, the habit of buying frorn catalogs, and even a reliable post office. Even so, new technology is opening up a world of readily available inforrnation frorn business and politics to people and countries formerly isolated by politics or geography. Best expressedin the words of a famous Economist cover: "Suddenly distance doesn't matter any more." When an official from the World Bank speaks proudly of the Bank's efforts to prornote a subversive technology, we are indeed glimpsing into a brave new world. This is not the first time in recent history that basic changes in political and economic geography have been traceable to changes in technology. Arguably, the fall of the Soviet lJnion was largely due to the fact that its rigid economic and political structure was ill-suited to the needs of inforrnationand comrnunicationintensive technology that was essential to both economic growth and military competitiveness. By contrast, the rise ofJapan and the Pacific Rim was due grehtly to these countries' ability to respond to market opportunities by mastering imported technology and-especially in the caseofJapan-improving it. The United States is fortunate that the current wave of technological change is uniquely suited to its peculiar

wErss WiredAffairj strengths: an entrepreneurial business climate, a tradition of individual innovation, a well-funded, decentralized, and rneritocratic research structure, and a consumer culture that welcomes novelty and tolerates failure. In addition, a free and flexible labor market, strong links between universities and industry, a free and highly diversified capital market, and a tradition of welcoming imrnigrants are all factors that contribute to the United States' ability to adapt well to the emerging new technologies. On the other hand, it would be a mistake for the United States to take for granted its present dominance as a permanent one. Who knows what national characteristics will be key to the next wave of technological innovation? It will be solne years before the irnpli-

cations of the revolution in "informatics" and communications are fully absorbed by the international affairs community. This is in part due to the intellectual and social distance-or technophobia-that has traditionally separated the scholars of international affairs from their colleagues in the scientific and technological community. Perhaps the current issue of the /ournolwill begin to bridge this anachronistic divide. Certainly it will provide the reader with an instructive and insightful glimpse of the pervasive influence of information technology on a wide range of international issues.

Dr, Charles Weiss i" Disringuishedprofessorand Director of Science,Technology,and InternationalAffai.s at the Edmund A. WalshSchoolof ForeignSeroice,GeorgetownUniversitv.

Sumner/Fallzooo

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WiredAffairs

lhe

NewWorldInfoffnation

andCommunication 0rder

John Walcott In mid-Septernber of 1983, the United Nations and UNESCO, the world body's Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization, convened a roundtable of experts on the media in the scenic alpine village of Igls, Austria to debate the creation of what UNESCO had dubbed the "New World Information and Communication Order. " Much of the discussion followed in the deep ideological ruts of the Cold War' Delegatesfrom the East accusedthe West of cultural imperialism, delegatesfrorn the South accusedthe Nonh of neocolonialism, and delegatesfrom the West complained about the absenceof press freedorn in the East and the South. Then, about rnidway through the conference, a pro* tracted debate erupted over whether developing nations needed to develop indigenous cornputer industries in order to fully participate in the dawning information revolution. Yes, argued a Nigerian acadernicr Otherwise, new technology would serveonly to perpetuate colonialism and rnercantilisrn. No, replied anArnerican journalist' While developing nations might want to cultivate the ability to write software for their own requirements, there was no reason for them to invest billions of dollars in an effort to build their own computers. After a half-hour or so of this, the Soviet delegate, a highranking official of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information

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T H E N E WW O R L D I N F O R M A T I O N AND COMMUNICATION ORDER

Department, grew visibly impatient. Finally, unable to contain himself any 'W-e longer, he exclaimed, are wasting our time. The personal computer is a rnatter for the twenty-first century!" The Yugoslav delegate, a professor at a university in Ljubljana, today's capital of Slovenia, who had maneuvered himself adroitly into a position to referee the conference's East-West political squabbles, quickly pounced. The Soviet delegate and the conference, he said matterof-factly, might be interested to know that his university had recently purchased a number of Apple IIC computers. That shot of reality destroyed the Soviet bloc's credibility at the conference, and with it any hope that U N E S C O m i g h t c o n c e i v ea n o r m a t i v e New World Information and Cornrnunication Order. The roundtable's final report, in fact, condernned censorship and harassment ofjournalists, as well as high telecornmunications tariffs and the lack of media facilities in developing countries. Barely six years later, the Soviet bloc itself collapsed, in part becauseby then it was clear that centrally planned economies and totalitarian political regimes were ill-equipped to participate in the new world information, communication, and economic order, powerless to defend thernselves against it, and unable to ignore it. But if the Soviet ljnion and other totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been the first to experience the Information Age's "creative destruction," to borrowJoseph Schumpeter's phrase, the United States and the other post-industrial democracies are not immune to the same forces. lndeed, the irrational exuberance that has characterized not only the stock market, but also Arnerican foreign policy in

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GeorgetownJournal of International Affairs

the last decade, may turn out to have been, at best, premature.

Authority. Challenging rr,"u,,ited States and other pluralistic, postindustrial, market-driven countries appear to be far better equipped to cope with the inevitable than totalitarian and authoritarian states. And if the United States is blessed, China is stressed and North Korea is doomed. The Iraqi newspaper al-Jamhur!1a captured Saddam Hussein's attitude toward the mother of all rnedia in rgg/, when he wrote that the Internet means "the end of civilizations, cultures, interests. and ethics."' The strains are already obvious, especially in nations such as China that are atternpting to promote economic growth while continuing to strangle political dissent. Last March, while trying to negotiate its entry into the World Tiade Organization (WTO), China cracked down on more than I,OOO Internet cafes that had sprung up in Beijing and Shanghai. City authorities warned the cafe owners not to permit "any activities that would darnage state security, disturb public order and interfere with the public's rights and interests."" On March tJ, the Hong Kong newspaper Ming Paoreported that the China Press and Publications Adrninistration (CPPA) had issued an order forbidding Chinese newspapersfrom printing "confirmed news and information from the Internet." The order said that newspapers "must firrnly follow the political gr.ridance for the media and not carry reports that run counter to the principles and policies of the party and state," according to MingPao.3 At the same time, however, starting with bookstores such as Bookmall.com in Shanghai, which opened in early rggg,

wALcorr wired Affairs more than 6oo online stores have popped up in China in less than a year, with an averageof two new ones opening every day. According to the Boston Consulting Group, there now are 160 online bookstores, rB9 online rnalls, and 126 online travel sites in China-a nation where just a few years ago even the sirnplest trip required navigating an elaborate bureaucratic maze.a China's dilemma is evident in its onagain, off-again efforts to forbid foreigners frorn investing in Chinese Internet businesses. In September rggg, Information Industry Minister \Mu declared that Internet-related Jichuan businesses could not be financed or operated by foreign entities. Late in the Yahoo ! launched sarne rnonth, YahoolChina, a joint venture with Beijing Founder Electronics. Two months later, on November 9, 1999, Sina.com announced it had raised a total of $85 million from a number of foreign investors, including Dell Computer and Goldman Sachs in the United Statesand Japan's Sumitomo Corporation.5 On November r5, 1999, the Chinese governrnent agreed in negotiations with the United Statesover WTO accessionto allow foreign investors to own as much as 49 percent of the equity in Chinese telecorn cornpanies and as much as $o percent two years after China joins the WTO.U Although the deal apparently overruled Minister Wu and the Ministry of Information Industry, what it will mean in practice remains unclear. Although Russia already has rnore than one million Internet users and rnore than rB,ooo Web sitesin the .ru dornain, sorne Russian leaders appear to be having sirnilar qualrns about allowing unfettered access to information. In January, the chairman of the Russian Electoral Com-

mission, Alexander Vesnyakov, said his agency would "consider the Internet as a rnass rnediurn" and "monitor and punish" violations of election laws. A rnonth earlier, Russian bureaucrats drafted plans to have the state take over the registration of .ru dornains and to consider all Russian Web sites, even personal homepages, mass media if they were updated at least once a year. Russian President Madimir Putin, who at the time was still Boris Yeltsin's prirne rninister, shot down the plan and told Internet officials that "the government will not try to find a balance between regrrlation and freedom. The choice will always be in favor of freedom."T Putin's dedication to freedom of the press has been less evident in his governrnent's response to critical coverage of its war against pro-independence forces in Chechnya, and missing entirely frorn its atternpts to shut down the Media-MOST organization, which has been unkind to Yeltsin and his chosen successor. Chinese, Russian, and other nations' efforts to control the electronic flow of inforrnation, however, probably are as futile as the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Council of tent, which in December 1563 produced an index of prohibited books in a vain attempt to halt the Protestant Reformation. Johann Gutenberg's movable t1pe, invented more than a century earlier, could print Martin Luther andJohn Calvin as well as the Bible. In short order, a crude rnarketplace of ideas, rather than the ecclesiasticalauthorities, began to decide what was printed. Now Iran's conservative clerics, among others, are following in the footsteps of the Council of Trent and discovering that pixels are even harder to corral than printed pages; the little ones and zeros come flying over, under, and around the

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walls of censorship frorn a thousand different directions. For example, on June 2g, 1999, as India was stepping up its campaign against Pakistani-backed Muslirn separatists in Kashmir, Indian authorities blocked Internet accessto Dawn,a liberal Pakistani newspaper, by clamping down on India's lone, state-owned Internet Service Provider, Videsh Sanchar Nigarn. Internet activists on both sides of the line of control separating Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir promptly posted instructions on how to evade the ban.8 In democratic nations, too, the Internet is proving to be sornething of a challenge. In February 1996, two protestors charged with libeling McDonald's by accusing the fast food giant of contributing to deforestation of the rain forest, heart disease, cancer, and starvation in developing countries turned to the Web to publicize their cause. Frustrated by the lack of rnedia coverage their casewas getting, the two set up a "McSpotlight" Web site frorn a laptop connected to the Internet via a cellular phone outside a McDonald's in central London. To evade Britain's tough libel laws, they set up mirror sites in Australia, Finland, New Zealand, and the United States, aided by fellow activists in the Netherlands. (In rgg/, a judge ruled that the two had failed to prove their allegations, but awarded McDonald's only $6o,ooo-half the damagesthe company had claimed.)s Although they are arrned with more forrnidable weapons, neither Slobodan Milosevic nor the Vietnarnese Communist Party have had much luck building walls against the Internet. And although the "digital divide," the gap between electronic haves and have-nots, is both real

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and pernicious, even it cannot prevent those pesky pixels from penetrating the /cuelcsof Rio deJaneiro, the slurns of Calcutta, or Cairo's City of the Dead. The first Community Computer School in Brazil was erected in rgg{ in the Rio slurn of Santa Marta with five Intel {86 computers, a fax/modem, and a color printer. Now the Comitepara a Democratipgdoda Informafrco(Comrnittee for the Dernocratization of Computer Science) is collecting used computers in Japan for poor people in Brazil.'o In Peru, "Internet cabinas"are springing up in Lirna and even in Cuzco, the old Incan capital in the Andes at rr,ooo feet above sea level. Many are run by farnilies who let their neighbors rent tirne on their computers and Internet connections-an hour of e-rnailing costs about the same as rnailing a postcard to the United States."

Future Visions, The powerof the Internet has fueled two dueling predictions. The first, propounded by no less formidable an intellect than Peter Drucker, is that the nation-state, which after all is a relatively rnodern construction, cannot survive. Optirnists suggest that the new world information and cornmunication order will be blessedly free of nationalism, Iangrragesother than English, officious customs agents, and irritating currency conversions. Pessimists foresee a snakepit of feuding Basques, Chechens, Hezbollahis, Karens, Kosovars, Kurds, trnils, T.l'pumaros, and Zapatistas, all of thern conspiring in r28-bit encrypted code and arrned with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons they cooked up using recipes they downloaded frorn the Net. The second school predicts that ecommerce, e-warfare, and e-diplomacy

wALcorr WiredAffairs

FrgnGhPresident Tacques Chirachascalled

the widespread ^risk use of Enelish on the Internet "a major for humanity. " will make strong nations such as the United States even stronger and leave everyone else even further behind. This view is especially fashionable in France, where the government has decreed that all Web sites in France rnust offer content in French, and President Jacques Chirac has called the widespread use of English on the Internet "a major risk for humanity."'' Both the one-worlders and those who fear le ddf Amdricain|lectroniquemay be \Nrong. More likely, there will turn out to be some truth found in all of the predictions: The Information Age will weaken some aspects of national government, but strengthen others; prornote both globalization and Iocalization; and advance some American interests while obstructing others. If the upper strata of the economic world continue to integrate while the lower strata do not and the political order crumbles, the new world information and communication order will be anything but orderly. If things get messy enough, anyone who remembers that obscure UNESCO conference in Austria way back in r9B3 may come to wish that the experts the UN assembledin the Alps had drafted a norrnative new world order.

on behalf of and intervention-usually the less fortunate. As Robert Wiebe, Richard Hofstadter, and other students of the Progressive Era have described, the industrial revolution in the United Statesled, in tirne and after much misery and some bloodshed, to the activist view of government that President Theodore Roosevelt championed. Government busted trusts. set standards. financed education, and underwrote scientific research. Much the same thing happened in England and elsewhere in -Western Europe. Similarly, the social and economic strains of the Great Depression inspired the New Deal, and the technological fears and dernands of the Cold War led to what critics on the left have dubbed the "National Security State." In some authoritarian regimes-think of Chile, East Germany, or South Korea-much the sarne thing has happened, but more slowly, less cornpletely, and sometimes, more dramatically. 'Western In the United States, Europe, and East Asia, the actual and feared dislocations caused or aggravated by new inforrnation technology have already led to calls for more rnuscular government regulation (and perhaps taxation) of e-commerce, policing of cyber crime, and enforcernent of paGt... In the past, periods of great antitrust, banking, and securities laws and demotechnological, economic, and regrrlations. The U.S. Department nations ofJustice's action against Microsoft, the graphic change in dernocratic have, in time, produced demands for Securities and Exchange Commission's challenges to the accounting practices of greater government power, activism,

Towarda New SocialCom-

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MicroStrategy, America Online, and Fund in Washington, D.C. In Seattie, others, and the difficulties encountered alternative media activists created the Independent Media Center to teII the stoby police hunting for the culprit behind "I May Love You" the virus all may ry their way; although they raised only 2ooo presage demands for more, not less, $45,ooo in cash, their Web site had r.5 million hits during the week of the WTO government action. In time, the cornbination of an economic downturn in the meeting.'3 Two-and-a-half hours after United States and questionable activity J a p a n ' s w o r s t n u c l e a r a c c i d e n t , a t by today's malefactors of great wealth is Tokairnura on September 30, 1999, Citlikely also to lead to calls for greater govizens for Alternatives to Nuclear Energy ernment power to police the new econin the high-tech hotbed of Bangalore, India, downloaded news and analysis of omy and patrol cyberspace. the disaster from a university professor in Japan. They relayed the information to Whether even the United States, the anti-nuclear activists in Sirsi. India. undisputed leader of the information where the Kaiga Nuclear Power Plant is r e v o l u t i o n , w i l l b e a b l e t o r e s p o n d located, and they translated reports into effectively is another matter. For all its the local language, Kannada, and distributed them. It was a front-page story obvious advantages-a diverse, welleducated labor force; a formidable eduthe next morning in Sirsi's daily newspacational system, especiallyin the naturp er, DhganishtaPatrakafta.'+ As Steven Thornrna of Knight Ridder al sciences; a high-tech military; an Newspapers wrote on the eve of the New enormous domestic market; a dearth of mortal threats; and a tradition of innoHampshire presidential primaries last February, the American political scene vation and ingenuity-it is nowhere preordained that the United States will offers little evidence that either major dominate the Computer Age as it did presidential candidate or either of their the Age of Slide Rules. political parties has given much thought Indeed, the early retr.rrns suggest that to the new challenges-despite the fact that one of thern clairned to have had a the private sector and non-governmental organizations are adapting to the new hand in inventing the Internet and the order much rnore nimbly than are politiother lives in Austin. Texas. one of the nation's hottest high-tech towns. cians and governments. The information revolution, in short, is leveling the playing Indeed, the slow, deliberative, consenfield between nations and non-state actors sus-driven politics of the Industrial Age ranging frorn Burmese activist Aung Son seem ill-suited to the tasksof governance Suu Kyi to terrorist Osama bin l-aden, in the Information Age. First, except in extraordinary circumand Hurnan Rights Watch to Hezbollah. have Environmental groups organized stances, governments in the United States and almost everywhere else have worldwide to restrict oil drilling in Nigeria, and allied themselves via the Web with Iost the near-monopoly they once had on labor unions and others to disr-upt the r e a l - t i m e information-economic, WTO meeting in Seattle and less success- political, and strategic-and with it much fully, the annual meeting of the World of their ability to muster public support. Delayed television pictures of the Tet Banl and the International Monetary

...But MovingToo Slowly.

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Offensive sapped public support for the war in Vietnam a generation ago, and CNN satellite images of a U.S. soldier's corpse being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu helped end a peacekeeping mission (admittedly, one that was creep ing toward being much more than that) in Somalia. What effect will streaming video and audio from the next battlefield or terrorist target have on public, allied, and congressional opinion? Moreover, audio and video are likely to be available not only from big news orga nizations, but also from anti-war activists with their own Web sites-or from the ter rorists themselves. Cat-and-mouse cyber warfare between Hezbollah and Israel, the

Wired Affairs

order has let a hundred flowers bloom each minute, often eighty of them are weeds, and one or two of them are toxic. During the turmoil that surrounded the ouster of President Suharto of Indone sia, for example, activists posted pho tographs of human rights abuses they said were being directed at ethnic Chinese in the country. Although there were real abuses, the photos turned out to be fake. So have numerous other bits of news on the Internet, one example being the "revelation" that TWA Flight 800 was shot down by a U.S. Navy missile. But the overwhelming reality of the new century is that the absence of con sensus, the lack of a common market-

The slow t deliberative,

consensus-driven

Eolitics of the Industrial ke seem ill-suited to

the tasks of governance in the Information Age.

commerical sale of high -resolution satel lite photos, and the worldwide contagion of computer viruses suggest a range of unpleasant pOSSibilities. If technology is loosening the state's grip on information, much as Gutenberg broke the Church's, it already has broken the monopoly that the mass media have enjoyed since the advent of movable type. Given the high price that reporters too often pay for access to high-ranking gov ernment and business officials, the dumpster-diving quest for ratings and attention, and the herd mentality that too frequently characterizes the trade, th is development is not altogether a bad thing. Information technology is not alto gether a good thing, either; if the new

place of ideas, will make governance increasingly difficult, espeCially across the traditional international boundaries across which money, ideas, and informa tion now flow without interruption, twenty-four hours a day. Nations rose and feli after the inven tion of movable type during the Industri al Revolution, and again during the Age of Engineering, which gave birth to, among other things, television, atomic energy, artificial satellites, antibiotics, and oral contraceptives. Now they will rise or fall depending on how successfully they can cope with the new demands of the Information Age. Yogi Berra put it more succinctly: "The future," he reportedly said, "is inevitable."

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Affairs andForeign Richard M. Moose Four decadesago, I was a junior Foreign Service Officer lugging code rnachines around Africa to keep the Soviets (and the French) frorn reading our mail. That experience seems very distant today. Virtually everything about that world of foreign affairs has changed, and technology is one of the principal factors behind this transformation. The United States still appears undecided about whether and how we should respond to the challenges and opportunithat would flow from a ties of the new era-opportunities deliberate exploitation of our global prirnacy. Whether the United States chooses to lead or merely to react to events, the foreign affairs agencies rnust be prepared to deal with a very different world. Change is the dominant therne of our time; the ability to manage change is the distingrrishing mark of successful organizations, be they public or private. The ability of the U.S. government to reshape its institutions, using technology to engender and enable new forms of communication and new responses to events, will have a critical bearing on our future security and well-being. This will be the case in the new world of foreign affairs, just as it has proven to be in the business world. The challenges of effecting these changes have as much to do with redefining organizations and culture

R i c h a r dM . M o o s e is President of the Irrstitute for Public Research and former UndersecretarT Management United

of at the

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as they do with simply incorporating new technology. If the (J.S. government is unable to marshal its internal expertise and aralyze problems in a timely, nearly instantaneous manner, the rest of the world takesnote. If its leaders lack rapid, two-way means of coordinating the component elements of the foreign affairs community, its potential strength may be wasted. When its official responsesare perceived by the rest ofthe world to be one or more laps behind emerging realities, its capacity for leadership is impaired. The United States may be the most knowledgeable, most wired country in the world, but if its foreign affairs institutions are not organized and equipped to compete with its international counterparts as well as the host of new inforrnal actors, its interests will suffer.

Is Technology the Answer? rn. U.S. executive branch and its foreign affairs components continue to experience great difficulty in coping with key aspects of the Informatio. Ag". No longer a bipolar contender, the United States has become the reluctant hegemon. With the end of the Cold War, the United Statesbecame the singular focus of the world's hopes and grievances, whatever their nature or origin. Causes and movements of all forms, repressed or ignored in the bipolar era, now gain worldwide saliency, often through access to technology. Globalization makes it difficult for the United States to escape their thrust, eYen when it wishes to ignore them. There is broad agreement that better use of information technology (lT) by foreign affairs agencies could help address the aforementioned challenges and dangers. In reports published over

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the last two years, three panels of experienced foreign policy practitioners addressed the relationship between technology and international affairs.' The reports examined the array of new actors, traditional and non-traditional, that have engulfed foreign affairs. Each emphasized, in its own way, the contribution that IT can make by enhancing the capacity of the foreign affairs community to cope with the changing global environment. The panel sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found "unacceptable performance gaps" in the community's priorities, leadership, infrastructure, resources, technology, and relations with non-governrnental players. "In short," the report said, "the State Department and allied agencies are encumbered with traditions and tools that inhibit the practice of diplomacy. "" The U.S. government is faced with an increasing array of issues affecting the national interest in which private expertise exceedsthat available in the lead government agenciesor in any combination of agencies.Ethnic lobbies and non-governrnental agencies are often more intimately informed about conditions in obscure locales than the g'overnment's vast and costly intelligence apparatus. If properly equipped, the governrnent could, if it so chose, assemble its own "virtual" expert panels and capitalize on the knowledge of those outside the government bureaucracy. More inclusive modes of technology, aided by personal interaction, would enable government to have a better understanding of local situations-or at the very least not be caught off-balance so often. A recent Stimson Center report, for example, spoke of the need to forge "an inclusive diplomacy in a complex world. " Non-traditional

MoosEWiredAffairs international actors with worldwide electronic access,unencumbered by cr)?tographic constraints and clearance protocol, act more quickly than hierarchical, stove-piped bureaucracies. Technology can facilitate the horizontal sharing, gathering, and coordinating of inforrnation, thereby enhancing the speed and coherence of responses.

up. But at least the last WANG has finally been retired.

in the System.rn the Stresses

past, the foreign affairs elements of the government gathered information largely through personal observation and interaction. This information was reported to headquarters through the protected, classified telegraphic channels. The ernphasis was on control of Dawn Of IT. The StateDepartment highly sensitive, internally generated arrived at the dawn of the IT era heavily information. This prevailing style of equipped with Cold War technology dedmanaging inforrnation, however, is i c a t e d t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f c l o s e d , obsolete. The information most needed inward-looking processes and classified to feed today's processesis often unclasnetworks. Today's concepts of accessing sified and readily available outside the and riding the Internet are the antithesis government. The challenge is to find

TheStateDepartment at the

At least the WANG hasfinallvbeen ' retired .

of what the Department's systernswere designed for, what its IT staff was trained to execute, and what its practitioners were trained to use. Even so, in tgJJ, the rnuch-maligned IMr\NG cornputer made the Department a leader in the technology arena among agencies in the executive branch. This early successsoon faded, however, as the Department missed the start of the PC revolution, having failed-as did rnany others-to grasp its potential. Thereafter, the State Department could never lay its hands on the substantial funds required to invest in a transition away frorn its legacy systems, explaining why its IT systemswere seriously lagging when the Internet exploded onto the technology scene. Burdened with continuing budget and security concerns, the Department has never caught

efficient means of gathering and sifting through information to rnake it available where it is needed most. The tempo of today's interaction, coupled with the frustration with laborious, hierarchical telegraphic clearance processes, have created the need for faster, rnore flexible, and less formal channels of comrnunication. Until a decade or so ago, the speed of international interaction allowed the government to rely heavily upon individual knowledge and rnanual retrieval of information. Sirnilarly, individual agencies pursued their respective missions with an eye on a few clarified goals, and with the overall thrust of their activity driven by the imperatives of a bipolar world. Today's broader agenda, however, challenges old rnis-

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instructed by the president, that it should give a higher priority to the IT budget. During rny years as lJndersecretary of State for Management, the Department was invariably obliged to squeeze the IT budget within the constraints of the OMB "grridance" for the international affairs account. In the Departrnent's internal budget process, no major proposal for IT modernization could hold 0bstacles to Progress. Asamem- its own against any "policy" or "program" requirement. Secretaries of state share ber of the aforementioned CSIS panel, I most its findings and responsibility in this matter. They must agree with of with recognize that their Departrnent's dysmany of those of the other panels. I yield function may, in the long term, be just as to no one in my advocacyof the Department's need for substantial additional great a liability to the protection and funding. But I also believe that the depth promotion of U.S. interests abroad as and persistence of the information techthe failure to obtain enough funds for nology gap has diverted attention frorn the regional crisis dujour or the perpetual underlying problems of management Middle Eastpeaceprocess.It is not fair to and mission that rnust be addressed reproach Congress when the executive before current technology problems can branch consistently fails to ask for suffibe surrnounted. In rny view, the distincient funding. grrished panelists seriously understate the INrrrlonNcv non-technical difficulties that inevitably L n , c . o r n s H r p A N D accompany the introduction Changing dornestic of new C o o n n r N e r r o N . and international agendashave induced a technology into any bureaucracy-large or srnall, public or private, civilian or great increase in the nurnber of U.S. govrnilitary. While steady progress has been ernment agencies operating abroadmade by the State Departrnent in its use presently rnore than thirty-five. Globalization and today's speed of inforrnation of IT over the last fewyears, the potential of these advances will not be realized exchange require interagency responses unless the underlying problems are identhat are better inforrned, well-coordinated, and equally rapid. Poorly coordinated tified and the necessaryenergy is maragency activities can-and often do-send shaled to solve them. These problems contradictory signals about U.S. policies. span three areas that bear directly on leadership, The Overseas Presence Advisory Panel technology use-funding, (OPAP) report found that inefficient and mission focus. information systems "leave the [State] F u N o r N c , W r r o I s R n s p o N s r n r r ? Department'out of the loop."'' There is no doubt that funding will The foreign affairs agencies have not remain the most obvious obstacle to the yet responded to new demands, and there has been only limited pressure for them modernization of foreign affairs technology until the Office of Management to do so. The executive branch missed an and Budget (OMB) recognizes, or is historic opportunity to put its interasions and engages an unprecedented number of agencieswhose previous orientation was primarily domestic. For example, U.S. law enforcernent agencies, today the fastest growing cornponent of the nation's official presence overseas, used to be primarily concerned with domestic crime, not international terrorists and drug traffickers.

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tvloosEwiredAffairs gency house in order when Senate Foreign Relations Cornrnittee Chairman JesseHelms sought, beginning in rgg5, to force the consolidation of the foreign affairs agenciesunder the Department of State. This proposal was, at once, both constructive in its logic and rnischievous in its effect. While the Department vacillated, the other agencies fought to protect their autonomy, budgets, personnel, and the right to exclusive control of their own comlnunications channels. The White House shielded the Agency for International Development (USAID) from consolidation, while allowing the Arms Control and Disarmarnent Agency (ACDA) and the United StatesInformation Service (USIS) to be absorbedalbeit on terms that nullified rnost of the potential benefits. One of the rnost potent (and transparently self-serving) arg'uments invoked by opponents was the Department's alleged lack of interest in our capacity to rnanage other programs or, indeed, to properly manage itself. Many in the Department agreed. Greater ease in sharing information among the agencies, both at home and abroad, would greatly enhance interagency coordination and thus the execution of U.S. foreign policy. Still, the expectation that constructive interagency action can be realized through a foreign by the affairs intranet-recommended OPAP-is unrealistic. Sharing cornrnunications is generally the last thing that competing agencies want to do. Anticipating this resistance, the OPAP sagely recommended the creation of an interagency technology regulatory body, directly empowered by the president, in order to "overcorne the natural tendency of agencies to want their own systems."a Leadership is at the heart of interagency dysfunction, but it is a touchy subject.

The for exarnple, CSIS report, approached the rnatter with great delicacy, observing: "That some presidents and secretaries have not effectively used the bureaucracy of diplomacy to advance national interests reflects, in part, their own personal style, but also the failure of diplornacy to keep up with the pace of change."s Progress in the State Departrnent's utilization of new inforrnation technologies will require leadership that can convince its own personnel, asweII as the personnel of the other foreign affairs agencies, that greater interagency communication will create a rnore fluid and responsive foreign poliry apparatus. FocusrNc oN THEMrssroN. The preconditions for successful technology modernization in any organization, including the State Department, involve rethinking the organization's mission and reshaping its structure and processes (taking into account its goals and operating environment) before investment occurs. The State Department is almost universally at fault for not having undertaken these critical steps. Managing organizational change in order to achieve a clearer mission focus is particu l a r l y c h a l l e n g i n gw h e n s t r o n g o r g a n i z a tional culture is a factor. Other equally proud but troubled organizations, however, have succeeded in rernaking themselves.In the case of the State Department, nothing is rnore important than rethinking its mission around those whom, in the words of the CSIS study, "listen, interact, analyze, interpret, and communicate."6 The OPAP believed that "since gathering and disseminating information [has] . . been arnong the core functions of overseas representatives, the United Statescan better ensure the future successofits overseasDresence

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by fostering an organizational culture that values knowledge-its development, sharing, and storage."TThese opinions are consistent with the "value-added" perception of "stakeholders" who were

principal functions: gathering and disseminating information, as well as coordinating foreign affairs activities. Basic management philosophy would suggest that the Departrnent divest or interviewed during the Department's outsource to the private sector, to the short-lived Strategic Managernent Inigreatest extent possible, its nurnerous tiative (SMI) of r995. More recently, the non-core functions such as property Stimson panelists declared that "informanag'ernent and telecommunications mation is State's prirnary commodity network operation. The Department's a n d p r o d u c t . S t a t e ' s v a l u e - a d d e d i s top rnanagement has traditionally not knowledge. "8 Re-evaluating the Departgiven those activities adequate oversight. rnent's mission in terrns of its value- O v e r s e a s , n o n - c o r e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s added should be the first step; fitting substantially distract senior officers new technology into the mission can frorn their primary missions. As the enhance its pursuit. CSIS study observed, "the foreign Knowledge is often uselessto policyaffairs cornmunity has too many adminmakers and foreign affairs executives istrators and other support personnelunless they can gain accessto it easily and and too few people who listen, interact, q u i c k l y . T h e D e p a r t m e n t e x p e r i e n c e s a n a l y z e ,i n t e r p r e t , a n d c o m m u n i c a t e . " e immense difficulty in streamlining the Ironically, one of the unfortunate sideprocess of accessing information partly effects of belated attention to IT and because its internal comrnunications security has been to shrink even further channels are clogged by self-irnposed the number of personnel positions constraints and distractions. High on the available overseas for core functions of iist of measures that could re-energize reporting and analysis. the Departrnent would be the revival of the neglected objective put forth by former Secretary of State W-arren ChristoM iSSiOn. The alignrnent of new technology with the State Department's rnispher' to eliminate layers in the Departrnent's organizational structure and simsion is bedeviled by two factors, first, a plify the clearance process. Behind those reluctance to embrace the new, broader bland prescriptions lies a bureaucratic agenda; and second, a continuing lag in matching appropriate IT tools to the black hole that devours energy better spent on leadership and analysis. Sirnitasls at hand. The Department's IT staff Iarly, the endless, self-imposed clearance is doing more planning than ever before and crosschecking undertaken in the and are attempting to take advantage of narne of coordination sewes prirnarily to the OPAP recommendation for an interobscure accountability and stifle initiaagency intranet. Still, insiders experitive. Here again, technology can help, enced with IT worry that the planners are not adequately engaging the would-be but first there is the matter of will. Like many other venerable public users: The CSIS panel noted that politiand private organizations, the State cal and economic officers, as well as speDepartment has accumulated functions cialists in fields such as public diplomacy, over the years that are not integral to its should be given a greater say in the allo-

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What iS mOSt rernarkable aboutthe Pentagon is not the disital displays . . . but that CNN"and the Internei are available for everyday use throughout the building. cation of resources.'o\Mhile this point is valid, the greater challenge lies in convincing policy officers to participate meaningfully, for they are often disinterested or insufficiently conversant in technologies to contribute effectively to the planning process. The problem of familiarity with technology rnay be, at least in part, a generational phenornenon. Still, if the technology is not available, how will the senior officers ever learn its value?

Encouraging Innovation. Asnoted earlier, culture plays a role in retarding the developrnent of the foreign affairs institutions and the related application of technology. The Stirnson Report, citing the need to foster a change in culture at the State Department, urged the seventh floor principal officers-including the secretary, undersecretaries, and other high-level officials-to farniliarize themselves with the information technology currently used by the top leadership at the Departrnent of Defense." (Those who are critical of State's IT perforrnance are prone to exaggerate the Pentagon's s.tccess.)But wiring a handful of top officials will not get the job done. The Departrnent has alwaysensured that its top principals are well-equipped, but where most of those below thern in the hierarchy work, the Inforrnation Dark Age still prevails. By contrast, what is most rernarkable about the Pentagon is

not the digital displays in the office of the Secretary of Defense, but that CNN and the Internet are available for everyday use throughout the building. Leadership by example can help overcome cultural and organizational resistance to technology. One assistant secretary has created intranet sites for an entire geographic bureau, an organizational entity that is central to the Departrnent's policy rnission. The pilot program demonstrates how enlightened leadership can use IT to improve the dissemination of directives downward, how it can quickly draw upon the expertise below, and how flexible, lateral communication can knit together a farflung bureau. The application has its limitations' It is expensive and provides prirnarily internally generated information. Still, the pilot demonstrates IT's potential to change the way people approach their work. Pocketsof innovation such as this need to be encouraged and explored.

The Right Connection. Themain State Departrnent building reportedly now has rnore than r,OOO Internet hookups, but officials acknowledge that they are significantly under-utilizedexcept by the public affairs staff. One explanation for this is the current security requirement for a separate network to provide Internet connections. This means that, with a few exceptions, Inter-

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net stations are located for shared use. "While many. if not most. officers can access the classified cable system on their desktops. most must leave their desks and walk to a shared location to access the World Wide Web. Work habits and the level of Internet use are not likely to change under these circumstances. cIne recent case of the missing top secret laptop will only make it more dif ficult for the Department to surmount the security concerns that currently con strain its use of the Internet. Acknowl edging the cost and complexity of sus taining adequate firewall protection to guard sensitive information. the Stimson panelists emphasized the need for State to replace its current policy of risk avoid ance with risk management. The atmos phere must change. they argued. from one of "information policing" to one of "information providing." In this spirit. one may wonder about the changes that might result if the Internet, rather than the classified telegram system, were at all workstations in the State Department. The classified

terminals could then be safely locked away in nearby closets. At first, some staff might find this procedure difficult, but before long. I posit that work habits. as well as the general level of Internet awareness, would be greatly enhanced.

Preparing a Strategic Plan. Use of technology in foreign affairs boils down to questions of mission and money. The foreign affairs community must modernize its outlook on its collective mission and the role of technology. As the Stimson Center report noted: "The State Department needs to view technology ... as a way to improve policy rather than see ing it as just a tool of communication. "'2 Having rethought the Department's mis sion-something they must do for them selves-the benefits of and necessity for technology would be readily apparent to its leaders. Only at that point could a convincing, coherent modernization plan be prepared-one that embraces the entire community-and presented to the president and the Congress as a matter of the highest national priority.

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4· Ibid, p. 58. 5· CSIS. p. 53· 6. Ibid, p. 57·

7·

o PAP.

p. 19·

8. csrs, p. 57. 9· Ibid, p. 93· Stimson, p. 2+. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 10. [I.

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r. "Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age." Center for Strategic and International Studies. October 9.1998; "America's Overseas Presence in the 21st Cen tury." The Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel. November 1998; "Equipped for the Future; Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 2[st Century." The Henry L. Stimson Center. October 1998. 2. CSIS. p. 13. 3· OPAP. p. 56.

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The information revolution is a phenomenon whose introduction occurred in the industrialized world, but whose conclusion rnay very well take place in the developing world. Advances in information technologies have enabled developing countries to connect thernselvesto the world economy and world community at an unprecedented pace. They have also created new opportunities for irnproving education and engaging in e-commerce. But not everyone has embraced this integration. Governrnent telecommunications monopolies have slowed the expansion of Internet networks, and many are uncertain as to whether information technologies are tools that will empower developing countries or sirnply the newest mechanisms of control for the industrialized world. Indeed, a digital divide is emerging that has the potential to further weaken the position of developing countries in the world economy. Carlos Braga, Manager of the Information for Development Project at the World Bank, joined Professor Charles Weiss of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service to discuss the impact of information technology on the developing world, as well as the policy issues confronting newcomers to the information revolution.

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wElss Has the information revolution reached the developing countries, and is it having an impact there? snnen Yes, there is no doubt it is having an impact, but there is a lag. How it affects countries varies a lot. Middleincome countries naturally are the ones that are rnore activelypromoting the kind of development and access to modern inforrnation infrastructure that you already witness in industrialized countries. In rggg, for example, we saw significant advancernentsin the penetration of wireless networks, as well as the explosion of the Internet all over the developing world-Latin Arnerica was the region with the highest level of growth in Internet-wired hosts. At the same time, it's quite true that in the least developed countries, the information revolution is at best affecting some very discrete parts of the economyand society. w EI s s Let's start with the rnore advanced developing countries. What are the rnajor applications of the Internet, and what difference is it making? BRAcAThere are very different aspectsof Internet use and how it's affecting the economy. First, the Internet as a platform for communication and networking is something that's already having an irnpact in many rniddle-income countries-a whole new segment of the industry has appeared, the so-called Internet serrrice providers. Countries like Brazil and Mexico have hundreds of Internet Serrrice Providers, and this segrnent is very dynamic. At the same time, this creates a whole new array of questions for the regrrlatory authorities and the content carriers, and affects opportunities for using the Internet for cornmunica-

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tion. So that's one dimension. The other dirnension is the question of the impact on education. Once again, in Latin Arnerica but also in Asia, the Internet is increasingly used to support educational activities and access to inforrnation, be it government information or inforrnation by separate cornmunities of interest. These types of activities are undoubtedly proliferating all over the developing world. welss Is e-cornmerce growing? B R A G AE - c o m m e r c e i s g r o w i n g , b u t many questions remain. The challenges for developing countries remain quite significant because they have to deal not onlywith the level, quality, and pricing of connectivity-these are often bottlenecks for many developing countries-but on top of that, they rnust deal with the complementary servicesthat you need to have in place if you are going to seriously engage in electronic cornrnerce. By that I mean express rnail delivery, a modern financial system, and the use of credit cards. In many developing countries, these complernentary seryices are still very weak, so on top of the problems with the network, you have problerns with the complernentary services that, of course, make it more difficult to engage in ecommerce. But even without these challenges, there is an explosion of activity and a lot of dynamism in certain regions of the developing world with respect to electronic cornmerce, be it business to consurner or businessto business. w Er s s Do you find that there's an irnportant social impact, with people talking to each other in new ways that are not necessarily political? Do you find new forms of communication taking place?

t N r E R V t E w i r e dA f f a i r s BRAGADefinitely. The Internet creates cyberspace, which is really a new space becauseit increasesthe opportunities for people to communicate and create communities. And it's very interesting to see these communities thriving. The way that information technology is shared in cyberspace is really fascinating, and the creation of these communities is opening 'Ilee new doors for participation. Internet is very powerful in terms of creating opportunities for interaction, and the World Wide Web is undoubtedly creating opportunities for this to happen in a rnore significant fashion than ever before.

Organization, which deals with issues such as taxation and Web-related foreign trade; and the'World Intellectual Property Organization, which is the authority on intellectual property rights. wetss Let's talk a little about the obstacles to connectivity. I know there are serious problems with access to simple telephone service, let alone broadband service. What's the status of connectivity in different parts of the Third World, and what has been the reaction of the telephone monopolies to this situation?

snre n The good news is that connectivity wrtss Are developing countries corning has improved significantly throughout to terms with the sarne types of policy the r99os as a wave of liberalization and issues confronting the developed counprivatization washed throughout the tries, such as those dealing with privacy, world, both in industrialized and develconflicts of law, and copyright? oping countries. Many countries have opened their rnarkets and state-owned ene e n Most developing countries are stili enterprises, allowed privatization, and struggling with more basic issues such as seen significant improvements in levels connectivity and how to regulate interof connectivity. The bad news is that, at connection and prices for the Internet. the same time, there are still those counThose that are in the intermediate stages tries, particularly the ones lagging of their e-commerce developrnent have a behind in their policy reforms, that still relativelylarge proportion of their popface very substantial problems with qualulation connected and are already facing ity and level of access.Actually, in some issuessuch as privacy, intellectual propnew areas, ifyou talk about wireless teleerty rights, and security of transactions. phony, you see signs of converg'ence But these issues are much more on the between developing and industrialized radar screen of industrialized countries countries in the sense that networls are than on those of developing countries. expanding faster in the developing world One of the concerns is that the dialogue than in the industrialized world. But if is being conducted in a lirnited environyou are talking about Internet access,the ment becausemost developing countries situation is much more uneven, and in have not yet been exposed to some of some cases, you'll see an even greater these issues. For example, it is important divergence. to give a voice to developing countries in we t ss What is the problem? Why is there organizations like ICANN flnternet Corporation for Assigned Names and a tension between a government postal, Numbers], which handles the allocation t e l e g r a p h , a n d t e l e p h o n e m o n o p o l y of dornain names; the World Trade tmT] and the provision of connectivity?

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BRAGA There are exarnples of PTTs around the world that have done a good job. But there is a typical problem in terms of the incentives for the provision of services. What has been proven again and again is that, on average, a competitive environrnent is the prirnary stimulus for a policy centered on the consumer, and in this sense, it is the best

of schools are now connected all over the world and engage in pedagogical experiments. wElss How about for medical applications? enre n Again, the Internet has become a powerful tool at several levels. One is to

Itm vefy OptimistiC abouttheinformation revolution as a mechanism of ernpowerment. rnechanisrn to direct investments in connectivity. Entities in a monopoly are in a position to extract rents from the consumer, and these rents are not used for the expansion of the network in many countries. PTTs are a cash cow for the government to fund other activities of the governrnent. Hence, you see a negative relationship between monopoly and expansion of networks. welss What important experiments are going on in terms of Internet use for educational purposes? snrcr There are many initiatives all over the world that are experimenting with the Internet. It's irnportant to emphasize "experimenting" because all of this is very new. And these initiatives are being implemented frorn universities all the way to private research. The World Bank, for example, created the links for a development program that connects schools in developing countries with schools in industrialized countries in order to create communities that dialogrre through the Internet. Hundreds

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provide access to medical information. Imation, which is supported by the.World Bank's Information for Development Project, is an NGO that transmits medical information to a low-earth orbit satellite, aimed particularly at sub-Saharan Africa. More and more health practitioners can accessthis medical inforrnation through the Internet, use it for their own training, and post important information. At the same time, you have increased use of the Internet for training in medical schools and access to medical literature. Many journals are now online, and the mechanisms for accessand dissemination of this information are more pervasive. werss Let's turn to the question of the digital divide. One hears two contradictory stories. One is that the Internet spells the "death of distance," but the other is that of a digital divide, a tale of a global shakeout between those who can rnanage globalization and the Internet and those who cannot. What are we to think? anrcr I think both of the stories are true. Information technologies are dis-

tNrERvtEW wiredAffairs tance-insensitive. The costs for you to call from Georgetown to downtown W-ashington or to downtown Moscow are not that different. The price may be different because of the pricing structure and regulatory bottlenecks that allow companies to continue to exercise monopoly power in this area, but the costs, technologically speaking, are very much distance-insensitive. These will become even rnore so with the delivery of fiber optics, advanced networks, and a new generation of satellites around the world. A1l of these point to the death of distance because the costs of telephony are less and less distancesensitive. Having said that, this should not be equated to the death of geography because the characteristics of each region will continue very much to dorninate and define the reach and the impact of globalization. welss What about the rural areas in developing countries? Will there be a digital divide within developing countries? enaor There is definitely a digital divide within developing countries as well as within industrialized countries. Typically, areas with either low income or low population density, like rural areas, are the ones less well-serviced by networks. Therefore, it is very misleading to look at average densities around the developing world, because once you go out of the main urban centers, the decline in the level of connectivity is dramatic. So, yes, there is a digital divide, and unless governments are able

to take proactive approaches toward network development with special attention to rural areas, it will continue to be a major problem. wErss All things considered, is information technology going to be an empowering technology for poor, disadvantaged, and rural people, or will it just be another technology that helps the rich rnore than the poor? B R A G AI ' m v e r y o p t i r n i s t i c a b o u t t h e information revolution as a mechanism of empowerment. The Internet, to a certain extent, is a subversive technology, because it enables and facilitates, giving a voice to the poor. Now, having said that, it is also true that given the structure of existing networks, given the kind of access we have now, you can seethis nascent revolution sharpening the divide because those who are wealthy are the ones that have accessto modern networls. But the logic of the network is inclusive. As the technology becornes more widespread, the value of the network will increase exponentially, and with the proper regulatory environment, market forces can be cornplemented by a proactive policy agenda, so that specific market gaps in rural accessto the Internet and accessby the poor in urban areas will begin to be filled. So it is in the hands of governments, to a certain extent, to respond to this revolution. But in the end, it is really in the hands of each one of us-and the communties to which we belong-to explore the Internet and to gain a voice in this emerging global network.

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||enge Ttre?romiseantrCha of E-Commerce Patricia Bucklev & Sabrina Montes In 1996, a small family-owned store in the valley of Benasque in the Spanish Pyrenees mountains began selling its ski gear and mountaineering equiprnent on the fledgling Internet. The store's saleswent from just over $59o,ooo with 2 percent sold outside the store in rggg t" $+.7 million with alrnost 2$ percent of sales made online in 1999.'A small business in a remote area createsan online store that enables it to expand its market globally and grow its business dramatically, This is the promise, but also the hype, of e-cornmerce. It is the promise because these are actual gains going to an actual producer. It is the hype becausethese types of transactions still compose only a minute fraction of total worldwide sales. Even in the United States,where e-cornmerce is arguably most prevalent, online retail saleswere only $5.3 billion in the first quarter of 2ooo. This amounted to less than r percent of the $748 billion total retail salestallied during that sarneperiod.' Given this tiny nurnber, one rnight reasonably ask, why all the media coverage? Indeed, the rnedia's focus on e-commerce's retail potential is misplaced. A rnore far-reaching consequence of emerging ecommerce technology will be the way it influences and improves business processesthemselves.

P a t r i c i aB u c k l e y is Senior

Policy Advis

er in the Office

Policy and De'elopment

of the Economics

and Statistics Adminisrrarion

at the United

States Department

Comnerce.

Sabrina Montes examines ecortomic and policy

issues for

the Economics

and

Statistics Administra tion

of the United

States Ilepartment

Commerce.

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The snazzyWeb sites that enable firms to sell books, computers, and ski equipment to consumers worldwide represent only a tiny facet of what is made possible by technological progress. Many of the revolutionary applications of these information and communication technologies are taking place in the more prosaic world of business processes, such as procurement and inforrnation management. While these applications are changing the face of global business, it is not clear how they will develop in the future and what their impact will be on business. Will the new technologies level the playing field among businesses of different sizesor will they exacerbate the differences? Will they increase economic opportunity for developing countries or will they contribute to the advantages already held by industrialized countries? Two implications, however, are clear about these technologies. First, there is a great deal at stake. The future economic health of businesses and nations hinges on how well they adapt to the realities of an increasingly digital world. Second, one cannot ignore the technological, regulatory, and legal issuesbrought about by e-commerce. And they are likely to become thornier as the Internet continues to grow rapidly. The number of connected computers has already increased dramatically from about 6 million in rgg$ to 72 million in early 2ooo.3 The number of people online worldwide continues to surge, from fewer than {O million in rg96 to an estimated 3o4 mlllion in 2ooo. Now, for the first time, more than half of those online reside outside the United Statesand Canada.a In this environment, it is important to recognize and examine the stakes of the technology-driven changes that are tak-

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ing place in business practices. If a small rnountaineering equipment store can use the W-eb to expand its market globally, imagine what a multinational company can do. How will new technologies change business practices and what are the implications of these changes on global cornrnerce? How have governrnents responded?

N e w B u s i n e s sM o d e l sE . -commerce is reshaping business practices and raising new sorts of cross-border issues between countries whose firms engage in electronic commerce; A growing number of African tourist facilities now prornote their accommodations and arnenities directly to vacationers on the Internet, decreasingtheir dependence on overseastravel agents.5 At WorldZMarket.corn, one can purchase a variety of handicrafts, from exquisite beaded Huichol masls from Mexico to a hand-ernbroidered quilt from Bihar, India.6 An international collection of leading energ'y and petrochemical companies have announced plans to launch an online exchange specializing in goods and services (frot t gas exploration to marketing) relevant to the industry. The collective annual procurement spending of the founding partners exceeds $r2$ billion' 40 percent of this spending is in North and South America, {.O percent in Europe and Africa, and 2o percent in the Asia Pacific and the Middle East.7 The example of the African tourist facilities using e-cornmerce to reach -Western vacationers illustrates one of the key benefits of using the Internet. Electronic commerce enables firrns to extend their reach, bring in new business, and at times bypassintermediaries (in this case, the overseastravel agents)

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and connect directly with potential custorners. This model fulfills one of the early predictions about the Internet and e-commerce-that e-commerce would create efficiencies by eliminating the need for interrnediaries. Manufacturers and service providers sell directly to the customer, and "middlemen" disappear. The early predictions, however, failed to take into account the important role that intermediaries play. Nor did the early speculation foresee the resourcefulness some interrnediaries would exhibit in finding new ways to add value in an online world. These predictions failed to

rnany sites targeting srnall businesses. It seeksto be the portal for all of the goods and servicesrequired by small businesses. Other sites leverage existing relationships within specific industries on a global basis. Ford Motor Company, General Motors, and DaimlerChrysler AG, for example, have plans to develop an automotive supply space. Sears, Roebuck and Cornpany and Carrefour SA, a Parisbased retailer, recently announced their intention to develop an online marketplace for the retail industry. In all three exarnples, access to the Internet enables firms to extend their

E-commerce rrnpactl maPy aspectsof businessbeyond lncreaslng the nrimber of potential parties able to pirticipate in the ..!t

marketplace. anticipate, for example, a new tlpe of reach and potentially bring in new busiintermediary, the online marketplace. ness, However, businessesand individuWhile some producers directly target als in less developed countries, like those their customers, others are finding new in the first two examples, are among the spaces in which to conduct business least able to take advantage of such beneonline. In the World2Market example, fits because of poor communications the handiwork of widely dispersed artii n f r a s t r u c t u r e i n t h e s ec o u n t r i e s . sans is brought together by a new online E-commerce impacts many aspects business-to-consurner interrnediary. of business beyond increasing the The online petrochemicals exchange is number of potential parties able to another, although somewhat different, participate in the rnarketplace. For example of an online rnarketplace-a exarnple, online markets can cause a b u s i n e s s- t o - b u s i n e s s m a r k e t p l a c e . shift in the relative balance of power According to a recent estimate by the arnong participants in a transaction. In Economist,over /$o of these networked Argentina, two Internet companies rnarketplaces have been developed worldhave created marketplaces for farmers wide.8 Some of these cover a wide variety (only ro percent of whom have individofproducts and a diverse group ofbuyers ual Internet access)to pool their buyand sellers. Some sites offer broader ing power for the purchase of pesticides functions for rnore targeted client and herbicides. These companies clairn groups. Onvia, for example, is one of the to have achieved volume discounts of $

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benefits of e-commerce can be realized on a global level. Many businessesand consumers are wary of conducting extensivebusiness over the Internet due TheChallenge Access of Access. to the lack of a predictable legal envito the enabling technologies is a neces- ronment governing transactions. This is particularly true in business-to-consary precondition for the diffusion of esumer transactions (where typically commerce. Such access is limited in many countries by either inadequate t h e r e i s n o w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t ) a n d f o r international cornrnercial activity where communications infrastructure, by relae - c o m m e r c e a c c e n t u a t e se x i s t i n g i s s u e s tively high user costs, or both. It is diffirelated to cross-border trade or e-comcult to talk about the benefits of e-comrnerce in places where there may be, at rnerce, such as the enforcement of contracts and legal dispute jurisdiction. best, a single telephone for an entire vilI a g e . I n p l a c e s w h e r e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s Take the hypothetical example of a E u r o p e a n c o m p a n y o p e r a t i n g s e r v e r si n infrastructure is available, the cost of computers and other technologies need- the United States that enable transactions to take place between the Euroed for e-commerce may be a barrier. Even in countries with an extensivecompean headquarters and customers in rnunications infrastructure and ready Latin America. If a contract is develaccessto capital for investrnent in comoped using these cornputer-mediated puters, the spread of e-commerce may c o r n m u n i c a t i o n s c h a n n e l s , t h e l e g a l slow down becauseofthe cost ofaccessto jurisdiction for any subsequent disputes rnay be unclear. infrastructure. For example, some counit meter local calls, making tries phone expensive for individuals to stay online for any length of time. global reach of online markets also raisAccess to appropriately trained es issues of privacy and consumer prohuman capital is also a necessaryconditection. Different countries also have t i o n f o r t h e a d o p t i o n o f e - c o m m e r c e . differing views on individuals' rights to lJnfortunately, worldwide demand for privacy and differing opinions on how these workers easily outstrips available to enforce privacy rights for their citisupply. While this labor imbalance has zens. The proliferation of technologies the potential to limit the evolution of that allow customer tracking and profilthe digital econornies of developed ing raises questions about the use and sale of data collected over the Internet. nations, it has even more serious impliElectronically collected information cations for less developed countries. The higher salaries and greater opporcan now be compiled, matched, and tunity to work on cutting-edge projects "rnined" to reveal the characteristics and habits of individuals or groups. in industrialized countries make it difficult for the developing world to keep Applications, such as "cookies"-text to r$ percent and have seized the attention of the large multinationals from which they purchase.s

SecurityversusPrivacy.ri,"

their limited pool of technology workers at home. Many regulatory and legal issues, however, stand to be resolved before the

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files automatically stored on a Web user's hard drive by a Web site-enable the tracking of a Web user's online activities. These tools help businessesto

B U C K L E Y& I V I O N T E SW i T C dA f f A i T S

manage their inventories and custornize the products they offer, but they also raise issues of privacy. The easewith which information can be duplicated and transmitted has posed a challenge to intellectual property rights and raised questions of authentication and security. Authentication refers to assuring that a file or document has not been altered since its creation and that it came from the person or organization indicated as the sender. These concerns are particularly important in the case of legal records, such as contracts, or in situations in which control of duplication can be the key to profits, such as limiting distribution of digitized copyrighted materials. Related to authentication are issues of security. \Mhen data is transferred across a computer network, interception is alwaysa possibility. lJnauthorized accessto data can also be damaging. A common concern of consumers on the Internet is the security of their credit card information. Authentication and security concerns can be addressed through encryption technology, but this solution produces a different set of issuesthat pits concerns about privacy against the needs of law enforcernent officials. In the open Internet environment, it is difficult to ensure that individuals and businesses can conduct their activities in a confidentiai manner without also affording the same degree of protection to criminal activities. The law enforcement cornmunity argues that the availability of strong encryption reduces law enforcement capabilities and represents a threat to national security. Others argue in favor of encryption on the grounds that sensitive electronic information-government, commercial, and private personal information-requires

strong protection from and unlawful access.

unauthorized

TaxatiOn. Nurnerous questions also surround taxation, tariffs, and e-commerce. In the United States, sales taxes represent a substantial revenue source for state and local governments. These taxes are collected by businesses and remitted to states.A state, however, cannot require an out-of-state business, which lacks a local presence, to collect and remit salestax for purchases rnade by its residents. States must therefore rely on self-reporting of purchases by taxpayers. State governrnents have no reason to assumethat e-commerce saleswill be reported any more often than catalogue sales (where use taxes are rarely reported). They are concerned that e- c o r n r n e r c e business-to- consumer transactions could result in tremendous revenue lossesif such transactions continue to grow at a rapid pace. Other countries are also confronting the issue of e-cornmerce taxation. In the case of those countries that rely heavily on value-added taxes to support government services,it may be even more critical to find a resolution. Another complicating factor is the growing interest in digital delivery. If countries are not able to find an acceptable way to tax a compact disc delivered to the door, it is unlikely that they will be able to devise a rnethod of directly taxing downloaded music. In addition to lost revenue, governments are concerned that tax differentials may unfairly disadvantage the "bricks and rnortar" establishments located within their borders and favor cyber businesses.

The MultilateralResponse. This is by no means a complete account

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of the issuesthat remain to be resolved if the benefits of e-commerce are to be fully realized. New issueswill continue to emerge. Because these issues arise from use of a global computer network, in certain casesmultilateral efforts may be required to resolve them. Many efforts to address these issues are already under way.'o Ministers for the Organization for Econornic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recently endorsed the Taxation Frarnework Conditions, which treats online cornrnerce no differently than offline commerce. The OECD also issuedthe Consurner Protection Guidelines which establish benchmarks for t r a n s p a r e n ta n d e f f e c t i v ec o n s u m e r p r o tection online. To facilitate implernentation of its rgBo PrivacyGuidelines, the OECD released a Privacy Inventory of Instruments and Mechanisrns. It also developed a Web-based application, a "Privacy Policy Wizard," to help private sector organizations establish privacy p o l i c i e sf o r t h e i r W e b s i t e s . During the Free Tiade Area of the Americas (FfAA) Conference,'Western Hemisphere governments embraced private sector leadership and agreed to establish a groundbreaking public-private sector collaboration on electronic commerce. Drafted with the full participation of private sector representatives from throughout the hernisphere and approved by government delegates, the FTAir{'s Joint Cornmittee of Experts on Electronic Commerce recomrnended a broad range of market-led policies that would expand the benefits of e-commerce to the region. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC) demonstrated its commitment to market-led electronic commerce by establishing an Electronic

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Commerce Steering Group and endorsing the OECD's Taxation Framework Conditions and the United Nations' Model Law on Electronic Comrnerce. The latter furthers electronic commerce by giving electronic docurnents the same legal validity as paper documents. APEC's Telecornmunications Working Group also joined the OECD in giving critical support to the U.S. view that governments should allow market forces to deterrnine the developrnent of electronic authentication systems. In May rgg8, the World tade Organization's WTO) Ministerial Conference adopted a declaration comrnitting mernber governments to all WTO refrain from irnposing customs duties on electronic transmissions. Over the past year, the United States has worked intensively with the I35 WTO countries t o e x t e n dt h i s m o r a t o r i u m . Through cornrnitments on rnarket access,national treatment, and regulatory safegrrardsby seventyWTO members, the February 1998 WTO Telecommunications Senrices Agreement already has encouraged billions of dollars in international investment in new telecomrnunications facilities. As a result, the drastic reduction in long distance rates w.itnessed in the United States is being internationally, steadily replicated removing geography and borders as a constraint on the delivery of a broad range ofservices and products. Businessesare at the forefront of the rapid technological change. Many of the problerns associated with this change have technological solutions that businessesare better suited to solve than governments or multilateral institutions. Such groups as the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Global Informa-

& M O N T E SW i T E dA f f A i T S BUCKLEY

tion Infrastructure Commission, and the U.S.-Japan Business Council have launched innovative efforts to provide policy leadership. In many ways, the issuesbrought forward by these technologies-privacy, intellectual jurisdiction, ProPerty rights-are not new. The rapid pace of change associatedwith the emergence of e-commerce has, however, forced these issues to the forefront of international

dialogue. The cross-border implications of e-commerce, as well as accessto and use of the technologies driving it, have become high-priority rnatters for governrnents around the world. How effectively these governments, international institutions, and the private sector work together to address the challenges and potential of e-commerce will have critical long-term consequences for world productivity and prosperity.

N O TE S The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of any

March 2ooo. http,//w.nua.ie. "E-Commerce $. Milan Vesely,

other employee or entity of the U.S' Government.

Firms,"

Bonanza for African 1999'

Ay'iccnBusine$, October

6. See w.World2Market.com "E-Business, r. The store is Barrab6s. KeithJohnson, TheWallStreetlournal.FebThe Web @ WorVBarrabes." ruary I4, 2ooo. z. U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Retail E Commerce Sales For The Fourth Quarter I999 Reach $5.3 BilIion, Census Bureau Reports" Press Release. March 2, 2 ooo.

census. gov/svsd/w/adrtable.html "Internet Domain Suwey." Wizards.

http'//w.

3. Network http,//w.isc.org.

4. The 1996 estimate is from NUA as cited in U.S. "The Emerging Digital Department of Commerce. April tgg8. http'//w.ecommerce.gov. Econony." The 2ooo estimate is from No. "How Many Online."

press release, "Leading energy /. Royal Dutch/Shell and petrochemical companies to launch global procurement exchange," APril II, 2OOO. B. "Seller Beware,"

The Economist,March

2ooo,

6r-2. "Business Spins onto the Web, New 9. Craig Torres, Generation of Farmers in Argentina Plug Into Internet, Reshape the Business," TheWallStreetlournol,March 2.2000. ro.

This

Working Digital

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1999.

http,//w.ecommerce.gov.

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ors

andthe MineBanTreaty Kenneth R. Rutherford

On December 16, rggg, while working as a credit union training officer in southwestern Somalia, rny vehicle ran over a landmine. BecauseI had a handheld radio, I was able to call for assistanceand was airlifted to a hospital' Nevertheless' rny right leg had to be arnputated irnmediately, and after seven surgeries my left leg was also amputated. Comparatively speaking, I was luc\. Information technology would soon help ban the weaPon that almost killed me, and that maims or kills more than 2o,ooo people each year. The Internet would soon Prove instrumental in disseminating information and gathering support for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) as well as in helping reduce coalition-building costs while increasing international attention for the landmine ban and victim assistanceissues. The Internet helped bridge the traditional North-South non-governrnental organization (NGO) dl"ide and achieve the Mine Ban teaty in record time. While the lnternet cannot substitute for perremains crucial-it does son-to-person interaction-which enhance NGO activities and lobbying Practices. The Internet also helps NGOs counter doublespeak and readily-offered, vag'ue commitrnents from governrnent officials. Furthermore, through it, key NGO dlplomatic and lobbying func-

Kenneth R. Rutherford isAssistant

Professor

of Polit

ical Science at SouthState and Co -

west M issouri University Founder mine

of the Land-

Suruivors Net-

work.

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tions can be coordinated and performed from anywhere in the world, there\ ensuring a nearly universal rnonitor on government behavior.

The ICBL. In 1995,I hadlunchwith Jerry White, an American who lost his right leg in 1984 when he stepped on a landmine while hiking in Israel. As a specialist in tracking weapons of mass destruction for a project based in Washington, D.C., Jerry was appalled to learn that every twenty-two minutes someone steps on a landmine. Perhaps even more shocking is the fact that rnore civilians havebeen killed or maimed by landmines than by biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons combined. Both of us realized how our own personal situations were unlil<e those of hundreds of thousands of landmine victims around the world. In rnany mine-infested countries, people earn lessthan $$,ooo peryear. The most basic rehabilitation costs at least rny rehabilitation To date, $ro,ooo. more costshave totaled than $5oo,ooo. The following week, Jerry invited me to Vienna to attend the Review Conference for the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) that would strengthen the landmines protocol, which at the time was the only existing legal document controlling landmine use. In Vienna, Jerry and I met many NGO representatives campaigning for a ban under the umbrella of the ICBL, a coalition of NGOs from rnany countries. Realizing the need to strengthen the voice of landrnine survivors both within the ICBL and the international community, we announced the creation of the Landmine Surwivors Network (LSN) in April of 1996 in Geneva. In addition to ampliSing the voices of survivors, Jerry and I wanted to help mine

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victims and their families recover and resume their roles as contributing mem'We were faced with many bers of society. difficulties, however, including lack of both the financial resources and the infrastructure with which to disseminate our rnessage worldwide. The LSN immediately joined the ICBL, which was just beginning to rely upon the Internet to develop a nearly global coalition of more than r,ooo NGOs. The ICBL helped initiate a dramatic transforrnation in international affairs by encouraging governments to ban landmines, which were widely used by nearly every military in the world. This goal was achieved in 1997 with the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty by 12! countries.' From the ICBL's inception in r99r and the LSN's founding in rggg, the fax and telephone were important for internal communications. E-mail, however. soon proved to be an instrurnental communication tool for both organizations. ICBL members, including the LSN, sent e-rnails to policymakers, encouraging them to join the ban rnovement's efforts. In addition, the ICBL and LSN Web sites educated the public about the landmine issue and, rnost importantly, helped rnonitor state landmine behavior and policies. LSN, for exarnple, is currently rnonitoring the progress of landmine victim assistancefunding and programs, an important part of the Mine Ban teaty obligations. With support of the UN Mine Action Service and the UN Office for Project Serwices,the LSN has developed a free online database that tracks assistanceresources and programs worldwide.

Bridging the North-South Dividg. The ICBL's creation of a wide-ranging coalition with ethnic,

RUTHERFORD W i T C dA f f A i T S

geographic, and religious diversity was c i a l l y s i n c e m o s t l a n d m i n e - i n f e s t e d countries are in the South. one of the campaign's major accornIn planning large international landplishments. That the ICBL built a globmine conferences, especially those in al coalition of more than r,ooo NGOs is even more impressive given the logisunderdeveloped countries such as Cambodia, Mozambique, and Jordan, tical difficulties and expenses involved. The Internet allowed the ICBL to reach e-mail was crucial. These conferences out to NGOs across geographical space w e r e v e r y i m p o r t a n t t o t h e I C B L in an effort to broaden and expand its because they helped broaden campaign involvement to include NGOs in lessmembership base. Most irnportantly, the Internet allowed the ICBL to developed countries. The ICBL's Camexpand into developing countries at bodia Conference in June of 1995 was rninirnal cost. The low cost and ease the first international landmine conwith which the Internet could be used ference held in a landmine-infested enhanced the ICBL's political strategy country, as well as the first conference organized by e-rnail.' In JuIy of 1998, to attract as many states as possible in the LSN hosted the Middle East Conorder to counter treaty opposition from major powers such as China, Russia, ference on Landmine Injury and Reha-

The Intef net alowed. theICBL to reachout to NGOs acrossgeographical spacein an effort to broaden and drpindits merir.bershipbase. and the United States. Moreover, since most landmines are found in underdeveloped countries, it was symbolically important and more effective for treaty implementation to encourage NGOs from developing nations to join the campaign. The ICBL incorporated NGOs from these developing nations into the decision-making process, providing NGOs frorn most of the world's rnost heavily rnined areas with a voice and an inexpensive avenue through which to provide field data. NGOs in wealthy countries then disseminated this data to governrnental representatives, the media, and the public. It was crucial to show that the campaign was not just a European and North American effort, but a truly global one, espe-

bilitation, which was planned primarily through e-mail. To organize the conference, located in Jordan, LSN staff used the Internet to extend invitations and plan visas and travel logistics for nearly forty landmine survivors and more than thirty international public health experts from nearly every Middle East country. The conference allowed for informational and professional exchanges among a host of rehabilitation specialists,landmine survivors, and governing authorities, including repreThliban in sentatives from the Afghanistan. Furthermore, it provided a platforrn frorn which Her Majesty Queen Noor announced that Jordan would sign the treaty, rnaking it one of the first Arab countries to do so.

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After the 1997 reaty signing, the ICBL encouraged nascent national landmine ban campaigns to use the Internet in order to stay in contact with the International Carnpaign. Funding for some of these technologies came from the Landmines Project at the Open Society Institute (OSI), which supported some communications costs for NGOs. Individual NGOs, such as the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), supported procurernent of comrnunications technologies by forrning a srnall grants project funded by Comic Relief, a group that raises money every other year for African development projects. MAG donated some of these funds to landmine ban activists.

al and multilateral lending agencies.+ The coupling of the Internet and an international coalition, therefore, may be one of the only means through which NGOs in non-democratic countries may influence their authoritarian political leaders., By t997, internal ICBL communication and information dissemination was conducted almost exclusivelythrough email, coordinated by Llz Bernstein, and through its Web site, managed by Klell Knudsen. While Knudsen was based in Oslo, Norway, Bernstein coordinated the ICBL cornrnunications network frorn two continents: Africa and North America. In all likelihood, Bernstein would not have been able to maintain her high level of intensity had she relied on the telephone and fax as primary tools of communication.

Circumventinq Traditional Communications Controls. rn" Internet proved to be a cheap comrnunication tool through which NGOs in developing countries could furnish information to the ICBL for use at the international political level. In some cases,the Internet was the only channel open to NGOs operating in countries in which the government (or neighboring governments) irnposed tight comrnunications controls. A campaign leader in Central Asia noted that the domestic government would often restrict or block local communications, leaving the Internet as his only outlet for communication with the ICBL.3 A prominent leader in the Kenyan Campaign to Ban Landmines, Dr. Walter Odhiambo, said that NGOs in the South can only influence their governments when two factors come into play-the Internet and pressure from an international coalition-especially if it includes countries that have economic and political influence through bilater-

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Buildinga VirtualOrganizat l O n . W h i l e t h e I C B L m e m b e r sh a d different reasonsfor being part of the movement, their activities required coordination with each other in order to achieve their common goal of a landrnine ban. The ICBL did not have a hierarchical organizational structure, but rather a virtual organizational structure that did not require a physical or formal institutional presence. While keeping rnembers focused on the common goal of banning landmines, ICBL leaders encouraged rnernbers to decide their own lobbying, media, and fundraising tactics and to select those that were most appropriate for their own local environrnents. Nonetheless, the Internet allowed NGOs to speak with a collective voice. On March r, 2ooo, the LSN made an appeal to President Bill Clinton. We used the Internet to invite landmine

R U T H E R F o RW Di r e dA f f a i r s

E-mail

alSO facilitated. our effort to increase

attention to the pli.qht of landmine victirns and assistanceon bofh ihe ICBL and international agendas. survivors to sign on to the appeal, sending e-mails directly to survivors and to NGOs working with survivors through the ICBL e-mail network. In turn, survivors e-rnailed their approval as signatories to the LSN headquarters in Washington, D.C. Within several weeks, we had collected more than r,loo landmine survivor signatures from individuals in fifteen countries, including rnined those heavily such as Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Jordan, Mozambique, Russia, and Vietnarn. Regrrlar fax, telephone, and mail correspondence would not have been as effective and rapid in responding quickly to the various supporters of the appeal and in disseminating information worldwide, because the state-controlled telephone and mail systemsof rnany of these countries, such as Angola, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, are fragile or non-existent.

g-reater collaboration and communication arnong international organizations, local groups, and governrnent ministries to avoid serwiceduplication and competition, and to promote coordinated action to addressurgent needs. Information technologies, however, were not integrated to solve these challenges. To addressthis problem, LSN began collecting documented information regarding the roles and locations of organizations, groups, and ministries involved in support for landmine victims. This information was then entered into a userfriendly database published over the Internet. The information on the needs of survivors and the organizations that help thern was then readily available to those working in the field and to all with Internet access. E-rnail also facilitated our efforts to increase attention to the plight of landmine victims and assistanceon both the ICBL and international agendas.In late CoalitionBuilding.At theLSN,we rgg$, for example, very few people in the used the Internet to help coordinate and ICBL were pushing for victim assistance. collect landmine survivor and assistance Several NGOs, such as the Vietnam Vetinformation frorn our five LSN peer erans of America Foundation, Handicap International, and the International support networks in landrnine-infested c o u n t r i e s - B o s n i a , E t h i o p i a , E r i t r e a , Committee for the Red Cross, provided Jordan, and Mozambique. Before estab- prosthetics and other assistanceon the lishing the networks, we found that in ground. Yet NGOs were not lobbying for such assistanceas part of the negotiations heavily mined countries there was little continuity regarding who is doing what, for solving the landmine problem. In with whom. where. and with what result. October rgg6, we unveiled a prototype It was noted that there needed to be of the first databaseto track the needs of

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V I R T U A LA C T I V I S M

mine victims worldwide and the limited resources to help them. The LSN database began to serve as a small clearinghouse of information and resources. In rgg/, we proposed the establishmentof a landmine surwivor register and caregiver database on the Internet that could be used by the media, policymakers, international organizations, de-miners, the military, landmine sulivors, and others wishing to become involved or learn more about the realities of the landmine problem. By rgg8, the database contained profiles of scores of landrnine surwivors and their families in Mozambique, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Jordan, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. It also contained detailed information on over r,ooo organizations and was used by rnedia and NGOs alike as a source of information about the world's mineaffected comrnunities. One of the tangible results of our landmine victirn assistance strategieswas the inclusion of landmine victim assistanceinto the Mine Ban teaty, which makes it the first time in the world's history that a disarmament treaty incorporated assistance langrrage for victims of the weapon being banned.

were fulfilling their countries' commitments, ICBL members e-mailed national landmine ban campaigns in each country, directing them to contact and lobby their governments about critical issues and policies discussed at the treaty negotiations. These campaigns, in turn, e-mailed the ICBL activists in Oslo with updates regarding their governments' positions.5 This Internetbased cornmunication network proved extremely useful to NGO activists in holding statesaccountable to their previous landrnine policy commitments. The ICBL is still relying on the Internet to systematically and regularly docurnent government progress on treaty irnplementation. E-rnail allows the ICBL to coordinate NGO researchers in more than seventy countries who track governrnent landmine policies and activities. Using e-mail as the primary coordination tool has allowed the ICBL and its researchersto work more closely together in an organized effort to monitor, for the first time in the world's history, a disarmament treaty. The Landmine Monitor coordinators send instructions and e-rnail to the guidelines through researchers. The researcher reports are then posted on a secure ICBL.Web site, which Landmine Monitor coordinators researchers and other ICBl-approved can read and provide feedback. The final product will be a book scheduled to be released at the Second States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty conference in Geneva in September 2ooo and then disserninated through the Internet.

PoliticalDoublesCountering peak. The ICBL used the Internet to convince governments to sign the landmine ban treaty and to hold them accountable for their treaty commitments. For exarnple, during the final treaty drafting conference in September of t997 in Oslo, the Internet made a crucial difference. During these important negotiations, the Internet enabled Stephen Goose,Jody Williams, and other ICBL rnembers to coordinate their responses to the sundry governrnent policies and conference statements. To ensure government decision-rnakers

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No Substitute for Person-toPerson InteractiOfl. Nevertheless, solely crediting the Internet for the ICBL's successin initiating and sustaining momenturn toward achieving and

W i T C dA f f A i T S RUTHERFORD

implernenting the Mine Ban teaty and for the LSN's success in promoting landrnine victim assistance is not cornpletely accurate for two reasons. First, the ICBL was created in rggr. The Internet was not a farniliar or frequently utilized communication tool until several years later. Even in 1995, at the LSN's inception, e-mail wasjust becoming widely available. During the early years, therefore, the campaign relied extensively on the telephone and fax for cornmunication. E-mail cornrnunications became rnore important later for both the ICBL and LSN as information technology became more cornmon and the advantagesof e-mail were being realized. Second, person-to-person meetings arnong ICBL representatives and governmental officials were important in building a strong relationship ICBL and governrnents. between the Moreover, before rgg6, e-mail cornrnunication with governments was difficult for several reasons. First, rnany gov-

ernments, including those in developed countries, did not have e-mail capabilities. Second, even when governments had an e-rnail infrastructure, some diplomats sirnply preferred telephone conversations and fax correspondence to e-mail. Because of these challenges in using the Internet to communicate with government decision-makers, NGO leaders ernphasized personal lobbying, such as rneeting regrrlarly with government officials. IArhile LSN's Internet-based activities, including its database,are useful to keep track of and promote landmine survivor needs, they can neither rneet those needs nor ban landmines. Our efforts to ban landrnines and help survivors would not have succeeded without engaging governrnents. Yet at LSN, we found that by incorporating inforrnation technology into our organization, we were better able to communicate messages and strategies arnong landmine survivors and their caregivers.

NOTES is officially know as the r. The Ottawa Convention "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpil ing, Mines

Production and

Transfer

and

Anti

Destruction."

their

Personnel

LondmineMonitor

Campaign to Ban LandReporilggg, International 1999), pp. mines (Human Rights Watch, NewYork, ro5B-ro7I. refer forms

Unless noted, all references to landmines landmines and not other

anti-personnel

of landmines,

such as anti-tank

mines,

anti-

vehicle mines and seamines. Z. Jody Williams and Stephen Goose, "The lnternaA. in Mwell tional Campaign to Ban Landmines," Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin, Cameron, RobertJ. eds.. ToWolkWithoutFear:The Clobol Mouementto Ban Landmines (Oxford University Press: Toronto, rggS), p. lo.

Brussels, Belgium, with campaigner, 3. Inteniew February I, 2oOO. International {. Statement by Dr. Walter Odhiambo, Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPa Cam and Strengthening NW) to the "Creating Conference on paign" panel at the First International Landmines in Russia and the CIS," Moscow, May 2l , Report on the First Internat99B, in IPPNW-ICBL Conference on Landmines in Russia and CIS, New Steps For A Mine Free Future (Boston, IPPNW, tional

r 9 9 9 ) ,p . 4 r . 5i. Telephone interview with Mary Wareham, Senior Researcher, Human Rights Watch, and former coor dinator

of the U.S.

Campai.gn

to Ban Landni.nes,

October r2, 1999.

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M._oder.n Humanitarianism.: Rethinl<ing Neutrality

live calm. This nderlying shifts mand; and (2) gligent-in

Mark Bartolini

in many cases

~Jatively benign energy-pro Drawing on the -level energy lies, the

The collapse of the Cold War security paradigm has given rise to a new system that poses more dynamic challenges to pur veyors of humanitarian assistance. Between 1975 and 1985 there were an average of five humanitarian emergencies a year. According to the United Nations. in 1998 there were forty emergencies, plus an additional eight "critical cases." The evolution of twentieth-century warfare. marked by the atrocities of urban combat, scorched earth policies, and eth nic cleansing. has fed the expanding number of conflicts where civilians are often the primary targets and casualties. These destructive trends pose unique challenges and dilem mas for the practitioners of humanitarian assistance, prompting a widening debate over the fundamental nature of humanitarian response. In addition to such a debate, the reality of modern mili tary techniques and the rise of a more anarchical global sys tem have changed the methods of response and called into question some of its very definitions. A "refugee crisis" no longer adequately describes today's complex emergencies. The plight of refugees, people forced to flee across an inter national border out of a credible fear of persecution, is hardly distinguishable from. and is often preferable to, the plight of internally displaced people, those driven from their

;ources;

integration;

rgingchal --related Ie decisions ~ptember 2000

ton, D.C. 20006 g;

Mark Bartolini

is Director of Govern ment Relations of the International Rescue Committee.

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home and unable to flee their country resources of\Mestern rnilitaries, while tryof persecution. IA/hile there are numering to rnaintain their independence. ous international agencies dedicated to The complexity of rnodern emergenthe needs of refugees, there are none cies demands that assistance agencies dedicated to the needs of internally discontinually examine the practical and p l a c e d p e r s o n s . A s s i s t a n c e a g e n c i e s political impact of their work. In crises often find ways to assist internally diswhere political solutions are required, placed persons, but questions of sover- hurnanitarian assistance can be used eignty and scarcity of resources have inappropriately by foreign governrnents stalled a formalized approach. as cover for a lack ofpolitical resolve. In

By faf, the mOSt contentious issues raised. by the new .qlobal environment are those that challenge tlie core ideology of the hurnanitarian rrrovernent-n eutrality. Along with refining definitions to meet the new realities of complex ernergencies corne the practical questions of how to best render assistance. Such questions are not easily answered due to the nature of modern war as well as the multiplicity of actors and interests tlpically present in today's complex emer* gencies. Warring parties, factions within national governments, black rnarket operators, foreign governments, and international organizations intervening in a crisis all have unique agendas. Organizations attempting to provide life-saving assistance face ever-greater threats to their own security frorn belligerents. Some agenciesalso seea need to enhance their capacity to provide protection to beneficiaries and thus revisit questions of neutrality and advocacywithin the context of providing impartial needsbased assistance.Many agenciescontinue to push for reforms within the United Nations systern while concurrently acting as implementation partners. Assistance agencies are increasingly utilizing the

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order for humanitarian assistance to avoid being co-opted by the rnultitude of agendas that come into play in today's emergencies, there needs to be flexible and creative responses, more clearly defined divisions of labor arnong aid agencies, and a sober evaluation of the lirnits and potential dangers of assistance.

TheQuestion of Neutrality. By far, the most contentious issuesraised by the new global environrnent are those that challenge the core ideology of the humanitarian rnovement-neutrality. Modern day humanitarianism was born in rB59 when Jean-Henri Dunant witnessed injured and dying soldiers lying unattended on a battlefield at Solferino, Italy. Dunant went on to establisha moral code of war and an organization of firstaid societies that, under the banner of neutrality, could rninister to fallen soldiers: the International Cornrnittee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Nearly a century and a half later, the ICRC continues to play a critical role in

B A R r o L r NCro n f l i c t & S e c u r i t y saving lives duringwartirne. Its principle afforded assistanceagencies. Their presof neutrality and its mandate allow the ence in the field is often lirnited to the ICRC to accessprisoners of war, negotitirne it takes to write a report, whereas ate their release,and perform numerous the staff of assistanceagencieswitness the other indispensable assistancefunctions conflict twenty-four hours a day for under its universally recognized humanrnonths, or even years, at a tirne. itarian banner. Despite its well-known The traditional division between adherence to the principle of neutraliassistance and advocacy groups affirms ty-and sometirnes because of it-ICRC the principle of neutrality which delegateshave suffered grievous lossesin demands that hurnanitarian relief based the field. In the past decade, more ICRC on need be available to all parties in a delegates were killed in the line of duty conflict. Yet some assistance agencies than in any other decade of the organiassert that the principle of need-based zation's history. assistance can be maintained while A long-running debate dating back to speaking out and adopting strategies the ICRC's work during World War II against hurnan rights violations. One questions whether the code of strict neuexample of a rnelding of these two agentrality to which the ICRC adheres is das occurred during the Kosovo crisis. always appropriate during wars in which Following a White House rneeting with civilians are the primary targets and President Bill Clinton, several reprecrirnes against humanity, including sentativesof non-governmental organigenocide, occur. Is there a rnoral duty to zations (NGOs) working with refugees speak out against such atrocities, or is fleeing Kosovo expressed support for there an imperative for neutrality? the NATO-led interwention during an Many in the humanitarian assistance imprornptu press conference. At least field fear taking on issues beyond the two of the organizations offering such impartial delivery of aid. They believe support continue to implement longthat adopting an agenda that incorpostanding need-based assistanceprorates political and hurnan rights congrarns in Serbia today. cerns will inhibit access, endanger its Assistance agencies rnust tailor their staff rnembers, and cornpromise the response to individual ernergencies. viability of life-saving prograrns. They While activities should sornetirnes be argue that such activities are more Iimited to discreet lobbying, other crises appropriately addressed by the already will call for overt actions in the field. numerous network of governmental During the Kosovo crisis, some assisand intergovernrnental agencies deditance agencies operating in the relative cated to advocacy and reporting on safety of Albania and Macedonia hurnan rights. referred refugees to hurnan rights What is needed, however, is a division groups seeking evidence for the Interna* o f l a b o r t h a t a l l o w s s o m e a s s i s t a n c e tional Criminal Tribunal for the former agencies to apply a human rights perYugoslavia. Supporting a human rights spective to what they witness. Such a agenda in Chechnya is more cornplicatmove is both a rnoral and practical ed, because the politics of the region imperative. At present, hurnan rights demand greater consideration of the groups rarely enjoy the level of access significant risks to the victim of abuse,

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the safety of the agency's personnel, and the potential impact on regional aid operations. To be sure, it is difficult to determine the boundaries separating advocacy, human rights, and protection. Possible benefits must be weighed against the lev el of risk an activity will pose to staff members, the organization's programs, and its beneficiaries. The fact that mis-

The fact that the military's humanitar ian impulses are at times subservient to its public relations needs or political direc tives should not come as a surprise. Rather, it is the nature of the beast. Instead of shrinking in horror, assistance agencies need to consider engagement on a case-by-case basis. Although the main tenance of neutrality on the part of assis tance agencies is critical, they must ask: Is

In Bosnia t the sometimes apparent futility of

Eroviding aid was referred to as providing for the ttwell-fed dead." takes will be made in such calculations is used as justification by those who believe that such activities are not the role of assistance agencies. But there are also a plethora of cases in which the failure to act beyond providing assistance ren dered agencies mere bystanders to the tragedies befalling their beneficiaries. In Bosnia, the sometimes apparent futility of providing aid was referred to as pro viding for the "well-fed dead." The post-Cold War phenomenon of military humanitarian intervention fur ther complicates the neutrality debate. Some aid agencies express concern that working with a sovereign military force or alliance, such as NATO, is a de facto breach of neutrality, especially when it is a party to the conflict, as in Kosovo. Military interventions involve political motives that can be antithetical to a humanitarian agenda. Yet. as the recent flight of nearly one million refugees from Kosovo demonstrated. in some instances only military forces will have the logistical capacity and resources to adequately respond to the needs of refugees in the early weeks of a crisis.

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it fair to do so at the expense of benefi ciaries? When a crisis erupts beyond the capacity of assistance agencies to respond adequately, humanitarian responses coordinated with the armed forces can employ the superior logistical capacity and resources of militaries. Such coop eration in the early days of a crisis can greatly ease the transition phase, when the structures created to assist and house refugees are turned over to the sole con trol of humanitarian agencies. It should also be noted that while assis tance agencies are generally more com fortable with humanitarian interventions that operate under the banner of the UN, the performance of UN forces in Bosnia and Rwanda demonstrated that in such interventions. proper humanitarian behavior is hardly guaranteed. The mur der of inhabitants of UN -designated safe havens, the indiscriminate killing of civilians that continued despite the pres ence of UN soldiers, the abhorrent deals made with Serb militants, and the failure to transmit and respond to grave warn ings of impending genocide in Rwanda are but a few testimonials to the flaws of

collective respons influence of indi, bureaucracy.

Whatever side al takes in these deba by the axiom, "0 aimed at the best ir ciaries." Unfortun. fare where civilians primary targets, it actions are in the b~ populations. Virtu<i assistance activities ( quences. Food to tl long a war, create a c cy, or allow a despc other enterprises in people. Funds for n can be used to reinfo ~f militants througl lnundation of hum and personnel may c.ivil soc.iety Or harm

The purveyors

must recognize that a complex environn ally all assistance ha The value-added th can offer is the abilit the ground to analy offer donors and po efit of their observati is the donor or polic' the aid program in s~ and then presents i agency as a fait accom tation. There needs t( tive dialogue betwe NGOs, local stakeho to design programs t interests of a commun

Facing Down a H(

ment.

The allegiance by the Cold War sup~

B A R r o L r NCro n f l i c t &S e c u r i t y collective response and the pernicious up corrupt, authoritarian regimes and, influence of individuals within the UN in many places, left a power vacuum to be bureaucracy. filled by opportunistic politicians proWhatever side an agency or aid worker moting ethnic and religious intolerance. takes in these debates is usually defended This legary presents a major irnpedirnent by the axiom, "Our actions are always to assistance agencies in responding to aimed at the best interests of our beneficomplex emergencies. Corruption ciaries." IJnfortunately in modern warseverelyhampers the distribution of aid, fare where civilians, not soldiers, are the stunts the growth of civil society, and disprirnary targets, it is rarely clear what torts the impact of aid by favoring actions are in the best interest ofaffected entrenched militants and ultranationalists. The political leverage previously populations. Virtually all humanitarian assistanceactivities carry political conse- afforded by superpower rivalries rnade quences. Food to the starving may prothe implementation of assistancestratelong a war, create a culture of dependengies far less complex. cy, or allow a despot to divert funds to Even so, it should be understood that other enterprises in order to suppress his the delivery of aid is not a static process. people. Funds for reconstructing homes There are creative aid workers capable of can be used to reinforce the political base adapting to their environments and of militants through patronage and an developing effective strategies to circurni n u n d a t i o n o f h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e vent or diminish the possibly negative and personnel may smother a nascent impact of assistance. Even in a hostile civil society or harrn local rnarkets. environment, humanitarian assistance The purveyors of humanitarian aid can saveor better the lives of large nurnrnust recognize that they are operating in bers of people. The alternative to assisa complex environment in which virtutance, to deny food to the starrring, water all assistance has irnpact. ally a political to the parched, and medical care and The value-added that aid organizations sanitation facilities to the sick and injured, is rarely a preferable option. can offer is the ability of their people on the ground to analyze these effects and The solution often lies in devising strateoffer donors and policymakers the bengies to improve the delivery of aid. Today the refugee scene is no longer efit of their observations. All too often it is the donor or policymaker who designs in response to the former Soviet lJnion. the aid program in some-Western capital It is about the disintegration of statesin and then presents it to the assistance that empire as well as in Africa, Asia, agency as a fait accompli for implemenand the former Yugoslavia. While the tation. There needs to be more substan- n u m b e r o f r e f u g e e s c o n t i n u e s t o tive dialogue between international decrease, the U.S. Committee for NGOs, local stakeholders, and donors Refugees reports that they now total to design programs that serve the best around r!.9 million worldwide. The interests of a community. number of internally displaced persons, however, has risen to over 20 million. This is due, in part, to two factors: a ment. The allegiancesystempromoted failure of neighboring countries to by the Cold'War superpowerspropped honor the principle of first asylum by

Facing Downa Hostile Environ-

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forcing internally displaced persons to remain inside or along the borders of the country they are trying to flee, and the refoulement (forced return) of

orphans, and in ten years, that number will quadruple to {.o million. More people will die of AIDS in Africa in the next decade than died in all of the wars refugees by asylum countries. Refoulement of the twentieth century. occurs at an alarrning rate despite its Add to this mix of orphaned, irnpovexplicit prohibition by the rgSr United erished, and highly vulnerable children Nations Convention and the 196/ Prothe availability of cheap weapons and the tocol relating to the status of refugees. potential for future conflict rises expoThe situation is not likely to change nentially. Such grim statistics have rnuch in the next decade. More violence unfortunately not convinced internaseems likely in the states of central Asia tional policymakers to devote rnore and the Caucasus.Africa, with ro percent attention and resources to Africa. of the world's population, $o percent of Problems of poverty, illiteracy, child the world's conflicts, and regrettably, 5 soldiers, corruption, and disease are percent of the world's attention, is the exacerbated by Africa's perceived limited epicenter of the problem. The future of strategic importance to the West. Africa's a united Indonesian state is in grave myriad of problerns cannot be meaningdoubt, and there are nurnerous other fully addressed without fundamental candidatesfor d isintegration. changes in the comrnitment of the develIn 1994, U.S. troops withdrew from oped world to address these problems, Somalia after suffering casualties on a and the cornrnitrnent of Africans to put hurnanitarian mission that becarne a their house in order. defining event for post-Cold War There are sorne reasons for optimisrn, humanitarian intervention in Africa but there is no indication that sweeping and the world over. The withdrawal changes will occur. Assistance agencies reinforced the opinion of those in the will continue to perform triage in ever U.S. Congress and Clinton adrninistramore difficult environments, prioritiztion who believed that Africa was drifting food, water, sanitation, and rnedical ing beyond governance. The debacle in assistancebased on organizational capacSomalia was used as a pretext for a poliity and providing srnall-scale income cy of rninirnal engagement throughout generation projects where funding is much of sub-Saharan Africa. This isoavailable. The tragedy of Rwanda may lationisrn characterized the internacontinually play out on a smaller scale, t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y ' s r e s p o n s e t o t h e with the West playing bystander to one largest genocide of the decade in Rwannew outrage after another. da, a sixteen year conflict in Sudan, and Today's hurnanitarian agencies conhorrific atrocities in Sierra Leone, tend with a transformed political enviAngola, Uganda, Burundi, Liberia, the ronment in which anarchy, corruption, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somaand terrorisrn threaten the lives of both lia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. civilians and assistanceworkers. In addiThe hurnan toll of war pales in comtion to casualties, what these security parison to the the single largest destabi- problems portend for assistanceagencies lizing factor in Africa-AIDS. The epiare higher costs, less efficiency, such as produced demic has already ro million the one assistanceagencies currently face

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BARroLrNr Conflict&Security in Chechnya, in which an adequate response is not possible because of overwhelming risks to staff and political constraints imposed by major donors. Despite these threats, it is clear from this last decade that aid organizations are willing to face the risk of operating in insecure environments as long as there is an overwhelming need and financial support. Indeed, while the response is far from adequate, the International Rescue Committee and other assistanceagencies are operating in Ingushetia today to assist refugees from Chechnya. Governments seem content to fund aid operations in conflicts that they consider too risky for military intervention. Despite recognizing the risks these situations pose to humanitarian workers,

a burgeoning interest in expanding mandates to include protection. The definition of protection within the vernacular of humanitarian assistance is extremely broad. It can be as bold as intervening to stop a summary execution, or it can rnean ensuring that refugees are not being abused when they are forced to seek private accommodations in a third country. Until recently, protection had been the purview of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR), the lead agency in humanitarian crises whose mandate specifically encornpasses protection. But it has become clear to the UNHCR, and to an increasing number of NGOs, that the protection of refugees should be within the mandate of all agencies

GOvefnments Segm contentto fundaid operations in conflicts that they consider too risky for rnilitary intervention. governments have done little to ensure their safety beyond providing thern with security training. Given this fact, it is not surprising that anecdotal evidence suggeststhat far rnore aid workers were killed in the line of duty this past decade than U.S. soldiers in combat. While there is no single answer to issues of security, the creation of a permanent internationai criminal court and the designation of attacks against humanitarian aid workers as a crime of war would go far in stripping impunity from the perpetrators of such attacks.

FromServing to Protecting. r. apparent

contradiction

to the increas-

ing risks assistance agencies face, there is

working with civilian populations in complex emergencies. Protection strategies have greatly expanded the scope of work performed by assistanceagencies.There are now technical units geared toward implementing a diverse range of programs from microcredit to major infrastructure. During the siege of Sarajevo, the International Rescue Committee rebuilt the city's gas lines and heating system and erected a sophisticated emergency water system. The gas and heating systemrepairs protected people from e{posure, and the water system protected the lives of those people who would have been otherwise forced to stand in long lines that were easily targeted by sniper fire and shelling.

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Coalitions between human rights agencies and assistance agencies have begun to form. Assessment teams in the field frorn both groups are identifring vulnerable populations and working together to develop protection strategies. Activities run the gamut from supplying full-time staff and monitoring the security of lr-rlnerable populations to creating advocacy carnpaigns that generate pressure for adequate assistance and protection. Along with moves toward developing technical capacity and interdisciplinary cooperation, hurnanitarian assistance agencies have encountered new challenges to their moral authority as they find thernselves in increasingly complicated situations. Perhaps the rnost conspicuous example occurred in Goma, Zalre.In r99{, following the genocide of minority Tutsis in Rwanda, the Tutsi rebels were able to regain power. Over one million Hutus fled into neighboring Zaire (now the Dernocratic Republic of Congo). Among them were fighters from the Interaharnwe, the militia that had committed the genocide in Rwanda. The carnps were terrible places where people died hourly of diseaseand malnutrition. Aid agencies rushed in to help, but it soon became clear that the Interaharnwe, through force and intimidation, were intent on controlling the camps and using them as basesfor attacls in Rwanda. When M€decins Sans FrontiEres (Doctors without Borders) and the International Rescue Committee declared they would no longer work in the camps, they were harshly criticized for abandoning innocent civilians. Today the ruling Tutsi government in ttregroupBurundi operates so-called ment" camps. Hutus are forcibly relocated, ostensibly for their own protec-

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tion, as rebels are indiscriminately pursued. Mddecins Sans Frontidres decided to pull out of, at least temporarily, some camps in protest of the government's policy. The International Rescue Cornmittee has remained. Despite abhorring the practice of forced relocation, the International Rescue Committee believed that in this instance, withdrawal would only make the plight of the displaced Hutus worse. As in Goma, there are no easyanswers.

Fittingin the UnitedNations. Where does the United Nations fit into all of this? The United Nations has often been slow to respond to crises and reluctant to violate the sovereignty of member statesby calling for intervention-even in the face of genocide. But two highly selfcritical reports recently released by the United Nations-one on Rwanda and one on Srebrenica, Bosnia-seem to signal a shift in policy. To quote United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's own words in describing the lessonsto be learned frorn these reports: "National borders should no longer protect leaders who abuse people under their control." This signals a revolutionary new outlook on the part of the United Nations. Of course, it is one thing for the Secretary-General to make such a pronouncement and quite another for Security Council members to concur. The importance of the review lies in the United Nations' willingness to re-examine issues of sovereignty in the face of c r i m e s a g a i n s th u m a n i r y . The recent NAIO intervention in Kosovo highlighted the inherent problems of past United Nations interventions. In both its scale and its consequences, Kosovo will eclipse Somalia as the defining humanitarian intervention

B A R r o L r NCro n f l i c t &S e c u r i t y

While NAT0 i.rt"*ention raiseda nurnber of le.qalissues,it also resulted in one of the rnosidramatic, spontaneous refugee returns in history. of the post-Cold War period. One State Department official, when asked before the intervention if the United States would make the same rnistakesin Kosovo as it had made in Bosnia, replied testily: -We "Of course not. will make new ones." He certainly was correct. Kosovo wasn't pretty. While NAIO intervention raised a number of legal issues, it also resulted in one of the rnost drarnatic, spontaneous refugee returns in history. Of the B5o,ooo refugees driven frorn the country, 777,OOO returned within six weels of a peace accord. It remains to be seenwhat role Kosovo will be accorded in the terrible annals of Yugoslav disintegration. But for those who witnessed first-hand the genocide in Bosnia and saw the same state organs and tactics at work in Kosovo, NATO intervention represented the first time in history that ethnic cleansing was stopped in its tracks. The United Nations must learn frorn N A T O ' s h u m a n i t a r i a n s u c c e s s e si n Kosovo. The recent reports on Srebrenica and Rwanda are indicators that the United Nations understands that it must create a new paradigrn if it is to rnaintain its relevance in the post-Cold War world. But the ability of the United Nations to remake itself so that it can respond more effectively to internal conflictswould require overcoming significant barriers in international law, a deeply divided Security Council, a General Assernbly loath to trample on principles of sovereignty, and a bureau-

cracy that has grown to support institutionalized constraints. Rather than reinvent itself, the United Nations is likely to go on issuing more self-critical reports, this tirne on failures in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. There seerns to be more hope for the various agencieswithin the United Nations supporting relief and developrnent. Assistance agencies recognize that in the global anarchy they need the UNHCR to assert its role as the lead agency in hurnanitarian crises and refugee protection. In order for the UNHCR to operate effectively, it must garner the full support of donor governrnents, work constructively with its sister IJN agencies, possessthe requisite organizational capacity to do its job well, and be able to depend on the cooperation and professionalism of NGOs. COnClUSiOll. The dissolution of the Cold War system has challenged assistance agenciesto re-evaluate their role as rnere providers of humanitarian aid and has prompted them to broaden their role to include advocacy and protection. In addition, assistanceagencies increasingly focus on human rights. This expanded role requires assistanceagenry personnel to become more and more specialized. It also necessitatesmore training on how to analyze the political dimensions of their work and develop strategies to address human rights violations and corruption among Iocal actors.

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Whatever progress assistanceagencies are able to make, the role of humanitarian assistance is likely to become increasingly contentious unless the international community becomes rnore united and committed to resolving regional crises. Adding to the debate will be a more sober look at the impact of aid by the media and continuing fis-

sures arnong practitioners of assistance as they debate the practical and moral implications of their work. The level of complexity in the field of humanitarian assistance spawned by the demise of the Cold War system has left few options but to adapt to each unique environment and to acknowledge that there will rarely be easy answers.

CERES offets a two-year program ofgraduate study leading to the degree ofMaster ofArts in Russian and East European Studies. Our curricular programs serve students planning further graduate study and those seeking professional training. Students may concentrate in historyl governmentl economics; social, ethnic and regional issuesl or literature and culture. More than half of our students currendy receive frnancial aid through University scholarships and FLAS fellowships. Fot more information about CERES, financial aid, or about our ioint degtee programs (M.A,/Ph.D. ptofessional), please contact: Harley D. Balzer, Director Christianne Hardy Wohlforth, Associate Director CERES . Box 571031 Georgetown Univetsity Washington, DC 20057-1031 phone: (202)687-6080 fx: (202)687-5829 E-mail: guceres@gunet.georgetown,edu Visit our web site ar WWW.GEORGETOWN.EDU/SFS/CERES/CERES.HTM

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and M.A./

Conflict & Security ners of assistance actical and mo ral ork. The level of of humanitarian the demise of the ft few options but que environment at there will rarely

I\rts in Russian and Itc study and those seeking ial, ethnic and regional ial aid through University

M.A./Ph.D. and M.A./

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Stephen Blank As the Cold War ended, pundits proclaimed a "post-nuclear" era, when both deterrence and warfighting would be exclusive ly conventional and U.S. nuclear guarantees to allies against non-nuclear attack would become increasingly implausible. Nuclear weapons, therefore, would allegedly have a diminish ing utility except for deterring nuclear attacks against the Unit ed States. Consequently, contemporary deterrence and stabil ity would be more generally measured by conventional defense capabilities than by nuclear ones. These prophecies, however, have proven strikingly incor rect. Major powers increasingly have been moving to opera tionalize weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This includes asserting a broader range of missions, developing a credible second -strike capability, and using WMDs to weaponize space. Such trends transcend the proliferation debate to include both existing and potential nuclear powers. These actions are the consequence of a broader worldwide trend in response to the fundamental strategic developments of our epoch: the revolution in military affairs (RMA) , the end of the Cold War and search for a new international order, glob alization, technological revolutions, and the rise and fall of major powers. The rising number of disturbing threats to the non -proliferation treaty (NPT) regime must relate in part to

Stephen Blank is Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

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contemporary trends in warfare. Non proliferation campaigns, however well meaning, will fail unless they can account for real trends in modern war fare and strategic situations. The undoubted slowdown in non -prolifera tion' therefore, is not just due to a lack of U.S. leadership or to benighted politicians, as some partisans of non proliferation argue. An emerging global trend toward the weaponization of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) capabilities dis proves conventionally focused prophe cies and the misplaced emphases of a unilaterally virtuous American foreign policy of non -proliferation. It tells us that too much American thinking on military strategy is excessively ethnocen tric and plain ignorant of foreign con ditions. It demonstrates the absurdity of substituting theory or normative anti nuclear values for close observation of empirical facts. It also highlights one of the most disturbing features of writing on arms control, nuclear war, and pro liferation: It too often ignores new developments in contemporary warfare and strategy. For example, much schol arship on China complacently assumes that, in the foreseeable future, China cannot alter the fact that, "with the proper mix of U. S. forces in the region, rimland and maritime Asia will always have the ability to 'trump' Chinese pro jection attempts."l This view neglects how fundamental changes in strategic geography due to China's and other Asian states' development of WMD and ballistic missiles threaten U.S. allies and interests in Asia. This observation also overlooks the fact that whatever threat China poses is not so much to the Unit ed States but to its Asian allies and part ners. U.S. allies cannot blithely count

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on superiority against a nuclear and developing China. Indian authorities, in part, invoked this concern over Chi na to explain and justify India's nuclear tests. To ignore such palpable strategic realities is to continue refusing to think seriously about major contemporary strategic issues, a failing that character izes much of the literature on nuclear war, arms control, and proliferation. Another cause for the WMD danger is the security dilemma created by U.S. strategy for high -tech warfare as the leader of a global RMA. This revolution may be characterized as the application of revolutionary technological advances in cybernetics, information technology, and telecommunications to weapons systems, particularly in the United States. Precisely because many potential American adversaries cannot compete at this level, they are intensifying their nuclear and space capabilities to deter and threaten regional rivals or the United States. Subsequently, other states in the region will feel the need to move toward nuclearization, second strike, or missile defense systems to counter these new threats. The creation of a more unstable post Cold War strategic environment and the advent of the RMA have resulted in two parallel, yet distinct, patterns in WMD developments. First, regional powers are increasingly relying upon WMD and bal listic missiles to provide national securi ty. This trend can be seen in areas rang ing from the Middle East to South Asia and Northeast Asia. The post-Cold War strategic challenges, for example, are forcing Iran and North Korea to pursue strikingly similar policies towardWMD and ballistic missiles, despite widely dif fering regional contexts. Second, estab lished nuclear weapon states are looking

to expand the particularly ill missile .capal: emerged in t have forced Rl ed States to en ballistic mi~ warfighting set

WMD and

Much of the fe eration progra actors. These 1 ignore the st resultant chang that are causin! missile technol, fore, we shoul nuclear and mi South Asia, the the existing nuc post-Cold War North Kore, to compensate i; development ( weapons system istan's nuclear flight tested tJ N odong missile ballistic missil nuclear warhe, United States. sought to deve! range missiles al India and P weaponized nu quickly develo] and long-rang security doctrin and deterrence large nuclear ar, sible to achieve ty. Both goverr: receiving mater] the United Sta1

BLANKConflict & Security to expand the operational uses of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons and ballistic missile .capabilities. New threats that ernerged in the post-Cold War world have forced Russia, China, and the United Statesto ernploy nuclear weapons and rnissiles in ballistic conventional warfighting scenarios.

nuclear programs. Russia is helping India build the Sagarika sub-surface nuclear missile and nuclear-powered subrnarines. Moreover, Russia is providing technology to India's civilian space program that can be used to improve the construction of India's nuclear missiles, since spacelaunch vehicles can double as missile launchers. Both statesalso intend to have a robust space presence with the goal of rnilitarizing space, presurnably starting with satellites and then other systems. Meanwhile, Pakistan continues to tempt fate by inciting bloody, prolonged, low-level conflicts in Kashmir. U.S. and Israeli officials accept that Iran will have an inter-regional ballistic missile (IRBM) and nuclear capability by 2oo5 with the Shihab-3 and will be close to expanding it into an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabllity with the Shihab-{.. General Anthony Zinni, commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, publicly professed that Iran would have a nuclear capability within three to five years, and the CIA now says it cannot guarantee that Iran will not have a nuclear capability to accompany its recently tested Shihab-3 IRBM." These developments have becorne possible only with extensive Russian, Chinese, and North Korean proliferation. Israel is expanding its acknowledged first-strike capability to a second-strike sea-based nuclear capability by purchasing German Dolphin Class submarines. This quest for credible sea-based second-strike deterrent capabilities is a predictable response to Iranian and Iraqi nuclearization. Simultaneously, Israel has been building the Arrow missileoperational as of March 2ooo-that also has an offensive capability "to cover all bets" and prevent rnissile attacks upon its territory or forces. Israel may also offer

WMD and Regional Powers. Much of the focus of recent non-proliferation programs has been on regional actors. These programs, however, often ignore the strategic context and the resultant change in operational doctrines that are causing the spread of WMD and missile technology in these areas. Therefore. we should consider these recent nuclear and military events in East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and among the existing nuclear powers in the light of post-Cold'War context. North Korea persuaded Washington to compensate it in return for halting the developrnent of a probable nuclear weapons system; aided Iran's and Pakistan's nuclear rnissile programs; and flight tested the Thepo-Dong I and Nodong missiles that could become the ballistic rnissiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads to the continental United States. In response, Seoul has sought to develop or purchase longerrange missiles against the North. India and Pakistan have tested and weaponized nuclear weapons, and are quickly developing short-, medium-, and long-range missiles. India's new security doctrine advocatesearly warning and deterrence, which requires a very large nuclear arsenal, but rnay be impossible to achieve given Pakistan's proximity. Both governments have and still are receiving material assistancefrom China, the United States, and Russia for their

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Turkey a modified form of missile defense against missile what Ankara perceives as threats from virtually all its neighbors. Meanwhile, Iraq's WMD programs continue despite all the UNimposed restrictions on them. As inspections ended in r99B-99, Saddam Hussein has undoubtedly continued his lifelong quest for diverse WMD capabilities.

Conventionalization amongthe Established NuclearStates. Alongside the rise of new nuclear weapon states, established nuclear weapon states are also looking to conventionalize WMD. States involved in this movement toward conventionallzation include Russia. China. and even the United States.These countries are increasingly looking to incorporate WMD, including nuclear weapons, into conventional warfighting doctrines and operations. The U.S. Senate decisively repudiated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty despite widespread fears that doing so would encourage nore proliferation, an accusation that Moscow, arnong others, subsequently repeated. Meanwhile, the Clinton administration has delivered Moscow an ultimaturn that it support amendments to the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, allowing the United States to construct a national missile defense; otherwise, the United States would leave the ABM treaty. Defense Secretary'William Cohen has stated that any attack on U.S. satellites, a iikely opening move by an enemy seeking to deny us precision strike capabilities and information dominance, would be regarded as an "infringement on our sovereign rights."3 Such an attack could justify the use of all appropriate self-defense measuresby the United States, including

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the use of force. If that attackwasa nuclear one directed to, from, or within space, political pressure for an equivalent riposte would be enormous. Furthermore, the Clinton administration has publicly stated that chemical or biological attacls on the United States could justifr nuclear responsesand refuses to rule out the use of nuclear weapons as part of its counterproliferation progr:am. Russia has repeatedly stated that it will deter even srnaller-scale conventional attacks against key installations or allies with nuclear weapons. Its new security concept and defense doctrine repeated those statements. Russian analysts and officials told the author that NATO's invasion of Kosovo stimulated doctrine writers to add scenarios for using tactical nuclear weapons against purely conventional attacls. Thus in Decernber, Ig$9, Colonel General Vladimir Yakovlev, Commander of Russia's nuclear forces, stated that Russia must lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons, extend the nuclear deterrent to smaller-scale conflicts, and openly warn potential about opponents this potential response. Meanwhile, Russia is continuing under START II to replace old arms with newer, more accurate Topol-M ICBMs that are especially designed to frustrate W'estern defenses. Russia's new national security concept and defense doctrine postulate allencompassing and growing threats to Russian security that include proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles. These docurnents proclaim Russia's readiness for a nuclear first-strike against threats to Russian vital interests that cannot otherwise be resolved. Specifically, the security concept statesthat the armed forces must deter aggression on any scale, nuclear or otherwise, against Russia and

BLANKConflict & Security

Malting nuclearweapollsale,qitirnate tool of war fundarnentally contradicts the notion that nuclear weaponi are prirnarily for deterrence. T

its allies. It thereby extends deterrence to those allies, presumably members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The security concept also states that nuclear weapon use would become possible "in the event or need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measuresof resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and proven ineffective."a The new defense doctrine reiterated this idea. Russian nuclear weapons serve crucial but not necessarily complernentary functions. They deter a wide range of contingencies that could conceivably threaten Russia. They are also warfighting instruments that might be used against a wide range of threats arising out of actual conflict situations. Their use will be tailored to the particular threat at hand, as stated in the security concept. The security concept and other open source documents proclairn limited nuclear war as Russia's officially acknowledged response to rnany different kinds of contingencies. Russian military writers regard these weapons not just as weapons of mass destruction, but as perfectly legitimate weapons for performing military missions. Essentially, there is no clear firewall between conventional and nuclearscenarios. Making nuclear weapons a legitimate tool of war fundarnentally contradicts the notion that nuclear weaponsare primarily for deterrence. Nor is it clear if Moscow distinguishes between tactical or strategic

missiles. Indeed, many Russian political and military analysts view NAIO's enlargement as a future military threat that can only be countered by the threat or use of tactical, if not strategic, nuclear missiles. This conventionalization of Russian nuclear weapons substantially lowers the threshold for nuclear use, which incorporates new lethal, highly accurate, third generation weapons. Russia wiII also have to concurrently increase the accurary of delivery and the effectiveness of target engagernent. Hence, nuclear warfighting scenarios have become truly feasible options. At the same tirne, the People's Republic of China is also displaying a disturbing trend toward the conventionalization of \4IMD. China bracketed tiwan with intimidating missile launches in rg95 and 1996 and has continued proliferating to Pakistan and Iran despite its membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime. Furthermore, China is moving toward a new nuclear doctrine that contemplates using nuclear weapons not only for deterrence, but also for warfighting. Aided by Russia, China is modernizing and extending the range and precision of its ICBMs and sealaunched ballistic missiles (SLBM), shorter range rnissiles, and missile defense systems.Through these advancements, China will be able to threaten the continental United States, diversif, and expand its arsenal, and counter foreign

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missile attacls in the event of conflict over Thiwan or elsewhere in Asia. This is only part of a much larger comprehensive modernization of military technologies that is intended to give China the means to fight for information dominance and strategic superiority by striking the enemy's most critical targets first, even preemptively. This strategy and target set could easily mandate space war, nuclear attacks,or both. Thus, we see the return of limitedand possibly even unlirnited-nuclear war as a viable operational mission. Proliferators and established nuclear powers alike see new justification for nuclear use as threats change and as warfare becomes multi-dimensional, Today, the potentiality for weapons to strike from underwater, the sea, the air, space, and the earth at targets in any one of the other dimensions are realities. The trend whereby proliferating states,such as China and North Korea, then becorne salesmen ofWMD systemsto other proliferators diffuses these capabilities. The universal trend to expand the role of nuclear weapons occurs against a backdrop of widespread military modernization that is part of the RMA. Proliferators and established nuclear powers are also robustly modernizing their conventional and high technology capabilities for waging electronic, space,and information warfare. Frequently they acquire these capabilities not just for political reasons or for deterrence but to counter U.S. technological primacy. The nuclear buildup is inconceivable apart from this context. Moreover, the problem with too much U.S. thinking nuclear issues-warfighting about strategies, deterrence, arms control, and proliferation-is its refusal to consider war's changing context.

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l(illing the SacredCows.rhese current trends support the argument that proliferation really is America's most serious threat. The situation mandates going beyond merely stopping proliferation. Many existing nuclear weapons states, including the United States, have discovered the increasing utility of nuclear weapons to deter conventional attacks and fight smaller-scale wars. This trend to consider the use of nuclear weapons in scenarios other than nuclear attack is undermining several "sacred c o w s " i n s e c u r i t ys t u d i e s . One sacred cow is the "major war is obsolete" school that contends that major war between the great powers is increasingly obsolescent, which is strongly related to the belief in the existence of a nuclear taboo. However, it seems that other governrnents will break taboos against using weapons of mass destruction much more willingly than we assume. In Chechnya, the Chechens resorted to chernical weapons and Russia used what it considers to be WMD-fuelair explosives and cruise missiles. Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds went unpunished, highlighting the weaknessof the international cornmunity's commitment to condemning the use of WMD. Another sacred cow is the argrrment that proliferation is a declining threat, and even if lt is not, new nuclear states will probably not use these weapons except for deterrence, which is linked to the argrrment that more nuclear statesare really better. However, the trend towards the operationalization of nuclear weapons undermines both these arguments. Further, as Iraq, North Korea, and previous proliferators have demonstrated, truly determined proliferators cannot be stopped from succeeding. The

BLANKConflict & Security experience of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq shows that extensive proliferation, including Iraq's increased biological warfare capability, can happen under the most severe inspection regime without the inspectors' knowledge. Meanwhile, foreign suppliers remain willing to help proliferators like Iraq. Nor can the U.S. expect that proliferators will follow its testing procedures or t h a t i t s i n t e l l i g e n c e s e r v i c e sc a n a c c u rately warn it of policies, strategies, intentions, and capabilities. In addition, the United Statescannot attribute the disturbing trends to nuclearizatiort and the spread of chemical and biological warfare capabilities solely to prolifer-

have no discernible rnilitary-strategic utility other than to deter a nuclear attack. As the argument goes, defenseless nuclear powers will deter each other from attacks. However, this cow is being undone because proliferators and established nuclear powers are further extending their capacity to exploit space for rnilitary purposes and integrating spacebased satellites and sensors with missiles to enhance precision. For instance, the Pentagon believes that China is attempting to develop an anti-satellite capability against the U.S. space satellites. Such weaponization could come to include nuclear missiles or vital comrnand, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

The shger scOpeof thenuclear, and. space, conventional improvements to a maior military's capability cannof be orplained awayis simply u' failure of the non-proliferation cdmpaign. ators' desire for bigger and betterWMD. Even existing nuclear powers Russia and China are acting in ways that apparently indicate that they favor proliferation. Reportedly, Russia and China are covertly violating the accords on preventing biological warfare even as they devise new missions for their nuclear weapons. Russia exported tritium to China to improve China's nuclear weapons and renewed its rnilitary collaboration with Iran. And as they draw closer together, their military cooperation in nuclear missile, launch, and space capabilitieswill continue and deepen. A third sacred cow is the long-standing American belief-a cornerstone of deterrence theory-that nuclear weapons

(C+ISR) cornponents of nuclear arsenals, such as satellites and anti-satellite weapons, ballistic missile defenses, and anti-ballistic rnissiles, Such weaponization of spaceis hardly new. During the rg8os the Soviet (Jnion established a space theater of s t r a t e g i cm i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s ( T e o t rV' o e n rykh Deistufa)that included a cornmand and control structure aswell asplanning for the conduct of strategic operations in, to, and from space. Moscow was hardly alone in this endeavor. Therefore, the sheer scope of nuclear, space, and conventional improvements to a rnajor rnilitary's capability cannot be explained away as simply a failure of the non-prol iferation campaign.

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Finally, these build-ups also undersive concentratio n on non- proliferation mine another sacred cow of American and purely nuclear scenarios is bound to writing and policy under the Clinton fail because it only deals with part of the administration, namely that we can problern. While Russian and Chinese arrest, inhibit, or even prevent nuclear claims that Kosovo stimulated regional proliferation by supplying potential propowers to consider going nuclear are iiferators with high-quality conventional self-serving, they also discerned a crucial platforms and weapons or by further truth: In the post-Cold War strategic reinforcing pledges of extended deterenvironrnent, regional powers will opt rence. Increasingly, it looks like those f o r W M D . states only pocket the conventional At the same time, trends in rnodern weapons transfers while continuing to war and strategy are driving the estabdevelop their WMD capabilities. Even lished nuclear states toward further allies, like South Korea, who in the past nuclearization. It may be unpalatable for have resisted frorn developing nuclear \Mashington, who is leading the revoluweapons and their delivery vehicles, now tion in modern warfare, to hear that its seek to extend the range and capacity of embrace of, for example, strategic their missiles. Japan is extending both preclusion and inforrnation warfare is at the perimeter of its defense-under new fault here. But as long as the United its States ernbraces a form of war whose guidelines with Washington-and space and reconnaissance capabilities. conventionally informationally or SinceJapan could easilyand quickly build achieved strategic results equate to those nuclear weapons, its plutonium program of nuclear war and pursues nuclear and and policies evoke some concern across conventional superiority, other potenAsia. Thus, the quest for ever better contial strategic rivals will look to nuclear ventional rnissiles and space systems for weapons as a force equalizer. military purposes have the potential to If the United States wishes to arrest contribute to further nuclearization and the nuclear danger, it rnust begin by operationalization of those weapons. educating its own elites of the need to make more progress on nuclear issues. Justified or not, repudiating the CornDeveloprnents in the weaponization and prehensive Test Ban Tieaty allows anyoperationalization of nuclear capabilione to build and test nuclear weapons. ties transcend the proliferation issue and In most cases, these weapons will be express at least to sorne degree trends in used against our strategy and forces. modern warfare. Part of the answer as to This was clearly not the Senate'sintendwhy we should fight this trend toward ed outcome. Second, our elites nust nuclearization lies in a cause larger than better grasp the connections between the canonical motives-a strict nuclear advanced conventional weapons, infordeterrence or prestige factor-ascribed mation warfare, and nuclear weapons. to proliferators. Tiends in rnodern warFinally, we must build real missile fare and technology make the build-up defensesto prevent attacksand keep the of I\IMD and ballistic missiles more feapressure on proliferators and their sible and even desirable for potential recipients, while also trying to reduce nuclear states.Hence, the present exclu- operating arsenals through arms con-

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BLANKConflict&Security trol treaties, such as START III. None of this will be easy. Congress and many foreign powers, including allies, are obstructive and do not see the linkages between the issuesthat have been connected above. Likewise, much of the arms control and non-proliferation lobby is equally inflexible in not understanding how warfare is changing and its subsequent irnpact on nuclear weapon use. The lobby's visceral opposition to missile defense derives on classical deterrence arguments that are forty years old and fail to take into account modern developments. Until policy elites and the public grasp the important new trends that are developing in warfare and regional deterrence agendas, the U.S.

will continue to fight old battles and rely upon old truths that are irrelevant to current realities and that other governments are busily repudiating. Whatever security the U.S. then obtains by those methods will be illusory and short-lived. The old landmarks of deterrence are undergoing severe stress and must be buttressed or restructured. This outcome rnay be disconcerting, but it is not unusual that strategic doctrines conceived for one kind of war rnakes another forrn of warfare rnuch more conceivable. Global trends toward nuclearization oblige us to rethink our strategies more closely. If we do not learn from what others are doing, we will have to learn from what they did to us.

NOTES r. Admiral

Michael

McDevitt

(Ret.)

USN,

"Geo-

in Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The graphic Runinations," ChineseArmed Forcesin the 21st Cenfup, (Carlisle Barracks, Srategic

Studies Institute,

U.S. Army

War College,

1999p ) p.5-6. 2. JamesRisenandJudithMiller, "C.I.A. TellsClinton An Iranian A Bomb Can't Be Ruled Out" Neo IorA' ? i n e sJ,a n u a r y 1 7, 2 o o o , p . r . 3. David Isby, "US Funds Offensive and Defensive Space Systems,"Jane'sMissiles and Rockets, III, No.

tt, November, t999, Lexis Nexis. 4 . " V o y e n n a y aD o k t i n a . " p p . 3 - 4 . F B I S S O V , J a n u aty r+, 2ooo Stephen Blank, "Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Proliferation in Russian Strategy," Report of the Commission To AssessThe Ballistic Missile Threat To The United States, Appendix III, Unclassified Working Papers, Pursuant to Public Law 2oI, rgg8, pp. 57 -77 that is basedon extensiveRussiansoulces in support of this argument.

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0ulture&Soclety andIntervention Cinema Frank Stern Bnrcuon, NovEr,.rsnt5, 2ooo-A rnob of angry Serbs flooded Yugoslavia's capital today to protest the rule of President Slobodan Milosevic and dernand that he call general elections. Repeating a strategy it had used in April, state-run television tried to distract tens of thousands of protesters from political action by broadcasting pirated copies of Western hits such as and the Oscar-wintheJames Bond filrn TheWorldIsNotEnough

Frank Stern ir P"ofessor of Modern man

Ger

and Chair

History

of the Center

for Ger-

man Studies, Ben Gurion

University

the Negev,

Israel.

Beau!. ning American The twentieth century ushered in the age of cinema. At the turn of the century, filrns emerged as the new cultural agents, introducing events and irnages frorn remote corners of the world to rnass audiences in the urban centers of Europe and the United States. By rgro, a growing segment of the urban population was gazing at images flickering across white screens. Movie houses supplied what rnillions of spectators were expecting: information, entertainrnent, rnoving stories, thrills, and modern heroes and heroines. Curious gaze, cultural hunger, and political sightseeing mingled with the expectations of a growing lower- and middle-class audience' At the turn of the century, with the Boer War reconstructed for a film audience and war in the Balkans recorded in moving photographs, politics and the new visual art began to

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intertwine. The moving images proved useful for political and military interests when it came to reaching a broad segment of the population and creating consent or encouraging rejection of the real or imagined enerny. They also provided a forceful voice for independent critics of conternporary events. Artistic expression influences political interventions just as political interventions have an impact on cinernatic representations of past, present, or future events. Cinerna has become the modern tool of visual intervention in politics, culture, and international relations.

Interventions of the Mind.o.." basic images of international crises and catastrophes such as World War I, the 'World Spanish Civil War, War II, the Holocaust, the Vietnam War, the Cold 'War, and the recent war in the Balkans have been thoroughly influenced by rnoving pictures. Filrns are aesthetic representations of realities, whether we are viewing documentaries or feature films that refer to politics or culture. Films elaborate rneaning-either by creating new images of reality or by confirrning and changing these irnages-and they provoke ernotional responses that contribute to intellectual debate. Films are the interventions of the rnind, either before the real events or in hindsight, offering interpretations that can be as antagonistic as the actual events. Today, these interventions of the mind are produced, marketed, and promoted by sophisticated means of technology, comrnunication, and cultural discourse. Cinerna is at the very heart of visual culture, which not only defines the modernism of the past century and the beginning of the twenty-first centu-

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ry, but also creates a bond between art and political power. Films may try to tell a story in a seemingly objective rnanner. They may also, however, carry an overt ideological message or create subversive images that can encourage a range of attitudes from a democratic belief in equality to hatred of "the other." Such effects do not derive exclusively from the highest standard of film art and form, but can result from any effective representation of the cultural or political other through narration, visual aesthetics, and cinematic imagination, as long as these resonate with the spectator. The cinematic attempt to influence political conflict focuses on the individual rninds of participants, bystanders, and viewers. Feature films and newsreels rnay evoke conscious reflections on a given conflict, enhance or fight stereotypes,or distract from a crisis situation through illusionary irnages-as the feature filrn WogtheDog did so effectively. Although the filrnmakers created a believable vision of the Oval Office, they did not imagine that a real war in Albania would ensue and prove to be lesshilarious than their digital playfulness. Intervening films rnove a political question or a strategic goal into the visual sphere. Today, the visuai sphere has to be understood as an essential part of the public sphere. Departing from traditions of nineteenth century literature, cinema dissolves the questionable distinction between high and popular culture. Through film, the private sphere has become politicized and has gained a new social dimension. Messagesare no longer kept in a literary bottle, but are visualized and constantly imposed on the rnind. Hence the researcher of modern culture and politics has to ask not only what the

srpnr'rCulture & Society images on the screen represent, but also over into the territory of the real or imagined other? How do cinematic rephow they convey meaning. The functions of film can work in a resentations influence the public and totally unexpected way, since cinematic private spheres, creating an atmosphere interventions cannot be reduced to subof awarenessor even a clirnate of intertle or blatant propaganda, emotional vention or non-intervention in historioutcries, or rnoral didactics. Severalyears cally relevant situations and processes? ago, at the time of the military conWhat is history in the movies beyond the frontations between Serbs and Bosnians, history of cinema? Filrn illustrates ex post Saturday nights brought one hour when historical events and contributes to the the weapons usually became silent. A development of the viewer's historical strange calm drifted over the front lines consciousness. Academics frequently of the Balkans, and the United Nations question whether the depiction of a hisobservers could relax. It was the midnight torical context in a film meets the stanhour when a German TV station that dards of historiographical works. The increasing number of historians, sociolcould be received in the Balkans broadcast the weekly pornographic film. One ogists, and other specialists on film sets could call this a cultural intervention, underscores a new attention to this conalthough no number of pornographic cern. But the cinematic imagination movies would have prevented the return cannot be reduced to a cultural or artis-

Cinema has beconr0themoderntoolof visual intervention in politics, culture, and international relationi. to fighting. As this example illustrates, films may not alwayslead to the reactions intended by filmmakers or producers.

TheVirtualWorldof FilmHistOf ieS. Cinema createsa virtual world of its own, and the relationship between what is happening on the screen and what is happening in social, political, and international reality is transformed into a visual dimension of the individual mind. It is not just the representation of reality we are exploring in political and historical analysis, but the reality of cultural representations. What do popular culture and the cinernatic imagination achieve by crossing

tic illustration or a historical fact. It creates a reality of its own. The tgzg film BaltleshipPotemkinby Sergei Eisenstein depicted in a revolutionary new film language the Russian Revolution of 19o5. It created the founding myth of the Russian Revolution as a movement carried by the massesand transformed images of these rnassesinto icons revered by future filmmakers. however, was less the depiction Potemkin, of the rgog revolution than of the ideological and aesthetic impact of the later revolution in I9I7. It was not just made for a Russian audience, but intended as a visual intervention in the Western European ebb and flow of Comrnunist move-

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ments. When the film was brought to where the lower and middle classeswere Germany in the late rg2Os, it wasbanned looking for entertainment, and more importantly, for information and images because the authorities feared its revoluabout what was happening outside their tionary message. In r936-37, the German semi-docuimmediate environrnent. For these inimentary O!1mpia, directed by Leni tial filrngoers, the screen became the first Riefenstahl, was exported to all'Western public sphere, not social life or politicscountries to prove that Nazi Germany a defining characteristic of early twentiwas a democratic and open society. This eth-centurT masssociety. film attempted to create a perception of The pre-rgr{ wars in the Balkans, for reality under Nazi rule. It won a numinstance, yielded images of rnarchingsolber of prestigious film awards but fell diers, firing artillery, and countless from grace, particularly in the United corpses strewn across the fields that soon S t a t e s w h e n , i n N o v e m b e r 1 9 3 8 , t h e became part of popular cinematic perworld learned of the pogrom against the ceptions. Over twenty cameramen filmed Jews. The atternpt to intervene in the the Balkan Wars of r9r2-r3. By rgrJ, perception of Nazi Gerrnany abroad was most Balkan governments had banned foiled by growing awarenessof political filming by foreign correspondents, so realities in Gerrnany. The change of the film companies resorted to staging p e r c e p t i o n r u i n e d t h e r e c e p t i o n : the action-which soon became a rnedia Riefenstahl, who was touring the Unitevent or pseudo-event. In the Balkan -Wars ed Stateswith the film at the time, was a Danish camerarnan and a British immediately asked to leave. aristocrat who had failed to arrive in time Filrns may establish visual icons of hisfor a deadly battle staged some battles on torical reality and consciousness,define Iocation. Most faux filrns in Europe at public attitudes, mobilize people for a the time wele anti-British and depicted common or less-common cause, and the Boer War. In the United States, the c r e a t e p a t t e r n s o f p r i v a t e b e h a v i o r . Edison Company led the market in Boer Political and historical films represent W'ar fakes. Out of rnarketing considerahistorical consciousness. At the same tions, however, they produced two vertime, they influence or create facets of sions: one in which the Boers won, and historical consciousness,or even distort one in which the British, dressed in Civhistorical events.Hence it is obvious that il W-aruniforms, were victorious. not only aestheticbut also ethical quesImages of war and death strengthened tions are involved in these films. Cinema peace movements, while at the same time is more than entertainrnent: It is the distancing the viewer from the terror of visual backbone of modern Western culwar. Thus, they also readied populations ture and beyond. It is the intervention of for war, particularly if the films were the conscious and subconscious mind. combined with newsreels about domestic affairs that were imbued with nationalistic overtones. In Germany, the most Waf. In the first d.ecadeof the twentieth popular movie star of the time was Kaiser century, short newsreels about events Wilhelm II. No movie show could start around the world began to appear in without pictures of him attending a Europe and the United States, places parade of marching Germans or of

ScreenImagesPreparedfor

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Cinema iS m0fe thanentertainrnent: It is the visual backbone of modern Western culture and bevond. I

touching moments from the private life of the royal farnily peppered with the hugging of kids and pets. In France, the many depictions of heroic and suffering women led to the reincarnation of Alsace-Lorraine as a beautiful female victim, abused by Germanic Huns, crying silently, and demanding national redemption. During the years leading up to World War I, cinema all over Europe contributed to a nationalistic atmosphere and to the fervor of preparing for battlenotwithstanding the many images of casualtiesin the Balkans. The mainstream images that prepared the public for war had all the characteristics of interventions of the rnind, They prepared the private eye for the collective onsiaught. The piano accompaniment of the silent filrn show cornbined patriotic marches with sound effects of explosions and the delicate tunes of the Viennese waltz, implying through music that the ruling classesof Europe were gradually dancing into war and disaster. Cinema became a central instrument for what George Mosse has called the "nationalization of the masses." In this context, Worid W-ar I was the birth pang of filrn as propaganda, sometimes hiding its ideological and political qualities behind the screen of emotions, but more often deliberately mobilizing heart and mind for the national cause and against the imagined or real enemy. Film aesthetics developed as aesthetics of destruction, war, and self-sacrifice. The German film

empire UIA was founded in r9r7 once the German High Command realized during the course of the war the power of the films it had inspired. The film industry, the war industry, and the army were in dire need of rnovies that could mobilize the public. General Ludendorff, chief of staff of the German army under Hindenburg, insisted on influencing the massesin the interest of the state and defined film in this regard as an "effective war weapon." By rgr/, however, it was too late to start a new war of propaganda. Nevertheless, within a very short period, UFA evolved as the biggest and most influential film corporation in Europe. At the same tirne, in the United States Charlie Chaplin produced short slapstick clips in which he beat up the kaiser with a huge hamrner that bore the inscription "War Bonds."

From ScreenPacifismto the

Allied War Effott. A-o"g thecin-War

ematic responses to World I were pacifistic films that tried to create a popular anti-militaristic atmosphere, which filmmakers hoped would contribute culturally to the rejection of any future war effort. The rnost important work from the new genre of anti-war films was Ali Qtiet on theWsternfront (r93r), based on the literary bestseller by Erich Maria Remarque. Heated debates about Remarque's novel were still going on when the film opened in the United States in rg!o, where it subsequently received an Oscar. In Berlin. however.

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the Nazi party mobilized its members to terrorize the audience, the police intervened, and finally, the courts decided to censor what the Weimar audience was allowed to see. The film was banned for months because, to quote the decision, it exhibited "an uninhibited pacifistic tendency." The Ministry of the A"*y chirned in with the argument that the "film discriminates against the image of the German soldier" and was harrnful to the "whole irnage of Germany abroad." American filmmakers had "intervened" with the cinematic adaptation of a German novel, influencing the controversies in the Weimar Republic between the visions of the ultranationalistic right and the republican's dream of a peaceful dernocracy. As a consequence, the German version was recut, and it was not until r9B4 that the original version was shown again in Germany. In the I93os and early Ig4Os, the cinematic experiences of World War I were transformed into veritable propaganda rnachines. No other field of culture and public life achieved such intense attention from the Nazi leadership as did German film. Highly ernotional films about the suffering of the German rninority in Czechoslovakia and Poland, for instance, were crucial in creating popular support for the occupation of the Sudetenland and for the attack on Poland. The fictional images on the screen prepared the spectator'smind for the real intervention which. in turn. was filmed on location, and then screenedas documented evidence of the need to intervene. The r94r German film Heimkehr(Return)depicted the constructed plight of ethnic Germans in Poland Ionging to get "back into the Reich." The film.iustified the Gerrnan attack on Poland and aimed to create mass sup-

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(living port for the politics of Lebensraum space). The Allied film industries responded to the Third Reich's "Ministry of lllusion" with fierce efforts. The real battles of armies were almost superseded by virtual battles and dramas on the screens. Three films that have become classicssince the rg{os are particularly noteworthy' Charlie Chaplin's TheGreat Dictator (rg+o), Michael Curtiz's Casablanca Gg4z), and Sam Woods' ,For WhomtheBell Tolls(rg+g), which was based on the Hemingway novel and depicted an episode of the Spanish Civil War. This last film is a remarkable example of film as intervention. The film aimed less at the creation of historical consciousness about the Spanish Civil War than at a collective, emotional identification with the ongoingAllied efforts to combat Nazi Germany. It was the Allies' alternative to many Nazi filrns.

Beyond.rnthe TornCurtainand'War

decades after World II, the moral divide on the screen was obvious, rnaking the spectator's decision with whom to 'War side rather easy. Cold movies on both sides of the Iron Curtain left no doubt about where the despicable adversaries were to be found. Images of the past were evoked to fight present-day battles and to foster political support for power politics, real or ideological interventions. There are many such films, but perhaps the most outstanding illustration of the relationship between visual interventions and real political or rnilitary interventions can be found in film material depicting the aftermath of the construction of the Berlin Wall in 196r. In October 196r, television, newsreels, and photos around the world showed Russian and U.S. tanks facins

srERNCulture & Society each other at Checkpoint Charlie. The usual commentary was: "The world is holding its breath. " Fear of an imminent military confrontation and of World War III surfaced. The Cold'War threatened to explode into a hot war between the superpowers. At stake, however, were not the liberties of the Berliners but General Lucius Clay's decision to challenge the East German regime's interference with the free movement ofAmericans into the East. A U.S. diplomat on his way to the opera in East Berlin had been stopped, and the East German border guard asked for his passport. The American refused, and Clay ordered a platoon of U.S. troops to the'Wall to escort the car to the opera. The next day the conflict escalated, and on October 29, General Clay ordered ten M-{B tanks to line up. Dozens of jeeps and personnel were ordered to drive back and forth across Checkpoint Charlie. In the early morning of October 26, ten Soviet tanls lined up at the Wall. Soviet MiG fighters buzzed the city skies. The filmed standoff created a strong visual impact. At school, young Berliners were allowed to view the show and enjoy it. Whether the guns and cannons were fully or semi-loaded or empry is still a point of contention. In the end, no shot was fired. The White House was irritated and called the Kremlin, and one by one the tanls were withdrawn on both sides in a streamlined choreography. When Kennedy heard about the incident, he demanded to know why an American was going to the opera in East Berlin in the first place. October 196r, then, wasthe end of General Clay's Berlin career. Today the visual documentation influences the memory of the first confrontations over the Wall. At the time, the documentation created a visual intervention; the power-

ful imagery helped both powers to prove their strength and attain masssupport in their countries. In the end, we do not even know which opera moved the tanks to the WaIl.

The Ball(ans: Realigning Film and H iStOfy. Oncethe Iron Curtain was torn down and the walls of a bipolar world had crumbled, the cinematic mirror of Europe became blurred. The Balkans in the mid-rggos became the focus of political and cinernatic uncertainties. The European public debate, particularly in Germany and France, focused on the question of political and military intervention. The question was particularly difficult for Germany. In the early rggos, its foreign policy and international political and rnilitary involvement were still rather limited, and the German public was still grappling with the military legacy of the past. Without going into the countless news reports and documentaries about the Balkan crises and wars, six filrns produced in the mid-rggos deservemention for their influence on the European debates over the Balkan Wars. Three of the films aim at documenting the end of Yugoslavia and implore solidarity arnong different ethnic groups. None of these three films provides sufficient explanation, but all provide graphic testimony of the horrors of war. The six-part 1995 BBC film Tugoslaaia' DeathofaNationindicts the Serbian and Croatian leadership, reveals their virulent nationalism, and deplores the lack of international intervention. The 1994 film Vukouartries to mobilize the public and explain Yugoslavia's dilemmas through a fictional Croatian-Serbian love story. Due to its unfavorable portrayal of Croatian nationalism, the film was sharply criti-

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cized by the Croatian government. The film poses questions of identity and ethnic belonging, and confronts both the private and the political spheres through the displacement of the individual in a time of nationalistic powerplays. The third film, Bosno/(1994), was co-directed by the French philosopher BernardHenri Levi and co-sponsored by Bosnian state television. It seeks to appeal to the cultural memory of the audience. More than any other, this film asLsfor international intervention to prevent any further military confrontations in the Balkans. All three films were part of the ongoing public debate about the results and, to a lesser extent, the causesof the 'Wars. Balkan The involvement of Bernard-Henri Levi, not only in this filrn, but also in French and European politics concerning the Balkans, demonstrates how intellectual debate and film can be tightly linked. In his cinematic narrative and in his Levi visual material, Bernard-Henri 'W'ar refers to irnages of World I, the Spanish Civil War, Auschwitz, and political confrontations since rg{$. It sides with the Bosnians and accuses governments, media, and the military of not siding with hurnanity. Bosna!is a documentary film essayabout the legacyof the twentieth century, an accusation of the humanities failure to intervene. This human failure, however, has its political agents-the United States, the European Union, and particularly France in the mid-rggos. Bosno/tells the story of the Balkans, as well as of Europe.

-Western tive visual icons of culture. Such films not only ask for political and military interventions in favor of universal human rights and Western democratic civil rights, but also function as cultural interventions based on the best traditions of the European Enlightenment. They proclaim the defense of democracy and humanism as a popular cause, and they freely cross borders in their discourse between the screen and the audience. Three outstanding feature films of rgg$ illustrate the controversial nature of linklng politics and aesthetics. Emir Kusturica's rgg$ filrn, Underground, led to a sharp clash between the French intellectual, Alain Finkielkraut, and the Austrian writer, Peter Handke, who defended the Serbian cause in his writing. National loyalties, intellectual reasoning, and sorne subversive tensions in the Franco-German relationship that influenced the whole western European discussion on intervention carne to the forefront in Handkethe r996 Finkielkraut debate. Following the discussions in the media, the Gerrnan government decided to take part in the military intervention, completing the process of restoring German sovereignty and cementing its position in NATO. The film Before the .Roin by Milcho Manchevski focuses on the European perspective and shows that the Balkan wars may draw all Europeans into the abyss. Theo Angelopoulos's fllrn Ufises' Gwe transcends current politics. This movie by the Greek filmmaker cornbines history and rry.thology in a fictional film essay about the Balkans, ethnic diversity, European (and hence Western) myth, and a resulting deep-rooted universalisrn. His ambition is less to inform or to endorse political action than to encourage specta-

DebatingUniversalHuman RightS. Films like Bosno/ document not only events, but also attitudes about events.To bolster their cause,they refer to historical analogies and to the collec-

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srERNCulture & Society tors to rethink the political history of the Balkans. The entire movie is a representation of cultural memory, of counterimages that repel the simplified and gory portrayal by the media. The film offers a cultural definition of the human condition in our time. It refers us back to basic -Western European and myths. Theo Angelopoulos once stated in an interview that the twentieth century

r-LIf

began and ended in the Balkans. Hence, Ultsses'Ga<eembodies the very idea of Europe, of civilization, of powâ&#x201A;Źr, and of the best traditions of realpolitik. Above all, the film defends the beauty and humanism of European civilization, despite its troubled last century. It is, Iike so many good films, a filmmaker's search for the ultimate documentation, for visual intervention.

FL fne Fpmrformda&r!,CerterfurGbhalPartner$tp

EH*th&snxtY#*:

FuNorNcron Coneeonerrvr RssneRcFr aNo Drerocun The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP) provides funding for collaborative projects that address issues of importance to US-Japan relations. W'e are pleased to announce new priorities in the Intellectual Exchange Programs for support of poliry-relevant collaborative research and dialogue in the following fields:

Health Care and Aging InternationalEconomlcs

International

Securitv

SustainableDevelopment Civil Societv

regarding tb6e neu pdodries, tbe CGP Intelbcrual Excbange Prograts, and our otbs grant andfellouship opporlunitks, ple6e contact CCP. TheJapan Foundation Center for Global Panneship, 152 West 57th Stret, 39th Floor, New York, New York 10019 'leI: (212) 489-7255, Fu: (Zl2) 489-1344, E-mil: info@cgp.org, Website: http://w.cgp.org/cgplinW Forfunba

infomation

b u m m e r / h a l l2 O O O t 7 3 l

Culture & Society

SeattleSouth:TheNew Mexican Radicalism Mark Stevenson When a disparate array of protesters took to the streets of Seattle for a few days in 1999, and a more disciplined group 'Washington, D.C., inApril, they sent a beseiged the streets of messagethat the world's various trade and economic organizations, not to mention the press, are still discussing. But for ten months, between April t999 and February 2ooo, a band of a few thousand Mexican student strikers did much more: They Latin America's largest university, National turned Autonomous lJniversity of Mexico (UNAM), into a barricaded school of radical resistance. Their debates on strategy ran into marathon, all-night "consensus-style" discussions in the ernpty classrooms in which they ate, slept, and organized. They locked out over 25o,ooo classmates, repeatedly faced down the federal government, encouraged smaller uprisings at a half-dozen other schools, and dominated public attention in what was to have been the jubilee year for former President Ernesto Zedillo's free-market economic policies. Not bad for a motley group of anarchists, synarchists, Zapatista rebel supporters, and Stalinists who flipped a coin to determine who would speak for the group and forwarded an escalating list of demands that grew more maximalist as their movernent grew more isolated. Their tactics, structure, and goals made them harder than any other traditional

Mark Stevenson i. a journalist covered

who has

Mexico

for

over seven years.

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insurgent movement in Mexico for the government to control, battle, or coopt. As Miguel Abraxas, a strike supporter who wore a Cuban-style military cap with a red star at the strike barricades, said, "We are inventing a new way of doing politics. We have no interest in the traditional left parties because of their involvement in electoral horsetrading. We are a resistance movernent" against privatization, free trade, and globalization. "We feel we are the brothe r s o f t h e S e a t t l ep r o t e s t e r s . " Though many Mexican protesters like Abraxas identifr with their counterparts in Seattle, the potential of this backlash movement to actually stir things up in Mexico is more powerful. The strikers rallied against more than just globalization; they protested Mexico's woefully lopsided distribution of incorne, the disrnantling of the last remnants of the social safety net, and the increasing privatization of Mexican industries. They revealed the governrnent's lack ofinterest in public universities and exposed hamhanded security agencies. Finally, after police broke up the strike, the student protesters entered Mexico's deeply flawed penal systern.A1l of these very real themes have much rnore potential to spark a wider rnovement than the strikers' stated goals, what Zedillo has attacked as antiglobalism, or "globaphobia. "

strikers as unreasoning fanatics or pawns manipulated by some obscure political force. There was largely baselessspeculation that the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) kept the strike going to discredit the left or else to create an atmosphere of insecurity as the July 2ooo presidential elections approached. Some reports maintained that strikers were eggedon by the left-center Democratic Revolution Party. In fact, almost all the strikers-and certainly the radical core of 2, ooo or so that kept the lockout going-reject all Mexican party politics with contempt. Nor are they tied up by old, established leftist politics. Alfredo Velarde, a twenty-nine-year-old "anar-

chist-communist" econornics professor who joined the strilers, said"'The traditional definitions of Marxist-Leninist politics leave us completely cold. " Instead, Velarde described his goal as politics-as-process: The movement's goals would be redefined as a wider circle of students was drawn into strike-sponsored debates, forurns, and referendums. That, in fact, didn't happen, largely due to the strikers' incompetence in dealing with the rnedia; their cornplete failure to reach out to Mexico's vast lowand rniddle-class; and their poor choice of tactics, like blocking rnain roadways during rush hour, preventing "alternative classes"from rneeting, or forbidding T h i s p o t e n t i a l i s e v e n g r e a t e r s i n c e students not already on their side from Mexico's social tinderbox has always entering the campus. But judging by Mexico's past, like the needed only a middle-class, educated 1968 student democracy movement, leadership component in order for it to burst into flames. The strike may, in the some of the rggg strikers will turn up five or ten years from now leading the next future, contribute to such a leadership from among the dozens of strikers in guerrilla movement. It will not be the top leadership-in Mexico, such leaders are jail and the strikers' parents drawn into traditionally either co-opted or jailedthe fray. Most press reports about the student but rather, the middle ranks of strike strike at UNAM depicted the radical participants who could move to stateslike

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sTEVENSoN C u l t u r e& S o c i e t y Guerrero, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, or Chiapas and begin building rebel groups. Influenced and encouraged by the successof their tactics in closing the university, their methods, however, rnay differ frorn those of traditional rebel groups-looser, less hierarchical, less ideologically strict. Even during the strike, the Mexican governrnent had a hard time identifying the strike's real leadership channels and had little ability to negotiate with them or even predict their actions. The failure of Mexico's intelligence agencies was displayed by clurnsy efforts at surveillance and infiltration. While guerrilla organizations like the EPR or EZLN (Zapatistas) operate in richer terrain (to date, rural, not urban,

ico can handle rural peasant uprisings, as it did in Guerrero in the r97os and in Chiapas in 1994. What the PRI-or any other party in Mexico, for that rnattercould not handle is unrest in rnajor cities spreading among the !O million strong, urbanized lower class. Occasional demonstrations by teachers, neighborhood groups, and even taxi drivers have shown that, on a routine basis, police in Mexico have no effective forrn of urban crowd control. By the time the newly created (and militarized) Federal Preventative Police rnarched onto the UNAM campus in February, the strikers had already essentially conceded defeat and were gathered in an auditoriurn in anticipation of their

Judginghy Mexico'spast,hkethere68 student democracy rnovelnent, sorne of the 1999-strikers lv-rllfurn up five or ten years frorn now leading the next guerrilla rnovernent. Mexico provides the troops for political mass action), they are basically "arrned pressure groups" looking to build a regional constituency that they can then represent in negotiations with the government. The student strikers had no such plans. Thus, they are not as "localized" or as easily controlled as the grrerilla groups. Of rnore concern to the government, is the fact that they are urban-based. Perhaps rnost worrisorne for the government was the involvement of thousands of middle-class, urban parents of students acting in a supportive role during and after the strike movement. Even under the glare of international scrutiny, Mex-

arrest. But the student movement can spread. Awave of strikes, confrontations, and takeovers at rural teachers' colleges that followed the end of the UNAM strike were, to some extent, part of past battles; a system of "socialist" rural education set up decades ago that is slowly being dismantled. To many, the UNAM, as a virtually free, open-adrnission state school, is also an anachronisrn. But such skirmishes could becorne battles as the Fox administration moves to perfect Mexico's free-market reforrns by elirninating the Iast vestiges of state support, subsidies, and handout programs. Zedillo erred by fundarnentally underestimating the exact rnood and conditions of the people he

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the UNAM suike that he might be governs. Programs like free education, tortilla subsidies, and farrn price suptempted to use it in other situations, ports-no rnatter how anachronistic they like Chiapas or Guerrero. Nor are the may appear-are crucial for Mexican recent reforrns in Mexican campaign social and political stability. Given Mexilaws, which Zedillo saw as the legacy of co's extremely depressed wage scale, they his administration, capable of integratoften contribute to a farnily's very survival ing the students, or rnany other Mexiand provide any slim hope for advance- cans, into electoral politics. As striking rnent. Moreover, Mexicans tend to see students said repeatedly in interviews, such programs as no less than a they see all political parties as wornbirthright. Cutting these prograrns is out-either sold-out or incapable of inherently dangerous, for they are preeffecting any real change. cisely programs won or supported by a The electoral laws, like so many othconstituency accustomed to defending er Mexican statutes, are fine on paper, itself through political mass action like but simply do not correspond with the strikes or street protests. country's reality. The reality is that even Zedillo, his finance rninister, and the government uses organized, sornet h e c e n t r a l b a n k p r e s i d e n t s e e r n e d times violent regional pressure groups almost completely out of touch with like the Territorial Movement, the these central truths, and are thus Antorcha Campesina, or the National unwisely willing to take on such battles. Peasants Confederation to enforce its Given this central disconnect-and rule and get its candidates elected. If Zedillo's known reputation for petuthat is how the government does busiIance-one cannot rule out the possibilness on occasion, how then can it conity that Zedillo so liked the method of vince the students that ballots are better massivepolice intervention used to end than street protests?

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Business &Flnance TheIMF We Need Michel Carndessus Globalization must not be viewed as a blind, potentially rnalevolent force that needs to be tarned. Rather, it should be seen as the best chance we have of improving the hurnan condition throughout the world. This view of globalization is one that goes beyond trade and capital rnobility, beyond the wonders of instantaneous electronic cornrnunication and business transactions, beyond even the freedom ofpeople and ideas to move around the world. It is a view that sees globalization as an invitation to enhance our sense of world citizenship, responsibility, and solidarity. These universal values-a global sense of responsibility and citizenship in a globalizing world-must serve as the basis of action for leaders of the international community who now confront the tremendous challenge of humanizing globalization. Meeting this challenge is an especially daunting task for the leadership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an institution that specializes in abstract issues such as international monetary affairs and has a twin sister, the'World Banl, that focuses specifically on human developrnent and fighting poverty-a rnission the IMF should not duplicate. The question we must answer is, How do we define the IMF we need, an international financial institution that furthers the goal of making globalization work for all the world's citizens? To answer this, we must address two issues. Firsr, we musr assess how the IMF can be responsible to each of its rB2 member

Michel Camdessus is former

Managing

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of the Inter-

national

Monetary

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flourish, and it must promote basic stability and rapid, sustainable, and highquality g:rowth for each country. The IMF is in a unique position to help each country generate such growth and contribute to high, better-balanced growth for the entire world. The IMF cannot and should not aim for anything How do we define the relationship less. The prirnary focus, of course, rnembers? and its IMF the between First, all member countries have the should be on the core areas of the right-and the obligation-to maintain a Fund's mandate-macroeconomic polipermanent dialogue with the IMF, the cy and management. We have learned, however, that effective, credible policy goal of which is to identify the optimal implementation hinges on broader staand sustaining policies for creating bility and high-quality growth. Second, issues of sound economic institutions, mernber countries can also count on the transparency, and good governanceIMF's technical assistance and catalytic bringing with it irnplications for social and labor policies, financial soundness, financing in times of crisis. This points structural reform, and the implernentato an active and wide-ranging agenda for tion of international standards. Surthe IMF and its members. I will concentrate on three areas where IMF activities veillance is one of those activities conare changing most rapidly, surveillance, tinually being adapted. That is why IMF assistancefor the poorest countries, and surveillance has extended in recent years to cover a wider range of issues,includcrisis management. ing financial sector stability, stronger S u n v r r L L A N c E . G l o b a l i z a t i o n i s a ernphasis on regional surveillance, and potent force that spreads and accelerates the dissernination and promotion of recognized standards internationally repercussions of the international and codes. better or for domestic policies-for worse. In this environment, whether a country is large or small, a crisis in one H n r - p r N c r n r P o o n r s r . T h e I M F w e country has the potential to becorne sys- need must also recognize that at the start ternic through contagion in globalized of the twenty-first century, the plight of markets. Now rnore than ever, domestic the poorest countries-and particularly economic policy must take into account of the poorest people within them-is the its potential worldwide impact. This duty ultimate systemic threat. For this reason, the IMF recently replaced its concessionof universal responsibility is incumbent upon all; every country, regardless of its al facility, the Enhanced Structural size, is responsible for the stability and Adjustment Facility (ESAF), with a betquality of worldwide economic gl'owth. ter-focused Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which establishIMF surveillance must help countries face this responsibility. Surveillance rnust es poverty reduction as a core objective of i t s p r o g r a m s i n t h e p o o r e s tc o u n t r i e s . focus on more than just preventing a criWhy should the IMF take such an sis. It must contribute to creating the explicit stance on poverty reduction? conditions for an active private sector to countries, whatever their size and condition. Second, we must determine how the IMF can best fulfill its responsibility of overseeing the international rnonetary and financial system.

Needs. to Members' Responding

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CAM DES SUS

'omote basic sta lable, and high country. ique position to rate such growth better- balanced world. The IMF aim for anything cus, of course, re areas of the oeconomic poli Ife have learned, , credible policy res , on broader mic institutions, ad governance :ations for social mcial soundness, the implementa standards. Sur se activities con That is why IMF ed in recent years :>f issues, includ lability, stronger surveillance, and :l promotion of nized standards

The IMF we that at the start ury, the plight of -and particularly ithin them-is the . For this reason, ~d its concession need Structural ;AF), with a bet Reduction and ,which establish I core objective of rest countries. iF take such an verty reduction? ST.

Because there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between macroeconomic stability and structural reform on the one hand, and growth and the reduc tion of poverty and inequality on the other. Stability and strong institutions are clearly essential for growth, and hence for poverty alleviation. But the converse is also true: Popular support for stabilization and reform will not materialize unless the productive potential of the population, including the poorest, is unleashed through better health, education, and nutrition. Articulating poverty reduction as an explicit objective of Fund-supported programs does not, however, imply that the IMF has all the answers-far from it.

Business& Finance

CRISIS MANAGEMENT. The IMF has the highly visible task of working with countries to reduce the length and severity of economic crises. Together with the rest of the world, the IMF has learned valuable lessons from the expe rience of the Asian crisis. We have seen that no country is completely immune to crisis, and consequently, the Fund needs to maintain a variety of approaches and instruments to respond adequately to the unexpected. The most highly publicized crisis situ ations are likely to occur in emerging market economies that may from time to time experience urgent, if temporary, large-scale liquidity crises. The Fund is now better equipped to extend support

The 1M F we need must also recognize that at the start of the twenty-first century, the plight of the poorest countries ... is the ultimate systemic threat. For the Fund, the point is to ensure that poverty reduction is an integral and explicit objective when designing poli cies, and equally important, to be con fident that adequate institutions and resources are available to implement the policies. This explains what the IMF is doing at the moment by significantly strengthen i ng the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. This pro gram, initiated with the World Bank three years ago, aims to reduce the debt of thirty-five to forty of the poorest countries by half, and to ensure that in the framework of the IMF's new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, these resources are applied to human devel opment expenditures.

in such situations, having introduced two new mechanisms within the past three years: the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) and Contingent Credit Lines (CCL). The former provides assistance with crisis management, while the latter addresses crisis prevention. Less dramatic, but no less important, are the many countries that will continue to demand the Fund's attention and sup port. Ineligible for concessional support, not able to attract sizable private capital flows, and yet faced with the challenges of deep structural reform at times, some of these countries will continue to seek recourse through official sources. These countries should have the assurance of drawing, when necessary, on the IMF's

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existing facilities-ranging from the classic twelve-month standby arrangement to the well-established three-year extended arrangement. But what if (and we were not that far from it in the fall of 1998) the entire global financial systernappeared suddenly to be on the verge of a major global meltdown? To be ready for such an occurrence is indeed one of the IMF's responsibilities toward the system. Let us turn to this issue.

national levels. Nonetheless, the IMF is the closest that the international financial systemhas to a lender oflast resort. It is irnportant to recognize the Fund in this role and to invite the IMF to continue to offer the international cornmunity this vital gararanteewith enough of a judgmental basis to avoid any risk of moral hazard. But when we talk about "unlimited amount of liquidity," the problerns of resources emerge. In the crisesof 1997-98, when several systemically important countries sirnultaneously needed substantial support, the resources of the IMF were stretched to the lirnit. In a more widespread conflagration-a truly systemic crisis-the IMF's resources, substantial though they are, could be rendered completely inadequate. Responding to this problem does not require a massive increase in the IMF's resources, which I do not believe to be necessaryor desirable. Instead, I see a role for the creation of additional liquidity on a temporary basis by making innovative use of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the IMF's reserve currency. It is not unreasonable to expect that in a grave crisis the leading developed countries would collaborate to inject international liquidity through a very simple mechanism, which could decisively underpin confidence in the international system. To this end, the IMF rnight be authorized to inject international liquidity-and to withdraw it when the need passes-in a rnanner analogous to that of a national central bank, through the creation and selectiveallocation of SDRs. The international community has been cautious in authorizing use of the SDR in the quarter-century of its existence, in part because of concerns about its potential inflationary effects. The experience of

Overseeing theWorldFinancial Reforms are needed to allow SyStgm. the IMF to respond more effectively and rapidly to problems facing the international financial system. The IMF must be able to addressthe need for some kind of lender of last resort for the world; adapt to the world financial architecture rnore thoroughly; and address problems of world economic governance as they ernerge. Let us start by imagining the hypothetical situation in which a rneltdown worse than what we observed in rgg] and rgg8 were to occur. Would the world be in a proper position to respond? And what would the role of the IMF be? AN

IN:rnTNATToNAL LnNorn

Lesr

Rnsonr. This scenario raises the issue of the need for an international lender of last resort and whether the IMF can fulfill that role. UsingWalter Bagehot's classiccriteria, in the event of a national systemic crisis, a domestic lender of last resort would provide the system with unlimited amounts of liquidity, unconditionally and at penalty interest rates, to borrowers with good collateral. There are no convincing reasons in favor of trying to establish a simplistic parallel between the national and inter-

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c A M D E s s uBsu s i n e s sF&i n a n c e the past two years, however, reinforces the casefor considering the tremendous potential that this instrument could have for the stability of the global econorny. It would be sufficient to decide to put in place a contingency system of allocation, to be activated only in the event of a systernic credit crunch. THr

INrrnNlrroN.e.r-

FrNeNcrll

I Nr n e s r n u c r u R E. A 1 l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the financial crisis of the late rggos could by no rneans be ascribed solely to state mismanagement. The crisis revealed the existence of major systernic weaknessesthat require correction. This is the focus of the IMF's work on a new architecture of the international financial system. It responds to five basic principles: transparency, sound banking and financial systems, private sector participation, the orderly liberalization

tions, however, means that each country must prepare its own path to liberalization, under carefully tailored conditions. Work is underway in the Fund on proposals that would allow countries to individually identi$ the steps that they should take, to define their own timetable, and to identifi, how the Fund may help them. 'Worrp

EcoNourc GovrrNA.Ncn. Finally, let me turn to the question of the international monetary system and governance of the IMF, itself one aspect of the governance of the entire international economy. Over the years, the stability of the international monetary and financial system has been viewed increasingly in the context of world economic g'overnance. This refers not to some kind of world economic governrnent, but instead to the more limited ambi-

The post-World Wal generations arethe

first in history to have beei called upon to influence global affairs not from a p^osition of rnilitary co-nquestor imperial poy&, but through voluntary international cooperation. of capital flows, and modernization of the international rnarkets on the basis of universally accepted standards. The work is well advanced in several respects, but it needs to be further developed in others, particularly regarding the orderly liberalization of capital movements. Few would now dispute the potential benefits that can flow from liberal capital movements supported by appropriate economic policies, institutions, and financial sector stability. The wide variety of country-specific situa-

tion of finding a global response to inescapable global problems. The post-'World W-ar generations are the first in history to have been called upon to influence global affairs not from a position of military conquest or imperial power, but through voluntary international cooperation. The challenge we face is to find mechanisms for managing the international economy that do not compromise the sovereignty of national governments, that help the smooth and effective functioning of markets, that

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The pfOblem is not that the IMF is unaccountable, but that it is viewed as unaccountable. ensure international financial stability, and that offer solutions to problems that now transcend the boundaries of the nation-state. The task is monumental. Two problerns deserve particular attention, coherence in international economic decision-making and political responsibility. The lack of coherence in decisionrnaking at the world level is exernplified by the failure in Seattle to launch the 2ooo round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. On the one hand, we have the far-reaching decision by governments-in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutions-to reduce the debt burden of the heavily indebted poor countries. On the other hand, these same governments have failed to launch a trade round in the framework of the WTO that could promptly eliminate trade barriers to the exports of these countries. It is the latter that has the greater long-term potential for lifting the poor out of poverty through export-led growth. This failure, unless quickly reversed, will make a rnockery of a decision on debt that is otherwise of historic dimensions. Equally urgent is the issue of the "political responsibility" of international institutions, including the IMF. Too often these organizations are portrayed as unaccountable technocracies. The truth is that the IMF is responsible and accountable to its member governments, and that all decisions have to be approved by the executive board of twenty-four

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members, representing rBZ countries. Every loan, including the controversial loans to Asian countries and to Russia, has had the unanimous support of the IMF's entire membership, that is to say, of each member governrnent. The problem is not that the IMF is unaccountable, but that it is viewed as unaccountable. Part of the problem is that member governments have until recently been reluctant to publish their agreernents with the Fund, heightening the perception that the IMF is not accountable. Furthermore, some member governments find it convenient not to express their public support for actions that they have supported in the executive board. In fact, the IMF has become much more transparent in recent years. This greater openness will help ensure the IMF's legitirnacy asweII as its effectiveness in improving the quality of policy debate and democratic participation in rnember countries. At the sarne tirne, it will help the international capital rnarkets become more efficient. It is also irnportant to ensure that the IMF is seen, far more visibly, to have the legitimate political support of its shareholders. One reforrn to addressthis issue would entail transforrning the IMF's advisory ministerial cornmittee-the International Monetary and Financial Committee-into a decision-rnaking council for the major strategic orientations of the world economy. In the eyesof the public, this would simply place responsibility squarely where it already rests.

c A M D E S s uBsu s i n e s sF&i n a n c e Another suggestion is to replace the biannual G8 Summit with a meeting of all the countries-approximately thirty at any one time-that have executive directors on the boards of either the IMF or the World Bank. This would be more thoroughly representative of the organizations' entire rnembership. As such a meeting would be attended by heads of state as well as by the leaders of the two Bretton Woods organizations, the International Labor Organization, the WTO, and the United Nations, it would offer a way of establishing a clear and strong link between the rnultinational institutions and a representative grouping of world leaders with the greatest possible legitimacy. Under this heading of world economic governance, I could only report modest changes and timid reforrn ideas. This is not surprising, since the basic value that should help to bring about such changes-a new sense of world citizenship-has not yet emerged. But this will be necessaryif humanity is to assume responsibility for the global aspect of its destiny, by providing the world with the necessary institutions. This will also be necessary if we are sensitive to the oftexpressed Darwinian fear outside the United States that local cultures and traditions are at risk of being overwhelmed by the strongest. One of the most pressing responsibilities of the international community will be to make sure that just the opposite occurs: that local cultures are given an

opportunity to contribute their uniqueness to a unifring world.

Building GlobalSolidarity. rr,. great hope we have for the twenty-first century-to see hurnan development truly served by a process that unifies the world-will not come to fruition if new generations ofleaders do not acceptthe responsibility of endowing public opinion with a global consciousness. Leaders must strive to create a new kind of citizenship-not simply a vague cosmopolitanism, but a genuine citizenship at all levels, local, regional, national, and global. For this goal to be achieved, global solidarity must become more than just an adjunct of national policies. It must become a core principle of policymaking, difficult as this may be. Building a universal sense of global solidarity requires facing difficult problems and dealing with vested interests, certain lifestyles and rnodels of consurnption, and entrenched power structures in countries. This is what we are trying to do in adapting the IMF and the other rnultilateral organizations to this new world. You can count on the men and women of these organizationsto continue striving to transforrn them to meet the challenges of the new global order. But to succeed, they need to have global public opinion behind thern. The text of this article was adapted from an address by Mf. CamdeSSUS

f"r the Jit Trainor

Lecture, sponsored by the

Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, G.o.g" town University, on February 2, 2ooo.

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For nearly half a century, the Cold War was the most prominent feature of the world arena. Since the end of the Cold War just over a decade ago, globalization, the worldwide integration of markets, finance, and communication, has been

farther the world's defining phenomenon. Whereas the Cold War era was characterized by division, the dominant characteristic of globalization is integration and even homogenization. It is driven not by armies, or weapons systems,or spheres of influ-

faster ence, but by technology and market capitalization. Although globalization has delivered Arnerica unprecedented levels of prosperity, its benefits have been unequally distributed, and the gap between the rich and the poor has skyrocketed around

deeper the world. Increasingly, the have-nots view globalization as a phenomenon that is either passing them by or holding them back. What defines globalization? What is the report card on its performance, and what is its future? Thomas Friedman,

cheaper NewTorklimesforeign affairs columnist and author of TheLexus andtheOliueTree,answers these questions in a discussion with Peter F. Krogh, Dean Emeritus of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.

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KRocH You are widely known as Mr. Globalization. The editor of Le Mond.e Diplomatique,Ignacio Ramanet, believes that you are the very incarnation ofglobalization. So as the leading spokesrnan and interpreter of globalization, could you begin by defining it for us? F R I E D M AIu f i r s t w a n t t o c l a r i { y t h a t I a m the interpreter of, and not the spokesman for, a phenomenon which I had no control in starting nor have any ability to stop. I define globalization as the integration of markets, finance, and inforrnation technologies in a way that is shrinking the world from rnediurn-size to small-size and enabling each of us to reach around the world farther. faster. deeper, and cheaper than ever before in history, while enabling the world to

of British power-the British Nary and the British pound. \Mithin that power structure, or coincidingwith it, is an information and technological revolution that by its very nature integrates us rnore, making it rnuch cheaper and easier for all of us to reach around the world farther. faster. and deeper. x no c n Does this rnean, then, that globalization carries with it heaw-dutv American baggage? FRI EDMANThere is no question that globalization is in some waysArnericanization and is in rnany ways perceived as Americanization even when it's not, even when it is actually affording "worldization" in sorne ways. But there is no question that, on its surface, globalization wears Mickey

Therg iS nO questiOnthat,on thes'rface, globalizatiortwears Mickey Mouse ears . reach into each of us farther. faster. deeper, and cheaper than ever before in history. That's my short definition of globalization. xnoen \Mhat is fundamentally driving globalization? What are its rnost powerful engines? FRTEDMAN I think there are really two forces at work here. One is a power structure. And the power structure is the structure of Arnerican power and an American ideology which favors capitalism, deregulation, open markets, and integration. So there is a power structure out there, just as in the first era of globalization in the nineteenth century there was a structure

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Mouse ears, eats Big Macs, drinks Cokes, does its computing on an IBM with Windows 2OOO, and connects to the Internet over a Cisco rider. There is no question that, on the surface, globalization definitely is Americanization. rnoe u Some believe that globalization is the handmaiden of multinational corporations and that the rnultinational corporations are essentially in charge. What is the role of multinational corporations here? Do you seeit as an essentiallybeneficial or exploitative role? F R I E D M AW N ell, let'slook at that, because you can look at that question from a lot of different angles. People saythat in global-

l N r E R V t EBwu s i n e s sF&i n a n c e ization, multinational corporations will just go to the cheapest labor markets and exploit people. By that criteria, every IBM and Cisco and Ford and General Motors and Intel should be set up today in subSaharan Africa. Chad and Upper Volta should be the centers of globalization, because where are wages lower than in

it also makes the minnows stronger than ever. And if you just see one and not the other, then you're rnissing the story. xnoex But if you happen to be a minnow by the name of Chad, you're not stronger than ever. In a way, you're weaker than ever. Aren't you?

sub- Saharan Africa today? But the multinationals are not there. F R T E D M AI Nh a v e a q u i z f o r y o u . Y o u c a n They're in Singapore, they're in Malaysia, have what's in my wallet if you can name and they're in Scotland. What are they the country with the fastest growing doing there? They are there because that econorny in the world last year. It was Mozambique was the Mo"ambique. is where you can get the most productiviin the world. economy most fastest growing ty-not the lowest wages, but the How did that happen? productivity per wage. That's what multiWhat that story is about is that the nationals seek out. And what you find down escalator in globalization is turbowhen you go to these places is that in order to attract these multinationals, they charged; it goes faster than ever. But so have upgraded their education, roads, does the up escalator. And when a countelephones, and infrastructure. So are try like Mozarnbique puts into place the basic infrastructure, the good goverthese big, bad rnultinationals exploiting nance, software, and operating system, it the poor, or are they in fact looking for the rnost productive, able, and educated is rewarded just like anybody else. People say the systern is unfair. Well, good workforces and, in a way, elevating them? That's part of the story. Are they also morning, Mary Sunshine. When was it looking to pay cheaper wages? No ques- fair? Did I miss that class when everything was fair, everyone had a good job, tion that's also part of the story. They and there was no inequality? Of course The multinationals are in charge. are in charge,and they are running every- it's unfair. Socialism was great at making everyone equally worse off. Capitalism is thing. But ask Bob Shapiro, the chairman of Monsanto, whether he thinks the good at rnaking certain people better off than others. There is inequality in this multinationals are in charge. Monsanto decided that they were going to make systern.There is no question about it. genetically-rnodified food. They were xnoen But isn't some of that inequality going to do it, and they didn't ask anydriven by the fact that we're not really is terrorized now being body. Monsanto globalized yet? For e*ample, if we really by little NGOs [no.t-governmental organizations] on the Internet all over had a globalized agricultural rnarket, the Europe, and the company has been devas- developing countries would have better opportunities to grow and to join the tated by the empowerment of individual activists to go after them in this global sys- first-class cornpartment. tem. The essentiallogic of globalization is F R I E D M A N - Wa er e a l o n g w a y f r o r n a t r u l y this: It makes the whales, Iike Time Warnfree, fully-integrated, and open trading but than ever, EMI, bigger er, AOL, and

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age that as, "Oh, we're not just for protection. We're actually for workers around the world and for lifting their standards, " as if they could give a flying petunia about the standards of workers in Bangladesh. But never mind, that's what t-heywere out there for. Then there were the environmentalists-people who I think rightly and sincerely care about what all this trade and xnoer But we have very high protective integration is doing to turtles, trees, and tariffs on textiles projected out for our environment-and that's a real issue. another decade. Now those two groups are not really allied. You see, you wouldn't want to be a F R T E D M AA Hb s o l u t e l y . A n d t h a t ' s w h y turtle that got in the way of those dock there is no question that the world is in workers unloading a boat. Then there the process of globalizing. But to say that were the anarchists who all just piggyit is a fully integrated, open trading sys- backed on this to throw rocks through a tem would definiteiy be wrong. Starbucls window. So that's one Seattle. Now what the AFL-CIO wants to tell K R o G HG l o b a l i z a t i o n u s e d t o b e d i s - you is, "That was the only Seattle. It is a c u s s e d i n a l r n o s t p u r e l y e c o n o r n i c world of the poor rising up against the terms. But post-Seattle it is being disugly forces of globalization." That is cussed increasingly in political terms. nonsense becausethere is another SeatAre we seeing the politicization of globtle. It is actually the Seattle of the develalization, and is that potentially trouIndia, of Brazil, of oping world-of blesome? Egypt, of Pakistan, of Bangladesh, and of China. They were not in the street. F R T E D M AWNe l l , I l o o k a t S e a t t l ea s r e a l l y Their ministers were in the negotiating an event that in many ways was overroom-not trying to tear down the sysinterpreted, becausethere wasn't just one tem, but trying to get a fair share of itSeattle; there were actually at least three because their complaint with the develSeattles.The first Seattle is the Seattle of oped countries is, "'We'veopened to you, the AFL-CIO, of the trade unions-the but you haven't opened to us." They steel workers and the dock workers-who weren't in the street. They hate those are against globablization. They are for people in the street, because they hear protection and always have been. They them saying, "We're going to save you want to protect every job. I get it. I from development." "Well, thank you understand that. very much," say the Mexicans, and the Brazilians, and the Indians. T h e y KRocH want more unionized workers. xnoex I think you said at one point that the ones on the outside wanted to slow FRIEDMAN T h e y w a n t m o r e u n i o n i z e d globalization down and get off. The ones workers, but they understand that in on the inside wanted to slow it down so today's company it is much better to pack- they could get on. system. And the people who have the biggest complaint about that, and rightfully so, are the Africans. After all, the Africans, like people in other developing areasof the world, can in many casesonly make textiles. All they want from us is to be able to export those textiles to the United States.

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Thefg afe dt l.urt three Seattlesout there. and don't let anyone sell you the canard that there is just one Seattle. F R T E 0 M AANb s o l u t e l y .A n d t h e n t h e r e ' s a third Seattle that wants to speed it up so that they can stay ahead of everybody, the Seattle of Arnazon.com, Microsoft, and the Internet revolution. So there are at least three Seattles out there, and don't let anyone sell you the canard that there is just one Seattle.

third way. There's only one way: the third way. Ways number one and two don't really exist. Way nurnber one is a pure market approach-forget about the workers and forget about the environrnent. The market should rule. That's not poiitically sustainable because people are going to rise up and shut the door.

xnoeu How do you think this is aII going to be intermediated? I mean the NGOs were the apparent power structure there, and they are rnultiplying as fast as the'Web is multiplying. But no one has elected thern, and no one really knows to whom they are accountable.

KRocH Including your friend Ramanet over in Paris.

F R T E D M AANn d t h a t ' s w h y i t t a k e ss t r o n g political leadership. rnoe n So is globalization hastening the demise of the nation-state? And are we going to be better off ruled by the NGOs than by Congress, and by the Web instead of by Washington? F R T E D M ANNo w t h a t i s a r e a l i s s u e t h a t you've raised. And I believe that the state actually matters more, and not less, in globalization. You've got to get the size of your state down, like a cornpany, but you've got to get the quality of your state up, because it's still the vesselwith which we plug into this system. Now all Seattle saysto rne is that you've got to have balance as a society. People talk about the third way as a way to kind of deal with and approach globalization. I say there is no

Ignacio

Exactly.Then there is the arguFRIE0MAN rnent that the safetynet should rule. Forget about markets. Forget about growth. We should have a safety net approach to this. Well, that's not sustainable either because you're not going to have the incorne to redistribute to support your safetynets if you close the door. So clearly we have to find the balance between always keeping the door open, which involves rnore integration, trade, deregulation, and opening to the world so that we have the knowledge, income, and resources to keep growing. But at the sarne time, over here we need to make sure that we are protecting and bringing along the have-nots, the know-nots, and the leftbehinds. And what politics is about, here and in just about every other country, is the struggle to find the equilibrium point and the balance. How much openness versus how much safetv net. That's reallv what it's about. r no e n So can globalization actually be steered, even though its principal armature

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is the Internet? The leaders of Davos came out with an article saying we need new institutions, and we need to get a hold of this, manage it, and steer it.

globalized. So surely if we have a single overarching interest in the world today, it is to sustain that process. Sustainable really globalization requires two things. One is a power F R T E D M AWHe l l , I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t i t c a n structure that basically stabilizes the be totally steered. But it needs really farworld, that keeps everything flowing, sighted and clear political leadership. keeps the sea lanes and the trade lanes Not the leadership that goes to Seattle open, and prevents the Milosevics and 'Well and says, maybe the unions are the Saddams from rising up against the right," and then goes to Davos and says, system. Without a hidden fist, there is "Well maybe we should have more trade." no hidden hand. Without McDonnellI mean, you have to know what you're Douglas, there is no McDonald's. Withhere. about What this is about is very out America on duty, there is no Amerclear. I am for protection, not protecica Online. And so I believe that is part tionism. I arn for floors, not ceilings. of America's role. So we've got to be out And I believe that you have to put a floor there stabilizing this system.At the sarne under people, but at the same time you time, you stabilize it and make it sushave to keep the door open and keep tainable through dernocratization by pushing it open. That is what's driving enabling more people to become winour econorny. I was listening to the radio ners as a result of it and by widening the in the cab, and it was saying that the winner's circle. unernployment rate of hlgh school dropouts today is higher than ever xnoer Does the pursuit of sustainable before. That's part of globalization, too. globalization lead us rnore and rnore into And people don't think of it that way. physically laying our hands on the world? The problem with globalization is people More interventions and more constabuwho are hurt by it know exactly who they lary military operations? are, and they feel the effects immediately. The people who benefit from it don't F R T E D M AI tNi s g o i n g t o d e p e n d . T h e r e i s have a clue and feel the effects over a no magic cure such that you can say, broad period of time. And so you have a "Here is what our policy will be everypolitical asymrnetry basically built into where." In some places we will go it the whole process. alone. In sorne places it means we will have to organize coalitions, d /a Kosovo. KRocHWhat do you see as the irnpact of In other places, we will encourage the UN to step in. It doesn't mean that we have to globalization on our conduct of foreign and defense policy? be everywhere. But it does mean that we have to think about everywhere, and how F R I E D M AF r ur o m m y p o i n t o f v i e w , w h a t to stabilize and democratize globalizatior' Arnerican foreign policy should be throughout the world. about is very clear: sustainable globalization. After all, it is our ideas, our r noe x You are joined in interpreting the p e o p l e , o u r p r o d u c t s , o u r v a l u e s , a n d world by others who don't necessarily our technology that are rnost being ernbrace your paradigm. One of them is

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t N T E R V t EB WU S | n e S SF&i n a n C e an emeritus colleague ofyours up at Harvard, Sam Huntington, who projects a clash of civilizations. How do you look at it, and is it possible that globalization may be hastening a clash of civilizations as people rise up against the American baggage that goes along with it? FRIEDMAN Well, I don't disagreewith Professor Huntington that there is a clash of civilizations going on in some places. But how do we explain Kosovo? Let rne see now, a white Christian-American nation intervenes in the Balkans on the behalf of dark-skinned Muslims fighting whiteskinned Christian Serbs. Is that a clash of civilizations? Where is the clash of civilizations? How do you explain that? I have a little problem with that as a pan theory, but I think there is some truth and wisdom in what Professor Huntington suggested-that there is a kind of dialectic here between integration and fragmentation. But I think that's not the big story. It's happening under a larger umbrella. xnoex Does globalization make us more vulnerable to threats from abroad? F R T E D M AWNe a r e l i v i n g a t a t i m e w h e n the leading commercial Web sitesYahoo, E*tade, Amazon, and eBayhave all been hit by hackers. And it

shows you that when we are all connected, it takes less and less dynamite, or fewer and fewer software viruses, to disrupt the lives or businessesof more and more people in more and more places. x no e x What would you advise our leadership to do in the pursuit of globalization? F R T E D M AWNe l l , I t h i n k t h e b i g g e s tt h i n g that leadership can begin to do is educate people about where we are. Give people a picture of the world and an understanding of where they are and what balances need to be maintained. And to identify one failing, I think we have not done that enough. We are still in many waystalking about the old agenda. I rnean, look at the presidential campaign. People are talking about ethanol when we are going to have $5o billion in e-cornmerce this year. When Bill Clinton took office, there were fifty pages on the World Wide Web; there are go million today. We are in the midst of hugely disruptive and rapid change, and we need leadership that can educate people about that, becauseyou can't lead people if they don't know whereyou are going.

This interview was provided courtesy oi tt'. Gf eat television series, produced by the Foreign

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at iOn i" collaboration with the School of Foreisn Seruice, Ceorgetown University.

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Law&Ethlcs nation TheU.S.and ssassl Mark Vincent Vlasic U.S. air strikes against Libyan leader Colonel Muamrnar elQ,addafi, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and terrorist Osama bin Laden have, over the years, raised serious questions about the increasingly gray area surrounding the law on assassination. While the American press continually rerninds the public of the presidential ban on assassination,the legality of state-sponsored assassinationremains unclear. Whereas academics, experts, and the media have engaged in a public debate on this issue, the Department of Justice and the National Security Council have kept their interpretations of domestic and international laws on assassinationclassified. Contrary to popular perception, there is a very real debate within the intelligence community over the definition, legality, and proper use of assassination. Those who think the United States is legally prohibited from engaging in what is cornmonly known

MarkVincentVlasic is a student at the Georgetown University Law Center.

as assassinationare wrong.

Defining Assassination.one of themostcontentious aspectsof the law on assassinationis defining the term itself. While many laws refer to assassination, few, if any, actually define it. Even Executive Order (EO) lzggg, which establishes the famous U.S. "ban" on assassination, fails to provide a definition of the term.'For this reason, it is necessaryto exam-

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ine the origin, history, and use of assassination. Long before the CIA's infarnous attempts to assassinatefigures like Fidel Castro, the early Romans, Greeks, and Persians plotted their own acts ofassassination. In fact, "assassination" itself is derived from Arabic the word

considered free from blarne."s Such staternents illustrate that, historically, warfare and lawful killing were not limited to acts on the battlefield or traditional combat. Thrgeting specific individuals during wartime generally was considered valid, but it was not a right without limitation.

The historiCaltest for assassination . . . is whether there has been an act of treachery. hashishiyyin, which refers to members of Early scholars often excluded from their an eleventh-century Muslim brotherdefinitions of lawful killings those acts hood that was devoted to killing its relithat involved the use of "fraud and gious and political opponents. This orisnares," a lirnitation still applied in rnodgin is reflected in Dante's use of "assas- ern law ofwar doctrine. Indeed, this limsin" to describe any "professional secret itation, known as the "ruse-perfidy disrnurderer. "' tinction," rnay be found in all U.S. milMany thinkers have accepted the legititary law doctrine manuals. Scholars irnacy of killing that airns to achieve equated the use of fraud and snares with political and rnilitary objectives. For treachery, which Gentili denounced as a example, Saint Thomas Aquinas conviolation of the trust a victim rightfully tended that killing the sovereign for the expects from an assassin.According to cornrnon good was legally justified and, Gentili, such treachery is "so contrary to in sorne cases, even noble. President the law of God and of Nature, that Abraharn Lincoln concluded that "tyranalthough I may kill a man, I may not do nicide was morally justified when a peoso by treachery."o ple had suffered under a tyrant for a long Scholars differentiated lawful killings time, when all legal and peaceful means frorn assassination, which they equated to oust him had been exhausted, and with the use of treachery. Grotius and when the prospects for his early deparGentili defined assassinationas a breach ture were grirn."3 The renowned Italian of confidence. Similarly, Emmerich de thinker Alberico Gentili wrote that it Vattel of Switzerland, writing I$O years made "no difference at all whether you later, defined assassination as "murder kill an enemy on the field of battle or in committed by means of treachery."7 De his camp."a And Hugo Grotius comVattel was careful to distinguish a treachrnented, "It is in fact perrnissible to kill erous act from a killing by surprise or an enemy in any place whatsoever . . stealth, which he found to be acceptable. According to the law of nations, not only Historically, scholars have not placed those who do such deeds, but also others an absolute prohibition on killing one's who instigate others who do them, are enerny by unconventional rneans, either

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vLAsrc Law& Ethics on or off the battlefield. Such killing is lawful so long as one does not use treachery, which is defined as betrayal by one owing an obligation of good faith to the intended victim. It is important to note, however, the namow interpretation of treachery. The use of stealth or trickery, for instance, is not prohlbited and wilI not render an otherwise lawful act illegal. The historical test for assassination, then, is whether an act of treachery has been committed.

the treaty fails to give full protection against assassinationbecause it accords a person protected status only when the individual is in a foreign state. Such protection, while helpful to such persons traveling abroad, fails to establish any international prohibition of the assassination of those people within their own state's borders. Furthermore, the New York Convention failed to make assassination a criminal act under international law; instead, the treaty only made assassination a crirne under the signatory states' domestic laws. In spite of these Countries have agreed to different stan- failings, though, the treaty does reflect dards for rnurder and assassination, the international community's condemdepending on whether it is a time of war nation of assassination. law during Under international or of peacebetween states.International law during peacetime is governed by both peacetime, the term assassinationmay be customary international law and treaties defined as the rnurder of a targeted indibetween states. Perhaps no such legal vidual for political purposes. The UN Charter and the New York Convention standard is more recognized than that of demonstrate that assassinationis an illethe United Nations Charter. Article q(4) of the Charter provides that, in peace- gal act prohibited by international law. time, the citizens of a nation, whether Therefore, international law forbids any U.S. government action to assassinate they are political officials or private indian individual in peacetime because such an viduals, are entitled to immunity from intentional acts of violence by citizens, act would be an unlawful act of force. agents, or military forces of another When states are engaged in armed conflict, however, the international law of nation. Such immunity would include assassinationdiffers, and a separate docimmunity fro m assassination. This prohibition was codified in the trine of law known as the International Law of War applies. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York Convention), wartirne, the legitimate role of the miliwhich entered into force in the late rgTos tary encompasses the lawful killing (as

Assassination in Peacetime.

in Wartime.r'' Assassination

in an attempt to encourage the criminalization of violent acts committed against certain internationally protected persons.t Article 2(a) criminalizes inter alia "the international commission of . murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person."s However,

opposed to murder) of the enemy, including combatants, unprivileged belligerents, and civilians that take part in the hostilities. The Law ofWar consists of treaties, laws, and legal scholarship based on the relationship between states and their actors during times of armed conflict. Everyday peacetime legal prohibi-

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tions against assassinationfall under different legal doctrine duringwartime, and such prohibitions must be understood in order to allow lawful military targeting during times of armed conflict. The first legal guidelines promulgated on wartime assassinationwere written by Professor Francis Lieber at the time of the American Clvil War. After being reviewed and revised by a board of military officers in 1863, the Lieber Code was signed by President Lincoln as General Order roo.'oArticle r{,8, which contains the ban on assassinations,states that "the law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the hostile arrny, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government, as an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage."" Later codification efforts defined "outlawry" as a form of treachery. As a result, the distinction made by earlier scholars between assassination and la*{ul killing was codified into modern war manuals, This distinction was later codified as custornary international law in the Hagrre fV Convention, which re-established the assassination-treachery relationship developed by Grotius and de Vattel. Article z3(b) of Hague fV states that "it is especially forbidden to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army. "" 'War lJ.S. manuals on the Law of are in agreement with internagenerally the tional law on assassinations.For example, the U.S. Army's law of war manual, Field Manual 27-ro, directly quotes the Hague IV prohibition on assassination. Similar provisions excluding the use of treachery or perfidy appear in U.S. Navy and Air Force law of war manuals.'3 In its compli-

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ance with international law. however. the U.S. government has been careful not to overly restrict its potential military operations. For exarnple, the U.S. Army's Law of Land Warfare, for example, states that the Hague fV Convention "is construed as prohibiting assassination . It does not, however, preclude attacls on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere."'a It is clear that wartime assassination, while still illegal, is defined differently than peacetirne assassination. While peacetime assassination focuses on the political intent of a targeted killing, the prohibition on wartime assassination focuses o.t (r) a targeted individual, and (z) th" use of treacherous means. A wartime killing is an unlawful assassination only if it violates both prohibitions (targeting and treachery), so it does not rnatter whether the killing is political or not. In wartime, therefore, the targeting of a specific individual is not an assassination so long as treachery is not utilized. The limitation of specific targeting during wartirne does not preclude an armed attack utilizing the elernent of surprise. Combatants are liable to attack, and are themselves legitimate targets at any tirne or place, regardless of their activity. It is important to note that combatants need not be actively partaking in hostilities at the time of their targeting, nor does individual combatants' vulnerability to lawful targeting (as opposed to assassination)depend upon their military duties or proximity to the field of combat. The military prohibition on assassination also does not limit the means one may use to kill a lawful target. The U.S. Army Memorandum of Law on assassinationsstatesthat "no distinction

vLASrcLaw& Ethics is made between an attack accomplished by aircraft, rnissile, naval gunfire, artillery, mortar, infantry assault, ambush . . . booby trap, a single shot by a sniper, a commando attack, or other similar means. All are lawful means for attacking the enemy and the choice of one vis-ir-vis another has no bearing on the legality of the attack."'5Such a statement illustrates the many lawful means the United States may employ to eliminate a lawful target during times of conflict. Therefore, under the law of war, the United States rnay target and kill a specific combatant through any means, so long as treachery is not used. Like any military use of force, however, the principles of necessity and proportionality will govern every operation, but they will have no bearing as to whether an act c o n s t i t u t e sa n a s s a s s i n a t ino.

U.S. intelligence community's secret foreign activities, especially its involvernent in foreign assassinationsduring the rg$os and r96os. The resulting report uncovered the CIA's involvement in assassination attempts on five different foreign leaders' Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Ngo Dinh Diern of South Vietnam, and General Rene Schneider of Chile. Perhaps the most infamous CIA operation involved repeated atternpts to assassinate Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. The Church Comrnittee identified at least eight different assassinationplots against Castro, many ofwhich involved the use of devices like poisoned cigars, poisoned drinks, poisoned pens, high-powered rifles, deadly bacterial powders, exploding seashells, and "other devices which strain the imagination."'o In the tujillo affair, the CIA knowingly provided arms While any action by the United States to to Dorninican dissidents who intended assassinatea foreign leader would naturalto, and later did, assassinatethe Dominily involve international law prohibitions can dictator. The Committee also estabagainst assassination, U.S. dornestic law lished a CIA connection to a military also limits the ability of government coup d'6tat in Chile in which General agents to carry out such actions. The Schneider was "accidentally" killed durdomestic law prohibition of assassination ing an attempt to kidnap the Chilean is promulgated in EO 12333, which has commander in chief.'7 Although the CIA received increased media attention in was not directly involved in the assassinarecent years due to conflicts with Iraqi tion of President Diem, Senator Daniel President Saddam Hussein and terrorist Moynihan has stated that "we were leader Osama bin L-aden. EO 12333, around, " implying that the United States however, fails to provide any definition of was not wholly innocent in this affair.'8 assassination,so it is necessaryto examine Early revelations of U.S. involvement the events that inspired EO 12333 in in assassinationattempts on foreign leadorder to clarify its language. ers outraged both Congress and the The Senate Select Committee to Study American public, and the executive Governmental Operations with Respect branch was quick to respond. Soon after to Intelligence Activities, better known as the media began to broadcast stories on the Church Committee, was convened in U.S. intelligence operations, but well t975 by Senator Frank Church in an before the committee released its findeffort to uncover the truth about the ings, then-CIA Director Richard Helms

Assassination underU.S.Law.

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Lil<e President Ford's order,

the current executive order fails to define assassination, which has led to significant debate over the true limitations of the Dan. issued an agency directive prohibiting assassination. In fact, much of the action taken by the executive branch seemed to follow from public commentary and the speed of the Church Committee investi gation. While President Gerald Ford attempted to quell public outrage, he repeatedly appealed to the committee members to seal their report in order to protect U.S. interests. When the Church Committee's report was leaked to the press in January 1976, decisive executive action had to be taken. What followed was EO Il905,which openly addressed public concern over assassi nation and publicly preempted congressional legislation on the same matter.'9 Since the Church Committee contro versy, every U.S. president has endorsed the executive prohibition of assassination. The current prohibition is set forth in EO 12333: "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Gov ernment shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination."2o Like President Ford's order, the current executive order fails to define assassination, which has led to significant debate over the true limita tions of the ban. In an effort to clarifY the presidential ban, executive agencies have worked to establish clearer legal guidance. Legal experts in the Army's Interna tional Law Division prepared the first executive branch analysis on Executive Order 12333 and assassination. Their legal analysis embraced the distinction first articulated by early scholars and lat

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er codified in the Lieber Code. While reaffirming the historical prohibition of treachery during wartime, the experts upheld the ability of the United States to lawfully target specific individuals or groups under certain situations. The Department of Justice also pre pared its own legal opinion on EO 12333. Although the Department's conclusions remain classified, a former CIA counsel publicly concluded that the ban "does not prohibit U.S. officials from encouraging and supporting a coup, even where there is a likelihood of violence and a high probability that there will be casualties among oppo nents of the COUp."2' In other words, as long as U.S. officials do not approve specific plans for the killing of individ uals, the "prohibition against assassina tion has not been violated. "22 The failure of EO 12333 to define the term assassination has permitted U.S. officials to interpret its prohibi tion in a very restrictive manner. The current legal guidance seems to allow the United States to conduct the target ed killing of individuals during a period of armed conflict or when such individ uals pose a threat to U.S. national secu rity. In addition, it is permissible for U.S. agents to assist in a coup plot so long as the specific plans do not call for the killing of a specific individual.

The Future of Assassination. In order to understand trends in U.S. law

and policy on as: to first examine 1 tions against C Qaddafi, Saddar bin Laden. On April bombers attack Libya, includin~ quarters of Cole he survived the r ter was killed, aT were injured. .fu the United State: sinate the Libyan The United arguments to jw First, the U.S. re Council claimec legitimate act of to "an ongoing 1 government of April 1986 boml Berlin where a r men were killed had indicated th the Berlin born future attacks on matic facilities w. Second, as Ju former attorney ment, argues, C "personally imn exposure to a Ie and is personall) policy of trainin! terrorists in atta< izens, diplomats His position as him no legal attacked when p tary target. "24 Judge Sofaer' raid on Libya as lar military targ individual cause

VLASIC

and policy on assassination, it is helpful to first examine recent American opera tions against Colonel Muammar el Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein, and Osama bin Laden. On April 15, 1986, American bombers attacked various targets in Libya, including the home and head quarters of Colonel Qaddafi. Although he survived the raid, his adopted daugh ter was killed, and his wife and two sons were injured. As a result, many accused the United States of attempting to assas sinate the Libyan leader. The United States articulated two arguments to justifY its attack on Libya. First, the U.S. report to the UN Security Council claimed that the attack was a legitimate act of self-defense in response to "an ongoing pattern of attacks by the government of Libya," including the April 1986 bombing of La Belle Disco in Berlin where a number of U.S. service men were killed. 23 Intelligence sources had indicated that Libya was involved in the Berlin bombing and was planning future attacks on up to thirty U.S. diplo matic facilities worldwide. Second, as Judge Abraham Sofaer, a former attorney for the State Depart ment, argues, Colonel Qaddafi was not "personally immune from the risks of exposure to a legitimate attack. He was and is personally responsible for Libya's policy of training, assisting, and utilizing terrorists in attacks on United States cit izens, diplomats, tr<fops, and facilities. His position as head of state provided him no legal immunity from being attacked when present at a proper mili tary target. "24 Judge Sofaer's characterization of the raid on Libya as an attack on a particu lar military target rather than a specific individual caused U.S. policymakers to

current ltion, r the true ~

~ber

Code. While cal prohibition of :ime, the experts le United States to ic individuals or ituations.

rJustice also pre

opinion on EO le Department's assified, a former :oncluded that the bit U. S. officials nd supporting a : is a likelihood of probability that es among oppo n other words, as do not approve ~illing of individ against assassina lted."22

12333 to define n has permitted pret its prohibi lve manner. The e seems to allow nduct the target s during a period len such individ S. national secu ; permissible for

n a coup plot so ns do not call for individual.

assination. In ends in U.S. law

Law&Ethics

describe other assassination attempts in a similar manner. In addition, the Libya raid demonstrated that the execu tive branch did not believe that EO 12333 was applicable in times of armed conflict. This view was justified by the fact that the attack on Libya was carried out by military forces rather than intel ligence agents. The international and domestic response to the raid on Libya did not encourage strict adherence to the prohi bition on assassination. While the inter national response was generally negative, it failed to send a clear message about dis dain for assassination attempts specifical ly. The domestic response, on the other hand, was overwhelmingly positive, with bipartisan congressional support and a 77 percent public approval rating. In the Libya example, then, it seems neither domestic law nor political leaders nor public opinion placed any limita tions on a direct attack on the home of a foreign leader as long as the act was car ried out by U.S. armed forces. During the Gulf War, Saddam Hus sein was a ripe target for assassination, yet the UN coalition failed to eliminate him. Some scholars have claimed that a deci sion to directly target Saddam would have been illegal under international law and Executive Order 12333. This view, how ever, is incorrect, for the decision not to kill Saddam was based on political, rather than legal, considerations. Any direct targeting of Saddam Hus sein by the United States would have been legal under the individual and col lective use of force provision in Article 51 of the UN Charter. 25 The invasion of Kuwait, its plea for assistance, and the subsequent UN Security Council reso lution condemning the Iraqi invasion provided the legal basis for the coali

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The decision not to kitl Sad.darn wasbased. on political, rather than legal, considerations. tion's military actions against Iraq. Saddam, as cornrnander in chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces, was a combatant; therefore, under the Law of War Doctrine, the direct targeting of Saddam would have been lau.ful, provided treachery was not used. Saddam, as a combatant, could have been attacked at any time or place by any means. EO t2333 would not have applied to such an assassination since it only addresses the conduct of intelligence activities, not rnilitary action, during war. The GulfWar example, then, supports the proposition that the United States can kill a foreign leader, provided the proper prerequisites are met. First, a state of war must exist between the two states. Second, the leader in question must be deemed a lawful combatant under the Law of W-ar. FinaIIy, the attack on the leader's life must not be done in a treacherous manner. The lawfulness of such an attack outside the scope of an armed conflict, however, remains less clear. Such was the caseof the August 20, r99B cruise missile attack on the terrorist training camps of Osarna bin Laden at Khost, Afghanistan. In October 1998, Defense Secretary Williarn Cohen told U.S. troops in Saudl Arabla that the United States had aimed to "hit" terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden during the August 20 missile strike.'o Clinton administration officials stated that, in spite of the executive ban on assassination, the United Stateshas a legal right to use deadly force against terrorist leaders. Specifically,

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officials claimed that the United States can authorize military commandos or undercover agents to use deadly force against the leadership of an organization that has hurt or threatened Americans. This right, however, should not be equated with the issuance of a written order calling for the death of a particular individual. "Larvful use of force in selfdefense," said one official, "is not assassination. "t7 In November rgg8, National Security Council spokesman David Leary stated that terrorist groups' "infrastructure" and "command and control" are "iustifiable target[s]," atrd such "infrlstructures" are often "human.""8 In other words, the U.S. governrnent claimed that it was targeting bin Laden not as an individual person, but rather as part of the larger human command and control infrastructure of a terrorist group. The rationale used in the attack on bin Laden provides an important precedent for future operations because it greatly expands the number of potential targets of assassination. U.S. policymakers may now justi$ attackson threats to American security as attacks on persons not in their individual capacities, but in their identities as human infrastructure and command and control centers. This rationale, which was first articulated to justifr the attack on Qaddafi, has now becorne an integral feature of international law. The Libya, Gulf'War, and Afghanistan examples describe the evolution of a new U . S . d o c t r i n e o n a s s a s s i n a t i o n .T h i s doctrine permits the use of clandestine,

V L A S I CL A W& E t h i C S

Iow visibility, overt, or covert rnilitary force against those who pose a threat to U.S. security. Under such a doctrine, little stands in the way of the direct targeting of a foreign leader, especiallyin times of conflict. For this reason, it is reasonable to wonder whether the prohibition on assassinationcontained in EO 12333 rernains valid and rneaningful. IMhiIe much of the law regarding assassination is largely rnisunderstood by the media and the public, the basic elernents of international assassination law have remained largely unchanged since the time of Grotius. The law of assassinations is divided into two doctrines, one for times of conflict and the other for times of peace. The former looks to the pres-

ence of treachery while the latter asks whether there was a political purpose in the killing. Problems arise, however, when an attempt is made to determine what constitutes a peacetirne setting and what situations permit the use of the Law of War doctrine. An international convention or a new executive order rnight help clari$ these terms, but it is not clear that U.S. policymakers desire such clarity. Indeed, they have exploited the ambiguity in these terms to justify attacls on Qaddafi, Hussein, and bin Laden. As terrorists continues to threaten U.S. security, the rationale used in these attacks will likely be used again each tirne U.S. military forces conduct operations that appear to violate EO r2333.

NOTES r E x e c .O r d e r N o . r 2 l l l , 3 C . F . R . 2 o o , 2 r 3 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , reprinted in 5o U.S.C.A. S 4or (r98r) [hereinafter EO r 2 3 3 3i . z Franklin L. Ford, Political Murder, From Tyrann:icide to Terrorism (Cambridge, Mass., Haryard fJniversityPress,rg8g). 3 Ernest W. Lefever, "Death to Saddam Hussein? Let His Om People Decide Assassination: Even Lincoln believed that qrannicide was morally justifiable," los AngelesTimes, Rbruary 28, r9gr, at 7. 4 Alberico Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres (The Classicsof International Iaw No. 16) 168 (John C. Rolfe t r a n s . ,t 9 3 3 ) ( 1 6 r z ) . ! Hugo Grotius, The law of War and Peace (vol. 3) G6zg), quoted in The Law of War, A Docunentary History (vol. r) 16, 39 (Leon Friedman ed., r9/z). 6 Gentili, pp. t6B. / Emmerich de Vattel, The llw of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law S 15! (Washington, DC, Carles Fenwicktrans., Carnegie Institution 1916) (1958), pp. 287-288. 8 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including DiplomaticAgents, Dec. r{, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, ro35 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter the New York Convention] . g C e n e r a lO r d e r s N o . I o o , A p r . 2 4 . 1 8 6 3 [ o n f i l e w i t h the author]. ro General Orders No. roo, Apr. 24, 1863, art. r48. tr Convention Respectingthe laws and Customs ofW'ar

on land, Oct. 18, rgo/, Annex: RegulationsRespecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. rB, I 9 o 7 . 3 6 S l a r . 2 2 7 7 . r B e v a n s6 3 t f h e r e i n a l t e rH a g u e M, art. z3(b). rz Parlc, pp. 6. t3 Id., pp. {. r{ Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, An Interim Report of the SenateSelectCommittee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Operations, 94th Cong., rst Sess.r (r975) [hereinafter Church Report], pp. 7r-86. r5 Id., pp.zz6. 16 Boyd M.Johnson, III, "ExecutiveOrder 12333, Permissability of an American Assassination of a Foreign Leader," 2$ Cornell International LawJournal 4or, pp. 406 (citing Daniel P. Moynihan, "Assassinations: Can'tWe Learn?" Newfo*Times,Oct. 20, t989, A35). r J E x e c .O r d e r N o . r r , g o 5 , 3 C . F . R . 9 0 ( 1 9 7 6 ) G t a t ing, "No employee of the United States Governnent shall engagein or conspire to engagein, political assassination.") t 8 E x e c . O r d e rN o . I 2 ! J ! , 3 C . F . R . 2 o o . 2 1 3 ( 1 9 8 r ) , r e p r i n t e di n 5 o U . S . C . A .S 4 o r ( r 9 8 r ) . rgJohnson, p.422 (quoting GeorgeJ. Church, "Saddam in the Cross Hairs," Time,Oct.8, r99o, pp.z9). 20 Id. 2r Letter from Herbert S. Okun, Acting United States Permanent Reoresentativeto the United Nations Security Counsel (Ap.. t4, 1986), reprinted in Leich, "Contemporary Practice of the United States," 8o

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AmericanJournal of International Law 6rz, pp. 632 (r986). 22 Michael N. Schmitt, "State-SponsoredAssassination in International and Domestic law," r/ YaleJourn a l o f I n t e r n a t i o n a ll a w 6 o 9 , p p . 6 r 3 ( r 9 9 2 ) . c i t i n g David Neman & Tyll Geel, "Executive Order r2!!!: The Risksof a Clear Declaration of Intent," t2 Harvard (r98S) Journal ofLaw and Public Policy 433, pp. 669 (citing Abraham Sofaer, "Tenorism, The Law, and the National Defense," 126 Military Iaw Review 89, pp. r2o (r989).

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23 U.N. Charter, art. 5ir. 2{ "Cohen SaysStrike Targeted Terrorist bin Laden," ?ims, October r4, rgg8, pp. r3. TheWuhinglon 25 Paul Richter, "Targeting SpecificTerrorists is Legal, Timu, October 2g, Administration Says," fus Angeles 1 9 9 8 ,A r . 26 Stuart tylorJr., "Is the AssassinationBan Dead?," T h e N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l ,N o v . 2 r , 1 9 9 8 , p p . 2 7 5 8 . z/ Richter, Ar. 28 Stuart TaylorJr., "Is the AssassinationBan Dead?," Nov. 2I, tgg8, pp. z/98. TheNotionalJoumol,

Law&Ethics

Matt Jackson In late 1998, Don Biesinger, owner and manager of Sunrise Farnily Video in American Fork, Utah, offered his custorners the opportunity to own copies of the blockbuster film ?ifonic that did not offend their rnoral values. Biesinger did not sell or rent any Titanicvideos, but for five dollars customers could have three minutes of objectionable content removed from their copy of Titanic.Paramount Pictures, claiming copyright infringernent, threatened legal action against Biesinger. When asked to explain his actions, Biesinger stated: "The studios have too much power over what people can and cannot see, and that's why we're doing what we're doing at this time."' Under current law, Paramount's claim of copyright infringement was questionable at best. But as copyright law changes, it may well become easier for Paramount to exert complete control over the content of its films and prevent Biesinger from providing this legitimate service to his custorners. Such control threatens to privatize and commercialize culture, and to inhibit free speech. The global march of capitalisrn over the past decade has fueled two trends that are dramatically influencing culture throughout the world, media industry consolidation and the expansion of copyright law. As a result of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, media and entertainrnent companies increasingly are merging with one another to form huge conglomerates. Many commentators view this consolidation as

Matt Jackson is Professor of Communication

Studies at

Pennsylvania

State

University.

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a major threat to free speech and cultural autonorny. A bigger threat, however, lies in the expansion of copyright, which places more power in the hands of copyright holders at the expense of the public. The copyright industries, whose products include films, television prograrns, music, and computer software, wield enormous economic, political, and cultural influence. Their power is especially felt in industrial nations like the United States where copyright products constitute a large share of the econorny and are a significant sou.rce of exports. As new technologies lower the barriers to communication, copyright will pose a greater threat to free speech and cornmunity than rnedia consolidation.

ited to twenty AM and twenty FM radio stations." The rgg6 act rernoved all national ownership limits for radio, resulting in a r2 percent decline in the nurnber of owners.3 In the most recent merger announced in October rggg, one company, Clear Channel Communications, will controi B3o radio stations. The Igg6 act also raised the number of stations that could be controlled by one entity in a single rnarket to eight stations in the largest markets.l Since the act was passed, the number of local owners of radio stations has, on average, dropped by 20 percent.5 Ownership of cable systems and television stations is also being consolidated. In October rggg, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) revised how it M e d i a M e g a - M e r g e r sM . e d i awould calculate the audience reach of consolidation has taken place at an extra- cable systems, effectively raising the limit ordinary pace in recent years. Tirne from !o percent of all subscribers to !/ Warner, the largest "traditional" rnedia percent. The change will ease Af&T's conglomerate, is set to merge with Amereffort to acquire Media One's cable sysica Online (AOL), the largest Internet tems after already acquiring TCI, the Service Provider, creating a rnedia behelargest multiple cable systemsoperator in rnoth with almost $32 billion in annual the United States. The overall trend revenues. Its assetswill include properties toward consolidation within the distribuas diverse as CNN, New Line Cinema, tion industries that are regu.lated by the Warner Brothers films and music, FCC has been dramatic, and shows no Atlantic and Elektra Records, the Book sign of slowing anl'time soon. It has been of the Month Club, Fortune, Time, Peo- spurred by a climate of deregulation that ple, Sports Illustrated, Netscape, and is retreating from public interest regulaICQ software. The pending merger tion and is instead embracing marketbetween Viacom and CBS will create the place definitions of the public interest. third largest entertainment company, w i t h a n n u a l r e v e n u e so f $ 1 9 b i l l i o n . F u r ther examples include the takeover of commentators argue that rnedia consoliRandom House by Germany's Bertelsdation will limit content diversity, as the m a n n a n d t h e m e r g e r o f D e u t s c h e number of different ideas and opinions Telekom with Debis. expressedwill be reduced. Such an outConsolidation is also occurring withcorne would clearly threaten political disin specific segrnents of the rnedia induscourse and free speech interests. Many try. Prior to the Telecommunications economic and business theories suggest, Act of 1996, individual owners were limhowever, that consolidation will not nec-

Don't Fearthe Mergers.uu.,y

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J A c K s o NL a w & E t h i c s essarily diminish content diversity, and indeed, there is little evidence that previous media consolidation has done so. Media companies, like other businesses, focus primarily on market share, or "shelf space." Just as soda and cereal manufacturers seek to expand their shelf spacein a g:rocerystore, content producers and distributors seek to increase their exposure on cable systems,radio stations, and video store shelves. Which scenario provides the consumer with more diversity' four distinct brands of cola or two distinct brands that each have three variations? In each scenario, the consumer has several possible choices. Whether a loss of diversity has occurred depends on one's definition of diversity. Ultimately what matters is what content gets produced and is made available to the public, not who profits from its production and distribution. With more than r{o cable networks, seven broadcast networks, and countless direct-to-video productions, there is greater dernand for original content than ever before. Cable networks that used to rely on theatrical or television rerl..ns now budget millions of dollars per year to produce original content. The variety of content available to the public has thus expanded, not contracted. Much of what is produced is still disappointing to many, but it is unlikely that television fare would be any better had Disney not purchased ABC/Capital Cities. In the music and film industries, where a handful of companies control content distribution, there is little evidence that decisions are motivated by censorship rather than profits. Since each song or filrn is a unique, differentiated product, media cornpanies will continue to promote whatever they think will be the next big hit, often regardless of

controversy or political view. Indeed, in critiques of the media, the complaint is often that ethics and morality seem to play no part in decision-making. Just as cable and satellite technology have dramatically expanded the distribution opportunities for video content, the Internet has expanded the opportunities for publishing and music. For any artist trying to create a book, song, or film, there are three hurdles: funding the production of the work, finding ways to distribute it so that consumers have the opportunity to purchase it, and promoting the work to get the attention of consumers. The advantage of the Internet is that it significantly reduces the first two hurdles. No longer must a band find a record company to produce or distribute its music, or convince record stores to stock its albums. Digital technology and digital networls allow individuals to produce and distribute content at a fraction of the cost that has traditionally been required. For example, MP3 files allow bands to reach a much wider audience than previously possible and thereby gain the attention of record labels. Record cornpanies and music stores still wield c o n s i d e r a b l ep o w e r i n p r o m o t i n g c o n tent, as do radio stations and music critics. However, the band (or atty copyright owner) has much more control over its own fate than at any time previously. Media consolidation is troubling in part because of fears that any reduction in competition is likely to raise prices and reduce accessfor consumers. However, it is doubtful that current consolidation truly threatens consumers, given the rapidly declining costs of producing and distributing content. Even the huge conglomerates that now control the copyright industries are constantly seeking new content, giving individual authors,

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composers, artists, and filmmakers countless opportunities to place their works before the public. What happens if Disney makes the ABC television network a subscription service or the Super BowI moves to pay-per-view? Perhaps those who cannot afford to pay for accesswill find other forrns of cheaper entertainment or even begin to create their own content. In other words, rnedia consolidation rnay only lead to rnore citizens actively participating in the production of culture. This transformation of consulners into content producers could have significant benefits in terms of political empowerment and self-fulfillment. The public has more to fear from expanding copyright law than media consolidation. There is no question that more content is produced today than ever before. In addition, antitrust law ensures that a minimum level of competition will continue to exist in the rnedia industries. This is not to suggest that rnedia consolidation is inconsequential. Indeed, the recent spate of rnergers is profoundly troubling, for it will have a significant irnpact on political discourse and the barriers to entry for new content producers. This is especially true for the rnedia conglomerates, which provide the majority of news coverage throughout

and distributed. But what happens once that content is placed into the stream of culture? It is vital that the public has the ability to discuss and critique those works that become a part of the cultural landscape. Copyright law directly impacts the public's ability to use and debate these media texts.

A Brief Historyof Copyright. Copyright is a legal concept of relatively recent origin. While domestic and international trade in content can be traced to the earliest hurnan civilizations, the precursors to copyright did not emerge until the development of printing in Europe in the fifteenth century. Soon after the invention of the printing press, many printers requested government-issued privileges to prevent competitors from publishing the same book. Printers used these rnonopoly privileges to recoup the Iarge surns they had invested in presses and fonts. By making printing an economically viable activity, governments encouraged the dissernination of new ideas and knowledge. However, the authorities responsible for granting these privileges soon discovered that by dispensing them selectively, they could engage in censorship and control the flow of ideas in their societies. A system that began as a forrn of industry protec-

It iS Vital that the public hasthe ability to discussand critique those works that bec6rne a part of the cultufal landscape. the world. However, the attention given to consolidation has overshadowed the more serious problern of copyright expansion. Regardless of the number of firrns, content will always be produced

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tion thus quickly developed the secondary purpose of controlling the spread of information and ideas. Over time, copyright replaced printing privileges as a rneans of protecting the

JACKSON LAW&EthiCS

publishing industry. The rlro Statute of Anne, the first true copyright law, was intended to break the monopoly that the Stationer's Company held over the publishing industry in England.6In order to accomplish this objective, the law granted authors of books a copyright for the first time. Other European nations soon adopted copyright laws, and the United States followed suit after winning its independence. This new right enhanced the ability of authors to profit from their works and spurred competition in the publishing industry. Copyright thus stirnulated the development of new cultural products and intellectual property. As the content industries have grown in economic and political influence, copyright has steadily expanded to offer greater protection for more types of content, especially as new communication technologies have corne to the fore. In r/go, the first federal copyright statute in the United States offered protection for maps, books, and charts for a maxirnum of twenty-eight years.TBy the beginning of the twentieth century, copyright had expanded to include rnusic, dramatic works, drawings, photographs, and even performance rights, and the length of protection had doubled to fifty-six years. The t9/6 Copyright Act subsequently expanded copyright to include all forrns of original expression in a tangible medium and extended the term of protection again, this time to the life of the author plus fifty years.t Similar expansion of the law occurred in many other nations, particularly in Europe. International disputes have played a major role in the development of copyright due to the protectionist origins of each nation's copyright law. Widespread copyright piracy and a lack ofprotection many for foreign authors under

nations' copyright laws led to the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic-Works, the world's first multilateral copyright treaty. Under the Berne Convention, each signatory nation is required to enact minimum standards of copyright protection through its domestic laws. The potential for international disputes remains high, however, because signatory nations can have different levels of copyright protection as long as the rninimum standards are respected. Conflicts arise as a result of the tensions between these different copyright laws. The United States did not join the Berne Convention until rg8g, when Congress arnended the Copyright Act to meet the international agreement's rninirnurn requirements. One reason the United States eventually joined the Convention was the successful lobbying from content producers who wanted the the United Statesto play a larger role in the development of international copyright law. These copyright owners found themselves with significant power in Washington, especially after the copyright industries became the largest group of U.S. exporters. The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1997 (CTEA) and the Agreement on Aspects of Intellectual tade-Related Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994 represented more victories for the copyright industries.e To match laws in Europe, CTEA extended the length of copyright protection in the United Statesto the life of the creator plus seventyyears.'oTRIPS created rights that go beyond the Berne Convention, requiring nations to provide protection for sound recordingp and prohibiting the rental of computer software. More importantly, under this agreement, conflicts may be settled

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through World Trade Organization (\tTO) dispute settlement procedures. One nation's lack of vigorous enforcement of its domestic copyright law can now be raised to the level of an international trade dispute. U.S. copyright industries favor this systern because the U.S. government can now act as their agent to protect their copyrights and profits. Ultimately, TRIPS gives the copyright industries more power to protect their worls by putting economic pressure on governments with a history of weak copyright enforcement.

court has granted a preliminary injunction forcingWeb site owners in the United States to stop distributing the program." However, the global nature of the Internet makes such injunctions meaningless if users can download the software from servers in other countries. The copyright industries have lobbied vigorously and successfully for increased copyright protection under national laws and international agreements to counteract these perceived negative effects of the Internet. The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of rggT drarnatically increased the scope of criminal copyright law in the United States. It made it illegal rise of the Internet has challenged the to use the Internet to willfully distribute a b i l i t y o f m e d i a c o n g l o m e r a t e s t o copyrighted works having a total retail enforce their copyrights and illustrates value of more than $r,ooo, regardlessof the growing tensions between U.S. and whether one profits frorn the distribuforeign copyright laws. For example, a tion.'3 Similarly, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) CopyCanadian start-up called iCraveTV recently began retransrnitting television right teaty and the WIPO Performances signals over the Internet. In response, and Phonograms teaty, both of which major television copyright owners were signed in Geneva in rgg6, increased including Twentieth Century Fox, CBS, the ability of copyright holders to restrict Disney, and the NFL sued iCraveTV in the use of copyrighted worls in digital forrn, and encouraged the use of technothe United Statesfor infringing on their copyrights. Under Canadian copyright logical measures to protect copyrighted law, the retransmission of TV signals on works. The Digital Millennium Copyright the Internet without permission may be permissible, but under U.S. law, such an Act of 1998 (DMCA), which enacted action is clearly a copyright violation. the two treaties into U.S. Iaw, offered For this reason, a U.S. district judge l i a b i l i t y for protection service issued a temporary retraining order to providers who follow notice and takeprevent the signals from being accessed down procedures, outlawed the manuvia the Internet in the United States." facture or distribution of devices that A software program called DeCSS that can override technological protection was developed in Europe also highlighted measures, and required the protection the threat that the Internet poses to the of copyright managernent systems.'a copyright industries. DeCSS was T h e s e l a s t t w o p r o v i s i o n s e n c o u r a g e designed to break the copy protection copyright holders to develop technoprogram used to protect DVDs. After its logical rneasr.rresthat will control all creation, DeCSS was distributed on accessto their works. This potentially numerous Web sites. A U.S. district gives copyright owners complete con-

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The increasingeconomicweight ofthe copyright industries carries the day in an era wh^ehflree trade and free markets lr.arrebecorne the rnantra of government leaders. trol over how their works are used. Copyright has always benefited the industries that distribute content more than the authors who create content. Distributors typically have more negotiating power since they control accessto consumers. Recent controversies surrounding the use of MP3 files and streaming audio demonstrate the concern of music distributors regarding the easewith which the public can share files over the Internet. As the copyright industries grow larger in scope and influence, the public's ability to use and critically debate the content that is provided for its consumption is threatened. If copyright owners are able to exercise cornplete control over how expression enters the strearn of culture, they have the power to limit the role of the public to that of passiveconsumers, rather than that of active participants in culture.

r'"oTheThreatto FreeSpeech. a public interest perspective, the fact that Disney now owns a variety of distribution outlets to market Mickey Mouse as a commodity is somewhat unsettling, but not particularly harmful. The bigger threat is that Disney might be able to stifle any critique of Mickey Mouse or the values that Disney promotes. The concept of fair use in copyright law has long facilitated dialogue and debate of copyrighted content. Many of the recent changes to copyright law give Disney and other copyright owners increased power to prevent the fair use of their works by

shifting the focus of copyright from legal protection to technological protection. This shifts the locus of control from the courts, which are able to balance the need for protection against the cornpeting concerns of accessand free speech, to the copyright owners who control the technology used to accesstheir content. These technological barriers rnay prevent individuals from engaging in fair use and utilizing the facts and ideas contained in the expression that are not protected by copyright. This trend toward a technological concept of copyright largely results frorn the copyright industries' successfuleffort to characterize their products as economic, rather than cultural, cornrnodities. The interests of the diffuse public are not easily represented, and the social costs of increased copyright protection are not easily quantified. The increasing economic weight of the copyright industries carries the day in an era in which free trade and free markets have becorne the mantra of government leaders, and the public is characterized as consurners rather than as citizens. Industrial nations with large copyright exports are using the tMPO and the WTO to pressure other nations to bend to the interests of large media conglomerates. Without legal safeguards to protect citizens of all nations, the media conglomerates will control all flow of data. Policymakers in all nations rnust be wary of the quick fix provided by reliance

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on technological enforcement of copyright law. While such technological measures may appear to be the only solution in an age in which content crossesborders as effortlessly as air, the danger of reliance on extralegal controls is significant. Currently, each nation can craft its domestic copyright law to meet its internal public policy objectives. The trend toward international harmonization and technological enforcernent of copyright law threatens the ability of each society to determine its own fate. The fact that the Internet is a decentralized, multipointnetwork is a significant to-multipoint advantage of its design and one that should not be tarnpered with lightly. Nations should hesitate to pass laws that attempt to fix this "design flaw. "

Copyrightand Culture.Thefree flow of ideas and inforrnation is clearly essential to the maintenance and evolu* tion of culture. Freedom of speech and expression promote democracy and protect the search for truth in the "marketplace of ideas." Copyright law, which is designed to prornote the flow of speech by allowing authors to recoup their investment in the creation of new content, necessarily gives authors the ability to restrict the use of their speech. However, this need to protect ownership over content needs to be balanced against society's requirement for intellectual freedom. The purpose of copyright is to prornote creativity for the public good. This purpose is thwarted if accessto content is unduly restricted.

NO T E S t Andy Seiler, "Near, Far, Wterever You Are, Utah Store Snips'Titanic' Nudity." USA Today (September

9 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), incorporating intel-

3, r998, 3D). 2 T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n sA c t o f t 9 9 6 , P u b . L . N o . r o { , r 0 4 , I r o S t a t . 5 6 ( r 9 9 6 ) ( c o d i f i e d a t 4 7 U . S . C . S Sr 5 I

lectual property

et seq.,/

Round

3 47 C.F.R. S 7g.gS55 (1998). I" re Reviry of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television B r o a d c a s t i n g( t r , t l r ,gt r - z z r ) , F C C A g - 2 o 9 , p a r a . ! 8 (r999). 4 4 7 C . F . R . s 7 3 . 3 5 5 5( 1 9 9 8 ) . 5 In re Reviewof the Commission's Regulations Gove r n i n g T e l e v i s i o nB r o a d c a s t i n g( V V 9 r - z e r ) , f C C 9 9 - 2 0 9 , p a r a .3 9 ( 1 9 9 9 ) . 6 8 Anne C.rg (r7ro). / A c t o f M a y 3 I , I 7 9 o , c h . 1 5 , r S t a t .r 2 4 . 8 Copyright Act of t976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 S t a t .2 5 4 r ( r g / 6 ) , c o d i f i e d a t r 7 U . S . C . S t o t e t s e q .

. 8 0 9 , 4 9 7 6 - 8 r( r 9 9 4 ) . 5 r 4 ( a ) r, o 8 S t a t 4 ro CopyrightTerm ExtensionAct of r9g/, Pub. L. N o . r o 5 - 2 9 8( r 9 9 8 ) .

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Affairs

General

rights in the Uruguay

Agreement

overseen by the World Agreements

Tariffs

Round of the (GATT)

and Trade

Trade Organization. Act,

Pub.

No.

IJruguay 103-465,

rr Twentieth Century Fox Corp. v. IcraveTV, 2ooo U.S. Dist. Lexisror3 (W.D.Pa.,Jan. 28, zooo). t2 lJniversal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 2ooo U.S. Dist. Lexisg06 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.z, zooo). 13 17 U.S.C.A. S 5o6(a)(z) (WestSupp. rggg), as amended by Pub. L. No. Io5-I47, IIr Stat. 2678 (rgg7). 14 Digital Millennium CopyrightAct of t998, Pub. L. N o . r o 5 - 3 o 4 , r r z S t a t .2 8 6 o .

Polltlcs&Dlplomac

Marina Ottaway Democratic transformations are never simple, linear processes.The now established democracies of Europe and the United States have arrived at where they are having endured a tortuous process of partial transformations, conflicts, slowdowns, and even outright reversals. It should not, therefore, corne as a surprise to see many countries undergoing the same travails today. Despite the demise of socialism as a cornpeting ideology, the road to dernocracy is proving as difficult as ever. After a decade of transformation, it is clear that many countries will remain very irnperfect democracies or even suffer reversals in the foreseeable future. This is normal and it should not be causefor despair. What is worrisome, however, is the evidence that, in many countries, citizens are welcoming the overthrow of formally democratic, elected governments and their replacement by military regimes or populist leaders. Also worrisome is that, in some cases,the international community is unwittingly contributing to this rejection of democracy by pushing for the implementation of economic policy reforms that go beyond what the domestic political process of democratizing countries can sustain. Rapid democratization and rapid economic reform may well be incompatible in many countries.

Marina Ottaway i' a Senior

Associate

the Carnegie ment

Endow-

for International

Peace.

TfgndS. After two decades of steady progress COntfary toward greater democracy in Latin Arnerica, contrary trends

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have emerged. In Peru, people have shown strong support for Alberto Fujirnori for years despite his questionable practices; support started weakening only after he sought a third term in office. In Venezuela, voters overwhelmingly elected Hugo Chavez to the presidency only a few years after he led two coup atternpts, and more recently endorsed a constitution that allows a sigIn nificant role for the military. Ecuador, massivedernonstrations forced the resignation of the elected president

ple, had been busy rigging the forthcoming elections, according to reports of international NGOs monitoring the preparations. Pakistan has had a succession of highly corrupt elected governments. In Venezuela, the atternpted coups d'etat that eventually catapulted Hugo Chavez into power carne in the wake of a strong popular reaction against newly-implemented econornic reforms. These measureswere enacted by an elected president who had not campaigned on an economic reform agenda and had

The mOSt diffiCult partof thed.ernocratic transformation lies aheat,: to convince the rnajo{ity of citizens not to throw out dernocracy with the particular governrnent they oppose. Jamil Mahuad, showing not only popuIar resentment of a specific leader, but also disregard for the democratic process. Similar trends are evident elsewhere. Military coups are becoming common again in Africa, with the Ivory Coast serving as the most recent reminder that elected governments are no more irnrnune to military takeovers than autocracies, and that the population still welcornes military intervention when it distrusts civilian politicians. An elected government has been overthrown in Pakistan, also to popular acclaim. In all these cases, the incumbent regimes were not models of democracy; on the contrary, many were corrupt, unresponsive to their citizens, or adept at manipulating elections to lock out the opposition. The recently overthrown president of the Ivory Coast, for exarn-

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pursued quite different policies during his first term in office during the rg/os, leading voters to expect more of the sarne. He decided neverthelessto follow a radical reforrn agenda for which he had no rnandate.

Tepid SuppOrt. Whatis problematic in all these casesis not the rejection of the incumbent governments, but the lack of support for democratic practices shown by those who encouraged rnilitary intervention or who supported new leaders who disregarded democratic practices. The trend augurs poorly for the consolidation of dernocracy. During the r99os, a surprisingly large number of countries took some steps toward democratization, with elected governrnents, however imperfect, replacing authoritarian ones. That was the easy part of democratic Since the citizens transformation.

orrAWAYPolitics&Diplomacy blamed incumbent, authoritarian governments for the problems they were experiencing, democracy was seen as an appealing alternative. Today, most governments are formally democratic, but often the problems are as bad as ever. And the rnost difficult part of the democratic transformation lies ahead, to convince the majority of citizens not to throw out democracy with the particular government they oppose. It is only when people have come to value democracy in itself, rather than simply as a tool for change, that democratic consolidation can be considered to have taken place. As the aforementioned examples demonstrate, democratic consolidation is still a distant goal in many countries. In a growing number of countries that have had experience with dernocratic institutions, ordinary people appear ready to put their future in the hands of charismatic leaders and military officers promising salvation, instead of using the mechanisrnsof democracy to seekredress. Today there is a renewed skepticisrn about democracy that was rare in the early I99Os but was frequently voiced in developing countries in the 196os and r97os. Underlying this disturbing trend is the fact that most people care a lot about the government policies that affect their lives, but much less about democracy as an abstract ideal. Compounding skepticism about democracy is the fact that many formally dernocratic governments have done very little for their citizens. The reasons for this failure are multiple and vary from country to country. They include poor leadership, corruption, and the enormity of the problerns many countries face after decades of misrnanagement. But they also include strong external pressures for policy reform, which create a

disjunction between the democratic process governments are supposed to respect and the policy choices they implement. These pressures often come from the same foreign donors and international institutions that actively promote democracy.

Well-Intentioned Meddling. r". almost twenty years, the international community-industrial democracies and the international financial institutions, that is-has pushed developing countries to enact economic policies that aim to liberalize their economies and integrate them as swiftly as possible into the global rnarket. As these institutions learn more about the cornplexities of economic reform, dernands on reforming countries escalate. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank impose conditionalities, the W'orld Tiade Organization (WTO) adds its own rules, and bilateral donors throw in their requirements. To complicate matters, increasingly vocal international networls of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also push their economic policy prescription, which may be different frorn, or even at odds with, those of the international financial institutions or the bilateral donors' halting the construction of large darns, for example, or preventing oil exploitation in countries with authoritarian governments. These outside pressures, particularly those of international financial institutions capable of providing or withholding financial resources needed by hard-pressed governments, are difficult to ignore. During the last decade, the international community, emboldened by the disappearance of socialist regimes, has added democratization to the demand for economic reforms. Donors mount-

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ed complex democracy promotion activities and, in some cases, also imposed sanctions on governments resisting change. In this realm, too, NGOs added their demands, often going far beyond those of the bilateral donors. Some human rights organiza tions are trying to pressure countries that still have trouble respecting their citizens' basic right to respect standards that not only go well beyond the funda mental principles embraced by the United Nations and include ideas that are still extremely controversial even in the most industrialized countries. The government of Zimbabwe, for example, has been condemned for not respecting gay rights. Whether the economic and political measures prescribed by all these actors are good, bad, useful, or damaging is not the issue here. Rather, the problem is that outside actors are prescribing the adoption of democratic processes and detailed policy outcomes. In so doing, they have tried to separate democratic political process from policy outcome. As a result, policies enacted by governments that are democratic in form do not nec essarily reflect a domestic compromise based on the balance of political forces. And this practice undermines democrat ic consolidation by reducing democracy to a formal process of choosing leaders.

Form over Function.

The wave of democratization that began in the 1980s in Latin America and then spread to the rest of the world in the 1990s was, first and foremost, a triumph of democratic form. The democracy promotion poli cies put in place by governments and NGOs of industrialized societies con tributed to this triumph of form over policy content. The promotion of

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democracy initially focused on improv ing the electoral process-helping reform election laws, organizing election com missions, devising voter registration sys tems, and eventually sending observers to ensure that due process would be respected on election day. Mter the initial elections, donors continued to stress form by focusing on the organization of democratic institu tions-the structure of parliamentary committees, for example, or their access to information. Even when donors pro moted civil society, an important com ponent of democracy assistance projects, they focused on a predetermined for mat-civil society meant organizations focused on civic education or advocacy that predominantly concerned human rights, women's rights, and environ mental issues. The democratization process promot ed by donors has been strikingly devoid of policy discussions. Donors have unquestioningly assumed that democracy and the free market go together, thus tak ing it for granted that democratic gov ernments would naturally pursue free market reform and open up their economies to domestic and foreign com petition. In many transitional countries, democracy has therefore become a for mal process for selecting a government, rather than a mechanism that ensures that the policies enacted by an elected government reflect an acceptable com promise among different interest groups. This practice makes democratic consolidation difficult. A deepening of the democratic process cannot take place without more change in the internal politics of many countries, and without a change on the part of the international community. Political parties and organized groups

As long

policy is n

see much·

that represent th sectors of the become stronge] that their vote re At the same til community neec really wants to F must accept th, process will not 1: ic principles, but Democratic c( take place if citiz that they can f1 through democr is, if they think parties and press sent their partin at this point the tempted to applm and support pop democratic cred with large, poor majority of del falling into tl demands are like: that are not satisf: civil and political industrial demo( problem in the p; to briefly conside In Europe, th( chise resulted i strong socialist a whose agenda wa: liberty, but the re ances. What mac dation possible , accepted democr,

orrAWAYPolitics&Diplomacy

AS lOng ?S the linkageh.q*.gn politicsand policy is missing, it is unlikelv that citizens will i". ttinch poinfin defendirg democ racy. that represent the interests of different sectors of the population need to become stronger so that citizens feel that their vote represents a real choice. At the sarne time, the international community needs to accept that if it really wants to promote democracy, it must accept that the policy reform processwill not be dictated by economic principles, but by political realities. Democratic consolidation can only take place if citizens become convinced that they can further their demands through democratic mechanisms-that is, if they think that there are political parties and pressure groups that represent their particular interests. It is only at this point that citizens will not be tempted to applaud military coups d'etat and support populist leaders with weak dernocratic credentials. In countries with large, poor populations-with the majority of democratizing countries falling into this category-popular demands are likely to be economic ones that are not satisfied by the protection of civil and political rights. The established industrial dernocracies faced the same problem in the past, and it is worthwhile to briefly consider their experience. In Europe, the extension of the franchise resulted in the emergence of strong socialist and cornmunist parties whose agenda was not the protection of liberty, but the redress of material grievances. What made democratic consolidation possible was that radical parties accepted democracy, transformed them-

selves into a parliamentary opposition, and succeeded in pushing through enough reforms to give their constituents a vested interest in the preservation of the system. The result was the emergence of the welfare state. Even in the United States, where dernocracy developed under very different circumstances, the reforms of the New Deal were irnportant in convincing a population battered by economic crisis that a democratic government was capable of responding to their plight.

A missing CreatingStakeholders. elernent in rnany dernocratic transitions today is a process through which policy reform gives the majority of citizens a vested interest in supporting dernocracy. As long as the linkage between politics and policy is missing, it is unlikely that citizens will see much point in defending democracy. They will be tempted instead to turn to leaderswho promise concrete measures. The process that reconciled political form and policy content for the now established dernocracies-the ernergence of the welfare state-is unlikely to be replicated elsewherein the same form. Today, welfare states are politically controversial and economically suspect, and even in the industrial countries, they are threatened financially by the rnounting costs created by an aging population. Though the welfare state of the past is not a viable model for the future, governments cannot disregard the demands of their populations and still suryive as

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democracies. The consolidation of democracy depends today, as in the past, on a successful compromise among the demands of different groups. The struggle to reconcile democratic form with a policy content that satisfies popular demands is the next chapter in the process of dernocratization, and the survival of many new democracies will depend largely on how it plays out. The outcome depends on both the formally dernocratic government and the country's citizens, how citizens organize themselves, how parties develop their programs, how interest groups defend their agendas and cornpromise, and how governrnents clean up their act. But the consolidation of democrary also depends increasingly on the international community, which needs to become more realistic about the possibility of what has been called the double transition-simultaneous democratization and radical economic reform.

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A few countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic have been able to move forward rapidly and successfullyon both fronts. [n many other countries, rapid economic reform undermines democratic consolidation and democratic consolidation undermines the possibility of rapid economic reforrnVenezuela is a casein point. The international community must learn that dernocracy is the art of the possible, in their own countries as well as developing countries, and modifr its goals accordingly. If it wants to promote democracy, the international cornmunity will have to accept the messy, cornpromise-driven policymaking process with which the citizens of democratic countries are familiar. If it wants a tidy, rational, and orderly policyrnaking process, it will have to accept the risk of undermining of democratic consolidation and the possibility of democratic reversals.

Politics & Diplomacy

Susan Martin Historically, stateshave seen immigration policy as a matter of national interest, often adopting unilateral policies aimed at regrrlating entry and exit. Nations treat the admission of immigrants and control of unauthorized migration as quintessential matters of sovereignty. After all, imrnigration policy deals with fundamental issues of national identity as well as national security. The protection of one's borders is key to a s t a t e ' ss e l f - d e f i n i ti o n . While few would question that stateshave both the authority and the responsibility for making decisions concerning immigration, sovereignty limits the ability of statesto address the realities of today's international migration. Indeed, only through international cooperation, coordination, and ultimately, the harmonization of migration policies will statesbe able to effectively manage international flows of people. Some steps have been taken in this direction, including the development of new regional mechanisms for coordinating migration policy, but more needs to be done before a global migration regime-necessary for managing international migration-emerges. At the start of the new millennium, about r$o million people reside outside of their country of birth.' Although comprising only about 2.$ percent of the world's population, these international migrants play important economic, social, and political roles that affect both their home and

Susan Martin is D irector of the Institute for the Study of International tion,

Migra-

Ceorgetown

University.

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adopted countries. Migration can change the very nature of societies, and as new groups settle and shift the composition of the resident population, population movements often generate highly emotional responses, sometimes disproportionate to the actual nurnber of migrants present. International migration is unlikely to yield in the near future. Fuelled by a combination of push factors in source countries and pull factors in receiving countries, economic-based rnigration is sustained by well-developed networks that link the supply of labor with the dernand of businesses for both hlghly skilled and unskilled workers. At the same time, forced migration will continue as long as conflicts, hurnan rights abuses, and political repression displace people from their home communities. By definition, international migration affects at least two countries. In fact, few countries are unaf{'ected by international migration. Many countries are sources of international flows, while others are net receivers, and still others are transit countries through which migrants reach receiving countries. Countries such as Mexico experience rnigration in all three capacities. The mechanisms and legal frameworks for achieving cooperation among and between receiving, source, and transit countries are in their infancy. In contrast to the international movement of goods and capital, there is no international regime to set rules regarding movements of people. Nor is there a common understanding among states, or experts for that matter, as to the costs and benefits of freer or more restrictive irnmigratio n policies. There is increasing recognition, however, that international migration is a

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continuing phenomenon which requires greater harmonization of policies and Bilateral approaches. consultation United processes-between the States and Mexico, for example-have become more commonplace. During the past decade, regional mechanisms have been established in the Americas, Europe, East Asia, Africa, and elsewhere, in which receiving, source, and transit countries address issuesof mutual concern. Bodies such as the Intergovernrnental Consultations on Asylurn, Refugee, and Migration Policies in Europe, North Arnerica and Australia give receiving countries the opportunity to share experiences and formulate strategies.

GlobalTrendsin International M igf atiOn. A numberof globaltrends reinforce the need for consolidation of these regional mechanisms and for gradual development of a global regirne that can more effectivelymanage international migration. The four principal trends which affect international migration trends and global responses include, growing econornic integration and globalization, changing geopolitical interests -War in the post-Cold era, changing demographic trends and gender roles, and increasing transnationalism as migrants maintain residency in two or more countries at the sarne tirne. AND MrcnerroN. GroserrzarroN Economic globalization is not new. Nor is the role of international migration in stimulating and reacting to global markets. More than $oo years ago, European exploration, conquest, and colonization of continents with rich natural resources were connected integrallywith the growth of a new mercantile, capitalist economy. Supported by new technologies that

MARIN Politics&Diplomacy rnade circurnnavigation of the earth possible, migration played a critical role in the expansion ofglobal trade. Today's economic globalization, however, gives new meaning to this old phenomenon. The growth in communications and transportation technologies, combined with the willingness of statesto enter into binding trade commitments and businessesto establish multinational entities, has perrnitted an integration of economies that had heretofore operated in separate, differentiated spaces. Economic trends influence rnigration patterns in a number of ways.The growth of multinational corporations, for example, has put pressure on governrnents to facilitate the interstate movernents of

professionals, executives, and others who provide international services. Although movements of lesser-skilled workers are not regulated by NAITA, the issue is likely to be revisited as economic integration grows. The growh in global trade and investment is important for major source countries of migration as well as the receiving countries. The issues raised in this connection are far more difficult becausethey are raised often by unauthorized movements of unskilled workers. It has long been held that economic development, spurred by accessto global rnarkets and capital, is the best long-terrn solution to emigration pressuresin poor countries. While negotiating NAFfA,

B ilateral , regional, andinternational

trade regim'esare beginning to have a profound effect on migration. executives,rnanagers, and other personnel. In manufacturing, it is not unusual for components of a single product to be made in severaldifferent countries. Corporate interest in moving its labor force to meet the dernands of this type of scheduling often runs into conflict with immigration policies. Bilateral, regional, and international trade regimes are beginning to have a profound effect on migration. The European lJnion's development of a harrnonized rnigration regime to serve as a counterpart to its customsunion is just one example. The North American (NAFTA) Free Trade Agreement includes potentially important rnigration-related provisions perrnitting freer movement from signatory countries of

President Carlos Salinas of Mexico described his hope that "more jobs will mean higher wagesin Mexico, and this in turn will mean fewer migrants to the United States and Canada. fMe want to export goods, not people."" In more colorful langrrage, Salinas cited his preference for Mexico to export tornatoes instead of tomato pickers. Academicians exploring the relationship between econornic development and emigration also tend to agree that irnproving the economic opportunities for people in source countries is the best long-term solution to illegal migration. Alrnost uniforrnly, however, they caution that emigration pressures are likely to remain and possibly increase before the long-term benefits of econornic reforms

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accrue: "The transformations intrinsic end. Democratization and increased respect for human rights took hold in to the development process are at first numerous countries around the globe. destabilizing. They initially prornote rather than impede migration. Better As a result, repatriation became a possicommunications and transportation and bility for millions of refugees who had other improvements in the quality of life been displaced for years. of people working hard to make a living One of the most significant changes in recent years has been in the willingness of raise expectations and enhance their ability to migrate."' Se',reralresearchers countries to intervene on behalf of internally displaced persons and others in posit what economist Philip Martin refers to as an "irnrnigration hurnp." As need of assistanceand protection within levels of income rise, emigration would their home countries. Classicnotions of at first increase, then peak and decline.a sovereignty, which formerly precluded The experience of such countries as Italy such intervention, are under reconsiderand Korea in successfully transitioning ation. International human rights and humanitarian law have growing salience from emigration to immigration counin defining sovereignty to include tries gives credence to this theory. responsibility for the welfare of the resiF o n c n o M r c n e r r o N l r q o S o v n n E r c N - dents of one's territory. Intervention rnay be expected when rv. The post-Cold IMar era presents new opportunities as well as new chal- the actions of a sovereign state threaten lenges for migration regimes. The the security of another state.What is new is the recognition that actions that effects are most profound with regard to treatment of forced rnigration. Most prompt mass exodus into a neighboring current refugee and asylum policies territory threaten international security. In a number of cases, beginning with were formulated following World War II Resolution 688 that authorized the with the lessonsof the Nazi era in rnind and tensions between the East and West establishrnent of safe havens in northern Iraq, the UN Security Council has growing. To a large degree, refugee policy was seen as an instrument of foreign determined that the way to reduce the international and at domesthreat to a neighboring state is to propolicy both vide assistanceand protection within the tic levels. Admission of refugees for territory of the offending state. permanent resettlement, asylum for The new opportunities for humanivictirns of persecution and repression, and international aid to victims of proxy tarian action also affect the roles and responsibilities of international organiwars (Central America, Ethiopia, Vietnarn, for example) were all part of the zations with regard to forced migrants. Formerly, most of the responsibility for f i g h t a g a i n s tc o m m u n i s m . handling refugee crises went to the The Cold War also made all but impossible some of the solutions to United Nations High Commissioner for refugee crises, whether defined as Refugees(UNHCR). In contrast to othattacking root causes or promoting the er forms of migration, a global regime return of refugees. With the end of the did exist for aid and protection of Cold W-ar, new opportunities emerged. refugees. Today, newsets ofactors drawn Many decades-old civil wars came to an from security, military, human rights,

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MARflN Politics&Diplomacy and development communities have growing involvement in assisting both internally and externally displaced persons, broadening the scope of the current migration regime from one solely concerned with refugees. DruocnepHrc AND GrNon* TnrNos. Fertility rates are falling worldwide, although many countries in the developing world continue to see rapid population growth. In most developed countries, fertility levels are well below replacement rates-that is, couples are having fewer than two children. These countries can foresee a time in which total population will decrease, leading some demographers to refer to a looming population implosion. They can also expect an aging population. The United Nations Population Division projects that the number of persons aged sixty or older will increase from 60o million in the late Iggos to 2 billion in 2o5o.5 The population of older persons will exceed that of children for the first time in history. At the same time, the ratio of the nurnber of working-age people to people over sixty will decline. Along with these changes in population growth and age distribution are changes in the role of women within society.An increasing number of women pursue educational opportunities, work outside of the home, and participate in civil society. Not surprisingly, as women gain greater autonorny through education and work, they are also migrating, not just as reunifying spouses,but also as principal applicants for work visas. Demographic trends are an important factor in explaining emigration pressures in many countries. Societies with rapid population growth often are

unable to generate sufficient employment to keep pace with new entries into the labor force. Environmental degradation may also result, particularly when land-use policies do not protect fragile ecosystems. Natural phenomena such as hurricanes and earthquakes often have disproportionately negative effects on densely populated areas, particularly those in poor countries, and displace large numbers from homes that have been destroyed. Demographic trends also influence the receptivity toward and impact of migration on countries of destination. The direction of these effects. however. is not necessarilystraightforward. For example, a country with low fertility rates and an aging population may benefit from the admission of working-age international rnigrants, but as the migrant population becomes a larger share of total population, there may be a backlash against the newcomers.This pattern is seen particularly where the migrants are of a different race, ethniciry, or religion than the native population. T n e N s N e r r o N A L r s r . . r .P a r t l y b e c a u s eo f the technological revolution of the second half of the nineteenth century, migrants can far more easily live in two societies at the same tirne. While circular migration has been a notable aspect of migration for much of the past century, when travel was more difficult, migrants tended to live sequentially in one country or the other. Now they can maintain two homes, shuttling easily between them. This phenomenon can be seen in migration from north Africa and Turkey into Europe; Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean into the United States; China into Canada, Australia, and the United States; and

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TOWARD A GLOBAL MIGRATION REGIME

Mozambique and Lesotho into South Africa. Money flows between immigrants and those who remain at home is another important aspect of transnationalism. Remittances often exceed any other form of trade, investment, or foreign aid available to the source countries of migrants. According to the Internation al Monetary Fund. an estimated $77 bil lion was remitted in 1997. Maintaining the flow of these resources is often an important consideration in immigra tion policymaking. Perhaps the most visible aspect of transnationalism is the growing accep tance of dual nationality. Several major emigration countries, including Mexico and the Dominican Republic, have shift ed from opposition to dual nationality to its active support. In some cases, states permit absentee voting by nationals who are naturalized elsewhere.

Regional Migration Approach

es.

In 1995, the UN General Assembly asked Secretary-General Kofi Annan to report on the feasibility and desirability of convening an international conference on international migration and develop ment. After consulting with member gov ernments. Annan concluded that there was insufficient consensus about what could be accomplished at such a confer ence. Given the "disparate experiences of countries or subregions with regard to international migration." he believed that regional and subregional approaches would be most practical and effective. b Since then. there has been significant growth in such regional processes. Three examples of regional cooperation illustrate the point. The first represents a regional effort to address forced migration pressures, while the others

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bring source, transit, and receIvIng countries together to discuss areas of common concern. In 1996. the United Nations con vened a conference to address and act upon the problems of refugees. dis placed persons, and returnees in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and surrounding territories. The CIS conference aimed to prevent emer gencies, and where prevention was not possible, ensure early and effective responses to mass migration. The con ference identified concrete programs toward these ends. Although funding has not kept pace with requests for assis tance, the conference has helped the CIS countries develop and implement national laws and practices that improve migration management. The conference and its aftermath also generated new roles for non-governmental organiza tions in countries that had little in the way of civil societies. Second, the Regional Migration Con ference. referred to as the "Puebla Group." has brought together all the countries of Central and North America for regular, constructive dialogue on migration issues, including an annual session at the vice-ministerial level. Their "Plan of Action" calls for cooper ation in exchanging information on migration policy, exploring the links between development and migration, combating migrant trafficking, returning extra -regional migrants. ensuring full respect for the human rights of migrants, reintegrating repatriated migrants within the region, equipping and modernizing immigration control systems, and train ing officials in migration policy and pro cedures. An early and continuing issue on the agenda is averting movements of extra-regional migrants through Central

How car

I I

I, I

and still re rule of law

America, Mexico. the United States i Third, in East a regional migratior es are ongoing. "Manila Process," International Or; tion (lOM) and migration and tr Southeast Asia. Si has brought togetl for the regular ex( The second Asi Asia - Pacific Cor co-sponsored by provides for con: ernments in Asi broad range of is~ lation movements these ongoing di ened by the mil tional Symposiurr Royal Thai Go Bangkok. The sea many migration-J ing the region ha: in light of the ec parts of Asia. Other such pr ing in the souther ica, in southen Mediterranean. ' together the gove: involved in the they origin, trans

Toward a ( Regime. WillI

MARTIN

Politics& Diplomacy

t, and receIVing

discuss areas

HOW can such

migration best be deterred and still remain consistent with respect to the rule of law and the human rights of migrants?

ed Nations con ) address and act Jf refugees, dis returnees in the dependent States g territories. The to prevent emer ·evention was not -ly and effective -ration. The conIncrete programs laugh funding has equests for assis las helped the CIS and implement :ices that improve t. The conference o generated new mental organiza t had little in the

America, Mexico, and the Caribbean to the United States and Canada. Third, in East and Southeast Asia, two regional migration consultation process es are ongoing. One, known as the "Manila Process," is coordinated by the International Organization for Migra tion (lOM) and focuses on irregular migration and trafficking in East and Southeast Asia. Since 1996, each year it has brought together seventeen countries for the regular exchange of information. The second Asian regional process, Asia - Pacific Consultations (APC) , is co-sponsored by 10M and UNHCR. It provides for consultations among gov ernments in Asia and Oceania on a broad range of issues concerning popu lation movements in the region. Both of these ongoing dialogues were strength ened by the ministerial-level Interna tional Symposium on Migration that the Royal Thai Government hosted in Bangkok. The search for solutions to the many migration-related problems affect ing the region has increased in relevance in light of the economic crisis affecting parts of Asia. Other such processes are in the mak ing in the southern cone of South Amer ica, in southern Africa, and in the Mediterranean. They intend to bring together the governments of all countries involved in the migration process, be they origin, transit, or receiving.

II Migration Con

as the "Puebla together all the ld North America tive dialogue on uding an annual ninisterial level. calls for cooper information on ~loring the links and migration, ficking, returning ts, ensuring full 'ights of migrants, d migrants within and modernizing stems, and train n policy and procontinuing issue ng movements of : through Central

Toward a Global Migration Regime. Will these regional processes

lead to a global migration regime? It is too early to know. Three issues need to be addressed if a global regime is to emerge. First, there must be increased agree ment among states on the benefits accru ing from harmonization of policies. There are signs, in fact, of growing con vergence among regional groups in set ting an agenda for such harmonization, but much more discussion and debate is needed. As discussed above, many of the issues on regional agendas relate to unauthorized migration: How can such migration best be deterred and remain consistent with respect to the rule of law and the human rights of migrants? Although source and destination coun tries may disagree still as to the causes of these movements, there is growing agree ment on some approaches, for example, that curbing alien smuggling and traf ficking-a global enterprise that nets an estimated $7-10 billion per year requires international cooperation. Other issues arise in addressing forced migration. For example, how should states best protect persons fleeing repres sion and conflict? When conflicts end and migrants no longer require protec tion, when and in what manner should they be required to return? The growing use of temporary protection, as witnessed in response to the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, has led the European Union member states to place harmonization of temporary protection policies and mech anisms for burden sharing high on its agenda. At the same time, the Puebla

Summer/Fall '2000

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T O W A R OA G L O B A L M I G R A T I O NR E G I M E

Process, in the aftermath of Huricane Mitch, has been a forum for discussing temporary protection of the victims of natural disasters. More recently, certain legal admissions issues have found their way onto regional agendas. When and to whom should visa restrictions apply? Under what circumstances should family reunification be guaranteed? Who should be eligible for work and residence permits? What rights should accrue to those legally admitted for work or family purposes? Answers to these questions will take tirne since attitudes and policies toward legal immigration statesstill differ significantly from state to state. Signs ofchange can be seen even here, though. The European LJnion has led the way since its inception with free rnovement of labor for its own nationals. The Amsterdam teaty takes the EU to the next step, mandating the establishment of a common immigration policy for participating states. In Africa, protocols on free movements of persons are under discussion in the context of the Cornmon Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Developrnent Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). APEC is reviewing proposals for multiple-entry visas,visa waiver arrang'ements, travel passes, harrnonization of entry conditions, and inforrnation sharing and systemstraining for border rnanagement agenciesof member countries. Aglobal migration regime will require global standards, policies, and new international legal frameworks. Such a legal framework already exists in reference to refugee rnovements, with most countries now signatories to the Ig$r UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or

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of International

Affairs

its r967 Protocol. There are also international agreements on the rights of migrant workers, but very few statesratified the most recent UN convention related to this. There is no body of interlaw or policy governing national responses to other forms of international migration. With growing economic integration, however, international trade agreements may become vehicles for the formulation of such policies. The current round of negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Serwices,for exarnple, is likely to result in new migration agreements under the rubric of the "movement of natural persons." Another issue to address in forming a global migration regime pertains to organizational responsibilities. At the heart of the refugee regime is the UN High Cornmissioner for Refugees,whose mandate datesback to r95o. No comparable institution has the mandate for other migration matters. The International Organization for Migration comes the closest, as an intergovernmental body asked by states to assume a broad set of responsibilities related to the management of rnigration flows. In particular, it serves as the secretariat for a nurnber of the regional processes discussing international migration. Although IOM cooperates with UN agencies, it is not a part of the UN system, and it represents far fewer states. For it to be the focal point of a new migration regirne, the organization would need substantially more resources and government support for taking on new roles.

A MultilateralApproach.rn an increasingly interconnected world, it is unlikely that governments will be able to find solutions to the many questions raised by international migration only

MARTIN

are also interna the rights of ry few states rati UN convention 10 body of inter licy governing s of internation )wing economic ternational trade ~ vehicles for the licies. The cur )ns on the Cen e in Services, for It in new migra .he rubric of the ersons. " 'ess in forming a ne pertains to bilities. At the sime is the UN Refugees, whose 150. No compa le mandate for •. The Interna Jigration comes ernmental body ~ a broad set of

through unilateral approaches. The cooperation of receiving, source, and transit countries of immigration is essential to ensuring effective manage ment of international migration. Finding agreement will be relatively straightforward when countries share similar interests and problems. In many cases, though, interests will diverge, with source countries pressing for easi-

Politics& Diplomacy

er access to the labor markets of wealth ier countries, while the likely receivers of migrants face public concerns about seemingly uncontrolled movements into their territories. These issues will not go away, however. Sheer necessity is likely to move governments toward embracing a global migration regime to ensure that cooperation in managing migration is forthcoming.

NOTES International Organization for Migration. World Migration Report: 2000, Geneva: UN Publications. forthcoming. 2. Philip L. Martin. Trade and Migration: NAFTA and Agriculture, Washington. D.C.: Institute for I nternational Economics. 1993. 3. U.S. Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development. Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Develop ment Response, Washington. D.C,: Government Printing Office. 1990. 4. Wayne A. Cornelius and Philip L Martin. The 1.

Uncertain Connection: Free Trade and Mexico-U.S . Migration. San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies. University of California. San Diego. 1993 5. UN Population Division (1999). Population Age ing 1999. United N"ations publication. (ST/ESNSER.NJ 79) 6. UN Secretary-General. International Migration and Development. including the convening of a United Nations Conference on International Migra tion and Development. N52/314. September 18. 1997·

the manage In particular, it )r a number of iscussing inter lthough 10M cies, it is not a ld it represents be the focal m regime, the d substantially nment support

roach.

In an ed world, it is will be able to lany questions !1igration only

Summer/Fall 2000

[127]

Books

GoingBeyond theABC's

Michael O'Hanlon's answers appear to be: sort of and not much. This is a refreshing voice of sanity on Reuieu b7Kenneth Allard a topic marked by more than the usual amount of overstaternent, sophistry, Mrcrrerr O'HeNr-oN. Technological Change and sheer fantasy. Predictably, some of and the Future of Warfare. Washington' the worst examples of the genre have Brookings Institution Press, 2Ooo, 2Io corne from the Pentagon. O'Hanlon quotes some of the more orotund of PP.$42.95. 'Joint these pronouncements from For most of the last decade, national Vision 20Io, " a futurist publication security practitioners and scholars alike issued by no less a personage than the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff. It have focused their attention on the revstates that instead of relying on tradiolution in military affairs (RUa;. 1h" RMA represents the marriage of warfare tional means of employing military forces, "information superiority and and advanced technology-especially advances in technology will enable us to information technology-foreshadowed achieve desired effects through the taiby the demonstrations of stealth aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and lored application ofloint combat powother information-based w e a p o n r y er." In contrast to such overheated rhetoric, O'Hanlon is coolly on the during the GuIf War. Two principal mark in pointing out that, given the questions frame current thinking on these matters: Are we in the midst of a usual pace of weapons procurement, these developments are unlikely to true revolution in the American way of occur before 2orO. war. and if so. what do we do about it?

OfRMA

Summer/Fallzooo Irz9J

A L L A RD

He is equally precise in summarizing don't kill things on their own, "They are t h e c o n t e n d i n g s c h o o l s o f t h o u g h t positioned in large part in an interrneamong RMA advocates, who generally diate location in the military technology accept the premise that technology is food chain." Sirnilarly, one of the rnost revolutionizing warfare, but differ on irnportant issues to understand about w h e t h e r n e t w o r k s . s e n s o r s ,o r a i r p o w e r the RMA is that it is limited by widely represent the wave of the future. A convarying rates of change arnong different trarian view stressesthe parallel vulneraclasses of weapons. Advances in b i l i t i e s o f U . S . f o r c e s s h o u l d o t h e r microchip technology are not likely to be countries adopt these same technologies rnatched by corresponding irnproveand apply thern in innovative ways. But ments in propulsion systerns and the there is no question that these readings overall design of ships, aircraft, tanks, of the future carry price tags, because and rnissiles. advocacy is the first step in the creation If there is aweakness in the book, it is and funding of defense strategy. In one that O'Hanlon, for all his other attainof his most trenchant passages,O'Hanments, is not a rnilitary insider. His is lon notes that the post-war American the world of think tanks and defense rnilitary has institutionalized change by policy literature, to which he has made a maintaining a "balanced approach to number of distinguished contributions. modernization that has served the That experience, however, carries with

ThiS iS a refreshiflg voiceof sanityon a

topic marked by more than the usual arnount ofoverstatement, sophistry, and sheer fantasy. country rernarkably well for decades. It is not clear that we need to accelerate the pace of modernization now." He backs up that caseby presenting an overview of the key technologies driving the RMA and an assessment of their effects on future air, land, and sea combat. Discussions of stealth aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, non-lethal weapons, missile defenses, and weapons of rnass destruction are mercifully free frorn most military and scientific jargon. Presumably aided by his training in the physical sciences, O'Hanlon is able to corne up with some valuable insights, beginning with the cornmon-sense observation that, for all of the advances in information technology, computers

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it certain limitations that occasionally surface in the book. Even the best new sensors are unlikely to allow snipers to be "detected and counterattacked after their first shot." Despite the author's cautious enthusiasm, arsenal ships and transoceanic blimps are sirnilarly u n l i k e l y t o m a k e t h e i r a p p e a r a n c ea n y tirne soon. And he rnisses entirely the proverbial resistance of the Ar-y Signal Corps to any technology, especially comrnercial technology, that would improve communications but potentially reduce the size and influence of that establishrnent. O'Hanlon also does not consider in any depth the human and organizational dirnensions of the RMA. despite not-

8001<5 wn: "They are n an interme tary technology ne of the most erstand about ited by widely ong different Advances in not likely to be ing improve stems and the aircraft, tanks, the book, it is is other attain insider. His is s and defense Ih he has made a contributions. er, carries with

yon a lffiount fantasy.

lat occasionally ~n the best new llow snipers to ~rattacked after :e the author's ;enal ships and are similarly Jpearance any ;es entirely the ne Army Signal Jgy, especially r, that would 1S but poten d influence of

Lot consider in

l organization

'\, despite not

ing that "military revolutions are the purposeful actions of people. They are created by a combination of technolog ical breakthroughs, institutional adap tation, and warfighting innovation"-in other words, by perspiration, inspira tion, desperation, and blood. Far more than any technological factor, the potential for an American RMA is lim ited principally by the very military and political institutions O'Hanlon men tions only in passing. And if experience did not suggest the importance of that perspective to 0 'Hanlon, then there is abundant literature in the policy and behavioral fields suggesting how diffi cult it is for traditional organizations to transform themselves in the face of rev olutionary technologies. It is thus hard to evaluate the wisdom of O'Hanlon' s go-slow approach to the RMA, because it is largely expressed in the language of the budget debate. Echoing the opinions of many on Capi tol Hill and elsewhere, he is dubious about the wisdom of procuring four separate aircraft lines over the next ten years. And he is surely correct in argu ing for more research and development funding, as well as paying attention to the chronically under-funded areas of interoperability, electronic defenses, and sealift. But it is less certain that his prescriptions for saving procurement dollars through a "hi-low mix" of com bat capabilities are workable. The fact is that the high- and low-tech military equipment purchased during the Rea gan administration is quickly wearing out and must be either refurbished or replaced, beginning with the next sever al budget cycles. Because the military has been chronically under-sized and over-deployed throughout the Clinton years, the real choices are likely to

involve distinctly evolutionary "fixes" in personnel, training, and readiness accounts-rather than the revolutionary changes of futuristic systems that are as expensive as they are exotic. Michael O'Hanlon's Technological Change and the Future ofWarfare will certainly be read by policymakers faced with those diffi cult choices. Others interested in its themes of technological change and the future of war will consult the book as well, both for reference and for its suc cinct discussion of technologies and their applications. It is a useful addition to our understanding of the enduring, but constantly changing relationship between technology and defense. Kenneth Allard is a milital'y analyst for NBC News and Adjunct Professor in the National Security Studies Pm gram, Georgetown University.

The Rise of Development

Law Review

qy Andres Riga

RUMU SARKAR. Development Law and Interna tional Finance. Hague: Kluwer Law Inter

national, 1999, 254 pp. $3 0 . 00 . For the first time in the history, there has been a leveling of the playing field to the point where any commodity, service, or product may be obtained from anywhere by anyone. As a result, developing nations can now assume a proactive role in determining their own path of devel opment. In Development Law and International Finance, Rumu SarkaI' suggests how this process of development should proceed in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union, growing interdependence, and recurrent financial crises.

Summer/Fall 2000

[13

yon a lffiount fantasy.

Lot consider in

l organization

'\, despite not

The Rise of Development

Law Review

qy Andres Riga

RUMU SARKAR. Development Law and Interna tional Finance. Hague: Kluwer Law Inter

Summer/Fall 2000

[13

RIGO

Sarl<ar proposes

a fresh approach to development that is more responsive to global needs . . . .

In the globalized economy, the realms of ethics, morality, justice, and religion fall behind as Western economic, politi cal, and legal ideals become more dom inant. According to Sarkar, "the struggle between the developed and the develop ing worlds is not only one of economic accumulation but is also a struggle of ideas around which societies are orga nized." She posits that this struggle can be resolved through the application of development law. Sarkar proposes a fresh approach to development that is more responsive to global needs, especially in the matura tion, coordination, and integration of legal systems. This approach consists of a rapprochement between the opposing principles of Western universalism and non-Western cultural relativism. Legal reform programs, she argues, should not be imposed on a country as if that country has no legal tradition. Indeed, it is necessary to assess how legal reform measures will affect other areas of the law and then look at the purpose of enacting the legal reforms. Western legal norms may not be "good, viable, or even inevitable choices for all other non-Western societies." At the same time, SarkaI' notes, preserving "indige nous norms" may have adverse conse quences for developing nations that are too costly to bear. The book argues that individuals have the right to become stakeholders in the development process. For this reason,

[J 3 2]

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

states must permit the general public to have access to, and equitable participa tion in, the development process through hearings, access to information, and a mechanism for addressing griev ances. According to SarkaI', all actors in the development process, including donor nations, international lending institutions, and developing countries themselves, must adhere to the principles of mutuality and equitable participation. Development law is thus seen as an equal izing force among the various actors. Sarkar identifies a lack of any "mech anism for addressing capital transfer issues" arising from World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending. She proposes the establishment of an independent body, the Capital Transfer Appellate Board (CTAB), to adjudicate disputes between the two organizations and their members. By allowing member states to appeal deci sions of the executive boards of these institutions, the CTAB would ensure the accessibility, transparency, and account ability of World Bank and IMF lending practices. As is the case with the World Trade Organization (WTO), private claimants could lobby their respective governments to seek appellate review. The CTAB would have enforcement powers sufficient to declare null and void provisions that placed conditions on financing provided by the World Bank and the IMF. The proposed grounds for appeal are: failure by the

World Bank ar policies, cond member's law~ ments, and ch The book issues related 1 including inte tension bet~ nationalizatiOI markets. Sarka sion of whethe development. unconvinced ( right. In addi proponents O' clarify the rigl ment, which h, eral confusior theless, Sarka represents an i tinuing evoluti The primal and International omitted. Even state of flux, concept of del tion during th appropriate. E prisingly left Non-governrr (NGOs) recei" parties in de their substant: important 1'0 process. The contains an ex privatization countries, bUI chapter on 1'1 fuller discussi, principles of d warranted, pa proposed are 1 discipline. Fin ate among stat

Books World Bank and IMF to follow their own policies, conditionality contrary to the member's laws and international agreements, and change of circumstances. The book also addresses a host of issues related to structural legal reform, including international borrowing, the and tension between privatization nationalization, and emerging capital markets. Sarkar concludes with a discussion of whether there is a human right to development. She remains critical and unconvinced of the existence of such a right. In addition, she argrres that the proponents of this idea have failed to clarify the right's content and enforcement, which have only added to the general confusion surrounding it. Nevertheless, Sarkar believes that this idea representsan important step in the continuing evolution of developrnent law. The primary flaw of Deuelopment Law and InternationalFinanceis what has been omitted. Even though this subject is in a state of flux, a full discussion of the concept of development and its evolution during the last fifty years would be appropriate. Environmental law is surprisingly left out of the discussion. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) receive scant attention as active parties in development law, despite their substantial contributions to and important role in the development process. The chapter on privatization contains an extensive discussion of the privatization experience in several countries, but this is lacking in the chapter on rule-of-law programs. A fuller discussion of the constitutional principles of development law would be warranted, particularly because those proposed are not exclusive to this legal discipline. Finally, the duty to cooperate among states goes beyond develop-

ment law, as do the principles of transparency, openness, and accountability. Sarkar also fails to note that structural changes taking place in developing countries have not necessarily been imposed by the W-est.Furthermore, these changes are taking place in developed nations and are not limited to privatization and the creation of capital markets. The discussion on globalization and the dangers of a "unicultural" world fails to recognize that a large nurnber of cultures and countries have had similar legal systems for generations. Furthermore, the transmission of laws from one country to another has taken place throughout history in a more significant way than recognized by the author, and this transmission has not alwaysbeen the result of conquest. The proposed rnechanism to appeal decisions of the executive boards of the Bretton Woods institutions is certainly daring and innovative, but it is reasonable to doubt its practicality. Even assuming that the World Bank and the IMF would agree to the establishment of the CTAB, the grounds for appeal are rather limited, and they do not seem to respond to the concerns expressed about these institutions in the book. While failures of the World Bank to apply its policies prompted the establishrnent of the inspection panel, the boards of these institutions are not known for violating the policies that they themselves establish and may change. The purpose of the CTAB, according to Sarkar, would be "to provide a concrete institutional framework in which to discuss capital transfer practices and policies, reach an international consensus thereon, and create a problem-driven body of substantive law flowing therefrom." This is currently

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the role of the World Bank and IMF boards, and it should not be that of an adjudicatory body consisting of only five board members. Overall, however, the book provides a balanced discussion of development law issues and their philosophical and contexts. The political proposed approach to development, the substantive principles of development law, and the CTAB are all thought-provoking and interesting contributions to the field of developrnent. Andr6s Rigo World Bank.

is former Deputy General Counsel of the

Lesson, Yesterday's

Tomorrowts Game Reuiew b-yS. Rob Sobhani

Klnr E. Mnvrn & SnenrnNBr-.lrnBnysac. Tournament ofShodour,TheCreatGameandthe RaceforEmpirein Centrol,Asia.Washingon, D.C.' Counterpoint, rg9g, 688 pp.

$3S.oo. Why would Western oil companies pay the government of Azerbaijan $roo million for the right to drill a hole in the bed of the Caspian Sea? Becausethe standard of living to which we are accustomed depends directly upon the price of oil at the purnp, and the Caspian Sea regionwhile not the Persian Gulf-has enormous untapped reservesof oil and gas. Competition among the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, and other powers for control of the Caspian's oil and gas deposits has been dubbed the "new Great Game." Hence the delightful work by Karl E.

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of International Affairs

Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, in which they describe at the outset the prernise of this voluminous and wellresearchedbook' [The Great Game] threatens to happen all over again. Pipelines, tanker routes, petroleum consortiurns, and contracts are the prizes of the new Great Game, India and China, each with exponentially growing energy needs, are rying for access, along with Russians, Europearu, and Americans. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have their own political, econornic, and cultural interests in the former Soviet Reoublics. where slumbering rivalries hate abruptly awakened among Azeris, Armenians, Thjiks, UzbeLs, TurLmens, and other long-subject peoples. "

In short, history is about to repeat itself. The book takes its tiie, Tournament of Shodou.,s, from a phrase coined by the Czar's Foreign Minister, Count K.V. Nesselrode, which described the contest for control of the Eurasian heartland. The object of the book is to explain how and why this struggle for mastery of Central Asia began. This historical struggle has enormous implications for the contemporary United States; "old whereas the Great Game" pitted Russia against the British Empire, the "new Great Game" involves the United Statesas well. Meyer and Brysac argue that there was no one reason the Great Game started, but a "mixture of impulses" such as pride, claims of national interest, the quest for profit, missionary zeal, ambitious soldiers, and explorers in search of new territories to conquer. However, two phrases frequently used in international affairs come to mind as primary reasons for why the Russian and British empires locked horns over such remote locations as Lhasa or Kashgar: geopolitics and the security dilemma.

SOBHANI

is former Deputy General Counsel of the

Lesson, Yesterday's

Tomorrowts Game Reuiew b-yS. Rob Sobhani

Klnr E. Mnvrn & SnenrnNBr-.lrnBnysac. Tournament ofShodour,TheCreatGameandthe RaceforEmpirein Centrol,Asia.Washingon, D.C.' Counterpoint, rg9g, 688 pp.

It g+]

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of International Affairs

Books India, with its enorrnous natural resources, was the crown jewel of the British Empire. Controlling accessto these riches became Britain's number one priority. Meanwhile, Czarist Russia woke up from its winter of discontentat the hands of Mongols who had for centuries turned Muscovy into their vassalstate-and expanded eastward and southward in successivewavesstarting in the rg8os. According to Meyer and Brysac, these waveswere so powerful that over the course of 4oo years the duchy of Moscory grew fifty-five square miles per day as it transformed into the rnighty Russian Ernpire. The British viewed this expansion with suspicion and were convinced that St. Petersburg's ultimate ambition was the domination of the whole of Asia-a goal it was to achieve one countrl at a time. George Nathaniel Curzon, the Viceroy of India wrote: "If Russia is entitled to these ambitions still more is Britain entitled, nay compelled to defend that which she has won, and to resist the minor encroachments which are only part of a larger plan." In short, every Russian advance toward India, whether through annexation (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) or conquest (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan), created a security dilemma for London. Curzon, for example, was convinced that the goal ofSt. Petersburg was the Persian Gulf, and he saw to it that Iran remain within the sphere of British influence, thus blocking Russian accessto India via the Persian Gulf. Another victim of this security dilemma was Tibet. The British invasion of Tibet took place between I9o3-I9o4. When admirers of this ancient and mysterious land accused the British of "unprovoked aggressionby a great power against a weak and small country," the

Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, shot back, "As the guardian of India, I cannot afford to see Russian influence paramount in Lhasa, and I have intervened to prevent it." Clearly, the British viewed any foreign meddling in and around Tibet as a direct threat to their prized possession,India. The bloody transition from Czarist Russia to Soviet Communism did not end this security dilemma. In fact, as the authors point out, ". . . the most fateful convert to this [Czarist] imperial ethos was Joseph Stalin." In an attempt to redress the setbacks that followed the Crimean War of 1877-78, Stalin set his sights on Turkey and the Dardanelles. And here, the authors make a remarkable discovery, courtesy of Israeli scholar Gabriel Gorodetsky' Stalin's handwritten notes with the Russian words for Great Game-Bol'shaia lgrc-scrawled by the General Secretary of the Comrnunist Party of the USSR. This discovery illustrates that Stalin the dictator was also a strategic thinker, on par with his contemporary, Winston Churchill. It is very clear that the Soviet leader understood the importance of geopolitics and was thinking about a "grand design," albeit for the sake of expanding the boundaries of Soviet Communism. A delightful feature of Tournamentof is the role Meyer and Brysac give Shad.ows to those who played the Great Game. These actors were central to how the Russo-British struggle for territory in Central Asia played out. They point out that "the players in the Great Game were men of action, not reflection . . . driven by both ambition and belief in the rightness of their cause." In other words, for the actors in this great historic drama, the Great Game was, in fact, not a 'rgame." It was a competition among

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refer to Hedin as the "spiritual godfather" of the SS expedition to Tibet, which was led by Heinrich Himrnler's protdg6, Ernst Schafer, in rglg. Beyond the story of the how and why of is o/SAodoios the Great Garne, Tournament also a wake-up call for the United States. Meyer and Brysac argrre that there are limits to the Great Game, such as Britain's earlier and Russia'slater failures in Afghanistan. The occupation of Kab* ul by the Soviet At*y did not give the Kremlin mastery over Iran, Pakistan, or the Persian Gulf. Nehru's rnegalomaniac design to carve out more territory for his beloved India from China ended in disaster. And the British Ernpire eventually collapsed under the weight of its own imperial holdings. The United States must enter the old battlegrounds of the Great Game with caution. For the British and Russian Ernpires, these territories were easy to swallow, but hard to digest. Scandinavian entry in the irnperial drama. " As the greatest Central Asian Thus the key policy question for Washexplorer of his time, Hedin's maps drew ington is how to interact with a region the interest of not only the Russians and that is rich in natural resources, yet has the British, but also the Germans. St. the potential to extract an enorrnous Petersburg, London, and Berlin saw amount of human and rnaterial sacrifice. Tibet as the cork in the bottle of northwest India, and as such, a geopolitical is Adjunct Professor of Government S. Rob Sobhani at Georgetown University. prize to be won. Indeed, the authors

strong-willed individuals which ended more often than not in death, destruction, and, on a few occasions, historic a r c h e o l o g i c a ld i s c o v e r i e s . Thke the example of Russian archaeologist Colonel Pyotr Kuzrnich Kozlov (1863-1935). While he had his eyesfixed on Tibet, the Russians made it clear to him before setting off on his expedition in 1899 that' "The developrnent of our relations with Tibet is a matter of immense importance . . . In that citadel of Central Asia the name of Russia rnust be upheld . . . ." This comment is significant because while Kozlov's motive was to explore the wonders of Tibet, his rnasters in St. Petersburg viewed his expedition in the context of their rivalry with the British Empire. Another explorer with his sights on Tibet was Sven Hedin (1865-1952), referred to by the authors as the "lone

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IslandParadiseLost Krishna Ravindran If any place on earth could be described as the Garden of Eden, Sri Lanka would have a valid clairn to the title. Each planted tree stems to flower, every sandy white beach calls irresistibly, and the entire landscape radiates a shimmering tranquility. In the thirteenth century, Marco Polo wrote about his travels in what he called "Zeilan." In the twentieth century, story has it that Aldous Huxley wrote the utopian novel Is/ondafter a visit to what was then the British colony of Ceylon. This was the paradise in which my parents and my grandparents before them lived and loved. This was the island in which my Tamil ancestors coexisted peacefully with t h e S i n g h a l e s ef o r g e n e r a t i o n s . From a paradise under the palrns to one of the world's hellholes-what went wrong? The story of Sri Lanka's first fifty-two years is both complex and depressing in a unique way. The downward spiral began with the elections of 1956, when the Oxford-educated S.W.R.D. Bandaranayake proclaimed that if his Sri Lanla Freedom Party won, he would rnake Singhalese the official language. The objective was to exclude Thmils from the coveted governrnent jobs for which they had been favored under British rule. He won by a landslide. This policy was successfulfor hirn becauseit gratified the Singhalesepopulation, a substantial majority in Sri l-anka. Over the next three decades, Singhalese politicians indulged in an orgy of chauvinism at the expense of the tmils. They devised the notion that there was

Krishna Ravindran is a senior in the McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, He was born and raised in Sri Lanka.

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RAVINDRAN

not enough roorn in Sri Lanka for both the Thmils and Singhalese; and that there were not enough jobs, university seats,or pieces of land to go around. The Tamils became second-class citizens, and the Singhalese mainstream rejected their call for federal a with government autonornous powers for the Tarnil-dorninated north. This gave rise to dernands for a Tarnil nation by a range of separatist groups, the rnost powerful of which was Velupillai Prabhakaran's Tigers (the tiger being a symbol of ferocity, a direct c o u n t e r t o t h e S i n g h a l e s el i o n ) . E v e n t u ally, the Tigers ruthlessly wiped out or

down the homes and shops owned by Thrnils. My first mernory of the struggle is one of the most vivid of rny childhood. As a five-year-old, I rernernber going into rny grandmother's house one Sunday morning, as I usually did. The cernent house, which was painted white was noticeably darkened. There was a large crowd of excited people entering and exiting the living room, and I rernernber being rushed into the kitchen. I knew that there had been an attack on rny grandrnother's house that had causeda fire, but at that age I did not realize that this fire was the result of the riots of r983-the

Over thg next threed.ecad.es, $igghalese

politicians induJged in an orgy of chluvinisrn at the expense of tht Thrnils. marginalized all competing representatives of the Tamil voice in Sri Lanka. As a youth, Prabhakaran was swept up in the growing militancy in the northern peninsula of Jaffna, which is predominantly Thmil. At the age of sixteen, he dropped out ofschool and helped launch a rnilitant group called the Thmil New Tigers, which in rg16 was renamed the Liberation Tigers of Thmil Eelarn (LfTE). The LTTE survived by robbing banls. Whenever the police closed in on Prabhakaran and his rnen, theywould flee to the Indian state of Thmil Nadu, srnuggled across the border with the help of friends. In r9B3, the Tigers arnbushed and slaughtered thirteen soldiers near Jaffna. Prabhakaran and his cohorts fled to Thmil Nadu once again, but hundreds of Thmils left behind were rnassacredin retaliation. Singhalese rampaged through Colombo, selectivelylooting and burning

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beginning of the civil war that would change rny country. My grandrnother's Thrnil household was the target of Singhalese wrath, along with the homes of hundreds of other innocent Thmil civilians. Although the riots were getting out of hand, the government did not crack down on the rioters for an extended period of time, an oversight that greatly angered Thmils acrossthe nation. The civil war escalated over the next fewyears in the north and the east. With talks between the government and the LTTE grinding into a prolonged stalemate, President Junius Richard Jayewardene gradually built up the Sri Lankan arrny and, in 1987, set out to quash the Tigers. India, concerned about the political backlash in Tarnil Nadu, its Thrnil-dominated state, interceded. PresidentJayewardene signed an accord with Indian Prirne Minrster Rajiv Gand-

ViewfromtheGround resulting in the deployment of 7O,ooO troops in an effort to put the Tigers out of business once and for all. This was a colossal miscalculation on two accounts, and Sri Lanka is still trying to recover as a result. For decades, the People of the Lion (all Sri Lankans) had been lectured on the perils of an Indian takeover. The landing of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) appeared to be a Singhalese nightmare corne true. Not only did this lead to the insurrection of a Singhalese group called the People'sLiberation Front, which incited further riots and violence, but rnore importantiy, it prompted cornplaints of the looting and rape of Thrnils by the IPKF. This increased Thmil animosity toward the government, while bolstering their support for the LTTE. Eventually, the IPKF was sent back home to India, having failed to su\ugate the LTTE. The whole incident not only was an embanassrnent for the governrnent, but also proved to be valuable fuel for the LTTE propaganda rnachine. The key problern the government faced in eliminating the Tigers was that the Tigers were no longer a guerrilla group known more for their martyrdom than for their fighting prowess. The once ragtag Tigers became a deadly fighting force. Furthermore, supporting the 7,ooo guerrillas fighting in the north and northeast corners of Sri Lanka was a global intelligence and financial network. Using an array of front cornpanies, the LTTE extended its web frorn Singapore and Australia to Europe and North America. In addition, wealthy Sri Lankan Thmils residing abroad added valuable investrnents to the LTTE's coffers. Even though I am Thmil, my life in the capital, Colombo, located in the southwest, was nothing like the lives of the hi,

Thmils to the north and east. ALl the Singhalese whom I knew were my friends-there were no landmines of which to beware and no gunfire at night. In fact, Colombo's nightlife was quite "happening." Most of the news about the events to the north was censored by the government, and the only accurate infor-mation we would hear was from family or friends visiting Colornbo. There would be the occasional bornb in Colornbo that would take several lives or destroy vital infrastructure, but that was all these were-occasional bornbs. The city would mourn for the lives that had been lost, but would then move on. One aspect of my life that did give rne an insight into how the Thmils in the north felt was my elementary- and middle-school education. The elernentary and rniddle schools that I attended separated Tamil and Singhalese children from the first grade. Thus, for eight years of my life, I learned science, history, geography, and all of the other subjects in Tarnil, while the Singhalese children were instructed in Singhalese. Despite this separation, there were relatively few problems between the students in my classand my Singhalese counterparts; at most I can rernember a few cases of Thmil-Singahalese altercations, but they were not systernic. We were cornpetitive, but we had no animosity toward each other. Having said that, however, what this separation did instill in us was the awareness that we were trnil and theywere Singhalese-we were different frorn them. I could easily imagine how this perceived difference could lead to heightened competition or even hostility in the future. In the fall of 1993, I entered high school, which proved to be an altogether different experience. At the Colornbo

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The CriCketlelC i"sprobably theonlyplace

where the ceasefireholds. International School, all classeswere taught in English, the classeswere co-ed, and the teachers were primarily from England. While I had to adjust my lifestyle a certain arnount in order to accommodate the change in the rnediurn of instruction and the inclusion of girls in rny daily life, I realized that there was another change I had to make. By the end of the first month in high school, I realized that most Thmils in my classdid not socialize together. Those who did enjoy the cornpany did not do so because they were Thmil. My three closestfriends from the beginning, and to this very day, were all Singhalese. Ethnic differences did not matter. This led rne to wonder how important something as sirnple as education at an early age can build bridges between two groups. What the country needs in order for the civil war to ceaseare unifiers, things that make you indifferent as to whether the person standing next to you is trnil or Singhalese. One such unifier is cricket. While the civil war rages, a different picture of Sri Lankan aggressionhas captured the world's attention: the nation's sportsrnen pounding all opponents on the cricket field. Sri Lanka's cricketers were not only victorious over the favored Australia in the finals of the 1996 CricketWorld Cup, but they have also gone on to win four more international tournaments and have set six rnajor world records along the way. Cricket fever has transcended the island's ethnic conflict. Though Singhalese players dorninate the

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national team, the country's leading bowler, Muralitharan, is a Thrnil. The cricket field is probably the only place where the ceasefire holds. As long as the Lankan Lions keep winning, cricket seems to have the power to make people lorget that there are more important tasks at hand than swinging a bat at a speeding ball. But while cricket proves to be an excellent diversion, it is clearly not enough to end the war. As far as the fighting is concerned, President most saw Chandrika Kumaratunga's election in 1994 as a new beginning. It is true that her father was the political progenitor of the ethnic problem, and the two terrns of her rnother, Srimavo Bandaranayake, served were painful experiments in socialism. But Kurnaratunga vowed that she would end the civil war, and people believed her. Including me. Six years later, things have not improved. The army has taken control of rnost of the north and the east, but the LTTE is not even close to completing its crusade. Its irnrninent threat was evident with its atternpt on the life of President Kurnaratunga, who coincidentally was the first target that it has rnissed. The economy tumbles along, with rninirnal growthlargely based on tourist dollars, tea, and garment exports-that will never really take off without peace and an end to the bombings that have virtually destroyed the downtown financial district. My own prospects for successwhen I return to Sri Lanka will increase when stability is achieved all over the island.

ViewfromtheGround To me, the end of the war is not in sight. I gravely fear that I will not experience the blissful paradise that my parents and grandparents enjoyed. Yet all is not lost; an end to this war is indeed possible, if difficult. Both sides will have to rnake concessionsfor this peace to be achieved. Both sideswill have to learn to live together as friends and not foes. This requires equal opportunity in land and property ownership, in the workplace, and in the governrnent. This will hopefully lead to

the end of Singhalese oppression of the Thmils, and the end of Thmil agitation of the Singhalese majority. I do believe the necessary tools are in place-a secular, educated, and democratic government with elected leaders who respect democratic institutions, and enough resources in the country for both Tlrnils and Singhalese to share. My country would be much more advanced if the two peoples decided to unite as one entity and work toward rnutual prosperity.

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SouthAsiaGornesJo \flashington Howard B. Schaffer Pr-esidentClinton's recent visit to South Asia, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's planned trip to Washington later this year, and the dramatic dash last year of then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif have underscored the greater attention America has paid to the r-egion following nuclear testing in India and Pakistan. For me, they also recalled the spate ofjourneys that a bevy of South Asian leaders rnade to the United Statesin the early rgBos. During a period of less than two years, betweenJuly r9B2 andJune rg84, no fewer than five heads of governrnent traveled frorn South Asia to the United Statesand elsewherein the country to confer with President Ronald Reagan and other leaders and to rnake a caseto them, the rnedia, and the Arnerican public about the importance of their countries-and themselves-to the well-being of the United States. They included an internationally renowned prime minister (Indira Gandhi of India), a couple of authoritarian generals (Presi-

Howard B. Schaffer is former

Deputy

Assistant

Secretary

of State for Eastern Asian

Near

and South

Affairs.

former

U.S. Anbassador

Bangladesh, and Direc tor of Studies at the Institute

for the Study

of Diplomacy, town

George-

University.

dentZra Ul-Haq of Pakistan and Chief Martial LawAdministrator Hussain Mohamrned Ershad of Bangladesh), a democratically elected chief executive (President Junius Richard Jayewardene of Sri Lanka), and a monalch with real, rather than syrnbolic, power (King Birendra of Nepal). As Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, it was my lot to plan the visits of this odd collection and to ensure that they were imple-

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mented in a way that strengthened U.S. undertaking a similar visit to Moscow, interests and sent the leaders back to whose special relationship with New their homelands at least reasonably Delhi rnay by then have become a little pleased with their experiences. too close for her non-aligned comfort. It is not easyto explain why this minor The fact that Mrs. Gandhi had gotten avalanche of South Asian rulers was along remarkably well with the president allowed to descend on Washington in when they met at an international ecothose early Reagan years. The continunomics conference in Cancun the previing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was ous year was helpful in selling the idea in no doubt key to the invitation of Prime W-ashington, where committed rightMinister Gandhi and General Zia. The wing Reaganites had little love for a newly-elected Reaganites had moved tough lady they suspectedof pro-Comswiftly in rg8r to revive Washington's munist leanings. In any event, an invitalargely defunct security ties with the Pak- tion was soon on its way and a visit was istanis and embolden them to stand fast scheduled forJuly 1982. as a frontline state bordering an expandAs it was inconceivable that the leader ed, and possibly expanding, Soviet of unhelpfully non-aligned India could e r n p i r e . I n d i a h a d g r e e t e d t h e s e come to Washington absent a sirnilar visstrengthened U.S.-Pakistani relations it by the president of the key country in with angry disrnay that easily outstripped the fight against consolidation of Soviet the concern it expressed over the Soviet power in Afghanistan, General Zia of invasion that had brought them about. Pakistan also got an invitation. The High on the list of Indian cornplaints prospect of that statevisit was not greeted was the Arnerican decision to provide with universal rejoicing at the State Pakistan with weapons systemsas sophisDepartrnent. Zia' s authoritarian military ticated as F-r6 aircraft and heary tanks. rule, his hanging of the predecessor he Even Indians troubled by their governhad deposed, and his adoption of Islarnrnent's cornplacence concerning the ic principles of governance and punishment were seen as a source of trouble, presence of Russian troops in Kabul recognized that the Pakistanis were rnuch especially in the public relations aspect of more likely to use these U.S. arms the visit. (In fact, the general was greeted against India than in battle against Soviby unfriendly demonstrators in several ets coming through the Khyber Pass. cities.) His trip was put on the presidenBy the spring of 1982, however, sig- tial calendar for December rgB2, but was nals frorn New Delhi clearly indicated to announced at the sarne time as Prirne us that Prime Minister Gandhi had conMinister Gandhi's.'We did notwant anycluded that there was nothing much her one to think, even briefly, that we were government could do to dissuade the cold-shouldering the Pakistanis or that Reagan administration frorn providing the Zia trip was an afterthought. military assistanceand political backing At the tirne, and in retrospect aswell, to Pakistan. She let it be known that she the Indian and Pakistani sumrnit visits would welcome the opportunity made sense. Mrs. Gandhi's trip moved to repair ties by coming to Washington on the difficult U.S.-Indian bilateral relaan official visit. We were told that she was tionship beyond the problems sparked prepared to make the journey before by their respective reactions to the

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Afghanistan issue. It also provided the occasion for the settlement of a nasty dispute over the provision of U.S. nuclear fuel to Indian reactors that had bedeviled ties for years. The prime minister's uncharacteristic reluctance to criticize U.S. policy in the course of her trip, the effective use she made here of her senior standing on the international stage, and her considerable charrn all smoothed the way for better bilateral relations during her remaining two years in power. Zia's trip, in turn, proved a valuable opportunity for the Reagan administration to consolidate our once again robust security and political relationship with Pakistan, if not also to deal with such underlying problem areas as its nuclear prograrn and its human rights record. The visit was also a fitting occasion for us to honor a leader who for all his faults had been willing to stand up to the Sovietswhile extracting for this a price the adrninistration was quite prepared to pay. Sornewhat like Mrs. Gandhi, the Pakistani president was also able to corne across to Americans as a rnore attractive personality than his reputation had suggested he was. This, too, benefited bilateral ties. But what about the visits by the leaders who trooped to Washington from the smaller South Asian countries, none of which had any plausible clairns to major irnportance to American interests? How did the Nepalese king, the Sri Lankan president, and the chief martial law administrator of Bangladesh manage to wrangle much sought-after trips to Washington frorn the Reagan administration? The origin of King Birendra's visit is a fascinating example of the way a small country's ambassadorcan make a mark in

official Washington if he knows how to play his limited hand. As such, it deserves more detailed treatment than it has received in print before. In 1982, Nepal was represented in Washington by Arnbassador Bhekh Thapa-a small, round-faced, engaging man then in his early forties. Thapa had been educated in the United States, spoke idiomatic Arnerican English fluently, and had worked closely with many U.S. officials as minister of finance before his Washington assignment. Charged by his governrnent with arranging a royal visit, he made that his top priority. Ambassador Thapa first When expressed to me his interest in a visit, I told him I could not support him. I was then seeking State Department and White House approval for the Indian and Pakistani visits. Only when these were nailed down could I offer any help. Even then, I said, the odds would be strongly against an invitation. Three South Asian summiteers in a short span of time was probably more traffic than could be beared. Nepalwas, in any event, nowhere near the top of the administration's list of countries with which it wished or needed to strengthen ties. lJndeterred, Ambassador Thapa set to work, and once the Gandhi and Zia trips were scheduled, I, too, did what I could to help move a royal visit forward. My own efforts generally produced little more than amused reproach for what seernedto be excessive"clientitis" on my part. I did succeed in getting the Near East-South Asia bureau to send up a favorable recommendation for the trip to the Executive Secretariat of the State Department. But this, I believe, was becausemy bureau colleagueshad no other suitable candidates. Thapa, meanwhile, was following a different approach. It soon becarne evi-

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The idea Of a king cornin.qto theWhite F{ouse from a remote Himalayin rnonarchy misht well appeal to an adrninistration heailed actor with a taste for bv E one-tirie Hollrr*ood ' tlre romantic. dent to me that he saw Washington as a their tirne with such fantasies. A couple larger, more complicated version of the ofhours later I received another call. It royal court in Kathmandu. Here, as was the Executive Secretariat phoning to there, what had to be done to gain an arrange the first planning meeting for those the king's visit. objective was to befriend "courtiers" who could be helpful. These, The visit eventually took place in late he perceived, could be found in Wash- r9B3 and went off very well. Although the ington mostly at the White House. king failed to get the U.S. military aid Through what would later come to be that he sought, he made a great splash in -Washington called effective networking, Thapa rnanand elsewhere. It was evident aged to develop relations with a nurnber throughout the visit that Arnericans' fasof key players including Reagan conficination with South Asian monarchs, dante Helene Von Darnrn, National particularly young ones who spoke with Security Adviser Williarn Clark, and apparent sincerity about bringing Attorney General Edwin Meese. dernocrary to their countries, extended Much impressed, I fed Thapa ideas that well beyond Hollywood types. The glarnour of the king'sjourneywas I thought he could use in persuading heightened by another Thapa stratagern. these and other senior administration figures to support Birendra's visit. I recall He had shrewdly narned a nurnber of suggesting,for example, that the idea of a rich and prorninent Arnericans to be king coming to the White House from a honorary Nepalese consuls general in rernote Hirnalayan monarchy might well cities Birendra was to visit. Delighted to appeal to an adrninistration headed by a be participating in a royal progress, they one-tirne Hollywood actor with a taste for put on glittering receptions and dinners for the king, at no expense to the the romantic. I was sitting at rny State Department Nepalese exchequer. One of them was Mrs. Murchison, co-owner of the NFL's desk one rnorning when Thapa called to Dallas Cowboys. Fortuitously, the king tell rne the good news. The JArhiteHouse had approved the king's visit and would visited Texas on the weekend the Cowshortly be inforrning the Departrnent. I boys were playing the Washington Redskins, in those years a key NFL rnatchquickly phoned the Executive Secretariat to alert them. I was asked in reply what up. Amid great publicity, he and the strange drinking habits I had picked up llueen sat in the owner's box for the during my extensive South Asian assign- game, which Birendra, who had spent a ments, then rudely told not to waste year as a Harvard undergraduate,

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A LookBack seemed to vaguely understand. Before As Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh the king headed south, Vice President army, Ershad had overthrown the elected government of the country a few George Bush, noting his own ties to both years earlier. The decision to receive Dallas and'Washington, had suggestedin a luncheon toast that he follow Nepal's him for a brief visit in October 1983 that took up relatively little of the longstanding policy of non-alignment administration's time was a way of when attending the gridiron classic. He (The handily.) demonstrating its interest in the poorwon Redskins did so. Although the visits of Jayewardene of est countries of the world and support Sri Lanka and Ershad of Bangladesh also for their econornic developrnent. It was not meant to be an endorsement of owe something to the hustle of their respective ambassadors, they seem to Ershad's rnilitary regirne, though of have found their way onto Reagan's course the general tried to spin it that schedule, rnostly because it was fairly way. He, too, sought Arnerican arrns, open at the time. Jayewardenewas then with no more successthan Birendra and something of a poster-boy among Third Jayewardene, but won some credit from the administration for volunteering to had reinvigorated He World leaders. democracy in Sri Lanka following the cancel scheduled rneetings with officials repressive measures of his predecessor whom he knew had becorne preoccupied and had instituted a free market with the invasion of Grenada and the approach to economic policy that was blowing up of the Marine barracks in Beirut. These distracting, contemporamuch admired in Washington. His proneous events lirnited to the barest minWestern tilt within the bounds of Sri imum the publicity Ershad received in also won hirn Lankan non-alignment the American media. much praise here. lJnfortunately for In sum, the five visits seerned to the he came to Jayewardene, by the time United States some of the sheen had achieve relatively little in terms of concrete agreements and significant policy worn off his government. He had forced through a constitutional amendment to initiatives. They were more rneaningful extend his terrn in office and had badly in the effect they had in shaping the handled the murderous rioting between environment in which policy is forrnuthe country's two major ethnic grouPs lated. This was particularly true in the that had occurred a year before his visit case of the Gandhl and Zia visits. The took place in June r98{. The Tamil visits of the leaders of the smaller couninsurgency that these disturbances had tries were, not surprisingly, Iess conse* helped spark became the major subject quential. Although the Thapa's trip was by far the most glittering of the jourof the exchangesduring the Washington neys, its impact was evanescent. Like a talks, when Jayewardene sought unsucw ell-choreographed pageant, it was adminReagan cessfully to persuade the impressive when it was staged. But it istration to provide him with arms to would be hard to argue that it left much defeat the rebels. behind either in the minds of policyErshad's visit was billed as "officialmakers or in lasting public impressions. him less proinformal." This afforded As I quickly discovered, for those who tocol and fewer bells and whistles than the other South Asian leaders received. plan and execute such visits there is no

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end to the challenges. Some of these are, of course, predictable and routine: the seemingly unending preparation of scope papers, speeches, memoranda, and talking points; decisions about whom the visitors should see,when, and with whorn; and the planning of the itinerary outside of \Mashington following the conclusion of the "official" portion of the trip. But unexpected prob*

Jayewardene also faced problems elsewhere. He told of a childhood fascination with the people he called "Red Indians, " and to his delight, we arranged for him to visit a reservation in New Mexico. There he found hirnself the target of an irnpassioned plea by a tribal chief for support for the tribe's clairn to autonorny frorn the United States. For the leader of a country facing sornething

P're ne alrls( )silldrent Jayewarde o. ented an 'ra Pres 't

,h:a1n1r t . He sawit as a way o'}tg qr rtrty a LepJ eL Rr-eplulblliLCe nfr fo)rtuna tely for :an adrni nlstratlon. U)ra ,ankans, the elephaanrt Si O()o SrTri ILa ( )n die( threlD d, nlgaPub lic relatioNS dir is: saf ster. P ror I mlrP)tiin lems also inevitably crop up. I faced plenty of these. Mrs. Gandhi wished to present a baby elephant to the Honolulu Zoo. We all thought that was a wonderful idea until we learned that the Indians expected the U.S. government to pay for sending the beast and its attendant by air from Madras to Hawaii. (After much wrangling, the honorary Indian Consul General, a wealthy Hawaiian of Indian descent, agreed to pick up the tab.) PresidentJayewardene also presented an elephant, in his case to the National Zoo. He saw it as a way to gratifr a Republican administration. lJnfortunately for the Sri Lankans, the elephant soon died, prornpting a public relations disaster.

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of a sirnilar call at horne, it was a singrrlarly inappropriate demand. Jayewardene's was the final trip in the South Asian cycle. It was also the last state visit by a foreign leader to Washington before President Reagan began his campaign for re-election. The White House dinner Reagan hosted in honor of his Sri Lankan visitor was a particularly glamorous affair. Reagan was at his affable best, and, atJayewardene'srequest, Frank Sinatra had been invited to entertain the guests. He sang aJayewardene favorite, "I Did It My Way." It was an appropriate song to conclude a series of visits that folIowed a fixed forrnat, but were singularly individual in the rnanner in which they were carried out.